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astal Zone formation Center The Global The Technical Volume Two 2000 Report Report to the President HC 79 .E5 G59 1980b V.2 C.2 W" About the Cover The Global 2000 Report to the President presents a pic- ture that can be painted only in broad strokes and with a brush still in need of addi- tional bristles. It is, however, the most complete and con- sistent such picture ever painted by the U.S. Govern- ment. Many rapid and unde- sirable developments are foreseen if public policy con- cerning population stabiliza- tion, resource conservation and environmental protec- tion remain unchanged over the coming decades. Dra- matic changes in public policy are needed around the world. These changes need to be made soon while the picture is yet fluid and nations are still preparing to enter the twenty-first century. The Global 2000 Report to the President Entering the Twenty-First Century A Report Prepared by the Council on Environ- mental Quality and the Department of State Gerald 0. Barney U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NOAA Study Director COASTAL SERVICES CENTER 2234 SOUTH HOBSON AVENUE CHARLESTON SC 29405-2413 Property of CSC Library Preface and Acknowledgments ON MAY 23, 1977, President Carter stated in his Environmental Message to the Congress: Environmental problems do not stop at national boundaries. In the past decade, we and other nations have come to recognize the urgency of international efforts to protect our common environment. As part of this process, I am directing the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State, working in cooperation with the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Science Foundation, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and other appropriate agencies, to make a one-year study of the probable changes in the world's population, natural resources, and environment through the end of the century. This study will serve as the foundation of our longer-term planning. Entering the Twenty-first Century is the interagency report prepared by the Global 2000 Study in response to President Carter's directive. The report comprises three volumes: (1) an interpretive report that summarizes the,findings in nontechnical terms, (2) this technical report, which presents the projections and related analyses in greater detail, and (3) a volume of basic documentation on the models used in this Study. The Study was supervised by an executive group cochaired originally by Charles Warren, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, and Patsy Mink, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. During the course of the study Mr. Warren was succeeded by Mr. Gus Speth, and Mrs. Mink by Mr.Thomas Pickering. The other executive group members and participating agencies are as follows: ALVIN ALM (later C. WILLIAM JOAN DAVENPORT FiscHER) Assistant Secretary for Energy and Min- Assistant Secretary for Policy erals Department of Energy Department of the interior RICHARD C. ATKINSON Director RICHARD A. FRANK National Science Foundation Administrator BARBARA BLUM National Oceanic and Atmospheric Deputy Administrator Administration Environmental Protection Agency Department of Commerce RUPERT CUTLER ROBERT A. FRoscH Assistant Secretary for Natural Re- Administrator sources and Environment National Aeronautics and Space Admin- Department of Agriculture istration v vi JOHN J. GILLIGAN qater DOUGLAS BEN- BARDYL 1U.-TIRANA (later JOHN W. NET) MACY) Administrator Director, Federal Emergency Manage- Agency for International Development ment Agency Department of State STANSFIELD TURNER JAMES LIVERMAN 0aterRUTH CLUSEN) Director Assistant Secretary for Environment Central Intelligence Agency Department of Energy FRANK PRESS Director Office of Science and Technology Policy Executive Office of the President Each executive group member designated a member of his or her staff to be a point of coordination for the Study. The coordinators am as follows: WILLIAM ARON ROGER NAILL Director, Office of Ecology and Envi- Office of Analytical Services ronmental Conservation Department of Energy National Oceanic and Atmospheric ALICE POPKIN qater LEwis HUGHES Administration Associate Administrator for Intema- Department of Commerce tional Activities Environmental Protection Agency CARROLL BASTIAN (later ELINOR C. TERHUNE) C. LEROY QUANCE Division of Policy Research and Analy- Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives sis Service b National Science Foundation Department of Agriculture FRANK RossoMONDO LINDSEY GRANT (later Wm. ALSTON Chief, Enviromnent and Resource Anal- HAYNE) ysis Center Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environ- Central Intelligence Agency ment and Population Affairs PENNY SEVERNS (later JOHN WASIE- Department of State LEWSKI) GORDON LAw Special Assistant to the Administrator Science Advisor to the Secretary Agency for International Development Department of the Interior Department of State GEORGE SHEPHERD (later PETER HOUSE) CLIFFORD MCLEAN Office of The Assistant Secretary for Director, Program Analysis and Evalua- Environment tion Department of Energy Federal Emergency Management Agency LEE M. TALBOT (later KATHERINE B. RICHARD MESERVE GILLMAN) Office of Science and Technology Policy Assistant to the Chairman for interna- Executive Office of the President . tional and Scientific Affairs Council on Environmental Quality JAMES R. MORRISON (later PITT THOME) Executive Office of the President Director,, Resource Observation Divi- sion National Aeronautics and Spare Admin- istration vii Study Plan and Focus President Carter's purpose in requesting this Study was to understand the long-term implications of present policies and programs and to establish a foundation for longer-range planning. Such a foundation cannot be estab- lished by merely publishing official projections. An assessment and a strengthening of the Government's current analytic capabilities is also needed. Accordingly, it was decided early that the Global 2000 Study should exercise and employ the "present foundation" to the fullest extent- possible. As a result the Study has been conducted almost exclusively with Government personnel and Government projection tools. Research and data from outside the Government were used only when needed capabilities and information within the Government were not available. It was alsodecided that methodologies underlying the. Study's projections should be carefully described. Therefore, Chapters 14 through 23 of this technical report contain an analysis--4n relatively nontechnical terms---of every model and analytical tool used to project trends for this Study. Entering the Twenty-First Century builds upon the work of a number of important Government-sponsored organizations that preceded it, including: National Commission on Supplies and Shortages (1975) Advisory Committee on National Growth Policy Processes (1975) National Growth Reports Staff (19172) Commission on Population Growth and the American Future (1972) National Commission on Materials Policy (1970) National Goals Research Staff (1969) Public Land Law Review Commission (1%5) President's Commission on National Goals (1960) Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (IM) President's Materials Policy ("Paley") Commission (1951) National Resources Planning Board (1939) The work of these organizations has contributed significantly to the Government's present foundation of.tools for longer-range planning relating to population, resources, and,,environment, and one of the Study's first priorities was to review and assess * the impact of this earlier work. The results of this historical review are summarized in Appendix A. Perhaps the most striking feature of this review is the very existence of a 70-year record of Government concern with issues relating to population, resources, and environment-4ssues that are often thought of as new.. There are, however, several genuinely new features emerging in the most recent studie's,. interdependence being perhaps the most important. The early studies view population, resources, and environment primarily as unrelated short-term,national (regional, or even local) topics. Only in the most recent studies does the interrelatedness ofthese three to creasingly pics come in into focus. The present Study is the first Government study to address all three topics from a relatively long-term, global perspective. It also attempts to emphasize interconnections and feedback, but in this much remains to be done. Viii The basic plan for the Global 2000 Study was to identify the long-term global models* currently used by Government agencies and to establish a set of uniform assumptions so that these models and tools could be used by the agencies' projection experts as a single, internally consistent system. Since the models and tools used in this Study are the ones now employed by the agencies in their long-term global analyses, they reflect the present foundation for long-term planning. Collectively, therefore, these models and tools can be thought of as the Government's present "global model." The elements of the Government's global model were not, of course, designed to be used together as an integrated whole. The constituent models were developed separately and at different times to serve the various projection needs of individual agencies. As a result, there are certain inconsistencies in the Government's overall global model. These inconsist- encies and the individual constituent models are described and analyzed in Chapters 14 to 23. While some of the inconsistencies were eliminated during the Study, difficulties were encountered in linking the agencies' models together and in synthesizing the projections into a coherent whole. A group of outside experts (listed in the acknowledgments) met with the agency experts and the Study staff to assist in synthesizing the projections. This group had many criticisms. Some of the problems noted were corrected; others could not be. Excerpts from the criticisms are included in. Appendix B. In spite of remaining weaknesses, the projections reported in Chapters I through 13 present, an important and useful picture of the future. Assuming continued technological progress (but no departures from present public policy), the picture that emerges is one of only modest-if any-global increase in human welfare. In fact, there is real risk that population growth and environmental degradation may lead to a significant decrease in welfare in parts of the world by 2000. (See appendix C for examples of this phenomenon already being observed.) Furthermore unless present efforts to meet human expectations and basic human needs are m6dified between now and 2000, they may undermine biological capabilities to meet basic needs.early in the 21st century. Finally, Chapter 31 suggests that the projections behind this picture would be still more sobering if it had been possible to correct the remaining inconsistencies in the analysis and to supply the missing linkages. The projections were developed assuming no change in public policy.t Clearly policy changes will be made, and these changes will have important * The agencies guided the selection of these models and tools.Emphasis was plated on models that are (1) long-term, (2) global, and (3) used. t Exceptions to this rule wer made in the population projections and the projections of energy impacts on the environment. The population projections assumed that countries that do not already do so will make family planning services available to an appreciable portion of their populations during the 1975--2000 period, and that countries with family planning programs now in operation will extend coverage, particularly in rural areas. The projections of energy impacts on the environment assume that all countries will have implemented U.S. new-source emission-standards by 1985 at all energy-conversion facilities. ix PROJECTION ANALYSIS SECTOR CHAPTER CHAPTER Population 2 15 Gross National Product 3 16 Cliniate 4 17 Technology 5 23 Food 6 18 Fisheries 7 19 Forestry 8 19 Water 9 19 Energy 10 20 Fuel Minerals 11 21 Nonfuel Minerals 12 22 Enviromnent 13 19 effects on long-term trends. Equally clearly, improved tools are needed to analyze and evaluate alternative policies if optimal choices to be made. Since only one policy option-no policy change-was analyzed, the Study is not an adequate basis for detailed policy recommendations. Consequently, no detailed policy recommendations are made, but the chapters presenting the projections and those presenting the analysis of the projection tools (see the following table) unavoidably imply ways in which both the projections and the future might be improved. The Study plan also called for the examination of alternative methodolo- gies for projecting longer-term global trends on an integrated basis. Since the early 1970s, when the Club of Rome sponsored the first global model to examine longer-term trends involving population, resources and the environ- ment, there have been several private-sector'attempts to develop internally consistent global models from a variety of differing perspectives. At least five global models now exist. Chapters 24 to 31 examine these models and compare their results and structures with the Government's global model. Most of the non-Government global models contain many more feedback linkages than it has been possible to achieve in this Study with the agencies' models. Chapter 31 describes the results of experiments in which feedback linkages in two global models were cut to make these two models more closely resemble the linkages achieved by this Study among the agencies' models. Projections from these two global models are distinctly more optimistic when the feedback linkages are missing (as they are in the Government's global model) than when the linkages are present. Finally, it should be stated, that this is the first time the Government has attempted such a broad study, and difficulties in interagency coordination of analyses and assumptions were encountered on an enormous scale. Resolving of the inconsistencies receivedthe first priority of attention, and, in spite of time extensions, other important (but less urgent) objectives thus proved to be unattainable. For example, there is an unevenness in style in the chapters of this volume. There is no indication of the uncertainty associated with most of the numbers reported, and in several places results are reported as, for example, ".3.745816352," when what is really meant is "4, plus or minus 50 percent." It was intended originally to use metric units throughout followed by values in other units in parentheses; instead, the report contains a mixture of metric and other units. (To help the reader with the'units problem, Appendix D provides an extensive set of conversion tables.) A consistent grouping of countries by region, with individual detail provided for a small set of representative countries, was desired, but current methodological differences underlying the agencies' projections made this impossible. In the time available, problems of this sort were simply unavoidable. Acknowledgments Literally hundreds of people contributed in one way or another to this Study, and at different points each contribution was vitally important. Initially, the members of the executive group (listed earlier) made the project possible by establishing guidelines and providing the necessary budget. The agency coordinators (also listed earlier) played a vital role throughout .in helping to identify persons in their agencies who could provide data and analysis. Five persons--George M. Bennsky, Lindsey Grant, Dolores Gregory, Donald King, and Lee M. Talbot-played particularly important roles in the developed of the papers setting forth the initial concept of the Study. . I . I The hardest work-the detailed preparation of the projections-was done by a group of experts, most of whom were already more than fully occupied with other work before this study came along, but somehow they managed to find time to complete their contributions to the study. These experts and their contributions are: PROJECTIONS Chapter I Introduction Gerald 0. B amey Chapter 2 Population Samuel Baum, Nancy B. Frank, Larry Heligman, Donald Bogue, Amy Tsui, Melanie Werkin McClintock, Patricia Baldi Chapter 3 Gross National Gerald 0. Barney, Nicholas G. Carter, Product Lachman Khemani Chapter 4 Climate Russell Ambroziak Chapter 5 Technology Pieter VanderWerf Chapter 6 Food Patrick O'Brien Chapter 7 Fisheries Richard Hennemuth, Charles Rock- wood Chapter 8 Forestry Bruce Ross-Sheriff Chapter 9 Water John J. Boland, John Kammerer, Wal- ter Langbein, James Jones, Peter Free- man, Alan C. More Chapter 10 Energy John Pearson, Mark Rodekohr; Rich- ard BaU, Gregory D'Alessio, Stephen Gage, Leonard Hamilton, Sam Morris, Gerald Rausa, Steve Resnek, Walter Sevian xi Chapter I I Fuel Minerals Walter Dupree Chapter 12 Nonfuel Minerals Gerald 0. Barney, Pieter VanderWerf, Allan Matthews, Alvin Knoerr Chapter 13 Environment Jennifer Robinson and Ger-ald 0. Bar- ney, with major assistance from Jeffrey M. Maclure and Peter Freeman. Other contributors include Wayne Bloch, Dan Botkin, John Costlow, Joel Davis, Erik P. Eckholm, Lawrence Fahey, Stephen Gage, Leonard Hamilton, Barbara Ledeen, Paul E. Lehr, Thomas E. Lovejoy, All= Matthews, Sam 'uel Morris, Albert Printz, Gerald Rausa, Steve Resnek, John Ross, Bruce Ross-Sheriff, Walter Sevian, Fred Smith, George Woodwell, and Pieter VanderWerf. Wayne Bloch with Albert Prmtz assembled an initial in- ventory of the environmental analyses done by the contributing agencies. ANALYSES OF GovERNMENT MODELS Chapter 14 The Government's Ned W. Dearborn, Gerald 0. Barney Global Model Chapter 15 Population Ned W. Dearborn Chapter 16 Gross National Ned W. Dearborn Product Chapter 17 Climate Judith Johnson Chapter 18 Food Ned W. Dearborn Chapter 19 Fisheries, Forestry, Jennifer Robinson Water, and Environment Chapter 20 Energy Pieter VanderWerf Chapter 21 Fuel Minerals Pieter VanderWerf Chapter 22 Nonfuel Minerals Ned W. Dearborn Chapter 23 Technology Pieter VanderWerf, Gerald 0. Barney, Ned W. Dearborn ANALYSES OF OTHER GLOBAL MODELS Chapter 24 Introduction Jennifer Robinson Chapter 25 Worlds 2 and 3 Jennifer Robinson Chapter 26 Mesarovic-Pestel Jennifer Robinson IWorld Model Chapter 27 MOIRA Jennifer Robinson Chapter 28 Latin American Jennifer Robinson World Model Chapter 29 U.N. World Model Jennifer Robinson ComPARisoN OF RESULTS Chapter 30 Introduction Jennifer Robinson Chapter 31 Comparisons Jennifer Robinson, Milivilo Mesarovic, Berry Hughes, Samir Salama, Jeffrey Amlin xii Appendix A Historic Analysis Robert Cahn and Patricia L. Cahn Appendix B Advisory Views Ned W. Dearbom (editor) The thoughtful and insightful writing done by Ned W. Dearborn, Jennifer Robinson, and Pieter VanderWerf of the Global 2000 Study staff, deserves special note and acknowledgment. The Study benefited enormously from the active participation of two groups of expert advisers. One group consists of seven persons who have previously attempted integrated studies of population, resources, and the environment. They are: ANNE CARTER MIHAJLO MESAROVIC Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. Case Westem Reserve University, NICHOLAs G. CARTER Cleveland, Ohio World Bank, Washington, D.C. DoUGLAs N. Ross ANNE EHRLICH Joint Economic Committee, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. U.S. Congress, Washington D.C. PETER J. HENRIOT KENNETH E. F. WATT Center of Concem, Washington, D.C. University of Califomia, Davis, Calif. On two occasions these seven met for a total of three days with the agency experts to discuss ways of integrating and improving the projections. Their criticisms were often pointed but always constructive. Some of the problems and inconsistencies they noted could be resolved; others could not be. Excerpts from written criticisms submitted by this group are included in Appendix B. The other group consists of more than one hundred individuals from academic institutions, public interest groups, business, labor, and founda- tions, who read and criticized the manuscripts. Their constructive-some- times rather candid--comments were very helpful in identifying errors, weaknesses, and inconsistencies. Some of their comments are also included in Appendix B. The members of this group are listed at the end of the Acknowledgments. Information regarding forestry and agricultural practices and trends in a score of countries in Affica, Asia, and Latin America was provided on very short notice by U.S. Embassy personnel in response to the Study's last-minute request for information not otherwise available. Their cabled responses, which were particularly helpful in making the environment projections presented in Chapter 13, are reproduced in Appendix C. Assistance. and consulting on particular topics was provided by George Bennsky, Edmond R. du Pont, Frank Pinto, Patrick Caddell, Daniel Tunstall, Nicolai Timenes, Bill Long, Donald King, James L. Holt, John H. DeYoung, Jr., Michael Field, David Overton, and Raphael Kasper. Several persons made special contributions to the study. Story Shem, detailed from the Department of State, served as Special Assistant to the Study Director and provided the primary liaison between the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State. In addition, she contributed to the research and writing and found imaginative solutions to a seemingly endless array of institutional, financial and procedural difficul- ties. Jeffrey M. Maclure, a member of the Study's small central staff, xiii contributed to the research and writing, and coordinated much of the final rewriting and editing. Frank Rossomondo often went out of his way to facilitate progress of the Study generally and to locate missing data and needed documents. George Bennsky, Delores Gregory, and Leonardo Neher were always available for valuable counsel and guidance. And Lee Talbot and Lindsey Grant were especially helpful throughout in guiding and shaping the Study. During the final phase of the Study Wm. Alston Hayne, Katherine B. Gillman, Lindsey Grant (then a consultant to the Department of State), and John M. Richardson Jr. contributed significantly to the reviewing and editing. A great deal of credit goes to the persons who brought the pieces of the Study together in an attractive final form. Fred Howard edited the entire manuscript in an incredibly short time. The cartographic and graphic support effort was handled by Holly Byrne and Roy Abel of the CIA's Cartographic Division with consulting assistance from Lawrence Fahey. Charles D. Collison guided the manuscripts through the Govemment Printing Office under difficult circumstances. Louise Neely, Project Secre- tary, managed to remain calm and collected through seemingly endless pressures and illegible manuscript. But the job could not have been done without others, too, including Thomas J. Delaney, Lilia Barr, Linda Arnold, Bernice Carney, Alvin Edwards, Susan Reigeluth, Gavin Sanner, Marie Pfaff, Charles McKeown, Betty Ann Welch, Lachman Khemani, Nancy Boone, Judith Johnson, and Oriole Harris. Finally, indirect-but very important-contributions by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the George Gund Foundation are acknowledged gratefully. GERALD 0. BARNEY Study Director Informal AdAwrs to the Study John Adams Norman E. Borlaug Natural Resources Defense Council International Maize in Wheat Improve- New York, New York ment Robert M. Avedon Mexico City, Mexico Population Reference Bureau Washington, D.C. Daniel B. Botkin Russell Beaton Marine Biological Laboratory Willamette University Woods Hole, Massachusetts Salem, Oregon Wallace Bowman Thomas Bender, Jr. Library of Congress R.A.I.N. Washington, D.C. Portland, Oregon James Benson Shirley A. Briggs Council on Economic Priorities Rachel Carson Trust New York, New York Washington, D.C. xiv David R. Brower Earl Cook Friends of the Earth College of Geoscience San Francisco, California Texas A & M. University Lester R. Brown College Station, Texas Worldwatch Institute Chester L. Cooper Washington, D.C. Institute for Energy Analysis Gerhart Bruckmarm Washington, D.C. International Institute for Applied Sys- Arthur Cordell tems Analysis Science Council of Canada Vienna, Austria Ontario, Canada Reid A. Bryson Robert W. Crosby University of Wisconsin Department of Transportation Madison, Wisconsin Washington, D.C. Nicholas G. Carter Herman Daly World Bank Louisiana State University Washington, D.C. Baton Rouge, Louisiana Verne Charit Richard H. Day Canadian Association for the Club of University of Southern California Rome Los Angeles, California Ottawa, Canada T. L. de Fayer Duane Chapman Department of the Environment Comell University Ottawa, Canada Ithaca, New York Henry L. Diamond Anne W. Cheatham Beveridge, Fairbanks, and Diamond Congressional Clearing House for the Washington, D.C. Future Charles J. DiBona U.S. Congress American Petroleum Institute Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Wilson Clark Wouter Van Dieren Governor's Office Foundation for Applied Ecology Sacramento, California Edam, The Netherlands Philander P. Claxton, Jr. William M. Dietel World Population Society Rockefeller Brothers Foundation Washington, D.C. New York, New York Harlan Cleveland Scott Donaldson Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies Command and Control Technical Cen- Aspen, Colorado ter, Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph F. Coates Washington, D.C. Office of Technology Assessment Andrew J. Dougherty U.S. Congress * National Defense University Washington, D.C. Washington, D@C. Vary Coates Henry L. Duncombe, Jr. George Washington University General Motors Corporation Washington, D.C. New York, New York John N. Cole Erik Eckholm . Maine Times Worldwatch Institute Brunswick, Maine Washington, D.C. Kent H. Collins Anne H. Ehrlich Charles F. Kettering Foundation Stanford University Dayton, Ohio Stanford, California xv Kenneth R. Farrell Ralph Hofineister Department of Agriculture World Bank . Washington, D.C. Washington, b.C.' Frank Fenner John P. Holdren The Australian National University Energy & Resources Program Canberra, Australia University of California Andrew Ford Berkeley, California University of California Richard Hough Los Alamos, New Mexico Agency for International Development Jay W. Forrester Washington, D.C. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Peter R. Huessy Cambridge, Massachusetts The Environmental Fund Irving S. Friedman Washington, D.C. First National City Bank Benjamin A. Jayne New York, New York Duke University William R. Gasser Durham, North Carolina Department of Agriculture Philip L. Johnson Washington, D.C. Oak Ridge Associated Universities Robert Gelbard Oak Ridge, Tennessee Department of State Edward G. Kaelber Washington, D.C. College of the Atlantic Theodore J. Gordon Bar Harbor, Maine The Futures Group Lawrence R. Kegan Gastonbury, Connecticut Population Crisis Committee James Grant Washington, D.C. Overseas Development Council Thomas L. Kimball Washington, D.C. National Wildlife Federation Reginald W. Griffith Washington, D.C. Reginald Griffith Associates. Washington, D.C, Alexander King International Federation of Institutes for Walter Haim Advanced Study Congressional Research Service Stockholm, Sweden, Washington, D.C. Robert Harnrin Erasmus H. Kloman Joint Economic Committee National Academy of Public Administra- U.S. Congress tion Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Bruce Hannon George R. Lamb Center for Advanced Computation American Conservation Association. University of Illinois New York, New York Urbana, Illinois Donald Lesh Peter Harnick U.S. Association for the Club of Rome Environmental Action Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Hans Linnemann Hazel Henderson Economisch En Sociaal Instituut Princeton Center for Alternative Futures Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Princeton, New Jersey Amsterdam, The Netherlands Peter J. Henriot James S. Lipscomb Center of Concern Gorden Gund Foundation Washington, D.C. Cleveland, Ohio xvi Robert Lisensky Norman Myers Willamette University Natural Resources Defense Council Salem, Oregon Nairobi, Kenya Dennis Little Sam Nilsson Congressional Research Service International Federation of Institutes for Library of Congress Advanced Studies' U.S. Congress Solna, Sweden Washington, D.C. Ian C. T. Nisbet Thomas V. Long 11 Massachusetts Audubon Society Committee on Public Policy Studies Lincoln, Massachusetts University of Chicago Patrick F. Noonan Chicago, Illinois Nature Conservancy Thomas E. Lovejoy Washington, D.C. World Wildlife Foundation Patrick O'Dell Washington, D.C. University of Texas Gordon MacDonald Dallas, Texas Mitre Corporation Howard Odum McLean, Virginia University of Florida Thomas F. Malone Gainesville, Florida Holcomb Research Institute Lewis J. Perelman Indianapolis, Indiana Solar Energy Research Institute John McHale Golden, Colorado Center for Integrative Studies Russell Peterson University of Houston Office of Technology Assessment Houston, Texas Washington, D.C. Magda C Iordell McHale David Pimentel Center for Integrative Studies Department of Entomology University of Houston Cornell University Houston, Texas Ithaca, New York George McRobie Dennis Pirages Technology Development Group Department of Government and Politics London, England University of Maryland College Park, Maryland Dennis Meadows Wilson Prichett, III Dartmouth College Environmental Fund Hanover, New Hampshire Washington, . D.C. Donnella Meadows J. A. Potworowski Dartmouth College Energy, Mines and Resources Hanover, New Hampshire Ottawa, Canada Martha Mills League. of Women Voters Education Roger Revelle Fund Center for Population Studies Washington, D.C. Harvard University J. Murray Mitchell, Jr. Cambridge, Massachusetts National Oceanic and Atmospheric Elliot Richardson Administration Department of State Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Roy Morgan Ralph W. Richardson, Jr. Zero Population Growth Rockefeller Foundation Washington, D.C. New York, New York Xvii Ronald G. Ridker Robert B. Stecker Resources for the Future American Telephone and Telegraph Washington, D.C. Company Peter C. Roberts New York, New York Department of the Environment Robert Stein - London, England international Institute for Environment Walter Orr Roberts and Development Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies Washington, D.C. Aspen, Colorado Thomas B. Stoel, Jr. William Robertson IV Natural Resources Defense Council National Academy of Sciences Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Richard S. Takasaki Archibald C. Rogers East-West Center RTKL Associates, Inc. Honolulu, Hawaii Baltimore, Maryland Joanna Underwood Rafael M. Salas INFORM UN Fund for Population Activities New York, New York United Nations New York, New York Carl Wahren John E. Sawyer International Planned Parenthood Fed- Andrew W. Mellon Foundation eration New York, New York London, England Lee Schipper Franklin Wallack Royal Academy of Sciences United Automobile, Aerospace and Ag- Stockholm, Sweden ricultural Implement Workers of and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory America Berkeley, California Washington, D.C. Peter Schwartz Kenneth E. F. Watt Stanford Research Institute Department of Zoology Menlo Park, California University of California James Selvaggi Davis, California Department of Housing and Urban De- Edward Wenk, Jr. velopment Aerospace Research Lab Washington, D.C. University of Washington Arlie Shardt Seattle, Washington Environmental Defense Fund New York, New York N. Richard Werthamer Manfred Siebker Exxon Research and Engineering Com- S.C.I.E.N.C.E. S.P.R.L. pany Brussels, Belgium Florham Park, New Jersey Joseph Smagorinsky Walter Westman National Oceanic and Atmospheric Department of Geography Administration University of California Princeton, New Jersey Los Angeles, California Anthony Wayne Smith Gilbert F. White National Parks and Conservation Asso- Institute of Behavioral Science ciation University of Colorado Washington, D.C. Boulder, Colorado Soedjatmoko Robert M. White National Development Planning Agency National Academy of Sciences Jakarta, Indonesia Washington, D.C. xviii Mason Willrich George Woodwell The Rockefeller Foundation Marine Biological Laboratory New York, New York Woods Hole, Massachusetts Carroll L. Wilson Jane Yarn Massachusetts Institute of Technology Charles A. Lindbergh Fund Cambridge, Massachusetts Atlanta, Georgia Nathaniel Wollman College of Arts and Sciences George Zeidenstein University of New Mexico The Population Council Albuquerque, New Mexico New York, New York )dx CONTENTS Chapter Page Preface and Acknowledgments V List of Tables xxv List of Figures xxxiii List of Maps xxxvii Part I THE PROJECTIONS 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECTIONS 3 The Study Plan 3 The Projections 4 2 POPULATION PROJECTIONS 7 Bureau of the Census Projections 7 Community and Family Study Center Projections 24 Migration 29 3 GNP PROJECTIONS 39 4 CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 51 Climate in the Year 2000 52 The Climate Scenarios 52 Climate Scenarios for the Global 2000 Study 64 5 TECHNOLOGY PROJECTIONS 67 Population 67 Gross National Product 67 Climate 68 Food 68 Fisheries 70 Forestry 70 Water 70 Energy 70 Fuel Minerals 70 Nonfuel Minerals 70 Environment 71 6 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 73 Caveats 73 Model and Methodology 73 General Results 77 Altematives 1-111: Results and Conclusions 90 Resources and Inputs 96 Costs and Investments 100 Environmental Implications 101 7 FISHERIES PROJECTIONS 105 Marine Fisheries Resources 105 Fresh Water Fisheries Resources 106 Living Marine Resources: Description 107 Living Marine Resources: Potential 108 Marine Pollution III Marine Aquaculture, 112 Economic Demand 113 xx 8 FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 117 Forest Inventories 118 Forest Products 118 The Forest-Man Relationship: Two Systems 119 Forests and Forestry in the Industralized Nations 120 Forests and Forestry in the Less Developed Countries 125 The Special Problem of Tropical Moist Forests 131 Global Linkages and the Year 2000 Scenarios 132 References 134 9 WATER PROJECTIONS 137 Properties of Water Resources 137 The Supply of Water 139 The Demand for Water 141 Future Water Resources 157 Conclusions 158 10 ENERGY PROJECTIONS 161 Basic Assumptions 161 Midrange Energy Forecasts, 1985-90 164 Long-Range Energy Projections 171 Future Oil Potential 175 The Role of Future Technologies 178 Energy Impacts 180 Conclusions 185 References 185 11 FUEL MINERALS PROJECTIONS 187 Resource Terminology 187 Petroleum 189 Natural Gas 191 Coal 192 Nuclear Fuels 193 Hydraulic Resources 194 Geothermal Energy 195 Oil Shale 198 Tar Sands 199 Solar Energy 200 Conclusions 202 References 202 12 NONFUEL MINERALS PROJECTIONS 205 Demand Projections 205 Supply Projections 212 Price Projections 213 Decision Points in the Mineral-Industry System 216 Nonfuel Minerals and the North-South Dialogue 222 Conclusions 224 References 225 13 ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 227 The Population Projections and the Environment 230 The Projections 230 Introduction 230 Population and the Environment in Traditional Cultures 232 Population and the Environment in Industrialized Cultures 238 Population Distribution and the Environment 241 The Population Projections and Human Health 246 Conclusions 251 The GNP Projections and the Environment 251 The Projections 251 Introduction 251 Pollution and Waste Generation 252 Resource Consumption 253 The Use of Chemicals in the Development of Societies 253 Conclusions M Climate Changes and the Environment 256 The Projections 256 Introduction 257 The Climate Scenarios 257 Environmental Consequences of the Climate Scenarios 257 Impact of the Other Projections on Climate 259 Conclusions 267 The Technology Projections and the Environment 270 The Pro)ections 270 Conclusions 272 The Food and Agriculture Projections and the Environment 272 The Projections 272 Introduction 273 Food and the Human Environment 274 Deterioration of Soils 276 Ecological Effects of Fertilizers and Pesticides 283 Crop Vulnerability: Genetic Considerations 288 Food and Nonrenewable Fossil Fuels 292 Conclusions 297 The Projections and the Marine Environment 298 The Projections 298 Introduction 299 Effects of Coastal Development 302 Coastal Pollution 304 Overexploitation of Living Marine Resources 313 Open Oceans 315 Conclusions 316 The Forestry Projections and the Environment 318 The Projections 318 Introduction 310 Deforestation in the LDCs 320 Increased Intensity of Forest Management 325 Global-Scale Environmental Impacts 327 A Projection of Species Extinctions 328 Conclusions 332 The Water Projections and the Environment 333 The Projections 333 Introduction 334 Environmental Developments Affecting Water Supply 334 Impacts of Hydraulic Works 338 Water Pollution 340 Water-Related Diseases 343 Extinction of Freshwater S 344 . pecies Conclusion 34.4 The Energy Projections and the Environment 345 The Projections 345 Introduction 346 Commercial Energy in Industrial Societies 348 Noncommercial fuels 374 Conclusion 380 The Nonfuel Minerals Projections and the Environment 381 The Projections 381 Introduction 381 Direct Environmental Effects of Mining on Land 382 Indirect Effects of Mining on Land 388 Effects of Mining the Seabed 389 Mdi Conclusions 389 Closing the Loops 390 Introduction 390 Assumptions, Discrepancies, and Feedback 408 Summing Up 427 References 431 Part 11 ANALYSIS OF PROJECTION TOOLS: THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL 14 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL: THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 453 The "Government's Global Model" 453 Description of the Present Foundation 455 Analysis of the Present Foundation 460 Interpreting the Projections 480 Strengthening the Present Foundation 482 Summary Descriptions of the 11 Elements 484 15 POPULATION 501 Census Projections 501 Chicago Projections 502 Key Analytic Methodology 502 Basic Principles 503 Basic Components 506 Basic Procedures 509 References 520 16 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 521 Key Analytic Methodology 522 Basic Principles 5.24 Basic Components 5@6 Basic Procedures 528 17 CLIMATE 535 Key Analytic Methodology 535 Basic Principles and Components 535 Basic Procedures 536 Climate Scenarios 539 Validation 544 Documentation 544 18 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 545 Key Analytic Methodology 545 Basic Principles 546 Basic Components 550 Basic Procedures 552 19 RENEWABLE RESOURCES 563 Water 564 Fisheries 564 Forestry 565 Environment 565 20 ENERGY 569 Key Analytic Methodology 569 Basic Principles 570 Basic Components 573 Basic Procedures 575 Documentation and Validation 578 21 FUEL MINERALS 579 Key Analytic Methodology 579 Basic Principles 579 Basic Components 580 Basic Procedures 580 Documentation and Validation 580 22 NONFUEL MINERALS 581 Key Analytic Methodology 581 Basic Principles 584 Basic Components 590 Basic Procedures 591 23 TECHNOLOGY 597 Key Analytic Methodologies 597 Basic Principles 599 Basic Components 599 Documentation and Validation 599 Part III ANALYSIS OF PROJECTION TOOLS: OTHER GLOBAL MODELS 24 INTRODUCTION 603 Carrying Capacity 604 Stability and Diversity 605 Ecological Buffering 605 25 WORLDS 2 AND 3 607 The Models and1beir Limitations 608 Method 608 Structure 610 Conclusions 611 Documentation 612 References 613 26 MESAROVIC-PESTEL WORLD MODEL 615 Method 615 Relevance 617 Structure 618 Conclusions 619 Testing and Validation 622 Documentation 623 References 625 27 MOIRA: MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN AGRICULTURE 627 Method 627 Relevance 628 Structure 629 Testing and Validation 631 Assumptions and Conclusions 633 Documentation 634 References 635 28 THE LATIN AMERICAN WORLD MODEL 637 Method 637 Relevance 638 Structure 639 Testing 643 Conclusions 644 Documentation 647 References 647 29 U.N. WORLD MODEL 649 Method 649 Relevance 650 Structure 650 X)dV Testing 653 Conclusions 654 Documentation 655 References 655 Part IV COMPARISON OF RESULTS 30 INTRODUCTION 659 31 THE COMPARISONS 661 Comparison of Integrated Global Models 661 Structure 661 The Government's Global Model vs. the World 3 Model 663 The Government's Global Model vs. the World Integrated Model 672 Conclusions 681 APPENDIXES A Lessons from the Past 685 B Advisory Views: A Critique of the Study 713 C Embassy Reports on Forestry and Agricultural Trends 723 D Metric Conversion Factors 739 Index 751 xxv LIST OF TABLES Table Page 2-1 Bureau of Census Estimates and Projections, Medium Series, Sum- mary Data, 1975-2000 8 2-2 Census Bureau World Estimates and Projections, 1975 and 2000 10 2-3 More Developed Regions and Less Developed Regions--Census Bu- reau Estimates and Projections 12 2-4 Major Regions-Census Bureau Estimates and Projections 15 2-5 Percent Distribution of World Population by Major Region, Census Bureau Medium Series 15 2-6 Population Size, Net Growth, and Percent of World Population of 15 Selected Countries, Census Bureau Medium Series 16 2-7 Broad Age Groups. by More Developed Regions and Less Developed Regions, 1975 and 2000 (Census Bureau) 16 2-8 Percent Distribution of Population, 1975-2000, and 1975-2000 In- crease for Major Regions and Selected Countries, Census Bureau Medium Series 18 2-9 Changes in Functional Age Groups and Total Population, 1975-2000, for World, More Developed and Less Developed Regions, Major Regions, and Selected Countries, Census Bureau Medium Series 19 2-10 Projected Total Population for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Census Bureau) 20 2-11 Projected Total Fertility Rate for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Census Bureau) 22 2-12 Projected Average Annual Population Growth Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Census Bureau Medium Series) 24 2-13 Estimated and Projected Crude Death Rates for World, Major Re- gions, and Selected Countries' (Census Bureau Medium Series) 25 2-14 Estimated and Projected Crude Birth Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Census Bureau Medium Series) 26 2-15 Annual Decline in Crude Birth Rate (Census Bureau) 26 2-16 CFSC Projected Total Population for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries 28 2-17 CFSC Estimated Total Fertility Rate for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries 30 2-18 Projected Average Annual Population Growth Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (CFSC Medium Series) 31 2-19 Estimated and Projected Crude Death Rates for World, Major Re- gions, and Selected Countries (CFSC Medium Series) 32 2-20 Estimated and Projected Crude Birth Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (CFSC Medium Series) 33 2-21 Comparison of Global 2000 Medium Series Projections without Mi- gration, and U.N. Medium Variant Projections with Migration, 1975 and 2000 35 xxvi 2-22 Population Projections, Medium Series, for U.S. and Mexico, 1975- 2000-No Migration vs. Estimated Net Migration 36 3-1 Annual Growth Rates, Assumptions A to G 41 3-2 GNP Estimates (1975) and Projections and Growth Rates (1985,2000) by Country 44 3-3 GNP Estimates (1975) and Projections and Growth Rates (1985,2000) by Major Regions and Selected Countries and Regions 48 3-4 Population Estimates (1975) and Projections and Growth Rates (1985, 2000) 49 3-5 Per Capita GNP Estimates (1975) and Projections and Growth Rates (1985, 2000) by Major Regions and Selected Countries and Re- gions 50 4-1 Large Global Cooling 54 4-2 Moderate Global Cooling 56 4-3 Same as the Last 30 Years 58 4-4 Moderate Global Warming 60 4-5 Large Global Warming 62 5-1 Electrical Generation from Nuclear and Hydro Power Assumed in Energy Forecasts 71 6-1 Population Growth Rates, Actual and Projected 78 6-2 Per Capita Income Growth Rates, Actual. and Projected 78 6-3 Yield Variations Due to Assumptions Regarding Weather Conditions 79, 6-14 Grain Production and Consumption Growth Rates, Actual and Pro- jected (Alternative 1) 79 6-5 Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) 80 6-6 Per Capita Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) 82 6-7 Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade (Alter- natives 1, 11, 111) 91, 6-8 Per Capita Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade (Alternatives 1, 11, 111) 93 6-9 Daily Caloric Consumption in the Less Developed Countries 95 6-10 World Grain Trade Quantities (Alternatives 1, 11, 111) 96 6-11 International Price Indices (Alternatives 1, 11, 111) 96 6-112 Arable Area, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) 97 6-13 Arable Area per Capita, Actual and Projec ted (Alternative 1) 99 6-14 Fertilizer Consumption, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) 100 6-15 Fertilizer Consumption per Arable Hectare, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) 101 7@1 Total World Catch and Selected Categories 105 7-2 Major Species Groups Reported in World Fishery Landings (FAO) 107 7-3 Marine Fisheries Catch by Area, 1975 108 7-4 Catch by Continent and Leading Countries, 1975 108 7-5 Leading Species Groups in World Catch, 1970 and 1975 108 7-6 1970 FAO Projection of Demand for Fish Meal, 1975 and 1985 113 xxvii 7-7 1970 Bell et al. Projections of World Aggregate Consumption of Fish- ery Products, 1975-2000 115 8-1 World Forested Area by Region, 1973 118 Biomass of the World's Forests and Woodlands 119 8-3 Major Traders of Forest Products, 1974 119 8-4 Forest Resources per Capita by Geographic'Region, mid-1970s 120 8-5 Distribution of European Forest Resources Among Subregions, Early 1970s 121 8-6 Forecasts of the Areas of Forest and Open Woodland in Europe, Year 2000 122 8-7 North American Forest Resources, Early 1970s 123 8-8 Asia-Distribution of Forest Resources by Subregion 130 8@-9 Estimates of World Forest Resources, 1978 and 2000 134 9-1 Estimates of Available Global Water Supply for Continents and Se- lected Nations 141 9-2 Per Capita Use of Drinking Water in Less Developed Countries. 1970 144 9-3 Water Use for Various Purposes. by Continent and Selected Nations 147 9-4 Average Annual Water Withdrawal per Unit of Land Area, Selected Geographic Units 149 9-5 Estimates of World Water Use in 1976 and Projections to 2000 150 9-6 Water Use in Selected Countries, 1965 151 9-7 Water Quality in Three Selected Irrigation Areas 151 9-8 Effect of Various Factors on Salt Concentration of Colorado River, United States, 1942-61 152 9-9 Irrigation and Drainage in the Developing Market Economies, 1975, and Targets, 1990 153 9-10 Per Capita Water Availability. 1971 and 2000 156 10-1 Real GNP Growth Rate Assumptions 165 10-2 Population Growth Rate Assumptions 165 10-3 Total World Oil and Energy Consumption, 1985 and 1990, and Av- erage Annual Growth Rates. 1975-90 166 10-4 Regional Energy Balances, 1985 167 10--5 Regional Energy Balances, 1990 168 10-6 Less Developed Oil Exporting Countries: Current Production, Re- .serves, Population, Income 170 10-7 Regional Energy Balances with High OPEC Prices, 1985 171 10-8 Regional Energy Balances with High OPEC Prices, 1990 172 10-9 Long-Run World Energy Assump tions 173 10-10 World Energy Demand, Year 2000 173 10-11 WAES Oil Balance. for Year 2000 174 10-12 U.S. Long-Run Energy Assumptions 175 10-13 Most Recent U.S. Projections for the Year 2000 176 10-14 Incremental Implementation Above Base-Case Levels for Three Al- ternative Energy Technologies, Year 2000 178 10-15 Resource Use for Three Alternative Technologies, Year 2000 179 xxviii 10-16 Emission Projections, 1985 and 1990, Medium-Growth Case 181 1047 Emission Projections, 1985 and 1990, High-Growth Case 182 10-18 Ernission Projections, 1985 and 1990, Low-Growth Case 183 10-19 Recent Estimates of Emissions from Fuel Combustion, Compared with IEES-ESNS Estimates for 1990 184 11-1 Recoverable World Nonrenewable Energy Resources 187 11-2 Reserve and Resource Terminology 189 11-3 Estimates of World Ultimate Production of Crude Oil Made Since 1970 189 11-4 World Cumulative Production, Ultimate Production, and Future Re- sources of Crude Oil as of January 1, 1976 190 11-5 World Petroleum Reserves, January 1, 1978 191 11-6 Density of Petroleum Drilling for Selected Areas of the World, as of End of 1975 191 11-7 Estimates Made Since 1970 of Remaining World Resources of Natural Gas 191 11-8 World Cumulative Production, Ultimate Production, and Future Re- . sources of Natural Gas (January 1, 1976) 192 11-9 World Natural Gas Reserves, January 1, 1978 192 Total World Solid Reserves and Fuel Resources 193 11-11 Lifetime Uranium Requirements for Nuclear Powerplants 194 11-12 World Uranium Resources 194 11-13 Developed and Undeveloped Conventional Hydroelectric Resources of the World 195 11-14 Major Tidal Power Project Sites, Operational and Potential 196 11-15 Estimated Heat Content of Geothermal Resource Base of the United States 197 11-16 Geothermal Powerplants 198 11-17 Identified Shale Oil Reserves of the World 199 11-18 U.S. and World Tar-Sand Oil Resources 200 12-1 Mineral Imports as a Percentage of Mineral Consumption, 1976 205 12-2 World Demand for Minerals, 1985 and 2000 206 12-3 Comparison of Bureau of Mines and Malenbaum Demand Projections for Selected Metals in 1985 and 2000 209 12-4 Life Expectancies of 1974 World Reserves of Mineral Commodities of Particular Concern at Two Different Rates of Demand 212 12 -5 Illustration of Nonfuel Mineral Prices Extrapolated to 2000 with a 5 Percent Growth Rate Beginning in 1980 213 12-6 Comparison of Price Projections for Four Metals in the Year 2000 216 12-7 World Production and Reserves in 1977 (Estimated), Other Resources in 1973-77 (as Data Available), Resource Potential, and Resource Base of 17 Elements 219 12-8 Percentage of World Production of Selected Minerals Traded Inter- nationally, 1950-70 222 12-9 Geographic Distribution of World Resources of Selected Mineral Commodities in 1974 223 12-10 Estimates of Metal Recoveries from Manganese Nodules from the Deep Seabed by 1985 224 13-1 Increase in World Population, 1975-2000 231 13-2 Number of Cattle and Number of Sheep and Goats, 1955-2000 234 13-3, Winrock Projections of World Feed,Resources for Ruminants, by Region 236 13-4 Winrock Projections of World Ruminant Populations, by Region 237 13-5 Annual Grain Consumption per Capita in the 20 Most Populous Coun- tries, 1975 239 13-6 Energy Consumption per Capita in the 20 Most Populous Countries, 1974 239 13-7 Post-Consumer Residential and Commercial Solid Waste Generated and Amounts Recovered, by Type of Material, 1977 240 13-8 Urban Population in All Cities of 100,000 or More 242 13-9 Estimates and Rough Projections of Selected Urban Agglomerations in Developing Countries 242 13-10 Levels and Trends of Life Expectancy at Birth, 1950-2000 248. 13-11 Percentages of Deaths of Children Under the Age of Five Due to Fecally Related and Airborne Diseases of Malnutrition, Latin America, Selected Areas 250 13-12 GNP Trends, 1975-2000, Medium-Growth Rate 252 13-13 Global Summary of Sources and Annual Emissions of Atmospheric Particulate Matter 263 13-14 Typical Climate Changes Caused by Urbanization 267 13-15 Selected Annual Energy Supply Rates for the Earth 267 13-16 Effects of Large Heat Additions to the Atmosphere 268 13-17 Daily per Capita Calorie Consumption, Historic and Projected, by Region, with.Percent of FAO Minimum Standards 275 13-18 Loss of Agricultural Lands, 1960-2000, Selected Industrialized Coun- tries 282 13-19 Average Energy Inputs per Acre in U.S. Corn Production, 1.940-70 293 13-20 Energy Inputs in U.S. Corn Production 293 13-21 Commercial Energy Required for Rice and Corn (Maize) Production, by Modern, Transitional, and Traditional Methods 296 13-22 Categories of Ocean Areas and Types of Pollution, with Effects on Uses and their Duration 301 13-23 Estimates from Annual River Discharges of Amounts of Metals In- jected into the Oceans Annually by Geological Processes and by Man 308 13-24 Total Inventory of Artificial Radionuclides Introduced into the World Oceans, 1970 and 2000 310 13-25 Best Estimates of Petroleum Hydrocarbons Introduced into the Oceans Annually 310 13-26 Annual Ocean Litter Estimates 313 13-27 Effect of Whaling on Stocks of Ten Species of Whales 314 13-28 Timetable of Societal Responses to Mercury Pollution of the Ocean, Minamata Bay, Japan, 1939-73 318 xxx 13-29 Estimates of World Forest Resources, 1978 and 2000 319 13-30 Extinctions of Species Implied by the Global 2000 Study's Projections 331 13-31 Projected Global Supply and Demand for Water by the Year 2000 334 13-32 Global Primary Energy Use, 1975 and 1990, byEnergy Type 346 13-33 Regional Distribution of Global Primary Energy Use, 1975 and 1990 347 13-34 Per Capita Global Primary Energy Use, Annually 1975 and 1990 347 13-35 U.S. Source Documents on the Effects of Pollutants 349 13-36 Projected Annual Emissions: 1985 and 1990, Low-Growth Case 351 13-37 Comparison of the Hard Path Definition and the Energy Information Administration's Projection Series C 360 13-38 Solar Sweden Assumed Production of Goods and Services and Specific Energy Use, 1975 and 2015 365 13-39 Solar Sweden Percent Distribution of Energy, by Energy-Quality Cat- egories A-I, 1971 and 2015 365 13-40 U.S. Department of Energy Studies Underway as of August 1978 to Examine "Soft Path" Options 368 13-41 Energy Supply in 1977 and Two Supply Scenarios for the Year 2000 370 13-42 Relative Environmental Impacts of Low- and High-Energy Growth Futures 370 13-43 Estimated Land Area Utilized for World Mineral Production Com- pared with Annual Production, 1976-2000 383 13-44 Estimates of Solid Wastes Generated Annually by World Production of Selected Mineral Products, 1976-2000 386 13-45 Apparent Opportunities for Further Mineral Development 390 13-46 Summary of Impacts on the Environment Implied by the Global 2000 Study's Population, GNP, and Resource Projections, by Major Environments 392 13-47 Projected Changes in Global Vegetation and Land Resources, 1975- 2000 401 13-48 Urban Population in All Cities of 100,000 or More 407 13-49 Environmental Assumptions Inherent in the Population, GNP, and Resource Projections 410 14-1 Index to Projections and Detailed Discussions Related to Each of the 11 Elements of the Government's Global Model 455 14-2 Selected Contrasting Assumptions of the 11 Elements of the Govern- ment's Global Model 470 14-3 Selected Institutional and Structural Differences Among the Elements of the Government's Global Model 479 15-1 Regions, Subregions, and Countries for Which Population Projections Were Developed 508 15-2 Egyptian Crude Death Rates, 1950-75 513 15-3 Age-Specific Egyptian Mortality Estimates, 1975 515 15-4 Assumed Annual Declines in Crude Birth Rate, Chicago Projections 516 15-5 Projected Annual Declines in Total Fertility Rates, Chicago Projec- tions, Medium Growth Case 517 15-6 Egyptian Personal Expenditure Distributions, 19 '74-75 518 15-7 Estimated Age-Specific Egyptian Fertility Rates, 1975 520 xxxi 16-1 Projected Average Annual Real GNP Growth, by Adjustment Steps, Medium Growth Case, 1975-85 524 16-2 Historical and Projected Average Annual Real GNP Growth for the Western Industrialized and Socialist Nations 528 16-3 Projected Average Annual Real GNP Growth for the High, Medium, and Low Growth Cases, 1977-85 530 16-4 Projected Demand for LDC Exports of Manufactured Goods 531 .16-5 Projected Average Annual Growth of Export of LDC Manufactured Goods, by LDC Group, Medium Growth Case 532 16-6 Projected Average Annual Growth of All LDC Exports, by Type of Export 532 16-7 Average Annual Growth of All LDC Exports, by LDC Group, Me- - dium Growth Case 532 16-8 Projected Exports for LDC Lower-Middle Income Group, by Type of Export, Medium Growth Case . 533 16-9 SIMLINK Calculations for the Low-Middle Income LDC Group, Medium Growth Case, 1977-85 533 16-10 Representative LDC Import Calculations, Lower-Middle Income Group, Medium Growth Case 534 17-1 Correla tion Between Self and Peer Ratings (Examples from Question 1) 537 17-2 Conversion of Expertise. Ranking to Weighted Scale 537 17-3 Definition of Temperature Categories 541 17-4 Percentage of Grouped Probability Densities Lying in Each Temper- ature Category 543 17-5 Frequency of Drought in U.S. in 1991-2000 543 18-1 Food Commodities Specified in the GOL Model 18-2 GOL Model Regions 551 18-3 Variables Used in the GOL Model 553 18-4 Representative Supply Equations: Wheat, Low-Income North Africa and Middle East (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case) 554 18-5 Representative Demand Equations: Wheat, Low-Income North Africa and Middle East (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case) 555 18-6' Comparison of Average Annual Projected Population Growth Rates, Medium Series 556 18-7 Representative Wheat Trade and Price Equations: Low-Income North Africa and Middle East (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case) 556 18-8 Projected Net Exporters of Wheat (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case) 557 18-9 Arable Area Submodel, Low-Income North Africa and Middle East 558 18-10 Total Food Submodel, Low-Income North Africa and Middle East 558 1&_1I Fertilizer Submodel, Low-income North Africa and Middle East '@58 18-12 Summary Supply Statistics: Low-Income North Africa and Middle East 559 18-13 Summary Demand and Trade Statistics: Low-Income North Africa and Middle East 560 18-14 Summary Meat Statistics: Less Developed Countries and Industrial- ized Nations 561 20-1 The 33 IEES Regions, Grouped According to Energy Position Clas- sification 573 10-2 The 59 Primary Fuel Types in the IEES Supply Submodel 574 20-3 The 13 IEES Transport Modes and the Fuels Carried 574 20-4 Final Energy Products in the IEES Linear Program 575 22-1 World Consumption of 14 Minerals and Materials in the Year 2000 582 22-2 Average Annual Economic Growth to the Year 2000 584 22-3 Base Year National Income 584 22-4 Representative Population Projections 584 22-5 Intensity of Use Statistics: Africa (excluding South Africa), 1951-2000 589 22-6 Intensity of Use Statistics: United States, Refined Copper, 1934-75 589 22-7 Minerals and Materials Consumption: Africa (excluding South Africa), 1951-2000 590 25-1 A Comparison of Levels in World 2 and World 3 610 29-1 Alternative Assumptions Concerning Income Targets and Future Pop- ulation Growth 653 29-2 Growth Rates and Income Gap Under the Assumptions of Basic Scen- arios X and C in the United Nations Model 654 31-1 Exogenous Inputs and Assumptions in World 3 Simulations for the Global 2000 Study 665 XXXM LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1-1 The process of projecting trends. 5 2-1 Twenty-five years of world population growth. 13 2-2 Age-sex composition of population, medium series, 1975 and 2000. 17 4-1 The three Global 2000 Study scenarios compared with the annual mean temperature changes during the past century for the latitude band 00-800N. 65 5-1 Innovative and adopted technology levels for rice production in Thai- land as projected by the GOL (grain, oilseed, livestock) model. 69 6-1 World grain yields, actual and projected under Alternatives 1, 11, 111. 76 6-2 Indices of world grain production, area, and yield, actual and pro- jected. 84 6-3 Energy intensity data. Cross-sectional energy use data plotted against crop and livestock yields for 30 largest food producing countries; 15-year historical series plotted against time for United States and several major European producers. 86 6-4 Energy used in agriculture, 1974. 87 6-5 Energy used in agriculture, plus fertilizer and chemicals, 1974. 87 6-6 World potentially arable, arable, and grain area, actual and projected. 98 6-7 World food production and fertilizer consumption, actual and pro- jected. 102 6-8 Indices of world food production and fertilizer consumption, actual and projected. 103 7-1 Annual catch of marine fish and of all marine animals, showing the downward trend in marine fish since 1970. 106 7-2 Per capita national income vs. income elasticity of fisheries demand in 77 countries. 114 9-1 Annual circulation of the hydrosphere, in quadrillions of cubic meters. 138 9-2 Distribution of withdrawals among major categories of water use, 1965. 142 9-3 Projected water use (withdrawals) for four Asian countries in percent of maximum limit of supply, as represented by runoff from local precipitation. 148 10-1 Demand projections for OPEC oil, 1976-90. 169 10-2 Comparison of global projections, 1975-2000. 174 10-3 Comparison of U.S. projections, 1975-2000. 176 10-4 Cumulative world discovery and production of oil. 177 10-5 World maximum oil production at a medium depletion rate and world demand at three growth rates of oil production. 177 10-6 Primary resources by fuel type for three alternative energy technol- ogies. 179 11-1 Classification of mineral resources. 188 12-1 Average annual demand by energy industries for some commodities, 1975-90, as a percentage of U.S. production in 1973. 210 12-2 Percentage of U.S. reserves needed to meet total energy demand for some commodities, 1975-90. 211 12-3 Energy requirements for recovery of iron, titanium, and aluminum, different grades, various sources. 214 12-4 Mineral product flow and four principal decision points in the flow. 215 12-5 Classification of mineral resources, the "McKelvey box." 217 12-6 The exploded McKelvey box, with indicated stocks and flows. 218 13-1 The two steps in integrating environment into the analysis. 228 13-2 Trend since 1958 in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the at- mosphere. 258 13-3 Global pools and flows of carbon. 260 13-4 Carbon dioxide concentrations implied by various energy scenarios. 262 13-5 Energy flow in the U.S. food chain, in billions of joules. 295 13-6 Transport mechanisms linking the oceans with the other principal parts of the physical world. 300 13-7 The effect of a gradual reduction, starting in 1971, in the use of DDT from a simulation model. 307 13-8 Loss of species through clearing of tropical forest areas-five projec- tions. 329 13-9 A monument to acid rain and air pollution-"Cleopatra's Needle." 336 13-10 Distribution and present production of ultimately recoverable con- ventional crude oil resources of the world. 352 13-11 Possible production rate curves for the world's ultimately recoverable crude oil resources. 353 13-12 Geologically estimated global crude oil production rates compared with consumption rates projected from actual growth over the 1950-75 period. 354 13-13 Historical growth of GNP and commercial energy use in the United States, 1850-1976. 355 13-14 Major regional trends associated with the DOE-MITRE Projection Series C (Hard Path) Energy Development Scenario. 362 13-15 OECD countries' projections of 1985 nuclear generating capacity for the world, by dates of estimates. 364 13-16 The Solar Sweden energy system for the year 2015. 366 13-17 Survey of energy savings in Denmark, 1977-90. 371 13-18 Traditional and reduced demand for energy in Denmark, 1990 and 2005. 372 13-19 Consumption of new mineral materials per person in the United States in 1975. 384 13-20 Arable land per capita, 1955, 1975, and 2000. 403 13-21 Conceptual model for closing the loops. 409 14-1 Sequential steps followed in linking elements of the government's global model. 458 14-2 Linkages achieved between elements of the government's global model. 459 14-3 Inconsistent population and GNP growth rates. 463 xxxv 14-4 Inconsistent commodity trade prices. 465 14-5 Inconsistent commodity trade volumes. 466 14-6 Inconsistent capital and resource utilization. 468 15-1 Population growth, selected countries, 1960-70 and 1970-74. 507 15-2 Egyptian population growth, 1950-2000, Census projections. 511 15-3 Egyptian population growth, 1950L2000, Chicago projections. 512 15@4 Projected Egyptian life expectancies, 1950-2000, medium growth case. 514 15-5 Projected Egyptian total fertility rates, 1950-2000, medium growth case. 519 16-1 Sequential operation of the SIMLINK model. 529 17-1 Global temperatures; historicafrecord of changes in annual mean tem- perature during the past century for the latitude band 6'@-80*N. 538 17-2 Sample response to Question 1; actual example of a single response to the instructions. 538 17-3 Cumulative probability function for Question 1. 539 17-4 Equivalent density function for Question 1. 540 17-5 Adding two density functions for Question 1. 540 17-6 Normalized density function for two respondents to Question 1. 541 17-7 Probability of mean Northern Hemisphere temperature change by the year 2000 as determined by the panel of climatic experts. 542 17-8 Probability of mean Northern Hemisphere temperature change to the year'2000 as determined by the panel of climate experts. 543 210-1 Structure of the International Energy Evaluation System (IEES). 577 22-1 Intensity-of-use curve of a nation whose economy is moving from an industrializing economy to a postindustrialization service econ- omy. 585 22-2 Graphic representation of the 1977 Malenbaurn Report's intensity-of- use table for refined copper, 587 22-3 Graphic representation of the 1977 Malenbaurn Report's intensity-of- use curve for crude steel. 593 22-4 Graphic representation of the 1977 Malenbaurn Report's intensity-of- use table for primary aluminum. 594 26-1 The five 'interrelated planes into which the world is stratified in the Mesarovic-Pestel world model. 616 26-2 Computational sequence of the Mesarovic-Pestel world model. 620 26-3 Historical-pattern no-change scenario, 1975-2020. 622 26-4 Isolationist scenario, 1975-2020. 623 26-5 Energy self-sufficiency fast-nuclear scenario, 1975-2020. 624 26-6 Actual vs. predicted consumption for Western Europe; one of the model's best predictions. 625 26-7 Actual vs. predicted value added in the Japanese extractive industries; one of the model's worst predictions. 625 27-1 Channels of causal influence and major feedback controls in MOIRA. 632 28-1 The demographic sector and objective function of the Latin American world model. 640 28-2 Latin American world model standard simulation for developed coun- tries. 644 xxxvi 28-3 Latin American world model standard simulation for Asia. 645 29-1 Internal st ructure of a region. 651 31-1 World 3 model sector linkages before linkage breaking. 664 31-2 World 3 model after breaking of sectoral linkages and introduction of exogenous drives. 664 31-3 Exogenous inputs to different sectors of the World 3 model. 666 31-4 World 3 model standard run (integrated version). 667 31-5 Four-level population sector with exogenous inputs. 667 31-6 Capital sector with exogenous inputs. 668 31-7 Agriculture sector with exogenous inputs., 669 31-8 Agriculture sector with exogenous inputs assuming no erosion or ur- ban-industrial use. 669 31-9 Renewable resource sector with exogenous inputs. 6.70 31-10 Nonrenewable resource sector with exogenous inputs assuming con- stant marginal cost of the.resource. 671 31-11 Persistent pollution sector with exogenous inputs. 671 31-12 Major linkages in the World Integrated Model with designation of linkages broken in model-integration experiment. 673 31-13 Global population projections for three versions of the World Inte- grated Model. 675 31-14 Global GNP projections for three'versions of the World Integrated Model. 676 31-15 Projections of North American GNP per capita for three versions of the World Integrated Model. 677 31-16 Projections of Latin American GNP per capita for three versions of the World Integrated Model. 678 31-17 Projections of South Asian GNP per capita for four versions of the World Integrated Model. 674 31-18 Projections of South Asian cumulativ -e starvation as a percentage of population for two versions of the World Integrated Model. 680 xxxvii LIST OF MAPS Page Population 9 Gross National Product 40 Gross National Product per Capita 41 Grain Consumption per Capita 74 Grain Trade 75 Per Capita Water Availability (1971) 154 Per Capita Water Availability (2000) 155 Energy Consumption per Capita (1975-1990) 162 Energy Trade (1975-1990) 163 Metal Consumption per Capita 208 Desertification Map 278 Maps in the colored map section GNP Projections: Simulated Trade Linkages (SIMLINK) Methodology Population Projections: Cohort Component Methodology Food Projections: Grain-Oilseed-Livestock (GOL) Methodology Energy Projections: International Energy Evaluation System (IEES) Methodology Nonfuel Minerals Projections: Intensity-of-Use (IOU) Methodology Extent of Commercial Activity Population Density (1975) Agricultural Production Potential Land Use Patterns (1975) Free Range Grazing Pressure, I Part I The Projections i I Introduction to the Projections The President's 1977 Environmental Message The Study Plan required the Global 2000 Study to develop projec- tions of trends in population, resources, and the The approach used in the Global 2000 Study environment for the entire world through the year was relatively simple. Each of the participating 2000. There is nothing uniquely significant about agencies was asked to make projections using the the year 2000, however, and the projections projection tools it currently employs in making reported in this volume are not intended to be long-term projections.* The assignments were as precise estimates for particular years. They are, follows: instead, broadly indicative of the direction in which major trends point. Population: Bureau of the Census and Similarly, it must be stressed that the results of Agency for International this study are projections, not forecasts. Forecasts Development. are attempts to predict the future, which, of GNP: Global 2000 Study staff, course, is influenced by public-policy decisions. with assistance from the In contrast, this study projects foreseeable trends Agency for International under the assumption that present policies and Development, Central policy trends continue without major change.* In Intelligence Agency, and a sense, the projections are intended to be self- World Bank. defeating, in that the basic purpose of the Presi- Climate: National Oceanic and dent's directive was to establish a foundation for Atmospheric longer-term planning-which in turn should lead Administration, to policy changes aimed at altering the projected Department of Agriculture, trends. National Defense University, and Central A considerable amount of longer-range analysis Intelligence Agency. and planning was already being conducted by Technology: The Global 2000 Study various federal agencies prior to this study, but staff, with assistance from usually only in response to the planning require- participating agencies. ments of the agencies' individual areas of respon- sibility. As a result, most longer-term government projections tend to focus on a single factor, directly relevant to the sponsoring agency's area Emphasis was placed on models that are (1) global, (2) of responsibility (for example,, food or population), long-term, and (3) used. The government has large numbers of other models, some of which include more feedback and without adequate consideration of the interrela- interactions than the models used in this Study. The models tions and feedback involved in a world system in chosen, however, are the global, long-term models most which population, resources, and the environment often used by the agencies in their long-term planning and are all interacting variables. analysis. Broad surveys that include other government As the President's directive establishing this models are provided in A Guide to Models in Governmental d Planning and Operations, Office of Research and Develop- study makes clear, however, the time has passe ment, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., when population (or energy, or food, or clean air, Aug. 1974, and in G. Fromm, W. L. Hamilton, and D. E. or public health, or employment) can be consid- Hamilton, Federally Supported Mathematical Models: Sur- ered in isolation. In establishing a foundation for vey and Analysis, National Science Foundation, Washing- longer-range analysis and planning, ways must be ton, D.C., June 1974. A discussion of the evolving role of models in government is provided by M. Greenberger, M. found to better understand the linkages and inter- A. Crenson, and B. L. Crissey in their Models in the Policy actions among these important elements of the Process, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1976, and in world system. Congressional Research Service, Computer Simulation Methods to Aid'National Growth Policy, prepared for the *As discussed in Chapter 14 and summarized in Table 14-2, Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and some policy changes were nevertheless assumed in devel- the Environment, U.S. House of Representatives, Washing- oping the projections. ton: Government Printing Office, 1975. 3 4 THE PROJECTIONS Food: Department of Agriculture. tools, the projections must be made independently Fisheries: National Oceanic and and sequentially. Atmospheric The sequential approach used in this study is Administration and outside illustrated in Figure 1-1. The first step is the consultants. establishment of policy assumptions (assumed Forestry: Central Intelligence constant in this study), followed by projections of Agency, with assistance population, GNP, technology, and climate. These from the Department of assumptions and projections are necessary inputs Agriculture, Department of to the resource projections in the second step. State, and Agency for The resource projections, in turn, are needed for International Development. the environmental analysis. It is only through this Water: Department of the Interior, sequential process that a measure of self-consist- with assistance from ency, coherence, and interrelationship is obtaina- outside consultants. ble with present government projection tools. Fuel Minerals: Department of Energy, Many important linkages, however, cannot be with assistance from the established by this sequential process. In particu- Bureau of Mines and the lar, the population and GNP projections that are Geological Survey., made in the first step are based largely on Nonfuel Minerals: The Global 2000 Study extrapolations of past trends and are uninformed staff, with assistance from by interactive feedback from the resource and the Department of the environmental projections. The resource and en- Interior and outside vironmental analyses, however, project develop- consultants. ments that may significantly influence GNP and Energy: Department of Energy. population trends. Envi Ironment: The Global 2000 Study The Projections staff, with assistance from the Environmental Protection Agency, Agency The agency experts were asked.to produce a for International first, draft of their projections in just six weeks, at Development, and outside which time they, the Global 2000 Study staff, and consultants. a small group of outside experts,* met for a weekend synthesis meeting. The purpose of the This approach has had both advantages and meeting was 'to improve' the consistency of the disadvantages. It was a distinct advantage to be projections and to begin-at least subjectively-to able to move ahead quickly, using previously consiIder the implications of the resource and developed tools. It was also an advantage to be environmental projecfions for the independently able to test and evaluate the existing long-term derived projections.of GNP and population. So analytical capabilities of the govemment. It was a unusual is this type of agency interaction that disadvantage to use projection tools that do not most of the agencies' long-term projection experts lend themselves easily to the analysis of the many were until then not acquainted with each other. interactions among population, resources, and A certain amount of difficulty was expected in environment. It was also a disadvantage that these this preliminary meeting, and, in fact, many analytical tools require that the projections be inconsistencies were revealed. The experts then undertaken sequentially. This last point needs decided collectively how best.to adjust and modify explanation. the projections to improve the internal consistency Future environmental trends depend in large of the whole set. The final projections were measure on demands for resources (minerals, prepared during the following two months. energy, food, water, etc.); therefore, the environ- It must be made clear, therefore, that the mental trends cannot be projected and assessed projections reported in this study are based on the until relevant resource projections have been completed. However, the demand for resources *Anne Carter, Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass.; Ni- depends on the number of people and their cholas G. Carter, World Bank, Washington, D.C.; Anne income, as well as on policy, climate, and tech- Ehrlich, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.; Peter Hen- riot, Center of Concern, Washington, D.C.; Mihajlo Mesa- nology. In the real world (and in more interactive rovic, Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, Ohio; models) all of these variables evolve and interact Douglas Ross, The Conference Board, New York City; and continuously, but with the government's present Kenneth E. F. Watt, University of California, Davis. INTRODUCTION 5 7- Climate P Population Technological Poky First step@ assumption i ,i projections t4N scenario assumptions projectu T1 f 7i Resource projections ergy, Secoh, @$t (food, en water, minero s, etc.) 7,777 -7 -7 nmental @,'J Third p: mr, i r EE?, I im I mp p Figure 1-1. The process of projecting trends. collective judgment of the agency experts who was given throughout to introducing as much participated in the effort. To ensure internal feedback and interaction as possible. The resulting consistency, several adjustments were required in projections are certainly sufficient to indicate the individual agency 'projections. As a result, the general nature and direction of the. trends. Fur- projections may not agree completely with projec- thermore, as discussed in Chapter 31, the inade- tions previously published by the participating quacies and inconsistencies that remain generally agencies. Since the manuscript has not been tend to make the projections more optimistic than subjected to formal interagency clearance proce- they would be if it had been possible to eliminate cedures, the agencies are not responsible for any the inadequacies and inconsistencies. The projec- errors in fact or judgment that may have occurred. tions therefore establish a "best-case" analysis in One striking finding of this.study is that, collec- that (given the assumptions of steady technologi- tively, the executive agencies of the government cal progress, but no public-policy changes) im- are currently incapable of presenting the President proved analysis is Rely to assign more impor- with a mutually consistent set of projections of tance-rather than less-to future problems of world trends in population, resources, and the population, resources, and environment. environment. While the projections presented in Finally, analysis of the limitations and weak- the chapters that follow are probably the most nesses in the models now in use (see Chapters 14 internally consistent ever developed with the long- through 23) provides a basis for developing and range, global models now used by the agencies, introducing improved models. The issues are they are still plagued with inadequacies and incon- important. Population, resources, and environ- sistencies. ment are long-term, global, highly interrelated issues, not likely to disappear without further While the analyses are admittedly imperfect, attention. Improved methods of analysis are they are still highly useful. This is the first time needed to better understand the future implica- that an effort has been made to apply-collec- tions of present decisions and policies. Given tively and consistently-the global, long-range adquate coordination and the necessary resources, models used by the government. Careful attention better models can be developed. 2 Population Projections Population projections comprise one of the Center assume no migration; a final section in this basic prerequisites for predicting and planning for chapter discusses probable developments in mi- future needs in such areas as food, energy, gration and their possible effects on the projec- employment, community facilities, and social tions. services. It would be ideal to have a single The terms used in the tables and the discussions forecast of population on which there was general in this chapter are defined as follows: agreement. However, since the factors influencing Crude birth rate: The .number of births per population trends-fertility, mortality, migration- 1,000 persons in one year (based on midyear are not perfectly predictable, projections usually population). represent individual or collective judgments that differ greatly, even among experts. Indeed, there Crude death rate: The number of deaths per is often even disagreement about the data used as 1,000 persons in one year (based on midyear the base for projections. population). Because of these inherent difficulties, popula- Growth rate: The annual increase (or decrease) tion estimates are presented in this chapter in in the population resulting from a surplus of deficit terms of an illustrative range, with a high and a of births over deaths and a surplus or deficit of low series, representing the highest and lowest migrants into or out of the country, expressed as population counts that may reasonably be ex- a percentage of the base population.* pected to occur, and a medium series, represent- Rate oj'natural increase: The annual increase ing reasonable expectations, given existing trends (or decrease) in the population resulting from a and present knowledge of the underlying factors. surplus or deficit of births over deaths, expressed Two sets of population projections are used in as a percentage of the midyear population. The the Global 2000 Study: those made by the U.S. natural increase of the population does not include Bureau of the Census and those made by the the migration of persons into or out of the Community and Family Study Center (CFSQ of country. the University of Chicago. It was decided to include the CFSC projections Total ftrtility rate (TFR): The average number along with the Census projections in order to of children that would be born per woman if all illustrate how such estimates are affected by women lived to the end of their childbearing years differences in basic assumptions about such fac- and bore children according to a given set of age- tors as fertility rates. For instance, the Census specific fertility rates. It is five times the sum of Bureau's high, medium, and low projections of the age-specific fertility rates, divided by 1,000.t world population in the year 2000 are 14, 8, and 3 percent higher, respectively, than the correspond- Bureau of the Census Projections ing CFSC projections. The detailed Bureau of the Census projections Along with discrepancies between the base-year are presented in Tables 2-10 through 2-14 at the data used in the two sets of projections (popula- end of this section. Tables 2-10 and 2-11 include tion estimates, fertility rates and mortality rates estimates and projections for all three series (high, for 1975), there are also significant differences in medium, and low) to provide an indication of the the way in which each group projected trends in fertility. Using a mathematical model, the CFSC arrived at sioficantly more optimistic projections *Average annual growth rates are computed using the of fertility rates in the year 2000. Differences compound growth formula r = ln(P,1P,)Jt- between the two methodologies will be discussed tPopulation projections usually employ total fertility rate as a unit of measure rather than crude birth rate, in order to further in Chapter 16. avoid methodological difficulties pertaining to age composi- The projections by both the Bureau of the tion, sex ratios, and interaction between fertility and mor- Census and the Community and Family Study tality. 7 8 -THE PROJECTIONS range covered by the projections and to serve as 4. Knowledge and methods of family limitation a basis for comparison with the corresponding will become better known and will be better used CFSC projections. 'Tables 2-12, 2-13, and 2-14 among populations that wish to reduce fertility. show only the medium range projections of popu- Expansion of family limitation practices will ex- lation growth rates, mortality rates, and birth pedite the process of fertility decline, and in rates. Table 2-1 summarizes the salient data from countries where rapid social and economic prog- the Census estimates and projections. The map on ress and s(rong desires for smaller families coin- the following page Illustrates the population cide, fertility decline will be very rapid. changes projected i .n the medium case. In making projections for each country or Assumptions region, the Census Bureau adopted fertility levels for the year 2000 that represented in their judg- Fertility Assumptions. The general assumptions ment the "most likely" level, which corresponds that underlie the Census projections with regard to the level for the medium series. Specific fertility to fertility are: levels were also assumed for the purpose of the high and low series. Consideration was given to 1. Less developed countries will continue to fertility assumptions made in existing projections make moderate progress in social and economic prepared by national agencies or universities, development during the 1975-2000 period. based on the belief that demographers in the 2. As less developed countries (LDCs) progress individual countries could be expected to have a in social and economic development, the fertility special understanding of what are "reasonable" level is expected to decline more or less continu- fertility levels to expect in the future of their own ously but with some temporary plateaus. country. 3. Almost all countries that do not already do For the more developed countries the fertility so will make family planning services available to assumptions in existing official national projec- an appreciable portion of the population during tions were used with, in some instances, slight the 1975-2000 period, and countries with present modification. The aggregates of Eastern and West- family planning programs will extend coverage, ern Europe were projected on the basis of fertility particularly in rural areas. trends -according to the U.N. medium series, with' slight adjustment at the U.S. Bureau of the TABLE 2-1 Census to take account of fertility data available since the U.N. projections were prepared. For the Bureau of Census Estimates and Projections, less developed countries the fertility assumptions Medium Series, Summary Data, 1975-2000 were made on a judgmental basis by demogra- phers who have worked with the demographic (Population in billions) and related socioeconomic data for the individual Popula- Percent Annual countries over extended time periods. Specifically, tion of World Percent a no mathematical model of fertility change was Pop. Growth used. However, in setting the target fertility levels 1975 World 4.09 - and paths of fertility decline for the less developed More developed regions 1.13 28 countries, the demographers took into considera- Less developed regions 2.96 72 tion the following major factors: 1980 World 4.47 - 1.78 More developed regions 1.17 26 0.68 1. Current level of fertility. Less developed regions 3.30 74 2.18 2. Recent trends in fertility. 1985 World 4.88 - 1.77 3. Current levels and recent trends in social and More developed regions 1.21 25 0.70 economic. development. Less developed regions 3.67 75 2.14 4. Current status and approximate past impact 1990 World 5.34 - 1.78 of family planning and public health programs. More developed regions 1.25 23 0.66 5. Government policy on population matters. Less developed regions 4.09 77 2.14 6. Recent fertility trends in countries with 1995 World 5.83. - 1.77 More developed regions 1.29 22 0.59 similar cultural, social, and economic conditions Less developed regions 4.54 78 2.11 and prospects. 2000 World 6.35 - 1.70 7. Expressed "desired" family size in the More developed regions 1.32 21 0.51 population. Less developed regions 5.03 79 2.02 8. Fertility assumptions made by international 'Annual percent growth for the preceding 5-year period. agencies, such as the U.N. and the World Bank. P Ni iq 2000 1975 t 460 1975 2000 3 S and Europe ___moo I T-7 1975 0 214 24 'A' s s I'C 2@0 - --- -- -'1975 5- _4 if; @0 200 9 814 iN 1975 Af 325- 197 katInAMprics "V, lbr, OW, A, OW 7-% @;i,- V'L 10 THE PROJECTIONS Furthermore, two general guidelines were Projection of mortality, using the base year as adopted in setting the range of fertility levels in the starting point, was generally done in one of the year 2000. two ways: 1. The higher the level of fertility at the base 1. Either a target life expectancy at birth (and date, the wider the range of assumed fertility corresponding life table) was chosen for the year levels in the year 2000. 2000 with life expectancies for the intervening 2. The greater the uncertainty about current years obtained by assuming a "reasonable pat- the tern" of change of mortality; or fertility levels and current trends, the greater 2. The pattern and degree of change in mortality range of assumed fertility levels in the year 2000. from year to year was assurned with the eventual Mortaliti, Assumptions. Only one specific mor- life expectancy in the year 2000 "falling out" of the process. tality trend was assumed for each projection, except for the People's Republic of China. Esti- In either case, consideration was always given mates for mortality in the base year of the to the trends and levels shown in national projec- projections and for the projection period through tions and in projections by international organiza- 2000 are developed through the use of life table tions, and by considering the mortality trends in estimates. The life tables for the base year of the similar countries in the region that have already projections were usually compiled from a variety experienced the relevant portion of the mortality of sources, including vital registration data on transition. Target life expectancies for the year deaths by age and sex (adjusted at times for 2000 were sometimes chosen, in fact, to be the underregistration) and survey or census data on same as those already achieved in "leading" deaths by age and sex during the preceding year countries, or previously assumed in national or (after appropriate evaluation and adjustment if U.N. projections. necessary), or by analyzing age distributions of the population at one or more points in time and Total Population applying a variety of demographic techniques such as stable population analysis and use of model life All three Bureau of the Census estimates and tables. In a few countries, such as Nigeria, where projections of total world population are summa- little reliable information is available, "guessti- rized in Table 2-2. The medium series is consid- mates" of the appropriate level of mortality and ered the population growth trend most likely to of the model life table pattern were made, always occur. The high and low series represent a considering estimates that have been made by 11 reasonable range" above and below the medium other institutions, such as the United Nations. series. TABLE 2-2 Census Bureau World Estirnates and Projections Population Size and Net Growth Total Population Net Growth Average (Millions) 1975 to 2000 Annual Growth 1975 2000 Millions Percent Rate (Percent) Medium series 4,090 6,351 2,261 55 1.8 High series 4,134 6,798 2,664 64 2.0 Low series 4,043 5,922 1,879 46 1.5 Vital Rates8 Crude Birth Rate Crude Death Rate Rate of Natural Increase (per 1,000) (per 1,000) (Percent) 1975 2000 1975 2000 1975 2000 Medium series 30.4 25.6 12.3 9.1 1.8 1.6 High series 32.0 29.4 12.9 9.4 1.9 2.0 Low series 28.8 21.9 11.9 8.9 1.7 1.3 Rates shown for 200D refer to midyear B99 to midyear 2000. POPULATION PROJECTIONS 11 The medium series begins with a 1975 base people during the period 1975-2000 (1.88-2.26 population total of about 4.09 billion, a crude birth billion) than during the 1950-1975 period (1.56 rate of 30 per 1,000, and a crude death rate of 12 billion). Oer 1,000. The series implies declines of 16 0¢ in the crude birth rate and 26 percent in Contrasts Between More Developed and Less the crude death rate from 1975 to 2000, generating Developed Regions. There are characteristic de- changes in the natural increase from 1.8 percent mographic differences between the populations of in 1975 to 1.6 percent in 2000. Net population the more developed and less developed regions of growth during this whole 25-year period would the worid (Table 2-3). For example, the estimated add about 2.26 billion to the base population and crude birth rate for the less developed regions in produce an end-of-century world population total 1975 was more than double the estimated crude of about 6.35 billion. birth rate for the more developed regions; the The high series of world population projections estimated crude death rate for the less developed begins with a 1975 base population of 4.13 billion, regions in 1975 was significantly higher than for and the low series with a 1975 base population of the more developed regions; and the resulting rate 4.04 billion.* Using the 1975 base populations of natural increase for the less developed regions and, alternately, the high and low series trends of in 1975 was two-thirds higher than for the more 1975-2000 vital rates, world population would developed regions. These characteristic differ- increase in the high series by about 2.66 billion ences are expected to persist into the future, as between 1975 and 2000 and would total about 6.8 indicated by the projected vital rate differences billion by the end of the century; in the low series, for the year 2000. world population would increase by about 1.88 The medium series for the more developed billion between 1975 and 2000 and would total regions begins with a 1975 base population total of about 5.92 billion by the end of the century. about 1.13 billion, a crude birth rate of about 16 World population growth between 1950 and per 1,000, and a crude death rate of about 9.6 per 1975 is estimated at about 1.56 billion, reflecting 1,000. The series implies a slight change in the an average growth rate of about 1.9 percent per crude birth rate, increasing from 16 in 1975 to a year. The latter may be compared to the medium, peak of 17 by 1985, and thereafter declining to 15 high, and low projections for 1975 to 2000 as by the year 2000, an increase in the crude death follows: rate from 9.6 per 1,000 in 1975 to 10.4 per 1,000 in Average 2000 and an average annual growth rate of 0.6 Net Growth Annual percent. Net population growth during this entire (billions) Growth 25-year period would add about 0. 19 billion to the Rate base population and produce an end-of-century (percent) population figure of 1.32 billion for the more 1950 to 1975 estimates 1.56 1.9 developed regions. 1975 to 2000 projections The same 1975 base population estimate is used Medium series 2.26 1.8 for the more developed regions in the high and High series 2.66 2.0 low series as in the medium series. However, Low series 1.88 1.5 alternately high and low trends in vital rates are The medium projection series suggests that the utilized for 1975 to 2000. Thus, the population of population of the wodd may grow between 1975 the developed regions in the year 2000 might be and 2000 at a slightly lower annual rate than that as high as 1.38 billion or as low as 1.27 billion. observed from 1950 to 1975. The high and low The medium series for the less developed series present alternative increase rates for 1975 regions begins with a 1975 base population total of to 2000. However, it should not be overlooked 2.96 billion, a crude birth rate of about 36 per that irrespective of the medium, high, or low rates 1,000, and a crude death rate of about 13 per of growth during 1975 to 2000, all three projection 1,000. The series implies declines of 21 percent in series indicate a net addition to the world popula- the crude birth rate and 35 percent in the crude tion total of an appreciably greater number of death rate during 1975 to 2000; these changes result in rates of natural increase of 2.2 percent in *Nearly all of the differences between the 1975 estimates of 1975 and 2.0 percent in 2000. Population growth world population in the medium, high, and low series are during this 25-year period would add over 2 billion due to the use of the following alternate 1975 population to the base population, producing an end-of-cen- estimates for the People's Republic of China: medium series, 935 million; high series, 978 million; low series, 889 tury population figure of about 5 billion for the million. less developed regions. 12 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 2-3 More Developed Regions and Less Developed Regions--Census Bureau Estimates and Projections Population Size and Net Growth Average Total population Net Growth Annual Willions) 1975 to 2000 Growth Rate 1975 2000 Millions Percent (Percenf) More developed regions Medium series 1,131 1,323 192 17 0.6 High series 1,131 1,377 246 22 0.8 Low series 1,131 1,274 143 13 0.5 Less developed regions Medium series 2,959 5,028 2,069 70 2.1 High series 3,003 5,420 2,417 80 2.4 Low series 2,912 4,648 1,736 60 1.9 Vital Rates' Crude Birth Rate Crude Death Rate Rate of Natural Increase (per 1,000) (per 1,000) Wercent) 1975 2000 1975 2000 1975 2000 More developed regions Medium series 16.1 15.2 9.6 10.4 0.6 0.5 High series 16.1 17.4 9.6 10.1 0.6 0.7 Low series 16.1 13.0 9.6 10.7 0.6 0.2 Less developed regions Medium series 35.9 28.4 13.4 8.7 2.2 2.0 High series 38.0 32.4 14.1 9.2 2.4 2.3 Low series 33.7 24.3 12.8 8.4 2.1 1.6 Rates shown for 2000 refer to midyear 1"9 to midyear 2WO. For the less developed regions, alternate high population growth from 1975 to the end of the and low projections of population growth for the century would be lower than was the case be- 1975 to 2000 period result in total population tween 1950 and 1975, in ternis of both absolute growth during the period of as high as 2.42 billion increments and rates of growth. or as low as 1.74 billion. For the less developed regions, the medium Estimates of net population growth in the more projection series suggests that the population may developed and less developed regions between grow between 1975 and 2000 at a somewhat lower 1950 and 1975 may be compared to the projections annual rate than that observed from 1950 to 1975. for 1975 to 2000, as follows: Regardless of the differences in the high, medium, Average and low series growth nates, however, all three Annual projections indicate a net addition to the popula- Net Growth Growth tion of the less developed regions of an apprecia- (billions) Rate bly greater number of people during the 1975-20W (percent) period (1.74 to 2.42 billion) than during the More developed regions preceding 25-year period (1.28 billion). 1950 to 1975 0.27 1.1 The population of the less developed regions 1975 to 2OW Medium series 0.19 0.6 comprised about 72 percent of the world's popu- High series 0.25 0.8 lation in 1975 and, according to the three projec- Low series 0.14 0.5 tion series, will constitute 78-80 percent of the Less developed regions world's population in the year 2000. This dramatic 1950 to 1975 1.28 2.3 increase is hardly surprising when one considers 1975 to 2000 that the less developed regions would account for Medium series 2.07 2.1 High series 2.42 2.4 nine-tenths of world population growth according Low series 1.74 1.9 to tfie projections (see Fig. 2-1 for medium series projections). During the previous quarter century, For the more developed regions, all three projec- less developed regions accounted for four-fifths of tion series in the present report indicate that world population growth, and thereby increased "Ol mm c a > m wo ?a M* coo=. z a z. It I > CL 'th S.c > L4 CA m (A co 00.30 ID st zp 0 > 0 * 3 r4 iA fA & CA 2 z CL 0 Z* irp 14 THE PROJECTIONS their share of world population from 66 percent in increment in total population in 2000 than in 1975 1950 to 72 percent in 1975. and, if continued after 2000, would require nearly Note: Hereafter, the-tables and discussions of 140 years to cause the population of the more the Bureau of the Census projections will pertain developed regions to double. only to the medium series of estimates and Major Regions. The medium series of estimates projections unless otherwise specified. and projections of population growth for the world's major regions from 1975 to 2000 are Changes in Selected Vital Rates and Total shown in Table 2-4. Population. The data presented in this chapter Africa's population is characterized by high refer to a projection period of 25 years, from 1975 fertility and high mortality rates-a population of to 2000. In terms of fundamental demographic about 0.81 billion in the year 2000, a net increase change, this is a relatively short time period. Any of 0.42 billion over 1975. This increase would profound modification (barring major calamities) reflect a more than doubling of Aftica's population of world population growth trends, including req- in only 25 years and represents the most rapid uisite changes in age composition, would require population growth rate projected for any major a much longer time to evolve. According to these world region during the period 1975 to 2000. * projections, the population growth rates for the Moderately high crude birth and death rates world as a whole and for the less developed characterize the less developed countries of the regions in particular, will decline only slightly Asia and Oceania region. The projected popula- from 1975 to 2000, despite significant declines in tion of these LDCs in 2000 is 3.63 billion, a net fertility levels. increase of 1.36 billion over 1975, or about 60 For the less developed regions the projected percent of world population growth projected for rate of natural increase declines from 1975 to 2000 this period. by only 12 percent, despite a decline in the crude Fertility remains high in Latin America and birth rate of 21 percent and a decline of 30 percent crude death rates low. The projections indicate a in the total fertility rate.* This projected decline total population of about 0.64 billion by the year of 12 percent notwithstanding, the resulting 2000, a 96 percent increase over 1975. Latin "lower" rate for 2000 of about 2.0 percent per America's projected percent increase is the sec- year is still relatively high. For example, applied ond highest for any major world region. to the larger base population of 5.03 billion, it The populations of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern produces a much higher annual increment of total Europe (including Albania and Yugoslavia) are population in 2000 (99 million) than the 2.2 percent characterized by relatively low fertility, mortality, rate of natural increase produced in 1975 (67 and growth rates. The projections reveal a total million). In fact, an annual rate of natural increase population of 0.46 billion by 2000, or an increase of 2 percent, if continued after 2000, would double of 20 percent over 1975-the second lowest of any the population of the less developed regions in major world region. only 35 years. The industrialized North American countries, For the more developed regions of the world, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zea- the projections indicate a decline from 1975 to land have completed their "demographic transi- 2000 of about one-fourth in the rate of natural tion," and their populations are characterized by increase, concurrently with a slight decline in the relatively low fertility, mortality, and growth rates. crude birth rate and a slight increase in the By the end of the century, their population will projected total fertility rate. However, the rate of increase to about 0.81 billion, or 14 percent over natural increase for 2000 (about 0.5 percent per 1975, by far the lowest percent increase of any year) is quite low; it produces a lower annual major world region. The percentage distribution of world population *T'he difference between the 30 percent decline in the total by major. regions as estimated for 1975 and as fertility rate and the 21 percent decline in the crude birth projected in the medium series for 2000 are shown rate from 1975 to 2000 can be explained as follows. About 6 in Table 2-5. percentage points of the difference is due to a larger The projections indicate that at the end of the proportion of women in the childbearing ages (15-49 years) in 2000 than in 1975. The rest of the difference is due to century the less developed countries of Asia and changes in the age patterns of fertility within the childbear- Oceania will continue to have the highest percent- ing years. The difference between the 21 percent decline in age of world population of any major region by the crude birth rate and the 12 percent decline in the rate of far-about 57.2 percent in 2000, as compared with natural increase is due to the decrease in the crude death rate by a greater percentage than the decrease in the crude about 55.6 percent in 1975. Also, by 2000 Africa's birth rate. and Latin America's percentages of world popu- POPULATION PROJECTIONS 15 TABLE 2-4 Major Region&--CensusBureau Estintatesand Projections Population Size and Net Growth Total Population Net Growth Average (Millions) 1975 to 2000 Annual Growth 1975 2000 Millions Percent Rate (Percent) World 4,090 6,351 2,261 55 1.8 Africa 399 814 416 104 2.9 Asia and Oceania', 2,274 3,630 1,356 60 1.9 Latin America 325 637 312 % 2.7 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe b 384 460 76 20 0.7 North America, Western Europe,c Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 708 809 101 14 0.5 Vital Ratesd Rate of Natural Crude Birth Rate Crude Death Rate Increase (per 1,000) (per 1,000) (Percent) 1975 2000 1975 2000 1975 2000 World 30.4 25.6 12.3 9.1 1.8 1.6 Afr ica 46.7 38.5 19.0 11.3 2.8 2.7 Asia and'Oceania 0 33.7 25.9 13.0 8.7 2. 1 1.7 Latin America ' 37.2 28.7 8.9 5.7 2.8 2.3 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe' 17.7 15.9 9.7 10.5 0.8 0.5 North America, Weste m Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 14.8 14.5 9.6 10.5 0.5 0.4 oDeveloping countries only, i.e.. excluding Japan, Australia. and New Zealand. hEastern Europe includes Albania and Yugoslavia. -Western Europe as used here comprises all of Europe except Eastern Europe, Albania, and Yugoslavia. The U.S.S.R. is also excluded. d Rates shown for 2000 refer to midyear 1999 to midyear 2WO. TABLE 2-5 15 Selected Countries. Estimates and projec- tions of population growth from 1975 to 2000 for Percent Distribution of World Population by the 15 selected countries are presented in Table Major Region, Census Bureau Medium Series 2-6. The largest population increases indicated are 1975 2000 for India and the People's Republic of China, each Africa 9.9 12.8 adding about 0.4 billion inhabitants between 1975 Asia and Oceania& 55.6 57.2 and 2000. The highest percentage increases, how- Latin America 7.9 10.0 ever, are projected for Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europeb 9.4 7.3 Brazil, and Bangladesh, each of which shows ail North America, Western Europe, e Japan, increase of 100 percent or more. The lowest Australia ', and New Zealand 17.3 12.7 percentage increases are projected for the United -Developing countries only, i.e.. excluding Japan. Australia. and New Zealand. States, Japan, and the U.S.S.R. In the year 2OW bEastern Europe includes Albania and Yugoslavia. I -western Europe as used here comprises all of Europe except Ea Istern Europe. the People's Republic of China would still be the Albania,.and Yugoslavia. The.U.S.S.R. is also excluded. world's most populous nation, comprising one- fifth of the world's population. The second most lation will increase significantly, while the percent- populous nation-India-would constitute about age of world population living in the U.S.S.R. and 16 percent of the world's population. The Eastern Europe will decline to about 7.3 percent, U.S.S.R. and the United States would remain the and the percentage living in the nonsocialist more third and fourth most populous nations with about developed countries of North America and West- 5 percent and 4 percent, respectively, and Japan, ern Europe, as well as in Japan, Australia, and which in 1975 was the sixth most populous, of the New Zealand, will decrease to less than 13 15 selected countries, would drop to 10th place percent. with about 2 percent of the total world population. 16 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 2-6 Population Size, Net Growth, and Percent of World Population of 15 Selected Countries, Census Bureau Medium Series Total Population Net Growth, Average Percent of World (millions) 1975 to 2000 Annual Population Country Growth 1975 2000 Millions Percent Rate 1975 2000 (Pervent) People's Republic of China 935 1,329 394 42 1.4 22.9 20.9 India 618 1,021 402 65 2.0 15.1 16.1 Indonesia 135 226 91 68 2.1 3.3 3.6 Bangladesh 79 159 79 100 2.8 1.9 2.5 Pakistan 71 149 78 111 3.0 1.7 2.4 Philippines 43 73 30 71 2.2 1.0 1.2 Thailand 42 75 33 77 2.3 1.0 1.2 South Korea 37 57 20 55 1.7 0.9 0.9 Fgypt 37 65 29 77 2.3 0.9 1.0 Nigeria 63 135 72 114 3.0 1.5 2.1 Brazil 109 226 117 108 2.9 2.7 3.6 Mexico 60 131 71 119 3.1 1.5 2.1 United States 214 248 35 16 0.6 5.2 3.9 U. S. S. R. 254 309 54 21 0.8 6.2 4.9 Japan 112 133 21 19 0.7 2.7 2.1 Age Composition of the Population As projected to 2000, the age composition of Broad Age Groups. The age composition of the the. population of the world.'s more developed world and of the more developed and less devel- regions would still be significantly different from oped regions in 1975 is summarized in Table-2-7 that of the less. developed regions, as can be seen (medium series). The more developed regions had from. Figure 2-2. The age composition of the less significantly higher percentages of population in developed regions would still be very similar to the 15-64 -age group and in the age group 65 and that of the world as,a whole, since 80 percent of over, and a far lower percentage of population in the worid's population would be living in these the 0-14 group. For the world as a whole, the re ons by 2000. percentages of population in the various broad age In absolute figures, the 15-64 age group shows groups were closer to the age composition per- the largest projected increases from 1975 to 2000. centages of the less developed regions, since over The highest percentage increase over 1975, how- 72 percent of the world's population lived in the ever, is shown by the 65 and over group, and the less developed regions in 1975. lowest by the 0-14 group. For the five major world regions and the 15 TABLE 2-7 selected countries, Table 24 shows the percent Broad Age Groups, by More Developed Regions distribution of population by age in 1975 and in and 2000 and the 1975-2000 percent increase in popu- Less Developed Regions, 1975 and 2000 lation by age. . (Census Bureau) Functional Age Groups. Table 2_9 presents a (Population in millions) summary of projected changes -from 1975 to 2000 World More Dev. Less Dev. in the population of certain functional age groups 1975: for the world, the more developed and less 0-14 yrs 1,505 37 281 25 1,224 42 developed regions, the major regions, and 15 15--64 yrs 2,368 58 731 65 1,637 55 selected countries. 65 & over 217 5 119 to 98 3 For the world as a whole, the projected percent All ages 4,090 100 1,131 100 2,959 100 increases in the school-age population are lower 2000: than the projected percent increases in total pop- 0-14 yrs 2,055 32 297 22 1,758 35 Wations, but for Africa, Latin America, and many 15-64 yrs 3,906 62 859 65 3,047 61 of the selected LDCs, the projected 'percent 65 & over 390 6 167 13 223 4 increases in school-age'population are extremely All ages 6,351 100 1,323 100 5,028 too high. For the less developed regions as a whole, e;, Ul@ zz AI JM E2. 14 :14 vy ON, Nli. 15, Ai ME' I 18 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 2-8 Percent Distribution of Population, 1975 and 2000, and 1975-2000 Increase for Major Regions and Selected Countries, Census Bureau Medium Series Percent Distribution of Percent Distribution of Total Population by Age in Percent Increase of Population by Total Population by Age in 1975 Age, 1975 to 2000 2000 0-14 15--64 65 0-14 154A 65 All 0-14 154A 65 and over and over Ages and over Major regions Africa 44 53 3 97 109 129 104 43 54 3 Asia and Oceaniaa 41 56 3 29 78 125 60 32 63 5 Latin America 42 54 4 73 112 124 96 38 58 4 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe b 25 65 10 10 19 49 20 23 65 12 North America, Western Eu- rope,' Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 25 64 11 1 15 36 14 22 65 13 Selected countries People's Republic of China 38 58 4 5 62 116 42 28 66 6 India 40 57 3 36 82 147 65 34 62 4 Indonesia 43 55 2 44 82 201 68 37 60 3 Bangladesh 46 51 3 79 120 85 100 41 56 3 Pakistan 46 51 3 84 133 124 111 40 57 3 Philippines 44 53 3 30 102 119 91 34 62 4 Thailand 43 54 3 45 99 135 77 35 61 4 South Korea 39 58 3 14 75 170 55 28 66 6 Egypt 41 56 3 54 91 136 77 35 60 5 Nigeria 45 53 2 115 111 159 114 45 52 3 Brazil 43 54 3 88 119 167 108 39 57 4 Mexico 48 49 3 88 150 109 119 41 56 3 United States 26 64 10 0 19 40 16 21 66 13 U.S.S.R. 26 65 9 11 20 59 21 23 65 12 Japan 24 68 8 2 16 108 19 20 66 14 *Developing countries only, i.e., excluding Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. bEastern Europe includes Albania and Yugoslavia. 'Western Europe as used here comprises all of Europe except Eastern Europe, Albania, and Yugoslavia. The U.S.S.R. is also excluded. the projected net increase in the school-age popu- tional demands for training and employment. In lation amounts to 0.36 billion (a 48 percent in- more developed regions, the projected increment crease), an enormous increment in terms of main- amounts to only about 0.13 billion persons (an taining or improving the quality of education. By increase of 18 percent). comparison, in the more developed regions of the As may be expected, the growth patterns for world, where neady full enrollment has already the female population in the reproductive ages will been achieved, the projected increment for the be similar to those of the working-age population. school-age group is only 8 million (an increase of Thus, the projected increase of females in the 4 percent). reproductive ages in the less developed regions is The broad age group comprising persons 15-64 about 85 percent from 1975 to 2000, as compared years of age corresponds approximately to a with about 13 percent in the more developed country's working-age (or main working-age) pop- regions. Such rapid growth in the numbers of ulation. For the less developed regions, the pro- women in the fertile ages in the less developed jected 86 percent increase in this group is greater regions will ensure an increase in the absolute than the projected 70 percent increase in total number of births, even if fertility nates decline. population. Among the 15 selected countries, the The highest percentage increases are projected largest projected percentage increases are for for the age group 65 years and over in both less Mexico, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Brazil, and Ni- and more developed regions. Although the growth getia. While such a large growth in working-age of this group is particularly rapid in the less population represents a beneficial increase in the developed regions (127 percent as shown in Table productive sector of the population, the net incre- 2-8), it constitutes only about 6 percent of total ment (about 1.41 billion persons) will create addi- 1975-2000 population increase for these regions. TABLE 2-9 Changes in Functional Age Groups and Total Population, 1975-2000, for World, More Developed and Less Developed Regions, Major Regions, and Selected Countries, Census Bureau Medium Series Females of School-Age Working-Age Popu- Reproductive Age: Old-Age Population: Total Population: Population: 5-14 lation: 15--64 15-49 65 and over Allages Millions Percent Millions Percent Millions Percent Millions Percent Millions Percent World 369 39 1,538 65 619 64 173 80 2,261 55 More developed regions' 8 4 128 18 37 13 49 41 192 17 Less developed regions 361 48 1,410 86 582 85 125 127 2,069 70 Major regions Africa 110 105 231 109 99 108 15 129 416 104 Asia and Oceania' 184 32 994 78 405 76 % 125 1,356 60 Latin America 69 82 196 112 83 111 15 124 312 96 C U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 7 10 48 19 14 14 18 49 76 20 Northern America, Western Europe,' Japan, Australia, and New Zealand -1 -1 70 15 19 11 29 36 101 14 10 V Selected countries 2 People's Republic of China 9 4 334 62 133 59 43 116 394 42 India 61 39 286 82 114 80 27 147 402 65 Indonesia 18 52 61 82 26 79 5 200 91 68 Z Bangladesh 20 93 48 120 21 126 2 85 79 100 Pakistan 19 % 49 133 21 138 2 124 78 111 Philippines 4 30 23 102 10 96 2 119 30 71 Thailand 6 50 23 99 10 98 2 135 33 77 South Korea 1 14 16 76 6 68 2 170 20 55 Egypt 6 60 19 91 8 89 2 136 29 77 Nigeria 20 122 37 111 16 114 3 159 72 114 Brazil 28 103 70 119 30 116 6 167 117 108 Mexico 17 95 44 150 19 146 2 108 71 119 United States -1 -2 26 19 9 17 9 40 35 16 U.S.S.R. 5 10 34 20 11 16 13 59 54 21 Japan 1 4 12 16 0 9 108 21 19 : Includes North America, Europe (including the U.S.S.R.), Australia, New Zealand, Japan, temperate South America (i.e., Argentina, Chile, Falkland Islands, and Uruguay). Developing countries only, i.e., excluding Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. 'Eastern Europe includes Albania and Yugoslavia. dWestern Europe as used here comprises all of Europe except Eastern Europe, Albania, and Yugoslavia. The U.S.S.R. is also excluded. 20 THE PROJECTIONS In the more developed regions, however, the grow between 1975 and 2000 at a slightly lower increase of, about 41 percent in the size of the old- annual rate than between 1950 and 1975, but that ,,age group is especially significant, since it com- an appreciably greater number of people would be prises one-fourth of the total population increase added to the total world population during the for these regions. 1975-2000 period than during the former period. The less developed regions would account for ,Summary nine-tenths of the world population growth be- The Bureau of Census projections* presented in tween 1975 and 2000. By 2000 these regions would @Tables 2-10 through 2-14 can be summarized comprise more than three-fourths of the world's 'briefly- as follows: population, reflecting notable projected population World population totaled about 4.09 billion increases in Africa, Latin America, and the less persons, in 1975 and as projected in the Bureau of developed countries of Asia and Oceania. As the Census medium series would increase by indicated in Table 2-1, the percentage of the about 55 percent and number about 6.35 billion in world's population in the LDCs continues to 2000. This' means that worid population would increase, approaching 80 percent by 2000. The LDC growth rate declines from about 2.28 percent *A 'more detailed presentation of the Census projections is to 2.02 percent and by 2000 is the predominant provided in U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the influence in the world growth rate-which de- Census, Illustrative Projections of World Populations to the 21st Century, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Of- clines only slightly, from 1.78 percent in the 1975- fice, 1979. 80 period to 1.70 percent in the 1995-2000 period. . BUREAU OF THE CENSUS PROJECTIONS U.S. Bureau of the Census projections for total population, total fertility rates, population growth rates, crude death rates, and crude birth rates are presented in Tables 2-10 through 2-14. In each table: More developed regions comprise Northern America, temperate South America, Europe, U.S.S.R., Japan, Australia, andNew Zealand. All other regions of the world are classified as less developed regions. Asia and Oceania excludes Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Eastern Ettrope includes Albania and Yugoslavia. Western Europe comprises all of Europe except Eastern Europe (including the U.S.S.R.), Albania, and Yugoslavia. TABLE 2-10 Census Bureau Projected Total Population for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (in thousands) 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 HIGH SERIES World 4,134,049 4,548,928 5,012,753 5,544,671 6,143,076 6,797,504 More developed regions 1,130,989 1,173,831 1,224,157 1,276,131 1,327,400 1,377,258 Less developed regions 3,003,060 3,375,096 3,788,596 4,268,539 4,815,676 5,420,245 Major Regions Africa 398,694 459,653 533,548 621,830 726,565 846,880 Asia and Oceania 2,318,028 2,580,123 2,861,277 3,185,185 3,551,394 3,951,198 Latin America 325,085 377,073 438,7% 509,969 589,698 677,904 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe - 384,336 402,262 422,289 441,660 460,433 479,518 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 707,906 729,817 756,842 786,028 814,987 842,003 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 977,862 1,071,378 1,150,998 1,241,497 1,347,876 1,467,860 India 618.470 694,190 786,222 893,586 1,012,943 1,141,900 Indonesia 134,988 150,467 168,155 188,290 210,993 235,720 Bangladesh 79,411 92,319 107,565 125,171 144,862 166,185 Pakistan 70,974 $3,261 98,078 115,339 134,777 156,083 POPULATION PROJECTIONS 21 TABLE 2-10 (Cont.) (In thousands) 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 HIGH SERIES (cont.) Philippines 43,029 49,063 55,545 62,697 70,771 79,773 Thailand 42,473 48,435 55,168 62,805 71,354 80,806 South Korea 36,895 40,946 45,507 50,663 56,087 61,535 Egypt 36,859 42,122 48,250 55,162 62,658 70,534 Nigeria 62,925 72,473 84,271 98,722 116,159 136,934 Brazil 108,882 128,235 151,309 177,977 207,995 241,436 Mexico 60,188 72,214 86,468 103,006 121,618 142,022 United States 213,540 222,395 234,841 248,034 259,823 270,174 U.S.S.R. 254,393 267@577 282,384 296,415 309,551 322,787 Japan 111,566 117,076 122,169 126,768 131,102 135,309 Eastern Europe 129,943 134,685 139,905 145,245 150,882 156,731 Western Europe 343,@17 348,908 355,610 364,172 374,386 384,331 MEDIUM SERIES World 4,090,133 4,470,380 4,884,743 5,340,419 5,833,887 6,351,070 More developed regions 1,130,989 1,169,863 1,211,772 1,252,233 1,289,712 1,3229824 Less developed regions 2,959,143 3,300,516 3,672,971 4,088,186 4,544,175 5,028,246 Major Regions Africa 398,694 458,861 530,567 613,894 708,896 814,272 Asia and Oceania 2,274,471 2,508,490 2,754,505 3,025,189 3,320,192 3,630,195 Latin America 324,M, 374,774 432,486 496,624 565,431 636,937 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 384,336 .400,789 418,080 433,672 447,658 460,471 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 707,906 727,466 749,105 771,041 791,710 809,195 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 934,626 1,007,858 1,075,999 J, 151,665 1,237,029 1,328,645 India 618,471 689,545 764,157 843,643 929,102 1,020,917 Indonesia 134,988 150,246 167,005 185,375 205,425 226,388 Bangladesh 79,411 92,196 106,892 123,202 140,666 158,724 Pakistan 70,974 83,145 97,512 113,754 131,296 149,464 Philippines 42,810 48,181 53,657 59,526 66,064 73,229 Thailand 42,4@O 48,101 54,307 61,051 68,056 75,238 South Korea 36,846 40,604 44,561 48,721 52,902 56,983 Egypt 36,859 42,046 47,739 53,648 59,477 65,380 Nigeria 62,925 72,469 84,215 98,439 115,261 134,680 Brazil 108,797 127,825 149,762 173,723 199,110 225,897 Mexico 59,913 71,136 94,016 98,555 114,450 131,320 United States 213,540 220,497 228,912 237,028 243,581 248,372 U.S.S.R. 254,393 266,304 278,973 290,235 300,020 308,893 Japan 111,566 116,962 121,741 125,870 129,574 132,951 Eastern Europe 129,943 134,485 139,107 143,437 147,638 151,578 Western Europe 343,517 348,733 354,878 362,306 370,702 378,222 LOW SERIES World 4,043,444 4,384,420 4,753,'612 5,140,162 5,533,442 5,921,745 More developed regions 1,130,989 1,166,263 1,200,970 1,231,408 1,256,351 1,274,174 Less developed regions 2,912,455 3,218,157 3,552,642 3,908,754 4,277,091 4,647,571 Major Regions Africa 398,694 457,621 525,247 599,B0 677,723 758,842 Asia and Oceania 2,228,443 2,431,561 2,650,767 2,882,418 3,121,231 3,359,092 Latin America 324,064 370,543 421,024 473,826 527,467 580,958 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 384,336 399,321 413,884 425,712 434,955 441,680 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 707,906 725,374 742,689 758,677 772,066 781,174 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 889,015 937,955 991,581 1,050,502 1,113,447 1,175,761 India 618,471 686,790 757,233 827,960 899,438 974,282 22' THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 2-10 (Cont.) (In thousands) 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 LOW SERIES (cont.) Indonesia 134,988 149,831 164,983 180,321 195,349 209,125 Bangladesh 79,411 91,993 105,995 120,959 136,299 151,136 Pakistan 70,974 83,075 97,169 112,735 128,852 144,181 Philippines 42,630 47,462 52,031 56,682 61,635 66,786 Thailand 42,352 47,813 53,349 58,824 64,219 69,384 South Korea 36 677 39,990 43,372 46,918 50,390 53,550 Egypt 36:859 41,918 46,772 51,067 54,909 58,803 Nigeria 62,925 72,437 83,907 97,313 112,397 128,749 Brazil 108,524 126,508 146,582 168,100 190,688 213,838 Mexico 59,526 68,800 78,432 88,664 99,451 .110,595 United States 213,540 219,078 224,%2 229,919 233,0713 234,328 U.S.S.R. 254,393 265,031 275,563 284,056 290,495 295,115 Japan 111,566 116,733 120,884 124,141 126,7% 128,891 Eastern Europe 129,943 134,290 138,321 141,656 144,460 146,565 Western Europe -343,517 348,457 353,916 359,983 366,132 370,788 TABLE 2-11 Census Bureau Projected Total Fertility Rate' for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries 1915 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 HIGH SERIES World 4.5299 4.2163 4.0892 4.0523 4.0037 3.9189 More developed regions 2.1505 2.3184 2.4060 2.4700 2.5408 2.6080 Less developed regions 5.5202 4.9494 4.6814 4.5493 4.4103 4.2417 Major Regions Africa 6.3847 6.3826 6.3315 6.2211 6.0755 5.6424 Asia and Oceania 5.3501 4.6174 4.2917 4.1600 4.0175 3.8829 Latin America 5.3992 5.2939 5.1726 4.9912 4.7436 4.4952 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 2.3687 2.4987 2.5284 2.5642 2.6178 2.6719 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 1.9703 2.1702 2.2987 2.3832 2.4577 2.5328 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 5.1710 3.6565 3.0870 3.0750 3.0750 3.0750 India 5.3000 5.2099 5.1750 5.0500 4.8000 4.5000 Indonesia 5.3235 4.8805 4.6495 4.4490 4.2495 4.0000 Bangladesh 6.9999 6.8500 6.5500 6.1000 5.5600 5.0000 Pakistan 6.9000 6.6100 6.2700 5.8900 5.4500 5.0000 Philippines 5.3995 4.9005 4.4505 4.1000 3.8995 3.7995 Thailand 5.1675 4.7005 4.4000 4.2005 4.0000 3.9000 South Korea 3.9251 3.4000 3.2250 3.1249 3.1100 3.1000 Egypt 5.8190 5.8500 5.7000 5.4700 5.1000 4.6001 Nigeria 6.6999 6.7000 6.7000 6.6749 6.5499 6.3750 Brazil 5.7800 5.7255 5.6750 5.5755 5.3005 5.0000 Mexico 6.7005 6.4610 6.1600 5.7200 5.2600 4.7000 United States 1.7705 2.2160 2.4785 2.6335 2.6890 2.6965 U.S.S.R. 2.4055 2.5390 2.5690 2.6000 2.6305 2.6610 Japan 1.9245 2.1.122 2.3000 2.3000 2.3000 2.3000 Eastern Europe 2.2699 2.3520 2.4340 2.5160 2.5980 2.6800 Western Europe 2.0219 2.0830 2.1540 2.2520 2.3380 2.4199 MEDIUM SERIES World 4.2654 3.8571 3.6692 3.5456 3.4389 3.3098 More developed regions 2.1481 2.1714 2.1891 2.1921 2.2120 2.2272 Less developed regions 5.1473 4.5051 4.1862 3.9693 3.7799 3.5775 The total fertility rate in a given year basically represents the average number of children each woman would have over her lifetime, assuming the age-specific fertility rates for that yew applied to her Lifetime. POPULATION PROJECTIONS 23 TABLE 2-11 (Cont.) 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 MEDIUM SERIES (cont,) Major Regions Africa 6.3524 6.2884 6.1263 5.8"6 5.4979 5.0156 Asia and Oceania 4.8865 4.0835 3.7307 3.5315 3.3713 3.2238 Latin America 5.2679 5.0546 4.7661 4,4427 4.0520 3.6391 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- rope 2.3694 2.3513 2.3230 2,2920 2.2783 2.2659 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 1.9697 2.0175 2.0748 2.1051 2.1430 2.1751 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 4.1280 2.8590 2.5690 2.5620 2.5620 2.5620 India 5.3000 4.6750 4.1749 3.8750 3.6500 3.4999 Indonesia 5.3235 4.7700 4.4205 4.1100 3.8400 3.5000 Bangladesh 6.9999 6.7400 6.2700 5.5900 4.9200 4.2500 Pakistan 6.9000 6.5100 6.0400 5.4999 4.8799 4.2500 Philippines 5.0705 4.3500 3.8495 3.4495 3.3000 3.1995 Thailand 5.0500 4.2500 3.9500 3.6000 3.3005 3.1000 South Korea 3.7889 3.1199 2.7800 2.5499 2.5200 2.5000 Egypt 5.8190 5.6500 5.2000 4.5500 3.9499 3.6000 Nigeria 6.7000 6.6800 6.6499 6.5250 6.2750 5.9000 Brazil 5.7255 5.6000 5.2755 4.9005 4.4000 3.9995 Mexico 6.3600 5.9605 5.4805 5.0005 4.4800 4.0005 United States 1.7705 1.8710 1.9940 2.0615 2.0900 2.0955 U.S.S.R. 2.4055 2.3740 2.3455 2.3170 2.2865 2.2575 Japan 1.9245 2.0622 2.2000 2.1667 2.1333 2.1000 Eastern Europe 2.2699 2.2699 2.2699 2.2699 2.2699 2.2699 Western Europe 2.0220 2.0520 2.0919 2.1340 2.1740 2.2070 LOW SERIES World 3.9942 3.5261 3.3180 3.0877 2.9026 2.7546 More developed regions 2.1473 2.0363 2.0050 1.9429 1.9092 1.8694 Less developed regions 4.7647 4.0%7 3.7747 3.4449 3.17% 2.9761 Major Regions Africa 6.3146 6.1381 5.7409 5.1%9 4.5308 4.0436 Asia and Oceania 4.4170 3.6382 3.3499 3.0668 2.8700 2.7163 Latin America 5.1030 4.6033 4.0976 3.6399 3.2144 2.8949 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eu- rope 2.3696 2.2162 2.11% 2.0219 1.9429 1.8620 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 1.%95 1.8774 1.8986 1.8653 1.8622 L8559 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 3.0830 2.0600 2.0500 2.0500 2.0500 2.0500 India 5.3000 4.5250 3.9500 3.4250 3.1500 3.0000 Indonesia 5.3235 4.5400 3.9995 3.4695 2.9700 2.4995 Bangladesh 6.9999 6.5800 5.9200 5.1100 4.2999 3.5000 Pakistan 6.9000 6.4500 5.9000 5.2300 4.4300 3.5000 Philippines 4.7995 3.8995 3.2505 2.8500 2.6000 2.5000 Thailand 4.9000 4.0000 3.4000 3.0000 2.65W 2.4000 South Korea 3.4099 2.6800 2.3200 2.1799 2.1300 2.1275 Egypt 5.8190 5.3000 4.2001 3.2500 2.7500 2.6000 Nigeria 6.6999 6.6500 6.4500 6.1300 5.5999 4.9999 Brazil 5.5500 5.2000 4.8005 4.4000 3.9750 3.5000 Mexico 5.9120 4.7600 4.0595 3.5695 3.2000 3.0000 United States 1.7705 1.6070 1.6975 1.6940 1.6935 1.6935 U.S.S.R. 2.4055 2.2120 2.1230 2.0335 1.9440 1.8540 Japan 1.9245 1.%22 2.0000 1.9333 1.8667 1.8000 Eastern Europe 2.2700 2.1900 2.1100 2.0300 1.9499 .1.8700 Western Europe 2.0219 2.0039 2.0260 1.9850 1.9750 1.9590 24 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 2-12 Census Bureau Projected Average Annual Population Growth Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Medium Series) 1975 to 1980 1980 to 1985 1985 to 1990 1990 to 1995 1995 to 2000 World 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 More developed regions 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 Less developed regions 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 Major Regions Africa 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 Asia and Oceania 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 Latin America 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.4 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 India 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 Indonesia 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 Bangladesh 3.0 3'0 2.8 2.7 2.4 Pakistan 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.6 Philippines 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 Thailand 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0 South Korea 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 Egypt 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 Nigeria 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.1 Brazil 3.2 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.5 Mexico 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.7 United States 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.4 U.S.S.R. 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 Japan 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 Eastern Europe 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 Western Europe 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 Community and Family Study Center pace of population growth is being increasingly Projections felt. This pressure is manifested both at the aggregate (governmental and policy) level and at The CFSC projections Of population, fertility the level of the family and the individual. Modern- rates, death rates, and birth rates are shown in ization is inherently inconsistent with high fertility, Tables 2-16 through 2-20 at the end of this and high fertility is inherently inconsistent with section. most of the objectives and life goals sought by Assumptions most peoples (literacy, health, a higher standard of living, better housing, basic luxury commodi- Fertility Assumptions. The CFSC projections ties, physical comfort). Even in nations where this rest on the condition that fertility has considerably set of pressures has not been officially recognized, more potential for change in population growth they are present and mounting in individual fami- and hence is more important than the other two lies. Environmental, economic, and social factors components of population growth-migration and will increase this pressure substantially during the mortality. The "validity" of the population projec- remainder of this century. tions in this series depends then primarily upon 2. The present pace of economic development assumptions made concerning fertility. In the case and modernization will bring down fertility to the of the CFSC projections, these assumptions rest replacement level gradually through provision of upon a theoretical base somewhat different from facilities and gradual accumulation of knowledge that employed by the Census Bureau and others. and motivation. The pace will be somewhat faster The basic premises underlying the CFSC argu- than that followed by Europe and North America ment are as follows: during the 19th and early 20th centuries because I . Throughout the entire world, in developed of improved communications and improved meth- and developing societies, the need to reduce the ods of contraception. POPULATION PROJECTIONS 25 TABLE 2-13 Census Bureau Estimated and'Projected Crude Death Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Medium Series) Estimated Projected July I to June 30 1975 1979/80 1984/85 1989/90 1994/95 1999/2000 World 12.3 11.4 10.6 10.1 9.5 9.1 More developed regions 9.6 9.9 10.0 10.1 10.1 10.4 Less developed regions 13.4 11.9 10.8 10.0 9.4 8.7 Major Regions Africa 19.0 17.7 16.0 14.3 12.8 11.3 Asia and Oceania 13.0 11.4 10.4 9.7 9.2 8.7 Latin America 8.9 8.0 7.2 6.6 6.1 5.7 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 9.7 10.0 10.2 10.3 10.0 10.5 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 9.6 9.8 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.5 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 9.8 8.3 7.9 7.9 8.1 8.3 India 14.4 12.7 11.1 10.1 9.2 8.4 Indonesia 18.2 16.1 14.3 12.7 11.3 10.2 Bangladesh 18.2 16.8 15.4 14.2 13.1 12.1 Pakistan 13.6 11.7 10.3 9.2 8.2 7.3 Philippines 10.1 9.3 8.4 7.4 6.4 6.1 Thailand 9.9 9.5 9.0 8.1 7.1 6.7 South Korea 6.2 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.7 6.0 Egypt 12.5 11.9 11.0 9.9 9.0 8.3 Nigeria 22.0 20.4 18.6 16.8 15.0 13.2 Brazil 8.3 7.3 6.5 6.0 5.7 5.7 Mexico 7.2 6.7 6.1 5.4 5.0 4.8 United States 8.9 9.3 9.6 9.8 10.1 10.3 U. S. S. R. 9.3 9.7 10.0 10.2 10.1 10.5 Japan 7.0 7.1 7.3 8.0 8.8 9.7 Eastern Europe 10.4 10.7 10.6 10.4 10.0 10.4 Western Europe 11.0 11.2 11.3 11.2 10.8 11.1 3. The pace of fertility decline is directly 5. Those countries which now have no family influenced by family planning programs, organized planning programs may be expected to begin at on a national or regional basis to provide infor- least weak.(partial) programs within the very near mation, motivation, and contraceptive services. future. Nations that presently have weak or mod- The larger the per capita investment, the more erate family planning programs may be expected wholehearted the official support, and the greater to strengthen them substantially. By the end of the accessibility to the entire public of these the century, every nation on earth may be ex- services, the more rapid will be the decline. pected to have at least some kind of a substantial 4. The pace of the decline of fertility will be family planning effort (either public or private or that of a reverse S curve. When birth rates are both) and these programs may be expected to high and family planning programs are in stages of have a substantial impact in reducing fertility -establishment and gaining social acceptance, the faster than otherwise would be the case. pace will be slow. As birth rates sink to lower Table 2-15 illustrates the impact on future birth levels, the rate of decline will accelerate to a rates of the factors identified above. The right- maximum when the crude birth rate is between 38 hand column of the table shows the estimated 'and 20 per 1,000 women. In this interval, the pace annual decline in crude birth rate that may be may be very rapid. When the crude birth rate expected in the future on the basis of moderniza- reaches the lower 20s, Complete saturation of tion alone, with no special efforts at providing contraception is being approached. Only young family planning information and services. The people still starting families and a residue of downward trend anticipated then is almost linear, reactionary "late adopters" will remain to be with a one-point decline in the crude birth rate -convinced about the need for fertility decline. The every four or five years. Under this set of decline continues, but at a decelerating- rate. conditions, it would require about 135 years for a 26 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 2-14 Census Bureau Estimated and Projected Crude Birth Rates for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries (Medium Series) Estimated Projected July I to June 30 1975 1979/80 1984/85 1989/90 1994/95 199912000 World 30.4 29.0 28.5 27.9 27.0 25.6 More developed regions 16.1 16.8 17.0 16.4 15.7 15.2 Less developed regions 35.9 33.3 32.2 -31.5 30.3 28.4 Major Regions Africa 46.7 46.3 45.2 43.5 41.4 38.5 Asia and Oceania 33.7 30.2 29.1 28.5 27.6 25.9 Latin America 37.2 36.9 35.6 33.7 31.2 28.7 U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 17.7 18.6 18.3 17.1 16.1 15.9 Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand 14.8 15.4 15.9 15.7 15.1 14.5 Selected Countries and Regions People's Republic of China 27.6 21.6 21.0 21.8 22.5 22.0 India 36.9 33.9 31.3 29.7 28.3 27.1 Indonesia 40.3 37.3 35.3 33.4 31.6 28.9 Bangladesh 47.9 46.7 44.7 41.9 38.8 35.2 Pakistan 44.6 43.7 42.0 39.3 35.8 32.1 Philippines 35.3 31.7 29.5 27.9 27.4 26.3 Thailand 35.8 34.0 33.2 30.8 28.1 26.2 South Korea 26.9 24.6 24.1 22.6 21.6 20.2 Egypt 38.9 38.1 35.8 32.1 28.5 26.9 Nigeria 49.4 49.5 49.3 48.4 46.5 44.1 Brazil 40.2 39.8 37.5 34.8 32.0 30.3 Mexico 42.0 40.7 38.9 36.7 34.0 31.3 United States 14.5 16.1 17.1 16.3 14.8 13.8 U. S. S. R. 18.1 19.1 18.9 17.4 16.4 16.1 Japan 17.0 15.9 14.9 14.2 14.4 14.4 Eastern Europe 17.0 17.6 17.2 16.3 15.6 15.5 Western Europe 13.8 14.3 15.1 15.5 15.4 14.7 population to make the demographic transition The "Strong" column of Table 2-15 shows the from a crude birth rate of 45 to the replacement annual decline in the crude birth rate that CFSC level of about 15 per thousand. expects in the presence of a strong, well-financed, well-organized, and well-administered family plan- TABLE 2-15 ning program that reaches the entire population, Census Bureau Annual Decline in Crude Birth both urban and rural, in a sustained way. Under Rate these conditions, the CFSC estimated that the Crude Birth Rate Strength of Family Planning Effort annual rates of decline would be two to four times (per thousand) Strong Moderate Weak None those that would occur in the absence of a 45 and over .40 .333 .25 .20 program. 40 44 .60 .50 .30 .20 This acceleration in the pace of decline, it is 35-39 .80 .667 .40 .25 estimated, would be capable of bringing about a 30-34 1.00 .75 .50 .25 25-29 1.00 .667 .40 .25 complete demographic transition from a crude 20-24 .80 .50 .30 .20 birth rate of 45 to one of 15 within a span of about 15-19 .60 .333 .25 .20 38 years, or in about one-fourth the time that 13-14 .40 .25 .15 .15 would be required in the absence of a family 40-44 8.0 10.0 17.0 .25 planning program. 35-39 6.0 8.0 12.0 .25 30-34 5.0 7.0 10.0 .20 The assumptions of Table 2-15 were translated 25-29 5.0 8.0 12.0 .20 into annual declines in birth rates for individual 20-24 6.0 10.0 17.0 .25 countries and regions of the world on the follow- 15-19 8.0 15.0 20.0 .25 ing basis: Time required to decline from CBR 45 1. Each country was classified into one of four to CBR = 15 38.0 58.0 88.0 135 categories, according to the level of its family CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 59 TABLE 4-3B SAME AS THE LAST30 YEARS 6 0 0 0 t .2 x .2 E 0 C > RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CARBONDIOXIDE AND TURBIDITY (PERCENT) DURING THE 50 10 10 15 15 PERIOD 1975-2000 1977-80 1981-90 1991-2000 Q) C W C Cr Cr W > > > "E < < < PROBABILITY OF MID-LATITUDE DROUGHT* United States 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.1 Other Mid-Latitude 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.5 0,1 PROBABILITY OF SAHEL DROUGHT** 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1 PROBABILITY OF MONSOON FAILURE*** Northwest India 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 Other India 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 L Other Monsoon Asia 0.3 1 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 *Frequent-similar to early to mid-1930s and early to mid-1950s;average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1940s and 1960s. **Frequent-similar to 1940-50 and 1965-73 periods; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1950-65 period. -Frequent-similar to 1900-25 period; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1930-60 period. 60 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 44A MODE RATE G LOBA L WARM I NG PROBABILITY OF SCENARIO: 0.25 MEAN NORTHERN HEMISPHERE TEMPERATURE CHANGE SINCE 1969: between 0.250 and 0.60C warmer PROBABILITY OF TEMPERATURE CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1970-75) 0 U 0 L) U U L) U o 0 0 Ln to Lq t 0 0 00 t cb @; 0 u@ - qZ . t q a; q a) - 'a 9, C? E - E E cj E 6 E u? E 6 :2 @@ -6 Lh -@ 1 U@ 6 0 0 Polar 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 Northern Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 hemisphere Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 Subtropical 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 Subtropical 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 Southern Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 hemisphere Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 Polar 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 *Growing season in higher middle latitudes: Probability of an increase (decrease) in the length of the growing season exceeding 10 days is 0.4 (0.2@; probability of an increase (decrease) in the variability of the length of the growing season in excess of 25% is 0. 1 (0.2). PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1941-70) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON (D 5i M C ti M T\ 6 V 0. A ST\ U V 0 A Higher mid-latitude 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 Lower mid-latitude 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 Subtropical 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION VARIABILITY CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with average for the previous 25-year period) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON M M Lb a, Ln C Ln LO Ln CN CN C4 cm r4 E A V 0 A E A V. AI Higher mid-latitude 02 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 Lower mid-latitude 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 Subtropical 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 61 TABLE 4-4B MODERATE GLOBAL WARM ING U 6 2 E 6 0 X o @6 .2 :3 -2 U "o iZ M E 0 5 U CA > .0 CL RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND TURBIDITY (PERCENT) DURING THE 60 15 5 10 10 PERIOD IM-2000 _j 1977-80 1981-90 1991-2000 C or Cr Cr > (1, > - 2 LL < E PROBABILITY OF MID-LATITUDE DROUGHT* United States 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 Other Mid-Latitude PROBABILITY OF SAHEL DROUGHT** 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 PROBABILITY OF MONSOON FAILURE*** Northwest India 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 Other India Other Monsoon Asii, *Frequent-similar to early to mid-1930s and early to mid-1950s; average-similar to the frequency over the longest poriod of record available; infrequent-si mi lar to 1940s and 1960s. **Frequent-similar to 1940-50 and 1965-73 periods; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1950-65 period. *"Frequent-similar to 1900-25 pehod; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1930-60 period. 62 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 4-5A LARG E G LOBAL WARM I NG PROBABILITY OF SCENARIO: 0.10 MEAN NORTHERN HEMISPHERE TEMPERATURE CHANGE SINCE 1969: between 0.60and 1.80C warmer PROBABILITY OF TEMPERATURE CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1970-75) U U U 0 0 0 Iq U@ 8 in @i ob 'in '0 t '0 t C D 7 7' csi E vi E Lri E -6 LQ CD 0 9 M ix@ -m6 @6 6 0 LC qD 3; -9 3: -: 3: "i @: M Polar 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 Northern Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.5 0.4 hemisphere Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 Subtropical 0.1 0.8 0.1 Subtropical 0.1 0.8 0.1 Southern Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 hemisphere Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.5 0.4 Polar 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 *Growing season in higher middle latitudes: Probability of an increase (decrease) in the length of growing season exceeding 10 days is 0.8 (0.0); probability of an increase (decrease) in the variability of the length of the growing season in excess of 25% is 0.0 (0.7). PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1941-70) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON CU CD C 0 M A U V A E A 0 V 0 A Higher mid-latitude 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 Lower mid-latitude 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 Subtropical 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION VARIABILITY CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with average for the previous 25-year period) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON M (1) Me e) Lo C in 111) PU.) CLr) in C-4 M (N U Cq C14 Cj W V A 53) V 0 A A u A Higher mid-latitude 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 Lower mid-latitude 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 Subtropical 0,2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 63 TABLE 4-5B LARGE GLOBAL WARMING 6 c 6 x .8 0 2 @j E 0 U. > 0 0. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND TURBIDITY (PERCENT) DURING THE 90 10 0 0 0 PERIOD 1975-2000 1977-80 1981-90 1991-2000 C 0 e 9 n T 9 > -t: 12D > T > LL LL E < "E PROBABILITY OF MID-LATITUDE DROUGHT- United States 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 Other Mid-Latitude 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 PROBABILITY OF SAHEL DROUGHT" 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3 PROBABILITY OF MONSOON FAILURE*** Northwest India 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.8 Other India 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.7 Other Monsoon Asia 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0,7 *Frequent-similar to early to mid-1930s and early to mid-1950s; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1940s and 1960s. **Frequent-similar to 1940-50 and 1965-73 periods; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1950-65 period. 'Frequent-similar to 1900-25 period; average-similar to the frequency -over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similarto 1930-60 period. 64 THE PROJECTIONS While average global temperature increased tudes warmed, on the average, by 0.8* C; the moderately, the largest temperature increases lower middle latitudes by.1.0.C; the higher mid- came in the higher latitudes. The Northern Hemi- dle latitudes by 1.4' C; and.the polar latitudes by sphere warmed slightly more than the Southern a remarkable 3.00 C, compared to the early 1970s. Hemisphere due to its greater land area and the Symmetry prevailed as similar temperature. larger thermal inertia of the southern oceans. In changes were observed in both. the Northern and the Northern Hemisphere, the polar latitudes Southern Hemispheres. The increase in tempera- warmed by 1.2* C; the higher middle latitudes by ture was accompanied by a significant increase in 0.5* C, the lower middle latitudes by 0.3' C; and the length of the growing season in the higher the subtropical latitudes by 0.25* C. In the South- middle latitudes, as well as by a substantial em Hemisphere, average temperatures over the decrease in the variability from year to year in the polar latitudes increased by 0.650 C; the higher length of the growing season. middle latitudes by 0.4' C; the lower middle Precipitation levels generally increased, espe- latitudes by 0.3' C; and the subtropical latitudes cially in the subtropical and higher middle lati- by 0.2* C. The increase in global temperature was tudes. In the lower. middle latitudes there was reflected in a moderate increase in the length of little net change of precipitation. Annual precipi- the growing season in higher middle latitudes, but tation variability decreased slightly compared to no significant change in the interannual variability the 1950-75 period; precipitation variability during of the growmig.season was noted. the growing season similarly decreased in the .Annual precipitation levels increased slightly in higher middle latitudes, but increased slightly in the higher middle latitudes but showed little the lower middle and subtropical latitudes. change for, lower latitudinal bands. Growing-sea- The warming trend also ushered in more favor- son precipitation also increased slightly in the able climatic conditions in India and other parts of higher middle latitudes and subtropical regions but Asia. These conditions were similar to those of remained unchanged in the lower middle latitudes. the 1.930-60 period. Monsoon failure was infre- Both annual and growing-season precipitation var- quent, especially in northwest India. But in the iability remained essentially unchanged except for midlatitude areas of the United States, extending a slight increase in the variability of growing- from the Rockies to the Appalachians, drought season precipitation in subtropical latitudes. conditions similar to the mid-1930s And the early Drought conditions again plagued the midlati- to mid-1950s prevail6d. In other midlatitude areas tude areas of the United States, corroborating the of the world, notably Europe, the probability of 20- to 22-year drought cycle hypothesis. Cfimatic drought declined. The increased levels of precipi- conditions were somewhat more favorable in the tation also returned the Sahel region to wetter Asiatic region and in subtropical North Africa. weather conditions. The frequency of monsoon failure, especially in northwest India, resembled more closely the long- Climate Scenarios for the Global 2000 term average; so did the f1requency of drought in Study the Sahel region. The NDU scenarios provide a richness of detail Large Global Warming* that could not be used in the Global 2000 Study. The global cooling trend that began in the 1940s At the beginning of the Study it was assumed that was dramatically reversed in the last quarter of the government's long-term global models would the 20th century. By the year 2000, the mean require climatological inputs, and three simplified Northern Hemisphere temperature had increased scenanos-informed by the National Defense Uni- by about 1* C compared to the early- 1970s. versity study-were developed. More careful in- Climatologists explained that this trend was due vestigation established later that none of the principally to the warming effects of the increasing global long-term models used by the agencies for amounts of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. this Study are capable of accepiing climatological While temperature increased over the entire i.nputs. The energy, food, water and forestry globe, temperature increases were more pro projections all assume implicitly a continuation of nounced at higher latitudes. The subtropical lati- the nearlv ideal climate of the 1950s and 1960s. Although the climate scenarios developed for the Global 2000 Study could not be incorporated into *Statements concerning some details of this scenario reflect the Study's projections, the scenarios are reported a higher degree of certainty than was expressed by the climatologists who participated in this study. See Tables 4- here to indicate the range of climatic change that 5 A and B for the range of uncertainty. should be analyzed in a study of this sort. CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 65 The Global 2000 Case I scenario described crease by 1' C. Most of the warming is in the below is similar to the "same as the last 30 years" polar regions and the higher middle latitudes, with scenario in the NDU study. The Case 11 scenario only slight warming in the tropics. Annual precip- is intermediate between NDU's "moderate warm- itation increases by 5-10 percent, and year to year ing" and "large warming"; similarly, Case III is variance decreases slightly. There is an increased intermediate between NDU's two cooling scena- likelihood of U.S. drought conditions similar to rios. Note that these scenarios span a narrower those of the mid-'30s. range of variation than the National Defense Case III: Cooling. Global temperatures de- University scenarios and that the narrow span crease by 0.5' C. Cooling of P C occurs in the excludes climatological developments that would higher and middle latitudes, with a smaller change have a pronounced effect on future demands for in the tropics and subtropics. Precipitation and supplies offood, wood, water, and energy. amounts decline and variability increases both The three Global 2000 climate scenarios are: from month to month and from year to year. Case L No Change. Yearly rainfall and tem- Storm tracks--and the precipitation they bring- perature statistics are similar to those of the 1941- shift toward the equator, improving conditions in 70 period. Drought conditions in the U.S. continue the upper latitudes of the great deserts And to occur every 20 to 22 years. Monsoon failures worsening them on the equator side. Severe in India become less frequent than recently and monsoon failures are more frequent in India, the Sahel region of Africa no longer experiences severe droughts more frequent in the Sahel. severe drought of the type that occurred in the The three Global 2000 scenarios are compared late '60s and early '70s. in Figure 4-1 with the historical record of temper- Case H: Warming. Global temperatures in- ature changes from the 1870s to the 1970s. 1.0 - GIoW 2000 Cc" "Warn-ing 1 0.8 0 6 . J-0.4- 01 - Global 2000 Com I "No c 0.0 - No c -0.2 Globol 2000,Case III -0.4 "Cooling" -0A 18,60 1880, 1900, 1940 1960 Figure 4-1. The three Global 2000 Study scenarios compared with the annual mean temperature changes during the past century for the latitude band 0*-80*N. The period 1941-70 is the zero reference base. 5 Technology Projections Logically, technology is an input to the Global ing generally declining fertilities and mortalities. 2000 Study projections much as are population, While the Bureau recognizes the possibility of GNP, and climate. But, because technology is so technological breakthroughs in both fields, some highly specific to each type of projection, it was of which are currently under study, it believes impossible to formulate a single set of measures that it is uncertain whether any will be perfected of technological change for all analyses. It was and adopted widely enough by the year 2000 to therefore left to the individual experts to make have a significant impact on fertility and mortality their own assumptions about the effects of tech- levels. Similarly, the Bureau assumed that no nology in their own fields and to develop their regression in either type of technology serious projections from those assumptions as well as enough to significantly affect their forecasts will from the exogenously supplied population, GNP, occur in the near future-for example, major harmful and climate forecasts. They were requested to side effects of existing birth control techniques will make these assumptions as explicit as possible in not be discovered, and new uncontrollable micro- statements to'the Global 2000 Study--often a bial strains harmful to humans will not develop. difficult task, as when trends of technological While technological advance or regression may advance were concealed in time series extrapola- occur before 2000 and shift population growth up or tions of other input variables, or when it was down slightly, the Bureau believes that such oc- unclear whether a particular idea was more cor- currences will not result in increases or decreases rectly considered an assumption or a conclusion. that exceed the limits of its high and low projec- This chapter gathers together the assumptions tions. of technological change made in the individual The discussion of migration in Chapter 2 makes analyses of the Global 2000 project. For the sake no technological assumptions except that world of comprehensiveness, the assumptions behind industrialization will probably continue at about the development of the input forecasts already present rates. considered (population, GNP, climate) are in- cluded. Gros@ National Product In general, the analyses assume that the adop- tion and refine ment of existing technologies will The GNP forecasts in Chapter 3 were made by continue at about the same rate as in the recent analysts in three separate agencies according to past. The verbal analyses often refer to possible somewhat different methods. The forecasts for technological breakthroughs, and many of the industrialized noncommunist and communist quantitative forecasts extrapolate from historical countries, made by a panel of WAES (Workshop data taken from the past two or three decades, on Alternative Energy Strategies) experts and by which were characterized by many such break- the CIA, respectively, are largely the result of throughs. These forecasts implicitly assume, subjectively extrapolating historical growth rates. therefore, that breakthroughs will occur in the Thus, technology is implicitly assumed to contrib- future at recent historical rates. ute to future economic growth about as it has in the recent past. The WAES panel adjusted its Population estimates downward to account for the supposed restrictive effect of slowed future population Technology affects population primarily in the growth. The CIA adjusted its forecasts for parts form of birth control, which lowers fertility, and of Eastern Europe downward on the basis of the health care, which lowers the death rate. In. availability of energy, thus assuming that techno- making the population projections used in the logical advance will not completely counteract an Global 2000 Study, the U.S. Bureau of the Census increasing scarcity of energy. Initially, however, it implicitly assumed continued adoption of both based all of its forecasts on direct extrapolation of forms of technology at moderate rates by project- past trends of GNP and productivity growth, 67 68 THE PROJECTIONS implicitly assuming a continuation of past techno- make the Global 2000 Study's agricultural fore- logical trends. casts assumes that economic variables such as Forecasts for the less developed countries product and input prices will influence food pro- (LDCs) were made by the World Bank (originally duction efficiency as in therecent past. However, for use by the WAES study) in three stages: provision is also made to incorporate an exoge- 1. Projections were developed by analysts on nously estimated trend rate of growth in technol- an independent, country by country basis, relying ogy over and above the,growth explained by on a combination of professional judgment and economic variables. This is done by adjusting the use of specialized country or regional models. regional food yield and thus, implicitly, yields per Typically, past rates of increase in the productiv- hectare. Yield per hectare is the measure of iiy' of new capital investment were implicitly production efficiency used in the GOL model. projected to continue in the future. These in- The exogenous adjustments for changes in yield creases were not explicitly attributed to technolog- are made in the regional production equations. ical change. However, because capital productiv- For each region, GOL has one linear regression ity increases in the past resulted partially from equation for each major agricultural product pro- technological advance, extensions of the upward duced locally. In each equation, total production trend in productivity presumably imply continued is calculated as a function of endogenously deter- advance. mined crop hectarage, a base crop yield, a time 2. Using a computer-based model, the various trend variable, and changes in product prices, country projections were aggregated and adjusted input prices, and the prices of products competing on a globally consistent basis to reflect probable for inputs. The time trend variable is equal to I in economic growth constraints due to likely limita- the first year of the estimation period, to 2 in the tions in the availability of foreign trade earnings second, and so on. It is intended to capture the and foreign investment capital. Each LDC group effects of factors--other than those included in was represented in a way that implicitly assumed the total production equation--that influence total that major increases in the productivity of new yields over time. The most important of these is capital investment will occur in each LDC, in part believed to be technology, which has acted over as a result of technological change (see Chapter time to increase yields. The following steps are 16). For example, in the case of the Other South taken to adjust the estimated coefficient of the Asian LDC group, a given investment was implic- trend variable to reflect country analysts' judg- itly assumed to produce about 60 percent more ments about future productivity trends: incremental GDP in 1985 than in 1977 (in constant dollars). However, there is no way to infer the 1. GOL supply and demand inputs are used to precise extent to which this improved productivity project roughly the direction of likely future price of capital might properly be attributed to techno- movements. logical change. 2. For each region, a measure of likely pressure 3. The projections were further adjusted judg- on supply calculated from the price projections is mentally by Bank and WAES analysts, but these used to estimate changes in "innovative technol- adjustments were not related to assumptions re- ogy," which in turn defines the physical or garding technological change. biological limitation on yield per hectare with the best available technology; the estimation thus Climate assumes that technological advance responds di- rectly to economic incentives. The climate forecasts make no assumptions 3. The innovative technology level for each about technology except that industrial processes region and various data forecasted from the GOL will continue to release large amounts of carbon run (see Step 1) are given to the appropriate dioxide into the atmosphere, with the possible regional analysts within the Department of Agri- effect of warming the earth's atmosphere. No culture. other foreseeable technological developments be- 4. On the basis of the data received, each fore the year 2000 were considered to have a regional analyst re-estimates trend growth in yield significant effect on the climate of the planet. to reflect possible constraints or sources of growth not included in the original regression analysis. Food 5. In each regional production equation of GOL, the coefficient of the time trend variable is As an econometric projection model, the GOL recalculated so that the trend increases approxi- (grain, oilseed, livestock) model that was used to mate the values estimated by the regional analyst. TECHNOLOGY PROJECTIONS 69 6. The GOL model is run with the judgmentally above. The right half of the bottom curve is modified trend coefficients along with the other adopted technology calculated as explained in economic variables cited above. The output of the Step 6. GOL was run twice, once for each of two model is its final forecasts. The yields per hectare years, to get two points from each kind of that can be calculated from the output are called technology with which to draw.the extrapolations "adopted technology" because they are the yields shown. The innovative technology data are, what per hectare that the regions are projected to is given to the Thailand regional analyst to con- actually achieve., sider in setting Thailand's rice output for the Thus, potential yields per hectare in the future,@ adjustment of. the GOL model described in Step estimated - with data from the GOL model, are 3. The adopted, technology data points were used by analysts in adjusting productivity data calculated from the output, of the runs as described within the model. in Step 6. A graph of innovative and adopted technology Fertilizer consumption per unit of food, produc- taken from actual model data is reproduced in tion, also often considered an important measure Figure 5-1. It is for rice production in Thailand. of agricultural technology, is estimated subjec- The first half of each curve is historical data. The tively by Department of Agriculture analysts ion right half of the top curve is future innovative the basis of the GOL output after the modet run technology, calculated as explained in Step 2is complete. The fertilizer consumption and food In the GOL model, both forms of technology are measured as indexes which are set equal to fin some blase year. Innovative Technology Prodixtivity measured in terms of crop and livestock yields AA*t-d Technology ri j V actuol projected,' TORM A Figure 5-1. Innovative and adopted technology levels for rice production in Thailand as projected by the GOL (grain, oilseed, livestock) model. 70 THE PROJECTIONS production data in Chapter 6 show an assumption puter model, assume that only proven techniques of continued increases in fertilizer use per unit of for producing final fossil fuels will be widely food output, from about 800 nutrient tons around enough adopted to significantly -affect the world 1971 to 970 nutrient tons in 1985 and to 1210 energy market by the year 2000. Producers' sup- nutrient tons in the year 2000. ply curves, indirectly representing their cost of production, assume no rapid acceleration in yield. Fisheries The real costs and efficiencies of refining and con- The fisheries analysis assumes that the means verting primary fuels and the costs, routes, and modes of transporting intermediate products are to harvest and process formerly unfished marine also held constant. However, the types of final animals, such as Antarctic krill, will be increas- fuels demanded, the sources of the primary fuels ingly adopted through the year 2000. Ocean pol- used to make them, the refining and conversion lution will continue unabated. Technology will techniques applied in production, and the transpor- soon be ineffective and perhaps counterproductive tation modes and routes all vary according to rela- in increasing catches from natural fisheries because tive costs. Large increases in the adoption of exist- of reduction of fish populations. ing technologies are also assumed to be possible. The IEES allows world shipping and refining Forestry capacities to expand indefinitely to meet world The forestry analysis assumes a continued de- energy demand, and miscellaneous conversions velopment and adoption of technologies that in- capacity to expand up to high limits. Mscellaneous crease both forest productivity and the percentage conversions capacity in 1985 and 1990 is allowed to of that productivity that can be exploited and be as much as two and three times its historical used. Particularly in the industrialized countries, 1975 level, respectively. In general, the expansions the management of forests will become more inten- in re .fining and miscellaneous conversions sive, uses for formerly discarded parts of trees will capacities are restricted to the industrialized na- be found, and cut timber will be used more effi- tions. ciently. In the LDCs, harvesting technologies and The forecasts assume continued new adoption of nuclear and hydro power for electrical genera- uses for formerly ignored species and size classes tion. Regional electrical generation capacities from will be adopted; fuelwood plantations may also be nuclear and hydro (including geothermal and so- established. lar) power are inputs to the IEES; the exact Also assumed is that no fuel as cheap as wood quantities assumed (Table 5-1) show an increase is at present will become as widely available in in total world generation from these power LDCs before the year 2000. sources of about 200 percent from 1975 to 1990. Capacities of conventional thermal generation, Water like refining and transportation capacities, are The following major uses of water are expected determined within the model but allowed to ex- to remain the same through 2000. Currently, they pand as much as necessary to meet final demands. are domestic, irrigation, industrial (primarily in manufacturing but also in mining and mineral Fuel Minereds processing), and energy production (thermal and The primary purpose of the fuel minerals hydroelectric). The two projections of total world analysis was to estimate current world energy water use in Chapter 9 make no explicit techno- resources and reserves. The estimation of re- logical assumptions. The Doxiadis projection gives sources (all potentially recoverable occurrences of no technological justification for its S-shaped a mineral) implicitly assurnes how far,technology growth curve for water use. The Kalinin projec- tion admittedly neglects the possibilities of (1) can or will advance in the recovery of low-grade decreasing water requirements per unit of indus- ores. Exactly how it will advance is typically left unspecified. The estimation of reserves (all re- trial or agricultural output, (2) increasing water sources economically recoverable at current prices purification or desalinization, and (3) increasing with existing technology) assumes by definition no direct use of unpurified and salt water. technological change. I Energy Nonfuel Minerals The energy forecasts, made with the Interna- The nonfuel minerals demand forecasts were tional Energy Evaluation System (IEES) com- made from combinations of expert judgment and TECHNOLOGY PROJECTIONS 71 TABLE 5-1 U.S. primary demand for minerals is projected to 1985 and 2000 by use of a regression analysis Electrical Generation from Nuclear using the following U.S. economic indicators as and Hydro Fbwer Assumed in Energy Forecasts explanatory variables: GNP, Federal Reserve (Terawatt-hours per year) Board index of industrial production, gross private domestic investment, new construction, popula- Indus- Less Centrally tion, and GNP per capita. The historical values of United trialized Devel- OPEC Planned these variables, supplied by the Office of Manage- oped Coun- States Coun- Econo- ment and, Budget, are taken from the 1954-73 tries' Coun- tries Mies tries period. Such a regression equation would implic- 19175 475 1,343 .240 0 - itly assume that the role that technological ad- 1985 vance has had in making mineral consumption Low growth 969 2,492 585 19 760 track the explanatory variables in the past will Medium continue into the future. The forecasts of the growth 975 2,515 585 19 760 regression equations are considered by the indi- High vidual commodity analysts, who then make the growth 976 2,516 585 19 760 final U.S. forecasts after considering other infor- High prices 1,045 2,584 585 19 760 mation relevant to their specific commodity mar- 1990 kets, including expected technological advances. Low growth 1,373 3,316 924 64 1,350 The analysts' forecasts for rest-of-the-world de- Medium mand, are made with consideration of various growth 1,397 3,513 924 64 1,350 world and regional data, including population, High GDP, and GDP per capita, and their own knowl- growth 1,402 3,518 924 64 1,350 edge of world markets and probable technology, High prices 1,555 3,670 924 64 1,350 but without formal regression forecasts of de- 'including the U.S. mand. data analysis. Technology entered the develop- ment of the forecasts taken from the 1977 Malen- Environment baum Report (see Chapter 22) in the derivation of intensity-of-use curves@ Many of the technological, As Chapter 13 assesses the environmental im- assumptions that influenced the construction of pact that would result iif the other forecasts were any one curve tended to be highly specific to the valid, it generally accepts their assumptions and mineral and region for which it was drawn. The conclusions pertaining to technology, in addition general technological assumptions implied in the to its own technological assumptions. The tech- report to underlie all of the curves, with some nological assumptions made specifically for the qualification for individual curves, are: environmental analysis are fisted below. The tech- 1. As an economy grows, it first develops or nological assumptions used to make the other adopts production processes that are relatively forecasts are not repeated here. The general mineral-intensive. Then increasingly it refines assumption underlying the entire environmental these processes or shifts away from them, which analysis is that most environmental problems are contributes to a gradual decline in the economy's the result of conflict between population and mineral intensity of use. general economic growth on the one hand and 2. The advances in mineral production technol- evolved biological systems and physical constants ogy necessary to allow continued growth in pro-. of the globe on the other; technology can aid the duction will be made. Mineral production will management of these problems but not eliminate grow through 2000 quickly and reliably enough to their cause. The sector-specific assumptions are make end-use factors, not supply constraints, the as follows: dominant determinants of mineral consumption. Population. The relatively resource-intensive Economic growth will not be restricted by mineral living habits and practices of the industrialized availability or price; in fact, real mineral Prices nations will continue to supplant other fifestyles may decline in the future. around the world. The Bureau of Mines demand forecasts used Energy. There wHI be a global acceptance of the judgments of the Bureau's individual commod- U.S. new source performance standards in the ity analysts, aided by analyses of historical data. near future. (This is an assumption of the Energy 72 THE PROJECTIONS Systems Network Simulator model used to convert photosynthesis) or soil, water, and air manage- the energy consumption forecasts to emissions ment. Plant breeding will continue to reduce the forecasts, described in Chapter 19). genetic diversity of food crops. Food. The productivity increases projected in Minerals. The means to extract increasingly low- the food analysis will involve no major break- grade mineral ores will continue to be developed and throughs in genetic engineering of food crops adopted. No breakthroughs in reducing the land (such as the development of nitrogen-fixing strains disturbance, water use, or waste quantities resulting or c-4 grains, which are relatively efficient in from mining will occur. 6 Tood and Agriculture Projecfions Recent shifts in world food supplies from sur- industrialized countries against the paucity of plus toward deficit and back again toward surplus information available for the less developed and have generated wide concern as to future food centrally planned countries. The extent to which balances. This chapter reports on world food governments intervene to influencethe quantities projections to 1985 and 2000, emphasizing the and prices of food produced and consumed in problem of food balances in the context of wider much of the world also leaves long-range projec- resource and environmental balances. The projec- tions subject to wholesale revision as agricultural, tions are summarized in the maps on the following food, and trade policies change. pages. The analytic fi-amework used to generate Hence, the food projections presented in.this the projections and their broad implications are chapter must be seen as broad directional indica- highlighted. Resource balances, estimates of the tors only. changing cost and growth in investment required to develop the productive capacity projected to Model and Methodology 2000, and the broad environmental implications of the projections are also treated. The projections outlined below were generated using a world grain-oilseed-livestock (GOL) model and three smaller sets of aggregate food, arable area, and fertilizer relationships. Caveats GOL is a formal mathematical model made up of roughly 1,000 equations describing the function- Long-range projections, particularly food pro- ing and interaction of 'the world's grain, oilseed, jections, are subject to several qualifications. and livestock sectors. More precisely, GOL is a First, estimating changes in population, income, conglomerate of some 28 regional agricultural taste, resources, technology, and weather as well sector models made up of grain, oilseed, and as their interrelationships 25 years in the future livestock supply, demand, and trade equations calls for a number of studies rather than a single that sum to a world total. The parameters for the paper. The wide range of credible studies analyz- mathematical relationships underlying the models ing these factors but reaching conflicting conclu- were estimated using data from 1950 through 1975 sions points up the latitude possible in estimating or were drawn from the literature and the judg- changes in these key variables and their interrela- ment of experts. tionships. The analyses that follow endogenize as The strength of the GOL model lies in its many of these variables and interrelationships as emphasis on cross-regional and cross-commodity possible but depend to a large extent on output quantity and price linkages. The individual grain, from other models that study individual variables oilseed, and livestock sectors within each regional in greater detail. model are linked on the supply side in their Second, highly aggregated food projections with competition for resources, and on the demand so distant a time horizon are not forecasts of what side as intermediate or finished products in the will happen, but rather educated guesses of what human diet. Production and consumption across could happen. Assigning probabilities to projec- regions are balanced at the world'level. Imports tions is consequently difficult; projection studies and exports sum to zero, and world and regional themselves are designed to test alternatives and to trade prices are harmonized. Each of the regional identify potential problems and evaluate possible models provides for physical factors (such as solutions. technical input-output relationships) and economic Third, global food projections in particular de- factors (such as supply, demand, and trade pend on generally limited and sometimes conflict- prices). Exogeneous inputs include population and ing data. Any global food analysis must balance income growth rates, agricultural and trade policy the wealth of information available for most of the assumptions, and weather assumptions. 73 .@p k n- -Ar 783 965 USSRand tqp Euro Jl@l AAW' Uni K 2000 @""fn :A_ ;A rica , 71 Middow "Ag-@'NOU P 3 Ls4n America Irl P F . ....- 1975 X T"% M4, j Z V@@ 17 @4, 65 3 f A S, An 4@ 4@@ k Grain Trade X-1 0 2000 X. A -JJSSR and @effl Europe 200D P V estitm nited States I, and J X j, No" n AfrIc6' 2000 1975 iddle EgMr- X and the m Asin,' uthej n Ask' 1975 2000 SO L K R - Africa L_ 2000 RIM 300 whv. Net exports 11,71. .elm 101.11 -Not imports Latin America 150. Consumption Other industrialize4 exporters 0 . Loctuding Aulkoba. Can$ds. New 7ealand, and Akouqiein Africa j Grain consumption figures IWude grain usecir for tivastocit. a0an U 0 1600 Wo-elels 1500 miles 5037036-78 Alternative II Base Yield Level 2.75@ Alternative I Base Yield Level Note- A@ rgin between alternatives based on Regional Standard Errors and summed to a world total calculated on 1950-76 data 2.25 Alternative III Se Base Yield Level 1.25 1960 Actual 1970 1975 1,985 20M Proocted- rim Alter Base Y* Base Figure 6-1. World grain yields, actual and projected under Alternatives 1, 11, 111. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 77 GOL materials were supplemented with three 1950-75 regional yield series (see Table 6-3 and smaller, informal sets of relationships dealing with Fig. 6-1). Alternative 11 is run assuming petroleum aggregate food production and consumption, ara- prices remain at their real 19174-76 level through ble area, and fertilizer use. The first is used to the year 2000. translate GOL output into indices of total food Alternative 111, which defines a lower bound, production and consumption; the second and third assumes higher population growth and lower per sets of relationships are used to estimate arable capita income growth rates of about 2.1 percent area and fertilizer use. Fertilizer is used as a and 0.7 percent, respectively. Growth in yields is proxy for a larger collection of inputs, including projected assuming poor weather-i.e., assun-drig improved varieties, pesticides, and irrigation. Sec- weather through 2000 to be less favorable than /ondary measures of land-man ratios and use of over the last 25 years. Yields are projected the fertilizer per arable hectare are also generated. equivalent of one standard error below Alternative I levels (see Table 6-3). Alternative III is run assuming that real petroleum prices more than Scenario Definitions double by 2000. Three alternative sets of projections were gen- No provision was made for long-term improve- erated for the Global 2000 Study using different ments or deterioration in climate. It is assumed income, population, and weather assumptions as that the world's climate continues largely as well as different assumptions about the rate of reported over the past several decades, or that petroleum price increases. changes in climate will be small enough tobe Alternative 1, a baseline projection, assumes compensated for by changes in cultural practices median world population and per capitaincome and development of new technology. Assuming growth rates averaging roughly 1.8 percent and no significant climate changes, however, does not 1.5 percent, respectively, through the year 2000 rule out years of good weather comparable to the (Tables 6-1 and 6-2). Growth in yields, ultimately late 1960s in the Soviet Union or bad weather raised or lowered by the producer prices gener- years comparable to the mid-1960s in India. 'Me .ated under a specific alternative, is projected at variations in yields between Alternatives 11 and rates compatible with the technological advances III provide some measure of the good weather- Of the past two decades. Weather is held con- bad weather range likely without a major change @tant-i.e., the impact of weather on yields in climate. through 2000 is assumed to be comparable to that of the past 25 years. Agricultural and trade General Results policies are assumed to continue to be largely While the output generated under Alternatives protectionist in the major importing countries and 1, 11, and III differ with regard to specifics, a trade-expansionist in the. major exporting coun- number of conclusions hold for all three scenarios. tries. Alternative I's median income, population, The following general conclusions pertain to Alter- and weather assumptions are run in combination native I output. first with constant energy prices--i.e., assuming petroleum prices do not increase markedly from Record Growth the real-price highs of 1974-76---and second as- suming marked increases more than double the The world bas the capacity, bothphysical and cost of energy inputs by 2000. As will be noted economic, to produce enough food to meet sub- later, the resultant quantity and price ranges stantial increases in demand through 2000. The quoted under Alternative I reflect not so much projections are compatible in this regard with a uncertainty about petroleum price increases as number of other studies suggesting a world food uncertainty about the ability of the agricultural potential several times higher than current produc- sector to adjust to changes in input costs. tion levels. The food growth rates implied in this Alternative 11, which defines aii optimistic up- Study's production and consumption projections per bound, assumes lower population growth and are comparable to the record increases reported higher per capita income growth of about 1.5 for the 1950s and the 1960s. Growth in the grain percent and 2.4 percent, respectively. Growth in component of total food production and consump- yields is projected assuming favorable weather--:- tion-for which longer historical series are avail- i.e., assuming weather through 2000 to be more able-is also projected near or above the record favorable than weather over the last 25 years. rates of the last two decades and more than Good weather is assumed to raise yields about the double the rate of increase for the first half of equivalent of one standard error calculated on the century (Table 6-A). Several significant quali- 78 THE PROJECTIONS fications are needed, however, to put this growth early 1970s (Tables 6-5 and 6-6). into proper perspective. Driving near-record growth Driving near-record rates of growth on the sup- in demand are equally impressive growth in pop- ply side Are marked increases in the resources ulation in the less developed countries (LDCs) committed to food production-measured roughly and affluence in the industrialized countries. The in terms of land under cultivation-and strong world's food sector must grow at near-record rates gains in productivity-based primarily on wider simply to maintain the benchmark per capita con- adoption of technology and increased use of re- sumption levels reported in the late 196(Js and source-augmenting inputs such as fertilizers and TABLE 6-1 Population Growth Rates, Actual and Projected (Percent) 1985/1975 2000/1975 1970/1960 Alternatives Alternatives I II III I Percent Industrialized countries 1.09 .57 .48 .67 .52 .34 .71 United States 1.26 .70 .52 .96 .55 .27 .94 Other developed exportersa 2.28 2.05 1.99 2.15 1.80 1.60 1.94 Western Europe .80 .33 .30 .35 .43 .31 .52 Japan 1.04 .88 .81 .91 .59 .43 .68 Centrally planned countries 1.54 1.25 .99 1.45 1.21 .94 1.43 Eastern Europe .70 .68 .63 .74 .57 .39 .76 U.S.S.R. 1.25 .93 .80 1.05 .68 .46 .90 People's Republic of China 1.78 1.42 1.10 1.64 1.42 1.14 1.63 Less developed countries 2.56 2.50 2.36 2.66 2.37 2.04 2.71 Latin America 2.82 2.91 2.65 3.04 2.61 2.17 2.94 North Africa/Middle East 2.74 2.75 2.61 2.86 2.75 2.44 3.05 Other African LDCs 2.42 2.61 2.50 2.69 2.68 2.31 2.94 South Asia 2.56 2.34 2.25 2.58 2.13 1.88 2.63 Southeast Asia 2.68 2.50 2.34 2.65 2.20 1.77 2.58 East Asia 2.23 2.13 1.94 2.28 1.99 1.58 2.27 World 1.93 1.79 1.63 1.95 1.77 1.48 2.05 "Canada, Australia, South Africa. Somme: U.S. Bureau of the Census. TABLE 6-2 Per Capita Income Growth Rates, Actual and Projected (Percent) 1985/1975 2000/1985 1960-1970 Alternatives Alternatives 1 11 111 1 11 111 Industrialized countries 3.29 3.41 4.40 2.41 2.57 3.35 1.77 United States 2.52 3.28 4.35 2.12 2.54 3.42 1.55 Other major exporters, 1.87 1.95 2.85 1.10 1.40 2.25 .55 Western Europe 3.52 3.66 4.59 2.74 2.66 3.38 1.97 Japan 8.76 3.10 4.06 2.17 2.49 3.26 1.81 Centmfly planned countries 3.65 2.35 3.22 1.50 2.20 3.15 1.25 Eastren Europe 3.88 2.55 2.85 2.24 2.16 2.60 1.73 U.S.S.R. 5.17 2.30 2.67 1.93 2.06 2.53 1.59 People's Republic of China .90 2.30 3.85 .86 2.30 3.81 .85 Less developed countries 3.13 2.54 3.52 1.55 2.01 3.00 1.03 1 Latin America 2.62 2.64 3.90 1.51 1.84 2.84 .97 North Africa/Middle East 2.79 3.95 4.70 3.35 3.20 4.15 2.26 Other African LDCs 1.00 2.95 3.60 2.35 2.15 3.00 1.38 South Asia .73 1.12 1.91 .20 .66 1.20 .15 Southeast Asia 2.26 2.50 2.65 2.34 2.20 2.58 1.77 East Asia 2.01 3.34 4.37 2.66 2.80 3.98 1.54 World 2,80 2.26 3.23 1.29 1.53 2.42 .66 aCanada, Australia, South Africa Source: Global 2000 Study staff. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 79 TABLE 6-3 Yield Variations Due to Assumptions Regarding Weather Conditions Variation from Kilogram per Hectare, Alternative 1 1985 Equivalent and 2000 Yield 1985 2000 Percent Industrialized countries United States 5.75 250 280 -Other developed exporters �14.50 310 400 Western Europe t 5.00 190 .220 Japan t 4.75 190 160 Centrally planned countries Eastern Europe :t 6.25 220 280 U. S. S. R. :i_ 11.75 240 310 People's Republic of China :t 5.50 100 130 Less developed countries Latin America �8.00 130 200 North 4rica/Middle East �9.00 130 200 Other developing Africa �3.50 50 80 South Asia �4.75 60 so Southeast Asia �6.50 110 160 East Asia �6.00 110 160 Weighted total above" �7.20 180 220 World aggregated" �3.00 70 90 Note:. Yield variations are calculated on the basis of one standard error of the regression of 1950-75 yield data against time. -Production weighted aggregate of regional variations. hVariation calculated using world yield series. Source: Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. TABLE 6-4 pesticides. The rates of growth in production and the relative importance of area and productivity Grain Production and Consumption Growth gains shown in Figure 6-2's grain data are repre- Rates, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) sentative of the changes projected, for the food ' sector as a whole. Land-man ratios decline 1973-75/ 1985/ 2000/ throughout the projection period, however, and 1951-55 1973-75 , 1985 the productivity gains needed to keep up growth Percent in production come at increasing real cost, partic- Industrialized countries ularly if sharp increases in petroleum prices are Production 2.5 2.5-1.8 1.9-1.7 incorporated into the analysis. Consumption 2.2 2.4-2.0 1.9-1.8 Problems of distribution across and within re- Exporters Production 2.6 2.9-2.5 2.1-2.0 gions also detract from the high world growth Consumption 2.1 2.7-2.2 2.2-2.1 r[Ites shown in Table 6-5. Production and con- Importers sumption increase at faster rates in the LDCs than Production 2.3 l.".2 Consumption 2.1 2.1-1.7 1.6-- 1.5 in the industrialized countries. LDC growth, how Centrally planned countries ever, is from a substantially smaller base. Further- Production 2.8 2.4 1.6 more, the LDC aggregate and many of the re- Consumption 3.0 2.2 1.6 gional totals are somewhat misleading because the Less developed countries difference between individual LI)Cs-i.e., an Ar- Production 2.8 33-3.7 3.0-2.8 gentina compared with an India, or an Egypt Consumption 3.1 3.6-3.6 2.9--2.6 compared with a Bangladesh-are far wider than Exporters the differences between the industrialized coun- - Production 3.2 3.1-4.2 3.2-2.9 tries total and the LDC total. Consumption 3.5 1.7-1.7 2.4-2.3 Importers Growth in food production and consumption Production 2.7 3.3-3.6 3.0-2.8 are not likely to balance at the regional or country Consumption 3.0 3.9-3.7 2.9-2.7 levels. Significant increases in trade--exported by World a few major surplus producers, including the Production 2.7 2.7-2.5 2.1-2.0 United States, Canada, Australia, and several Consumption 2.7 2.7-2.5 2.1-2.0 em .erging exporters such as Thailand and Brazil- tzj 0 C@ 1. --3 n @p :Z -3 n 11 "o, -3 r) 11 -q n no q ri -q o - ; 0 r- " 0 5 ; ? 1'@ g 8 W" 0 R 0 prK.0 .0 mg CL CL E6 0. Ini. CD C'n CW CL 0 eb P4 ;.c M. V co CD ww + t4 + w w 00 7- z; 00 + 00 00 \0 w 00 C) tA cItA -4 + wc@ -1@ -;@ @o LA LA @A @j w @o 9 * (3-1 4) t4 (Z -Q LA W" @A @A 00 tA LA 00 th tA 00 w + + ;@; " t + 'i CD + + 0a, !4 -j CL CL -4 91 kA 4, LA tA tj '.A kA 90 w -10 00 -1 Lo 00 -4 @j :-j 00 -4 00,2, -4 -4 SNOUDWOM 3HJL tri tyl U) (n 0 !4 >e 0. -q C) @v 8 -1 n @p 'R q n n? 5 -3 OY " , ;; P. G@ R g - g 0, 7 R L UI CC, 2. r 0 > OR > 0.- k*b Fj 00 00 ID W @C a, t.A 10 Po p bo @,j @Q @o w 0 LA @o tj 00 00 cu tj + tj ww -,, 9 z;; -4 @o 0 -4 @o -3 00 w 00 k.A @tj t.A ZZ LA 0, 00 LA <Z 00 Lft tA 00 r cr, t4 @o 91 P. 91 PO @A P6 \0 LA @o LA :9@ LA Q 00 m 00 -4 @o 00 w @o @A 4.. P p + + + LA @@ !@ w j twh (7100 91 tj -4 m + + cr, 00 w LA w 00 7i 7;; tA PO PO p 91 PC tj t1i L 00 tlJ @.A 400 a, .91 li @o tj LA 91 Ir ?110 IE z - LA K t ot LA tj @D 60 ;1) 00 SNOI.L3gfO'dd aldfll-IfIDIHOV (INV GOOA '4 CL CL aL 'm I Q,-m r to r- .rz nN < - E - 0 .0n go X + 'A Lft V ;-o 10. -W4 Go -j 00. cy, t4 -J + tA :2 0000 Zo 14 __a t Tj . . a, tj -P. CYN \0 41 tA a, Lj 41 COW 0 -4 42@ + + + tj 11 t.A .11 LA kA .1@w C) tj t9 li w 00 w LA a, p 00 4 :4. 00 4@ 4@. LA t, w w+ LA 00 a li -4 00 NI @O 0 LA W W + + + NJ W -t@ tA ON 00 00 'A w 4@- .91 . . . 90 -4 cps 00 CY, %0 W i:A 1@ t f r + + 00006 j @,o a, @o W 4@, w @o 90 !-A PO -4 w 4. 00 00 C= 0@ a, 00 1@ ll@ 4@- -t@ 00 pa PO p lp 4:1 Q 00 @11 bi 0@ WI 10 ON 00 t1i tA 90 !1, @A @C -S@ .8h, - 00 C7, LA 00 90 00 W SNOIJDgfOSd 9HL Z8 0 z x C6 CL =6 E. CA. CL ft >5 r- c to 00 --J 4@ w + + G w %A W W 00 t-j + -W t4 " m 7- 7- 7- 00 -W W @,J @A 00 LA LA @o ba tA + 0 + tj t4 tj tj t-4 t4 LA @.A + 00 00 r r ww !4 !4 1000 @o @o 00 -W + a ,A 20, @A Z; :4 @o bo LA R!R 800 ao 39 90 PO w Lft @o w w ?o ao 2! 00 -47 tQ w 00 w -j !4 ss -j @A @11 . . :4. uj Go co C7% @-A j 00 00 .414, SNOIIDHfO'dd aldfll-InMMOV (INV G00a VU, v@ -e2 N n;@ FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 85 will be needed to balance excess demand in food- above the levels projected under a constant petro- deficit Western Europe, Japan, the centrally leum price alternative. planned countries, and parts of developing Africa Even a rough estimate of the impact of higher and Asia. World trade varies from alternative to energy prices on agricultural production depends alternative but exceeds record 1973-75 levels by on the timing of price increases, long-run rates of at least 20 percent by 1985 and 60 percent by technological change, and short-run input flexibil- 2000. ity. The real energy price increases projected to Energy Price Impacts 2000 in the energy projections of this study (Chapter 10) are so large as to suggest that the The quantity and price ranges shown in Tables severity of the impact in the long run depends on 6-5 and 6-6 reflect model outputs on the impact the rate at which energy-conserving technologies energy price increases could have on the agricul- replace existing energy-intensive technologies. tural sector. The bottom end of the range provides Little can be done to project the rate or the for no marked increase in the price of energy from impact of such long-run technological change. In real 1973-75 levels. The upper end provides for the shorter term, however, some estimate of the moderately higher real prices by 1985 and substan- impact of higher energy prices can be made on .tially higher real prices by 2000. The range the basis of data on energy intensity and judg- reflects not so much uncertainty about petroleum ments as to how much flexibility farmers in a price increases as uncertainty about the effect particular country have to change input mixes. changing petroleum prices have on agriculture Figure 6-3 can be used to gauge approximate and the ability of farmers to maintain or expand energy intensity and to demonstrate the impor- production while shifting away from energy4nten- tance of energy flexibility. Both cross-sectional sive inputs. A variety of cultural practices and data for the 30 largest agricultural producers, and ,management techniques are available in the short time series data for a smaller number of countries 'and medium terms to minimize the effect of suggest the energy-intensity curve is basically S- energy price increases. The experience of the past shaped. Given the position of countries along ,2-4 years suggests that food and overall agricul- the curve, there appears to be little question that - ong run ,tural production could well adjust in the I past increases in productivity have generally de- substantially higher energy prices, depending pended on marked increases in energy inputs. The. .;Ton the timing.of increases, without the degree of impact of any energy price increase, all other ,dislocation implied at the upper end of the range. things being equal, depends on where a country is 1. The model results suggest that, while world on this energy-intensity curve. The efficiency of ,Oroduction and consumption levels might not be energy use measured roughly in terms of energy .'changed measurably by marked but gradual in- input-product output ratios might well strengthen .creases in energy prices, major shifts within and or weaken the impact of any energy price change, ,across sectors and regions would be likely. The but the general ranking of the countries from fight comparative advantage of the resource7endowed to left would not be likely to change much. The LDCs such as Brazil and Thailand, which use experience of the past 3-4 years of higher energy ,relatively few high energy-intensive inputs, would prices suggests that a country's ability to move 1, If improve. Higher energy prices, however, would back down the curve toward lower energy inten- likely exacerbate problems of comparative disad- sity-i.e., to adjust production techniques without vantage in food production common to many of sacrificing the high productivity associated with the industrialized and higher-income LDCs. advanced technology-is particularly crucial. Adjustments in the food-exporting countries A review of the adjustments U.S. farmers can would likely be mixed. In countries such as the and, in many cases, are making suggests that the United States, higher energy prices could be range of options available even within a basically offset at least partially by increasing the land energy-intensive technology is quite wide. Data resources committed to food production and by from Department of Agriculture and Federal En- decreasing on the use of, or increasing returns to, ergy Administration studies estimate that the en- energy-intensive inputs. The coniparative advan- ergy used in the U.S. agricultural sector in 1974 tage of the traditional food-exporting countries was equivalent to 2,000 trillion Btu (British ther- would likely deteriorate relative to the resource- mal units) or roughly 5,300 Btu per hectare of endowed LDCs but improve relative to most of total cropped area. As Figures 6-4 and 6-5 the industrialized countries and several of the indicate, the largest energy expenditures were resource-tight LDCs. The sizes of these changes reported in cultural operations, transportation, in comparative advantage are projected to keep irrigation, livestock operations, crop drying, and the exporters' sales on the world market at or energy investment in fertilizers and pesticides. iNS 197,IWU'3"e'* im*x of Enww use Per *we Heclm 100) EL =7 P. rL i gz SNO1133fOldd 3HI 98 'Percent of tbkd, kra rn '40 0 EmW in &Wons of ofu Percent of tatof rlmkdbv d-m") F-D 2. fo CL ir CL Energ@ In-,*AVOM of 010 L8 SNO1133folid gHfiliflaMov GNV U00d 89 THE PROJECTIONS A review of the literature on energy-saving or much sharper than a graduated 5- 10 percent per techniques 'suggests that considerable reductions year. The present capabilities of the GOL model in energy use are possible in all of these areas. do not permit more precise measurement of the The energy savings possible from modifying cul- impact of gradually changing petroleum prices or tural practices, which currently account for 20 reliable projections of the impact of more extreme percent of energy use, to provide for reduced or energy price changes. minimum tillage are quite large. Net energy sav- ings range up to 50 percent. Moreover, reduced Continuing Trends tillage in 1975 amounted to only 35.8 million acres, The projections also suggest that the major while conventional tillage amounted to 218.2 mil- trends of the past two decades-41) the increasing lion acres. dependence of LDCs on food imports; (2) the Another potential area of large savings is in growing importance of variability in supply; and fertilizer use, which currently accounts for over (3) the increasing importance of the trade and one-third of total energy expenditures. Significant agricultural policy decisions of a few major ex- energy savings are possible through proper selec- porting and importing countries-are likely to tion and use of fertilizers. The proper timing and continue on to 2000. Shifts in demand toward method of application also contribute to fertilizer livestock products as incomes increase, however, efficiency. Moreover, considerable savings appear are also likely to play an increasingly important possible by changing mixes of fertilizers to empha- role in determining the quantities and prices of size organic and green fertilizers as well as commodities moving on the international market. inorganic chemical fertilizers. The grain trade projections shown in Table 6-5 Irrigation engineers also suggest that it is tech- suggest that the LDCs, excluding food-surplus nologically impossible to reduce the 10 percent of exporters, * face sharp increases in the absolute total energy use accounted for by irrigation by as volume of food imports as well as possible in- much as one half. Reductions in energy consump- creases in the proportion of food imported. tion of as much as 10-20 percent appear to be The increased food imports of many of the de- possible through minimal efforts to increase ini- veloping countries, however, are not without gation pumping plant efficiency, to upgrade water positive implications. The grain gap--the differ- usage and water scheduling, and to adopt runoff ence between grain production and consump- control procedures. tion-is generally seen as an indication of the less Drying grain for storage-which accounts tbr 5- developed countries' inability to feed themselves. 10 percent of energy use-is another area of Increases in imports, however, also measure the potential saving. There appear to be several ways LDCs ability to supplement, limited domestic out- to reduce grain-drying fuel requirements, including put with foreign production. A closer look at more in-the-field drying, better management of the which LDCs import more through 2000 suggests existing system, and the use of new technical that the largest increases are concentrated in the developments such as solar heat. There are also relatively affluent upper one-third of the develop- significant potential savings in the transportation ing world. The calorie gap--the difference be- sector through more efficient use of equipment. tween recommended caloric consumption mini- Keeping these short-term options for minimiz- mums and food energy supplies-sug'gests a much ing energy inputs in mind, the projection alterna- larger, more persistent problem concentrated in tives can be seen in a number of different con- the lowest-income countries but affecting groups texts. Those Alternative I runs assuming constant within higher-income countries as well. The aver- petroleum prices would be valid either given no age LDC per capita calorie gap narrows margin- increase in petroleum prices or given increases at ally through 2000 but, with the number of people a fairly even pace-possibly 5-10 percent per increasing at near-record rates, the absolute size year-provided the agricultural sector maximizes of the gap and the number of people eating below short-term energy savings and ultimately substi- the recommended minimum is projected to in! tutes energy-conserving technologies. A number crease under all but optimistic Alternative 11. of the model's coefficients have been adjusted to While the direction, frequency, and size of reflect estimates of both short-term flexibility in fluctuations in supply will continue to depend energy use and the long-term development of largely on weather, the importance of variability energy-conserving technologies as discussed in in supply is likely to increase markedly as world Chapter 18. The Alternative I projections based productive capacity is used at significantly higher on an increasing petroleum price would be valid should agriculture not adjust to gradual energy -Primarily Argentina and Thailand, but in some scenajios price increases or should the increases be sudden other LI)Cs as well, e.g., Brazil, Colombia, and Indonesia. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 89 levels. The experience of a number of countries , ruminant herd suggest that a larger proportion of suggests that expansion of cultivation into mar- meat supplies will have to come from pork and ginal areas increases susceptibility to weather poultry products heavily dependent on grain and fluctuations. The resource balances reviewed be- oilseed feeds. Moreover, the world's fish catch is low indicate that a larger proportion of the world's an essentially concentrate-free source of animal food supplies will have to be grown on increas- protein, and, should the world's fish catch not ingly marginal areas dependent on favorable increase at the 1.5-2.0 percent rate assumed in (rather than normal) rainfaff and temperature. the model runs, demand- for feed to produce a Reserves are likely to increase in importance as comparable amount of animal protein from pigs a means of ensuring that production windfalls and and chickens could increase grai.n'and oilseed de- temporarily low producer prices do not generate mand by another I percent. The impact on prices production cutbacks in the food-exporong coun- and diets worldwide would be relatively small, tries. Reserves are also likely to increase in since less than 6 percent of the world's protein importance as a means of reducing price fluctua- and 1 percent of the. world's calories are derived tions and the market-rationing effect of short-term from fish and seafood products. However, in se- drops in production in a world of rising real lected countries--such as Japan, where fish ac7 prices. counts for 25 percent of protein supplies and 8 All three alternatives also suggest that the percent of calories--the impact would be very sig- agricultural and trade policies of a small number nificant. of importers and exporters will play an increas- World grain and overall food balances could ingly dominant role in determining the quantities tighten further if the lower-income industrialized and prices of food traded on the world market. countries, centrally planned countries, and the The increased importance of policy decisions in higher-income less developed countries were to the exporting countries would result from their markedly increase their consumption of livestock control of scarce excess productive capacity. The products and adopt the grain-intensive feeding experience of the last five years suggests that techniques of the U.S. World food prices could without marked changes in international trading also be pushed up substancially as price-inelastic conventions, the role of major but sporadic im- food demand in the poorest LDCs competes porters such as the Soviet Union is also likely to against more elastic feed demand in the affluent increase. Protectionist agricultural and trade poli- countries. cies currently allow large countries or blocs rela- tively close to self-sufficiency to avoid the costs Differing Perspectives of adjusting to world production shortfalls. The All three alternatives also suggest that the food current structure of the world market also allows and environmental concerns of the industrialized them to pass on part, if not aR, of the cost of and less developed countries are likely to differ disruptions in their domestic agricultural econo- widely. The prime concern in the industrialized mies for absorbtion by the world market. The countries is likely to be adjustment. The major impact of changes in world supply and demand exporters will continue to face the problem of are consequently likely to be absorbed more and adjusting their production to higher but widely more by countries exporting a large proportion of fluctuating foreign demand. The food-deficit production and countries importing a large propor- higher-income countries will continue to face the tion of consumption on a regular basis. problem of worsening comparative disadvantage AD three alternatives also suggest that, in addi- and increasingly expensive protectionist agricul- tion to population and income growth, shifts in tural and trade policies. The effect of changing consumption patterns are likely to play a major production levels on the environment and the role in shaping demand, particularly beyond 1985. impact of environmental constraints on production @Growth in demand and shifts in taste away from costs, however, wifl be a concern common to all calorie-efficient diets based on cereals and the industrialized countries. starches toward less calorie-efficient, livestock- In contrast, the LDCs are likely to face the ,oriented diets will determine to a large extent the more pressing problem of expanding production- demand price. of'grains, oilseeds, other high- often regardless of environmental costs--to meet protein feeds, and possibly food prices in general. rapidly expanding food needs. Several of the Changes in the proportion of concentrate-fed higher-income countries, such as Korea and Tai- products in the livestock total will be critical in wan, and several of the resource-constrained determining the impact of this shift toward live- countries of North Africa and the -Middle East wifl stock diets and the grain and oilseed balance. face the same comparative disadvantage problems Biological limitations on the expansion of the as many of the food-deficit industrialized coun- 90 THE PROJECTIONS tries, but the bulk of the LDCs will be concerned population, income, yield, and petroleum price with environmental quality only after basic human variables differs widely by regions and over time. needs are met. In the food-importing countries of Western Eu- rope and in Japan, with relatively stable yields and low population growth rates, the crucial Alternatives I-M: Results and demand variables both in 1985 and 2000 are likely to be income growth rates and shifts in taste. The Conclusions crucial determinants of supply are likely to be The projections presented in Tables 6-7 and petroleum prices and domestic agricultural and cific trade policy decisions. Among the traditional 6-8 point up a number of alternative-spe exporters, foreign demand, weather-related fluc- conclusions regarding (1) the impacts of popula- tuations in yields, and, to a lesser extent, petro- tion, income, yield, and petroleum price variations leum price increases will be the most relevant in particular regions and over time, (2) the range considerations. Among the centrally planned of possible LDC food consumption improvements countries, yield variations are likely to continue to through 2000, (3) the variability of world trade and be the most relevant factors. Among the less the role of the U.S. as residual supplier, and (4) developed importing countries, population growth the range of likely world market price increases. is by far the dominant demand factor, with Before reviewing specific conclusions, however, variability in yields dominating on the supply side. comments on the range spanned by the alterna- tives and on short-term versus long-term adjust- The importance of each of these exogenous ments are called for. variables changes over time. Petroleum prices The range covered by the population and in- become more important as increasingly tight re- come growth rates for Alternatives 11 and III is source supplies narrow the alternatives to energy- narTow (see Tables 6-1 and 6-2). The range of intensive food production techniques. Variations yield variations is also narrow (see Table 6-3). in yields are also likely to become more important Given the amount of uncertainty about rates of as agricultural production expands into increas- growth in these variables, the ranges tested here ingly marginal areas more susceptible to weather would appear to be too narrow. Moreover, com- fluctuations. Income growth becomes increasingly parisons in terms of absolute production and important in LDCs as low but sustained growth consumption levels suggest rather minimal differ- over the rest of the century pushes per capita ences between alternatives. However, the combi- levels in the middle-income countries high enough nation of all the favorable assumptions in Alter- to generate shifts in taste toward grain-fed live- native II and all the unfavorable assumptions in* stock products. Alternative III suggests it is highly probable that the outcome for the world and for major region s With regard to improvements in per capita would fall within the range bounded by these two LDC food consumption, even Alternative H's alternatives-particularly if analyzed in terms of combination of optimistic supply and demand per capita (rather than absolute) production and assumptions suggests gains are likely to be small consumption levels. and poorly distributed. Annual gains in per capita consumption for the LDCs as a group average With regard to short-term versus long-term adjustments, the static nature of the GOL model less than 0.5 percent but range as high as I and the long-range specification of its elasticities percent and as low as declining per capita con- limit the model to measuring net long-term adjust- sumption. Given Alternative 111's pessimistic as- ments. The model can say little about the year to sumptions, LDC per capita levels do not grow. year adjustments within the agricultural sector While increase in the high-growth regions slows needed to reach the solutions calculated for 1985 somewhat, per capita consumption levels fall or 2000. Consequently, the fluctuations in endog- below substandard benchmark 1969-71 levels inj enous variables generated by the changes in the low-growth South Asia and Central Afirica. exogenous variables noted above could well be The food problem in many of the LDCs with substantially wider if gauged over a shorter 3- to the slowest growth in consumption appears to be 5-year rather than a 10- to 20-year period. as much a problem of effective market demand as a problem of expanding production. The effect of Results production conAraints-be they limited agricul- A comparison of the results of the alternatives tural resources, inadequate agricultural infrastruc- tested suggests that the impact of changes in tur.e, outdated technology, institutional con- CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 59 TABLE 4-3B SAME AS THE LAST30YEARS C 0 '0 2 C 0 0 _x 0 E 0 .2 0 -2 L) -0 > RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND TURBIDITY IPERCENT) DURING THE 50 10 10 15 15 PERIOD 1975-2000 1977-80 1981-90 1991-2000 CU CM M (7 Z3 n "W 2! > T u_ LL PROBABILITY OF MID-LATITUDE DROUGHT* United States 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0 0.5 0.4 Other Mid-Latitude 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0 .1 0.4 0.5 0.1 .6 0 ,2 0.1 .6 0 PROBABILITY OF SAHEL DROUGHT** 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1 PROBABILITY OF MONSOON FAILURE*** Northwest India 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0,5 0.3 Other India 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 Other Monsoon Asia 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 *Frequent-similar to early to mid-1930sand early tomid-1950s;average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1940s and 1960s. **Frequent-similar to 1940-50 and 1965-73 periods; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1950-65 period. -Frequent-similar to 1900-25 period; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; in frequent- si mi lar to 1930-60 period. 60 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 4-4A- MODERATE GLOBAL WARMING PROBABILITY OF SCENARIO: 0.25 MEAN NORTHERN HEMISPHERE TEMPERATURE CHANGE SINCE 1969: between 0.250 and 0.60C warmer PROBABILITY OF TEMPERATURE CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1970-75) U U U 0 U U 0 0 U 0 o Ln Oq Lq q . O'D 6 - 6. '7 C? -7 7 0@ ,i E L6 E U, R M Lq M M U!M U U Polar 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 Northern Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 hemisphere Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 Subtropical 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 Subtropical 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 Southern Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 hemisphere Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 Polar 0@1 0.2 O@5 0.1 0.1 *Growing season in higher middle latitudes: Probability of an increase (decrease) in the length of the growing season exceeding 10 days is 0.4 10.2); probability of an increase (decrease) in the variability of the length of the growing season in excess of 25% is 0.1 (0.2). PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1941-70) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON 31 C E M M C z S A 5 V 0 A L) V a A Higher mid-latitude 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 Lower mid-latitude 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 Subtropical 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION VARIABILITY CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with average for the previous 25-year period) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON M, 0, ae M C tn E! Lo Ln U, Ln (N M C,4 U C.4 U C1J M C.4 (N A V 0' A -c A V A Higher mid-latitude 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 Lower mid-latitude 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 Subtropical 1 0.2 1 0.6 1 0.2 1 0.3 05 0.2 @ " e EA CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 61 TABLE 44B MODERATE GLOBAL W A R M I N G o C, 0 'a 0 .a,- 0 x E 0 > RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND TURBIDITY (PERCENT) DURING THE 60 15 5 10 10 PERIOD 1975-2006 1977-80 1981-90 1991-2000 C C W W cr 1E T 2! < LL PROBABILITY OF MID-LATITUDE DROUGHT* United States 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 Other Mid-Latitude PROBABILITY OF SAHEL DROUGHT- 0.3 OA 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 PROBABILITY OF MONSOON FAILURE*** Northwest India 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 Other India Other Monsoon Asi@, *Frequent-similar to early to mid-1930s and early to mid-1950s; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1940s and 1960s. **Frequent-similar to 1940-50 and 1965-73 periods; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1950-65 period. ***Frequent-similar to 1900-25 pehod; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1930-60 period. 62 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 4-5A LARGE GLOBAL WARMING PROBABILITY OF SCENARIO: 0.10 MEAN NORTHERN HEMISPHERE TEMPERATURE CHANGE SINCE 1969: between 0.6'and 1.80C warmer PROBABILITY OF TEMPERATURE CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1970-75) U U U L) U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o U@ 9 Ui in 0 in t a t q t q 41 C E E E v@ E v? E L@ E ? 6 L6 :9 C? L6 '. 6 U@ @6 0 0 0 U 0 0 C; 3: 3: 3: C"I C.) 3: Polar 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 Northern Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.5 0.4 hemisphere Lower mid-latitude O'l 0.5 0.2 0.2 Subtropical 0"1 0.8 0.1 Subtropical 0.1 0.8 0.1 Southern Lower mid-latitude 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 hemisphere Higher mid-latitude* 0.1 0.5 0.4 Polar 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 Growing season in higher middle latitudes: Probability of an increase (decrease) in the length of growing season exceeding 10 days is 0.8 (0.01; probability of an increase (decrease) in the variability of the length of the growing season in excess of 25% is 0.0 (0.7), PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with 1941-70) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON M 'm U U V 6 A U V 0 A Higher mid-latitude 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 Lower mid-latitude 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 Subtropical 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 PROBABILITY OF PRECIPITATION VARIABILITY CHANGE BY LATITUDE (Compared with average for the previous 25-year period) ANNUAL GROWING SEASON 00 In C in in r_ in Lo 8Cj M cli UC14 C-4 M C4 N z V 0) A A A 5 V A Higher mid-latitude 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 Lower mid-latitude 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 Subtropical 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 63 TABLE 4-5B LA RG E G LO BAL WARM ING r W 6 ig c x 0 .2 .2 C. E 0 'M 6'0 LL U >-0 CL RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND TURBIDITY (PERCENT) DURING THE 90 10 0 0 0 PERIOD 1975-2000 1977-80 1981-90 1991-2000 C CD oll 0 0 CM n CM cr C, M n cr 4) U Cr "E LD -1 T > LL E U_ < E PROBABILITY OF MID-LATITUDE DROUGHT* United States 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 Other Mid-Latitude 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 PROBABILITY OF SAHEL DROUGHT** 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3 PROBABILITY OF MONSOON FAILURE- Northwest India 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.8 Other India 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 Other Monsoon Asia 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.7 *Frequent-similar to early to mid-1930s and early to mid- 1 950s; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1940s and 1960s. **Frequent-similar to 1940-50 and 1965-73 periods; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similar to 1950-65 period. -Frequent-similar to 1900-25 period; average-similar to the frequency over the longest period of record available; infrequent-similarto 1930-60 period. 64 THE PROJECTIONS While average global temperature increased tudes warmed, on the average, by Q.8' C; the moderately, the largest temperature increases lower middle latitudes by 1.00 C; the:higher mid- came in the higher latitudes. The Northern Hemi- dle. latitudes by 1.4' C; and the polar-latitudes by sphere warmed slightly more than the Southern a remarkable 3.0' C, compared to the early 1970s. Hemisphere due to its greater land area and the Symmetry prevailed as similar temperature larger thermal inertia of the southern oceans. In changes were observed in both the Northern and the Northern Hemisphere, the polar latitudes Southern Hemispheres. The increase in tempera- warmed by 1.2' C; Ihe higher middle latitudes by ture was accompanied by a significant increase in 0.5' C, the lower middle latitudes by 0.3' C; and the length of the growing season in the higher the subtropical latitudes by 0.25' C. In the South- middle latitudes, as well as by a substantial ern Hemisphere, average temperatures over the decrease in the variability from year to year in the polar latitudes increased by 0.65' C; the higher length of the,growing season. middle latitudes by 0.4' C; the lower middle Precipitation levels generally increased, espe- latitudes by 0.3' C; -and the subtropical latitudes cially in the subtropical and higher middle lati- by 0.2' C.The increase in global temperature was tudes. In the lower middle latitudes there was reflected in a moderate increase in the length of little net change of precipitation. Annual precipi- the growing season in higher middle latitudes, but tation variability decreased slightly compared to no significant change in the interannual variability the 1950-75 period; precipitation variability during of the growing season was noted. the growing season. similarly decreased in the Annual precipitation levels increased slightly in higher middle latitudes, but increased slightly in the higher middle latitudes but showed little the lower middle and subtropical latitudes. change for lower latitudinal bands. Growing-sea- The warming trend also ushered in more favor- son precipitation also increased slightly in the able climatic conditions in India and other parts.of higher middle latitudes and subtropical regions but Asia. These conditions were similar to those of remained unchanged in the lower middle latitudes. the 1930-460 period. Monsoon f"ure was infre- Both annual and growing-season precipitation var- quent, especially in northwest India. But in the iability remained essentially unchanged except for midlatitude areas of the United States, extending a slight increase in the variability of growing- from the Rockies to the Appalachians, drought season precipitation in subtropical latitudes. conditions similar to the mid-1930s and the early Drought conditions again plagued the midiati- to mid-1950s prevail6d. In other midlatitude areas tude areas of the United States, corroborating the of the world, notably Europe, the probability of 20- to 22-year drought cycle hypothesis. Climatic drought declined. The increased levels of precipi- conditions were somewhat more favorable in the tation also returned the Sahel region to wetter Asiatic region and in subtropical North Affica. weather conditions. The frequency of monsoon failure, especially in northwest India, resembled more closely the long- Climate Scenarios for the Global 2000 term average; so did the firequency of drought in Study the Sahel region. The NDU scenarios provide a richness of detail Large Global Warming* that could not be used in the Global 2000 Study. The global cooling trend that began in the 1940S At the beginning of the Study it was assumed that was dramatically reversed in the last quarter of the government's long-term global models would the 20th century. By the year 2000, the mean require climatological inputs, and three simplified Northern Hemisphere temperature had increased scenarios-informed by the National Defense Uni- by about V C compared to the early 1970s. versity study-were developed. More careful in- Climatologists explained that this trend was due vestigation established later that none of the principally to the warming effects of the increas' global long-term models used by the agencies for mg amounts of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. this Study are capable of accepting climatological While temperature increased over the entire '.nPuts. The energy, food, water and forestry globe, temperature increases were more pro- projections all assume implicitly a continuation of the nearlv ideal climate of the 1950s and 1960s. nounced at higher latitudes. The subtropical lati- Although ,the climate scenarios developed for the Global 2000 Study could not be incorporated into *Statements concerning some details of this scenario reflect the Study's projections, the scenarios are reported a higher degree of certainty than was expressed by the climatologists who participated in this study. See Tables 4-- here to indicate the range of climatic change that 5 A and B for the range of uncertainty. should be analyzed in a study of this sort. CLIMATE PROJECTIONS 65 The Global 2000 Case I scenario described crease by 10 C. Most of the warming is in the below is similar to the "same as the last 30 years" polar regions and the higher middle latitudes, with scenario in the NDU study. The Case 11 scenario only slight warming in the tropics. Annual pretip- is intermediate between NDU's "moderate warm- itation increases by 5-10 percent, and year to year ing" and "large warming"; similarly, Case III is variance decreases slightly. There is an increased intermediate between NDU's two cooling scena- likelihood of U.S. drought conditions similar to rios. Note that these scenarios span a narrower those of the mid-'30s. range of variation than the National Defense Case III: Cooling. Global temperatures de- Universitv scenarios and that the narrow span crease by 0.50 C. Cooling of V C occurs in the excludes climatological developments that would higher and middle latitudes, with a smaller change have a pronounced effect on future demands for in the tropics and subtropics. Precipitation and supplies offood, wood, water, and energy. amounts decline and variability increases both The three Global 2000 climate scenarios are: from month to month and from year to year. Case I. No Change. Yearly rainfall and tem- Storm tracks-arld the precipitation they bring- perature statistics are similar to those of the 1941- shift toward the equator, improving conditions in 70 period. Drought conditions in the U.S. continue the upper latitudes of the great deserts and to occur every 20 to 22 years. Monsoon failures worsening them on the equator side. Severe in India become less frequent than recently and monsoon failures are more frequent in India, the Sahel region of Africa no longer experiences severe droughts more frequent in the Sahel'. severe drought of the type that occurred in the The three Global 2000 scenanos are compared late '60s and early '70s. in Figure 4-1 with the historical record of temper- Case II: Warming. Global temperatures in- ature changes from the 1870s to the 1970s. 1.0- Global 2000 Ccm 111_@ "Worining" 0.8 01 .6 0.4 0.2 Global 2000 Cam I 0.0 -014 Global 2000,Case III "Cooli -0.6 1860 1880, 1900 1920, 1940 19160 Im 2000, Figure 4- 1. The three Global 2000 Study scenarios compared with the annual mean temperature changes during the past century for the latitude band 0*-80*N. The period 1941-70 is the zero reference base. 5 Technology Projecdons Logically, technology is an input to the Global ing generally declining fertilities and mortalities. 2000 Study projections much as are population, While the Bureau recognizes the possibility of GNP, and climate. But, because technology is so technological breakthroughs in both fields, some highly specific to each type of projection, it was of which are currently under study, it believes impossible to formulate a single set of measures that it is uncertain whether any will be perfected of technological change for all analyses. It was and adopted widely enough by the year 2000 to therefore left to the individual experts to make have a significant impact on fertility and mortality their own assumptions about the effects of tech- levels. Similarly, the Bureau assumed that no nology in their own fields and to develop their regression in either type of technology serious projections from those assumptions as well as enough to significantly affect their forecasts will from the exogenously supplied population, GNP, occur in the near future-for example, major harmful,, and climate forecasts. They were requested to side effects of existing birth control techniques will make these assumptions as explicit as possible in not be discovered, and new uncontrollable micro- statements to the Global 2000 Study-70ften a bial strains harmful to humans will not dev/elop. difficult task, as when trends of technological While technological advance or regression may advance were concealed in time series extrapola- occur before 2000 and shift population'growth up or tions of other input variables, or when it was down slightly, the Bureau believes that such oc- unclear whether a particular idea was more cor- currences will not result in increases or decreases rectly considered an assumption or a conclusion. that exceed the limits of its high and low projec- This chapter gathers together the assumptions tions. of technological change made in the individual The discussion of migration in Chapter 2 makes analyses of the Global 2000 project. For the sake no technological assumptions except that world of comprehensiveness, the assumptions behind industrialization will probably continue at about the development of the input forecasts already present.,rates. considered (population, GNP, climate) are in- cluded. Gros@ National Product In general, the analyses assume that the adop- tion and refinement of existing technologies will The GNP forecasts in Chapter 3 were made by continue at about the same rate as in the recent analysts in three separate agencies according to past. The verbal analyses often refer to possible somewhat different methods. The forecasts for technological breakthroughs, and many of the industrialized noncommunist and communist quantitative forecasts extrapolate from historical countries, made by a panel of WAES (Workshop data taken from the past two or three decades, on Alternative Energy Strategies) experts and by which were characterized by many such break- the CIA, respectively, are largely the result of throughs. These forecasts implicitly assume, subjectively extrapolating historical growth rates. therefore, that breakthroughs will occur in the Thus, technology is implicitly assumed to contrib- future at recent historical rates. ute to future economic growth about as it has in the recent past. The WAES panel adjusted its Population estimates downward to account for the supposed restrictive effect of slowed future population Technology affects population primarily in the growth. The CIA adjusted its forecasts for parts form of birth control, which lowers fertility, and of Eastern Europe downward on the basis of the health, care, which lowers the death rate. In availability of energy, thus assuming that techno- making the population projections used in the logical advance will not completely counteract an Global 2000 Study, the U.S. Bureau of the Census increasing scarcity of energy. Initially, however, it implicitly assumed continued adoption of both based all of its forecasts on direct extrapolation of forms of technology at moderate rates by project- past trends of GNP and productivity growth, 67 68 THE PROJECTIONS implicitly assuming a continuation of past techno- make the Global 2000 Study's agricultural fore- logical trends. casts assumes that economic variables such. as I ]Forecasts for the less developed countries product and input prices will influence food pro- (LDCs) were made by the World Bank (originally duction efficiency as in the recent past. However, foe use by the WAES study) in three stages: provision is also made to incorporate an exoge- 1. Projections were developed by analysts on nously estimated trend rate of growth in technol- an independent, country by country basis, relying ogy over and above the growth explained by on a combination of professional judgment and economic variables. This is done by adjusting the use of specialized country or regional models. regional food yield and thus, implicitly, yields per Typically, past rates of increase in the productiv- hectare. Yield per hectare is the measure of ity of new capital investment were implicitly production efficiency used in the GOL model. projected to continue in the future. These in- The exogenous adjustments for changes in yield creases were not explicitly attributed to technolog- are made in the regional production equations. ical change. However, because capital productiv- For each region, GOL has one linear regression ity increases in the past resulted partially from equation for each major agricultural product pro- \technological advance, extensions of the upward duced locally. In each equation, total production trend in productivity presumably imply continued is calculated as a function of endogenously deter- advance. mined crop hectarage, a base crop yield, a time 2. Using a computer-based model, the various trend variable, and changes in product prices, country projections were aggregated and adjusted input prices, and the prices of products competing on a globally consistent basis to reflect probable for inputs. The time trend variable is equal to I in economic growth constraints due to likely limita- the first year of the estimation period, to 2 in the tions in the availability of foreign trade earnings second, and so on. It is intended to capture the and foreign investment capital. Each LDC group effects of factors--other than those included in was represented in a way that implicitly assumed the total production equation-that influence total that major increases in the productivity of new yields over time. The most important of these is capital investment will occur in each LDC, in part believed to be technology, which has acted over as a result of technological change (see Chapter time to increase yields. The following steps are 16). For example, in the case of the Other South taken to adjust the estimated coefficient of the Asian LDC group, a given investment was implic- trend variable to reflect country analysts' judg- itly assumed to produce about 60 percent more ments about future productivity trends: incremental GDP in 1985 than in 1977 (in constant dollars). However, there is no way to infer the 1. GOL supply and demand inputs are used to precise extent to which this improved productivity project roughly the direction of likely future price of capital might properly be attributed to techno- movements. logical change. 2. For each region, a measure of likely pressure 3. The projections were further adjusted judg- on supply calculated from the price projections is mentally by Bank and WAES analysts, but these used to estimate changes in "innovative technol- adjustments were not related to assumptions re- ogy," which in turn defines the physical or garding technological change. biological limitation on yield per hectare with the best available technology; the estimation thus Climate assumes that technological advance responds di- rectly to economic incentives. The climate forecasts make no assumptions 3. The innovative technology level for each about technology except that industrial processes region and various data forecasted from the GOL will continue to release large amounts of carbon run (see Step 1) are given to the appropriate dioxide into the atmosphere, with the possible regional analysts within the Department of Agri- effect of warming the earth's atmosphere. No culture. other foreseeable technological developments be- 4. On the basis of the data received, each fore the year 2000 were considered to -have a regional analyst re-estimates trend growth in yield significant effect on the climate of the planet. to reflect possible constraints or sources of growth not included in the original regression analysis. Food 5. In each regional production equation of GOL, the coefficient of the time trend variable is As an econometric projection model, the GOL recalculated so that the trend increases approxi- (grain, oilseed, livestock) model that was used to mate the values estimated by the regional analyst. TECHNOLOGY PROJECTIONS 69 6. The,GOL model is run with the judgmentally above. The right half of the bottom curve is modified trend coefficients along with the other adopted technology calculated as explained in economic .variables cited above. The output of the Step 6. GOL was run twice, once for each of two model is its final forecasts. The yields per hectare years, to get two points from each kind. of that can be calculated from the output are called technology with which to draw the extrapolations "adopted technology" because they are the yields shown. The innovative technology- data are what per hectare that the regions are projected to is given to the Thailand regional analyst to con- actually achieve. sider in setting Thailand's,rice output for the Thus, potential yields per hectare in the future, adjustment of the GOL model described in Step estimated with data from the GOL'model, are 3. The adopted technology data points were used by analysts in adjusting productivity data calculated from the output of the runs as described within the model. in Step 6. A graph of innovative and adopted technology Fertilizer consumption per unit of food produc- taken from actual model data is reproduced in tion, also often considered an important measure Figure 5-1. It is for rice production in Thailand. of agricultural technology, is estimated subjec- The first half of each curve is historical data. The tively by Department of Agriculture analysts on right half of the top curve is future innovative the basis of the GOL output after the model run technology, calculated as explained in Step 2 is complete. The fertilizer consumption andfood 777-@77 '77 77 in the GOL model,both forms of technolc4y are n4i 4 As , I ex qw ic -a io 7 nd e h-h' re set4qual to,1 In-s r. Innovative Technology -Productivity @nvosumd terins of crop livestock yields Adopted Technology rT "Or - 'rime Figure 5-1. Innovative and adopted technology levels for rice production in Thailand as projected by the GOL tgrain, oilseed, livestock) model. and "@A 70 THE PROJECTIONS production data in Chapter 6 show an assumption puter model, assume that only proven techniques of continued increases in fertilizer use per unit of for producing final fossil fuels will be widely food output, from about 800 nutrient tons around enough adopted to significantly affect the world 1971 to 970 nutrient tons in 1985 and to 1210 energy market by the year 2000. Producers' sup- nutrient tons in the year 2000. ply curves, indirectly representing their cost of production, assume no rapid acceleration in yield. Fisheries The real costs and efficiencies of refining and con- verting primary fuels and the costs, routes, and The fisheries analysis assumes that the means modes of trunsporting intermediate products are to harvest and process formerly unfished marine also held constant. However, the types of final animals, such as Antarctic krill, will be increas- fuels demanded, the sources of the primary fuels ingly adopted through the year 2000. Ocean pol- used to make them, the refining and conversion lution will continue unabated. Technology will techniques applied in production, and the transpor- soon be ineffective and perhaps counterproductive tation modes and routes all vary according to rela- in increasing catches from natural fisheries because tive costs. Large increases in the adoption of exist- of reduction of fish populations. ing technologies are also assumed to be possible. The IEES allows world shipping and refining Forestry capacities to expand indefinitely to meet world The forestry analysis assumes a continued de- energy demand, and miscellaneous conversions capacity to expand up to high limits. Mscellaneous velopment and adoption of technologies that in- conversions capacity in 1985 and 1990 is allowed to crease both forest productivity and the percentage be as much as two and three times its historical of that productivity that can be exploited and 1975 level, respectively. In general, the expansions used. Particularly in the industrialized countries, in refining and miscellaneous conversions the management of forests will become more inten- capacities are restricted to the industrialized na- sive, uses for formerly discarded parts of trees will be found, and cut timber will be used more effi- tions. ciently. In the LDCs, harvesting technologies and The forecasts assume continued new adoption of nuclear and hydro power for electrical genera- uses for formerly ignored species and size classes tion. Regional electrical generation capacities from will be adopted; fuelwood plantations may also be nuclear and hydro (including geothermal and so- established. lar) power are inputs to the IEES; the exact Also assumed is that no fuel as cheap as wood is at present will become as widely available in quantities assumed (Table 5-1) show an increase LDCs before the year 2000. in total world generation from these power sources of about 200 percent from 1975 to 1990. Capacities of conventional thermal generation, Water like refining and transportation capacities, are The following major uses of water are expected determined within the model but allowed to ex- to remain the same through 2000. Currently, they pand as much as necessary to meet final demands. are domestic, inigation, industrial (primarily in manufacturing but also in mining and mineral Fuel Minerals processing), and energy production (thermal and hydroelectric). The two projections of total world The primary purpose of the fuel minerals water use in Chapter 9 make no explicit techno- analysis was to estimate current world energy logical assumptions. The Doxiadis projection gives resources and reserves. The estimation of re- no technological justification for its S-shaped sources (all potentially recoverable occurrences of growth curve for water use. The Kalinin projec- a mineral) implicitly assumes how far technology tion admittedly neglects the possibilities of (1) ran or Will advance in the recovery of low-grade decreasing water requirements per unit of indus- ores. Exactly how it will advance is typically left trial or agricultural output, (2) increasing water unspecified. The estimation of reserves (all re- purification or desalinization, and (3) increasing sources economically recoverable at current prices direct use of unpurified and salt water. with existing technology) assumes by definition no technological change. Energy Nonfuel Minerals The energy forecasts, made with the Intema- The nonfuel minerals demand forecasts were tional Energy Evaluation System (IEES) com- made from combinations of expert judgment and TECHNOLOGY PROJECTIONS 71 TABLE 5-1 U.S. primary demand for minerals is projected to 1985 and 2000 by use of a regression analysis Electrical Generation from Nuclear using the following U.S. economic indicators as and Hydro Fbwer Assumed in Energy Forecasts explanatory variables: GNP, Federal Reserve (Terawatt-hours per year) Board index of industrial production, gross private domestic investment, new construction, popula- Indus- Less Centrally tion, and GNP per capita. The historical values of United trialized Devel- OPEC Planned these variables, supplied by the Office of Manage- States Coun- oped Coun- Econo- ment and Budget, are taken from the 1954-73 trie S. Coun- tries mies tries period. Such a regression equation would implic- 1975 475 1,343 240 0 - itly assume that the role that technological ad- 1985 vance has had in making mineral consumption Low growth 969 2,492 585 19 760 track the explanatory variables in the past will Medium continue into the future. The forecasts of the growth 975 2,515 585 19 760 regression equations are considered by the indi- High vidual commodity analysts, who then make the growth 976 2,516 585 19 760 final U.S. forecasts after considering other infor- High prices 1,045 2,584 585, 19 760 mation relevant to their specific commodity mar- 1990 kets, including expected technological advances. Low growth 1,373 3,316 924 64 1,350 The analysts' forecasts for rest-of-the-world de- Medium mand are made with consideration of various growth 1,397 3,513 924 64 1,350 world and regional data, including population, High GDP, and GDP per capita, and their own knowl- growth 1,402 3,518 924 64 1,350 edge of world markets and probable technology, High prices 1,555 39670 924 64 1,350 but without formal regression forecasts of de- ,including ft U.S. mand. data analysis. Technology entered the develop- ment of the forecasts taken from the 1977 Malen- Environment baum Report. (see Chapter 22) in the derivation of intensity-of-use curves. Many of the technological As Chapter 13 'assesses the environmental im- assumptions that influenced the construction of pact that would result if the other forecasts were any one curve tended to be highly specific to the valid, it generally accepts their assumptions and mineral and region for which it was drawn. The conclusions pertaining to technology, in addition general technological assumptions implied in the to its own technological assumptions. The tech- report to underlie all of the curves, with some nological assumptions made specifically for the qualification for individual curves, are: environmental analysis are fisted below. The tech- 1. As an economy grows, it first develops or nological assumptions used to make the other adopts production processes that are relatively forecasts are not repeated here. The general mineral-intensive. Then increasingly it refines assumption underlying the entire environmental these processes or shifts away from them, which analysis is that most environmental problems are contributes to a gradual decline in the economy's the result of conflict between population and general economic growth on the one hand and mineral intensity of use. evolved biological systems and physical constants 2. The advances in mineral production technol- of the globe on the other; technology can aid the ogy necessary to allow continued growth in pro- management of these problems but not eliminate duction will be made. Mineral production will their cause. The sector-specific assumptions are grow through 2000 quickly and reliably enough to as follows: make end-use factors, not supply constraints9 the dominant determinants of mineral consumption. Population. The relatively resource-intensive Economic g 'rowth will not be restricted by mineral living habits and practices of the industrialized availability or price; in fact, real mineral prices nations will continue to supplant other fifestyles may decline in the future. around the wodd. The Bureau of Mines dern and forecasts used Energy. There will be a global acceptance of the judgments of the Bureau's individual commod- U.S. new source performance standards in the ity analysts, aided by analyses of historical data. near future. (This is an assumption of the Energy 72 THE PROJECTIONS Systems Network Simulator model used to convert photosynthesis) or soil, water, and air manage- the energy consumption forecasts to emissions ment. Plant breeding will continue to reduce the forecasts, described in Chapter 19). genetic diversity of food crops. Food. The productivity increases projected in Minerals. The means to extract increasingly low- the food analysis will involve no major break- grade mineral ores will continue to be developed and throughs in genetic engineering of food crops adopted. No breakthroughs in. reducing the land (such as the development of nitrogen-fixing strains disturbance, water use, or waste quantities resulting or c-4 grains, which are relatively efficient in from mining will occur. 6 Food and Agriculture Projections Recent shifts in world food supplies from sur- industrialized countries against the paucity Of plus toward deficit and back again toward surplus information available for the less developed and have generated wide concern as to future food centrally planned countries. The extent to which balances. This chapter reports on world food governments intervene to influencethe quantities projections to 1985 and 2000, emphasizing the and prices of food produced and consumed in problem of food balances in the context of wider much of the world also leaves long-range projec- resource and environmental balances. The projec- tions subject to wholesale revision as agricultural, tions are summarized in the maps on the following food, and trade policies change. pages. The analytic f1ramework used to generate Hence, the food projections presented in this the projections and their broad implications are chapter must be seen as broad directional indica- highlighted. Resource balances, estimates of the tors only. changing cost and growth in investment required to develop the productive capacity projected to Model and Methodology 2000, and the broad environmental implications of the projections are also treated. The projections outlined below were generated using a world grain-oilseed-livestock (GOL) model and three smaller sets of aggr egate food, arable area, and fertilizer relationships. Caveats GOL is a formal mathematical model made up of roughly 1,000 equations describing the function- Long-range projections, particularly food pro- ing and interaction of 'the world's grain, oilseed, jections, are subject to several qualifications. and livestock sectors. More precisely, GOL is a First, estimating changes in population, income, conglomerate of some 28 regional agricultural taste, resources, technology, and weather as well sector models made up of grain, oilseed, and as their interrelationships 25 years in the future livestock 'supply, demand, and trade equations calls for a number of studies rather than a single that sum to a world total. The parameters for the paper. The wide range of credible studies analyz- mathematical relationships underlying the models ing these factors but reaching conflicting conclu- were estimated using data from 1950 through 1975 sions points up the latitude possible in estimating or were drawn from the literature and the judg- changes in these key variables and their interrela- ment of experts. tionships. The analyses that follow endogenize as The strength of the GOL model lies in its many of these variables and interrelationships as emphasis on cross-regional and cross-commodity possible but depend to a large extent on output quantity and price linkages. The individual grain, from other models that study individual variables oilseed, and livestock sectors within each regional in greater detail. model are linked on the supply side in their Second, highly aggregated food projections with competition for resources, and on the demand so distant a time horizon'are not forecasts of what side as intermediate or finished products in the will happen but rather educated guesses of what human diet. Production and consumption across could happen. Assigning probabilities to projec- regions are balanced at the world'Ievel. Imports tions is consequently difficult; projection studies and exports sum to zero, and world and regional themselves are designed to test alternatives and to trade prices are harmonized. Each of the regional identify potential problems and evaluate possible models provides for physical factors (such as solutions. technical input-output relationships) and economic Third, global food projections in particular de- factors (such as supply, demand, and tradi pend on generally limited and sometimes conflict- prices). Exogeneous inputs include population and ing data. Any global food analysis must balance income growth rates, agricultural and trade policy the wealth of information available for most of the assumptions, and weather assumptions. 73 Q@l V, A x AY v"A > A XV 783 965 v, 197 WEIR' 0 USSR and t%n Europ 7K gkM 193 t'A Uni -PARA a@d 14@ 105 2000 _@p g@" I', wzx, N Africa aRd 1975 n -the Midd@ a- % 283 N 4a#n America -AM wf,@" 0 of ;All@llt @I'MWA WOO X@O@ MO Vie- t @A- 4S'P, Av@ Nc @Z A 21 W5, A@Z 4 "A"'NP" @j % TE% x mv R W E 1975 M Sr and Europe 61 and United States No Aid' MKOR-41 and the die 4- --2Q00 1975 AM 2000 1975 Latin America 1975 V, Other Industrialize go - Ail M lia Can M, go 'qm@, 4 X, % wo 3.25 Alternative 11 base Yield Level 2.75 Alternative I Base Yield Level Nol r9in between alternative$ based on Regional Standard Errors and summed to a world total calculated on 1950-76 data 2.25 Alternative III Base Yield Level 1.75 1.25 1960 1965 Actual 1970 1975 1985 2000 Pro*ted rinm V A Ba B_se Figwv 6-1. World grain yields, actual and projected under Alternatives 1, 11, M. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 77 GOL materials were supplemented with three 1950-75 regional yield series (see Table 6-3 and smaller, informal sets of relationships dealing with Fig. 6-1). Alternative H is run assuming petroleum aggregate food production and consumption, ara- prices remain at their real 1974-76 level through ble area, and fertilizer use. The first is used to the year 2000. translate GOL output into indices of total food . Alternative 111, which defines a lower bound, production and consumption; the second and third assumes higher population growth and lower per sets of relationships are used to estimate arable capita income growth rates of about 2.1 percent area and fertilizer use. Fertilizer is used as a and 0.7 percent, respectively. Growth in yields is proxy for a larger collection of inputs, including projected assuming poor weather-4.e., assuming improved varieties, pesticides, and inigation. Sec- weather through 2000 to be less favorable than ondary measures of land-man ratios and use of over the last 25 years. Yields are projected the fertilizer per arable hectare are also generated. equivalent of one standard error below Altemative I levels (see Table 6-3). Altemative III. is run assuming that real petroleum prices more than Scenario Definitions double by 2000. . Three altemative sets of projections were gen- No provision was made for long-term improve- erated for the Global 2000 Study using Merent. ments or deterioration in climate. It is assumed income, population, and weather assumptions as that the world's climate continues largely as well as Merent assumptions about the rate of reported over the past several decades, or that petroleum price increases. changes in climate will be small enough to be Alterriative 1, a baseline projection, assumes compensated for by changes in cultural practices median world population and per capitaincome and development of new technology. Assuming growth rates averaging roughly 1.8 percent and no significant climate changes, however, does not 1.5 percent, respectively, through the year 2000 rule out years of good weather comparable to the 'iffables 6-1 and 6-2). Growth in yields, ultimately late 1960s in the Soviet Union or bad weather raised or lowered by the producer prices gener- years comparable to the mid-1960s in India. The -'ated under a specific altemative, is projected at variations in yields between Altematives H and ,rates compatible with the technological advances III provide some measure of the good weather- @of the past two decades. Weather is held con- bad weather range likely without a major change ,.stant-i.e., the impact of weather on yields in climate. ,through 2000 is assumed to be comparable to that @of the past 25 years. Agricultural and trade General Results policies are assumed to continue to be largely While the output generated under Altematives protectionist in the major importing countries and 1, 11, and Ill differ with regard to specifics, a trade-expansionist in the major exporting coun- number of conclusions hold for all three scenarios. tries. Altemative I's median income, population, The following general conclusions pertain to Alter- and weather assumptions are run in combination native I output. first with constant energy prices-i.e., assuming petroleum prices do not increase markedly from Record Growth the real-price highs of 19174-76--and second as- The world has the capacity, both physical and suming marked increases more than double the cost of energy inputs by 2000. As will be noted economic, to produce enough food to meet sub- later, the resultant quantity and price ranges stantial increases in demand through 2000. The quoted under Altemative I reflect not so much Projections are compatible in this regard with a uncertainty about petroleum price increases as number of other studies suggesting a world food uncertainty about the ability of the agricultural Potential several times higher than current produc- sector to adjust to changes in input costs. tion levels. The food growth rates implied in this Altemative 11, which defines ai@i optimistic up- Study's production and consumption projections per bound, assumes lower population growth and are comparable to the record increases reported higher per capita income growth of about 1.5 for the 1950s and the 1960s. Growth in the grain percent and 2.4 percent, respectively. Growth in component of total food production and consump- yields is projected assuming favorable weather- tion-for which longer historical series are avail- i.e., assuming weather through 2000 to be more able-is also projected near or above the record favorable than weather over the last 25 years. rates of the last two decades and more than Good weather is assumed to raise yields about the double the rate of increase for the first half of equivalent of one standard error calculated on the century (Table 6-4). Several significant quali- 78 THE PROJECTIONS fications are needed, however, to put this growth early 1970s (Tables 6-5 and 6-6). into proper perspective. Driving near-record growth Driving near-record rates of growth on the sup- in demand are equally impressive growth in pop- ply side are marked increases in the resources ulation in the less developed countries (LDCs) committed to food production-measured roughly and affluence in the industrialized countries. The in terms of land under cultivation-and strong world's food sector must grow at near-record rates gains in productivity-based primarily on wider simply to maintain the benchmark per capita con- adoption of technology and increased use of re- sumption levels reported in the late 1966s and source-augmenting inputs such as fertilizers and TABLE 6-1 Population Growth Rates, Actual and Projected (Percent) 1985/1975 2000/1975 1970/1960 Alternatives Alternatives III I Percent Industrialized countries 1.09 .57 .48 .67 .52 .34 .71 United States 1.26 .70 .52 .96 .55 .27 .94 Other developed exporters' 2.28 2.05 1.99 2.15 1.80 1.60 1.94 Westem Europe .80 .33 .30 .35 .43 .31 .52 Japan 1.04 .88 .81 .91 .59 .43 .68 Centrally planned countries 1.54 1.25 .99 1.45 1.21 .94 1.43 Eastern Europe .70 .68 .63 .74 .57 .39 .76 U.S.S.R. 1.25 .93 .80 1.05 .68 .46 .90 People's Republic of China 1.78 1.42 1.10 1.64 1.42 1.14 1.63 Less developed countries 2.56 2.50 2.36 2.66 2.37 2.04 2.71 Latin America 2.82 2.91 2.65 3.04 2.61 2.17 2.94 North Africa/Middle East 2.74 2.75 2.61 2.86 2.75 2A4 3.05 Other African LDCs 2.42 2.61 2.50 2.69 2.68 2.31 2.94 South Asia 2.56 2.34 2.25 2.58 2.13 1.88 2.63 Southeast Asia 2.68 2.50 2.34 2.65 2.20 1.77 2.58 East Asia 2.23 2.13 1.94 2.28 1.99 1.58 2.27 World 1.93 1.79 1.63 1.95 1.77 1.48 2.05 aCanada, Australia, South Africa. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. TABLE 6-2 Per Capita Income Growth Rates, Actual and Projected (Percent) 1985/1975 2000/1985 1960-1970 Altematives Alternatives Industrialized countries 3.29 3.41 4.40 2.41 2.57 3.35 1.77 United States 2.52 3.28 4.35 2.12 2.54 3.42 1.55 Other major exporters, 1.87 1.95 2.85 1.10 1.40 2.25 .55 Western Europe 3.52 3.66 4.59 2.74 2.66 3.38 1.97 Japan 8.76 3.10 4.06 2.17 2.49 3.26 1.81 Centrally planned countries 3.65 2.35 3.22 1.50 2.20 3.15 1.25 Eastren Europe 3.88 2.55 2.85 2.24 2.16 2.60 1.73 U.S.S.R. 5.17 2.30 2.67 1.93 2.06 2.53 1.59 People's Republic of China .90 2.30 3.85 .86 2.30 3.81 .85 Less developed countries 3.13 2.54 3.52 1.55 2.0 1 3.00 1.03 Latin America 2.62 2.64 3.90 1.51 1.84 2.84 .97 North Africa(Middle East 2.79 3.95 4.70 3.35 3.20 4.15 2.26 Other African LDCs 1.00 2.95 3.60 2.35 2.15 3.00 1.38 South Asia .73 1.12 1.91 .20 .66 1.20 .15 Southeast Asia 2.26 2.50 2.65 2.34 2.20 2.58 1.77 East Asia 2.01 3.34 4.37 2.66 2.80 3.98 1.54 World 2.80 2.26 3.23 1.29 1.53 2.42 .66 'Canada, Australia, South Africa Somme: Global 2W Study staff. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 79 TABLE 6-3 Yield Variations Due to Assumptions Regarding Weather Conditions Variation from Kilogram per Hectare Alternative 1 1985 Equivalent and 2000 Yield 1985 2000 Percent Industrialized countries United States 5.75 250 280 Other developed exporters :t 14.50 310 400 Weste r Europe 5.00 190 220 Japan 4.75 190 160 Centrally planned countries Eastern Europe :t 6.25 220 280 U.S.S.R. --11.75 240 310 People's Republic of China 5.50 100 130 Less developed countries Latin America 8.00 130 200 North Africa/Middle East 9.00 130 200 Other developing Africa 3.50 50 80 South Asia 4.75 60 80 Southeast Asia 6.50 110 160 East Asia 6.00 110 160 Weighted total above@l 7.20 180 220 World aggregated" 3.00 70 90 Note:. Yield variations are calculated on the basis of one standard error of the regression of 1950-75 yield data against time. - Production weighted aggregate of regional variations. hVariation calculated using world yield series. Source: Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. TABLE 6-4 pesticides. The rates of growth in production and the relative importance of area and productivity Grain Production and Consumption Growth gains shown in Figure 6-2's grain data are repre- Rates, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) sentative of the changes projected for the food sector as a whole. Land-man ratios decline 1973-75/ 1985/ 20M/ throughout the projection period, however, and 1951-55 1973-75 1985 the productivity gains needed to keep up growth Percent in production come at increasing real cost, partic- Industrialized countries ularly if sharp increases in petroleum prices are Production 2.5 2.5-1.8 1.8-1.7 incorporated into the analysis. Consumption 2.2 2.4-2.0 1.9-1.8 Problems of distribution across and within re- Exporters Production 2.6 2.9-2.5 2.1-2.0 gions also detract from the high world growth Consumption 2.1 2.7-2.2 2.2-2.1 rates shown in Table 6-5. Production and con- Importers sump tion increase at faster rates in the LDCs than Production 2.3 L".2 in the industrialized countries. LDC growth, how- Consumption 2.1 2.1-1.7 1.6-1.5 ever, is from a substantiaBy smaller base. Further- Centrally planned countries Production 2.8 2.4 1.6 more, the LDC aggregate and many of the re- Consumption 3.0 2.2 1.6 gional totals are somewhat misleading because the Less developed countries difference between individual LDCs-i.e., an Ar- Production 2.8 3.3-3.7 3.0--2.8 gentina compared with an India, or an Egypt Consumption 3.1 3.6-3.6 2.8-2.6 compared with a Bangladesh-are far wider than Exporters the differences between the industrialized coun- Production 3.2 3.1--4.2 3.2-2.9 Consumption 3.5 1.7-1.7 2.4-2.3 tries total and the LDC total. Importers Growth in food production and consumption Production 2.7 3.3-3.6 3.0-2.8 are not likely to balance at the regional or country Consumption 3.0 3.&-3.7 2.8-2.7 levels. Significant increases in trade---exported by World a few major surplus producers, including the Production 2.7 2.7-2.5 2.1-2.0 United States, Canada, Australia, and several Consumption 2.7 2.7-2.5 2.1-2.0 emerging exporters such as Thailand and Brazil- TABLE 6-5 Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade, Actual and Projected (Alternative I) Grains Food (million metric tons) (1969-71 = 100) 1969-71 1973-75 1985 2000 1969-71 1985 2000 Industrialized countries Production 401.7 434.7 569.5- 525.9 739.7- 679.1 100.0 126.6-118.1 157.0-143.7 Consumption 374.3 374.6 486.2- 465.3 648.4- 610.8 100.0 121.0-116.6 155.8-147.7 Trade +32.1 +61.6 +83.3-+60.6 +91.3-+68.3 United States Production 208.7 228.7 304.0- 297.1 416.0- 402.0 100.0 137.8-134.9 184.3-178.5 Consumption 169.0 158.5 210.9- 199.8 290.0- 272.4 100.0 119.6-114.0 160.3-151.3 Trade +39:9 +72.9 +93.1-+97.3 + 126.0-+129.6 Other developed exporters Production 58.6 61.2 93.0- 83.1 121.9- 106.1 100.0 139.1-126.7 175.4-155.6 Consumption 33.2 34.3 47.1- 45.5 68.1- 65.2 100.0 126.8-123.2 173.3-166.8 Trade +28.4 +27.7 +45.9-+37.6 +53.8-+40.9 Western Europe Production 121.7 132.9 160.0- 133.0 182.8- 153.0 100.0 119.1-105.0 133.5-114.6 Consumption 144.2 151.7 182.2- 175.5 225.9- 213.1 100.0 115.1-111.5 138.5-131.6 Trade -21.8 -19.7 -22.2--42.5 -43.1--60.1 2 Japan M Production 12.7 11.9 12.5- 12.7 19.0- 18.0 100.0 102.0-103.6 125.0-131.5 Consumption 27.9 30.1 46.0- 44.5 64.4- 60.1 100.0 150.7-146.3 205.6-192.8 Trade -14.4 -19.3 -33.5--31.8 -45.4--42.1 Z Centrally planned countries Production 401.0 439.4 567.0 722.0 100.0 138.2 174.0 Consumption 406.6 472.4 596.0 758.5 100.0 143.3 179.9 Trade -5.2 -24.0 -29.0 -36.5 Eastern Europe Production 72.1 89.4 110.0 140.0 100.0 146.2 183.2 Consumption 78.7 97.7 118.5 151.5 100.0 144.4 181.7 Trade -6.1 -7.8 -8.5 -11.5 U.S.S.R. Production 165.0 179.3 230.0 290.0 100.0 137.7 172.7 Consumption 161.0 200.7 242.5 305.0 100.0 148.5 185.9 Trade +3.9 -10.6 -12.5 -15.0 People's Republic of China Production 163.9 176.9 227.0 292.0 100.0 134.0 169.0 Consumption 166.9 180.8 235.0 302.0 100.0 136.0 171.4 Trade -3.0 -3.9 -8.0 -10.0 Less developed countries Production 306.5 328.7 471.7- 490.7 735.0- 740.6 100.0 154.4-161.4 244.5-247.7 Consumption 326.6 355.0 526.0- 5223 789.8- 772.4 100.0 163.4-162.8 247.8-242.8 Trade -18.5 -29.5 -54.3--31.6 -54.8--31.8 TABLE 6-5 (continued) Grains Food (million metric tons) (1969-71 = 100) 1969-71, 1973-75 1985 2000 1969-71 1985 2000 Exportersa Production 30.1 34.5 48.5- 54.4 78.1- 84.0 100.0 132.5-142.9 209.2-225.0 Consumption 18.4 21.5 25.7- 25.5 36.7- 36.0 100.0 122.2-121.7 160.8-158.0 Trade +11.3 +13.1 +22.8-+28.9 +41.4-+48.0 Importers" Production 276.4 294.2 423.2- 436.3 656.9- 656.6 100.0 156.0-158.4 247.0-249.3 Consumption 308.2 333.5 500.3- 496.8 753. 1'- 736.4 100.0 166.2-164.6 254.0-248.9 Trade -29.8 -42.6 -77.1--60.5 -96.2--79.8 0 Latin America a Production 63.8 72.0 101.0- 111.9 182.6- 185.9 100.0 158.7-174.8 279.5-284.4 > Consumption 61.2 71.2 99.5- 98.2 168.8- 166.0 100.0 162.7-160.7 269.7-265.3 Z Trade +3.2 +0.2 +1.5-+13.7 +13.8-+19.9 a North Africa/Middle East > 0 Production 38.9 42.4 56.2- 56.8 92.2- 89.0 100.0 146.3-148.1 252.5-257.8 X Consumption 49.5 54.1 80.6- 79.6 127.5- 123.7 100.0 167.4-165.1 276.1-267.3 r) Trade - 9.1 -13.8 -24.4--22.8 -35.3--29.7 Other African LDCs Production 32.0 31.3 47.1- 50.0 61-3- 63.7 100.0 150.7-160.2 197.1-204.9 Consumption 33.0 33.8 51.9- 51.5 63.3- 63.0 100.0 161.2-160.0 196.4-196.4 Trade -1.0 -2.4 -4.8- -1.5 -2-0- +0.7 South Asia Production 119.1 127.7 184-2- 186.0 265.0- 259.0 100.0 154.0-155.5 221.8-216.8 Consumption 125.3 135.1 199.7- 199.0 284.3- 275.7 100.0 158.7-158.2 226.2-219.4 Trade -6.2 -9.3 -15.5--13.0 -19.3--16.7 0 Southeast Asia Z Production 22.8 21.4 38.3- 41.4 62-0- 65.0 100.0 179.1-194.3 295.3-310.0 W Consumption 19.3 17.9 30.5- 30.5 47-9- 47.0 100.0 168.0-168.0 268.8-263.6 Trade +3.4 +3.7 +7.8-+10.9 +14.1-+18.0 East Asia Production 29.9 34.0 44.9- 44.6 71-9- 73.0 100.0 155.8-154.7 251.4-255.3 Consumption 38.3 42.9 63.8- 63.5 98.0- 97.0 100.0 173.1-172.3 267.7-264.9 Trade -8.8 -9.7 -18.9--18.9 -26.1--24.0 World Production 1,109.2 1,202.8 1,608.2-1,583.6 2,196.7-2,141.7 100.0 141.5-140.5 194.0-191.0 Consumption 1,107.5 1,202.0 1,608.2-1,583.6 2,196.7-2,141.7 100.0 141.5-140.5 194.0-191.0 Trade +1.7 -0.8 Note: in trade figures + indicates export; minus sign indicates import. 'Argentina and Thailand. hAll others, including several countries that export in some scenarios (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia, and Colombia). 00 00 TABLE 6-6 Per Capita Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) Grains Food (kilograms per capita) (1969-71 = 100) 1%9-71 1973-75 1985 2000 1969-71 1985 2000 Industrialized countries Production 573.6 592.6 718.9- 663.8 838.5- 769.8 100.0 112.9-104.5 128.8-118.4 Consumption 534.4 510.7 613.7- 587.3 735.0- 692.4 100.0 108.8-104.9 127.7-121.2 Trade +45.8 +84.0 +105.1- +76.5 +103.5- +77.4 United States Production 1,018.6 1,079.3 1,331.2-1,301.0 1,697.4-1,640.3 100.0 124.8-122.2 156.0-151.1 Consumption 824.9 748.0 923.5- 874.9 1,183.3-1,111.5 100.0 108.5-103.4 135.9-128.3 Trade +194.7 +344.0 +407.7-+426.1 +514.1-+528.8 Other developed exporters Production 1,015.6 917.0 1,117.4-1,052.1 1,052.0- 915.6 100.0 103.3- 98.6 99.6- 88.7 Consumption 575.4 514.0 596.3- 576.1 587.7- 562.6 100.0 98.6- 96.0 97.5- 94.3 Trade +492.2 +415.0 +581.1-+476.0 +464.3-+353.0 Western Europe X Production 364.9 388.4 441.5- 367.0 470.7- 394.0 100.0 111.0- 95.2 117.1-101.0 M Consumption 432.4 443.3 502.8- 484.3 581.7- 548.8 100.0 107.4-104.1 121.4-115.5 10 X Trade -65.4 -57.6 -61.3--117.3 -111.0--154.8 0 Japan tri Production 121.7 108.5 102.1- 103.7 142.9- 135.4 100.0 83.4- 84.5 111.3-106.1 Consumption 267.5 274.4 375.7- 363.4 484.4- 452.3 100.0 130.4-126.6 164.2-154.2 Trade -138.1 -175.9 -273.6--259.7 -341.5--316.7 Z Centrally planned countries Production 356.1 368.0 411.5 451.1 100.0 116.7 129.6 Consumption 361.0 395.6 432.5 473.9 100.0 122.4 135.8 Trade -4.6 -20.1 -21.0 -22.8 Eastern Europe Production 574.0 693.0 788.6 921.9 100.0 132.7 153.3 Consumption 626.6 757.4 849.5 997.6 100.0 131.1 152.1 Trade -48.6 -60.5 -60.9 -75.8 U.S.S.R. Production 697.6 711.2 812.8 903.2 100.0 115.6 128.1 Consumption 663.1 7%.1 856.9 949.9 100.0 127.9 141.4 Trade +16.1 -42.0 -44.1 -46.7 People's Republic of China Production 216.3 217.6 237.6 259.0 100.0 108.7 117.4 Consumption 220.2 222.4 246.0 267.8 100.0 110.3 119.1 Trade -4.0 -4.8 -8.4 -8.8 Less developed countries Production 176.7 168.7 182.0- 189.4 195.6- 197.1 100.0 101.7-106.5 109.5-110.8 Consumption 188.3 182.2 203.0- 201.6 210.2- 205.5 100.0 107.7-106.7 111.0-108.6 Trade -10.7 -15.1 -21.0- -12.2 -14.6- -8.4 TABLE 6-6 (continued) Grains Food (kilograms per capita) (1969-71 = 100) 1%9-71 1973-75 1985 2000 1%9-71 1985 2000 Exporters' Production 491.0 521.9 541.1- 606.9 624.5- 671.7 100.0 90.6- 97.7 102.6-110.4 Consumption 300.1 325.3 286.7- 284.5 293.5- 287.8 100.0 83.6- 83.2 78.9- 77.4 Trade +184.3 +198.2 +254.4-+322.4 +331.1-+383.9 Importers" Production 159.4 173.8 169.2- 174.4 180.8- 180.7 100.0 104.3-106.0 110.0-110.8 Consumption 177.7 193.6 200.0- 198.6 207.3- 202.7 100.0 111.2-110.1 113.3-110.8 Trade -17.2 -24.1 -30.8- -24.2 -26.5- -21.9 Latin America 0 Production 236.1 241.0 247.6- 247.4 305.9- 311.4 100.0 108.2-118.9 131.5-133.7 0 Consumption 238.3 244.0- 240.8 282.8- 278.1 100.0 > 226.5 110.9-109.6 127.1-125.1 Z Trade +11.8 +2.7 +3.7- +33.6 +23.1- +33.3 0 North Africa/Middle East > Production 217.1 214.6 201.8- 203.9 218.3- 222.5 100.0 87.2- 88.3 95.9- 98.2 0 100.0 X Consumption 276.2 273.8 289.4- 285.8 301.8- 292.8 101.8-100.3 105.9-102.2 Trade -50.8 -69.8 -87.6--81.9 -83.6--70.3 Other African LDCs Production 134.9 118.3 130.7- 138.7 109.0- 113.2 100.0 98.1-104.3 81.2- 84.5 C@ Consumption 139.1 127.7 144.0- 142.9 112.5- 112.0 100.0 105.0-104.2 81.3- 80.9 X Trade -4.2 -9.1 -13.3- -4.2 -3.6- +1.2 tri South Asia Production 161.6 162.4 170.0- 171.7 174.0- 170.0 100.0 104.6-105.6 107.0-104.6 0 1. tri Consumption 176.0 171.8 184.3- 183.7 186.7- 181.0 100.0 107.8-107.4 109.2-105.8 Trade -8.4 -11.8 -14.3--12.0 -12.7--11.0 -3 Southeast Asia 0 Z Production 244.7 214.5 273.6- 295.8 301.9- 316.5 100.0 116.3-126.4 129.2-135.9 W Consumption 207.2 182.6 217.9- 217.9 233.2- 228.5 100.0 108.9-108.9 117.1-114.6 Trade +37.5 +31.9 +55.7-+77.9 +68.7-+87.5 East Asia Production 137.3 136.0 139.9- 138.9 161.1- 163.5 100.0 104.6-104.9 121.1-122.8 Consumption 176.2 171.5 198.8- 197.8 219.5- 217.3 100.0 116.2-115.6 128.7-127.3 Trade -40.4 -38.8 -58.9--58.9 -58.5--53.8 World Production 311.5 313.6 337.7- 332.6 352.2- 343.2 100.0 109.5-108.5 117.0-114.5 Consumption 311.0 313.4 337.7- 332.6 352.0- 343.2 100.0 109.5-108.5 117.0-114.5 Trade +0.5 +0.2 Note: in trade figures, + indicates export; minus sign indicates import. 'Argentina and Thailand. 6AH others, including several countries that export in some scenarios (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia, and Colombia). 00 w 25D -"x 235 Projected Production Changes too,- Projected Yield Changes S A 'T -3, "CIA Historic Production Historic Yield Projected Area Changes 77IF g -- @Hirtric @Ar. "fT Sim, -Of" 0-5, W; 0" 47 W-, ,Q-7 'vP J !@t,, A.' Figure 6-2. Indices of world grain production, area and yield, actual an4. ptqj _t qc C4 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 85 will be needed to balance excess demand in food- above the levels projected under a constant petro- deficit Western Europe, Japan, the. centrally leum price alternative. planned countries, and parts of developing Africa Even a rough estimate of the impact of higher and Asia. World trade varies from alternative to energy prices on agricultural production depends alternative but exceeds record 1973-75 levels by on the timing of price increases, long-run rates of at least 20 percent, by 1985 and 60 percent by technological change, and short-run input flexibil- 2000. ity. The real energy price increases projected to Energy Price Impacts 2000 in the energy projections of this study (Chapter 10) are so large as to suggest that the The quantity and price ranges shown in Tables severity of the impact in the long run depends on 6-5 and 6-6 reflect model outputs on the impact the rate at which energy-conserving technologies energy price increases could have on the agricul- replace existing energy-intensive technologies. tural sector. The bottom end of the range provides Little can be done to project the rate or the for no marked increase in the price of energy from impact of such long-run technological change. In real 1973-75 levels. The upper end provides for the shorter term, however, some estimate of the inoderately higher real prices by 1985 and substan- impact of higher energy prices can be made on fially higher real prices by 2000. The range the basis of data on energy intensity and judg- reflects not so much uncertainty about petroleum ments as to how much flexibility farmers in a price increases as uncertainty about the effect particular country have to change input mixes. changing petroleum prices have on agriculture Figure 6-3 can be used to gauge approximate and the ability of farmers to maintain or expand energy intensity and to demonstrate the impor- production while shifting awayfrom energy4nten- tance of energy flexibility. Both cross-sectional sive inputs. A variety of cultural practices and data for the 30 largest agricultural producers, and management techniques are available in the short time series data for a smaller number of countries and medium terms to minimize the effect of suggest the energy-intensity curve is basically S- energy price increases. The experience of the past shaped. Given the position of countries along 2-4 years suggests that food and overall agricul- the curve, there appears to be little question that tural production could well. adjust in the long run past increases in productivity have generally de- to substantially higher energy prices, depending pended on marked increases in energy inputs. The on the timing *of increases, without the degree of impact of any energy price increase, all other dislocation implied.at the upper end of the range. things being equal, depends on where a country is . The model results suggest that, while world on this energy-intensity curve. The efficiency of production and consumption levels might not be energy use measured roughly in terms of energy changed measurably by marked but gradual in- input-product output ratios might well strengthen creases in energy prices, major shifts within and or weaken the impact of any energy price change, across sectors and regions would be Rely. The but the general ranking of the countries from right comparative advantage of the resource-endowed to left would not be likely to change much. The LDCs such as Brazil and Thailand, which use experience of the past 3-4 years of higher energy relatively few high energy-intensive inputs, would prices suggests that a country's ability to move improve. Higher energy prices, however, would back down the curve toward lower energy inten- likely exacerbate problems of comparative disad- sity-i.e., to adjust production techniques without vantage in food production common to many of sacrificing the high productivity associated with the industrialized and higher-income LDCs. advanced technology-is particularly crucial. Adjustments in the food-exporting countries A review of the adjustments U.S. farmers can would likely be mixed. In countries such as the and, in many cases, are making suggests that the United States, higher energy prices could be range of options available even within a basically offset at least partially by increasing the land energy-intensive technology is quite wide. Data resources committed to food production and by from Department of Agriculture and Federal En- decreasing on the use of, or increasing returns to, ergy Administration studies estimate that the en- energy-intensive inputs. The comparative advan- ergy used in the U.S. agricultural sector in 1974 tage of the traditional food-exporting countries was equivalent to 2,000 trillion Btu (British ther- would likely deteriorate relative to the resource- mal units) or roughly 5,300 Btu per hectare of endowed LDCs but improve relative to most of total cropped area. As Figures 6-4 and 6-5 the industrialized countries and several of the indicate, the largest energy @ expenditures were resource-tight LDCs. The sizes of these changes reported in cultural operations, transportation, in comparative advantage are projected to keep irrigation, livestock operations, crop drying, and the exporters' sales on the world market at or energy investment in fertilizers and pesticides. - ------------------ Cross sectional data Japan @An 300 - West Germany H X 200- 0 United Kingdom 0 Z 100- United States 'k-Time series clato India Indonesia Brazil Ni rio T10*11ndex of Crop and LIMStock V@Ws Figure 6-3. Energy intensity data. Cross-sectional energy use data plotted against crop and livestock yields for 30 largest food producing countries; 15-year historical series plotted against time for United States and several major European producers. 40 Energy - Wo 40.1 invested" in Gasoline chemicals: - 700 f"lizers, 3.7 bit gals. 500 pesticides, Cultural herbicides, 30 operations fungicides 600 till, plant, 0 0 Diesel Fuel cultivate, tv 30 400 RZ > 2.6 bil. gals. applications, Son harvest > ca I Transportation 0 20 hauling, pickup 400 t: x 3DQ trucks, some auto 20 300 M Irrigation Natural Gas Cc to 200 167 bil cubic ft. Crop L.P. Gas drying 3 0 100 Z 1.5 bil. gals. J. Electricity (A 32 bil. kWh too 10 0', FW Oil Livesitock, Miscellaneous 300 mill. Qok.. dairy, Poultry frost protection, electric overhead other 0 01' Figure 6-4. Energy used in agriculture, 1974. Figure 6-5. Energy used in agriculture, plus fertilizer and chemicals, 1974. 00 88 THE PROJECTIONS A review of the literature on energy-saving or much sharper than A graduated 5-10 percent per techniques suggests that considerable reductions year. The present capabilities of the GOL model, in energy Use are possible in all of these areas. do not permit more precise measurement of the- The energy savings possible from modifying cul- impact of gradually changing petroleum prices 6r' tural practices, which currently account for 20 reliable projections of the impact of more extreme percent of energy use, to provide for reduced or energy price changes. minimum tillage are quite large. Net energy sav- ings runge up to 50 percent. Moreover, reduced Continuing Trends tillage in 1975 amounted to only 35.8 million acres, The projections also suggest that the, major while conventional tillage amounted to 218.2 mil- trends of the past two decade"l) the increasing lion acres. , dependence of LDCs on food imports; (2) the Another potential area of large savings is in growing importance of variability in supply; and fertilizer use, which currently accounts for over (3) the increasing importance of the trade and'i one-third of total energy expenditures. Significant agricultural policy decisions of a few major ex energy savings are possible through proper selec- porting and importing countries-are likely t tion and use of fertilizers. The proper timing and continue on to 2000. Shifts in demand towar method of application also contribute to fertilizer livestock products as incomes increase, however', efficiency. Moreover, considerable savings appear are also likely to play an increasingly important possible by changing mixes of fertilizers to empha- role in determining the quantities and prices oe size organic and green fertilizers as well as commodities moving on the international market . inorganic chemical fertilizers. The grain trade projections shown in Table 6-5i Irrigation engineers also suggest that it is tech- suggest that the LDCs, excluding food-surplus," nologically impossible to reduce the 10 percent of exporters, * face sharp increases in the absolute,' total energy use accounted for by irrigation by as volume of food imports as well as possible in- much as one half. Reductions in energy consump- creases in the proportion of food imported. tion of as much as 10-20 percent appear to be The increased food imports of many of the de-* possible through miitimal efforts to increase irri- veloping countries, however, are not without gation pumping plant efficiency, to upgrade water positive implications. The grain gap-the differ- usage and water scheduling, and to adopt runoff ence between grain production and consump- control procedures. tion-is generally seen as an indication of the less. Drying grain for storage-which accounts for 5- developed countries' inability to feed themselves. 10 percent of energy use-is another area of Increases in imports, however, also measure the' potential saving. There appear to be several ways LDCs ability to supplement limited domestic out- to reduce grain-drying fuel requirements, including put with foreign production. A closer look at more in-the-field drying, better management of the which LDCs import more through 2000 suggests existing system, and the use of new technical that the largest increases are concentrated in the developments such as solar heat. There are also relatively affluent upper one-third of the develop-. significant potential savings in the transportation ing world. The calorie gap--the difference be- sector through more efficient use of equipment. tween recommended caloric consumption mini-. Keeping these short-term options for minimiz- mums and food energy supplies-suggests a much ing energy inputs in mind, the projection alterna- larger, more persistent problem concentnated in tives can be seen in a number of different con- the lowest-income countries but affecting groups texts. Those Alternative I runs assuming constant within higher-income countries as well. The aver- petroleum prices would be valid either given no age LDC per capita calorie gap narrows margin- increase in petroleum prices or given increases at ally through 2000 but, with the number of people a fairly even pace-possibly 5-10 percent per increasing at near-record rates, the absolute size' year-provided the agricultural sector maximizes of the gap and the number of people eating below'. short-term energy savings and ultimately substi- the recommended minimum is projected to in- t.utes energy-conserving technologies. A number crease under all but optimistic Alternative H. of the model's coefficients have been adjusted to While the direction, frequency, and size o reflect estimates of both short-term flexibility in fluctuations in supply will continue to depend' energy use and the long-term development of largely on weather, the importance of variability energy-conserving technologies as discussed in in supply is likely to increase markedly as world Chapter 18. The Alternative I projections based productive capacity is used at significantly higher on an increasing petroleum price would be valid should agriculture not adjust to gradual energy *Primarily Argentina and Thailand, but in some scenarios price increases or should the increases be sudden other LI)Cs as well, e.g., Brazil, Colombia, and Indonesia. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 89 levels. The experience of a number of countries ruminant herd suggest that a larger proportion of suggests that expansion of cultivation into mar- meat supplies will have to come from pork- and ginal areas increases susceptibility to weather poultr y products heavily dependent on grain and fluctuations. The resource balances reviewed be- oilseed feeds. Moreover, the world's fish catch is low indicate that a larger proportion of the world's an essentially concentrate-free source of animal food supplies will have to be grown on increas- protein,.and, should.the world's fish catch not ingly marginal areas dependent on favorable increase at the 1.5-2.0 percent rate assumed in (rather than normal) rainfall and temperature. the model runs, deman& for feed to. produce a Reserves are likely to increase in importance as comparable amount of animal protein from pigs a means of ensuring that production windfalls and and chickens could increase grain'and oilseed de- temporarily low producer prices do not generate mand by another 1 percent. The impact on prices production cutbacks in the food-exporpng coun- and diets worldwide would be relatively small, tries. Reserves are also likely to increase in since less than 6 percent of the world's protein importance as a means of reducing price fluctua- and I percent of the world's calories are derived tions and the market-rationing effect of short-term from fish and seafood products. However, in se- drops in production in a world of rising real lected countries-such as Japan, where fish ac- drices. counts for 25 percent of protein supplies and 8 ' All three alternatives also suggest that the percent of calories-the impact would be very sig- agricultural and trade policies of a small number nificant. of importers and exporters will play an increas- World grain and overall food balances could ingly dominant role in determining the quantities tighten further if the lower-income industrialized and prices of food traded on the world market. countries, centrally planned countries, and the The increased importance of policy decisions in higher-income less developed countries were to the exporting countries would result from their markedly increase their consumption of livestock control of scarce excess productive capacity. The products and adopt the grain-intensive feeding experience of the last five years suggests that techniques of the U.S. World food prices could without marked changes in international trading also be pushed up substancially as price-inelastic conventions, the role of major but sporadic im- food demand in the poorest LI)Cs competes porters such as the Soviet Union is also likely to against more elastic feed demand in the affluent increase. Protectionist agricultural and trade poli- countries. cies currently allow large countries or blocs rela- tively close to self-sufficiency to avoid the costs Differing Perspectives of adjusting to world production shortfalls. The All three alternatives also suggest that the food current structure of the world market also allows and environmental concerns of the industrialized them to pass on part, if not all, of the cost of and less developed countries are likely to diffi@r disruptions in their domestic agricultural econo- widely. The prime concern in the industrialized mies for absorbtion by the world market. The countries is likely to be adjustment. The major impact of changes in world supply and demand exporters will continue to face the problem of are consequently likely to be absorbed more and adjusting their production to higher but widely more by countries exporting a large proportion of fluctuating foreign demand. The food-deficit production and countries importing a large propor- higher-income countries will continue to face the tion of consumption on a regular basis. problem of worsening comparative disadvantage All three alternatives also suggest that, in addi- and increasingly expensive protectionist agricul- tion to population and income growth, shifts in tural and trade policies. The effect of changing consumption patterns are likely to play a major production levels on the environment and the role in shaping demand, particularly beyond 1985. impact of environmental constraints on production Growth in demand and shifts in taste away from costs, however, will be a concern common to all calorie-efficient diets based on cereals and the industrialized countries. starches toward less calorie-efficient, livestock- In contrast, the LI)Cs are likely to face the oriented diets will determine to a large extent the more pressing problem of expanding production- demand price. of grains, oilseeds, other high- often regardless of environmental costs-to meet protein feeds, and possibly food prices in general. rapidly expanding food needs. Several of the Changes in the proportion of concentrate-fed higher-income countries, such as Korea and Tai- products in the livestock total will be critical in wan, and several of the resource-constrained determining the impact of this shift toward live- countries of North Africa and the- Middle East will stock diets and the grain and oilseed balance. face the same comparative disadvantage problems Biological limitations on the expansion of the as many of the food-deficit industrialized coun- 90 THE PROJECTIONS tries, but the bulk of the LDCs will be concerned population, income, yield, and petroleum price with environmental quality only after basic human variables differs widely by regions and over time. needs are met. In the food-importing countries of Western Eu- rope and in Japan, with relatively stable yields and low population growth rates, the crucial Alternatives I-M: Results and demand variables both in 1985 and 2000 are likely to be income growth rates and shifts in taste. The Conclusions crucial determinants of supply are likely to be petroleum prices and domestic agricultural and The projections presented in Tables 6-7 and trade policy decisions. Among the traditional 6-8 point up a number of alternative-specific exporters, foreign demand, weather-related fluc- conclusions regarding (1) the impacts of popula- tuations in yields, and, to a lesser extent, petro- tion, income, yield, and petroleum price variations leum price increases will be the most relevant in particular regions and over time, (2) the range considerations. Among the centrally planned of possible LDC food consumption improvements countries, yield variations are likely to continue to through 2000, (3) the variability of world trade and be the most relevant factors. Among the lesg the role of the U.S. as residual supplier, and (4) developed importing countries, population growth the range of likely world market price increases. is by far the dominant demand factor, with Before reviewing specific conclusions, however, variability in yields dominating on the supply side. comments on the range spanned by the alterna- tives and on short-term versus long-term adjust- The importance of each of these exogenous ments are called for. variables changes over time. Petroleum prices The range covered by the population and in- become more important as increasingly tight re- come growth rates for Alternatives II and III is source supplies narrow the alternatives to energy- narrow (see Tables 6-1 and 6-2). The range of intensive food production techniques. Variations yield variations is also narrow (see Table 6-3). in yields are also likely to become more important Given the amount of uncertainty about rates of as agricultural production expands into increas- growth in these variables, the ranges tested here ingly marginal areas more susceptible to weather would appear to be too narrow. Moreover, com- fluctuations. Income growth becomes increasingly parisons in terms of absolute production and important in LDCs as low but sustained growth consumption levels suggest rather minimal differ- over the rest of the century pushes per capita ences between alternatives. However, the combi- levels in the middle-income countries high enough nation of all the favorable assumptions in Alter- to generate shifts in taste toward grain-fed live- native 11 and a the unfavorable assumptions in stock products. Alternative III suggests it is highly probable that the outcome for the world and for major regions With regard to improvements in per capita would fall within the range bounded by these two LDC food consumption, even Alternative II's alternatives-particularly if analyzed in terms of combination of optimistic supply and demand per capita (rather than absolute) production and assumptions suggests gains are likely to be small consumption levels. and poorly distributed. Annual gains in per capita With regard to short-term versus long-term consumption for the LDCs as a group aver-age adjustments, the static nature of the GOL model less than 0.5 percent but range as high as I and the long-range specification of its elasticities percent and as low as declining per capita con- limit the model to measuring net long-term adjust- sumption. Given Alternative III's pessimistic as- ments. The model can say little about the year to sumptions, LDC per capita levels do not grow. year adjustments within the agricultural sector While increase in the high-growth regions slows needed to reach the solutions calculated for 1985 somewhat, per capita consumption levels fall or 2000. Consequently, the fluctuations in endog- below substandard benchmark 1%9-71 levels in enous variables generated by the changes in the low-growth South Asia and Central Affica. exogenous variables noted above could well be The food problem in many of the LDCs with substantially wider if gauged over a shorter 3- to the slowest growth in consumption appears to be 5-year rather than a 10- to 20-year period. as much a problem of effective market demand as a problem of expanding production. The effect of Results production constraints-be they limited agricul- A comparison of the results of the alternatives tural resources, inadequate agricultural infrastruc- tested suggests that the impact of changes in ture, outdated technology, institutional con- TABLE 6-7 Grain and Total Food Prodwtion, Consumption, and Trade (Alternatives I, H, 111) 1985 2000 Grain Food Grain Food (million metric tons) (1%9-71 = 100) (million metric tons) (1%9-71 = 100) Industrialized countries Production 569.5- 525.9 568.1 536.2 126.6-118.1 127.3 118.2 739.7- 679.1 730.0 683.3 157.0-143.7 157.1 143.5 Consumption 486.2- 465.3 515.7 455.9 121.0-116.6 127.1 114.6 648.4- 610.8 687.6 590.2 155.8-147.7 165.7 143.6 Trade +83.3-+60.6 +52.4 +80.3 +91.3-+68.3 +42.4 +93.1 United States Production 304.0- 297.1 297.5 309.7 137.8-134.9 135.1 140.2 416.0- 402.0 409.8 414.0 184.3-178.5 181.8 183.5 Consumption 210.9- 199.8 229.5 194.4 119.6-114.0 129.2 111.2 290.2- 272.4 325.0 256.8 160.3-151.3 178.3 143.2 0 Trade +93.1-+97.3 +68.0 +115.3 +126.0-+129.6 +84.8 +157.2 0 Other developed exporters > Production 93-0- 83.1 91.5 78.7 139.1-126.7 137.3 121.2 121.9- 106.1 126.0 107.3 175.4-155.6 180.6 157.1 Z Consumption 47.1- 45.5 49.9 44.2 126.8-123.2 133.0 120.3 68.1- 65.2 75.9 65.9 173.3-166.8 190.6 168.4 > Trade +45.9-+37.6 +41.6 +34.5 +53.8- +40.9 +50.1 +41.4 0 Western Europe w Production 160.0- 133.0 166.0 135.5 119.1-105.0 122.9 103.5 182.8- 153.0 184.3 143.0 133.5-114.6 134.4 108.3 Consumption 182.2- 175.5 188.8 173.3 115.1-111.5 118.6 110.4 225.9- 213.1 229.9 208.5 138.5-131.6 140.6 129.2 Trade -22.2--42.5 -22.8 -37.8 -43.1- -60.1 -45.6 -65.5 Japan Production 12.5- 12.7 13.1 12.3 102.0-103.6 104.2 %-0 19.0- 18.0 19.5 19.0 125.0-131.5 139.3 138.0 tri Consumption 46.0- 44.5 47.5 44.0 150.7-146.3 155.2 144.8 64.4- 60.1 66.4 59.0 205.6-192.8 211.5 189.5 Trade -33.5--31.8 -34.4 -31.7 -45.4- -42.1 -46.9 -40.0 Centrally planned countries Production 567.0 589.5 534.0 138.2 143.7 130.1 722.0 746.0 691.0 174.0 179.5 166.1 Consumption 5%.0 597.5 578.5 143.3 143.8 139.1 758.5 755.0 730.0 179.9 179.2 173.2 Z Trade -29.0 -8.0 -44.5 -36.5 -9.0 -39.0 En Eastern Europe Production 110.0 114.5 104.0 146.2 151.7 138.8 140.0 145.0 136.0 183.2 189.4 178.3 Consumption 118.5 119.5 116.5 144.4 145.6 1412 151.5 151.0 148.0 181.7 181.2 177.8 Trade -8.5 -5.0 -12.5 -11.5 -6.0 -12.0 U.S.S.R. Production 230.0 245.0 210.0 137.7 146.4 126.0 290.0 305.0 270.0 172.7 181.5 161.0 Consumption 242.5 244.5 232.0 148.5 149.7 142.2 305.0 304.0 289.0 185.9 185.3 176.3 Trade -12.5 +.5 -22.0 -15.0 +1.0 -19.0 People's Republic of China Production 227.0 230.0 220.0 134.0 135.6 130.2 292.0 2%.0 285.0 169.0 171.1 165.2 Consumption 235.0 233.5 230.0 136.0 135.2 133.4 302.0 300.0 293.0 171.4 170.4 166.7 Trade -8.0 -3.5 -10.0 -10.0 -4.0 -8.0 Less developed countries Production 471.7- 490.7 485.3 470.5 154.4-161.4 158.9 152.9 735.0- 740.6 757.0 745.3 244.5-247.7 268.2 246.4 Consumption 526.0- 522.3 529.7 506.3 163.4-162.8 165.1 157.1 789.8- 772.4 790.4 799.4 247.8-242.8 261.2 249.0 Trade -54.3--31.6 -44.4 -35.8 -54.8- -31.8 -33.4 -54.1 TABLE 6-7(cont.) Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade (Alternatives I, II, III) 1985 2000 Grain Food Grain Food (million metric tons) (1969-71 = 100) (million metric tons) (1969-71 = 100) Exporters!' Production 48.5- 54.4 48.7 52.2 132.5-142.9 133.0 139.7 78.1- 84.0 81.0 79.3 209.2-225.0 216.9 212.4 Consumption 25.7- 25.5 26.1 25.6 122.2-121.7 124.1 122.0 36.7- 36.0 37.7 39.3 160.8-158.0 165.2 172.2 Trade +22.8-+28.9 +22.6 +26.6 +41.4- +48.0 +43.3 +40.0 Importers" Production 423.2- 436.3 436.6 418.3 156.0-158.4 159.9 155.6 656.9- 656.6 676.5 666.0 247.0-249.3 271.9 24&8 Consumption 500.3- 496.8 503.6 480.7 166.2-164.6 166.3 160.9 753.1- 736.4 752.2 760.1 254.0-248.9 268.1 254.5 Trade -77.1--60.5 -67.0 -62.4 -96.2- -79.8 -75.7 -94.1 Latin America Production 101.0- 111.9 104.3 107.6 158.7-174.8 163.6 168.4 182.6- 185.9 195.4 188.4 279.5-284.4 298.4 288.1 Consumption 99.5- 98.2 103.7 97.2 162.7-160.7 169.2 159.2 168.8- 166.0 172.5 160.6 269.7-265.3 275.4 257.0 Trade +1.5-+13.7 +.6 +10.4. +13.8- +19.9 +22,9 +27.8 North Africa/Middle East 56.2- 56.8 57.3 53.0 146.3-148.1 149.6 136.9 92.2- 89.0 94.5 88.1 252.5-257.8 259.3 240.4 Production Consumption 80.6- 79.6 80.9 79.9 167.4-165.1 168.1 165.8 127.5- 123.7 125.5 132.5 276.1-267.3 271.4 287.7 Trade -24.4--22.8 -23.6 -26.9 -35.3- -29.7 -31.0 -44.4 Other African LDCs Production 47.1- 50.0 48.6 45.5 150.7-160.2 155.6 145.5 61.3- 63.7 63.1 61.5 197.1-204.9 203.0 197.8 0 Z Consumption 51.9- 51.5 51.5 48.5 161.2-160.0 160.0 150.5 63.3- 63.0 60.7 62.0 196.4-196.4 189.1 193.2 th Trade -4.8- -1.5 -2.9 -3.0 -2.0- +3 +2.4 -.5 South Asia Production 184.2- 186.0 190.0 178.6 154.0-155.5 158.9 149.3 265.0- 259.0 269.0 271.0 221.8-216.8 225.2 226.9 Consumption 199.7- 199.0 200.0 186.3 158.7-158.2 159.0 148.0 284.3- 275.7 290.7 293.9 226.2-219.4 231.3 233.9 Trade -15.5--13.0 -10.0 -7.7 -19.3- -16.7 -21.7 -22.9 Southeast Asia Production 38.3- 41.4 38.6 39.6 179.1-194.3 180.6 185.5 62.0- 65.0 62.6 64.1 295.3-310.0 298.3 305.6 Consumption 30.5- 30.5 29.9 30.7 168.0-168.0 164.5 169.1 47.9- 47.0 46.0 49.9 268.8-263.6 257.8 280.4 Trade +7.8-+10.9 +8.7 +9.9 +14.1- +18.0 +16.6 +14.2 East Asia Production 44.9- 44.6 46.5 43.2 155.8-154.7 161.4 149.7 71.9- 73.0 72.4 72.2 251.4-255.3 253.1 252.4 Consumption 63.8- 63.5 63.17 61.3 173.1-172.3 172.9 166.2 98.0- 97.0 95.0 100.5 267.7-264.9 259.4 274.6 Trade -18.9--18.9 -17.2 -18.1 -26.1- -24.0 -22.6 -28.3 World Production 1,608.2-1,583.6 1,642.9 1,540.7 141.5-140.5 144.5 137.0 2,196.7-2,141.7 2,233.0 2,119.6 194.0-191.0 198.0 191.5 Consumption 1,608.2-1,583.6 1,642.9 1,540.7 141.5-140.5 144.5 137.0 2,196.7-2,141.7 2,233.0 2,119.6 194.0-191.0 198.0 191.5 Trade Awe: in trade figures, + indicates export; minus sign indicates import. 'Argentina and Thailand. bAll others, including several countries that export in some scenarios (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia, and Colombia). TABLE 6-8 Fer Capita Grain and Total Food Production, Consuniption, and Trade (Alternatives 1, 11, HI) 1985 2000 Grain Food Grain Food (kilograms) 0 969-71 = 100) (kilograms) (1%9-71 100) I Industrialized countries Production 718.9- 663.8 719.2 669.7 112.9-104.5 115.2 105.0 838.5- 769.8 847.5 716.9 128.8-118.4 131.8 108.8 Consumption 613.7- 587.3 656.9 569.4 108.8-104.9 115.2 102.1 735.0- 692.4 798.3 619.2 127.7-121.2 139.1 110.0 Trade +105.1- +76.5 +62.3 +100.3 +103.5- +77.4 +49.2 +97.7 United, States Production 1,331.2-1,301.0 1,324.6 1,322.1 124.8-122.2 124.2 124.0 1,699.4-1,6403 1,719.1 1;479.5 156.0-151.1 157.8 137.4 M 0 Co 'nsumption 923.5- 874.9 1,021.9 829.9 108.5-103.4 118.9 98.7 1,183.3-1,111.5 1,363.3 917.7 135.9-128.3 154.8 107.9 0 Trade +407.7-+426.1 +302.7 +492.2 +514.1-+528.8 +355.8 +561.8 0 Other developed exporters > Z Production 1,117.4-1,052.1 1,176.5 983.1 103.3- 98.6 107.6 93.6 1,052.0- 915.6 1,244.5 833.8 98.6- 88.7 112.5 82.8 0 Consumption 5%.3- 576.1 641.6 552.2 98.6- 96.0 104.4 93.0 587.7- 562.6 749.7 512.1 97.5- 94.3 127.4 94.1 > Trade +581.1-+476.0 +534.9 +431.0 +464.3-+353.0 +494.8 +321.7 0 Western Europe X Production 441,5-- 367.0 459.6 372.8 111.0- 95.2 114.8 %.5 470.7- 394.0 480.2 355.4 117.1-101.0 119.2 92.8 Consumption 502.8- 484.3 522.8 476.8 107.4-104.1 110.9 102.7 581.7- 548.8 599.0 519.2 121.4-115.5 124.5 110.1 Trade -61.3--117.3 -63.2 -104.0 -111.0---154.8 -118.8 -162.8 C: Japan w Production 102.1- 103.7 107.8 100.1 83.4- 84.5 87.3 82.0 142.9- 135.4 141.3 129.1 111.3-106.1 110.2 101.8 tT' Consumption 375.7- 363.4 390.8 358.1 130.4-126.6 135.1 124.9 484.4- 452.3 481.2 401.1 164.2-154.2 163.2 138.3 Trade -273.6--259.7 -283.0 -258.0 -341.5--316.7 -339.9 -272.0 2 Centrally planned countries Production 411.5 452.5 369.6 116.7 127.6 107.2 451.1 489.2 375.3 129.6 135.6 112.8 d Consumption 432.5 458.5 400.4 122.4 125.0 115.9 473.9 495.1 3%.5 135.8 138.4 119.0 0 Z Trade -21.0 -6.0 -30.8 -22.8 -5.9 -21.2 w Eastern Europe Production 788.6 825.5 74 1. 3 132.7 138.4 125.4 921.9 071.9 846.2 153.3 161.1 141.6 Consumption 849.5 861.6 830.4 131.1 132.8 128.4 997.6 1,012.1 920.8 152.1 154.2 141.2 Trade -60.9 -36.1 -89.1 -75.8 -40.2 -74.6 U. S. S. R. Production 812.8 877.5 732.2 115.6 124.6 104,5 903.2 979.7 773.9 128.1 138.7 110.3 Consumption 856.9 875.8 808.8 127.9 130.6 120.9 949.9 976.4 828.4 141.4 145.2 123.7 Trade -44.1 +1.7 -76.7 -46.7 +3.3 -54.4 People's Republic of China Production 237.6 260.0 216.2 108.7 117.8 99.9 259.0 278.0 214.0 117.4 125.2 99.0 Consumption 246.0 263.8 226.0 110.3 117.5 102.3 267.8 281.8 220.0 119.1 124.7 99.9 Trade -8.4 -3.8 -9.8 -8.8 -3.8 -6.0 Less developed countries 182.0- 189.4 190.4 178.3 101.7-106.5 106.7 99.1 195.6- 197.1 210.2 176.6 109.5-110.8 119.5 99.1 Production Consumption 203.0- 201.6 207.8 191.8 107.7-106.7 110.8 101.8 210.2- 205.5 219.4 189.5 11 [email protected] 116.7 99.9 Trade -21.0- -12.2 -17.4 -13.5 -14.6- -8.4 -9.2 -12.9 TABLE 6-8 (cont.) Per Capita Grain and Total Food Production, Consumption, and Trade (Alternatives 1, 11, 111) 1985 2000 Grain Food Grain Food (kilograms) (1969-71 = 100) (kilograms) (1969-71 = 100) I Exporters4l Production 541.1- 606.9 552.3 573.0 90.6- 97.7 92.5 94.0 624.5- 671.7 663.7 545.6 102.6-110.4 109.0 94.6 Consumption 286.7- 284.5 296.0 281.0 83.6- 83.2 86.3 82.1 293.5- 287.8 308.9 270.4 78.9- 77.4 93.0 72.7 Trade +254.4-+322.4 +256.3 +291.9 +331.1-+383.9 +354.8 +275.2 Importers" Production 169.2- 174.4 177.4 164.1 104.3-106.0 108.7 102.2 180.8- 180.7 194.5 163.4 110.0-110.8 120.3 99.4 Consumption 200.0- 198.6 204.6 188.6 111.2-110.1 113.1 105.6 207.3- 202.7 216.2 186.5 113.3-110.8 119.1 101.8 Trade -30.8- -24.2 -27.2 -24.4 -26.5- -21.9 -21.7 -23.1 Latin America Production 247.7- 247.4 264.3 259.6 108.2-118.9 114.9 113.0 305.9- 311.4 346.6 286.0 131.5-133.7 147.8 123.6 Consumption 244.0- 240.8 262.8 234.5 110.9-109.6 118.7 106.9 282.8- 278.1 306.0 243.8 127.1-125. 1 136.7 110.8 -4 Trade +3.7- +33.6 +1.5 +25.1 +23.1- +33.3 +40.6 +42.2 North Africa/Middle East Production 201.8- 203.9 209.0 188.4 87.2- 88.3 91.0 80.1 218.3- 222.5 239.9 188.6 95.9-98.2 107.4 80.3 0 Consumption 289.4- 285.8 295.1 294.1 101.8-100.3 104.2 99.7 301.8- 292.8 318.6 283.7 105.9-102.2 112.9 98.4 Trade -87.6- -81.9 -86.1 -95.6 -83.6- -70.3 -78.7 -95.0 Other African LDCs Production 130.7- 138.7 136.2 125.5 98.1-104.3 102.3 94.0 109.0- 113.2 123.8 108.0 81.2- 84.5 92.7 80.5 0 144.0- 142.9 144.4 133.7 105.0-104.2 105.3 97.3 112.5- 112.0 119.1 108.8 81.3- 80.9 86.3 78.5 z Consumption (A Trade -13.3- -4.2 -8.1 -8.3 -3.6- +1.2 +4.7 -0.8 South Asia Production 170.0- 171.7 177.1 160.7 104.6-105.6 108.9 98.8 174.0- 170.0 178.1 152.1 107.0-104.6 109.6 93.5 Consumption 184.3- 183.7 186.4 167.7 107.8-107.4 109.0 98.0 186.7- 181.0 192.4 164.9 109.2-105.8 112.5 %.4 Trade -14.3- -12.0 -9.3 -7.0 - -12.7- -11.0 -14.3 -12.8 Southeast Asia Production 273.6- 295.8 282.0 278.1 116.3-126.4 120.1 119.4 301.9- 316.5 322.7 282.5 129.2-135.9 138.7 120.4 Consumption 217.9- 217.9 218.5 215.6 108.9-108.9 109.2 107.6 233.2- 228.5 237.1- 219.9 117.1-114.6 119.2 10.0 Trade +55.7- +77.9 +63.6 +62.5 +68.7-1 +87.5 +85.6 +6.2.6 East Asia Production 139.9- 138.9 148.4 131.9 104.6-104.9 111.2 08.5 161.1- 163.5, 168.7 140.4 121.1-122.8 126.9 105.0 Consumption 198.8- 197.8 203.3 IVA I t6.2-115.6 118.9 109.2 219.5- 217.3 221.3 195.5 128.7-127.3 129.7 114.2 Trade -58.9- -58.9 -54.9 -55.2 -58.5- -53.8 -52.6 -55.1 World Production 337.7- 332.6 354.4 315.4 109.5-108.5 114.0 103.0 352.2- 343.2 373.0 302.0 117.0-114.5 126.0 104.0 Consumption 337.7- 332.6 354.4 315.4 109.5-108.5 114.0 103.0 352.0- 343.2 373.0 302.0 117.0-114.5 126.0 104.0 Trade Note: In trade figures, + indicates export; minus sign indicates import. aArgentina and Thailand. "All others, including several countries that export in some scenarios (e.g., Brazil, Indonesia, and Colombia). FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 95 straints, or any combination thereof --- am obvious The surplus productive capacity of the tradi- in countries such as Mexico and Egypt. The tional exportem-particularly Canada, South Af- impact of demand constraints--be they low in- rica, and Australia-4s projected to decrease be- come, skewed income distribution, foreign ex- yond 1985 as a result of growth in domestic change shortages, or any combination thereof- demand. Given the added capacity of several are also obvious in countries such as Bolivia and emerging developing exporters, however, excess Haiti. The regions showing the smallest improve- productive capacity is expected to be more than ments through 2000, however, are those with, adequate to balance the highest import demand severe supply and demand problems. The typical projected in 2000 but at real prices somewhat agricultural economy in South Asia and much of above 1973-75 levels. The model implies that the Sahelian and Central Aftica will be hard pressed major exporters will continue to play a crucial to produce an additional 5-1() kilograms of grain role in balancing world supply and demand by per capita over the next 10 years; their consumers, slowing production in Alternative 11-type situa- however, are also likely to be hard pressed to tions in order to avoid the buildup of price- demand an added 5-10 kilograms. It should be depressing surpluses, and by increasing export noted that Alternative U's production increase is availability under Alternative 111-type situations to relegated largely to reducing imports rather than slow down price increases. increasing consumption. The per capita food en- The U.S. is projected to play an increasingly ergy supplies shown in Table 6-9 suggest that dominant role in this balancing procedure. As the effective market demand is likely to lag below world's residual supplier, the U.S. is projected to nutritional demand measured in terms of even the expand exports faster than the other major traders most minimal requirements. in a tight world supply situation but to contract The results of Alternatives II and III also exports faster in a loose supply situation. The suggest that world trade is likely to vary far more marked variability of yields in the other major than world production and consumption. While exporters shifts an even larger share of the world production and consumption vary as much adjustment on the U.S. in periods of weather as 10 percent from Alternative II to Alternative fluctuations. As Table 6-10 shows, while the III, world trade varies as much as 35 percent. margin between Alternative 11 and III world Among the food-deficit countries, variations in the export levels is roughly 35 percent in both 1985 import demand of the centrally planned countries and 2000, the margin for exporters excluding the' are largest-ranging from 9 to 47 million metric U.S. is 10-20 percent, and the margin for the U.S. tons in 1985 and 10 to 40 million metric tons in is 65-90 percent. 2000. The import demand of most of the other Alternatives II and III also suggest that the major importers, including Japan, South Asia, range of possible real-price changes is wide. North Afiica/Middle East, East Asia, and, to a Under optimistic Alternative II, an index of real lesser extent, Western Europe, shows strong but world market prices increases 30 percent from relatively stable growth (Table 6-10). 1%9-71 to 2000. Alternative III's tighter supply TABLE 6-9 Daily Caloric Consumption in the Less Developed Countries 1%9-71 1973-74 1985 2000 Calories per capita per day Less developed countries 2165 2135 2310-2290 2350 2210 2370-2330 2390 2165 Latin America 2525 2540 2690-2670 28tO 2630 2935-2905 3080 2710 North Africa/Middle East 2421 2482 2465-2430 2525 2415 2530-2460 2655 2390 Other African LDCs 2139 2071 2245-2230 2255 2095 1840-1830 1920 1800 South Asia 2036 1954 2155-2145 2175 2005 2180-2130 2230 1985 Southeast Asia 2174 2270 2320-2320 2325 2300 2400-2365 2425 2310 East Asia 2140 2205 2310-2340 2380 2260 2505-2480 2520 2320 Note: PAO minimum requirements estimated at 2,375 calories per day for Latin America, 2,325 calories in developing Africa, aod 2,210 calories in developing Asia. Skewed caJoric consumption, however, suggests national caloric consumption averages would have to be 110-125 percent of the minimums to ensure that lowest income classes would be consuming at minimum levels. Source: Tables 6-6 and 6-7. 96 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 6-10 World Grain Trade Quantities (Alternatives 1, H, III) Historic 1995 2000 1969-71 1973-75 1 If III 1 11 111 Millions of metric tons World exports Developed exporters 68.3 100.3 139.0-134.9 109.8 149.8 179.8-170.5 134.9 198.6 United States 39.9 72.9 93.1- 97.3 68.0 115.3 126.0-129.6 84.8 157.2 Other developed exporters 28.4 27.7 45.9- 37.6 41.8 34.5 53.8- 40.9 50.1 41.4 Developing exporters 11.3 13.1 22.8- 28.9 22.6 26.6 41.4- 48.0 43.3 40.0 World imports Developed importers 36.2 39.0 55.7- 74.3 61.2, 69.5 88.5-102.2 92.5 105.5 Centrally planned importers 5.2 24.0 29.6 8.7 46.6 36.5 9.0 39.0 Developing importers 29.3 45.3 77.1- 60.5 67.0 614 %.2- 79.8 75.7 94.1 World Total (net export basis) 79.6 113.7 161.8-163.8 132.4 176.4 221.2-218.5 178.2 238.6 Note: Trade quoted on a net regional basis for total grains and is consequently smaller than trade quoted for individual grains and individual countries. and doubling of petroleum prices generates more with a general Alternative III-.type situation (Table than a 100 percent increase over the same 30-year 6-11). period. A mote detailed analysis of the model's output suggests that the effect of world market price increases varies widely by region and com- Resources and.Inputs modity. Countries importing or exporting a large proportion of their total supply on a regular basis, A closer look at the projections suggests that a such as Japan and the United States, are strongly substantial increase in the share of the, world's affected. In those parts of the world that are near resources committed to food production *will be self-sufficiency, the effect of price changes would needed to meet population- and'income-generated be substantially smaller. Among the industrialized growth in demand through 2000. A number of importing countries near self-sufficiency, higher recent studies conclude the earth's physical re- world prices could strengthen protectionist agri- sources and expanding technology can sustain a cultural and trade policy tendencies. In most of 4-6 percent rate of , growth in food production. the regions of the world, however, domestic Realizing even the 2.1 percent growth to 2000 supply and demand pressures and govemment shown in Table 6-5, however, will entail higher intervention to minimize the effect of world food real costs and increased pressure on the world's price movements on domestic prices would be far resource and environmental balances. more important determinants of actual production and consumption levels. The poorest LDCs accus- Natural Resources tomed to importing to fill basic food needs, however, could find themselves priced out of the Table 6-12's arable area data provides one world market to an even greater extent than in rough measure of food pressure on finite resource 1973-75 should their production shortfalls coincide supplies. Under all the alternatives tested, growth TABLE 6-11 International Price Indices- (Alternatives 1, 11, 111) 1%9-71 1972-74 1975-77 1985 2000 Real 1969-71 $ 100 World market weighted food prices 100.0 165.0 120.0 110-130 105 135 145-195 130 215 Note: Price index movements indicative of direction of change and order of magnitude ottly; static nature of the GOL (grain, oilseed, livestock) model and its use of long-run elasticities can understate price adjustments in the short and medium term. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 97 in arable area slows-generally to less than half put into an extended fallow rotation if any long- the rate of increase over the last two and a half term productivity is to be maintained. Population decades-despite producer,price incentives to ac- pressure on and or semiarid land in these regions celerate the rate of expansion. Physical con- in particular has caused soil-fertility losses, dete- straints, both in the absolute sense of running out rioration of limited water resources, and declining of cultivatable land -and in the relative sense of returns to increasingly costly cultivation. The net the increasing scarcity of good and reasonably return to intensifying use of higher-quality land accessible land, affect virtually all of the regions suggests that economically and environmentally shown in Table 6-5 by 2000 (Fig. 6-6). optimum cropped area is far smaller than -the Although felt generally throughout the world, potential or maximum area generally measured in pressure on land resources is likely to vary widely physical surveys. and to evoke a number of different responses. Arable area will undoubtedly continue to ex- The projections suggest that absolute constraints pand in other regions of the world, particularly in will be most marked in Western Europe, Eastern parts of South America, Central Africa, and East Europe, Japan, South Asia, China, North Africa and Southeast Asia. But by 2000, even in these and the Middle East, and parts of Central America regions where arable area has not reached a and East Asia by the early 1990s. Arable area in maximum, the costs of expansion are likely to be many of these regions will quite likely begin to substantially higher as cultivation moves toward contract before 2000 as demand for land for forested areas or wasteland, and as water supplies nonagricultural uses' increases and as the eco- and water management become constraints. nomic and environmental costs of maintaining Table 6-13's declining land-man ratios add a cultivated areas near physical maxima becomes population dimension to the problem of absolute prohibitive. Reports on land and water manage- and relative constraints on arable area. In general, ment problems suggest that marginal or submar- regions with the tightest absolute constraints,re- ginal land in Sudano-Sahelian Africa, North Aftica port large populations, low incomes, and average and the Middle East, and parts of heavily popu- caloric consumption levels below recommended lated Asia will have to be returned to pasture or minimums. TABLE 6-12 Arable Area, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) Alternative I 1951-55 1961-65 1971-75 1985 2000 Millions of hectares Industrialized countries 361.2 371.8 400.3 392.2 399.1 United States 188.5 180.5 200.5 195.0 208.0 Other major exporters 72.5 89.0 104.0 102.0 99.0 Western Europe 95.1 96.4 90.1 89.5 87.0 Japan 5.1 5.9 5.7 5.7 5.1 Centrally planned countries 384.3 404.5 414.5 417.5 a 420.02 Eastern Europe 55.0 56.0 54.4 U.S.S.R. 219.8 229.5 232.5 People's Republic of China 109.5 119.0 127.5 Less developed countries 529.2 607.1 662.0 706.0 723.5 Latin America 93.5 114.0 136.5 155.0 165.0 North Africa/Middle East 78.5 86.3 91.5 92.5 91.0 Other African LDCs 116.0 146.5 160.5 175.0 182.5 South Asia 196.0 200.5 207.5 209.0 207.0 Southeast Asia 22.7 31.6 34.9 39.0 41.0 East Asia 22.5 28.2 31.1 35.5 37.0 World 1,274.7 1,383.4 1,476.8 1,513.7 1,538.6 Arable area in centrally planned countries thought to be at or near maximum. Growth in land used outside the agricultural sector approximately balances arable area increases. 00 PotentioHy Arable Area XZ V,, @'Moo' - Arable Area 0 z % Per Capita j006 7 w Grain Area 1-71 20W d"O' Figure 6-6. World potentially arable, arable, and grain area, actual and projected. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 99 TABLE 6-13 Arable Area per Capita, Actual and Projected (Alternative 1) Alternative 1 1951-55 1%1-65 1971-75 1985 2000 Arable hectares per capita Industrialized countries .61 .56 .55 .50 .46 United States 1.17 .95 .95 .86 .84 Other major exporters 1.72 1.66 1.58 1.29 .94 Western Europe .33 .30 .26 .24 .22 Japan .06 .06 .05 .05 .04 Centrally planned countries .45 .39 .35 .30 .26 Eastern Europe .50 .47 .43 .39 .36 U.S.S.R. 1.16 1.02 .93 .83 .73 People's Republic of China .19 .18 .16 .0 .11 Less developed countries .45 .40 .35 .27 .19 Latin America .56 .51 .47 .38 .28 North Africa/Middle East .68 .58 .47 .33 .22 Other African LDCs .72 .73 .62 .49 .32 South Asia .38 .32 .26 .19 .13 Southeast Asia .38 .41 .35 .28 .20 East Asia .15 .15 .13 .11 .08 World .48 .44 .39 .32 .25 Nwe: Arable area includes land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas ire counted only once), temporary meadows for mowing or pasture, land under market and kitchen gardens (including cultivation under glass), and land temporarily fallow or lying idle. Source: Economics, Statistics, and Cooperative Service, U.S. Departme6t of Agriculture. Countries with the broadest latitude for expan- a proxy for a much larger bundle of productivity- sion report smaller populations but higher popula- expanding inputs, Table 6-14's estimates can be tion growth rates and limited agricultural infra- used as rough indications of the growth associated structure and investment monies-4actors likely to with Table 6-5's projections. The 90-100 percent accelerate growth in their domestic food needs on increase in food production projected through the one hand while slowing the pace or raising the 2000 under Alternative I suggests roughly a 180 cost of increases in production on the other. percent increase in fertilizer use from 80 million AD three alternatives also suggest substantial metric tons in 1973-75 to 225 million in 2000. pressure to increase not only the quantity of The measures of fertilizer use per arable hectare in resources committed to agriculture but also the Table 6-15 point ti@ the increasingly input-intensive intensity of their use. Increasing use of already nature of food production through the end of the cultivated land is possible through multiple crop- century. ping, i.e., enlarging harvested area faster than Expanding food production through increased arable area. Even in those countries where re- use of resource-augmenting inputs, however, is source endowment is such that expansion in subject to diminishing marginal returns. In highly arable area is possible, economic returns to inten- simplistic terms, the 20 million ton increase in sification are likely to rival returns on developing fertilizer Consumption from the early 1950s to the remaining land and water resources by 1990. In early 1960s was associated with a 200 million ton many of the temperate regions unsuited to multi- increase in grain production suggesting a 10:1 ple cropping, similar pressures to intensify are ratio. Growth from the early 1960s through the likely to generate changes in land use-shifts out early 1970s appears to have been at a somewhat of grasslands into higher-yielding or higher-valued lower ratio of 8.5: 1. The increases projected under crops, for example, and shortening of fallow Alternative I imply a further deterioration in this periods. grain:fertilizer ratio to roughly 7.0:1 by 1985 and 5.5:1 by 2000. Ratios within individual regions Resource-Augmenting Inputs vary widely, from as low as 3-4:1 in the countries Pressure on the supply side is also likely to already fertilizing heavily to as high as 10-20:1 in generate increases in the use of inputs (such as the developing countries at the bottom of what fertilizer, pesticides, and high-yielding varieties) to appear to be S-shaped fertilizer response and augment natural resources. If fertilizer is used as fertilizer adoption curves. Changes in these world 100 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 6-14 Fertilizer Consumption, Actual andfrojected (Alternative 1) 1951-55 1961-65 1971-75 Alternative I 1985 2000 Thousands of metric tons Industrialized countries 13,675 25,075 39,900 57,150 84,000 United States 5,175 9,400 16,850 26,250 40,000 Other major exporters 1,050 2,025 3,375 5,500 9,750 Western Europe 6,525 11,850 17,650 23,000 31,000 Japan 925 1,800 2,025 2,400 3,250 Centrally planned countries 3,525 9,100 28,125 49,250 77,500 Eastern Europe 1,375 3,950 9,850 17,500 24,500 U.S.S.R. 2,000 3,700 12,850 22,000 33,500 People's Republic of China 150 1,450 5,425 9,750 19,500 Less developed countries 1,075 3,625 11,925 28,500 58,750 Latin America 375 1,250 3,900 8,750 20,750 North Africa/Middle East 225 650 2,000 4,250 8,750 Other African LDCs 50 175 550 2,500 4,500 South Asia 150 625 3,425 7,750 159000 Southeast Asia - 200 450 2,000 3,500 East Asia 275 725 1,600 3,250 6,250 World 18,275 37,800 79,950 134,900 220,250 Note: Measures in nutrient tons. Fertilizer total includes nitrogenous fertilizer (N), phosphates (P10d, and potash (KgO) used for agricultural production only. Historic usage patterns suggest that the total is made up of approximately 50 percent nitrogenous fertilizers, somewhat over 25 percent phosphates, and somewhat under 25 percent potash. Source: Economics, statistics, and Cooperatives Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. ratios could well be slowed or reversed by either potentially arable land. As increased pressure on changes in the distribution of scarce fertilizer supply generates wider use of high-productivity supplies to increase use in higher-return areas or inputs, water management could become the sin- by technological advances similar to the develop- gle most important constraint on increasing yields merlt of fertilizer-responsive wheat and rice vari- in the developing world. eties through the late 1950s and early 1960s (Figs. 6-7 and 6-8). Costs and Investments Water Resources All three alternatives indicate that projecting . The key role water plays in developing new food balances to 2000 is a question not of capacity resources and intensifying cropping suggests that alone but also of private and public cost. The pressure on water resources is likely to increase projection results presented in Tables 6-5 through even faster than pressure on arable land and 6-9 suggest that the world's productive capacity inputs. Water, management--defined to include is more than adequate to meet the largest foresee- conventional irrigation activities as well as flood able increases in demand to the end of the control, drainage, and soil-erosion control--is al- century. However, real food prices are projected ready the limiting factor on expanding production to increase even if the price of inputs from outside in large areas of the world. FAO estimates suggest the agricultural sector are assumed to remain that over half of the investment in land develop- constant. Projected price increases would un- ment of the 1960s and early 1970s was concen- doubtedly be even larger if the GOL model's trated in water development projects. r@uture private producer and consumer prices were ex- growth in resources committed to agriculture and panded to reflect the public and social costs the successful intensification of resource use are associated with developing and maintaining the likely to depend to an even greater extent on productive capacity needed in 2000. The margin providing more water and improved water man- between public and private costs in the agricul- agement in the arid and semiarid areas, and on tural sector has traditionally been Wide. In gen- drainage and managing surplus water in the humid eral, the expense of developing and -expanding and wet areas that together make up well over productive capacity has been funded largely by half of the world's remaining reserves of arable or. public investment. Productivity gains have also FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 101 TABLE 6-15 Fertilizer Consumption per Arable Hectare, Actual and Projected (Alternative I) Alternative 1 1951-55 1961-65 1971-75 1985 2000 Kilograms per arable hectare Industrialized countries 40 65 100 145 210 United States 30 50 85 135 190 Other major exporters 15 25 35 55 100 Western Europe 70 125 195 255 355 Japan 180 305 355 420 635 Centrally planned countries 10 20 70 120 185 Eastern Europe 25 70 180 315 440 U.S.S.R. 10 15 55 95 145 People's Republic of China 1 10 45 75 150 Less developed countries 2 5 20 40 80 Latin America 5 10 30 55 125 North Africa/Middle East 5 10 20 45 95 Other African LDCs 1 5 15 25 South Asia 5 15 35 70 Southeast Asia 5 15 50 85 East Asia 10 25 50 90 170 World 15 30 55 90 145 Note: Measures in nutrient kilograms. Sourcer Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service, U.S. Department ofAgriculture. depended to a large extent on public investments 2000. The public costs associated with the produc- in education, technology, and extension work. tion levels in Table 6-5 are likely to be several The relationship between public and private times projected private costs. Large public invest- costs have varied widely from country to country ments in basic infrastructure will be needed; the due to differing resource endowments and agricul- institutional organization of agriculture in many tural and trade policies. The most marked differ- LDCs leaves the bulk of capital-intensive expan- ences, however, have been between the industrial- sion (as compared to labor-intensive maintenance) ized and less developed countries. of productive capacity to the public sector. Public Among the industrialized countries-particu- resources can be injected through market in- larly the Western European countries and Japan- creases in farm returns or directly through devel- governments supplement public investments with opment projects. A significant proportion of the farm income and price supports. The projections capital, goods, and services needed, however, will imply that public costs in many of these countries have to come from, foreign sources on a conces- will have to increase several times faster than sional basis if improvements in the agricultural private costs-possibly 3 to 4 times faster-if farm sector are not to slow progress in the rest of the production incentives are to be kept high and if economy. new productive capacity is to be developed and old capacity maintained. Public costs will likely increase faster than pfivate costs in several of the Environmental Implications LCDs with similar problems of high price supports and limited agricultural resources. While the GOL model does not explicitly ad- The situation in many LDCs is likely to be in dress environmental issu .es, the environmental flux beyond 1985. Development policies aimed at difficulties likely to be, associated with the prejec- taxing the agricultural sector--4ndirectly .by keep- tions outlined above appear to be manageable in ing, farm prices low, or directly by financing theory. Management options within the agricul- development in other sectors of the economy- tural sector are wide enough, particularly if sup-' have kept public costs much closer to private plemented with environmentally sensitive technol- costs. The projections in Tables 6-5 through 6-8 ogy, to solve the problems inherent in using @i indicate that a M reversal of conventional public larger proportion of the world's resources in an and private cost margins will be necessary by increasingly intensive manner to produce food. 102 THE PROJECTIONS 4w - 300 - World Food Production in constant 1961-65 dollars (billion) i75 200- :9 2U .0 100 175 - World Fertilizer Consumption in million metric of nutrients -125 23@I "5 'Adtkd Nine Rpre 6-7. World food production and fertilizer consumption, actual and projected. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS 103 600 300 400- World Fertilizer COM on 3-00 World Food Production 200- 100- Projected' ry" Figure 6-9. Indices of world food production and fertilizer consumption, actual and projected. 104 THE PROJECTIONS Environmental problems Rely to be associated and pests of high-yield varieties grown in mono- with future increases in food production are worth cultures; the potential toxicity of growth-stimuiat- cataloging, however. ing additives used in animal husbandry ; and the There appear to be two broad categories of effects of changing techniques in food collection, possible problems-those related to expanding processing, and distribution. Man-made inputs and intensifying the use of resources, and those tend to raise productivity initially; if mismanaged, related to increased use of inputs such as fertil- however, they tend to reduce productivity in the izers and pesticides. - medium and long term, to result in increased Among the first group are problems of deterio- output of products of questionable quality, and to rating soil fertility, problems of soil loss and contribute to pollution in other sectors of the sedimentation, problems of desertification, and economy. problems related to irrigation (such as soil and The information available on fertilizer and pes- water salinization, changing water tables, and ticide pollution is fragmentary and generally lim- pollution of water required for nonagricultural ited to microstudies. The potential for widespread uses). If untreated, the problems of this first group pollution due to the primary as well as the cause a gradual deterioration in resource produc- secondary and tertiary effects of fertilization and tivity and declin:uig levels of output. pest control is clear. However, the levels of Detailed information on the extent of past pesticide and fertilizer use projected in Tables fertility losses, erosion losses, desertification, and 6-14 and 6-15 are well below currently defined salinization is limited. Problems have been most maxima. marked in countries where man-land pressures are Fertilizer and pesticide pollution problems can greatest, where agricultural technologies are prim- also result from misuse. Even relatively small itive, where soil conservation measures are quantities of ferilizers and pesticides can generate limited, and where climate factors do not favor major environmental problems if they are used intensive cultivation. Areas reporting the severest improperly. The fast growth in the use of fertil- problems include the Sudano-Sahelian countries izers and pesticides implied by the projections for of Africa and areas of South Asia, North Africa most LDCs over the next three decades point up and the Middle East, East Africa, and Latin the need. for expanding and upgrading farm edu- America. Future problems are likely to continue cation programs and monitoring input use to to be associated with pressure to expand agricul- ensure the optimum trade-off between food pro- ture into marginal areas and to utilize marginal duction increases and environmental quality. resources more intensively. Table 6-12 suggests In summary, while solutions to foreseeable potential problems even in land-extensive areas Of envirortmental problems in expanding food pro- Africa and South America by 2000.. _ duction are theoretically available, their applica- Similar problems in many industrialized coun- tion-particularly in those parts of developing tries, including the U.S. and Australia, have been countries experiencing the greatest environmental offset to some degree by technological improve- stress-4s in question. Ultimately, the environ- ments and upgraded management practices. The mentally positive or negative nature of increases range of technological and managerial options in food production is likely to depend on short- available, however, is limited by basic land char- term versus long-term costs. The real food price acteristics, tillage techniques, and farmers' incen- increases projected for the decades ahead could tives to adopt conservation practices. The most well make the short-term costs of environmentally successful efforts-to date have centered on reduc- positive agriculture seem high and the long-run ing the intensity of land use and implementing costs of an environmentally negative agriculture programs for minimum or conservation tillage, seem small. In the industrialized countries, inter- contour plowing, ten-acing, strip cropping, extend- nalizing the cost of pollution--translating public ing dry or green fallow, minimizing runoff and costs into private producer and consumer costs- wind erosion, and improving crop rotation. The could narrow the margin between short-term and majority of these programs, however, are likely to long-term costs and accelerate the move to an be costly in terms of short-range reductions in environmentally positive agriculture. In most less output or increases in unit production costs. developed countries, however, questions of grain Among the second group of problems related 'to gaps and calorie gaps are likely to outweigh increased use of inputs are: fertilizer and pesticide problems of environment well beyond the'year pollution; the increased susceptibility to diseases 2000. MEMORANDUM OF CALL _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ TO: ________________________________________________________________________________________ YOU WERE CALLED BY-- YOU WERE VISITED BY-- RECEIVED ____________________________________________________________________________________________ OF (Organization) _____________________________________________________________________________________________ PHONE NO. PLEASE CALL-- CODE/EXT.______________________________________________FTS WILL CALL AGAIN IS WAITING TO SEE YOU RETURNED YOUR CALL WISHES AN APPOINTMENT _________________________________________________________________________________________ MESSAGE 7 Fisheries Projections Marine Fisheries Resources fully exploited. In fact, many are severely over- exploited The catch of crustaceans has been The total nominal world catch of marine am- nearly constant since 1970 at about 2.0 nimt. mals in 1975 was 59.7 million metric tons (mint). Mollusks have increased, but in only small The catch from inland areas was 10.4 mint, which amounts. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the includes some of the diadromous species. Marine generally accepted annual potential of 100 mrnt of fish accounted for 49.3 mint. The total aquatic traditional marine species will be achieved on a catch in 075 of 69.7 mint was roughly the same sustained basis. It is more likely that the potential as 1970 (69.6 mint), the last year of steadily is nearer the present catch, or about 60 ninit. increasing. annual catches. Between 1970 and Technological and social developments over the 1975, the average annual total had actually de- next 25 years will not, therefore, cause an increase creased somewhat, primarily, but not entirely, due in sustained yield of the traditional marine fisher- to the failure of the Peruvian anchovetta fishery ies. It is more likely that extended jurisdictions (Tables 7-1 and Fig. 7-1). ownward will decrease the actual yield as management The trend in marine fish has been d der the optimum yield concept brings fishing since the peak year of 1970, demonstrating that un the traditional marine fish populations are now mortality down to magnitudes more in fine with stable, profitable fisheries. Technological ad- TABLE 7-1 vances will likely be needed to just keep the cost of fishing in line with market values. To maintain Total World Catch and Selected Categories present yields will also require development of markets for a wider variety of species in order to (Millions of metric tons) take advantage of inevitable cyclic changes in Freshwa- Crusta- species productivity, and implementation of con- Total ter and Marine ceans Mollusks servational management practices, Diadrorn- Fish . and To a large extent, the current fisheries yields ous Mollusks have been maintained by development of formerly 1953 - - 19.1 2.6 - nontraditional species, e.g., capelin and sprat in 1954 - - 20.3 2.9 - the northern Atlantic and pollock in the northern 1955 28.9 - 21.3 2.8 - Pacific. New fisheries in the next 25 years will 1956 30.8 - 22.7 2.9 - 1957 31.7 5.1 22.8 3.0 - continue to develop by seeking species as a -1958 33.3 5.6 24.1 3.0 - replacement for decimated traditional stocks in 1959 36.9 6.1 26.8 3.3 - Waditional markets. Species will likely be smaller 1960 40.2 6.6 29.2 3.6 - in size and shorter lived. These fisheries may 1%1 43.6 7.0 32.2 3.5 - increase productivity per unit area, but they will 1%2 44.8 6.8 35.6 3.8 - 1%3 46.6 7.0 36.4 4.1 - also create problems in marketing, particularly for 1964 51.9 7.2 40.9 4.0 - direct consumption. Their development may also 1%5 53.3 7.8 39.6 4.1 2.9 restrain rebuilding of traditional stocks because of 1%6 57.3 8.1 43.0 4.3 3.0 ecological interactions. The actual theoretical po- 1%7 60.4 8.2 45.9 4.5 3.2 1%8 63.9 9.3 48.7 5.0 3.5 tential of marine protein becomes quite large, 10 1969 62.6 9.8 47.2 4.7 3.2 to 100 times that of traditional fishery forms, if 1970 69.6 11.6 52.7 5.1 3.4 one is willing to accept that plankton and very 1971 70.9 12.2 52.5 5.1 3.4 small vertebrates can and will be utilized. It is 1972 66.2 12.4 47.2 5.3 3.6 unlikely that a significant stable fishery will de- 1973 66.8 12.8 47.1 5.4 3.5 1974 70.4 12.6 50.8 5.5 3.5 velop on these forms with a few possible excep-- 1975 69.7 13.4 49.3 5.8 3.8 tions. Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Fishery Statistics; Utilization of kritl in the Antarctic is now Catches and Landings, vols. 16, 24, 32, 40. developing, and may result in large annual yields 105 106 THE PROJECTIONS 7 L @C V YA All categories Marine Fish @J'46' -30- ,''26 ,10 IV6$ 100 19 @-'@,:2000 75 7 L L- Figure 7-1. Annual catch of marine fish and of all marine animals, showing the downward trend in marine fish since 1970. sometime in the next 10-15 years. There is some The 60 mmt marine animal catch in 1975 is potential for developing fisheries on mesopelagic roughly equivalent to 12 mmt of protein. It has" fishes, e.g., lantern fishes, particularly since these been calculated that about 36 grains per day per are distributed in areas outside of national jurisdic- person is an adequate diet of protein (thc average tions. Processing and economic considerations daily U.S. protein intake is about 65 grains). will constrain development of both these poten- Thus, the present fisheries catch would supply tials. about 28 percent of the required protein intake for If present trends continue, recreational marine a population of 4 billion people. This will decrease fisheries will increase over the next 25 years to by 2000 to 25 percent of the requirement for a the point where they will have to replace a population of 6 billion people, even if the total significant share of the present commercial fishery aquatic yield increases to 100 mmt. mortality if the resource is to be managed for Culture of marine species probably produces sustained, maximal yields. This is now more a less than 3 mmt currently but has had a real development in the U.S. than elsewhere in the potential for increasing the supply of marine world but may become a global problem by the animals. This is particularly true for mollusks year 2000. (except squid) in estuarine areas. Demand is Natural changes in ocean climate will not expected to increase, but primarily in the high- greatly affect the total potential yield. Species market-price, low-volume species. Production compositions may change and regional productiv- from culture will be slow at first. Over the next 25 ity may change, but the resource has a basic years it might double to around 6 mint. adaptability which should offset any total changes. Man-made changes are different. Pollution and Fresh Water Fisheries Resources physical side effects of other uses such as mineral extraction and powerplants will have an overall The reported harvest of naturally produced negative effect on productivity. If pollution contin- fresh water fish was about 10 mint in 1975 and ues unabated as appears to be the prognosis, the has not increased over the last five years. There effect will be a significant reduction in fishery appears to be no potential for increased yields yields, but there will be a lag in the effects of from this type of fishery. pollution on the marine resources. Thus, a mo&@ The present production from fresh water culture erate to low decrease in potential due to this effect is uncertain. A large share of this is attributed to would occur during the next 25-year period but the People's Republic of China and Asian pond would become more severe thereafter. culture. The aquaculture potential in fresh water FISHERIES PROJECTIONS 107 where nutrition and primary productivity can be percent of the landings. The largest part of the artifically enhanced is, perhaps, the greatest of fishery resource is located on or above the conti- any in terms of realization. The only natural nental shelf out to a water depth of 150 fathoms. limitation is water supply. Even the species that do provide high yields are The potential yields of marine and fresh water not on the average very densely distributed. Adult resources will only be realized if good manage- demersal fish, those associated closely with the ment, based on a good understanding of the bottom, average about one individual per cubic ecosystem is obtained. The principal ecological meter. Pelagic fish also average about one per research required is on the fundamental processes cubic meter. These adult fish range from 0. 1 to whereby energy is transformed and distributed in 100 kg in size. Zooplankton, thi small animals the ecosystem, and on the effects of abiotic that drift in the water column, average about 100 factors on productivity and species success. individuals per cubic meter and weigh 0.01 grams or less. Almost all organisms are not uniformly Living Marine Resources: Description distributed and tend to aggregate in dense concen- trations, which provide the basis for today's The number of different categories (families, successful fisheries. genus, species) of marine animals reported in The productivity of some of the richest areas is world harvest data is well over a thousand. based on a variable habitat and a multispecies. Because some species are not reported and some fauna. Sustained yields of from 3.0 metric tons not yet exploited, the total numbers of marine per kM2 of surface area (northeast Arctic, New species that might enter the harvest would number England shelf) to 5.0 (North Sea) have been in tens of thousands. An abbreviated list of obtained by intensive fisheries. Most of the shelf species groups used by FAO (the U.N. Food and area is located well within 200 miles of the Agriculture Organization) to report landings is coastline. given in Table 7-2. Most of the species are rare or The largest share of the marine catch (60 sparsely distributed and do not form a resource percent) in 1975 came from the temperate waters significant enough for harvest. Off New England, of the northern Pacific and Atlantic oceans. The for example, there are about 200 species of fish, catch from@ the central and southern zones fol- of which only 30 contribute 3,000 or more metric lowed in order (Table 7-3). The north temperate tons each per year and in total amount to 95 seas have large areas of very productive shelf, TABLE 7-2 Major Species Groups Reported in World Fishery Landings (FAO) FRESHWATER FISHES: CRUSTACEANS: MISCELLANEOUS AQUATIC Carps, barbels and other cyprinids Freshwater crustaceans ANIMALS: Tilapias and other cichlids Sea spiders, crabs, etc. Frogs and other amphibians Miscellaneous freshivater fishes Lobsters, spiny-rock lobsters, etc. Turtles and other reptiles Squat lobsters, nephrops, etc. Sea squirts and other tunicates DIADROMOUS FISHES: Shrimps, prawns, etc. Horseshoe crabs and other arachnoids Sturgeons, paddlefishes, etc. Krill, planktonic crustaceans, etc. Sea urchins, sea cucumbers, and other River eels Miscellaneous marine crustaceans echinoderm Salmons, trouts, smelts, etc. Miscellaneous aquatic invertebrates Shads, milkfishes, etc. MOLLUSCS: Miscellaneous diadromous fishes Freshwater molluscs MISCELLANEOUS AQUATIC Abalones, winkles, conchs, etc. ANIMAL PRODUCTS: MARINE FISHES: Oysters Pearls, mother-of-pearl, shells, etc. Flounders, halibuts, soles, etc. Mussels Corals Cods, bakes, haddocks, etc. Scallops, pectens, etc. Sponges Redfishes, basses, congers, etc. Clams, cockles, arkshells, etc. Aquatic bird guano, eggs, etc. Jacks, mullets, sauries, etc. Squids, cuttlefishes, octopuses, etc. Herrings, sardines, anchovies, etc. Miscellaneous marine molluscs AQUATIC PLANTS: Tunas, bonitos, billfishes, etc. Brown seaweeds Mackerels, snoeks, cutlassfishes, etc. WHALES, SEALS, AND OTHER Red seaweeds Sharks, rays, chimaeras, etc. AQUATIC MAMMALS: Green seaweeds and other algae Miscellaneous marine fishes Blue whales, fin whales, sperm Miscellaneous aquatic plants whales, etc. Minke whales, pilot whales, etc. Porpoises, dolphins, etc. Eared seals, hair seals, walruses, etc. Miscellaneous aquatic mammals .108 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 7-3 Twenty countries exceeded 1,0 million Imetric Marine Fisheries Catch by Area, 1975 tons. Chile and Peru, notably, depend on one species, the anchovetta, the fishery which failed (Mil .lions of metric- tons) in 1972 and has not yet recovered. South Africa (pilchard and anchovy) and Norway (capelin) are Atlantic Pacific Total heavily dependent on one main fishery. The North 15.9 19.3 35.2 remainder are rather well diversified. Central 6.4 9.3 15.7 Much of the world catch is taken in or near South 3.4 4.9 8.3 home waters. The long-distant fleets, however, Total 25.7 33.5 59.2 have been important to many countries, both traditionally (Spain, Portugal) and in the light of recent developments (e.g., Japan, U.S.S.R., and the intensity of fishing has been very great as Cuba, Poland, Korea). well.-These areas border the industrialized coun- The leading species group in 1975 catches was tries, which have developed strong coastal fishing the herrings-sardines-anchovies group, which has fleets. Initial expansion of long-distance fishing traditionally been at the top but has dropped from fleets took place in the north Atlantic area. 44 to 30 percent of the 10 leading species groups. The same countries comprised the 10 leading The cod-hake-haddock species group is a close fishing nations from 1970 to 1975 (Table 7-4). The second; together the two groups account for about top two,3apan and the U.S.S.R., have the'largest 40 percent of the total catch (Table 7-5). The, catches from nonhome waters; Cuba has the herrings group is utilized to a large extent for fish largest proportion of distant water catches The meal and oil. The cods are almost totally used for direct human consumption. The redfishes and 10 leaders take 44 - mmt, or about 63 percent of jacks catches have increased more than the others the total. The Republic of South Korea has the since 1970. largest relative increase in catch since 1970, more The total 1975 catch in U.S. continental shelf than double, followed by Cuba (1.6 times) and areas was abou .t 5.8 mmt, the foreign catch in Denmark (1.5 times). these waters about 3.0 mint. The U.S. consumes most of its catches in the United States and imports about 70 percent of its total fish consump- TABLE 7-4 tion. In this respect, it is unique in the world. Catch by Continent and Leading Countries, 19175 Almost all of the U.S. catch, except tuna, is taken from the U.S. continental shelf. (millions oftnetric tons) Rank Living Marine Resources: Potential Of 10 Catch Several aspects of living marine resources are Highest of prime importance for projecting their use and Africa 4.5 South Africa 1.3 N. America 4.8 TABLE 7-5 Canada 1.0 S U.S. 2.8 Leading Species Groups in World Catch, 1970 South America 6.0 Chile 1.1 and 1975 4 Peru 3.4 Asia 30.7 (Millions of metric tons) 8 South Korea 2.1 1970 .1975 Philippines 1.3 Thailand 1.4 Herrings, sardines, anchovies 21.6 13.7 Socialist Republic of Vietnam 1.0 Cods, hakes, haddocks 10.5 11.8 3 China 6.9 Redfishes, basses, congers 3.9 5.0 7 India 2.3 Mackerels, cutlassfishes 3.1 3.6 Indonesia 1.4 Jacks, mullets, sauries 2.6 3.5 1 Japan 10.5 Salmons, trouts, smelts 2.1 2.8 Europe 12.6 Tunas, bonitos, billfishes 2.0 1.9 9 Denmark 1.8 Shrimps, prawns 1.0 1.2 6 Norway 2.6 Squids, octopuses 0.9 1 -I 10 Spain 1.5 Flounders, halibuts, soles 1.3 1.1 2 U.S.S.R. 9.9 Total 49.0 45.7 FISHERIES PROJECTIONS 109 productivity. First, they are renewable resources respect to the resourre and, to a lesser extent, the and have the potential for continuing productivity. same is true of the offshore limits. Because of The harvest of 'this. productivity is based on the differing concepts of optimality and management, axiom that the net natural rate of growth is national objectives may be quite differently per- changed when population magnitude changes. In ceived, even for the same population. This tends particular, when population magnitude decreases to further exacerbate the harmony between man from virgin levels, the rate of growth increases and nature that is essential for continued and and the net increase provides the surplus yield for optimal utilization of the resource. This is critical harvest. The rate of growth is limited, however, at present with respect to the effects of fishing but being at its maximum in the midrange of density perhaps even more critical in the future with levels, which limits surplus yield. respect to pollution and other man-made changes Between the existing populations of marine in the marine environment. plants and animals and their environments an Up to this time, a natural environment has been intricate balance has evolved, based on feedback assumed when studying and estimating the pro- mechanisms that provide the optimal reactions of ductivity of marine resources. This assumption' populations to the natural ecological variations. can no longer be maintained. This creates even The populations have co-evolved with a wide greater difficulties in understanding the underlying range of natural changes and are adapted to them. natural processes than those experienced in the In terms of our span of time, "What is past is past. The effects of man's changes in the environ- prologue." We do not understand the system well ment are much more subtle, at least initially, than enough to predict the possible changes. Neverthe- those of the fisheries. They are also probably less, we can be confident the populations will longer lasting. Hence, detection of their effects maintain themselves in varying composition but (and subsequent correction) will come througha with generally the same productivity. Marine very much delayed and dampened 'feedback. So animals have not co-evolved with man, and our much so, that it may be useless to attempt interventions cause changes which are potentially management on the basis of detection and correc- very different from those experienced by the tion. At any rate, the uncertainties create great natur-al system and for which the populations do difficulties in projecting the future course of not have the appropriate built-in feedback. Man is events. not sensitive to the effects of such changes. Out Productivity of the living marine resources has technology has developed to the point where we been estimated using two general methods. One is can drive the ecosystem into a disequilibrium based on estimating primary productivity, the from which recovery is unpredictable. The control production of protoplasm or carbon by,photosyn- we now exert in managing the populations is thesis and then extrapolating the conversion of based entirely on a pervasive and intense fishing this energy upwards through the food chain. It mortality that significantly alters population mag- can start with estimates of sunlight entering the nitude. The feedback is entirely through our oceans, with estimates of the standing crop of observation of effects and our reactions, both of phytoplankton (chlorophyll), with estimates of the which are constrained by an economics totally fixation of carbon, or some combination thereof. independent of the marine biosphere. The time Beyond this empirical base, the extrapolations span of changes in the ecosystem is probab 'ly into production of other elements in the food quite out of phase with human desires. Our chain are based on theoretical assumptions, concepts of optimality are very different, from backed by some experimental work, of the con- nature's, and our ignorance of the natural system version coefficients between trophic layers. The is very great. Thus, man's continuing activities in estimates of potential depend to a great extent on the marine ecosystem means that maintaining the definition of the trophic layers or the group of potential productivity in the long run is problemat- species from which the yield is to be obtained. ical, and reduced productivity in the short run is These decisions or judgments can change esti- most likely. A significant example of this aspect is mates by factors of from 10 to 100. It is not the geopolitical treatment of the resources. always clear what is assumed or what animals are Living marine resources are globally considered included in the different levels. The other ap- as, a common property to be held and managed in proach utilizes observations of actual fishery perpetual trust. The scope of commonality is a yields and field surveys of the resources. variable factor and recently has been defined in Most of the ocean areas that are productive of terms of extended coastal jurisdictions. Division fishery resources have been exploited to some by national boundaries is totally artificial with degree. Potential can, therefore, be. usefully esti- 110 THE PROJECTIONS mated by examining the available statistics and possible improvements are limited.and the de- extrapolating therefrom. Lack of accurute reports clines have become increasingly apparent in re- limits the accuracy of such estimates of course, as cent years. It has also become apparent that does the inference that past performance reflects previously observed highs in cycles cannot neces- future potential. Where only surveys of standing sarily be achieved again after intense exploitation. stock are available, assumptions about the annual That is, the potential for a population to react to turnover rate must be made, similar to the tropho- favorable environment is lessened after a high dynamic approach. mortality has been exerted upon it, at least within In both approaches, the overall world total the time spans of 10-20 years, within which the potential is the most precise, since the sum of majority of intense fisheries have been developed. regional and species estimates may average out This may, in part, be caused by species changes the errors of estimate. The regional estimates will triggered by the selective exploitation. change in accuracy in relation to the amount of Relations among species have"not explicitly data and analyses available. On the other hand, been included in most of the estimates of poten- once certain types of areas are defined, and tial. It is documented that shifts have taken place estimates of production per unit area are obtained in some intensely exploited areas (California for some, extrapolation to the total becomes more coast, sardine and anchovy; North Sea, multiple meaningful. The trophodynamics approach utilizes species). It has been observed that the replace- this feature more successfully than the fishery ment populations tend to be of the smaller sized, approach because it does not depend on the shorter-lifespan species. In some cases, yield has vagaries of historical exploitation patterns. The been maintained, but often at the expense of trophodynarnic estimates tend to be greater than heavier fishing. In other cases, yield has de- the fishery-based estimates. The former is estimat- creased, perhaps because the species was less ing a resource potential that includes the total desirable. organic biomass in arbitrary categories and is less In any event, although it has been the case that restained by the implications of practical and fishing has been directed at certain desired spe- feasible fisheries. Thus, the estimates' potential cies, it has also been the case that the gear has are likely to be biased upward in relation to what not been selective enough. The unselective mor- may be achieved. They may be biased upward tafity has, in many cases, been directed at large also because the efficiency of transfer of energy biomass populations, partly because of the devel- may be less than assumed when the populations opment of long-distant, large-vessel fleets, but it is are being selectively fished, although this is a also due, in coastal fisheries, to the high economic currently debated issue. returns. In any mixed species population, which The fishery-based estimates have increased with not by accident occurs in most productive areas, time. This is characteristic of trend extrapolation the fishing mortality exerted on the smaller bio- methods. The very recent experience of fisheries ' mass species, often inadvertently, is greater than however, has led to less optimism about the total that which will maximize long-run yields. Thus, in extractable amounts of living marine resources. general, total area yield has, in many cases, Many of the estimates have been made to promote proven to be less than estimates based on individ- fishery development by stressing the fact that ual species assessment. In addition to these fac- more is available. But outside of this aspect, some tors, many estimates include organisms that have estimates assume that past trends could be simply not yet been subjected to exploitation and are in linearly extrapolated in time and that laws of the so-called lower trophic levels. diminishing returns (limits of biological productiv- The potential of these populations is often ity) would not apply for some time to come. The estimated by multiplying upward from an inverted more specific estimates were often based on the conversion coefficient the consurription by preda- concept and method of maximum sustainable tor populations. Predator and prey cannot be yield. Many of these calculations were based on simply added together. Also, it is not obvious that data from rapidly developing fisheries that were what was consumed by predators in the system is not stabilized to the extent needed for accurate available to man either from an ecological view- estimates and, because of the opportunistic nature point or from a practical technical viewpoint. of 'fisheries, were based on short-term, above- Most published studies agree that the north average population magnitudes. Some animal pop- temperate areas of both the Atlantic and Pacific ulations do cycle. Fisheries are seldom started at Oceans are now being fished to the full potential. population lows. Improved technology has also This corresponds to the belt of highly industrial- masked real declines in populations, but the ized nations which, with few exceptions, are the FISHERIES PROJECTIONS world leaders in fishing. The central and southern overcoming severe social and economic con- sectors of fisheries have been developing primarily straints. Development will have to be carefully through long-distance fleet expansion, and the planned so that the balance and equilibrium of the potential is probably greater than present catch- marine ecosystem are not radically perturbed. more so for the southern temperate Atlantic and There is not enough information to evaluate the the central Pacific region than the other regions. real possibilities of sustained increases in yields, The total increased yield from lightly exploited to say nothing of their practicality. areas has been estimated at 30-50 million tons. The species available strongly influence the devel- Marine Pollution opment of fisheries. Thus, the estimated increase in potential yield over current yield is made up of Industrialization, which is heaviest in the North- hakes in the southwest Atlantic and croakers and ern Hemisphere, is now introducing pollutants small pelagics in the central zones. Some increase into the oceans in quantities which are beginning in cephalopod yield has also been predicted. to cause significant deleterious effects on re- Exploration for krill in the Antarctic Ocean sources and the environment. The important (Atlantic sector primarily) is now underway. The coastal zones are being changed at ever increasing potential has been estimated by various authors at rates to the detriment of natural resource produc- 25-100 million metric tons. Doubtless the popula- tivity. tion is large, but there are many unanswered Worldwide attention to this process is attra cted questions. Do these euphausfids undergo cycles of by the more spectacular, acute events that have density, and is a present high what is attracting direct, but short-term, effects on man (large oil attention? Will the present turnover rate continue spills that affect beaches, heavy metal injections as fishing mortality increases? Will this interfere that poison people). The more important effects, with recovery of whale populations? The answers however, stem from the largely unnoticed, and are not yet available. The more recent comprehen- undetected, chronic low-level pollution. Because sive fishery-based estimates and the better defined most pollutants fall in the latter category and do trophodynamic estimates provide a range of po- not generate public outcry, the general attitude is tential of 100-150 mint. to consider the oceans as an important resource The yields of traditional species in the more to be utilized in disposing of the wastes of man. heavily exploited areas, which are included in the This utilization requires the identification of sub- estimates, have not held up in recent years. In stances that jeopardize marine resources and hu- many areas, the so-called nontraditional species man health and the determination of acceptable are already being harvested (e.g., capelin and levels--an extremely slow process because the squid in the north Atlantic) at maximal levels. pathways and effects are extremely complex and Thus much of the hypothesized expansion is in long-term. Demonstrable threats to marine re- fact a replacement yield and is not additional in sources are seldom available within time spans terms of potential to the present yields. In addition that could effectively stop the pollution prior to to the ecological constraints on estimates of poten- adverse accumulations. tial, the more practical constraints of society The residence time in the oceans of the pollu- (economics, technology, management) will surely tants is minimally a matter of decades, but in- reduce the ability to utilize what has been esti- creases to centuries or greater for. a host of mated as future potential expansion. For example, substances. The process of.transport to the ocean the most efficient fishing operation at present will and accumulation to detectable, but not necessar- average 50 tons per day in good conditions. The ily ineffectual, levels is also in many cases a same efficiency applied to zooplank-ton would matter of decades or centuries. average much less than half a ton per day. How a given material will affect components of These considerations lead to the conclusion that the ocean, and how much of a substance or the present world harvest of marine fish of about habitat modification jeopardizes a resource re- 60 mint will not increase on a sustained basis. quires an ability to predict events in the ocean._ Furthermore, it will only be maintained with good This in turn requires a knowledge of the natural management of fisheries and protection of the processes in the undisturbed system. It is highly marine environment. The total world harvest of problematical that such knowledge will be accu- marine renewable resources, based on exploiting mulated rapidly enough to detect and correct natural production, could be increased substan- adverse effects. tially by the year 2000, perhaps to as much as 100 Productivity of marine resources can be re- mint. To achieve this, however, will require duced by destruction or change of habitat as well 112 THE PROJECTIONS as by bio-accumulation of chemicals, most notably ence on Aquaculture concluded that even with in the coastal zones of industrialized countries. existing technology a doubling of world food Estuarine areas are highly productive, and are an production from aquaculture will occur within the important, and limiting, factor in the life cycles of next decade and that a 5-10 fold increase by the many species of fish and shellfish. Atmospheric year 2000 is feasible if the necessary scientific, transport of pollutants is also affecting the open financial, and organizational support becomes ocean environment far from the sites of direct available. discharge and origin. Man's emissions into the Development of energy-intensive high-technol- atmosphere are now at least about 10 percent of ogy culture of species requiring high-protein diets the naturally occurring flux. will undoubtedly continue in the next two dec- Most of man's activities lead to pollution and ades, especially in industrialized countries, but physical change of the environment. Most of these substantial production of herbivorous species in changes must be viewed as potentially reducing natural waters-designed to yield relatively, low-,. natural productivity. It is only in physically re- cost animal protein--should expand even more stricted areas, under controllable and predictable rapidly, particularly in less developed countries, situations, that man can increase productivity. and particularly in tropical and subtropical areas Because such areas are limited, pollution of the with year-round growing season. An. important oceans at increasing rates will likely have the role of industrialized countries'will relate to im- effect of reducing overall yields of marine re- provement of the technology required for exten- sources. sive culture production of inexpensive animal protein in less developed parts of the world by such methods as genetic selection for high food- Marine Aquaculture conversion efficiency and rapid growth, testing of low-cost diets from natural products, and training@;, Aquaculture, defined as the culture or husban- of technicians. The role of aquaculture in inte- dry of aquatic organisms in fresh or salt water, grated rural development, through provision of yielded an estimated 6 mmt of food in 1975- better diet, jobs, and cash crops, can be significant roughly 10 percent of the world production of in less developed countries. Aquaculture there fishery products. Yields from aquaculture doubled would be primarily in the form of small-scale, in the period 1970-1975; much of the increase was low-technology, labor-intensive operations. in high-unit-value species in industrialized coun- The potential of ocean ranching-not only of tries. Some countries now depend on aquaculture anadromous species, but also of coastal-migratory for a significant part of fish and shellfish produc- species-will be exploited within the next two tion. Japanese aquaculture production increased decades, and substantial increases in yields (as fivefold (to 500,000 metric tons) in the period well as augmentation of fished stocks) can be 1970-1975, while Isr-ael now derives almost half expected in proportion to public and private its finfish from aquaculture. United States aqua- investment in this approach to fish production. An culture production in 19175 was only 65,000 metric important qualifying comment here would be the tons, about 3 percent of U.S. fish and shellfish need for consider-ation of impacts of introduced landings, but this limited amount still constituted populations on natural stocks, and the need to (in 19175) about a quarter of our salmon produc- determine and consider the total carrying capacity tion, about two-fifths of our oyster production, of the ocean areas involved. and about half of our catfish and crawfish produc- Expansion of food production through aquacul- tion. ture must be a matter of national policy and There is cause for reasoned optimism when national priority--4nuch as the expansion of dis- considering increased food production from aqua- tant-water fishing fleets was in many countries culture. Despite institutional, economic, environ- (particularly the socialist countries with plannnedil mental, and technological constraints, global economies) during the 1960s. Included in such yields are increasing. Intensive culture of high- policy would be improvement in the technological unit-value species--such as pen-rearing of salmon base, development of legal protection for aquacul- and raceway culture of shrimp--is approaching ture enterprises, control of coastal/estuarine pol- the point of economic feasibility, and extensive lution, and encouragement of capital investment. culture of animals that utilize very short food With increasing restrictions on harvests from'l chains--such as oysters, mussels, and mullet- continental shelf waters of other nations, the I has the potential for enormous expansion with aquaculture option should become much more- existing technology. The 19176 FAO World Confer- attractive as a protein food source. FISHERIES PROJECTIONS 113 Economic Demand percent for every 100 percent growth in income, e Asian demand to increase 109 percent for 'every ,Projection of past trends in landings into th 100 percent growth in income, and so on. These future assumes that costs of harvesting increasing estimates depend upon the rather awkward as- quantities of fishery products, adjusted for infla- sumption of constant prices for fishery products. tion, will not rise more rapidly than in the past. This, in turn, suggests a whole host of other In its world projection to 1985, FAO estimated the demand for industrial fish separately, assum- assumptions about fishery technology, species abundance, and patterns of fishery management. ing that the demand for industrial fish was func- World forecasts often ignore geographical differ- tionally related to the demand for poultry and ences in population and income growth and the hogs. Demand of fish meal for poultry and hog effects of these different rates of growth on world production was estimated to grow at a higher rate demand for fishery products. for the period 1%5-1975 than for 1975-1985, so .In an effort to overcome some of these difficul_ the growth progression was a step function. ties, FAO in 1970 attempted to estimate the Any long-term forecast is bound to present income elasticity of demand for world fishery numerous difficulties, but the FAO method poses products and to project the demand for food fish some special problems. The greatest drawback to to 1975 and 1985 on the basis of 1%9 FAO the FAO estimation procedures is their lack of expectations about world population and income adjustment for possible price changes, their use of trends (Fable 7-6). The FAO approach assumed unchanging country by country income elasticity 0. - demand for food fish would grow with world coefficients for the time of their forecast, their income, but not at the same rate as world income. failure to disaggregate by species, and the lack of Thus, for example, U.S. and Canadian demand explanatory information on their derived demand for food fish would be expected to increase 20 equations for industrial fish. TABLE 7-6 1970 FAO Projection of Demand for Fish Meal, 1975 and 1985 (Thousands ofmetric tons, product weight) 1975 1985 Consumption Projected . Projected 1961-63 Rate of Projected Rate of Projected Increase Demand Increase Demand (percent per year) (percent per year) Industrialized countries 2,408 4.5 4,250 3.6 5,390 North America 668 2.8 960 2.4 1,140 Europe EEC 734 4.4 1,280 3.5 1,620 Northwest Europe 517 4.1 870 3.1 1,040 South Europe 104 8.5 300 6.7 460 Other industrialized countries Japan 340 5.8 710 4.6 960 Others 45 8.5 130 5.9 170 Centrally planned countries 231 11.2 920 8.6 1,550 U.S.S.R. 119 11.0, 460 9.2 900 Other European countries 112 11.5 460 7.9 650 China - - - - - Other Asian countries - - - - - Less developed countries 221 8.3 620 8.9 1,560 Latin America - - 310 - 710 Africa, South of Sahara - - 30 - 130 Near East - - 60 - 130 Asia - - 220 - 590 World Total 2,860 5.6 5,790 4.9 8,500 Meal from offal 230 6.2 500 6.6 1,000 Demand for meal from fish 2,630 5.5 5,290 4.7 7,5W Demand for fish for meal 13,150 5.5 26,450 4.7 37,500 Note: To convert the demand for meal from fish to the demand for fish a conversion factor of 5 is used, i.e., it is assumed that 5 tons of fish make Iton of meal. Source: Food and Agriculturai Organization, Pro@isional Indicative World Plan for Agricultural DeMopmeni, Rome, 1970. 114 THE PROJECTIONS In 1970 Frederick W. Bell et al. sought to model predicted price increases, sometimes sub- overcome several of the cited disadvantages of stantial increases. The FAO group did not attempt the FAO projection methodology. The Bell @ group this, so the two forecasts are somewhat different undertook to estimate price and income elasticity in their intent. FAO sought to forecast what the of demand by species (Table 7-7) and by major world demand would be if prices did not change, consuming country for the years 1975, 1985, while the Bell group attempted to forecast what and 2000. Incorporated into the Bell analysis world prices and quantity demand would be if was an assumed decline in the income elasticity resource scarcities developed as expected. Of demand for food fish for the world starting at Because the Bell Group attempted more than 0.68, in 1965, but declining to 0.22 by 1985, and FAO, there were more places where their forecast leveling out at about that point. This is in compar- could go awry. Interestingly enough, both fore- ison with the FAO estimate which remains at 0.68 casts came out about the same for the 1975 throughout their projection. The Bell group as- predictions, and both were higher than-but sumption of a declining income elasticity is based relatively close to-the actual landing of 69.7 upon the empirical observation that in general mmt (FAO had predicted 74.1 mmt, the Bell richer countries consume less fish per capita (Fig. Group 74.0). Where the two forecasts diverge is 7-2). in the later years. For 1985, FAO predicted a The Bell group also incorporated into their demand of 106.5 mmt, the Bell group 78.6. For model selective assumptions, on a species by the year 2000, the Bell group predicted 83.5 mrnt; species basis, about supply constraints. Their FAO did not make the projection. 7-7-7 1.60 A.40- 1.30' - 1.20 1.10 1. 00 .80,:r .70 @30 AO.- .30 .10 00 500 @M 2000 2,500 3,00W 3,500, 4,500 liars pe, capita, national income in do Figure 7-2. Per capita national income vs. income elasticity of fisheries demand in 77 countries. (Frederick W Bell ef al., unpublished manuscript, 1969) FISHERIES PROJECTIONS 115 TABLE 7-7 19170 Bell et al. Projections of World Aggregate Consumption of Fishery Products,,-1975-20M (Thousands of metric tons, round weight) Changes 1%5-67a 1975 1985 2000 1%5-67 to 2000 (percent) Food fish Groundfish 6,368 6,940 5,761 4,763 -25.2 Tuna 1,291 1,456 1,615 1,657 28.4 Salmon 476 481 485 485 1.9 Halibut 58 58 58 58 0 Sardines 871 1,464 1,848 2,370 172.1 Shrimp 634 1,066 1,347 1,479 133.3 Lobsters 137 174 192 145 5.8 Crabs 328 481 517 386 17.7 Clams 478 535 626 694 45.2 Scallops 166 236 281 322 94.0 Oysters 777 1,218 1,755 2,453 215.7 Other fish 25,086 32,659 41,504 53,524 113.4 Total food fish 36,670 46.768 55,989 68,226 86.4 Fish meal 20,440 27,170 22,634 15,1% -25.7 Total (food and meal) 57,110 78,938 78,623 83,532 46.3 1 Average ofactual. Source: Frederick W. Bell et al., The Future of the World's FisherY Resources (National Marine Fisheries Service, File Manuscript No. 65. 1) Dec. 1970.. These predictions comprise the best available rate to 2000 and a 3.0 percent growth in per capita world demand estimates, although they are both income. out of date. There is need for a new effort in World income may rise 3.2-4.1 percent annually which price and income elasticities are re-esti- from 19r75 to 1985, depending upon whether one mated by species and by country, and revised accepts the low or the high growth rate assump- maximum sustainable yield and other supply fac- tion. From 19175 to 2000 the low projection is 2.9 tor calculations are introduced; projections should percent per year and the high 4.2 percent. On the then be made on the basis of contemporary basis of these assumptions, a crude adjustment of estimates of country by country population and the FAO projection suggests a world fish demand income projections. for 1985, under the constant price assumption, of 92-98 mmt (as opposed to FAO's projected 106 The FAO projections assumed a world popula- mmt). A parallel adjustment for the Bell group tion growth rate to 1985 of 2.1 percent and a per study suggests 72-76 mmt for 1985 (as opposed to capita income growth of 3.2 percent. The Bell their projected 78.6) and 81-83 mmt for 2000 (as Group assumed a 1.7 percent population growth opposed to their projected 83.5). 8 Forestry Projections Twenty-two years ago, forests covered over more industrialized nations, consumption of wood one fourth of the world's land surface. Now products is expected to rise sharply with increas- forests cover one fifth. Twenty-two years from ing GNP per capita. Relative prices of industrial now, in the year 2000, forests are expected to wood products, paper, sawn lumber, wood panels, have been reduced to sixth of the land area. wood-based chemicals, plastics, and many other The world's forest is I y to stabilize on about products, are sure to increase. The effects may be one seventh of the land area around the year somewhat disruptive, but substitutes will probably 2020.* be found for the-'products that become too expen- The economic implications of this transition sive. No catastrophic changes are foreseen. from a period of global forest wealth to a period In the less developed countries (LDCs), where of forest poverty are more apparent from the most of the deforestation will occur, people will expected change in wood per capita. The world forgo the increased use of paper and other indus- now grows about 80 cu m (cubic meters) per trial wood products that might have been expected capita of wood in trees large enough to be to follow increased GNP, and the effect on commercially valuable. In the year 2000, there welfare will be negative but bearable. But indus- will be only 40 cu in per capita, even if the trial wood products are much less important in deforestation rate stabilizes now. If the deforesta- LDCs than charcoal and ftielwood used for cook- tion rate continues to increase with population ing and heating, and poles used for framing growth, there will be substantially less than 40 cu structures'for shelter. Prices and absolute scarcity m per capita.t Yet by the year 2000, GNP is will put fuetwood and charcoal out of economic expected to have increased significantly in both reach of not only the subsistance sector but also the mdfe and less industrialized nations. In the much of the market sector of the LDC popula- tions. *The estimates of forest area as a fraction of the world's land area are derived as follows (references are to work 's in forested area is thus calculated to be about 2.57 billion the list of references at the end of this chapter, unless cited hectares, and the year 2000 area is about 2.1 to 2.2 billion in full). The forest area in 1950 was 4.85 billion hectares, hectares. The assumption that the deforestation rate will not according to Whittaker and Likens. That figure excludes accelerate with population and GNP growth is arbitrary, woodland, shrubland, and savannah. The forest area in 1973 chosen to be on the conservative side. That. the forest area was about 2.66 billion hectares, according to data from will stabilize at about 1.8 billion hectares follows from the Persson (1974), the Economic Commission for Europe, and observation that the forests of the more industrialized J. T. Micklewright ("Forest and Range Resources of the nations have already stabilized at about 1.45 billion hectares United States and Factors that Affect Their Use," unpub- (Micklewright and European Economic Commission) and lished manuscript prepared for the 8th World Forestry that about 365 million hectares of forest in the less devel- Congress, Oct. 1978). That figure refers to "closed forest". oped nations is physically or economically inaccessible to For the United States, closed forest excludes forest land logging and land-clearing operations (European Economic incapable of producing more than 1.4 cubic meters of Commission and Sommer). At the present deforestation industrial wood per hectare per year. For Canada, it rate, the accessible forests in the less industrialized nations excludes land incapable of producing stands of trees 4 will have been razed before 2020, but the rate will undoubt- inches in diameter or larger on 10 percent or more of the edly slow down as the forests available for cutting diminish. area. For the rest of the world, it excludes land where tree Thus the inference that the forest area will stabilize around crowns cover less than 20 percent of the area and land the year 2020. The fractions are derived using 13.003 billion which has a primary use other than forestry. Interpolating hectares as the world's total land area. That figure is from between the 1950 forest area and the 1973 area suggests that Persson (1974); it includes 19 percent of arctic regions and 22 years ago the forested area was over 4 billion hectares. excludes the Antarctic, Greenland, and Svalbard. The present forest area and the forest area for the year 2000 fThe estimates of present and future wood volume per are calculated by factoring the 1973 area by an annual net capita were derived by factoring forest areas for each region deforestation rate of 18 to 20 million hectares. This rate is by the wood volume per hectare for each region as aggregated data from a variety of sources, including Persson estimated by Persson (1974). The estimates of forest area by (1974), Sommer, and several series of reports from U.S. region for the year 2000 used in this calculation were embassies in the less industrialized nations. The 1978 derived from the sources cited in previous footnote. 117 118 THE PROJECTIONS I To provide some insight into the economic and TABLE 8-1 environmental transition occurring as a result of World Forested Area by Region, 1973 changes in the world's forests, this paper first discusses the status of forest inventories and the Closed economic significance of forests from a global Forest standpoint. Then trends and prospects for forests Open Total (% of and forestry in each of the main geographic Forest Closed Wood- Land land regions are reviewed. The special problems of the Land Forest land Area area) world's most complex ecosystems, the tropical Millions of hectares Per- moist forests, are treated briefly in a separate cent North America 630 470 (176) 1,841 25 section. Finally global linkages that will make the Central America 65 60 (2) 272 22 year 2000 forest situation in the tropics important South America 730 530 (150) 1,760 30 to the people of the temperate zone are cited. Africa 800 190 (570) 2,970 , 6 Europe 170 140 29 474 30 U.S.S.R. 915 785 115 2,144 35 Asia 530 400 (60) 2,700 15 Forest Inventories Pacific area 190 80 105 842 10 Several recent reports have mistakenly indi- World 4,030 2,655 (1,200) 13,003 20 cated that the world contains 4.5 billion hectares Notes: Data on North American forests represent a mid-1970s estimate. Data on U.S.S.R. forests are a 1973 survey by the Soviet government (see Reference of forests plus over 2.3 billion hectaxes of open 3). Other data are from Persson (1974); they represent an eady-1970s estimate. Woodlands.' Apparently there is some confusion Forest land is not always the sum of closed forest plus open woodland, as it includes scrub and brushland areas which are neither forest nor open woodland, over the distinction between "forest land" and and because it includes deforested areas where forest regeneration is not taking place. In computation of total land area, Antarctic, Greenland, and Svalbard are "forest," and it seems to be common practice to not included-, t9 percent of arctic regions are included. use forest area data from 1950, as though neither extent of forests nor knowledge about forest areas were changing. In fact, the world has only about global figure must be considered an "informed 2.6 billion hectares of closed forest and another guess. 13 1.2 billion hectares of open woodlands and savan- The wood resources in the world's forests have nahs, according to the most recent and best global been estimated by extrapolating from detailed estimates .2 forest inventories carried out in the various re- About half of the closed forests are located in gions and biomes. the LDCs of the tropic and subtropic regions, Most forest inventories are concerned with the where exploding populations are rapidly destroy- quantity of wood that might be extracted in logs ing forests for farmland and for fuel. The other of commercially useful size. Analysts concerned half are in the industrialized, nations, mainly the with ecological processes, with fuel and other U.S.S.R., Canada, and the U.S., where their nonindustrial products, or with biomass conver- extent is relatively stable in spite of increasing sion and other innovative concepts, need to know demands for forest products. Table 8-1 shows the the total forest biomass. It is possible to multiply distribution of forests by global region. the estimates of biomass density for each ecosys- Information about forest areas is scarce for tem type, as given by Whittaker and LikenS4 by many countries. The data that are available are the present area covered with each major forest classified according to widely varying definitions type, as given by Persson. This calculation (Table from year to year and from country to country. 8-2) indicates that the total biomass of the world's The task of evaluating and synthesizing all these forests and woodlands is on the order of 400 to heterogeneous data was undertaken by the World 500 billion tons of carbon. Forest Inventory project of the Food and Agticul- lure Organization (FAO) in the 1950s and 1960s Forest Products and, when FAO discontinued the work in the early 19170s, by Reidar Persson at the Royal College of Worldwide production of forest products, in- Forestry in Stockholm. Persson considers the area cluding fuelwood, as well as wood for construc- data to be "relatively reliable" (accuracy of - 5- tion, for paper and for other industrial products, 10 percent) for about half of the world's closed totaled at least 2.4 billion cu in (in underbark forest. The data are "poor" (t 40-100 percent) roundwood equivalent) in 19175.5 About half of the for about a third of the closed forest area, and wood harvest is in the industrialized nations where intermediate (� 20 percent) for the rest. The harvest and production vary with economic information on open woodlands is so poor that the cycles. The other half is in the LDCs where most FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 119 TABLE 8-2 manufactured products. As a result, most coun- tries both import and export. With a few excep- Biomass of the World's Forests and Woodlands tions, demand for forest products in industrialized Total nations is greater than production, so that most Biomass Biomass industrialized nations are net importers. Many of 1973 Area Density (billion the less developed nations, on the other hand, (millions (tons tons produce more nonfuel forest products than they Forest Type ha) carbonlha) carbon) can consume and are net exporters. This comple- Tropical rain (tropical mentarity is expected to become even greater and subtropical wet during the next 20 years. As it happens, few of evergreen) 568 202.5 115 the major forest product net exporters are among Tropical seasonal the more rapidly developing LDCs that are likely (tropical and subtropical moist and to be narrowing the consumption gap by the year dry deciduous) 1,112 157.5 175 2000. Table 8-3 indicates the rank order of the Temperate evergreen major net importers and net exporters of forest (temperate coniferous) 448 157.5 65 products. Temperature deciduous (temperature broadleaved) 135.0 The Forest-Man Relationship: Boreal (Boreal) 672 90.0 60 Two Systems Woodland, shrubland and savannah (open Forest resources and the total wood harvest are woodlands) 1,000 22.5 22 about evenly divided between the industrialized Total 3,800 437 , . and the less developed nations. Otherwise, most Notes: The data on areas of each forest type are from Persson (1974). The aspects of the forest-man relationship are pro- biomais d nsities for each forest type are from Whittaker and Likens (1975). Persson .seforest types are named in parenthesis. indicating how they are foundly different in the two types of economies. assumed to correspond to Whittaker and Likens' ecosystem types for this marriage of the two sets of data. Persson does not disaggregate coniferous and The industrialized nations am three times richer in broadloaved temperate forest areas, so it was necessary to use the mean of the forest resources per capita. Table 84 indicates biomass density figures for the two types (i.e., W tons carbon per hectare); however this manipulation introduces a potential error of less than 5 percent. the distribution of forest area and growing stock per capita in the early 1970s. The gap indicated by these -data is widening rapidly. Resources per of the production is fuelwood for cooking, used by people who are so poor that they'are hardly aware of short-term variations in global markets. TABLE 8-3 Supply factors affecting the production of forest Major Traders of Forest Products, 1974 products include not only forest area and standing crop, but also the physical accessibility, species Exports Imports mix and quality of the timber, as well as the Major Less Major Less availability of capital, labor, and management Net Imports Net Exports expertise for road or rail construction and for the Exporters (millions Importers (millions other developments necessary to forest exploita- $) $) tion. Factors affecting production from the de- Canada 4,921 Japan 4,365 mand side include size and socioeconomic char- Sweden 3,601 United Finland 2,273 Kingdom 3,795 acteristics of the indigenous population, rates of U.S.S.R. 1,552 Italy 1,442 investment in wood-processing technology, trans- Ivory Coast 706 German Fed. 1,439 portation costs to foreign markets, national eco- Indonesia 666 France 1,186 nomic growth rates, and market development Austria 540 Netherlands 1,085 Malaysia, U.S.A. 746 achievements. Each nation's annual wood harvest Sabah 373 Belgium-Lux. 504 is also strongly affected by institutional and politi- Philippines 237 Spain 479 cal constraints on forest resource development Romania 218 Denmark 472 and exploitation. These constraints vary from Malaysia, Norway 416 political restrictions on international trade to indig- Peninsula 200 Australia 295 Gabon 133 German DR 284 erious demand for recreation or other noncon- Chile 115 Switzerland 259 sumptive use of forest resources. Portgual 112 Argentina 245 Forest products enter into world trade at an New Zealand 94 Hungary 244 stages-@ primary, semiprocessed, processed and Hong Kong 193. 120 THE PROJECTIONS capita decline in the industrialized countries at the clearing forest lands. The natural ecologies are relatively slow rate of population growth (0.6 likewise basically different. For the most part, 1he percent per year), but in the LDCs the rate is the LDCs are located in the tropics and subtropics, sum of the relatively high population growth rate where natural cycles and,processes are very rapid and the relatively high deforestation rate, which and forcefid. Most industrialized nations are in the means a decrease of 3-6 percent per year in some temperate or boreal regions, where energy and nations, and an even faster decrease in others. materials cycle more slowly through the ecosys- The second major difference in man-forest rela- tems, and where nature is generally less forceful. tions in the two types of economies is in the Because the man-forest systems of the two pattern of forest,product consumption. The indus- types of economies are so dissimilar, they will be trialized nations consume over 90 percent of the treated separately in the remainder of this paper- world's processed forest products, while the except for the important links between the two LDCs consume nearly 90 percent of the wood types of systems, including trade, technology used as fuel. The use of wood for fuel in the transfer, and ecological linkages, which will be industrialized nations may increase somewhat, as considered at the end of the paper. prices rise for the ftiels that have been displacing its use during the past 25 years. Theonly other factor that seems likely to substantially alter Forests and Forestry in the Industrialized consurn ti patterns between now and the year I p on , Nations 2000 is the impending scarcity of wood for fuel and lumber in the LDCs. The U.S.S.R. Ecological aspects of the man-forest relations are as disparate as the economic aspects in the The Soviet Union has, by far, the single largest developed and developing world. The LDCs have forest resource base in the world, with 785 million mainly labor-intensive agricultural systems. In- hectares of forested land growing 75 billion cu rn creased production to meet the demands of grow- (overbark) of industrial sized. wood. The growing the stock is over a third greater than that of the U.S. mg populations must come from increasing labor intensity or from increasing the agricultural and Canada combined. The net annual increment land base, which usually implies clearing forests. in growing stock (growth less natural losses) is on By contrast, the human ecology of the industrial- the order of 880 million cu in (overbark), or 1.2 ized nations comprises mainly capital-intensive percent of growing stock.6 This does not mean systems, in which increased agricultural produc- the resource is unlimited, however. tion is generally achieved by investing more Fourteen percent of the forested area has such capital in already developed land, rather than by slow growth that it is considered unproductive; another 36 percent is not considered to be com- mercially exploitable, mainly because it is inacces- TABLE8-4 sible. Thus only 465 million cu m of net annual Forest Resources per Capita by Geographic growth are presently or potentially available with .present transportation and harvesting technolo- Region, mid-1970s gies. Open Fuelwood production, which takes up about 20 Closed Wood- percent of the total cut now, has been declining Forest land Growing slowly. Lumber production, which takes the larg- Area Area Stock est share of the wood harvest, about 40 percent, (halcap) (halcap) (m*ap)_ has had hardly any growth during the 196N and North America 2.0 0.7 179 1970s. Production of pulp, paper, and fiberboard Central America 0.5 0.02 50 has grown much faster, but the growth rate has South America 2.4 0.7 428 been slackening for the past decade. Stagnation of Africa 0.4 1.3 92 Europe 0.3 0.1 27 total production of forest products is explained U.S.S.R. 3.0 0.4 310 partly by the geographic isolation of the forests, Asia 0.2 0.3 17 85 percent of which are in northern and eastern Pacific 3.6 4.8 390 U.S.S.R., far from the population, 85 percent of World 0.7 0.3 80 which is in the southern and western portions of More industrial 1.3 0.4 128 Less industrial 0.4 0.3 61 the country. Large areas of European U.S.S.R. Sources: Population data from Population Reference Bureau 1977); Forest area are being overcut. For example, the mature stands am volume data from Persson (1974). of Karelia, which account for 5 percent of Soviet FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 121 total and 20 percent of pulp production, will last Europe has about 135 million hectares of com- only 25 years at the present rate of exploitation .7 mercially exploitable closed forest, with a growing The future of Soviet forestry is difficult to stock of 15 billion cu in (overbark). Another 9 predict. A large unsatisfied domestic demand for million hectares of closed forest are classed unex- industrial wood products already exists, as indi- ploitable, because of very low productivity or cated by persistant gaps between production tar- inaccessibility, or because they are reserved for gets and actual output of all the major wood various noncommercial uses. The distribution of products during the past decade. If current trends forest resources among subregions is indicated in continue, the Sbviet's forest industry will be able Table 8-5. The Nordic countries have the largest to satisfy neither domestic nor foreign demand for share of forest resources and have long been its products. exporters to the rest of Europe. Their great wealth In the longer term, the Soviets need to step up of forests per capita suggests that this relationship the reforestation programs, which have been ne- will continue indefinitely. 10 glected in the past. More reliance on Siberian The total wood harvest declined in Europe by 5 forests will be inevitable, but the distance to percent in 1972 and by 10 percent in 1975. In both western markets is enormous, and exploitation is years industrial wood production dropped. unlikely to grow rapidly until roads or railways Whether those declines signal a transition to a are built for other purposes. period 'of slowing growth for the forest products We know little about the reservation of forest industry* is uncertain. A 1976 study commissioned environments for aesthetic values, recreation, or 'by the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe other nonconsumptive use in the U.S.S.R. A Tass (ECE), European Timber Trends and Prospects report claims that forest is being planted at the 1950 to 2000, made predictions for forest products rate of 2 million hectares per year, much of it as consumption based on alternative assumptions groves around cities for "zones of rest" and on about growth of gross domestic product (GDP).. the steppes as shelter belts, which are said to For both high and low GDP growth conditions, "insure grain yield increases" by up to 25 per- the study projects that: (1) fuelwood consumption cent. 8 will continue to decline, though more slowly than in the past; (2) sawnwood consumption will con- Europe tinue to grow, but at a decreasing rate; (3) Forest is one of the few major natural resources consumption of paper and wood-based panels will in which Europe can expect to remain reasonably increase at an accelerating rate, and by the year self-sufficient. 9 By the year 2000, total wood 2000 each will account for a larger portion'of total consumption is expected to increase by 45 to 80 wood use thail will sawnwood; (4) supply of percent, but European forests should supply 80 wood, including imports, will be less than demand percent of the increase. by the year 2000 and will be the main constraint TABLE8-5 Distribution of European Forest Resources Among Subregions, Early 1970s Net Annual Annual Increment Fellings Exploitable Growing Net Annual Fellings per Forest Stock Increment per Area (170) M (0/0) Capita Capita (cu m (cu m underbark) underbark) Nordic countries 37 29 30 33 6.9 7.2 European Economic Community 21 20 23 23 0.3 0.4 Central Europe 3 6 5 5 1.5 1.3 -Southern Europe 22 19 19 17 0.7 0.6 Eastern Europe 18 26 23 22 0.9 0.8 Total 100 100 100 100 0.8 0.7 Measure 138 13.0 393 368 million billion million million hectares cu In cu m cu In underbark underbark underbark Source: U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, European Timber Trends and Prospects 1950 to 2000, pp. 66, 67. 122 THE PROJECTIONS on consumption. Adjusted for the supply con- purification, recreation opportunities, and aes- straint, total wood consumption during the 1975 thetic qualities. to 2000 period is expected to rise at an annual No statistics are available on the forest area in compound rate of 1.3 to 2.0 percent, based on Europe as a whole which has been set aside from assumed GDP per capita growth of 3.1 to 4.1 commercial production for use as parks, nature percent. The ECE study concludes that if more reserves, protection forests, campsites, and so on. countries will begin providing greater incentives Most studies lump such areas with the nonprod- for improved forest management, the projected uctive and inaccessible forests, which together growth in consumption to the year 2000 can be account for about 6 percent of the European real@ed without impairing the forests' potential forest. for sustained production beyond that date. Forested area is expected to increase in all of Environmentally, there will be substantial the European subregions, mainly as a result of changes in European forests during the years to afforestation programs. The area of scrub and 2000. Few, if any, natural forest areas remain open woodlands in southern Europe and espe- now; the present structure and composition of the cially in Spain should decrease as large areas are forest reflects a long history of use and manage- converted to productive closed forest. In the ment. As management intensifies, the forests will Nordic countries, natural regeneration has been become younger and still less diverse. This will more important than planting in the past, but lead to the reduction of some ecological niches planting will have to increase during the next and is likely to cause the extinction of some plant quarter century if the harvests are to be sustained and animal species and changes in the population in spite of the recent tendency to overcutting. In dynamics of others. Meanwhile, pressure is cer- the rest of Europe, afforestation and reforestation tain to grow for management of forests to enhance programs will continue at the pace set during the noncommercial values such as ecosystem stabil- past 20 years, about 150 thousand hectares per ity, protection of water quality and flow, air year. Table 8-6 indicates the ECE study's fore- TABLE8-6 Forecasts of the Areas of Forest and Open Woodland in Europe, Year 2000 Forest and Open Woodlands Exploitable Forest Other Percent Percent Percent of Total of Forest Period. Total Area of Forest Area and Open Land Area and Open Wood- Woodlands lands millions millions millions of ha of ha of ha Nordic countries 1970 58.0 52 50.5 87 7.5 13 2000 61.0 54 51.2 84 9.8 16 European Economic Community 1970 32.6 22 28.9 88 3.7 12 2000 34.0 23 30.6 90 3.4 10 Central Europe 1970 4.8 39 3.8 80 1.0 20 2000 5.2 43 4.5 85 0.8 15 Southern Europe a 1970 52.0 29 @9.8 57 22.1 43 2000 53.2 31 38.4 72 15.1 28 Eastern Europe 1970 27.7 29 25.1 90 2.6 10 2000 29.9 31 27.4 92 2.5 8 Total 1970 175.0 32 138.1 79 36.9 21 2000 183.3 34 152.0 83 31.3 17 Change 1970-2000 Area +8.3 +13.9 -5.6 Percent +5% +1090, -15% Including Cyprus and Israel. Source: Economic Commission for Europe, European Timber Trends and Prospects 1950 to 2000. p. 80. FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 123 casts of the forest areas in the year 2000. For the future of North American forestry seems rather whole region, the forested area is expected to be uncertain. In the early 1970s, before the recent 5 percent larger. perturbations in the global industrial economies, North America the U.S. Forest Service published a study analyz- ing trends and making projections of demand, Canada and the United States are about equally supply, and consumption of wood products. That endowed with forest resources. Each has over 200 study, The Outlook for Timber in The United million hectares of productive forest, and each has States, assumed a GNP increase of 4 percent per about 19 billion cu m of growing industrial-size'd year during the 1970-2000 period and projected wood. Most of the U.S. forest is accessible, and it the U.S. demand for wood products would rise has been used and managed more intensively than by 1.3-2 percent per year, depending on how the Canadian forest. More use generally means a wood product prices change. Increased harvests younger and more rapidly growing forest, and for of the U.S. forest would depend mainly on this reason as well as better growing conditions, changes in relative wood prices and on political annual growth of the U.S. forest is significantly decisions regarding intensity of use of the publicly higher than that of the Canadian forest. On a per owned forest. Under the various assumptions, the hectare basis, the U.S. forest grows nearly as study indicated that the volume of wood supplied rapidly as the European forest. Table 8-7 summa- from the U.S. forest in the year 2000 would. be rizes the present forest resource situation for between 140 and 190 percent of the volume North America. supplied in the year 1970. Most of the volume Because of the recent variation from the longer would come from increased fellings, but part trends in the growth of industrial wood use, the would come from technological advances that TABLE 8-7 North American Forest Resources, Early 1970s Resource U.S.A. Canada North Unit (1970) (1973) America Stocked commercial forest a Million hectares 194 220 414 Unaccessible productive foreStli Million hectares 5 - 5 Reserved forests (parks, etc) c Million hectares 8 15 24 Total productive forest 4 Million hectares 207 235 442 Unstocked commercial foreSte Million hectares 8 17 26 Open woodlands and other forests of extremely low productivity I Million hectares 103 73 176 Growing stock on commercial forest (underbark volume) Billion cubic meters 19 19 38 Cu meters per hectare 93 75 87 Net annual growth on commercial forest land Million cubic meters 527 270 797 (underbark volume) h Cu meters per hectare 2.6 1.1 1.8 Percent growing stock 2.9 1.5 2.1 Cu meters per capita 2.4 11.5 3.3 1974 fellings (underbark volume) Million cubic meters 402 167 545 1975 fellings (underbark volume) Million cubic meters 358 147 505 1974 fellings as percent of net annual growth Percent 76 62 68 'For the U.S.A.. commercial forest is defined as forest land producing or cubic meters of industrial wood per hectare per year. For Canada. this capable of producing crops of industrial wood inexcess of 1.4cubicmeters per includes forest land not suitable for regular harvest because of extremely low hectare per year in natural stands and not withdrawn from timber use. For productivity. Canada, commercial forest is defined as forest land suitable for regular OFor the U.S.A.. this is the volume, suitable for industrial wood use, in trees harvest, capable of producing stands oftrees 4inchesdiameter orlargeron to over 5 inches diameter. For Canada. the definition is presurnably similar. For percent or more of the area, excluding agricultural land currently in use. both, the unstocked commercial forest area is included in the calculation. bThis refers to forest in Alaska that meets the production criteria but is too hNet annual growth is total growth less volumes of trees dying annually. inaccessible to be used commercially. Apparently it refers to wood in the parts of trees suitable for industrial wood 'These are forest lands reserved for noncommercial use. Whether all of the 15.5 use, and apparently it does not net out the volume lost to forest fires. million hectares reserved in Canada are actually productive forest is not clear Fellings refers to removals plus harvesting losses, apparently only wood of from the available sources. size suitable for industrial wood use is included. This measure is provided to dThis category excludes some woodland that would meet the tree growth allow comparison of annual fellings to net annual growth. The ratio offellings criteria, but is not included in forestry statistics because it has been developed to removals was inferred from data provided in U.S. Forest Service (1974), below, and the figures for fellings were calculated by applying that ratio to the for non-forestry commercial use (e.g., residential land). 6For Canada, this is probably an underestimate, as it includes only unstocked removals as reported in FAO (1977). federal and provincial lards that have been allocated to wood production. Sources: U.S. Forest Service, The Outlook for Timber in the United States, 'For the U.S.A., this includes stands of pinyon-juniper, woodland-grass, Washington: GPO, 1974; Cliff (1973); Micklewright (1977); FAO (1977)@ Cana- chaparral, subalpine forests, and other woodlands incapable of producing 1.4 dian Forestry Service, "Canada's Forests," Ottawa: 1974. 124 THE PROJECTIONS would make harvesting and processing more effi- tares per year in the U.S. since 1960. During the cient. If efficiency of softwood production in- . same period, the area planted with trees has creases 12 percent by the year 2000, and efficiency averaged about 650,000 hectares per year. The of hardwood production increases 4 percent, I I remainder, except the relatively small portion and if hardwood use gains on softwood use to dropped from the commercial forest land inven- become a third of the total volume harvested by tory, is left for natural forest regeneration. If the 2000, 12 then the year 2000 fellings in U.S. forests trend continues, the U.S. forest will be less could be between 130 and 175 percent of 1970 completely stocked than it is now. This will not fellings. significantly affect wood production in the year Those projections correspond to a total annual 2000 but will have a negative effect in the longer felling in U.S. forests of from 510 to 690 million term if reforestation programs are not accelerated. cu in (underbark) of industrial-sized wood. The The situation in Canada, where the area harvested lower cut could be accommodated within the or burned annually is about 2.5 million hectares, present net annual growth of the forest, which is is similar. The pressure for reforestation in Can- estimated at 527 million cu in (underbark). The ada is likely to be lower, and costs of reforestation higher projection cannot be realized on a sustained there are higher because of the greater problems yield basis without a substantial increase in the of accessibility. net annual growth of the forest, which can only In the year 2000, the North American forest is occur with an increased intensity of management. likely to be marginally smaller, be less well Increases in demand for Canadian forest prod- stocked, have fewer slow-growing mature trees ucts will depend on the same factors that influence and more fast-growing young trees, contain larger demand in the U.S., except that rising prices of areas reserved for noncommercial use, and have a wood relative to other products would dampen lower ecological diversity in the nonreserved demand less for Canada than for the U.S., be- areas. The magnitude of these changes will de- cause Canada would supply a larger proportion of pend partly on exogenous economic factors and the U.S. demand under that condition. The Cana- partly on the attitude of the public towards forest dian wood harvest is expected to increase by management. about 2 percent per year, to reach 215 million cu In recent years, environmental awareness has in (underbark) in the year 2000.13 With that increased significantly in both Canada and the increase, the harvest would still be below the net United States. As a result there has been consid- annual growth, which is currently about 270 erable public resistance to forest management million cu in (underbark). More significantly, it techniques such as clear-cutting, which are eco- would be below 240 cu in, which is the Canadian nornically sound, at least in the short term, but Forest Service's estimate of the annual cut allow- which are aesthetically disagreeable and environ- able for sustained yield conditions on the portion mentally dubious. It is likely the management for of the Canadian forest that is accessible under wood production will be constrained on increasing current economic and technological conditions. proportions of the 27 percent of the U.S. commer- Thus there is unlikely to be any strong pressure cial forest that is publicly owned and on the 59 for increased intensity of Canadian forest manage- percent of the forest that is privately owned by ment during the next 25 years. parties other than forest industry companies. It is The condition of the North American forest theoretically possible for the managers of the environment in the year 2000 will depend to a public forests to increase production of all the considerable extent on economic developments types of benefits provided by the forest, but that will affect management intensity. The Out- without a greatly expanded environmental educa- look for Timber in the United States forecasts tion effort, it is unlikely that the public will be that the U.S. commercial forest area will be 6 well enough informed and motivated by the year million hectares smaller by the year 2000. Similar 2000 to demand management programs that will estimates are not available for the Canadian optimize production of all the forest's benefits. forest; probably the changes will be less as the smaller population of Canada will be making fewer Pacific Area demands for alternative uses of forest land. The fact that the annual harvest is less than the Japan is second only to the United States in net annual growth disguises the low rate of volume of wood imported, and is the world's reforestation in North America. The commercial largest net importer of wood products. Although forest area partially or totally harvested plus the Japan has experienced the world's most rapid area burned have averaged about 4 million hec- - increase in industrial wood consumption during FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 125 the past 25 years, and although 68 percent of commercial forests will become more intensive, Japan is forested, domestic production has been and this will lead to lower ecological diversity. declining steadily as a result of overcutting during The forest area reserved for noncommercial use the postwar years and several constraints on use will increase in North America, and noncommer- of the existing mature forests. cial factors will become more prominant in forest Japan has a good forestry program, and by the management decisions in the other industrialized year 2000 the domestic wood production may be regions. Except in Europe, Japan, and New rising again. The country will continue to be a Zealand, forests in the year 2000 win be less fully mAjor importer for the foreseeable future, how- stocked than now, as cutting will continue to ever, consuming a substantial proportion of the outpace tree planting and natural regeneration. sawlogs and pulpwood produced in western North For the most part, the cutover land will not be America and most of the Philippine mahogany allocated to other uses, however, and will be and other high-value logs from Southeast Asia. available for reforestation during the 21st century. The other nations with developed economies If the industrialized nations recover ftilly from and substantial forest areas in the Pacific are the economic setbacks of the past few years, then Australia and New Zealand. Australia has about consumption of wood will continue to rise and 38 million hectares of closed forest, only 20 supplies will begin to be tight within, the 1978- percent of it coniferous. New Zealand has 6.2 2000 period. Production costs for softwood ex- million hectares, 70 percent coniferous. It is a ports will rise as more remote areas must be major net exporter of wood products, while Aus- logged in both the U.S.S.R. and Canada, so prices tralia is a net importer. will rise. The already rising demand for imports Only vague forecasts of the future of forest from the tropical forests of the less developed environment in the two nations can be given here. countries will increase further. Management of the -New Zealand forest is rela- In the more distant future, rising prices for tively intensive and the general trend has been use wood products may lead to improved stocking in of monocultures of fast-growing exotic species for the northern forests and to heavier reliance by the reforestation, rather than reliance on natural re- wood products industry on plantation forestry in generation of native species. As a result, the New southern Europe, in the southern U.S. and in the Zealand forest has become less diverse ecologi- troPics. cally and more subject to catastrophic losses from pests and diseases. It seems likely that significant Forests and Forestry in the Less proportions of the natural forest will -be effectively reserved for noncommercial use. Developed Countries Tropical rain forest comprises a substantial part Demand, Supply, and Deforestation Of the Australian resources, and it has all the typical rain forest problems of wood heterogene- The LI)Cs contain nearly half of the world's ity, soil instability, climate harshness and poor closed forest area and over half of the growing resiliance after commercial exploitation. Aus- stock of industrial-sized wood. These forest re- tralia's agronomy is capital-intensive, so that pro- sources play an important role in economic devel- duction increases can generally be effected better opment by providing subsistance, shelter, employ- by increasing capital inputs on already cleared ment, resources for development of other sectors, land where there are high-quality soils than by and, for some LI)Cs, an important export com- clearing forest lands with marginal soils. Until the modity to earn foreign exchange. cost of Australia's wood. imports becomes too . The demand for industrial wood products within high, or until technological advances make capital- the LDCs will increase rapidly with economic intensive harvesting and processing of tropical development, because the elasticity of demand for forests more economic, the Australian forest en- wood products is high among relatively poor vironment is likely to remain relatively stable. consu Imers so long as wood supplies are abun- dant. 14 As income increases further, the demand Summary for paper products rises rapidly. Most of LDCs rely on imports of paper now, but recent techno- Use of land for forests and for agriculture are in logical breakthroughs have made paper production approximate equalibrium throughout most of the based entirely on mixed hardwoods possible. industrialized nations. Thus the forest area is Where economic development progresses, capital relatively stable and will be only marginally to develop modern wood-processing facilities smaller in the year 2000. The management of should become available. 126 THE PROJECTIONS Even where economic progress is not made, forest land accessible to them long ago (e.g., demand for forest products has been rising and Afghanistan), other densely populated nations that will continue to rise. Tightening supplies of soft- still have substantial forest resources will have woods in the industrialized nations are causing lost most of them before the year 2000 (e.g., increased use of hardwoods for sawwood, wood Indonesia, Thailand), and some sparsely popu- panels, and pulp, and tropical hardwoods have lated nations with vast forests will still have vast been capturing an increasing portion of this mar- forests in the year 2000 (e.g., Gabon, Congo). ket. Furthermore the demand for fuelwood win The process of deforestation is poorly under- rise with the population growth of the LDCs, stood. Apparently most of the forest losses result regardless of progress in industrialization. LDCs from clearing and burning for agriculture, with now get about one-fourth of their commercial much of the wood being used only to the extent energy from fuelwood; the proportion may de- that its ashes constitute fertilizer for one or two crease where industrialization progresses; but the season's crops. An estimated 190 million hectares absolute quantity will probably increase with of cleared tropical forests are used for shifting growth of cottage industries. In any case, most of agriculture. After rudimentary clearing, the land is the fuelwood is used for cooking in residences. burned and crops are grown for a year or two. Ten years ago it seemed that increased use of Then it is fallowed for about a decade, while a bottled gas and kerosene would constrain the degraded forest develops, and that re-estabfishes rising consumption of wood for residential fuel, at least some of the soil's fertility for the next but the five-fold petroleum price increases have round of clearing, burning and planting. The thrown most of the demand back to wood. system breaks down as populations increase and For the near future, the supply side of the the fallow periods are necessarily shortened, and forestry picture seemsbright for the well-forested eventually the forest loses its capacity to regener- LDCs. There is still an abundant supply of virgin ate and to restore the soil's fertility. The land is tropical timber, and technological advances in abandoned, and often forest is not re-established. processing are resulting in the use of a higher The balance between deforestation caused by proportion of tree species and size classes. Forest shifting agriculture and that caused by farmers land is generally less expensive in the LDCs than clearing land for permanent settlement is un- in the industrialized nations, and forest labor is known, and nothing is known about how the inexpensive and in abundant supply. Finally, the deforestation rate changes as the forest base LDCs have a comparative advantage in the devel- diminishes. Nor does anyone know how much of opment of tree plantations, as the long growing the forests now remaining in the LDCs is on seasons and high insolation available in the tropics arable land, and even the definition of arable may result in wood growth rates three to five times be changing. higher than in the temperate environments. The deforestation rate is closely related to the Unfortunately, these favorable factors are over- rate of commercial logging. Hardly any of the shadowed by the specter of deforestation. The LDC forests are under intensive management. In forest product supply picture is bright only for the most cases, reforestation after logging is left to near term. The current forest stock of the LDCs, chance. In densely populated regions, farmers about 1.1 billion hectares of mature closed forest, often follow the loggers to complete the process is being consumed at the rate of about 20 million of razing the forest. In less densely populated hectares per year. About two thirds of the tropical areas, natural regeneration may result in refores- forests are economically accessible, and if the tation, but the forests that result are generally present rate of deforestation were to continue degraded and seldom have commercial value. most of the accessible forest would be lost by How deforestation is related to the fuelwood year 2000. If the rate is assumed to increase with harvest is another unknown, and the statistics on the populations of the LDCs, then virtually all of fuelwood use are only crude guesses. Where the the accessible tropical forest would be gone by fuelwood comes from is even less well known. the year 2000. Much of the wood, perhaps most of it, is con- However, it is more likely that the overall LDC verted to charcoal. This is a cottage industry that deforestation rate will decline before the year supports many farmers clearing forests during 2000, for the simple reason that the people who their first years in a newly settled area. In other are doing most of the cutting will begin to run out places, rapid deforestation is only for fuel and of forests to cut. Forests and population are not is independent of the local demand for agricul- evenly distributed. Some nations cleared all the tural land. FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 127 Denudation of land, caused by the demand for year 2000, the Amazon forest will cover less than ftielwood, is -thought to be most rapid and to have half the area it does now. In Central America and the most severe environmental consequences in northwestern South America, -closed forests are the dry open woodlands of the tropics. In such diminishing at about 2 percent per year and are areas, tree cutting often leads not to a degraded likely to be completely removed from arable areas woodland but rather to a desert. 15 by the year 2000. The deforestation of lowland Because so few details are known about the forests in those areas will depend largely on how process of deforestation and about the rates at the high costs of clearing, drainage, and disease which it occurs under varying economic, demo- control relate to the demand for increased food graphic, and environmental conditions, it is quite production. In Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, and impossible to predict the global condition of Brazil, the rate of clearing of open woodlands will forests in the LDCs in the year 2000. It is depend on implementation of proposed schemes possible, however, to review current regional to make the savannah soil arable. If the new conditions, which may give some rough indica- methods work as expected, the savannah wood- tions of which areas will still have forests 22 years lands could be significantly reduced by the year from now. 2000, but that will take some pressure off the moist tropical forests, especially in Brazil. Latin America Man-made forests were reported to cover 1.9 million hectares in Brazil and another 1.7 million Closed forests cover about 725 million hectares, hectares in the rest of Latin America. It is a small over one-third of the total land area of Latin area relative to the deforestation rate, but conser- America. Open woodlands cover another 400 vation of the forest environment is not the objec- million hectares. Nearly all of the softwoods are tive of these plantings. They are industrial wood in Central America. Three-quarters of the tropical plantations, about one third conifers and much of .moist forest is in the Amazon basin. Open wood- the rest eucalyptus, and they do represent a lands predominate in parts of Central America, in significant beginning for plantation forestry. In northeastern and central Brazil, -in the Andean Brazil the planting rate is reported to be gaining valleys of Bolivia, Peru, and Chile, and in the momentum; in some areas natural forests are Chaco of Bolivia, Argentina, and Paraguay. razed to provide land, for the fast-growing com- The volume of growing stock of commercial mercial species. Some of the firms involved have size is higher than in any other region of the had economic setbacks, but it seems likely that in world, about 90 billion cubic meters. On a per the long run plantations will be providing most of hectare basis, the volume varies from 92 cu in in Latin America's wood supply. Central America, where the forests are similar to Increasing demand for processed wood prod- those of North America, Europe,. and Asia, to ucts in southern Brazil is likely to lead to in- over 250 cubic meters in parts of the Amazon creased investment in modem facilities that will Basin. The moist forests are extremely heteroge- be able to process a wider variety of species than neous, with up to 100 species per hectare and the present domestic and export markets can use. with plant associations, varying greatly over short This will make profitable the exploitation of forest distances. Only 10 to 30 percent,of the,standing areas where now the commercially valuable spe- volume in the Amazon basin is commercially cies are too widely scattered. The development of valuable, the rest of the wood is an impediment a forest products industry and construction of from the point of view of commercial loggers. For processing facilities is a priority feature in the this reason, logging operations have concentrated national planning frameworks of most of the well- more on the less dense stands where commercially forested Latin American nations, though only in valuable wood may be more abundant and more Brazil is implementation of such plans likely to accessible. have a significant impact on the forest environ- Deforestation rates vary with population den- ment by the year 2000. sity, as commercial logging operations are not yet well developed in most of Latin America. In the Amazon basin, the deforestation rate is estimated Africa at 4 percent per year. 16 In the past, forests were With only' about 6 - percent of its land area cut only along the perimeters and along rivers, but covered with closed forests, Africa is the least new roadway infi-astructures are rapidly increasing forested of the three tropical regions. The conti- the accessible area. it seems likely that by the nent contains about 180 minion hectares of closed 128 THE PROJECTIONS forest, 88 percent of which is tropical moist forest increase and as economic development makes in Central and West Africa. The area of open crops more valuable, the shifting agriculturalists woodlands is estimated to be about three times are likely to expand into more remote areas of the area of closed forest. 17 natural forest, and to cause permanent deforesta- The 1975 harvest of forest products comprised tion on larger portions of the areas they are about 320 million cu m (underbark) of wood, of already using. which 84 percent was ftielwood and charcoal, and Permanent agriculture is also likely to take 5 percent was unprocessed roundwood used as increasing areas of moist forest land in the coming poles and posts, mainly for construction. Thus decades. Growing demand for products of tree only about I I percent of the harvest, or 35 million and bush crops, including coffee, cocoa, and oil cu m, was used for sawn or other industrially palm, will probably result in significant deforesta- processed Wood products. About one third of this tion. industrial wood was exported, most of it as logs, In the seasonally dry areas, shifting cultivation most of it to Europe. The rest was consumed also occurs; often the effects are more deleterious within the region, mainly as sawwood for con- than in the rainforest zone, as the vegetation struction. The main exporters, in order of volume recovers more slowly. Most of the closed forest exported, are Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cameroon, in such areas have been insulated from deforesta- Ghana, Congo, Nigeria and Zaire. Most of the tion pressures by tsetse infestations. Gradual prog- countries of Africa are net importers of wood. ress is being made in tsetse eradication, however, The continent as a whole is a net importer of and permanent clearing of most of the woody sawwood, paper, and paperboard, and a net vegetation is one of the necessary elements in exporter of industrial logs, plywood, veneers, maintaining eradication. fiberboard, and charcoal.18 In the open woodlands, gradual denudation The demand within Africa for processed indus- results from overgrazing, from burning too fre- trial wood products is expected to grow by 6 to 9 quently for pasture improvement, and from wood- percent per year between now and the year 2000. gathering for fuel in the more densely populated However, much.of the industrial wood production areas. Since the effect of these factors is too is likely to continue to be directed to Europe gradual to be easily discemable, there is presently rather than to be traded within Africa, so that the no way to estimate the rate at which the savannah increasing Africa demand is unlikely to be satis- environments are being degraded. Recent atten- fied. tion focused on the desertification process is likely The demand for fuelwood used at the household to lead to some study of how open woodlands are level is likely to increase at about the rate of changed, and predictions may be possible within population increase, while the demand for fuel- a decade. wood used for production of commercial energy Persson's and other recent studies have indi- may increase somewhat faster, as the small-scale cated that the moist tropical forests of Africa now industrial sector grows. Supply is already insuffi- cover less than half of the area for which they are cient to meet demand in many countries, and with designated as the natural vegetation climax. Of no economically available substitute for woodfuel, course, most of this change is the result of energy consumption per capita has been falling in clearing and burning by man and grazing by parts of North Africa. domestic livestock. The rate at which the change Changes in the African forest environment have has occured is unknown. It seems likely that the been best researched and described by R. Per Isson rate has been increasing, and that the next halving in his 1977 study, Forest Resources of Africa. '9 of the forested area will occur much more quickly. He indicates that agriculture is the main cause of Persson and the other sources calculate that the deforestation. The area cleared annually for shift- closed forest area of Africa is decreasing by at least ing cultivation in the rainforest zone is 2 to 4 2 million hectares per year and suggest that the rate million hectares. There is no estimate of the may be higher. The greatest change is in West proportion of this area that is intact natural forest. Africa, where large populations and large forests In the more densely populated humid areas of both occur. In North Africa, there is probably no West Africa, large forest areas are reported to net decrease in forested area, as there is limited have become denuded and badly eroded waste- forest left to cut and as intensive tree planting has lands in recent years, because of the pressure to begun in several countries. There is an shorten the fallow periods. Persson estimates that environmental change, however, since the natural 40 million hectares of the rainforest may be under vegetation of North Africa continues to be thinned use for shifting cultivation. As rural populations out and the replacement forests are monocultures FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 129 of single age classes. Catastrophic change does not in. About one-fourth of the wood harvested for seem imminent in Central Africa. Gabon, Central processed products was exported, mostly as saw- African Republic, northern Congo, and logs, mostly to Japan. The main exporters, in southeastern Cameroon all have vast forests and order of value of forest product exports, were sparse populations. However, if access becomes Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, China, Mon- easier, fast destruction of forests can start, even golia, Burma, and Thailand. where populations are relatively low. As in Africa and Latin America, the demand By the year 2000, the closed forest area of for wood products is expected to rise rapidly in Africa will have been reduced from 180 to 146 the Asian LDCs, driven by rapid population million hectares if deforestation continues at the increases and by substantial gains in GDP per present rate. It seems likely that the rate will capita. A 1976 study by FA022 projected that increase, and the forest area may be as small as with GDP increases of 2.5 to 3.5 percent per.year, 130 million hectares by then. Most of the change the Asian LDCs would increase consumption of will have resulted from clearing for agriculture. forest products by 2 to 2.5 times during the 1971 Timber cutting for industrial wood products is to 1991 period, and consumption of fuelwood, as likely to result in changes in botanic composition a direct simple ftinction of population growth, was of the forests, but not in very much deforestation. expected to be 1.6 times greater. The projections Woodcutting for ftielwood, charcoal, and poles, assumed that relative prices of wood products on the other hand, will probably cause degradation would remain the same, and that the proportion of open woodlands and complete destruction,of of wood exported would not increase. The pro- many of the mangrove forests. Assuming no jected consumption rates were then compared to changes in current patterns of land use or in forecasts of sustainable yield from the region's priorities of development project funding, substan- forests to indicate the extent of the wood harvest tial areas that are covered now with moist tropical shortfA that can be expected by 1991. forest will become barren wastelands with, sods Supply of wood depends on the volume of that have no potential for production, and many growing stock, the net annual growth rate, the areas that are dry open woodlands now will rate of cutting and the efficiency of processing. become deserts. The 1976 FAO study used estimates of growing stock ranging from about 50 cu in per hectare in Asia South Asia and in the communist countries to 75 cu in per hectare in insular Southeast Asia. The The less developed nations of South and South- net annual growth is estimated at about 2 percent east Asia contained about 250 million hectares of of the growing stock, or 1.5 cu. in per hectare per closed forest in 1973. China, Mongolia, and the year. Thus the total net annua II growth for the two Koreas contained another 110 million hec- region's forest is on the order of 540 million cu in, tares .20 Since then, South and Southeast Asian which is less than the 1975 harvest. forests have probably decreased by about 25 By 1991, more of the annual growth will be million hectares, while in the more northern occurring in plantations. Most of the plantations countries of Asia, afforestation programs have to date are in China, where the main objective offset some of the losses, so that the net decline has been watershed protection. Afforestation to in forest area is probably less. The Asian LDCs regulate water flow and to counter soil erosion have about 135 million hectares of rainforest, 55 began 30 years ago in China. As many as 100 million hectares of tropical moist deciduous forest, million hectares may have been planted in the 95 million hectares of other deciduous forests, and years since, but the survival rate of the seedlings 50 million hectares of coniferous forests .21 has been low. The Chinese government has not The Asian subregions are widely variable with yet released forest statistics on a national level, regard to the distribution of forest resources. but the FAO study uses an estimate of about 30 Table 8-8 summarizes data on distribution of million hectares of plantation trees in China in resources by subregion. 1970, plus another 2.3 million hectares in the other The 1975 harvest of forest products in Asian Asian LDCs. The plantation area in 1990 is LDCs totaled about 650 million cu in (underbark). expected to be on the order of 60 million hectares. Fuelwood and charcoal accounted for about 78 Deforestation is occurring most r-apidly in the percent of the total; unprocessed poles, posts, and LDCs of tropical Asia. The Green Revolution has pitprops accounted for another 6 percent. Sawn caused only about half the food production in- and other processed wood products accounted for creases achieved in Asia over the past two 16 percent of the total harvest, or 104 million cu decades. The other half has come from expanding 130 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 8-8 Asia--Distribution of Forest Resources by Subregion Operable Forest Areas (millions of hectares) Operable Closed Forest Total Area Subregion Inoperable of In use Total Closed Forest Asia Far East region 279.8 378.3 158.7 537.0 South Asia 53.2 58.5 12.0 70.5 Continental Southeast Asia 52.3 72.6 18.5 91.1 Insular Southeast Asia 36.0 71.9 32.9 124.8 East Asia developing 4.0 5.2 1.4 6.6 Oceania developing 2.1 16.3 23.0 39.3 East Asia developed 24.1 24.1 1.1 25.2 Oceania developed 29.2 29.2 20.2 49.4 Centrally planned countries 78.9 100.5 29.6 130.1 Growing Stock--Closed Forest Currently Operable Closed Forests Commercial All Closed Forests Species Total Conif- Broad- Broad- Total Conif- Broad- erous leaved leaved erous leaved million M, Asia Far East region 29,000 5,600 23,400 15,000 39,000 7,000 32,000 South Asia 3,000 400 2,600 1,900 3,500 600 2,900 Continental Southeast Asia 5,000 1 5,000 3,400 6,300 50 6,200 Insular Southeast Asia 9,200 40 9,200 5,200 13,300 50 13,200 East Asia developing 60 30 30 30 80 40 40 Oceania developing 1,600 30 1,500 700 3,000 30 3,000 East Asia developed 2,000 1,100 900 800 2,100 1,100 1,000 Oceania developed 1,500 400 1,100 1,000 2,000 500 1,500 Centrally planned countries 6,500 3,600 2,900 2,300 8,400 4,700 3,700 Source: European Economic Commission (1976), pp. 18, 19. the area harvested, by increasing the crops per vation in that country is estimated at 2 million year in some places and by clearing new fields in hectares. others. The yield increases seem to be reaching a Commercial logging by itself does not necessar- plateau in several of the Asian LDCs, so that an fly result in destruction of the forest cover, but in even greater proportion of the needed 3 to 4, most of the Asian LDCs the loggers are responsi- percent per year increase in food production may ble for making the forest accessible to farmers. In have to come from newly cleared fields. most cases the settlement of logged-over land is Forest areas for which conversion to farmland spontaneous, rather than planned. is already planned are substantial in continental The FAO study estimates that by 1990, the and insular Southeast Asia, and shifting agricul- operable forest area in South Asia and Southeast ture is consuming an increasing portion of both Asia will be reduced by 34 percent, while the insular and mainland forests. In the Philippines, forest area in China and the Koreas will have a 4 an estimated 200,000 hectares of forest is de- percent net increase because of continued affores- stroyed by the shifting farmers each year. In tation. The study assumes that techniques of Thailand, they clear an estimated 250,000 hectares harvesting, marketing, and processing will im- per year. In Indonesia, shifting cultivation is said prove so that 90 percent of the logs will be to have devastated about 30 million hectares of commercially used, as opposed to only 25 perrent forest, which are now degraded grasslands, and at present. The study further assumes that the the forest currently being used for shifting culti- trees outside the closed forests will continue to FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 131 supply about 250 million cu in of fuelwood per than in the sods. As the plants gradually-die, fall, year on a sustained basis. and decompose, the enormous mass-of vegetation By the year 2000, the natural closed forests of quickly recaptures the nutrients" However, the South and Southeast Asia are likely to be reduced slash and bum method of-the shifting farmers to less than 100 million hectares. The natural results in sudden release Of-the plant nutrients at forests that remain will be either in inaccessible a time when power of the vegetation to recapture mountainous or swampy regions, or will be pro- the nutrients has been greatly reduced. Because tected by law, or will be so degraded as to be of the quantity and intensity of tropical rains, the commercially useless. These subregions may have soluable nutrients are usually leached too deeply about 5 million hectares of plantation forests by into the earth, and are effectively lost from the that time. In China, Mongolia, and the Koreas, ecosystem. the forest area may increase slightly, as forest Modification through selective logging seems clearing is offset by continued afforestation. likely to have a less permanent effect on the forest Erosion, siltation, flooding, and other problems ecosystems, since at present only a small propor- associated with deforestation are likely to have tion of the trees are commercially useful, and only become a severe constraint on food production by the stems of those trees are removed from the the year 2000 in South and Southeast Asia. The forest. Physical destruction that results from selec- ecological diversity of the region will be much tive logging is considerably greater in tropical lower, and populations of the remaining fauna moist forests than in the temperate zone forests, may be expected to fluctuate much more widely, however. The tropical moist forest is usually with some species becoming extinct in the low multistoried, with commercially valuable trees flux and other species becoming hazardous pests often limited to those which form the upper-most in the high flux. It seems likely that some of the story. The crowns of such trees are large and region's present potential to support human pop- vines form strong physical links within and be- ulations will have been irretrievably lost. tween the several stories. As a result the felling operations are massively destructive. Even more destructive are the extraction operations. In addi- The Special Problem of Tropical tion to its direct impact on the vegetation, the Moist Forests extraction process disturbs large expanses of the forest floor, often exposing mineral soil to erosion As already indicated, the most drastic changes and to other forms of physical and chemical in forest resource inventories and in forest envi- degradation, which occur much more rapidly in ronments will occur in the less developed coun- hot wet climates than in temperate zone areas. tries. All types of forests in those countries will Most studies of tropical forestry forecast that be affected: evergreen rainforests, moist deci- the number of species and proportion of size duous forests, dry deciduous forests, and open classes used will be greatly increased during the woodlands. The effects of changes in the first two next decade. There are several advantages to types will be of greatest importance, for several increased intensity of forest use, the main one reasons: first, because the evergreen and deci- being that more wood can be harvested from less duous moist forests of the tropics cover larger land. There are many potential problems however. areas than the other types; second, because the Nutrient depletion will be increased as greater moist forests have less potential for recovery; and volumes of wood will be removed. Ecological third, because the moist forests are genetically diversity will be lowered, and consequent popula- and ecologically richer resource systems. tion explosions of pest plants and animals are It is useful to distinguish between forest modi- likely to occur. Water yield and quality are likely fication and transformation. Modification results to suffer if large areas are intensively cut-over, as from selective logging and from shifting agricul- very little is known about how to forestall water ture; transformation results when the original or problems in the tropics. The few techniques for modified natural forest is totally removed and is water conservation that have been developed are replaced by agricultural settlement, man-made seldom implemented, as the institutional structure forest or wasteland. Modification of moist tropical is lacking. Effects of intensive forest use on soil forests through shifting agriculture is generally structure and sod microorganisms in the tropics believed to result in a permanent degradation of are virtually unknown, but are almost certain to biological productivity. This is because most of be negative. The commercial and environmental the plant nutrients in a tropical moist forest quality of the second-growth forest that will follow system are held in the standing plant cover, rather intensive forest use is another unknown. It will be 1-32 THE PROJECTIONS lowert an the quality of second growth that now runoff and streams are filled suddenly with silt- follows selective logging, unless improved silvicul- laden water that may be contaminated with pesti- tural technique'sare developed and implemented. cides, fertilizers, or other pollutants. As steeper Techniques for Minimizing the environmental slopes are deforested, the stream flows become damage that will result from intensified use of more erratic. Sedimentation in streambeds raises tropical moist forests have been proposed, and them, ftirther increasing flood frequency and se- some research has begun to develop new meth- verity. At the same time, groundwater tables fall ods, such as logging in relatively narrow strips, and wells become seasonal at best. Reservoirs leaving wider strips of natural forest undisturbed. and other irrigation works become choked with However the capital and institutional constraints silt, and must be dredged at high cost or aban- on improved management of logged-over areas, doned and replaced with new, more expensive and the lack of control that LDC governments systems. There is, of course, a limit to the suitable have over operations of commercial loggers, are sites for reservoirs. likely to prevent conservation on any substantial The effect of tropical moist forest on microch- portion of the tropical moist forests. mate is related mainly to the balance between Resource planners for tropical regions have no sensible heat and latent heat in the environment. method with which to determine the balance When the forest is razed, the heat that had fueled between the benefits and costs of transforming the evapotranspiration process instead raises the tropical moist forest land to other uses. The environment's temperature, usually to the detri- benefits are usually relatively immediate and can ment of seed germination, plant survival, animal be measured in terms of economic gains. This survival, and human comfort. Where soil is poor paper has no solution to the problem of weighing and natural moist forest is not replaced with year- benefits against costs. Rather the main environ- round agriculture or man-made forest, there may mental costs will be briefly reviewed, to indicate be a positive feedback in the microclimate system the kinds of changes that may be forecast for the that leads to self-generuting aridity. year 2000. These costs include: the risk of creating a useless wasteland; the acceleration of rainwater Global Linkages and the Year 2000 runoff, with consequent erosion, siltation, and failure to recharge aquifers; the loss of ecological Scenarios diversity; the more extreme microclimate; and the permanent loss of genetic resources. Global Linkages The loss of ecological diversity is the most Changes in the forest environments of the subtle cost. Tropical moist forests are believed to several regions will impact on global environment comprise the most complex ecosystems in nature. and global economic interactions in several ways. Their diversity gives them great stability in rela- The interregional linkages include: availability of tion to the kinds of natural changes under which genetic resources, trade of forest products, effects they have evolved. Under conditions of forest of deforestation on climate and on the. production destruction by man however, the diversity makes and trade of agricultural products, and interna- them fragile rather than stable .23 Where tropical tional transfer of technology for forest manage- moist forest is removed, that kind of forest and ment and for wood processing. nearly all the species it contains will disappear .24 During the coming decades, some forest plant There are other consequences of the loss of the and animal species will become extinct as intensi- forest's diversity, which may become more im- fied use leads to ecological simplification of the mediate costs. Animal communities, like tree temperate zone forests. More importantly, communities, are much less diverse after the hundreds of species will become extinct as the forest is destroyed. The populations of remnant moist tropical forests are razed. There will be animals often become very high, and cause mas- local effects on ecosystem stability and global sive depredations on newly created croplands. effects on agriculture. The genetic reservoir for Water quality, quantity, and timing in tropical many tropical crops is in the moist forests. These streams and aquifers depend to a great extent on include bananas, cocoa, oil palm, mango, many the forest cover. Where the cover is maintained, other fruits, rubber, lac, and various resins. Im- rainwater infiltrates the soil, streams are fed proving production from any of these crops may gradually by subsurface flows of relatively clean depend, as development of hybrid maize de- water, and aquifers are recharged by deep infiltra- pended, on the availability of wild varieties of the tion. Where forest cover is removed from sloping domestic plant. For most such crops, genetic land, more of the rainwater becomes surface research has hardly begun, and as wild varieties FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 133 are lost, there is less potential for development of thus inhibits precipitation, causing a man-made high-yield strains, or of strains resistant to pests, desert.27 diseases, and drought. Also, opportunities for The most significant of the global linkages is development of new products, medicines, foods, probably the impact of deforestation on the wel- drinks, resins, specific pesticides, and so forth, fare of the LDC populations. Energy crises caused are diminished as the tropical moist forests are by short supplies of off in the industrial nations cleared. will not be more profound than the crises caused The interregional linkage provided by interna- by short supplies of fuelwood and charcoal in the tional trade in forest products will be stronger in LDCs. Fuel consumption per capita is already some cases and in others will disappear. Japan minimal for both the rural and urban LDC poor. and Western Europe will be increasingly depend- They will have to cut back consumption even ent on Canada and the U.S.S.R. for pulp supplies more as populations grow and wood becomes and for softwood sawlogs. Japan will no longer be scarce. Gradually the urban poor will have to able to import sufficient tropical hardwood saw- allocate a larger portion of their incomes, and the logs and veneer logs from Asia, and European rural poor a larger portion of their time, to importers will be paying -much higher prices for aquisition of the minimum amount of fuel needed sawlogs from Africa. Only northern South Amer- for - survival. These reallocations of money and ica is likely to be exporting more sawlogs in the time. will erode productivity and consequently year 2000 than it does now. The United States human welfare. will probably remain self-sufficient in pulpwood - Deforestation increases food production in the and may become more nearly self-sufficient in LDCs wherever it leads to an increase in the sawlogs as the global supply becomes tighter. arable land area. As the limits of arable land are Scientists have wondered and speculated about approached, however, continued deforestation the impact of forests on climate since the time of suppresses agricultural production. The negative Plato, but as yet there is no agreement on how effects include direct environmental processes, deforestation affects regional and global climates. such as the siltation of irrigation works, and Three mechanisms through which deforestation indirect effects. As wood has become scarce in may be changing'climate have been discussed in South Asia, for example, cattle dung and crop recent articles. First, the carbon dioxide content residues that once functioned to maintain soil of the atmosphere is increased as carbon stored in fertility have been used for fuel. -In India, Paki- forest biomass and in forest soils is released. stan, Java, Madura, and in parts of Central However, the amount of carbon being released to America and West Africa, the negative effects of the atmosphere has not been accurately estimated, deforestation have already begun to constrain and the proportion of the C02 re-stored in wood food production. It appears likely that by the year elsewhere or absorbed by the oceans has not been 2000, the effects will be severe throughout the determined. Measurements of atmospheric C02 tropical regions. Both fuel and food shortages do confirmthat the concentration of carbon in the could result in increased LDC demands for aid, atmosphere has been increasing at the rate of 0.2 and suppression of the LDC economies may percent per year since 1958, and that the rate is reduce markets for the products of the industrial- accelerating. Most of that increase is due to ized economies. burning of fossil fuels., however. It seems likely that the C02 content of the atmosphere will The Year 2000 Scenarios increase by at least 25 percent during the 1978- 2000 period, buthow this will affect global or The future may be less gloomy than the fore- regional climates is,unknown .25 going implies. To some extent, the negative im- Another mechanism through which deforesta- pacts of deforestation may be offset by reforesta- tion may affect regional or global climate changes tion and afforestation programs. Furthermore it is change of the earth's surface albedo, which, may be possible for some countries to slow down along with the increased ratio of sensible to latent the deforestation rates. In Thailand, for example, heat, may affect the generation and dissipation of the government announced in January 1978 that it tropical easterly waves or may affect the dynamics would begin to use its most extraordinary powers of general atmospheric circulation .26 The third of summary judgment and even execution to mechanism is the increase in dust from deforested punish unauthorized cutting in the national forests. areas. At least one climatologist has argued that This resolve follows years of failurr, to enforce the in the Rajputana region of India, extensive atmos- less powerftil forest protection laws already in pheric dust prevents moist air from rising, and existence. The change was prompted by an. in- 134 THE PROJECTIONS creasing frequency of disastrous floods and also Matters. Other changes, such as implementation by an investigation that indicated the forest re- of crash programs for fuelwood plantations, could source was being destroyed at the rate of 13 require aid programs developed by international percent per year and would be totally lost within agencies. Increased investment in silviculture in a decade. Whether LDC governments have suffi- the industrialized countries and more plantations cient control over farmers and loggers remote of fast-growing trees for industrial wood produc- from the seats of government to keep them from tion in the LDCs are most likely developments. cutting the forests in desperate quest for cropland Table 8-9 summarizes forecasts of forest re- and wood products remains to be seen. sources by global region for the year, 2000. The An optimistic scenario would have governments figures represent a mildly optimistic scenario. of the LDCs bringing deforestation under control during the next decade, so that by 1990 forests would be transformed to cropland only where TABLE8-9 soils were known to be arable. Logging would be accompanied in both the developed and develop- Estimates of World Forest Resources, 1978 ing world by intensified silvicultural efforts that and 2000 would assure sustained yields of wood products. Reforestation with mixed species of trees for Growing Stock industrial wood would be greatly accelerated in of Commercial the LDCs, and a crash program of developing Sized Wood in Closed Forests village fuelwood plantations would be imple- and in Open mented. Reforestation and afforestation for wa- Closed Forest Woodlands tershed protection would be given top priority in (millions of (billions cu m the development programs of South and Southeast hectares) overbark) Asia and Central America, as would the develop- 1978 2000 1978 2000 ment and diffusion of solar cookers and bio-gas U.S.S.R. 785 775 79 77 generation plants. Genetic resources would be Europe 140 150 15 13 conserved with programs combining national North America 470 464 58 55 parks and germ plasm banks. New technologies Japan, Australia, that increase the efficiencies of forest harvesting New Zealand 69 68 4 4 and wood processing would be developed and Sub .total- 1,464 1,457 156 149 Latin America 550 329 94 54 become economic so quickly that the rapidly Africa 188 150 39 31 increasing demands for industrial wood products Asian and Pacific could be met without overcutting. LDCs 361 181 38 19 While each of the above developments is possi- Subtotal (LDCs) 1,099 660 171 104 ble, it seems unlikely that they will all occur in the relatively brief 1978-2000 period. World 2,563 2,117 327 253 A more realistic scenario includes some but not World population (billions) 4.3 6.4 all of the above changes in policies and trends. Wood per capita Some changes, such as resolve by a goverriment (cu in) 76 40 to spend whatever political capital is necessary to Source: Based on calculations from preceding tables and deforestation rates protect its forest resources, am entirely internal cited in the footnote at the beginning of this chapter. REFERENCES 1. For example, R. H. Whittaker and G. E. Likens, "The Persson discusses the confidence limits of the data at Biosphere and Man," in H. Lieth and R, H. Whittaker, length and concludes that his global summaries, quoted eds., Primary Productivity of the Biosphere. New York: in this paper, are probably overestimates of the 1973 Springer, 1975. This is a basic reference for papers on forest area. global effects of deforestation, and the data have been 3. Persson, 1974; R. Persson, Forest Resources of Africa, used as the current baseline for rather complex models, Stockholm: Royal College of Forestry, 1977. for example, by R. Revelle, and W. Munk, "The 4. Whittaker and Likens. Carbon Dioxide Cycle and the Biosphere," in Energy 5. Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Forest and Climate, Washington: National Academy of Sci- Products, Rome: FAO, 1977. ences, 1977. 6. Data on Russian forest resources are from a 1973 2. R. Persson, World Forest Resources, Stockholm: Royal inventory, reported in Economic Commission for Eu- College of Forestry, 1974. This is the most detailed and rope, European Timber Trends and Prospects,, 1950 to best documented global forest inventory ever published. 2000, Geneva: FAO, 1976. FORESTRY PROJECTIONS 135 7. J. Holowacz, Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 19. Persson, Forest Resources of Africa. "The Forests and the Timber Industry of the USSR,- 20. Persson, World Forest Resources; Food and Agriculture unpublished manuscript, 1973; R. N. North and J. J. Organization, Development and Forest Resources in Solecki, University of British Columbia, "The Soviet Asia and the Far East: Trends and Perspectives 1961- Forest Products Industry: Its Present and Potential 1991, Rome: FAO, 1976. Exports," unpublished manuscript, 1976. 21. Calculated by factoring the areas in each forest type, as 8. "Planting of Forests in Russia," Tass, May 3, 1973. indicated in Persson, World Forest Resources, Sommer, 9. Food and Agriculture Organization, Forest Resources and FAO Development and Forest Resources in Asia, in the European Region, Rome: FAO, 1976. by the deforestation rates in each subregion. 10. Economic Commission for Europe. 11. E. P. Cliff, Timber: The Renewable Resource, Wash- 22. FAO, Development and Forest Resources in Asia. ington: Government Printing Office, 1973. 23. Duncan Poore, "The Value of Tropical Moist Forest 12. Ibid. Ecosystems and the Environmental Consequences of 13. Ibid. Their Removal," Unasylva, 28:112, pp. 127-43. 14. G. R. Gregory, Forest Resource Economics, New 24. Ibid. York: Ronald, 1972. 15. E. P. Eckholm, Losing Ground-Environmental Stress 25. Revelle and Munk. and World Food Prospects, New York: Norton, 1976. 26. R. E. Newall, "The Amazon Forest and Atmospheric 16. A. Sommer, "Attempt at an Assessment of the World's Circulation," in W. H. Mathews et al., eds., Man's Tropical Forests," Unasylva, 28:112, pp. 5-25. Impact on the Climate, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 17. Persson, Forest Resources of Africa. 1971. 18. Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Forest 27. R. A. Bryson and T. J. Murray, Climates of Hunger, Products. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977. 9 Water Projections Of a the substances found on the earth, those In common usage, a resource is something most fundamental to the existence of man, or to that can be used for supply or support. This the existence of life itself, are unqu 'estionablY definition includes most, if not all, components of water and air. Water comprises some three-quar- the physical environment. Resources that attract ters of the surface of the earth, including the great the attention of analysts and policyrnakers, how- oceans, the inland lakes and rivers, and the polar ever, are those that display an additional charac- icecaps. Water is the major constituent of living teristic-scarcity. If all resources were available matter, thether animal or vegetable. The processes in unlimited quantity wherever and whenever of life depend upon a continuous exchange of desired, resource planning and resource manage- water between living matter and the environment, ment would not be required. Most resources are and this exchange constitutes an important link in scarce in some sense, and these scarce (or eco- the global hydrologic cycle. nomic) resources are the legitimate object of From the time primitive man first organized for national and global concern. the gathering or production of food and clothing, This chapter will examine the resource nature water has been a critical factor in man's economic of water, in particular the properties that distin- activities. Lakes, rivers, and oceans have pro- guish it from other scarce resources. Water supply vided sustenance, transportation, and protection. will be discussed, as well as the nature of the Population centers evolved along the shores of demand for water, together with the problems of water bodies, and economic development took identifying existing scarcity and of predicting place along shores and major river valleys. scarcity in the future. Finally, the nature of Increasing development and advancing technol- adjustments to water scarcity, including their ogy have served to further magnify man's depend- implications for other resource stocks, will be ence upon water. In modem societies, water is reviewed. used for human consumption, for transport of wastes, for sanitation in general, for the produc- Properties of Water Resources tion of energy, for all types of industrial produc- tion, for agricultural production, for transporta- The concept of water as an economic resource, tion, and for recreation. subject to scarcity and dependent upon rational In order to confine this discussion to the uses management, is not universally shared. Water has of water of most interest to resource planning, often been ignored in resource planning efforts or only those uses requiring deliberate diversion of has been presumed to obey economic laws differ- water from the hydrologic cycle (by withdrawal ent from those that apply to other resources. The from stream, lake, or aquifer) will be considered. planning and construction of water supply works, This excludes such "in-strearn" uses as water the allocation of water among users, the pricing of transportation, use of water as an energy source, water-4hese and other activities have been fre- and flood-plain agriculture. quently influenced by the notion that water is While the identification of water as an important virtually "free goods," which should be provided natural resource seems beyond argument, water as cheaply as possible in any quantity desired. has not always been viewed as a resource in the Even where water is conspicuously scarce, it same sense as coal, petroleum, mineral ores, may be diverted to low-value uses to the detri- timber, and crops. In fact, the management and ment of other users and of future supplies. At the utilization of water has followed patterns distinctly same time, water shortages occur worldwide with dfferent fi-om those of other economic resources. increasing frequency, due to drought or other The differences may stem from the relative abun- reasons, often leading to serious economic disrup- dance of water in many parts of the world, or tion and human suffering. from ambiguity concerning the resource nature of A number of specific properties of water re- water. sources contribute to the tendency to inappro- 137 138 THE PROJECTIONS priate water policy and combine to frustrate the water on the globe is unavailable or unsuitable attempts at rational water resource planning. Six for beneficial use, because of salinity (seawater) general properties of water resources are listed or location (polar icecaps). The beneficial use of below. water requires more than the coincidence of 1. Water is ubiquitous. It may be safe to say supply and demand; the characteristics of the that no place on earth is wholly without water. In water supplied must match the requirements of general, vast quantities of water surround most the use for which the water is demanded. locales of human activity. While the means by 3. Water is a renewable resource. The forces of which water is moved to the point of use may be nature constantly renew all water resources. The of concern, and while the quality of available process is depicted, in broad outline, in Figure 9- water may not be all that could be hoped for, the 1, which divides the hydrologic cycle into three existence of water is a fundamental assumption. major water locations: the atmosphere, the land, 2. Water is a heterogeneous resource. While and the oceans. Water falls from the atmosphere few natur-al resources are perfectly homogeneous as precipitation on both land and oceans. A in the environment or in their use, water may be portion of that falling on land returns to the the least homogeneous of all. Although used in atmosphere as a consequence of evaporation and the liquid form, water is found as a liquid, a solid, of transpiration by living matter. Water that does or a gas. As a liquid, it may exist as a lake or a not return irnmediately to the atmosphere is stored sea, as a flowing stream, or as an underground in lakes and rivers, as icecaps and glaciers, or as deposit. Its chemical and biological constituents underground reserves, or it runs off to the oceans. vary widely. Water uses may range from human The water that enters the oceans by precipitation consumption to cooling sheets of hot steel, and or by runoff from land is essentially returned to each use implies constraints on chemical or bio- the atmosphere by evaporation. The chemical and logical quality. In fact, more than 99 percent of biological quality of water at various places and IV fHE To ATER. c- rs@ ATMOSPHERE @e V, 13 f44 All 'V LAND WORLD @OCEANS 4. Lakes, rivers 230 1,350,000 Subsurface 7,000 77 Ice caps and glaciers 26,000 w R V- "i Figure 9-1. Annual circulation of the hydrosphere, in quadrillions of cubic meters. WATER PROJECTIONS 139 times is also subject to deterioration and renewal, ornies of scale-water is very inexpensive. The especially in lakes and streams. An important point-of-use cost of water in the United States is aspect of the renewability of water is the limited seldom more than $0.30 per metric ton (for yet significant ability of man to intervene in the municipally supplied water) and may be as little renewal process. Modem technology permits the as $0.03 per metric ton (for irrigation water). By exchange of water between surface sources (lakes, contrast, very few minerals can be purchased for rivers) and ground water sources, the restoration as little as $30 per metric ton at the minehead. of contaminated water to higher levels of quality, In summary, then, water is a substance found the reclamation of water from the sea, and, in almost everywhere on earth, although in many some instances, the alteration of the pattern of different forms and qualities. Water is renewable, precipitation. While such efforts have resource either by natural processes or, to some extent, by costs in themselves, their possibility modifies the human intervention. Most societies have tended renewability characteristic of water in important to treat water as a common property resource, Ways. thus concealing the opportunity costs that may be 4. Water may be common property. Unlike associated with water use. Water is used in very mineral resources, which are relatively well de- large quantities and is very inexpensive; aggregate fined in space and subject to private ownership in worldwide water use is about three orders of many societies, water is ubiquitous and nonsta- magnitude larger than the total of all mineral tionary. Accordingly, property rights in a water products produced, and typical water costs are resource are typically ill defined or nonexistent about three orders of magnitude lower than the (the system of water rights in the Western states costs of the least expensive mineral products. constitutes an important partial exception). Since These properties have important consequences water withdrawals are, in principle, available to for studies of future water resource trends. Be- all comers without direct charge for withdrawal, cause of the ubiquitousness, the heterogeneity, any opportunity costs that might be associated and the renewability of water, it is difficult to with withdrawal are not faced by the withdrawer, characterize supply, now or in the future. The and no inherent mechanism for efficient allocation quantity and quality of the water available at a exists. Water is typically treated as a free good by particular time and at a particular place constitute actual users, even during times of scarcity, when the relevant supply; aggregate or summary statis- many potential users may be excluded. Users tics are nearly meaningless. recognize the costs of capturing, treating, and The common-property characteristic of water, transporting water but do not associate cost with the large quantities used, and the low user costs the water itself. As a result, past patterns of water all act as deterrents to forecasting future water use provide only a flawed guide to future, hope- use. While it may be tempting to extrapolate past fully more efficient, allocations. water-use experience, the possibilities for changes 5. Water is used in vast quantities. Because of in the structure of use in response to relatively the many uses to which water is put and the minor adjustments in.the way water is managed liberal quantities traditionally associated with are so great as to render extrapolation essentially many uses, the quantity of water used annually useless. As will be seen in the following section, exceeds by far the total quantity used of any other further problems arise when specific supply fore- single resource, or of many other resources taken casts must be compared to specific demand fore- together. In recent years, the total quantity of the casts. world's production of minerals, including coal, petroleum, metal ores, and nonmetals, has been The Supply of Water estimated as about 8 x 109 metric tons per year. Total water use, on the other hand, has been Water available for use in human activities is, estimated near 3 x 1012 metric tons per year, for practical purposes, water found in streams, nearly three orders of magnitude larger. This fresh water lakes, and in fresh water aquifers amounts to about 800 metric tons per person per (ground water). While brackish and saline water, year, worldwide, including all water used in (non- including seawater, may be used for some limited hydropower) energy production, in industry, and purposes and may be rendered useful for other for irrigated agriculture, as well as water for purposes by desalting, total water supply is cus- domestic and municipal uses. tomarily measured in terms of fresh water avail- 6. Water is very inexpensive. For various rea- able on or under the surface of the land. Since sons-including water's common property nature, water bodies are constantly replenished, the aver- the nature of water supply technology, and econ- age rate of replenishment is ordinarily of greater 140 THE PROJECTIONS interest than the volume of water available at any ground-water storage, and return flows from other specific time. Two major exceptions are: (1) In water users, but data are not available to determine the case of water withdrawal from streams, some the magnitude or significance of these additions to minimum amount of water storage may be re- water supply. quired to permit,the desired rate of withdrawal in Table 9-1 summarizes estimates of replenish- the presence of highly variable strearnflow, and ment rates for the populated continents of the (2) certain ground-water deposits, especially in earth and for selected nations. The figures repre- and or semiarid areas, may be very large by sent the excess of precipitation over evapotran- comparison to annual inflows and may be spiration. This excess, the net replenishment rate, -mined" by setting withdrawals consistently in is expressed in two ways: as cubic kilometers per excess of inflows. year and as billion gallons per day. Divided by Replenishment of surface and ground-water re- land area (after converting the second measure to sources occurs as a consequence of precipitation. cubic feet per year), these data yield estimates of A portion of the total quantity of precipitation is the average rate of replenishment per unit land returned to the atmosphere by evaporation and area, expressed in millimeters per year and inches transpiration, a portion becomes inflow to the per year, respectively. These estimates provide a ground-water reserves, and the remainder runs Off reasonably comparable index of the relative avail- as surface drainage. In the absence of human ability of water at various locations in the world. withdrawals, inflows to ground-water resources Unfortunately, calculations performed on the are usually matched by outflows, through springs basis of nations and continents inevitably blur the or seeps, to surface water bodies. A first approxi- inherent variation in the data. Many nations, such mation of the overall rate of replenishment, there- as the United States, consist of areas which range fore, may be obtained by measuring the total from very and to very humid; water may be surface-water discharge from a specific watershed. exceedingly scarce in the Southwest but abundant Unmeasured outflows from ground-water (such as in the Pacific Northwest. Even so, the average discharges from the ocean floor), net ground-water annual runoffs for nations can be seen to range storage, and/or the existence of ground-water from 4 millimeters for Egypt (not including inflows withdrawals may cause this measure to understate the true replenishment rate. from other nations via the Nile River) to 1,300 The use. of replenishment rate in estimating millimeters for the Philippines. The United States supply carries further liabilities. As the area under is close to the world average at 250 millimeters. study becomes large (a major river basin, a nation, The larger the land area of a nation, the longer or a part thereof) the replenishment rate under- the major river systems within the nations, and states the true supply because it fails to reflect the more seacoast included, the more seriously reuse possibilities. As each user withdraws and these data may understate the true availability of uses water, wastewater flows are generated and water. On the other hand, environmental consid- returned to the stream or lake. These return flows erations may require minimum flows in streams, are then available to other users, water quality especially those draining into significant estuaries, permitting. Quality requirements can be met by which substantially reduce the annual volumes of dilution, by relying on in-stream purification proc- water that can actually be withdrawn from ground esses, by wastewater treatment before discharge, and surface sources. Where surface storage or by water treatment after withdrawal, or by a extensive well fields are required to accomplish a combination of these. The more effectively the desired withdrawal, economic costs may prevent desired water quality can be maintained ' the or delay a potential supply from becoming an greater the potential for reuse of return flows. actual one. The supply of water available to a given area, As a result of the considerations discussed therefore, cannot be estimated on the basis of above, it is impossible to make meaningful state- data now available, but a lower bound can be ments concerning the supply of water available determined by measuring or estimating the total across the world, or throughout any continent or surface water discharge from the area. This annual nation. Meaningful statements describing supply volume of water is potentially available for with- can be made only for relatively small areas and drawal, although storage facilities might be re- then only after detailed on-site investigation of the quired to satisfy certain patterns of withdrawal. nature and behavior of the actual water resources Additional, unmeasured sources of supply include available to that area. Therefore, the data pre- ground water that leaves the area in some way sented in this section are included only to illustrate other than as surface discharge, net additions to the shortcomings of aggregate calculations and to WATER PROJECTIONS 141 TABLE 9-1 Estimates of Available Global Water Supply for Continents and Selected Nations' Mean Annual Discharge (Water Supply) Land Area Mean Annual Runoff cubic billion 1,0W 1,0W milli- I.nches kmlyr gallday miles 2 kM 2 meters AFRICA 4,220 3,060 11,800 30,600 139 5.5 Egyptb 4.0 2.9 387 1,000 4.0 0.2 Nigeria 261 189 357 924 284 11 ASIA 13,200 9,540 17,200 44,600 2% 12 Bangladesh 129 93.3 55.1 143 915 36 China 2,880 2,080 3,690 9,560 300 1 @ India 1,590 1,150 1,270 3,290 485 19 Indonesia 1,510 1,090 747 1,934 1,000 39 Japan 396 286 144 372 1,070 42 Pakistan 73 52.8 310 804 90.2 3.6 Philippines 390 282 116 300 1,300 51 South Korea 60 43.4 38.0 98.5 609 24 Thailand 171 124 198 514 335 13 Turkey (both continents) 172 124 301 781 215 8.5 U.S.S.R. (in Asia) 3,320 2,400 6,760 17,500 190 7.5 AUSTRALIA-OCEANIA (Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea) 1,960 1,420 3,250 8,420 245 9.6 Australia (including Tasmania) 382 276 2,970 7,690 49.8 2.0 EUROPE 3,150 2,280 3,770 9,770 323 13 U.S.S.R. (entire nation) 4,350 3,150 8,650 22,400 194 7.6 U.S.S.R. (in Europe) 1,030 744 1,890 4,900 210 8.3 NORTH AMERICA 5,960 4,310 8,510 22,100 286 11 Mexico 330 239 762 1,970 165 6.5 United States (50 states)c 2,340 1,700 3,620 9,360 250, 9.9 SOUTH AMERICA 10,400 7,510 6,880 17,800 583 23 Brazil 5,670 4,100 3,290 8,510 666 26 GLOBAL (excluding Antarctica) 38,900 28,100 51,600 134,000 290 11 Africa 3,400 2,460 29,800 114 Asia 12,200 8,820 44,100 276 Australia (-Oceania) 2,400 1,740 8,900 269 Europe 2,800 2,030 10,000 282 North America 5,900 4,270 24,100 242 South America 11,100 8,030 17,900 618 Antarctica 2,000 1,450 14,100 141 Global 39,700 28,700 149,000 266 Global (excluding Antarctica) 37,700 27,300 134,000 280 Data are rounded to 2 or 3 significant figures. Egypt is a good example of some nations whose additional water supplies come from large rivers entering or passing through the nation but having their upstream source in one or more other nations. The Nile is the mqior Egyptian water supply, but the Nile is largely fed by precipitation and stream systems located south of Egypt and is therefore not included in the data shown for Egypt. @ The figures for the 48 conterminous states are: area, 3,020,000 square miles; mean runoff, 1,900,000 cubic feet per second; water supply, about 1,200 billion gallons per day, or 1,620 cubic kilometers per year. Sources: Runoff data for all but the global areas and continents at end of table were compiled from statistics in M. 1. L'vovich. Global Water Resources and Their Future (in Russian), 1974, pp. 264-70. The somewhat comparable data for each continent at the end of the table are from Albert Baumgartner and Eberhard Reichel, The World Water Balance: Mean Annual Global. Continental and Maritime Precipitation, Evaporation and Run-off, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1975. provide some indication of the gross differences - Domestic use existing among the various regions of the world. - Industrial use (both in manufacturing and min- erals extraction and processing) The Demand for Water - Crop irrigation Water is used to perform a wide variety of . Energy production (not including hydropower) functions in human society. Among the major uses to which water withdrawn from surface and In each use, some fraction of the amount with- ground sources may be put are: drawn is consumptive use (it is evaporated or 142 THE PROJECTIONS incorporated into a product), and the remainder is time to time (for example by the Economic' retumed to the environment, where it may be Commissions for Europe and for Asia and the Far available for later withdrawal by another user.* East). In order to estimate the amount of water The distribution of withdrawals among three of use for all regions on a systematic basis in the these uses (domestic, industrial, agricultural) for absence of such first-hand statistics, recourse may 16 selected countries is shown in Figure 9-2. be made to comparisons with demographic and Data on the above uses have been compiled for related data that are more generally available and the U.S. at 5-year intervals by the U.S. Geological which are generally considered in projections of Survey. Scattered data have been compiled for ftiture natural development. other countries and reprinted and published from Domestic use, for example, can be estimated froin data on urban and rural populations, using Preferred water use terms used in this chapter are water figures on per capita use where such data me withdrawn (or withdrawals), and water consumed (consump- available. Use factors for European countries tive use). Water withdrawn is pumped or diverted for use range from 76 to 270 liters per day per capita, from a stream, lake, or aquifer. After use, part of the water with a general average of 150 liters. Estimates of withdrawn returns to a stream, lake, or aquifer, and is per capita use for developing countries, published available for reuse. The other part has been consumed by the World Health Organization, are given in during use-by evaporation, transpiration, drinking by man or beast, or by incorporation into a food or other product. Table 9-2. Ther term "consumption" should be avoided because, Industrial use can be estimated from data on although usually meaning water withdrawn, the word itself the production of various commodities, (e.g., see may be confused with "consumed." Water demand, water ECOSOC, 1969). Water-product ratios are highly requirements, and water use also usually refer to water withdrawals rather than water consumed, except when variable among industrial plants depending, among otherwise noted. other things, on the particular plant process, costs Z 7 Domestic sector Agriculture Idus" h loc- so- 60- % 1b 40- 20- low MM BulWic Czechoslovakia East France West Hungary India Israel Gwmony Germany (1968) (1960) 0: 100- 44444 so- 60- Ix 40 20- Li MW how how Tan Japan .@,M@xko Mang@oliicr, Poland U.S.tjt. u.x. xanio U'S. (1970) Figure 9-2. Distribution of withdrawals among major categories of water use, 1965. Distribution by water-use types reflects the economic characteristics of a nation. lAdaptedfrom G. R. White et al., Resources and Needs: Assessment of the World Water Situation, U.N. Water Conference, 1977) WATER PROJECTIONS 143 of water, and recycling. For the purposes of this of water supply data, these large aggregates mask chapter, the ratio of water use to the population important variations in the data. Within each engaged in manufacturing is used as a simple country, water withdrawals are doubtless concen- measure. For the U.S., the water use/population trated in specific areas, so that certain areas will ratio is 2,500 gallons per day per capita or about have withdrawal rates much above that given for 9,500 liters. In several Asian countries, the ratio the country, and other areas will be much below. nins from 2,150 to 8,600 liters per day per capita. Nevertheless, average water withdrawals are seen The ratio for Japan is about 4,500 liters per day to vary from a low of just over I millimeter for per capita (or 1,640 cubic meters per year per Brazil to a maximum of 301 millimeters for Japan. capita). Experience in the U.S. indicates that The latter figure can be traced to very high about 11 percent of industrial withdrawal is con- withdrawals for cooling thermoelectric power sumed. plants, as well as relatively high withdrawals for Irrigation use can be estimated from data on other industrial uses and for crop irrigation. irrigated acreage, recognizing that this irrigation 'Forecasts of future water withdr-awals require use varies climatically, and with the techniques consideration of all the various determinants of used for irrigation (a maximum under gravity-flow water demand. Ideally, each water-using sector ditch irrigation, a minimum under trickle irrigation would be considered separately, and the factors schemes). that influence water use would be identified, Irrigation experience in the.U.S. indicates that quantified, forecast, and combined, using an ap- about 3.1 acre-feet per acre (0.95 hectare-meters propriate demand function, to yield a forecast of per hectare) is withdrawn for irrigation. This depth future water use. Thus domestic water use would applied to the irrigated area gives the gross depend upon future lifestyles, family income, amount withdrawn. Of this amount, 17 percent is family size, water-using appliance technology, and lost (consumed) in transport to the irrigated lands the future price of water for domestic purposes. (largely canal seepage), 59 percent is lost by Future industrial water use would be determined evaporation for plant growth, leaving 24 percent from assumptions regarding technology, industrial as return flow from the irrigated lands. In the output, the price of water, etc. Similarly, agricul- absence of an adequate return flow, salts build up, tural use of water would be expressed in terms of destroying soil fertility. crops, output, irrigation technology, price,'and Cooling water use in energy production is often other factors. expressed in terms of a ratio of water use to Unfortunately, general demand relationships kilowatt-hours of generation. This ratio, however, suitable for such estimates on a national and a varies with the cooling method used, being large global basis are not available. The prevailing, for "once-through" cooling, small for evaporative ambiguity regarding the identity of water as an cooling, and near zero for dry towers. economic good has tended to discourage the In the U.S. an average of about 42 gallons (160 necessary economic modeling. Little examination' liters) per kilowatt-hour is withdrawn for thermal of the demand for water has occurred, and that cooling. In recent years the average use has has tended to focus on relatively small aggrega- decreased toward 34 gallons (130 liters) as a result tions. of more efficient plants, greater use of cooling Further, past management practices have-pro- ponds and towers, and other changes. About 1.5 duced historical data of dubious relevance to the percent is consumed through evaporative dissipa- future. For example, many countries having sub- tion. stantial irrigated areas have chosen to subsidize Data describing water use for various purposes the withdrawal of water for irrigation purposes. are available from the U.N. Yearbook and other ne result is the displacement of higher-valued sources. Table 9-3 lists such data by nations and uses by agriculture (and the subsequent lack of continents, as collected from various studies of information about the identity or nature of these variable quality, and as estimated by the proce- uses) and a general lack of experience regarding dures described above. These readily available the applicability of more efficient irrigation tech- statistics have not been compared with alternate nologies, since artificially low prices tend to sources or checked for internal consistency or discourage their use. In other cases, water is accuracy. There are numerous missing data, most allocated administratively without cost, or with notably for the People's Republic of China. negligible cost to the user. Consequently, no Table 9-4 lists the land areas and average direct observations of value, or of the possibilities annual water withdrawal for some of the nations for reduction of water use during times of short- and continents listed in Table 9-3. As in the case age, can be obtained. TABLE 9-2 Per Capita Use of Drinking Water in Less Developed Countries, 1970 (Liters per day) Present Consumption Future Consumption Urban Rural Urban Rural With House With Public With House With Public Connections Standposts Connections Standposts Min. Max. Min. Max Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. AFRICA Botswana 90 1,820 10 45 90 320 - 45 20 45 Burundi too 350 to 40 - - 150 350 40 70 20 40 Cameroon 100 180 18 34 10 20 120 200 30 50 20 30 Central African Republic 50 300 - 20 - - 75 220 15 20 - - Chad 60 400 8 25 5 15 150 400 25 45 20 40 Congo 75 100 50 75 -10 30 75 100 50 75 - Dahomey to 125 to 30 to 20 so 150 25 50 20 40 X Gambia 60 220 50 150 22 50 90 310 - - - - M Ghana 36 120 22 36 22 100 115 180 20 55 20 45 10 Guinea too 150 40 66 - - too 150 40 66 Ivory Coast 20 130 20 40 10 20 40 150 20 40 20 40 tri Kenya 20 200 5 15 to 20 50 300 20 30 15 75 Lesotho 55 270 - - 27 54 55 270 35 70 35 70 0 Liberia Z 95 190 20 40 20 40 115 285 40 80 40 95 rA Madagascar 40 250 10 24 4 10 80 250 - 25 10 40 Mali 10 25 - - - - 40 160 30 50 - - Mauritania 20 200 20 50 10 50 100 300 50 100 30 100 Niger 100 306 1 2 3 10 - - - - - - Nigeria 45 230 45 70 45 45 90 230 45 90 45 70 Senegal 76 96 18 22 - - 100 125 20 24 - - Togo 60 too - - - - - - - - - - Uganda 50 500 5 15 5 10 70 700 20 30 10 .15 Tanzania 80 110 40 80 25 50 100 150 55 100 20 40 Upper Volta 50 250 5 50 5 20 75 300 10 75 to 50 Zaire 30 250 10 30 20 40 100 300 20 50 5 10 Zambia 200 700 50 90 10 50 130 700 50 90 40 50 AMERICAS Argentina 300 600 - - too 200 200 350 - - 100 200 Barbados 230 1,730 23 68 23 916 135 570 23 68 135 570 Bolivia 60 150 10 25 60 100 150 250 - - 80 150 Brazil 80 500 10 50 20 75 too 500 30 50 20 75 Chile 180 400 10 20 100 100 250 500 - - too 100 Colombia 113 275 - - 40 200, 115 360 - - so 150 Costa Rica 175 275 - - 120 150 200 300 - - 150 250 Dominican Republic 320 375 55 95 95 130 130 340 55 95 95 130 Ecuador 140 -100 - - 70 140 - - - - - - El Salvador 17 295 40 40 60 100 130 400 40 40 60 100 Guatemala 150 150 - - 25 25 200 200 - - -66 60 Guyana 270 360 - 135 270 450 550 - - 360 550 Haiti 150 200 20 46 - - 175 225 20 40 20 40 Honduras 20 270 - 45 140 160 270 - - 90 135 Jamaica 320 390 45 70 20 320 340 570 45 90 45 450 Mexico 100 350 20 50 50 250 100 350 20 50 50 250 Nicaragua 130 220 40 60 75 150 240 300 40 60 95 150 Panama 190 300 - - 40 80 210 340 - - 60 90 Paraguay 160 350 10 30 100 200 160 350 10 30 100 200 Peru 90 400 25 30 80 100 150 300 30 50 600 100 Uruguay 120 250 - - 100 180 126 262 - - 105 190 Venezuela 200 300 - - 150 300 400 600 - - 150 200 EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN Afghanistan 60 7.0 20 30 15 20 60 100 30 50 30 50 Bahrain 220 420 23 140 110 340 230 360 - - 140 280 Cyprus 145 275 - - 90 145 185 320 - - 145 185 Democratic Yemen 50 180 10 23 10 18 140 230 18 36 50 70 > Egypt 100 260 30 40 30 40 250 350 150 250 40. 60 Ethiopia 20 100 5 10 5 10 40 100 10 20 5 15 Iran 75 150 - 25 40 75 150 190 - - 110 150 Iraq 90 200 - - 65 130 160 360 - - 90 145 Jordan 60 120 - - 30 60 so 150 - - 40 so M Kuwait 150 220 70 220 - - 180 410 150 220 - - Lebanon 150 200 - - 80 125 200 250 - - 100 150 0 Z Pakistan 70 180 20 60 20 100 150 220 20 70 50 100 0 Qatar 150 300 80 110 40 80 230 300 80 150 80 150 Saudi Arabia 50 400 25 50 25 50 150 250 25 50 100 200 Somalia -.-.0 250 20 50 - - 250 - 60 - - Sudan 45 900 23 32 14 42 110 1, 140h - - 18 45 Syrian Arab Republic 150 200 - - 50 - - 250 - - - 75 Tunisia 100 150 5 10 - - 150 - 5 10 - - Yemen 50 so 30 50 20 40 - - - - 30 60 EUROPEAN REGION Algeria 20 200 10 30 10 60 80 200 50 60 50 60 Morocco 60 260 10 20 - 70 100 ' 300 20 30 20 80 Turkey 120 170 60 70 50 60 - - - - - - SOUTHEAST ASIA Bangladesh 45 70 15 25 10 20 70 135 25 45 25 45 Burma 100 180 45 100 22 60 150 220 70 120 50 100 India 50 270 - - 25 100 90 270 - - 45. 130 Indonesia, 50 150 5 20 - - 86 150 100 30 60 Mongolia 24 150 5 60 - - 187 420 - - - Nepal 60 100 40 60 40 60 100 200 60 100 60 100 3ri Lanka 170- .220 30 50 20 70 170 220 30 50 20 70 TABLE 9-2 (Continued) Present Consumption Future Consumption Urban Rural Urban Rural With House With Public With House With Public Connections Standposts Connections Standposts Min. Max. Min. Max Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Thailand 120 190 - - 50 100 150 200 - - 50 80 WESTERN PACIFIC Fiji 140 260 - - - - - 270 - - 9 90 Khmer Rep. 40 400 15 140 - 15 - - - - - - Korea, Rep. of 150 250 - - 40 80 200 350 - - 80 120 Laos 50 300 40 80 20 40 100 200 50 150 50 100 Malaysia 18 410 - - 14 230 250 250 - - 23 110 Philippines 110 540 - - 40 110 360 1,100 - - 180 360 Singapore - 220 - - - - - 315 - - - - Viet-Nam, Rep. of - 150 - 60 - - - 300 - 60 - - Western Samoa - 770 - - - - - 220 - 50 - 100 AVERAGESO Africa 65 290 20 45 15 35 90 275 30 60 20 50 Americas 160 380 25 50 70 190 195 375 30 55 120 195 Eastern Mediterranean 95 245 30 60 40 85 160 310 55 95 70 115 European Region 65 210 25 40 20 65 90 250 35 45 35 70 0 Southeast Asia 75 165 25 50 30 70 125 225 45 8-5 40 85 Ln Western Pacific 85 365 30 95 30 95 230 375 50 85 70 145 Average 90 280 25 55 35 90 150 300 40 70 60 110 a Magnitude negligible. Estimation includes garden watering. Averages rounded to nearest 5 liters. Source: FTits van der Leeden, Water Resources of the World: Selected Statistics, Port Washington, N.Y.: Water Information Center, 1975; original data from World Health Organization, 1973 (data as of Dec. 31. 1970). WATER PROJECTIONS 147 TABLE 9-3 Water Use for Various Purposes, by Continent and Seleded Nations (Water use in billions of cubic meters) Energy Industrial Domestic Production Irrigation (per capita) (per capita) Per- Water Genera- Water Area Water sons Fac- Water Popu- Fac- Water Use tion Use Use in tor Use lation tor Use Total Mfg. 10 9kw-hr 109M3 10' ha 10"3 loft M 3 Millions In3 109M3 thermal Africa 86 11 6.4 60.8 2,963 1,500 4.4 405 30 12 88 Egypt 3 0.4 2.9 27.6 615 1,500 0.9 38 40 1.5 30 Nigeria 172 1,500 .3 65 40 2.6 Asia 520 68 147.4 1,400 23,600 1,300 30.7 2,290 98 1,597 Bangladesh 1 0.1 -, 260 1,000 .26 75 40 3.0 China 14.0 703 853 40 34 India 48 0.6 37.6 357 4,800 1,000 4.8 611 40 24 386 Indonesia 1 0.2 3.8 36 925 1,000 .9 132 40 5 42 Japan 378 49 3.4 32 11,900 1,640 19.5 112 100 11 112 Pakistan 4 0.5 12.0 114 427 1,000 .4 73 40 3 118 Philippines 10 1.3 1.0 10 538 1,000 .5 44 40 2 14 South Korea .8 7.6 1,160 1,000 1.2 35 40 1 Thailand 5 0.7 1.9 18 309 1,000 .3 42 40 1 20 Turkey 10 1.3 1.7 Is 638 1,000 .6 41 50 2 22 Australia-Oceania 61 7.9 1.4 13 1,610 3,600 5.7 20 2 29 Australia 56 7.3 1.3 12 1,337 3,600 4.8 14 90 1 25 Europe 1,355 176 12.2 116 51,000 3,600 183.6 404 100 40 516 U.S.S.R. 844 110 9.9 94 29,036 2,500 72.8 256 70 18 295 North America 1,788 232 21.6 205 21,270 3,600 76.5 339 38 551 Mexico 24 3 3.3 31 60 50 3 United States 1,663 216 16.9 160 19,000 3,650 69.4 216 150 32 477 South America 50 6.4 3.7 35 3,653 1,200 4.4 214 50 11 57 Brazil 4 0.5 0.14 1 2,470 1,200 3.0 106 50 5 10 Global 3,960 502 10.7 1,830 104,0% 2,930 305 3,670 55 201 2,838 OECD countries 3,214 418 33.1 314 67,400 755 100 76 Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1977, New York: 1977; Water use computations by U.S. Geological Survey. Figure 9-3 shows the projected water use to the flow, water withdrawn and wat er consumed in year 2000 for four Asian countries in percent of 1975 was, respectively, 35 and 8 percent of the the maximum limit of supply as represented by maximum limit of developable water supply (av- runoff from local precipitation. In these four erage runoff). cases, the maximum developable supply that could be depended upon, without storage, might These problems do not preclude the develop- be between 20 and 70 percent of the maximum ment of suitable forecasting models; they merely limits shown in the figure (100 percent). Storage underline the necessity of intensive sector by capacity equivalent to one year's flow can raise sector analysis prior to thr. postulation of such this percentage to 80 percent of the maximum models. They also suggest some of the important limit. "Water consumed" is a more appropriate deficiencies of forecasting methods that rely on characteristic than "water withdrawn" for making extrapolations of past water-use data. Such meth- comparisons with maximum limits of developable ods are likely to produce forecasts seriously in water supply, because most water withdrawn is error, especially where water scarcity may in- reusable. However, data on "water consumed" crease. Extrapolation alone cannot predict the are fi-agmentaxy or nonexistent in many parts of various economic, technological, and social ad- the world. In the United States, with existing justments known to occur when water becomes, storage capacity of 15 percent of the year's river through scarcity, a higher-valued resource. Ex- 148 THE PROJECTIONS P, wmirnum d welopable su 3ply if storal o capacity I equal to one year's c werage flow (runaf f) tram 0 -100 -a- 4000 00 40 00' 0001" 00@ 000@ '00< 100--@ 20' to vp6s 1990 11"S 20M 2005 200 Figure 9-3. Projected water use (withdrawals) for four Asian countries in percent of maximum limit of supply, as represented by runoff from local precipitation. (Various country and U.N. reports) trapolations have a limited use but should be Doxiadis Projection viewed as highly tentative forecasts. In 1%7, C. A. Doxiadis published a graph* In spite of the difficulties noted above, several showing projected increase in the "consumption" global forecasts of water use have been prepared. (withdrawal) of "water controlled by man"' His Four are discussed here. Three rely on ex la- trapo estimated total for 1975 (2,412 x 109 m3/yr) is in tions of past water use, modified by certain gross general agreement with the.data presented in this adjustments to reflect assumptions regarding changing future conditions of water use. The third forecast attempts, in a. relatively crude manner, to *Constantinos A. Doxiadis" "Water and gnvironment," in identify countries where the availability of water Water for Peace, International Conference on Water for resources could be critical by 2000. Peace, Washington, D.C., My 23-31, 1%7, pp. 33-60. WATER PROJECTIONS 149 TABLE 9-4 Kalinin Projection Average Annual Water Withdrawal per Unit of In 1969, the Russian hydrologist G. P. Kalinin Land Area, Selected Geographic Units published the following estimates of global water requirements by the year 2000.* Average Annual Withdrawn Consumed Land Area Billions of cubic meters (millions Water km2) Withdrawals I rrigation 7,000 per year 4,800 (millimeters per year) Domestic 600 100 Industrial 1,700 170 AFRICAa 30.6 2.88 Waste dilution 9,000 - Egypt 1.00 30.0 Other 400 400 ASIAh 27.7 57.7 Total 18,700 5,470 India 3.29 9.12 Indonesia 1.93 3.11 Kalinin's figures for withdrawals for irrigation Japan .372 301 and industrial use are greatly in excess of Doxi- Pakistan .804 147 adis' projections. His domestic-use projections are Philippines .300 46.7 Thailand .514 38.9 also higher than those of Dioxiadis. While Kalinin Turkey (Asia and Europe) .781 28.2 does not explain the derivation of his projections, AUSTRALIA' 8.42 3.56 he does comment: Australia 7.69 3.25 By the year 2000, half of all the earth's annually EUROPE d 27.2 19.0 renewed water--4he- 37,000 cubic kilometers [bil- U.S.S.R. (Europe and Asia) 2'2.4 13.2 lions of cubic meters) of evaporated ocean water NORTH AMERICA@ 22.1 24.9 which precipitates on land rather than back into United States 9.36 51.0 the ocean-will be in use by man. With so high a SOUTH AMERICA 17.8 3.20 demand, and the uneven distribution in space and Brazil 8.51 1.18 time, work will soon have to be undertaken on an GLOBAL (excluding Antarctica) 134 21.2 unprecedented scale to regulate run-off and divert Note: Data am rounded to three significant figures. the waters of rivers into areas affected by drought. Including M-A-st, ar. The problem is'particularly acute, since demand Excluding U.S.S.R. (listed under Europe). is growing several times faster than the popula- Including New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. � Including entire U.S.S.R. but excluding all of Turkey. tion. When the world population reaches 20,OW � Including Central American countries, Bahamas, Cuba, Dominican Republic, million in the twenty-first century, the demand Haiti, and Jamaica. will be several times greater than in the year 2000. These water demand forecasts are rough ap- report for the same set of uses (irrigation, indus- proximations, only, because data on growth of trial, urban, and rural): 2,336 X 109 m3/yr. population, irrigation, industry and consumption Doxiadis projected use to increase to 6,500 x are also only approximate, and estimates of pol- 109 m3/yr by the year 2000, increasing further lution are either too high or too low. Very likely, along a logistic curve to an asymptotic limit of the future demand for clean, fresh water is exag- 23,000 X 109 m3/yr about a century hence. This gerated because: (a) as demand grows, means will be sought to reduce consumption per unit of limit is close to the estimated global supply of industrial and agricultural production; (b) some fresh water. In the following estimated withdraw- branches of industry could use salt water or als for the year 2000, the largest proportional brackish water, as is already being done in some increase is projected in the industrial and urban cases-, (c) desalination of seawAter'and brackish uses: ground Water will increase; and (d) the purifying 1975 -2000 of polluted water will be, improved and acceter- Billions of cubic meters ated. per year Nevertheless, the figures must be regarded as Irrigation 2,000 4,600 approximately correct for- the next thirty@five to Industrial 184 950 fifty years, i.e. until A.D. 20M-15. Urban 182 850 Rural 46 100 Total 2,412 6,500 In general, population growth, irrigation, or industrial development will exacerbate the con- Doxiadis did not provide any explanation of his calculations nor of the regional 'or continental *G. P.Kalinin and V. D. Bykov, "'The World's Water distribution. Hence,, no judgment Can be -made Of Resources, Present and Future," Impact @qf Science in their reliability. Society (UNESCO), Apr.-June .1969, p. 143.:; 150 THE PROJECTIONS trasts between have and have-not countries or With a region, country or river basin, the regions. A percentage increase in water use in a spectrum of uses and withdrawals of water will region where the margin is thin would have vary according to climatic and socio-economic greater consequences than the same percentage conditions, and it is thus necessary to distinguish increase rin a region where the margin is broad. between consumptive and non-consumptive use. Moreover, the processes of development in and For example, Table [9-6] indicates that, among areas often lead to changed cultures that are less the countries covered, the highest annual with- resilient than the cultural forms they replace. drawals per capita occur in the United States and Water development (i.e., storage) decreases the the U.S.S.R., where both irrigated agriculture and frequency,of shortage but may increase the net industry are highly developed. However, very severity of consequences of droughts that cause high withdrawals also take place in non-industrial- excessive demand for stored water. ized countries such as Mexico and India, where there is a large use of water for irrigated agricul- The FAO Water Projection ture. The figures for Czechoslovakia and the Table 9-5 presents water use projections pub- United Kingdom show that per capita demand lished by the Food and Agriculture Organization. may be quite low in industrial countries with very These projections are of interest because they low demands for irrigation. project separately each of the major sectors of the Water quality world water economy. The need for water resources, however, goes In commenting on the table and water problems beyond quantity and must also consider quality. generally, the FAO writes in The State of Food The harmful effects of waste disposal on quality andAgriculture (C 77/INF/19, Nov. 1977): are well known, but a major unseen problem is Although irrigated land comprises only 13% of the increasing salinity of water resources with use. the world's total arable area, irrigation accounts This is an inevitable process in nature, but man for by far the largest proportion of the total water has greatly accelerated it and, with.continued used by man. . . . Other non-agricultural water increases in the intensity of use, the problem will uses (for industry, mining and domestic purposes) become greater. are now increasing much faster than the use for Guidelines have been drawn up for interpreting irrigation. However, a considerable amount of this the quality of water for irrigation.* Table [9-71 water is non-consumptive and is recycled, while illustrates the application of some of these guide- irrigation continues to be a consumptive use. *R.S. Ayers and D.W. Westcott. Water Quality for Irrigated agriculture will therefore continue to be Agriculture, Irrigation and Drainage Paper No..29, Rome, the greatest water consumer in the future. FAO, 1976. TABLE 9-5 Estimates of World Water Use in 1976 and Projections to 2000 Total Use Projected Rate Fraction of in Millions of Growth Total Use of m, 1967-2000 in Percent in Percent 1967 2000 per Year 1967 2000 AGRICULTURE Irrigation 1,400,000 2,800,000 2.1 70 51 Livestock 58,800 102,200 1.7 3 2 Rural Domestic 19,800 38,300 2.0 1 1 OTHER Urban Domestic 73,000 278,900 4.1 4 5 Industry and Mining 437,700 2,231,000 5.0 22 41 TOTAL 1,989,300 5,450,400 3.1 100 too Source: M. Holy, Water and the Environment, Irrigation and Drainage Paper No. 8, Food and Agriculture organization, Rome, 197 1. WATER PROJECTIONS 151 TABLE 9-6 Water Use in Selected Countries, 1%5 Total U se Percent of Total in M3 per Municipal and Rural Agriculture Industry Capita Water Supply 'United Kingdom 200 31 3 66 Czechoslovakia 285 13 6 81 India 600 3 96 1 Japan 710 10 72 18 Mexico 930 4 91 5 U.S.S.R. 1.000 8 53 39 United States 2.300 10 42 48 Source: United Nations. The Demandfor Water, Natural Resources, Water Series No. 3, New York, 1976. TABLE 9-7. average salinity concentration over the 20 year monitoring period was attributable to natural Water Quality in Three Selected Irrigation Areas causes (including evaporation), 41% was due to Salinity Sodium man's activities (mainly irrigation, which ac- ECw 11 SAR b counted for 3717c). 1 Another major concern in the developing coun- GUIDELINE tries is the provision of safe drinking water and the hygienic disposal of wastes. A recent WHO No Problem Below 0.75 Below 3 Increasing Problem 0.75-3.0 3-9 survey, covering 1,600 million people (including Severe Problem Above 3.0 Above 9 those of 88 developing countries), found that 77% of the populations surveyed were not satisfactorily IRRIGATION AREAS served by community water supplies.* Mona Project. Paki- Irrigation problems stan, 1%8 3.60 38.0 Irrigation, or the controlled use of water for Pecos River, United States, 1946 3.21 8.6 agriculture, is playing an increasingly important Tigris River, Iraq, role in increasing production and in reducing its 1966-69 0.51 2.5 instability. In the Near East, for example, 70% of the total agricultural production is derived ftom Electrical conductivity, expressed in mmhos/cm. the 35% of the cultivated area that is inigated.t Sodium absorption rate, adjusted for calcium and magnesium content. The benefits of irrigation go far beyond the mere Source: R. S. Ayers and D. W. Westcott, Wafer Quality for Agriculture, op. Cit. provision of water, since it creates conditions suitable for the optimum use of other inputs, such lines to the quality of water in three irrigated as fertilizers and high-yielding varieties. areas. The Mona project in Pakistan and the The total irrigated area of the world was 223 Pecos River in the United States would be classi- million hectares in 19175, and is expected to rise to fied as having severe or increasing water quality 273 million hectares by 1990. Table [9-91 shows problems for irrigation. The Tigris River would be estimates of the area equipped for irrigation in the classified as having no problem, although sodium developing market economies in 1975, and targets concentrations would be regarded as borderline. for new irrigation and the improvement of the Increased salinity in water supplies results from existing irrigation in these countries by 1990. the two basic processes of salt loading and salt Irrigation accounted for 669/o of the cropped area concentrating. Salt loading is due both to natural in Asia in 1975, 191% in the Near East, 13% in causes such as surface run-off and to man-made Latin America, and only 3% in Africa. The sources such as industrial waste and return flows demand for water for irrigation in the developing from irrigated land. The relative effects of salt loading and salt concentrating on salinity concen- United Nations, The Demandfor Water, op. cit. trations for the Colorado River in the United t M. El GabalY, Seminar of Committee on Water Re- States are shown in Table [9-8]. While 5901o of the search, Cairo, 19176, 152 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 9-8 land have had to be abandoned as a result of sod Effect of Various Factors on Salt Concentration of salinization. The serious extent of this problem is illustrated in Table [9-9]. Improved drainage Colorado Rivera, United States, 1942-61 should be extended to 52 million hectares of Cumulative Percent irTigated land in the developing market economies, Concentration b of Total much of it within the 45 million hectares requiring improvements in the irrigation system. The cost Natural Sources 334 47 of the drainage improvements shown in Table [9- Evaporation 80 12 9] has been estimated as U.S. $13,700 million at Irrigation (Salt Contribution) 178 26 1975 prices. Irrigation (Consumptive Use) 75 11 Municipal and Industrial Sources 10 1 In Pakistan, out of a total of 15 million hectares Exports Out of the Basin 20 3 of irrigated land, about 11 million [73 percent) suffer from salinity, waterlogging or both, result- : At Hwver Dam. ing in pronounced reductions in crop yields. In Expressed in miligrams per liter (mg/l.) Iraq, more than 5Wo of the Lower Rafadain Plain Source: United States Environmental Protection Agency, Summary Report. suffers from salinity and waterlogging. In Syria, 1971. about 5017o of the irTigated land in the Euphrates market economies would increase between 19175 Valley is seriously affected, with crop losses and 1990 by 438 kM3, or more than 3017o of the worth about U.S. $30 million annually. In Egypt, total world use of water for irrigation as estimated some 0.8 million hectares, or 30% of the total, are in Table [9-51 above. affected, and in Iran over 15% of the irrigated The major irrigation problems arise from water lands.* losses due to ineffective or badly managed sys- . Among other factors to be considered, the most tems, and from salinity and waterlogging associ- important is disease transmission as a result of ated with inadequate drainage. As regards the irrigation. Schistosomiasis is the most serious of former, the targets shown in Table [9-91 indicate the diseases concerned. Irrigation schemes pro- the need for the improvement of almost half of vide a natural environment for its spread, and in the existing main and on-farin inigation systems one case 6001o of the adults and 8wo of the in the developing market economies. About 401yo children are affected.t Malaria can also thrive on of these improvements are classified as "major." inigation projects, when havens for vector breed- Even under optimum conditions of efficiency, ing become established as a result of defective some 25 to 3017o of the water used in inigation plan ng and water management. schemes is not utilized by the crop, but is lost in The problems of inigation are immense, but the r.un-off, evaporation and percolation. More often crop production potential due to irrigation is the figure is 5017o or even more. More efficient equally great. The solution lies mainly in the irrigation systems, however, require large invest- rehabilitation and improvement of existing iniga- ments, which must be returned in higher yields tion schemes and the proper installation and and income. The cost of the improvements in- subsequent management of new ones. The instal- cluded in Table [9-9] has been estimated as U.S. lation of new schemes will be particularly impor- $23,000 million at 1975 vrices. tant in Africa, where irrigated areas are now As regards salinity and waterlogging problems, expanding rapidly. salinization is very often associated with irrigation. Regional Water Projections The causes include unsuitable sods, irrigation with poor quality water (as discussed above), inade- Table 9-10 and the accompanying maps show quate soil drainage to remove soluble salts, a high per capita availability of watert in 1971 and water table, and a high evapotranspiration rate. It projected availability in 2000. These projections is estimated that about half of a the irrigated were developed by the C.I.A. for the Global 20M lands of the world have been damaged by salini- Study and are based on data published in 1971 by zation, alkanization and water logging.* the Russian hydrologist M. 1. L'vovich in his Past neglect of drainage, in conjunction with irrigation, has reduced the productivity of millions M. El Gabaly, op. cit. of hectares, which must now be reclaimed if at all t M. A. Amin, Problems and Effects of Schistosomiasis possible. In some cases, large areas of inigated in Irrigation Schemes in the Sudan, Khartoum Bilharzia Project. t Water availability is defined as annual surface (over- FAO/UNESCO, Soil Map of the World, Paris, 1964-74. land) runoff plus ground-water flows. WATER PROJECTIONS 153 TABLE 9-9 Irrigation and Drainage in the Developing Market Economies, 1975, and Targets, 1990 Africa Latin America Near East Asia Total IRRIGATION (thousands of hectares) Equipped irrigation area, 1975 2,610 11,749 17,105 60,522 91,986 Targets, 1990 New irrigation 960 3,101 4,295 13,848 22,204 Improvements to existing irrigation 783 4,698 9,789 29,718 44,988 minor 522 2,349 6,368 17,614 26,853 major 261 2,349 3,421 12,104 18,135 Increased water demand (thousands of cubic meters) 20 33 44 341 438 DRAINAGE (thousands of hectares) Equipped drainage area, 1975 7,044 46.585 18,212 62,501 134,342 Improvement targets, 1990 5,900 19,245 9,643 43,396 78,184 on irrigated land 1,177 2,018 7,076 42,152' 52.423 on non-irrigated land 4,723 17,227 2,567 1,244 25,761 Source: United Nations water Conference, Waterfor Agriculture, 1977, Annex I. book Global Water Resources and Their Future. are least able, both financially and technically, to The projections from the L'vovich data were deal with the problem. obtained simply by calculating the percentage As Ipressures on water resources increase, con- change in population by 2000 and reducing propor- flicts among nations with shared water resources tionately the per capita water availability. are likely to intensify. Interstate disputes between A simple linear extrapolation based on popula- upstream and downstream users of multinational tion growth alone obviously ignores many other river basins are particularly apt to occur over important factors that could effect a country's questions of water rights and priorities. Long- water situation (e.g., the level of agricultural standing quarrels over the la Plata (Brazil, Argen- development, degree of urbanization, etc.). In- tina), Jordan (Israel, Jordan), Euphrates (Syria, deed, water availability itself is a relatively crude Iraq), Indus (Pakistan, India), and Ganges (Bang- measure of an overall water situation. Nonethe- ladesh, India) could easily worsen as pressures less, population growth will be the single most become critical. And the pressures will become significant cause of increased future demand, and critical: By 2000 the Ganges basin alone will' the projections are useful in giving a general probably contain more than hatf a billion people! indication of potential future problem areas. The potential for conflict is underscored by the By the year 2000 population growth alone of fact that approximately 148 of the 200 first-order the world will cause at least a doubling in the river basins* of the world are shared by two demand for water in neady half of the countries countries and 52 by three to ten countries. Inter- of the world. The greatest pressure will be on national cooperation and negotiation will have to those countries with low per capita water availa- be pursued as the primary means of preventing bility and high population growth, especially in and resolving future disputes. parts of Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Much of the increased pressure will occur in developing countries where, if im- proved standards of living are to be realized, A first-order river basin is one in which the final water requirements will expand several times. destination of the basin water flow is an ocean, closed Unfortunately, it is precisely these countries that inland sea, or lake. Per Capita Water Availablifit (1971) y 40V UL C, HE- ll@z Thiusands 01 Cubic Molars 01 irratit, pe; person per yi@ar High (.0'. than 10) Medium (10-5) 0 Low (5-11 lit. Very low 0 1.56) Bouridary mpresentat,on is not neLBSSdr,ly sulhonlative 0 15@10 kilometers 0 Iboo miles X POr-Capito Water A vallab, 4r A" T '12 -IV __0xR._"MI 7L ME@ _VY 4 T, % "Th, @n@ Of Ova I J, peryear. NO (TW6 thah 16) J Me'di@@ 40, 7- 77M@ 'W@ -1 I ME m 3 S@ 'y @w '(1 oilsW a indwy rt@resenfalion'!& Ot I-S necmsatily aulho@lo I @00 kilordeters- . sp TT J 411 A 156 THE PROJECTIONS 'TABLE 9L-1 .0 Percent Changein Per Capita Water AvailabUity, 1971 and 2000 Population 1971 a 2000 t' 1971-2000 (Thousands of cubic ineters per capita per year) Indonesia (excluding Western Percent, New Guinea & Portuguese Change in Timor 13.0 6.7 95 Population 1971 2000 b 1971-2000 AFRICA Tunisia 0.9 0.4 126 EUROPE Algeria 2.2 1.0 111 Finland 22.5 19.9 .13 Morocco 2.1 0.9 132 Sweden 24.1 21.3 13 Libya 3.7 1.2 198 Norway 96.9. 81.141 19 Egypt 0.1 0.05 111 Denmark 3:0 2.7 13 Sudan 4.0 1.9 107 ab Iceland 319.0 209.9 52 W. Sahar 1.8 0.9 94 Netherlands 0.8 0.6 30 Mauritania 7.0 3.6 94 Belgium.& Luxembourg 0.9 0.8 7 Mali 12.4 5.6 121 France 3.8 21 Niger 3.5 1.7 101 Great Britain 2.7 2.0 '34 Benin 5.7 2;7 111 Ireland 13.7 11.1 23 Nigeria 4.7 2.4 96 Switzerland 7.3 6.5 13 Togo 4.5 1.9 139 Austria 7.7- 7.6 11 Ghana 7.8 3.1 150 Portugal 2.8 2.5 13 Upper Volta 5.2 2.7 92 Spain 3.9 2.8 39 Ivory Coast 30.8 14.3 115 Italy 3:0 2.4 26 Liberia 198.0 89.6 121 Yugoslavia 6.0 4.6 30 Sierra Leone 63.7 30.5 109 Albania 10.2 5.5 8T: Guinea 57.6 30.8 87 Greece 7.4 6.4 16 Guinea-Bissau 55.4 38.7 43 West Germany L4 1.3 9 The Gambia 4.4 2.8 58 East Germany 1.2 1.2 1 Senegal 5.9 2.9 106 Czechoslovakia 1.9 1,5 27 Cameroon, 45.9 24.4 .88 Hungary 0.81 0.7- 20' Chad 10.4 5.6 85 Romania 1.8 1.3 40 Cen. African Empire 92.8 49.4 88 Bulgaria 2.1 1.7 i3 Congo 192.0 108.5 77 Poland 1.7 1.3 35 Zaire 58.4 34.6 69 Gabon 328.0 258.3 27 ASIA Equatorial Guinea 103.0 61.7 67 U.S.S.R._ 17.8 13.6 31, Ethiopia 4.6 2.1 115 European Portion 6.2 4.7 31 Somali 3.9 1.8 115 Asian Portion 39.1 29.8 31 Kenya 3.4 1.12 191 Mongolia 36.7 14.5 153 Uganda 6.8 , 2.6 166 P,R. China 3.8 '2.7 42 Tanzania 5.7 2.4 142 Japan 3.8 17, 43 Rwanda 1.8 0.8 .135 North Korea 5.0 2.0 153 Burundi 1.0 0.6 81 South Korea '1.9 1.0 93 Malawi 2.0 1.0 108 Afghanistan 4*4 2.2 '96 -Zambia 22.3 8.5 161 145 Malagasy Republic I ran 6.0 2;5 33.6 16.9 99 Iraq. 3.6 173 Mozambique 8.0 4.0 102 Turkey 4.9 2.3 118 S. Rhodesia 4.4 L6 169 Cyprus 0.06 0.05 22 Namibia 14.3 7.4 93 Syria 3.0 1.0 165 Botswana 13.8 7.2 92 Countries of the Arabian Rep. S. Africa 2.9 1.3 128 ', Peninsula 0.7 0.3 106 Lesotho 2.1 85 Pakistan 1.1 0.5 125 Angola 29.5 15.3 93 Bangladesh 1.8 0.9 India 2.9 1.5 92', NORTH AMERICA Sri Lanka 4.7 2.8 69 Canada 128.0 83.0 54 Nepal 11.0 5.6 95 Yukon & N.W. Territories 5200.0 3376.6 54 Burma 24.6 13.2 86, British Columbia 381.0 247.0 54 Thailand 4.8 2.0 135 Eastern Provinces 87.5 56.8 54 Laos 77.0 37.0 108 United States (48) 8.14 16.6 27 Cambodia 17.5 7.4 135 Western States 12.0 9.4 27 N. Vietnam 8.2 4.9 68 Northern States 5.4 4.3 27 S.- Vietnam 11.0 5.7 92, Southern States 11.6 9.1 27 Philippines 10.1 4.2 139 Alaska 2033.0 1600.8 27. Malaysia, Singapore & Brunei 33.3 14.4 .132 Mexico 5.5 1.9 185 WATER PROJECTIONS 157 TABLE 9-10 (continued) order of magnitude greater, nearly 4 x 10'3 cubic Percent meters per year. Other estimates indicate that Change in nearly 60 percent of all water withdrawn is Population returned to the environment, so the actual global 1971 a 20M t, 1971-20M total of water consumedmay be no more than 3 per cent of the aggregate water supply., Baning CENTRAL AMERICA, WEST INDIES substantial climatic change, the supply estimate Guatemala 15.1 7.0 113 should remain constant throughout the near fu- Belize 123.0 63.7 193 ture, while water withdrawals climb steadily with Salvador 4.2 1.7 146 population and rising agricultural and industrial Honduras 38.0 15.3 48 put. Even if water withdrawals were to in- Nicaragua 71.7 27.9 157 Out Costa Rica 41.4 22.3 86 crease by a factor of 7 by the year 2000 (the Panama 54.8 25.1 118 Kalinin forecast), only about 50 per cent of Cuba 3.1 1.8 74 aggregate supply would be withdrawn, and about Jamaica 1.1 0.6 93 Haiti 1.4 0.8 81 15 percent actually consumed. Dominican Rep. 2.8 1.2 142 Comforting as such figures may be, they are misleading. In fact, any significant increase in the SOUTH AMERICA rate of water withdrawal,. even a doubling"by the Argentina 11.9 7.7 54 U ruguay 20.4 15.9 28 year 2000, is virtually certain to cause major water Paraguay 39.3 19.0 107 supply problems. The use of energy and other Brazil 59.5 26.0 128 resources by the water supply sector will increase French Guiana 24M.0 1034.5 132 dramatically. Water shortages will become more Surinam 513 251.5 104 frequent, and their effects will be more wide- Guyana 317 164.2 93 Venezuela 73.2 28.5 157 spread and more severe. The availability of water Colombia 52.7 22.5 134 will become an even more binding cori�traint on Ecuador 52.2 22.7 130 the location of economic development. The notion Peru 59.6 26.1 ,28 of water as a free good available in essentially Bolivia 60.8 28.7 112 Chile 47.8 28.6 67 limitless quantities will have disappeared through- out much of the world. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEA- These less encouraging predictions stein from LAND I recognition of the intensely local nature of a water 'Australia 678.0 452.0 50 W. Australia 62.6 41.7 50 resource. There exists no world water economy, N. Territory 757.0 504.7 50 and it is rarely meaningful to speak of a national S. Australia 4.5 3.0 50 water economy. Most water economies exist Queensland 76.8 51.2 50 within smaller hydrologic provinces, in sing!F@,nver New South Wales 12.0 8.0 50 basins, adjoining basins- connected by water,trans- Victoria 5.5 3.7 50 Tasmania 123.0 82.0 50 Mission facilities and the like. When the supply in New Guinea Island 30.4 13.9 iig such a limited area falls short of the attempted New Zealand 136.0 72.0 89 withdrawals, water shortages occur, regardless'@ of N. Island 56.9 30.1 89 the quantities of water available in neighboring S. Island 346.0 183.0 89 basins. It may also be true that attempted water withdrawals cannot be maintained during a period -These numbers, in thousands of cubic meters per capita per year, have the of low strearnflow, even though adequate water is following approximate meaning: A value of 1.0 or under is a very low availabiliity@ 1.0-5.0 is low; 5.0-10.0 is medium; 10.0 or above is high. available in the same stream at other times. hThe population projections used here are the Bureau of Census medium series This nonuniform distribution of water, both in developed for this Study. Projections for countries not listed in Chapter 2 were obtained directly frorn Census personnel. Western Sahara's projection is based space and in time, is the fundamental cause of the on Mauritania's population change figure because available data for Western uniquely local nature of water supply problems. Sahara was unreliable. Sources: The 1971 figures were taken from M. 1. L'vovich, Global Water When data are summed or averaged over a Resources and Their Future (in Russian), 1974. The 2000 figures were obtained by calculating the percentage change in population and reducing proportionately number of water supply areas, the nonuniformity the per capita water availability. is concealed, and water resources may appear to be adequate when, in fact, serious shortages are Future Water Resources likely to occur. When shortages do occur or are considered World water withdrawals for 1975 aggregated likely to occur, a number of steps can be taken. less than 3 X 1012 cubic meters per year, while First, the supply'may be augmented. the lower-bound supply estimate is more than an One approach to augmentation consists of trans- 158 THE PROJECTION9 &rring: Water in space and/or time so a*s to meet water supply fails entirely. Supply'failure creates 'the requirements of attempted withdrawals. Water a potential for public health problems, industrial is transferred in space by constructing or employ- shutdowns, and massive crop failures (which Also -ing transportation facilities (such as water trans- have human health implications). mission mains) to move water from an Area where Some of the measures outlined here 'can only it is riot required to the area of potential shortage. be implemented after relatively long-term planning Water is 'transferTed in time by constructing stor-' and construction (water transmission And storage age 'facilities'- usually major impoundments on facilities, for example); others are availdble on an existing streams.. Due to the very large quantities immediate short-term basis (water-use, reduction of water involved, transmission over large dis- techniques' not involving new technology)@ The tances is very expensive, requiring large commit- measures requiring construction have the potential ments of energy. Major storage proJects are also of creating adverse environmental 'effects, and expensive, and may have the added disadvantage some may imply large increases in the use'6f of increasing total evaporation, thus reducing the energy. It may be advantageous to engage in still total supply available. Both actions have the longer-term planning so as to facilitate the loca- potential of permanently altering natural land- tion of future water-@sing activities in areas better scapes, and of creating ecological disruptions. able to provide the necessary water. Again, these However, water shortages that result from a lack consider-ations and findings depend upon ;ecific, of adequate storage capacity may entail high area by area analyses of water supply and de- economic and social costs. mand; they cannot be obtained from national Another means'of supply augmentation requires aggregate data. increased reuse of return flows from other water users. This may require rearranging the sequence of uses so that those requiring the highest quality Conclusions come first, followed by users who are increasingly tolerant of lowekuality water. More often, reuse There will apparently be adequate water avail- may. be increased by the installation of improved able on the earth to satisfy aggregate projected treatment facilities, either at the first user's ef- water withdrawals in the year 2000; the same fluent or the second user's intake. Such measures finding holds for each of the continents. Neverthe- are costly, and they consume significant quantities less, because of the regional and temporal nature of energy and, perhaps, various chemicals. of the water resource, water shortages even before Changes in the quality of the environment may 2000 wiff probably be more frequent and more occur directly, or as the result of decreased severe than those experienced today. streamflows below the region of more intensive By the year 2000 population growth alone of water use. the world will cause at least a doubling in the . The second -step taken in the case of water demand for water in nearly half of the countries shortage involves reducing rates of water use. of the world. The greatest pressure will be on This may occur through economic incentive, as those countries with low per capita water avaita- increasing scarcity drives the price of Water bility and high population growth, especially in higher, encouraging water users to substitute other parts of Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and goods or other inputs for the use of water. It may Latin America. Much of the increased pressure occur administratively, as users either voluntarily will occur in developing countries where, if im- invoke water conservation practices or do so proved standards of living are to be realized, because of regulation or because of reductions in water requirements will expand several times. water allocations. Water use may also be reduced Unfortunately, it is precisely these countries that by stimulating the introduction of new, less water- are least able, both financially and technically, to intensive technology (cooling towers for power- deal with the problem. plants, or drip irrigation). Although irrigated land comprises only 13% of I Finally, when possibilities for supply augmen- the world's total arable area, irrigation account$ tation and.for water-use reduction have been for by far the largest proportion of the total watef exhausted, and withdrawals still threaten to ex- used by man and will continue to be the greatest ceed available supply, water must be allocated water consumer in the future. The total irrigated among several uses, so that the damages incurred area of the world was 223 million hectares in as a result of shortage will be minimized. In the 1975, and is expected to rise to 273 million absence of such allocation, the available water is hectares by 1990. As a result the demand for used on a first come, first served basis, until the water for irrigation in the developing market WATER PROJECTIONS 159 economies alone would increase between 1975 high water table, and a high evapotranspiration and 1990 by 438 cubic kilometers, or more than rate. It is estimated that about half of all the 30 percent of the current total world use of water irrigated lands of the world have, been damaged for irrigation. by salinization, alkalinization and waterloggingi, In Theneed 'for water I resources, however, goes some cases, large areas of irrigated land.,have. had beyond quantity and must also consider. quality. to be. abandoned as a result of soil salinization. The harmful effects of waste disposal on quality Past neglect of drainage, in conjunction ,.with are well known, but a major unseen problem is irrigation, has reduced the productivity. of millions the increasing salinity, of water resources with of hectares, which must now be, reclaimed if at all use--particularly irrigation use. Increasing salinity possible. is. an inevitable process in nature, but man has As pressures on water resources increase, con- greatly accelerated it and, with continued in- flicts among nations with shared water resource's creases in the intensity of use, the problem will are likely to intensify. Interstate disputes between become greater. - upstream and downstream users of multinational Salinization is,very often, associated with irriga- river basins are particularly apt to. occur @qver tion. 'Me causes include unsuitable sods, irrigation questions of water rights and priorities. Long- with -poor quality water (as discussed above), standing quarrels could easily worsen as pressures inadequate soil drainage to remove soluble salts, a become critical. 10 Energy Projections This chapter presents U.S. and world energy petroleum production will peak in the 1990-2010 forecasts for the midrange (1985-90) and the long interval at 80-105 million barrels per day, with range (to the year 2000). The forecasts, made ultimate resources estimated at 2,100 billion during the spring of 1978, endeavor to reflect a barrels. range of uncertainty in future economic and There is a substantial potential for growth in the demographic growth by presenting three projec- coal and natural gas supplies beyond the year tions of energy consumption trends. The analysis 2000. also examines how these demands would be Since there was not sufficient time to evaluate satisfied by development of energy supply in a a range of possible global long-term projections, market environment. The midrange forecasts were there is a degree of inconsistency in the long-run made for the Global 2000 Study. The long-range view that can be resolved only by further careful forecasts, made by other organizations, are com- long-term analysis of the projections or an inde- pared to the trend in the midrange projections. pendent long-run projection exercise. The, regional changes in energy trade and per caoita consumption between 1975 and 1990 im- plied by the forecasts are summarized in the maps Basic Assumptions -on the following two pages. The underlying assumptions of the forecasts in The conclusions can be summarized as follows. this chapter take into account many uncertainties On the consumption side: in key variables and thus reflect a range of future � The connection between economic growth and outcomes. Projections of energy supply and de- energy demand growth is projected to continue mand levels require estimates of economic varia- at least through 1990, moderated only by poten- bles as well as estimates of possible technologi- tial price increases. cal-and to some extent political--changes. The � Current analysis of the effect of relative and major variables used to drive the forecasts are: overall levels of energy prices on the structure gross domestic product (GDP) and population of energy demand shows that there is a strong ranges*; price assumptions; the behavior of the potential for fuel substitution in energy con- Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries sumption. (OPEC); technological penetration; and conserva- � However, current medium and high economic tion. growth projections appear to lead to situations GDPIPopulation Ranges. Future energy gr6wth in which significantly higher prices for petro- is determined primarily by future economic leurn will be required to equilibrate supply and growth, as reflected in GDP and population demand by fuel substitution and other means of changes. This analysis assumes that there will be petroleum demand reduction. � In the very long term, there ap ears to be no structural changes. In this analysis, one com- p plete set of projections was developed for each of considerable potential for aggressive, conserva- the Global 2000 medium, low, and high GDP and tion-induced reductions in energy consumption. population growth-rate assumptions. These three On the energy supply side: economic projections are designed to cover the range of possible outcomes. � Petroleum production capability is not increas- Price Assumptions. Energy price assumptions ing as fast as demand. Depending upon eco- affect the levels of consumption and determine nomic growth and conservation, a supply-con- the competitiveness of all new technologies. They strained market appears to be a strong possibility for the late 1980s. *Results calculated for the Administrator's Annual Report � In the long term, the rate of petroleum reserve are not entirely comparable with Global 2000 Study figures additions appears to be falling. As a result, because different economic and demographic growth rates engineering considerations indicate that world were assumed. 161 R- , , W, ;l "NAf W@ J Al Ir PRO 14 "AA -15F xnA IV 44, 1 MA 51, M "r qr, @-N N5;, WZI@ N"A Iq 114 Y'i 44 ....... .. g@ 2 @;k t@ 4, f ns, UP -4, 4,@ '71 W t AN ZAK 54 ht 09V -1 0@ W;@ 1-0 ,,777 -,7 4% 1,A J@ X-7 40 N.; V, ID' 'Y" J: U5 164., THE PROJECTIONS are dependent not only on traditional supply and more efficient capital into the stock. Conservation demand conditions but also on the actions of the may also. be encouraged through governmental OPEC cartel inadjusting the price of the marginal policies aimed at controlling environmental dam- supply of oil. age. The first set of projections in this chapter is based on a, constant real oil price of $13 per barrel Midrange Energy Forecasts, 1985-90 in 1975 dollars through the year, 2000., However, The energy forecasts will be presented in two rising oil prices appear to be a strong possibility. phases: midrange extrapolations covering 1985-90 Strong upward pressure on world energy prices in and long-range extrapolations extending to the the 1980-90 period may result from resource year 2000. This division is made necessary by the conservation policies of producer countries and differing philosophical approaches used in the rapidly rising world demand. A second projection forecasts. is then generated, using the assumption that oil This section presents an@analysis of three scen- prices' rise at a real rate of 5 percent per annum. arios chosen to illustrate the range of possible between 1980 and 1990. variations in world economic and demographic OPEC Behavior. OPEC currently controls the trends, with regional and world energy balances pric'e 'of international crude oil.@ More intense presented for 1985.and *1990. The scenarios are competition among oil importing countries for unconstrained in the sense that unlimited world oil the available -OPEC supply is expected in the supplies are assumed available at constant real oil future, so OPEC pricing .'policies remain specula- prices to 1990. A modified energy projection is ti-ve. also developed, assuming annual energy price It is possible that the- demand for oil will increases of 5 percent from 1.980 through 1990. exceed maximum world production well before The @ basic assumptions of the model are the the year '2000. This will ultimately. lead to re- analyst's representation of,the way the energy source depletion, and many OPEC nations face a system operates. In this analysis this system is future where oil is no longer their principal asset. understood to be a market in which sellers of To. extend this transition period,, some oil prpduc- natural resources--od, coal, and gas--are compet- ing countries may adopt resource conservation ing to satisfy the demands for energy. In the measures and output ceilings, resulting in higher, midrange forecasts demand is based primarily real oil prices. upon past trends, driven by economic activity, Technol ogical Penetration. The characteristics energy prices, and the growth of energy-consum- and economics of tec.hnologies.can have dramatic ing stock.. The actual demand for energy products effects on the @overall projections. Of equal im- is constrained by technological limits imposed by: portance are the assumed availability and rate of our ability to satisfy end-use demands.for heat, penetration @of -competitive technologies., Im- transportation,. mechanical drive, etc., with pri- proved 'technology-can provide for the full utili- mary fuels;. our ability to generate secondary fuels zation of renewable @re'sources in the long run. and energy such as gasoline, distillate, and elec- Most alternative technologies are Enot now eco- tricity from primary fuels; and our ability to nomic, 'but 'higher -energy prices and limited convey primary fuels* to points of conversion and conventional supply prospects encourage their generation.*_ , devef6pment. Both hard and'soft technologies The midrange model. of the energy market are considered in the forecasts, with potential equilibrates supply and demand under these con- impacts being realized, in. some cases through straints in a competitive market simulation. Fore- 1985, in others not until after 2000. The eventual casts are gener-ated' using two equilibrium repre- result will probably encompass- a blend of differ- sentations, the Project'Independerice Evaluation ent technologies that most efficiently and eco- System (PIES) for the U.S. and the International nomically meets the, diverse consumption re- quirements; *For example, natural gas remains in Saudi Arabia because Conservation. Energy conserving policies may there is no practical way to transport it to New York for originate from both consumer and producer use as home heat. Likewise, excess natural gas* in New groups. As energy prices increase demand will york would be useless as a fuel for automobile transporta- decrease., Possible structural changes will further tion. These anomalies limit our current ability to satisfy reduce demand. Shifts Iare introduced by changes requirements for services. Long-term planning should be directed toward satisfying actual end-use requirements with in the, eff 'iciency of the capital stock either by primary sources. InIcontrast, midrange planning is predom- turning over the stock at a faster than normal rate, inately concerned with providing secondary fuels, using our by retrofitting the stock, or. by, introducing new, existing conversion, transportation, and delivery capability. ENERGY PROJECTIONS 165 Energy Evaluation System (IEES) for the rest of TABLE 10-2 the world. Results of the PIES analysis are used in IEES to represent the United States. Population Growth Rate Assumptions In both PIES and IEES, energy sector demands (Compound annual percent) are determ "incd on the basis of past experience as 1976-85 1985-2000 functions of product prices, economic activity (GNP or GDP), and a lag term to estimate capital High Me- Low High Me- Low, stock changes. After determining total sectoral dium dium Btu (British thermal unit) demands, individual United product demands are estimated as functions of States .70 .51 .94 .55 .27 relative prices and stock changes. Given this Canada 1.1 .92 .70 1.20 .90 .59 Japan .91 .88 .81 .58 .67 .53 demand slate, an integrating analysis uses a supply Europe .35 .32 .30 .48 .42 .34 function derived from fuel specific supply and Note: The energy demands of the less developed countries, OPEC nations, and conversion models to-produce supply estimates. centrally planned economies are not modeled as being sensitive to population An iterative approach is then used to adjust prices growth rates and therefore are not presented in this table. until an energy market equilibrium is reached tion is not an .exogenous variable in the deterini- between supply and demand. Detailed representa- nation of energy demands, so changes in popuia'- tions of energy transportation-, conversion (by tion growth rates influence energy demand only utilities and other processes), and refining are insofar as they are reflected in GNP growth rates. employed to capture the effects of the existing All other exogenous variables are held constant. capital stock. of coal, oil, and gas consurning The common assumptions for this set of projec- equipment and and changes as this equipment is ions are: replaced by new building programs. The method- ology is described in greater detail in Chapter 20 - A real oil price of $13 per barrel (in 1975 dollars, of this volume. CIF U.S. East Coast) is maintained through the The two principal uncertainties in forecasting year 2000. consumption are also the most important varia- - OPEC is the world's unconstrained marginal bles--economic and population growth. Three supplier of crude oil. alternative projections of each were used as the - The base-case situation for the U.S. includes basis for the low, medium, and high cases (Tables natural gas regulation and crude oil price con- 10-1 and 10-2). 1 . trol. The medium case assumes medium population' - OECD country policies regarding conservation, and GNP -growth; the high case assumes low taxation, import tariffs, and supply development population and high GNP growth; and the low are fixed. (Their relative contributions, shown case assumes high population and low GNP in the 1978 annual report of the Department of growth. For the less developed regions, popula- Energy's Energy Information Administration, are discussed below in the uncertainty section.) Development policies of the less developed TABLE 10-1 countries (LDCs) continue on their present course (energy demand tied. to GDP growth), Real GNP Growth Rate Assumptions with no special OPEC oil price arrangement for (Compound annual percent) LDCs. 1976-85 1985-2000, The result of the calculations is a set of world Me- Me- and regional equilibrium energy balances for 1985 High dium Low High dium- Low and 1990 for all three growth scenarios (Tables - 104 and 10-5). Table 10-3 summarizes the fore- OPEC 7.2 6.35 5.5 6.5 5.4 4.3 casts for total oil and total energy. Low-income LDCs 4.4 3.6 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.5 For 1985 U.S. energy demand ranges from 87 Medium-in- quadrillion Btu (quads) in the low GNP case to come LDCs 6.6 5.55 4.5 4.9 4.4 3.9 102 quads in the high GNP case, the range for OECD world demand being 329l-352 quads. World oil nations 4.9 4.0 3.1 3.7 3.1 2.5 Soviet bloc consumption is forecast to be in the range of 71- (excluding 86 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 1985,, with U.S.S.R.) 3.5 3.25 3.0 3.0 2.75 2.5 U.S. oil consumption between 19--24 mb/d. Aver- U.S.S.R. 3.5 3.25 3.0 3.0 2.75 2.5 age annual 1975--90 growth rates range from 3.3 to China 5.0 3.75 2.5 5.0 3.75_ 2.5 4.4 percent for total energy and 2.8 to 4.5 percent 166 THE PROJtCTIONS TABLE 10-3 Figure 10-1 shows the uncertainty bands for projected total demand for OPEC oil. The spread Total World Oil a 'nd Energy Consumption, 1985 of uncertainty around the base-line economic and 1990, and Average Annual Growth Rates, projections (shown by the shaded bands) illus- 1975-90 trates an extreme range of demand levels that Average consider the highest and lowest possible out- Annual comes. The projected demand for OPEC oil under Growth the high price assumption, discussed below, is Total Rate also shown in the figure. Rest-of-world demand Total Oil Energy 1975-90 for OPEC oil becomes lower-appru@aching the (thousands bbild) (10"Btu) (percent) most favorable line--as the non-OPEC supply of 1985 1990 '1985 1990 Oil Total oil increases and conservation measures are suc- Energy cessful. Higher dependence on OPEC oil results if High GNP 86,318 , 102,266 - 375 448 4.5 4.4 non-OPEC production is at the bottom of the Medium expected range and energy consumption increases GNP 78,256 90,105 352 414 3.7 3.8 faster than projected. The broad range of possibil- Low GNP 71,235 79,581 329 379 1.9 3.3 ities occurs because of the potential difference for world oil. The corresponding pre-embargo between non-OPEC supply and demand. Also, the potential error in computing the high and low growth rates were 5.1 percent for energy and 7.7 bands- is additive, the extremes being. realized only percent for oil for the 1966-73 period. The pn*nci- with certain combinations of events. Projections pal change is the lowering of economic growth of high, medium, and low demand made with rates as higher prices affect consumption and moderate conservation and supply @assumptions conservation. can be regarded as the most probable limits. In Table 10-5, predicted world energy con- sumption for 1990 has risen to 379448 quads and U.S. consumption to 96-111 quads. Both medium OPEC Pricing and high GNP growth demands for oil exceed Another significant unknown is OPEC pricing estimated OPEC productive capacity and thus are policy for Saudi Arabian reference crude. OPEC probably infeasible. U.S. oil demand is in the 20- is a 13-member assembly of countries with a 25 mb/d range and world demand between 80 and broad range of economic potential, .,per capita 103 mb/d. For the same year, U.S. oil imports are income, oil reserves, and development require predicted at 10-15 mb/d. World coal consumption ments. Table 10-6 illustrates this range rfor all less varies from a high of 5.2 billion short tons per developed, oil exporting countries, inchiding non- year to 4.6 billion. Natural gas consumption is OPEC members. Current production revels are predicted to be between 59 and 66 trillion cubic compared with capacity and future p@r;',ocluctlion feet, per year. potential, based upon proved reserves. Note that countries with high per capita incomeSr.such as The Role of Uncertainty Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have surplus production capacity and large financial reserves. Because of The midrange forecasts display 4, range of diversity among OPEC members, the forecast possible economic outcomes but do not incorpo- level of oil prices as determined at biannual [email protected] such as: meeting's is based on essentially speculative fac- �Energy supply,from the centrally planned econ- tOrs- omies. Forecasts of their uncertain role in the From the oil market point of view, OPEC international market between 1985 and 1990 membership is not important because the cartel range from net exports of I mb/d to net imports oil price determines the price of incremental oil of 4-5 mb/d. production. If the market is viewed asessentially �Non-OPEC supply. Estimates show an uncer- competitive, all oil, regardless of the.source, is tainty of �3.0 mb/d in 1985 and � 3.5 mb/d in priced to compete in its own market with oil from 1990 for the midrange estimate assumed here. this spare capacity. �OECD conservation programs. These were as- The low-income countries--Indonesia,, Mexico, sessed at conservative midrange values in this Nigeria, Algeria--have an incentive to shade their@ fbirecast. A more aggressive upper range assess- prices relative to the reference price in -order 'to ment places this saving at 2.5 mb/d in 1985 and maximize sales and revenues. With their prices 3.; mb/d in 1990. slightly lower than the established OPEC price, ENERGY PROJECTIONS '167 TABLE 10-A Regional Energy Balanm, 1985 United Industrial- - Less Centrally OPEC States ized Developed Countries Planned World Countries@ Countries Economies MEDIUM GNP GROWTH Oil (t4ousands'bbilday) Production 10,234 16,276 7,429 39,257 15,295 78,256 Imports 11,288 34,066 2,816 -35,579 -1.,304 Consumption 21,522 50,342 10,245 3,678 13,992 78,256 Natural gas (billions c*ft@yr) Production 16,731 29,215 3,034 -5,879 18,339 '56,468 Imports 1,844 3,414 -600 -2,164 -654 - Consumption 18,575 32,629 2,433 3,720 17,684 56,468, Coal (millions short tonst%,r) ]Production,,. 1,038 1,726 5 2,616 4,772 Imports , -74 97 -42 - -55 Consumption 964 1,823 384 5 2,561: 4,7.72 w Nuclear, hydroz solar, geothermal (terawatt-h,@r) 975 2,515 585 19 760 3,879 Total energy consumption (quadrillion Btu) % 203 39 12 98 352 Oil HIGH GNP GROWTH (thousands bbliday) Production 10,240 16,290 7,452 47,280 15,295 86,318 Imports 13,647 40,292 3,788 -43,186 894 Consumption 23,887 56,583 11,240 4,094 14,401 86,318. , Natural gas (billions cu P6,r) -Production 29,806 3,262 6,582 18,980 M,630 Imports 1,987 3,905 -600 .-2,532 -773 Consumption 18,794 33,711 2,662 4,050 18,207 58,630: Coal (millions short tonslyr) Productilo.n, [,102 1,844 462 6 2,394 4,706 Imports, -74 97 -42 - -55 Consumption 1,028 1,941 420 6 2,339 -4,706,. Nuclear, fi@dro, solar, geothermal . (terawaii-hrlyr) 976 2,516 585 19 760 3,880 Total energy consumption (quadrillion Btu) 102. 220 43 13 99- 375 Oil LOW GNP GROWTH 0housands bbilday) Production 10,231 16,273 7,405 32,261 15,295 71,235 imports 9,259 28,793 1,875 -28,%6 -1,702 Consumption 19,490 45,065 9,280 3,2% 13,594 71,235 Natural-gas (billions cu ft @yr) Production 16,677 27,847 2,807 5,307 17,831 53,191 - imports 1,724 3,160 -600 -1,905 -654 Consumption 18,401 31,007 2,207 3,401 17,176 53,791 Coal (millions short tonslyr) Produdion 973 1,597 392 5 2,36 4,299 imports -74 -42 - -55 Consumption 899 1,694 350 5 2,250 4,299 Nuclear, hydro, solar, geothermal (terawatt-hrlyr) -%91 2,492 585 '19 760 31.8@6 Total energy consumption (quadrill,fon Btu) 90 188 30 11 86 315 'All OECD countries, including the U. S. 168 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 10-5 Regional Energy Balances, 1990 United Industrial- Less OPEC Centrally States ized Developed Countries Planned World Countries a Countries Economies MEDIUM GNP GROWTH Oil (thousands bbilda.v) Production 9,756 16,281 8,006 48,823 16,995 90,105 Imports 12,085 40,05 4,546 -44,091 -1,090 Consumption 21,841 56,915 12,554 4,731 15,905 90,105 Natural gas (billions cu ft@yr) Production 15,920 28,635 3,759 8,759 20,793 61,880 Imports 2,424 5,105 -700 -3,719 -687 Consumption 18,344 33,739 2,995 5,051 20,106 61,880 Coal (millions short tonslyr) Production 1,166 1,796 502 7 2,986 5,291 Imports -81 115 -40 - -75 Consumption 1,085 1,911 462 7 2,911 5,291 Nuclear, hydro, solar, geothermal (terawati-hrlvr) 1,397 3,513 924 64 1,350 5,851 Total energy consumption (quadrillion Btu) 103 231 50 16 117 414 oil HIGH GNP GROWTH (thousands bbilday) Production 9,770 16,295 8,044 60,932 16,995 102,266 Imports 14,691 49,794 6,025 -55,434 -385 Consumption 24,460 66,089 14,069 5,498 16,610 102,266 Natural gas (billions cufflyr) Production 16,122 29,411 4,048 10,580 21,832 65,871 Imports 2,512 6,290 -700 -4,762 -828 Consumption 18,634 35,701 3,348 5,818 21,004 65,871 Coal (millions short tonslyr) Production 1,260 1,981 558 8 2,634 5,181 Imports -81 98 -43 - -55 Consumption 1,179 2,079 515 8 2,579 5,181 Nuclear, hydro, solar, geothermal (terawatt-hrlyr) 1,402 3,518 924 64 1,350 5,856 Total energy consumption (quadrillion Btu) 111 256 55 19 118 448 Oil LOW GNP GROWTH (thousands bbl1day) Production 9,734 16,253 7,971 38,363 16,995 79,581 Imports 9,929 32,967 3,140 -34,344 -1,766 Consumption 19,663 49,219 11,111 4,019 15,229 79,851 Natural gas (billions cu ftlyr) Production 15,598 27,648 3,355 7,903 19,608 58,542 Imports 2,345 4,549 -700 -3,484 -364, . . Consumption 17,942 32,197 2,655 4,446 19,244 58,542 Coal (millions short tonslyr) Production 1,075 1,631 452 6 2,503 4,592 Imports -81 115 -40 - -75 Consumption 994 1,746 412 6 2,428 4,592 Nuclear, hydro, solar, geothermal (terawatt-hrlyr) 1,373 3,316 924 64 1,350 5,758 Total energy consumption (quadrillion Btu) 96 209 45 15 110 379 All OECD countries, inducting the U.S. ENERGY PROJECTIONS 1691 70 -Upper bound (including uncertainties) 60 High economic growth; no increase in the real price of oil. 50 -Medium economic growth; no increase in the real price of oil. Medium economic growth, real oil prices increase 40 Q. 5% per year starting -!2 OPEC Production in 1980. Capacity Low economic growth; no in- --a crease in the real price of oil. r .2 30 Lower bound (including uncertainties) 20 10 OPEC's own demand 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 !L Figure 10-1. Projected demand (including OPEC's own demand) for OPEC oil, and OPEC's own demand for. OPEC oil. these countries are able to attract more buyers countries with the least desire for income-Ku- and thus sell more oil. However, seasonal shifts wait, Iran, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, and in demand structure favoring different crude qual-.' Saudi Arabia. These swing countries act as buff- itiesat dfferent times of the year, refining inflexi- ers, absorbing seasonal rises and falls: in demands. bility, and the institutional arrangements with the OPEC pricing policy appears to encompass major oil companies all tend to make price shading conflicting objectives. The small, lower-income an ineffective revenue-maximizing policy. producers are concerned with maximizing. real OPEC production capacity is projected to ex- income, consistent with'development plans and ceed,demand over the midrange, and this results future prospects for 'oil production. . In contrast, in some spare capacity. As a result of price the large, higher-income producers in the.swing shading, this spare capacity is concentrated in group must consider the effects of sudden price 170 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 10-6 Less Developed Oil Exporting Countries: Current Production, Reserves, Population, Income 1977 1977 Jan. 1, 1975 1977 Production Production 1978 Future 1975 1975 Per Capital Account (thousand Capacity Reserves Years of Production GNP Income Balances bbllday) (thousand (billion Production (millions) (billion $) bbl)day) bbl) (million $) . OPEC Members Algeria 990 1,100 6.6 16 15.7 12.3 780 -1,520 Ecuador 180 225 1.6 20 7.1 3.9 550 -50 Gabon 225 250 2.1 23 0.5 1.2 2,239 -220 Indonesia 1,690 1,800 10.0 15 136.0 24.2 178 -580 Iran 5,650 6,700 62.0 25 33.0 48.9 1,478 5,900 Iraq 2,150 3,100 34.5 31 11.1 14.3 1,282 1,950 Kuwait 1,700 3,340 67.0 55 1.0 11.3 11,280 5,750 Libya 2,050 2,500 25.0 27 2.4 12.4 5,078 3,600 Nigeria 2,150 2,400 18.7 21 75.0 23.1 308 290 Qatar 350 650 5.6 24 0.2 1.7 8,400 900 Saudi Arabia 8,950 11,840 150.0 35 8.3 25.0 3,009 20,330 United Arab Emirates 2,030 2,420 32.4 37 0.7 6.9 10,521 -5,250 Venezuela 2,280 2,600 18.2 19 12.0 26.7 2,224 -150 Non-OPEC Mexico 990 990 14.0 39 59.9 71.2 1,188 Trinidad 230 230 .7 8 1.1 2.1 1,895 Malaysia 190 190 2.5 36 1 L7 8.7 743 Bolivia 35 35 .4 5.6 1.8 314 Peru 90 90 .7 22 15.4 12.5 814 Egypt 450 450 2.5 15 37.2 11.6 310 Syria 200 200 2.2 30 7.4 4.9 657 Bahrain 54 54 .3 14 0.3 0.6 2,423 Angola 195 195 1.2 16 6.5 3.7 573 Congo 35 35 .4 28 1.3 0.7 497 Zaire 24 24 .2 17 24.7 3.7 151 Oman 350 350 5.7 44 0.8 1.6 2,078 Brunei 207 207 1.6 21 0.2 Tunisia 87 87 2.7 84 5.6 4.2 757 For non-OPEC countries, 1977 production is assumed to be production capacity. movements on the prospects for economic growth than expected depletion and production declines in the industrialized countries, the major reposi- in the older OPEC countries. tory for their investments. As a result, there These limits on output would extend the pro- appears to be a strong incentive for the swing ductibn horizon for some OPEC countries as countries to maintain constant real oil prices. lesser quantities of oil are produced over a greater Curtailed oil supplies due to production ceilings number of years. This grace periodwould give could have profound effects on future oil prices, both producing and consuming countries time to and importing countries must consider the possi- prepare for the transition from oil and gas to coal bility of increasing world oil prices as demand and then to renewable energy sources. approaches available supply. Figure 10-1 shows Based on the projections shown in Figure 10-,I, potential OPEC oil production, derived from en- the following statements can be made: gineering assessments and published production - There is a very real possibility that the,surplus policies, in relation to the projected demand production capacity in OPEC will disappear as levels. The realization of the estimates depends on early as 1985 and as late as 1990.' both producer country motivation and engineering - There is a lower possibility of this occurring limitations. Limitations on oil supply from OPEC either before 1985 or after 1990. countries could result from any one outcome or combination of outcomes, including resource con- As demand levels approach supply constraints, servation by OPEC members with large surplus competitive market demand pressures are ex- revenues, technical limitations on field develop- pected to result in real price increases. Price ment and infrastructure expansion, and higher changes may also come from OPEC policies, ENERGY PROJECTIONS 171 although the timing and magnitude of these limit of the low GNP scenario. Total primary changes are difficult to predict. Two broad possi- energy consumption in the U.S. is predicted to be bilities to equate world oil demand with OPEC's 94 quads in 1985 and 100 quads in 1990. Total capacity to produce are (1) OPEC maintaining a world energy consumption increases from 335 passive role, allowing price increases to occur quads in.1985 to 384 quads in 1990. The resulting onlytwhen demand begins to exceed capacity, or average annual growth rate using the higher price (2) OPEC pursuing an active role by raising prices assumption is 3.3 percent for total energy. smoothly each year until some technological back- The possibility of further price increases is still stop becomes competitive. In either case, such a a likely outcome, although the pressure on slack price rise would cause considerable economic capacity is potentially less in the medium term. impacts. Th "e demand for oil would be reduced, partly because the price had increased and partly .because of the depression in economic activity Long-Range Energy Projections .caused by higher prices. In the long run, these For the price range assumed in the midrange higher prices would stimulate a shift to conserva- section, the projections show that the supply tion strategies and alternative supply develop- situation will tighten rapidly over the 1980-90 inent. Increased conservation efforts would ulti- period, with a strong possibility of real price mately lower demand. increases caused principally by OPEC resource @ The effect of a sustained higher OPEC price is conservation policies that limit production. In the projected in Tables 10-7 and 10-8 for 1985 and long range, a further tightening in the oil supply 1990, showing the balances for world energy in situation can be expected due to resource deple- those years, assuming a real price increase of 5 tion effects. This resource problem is character- percent per annum for the medium growth case. ized by two phenomena: Demand for OPEC oil imports, as shown in Figure 10-1, relative to the previous medium case, 1. The world appears to be facing a long-run oil has dropped in response to the higher prices. U.S. and gas depletion situation, because reserve addi- oil demand in 1985 is forecast at about 21 mb/d, tions to the production base may not be. sufficient and world,oil demand at 76 mb/d. The respective to support the growth in demand. figures for 1990 oil consumption are 19 and 84. All 2. The growth rates of energy consumption will these forecasts are within the range of the con- have to fall substantially from currently projected stant price numbers discussed earlier, although levels to be consistent with projected rates of U.S. oil consumption in 1990 falls-to the lower growth in resource production. TABLE 10-7 Regional Energy Balances with High OPEC Prices, 1985 &nited Ind.u�trial- Less OPEC Centrally ized Developed Planned World States Countries Countries' Countries Economies Oil -(thousands bbilday) Production 10,507 16,735 7,612 36,637 15,311 76,295 Imports 10,157 3 l,694 2,634 -33,010 -1,318 Consumption 20,664 48,429 10,246 3,627 13,992 76,295 Natural gas (billions cu ft6r) 116,934 29,750 3,034 5,651 18,462 56,897 Production Imports 1,833 .3,345 -600 -1,967 -778 Consumption 33,095 2,433 3,684 17,694 56,897 Coal (millions short tonslyr) Production 1,055 1,764 426 5 2,616 4,811 Imports -74 97 -42 -55 Consumption 981 1,961 384 5 2,561 4,811 N uclear, hydro,'solar, geothermal (terawatt-hrlyr) 1,045' 21584 585 M 760 3,948 Total energy consumption (quadrillion Btu) 94 200 33 12 90 335 'All OFCD countries, including the U.S. 172 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 10-8 Regional Energy Balances with High,OPEC Prices, .1990 United Industrial- Less OPEC Centrally States ized Developed CountriesI Planned World Countries' Countries Economies oil (thousands bbllday) Production 11,347 18,238 8,404 41,133 17,029 84,803 Imports 7,969 33,601. 4,118 -36,603 -1,115 Consumption 19,316 51,839 12,521 4,529 15,914 84,803 Natural gas (billions cu ftlyr) Production 16,614 29,808 3,695 9,974 20,887 64,363 Imports 2,361 6,222 -700 -4,741 -781 Consumption 18,975 36,031 2,995 5,232 20,106 64,363 .Coal . (millions short tonslyr) Pr ,oduction 1,244 1,928 502 7 2,986 5,424 Imports -81 115 -40 -75 Consumption 1,163 2,043 462 7 2,911 5,424 Nuclear,.hydro, solar, geothermal (terawatt-hrlyr) 1,555 3,670 924 64 1,350 6,008 Total energy consu miption (quadrillion Bid) 100 225 41 15 103 384 "All OECD countries, including the U.S. I Together these' conditions increase 'the likeli- projections present a range of possible energy hood of long-run competitive pressure among futures. The first part of what follows focuses on consumers for oil in the'world energy market. two recent global projections, and the. second This-pressure can be partially offset by contribu- part examines three projections for the U. S. tions from both new technologies and conserva- alone. tion measures. Increased supplies of energy can be expected from new energy sources-solar,' Long-Range Global Projections wind, geothermal, nuclear-as well as from more advanced'development ofexi@ting sources, includ-' Possible ranges of world energy demand for the ing oil shale, coal gasification, and enhanced oil year 2000 were forecast in 1977 by the Workshop recovery. 'Utilization of these sources requires on Alternative Energy Strategies (WAES)* and' demonstration of the necessary technologies on a the World Energy Conference (WEC).t commercial scale, which involves resolution of The WAES multicountry study w*'as pfepared4 uncerWnties regarding both the basic cost and by independent nation Ial experts in each country", availability of the new processes., However, at and integrated to form a single series of consistent' least to the year 2000, the contribution of technol- inte rnaiional forecasts. Some of the forecasts.. ogy will not cover the excess of U.S. energy, embodied detailed representation of end-use con- demand over supply. Conservation policies might sumption and conservation possibilities in a mul- also be expected to play a role in easing the, tisector input-output representation of the econ- demand for world energy supplies. Consumers omies of the major countries. Others were based may lower projected demand levels by conserving upon much simpler methodologies. The WAES energy, while producers may choose to conserve study focused on the key issues of resource resources by establishing production limits. depletion in the U.S. by emphasizing either a This section surveys major recent long-run nuclear or coal technology approach to oil replace- energy projections for the year 2000. The projec- ment. tions have been selected on the basis of being The reports to the World Energy Conference at publicly available, either in published or in report Istanbul included a series of invited papers on form, and represent a range of viewpoints. The projections are not fully consistent or directly *Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies, Energy Sup- comparable, since they were performed at dffer- ply-Demand Integrations to the Year 2000, Cambridge, 2 ent times and with different assumptions regarding Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. tWorld Energy Conference, Conservation Commission, Re- such basic factors as economic growth rates and port on World Energy Demand, 1985-2020, London: World future oil prices. Despite these difficulties, the Energy Conference, 1977. ENERGY PROJECTIONS 173 TABLE,10-9 rates are roughly comparable (4.2 and 3-5 percent, Long-Run World Energy Assumptions respectively.). Other assumptions are summarized in Table 10-9, and the unconstrained world energy WORKSHOP ON ALTERNATIVE ENERGY consumption figures are shown in Table 10-10. STRATEGIES The objective of the different forecasts is to 1975-85 1985-2000 define a range of credible futures against which Case: a C D C I C2 D7 D8 alternative policy options can be tested. The GDP growth high low high low ranges of possible world energy demand by non- 6% 3.5% 5% 3% centrally planned economies are 338-438 quads Oil price $11.50$11.50 $17.25 $11.50 (WAES) and 317-507 quads (WEC). These differ- by 2000 ent levels result from varying -assumptions about Reserve additions 20 10 20 10 economic growth, energy prices, and policy re- (billion bbllyr) sponses. The WAES scenarios ranged from a OPEC limit (mb/d) none none 45 40 "low economic growth/constrained energy price/ WORLD ENERGY CONFERENCE increasing coal case" to a "high economic growth/ rising energy price/increasing nuclear case." Like- 1975-2000 wise, the World Energy Conference study listed a Case: H-I H-A H-5 L-I L-4 range of forecasts based on scenarios of high (4.2 percent) and low (3.0 percent) projected economic GDP growth high low growth. These cases studied variations in the price 4.2% 3. wo Price response none high high none high response of demand and constraints, on energy Constraints none oil energy none oil development. -WAES cases C I and D7 emphasize coal as the replacement fuel: cases C2 and The WAES analysis predicted gaps in all cases D8 'mphasize nuclear energy. between available Free World- oil supplies and WAES prices per barrel are in 1975 dollars, FOB the Persian Gulf. desired oil demand (Table 10-11). In the year world energy resources--coal, oil, and gas--and 2000, the shortages are projected to range from energy demand for the Conservation Commission. 15-20 mb/d. These "gaps" are the consequence Since these papers were prepared by different of political limits on oil production that could groups, the demand study is not wholly consistent emerge as early as the 1980s or of limits to the with the supply studies. (The authors of the WEC ultimately recoverable oil resources, which seem demand analyses were also associated with the likely no later than the turn of the century..WAES WAES. group that coordinated the individual, noted that in reality these gaps will never occur. country balances.) Rather' than forcing 4 world energy balance, the The WEC demand cases assume a slightly'more WAES study ind ,icated that the gaps were meas- pessimistic future than the WAES projections, ures of the additional effort required to achieve a with..1075-85 world economic growth at 3.0 per- balance. Prices will rise., economic growth 'will. cent, vs. 3.5-6 percent for WAES. In the 1985- slow, stronger government policies will be 2000 period, WEC and WAES economic growth adopted, or otheractions will be taken to balance TABLE 10-10 World Energy Demand, Year 2000 (Quadrillion Btu) WAES Cases WEC Centrally Case Planned C-1 C-2 D-7 D-8 H-5 Economies GNP Growth 5. Wo 5. wo 3.001o 3.0% 4.21% Renewable resources 33 31 24 23 55 27 Nuclear 60 % 54 82 59 26 Oil 1% 194 156 155 164 29 Natural gas 59 55 50 46 22 37 Coal 72 62 54 45 64 71 Total 419 438 338 350 364 190 Total (with centrally planned economies) 6W 628 528 540 554 a includes hydro, geothermal, solar, and biomass resources. 174 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 10-11 numbers have been adjusted. on the basis of WEC data to include the centrally planned economies). WAES Oil Balance for Year 2000 (Millions of barrels per day) Lang-Range U.S. Projections WAES Cases Projections of future energy supply and*demand C-1 C-2 D-7 D-8 for the United States must be examined in the Desired Imports: context of world requirements. Increasing depqrld- North American 10.4 10.7 15.8 15.8 ence on imported oil in the near term necessitates Western Europe 16.5 16.4 13.2 12.5 an international framework. ' The world price'doiil Japan 15.2 14.4 8.2 7.9 also has a strong influence on the ec6nbffiic Rest of Free World competitiveness of alternative energy tecAnolo- outside of OPEC 11.2 9.5 9.6 9.0 gies. International Bunkers 5.4 5.4 4.5 4.5 Three long-range U.S. forecasts published'dur-@ Total 58.7 56.4 51.3 49.7 ing the past year use fundamentally different OPEC Potential Ex- methodological approaches. These are: ports 38.7 37.2 35.2 34.5 1. The Workshop on Alternative. Energy''Strat- Prospective egies study, already described. shortage (gap) 20.0 1 19.2 16.1 15.2 2. A study by the Stanford Research lfistitute. supply and demand. The size of the gaps merely (SRI),* which utilizes a 50-year representation of indicates the magnitude of the adjustment that will supply, conversion, and end-use consumption ' in a be needed in addition to that assumed in the case competitive energy market. An unusual and debat- able. feature of the forecast procedure is that it specification. Figure 10-2 compares the higher priced growth *Electric Power Research Institute, Fuel and Energ''y'Price cases for 1985 and 1990 with the year 2000 Forecasts, Report EPRI EA-433, 2 vols., Menlo 'Park, forecasts from WAES and WEC (the WAES Calif., 1977. 600- Other Nuclear 500- 400 cook. n 300 - 77 Gas 200- oil 106- low nvd high low mod high WEC case H-5 WAFS coses D-7,C-2 1975 1985 1990 2000 2000 Figure 10-2. Comparison of global projections, 1975-2000. ENERGY PROJECTIONS 175 em bodies foresight-that is, future shortages influ- TABLE 10-12 ence present decisions1n planning representation U.S. Long-Run Ener ' Assumptiohs of the energy market. Decision-makers are as- gy sumed to consider the future prices calculated in Technol- the model in deciding whether to produce now or Economic Oil ogy Period Prices 3 later, and whether to expand capacity. Growth I- Empha- fpercent) per oar- sized 3.'A study by Brookhaven National Laboratory rel) and Dale Jorgenson Associates (BNL/DJA),* which uses multiperiod linear programming to WAES case represent the technology of supply, conversion, C 19754985 4.4 $13.00 Cl 1985-2000 3.5 18.75 Coal and end-use consumption in conjunction with a C2 1985-2000 3.5 18.75 Nuclear lon g-term, interindustry transaction model of the D 1975-1985 3.2 13.00, economy. The solutions emphasize conservation D7 1985-2000 2.5, 13.00 Coal and coal resource development along with signifi- D8 1985-2000 2.5 13.00 Nuclear cant development of nuclear and renewable re- SRI sources. Base 1975-1985 4.6 14.09 The ,assumptions of the various cases for the 1985-2000 2.9 17.86 Coal U.S. are shown in Table 10-12 and the outcomes Low 1975-1985 2.8 12.82 in Table 10-13. The broad range of ftitu res shown 1985-2000 1.1 '15.@4 Coal in Table,.10-13 is in part due to the differences in BNL/DJA input .assumptions. Total domestic energy con- Base 1975-1985 3.6 13.00 1985-2000 3.0 15.09 Coal sumption is predicted to range between 109 and and 143 quids in the year 2000, a narrow band of conserva- consumption estimates compared with earlier tion studies. The most critical supply estimate is future Ali prices are in 1975 dollars cif. The WAES prices w.ere FOB the Persian oil availability from domestic sources. WAES Gulf-, $1.50 has been added for freight charges. domestic oil estimates are lowest at 13-15 quads, - However, the rate of growth of U.S. consump- SRI the highest at 18-24 quads. The higher tion can be cut dramatically in the long run by estimates result from relatively optimistic assess- aggressive conservation policies. ments of resource availability, the rate of discOv- - At least to the year 2000, the contribution of ery, and the resolution of uncertainties and bar- technology-supply enhancement, synthetics riers to resource development. Oil imports vary production, nuclear generation, and renewable widely (15-32 quads) depending on world price resources-will not make up the excess of U.S. and the" U.S. supply base. Coal consumption is energy demand over supply, and U.S. depend- predicted to grow substantially in all scenarios. ence on world oil resources will continue at Estimates of nuclear power range from 22 to 35 least at the current range of 7-10 mb/d. quads in 2000. These estimates imply 380-610 Figure 10-3 compares the U.S. projections for gigawatts of generation capacity-a staggering 1985 and 1990 with the range of year 2000 increase from the 163 gigawatts estimated for 1990 estimates to provide a perspective for the rising for the U.S. in the 1978 annual report of the price cases. The comparison shows the divergence Department of Energy's Energy Information of the present. base case forecasts, embodying Administration. Renewable resources including regulatory trends, from the range of free-policy solar and biomass will play a minor but increas- forecasts advocated for the year 2000, none of ingly important role, contributing 1.7-3.9 quads which' is completely consistent with the high, by 2000. Three additional forecasts made by BNU medium, and low growth case specifications. DRI examining the implications of alternative energy sources and technologies will be discussed Future Oil Potential, later in this chapter. , Basic conclusions that can be drawn from the The long-range energy forecasts show declining recent U.S. projections are: world oil production, concommitant with increas -'U.S. oil and gas production from conventional ing demand. Future production, of course, is resources will be unlikely to cover the growth influenced by known reserves, the new discover in U.S. oil and gas consumption., ies,, improved production techniques, level of demand, and OPEC production policies. In the *David 1. Behling and Edward Hudson, Policies for Energy Conservation: Potentials, Mechanisms, and Impacts, midrange years, governmentally imposed produc- Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1978. tion ceilings could alter the supply position, but 176 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 10-13 Most Recent U.S. Projections for the Year 2WO (Quadrillion Btu,) BNL/DJA SRI WAES Cases Base Base Low CI C2 D7 D8 Hydroelectric 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.6 4.6 3.7 3.7 Geothermal 2.2 (in hydro) 3.0 3.0 1.2 1.2 Solar/biomass 3.9 2.3 1.8 3.9 3.9- 1.7 1.7 Nuclear 28.5 31.6 23.0 26.0 35.2 26.0 33.1 Domestic oil 18.8 23.5 17.9 14.9 14.9 12.7 12.7 Imported oil 26.9 14.9 14.9 19.9 20.5 32.2 32.3 Shale oil 3.0 0.6 0.2 4.2 4.2 - - Domestic gas 17.7 20.1 15.7 14.0 14.0 11.5 11.5 Imported gas 1.3 2.6 3.1 3.0 3.6 5.0 5.0 Coal (domestic consumption) 32.6 43.8 29.0 29.8 27.1 21.1 19.1 Other - - - 1.0 1.0 - - Total domestic consumption 138.5 143.2 109.4 124.3 132.0 115.1 120.3 Coal Exports - - - 18.1 7.1 14.6 8.6 "One quadrillion Btu = 0.476 million barrels of oil per day (mb/d). the most important long-range constraint on po- in 1977 the WEC Conservation Commission tential production is the estimated level of re- prepared a Report on Oil Resources, 1998-2020, coverable resources. WAE@ concluded that even containing estimates ofpote-ritial oil production, in without goveinment constraints oil supply in 2000 parallel with the demand study discussed above. will meet demand only under the most optimistic For the oil study, a poll of experts was conducted. assumptions concerning gross additions to re- The findings, broadly comparable to those of serves. WAES, placed ultimately recoverable worldwide 150 - Other 135 144 clear u 120 J '105 _7-7. 90- Coal 75 60 777_77 45.- 30, Oil 15" 10- low tried high IOW med high WAES WAES BNL/' SRI Case Case DJA Bose P-17 C-I 1975 1985 1990 2000 Figure 10-3. Comparison of U.S. projections, 1975-2000. ENERGY PROJECTIONS 477 conventional petroleum resources at approxi- mately 2,100 billion barrels (including cumulative 'I of barroh, production through 1975 of 320 billion barTels). With increased prices and government policies 2,000- directed at supporting higher production levels, estimated recovery rates could be increased and offshore development continued. WEC Production Recovery rate, the ratio of recoverable oil to oil in-pla@e, is an extremely important parameter and suspectible to technological enhancement. If ulti- I Cumulative I., mately recoverable world oil resources at a 40 Discoveries' percent recovery rate are 2,000 billion barrels, a I percent improvement in recovery rate adds 50 billion barrels of ultimately recoverable oil. To 1 show a relative comparison, current-proven re- 0 ............. 1950 1075 2000 2025 serves for the U.S. are estimated at 31 billion barrels. According to the experts polled, the current world recovery rate, estimated at 25-30 Figure 10-4. Cumulative world discovery and production, of oil. percent, is expected to increase to 40 percent by the year 2000 (in the industrial countries to 45 higher recovery factors might postpone. these percent), compared to the present U.S. rate of 32 peaks a few years, but would not reverse.-the percent.-An increase of that size would compare inevitable decline. of oil 'reserves. For comparison, with a U.S. rate that has risen only 0.3 percent the "WAES high" and "WAES'low" ,curves per year over the last two decades. show the two WAES assumptions of constant Based on alternative combinations of ultimately reserve additions of 20 and 10 billion barrels.per@ recoverable resources and reserve/production ra- year. tios, the WEC examined various levels of maxi- The lower curve in Figure 10-4 was derived mum technical production capacity. The conclu-_ from the upper curve by WEC, and shows the sion of the group was that the most likely cumulative production curve based on depletion production profile would lead to a ceiling of 82- of world reserves to an average R/P (reserve/ 104 million barrels per day, peaking around 1990. production) ratio of 20. The production is actually Figure,s 10-4 and 10-5 illustrate the WEC anal- calculated by region, with different R/P ratio limits ysis of the depletion of the world's oil resources. to reflect current national resource conservation In Figure 10-4, the upper curve shows how strategies. Figure 10-5 displays the same produc- cumulativ'e discoveries (reserve additions) would tion curve in terms of annual production rates and grow if the experts' estimated limit of world compares it to a series of world demand growth resources were approached along a growth curve rates of 2, 3, and 5 percent. Under progressively similar to the pattern shown so far by the United lower oil demand growth curves, the WEC study States. The WAES study developed two scenarios- implies ultimate failure of world oil production to using different rates of gross additions to reserves: meet world oil demand in the 1985-20.10.@ time (1) The 20 billion barrels per year case assumes successful but declining discoveries and an in- creased contribution from enhanced recovery; (2) Growth, Rafts the 10 billion barrel per year case assumes rapidly -120 t I [ 40 - decreasing discoveries and little enhanced recov- -100 ery. K30 - Production 80 The model considers high and low economic growth rates, as well as varying oil price levels. A 20 60 .8 disaggregation of OPEC and non-OPEC produc- 40 a 10 tion takes into account the possibility of produc- 20 or tion restrictions. Although these cases result in M i 0 0 different levels of peak production and oil produc- I 1,975 1980 1990 2010 2020 tion levels in 2000, the underlying conclusion is that potential oil demand in the year 2000 is Figure 10-5. World maximum oil production 'at a medium unlikely to be satisfied by crude oil production depletion rate and world demand at three growth rates of from conventional sources. New oil discoveries or oil production. Growth PR,,.otesi "0 178 THE PROJECTIONS frame. The WAES analysis also indicates this of those services are allowed to change across shortfall. scenarios. Incremental implementation levels for the three cases are shown in Table 10-14. Table The Rolel.of Future Technologies 10-15 summarizes resource use in 2000 by fuel and consuming sector. Figure 10-6 iflustrates the In view of a possible midrange production crisis Merences in fuel use under each of the scenarios followed by depletion of the resource'- base', tech- for 1985 and 2000. nological developments will be increasingly nec- In the large-scale electrification scenario, elec- essary to maintain sufficient energy supplies. Al- tricity is substituted for direct use of fossil fuels. ternatives include both new technologies and Coal and nuclear fuel have the potential to con- existing technologies that become eco .nomic as tribute substantially to electricity generation, al- energy prices rise. Improvements could occur not though there are development impacts that must only in actual exploration and production tech- be considered in both cases. One major area of niques but also in electric utility operations, direct increased electricity demand is in the use of heat fuel consumption, energy conversion, and effi- pumps. Fifty percent of new buildings constructed ciency levels. Determining the impact of various between 1985 and 2000 are projected to have methods is complicated because each may pene- electric heat pumps, the remaining new buildings trate the market at a different time, with varying split evenly between electric resistance heat and implementation and success rates. fossil fuels. Electric heat pumps also are assumed Current predictions of technological implemen- to have penetrated the industrial market as a tation are based on research and development source of low-temperature process beat, providing status and schedules, projected product costs, 0.9 quad by the year 2000. This increased indus- anticipated infrastructural requirements, and fu- trial use of electricity results from a combination ture governmental regulatory actions. of declining ofi and gas supplies for boiler fuel and 'Among the technologies expected to be compet- itive before 2000 are heat pumps, enhanced recov- TABLE 10-14 ery of oil and oil shale, geothermal energy for Incremental Implementation Above Base-Case electricity production in certain regions, solar Levels for Three Alternative Energy Technologies, heating, and light-water fast-breeder reactors. Year 2000 Some marginally competitive sources include solar cooling, synthetic fuels from coal, advanced Thousand Quadrillion geothermal techniques, and electric automobiles. megawatts Btu Technologies not now economic could become Large-Scale Electrification: more attractive if prices of conventional energy Light-water reactor 48.7 1.02 sources increased, although a 20-30 percent in- Enhanced coal recovery - - crease in prices would reduce energy demands by Solar electric 9.6 .20 10 percent, so the demands for energy from new Magnetohydrodynamic 1.0 .02 Heat pumps 16.7 .35 technologies still may not exist. Advanced coal combustion 7.2 .15 The implications of -alternative energy technol- Advanced turbines 1.4 .03 ogies.on the total energy system were explored in Geothermal for electricity 16.2 .34 the Brookhaven National Laboratory study for Fossil-Based Systems: the following three scenarios: Enhanced oil recovery - 4.00 Unconventional gas - 3.00 � Large-scale electrification of demand based Coal recovery - .53 upon coal and nuclear fuels. Shale oil - 2.00 Advanced coal combustion 1.4 .03 � Large-scale enhancement of fossil supplies of Coal gasification - 2.00 conventional oil and gas as well as synthetics Coal liquefication - 2.00 from coal. Decentralized Systems: � Large-scale use of renewable resources-solar Low-head hydropower 15.3 .32 energy and biomass and process heat from Geothermal - ..53 cogeneration. Biomass gas and liquids - .20 Fuels and wastes - 1.90 These scenarios show three plausible mixes of Advanced coal combustion - - energy technologies,for a given economic forecast Solar energy - 3.00 and level of consumption implementation. Each Cogeneration - 1.67 forecast delivers the same end-use demands for Note: Year 2000 oil imports for the three cases (in equivalent Btu) are: Large- Scale Ele trification. 15.52 quads@ Fossil-Based Systems, 11.19 quads; Decen- services at the same cost. 'Me means of delivery tralized Scstems, 15.16 quads. ENERGY PROJECTIONS 179 TABLE 10-15 Resource Use for Three Alternative Technologies, Year 2WO (Quadrillion Btu) Alternative Technologies Large- Fossil- SRI Scale Based Decentralized Base Electrification Systems Systems Total primary inputs 138.5 141.3 135.7 129.7 Oil Domestic 18.8 18.8 22.8 18.8 Imported 26.9 26.6 22.0 28.5 Shale 3.0 3.0 5.0 3.0 Coal 32.6 32.1 33.3 26.3 Gas Domestic b 17.7 17.9 21.1 17.9 Imported 1.3 .1 2.7 3.7 Nuclearc 28.5 31.6 20.0 17.8 Electricity, central (hydrolgeolsolar) 7.7 9.2. 6.8 10.2 Electricity, noncentral (other solar/geo) 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.4 Includes wood. Includes biomass, Breeder plus fight-water reactor, economic s of scale in pollution control technol- cluding shale. Coal gasification and,liquefaction ogy. also contribute to the total energy supply by 2000. Energy demands in the fossil-based systems Enhanced crude oil recovery is predicted to scenario are satisfied by heavy reliance on gas supply an additional 1.9 million barrels per day, and oil in the residentialrcommercial sector and and unconventional recovery of natural gas con- increased use of coal by industry. The sources of tributes an increase of 1.4 million barrels per day increased gas and oil supplies are higher recovery (oil equivalent). Coal use by industry is assumed rates from existing developments and production to increase from 4.1 quads in 1976 to 10.7 quads of oil and gas from unconventional sources, in- in 1985, reflecting increased direct use of coal as well as cogeneration. Use of liquefied coal as a fuel allows plants to use existing equipment and "d y reduces, air -pollution levels compared with direct coal use.. i5o The decentralized systems case involves in- 140 creased use of renewable @ resources; including 130 biomass and solar energy, and decentralized or 120 E small-scale technologies. Electricity from central 710 i station powerplants to satisfy final demands is too 7 11 replaced by electricity from decentralized gener- 90 -cca :"d ating; facilities using power included as low-head LO , 00 !4 hydropower and cogeneration. One-quarter of the 70 @14 residential housing units are projected to use solar 60 4. Oil E E space heating to tirieet two-thirds of their heating 50 E requirements in 2000. As with other new energy 40 0 - 4 30 sources, higher prices of traditional fuels and 20 t; C9 0? Domesfic Oil' technological advances both would encourage the 6 f '0 se of solar systems. Congeneration in coal-fired 0 U 1976 IM 2M plants is projected to supply 2.3 quads of process heat and 176 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity to industry by 2000. Figure 10-6. Primary resources by fuel type for three These three extreme cases have an 'overall high alternative energy technologies. degree of similarity and indicate that great changes ,180, THE PROJECTIONS in the structure of U.S. energy supply by the year exclude mining, a dominant factor in land disrup- 2000 do not appear to be feasible. Despite the tion and solid waste generation from the energy enormous rate of growth'of renewable resource sector. use shown forthe decentralized case, the U.S. is The application of U.S. new-source perform- s6en,to remain fundamentally dependent on fossil ance standards on a global basis in the ESNS fuels, and nuclear power in the year 2000. calculations is a highly optimistic assumption. On the other hand, the differences in fuel mix More strict standards may be adopted in some show that we do have options, the choice of areas,but, in general, less strict standards can be which will have an. increasingly significant impact expected. Even the U.S. may not be, meeting the beyond the turn of the century. current standards by 1985--or even by 1990. In general, this assumption leads to underestimates Energy Impacts of probable future emissions. The extent of under- estimation varies by region and by emission type The environmental implications of the energy for regions likely to differ greatly from U.S. projections were assessed quantitatively by the standards, such as many LDCs. The underesti- Biomedical and Environmental Assessment Divi- mation is large for emissions that are heavily sion of Brookhaven National Laboratory with an regulated under U.S. emission standards (sulfur emissions-accounting program called ESNS (for' dioxide and oxides of nitrogen) but small for Energy System Network Simulator). The Brook- regions likely to follow policies similar to those of haven group was provided with energy projections the U.S. (such as Western Europe and Japan) and for 1985 and 1990 from the International Energy for environmental impacts (including land use and Evaluation System (IEES) and, as a first approxi- solid waste generation) that are not affected by mation, used the ESNS program to assess the new-source performance standards. environmental implications of the projections. The It should also be pointed out that the emissions information provided to Brookhaven was insuffi- figures do not address some potentially serious cient in content to produce a global assessment environmental impacts of the energy sector. Esti- for the year 2000 for several reasons: mates of tritium emissions and population expo- (1) IEES projections were for 1985 and 1990 sure refer only to operations occurring in routine only. They did not include base-year estimates or operations in nuclear powerplants; they do not estimates for years beyond 1990. include estimates for mining and for refining and (2) IEES projections included no information as reprocessing plant activities. Indirect effects of to whether the coal used was to be strip-mined or energy processes, such as environmental conse- deep-mined. Thus, the Brookhaven team could quences of energy transport (e.g., oil spills, and not estimate land disruption and solid waste impacts of oil pipelines), are also not included. generation caused by mining. Since the IEES model outputs were not suffi- ciently detailed, these issues could not be ad- (3) Global projections of future emissions stand-. dressed in depth. ards,by region (i.e., emissions generated per Btu Finally, the Brookhaven estimates are the direct of fuel, by region) are not available from any result of the IEE8 projections, and therefore known, source. obviously subject to the assumptions implicit in (4) . Although the environmental effects of en- these projections. For example, the high estimates ergy use depends on sector-specific fuel end-use of sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide generation by (e.g., -petroleum used in air transportation has a the centrally planned economies are a direct result different impact than that used for automotive of the IEES projections of heavy coal use in the transportation), the IEES output does not provide ocentrally planned economies. To reflect this close such detailed end-use information for the ESNS linkage 'between IEES and ESNS, the following model. findings are attributed jointly to IEES-ESNS. The Brookhaven analysts compensated for lim- Findings itation (4) by using the currently dominant con- suming devices for energy end-use. They compen- The IEES-ESNS findings for the 1985 and 1990 sarted for (3) by applying U.S. new-source medium-GNP growth scenarios are summarized in performance standards on a global basis. No Table 10-16. (The high- and low-GNP growth ,means were available to compensate for limita- findings are in Tables 10-17 and 10-18.) A com- tions'(1) and (2).* It should also be noted that parison of 1990 IEES-ESNS emissions projectio 'ns estimates for land -disruption and solid waste with estimates of recent emissions rates from the generation are incomplete measures, since they technical literature is given in Table 10-19. The ENERGY PROJECTIONS 181 TABLE 10-16 Emission Projections, 1985 and 1990, Wdium-Grow -th Case European U.S. Less Centrally OECD and Japan Developed OPEC Planned World Countries Canada Countries Countries Economies 1985 Carbon dioxide (billions of short tons) 5.2 7.54 1.68 2.81 0.89 8.99 27.1 Carbon monoxide (millions of short ions) 24.7 115.2 7.25 17.2 6.22 25.4 96.0 Sulfur dioxide (millions of short tons) 12.8 14.2 5.10 7.76 1.51 36.8 78.1 Oxides of nitrogen (millions of short tons) 15.1 17.1 5.27 8.99 2.68 23.4 72.5 Particulates (millions of short tons) 6.21 9.85 2.20 7.17 0.58 38.1 64.1 Hydrocarbons (millions of short tons) 2.8 2.08. 0.86 0.67 3.46 .11.8 Land use (millions of acres) 13.7 18.8 3.37 11.9 0.005 15.1 62.8 Solid wastes (millions 'of short tons) 61.9 240 7.69 50.4 0.73 187 547 Tritium (thousands of curies) 103 145 22.9 34.6 3.64 47,9 357 Population exposure (thousands of man-rems) 3.98 5.59 0.88 1.33 0.14 1.84 13.8 Solid high-level wastes (billions, ofcuries) 11.0 15.5 2.44 3.69 0.39 5.10 38.1 1990 Carbon dioxide (billions of short tons) 5.90 8.29 1.88 3.42 1.15 10.2 30.9 Carbon monoxide (millions of short tons) 29.4 15.6 9.20 21.1 7.97 28.9 112.0 Sulfur dioxide (millions'of short'lons) 14.2 15.6 5.52 9.40 1.94 41.9 88.5 Oxides of nitrogen (millions of short tons) 14,9 18.2 5.84 11.0 3.46 26.7 82.0 Particulates (million@ of short tons) 6.92 11.0 2.38 8.63 .0.76 43.4 73.1 Hydrocarbons (millions of short totrs) 1.29 2.17 1.06 2.32 0.96 3.94 13.7 Land use (millions of acres) 15.7 21.7 4.43 15.7 0.008 21.7 79.1 Solid wastes (millions of short tons) 74.2 280.0 7.75 60.4 1.02 213.0 637.0 Tritium (thousands of 47uries) 178.0 225.0 42.4 74.6 .12.0 118.0 650.0 Population exposure (thousands of man-i-ems) 6.83 8.65 1.63 2.87 0.46 4.53 25.0 Solid high-level wastes (billions of curies) 18.9 24.0 4.52 7.95 1.28 12.6 69.2 probable consequences of the projections are reliance on fossil fuels continues, accumulations discussed below. of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will cause seriously'disruptive climatic shifts in the early 21st Carbon Dioxide. As projected, carbon dioxide entury. emissions in 1990 will be about double those of c the mid-1970s. The prevailing belief among clima- tol9gists is that increases of CO, emissions on this Particulates. IEES-ESNS estimates a total of order of magnitude will not have strong impacts. 61-78 million short tons -of particulates per, year However, there is growing concern that, if heavy will result from fossil fuel combustions in 1990. 182 THE PROJECTIONS This represents roughly a doubling of energy- emissions. I Thus, the energy sector may not have related particulate emissions. More than half of a major impact on the total global particulate these emissions are calculated to come from the levels. centrally planned economies, due to the energy In urban areas the projected doubling of en- projection of their heavy reliance on coal. ergy-related particulates would degrade the air Present global particulate emissions from nat- quality, lowering visibility and contributing to ural and anthropogenic sources were estimated chronic and acute respiratory illnesses. The ex- at 2.6 billion short tons per year-about 50 times tent of harm that might be done is difficult to the projected 1990 energy-related particulate estimate due to (1) lack of knowledge about TABLE 10-17 Emisson Projections, 1985 and 1990, High-Growth Case European U.S. Less Centrally OPEC OECD and Japan Developed Planned' World Countries Canada Countries Countries Economies Carbon dioxide 1985 (billions of short tons) 5.81 8.31 1.88 3.02 .97 9.27 29.2 Carb on monoxide (millions (?f short tons) 27.4 17.4 7.89 18.2 6.69 26.2 104.0. Sulfur dioxide (millions of short tons), 14.3 15.5 5.73 8.35 1.63 37.9 83.3 Oxides of nitrogen (millions of short tons) 17.0 22:2 5.90 9.62 2.90 24.1 78.3 Particulates (millions of short tons)' 6.44 10.7 2.37 7.77 0.62 39.2 67.2 Hydrocarbons (millions of shorttons) 3.11 1.84 .94 2.01 0.72 3.57 12.7 Land use (millions of acres) 13.7 18.8 3.37 11.9 0.005 15. 1, 62.9 Solid wastes (millions of short tons) 66.5 264.0 8.01 55.5 1.02 193.0 598.0 Tritium (thousands of curies) 103.0 149.0 22.9 34.6 3.64 47.9 361.0 Population exposure (thousands of man-rems) 3.98 5.71 .88 1.33 0.14 1.84 13.9 Solid high-level wastes (billions of curies) 11.0 15.9 2.44 3.69 0.39 5.10 38.4. 1990 Carbon dioxide (billions of short tons) 6.80 9.47 2.15 3.84 1.36 10.7 34.3 Carbon monoxide (millions of short tons) 33.6 18.6 10.5 23.6 9.36 30.2 126.0 Sulfur dioxide (millions of short tons) 16.4 17.8 6.38 W.5 2.28 43.7 97.0 Oxides of nitrogen (millions of short tons) 19.7 25.3 6.72 12.3 4.07 27.8 91.1 Particulates (millions of short tons) 7.58 12.4 2.63 9.60 0.87 45.3 78.3, Hydrocarbons (millions of short tons) 3.79 2.15 IA7 2.60 1.01 4.12 153. Land use (millions of acres) 15.7 21.7 4.43 15.7 0.009 21.7 79.2 Solid wastes (millions of short tons) 63.7 314.0 8.32 67.9 1.46 223.0 667.0 Tritium (thousands of curies) 178.0 230.0 42.4 74.6 12.0 118.0 655.0 Population exposure (thousands oyman-rems) 6.83 8.86' 1.63 2.87 0.46 4.53 25.2 Solid high-level wastes (billions of curies) 18.9 24.6 4.52 7.95 1.28 12.6 69.8 ENERGY, PROJECTIONS 183 TABLE 10-18 Emission Projections, 1985 and 1990, Low-@Growth Case European U.S. Less OPEC Centrally OECD and Japan Developed Countries Planned World Countries Canada Countries Economies 1985 Carbon dioxide (billions of short ions) 4.78 6.85 1.51 2.57 0.80 7.5.2 24.0 Carbon monoxide (millions of short tons) 22.5 13.4 6.68 15.7 5.50 22.4 86.1 Sulfur dioxide (millions of short tons) 11.8 13.0 4.52 7.07 1.33 29.8 67.4 Oxides of nitrogen (millions of short tons) 13.5 15.7 4.71 8.21 2.38 19.7 64.1 Particulates (millions of short tons) 6.3 9.02 2.03 6.56 0.54 30.6 55.0 Hydrocarbons (millions of short tons) 2.56 1.84 0.79 1.73 0.59 2.99 10.5 Land use (millions of acres) 13.7 18.7 3.37 11.9 0.004 15.1 61.2 Solid wastes (millions of short tons) 80.1 218 7.43 45.6 0.58 149 500 Tritium (thousands of curies) 103 142 22.9 34.6 3.64 47.9 354 Population exposure (thousands of man-rems) 3.98 5.44 0.88 1.33 0.14 1.84 13.6 Solid high-level aastes (billions of curies) 11.0 15.1 2.44 3.69 0.39 5.10 37.6 19" Carbon dioxide (billions of short tons) 5.20 7.31 1.62 3.05 0.97 8.42 26.6 Carbon monoxide (millions of short tons) 26.2 13.1 8.44 19.6 6.% 25.0 99.2 Sulfur dioxide (millions of short tons) 12.7 13.8 4.68 8.42 1.56 33.4 .74.6 Oxides of nitrogen (millions of short tons) 14.8 16.2 4.44 9.74 2.88 22.0 70.7 Particulates (millions of short tons) 6.66 9.73 2.15 7.81 0.63 34.2 61.2 Hydrocarbons (millions of short tons) 2.94 1.85 0.38 2.14 0.73 3.35 12.0 Land use (millions of acres) 15.7 21.6 4.43 15.7 0.007 21.6 79.0 Solid wastes (millions of short tons) 75.1 243 7.49 50.2 1.02 .168 545 Tritium (thousands of curies) 178 214 42.4 74.6 12.0 118 639 Population exposure (thousands of man-rems) 6.83 8.23 1.63 2.87 0.46 4.53 24.6 Solid high-level wastes (billions of curies) 18.9 22.9 4.52 7.95 1.28 12.6 68.1 chemical composition and specific effects of half of this-33 to 44 million short tons-is particulates; (2) dependence of the effects on projected to come from the centrally planned plant siting, air drainage, and other factors; and economies and is again attributable to the energy (3) difficulties establishing clear cause and effect projection that the centrally planned economies relationships in health problems. will rely heavily on coal as an energy source. The IEES-ESNS figures for sulfur dioxide Sulfur dioxide. IEES-ESNS projects global emissions are probably substantially lower than emissions of sulfur dioxide to be between 75 and will actually be realized. Global emissions of 97 million short tons per year in 1990. Nearly sulfur dioxide are currently about 140 million 184 THE PROJECHONS TABLE 10-19 considerable amounts of land for disposal. Even after the land-use problem is solved, leaching Recent Estimates of Emissions from.Fuel problems can lead to further environmental dam- Combustion, Compar ed with EEES-ESNS Estimates for 1990 age. Oxides of Nitrogen. IEES-ESNS estimates the Present Calculated 1990 emissions of oxides of nitrogen at 71-91 Emissions Erttissions per million short tons per year. As a point of per Year Year for 1990 comparison, current global emissions from fossil Carbon dioxide (billions of fuel combustion have been estimated at 52 mil- short tons) 5.4a 27-34 lion short tons per year, which is less than 10 Sulfur dioxide (millions of percent of the almost 600 million short tons of short tons) 113b 75-97 4 Oxides of nitrogen (millions nitrogen dioxide thought to be released into thT of short tons) 1. 52c 71-91 atmosphere annually by bacterial action .2 Thl Particulates (millions of short Brookhaven 19% figure, therefore, represents an tons) 28d 61-78 increase of 30-75 percent over current estimated Council on Environmental Quality, 8zh Annual Report, 1977, p. 190. global emissions from fossil fuel sources. Even Estimated from total global sulfur dioxide generation figures in D. M. Whelpdale and R. E. Munn, in A. C. Stem, ed., Air Pollution, vol. 7, 3rd ed., though this increase, is small compared to natural New York: Academic Press, 1977. sources, it may be environmentally significant, 0 E. Robinson and R. C. Robbins, Emissions Concentrations and Fate of Particulate Atmospheric Pollutants, Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research since it will occur in urban and industrial areas Institute, 1971. with high population density, where it will con- dIbid.: calculated using same procedures used for sulfur dioxide estimates. tribute to the formation of photochemical oxi- dants, the most damaging ingredient in smog. Human exposure to nitrogen dioxide has been short tons per year.3 If U.S. figures are typical shown to increase susceptibility to respiratory throughout the world, then 81 percent of the infections and result in increases in chronic sulfur oxide emissions (113 miflion short tons) are respiratory diseases. Ozone, a respiratory irritant from fuel combustion. The IEES-ESNS figures formed in the atmosphere through chemical reac- would therefore imply a substantial decrease in tions involving nitrogen oxides, is associated with sulfur dioxide emissions between now and 2000. decreased pulmonary functions. It is unclear These optimisticafly low projections stem in large whether oxides of nitrogen alone have adverse part frorn'the assumption that U.S. new-source effects on vegetation, but adverse synergistic performance standards will be applied throughout effects of oxides of nitrogen and sulfur dioxide the world. The Environmental Protection Agency's' have been demonstrated. Photochemical smogs Office 'of Research and Development estimates containing nitrogen oxides, ozone, and related that these standards would, in the case of high- pollutants are quite'darnaging to many food crops sulfur coals, require reductions in emissions from and to other sensitive vegetation. Nitrogen dioxide coal combustion to about 20 percent of the and nitrate aerosols contribute to decreased visi- unregulated emissions. bility. Sulfur dioxide and its oxidation products have Carbon Monoxide. IEES-ESNS projects car- many adverse effects on biological organisms. bon monoxide emissions in 1990 at between 99.2 These pollutants damage crops and other vege- and 126 million short tons per year. No current tation. They are respiratory irritants and contrib- ute to acid rain and its damage to fish and estimates of carbon monoxide emissions could vegetation (see the forestry and fresh water be found for comparison. However, the IEES- projections in this chapter). The extent to which ESNS figure for 1990 represents a 16 percent sulfur dioxide emissions from the global energy increase over the 1985 figure. These increased sector increase or decrease will determine carbon monoxide emissions are expected to have whether the problems associated with sulfur little environmental effect-except in urban dioxide and sulfates will increase or decrease in areas-because carbon monoxide released into the years ahead. the atmosphere quickly dilutes to levels believed The reduction of atmospheric emissions is not to be below physiological significance. a final solution to the sulfur problem. The cherni- INticlear Emissions. Of the radioactive emis- cal-rich sludge that results from desulfurization sions figures produced by IEES-ESNS, the high- processes can itself become an environmental level solid wastes, which pose the greatest diffi- hazard. The projected increases in desulfurization culty (and the greatest potential hazard), are the imply volumes of sludge large enough to require only ones discussed here. ENERGY PROJECTIONS 185 The problem of high-level radioactive sol -id the increase will depend on what fuels are used waste is not so much in the magnitude of the and how emissions are regulated. A strategy wastes generated (which is projected to be large) making heavy use of coal-as in the @energy as in the nature of the disposal problem. At calculation for the centrally planned economies- present the technical problems of high4evel leads to heavy loadings of particulates, sulfur ,:waste disposal are,unresolved. The U.S.'Depart- dioxide, o 'xides of nitrogen, and carbon dioxide. .ment of Energy plans a demonstration project'in Worldwide regulation along the lines of the U.S. the next few years, but no commercial facilities new-source performance standards would reduce Are now available in the U.S. With the future of sulfur dioxide emissions to the-point where toial reprocessing plants in question because of their annual emissions in 1990 could be less than E otential to contribute to the proliferation of present-day emissions if they were applied- on a clear weapons, spent fuel rods are rapidly filling global basis. ixisting storage facilities in some countries.' The strongest impacts for the class of energy f'- Disposal of nuclear wastes will be a difficult impacts considered in the Brookhaven analysis ,issue even with solution to the technical prob- are likely to be those on urban air quality. As we.11 lems of storage and the political problems of as having the aesthetically. negative, quality of proliferation. Japan and several of the European dirtying air and reducing visibility, these air-qual- 'nuclear countries lack appropriate sites for dis- ity impacts will tend to increase' respiratory. .in- posal. Localities with sites more suitable 'for nesses and damage to vegetation. In the longer- disposal may resist having nuclear waste facilities term, accumulation of atmospheric carbon dioxide develope .d within their jurisdictions. 'All but three may have more impact on the environment than ,states in the U.S. have rejected nuclear disposal all the other effects of energy use taken together. within their borders. 4 This probably will not have happened by 2000, thou gh, if the world by then has adopted an energy-, str-ategy based on coal, oil shale, and other fossil Conclusions fuels that will still be abundant by 2000, the best Increases in energy use will, ceterus paribus, scientific evidence presently available, -indicates lead to 'increases of the gaseous emissions gener- that large disruptive climate shifts may occur in ated in the course of energy use. The extent of the first,half of the 21st century. REFERENCE$ 1. Rai'ph M. Rotty, "Uncertainties Associated with Future 3. D. M. Whelpdale and R. E. Munn, in A. C. Stern, ed., Atmospiieric CO, Levels," Oak Ridge Associated Uni- Air Pollution, vol. 7, 3rd ed., New York: Academic versities Institute for Lnergy Analysis, lune 1977. Press, 1917. E. Robinson and R. C. Robbins, Emissions Concentra- tions and Fate of Particulate. Atmospheric, Pollutants;- 4. "Trouble:even in New Mexico for Nuclear Waste Dis- Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, 1971.. posal, " Science, Mar. 10, 1978,, p. @ 1050.1 11 Fuel-Minerals Projections A consensus is developing that a major shift in TABLE 11-1 the world's patterns of energy utilization is im- Recoverable World Nonrenewable Energy pending. Growing energy demand will deplete Resources conventional energy resources eventually. The problem is more acute for petroleum and natural (Quadrillion Btu) gas than coal--our most abundant conventional fuel. But there are limits to the role that even coal Petroleum 9,634 can play. Natural gas a 8,663 Table 11-1 illustrates the estimated energy re- Solid fuels b 120,854 Shale oil c 20,130 sources available to the world. It should be clearly Tarsands" understood that a high degree of uncertainty Uranium e 1,%0 applies to these numbers, as resource estimating is not an exact science. Thus, approximately Total 161,241 161,250 quadrillion Btu (British thermal units) of Based on physical units from Congressional Research Service. Project Interdependence: U.S. and World Energy Outlook Through 1990, Washington: energy is assumed available for use--if conditions GPO, 1977 (based on work done by M. King Hubbert). Conversion factors: I allow. While this seems large, an exercise devel- barrel oil = 5.8 million Btu; I cu ft natural gas = 1,020 Btu. b Based on physical units from World Energy Conference, Siin e@ (@/' Energy oped by Vincent E. McKelvey, former Director Resources. 1976. Recoverability of coal assumed to be 50 percent. Conversion of the U.S. Geological Survey, shows the impact factor varies for geographical regions. ,Based on physical units from U.S. Geological Survey. Represents identified of exponential growth rates of energy demand.' resources only. I Not estimated, but total energy content of oil in-place is approximately 5.600- Assuming only the energy availability shown in 9,000 quadrillion Btu. based on physical units in table 11-18. Table 11-1, and world energy consumption of e Based on physical units from World Energy Conference, Surt eY of Energy Resources, 1976. Light-water reactor technology assumed. Conversion factor: approximately 250 quadrillion Btu (the 1976 esti- 400 billion Btu/short ton of U30, mate), life of these resources would be: At 0 percent annual increase in demand rate: It would appear that a sixth doubling would be Resource life = 161,250/250 = 645 years impossible and that resource Iffe would be slightly At 2 percent annual increase in the demand rate: over 70 years. Cumulative consumption during The above is a highly artificial example of the ist doubling period (1977-2011) 12,750 effects of continued growth rates on the energy 2nd doubling period (2012-2046) 25,500 resource base, as the expectation of continued 3rd doubling period (2047-2081) 51,000 growth is unrealistic. It does point to the problem Tota11977-2081 89,256 to be faced as the world shffts from one energy Total 2082-2110 71,494 source to another. Total 160,750 Other energy sources have the potentiality for supplying future energy demand. Some, such as It would appear that a fourth doubling would be solar energy, are renewable while others, such as impossible, and that resource life would be less nuclear fission (using the breeder), thermonuclear than 133 years. fusion (perhaps), and geothermal energy, offer hopes of long-term solution to energy supply. The At 5 percent annual increase in the demand rate: major problem is bridging the transition from the Cumulative consumption during fossil fuels to the more abundant energy sources. Ist doubling period (1977-1990) 5,150 2nd dubling period (1991-2004) 10,300 3rd doubling period (2005-2018) 20,600 Resource Terminology 4th doubling period (2019-2032) 41,200 In discussing resources it is necessary to define 5th doubling period (2033-2046) 82,400 two key terms-reserves and resources. For the Total 1977-2046 (70 years) 159,650 United States the terminology is based on a U.S. 187 188 THE PROJECTIONS -777 7 TOTAL RESOURCES r IDENTIFIED UNDISCOVERED r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Demonstro;7 Inferred Hypothetical Speculative --I Iln Undiovred sured n;,Cae; Iln Known Dioricul I Districts) 0 z RESERV S 0 1 UJ Aft r OURCES JE 0 1 OL_ UJI-2 go P 4mr-bV *#r" of-Cvc@gk Aswwonce F%m 11-1. Classification of mineral resources. Geological Survey/Bureau of Mines classification geologic knowledge for which quantitative meas- system. 2The system is based on two variables- urements are not available. Such reserves are degree of geologic assurance and degree of Eco- estimated to be recoverable in the future as a nomic feasibility-411ustrated in Figure 11-1. result of extensions, revisions of estimates, and Thus, reserves are identified deposits of min- deeper drilling in known fields. ' erals known to be recoverable with current tech- In most instances these three categories are nology under present economic conditions. There undifferentiated here. Reserves of coal are some- are three categories of reserves: times discussed in daerent terms, as follows: Measured reserves are identified reserves from The demonstrated coal reserve base includes which an energy commodity can be economically measured and indicated in-place quantities of extracted with existing technology and whose bituminous coal and anthracite located in beds 28 location, quality, and quantity are known from inches or more thick, and subbiturninous coal in geologic evidence supported by engineering evi- beds 60 or more inches thick that are located in dence. depths up to 1,000 feet. The demonstrated coal Indicated reserves are reserves based partly on reserve base includes also small quantities of coal specific measurements, samples, or production located in beds thinner and/or deeper than coal data and partly on projections for a reasonable presently mined, for which there is evidence that time period on the basis of geological evidence. mining is commercially feasible at this time. The Inferred reserves are reserves based upon broad data for lignite include beds 60 inches or more FUEL-MINERALS PROJECTIONS 189 TABLE 11-2 Reserve and Resource Terminology Type Resources Total Reserves Recoverable Reserves Other Resources a Solid fuelsb Known reserve-in-place Known recoverable Additional resources Oil and natural gas Original reserve-in-place Proved recoverable reserves Additional resources Natur-al gas liquids Proved recoverable reserves Additional resources Oil shale and bituminous Potential total known recoverable resources sands Uranium and thorium Known recoverable reserves d Additional resources Note: Terminology for hydraulic resources includes installed and installable capacity (power in Mw) and probable annual generation (energy in GWhr/yr). Similar terminology applies, in general, to other renewable resources. 41ncludes indicated (probable) and inferred (possible) reserves as normally defined, bTotal resources are also given for solid fuels. 'Includes past cumulative production. 'Alternative (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) terminology is reasonably assured resources (recoverable at costs up to approximately $26/kg of U or Th). Reasonably assured resources recoverable at costs above $26/kg are reganled as part of additional resources. Smme: Bauer and Carlsmith, p. 47. thick that can be surface-mined. These are gener- ing them have been identified and their geometry ally located at depths no greater than 120 feet. and quality evaluated on the basis of direct Resources includes reserves as well as minerals evidence. Even so estimates of resdrves do not that have been identified but cannot now be have the exactitudes of inventories of other kinds extracted because of economic or technological of stock and they may err by plus or minus 10-25 limitations, as well as economic or subeconomic percent. The assessment of undiscovered re- materials that have not as yet been discovered. sources, however, entails far more hypothesis and Undiscovered recoverable resources are quan- much speculation, based on incomplete and some- tities of an energy commodity that may be reason- times incompatible data, with the hazard, then, ably expected to exist in favorable geologic set- that even the most conscientious estimate may be tings but that have not yet been identified by grossly in error .4 drilling. Exploration and resulting discovery, will permit the reclassification of such resources to the Petroleum reserves category. This, of course, is the U.S. system. There are Various resource estimators place the quantity other classification systems. As pointed out by of ultimately recoverable petroleum at approxi- Bauer and Carlsmith,l "One of the reasons for a. mately 2,000 billion barrels. Some * of these esti- wide disparity in definitions of reserves and re- mates made since 1970 and cited by M. King sources of energy raw materials among the var- Hubbert in the Project Interdependence report 5 ious regions and nations is that present local usage are presented in Table 11-3. is based on historical precedents which have evolved under differing social, legal, economic, and technical experiences and commercial prac- TABLE 11-3 tices." For this reason the World Energy Confer- ence (WEC) in its latest reports uses the reserve Estimates of World Ultimate Production of and resources tenninology defined in Table 11-2. Crude Oil Made Since 1970 The above classification systems are applicable (Billions of barrels) primarily to stock energy sources, i.e., energy sources having finite quantities. Proble ms arise in Estimators Organization Quantity classifying flow and renewable energy forms, for J. D. Moody and H. Mobil Oil Corp., 1,800-1,900 here the concept of time enters. For this reason, H. Emenik renewable energy sources will be shown with their Richard L_ Jody Sun Oil Co. 1,952 annual output. This is particularly true for hydro- H. R. Warman BP, Ltd. 1,800 William Verneer Shell 1,930 power, tidal power, solar energy, etc. H. R. Warman BP, Ltd. 1,915 Before turning to the subject of oil resources, J.D. Moody and R. Mobil Oil Corp. 2,000 some quahfications regarding reserves should be W. Esser noted. V. E. McKelvey states: We know a good M. King Hubbert U.S. Geological 2,000 deal about reserves because the deposits compos- Survey 190 THE PROJECTIONS Hubbert's estimates of ultimate production of dle East (315 billion barrels additional). The de- cru& oil are given in Table 11-4. Basically, he gree to which other resource estimato 'rs have estimates that 2,000 billion barrels of oil were included deep oiffshore and polar@ areas is not a Ivailable originally, and that approximately 339 readily discernible. billion barrels have already been produced. This Bernar-do F. Grossling of the U.S. Geological leaves 1,661. billion barrels of remaining resources. Survey has, pointed out that many prospective Of this, 646 billion barrels are reserv4is '6 leaving areas of the world have not been extensively slightly over 1,000 billion barrels to be discovered. drilled. As shown in Table 13-5 the density of Reserves as of January 1, 1978, are shown in drilling per square mile of prospective petroleum Table 11-5 for various regions of the world. area (Mi 2) varies from a high of 0.98 wells/mile 2 in 1976 the world produced 21.7 billion barrels in the United'States to a low of 0.0031 wells/mile 2 of oil. Thus, if the production rate remained con- in Africa. As,many resource estimates are. based stant, World reserves of oil would last about 30 on extrapolations from known petroleum areas, years, and total resources about 77 years. This is, some of the least drilled areas may contain of course, not a proper description of the decline resources not showing up in resource estimates. pattern of petroleum production. The overall pro- The 9,634 quadrillion Btu of petroleum re7 duction would decline over time from some peak, sources constitutes 5.4 percent of total recovera- and the time involved would be longer than 77 ble world nonrenewable energy resources. years. A feeling is developing that the peak of Two final points on the distribution of petro@ petroleum production will occur in the 1990s. leum resources and reserves are in order. One is The World Energy Conference recently ran a that, in general, reserves and resources are fairly survey among various resource estimators on their closely con-elated, as would be expected. There.is view of ultimately recoverable resources of oil. 7 one notable exception--and that is the communist The average of -their low estimates was 1,240 countries. These countnies have 15 percent of total billion barrels; of their median estimates, 1,806 world petroleum reserves, and are estimated to billion barrels; and of their high estimates, 3,110 have, 25 percent of total world petroleum re- billion barrels. Most'of the incremental oil for the sources. Development is at an early to intermedi- high estimate comes-from deep offshore and'polar ate stage. areas (505 billion barrels additional) and the Mid- A second general point is that, with the excep- TABLE 11-4 World Curnulative Production, Ultimate Production, and Future Resources of Crude Oil as of January 1, 1976 Region Cumulative Ultimate Remaining Energy Production Production Resources Content Quadril- Billions of barrels lion Btu United States and Canada: United States 112.118 215 103 597 Canada 7.217 84 77 446 Total 119.335 299 180 1,044 Latin America: Mexico 5.574 30 24 139 South America 160 120 696 Total 45.249 190 144 835 Europe (excluding communist countries) 3.220 68 65 377 Africa 20.598 162 141 818 Middle East 84.170 598 514 2,981 Asia-Pacific 9.477 % 97 505 Communist countries 57.367 472 415 2,407 Additional future discoveries - 115 115 667 World total 339.416 2,000 1,661 9,634 Now Coriversion factor. I barrel od -_ 5.9 million Btu. Source: Library of Congress, CongressionaJ Research Service, Prf4ecl Interdependence: U.S. und World Energy Outlook Through 1990. FUEL-MINERALS PROJECTIONS 191 TABLE 11-5 tion of the U.S.S.R.i the industri alized nations World FL-troleurn Reserves, January 1, 1978 with the highest rate of petroleum consumption have the smallest reserves and resources. The Estimated Estimated Reserves/ implications for future capital transfers are signifi- Region Proved, Production Production cant. Reserves 1977 Ratio Billions of barrels Naftwal Gas U.S. and Canada United States 29.50 3.01 9.8 Unlike petroleum, no consensus has developed Canada 6.00 .50 12.0 as to natural gas resourr-es. Some estimates made Total 35.50 3.51 10.1 since 1970 are given in Table, 11-J. M. King Latin America . I Hubbert has estimated that the ultimate natural Mexico 14.00 .36 38.9 gas production is 10,000 tcf (trillions of cubic Central and feet), of which 1,507, has been produced. This South America 26.37 1.31 20.1 Total 40.37 1.67 24.@ leaves 8,493 tcf available, as 'illustrated in Table Europe (excluding 114. Of the available resources, 2,519 tcf consist communist coun- of. reserves,-. leaving 5,984 tcf still to be found.. tries) 26.8 .50 53.6 Reserves are delineated in Table 11-9 for various Africa 59.20 regions of theworld. Middle East 366.17 7.98 45.9 In 1976 approximately 50 tcf of natural gas was Asia-Pacific produced. Assuming continuation of this rate of (excluding production, the world would have reserves lasting communist 44.6 years, and total remaining resources lasting countries) 19.75 1.01 19.6 approximately 170 years. As with petroleum, this Com munist countries is not an especially apt description of the produc- U.S.S.R. 75.00 4.06 187 tion rise and decline of natural gas. China 26.00 .66 303 'Other 3.00 1'5 20.0 Also, as with petroleum, the sparsity of drilling Total 98.00 4.81 20..4 in certain prospective petroleum areas may indi- cate understatement- of the resources in these Total World 645.85 21.73 29.7 regions. Source: Oil and Gas Journal. December 26. l9rn. Natural gas resources of 8,663 quadrillion Btu represent 4.8 percent of the total nonrenewable TABLE 11-6 energy resources estimated to be remaining to the world. Density of Petroleum"Drilling for Selected Areas of the World, as of End of 19751 TABLE 11-7 Exploratory Country or Region Wells/mile2 Wells/mile 2 Estimates Made Since 1970 of Remaining.World Resources of Natural Gas United States 0.98 0.20 U.S.S.R. 0.15 0.029 (Trillions of cubic feet) Canada 0.053 0.011 Western Europe 0.019 0.0094 Estimators Orgamization QuantityO Japan 0.021 0.0039 C. P. Coppack 6,660 Australia and New Zealand 0.0016 0.0032 M. King Hubbert U.S. Geological Survey 11,950 South and Southeast T. D. Adams and Mobil Oil Corp. 7,020-7,88b Asia 1 0.0067 0.0031 M. R. Kirby 5,150 Latin America 1 0.0021 0.0029 National Academy of People's bRepublic of Science 6,900 China 0.010 0.0022 Institute of Gas Middle bEast b 0.0083 0.0017 Technology 9,1504,550 Africa 0.0031 0.0014 M. King Hubbert CongressionalResearch 6Density refers to prospective petroleum areas of a country. which are, in Service 8,493 general, smaller than the total area of the country. bDevelopment area. -Remaining resources converted to ultimate resources by addition of 1.500 tcf Soarte:'Bemardo F. Grossling. "the Petroleum Explorat 'o challenge with previous production to figure. Numbers originally irk exajoules and converted on Respect to Developing Nations." in The Fulure Stipp@% @/ Nature-Made basis of I 1cf= 1.0885 exajoules. Petroleum and Gas: The Firw UNITAR Cmilm,me )n Energ.v and Me soior,,: world Energy Conference. The Finitrelm- WiWil Natural Gas sal,14'.. f*ja are. Elmsford. N.Y.: Pergamon. 1977. 1985-1020, Apr. 15. 1977. p. 5. 192 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 11-8 World Cumulative Production, Ultimate Production, and Future Resources of Natural Gas (January 1, 1976) Region Cumulative Ultimate Remaining Energy Production Production Resources Content Quadril- lion Trillions (if cubic feet Blu United States and Canada: United States 500 1,240 740 755 Canada 26 663 637 650 Total 526 1,903 1,377 1,405 LatinAmerica: Mexico 21 104 83 85 South America 106 428 322 328, Total 127 532 405 413 Europe (excluding communist countries) 25 517 492 502 Africa 81 638 557 568 Middle East 158 1,122 964 983 Asia-Pacific 46 468 422 430' Communist countries 544 4,478 3,934 4,013 Additional future discoveries 342 342 349 World total 1,507 10,000 8,493 8,663 Nwe: Conversion factor: I cubic foot = 1.020 Btu. Sww-: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Pwii,t r Inteiii(wend e: U.S. and W,,rl,l Energ) Owl ... k Thrmegh 1990. TABLE 11-9 As can be seen from Tables 11-8 and 11-9, the World Natural Gas Reserves, January 1, 1978 communist countries (and the U.S.S.R. in partic- ular) have a significant share of world natural gas (Billions of cubic feet) reserves and resources. For reserves, the share is Estimated 38 percent, and for resources 46 percent. The Proved United States, Canada, and Western Europe have Region Reserves 16 percent of world natural gas reserves and 22 United States and Canada: percent of total resources. United States 210,000 Canada 58,000 Total 268,000 Coal Latin America: Mexico 30,OW Coal is a solid, brittle, more or less distinctly Central and South America 78,580 stratified, combustible carbonaceous rock, formed Total 108,580 by partial to complete decomposition of vegeta- Europe (excluding communist coun- 138,190 tion. It varies in color from brown to black, and is tries) not fusible without decomposition. It is also very Africa 207,504 insoluble. Ranks of coal have been established Middle East 719,660 according to the degree of coalifiCation. This is a Asia-Pacific (excluding communist 122,725 general indication of carbon content, with anthra- countries) cite ranking highest followed by bituminous coal, Communist countries: subbiturninous coal, and lignite. U.S.S.R. 920,000 World reserves and total resources are shown China 25,000 in Table 11-10. The reserves of 786 billion short Other 10,000 tons are recoverable. The total resources of 12,682 Total 955,000 billion short tons are in-place coal and must be Total World 2,519,659 multiplied by a recoverability factor. For most S....... .. : OdA .......... 1. Dec. 26.1977. purposes this is assumed to be 50 percent; thus, FUEL-MINERALS PROJECTIONS 193 TABLE 11-10 Total World Solid Reserves and Fuel Resources Energy Total Energy .Continent or Reserves Content Resourcesa Content Region (billion short tons) (quadrillion Btu) (billion short tons) (quadrillion Btu) Africa 19 398 106 2,209 Asia 130 3,147 1,223 29,515 Europe 192 3,270 770 13,128 U.S.S.R. 151 2,328 6,294 97,294 North America 229 5,478 3,978 94,993 South America 7 128 32 594 Oceania 58 822 279 3,975 Total b 786 15,572 12,682 241,708 -In-place coal. Recoverability approximately 50 percent. b Data may not add to total due to rounding. Sour(e: World Energy Conference, Survey of Energy Resources, 1976. Table 1. the total resource recover-able would be approxi- exploration. Even more potential may exist be- mately 6,341 billion short tons. yond the potential already estimated. At the 1977 World Energy Conference it was Not all resource investigators are in agreement pointed out that the reserves considered techni- as to the magnitude of the resources of what is cally and economically recoverable constitute only commonly called our most plentiful fossil fuel. 6 percent of resources, and is probably low. This Gunther Fettweis analyzed worldwide coal re- was attributed to use of extremely strict criteria sources with more. emphasis on technical and for assessing and evaluating reserves. In addition, economic factors and came up with a world total the 50 percent recoverability factor may be too recoverable resource figtire of 1, 130 billion short lowO--a point brought out in greater detail by tons. I I He also pointed out that worldwide distri- Paul Averitt.,9 Averitt has also estimated world bution of this smaller 'resource quantity may be coal resources. His estimated total resource figure rather uneven. for coal in-place is 16,620 billion short'tons-a figure 31 percent -higher than:the World Energy Nuclear Fuels Conference estimate.", Either estimate is far in excess of the amount usable within the time Uranium is the fuel used to produce nuclear horizon of this study. energy. Unlike other ftiels, the technology used At the 1976 rate of coal consumption (3.7 billion will detem-iine the final quantity of energy avail- short tons -per year) coal reserves would last for able. Assuming light-water reactor technology, the 212 years while recoverable resources (total re- uranium requirements for a 1,000 megawatt elec- sources at 50 perr-ent recoverability) would last trical nuclear powerplant is about 5,400 short tons approximately 1,700 years. Growth rates much in over its lifetime. (A megawatt is 106 watts.) If the excess of zero would. sharply decrease these spent fuel is recycled and the unused uranium numbers. Still, coal. is the world's most abundant recovered, this requirement would decline by fossil fuel. about 17 percent. Similarly, recycling the pluton- In contrast to the situation as regards other ium in spent fuel would further reduce uranium fossil fuels, the Western nations (the United requirements by an additional 18 percent. 12 Life- States, Canada, and Western Europe) have 56. time requirements for various nuclear powerplant percent of world solid ftiel resources based on Btu capacities are shown in Table 11-11. content; The U.S.S.R.,has 15 percent, and the Note that in Table 11-12 total world resources rest of the world has 29 percent. Much the same of 4,900 thousand short tons of uranium would distribution occurs for resources. thus fuel only 800 gigawatts (800 billion. watts) of Most,resource estimators would say the world light-water reactor (or equivalent technology) possesses abundant coal, fairly evenly distributed plants.' As a fuel for the present generation of over the various continents. Because of the large burner reactors, uranium resources now represent quantities of coal already located, there has been a source of firnited potential, complarable. in mag- little effort undertaken in coal deposit research or nitude to that of the remaining recoverable re- 194 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 11-11 cycle burners. Staatz and OlsonI4 have come up with a worldwide estimate of 1,435 thousand short Lifetime Uranium Requirements for tons of thodurn. oxide recoverable primarily as a . I Nuclear Powerplants by-product, an additional 120,000 short tons of Installed. Lifetime' grade. higher than 0.1 percent, and 902,000 short Nuclear Capacity Uranium Requirements tons of lower and 0. 1 percent grade. In the United (Gigawatts) (1,000 short tons) States, the only fuel use of thorium was in high- 100 600 temperature gas reactors. 200 1.200 300 1,800 Hydraulic Resources 400 2,400 500 3,000 Conventional hydroelectric developments (ulti- 600 3,600 mately using solar energy) use dams and water- 700 4,200 800 4,800 ways to harness the energy of falling water in Somme: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Project interde- streams to Iproduce electric power. The significant pendence. p. 285. differences between hydropower energy resources and fossil and nuclear fuels. 1-1 are: sources of oil and gas. The breeder reactor, if - Hydraulic resources are renewable. deployed, would increase the energy output from - The total potential of hydraulic resources is this fuel by a factor of from 60-100 times. For this small compared to fossil fuel resources. Thus reason stress has been placed by many on building their full development could account for only a breeder reactors. As a counterpoint, the Nuclear small part of total energy requirements. Total Energy Policy Study Group has stated: "The 1976 world energy -consumption was approxi- current assessment of uranium reserves probably mately 250 quadrillion Btu. Even if all hydro- substantially understates the supplies that will electric resources were developed, they could become av"able;, uranium, at prices making light- supply only 33.1 quadrillion Btu. water reactors competitive with breeders, win be Hydraulic resources often have other uses-in available for a considerably longer time than navigation, flood control, and irrigation-that previously estimated. New enrichment technolo- could interfere with power generation. gies may also extend these supplies." 13 Hydraulic resources convert potential energy to Their estimate of 4,876 thousand short tons of kinetic energy principally for electrical genera- uranium at $30 per pound or less is comparable to tion purposes, whereas other energy sources the 4,900 thousand short tons of the World Energy first produce heat. Conference. . The developed and undeveloped conventional Research continues on not only the breeder hydroelectric resources of the world are deline- reactor but on new types of uranium- and thorium- ated in Table 11-13. Of the total estimated capac- TABLE 11-12 World Uranium Resources Quantity Total Recoverable Energy Additional Energy Total Energy Continent or at Content Resources I Content Quantity Content Region $10-$35/lb (quadrillion (1,000 short (quadrillion (1,000 short (quadrillion (1,000 short Btu) tons U.,.@ Btu) tons U30,) Btu) tons U304 Africa 306 1,224 96 383 402 1,607 Asia 41 164 34 137 75 301 Europe 421 1,686 91 364 512 2,050 North America 770 3,080 2,740 10,958 3,510 14,038 South America 21 85 23 92 44 177 Oceania 268 1,074 89 357 357 1,431 Total World 1,827 7,313 3,073 12,291 4,9M 19,604 Note: Energy content assumes ligbt-water reactor technology. Conversion factors: 400 billion Btu/short ton for light-water reactors; breeders would be 60- 100 times higher. *includes all indicated and inferred resources in addition to quantity recoverable. Source: World Energy Conference, 1976. FUEL-MINERALS PROJECTIONS 195 ity, some 14.2 percent has been developed. This usefulness to areas where it is concentrated into developed capacity is capable of generating restricted volumes. 1,348,554 gigawatts or 13.9 percent,of the potential Reserves and resources of geothermal energy hydropower generation capability of the world. must be distinguished from the resour'ce base, Of the undeveloped capacity left, sparsity of defined as all of a given material in the earth's population I and remoteness from population cen- crust, whether its existence is known or unknown ters with large energy requirements leave the and without consideration of recovery cost. For economic development of many undeveloped sites geothermal energy, this resource base is all of the in considerable doubt. heat in the earth's crust (its mean surface temper- Tidal energy is a form of hydraulic resource ature is about 15' Q. The-U.S. Geological Survey similar to conventional hydropower. The major (USGS) has estimated that the worldwide, heat in differences are: the earth's crust to a depth of 10 kilometers is about 1024 Btu. I I This is approximately 4 million �Ocean tides are bidirectional, flowing in twice a times the energy consumption for the world in day and out twice a day. 1975. For the U.S. alone, the USGS estimate of �Construction materials must be much more earth heat is 2 x 1022 Btu. corrosion-resistent than those, used for fresh Obviously only a small proportion of this large water facilities. resource base can be considered as a resource. The hydrostatic heads available for tidal energy Not only, would it be uneconomic and technologi- use are small compared to conventional hydro- cally infeasible, but seismic disturbances might power instaHations. result,if any substantial fraction of the heat were Tidal and topographic factors combine to make extracted. The proportion of this resource base energy conversion practicable at nearly 100 sites 16 that is a resource depends, to a significant degree, around the world. The sites considered most on the following factors: viable are fisted in Table 11-14. - Depth of extraction Geothermal Energy - Assumed temperature distribution - Effective porosity, specific yield, and permeabil- Geothermal energy is the natural heat of the ity of the reservoir rocks earth. The earth's temperature increases toward - Physical state of the fluid (water or steam) the core, primarily because of natural nuclear - Available technology decay and the frictional heat of moving masses of - Economics of uses rock. The diffuseness of this energy ;limits its - Government policy vis-A-vis research and devel- opment, leasing, environmental constraints, etc. TABLE 11-13 Many of the variations in published estimates Developed and Undeveloped Conventional of.geothermal resources are caused by assump- Hydroelectric Resources of the World tions that differ concerning the above factors. I The U.S. Geological Survey has identified these Developed: major categories of the geothermal resource base: Capacity (megaivatts) 315,137 Hydrothermal convection systems. These in- Average annual generation (gigawatt hours) 1,348,554 Energy content of annual generation volve circulating hot water and steam that transfer (quadrillion Btu) 4.6 heat from depth to the near surface. Undeveloped: Hot, young, igneous (volcanic) systems. These Capacity (megavratts) 1,911,666 occur where molten magma generated deep within Average annual generation (gigawatt hours) 8,351,720 the earth intrudes into the shallow crust. Temper- Energy content of annual generation atures are elevated, but there is an absence of (quadrillion Btu) 28.5 natural fluid to carry the heat to the surface. Total: Capacity (megawatts) 2,226,803 Conduction-dominated environments. These Average annual gener-ation (gigawalt hours) 9,700,274 consist of large areas where the heat is transferred Energy content of annual generation from the interior of the earth by. conduction (quadrillion Btu)a 33.1 through solid rocks. &Based on direct conversion of average annual generation in kilowatt hours to At present the types of geothermal energy Btu: I kWh=3,412 Btu, the actual energy content corresponding to 100 percent demonstrated to be economic are from the hy efficiency. Source: World Energy Conference, 1976. drothermal convection systems. They are: ------------- 1% THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 11-14 Major Tidal Power Project Sites, Operational and Potential Average Annual Approximate Average Energy Output Capacity Tidal Range (gigawatt (megawatts) (meters) hours) 1. OPERATIONAL PROJECTS Rance, near St. Maio, France 8'/2 5408 240 a Kislaya, Guba, (pilot plant) 40 miles north of Murmansk, Russia 2'/2 0.4a 11. POTENTIAL PROJECTS United States: Cook Inlet, Alaska (Tumagain Arm and Knik Arm, A3) 8 10,950b 2,600b Passamaquoddy, Maine (M2)1 5'/2 2, lood 1,000d Canada: Minas Basin (119) 1 V/2 10,374 d 3,200d Shepody Bay (A6)c 91/2 2,967d 920d Cumberland Basin (A8)c 10 2,352d 795 d England: Severn River Estuary, near Bristol c 9 20 '000b 4, 000b Solway Firth c 5 13 '000b 5-,0001 Morecambe Bay 6 10,000b 4'000b Carmarthan 5'/2 7'000b. 2,000b France: 'Minquiers (Cotentin Peninsula) 8 50,000b 15 '000b Chausey (Cotentin Peninsula) 8 34 '0001, 6,000 to 12,000b Argentina: San Jose, Gulf of San Jose, Chubut Province Valdez Peninsulac 6 9,000b 1,0001, Santa Cruz River T/2 4, 000 b Puerto Gallegos T/2 2'000b San Julian 6 400b Deseado Estuary 3'/2 700 b Russia: Gulf of Mezen, White Sea c 6'/2 2,600b 1,300t' Okhotsk, northern end of Kamchatka Peninsula 6 25 '000b Kuloi Estuary 61/2 1,300b 500b Lumbovskayac 4'/2 900b 400b Australia: Secure Bay 7 1,700 600 Walcott Inlet 12 4,000 1,300 George Water - 2,500 800 St. George Basin - 3,500 1,000 People's Republic of China: Chientang Kiang c 7 7,0006 Gulf of IFuchin Wan - 1,000b Gulf of Shinhwang Wan 1,000t,! Gulf of Sanmen Wan - 1,000b Brazil: Itagui c 5 Sao Luis 8 India: Bhaunagar 7 Northern Ireland: Strangeford 3 2'000 b 200b Carlingford 3'/2 1,300b 120 b Guinea Bissau: Porto Gole 5'/2 North Korea: Yangkakto 7'/2 South Korea: Inchon 6 4W : Actual output Of plant in operation. Potential output of possible scheme for tidal power. 'Known or believed to be under formal study by the government. 'Planned output for plant in design or formal planning stage. SourCe: Stone and Webster Engineering Corp., "Final Report on Tidal Power Study for the United States Energy Research and Development Administration," Boston: Mar. 1977, quoted in Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Project Interdependence, p. 465. FUEL-MINERALS PROJECTIONS 197 � Vapor-dominated fields, which produce dry@ The U.S.S.R. and Hungary are the only other steam at temperatures suitable for power gen- countries that have published data on low-grade eration. geothermal energy resources. Hungary has identi- �High-temperature hot water fields, which pro- fied systems containing reserves (represented by duce flash steam suitable for power generation water at 100' Q equivalent to 2 billion barrels of and a large quantity of hot water suitable for oil. It has been estimated that economically ex- low-grade heat applications. ploitable thermal waters underlie 50-60 percent of �Moderate-temperature hot water fields, which the territory of the U.S.S.R. The estimate of produce large quantities of water for low-grade producible reserves of thermal waters at depths of heat applications. 1,000-3,500 meters and temperatures of 50-130' C There is Ia high degree of uncertainty in estimat- is equivalent to the heat of combustion of 490,000 ing quantitative reserves of any subsurface re- barrels of oil per day. source. Geothermal energy development, being a As for the rest of the world, the amount,of low- relatively new field, has limited data available for grade.energy is assumed to be very large. This estimating purposes. At present, only the United energy would be suitable for space heating-as well States has made any effort to estimate its reserves as agricultural and industrial application. High- of both low-grade and high-grade geothermal re- grade geothermal resources suitable for power sources (Table 11-15). The regional conductive generation are far more restricted in global distri- environments, which include geopressured zones bution and quantity but could furnish significant containing exploitable quantities of methane gas, energy for countries in geologically favorable, show only trapped heat. zones. TABLE 11-15 Estimated Heat Content of Geothermal Resource Base of the United States Recoverable with Current Heat in the Ground Technology Identified (+ Estimate for Identified Systems Undiscovered) Identified Systems Heat Heat (alegawalts Number Content Content for 30 years) (10" Btua) (1015 Btu a) Hydrothermal convection systems (to 3 km depth, 10,000 ft, near the maximum depth drilled in geothermal areas) Vapor-dominated (steam) systems 3 104 200 1,590 High-temperature hot water systems (over 150'C) 63 1,480 6,400 10,100 Intermediate-temperature hot water systems (90'-150'C) 224 1,380 5,600 27,500b Total 290 2,964 12,200 Hot igneous systems (0-10 km) Molten parts of 48 best known systems, including Alaska and Hawaii 52,000 Huge Crystallized parts and hot margins of same 48 48,000 potential Total 100,000 400,000 Regional conductive environments (0-10 km; all 50 states subdivided into 19 heat-flow provinces of 3 basic types, Eastern, Basin-and-Range; and Sierra Nevada) Total, all states 32,000,000 32,000,000 30,800' Overall total (as reported) d 32,103,000 32,412,000 70,000 a 1015 Btu equivalent to heat of combustion of 174 million barrels of petroleum or 39 million short tons of coal. INonelectrical um value is electrical equivWent. .GeopreSS'ned resources only (lowest estimate; does not include methane). dTotalS may not add due to independent rounding. Source: D. F. While and D. U. Williams, eds., Geological Survey Circular 726, 1975. 198 THE PROJECTIONS As 'of'1977, 17 geothermal powerplants, repre- tions of the deposits. Some known oil shale senting 1,472 megawatts capacity, Were either "on deposits have been only partially appraised, or not line" or slated for 1977 or later (Table 11-16). appraised at all. Geological studies indicate that Low-grade geothermalheat applications represent large oil shale deposits, as yet unknown, probably an additional 1,298 megawatts of capacity. exist outside the areas of known shale oil re- sources. These possible unidentified resources Off Shale (termed speculative) are thought to be many times as large as the identified world shale oil resources. The term oil shale, as commonly used, covers, Hypothetical oil shale resourres (in-place oil) a wide variety of laminated, solidified mixtures of for the world are 450 billion barrels for the 25-100 inorganic sediments and organic, matter that have gallon per ton shale and 8,800 billion barrels for the - common property of yielding oil (shale oil) the 10-25 gallons per ton material. Speculative 00 upon destructive distillation but are only slightly shale resources (in-place oil) are estimated at susceptible to the action of solvents. Shales or 15,200 billion barrels and 318,000 billion barrels hard clays partly or completely saturated with oil for the two grades, respectively.19 Exploitation of from an outside source are not considered true oil these resources, if eventually discovered, is ex- shales. Shale oils have extremely complex physi- pected to be so far in the future as to have no cal - and chemical properties that vary with the relevance for the year 2000. type of shale from which they are produced and the conditions under which they are distilled from Outside the United States, the largest known the source rock. 18 deposit is the Irati shale deposit in southern Estimates of identified shale oil resources Brazil. Although some of the other known depos- throughout the world in oil shales richer than 10 its in countries other than the United States are gallons per ton are shown in Table. 11-17. The richer, they are not nearly as large. Surface quantities shown as recoverable paramarginal re- mining operations are anticipated for the Irati sources in the right-hand column of the table shale in Brazil. The shale is medium grade, represent the more accessible, higher-grade por- containing about 8 percent kerogen by weight. Shale oil, production costs should be reasonable, TABLE 11-16 and prospects for future shale oil production appear good. Geothermal Powerplants In the People's Republic of China, the Manchu- Present rian oil shale deposits presently being exploited Plant Date of overlie thick coal deposits. After stripping off the Field Capacity Initial overburden, the oil shale is mined by open pit (megqwatts) Operation methods; this is followed. by mining of the Larderello, Italy 380 1904 coalbeds. The grade of shale varies but probably Wairakei, New Zealand 192 1958 averages about 15 gallons per ton. The mining of Paie, Mexico 3 1958 both oil shale and coal in this manner, plus fairly Geysersi U.S.a 502 1960 efficient processing, results in relatively low costs. Matsukawa, Japan 22 1966 Shale oil production is believed to be economical, Monte Arniata, Italy8 26 1967 Otake,.Japan 23 1967 especially if shale oil is regarded as a by-product Pauzhetsk, U.S.S.R. 6 1967 of coal production. NarnafJall, Iceland 3 1969 Kawerau, New Zealand 10 1969 In the U.S.S.R. there am a number of oil shale Tiwi, Philippines 10 1969 deposits, but the one of primary interest lies in Cerro Prieto, Mexico 70 1973 Estonia and the adjacent Leningrad region. This Onik6be, Japan 25 1975 deposit is estimated to contain about 22 billion Ahuschapan, El Salvador 30 1975 tons of oil shale, of which about 15 billion tons Hatchobuni, Japan 50 1976 Katsukonda, Japan 50 1977b are considered rich enough and thick enough to Krafla, Iceland 70 1977 b mine. For many years underground mining was, Total 1,472 used almost exclusively. About 10 or 15 years -Fields producing from dry-steam reservo irs. The remainder are hot water. ago, open pit mining@was introduced, and its use reservoirs. has been expanding. As a result, mining costs bProjected. have been reduced. The U.S.S.R. has recently Source: Adapted from P. K. Takahashi and a. Chen, "Geothermal Reservoir Engineering," Geothermal Energy Magazine, vol. 3, no. 10, 1975, for the been increasing its oil shale output *A doubling is: Committee on Natural Resou ces, U.N. Economics and Social Comcd, Stains as the goal, by the early of the Use of GeothermaIr Energy and Future Prospects Jbr Developing tentatively indicated Coataries (EC.7/64, 28), Feb. 1977. 1980S.20 FUEL-MINERALS PROJECTIONS 199. TABLE 11-17 they have been treated as a potential petroleum Identified Shale Oil Reserves'6f -the World supplement, although in reality the organic mate- rial in tar sands is a form of petroleum. The real, (flillions of 42-gallon barrels) difference is that tar-sand oil is not producible by Oil in Place Recovera- the methods commonly used in ordinary oil fields. The bitumen obtained from tar sands is too ble Parla- 25-100 10-25 marginal viscous (5,000-50,000 P at 50' F) to be transport- gallons gallons Shale Oil per ton per ton ResourceSa able by pipeline without first being upgraded to a fighter, less viscous oil. Crude tar-sand oil, or North America 600 1,600 80 bitumen, also is very heavy (usually 6-100 API). South America Small 800 50 However, it can be upgraded by hydrogenation to Europe 76 6 30 Africa 100 Small to yield a fight syncrude, comparable to a high-API- Asia 90 14 20 gravity petroleum. Australia and New Small I Small Tar sands resources are illustrated in Table I I- Zealand 18. As presently known, the bulk of these re- World totals 860 2,400 190 sources are concentrated in Canada (731 billion allsing present technology and considering only the higher-grade, more acces- barrels of in-place oil) and Venezuela (200 billion sible portions of deposits; included in the oil-in-place figures. barrels of in-place oil). The Canadian tar sands Sotirce: U.S. Geological Survey, United Stales Mineral ReNtmrces. USGS Professional Paper 820, 1973. are concentrated in the Athabasca field., The Athabasca field in Alberta, Canada, is one Approximately on6-tenth of arl estimated 100 of the largest deposits of oil in the world, extend- billion barrels of'oil *in known shale deposits in ing over 21,000 square miles .22 It is estimated to Zaire is in deposits of relatively high quality, and contain 626 billion barrels of bitumen in-place, there appears to. be some possibility of eventual, with 74 billion barrels lying beneath less than 150 development. feet of overburden and 552 billion barrels beneath In Scotland, once a center of shale oil produc- overburden ranging 'in depths from 150 to 2,000 tion, high-grade reserves have bcendepleted, and feet .21 Estimates of oil in-place in other deposits there appears to be little prospect for future shale in the Athabasca region total 105 billion barrels. oil production. Thus, the total in-place estimate for the Athabasca Tar Sands region is 731 billion barrels. This does not include the heavy oil in the Canadian Cold Lake area, Tar sands are sedimentar .yrocks or sands which is estimated at 164 billion barrels in-place. containing a heavy asphaltic substance called One estimate of the oil-generating potential of bitumen. Characteristics of tar sands vary from the Athabasca field is 285 billion barrels, with 85 one deposit to another with respect to both the billion barrels currently possible by open pit host rock and the impregnating material. The mining of near-surface deposits, which are often sands and.rocks1ave void spaces that are impreg- 200 feet thick .24 The other 200 billion barrels nated with bitumen. The impregnating materials would have to be recovered by in situ techniques. vary from semiliquid to semisolid (and in some, Another estimate places the total recoverable cases solid) petroleum materials. They range from resource at 250 billion barrels, with 26.5 billion forms oozing slowly from an outcrop on a warm barrels recoverable using established open pit day to forms difficult to soften in boiling water. mining and established aboveground recoverable Rock types include dolomite, limestone, conglom- techniques. 21 erate, and shale, as well as consolidated sandstone Great Canadian Oil Sands, Ltd. has been pro- and unconsolidated sand. ducing oil from the Athabasca deposit since Sep- The composition of the rock or sand is mainly tember 1967. Its plant is the only commercial tar quartz, silt, and clay. A typical tar sand consists sands facility in operation. Another plant (Syn- of approximately 83 percent sand by weight, 13 crude Canada, Ltd.) has been built and is ex- percent bitumen, and 4 percent water .2 1 Bitumen pected to begin operating in the near future. There is usuallyr -interspersed with collections of water, are no significant extraction plans for any other air, or methane in the tar-sand beds but tends to area of the world. have a relatively constant chemical composition, United States resources of tar sands oil in-place throughout a given deposit. are estimated to be a little over 30 billion barrels. Tar sands are known also as oil sands, biturni- The bulk of these resources is in Utah, whose in- nous sands, and bituminous rocks. Traditionally, place resources of oil from tar sands are estimated 200 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 11-18 U.S. and World Tar-Sand Oil Resources (Billhms of barrels) Estimated Recoverable Oil Total Estimated Using Only Surface Including Use of in Situ Oil in-place Mining and Processing Aboveground Technology Processing not yet Developed United States a Utah 28 California 0.169-332 Texas 0.124-141 New Mexico .037 Kentucky 0.034-037 All other states combined 1.6 Total (rounded) 30 2.5-5.5 NEf Rest of the World Canada d 731 26.5-85 250-285 VenezuelaO 200 NE NE Malagasy 1.750 NE NE Albania 0.371 NE NE Trinidad 0*060 NE NE Romania 0.025 NE NE U.S.S.R. 0.024 NE NE Total (rounded) 934 NE NE World Total %4 NE NE Note: Excludes heavy oil resources, but see footnotes d and e. Not shown are 600 billion barrels of oil in-place in the Olenek tar sands of the U.S. S. R. (See Oil and Gas,Journal. Oct. 10, 1977, p. 85). 'Heavy oil resources in the U.S. were estimated at 106.8 billion barrels in 1%6. : None of the other states has as large an estimated tar-sand oil resource as New Mexico or Kentucky. Based on information available in 1964. d626 billion barrels in the Athabasca deposit and 105 billion barrels in other deposits in the Athabasca region. Does not include heavy oil in the Cold Lake Area, which is estimated at 164 billion barrels in-place. 'Heavy oil resources in-place in the Orinoco petroliferous belt are estimated at 700 billion barrels. INE: not estimated. at about 28 billion barrels .26 In-place resource average square mile, such as,one located in estimates for California range from 169 to 322 Asheville, North.Carolina, receives about 15 X million barrels-for Texas, 124-141 million bar- 1012 Btu. By comparison the' total net energy rels-arid for New Mexico and Kentucky, about consumed in the U.S. in 1976 was about 7.4 x 37 million barrels each. A number of other states 1016 Btu. Thus, 4,900 square miles (less than two have smaller tar-sand resources. hundredths of one percent of the U.S. continental I An estimate of resources of bitumen recovera- land area) receives on the average-the equivalent ble by known mining methods for near-surface of the total U.S. energy needs for 1976. At a 10 deposits of relatively easy access was made in percent conversion efficiency, only 49,000 square 1964, based on a compilation of information then miles (or 1.7 percent of the lower 48 states) would available from: numerous sources. The estimated be required to produce the total amount of energy resources on this basis were 2.5--5.5 billion bar- consumed in the U.S. in 1976 .28 The difficulty is, rels .27 No estimate was made of the oil that might of course, in attaining the proper distribution of be recovered from U.S. tar sands if satisfactory in this energy in time and location and in matching situ methods were developed. end-use technologies with this abundant, clean source of energy. Since solar energy is dispersed, it is'suitable for a dispersed settlement of people Solar Energy and industry. By contrast, a centralized and concentrated society is needed to minimize distri- Solar "insolation," the average rate at which bution losses for efficient use of nuclear technol- solar energy strikes the earth is about 1,500 Btu/ ogy. Jbere are many ways in, which thermody- ft2 per day or 42 x 109 Btu/mile 2 per day. This is namic efficiencies can be achieved with solar an enormous flux of energy. In one year an energy.29 Many of these possibilities have not yet FUEL-MINERALS PROJECTIONS 201. been adequately investigated, but research in wide. This method indicates that the total energy these areas is increasing. dissipation rate overland in the Northern Hemi- There is currently no systematic collection of sphere in winter would be about 167 x 109 watts, data on solar energy resources or consumption in and 24 x 109 watts at the same time on land in the world. The following discussion will delineate the Southern Hemisphere. The total wind energy some data on resources, reserves, and consump- generated overland is therefore about 0.19 x 1012 tion, but many of the proposals for use of solar kilowatts, or 1,660 x 1012 kWh (kilowatt hours) energy overlap, or are contradictory, and esti- per year. It is estimated that placement of wind mates based on them are uncertain and open to turbines 175 feet in diameter, spaced 16 to the question. square mile over the entire land area and operating In discussing solar energy, it is necessary to an average of 2,000 hr/yr would yield about 120 x distinguish between natural collection systems 1012 kVVlVyr.35 Scaling this down to cover 2.5 (involving indirect use) and engineered collection percent of the area of the U.S., or an area about systems. The natural collection systems (except the size of Utah, would provide about 190 x 109 for hydropower, which has already been dis- kWh/yr or about 10 percent of U.S. electrical cussed) are considered first. energy consumed in 1972. Photosynthetic process (biomass). It has been Ocean thermal energy conversion. In the tropi- estimated that the world produces 150 x 109 tons cal regions of the ocean, a temperature difference per year of biomass, with an estimated energy of 200 C between the surface and deep waters has content of between 1,500 and 2,400 quadrillion been observed. In 1929 Georges Claude demon- Btu annually. 30 Two ideas under consideration to struted a plant to utilize this heat. The 22 kilowatt exploit biomass are: plant admitted surface seawater to a low-pressure 1. The use of waste products. It is estimated evaporator, which provided low-pressure steam to that the U.S. has a resource base of 826 million a turbine. More recent proposals suggest utilizing tons of waste products per year, of which 122 an indirect vapor cycle. A secondary working million tons is available for use.31 This would be fluid such as ammonia, freon, or propane would burned directly. It is assumed that world re- expand through a turbine at higher pressures. sources would be significantly higher. Cycle efficiency would range between 1.6 percent 2. Energy farms. This involves cellulose pro- and 3.2 percent.36 The estimated power capacity duction, the growth of oil-producing plants, and that can be utilized in water adjacent to the the production of marine kelp. Under cellulose United States is 2,000 megawatts. 17 production, it has been estimated that the U.S. Hydropower. This has already been discussed could produce 10 quadrillion Btu of energy per above. year off 10 percent of forest and range land. 32 If In addition to'natural collection systems, some special plants that produce a sap or latex, which is an emulsion, were grown on 10 percent of of the engineered systems are: forest and range land, the resulting energy avail- Photovoltaics. This involves direct conversion of solar energy into electricity. The possible able would be between 0.5 and 25 quadrillion Btu per year. 33 It has been estimated that the growth maximum annual contribution to the United States of kelp on submerged mesh in the ocean and has been estimated at 25 quadrillion Btu/year. ' conversion of the kelp to methane by anaerobic Thermal collection. This involves direct use of digestion has a resource potential for the world of heat for such purposes as space heating, hot ,1,200 quadrillion Btu per year, and for the United water, industrial heat, etc. Its, possible contribu- States of 23 quadrillion Btu. 34 It cannot be tion to the United States energy needs is about 7 iadrillion Btu per year. Thermal collection is stressed too strongly, the economic and technical qu___ feasibility of these processes has yet to be dem- also used to collect heat for heat engines producL onstrated. ing- electricity. The possible contribution could run as high as 80 quadrillion Btu per year for the U.S. Wind. Some of the solar energy striking the alone. The possible contributions of both these earth is converted into the kinetic energy of air systems in the world context have not been currents. Although data are sketchy, information estimated. 38 on wind velocity patterns indicate certain areas as While few present estimates of world energy having strong, fairly constant winds. One method supply and demand through the year 2000 place of estimation of total wind energy is based on the much reliance on solar Power, some do. (Se6, for natural rate of regeneration as indicated by a example, A. B. Lovins .in "Energy Strategy -- The summation of surface friction in latitude belts 5' Road Not Taken?" 29.) There is little question that 202 THE PROJECTIONS solar already makes an important and often under- presently unworkable deposits within economic valued contribution to the world energy economy. reach are also high. The major problem is that Russell Peterson has noted correctly that without continued exponential growth in consumption will the solar contribution, the entire earth would be exhaust these large amounts of resources before more than 400' F cooler than it is now! While the the transition to the longer-lived and renewable potential of this energy source is large, an assess- fuels can be made. ment of its full potential must await further The best summary of the existing energy situa- research and analysis. tion was made by Vincent E. McKelvey when he said: Conclusion The era of readily available, cheap fossil fuels is Large quantities of petroleum, natural gas, and closing and a high order of human ingenuity will be required to extend it and to bring into use solid fuels can still be found and produced. In another energy resource base. The time necessary addition, there exists the strong possibility that to complete these tasks depends not only on the exploration in search of as yet undiscovered vigor and imagination with which new sources are deposits of fossil fuels will be successful. The sought but on the wisdom and restraint exercised probability that technological advance to bring in the use of the old. 39 REFERENCES 1. Vincent E. McKelvey, Remarks at the International 17. Department of the Interior, Panel on Geothermal En- Conference on Energy Use Management, Tucson, Ariz., ergy Resources, -Assessment of Geothermal Energy Oct. 24, 1977. Resources" (mimeo), June 26, 1972, p. 57ff. 2. "Principles of the Mineral Resource Classification of 18. U.S. Bureau of Mines Bulletin 415, "Studies of Certain the U.S. Bureau of Mines and U.S. Geological Survey," Properties of Oil Shale and Shale Oil," 1938, p. 6. USGS Bulletin 1450-A, Washington: Government Print- 19. W. C. Culbertson and J. K. Pitman, chapter on oil shale ing Office, 1974. in United States Mineral Resources, U.S. Geological 3. L. Bauer and R. S. Carlsmith, "World Energy Confer- Survey Professional Paper 820, 1973, pp. 500-501. ence Activities in the Field of Surveying World Energy 20. Oil and Gas Journal, Feb. 14, 1977, p. 54. Resources," in M. Grenon, ed., First IIASA Confer- 21. T. J. Peach, "Bitumen Recovery from Tar Sands," ence on Energy Resources, Laxenburg, Austria: Inter- Energy Processing (Canada), May-June 1974. national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1975, 22. Frederick W. Camp, The Tar Sands of Alberta, Can- p. 47. ada, 3rd ed., Denver: Cameron Engineers, 1976. 4. McKelvey. 23. L. B. McConville, "The Athabasca Tar Sands," Mining 5. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Engineering, Jan. 1975, pp. 19-38. Project Interdependence: U.S. and World Energy Out- 24. Sam H. Schurr and Paul T. Homan, Middle-Eastern Oil look Through 1990, Washington: Government Printing and the Western World, New York: Elsevier, 1971, pp. Office, 1977, p. 638. 59-66. 6. Oil and Gas Journal, Dec. 26, 1977, p. 101. 7. World Energy Conference, Conservation Commission 25. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Report on Oil Resources, 1985-2020, Executive Sum- Energy from U.S. and Canadian Tar Sands: Technical, mary, London: Aug. 15, 1977, Appendix, p. 18. Environmental, Economic, Legislative, and Policy As- 8. World Energy Conference, An Appraisal of World Coal pects, Dec. 1974. Resources and Their Future Availability, Executive 26. H. R. Ritzma, "Oil-Impregnated Rock Deposits of Summary, London: Aug. 15, 1977. Utah," Utah Geological and Mineral Survey Map 33, 9. Paul Averitt, Coal Resources of the United States, Apr. 1973, preprint July 1974, 2 sheets. January 1, 1974, Geological Survey Bulletin 1412, 1975, 27. Ball Associates, Surface and Shallow Oil-Impregnated pp. 28-3 1. Rocks and Shallow Oil Fields in the United States, 10. Ibid., p. 91. U.S. Bureau of Mines Monograph 12, 1965. 11. Gunther Fettweis, "Contributions to the Assessment of 28. William R. Cherry, "Harnessing Solar Energy: The World Coal Resources, or Coal is Not So Abundant," Potential," Astronautics and Aeronautics, Aug. 1973, in M. Grenin, ed., First IIASA Conference on Energy pp. 30-63 (brought up to date). Resources, Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute 29. A. B. Lovins, "Energy Strategy: The Road Not for Applied Systems Analysis, 1975, pp. 476-530. Taken?" Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1976, pp. 65-96: A. B. 12. Project Interdependence, p. 285. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace, 13. Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, Nuclear Power Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977; Efficient Use of Issues and Choices, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977, Energy, American Institute of Physics Conference Pro- p. 32. ceedings No. 26, New York: 1975 (summarized in 14. Mortimer H. Staatz and Jerry C. Olson, "Thorium," in Physics Today, Aug. 1975). United States Mineral Resources, U.S. Geological Sur7 30. Jerome Saeman, "U.S. Department of Agriculture For- vey Professional Paper 820, 1973, p. 474. est Products Laboratory," Chemical Engineering 15. The discussion is based on World Energy Conference, News, Feb. 20, 1977, p. 21. Survey ofEnergy Resources, 1974, New York, Ch. VI. 31. Synfuels Interagency Task Force, "Recomme ndations 16. Project Interdependence. for a Synthetic Fuels Commission." FUEL-MINERALS PROJECTIONS 203 32. Phillips Hahn, "Producing Fuel for Energy Under 36. J. H. Anderson and J. H. Anderson, Jr., "Thermal Intensive Culture," excerpted in Energy User News, Power from Seawater," Mechanical Engineering, Apr. Dec. 26, 1977, p. 22. 1966, pp. 41-46. 33. "The Petroleum Plant: Perhaps We Can Grow Gaso- 37. U.S. Energy Research and Development Administra- line," Science, Oct. 1, 1976, p. 46. 34. Howard Wilcox, "Ocean Farming," in Proceedings-, tion, "Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Program Conference on Capturing the Sun Through Bioconver- Summary" (ERDA 76-142), Oct. 1976, p. 1. sion, Mar. 10-12, 1976, p. 265. 38. Richard S. Caputo, "Solar Power Plants: Dark Horse in 35. U.S. Congress House Committee on Science and Astro- the Energy Stable," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, nautics, "Solar Energy Research, A Multidisciplinary May 1977. Approach," Washington: Goverriment Printing Office, 1973. 39, McKelvey, op. cit. 12 Nonfuel Minerals Projections, There are more than 100 commercial nonftiel Table 12-1 mineral commodities-that is, mineral commodi- ties that are not used primarily as fuels-mined, Mineral Imports as a Percentage of Mineral processed, and traded in the world market today. Conswrliption, 1976 In 1973 the value of all nonfuel minerals produced European in the world was $37 billion I (excluding processing United Economic Japan U.S.S.R.a and transportation costs), or about 1 percent of States Community the gross world product. Bauxite 88 50 100 44 This figure does not in itself fully reflect the Chromium 90 95 95 0 value of minerals in the world economy. The Copper 16 99 93 4 industrial and agricultural processes that are taken Iron Ore 35 85 99 0 for granted today would be severely disrupted if Lead 12 85 78 24 Manganese 100 99 90 0 any one of dozens of critical minerals ceased to Nickel 61 90 95 0 be available in dependable, reasonably priced Tin 75 90 90 22 supply. Supply, in turn, has become highly en- Zinc 60 74 63 13 ergy-intensive and international in scope. The -1975. industrialized countries are dependent on im- Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Research Aid: Handbook of Eco- ports-from each other and from the less devel- fiom"' Statistics, Sept. 1977. p. 17. For U.S.S.R. data, V. V, Strishkov. -Mineral Industries of the U.S.S.R.," Mining Annual Res,", 1976, Mining oped countries (LI)Cs)-for a portion of their Journal (London): reprinted by the U.S. Bureau of Mines. supplies of .such basic miner-al commodities as minum, copper, iron, phosphate, potash, and bauxite, copper, and iron ore (Table 12-1). Their sulfur). The remaining 13 (chromium, fluorspar, reliance on imports from the LDCs has increased helium, industrial diamonds, lead, manganese, in recent years as industrial economies have found mercury, nickel, platinum-group metals,* silver, new uses for formerly unimportant minerals and tin, tungsten, and zinc) are included because they have partially depleted high-grade domestic depos- illustrate possible future problems. its of some important minerals. The less devel- Projections of demand, supply, and price are oped countries, in turn, rely on exports for foreign taken up sequentially in the following sections. exchange and on imports from industrial countries The chapter concludes with a discussion of future for the sulfur and potash needed for chemical issues and questions. fertilizers. There are therefore many, important questions associated with projections of supply, Demand Projections demand, and price of nonfuel minerals. I I Unfortunately, economic projections for nonfuel Table 12-2 and the map on the page following it minerals are exceedingly difficult to make. The present a combination of two sets of mineral sheer number of nonfuel mineral commodities demand (or, more precisely, consumption) projec- present the first difficulty. Matters are compli- tions for 1985 and the year 2000.t One set of cated further by the fact that significant substitu- projections was prepared by Wilfred Malenbaum, tions in end use occur when one mineral commod- Professor of Economics, University of Pennsyl- ity changes price relative to another. Finally, vania, in 19772; the other was prepared by the because resources are not uniformly distributed U.S. Bureau of Mines in 1976.3 Table 12-3 geographically, political considerations become compares these two projections for selected min- important determinants of price and trade pat- erals. tems. *Platinum, palladium, iridium, osmium, rhodium, and ruthe- To keep th 'e discussion within bounds, this nium. chapter focuses on 19 nonfuel mineral commodi- tHelium, originally included in this table, has been omitted. ties. Six are included because they are basic to The only available datum for helium was average (1971-75) modem material fife and international trade (alu- U.S. demand: 570 million cubic feet. 205 TABLE 12-2: World Demand for Minerals, 1985 and 2000 Other Non- Western Developed Eastern Latin United U.S. World Europe Japan LandSa U.S.S.R. Europe Africa Asia America China States World Total Aluminum b Aver. 1971-75 2862 1254 528 1490 827 40 294 333 234 4388 7861 12249 (1000 1995 4637 2414 890 2352 1339 65 453 599 431 7410 13180 20590 metric tons) 2000 7791 4674 1565 3868 2457 160 884 1217 827 13073 23443 36516 Aver. growth 3.93 5.19 4.27 3.74 4.28 5.48 4.33 5.11 4.98 4.29 4.29 4.29 Chromium ore Aver. 1971-75 1873 1127 740 750 744 49 184 109 216 1149 5792 6941 (1000 1985 2951 1836 1140 760 1249 82 302 .221 375 1347 8916 10263 metric tons) 2000 4452 3233 1877 1083 2047 142 526 423 634 1601 14417 16018 Aver. growth (%) 3.39 4.14 3.64 1.42 3.97 4.18 4.12 5.35 4.23 1.28 3.57 3.27 Copper, refined Aver. 1971-75 2422 922 357 1097 539 21 111 278 290 1886 6037 7923 (1000 1985 3442 1358 528 1440 795 38 181 473 486 2610 8731 11341 metric tons) 2000 5231 2181 715 2088 1199 71 311 873 968 3202 13637 16839 Aver. growth (0/6) 3.01 3.37 2.71 2.51 3.12 4.80 4.04 4.50 4.75 2.06 3.18 2.94 Diamond, industrial Aver. 1971-75 35 50 75 (million 1985 37 80 117 carats) 2000 70 150 220 Aver. growth (%) 4.04 4.32 4.23. Fluorspar (F content) The government has no projections. Aver. 1971-75 699 1598 2287 (1000 1995 1560 3640 5200 0 z shortions) 2000 1930 5400 7330 (n Aver. growth (0/v) 4.04 4.80 4.58 Iron ore Aver. 1971-75 95 53 24 97 27 4 10 15 23 95 346 432 (million 1985 133 78 35 144 34 8 18 25 39 101 5i4 615 metric tons) 2000 189 129 49 209 50 14 33 48 65 133 786 919 Aver. growth 2.68 3.48 2.78 3.00 2.40 4.94 4.70 4.58 4.08 1.74 3.21 2.95 Lead Aver. 1971-75 931 2461 3392 (1000 1985 i2OO 3960 5160 short tons) 2000 The government has no projections. 1530 6040 7570 Aver. growth (01v) 1.43 3.51 3.14 Manganese Aver. 1971-75 4134 1667 1100 6420 1157 481 1384 1071 998 1929 18410 20339 (1000 1985 5620 2586 1168 9500 1785 8io 2265 1890 1658 2947 27292 30239 metric tons) 2000 8349 4285 1743 14696 2778 1513 3824 3703 3168 4002 44058 48060 Aver. growth (9v) 2.74 3.70 1.79 3.24 3.43 4.51 3.99 4.89 4.54 2.85 3.41 3.36 Mercury Aver. 1971-@5 53 183 .236 0090 1085 53 190 243 flasks) 2000 The government has no projections. 47 h2 260 Aver. growth -0.46 0.75 0.50 Nickel Aver. 1971-75 170 97 17 159 b 4 4 7 161 458 618 (1000 1985 246 155 24 242 8 8 13 211 694 905 metric tons) 2000 345 245 34 360 11 14 24 280 1034 1314 Aver. growth 2.76 3.63 2.70 3.19 3.97 4.94 4.85 2.15 3.18 2.94 Phosphate rock - Aver. 1971-75 35 88 123 (million 1985 207 shorttons) 2000 The government has no projections. 45 69 w456 Aver. growth (%) 2.64 5.86 5.17 Platinum-group Aver. 1971-75 653 1765 272 702c -38 141 34 123 1660 372'8 5387 (1000 1985 948 3146 403 .1218 65 242 79 210 2442 63,11 8753 troy ounces) 2000 1391 5765 625 1806 129 418 158 343 3335 10695 14030 Aver. growth M 2.95 4.66 3.25 3.70 4.81 4.27 6.09 4.02 2.72 4.14 3.7S Potash Aver. 197145 6 26 26 (Million 19.85 ,9 31 40 0 shorttons) 2000 '48 60 z 12 Aver. growth 2.70 3.42 3.27 C Silver M Aver. 197 1-75 171 374 (million 1985 160 3121 481 WE troy ounces) 2000 2 The govermn ent has no projections. 230 -450 680 Aver. growth (9o 2.40 2.29 2.33 Sulfur > Aver. 1971-75 11 38 49 (million 1985 "a 15 50 65 ;V long tons) 2000 23 97 110 0 Aver. growth M 2.88 3.24 3. 116 Tin Aver. 19@1-75 69 33 12 18 17 2 8 7 14 53 180 232 0 (1000 1985 84 47 15 24 23 7 11 11 20 50 242 301 z metric tons) 2000 111 62 22 31 32 10 14 16 28 67 326 393 0 Aver. growth (9o) 1.85 2.46 2.36 2.11 2.46 6.3� 2.18 3.23 2.70 0.91 2.31 2.05 Tungsten Aver. 1971-75 11575 2758 578 6645 3824 685 849 1372 5386 6510 33672 40182 (metric 1985 16860 4jIO 834 9975 6069 1090 1510 2520 8619 8420 51787 60207 tons) 2000 24486 7011 1252 14697 9669 1807 2868 4761 14080 12006 80631 92637 Zinc Aver. growth (%) 2.92 3.65 3.02 3.10 3;63 3.80 4.79 4.96 3.77 2.38 3.42 3.26 Aver, 1971-75 1555 673 316 832 452 24 208 226 190 1160 4346 5506 (1000 1985 2178 1034 459 1296 625 38 347 378 298 1600 6653 8253 metric tons) 2000 3116 1441 704 1934 965 71 574 688 528 2001 10021 12022 Aver. growth (90) 2.71 2.97 3.13 3.30 2.96 4.26 3.98 4.37 4.01 2.12 3.27 3.05 Note: Average growth in percent, is average growth rate from 1971-75 to 2000. In calculations of average growth rates for the Malenbaum forecasts, in which the base figure is the average annual demand during 19.71775, the base figure is treated as though it were 1974 demand. 'Includes Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa. 'Nickel demand figures for the U.S.S.R_ Eastern Europe, 4nd China are aggregated under U.S.S.R. -9 Platinum-group demand figures for the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe are aggregated under U.S.S.R. r Metal Consumptfoo Per Capita' hr 2000 2000 140 220 120 1 8@', Western Eui" USSR and Eastern Euro 1975 2000 I B T- 8 12 20di 97 00 290 -j- Asia and Oceania 1.75 2000 NI 4 7 Africa 0 1975 2000 14 30 40 Latin Americaj 2odik: Raufts (in BMW 1975 1975 U& duffor v"aml Uw of cmde st"I. Pdm-Y mimomm 0 MI. d WA"O any 10r *4. 320 UN WDVMWM Case. tlodust@llzed cou" Other I s Boundary representaom'm including AjAtralia, Canaqq;@36n, rim,ec.e.enly New Zealand, and SoijjA7AMFC& @- \41 and ,@em Europe 1975 2; 0 1 5@)D kflwa jP 100 nQm NONFUEL MINERALS PROJECTIONS -209 TABLE 12-3 growth rates of over 4 percent, while growth in demand for phosphate rock exceeds 5 percent. omparison of Bureau of Mines and Malenbaurn The mineral needs of the world energy industry. Demand Projections for Selected Metals (and the energy needed to produce these minerals) in 1985 and,2000 have not yet received the special attention and (MUUons of metrk tons) analysis that they deserve. The mineral needs, of Other Countries United States the U.S. energy industry have been analyzed by the U.S. Geological Survey based on the 1974 .Bur. Malen- Bur. Malen- Project Independence Report. The Survey -report Mines baum Mines baum concludes, in part: Aluminum Expanded energy development and production- 1971-75 (avg.) 8 1975-90 will necessitate a significant increase in 1974 10 5 domestic production above that of 1973 for most 1985 20 13 10 7 materials. Averaged.over 15 years, the quantities 2000 41 24 19 13 lt@on Ore of some materials needed for energy will be a 1971-75 (avg.) 346 85 large percentage of 1973 production [Figure 12-1]: 1974 431 83 for example, aluminum (30 percent), barite (100 1985 590 514 97 101 percent), bentonite (30 percent), fluorite (58 per-. 2000 907 786 117 133 cent), shipping-grade iron ore (26 percent), and (;,opper' tungsten (78 percent). [Figure 12-2] graphs the 1971-75 (avg.) 6 1.9 data in terms of the percentage of U.S. reserves 1974 4.8 1.8 needed to meet the total energy demand, 1975-90. 1985 9 9 2.4 2.6 of oil, ,2000 16 14 3.8 3.2 A minimum of about 2.5 billion barrels Z equivalent (I bbI = 5.8 X 106 Btu) may be mc 1971-75 (avg.) 4.3 1.2 required to produce 20 selected mineral commod-: 1974 4.5 1.3 ities ... needed by the energy industries 197@-90,, 1985 6.1 6.7 1.9 1'6 and 18.5 billion barrels of oil-equivalent to pro- 2000 8.4 10.0 2.8 2.0 duce sufficient supply to meet the overall domes-; 'The Bureau of Mines projections and the Malenbaum projections for th se tic demand for those minerals during the same minerals am not strictly comparable because of differences in definitions of the period. This amount, of energy, equal to more@ commodities. For a more detailed accounting, see table 22-1. than half of the known U.S. recoverable petro-. Source: Table 12-2. leurn reserves, is only a fraction of the energy required to produce the 90 or more mineral , Neither set of projections meets the- needs of Fornmodities used in the total economy. Thus, imports of mineral raw materials ... and semifa- the Global 2000 Study. The Bureau of Mines bricated or processed material also constitute projections are for the United States and "rest Of energy imports. Substitution of domestically pro7 world" only and do not permit the regional duced materials for imports will further stress disaggregation needed for this, study. Neither set domestic energy production. of projections could be adjusted to meet the GNP Adequacy of mineral supplies for a sustained and population assumptions used in the other economy should be a matter of deep concern, Global 2000 projections. The inability to match particularly in view of the large quantities of the GNP and population assumptions is particu- minerals and materials required for energy produc- larly important in the case of the Malenbaurn tion and the serious consequences in the event of projections, which assume that mineral demand is deficiencies. As was evident in the 1973 oil embargo, political and economic changes and reliably determined as a function of per capita mineral shortages can occur swiftly. Our mineral GNP. The Bureau of Mines methodology is not inventory developed and ready for immediate sufficiently defined to allow one to understand extraction is nil in the case of some commodities, precisely the influence of GNP and populations and in manycases is not equivalent to projected projections. These and other limitations are dis- requirements for a decade of U.S. consumption. 4 cussed more fully in Chapter 22. The demand forecasts of Table 12-2 give a Similar analyses are needed for world energy and. 'rough idea of what future demand growth could economic development plans. be. Collectively, the 18 mineral commodities (data The regional subcategories of the demand data were unavailable for helium) show a worid de- in Table 12-2 suggest only a modest increase in m4nd growing at an annual rate of about 3 the participation of LDCs in world industry. Latin percent. Three commodities-aluminum, indus- America, Africa, and Asia (including mainland trial diamonds, and fluorspar-show annual China) used only 7 percent of the worid's alumi_@ 210 'THE PROJECTIONS Aluminum Antimony Asbestos Barite Bentonite Chromite ----------- no production ---------- Cobalt --------- negligible production -------- Copper Fluorite Iron ore Lead Manganese --------- negligible production -------- Molybdenum Nickel Niobium ----------- no production ---------- 11101111=1 Silver Tin --------- negligible production -------- Titanium Tungsten Vanadium Zinc Zirconium 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 PERCENT Figure 12-1. Average annual demand by energy industries for some commodities, 1975-90, as a percentage of U.S. production in 1973. (Goudarzi et al., U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 1006-B, 1976) num production in 1971-75, 9 percent of the three-fourths of the world population by year copper, and 12 percent of the iron ore. Although 2000, the projections suggest they will use only 8 the people in these regions will constitute over percent of the aluminum production, 13 percent of NONFUEL MINERALS PROJECTIONS 211 Aluminum ore 1g." 180 (bauxite) Antimony Asbestos Barite Bentonite Chromium ------------ no reserves ------------ Cobalt ------------ no reserves ------------ Copper Fluorite Iron ore Lead 3 Manganese ore ------------ no reserves ---------- Molybdenum Nickel 147 Niobium ------------ no reserves ------------ Silver Tin Titanium Tungsten Vanadium Zinc Zirconium 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 76 80 90 100 PERCENT Figure 12-2. Percentage of U-.S. reserves needed to meet total energy demand for some commodities, 1975-90. (Goudarzi et al., U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 1006-B, 1976) the copper, and 17 percent of the iron ore. This is Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly5) considerably short of the goal (set at the U.N. of expanding the share of Third World countries Industrial Development Organization Conference in world industrial production to 25 percent by the in Lima in 1975 and endorsed by the Seventh year 2000. 212 THE PROJECTIONS Supply Projections portion of the identified resource from,which a Ftcjections of world nonfuel rMineral production useable mineral ... commodity can be economi- cally and legally extracted at the time of determi- to 2000 are not available from government or nation. 116 other,,s.ources., In the absence of supply estimates, fufu .re world production can be assumed to be The life expectancies of 1974 world reserves of roughly equal to the quantity demanded as pro- 18 mineral commodities are shown in Table '12-4 jected in Table 12-2. Since .these projections are for two different rates of demand.'The, relatively point estimates, the "demand" figures'must be short life expenctancy of some of the commodities understood to be amounts of minerals consumed. listed in the table does not imply impending Total'production, of course, is always equal to exhaustion but does indicate clearly that, in order to Ital consumption, neglecting year to year varia- to sustain adequate production in the decades tion� in in"ventories. ahead, reserves must be increased for at least a Sorfie of the 'rojec half a dozen minerals-industrial diamonds, silvei,' p ted increases in supply (i.e., demand) are large, and will require contributions mercury, zinc, sulfur, and tungsten. from the two sources of nonfuel minerals--virgin Over the past few decades, efforts to increase mineral commodities and recycled (or "second- mineral. reserves have generally been successful. ary") mineral commodities. Therefore, the factors Of the six minerals just mentioned, world reserves influencing the availability of both virgin and of five nearly or more than tripled from 1950,to recycled mineral. commodities need examination. 1974.7 Tungsten is the only mineral commodity The, supply of virgin mineral commodities . is whose reserves have declined since 1950., On the considered first. other handi reserves of iron ore, bauxite, copper, The stock from which the mining industry lead, and platinum increased by four times or extracts ore for processing and refining is termed more during the. period. A comparison of Tables reserves. The U.S. Geological Survey and the 12-4 and 12-7 shows that reserves of several U.S. Bureau of Mnes define reserves as ."that mineral commodities, notably chromium, in- TABLE 12-4. Life Expectancies of 1974 World Reserves of Mineral Commodities of Particular Concern at Two Diflerent Rates of Demand Life Ex pectancy in Years Demand Demand 1974 19174 Projected Demand Static at Growing at Reserves Demand Growth Rate (90 1974 Level Projected Rates Industrial diamonds (million carats) 680 75 4.23 9 8 Silver (million troy ounces) 6,000 374 2.33 16 14 Mercury (thousand flasks) 4,930 236 0.50 22 21 Zinc (million short tons) 260 6.40 3.65 29 21 Sulfur (million long tons) 2,000 49 3.16 41 26 Tungsten (million pounds) 3,924 85 3.26 45 28 Lead (million short tons) 165 3.39 3.14 47 29 Tin (thousand long tons) 10,120 230 2.05 44 31 Copper (million short tons) 450 7.24 2.94 60 35 Fluorine (million short tons) 38 2.29 4.58 97 37 Platinum (million troy ounces) 297 2.70 3.75 104 43 Nickel (million short tons) 60 0.78 2.94 90 44 Iron ore (billion short tons) 100 0.57 2.95 216 68 Chromium (million short tons) 577 2.70 3.27 249 .68 Manganese (million short tons) 2,013 10.22 3.36 268 69 Potash (million short tons) 119000 26 3.27 430 84 Phosphate rock (million. short tons) 17,712 123 5.17 1,659 88, Aluminum. in bauxite (million short tons) 3,940 17 4.29 1,199 94 Note: Corresponding data for helium not available. Source: Reserves and production data from Bureau of Mines, Mineral Trends and Forecasts, Oct. 1976 except data for industrial diamonds, from Bureau of Mines, Minerals Facts and Piablents, Bulletin 667, 1975. Prqjected demand Vowth rates from Table 12-2. NONFUEL MINERALS PROJECTIONS 213 .creased appreciably even in the -few years 19747 years. Economists have generally interpreted 77. these. trends to mean that no "scarcity" is devel- Among the pitfalls of interpreting the calculated oping and that no real-price increases am to be life of world mineral reserves is the fact that some, , expec "ted.-10,11 The trends,may be changing '12 ,mines take much longer to exhaust than,the however, and-the simple extrapolations behind aver@ge (reserve-lifetime figures'are averages that those projections are being questioned. 13 The do not take this into account). Furthermore, mine techniques for analyzing intercommodity competi- output over time is'not typically represented-by a tion that ha ve been,developed for energy projec- straight fine to exhaustion and then a vertical drop tions have not yet been'applied to nonfuel min- 'to zero, but rather by a declining curve. 8 erals. Furthermore, developments that can be The demand/supply projections of Table 12-2 anticipated in the nonfuel minerals industries- assume that part of the future s %upply of products increasing energy costs, gradually declining ore- '@of mineral origin will be recycled mineral com- grades, increased recycling, and requirements for modities. What portion will come from recycled environmental protection-require better methods ("secondary") mineral commodities is not esti- of analysis than have been used in the past if mated, but rough estimates can be obtained from imp'qrtant nonlinear phenomena am to be consid- past experience. In 1974, scrap accounted for'5 ered.,'Figure 12-3 illustrates the nonlinear in- percent of,U.S. aluminum consumption, 11 per- creases in energy requirements from mining lower- cent of -chromium, 20 percent of copper,' 37 grade ores. percent of iron, and 39 percent of lead, according With',diminishing returns in prospect, it is to the Bureau of Mines. plausible that the price trends in nonfuel minerals The portion of the waste stream that is recycled will change and real-prices will increase. How is influenced by many economic factors. Just as much increase might be expected is open to discarded tailings from mining and milling opera- question. Table 12-5 illustrates the prices that tions are now sometimes reworked in response to TABLE 112-5 changing economic conditions, refuse dumps may someday be "mined" to recover some of the Illustration of Nonfuel Mineral Prices metals and other elements previously discarded. Extrapolated to 2000 with a 5 Percent Growth While the potential recover-able amounts have not Rate Beginning in 1980 been estimated, it has been observed by McHale9 that cumulative world production of ironi,- m an- 19768 1985 2000 ganese, and nickel since 1870 equals one-fourth of (constant 1970 dollars) their respective present reserves. McHale notes Aluminum (pound ingot) 0.32 0.41 0.86 Chromite (long ton, South Af- further that the cumulative production of copper rica) 30 38 79 and lead equal about half of present reserves, and Copper (pound) 0.45 0.58 1.21 cumulative production of zinc, tin, and tungsten Diamond, Industrial (carat) 3 4 8 exceed present reserves. This past production is Fluorspar (short ton of met- spar) 61 78 164 either still in use or has been discarded. At some Helium, (1000 cubic ft) 15 20 42 point in the future it may be cheaper to recover Iron ore (long ton, 51.5 per- and recycle some discarded minerals than to mine cent Fe) 14 19 39 ores of ever decreasing grade. Lead(pound) 0.14 0. 18 0.38 Manganese (long ton unit of contained Mn) 1.02 1.31 2.74 Mercury (76-lb flask) 67 86 180 Price Projections Nickel (pound) 1.62 2.07 4.35 The Global 2000 Study could not obtain nonfuel Phosphate Rock (short ton) 14 18 38 Platinu lm@ Group mineral price projections from the Department of Palladium (troy ounce) 36 46 % the Interior because the Department does not Platinum (troy ounce) 114 146 306 make such projections. Price projections were Potash (short ton unit of K,O) 0.51 0.65 1.37 made some years ago but were discontinued Silver (troy ounce) 3 4 8 Sulfur,(long ton of elemental because they were heavily criticized. The Depart- S) 32 41 66 ment normally assumes that the price of refined Tin (pound) 2.41 3.08 6.47 minerals will remain constant in real terms out to Tungsten (pound W0,1) 0.04 0.05 0.10 2000, even if there are signfficant increases in Zinc (pound) 0.23 0.29 0.62 energy costs. 'The 1976 price was put into 1970dollars by dividing its level in 1976dollars by In fact, the real price of most mineral commod- 1. 42, corresponding to an average 6 percent inflation rate. lource: The 1976 price was obtained from the Bureau of Mines-Future prices ities has been constant or declining for many, were calc 6lated assuming a 5 percent annual increase from 1980 on, 214 THE PROJECTIONS 240 220 Titanium in soils 0 200 0 U- 0 180 U) 0 z Titanium in beach sands < rich in ilmenite Cn D 0 160 Titanium in all rocks *--,Titanium in ferruginous rocks w 140- 0 z Titanium in beach sands rich in rutile 0 UJ 120- z Aluminum in anorthosite 0 w Aluminum in clays 0 cr 100- CL 0 w 80- Range of Al .03 content of plagioclase 0' w a: --------- - ----- Range of AI20, content of clays Alumii um in bauxite ---------- w (from A120.) z 60 w -j Range of A1203 content of < U.S. bauxite resources 0 ------------------------- ---------------- z ... 40 -j Iron in magnetic taconite Range of iron content copper in sulfides of taconites ---------------------------- Range of iron content 20 Iron in nonmagnetic taconiteZ of laterites Iron in specular hematite iron in laterites 01 Iron in.hematite 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 so METAL CONTENT, IN WEIGHT PERCENT Figure 12-3. Energy requirements for recovery of iron, titanium, and aluminum, different grades, various sources. (Page & Creasey, U.S. Geological Survey Journal of Research, Jan.-Feb. 1975) Earth's crustal.mass Other Reserve Other crustal mass potential resources Reserves Mining, milling, smelting ris mirig Geologic Exploration, Exploration, calculation, geologic and technology, technology, economic price increase, energy price judgments, production 0 technolog, costs, Y, z energy price especially energy costs Saving, M collecting, sorting recycling ZI 1-@ 17, @77 Materials in Usable minerals, Materials metals, compounds, in use depreciated goods etc. z CA v CL Cc 41 =sse- The symbols Wesartf inywitory Stocks of resoiffces. Unrecovered waste The symbols represent "volves" controlling the rates of flow between inventory stocks. @E xpl.)r:lio., lFigure 12-4. Mineral product flow and four principal decision points (A B. C. D) in the flo%@. 216 THE PROJECTIONS would result. from a 5 percent per year increase involved at each of these four decision points are starting in 1980-the same rate as was assumed discussed in the following paragraphs. for energy prices. Table 12-6 compares these prices with projections made for the United Na- Replenishing Reserves tions. Decisions made at point A in Figure 12-4 influence the rate at which mineral reserves are Decision Points in the replenished from the stock of "other mineral resources.- These other resources consist of three Mineral-Industry System additional major inventories: (1) undiscovered eco- Meeting the projected 3-5 percent per year nomic rrso.urces, (2) undiscovered subeconornic growth in demand will require careful attention to resources, and (3) identified subeconomic re- the health and stability of the minerals supply sources. Figure 12-5 depicts this classification system. 14 This system consists of several different scheme in the so-called McKelvey box, named types of inventory stocks linked together by flows. after former Geological Survey Director Vincent The flows are governed by the associated indus- E. McKelvey, who contributed most to its con- try, technology, economic conditions, institutions, ception. Since reserves are just that portion of the and government regulations. Stable management identified resources from which mineral commod- of these inventory stocks is an enormously com- ities can be economically and legally extracted, plex matter, not just because of the physical other resources constitute undiscovered deposits magnitude of the system but also because the and those not quite economically exploitable stocks themselves are difficult and expensive to ("paramarginal") or far from economically ex- measure. ploitable ("submarginal"). There are four major decision points contr6lling The stocks of all resource inventories change the primary flows in the minerals supply system. over time as the result of explor-ation, technology, These four principal decision points are designated changes in production costs and changes in price. by the letters A through D in Figure 12-4. At The flows among these inventory stocks are point A, decisions are made as to what can and illustrated in Figure 12-6, which is an exploded should be done to replenish reserves. At point B, version of the McKelvey box.* Exploration lo- decisions are made on the mix of virgin and cates previously undiscovered mineral deposits recycled materials to use in their products. At thus "moving" them into the-inventories of iden- point C, decisions are made on whether a depre- tified resources and reserves. This movement ciated good should be discarded or saved for augments the identified resource inventories while recycling. Manufacturers decide at point D where reducing the undiscovered stocks. likewise, ad- they can reduce their requirements for certain vances in technology and rising miner-al prices can material elements (conservation) and where they move resources from the paramarginal and sub- should change from one material to another (sub- marginal inventories into the economic invento- stitution). Some of the many factors and questions ries. However, increased production costs (e.g., increased energy,, capital, and labor costs) and TABLE 12-6 environmental constraints can move deposits in the opposite direction. Mining, of course, depletes Comparison of Price Projections for Four Metals reserve inventories. in the Year 2000 Exploration determines the flow that moves resources from the stock of undiscovered, re- Leontief coverable resources into reserves. Many factors Normalized Prices a influence the level of explorutory efforts. Prevail- From ing interest rates and tax policies influence the Table 12-5 Low High amount of reserves companies want to hold. High (dollars per pound) interest rates tend to discourage exploration until Copper 1.21 .56 1.29 the ratio of reserves to annual production becomes Lead .38 .15 .27 Nickel 4.35* 1.81 3.18 *Adapted from John J. Schanz, Jr., "United States Min- Zinc .62 .29 .29 erals-A Perspective," Mining Congress Journal, Feb. 1977, P. 27, and "A Quick-Look Method for Monitoring the : Normalization- is a process through which the prices projected by t .he model Adequacy of Metal Supplies from Canadian Mining 'for r,e* adjusted for inflation under the assumption that the average price of all goods consumed will be the same in the future as; it was in 1970. Domestic Needs," Energy, Mines and Resources'Canada Source: Wassily Leontief et aL, The Future of the World Economy, New York: (Minerals), Mineral Policy Series, Mineral Bulletin MR 165, Oxford Univenity, 1977, p. 45. 1976. NONFUEL MINERALS PROJECTIONS 217 TOTAL RESOURCES IDENTIFIED UNDISCOVERED DeMmtrated HYPOTHETICAL SPECULATIVE Inferred 'In kno.n districts) (in undiscovered MeasuredI Indicated districts) R E S E R V E S Z 0 0. E R S 0 U R c E S f 0 0 Z 0 + 4- W go E E U) I Increasing degree of geologic assurance Figure 12-5. Classification of mineral resources, the "McKelvey box." (U.S. Geoh)gical SurveY Bulletin 1450-A, 1976) relatively small. Taxes on reserves also discourage tion of norifuel minerals?What will be the energy exploration. requirements? The capital requirements?* The . Technological advances and increased price of water requirements? The labor needs? The, envi- a mineral commodity relative to production costs ronmental impacts? Will lower-grade resource are the major determinants in the flow of identified stocks become economic? What will be the imph- paramarginal and submarginal resources into the cations for the price of mineral commodities reserves inventory. Increased real prices offset relative to other goods and services? What indi-- the high production costs associated with para- cators; should be used to measure technological marginal (or even submarginal) resources, but at progress? Has progress been achieved if a tech- the same time increases in real prices constrain nology provides economic access to lower-gradd demand and limit the use of mineral commodities deposits while increasing energy and/or water in the economy. Over the past decade technology requirements? has contributed to a flow of paramarginal and Production costs (relative to nonfuel mineral submarginal resources into reserves without in- commodity prices) also need careful examination, creasing relative prices, but continuation of these because increased production costs relative to trends may be more difficult in the future. market prices can move reserves back to the Technology is knowledge organized and applied paramarginal inventory by making production un- to an objective-in this case the production of economical. An example from fuel minerals illus- nonfuel mineral commodities. This production trates the point. process involves many factor-,-labor, water, en- Atyarious times during the past decade the per ergy, nonfuel minerals, capital-and the relative barrel'price of oft at which oil shale would become mix of the production factors is determined largely economic has been placed at $5, $7, $10, etc. Yet by technology. at an bil price of $14 per barrel, shale is still not Much more information (and policy attention) is economically recoverable, in large part because needed on the influence of technology on the the increased cost of oil has in turn increased the production of mineral commodities. To what ex- costs of producing oil from shale. The energy tent have past technological developments substi- required to produce a unit of energy from shale is tuted energy, water, and capital for labor? To large or, to put it another way, the net energy what extent has cheap energy contributed to yield is small. In such cases, increases in the price keeping the prices of nonfuel mineral commodities of oil are reflected quickly in increased production low? What specific technological developments costs. As a result, shale may never be more than are now expected to influence the future produc- marginally economic. Similar questions have yet 71 7 7 -M 00 0 v q, Z A, "Ttl -@@ " , _-1 li-,, @, 'o Undiscovered Minerals-in- use a @@4 Reserves ----------- recoverable "I N, resources ',z C y - .2 14, jt' X 7 Er :.1 e] Technology Technology M and increased and increased price price X ---------- - - M Increased costs of Increased costs of High-entropy production and production and waste environmental environmental constraints constraints Identifi d Undiscovered paramorginal paramorgina and submarginal and submarginal resources resources .0 '6 X The symbols represent inventory stocks of resources. '41 11 V The _j@symbols represent "valves" controlling the rates of flow between inventory stocks. 7_7 V _7@ Al 4 Figure 12-6. The exploded McKelvey box, with indicated stocks and nows. NONFUEL MINE RALS PROJECTIONS 219 to be carefully answered about paramarginal and ship and applied it on a world basis. 16 The submarginal nonfuel mineral resources. .,recoverable resource potentials implied by this Estimates of resources other than reserves are method are included in Table 12-7 for 15 of the very uncertain, partly because of conceptual diffi- elements considered in this chapter. These poten- culties-How does the investigator decide when a tials include undiscovered deposits but exclude all mineral occurrence is too low grade or too difficult deposits (discovered and undiscovered) not eco- to extract or refine to include it as a resource? As nomic at current prices with present technology. a practical matter, investigators do establish cutoff Corresponding production and resources data are points, selected by professional judgment with included in the table for comparison. limited standard criteria available for guidance. The quantity of minerals distributed in the The question then arises as to what extent earth's crust down to a depth of I kilometer is mineral resources, as represented by the estimates very large, as indicated in the last column of the presented, might be enlarged from other parts of table. Most of these minerals, however, generally the earth's crust (see Fig. 12-4). McKelvey has have such a low concentration that the costs of suggested that the recoverable resource potential their extraction and refining are prohibitive. of well-explored chemical elements in the United States is roughly equal to their crustal abundance The Mix of Virgin and Recycled Materials (percent of the element contained in the earth's The second major decision to be considered crust) times a factor ranging between I billion and (see point B in Fig. 12-4) is the way in which the 10 billion. IS Ralph Erickson, also of the Geologi- mix of virgin and recycled materials is determined cal Survey, elaborated somewhat on the relation- in the minerals supply system. The factors in- TABLE 12-7 World Production and Reserves in 1977 (Estimated), Other Resources in 1973-77 (as Data Available), Resource Potential, and Resource Base of 17 Elements (Millions of metric tons) Produc- Other Resource Potential Resource Base . tion Reserves Resources (Recoverable) (Crustal Mass) Aluminum 174 5,200 & 2,800a 3,519,000 1,990,0()0,000,000 Iron 495 b 93,100 143,000- 2,035,000 1,392,000,000,000 Potassium 22 9,960 103,000 n.a. 408,000,000,000 Manganese lod 2,200 1,100e 42,000 31,200,000,000 Phosphorus 14t 3,400 f 12,000f 51,000 28,800,000,000 Fluorine 29 72 270 20,000 10,800,000,000 Sulfur 52 1,700 3,800 1- 9,600,000,000 Chromium 3 7801 6,000t 3,260 2,600,000,000 Zinc 6 159 4,000 3,400 2,250,000,000 Nickel 0.7 54 103e 2,590 2,130,000,000 Copper 8 456 1,770 J 2,120 1,510,000,000 Lzad 4 1.23 1,250 550 290,000,000 Tin 0.2 10 27 68 40,800,000 Tungsten 0.04 1.8 3.4 51 26,400,000 Mercury 0.008 0.2 0.4 3.4 2,100,000 @Silver 0.010 0.2 0.5 2.8 1,800,000 Platinum groUpk 0.0002 0.02 0.051 1.2 m 1,1()0,000 :,In bauxite, dry basis, assumed to average 21 percent recoverable aluminum. n ore and concentrates assumed to average 58 percent recoverable iron. e in ore and concentrates assumed to average 26 percent recoverable iron. 4 in ore and concentrates assumed to average 40 percent manganese. Excludes metal in deep-sea nodules and, in the case of nickel, unidentified resources. In phosphate rock ore and concentrates assumed to average 13 percent phosphorus. In fluorspar and phosphate rock ore and concentrates assumed to average 44 percent fluorine. &Excludes unidentified sulfur resources, enormous quantities of sulfur in gypsum and anhydrite. and some 600 billion tons of sulfur in coal, oil shale. and in shale that is rich in organic matter. :In ore and concentrates assumed to average 32 percent chromium. Includes 690 million tons in deep-sea nodules. Platinum, palladium. iridium, cesium, rhodium, and ruthenium. 'Approximate midpoint of estimated range of 0.03-0.06 million metric tons. I Platinum only. Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity Summaries 1978: Mineral Commodity Profiles 1977: Mineral Facts and Problems (Bulletin 667), Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975., Donald A. Brobst and Walden P. Pratt, eds., United States Mineral Resources (Geological Survey Professional Paper 820) Washington: Government Printing Office. 1973. 220 THE PROJECTIONS volved are, basically, the quantity and quality of Entropy is the scientific term that measures resources available from mining and recycling. how "mixed up" things are. "Concentratedness," As noted above, the earth's crust contains very as used above, is the opposite of entropy. Concen- large quantities of minerals. It follows, therefore, trated deposits have relatively low entropy and that the basic long-term issue of mineral-commod- low production costs; low-grade deposits have ity policy for all nations and the world is not the high entropy and high Costs. 17 Combining min- exhaustion of minerals but rather the maintenance erals and materials in alloys and other products of an adequate stock of minerals-in-use in the and distributing these products throughout the global economy at manageable economic and economy increases the entropy of the minerals environmental costs. Nonetheless, concern over used; how much entropy is added determines exhaustion persists, stemming in part from confu- largely the practicality of recycling. The factors sion over the terms "renewable" and "nonrenew- that determine the entropy of ores and the wast 'es able." Biological resources, are often thought of from society are therefore highly relevant to as "renewable.- Nonfuel mineral resources, are maintaining'an adequate stock of minerals in use usually termed "nonrenewable." Actually in both at manageable costs. cases, the reverse is more nearly true. Mineral deposits of the lowest entropy (highest When passenger pigeons were hunted for sa- grade) are generally used first. It is widely thought vory pigeon-pie filling, they were regarded as a that, as low-entropy deposits are depleted, higher- renewable resource. After all, every year the entropy deposits are found in greater abundance. pigeons bred and produced more pigeons. Unfor- In some types of mineral deposits, there is a graduation from relatively low entropy to rela- tunately, the take of pigeons exceeded the maxi- tively high entropy, and the tonnage available mum sustainable yield of this resource and the increases at a constant geometric rate over some . min- passenger pigeon population declined. Unlike i range as the grade decreases. Is However, there is eral resources, the remainder of this depleted no geological reason to think that this relationship resource was not scattered across the earth, holds for a ore deposits or that "there must be limiting the take, but concentrated. After each undiscovered [higher-entropy) deposits of astro- attack, a biologically fatal instinct flocked the nomical tonnage to bridge the gap between com- birds together again-until the last pigeon was mercial ore and the millions of cubic miles of shot. The passenger pigeon resource-the spe- crystal rocks that have measurable trace amounts cies-is extinct now and will never be replaced. of the various less common metals in them." 19 It, like all biological resources, was exhaustible Much further work is needed to more adequately and nonrenewable. estimate the ultimate availability of naturally o'c- By contrast, mineral resources are (at least in curring resource deposits and the economic, so- theory) completely renewable. When an atom of cial, and environmental cost associated with pro- copper is used, it is not "consumed" or destroyed ducing them. 20 but remains an atom of copper potentially avail- able for recovery and reuse. In many cases the Save It, or Throw It Away? cost of recovery and recycling would be exceed- At point C in Figure 12-4 decisions are made ingly high. For example, recoverv of lead from by the final users of products as to whether the the waste stream of used tetraethyl lead (in leaded depreciated goods are to be "thrown away" or gasoline) would be very costly since this lead is saved for recycling. In part this is a question of scattered along highways across the world as personal values: Will a person take the time and exceedingly fine, diffuse particles. Nonetheless, go to the inconvenience to see that materials are recovery and reuse of this lead is theoretically saved for recycling? In part the question is possible at some cost of energy, water, labor, and economic: Are there institutions available for capital. Therefore, in contrast to biological re- recycling and have the depreciated goods been sources, the basic issue of nonfuel mineral re- designed so as to have economic value for recy- sources is not exhaustion or extinction but rat er cling? the cost of maintaining an adequate stock f The most influential decisions affecting the fate nonfuel mineral commodities within the economy of depreciated goods are not made by. the final through mining and recycling. users and recyclers but by the manufacturers who The mix between mining and recycling is deter- originally designed the depreciated goods. If the mined largely by relative costs. These, in turn, original design produces a high-entropy combina- depend to a large extent on the "concentrated- tion of materials, the final user has little choice. ness" of the sourr-es of nonfuel minerals. but to "throw it away." Thus, while decisions on NONFUEL MINERALS PROJECTIONS 221 recycling appear to be Made at point C in Figure tested that the aluminum contamination precluded 12-4, most are actually design decisions made at recycling the glass cullet was the product design point D. changed. Some designs 'facilitate -reuse and recycling and Automobiles provide another important exam- thereby increase residence times for minerals-in- ple. Automobiles are by nature a high-entropy use. Other designs make reuse and recycling product containing many materials, but design virtually impossible. "Disposable" products and considerations could greatly facilitate recycling of containers are not designed for easy disposal, in much of the material. Steel, one of the largest fact disposal of "disposable" products is an, constituent materials in automobiles, is reduced in increasingly difficult municipal problem. "Dispos- value significantly by contamination by copper. able" products and containers are designed so Were automobile manufacturers responsible for that they cannot be reused. Many cannot even be the disposal of depreciated cars, a strong incentive recycled because they are such high-@entropy prod- would be established to reduce copper contami- ucts. nation. In fact, if automobiles were leased rather Frozen orange juice containers provi& an ex- than sold, there might be benefits not only for' ample of a "disposable" product of a particularly recycling and solid waste, but also for mainte- high-entropy design. The'rnetal top is usually a nance and air quality. different alloy (or even a different metal) from the The positive effect of institutional responsibility bottom. The cylinder itself is composite material- can be seen in the! example of scrap wire from rial heavy paper coated on the outside with ink telephone installations. Telephone companies are and plastic and lined on the inside with a metal responsible for cleaning up after installations; foil. Minerals and materials combined in such rather than paying to have scrap wire carted high-entropy designs can be used only once and away, attention is given to designs that facilitate are thereafter lost to society. recycling of scrap copper wire. Special recycling The costs of maintaining an adequate stock Of bags facilitate collection, and insulating materials minerals-in-use, therefore, depend not only on difficult to separate from the copper are avoided. adequate reserves'and other resources but also on Similarly,, airr-r-aft manufacturers, who are often the residence time of the mineral commodities in asked to scrap aircraft, may stamp alloy composi- the economy before they are'lost as bigh-entropy tions on parts during manufacture to facilitate wastes. Product design, the availability of mainte- recycling. Thus, institutional responsibility for.- nance and spare parts are important cOnsidera- disposal clearly leads to product designs that are tions, as are the institutional considerations that very different from those used in the "disposable" govern recycling and reuse. Important institutional products that are ultimately the responsibility of considerations include the freight' rates and tax municipal sanitation departments. policies that favor virgin-over recycled-maie- rials and the municipal disposal service (provided, Conservation and Substitution at no charge to manufacturers) for the disposal of all products, independent o 'f design. A nation's Point D, the last of the four -decision points, in, minerals policy, therefore, extends well beyond Figure 12-4, is where decisions on conservation reserves, resources, and mining; it includes all and substitution are made. Both conservation and factors 'that lead to high-entropy loss from its substitution come about as a result of design stock of minerals-in-use. policies, which respond strongly to technological High-entropy product designs have an impor- developments and relative prices. tant influence on future material costs and Are The demand for nonfuel Mineral commodities- closely associated with an especially important like the demand for energy-@-can be moderated by institutional consideration: Responsibility for the conservation, but just as with energy, there are design of most products is separated completely costs associated with minerals conservation, costs from responsibility@ for the ultimate disposal of the that may delay major conservation efforts until products designed. The results of this institutional prices increase significantly. arrangement are often disastrous for those in- Substitution also has potential for decreasing volved in the recycling (secondary-materials) in- the need for the less common metals, provided * dustries. For example, a few years ago beverage the substitute material is not highly energy-inten- producers began using closures that left aluminum sive, like plastics, or is also experiencing supply rings on the necks'of "one-way" bottles with little limitations, like wood and wood products in some thought about the implications of this high-entropy regions. Sometimes an alternative process, rather design for recycling. Only when recyclers pro- than'a different material, reduces or even elimi- 222 THE PROJECTIONS nates the demand for particular uses of a scarce however, industrialized countries are projected to material. There are examples relating to mercury. absorb over three-fourths of world nonfuel mineral Projected demand for mercury, when compared production. with the resource outlook, suggests that mercury The per capita demand for nonfuel minerals in may be one of the first industrial metals to the industrialized countries is @so high compara- experience significant supply constraints. Further- tively that these countries use not only their own more, use of mercury is being restricted in part domestic supplies but import increasingly large because of health and environmental hazards. quantities from the LDCs. (While some of these However, acceptable alternatives are now known resources are re-exported to the less developed for most of the major uses of mercury. These countries as manufactured goods, a large portion alternatives, in effect, substitute for mercury." remains in the developed economies.) As a result, Impressive as such developments are, one can- the percentage of worid niineral-commodity pro- not simply assume that technology will eliminate duction traded internationally increased apprecia- the need for minerals as they become more bly in the 1950s and 1960s, as shown in Table 12- scarce. It will probably be very difficult-perhaps 8. During this same period, real prices of most impossible-to develop entirely satisfactory sub- mineral commodities either decreased or increased stitutes for lead and antimony in storage batteries, only moderately. manganese for use in desulfurizing steel, nickel Prices are a major concern of those LDC!s that and chromium in stainless steel, tin in solder, export nonfuel mineral commodities. They would, helium in low-temperature refrigeration, uranium of course, like to receive higher prices for their and beryllium in nuclear reactors, tungsten in commodities and argue that the present price of high-speed tools, mercury in wetted contact relays most nonfuel mineral commodities does not reflect and arc rectifiers, silver in photography, and the real value of the commodities and is not palladium as a contact material in telephone compatible with the prices charged for the manu- electromagnetic relays. Furthermore, it often factured goods they import. To support the latter takes one or two decades for a new technological point, they note that LDC "terms of trade" with development to reach the point of widespread developed areas (unit value index of exports use. There can be significant costs and uncomfort- divided by unit value index of imports) for com- able economic dislocations during the transition if modities (excluding petroleum) dropped from 109 stable international supplies are not planned and in 1953 to 84 in 1975 (1970 = 100). 22 developed well in advance of anticipated needs. The LDCs' bargaining position is generally not as strong with respect to nonfuel mineral com- Nonfuel Minerals and the North-South modities as it is with respect to oil. The OPEC Dialogue nations have over 70 percent of the proven reserves of petroleum; mineral reserves are not so Mineral commodities are essential to both de- concentrated. The comparative mineral reserve veloped and developing economies, but in differ- position of the developed and developing regions ent ways. Developed industrialized economies is shown in Table 12-9. However, as the indus- need access to dependable supplies of inexpensive trialized nations continue to deplete their own raw materials.. Developing economies need both resources, the LDCs' position will become foreign exchange from mineral commodity exports and refined minerals and materials for develop- ment. Mineral policies and prices are therefore a TABLE 12-8 point of potential disagreement between the indus- Percentage of World Production of Selected trialized nations (predominantly in the northern Nfinerals latitudes) and the less developed nations (primarily Traded Internationally, 1950-70 to the south). In fact, minerals issues have been a major element in the North-South dialogue. 1950 1960 1970 The demand for nonfuel. minerals commodities Aluminum 81 86 103 in the industrialized nations is large. If the fourth Copper 55 66 59 of the world's population that inhabits industrial Zinc 52 60 60 countries were content with a fourth of the Fluorspar 29 42 54 world's mineral production, they could ftirnish 'More than 3 percent of traded aluminum materials derived from drawdowns of their entire needs (except for tin and possibly mine and smelter stocks. bauxite) from their domestic deposits and by trade Source: National Commission on Materials Policy, To.ard a National Materials Policy: World Perspective, Washington: Government Printing Office, Jan. 1973, among themselves. At least until the year 20M, Appendix. NONFUEL MINERALS PROJECTIONS 223 TABLE 12-9 Geographic Distribution of World Resources of Selected Mineral Commodities in 1974 (Percent of world total) Northern America, Republic of U.S.S.R. and Less Western Europe, South Africa, Eastern Developed Australia, Japan . Rhodesia Europe Countries Reserves Total Reserves Total Reserves Total Reserves Total Resources Resources Resources Resources Steel-making commodities Iron 40 35 1 2 30 27 29 36 Manganese 8 8 45 47 37 38 10 7 Chromium 1 1 96 97 1 1 2 1 Nickel 27 33 3 4 9 61a 55 b Nonferrous commodities Aluminum 23 25 4 3 73 72 Copper 31 42 1 2 12 8 56 48 Lead 58 65 21 17 21 18 Zinc 63 63 15 15 22 22 Tin 7 10 6 7 87 83 Nonmetallic commodities, Sulfur 40 57 18 14 42 29 Phosphate rock 18 12 It 1 3 5 68 82 Potash 82 91 17 8 1 1 Comprises New Caledonia 25 percent and other less developed countries 36 percent. b Comprises New Caledonia 22 percent and other less developed countries 33 percent. Source: Bureau of Mines. Mineral Facts and Ptablerns, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975. stronger, and continued efforts to establish cartels Zambia, and Zaire; iron ore in the case of Liberia can be expected. and Mauritania; and aluminum in various primary The future prospects for cartelization efforts is forms in the case of Guinea and Surinam. Tin is unclear. Some analysts believe that the political, nearly as dominant in Bolivian exports, and phos- technical, and economic factors responsible for phate rock in Moroccan exports. OPEC are unique and that there will never be a Much of the final value of refined minerals is comparably effective marketing organization for added during processing and refining, and many any other commodity. Others are far less certain. LDCs want to process their mineral raw materials Examples of unity among LDCs have become before export so as to retain as much as possible increasingly evident in recent years, and these of the value added by manufacture. Already most countries have much to gain economically by such bauxite mined in Jamaica is processed to alumina cooperation. It is clear, however, that the LDCs and aluminum metal before export. Collectively, will be restrained by a desire to maintain employ- LDCs have set a goal of producing 25 percent of ment in their mining and related industries and the world industrial production by 2000. Much of will therefore be hesitant to encourage industrial the LDC production will be refined mineral com- countries to turn to alternative sources and substi- modities. tute materials. Furthermore, all of the non-OPEC Mineral deposits beneath the sea are of concern LDCs need foreign exchange to pay for essential to less developed countries both because these imports. minerals are a possible source of competition and Nonfuel minerals play an important role in the because of a feeling of participation in ownership. balance of payments of the less developed nations. Avid Pardo, Maltese Ambassador to the United Of the total value of commodity exports (exclud- Nations, succinctly stated the LDC position in his ing petroleum) by LDCs, eight principal nonfuel address to the General Assembly on November 1, minerals constituted 13 percent in 1960 and 11 1967, when he stressed that the resources in and percent in 1975 .23 Sometimes a single mineral under the oceans are a "common heritage of accounts for over half of total exports of a mankind." Disputes over who should receive the particular country-copper in the case of Chile, benefits has delayed the development of seabed 224 THE PROJECTIONS resources, the most important of which are the Proposal for the establishment of a New Interna- manganese nodules." . tional Economic Order. These potato-siz d nodules, containi Many of the developing countries have come to e, . ng impor- tant amounts, of nickel, copper, cobalt, an Id man- believe they cannot accomplish their development ganese, fie on the ocean floors beneath 1,000 to at a satisfactory. rate without basic structural 20,000 feet of water. The possibility of exploiting changes in the world economy. Accordingly, a these resources has led mining companies in proposal for structural change was presented by industrial countries to form several consortia to the LDCs at the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. actively develop the necessary dredging and proc- General Assembly in 1974. The proposal calls for essing technology. Much of the technology has the establishment of a New International Eco- already been developed and tested. Preproduction nomic Order, and one of its principal- objectiveS25 expenditures are expected to reach $1 billion by is a more favorable relationship between prices of 1980. Commercial output may begin in th@ early LDC exports and imports. 1980s. The prospects for profitable operation are Since the Sixth Special Session in 1974, the good, but the profits would accrue primarily to LDCs have made additional initiatives on com- industrialized nations since the LDCs have neither modity prices. An important effrt was made at the technology necessary to move into deep- the Fourth U.N. Conference on Trade and Devel- seabed mining nor (except for the OPEC nations) opment (UNCTAD) in 1976 to support the prices the necessary capital. of 10 commodities, including three nonfuel min- Annual extraction of manganese nodules from erals--bauxite, copper, and tin. Further discus- the deep seabed may total 15 million metric tons sion' of the price of these minerals (plus iron ore, by 1985, according to estimates by Leipziger and manganese ore,and phosphate rock) were held at Mudge .24 These nodules may yield the metal the 1977 UNCTAD Conference. tonnages shown in Table 12-10, plus smaller One consideration that will become increasingly quantities of some other metals. However, poten- important in North-South discussions of mineral tial environmental impacts have not yet been fully commodity prices is the fact,that high-grade ores examined, and the LDCs believe that the nodules in effect have a large "energy content" as a result should be mined by an international authority in of their low entropy. It takes less than half as which they have significant representation. much energy to recover a ton of copper from 4 At recent United Nations Law of the Sea Percent Zambiari ore than from 03 percent Ari- Conferences, the LDCs have requested the estab- zonan ore. Grade and entropy considerations are lishment of an International Seabed Resource likely to become more important in the future. Authority (ISRA) to control all aspects of deep- seabed mining. It is proposed that the ISRA be an operating institution in competition with (or to the Conclusions exclusion of) private firms. Whether the opera- tions are public or private, an international tax on Projected wodd demand (when compared with resources mined from the deep seabed could yield world reserves) of nonfuel resources, shows no $200 million to $600 million annually. These funds immediate prospect of resource exhaustion. On could then be used to accelerate development in the other hand, significant increases in reserves the LDCs, which is the basic ob ective of a related will be needed to meet projected demand, which j does not include a significant increase in LDC TABLE 12-10 demand. As noted in Chapter 22, the projections Estimates of Metal Recoveries from Manganese of LDC demands for nonfuel minerals could be Nodules from the Deep Seabed by 1985 much higher if other assumptions were introduced into the analysis. In any event, the industrialized Production Percent of I Percent of nations will continue. to be heavily dependent on (thousands of 1974 World Estimated 1985 resources importpd.from LDCs, and both availa- metric tons) Production World Produc- bility and pricewill depend on developments in tion the North-South dialogue, especially concerning Nickel 225 32 14 proposals for a New International Economic Or- Copper 180 2 2 der, for multinational 'corporation codes, and for Cobalt 37 125 62 Law-of-the-Sea issues. Manganese 3,750 40 N Such North-South issues, and the prospects for Source: Danny M. Leipziger and James L. Mudge, Seabed Mineral Resources rising energy costs, will deeply affect coming and 'he Economic Interests of Developing Countries, Cambridge, Mass.: Balfinger, 1976. Data for manganese have been updated. decisions over the exploitability of resources NONFUEL MINERALS PROJECTIONS 225 around the world and the technologies used in the institutional considerations, especially product-de- exploitation process. The results could include sign decisions that determine the entropic-staw of significant increases in the real price of nonfuel the resources in depreciated goods. As a result, minerals. Recycling could then appear relatively product-design decisions between now and 2000 attractive in industrialized nations. The possibili- may have a significant bearing on resource stocks ties for recycling, however, depend largely on and prices in the early 21Strcentury. REFERENCES 1. F. Callot, "Production et Consommation Mondiales des (for information on geologic occurrence of mineral Mindrais en 1973," Annales des Mines, Dec. 1975, pp. deposits); Stephen Kesler, Our Finite Mineral Re- 13-14; also Charles L. Kimbell and George A. Morgan, sources, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976, and Charles F. "Minerals in the World Economy," in U.S. Bureau of Park, Earlhbound, San Francisco: Freeman, 1974 (for Mines, Minerals Yearbook 1974, Washington: Govern- information on resource scarcity). ment Printing Office, 1976. 15. Vincent E. McKelvey, "Relation of Reserves of Ele- 2. Wilfred Malenbaum, World Demand for Raw Materials ments to Their Crustal Abundance " American Journal in. 1985 and 2000- Philadelphia: University of Perinsyl-, of Science, vol. 258-A (Bradley voiume), 1960, -pp. 234- vania, Oct. 1977. 41. 3. U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Trends and Forecasts, Washington: Oct. 1976. 16. Ralph L. Erickson, "Crustal Abundance of Elements 4. G. H. Goudarzi, L. F. Rooney, and G. L.- Shaffer, and Mineral Reserves and Resources," in Donald A. "Supply of Nonfuel Minerals and Materials for the Brobst and Walden P. Pratt, eds ., United States Mineral United States Energy. Industry, 1975-90," in Demand Resources, Geological Survey Professional Paper 820, and Supply of Nonfuel Minerals and Materials f6r the Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 21- United States Energy Industry, 1975-1990-A Prelimi- 25. nary Report, Geological Survey Professional Paper 17. For a discussion of entropy as it relates to mineral 1006-A,B, Washington: GoverrimenU Printing Office, economics, see Nicholas George scu-Roegen, "Matter 1976. Matters, Too," in K. D. Wilson, ed., Prospects for 5. "Report of the 2nd General Conference of the United Growth, New York: Praeger, 1977. Nations Industrial Development Organization" (Lima, 18. S. G. Lasky, "Mineral Resources Appraisal by the U.S. Mar. 12-26, 1975), UNIDO, May 1975. Geological Survey " Colorado School of Mines Quart- 6. U.S. Geological Survey, Principles of the Mineral erly, Jan. 1950, p@- 1-27; "How Tonnage-Grade Rela- Resource Classification System of the U.S. Bureau of tions Help Predict Ore Reserves, Engineering and Mines and U.S. Geological Survey,. Bulletin 1450-A, Mining Journal, Apr. 1950, pp. 81-85; and "Mineral Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976. ' Industry Futures Can Be Predicted, 11," Engineering 7. John E. Tilton, The Future op Nonfuel Min eIra Is, and Mining Journal, Sept. 1955, pp. 94-%. Washington: Brookings, 1977, p. 10. @. 1 19. T. S. Lovering, *'Mineral Resources from the Land," in 8. J. Zwartendyk, "The Life Index of Mineral Reserves- National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Re- A Statistical Mirage," Canadian Institute of Mining sources and Man, Resources and Man, San Francisco: and Metallurgy Bulletin, Oct. 1974, pp. 67-70. Freeman, 1969, p. 114. 9. John McHale, "Resource Availability and Growth," U.S. Economic Growth from 1976 to 1986: Prospects, 20. Donald A. Brobst, "Fundamental Concepts for the Problems, and Patterns, Studies Prepared for Use of Analysis of Resource Availability," presented at a the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, Vol. 4, Resources for the Future conference, Washington, Oct. "Resources and Energy," Nov. 16, 1976. 19, 1976, in V. Kerry Smith, ed., Scarcity and Growth 10. Harold J. Barnett and Chandler Morse, Scarcity and Reconsidered, Washington: Resources for the Future, Growth: The Economics 'of Natural Resource Availa- forthcoming; D. A. Singer, "Long-Term Adequacy of bility, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. Metal Resources," Resources Policy, June 1977, pp. 11. Harold J. Barnett, "Sear-city and Growth Revisited," 127-33. presented at a Resources for the Future conference, 21. H. E. Goeller andAlvin M. Weinberg, "The Age of Washington, Oct. 19, 1976, in V. Kerry Smith, ed., Substitutability," Science, Feb. 20, 1976, pp. 683-89. Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered, Washington- Re- 22., United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, June sources for the Future, forthcoming. 1977, p xxxi. 12. John J. Schanz, Jr., "United States Minerals-A Per- 23. World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends, 1977 spective," Mining Congress Journal, Feb., 1977, p. 27. ed., Washington, Aug. 1977, p. 14. 13. G. M. Brown, Jr. and B. Field, "The Adequacy of Measures for Signaling the Scarcity' of Natural Re- 24. Danny M. Leipziger and James L. Mudge, Seabed -sources," presented at a Resources for the Future Mineral Resources and the Economic Interests of conference, Washington, Oct. 19, 1976, in V. Kerry. Developing Countries, Cambridge, M .ass.: Ballinger, Smith, ed., Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered, Wash- 1976. ington: Resources for the Future, forthcoming. 25. A careful analysis of the need for a New International 14. Also see: J. F. McDivitf and G. Manners, Minerals and Economic Order and some of its proposed objectives is Men, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,' 1974 (for infor- contained in Jan Tinbergen (coordinator), RIO-Re- mation@on use of materials); Brian J. Skinner, Earth shaping the International Order, New York: Dutton, Resources, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1%9 1976. 13 Environment Projections This chapter is the last of the 12 chapters pre- beginning to threaten goods and services that the senting the Global 2000 Study projections. Chap- environment has heretofore provided free or at ters 2-4 present the driving-force projections minimal cost.. (Population, GNP, Climate), which provide basic Humankind has habitually taken for granted inputs to the resource -projections presented in the goods (e.g., soil fertility, clean plentiful water) Chapters 5-12. Attention turns now to the future and the services (e.g., removal of air pollutants) of the world's environment. provided by the environment. The habit persists. The term "environment" is not easily defined. The projections reported in the previous chapters To some, the word suggests pristine landscapes are based generally on the assumption that the and wilderness. While these connotations are cer- environment will continue to provide goods and tainly inherent in most definitions of the term, ,6environment" is used in this chapter in a much services as abundantly and inexpensively in the broader sense. future as it has in the past. Many of these general Literally, the environment is the physical and assumptions about future environmental goods biological surroundings of the organisms under and services are brought into question by the anal- yses in this chapter. In the years ahead, human- discussion-in this case Homo sapiens, the human kind will need to consider more carefully both the species. Humankind depends on this life-sup- environmental implications of its activities and the porting environment in many complex ways. So effects that environmental deterioration generally intimate is the linkage between humankind and will have on human activities. its environment that the distinction between in- In this chapter, two questions will be asked of dividual and environment blurs. Some of the air all of the Study's other projections: First, assum- we breathe becomes a part'of us. The oxygen ing (1) that the developments projected in the metabolizes our foods and becomes a part of our flesh and blood; particulates we breath accumu- previous chapters actually come about and (2) that late in our lungs. Some of the liquids we drink present environmental policies remain un- become a part of our bodies, as do the toxic sub- changed, what impacts on the world's environ- stances the liquids sometimes contain. The soils ment can be anticipated? Second, considering all become our food, which in turn becomes, our tis- the projected environmental impacts collectively, sues. In fact, the term "environment'@--i.e., hu- how might developments and changes in the man surroundings-is an inadequate and inaccurate world's environment influence the prospects for concept because there is not and cannot be a sharp achieving theprojections outlined in the previous distinction between humankind and its surround- chapters? ings. In this chapter, for lack of a better alter- The analyses are conducted in two steps, as native, the term "environment" will be used to illustrated in Figure 13-1. In the first step, the describe human surroundings, but throughout it environmental implications of each of the pre- should be remembered that in many important vious driving-force and resource projections are ways we and our environment are one. analyzed. In the second step all of the environ- In analyzing the future of the human environ- mental implications are synthesized and their col- ment, it is also important to note the ways in which lective impact back upon the driving-force and humankind shapes its environment. Many an- resource projections are considered. Were it pos- thropogenic changes in the environment are ben- sible to actually reflect these collective impacts in eficial, but some are not. Houses and communities the earlier projections, the two feedback loops in provide many benefits, including shelter from the Figure 13-1 would be closed. In practice, it is' elements, predators and pathogens. Other an- possible only to note the kinds of effects that could thropogenic changes-such as the contamination be expected, but without actually modifying the of air, water, and soils-have not been wholly projections. Thus the feedback loops remain open beneficial. Some anthropogenic changes are even at two points and the projections continue to be 227 228 THE PROJECTIONS xx .0 %: X-Xj: .... .................... . . . . .% Step Two: Closing the Loops An analysis of the projected environ- mental developments' implications for the driving-force and resource projections Step One: Environmental Projections An analysis of the environmental impli- cations of the driving-force and re- source projections X% %; X Figure '13-1. The two steps in integrating environment into the analysis. The gray box represents the analysis prior to integration with the environmental analysis. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 229 based on rather 'optimistic environmental as- environmental impacts of specific project propos- sumptions. als, but with few exceptions they do not have the The results of the environmental analyses are data and analytical tools needed to perform en- presented in the following 11 sections of this vironmental analyses of long-term plans and Chapter. The first step-the analysis of the en- global projections. Nor have such analyses been vironmental implications of t -he previous projec- required of them to date. * As a result, most of tions-is presented in the next 10 sections in this, the environmental analyses that were appended order: Population, GNP, Climate, Technology, to the agencies projections were quite limited, and Food and Agriculture, the Marine Environment, the bulk of the environmental analyses and writ- Forestry, Water, Energy, and Nonfuel Minerals. ing for this chapter had to be done by experts Each of these sections attempts to analyze the outside the government. But although the Study's environmental developments that might be ex- objective could not be met entirely in the case of pected to follow from the corresponding driving- the environmental chapter, many government force and resource projections. To assist the personnel have been involved in reviewing the reader in recalling the earlie 'r projections, each analyses that follow. of the 10 sections begins with, a brief summary of A second point that must be made before the the projections being analyzed (under the heading analyses are presented concerns assumptions. An The Projoctions, as on the following page). The effort was made to avoid abstract environmental secondstep the analysis of the effects of envi- projections by relating the analyses as directly as ronmental developments collectively on the other possible to the driving-force and resource projec- projections-is presented in, the final section: tions, but many of the driving-force and resource "Closing the Loops: Environmental Feedback to projections were not explicit enough to permit the Other Projections." detailed analysQs of their environmental impli- Before proceeding to ,the first of the environ- cations, and it was necessary to base some of the mental projections, a few additional points need environmental analyses on further assumptions. t.o be mentioned. These additional assumptions are described as First, an effort @ has been made to conduct the they occur throughout this chapter. entire Global 2600* Studywith government per- Third, the environment projections were fre- s,onnel, government data, and government ana- quenily difficult to develop because much of the lytical tools, but unfortunately this objective could data needed on specific topics was not available. not be met in the case of the "Environment Pro- In such cases, the analyst was forced either to jections" chapter. There is no agency of the gov- omit certain topics or to discuss their implications ernment th 'at has the responsibility and capacity on the basis of fragmentary information. The lat- to conduct the kind of environmental analysis and ter course was chosen whenever the topic seemed synthesis required by the Global 2000 Study. The important-in which case the discussion was Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a based on the best information available, even if large staff and substantial resources, but EPA is it was only fragmentary. charged with a regulatory mission,not with de- Fourth, a variety of technologies for environ- veloping broad, long-term environmental projec- mental protection are considered in the various tions. The National Environmental Policy Act sections of the chapter. In general, technologies (NEPA) assigns a long-term foresight mission for solving most environmental problems are now (among other responsibilities) to the Council on available, but there are exceptions. For example, Environmental Quality (CEQ), but CEQ has there is no practical means at present for removing never had the staff and resources necessary to oxides of nitrogen from power plant exhaust carry out all of its assigned functions. stacks. The analyses suggest that in most cases . Faced with the fact that-no single agency could economic and policy.considerations-rather than be expected to prepare the environment projec- the lack of technology-impede environmental tions, the original Global 2000. Study plan called protection efforts. for each agency to prepare an environmental , anal- Fifth, the. Environment Projections chapter is ysis of its projections, using the capabilities it had far longer than any other chapter in the Global developed since NEPA initiated.the process of environmental impact 'analysis. This too proved unworkable. As a result of NEPA, most of the *For example hundreds of environmental impact statements have been prepared on individual highways and power plants, agencies now have a substantial capability for en- but there are no corresponding environmental analyses for the vironmental analysis. They have assembled the Department of Transportation's year 2000 plan or the De- data and analytical tools needed to analyze the partment of Energy's national energy plan. 230 THE PROJECTIONS 2000 Study. Its disproportionate length can be jus- environment, this assumption has many implica- tificed on two counts: (1) because future trends tions. In situations where there is currently no in the world's environment is a larger than average formal environmental management policy, as for topic, and (2) because the development of global example in management of grazing lands in some environmental models is still in its infancy, the countries, it is assumed that present lack of man- environmental analyses-in contrast to the anal- agement practices will continue. While the re- ysis in preceding chapters-are largely discursive, sulting prognostications are occasionally grim, rather than analytical. It should also be mentioned they should not be interpreted as 'statements of that organizing this long chapter was complicated what will actually happen, but rather as indica- by the fact that it was necessary to include several tions of what is likely to happen if societies do not topics in more than one section. Every effort has develop and implement policies that will sustain been made to reduce redundancy, however, the health of the environment. Failing this, the through footnotes and occasional cross-references analyses suggest strongly that the collective en- to other sections of the chapter. vironmental impacts to be anticipated over the Finally, the environment projections proceed next two decades will be sufficiently severe in from the same policy assumption used in the other many areas to alter significantly-and undesira- parts of the Study-namely, that no changes in blym-the projected population, 'GNP, and re- public policy are anticipated. When applied to the source trends. THE POPULATION PROJECTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT The Projections Population levels and their rates of change projected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census are summarized in Table 13-1. The average a 'nnual world pop- ulation growth rate will be 1.8 percent per year throughout most of the 1975 2000 period. By the year 2000, a total of 2.3 billion persons will have been added to the world's population, an increase of 55 percent. The less developed countries will contribute nine-tenths (2 billions) of the world total increase by 2000. The crude birth rates in the LDCs are projected to decline 21 percent, while life expectancies increase 18 percent (from 54.0 to 63.5 years).* The result is a net annual rate of natural population increase averaging 2.1 percent over the 25-year interval. Asia and Oceania experience the largest numerical increases--60 percent of the total projected world growth. The largest rates of increase occur in Africa (leading to more than a doubling) and in Latin America (a 96 percent increase). The industrialized countries reduce their population growth rates by about a quarter and experience relatively modest numeric increases: 76 million in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (a 20 percent increase) and 101 million in the rest of the industrialized world (a 14 percent increase). Although the projections do not explicitly address migration and urbani- zation, there are many indications that the LDCs will experience substantial urban growth by 2000. Introduction implications for the environment. For example, the direct effects of excrement from an additional The 5 percent increase in world population pro- 2.2 billion persons can be expected to have a sig- jected by the Bureau of the Census and summa- nificant impact on the environment in many areas ' rized in Table 13-1 t has many direct and indirect Still larger indirect effects can be anticipated as *Calculated from Table 8 in U.S. Bureau of the Census, 11- at the University of Chicago. Both projections were funded lustrative Projections of World Populations to the 21st Century, by the Population Office of the U.S. Agency for International Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979. Development. The Census projections have been used tTwo sets of population projections are presented in Chapter throughout as the Global 2000 Study base case and are sum- 2. One set was developed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census; marized in Table 13-1. The CFSC projections were undertaken the other by the Community and Family Study Center (CFSQ with a different methodological approach that assumes a rapid ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 231 TABLE 13-1 matter of this section somewhat, a few further Increase in World Population, 1975-2000 distinctions relevant to the subjects under discus- sion should be noted. 1975 2000 Increase I One distinction involves the different types of pressures that different cultures exert on the en- Aver- vironment. In what follows, the world's cultures age are categorized as one of two types: either "tra- Popu- Popu- An- lation Share lation Share nual Total ditional" or "industrial." This distinction is ad- bil per- bil- per- mittedly a gross simplification, intended only to lions cent lions cent percent indicate the relative closeness- of a culture to the Industrialized re- environment on which it depends. In traditional gions 1.1 28 1.3 21 0.6 17 cultures, the people depend largely on their local Less developed environment and are familiar through personal regions 3.0 72 5.0 79 2.1 70 experience with the environmental implications World 4.1 100 6.4 100 1.8 55 of their numbers and demands. In industrial cul- tures, the people depend to a much larger degree Source: Bureau of the Census proicaions. Chapter 2. this volume. on environments that are connected with them a result of efforts to meet the growin Ig needs of only by transportation and trade networks, and the projected populations for shelter, food, fiber, as a result, such people are often not familiar educational facilities, transportation networks, personally with the full environmental conse- and employment sites. quences of their population growth and demands. The pervasive environmental consequences (both Although per capita demands on the environ- direct and indirect) of the projected population ment tend to be higher for industrial cultures than growth make the subject of "Population and the for traditional cultures, the distinction is not Environment" unmanageably large. Some bound- strictly between the less developed and the de- veloped countries. LDCs contain within them aries must be drawn and limitations established. small industrial cultures that make relatively large There are, of course, a number of ways in which per capita demands on environments around the this can be done. The choice here has been to world, and the industrialized countries contain discuss in this.section those environmental con- traditional cultures that make demands-rela- sequences that are directly related to population. tively small per capita demands-primarily on The more indirect environmental consequences their local environment. (The Amish communities of population growth-the environmental conse- in the U.S. are an excellent example of a tradi- quences of increased demands for food, energy, tional culture within a developed country, as is minerals, forestry, etc., to meet the needs of the the community and family life-style practiced.by projected population-are discussed later in this some individual environmental advocates.') While chapter in the sections devoted to those topics. the traditional/industrial cultural dichotomy in- (There are a few exceptions, however; some in- volves major simplifications, it facilitates discus- direct consequences of population growth--e.g., sion of some important relationships between increased cattle herds for increased populations Population growth and environmental change. of nomadic herders-do not fit well in the other sections of this chapter and, are therefore dis- In the following pages, the relatively localized cussed here.) While this choice limits the subject Impacts of traditional cultures on their environ- ments are considered first. The discussion of tra- reduction of fertility rates attributed to large expenditures on ditional cultures introduces the problem of family planning programs. Both- the Census and the CFSC managing "common" resources, a problem en- methodologies are discussed in Chapter 15. Since the writing countered in various forms throughout this chap- of Chapters 2 and 15, an extensive criticism of the CFSC meth- ter. The discussion then turns to the more dispersed odology and projections has been published and rebutted. The pressures that industrial society places on the en- criticism appears in Paul Demeny, "On the End of the Pop- ulation Explosion." Population and Development Review, vironment, after which the environmental con- Mar. 1979, pp. 141-62. The response to the criticism is D. J. sequences of changing population distributions Bogue and A. 0. Tsui, "A Rejoinder to Paul Demeny's Cri- are noted, especially the growing concentration tique, 'On the End of the Population Explosion,' " which is, of populations in large settlements with minimal at this writing, being considered for publication in Population and Development Review. Prepublication copies of the Bogue- public health and other services. Finally, some of Tsui rejoinder are available from CFSC, University of Chi- the. linkages between environment and health are cago. considered. 232 THE PROJECHONS Population and the Environment in cantly over the next two decades, with the result Traditional Cultures that a number- of environmental consequences can be anticipated. The effects of expanding popula- Traditional cultures, in the sense used here, are tions of herders and shifting cultivators on the cultures that obtain the necessities of life-food, environment are discussed below.. The environ- energy, fiber, and shelter-primarily from the lo- mental effects of population growth among settled cal environment with little or no involvement in agriculturists are discussed later, in the food and regional or national trade and commerce.- Mem- agriculture section of this chapter. bers of-such societies are well aware of their de- pendence on a healthy environment. Their Cultures Based on the Herding of Animals community values and traditions generally reflect The world's herding populations, depending this awareness and encourage a harmonious and upon grasslands or savannas to sustain their live- sustainable relationship with the environment. I stock, maintain a delicate, often tenuous rela- Over the past century industrial cultures have tionship with their local environments. When spread and affected, in one way or another., all herds are managed to sustain the productivity of but a- few exceptionally remote traditional cut-' grassland or savanna ecosystems, grazing can be tures. Limited contacts with industrial society continued indefinitely without damaging the life- have changed some- traditional cultures only a lit- support system. However, when management is tle, but in most cases such contacts have set in neglected, overgrazing often leads to the deteri- motion changes significantly affecting the form oration or destruction of the rangeland. The ex- and function of traditional cultures. tent to which the, world's grazing lands are already Currently, a majority of the world's rural peo- under pressure is illustrated in the Free Range ples, who occupy a large fraction of the earth's Grazing Pressure Map in the colored map section land, live in modified traditional cultures. There of this volume. are many such cultures in the less developed coun- Once begun, rangeland, deterioration is difficult tries. Even in the industrialized nations, some to control. Most grasslands and savannas are lo- native populations still approximate their former cated in semiarid areas, where heavy grazing de- traditional cultures-such as the Amish in the stroys the ability of. plants to resist drought and U.S., the Eskimos in Canada and Alaska, and the leads to eventual loss of palatable species in favor Samis (Lapps) in northern Scandinavia. But trade, of weed species.' Range. deterioration is almost medicine, technologies, and other factors have always accompanied by increased soil erosion. changed. practices, values, outlooks, and the re- Unfortunately, over much of the world's range- lations of such cultures to the environment. The lands today, such overstocking, overgrazing, loss populations of modified traditional cultures often of vegetation, erosion, and associated negative grow at the world's fastest rates and, if unchecked, impacts on the hydrologic cycle are accelerating soon exceed the carrying capacity of the local en- the conversion of productive grazing lands to des- vironments on which they depend. As long as the ertlike wastelands.' needs of traditional cultures remain well below The two primary causes of the environmental the life-support capacity of the local environment, consequences of overgrazing are (1) expanding population growth can continue with minimal im-' human populations accompanied by increasing pacts. As the life-support capacity is approached, human demands for larger herds, of livestock and however, environmental degradation begins, (2) efforts to breed and own more livestock as a eroding and reducing the quality of life previously means of increasing individual and cultural wealth. enjoyed. Social tension and conflict over the dis- Together, these two causes lead to accumulating tribution of increasingly scarce resources often individual pressures on a jointly used, limited re- follows. Ultimately, the capability of the environ- source.base. ment to support life is undermined and dimin- The protection of such a base in the face of ished. population And economic,growth is an exceedingly Three forms of traditional cultures (and their difficult managerhent problem. " Proper manage- modified forms) have special significance for the ment is central to the protection of grazing lands. environment: (1) those based on the herding.of Unprotected, any jointly used, limited resource animals, (2) those based on shifting cultivation, suffers a fate often referred to as the tragedy of and (3) those who have cut their forests and the commons.* shifted to settled agriculture. The Global 2000 Study's population projections imply that the pop- *Protecting a jointly used resource is often an aspect of en- ulations of all three types will increase signifi- vironmental management. The problems it engenders will be ENVIRONMENT PROJECrIONS 233 The tragedy is this: Actions that are in the im- herds, which in turn tend to degradation of the mediate best interest of each and every individual commons. employing a jointly utilized (common) resource Degradation of a commons gives rise to a wide are collectively detrimental to the long-term wel- range of environmental and societal stresses. In fare of the whole society. In his classic essay, "The many cases, social conflicts have their source in Tragedy of the Commons," Garrett Hardin de- the deterioration or destruction of a common re7 scribes the tragedy in terms of a grazing commons: source base. One of the earliest recorded illustra- Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected tions of social stress caused by growing human that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle and livestock populations utilizing a limited-re- as possible on the commons. Stich an arrangement source commons is the account of the experiences may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries of Lot and Abram (later Abraham) in the 13th because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep chapter of Genesis. In the biblical case, their cat- the numbers of both man and beast well below tle and herds became so numerous (as a result of the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, how- the increases in their population and wealth) that ever, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day "the land could not support them." Eventually, when the long-desired goal. of social stability be- fighting broke out between the herdsmen of the comes a reality. At'this point, flie. inhere t I * two families. To resolve the conflict, Abram pro- of the commons remorselessly generates trage y. As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to posed to Lot that the two families separate and maximize.his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more gave Lot his choice of where to go. Lot chose to or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility move toward Sodom and the other towns along to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" the river Jordan; Abram chose the hills of Ca- This utility has one negative and positive com- naan. ponent. The Genesis solution-separation and move- 1. The positive component is a function of the ment into new, resource-rich commons-is not a increment of one animal. Since the herdsman re- true solution to the tragedy of the commons be- ceives all the proceeds from the sale of the ad- cause it is effective only until all of the entire ditional animal, the positive utility is nearly + 1. commons is threatened with overuse and destruc- 2. The negative component is a function of the tion. At this point the basic nature of the tragedy additional overgrazing created by one more ani- can no longer be ignored, and true solutions must mal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing be sought. In his essay, Hardin sets forth his rec- are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is ommended solution-mutual coercion, mutually only a fraction of - 1. agreed upon-and explains a number of successful Adding together the component partial utili- applications of this solution.* (Fishing licenses ties, the rational herdsman concludes that the only and catch-limits to protect the sport-fish popula- sensible course for him to pursue is to add another tions of the commons-lakes and streams-are an animal to his herd. And another.... But this is example of Hardin's "mutual coercion, mutually the conclusion reached by each and every rational agreed upon.") herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tra97 American Indians, Eskimos, Lapps, and many edy. Each man is locked into a system that com- other traditional cultures evolved solutions to the pels him to increase his herd without limit-in a tragedy that limit their demands on resources held world that is limited. Ruin is the destination to- in common." Often these solutions are based on ward which all men rush, each pursuing his own myths, traditions, technologies, and cultural prac best interest in a society that believes in the free- dom of the commons. Freedom in a commons tices that are displaced following contacts with brings ruin to all." industrial society. The results are generally dis- ruptive and sometimes disastrous. " In the case of Hardin points out in his article that human pop- herding societies, the disruptive influences often ulation growth also unavoidably brings with it in- creasing demands on the environment. These *In a more recent essay, Hardin discusses his solution in terms increasing demands are perhaps most easily ob-. of national efforts to protect biotic resources from the tragedy served in traditional herding societies where in- of the commons and concludes that protection of biotic re- creased populations lead to a need for increased sources is possible under either socialism or free enterprise but not under the system of unregulated commons (Garrett encountered again later in this chapter in connection with the Hardin, "Political Requirements for Preserving Our Common protection of forests, fisheries, oceans, and the atmosphere. Heritage," Ch. 20 in Council on Environmental Quality, Wild- The explanation of "the tragedy of the commons" given above life and America, Washington: Government Printing Office, applies wherever the tragedy of the commons is mentioned 1979). Hardin and John Baden propose other solutions in elsewhere in the text. Managing the Commons (San Francisco: Freeman, 1977). 234 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 13-2 Number of Cattle and Number of Sheep and Goats, 1955-2000 (In millions of head) Cattle Sheep and Goats Annual A nnual 1955 Growth' 1976 2000, 1955 Growth* 1976 2000. Developing market economieSb 514.3 1.7 696.3 904.3 587.8 1.3 754.3 944.6 Africa 95.0 1.7 129.9 169.8 150.3 2.1 216.8 292.8 Far East 214.8 0.9 254.0 298.8 1305 1.7 176.6 229.3 Latin America 175.7 2.4 265.6 368.3 155.9 0.2 161.4 10.7 Near East 28.6 2.9 46.2 66.3 150.8 1.5 199.3 254.7 Asian centrally planned economies 57.5 1.2 71.6 87.7 101.6 2.5 154.8 215.6 Subtotal 571.8 1.6 767.9 992.0 689.4 1.5 909.1 1160.2 Developed market economies' 225.0 1.6 302.0 390.0 364.8 -0.1 359.6 353.7 North Africa 106.4 1.6 141.7 182.0 35 *3 -2.7 15.0 0 Western Europe 92.0 1.1 100.6 121.9 115.7 -0.5 103.0 89.5 Oceania 21.7 4.7 43.2 67.8 170.1 1.0 205.0 244.9 Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. 81.2 3.7 143.9 215.6 146.7 1.1 182.0 222.3 Subtotal 306.2 2.2 445.9 605.6 511.5 0.3 541.6 576.0 World Total 878.0 1.8 1213.8 1597.6 1200.9 1.0 1450.7 1736.20 Source: The State of Food and Agriculture 1977, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, Nov. 1977, Cb. 3, pp. 3-16 (draft). Both the annual growth and the projection to 2000 are based on a linear rather than compound (i.e.. exponential) growth model. Reviewers of the manuscript felt that, in view of range conditions, an exponential growth model gave unrealistically large animal populations in 20(g). b Including countries in regions not specified. come. through modern medical technology, vet- omies-from 696.3 million head in 1976 to 904.3 erinary medicine, and increased access to water. 9 million in 2000, an increase of -more than 200 The consequence is often a growth in human and million head. Oceania, Eastern Europe, and the animal populations that cannot be sustained on U.S.S.R. have experienced the world's most rapid the. available grazing land. " growth in cattle populations. Oceania's cattle pop- Lands suitable for grazing are limited, and al- ulations, with the world's highest growth rate at ready available rangelands are overpopulated by 4.7 percent per year, almost doubled in two dec- livestock in many areas (as in the Free Range ades, from 21.7 million in 1955 to 43.2 million in Grazing Pressure map in the colored map section 1976. Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R. cattle pop- of this volume). Data on this problem are limited, ulations grew at 3.7 percent per year over the but its seriousness *is illustrated by recent and pro- 1955-76 period, from 81.2 million to 143.9 mil- jected trends in numbers of cattle, sheep, and lion, and by 2000 are projected to reach 215.6 goats. Table 13-2 summarizes such livestock data million, more than three times 1955 levels. for 1955 and 1976 and projects the 1955-76 trends, The most rapid recent increases in sheep and to the year 2000. goats have been in Africa and the Asian centrally The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization planned economies. Between 1955 and 1976 Af- (FAO) estimates that between 1955 and 1976, rican sheep and goat populations grew by 66.5 world cattle populations grew by more than 330 million, and in the Asian centrally planned econ- million head. If these trends continue, approxi- omies, they rose by 53.2 million. Sheep and goat mately 380 million additional cattle will be added populations in North America and Western Eu- to the world's herds by 2000. In North America, rope have been declining. If present trends con- the Soviet Union, Japan, and Europe, a signifi- tinue, sheep and goats will have largely disappeared cant portion of the growth in herds has been on from North America by 2000; whereas, world- feedlots, but elsewhere much of the.growth is on wide', sheep and goat populations are projected open rangelands. to i Increase by more than 280 million head be- Much of the global growth of cattle herds is tween 1976 and 2000. projected to occur in the developing market econ- Theserecent and projected livestock in- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 235 creases-many of them concentrated in the al- in forage feed sources, a 75 percent increase in ready heavily utilized, fragile grasslands of Eurasia, grain feed, a 68 percent increase in feed from by- the'Near East, Africa, the Far East, Oceania, and products of the agricultural industry, a 98 percent Latin America-signal accelerating rangeland de- increase in feed from oilseeds, and a 21 percent terioration, soil erosion, and desertification in increase in feed from crop residues-an overall these areas. In describing the seriousness of the increase in ruminant feed resources of 18 percent prospects, the FAO recently reported that global over the 1970-2000 period. Based on these esti-. livestock population growth has led to ma tes of feed resources and improved livestock the serious deterioration of grazing land, partic- management, Winrock projects that the world's ularly in the Sahelian and Sudanian zones of Af- herds could increase over the 1972-2000 period rica, and in parts of the Near East, the as follows: cattle by 27 percent; buffalo by 29 Mediterranean and North Africa. The grazing re- percent; sheep and goats by 40 percent; total ru- sources in these areas are to a large extent under ninants (cattle, buffalo, sheep, and goats) by 34 and and semi-arid conditions, and some of them percent. The prospects for increases vary mark- have alfead been threatened for hundreds and edly from region to region-from a high of 56 sometimes Lusands of years by overuse, leading ercent for sheep and goats in middle America to complete changes in the vegetation, which have p left only shrubs of low palatability. Further in- to no increase in a number of other areas. creases in grazing pressure and aggravated misuse The Wintock projections differ in important result in the complete devastation of all vegeta- ways from the relatively simple trend projections tion, which finally ends in desertification. The presented in Table 13-2. The Winrock projections problem has been magnified by the encroachment start with the feed resources and attempt an as- of cropping onto the grazing area, as a result of sessment of how these could be developed. Since faster population growth outside the range area. the projections of Table 13-2 are not as con- Similar problems exist in other and and semi-arid strained by feed resources, somewhat different areas, for example, in continental Eurasia, in In- dia and Pakistan, and in Northeast Brazil. 11 results are therefore to be expected. The pro- The Global 2000 Study projects further popu- jected cattle populations, for example, differ in lation growth, both within and outside of the that the Winrock estimates of potential growth world's major grazing lands. Such growth will in- are smaller. On the other hand, Winrock believes tensify'the pressure on these grazing resources, that the feed resources are potentially available either.for conversion to cropland or for feeding for a larger increase in sheep and goats. However, increasing numbers of livestock. " In a time when whatever the animal and whatever the increase, improved range management methods will very many of the world's free grazing commons. have much be needed if severe overgrazing of forage already been overgrazed beyond their ability to resources is to be avoided in the decades ahead. recover, the prospect is for even greater devas- The projected increases in herding populations tation of the world's remaining grazing commons can only increase the already severe pressure on by the year 2000. range and grassland resources in many parts of If the consequences of overgrazing are to be Asia, the Middle East, north and central Africa, avoided in the areas of the world so threatened, and Central America. efforts will be needed'to relate future herd sizes to the feed resources available. A pioneering global study of livestock feed resources and live- Cultures Based on Shifting Cultivation stock populations has 'been completed by the Like the herdsmen just discussed, the cultiva- Winrock International Livestock Research and tors of traditional cultures also place intensifying Training Center, Morrilton, Arkansas. The Win- pressure on the environmental commons as their rock study starts from an assessment of global populations grow. According to one estimate, 25 livestock feed resources and the potential for their percent of the world's land surface--primarily in development. " This feed potential is then related tropical or subtropical regions-is occupied by to herd sizes and composition (to provide projec- about 300 million people who practice shifting tions of possible ruminant populations in 2000) cultivation. " (See the Land Use Patterns map in and to the contributions these animals could make the colored map section of this volume.) In some toward meeting human needs. areas, traditional agriculturists practicing shifting. The Winrock projections of feed resources and 'cultivation on lands that cannot sustain continual ruminant populations are summarized in Tables intensive agricultural use are beginning to damage 13-3 and 13-4. Worldwide, the Winrock study permanently the productivity of the area and to foresees the possibility of a 13 percent increase reduce its carrying capacity. 236 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 13-3 Winrock Projections of World Feed Resources for Ruminants, by Region In billions of Mcal (1011 calories) Forage Sources and Grain Forage Sources Grain Permanent Pasture and Meadows Arable Lands Nonagricultural Lands 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 North America 470 515 615 700 175 125 205 335 Middle America 215 350 60 70 30 15 3 5 South America 1,130 1,170 230 295 230 110 15 15 Western Europe 310 310 220 220 40 30 95 170 Eastern Europe 115 145 85 85 10 10 35 65 U.S.S.R. 300 310 575 670 15 15 50 100 China 250 360 75 85 20 15 2 5 North Africa, Middle East 180 200 150 230 15 10 5 15 Central Africa 850 900 240 300 310 300 1 1 Southern Africa 190 205 25 30 15 15 3 5 India 15 55 415 450 15 10 3 15 South and Southeast Asia 70 445 220 245 130 50 1 5 Japan 5 10 25 25 1 1 5 15, Oceania 580 495 175 360 10 10 15 15 Rest of world 140 140 5 10 3 3 1 1 World total 4,820 5,610 3,115 3,775 1,019 719 439 767 Other Sources Agri-Industry By-products Oilseeds Crop Residues World Total Percent of World 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 North America 15 20 25 55 440 500 1,945 2,250 16 15 Middle America 1 1 1 1 65 80 375 522 3 4 South America 5 10 2 5 195 325 1,807 1,930 14 13 Western Europe 10 15 25 55 275 280 975 1,080 8 7 Eastern Europe 5 10 5 10 175 180 430 505 3 3 U.S.S.R. 25 30 10 15 370 430 1,345 1,570 11 11 China 5 5 1 1 540 595 893 1,066 7 7 North Africa, Middle East 5 20 2 2 110 135 467 612 4 4 Central Africa 10 10 1 1 130 160 1,542 1,672 12 11 Southern Africa I 1 1 1 25 35 260 292 2 2 India 30 65 5 5 270 350 753 950 6 7 South and Southeast Asia 10 20 1 1 235 300 667 1,066 5 7 Japan 2 2 2 10 45 45 85 108 1 1 Oceania 3 5 1 1 35 105 819 991 6 7 Rest of world 1 1 1 1 35 40 186 196 2 1 World total 128 215 83 164 2,945 3,560 12,549 14,810 106 100 Source: H. A. Fitzhuhg, H. J. HGdgson, 0. J. Scoville, T. D. Nguyen. and T. C. Byerly, The Role of Ruminants in Support of Man, Morrilton. Ark.; WinTock lAvestock Research and Training Center. Apr. 1978. When conducted in moderation on suitable usually sustainable for long periods of time and slopes and at human population levels within the with low requirements for energy subsidies, or ex- carrying capacity of the environment, shifting cul- ternal capital. A recent U.N. report noted that tivation is a sound and appropriate practice. Un- shifting agriculture "achieves high productivity der moderate demands, shifting agriculture is per man-day with small capital investment. . . . ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 237 TABLE 13-4 Winrock Projections of World Ruminant Populations, by Region Cattle Buffalo Sheep and Goats Camels, Percent 1972 2000 Percent Percent 1972 2000 Increase Increase 1972 2000 Increase 2000 millions millions millions millions North America 130 156 20 21 25 19 Middle America 39 59 51 16 25 56 - South America 190 286 51 0.1 - - 142 214 51 6,154 Western Europe 89 107 20 0.1 0.1 0 94 113 20 - Eastern Europe 35 42 20 0.3 0.5 67 43 52 21 - U.S.S.R. 102 123 21 0.4 - - 145 218 50 307 China 63 82 30 29.7 38.6 30 129 194 50 17 North Africa, Middle East 44 57 30 4.8 6.2 29 216 323 50 6,165 Central Africa 116 150 30 - - - 157 235 50 7,656 Southern Africa 16 19 19 - - - 45 67 49 7 India 179 179 0 57.9 75.3 30 108 130 20 1,464 South and Southeast Asia 75 112 49 33.2 43.1 30 75 113 51 1,489 Japan 4 4 0 - - - - - - Oceania 37 33 19 - 224 269 20 Rest of world 11 13 18 - 19 27 42 1,059 World total 1,130 1,435 27 126.6 168.8 29 1,435 2,005 40 24,311 Source: H. A. Fitzhugh. H. J. Hodgson, 0. 1. Scoville. T. D. Nguyen, and T. C. Byerly, The Role ofRuntinants in Support ofMan, Morrilton, Ark.: Winrock International Livestock Research and Training Center, Apr. 1978. Camel populations were not available for 1972. It cultivation is not prolonged, rapid regeneration cultivators. In the forestry projections in Chapter of secondary forest vegetation occurs when the 8, approximately one fifth of the world's remain- land is abandoned." 15 ing forests are projected to be removed by 2000. The importance of the phrase "if cultivation is By far the largest portion of the forest losses will not prolonged" must be emphasized. Sustainable occur in developing countries with large popula- shifting agricultural requires periodic fallow pe- tions of shifting cultivators. As a result of reduced riods for the cultivated lands to rebuild soil fer- forested areas. and the spread of settled agricul- tility. 11 ture, shifting cultivators will be forced to return The possibilities. for maintaining an adequate with increasing frequency to lands previously fallow cycle are closely related to size of the shift- cleared and cultivated. Fallow periods will una- ing cultivator population, and to the land area voidably shorten, leading to nutrient losses, ad- available. The Global 2000 Study's projections verse - shifts . in the species composition in the suggest that the size of these populations will in- naturally occurring flora and fauna (a reduction crease by 50-70 percent by 2000. The amount of of overall species diversity and an increasing pre- land burned* and cultivated each year by shifting ponderance of weed species)@, and deleterious al- cultivators will also increase. Where will this land terations of the soil structure." Although crops come from? may be grown temporarily in some areas following Virgin forest lands are not likely to be available a short fallow period, the ultimate result of short- to meet all of the increased land needs of shifting ening the fallow cycle is increased nutrient leach- ing from soils, accelerating competition from *Little has been written about the local and global effects on weeds, and declining yields. air quality and climate of burning for agricultural clearing and weed control, but accidental forest fires have somewhat similar The projected growth of shifting cultivator pop- effects (see "Air Quality and Smoke from Urban -and Forest ulations will also lead to increased use of marginal, Fires: An International Symposium," Washington: National and submarginal lands. Such lands have generally Academy of Sciences, 1976). One of the primary atmospheric effects is thought to be a large contribution of particulates. It been avoided in the past because of the known is now also thought that this burning contributes to the ac- agricultural risks and low yields typical of such cumulating concentrations; of carbon dioxide in the earth's areas. However, as good land becomes scarcer, atmosphere (George M. Woodwell et al., "The Carbon Diox- the erosion-prone soils of steep slopes and the ide Problem: Implications for Policy in the Management of lateritic soils of humid tropics are likely to be Energy and Other Resources," report to the Council on En- vironmental Quality, July 1979.) cultivated. Steep slopes erode rapidly when cleared, 238 THE PROJEMONS increasing flooding, drought, and siltation down- tures,* place population-related pressures on the stream. Similarly, lateritic tropical soils can quickly environment. They face the same basic problem become unproductive when misused. If intensive of the tragedy of the commons, but there are at shifting. cultivation is continued in such areas, least three important differences between indus- even the forest's ability to regenerate can be trial and traditional cultures. First, an additional threatened. " person in an industrial society makes larger de- The populations of traditional cultures-both mands on the world's resources than does an ad- herdsmen and shifting cultivators-already exert ditional person in a traditional society. Second ' large, population-related environmental effects the environmental pressures produced by an ad- on approximately a quarter of the world's land ditional person in an industrial society are trans- area. The Land Use Patterns map and Free Range mitted by transportation and commerce over a Grazing Pressure map (in the colored map sec- much wider geographic area than are those of an tion) show large expanses of the globe now peo- additional person in a traditional society. Third, pled by herdsmen, pastoralists, and peoples the economies of industrial cultures are much practicing shifting crop culture. Although data on more complex than those of traditional cultures, these populations and their effects on the envi- complicating the analysis-and even the percep- ronment are quite limited, most experts agree that tion-of population-related environmental im- large and growing numbers are involved. " Al- pacts of industrial cultures. ready major reductions in the productivity of parts It is often asserted that some small percentage of Eurasia, the Near East, Africa, Oceania, and (e.g., 6 percent) of the world's population living Latin America have been observed. Some of the in industrial cultures consumes some dispropor- productivity losses are very severe. Reductions tionately large share (e.g., 60 percent) of the in land productivity by as much as 90 percent were world's resources. While this assertion is true in@ reported for several areas during the 1977 U.N. some generalized sense, the percentages often '' Conference on Desertification." quoted are not as easily developed as the asser- The Global 2000 Study's population projections tions might suggest. One of the major difficulties indicate that by 2000 the populations of traditional in comparing the resource consumption (e.g. com- cultures will have increased significantly, nearly mercial energy) of an "average" person in an in- doubling in some areas. If present trends con- dustrial society with that of an "average" person tinue, these populations can be expected to con- in a traditional society is that the industrial person tinue growing well into the 21st century,* but in uses a significant portion of the resources to pro- some areas, the trends may change. Evidence is duce products that are ultimately exported and accumulating that -agricultural and grazing lands "consunied" in other countries. Food is probably in parts of Africa, Asia, the Near East, and Latin the resource that is easiest to compare directly America are already under such heavy stress that because. relatively little human energy (the end they simply cannot be expected to retain their product of food consumption) is exported as com- present productivity through another two decades pared to the human energy exported in industrial of intensifying human and animal population pres- products,t Tables 13-5 and 13-6 present data on sure. " In such areas, further population 'growth *The populations of most industrial cultures and nations are makes major losses of biological life-support ca- increasing both as a result of natural increase and as a result, pacity virtually inevitable. of immigration. The effects of immigration are discussed briefly in Chapter 2. One of the problems associated with demographics in industrial cultures is that those immigrants Population and the Environment in who enter a country illegally avoid contact with the govern- Industrialized Cultures ment and are often not counted in official census figures. As immigration continues, the demographic importance of un- Like traditional cultures, modern industrial cul- counted persons will increase. A demographic analysis by Robert Cook (available from the Environment Fund, Wash- *Erik Eckholm points out that many of the cultivators re- ington) suggests that as of mid-1979, the official population sponsible for deforestation, soil erosion, etc., are not "tradi- figures for the United States are about 3 percent low, in part. tional" shifting cultivators but rather landless castoffs of because of uncounted immigrants residing illegally in the U.S. modem development processes. They are not ecologically Concern has already been expressed about the accuracy that skilled like tribal people, but are trying to farm wherever they will be achievable in the 1980 Census (T. R. R. Reid, "Billion- can. Driven by population growth, unequal. land tenure, and Dollar Nosecount of '80 Fated to be Wrong," Washington unemployment, these people are moving onto hillsides and Post, June 10, 1979, p. A2). desert margins. Poverty itself is a cause of some forms of tEven here, the comparison is not clear-cut because there is environmental deterioration. (Erik Eckholm, The Dispos- a significantly higher human energy content in the goods ex- sessed of the Earth: Land Reform and Sustainable Develop- ported by traditional cultures (such as oriental rugs) than in ment, Washington: Worldwatch Institute, June 1979.) most industrial goods. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 239 TABLE 13-5 TABLE 13-6 Annual Grain Consumption per Capita in the 20 Energy Consumption per Capita in the 20 Most Most Populous Countries, 1975" Populous Countries, 1974' Kilograms Kilograms United States 708 of Coal U.S.S.R. 645 Equivalent Spain 508 United States 11,485 France 446 Federal Republic of Germany 5,689 Federal Republic of Germany 441 United Kingdom 5,464 Turkey 415 U.S.S.R. 5,252 Italy 413 France 4,330 United Kingdom 394 Japan 3,839 Mexico 304 Italy 3,227 Egypt 286 Spain 2,063 Japan 274 Mexico 1,269 Brazil 239 Brazil 646 Thailand .225 People's Republic of China 632 People's Republic of China 218 Turkey 628 Bangladesh 203 Egypt 322 Pakistan 171 Philippines 309 Philippines 157 Thailand 300 Indonesia 152 India 201 India 150 Pakistan 188 Nigeria 92 Indonesia 158 Source: Lester R. Brown, The Twenty-Ninth Day, New York: Norton, 1978, p. Nigeria 94 200. Bangladesh 31 * Includes grain consumed both directly and indirectly (in the form of meat, milk, and eggs). Source: Lester R. Brown, The Twenty-Ninth Day, New York: Norton. 1978. P. 202. Excludes firewood and dung. the food and commercial energy consumption per capita in the 20 most populous countries. The rel- The cost of disposing of this waste is high-$9 atively "industrial" nations clearly tend to have billion in 1977-and the rate of resource recovery substantially higher per capita consumption of is low-about 7 percent. ' CEQ reports* that the both food and energy than the relatively "tradi- recovery rate could be tripled by individuals set- tional" nations. ting aside recyclable materials such as newspa-; Another approach to.comparing the. resource pers, glass, and metal for separate collection or and environmental impacts of industrial and tra- delivery to recycling centers." ne composition ditional societies is to compare the discarded of municipal refuse generated in the United States waste from each. In traditional societies very few in 1977 is illustrated in Table 13-7. In addition to resources are lost as waste. Even human excre- ment is returned to the soil where it adds nu- reducing per capita mineral resource demands," trients. In indust .rial societies, wastes of every recycling has energy-saving and environmental kind are extensive and environmentally damag- advantages. CEQ reports, for example, that mak- ing steel reinforcing bars from scrap instead of ing. from virgin ore takes 74 percent less energy, a*nd In the United States, for example, industrial 51 percent less water, creates 86 percent less air solid wastes generated in 1977 totaled about 344 pollution emissions, and generates 97 percent less million metric tons, and the amount of these mining wastes .31 wastes is growing at about 3 percent per year.' Per capita wastes and demands on environ- The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) mental and other resources in the United States reports that solid wastes from residential and com- are not typical of all industrial societies, but in mercial sources were estimated At 130 million general an "industrial person" seems likely to metric tons in 1976. Based on present trends and have a larger impact on the worldis resources and policies, the projection for 1985 is 180 million metric tons. These rising waste generation rates reflect increasing use of raw materials and en- *Since this text was written, CEQ has reported further on ergy. ' Currently, the average person in the resource recovery. (See Council on Environmental Quality, "Municipal Solid Wastes," in Environmental Quality: the United States produces about 1,300 lbs. of mu- Tenth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality, nicipal solid waste annually." Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.) 240 THE PROJECrIONS TABLE 13-7 Post-Consumer Residential and Commercial Solid Waste Generated and Amounts Recovered, by Type, of Material, 1977 (As-generated wet weight, in millions of tons) Material Recovery Net waste disposed of *Percent of Percent Nonfood Gross of Total Product Discards Quantity Percent Quantity Waste Waste Paper 49.2 10.2 20.7 39.0 28.6 Glass 14.7 0.5 3.4 14.2 10.4 17.1 Metals 13.7 0.4 2.9 13.3 9.8 16.0 Ferrous 11.9 0.3 2.5 11.6 8.5 13.9 Aluminum 1.4 0.1 7.1 1.3 1.0 1.6 Other nonferrous 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.5 Plastics 5.3 0.0 0.0 5.3 3.9 6.4 Rubber 3.3 0.2 6.1 3.1 2.3 3.7 Leather 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.7 Textiles 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 2.2 3.6 Wood 4.7 0.0 0.0 4.7 3.4 5.6 Total nonfood product waste 94.5 11.3 12.0 83.2 61.0 Food waste 23.8 0.0 0.0 23.8 17.4 28.6 Yard waste 27.3 0.0 0.0 27.3 20.0 32.8 Miscellaneous inorganic wastes 2.2 0.0 0.0 2.2 1.6 2.6 Subtotal 147.8 11.3 7.6 136.5 100.0 164.0 Energy recovery +0.7 0.5 -0.7 Total recovery 12.0 8.1 Total net disposal 135.8 Source: Franklin Associates (Prairie village. Kan.), Post-consumer Solid Waste and Resource Recovery Baseline: Working Papers, draft prepared for the Resource Conservation Committee, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. May 16. 1979. p. 22. environment than a "traditional person." Fur- merce do not alter the fact that-increases in in- thermore, the industrial person has less direct ex- dustrial populations and their wealth-like perience of the impacts being made on the increases in herdsmen and cattle-threaten thej environment than the traditional person because resources of the environm 'ental commons. The the industrial person is separated by distance from fundamental population-related problem pre- many of the more severe forms of environmental sented by the tragedy of the commons' faces both degradation caused by modern industrial cul- traditional and industrial societies. As Garrett'. tures. " To many urban members of industrial so- Hardin has -shown, common environmental re- cieties, energy comes from an electrical outlet and sources can be protected by. "mutual coercion, food comes from grocery stores. Relatively few mutually agreed upon" both under socialist and have had anything to do with the strip mines, under market economic systems.' The socialist power plants, and nuclear waste facilities involved approach is illustrated by the examples of the So- in producing "clean" electricity or with the air viet Union' and China'. The market (or mixed) and water pollution associated with steel manu- economy approach is illustrated by U.S. efforts, facturiiig and with the chemicals used in "indus- among others. " It should be noted, however, that trial" agriculture. The complex economic web of both socialist and market economic systems face trade and commerce extends the environmental two incompletely resolved difficulties in protect- impacts of each additional industrial person across ing the resources of the. environmental commons: oceans and continents (see the map Extent of They place a monetary value on environmental Commercial Activity in the colored map section resources and weigh present and future costs and of this volume). benefits of resources and protective measures. The complexities of trade and industrial com- Under the theory of market economies, the ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 241 price of a good (or service) has a major influence population increase in the Soviet Union, Europe, on demand, and to the extent that environmental and North America (about 200 million) is small costs are included in' market prices, the market compared to the rest of the world (about 2 bil- can help control the demand for and use of the lion), but the per capita resource and environ- environmental commons. A valuation problem mental impacts of industrial societies are relatively arises because many environmental costs (e.g., large. However analyzed, population increase degraded water and air quality or loss of species throughout the world must be regarded as a major and wilderness) are borne by a large portion-or source of stress on the common environmental all-of society. Called "externalities" by econo- resources of the earth. mists, these costs are generally not included in the price of a particular good or service. Unless en- vironmental costs are included in the market Population Distribution and the price, the market cannot act to protect the envi- Environment ronment. * Similar environmental valuation prob- The nature of the demands and impacts a pop- lems. arise under socialist economic systems, ulation makes on its environment depends in part because government-set prices often fail to reflect on how its people are distributed over the land. external costs any more adequately than market For both developing and industrialized nations, prices. this distribution has been changing. The trend has The second problem involved in using either been toward a decreasing proportion of the socialist or market economic systems to protect world's population living in rural areas and an the environmental commons is that of intergen- increasing proportion living in urban areas. erational equity. ' In most societies, a present- Over the past two centuries the growth of rel- value approach is used in economic decision-mak- atively dense human settlements has been rapid, ing. U 'rider the present value approach, future even more rapid than the growth of the world's benefits and costs are valued less (i.e., are dis- population. Between 1800 and 1950, the world's counted) relative to current benefits and costs. population increased by a factor of 2.6. Over this The higher the discount rate the more difficult same period the number of persons living in hu- conservation and environmental protection be- come. 39 man settlements of 20,000 or more increased from Whatever economic system is involved, in- 22 million to more than 500 million, a factor of creased numbers of people lead to increased en- 23. The populations of large industrial cities vironmental pressures. The magnitude and (100,000 or more inhabitants) in America, Eu- character of these pressures depends significantly rope, Oceania, and the Soviet Union grew still on the type of culture. The Global 2000 Study's faster, increasing by a factor of 35. Recently, how- projections suggest that the populations of tra- ever, urban expansion in developed countries ditional,cultures will be growing, rapidly (at more (especially in Europe) has slowed. Large cities in than 2 percent per year in some cases) in the dec- the LDCs grew less rapidly than large cities in the industrialized nations during this period, but since ades ahead. Increased overgrazing and shortened 1900, LDC urban growth has accelerated. 40, , fallow cycles will aggravate erosion, forest losses, United Nations reports suggest that trends to- and desertification. In parts of Eurasia, the Near ward urbanization may continue .41 In 1950,- 29 East, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America, the percent of the world's population lived in urban land cannot be expected to retain even its present settlements. The urban population share grew to productivity under another two decades of inten- 39 percent in 1975 and is projected to approach sifying stress, as discussed in later sections of this 41 50 percent by 2000. Using the Global 2000 chapter. The Global 2000 Study's projections Study's medium world population figure, 50 per- show the population growth rates of industrial cent urbanization would mean more than 3 billion societies falling by about a quarter by 2000. The urban residents in 2000. Such a population dis- tribution would have significant environmental *Energy provides an.example of the externalities problem. implications in both less developed and industrial- There ate many external environmental costs of energy pro- ized nations. duction that are not now included in the market price of en- ergy. Although this problem is not resolved, much thought is being given to alternative methods of including external costs Urbanization and the Environment in the LbCs into the market price of goods. William Ramsey's Unpaid Costs How much urban. growth can be expected in of Electrical Energy: Health and Environmental Impacts from Coal and Nuclear Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1979) the LDCs by the year 2000? The Global 2WO provides a useful introduction to this problem. Study's projections do not include detail regarding T 242 THE PROJECnONS TABLE 13-8 TABLE 13-9 Urban Population in All Cities of 100,000 or More Estimates and Rough Projections of Selected Ur- 1950 1975 mo ban Agglomerations in Developing Countries millions 1960 1970 1975 2000 World 392 903 2,167 Millions of persons Industrialized countries 262 503 756 Calcutta 5.5 6.9 8.1 19.7 Less developed countries 130 480 1,411 Mexico City 4.9 8.6 10.9 31.6 Source: Trends and Prospects in the Populations of Urban Agglomerations 1950- Greater Bombay 4.1 5.8 7.1 -19.1 2000, ay Assessed in 1973-1975, New York: United Nations 1975 Greater Cairo 3.7 5.7 6.9 16.4 Jakarta 2.7 4.3 5.6 16.9 Seoul 2.4 5.4 7.3 18.7 Delhi 2.3 3.5 4.5 13.2 rural or urban populations, but an estimate of the Manila 2.2 3.5 4.4 12.7 LDCs'urban growth can be obtained from United Tehran 1.9 3.4 4.4 13.8 Nations information. Karachi 1.8 3.3 4.5 15.9 Projections reported by the U.N. Secretariat Bogota 1.7 2.6 3.4 9.5 indicate that urban areas will absorb 59 percent Lagos 0.8 1.4 2.1 9.4 of the increase in LDC population between 1975 Source: U.N. estimates and medium variant projections, as published in Depart- and 2000. " The Global 2000 Study projects a net ment of State Bulletin, Fall 1978, p. 17. population growth of 2.0 billion persons in the developing nations. Applying the U.N. urban per- centage to this figure, the urban populations of the LDCs would increase by about 1.2 billion by tion in 1971 was living in squatter villages and 2000. As illustrated in Table 13-8, U.N. projec- slums, and the squatter-slubi population wasf tions are similar, but somewhat higher. growing at 17.4 per cent per year. 11 F Most of the projected increase would occur in The rapid growth of LDC urban populations existing cities, and as a result many LDC urban will create unprecedented pressure on sanitation populations would become almost inconceivably and othe *r public services by 2000. Waste disposal, large. For example, by 2000 Mexico City would water, health care, shelter, education, food, and house nearly 32 million persons-about 4 times employment will be needed for approximately 1.2 New York City's present gopulation. ' Sdo Paulo billion additional urban residents. Simply to pro- would surpass 26 million. Altogether, more than vide in 2000 the same per capita services that now 400 cities would be expected to pass the million exist, the LDCs. will need to increase all of the mark, most of them in developing countries. ' The services, infrastructures, and capital of their cities projected growth of selected LDC cities is illus- by roughly two-thirds-and this massive increase trated in Table 13-9. would provide no net improvement in services. The most rapid urban growth of less developed The degree to which public ser@ices are provided countries occurs in the "uncontrolled settle- will, in large measure, determine future environ- ments"-urban slums and shantytowns, where mental conditions in LDC cities. sanitation and other public services are non- Safe drinking water and sewage disposal are existent or, at best, minimal. Already more than two of the most basic indicators of LDC urban half of the populations of many larger cities-for environmental conditions. While conditions im- example, Buenaventura in Colombia, Ismir and proved over the 1970-75 period, large numbers Ankara in Turkey, and Maracaibo in Venezuela- of LDC urban residents still do not have access live in uncontrolled settlements, ' as do more than to safe drinking water. A 1975 World Health Or- a quarter of the populations of Baghdad, Seoul, ganization (WHO) survey' indicated that at that Calcutta, Taipei, Mexico City, and Rio de Ja- time 24 percent of the urban populations in LDCs neiro. ' Recent estimates indicate that the pop- did not have house water connections, or even ulations of many uncontrolled settlements are access to standpipes, and 25 percent were without doubling in size every 5-7 years, while the urban even household systems for excreta disposal.* populations as a whole double every 10-15 years." Progress in providing basic LDC urban services The more rapid growth of the uncontrolled set- also appears to have varied significantly according tlements means that as time goes on, a larger frac- to income group. The WHO survey found the tion of the LDC urban population will be living in these settlements. In Bombay, where uncon- *For comparison, 79 percent of the LDC rural population did trolled settlements are among the largest in the not have access to an adequate water supply, and 86 percent world, 45 percent of the 6 million urban popula- were without even household systems for excreta disposal. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 243 installation of piped indoor water connections are .by no means attributable to growth only in were running well in excess of anticipated rates; the poorest classes; growth in the more affluent thus, it was proposed that the 1980 target for in- classes also creates environmental problems. One stallation of connections from piped public water indicator of the environmental stress produced by supplies be moved upward from 60 to 68 percent. growth of the affluent classes is the increa .sing On the other hand, service from public standpipes numbers of automobiles and the associated air increased slower than anticipated, and the pro- pollution. Although statistics on LDC urban air posed target for this form of service has been quality are very limited, a few examples will serve moved downward from 40 to 23 percent.' These to indicate some of the general trends: trends suggest that service is being provided more In Caracas, Venezuela, the motor vehicle pop- rapidly to the relatively affluent middle-class ulation grew at an annual rate of around 10 neighborhoods than to the very poor in the rapidly percent prior to 1974. With the increase in.in- growing uncontrolled settlements. comes brought about by 1973 oil price increases, Provision of potable drinking water in LDC the figure rose roughly 20 percent during 1974 cities is a service closely related to the problems and 1975. Vehicles now produce 90 percent of of sewage treatment and disposal. A 1976 report the air contaminants in Caracas. At peak traffic found that only 3.3 percent of the world's LDC hours, the carbon monoxide concentrations urban population lived in dwellings connected to reach 40-45 parts per million (ppm); the aver- sewer systems that were in turn connected to some age urban concentration is 25-30 ppm. " An 8- form of conventional treatment facility or oxida- hour exposure to even 20 ppm is described by tion pond. The dwellings of another 23.7 percent the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as were connected to sewer systems without any "very unhealthful."" form of sewage treatment capability. Household Air pollution problems in most LDC cities are systems-pit privys, septic tanks, and buckets- made worse by the fact that many automobiles were used by 42.1 percent. The remaining 30.9 used are old and in poor state of repair, and percent did not even have a pit privy.' their engines release relatively high amounts of While WHO reports that over the 1970-75 pe- carbon monoxide, particulates, and smog-pro- riod an increasing percent of LDC residents are ducing hydrocarbons. In addition, other motor- served by sewers, the projected growth of slums ized vehicles causing relatively high releases of and uncontrolled settlements projected in the air pollutants (motorbikes, scooters, motorcy- years ahead pres Ient an unprecedented challenge cles) are common in LDC cities. LDC urban air In Sdo Paulo, the number of homes served by pollution problems are further intensified by the sewers increased over the 1940-75 period, but the lack of vehicular air pollution control laws and proportion of urban dwellers served by sewers associated emission-control devices for internal dropped from 38 percent to 29 percent over the combustion engines. same period." The high capital costs of.Western- style sewage systems lead many development spe- Ecologist Carlos Bustamante of Peru's National cialists to advocate less costly composting toilets University of Engineering noted recently that as an alternative.% Lima's serious air pollution problems are not Without basic hygienic facilities, LDC urban just due to its low diffusion of contaminated. air populations face the constant threat of ' epidemics (Lima is surrounded on three sides by Andean and the daily reality of rampant infectious disease. foothills). He claimed much of the problem was The health impacts of sewage pollution of water due to the city's numerous old and poorly main- are already serious in LDCs. Growing popula- tained vehicles and estimated that such vehicles tions-and the resultant sewage burdens in streams, emit five times more pollution than new cars. 60 rivers, and lakes and along coastlines-are In the capital city of Ankara, the Turkish Health spreading several waterborne diseases in many Ministry recently reported that the air was laden urban communities. Recent figures onthe impact with 2.5 times more sulfur dioxide and four of waterborne diseases in developing countries times more smoke than the maximum levels set show that such diseases are responsible for 40 by WHO. Because of this condition, the Min- yercent of the affected countries' mortality and istry reports that cases of bronchitis, asthma, 60 percent of their morbidity. In areas occupied pneumonia, heart attacks, and other diseases by more than 67 percent of the world's popula- caused by the air pollution have sharply in- tion, dysentery, typhoid, cholera, and hepatitis, creased.6' the major causes of death, can be linked to in- adequate sewage treatment.57 Bombay, India, is another city suffering from Environmental problems in LDC urban areas serious air pollution. A recent government sur- 244 THE PROJEMONS vqy,found that, largely because of industrial Asia and Africa, firewood now absorbs 15-25 per- growth, pollutants enter the area's air at the rate cent of household income." of 1 .000 tons every four hours.' The air pol- Will the trends continue? Some observers are hitants include 38.4 percent carbon monoxide, beginning to have doubts. Harold Lubell, project 33.4 percent sulfur dioxide, and 9.8 percent ox- leader for an International Labor Organization . ides of nitrogen. In one residential area of Bom- study of six major Third World cities, concludes bay, the residents were found to be inhaling that "there appears to be a saturationpoint,'and very large amounts of sulfur dioxide every day, when this is reached migr ation falls off in response and most were suffering from cough, constant to declines in the urban economy."' Lester R. sneezing, asthma, bronchitis, chest pain, and Brown, President of the Worldwatch Institute, fatigue. ' Bombay's nearly 300,000 automobiles questions whether sufficient food will he available have added to the air pollution caused by local to LDC cities, either from other countries or from industry, magnifying the respiratory disease im- domestic sources in large enough quantities and pacts.'" at low enough prices to allow the urbanization Migration to cities will continue to be a major trends to continue for many more years'" in ef- component of urban growth in LDC nations as fect, negative feedback may slow the growth of long as rural populations, especially the rural already overcrowded cities. poor, believe that urban areas offer greater eco- If present trends do continue to 2000, urban nomic opportunities than rural areas. As urban populations would approach a majority of the populations continue to expand, however, eco- world's population,"' and the largest urban areas nomic and environmental conditions may change. would be in the LDCs. The economic and envi- Existing trends indicate that the problems of air ronmental challenges implied by these trends are and water pollution can be expected to worsen, enormous. Whether these challenges can be met and the spread of waster-borne diseases-and to the degree necessary if the trends are to con- even the disposal of the dead*-will present in- tinue is an open question. creasing threats to human health. Urban econ- omies will be hard pressed to keep pace. Housing Urbanization and the Environment in Industrial and employment are in short supply, and energy Nations wil I present increasing difficulties, especially for the LDC's urban poor. Many can no longer afford Over the past several decades population pat- kerosene or gas and depend on firewood and char- terns in most industrial nations have changed sig- coal. In some areas the price of firewood has in- nificantly. Rural to urban migration has created creased at rates exceeding international oil price large national majorities of urban dwellers, de- increases" (see also the forestry section of this clining populations in most small towns and vil- chapter). The FAO reports that in some areas of lages, the consolidation and mechanization of farms,- and a concurrent decline in the number of small, family-owned farms. Rapid growth of var- ious transport systems (particularly highway and *Disposal of the dead presents fewer physical and health prob- air) has lead to high personal mobility and rapid lems in cou 'ntries where religion and custom encourage cre- growth of single-family houses and "townhouse mation. In cultures where burial is preferred and space is scarce, public health issues become more important. The! dif- complexes" in suburban areas. Urban and sub- ficulties are most severe in LDC cities following an earthquake urban installation of potable-water, sewer, and or some other temporary cause of high mortality but can occur electric and fossil fuel energy systems for house- in industrialized countries as well. A particularly striking ex- holds is nearly complete. Although some of these ample of, the cumulative problems that burial can present oc- changes have also been occurring to a degree in curred in France during the late 1700s. The principal cemetery in Paris had accumulated some 2 million bodies in a space of some developing nations, such changes are rela- only 131 by 65 yards. The Smithsonian magazine reports: "This tively well advanced in industrial nations. human compost heap was 30 feet deep and extended seven The environmental consequences of these pat- feet above ground. In 1780, in a catastrophic landslide, the terns of population distribution and human set- walls of an entire apartment block adjoining the cemetery gave way and 2,000 corpses slid into the cellars, giving off a stench flement, many of which have already been touched that well-nigh asphyxiated the residents above, It was clear upon, are numerous. One factor needing empha- that new arrangements were urgently needed. But the turmoil sis concerns the importance of the low (even -the of the French Revolution and the establishment of the Na- falling) real price of energy and other -raw ma- poleonic Empire precluded the opening of [the new] Mre- terials during the period of urbanization in the' Lachaise. [cemetery] until 1804." (Robert Wallace, "The Ele- gies and Enigmas of Romantic Rre-Lachaise," Smithsonian, industrialized nations. Nov. 1973, pp. 108-15. During the 1950s and .60s, the low real cost of ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 245 energy encouraged a variety of wasteful and in- abundant cheap energy has led to the develop- efficient designs. Homes, offices, and factories ment of a stock of capital goods, such as homes, were built with minimal insulation and energy- cars, and factory equipment, that uses energy in- conserving features. Labor-saving, but energy-in- efficiently."" The NEP went on to note that a tran- tensive, appliances and machinery spread sition,to an era of substantially more expensive throughout the culture. Agriculture and industry and less abundant energy is in progress and -that became increasingly energy-intensive and less la- as a part of this transition, changes in capital bor-intensive. Production of vehicles expanded stocks will be needed.' These changes, if started rapidly, and their, weight and horsepower grew soon, can be accomplished incrementally. substantially. Simultaneous massive investments In reviewing the NEP, the Office of Technology in highway and road construction led to rapid Assessment (OTA) noted that energy efficiency growth of energy-inefficient single-family homes in the use of capital stocks depends in significant in suburban communities, often around,decaying part on how the stocks are distributed over the inner cities. Oil-based chemicals, plastics, and nation and that changes in patterns of capital dis- fabrics- replaced many natural materials, such as tribution and transportation are long-'range and wood, wool, and cotton. All this was made pos- fundamental and will take more than one gener- sible by cheap, abundant energy, especially fluid ation to complete. " The OTA report recom- fuels, and all of this has now changed. mends guidelines, leadership and incentives to Some of the environmental, resource, and eco- initiate the process now. Its point might be nomic costs of the past decades of urbanization summed up as follows: have been analyzed for the United States in "The The United States and other industrial nations Costs of Sprawl," a study prepared by the Real will face an exceedingly difficult energy problem Estate, Research Corporation for the Council on in 2000 if its patterns of capital distribution are Environmental Quality and other federal agencies still based on the sprawl that is so characteristic in 1975. "' This study documents how, in contrast of many industrial cities; yet because of the long to urban sprawl, higher-density, better-planned depreciation times associated with transportation, communities require less energy for cooling and communication, sewage, and other systems as- heating, stimulate less automobile use, and con- sociated with sprawling types of land-use patterns, serve water. They produce about 45 percent less' the major capital systems of most industrial cities air pollution than sprawling communities, reduce in 2000 will look much like those that existed in storm water runoff, and allow more land, wildlife, 1977 unless the "guidelines, leadership, and in- and vegetation to be protected in parks and open centives" called for by OTA are established im- .spaces. mediately. The distribution patterns of major . Now that the era of inexpensive, widely avail- capital systems can be changed only over a period ,able energy has come to an end, the implications of decades, not within a few years. for both population distribution and environmen- At least in the U.S., the dependence on and tal quality are likely to be profound. Although the passion for the private automobile is not likely the future shape of cities in industrial nations is to change easily. The U.S. Bureau of the Census not yet clear, it is certain that such c ' ommunities recently completed a study of some of the ties ,will be confronting radical. transformation from between Americans and their automobiles. The energy-wasteful to energy-conserving societies. study found, among other things, that while the Smaller, well-insulated homes, and increasing use of car pools and mass transportation probably shifts to townhouses and condominiums are trends increased after the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, the already underway in housing. Slower driving increase was apparently only temporary. By 1975: speeds, smaller and more efficient automobile engines and greater use,of public transport are Of 80.1 million Americans going to work each energy-conserving transportation measures al- day, 52.3 million (65 percent) were driving ready beginning to take'effect. Recycling of ma- alone., terials and increased reliance once again on Another 15.6 million (19.4 percent) were driv- renewable sources of materials (especially wood) ing, but with other passengers in the car or may also reduce societal energy requirements" truck. ,but might also increase the competition for land. The fundamental nature of the long-term change Only 4.8 million (6 percent) used public trans- .was indicated briefly in the 1977 U.S. National portation, and 3.8 million (4.7 percent) walked. Energy Plan (NEP). 71 The NEP noted that a basic The remaining 3.6 million (4.5 percent) used aspect of the energy problem in the U.S. is that bicycles or motorcycles or worked at home. 246 THE PROJECTIONS --The average commuter trip was 9 miles each without access to'even basic public services such way and was 20 minutes in duration."a as potable water and sewage disposal. At antici- The. proportion of mass-transit users among pated growth rates, it is doubtful that the services those employing vehicles actually decreased of many LDC cities can be increased rapidly from 10 percent to just over 6 percent in 1975. enough to provide services at even the present per Despite the abiding passion and dependence, capita level."' Raw sewage, air pollution, lack of the future of the private automobile is in doubt housing, poor and crowded transport, inadequate not only in the U.S. but throughout the world. fire protection, and disease will present increasing Virtually every other use of dwindling petroleum difficulties within these cities. Immediately out- resources has been found to have a higher priority side the cities, firewood gatherers, animal grazers, than that of the private automobile.'5' However, and charcoal-makers will strip the surrounding it will be difficult to eliminate dependence on the areas of accessible trees, shrubs, and grasses. As private automobile without fundamental changes the area of degradation widens, there are likely in population and land-use patterns. As discussed to be losses of indigenous plants and animals, ag- briefly in the energy section of this chapter, the gravated soil erosion, and increased risk of serious choice *of future energy systems and technolo- flooding. "' gies--large-scale centralized systems or small- In the industrial nations, future trends in ur- scale decentralized systems-will have a major banization are not clear, but designs that conserve influence on the population and land-use patterns resources, especially energy, will become increas- than can be expected in the future. ingly attractive. Ttle era of rapid growth in in- Whether or not in direct response to energy dustrialized nations fueled by high consumption of resources, particularly relatively clean, inex- developments, the trend toward urbanization in pensive, and abundant petroleum fuels, has ended. some industrial nations has begun to change. In In the future, consumption patterns of both rural the U. S., for example, signs began to appear after and urban settlements of industrialized nations 1970 that many of the nation's larger cities-New will be altered.by inevitable shifts from a high- York, Los Angeles, Detroit, Seattle, Chicago, consumption to a conservation approach. " Be- and St. Louis-were declining in population. 76At fore the year 2000, industrialized nations will be the same time, much of the nation's fastest pop- forced to make major choices relating to their ulation growth has shifted to rural areas. From future energy and resource industries and their 1970 to 1975, 1 million people emigrated from production technologies--choices that will have U.S. central cities to suburbs and other nonmet- r9politan areas. '17 profound implications for population distribution and environmental quality throughout the 21st However these trends continue, the industrial century. nations of the world face a period of perhaps 50 to 100 years of transition. Over the next decades, choices will have to be made, not only in energy development but in many other sectors of indus- The Population Projections and Human trial society (such as food production and water Health and minerals supply) that will encounter problems The life expectancy of a population is perhaps of scarcities and resource degradation. How these themost all-inclusive and widely measured indi- choices are made will profoundly affect patterns cator of a nation's environmental health. In the of future development and human settlement in absence of safe drinking water, sewage systems, industrial nations. adequate food and shelter, medical services, and controls over toxic pollutants and disease vectors Urbanization and the Environment--Summary and hosts, the release of environmental pathogens Urban growth, due largely to the migration of and pollutants, life expectancies are low. With poor people from rural areas, may have created these basic environmental conditions met, life ex- cities in the developing countries of unprece- pectancies are high. 11 dented'sizes by the year 2000. On the other hand, It is generally believed that as economic de- it is possible that rural development plus a decline velopment proceeds, one of its major benefits is in economi *c and public health conditions in LDC a combination of beneficial environmental con- cities will slow the migration somewhat. In any ditions that increase the average period of pro- event, it is anticipated that the most rapidly grow- ductive life. The increased life expectancy is ing parts of these cities will be the uncontrolled brought about in three stages according to a the- settlements where large numbers of the poor exist ory that has been expressed succinctly by Dr. N. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 247 R. E. Fendall, former director of medical services expectancy have been particularly difficult to for Kenya: achieve in the industrialized nations, where child 1. In the earliest stages of development, the ep- mortality is relatively low. Degenerative diseases idemiological picture is determined largely by (e.g., cancer, heart disease, cerebrovascular dis- an endemic infectious disease situation with a ease) have proven very difficult to prevent or con- high prevalence of parasitosis, gastroenteritis, trol. In the LDCs, decreases in infant and child respiratory diseases, malnutrition, and vector- mortality have been difficult to achieve, and prog- borne diseases. ress in increasing life expectancies has slowed 2. As living standards rise and environmental there too. conditions improve, the endemic infectious The Bureau of the Census life expectancy pro- disease problems are brought under control, jections are based on an examination of past and measles, whooping cough, poliomyelitis trends, not on an examination of the causes of andother bacterial and virus diseases dominate mortality and the prospects for changes in these the epidemiological picture. causes. The causes are largely associated with en- vironmental problems, and the prospects for 3. In the final stage of economic development, change need to be examined. The problems and the degenerative diseases of a cerebrosclerotic prospects for improvements are quite different in nature, hypertension, heart failure, diabetes, the industrialized countries than in the less de- psychosomatic diseases, and cancer comprise veloped countries. the major portions of ill health. Undernutrition gives way to overnutrition and the severity of the disease pattern shifts from the child to the Environment and Health in the LDCs. aged. Mortality statistics show that in most LDCs high mortality rates among infants and children are the This theory, in effect, underlies the projections primary statistical contributors to low life expec- of life expectancy made by the Bureau of the Cen- tancies. A 1975 World Bank Policy Paper con- sus for the Global 2000 Study. These projections taining vital statistics for 67 countries lists 19 (see Chapter 2) assume that future economic countries with per capita incomes of less than $200 progress and development will lead to environ- per year." Of these, only 2 had infant mortality mental conditions that will in turn result in in- rates below 10 percent, while 10 had rates 15 per- creased life expectan ,cy..For the world as a whole, cent or higher. By contrast, only 4 of the 16 coun- life expectancy is projected to increase 6.7 years tries with per capita incomes of over $700 had (11 percent) by the year 2000 (from 58.8 years in child mortality rates greater than 5 percent; 8 had 1975 to 65.5 years in 2000). For the LDCs, the rates of less than 3 percent." projected increase is 18 percent (form 54. '0 to 63.5 The World Bank also notes that the rate at years), and for the industrialized countries, 3 per- which life expectancies have improved in less de- cent (from 71.1 to 73.3 years). In no country is veloped countries has declined since 1955-from life expectancy projected to decline. 2.7 years in the periods 1950-55 and 1955--60 to Since the advent of preventive immunization 2.6 years in 1960-65 and to only 2.0 years in 1965- against communicable diseases, life expectancies 70." A particularly significant factor in the slow- have improved steadily. The continuing trend of down of the decline of LDC mortality appears to life expectancy is illustrated and compared in Ta- be that mortality in childhood has shown a some- ble 13-10 with the Bureau of Census projections what greater resistance to decline than mortality developed for the Global 2000 Study. For the at some later ages. world as a whole, a 15 percent increase was The persistence of infectious diseases (above all achieved over the 1950-70 period. Life expectan- diarrhea),that cannot be conquered with modern cies increased everywhere, but the most dramatic medicine is, in large part, responsible for slowing increases were in the less developed countries- the decline in infant mortality. Malaria control, a 21 percent increase overall. Asia achieved a antibiotics, and immunization programs have. striking 24 percent increase. brought some quick, dramatic gains,'but further On closer examination, the life expectancy data progress depends on improvements in nutrition show another important development: The rate and sanitation, which are coming along slowly, if of increase of life expectancy has slowed. For the at all. According to Dr. John Bryant (formerly world as a whole, the average annual increment with the Rockefeller Foundation, now with the in life expectancy declined from 0.64 to 0.34 years office of International Health, U.S. Department over the 1950-70 period. Further increases in life of Health, Education and Welfare): 248 THE PROJEC71ONS TABLE 13-10 Levels and Trends of Life Expectancy at Birth, 1950-2000 Life Expectancy at Birth, in Years 1950/55 .1955/60 1960/65 1965/7.0 1975, 2000, World 46.7 44.9 52.7 53.9 -58.8 65.5 IndustriaUed countries 65 ' 0 68.2 69.5 70.3 71.1 733 Less developed countries 41.6 45.0 48.0 50.4 54.0 63.5 Africa 36.1 38.5 40.8 43.0 46.2 57.4 Latin America 52.3 55.3 57.7 59.5 63.1 70.3 Asia 42.5 46.3 49.8 52.5 54.3 b 63.7b Average Annual Increment in Life Expectancy at Birth, in Years 1950/55-1955/60 1955/60-1960/65 ig6o/65-i965no 1975-20W World 0.64 0.46 0.34 0.27 IndustriaUed countries 0.64 0.26 0.16 0.09 Less developed countries 0.68 0.60 0.48 0.38 Africa 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.45 Latin America 0.60 0.48 0.36 0.29 Asia 0.76 0.70 0.54 0.38 Source: World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1973, New York: U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 1977. pp. 138 ff. 0 Calculated from Bureau of the Census. Illustrative Projections of World Populations to the 21st Century, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 91 Table 8. Weighting is 105 for males, 100 for females. b Asia and Oceania The great weapons of modern medicine are aimed testinal parasites and various infectious diarrheal at the patho-physiolop of disease and its suscep- disease's are probably the most devastatingof the tibility to pharmaceutical, immunological, or sur- fecally related types. Surveys of parasite-infected ical attack. Health services are designed to populations frequently show from 70 to 90 percent geliver these weapons mainly through the hands of doctors. The dismal fact is that these great kill_ infestations. 11 In Egypt, Iran, and Venezuela, the monthly incidence of diarrhea among preschool ers of children-diarrhea, pneumonia, malnutn- tion-are beyond the:reach of these weapons. children has been estimated to be 40-50 percent. 89 If children sick With these diseases reach the The effects of diarrhea, pneumonia, and intes- physician, there are sharp limits to what he can tinal parasites are greatly aggravated by under- do. Diarrhea and re often not af- nutrition, which is the major underlying cause of I pneumonia a fected by antibiotics, and the frequent presence death among children. Deaths from infection of malnutrition "makes even supportive therapy nearly always result from a combination of un- difficult or futile. And even these interventions dernutrition and infection. When women are un- by the physician, whether or not they are thera- demourished, too frequent pregnancies result in peutically effective, are only sporadic ripples in malnutrition for the mother and baby, low aver- a running tide of disease. We are speaking of so- cieties in which, at any given time, a third of the age birth weights, and poor resistance to disease. children may have diarrhea and more than that The prospects for reducing malnutrition are may, be malnourished. Their lives are saturated mixed. The Global 2000 Study food projections, with the causes-poverty, crowding, ignorance, in the medium case, show only limited improve- poor ventilation, filth, flies. ment in per capita food availability and, in some instances, declines. Furthermore, when food dis- tribu.tion among income classes is taken into con- The causes of high infant-mortality rates are sideration, the number of malnourished, disease- well known and closely linked to environmental vulnerable children is likely to increase by 2000. conditions. As shown in Table 13-11, the diseases Increased death rates in parts of Asia have already most often fatal during early childhood in a de- been observed during poor crop years. veloping area (in this case, Latin America) are To further complicate the situation, many of fecally related and airborne contagious diseases: the diseases most threatening health in developing Although diseases such as cholera, typhoid, and countries.are becoming increasingly resistant to polio all contribute to the mortality statistics, in- drugs now being used in their treatment. 11 Al- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 249 ready drug-resistant pathogen strains* have con- 'inexpensive, common antibiotics are widely avail- tributed to severe epidemics in several LDCs: -able without prescription even in remote rural � In Central America between 1968 and 1971 a LDCs.` And the appearance of resistant bacte- rial strains may not be due only to low probability dysentery pandemic occurred in which the drugs mutations; it is now thought that epidemic dis- normally used to treat the disease proved in- eases may suddenly acquire resistant traits through effective. " The strain-Shigella dysenteriae higher-probablifity contacts with more common, 1-had high mortality rates in both Guatemala and El Salvador. In Guatemala alone, an esti- harmless intestinal species that have -already mated 12,500 people died from the disease in evolved their own resistance."3 1968 (200 out of'every 100,000 inhabitants).93 If the reduced LDC mortality figures projected � In Mexico in 1972, an epidemic of typhoid fever in the population chapter are to be achieved, appeared on a scale unprecedented in modern progress must be made in controlling the fecally times. " The strain-Salmonella typhi-has re- related diseases, the airborne diseases, and the sistance to a wide range of drugs. " The out- increased mortality associated with these diseases break lasted for months and involved four as a result of nutritional deficiency. These diseases Mexican states. Large numbers of persons of all are largely of environmental origin and can be ages and varying socioeconomic groups were controlled only through improved environmental affected. " and sanitation conditions and through improved � In recent years resistance to commonly used nutrition and education, all of which require cap- therapeutic agents against malaria has increased ital investment, as well as through changes of hab- substantially in South America and Southeast its and cultural traditions. As discussed above Asia. There is every reason to believe that these u .nder urbanization in the LDCs, there is reason resistant strains will spread, thus hampering to question whether the needed improvements in treatment and eradication. " sanitary and environmental conditions will occur. In short, there is growing evidence that nu- By the year 2000, sanitary conditions in some merous pathogens and vectorst are evolving areas may even deteriorate. This situation, wors- strains that are resistant to many of the common ened by increasing scarcities of food and energy and least expensive drugs." While new drugs will in poorer regions, could lead to an increase, rather continue to be developed, the new drugs are often than a decrease, in mortality rates among some more expensive and effective against a smaller populations. 104 group of pathogens than those that they replace." Excessive use of commorn antibiotics both by hu- Environment and Health in the Industrialized mansloo and in animal feed01 may increase the Nations rate at which resistant strains evolve. The most Two important developments in health condi- tions are occurring in the industrialized nations. First, life expectancies are continuing their trend *Pathogen resistance to drugs is not limited to developing of many years, increasing slowly. In the U.S., for countries; it causes increased mortality in industrialized soci-. example, the rate of increase of life expectancy eties as well ("Rise of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria," Science averaged 0.53 years per year over the 1940-50 News, Aug. 24/31, 1974, p. 119). Certain staphylococcus in- period but fell to 0. 15 years per year for the 1950- fections (especially in hospitals) and gonorrhea in particular 60 decade and to 0. 12 years per year for the 1960s. are growing problems. There are many indications that drug resistance in pathogens will continue to increase throughout Over the first five years of the 1970s, the annual the world (Marietta Whittlesey, "The Runaway Use of An- rate has increased to an average 0.32 years, bring- tibiotics," New York Times Magazine, May 6, 1979, p. 122). ing the U.S. life expectancy at birth to 72.5 Coastal waters off New York have been contaminated with years. 105 both sewage and mercury. Tests show that bacteria in these waters have developed varying degrees of r 'esistance to am- The second development relates to causes of picillin, tetracycline, kanamycin, and streptomycin and re- search with both the genus Vibro and the genus Ba@iii@; led death. Although there is much dispute over par- to the conclusion that ampicillin resistance and mercury re- ticulars, medical experts generally agree that the sistance are genetically linked (Marine Ecosystems Analysis causes of the diseases and accidents responsible Program, New York Bight Project Annual Reportfor FY.1976- for most fatalities and prolonged periods of ill 76T, Boulder, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis- health in affluent societies (heart disease, lung tration, 1977, p. 28). t See the food and agriculture section of this chapter for a disease, cancer, stroke, highway accidents) are discussion of the increasing problems of insecticide resistance now related largely to life-styles and environmen- and immunities developing in strains of insect vectors. tal circumstances. Frequently mentioned as con- 250 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 13-11 Percentages of,Deaths of Children Under the Age of Five Due to Fecally Related and Airborne Diseases or Malnutrition, Latin America, Selected Areas Fecally Related Airborne Nutritional Total Discase Disease Deficiency Chaco, Argentina (rural) 40 36 2 79 San Juan, Argentina (central urban) 38 32 3 72 San Juan, Argentina (suburban) 34 38 8 80 San Juan, Argentina (rural) 35 42 8 94 Chaco Resistencia, Bolivia (ru- ral) 52 27 6 84 La Paz, Bolivia (urban) 29 55 3 87 Viacha, Bolivia (rural) 25 65 0 91 Recife, Brazil (urban) 42 41 5 88 Ribeirao Preto, Brazil (urban) 49 36 2 87 Ribeirao Preto, Brazil (rural) 50 29 3 81 Ribeirao, Preto Franca, Brazil (rural) 55 20 7 82 Sao Paulo, Brazil (urban) 40 33 5 78 Santiago, Chile (central urban) 31 37 6 71 Santiago, Chile (suburban) 33 38 3 74 Cali, Colombia (urban) 44 25 15 84 Cartagena, Colombia (urban) 38 23 17 78 Medellin, Colombia (urban) 49 22 11 82 San Salvador, El Salvador (ur- ban) 52 28 6 86 San Salvador, El Salvador (rural) 51 22 13 86 Kingston, Jamaica (urban) 37 21 5 63 St. Andrew, Jamaica (rural) 23 23 23 69 Monterrey, Mexico (urban) 43 35 4 83 Source: Ruth R. Puffer, and Carlos V. Serrano, Inter-American investigation of Mortalitv in Childhood. Provisional Report. Washington: Pan American HealthOrgani zation. Sept. 1971. pp. 133-54. tributing factors are limited exercise, cigarette only major cause of death that has continued to smoking, alcohol consumption, exposure to toxic rise from 1970 to 1976, and environmental (i.e., chemicals, chronic psychological stress, and diets exogenous nongenetic) factors contribute 80-90 high in fats, salt, and refined carbohydrates.'" percent of the present cancer cases.'09 Little .Changes in these contributing factors must occur change seems in prospect, for the life-styles and if the increased life expectancy projected in the institutional demands that are the root cause of Global 2000 population projections is to be much stress. However, many persons are making achieved in the industrialized countries. What are efforts to improve their physical fitness. Some the prospects? persons are changing their dietary habits, but the The prospects for change are mixed, at least in Global 2000 food projections (see Table 13-17) the U.S. The adverse effects of smoking have re- show the industrialized nations increasing their ceived much attention since the Surgeon Gen- already high per capita food consumption still fur- eral's report of a decade ago, but smoking habits ther to 130-35 percent of the standards recom- have changed relatively little. Over the 11-year mended by the Food and Agriculture Organization. period from 1965 to 1976 smoking among males Efforts to reduce energy consumption have in- declined about 10 percentage points (from 52.4 creased life expectancies in at least one way: Ac- to 41.9 percent of. the male population) and- about cidental deaths associated with motor vehicle, 2 percentage points for women (from 34.1 to 32.0 accidents have declined by 25 percent between percent of the female population). " Efforts are 1972 and 1975, due primarily to reduced speeds. "6 being made to control toxic substances, but there However, due to lax enforcement of the new will be long lags in identifying and removing toxic speed limits, speed and accidents are both in- substances from the environment. '08 Cancer is the creasing again. ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 251 Conclusions the 21st century. A large portion of the 6.4 billion The discussion in this and other sections of this persons projected for 2000 will be desperately chapter make clear that the projecied'levels of poor. Biological resources and the environment human population will,exert, significant pressures generally as well as economies will be stressed on the environment, both di -rectly and indirectly: just to meet basic human needs. Income dispar- Environmental impacts. will occur in both tradi- ities and limited educational opportunities will tional and industrial cultures. compound the difficulties. A number of traditional cultures have existed Population-related pressures on the environ- for. centuries in relative equilibrium with their ment are also expected to increase in the indus- environments. Today, population growth, chang- trialized countries. Although population growth ing technologies, and altered life7Styles have ren- in these countries is much less than in the LDCs, dered the balancing mechanisms, ineffective. Highly the resource requirements and waste production evolved social-ecological systems are breaking of an "industrial person" is large. Trade and com- down with disastrous re 'sults for both humans and merce spread the environmental impacts of in- their life-supporting environment. creased industrial populations over very wide The threat to most ecosy .stems in less developed areas. regions is illustrated in the last *four maps in the Environmental factors will complicate preven- colored map section at,the end-of this volume. tive health measures in both less developed and These maps show.the extensive overlap between industrialized countries. Poor sanitary conditions the areas of high population density, limited ag- will hamper efforts to eradicate the diseases that ricultural'potential, and intense land use. In parts have the largest influence on mortality rates in of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the produc@ the LDCs. In the industrial nations, environmen- tivity of the life-supporting ecosystems can be ex- tal factors and life-styles may lead to the contin- pected to decline as a result of another two ued prevalence of premature deaths. "' Curative decades of intensifying pressure. health measures will be complicated in both de- The Global 2000 population projections show veloping and developed countries as a result of no significant slowing in growth through the year increased pathogen resistance to many common 2000, and increases can be anticipated well into and inexpensive drugs. THE GNP PROJECTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT The Projections The medium-growth* Gross National Product (GNP) projections, developed from World Bank, CIA, and nongovernmental data, are summarized in Table 13-12. GNP is projected to grow exponentially at 3.6 percent per year, in- creasing 145 percent by 2000. The industrialized countries' GNP grows more slowly than the world average, increasiAg by 129 percent. The less developed countries more than triple their GNP, but the magnitude of the LDC increase ($2.4 trillion) is much less than the magnitude of the increase in the indus trialized countries ($6.3 trillion). Nonetheless, the LDC share of the world's total GNP is projected to rise from 18 to 24 percent. On the average these trends, when combined with the trends inherent in the population projections, imply that real per capita incomes increase by about a third-more in countries with rapid economic and slow population growth, less in countries with slow economic growth and rapid population growth. In some cases (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh), little or no growth in real per capita income is projected. The GNP projections do not address the distribution of GNP (or income) among socioeconomic classes within coun- tries and give no indication of any changes that might occur in the composition of GNP. Introduction The GNP projections in Chapter 3 are based on rates for low, medium, and high growth. Only the medium-growth case Although economic activity certainly has many is considered here. environmental effects, GNP estimates are not an 252 THE PROJEMONS adequate basis from which to deduce detailed en- TABLE 13-12 vironmental impacts. At best, GNP figures pro- GNP Trends, 1975-2000, Medium-Growth Rate vide @an, indication'.of the volume of economic (In trillions [10"I of constant 1975 U.S. dollars) activity, but 'with virtually no:hint of the content. The, content of GNP is particularly important in 1975 2000 Increase connection , with the environment;, as the U.S. Aver- Commission. on Population Growth and the GNP Share GNP Share age , Total American Future observed, "An irony of [pres- ent] economic measurement is.that the value of per- per- goods' and services represented by the GNP in- Industrialized cent cent percent cludes'the post of producin&the pollutants as well countries 4.9 82 11.2 76 3.4 129 as expenditures for cleaning up afterward." 112. Less developed Without knowledge of the specific goods and bads countries 1.1 18 3.5 24 4.7 218 and, the. services and.disservices to be- produced, World 6.0 100 14.7 100 3.6 1.45 only a very general discussion of the environmen- Source: Chapter 2, this volume. tal implications of GNP projections is possible. Nonetheless, GNP projections,do provide some clue to future environmental problems, particu- larly with respect to p ollution and waste genera- nomic activity can be expected to produce larger tion and resource consumption. By the year 2000, quantities of waste- materials and more residual even the slowest growing economy is projected' wastes. Whether these residual wastes actually to have nearly doubled its GNP, while more vig- enter the environment as pollutants depends on orous economies will have more than tripled policies for, and expenditures on, environmental theirs., Barring. major changes, in the kinds of protection. The projecte *deconomic growth will goods (and bads), and services, (and disservices) have one of two effects (or a combination of pro.duced-and barring major changes in the tech- both): increased rele.ase of wastes and pollutants no] .ogies employed and.in the share of GNP de- into the environment or, increased costs of keeping voted to environmental protection-certain rough the waste and pollution out of the environment. proporitiori .al increases,in waste and pollution ge__ Increased environmental pollution can occur in at least@ two ways: first, as a result of relaxed or eration and. in, resource consumption can be an- unmet ambient (or source-emission) standards; ticipated. * @ In the paragraphs that follow, the implications second, as a consequence of increased numbers of GNP growth for pollution- and waste generation of emission sources, all of which meet unchanged and for resource consumption.are considered very source-emission standards. As the number of briefly. (The specific .implications of the projected sources (or the volumes discharged from existing resource developments are disc Iussed in later sec- sources) increases, source-emission standards (per tions,of this_c'@apter.),Then, toxic substances-a unit of effluent discharged) must be tightened just topic that relates more to GNP growth than any to maintain present environmental conditions. of the other projections-are discussed briefly. Tightening st *andards to compensate for in- creased economic activity may become quite ex- Pollution and Waste Generation pensive. For example,'if the number of sources meeting a 94 percent emission standard doubles, Unless 'there are very significant structural the standard must be tightened to 97 percent, just changes in the world's 'economies, increased eco- to break even If the discharges triple, increased pollution occurs unless the standards are tight-. This. observation depends to a degree on where sectorally the GNP growth occurs. In industrialized countries, economic ened to 98 percent. As the standard approaches growth hasbecome increasingly concentrated,in the relatively 100 percent, the costs of meeting the standard, clean service sector, rather than in the more polluting extrac- generally increase very rapidly. Thus, the pro- tive and manufacturing sectors. GNP growth in the LDCs, jected doubling or tripling of economic activity which will occur largely in primary and secondary sectors, will can be expected to lead to either an increasing, probably have relatively larger impacts on the environment over the next two 'decades. Furthermore, as discussed in Chap- proportion of GNP being devoted to* pollution ter 14 ', the GNP model assumes that the proportion of GNP control, to more pollution, or to both-unless allocated to environmental pollution will not increase mark- there are'innovations in production processes, by edly in. the LDCs, and the energy model assumes that the real which "wastes" are recycled and used (as in the cost of environmental protection will not significantly increase the@ cost of building or operating future energy facilities in the pulp and paper industry, which now.uses "waste" industrialized countries. as an energy source). ENVIRONMENT PROJECHONS 253 Resource Consumption of chemicals to enhance living conditions can be traced to the simple use of metals in the devel- The projected increases in GNP imply in- opment of glazing materials tot cerarnic utensils. creased demand for both renewable and nonre- Other uses of metals are found, for example, in newable resources. Meeting these resource the development of bronze, initially for weap- demands will have many environmental implica- onry, then for the creative arts. Accounts ate also tions. found of the use of metals in the development of The Global 2000 Study's nonrenewable re- medical practice, such as the use of mercury for source projections (i.e., the energy and minerals medicinal purposes by the Romans. The reliance projections of Chapters 10-12) are based,on var- by civilizations on chemicals in order to improve ious assumed linkages to GNP. For example, as their living conditions has had a long history in discussed in Chapter 14, the LDC minerals pro- Western,civilization. jections assume that LDC economies will become By the same token, however, the use of chem- more mineral-intensive as growth continues; the icals inIan adverse sense -also has had a long his- LDC energy projections suggest that LDC econ- tory, beginning with the use of extracts from the omies will not increase in energy intensiveness as fruit of the hemlock by the Greeks. This was fol- industrialization proceeds. In the industrialized lowed by the Romans, who used other forms of economies, the models assume that GNP growth poisons, and later still by those who participated will lead to little change in energy intensiveness, in the Italian court intrigues of the Renaissance and to decreasing minerals intensiveness. What- era. This, of course, continued into the end of the ever the actual relationship is between GNP and 19th century with the development of trinitrotom nonrenewable resources, increased environmen- luene (TNT) and the use of chemicals in modern tal impacts can be anticipated in the mining, re- warfare in World War 1. fining, and energy sectors as a result of increased It was not until the end of the 19th century that economic activity. The environmental impacts of the use of chemicals in society began to become the projected increase in demand for nonrenew- widespread. It was at this point that reliance on able resources are considered in other sections of natural sources for chemicals became, so strong this chapter. that the sources of supplies began-to lag signifi- Renewable resources are also of critical impor- cantly behind the demands society placed upon tance to the health of the world's economies. As them. This led to the development of exp&imen- Lester R. Brown, President of Worldwatch Insti- tal chemistry in Europe for the express purposes tute, has observed: of synthesizing new chernica IIs to replace those Four biological systems-fisheries, forests, grass- originally obtained from natural sources. This de- lands, and croplands-form the foundation of the velopment coincided with the discovery that crude global economic system. In addition to supplying oil, which was initially used as a replacement for all bur food, these four systems providevirtually whale oil, could also be used as a new source of all the raw materials for industry except minerals supply for chemicals. A new scientific discipline and petroleum-derived synthetics. The condition emerged, to expand the utility of crude oil: or- of the economy and of these biological systems ganic chemistry. cannot be separated. As the global.economy ex- pands ... pressures on earth's biological systems With the advent of organic chemistry, the syn- are mounting. In large areas of the world, huma 'n thesis of every imaginable organic compound claims on these systems, are reaching an unsus- originating from crude oil feedstock began. In tainable level, a point where their productivity is part, this activity Iwas the domain of the scientist being im aired. When this' happens, fisheries col- in order to further understand the mechanisms of lapse, forests disappear, grasslands are converted organic chemical reaction rates. Uses for the in- into barren wastelands, and croplands deterio- creasing number of organic compounds synthe- rate. 113 sized by the organic chemists was left tobtliers, The environmental impacts of projected creases in demand for renewable resources are coi,isidered in other sections of this chapter. This section was added at the suggestion of the U.S. De- partment of State, while Chapter 13 was in press. It is the work The Use of Chemicals in'the of Mr. Jack Blanchard in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Development of Societies* Affairs, Department of State. Since toxic 6emicals are a major source of pollutants in the coastal waters of the world's oceans, Reports can be found documenting the use of they are also discussed below, in the section on the marine chemicals dating back to antiquity."The utilization environment. 254 THE PROJECTIONS however, to develop. An example of such a proc- the environment and public health following long- ess @was, DDT. It was considered a novel com- term low level exposures to chemicals. Society has pound by organic chemists in the early 1940s. It come to rely extensively on chemicals in order to was not until the latter stages of World War 11, improve its living conditions. This h@avy reliance however, that it -was found to have pesticide ac- on chemicals, however, has begun to elicit conr tivity and was used extensively as a disinfectant. cerns about the benefits when evaluated with the Subsequently, its use as an overall general pes@- unintended risks associated with their use. These ticide expanded enourmously after the war. It was risks have been associated with every facet in the '@ from their @ manufacture used widely and it was inexpensive. Only recently utilization of chemicals" have we realized its adverse effects: pesticide re- and use to their transportation and disposal. sistance, thinning of eggshells, and its appeara:nce Examples 'of such risks to chemicals abound, in,foodstuffs worldwide. Indeed, the field of or- not only in the technical press, but the lay press ganic chemistry spawned an impressive expansion as well. There can be no dispute that radium, of new pharmaceuticals which led to striking ad- originally used on watch faces for luminescent fig- vancements in medical health practices. In time, ures, causes cancer. Similarly that dibromochlo- the advent of novel synthetic organic chemicals ropropane (DBCP) developed as a herbicide quickly found commercial uses, such as plastics causes sterility in males following occupational and even artificial diamonds. Just before the exposures. "' Also that vinyl -chloride monomer, World War 11, U.S. production of synthetic or- the precursor to polyvinyl chloride, causes an- ganic materials was less than 1 billion pounds per giosarcorna of the liver. "I Transportation of bulk year. By 1978, U.S. production had risen to ap- chemicals has periodically resulted in major ac- proximately 172 billion,pounds annually. "" cidents requiring the evacuation of whole com- The use of,chemicals in the 20th century has munitids in order to protect them from clouds of become so widespread that it can be said that their poisonous gas, explosives, or, other hazards. ` presence is ubiquitous. Along with this expanded Similarly, disposal of chemicals until recently has reliance of chemicals, however, has been an in- never been regulated. Environmental contami- creasing awareness in recent years of the unin- nation of the Hudson and James Rivers by tended adverse impact to the environment and PCBs "I and Kepone 121' respectively, of the Love public health due to the widespread use of chem- canal in New York State, "' and of Hardeman icals. Society has, come to rely extensively on County, Tennessee, "' and Seveso, Italy, are ex- chemicals and is now beginning to realize the amples of large-scale industrial disposals of chem- problems that have been created with the man- icals, which in time have proven injurious to ufacture, use, transportation, and disposal of communities. chemicals. For the advantages that chemicals have Where does the control of chemicals begin in given societies, which have been overwhelming, order to provide society with some protection? there have also been disadvantages which have How will the uses of chemicals be tempered in proven striking. We are now beginning to realize order to provide a rational basis for their contin- how extensive these disadvantages are, and in in- ued use? The projected outcome may not be dif- dustrialized societies remedial measures are being ficult to develop if current practices are taken into developed to respond to the more serious prob- consideration. The major question remains as to lems chemicals pose to the environment and pub- whether controls on chemicals will be adequate lic health. to allow for their continued use by society while At the Governing Council meeting of the maintaining an acceptable measure of protection United Nations Environment Programme in 1978, from exposures associated with their manufac- it was estimated that 4 million identifiable chem- ture, use, transportation, and disposal. icals are in common use, with the worldwide value Chemicals will continue to play an integral role of chemical sales in excess of $300 million annually in the development of societies of both industrial- and with over 30,000 chemicals in commercial use. ized nations and less developed countries. The There are some 1,000 new chemicals brought on roles played by these societies with regard to the to the market'annually. "' With regard to inter- control of toxic substances may pot be changed national trade in chemicals among OECD-mem- materially by the year 2000. bdr countries, this amounted to approximately Industrialized countries have begun to institute t@O billion in 1976. 116 regulatory controls on chemicals. As national pro- Along with this expanded use of chemicals, grams have been developed in the last few years, however, has been an increasing awareness in re- continued examples of adverse environmental and cent years of the unintended adverse impact to public health damage coupled with society's in- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 255 creasing concerns, have led to this development. the environment from pollutants from industrial As governments move to implement their respec- sources. This activity has been concerned with tive national programs, two major goals are being toxic chemicals. Many of these programs have addressed: (1) protection of public health and en- been adopted by the World Bank in establishing vironment and (2) recognition that economic im- environmental guidelines for developing coun- pacts associated with tbese.controls should not tries desirous of undertaking rapid growth in their impede unduly (or create, unnecessary economic economies. " While environmental controls are barriers to) technological innovation. These issues being imposed in industrial countries, less devel- have international ramifications. Considerable oped countries will be able to,benefit from these movement has been made in attempting to reach efforts. consensus among industrialized, countries regard- With regard, to direct controls in chemicals ing tihe control of chemicals. It seems prudent to themselves, the picture is a bit less clear. Indus@ project that some form. of international cooper- trialized countries have identified the characterw ation will take place in the future, hopefully well istics of those chemicals which could be regarded before the year 2000. as having unacceptable effects on humans and A.different set of problems exist, however, for their environment. These generally are persist- less developed countries. In these instances, ex- ence, wide distribution, and bioaccumulation amples already exist wi 0th regard to governments leading to biological effects, and they form the who per 'ceive . themselys at some disadvantage basis of 6their respective chemical control pro- relative to industrialized countries in protecting grams. " Since pollution readily crosses political themselves from adverse exposures to chemicals. boundaries, there is a definite correlation that can Developing countries, and in some cases less de-, be expected to occur between control programs veloped countries,,have indicated that insufficient in industrialized and those in less developed coun- data are available to them in order to develop tries, the only mitigating aspects being economics, adequate control programs. I Few developing technical expertise, and societal factors. In time, countries have, the capacity, to cope with the so- one would expect that regulatory controls of toxic phisticated analyses required to assess the risks substances, once initiated by industrialized coun- of imported or locally manufactured chemicals, tries, will also be adopted by nonindustrialized and multinational chemical manufacturers are lo- countries. cating plants in the LDCEi to avoid the regulations As less developed countries improve their econ- that already exist in many industrialized nations. omies, a transfer of information on the control of In view of theseproblems, the LDCs have asked chemicals will be expected to occur. In time, the the United Nations Environment Programme differences will be one of a degree of enforcement (UNEP) for assistance in developing and strength- from country to country. Society cannot live with- ening their capabilities for evaluating chemicals, out chemicals. It is clear,on the other hand, that food, drugs, and cosmetics. " society cannot live without controls on -chemicals. The projections for less developed countries for Somewhere in between will be found the position the year 2000 in dealing with chemicals are less of the broad range of societies, their, disparities amenable to generalizations. It can be said that measured by their willingness to coexist with they will, of course, rely on UNEP as well as other chemicals in their environment. multilateral organizations to provide the basic technical skills for controlling the manufacture, use, transportation, and disposal of chemicals. Conclusions Some countries may incorporate directly part or all of the control programs implemented by in- The Global 2000 Study projects the GNP of the: dustrialized countries. As such the work of de- world to increase from $6 trillion in 1975 to $14.7 veloped countries in harmonizing regulatory trillion in 2000. Because GNP figures include the controls in chemicals becomes quite important to cost of producing pollution as well as cleaning up both the chemical-exporting countries and the afterward, they are an inadequate basis for antic- chemical-importing countries. ipating environmental impacts. However, the, .The level of control of chemicals by the year GNP projections imply increasing demand for 2000 may be somewhat anticipated on the basis both renewable and nonrenewable resources.. of developments already under, way. Within in- Short of major changes in the structure of the. dustrialized societies, the environmental move- world's economies, meeting the projected re- ment has established a substantial body of legislative source demands will lead to increases in environ- mandates designed to protect public health and mental pollution or increases in the proportion of 256 THE PROJECTIONS GNP devoted, to environmental protection, or the projected demands are analyzed in other sec- both. The environmental implications of meeting tions of this chapter. CLIMATE CHANGES AND THE ENVIRONMENT The Projections Because of the difficulty of climatological modeling, it is not possible currently to produce generally agreed-upon quantitative climate projections. Instead, the CIA developed for the Global 2000 Study three climatological scenarios,* each of approximately equal probability, and described the principal char- acteristics and probable broad-scale effects of each. The thre e 'scenarios, discussed in detail in Chapter 4, are, in brief: CASE 1: No CHANGE. Climate conditions approximate those of the 1941-70 period. CASE 11: WARMING. A general warming, mainly in the polar and higher middle latitudes, is associated with smaller year to year variation in precipitation and with slight increases in global precipitation but, 'at the same time, with a .greater likelihood of continental drought in the U.S. CASE'111: COOLING. Cooling in the higher and middle latitudes is associated with a decrease in precipitation Amounts and an increase in month to month and year to year variation in precipitation, a general equatorward shift of storm tracks, more frequent failures of the monsoon over India, and @ecurrent severe droughts in the Sahel (as during the 1972-74 period). Aspects of the energy, forestry, food, and GNP projections, which also have the potential to influence (and be influenced by) climate, are listed here in summary form. The Energy Projecions through 1990 show annual increases in the de- mand, for oil of 3.0 percent; oil will supply 47 percent of the 1990 energy demand. (See Chapters 10 and 20 for an explanation of the 1990 limit to the energy projections.) It is projected that coal will furnish one-fifth of the total energy for 1990. Nuclear and hydroelectricity production will treble and will furnish 16 percent of the 1990 energy demand. Natural gas usage will have increased 43 percent by 1990 to satisfy 17 percent of the demand. The Forestry Projections anticipate deforestation at rates that will reduce total forested areas on the earth by 16-20 percent by 2000. The Food and Agriculture Projections foresee a 90-100 percent increase in total world production. This increase is based on a small (5 percent) increase in arable land and a 70-100 percent i increase in productivity of land under. cultivation. Much of the increased productivity is a result of more than a doubling of fertilizer t use per hectare for the world as a whole, and, a quadrupling of fertilizer use per hectare in the LDCS. The rGross National Product Projections show trends toward increases in real per capita incomes by about one-third, with greater increases in countries with rapid economic growth but slow population growth, and smaller increases in countries with slow economic-but rapid population-growth. The three climatological scenarios developed by the CIA were based in part on five scenarios developed jointly by the National oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the National Defense University and the Central Intelligence Agency. t In the,USDA projections, the term "fertilizer" is used to denote fertilizers and other yield- enhancing inputs, including pesticides and herbicides. ENVIRONMENT PROJEC71ONS 257 Introduction genicinfluences. Natural influences are exempli- fied by changes insolar radiation, volcanic activity,. Present comprehension of `long-range, climatic and shifting ocean currents, all of which can have phenomena is so limited that scientists have no significant effects on climate. generally accepted bases for predicting with as- All members of the panel had available detailed surance the magnitudes-or even the, directions- evidence of, climate variation, both during human of possible changes in the earth's climate over the history. and during the geological history of the next several decades. Yet it is known that the pl@net, indicating that significant natural varia- climate of the 1950s and 1960s was exceptionally tions. could, occur between the present and the favorable and that,,on'the basis'of past experi-, year 2000. ence, the earth can expect botli'more.variable and., The.benign climate of the 1950s and the 1960s less favorable climate in1he future. Some human was by no means typical of the integlacial (or post- activities, especially those resulting in releases of glacial) period the earth has been experiencing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, Are known for approximately the last 10,000 years.'" This to have the potential to affect the world's climate. 20-year period was most favorable for agriculture Whether future climate changes will be predom- and food production over much of the cultivated inantly of natural or human origin is not known, areas of the industrialized high-.technology na- and the pace at which they will occur. and,.the tions; a climate a few degrees Iwarmer or cooler severity of their consequences are.unknown q@,an- could have.been considerably less favorable. " tities. Many experts nevertheless feel that changes , Consideration.of current trends in temperatures on a scale likely to affect the environment and the and of the history of climate over the past 10,000 economy of large regions of the world are not years led the NDU panel of experts to five alter- only possible but probable in the next 25-50 years. 'native climate scenarios for the next 25 years; (1) The Global 2000 Study -group, faced with the Large Warming, (2).Moderaie Warming, (3) No need to estimate the effects of climate change on Change, (4) Moderate Cooling, and (5) Large the environment over the next quarter century, Cooling. The'three Global 2000 Study scenarios decided to use the recent survey of expert opin- ate: related to these five as follows: Case I (No ion"' conducted by.the National Defense Uni.- Change) is essentially identical to the NDU No versity as a basis for the.three scenarios described Change scenario; Case- 11 (Warming) falls be- briefly above. Environmental implications of each tween the NDU Moderate Warming and Large of the Global 2000 S 'tudy climate scenarios will be Warming scenarios; Case III (Cooling) falls be- examined here,*together with aspects of some of., tween the NDU Moderate Cooling and Large the other projections that have implications, for Cooling scenarios. world climate. The climatolo ical considerations behind the 9 Global 2000 Study scenarios are, briefly: The Climate Scenarios., Case L-' No Change might occur if warming and An analysis of the environmental impacts Iof the cooling effects should happen to balance one an- three Global 2000 climate scenarios must begin other betwe 'en now and 2000. - with a brief glance at the Natiorial'Defense Uni- Case 11., Warming might occur if the warming ef- versity (NDU) study on which they are based. 128 fect of atmospheric carbon dioxide were to pre- The five climate scenarios of the NDU study' dominate over all other effects. were developed by a panel of experts in clima- Case III.-Cooling might -occur if the global cooling tology. All had the same basic information; each trend that began in the 1940s were to continue, had his own ideas and opinions as to'the nature, possible as the result of an increase in volcanic dimensions, and consequences of the climate activity (and: related dust) or a (sunspot-cycle-re- changes that could be expected over the next 25 lated) decrease in the solar energy reaching the earth. years. Both human-caused (anthropogehic) and natural influences were considered. Increased fos- Envi Ironmental Consequences of the sil fuel combustion and clearing of forests for food production are examples of possible anthropo- Climate Scenarios Details of the Global 2000 Study's Case I (No The probability of occurrence of the Case I scenario (No Change) scenario are given in Chapter 4 under Change), is 0.30; of Case ll,.(Warming), approximately 0.25; the heading "Same as the Last 30 Years." The of Case III (Cooling), also 0.25. Estimated from the probability figures for the five National Defense University scenarios given major premise is that the,warining effects of in- in Tables 4-1A through 4-5A in Chapter 4. creasing C02, in the atmosphere will compensate 00 340- 340 NOAA MAUNA LOA. HAWAII BASELINE STATION 335 BASEO ON SCRIPPS 1974 MANOMETRIC CALIBRATION 335 CL z 0330- 330 z U325- 325 0 LU 0 X 0326- 320 0 z z 0- 315 < 315 3101- 19L6I I 59L62@ 1-9'63 1-9@6-4 1-9L65 1 1-9@6-6 1 196L7 1 1-9'6-8 1 1 -9L6- 91 1 -9'7 0 1 1 -9'7 1 1 1 -9'L7 2 1 1 -9L7 3 1 1-9L74 197L5 1 1.9176 1 1 -9L7 7 1 1.9178 1 1 - 1 310 A" chonge 1958 1959 1960 979 1980@ (0.611 0.89 0.68 0.86 0.46 (0.641 (0.58) 0.68 0.70 0.87 1.90 1.31 1.04 1.15 2.19 0.54 0.51 , 1.08 1.58 1.49 PPM YH Figure 13-2. Trend since 1958 in the Concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (parts per million by volume), as monitored at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Mauna h- - A-O Loa Observatory, Hawaii, 19.50 N latitude, 3,401 meters altitude. (L. Machta, NOAA Air Resources Laboratories, 1979) ENVIRONMENT PROJECF]ONS 259 for the cooling effects of a natural cycle of failing to relieve drought effects in densely populated temperatures. The environmental consequences areas by producing water in massive desaliniza- of this scenario on changes in energy usage, ag- tion programs. Forested areas at higher latitudes riculture and food production, and forestation are of the Northern hemisphere would become less minimal. Furthermore, since none of the govern- accessible, and grow more slowly. ment's present long-term global models can utilize climate inputs, all of the Global 2000 Study en- Impact of the Other Projections On vironmental impact projections are based on the Climate assumption that the Case I (No Change) scenario will actually occur, Thus, the environmental im- Climatologists have identified two general types pacts of the Case I scenario are incorporated in of factors that influence climate: human activity those projections. I (anthropogenic influences) and natural factors The Case II (Warming) scenario has, of course, (geological, oceanic, and ice feedback effects and somewhat different environmental implications. astronomical effects). The following paragraphs This scenario leads to an increase of 1* C in global focus primarily on the anthropogenic influences temperatures, with most of the warming in the implied by the other Global 2000 Study projec- polar regions, and the higher middle latitudes. tions, especially the GNP, food and agriculture, Precipitation increases are predicted for the higher forestry, and energy projections. These projec- middle latitudes 'with little change elsewhere. tions are considered in terms of their potential Fewer extremely cold winters might be expected, effects on the factors thought most likely to alter but the chance that the interior of the U.S. would the world's climate. . experience hot.summers and widespread drought Most experts agree that the most potentially conditions resembling those of the mid-1930s is harmful changes in climate on a global scale would likely to increase. The warming would be sub- result from increases of atmospheric carbon diox- stantially beneficial to Canadian and Soviet wheat ide and other "greenhouse gases" (such as fluo- production; it would be moderately detrimental rocarbons and nitrous oxide), from changes in the to wheat in Argentina, Australia, and India and quantity and character of particulate matter in the marginally unfavorable to corn'(maize) in Argen- atmosphere, or from a partial destruction of the tina and the U.S - " The effects on energy usage, ozone layer, Changes in the earth's surface albedo while not calculated, are probably negligible. De- (a measure of reflectivity), and increases in resid- forestation would probably increase in the higher ual heat released as a consequence of energy use middle latitudes as more of the land became ar- are also known to be factors. in local, regional, able. Pressures on forests elsewhere would de- or-in extreme cases--global changes in climate. pend on population growth and concomitant Carbon Dioxide needs for food, fuelwood, building materials, and other forest products. Carbon dioxide (CO,) is a colorless, tasteless, The Case III (Cooling) scenario leads to a nontoxic gas. It is exhaled by all animals as a global temperature decrease of 0.5' C, with 10'C product of metabolism and is absorbed by plants cooling in the higher and middle latitudes and as part of the process of photosynthesis. CO, is smaller changes near the equator. Precipitation a basic product of the combustion of all hydro- amounts decrease, and month to month and year carbons, including fossil'fuels and wood. It is not to year variability increases. Storm tracks shift subject to economically practical control by any equatorward, bringing precipitation to the higher pollution-control technology 'The amounts pro- latitudes of deserts, but causing equatorward ex- duced annually are so large that the only possible pansion of these deserts. Monsoon failures would means of disposal is discharge to the atmosphere. become more frequent and severe in India, and The carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere the Sahel would experience more frequent severe has been increasing since routine observations droughts. Wheat yields in Canada and the Soviet began. Preindustrial (ca. 1860-90) atmospheric Union would be reduced, but other key crops CO,, content is estimated by most experts at ap- would not be severely affected. "' The demand proximately 290 ppm (parts per million by vol- for energy would increase, particularly in the mid- ume)34; measurements show the 1976 content to dle and higher latitudes, where increasing amounts be 332 ppm. "' The upward trend is easily seen of energy would, be'rieeded for'heating. Also, in Figure 13-2, which shows rather large seasonal greater variability of climate might call for higher variations superimposed.on the long-term trend. levels of heating-fuel reserves. Additional de- The average concentration increased by about 5 mands for energy might also result from attempts percent in the 20-year period 1958-78. 260 THE PROJECrIONS ATMOSPHERE 700 <.05 5 ? NET PHOTOSYNTHESIS 50 RESPIRATIONP so LAND OCEAN VEGETATION MARINE LIFE NET PHOTOSYNTHESIS 827, 2, 25 z z %%.,,'MIXED LAYER 2 0 0 560, V) 9 RESPIRATION z 25, DISSOLVED. ORGANIC MATTER]. LU > 30 THERMOCLINE WATER EXCHANGE DEAD ORGANIC DISSOLVED DEEP OCEAN MATTER (HUMUS) ORGANIC MATTER (.5-5) 1,000-3,000 1,W0-3,000 38,000,000 vt CARBONATES SEDIMENTS 20,000,000 OSSIL FUELS Figuml.3-3. Global pools and flows of carbon. Pools are expressed in billions of metric tons of carbon, flows in billions of metric tons of carbon per year. (From "The Carbon Dioxide Question, " by George M. Woodwell, copyright 1978 by Scientific American,. Inc., aH rights reserved) The increasing atmospheric concentration of ment. The CO, in the atmosphere acts in much C02 'Sof concern because of the so-called. green- the same way as glass, permitting solar radiation house effect. In a greenhouse (or*solar collector), to pass.through'to the earth's surface but inter- shortwave solar radiation (light) from the sun cepting some of the heat radiated upward from passes: through the glass and 'is re-radiated as in- the surface toward space. and reradiating it back frared longwave, heat radiation from the soil and toward the surface. With steadily increasing at- ,other surfaces inside the greenhouse. The heat 'mospheiic C021 the balance between 'incoming energy radiated upward is trapped, inside of the and outgoing radiation can be maintained only if '<7@ greenhouse by the glass, which cannot,transmit surface and lower-atmospheric temperatures in- longwave radiation to-the colder outside environ- crease. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 261 There is still some uncertainty on exactly where an acceleration in the current annual rate of in- all of the additional C02 is coming from, where crease in atmospheric C02. No one knows for sure it goes, and whether the rate of increase will re- how these and other'40 circumstances will com- main constant or change. The general picture, bine in the years ahead, but after a careful study however, is reasonably well established, at least of the matter, the National Academy of Sciences out to the year 2000. " Since the total amount of anticipates that, if present trendscontinue, a four- carbon in the earth-atmosphere system is con- to eightfoldincrease of atmospheric C02 concen- stant, the carbon being added to the atmosphere tration is entirely possible by the latter part of the pool must Pome from a nonatmospheric carbon 22nd Century. "" A four- to eightfold increase in pool somewhere within the system. Figure 13-3 atmospheric C02 concentration would have ex- shows the various pools of carbon in the earth- ceedingly serious consequences. Even a doubling atmosphere system and the flows of carbon be- would have very serious consequences, and sev- tween pools. Most experts consider that carbon eral scientists feet that, if present trends continue, from the combustion of fossil fuels is the main a doubling is likely to occur during the first half cause of increasing C02 in the atmosphere, but of the 21st Century. recently others have suggested that,deforestation The major contribution to an increased con- (and the associated oxidation of the fixed carbon centration of atmospheric CO, is the- combustion in plants and humus) may contribute approxi- of fossil fuels. Over the past 30 years fossil fuel mately as much to the increase of atmospheric combustion has increased at about 4.3 percent per C02 as the combustion of fossil fuels. "' year. About half of the C02 released by fossil fuel Global 2000 Study projections are not suffi-, combustion remains in the atmosphere while the ciently precise to permit accurate calculations of other half is taken up by plants and ocean waters, how much C02 will accumulate in the atmosphere or is otherwise removed from the atmosphere. If in the coming decades. However, significant in- these trends continue,, the atmospheric content of creases in atmospheric CO, levels can be antici- the atmosphere could reach twice that of prein- pated on the basis of the forestry and energy dustrial times by 2025-2050." The rates of in- projections: Deforestation and fossil fuel com- crease are dependent on energy strategies yet to bustion are both projected to increase signifi- be chosen, but an illustrative range of cases is cantly. On the basis of the Study's projections of shown in Figure 13-4. The rapid increases shown fossil fuel combustion alone, the Brookhaven in the figure are due in part to an assumed con- National Laboratory estimates that annual emis- tinuation in the growth of fossil fuel combustion sions of C02 Will increase by 35-90 percent by the and in part to a shift toward coal and synthetic year 1990.* fuels produced from coal, both of which produce Not all the CO, released into the atmosphere somewhat more C02 per unit of heat produced by these and other processes accumulates in the than do oil and gas. atmosphere. Past records and computations show The increased C02 concentrations implied by that atmospheric carbon dioxide has been increas- a continuation of present trends have momentous ing by only about 46 percent of the CO, released implications. The Geophysics Study Committee into the atmosphere annually. "' An amount of the National Academy of Sciences has studied equivalent to the remain iing 54 percent.is removed the prospects with one of the most complete cli- by plants through the process of photosynthesis mate models yet developed for examining such and by the surface waters of the ocean, which take problems. The Committee has observed: up the C02 in solution. '39 The amount removed For even a doubling of carbon dioxide in the at- from the atmosphere by these processes is de- mosphere, the model predicts about a 2* -3' C pendent on the atmospheric concentration of rise in the average temperature of the lower at- C02. From biology and chemistry it is known that, mosphere at middle latitude's and a 7 percent in- in general, the greater the concentration of C02 crease in [global] average precipitation. The in the atmosphere, the more is removed, by veg- temperature rise is greater by a factor of 3 or 4 etation and the oceans. However, the increasing in polar regions. For.each further doubling of car- concentration of C02 in the oceans (which may bon dioxide, an additional 2' -3' C increase in reduce the ability of.o'cean, surfaces to dissolve air temperature is inferred. The increase in carbon COO and the projected deforestation could con- dioxide anticipatedforAff 215010A.D. 2200Tight ceivably reduce the rate of absorption and cause lead to an increase i .n global mean air temperature of more than 6' C --- comparable with the differ- ince in temperature between the present and the See the Energy System Network Simulator (ESNS) estimates warm Mesozoic climate of 70 million to 100 mil- in Chapter 10. lion years ago. [Emphasis in the original.]" 262 THE PROJECTIONS 1200, (4 times pre-industrial concentration) @,@1,100 Synthetic fuels replace all world oil; coal replaces all world gas; growth rote=4.3% per year for each; 55% airborne fraction. 1000. -900 (3 times pre-industrial concentration) 000 Historic mix and amounts of fossil fuels (no synthetic fuels); growth 700 rate=4.3% per year; 55% air- borne fraction. 60,0' (2 times pre-industrial concentration) No growth in Natural gas replaces all world coal fossil fuels J and half of world oil (no synthetic after 1985. 500 fuels); growth rate=4.3% per year for each; 55% airborne fraction. r 400 Dept. of Energy's world energy sceneric, (NEP 2); 40% airborne fraction. (pre-industrial concentration) 200,_ 100 Today Estimated Observed Projected 0 1900 )925 '1950, IM 2000 2025 2650'' Figure 134. Carbon dioxide concentrations implied by various energy scenerios. Synthetic fuels derived from coal are assumed to release 3.4 x 10" grams of carbon in CO, per 100 quads of energy. Airborne fraction is the percent of emitted CO, that remains in the atmosphere. (U.S. Departmeni of Ehergy) concentr "on) alur Igas replaces a' war d c- half of world oil (no yrit t c " a rid No gr*' fossil fu' s @iter g,.wt he f 19 Fuel h t 4.3 per or far ec h 55 'borne l,cictiori. Dept- of Energy world ene,i NEP 2 40% c fraction. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 263 TABLE 13-13 mation of clouds and rainfall, the surface Global Summary of Sources and Annual Emissions temperature of the earth, and the quality of air for both plant and animal life. " of Atmospheric Particu II.ate Matter Naturally produced particulates tend to.have Anthropo- more widespread and more chronic effects than Natural genic those produced by human activity. For example, Sources Sources volcanic activity injects particulates high into the Millions of metric tons per atmosphere, where they tend to reflect much year more of the incoming solar radiation than do par- Primary particle production ticles generated by human activity, which tend to Fly ash from coal 36 remain at lower altitudes. " Volcanic particles are Iron and steel industry emis- known to have been carried completely around sions 9 Nonfossil fuels (wood, mill the world and to have remained in the atmosphere wastes) 8 from one to three years..* Clouds of dust particles Petroleum combustion 10-90 from desert areas are sometimes carried thou- Incineration 4 sands of miles by the prevailing winds. "" These Agricultural emission 10 Cement manufacture 7 heavy clouds of dust may suppress cloud forma- Miscellaneous 16 tion and the occurrence of precipitation, and Sea salt 1,000 - could be implicated as a cause of drought.'" Soil dust 428-1,100 A general atmospheric effect of particulates in- Volcanic particles 4 volves the scattering and reflection of solar radia- Forest fires 3-150 ? tion back into space, thus reducing the amount Subtotal 1,500--2,300' 100-180 of solar energy reaching the earth's surface. t With Gas-to-particle conversion this effect in mind, it has occasionally been spec- Sulfate from H,S 130-200 - ulated that the cooling effect of anthropogenic Sulfate from SO, 130-200 particulates might just balance the warming effect Nitrate from NO., 60-430 34-35 Ammonium from NH, 80-270 - of CO, accumulations. All the Global 2000 Study's Organic aerosol from ter- projections. of fossil fuel combustion, deforesta- penes, hydrocarbons, etc. 75-200 15-90 tion, agricultural production, and GNP generally Subtotal 350-1,100, 175-325 imply increases in particulate emissions. The Total 2,000-3,400' 275-500, ESNS (Energy System Network Simulator) find- Sowce: Adapted from George D. Robinson. -@fflacnts of Energy Production: ings reported in Chapter 10 indicate that over the Particulates." in Geophysics Study Committee. Energy and Climate, Washington: next two decades there will be significantly more National Academy of Sciences, 1977. p. 62. emissions from energy conversion. If desertifi- Subtotals and totals do not sum exactly due to rounding. cation, conversion of forests to agriculture, and general removal of vegetative cover continue, the Particulates amount of particulates contributed by windblown dust will increase-perhaps.significantly. At any given time the earth's atmosphere, at Can the effects of increased particulates and various levels above the ground, carries billions C102 emissions be expected to be mutually bal- of tons of many different kinds of particles in var- ancing? The definitive study of this question has ious concentrations. These particulate accumu- yet to be done, but on the basis of present infor- lafions are of both natural and anthropogenic mation, the answer seems virtually certain to be origin. '44 no. Anthropogenic particulates do not have enough Table 13-13 lists the kinds, amounts, and effect. The National Academy of Sciences re- sources of particulate matter in the atmosphere * ports: The figures in this table are estimates only; for the most part they were extrapolated from data that are limited both in accuracy and length of The National Defense University global climate scenario for record, and assumptions used in the extrapola- Large Cooling is based in part on the cooling effect of partic- tions were sometimes arbitrary in nature. ulates released by several major volcanic eruptions assumed The effects of atmospheric, particulates on cli- to occur between 1980 and 2000 (see Chapter 4). f The scattering and reflective properties of particulates vary mate are varied. Their size, shape, color, electro- considerably with the size and other properties of the particles. magnetic properties, and distribution in the While the most common effect is as described above, some atmosphere determine how they affect the bal- particles absorb enough solar radiation to produce a warming ance of solar and terrestrial radiation, the for- effect. 264 THE PROJECTIONS We can greatly increase emission of the kind of in, or migrating slowly into, the stratosphere may particle now produced by combustion in industrial remain there for years until they are converted to communities without greatly changing the inte- other substances in the stratosphere or are trans- grated radiative properties of our planet's disk as ported downward into the troposphere, where @een from space, unless, as may be the case, the they can be removed by various processes, in- increased particle loading changes the albedo of cludin rain. The difficulty is that the effluents of cloud. . - . [@fowever,] there is little doubt that 9 an increase in particles and sulfurous emissions several human activities are being trapped by the to' a magnitude that might have global climatic temperature inversion in the stratosphere, where consequences would be intolerable from the point they react in ways that deplete the ozone. "I The of view of community health. 141 human activities now thought to have varying de- The Academy's passing reference to cloud al- grees of adverse impact on the ozone layer include bedo is significant. Particulates and aerosols are the release of chlorofluorocarbons from pressur- known to provide condensation nuclei important ized cans and other sources, " jet aircraft flightt in the stratosphere, " and the use of nitrogen fer- in the formation of clouds, but it is not known tilizers in agriculture. " The Global 2000 Study's how the types,of particles and aerosols that are projections all suggest that, unless regulatory pol- likely to be added to the atmosphere in the years icies change, these activities and emissions will ahead would affect cloud formation. The effect continue to increase. is likely to @ be -quite nonlinear, at least in some The effect of effluents (hydrocarbons and ox- respects-i.e., relatively modest changes in par- ides of nitrogen) from jet flights in the strato- ticulate loadings may lead to significant changes sphere has been studied in reports by the U.S. in cloud cover. The linkage between condensation Department of Transportation and the National nuclei and cloud formation has been termed one Academy of Sciences. " The effect depends greatly of the most frequently overlooked, yet potentially on the number of flights and the performance of most serious, consequences of industrial pollu- the jet engines. Concern has centered primarily tion. I" More research in this area will definitely on supersonic transport (SST) since these aircraft be needed. fly higher in the stratosphere'than subsonic jets. Ozone The Department of Transportation report esti- I The atmosphere consists of two major layers; mates the size and properties of future SST fleets the troposphere extending upward to 8 to 16 kil- that would be required to pay off development ometers and, above that, the stratosphere ex- cos.ts and return a fair profit. On the basis of these tending up to about 50 kilometers. Temperature estimated fleet sizes, updated for improvements decreases with increasing altitude throughout the in technology, the National Academy of Sciences troposphere, but a permanent temperature inver- estimates that the impact of such a fleet might sion exists at the tropopause, with temperatures ultimately be a reduction of ozone by about 6.5 increasing with altitude in the stratosphere, Tem- percent, with an uncertainty range of 1-10 per- peratures rise by roughly 65* C over a height in- cent, whereas current stratospheric flights reduce terval of 35 kilometers. The temperature rise is ozone by less than 0. 1 percent. "'I ).!51 The effect of chlorofluorocarbon release has caused by the stratospheric layer of ozone (03 been studied by the National Academy of Sciences The ozone layer has two important and inter- and others.'" Using recently updated informa- related effects., First, it absorbs ultraviolet (UV) light in the UV@B band (optical wavelengths rang- is therefore little that any one nation or region can do to ing from 290-320 nanometers) and so protects all protect the ozone layer above it. Like carbon dioxide, the life on the earth from the harmful effects of this ozone problem is global in scope. radiation. Second, by absorbing the UV radiation, t Based on a 1975 report by the National Academy of Sciences. A very recent opinion by the Academy's Committee on Im- the ozone layer heats the stratosphere, causing pacts of Stratospheric Change-as yet unpublished--suggests the temperature inversion. " The effects of tem- that jet aircraft may not be as much of a problem as suggested perature inversions in limiting vertical mixing in in previously published reports and may actually increase the atmosphere are well known as a result of the ozone (personal communication, Apr. 3, 1979, from J. Murray Mitchell, Jr., senior research climatologist, National Oceanic pollution problems of inversion-prone areas such and Atmospheric Administration). Opinions, however, are as Los Angeles. This same effect is at work in the stiff in a state of flux (see, for example, Anthony J. Broderick, stratosphere.* Various Waste products produced "Stratospheric Effects from Aviation," Proceedings, Ath Pro- pulsion Congress, Orlando, Fla., July 1977, and his "Strato- Whilethe wastes mix only very slowly vertically, they spread spheric Effects from Aviation," Journal of Aircraft, Oct. 1978, horizontally relatively rapidly, reaching all longitudes of the pp. 643-55). The discussion presented here is based on Na- world in about a week and all latitudes within months. There tional Academy of Sciences published reports. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 265 tion, " t he Academy reports that continued use mutations in the atmosphere.'" The effects of in- of chlorofluorocarbons at the 1974 rate would re- creased. amounts of ultraviolet (UV) radiation. duce the. global ozone by 14 percent over the next may be more serious. 50 years, with a 4-40 percent range of uncertainty. Ozone-induced changes in UV radiation would If the rate of production we're to increase in pro- change one of the conditions that has almost ce'r- portion to the Global 2000 Study's GNP projec- tainly influenced the evolution of,life on earth so tions, the impact would be much larger. far, and a significant UV increase can be expect@d The Academy has also studie 'd the impact of to precipitate a disturbance in the existing balance anthiop6genic nitrogen. fixation on stratospheric of life virtually everywhere on the planet. The ozone. "I The linkage.between fertilizer and ozone National Academy of Sciences reports: comes through the release of nitrous oxide (N,O) All unshielded cells are highly vulnerable. to sun- during the. denitrification of fixed nitrogen. The light and may be killed by relatively short expo- processes involved are much more complex than sure to full sunlight. While such cells and organisms for either SST emissions or chlo.rofluorocarbon are generally protected to varying degrees in na-,' erhissions, and yet they have been studied far ture so that they experience @ sublethal doses' of less. " Assuming a 2-3 times increase in manu- radiation, any increase in UV radiation could be 'factured and legume-pro Iduced nitrogen fertil- considered to increase the pressure against sur- izer,* the Academy estimates that the global vival. Because of the- relations ips between spe@ ozone would be reduced by 3.5 percent, with a @ies in ecosystems, jdamage to one species might jeopardize an entire @ ecosystem, Hence, the po- range of uncertainty of., 0.4-13 percent. '63 tential effects of any elevation of the present UV- It now appears, therefore, that definite and ad- B levels of sunlight reach .ing the earth's surface verse effects on the ozone layer,do exist in varying should be taken most seriously. magnitudes as a result of (1) aircraft exhaust in the stratosphere, (2) chlorofluorocarbon and other Cancer is the best-established direct threat to halocarbon emissions, and (3) nitrogen fertilizer the human species. There is compelling evidence use. The Global 2000 Study's projections suggest that UV radiation is a cause of skin. cancer. '69- A that all three activities ca *n be expected to increase 10 percent decrease in stratospheric ozone,ap@ by the year 2000. At present, there is tremendous pears likely to lead to a 20-30 percent increase uncertainty associated with the relative magnitude in this type of cancer, "' but the increase may vary of the impacts of these three human activities, but significantly from area to area @(e.g.; in the An- all three now appear to be within an order of dean or Tibetan highlands it could be higher than magnitude of each other, " with chlorofluorocar- the world average). bons apparently having the greatest impact. While The indirect threat of UV radiation to human scientific assessment is still in flux and might,shift welfare may be even larger than its direct effect. significantly, the most recent work .on the subject It is known that, for small changes, UVradiation continues to support these general conclusions. '61 reaching the ground increases about 2 percent for. How serious are depletions of global ozone? each 1 percent decrease in stratospheric ozone.,F2 The consequences are , related bo 'th to climate It is also known that increased exposure to UV modification and to the,amount'of ultraviolet ra- radiation adversely affects plants. Plants that have diation reaching living, organisms on the earth. been exposed.to supplemental UV in growth The temperature inversion in the stratosphere is chambers or greenhouses have shown a 2&L50 caused by the solar energy absorbed by ozone. A percent inhibition -of growth, a 10-30 percent de- change in the ozone would lead to a significant cline in chlorophyll content (and wsimilar decline change in the temperature distribution of the in capacity, for photosynthesis) i and up to a 20- stratosphere, and probably to a small (but as yet fold increase in the frequency of harmftil muta- uncertain) change in the patternof temperature tions. "' Seedlings are even more sensitive- to UV .and rainfall over the earth's surface as well. These radiation than mature plants, and single-celled -climatic changes are currently thought likely to be algae are extremely sensitive., Algae:-can. with- small compared to the potential changes that stand only a few hours' exposure to even natural could occur as a result of carbon dioxide accu- sunlight, and enhanced UV is expected to cut the survivable exposure time by as much as,a factor of 2. "Enhanced UV radiation also @ appears to The Global 2000 Study's agricultural projections are based be extremel Iy lethal to fish and crustacean Jarvae on a doubling of fertilizer application worldwide and a quad- rupling in the LDCs. Over and above these increases, large and has been shown to produce burns and induce amounts of fertilizer may be applied i In theIintensive silvicul- tumors on those organisms surviving exposure. 175 tural methods projected to occur in forestry. At the present time, the accumulating research 266 THE PROJECTIONS data seem to indicate that ecosystems may be sig- jected in Chapter 8. This reduction of 420 million nificantly disrupted by increased levels of ultra- hectares involves roughly 3 percent of the earth's violet radiation. continental land surface and about 1 percent of There are a number of steps that can be taken the earth's total area. to limit the reduction of the earth's ozone layer. The most direct linkage. between change of land The emissions of chlorofluorocarbons can be lim- use and climate is through change of surface al- ited by legislation. The U.S. has enacted such bedo.* Evergreen forests have an albedwof 7-15 legislation " and hopes to persuade all industrial- percent. Dry, plowed fields have an albedo of 10- ized nations to establish similar limita .tions. 15 percent; deserts, 25-30 percent; fresh snow, Supersonic flying can also be regulated if further 85-90 percent; and asphalt, 8 percent.'" research indicates the need.* But the world can- The global changes in land use over the next not easily dispense with nitrogen fertilizers even two decades are by themselves probably not so if future research should indicate that they con- extensive as to cause a significant change in global tribute more to ozone depletion than recent find- climate, but they are certainly sufficient to cause ings suggest. The National Academy of Sciences local changes in many areas. In some cases ben- has published an economic analysist of the costs eficial changes will occur as, for example,, when and benefits of chemical fertilizers and reports restored park and forest lands improve local cli- that the present discounted value of damages is mate, but adverse change-including desert con- small because of the distant nature of the pro- ditions--can also be anticipated. "' . jected impacts. "" On the basis of this analysis, Urbanization is another lan&-use trend known the Academy states that "in our opinion, the cur- to affect local weather and climate. Typical rent value to society of those activities that con- changes resulting from urbanization are shown in tribute to global nitrogen fixation far exceed the Table 13-14. potential cost of any moderate (e.g., up to a dec- The energy projections in Chapter 10 anticipate ade) postponement of action to reduce the threat an almost 50 percent increase in energy demand of future ozone depletion by N20 [from nitrogen by 1990. All human energy use ultimately ends fertilizer use]."""' up as residual heat and much of it-especially in Albedo and Heat thermal generation of electricity-is converted to heat immediately on use.t Already, residual heat Ile Global 2000 Study's forestry, energy, min- releases are comparable or larger than the solar erals, agriculture, and GNP projections all point input in some reasonably large local areas. 181 The to significant changes in land use � and significant anthropogenic, energy releases over the 60 square releases of waste heat. These changes will cer- kilometers of Manhattari are almost 4 times the tainly influence local climates, and may even af- solar energy falling on the area; even over sprawl- fect regional or global climate. ing Los Angeles (3,500 square kilometers) the Perhaps the most significant land-use change anthropogenic beat released now totals 13 percent anticipated is the 16-20 percent reduction in the of the solar flux. 182 world's forests over the next two decades, as pro- Although it has long been known that releases of residual he-at influence local climates, it has During the 1976 U.N. Environment Programme's Governing generally been thought, that thermal pollution Council Meeting, the U.S. sponsored a resolution calling.for would probably not affect,global climate because an international meeting on the regulation of supersonic flying. anthropogenic heat is ow, and is ''xpect6a to n e The meeting, held in Washington in March 1977, prepared a world plan of action on the ozone layer, which is reported in remain, a small percentage of the solar irliflue'nce Ozone-Layer Bulletin (U.N. Environment Programme, Nai- on global weather. 1113 As shown in Table 13-15, robi), no. 1, Jan. 1978. fossil fuel combustion increased by a factor 4,-8 t The Academy's report notes that this economic analysis has limitations and is not a broad-scale assessment of the full costs and benefits of current or projected patterns of global food Albedo (as defined in the National Science Board/National production and energy use. The analysis addresses a 3.5 per- Science Foundation Patterns and Perspectives in Environmen- cent decrease in stratospheric ozone, using discount rates rang- tal Science, 1972, p. 66) is the percentage of the amount of the ing from 3 to 8 percent. Changes in temperature and, in incident solar radiation reflected by a land or water surface. ultraviolet radiation are considered. Increased UV radiation For example, if the sun radiates 100 units of energy per a .finute is assumed to have negligible effects on plants. to the outer limits o If the atmosphere, and the earth's:surface � Surface changes are thought to affect climate through (4) receives 80 units, per minute (the atmosphere absorbs 20 units) changes in albedo, (2) changes in surface "roughness" (by and then reflects 40 units upward, the albedo is 50 percent. affecting drag on winds), (3) changes in water storage capacity t Roughly two-thirds of the primary energy needed in the (affecting wetness), and (4) changes in heat storage capacity. thermal generation of electricity (primarily by coal and nuclear Only albedo effects are discussed here. plants) is lost immediately as waste heat. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 267 TABLE 13-14 TABLE 13-15 Typical-Climate Changes Caused by Urbanization Selected Annual Energy Supply Rates for the Type of Comparison with Earth' Change Rural Environs (Billipns of watts) Temperature Annual mean [email protected]'.C higher 1/4 Solar constant (extra-atmospheric 178,000,000 Winter minima 1.0-3.0* C higher irradiance) Insolation absorbed at ground level 90,(K)0,000 Relative Humidity Dissipated by friction in atmospheric 1,500,000 Annual mean. 6% lower circulations Winter 2% lower Photosynthe .sis (production by living 40,000 Summer 8% lower vegetation) Dust Particles 10 times more Geothermal heat (by conduction in crust) 32,000 Cloudiness 1970 Rate of fossil fuel burning 8,000 Infrared radiation from full moon 5,000 Cloud cover 5-10% more Dissipated by friction in ocean currents and 3,000 Fog, winter 100% more frequent tides Fog, summer 30% more frequent Solar radiation received via reflection from full 2.000 Radiation moon Total on horizontal surface 15-20% less Dissipated by friction in solar tides of the 1,000 Ultraviolet, winter 30% less atmosphere Ultraviolet, summer 5% less 1910 Rate of fossil fuel burning 1.000 Human body heat 600 Wind Speed Released by volcanoes and hot springs 300 Annual mean 20-30% lower (geoconvection) Extreme gusts 10-20% lower 1960 Rate of hydroelectric power production 240 Calms 5-20% more Precipitation, Dissipated as heat in tightening discharges 100 Amounts 5-10% more Radiation from bright aurora 25 Days with i0.2 inch 10% more Received from space by cosmic radiation 15 Dissipated mechanical energy of meteorites 10 Source: After H. E. Landsberg. in W. H. Matthews et al., eds.. Man's Impact on Total radiation from all stars 8 the Climate, Cambridge. Mass.: MIT Press, 1971, p. 168. Dissipated by friction in lunar tides of the 5 Precipitation effects are relatively uncertain. atmosphere Solar radiation received.as zodiacal light 2 between 1910 and 1910, but solar energy.iS still Source: After Office of Research and Development. U.S. Environmental Protec- tion Agency. Changes in Global Energy Balance. Washington. Oct. 1974. farand away the most important energy source a These whole globe averages represent annual gigstwatts 111)9w) of Power totaled in human affairs. However, it has been noted that over the earth's surface. although anthropogenic heat inputs will be local- ized, they may be strong enough to alter local or regional components of, the world climate Sys- gional elements of the global system, and that tem. In turn, changes triggered in individual these in turn produced global effects in the model runs. The kinds of global changes produced de- components of the system may have effects, throughout the world6"Examples of, local effects pended on where the heat source was located. are given in Table 1346. The HASA group concluded that the results of Ile energy research group At th .e International these model experiments indicate a possible global Instituteof Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)' atmospheric response to large. heat discharges, near Vienna has studied this problem with the which must be borne in mind for planning pur- general circulation model of the United Kingdom poses, and also investigated further. Meteorological Office. '8The HASA group found that large heat releases,(such as one might expect Conclusions from "power parks") 'could trigger changes in re- Both the National Defense University survey of expert opinion and the analysis of the possible An international effort to accomplish East-West cooperation climatic implications- of the Global 2000 Study's through joint work with the use of systems analysistools. The other projections lead to the same general con- Institute is well supported by both the V. S and the U. S. S. R.. lusions: (1) Climate will continue to vary in'the Canada, Czechoslovakia, France" and GermA n D c emocratic future, just as it always has in the past, in a largely Republic,, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Bulgaria, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, Austria, Hungary, Swe- unpredictable manner. (2) Apart from this char- den,.Finland, and the Netherlands also participate. acteristic variability, no substantial net trend of 268 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 13-16 Eff&ts of Large Heat Additions to the Atmosphere. Energy Rate Area Ene rgy-Flux- Density Phenomenon (Mtv) (knrl) (W/m') -Large brush fire, I(X).(XX) 50 200 Consequences: (Relatively small energy-flux rate. very large.area.) Cumulus cloud reaching to a height of 6 km formed over 0. 1 area of fire. Convergence of winds into the fire area. Forest fire whirlwind' Consequences: Typical whirlwind: Central tube visible by whirling smoke and debris. Diameters few feet to several hundred feet. Heights few feet to 4,000 ft Debris picked up-4ogs up to 30 in. in diameter and 30 ft long. World War 11 fire storm' 12 Consequences: Turbulent column of heated air 2.5 mi in diameter. Fed at base by inrush of surface air; 1.5 mi from fire, wind speeds increased from 11 to 33 mph. Trees 3 ft in diameter were uprooted. Fire at Hiroshima" Consequences: (10-42 hr after atomic bomb.) "The wind grew stronger, and sudden ly-probably because of the tremendous convection set up by the blazing city-a whirlwind ripped through the park. Huge trees crashed down; small ones were uprooted and flew into the air. Higher, a wild array of flat things revolved in the twisting funnel." The vortex moved out onto. the' river, where it sucked up a waterspout and eventually spent itself. Surtsey volcano, 100.000 < I @100,000 Consequences: Permanent cloud extending to heights of 5-9 km. Continuous sharp thunder and lightning, visible 115 km away. (Phenomenon probably peculiar to volcano cloud with many small ash particles.) Waterspouts resulting from indraft at cloud base, caused by rising buoyant cloud. Surtsey volcano' 200,000 1 200,000 Consequences: Whirlwinds (waterspouts and tornadoes) are the rule rather than the exception. More often than not there is at least one vortex downwind. Short inverted cones or long, sinuous horizontal vortice s that curve back up into the cloud, and intense vortices that extend to the ocean surface. French Meteorrons 700 0.0032 219,000 Consequences: artificial thunderstorms, even tornadoes, many cumulus clouds ... substantial down pour." Dust devils. Meteotron' 350 0.016 22,400 Consequences: 15 min after starting the burners, observers saw a whirl 40 m in diameter . whirlwind so'strong burner flames were inclined to 45o Single large cooling,tower 2,250 0.0046 484,000 Consequences: Plume of varying lengths and configurations. Array of,large cooling towers %,000 194 495 f48,000 Mw(e) NEC; area 48,000 acres] Consequences: Unknown. Source: Ralph M. Rotty, "Energy and the Climate," Institute for Energy Analysis. Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Sept. 1976, pp. 15-16. I From R. J. Taylor et al.. "Convective Activity Above a Large- ,Scale Brush Fire.--- Journal of Applied Meteorology. vol. 12, 1973, p. 1144. b From H. E. Graham. "Fire Whirlwinds.--- Bulletin of American Meteorological Society, vol. 36, no. 3.1955. p. 99. 1 From H. Landsbcrg, "Fire Storms Resulting from Bombing Conflagrations.--- Bulletin of American Meteorological Society, vol. 28. no. 2,1947, p. 72. d From J. R. Hersey. Hiroshima, New York: Bantam. 1946. pp. 50-51. From A. G. Borne, "Birth of an Island,'* Discovery. vol. 25. no. 4,1964. p. 16. From S. Thorarinsson and B. Vonnegur. "Whirlwinds Produced by the Eruption of Surtsey Volcano." Bulletin of American Meteorological Society, vol. 45, no. 8, 1964. p. 440. From J. Dessens, "Man-made Thunderstorms." Discovery. vol. 25. no. 3. 1964. p. 40. From J. Dessens. "Man-made Tornadoes." Nature, vol. 193, no. 4810, 1%2, p. 13. climate in the direction of either warming or cool- ingly) dependent on favorable climate. Less fa- ing is anticipated between now and 2000. . vorable climates are known to have occurred in , These conclusions, however, are not the end of the past,. and the less favorable climate of the the climate story. Human societies around the 1971-73 period demonstrated just how vulnerable world have become (and are becoming increas- world societies have become to weather and cli- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 269@ mate change. The Global 2000 Study's projections needed to implement. any basic change in the (all based on the assumption of no significant cli-7 world's energy capital, infrastructure, and econ- matic change) point to a world in 2000 that is even omy? By the time the world is prepared to address more vulnerable to weather and climate change seriously the climatological implications of world than the world of today. Furthermore, scientists energy policy, commitments (e,g.,'to intensified now know that several human activities have use of coal and to deforestation) may have be- reached a scale that, over periods of several to come so well established that a basic change in many decades, has the potential to alter the the global energy economy might be as econom- world's climate significantly. These anthropo- ically catastrophic as'the climatic change itself. genic influences on global climate include carbon Thus, to delay a careful and prompt international dioxide emissions and. release of chemicals af- assessment of the carbon dioxide problem could fecting the ozone layer as well as potential land- lead to capital commitments and forest policies use changes, aerosol and particulate generation, that make irreversible accumulations of CO, in and heat releases.) the atmosphere essentially unavoidable. Similar The @import of anthropogenic influences on cli- difficulties could, develop in connection with the mate ties not in any imminent threat of massive stratospheric ozone layer as the world's growing climatic change, but rather in the inadequacy of population becomes increasingly dependent on present knowledge and the inability of institutions biologically and synthetically. produced nitrogen to make society respond effectively if evidence of fertilizers. serious consequences develops. Probably the most In the decades ahead, the finite capacity of the serious anthropogenic threats to the stability of atmosphere to absorb various anthropogenic climate areCo2emissions and releases of chem- chemical emissions without catastrophic climate icals that deplete stratospheric ozone. In both change must be recognized as an extremely im- cases it is impossible for an individual nation to portant resource, a resource vital to and held in protect itself against the consequences of other common by all nations. Protecting this resource nations' actions. These problems are truly global will raise perplexing and troublesome questions: in scope, and there is no human institution now Which nations should be allowed to burn how ,established that can adequately address them. much coal or to replace how much forest with In commenting on its carbon dioxide findings, food crops? How are global CO, discharges to be the National Academy of Sciences concluded: monitored and controlled? "If the preliminary estimates of climate change The capacity of the atmosphere to absorb COi in the latter part of the twenty-second century are may be a resource that is even more limited than validated, a reassessment of global energy policy either forests or fossil fuels, and questions con- must be started promptly because, long before cerning the allocation of "C02 disposal rights" that destined date, there will have been major could conceivably overshadow all other energy climatic impacts all over the world."" Other issues."' Similarly, if protecting the ozone layer studies now underscore the Academy's concern, requires limitations on the emissions from spray and point to significant changes inC02 concen- cans, air conditioners, supersonic aircraft, and trations by 2000 or shortly thereafter: nitrogen fertilizers, the right to deplete the at- The key word in the Academy's admonition is mosphere's limited ozone resource can be ex- "promptly." Unfortunately, given the limitations pected to go first to agriculture. cited above, it is difficult to imagine how a reas- Even within individual nations, the making of sessment of global energy policy could be under- major decisions in these regards can be expected taken promptly. Considering the uncertainties in to place a strain on existing institutions and to the magnitude of CO, sources and sinks and the require long periods of time for debate. On a limited research that has been done in these areas, global scale, there is no adequate institution and it could easily be more than a decade before a no precedent for such decisions.or the cooperation definitive conclusion is reached just on how to they would require. project CO, concentrations accurately. Even given While no major worldwide climatic changes are definitive projections, several decades of inten- expected by 2000, anthropogenic forces affecting sive research will be required to reach agreement the world's climates will be accelerating, and un- on the, climatological implications of increasing less these forces and their effects are soon studied, CO, concentrations. Lacking a world institution monitored, and analyzed much more carefully, with an energy mission, how long would a global human institutions. will be ill prepared m make reassessment of a world energy policy require? some of the difficult choices that may be required And given a change in policy, how long would be in the 1980s, or at the. latest in the 1990s. 270 THE PROJEMONS THE TECHNOLOGY PROJECTIONS AND THE ENVikONMENT The Projections Each of the agencies making projections for, the Global 2000 Study made its own projections (and/or assumptions) of technological developments in its particular area of concern. In general, the technological projections and as- sumptions are implicitly, rather than explicitly, incorporated in each agency's overall contribution to the Study. As a result it is not always possible to state precisely what technological developments are projected or assumed. None-' theless, a general pattern is discernible. On the whole, the technological projections and assumptions imply that production- and yield'-enhancing tech*- nologies will continue to be developed and disseminated as fast as they have been over the past few decades-or faster. Further, the agencies generally assume that new technologies will be deployed as fast as (or faster than) they have in the past, and that the technologies will not produce adverse side effects (of an economic, environmental, social, or resource nature) that would limit their application. The more specific technological assumptions associated with theiprojections are as follows: Population Projections. Birth control (family planning) and health care, technologies will be disseminated and used to a greater extent than in the past two decades. The technological developments of industrialization, as they impinge on natality and mortality, will continue at or above historically observed rates. Gross National Product Projections. In the industrialized world,.technology is assumed to contribute to future economic growth as it has iq the recent past. The productivity of new investment capital will increase, in part a result of technological change, at about the historically observed rate, of 0.5-1.5, percent per year. 1 1 . I Fisheries Projections. The projections assume that technologies for har- vesting and processing nontraditional living marine resources will be adopted increasingly through the year 2000. Food and Agriculture Projections. The projections assume that, yields, per hectare will continue to increase at rates comparable to those of the past two decades. . Forestry Projections. Continued progress is assumed in increasing forest yields per hectare, and in decreasing losses incurred during processing or. from previously underutilized species and from disease.@ Energy Projections. Due to technological developments, the real costs of production, refining, and marketing of energy products will remain essentially constant. Large increases in the adoption of existing technologies are assumed to be possible. It is assumed that, collectively, nuclear and hydroelectrical generation (which are lumped together in the Department of Energy pro- jections) will approximately triple between 1975 and 1990. The technologies for fossil fuel production and use are assumed to respond to variations in relative costs, resulting in shifts from oil and natural gas to coal Nonfuel Minerals Projections. Technological advances in production tech- nology necessary for continued growth in production will be made. As high- grade ores are depleted, technological developments will hold the real cost of minerals and materials constant. Mineral use per dollar of GNP will tend to decrease as economies enlarge and mature. None of the projections assumes specific major technological break- throughs, (such as harnessing of the fusion process for energy production), ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 271 and none assumes failures of existing technologies (such as the evolution of antibiotic..-resis,tant diseases, or the termination of nuclear power development due to ini@dequate reactor safety or waste disposal methods). For three reasons, no attempt will be made to technologies. In the United 'States, the Office of analyze the environ 6rital implications of the Technology Assessment was instituted to assist in , technological projecticips and, assumptions made Congress in assessing the social, economic, arid by the contributing agencies. First, the techno- environmental consequences of new and eme?rg- logical projections and assumptions are, for the ing technologies. Internationally, the United r4a- most part, too inexp6oit to permit an adequate tions Conference on Science and Technology for assessment of their et.i6ronmental implications. Development (UNCSTD) was designed to con- Second, technology is k:nowledge--especially sci- sider both technological choice and the trarisfer entific knowledge-applied to practical or pro- of technologies among nations. I I ductive ends, and since the principal environmental The international transfer of technologies has implications of a particular technology occur in, important environmental implications. In fact, the economic sector in 'Which it is applied, its en- some of the most serious environmental problems vironmental implications are analyzed individ- have come from the direct transfer of technologies ually in the other sect)[Ons of this chapter. Third, from temperate-zone industrial societies to tro the interesting and i,-mportant environmental ical environments in less developed soci,eties. F1_1 questions about technologies emerge not from an Many of these environmental problems are due analysis of a particulax technology but from an to lack of understanding of how tropical-and arid- analysis of alternative technological options. The zone ecosystems differ from temperate-zone sys- last point deserves ela.6oration. I I tems. For example, many tropical river basin de- Both developed and less developed. nations velopment projects have stabilized iirrigation have had consideraW experience with the un- systems to provide increased agricultural produc- foreseen social and e:nvironmental impacts of tion, only to discover such stabilized -irrigation technology and development. Neither Henry Ford agriculture provided ideal environments for the nor the purchasers of Ws Model Ts foresaw that spread (via snail vectors) of such serious water- automobile exhaust would become an environ- borne diseases as schistosomiasis.,9' mental health problerri,. Similarly, university ag- Economist E. F. Schumacher and his colleagues ricultural facilities involved in the development of the Intermediate Technology Group in London of modern agricultural equipment failed to antic- have pioneered efforts over the past two decades ipate adverse social impacts-such as unemploy- to develop "appropriate" technologies, i.e., tech- ment among farmworkers and urban migration- nologies that are ecologically gentle and adaptable and were taken by surprise recently when 19 farm- to the economic, resource, and social structures workers and a Califorria Rural Legal Assistance of a particular society. Schumacher presented his group sued the University of California over the thoughts on technology in Small is Beautiful: development of sophisticated harvesting ma- Economics as if People Mattered. In this well- chines, which the farjmworkers alleged were a known book, Schumacher goes beyond environ- threat to their livelihood. The suit contends that mental compatability to identify tour basic prop- harvesting machines i1ni the California tomato in- ositions for choosing technologies for developing dustry alone have displaced 32,000 workers and societies: that thousands more have been displaced by uni- versity-developed machinery in vegetable fields First, that workplaces have to be created in the and fruit orchards." One certainly cannot infer areas where the people are living now, and not from this development that all harvesting ma- primarily in metropolitan areas into which they chinery is bad, but the farmworkers' suit does tend to migrate. illustrate the extent to,which questions are being Second, that these workplaces must be, on av- raised about the impacit of technology-questions erage, cheap enough so that they can be created that in even the relativ,ely recent past might have in large numbers without this calling for an un- been thought externall to decisions concerning technological priorities.. attainable level of capital formation and im- New institutions are developing in response to ports. the growing awareness,of the social and environ- Third, that the production methods employed mental impacts that follow in the wake of new must berelatively simple,,so. that the demands 272 THE PROJECTIONS for high skills are minimized, not only in the Conclusions production process itself but also in matters of Many of the environmi,@.ntal impacts discussed organization, raw material supply, financing, in other sections of this ',chapter are the conse- marketing, and so forth. quences of past technological choices. The health Fourth, that production should be mainly from of the environment during the 21st century will Iocal materials and mainly for local use. be shaped significantly ih '@ both developing and industrialized countries., by *the choices of tech- 17he industrialized nations face corresponding nologies made over the next two decades. For- choices in defining and developing appropriate tunately, a wide range of te.,chnologies-are available 14 poistindustrial" technology. The environmental that appear to be environ'Mentally, socially, and prob,lems that are passed on to the next generation economically sound, but iit is by no means clear will I)e greatly influenced by whether industrial- that these technologies mtill be chosen.91 How ized countries-as well as less developed coun- political and social controls affect the choice and tries- @encourage technologies that conserve energy diffusion of technologies, in the early stages of and other natural resources, increase employ- their development will have monumental impli- ment, and minimize pollution and other impacts cations for the environm@-ntal conditions passed on the environment, or whether these countries on to the next generation.' Indeed, the choice of continu,e to develop technological innovation pri- technologies may be the ar.ea in which society will marily for increasing per capita consumption of have the greatest latitude "ind leverage in shaping goods and services. the future of the global er'tvironment. THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PROJECTIONS AND THE EN@VIRONMENT The Projections The food and agriculture projections developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture* foresee &90-100 percent increase in total world produiction over the 1970-2000 period. This increase, however, is the equivalent of@ only a 10- 15 percent increase in per capita production. The real price of food is pro- jected to increase from 30 to 115 percent over 1969-71 prices. 'I, The projections increases are based in part on a projected@ 4 percent increase in arable area. Although this expansion of arable area - involves a ,substantial increase in the world's harvested area over the record high levels Yeported for the first half of the 1970s, the rate of increase in arable area is significantly slower than in the postwar period. The slowed exparision is due in large part to the growing capital costs of adding increasingly 1.1emote and marginal lands to the production base. The slowed rate of increa-se leads to an increased number of people supported per hectare. Globally during the first half of the 1970s, 2.6 persons were supported per arable hectai-e; by 2000 th'e figure is projected to rise to 4.0. In the LDCs the ratio is projected to rise from 2.9 in the early 1970s to 5.3 in 2000, excluding China. Half of the Study's. food projections reported in Chapter 6 LDCs. overall, average per capi 'cadaily calorie consumption assume that energy prices remain constant in real terms (at remains constant at the 2,165 cal@)rie per capita levels of 1969- 1974-76 prices) to the year 2000. The figures presented under 71. Per capita calorie consumptiOn declines for the North Af- Alternative II (see Chapter 6) assume that energy prices re- rica/Middle East region, other African LDCs, and South Asian ,main constant. The double set of figures presented under Al- areas and increases for Latin America and the Southeast Asia ternative I reflect possibilities ranging from constant to and East Asia areas. The percentages of decline in per capita increasing energy prices. (The first of the two Alternative I consumption (relative to 1969-71 levels) are as follows: I per- entries is for constant energy prires; the second entry is for cent for the North Africa/Middle'East area, 16 percent for the rising energy prices.) Alternative III explicitly presents results other African LDCs, 3 percent for the South Asian area. Fer- based on real energy prices rising as projected in the Study Is tilizer consumption and increase in arable area are not pro- energy projections in Chapter 10. Alternative III also assumes jected for the specific case of rising energy prices. World grain high population growth rates, lower income growth rates, and trade increases 200 percent, frofili 79.6 million metric tons in weather less favorable than that of the past 25 years. The food 1969-71 to 238 million in 2000. -Grain imports increase as fol- projections under this alternative show the real price of food lows: 190 percent for develope 'd importers, 650 for centrally increasing by 115 percent over the 1970-2000 period. For planned country importers and 220 for LDC importers. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 273 The remainder of the increase in production comes from a projected 70- 100 percent increase in productivity, (i.e., substantially higher crop yields per hectare). Implicit in the projected productivity growth is a more than doubling of "fertilizer* use per hectare for the world as a whole and a quadrupling of fertilizer use per hectare for LDCs. The food projections also note a continued diminishing of marginal return to increases in fertilizer use. In simplified terms, a'l-kilogram increase in fertilizer use at the world level appears to have generated about an 8-kilogram increase in grain production in the early .1970s; a 1-kilogram increase in fertilizer use in 2000 is projected to generate less than' a 6-kilogram increase in production. Water, which is already a limiting factor in agricultural production in large parts of the world, will become' even more of a limiting factor by 2000. As noted in the food and agriculture projections (Chapter 6), the projected increases in food produc- tion imply large public-sector investments in irrigation, agricultural extension, and land reclamation. The projected increases in demand will be generated by the projected increases Iin population and, to a lesser extent, by increases in per capita income. Increases in both production and 'demand are likely to be unevenly distributed and are therefore expected to generate both a marked increase in international trade and a widening of the differences between per capita consumption in the different regions of the world. Net declines in caloric consumption per capita are projected for most areas of developing Africa s,outh of the Sahara; negligible gains in caloric consumption are expected for South Asia and parts of the rest of the developing world. As noted in Chapter 4 ("Climate"), the Study's food projections im- plicitly assume that no significant change in the climate will occur relative to that experienced over the last several decades. However, the projections do explicitly,consider variations in weather by providing for fluctuations in yields similar to weather-related variations experienced during the 1950-77 period. The projections take into account ecological stresses, such as deterioration in soil fertility, and hydrologic irregularity induced by deforestation, but only to the, extent that these problems have occurred in the past and-given past experiences-are likely to occur in the future. Ecological stresses are linked to the projections by assuming that steps will be taken to alleviate the impact of these'stresses on production. The costs of taking the preventive steps are expensive: and contribute significantly to the increased real cost of producing and consuming food. The required capital is assumed to be.available. Introduction of limitations. Further, the n 0@nrenewable re- The food projections present a compl .ex picture sources on which agriculture is based-fossil fuels, , environ- genetic strains, and soils-are being diminished of interacting factors that will affect the. rapidly in some areas. All of these developments ment. The growing populations and incomes pro- will have environmental implications, some of jected increase the demand for food at a time which will directly influence the prospects for fu- when increasing the stock of arable land will have ture food production. become more difficult and expensive. A reduced This point has already been forcefully made by rate of expansion of arable land will place further the Council on Environmental Quality. The importance on increasing yields, but yield-en- Council's 1977 report "The'Food-People Prob- hancing techniques are themselves showing signs lem" discusses the situation in the following In .the Department of Agriculture's projections for this terms: Study, the term "fertilizer" is used as a proxy for a group of In the race to provide food for the expanding productivity-expanding, inputs, including pesticides, herbi- Id la on mproper farming practices- cides, and high-yield grain varieties, as well as chemical fer- wor popu ti tilizers in the usual meaning of the term. The projections are mcluding over y ntensive cultivation, too heavy not detailed enough to specify any change in the relative pro- a reliance on marginally productive semi-arid portions of these various inputs. lands, and inadequate conservation measures- 274 THE PROJECTIONS are increasing the erosion and depleting the nU7 Food and the-Human Environment trients of topsoils. The result ... is reduced fer- 11. ., "I, tili% of the land, lowering its Icapacity for food Food- is an essential element in environmental pro 'uction. quality for the human population. Without an In many parts of the world, hillsides are being adequate diet, vulnerability to disease is in- deforested to, make way for more farms and to c.teased, capacity to perform physical work is lim- provide fuel for cooking food. The rains no longer ited, and (in children) mental and physical soak into the ground but run off in the form Of development is impaired. Nutritional r i uncontrollable torrents which tear away the soil equire- ments vary with age, sex, occupation, height, and under cultivation, flood the low lying cropland, weight. As a rough guide to human nutritional and clog reservoirs and irrigation canals with silt. needs, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organi- Left behind are barren slopes that later become 97 abandoned. zation (FAO)' has estimated minimum caloric Environmental degradation has been barely requirements for various regions.* The degree to noticeable amid increased farm production re- which the FAO standards are met provides an sulting from the technological improvements of important indication of the nutritional dimension the "Green Revolution," made particularly ef- of human environment and, indirectly, an indi- fective by fertilizers and pesticides, However, rap- cation of the pressures on local agriculture. idly growing population and growing affluence Table 13-17 compares recent and projected per continue to increase the demand for food, while capita calorie consumption with the FAO mini- at the same time losses in soil fertility which re- mum standards for various regions of the world. duce land's capacity to produce' are occurring As noted in Chapter 6, r al-price increases will across the world.. e According to a U.S. survey of 69 countries with be needed to pay fox more costly land develop- 1.8 billion people: ment and yield-enhancing technologies implicit in �Overgrazing and overcropping, which result in the projected figures. Some regions will be better heavy loss of soil by erosion, a able than others to pay the increasing real prices, re serious prob- lems in 43 countries with 1.4 billion people. , and consequently the prospects reflected in the �Serious irrigation problems were recorded in table vary widely from region to region. The pros- eight and countries attempting to increase food pects are good in the industrialized countries and product' planned economies. In the affluent , ion. the centrally �Heavy loss of forests has occurred in at least 24 developed countries, diets can be expected to be- developing countries. Principal reason for con- come more diversified while calorie consumption verting forest to cropland and grazing fields is rises to perhaps 135 percent of FAO standards. to meet the demand for food. The increased consumption in t .hese regions brings �Water problems resulting from deforestation to mind the problem of malnutrition due to over- have appeared in 16 countries in the form of critical water shortages, and in 10 countries in consumption (i.e., overeating) cited in several re- the form of increased flooding. Some countries cent studies." shared both drought and flooding." The consumption statistics for the. industrialized countries and centrally planned economies do not The implications of the Global 2000 Study's fully, indicate the magnitude of the pressures for food projections for the environment are dis- increased agricultural production in these regions. cussed in the following five sections. First, the Many are critically dependent 'on imports. In one food projections are analyzed in terms of their case, the food projections in Chapter 6 show a implications for human nutrition-an important food-importing centrally planned economy in- aspect of environmental quality-and in terms of creasing its grain purchases by 050 percent by the the kinds of pressures that agricultural activities year 2000. Pressure will also be high in those ex- will exert on other parts of the environment. porting countries experiencing balance of pay- Other subjects of environmental concern include ment problems. Agricultural sales provide a soil deterioration, the ecological effects of fertil- significant amount of foreign _exchange for some izers and, pesticides, crop vulnerability (the ge- countries. In 1975-77 in the U.S., for example;, netic instability induced by simplification of ecosystems and reduction of genetic resources), and,the implications-of the food projections for Of course, adequate nutrition also requires protein and other nonrenewable fossil, fuels.* nutrients, many of which will also be increasing in price, The discussion here is limited to caloric requirements. See Joint *In addition to the discussions that follow, several,direct es- FAO/WHO ad hoc Expert Committee, "Energy and Protein timates and broad directional indicators of environmental Requirements," Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, change are presented in the food and agriculture projections 1973; and World Food Study and Nutrition, vol. 1, Washington: themselves (Chapter 6). National Academy of Sciences, 1975. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 275 TABLE 13-17 Daily per Capita Caloric Consumption, Historic and Projected, by Region,, with Percent of, FAQ Minimum Standards Historic Projected for 2000 1969-71 1973-74 Alternative III Alternative Illb Figures in parentheses are percents of FAO minimum slandar& Industrialized countries 3,180(122) 3,340(128) 3,500(135) 3,400 @(130) .Centrally planned economies 2,600(107) 2,665 (110) 2,940.(121) 2,860,(118) Less,developed countries 2,165 (94) 2,135 (93) 2,390(104) 2,165 (94) Latin America ' I 1 .2 '525 (106) 2,540(107) 3,080(130) 2,710(114) North Africa/Middle Easv 2@,421 (104)@ 2,482 (107) 2,655 (114) 2,390(103) Other, African LDCs 2,139 (92) 2,071 (90) 1,920 (83) 1,800 (77 South, Asia 2,036 (92) 1,954 (88) 2,230(101) 1,985(105) Southeast Asia 2,174. (98) 2,270(103) 2,425 (110) 2,310(105) East Asia 2,140 (97) 2,205(100) 2,520(114) 2,320(105) Source: Data for inclustrialized countries and centrally planned economies are waste or piocessing margin rather than a sustained daily per capita intake in the from Table 6-8, Chapter 6, this study; data for LDCs are from Table 6-9. Con- 1,700-1.8W caloric range or in the 3,300-3.400 calorie range. . versiot, from the food indexes was performed by the Department of Agriculture. I Real price of energy remains constant. with low population growth. high income rowth, and less favorable weather. Note: Caloric requirements* and per capita caloric consumption figures are cal- Real price of energy increases as projected in Chapter 10. with high population culated from measures of total food supply (adjusted for nonfood use, and proc- growth, low incornegrowth. and less favorable weather. essing losses and waste) divided by midyear population. intake below 80-% percent FAO's minimum, country-specific caloric requirements imply regional require- or above 120-130 percent,of the FAO minimum requirement is unlikely. given nts of 2,375 calories per capita per day for Latin America. 2.325 for de eloping basic body metabolism. Therefore projected per capita caloric levels outside a me v range of 80-130 percent of caloric minimums reflect an unusually small or large Africa, 2.2 10 for developing Asia (2,300 for the LDCs as an aggregate). .2.600for the industrialized countries. and 2.420 for the centrally planned economies. grain sales provided over 10 percent of all U.S. pected to approach the recommended minimum. foreign sales. Keeping this added distribution factor in inind, Prospects in the LDCs are mixed. Diet im- the projected increase in per capita calorie con@ provements for the poorest two-thirds of the sumption would probably be adequate to improve world's population are4ikely to be small or not Latin American diets (under all three alterna- forthcoming at all. As shown in Table 13-17, diets tives-) and Southeast Asian and East Asian diets are projected to improve in Latin America and ('Under selected alternatives) to the extent that in Southeast and East Asia. Diets also improve low-income groups would have access to mini- in South Asia under the optimistic assumptions mum food supplies. Consumption in the rest. of (including constant energy prices) of.Alternative the developing regions-and, in 4h e LDCs as a Il. But with the assumptions of increasing energy whole@would fail to increase fast enough to meet prices, high population growth, low income growth, the minimum needs of the lowest-income groups, and less favorable weather (Alternative 111), av- which possibly make up one-third to one@half of erage per capita calorie! consumption declines in the total world population. The World Bank, tak- South Asia and in the LDCs south of the Sahara. * ing these inequities into account, estimates that The full implications,, of these calorie consump- malnourished persons in the LDCs could increase tion levels depend on an additional measure-the from the current figure (400-600 million) to as statistical distribution of diets above and below many as 1,300 million by the year 2000. "' calorie consumption averages. Studies by the U.S. There has been hunger and malnutrition some- Department of Agriculture and the World Bank' where in the world for virtually all of recorded suggest that calorie distribution in the LDCs is history, but as National Academy of Sciences sufficiently skewed that national average calorie President Philip Handler has, observed, consumption levels would have to. be at least 110- The character of malnutrition has changed mark- 120 -percent of the FAO minimum before con- edly in the last. 40-50 years. The classical defi- sumption in lower-income groups. could be ex- Policies leading to a more equitable income" distribution Alternative I (see Chapter 6) presents a range for. the me- could reduce this skewness and result in a far larger improve- dium case. The first number presented in the Alternative I ment in diets than reflected in the regional consumption av- entries reflects conditions with constant energy prices; the sec- erages. However, the analysis throughout this Study is limited ond entry is for rising energy prices. The Nutritional impli- to one policy option, namely the continuation of present pol- cations of Alternative I are presented in Chapter 6. icies. 276 THE PROJEMONS ciency, diseases-beriberi, scurvy, pellagra, rickets" of soil deterioration.* The primary problems'ih- sprue-have almost disappeared. Only xero- clude: (1) loss of topsoil to erosion,@ (2) loss of phthalmia due to Vitamin A deficiency continues organic matter, (3) loss of porous soil structure, as aserious Eroblem, causing blindness in large (4) build-up of toxic salts and chemicals. ' * numbers of c ildren. Instead, there is inarasmus, Given the limited data','there are several ap- and kwashiorkor-both forms of general protein- proaches that might-be used in assessing the in- calorie insufficiency and iron deficiency anemia. fluence of soil deterioration on agricultural Thus, nutritional status is now rarely the conse- production to the year 2000. First, as has been quence of ignorance; malnutrition now reflects done in the Global 2000 Study's food projections, lack of food, not lack of scientific understand- ing. "2 one can assume that farmers throughout the world will be aware of the potential problems, will suc- In short, nations throughout the world will be cessfully charge more for their produce, and will pressured to substantially increase agricultural use the additional income to counteract potential output to respond to growth in demand. Demand ecological problems. The'technologies and man- will be driven by both population and income agement techniques now @available are assumed growth,, but in different proportions in different to be brought to bear on ecological problems as areas. In the LDCs, approximately a third to a they emerge, so as to limit their adverse impact half of the world's population will experience a on expanding production. This approach does not calorie shortfall. Most food-importing nations will assume that adverse effects do not occur but produce as much as possible to alleviate negative rather that the capital, knowledge, and incentives trade balances. Exporters, especially the U.S., necessary to employ presently known solutions will encourage grain production to help offset the will be available. Under this assumption, the im- balance of payment pressure created by continued pacts of ecological problems on agricultural pro- heavy oil imports. While the demand for food will duction do not increase markedly beyond the be high everywhere, the strains on the agricultur current level. This approach is subject to criticism sector are, likely to be highest in South Asia and because it is based on assumed developments- in LDCs south of the Sahara. These pressures will specifically, the adoption of environmentally sen- affect the environment adversely through soil de- sitive technologies and management policies- terioration, through use of pesticides and abuse that may or may not occur. of fertilizers, and through the consequences of Another approach is to extrapolate on the basis monocultures of inbred crop varieties. of the present limited knowledge of world soil deterioration. For example, the 1977 U.N. Con- Deterioration of Soils ference on Desertification Projected that if pres- ent trends continue, the world will have lost one- The amount of land available for cultivation thirdt of its arable lands dud to desertification and changes when new lands are brought into pro- duction, when existing,croplands deteriorate and Changes in soil quality cannot be directly and accurately are abandoned, and when croplands are con- measured over large geographic areas, and too few sample verted to other uses. The projections suggest that, measurements have been made to obtain a detailed statistical even with substantially higher food prices, only picture at the global (or even,;with few exceptions, at the relatively modest amounts of additional 4and can national) level. Presently, rates of soil deterioration for large be expected to be brought into production by geographic areas can be estimated only on the basis of frag- mentary evidence: data from experimental plots, studies of 2000. This prospect accentuates the importance. stream-water siltation, archeological and historical studies of of increasing yields and, in turn, of maintaining once verdant lands now turninglo desert, and remote sensing and improving.soil fertility. Yields can be en- satellite images used to assess vegetative and other character- hanced with fertilizers but only at an increasing istics. The limited number of cases where site-specific data are cost and only as long as an adequate soil structure available include examples of disastrous soil deterioration, and evidence of deterioration can be found in scattered observa- remains. The condition of soils is of central im- tions from around the world. I The study of world soil con- portance -now, and its importance is likely to in- ditions is further complicated in many regions by the use of crease in the years ahead. The trend, unfortunately, synthetic fertilizers and high-yielding varieties, which may is one of deteriorating soil conditions. maintain or even increase production for a time, temporarily To what extent does soil deterioration on ex- masking losses of soil and deteriorating soil structure. t Erik Eckholm has noted in a private communication an in- isting croplands affect the world's agricultural po-. ability to find anyone who will take responsibility for this U.N. tential? The limited data available can only projection. Eckholm himself sees the problem as serious', but suggest the outlines of an answer to this ques- not quite this serious. He has described his own perceptions tion, ' showing scattered but alarming examples of the problem in Erik Eckholm and Lester R. Brown, Spread- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 277 7- other causes by 2000. " This approach is open to an active ongoing phenomenon, and its implica- criticism because of tl@e limited knowledge on tions are not a matter of speculation. The eco- which it is based. The approach used in the fol- nomic bases of several West African countries, lowing paragraphs is simply to catalog and de- including Mauretania, Senegal, Upper Volta, scribe, the principal . eliements of what is now Mali, Niger, and Chad have recently been un- known of world land @,I.pgradations. dermined through the extensive desert expansion The five major agetits of soil loss are: (1) de- that occurred during the 1968-73 drought. These sertification (the process of land deterioration as- countries will,find recovery difficult, as the dam- sociated with desert enc-roachment, usually caused age done to soils was long-term. Sudan, Somalia, by overly intense grazing, shortened fallow pe- Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania have also suffered riods, and consumptionof woody plants as fuel); degradation of soils associated with the recent (2) waterlogging, salin] ,[Zation, and alkalinization, drought.' which commonly occur when irrigation systems, As already stated, one of the leading causes of particularly in and lands, apply water in ways that desertification is overgrazing. As shown in the areincompatible with sbil drainage and other soil Free Range Grazing Pressure map in the colored and water characteristics; (3) soil degradation that map section, a large amount of land surface is follows deforestation on steep slopes and in many used for free range grazing. Livestock populations humid tropical areas;. (,i) general erosion and hu- have grown rapidly over the last few decades, and mus loss occurring in major agricultural regions in the LDCs much of the increase has been in as a consequence of routine agricultural practices; free-ranging animals. Globally the population of and (5) loss of lands to urbanization, road build- cattle rose by 38 percent over the 1955-76 pe- ing, village expansion, and other land-consuming riod-including a 62 percent increase in the Near developments associated with economic and pop- East and a 51 percent increase in. Latin America. ulation growth. Over the same period, global sheep and goat pop- Desertification. ulations increased by 21 percent, with a 52 percent increase in the Asian centrally planned economies Desertification* will probably be a major mod- and a 44 percent increase in Africa.' A portion ifier of landscapes betloveen now and 2000. If all of this increase has been in countries with rapidly. the lands identified by,the U,N. as having a high expanding feedlot operations, but in many areas or very high probability of desertification were to the increases in free-ranging livestock populations become desert by 2000, deserts would occupy have pushed above the levels that can be indefi- more than three times, the 7,992,000 square kil- nitely sustained by the land-given current pas- ometers they occupied in 1977.' Most of the land ture management policies and the limited lost would be pastureland, but losses in cropland application of available (but expensive) technol- could also be significant. As shown in the accom- cogies for the protection of rangelands. In some panying map, most of ithe losses would probably regions, such as Rajasthan in India, increases in take place in Africa wad Asia. Desertification is the land under cultivation have reduced available pastureland and intensified pressure on remaining ing Deserts-The Hand of Man, Washington: Worldwatch In- pastures. The result has been severe declines in stitute, Aug. 1977. Present los@;es to desertification are apparently soil productivity and in some areas the actual c.re- on the order of 6 million hectares per year (60,000 square ation of deserts of blowing sands.'" kilometers): 3.2 million hectat.res of rangeland, 2.5 million hec- It is easy to underestimate the statistical prob- tares of rainfed cropland,, aind 125,000 hectares of irrigated farmland @Margaret R. Biswas, "United Nations Conference ability of a drought. The 1968-73 drought in the on Desertification in Retrospm,-ct," Laxenburg, Austria: Inter- African Sahel was so long and so severe that many national institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Sept. 1978, experts suspected that a climatic shift had oc- p. 31). According to "Deseirtification: An Overview," U.N. curred. However, several statistical analyses of Desertification Conference Aug. 1977, areas undergoing se- climatological data prepared for the 1977 U.N. vere desertification now cover about 30 million square kilo- , arth's ice free land area. C meters, or 23 percent of the `e onference on Desertification suggest that the 5- *Desertification is a broad, lo-cosely defined term encompassing year Sahelian drought was within the range of a variety of,ecological changes that render land useless for. statistical expectation and therefore should not be agriculture or for hurnan habitaticorr. Deserts rarely spread thought of as a climatic shift or a fluke. Moreover, along well-articulated frontieis; rather, they pop up in patches the analyses suggested a statistically significant where abuse, however uninumded, destroys the thin cover of vegetation and fertile soil and leaves only sand or inert earth. tendency for dry years to occur in succession. (Erik Eckholm and Lester R. Brown, Spreading Deserts-The Thus the Sahel can expect a recurrence of such Hand of Man, Washington: I@Vorldwatch Institute, Aug. 1977, a drought."" In most and areas the oldest people pp. 7-8). can, on average, remember having experienced IL w k". JQ \X m CD Moderate W.Severe INI Very severe Scale: 1/25,000,000 (approx.) Desertififaction Map (U.N. Desertification Conference, 1977) ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 279 about four major. droughts, some of which ex- irrigation downstream is impaired (see the water tended over several years. While most areas do section of this chapter for further information on not experience droughts as frequent or as severe this point). as those in the Sahel, the probability of adverse Seepage from unlined canals is often even more weather is often underestimated, especially dur- of, a problem than the water intended for irriga- ing periods of good weather. tion. Canal seepage may cause the water table to The example of the Sahel also raises questions rise, waterlogging the soil and transporting salts relating to populations,.. carrying capacity, and from lower soil horizons to the surface. assistance. Drought always means hardship, but Such problems reach extreme proportions in in cases like the recenuSahelian drought, where Pakistan even as early as the 1960s. At that time conditions exceed mere hardship and include se- in the Sind, one of Pakistan's two major prov- vere famine and ecological decline, the role of inces, 49 percent of all agricultural land was mod- human and animal population levels must be ex- erately or severely waterlogged, 50 percent was amined as potentially major contributors to suf- highly saline, and 27 percent was moderately sal- fering."' Where drought occurs periodically, the ine, according to'U.N. data. In the Punjab, the livelihood systems of the peoples there become other major agricultural province, over 30 percent adapted to coping with the consequences of of all agricultural land was reported suffering from drought. In these situations, the U.N. notes, great salinization. Massive soil reclamation projects in care must be exercised in external efforts to assist Pakistan have had some success, particularly in so that the adapted livelihood systems are not reducing waterlogging, but reclamation of saline disrupted."' soils has been SIOW.21S The situation in Pakistan is far from unique. In Waterlogging, Salinization, Alkalinization Afghanistan, waterlogging, salinization, and al- 216 Many irrigation projects also take their toll. kalinization are evident in most agricultural areas. The causes vary, as discussed below, but world-* In Argentina, 2 million hectares of irrigated land wide an estimated 125,000 hectares of irrigated are adversely affected by waterlogging, saliniza- land are lost from production each year due to tion, or alkalinization .2" And in Peru, 300,000 out waterlogging, salinization, and alkalinization.'" of 800,000 hectares of coastal irrigated land are This loss rate amounts to only about .06 percent affected by salinization or waterlogging. 2" In fact, per year of the worl&s@ total irrigated land."" If virtually every nation with a sizable irrigated area it rem a*ins constant through the year 2000, about is now adversely affected by these problems. 2.75 million hectares (approximately 1.4 percent In the U.S., for example, some of the nation's of the wbrld's total irrigated land) will be out of richest farmlands are threatened. The San Joa- production. These losses have more impact than quin Valley provides a recent, well-studied ex- averaged figures suggest because irrigated land is ample. About 400,000 acres (160,000 hectares) of almost always the most productive land in a given irrigated farmland in the San Joaquin Valley cur- region. But even assuming average productivity, rently are affected by high, brackish water tables 2.75 million hectares represents the food supply that pose an increasingly serious threat to pro- (with average yields) for more than 9 million peo- ductivity. Approximately 1.1 million acres (450,000 ple. hectares)-about 13 percent of the total valley- Problems of waterlogging, salinization, and al- ultimately will become unproductive unless sub- kalinization occur in and regions where irrigation surface drainage systems are installed. The salting systems supply water to the soilfaster than drain- problems of the valley have been compared to age can remove it. The excess water raises the those that resulted in the collapse of civilization water table to a level near the ground surface. in Mesopotania and Egypt's upper Nile when Evaporation brings dissolved soil salts to the sur- early signs of agricultural overproduction were face where they inhibit plant growth and form a not heeded. Loss of the productive capacity of the mineral crust. The water that returns to local San Joaquin Valley lands would be a serious loss streams and rivers is often so laden with salts that to the people who work'them, to the economic community of the valley, to the State of Califor- nia, and to the country as a whole. The agricul- *A Department of Agriculture representative has pointed out tural output of the valley is now estimated at $4 that with higher yields (2,000 kilograms) 2.75 million hectares billion annually. To prevent this loss, a compre- could feed more than 15 million people. Furthermore, even when lands are not abandoned, waterlogging, salinization, and hensive system for management and disposal of alkalinization are reducing the yields on ever larger amounts the saline effluent of on-farm subsurface drainage of land-annually and cumulatively. systems has been proposed."' Similar problems 280 THE PROJECTIONS are also being observed in California's Imperial tation can do to an agricultural systern. With a Valley. tight 5.3 persons per arable hectare, Haiti -has Reclamation of degraded irrigated lands is a effectively lost the.,forests on its watersheds. slow and costly.process, often requiring construc- Farmers,looking for a,@small patch of land, hungry tion of major publ 'ic works, drainage, and correc- cows and goats, and firewood gatherers have re- tive soil chemistry and structure. Lands that are duced the country's forests to 9 percent of their waterlogged but have no problems with accu- original extent. Droughts and floods are unmod- mulated salts can generally be restored by reduc- erated by forest buffersi erosion is rampant; ir- ing the water seepage rate and improving drainage, ngation and hydroelectric systems are silting in; which can be costly but at least shows immediate and the quality of the soils is declining.". results. Salinized and alkalinized soils, on the Information on watershed deforestation from other hand, generally can't be restored without U.S. Embassy officials (see Appendix Q and washing the accumulated salts out of the soil. In, from the U.S. Agency for International Devel- and lands where such problems occur, passing opment," suggests. that Thailand,, Brazil, Costa. enough water through the soil to carry away ex- Rica, the Philippines, Burundi, the Ivory Coast, cess soil salts is difficult, costly, and time-consum- Burma, India, Indonesia, and many other nations ing. In most instances, drainage problems make may be facing similar problems, at least locally, it,impossible to simply pour huge quantities of if not on a nationwide scale. For example, the water'over the soil, and major hydraulic engi- U& Embassy in Thailand reports that under the neering is required. Furthermore, once washed combined influences of firewood gathering, slash- out, the salts may reach ground-water supplies or and-burn agriculture, and large-scale illegal become deposited in downstream regions, thus poaching of protected forests, the country's entire moving the problem rather than solving it. In forest area cover could be effectively cleared by many cases it.is only possible to move the'salts 1987, and even the most optimistic estimates of down in the soil profile. the rate of destruction offer no hope of significant. In conclusion, history shows that when the de- forest stands in Thailand beyond 1993. As a result; sert is made to bloom, it sometimes does so only of its deforestation, Thailand suffers increasingly. as a day flower, soon to wither under the stressful from both flood and drought, and while Thai-, interaction, of soil and sun. Poorly managed irri7 land's arable, area is still expanding, the general, gation is often. a major cause. The U.N. Confer- impression left by the U.S. Embassy reports is ence on Desertification has focused attention on. that erosion is already serious and likely to be- these problems, and the ecological and techno- come more so. logical aspects of reclamation and prevention are As will be discussed more fully in the forestry beginning to -be und 'erstood.@" However, many section of this chapter, deforestation, particularly drylands scattered across the world are showing of mountain sto pes forming the watersheds to early signs of. salinization. By 2000 these a.reas heavily populated agricultural regions, appears may have experienced major declines in fertility' likely to create serious obstacles to achieving the unless major educaional efforts are made and cap- food projections summarized above, and hence ital is provided. The technology is ay@ilable, but also to the fulfillment of basic food needs for tens high costs and poor management (often including of millions of the world's people. no water charge, thus encouraging overwatering and inadequately designed drainage) may signif- General Erosion icantly limit its appliction. Given the scenarios developed in the agricul-I Deforestation: tural forecasts in this volume. it can be- anticipated that hydrologic destabilization will increase rates In their natural state, most regions of the globe of erosion and loss of soil organic matter through receiving moderate-to-high rainfall would be for- the year 2000. By that time many croplands that ested. When forests are cut, particularly in'trop- are now producing well will be facing serious soil' ical and semitropical lands (where rainfalls are problems if current cultivation practices continue. violent and biochemical reactions are relatively Because corn (maize) is relatively poor at hold-;- rapid) and on steep slopes (where soils are usually ing soil, the'corn-growing land.s-about 7.5 per- thin and easily eroded), accelerated soil erosion cent of all lands in cultivation, producing roughly occurs, accompanied by increased seasonal flood- one-fifth of the world's grain-will fare the worst. ing, low flows, and siltation. The United States, as the world's largest corn Haiti is an example of what advanced defories@, producer, is in particular danger. ENVIRONMENT PROJECrIONS 281 The U.S. Soil Conservation Service considers sive chemical fertilizers and high crop prices dis- soil losses of 1 ton pet acre for shallow soils and couraged fallowing and encouraged continuous 5 tons per acre for deep soils to be- the maximum cropping. Since 1973 fertilizer prices have risen, that can be sustained annually without harming but although the Global 2000 Study's energy pro- productivity. Although difficult to estimate, *the jections suggest that the price of energy-Intensive extent to which soil losses 6xceed this figure ap- fertilizers will increase significantly in the years pears to be great. For example, a survey of 283 ahead, the high effectiveness of chemical fertil- U.S. farms in the Midwest, Great Plains, and Pa- izers may continue to make the use of organic cific Northwest recently conducted by the General fertilizers less attractive. Accounting Office (GAO) found that 84 percent Loss of organic matter is critical for two rea- had annual soil losses in excess of 5 tons* per sons: (1) organic matter serves to retain soil siru@- acre.' In Iowa and Illinois, the two corn-domi- ture and moisture, and (2) breakdown of soil nated states c6vered by the GAO study, half the organic matter adds carbon dioxide to the atmos- farms surveyed lost betwen 10 and 20 short tons phere, potentially leading to climatic change. As per acre per year. These findings are consistent shown in Figure 13-3, the po .ol of cIarbon in soil with those of other studies.'" systems is thought t6be larger than that in forests Gently sloping lands planted to corn, millet, or and living organisms. The effects of converting cotton often lose as much as 20 tons of soil pet fixed carbon in both forests and soil systems to acre per year, at which rate they will have lost carbon dioxide are discussed above in the climate approximately 3 inches of soil by the year 2000." section of this chapter. Steeper slopes might double or even quadruple these figures and conceivably experience soil Losses to Development losses of 6 inches to a foot or more by the year When land is subjected to the intense uses char- 2000 wherever the main crop does not provide acteristic of urban and industrial development, it good soil cover, The significance of these losses is in effect permanently lost for food production. depends on local soil depths, but to date the se- Furthermore, urban and industrial developments riousness of such losses have been masked largely are often located on some of a nation's, or the by energy subsidies in terms of fertilizers-sub- world's, best agricultural land-rich,, irrigated, sidies that will be increasingly expensive and dif- alluvial soils in gently sloping river valleys. Such ficult to maintain in the decades ahead. lands lost to urban and industrial growth often Wheat is relatively good at holding soil. Five involve taking lands out of production and there- to 10 tons of soil loss per acre per year are com- fore represent an actual loss of production as op- monly reported losses for wheat, at which rate posed to a potential. loss. approximately 1.5 inches of soil could be lost by The loss of both producing and potentially pro- the year 2000." Terraced rice cultiviation appears- ducing land has serious implications for food-im- to be the most soil-conserving of all. It has been porting nations. For example, the total irrigated calculated that Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, land in Egypt has remained virtually unchanged practices may add more to the soil, through ad- over the past two decade .s. Old producing lands dition of canal dredging to the fields, than is are.lost to development almost as fast as addi- 221 washed away. Very low rates of erosion can also tional hectares are irrigated with water from the be attained by crop rotations, such as alternative Aswan Dan .121 plantings of corn, wheat, and clover, which re- The worldwide losses of agricultural land td store organic matter and keep the earth well cov- development are difficult to estimate on the basis ered at most times. of the limited data now available. A recent report Loss of organic matter follows trends similar to by Lester Brown, President of Worldwatch Insti- those observed for erosion. It is particularly se- tute, brings together most of what is now known.' vere with crops such as corn and soybeans, which Brown projects that, if present trends in urban do not provide a dense soil cover or sodlike root development and growth continue, development structure. Organic matter is also lost if crop res- between 1975 and 2000 will claim 25 million hec- idues are burned to protect crops against disease, tares of cropland. While this is only about 2 per- as they often are in the U.S., or if crop residues cent of the world crop base, it is enough,land and manure are used as fuel, as they are increas- (assuming even average productivity) to feed ingly in developing regions faced with firewood some 84 million people. shortages. Rotation schemes, fallow periods, and Increases both in urbanization (growth of the green manuring can reduce losses or permit urban population) and suburbanization (the geo- buildup. However, until 1973 relatively inexpen- graphical spread of urban settlements) have ac- 282 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 13-18 self-sufficient settlement patterns that efficiently use solar and other small-scale renewable sources Loss of Agricultural Lands, 1960-2000, Selected of energy, such as windmills, biogas plants and Industrialized Countries biomass). However these forces eventually bal- Average Annual Projected ance out, it seems likely'that significant amounts Rate of Loss Cumulative Loss of land will be removed from cultivation or po- 1960@70 1978-2000 tential cultivation between now and 2000. 7he Percent OECD countries again provide an example. Should Austria 0.18 5 1960-70 rates of land loss continue, the OECD, Belgium 1.23, 24 countries will have lost an average of 2.5 percent Denmark 0.30 b 6 of their agricultural lands by ,2000, as shown in Finland 0.28 6 the table. A substantial portion of the high Ier cost France 0.18 4 West Germany 0:25 5 of food production projected for 2000 in Chapter Japan 0.73, is 6 is a direct result of the costs of expanding arable Netherlands 0.48d 10 area to compensate for development losses. New Zealand 0.05 1 Over and above losses to urbanization and sub- Norway 0.15 3 Sweden 0.33 7 urbanization, agricultural lands are being lost to Turkey 0.04 1 expanding rural populations and villages around United Kingdom 0.18 4 the world. The data available on these losses are United States limited. Lester Brown, who finds evidence that (excluding villages frequently expand onto cropland, reports Alaska) 0.08 2 that India, a nation of 6W,000 villages, projects Weighted total 2.5 nonagricultural land use to expand by 9.8 million Source: 1960-70 data from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Dcvel- hectares (or 60 percent) between 1970 and 2000."' opment, Interfutures, Ch. 13,"Physical Environment.- Paris, May 16. 1977 (draft), Overall, world losses of agricultural land to village p.22. 1959-70. b 195"9. ' 1965-75. d 1%6-72. expansion have not been estimated. The food. projections in Chapter 6 include ex- celerated the rate at which agricultural land is lost plicit consideration of land lost to development.* to development. A recent study by the Organi- The above discussion is presented as support for zation for Economic Cooperation and Develop- the .estimates used and cited in the Study's food projections, although it provides only an indica- ment (OECD) indicates that in the OECD tion of the gross changes known to be occurring. (industrialized) countries urban land area has been growing about twice as fast as the popula- By the Year 2000 tion.' This trend is due in part to sprawling, res- This .discussion of global deterioration of soils idential patterns. In 1972 each additional U.S. has considered (1) desertification, (2) waterlogm suburbanite required 0.15 hectares of land (0.09 ging, salinization and alkalinization, (3) the ef- hectares of which was taken out of cultivation) for fects of deforestation, (4) general erosion and development purposes. This loss is nearly half the humus loss, and (5) loss of land to urbanization average agricultural land per capita, (0.19 hec- and village expansion. These problems are widely tares) projected for the LDCs by the year 2000.231 recognized by national and world leaders and ef- On a percentage basis, even higher loss rates are forts are being made to reduce rates of deterio- being experienced in some industrialized nations ration and to restore soils. The 1977 U.N. (see Table 13-18). Surveys in developing coun- Conference on Desertification is an example of tries show lower per capita land losses to devel- these efforts. opment, but the high rates of population growth and the limited amounts of prime farmlands a 're *In the GOL (grain, oilseed,, and'livestock) model used by the likely-to make such losses equally important in Department of Agriculture for the food projections, devel- the LDCs. opment-related land losses are,specified as a negative function of population growth. Specifically, the assumed losses range In the face of rising energy costs, it is unclear from 0.03 hectares per capita in LDCs. to 0.1 hectares per' whether the trend toward urban, suburban, and capita in the developed countries. The Department notes that industrial sprawl will continue or reverse. Energy to date losses of arable area to development have been offset concerns will gradually encourage both greater substantially by larger gains through settlement of new lands compactness (for the efficiency needed by Jarge or by reclamation of old lands. With the supply of poten 'tially arable area finite and the cost of reclamation increasing, losses centralized energy facilities) and more decentral- due to development are likely to become increasingly impor- ization (for the more diffused, land-intensive, and tant. ENVIRONMENT PROJECYIONS 283 Most instances of soil deterioration are revers- widespread cooperation from the agrarian popu- ible, at least in theory. Given sufficiently large - lation. The costs will be immediately apparent; commitments of time, capital, energy, technical the benefits will seldom be seen in less than half knowledge, and political will, most land deterio- a decade and in some cases may not be apparent ration can beslowed, stopped, or even restored. for a generation or more. Unless a government The problem is that in practice the time and is trusted by its people or can afford to offer long- knowledge required and the economic, resource, term financial incentives, it will have difficulty and political costs involved make many cases of implementing soil conservation programs. soil deterioration virtually irreversible. . The soil conditions that can be expected by the The difficulty in controlling the five types of year 2000 are critically dependent on policy land deterioration can be seen in examples in the changes during the intervening years.. Assuming United States. Luther Ca 'rter has described the no policy change-the standard assumption un- economic problem in part, noting that despite the derlying all of the Global 2000 Study projec- billions s ent on it, the problem of soil erosion tions-significant deteriorations in soils can be persists. The General Accounting Office has anticipated virtually everywhere, including in the recently pointed to the need to give soil conser- U.S. Assuming that energy, water, and capital are vation top priority in order to meet future food available, it will be possible for a time to com- needs.' Salinization continues to be a threat to pensate for some of the deterioration by increas- important U.S. croplands." Prime agricultural ing the use of yield-enhancing inputs (fertilizer, lands continue to be lost to urban sprawl, resource irrigation, pesticides, herbicides, etc.), but the development, roads, and shopping centers.' The projected increases in energy (and chemical fer- Department of Agriculture's Soil Conservation tilizer) costs will make this approach to offsetting Service (SCS) reported that in 1975 soil losses on soil losses ever more expensive. Without major U.S., cropland amounted to almost 3 billion tons, policy changes, soil deterioration could signifi- an average of about 9 tons per acre. Although cantly interfere with achieving the production lev- ,this was excessive, it was less than the estimated els projected in this Study. 4 billion tons of topsoil that would have been lost in 1975 if farmers had followed no conservation Ecological Effects of Fertilizers and practices at all." The SCS report concluded that Pesticides to sustain U.S. crop production indefinitely, at even present levels, soil losses must be cut in half. Historically, fertilizer use is correlated with the The SCS has developed a plan for reducing soil use of a number of yield-enhancing agricultural losses, but. the plan has not been implemented, inputs including pesticides and herbicides. The probably in part because it would lead to a 5-8 projections in Chapter 6 are based on the as- percent increase in production costs. It might also sumption that growth in fertilizer use is repre- reduce food output somewhat in the short run .231 sentative of the growth in all yield-enhancing . Not just in the U.S. but throughout the world, inputs. Therefore the "fertilizer" projections are the fate of soil systems depends on societies' will- intended to apply to a full package of yield-en- ingness to pay the short-run resource and eco- hancing inputs. nomic costs to preserve soils for long-run benefits. However, from an ecological perspective, fer- Whether the soils of the 'world will deteriorate tilizers and pesticides have very different effects. further or be re claimed willdepend in large part It is therefore important in the environmental on the ab ility and,willingness. of governments to analysis to examine factors that might alter the make politically difficult'p6licy changes'. Soil pro- historic correlation. Thus, the discussions that fol- tection requires a stable society and well-devel- low begin with a brief consideration of some of oped institutions. A society stressed. by warfare, the factors that will influence the relative growth hunger, internal turmoil, and corruption, or ob- of fertilizers and pesticides and herbicides. Fer- sessed with modernization to the point that it ig- tilizers are considered first. nores the fate of its agricultural lands, will be fortunate if the productivity of its land does not Fertilizers diminish significantly in the decades ahead. Chapter 6 projects that by 2000 global use per The political difficulties cannot be overem- hectare of "fertilizer" (as defined in that chapter) phasized. Often solutions to soil problems will will be 2.6 times that of the record levels reported require resettlement, reduction of herd sizes, re- in the early 1970s. Usage in LDCs is projected to strictions on plantings, reforms in land tenure, quadruple, and usage in the centrally planned and and public works projects, that will fail without market economies is projected to increase by fac- 284 THE PROJECTIONS tors of 2.3 and 2.1 respectively. Since the area and fixed nitrogen) might be expected to produce under cultivation, is projected to increase only many changes in soils. The most apparent effect slightly, the per hectare usage of fertilizers in all is simply the intended increase in plant growth. regions can be expected to increase at essentially One potentially adverse effect concerns the ac- the same rates as the total applications. In the celerated decomposition of organic matter in discussion that follows, it is assumed that actual soils. As nitrogen is often the limiting nutrient for fertilizer use will follow closely these indicative decomposition of soil organic matter, increased "fertilizer" projections. nitrogen usage contributes to reduction of soil In assessing the environmental implications of organic matter, thus degrading soils and contrib- the projected fertilizer usage, it is important to uting carbon dioxide to the atmosphere."' obtain some sense of the magnitude of projected . As soon as virgin soil is plowed, the decom- fertilizer use relative to natural flows of basic nu- position of its organic matter accelerates- and soil trients. The Scientific Committee on Problems of quality (especially tilth, porosity, and water-ab- the Environment (SCOPE) of the International sorbing capacity) begins,to deteriorate. It was Council of Scientific Unions estimated in 1976 that once thought that the application-of nitrogen,fer- if current rates of increase in nitrogen fertilizer tilizer would rebuild the organic matter in crop-' production were to continue, synthetic nitrogen lands by stimulating more plant growth, the fixation-which then amounted to about 26 per- residue of which would be added to the Soil.139b cent of natural, terrestrial fixation- would be However, it was demonstrated early"@---and con- equal to natural fixation by 1983 .13' The ecological firmed again more recentlyl39d-that under mod- ramifications of an alteration of this magnitude ern farming methods the organic matter in soils in a basic nutrient cycle are unclear, as Are the cannot be maintained at anything approaching its ramifications of the parallel and equally signifi- virgin state. Generally, soi 'I organic matter de- cant changes in the phosphate nutrient cycle. clines to an equilibrium value of 40-60 percent of While U.S. Department of Agriculture officials the orginal content. Soil quality deteriorates as regard the global levels of fertilizer use projected well. While in most cases crop y .ields can be main- for 2000 to be safe when applied carefully by tained through the continual application of chem- trained personnel, they are aware that improper ica[ fertilizers, through plowing with large heavy us'e leads to increased dangers. Improper use can tractors, and through' irrigation, the modern aggravate rather than alleviate problems of soil methods of farming tend to lock agriculture into deterioration and declining fertility. Further- a particular mode of cultivation and resource al- more, even with careful application adverse ef- location if high yields in degraded soils are to be fects of fertilizer usage have been observed, or maintained.3' are suspected, in aquatic and marine systems, in Consequences of increased fertilizer use for the atmosphere, and in terrestrial ecosystems. aquatic systems are more serious than terrestrial Scientific understanding of atmospheric influ- effects and include eutrophication' and nitrate ences is not yet well developed, but it is reported contarninatio In of drinking water supplies."" The by the National Academy of Sciences that nitrous phosphorus component of fertilizers is thought to oxide from fertilizer usage., when it makes its way contribute most to eutrophication in affected into the stratosphere, reacts in a fashion that de- lakes, but nitrogen is also important. Nitrogen pletes the ozone layer. If this phenomenon turns contributes most to eutropiiication in coastal out to be serious, the world could find itself in the waters. More than 70 percent'of the nitrogen en- tragic situation of having to support the human tering surface waters is from.nonpoint a g*ricultural population at the cost of subjecting the world's sources. Even the input of nitrogen from rain- biota to damaging dosages of cosmic and ultra- Water is a sufficient nutrient loading in some,lakes violet radiation, at least one effect of which would to support a moderate increase in biotic activity. be increased incidence of skin cancer in human An important part of, the fixed nitrogen in pre- liation enters the atmosphere as a result of am- beings. cip, From the perspective of ecology, the known monia volatilization, chiefly, from animal wastes.' terrestrial effects of increased fertilizer us,age are The levels of nitrogen that pose hazards to hu- surprisingly benign. The addition of large amounts man health-about 10. milligrams of nitrate per of three critical nutrients (phosphorus, potassium, liter of water-are roughly an.order of magnitude higher than the levels that produce eutrophication and are relatively rare at the rates at which fer- *See the climate section of this chapter for further information on nitrous oxide and other chemicals that deplete the ozone tilizers are, now used. The primary population at layer. risk is that of infants under the age of three. In- ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 285 fants consuming synthetic milk formula mixed Though more environmentally damaging, organ- with nitrate-contaminated water may experience ochlorines are markedly less expensive in most the toxic effect known as methemoglobinemia. applications than the less persistent, more specific This disease is readily diagnosed, and is rapidly alternatives, and are also far safer for farmers to reversible with clinical treatment. After the age apply because of less short-term toxicity to hu- of 3 months, vulnerability to methemoglobinemia mans. If the conclusion to the food projections in decreases rapidly. In the U.S., concentration of Chapter 6 is correct-namely, that in most LDCs nitrates above 10 -milligrams per liter are rare. food demands "are likely to outweigh problems The primary -risk is from wellwater on or near of the environment well beyond 2000" the use farms, especially in areas where soil and hydro- of DDT and other persistent pesticides can be lo-ic conditions favor the accumulation of nitrate expected to continue in proportions much like in groundwater. those found at present.245 While mortality from methemoglobinemia, is The future use of pesticides in the industrialized now extremely'rare, the presence of high levels nations is equally difficult to project both because of nitrate in drinking water supplies poses a health of data limitations and because of growing interest hazard that is already a valid concern in at -least in changing practices. The "fertilizer" indicator some regions of the United States, andr the pro- in Chapter 6 implies moderate increases (by a jected doubling to quadrupling of fertilizer appli- factor of 2.1) over 1971-75 average consumption cations by 2000 could make this disease more by 2000. The banning of DDT and other persistent sen*ous and more widespread.' insecticides by much of the industrialized world during the last decade suggests that increases in Pesticides and Herbicides insecticide usage there will be discriminating, em- The first step in examining the future environ- Phasizing compounds with less persistent ecolog- Mental implications of pesticides is to assess Ical effects than the compounds likely to be used whether their usage globally is likely to continue in the LDCs. Furthermore, there is growing in- to be correlated with the "fertilizer" package pro- terest in several industrialized nations in the tech- jected in Chapter 6. This assessment is difficult ni.ques of integrated pest management* (IPM).1 because data on pesticide use are not published Although,there is not at this time a prevailing for most countries, and thus it Iis.not possible to policy to encourage IPM, increasing pest resist- quantify past trends in any detail or to project ance and simple economics may encourage a shift. future developments. It is known that a large frac- If widely applied, IPM would reduce the use of tion-probably more than half---df all pesticides pesticides-. are applied to a few high-value, commercial crops The rapid increase in the use of herbicides in (especially cotton, vegetables, and tobacco) and the developed regions in the last two decades can that demands for these crops are expected to con- be expected to continue. If no-till planting, which tinue. growing steadily. The applications- of pes- involves heavy use of herbicides, is widely adopted ticides to food grains are relatively small. in the next few decades-and there is reason to The Food and Agriculture Organization st ic- expect that it will be-very rapid increases in her- ceeded in gathering some data for the LDCs in bicide usage can be.expected. 1975 and found that pesticide use in the LDCs No-till planting is the practice of eliminating had increased by about 50 percent over the two field preparation entirely and planting on top of year period 1971-73 and that consumption for the residue of the previous crops. Minimum tillage 1974-77 was expected to increase more slowly, at refers to the practice of minimizing field prepa- about 9 percent per year.2" These figures are sig- ration-principally plowing, but also tillage with nificantly influenced by the heavy use of pesticides disc harrows, drags, and cultivators-for planting. in India, Mexico, and Argentina. If this slowed There are both advantages and disadvantages in rate of increase (9 percent per year) continues, no-till and minimum-till practices. Crop residues LDC pesticide use by 2000 would still be more than 10 times the 1971-73 rate - The FAO growth *The Council on Environmental Quality defines integrated estimates are therefore considerably higher than pest. management as follows: IPM employs a combination of the "fertilizer" projection of Chapter.6. techniques to control crop-threatening pests. Maximum reli- The FAO survey revealed further that half the ance is placed on natural pest population controls and a com- bination of suppression techniques--cultural methods, pest- pesticides used in the LDCs were generally per- specific diseases, resistant crop varieties, sterile insects. at- sistent organochlorines (DDT, aldrin, and other tractants, augmentation of parasites or predators. or chemical chlorinated hydrocarbons). This is to, be expected. pesticides as needed. 286 THE PROJECTIONS are often breeding places for pests, which in- virtually certain to continue to increase in those creases the need for pesticides or other pest con- LDCs where DDT is still being used extensively. tT0l measures. Fertilizer placement options are Unfortunately, very little information is available reduced and, as a result, fertilizers may be inef- on DDT concentrations in LDC environments ficiently utilized and fertilizer runoff increased. because almost no monitoring is being done. Also, extensive use of herbicides is involved. The second problem, biological resistance, has Nonetheless, no-till and minimum-till techniques received less popular attention than the first, but appear to have potential for reducing energy in- is equally important. Biological resistance to pes- puts and for conserving soil resources. The use of ticides develops in pest species because repeated these techniques has grown roughly 300 percent pesticide usage places species under an evolution- in the U.S. since the start of the decade. They ary pressure such that those individuals in a pest account today for roughly a quarter of farmland population that possess some immunity to pesti- preparation, and some experts expect them to be cides are the most likely to survive and reproduce. used very extensively in the future. Malaria-transmitting mosquitoes, plant-eating What, then, are the prospects for future utili- mites,' and other insects that have been regularly zation of pesticides and herbicides? In the follow- exposed to pesticides are showing great genetic ing discussion, it is assumed that world pesticide flexibility in developing tolerance or resistance to (and herbicide) use will increase at approximately insecticides. The three examples that follow were the same rates as the "fertilizer" indicator in the selected from the many available and illustrate Department of Agriculture projections in Chapter the seriousness of this problem. 6, that is, they will more than double over the 1. In California, a state that makes heavy use 1975-2000 period. In the LDCs the increase is of pesticides, a large number of pest species at- likely to be fourfold, and possibly as much as six- tacks crops. Of this large number, 25 species have fold if the FAO estimated increase of 9 percent been found to cause major damage (i.e., losses per year is sustained. of $1 million or more per species in 1970). The The environmental problems anticipated from genetic flexibility of these species is indicated by increases in pesticide use are suggested by prob- the fact that, at some location in the world, 21 of lems that have already occurred and can be ex- those 25 species have been found to be resistant pected to continue."' They include: (1) biological to one or more pesticides: 16 to DDT, 16 to or- amplification and concentration of persistent pes- ganophosphates, and 10 to cyclodines. In Cali- ticides in the tissues of higher-order predators, fornia alone, 17 of the 25 species were found to including humans; (2) development of increased be resistant to one or more types of insecticide.' resistance to pesticides by numerous insect pests, and hence possible declines in yields through in- 2. Disease vectors that have been heavily con- creased vulnerability to pests; (3) destruction of trolled by use of insecticides have shown great natural pest controls such as insect-eating birds ability to tolerate their intended poisons. The and predatory insects, and hence further increases National Academy of Sciences (using World in the cost of-and decreases in the effectiveness Health Organization data) documents the grow- of-preventing crop losses caused by pests; (4) ing number of vector-insect species (e.g., body emergence of new pests previously not trouble- lice) showing tolerance to important pesticides some; and (5) increased poisonings of farm work- over an extended period, as shown in the follow- ers and families from nonpersistent pesticides. ing table." The first of these problems, biological ampli- fication (or concentration), is familiar because of Organo- the extensive attention it received (due initially phosphate to the pioneering work of Rachel Carson) in the DDT Dieldrin Compounds Total years preceding the bans in several developed 1956 27 25 1 33 1962 47 65 8 81 countries on the use of DDT.* Here it is appro- 1969 55 84 17 102 priate to note only that biological concentration 1974 61 92 27 109 is a continuing problem. Although monitored con- centrations of DDT in the environment have been Of the anopheline (malarial) mosquitoes, 41 have shown to be declining in those industrialized coun- been found resistant to dieldrin and 24 to DDT. tries that have banned DDT,' concentrations are One species, Anopheles albimanus Wiederman, *For some uses, that is. The bans do not prevent the use of has become resistant not only to dieldrin and DDT for controlling health-threatening insect vectors. DDT but to malathion and certain other or- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 287 ganophosphate and carbonate insecticides, thus and face a higher probability of being reduced to showing itself resistant to all the major chemical such a low level that they cannot recover; (3) the groups that are used to combat malaria vectors. 112 predator species are eliminated both directly If pesticide registance becomes widespread in through the effects of insecticides and indirectly other species of malarial mosquitoes, control of through the loss of their normal food when the malaria would be badly hampered, and its inci- insects on which they feed are eliminated. dence could be expected to rise sharply. Often predatory insects are made locally extinct through pesticide applications. When predatory 3. Cotton, which receives about 50 percent of insects are eliminated, herbivorous pest species all the pesticides applied in the U.S.,'53 now at- multiply rapidly leading to severe pest outbreaks. tracts several pests that have developed immunity Farmers often respond to such outbreaks with still to all currently available and registered pesticides. heavier application of pesticides, reducing further In cotton-growing districts across Central Amer- the chances that predator species might be rees- ica, the U.S. Southwest, Southern California, and tablished. Australia, the situation has become so severe that Also, in such predator-free environments, spe- growers in many places have been forced either cies that have previously been benign become to give up cotton growing or to shift to integrated major pests. Mites, which are now major pests in pest management techniques. Some districts have fruit culture, became pests only after the start of endured the cost of as many as 30-50 pesticide heavy use of pesticides in fruit cultivation. Similar applications a year, to a single crop.' histories can be found for many insect species, As long as pesticides are used, pest re Isistances including Hessian flies, and several major pest can be expected to continue to develop. By the species of the cotton plant. Insecticides ate prob-. year 2000 there will almost certainly be more pes- ably largely responsible for new insect pests in ticide-resistant pests and more crops, for which agriculture.' there are no effective pesticides. There will also Successive developments of biological resist- be more registered pesticides. How the continuing ance and releases of new pest species will decrease struggle with insect pests will stand in 2000 will the effectiveness of the projected increases in pes-. depend on pest control policies, chemical tech- ticide use. Diminishing returns on pesticide in- nologies, and biological technologies, Newer pes- vestments can go on only so long before crop ticides are generally more selective, but also more losses will force a major change in strategies of expensive than those they replace. The techniques pest control. The techniques of integrated pest of integrated pest management offer new hope,55 management... and biological controls appear but the transmittal of these techniques requires now to offer good alternatives. Although there a significant amount of field and laboratory re- are as yet few policy commitments to IPM or bi- search on insect ecology, and therefore commit- ological controls, interest is growing. ments of both time and money. Also IPM methods depend heavily on the very species most seriously By the Year 2000 threatened by pesticides----4he beneficial insect species that prey upon agricultural pests. The pressure to increase agricultural yields is The third problem of increased pesticide use is projected to more than double the application i @ 11 rates of nitrogen and phosphorous fertilizers and ,,simply, that pesticides destroy natural pest con- pesticides. This growth in fertilizer use implies trols.'The discussion here focuses on predatory that before 2000 the annual industrial rate of fix- insects, but insect-eating birds are also affected. ing of nitrogen for agricultural purposes will ex- Insecticides are usually more damaging to pred- ceed ator insect species than they are to pests, because the total global rate of nitrogen fixation by (1) predators may be poisoned through ingesting natural systems. The full implications of a modi- poisoned pest species as well as directly through fication of this magnitude in a basic nutrient cycle the effects of the pesticide*; (2) since predator are not clear and have not yet been studied care- populations are always less numerous and gen- fully, but potentially adverse effects are known erally less fecund than their prey, predator pop- or suspected. Nitrate contamination of fresh water ulations have less genetic material from which to supplies and eutrophication of fresh and estuarine develop immunities to pesticides, take @ longer to waters are among the adverse effects known to regain their numbers after insecticide application, be possible, and potentially serious reductions in the atmospheric ozone layer are suspected by *In general, predators are more susceptible to pesticides than some knowledgeable scientists. The increased use the pest species they hunt. of pesticides can be expected to continue to reduce 288 THE PROJECTIONS pest populations, but with diminishing returns. sures to continue increasing yields through genetic since insect resistances to pesticides will continue technologies. Following two decades of develop- to develop and predator populations will continue ments, in agricultural genetics, two trends can be to be depleted. By 2000 the techniques of inte- expected in response to the continuing strong grated pest management and biological controls pressures. The first is for further genetic improve- may be in much wider use than today. ments in key plant and animal species to raise The overall environmental impacts are difficult yields.* Developments in this area will entail to estimate because 'so many uncertain variables greater dependence on inbred strains manifesting are involved. Rising food prices (where people a high degree of genetic uniformity. The second can afford to pay them) may allow producers to trendis the shift toward monoculture cultivation endure the higher costs of increased pesticide use of A few relatively high-yielding, low-cost, staple at diminished returns; increased resistance to pes-, food crops. Together, these two trends will lead ticides may increase losses, thereby increasing to further genetic hybridibg and further replace- food prices still more; or increased pesticide prices ment of lower-yielding, diversified cropping pat- may make IPM more competitive. The rate at terns with extensive, often contiguous, patterns. which pest resistance will diminish returns. on in- The short-term effect will be increased yields, but vestments in chemical controls will depend both in the long run, questions of crop vulnerability on the way the chemicals are used and on the must be considered. progress of chemical technology in finding new These two factors-Aependence on inbred strains insecticides. New chemical pesticides will be de- and,the.shift toward nionoculture cultivation- veloped but will require time and money for reg- have become more closely interrelated over the istration, adoption, and application. past.two decades as pressure.to expand food pro- There are similar uncertainties for the variables duction..has grown. It has been estimated that by relating to fertilizers. Will the LDCs-where the the early 1970s over four-fifths of the world's food marginal returns on fertilizer investments are supplie -s were derived from less than two dozen greatest-be able to afford fertilizers? How se- plant and animal species. 258 One expert estimates rious a threat do fertilizers pose for the. upper that.as much as four-fifths of the world's popu- atmosphere? How far and how rapidly will the lation, depends for sustenance on wheat or rice. " biologically based technologies for nitrogen fixa- The. exact figures are not important. The point is tion develop and be applied? Ahat th& already narrow genetic base of the world's With all this uncertainty, it is not possible to. majotfood crops may become even more narrow. project precisely how these variables will develop :Pl,,Ant diseases are constantly evolving ways to over the next two decades. It is only possible to overcome plant resistances, requiring plant breed- note that the foreseeable trend is one oflicavy ers -to develop new resistant strains. The tens of and increasing dependence-often with diminishm thousands of ge inotypes of the major crop species ing returns-on both synthetic fertilizers and are the raw materials from which plant breeders chemical pesticides. The potentially adverse at- work, and- these stocks of genetic raw materials mospheric effects associated with continued heavy are being reduced as natural habitats are lost. In- dependence on synthetic fertilizers is one of the creased reliance on a narrowing ge ne pool and most understudied and potentially serious global more extensive monoculture of food staples could environmental questions. Pest control strategies lead to sudden unanticipated widespread losses also need much further study. Many experts feel in. world food production. How likely and how that strategies based on biological controls and serious is such a disaster? There is no easy or integrated pest management offer much greater precise answer to the question. Past history sug- possibilities for improvement than do chemical gests that thie, probability of a major genetic failure technologies alone, and a gradual shift toward ih7 is low but increasing. tegrated and biological control techniques seems The following paragraphs discuss three aspects probable in both the industrialized countries and of increasing genetic vulnerability. The first is the LDCs. historic in nature. Past examples demonstrate both th.0. difficulty of controlling pest or disease infections in areas, of extensive monoculture, and Crop Vulnerability: Genetic Considerations *Ouestions are being, raised as to how much further yields can dest increases in arable land ex- be increased by genetics and technology. See for example N. With only mo F. Jensen, "Limits to Growth -in World Food Production," pected, the food projections imply strong pres- Science, July 28, 1978, pp. 317-20. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 289 the severe implications 'of failures. The second epidemic proportions in large areas of the corn and third aspects -relate to concerns voiced, by belt. An estimated 80 percent of U.S. corn plant geneticists themselves: that present trends acreage was highly susceptible because of both toward uniform strains and loss of genetic reserves thegenetic composition of the corn and the con- could raise the frequency and severity of pest-rem tiguous monoculture used across large areas of lated and disease-related crop, failures signifi- the states involved. The disease did not spread to cantly by 2000, and that thecosts of even relatively all susceptible areas, but it did manage to reduce minor genetic failures (genetic in the 'sense that U.S. c orn production by 15 percent (710 million a crop population is genetically unable to protect, bushels). It is no exaggeration to call the response itself from pathogens and pests). may ultimately of the seed@corn industry heroic. There is a fas- outweigh gains from genetically increased yields, cinating story of efforts to locate stocks of normal even if major catastrophes do not. occur. Such a cytoplasm, which were then in short supply.*, If development. would be a catastrophe by, itself, the U.S. seed industry had not been sufficiently eventually. adaptable in developing a technical. fix-it re-, placed approximately 80 percent of its sales with Historical Examples an alternative (and much harder to produce) prod-. One of the best known examples of a genetic/ uct*-Iosses, in 1971 and 1972 might have been monoculture crop failure is the massive failure of much greater than in 1970.'" Nonetheless, the potato crops of the 1840s in Ireland and Europe. effect on the price of seed was significant. The An estimated 2 million people starved to death price of seed corn in 1970-71 was $18-$25 per in the wake of the blight, and a similar number bushel; the mean price was $20. The price. has were forced to emigrate. m The potato famine was risen steadily. ever since to a mean of $48 per not a unique phenomena; there are many other bushel during the 1976-77 season. *' This 140 per- examples. Wheat rust epidemics have caused lo- centincrease is due in large part to the increased calized famines since the Middle Ages. The-;Eu- difficulty of producing blight-resistant seed. ropean wine industry was nearly destroyed three times in the last century by three different plant Tlie Danger. of Present Trends Toward. diseases. Between 1870 and 1890 coffee rust trans- Monoculture and Genetic Uniformity formed Ceylon from the world's largest @coffee- - It is almost always the case that a hard fight on growing nation into a country unfit, for, coffee- one front means fewer defenses elsewhere. So it growing. Shortly after the turn of the century,- two is generally with breeding plants for high yields. separate, highly destructive epidemics struck:the Modern plant breeding is based largely on the use. widely cultivated Gros Michael banana. " A.fun- of inbred, uniform strains,'" and the most inbred gus devastated the Bengali rice crop in 1942, lead- strains appear to have weakened in their natural ing to the deaths of tens of thousands. 12 In 1946 resistance to pathogens and pests. The@ inbred, a large fraction of 1 the U.S. oat crop, which was products - manifest a high degree of genetic @ uni- comprised almost entirely of a strain called Vic- formity. The increasing cultivation of strains of- toria, was lost to a fungus epidemic. ' While these high-yield varieties will result in great increases-, genetically related crop failures have all had very in the degree of genetic uniformity of major crops serious impacts on the human populations in- throughout the world. As a result the fraction of volved, some genetic failures have; been even the crop at risk in the event of a trait@specific more damaging ecologically. For example, the epidemic will also'increase, as will the ease with, American chestnut is -virtually extinct due to, the which. disease or insect pests can spread across chestnut blight, and elms are becoming ever scar-, large-.areas of contiguous monoculture. As are- cer due to Dutch elm disease' sult, the probable geographic extent of the Serious outbreaks of genetically related crop demic may, expand in the years ahead.. diseases continue. For example, after, existing as Furthermore, since water enhances the,transmis-_@ a minor disease for 14 years, race 15B of thewheat@ sion of many plant diseases, the projected in-w stem rust erupted in the early 1950s into a full- blown epidemic 'It destroyed 75 percent of the *Tbe vulnerable strain in this case was a male-sterile cyto- Durham variety in the -1953 U.S. spring, wheat plasm, which allowed the breeder to cross strains in the field, crop as well as 35 percent of the bread wheat cro using natural pollination rather than employing an expensive in that season. p manual process to avoid self-fertilization of the two strains. The fungus forced the @ seed industry -to go back to hand de- Another example occurred in 1970. A corn fun- tasseling. .(C. E. Yarwood, "Man-Made Plant Diseases,". Sci- gus disease, Helminthosporium maydis,:, reached ence, Apr. 10,1970, pp. 218-20.) 290 THE PROJECTIONS creases in the amount of irrigated cropland may mosomes. The discovery of Zea perennis estab- further increase the vulnerability of crops to dis- lished the fact that a perennial variety of teosinte ease throughout the world. "' Furrow or flood ir- had in fact existed, but it seemed increasingly rigation, for example, creates conditions that likely that the 20-chromosome variety had been favor the growth of pathogens requiring high soil lost. moisture (e.g., Pythium), and sprinkling irriga- In late 1977 Raphael Guzman, a botany student tion favors diseases spread by splashing water and at the University of Guadalajara, found a new rain (e.g., bacterial blight and anthracnose of variety of teosinte growing in a remote, moun- bean). `9 tainous region of Mexico in the state of Jalisco. Simultaneously, the genetic resources available Guzman's variety (Zea diploperennis) has now for combatting diseases are dwindling. In the been examined by Dr. Hugh H. Iltis, Director of event of a major new crop epidemic, plant breed- the Herbarium at the University of Wisconsin, ers sort through thousands of varieties of the af- who reports that Zea diploperennis is a perennial flicted plant species, hoping to identify a resistant variety with the 20 chromosomes necessary for strain that can be interbred with other varieties cross-breeding with corn. to impart disease resistance without reducing pro- The discovery of Zea diploperennis opens the ductivity or imparting undesirable characteristics. possibilities of not only.perennial corn, but of corn Finding a resistant strain depends on the quality that can be grown over wide ranges of climate and of the available seed bank. In general, the more soil. Furthermore, since Zea diploperennis grows tough wild varieties available, the better the successfully in cool, damp places where fungus chance of finding an appropriate resistant strain. 271 diseases (such as the 1971 corn blight) abound, However, the varietal stock is diminishing. The crossbreeding may produce varieties that are wild strains (from which modern high-yielding more resistant to the diseases that now plague varieties were originally bred) are not usually cul- corn farming. tivated and are being obliterated by widespread Cross-breeding has begun, and fertile offspring and increasing destruction of habitat. High-yield have been produced. Dr. Iltis now feels certain varieties are being adopted everywhere, replacing that the perennialness of Zea diploperennis can the myriad native strains that local farmers have be crossed into corn, but cautions that perhaps developed over centuries. These strains, often 10-20 years will be required. uniquely suited to local conditions, are rarely pre- The sobering fact, however, is that the benefits served when farmers shift to high-yield varieties. from zea diploperennis could easily have been The increases in the use of high-yield varieties lost, just as the potential benefits from many other implicit in the food projections of Chapter 6 will plant species are being lost now, especially in the worsen this situation. 272 tropics. Dr. Iltis writes of Zea diploperennis: A recently discovered plant related to corn (maize) dramatically illustrates the potentia ly This species could easily have become extinct catastrophic losses that can occur when plant s e- [before its discovery], and may yet become [ex- cies are lost. Corn, an annual plant, must e tinct] in the wild in the near future.... Just this winter I spent 10 weeks exploring for primitive planted every year at the expense of labor, ero- corn in southern Jalisco, Mexico. There is whole- sion, and fossil fuel subsidies. A plant known as sale mass destruction of vegetation [in progress teosinte, an ancestor of corn, was thought to have there] on a gigantic scale (e.g.,,virgin tropical de- had several varieties, some annual and some per- ciduous forest near Puerto Vallarta, 30,000 hec- ennial. If a perennial variety of teosinte could be tares at a time) by pushing of vegetation into les found, modern plant breeding techniques might with bulldozers, then burning the piles and plant- permit the development of a perennial corn. For ing sorghum. . . . The destruction is enormous, many years, only annual varieties of teosinte were terrible and devastating. . . . None of this vege- discovered. Unfortunately, teosinte grew in only @ation has . . . been studied or ... represented limited areas of Mexico where they were regarded !n preserves. Much of such destruction was orig- inally U.S. instigated to "help . . . raise more locally as weeds, and it was feared that the per- food." . . . One could not think of a more effec- ennial varieties-if they ever existed-had been tive policy . . . to help destroy a livable world!" eradicated. In 1910 a perennial variety of teosinte was dis- Dr. Iltis has recommended that the mountain I P b covered. "" The variety discovered (Zea perennis) range where Zea diploperennis. was discovered be has the long-sought perennial properties, but un- established as a national park. Instead, he reports, fortunately it has 40 chromosomes and can not be the area is being deforested to provide jobs and crossed with modern corn, which has 20 chro- to supply wood for making broom handles. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 291 Plant breeders around the world are aware of in numbers, and programs for their genetic im- the rapid rate at which species are being lost, and provement are often weak. Native poultry and pig efforts are being made to protect genetic re- strains are also threatened in some developing sources. An International Board for Plant Genetic regions. Very little is known' about genetic re- Resources has been established in Rome with sources for goats, water buffalo, camels, alpacas, U.N. and 'national government funding. The llamas, cultivated fish species, and other domes- Board is encouraging a variety of seed collection, ticated animal varieties. "" Therefore it is not pos- storage, and documentation schemes. "' The U.S. sible to evaluate the loss of genetic diversity Department of Agriculture maintains an exten- among these types of livestock as readily as among sive collection of crop plant specimens which in- crop plants and their progenitors. cludes more then 60,000 small-grain specimens, but concern is increasing over corporate control Minor Genetic Failure of genetic resources. Seed companies owned by Regardless of whether major disasters occur, multinational conglomerates have large private it is clear that further development (or even main- seed reserves and are lobbying the U.S. Congress tenance) of genetically specialized, high-yield 116a to extend patent protection to plant varieties. crop strains that are also defensible against pests The institutes responsible for breeding Green and diseases will be increasingly difficult. There Revolution varieties are developing and expand- will be occasional pest and pathogen outbreaks ing their collections, and the Soviet collections are from genetic failures, i.e., when the natural or as extensive as our own, if not more so. But as inbred resistance of a plant (or animal) strain is plant geneticist Jack Harlan has pointed out, overcome by pests or pathogens. Many plant many of these collections leave much to be de- breeders now expect a new variety of wheat to sired: last only about a decade before pests and path- I know these collections too well. Some are better ogens evolve a way around the variety's defen- than others; some are better maintained than oth- ses. I The high-yield Mexican wheats that touched ers. All are incomplete and shockingly deficient off much of the Green Revolution were carefully in some kinds of materials. They tend to be enor- bred for resistance to stem rust, leaf rust, and mously redundant in certain races showing seem- stripe rust. Recently, however, this resistance ap- ingly endless repetition of combinations and pears to have begun to break down, and 10 years permutations of common items and are cluttered appears to be the longest that a wheat variety can with accessions that float from experiment station withstand the constantly evolving attack of the to experiment station. On the other hand, some three rusts. ' As a result, peasant and commercial races are hardly represented 'at all and, the wild farmers using high-yield seeds will have to learn and weedy gene pools are conspicuously missing. In no collection is there an adequate sampling of to shift varieties when the ones they are using the spontaneous races that are the most likely become vulnerable. Furthermore, the production sources of disease and pest resistance. On the and distribution of seed will have to be developed whole, the collections we have are grossly inad- to the point that one major variety can be sub- equate for the burden they will have to bear. "" stituted for another over large areas on very short This narrowing of the gene pool may hinder notice. * plant breeding in coming years: Traits possessed The trends point to problems for plant breed- by local plants (such as tolerance to adverse and ers. When favored strains cease to be effective, eroding soil conditions or insect and bird preda- good monitoring and management may be capa- tiory), which may be required by the high-yielding ble of limiting losses, but difficulties will mount. varieties to adapt them to local environmental As the probability of plant epidemics increases conditions, may be lost. (due to inbreeding, decreased species disease re- Animal genetic resources are facing problems like those affecting the pool of plant genes. Local *A far better approach might be to simply avoid monocultures breeds of livestock are disappearing almost as rap- altogether. Plant pathologist J. Artie Browning has described the advantages of diverse cultures modeled on natural eco- idly as are local crop strains. Due to artificial in- systems. He notes: "When used as part of a diverse [plant] semination, changes in livestock populations that population, a frequency of only about 30% [resistant plant might formerly have taken centuries now take strain] can be considered adequate protection against the most place in a few decades. About 80 percent of the vrulent and prevalent group of strains of the pathogen!" ("Relevance of Knowledge About Natuial Ecosystems to De- cattle strains indigenous to Europe and the Med- velopment of Pest Management Programs for Agro-Ecosys- iterranean are threatened with extinction. Else- tems," Proceedings of the American Phytopathological Society, where, many of the tropical cattle strains are low 1974, pp. 191-99.) 292 THE PROJEMONS sistance, and monoculture) and as the number of future the number of human lives at risk may not genetic resources available declines (due to loss be in the millions (as was the case in the Irish of wild habitat and the replacement of local strains '-potato famine-) but in the tens or even hundreds with, high-yield varieties), major food losses will of millions. While the magnitude of the risks in- be increasingly difficult and costly to avoid. volved cannot be measured precisely, the world's The less developed countries in the tropics may history of crop failures due to pests and diseases be particularly susceptible to genetic crop failures (including the recent U..S. corn blight) demon- in the years ahead. The traditional staple foods strates that the probabilities of a major failure are and export crops of the tropics are often more not negligible. Furthermore, the costs of everi a vulnerable than the global staples, either because minor failure would be so high they might offset they are propagated asexually (with the conse- the gains in yields expected from extensive mon- quence that all plants in a large area are geneti- ocultures of high-yield varieties. cally identical) or because the present collections of their genetic material are very limited--or Food and Nonrenewable Fossil Fuels both. " Notable among such vulnerable crops are: plantation crops, such as rubber, oil palm, coffee i Modern high-yield agriculture is heavily de- and cocoa (whose seeds resist normal methods of pendent on fossil fuel inputs.* As Philip Handler, storage with the result that the collectionsof germ President of the National Academy.of Sciences, plasm are extremely limited); and tropical roots has observed, and tubers, such as yams, taro, sweet potato, and The great gains in cereal production have oc- cassavas (which are both extremely difficult to curred where modern energy-intensive agricul- store and are commonly propagated by dividing ture-as developed in the United States, largely roots, a form of propagation that leads to genet- with federal research support-has combined ap- ically identical plantings). " For crops such as plied genetics, irrigation, pesticides and herbi these, the stage is set for disasters on the scale. of cides, fertilizer and mechanization to the increase that ruined ICeylon's co of [email protected] In effect,,modern agriculture utilizes the coffee blight ffee in suiilight to transmute fossil uels into edible dustry and the potato blight that struck Ireland. crops.ns Genetic engineering may, at some point, reduce dependence on naturally evolved sources of dis- The gains and dev 'elopments noted by Dr. Han- ease-resistant genetic -material, but to date there dler are, illustrated in the U.S. corn (maize) data has been little success in the use of induced mu- presented in Table 13-19 (inputs and outputs ex- tations for generating agriculturally useful plant pressed in common measures) and Table 13-20 varieties. ' Plant cell culturing might eventually (inputs and output expressed in energy equiva- improve photosy .nthetic efficiency and the amino lents). Perhaps most notable are the declining la- acid balance in plants (from the human point of bor input and the increasing energy inputs through view). and lead to asexual propagation of crop machinery, gasoline, fertilizers, pesticides, her- plants. "' Should this happen, the World may face bicides,' drying, irrigation, electricity, and trans- even greater genetic uniformityin crops. , - porItation. Yields also increase-by, 138 percent Areas in which science and technology could from 1945 to 1970-but on a list of the 20 major definitely help in combatting genetic vulnerability world food crops and nations that regularly* include increased systematization of existing col- achieve the highest yields per hectare of each, the lections, computerized reference systems, better United States, as of 1974, does not appear even international exchange of plant disease informa- once . 2`6 Furthermore, the energy input table tion, improved warning systems, genetic hetero- shows that the number of calories returned in food geneity in agro-ecosystems, and live collections energy per calorie of input energy declines by al- in , Or-otected, representative ecosystems. most 25 percent over the 1945-70 period. Overall, the, U.S. now.uses the equivalent of approximately By the Year 2000 80 gallons of gasoline to grow an acre of corn. If present trends continue, increasing numbers of Increases in energy inputs have been observed people will be dependent on the genetic strains throughout the entire U.S. food,system. Process- of perhaps only two dozen plant and animal spe- ing, packaging,. and distribution in all ultramodern cies. These strains will be highly inbred, and the food systems. require.about three times as much plant strains may have reduced pest and disease energy as the production itself. The overall en- resistance and may be plant ed in large, contiguous mohocultures. Plant and animal epidemics will implications of high ir e' The e nergy prices for the Global 2000 occur as they have in the past, except that in the Study's food projections are discussed in Chapter 6. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 293 TABLE 13-19 Average Energy Inputs per Acre in U.S. Corn Production, 1940-70 Input 1945 1950 1954 1959 1964 1970 Labor (hours per acre) 18 17 14 11 9 Machinery (thousands of kilocalories) 180 256 300 350 Q0 420 Gasoline (gallons) 15 17 19 20 21 22 Nitrogen (pounds) 7 15 27 41 58 112 Phosphorus (pounds) 7 10 12 16 18 31 Potassium (pounds) 5 10 18 30 29@ 60 Seeds for planting (bushels) 0.17 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.33 0.33 Iffigatio i (thousands of kilocalories) 19 23 27 31 34 34 Insectici Jes (pounds) .0 0.10 0.30 0.70 1.00 1.00 Herbickes (pounds) .0 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.38 1.00 Drying (thousands of kilocalories) 10 60 100 120 120 Electricity (thousands of kilocalorie's) 32 54 100 140 203 310 Transportation (thousands of kilocalories) 20 30 45 60 70 70, Corn yi(Ads (bushel) 34 38 41 54 68 81 Source: D Pimentel et al., "Food Production and the Energy Crisis,-Science, Nov. 2.1973. pp. 443-4& TABLE 13-20 Energy Inputs in U.S. Corn Production,(in kilocalories) Input 1945 1950 1954 1959 1964 1970 Labor, 12,500 9,9W 9,300 7,600 6,000 4,900 Machinuryl 180,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 420,000 420,000 Gasolini-I 543,400 615,800 W300 724,500 760,700 797,000 Nitrogen' 58,800 126,000 226,800 144,400 487,200 940,800 Phosphorus, 10,600 15,200- 18,200 24,300 27,400 47,100 Potassit-ml 5,200 10,500 50,400 60,400 68,000 68,000. Seeds for plantings 34,000 40,400 18,900 36,500 30,400 63,000 Irrigatic nh 19,000 23,000 31,000 34,000 34,000 Insectic ides' 0 1,100 3,300 7,700 11,000 11,000 HerbicidesJ 0 1 1 . 600 1,100 2,800 4,200 11,000 Drying' 10,000 30,000 60,000 100,000 120,000 120,000 Electricity' 32,000 54,000 100,000 140,000 203,000 310,000 Transportation- 20,000 30,000 45,000 60,000 70,000 70,000 Total irputs 925,500 1,206,400 1.,548,300 1,889,200 2,241,900 2,896,800 Corn yield (output)* 3,427,200 3,830,400 4,132,800 5,443,200 6,854,400 8,164,8W Kcal return/input kcal 3.70, 3.18 2.88 .3.06 2.82, Source: E avid Pimentaret al., "Food Production and the Energy Cfisis.-@cfeAc e. Nov. 2.1973. p. 445. It is ass imed that a farm laborer consumes 21,777 kcal per wce%C and works a 40-hour v eek. For 1970, from Table 13-117: (9 hours/40 hours per week) x 21,770 one season: Since only 3.8 percent of the corn acres arc*irTigated (1964-40). it was kcal per i week = 4,900 kcal. estimated that only 34.000 kcal were used per acre for corn irrigation. The per. bThe ma;hinery needed to farm'62 acres of corn was estimated to have required. centage of acres irrigated in 1945 was based on trends in irrigated acres in agri- 244,555,00 kcal. This machinery was assumed to function for 10 years. Repairs culture. were asst med to be 6 percent of total machinery production. Hence. acomservativc Insecticides: I pound 11.000 kcal. including production and processing. estimate or the production and repair of farm machinery Per acre of corn for 1970 Herbicides: I pound 11,000 kcal, including production an& processing. was 420,M) kcal. 'A high for the number of tractors and other types of machinery When corn is dried for storage, to reduce the moisture from about 1-6.5 percent on farms was reached in 1964 and continues. The number of tractors and other to 13 percent. 408,204 kcal are needeed to dry 91 bushels (Corn Grower's Guide. types of j nachinery in 1945 were-about half what they are now. - Aurora, Ill.: Grace and Co., 1968. p. 113). About 30 percent of the corn produced c Gasoline: I gallon = 36,225 kcal. in 1970 was estimated to have been dried, as compared toan estimated 10 percent dNitrogcn: I pound = 8,400 kcal, including production and processing. in 1945. Phosph 3rus: I pound = 1,520 kcal, including mining and processing. 1 In 1976. agriculture consumed about 310.000 kcal per acre for fuel used toproduce Potassitim: I pound = 1.050 kcal. including mining and processing. electricity. Corn se ed: I pound = 1,800 kcal. This energy input was doubled because of the The number of calories burned to transport machinery and supplies to corn acres effort en ployed in producing hybrid seed corn. and to transport corn to the site of use was estimated t(V t, about 7(1.(XX) kcal per h Only al)out 3.8 percent of the corn grain acres in the United Stateswere irrigated actic in 1%4 and 1970 and about 20.000 kcal per acre in 1945. in 1%4. ind this is not expected to change much in the near future. Art estimated A bushel of corn was considered to weight 56 pounds. and each pound was 905,600 ccal is required to irrigate an acre of corn with an acre-foot of water for assumed to contain 1.800 kcal. 294 THE PROJECnONS ergy requirements of the U.S. food system are nourishment) of an energy supply interruption illustrated in Figure 13-5. On a per capita basis, might well become twice what it is today. David Pimental estimates that U.S. crop produc- In the long run, agriculture becomes vulnerable tion alone requires about 112 gallons of gasoline through reliance on a depleting resource. David 29 per person per year. Pimentel estimates that if the world's petroleum The commercial energy requirements for mod- reserves were used exclusively to provide the ern and traditional production of rice and corn world's population with the average U.S. diet as (maize) are compared in Table 13-21. The only now produced with modern, energy-intensive ag- commercial energy input in traditional agriculture ricultural methods, the entire 415 billion barrel is the energy used in making simple tools and reserve would last a mere 29 years---or 107 years implements. But when the commercial energy in- if all potential reserves (about 2,000 billion bar- puts are low, the yields are also low. In transi- rels) became available. If the world population tional agriculture, more commercial energy is were to subsist on corn grain only, the same po- used especially for machinery, fuel, fertilizer, pes- tential petroleum reserves would provide enough ticides, improved seeds, and transportation. In energy to supply food for a p opulation of 10 billion transitional agriculture commercial energy inputs for 448 years!"' may increase by a factor of 10 or more over the The prospect of increasing energy dependence commercial energy used in traditional agriculture. and vulnerability in agriculture has led to some Yields may more than double. Modern agriculture preliminary examinations of alternative ap- involves commercial energy inputs that are more proaches. 11" Most of the options so far examined than 100 times those of traditional agriculture. involve relatively small farm units, less' substitu- Yields achieved are double to triple those achieved tion of fossil energy for human energy and skill, with traditional agriculture. '8' and the use of "intermediate 11 or "appropriate" The energy intensiveness of high-yield agricul- technologies. "I I . . . ture has been studied extensively"' and is dis- .The prospect of relatively small farm units cussed briefly in the food projections in Chapter raises questions of economic efficiency, and it is 6. While the concerns that have emerged cannot encouraging to note that the U.S. Department of be discussed in any detail here, a few need to be Agriculture, in its publication "The One-Man mentioned. Farm," considers that food production on a small scale can be as efficient as production on a larger The basic concern is that in becoming highly scale: dependent on fossil fuels, modern high-yield ag- The fully mechanized one-man farm, producing riculture is also becoming vulnerable-both in the the maximum acreage of crops of which the man short and the long run. In the short run (the next and his machines are capable, is@generally a tech- two decades), energy-intensive agriculture will nica@lly efficient farm. From the standpoint of costs become -increasingly vulnerable to-the vicissitudes per unit of production, this size farm captures of- -the energy sector. Even now a sudden price most of the economies associated with size. The increase or a sudden interruption of petroleum or chief incentive for farm enlargement beyond the natural gas supplies could severely affect world oftimum one-man size is not to reduce unit costs agricultural production, raise food prices, and in- o production, but to achieve a larger business, crease the numbers of people who cannot afford more output, and more total income.'" adequate food. * If the energy intensiveness of Encouraging as -some of the preliminary inves- agriculture continues to increase over the next two tigations are, two points must be kept in mind. decades as implied by the projections, the poten- First, present trends are overwhelmingly in the tial disruptiveness (measured in terms of the num- direction of further energy intensiveness of agri- bers of persons unable to obtain adequate culture; major technological and policy changes would be required to reverse this trend. Second, *In this connection it should be noted that energy-intensive food is "inexpensive" in the United States only because per (and cotton and rubber) to earn foreign exchange, even though capita income is high by world standards. U.S. costs of pro- their Own populations'ar6'mainourished. Land tenure is a con- duction in the U.S. are high compared to those of many other tributing factor. Much good farmland in the LDCs (and in- countries. For example, the cost of producing 1,000 kcal of creasingly in the industrialized nations) is held by landlords plant product is estimated to be about $38 in the U.S. and or corporations and is farmed for export, not local consump- about $10 in India (Pimental et al., "Food Production and the tion. Such exports, if they develop significantly, would also Energy Crisis," Science, Nov. 2, 1973, p. 448). Because many affect the U.S. balance of payments (CIA National Foreign LDCs can produce food less expensively than the U.S., some Assessment Center, "The Role of the LDCs in the U.S. Bal- observers expected LDCs to export significant amounts of food ance of Payments," Washington, Sept. 1978). ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 295 0.15 Machinery manufacture Potential food, feed and fibre produced 0. 45 Drying 80 4-- 0.70 Irrigation 4- 1.30 Field operations +@ 1.75 other petroleum 2.65 Chemicals Crop residue Food,feed and fibre utilized 7.0 TOTAL FOSSIL FUEL 19A 60 USED FOR PRODUCTION Expo s Domestic food and feed 55 Non -food 0.25 Animal feed Grain Hay and Grazing Human silage land food 14 27 6 By-product feedd Animal feed *2. 5 Manure 51.5 25.5 44 1.5 Farm livestock operations 0.5 Feed mandacture 2.0 4 5 +Aii- Food processing * Animal 2 0 2 5 metabolism 41" Transportation li4 3 0 2.5 41*0 Wholesale-retail &4 Processing waste 6.0 parat 4 0 Waste 0. 4 Food pre Ion and by-products 15.0 TOTAL 13.5 1.0 FOSSIL FUEL USED I Energy in AFTER PRODUCTION animal products Energy in 1.9 vegetative products 3.1 Annual supply per Caput of dietary energy Figure 13-5. Energy flow in the U.S, food chain, in billions of joules. (From The State of Food and Agriculture 1976, FA 0, 1977; adapted from F. C. Stickler et al., Energy from Sun to Plant, to Man, Deere & Co., 1975). TABLE 13-21 Commercial Energy Required for Rice and Corn (Maize) Production, by Modern, Transitional, and Traditional Methods Rice Maize Modern Transitional Traditional Modern Traditional (United States) (Philippines) (Philippines) (United States) (Mexico) Quantity per Energy per Quantity per Energy per Quantity per Energy per Quantity per Energy per Quantity Energy Input hectare hectare hectare hectare hectare hectare hectare hectare per ha. per ha. I& joules HP joules & joules & joules 10'joules Machinery and implements' 4.2 X 10" joules 4,200 335 x 106 joules 335 173 x 101 joules 173 4.2 X 10' joules 4,200 173 x 10' 173 joules Fuelb 224.7 liters 8,988 40 liters 1,600 - - 206 liters 8,240 - - Nitrogen fertilizer, 134.4 kg 10,752 31.5 kg 2,520 - - 125 kg lo,ooo - - Phosphate fertilizer4 - - - - - 34.7 kg 586 - - Potassium fertilizer, 67.2 kg 605 - - - - 67.2 kg 605 - - trl Seeds' 112.0 kg 3,360 110 kg 1,650 107.5 kg - 20.7 kg 621 10.4 kg - Irrigation b 683.4 liters 27,336 - - - - 351 X 106 joules 351 - - Insecticidess 5.6 kg 560 1.5 kg 150 - - 1. 1 kg 110 - - 2 Herbicidess 5.6 kg @560 1.0 kg too - - 1. 1 kg Ito - - Drying 4.6 x 101 joules 4,6001 - - 1,2.39 x 10' 1,239 - joules 0 Electricity 3.2 x I(r joules 3,2W - - - 3,248 x 101 3,248 - joules Transport 724 x 100 joules 7241 31 x 10' joules 31 - - 724 X 106joules 724 - Total 64,885 6,386 173 30,034 173 Yield (kglha) 5,800 2,700 1,250 5,083 950 Energy input yield per unit (10' joules1kg) 11.19 2.37 0.14 5.91 0.18 Source: Food and Agriculture Organization. The State of Food and Agriculture 1976, Rome, 1977. p. 93 6 Energy input to produce I kg of equipment assumed to be 68.7 x W6 joules b One litCT of fuel assumed to contain 40 x 106 joules. ' Production of I kg of nitrogen fertilizer assumed to require FA) X 10 joules. d Production of I kg of phosphate fertilizer assumed to require 14 x III, joules. . Production of I kg of potassium fertilizer assumed to require 9 x 106 joules. f Production of I kg of high-quality seed assumed to require 30 x 10 joules in the United States and 15 x Ifl' joules in the Philippines and Mcxico. I Production of I Its of pesticide assumed to require IW x 106. a Assumed to be similar to figures given for maize by David Pimental et al.. "Fotw] Protluction and the Energy Crisis."' Science. No%. 2. 1973. p. 444. ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 297 population growth may make energy-intensive a depletable, nonrenewable resource, required agriculture inevitable. The People's Republic of for production of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, China has probably been more successful than any and fertilizers and for mechanization and irri- other country in developing its agriculture with gation. Wate;, too, is a basic agricultural re- minimum energy requirements. The Chinese ex- source, but an exhaustible resource of finite perience and other experiments' demonstrate extent, threatened by competing uses, dissolved clearly that there are alternatives to the most en- salts, and acid rain.. ergy-intensive agricultural methods. Yet even The knowledge, technologies, and management China has been forced by the food needs of an techniques needed to protect the basic, depletable expanding population to import energy-rich resources of agriculture are generally established, chemical fertilizers and has contracted for the con- but often not known or available where they are struction of 13 large nitrogen fertilizer plants.'" most needed. Careful 'cultivation practices and well-known techniques of terracing, for example, Conclusions can reduce soil losses. The preservation of habitat It has often been observed that agricultural re- for the maintenance of genetic stocks requires no sources are renewable: A hectare of farmland can elaborate technologies. But the technological grow as many as three crops annually; soil fertility knowledge and capital necessary to successfully can be maintained and often improved; biomass use marginal soils is not available to many of the, can be consumed and yet grow again another year. farmers who will be forced to use these soils in While these points are all true, they do not pro- the years ahead. Similarly the skills needed for vide an adequate perspective for consideration of safe and effective use of fertilizers or for alter- agricultural prospects in the decades ahead, par- native methods of pest control are not widely ticularly beyond the year 2000. available in many less developed countries. There are three critically important facts to be Although further research is certainly called for kept in mind when considering agricultural pros- (e.g., the atmospheric effects of nitrous oxide pects for the future. First, agriculture is now and from fertilizer applications is not known with cer- will continue to be based largely on depletable tainty), the skills and technologies needed to limit resources. Second, at present these depletable virtually all of the environmental pressures im- resources--crucial to the maintenance and re- plicit in the Global 2000 Study's food projections newal of land, water, and other renewable agri- are already available. The big question is: Will cultural resources-are being consumed, these skills and technologies be used? extinguished, and eroded at rates that cannot be There is no clear answer to this question. Con- sustained indefinitely. Third, for the foreseeable flicts are involved. The need to increase agricul- future, there is no end in sight to increasing pop-' tural production will certainly continue since a ulation levels and to escalating needs for agricul- large fraction of the world's population is inade- tural production. quately nourished even now and since throughout The depletable nature of a number of basic ag- the foreseeable future the world's population. is ricultural resources has been given inadequate, projected to, continue growing. Historically, in- attention in the past. There has even been occa- creases in agricultural production have come both sional confusion as to what the basic resources of from increasing the lands under cultivation and agriculture are. Biomass is not a basic agricultural from increasing yields per hectare. Options for resource, but genetic stocks of crop plants and of increasing the lands under cultivation are now lim- domestic animals and beneficial insects are. These -ited and expensive, and becoming more so. agricultural resources are being depleted or ren- Therefore efforts to increase yields on lands al- dered extinct at an accelerating rate that alarms ready under cultivation can be expected to inten- many scientists. Soil is a basic agricultural re- sify. Unless marginal lands are introduced with source, but it is a depleting, salifying, and eroding skill and moderation, and unless efforts to in- resource. Lost soil fertility often can be restored, crease yields are carefully managed, environmen- but only after long periods of time and at great tal stresses will follow-erosion, laterization, cost. Furthermore, in some instances soil fertility alkalinization, salinization, waterlogging, urban simply cannot be renewed: Soils lost by erosion, encroachment, and loss of plant, animal, and pre- by urban and industrial expansion, and by hy- dator-insect species. If unabated, these stresses droelectric development are permanent losses for could lead initially to a significant reduction in the agriculture. Solar energy is, a basic agriculturat expansion of food production and in time to a resource, but fossil fuels are too. Fossil fuels are serious reduction in the world's capacity to main- 298 THE PROJECTIONS tain food production. As noted in the beginning environmental protection and to finance ecolog- of this section, the Global 2000 food projections ically positive technologies and management tech- are based on the assumption that steps will be niques. Issues relating to land tenure will also be taken to keep the impact of these stresses in line important. ' Unfortunately, efforts to maintain with past experience. If these stresses are not con- and expand the productivity of agricultural re- trolled, they could bring into serious question sources often increase unit costs and reduce pro- even the modest increases in per capita food avail- duction, at least in the short run. In the face of ability projected in Chapter 6. increasing costs of food, it is uncertain that the To what extent will farmers, governments, and public support required to accomplish these ob- international organizations act to protect the jectives will be made even in the affluent indus- world's depletable agricultural resources? Several trialized nations-and far less certain in the nations have already faced the kinds of agricul- LI)Cs, which face the greatest pressures to in- turally related environmental pressures that are crease food production in years ahead. expected to occur worldwide. Some of these na- The agricultural and population policies that tions have successfully maintained or expanded nations develop over the next two decades will their agricultural capacities. The People's Repub- have lasting significance. The possibility of a se- lic of China and Israel are examples. Several other rious erosion and depletion of the world's de- nations, of which Haiti and Ethiopia are exam- pletable agricultural resources cannot be ignored. ples, have so far been unable to respond success- Unless the pressures on these resources are ad- fully. Most nations have yet to experience the dressed and resolved, at least in part before the pressures and face the policy decisions. year 2000, it appears virtually certain that the Success in efforts to protect depletable agricul- world's per capita food production will slow, stag- tural resources will require a concerted public ef- nate, or even decline during the first half of the fort to set priorities for both food production and 21st century. THE PROJECTIONS AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT The Projections Many of the Global 2000 projections and their implicit consequences have implications for the future of the marine environment. The projections that are most relevant are as follows: Population. A 45-65 percent increase in human population will lead to substantial increases in the amount of coastal development. Gross National Product. Coupled with projected population growth, dou- bling and tripling of GNPs will lead to global increases in water and airborne pollutants and to increases in economic activities-such as dredging and the construction of port facilities-that alter the coastal marine environment. Agriculture. An increase by a factor of 2.5 in global use of fertilizer, pesticides, and other yield-enhancing inputs will lead to a marked growth in the quantities of nutrients and toxic chemicals entering the marine environ- ment. Fisheries. The intense demand projected for fishery resources (83.5 mil- lion metric tons by 2000) will result in severe pressure on preferred stocks and increased exploitation of nontraditional, smaller, and shorter-lived spe- cies. Pollution and physical destruction of marine habitats will impede the growth of aquaculture in estuarine and coastal areas, effectively reducing the overall potential yields of living marine resources. . Forestry. A 15-20 percent decrease in the area under forest cover, with most of the reduction taking place in LI)Cs, will lead to a sizable increase in the silt loads of tropical river systems and thus to increased silt deposition in estuaries, deltas, and on adjacent coastal shelves. Water. Hydraulic engineering of freshwater systems will alter salinity concentrations and cyclic flows in estuaries, and will interfere with the life cycles of organisms that spend part of their lives in the ocean and part in freshwater. Because nutrients will be trapped behind new dams, the quantity and quality of estuarine and coastal productivity will be adversely affected. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 299 Energy. More offshore drilling, more marine transport of oil, and more portside storage and processing facilities will -be needed to sustain the pro- jected 3.3-4.4 percent annual increase in demand for oil. More petroleum pollutants will enter the oceans. Proliferation of onshore and offshore power plants will result in extensive use of oxidants and other biocides (especially chlorine) to prevent biological fouling in cooling towers, entrainment, and thermal pollution, altering the habitat of marine organisms. The increased use of nuclear energy may lead to accidental release or to deliberate disposal .of radioactive materials into the oceans.* Nonfuel Minerals. More mining wastes will be produced and more min- eral products will be in circulation, due in part to increased production of various minerals from lower grade ores. As a result, more of these wastes will enter the earth's air and freshwater systems and, eventually, the oceans. Of particular concern are toxic wastes resulting from increased production of several heavy metals. Chromium production is projected to increase an- nually by 3.3 percent, copper by 2.9 percent, lead by 3.1 percent, mercury by 0.5 percent, and zinc by 3.1 percent. Increased industrial dredging for gravel and coral sands will also have significant local impacts. If initiated, deep-sea mining operations will produce locally disruptive effects on open- ocean ecosystems. In summary, while the projections are usually not sufficiently detailed to provide specific quantitative estimates, they do imply a variety of impacts on the marine environment. Worldwide population growth will contribute to increased economic development of the earth's coastlines and their estuaries. Industrial, agricultural, and domestic pollution, coupled with hydraulic en- gineering of freshwater systems, will adversely affect biological productivity in coastal waters and interfere with aquaculture. Growing demand for com- mercially preferred fish will increase pressures on these stocks. Overfishing may increase, and a growing proportion of the global catch will be composed of nontraditional species. Continued deforestation will lead to destructive silt deposition in river estuaries, deltas, and on adjacent coastal shelves. More energy-related pollutants-petroleum hydrocarbons, radioactive materials, and waste heat-will enter the oceans, and the increased production of various minerals will add to the amount of toxic wastes entering coastal waters. Dredging and deep-sea mining will disrupt coastal and oceanic ecosystems. Introduction water supply. So vast is this volume that more than 200,000 years would be needed by a river The earth is truly a water planet. The waters the size of the Amazon to drain the world's of the oceans cover 71 percent of the earth's sur- oceans. face and amount to 97 percent of the earth*s total For an understanding of the future of the *There are two emerging energy technologies that deserve ers, chemical anti-fouling treatments using chorine or other note here - Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) and biocides, and thermal shock. deep water hydrocarbon exploration. Neither of these tech- nologies are projected to be making a major contribution to Hydrocarbon exploration and production will occur in pro- the world's energy supplies by 1990 (where the DOE projec- gressively deeper waters, introducing into vulnerable oceanic tions stop), but both may be in early growth stages by 2000. ecosystems unprecedented quantities of drilling muds and cut- Both may have very significant impacts on the marine envi- tings, well treatment fluids, oily brines, natural gas flared un- ronment. derwater, and oil spills. oil spills are a special concern because . The OTEC technology utilizes the temperature difference production in oceanic waters will probably be by seabed sys- between the warm surface water and the cold deep water to tems rather than above-water platforms, making blowout re- generate electricity. OTEC plants are likely to be anchored pairs and spill cleanup operations particularly difficult. (Ocean in deep waters close to subtropical and tropical islands. Each Thermal Energy Conversion 197T Environmental Develop- plant may take in and discharge as much water as the flow of ment Plan (EDP), Washington: U.S. Department of Energy a large river. Environmental effects could include death of vast 1978; James J. Geraghty et al., World Atlas of the United numbers of plankton, and larvae of coastal and oceanic fishes States, Port Washington, N.Y.: Water Information Center, and benthic organisms by entrainmrit through heat exchang- 1973.) 300 THE PROJECTIONS MNOS ATMOSPHERE 14 FALLOUT. FALLOUT. SUSPENSION rION. PRECIPff ATION SPRAY, SUSPENSION ABSORPTION. ABSORPTION. OUTGASSING OUTGASSING -NOES . . I I I I I t RUNOFF t I EROSION SOIL SHORELINE EROSION I( OCEANS' GLACIAL TRANSPORT \1@ CURRENTS F WEATHERING C 1ICAL L FAL, OUT PRECIP,ITATION CRUSTAL MOTIONS t t SEDIMENTS AND ROCKS Figure 13-6. Transport mechanisms linking the oceans with the other principal parts of the physical world. (From Ecoscience: Population, Resources, Environment by Paul R. Ehrlich, Anne H. Ehrlich, and John P. Holdren. W. H. Freeman and Company, Copyright C 1977, p. 69) world's environment, the immensity of the oceans highly complex carbon and oxygen cycles, which, is important for two reasons. First, because of through photosynthesis in plants and respiration their size and other properties, the oceans have in most organisms, further link oceans, soil, and a major role in determining the energy flows and atmosphere. In the oceans, minute phytoplankton the macroenvironment of the entire planet. Thus annually fix 40 billion tons of carbon from carbon the condition of the oceans is of planetary signif- dioxide and release billions of tons of oxygen.2" icance. Second, the oceans' enormous size pro- Both oxygen and carbon dioxide gases are ex- vides a large amount of dilution and stability. As changed with the atmosphere. Settling and de- a result, change comes slowly to the oceans, and composition provide nutrients and energy to life changes are often difficult to detect and even more in the lower ocean-water strata. difficult to control. Although there are still uncertainties, the major The major flows involved in the oceans' influ- stabilizing functions of the oceans-the water, ence on the world's macroenvironment are illus- oxygen and carbon cycles-are not likely to be trated in Figure 13-6. Through evaporation, seriously disrupted over the next two decades. precipitation, and runoff, the oceans are linked The major impacts on the oceans are more likely with the atmosphere and soil in determining the to occur as a result of yet another function of the primary flows of solar energy and thus the planet's oceans, namely, as the ultimate receptacle for temperature distribution and climate. The mas- much of the world's unwanted waste materials- sive heat.storage capacity of the oceans is one of toxic substances, sediments, agricultural chemi- the strongest stabilizing influences on the planet's cals, oil, sewage, and solid litter. climate.. The flows toward the oceanic "sink" are also The absorption and outgassing flows noted in illustrated in Figure 13-6. Most of the waste flows r R t SION SHORE CI E]@G@ALL W Figure 13-6 are simplified representations of the start on land and move through runoff, dumping, ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 301 evaporation, precipitation, fallout, and absorp- Because of their enormous volume, ocean tion into the ocean waters. Marine transportation, waters are potentially capable of much dilution seabed oil development, and seabed mining also of polluting wastes. However, the ocean waters contribute to the flow of damaging wastes. themselves are not the ultimate. resting place for A major .impact on living marine resources is many wastes entering the oceans. Some materialf implied by the Global 2000 Study's projections. are biologically degraded; others are transported These resources now make an important contri-7 by particulate fallout and chemical precipitation bution to the economics, health, and welfare . of to the sediments of the ocean floor, as indicated many nations. Fisheries contribute about 2 per- in Figure 13-6. The rate at which wastes reach cent of the food calories consumed globally by various parts of the ocean is therefore important humans, and directly supply approximately 14 in determining their concentration and ultimate percent of the world's animal protein consumed fate. There is extreme variation in the times re- by humans. In a number of LDCs and industrial- quired. ized nations, such as Iceland, Japan, the Philip- There are two basic kinds of marine ecosys- pines, and Vietnam, animal protein from ocean tems: coastal and oceanic. Table 13-22 briefly organisms is a major component of the national describes these two ecosystems and indicates (1) diet, in some cases making up over one-half of the type of pollution affecting each kind, (2) the animal protein consumption.' Any reduction in effects of the pollution, and (3) the duration of calories and protein from the oceans will have the effects. One fact that stands out strikingly in serious implications for the populations of such the table is that the highly productive coastal areas. waters-including the world's estuaries, coastal Major changes in the composition of living ma- wetlands, reefs, and the many marginal seas over rine resources are anticipated, especially in the the continental shelves and slopes'-account for coastal waters. These changes will come about as only 10 percent of the total area of the global a result of habitat destruction and waste deposi- marine environment, whereas the relatively less tion and concentration, and particularly from pol- productive (biologically speaking) open oceans lutants such as synthetic organic chemicals and constitute 90 percent. heavy metals. In some areas habitat destruction An important distinction between coastal and is proceeding rapidly and is a major threat. Con- oceanic waters is the large difference in the du- tamination of the marine environment occurs at ration of effects from various pollutants, many of different rates in different areas. Its seriousness which have only relatively short-term effects in depends on a number of considerations. coastal waters. Although these effects are ex- TABLE 13-22 Categories of Ocean Areas and Types of,Pollution, with Effects on Uses and Their Duration Effects on Uses and Types of Pollution Pollution Trends Duration of Effects COASTAL WATERS (10 percent of total area; 99 Percent of total fish productiona) Sewage; industrial wastes; litter; petro- Living resources destroyed or rendered Short-term; mainly during period of dis- leum hydrocarbons unusable; industrial uses of seawater ad- charge versely influenced; amenities reduced; recreational values diminished Synthetic organic chemicals; metals; ra- Living resources decreased or rendered Long-term; metals and synthetic organic dioactivity unusable chemicals deposited in sediments may be released for a long time through normal leaching and/or dredging disturbance 'OPEN OCEAN (90 percent of total area; I percent of total fish production 1) Synthetic organic chemicals; metals; pe- Increasing concentrations in water and Long-term; duration depends on the res- troleum hydrocarbons; radioactivity organisms'may indicate dangerous trends idence time of pollutant Source: Nlichaell Waldichuk, Global Marine Pollution: An Overview, Paris: UNESCO, 1977, p. 12. Including fish production from upwelling area. Excluding fish production from upivelling area. 302 THE PROJECTIONS tremely serious in some instances, their intensity Coastal dredging is likely to,be extensive. The may be reduced rapidly after the discharge is ter- Global 2000 Study's minerals, technology, en- minated. Other pollutants can have longer-term ergy, population, and GNP projections indicate effects due to bioaccumulation and accumulated that offshore dredging for landfill, improved port sedimentary deposits. In the open ocean, pollu- and waterway facilities, and construction material tants have the potential to produce delayed ef- can be expected to continue. Coastal dredging of fects. In addition to bioaccumulation and anchorages and channels destroys the immediate interactions with coastal zone sediments, pollu- benthic area and, through sedimentation, can af- tant effects on the open ocean are prolonged, fect more distant zones. Commercial dredging of since most ocean waters below a depth of 100 gravel, coral, and coral sands is already conducted meters exchange with surface and coastal waters in many areas in waters as much as 100 meters in relatively slowly-usually over time periods on depth. the order of hundreds or thousands of years."' Marine transportation is still the cheapest, most Because deep open-ocean waters are so differ- energy-efficient mode of transporting materials in ent from coastal waters in the rate at which they bulk, and the Study's food, minerals, and energy receive and experience the effects of pollutants, projections suggest that it will accelerate at least these two major ocean areas will be considered as much over the next few decades as in the last separately. The implications of the Global 2000 few. Gross registered tonnages of ocean vessels Study projections for coastal waters are consid- have grown by 9 percent annually during recent ered first under the following topics: coastal de- years, while the volumes transported have in- velopment; coastal pollution; and overexploitation creased by 6-9 percent.' If present growth rates of living marine resources. continue, marine transport will have increased The implications of the projections for the deep three to sevenfold by- the year 2000. To accom- open-ocean waters must be examined separately. modate the increased marine traffic, existing port Not enough time will have elapsed by the year facilities will have to be expanded significantly, 2000 for projected developments to greatly affect and corresponding increases in secondary eco- these waters. The discussion of the open ocean, nomic activities and human settlement in coastal therefore, will be primarily in terms of the trends areas can be anticipated. Dredging, filling, pav- established over the next two decades that will ing, and construction of terminals, factories, set- ultimately have implications for oceanic ecosys- tlements, and service roads will increase noise, air tems. and water pollution, and will greatly reduce pro- Effects of Coastal Development ductivity, diversity, and stability of coastal and adjacent ecosystems. Increasing marine traffic The earth's coastal waters and ecosystems are may bring proportional increases in catastrophic important for human society because they are spills and chronic pollution from discharges of highly productive biologically and because they ballast and tank washings. However, international support a wide range of economic activities. These agreements requiring the use of navigation aids, ecosystems are strongly influenced by changes in segregated ballast tanks, and other features to the physical and biological conditions of the reduce oil pollution should diminish adverse ef- coastal seabed and adjacent land.' Many of the fects of increased marine traffic. 303a Global 2000 Study's projections suggest a variety A less widely recognized problem is "biological of coastal developments that can be expected to pollution," the introduction of nonnative species cause extensive and adverse changes in the bio- into coastal ecosystems. Newly introduced species logical productivity of the world's coastal zones. freed of their natural predators, parasites, and In the next two decades, a significant conse- competitors can severely disrupt food webs, di- quence of many of the Global 2000 projections versity, and stability and may effectively eliminate will be a dramatic growth in coastal development. valuable native living marine resources. Besides Population pressures will lead to rapid rates of marine transportation-related sources of biologi- coastal settlement and urbanization, especially in cal introduction such as ballast waters, bio-fouling LDCs. Rivers emptying into estuaries will be dammed to ensure adequate supplies of water for on vessels and mobile drilling rigs, and sea level burgeoning metropolitan areas and agriculture. canals, normative species may be introduced de- Rising GNPs and energy demand will encourage liberately or acciden 'tally, as in clumps of trans- the expansion of coastal industrial facilities, and planted oysters.101b the consequent development will have serious Once, established, settlements, factories, refin- impacts upon the marine environment. eries, power plants, and port facilities along the ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 303 coastal zones are not easily-nor are they likely coastline stabilization. Lush salt marshes also pro- to 'be-rel6cated. Furthermore there is a limit to vide a habitat for a wide variety of fish, shellfish,, the modification feasible should their presence or wildfowl and mammals. Many ducks, geese and their delayed, indirect environmental impact prove other waterfowl use coastal wetlands as resting severely damaging to coastal ecosystems. The ex- stations and feeding grounds during migratory pected result of the next two decades of devel- movements. Fish such as Bounder and bluefish opment along coastlines is. damaging physical may make transient use of marshes for feeding, a.1teration or total destruction of habitat-partic- overwintering or as nurseries.m ularly in estuaries and wetlands and on coral Like salt marshes and estuaries, tropical man- reefs-that will adversely affect marine organisms grove communities are highly productive. The net and natural nutrient and waste cycling processes. primary production from mangrove ecosystems is utilized by a variety of organisms in a complex, Impacts on Estuaries and Coastal Wetlands detritus-based food web. As a transitional eco- Estuaries,* and the salt marshes and mangrove logical belt, mangroves serve to protect the shore- communities that make up coastal wetlands, are line, are a source of raw materials for human globally widespread. One third of the population populations, act as a shelter for bird and mammal of the United States lives and works in regions species, and are nursery and breeding -grounds for surrounding estuaries, and of the 10-largest'met- freshwater and marine organisms. A large num- ropolitan areas in the world, seven border existing ber of commercially important fish and shellfish or former estuarine regions (New York, Tokyo, of the tropical coastal waters depend directly or London, Shanghai, Buenos Aires, Osaka, and indirectly on mangrove communities for food and Los Angeles). Estuaries and coastal wetlands ac- shelter during their lives.' cumulate natural rivcrborne sediments as well as The water, food, climate, and population pro- wastes from nearby urban areas. Nutrients are jections imply that future water-supply and con- cycled in estuaries and wetlands. Large phyto- servation efforts may include construction of plankton and zooplankton populations responsi- freshwater dams and irrigation works. However ble for the high productivity of global coastal useful these projects may be, they may reduce the fisheries, as well as benthic plant production, al- diversity, productivity, and stability of the marine gae, salt marsh grasses, seagrasses and mangrove environment. Already, the damming of rivers communities result from this rich nutrient supply. flowing into estuaries reduces the size of wetlands It is estimated that 60-80 percent of the com- and diminishes the flow and alters periodicity of mercial marine fisheries species are dependent freshwater entering the coastal zone. As yet, little upon estuarine ecosystems during part or all of definitive information is available with. which to their life cycles.' anticipate the ultimate effect of such human ma- Salt marshes and mangrove communities are nipulation of the hydrology of salt marshes and distributed all over the world and are either as- mangrove communities,"' but it can be reasona- sociated with estuaries or coastal barrier is- bly expected that global damming or diversion of lands." Intertidal salt marshes are an exceptionally estuarine river systems will disturb or destroy fertile part of coastal zone estuarine ecosystems. many estuarine habitats for fish and wildli 'fe, and Salt marsh grasses recycle mineral and organic will disrupt the normal processes;of nutrient sup- nutrients entering the marsh environment, cre- ply and cycling. As a consequence, estuarine 6co- ating an area of biological productivity that can systems.and their distribution and abundance of yield 10 tons of organic material per acre per plants and animals can be expected to be signif- year.' Cyclic tidal flooding circulates detritus icantly altered."' and dissolved nutrients to other marsh areas and Salt marshes have historically been filled or to offshore organisms. Much of the decomposing dredged to accommodate the needs of human set- plant matter goes to the floor of the marsh, pro- tlements, agriculture, and industry the world ducing rich deposits of organic peat. Ultimately, over."' The alteration of salt marsh wetlands con- low tidal marshes can actually build themselves tinues today for the establishment of new resi- up and out of the tidal range,' contributing to dences, for recreation, and industry. In the United States, commercial "finger-fill" lagoons have "Estuary" has been used to describe the lower reaches of a been dredged out of salt marsh to provide docking river in which seawater mixes with freshwater. The definition space for marinas and land -for housing sites.311 can be expanded to include bays, inlets, gulfs, and sounds into Salt marshes have been dredged for boat and ship which several rivers empty and in which the mixing of fresh- and saltwater occurs. (Charles B, Officer, "Physical Ocean- harbors in the course of commercial developnient ography of Estuaries," Oceanus, Fall 1976, p. 4). of coastal barrier islands as well.3" These practices 304 THE PROJECTIONS are environmentally detrimental. Instead of the mangrove areas along the coasts of the Ameticas, healthy flushing of salt marsh organic matter into Africa, east and west Malaysia, the Philippines, adjacent waters, the organic matter collects on Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, east and west In- the stagnant canal bottoms, depleting the oxygen dia, east and south Australia, and south Thai- from the canal waters, thus killing or driving away land." valuable fish and shellfish."' Leftover dredge spoils from channel and boat basin construction- Impacts on Coral Reefs and from their subsequent maintenance dredg- The loss to the marine environment of coral ing-often have been dumped on nearby undis- reef ecosystems is great. Coral reefs are among turbed wetlands, where they smothered established the most extensive and productive shallow marine plant life and bottom-dwelling animals, polluted communities."' Reef habitats, comparable in soil and water, and drastically altered the overall complexity and diversity to tropical rain forests, 322 topography of the marsh." Dredge spoils are provide food and shelter for approximately one- often dumped in offshore coastal waters, and the third of all fish species and for seemingly countless resulting spoil deposits smother and intoxicate invertebrates., some of which contain or produce benthic organisms. Sediments mobilized and re- a wide range of pharmacologically active com- suspended by bottom currents and upwellings can pounds. In addition, reefs function as buffers also move the spoil material inshore, or pollute against ocean forces. As self-repairing, energy- 315a more removed areas. dissipating breakwaters, they protect thousands Salt marsh lands have been regarded globally of miles of continental and island coastlines from as prime areas for industrial siting. Marshes also erosion in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the bear the brunt of the often environmentally de- Central and South Pacific and the Caribbean.'2' structive aftermath of economic development. Coral reefs in the U.S. Virgin Islands', Micro-' For example, new refineries, power stations, and nesia, the Seychelles, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas,, dikes are being planned for construction on Hawaii, and Florida have been damaged or de-' marshy European coastlines."" Rivers carrying stroyed entirely as a result of poorly planned and industrial pollutants contaminate their own es- managed Idredging." Continued destruction of tuarine marshes as well as those adjoining or con- coral reef habitats through dredging activities will nected by coastal currents; chemicals, metals, and ultimately affect the marine environment and its petroleum pollutants carried to the sea in the coastal productivity and protection capabilities. Rhine River have tended to move northward to In short, anticipated coastal development will pollute the Wadden Zee tidal flats in the Neth- lead to large-scale destruction of estuaries, coastal erlands. j17 C, r wetlands (salt marshes and mangroves), and coral Mangrove ecosystems are also fa ng destruc- reefs. Notwithstanding the vital role of these areas tion through development. In many countries with in maintaining coastal productivity and protec- large and rapidly expanding populations, man- tion, coastal development during the present cen-' grove areas are seen as areas for human settle- tury has already reduced the total world acreage ment and zones of more intensive exploitation- significantly."' as in southern Florida, U.S.A., where extensive If present trends continue throughout the next areas of.mangrove have been bulldozed and.then two decades, the increases in human population filled with dredged sediments to create land for density and industrial and commercial activity will housing developments."' have yet more substantial effects on the biological Mangrove communities have been destroyed to productivity of the oceans' coastal waters. The' make way for other forms of land use such as fish habitats provided by estuaries, salt marshes, man- ponds, urban development, and industrial sites. grove communities, and reefs will suffer the Coastal mining, logging without replanting, and stresses of coastline development, and their loss military defoliation have destroyed mangroves as will contribute significantly to changes in size and well .319 Destructive influences on mangrove com- species composition of the global fisheries catch. munities also include the diversion or regulation of freshwater streams and rivers. The resulting Coastal Pollution reduction of freshwater flows cause estuarine soils to become excessively salinized, a condition in Coastal waters the world over constantly re- which mangroves cannot survive. As a result of ceive direct injections of polluting materials through these varied development practices during the river discharge, coastal outfalls, dumping, and 1960s and 1970s, there has been widespread and atmospheric transport .36 The agriculture, popu- rapid degradation or destruction of extensive lation, minerals, forestry, and energy projections ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 305 suggest that the amount of pollutants entering the Toxic substances include those that are carcin- coastal zones will increase between now and the ogenic (causing cancer), mutagenic (producing ye ar 2000. Toxic chemical contamination, as yet mutations), and teratogenic (causing birth de- largely uncontrolled, is likely to have the most fects). Many toxic substances possess two--or damaging impact. While only a small number of even all three-of these specific properties. , all toxic chemicals are of agricultural origin, even Over 4 million chemical compounds have been the projected increases in pesticide and herbicide reported to the American Chemical Society for use have serious implications for the coastal en- listing in the Society's registry. Of the chemicals vironment. Pollution from expanding use of fossil listed, about 70,000 are now in production in the fuel energy sources will continue to afflict coastal' United States, 50 in quantities greater than 1.3 waters and their living resources. The impact of billion pounds per year."' Unfortunately, not all sewage, silt, and fertilizer nutrients will grow and 70,000 will be adequately tested for toxicity or have critical local and regional consequences. As environmental hazards. Studies to determine en- GNPs rise globally, the volume of solid wastes vironmental persistence, transport, and long-term discarded or deposited in the oceans will increase biological effects are expensive both in time and as well. money, and the substances to be measured are Collectively, the anticipated amount of coastal often not only low in concentration but accom- pollution is seen to be a major problem for the panied by other substances that produce syner- marine environment in the future. Pollutant stress gistic effects and complicate analysis of the data. on ocean life forms can cause chemical-physical Relatively few contaminants have been monitored damage to cell membranes or tissues, modifica- to the point where trends can be detected, and tion of biochemical reactions, buildup of micro- links between human health and the contaminants bial pathogens, low environmental oxygen levels, at the levels at which they occur are only tenuously viral infections, skeletal anomalies, and genetic understood.330 abnormalities. Several indicators point to rising One of the gravest perils to human and marine levIels of pollution in coastal waters. In fish, a life is that relatively persistent toxic chemicals and degenerative disease syndrome aptly named "fin metals might build to dangerous levels before erosion" is associated with degraded estuarine or being detected, as occurred in the mercury-poi- coastal environments and has been observed in soning incident at Minamata Bay, Japan (see Ta- U.S. coastal waters, in Tokyo Bay, and in the ble 13-28, below). The Minamata Bay tragedy is Irish Sea. A similar condition affects crabs, lob- by no means the only instance in which long-lived sters, and smaller crustaceans."" In the New York toxic chemicals have been released in a way that Bight, heavy municipal and industrial pollution will ultimately lead to their entry into the oceans. and long-term dumping of dredge, sewage, and The Kepone contamination of the James River'in industrial wastes has caused fouling of shellfish Virginia provides another example. gills by parasites and detritus." The collection of Until it was ordered to stop in 1975, a Hope contaminated shellfish is prohibited in certain well, Virginia chemical company under contract areas because of hazards to human health.* to Allied Chemicals had been dumping quantities of chemical waste into the James River in the Toxic Waste Pollution course of manufacturing, the insecticide Kepone. Toxic waste pollution (also discussed above in About 1.5 million gallons of highly toxic material the section entitled, "The GNP Projections and were created and dumped. In 1976, the strange the Environment.") will be discussed here be- symptoms that had been exhibited by workers at cause many toxic substances eventually find their the plant manufacturing this white-powder chem- way into the sea via the atmosphere or continental ical compound were attributed to Kepone poi- runoff. By either route, toxic waste pollution is soning: The acute physical symptoms of this one of the most serious threats to the health of poisoning are evident, but its long-term effects on the coastal oceans. humans and animals are still unknown. Since Ke- pone is bioaccumulative and environmentally per- sistent, aquatic life downriver from Hopewell and *Trends in shellfish contamination and the closure of shellfish in the James River estuary will be affected for beds in the U.S., as well as a description of the innovative many years, even though the source of pollution Mussel Watch-a monitoring program that uses mollusk tissue has been eliminated. '31 pollutant levels as an indicator of estuarine environmental Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) have been in quality-are discussed in "Ecology and Living Resources," Council on Environmental Quality, Environmenial Qualily use for half a century. More recently they have 197.91 Washington: Government Printing Office, forthcoming. been discovered to cause cancer in laboratory an- 306 THE PROJECTIONS imals, and skin diseases, jaundice, and liver dam- wastes and are now ubiquitous in the oceans.334 age in humans. In the Baltic Sea, only a few The effects of most of these chemicals has not thousand gray seals remain of a population esti- been carefully studied,,and even if the knowledge mated to be 20,000 in 1940, due to the seal's diet were available, the numbers of chemicals and of PCB-contaminated fish. ' In the United States, their even more numerous effects could not be the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 pro- fully addressed here. The discussion is therefore hibits the sale of PCBs after July 1, 1979, but this limited to a few examples from a group of chem- persistent chemical will remain in commercial icals-halogenated hydrocarbons-about which products, municipal dumps, soils, and the sedi- there is both concern and understanding (albeit ments of streams, lakes, and ocean coastal zones limited) of their effects on marine ecosystems. for years to come. Three heavy halogenated hydrocarbons are con- The Hudson River, already contaminated with sidered first, followed by examples of lighter hal- a complex mixture of toxic substances, was further ogenated hydrocarbons. contaminated in the early 1970s by approximately DDT, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and 440,000 pounds of PCBs, discharged there by two hexochlorobenzene are heavy halogenated hydro- General Electric capacitor plants. Now, much of carbons over which there continues to be concern. the PCB contamination, lodged in the river sed- DDT is still widely used in both agricultural and iments over a 40-mile stretch between Troy Dam vector control programs in many nations 'As dis- and Hudson Falls, poses a health threat to the cussed in the food and agriculture section of this 150,000 upstate New Yorkers who drink the river chapter, the Global 2000 food projections antic- water, as well as a threat to commercial fisheries ipate a large increase-on the order of 2 to 4 times in the Hudson's estuary. Approximately 6,000 the present amount-in the use of pesticides over pounds of the accumulated contaminant spills the next 20 years. Persistant pesticides such as over Troy Dam each year. DDT will almost certainly continue to be used in In 1976, General Electric agreed to pay the large and increasing quantities in many areas, es- State of New York $4 million for the removal of pecially in the LDCs. the polluted sediment. Two years later, the New Atmospheric transport is the principal pathway York State Department of Environmental Con- by which DDT and its metabolites reach the servation was requesting $25 million in federal oceans. 11 Regional DDT contamination has been funds to remove 75 percent of the contaminant shown to have caused reproductive failure in birds from 30-40 of the most contaminated spots in the and fish. In some cases DDT has proved to be riverbed. Estimates for dredging the entire 40 toxic to fish 3' and has interfered with their miles. of polluted sediments are in the hundreds chemoreception and natural behavior patterns. " of millions, and would take about 10 years and PCBs--stable, relatively insoluble and non- cause destruction of local sediment life for at least flammable compounds-are now widespread pol- a year or two in each section of the river dredged. " lutants of the marine environment as a result of In the absence of decontamination, most of the inadvertent spills and leakage, breakage of con- PCBs will ultimately be deposited in the Atlantic tainers, and evaporation. Besides being danger- Ocean. ous to human health, they are toxic to some Pollution of the James and Hudson Rivers are marine organisms. ' PCBs (and other heavy hal- dramatic illustrations of toxic substance contam- ogenated hydrocarbons including DDT and its ination that ultimately is transported to the oceans. metabolites, and dieldrin) are known to adversely While these instances are massive and serious in affect vital estuarine phytbplankton communities. and of themselves, hundreds of thousands of Field and laboratory experiments have shown that smaller daily losses of chemicals around the world a variety of normal functions-including growth, have even greater implications for the oceans. In photosynthesis, and cellular development-are the next few pages, marine environmental prob- inhibited in phytoplankton when they are exposed lems arising from toxic wastes will be discussed to chlorinated pesticide concentrations ranging by type of pollutant: synthetic organic chemicals, from 1 to 10 parts per billion. Sustained high con- heavy metals, and radioactive materials. centrations were observed to cause cell rupture and ultimate death. As a result, these chemicals in the marine environment may adversely affect Synthetic Organic Chemicals natural food chains by altering the quantities and Large numbers of different synthetic chem- sizes of phytoplankton available for zooplankton icals enter the oceans through rivers, the atmos- grazing. Such changes could in turn disrupt trophic phere and offshore coastal dumping of chemical interactions within an estuarine community and ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 307 could bring about changes in the species compo- regional scale begin to subside in individual spe- sition of many marine ecosystems."' cies 3-5 years after input to the ecosystem has Hexachlorobenzene (HCB) is a stable, unreac- halted."' On a global scale, however, simulation tive compound used as a grain fungicide and a models suggest that if world application were component in some pesticides. It is produced as phased out, a downturn in bioaccumulation and a by-product in the manufacture of many chlori- physiological effects might not occur for decades nated hydrocarbons. HCB is widely used as a fun- because of the DDT residue remaining in atmos- gicide in the Near East, Australia, the United pheric, soil, and oceanic reservoirs (Fig. 13-7). States, and Eastern and Western Europe.") The National Academy of Sciences has identified HCB Heavy Metals as a danger to human health and to the environ- All naturally occurring heavy metal elements ment. Once transferred to the oceans via atmos- are found in the oceans at some concentration. pheric fallout, waste-dumping. or coastal outfalls Those metals introduced by human society enter containing pesticide residues, HCB is resistant to via rivers, industrial ouifalls and domestic sewers, chemical, biological, or physical degradation." and through atmospheric transport and offshore It is now present in terrestrial and aquatic food dumping of waste materials. As a result, pollution webs, and has been observed to be concentrated of the marine environment by metals is most ev- in some marine organisms at levels similar to those ident in the coastal zones, especially where mixing of DDT and the PCBs. 342 processes between coastal and oceanic waters are Halogenated hydrocarbons of low molecular slow, facilitating accumulation. 14' Due to their weight are also of concern, but.their effects in the oceanic omnipresence, most heavy metals are now environment are different from those of heavier bioaccumulated to some degree in one or more molecules. Compared to the heavy halogenated hydrocarbons, such as DDT, the PCBs, and diel- drin, compounds of lower molecular weight are ------------------------------ ---------- more water-soluble. They are found in aerosol propellants, fumigants, fire extinguishers, solr vents, dielectric insulators, and are used as inter- mediates of organic synthesis. It is estimated that ----------- ----- ---------------------- 6,000 tons of one of these compounds (trichlor- ofluoromethane) enter the world's oceans an- nually. " These compounds readily evaporate and remain in the atmosphere long enough to make APPLICATION RATE transfer to the oceans highly likely. While low --------- --------- molecular weight compounds are now ubiquitous in the atmosphere and in surface waters,-' con- N centrations observed so far in the oceans are six orders of magnitude below the concentrations that cause toxic effects in mammals and aquatic or- DDT IN FISH ganisms. ' The long-term impact of these chem- DDT IN SOIL icals at low concentrations is unknown, and a continuing buildup of these chemicals could sig- nificantly increase'both their concentrations and their potential biological consequences. YEAR One aspect of the long-term buildup of syn- Figure 13-7. The effect of a gradual reduction, starting in thetic organic chemicals applies to both heavy and 1971, in the use of DDT from a simulation model. The usage light molecules. Unless monitoring increases sig- rate is assumed to reach zero by the year 2000. The usage rates nificantly, pollutant concentrations may grow to are historically correct through 1971, when it is assumed that unmanageable proportions before they are rec- a world decision to phase out the use of DDT is reached. Shortly thereafter, the concentration of DDT in soil begins to ognized. By that time, they may have become decline, but the concentration of DDT in fish continues to ecologically dangerous and, even if inputs were increase for I lyears and does not return to the 1971 level until to cease, the effects of the materials continuing 1995. The response of DDT concentrations in animals further up the food chain-birds and humans, for example-are sub- to circulate in the ecosphere would be manifested ject to even longer delays. (.16rgen Randers, in D. L. and D. for years afterward. DDT use offers an example H. Meadows, eds., Toward Global Equilibrium, Cambridge, of this phenomenon.' It has been observed that Mass.: Wright-Allen Press, 1973; reprinted by permission of the effects of DDT pollution on a localized or the distributors, MIT Press) 308 THE PROJECTIONS components of the marine - food web."' Trace TABLE 13-23 metal concentrations have been measured in fish Estimates from Annual River Discharges o If and shellfish in coastal waters of the United States Amounts of Metals Injected into the Oceans, An- and New Zealand, the North Atlantic, the North nually by Geological Processes and by Man Sea, and other European coastal areas. ` Ac- cording to the Global 2000 Study projections, the By Geological annual production and circulation of most metals Processes By Man is expected to increase between now and the year (in rivers) (in mining) 2000. In many cases the rate of accumulation in (in thousands of metric tons) the oceans of metals injected by human activity Iron 25,000 319,000 is expected to exceed the natural rate (Table 13- Manganese 440 1,600 23). Copper 375 4,460 The effect of heavy metal concentrations on the Zinc 370 3,930 Nickel 300 358 development of marine organisms is only begin- Lead 180 2,330 ning to be understood. However, the character- Molybdenum 13 57 istics of heavy metals are significant. They are Silver 5 7 among the most environmentally persistent sub- Mercury 3 7 Tin 1.5 166 stances. They cannot be transmuted or destroyed Antimony 1.3 40 and, in concert with certain bacteria, have the Source: Michael Waldichuk, Global Marine Pollution: An Overview, Paris: insidious attribute of combining with organic sub- LNESCO, 1977, p. 20. stances to form highly toxic metallo-organic com- pounds. Sometimes these compounds are discharged directly into ocean waters. For ex- Current levels of oceanic introduction of iron and ample, the "mercury poisoning" at Minamata, copper will not result in major overall concentra- Japan, involved spent chemical catalysts contain- tion changes but will probably increase. Global ing metallo-organic methyl mercury." industrial development will provide a growing The highest mercury concentrations in ocean source of metallic emissions that will easily enter 354 organisms are found in the top predators of the the world oceans . food chain. In the past decade there has been Cadmium poisoning in Japan has stimulated an concern that the concentration of mercury may interest in the possible effects of this metal on the increase as more of the metal is released into the marine ecosystem. As with most other metals, environment. However, recent studies suggest cadmium enters the oceans through continental that the present mercury levels in these pelagic outfalls and the atmosphere. Its bioaccumulation life forms should not be expected to increase with in organisms consumed by humans could poten- society's continued use of the metal. The esti- tially be a threat to health. Any significant cad- mated total mercury content of the world ocean mium pollution would be expected to occur in the mixed layer is currently two orders of magnitude coastal zones, and localized high concentrations greater than the annual production by human so- of cadmium could contaminate marine organisms ciety; therefore, measurable man-made alteration in coastal waters. However, open-ocean surface of mercury lev-ls in the open ocean is not prob- water pollution by cadmium metal does not seem able in the short term. It does appear likely that probable, at least in the near future. " regional pockets of high-level coastal mercury It appears that, up to this point, lead is the only pollution will continue to exist, due primarily to stable metal element that has exhibited wide- industrial processes. " spread increased concentrations in the ocean. It Besides input from rivers, urban outfalls, and has been nearly 20 years since concentrations in dumping, concentrations of iron and copper met- the oceans were demonstrated to be attaining sig- 316 als in the ocean are atmospherically transported nificant levels through anthropogenic sources. from specific industrial sources, particularly the These concentrations have been altered in coastal smelting industry processes for copper and the waters, mainly as a result of the use of lead alkyls processes of the iron, steel, and titanium dioxide as antiknock additives in fuels of internal com- industries for iron. The National Academy of Sci- bustion engines. Lead aerosols have been'respon- ences has estimated that coal combustion is also sible for the increase of this metal in the coastal one of the most significant 'human sources of iron surface waters of the Pacific, Atlantic, and Med- and copper introduction to the sea. -153 These met- iterranean Oceans. Once introduced into the sea als are partially released during combustion and via coastal runoff and the atmosphere, lead carried to the oceans in fly-ash particulate matter. quickly interacts with the marine biota. Concern ENVIRONMENT PROJECnONS 309 e ts over how human health may be affected by levels of 21 and 34 megacuries, respectively, and xis the consumption of lead-contaminated marine re- much of this material has now entered the oceans. sources. 357 Although the nuclear test ban has substantially Following.a course similar to that of lead in'the reduced the rate at which radioactive materials marine environment, other trace metals still in- enter the oceans, nuclear energy production and completely investigated may have increased their the use of radioactive materials has continued the concentration in the surface layers of the global flow of radioactive isotopes into the terrestrial ocean. this is especially possible in northernhem- environment and ultimately into the oceans. ispheric waters surrounding regions of high fossil The three broad types of radioactive species fuel combustion, cement production, and other have been introduced to the marine environment: 318 industrial activities. (1) transuranic elements used as nuclear fuels, Ultimately, most reactive heavy metals are de- such as uranium, neptunium, curium and pluto- posited relatively rapidly in the sediments of the nium;.(2) the radionuclides produced as fission coastal zones, seemingly out of the water layers products or as induced radioactive species, such where they may play a determinate role in bio- as strontium-90 and cesium-137; and (3) the ac- logical processes .3" However, metal accumula- tivation products resulting from the interaction. of tion in sediments poses potential problems. nuclear particles with the components of nuclear Measurement of the extent of metal concentra- reactors and weapons, such as zinc-65 and iron- ,tions have only begun, as have studies of the 55. As early as 1972, scientists had detected 52 mechanisms for redistribution of metals back into artificially produced radionuclides in the marine bottom water and their uptake by benthic orga- environment. nisms. I One study has examined the amounts In the decades ahead, the largest source* of and distribution of six trace metals--cadmium, radioactive materials entering the oceans will ch ,romium, copper, nickel, lead, and zinc-in the probably be the nuclear fuel cycle, i.e., the pro- water and sediments of Raritan Bay, a polluted duction, use, reprocessing and disposal of nuclear estuary of the New York Bight. Large amounts fuels. The Department of Energy projects more of ril6tal-laden municipal and industrial wastes than a 200 percent increase in nuclear energy by have accumulated in the bay, forcing the termi- 2000. How extensive this source will be depends nation of shellfish harvesting, decreasing benthic critically on how carefully the fuel cycle is man- diversity and reducing the yield of commercial aged. fishery species. Metal concentrations in Raritan Table 13-24 presents a projection of the inven- Bay bottom sediments have been found to be sim- tory of radionuclides in the world's oceans that ilar to other estuarine areas in the United States has been reported by UNESCO. The total arti- and in the United Kingdom. " Anoxic coastal ficial radioactivity in the oceans in 2000 is pro- sediments containing precipitated mercury sulfide jected to be. of the same order of magnitude as also may release their deposited mercury upon it was in 1970, i.e., about 10' curies. Tritium from contact with aerated waters. 362 nuclear reactors increases by three orders of mag- nitude over the 30-year period, reaching some- Artificial Radioactive Materials thing on the order of 10' curies. ' The largest artificial contribution continues to be tritium from The Global 2000 energy projections foresee sig- nuclear explosions. The total artificial radioactiv- nificant growth in the worldwide development and ity introduced remains two orders of magnitude use of nuclear energy, and this increased nuclear less than the total.natural background. of potas- activity may result in increased flows of radioac- sium-40 at 5 X 10" curies, but some of the arti- tive materials into the marine environment. ficially introduced radionuclides have effects quite The history of radioactive contamination of the different from those of natural potassium-40. I oceans provides a useful context for considering I It is not known to what further levels the various possible future contamination. The largest source radioactive elements could safely be accommo- of radioactive materials entering the oceans has dated in the marine environment, especially in been nuclear explosions detonated by the United crucial coastal zones. So far, only modest efforts .States, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, France, have been made to study the environmental im- Ithe People's Republic of China and India. Up to pact these substances have upon individual marine .1968 the world's oceans had received much of the organisms or their communities. Transuranics, radioactive debris from 470 nuclear explosions. Two biologically active fission products--cesium- *Assuming that atmospheric testing of nuclear devices is not 137 and strontium=90-have been produced at resumed. 310 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 13-24 systems may result from chronic discharges and Total Inventory of Artificial Radionuclides Intro- accidental low-volume spills during normal off- duced into the World Oceans, 1970 and 2000 shore and dockside operations, from disposal of drilling muds and cuttings, and from disturbance 1970 2000 of the seabed and coastal wetlands by platform Curies and pipeline construction. Losses incurred during Nuclear explosions transportation and processing also contribute to (worldwide distribution) low-level petroleum contamination, as do inputs Fission products (exclusive of from the atmosphere, coastal municipal and in- tritium) 2-6 x 10' ? X 109 dustrial waste outfalls, and urban and river run- off." Increased coal combustion and conversion Tritium to, ? X 10' can also be expected to contribute to oceanic pol- Reactors and reprocessing of lution. Mining wastes, secondary pollutants as- fuel (restricted local distri- sociated with trade and transport, and the by- bution) products of processing and primary combustion Fission and activation products of coal will enter coastal waters via the land and (exclusive of tritium) 3 x 101 3 x 101 the atmosphere. Tritium @ 3 x 10' ? X 1.0, The manner and severity with which fossil fuel Total artificial radioactivity 10, 10, pollutants affect the marine environment varies. Total natural potassium-40 5 x 1011 5 x 1011 Different factors-such as oil dosage and type, weather and water conditions, and the seasonal Source: A. Preston et at- as reported in Edward E, Goldberg, The Health ofthe Oceans, Paris: UNESCO, 1976. p. 81, behavior patterns of marine organisms-influence * Assuming that atmospheric nuclear testing will continue at about the 1968-70 the biological impact of petroleum hydrocarbons Tate. on ocean life and habitats. ' Nearshore petro- leum discharges cause more extensive and per- manent damage to organisms and life cycles in ' fission products, and induced radioactive species estuaries and coastal wetlands than those further are now found in seawater and in the ocean biota offshore. Biological recovery of oil-inundated. almost universally. The biological or environ- mental significance of this contamination is vir- tually unknown.'" Fossil Fuels TABLE 13-25 The Study's energy projections anticipate a Best Estimates of Petroleum Hydrocarbons Intro. global growth in commercial energy demand, and duced into the Oceans Annually a resulting rise in the production and use of fossil Best Probable fuel energy -resources. Driven by expanding GNPs, Source Estimate Range population 'needs, and technological advances, this increased energy usage will certainly aggra- (millions of metric tons) vate the already serious problems of coastal zone Natural seeps 0.6, 0.2-1.0 Offshore production 0.08 0.0". 15 degradation by fossil fuel pollutants. The propor- Transportation tions of fuel oil and gas supplies extracted from LOT tankers 0.31 0.15-0.4 the seabed are significant and increasing. While Non-LOT tankers 0.77 0.65-1.0 large oil spills caused by blowouts and tanker col- Dry docking 0.25 0.2-0.3 Terminal operations 0.003 0.0015-0.005 lisions can have disastrous local effects on coastal Bilges bunkering 0.5 0.4-0.7 zone ecosystems, the discharges from the routine Tanker accidents 0.2 0.12-0.25 transportation, production, and use of oil and gas Nontanker accidents 0.1 0.02-0.15 are greater in volume and may present a long- Coastai refineries 0.2 0.2-0.3 term threat to the marine environment. Estimates Atmosphere 0.6 0.4-0.8 Coastal municipal wastes 0.3 of the quantities of petroleum hydrocarbons en- Coastal nonrefining indus- tering the oceans annually are presented in Table trial wastes 0.3 13-25. Urban runoff 0.3 0.14.5 As oil exploration continues worldwide, in- River runoff 1.6 - creasing numbers of extraction facilities will be Total 6.113 established in coastal zone areas. Sublethal and Source: National Academy of Sciences, Petroleum in the Marine Environment, long-term damage to marine organisms and eco- Washington, 1975, p. 6. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 311 wetlands is a complex process, and the time re- environment would make cleanup efforts and ul- quired for recovery varies widely.' timate ecosystem recovery especially difficult."' The coastal effects of oil pollution may be of Exploitation of fossil fuel resources in the Ant- longer duration than previously thought. Com- arctic region could create similar difficulties. ponents of oil are now known to remain in es- There would certainly be localized environmental tuarine wetland sediments for as long as eight effects of oil processing and transport activities; years after an initial spill,' continuing to affect repeated accidental spills could have serious cu- benthic organisms and altering biological produc- mulative effects on Southern Ocean ecosystems. tivity. A marsh grass community has been ob- served to have been unable to reestablish itself Sewage, Fertilizer Nutrients, and Sedimentation even three years after an oil spill. Over the three The Global 2000 Study projections. for water, years of observation, erosion rates in the salt population, forestry, and food and agriculture im- marsh were found to be 24 times greater than ply that there will be a growth in coastal pollution 3111 those in nearby unaffected areas. from sewage fertilizers, and land runoff sedi If subjected to large enough amounts of oil and mentation. Tiiese problems are seen to be partic- petroleum hydrocarbon products, either through ularly acute in the coastal zones of less developed accidental spills or extended low level, inputs, a countries. Unprecedented urban growth will. give sea-surface hydrocarbon microlayer can form to rise to an increase in the volume of untreated cover the adjacent coastal ocean areas. This hy- sewage entering estuarine rivers and coastal waters. drocarbon film can act as a differential accumu- Intensified agricultural activity and the concomi- lation layer for trace materials such as toxic heavy tant twofold to threefold increase in global fertil- metal ions, vitamins, amino acids, and lipophilic izer use will add to already large amounts of chlorinated hydrocarbon pollutants, including DDT chemical nutrients carried into estuariesi wet- residues and PCBs. The combination of these lands, and coral reefs. Projected deforestation will materials near or at the ocean surface could sig- destroy watersheds, exacerbate erosion, and cre- nificantly affect coastal ocean ecosystems. Such ate large nutrient-laden silt loads in rivers running "microslicks" have been observed to interfere to the sea. Upon entering estuaries and coastal with the normal development of fish eggs during areas, river waters will release their suspended spawning seasons, and some scientists suspect sediment and organic matter, creating conditions microslicks of inducing changes within phyto- of coastal water overproductivity and contributing plankton communities. ' to problems of sedimentation that are especially Although the long-term implications of low- destructive of coral reefs. While the dangers of level oil contamination are just beginning to be both nutrient and sediment pollution are known, understood', it is now well established that petro- there has been little study of what the ultimate' leum hydrocarbons adversely affect a wide variety consequences of this pollutant combination may of marine organisms physiologically and behav- be. In the short term, however, it 'appears that iorally. `.Significant petroleum contamination of nutrients and sediments, together with physical wetland sediments resulting from repeated small alteration of estuaries and reefs, will produce lo- spills and/or effluent discharges have already oc- calized cases of estuarine and coastal eutrophi- curred along West German, British, French, and cation. Italian coastlines, as well as those of the U. S. 311 Coastal wetlands are naturally able to absorb Such polluting input can be expected to increase contaminants from polluted tidal water. Since globally as fossil fuel production, transportation, most salt marshes are either located in estuaries and use grow during the next two decades. or have freshwater flowing into them, their ability As the search for oil and gas intensifies, explo- to retain contaminants running off the land help ration and extraction will take place in areas pre- to prevent further transport of PoAlutants to the viously untouched. The marine environment in sea. Marshes of Spartina grasses can biologically parts of the Arctic is now vulnerable to conditions fix inorganic nitrogen, creating high levels of plant accompanying the exploitation of fossil fuel re- productivity equal to that of intensively managed sources. The construction of artificial drilling is- agricultural areas. "' Mangrove soils are effective lands, dredged up from bay bottoms, will have nutrient reservoirs too and are exceptional envi- locally adverse effects on Arctic sea life, as will ronments for the removal of nitrogen in sewage. low level losses of oil incurred during routine pro- In salt marshes, extreme enrichment of inorganic duction and transportation. Accidental large vol- nitrogen is counteracted by its bacterial conver- ume spills or well blowouts would pose serious sion to nitrogen gas. However, as capable as wet- problems, for the very nature of the far northern lands are in utilizing large volumes of nutrients, 312 THE PROJECTIONS the presence of excessive 'amounts of nitrogen, The sea floor, surface waters, and beaches of like those contained in sewage and fertilizer run- the earth's marine environment are littered with off, could eventually result in an overproductivity man-made materials originating from deliberate, of coastal waters that takes the form of coastal incidental, or accidental waste disposal.* Solid algal blooms' and could cause eutrophication of waste, often referred to as "litter," is of two types: localized estuarine and wetland areas. (1) refuse originating on land, consisting of pack- In tropical waters, sewage pollution can also aging materials (plastic, metal, cloth, glass, or result in the. growth of coral-smothering algae, wood), and (2) refuse from ships released during causing reef degradation and sometimes leading fishing, recreation, or cargo-carrying operations. to the sedimentary production of toxic levels of The amount of solid wastes entering the world's hydrogen sulfide. Pollution-intolerant reef species oceans each year-a large part of which is released then decrease. The more tolerant species take in harbors, ports, or other coastal water areas- over the community, and the reef ecosystem is is estimated to be in the millions of tons (Table altered, sometimes permanently. 13-26). The exposure of reefs to land runoff sedimen- Floating litter is mainly a coastal zone problem tation has, so far, been the greatest single cause and affects both commercial and biological activ- of reef destruction.'" Ongoing activities such as ity. Nylon ropes and plastic sheets floating just deforestation, intensive agricultural practices, beneath the sea surface easily foul ship propellors. livestock grazing, and dredging and filling oper- Wood debris and submerged logs can present sud- ations are currently leading to extensive sedimen- den and serious navigational problems. The effect tation of reef waters in tropical coastal waters. of litter on ocean organisms is apparent also. Plas- Natural growth of reef-forming polyps requires tic sheets can also smother benthic organisms. favorable conditions of salinity and relatively Sheer plastics, mistaken for jellyfish, have been warm, turbulent or upwelling water to bring nu- eaten by sea turtles, small plastic objects been trients and cleanse away waste materials. "' When injested by fish, and plastic bags caught on-the functioning naturally, a coral reef ecosystem sus- heads of sea mammals are known to have caused tains the life cycles of all of its individual com- suffocation. In coastal waters adjacent to logging ponents, but when the reef-growth system is and pulp mill activities, solid'and liquid wood disturbed, imbalances develop as certain reef or- wastes have been found to be destructive of ocean ganisms either leave or die. Most corals cannot organisms and habitats. 385 live if heavily coated or buried by sediment par- On the whole, given current practices and the ticles, and reduced light intensity caused by turbid projections of the Global 2000 Study, a growth waters significantly affect growth rates and species in marine pollution can be expected in the next diversity. 1 20 years. Outfalls and the atmosphere will inject Other causes of reef destruction include heavy industrial, municipal,. and Agricultural chemical freshwater runoff due to deforestation, excessive and metal wastes into coastal waters. Pollutants salinity (produced by desalinization plants), and from fossil fuel extraction, transportation, and thermal pollution. ` The resuspension of sedi- energy production will contribute significantly to ment in dredging operations effectively blocks any spoilation of the marine environment. Population regeneration of already damaged coral colonies. " growth, deforestation, and intensive agriculture Once destroyed, a coral reef has little hope for will all contribute to the volume of sewage, nu- .regeneration. If healing reef growth does occur trient chemicals, and sediments entering coastal in the absence of pollutants, the time for resto- ration to any semblance of its natural state can easily be a matter of decades. 113 *Disposal of solid wastes in the oceans can be carried to ex- tremes, as it has in the New York Bight, resulting in unpleasant localized impacts on the marine environment. The Marine Solid Wastes. Ecosystems Analysis Program of the National Oceanic and Solid waste disposal in the coastal zones is-for Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has described one in- the short term--one of the least serious of marine cident as the infamous "summer 1976 floatables event." during which "beaches along the south shore, of Long Island were pollution: problems. While foreign material can inundated by a variety Of floating litter. Included among the adversely affect coastal ecosystems, its current materials washed ashore were tar and grease balls. charred impact is generally as a localized nuisance and wood, garbage and trash (e.g., watermelon rinds, chicken human health hazard. However, considering the heads, styrofoam beads, paper@ and plastic wrappers), and sewage-related items (e.g., condom rings, diaper liners, and population,. GNP, and forestry projections, greater tampon applicators)." (New York Bight Project: Annual Re- quantities of solid wastes should be expected to port for FY 1976, NOAA Environmental Research Labora- enter the oceans between now and the year 2000. tories, Boulder, Dec. 1977, p. 29.) ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 313 TABLE 13-26 Fisheries Annual Ocean Litter Estimates The Global 2000 Study population and food pro- jections suggest that the demand for seafood will Litter increase, encouraging still more fishing activity. Source ("tillions of The degradation of coastal zone habitats---either metric tons) through physical destruction for development or Passenger vessels 0.028 through constant injection of various pollutants- Merchant shipping will contribute to changes in species composition Crew 0,110 and the quantity of the global catch. Future gross Cargo 5.600 Recreational boating 0.103 catch statistics therefore may show a constant or Commercial fishing increasing yield, but the catch will become com- Crew 0.340 osed of progressively less traditional products. Gear p 0.001 Advances in fishing and processing technologies, Military 0.074 Oil drilling and platforms O.W4 by helping the gross catch figures to remain high, Catastrophe 0.100 will effectively conceal the degree to which ov- Total 6.360 erfishing is undermining the utility and value of - the world catch. Source: National Academy of Sciences. Assessing Potential Ocean Pollutants, The coastal oceans are the crucially important Washington. 1975. p. 422. sites of the world's fisheries: At least half of -the marine life forms directly utilized by humans come from coastal waters; nearly all of the re- waters. Unsightly and unhealthy solid waste pol- mainder come from coastal and oceanic upwell- lution will develop into problems of greater mag- ings. * Although these upwellings occur in nitude and areal extent. The most serious impact approximately 0. 1 percent of all oceanic areas, of pollutants will be on the organisms and eco- they are among the world's most productive fish- 3M systems of the coastal zones. Living marine re- eries. sources will be affected by disease and by the Over the last three to four decades, intensive reduction and spoilation of viable habitat resulting fishing activity has produced a shift in the species trom pollutant increases. The greatest uncertainty composition of the global catch away from the over coastal pollution concerns the specific level traditionally preferred species toward species at of the pollution and the future of international lower trophic levels and of less economic value. efforts to control it. A growing proportion is being converted to fer- tilizer and fishmeal for animal feed. Before 1940, a negligible portion of the catch was used in meal Overexploitation of Living Marine production; by the mid-1970s, 35 percent was Resources being used for making meal and oil." Thus the The Global 2000 food and population projec- fish catch directly used for human consumption in 1975 was closer to 45 million metric tons than tions point to a growth in global demand for living the 70 million often cited. Use of the ocean fish- marine resources. However, the fisheries projec- eries for anirrial feed is somewhat analogous to tions themselves suggest that the trend in ever fattening livestock on high quality grain. The fish increasing annual yields may have peaked and ca.Itch-like, the grain-would be more efficiently that future catch tonnages may not be able to utilized if it were consumed directly by humans readily meet this demand. Increasing pressure by and if animals were raised primarily on plant spe- commercial fisheries will place great stresses on cies and other foods, of no value as human food. living resource populations and lead to an over- Whether the shift to fertilizer and fishmeal can be exploitation of traditional species. Catch com- attributed partially to the need to find a market positions will shift to greater amounts of for the less preferred species or to the fact that nontraditional species. A significant proportion fishmeal has been made into a more marketable of these smaller, shorter-lived species will con- product, the shift itself is clear. tinue to be utilized in ways other than direct hu- man consumption. The policies and practices applied to marine mammals are in flux. In the *Upwelling areas occur where winds and prevailing boundary face of extinction, the survival of many species currents allow cold, nutrient-laden water to rise from below.. depends on rational scientific and societal man- Upwellings create areas of high primary productivity which agement decisions. consequently allow the production of large stocks of fish. 314 THE PROJECTIONS Intensive fishing activity appears to have helped TABLE 13-27 reduce the absolute yield of the global fisheries Effect of Whaling on Stocks of Ten Species of catch. Improved fishery technologies have greatly Whales aided the overexptoitation of most traditional stocks. Until 1971, global total fisheries produc- 1974 Stock tion had increased annually at a rapid rate. How- as a Percent- ever, in 1972 a combination of natural ocean Virgin 1974 age of the current inversions and the prolonged strain of Species Stock Stock Virgin Stock overfishing on fish populations drastically reduced (thousands) the population size and thus the yield from the Sperm Peruvian anchovy fishery."' This reduction in both sexes 922 641 69 yield appears to have contributed significantly to male 461 212 45 female 461 429 93 the 1972 world decline in catch tonnage and to Fin 448 101 22 the subsequent fluctuations in total annual yields. Minke 361 325 90 Blue 215 13 6 Sei 200 76 38 Marine Mammals and the Marine Environment Bryde 100 (40)? ? Right, (50)? (2)? ? Constant global demand, shortsighted manage- Bowhead, (10)? (2)? ? ment of living resources, and overexploitation Humpback 50 7 14 have caused the severe depletion, and in some Gray* 11 11 100 cases the extinction, of a number of marine mam- Total 2,367 1,218 51.4 mal species. Marine mammals-which include Source: Victor B. Scheffer, "The Status of Whales.- Pacific Discovery, vol. 29, whales, porpoises, dolphins, seals, sea lions, Sir- no. 1, 1976, p. 3. enians, sea otters, and polar bears-have histor- Not currently being hunted. ically been hunted to the brink of extinction, Some animals, such as whales, have been attacked one species at a time and with increasing technological and consequent changes in more remote parts of expertise (see Table 13-27). As marine biologist the system are probable. 3"' Kenneth Norris has written, "The contest has now International efforts to regulate whaling have become so grossly unequal that no evasion on the been protracted. ' The somewhat more respon- part of the animals has any effect. Their only de- sible management techniques now established by fense is scarcity."' the International Whaling Commission are seri- Abusive overutilization of a living marine re- ously hindered by the lack of accurate whale-pop- source results in the loss of a full range of bene- ulation data needed to determine harvest quotas. fits-tangible, intangible, realized, or potential@ In the United States, the Marine Mammal Pro- to both present and future generations. Such ben- tection Act of 1972 is the first national legislation efits include econ 'omic and nutritive values, aes- that makes the healthy maintenance of the eco- thetic contributions, and important roles in system the primary objective of marine mammal 394 maintenance of the health and stability of the management. marine ecosystem. 391 Major uncertainties arise when evaluating the Ecosystem eff@cts may be a crucially important consequences of the Global 2000 Study's pTojec- factor; no species exists alone, and exploitation tions on the environmental quality.of marine fish- of one species has some impact on other com- eries. A good knowledge of the ecological effects ponents of the habitat. Yet present harvesting of marine resource overexploifation has yet to be procedures consider only the effects on individual gained, and agreement has yet to be reached over species, or groups of species in isolation, and do whether current reduced catch yields are a trend not recognize the need for predicting the impact or only a temporary fluctuation in fisheries pop- on the cycle of reciprocal relationships within the ulation cycles. The productivity of future fisheries ecosystem. The impact of overexploitation may depends on the development of cooperative ma- include changes (1) in the population of compet- rine management practices. Inherent in this course ing or symbiotic species within the functional will be the problem of how to regulate interna- group of the exploited species, (2) in the vege- tionally commonly utilized living resources'. Uni- tation structure and carnivore populations where laterally declared 200-mile economic zones may the exploited species is a herbivore, And (3) in both aggravate and alleviate the evolution of fish- numbers of prey where the exploited species is a eries overexploitation. Only time, and a clear per- carnivore. These are only first-order responses, ception of current and potential environmental ENVIRONMENT PROJECFIONS 315 conditions, will tell how successful these manage- Pollution of the Open Oceans ment efforts will have been. The Global 2000 energy, GNP, nonfuel min- In conclusion, the Study's projections indicate erals, and agriculture projections imply that in- that loss of habitat, pollution, and overexploita- creasing amounts of toxic pollutants will continue tive living-resource management policies will sig- to be produced in the decades ahead. Toxic chem- nificantly affect the integrity and ultimate icals enter oceanic waters three ways. Major .productivity of the world's coastal waters. Eco- quantities are deposited in coastal waters and sub- nomic development along the coastal zone will sequently carried into oceanic waters by currents destroy or alter ecosystems crucial to the life and living organisms. Significant amounts are also cycles of many fisheries species. Chemicals, fossil deposited directly from the atmosphere. Large fuels, solid and sewage wastes, agricultural nu- and probably increasing amounts will be depos- trients, and eroded sediments will pollute ecosys- ited directly into surface and deeper oceanic tems and degrade marine communities. Growing waters by accidental spills, operational discharges demand for food to feed rapidly multiplying pop- and intentional dumping. ulations will lead to great stresses on global fish- Oceanic ecosystems differ from coastal ecosys- eries and cause a further shift in total yields and tems by assimilating pollutants from land-based, species composition. Population pressures, con- coastal, and oceanic sources over a longer time certed economic development,. and an increased period. Most pollutants enter marine waters as need for food will have cyclic effects and even- fine particles, as liquids, or in dissolved form. The tually impact upon those very areas, the coastal pollutants are then adsorbed onto fine sediment zones, from which basic sustenance and livelihood and detrital particles that @ are consumed - by - zoo- is derived. plankton in the water column. The zooplankton incorporate the pollutants into their bodies and Open Oceans eject them as packaged fecal pellets. Dead or- ganisms and feces settle quickly, leading to a rapid The open oceans differ from coastal waters, accumulation of chemicals in oceanic depths." both in the time scales of the processes taking In the cold oceanic bottom waters, metabolism place within them and in their capacity to absorb, and natural sedimentation are very slow, 395b' and dilute, and disperse waste materials. The envi- as a result, pollutants are biologically degraded ronmental conditions of the deep sea are quite or immobilized in sediments at a much slower rate unique. It is an immense area that is relatively than in coastal waters. A related consequence of stable over long time periods, has little topo- the slow degradation and immobilization of p& graphic complexity, and receives low inputs of lutants is that deep sea communities 'are exposed energy. Most benthic animals are small mud- to pollutants for long periods of time. Lengthy dwelling and mud-feeding creatures of great va- exposure to even low concentrations of pollutants riety and long evolutionary history. Natural deep- is likely to be especially damaging to, the orga- sea disturbances consist of events such as mud nisms of the deep oceanic waters because they slumps, fish and invertebrate activity, and large have evolved in one of the most stable, least vary- objects settling from the surface. 39' ing ecosystems in the biosphere, and have had As a result of their vast size and the nature of little need to develop adaptations to deal with their ecosystems, environmental change in the environmental change. ` open oceans necessarily occurs very slowly. It can Given their enormous volume, oceanic waters be expected that the Global 2000 Study projec- can accept a certain amount o -f waste material. tions will cause no major impact on the earth's Yet the oceans' capacity to dilute is ultimately open oceans by the year 2000. However, the pro- finite. Marine scientist Edward Goldberg has ex@, jections do indicate that over the next 20 years pressed concern that over an extended period of world society will establish certain trends that, time the introduction of pollutants into the oceans sustained over the long term, will eventually cause could lead to a long-term buildup of toxic mate- measurable change in the oceanic environment. rial, causing "widespread mortalities and morbid- Most importantly, long-lived toxic substances will ities" in ocean organisms.' Once this condition continue to accumulate in open ocean waters and is reached, Goldberg writes, there would be "no inevitably affect oceanic ecosystems for many turning back. The great volume of the open ocean years into the future. Deep-sea mining, if initiated makes the removal of a toxic substance, identified without adequate knowledge and precautions will by a catastrophic event, an endeavor beyond man- also have the potential to disrupt the ecosystems kind's capabilities with the technologies of today of extensive benthic and pelagic areas. or of the foreseeable future." 316 THE PROJECTIONS Deep-Sea Mining The International Union for the Conservation The potential environmental implications of of Nature and Natural Resources413, Morges, mining the deep seabed are not yet fully under- Switzerland, feels that the eventual environmen- stood but are being studied by the U.S. National tal consequences of deep seabed mining may be Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the more serious than anticipated or observed, for the International Union for the Conservation of Na- following reasons: ture and Natural Resources, and the American 1* Deep sea organisms may have very long gen-. Society for International Law. eration times-a benthic clam was recently de- In a preliminary effort to assess what the eco- scribed as taking 200 years to reach sexual logical impact of deep-sea mining might be, the maturity-and may be extremely vulnerable to National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra- alteration of their environment.* tion (NOAA) has monitored test-mining activities 2. In the process of bringing dredged materials in the Pacific Ocean. 'The short-term 4 near-field to the surface, sediments and bottom water will effects of seabed mining have been evaluated to be released. Settling times for sediment may be some extent; they include the action of the ore very slow-on the order of 20 meters per year- collector itself, pelagic and benthic plumes g,en- and intensive dredging operations may create ex- erated by deep seabed collection, and damage to tensive surface plumes. One estimatestates that benthic and pelagic organisms. several hundred thousand square miles of the Pa- NOAA stated in its preliminary estimates' cific may be layered with sediment in the 100 that deep-ocean mining will have very marked meters below the surface by 1990. Clouding of impacts on the sea floor and in the 20 to 50 meters waters may have adverse effects on many orga- of water above the point of discharge of the bot- nisms, and species composition of the phytoplank- tom effluent. The NOAA-monitored mining test ton community may be altered due to transport has found this to be true in varying degrees. The of dormant spores from the bottom to surface ore collector contact zone-the portion of the waters. seafloor actually mined and an area of several 3. An estimated 7"6 percent of the nodules, meters on either side of the collector track-is the by volume, will end up as processing waste, and, site o*f severe, long-term environmental destruc- processing them will require large quantities of chemical reagents and energy. The wastes, which tion. " Under present techniques, ore collection on the seabed also creates a benthic plume of will include heavy metals, may be quite toxic to suspended sediment as thick as a few tens of me- marine life, and regardless of whether the oper- ters. The resedimentation from a benthic plume ations take place on the coast or offshore, it is is easily measurable near the collector track, yet likely that they will produce both chemical and diminishes rapidly as the distance from the track thermal pollution. increases. NOAA concluded that initial test mon- On the other hand, a report prepared for'the American Society of International Law states that itoring has shown the rese,dimentation to not if strict controls and regulations are established measurably affect benthic organisms at sites re- soon by the United States and other countries moved from the collector track.' However, the involved, adverse impact could be minimized and available study methods constrained the ability of deep-sea mining could be made environmentally the monitoring team to track the benthic plume acceptable. and observe its effects on the deep sea benthic organisms. The surface plume is a cloud of turbid waste Conclusions water that extends with decreasing intensity and detectability downcurrent from the mining ship Overall, what implications do the Global 2000 after its discharge. After monitoring the mining projections have for the marine environment? In activity and conducting initial laboratory tests, large part, the answer is uncertain. The limited NOAA concluded that the surface plume has no observable deleterious effects on the rate of pri- mary productivity. The effects of the plume sed- *The deep ocean floor exhibits very low rates of recovery from iments on penetration of light into the euphotic damage. Even after a period of two years, densities of life in zone are as yet undetermined. Preliminary inves- an altered area can be an order of magnitude lower than those tigations show no detectable "in-plume" mortality of surrounding sediments. Benthic species Composition remain different from the undamaged encircling environment for a of zooplankton; experiments are being conducted. similiar period of time (J. Frederick Grassle, "Diversity and to assess the possible uptake of plume-related Population Dynamics of Benthic Organisms," Oceanus, Win- particulates by zooplankton. I ter 1978, pp. 42, 43, 45. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 317 detail in the projections, @Combined 'with inade- environment.in the next few decades parallels the quacies in present knowledge of the oceans, leave terrestrial "tragedy of the commons," with the many questions unanswered. However,. a few gen- same complex problem of how to protect a jointly eral conclusions can be drawn. used, limited resource in the face of population First, there is no evidence to suggest that the and economic growth. No assured source of funds, major regulatory functions of the world's oceans no unified strategy, and no authority adequately will be substantially'disrupted during the next two protects the global marine environment from decades. The oceans' heat and energy storage ca- overuse or misuse. Unilaterally declared two pacity and its influence on global climate are not hundred mile limits encourage coastal states to expected to undergo major modifications. The protect their ocean resources, but the oceans oceanic role in the global oxygen, carbon, and themselves do not recognize such arbitrary bound- water cycles will not. be drastically affected by the aries; they will transport pollutants throughout year 2000. their environment regardless of political delimi- Second, the most significant impacts of the tations.41* International agreements on the con- events foretold in the projections will probably trol of marine pollution have addressed occur in the coastal zone's. These impacts will stem contamination by petroleum and radioactive ma- from the projected pressures of - overfishi 'ng, the terials. Dumping of wastes at sea has also been projected increase in the installation of new trans- considered in international conventions, but the portation and in 'dustriai facilities, and the pro- largest sources of marine pollution-land-based jected discharge of toxic wastes and petroleum outfalls, runoff, and atmospheric emissions of syn- hydrocarbon products. As a result of these pro- thetic organic chemicals and heavy metals-are jected developments, the future pollution, alter- largely exempt from regulation by international ation and destruction of estuaries, coastal wetlands agreement. The exploration and exploitation of and coral reefs may be anticipated. the deep seabed are also still unregulated. ' The' Spoilation of coastal waters and disruption of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) estuarine and wetland ecosystems may have grave is helping nations to protect and manage shared implications for the continued productivity of oceanic zones through' its Regional Seas Pro- global fisheries-including aquaculture-and for gramme. Of eight regional seas programs now the general viability of many ocean organisms. It designated by UNEP, that for the Mediterranean is known that a large fraction of marine fishes is the most developed. Assessment of coastal and depend, during some period in their lives, on es- open-ocean pollution is being conducted by most tuarine ecosystems, coastal wetlands (including of the states surrounding the Mediterranean; they salt marshes and mangroves), and coral reefs. The are also involved in marine environmental plan- extent to which the world's potential fish 'catch ning and management, the development of leg- has already been affected by losses of coastal wet- islation, and institutional and financial lands, estuaries and coral reefs is unknown, but arrangements. Although difficulties remain con- certainly large, continuing losses may be expected cerning both individual and collective responsi- to produce adverse effects. Furthermore, over- bilities and'capabilities, UNEP's Regional Seas fishing will continue, to stress coastal fish com- Programme is advancing the cause for interna- munities; fisheries catches will be composed of tional cooperation in the prevention of ocean pol- species at lower trophic levels; and the proportion lutioli. I - of these species used for animal feed and fertilizer To further complicate the management of the rather than for human consumption will increase. marine commons, there are societal delays in re- Coastal zones everywhere' will be affected in sponding to even catastrophic environmental one Way or another. The use of DDT and other problems'. The Minamata Bay incident in'Japan,- persistent pesticides in African, Latin American, -involving mercury poisoning through consump- and Asian countries for vector control and agri- tion of contaminated fish, is a case in point. As cultural pest control is expected to increase in the shown in Table 13-28, 17 years elapsed between next few decades, and the quantities of these per- the time the mercury-laden catalysts were first sistent chemicals entering the coastal waters and discharged into the bay and the observation of the open ocean will increase accordingly. ' The neurological disorders in the fishermen and their global input of herbicides and other agricultural families. Three more years elapsed before the chemicals will also increase, as will urban and agent causing the disease was identified, and an- industrial pollution and the destruction of estuar- other 14 years passed before the chemical factory ine and coastal wetland habitats. was held legally responsible for its -actions and In many respects the degradation of the marine ordered to compensate the victims or their fam- 318 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 13-28 Timetable of Societal Responses to Mercury Pollution of the Ocean, Minamatg k Bay, Japan, 1939-73 Years Elapsed Since Pollu- tion Year Began 1939 Chemical production begins on the shores of Minamata Bay; the factory discharges spent catalysts 0 containing mercury into the bay. 1953 Birds and cats in the bay area act oddly; the behavior disorder becomes known as "disease of the 14 dancing cats." 1956 Neurological disorders observed among Minamata Bay fishermen and their families. 17 1959 High concentrations of mercury ascertained in bay fish and in dead patients; an independent study 20 shows disease was methyl mercury poisoning and factory effluent the likely source. 1960 Chemical company denies relationship of mercury to the disease but finds new discharge sites for 21 waste; several new cases break out at new site. 1961--64 Very small compensations paid by the chemical company to disease victims and to fishermen for loss 22-25 of livelihood. 1965 A second outbreak occurs at Niigata, Japan, where an acety1dehyde factory discharges spent mercury 26 catalysts into the river. 1967 Niigata patients initiate a civil action, presumed to be the first large civil suit brought against a polluter 28 in Japan. 1971 Niigata District Court pronounces judgment against the Niigata factory; compensation awarded the 32 77 Niigata victims or their families. 1973 Kumamoto District Court finds Minamata Bay factory culpable and orders company to pay reasonable 34 compensation to victims or their families. Source: Edward D. Goldberg, The Health of the Oceans, Paris: UNESCO, 1976, pp. 21-23; Paul R. Ehrlich, et al., Ecoscience: Population, Resources, Environment, San Francisco: Freeman, 191n, p. 574. iiies.* And many more years will pass, if ever, Problems develop, and society reacts-after a before all of the consequences will have run their time. Considering the magnitude of the short- and course. If societal delays on the order of decades long-term problems to be faced, a determined are involved in theresponses of a single nation, shift to a more anticipatory mode is now appro- how long a time might be required for all of the priate. Although dead or dying global oceans will nations of the world to respond if the oceans were not be in evidence by the year 2000, what happens observed to be evolving into a "toxic broth?"' over the next two decades will be a major deter- Global society is currently in a reactionary minant of the health and productivity of the ma- mode in its dealings with the marine environment: rine environment in the 21st century. THE FORESTRY PROJECTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT The Projections The CIA forestry projections anticipate that the present net global defores- tation rate of 18-20 million hectares per year will continue through the end of the century.t About one-fifth of the world's land surface is now covered by closed forests. By the year 2000, the projected deforestation will shrink *Two years later, in 1975, a survey disclosed that there had been 3,500 victims of the disease and that an additional 10,000 Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, Jan. 1979). A persons might develop symptoms of the disease in the future more widely used estimate of tropic deforestation is 10-12 (Paul R. Ehrlich et al., Ecoscience, San Francisco: Freeman, million hectares per year (used, for example. by Edouard 1977, p. 574). Saouma in "Statement by the Director-General of the Food tEstimates of the annual rate of global deforestation vary and Agriculture Organization," 8th World Forestry Congress, widely. Data from the governments of tropical countries in- Jakarta, Oct. 16-28, 1978). The substantially higher estimate dicate a net annual deforestation of 6.4 million hectares during used in this study takes into account the common disparity the 1975-80 period, and an optimistic projection of those coun- between the official designation of areas as forests and the tries' plans indicates the rate will decline to 4 million hectares actual use of the land by farmers, as well as the disparity per year by the 1995-2000 period (J. P. Lanly and J. Clement, between official intentions and actual accomplishments in the Present and Future Forest and Plantation Areas in the Tropics, tropical nations. ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 319 forest cover to one-sixth of the land surface. As illustrated in Table 13-29, most of the deforestation will occur in the LDCs, whose humid tropical forests and open woodlands are steadily being felled and converted to farmland and pasture. This trend is impelled by several forces: the expansion of agricultural frontiers into forested areas in order to supply food as populations increase; the demand for fuelwood and charcoal; the demand for tropical forest prod- ucts by industrialized nations; and the demand within the LDCs for paper and other forest-derived products as incomes rise. In North America and the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, only small reductions in forested areas are expected, while in Europe some increase in forests is anticipated. The combination of increasing population growth and decreasing forest area will result in a decline in stocks of commercial-sized timber per person. In the industrialized countries, such stock will fall from the present 142 cubic meters per capita to 114 cubic meters per capita in the year 2000, with consequent rises in the real price of wood and some increases in the use of substitutes for wood products. In the LDCs over the same period, stocks will plummet from the present 57 cubic meters per capita to 21 cubic meters per capita, resulting in serious shortages of firewood, building materials, and other forest-derived benefits. Forest management practices will also change. In the industrial nations, forest management will become increasingly intensive as efforts are made to boost commercial wood yields. In the less developed countries, the planting of plantation forests may increase toward the end of the century, but over the next two decades denuded areas and degraded forests resulting from planned agricultural settlement and from unplanned cutting will become far more extensive. Introduction TABLE 13-29 Of all the environmental impacts implied by the Estimates of World Forest Resources, 1978 and Global 2000 Study's projections, the forest changes, .2000 summarized in Table 13-29, pose one of the most Closed Forest Growing Stock serious problems, particularly for the less devel- (millions of (billions cu m oped regions of the world. "' When forests are hectares) overbark) removed, water and nutrient cycles are destabil- 1978 2000 1978 2000 ized, and soil is left unprotected from rainfall and U.S.S.R. 785 775 79 77 from the sun's heat, often leading to a sharp de- Europe 140 ISO 15 13 cline in soil fertility and to harsh extremes of tem- North America 470 464 58 55 perature and moisture that reduce agricultural. Japan, Australia, potentials. "" Where catchments are deforested, New Zealand 69 68 4 4 the result is destabilization of steep slopes and Subtotal 1,464 1,457 156 149 increased flooding, both of which jeopardize Latin America 550 329 94 54 downstream land and water use. Where humid Africa 188 150 39 31 Asia and Pacific tropical lowlands are deforested and recovery LDCs; 361 181 38 19 does not occur, sterile soils--capable of support- . Subtotal (LDCs) 1,099 660 171 104 ing little more than tenacious inedible grasses- Total (world) 2,563 2,117 327 253 may be exposed. When followed by burning, ov- Growing Stock ercultivation, and overgrazing, deforestation is per Capita merely the first step in the process of converting (cu m biomass) forest lands into barren wastelands. This trans- Industrial countries 142 114 formation occurred centuries ago in much of the LDCs 57 21- Mediterranean basin and the Middle East and has Global 76 40 already occurred during this century in wide areas Source: Table 8-9 and forestry projections. Chapter 8, this volume. 320 THE PROJECTIONS of Africa and South Asia. "' By the end of the timber, such as teak, is sometimes used only for century it may well have occurred throughout firewood. Although management regulations of large areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. some kind have now been established in almost . Drastic reductions in global forest area,, coupled every nation, for public forests (and in some na- with a simultaneous growth in demand for wood tions even for private forests), the ability to en- products, are sure to lead to efforts to intensify force such regulations is commonly limited, since the management of the remaining forests to raise the responsible agencies have insufficient person- yields and to increased areas of timber planta- nel and inadequate budgets. "" The need for land- tions. These trends will have both positive and use planning based on soil capabilities and site negative environmental impacts. Well-managed features is widely recognized, but the pace of plan- plantations and production forests (especially in ning is glacial, and land-use changes-forced by temperate areas) can ease the cutting pressure on population growth and economic development- natural forests, but production forests are biolog- are proceeding rapidly. 417 ically less diverse, are poorer habitats for native The disruption ofwater systems is the most cer- animals 4'3 and,, in some instances, may be inferior tain environmental consequence of forest elimi- to natural forests in soil and water conservation nation. Deforestation is most rapid in the very values .414 Energy-intensive fertilizers, pesticides, region where water systems are most vulnerable: and herbicides may be required, creating runoff the equatorial (tropical) belt, lying between 15 and associated problems. Still, given the projected degrees north and 15 degrees south latitude in demands for forest products, intensified wood and Africa and America, and bulging up to 30 degrees fiber production will be absolutely necessary in north in Asia. The equatorial belt receives almost many areas, especially in the tropics, if other large half the globe's total terrestrial rainfall. Many areas are to -be preserved as natural forests. areas within this band receive over 3 meters of In the discussion that follows, the environmen- rainfall a year, and the rain is substantially more tal consequences of deforestation in the LDCs are erosive than elsewhere in the world. "" Until they examined first, then the effects of more intensive are removed, the multistoried tropical forests management in the remaining forests of both the buffer the force of torrential rains, absorb water, LDCs and the industrialized nations, followed by and slow runoff. Deforestation of this belt will a brief consideration of possible global effects of have serious effects on the flows in the major river the expected changes in forest environments. systems such as the Mekong, the Ganges, the Amazon, the Congo, and their tributaries; the Deforestation in the LDCs shorter rivers of the equatorial island systems will The world's forests are quite diverse, ranging also be affected. The effects will be felt in all zones from dense tropical rain forests to sparsely wooded of the equatorial-belt watersheds. Effects range savannas, from dwarf krummholz forests along from landslides in the mountains and siltation of reservoirs and irrigation areas to the smothering alpine timberlines to thickets on semiarid cha- of marine life with silt in coastal areas. 419 parral land. "' To simplify the discussion, how- The extent to which populations in the Asian ev er, all forests will be classified here into one of two broad categories: (1) closed forests, where equitorial belt are dependent on indirect agricul- dense tree canopies preclude the growth of grasses, tural benefits from- forests differs considerably or (2) open woodlands, where canopies are more from that of populations in the non-Asian areas open and ground cover includes grasses and forbs. of the belt. The Asian populations will be consid- ered first. Closed Forests The Asian Equatorial Belt. Most Asian forests Closed forests in the LDCs present difficult lie above rich alluvial valleys and basins, the ma- management challenges. Commercial timber cut- jority of which are intensively farmed and irri- ters usually operate on a "cut-and-get-out" basis, gated, and several of which support the largest, making no effort to manage for perpetuity, The densest agricultural populations on earth. Almost forest is "high-graded" of commercially valuable one-fourth of humanity lives in these valleys and species, while much of the remaining vegetation basins and.depends for subsistence on critical ir- is destroyed by the logging operations. Land for rigation water derived from forested watersheds. crops is often cleared (frequently by burning) with In India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh alone, about little or no use made of the wood,* and valuable 500 million people depend on water running off the Himalayan watershed, and a similar number *Wood ashes do yield crop nutrients_-until they are leached in East and Southeast Asia depend on water from out, which is often quite quickly. the Himalayan and adjacent mountain systems. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 321 Most of the humid Asian equatorial belt is sub- vironmental problem facing Bangladesh by the ject to heavy rains during the monsoon and to , year 2000. relative drought during the rest of the year. Con- From the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi: sequently, the intensive river,basin farming de- The combination of both overgrazing and strip- pends on flood control and drainage for wet- ping of trees for fuel is making a serious impact season crops and on irrigation for any double- on the Himalayan watershed. Effects are seen in cropping. The loss of water control thus spells landslides, flooding on the Gangetic Plain, low- disaster. ering of the ground-water table, and reservoir sil- Waterflows in the Asian river basins depend on tation. . . . Resolving the sociological problems what happens to,the forests on the slopes of the of forestry management would appear to be as problematical as finding the resources for refor- Himalayan and other Asian mountain systems. estation. Supplying an alternative means for the, How the millions of people living in these wa- economic survival of the people currently using tersheds manage the land and forests will deter- the forests for their livelihood must proceed si- mine the stability of the strearnflows available to multaneously with good forestry practices. the billion or so people living downstream. Un- fortunately present land-use trends offer little And from the American Embassy in Islamabad, hope that the forests will be conserved. The Pakistan: mountain people's populations are increasing by The scale of the problem overwhelms scattered over two percent per year according to the pro- attempts to reverse the negative trends. Good for- jections in Chapter 2, and they perceive no alter- estry practices are not implemented, and no one native to clearing the forests to meet their needs. really knows how much, if any, effective refores- Many practice a combination of cropping and an- tation is taking place. Disruption of watershed imal herding, and livestock populations are grow-, cover is responsible for declining soil fertility, ac- ing apace with the human populations."' celerated soil erosion, and increasingly severe Overgrazing is widespread and getting worse. flooding. . . . The forestry institutes, which direct Fire, routinely used to clear new croplands and the few rograms, have proven to be inadequately financesand unable to meet either the immediate to temporarily improve pastures, often gets out or the long-term needs of forest preservation. of control. "' Commercial cutting has reduced the forest cover of the Himalayan watershed by as Similar situations, where - deforestation is un- much as 40 percent in the past 30 years, and only dermining agriculture downstream, are reported an estimated 10 percent of the total area now (in the communications reproduced in Appendix under management by man in the East and West C) fromThailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, Himalayas of India (30,000 square kilometers) is and are undoubtedly also occurring in Vietnam, still tree-covered. "' Transformation of montane Burma, Laos, and Malaysia. ecosystems into alpine deserts has become an im- The Non-Asian Equatorial Belt. Outside Asia, mediate problem for large mountain populations; the dependency of the downstream populations landslides and catastrophic floods are becoming 423 on upstream forestry practices is less intense. The annual disasters. non-Asian portions of the equatorial belt are not The most severe consequences in the coming decades will occur downstream, across national so heavily populated and do not support a major portion of the earth's settled agriculture. How- boundaries in some cases. The potential for in- ever, even Ioutside of Asia deforestation of wa-' ternational disputes resulting. from Himalayan tersheds will affect not only natural systems but deforestation was highlighted in several U.S. Em- also the downstream reservoirs, ports, cities, and bassy cables sent in response to Global 2000 Study transportation facilities, all of which will suffer queries (see appendix C). For example, the U.S. from flooding, sedimentation, and decreased dry- Embassy in Dacca cabled: season water levels. Events in Panama provide a microcosmic pic- Should population pressures lead to large-scale ture of what will occur on' a much wider scale removal of forest cover in Nepal and Assam, throughout tropical Africa and Latin America. Bangladesh as a whole would be adversely af- All the water for operation of the Panama Canal fected by the increased runoff. Under present con- ditions the country is subject to periodic severe comes from the watershed of Lake Gatun. Farm- flooding, and the prospect of more frequent and ers have cleared forest from about half the wa- damaging floods would threaten both the pro- tershed, and operation of the canal is already ductivity of the land and large portions of the threatened by destabilization of water flows and population. This may be the most significant en- by sedimentation of the lake and its reservoirs. 322 THE PROJECTIONS In May 1977, the surface of Lake Gatun dropped woodlands' are most often used as rangeland, and 3 feet below the level needed for full canal op- - their regeneration is inhibited by burning and ov- eration. Ships had to send part of their cargo ergrazing'. Although most open forest species are across the isthmus by land, and some large carriers fire-resistant, the trees in many regions have been had to detour around the Horn. Such interrup- decimated by too frequent or too severe burning tions in the Canal's performance can be expected in attempts to make short-term improvements. 431 to become increasingly frequent if the trends in The transformation of open woodland to desert deforestation cannot be reversed. 425 is well documented and has in many instances The highlands of Ethiopia and of the Peruvian, taken, place within living memory. Where fire- Equadorian and Bolivian Andes have long suf- wood gathering, overgrazing and uncontrolled fered, from the. effects of deforestation and are burning occur, soil nutrients are leached beyond especially vulnerable to the consequent ecological the reach of remnant plants, soil organic matter deterioration. While their salubrious climates is depleted, erosion by wind and water becomes often attract more human settlements than the severe, and the ultimate consequence is often de- surrounding lowlands, the mountain terrain makes sertification. A large scald shift of vegetational most soils prone to erosion whenever farming be- belts is underway with desert encroaching into dry comes intensive." The hilly rainforest areas of prairie, dry prairie into savanna, and savanna into West Africa are likewise subject to severe ero- forest. "' By 2000 this succession will have sharply sion, as population pressure forces shifting culti- reduced the rangeland possibilities of the over- 427 vators to shorten or eliminate fallow periods. used open woodlands. Consequently, some areas have already become useless badlands. The elimination of tropical forests has several Prospects for Amelioration other damaging effects that are less dramatic than The demand for forest products, grazing land, catastrophic floods. As regions are deforested, and cropland will be high in the decades ahead, they lose much of the cooling effect of shade and the trends for both open woodlands and evapotranspiration and develop harsh microcli- closed forests imply much tropical deforestation mates.' Soil, fauna and flora are exposed to the in the equatorial belt. Can these trends, and the full force of the sun, rain and wind. Plants that associated environmental impacts, be reversed? can survive are often vigorous weeds. Vain at- The prospects are mixed. Many complex inter- tempts are made to control the tough, inedible acting factors are involved. No amelioration can grasses that choke out other vegetation by more be anticipated until there is awareness and, given frequent burning, and the fires eat further into awareness, explicit program ideas, then testing the remnant stands of trees, accelerating the de- and demonstration. But forests are long-term re- crease in life-support capacity. sources, and economic considerations---especially Open Woodlands during times of high discount rate ncourage short-term thinking. Finally, technologies, are Knowledge of open woodlands is fragmentary, being developed which will make forest clearing as they are included in few resource inventories. quicker and less expensive. These factors all re- They are thought to cover about 30 percent of the quire examination. earth's total forest area, or about 1.2 billion hec- There is a need for increased awareness both tares, but they contain less than 10 percent of the locally and within institutions. The Chipko An- total global stock of wood. About half of the dolan "tree hugger" movement in northern India earth's total extent of this type of ecosystem is is an interesting example of growing awareness located in Africa, about 15 percent is in North at the local level. The following passage is para- 411 America, and 12 percent in South America. phrased from S.K. Chauhan's 1978 article' de- Open woodlands in the tropics are found in scribing that movement: semiarid zones, where rainfall is insufficient to support a dense closed forest. In these dry areas, Literally linking arms against indiscriminate de- fire is an effective too] for weed control and land- forestation by the lumber industry, these Hima- layan villagers protectivel hug the trees when clearing. Being sparse, open woodland can supply lumberjacks approach to 7ell them! The Chipko only relatively small quantities of fuel for ex- movement's primary objective is to force the state panding populations and, in many countries (such government of Uttar Pradesh to change its anti- as Sudan, Chad, Niger, Yemen, Iran, Afghani- quated forest policy. Most of the deforestation stan, Pakistan, India, and Nepal), have been that takes place in this area is not because of wood nearly eliminated by wood gatherers.430 Open collecting to meet basic energy needs but the re- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 323 suit of the insatiable demand of, the lumber in- opments may foreshadow increased financial sup- dustry. rt for forest management in the LDCs. However, After a serious flood. and landslide five years forest conservation and reforestation projects will ago, people of this- region came to realize that continue to face stiff competition for funds and their lives were intricately interwoven with the institutional support. Industrial and agricultural surrounding forest, and that official policy since projects that show a quick profit and give a more colonial times had, been tearing that web apart. immediate response to the LDC's urgent need for As the thick, broad-leaf forests on the mountain economic growth are likely to continue to receive tops were slowly sold away, the humus sponge higher priority. Forestr projects that do receive that held the monsoon water back disappeared. priority and ftinding wilrstill face formidable eco- Perennial streams now dry up soon after the mon- logical, bureaucratic, and (perhaps even more for- soon season, and the collection of firewood has midable) sociological obstacles. become a major preoccupation of the hill women. Several types of programs have been proposed This deforestation has increased soil erosion and to offset the adverse effects of deforestation in decreased local agricultural productivity. the LDCs. These proposals include: The ecological usefulness of the government's 9 Better management of existing forest resources; afforestation programs in the region can be dis- - Reforestation; puted. Under these programs, most of the felled oaks, rhododendron, and other broad-leaf trees Tree Plantations; are replaced with pine, because they grow faster Rangeland management with grazing controls and their wood is wanted in the market. But pine and pasture improvement; forests do not produce any humus to absorb water Restriction of new land clearing, bas .ed on soil or increase soil fertility. Without urgent, proper capability studies; management of these forests, the agricultural economy of a vast region of plains as well as hills Development of agro-forestry techniques for will be threatened. people who now have no alternative to planting' The Chipko leaders have organized large vol- annual crops on steep slopes; untary afforestation programs, planting broad- Dissemination of more efficient wood cooking leaf trees in mountain areas and along riverbanks stoves; to halt erosion and provide a source of fuelwood. Yet the fact that the villagers themselves practice Development of bio-gas and solar stoves to re- such conservation techniques, and feel,limpelled place wood and charcoal burners; and to bodily prevent the razin of trees, uIstrates Intensification of agriculture and other employ- the failure of the country's fevelopmrit strategy. ment-creating forms of rural development in Instead of trying to link the life and economy of order to reduce the agricultural pressures on the the local people, and thereby their development, remaining forest lands. with the rational ex 101tation of the only resource surrounding them fin this case, the forests) the The technical feasibility of implementing some government continues to support policies that re- of these proposals in some less developed coun- gard these resources as things to be sold to the tries (especially those in the more temperate highest bidder. zones) has been tested in recent years. Agro-for- Much more than local awareness is called for; estry projects (especially for palm oil) have been institutional awareness and concern is imperative. developed over the past decade in Malaysia,' In recent years there have been some encouraging and significant reforestation has' been accom- signs of institutional awareness, at least at the plished over the past two decades in the People's international level. These developments include the establishment of the United Nations Environ- Republic of China. " Industrial wood plantations mental Program and the development of the have been established in parts of Angola, Argen- World Bank policy for environmental as well as tina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Kenya, the industrial forestry.' The U.S. Department of Republic of Korea, Malawi, Morocco, Tanzania, State and its Agency for International Develop- and Zambia. ' A village fuelwood plantation pro- ment recently sponsored a strategy conference on gram is underway in, the Republic of Korea." tropical deforestation.P' The papers presented at Experiments with agr'oforestry are being carried the Seventh World Forestry Congress, held in out in the'Philippines 442 and in Nigeria.' How- Buenos Aires in 1972, are probably the most com- ever, outside of the countries just named, few of prehensive set of papers on silviculture as it is these progr Ia.in @sl* have gone beyond the demon- practiced today around the world.' Numerous L D n en in din Malaysia, the Phil- stration stage. @C '@i il d nda, C '@na, and South Ko- Tropical deforestation is caused by a combi- ov r m 's c u g i nes' a an IPPI rea are now showing serious concern over nation of (1) need for, additional agricultural land, for st tio , 4n es W. fuelwood, a us_@ de e a n and th e institutional develm (2) need for 'addition, nd. (3) A,, s 324 THE PROJEMONS tained world demand for tropical woods operating Another innovative technique for efficient clear- in the absence of effective and enforced programs ing of tropical forests in Brazil is the correntao. ' for forest conservation and management. Syner- This involves the use of very large anchor chains, gisms are often involved. For example, although roughly 100 meters in length and weighing up to a growing population of subsistence farmers is 10 tons. Enormous tractors attached to each end clearing land to grow food, access to such land is drag them through the forest, uprooting trees and possible in many cases only because commercial everything else in the path.t Still another tech- logging operations have opened the forests in re- nological development likely to significantly affect sponse to growing domestic and foreign demand at least the Brazilian tropical forests is the "float- for wood products. ' Access and transportation ing papermill. " In 1978, industrialist Daniel Lud- are also factors in the economics of clearing steep wig's floating papermill (longer than two football slopes. Even if the soil washes away after only fields in size) was towed from its construction site one or two crops, farmers can support themselves in Japan through the Indian and Atlantic Oceans over several seasons of clearing by selling fire- to its final destination along the Jari River, a trib- wood or charcoal on the regional market if trans- utary of the Amazon. Time magazine, reporting portation is available. " One of the causes of the on the $250 million plant, commented that by 1981 growing world demand for forest products is, of the factory "will turn out 750 metric tons of course, population growth, but income is also a bleached kraft pulp a day, enough to make a single major factor, and the U.N. Food and Agriculture strand of toilet paper stretching more than 6-1/2 Organization (FAO) is well aware of both. Edouard times around the world. . . . To feed the mill's Saouma, FAO Director General, stated recently appetite, Ludwig's crews have cleared nearly that, based on projections of past trends: , 250,000 acres of jungle so far and planted 81 mil- Over the next 16 years it is expected that con- lion fast-growing trees .41' Eventually, Ludwig sumption of forestry products wil ,I rise by 75 per- plans to "tame" an area of rain forest almost the cent to an annual roundwood equivalent of 4,000 size of Connecticut. million ml. If international development strate- What then are the prospects for amelioration gies were to increase the b%ing power of the of the tropical deforestation trends in the LDC? masses of people in the deve op ing world, even While there are a number of important and en- by a small fraction, projected consumption figures couraging demonstration projects, environmen- would be far higher.' tally significant conservation and reforestation In addition, possibilities for earning foreign ex- practices cannot be expected unless and until tech- change, needed by many LDCs to reduce large nically competent institutions are provided with foreign debts, will continue to be a motivating more resources and authority. " Sociological re- factor in establishing tropical forest policy"' and search on community cooperation and institutions will therefore also influence the possibilities for will also be necessary if village-level woodlots to ameliorating the tropical deforestation trends. meet woodlot and environmental needs are to be . While techniques and technologies are being widely established." developed that will assist in protecting and ex- By the Year 2000 panding forests, other technical developments may affect the future of tropical forests adversely. Assuming no change in policy (the standard A variety of faster, less costly technologies are policy assumption of the Global 2000 Study's pro- being developed to replace cutting and burning, jections), deforestation can be expected to con- the traditional methods of clearing. For example ' tinue as projected in Chapter 8. Deforestation will Agent Orange, the chemical defoliant used widely affect the rural segments of the LDC populations by U.S. armed forces in Vietnam, is reportedly most severely. Small farmers in South and South- available in farm supply stores in the Amazon east Asia, already among the world's poorest, will basin, where it is used to clear land for cultiva- tion. I The chemical 2,4,5-T, one of two berbi- likely to have been exposed to herbicides in South Vietnam cides contained in Agent Orange and invariably (Health Effects of Exposure to Herbicide Orange in Vietnam Should Be Resolved, Washington: U.S. General Accounting contaminated with the toxic compound dioxin, is Office, Apr. 6,1979.) now banned in the United States @k' because it has tThis technique was used earlier (and may have been devel- been linked with birth defects and miscarriages.* oped initially) in the United States, where it was used in arid- zone range management. Undesirable woody vegetation was scraped from the land with heavy chains, after which preferred The Comptroller General of the United States has recom- range grasses were sown. (John Valentine, Range Develop- mended that the Department of Defense conduct a survey of ment and Improvement, Provo: Brigham Young Univ. Press, any long-term medical effects on military personnel who were 1974, p. 516.) ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 325 face yet harder times as waterflows from the ture involve high-yield strains and monocultures. mountain watersheds become more erratic and as Plant geneticists have been at work not only 'on reservoirs essential for irrigation ate filled with grains but also on trees, and there are hopes that silt eroded from the deforested slopes. In Africa, fast-growing supertree plantations"' will be to herdsmen will find that rangeland will recover forestry what Green Revolution methods have more slowly (where it does recover) from periodic been to agriculture.* However, monocultures of droughts. Throughout the LDCs millions of farm- genetically identical trees face essentially the ers using shifting agriculture will experience sharply same problems as monocultures of genetically declining harvests as yields fall and the short fal_@ identical grains. These basic problems were dis- low periods fail to restore soil fertility. cussed at some length for the case of the Green A consequence of deforestation and simulta- Revolution in the food and agriculture section of neous population growth is that wood for fuel will this chapter; a few points particularly relevant.to be in short supply and more people will be forced intensive silviculture and tree farming will be con- to use grass, crop residues, and animal dung for sidered here. cooking fuel, further endangering land productiv- A major, perhaps underestimated problem ity, since these organic materials are essential for faced by both intensive silviculture and intensive the maintenance of soil quality. As prices for com- agriculture is the increasing energy subsidies they mercial fuel increase and gathered fuels become require. The fossil fuel subsidies inherent in in- scarcer, the costs (both monetary and temporal) tensive agriculture have received much attention of boiling water and cooking food may become and have been discussed extensively in the liter- prohibitive for the poorest populations, especially ature (and earlier in this chapter), but the energy in areas where fuelwood plantations have not requirements of intensive silviculture have been been established. examined relatively little. A 1970 study" found that fertilization and shorter rotation resulted in a 38 percent increase in Douglas fir production, Increased Intensity of Forest while costs (excluding any costs of environmental Management protectiony increased 64 percent. Still higher cost As explained in Chapter 8 the real price of increases could be anticipated if the energy sub- sidies had'been priced at the post-19.73 level. forest products is expected to rise in the coming Nonetheless it is certainly true that trees grow two decades. The rising prices will enhance the rapidly in the tropics, producing rotation times as profitability of investments in forest management, short as 10 years. Attention is now being focused and forests can be expected to become increas- on nitrogen-fixing species that may not require ingly subject to human control and manipulation fertilizer. More attention to and testing of indig- through intensive silviculture and tree farming. enous species are needed, rather than further at- While it is not possible to know precisely how tempts to grow a few exotic species. But no matter fast intensive silviculture will develop, the trend what species are ultimately chosen, the energy is clear. It is also clear that there will be both subsidies inherent in intensive silviculture deserve positive and negative environmental conse- closer examination before major commitments quences. On the positive side, the higher yields are made. resulting from faster growth of wood in the in- Another difficulty in applying the intensive tensively managed stands and from more com- Green Revolution methods to forests is that the plete exploitation of accessible natural stands time between harvests is so much longer for trees should take some pressure off the less accessible than -for grains. A combination of genetics and forest areas and thus allow the preservation of management practices is expected to -reduce tem- some forests in their natural state. Wood from perate-zone growth cycles from 150 to 40 years intensively managed stands could certainly en- for Douglas fir and from 60 to 35-40 years for hance the human environment for those who de- southern pine.' Nonetheless, the exposure pe- pend on firewood and charcoal for domestic fuel. riod for genetically identical monoculture's of trees On the negative side, a number of adverse envi- ronmental effects are anticipated, some of which raise questions about the basic viability of inten- *In 1975, the journal of the American Forest InIstitute looked sive silviculture, especially in the tropics. forward to an increase of 100 percent in the productivity of The technological problems involvedi are sim- land in the production of wood and an increase of 300 percent ilar in many ways to those of intensive agriculture. in fiber yields ("More Wood, Faster," Green America, Fall Both intensive silviculture and intensive agricul- 1975). 326 THE PROJECTIONS (even in the tropics) will always be long compared with the higher prices anticipated for forest prod- with the corresponding exposure period for grains. ucts, there are serious difficulties in the way of As with grains, pests and pathogens may evolve rapid, global developments in intensive silvicul- ways to overcome the genetic defenses of single ture, and the pace of application promises to be strains, producing plant epidemics comparable to slower than was the case for intensive agricultural the southern corn blight or the Dutch elm dis- methods. ease. 457 To date, experience with intensive silviculture As with the deforestation problem, the negative is limited to a very small number of complete environmental impacts of intensive silviculture planting-to-harvest cycles. Furthermore, as shown will probably be more severe in the tropics than in Chapter 8, intensive silviculture is being prac- in the. temperate zones. Foresters and biologists ticed at present on a regional scale only in Europe, have suspected for some time that the great eco- although significant local developments are taking logical diversity of tropical forests, which makes place in Japan, North America, the People's Re- them exceptionally stable under natural condi- public of China, Brazil, South Korea, and New tions, also makes them exceptionally vulnerable Zealand. Less intensive techniques, such.as, reg- to permanent damage from logging operations ulation of livestock, pest control and reforestation and that natural forest stands degrade severely are practiced on parts of the forests in most in- when subjected to intense use."-" dustrialized countries and on scattered sites in Most silvicultural methods have been devel- many LDCs. In most forests outside Europe and oped by foresters in the temperate zones and are North America, however, the only management of doubtful suitability or utility for forests of the inputs are fire control and occasional cutting. humid tropics. A substantial research investment As a result of.all of these present and potential must be made to develop appropriate silvicultural problems, and because of limited planting-to-har- methods for tropical environments. However, the vest experience, most businessmen and investors time lag inherent in forestry research (a growth consider plantation forestry outside of the tem- cycle measured in decades, as opposed to months perate zone an unproven technology. " Many for grains) delays the economic return from trop- decades will pass before the questions created by ical forest research investments, making it difficult these problems have been answered. Investors to obtain support for forestry research in the will be slow to move into intensive silviculture, LDCs. In the absence of extensive tropical for- particularly in the tropics. Because of technical estry research, technological breakthroughs are problems, most multinational forest product com- not likely, and the application of doubtful forest panies do not expect that the incentives* will war- management methods can be expected to con- rant. lar e-scale commercial planting before the tinue for at least several decades. 1990s. U It is even less certain when and if publicly There are other reasons for environmental con- sponsored and local commercial enterprises will cern about increased silvicultural intensity: (1) In undertake plantation forestry projects on a scale both the industrialized nations and the LDCs, the that would alleviate local and global firewood ability of many forest soils to sustain short-rota- scarcities. tion tree cropping is doubtful. Recent U.S. re-' For all these reasons, major industrial wood search indicates that even in quickly recovering harvests from manmade tropical forests are not temperate-zone forests, the loss of soil nutrients likely to begin by the year 2000. Nonetheless, lo- following a clear-cutting operation is significant. '59 cally important harvests of wood for fuel and for (2) There is some evidence that plantations of village-level construction could be realized by uniformly aged trees do not stabilize watersheds 2000, and important watershed protection could as well as the natural forests that preceded them. be achieved in some areas where policies and at- (3) Applications of pesticides and fertilizers are titudes are now changing and where fast-growing likely to affect ecosystem elements other than the tree species are available. trees they are intended for, reducing the diversity *Several years ago, Brazil established strong tax incentives for of both flora and fauna and threatening the health reforestation, and a substantial amount of planting was,done of forest lakes and streams. (4) In some places hastily by corporations and large landowners in the country's intensively managed forests may even become subtropical areas. Under these 'incentives, the area devoted sources of pollution (from fertilizers and other annually to commercial planting was about three times the applied chemicals), where they once functioned goal set by the Food and Agriculture Organization for all of Latin America. Brazil, however, has now reduced the tax in- as filters of air and water.' centives. (Gordon Fox, "Commercial Forestry," Proceedings, Given all these problems, how rapidly can the U.S. Strategy Conference on Tropical Deforestation, Wash- methods of intensive silviculture be applied? Even ington: Department of State, Oct. 1978.) ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 327 Global-Scale Environmental Impacts now and 2000, however, the number of extinctions There are two global-scale environmental im- caused by human activities will increase rapidly. projec- Loss of wild habitat may be the single most im- pacts to be anticipated from the forestry portant factor. The projected growth in human tions. First is a potential impact on the world's populatiodand economic activity can be expected climate. Second is a significant reduction in the number of plant and animal species on the planet. to create enormous economic and political pres- sure to convert the planet's remaining wild lands Changes in Climate to other uses. As a consequence, the extinction The anticipated change in global forest inven- rate will accelerate considerably. tory may affect global climate patterns by increas- The death of an individual is very different from ing the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. the death of a species. A species is a natural biotic Climatologists have been aware of a steady in- unit-a population or a series of populations of crease in atmospheric carbon dioxide (C02) for sufficient genetic similarity that successful repro- many years, and some, as already stated in Chap- duction between individuals can take place. The ter 4, have expressed concern that a global warm- death of an individual of a particular species rep- ing trend may result. Until recently, it was resents the loss of one of a series of similar in- assumed by most experts* that nearly all of the dividuals all capable of reproducing the basic increase was coming from the burning of fossil form, while the death of a species represents both fuels and that the earth's plants were absorbing the loss of the basic form and its, reproductive some of the excess. However, recent calculations potential. that take deforestation into account indicate that Extinction, then, is an irreversible process carbon stored in the biomass has been decreasing through which the potential contributions of bi- rather than intreasing. One rough estimate indi- ological resources are lost forever. In fact ` plant cates that as much as half the carbon in the earth's and,animal species are the only truly nonrenew- biomass may be stored in the forests, much of it able resources.' Most resources traditionally in the tropics, and that current rates of forest termed "nonrenewable"-minerals and fossil clearing may be releasing amounts of carbon diox- fuels-received that label because they lack the ide approximately equivalent to the amounts com- reproductive capability. Yet most nonbiological ing from fossil fuel consumption. ' Others feel compounds and elements are, at least in theory, that these amounts and rates are probably lower. fully renewable. Given sufficient energy, non- It is well known that not all of theC02 released biological resources can be separated, trans- to the atmosphere remains there, but there is still formed, and restored to any desired form. By contrast, biotic resource&-species (not individu- debate over the sinks. Some of the releasedC02 als) and ecosystems-are completely nonrenew- is stored in new forest growth, but the net de- able.* Once extinguished, species cannot be crease in wood volume projected in this, study recreated. When extinct, biotic resources and implies an acceleration of theC02 buildup that their contributions are lost forever. may have significance for climate as early as 2050. How many extinctions are implied by the Changes in Biological Diversity Global 2000 Study's forestry projections? An es- The second global change implied by the for- timate was prepared for the Global 2000 Study by estry projections is a significant reduction in biotic Thomas E. Lovejoy of the World Wildlife Fund. diversity. The extent to which the diversity of the Dr. Lovejoy's analysis, together with a tabular flora and fauna is maintained provides a basic summary of the results, is presented on the next index to the ecological health of the planet. Pres- four pages. His figures, while admittedly rough, ently the world's biota contains an estimated 3- are frightening in magnitude. If present trends 10 million species. ' Until the present century, continue--as they certainly will in many areas- the number of species extinguished as a result of hundreds of thousands of species can be expected human activities was small, and the species so to be lost by the year 2000. affected were regarded as curiosities. Between Extinction, of course, is the normal fate, of vir- tually all species. The gradual processes of natural extinction will continue in the years ahead, but *G. E. Hutchinson is an exception. In 1954 he estimated that the extinctions projected for the coming decades the increase in atmospheric CO. from forest destruction was will be largely human-generated and on a scale that about equal to that from the burning of fossil fuels ("The renders natural extinction trivial by comparison. Biochemistry of the Terrestrial Atmosphere," in G. P. Kuiper, ed., The Solar System, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1954, vol. 11, pp. 371433). *Also see the discussion of this point in Chapter 12. 328 THE PROJECTIONS A PROJECTION OF SPECIES EXTINCTIONS* Virtually all of the Global 2000 Study's pro- themselves. Tropical forests sustain themselves j ections-especi ally the forestry, fisheries, through a rapid and highly efficient recycling population, and GNP projections-have im- of nutrients. Little nutrient is lost when an or- plications for the extinction of species. Ac- ganism dies, but when extensive areas of forest cepting these projections as correct, how many are cleared, the nutrients are quickly leached extinctions can be anticipated by 2000? out and lost. I Probably the largest contribution to extinc- Studies have shown that there are a wide tions over the next two decades will come as variety of tropical soils. Some (such as those a result of deforestation and forest disruption in lowland swamps) are rich, but most are (e.g. cutting "high-grade" species), especially either thin, infertile, and highly acidic, or thick in the tropics. The forestry projections in Chap- and highly leached of nutrients. Recent aerial ter 8 provide an estimate of the amount of trop- surveys of the Amazon basin, for example, in- ical deforestation to be expected. The question dicate that only 2 percent of the soils are suit- then is: What fraction of the species now pres- able for sustained agriculture. ' Once cleared, ent will be extinguished as a result of that de- the recycling of nutrients is interrupted, often forestation? permanently. In the absence of the forest Possible answers are provided by the curves cover, the remaining vegetation and exposed in Figure 13-8. The curves in this figure do not soil cannot hold the rainfall and release the represent alternative scenarios but rather re- water slowly. The critical nutrients are quickly flect the uncertainty in the percent of species leached from the soils, and erosion sets in lost as a result of a given amount of defores- first, sheet erosion, then gully erosion. In some tation. The endpoints are known with more areas only a few years are required for once accuracy than other points on the curves. dense forest lands to turn to virtual pavements Clearly, at zero deforestation the resulting loss of laterite, exposed rock, base soil, or coarse of species is zero-and for 100 percent defor- 14 weed" grasses. The Maryland-sized area of estation, the loss approaches 100 percent. The Bragantina in the Amazon basin is probably reasons for the high losses at 100 percent de- the largest and best-known area to have already forestation are as follows. undergone this process, becoming what has The lush appearance of tropical rain forests been called a "ghost landscape."'" masks the fact that these ecosystems are among With formerly recycled nutrients lost through the most diverse and fragile in the entire world. deforestation and its aftereffects, the capacity The diversityt of tropical forests stems in part of a tropical rain forest to regenerate itself is from the tremendous variety of life zones cre- highly limited and much less than that of a ated by altitude, temperature, and rainfall var- temperate forest. The possibilities for regen- iations. " The fragility of tropical forests stems eration are limited further by the fact that the from the fact that, in general, tropical soils con- reproductive biology of many of the tree spe- tain only a very limited stock of nutrients. Typ- cies found in mature tropical forests is adapted ically, the nutrients in tropical soils are only a to recolonizing small patches of disturbed for- small part of the total inventory of nutrients in est rather than the large areas now being the tropical ecosystem. Most of the nutrients cleared."' As a result and in spite of rapid are in the diverse flora and fauna of the forests succession rates, the disruption and simplifi- cation from deforestation of tropical rain for- ests. is, for the most part, irreversible, given the *This projection was developed for the Global 2000 Study time scale necessary to preserve the present by Dr. Thomas E. Lovejoy of the World Wildlife Fund. mature and diverse biota. While a few attempts tDiversity here is used simply in the sense of numbers of at reforestation to natural tropical forest are species. Ecologists sometimes use more complex indices being made, only limited success has yet been of ecological diversity. Efforts to meet basic human needs and rising ex- of the extinctions are expected to occur in the pectations are likely to lead to the extinction of tropics. between one-fifth and one-seventh of all species The lost potential of the earth's biological re- over the next two decades. A substantial fraction sources is often neglected in considering the con- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 329 100 90 80 70 60 U 50 0 C 0. D', 40 E 30 20 z"000 10 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 so 90 100 Percent of Tropical Forest Area Cleared Figure 13-8. Loss of species through clearing.of tropical forest areas-five projections. achieved (e.g., in Puerto Rico).More typically, point ofthe curves in the figure for 100 percent tropical forests are either cleared and aban- deforestation is therefore a 95 percent loss of doned, or (if the soil and economics permit) species. So much for the endpoints of the converted to plantation forests of high-growth curves. species such as Eucalyptus, Pinus, and Gme- The general shape of the curves (convex, lin- lina, which are not suitable for the diverse local ear, or concave) depends in large part on the fauna found in mature tropical forests. size of the areas needed to preserve the eco- As a consequence (and for purposes of the systems on which the species depend. Unfor- rough calculations here) the rain forest areas tunately, little is known about the size of these modified by deforestation can be expected, areas. ' Most tropical species occur at exceed- with few exceptions, to include a negligible ingly low densities. Dispersal (to compensate number of the species that were present in the for local extinctions) is probably an important virgin forests. The estimate used for the end- part of their biology, "I and this survival strat- sequences of deforestation in the tropics. Tropical of this huge stock of biological capital, which, if forests contain both the richest variety and the carefully managed, could be a rich, sustainable least well known flora and fauna in the world. It source of building materials and fuel, as well as would be difficult to overstate the potential value medicinal plants, specialty woods, nuts, and fruits. IDZ 330 THE PROJECTIONS egy is impeded or precluded when forest areas fugia are in fact relatively small for classes with are reduced to isolated reserves. the most numerous species. "') A concave It is also known that only a limited amount curve (curve D or E) would result if the refugia of a rain forest region can be converted to non- should turn out to be small and highly over- forest before local (or regional) changes in cli- lapping, and (a) if efforts are made to identify mate will occur, endangering the remaining and preserve the refugia, or (b) if the refugia forest areas. For example, current estimates are widely separated from one another. put the percent of precipitation in the Amazon While curve D is used in the following cal- basin generated by the forest (as opposed to culations,' it. may underestimate the impacts the ocean) at slightly over 50 percent, 4` Al- of the projected deforestation.* Were it pos- though this contribution to the precipitation sible-which it is not-to create instantly a will not be eliminated entirely by deforestation, mininium system of biological reserves of ad- it will be reduced, and reductions in rainfall equate size and ideal location, the impacts of beyond a certain point could initiate an irre- the projected deforestation would still be on versible drying trend. the order of the effects of the Pleistocene gla- In the face, of our limited knowledge, the ciations.4" Even so, such a system would not concept of "refugia" provides one approach to be secure because of local climatic effects and estimating the areas needed to preserve trop- ever rising political and economic pressures. It ical ecosystems and their species. During the is difficult to estimate how much of the world's Pleistocene glaciations, the climate in the equa- tropical forest has been cleared and how such torial regions was generally dryer and unable pressures will influence future cutting, but con- to support tropical rain forests. Rain forests sidering the amount of forest known to have did survive, however, in relatively small patches, already been destroyed, it is too late to achieve now termed refugia - ' It has been found that eve 'n the minimum system of reserves. Fur- within the Amazon basin there are areas of thermore, present global conservation plans for concentration of species not occurring else- rain forests are limited. For example, the most where (centers of endemism), and these areas ambitious proposal for conservation in the Am- of concentration are thought by many ecolo- azon basin would be site parks and reserves in gists to represent vestiges of Pleistocene re- the areas where refugia are thought to have fugia. Refugia have now been identified in the occurred, but the total area of the parks and basin for a few families of organisms (primarily small animals, including some insects and a few plants). " There is wide variation in size among *Even the deforestation projected in Chapter 8 may have the areas of concentration that have been meas- been underestimated. Warwick Kerr predicts the loss of all Amazon forests (B. Dickson, "Brazil Learns Its Eco- ured, the smallest areas being for the class with logical Lessons the Hard Way," Na'ture, vol. 275, 1978, pp. the most species (i.e., insects). And, of course, 684-85), and P. W. Richards (op. cit.) predicts the loss of the smaller the area of concentration, the more all untouched rain forests by,the century's end. Very re- vulnerable the species are to extinction by rea- cently, however, some new information has become avail- son of deforestation and loss of habitat. able for the tropical forests of the Amazonbasin. According to. Larry Rohter (op. cit.), Brazil',s. National Space Re- How then should the curves in Figure 13-8 search Institute analyzed 32 photographs taken from a be drawn? Assuming that the refugia concept Landsat satellite and estimated in late 1978 that as much applies generally to all tropical forests, a con- as one-tenth of the Brazilian Amazon forest has been razed. vex curve (curve A or 13) would result if the This is an area larger than the state of Texas and probably does not include areas that are now forested but are no @-refugia turn out to be relatively small and if longer diverse, virgin forest. On the matter of future cut- the refugia should happen to be cleared first. ting, the Brazilian Government is reported to be studying A linear curve (curve Q would result from the use of "risk contracts" for the large-scale logging in the random cutting if the refugia were not adjacent Amazon basin. The Superintendency for the Development but overlapping, or were relatively small. (The of the Amazon (SUDAM) has idendfied approximately 100 million additional acres (between 5 and 10 percent of limited data now available suggest that the re- the total area of the Amazon basin) for timber exploitation. However, if present trends continue, sustained adapted or fast-growing local trees will be cut be- benefits from this capital will never be realized. fore their fruits or seeds are collected. Predatory Unique local plants and animals will be unknow- insects and plants with herbicidal or insecticidal ingly and carelessly destroyed. Particularly. well-n properties will be lost for lack of observation and ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 331 TABLE 13-30 Extinctions of Species Implied by the Global 2000 Study's Projections,, Present Species- Projected Loss of ExtifictionSd (in thousands) Deforestation' Species' (in thousands) Low DEFORESTATION CASE" Tropical forests Latin America 300-1,000 50 33 100-333 Africa 150-500 20 13 20-65 S. and SE. Asia 300-1,000 60 43 1294M Subtotal 759-2,500 249-828 Ali other habitats Oceans, fresh water, nontropical forests, islands, etc. 2,250-7,500 81 18."25. Total 3,000-10,000 437-.1 i453 HIGH DEFORESTATION CASE' Tropical Forests Latin America 300-1,000 67 so 150-500 Africa 150-500 61 50 75-250 S. and SE. Asia 300-1,000 67 so, 150-500 Subtotal 375-1;250 All other habitats Oceans, fresh water, nontTOpical forests, islands, etc. 2,250-7,500 81 188-625 Total 3,000-10,000 563.4,8175 I The total of 3-10 million species (see reference 85) are assumed to be tropics as a whole. distributed roughly aS follows: 10 percent in the virgin forests of the Amazon b See the, forestry. projections in Chapter 8. (P. H. Raven. personal communication to T. E. Lovejoy, 1974), 5 percent c Derived from cur4C in Figure 13-8. in African tropical forests, 10 percent in south and southeast Asian tropical 4 Calculated as the krc*nt loss'of species times the present number ofspecies. forests, and 75 percent elsewhere (oceans. fresh water, nontropical forests. *:rhe combined effects of loss f habi6t.- 'presence of toxic substances. eu- islands, etc.). It should be noted that the figures for the percentage of the troobication. desertification, simplification of forests in the temperate zones. world's biout in tropical rain forests arc comservative. Many estimates (see acid rain. eic.---spread over five continents and the two-thirds of the planet's Norman Myers, The Sinking Ark, London: Perganion, forthcoming, 1979) surface covered by. the seas-are assumed to lead to a loss of one-twelfth of place 30-40 percent of the total in the moist tropics and 704M percent in the the planet's bioti. reserves would comprise only 5 percent of the that of the 3-10 million species 482 now present total land area of the Amazon. I Such a system on the earth, at least 500,00 '04M,000 will be would mimic the distribution of forests at the extinguished during the next two decades. The height of the Pleistocene glaciations. largest number of,extifictions,.can be expected What then is a reasonable estimate of global in the insect- drdeim@-many of them beneficial xitinctions by 2000? Given the amount of trop- speci ecause'ther e es@simply 6 e are so very ical forest already lost (which is important but many species of insects. The next highest num- often ignored), the extinctions can be esti- ber of extinctions will be among plants. While mated as shown in Table 13-30. In the low the projected,extinctions, refer wall biota, they deforestation case, approximately 15 percent are much.largdr than the 1,000 bird and @mam- of the planet's species can be expected to be mal species now r-ec.'og hized,'as -endangered. 483 lost. In the high deforestation case, perhaps as Clearly the extin 'ctions caused by human activ- much as 20 percent will be lost. This means ities will rise to unprecedented rates by 2000.1 study. Diverse assemblies of gigantic trees, their Canyon'-vill be irreparably lost.* In short, the unddrstories, and their resident communities of projected lossof tropical forests. represents a mas@. mammals, birds, and insects-natural wonders sive expenditure of biological capital, an expend- every bit as unique and beautiful as the Grand. iture so suddefiand,so large that it will surely limit 332 THE PROJEMONS the future benefits that even careful management cycles at most. Investors are cautious, and major and husbanding can sustain from the remaining world plantings are not expected before the 1990s biotic resources of the earth. at the earliest because the economic incentives do not match the risks involved. On the other hand, Conclusions the need for small-scale village woodlots is now The Global 2000 Study's forestry projections recognized by international aid agencies and by have serious implications for the environment. In many national governments, and many programs the Asian LDC's, deforestation Will cause exten- of this sort are now planned or underway. I sive erosion and will destabilize waterflows, ad- The tragedy of forests is that, like the com- versely affecting the agriculture on which a quarter mons, I they are another example of a common of the world's total human population depends. resource subject to misuse-but on a global scale. In the tropical zones of Africa and Latin America, While forest lands are owned by individuals (or deforestation will lead, in many cases, to the loss governments), forests provide community, na- of the nutrients and to reduction of the soil quality tional, and international benefits that go.well be- essential for the recovery of the forests. Desert yond the benefits usually considered in . forest encroachment can be anticipated in parts of nearly management decisions. Moderation of tempera- every continent. Extinctions of species caused by tures, stabilization of waterflows, protection of human activities will explode to rates never before soils'and provision of habitats for a wealth of observed, perhaps on the same order as during unexamined biotic resources are some of the ben- the Pleistocene glaciations. 4" efits of forests that accrue to society as a whole The deforestation will be caused by a combi- and do not enter into the normal calculus of for- nation of population increase and economic growth. estry economics. Currently the primar cause is agricultural ex- The difficulty-some would say, the impossi- y bility--of managing common. resources is well pansion. By 2000, agriculture will have expanded known. Garrett Hardin has written about the spe- about as far as it can, and fuelwood and forest cific problem of managing and protecting com- product demands will become the primary causes. mons-type biological resources. ' He concludes Populations needing firewood, charcoal, plots for that biotic resources cannot be preserved under agriculture, lands for grazing, and materials for commons management, and that socialism or pri- village construction are projected to continue vate enterprise are the only workable alternatives, their rapid growth over the next two decades. In both of which have limitations. The socialism ap- the industrialized nations, slower population growth proach suffers from the problem of quis custodiet coupled with economic growth and high per capita ipsos custodes? (who will watch the watchman consumption of forest products will also have a himself?). The private enterprise approach, Har- large impact on world forests through increased din argues, has a serious weakness in the way it demands for wood and paper products. The de- deals with time, the question being: Can conser- mand for commercial timber and paper in the less vation be accomplished over time solely as a result developed countries, while starting at a low base, of economic self-interest? is rising considerably faster than that in the in- Aldo Leopold, a wise and insightful observer dustrialized countries, and as a result a rising num- of biotic resources and economic systems, consid- ber of LDCs are becoming dependent on forest- ered this question and concluded: product imports. Prospects for amelioration of these trends are A sXstern of conservation based solely on eco- mixed, at best. On the one hand, there are a large nomic self-interest is hopelessly to sided. It tends number of difficulties. Silvicultural methods de- to ignore, and thus eventually to Si minate, many veloped primarily in the temperate zones are of elements in the land community that lack com- doubtful utility in the tropics, where most of the mercial value, but that are (as far as we know) deforestation will occur. Intensive silviculture essential to its healthy functioning. It assumes, (tree plantations), patterned after Green Revo- falsely, I think, that the economic parts of the biotic clock will function without the uneconomic lution agriculture, is a much-discussed hope but parts .489 its methods face the same problems (including energy-intensiveness and genetic vulnerability of More recently, economic analysis has provided single-strain monocultures) as Green Revolution further support for Leopold's conclusion.' A agriculture and over much longer planting-to-har- common approach to management decisions un- vest periods. Experience with these methods (es- . der private enterprise is to calculate the present pecially in the tropics) is limited to a few growth value of the future stream of benefits to be ob- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 333 tained from alternative management strategies. Their particular concern was whether this ap- Other things being equal, management strategies proach to management and conservation would that maximize the present value of discounted fu- keep the forest system in equilibrium at an 6pti- ture benefits are generally preferred. mal, sustainable yield. They concluded that the What benefits are to be considered, and at what conventional economic analysis (ignoring the ex- discount rate? Forest benefits to the entire wa- ternal costs and benefits of forests to the wider tershed, (e.g., water stabilization, erosion control, society) "must lead to a pattern of high cuts now temperature moderation, species protection, rec- and lower cuts later . . . to shorter and shorter reation) are often not included in the calculations rotations to the point of depletion of theresource, because they are "external" benefits, i.e., bene- and to the conversion of forest lands to other uses fits not- accruing to the self-interest of the forest until the relative price of forest products rises suf- landowner. Discount rates are also important be- ficiently high that the economic system is in equi- cause conservation by its very nature concerns librium. itself with future values. As Hardin explains, "The higher the interest rate on money, the more It seems likely, therefore, that without basic difficult it is to conserve for the future. Or as changes in forest policy throughout much of the economists put it: the higher the interest rate, the world, the environmental consequences of the more heavily the purely rational man must dis- Global 2000 Study's forestry projections are vir- count the future.... Compound discounting, tually inevitable. Even the bases for such policy which increases as interest rates increase, dimin- changes are unclear. It is not at all obvious what ishes and in the long pull virtually destroys [future should be done in each geographic area, and tech- values].""' And the Global 2000 Study's projec- nology is certainly not the whole answer.' In tions suggest that interest rates will remain high. general, localized approaches and solutions will Virtually every one of the projections is based on probably be needed, but until all of the societal the assumption that large amounts of capital in- benefits of forests are taken into consideration in vestment will be made in the sector; these in- making forest policy and management decisions, vestments of scarce capital can be expected to societies around the world can expect that the keep interest rates quite high. forest-related environmental benefits that are Scott Overton and Larry Hunt of the University taken for granted today will continue to slip away of Oregon have examined the implications of the and will be sadly reduced in number and quality present-value approach to forest management. by the end of the century. THE WATER PROJECTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT The Projections The Study's water resource projections, developed by the Department of the Interior and the Central Intelligence Agency, assume that water supply is constant and that demand increases with growth in population, expansion of irrigated agriculture, and increased industrial activity. The projections stress the severe limitations associated with supply-demand balance. But since re- gional or local quantitative data are lacking, global aggregates are presented (see Table 13-31). The present global supply of fresh water (i.e., total runoff) is large relative to demand, at least in theory. Supply is now about 10 times demand but by the year 2000 is projected to be 3.5 times demand. This projection dramatizes the rapidity with which human demand is catching up with the world's the- oretical availability of fresh water. However, even these figures are misleading because of the extreme seasonal and geographic uneveness in the distribution of water resources. Even now local and regional deficits occur on a seasonal and, increasingly, perennial basis. Given present data. limitations, the prospects for water in 2000 can be assessed only qualitatively. Based on examples from many areas, the pro- jections anticipate serious water shortages in many nations or regions. Water development projects will be pursued, but severe shortfalls are expected in 334 THE PROJECTIONS deficit areas. Areas noted as being particularly susceptible to water shortage include parts of Africa, North America, the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia. Conflicts among competing water-demanding economic sectors and among nations drawing water from the same river systems are anticipated. As a further complication, water supplies from streams and rivers may become less reliable in regions where deforestation is stripping watersheds bare. The projected decrease in the world's forests from 20 percent to 16 percent of the land surface by 2000 will take place largely in the LDCs, where needs for water already exceed supplies in some regions. The water projections assume no climatic change. However, in the event of a cooling trend supplies would be adversely affected as a result of a more erratic pattern of rainfall. A warming trend, on the other hand, might reduce variability and increase supplies slightly, but in the central United States droughts might become more common. Introduction catchment and river basin conditions will ad- It is not possible to analyze the environmental versely affect water supplies by increasing varia-' implications of the water projections with preci- bility., Climatic change could further increase sion because environmental impacts tend to apply variability. to specific river basins or other hydrological units, Deterioration of Catchments and River Basins and the water projections summarized in Table From the standpoint of both water supply and 13-31 could not achieve that level of detail. None- water quality, the condition of a catchment or theless, five environmental topics related to the river basin is determined largely by the flora on projections of water supply and to the conse- the upper portions of the basin. The high, often quences of water development and use are ex- steep portions of the basin usually receive a large plored: proportion of the rainfall, and the flora on these � Environmental developments affecting water slopes are critically important in determining the supply (deterioratin catchments in river basins, quality and flows of water throughout the basin. acid rain, climatic Inge); A continuous mantle of vegetation in the upper � Impacts of hydraulic works; portions of a basin has many benefits. The veg- � Water pollution (of urban and industrial origin etation breaks the fall of the raindrops, absorbing and of agricultural origin); the kinetic energy before it can dislodge soil par- � Water-related diseases; and ticles. The vegetation also slows the runoff and � Extinction of freshwater species. enhances the absorptive properties of the soils. This range of topics reflects the multiplicity of Where vegetation is present over the upper por- characteristics, uses, and values of the water re- source: Water is essential to human health and TABLE 13-31 well-being; water is habitat for a diversity of Projected Global Supply and Demand for Water aquatic life; water is a major component (and by the Year 2000 determinant) of the environment. In short, water is unique among resources in the diversity of its Cubic kilometers per year characteristics, uses, and values. Projected Demand With- Con- Environmental Developments Affecting drawn sumed, Supply' Water Supply Irrigation 7,OW 4,800 Domestic 600 100 Worldwide, two environmental developments Ind strial 1,700 170 are likely to have an impact on water supply by Wauste dilution 9,000 2.000: catchment and river basin deterioration and Other 400 4W regional or global changes in climate. The trends Total 18,700 5,470 37,700 in catchment and river basin deterioration are source: The work of G. P. Kalinin, as presented in Chapter 9. clearly discernible and accelerating. Climatic trends Not returned to streams or rivers. are less clear but just as important. Deteriorating Taken to be the mean annual discharge of all rivers. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 335 tions of a river basin, the basin's water is generally forests and the substitution of other soil-binding relatively well regulated and clean. vegetation that consumes less water (such as. In the absence of vegetative cover, rain flows grasses) can improve lower-basin water supplies off a basin's steep upper slopes as it would off a by increasing runoff-at the cost of tree growth. tin roof. The full kinetic energy of the raindrops Scientifically controlled cutting of catchment veg- is available to dislodge soil particles. A relatively etation has been employed in the United States unobstructed surface accelerates the runoff, pro- and some other countries to increase runoff, or ducing greater flood peaks downstrearn.* The water yield, in dry regions. ' To be successful this kinetic energy of the enhanced floods tears away practice requires strong, enlightened institutional riverbanks, broadens channels, and damages or programs for careful land and water management destroys canals, bridges, and other hydrological over much of the affected basin. In most of'the developments. Canals and dams are rapidly filled world there is as yet no such institutional capa- with sediments eroded from upstream, and top- bility, and as a result, the projected deforestation soils are carried far downstream to be deposited will in virtually all cases lead to adverse water ultimately in estuaries and oceans, often adversely impacts. affecting biological productivity. Aquifers are not Burning, overgrazing, and cultivation practices recharged, and in the dry season flows are low. that expose the soil for long periods can be ek- As a result, the removal of vegetation-especially pected to increase in many areas over the next forests-from the upper portions of river basins two decades, contributing further to catchment and catchments increases erosion, reduces water deterioration. These practices intensify the ex- quality, damages hydrologic developments, and tremes of flooding and aridity by reducing soil reduces the water available during the dryer sea- porosity and water storage capacity, by reducing son. 494 On very steep (therefore unstable) slopes, organic matter, and by increasing compaction. In removal of vegetation can trigger landslides and soils that are overgrazed, frequently burned, or flows of debris. In the Cape Verde Islands, nar- continuously cultivated, organic matter (largely row, irrigated valleys have been buried meters mulch from vegetative debris) can become suffi- deep by soil and debris swept down from denuded ciently depleted to cause soil drought. Without side slopes by intense rains .41-1 the absorbent properties of these organic mate- Deforestation, burning, overgrazing, and some rials, soils are less able to retain moisture, and cultivation practices all have potential for ad- shifts in vegetation occur. The vegetation able to versely affecting river basins and catchments. The survive in such soils is typical of climates that are Global 2000 forestry and agriculture projections more"arid than actual rainfall indicates. The in- both suggest that by.2000 such practices will have tensification of soil drought is already in evidence extended much further into the upper portions of in the African Sahel and other semiarid regions,' river basins and catchments (see Chapters 6 and and much further deterioration of the water re- 8 and Appendix C). taining properties of soils can be anticipated on Deforestation is one of the most serious causes the basis of the population and food projections. of deterioration of catchments. In steep, high- rainfall zones such as the midslopes of the Andean Acid Rain and Himalayan mountains, forests are indispen- Acid rain is an environmental problem closely sable for protecting catchments and controlling related to energy development. It deserves special, runoff. Removal of trees, however, does not in- note here because of its effects not only on water variably jeopardize water supplies. In regions bodies over much of the world but also on many, with moderate relief and low rainfall, removal of other parts of the biosphere. While the Global 2000 energy projections are *The development of large urban areas can produce similar effects. Roofs, streets, and other impervious surfaces both not specific enough to permit a detailed analysis increase the volume and shorten the duration of runoff, leading of the future prospects for the acid rain problem, to flash floods and serious erosion downstream. In Arlington, a few points can be made. First, increases in coal Virginia, for example, the county's Environmental Improve- combustion in the magnitudes projected (13 per- ment Commission has estimated that 50 percent of the land area in this suburban community as of 1972 had been covered cent by 1990) will significantly increase the pro- overor in some way made impervious, and as a resultdamaging duction of the two primary causes of acid rain- flash floods now occur in what were formerly small streams sulfur oxides (SOJ and oxides of nitrogen (NOJ@ (Arlington's Environmental Quality-1972, County Planning The 58 percent increase in oil combustion pro Office, Arlington, Va., 1972). Since 1972 much more of the ected to occur by 1990 will also increase both SO,' county has been made impervious, and an additional large J highway is now under constiuction. and NO,, emissions; the 43 percent increase pro- 336 TIHE PROJECTIONS jected in natural gas combustion will also increase ural forest growth have been observed in both NO,, emissions. Technologies are available to re- New England and Sweden.'"' One study tenta- move sulfur oxides, but their removal is expensive tively attributed a 4 percent decline in annual for- and probably will not be required uniformly est growth in southern Sweden to acid rain. 106 throughout the world. There is no practical tech- Other observers feel that a decline in Scandina- nology for the removal of oxides of nitrogen from vian forest growth has not been conclusively dem- stack gases; the only control now available in- onstrated but suspect that the even more acidic volves reduced combustion temperatures, which rainfall expected in the future will cause slower limit efficiencies. The water-@uality consequences growth. of increased emissions, especially increases of The effects of acid precipitation on leafy veg- NO,, emissions, need to be considered carefully. etation have been studied in the United States in The immediate consequence of both SO,, and the states of Maryland and West Virginia. While NO,, emissions is the acidification of precipitation. no major damage has yet occurred, one study con- These gaseous compounds react in the atmos- cludes that current levels of acidity in rainfall pres- phere to form sulfuric acid and nitric acid, which, ent little margin of safety for foliar injury to in turn, precipitate out of the atmosphere in both susceptible plant species, but with the increasing rain and snow. The acidified precipitation falls emissions of pollutants that contribute to the for- anywhere from a few hundred to a few thousand mation of acid rain, there is substantial risk of miles away from -the source, depending on the surpassing the threshhold for foliar effects in the strength of the prevailing winds. "" As a result, future. 50' the pH of rainfall is known to have fallen from Little research has been undertaken on the ef- a normal value of 5.7 to 4.5-4.2 (high acidic val- fects of acid rain on large natural ecosystems, but ues) over large areas of southern Sweden, south- one interesting study has now been @done for the ern Norway, and the eastern U.S.'" In the most boundary-waters canoe area and the Voyageurs extreme case yet recorded, a storm in Scotland National Park (BWAS-VNP) wilderness areas in in 1974, the rain was the acidic equivalent of vin- the north central United States. The findings are egar (pH 2.4)." Equivalent changes have almost as follows: certainly occurred elsewhere, for example, down- wind of the German, Eastern European, and So- Acid precipitation, by causing increased acidity viet industrial regions. Effects of acid rain are only in lakes, streams, pools and puddles, can cause slight to severe alteration in communities of beginning to be understood but have now been aq .uatic organisms. . . . Bacterial decompo .sition observed in lakes, rivers, and forests, in agricul- is, reduced and fungi dominate saprotrophic com- tural -crops, in nitrogen-fixing bacteria, and in munities. Organic debris accumulates rapidly. soils. Nutrient salts are taken up by plants tolerant of The clearest ill effects of acid rainfall observed low pH (mosses, filamentous algae) and by fungi. to date are on lake fisheries. A survey of over Thick mats of these organisms and organic debris 1,500 lakes in southwestern Norway, which has may develop which inhibit sediment-to-water nu- acid rainfall problems similar to those of southern trient and mineral exchange, and choke out other Sweden, showed that over 70 percent of the lakes aquatic plants. Phytoplankton species, diversity, with a pH below 4.3 contained no fish. This was biomass and production are reduced. Zooplank- ton and benthic invertebrate species diversity and true for less than 10 percent of the lakes in the biomass are reduced. Ultimately the remaining normal pH range of 5.5-6.0." Similar effects benthic fauna consists of tubificids and Chiroho- have been found in lakes in the Adirondack mus (midge) larvae in the sediments. Some tol- mountains of New York'"' and in some areas of erant species of stoneflies and mayflies persist, as Canada."' Acid rain appears to be the cause of does the alderfly. Air breathing insects (water both the low pH and the extinction of the fish boatman, backswimmer, water strider) may be- (see also the discussion of fresh water extinctions come abundant, Fish populations are reduced or in the fisheries section of this chapter). Within the eliminated, with some of the most sought after last 20 years salmon disappeared from many Nor- .es (brook trout, walleye, smallmouth bas�) specl he most sensitive and therefore among the wegian rivers, and trout soon followed. Measure- being t ment in such rivers almost always shows a decline first to be affected. Toxicity or elevated tissue concentrations of metals may result either from in pH, usually attributable to acid rain. Similar direct deposition or increased mobilization or occurrences have been observed in Sweden. " I both. Amphibian species may be eliminated. And Effects of acid rain on forest growth are only finally, populations or activities of higher terres- beginning to be understood. The effects on tree- trial vertebrates that utilize aquatic organisms for seed germination are mixed.'" Reductions in nat- food or recreation are likely to be altered. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 337 The study concludes that "as more lakes are Climatic Change ,eventually impacted, the whole philosophy be- Water supplies and agriculture can be severely hind the wilderness experience that forms the ba- affected by climatic changes that are well within sis of the establishment of the BWCA-VNP will the range of historic experience. Changes in ,be violated and the part of the BWCA which pro- global temperatures could lead to either an in- vides recreation will be reduced. Few people who crease or decrease in both the amount and vari- utilize the. BWCA-VNP could be expected to en- ability of rainfall. The climate projections therefore joy the areas made fishless by pollution from hu- have definite significance for water availability in man activity." the future. The effects of acid rain on nonforest agricultural The Global 2000 Study's climate projections crops are under study and are beginning to be provide little guidance, however, because of dis- .reported. Shoot and root growth of kidney bean agreement among climatologists on future trends. ,and soybean plants have been found to be mark- As discussed in Chapter 4 and in the Climate sec- -edly reduced as a result of simulated acid rain of tion of this chapter, the experts are more or less pH 3.2.` Similarly, nodulation by nitrogen-fixing e.verily divided over the prospects for warming or -bacteria on. legumes is significantly reduced by cooling, and most felt that the highest probability -simulated acid rain.'" The growth of radish roots is for no change.5" Faced with this uncertainty, -has been observed to decline by about 50 percent the Global 2000 Study devised three climatic scen- as the pH of rain falls from 5.7 to 3.0."' arios of roughly equal probability. There is con- The sensitivity of soils to acidification by acid siderable'uncertainty as to the pattern of rainfall @!rain varies widely from area to area, depending to be associated with these climate scenarios, but largely on the amount of calcium in the soil."' it is thought by many climatologists that global Calcium buffers the soil against acidification, but warming would lead to slight increases in.precip- .-is leached out by acid rain; this leaching of calcium itation in many areas and less year to year vari- and soil nutrients has been found to increase with ation. (The central U.S., however, migh t decreasing pH, and the pH of soils has been ob- experience more frequent drought.) A cooling served to decline more rapidly with more acidic trend is thought by many to be associated with :rains.'" The acidic soils that can result from acid less precipitation and increased year-to-year var- rain could be expected to significantly reduce crop iation. production in the affected areas unless lar ge In short, there is much uncertainty about future amounts of lime were applied. global climate because of the present lack of In addition to damaging biota and soils, acid agreement on causes, effects, and trends. Uncer- rain damages materials extensively over wide tainty over climate-and therefore also over water areas."' Even stone is being severely damaged. supplies and agricultural harvests-can be ex- A dramatic example of.the effects of acid rain and pected to lead to projects for the storage and reg- air pollution on stone is provided by the Egyptian ulation of water and to the development of food obelisk moved from Egypt to New York in the reserves in anticipation of unfavorable years. . ,1890s (Fig. 13-9). While the inscription on the Even if it were absolutely certain that the var- .11.east face of the monument is still legible, the in- iability and amount of water supply would not ,scription on the west face has been destroyed by deteriorate in the years ahead, there would still cchemicals in the city's air, driven by New York's be reason to anticipate further projects to increase prevailing westerly winds. the storage and regulation of water and to develop The 13 percent increase in coal combustion by food reserves. Population growth, urbanization, ..1990 implies that large areas in and near industrial and the extension of both agriculture and forestry - areas will continue to receive highly acidic rain- into more and and variable regions has made the ifall. The rainfall in these areas is likely to become social and economic impacts of variability of water 'increasingly acidic as SO. and NO. emissions in- supplies greater than in the past. In the years (@rease. The areas affected are likely to extend ahead the impacts of even present variability can hundreds to thousands of miles downwind from only become greater. As nations attempt to bring ithe sources, a total geographic area large enough more marginal lands into production, fluctuations ',io include many lakes, watersheds and farmlands. in water supply will quickly translate into social Jhe combined adverse effects in these areas on and economic vulnerability. Therefore, even in ..water quality (and indirectly on soil quality and the absence of any climatic deterioration, incen- 'plant growth) are likely to become increasingly tives will be present to maintain food-grain re- severe. serves, accelerate water conservation efforts, 338 THE PROJECTIONS WtIM, 41 "_-ii 'Jit @,4 i@ qvt fe PI.,J1 fly V@WV "i'J"V, 'INT' 2 41V @P WF q, 40, fjQ 13 WO @,P vi@ ;,AR 01". Figure 13-9. A monument to acid rain and air pollution-"Cleopatra's Needle," sent from Egypt to New York City in the 1890s. The inscription on the cast face (left) is still legible; the inscription on the west face (right) has been erased by chemicals in the city's air,. driven by the prevailing westerly winds. Ninety years in New York has done more damage to the stone than 3,500 years in Egypt. (U.N. photo) modify macro- and microclimates, and develop tribution will be required, especially in regions hydraulic works to reduce the risk and uncertainty with highly variable rainfall. By one estimate, in water availability. What will be the environ- 12,000 cubic kilometers of runoff will be con- mental consequences of these efforts? trolled in the year 2000 by dams and reservoirs- 30 percent of the total world runoff and three Impacts of HydrauHc Works times the estimated 4,000 cubic kilometers now stored in the world's reservoirs."' Both the prospect of destablizing deforestation In the LDCs, where most of the world's un- in the upper portions of river basins and the cer- tapped hydropower potential is located, river tainty of continued (possibly even increased) cli- basin development schemes that integrate flood matic variability will encourage the development control, power production, and irrigation will be of hydraulic works for flow regulation, electrical implemented for a number of reasons: generation, irrigation, and flood control. The - The indispensable role of irrigation in increasing Global 2000 Study's water projections assume 'n- food production; creased withdrawals of water for all uses, but make no projections as to how additional water I - The limited amounts of naturally fertile, well- supplies will be developed or where supplies 'drained, well-watered soils remaining to be might fall short of future need. To meet the pro- brought into production; jected withdrawals a considerable expansionof The need to control the floods of large rivers gi (eg. Yellow River, Lower Mekong River) en ineering works f6r.water regulation and dis- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 339 where floods have been more or less tolerated of China supported about 33 million persons. in the past; and Assuming the adoption of birth control methods The need for electricity in economic develop- at rates based on other South Asian experience, ment. the U.N. studies project this population to grow The environmental impacts of large river basin ultimately to or beyond the Lower Mekong development schemes can be great. In the case Basin's present food-production capacity, which of large dams, the impacts include: is estimated to be potentially adequate for 123 million persons. To feed the expanded population - The inundation of farmland, settlements, roads, by the end of the century, it will be necessary to railroads, forests, historic and archeological expand paddy rice production from 1970s 12.7 sites, and mineral deposits; million tons to 37 million tons.. The studies. suggest - The creation of artificial lakes, which often be- that this increase of nearly 200 percent cannot be come habitats for disease vectors such as the achieved without flood control and new irrigation. mosquitoes that transmit malaria and the snails It is estimated that multiple dams in the Lower which transmit schistosomiasis; Mekong River system could add up to 5 million - The alteration of river regimes downstream of hectares of land for double-cropping of rice and dams, ending the biologically significant annual might provide enough food to support an addi- flood cycle, increasing water temperature and tional 50 million persons in the basin."" The dams sometimes -triggering riverbank erosion as'a re- would generate badly needed power, and the res- sult of an increased sediment-carrying capacity ervoirs could, with proper management, become of the Water; productive fisheries. The proposed dams in the Lower Mekong Basin The interruption of upstream spawning migra- will involve significant social costs. For example, tions of fish; and the reservoir behind the Pa Mong-the largest Water quality deterioration. dam proposed for the Mekong River-would Irrigation systems have their own environmental force the resettlement of 460,000 persons, mostly problems: in Thailand. Land for resettlement en masse in large communities is not available, and Thailand � Danger of soil salinization and waterlogging in is faced with the prospect of paying these people perennially irrigated areas; an.estimated $626 million (approximately $1,400 � Water weeds, mosquitos, and snail infestation each) to leave without a planned alternative, a of drainage canals, with the danger of malarial situation euphemistically referped to as "self@set- and schistosomiasistic infections spreading in dement. "I areas where these diseases exist ' especially in The situation in the Mekong River Basin hap- parts of Africa and Latin America-, and pens to be relatively well understood because 20 Pollution of irrigation return water by a variety years.of internationally coordinated studies have of agricultural chemicals, with negative conse- examined the entire river basin as a single plan- quences for aquatic life and for the human use ning unit. Other densely populated river basins of downstream waters. in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are the focus of similarly ambitious schemes, but in most cases While the benefits of dams and irrigation de- there are no coordinated studies or even adequate velopment may outweigh the costs, environmen- data. Consequently the full social and economic tal impacts have a definite bearing on the benefit/ costs of these proposed projects can scarcely be cost ratios of river basin development schemes. estimated. Plans for the development of the Lower Mekong The environmental costs are just as hard to es- River Basin illustrate this point, timate. It is known that large dams produce very A series of engineering, economic, social, and considerable ecological impacts on rivers and es-, environmental studies of the Lower Mekong tuaries in temperate and subtropical areas. The Basin has been carried out under the aegis of the Aswan Dam in Egypt is a case in point.. United Nations Committee for Coordination of A considerable list of costly impacts are asso- Investigations. The development plan that has ciated with the High Aswan Dam and the irri- emerged from these studies calls for the construc- gation development that has subsequently taken tion over a 20-year period of a series of multi- place in the Nile Delta. They have been recently purpose dams and associated irrigation works for documented by Julian Rzoska"' in a ten-years- the basin, which is shared by Thailand,. Laos, later assessment, as well as by earlier researchers Cambodia and Vietnam."' In 1974 the portion of such as Kassas, George, and van der Schalie." the basin downstream from the People's Republic Here are some of their findings: 340 THE PROJECTIONS � 100,000 people had to be relocated from the trends,that, in turn, imply large increases in water,. reservoir site, which extends into Sudan. The pollution in many areas. EFople were mostly flood plain farmers of Nu- ian origin. � The ancient Nubian temples were inundated Water Pollution of Urban and Industrial Origin (a considerable portion of them were salvaged By the year 2000, worldwide urban and indus- intact in a UNESCO-organized emergency op- trial water withdrawals are projected to increase, 6ration). by a factor of about 5, reaching 1.8-2.3 trillion' � The dam tra s sediments that formerly enriched cubic meters (see Chapter 9). The higher figure the flood pFain as well as the Mediterranean is almost equal to the total annual runoff of 2.34 Sea, with a loss in natural soil productivity and trillion cubic meters from the 50 United States. the collapse of the sardine fishery that once pro- Most of the water withdrawn for urban and in- vided half of Egypt's fish. dustrial use is returned (treated or untreated) to': � Waves and tides are now eroding the delta, streams and rivers. If 90 percent is returned, the which formerly was extending into the Medi- terranean, and a reduction in the agriculturally total combined discharge of water flowing through' important delta is slowly occurring. sewers and industrial outfalls by the year 2000 will') � Year around irrigation in the delta, which rep- be on the order of 1.6-2.1 trillion cubic meters. resents 60 percent of Egypt's farmland, has el- Urban'and industrial effluent will be concen- evated the water table and caused salinization, trated in the rivers, bays, and coastal zones near now being remedied through expensive drain- the world's largest urban-industrial agglometa-. age works financed by the World Bank. tions. In the developing world-where 2 billion � Schi@tosomiasis is rapidly spreading throughout additional persons are projected to be living by the rural population as a consequence of the 2000 and where rapid rates of urbanization con- spread of the snail intermediate hosts in the ir- tinue-urban and industrial water pollution will ngation canals, the lack of sanitary facilities and become ever more serious because many devel- the continual exposure of the dense rural pop- oping economies will be unable or unwilling to' ulation. afford the additional cost of water treatment. Z � The water hyacinth spread almost uncontrolla- Few LDCs have invested heavily in urban and`j bly throughout the canal systems, where it har- industrial waste treatment facilities.' As a resulfl bors snails and interferes with water flows. the waters below many LDC cities are often thick This controversial project's benefits include an with sewage sludge and wastes from pulp and pa- 8,000 megawatt electricity generating potential, per factories, tanneries, slaughterhouses, oil re- and a doubling of agricultural potential on per- fineries, 'chemical plants, and other industries. ennially irrigated soils. One consequence of this pollution is declining While the extensive consequences of the Aswan fishing yields downstream from LDC cities. For Dam are reasonably well known and established, example, the inland catch in the eastern province relatively little is known about the ecological ef- of Thailand, 696 tons in 1963, fell to 68 tons by fects of dams in tropical areas, where most of the 1968, and it is thought that water pollution, par-' need and potential is located. The animal species ticularly from Bangkok, was the main cause of native to tropical rivers, estuaries, and oceans the decline.' Similar, though less extreme, de- have frequently evolved life cycles that are linked clines have occurred around the world in fresh- to annual floods and the patterns of salinity and water systems, and in bays, lagoons, and estuaries.. nutrient fluxes that accompany the floods. Reg- Frequently the changes are not measured but be- ulation of river flows can therefore be expected come apparent with the appearance of eutrophi- to significantly affect large numbers of estuarine cation, poisonous red tides, and the decline of and oceanic organisms. Similar impacts can be inland fishing occupations.-'14 anticipated in freshwater species. Their decline is Efforts to control the effects of pollution from. not likely to be compensated by the development LDC cities can lead to international disputes.'An of aquaculture, especially if pollution seriously example is the dispute that occurred in 1976 over, impairs water quality. India's withdrawal of water from the Ganges to flush out the port of Calcutta during the dry sea- Water Pollution son when the water was needed in Bangladesh for irrigation." The Global 2000 Study projections point to The reuse of urban and industrial waste water worldwide increases in urbanization and industrial is likely to increase as urban populations expand growth and in the intensification of agriculture- rapidly in the water-short regions of West Asia ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS -341 and in and portions of Mexico, Africa, and t 'he cooling. Nyith once-through cooling, large quan- U.S. Southwest. The use of waste water for irri- tities of river, lake, or ocean water are pumped gation will serve to recycle nutrients that would through condensers and returned to the natural otherwise overload the absorptive capacity of riv- water body approximately 10' C warmer. Be- ers; however, a careful management and moni- tween 1950 and 1972 annual water withdrawals toring will be required to avoid pollution of in the U.S. for thermal-electric power plant cool- ground-water and human exposure to disease ing jumped from 50 billion to 275 billion cubic pathogens, heavy metals, and other toxic sub- meters-2.5 times the average flow (110 billion stances.'26 cubic meters) of the lower Mississippi River- The use of water as the transport media for surpassing irrigation withdrawals in volume."9 sewage is.being questioned. because of its high, Concern for biological and ecological damage capital requirements, its potential for pollution, caused by water intakes and by thermal pollution and its energy intensiveness. Composting toilets in the U.S. resulted in the promulgation in 1974 that avoid the water medium entirely have been of standards for levels of thermal discharge to developed and are being used more widely."' . water bodies by power plants, but in 1976 the Some water pollution, problems are linked di- standards were remanded by court order. At pres- rectly to air pollutants from urban and industrial, ent, thermal pollution has a low priority at the areas, particularly from emissions of sulfur and Environmental Protection Agency.110 Thermal nitrogen oxides from electric power plants burn- pollution impacts ate numerous and generally del- ing fossil fuels (see "Acid Rain," above). The eterious in mid to low latitudes. In high latitudes increased use of coal (a rich source of both sulfur waters are naturally so 'cold that aquatic life proc- and nitrogen oxides) promises a growing contri- esses are slowed, and -in these areas heated dis- bution of acid to rain water and to lakes. There charges from power plants can stimulate production is no known, economically practical method'for of fish and other organisms. In the tropics, on the controlling NO, emissions. Control of SO,, emis- other hand, where waters are naturally warm and sions from coal is now technologically possible but many species live near their upper temperature is estimated to increase electricity costs by 6-15 tolerance, thermal discharges are often lethal. At percent. It seems that the price of ."live" lakes all latitudes increased - temperature reduces the will be high." dissolved oxygen in the water, stressing aquatic Urbanization and industrial growth, in addition fauna by speeding metabolic rates while at the to increasing various forms of water pollution, will same time depleting oxygen supplies .131 Other im- also increase the consumptive uses of water. pacts include: Evaporative cooling for thermal-electric gener- ating facilities is one of the fastest-growing con- Destruction of small organisms such as fish lar- sumptive uses of water. vae and plankton entrained in the cooling water Large amounts of water are used to remove intake and poisoned by antifouling biocides. waste heat from thermal-electric (primarily coal Reduction of fish abundance, biomass, and spe- and nuclear) power plants, but until recently rel- cies diversity in downstream thermal "plumes." atively little of this water has been consumed (i.e., Synergistic exacerbation of the stresses caused evaporated). Until the early 1970s in the U.S. most organisms by other factors such as in- most of the waste heat from electricity genera- creased salinity, biological oxygen demand, and tion-which amounts to approximately two-.thirds toxic substances. of the total primary energy input to electrical, gen- Shifting of the balance among algae species to eration*-was dissipated by means of once-through favor blue-green, algae, which create taste and * Nuclear plants typically convert roughly one-third of their odor problems in municipal water supplies. primary energy input to electricity; the remaining two-thirds Sudden changes of temperature during startups is usually lost as waste heat. Fossil-fuel-fired plants are only and shutdowns, causing death of many sensitive slightly more efficient. Over and above these losses, tran.s- species." mission-line losses are significant (A. L. Velikanov, Hydrologic Problems Stemming from Energy Development, U.N. Water The remanding of the 1974 Environmental Pro- Conference, Jan. 27, 1977, p. 6). The large amount of energy lost as waste heat is at the heart of some of the most intense tection Agency regulations on thermal pollution criticism of energy policies that increase electrical generation left U.S. problems of thermal pollution unre- for end uses that do not necessarily require electricity. See, solved. New plants tend to utilize evaporative for example, Amory B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths, Cambridge, cooling towers rather than once-through cooling Mass.: Ballinger, 1977, and Efficient Use of Energy, American Institute of Physics Conference Proceedings no. 25, summa- because of insufficient volumes of water available rized in Physics Today, Aug. 1975. rather than because of ecological considera- 342 THE PROJECTIONS tions.1 As a result, thermal water pollution in trend continue until 2000, the volume of pesticides the U.S. may remain at about 1976 levels, while used in the LDCs will have increased more than local atmospheric heat and humidity loadings in sevenfold.' Presently, about half the pesticides areas around new power plants increase. The U.S. used in the LDCs are organochlorines, a trend Water Resources Council estimates that the con- that may continue because organochlorines are sumptive use. of water by the country's electrical substantially less expensive than the more. spe- generating facilities will increase rapidly (650 per- cific, less destructive and less persistent alterna- cent between 1975 and 2000).' tives. The net consumption (i.e., evaporation) of A sevenfold increase in the use of persistent water can also be expected to continue increasing pesticides in Asia would virtually eliminate the elsewhere in the world during the years ahead as culturing of fish in irrigation canals, rice paddies, thermal-electric generation grows and supply con- and ponds fed by irrigation water." Or ganochlo- straints and environmental considerations en- rine insecticides continue to collect in aquatic sys- courage shifts away from once-through cooling to tems years after they have been applied and affect evaporative cooling towers. A. L. Velikanov has waters ma ny miles downstream. At moderately estimated for the United Nations that waste heat high concentrations, t 'hey kill fish."" Already, discharged from thermal-electric plants through- many Asian farmers are reluctant to buy fry for out the world in 1973 was sufficient to evaporate their paddies or ponds for fear that pesticide pol- 7-8 cubic kilometers (km-) of water if cooling tow- lution will kill the stock." The amount of protein ers had been in use everywhere."' This estimate forfeited could be substantial. Per hectare yields may be low. European energy specialist Wolf of fish from well-tended ponds can be as high as Hdfele calculates that if Europe had been using the per hectare yields of rice, i.e., 2,500 kg/ha cooling towers exclusively in 1974, Europe alone animal protein vs. 2,500 kg/ha carbohydrate.4' would have been evaporating water at an annual Cage culture yields are extraordinarily high and rate of 16 kml. I fflifele expects this consumption show great commercial promise in several devel- toreach 30 km-' per year by 2000. Although this oping countries, as long as waters are not poi- represents only about 1 percent of Europe's yearly soned by pesticides. Projected pesticide increase runoff of 2800 kml, the additional 'consumptive seriously threatens both freshwater and brackish demand on Europe's water resources would be water aquaculture in much of Asia. If pesticide significant. trends continue, aquaculture in Latin America and Africa will eventually face the same threat. Water Pollution of Agricultural Origin The protein that fish culture could provide is Extensive pollution from fertilizer runoff can badly needed, especially in the humid tropics be @expected, especially in developed, densely where aquaculture can thrive. Moreover, while populated regions, if worldwide fertilizer usage alternative forms of producing animal protein increases from 55 kilograms per hectare (kg/ha)- tend to increase the pressures on already stressed the average 1971-75 rate-to around 145 kg/ha as soil systems, fish culture places no,strain on ter- projected. The U.S. Department of Agriculture restrial systems and is complementary to the care- projects fertilizer application rates in Japan, ful water management schemes required for Western Europe, and Eastern Europe to reach sustained agricultural production in many parts 635, 355, and 440 kg/ha, respectively, by 2000 (see of the humid tropics. The FAO estimates that Table 6-15). * At these application rates it will be culture of fresh water and marine organisms could difficult to avoid at least some increase in the reach 20-30 million metric tons by 2000-between nitrogen pollution of water supplies and eutro- one-third and one-half of the present marine phication of bodies of water. catch.' Further pesticide pollution will sharply The LDCs are likely to experience increasing 'diminish this promising' prospect. water pollution by pesticides, especially chlori- Increased pesticide use will also create water nated hydrocarbon insecticides used in irrigated contamination problems in industrialized nations. rice culture and export crop production. The Food To cite but one example: California health offi- and Agriculture Organization expects that pesti- cials report that they have found dangerous levels cide usage in the LDCs will grow at 10 percent of a pesticide-dibromochloropropane (DBCP) per year for at least the near future. Should this in half 'of the irrigation and drinking water wells they have tested in one of the state's major ag- The projection assumes that real energy prices remain con- ricultural areas, the San Joaquin valley. ne U.S. stant to 2000; fertilizer projections were not reported for the Environmental Protection Agency banned the use Global 2000 standard case of rising energy prices. of DBCP in 1977 on 19 fruit and vegetable crops ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 343 after tests showed that the pesticide caused ste- increased to 850'mg/l and was expected to reach rility in the workers who manufactured it and 1,300 mg/1 by 2000. Most plant species cannot caused cancers in laboratory animals. Two years tolerate water with more than 500 mg/1 of dis- after the ban, California health officials found res- solved solids.' idues averaging 5 parts per billion (ppb) in the wells tested. The State has recommended that all Water-Related Diseases wells showing more than 1 ppb of DBCP be closed to human consumption. At thatlevel, one case Water related diseases have been an unfortun- of cancer is expected for every 2,500 persons who ate accessory to irrigation systems and dams as use the wells. Arizona health officials have tested well as to pollution by human wastes and are vir- 18 wells near Yuma and found 6 wells with con- tually certain to become more prevalent during centrations of 4.6-18.6 ppb. of DBCP. The En- the rest of'the century as more of the water en- vironmental Protection Agency has allowed vironment becomes affected by human activities continued use of an estimated 10 million pounds and wastes. of DBCP annually in the U.S. on crops such as A wide variety of water developments can in- soybeans, citrus fruits, grapes and nuts but is now crease the incidence of water-related diseases. considering restricting this amount.' The creation of ponds, reservoirs, and irrigation Other pesticides may not cause as many prob- and drainage canals in the course of water re- lems with water. California officials report that source development, and the widespread inade- DBCP is the only pesticide they tested.that shows quacy of waste water disposal systems in LDC a tendency to be absorbed into ground-water. cities, all favor the persistence or spread of a num- Nonetheless, the projected increases in pesticide ber of such diseases. In recent years new irrigation usage will create a variety of water contamination systems and reservoirs in Middle and North Africa problems in the industrialized nations as well as and West Asia have provided ideal habitats for in the less developed countries. the intermediate snail host 'of schistosomiasis, Irrigation will also add large amounts of salt which has spread dramatically among rural pop- contamination to the waters of many areas.' The ulations.' This debilitating disease of the intes- water-use projections reveal that by the year 2000 tinal and urinary tract now affects an estimated between 4,600 and 7,000 billion cubic meters of 250 million people throughout the world, approx- water will be withdrawn for irrrigation. Approx- imately 7 percent of the entire human population. imately 25-30 percent will be returned to streams In some irrigation-project and reservoir areas, up carrying dissolved salts. In very and areas return to 80 percent of the population is Affected.' water is heavily contaminated with salts, concen- I In addition to schistosomasis there are num- trated by high rates of evaporation. bers of other serious water-related diseases. These Salt pollution of arid-zone rivers draining away include malaria, filariasis (elephantiasis), and yel- from irrigated lands will ultimately make the riv- low fever, all of which are transmitted by mos- ers unfit for further irrigation use in their lower quitoes. Onchocerciasis, "river blindness" disease, reaches, as has already happened to the Shatt-al- is transmitted by flies. Paragonimiasis is a disease Arab River, in Iraq and the Lower Colorado transmitted by a snail. Poorly managed water re- River in the U.S.' The Shatt-al-Arab was formed source development projects, as well as the im- by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, whose delta pact of urbanization on aquatic habitats and water soils were once covered with extensive date-palm quality, contribute to the spread of all of these and citrus orchards. diseases. Diseases typical of waste water contam- One remedy-a very costly and energy-inten- inated by human feces-cholera, typhoid fever, sive remedy-for the salt pollution of rivers is to amoebic infections, and bacillary dysentery- can desalinate the water. A 104 million gallon per day become problems anywhere in the world. In desalting facility will soon be in operation on the LDCs today almost 1.5 billion persons are ex- Lower Colorado River. Now under construction posed to these diseases for lack of safe water sup- at Yuma, Arizona, this plant will be the largest plies and human waste disposal facilities. Largely desalting plant in the world, costing over $300 for this reason infant deaths resulting from diar- million. It is needed to fulfill a U.S. agreement rhea continue at a high rate. Every day 35,000 with Mexico to deliver water in the Colorado infants and children under five years of age die River with a total dissolved solids content (in- throughout the world; most of these deaths occur cluding salts) of no more than 115 milligrams per in LDCs.1 Schistosomiasis afflicts 200 million liter (mg/1). Because of the leaching of salts from people in 70 countries and elephantiasis is esti- fields upstream, the dissolved-solids content had mated to cripple 250 million more.' In parts of 344 THE PROJECTIONS Asia where night soil is extensively used as fer- tance may be perceived by fewer still. As a result, tilizer, roundworm (Ascaris) infections will con- high rates of extinction among freshwater species tinue to be a threat because the roundworm's eggs are expected to continue. are not easily killed. Water-related diseases are not limited to coun- tries that cannot afford sewage treatment. In in- Conclusion dustrialized countries the treatment of city waste waters with chlorine presents a different kind of Freshwater, once an abundant resource in most water-related health problem-the possibility of parts of the world, will become increasingly scarce cancer. When chlorine reacts with organic com- in coming decades for two reasons. First, there pounds in waste water, one of the resulting by- will beg'reater net consumption, by cooling towers products is chloroform, a carcinogen. Elevated and, especially, by irrigation so that the total sup- rates of fatal gastrointestinal and urinary cancer ply will decline. Second, pollution and the impacts are reported by some scientists in communities of hydraulic works will effectively limit the uses that utilize water supplies contaminated with chlo- Of freshwater-and therefore, in effect, the sup- roform."' The U.S. National Academy of Sci- Ply. The deterioration of river basin catchments, ences has recommended that strict criteria be especially as a result of deforestation, will increase applied in setting limits for chloroform in drinking the variability of supply, accelerate erosion, dam- water.-'52 age water development projects, and degrade water quality. It seems inevitable that the function Extinction of Freshwater Species of streams and rivers as habitat for aquatic life will steadily be sacrificed to the diversion of water The International Union for Conservation of for irrigation, for human consumption, and for Nature and Natural Resources notes in the draft power production, particularly in the LDCs. of its World Conservation Strategy that 274 fresh I The 1977 U.N. Water Conference served to fo- water vertebrate taxa are threatened by extinction cus global attention on the critical problems of as a result of habitat destruction. This number is managing the world's water resources in the com- larger than the number of similarly threatened ing decades. In the LDCs the development of vertebrate taxa in any other ecosystem group.-53 water resources for irrigation and power is a key It is not surprising that a large number of fresh- to providing for the economic needs of expanding water species are threatened with extinction populations. At the same time the ecological im- through loss of habitat in view of the major pacts of hydraulic works and of pollution from changes that are occurring in freshwater systems. agricultural fields and urban industrial concentra- Damming, pollution, channelization, and siltation tions is greatly diminishing the capacity of water are causing massive alterations in freshwater eco- systems to support fish that are isorely needed to systems throughout the world. Fresh water species supplement meager diets. The lack of safe water endemic to specific lakes, rivers, or upper reaches supplies and of methods for sanitary disposal of of river branches are particularly vulnerable be- human waste and waste water means that as many cause they are often easily extinguished by changes as 1.5 billion persons are exposed to fecally re- in water chemistry (the effects of acid rain for lated disease pathogens in drinking water. These example), modification of streambed contours, problems of water s 'upply and quality in LDCs are alteration of water temperature, or the imposition so severe as to be matters of survival for millions of dams that prevent species from reaching their of persons. spawning grounds. Because of the anticipated in- In industrial nations, water supply and quality crease in pollution and in manipulation of fresh- will pose more subtle and therefore more complex water systems, many of the species now threatened questions of trade-offs and conflicts among users may be extinct by 2000, and many now relatively (or values) of freshwater. Water resources man- common species may be on the way to extinction. agement in such nations is concerned not with The trends in freshwater extinctions will be dif- human survival but with balancing demands for ficult if not impossible to reverse. In many areas water resources against considerations of quality- political and social realities will stand in the way of-life. But scarcities and conflicts are becoming of installing expensive pollution control systems, more acute, and by the year 2000 economic, if not of changing dam sites, or of reducing pesticide human, survival in many industrial regions may usage or coal combustion in order to save a fish hinge upon water quality, or water supply, or or amphibian whose existence may be known to both. only a few people and whose value and impor- Perhaps the most underrated aspect of fresh- ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 345 water systems throughout the world is their func- the decline or disappearance of species that may tion as aquatic habitat. At some point, high social possibly be of great future value. Given the cht- and economic costs will follow the continued ne- icality of the other uses of freshwater resources,, glect of the water quality needed to maintain the future integrity of aquatic habitats is by no ecosystem health. This point may be marked by means assured. In fact, since aquatic habitats are the failure of fish farms, or by a decline of the much more difficult to know and monitor than capacity of streams to accommodate wastes, or by terrestrial ones, it is in serious doubt. THE ENERGY PROJECTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT The Projections Assuming a 5 percent annual increase (starting in 1980) in the real price of oil, the Department of Energy, projects a growth in demand for commercial energy (i.e., energy from fossil fuels and from'nuclear and hydro sources) of 3.0 percent per year for the 1975-90 period.* Total world commercial energy use (energy conversion) is projected to incre .ase about 56 percent in 15 years-from 246 quadrillion (10 ") Btu to 384 quadrillion Btu in 1990. The projected distribution of this 'increase among energy sources is illus- trated in Table 13-32. The world's dependence on oil increases from 46 to 47 percent of total energy us'e. Annual oil consumption is projected to increase 66 quadrillion Btu (11.4 X 10' barrels), a 58 percent increase in oil use over 15 years. Coal's share is projected to increase 13 percent; by 1990, 20 percent. of all the energy used is projectedto come from coal. Natural gas usage is projected to grow by 43 percent, providing 17 percent of the world's com- mercial energy in 1990. Nuclear and hydroelectricity productiont are pro- jected to increase by 226 percent (more than tripling); by 1990 they account for about 16 percent of the world's primary energy uses, but (after subtracting losses of waste heat) provide only about 6 percent of the world's usable energy. Solar energy,. other than conservation and hydroelectric, is not pro- jected to be making a significant contribution to the world's energy production by 1990. The distribution of the. increased use of commercial energy forms among regions of the world is illustrated in Table 13-33. Energy consumption in the United States increases by 41 percent, less rapidly than the 87 percent increase in other. industrialized countries. The LDCs increase their use of commercial energy forms by 64 percent, but because these countries use such a small amount of commercial energy now, the 15-year growth adds only one per- centage point to their fraction of the world total. The OPEC countries use arelatively small, but rapidly growing (mote than 6 percent per year), fraction of the world's primary energy. The centrally planned economies increase their annual energy use by 34 percent, but their share of the world total declines from 31 to 27 percent. Overall, the global use of primary energy increases by 56 percent. Trojected changes in per capita use of primary energy are illustrated in Table 13-34. U.S. per capita energy use increases by 27 percent over 15 years, from 553 percent of the world average to 586 percent. The other 'industrialized countries increase their per capita energy use more rapidly (72 percent) to reach 325 percent of the world average by 1990. The LDCs (including OPEC countries) increase their per capita Consumption by 27 tThe Department of Energy projections lump together nuclear *Because of the complexities of the world energy situation, and hydroelectric generation; most of the increase must be in the Department of Energy did not feel its projections could nuclear generation because most of the large undeveloped be extended beyond 1990. See chapters 10 and 20 for further hydroelectric sites are in the LDCs, and few of these will be details. developed over the next 15 years. 346 THE PROJEMONS percent, to reach 19 percent of the world average. (The OPEC countries, even though their populations are relatively small, account for 36 percent of the combined LDC-OPEC increase in energy use.) The centrally planned e Iconomies increase their per. capita energy use by 12 percent but decline relative to the world average from 97 percent to 90 percent. For the world as a .whole, per capita annual energy use increases 20 percent from 60 million to 72 million Btu. The world average oil consumption in 1990 will be the equivalent of approximately 12 barrels of oil per person per year. The global variation ranges from about 73 barrels per person per yearin the U.S. to about 2.4 barrels per person in the LDCs (including the OPEC countries).* Introduction' regions and even in cities, but because of their low energy content both per unit weight and per The DOE energy projections are based largely on an industriali .zed country perspective. The pro- unit volume, they are not commonly traded in international commerce. Nevertheless, these or- jections in Tables 13-32, 13-33, and 13-34 focus ganic fuels are traded locally and are vitally im- exclusively on what might be termed the com- portant to the economies in which they are used. mercial energy sources-oil, coal, natural gas, and Furthermore, their use has environmental impli- nuclear and hydro SOUTces--used primarily in in- cations of a significance comparable to that of dustrialized economies. -important as these com- .al e commerci , nergy sources. mercial energy sources and their environmental Two other.categories of energy need to be men- impacts are, they provide an incomplete picture tioned briefly. .One might 'be termed traditional of energy development and use and of environ- sources; the other high-technology sources. The mental impacts over the next two,decades. In the less developed countries, noncommer- traditional sources involve well-established t6ch- cial, organic fuels-wood, crop wastes, charcoal, niques and technologies for converting solar, and dung-are collected and burned daily by an wind, and water power into useful work. Exam- estimated 1.5 billion persons, approximately 40 ples include sailing ships, windmills, water mills percent of the total human population. These en- and wheels, hydraulic rams, solar drying and dis- ergy sources are used extensively throughout rural tilling, charcoal-fired smelters and forges', and human and draft animal power. Not much im- Th se projections were made by DOE in 1978, and DOE portance has been assigned to these traditional e sources of energy over the last several decades in has revised its estimates since. See, for example, National Energy Plan 11, Washington: Department of Energy, May the industrialized nations until recently, when 1979. "intermediate" and "appropriate" technologiesm TABLE 13-32 Global Primary" Energy Use, 1975 and 1990, by Energy Type 105 1990 Average Percent Annual Percent Percent Increase Percent 1015 Btu of Total l(Ps Btu' of Total (1975-90) Increase oil 113 46 179 47 58 3.1 Coal 68 28 77 20 13 0.8 Natural.gas. 46 19 66 17 43 2.4 Nuclear and hydro 19 81 62, 16, 226 7.9 Solar (other.than conservation and hydro)l - - - Total 246 100 394 100 56 3.0 Source. The 1990 figures are from the Department of Energy's projections irk Cbaptu 10 and note b, below. The 1975 figurcs for the centrally planned economies wen taken by DOE hem K. A. D. Inglis, BP Statisficat Review of World Oil Industry, 1976, London: British Petroleum Company, Ltd., 1976; the other 1975 figarn we from DOE's own sources.' x 1015 Btu. Nat Iurat gas: 64.4 x IOU ft3tyr x 1,032 Btu/ I AD of the nuclear and much of the coal primary (i.e., input) energy is used average grade coal] 77 therrastly to generate electricity. In the process, approximately two-thirds of the ft3 - 66 x lots Btu. Nuclear and Hydro: 6,009 x 10`2 Wb loutputyyr X 3.412 M energy is lost as waste beat. The figures given here awe primary energy BtufWh x 3 input Btu/output Btu - 62 x 1013 Btu. "==s from the DOE projections in Table 10-8 were made as follows: After deductions for lost (waste) heat (see note a), the corresponding figures for Oil. 84.8 x 106 bbL/day x 365 days X 5.8 x 10' Btulbbl = 179 X lop Btu. Coal: outut energy are 2.7 percent in 19175 and 6.0 in 1990. 1 5,424 x 106 short tonstyr x 14.1 x loll Biu/short ton [DOE figure for world -n IIES projection model is able to include solar only as conservation orhydro. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 347 TABLE B-33 Regional Distribution of Global Primary Energy Use, 1975 and 19% 1975 Annual Use 1990 Annual Use Average Percent Annual Percent Percent Increase Percent 10" Btu of Total 10" Btu of Total (1975-90) Increase United States 71 29 100 26 41 2.3 Other industrialized countries 67 27 125 33 87 4.2 Less developed countries 25 10 41 11 64 3.3 OPEC countries 6 2 15 4 ISO 6.1 Centrally planned economies 77 31 103 27 34 1.9 World 246 100 384 100 56 3.0 Source: The 1990 figures are from Department of Energy's projections in Chapter 10. The 1975 figures for the centrally Planned Economics weretaken by DOE from K. A. D. Ingles, BP Statistical Review of World Oil Industry, 1976, London: British Petroleum Company, Ltd., 1976; the other 1975 figures are from DOS'sown sources. TABLE 13-34 Per Capita Global Primary Energy Use, Annually 1975 and 19% 1975 1990 Average Percent of Percent of Percent Annual World World Increase Percent 10' Btu Average 10' Btu Average (1975-90) Increase United States 332 553 422 586 27 1.6 Other industrialized countries 136 227 234 325 72 3.6 Less developed countries" it 18 14 19 27 1.6 Centrally planned economies 58 97 65 90 12 0.8 World 60 100 72 100 20 1.2 Source: The energy figures are from the Department of Energy (see Chapter 10 and Table 13-33). The population figures were obtained from the Bureau of the Census (see Chapter 2). & Since population projections were not made separately lot the OPEC countries, those countries have been included here in the LDC category. began to attract attention. Now these and related version. Most of these high technologies are very technologies are being reexamined by many groups, large-scale approaches to energy supply and are including the National Academy of Sciences, and beyond the reach of the poorest regions of the it is generally agreed that many traditional tech- world. nologies and techniques and their modern elab- In the discussion that follows, the environmen- orations (e.g., methane generation) show great tal impacts of the Department of Energy (DOE) promise for rural development applications. I A projections for commercial energy in industrial- major advantage of the modernized traditional ized society are considered first. The Brookhav6n sources is their small-scale, decentralized nature, National Laboratory (BNL), under contract with which allows a wide range of applications espe- DOE, analyzed the environmental implications cially in poor rural areas. of the DOE projections, but the analysis, as will The high-technology category of energy sources be explained more fully below, does not provide includes a number of technologies now being re- an adequate, basis for assessing the environmental searched or undergoing development. There are consequences of future energy developments, many examples: large-scale synthetic fuel pro- largely because of technological uncertainties. duction from coal, nuclear fusion, nuclear fission Technology is then discussed in terms of the spec- breeder reactors, hydrogen fuel, solar photovol- trum of alternatives and the various environmen- taic cells for direct electrical generation, large tal consequences implied by these alternatives. wind turbines for electrical generation, and large The environmental implications of possible future scale geothermal and ocean thermal energy con- high technologies are not discussed because these 348 THE PROJECTIONS technologies are not projected by DOE as making alternative energy strategies do not exist. Re- significant contributions to the world's energy , cently, however John P. Holdren has proposed economy by 1990. a framework for such analysis. "' The framework, The environmental impacts of noncommercial in its barest outline, involves the following. se- organic fuels used in the LDCs is considered next, quence: together with two "intermediate" or "appropri- I IIdentification of the sources of effects on I the ate" technologies that are becoming commercial- environment, in the form of specific techno- ized to a degree in some LDCs: methane gas and 'logical systems and activities; charcoal. Since the DOE projections did not in- 2. Identification and characterization of the in- clude noncommercial energy sources, the discus-. puts to the immediate environment that are sion of organic fuels, charcoal, and methane is produced by these sources, where "input" is based largely on projections and estimates devel- taken to encompass what is put into, taken out oped by the United Nations. of, or done to the surroundings; 3. Analysis of the pathways by which the inputs lead to stresses on the components of the en- Commercial Energy in Industrial vironment at risk; Societies 4. Characterization and quantification of these The environmental implications of the DOE stresses; energy projections cannot be analyzed in detail 5. Analysis of the responses of the components for two reasons. First, the analytical tools needed at risk to the stresses imposed; for the assessment of the environmental conse- 6. Identification and quantification of the costs to human well-being associated with these re- quences of even national (let alone global) energy 557 projections are still being developed. Second, the sponses. DOE energy projections for the Global 2000 At present, the six steps of this sequence cannot Study are not sufficiently detailed to permit the be completed systematically for any nation, let full application of even the presently available alone for the world. Sources can now be identified tools for environmental analysis. Consider first in terms of specific technological systems and ac- the limitations in available tools for environmen- tivities, but most national (and all global) energy tal analysis. projections and scenarios do not provide the basic ,Much has been written, and continues to be source information-in the detail needed for a com- written, about the environmental aspects of en- prehensiVe environmental analysis. Large vol- ergy development. Probably'the largest portion umes of data of mixed quality on pollution and of this work in the U.S. is being conducted or residual inputs into the environment are being sponsored by one agency or another of the federal gathered in "data bases." However, the assem- government.* Most of the analyses and reports bling and synthesizing of this data into a coherent, are highly detailed and lack both the breadth and readily usable form is proceeding only relatively synthesis required for policy analysis and for the slowly. (Basic environmental input data are now Global 2000 Study. being summarized in a large data book""by the In spite of the large numbers of energy-envi- office of the Assistant Secretary for the Environ- ronment studies, the information,and analytical ment, DOE. When complete, this volume will framework needed to systematically, comprehen- provide an important and useful source of data sively, and objectively compare the impacts of on the amounts of pollutants various energy *The volume of energy-environment research and analysis Congressional committees and the Council on Environmental sponsored by the government is staggering. The Environmen- Quality have developed their own views (see Congre ssional tal Protection Agency has developed a directory just to assist Research Service, "Research and Development Needs to government personnel. and other interested persons in locating Merge Environmental and Energy Objectives," prepa red, for the principal, government officials involved'in the program the House Subcommittee on Environment and the Atmos- ("Who's Who in the Interagency Energy/Environment R&D phere, Mar.'1978; and the Council's "Environment and Con- Program," June 1978). In April 1977, the Energy Research servation and Energy Research and Development: Assessing and Development Administration published a 4-volume In- the Adequacy of Federal Programs," Government Printing ventory of Federal Energy-Related Environment and Safety Office, Sept. 1976). The following two books by INFORM, Research for FY 76, totaling approximately 1,500 pages. a nonprofit environmental research group in New York City, Debate surrounds the energy-environment research agenda. provide an excellent overview of industrial research on new The Department of Energy has obtained research recommen- energy technologies: Stewart W. Herman and James S. Can- dations from consultants (e.g., METREK Division of the non, Energy Futures: Industry and the New Technologies, 1976; MITRE Corporation International Aspects of Energy and the Walter C. Patterson and Richard Griffin, Fluidized-Bed En- Environment: Status and Recommendations, Apr. 1978). ergy Technology: Coming to a Boil, 1978. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 349 TABLE 13-35 U.S. Source Documents on the Effects of Pollutants Subject Title Source, Year Air pollution Air Quality Criteria for Nitrogen Oxides EPA 1971 Nitrogen Oxides NAS 1977 Air Quality Criteria for Hydrocarbons HEW 1970 Air Quality Criteria for Sulphur Oxides HEW no date Sulfur Oxides NAS 19178 Air Quality Criteria-for Photo Chemical Oxidants HEW 1970 Ozone and Other Photo Chemical Oxidants NAS 1977 Air Quality for Particulate Matter HEW 1969 Particulate Polycyclic Organic Mauer NAS 1972 Air Quality Criteria for Carbon Monoxide HEW 1970 Carbon Monoxide NAS 1977 Water pollution Quality Criteria for Water EPA 1976 Drinking Water and Health NAS 1977 Climate Energy and Clitnate NAS 1977 Land disruption Permanent Regulatory Program Implementing Section (501)(b) of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 DOI 1979 Rehabilitation Potential of Western Coal Fields NAS 1974 Thermal pollution The Environmental Effects of Thermal Discharges EPA 1974 Biological Effects of Once-Through Cooling UWAG 1978 Low-probability, Reactor Safety: Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear high-risk events Power Plants NRC 1975 The Risks of Nuclear Power Reactors: A Review of the NRC Reactor Safety Study UCS 1977 Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC 1978 Liquefied Energy Gases Safety GAO 1978 Radioactive The Effects on Population of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation NAS 1972 pollution Radiological Quality of the Environment in the U.S., 1977 EPA 1977 Report of the Interagency Task Force on lonizingRadiation HEW 1978 The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing radiation NAS 1979 Synthesis of U.S. The Strategic Environmental Assessment System' DOE 1978 energy-related environmental impacts In the order in which the abbreviations appear in the table: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; National Academy of Sciences; U.S. Department oftlealth. Education, and Welfare; U.S. Department of the Interior; Utility Water Act Group, Richmond, Va.; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Union of Concernedscientists, Cambridge, Mass.; U.S. General Accounting Office; U.S. Department of Energy' b The U.S. Government does not have a model capable of a synthesis of all energy-related environmental impacts along the lines of Holdren's 6-step sequence discussed in the text, but the Strategic Environmental Assessment System (SEAS) is used by DOE for its environmental analysis (see. for example, DOE*s Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environment, National Energy Plan 11, Appendix: Environmental Trends and Impacts. May 1979. p. 2). Also. there is no single source ofdocumenta- tion for the SEAS model, but Richard J. Kalagher et a]. indicate in & recent DOE-sporisored report that "documentation on the SEAS methodology. data bases, and other detailed information on the system" may be found in the 31 references listed on page 95 of the report (National Environmental Impact Projection No. ].McLean. Va.: MITRE Corp., Dec. 1978). sources put into the environment.) Information considering the complexities involved, time will on pathways, stresses, responses, and costs is still be needed to improve the models. incomplete and fragmented (see Table 13-35). In view of the present limitations in capabilities Given the fragmentary information available- for for the analysis of environmental consequences many of the six steps in the sequence, it is not of energy projections, the most that could be surprising that at present adequate analytical hoped for in the Global 2000 Study's analysis was models do not exist for translating environmental a clear indication of inputs only-the environ- inputs from even a national energy projection or mental inputs from world energy developments scenario through the pathways, stresses, and re- out to the year 2000. However., even this relatively sponses to the costs to human well-being,* and model-wis more integrated than many national energy models. 'Me model now being used by the Department of Energy- Some results from the SEAS model are discussed later in this the Strategic Environmental Assessment System (SEAS) section. 350 THE PROJECTIONS modest goal proved impossible for several rea- ergy-related effects. No base-year (1975) residual sons. First, the DOE projections do not extend emission figures could be provided because the to 2000. Because of technical, political, economic, DOE energy projections did not include base-year and policy uncertainties (see Chapters 10 and 20 figures. * Given these assumptions and limita- for further details), the DOE was unable to ex- tions, the DOE-BNL figures must be regarded tend its projections beyond 1990. Second, the at best as lower bounds on the expected environ- DOE energy projections are not sufficiently de- mental impacts. tailed to permit anything but the broadest of en- The DOE-BNL environmental projections are vironmental assessments. The fraction of coal to presented in Tables 10-16,10-17, and 10-18 of be strip-mined is not projected; the percent sulfur Chapter 10 for three cases in which oil prices are in the coal to be burned is not specified; nuclear assumed to remain constant out to 1990. The and hydroelectric generation-technologies with Global 2000 Study's base case--oil prices increas- quite different environmental effects--are lumped ing at 5 percent per year starting in 1980-was not together. analyzed. However, the low-growth case leads to Given the incomplete and tentative nature of a total world energy consumption similar to that the energy projections, a detailed and systematic in the Global 2000 Study's base case, but the mix environmental analysis could not be expected. of technologies is of course different. The DOE- However, DOE wasasked to provide at least a BNL residuals projections for the low-growth case general analysis of the environmental implications are shown in Table 13-36. The DOE-BNL en- of its projections, and the Department contracted vironmental projections are discussed in detail in this work to the Brookhaven National Laboratory Chapter 10 and will not be discussed here. Be- (BNL). cause of fundamental limitations in the DOE- BNL approach, remedial efforts would be insuf- Environmental Analysis--The Brookhaven ficient. Another approach is needed. National Laboratory Projections The DOE-BNL environmental projections in- Environmental Analysis-Another Approach clude energy-related air pollutant emissions (car- The energy problem has several dimensions- bon dioxide, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, political, economic, resource, technological, en- oxides of nitrogen, particulates, and hydrocar- vironmental, social-and difficult decisions will bons), radioactive emissions (tritium, population be required of each nation in each of these areas. exposure to radiation, and solid high-level waste), The basic difficulty in developing projections of land-use requirements, and solid-waste genera- the environmental consequences.of energy de- tion. Unfortunately, the simplifying assumptions velopment is that few nations have yet made these underlying the DOE-BNL environmental projec- difficult decisions. As a result, there is much un- tions severely limit the usefulness of the results. certainty as to the approaches and technologies These assumptions are: (1) that by 1985 all energy that will be used. facilities throughout the world will be retrofitted In the discussion that follows, the resource and to meet U.S. new-source performance standards* economic aspects of the energy problem are ex- for sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, particulates, amined briefly to establish a framework for the and hydrocarbons; and (2) that for other envi- spectrum of technological alternatives various na- ronmental emissions and effects, emissions per tions are now considering. The environmental fuel unit produced and consumed will remain at consequences of the technological' options at the presently estimated values. The DOE-BNL land- ends of the spectrum are then discussed and com- use and solid-waste estimates pertained only to pared. This comparison, based,on U.S. national those aspects of the energy system for which DOE studies, provides a range of possible environmen- was able to supply Brookhaven with projections tal consequences. Finally, the comparison is ex- (unfortunately this excluded strip-mining). The tended globally, with particular attention to estimates thus give only a partial picture of en- environmental impacts of energy development that could have significant implications for some See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857 et seq. In its Eighth of the other Global 2000 Study projections. Annual Report-1977 (p. 26), the Council on Environmental The Resource Problem. Essentially, the re- Quality writes-concerning the 1977 amendments to the Act- that "sections of the Amendments provide a more vigorous source aspects of the commercial energy problem definition of new-source performance standards requiring per- formance at least as, good as that which could be obtained by Late in the study, DOE did provide a limited amount of using the 'best technological system of continuous emission base-year data, which have been used in Tables 13-32, 13-33, reduction.' and 13-34. ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 351 TABLE 13-36 Projected Annual Emissions: 1985 and 1990, Low-Growth Cases European U.S. Less Centrally OECD and Developed OPEC Planned Countries Canada Japan Countries Countries Economies World 1985 Carbon dioxide (billions of short tons) 4.78 6.85 1.51 2.57 0.80 7.52 24.0 Carbon monoxide (millions of short tons) 22.5 13.4 6.68 15.7 5.50 22.4 86.1 Sulfur dioxide (millions of short tons) 11.8 13.0 4.52 7.07 1.33 29.8 67.4 Oxides of nitrogen (miliffons of short tons) 13.5 15.7 4.71 8.21 2.38 19.7 64.1 Particulates (millions of short tons) 6.3 .9.02 2.03 6.56 0.54 30.6 55.0 Hydrocarbons (millions of short tons) 2.56 1.84 0.79 1.73 0.59 2.99 10.5 Land use (millions of acres) 13.7 18.7 3.37 11.9 0.004 15.1 61.2 Solid wastes (millions of short tons) 90.1 218 7.43 45.6 0.58 149 Soo Tritium (thousands of curies) 103 142 22.9 34.6 3.64 47.9 354 Population exposure (thousands of man-rems) 3.98 5.44 0.88 1.33 0.14 1.84 13.6 Solid high-level wastes (billions of curies) 11.0 15.1 2.44 3.69, 0.39 5.10 37.6 1990 Carbon dioxide (billions of short tons) 5.20 7.31 1.62 3.05 0.97 8.42 26.6 Carbon monoxide (millions of short tons) 26.2 13.1 8.44 19.6 6.% 25.0 99.2 Sulfur dioxide (millions of short tons) 12.7 13.8 4.68 8'.42 1.56 33.4 74.6 Oxides of nitrogen (millions of short tons) 14.8 16.2 4.44 9.74 22.0 70.7 Particulates (millions of short tons) 6.66 9.73 2.15 7.81 0.63 34.2 6,1.2 Hydrocarbons (millions of short tons) 2.94 1.85 0.38 2.14 0.73 3.35 12.0 Land use (millions of acres) 15.7 21.6 4.43 15.7 21.6 79.0 Solid waste (millions o@short tons) 75.1 243 7.49 50.2 1.02 168 545 Tritium (thousands of curies) 178 214 42.4 74.6 12.0 118 639 Population exposure (thousands of man-rems) 6.83 8.23 1.63 2.87 0.46 4.53 24.6 Solid high-level wastes (billions of curies) 18.9 22.9 4.52, 7.95 1.28 12.6 68.1 Source: Department of Energy-Brookhaven National Laboratory projections. The important assumptions behind the figures in this table are discussed briefly in the text of this chapter and. more fully. in Chapter 10. facing the world is that convenient, easily trans- While there is still uncertainty and debate over ported, relatively clean-burning petroleum and how much oil will ultimately be recovered, esti- natural gas resources are being depleted. As these mates are becoming more refined. The lack of resources become increasingly scarce, a transition consensus on estimates of ultimately recoverable to other forms of energy must be made. How conventional world oil resources stems (1) from quickly the transition must be made depends upon several economic, technical, and geologic uncer- how much oil will ultimately be recovered and tainties that are not likely to be resolved soon, how rapidly the oil is used. and (2) from a failure to fully utilize existing public Figure 13-10. Distribution and present production of ultimately recoverable conventional crude oil resources of the world. Shaded areas represent cumulative production to date. (M. King Hubber, in Congressional Research Service, Project Interdependence: U.S. and World Engery Outlook Through 1990, Washington, 1977, p.644) information about world oil resources. A recent report prepared for the Central Intelligence Agency by Richard Nehring of the Rand Corporation provides a detailed, publicly available description of the known recoverable crude oil resources of the world and an explicitly reasoned estimated range of ultimately recoverable conventional crude oil resources. The Nehring report focuses on the relatively small number of giant oil fields, defined as fields haveing an ultimate recovery of 500 million barrels or more. These giant oil fields contain more than 75 percent of the known recoverable oil resources of the world. Their comprehensive examination provides an efficient means of assessing world oil resources. After a lengthy and detailed analysis, Nehring concludes that the ultimate recoverable conventional crude oil resources of the world are somewhere between 1,700 and 2,300 billion barrels.*Nehrings "best estimate" of the ultimately recoverable conventional crude oil resources of the world (i.e., the middle of his range) is 2,000 billion barrels. The global distribution of this resource is illustrated in Figure 13-10, in which the shaded areas indicate the fractions of the ultimately recoverable crude oil resources that have already been produced. The United States has produced the largest fraction of its crude oil resources (approximately 50 percent); Canada, Mexico, and Western Europe have produced relatively small fractions of theirs. How fast will the world's crude oil resources be consumed? This question cannot be answered with precision. As Nehring notes, the future depletion rate will depend on (1) the production policies of OPEC, (2) the development of technology for offshore Arctic and deepwater exploration and production, and (3) the existence of the necessary economic incentives to producers and refiners. However, it is possible to estimate roughly how long the world's crude oil resources will last. *These figures were estimated prior to the recent reports of a major oil province in Mexico. The Mexican find, thereford, may be considered to be on of "the two to four major oil provinces" that Nehring expects to be discovered and developed. The Mexican find is large, probably on the order of 50-60 billion barrels of petroleum (as opposed to "oil equivalent"). This amount is roughly equal to 10 percent of the petroleum ultimately recoverable in the Middle East or 50 percent of the oil yet to be produced in the United States--or about 3 percent of the ultimately recoverable crude oil resources of the world. ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 353 50 -250 X 109 1@@(80 PERCENT) BBL 58 YEARS ca 40 -<-(80 PERCENT).81 EARS CIO 0 30 PROVED UJ RESERVES Q.= 2,000 X 109 BBL 567, X 109 BBL Z 20 0 CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION U 339 X 1098BL 10 0 0 1,094 X 109 W 906 9 B'L nni 11 0 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 'YEAM Figure 13-11. Possible production rate curves for the world's ultimately recoverable crude oil resources. (M. King Hubbert In Congressional Research Service, Project Interdependence: U.S. and World Energyputlook Through 1990, Washington, 1977, p. 642) The production rate curve for any finite re- limited to the 1975 rate, 80 percent of the re- source-including crude oil,-has, a bell, r shape. sources are consumed over an 81-year period. The production rate starts at zero when. thel,re-- 'The resource -aspect. of the world's commercial source was first tapped. The curve then rises Ias energy, problem is, in essence, that crude oil (and the production rate increases. ' Ultimately, 'the natural gas) cannot continue to grow at historical curve must peak and return 'to zero as - the oil rates. Figure 13-12. illustrates the problem for resource is exhausted. On. such a curve, a steep crude oil. The rapidly rising curve* continues the rise in the real costs of discovery andproduction' growth trend experienced in the 1950s, 60s,'ania' can be anticipated. The total a'rea'under the curve early 70s. The lower curve is the symmetric pr67 must equal the total oil ultimately economically' duction curve (from Fig. 13-11) for the world's recoverable. ultimately recoverable conventional crude oil re-, Using 2,000 billion barrels (Nehring's best es- sources. The rapidly growing gap is an indication timate) for theultimately iecoverableresource, of the resource aspect of the world's commercial Figure 13@11 illustrates two possible'shape,s of the energy'problem: -future crude oil production rate curve for.. -the The Economic Problem. The.economic aspect world. In both cases'. the total. area'under the -of the world's commercial energy problem stems curves is equal t o the total'ultimately recoveria .ble largely from' the observation" that GNP and'en- convehtio"nal crude oil resource of the world ergy growth have been correlated in the pa 'st, as (2,000 billion barrels), and the initial-portion of illustrated in Figure 13-13 for the U.S.'The con- the curves corresponds to historicbxperii@nce. the cern is that (1) if GNP measures social welfare symmetric curve rises to a peak about, 1990, de- and (2) if growth in GNPJ.s both correlated with clining thereafter. The second curve shows that and caused by "energy growth, reduced energy if petroleum produ&ion were held at about 1075 growth would necessarily affect social welfare ad- rates, the decline in production could be post- versely, However, Ahere are many reaso ns.to poned for about two decades. The symmetric doubt these two suppositions. It is well known curve assumes that 80 percent of -the world's total that GNP is not an adequate or satisfactory,meas- ultimately recoverable conventional res 'ources are - ure of social welfare. Furthermore, there is wide Y consumed over a 58-year period; with roductibh' variation among nations and regions in the amount p :0 354 THE PROJECTIONS Since GNP figures include the value of services rformed in cleaning up the environment as well F71, pe IWO- as economic activities that create pollution, social welfare could actually increase as a result of re- Crude oil consumption rate duced GNP, at least to the extent that more ef- projected from actual growth 9M00 ficient use of energy could reduce the polluting over the 1950-75 period. component of GNP without reducing the bene ficial component. * While all of the future con- sequences are still not entirely clear, the social, economic, and environmental consequences of alternative energy paths are important consider- ations in projecting an energy future. @700 The Technological Options. There are many J ideas as to how the United States and other na- t ion , s might best respond to the resource and eco- nornic aspects of the world energy problem. The most widely discussed ideas are based on the use of increased amounts of energy derived from five primary energy sources: coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear fission, and solar. Increased use of each V of these primary sources has environmental im- pacts. These impacts are described briefly in the following paragraphs. Coal production and use involve serious en- vironment 306@ al problems, most of which can be Jim- ited through control measures. Worker health and safety is a special concern with coal. Coal mining is a hazardous occupation, s even when careful attention i given to maintain- ing a safe and healthy workplace. Without such Geologically attention, frequent accidents and a high incidence estimated crude oil of black-lung disease would be the norm. production rate. Adverse land and water impacts are also a prime concern. Without proper controls, surface ":777,@',@f mines can lead to large-scale land disruptions. '2 1050 19175@ 606' 20@i '2050 Natural habitats can be largely destroyed, and farmlands can be rendered unproductive. The physiological and ecological character of the af- Figure 13-12. Geologically estimated global crude oil fected regions can be markedly changed. Land production rates compared with consumption rates pro- subsidence is a common occurrence with deep jected from actual growth over the 1950-75 period. The mines. Water pollution, especially acid mine production curve is from Figure 13-11; the consumption curve is projected from historic consumption rates over drainage, is associated with both surface and un- the 1900-75 period. derground mines. . Without adequate controls, coal combustion of GNP (and welfare) produced per unit of energy can release considerable amounts of air pollu- used,* and the hypothesized causal linkages be- tants, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, tween energy use and GNP (and welfare) are particulates, and trace metals. These pollutants clearly subj ect to varying degrees of efficiency- et-m7ted crude -if pr ucti.. rate. Further support for this point is provided by the forthcoming A study prepared by the MITRE Corporation for the De- report of the Demand and Conservation Panel of the National partment of Energy (Richard J. Kalagher et al., "National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Environmental Projection No. I," Dec. 1978, p. 83) forecasts Energy Systems (discussed in part in "U.S. Energy Demand: that by 1990 the U.S. economy will generate $19 billion of Some Low Energy Futures," Science, Apr. 14, 1978, pp. 142- GNP per quad (10 11 Btu) of energy supply, up about 19 percent 52), and in the report of the Energy Project at the Harvard from the 1975 performance of $16 billion GNP per quad of Business School (Robert Stogaugh and David Yergin, eds., energy supply. Energy Future, New York: Random House, 1979). ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 355 r 20 1000 16 goI 08- 12 E 8, Energy Consumption I /I 400_1 0 Lu 11,4 -206 GNP in constant 1958 dollars 0 0 1850 1860 1880 1966 1020 '-19140"." ,@,',196b Figure 13-13. Historical growth of GNP and commercial energy use in the United States, 1850-1976. (U.S. Statistical Abstracts) can produce health or ecological concerns on a by coal. The environmental impacts associated local, regional, national, and sometimes even in- with the combustion of oil and coal are generally ternational scale. similar, but on a per unit energy basis tend to be The ecological effects associated with acid'rains less severe with oil. The comparison, however, is have only recently become of widespread' con- not completely straightforward because some of cern. The combustion of coal and other fossil fuels the impacts are not fully commensurable. (The produces oxides of sulfur and nitrogen that acidify problem of comparability becomes more acute rain over wide areas. (The acid rain problem is with energy.sources that are even more dis'simi- discussed extensively in the water section of this lar--e.g., coal versus nuclear energy.) chapter.) The most prominent generic environmental dif- The combustion of coal and other fossil fuels ference between coal and oil concern production releases carbon dioxide, contributing to the prob- and transportation. The problems of production lem of its accumulation in the atmosphere. Global and transportation of oil include the likely dis- atmosphere C02 levels have already increased by ruption of some pristine areas (such as the arctic about 10 percent above pre-industrial concentra- and antarctic regions), the possibility of blowouts tions. The global consequences of continued CO. during the exploration and drilling phases, and buildup are not well understood, but there is con- the likelihood of major spills due to transportation cern that a gradual, irreversible, and, potentially accidents. Ocean transportation by supertanker dangerous change in the world's climate could is of particular concern. Over the last decade -, occur over the next century as a result of the large oil spills from supertankers have become a "greenhouse effect." (Tbe C02 problem is dis- global problem. Chronic oil pollution from many cussed extensively in the climate section of this sources, land- and marine-based, also remains a chapter.) serious concern. Oil produces environmental impacts that are Natural gas produces substantially less air both similar to and -different from those produced pollution per unit of energy than either oil or coal. -356 THE PROJECTIONS Being gaseous under normal -conditions, it poses Nuclear power may Also increase the risk to less risks to 6@and-water during overland-trans- world security, both through the possibility of pIort. Natural gas, however, is increasingly being added vulnerability to terrorist actions and through liquefied and transported via ocean tankers. In its potential for accelerating the proliferation of the event of a serious accident near a major pop- nuclear weapons. Acts of vandalism and sabotage ulAtion center, a tanker filled with highly volatile to nuclear power plants have been reported in liquefied natural gas poses the risk of a disastrous several countries. While no radioactive releases fire or explosion. due to such attacks have been reported so far, this Nuclear energy raises a set of environmental possibility remains a -serious - concern. Nuclear power may also accelerate weapons proliferation. concerns that are largely different from those as- The spread of sensitive, facilities (e.g., enrichment sociated with fossil fuels. Electrical energy gen7 and reprocessing plants) can result in direct access eration at a nuclear power plant. does not, fb 'r to weapons-usable materials. 'To date, the tech- eiarriple, directly produce conventional air p6l- nology for enriching uranium and Separating plu- lution. Also, due to the comparatively high energy tonium from spent fuel has been tightly controlled content of uranium ores that are presently avail- and limited almost exclusively to those nations able, much less land is disrupted to produce A unit already possessing nuclear weapons'. However, of 'energy from uranium than from coal. , this situation may, change in the future if more Nuclear power, however, does have several im- nations Seek to acquire enrichment and reproc- portant societal and environmental problems, as- essing facilities. The widespread,use of plutonium sociated with its widespread use. These include and highly enriched uranium would increase the concerns related to reactor safety, nuclear waste availability of both, and thereby also increase the .disposal, and international security. risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons Nuclear reactor safety is a continuing issue. The throughout the world while -offering no substantial possibility of a truly catastrophic accident, in- advantage over the continued use* of low-enriched volving a reactor meltdown that releases consid-: uranium. in the nuclear energy facilities of those erable amounts of radiation and,could lead nations that do not now have nuclear weapons. potentially to thousands of deaths and billions of Furthermore, a substantial disadvantage could dollars of property damage, has been a concern occur in that a proliferation of nuclear weapons since the beginning of the technology. Elaborate capability would diminish world security and in safety measures with several levels of redundancy turn. threaten the energy security of all nations. have been developed to prevent such'an event. Even though the likelihood of a major accident Solar energy is available in several. forms, in- at a carefully designed, maintained, and managed cluding hydropower, wind power, organic mate- reactor is small, its precise value is uncertain and rial (biomass),,ocean thermal energy conversion, nonzero. The actual degree of risks under various and direct sunlight. Its environmental. problems conditions of design, maintenance, and manage- vary markedly both in kind and in degree from ment continues to be the subject of intensive anal-. one technology to another. Even for a given tech- ysis. Needless to say, if nuclear power plants are hology, , th'e environmental implications depend not subject to careful design, maintenance, and on the scale of the facility and on site-specific management, these facilities pose far greater risks factors. to public health and welfare. Hydro facilities that generate electricityusually The total global amounts of nuclear waste gen- generate from a few kilowatts to thousands of erated by reactor operations have grown steadily. megawatts, Envi .ronmenwl concerns associated Nuclear@ waste products are toxic, highly radio- with hydropower include the disruption of river active, and long-lived. Some of the radioactive flows and aquatic life, flooding of land and wet- isotopes in nuclear wastes remain dangerously radioactive for hundreds of thousands of.Years land habitats, potential public health problems relatedto@ecosystem changes, and possible long- a period many times longer than recorded history. term effects on agricultural, production at those Safe disposal will require extended containment locations where the reservoir is used for irrigation. in-sites that are stable over geological periods of time. Many disposal techniques have been pro- Energy production via large and small wind sys- posed but none has yet been established as fully tems also raises a number of minor but conse- satisfactory. Research aimed at resolving this quential environmental concerns. These include problem must receive greater attention than in' safety problems associated with blade or tower the past. failure, worker and neighborhood exposure to ENVIRONMENT PROJECrIONS 357 noise, electromagnetic interference, and windmi 111 Given these primary sources of energy --- coal, aesthetics. oil, natural gas, nuclear fission and solar-there The potential environmental problems associ- are a wide spectrum of mikes under consideration ated with increased reliance on biomass could be by nations around the world as .possible solutions severe. As noted elsewhere in this Study, LDCs to their,energy problems. The spectrum ranges have been particularly subject to the overuse of from heavy dependence on nuclear energy and biomass for basic energy needs. The problems in nonrenewable fossil fuels (especially coal) with some LDCs include widespread deforestation and minimal attention to the productivity and effi- the loss of essential nutrients due to the use of ciency of energy use on the one hand, toleavy animal wastes to meet domestic energy require- emphasis of renewable resources (especially the ments..These problems are already very cri tical various forms of solar energy), increased produc- in some countries land may.become even more tivity (i.e., end-use conservation), and increased critical in the future. efficiency in the energy sector (i.e., thermody- By comparison, the use of bioenergy in indus- Inamic matching of energy source to end-use re- trialized countries appears to pose problems of . irements*) on the other. T ese two extremes qu @h considerably smaller magnitude. These. include of the solution spectrum are now widely refer- the possibility of small- to moderate-scale ecolog- enced to as the "hard" and the "soft" paths. ical effects due to the development of intensive The hard path/soft path dichotomy is a conve- biomass "farms," air pollution associated with the nient means of capsulizing the range of environ- increased use of fuelwood, and air and water pol- mental impacts that may be expected from energy lution associated with the production of liquid or development in the decade ahead. While both the gaseous fuels from biomass. hard path and the soft path. have environmental Ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) sys- impacts, their relati .ve difference in emphasis on tems pose several environmental problems, (see conservation, productivity, efficiency and renew- The Projections and, the Marine Environment" able/nonrenewable sources leads to very different above), whose nature, magnitude, and effects are environmental impacts. For a time, the most com- still somewhat uncertain. Three unexplored areas plete comparisons of hard and soft path.scenarios provide the source of this uncertainty. First, the were provided by the writings of Amory Lovins' ' technology is evolving, rapidly and is subject to a .nd his critics, I but a fi umber of, additional stud- substantial modifications. Second, the @ specific ies are now. available. Most of the new studies are nature of the impact of OTEC facilities in an not strictly hard path or soft path studies, but are ocean environment is not well understood. Third, definitely closer to one end of the,spectrum or the the aggregate environmental impact of an OTEC other. The discussion that follows relates these "farm" is unknown. The most important concerns studies to the hard and soft path concepts and identified so far include:'the need to avoid ecology compares, environmental consequences. Finallyi sensitive areas by proper site selection; displace- the range' of energy-related environmental im- ment of sufficient oceanic waterto alter the tem- pacts that might be experienced globally in 2000 perature and chemical- characteristics of the marine is considered briefly in light of the comparison. environment; entrainment and possible destruc tion of marine organisms; and corrosion of me- tallic surfaces, which could lead to the buildup of The Hard Path toxic substances in the marine food chain. Studies of hard path options abound. The dis- The potential methods of harnessing direct so- cussion here is limited to two. The first is the work lar radiation range from large-scale electrical gen- of the World Energy Conference (WEC), which erating installations to small7scale applications for home space heating, hot water, and electricity. The. vast. majority of the applications appear to be relatively benign environmentally. @Most of the The degree to which the energy industry requires primary energy to deliver end-use energy for the needs of society is environmental impacts are typically associated illustrated by the example of converting coal to another form with.the production of equipment rather than oP- of energy, namely electricity. If three lumps of coal are burned eration. Large-scale solar "power towers" and in a thermal power plant to generate electricity,, the energy solar cells in space to generate microwave power sector of the economy loses the energy from two lumps of coal beamed to earth are possible 'exceptions. Ongoing as waste heat. Similar losses occur in the conversion of coal to research is aimed at the better identification of synthetic fuels. Such inefficiencies in the energy sector can be minimized by matching thermodynamically the quality of the the environmental effects associate& with these energy delivered to the quality of the energy needed for the. and other systems'. performance of particular end uses. 358 THE PROJEMONS provides what is probably the most complete ures, and the use of oil primarily for premium global hard path scenario yet developed, but has uses. The L4. assumptions result in a demand of only a very limited environmental analysis.* The about 520 EJ (494 quad)-an increase of about second is U.S. national energy scenario developed 1. 5 times over 1972 use.' by the U.S.. Department of Energy. The environ- The World Energy Conference's consideration mental implications of the DOE scenario have of environmental constraints is confined to one been analyzed much more fully than the WEC page in its current work. I This brief discussion scenario. recalls for the reader the assumption in the WEC The World Energy Conference Study. The rel- analysis that current environmental and antipol- atively hard path scenarios developed by the lution standards will remain unchanged. The dis- WEC anticipate significant growth in both coal cussion continues by noting that of course standards and nuclear. The WEC analysis,t noting that ul- will change; and because "in the case of an emer- timately production regulates demand, projects gency an ample supply of energy is given a higher potential World primary energy production in 2000 priority than at least the more marginal concern at 690 exajoules (EJ).� The potential production for the environment.... we believe that proper mix is as follows: coal, 170 EJ; oil, 195 EJ; gas, measures to prevent energy shortages should form 143 EJ; nuclear, 88 EJ; hydraulic, 34 EJ; uncon- a part of a comprehensive and responsible envi- ventional oil and 'gas, 4 EJ; renewable solar, ronmental policy."' geothermal, and biomass, 56 EJ. I The WEC environmental assessment continues, The WEC presents a range of energy demand "It is often said that the least-polluting joule is projections for 2000. All of the projections are the one never produced. This is not necessarily based on assumed rates of economic growth and true. In fact many antipollution measures, adopted, assumed elasticities of energy use relative to in- or proposed, reguire the use of more energy come and price. High growth ("H") cases and low rather than less. ' growth ("L") cases were developed using the fol- The WEC concludes its environmental discus- lowing assumed annual economic growth rates: sion with a call for more environmental analysis. It should be noted that environmental consider-' Centrally Less ations are one of the three.major topics on the OECD Planned Developed program of the next WEC conference. "I Nations Economies Countries World The DOE hard path scenario. The Department High growth 3.7 4.5 5.3 4.1 of Energy recently contracted with the MITRE Low growth 2.8 3.2 3.8 3.0 Corporation to analyze the environmental impli- cations of a DOE scenario that lies close to the The income and price elasticities vary from case hard end of the spectrum of energy paths. The to case. The high-growth case H3 includes only scenario, known as Projection Series C, is one of the impact of a significant price response and re- a set developed by DOE's Energy Information sults in a demand of about 680 EJ (646 quad) in Administration and reported in the Administra- 2000-an increase of a factor of two over energy tion's annual report. ` In Table 13-37, Projection use in 1972 (the study's base year). The H5 scen- Series C* is compared with the original definition ario includes not only the high price response, but of the hard path. While there, is a close corre- also oil utilization constraints and vigorous con- servation measures, which exceed the normally spondence between the scenano and the defini- expected consumer response to higher energ tion, this is not the "hardest" of the scenarios y being considered by DOE. The DOE-sponsored prices. The H5 assumptions result in,a demand MITRE analysis' describes this scenario as a of about 560 EJ (532 quad) in 2000-an increase "business-as-usual" scenario, 'characterizing "a of about a factor of 1.7 over 1972 use. The low- middle range of energy futures likely to result if growth case L4 assumes a high price response, further oil constraints, further conservation meas- Ile scenarios developed by Workshop on Alternative En- *Since the above was written, DOE has published a similar ergy Strategies (WAES) might also have been considered here, environmental analysis of.National Energy Plan 11 (NEP-11). but they exclude nations having centrally planned economies The NE -P-11 scenario for low-priced oil ($21/bbl in 2000) is and have no more environmental analysis than the WEC work. based on the identical average annual growth rate in primary t Tbe WEC projections extend to 2020, but to facilitate com- energy conversion-2.92 percent per year. The NEP-11 scen- parison with other figures in this report, the WEC figures ario for high-priced oil ($381bbl in 2000) has a slightly slower presented here are the ones for 2000. average annual growth -rate in primary energy conversion- I EJ = 100 joules = 0.95 X 1011 Btu = 0.95 quad. 2.60 percent per year. ENVIRONMENT PROJECrIONS 359 policies in existence prior to the pas 'sage of the hard path scenario. The treatment of air pollution National Energy Act* are continued. covecs most of major energy related pollutants: The DOE-MITRE analysis of Projection Series sulfur oxides, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, C is based on present and anticipated environ- nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons and particulates, mental regulations, many of which are under at- but omits carbon dioxide. * The discussion of tack or in question. Among these regulations, the water pollution covers total dissolved solids and air and water quality regulations are particularly nitrogen discharges. Water consumption is pro- importanct jected, but no indications of land disruption and Based on these and other assumptions, the loss by mining (especially coal strip-mining and DOE-MITRE report presents a mixed and incom- uranium mining) are provided. Solid wastes (es- plete picture through 1990 of the U.S. environ- pecially scrubber sludge and ash) are projected, mental future implied by the Projection Series C but nuclear wastes and radiation associated with the nuclear fuel cycle are not. Despite its limita- *Deregulation provided for in the National Energy Act Will tions, this is one of the broadest and most com- gradually raise the cost of domestic oil and gas to world price plete environmental assessments yet provided by levels, but will not significantly alter the basic strategy char- DOE in its energy scenarios and strategies.t The acteristic of Projection Series C. principal findings are exerpted briefly below. Me MITRE analysis (pp. 19, 59-.60) describes its assumptions about these regulations as follows: According to the DOE-MITRE report, the en- -rhe 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments to the Air Quality Act of 1967 ('Clean Air Act') provide the legislative basis, for most environmental regulations and assumptions used in this The major importance of carbon dioxide to the formulation section of the report. The Clean Air Act stipulated that the of energy policy is discussed in a recent report sent by four federal government set National Ambient Air Quality Stand- scientists to the Council on Environmental Quality (George ards (NAAQS) for five pollutants: total suspended particu- M. Woodwell, Gordon J. MacDonald, Roger Revelle, and C. lates, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, - hydrocarbons, and David Keeling, "ne Carbon Dioxide Problem: implications carbon monoxide. Each state was then required to develop for Policy in the Management of Energy and Other Re- and submit a State Implementation Plan (SIP) to the Envi- sources," Washington: Council on Environmental Quality, ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator. The SIP July 1979). specifies strategies to achieve the level of air quality established t There is wide variation in the extent to which environmental by the NAAQS for individual polluting categories in all regions considerations have been included in major domestic and of the state. EPA also set New Source Performance Standards world energy studies. In the U.S., for example, the Federal (NSPS) for selected industrial categories. Compliance with Energy Administration's 1974 Project Independence Report both the SIP and NSPS is assumed in the environmental fore- included a brief 15-page environment assessment (Chapter 4), casts of this report, although full compliance with SIP stand- addressing a wide range of environmental impacts associated ards is not assumed until 1985. It is assumed that new sources with six scenarios for $7 and $11 oil, but without much inte- coming on line after 1975 meet EPA's original NSPS standards gration and synthesis. The 1974 report of the Ford Founda- until the revised NSPS regulations of @ the Clean Air Act tion's Energy Policy Project (A Time to Choose, by S. David Amendments of 1977 become effective. Freeman et aL, Ballinger, 1974) anticipated higher oil prices The revised NSPS regulations require the use of the and included a reasonably thorough environmental assessment 'Best Available Control Technology' (BACT) for new major in its analysi's of alternative energypolicies (p. 179). The 1977 emitting facilities. This BACT requirement has been simulated Congressional Research Service report Project Interdepend- for new coal-fired electric utilities (projected to be operational ence discussed briefly the environmental constraints associated in 1984 or later) and new industrial boilers (initiated in 1981) with various possible energy. sources. The National Academy or later).... of Science's Implications of Environmental Regulations for "Title II of the Clean Air Act (as amended in August 1977) Energy Production and Consumption (1977) is very detailed specifies emission limits (in grams of pollwan 't per vehicle mile on those environmental impacts now being regulated in the traveled over the lifetime of a vehicle) for mobile pollution U.S. sources. These emission limits have been translated by EPA The National Energy Plan (Executive Office of the Presi- into emission factors (also expressed in grams per mile) which denti 1977) integrates general environmental considerations account for increasing pollutant.emissions as the vehicle ages. at many points, but specifics are limited. The Department of In several cases, the emission factors for new vehicles are lower Energy did not prepare an environmental impact.statement than the emission limits set because increasing emissions due for the plan, but an "environmental assessment statement" is to vehicle deterioration are accounted for by increasing emis- expected to be released in 1979 (John Pearson, Energy Infor- sion factors over tithe. . . . The Federal Water Pollution Con- mation Administration,, personal communication, 1979). In trol Act stipulated that the Environmental Protection Agency May 1979, DOE submitted a revised National Energy Plan (EPA) develop industry-specific guidelines limiting releases (NEP 11) to Congress, containing an appendix, Environmental of major pollutants. . . . "Ibe effluent limitations developed Trends and Impacts, that addresses the environmental con- by EPA set two levels of guidelines: 'Best Practicable Tech- sequences of the revised plan and its energy-pricing proposals, nology' (BPT) currently available, to be met by July 1, 1977; similar in scope to the DOE-MITRE report discussed in the and 'Best Available Technology' (BAT) economically achiev- text above. able, to be met by July 1, 1983. This DOE-MITRE study Outside the U.S., there is also wide variation in the ways assumes that 100 percent industrial compliance with BPT in which energy and environment are considered. The Sec- standards will be achieved in 1979, and with BAT standards retariat for Future Studies in Sweden has produced two reports by 1985. on energy that contain extensive and integrated consideration 360 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 13-37 Comparison of the Hard Path Definit ion and the Energy Information Administration's Projection Series C Hard Path Definition Projection Series Twin goals: sustaining growth in energy con- The Projection Series C scenario projects the following trends in macroecon- sumption (assumed to be closely and causally omic and energy consumption: linked to GNP and to social welfare) and 1975 1985 1990 GNP (billions of 1972 dollars) t,202 1,903 2,017 Energy consumption (quadrillion Btus) 70.6 94.6 108.51 minimizing oil imports Increased petroleum imports. The costs of production and distribution for all energy sources except oil and gas were held constant by the Energy Infor- mation Administration. Changes in oil and gas costs, however, are induced through alternative assumptions regarding their physical availability. The Pro- jection Series C case postulates a constant real price of imported oil of $15.32 per barrel in 1978 dollars. Rapid expansion of the coal sector (mainly coal Coal production, particularly in the West, will increase dramatically, reflecting strip-mined and converted into electricity or syn- increased demand brought about by higher (post-1973) prices of oil and gas, thetic fuels). particularly for electricity generation. Electricity sales "I grow at 4.8 percent per year, rather than the historic 7 percent, reflecting saturation of air con- ditioning and major appliances that included high rates of penetration during the 1960s. This is consistent with the 5 percent growth from 1970 to 1976 and 4.2 percent from 1976 to 1977. Rapid expansion of the oil and gas sectors (in- Increased oil imports, Domestic oil production will increase slightly over cur- creasingly from arctic and offshore wells). rent levels because of the development of Alaskan oil fields and the outer continental shelf. Lower 48 production of natural gas will continue to decline, although less rapidly, after Alaskan North Slope gas distribution systems are completed. Fuel shares in the industrial economic sector indicate ashift from gas to oil and, to a lesser extent, to electricity, reflecting declining gas supplies. Rapid expansion of the nuclear fission sector Large increases in nuclear power. (especially in fast breeder reactors). Limited or no use of solar and conservation tech- Solar technologies are not expected to contribute significantly to total energy nologies. supply through 1990. The key elements in supply-demand patterns through 1990 are assumptions about the degree of energy conservation in general and of oil and gas in particular, as a result of economic presssures and mandatory conservation measures introduced 1973. One example of such measures is the imposition of fuel efficiency standards for automobiles. Source: Hard path definition-Amory B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 1977, p. 26. Projection SeriesC-Richard J. Kalagher et aL, "National Environmental Impact Projection No. I.- McLean, Va.: MITRE Corp., Dec. 1978, pp. 1. 150. Compare the Department of Energy*s projection for the Global 2000 Study, which has the U.S. consuming l(K) quadrillion Btus in 1990 (table 13-33). of environmental impacts ("Energy and Society: Conceptual The international environmental group Friends of the Earth Outline Introducing a Futures Study," Dec. 1975; and MAans has published books on world energy strategies (Amory B. L6nnroth et al., Energy, in Transition: A Report on Energy Lovins, World Energy Strategies: Facts, Issues and Options, Policy and Future Options, Mar. 1977). The 1977 World En- Ballinger, 1975) non-nuclear energy options (Lovins and John ergy Outlook: A Reassessment of Long-Term Energy Devel- H. Price, Non-Nuclear Futures: The Case for an Ethical Energy opments and Related Policies, prepared for the Organization Strategy, Ballinger, 1975), and soft energy paths (Lovins, Soft for Economic Cooperation and Development, does not ex- Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace, Ballinger 1977), all plicitly consider the environmentaldimension of energy pros- of which contain general but not highly detailed considerations pects. The lengthy report of the Workshop on Energy Strategies @of social, political, and physical environments. The Rockefel- (Energy: Global Prospects 190-2000, McGraw-Hill, 1977) ler Foundation sponsored World Energy Survey by Ruth Leger concludes its consideration of environment in less than two Sivard (World Priorities, Leesburg, Va., 1979) contains a brief pages (p. 41). The global energy analysis work of the Inter- environmental discussion. The various reports of the World national Institute of Applied Systems Analysis is oriented pri- Energy Conference (WEC) contain nothing on the environ- marily toward economic and resource considerations but does mental aspects of energy issues (Robert J. Raudebaugh, Ex- contain a limited environmental dimension (see, for example, ecutive Director of WEC's U.S. National Committee, personal W. Hffele, "Energy'Options Open to Mankind Beyond the communication, Feb. 15, 1979). 'Me WEC, however, plans to Turn of the Century," International Conference on Nuclear include environmental considerations in two of the four major Power and Its Fuel Cycle, Schlossburg, Austria, May 1977; program divisions at its 1980 meeting (Ilth World Energy and Hrifele and W. Sassin, "The Global Energy System," Conference, 1980, "Energy for Our World," Technical Pro- Annual Review of Energy, vol. 2, 1977). gram with Instructions for Authors, 1979). ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 361 vironmental implications of the Projection Series impacts that are otherwise masked by the national C hard path scenario are as follows: trends. Figure 13-14 summarizes the most signif- �Little or no improvement is .shown for sulfur icant energy-related regional impacts. oxide (SO ) emissions. All im rovements occur The DOE-MITRE report describes the envi- by 1985 Aen it is assumed ttEt standards for ronmental trends from the Projection Series C existing sources will have been met. If So,, hard path scenario as "a middle ground of likely emissions are to be reduced by 1990, the retire- environmental futures" for the U.S. How typical ment of old plants must be accelerated or the might such impacts be for other industrial econ@- standards tightened. ornies? �Large increases in nitrogen oxide (NO ) emis- Serious as many of the DOE-MITRE environ- 9i.ons are'anticipated. Throughout the lorecast mental trends are, they may underestimate the pe.riod,. combustion activity (primarily by elec- impacts that would follow in many nations from tric utilities) is responsible for the majority of a hard path energy policy. This is because the SO. and NO, releases. degree of environmental protection assumed in Significant national reductions are expected by the DOE-MITRE report requires significant na- 1990 in the emissions of particulates, hydrocar- tional commitments of capital, resources, and la- bons, and carbon monoxide. . bor. The report notes that Large increases in dissolved solids (especially sulfates, creating acid problems) are antici- Total -pollution control costs (capital plus oper- pated. ating and maintenance expenditures) will increase Little or no improvement is shown for point- at an annual rate of 3.1 percent between 1975 and source nitrogen releases to water. 1990, but will decline relative to GNP. Significant national reductions are expected by Direct and indirect energy requirements for pol- 1990 in'point-source discharges of major water lution control are projected to increase by 50 per- pollutants such as biochemical'oxyge.n demand, cent between 1975 and 1990, but will account for suspended solids, total phosphorus, and nu- no more than 3.7 percent of total U.S. energy use merous metals. in any one year.... The number of persons in Large increases -in ash and scrubber sludge are 1990 that will be employed directly or indirectly anticipated. in pollution control-related activities is estimated High-Btu gasification of coal is expected to pro- to be 1.8 million, or 1.6 percent of total U.S. duce major increases in cyanide releases in re- employment. gions with gasific@tion plants unless zero discharge It is not clear that all industrial nations (perhaps regulations are imposed. . I even including the U.S.) will be able or willing to Thermal discharges are not calculated, but large commit as much of their capital, resources, and increases in water consumption for evaporative labor to environmental protection as is assumed cooling are anticipated. Both utilities and other in the DOE-MITRE report. .manufacturing industries contribute substan- There are a .number of variations of the hard tially to increased water consumption by 1990. The increasing role of nuclear-powered gener- path. The most significant differences among ation is a factor in this increase. Development these variations concern the major sources of ad- of both energy and manufacturing activity may ditional primary energy. Some variations involve .be seriously limited by existing or anti icipated a large growth in nuclear energy; others involve water shortages in several regions of thecoun- large increases in coal combustion. The environ- try. mental implications of these two variations are The DOE-MITRE report does not address the significantly different, and their economic advan- following energy-relafed environmental consid- tages and disadvantages differ from.region to re- erations: gion. The primary argument for nuclear power in the Land losses to facilities development, uranium U.S., for example, has been that it would produce ,mining, and strip-mining are not calculated or discussed. cheaper electricity than alternative energy sources. -Nuclear wastes and radiation from the nuclear Early advocates suggested that fission would pro- fuel cycles are not calculated or discussed. duce electricity "too cheap to meter." Nuclear -Occupational safety and health issues are not power has certainly no prospect of becoming too addressed. cheap to meter. As a result, the basic argument of its cost advantage@ over alternative source's has When the environmental trends, are viewed at been questioned frequently with the'charge that the regional and local levels, the picture reveals if all costs were properly accounted for, and sub- ALASKA WASH MONT New York-New Jersey NH MAINE N. DAK VT New O"G 10 Mountain MINN England IV IDAHO WYO S. OAK WISC 2 MASS CAL.IF weat Great Lakes MICH NY RI 8 IOWA 'CONN UTAH NEB ILL IND OHIO PA. NJ COLO 7 K40 5 3 DEL 9 ANS MD Central VA ARIZ KY Middle West N-FAEX TEX OKLA ARK TENN A S.C. Atlantic ALIA miss GUAM Southeast 6 LA South Central FLA HAWAII VIRGIN ISLANDS 2 PUERTO RICO Region 1 Region 6 TDS discharges double due primarily to electric Projected increases in energy related water con. utilities. Slight increase in particulate emiSSions, SUMption by 1990 may face strong Competition Moderate increase in SO, emission due to con- from other sources. TDS and chloride version to coal. discharges more than double by 1990 due to Organic chemicals Industry. Cyanide releases in- Region 2 Crease by 112 due to high STU coal gasification. Largest projected increase in SO, emissions. Arsenic discharges double due to pharm. Regional increases in SO, from new coal burn- aC0UtICaIS Industry. Moderate increase in SO, ing electric utilities and industrial boilers. emission due to Conversion 10 coal. High amounts of sludge generated by 1990. Region 7 Region 3 Large portion of national cyanide discharges in 1990 due to high BTU coal gasification. Regional Sulfate discharges increase by 115 due to coal increases in SO due to now coal combustion. mining activities. Substantial decline in SO and Increases in sludge and NCSW generation due Particulate emissions by 1990. High siudge'and to new coal burning facilities. NCSW volumes from electric utilities and in- dustrial boilers burning coal by 1990. Region 8. Projected increases In energy related water con- Region 4 sumption may face strong competition from other uses. Cyanide releases more than double TDS releases triple due to electric utilities and due to high BTU coal gasification. Substantial chemical industry. Several non-ferrous metals sulfate releases from coal mining and electric and chloride$ discharges double by 1990. High utilities activities. Large Increases In NCSW Particulate emissions In 1975 with substantial generation by 1990 due.to oil shale activities. decline by 1990. High sludge and NCSW volumes by 1990. Region 9 Large increases in NCSW volumes by 1990 Region 5, primarily in California. 80, emissions decline. TOS discharges increase by 112 due to electric Region 10 utilities and chemical Industry. High sludge and NCSW volumes by 1990 due primarily to electric TOS discharges double due to electric utilities. utilities and Industrial boilers burning coal. Potassium releases doubles due to smelting. FIgare 13-14. Major regional trends associated with the DOE-MITRE Projection Series C (Hard Path) Energy Development Scenario. In the regional analyses, TDS stands for total dissolved solids; NCSW stands for noncombustible solid wastes. (National Environmental Impact Noject No. 1, MITRE Corp., Dec. 1978) ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 363 sidies stripped away, nuclear power would not be by utilities and banks-may become increasingly competitive with alternative ene 'rgy sources. 575 comparable with coal.* The Ford Foundation's nuclear energy policy While there are many factors beyond purely study group addressed this question and con- economic ones involved in the choice of national cluded in 1977, before the Three Mile Island nu- energy policy beyond the purely economy factors. clear reactor accident in Pennsylvania, that in the Nonetheless, a number of recent decisions.seem United States nuclear energy based on uranium, to support the conclusions of the Ford study. In but not plutonium, is somewhat less costly than the U.S., the states of California and Montana coal, but that in much of the country "the choice have limited the construction of new nuclear fa- is so close and the uncertainties sufficiently large cilities until the federal government 'will have that the balance could easily shift either to in- demonstrated a capacity,to safety dispose of the crease or eliminate the small average advantage nuclear wastes. "' Sites for nuclear plants and dis- that nuclear power presently enjoys."' posal areas continue to present a problem; only For Japan and Western Europe, the Ford study the states of Washington, New Mexico, and Ne- concludes that vada are still sympathetic to locating new waste disposal sites within- their boundaries. '8' The gov- a shift to heavy reliance on coal would require ernors of the only three states now willing to ac- increasing dependence on imports from the United cept even low-level nuclear wastes recently wrote States and Eastern Europe. The political accept- ability of such dependence is not clear. There is to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the also a question as to how large a foreign market Department of Transportation demanding tight- [for coal the United States] could supply and still ened enforcement of safety rules on the shipment meet its own growing domestic deman I For these of nuclear wastes if their states are to continue reasons, a greater preference for nuclear power receiving radioactive materials. The Governor of should be expected in these countries than in the South Carolina cut off shipments from the dam- United States. "" aged reactor at Three Mile Island.' In Europe, For the LDCs, the Ford study concludes that antinuclear sentiments significantly contributed to the demand for nuclear power is "very uncer- a change of government in Sweden,' and voters tain": elected to terminate work on a nearly complete nuclear plant in Austria in 1978. " In the Federal Nuclear power may be competitive in some Republic of Germany, the construction of a nu- twenty developing countries by the year 2000, and clear reprocessing plant considered essential to others may instalf it for noneconomic reasons. As Germany's energy program for the next two dec- a practical matter, the large, 1,000 MWe nuclear ades was recently "postponed indefinitely."' power plants now being built (by commercial European expectations for nuclear energy can be manufacturers] to achieve economies of scale are seen in the history of OECD projections for 1985 not matched to the small power grids of most nuclear-generating capacities shown in Figure 13- developing countries. More suitable, smaller plants 15. It seems likely, therefore, that at least until (less than 600 MWe) would have significantly higher capital cost per kilowatt and, in the absence 2000, the hard path option will include some nu- of demand, are no longer being built. For these clear power (primarily existing plants) but will reasons, nuclear power may be ruled out as an emphasize coal. economic energy option for many developing na- tions. The Soft Path In the U.S. and many other countries, decisions There are many ideas about the technologies on major electric power facilities are made by most appropriate to a soft path future. These tech- utility executives based on costs to the utilities nologies were originally defined in terms of five (after government subsidy) rather than on costs characteristics: to the nation as a whole. The costs of decommis- sioning old plants and disposing of nuclear wastes *The costs of the Three Mile Island accident are now thought are minimized because of the uncertainty of those to be higher than the first estimates. Repairing the damaged costs. Recent accidents-such as occurred at reactor (unit 2) will cost not $140 million, but $240-320 million; Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania` have raised in addition, the cost of replacing the reactor core is estimated interest rates, and underwriters point to the pos- at $60-85 million; the utility will not be permitted to restart sible need for further costly regulations, desig' the undamaged reactor (unit 1) for 18 months to 2 years, nS, leading to costs--over and above those directly attributable and plant shutdowns. I As a result, the costs of to the accident-of $14 million per month. ("Costs Still Climb- nuclear power-including those costs perceived ing at Three Mile island," Science, Aug. 3, 1979, p. 475) 364 THETROJECTIONS 563 Other 542 Sod -Japan Other 416, OECD 409 Europe E -European 3 31 a 300 Community 234 2@00- -United. States World Installed Capacity, December 31, 1978 loo - 114,000 megawatts ol I I 1970 '1977 1972' 1973, 1974' 1,975 1976 1977 1978, 1919 1980 1981 1982 1983 19,84 1985 Date of Esfimate Figure 13-15. OECD countries', projections of 1985 nuclear generating capacity for the world, by dates of estimates. (From "Nuclear Energy," Central Intelligence, Agency, Aug. 1977, p. 39, world installed capacity data from U.S. Department Qf Energy, Energy Information Administration.) 1. 'they rely on renewable energy flows that are the Solar Sweden report produced by the Secre- always there whether we use them or not, such tariat for Future Studies'in Stockholm This re- as sun and wind and *vegetation: on energy in- port addresses the feasibility of basing the Swedish come, not on depletable energy capital. , - -, energy supply completely on solar energy (solar 2. They are diverse,'so that as a national treasury radiation, hydro power, wind power, and wave -tuns on many small tax contributions, so na- power) in the not too distant future. (Complete tional enerp supply is an aggregate of ver dependence on solar energy would be difficult -for many individually modest contributions, e2 ic- designed for maximum effectiveness in part' Sweden since it is quite far north and receives ular circumstances. only about. 40 percent of the solar energy per unit 3. They are flexible and relatively low technol- area that is received by countries in N ,orth Africa.) ogy@--which does not mean unsophisticated While the report does not advocat& that Sweden but rather, easy to understand and use without turn solely to solar energy, the report concludes esoteric skills, accessible rather than arcane. that by 2015 Sweden could shift entirely to solar 4. They are matched in scale and in geographic energy without prohibitive costs and without major distribution to end-use needs, taking advan- changes in life styles. tage @o 'f the free distribution of most natural . The Solar Sweden analysis,is based on a number energy flows. of assumptions. .The goods and services produced 5. They are matched in energy quality to end-use are assumed to double relative to 1975. The ef- needs [thus increasinphe ductivity of the ficiency with which energy is used to produce the primary energy u pro goods and services is assumed to increase as il- The number of national soft path and low-en- lustrated in Table 13-38. Care is taken to match ergy studies from around the world has increased the quality of an energy source with the quality rapidly in the last few years. Several of these stud- required for particular end uses,.as described in ies for some of the nations having energy-inten-, Table 13-39. The quality of the energy delivered sive economies are discussed in the following remains essentially unchanged. The resulting en- pages. * ergy system is illustrated in Figure 13-16. The The Solar Sweden Study. One of the most thor- final value for energy use in 2015 is not quite 500 ough national soft path studies now available is x 10" watt hours (WH), compared with 390 x 1012 WH in 1975. (The corresponding figures in *Readers interested in a more complete inventory and con- quads are 1.7 and 1.3, respectively.) , tinuing reporting of national soft-path studies are referred to The Solar Sweden energy system is very diver- the journal Soft Energy Notes (San Francisco, Friends of the sified. Production and use of biomass dominates Earth). and includes energy plantations on land and in ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 365 TABLE 13-38 fuel cells and plants for combined generation. By Solar Sweden Assumed Production of Goods and making the latter into relatively small units, they Services and Specific Energy Use, 1975 and 2015 can be located to minimize energy waste, e.g., by using the waste heat for space heating. Methanol, Goods and Services from biomass, is introduced into the transport sec- Produced in 2015 Rel- tor. Energy ative to 1975 In making its economic calculations, the Solar Specific Sweden report assumes that the costs for the re- Produc- Energy newable energy system are and remain those that 1975 2015 tion Need, can be foreseen for the 1980s. The calculations 7WHb Percent show that building up such a system is compatible Production of goods 165 264 +100 -20 with the assumed doubling of,the production of Production of services goods and services, implying an increase of ap- Transport 75 75 +100 -50 proximately 2 percent annually. Of this annual Other 70, 701 +100 -50 increase approximately one-eighth, goes to the Housing, including domestic electric- new energy system, and the remaining seven- ity 80 86 +40 -30 eighths are necessary to, increase the production .1 Total end use 390 489 of goods and services. Thus, the report concludes, Conversion losses 25. 79' a renewable energy system does not demand a Total supply 415 568 lower standard of living, but merely requires that part of the increase in goods and services is util- Source: Thomas B. Johansson and Peter Steen, Solar Sweden, Stockholm: Sec- ized to create such a system. retariat for Futures Studies. 1978. p. 26. Energy required to produce a unit of goods or services. In discussing the advantage of a solar Sweden, I 'rWH = 10" watt hours = 3.41 X 10-3 quads. the report notes that the energy system it sketches Of which space heating is approximately 40 TWH. d Of which space heating is approximately 31 TWH. is domestic, and that as a result, uncertainties con- Losses in electricity distribution and refineries. Losses occur mainly in domestic methanol production. cerning the possibilities of importing various en- ergy raw materials do not exist. Balance of payment is not to any large extent influenced. The the sea and the use of straw, reeds, and logging use of many different dispersed energy sources waste. Solar heating is used for space heating to- makes the system relatively invulnerable. The @ys- gether with district heating based on plants fueled tem is preferable from the environmental point with biomass for combined generation of elec- of view because it limits emissions and does not tricity and heat. The electricity sector becomes increase the risk of catastrophic occurrences. relatively large and the proportion of electricity But the environmental implications of the solar larger than today. Electricity is produced from Sweden energy system are not completely bene- .hydro power, wind power, and solar cells and in ficial.,The report notes that the demand on land TABLE 13-39 Solar Sweden Percent Distribution of Energy, by Energy-Quality Categories A-1, 1971 and 20150 1971 2015 Industry Transport Other Industry Transport Other ALighting, small motors 2 15 5 40 BElectricity for chemical processes 3 3 CStationary motors 15 17 DTransports 3 100 2 100 EProcess,heat (> 1000*C) 22 23 FProcess heat (500-1000*C) 9 9 GProcess heat (100-500*C) 26 26 HProcess heat (< 100'C) 9 9 1Low temperature heat (space heating) 11 85 6 60 Total 100 too too 100 100 Percent of total energy use 41 17 42 54 15 31 Source: Thomas B. Johansson and Peter Steen. Solar Sweden, Stockholm: Secretariat for Futures Studies. 1978, p. 26. The quaJity classification A-1 are not strictly thermodynamic but are user oriented. 366 THE PROJECTIONS Ele;ctr icity supply 189 TWIN Losses 21 TWh supplied Uses used 168 Quality Industry Transport- Others ation Hydropower 65 Windpower 30 146[-126 73- 73 A Electricity, 12 61 lights, etc. Solar cells 50 20 Aquatic energy I Industrial 0 8 6 Electricity, 8 com 6 bustion chemical Biomass total 351 processes co-generation 245 C Stationary 45 Biomass sources: engines 60 24 12\ Energy 21 6 80 D Transportation 5 75 plantations 260 Fuel cells Marine plantations 20' 20 77 55 60 E Process heat 60 > I OOOOC Bork, etc. 36 49 23 Forest waste 22 Methanol 30- 25 F 500-10000C 25 production 37 14- Straw 13 and reed 8 568 G 100-5000C 68 c i t heat g J Waste, etc. 5 Dist 7 CO. n ratio 21* 24@4 H < I 00-C 24 2 Solar heating 71 67 105 1 Space 17 88 TOTAL supplied Heat TOTAL used _,@S_ hewing 264 75 .149 Figure 13-16, The Solar Sweden energy system for the year 2015. The supply from renewable sources and the amounts from each are given on the left. The end use of energy is divided into energy quality categories A through I on the right. The linkage between supply and use is shown in the center of the figure. Numbers indicate the energy (in TWh =I 011 watt-hours) represented by each- line. (From "Solar Sweden," Stockholm, 1978, p. 32) A is great because of the low intensity of solar ra- Finally, the Solar Sweden report acknowledges diation in Sweden. It is estimated that approxi- conflicts of interest concerning the 3 million hec- mately 3 million hectares would be needed, tares that would be needed for energy plantations. mainly for energy plantations. As now conceived, The other sectors most interested in utilizing the the plantations would need to be heavily fertil- same areas would probably be the forest industry ized, particularly with nitrogen. Methods of con- and recreation. The forest industry in Sweden cur- trolling damage from game animals, rodents, rently uses approximately 23 million hectares. fungi, and insects would also be needed. The en- Wind power, etc., might meet with resistance vironmental problems of managing large-scale from those who own recreational houses near the energy plantations-and ecologically acceptable plants. Therefore, an important question is how management techniques-are discussed in two Swedish society should balance the interests of related Swedish reports. forest industry, recreation, and energy production -ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 367, in the future. The report concludes that these in- of soft path options by establishing a Standing.. terests can be balanced and conflicts resolved with Committee on Soft Technology under the R&D, farsighted planning, Coordinating Councilt and by initiating. a.smallw; Soft Energy Studies in Canada. Canada has also grants program for several studies. Th .ese studies' given thought to soft energy scenarios for its fu- are listed and described briefly in Table 13-40. The DOE-S onsored California Distributed tures" and has examined the possibilities for en- IR ergy plantations. The Canadian Ministry of Energy, Energy Study' is probably the most detailed ' and Mines, and Resources, in its Tree P. ower report, "2 thorough soft path analysis now available. The assessed the energy potential of forest biomass in study analyzes hypothetical future energy systems Canada for three technologies: (1) direct electric- for the State of California in the year 2025. As'. ity generation or cogeneration, (2) conversion to suming a doubling of population, a tripling of total methanol, and (3) low Btu gasification. Costs economic activity, and a quadrupling of energy were established, where possible. The Canadian prices by 2025, the study reaches four important forest resources are large, and the report notes conclusions for the State: that data on the extent of Canadian, forest re- 1 . It is possible to achieve a balance between en- sources are "severely lacking." Using various es- ergy demand and energy supply only through timates of the resource, the report estimates that strict attention to conservation for uildings, the total annual productivity of the forest is about * roved efficiencies of end-use appliances, 'in 400 X 101 ODt (oven-dried metric tons), equiv- anS improved efficiencies in industry. alent in energy to 8 x 10"' joules. The present 2. It is possible, in purely technical terms, to Canadian wood harvest of 51, x 106 ODt for all come quite close to operating the postulated purposes has an energy content of about I x 10 advanced, post-industrial society in California joules. The report concludes: using indigenous, sustainable resources. 96 * 3. The environmental impacts of certain -soV The medium term to 1990 will realize more forest technologies-notably increased end-use effi. energy but will require changes in harvesting tech- ciency, active and passive solar heatin and nology and forest management ractice as well as cooling with individual building or neiglibor-;. development of conversion anfend use technol- hood units, fuel production from biomass in, ogies. the form of wastes, and dispersed on-site wind Over the longer term to 2025, the extensive generators-will prove markedly smaller than' forest and energy plantations could provide a those of virtually all of the traditional '"haid" large fraction of the carbon based fuel require- technologies, as well as smaller than those of ments. However a development program includ- the more centralized technologies for 4aJ st"@ ing extensive environmental assessment of the ing r'enewables.'" impacts of such large scale use will be needed. 4. To achieve a distributed [soft] -ener Y. outcome For example, the effect of collecting forest residue which is approximately that desctited [in the in the medium term and of plantations in the California study by a time close,tb 2025.'Ite;; longer term could be to strip the soil of nu- quires that implementation begin almost' Iat trients. 893 once. U.S. Studies. In the U.S., the Department of Energy has indicated its interest* in consideration While the California Distributed Energy Study,.: is the only detailed soft path study now a'vAilab1,e,,-, *The DOE interest in what it terms "small-scale, appropriately a number.of studies have examined aspects of a distributed technology" was expressed most clearly at a public soft path for the whole of the U.S. The findings: briefing on January 26, 1978, in Washington. The official tran- and conclusions of approximately 40 related t'; A-' script of this briefing (published as DOE Rok in support of S P... : Small-Scale Appropriately Distributed Technology, DOE Of- ies have been drawn together by the Council. on, fice of Consumer Affairs, Aug. 1978) is available from the Environmental Quality (CEQ) in a recent report. National Technical Information Service. The specific'program- that compares the hard and soft paths for.'i.he matic efforts reported in the briefing are summarized in Table United States. I Some of the majdr'findings re-' 13-4. ported by CEQ are as follows: tAs of August 1978, it was established that the Standing Com- mittee would be chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Con- servation and Solar Applications, and that the Committee There is now clear evidence that the nited would have representatives from the DOE Offices of Energy States can maintain a healthy econorny. Without' Technology, Energy Research, Environment, and Policy and the massive increases in primary energy called Evaluation (p. 144 of the briefing cited in the previous note). for under the hard path. As of this writing (March 1979), no Committee members had been appointed, and the Committee's purpose had not been Recent macroeconomic analyses indicate' that resolved. there is a more loose and flexible linkage:be- 368 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 13-40 U.S. Department of Energy Studies Underway as of August 1978 to Examine "Soft Path" Options Subject Responsible or Title DOE Office Budget Description Small-Grants Conservation@ and $3 million (FY 78) This program provides small grants (up to $50,000) for conser- Program Solar $8 million (FY 79) vation and solar efforts. The $3 million pilot program started in Region 9 and was heavily over subscribed. Approximately 1,100 grant requests were received; approximately 100 were funded. The budget has now been increased to $8 million for all 10 federal regions. A preliminary report on the effectiveness of the grants has been prepared., Appropriate Policy and Evalua- $250,000 Contract to Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., for an Technology tion engineering notebook describing the technical and economic Characterization aspects of "appropriate," "soft," and "transitional" technolo- gies. A draft has been circulated for review at DOE, but as Of March 1979, the report was not publicly available." "California Case Policy and Evalua- $700,000 This study, conducted jointly by the Lawrence Berkeley Lab, Study: tion oratory and the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, is probably Decentratized the most thorough and detailed examination of a "soft path" Energy Systems" option for a specfic region-California. The DOE preface tp the study indicates that it was undertaken largely as a response to "Energy Strategy- ,The Road Not Taken," by Amory B. Lov@' ins (Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1976). Two reports and many sup@ porting documents have been produced.c Further'work on this topic has been proposed by the two laboratories' in'v`olved, buti DOE, as of March 1979, was not willing to fund additional work. "Any Town USA" Policy and Evalua- $240,000 SRI International was to provide a study on fiow:"a "typical" tion American town might look under a soft path solar future. The study was completed in 1977 but was never published or publicly released by DOE. A limited number of copies of the report are available directly from SRI International.' Energy Futures: Policy and Evalua- $500,000 This study at the Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge As- Solar and Nuclear tion sociated Universities, has two objectives: (1) to project the con- Alternatives tribution that solar energy might make by the year 2020; (2) to investigate how far nuclear development could continue if all additional reactors were located.on sites where nuclear reactors are already located or under construction. DOE representatives report that the contractor was unable to develop the solar por- tion of the study to any extent; the contractor reports that. DOE lost interest in the solar portion of the study. In any event, as of 'March 19.79, a nuclear report was available, but the solar report was incomplete.' Overview of Soft Environment Not applicable This subject was ultimately subsumed under "Alternative En- Energy Paths and ergy Futures" below. Decentralized Energy Systems in the United States Development of Energy Technology $500,000 (FY 78) As a part of a longer study, contractors were to work with local Community Level $250,000 (FY 79)',communities to develop "self-assessments of solar futures." As Technology of March 1979, one contrictor had started work, and Requests Assessments for Proposals (RFPs) are pending. No report was publicly avail- able,at that time, but one report prepared under the program may be obtained from another source! Alternatives Energy Environment $170,000 This work was contracted to the Argone National Laboratories Futures and in turn 'subcontracted to the Center for Energy Studies i@ I the Department of Industrial Engineering. The work was done by faculty and students as a part of Industrial Engineering Course 235 at Stanford University. As of March 1979, no report was publicly available from DOE, but a report was expected to be available from Stanford.1 ENVIRONMENT PROJ ECTIONS -369 TABLE 1340 (cont.) Subject Responsible . , , . . . - p. I or Title DOE Office Budget Description Less Developed International Affairs $1,600,000 This joint DOE/State Department program of cooperative as- Countries sistance to selected developing countries is intended to provide a complete and objective energy assessment, including 'all the basic data and information needed for the development of an energy plan for the country being analyzed. A wide range of energy options-both nuclear and nonnuclear-are considered with emphasis given to employing indigenous resources. An as- sessment of Egyptian energy options is now complete and has been very well received by Egypt and international development an ,d lending institutions.' Areport on Peru is in progress,.and five other reports are being considered. Source: U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Consumer Affairs, DOE Role in *The nuclear report is M. J. Ohanian et al., Feasibiliq of a Nuclear Citing Policv, 9upport of Small- 'Scale Appropriately Distributed Technology, Official Transcript Based on Existing Cites, Oak Ridge: Institute for Energy Analysis. Nov. 1979. As of Public Briefing and Addendum on Jan. 26, 1978. CONF-780132. Washington; of May 1979. the Institute was still planning seven topical reports on solar energy: National Technical Information Service. Aug. 197.8. p. 144. Budgets and desctip- two were final. three were being revised following review, one was under a new lions of studies are ba@cd on information Provided by the responsible DOE offices review, one was still being Written. The final reports are as follows: R. W. Gilmer @md DOE contractors; and R. E. Meunier. "Electric Utilities and Solar Energy: The Service Contract in a New Social Context," Oak Ridge Associated Universities. Apr. 1979: final re- ',DOE San Francisco Operations Office. Appropriate Energy Technology Pro- ports being revised at Oak Ridge Associated Universities are-(with dates ofdraft): gram, Summary of Profects: Appropriate Energy Technology, Pilot Regional Pro- R. W. Gilmer "The Social Control of Energy: A Case for the Promise of Decen- gram, 1978 (available from Appropriate Energy Technology. DOE. 1333 Broadway. tralized Solar Technologies." Apr. 2. 1979; W. D. Devine. Jr.. "Energy Account. Oakland, Calif. 94612)@ DOE Div. of Buildings and Community Systems. Assistant ing for Solar and Alternative Energy Sources." Jan. 1979@ D. B. RciSICT and W. Srcretaty for Conservation and Solar Applications. "Appropriate Technology: A D. Devine. Jr., "Total Costs of Energy Services." Mar. 1979. The following draft Fact Shcet,". Washington, 1977; "Report to Congress on Appropriate Technology is being reviewed: D. A. Boyd, "The Stochastic Sun: identifying the Recoverable Pilot Regional Program," undated, unpublished (available from, Jerry.D. Duane. Resource." Mar. 1979@ DOE. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Conservation and Solar Applications). f C. T. Donovan et al.. Energy Self-SufficiencY in Northampton. Massachusetts. b Edward Blum, DOE. Office of ihe Assistant Secretary for Policy and Evaluation, Jan. 3. 1979 (available from A. S. I(Tass, School of Natural Science. Hampshire personal communication, Mar. 1979. College, Amherst, Mass. 01002). ' Paul P. Craig and M. D. Levine. "Distributed Ene ,rgy Systems in California's 9 Grant Ireson et al., Alternative Energy Futures: An Assessment of Options for Future: Issues in, Transition." Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Jan. 16. 1979 U.S. Society to 2025, Institute for Energy Studies. Stanford University. forthcom- al"'. ing, 1979. 'VJ.hn Reu'yI Ct: al., Solar Energy in America's.Future: A Preliminary Assessment, b DOE Developing Countries Energy Program. Egypt-United States Cooperative Menlo Park, Calif.: SRI International, Mar. 1977. Energy Assessment. Washington, 1978. 5 vols. tween energy use and the economy than pre- the hard and soft path environmental impacts. viously thought. . I This comparison is made on the basis of two en- -,,.,These studies generally conclude that lowen- ergy supply futures I (see Table 13-41). * Future ergy growth is not only consistent with contin- I, with a total demand of 85 quads (1 quad = 101-1 ued economic expansion and a high standard of Btu) reflects a strong, sustained commitment to F.ii living but can also have a positive effect on em- conservation (higher energy productivity) and the ployment and can provide an important weapon use of renewable energy sources. In Future 11, in the fight against inflation. energy demand grows by 1.9 percent per year Muc h of the Ienergy s Iaved by a. departure from reaching 120 quads by 2000. the hard path would be realized in the form of The CEQ report compares the environmental reduced imports of oil and natural gas for which impact of these two energy futures as follows: Americans pay a high price both economically The most important difference in energy supply and in terms of national security. Improvements between the two futures described above arise istin U'.& balance of payments can be anticipated from the need to place great emphasis on coal and 'et-principally due 'to reduced Idollar outflows for nuclear in Future 11. In the high-growth future 0"direct purcha Ises of foreign fue .Is. these two sources collectively supply 2. l'times as 41 Mich energy (an additional 34 c s) in the year The CEQ conclusion in short, is that'the 2000 as they would in the low- ' I energy future. Al- United States can do well, indeed prosper, on though it is not feasible to describe completely 'much less energy, than has been commonly sup- ,in osed. *The CEO report is not a true comparison of hard and soft But what about the environmental impacts of paths for the U.S. because both of the energy supply futures contains the same solar component (19 quads). For a true hard/ a departure from the hard path? The CEQ report soft comparison for the U.S., it would be necessary to replace ,also provides one of the more complete national the 19 quads of solar in Future If with an additional 19 quads comparison now available of scenarios related to of coal or nuclear. 370 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 13-41 ergy requirements without harm to general eco- Energy Supply in 1977 and Two Supply Scenarios nomic development. The energy savings for the for the Year 2000 two cases are,illustrated in Figures 13-17 and 13- 18. Overall, the study concluded that the reduced Quads (10" Btu) of PrimarY Fuels energy growth, while requiring somewhat larger 1975 2000 investments over the next 15 years, produced a Future I Future 11 Oil and gas 56.5 40 46 TABLE 13-42 Solar' 4.2 19 19 Nuclear 2.7 8 18 Relative Environmental Impacts of Low- and Coal 14.1 18 37 High-Energy Growth Futures Total 77.5 85 120 Source: Council on Environmental Quality. The Good News About Energy.Wash- 1977 2000 ing,on: Government Printing Office. 1979. p. 20. ; The lar category includes all renewable energy sources. The 4.2 quads includes Future I Future 11 .8 qusods from biomass. which is usually not included in national energy statistics. Coal production (millions Of tonslyear)' 613 782 1,609 Cumulative coal mined, 1977- the details of these two futures, specific, impor- 2000 (millions of tons)' - 16,000 25,500 Cumulative area strip-mined, tant environmental impacts related to the addi 1977-20M (square miles)' 1,200 2.ooo, tional use of coal and nuclear energy in Future 11 Cumulative area affected by have been estimated and presented in Table 113- subsidence (square miles)d -- 1,400-3,30(r 2.304-53W 42). Although the total impacts of all these Number of coal power plants treniJs*is* highly uncertain, it is nonetheless clear (nominal 1,100 MW)' 200 243 500 that a national-indeed, global-policy empha- Number of nuclear power plants (nominal, 1, 100 MW)' 43 135 304 S'zin, energy conservation @(i.e., increased pro- ductIvity in the energy sector) and benign sources] Area required for transmission to lines for new coal and nu- will allow the world more flexibility and time clear plants (square miles)" 3,9W 16,500 maneuver in the event of incipient, adverse de- Radioactive tailings to supply velopments. 602 uranium for 1977-2000 (mil- Low Energy Study for Denmark. Domestic lion tons)' 400 800 Volume of low-level radioac- nonrenewable energy sources are limited in Den- tive wastes generated, 1977- mark. In the face of rapidly rising energy costs, 2000 (millions of cubic feet)' 34 66 the country has been considering a variety of Op- Spent fuel generated, 1977- tions for reducing its needs for foreign oil. Much 2000 (thousands of tonsy 61 120 Total spent fuel generated over of the energy analysis in Denmark has assumed lifetimes of plants con- that little departure from traditional energy growth structed through the year rates could be accomplished without serious eco- 2000 (thousands of tons)" 121 274 nomic implications. A 1976 study, sponsored Source: Council on Environmental Quality, The Good News About Energv. Wash- jointly by the Niels Bohr Institute and the Inter- ington: Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 23-24. national Federation of Institutes for Advanc Nominal tons at 23 million Btu each. , ed Assuming linear growth in production. Study, ' found much more flexibility in the GNP- Assuming (1) one-half of coal is mined in the West, one-half in the Midwest and East: and (2) all of Western coal and one-half of rest is strip-mined. Area energy relationship than had been assumed in the disturbed: 50 acres per million tons in the Weit and IM acres elsewhere, See past. EnergvlEnvironment Fact, Book, DOEXPA, Dec. 1977. p. 60. I d A;suming 230 to,529 acres affected per ton of coal mined. depending on mining The Danish study examines the economic con- techniques. See Energy Alternatives: A Comparative Anal 'vsis. University of Okla- sequences of two scenarios out to 2005. One scen- homa, Science and Public POHCY@P!`Ogram. May 1975. pp, 1-56. Assumes 70 percent of coal will continue to be used by electric utilities.capacity ario assumes a continuation of the traditional fi,@ors will average 55 percent and individual plant efficiencies 35 percent. f Assumes capacity factors of 60 percent and average efficiencies of 33 percent. growth in energy use (3-5 per cent per year); the 8 Based on an average value of 17,188 acres per Sigawatt of capacity. See Energy other assumes a reduced growth (under 1.5 per and the Environment: Electric Power, CEO, Aug. 1973, p. 42. note 8. I' Assuming 0. 1 percent uranium ore, 0.25 percent tailings assay. and annual cent per year). In the traditional-growth scenario, loading of 30 tons of fuel per reactor per year. energy is used more or less traditionally. In the I Based on an annual volume of 16,500 cubic feet per ptant-year. See "Report to the President by the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management." reduced-growth scenario, major efforts are made Oct. 1978, p. "fdrafrl. Assuming 30 tons discharged per reactor per year. to increase the thermodynamic efficiency with I Assuming 30 tons discharged per reactor per year and 30-year plant lifetimes. which the energy is used. 13,108 sq km. 5,180 sq km. The study found that over a 15-year period .03,62&.8,547 sq kin. Denmark could make major reductions in its en- 5,957-13.727sq km. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 371 11-. Enemy- 2. Accummillilled 3. Measures contritinung b rinluced 4. Investments "Vimp for Ute "WInGs in ftnal inneirily defflamiti. in eneirgy PW 1990 expems"t"s in consw"1110111 Wied 1977-90 "=$Wes 1977-90 Total 72 mill. Total Total Gcal 36 billion Dkr. 22 billion Dkr Billion Dkr. Billion Mr. mill Gcal mill. I of oil (1975prices) (1975prices) 10 7 35 ELECTRICITY 5 billion Dkr. 20 E=TWWy 4 billion ft. 1UC=ITY 60 Ismill.Gcal 6 30 ELECTRICITY - Restricted use for heating purposes. imposed standards for electr. appliances. Rules for operating integrated heating and cooling installations. 50 5. 25 15 HEATING Improved insulation. reduction of ventilation 40 4 20 HEATING losses. automatic temperature regulation. - - lowering of roomtemperature in offices e1c. - 21 billion Mr. during off hours, heat recycling equipment. HEATOO N EATM 16 billion W. 37 mill. Gcal 10 ..30 3 15 PRODUCTION Improved processes. heat recovery, automated controls. Insulation of green-houses. 20 2 10 PRODUCTION 6 billion DW. TRANSPORTS 10 N I Improved utilization of transport rapacity in 12 mill. Geal 5 goods transports - Higher taxes on cars with poor fuel econGinii - speed limits (These measures require no investments). TRANSPORTS PRODUCTION TRANSPORTS 4 billion Mr. 2 billion Dkr. 0 5 mill. Gcal Figure 13-17. Survey of energy savings in Denmark, 197@790; "mill Gcal" millions of gigacalories = 10's calories; Dkr = Danish kroner. (Sven Bj6mholm, Energy in Denmark, 1990 and 2005, Neils Bohr Insfilizae, 1976, p. 34) considerable overall advantage to the economy- for energy conservation in the U.K. The Insti- also to the reliability of Danish energy supplies tute's study uses the official U.K. Department of ,and to the environment. Energy estimates of GNP growth* and examines Low-Energy Study for the United Kingdom. In For the next 10-15 years GNP is assumed to grow as fast as, London, the International Institute for Environ- or faster than during the 1960s. By 2025 GNP roughly doubles I jo ment and Development has studied the potential in one case; ittrebles in another. 372 THE PROJECnONS Mill Gcal YEAR 2005' MILL. TONS OF OIL' 600 60 TRADITIONAL 539 500 50 Electri- REDUCED city 400 TEM 1990 404 197 40! TRADITIONAL 336 EL 141 300 REDUCED EL 30 264 109 Heating YEM 1975 .EL 163 200 192 91 Heat 114. 20 EL 46 Heat 120 Produc- Heat 83 tion 100 Heat 86 Pr. 72 94 _10., Pr. 54. Trans Tr.53 Tr. 77 ports 85 0 Figure, 13-18. 'Traditional and'reduced demand for energy in Denmark, 1990 and 2005, showing. quantities of fuel by type of demand. Fuel consumption is calculated by assuming the losses in the fuel conversion and distribution system that applied in 1975. (Sveh Bj6rnholm, Energy in Denmark, 1990 and 2005, Neils Bohr Institute, 1976, p. 35) alternative strategies for supplying. the needed that the gradual reduction assum&d-may occur energy: The study assumes a serie's'of policies without legislati I on). encouraging efficient, use of energy: These in- The study's conclusions (in.th,e authors' words) clude: are as follows: � Improved thermal performance of new residen- In 2000 the U.K. couldbe entirely self-sufficieni tial dwellings,@ offices, public-sector buildings, on North Sea oil and gas even oncentral estii such as'schools and*hospitals, and industrial mates of reserves. buildings' (by tightening the Ibuilding, regula- Coal production need be only some 120 million tiolis); [metrk tons] a year, far below the 170, million � Energy performance standards for cars (and target in the .[U.K.] "Flan for Coal." possibly also light-'goods., vehicles) to accelerate From 1976-2000 we have assumed the construc- and ensure the timely implementation of tech- tion of only 4.5-6.5 GW [gigawatts] of nuclear nical developments already under way inthe capacity, or three to five average-sized stations'i motor 'industry; compared to 30 GW in the, current'Department - Energy performance standards for major house- of Energy reference forecast If more -were built - hold electrical goods and cooking- stoves to'en- there would be such a surplus of generating ca- sure the. introd 'uctioh of relatively simple, low pacity that a choice would have to be made be@ NTr32 I cost improvements (such as better insulation) tween leaving nuclear stations idleand reducing and similar standards for lighting; coal production to uncomfortable -Jow levels. � Possible -legislation to reduce the use of oil in Over the same -period, only 26-:-30 GW of gefi- heating homes, offices, and public-sector build- erating capacity of all kinds need be'built"(mos? ingsi a& welLas, in industrialized boilers ("pos- of it replacing existing plant) compared 'to 81 sible legislation," because the authors believe GW in the Energy Department's reference fori-' ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 373 cast. The saving in. capital investment would be generation of electricity and the production of around f-26-30,000 million for the plant alone, synthetic fuels). Options at the soft path end of or well over L1,000 million a year. We would the spectrum lead to a relatively efficient energy be most surprised if this did not greatly exceed sector, capable of meeting end-use needs with less the costs of all the energy conservation meas- primary energy imputs than possible with options ures we have assumed for all sectors and fuels. near the hard end of the spectrum. Every option After 2000 the only significant fuel shortfalls are along the hard-soft spectrum produces social and in North Sea oil, taking the central estimate of environmental side effects. While most studies reserves.. This "gap" reaches an.annual 36-47 suggest that options toward the soft end, of the million @ [metric tons], of oil by 2025 in the Low spectrum produce impacts less serious than op- and High cases respectively,,or roughly half re-@ tions toward the hard end, the soft options too cent leV61s' of oil imports. It could be filled from have their effects. The Solar Sweden report dis- severat sources, either from the large quantities cussed above candidly acknowledges concern over of crud 6,bil that should even then be flowing in intensive energy plantations, and the brief men- world irad e or by the import. of liquid fuels made tion in the report of the International Institute for from crops grown in the' tropical belts .... Environment and Development of "the import of I . I liquid fuels made from crops grown in the tropical � Coal production need be only 128-148 million [metric tons] in 2025, or well below the present belts" might involve some significant environ- target for 2000. mental implications outside the U.K. � Electricity output can be met by building only It is now widely recognized and accepted that th6 largely undesirable side effects of energy-sec- 6 GW of nuclear capacity in the first quarter of the next century. Nuclear power in our projec- tor development must be taken into account in tions thus becomes a peripheral issue and could the selection and development of energy futures, but it is not yet widely understood that these side be abandoned as an option if-for whatever rea- effects-rather than resource or narrow economic son-it became prudent to,do so. We have, how- de . on"efine the energy dilemma in the consi rati ever, assumed a continuing nuclear programme long term. As noted in the DOE-sponsored Cal- at a "tick over" level sufficient to keep the in- ifornia Distributed, Energy Study: dustry alive as an insuran ce measure. The fast breeder reactor and the plutonium fuel . The energy problem resides fundamentally in the cycle, with all their risks of nuclear weapon pro- fact that the relation between energy and well- being is two-sided. The application of energy as liferation and public opposition, could be shelved a productive in t to the economy, yielding de- indefinitely. sired goods an%u services, contributes to well being; the environmental and social costs of get- Commercial Energy in Industrial Societies-- ting and using energy subtract from it. At some knvironmenW Prospects - level of energy use', and for = Tix of tech- The DOE projections and the hard and soft nologies of enerfy I increases in energy supply wil prosuupeyincrernental social and Oath studies reviewed here all suggest that'ma- environmental costs greater than the incremental jor-perhaps even massive-@--changes iin the'world's economic benefits-that is growth [in energy con- commercial energy economy will inevitably be in sumption begins to do more harm than good. progress well before 2000 and that these changes This level &an be said to define a rational "limit in the energy economy could well bring with them to growth," as distinct from a strictly physical one. major environmental. consequences throughout That such a level, beybnd'which energy growth the world. The type and,magnitude of the envi- no lohfqr pays, exists in principle for"any mix of ronmental impacts depends largely on the choice techno o&ies of supply and end-use is easily shown of technologies to be employed in the@energy sec- from basic economics and physical science; pre- tor of the economy to provide energy for end-use dicting its magnitude exactly is much harder, the needs, i.e., the production of goals and services. more so because social costs even less quantifiable As already noted, there is a spectruni,of tech- than environmental ones may dominate. Lovins evidently believes that the United States is alread nological options open for the future of the energy y sector. The spectrum ranges from the soft path near or beyond the point, given the "hard" energy (emphasizing both efficient use .ofI energy in the technologies on which it relies, where further growth hurts more than it helps. Whether he is @nergy sector itself and. renewable. forms of en- right or wrong,about exactly where we are now, prgy, especially solar, for primary sources) to the however, or in specific judgments about the merits hard path (emphasizing large increases in primary of "hard" versus "soft" technologies, it is clear energy production, especially coal.. and. nuclear that energy policy for.the long term should be V4@ THE PROJECTIONS shaped iby.'awareness that social-environmental basis of the analyses 'now available, only two costs, not exhaustion of resources, will limit the things can be said. The first is that the more ef- amount (if human W.ell-bein# derivable from en- ficient energy sector produced by soft path options ergy. axi iz n t is uantity will require striv- leads to a need for less primary energy. The sec- ifig',1br--,,te6hnolo 'es energy supply with low ond is that, to the extent that primary energy pro- social andenViron e tal costs per unit of energy duction leads to undesirable social and delivered, and.fostering patterns and technologies of. energy end-use that squeeze from each such environmental impacts and to the extent that soft unit. the @ maximum contribution to human well- path technologies are less damaging to the envi- being. ronment, a shift toward the soft path options can This perspective, then, elevates environmental be expected to reduce these impacts.* and sociaf characteristics to the top of the list of Systematic, comprehensive and objective anal- criteria used t6 select supply technologies from yses of alternative energy options are urgently the menu of genuinely long-term options-fission needed., These studies will not be done easily or breeder reactors, fusion, direct and indirect har- quickly, but in their absence it may be difficult to nessing of solar flows, and possibly some forms obtain public support of any choice of energy pol- of geothermal energy. It rationalizes the possi- icy. As time goes on, the situation (as Fig. 13-12 bility that society will choose to pay more (in suggests) will only become more urgent, and op- economic terms) for a more benign energy source tions may become more restricted. Lovins, for than for a less benign one. And it argues for usin&, example, argues that some options will be effec- as a criterion for selecting short-term and transi- tively foreclosed by delay. ' (There have been tion energy sources, the extent to which these sharp exchanges between Lovins and his critics on promote and facilitate the transition to a longer term. energy future built on more benign sources this point. ") It is clear, however, that the world's and efficient end-use. remaining petroleum resources need to be in- Giveii-'a perspective that places environmental v ested wisely in infrastructure, and capital needs and social impacts at .the heart of the energy pre- to be well matched to genuinely long-term energy dicament rather than on the periphery, it becomes options. The choice of both the long-term options essential to compare the impacts produced by al- and the transitional approaches can be facilitated ternAtive energy options systematically, compre- by further attention to, and analysis of, the as- hensively, an objectively. sociated social and environmental impacts. The environmental and social impacts of alter- nit,iVe energy options for the next two decades Non6mmercial Fuels halve not been compared "systematically, com- The preeminent noncommercial fuel through- pr6hensively, and objectively" for the U.S., let out the. world is wood. (Charcoal, also important, alone the-world. )AThile these ideas will never be fully achieved, progress is being made and should New York: .McGraw-Hill, 1977) and the works of the World continue. For the U.S., the DOE-MITRE study,* Energy Conference (see especially World Energy Commission DOE-sponsored California Distributed, Energy of the World Energy Conference, World Energy: Looking Study, and the CEQ comparison of alternative Ahead to 2000, New York: IPC Science and Technology Press, 1978). Neither is appropriate. The WAES report deals with energy futures-all three summarized above-are only a part of the world and concludes its treatment of the the most current (but still highly inadequate) ef- environment in less than two page Is. The WEC, as noted ear- forts. On, the world level, the primary analyses lier, is only now beginning to consider the environmental im- now available that address energy-related envi- plications of energy sector development (Robert J. Raudebaugh, ronmental and social impacts are a few very brief Executive Director of the WEC's U.S. National Committee, rIeports by the U.N. Environm personal communication, Feb. 15, 1979). ent Programme *Additional analyseso.n these points are becoming available. and.the works by Lovins already cited.t On the These include the report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School (Robert Stobaugh and David Yergin, eds., Energy Future, New York: Random House, 1979) and the *Since this text was drafted, DOE released its second National forthcoming report of the Demand and Conservation Panel Energy Plan (NEP-11), which includes an appendix on envi- of the. National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Nuclear ronmental impacts (DOE Office of the Assistant Secretary for and Alternative Energy Systems (discussed in part in "U.S. En@ironment,. National Energy Plan 11, Appendix.- Environ- Energy Demand: Some Low Energy Futures," Science, Apr. me Trends and impacts, Washington, May 1979). The ap- 14 1978, pp. 142-52). @Both reports point to the advantages 0.endix contains information quite similar to the DOE-MITRE of'an efficient energy sector of the economy and to the econ- siud@, plus an 'analysis of the environmental implications of ornies of. conservation. This last point is made effectively in !Pedfic NEP-11 initiatives. Energy: The Case for Conservation by Denis Hayes (World- tSeveral persons reviewing the manuscript of this Study sug- watch Paper 4, Washington: Worldwatch Institute, Jan. 1976). gestid adding to these the report of the Workshop on Alter- All three reports support the general points made in the text native Energy Strategies (Energy: Global Prospects 1985-2000, above. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 375 is derived from wood.) Only in the developing approximately 56 percent of the total energy con- countries, however, does firewood continue to be sumption in India and 58 percent of the total in a major fuel; 90 percent of the worlds fuelwood Africa. Commercial energy-coal, gas, oil, elec- consumption is in the LDCs."" Worldwide, the tricity, and charcoal-is used almost exclusively energy derived from wood amounted to 13.3 X by the wealthiest 20 percent of the people in poor 10" Btu in 1974, roughly the same amount as the countries.61' total from hydroelectric sources. "I Dried dung It was once hoped that fossil fuels (especially (providing an estimated 1.7 X 10" Btu in 1974) kerosene) would reduce fuelwood and charcoal and crop residues (providing an estimated I x use, thereby decreasing deforestation pressures. 10" Btu in 1974) are the other major noncom- The rapid increases in fossil fuel prices since 1973, mercial fuels. '" They are important in densely however, have largely eliminated this hope. The populated regions, such as northern India's Gan- rate of growth in LDC kerosene consumption has getic Plain, and in the treeless Andean mountains been slowed significantly, and the demand for in South America. Thus the noncommercial fuels-- fuelwood and charcoal is thought to be rising rap- wood, charcoal, dried dung, and crop residues- idly, in spite of percentage increases in the prices are all organic fuels. of these fuels that are as large or larger than the Statistics concerning noncommercial, organic percentage increases in the price of fossil fuels. fuels are incomplete, due to the inherent diffi- Switching from kerosene to fuetwood has been culties in collecting such data, and to the relative reported in parts of Africa"s and is probably oc- lack of attention given these forms of energy by curring in many other poor LDC areas where fuel- governments and world organizations. The United wood is still relatively plentiful. As a result, the Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) demand for fuelwood and charcoal in the years has attempted over the past decade to survey ahead may grow as fast as-or even faster than- these fuels even partially. LDC populations. It is not possible to make a precise distinction The primary environmental consequences of between commercial and noncommercial fuels. fuelwood consumption are those associated with Large quantities of firewood are marketed com- deforestation, described earlier in this chapter. In mercially, and the statistics now available on the paragraphs that follow, a few additional en- wood consumption include wood converted to ergy-specific impacts associated with fuelwood are commercial charcoal (estimated at 5 percent of presented. The discussion then turns to the im- the total fuelwood consumption) along with non- pacts of the use of dung and organic residues for commercial firewood. Dung is also sold to some fuel.impacts which are serious for soil productiv- extent, so that its noncommercial designation is ity. The discussion concludes with a consideration not entirely accurate. Furthermore, crop residues rf the prospects for controlling the environmental are increasingly being used along with animal impacts of noncommercial fuels. manure in the production of methane gas on a commercial basis, so that the noncommercial cat- Fuelwood egory is not precise in this case either. Although Today there is an inverse relationship between the discussion that follows focuses on the non- the level of economic development and the use commercial uses of these organic fuels, there is of fuelwood. The poorest countries or regions use a discernible trend toward commercialization. the most fuelwood; it is the principal source of Wood, dung, and crop wastes are used through- fuel for the, poorest families in these regions. Do- out the LDCs as a source of energy for the prep- mestic: energy requirements in developing coun- aration of meals and for heating. An estimated tries range from a low of 0.2 in-' (cubic meters) 1.0-1.5 billion persons"" (more than a quarter of of wood per person per year burned in open cook- the total world population) use fuelwood as their fires in tree-short South Asia, 619 to a medium of primary energy source for cooking. Most of these 0.5 ml in the warm tropics and to a high of over persons are located in rural areas where firewood 2M3 per person per year in the colder uplands, has traditionally been a free good. An additional where wood is burned. for both cooking and 100 million or more persons use dried dung and warmth.6" The average annual per capita con- crop wastes for, the same purpose. 615 sumption where wood is abundant is about 1 M3 Global estimates of the share of noncommercial (approximately 450 kg of wood),* but it drops to energy in the total energy picture in developing countries vary widely from a high of 70 percent *For comparison, a cord of wood (a common measure in the to a low of 30 percent. 61' It is known that these U.S.) is a pile measuring 4 x 4 x 8 feet (128 ft3 or 3.6 M3). fuels (wood, dung, and crop wastes) account for Therefore, I M3 of wood is less than 0.3 cord. 376 THE PROJEMONS less than 0. 5 in -in wood-poor areas such as China, fuelwood problem. Tree @ plantations established India, the N 'ear East, and North Africa. today will require atfeast 10 years of growth prior The demand for fuelwood in developing coun- to harvest, and growth rates are slow in the semi- 'tries is estimated (largely, on the basis of ' data and regions where scarcities are already critical. collected before the major oil price increases In the Sahel, annual production of wood in native started in 1973),to have been growing 1-2 percent scrub forests, on a, continuous basis, ranges from per year. Based on this growth rate., the FAO less than 0. 5 in' per hectare at. the desert's edge- projected in 1976 that consumption would reach or enough for'only one person's fuel needs-to 2 billion cubic meters annually.by the year.2000. " Iup to 5 in -per hectare in the less and belt adjacent In contrast, fuelwood consumption in developed to the wooded savanna.' Near the wooden sa- nations was failing at the rate of 6 percent per vanna, a hectare of well-tended forest could sat- year in 1975 and represented less than 1 percent isfy the fuel needs of a family of six or.more.11 of the total energy consumed by these coun- Since the region's remaining forest stock has not tries. I (This downward trend, however, may yet been measured, the extent of the present fuel- now have been reversed as a result of.the recent wood supply is not known, but local scarcities are rapid increases in the cost of fossil fuels.) In 1977 evidenced by the treeless landscapes around the FAO revised its estimate upwards to a 2.2 towns. The Club du Sahel* notes that where pop- percent annual increase in demand in LDCs and ulations exceed 25 persons per square kilometer, predicted that by 1994, there would be a fuelwood total deforestation is inevitable, and many areas shortage of 650 million cubic meters annually in of the Sahel have already surpassed this popula- wood- oor countries. ' For comparison, this fig- tion density." By the year 2000, the Club esti- . p ure is roughly one quarter of the year 2000 fuel- mates that total firewood consumption will increase wood consumption projected by the FAO. from the 1975 figure of 16 million to 33.5 million Wood is the only household fuel for most 'of cubic meters, including 9.8 million burned in cit- the rural families in the developing world, and ies.' To meet this demand it is calculated.that even urban families meet as much as 25 percent 150,000 hectares per year of forest plantations of their fuel needs with fuelwood .' However, would have to be established-50 times the pres- because of its high weight per unit fuel value, ent rate of 3,000 hectares per year.04 wood is seldom collected from farther away than The picture is not all bleak, however. Wood 10 kilometers and ordinarily is not transported by can be conserved through the use of more efficient road from beyond 50 kilometers. Therefore scarc- stoves. In many areas the potential for conser- ities tend to be local. Still, as scattered rural pop- vation exists for ample village woodlots. The con- ulations deplete, local wood resources, entire straints in most areas are more sociological than regions become treeless, and an increasing effort technical, though the difficulty of sociological con- must be exerted to find and carry wood to the straints is not to be underestimated. 635 home. In the and Sahel of Africa, the gathering of fuelwood has become a full-time job, requiring Charcoal in places 360 person-days per year per house- The manufacture and commercial use of char- hold.' Urban families, too far from collectible coal appears to be increasing in the LDCs, where wood, spend 20-30 percent of their income on it is used primarily for cooking and heating in wood in some West African cities. Large indus- rural and urban areas. Much of the increase is in tries involving trucks or animal carts exist to bring urban areas. The increasing use of charcoal in fuelwood into cities.' When demand is concen- cities is explained by a combination of factors: trated in large towns or cities, the surrounding increases in prices of kerosene, liquid gas, and areas become barren to a distance of as much as electricity; lack of fuelwood as deforestation ex- 50-100 kilometers. tends beyond distances from which it can be eco- FAO's annual shortfall of 650 million cubic nomically transported; and increasing urbanization meters of fuelwood by 1994 is an alarming pro- of LDC populations. I jection. It implies the reduction of essential fuel . Information on the production and use of char- consumption, expanded deforestation, increased coal is not routinely collected by many nations, wood prices and growin amounts of dung shifted and as a result the data now available are not from field to fireplace.L The fuelwood problem sufficient for making detailed projections. How- is every bit as great for the poor LDC rural dweller ever, the information that is available from sev- as is the problem of increased petroleum costs for the more affluent citizen of the developed world. An international voluntary association of nations, organized There are no panaceas or quick fixes, for the to mobilize assistance to drought stricken Sahelian states. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 377 eral countries indicate& increases in both the rate local surpluses or the cost of transporting - the of consumption and the price of charcoal in wood. LI)Cs."In Ghana, which has desert scrub, sa- The indirect environmental 'effects of charcoal' vanna woodlands, and.humid evergreen forests, use are more significant. Because charcoal is such charcoal consumption in 1975 was estimated at an attractive alternative fuel for urban uses, and over 280,000 tons, and use was growing at an es- because its manufacture is a simple and univer- timated, 2.7 percent per year. 6m Kenya's con- sally known technology, future conversion of for- sumption in 1972 was 310,000 tons, half of it- in ests and other vegetation to charcoal will continue cities, @and demand was growing at,7 percent per to be an important and probably increasing activ- 6A year. ' For the poor communities that ring cities ity in LDCs. Uncontrolled deforestation and its in Kenya, charcoal is now the major fueL In Moz- consequences. (described earlier in this chapter) ambique, 6,000 families earn their livelihood by' will therefore be a parallel and increasing result' supplying charcoal to the capital city Maputo. ' of intensified charcoal trade and manufacture. A Even in rural areas of East Africa, up to 50 per- related . social consequence will be a decline in cent of the people buy their charcoal* *"' In Sudan self-sufficiency among rural dwellers who will lose and Thailand, charcoal represents over 40 percent the natural vegetation they now exploit for mul-, of the wood consumed for fuel; in India, however, tiple purposes-medicine,- construction materials, its use is. relatively small. "'In general, the pattern tool Woods, food, livestock forage, vegetable appears to be one of an increasing trade in char- gums, etc.' The establishment of 1ast-growing@ coal in urban markets, particularly in low-income fuelwood plantations of such species as eucalyptus quarters, and an increasing amount of charcoal, will ensure a continuing supply of fuelwood, but manufacture. will not replace the numerous other uses of native While most charcoal is used for domestic.cook- vegetation. These environmental and related so- ing and hea:ting, Brazil, the world's largest char- cioeconomic consequences will be particularly coal producer, uses most. of its production for noticeable in the areas around large cities, out to smelting pig iron, 45 percent of which is smelted a distance of perhaps as much as 200 kilometers, with charcoal. Brazil burned 3.6 million tons of depending upon the cost of transport. If the land charcoal in smelters during 1978 and this figure is available and plantings can be encouraged and is expected to increase at, 10 percent per year, protected, large blocks of eucalyptus (or other doubling every 7 years.' In the iState of Minas fast-growing species such as pines or the acacia Gerais, where 56 smelters supply@ 85 percent of Leucaena) can be expected to replace the diverse, Brazil's, pig iron, virtually all of the,original 55 slower-growing native forests in the vicinity of million hectares of forest have - been removed, large cities. Otherwise, - the native forests near largely for charcoal production. At present rates cities may simply be removed and not replanted. of cutting, there will be no more savanna forest in Minas Gerais by 1982. ' To ensure a continuing supply of wood and charcoal, the Brazilian gov- Dung and Crop Residues as, Fuel ernment enacted a law in 1967 requiring wood- -Once fuetwood demands exceed forest produc- using industries to be self-sufficient in wood by tion,,a variety of stresses and changes begin. Arid 1982. A successful program of fiscal incentives regions have virtually no alternatives to fuelwood,- (now reduced) resulted in the, establishment of and after it is gone desertification is speeded.. In over 1.5 million hectares of eucalyptus by late more humid agricultural regions that have become 1978.'@s deforested, the, alternative openAo poor people The, actual combustion of charcoal fuel has is to turn @ to burning dung and crop -residues minimal direct environmental impact. It is cleaner- (stalks, hulls, etc.) for cooking and warmth. burning than wood or coal. Its sulfur content is The shift to dung and crop residues is already roughly one tenth that of even coking coal, mak- well advanced in- the treeless Gangetic Plain of ing it an ideal smelting fuel." It has twice the, India, Nepal, other parts of Asia, and the Andes caloric value of most air-dried wood, at less than of South America.' The FACI reports that in half the weight, and as a result it can be trans- 1970 India burned 68 million tons of. cow dung ported from much greater distances than wood. and 39 *million tons of vegetable waste, repre-- The carbonization process used,to make charcoal senting 35 percent of her total noncommercial - consumes some energy to drive off water and energy consumption. ' Worldwide ', an estimated other volatile substances, but dwood is used as 150-400 million tons of dung are burned for fuel, the energy source, it is energy that otherwise the -lower estimate being equivalent to 13 percent; probably would not be used or sold because of, of the amount of energy provided by firewood. 378 THE PROJECTIONS Dry dung has about the same caloric value as and plant wastes are fed into enclosed chambers wood per unit weight. "' of brick, concrete, or steel construction. Anaer- The burning of dung and crop residues is a dis- obic bacterial digestion of the organic matter pro- astrous loss. For the world's poor, these organic duces methane (CH4) and carbon dioxide (CO.), materials are the only sources of the nutrients the products of bacteria@ respiration. The envi- needed to maintain the productivity of farmlands. ronmental consequencesoof this growing form of It is the poorest people-the ones least able to energy production are generally quite positive. afford chemical fertilizers-who are now being The resulting sludge retains all of the mineral salts forced to burn their organic fertilizers. The com- and nitrogen (although little of the cellulose or bustion of dung and crop residues is equivalent carbohydrates) in the original material. Thus, the to burning food. One ton of cow dung contains fertilizing benefits of the organic wastes are re- enough nutrients to produce 50 kilograms of food tained in the sludge* while the energy value of grain, which in turn can feed one person for four the manure and crop residues is captured in the months."' The burning of almost 70 million tons form of methane gas. The energy value of the gas of cow dung in India wastes nutrients equal to produced ranges from 18,630 to 26,080 kilojoules more than one-third of India's chemical fertilizer (500-700 Btu/ft') per cubic meter. In small farm use. 6S2 applications the gas is piped directly to the kitchen In the LDCs the potential contribution of or- for cooking. ganic materials (including human wastes) to soil Small-scale bio-gas plants have been the subject fertility is enormous. The Food and Agriculture of intensive research and development in recent Organization reports that in a study done by J. years, especially in India and the People's Re- C. C. van Voorhoeve for the World Bank the public of China. A major focus of this research amount of nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus has been on family-size plants (2-3 m' of gas per potentially available to the LDCs from organic day). The offal from at least five cows (or an sources in 1971 was 7.8 times the amount actually equivalent amount from other animals or humans) applied that year as chemical fertilizer, worth $16 is needed to produce this amount of methane. billion at 1973 prices. For 1980, the van Voor- Since many rural poor do not have so many ani- hoeve study found that at least 80 million metric mals, this source of energy is not accessible in- tons of organic nutrients-worth $21 billion- dividually to the poorest rural people. India and could be supplied from organic sources.6" If the China are developing larger bio-gas plants (10 m I amount of dung burned increases in proportion of gas per day) that show considerable promise to population growth (the same assumption made for community use. 6" for fuelwood consumption), 250-670 million tons Both China and India have begun developing per year would be burned annually by 2000, rep- bio-gas production facilities. China has already resenting a loss of approximately 5-13 million built 7 million bio-gas plants and a total of 70 metric tons of nitrogen (assuming 2 percent ni- million are targetted for 1985."" India plans to trogen dry weight). In monetary terms, these lost build 100,000 bio-gas plants per year for the next nutrients would be worth roughly $2 billion an- decade. This rather modest number would affect nually. only 1-2 percent of India's people; it would proc- It is essential to understand that while inorganic ess the manure of only 2-4 percent of India's cows substitutes exist for organic sources of nitrogen, and recover only 100,000 metric tons per year of potassium, and phosphorus, there is no substitute nitrogen fertilizer. ' Presently, India has only for organic matter itself. The proteins, cellulose, 7,000 bio-gas plants. ' Taiwan, South Korea, and and lignins that comprise plant residues increase Thailand are also promoting this form of energy the porosity and water-holding capacity of soils, development. thereby serving to prevent erosion and provide Problems of operation and maintenance, initial the conditions needed for good root develop- cost, and social equity have impeded rapid dif- ment. ' Organic matter is also the food for the fusion of this promising technology, "' but the soil's microbiological life, which slowly converts many benefits of bio-gas technology assure it an and releases nutrients (and trace elements) in important role in the decades ahead. forms and at rates that plants can assimilate. Bio-Gas There is another advantage. The digestion process kills many pathogens affecting both plants and humans, thus improving Methane gas, also known as marsh gas, can be human health and reducing the transfer of crop diseases from obtained from organic wastes by means of a rel- year to year. This advantage is particularly important in those atively straightforward technology." Manure areas where night soil is used as fertilizer. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 379 Noncommercial Fuels,-Environmental Prospects returned to productivity. Such severe hillside eto- n has already been documented in Central Growing populations and increasing, prices of slo commercial fuels (especially fossil fuels) can be America, the Andean region of Latin America, expected,to lead to rapidly increasing demands the East African Highlands, and the Himalayan for organic noncommercial fuels. This increasing hills. "@ In less steep landscapes, the land will sim demand will lead to many environmental impacts. ply produce less food and plant matter, and both animals and people will go hungry or starve--or The environmental impacts of deforestation migrate if the alternative exists. Adverse climatic have been discussed earlier in this chapter ("The developments aggravate declining pr .oductivity, as Forestry Projections and the Environment") and experience in the Sahel has shown. will not be repeated here. One general outcome A reversal of these alarming trends is being of deforestation is, of course, a shift to other sought by the World Bank, the Food and Agri- sources.of fuel, such as organic matter. A single cultural Organization of the United Nations, and and disastrous consequence can readily be pre- dicted: decline in soil productivity and the decline, U.S. Agency for International Development,' therefore, .in the production of food for humans and other organizations that have studied the and animals. More specifically, a number of phys- problem.' Reduction in the use of wood, dung, ical and environmental effects of diminished lev- and plant residues for fuel could be, achieved by els, or disappearance of, organic matter in soils several means: can be determined: - Use @ of kerosene. This is judged to be too ex- � Diminished capacity of soils to hold water, pensive for the poorest people.* therefore greater susceptibility to drought dur- - Improved efficiencies in the technologies used in in@ dry periods, exacerbated by loss of lignin the production of charcoal. by products. . Improved efficienty offuel use, This is the most � Decreased porosity, therefore poorer aeration promising option. Open fires waste over 90'per- and-absorption of water and more difficult tilling cent of the heat generated. Improved stoves, of plus a.tendency to become compacted and, dur- which a number of designs exist, suited to dif- ing rains, waterlogged, leading to erosion and fast runoff. ferent cultures, can reduce wood consumption � Less adhesion between soil particles and greater by 70 percent. I susceptibility to erosion by wind or water. Utilization of methane digesters. This process Reduced reservoir of plant nutrients (and there- holds much promise, but requires an initial cap- fore reduced fertility) and greater loss of nu- ital outlay of several hundred dollars, and the trients to leaching action of soil water. possession of livestock. Thus, it holds little Overall loss, in productivity of the land. promise for the dilemma of the poorest people These effects have long been known'; avoiding (no free fuel and no ability to purchase an al- them through husbandry of soil organic matter ternative), but the process does save the value has been a hallmark of wise farming for thousands of organic matter while also exploiting its en- of. years. ergy."7 ment of fuelwood plantations. This is a In regions with scarce fuel supplies, it is not Develop promising solution after a few years to a decack likely that cattle populations will grow and com- 11 U@. pensate for the increased burning of dried dung. for growth, but is beset by lack of institutional As noted in Tables 13-2 and 13-4, cattle popu- capabilities for large.scale plantation programs, lations will increase in many areas but on over- as well as social and economic problems at the grazed lands; the animals will eat less and produce local level (see Chapter 8). less dung as land productivity declines. The sit- Solar and wind energy. There is increasing in- uation may lead to a self-accelerating downward terest in the use of solar energy for cooking and trend in soil productivity, driven by efforts of in- for irrigation pumping and of wind for pumping creasing populations to survive on decreasing and other energy needs. q .uantities of plant production. In regions with steep slopes erosion may be the coup de grace for lands which have been deprived The World Bank is concerned about the effects of increasing of, organic matter, reducing them in extreme cases world oil prices on non-OPEC developing economies and has to bare rock and in wide areas to infertile soils, inIitiated anew program to accelerate petroleum exploration and production in the non-OPEC developing countries; (See which will require decades or more of careful A Program to Accelerate Petroleum Production in the,Deyel- management and conservation if they are to be oping Countries, Washington: World Bank, January i979. 380 . THE PROJEMONS What then are the prospects. for noncommer- the consequences might be expected to include, cial, organic fuels by the year 2000? The answer- the following proportionate increases in the en- to the extent that it can be given-depends largely vironmental impacts described in Table 13-42: on which geographic region is being considered. Several thousand million tons of coal production Potentials for organic matter production vary per year by 2000. among regions by a factor of 10 or more, as do - Approximately one hundred thousand million population densities. Awareness of the impor- tons of coal mined cumulatively, 1975-2000. tance of organic fuels is growing rapidly in some areas, less rapidly in others. The role of cattle - Many thousands of square kilometers of land husbandry and traditional methods of cooking and strip-mined cumulatively. disposing of organic wastes also show cultural var- - Many thousands of square kilometers of land iations, which not only influence the practice of affected by subsidence cumulatively. using organic fuels but also the potentials for so- - Approximately one thousand (nominally 1,100 cially and economically feasible alternatives. Mw) coal power plants' However, further increases in population and fur- - Several hundre'd(nominally 1,100 Mw) nuclear ther increases in the costs of fossil fuels imply power plants. . i substantially increased pressures on organic fuel - Several tens of thousan .ds square kilometers re- resources virtually everywhere by the year 2000. quired for transmission lines for electricity gen- Conduslon erated by new coal and nuclear plants. - Approximately 1,000 million tons of radioactive How the many nations of the world will respond tailings from supplying uranium, 1977-2000. to the rapidly changing energy situation is uncer- - Approximately ten million cubic meters of low- tain, and as a result it has not been possible for level radioactive wastes.. the Department of Energy to develop energy pro- * A few 100,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel, 1977- jections that extend to the year 2000. While DOE 2000. did prepare projections that extend to 1990, the - Several 100,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel gen- information required to analyze the environmen- tal implications of these projections is not avail- erated over the lifetimes of the plants con- able. As a result, it has been necessary to limit structed through the year 2000. the discussion of environmental impacts to a qual- While these estimates are highly uncertain, they itative consideration of a range of energy devel- are the best estimates that can be made with the opment options bounded by the hard and soft projections and data currently available, and they paths. From this qualitative consideration it is do indicate the order of magnitude of the cumu- clear that all energy sources have environmental litive impacts of a global hard path over the dec- impacts associated with their development and ades ahead. use. The energy challenge to each nation over the In addition to its environment 'al. impacts, the next two decades is to develop an energy economy global hard path option will maintain and increase that balances the advantages of more energy with thermodynamic inefficiencies in the energy sector the disadvantage of the environmental and social itself. Large amounts of energy will be used in impacts. While the situation is still very uncertain, converting one form of energy to another, and trends are emerging for.both the commercial and the resulting energy forms will not in many cases the noncommercial energy economies. be efficiently matched thermodynamically to end- At present, the world's commercial energy sec- use requirements. tor (fossil fuels, nuclear energy, and hydropower) As the soft path studies illustrate, requirements is developing a structure that is much nearer the for nonrenewable. primary energy (and the asso- hard path end of the spectrum of options than the ciated environmental impacts) could be reduced soft path end. If the overall, primary-energy by increasing the thermodynamic efficiency in the growth rate projected by the Department of En- energy sector, by increasing the contribution of ergy out to 1990 were to continue to 2000, the renewable sources of primary energy, and by in- result would be a commerical energy economy creasing end-use conservation. However, 'the consuming 517 quads (517 x 10" Btu) annually, DOE energy: projections show only relatively more than double the 1975 figure. If, in addition'. small shifts in these directions through 1990. this commerical energy were to be supplied by a Trends in the world's noncommercial energy global energy sector similar in composition of that economy lead to environmental. consequences described in Table 13-41 for the United States, that are quite different from those implied by@ the ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 381 commercial economy. The FAO projectionof a continue, the organic fuel needs of increased LDC 650 million cubic meter annual shortage of fire- populations can be expected to seriously, affect wood in the LDCs means that approximately a forestry and agriculture in large parts of Africa, quarter of the needed fuetwood in the LDCs may Asia, and Latin America by the year 2000. not be available. The shortfall implies increased By then, the commercial and noncommercial deforestation and shifts to alternative fuels (dung energy sectors may be having increasing effects and crop residues). Both the deforestation and on each other. Higher costs of kerosene can be the shift to alternative fuels will have adverse af- expected to expand the@ use of organic fuels in fects. The deforestation will enhance erosion and LDCs, increasing further the pressures on LDC destabilize stream flows. The combustion of dung forests. The resulting deforestation and.-wood and crop residues will deprive the soil of needed combustion will contribute potentially significant nutrients and organic matter. amounts of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere and The most serious environmental impacts im- will reduce the amount of vegetation available plied by the noncommercial energy trends could globally to absorb C02--developments that, in be reduced significantly by extensive development turn, will increase concerns in the world's com- of village woodlots and the use of methane gen- mercial energy economy over the climatological erators. Encouraging initiatives in both areas have consequences of continued and expanded fossil been noted above. Nevertheless, if 'present trends fuel combustion. THE NoNFuEL MINERALS PROJECTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT The Projectio 'ns Collectively, the demand for the 18 nonfuel minerals considered in the pro- jections prepared by the Department of the Interior, was expected to grow at around 3 percent per year, slightly more than 'doubling between 1975 and 2000. In most cases it appears possible, to accommodate the projected growth of mineral demand, but there are a number of unanswered questions con- cerning the price at which demand will be met, especially if energy prices increase significantly above their present levels. As higher-grade resources in accessible locations are exhausted, new mining ventures will tend to exploit lower-grade deposits and deposits in less accessible parts of the world with more fragile environments. Some'of the projected increases in'supply are large and will require. contributions of both virgin and recycled materials. The industrialized nati 'ons will continue to depend heavily on resources im- ported from LDCs and are proj6cted to absorb over three-fourths of the world's nonfuel mineral production until at least the year 2000. Introduction National Academy of Sciences, advised against The Global 2000 Study projections indicate that making the assumption that mining is necessarily in the decades ahead there will be increasing the most appropriate use of mineral-bearing needs both for mineral resources and for envi- land. I" The goal recommended by the U.S. Sec- ronmental conditions beneficial to biological re- retary of Interior is a proper balance between sources. These two resource needs,@at least in the mineral extraction and environmental protec- context of present policy and practice, are to a tion. ' Achieving that balance in the U.S. and degree in conflict. Thus tensions between mate- elsewhere will require significant changes of pol- rials demand and environmental quality can be icy and practice, as well as significant expendi- expected to continue. In the past-and even to tures. According to a United Nations estimate, a greater degree now@mineral resource policy the cost of abating all world pollution due to min- has been based on the assumption that mining is ing by the year 2000 would be about $200 billion, the most appropriate use for mineral-bearing or 1-2 percent of the product value." land. Not long ago in the United States, however, Richard A. Carpenter, Executive Director of the Study Team on Environmental Problems As- the National Academy.of Sciences' Commission sociated with Metallic and Nonmetallic Mineral on Natural Resources, has summarized the situ- Resources, working. under the sponsorship of the ation as follows: 382 THE PROJECTIONS The tensions between availability of materials and tons of refined mineral materials were produced quality of the environment will increase with eco- in Japan, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and nomic growth and the appreciation of environ- the industrialized countries of Europe in 1976; 4 mental values. These tensions can be relieved to billion tons were produced in the United'States, an extent by internalizing the costs of environ- and 7 billion tons in the less developed countries. mental protection so that they are reflected in the This marketed mineral output amounted to 2 tons price of materials.... per person annually in the LDCs, 20 tons per Environmental protection regulations will re- sult in (i) increased costs for many materials; (ii) person in the United States, and 16 tons per per- disruptive changes in uses of materials, due to son in the other industrialized countries (Fig. 13- environmental characteristics and revised cost of 19). effectiveness calculations; (iii) restrictions on the Direct effects of mining on the landscape, such siting of processing and manufacturing installa- as surface disturbance, deposition of overburden tions; (iv) preemption of access and surface rights and tailings, and generation and disposal of pol- to some mineral bearing lands, particularly those lutants, tend to be roughly proportional to the that are federally controlled; (v) diversion of cap- quantity of minerals extracted. Such effects, in ital from newproduction facilities; and (vi) frus- the absence of measured data, can therefore be trating delays in decisions, such as those affecting leasing and plant siting. roughly estimated by applying conversion coeffi- In return for these generally undesirable dis- cients to estimates of future production. Estimates ruptions in the continued development and supply of utilized land areas and generated mining wastes of materials, society will obtain: (i) improved derived in this manner are presented below, after quality of air and water; (ii) long-term protection which their implications for air and water re- of the natural ecosystems of which man is a part; sources are discussed briefly. (iii) more efficient allocation of natural resources on the basis of more accurate and complete ac- counting of costs; (iv) improved human health Land Use in Mineral Production through decreased contamination of the environ- The extent of the earth's surface disturbed by ment with toxic substances; and (v) conservation worldwide mining operations has never been of materials through a closing of the production, measured accurately. It is estimated in Table 13- use, and disposal cycle. 43 at roughly 1.5 million acres per year in 1976, Ingenuity and a more complete understanding of the parts and interactions of the energy, ma- growing to 3 million acres per year by 2000 (ex- terials, and environmental system can do much cluding surface disturbed by oil and gas opera- to reduce the tensions in these conflicts and bring tions). The land area that will be directly disturbed about equitable trade-offs among societal goals. "' during the 1976-2000 period is approximately 60 Significant environmental damage can be an- million acres, or 94,000 square miles-an area ticipated from the projected increases in mineral roughly equal to West Germany, or 0.2 percent production and utilization. These impacts will be of the earth's total land surface. By comparison, the southern border of the Sahara Desert, by felt as a continuation of both the direct and the moving steadily southward during the last 50 indirect consequences of mining on land. Mining rs, is believed to have encompassed some the seabed will present new and unique environ- 250,000 square miles of land once suitable for ag- mental impacts. The three types of impacts are riculture or grazing." and it is expected that the discussed below. closed forests of the world will be reduced by 1.72 million square miles between 1978 and 2000 '" Direct Enviromnenfid Effects of Mining However, the projected figure (94,000 square on Land miles of land expected to be directly disturbed by mining over the next quarter century) is mislead- As shown in Table 13-43, mines, quarries, and ingly small. The mines themselves are not the only wells yielded about 21 billion short tons of refined areas disturbed by mining operations. It has been mineral materials worldwide in 1976 (25 bi 'Ilion said that the least of the problems is "the hole in if oil and gas are included). Of the quantity pro- the ground." Mining operations are responsible duced, roughly 16 billion tons were nonmetallic for water and air pollution, for destruction of fish minerals, mainly stone, sand, and gravel; 8 billion and wildlife habitats, for erosion, and the im- tons were fuels; and nearly 1 billion tons were pairment of natural beauty many miles from the metals. mine sites. The extensive areas indirectly affected Most mineral resource production now occurs by mining are not included in the 94,000 square in the industrialized countries. About 14 billion mile figure, and virtually no data are available ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 383 TABLE 13-43 Estimated Land Area Utilized for World Mineral Production Compared with Annual Production, 1976- 2000 Ratio of Mineral Production (in millions of short tons) 1976 1985 2000 to Acres of Land Land Land Land Utilized in Production Utilized Production Utilized Production Utilized the U.S. in (billions of (thousands (billions'of (thousands (billions of (thousands Mineral Commodity 1971* short tons) of acres) short tons) of acres) short tons) of acres) Stone 30 7.7 231 8.2 246 14.8 444 Sand and gravel 50 6.9 345 10.5 525 17.3 865 Commodities not elsewhere W 1.5 90 2.21 132 3.5' 210 specified b Clays 120 0.6 72 0.8 96 1.1 132 Bituminous coald 130 3.5 455 4.0 520 4.8 624 Iron (in ore) 170 0.5 85 0.8 136 1.1 187 Phosphate rock 260 0.1 26 0.2 52 0.5 130 Copper 12,670 0.008 101 0.013 165 0.022 279 Uranium, 200,000 0.000025 5 0.000107 21 0.000193 39 World total (excluding petro- 20.8 1,410 26.7 1,893 43.1 2,910 leum and natural gas) Note: Production figures assume U.S. 1971 ratio of marketable production to land utilized (column 1). Production figures for 1995 and 2000 are U.S. Bureau of Mines projections for demand, which is assumed to be matched by production. Millions of short tons produced : acres of land utilized. Mainly cement, anthracite coal, salt, and other nonmetallic minerals, but excluding petroleum. and natural gas. Estimated figure based on the relative contributions of cement, anthracite c oal, salt, and other nonmetallic minerals. 11is fuel minerai is included for purposes of comparison. Figures do not include centrally planned economics; data was not available. Sources: Ratios calculated from U.S. Bureau of Mines, Land Utilization and Reclamation in the Mining Industry, 1930-71, 1974. Production data for 19176 frotnU.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity Summaries, 1978. Production estimates for 1985 and 2000 from U.S. Bureau Mines, Mineral Trends =d Forecasts, 1976. on the overall amounts of land disturbed by min- ing in the United States totaled 5.7 million ing. acres. I The strip mining of bituminous coal ac- Mining directly disturbs land in a number of counted for the largest part of this. The thinner ways. According to United States experience over the coal seam, the greater the area disturbed for the 1930-71 period, 59 percent of such land was a certain quantity of coal. In the western United utilized for excavation and 38 percent for disposal States, for example, the mining of 30-foot seams of mine and mill waste; the remaining .3 percent of Wyoming coal disturbs 25 acres of land for either subsided or was otherwise disturbed by un- every million tons produced, whereas mining 10- derground workings.' foot seams of Washington, Arizona, Colorado, or Large areas have been directly disturbed by sur- Utah coal disrupts 72-80 acres per million tons of face mining for certain metals-in Malaysia for coal recovered. ' There is 12 times as much coal tin, in New Caledonia for nickel, in Australia for available by deep mining in the United States as titanium, and on various Pacific islands for phos- by stripping, I but although deep mining appears phate. I Work has begun near Hambach, West to cause less land degradation than surface min- Germany, on an open-pit lignite mine that will ing, it entails greater occupational hazard and cover 30 square miles of what are (or were) farms,, discomfort and greater cost. forests, and villages.' A proposed bauxite mine The nonfuel minerals commodities principally in Western Australia will destroy the only forest responsible for direct land disturbance during in a million square mile area. The mining com- mining are sand and gravel, stone, copper, iron, pany answers critics that it believes most of the clays, and phosphate rock ore. Table 13-43 pro- trees have an incurable root disease. The com- vides estimates and projections of the areas dis- pany has also offered to attempt reforestation. 61 turbed worldwide during the mining of these By 1977, land directly disturbed by surface min- commodities in the years 1976, 1985, and 2000. 384 THE PROJECTIONS ABOUT 40,000 POUNDS OF NEWVINERAL MATERIALS AR E REQUIRED ANNUALLY FOR EACH U.S. CITIZEN to 000 LOS. 8000 LOS. 660 LOS. 450 LOS. 430 LOS. 1400 LOS. STONE SAND AND GRAVEL CEMENT CLAYS SALT OTHER NONMETALS 1000 LOS. 46 LOS. 16 LOS. 14 LOS. 11 LOS. 31 LOS. OTHER IRON AND STEEL ALUMINUM COPPER ZINC LEAD METALS PLUS GAS- 7650 LOS. $200 LOS. COAL 4200 LOS. 1f7 LB. URANIUM PETROLEUM NATURAL GAS TO GENERATE: ENERGY EQUIVALENT TO 300 PERSONS WORKING AROUND -THE -CLOCK FOR EACH U.S. CITIZEN U.S. TOTAL USE OF NEW MINERAL SUPPLIES IN 1975 WAS ABOUT 4 BILLION TONS 1 Figure 13-19. Consumption of new mineral materials per person in the United States in 1975. (U.S. Bureau of Mines, Status of the Mineral Industries 1976) The figures, admittedly approximate, were de- pecially the ratio of surface to underground min- rived for each commodity by observing the ratio ing, differs from that of the world as a whole. The of production tonnages to land acreages disturbed United States is also atypical in that it exploits and utiUed in the United States in 1971 (as re- much low-grade ore deep beneath the surface. It ported in a Bureau of Mines study"') and apply- should also be remembered that as miners every- ing these ratios to the Bureau's projections of where deplete the world's higb-grade, accessible world mineral demand (which were equated with ores, they will be turning to deposits requiring production). even more surface disturbance. Some new pro- There are several factors influencing the accu- duction processes (such as leaching ores in place) racy of the area estimates in the table. The mix show promise for reducing the land requirements of mining methods used in the United States, es- of mining, but it is doubtful that these processes ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 385 will be in widespread use before 2000. Lastly, it. is projected to increase faster than the demand should be noted that the projected production fig- for miner'als'with low waste to-product ratios ures have a wide range of uncertainty, which car- (stone and clays). The. actual increase of waste ries over into the land utilization figures. will probably be greater than the increase in Table In addition to land disrupted by "the hole in .13-44, which does not take into account the fact the ground," other land is affected by mining that, as time goes on, the average grade of ores wastes. Furthermore, dust and toxic materials worked will generally be lower. from the wastes generated in mining and refining Several countries are now secking ways to pro- often spreads to surrounding areas, reducing their tect agricultural land, forests, and waterways from ability to support life. pollution from mine wastes. In the Philippines, The wastes from mining and the early stages of where mines discharge 140,000 tons of waste refining are usually bulky, and sometimes toxic. daily, the country's Bureau of Mines is investi- For many deposits, the tons of earth that must be gating potential uses of some of the mine waste moved to expose the ore body exceed the tonnage as material for cement, ceramics, and construc- of ore ultimately recovered from the site. This tion.'" There is plenty of waste to work with. For surface material removed (the "overburden") and example, nonfuel mining operations in the United the residue left after processing (the "tailings") States in 1975 moved 4.2 billion tons of material, are usually discarded in open piles. of which 2.6 billion tons represented crude ore Accurate data on the worldwide magnitude of and 1.6 billion tons mining waste; 94 percent of mining waste generated annually are not avail- the crude ore and 99 percent of the mining waste able, but it is known that in industrialized coun- was from surface mines. us tries the mining and cleaning of coal produces What happens to mined-out land after opera- more waste than the extraction of any nonfuel tions move on or cease? When nothing is done, mineral. According to the Organization for Eco- the abandoned and useless sites usually remain an nomic Cooperation and Development, annual ac- ugly, hazardous area and a major source of water cumulations of coal mining waste are 90 million pollution, air pollution, and soil erosion. Vege- metric tons in the United States, 60 million tons tation is slow to regenerate naturally because of in West Germany, and 56 million tons in the displaced soil, steep slopes, and drainage, which United Kingdom.' Uranium is also responsible usually is acid, alkaline, or saline. These problems for large amounts of mining waste. Nonfuel min- are particularly acute in areas where coal has been eral commodities whose extraction is accom- strip mined. ' panied by considerable waste include (inJescending According to the Environmental Protection order of apparent magnitude of waste) copper, Ag.-ncy,"7representative annual rates of erosion iron ore, phosphate rock, stone, and clays. from various land uses are as follows: Table 13-44 gives estimates of the amount of Metric Short waste generated by the world output of six mineral Tons per Tons per Relative commodities.* The estimates are rough approxi- Square Square Rate mations, derived by multiplying world production Land Use Kilometer Mile (Forest = 1) or projected demand by the ratio of marketable Forest 24 1 product to waste experienced in the United'States Grassland 85 240 10 Abandoned surface mine 850 2,400 '160- in 1975. 1 While these estimates suffer from the Cropland 1,700 4,8W 200 .same kinds of limitations as the estimates in Table Active surface'mine 17,000 48,000 2,000 13-43, they do suggest that world production of Construction 17,000 48,000 2,000 the six commodities (totaling 9 billion tons) gen- erated approximately 14 billion tons of waste in Reclamation efforts can reduce the environ- 1976. The projection for 2000 is 18 billion tons of mental damage caused by mining wastes. Mining commodities produced and 34 billion tons, of cqmpanies-at least in some nations-are increas- waste. Future mining and milling wastes are ex- ing the incidence and degree of - reclamation of pected to increase faster than the output of min- mined lands. These efforts are largely in response eral commodities, partly because the demand for to conservation movements and more stringent minerals with high ratios of waste to marketable legislation. product (phosphate rock, copper, and uranium) Although world data on the extent of@ recla- mation of mined-out lands are not available, somet information for the United States is available. Of: As indicated above, coal generates an enormous quai.tity of mining waste, but data corresponding to that presented in U.S. land used for mining in the 1930-71 period, Table 13-44 could not be obtained for coal. 40 percent has been designated "reclaimed." 386 THE PROJECTIONS However, the quality of 'the reclamation varies considerably. In some cases the effort has been minimal; in others serious difficulties are pre- moo 8. sented by hilly terrain and limited rainfall. Land reclamation success stories are heard from many other nations. For example, in Ostrava, Czechoslovakia, red oak has started to grow on coal dumps characterized by steep slopes and very limited soil.' American Metal Climax, Inc '. -of New York conducts a project to farm its acquired .4 coal lands (at Sullivan, Indiana) before strip min- ing and plans to develop.the land's most produc- tive resources after mining. I A cement plant at 06 Bamburi, on Kenya's Indian Ocean coast, has re- 2 1 habilitated hundreds of acres of land from which it quarried coral limestone.; the area now has a forest of 30,000 trees, a productive farm, and fish ponds. 69' As of mid-1977, 70 percent of the land disturbed by surface mining and needing reclamation in the hms& k8n United States was not under any legal require- ,i@ ment to be reclaimed. I This situation led to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. The law, which applies only to coal lands, Z stipulates that mined-over areas be returned ap- p imately to their original. contours. A tax on rox currently produced surface coal will be used to finance the reclamation of "orphaned" lands left from earlier operations. Slopes of more than 20 1-i en W) 180 degrees on waste dumps are prohibited. Compliance with the new reclamation law is .81 estimated to add from 50 cents to $4.00 to the cost I of producing a. ton of surface-mined coal in the A United States. ' Rehabilitating coal fields in the & western United States, parts of which have a dry climate, would cost an estimated $925 to $2,750 per acre."'I According to an Argonne National oo oc C; en Laboratory study, reclamation of mined land in cu some localities (such as certain phosphate rock a"a V: .91k sites in Florida) may be a profitable endeavor if 2 proper land use planning and marketing strategies 0 E are employed. Under present policy in most nations, the min- ing of a particular piece of land is usually per- Z B 6 mitted even when mining operations conflict with P other uses of the land. However, stipulations and n R!@-, conditions are increasingly being made that take other potential land uses into consideration. In a few cases, mining has even been prohibited for environmental reasons. For example, the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation was prohibited from min- ing in @ the Snowdonia National Park, Wales. The Swedish Government has assured environ- Ls "?- mental. groups and local authorities it will refuse to issue requested permits for strip.mining min- A la x 1 eral-bearing slate deposits in the Naerke area of ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 387 southern Sweden. In a region of Western Aus- this chapter in the section entitled "Water Pro- tralia recently experiencing a diamond rush, the jections and the Environment." They are also government set aside as off limits to mining a 440 known to increase the incidence of asthma, square mile park near Cape Londonderry. I Eco- chronic bronchitis, and emphysema.'" logical (as well as economic) -factors figured sig- Uranium-mill tailings present a radioactive air nificantly in the decision of -the Puerto Rican pollution problem. The radium in the tailings de- Department of Natural Resources to not allow cays to the radioactive gas radon, whose decay Kennecott Copper Corporation and American products are responsible for the high incidence of, Metal Climax to mine an estimated 243 million lung cancer among uranium miners in Europe and tons of copper reserves on the island."' The the United States.' Piles of uranium tailings in. United States has largely closed its national parks the United States total 140 million tons and could to'inining; it has also prohibited 'surface mining reach a billion tons by the year 2000. ' Lyman of coal on prime farmlands unless they can later J. Olsen, director of the Utah State Division of be restored to their original productivity and has Health, reports that thousands of people work prohibited mining that damages water supply.'"' and live in close proximity to the tailings pile of Trends such as these'may reduce to a degree the an inactive uranium-mill site in Salt Lake City and land disruption caused by mining, but they will are exposed to radioactive dust, radon gas and its also increase somewhat the cost of mineral prod- decay products, and gamma radiation.' An ac- ucts. tive uranium mill near Grants, New Mexico,* has dumped 23 million tons of tailings on 265 acres; Impact of Mineral Production on Air Quality the pile rises to a height of 100 feet. Covering Air pollution generated from mining and proc- such dumps with 8-12 feet of clay would reduce essing activities (particularly high-temperature the radon eminations to twice background lev- metallurgical operations) produces serious envi- els."" The cost of safe disposal of all uranium ronmental and-health problems. Air pollutants of tailings in the United States is conservatively es- particular concern are sulfur oxides, particulates, timated at $140 million.711 asbestos, radionuclides (radium and radon), coke Although radiation.at phosphate rock mines is oven emissions, arsenic, lead, and fluorides. 702 apparently a somewhat lesser problem,711 the Most sulfur oxide contamination of the atmos- Global 2000 Study projections of a doubling to phere is caused by the combustion of fossil fuels, quadrupling of fertilizer use by the year 2000 im- especially coal, but in addition, sulfur oxides go ply an increase in the amount of radioactive phos- up the stacks of smelters treating sulfide ores of phate waste. In Florida radiation from phosphate metals such as copper, nickel, lead, and zinc. wastes is already an issue. According to a prelim- In 1974 U.S. copper smelters emitted 8,2i4 tons inary report by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, there of sulfur oxides daily, 10 percent of the nation's could be a twofold increase in the incidence of total. However, smelter emissions are being ie- lung cancer among persons living in structures duced. The,1974 emissions were 33 percent below built on reclaimed phosphate lands in Florida. '113 previous highs and the 1986 emissions are ex- pected to be 90 percent below the earlier peak. 703 Impact of Mineral Production on Water Quality Unfortunately, such reductions are not the trend Surface and underground water is frequently everywhere. The Cuajone copper mining and polluted by effluents of mining and milling op- smelting project in Peru will soon double emis- erations and by rainfall or stream action on solid sions and effluents from the site; it.is expected mine and mill wastes. Thirty-four percent of waste that 60,000 tons of sulfur oxides will be released water discharged by all major U.S. industrial into the air and 30 million tons of tailings dis- groups in 1973 was from production. of primary charged into the sea annually. The World Bank, metals, 8 percent from petroleum and coal prod- one of the project's lenders, has persuaded the ucts, and 1 percent from stone, glass, and clay borrower to accept, in principle, the incorporation products. 114 of a number of environmental safeguards in proj- One "ample of water pollution from mining ect design. ' The copper-nickel smelters of the is acid mine drainage, which is caused by the re- Sudbury district of Ontario, Canada, emit 2.7 action of water and air with sulfur-bearing min- million tons of surfur oxides annually, causing erals in coal or metal mines and dumps. The losses of timber with a@ value of $117,000 per year sulfuric acid produced in this reaction enters in a 720 square mile zone of severe damage. I streams, lakes, and rivers where it lowers the pH, Such sulfur oxides contribute more widely, of killing many forms of life. course, to the problems of acid rain discussed in Another notable example of water pollution by 388 THE PROJECnONS mining wastes is the dumping of salt wastes by borne asbestos fibers are known to cause serious East German potash mining companies into the lung diseases, including a particularly dangerous Werra River. The Werra, which weaves across form of cancer. Whether similar problems arise the border between East and West Germany, from the drinking of water containing asbestos flows into the Weser River, which is now so salty has not been established. Nevertheless, state and that the city of Bremen can draw on it for only federal - courts have determined that a potential 20 percent of its water Supply. 711 In addition, health hazard exists' and have ruled that Re- wastes from potash mines in France have long @erve must change to on-land disposal. It is esti- been implicated as one of the primary sources of mated that the required pollution control facilities contamination of the Rhine River. will cost $370 million. In 1978, a series of earthquakes affecting Ja- The increased mining that follows from the pan's Izu Peninsula caused the collapse of earthen Global 2000 Study's projected demand for fuel dams holding mine wastes containing poisonous and nonfuel minerals could easily increase the sodium cyanide. Fish were killed not only in the amount of water pollution from mining activities. Mochikoshi and Kano Rivers but as far away as Present policies may limit the effects somewhat, Suruga Bay."' . but the quality of water used for drinking, irri- . The Philippine Inter-Agency Committee on gation, and fish culture can be expected to be Environmental Protection has reported the dis- adversely affected in at least some areas. charge of about 100,000 tons of mine tailings per day in *eight major river systems in the country, Indirect Effects of Mining on Land affecting an estimated 130,000 hectares of agri- cultural land .717 The Japan International Coop- The direct effects of most mining operations on eration Agency is expected to study the feasibility land, while not negligible, are localized and rel- of a project for collecting tailings from, at least atively small compared to many other forms of four of the six major copper mines in the Baguio human economic activity such as farming,, for- district of the Philippines and transporting them es.try, and urbanization. By contrast, the indirect by pipeline for discharge into the Lingayen Gulf. 718 effects of mining can be quite large, especially In Peru, tailings from copper mines are pollut- since the. infrastructure developed for mining op- ingthe San Juan, Mantaro, Locumba, and Moche erations often permits a large number of other rivers with iron, 'acid, magnesium, and other met- activities that would be very difficult or impossible als. The World Bank recommends a Mantaro to carry on without it. Among the many indirect cleanup project to be completed by.1980 to bring effects of mining on land are the boom-and-bust the iron content of the waste outflow dow to cycle, access roads, demand for renewable re- n 0.1 grain per liter and to reduce the acidity by 99.9 sources, and energy requirements. Each will be 719 percent. briefly considered here, As part of the opening of a molybdenum mine The boom-and-bus@t cycle of communities near at Urad, Colorado, American Metal Climax con- mining and refining centers is a virtually inevitable structed diversion structures and two miles of un- consequence of the nonrenewable nature of min- derground pipeline so that streams will flow eral resources. Demographic and economic insta- around and under the mill and tailings areas and bilities usually, result.* In the short run, small emerge from the property uncontaminated. The communities may be unable to supply the com- streams involved are part of the water supply for munity services needed by the overwhelmingly Golden, Colorado. A reservoir, holding water for large numbers of new citizens drawn to a new mining and milling the ore, will be open -to the public for camping, fishing, and the enjoyment of The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development the surroundings. has prepared a report suggesting how to manage growth when an area is suddenly affected by the rapid growth accompanying The Reserve Mining Company, a subsidiary of resource exploitation. Ile report focuses primarily on growth Armco Steel and Republic Steel Corporations has associated with energy development but applies equally to dumped approximately 67,000 tons of iron ore growth associated with the exploitation of nonfuel minerals. It includes brief case studies of the impacts of growth associ- waste (taconite tailings) daily into Lake Superior ated with the Jim Bridget Power Plant in Sweetwater County, for the past 23 years. Ile wastes contain micro- Wyoming, the nuclear power plant in Calvert County, Mary- scopic asbestos fibers from a mine at Babbitt, land, and oil production and coal mining in Campbell County, Minnesota, and an ore-processing plant at Silver Wyoming; the effects of North Sea oil and gas production on Bay, Minnesota. 711 Asbestos fibers are now pres- Scotland are also.examined. (Rapid Growth from Energy Proj- ects-Ideas for State and Local Action-A Program Guide, ent in the drinking water of Duluth and other Washington: Department of Housing and Urban Develop- communities that draw water from the lake. Air- ment-1 1976.) ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 389 mining operation - In the long run (of a decade or in agriculture and the intensive silviculture dis- two), these services may not be needed at,all. cussed elsewhere in this chapter, the technologies D. B. Brooks and P. W. Andrews, in reviewing of mining and processing are energy-intensive and the problem of boom-and-bust cycles on a global are becoming more so. The worldwide energy basis.fot a 1973 United Nation 's Symposium on dependence of mining and processing, has not Population, Resources and Environment, noted been studied carefully, but the linkages between that: energy and minerals in the U.S. has been exam- ined to some extent. The reason for concern over Even if mining communities are more carefully t planned today, their inherent tendency to deplete he energy-intensiveness of mining and processing their reason for existence cannot be ignored, be- is that lower-grade ores generally require more cause the result is often a depressed region with energy for extraction, processing, and refining at high unemployment and few services. Such prob- a time when energy costs are projected to increase lems are intensified by the, cyclical nature of in- significantly in the years. ahead. As Earl, Hayes vestment in minerals, so that there tend to be notes, cycles, every 20 to 40, years, during which a nation Each material has a fixed lower bound of ore is faced with waves of mine closures.23 grade, below which energy costs make processing This type,of local economic instability is exac- uneconomic. Energy. costs [in general) rise erbated by the relative isolation of -mining from rapidly as ore grade decreases.. At some lower the rest of the economy. Mining generally does -limit,. say 0.25 %, the energy expenditures domi- nate the whole recovery picture. Technological not spawn significant amou 'nts of associated in- improvements in rock disintegration, transporta- dustrial or manufacturing activities, especially i,f tion and concentration will have to be made if carried out in remote areas. such low-grade ores are to be considered re- Mining activities, especially in remote areas, serves-that i S resources that can be processed require improved access roads.,The access roads economically. 7@ built to mines often lead to other forms of natural Hayes also notes, that in 1971 the energy inputs resource exploitation that are undesirable if un- controlled. As happened in coal mining regions for processing metallic and nonmetallic minerals totaled 69 x 10 Is Btu. The net energy output was of Southern Appalachia and in the copper and 57 x 101-1 Btu. The U.S. materials industry uses silver mining regions of Chile, forests are often over 20 percent of the nation's'energy to process removed from a wide area around the mine, either materials: 8 percent, for metals, 7.8 percent for to provide timber for mining operations, housing cherhicals and allied products, 4 percent for pe- construction, railroad ties, and. fuel, or simply troleum refining, an Id 2 percent for nonmetallics. because improved transportation makes previ- Steel, aluminum, plastics, cement, and gasoline ously inaccessible forests exploitable. account for .half of the 20 percent. The excessive production, use, and marketing As these figures make clear, the projected of charco 'al is A case in point. A few countries still worldwide increases in .minerals production can use charcoal to.-smelt and refine ores, among them be ex Brazil, Argentina, Malaysia, Australia', and In- . pected to have a number of indirect envi- d 7 ronmental consequences through the associated ia. ' The'consequences of this practice are il- demands for energy. lustrated by what is happening in Brazil. The once extensive, mixed-hardwood open woodlands of Effects of Mining the Seabed the Brazilian plateau are being rapidly consumed. In the state of Minas Gerais, it is estimated that As mentioned. in Chapter 12, if the politics of by 1982, 45 million hectares of forest will have the ocean floor are adequately resolved and if been cut down, largely for conversion to charcoal inanganese nodules prove. economically compet- to smelt pig iron. I The dpstabilizhig impact of itive with the ores for which they would substitute, this deforestation on soils and the hydrological large-scale mining of the Pcean floor may com- cycle is discussed in more detail in the energy mence before the -year 2000. The, environmental section of this chapter. implications of mining the seabed have already Not all energy for mining and processing, comes been discussed in detail in this chapter in the sec- from renewable sources. Most energy for the min- tion on "The Projections and the Marine Envi- ing and metals industries comes from nonrenew- ronment." able sources, and these energy requirements lead Conclusions to yet another indirect consequence of the pro- jected increases in mining activities. II The environmental consequences of an approx- Like the technologies of the Green Revolution imate doubling of the global mining of nonfuel 390 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 13-45 Apparent Opportunities for Further Mineral Development Value of World Out- put, 1%8 (in millions Percent of of 1968 World Percent of Country Mineral dollars). Reserves World Output Zambia copper 7,740 10 Quite small Chile copper 7,740 19 12 Thailand tin 750 32 9 Indonesia tin 750 12 Quite small U.S. zinc 1,450 27 12 U.S. lead 775 37 14 Cuba nickel 1,100 24 Quite small Morocco phosphorus 835 42 13 Guinea bauxite 340 34 Quite small Australia bauxite 340 34 15 Source: Rex Bosson and Bension Varon. The Mining Indusiq and (he Developing Countries, New York: Oxford. t977, App@ G. minerals between now and 2000 are difficult to more years in and or cold (tundra) regions than assess. Possibilities for considerably expanded in hot humid regions, however. How long it will production seem to exist in countries having large take for mining scars to heal in the oceans is still portions of the world's reserves of critical, high- highly uncertain. value minerals (Table 13-45). Major new re- The indirect effects of boomtowns, new trans- source discoveries have been reported in ecolog- portation systems, and other infrastructures as- ically fragile areas such as the seabed, the Amazon sociated with mining operations may be more basin, Oceania, Siberia, and south central Africa. lasting and significant than the direct effects. Land A disproportionate fraction of resource devel- and water for mining and refining will in many opment is expected to take place in the LDCS, cases be in direct competition with agriculture, where environmental protection measures may be forestry, urban water supplies and other uses. limited. Conflicts with local populations over the use of Smelting, refining, and milling usually occur in land and water resources can be expected to in- major industrial centers rather than at the mine crease. In West Germany opposition was encoun- site, but mineral exploitation and processing can tered when an entire village was relocated recently have devastating impacts on extraction and con- to make room for a coal mine."" In central Flor- centration sites and their adjoining communities. ida, opposition has been raised to phosphate min- Although the mining and concentration opera- ing because of competition for the water used in tions may continue for only a decade or two, they beneficiating the ore. leave permanent scars on the landscape, espe- These and other environmentally related con- cially in the case of open pit mines, which can be flicts will increase in the years ahead as the min- very deep. ' Superficial mining of ores such as erals industry is forced to turn to poorer, less bauxite that are the result of weathering or are accessible, more energy-demanding ores than found- in sedimentary formations may be less de- those presently being exploited. As a result, the structive of the land, which can be restored to environmental damaje done by mining is likely productive forests, to pasture, or even to farmland to increase markedly unless policies change and if precautions and ecological conditions are ade- production technologies and practices improve quate - The recovery of such sites will take many significantly. CLOSING THE Loops Introduction considered the Global 2000 Study's projections for population, GNP, climate, technology, food Ile previous 10 sections of this chapter have and agriculture, forestry, marine and coastal re- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 391 Sources, water, energy, and nonfuel minerals for character.* Nonetheless, the examination of the the purpose of determining what impact those discrepancies and their implications provides a projections will have on the environment between step toward a more ecological perspective. now and the year 2000. In the final sections of As a preparation for shifting to this more eco- this chapter, however, the perspective will be re- logical perspective on the future world environ- versed. The focus will shift to the impact that the ment, it is helpful to review the impacts upon the environmental developments presented in the environment already presented in this chapter. preceding 10 sections would have on thepopula- Because, from the environmental point of view, lion, economic, and resource projections of Cbapters economic and political boundaries are of very lim- 2-12. ited relevance, it is necessary to organize the in- formation around major environmental Figure 13-1 at the beginning of this chapter classifications-terrestrial, atmospheric, aquatic- illustrates a reversed--ecological-perspective, rather than around the economic and political ju- showing first how population, economic, and re- risdictions considered heretofore. This is essential source factors affect environment (as presented as a first step in closing the feedback loops be- in the preceding 10 sections of this chapter) and cause, for instance, many of the projections imply how, in turn, the environment feeds back upon changes in the aquatic environment, and all of (affects) population, economy, and resources. these changes need to be considered in comparing While Figure 13-1 illustrates, at least concep- the future aquatic environment with the water tually, how the feedback loops are closed in na- assumptions in the various projections. Similarly, ture, it must be emphasized that in the discussion several of the projections imply changes in soil that follows the feedback loops are not actually conditions, and it is the overall soil conditions that closed analytically, and that they cannot be closed result from all the changes that need to be com- with the government's current models. pared with the projections' implicit assumptions about soils. In such cases, how is the whole eco- The problem is that the government's present logical perspective to be determined on the basis analytical tools for making population, GNP, and of fragmented projections-and then again how resource projections are not designed to accept is the whole environmental future to be made rel- explicit environmental feedback. Most of these evant to fragmented projection models? models simply assume implicitly that the environ- The approach used here is to gather the impli- ment will do what it has done in the past, only cations of the fragmented projections into one more so; and this assumption leads to discrep- extensive table-Table 13-46. This table is or- ancies between the environmental assumptions of ganized primarily by the earth's major environ- the population, GNP, and resource projections ments: terrestrial, atmospheric, aquatic. This and the environmental conditions implied by primary organization establishes the holistic per- these projections. Put simply, the environment spective characteristic of the environment. The cannot do what some of the projections assume secondary organization of the table is by major it will do. geographic groupings: global, regional (i.e., con- tinental or more than one nation state), and local Although there is no way in which revised, (i.e., subcontinental, individual nation states, or more realistic environmental assumptions can be smaller economic or political units). The "local" entered into the projection models, it is possible category is further subdivided into "rural" and to (1) compare each model's environmental as- "urban." This organization of the table demon- sumptions with the environmental conditions im@ strates the relationship of economic and geopo- plied by the population, GNP, and resource litical areas. projections, (2) note the discrepancies (which In the text that follows Table 13-46, the future would not - exist if the environmental feedback world 'environment is discussed first in terms of effects were actually present in the models), and the three major environments (still in the original (3) consider how the discrepancies might affect perspective of projections impacting on the en- the population, GNP, and resource projections vironment) so that the overall ecological descrip- if it were possible to alter the environmental tion of the future world environment can finally assumptions to eliminate the discrepancies. Since it is not possible to alter the environmental as- *These missing feedback loops and many other deficiencies sumptions in the population, GNP, and resource in the government's current analytical capabilities are dis- projections, the discrepancies remain, and the cussed in Chapter 14 and succeeding chapters of Parts 11 and projections retain theirbasically open-loop, linear Ill. TABLE1346 Summary of Impacts on the Environment Implied by the Global 2000 Study's Population, GNP, and Resource Projections, by Major Environments A. TERRESTRIAL ENVIRONMENTS Local Regional (subcontinental, individual nation states, or smaller) (continental or more than Global one notion state) Urban Rural Population No impact projected. No impact projected. Arable land lost to new or ex- Increased numbers of subsistence panding human settlements by the farmers in LDCs will result in de- year 2000 is projected to be 25 terioration in land productivity, million hectares. overgrazing, and deforestation. GNP No impact projected. Slow economic growth rates in Continued terrestrial disposal of No impact projected. densely populated LDCs will in- toxic industrial and urban wastes crease the pressures of people and will create potential health haz- domestic animals on land. ards in both industrialized coun- tries and LDCs. M Climate No impact projected. No impact projcjctcd. No impact projected. No impact projected. "a V Technology No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. 2 Agriculture and food Land productivity is declining in Regional germ plasm in traditional No impact projected. Soil erosion and compaction will 0 many industrialized countries as crops is being lost as increasingly he a continuing-perhaps intensi- Z well as LDCs. Losses of range and marginal lands are being brought fying-problem for intensively- CA farmland to desertification by 2000 under cultivation and local vari- cropped, clean-tilled land in both could total 2,800 million hectares, eties are replaced by high-yield industrialized countries and LDCs. primarily in Africa and Asia. varieties. Heavy dependence on pesticides One half the total irrigated land is will further deplete insect predator already damaged by waterlogging, populations, reducing the crop salinization, and alkalinization. By protection offered through insect 2000, an additional 2.75 million ecology, but the trend toward in- hectares could be lost or damaged. tegrated pest management may compensate or even rehabilitate some areas. Fisheries and marine de- No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. velopments Forest exploitation Hundreds of thousands of species Between 1975 and 2(W, 446 mil- No impact projected. Critical catchment areas and in- of plants and animals will be ex- lion hectares of forests will be rc- herently unstable land will become tinct by 2000-a major reduction moved to meet global demands for destabilized by deforestation lead- of a global genetic resource. forest products, fuelwood, and ag- ing to erosion and land slippage. ricultural land. The deforestation Habitats for wildlife (including will occur primarily in the LDCs predators of agricultural pests) and will: (1) cause irreparable or will be destroyed in large amounts. long term damage to the land by exposing the soil to sun and rain; (2) Tender up to 600,000 species of plants and animals globally ex- tinct; (3) destabilize slopes of catchments, especially in the Hi- malayan range and other moun- tains of Asia and in Latin American ranges. Deforestation rates are relatively slow in industrialized countries. balanced by plantations. Water resource develop- No impa ct projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. Large impoundments will inun- 4@ ment and regulation date agricultural lands, forests, FO mineral deposits, human settle- 0 ments,roads, ctc., especially in Z densely populated LDC areas. M Energy No impact projected. In industrialized regions (North Where LDC urban poor rely on Strip mining of coal and uranium "0 America, Eastern and Western charcoal or firewood, urban de- will cause land disturbance, and Europe, Japan, U.S.S.R., South mand will result in total denude- mine tailings will pose radiation M Africa, and Australia) energy de- ment of surrounding countryside danger. Q velopment by AW will result in: to as great a distance as 100 kilo- 0 -Thousands of millions of tons of meters. Z coal mined annually. -Approximately one hundred thousand million tons of coal mined cumulatively over the 1975-2WO period. -Many thousands of square kilo- meters of land sttip-mined cu- mulatively. -Many thousands of square kilo- meters (collectively) of land ad- vcrsely affected by subsidence. -Land for approximately I,O(X) coal power plants (nominal I'I(X) Mw), -Land for several hundred nu- clear power plants (nominal I'l(X) Mw). A. TERRESTRIAL ENVIRONMEIM (cont.) Local Regional (subcontinental, individual nation states, or smaller) (continental or more than Global one- nation state) Urban Rural -'Several tens of thousands of squire kilometers of land for transmission lines for new coal and nuclear plants. - Approximately 1,000 million tons of radioactive tailings from sup- plying uranium for the 1975-- 12000 period. -Approximately 10 million cubic meters of low-level radioactive wastes. -A few 100.(= tons of spent nu- clear fuel. Several 100,000 tons of spent X nuclear fuel over the lifetimes of M V the plants constructed through X the year AM. 2 Coal development can be expected ,to be most intense in those areas 0 with large coal deposits (U.S. and z Eastern Europe); nuclear devel- opment most intense in those areas with limited coal resources (West- ern Europe. Japan). In the less developed regions (North and Middle Africa, parts of the Middle East, much of Asia, parts of Latin America), the en- ergy impacts will be primarily in organic fuels leading to: A 650 million cubic meter an- nual shortfall in fuelwood before 2000, causing (1) combustion of even small bushes and aggra vated erosion and desertifica- tion, and (2) increased use of dung and crop residues for fuel. Annual combustion of 25"70 million tons of dung by 2000. depriving the soils of the equiv- alent of $2 billion in chemical fertilizer. Nonfu.el minerals No impact projected.. No impact projected. No impact projected. The mining of quarries of bauxite, sand. gravel, and limestone, as well as the mining of metallic min- erals from hard rock, will result in long-term-sometimes perma- nent-local land disturbance and loss. B. ATmOSPHERic ENVIRONMENTS t" Z 0 Population No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. Z GNP Some spray-can propellants and No impact projected. LDC air pollution-especially by -1 some high-altitude aircraft flights toxic substances-will increase if M may contribute to the depletion of polluting industries move from 2 the ozone layer. areas with strong dnvironmental standards to areas with limited or no standards. Z (A Climate No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected; No impact projected. Technology No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. Agriculture and food Nitrous oxide release to air from No impact projected. No impact projected. Pesticides sprayed from aircraft bacterial conversion and nitrogen may create local air quality prob- fertilizer may contribute to deple- lems and poison people and ani- tion of the ozone layer. mals. DDT and other organochlorines Smoke and dust will create local enter the atmosphere where they air quality problems. accumulate and are precipitated Land clearing will cause greater out in rain, which ultimately will weather and microclimate ex- contaminate the occans. tremes. Fisheries and marine de- No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected.. velopments W 1@0 LA CS A. ATmOSPHERIc ENVIRONMENIS (cont.) Regional Local (c.ontinental or more than (subcontinental, individual nation states, or smaller) Global one nation state) Urban Rural Forest exploitation 446 million hectares of forest will No impact projected. No impact projected. Noticeable increase in humidity be lost as an absorber of atmos- will occur near reservoirs and ir- pheric carbon dioxide (CO2). rigation systems. COZ will be added to the atmos- phere as a result of burning a pot- tion of the trees that were on the 446 million hectares cleared. Water resource develop- No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected, Slight increase in humidity near ment and regulation reservoirs and irrigation systems. Energy C02 emissions will increase to 2.6- In industrialized regions of the Coal combustion will result in to Hotter local weather will occur 34. billion short tons per year, world (North America, Eastern 20 times more air pollutants (CO. where forests have been removed roughly double the C02 emissions and Western Europe. Japan, NOX, S02, hydrocarbons. smoke, for fuelwood or charcoal. "a of the mid-1970s. U.S.S.R., South Africa, and Aus- smog) than at present and higher 446 million hectares Of COrab- tralia) the annual production and temperatures than surrounding sorbing forests will be lost. combustion of several thousand countryside. million tons of coal will produce LDC cities willprobably not de- 0 Burning of much of the wood on regionally significant emissions of mand emission controls on coal 446 million hectares will produce particulates, carbon monoxide more C02. nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, an power and heating plants, and as toxic heavy metals. a result will experience large in- Decomposition of much soil hu- creases in many air pollutants, es- mus will release more COZ. In some areas, emission control pecially Sulfur oxides and Establishment of trends in fossil standards will limit or reduce some particulates. fuel combustion and deforesta- emissions. In the U.S., for exam- tion, which will lead inevitably to ple, the Department of Energy significantly larger concentrations estimates that under present of C02 in the earth's atmosp ere standards, national emissions of during the 21st century. sulfur oxides will decline until 1985 and increase thereafter. A doubling of the C02 concentra- tion by 2050 could increase the In the less developed regions, in- average temperature of the earth creased combustion of wood, dung, and coal is not expected to result by about 3*C, melting much of the in multinational or continental air polar ice over an estimate per quality problems. of 200 Years and flooding [a e amounts of coastal land. Increased emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides will acidify the rain over wide areas. Nonfuel minerals No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. C. AoUATIc ENVIRONMENTS Population No impact projected. No impact projected. Human wastes create increasingly No impact prc!jected. severe water pollution problems in many LDC urban areas. GNP No impact projected. Pollution by toxic wastes from pe- In or near large cities--especially trochemical. metallurgical, and in the middle-income LDCs--se- other industries will accumulate in rious water pollution by organic regional seas and gulfs with slow and inorganic wastes, some highly or restricted water circulation (e.g., toxic, can be expected from areas < Red Sea, Caspian Sea, Persian of industrial concentration and Gulf, Mediterranean). ports.. Construction on coastal and wetland habitats will reduce spawning and breeding habitats and damage reefs. Climate Climate change of sufficient mag- Climate change of sufficient mag- Climate change of sufficient magnitude to influence local watersupplies nitude to influence global water nitude to influence regional water are thought possible by 2000. but there is no consensus on either the supplies are thought possible by supplies is thought possible by climate change or the associated change in water supply- 2000. but there is no consensus on 2000. but there is no consensus on either the climate change or the either the climate or the associated associated change in water supply. change in water supply. Technology No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. No impact projected. Food and agriculture No impact projected. Consumptive (evaporative) use of Pesticide, fertilizer and other Streams receiving runoff from water for irrigation will increase. chemical manufacturing plants may farmlands, especially irrigated Surface waters will contain in- pollute local waters with effluents. lands, will receive increased quan- creased amounts of salts, fertil- titics of pesticides. herbicides. sed- izers, and pesticides. iments, nitrites. and nitrates. Persistent pesticides and their deg- Persistent pesticides in runoff will radation products, especially the contaminate sediments and near- organochlorine group, will accu- shore waters and damage spawn- mulate in marine sediments and ing and breeding waters. bioaccumulate i n marine food Feedlots and food-prooessing plants chains. will pollute local waters with or- ganic wastes, depressing dissolved W oxygen levels and killing fish. Is 00 C. AQuAnc ENviRONMENTS (cont.) Regional Local (continental or more than (subcontinental, individual nation states, or smaller) Global one nation state) Urban Rural Fisheries and marine de- Intensive commercial fishing will Populations of preferred fish spe- Fishing in heavily polluted rivers, coastal waters, and estuaries will velopment continue to deplete oceanic stocks cies may decline in some regional decline or become restricted due to health hazards of toxic chemicals of tuna and other traditionally pre- seas (e.g., the Mediterranean) as and pathogens. ferred species. a result of intensive fishing and pollution. The 200-mile economic zone, on the other hand, may lead to im- proved management of some re- gional and national fisheries. Forest exploitation No impact projected. Extensive deforestation and land- Local streamflow and seasonal floods will increase in basins with de- clearing will alter the hydrology of forested. watersheds. "a major rivers, exaggerating cx- Aquifer recharge will diminish following deforestation, reducing ground- V treme high and low flows. water supplies and increasing vulnerability to drought. 2 Intensive tree-faTming will add fertilizers and pesticides to local waters. 0 Z Water resource develop- No impact projected. Large-scale dams, impoundments, Hazards of schistosomiasis, malaria, and other water-borne diseases ment and regulation and modifications of river flows will be increased significantly through irrigation projects that create will significantly alter salinity, and expand habitats for the vectors and hosts of these diseases. temperature, and flows of nu- Increasing consumptive use of water will diminish the capacity of trients in estuaries. disrupting the streams and rivers to carry and degrade wastes, including soil salts. life cycles of many organisms and adversely affecting biological pro- Impoundments on smaller rivers to store water, control floods, and ductivity in the affected waters. generate electricity will alter hydrologic regimes to the detriment of aquatic productivity, only partially compensated for by still-waterfish- eries in reservoirs. Energy Open oceans will be polluted by In the industrialized regions of the Oil pollution of ports, coastal waters, and estuaries from accidental oil from tankers and by atmos- world (North America. Eastern losses occuring during transfers. or from groundings or collisions. pheric fallout from the combustion and Western Europe, Japan, of fossil fuels. U.S.S.R., South Africa, and Aus- Local waters will experience thermal and other kinds of pollution as tralia), there will be several aquatic a result of coal and nuclear generating plants with once-througb cooling, impacts of energy development: which alters aquatic ecology, lowers dissolved oxygen, kills fish eggs, Acidic drainage from approxi- and may cause fish kills. mately one thousand million tons Consumptive use of water for evaporative cooling in generating plants of coal mined annually will affect may be large enough to affect stream flows in some areas, potentially water quality and aquatic life over reducing the ability of streams to absorb wastes and degrading water large areas. quality locally. Lakes in southern Scandinavia and Local streams and rivers will be polluted by acidic drainage from mines. eastern Noth America will become acidified as a result of acid rain and snow. Oil from offshore wells and tank- ers (operational discharges and accidental spills), and terrestrial runoff will pollute coastal and open ocean areas. Large increases in the number of Z coal and nuclear power plants will create a large impact on the aquatic Z environment through once-through 4 cooling or consumptive, evapora- rn tive cooling. In the less developed regions, two aquatic impacts of energy devel- opment can be expected: Stream and river flows will be destabilized as a result of deforestation for fuel- wood; oil development and export in petroleum exporting countries will adversely affect water quality and aquatic resources. Nonfuel minerals No impact projected. Deep-sea mining is not expected Deep-sea mining will produce silt and processing wastes that may be to produce seriously adverse ef- locally damaging to marine ecosystems. fects in the short run (years) but the long-term, ultimate effects of bottom disruption. turbidity in the deep ocean waters, and the proc- essing of wastes are still very un- certain. TABLE 1346 (cont.) D. Low PROBABILITY, HIGH-RISK EVENTS AFFECTING ALL EN VIRONMENTS Regional LA)cal (continental or more than (subcontinental, individual nation states, or smaller) Global one nation state) Urban Rural Climate As populations grow, forcing the Regional manifestations of the Vulnerability, large increases in Vulnerability is less in rural areas use of more marginal and and global problem will be significant. prices, and supply interruptions but, locally, will be severe, as in lands, world food production will especially for South Asia, the will be especially high in urban the African Sahel. become more vulnerable even to United States, the U.S.S.R., and areas. (relatively) high-probability vari- the Sahel region of Africa. ations in climate. Food and agriculture Habitat for the wild progenitors of Regional manifestations of the Urban areas will be more vulner- Rural areas will be less vulnerable major food crops will continue to global problem will be experi- able to incrqased prices and supply than urban areas to supply inter- be lost while single-variety mon- enced. interruptions. ruptions and increased prices. ocultures expand. As a result, there would be an increased prob- ability of plant epidemics (e.g., the 0 U.S. problem.with corn blight in the early 1970s), which could sig- nificantly affect world food sup- 0 plies and markets. Increased dependence of agricul- ture on fossil fuel intensive inputs increases the vulnerability of crop production to disruptions of en- ergy supplies. Energy The increased use of nuclear en- A 226 percent increase in nuclear Local manifestations of the global No impact projected. ergy increases the probability of and hydroelectric (mostly nuclear) and regional impacts will be ex- further nuclear proliferation and generation by 1990 (several perienced. of nuclear terrorism. hundreds of plants by 2000), will increase the probability of a,seri- Increased marine transport of liq- ous accident in a nuclear reactor uefied energy gases will increase the risks of fires or explosions in or in some other portion of the nuclear cycle. ports. 'Note: Throughout Table 13-0 the word "will" is used in the sense that an impact will follow if the population, GNP, and resource projections are fulfilled and if there is no change in current environmental, projection policies. ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 401 be related back to the environmental assumptions but especially in the idifficult or marginal environ- in -projection models for the discussion of dis- ments, such as mountains, and lands, and very crepancies and their implications in the section humid regions. The most massive losses or dam- entitled, "Assumptions, Discrepancies, and Feed- ages to the,world's lands, forests, and genetic back." wealth have been taking place andwill continue It should be emphasized here once again that to take place in the less developed regions of the entries in Table 13-46 and in the following Africa, Latin America and Asia, but the indus- section ("The Global Environment in 2000") trialized countries are also being affected. summarize impacts on the environment implied by Some reference figures are helpful in adding the Global 2000 Study's population, GNP, and perspective to the discussion of the future of- the resource projections. Where an entry in the table terrestrial environment. The most basic of these indicates "No impact projected," it means simply figures is the earth's total area: 51,000 million that the Global 2000 Study's projections for pop- hectares (510 million square kilometers) or 197 ulation, GNP, and resources do not imply an im- million square miles-. Of the earth's total surface, pact in this particular area. For example, although more than 70 percent is ocean (361 million sq km). there are many indirect implications of the pro- About 25 percent (132 million sq km) is ice-free jected increase in human population, the pro- land. About 5 percent (26 million sq km) is closed jected increase is not expected to have a direct, forest and 2 percent (12 million sq km) is open global effect on the world's soils. As a result, the forest and range land. Deserts now cover about first entry in Table 13-46 under Terrestrial En- 2 percent of the surface area (7.9 million sq km). vironment is "No impact projected." About 3 percent (15 1million sq km) is arable land. Irrigated land amounts to less than I percent of The Global Environment in 2000 the arable total, as does the total urban area. Most- aspects of environmental deterioration Table 13-47 presents the major trends in the are not global in scale, but those that are are world's terrestrial, environment. In geographic serious and troubling indeed. They are serious not terms, desertification is the most sweeping change. only because they develop slowly on a massive If unchecked, the process of desertification that scale but also because they are usually not subject is claiming range land and some crop land, es- to any quick technological fixes. They are trou- pecially in Africa and Asia, will more than triple bling not only because data and knowledge on the present 7,922 thousand square kilometers of their development and causes are often only desert in the world, possibly by 2000. Twenty one sketchy, but also because the institutions studying and addressing these problems are underfunded and understaffed. Furthermore, solutions to many global environmental problems are related di- TABLE 13-47 rectly or indirectly to economic development and population stabilization efforts, and therefore Projected Changes in Global Vegetation 9ndLand programs to address global environmental prob- Resources, 1975-2000, lems must inevitably become involved in some of Percent- the world's most difficult and complex social, po' 1975 2000 Change Change litical, and economic problems. Serious environmental developments on a global millions of hectal,6 scale are clearly in evidence--on the land, in the Deserts 792 1,284 +492 atmosphere, and in the waten The global prob- Closed forests 2,563 2,117 -446 - 0 lems of the terrestrial environment are considered Irrigated area 223 273 +50 +22 first. Irrigated area damaged by The World's Terrestrial Environment in 2000. salinization and related The world has only recently begun to take meas- problems, 111.5 114.6 +3.1 +3 ure of the universal and momentous nature of Arable land 1,477 1,539 +62 +4 trends in the condition of the terrestrial environ- Sou c .Global 2000 Study projections. - ment. The data now available are largely a result a. Ersteimated as follows. in Chaipter 9 it is estimated that half of the worid*s total of a series of specialized international conferences irrigated area is already damaged@ thus the 1975 figure is approximately 111.5 million Its. The U.N. estimates (Desertification: An Overview, U.N. Conference and studies sponsored by the United Nations. The on Desertification, 1977, p. 12.) that approximately 125,000 ha are degraded an- general picture is that of a decline in soil quality nually due to waterlogging, salinization. and alkalinization. Assuming that this annual figure remains constant to the year 2000, a total of 3.1 million Its. would and productive capacity over much of the planet, be added to the damaged area, bringing the total to 114.6 million ha. 402 THE PROJEMONS percent of the earth's ice-free surface would, then historic and present intractability of this problem be desert. does not bode well for irrigation in and zones.. At the other climatic extreme-the humid trop- While the areas affected are relatively small, ir- ics-deforestation is projected to remove 446 rigated lands generally have. exceptionally high million hectares of closed forest by 2000, thus re- yields, and their loss, or even their reduced pro- ducing the amount of the earth's surface covered ductivity, is therefore very important. In the U.S., with closed forests from one-fifth to one-sixth of for example, the extremely productive San Joa- the total. Because of the low fertility of many soils quin Valley in California is experiencing increas- in the humid tropics, the removal of tropical for- ing problems of salinization. ests may represent a onetime exploitation with Worldwide, the productivity of arable, uniffi- high long-term costs, especially.for the survival gated land is declining in many areas due to ov- of local flora and fauna. erintensive, use. While in the industrialized At no time in recorded history has the specter countries, a loss in natural productivity is partially of species extinction loomed so ominously. Largely obscured by heavy use of increasingly expensive, a consequence of deforestation and the "taming" petroieum-based chemical fertilizers, that is not of wild areas, the projected loss over two decades the case in the LDCs. While lack of comprehen- of approximately one-fifth of all species on the sive data limits appreciation of the phenomenon, planet (at a minimum, roughly 500,000 species of observations in Africa and in India and elsewhere plants and animals) is a prospective loss to the in Asia point to continuing erosion, loss of organic world that is literally beyond evaluation. The ge- matter, shortened fallow periods, and declining netic and ecological values of wild or newly iden- soil quality in the decades ahead. tified species continue to be discovered. They The prospect of declining soil quality can be represent an irreplaceable evolutionary legacy seen to be very serious when viewed against a whose value, particularly the value of the many backdrop of increasing population densities on expected to be lost in the tropics, will certainly arable lands. The trends in arable, hectares per increase especially if the earth's climate becomes capita throughout the world are illustrated in Fig- warmer. The fact that humankind derives most ure 13-20. With less than 2000 square meters of its food from no more than 15 species of plants (one-fifth of a hectare, or one-half acre) of arable masks to some extent the importance of genetic land per capita projected for the year 2000 in the extinction, but not for the plant breeders who rely LDCs, continuation of the deterioration in soil on the traits of wild progenitors of domestic plants quality and natural productivity would, be disas- in their continuing battle against pests and disease trous. Nonetheless, since birth rates are not pro- and in efforts to increase yields. jected to decline to replacement levels anytime Arable land for agriculture is projected to in- soon and since little additional land will be crease by about 4 percent over the next two dec- brought into cultivation, very intensive use-and ades to a total of 15.4 million square kilometers. abuse---of land can be expected to continue well This global projection, however, hides a number into the 21st century. of important considerations. In some areas the While there are definite global trends toward amount of arable land is actually projected to de- soil loss, soil deterioration, and species extinc- cline. Where arable land is projected to increase, tions, these terrestrial trends are generally subject the projection is based on the assumption that to remedial action on a national or even local capital will be available to bring the land into scale. By contrast, the atmosphere and the oceans cultivation at two to three times the present cost are examples of global resources held in common, per hectare. Furthermore, overall basic land pro- and all nations must inevitably participate in the ductivity is declining in many areas. resolution of problems in these areas. Institution- Irrigated lands, a part of the productivity prob- ally, therefore, the problems of the atmospheric lem, are projected to increase by about 28 per- and aquatic environments are even more difficult cent, again assuming that large amounts of capital of solution than those of the terrestrial environ- will be available for water regulation and irniga- ment. * tion projects. However, one-half of the world's *It can be reasonably argued that terreIstrial resources are also, irrigated soils are presently suffering the effects in effect, a global commons pioblem. Foreign economic as- of salinization and alkalinization resulting from sistance and international trade in oil, grain, and forest prod- inadequate drainage and poor water manage- ucts involve many nations directly or indirectly in the fate of ment. The amount affected will increase during other nations' terrestrial environments. Nonetheless, each na- tion does have significantly more control over its soils, forests, the rest of the century. Barring unprecedented and fresh water resources thar it does over its share of the improvements in water and soils management, the world's atmosphere land oceans. ENVIkONMENT PROJEMONS 403 7"1 4_ Industrialized nations Centrally planned economies 210 ountries Less developed 0: i4i, 5 Figure 13-20. Arable land per capita, 1955, 1975, and 2000. (From Chapter 6, Table 6-13) The World's Atmospheric Environment in 2000. the end of the next. The Declaration of the 1979 Two global atmospheric changes resulting from World Climate Conference of the WMO states anthropogenic pollutants are of great conse- that the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, and quence over the long term: the increase in con- changes of land use have increased the C02 con- centrations of carbon dioxide (CO,) and the tent in the atmosphere by about 15 per cent during depletion of the ozone layer in the stratosphere. the last century and are continuing to increase Most climatologists expect a general, global CO. concentrations by about 0.4 per cent per warming as a consequence of increased atmos- year. ' pheric concentrations of CO,, but the timetable IMost recently, four scientists reported to the for significant global warming is not agreed upon. Council on Environmental Quality on the CO. The National Academy of Sciences projected a problem, noting-among other things-that the 6' C warming by the latter half of the 22nd cen- time is at hand when industrialized nations must tury, but it appears very likely that significant begin careful consideration of the implications of global climatic warming could occur long before their energy policies for the CO, balance of the that time. A panel of scientists assembled by the atmosphere. The scientists concluded: "If we wait Department of Energy anticipates that a doubling to prove that the climate is warming before we of atmospheric C02 would result in a 2-3* C take steps to alleviate the CO, build-up, the ef- warming as early as the year 2050. "1 fects will be well underway and still more difficult U.S. analyses of early warming trends are sup- to control. The earth will be committed to appre- ported by World Meteorological Organization ciable changes in climate with unpredictable con- (WMO) reports on atmospheric carbon dioxide. sequences. The potential disruptions are sufficiently The WM0 also suggests that with a doubling of great to warrant the incorporation of the CO, C02 the global average temperature would in- problem into all considerations of policy in the crease by almost 3* C above its present level"" development of energy.' and that gradual warming of the lower atmos- A global warming would mean more rain and phere,'expecially At high altitudes, would create a melting of polar ice, with a consequent rise in global and regional climatic effects detectable be- sea level. Temperature increases in polar regions @Cet,-Ily @pl-.-d @-- c fore the end of this century and significant before would be 3 or 4 times greater than global aver- 404 THE PROJECTIONS ages. If -the West Antarctic ice sheets were to ades coastal waters will be steadily @polluted by melt,* it could raise @ sea levels worldwide by 5 oil, persistent chemicals (including organochlo- meters. I Even if only a 1* C increase in average rine pesticides), and by heavy metals, even though temperature were experienced, it would make the discharges of these pollutants are@ controlled in a earth's climate warmer than it has been at any number of nations. The U.S. alone now disi time in the last 1,000 years.'-* charges 50 million tons of waste,per year into thp The date at which significant depletion of the ocean--80 percent of. it dredge spoils, 10 percent ozone layer could take place is at least as.uncertain industrial waste,.9 percent sewage sludge, and 1 as -the date for significant effects of carbon dioxide percent miscellaneous. I In addition, increased accumulation. It is thought that-continued use of offshore oil and gas drilling, a projected 7 percent chlorofluoromethanes at the 1974 rate would re- increase in ocean traffic (including the transport duce global ozone by 14 percent over 50 years. of oil), the mining of the seabed, and the. urban- Gases emitted from high-altitude aircraft and ization and industrialization of coastal areas will from nitrogen fertilizers, thought to have a simi- all contribute to ocean pollution. lar, if lesser, effect on ozone, would also contrib- Continuing heavy exploitation of coastal fish- ute to the depletion. eries and upwellings, as well as pollution and loss Ozone absorbs ultraviolet and cosmic radiation, of estuarine habitats, will deplete preferred stocks and as a result its depletion allows greater amounts of fish I (e.g., turia) worldwide. The following of these biologically potent forms of radiation to trends for fish and shellfish populations are based reach the earth. It is estimated that a I percent on the Global 2000 -Study projections': decrease inozone increases ultraviolet radiation by 2 percent. The known consequences. of in- Annual creased ultraviolet radiation include a greater in- Harvest cidence of,skin cancer in humans and damage to (in millions other species (both plants and animals), but, the of meirric biological impacts of increased ultraviolet radia- ions) Trend tion have not been studied extensively. Marine species 60 Peak, 1970' Freshwater species 10 Peak, 1975- The World's Aquatic Environment in 2000.- Marine aquaculture 3 Increasing, 1979 Over the next two decades, changes in the world's Freshwater aquaculture 3 Increasing, 1979 aquatic'environment are expected to occur pri- Total 76 marily on or near land. Freshwater will be affected Demand in year 2000 83.5 most, followed by changes in coastal marine waters and habitats. The deep open-ocean waters interact only very slowly with surface and coastal The .200-mile economic zone may. lead to im- waters and are not expected to change signifi- proved management of marine fisheries, butthe cantly by 2000. pressures on these resources are expected to con-' The precise nature of freshwater pollution is tinue to increase. highly localized, but the general problem of water Low-Probability, High-Risk Events Affecting quality deterioration is global in scope. In the less All Environments. By 2000 the world will be more developed regions, pollution of water supplies by vulnerable,. to several low-probability high-risk disease pathogens or parasites is perhaps the ma- events. Food productionwill be more vulnerable jor, problem., In industrialized and urbanized re- to fluctuations in climate and to. disruptions @ in gions, pollution of waterways and ground water energy supplies for fertilizer production, farm by municipal. sewage and industrial wastes (toxic machinery fuel, and irrigation. Loss of wild pro- chemicals and heavy metals). are principal con- genitors of major food crops could lead to in- cerns. In rural areas, nonpoint pollutants-fertil- creased difficulty in.maintaining pest and pathogen izers, pesticides, salt-laden irrigation drainage, resistance in high-yield hybrids. A major shift to and other contaminants emitted from sources that nuclear power could make the energy sector vul- are difficult or impossible to pinpoint-are of uni- nerable, should a major.nuclear accident occur. versal concern. And a major shift to coal could make the energy Ultimately, rivers carry many freshwater pol- sector vulnerable, should a seriou problem de- e next two dec- s lutants to the oceans, and over th velop with COV While it may be that none of these difficulties will occur, the disruptive poten- Scientists believe that with a 6* C increase in the earth's tial of such events will increase significantly by average temperature, the melting would require about 200 YCM- MO.: ENVIRONMENTFROJEMONS 405 Special Regional Problems U.S., water for coal processing and the production In @ addition to the worldwide environmental of synthetic fuels may pose constraints in the and developments just described, Table 13-46 in- West. Increased deep- -and surface-mining could cludes a large humber@of regional, developments: easily lead to much water, pollution in the U.S. involving continents or more than one 1 nation and Europe, especially with- silt and acid. The state. Six regional developments' are discussed U.S. has recently passed strip-mining legislation, here: (1) the increasing use of coal combustion by but it remains to be seenbow effectively the leg- industrial regions; (2) their increasing use of nu-m islation can be, enforced. clear power; (3)@ fuelwood shortages in rural LDC Increased, emissions of oxides of nitrogen and areas; and developments in (4) regional seas, (5) sulfur will aggravate another aquatic effect of in- transnational river basins, and (6) wet tropical creased coal combustion-the acidification of regions. rain @ Acid rain is already a problem -not only for northeastern Europe and the U.S. but also for Industrial Regions Turning to Coal. Two large neighborin& states. Weather patterns carry the industrial regions are rich in coal resources-the emissions and contaminated water vapor north of United States and Eastern Europe. It is likely that the industrial centers in northern Europe and the the coal resources of these .regions will.be devel- northeastern U.S. Thousands of lakes and streams oped much I more extensively over the next two in southern Sweden and Norway, in, the U.S. decades. While it is not possible to anticipate, the Adirondacks, and in adjacent areas in Canada environmental consequences in *detail, there are have been damaged-@-perhaps irreparably-by broad implications for the land, air, and water of acid rain. These watersnormally yield abundant these regions. arctic char, salmon, and trout, but are losing much The land impacts are primarily associated with of their aquatic life as the acidity increases. Lower coal mining, power plant facilities, and transmis- forms of aquatic life and juvenile life forms are sion lines. Worldwide, over the 1977-2000 period, extinguished by the excessive acidity caused by approximately 100,000,million tons of coal can be the rain. Evidence has now been presented sug- expected to be mined, reaching the rate of several gesting that the emissions that cause acid rain may thousand million tons per year by 2000. Strip- travel more than 10,000 kilometers to contribute mined land would total tens of thousands of to atmospheric haze in the Arctic. The shift to square kilometers, and subsidence would affect more coal, use will aggravate future acid rain prob- an additional tens of thousands of square kilo- lems-. meters. Land for more than 1,000. coal-fired power plants would be needed. Additional trans- Industrialized Regions Turning to Nuclear Power. mission lines would require many tens of thou- Neither Western Europe nor Japan have, large sands of square kilometers. Much of the affected coal resources and may, as a result, turn increas- land would be in the United States, and Eastern ingly to nuclear power in the decades ahead. A Europe. shift toward nuclear power would bring its own The atmospheric impacts would include signif-. environmental impacts, starting with the mining icant increases in combustion residuals-particu- of uranium. In addition to the land disturbed, lates, heavy metals, carbon monoxide ' nitrogen thousand& of millions of tons of radioactive tail- oxides, and sulfur oxides. Emissions of most of ings will rewlt from supplying uranium for the these residuals would depend on the control meas- world over the 1977-2000 period. ures applied, but no economically practical tech- The nuclear plants and transmission lines them- nology is available to control the release of oxides selves require large amounts of land. The pro- of nitrogen. jected 226 percent increase in nuclear and The aquatic impacts of increased coal combus- hydroelectric generation by 1990 (most of it nu- tion includethermal discharges,@ increased con- clear) will require hundreds of additional nuclear sumptive uses, and acid drainage. Once-through power plants. By the year 2000, the spent nuclear cooling kills many small organisms and young fish,, fuel will accumulate in amounts measured in causes damaging variations in watertemperatures hundreds of thousands of tons. There will also be and reduces dissolved oxygen concentrations. more than 10 million cubic meters of low-level Evaporative cooling towers are projected to cause wastes that will have to be stored somewhere. In the second,largest increase in consumptive use: of view of local opposition to locating'such plants in 'water, and in parts of water-scarce Europe,-water many areas and of even more widespread oppo- for cooling towers may be subject to limiting con- sition to storing radioactiveyastes in most local- straints until other needs have been met. In'the ities, it is not at all clear where these plants will 406 THE PROJECnONS be located or where the radioactive materials will affected areas, as is already the case in parts of eventually be stored. India, Nepal, Sahelian Africa, and South Amer- The reactor accident and its aftermath at Three ica. Most of the people living in semiarid zones Mile Island, Pennsylvania, in March and April threatened by desertification are pastoralists and 1979, dramatized the hazards of nuclear power. herdsmen, and the resulting disappearance of soil Subsequent reviews and investigations are sharp- organic matter will have disastrous effects on their ening the basis for assessing and reducing the risks ability to feed themselves and their animals. The of nuclear power, but it is now virtually certain- carrying capacity of the land will decline as soils at least in the United States-that the develop- lose the fertility and water-holding capacity pro- ment of nuclear power will be delayed. It will be vided by organic matter. Outmigration or star- more closely regulated and, as a result, will be- vation (or both) will accompany this scenario of come more expensive. . land degradation. As many as 600 million people Fuelwood Shortages in the LDCs. By 1994, now living in the zones threatened by desertifi- cation would cause (and would ultimately be vic- there will be a 650 million cubic meter shortfall timized by) this process. in fuelwood in the LDCs, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization. This shortfall is Pollution of Regional Seas. Many regional seas, about one-half the present fuelwood consumption or gulfs with relatively poor circulation, are suf- in LDCs and would furnish the cooking and heat- fering from land-based pollution introduced by ing needs of approximately 650 million 'persons. rivers or directly by sewage pipes from cities and Today, by comparison, an estimated 1.5 billion industrial sites. The Mediterranean Sea, the Per- persons warm themselves and cook with wood. sian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea exemplify this The numbers will surely increase as long as the problem. price of alternative fuels continues to increase The threat to the Persian Gulf is growing rap- more rapidly thanincome. idly. Sixty percent of all the oil carried by ships The fuelwood shortage will be felt throughout throughout the world moves through the shallow the world, especially in the semiarid regions. Persian Gulf. There are 20 existing or planned These same semiarid regions are threatened by major industrial centers along the coast. Heavy desertification, and of course fuelwood exploita- pollution of the Persian Gulf as well as the Med- tion of the slow-growing trees in open woodlands iterran'ean has resulted in international,,antipol- and "bush" of Africa and Asia is one of the pri- lution agreements and action plans, sponsored by Mary causes of desertification. Fuelwood short- the United Nations Environment Program. These ages will also affect the populations of high plans, a first step toward cleanup, are also in- mountains in LDCs where tree growth is slow and tended to prevent further deterioration and to im- human numbers are high-the Himalayas, the prove documentation concerning pollution, levels Hindu Kush range, the Andes of South America, and the resources affected. and other, lesser massifs. I Statistical data on the open woodlands of the Transnational River Basin Development. Of the world and the woody vegetation of semiarid re- world's 200 large rivers, 148 are shared by two gions are limited, but it is known that approxi- states and 52 by 3-10 countries each. Examples mately 50 percent of the world's total open include the Nile, shared by Ethiopia, Uganda, woodlands are in Africa and 12 percent in South Sudan, and Egypt; the lower Mekong River, America. The fuelwood crisis has already afflicted shared by Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cam- Africa seriously and shows no sign of easing soon. bodia; the Plata, shared by Brazil, Bolivia, Uru- Firewood and charcoal production account for 90 guay, Paraguay, and Argentina; and the Ganges percent of the total forest exploitation on that shared by Nepal, India, and Bangladesh. continent. In the Sahel, the present rate of refor- Large-scale development in transnational river estation, an inconsequential 3,000 hectares per basins often have environmental impacts that ex- year, is far, far below the 150,000 hectares that tend across national borders. Difficult political needs to be planted there each year if future de- problems of international equity result from the mands are to be met. ecological and socioeconomic impacts that follow To reverse the fuelwood shortage trend, truly from' urgently needed dams and by flood-control, dramatic increases in the establishment of fuel- drainage, and irrigation projects. Downstream wood plantations will have to be made worldwide. states may experience costs while upstream states If the trend is not reversed, all other vegetation enjoy the benefits. Reduced flows, sudden changes (and dung as well) will be used for fuel in the in flows (related- to generation of peak power), ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 407 dislocation of populations from reservoir sites, resenting anywhere from 375,000 species to well water-related diseases (such as malaria and schis- over a million. The loss is incalcuable since most tosomiasis) associated with man-made lakes and ofithe tropical gene pool has not been identified irrigation projects, and water quality problems and studied, but if the wet tropics contain one- resulting from agricultural runoff-all are prob- third of the world's species, as scientists have es- lems of river development with the potential to timated, the projected losses will be truly mo- stir up international conflicts. Rivers, such as the mentous. Euphrates and the Jordan, running through water- short regions will -be especially susceptible to de- Deterioration of Urban Environments velopment conflicts. A general worsening of urban environments in The LDCs in particular will have to grapple the less developed countries is a virtual certainty, with these difficult problems, since their hydroe- with population growth and poverty as the most lectric power generating potential is relatively important factors. As illustrated in Table 13-48, undeveloped. Increased petroleum prices have the population of LDC cities is projected to grow greatly enhanced the economics of hydroelectric at the extraordinary rate of 4.3 percent per year, power in the LDCs, and the needs for flood con- almost tripling over the 1975-2000 period. Of the trol and increased irrigation (assumed in the food 2.2 billion total world increase in population be- projections) are similarly compelling. tween 1975 and 2000, almost half-930 million Wet Tropical Regions. Forty percent of the re- additional persons-will live in LDC cities. The maining 1,680 million hectares of "closed" trop- increase in LDC urban populations is projected ical forest will have been destroyed by 2000, to be larger than the entire 1975 urban population according to the forestry projections in Chapter of the world. Although LDC economic growth is 8. Much or most of this destruction will occur in expected to be concentrated in urban areas, it is the Amazon Basin, in the Indonesian territories doubtful that LDC cities will have the resources of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and West Irian, and in necessary to keep pace with the increasing needs Papua New Guniea. Equatorial Africa's small for public services and facilities. amount of closed tropical forest (approximately To keep pace with the projected increases in 40 million hectares) will be all but gone by 2000. needs during the next two decades, LDC cities Increases in firewood gathering, shifting agricul- would have to essentially triple all of the facilities ture, permanent agriculture, and industrial for- and services that have been built up over the past estry will all contribute to this destruction of the centuries- The chances of this happening'are un- world's tropical forests. likely at best. Water supplies and sanitation serv- The fate of these deforested areas remains in ices in most LDC cities and surrounding slums are doubt. The intensification of shifting agriculture already being rendered obsolete by rapid popu- through shortened fallow periods will degrade lation influxes. Almost 1.5 billion persons in large areas or force their conversion to grazing LDCs-more than one-third of the world's total land. Relatively little of the forested land is pro- population-presently lack safe water and waste jected to have been converted to permanent ag- disposal facilities. LDC cities will also be hard riculture. Portions may succumb to laterization pressed to provide food and the sanitary condi- while other areas will be invaded by cogon grass tions for safe food distribution. Most LDC cities (Imperata cylindrica) orother vigorous weed spe- have only very limited sewage systems, or none cies that will be virtually impossible to exclude as at all. Noise, congestion, and air pollution are as soil fertility declines. Regions with almost sterile bad-or worse-in many LDC cities as they are soils will become useless, covered with grass too in industrialized nation cities. Infant mortality coarse for cattle. This case is exemplified by the quartzite sands of the Gran Sabana regions of TABLE 13-48 Venezuela, once forested by broadleafed trees, Urban Population in All Cities of 100,000 or More now covered only by short grass. There has been no natural regeneration of the trees. Large areas 1950 1975 2000 will be degraded forest--devoid of commercially millions valuable species-but will still be heavily vege- World 392 983 2,167 tated. Industriafized countries 262 503 756 In addition to the loss of productivity, defores- Less developed countries 130 4W 1,411 tation of these humid regions will render extinct Source. Tren& and Prmpew in the Populadons of Urban Agglomerations 1950@ as much as one-half of their genetic heritage, rep- 2000, as Assessed in 19734975, New York: United Nations, 1975. 408 THE PROJEMONS continues to be high in LDC urban slums and Assumptions, Discrepancies, and uncontrolled settlements partly because of dis- Feedback eases(such 'as diarrhea) related to poor sanitation and contaminated water and because of inade- With completion of the description of the future quate diets, which increase susceptibility,to dis- world environment as it is implied by the popu eases. Already most of the 35,000 'infants and lation, GNP, and resource projections of Global children under the age of 5 who die throughout 2000, the shift can'now be made to an examination the world each day were born and died in the of the effect theenvironment will have on these LDCs, and the proportion is likely to increase in population, GNP, and resource projections. As the years ahead. illustrated in Figure 13-1 earlier in this chapter, Urban populations in industrialized countries this is the point at which the closing of the feed- are also projected to increase over the next two back loops can begin. As already noted, the loops decades, -but at a relatively manageable 1.6 per- cannot actually be closed analytically here, but cent per year. However, even this growth rate the implications of the lack of closure can be ana- leads to a 50 percent increase over the 1975-2000 lyzed to a degree. The basic process to be used period. is (1) to identify the environmental' assumptions, both implicit and explicit, that were made in de- Urban areas in industrialized countries are velooing the population, GNP, and resource pro- likely to be most adversely affected by deterio- jections, (2) to compare these assumptions wth rating air quality resulting from a large increase the future world environment (terrestrial, atmos- in coal combustion and from the possibility that pheric, and aquatic), as treated in the preceding some nations will relax emission standards so as section, and in Table 13-46, (3) to note the dif- to reduce the economic costs of emission control. ferences (discrepancies) between the assumptions While national energy plans are by no means firm, and the environmental perspective, and (4) to and while the energy projections anticipate only consider how these discrepancies would feed back a modest 13 percent increase in coal combustion to and alter the population, GNP, and resource by 1990, many observers anticipate large, in- projections. creases. The health and environmental conse- The actual tracing through of the assumptions, quences of an increased use of coal will be discrepancies, and effects becomes quite compli- determined by the stringency of environmental cated because of the number of feedback loops controls. If there is no change of policy (the involved. The two loops shown in Figure 13-1 Global 2000 Study's standard assumption) emis- linking back to the two driving-force projections sions can be expected to begin increasing in at (population, and GNP) and the resource projec- leas! some parts of the world. In the U.S., for tions are highly simplified representations of the example, a middle-range energy scenario devel- myriad ways the environment influences the pros- oped by the Department of Energy shows sulfur pects for future developments in populations, oxide emissions decreasing through 1985 but in- GNP and resources. Analysis of these influences creasing thereafter as a result of increased coal, on th@ population and GNP projections is partic- combustion and the slow retirement of old power ularly complex because many of the environmen- plants. Similar trends can be expected elsewhere., tal influences from these projections come indirectly In fact, in some areas there may even be efforts through the resource projections. to relax present emission standards because of the As an aid to systematic discussion of these many economic costs entailed. influences, Figure 13-21 presents a conceptual However, the human health consequences of model of the major feedbacks linking the envi- exposure to air pollutants may be more serious ronmental projections back to the other projec- in LDC cities than in the cities of industrialized tions. This conceptual model underlies the nations. Emissions from increased coal combus- discussion that follows. The Global 2000 popu- tion in LDC cities are not likely to be tightly reg- lation, GNP, and resource projections imply a ulated, and some highly polluting industries future world environment (summarized in.Table (including some emitting toxic substances) are 13-46), When this world environment is com- avoiding regulations in industrialized nations by pared with the assumptions that are inherent in locating plants in LDCs, where there are far fewer the population, GNP, and resource projections, regulations.' Furthermore, the health impacts a number of significant discrepancies appear. The of air pollutants in. LDC cities are likely to be discrepancies generally result from unrealisticas- complic'a"ted--especially in the poorer sections- . sum,ptigns in the. population, GNP, and resource by poverty, disease, and poor nutrition. projections about the ability of the environment ENVIRONMENT PROJEMONS 409 Population, GNP, and Assumptions in Consequences of the Effects of the Discrepancies i tions the Projections About @c onomic Sectors Future World Environment Human Health -7-77 and Fertil ity Sioresources Water Minerals the Future World Feedback to Feedback to the Ec Environment and Energy. Discrepencies Effects from the Economic Parts of the Environment Effects from the Noneconomic Feedback to GNP Parts of the Environment Effects Related to Feedback to 6. Low-Probability High-impact Demograpohics Regulation Through Events Human Institutions Figure 13-2l.. Coneeptual model for closing.the loops. to' supply increased goods and services. The ef- environmental. (and safety and health) regulation. fecits of the discrepancies are traced through the of the mineral and energy sectors.. environment to consequences which feed back to human health and the economic sectors. The col- The effects of the discrepancies that feed back lective consequences are subsequently traced on onto human health,and the economic sectors are through the human health and the economic sec@ disaggregated into . two categories in Figure. 13- tors for their secondary consequences and their 21: effects from the "economic" and eff6cts from feedback to the, GNP and demographic projec- the"nonecon 'omic" parts of the environment. The tiom. The discussion of the, feedback to the eco- distinction is between those aspects of the envi- nomic sectors includes illustrative economic impacts ronment on which markets place economic value that are referred to later in:the discussion of feed- (e.g., land, water, forests, fish stocks) and those backs to 'GNP. aspects of the environment* on which markets Developments in the,environment have vir- place relatively little--oT no--economic value" tually no direct effect on the'mineral and energy' (e.g., population of insect predators, pollinating sectors @of industrialized economies. (Fuel and insects, decomposer organisms, and nitrogen-fik@ nonfuel deposits, and, mining operations are not ing bacteria; Spawning habits; and a variety of affected directly by, for example, water pollution, biological and ecological, processes, such as the air pollution, and species extinctions.) However'. annual flooding or drying cycles that, trigger re- there ire significant indirect effects. These indi- productive behavior in'fish and other Species). rect effects arise largely.through human health This distinction is made to emphasize @. point effects and JOW7p'robability high-impact events made. years ago by Aldo Leopold, namely, that thatlead (through human institutions) to tighter one cannot expect the "economic" parts oUthe" 410 THE PROJECTIONS TABLE 13-49 Environmental Assumptions Inherent in the Population, GNP, and Resource Projections Population The population projections anticipate declines in fertility and mortality, partly because of an assumption that environmental conditions affecting human populations will improve significantly over the next two decades. The lack of consideration of migration assumes implicitly that differences in environmental conditions will not lead to significant migration. GNP The GNP projections make no explicit environmental assumptions. Implicitly, however, they assume that over the next two decades the environment will supply goods and services free (or at no increase in cost), in vastly increased amounts and without breakdown or interruption. Food and agriculture The food and agriculture projections take into account losses of arable land due to ur- banization and assume (1) that other losses and deterioration of soil will occur at about the sarne rate as in the past, (2) that losses of soil and soil fertility can be made up through the application: of increased amounts of fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation water, and (3) that losses to insects and plant diseases will not increase significantly. Forestry The forestry projections assume that the adverse effects of deforestation and forest sim- plification will not reduce the rapid rate of large amounts of deforestation, especially in the tropics. The projections assume, further, that serious deterioration of soils will follow much of the anticipated deforestation but that there is potential for applying intensive methods of silviculture through' the use of rapidly growing species and, possibly, the use of fertilizers. Water The water projections do not specfically address environmental developments that may affect water supplies and quality; they assume implicitly that environmental developments will not significantly alter future water supplies. Marine The marine projections note that pollution of the ocean will ultimately, if continued, adversely affect fish stocks and catches but significant effects are not expected by 2000. Energy The energy projections make no explicit environmental assumptions and assume implicitly that environmental considerations and regulations will not interfere with achieving the 56 percent increase in the use of fossil fuel and nuclear energy projected for 1990.. The projections also assume that there will be no significant increase in the cost of pollution control. Minerals The minerals projections include no explicit environmental assumptions and assume im- plicitly that the environmental implications of mining and refining will not lead to further regulation and increased costs, and that lands now containing mineral resources or reserves will not be protected in any way that would make the mineral resources unavailable for exploitation. environment to function without the "nonecon- In many cases (such as soil deterioration, spe- omic" parts. cies extinctions, and C02 accumulations) the pro- The environmental assumptions inherent in the jections lead to environmental feedbacks that will population, GNP and resource projections are not have produced their total effect until well be- summarized in Table 13-49. With few exceptions, yond 2000. the models do not have provisions for explicit en- vironmental assumptions, and as a result, the en- Feedback to the Forestry Projections vironmental assumptions tend to be implicit and, Of all the resource projections, the forestry in some cases, quite vague. projections may have the most significance for the Before discussing the assumptions of the indi- future world environment. Feedback to these pro- vidual projections, a point concerning time lags jections is therefore taken up first. must be stressed. The population, GNP, and re- The forestry projections are based on only a source projections imply a number of environ- few environmental assumptions: (1) that the ad- mental impacts.that will not nearly have run their verse effects of deforestation will not lead to reg- courses by 2000. The continued flow of long-lived, ulatio,n and control of deforestation, especially in toxic organochlorines (e.g., PCBs and DDT) into the tropics; (2) that serious deterioration of soils the world's oceans is but one example.. In these will follow much of the anticipated deforestation cases, time lags occur between the causal action in the tropics; and (3) that in most of the areas (the developments implied by the population, to be deforested there is potential for intensive GNP, and resource projections) and the ultimate methods of silviculture using fast-growing species feedback, through the environment, back to the and, possibly, fertilizers. The projections them- projection. selves, being extrapolations of historic trends, as- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 411 sume that the 18-20 million hectare annual net trees of the open forests of the world's and lands deforestation rate will remain constant despite are similarly vulnerable to expanding rural pop- growth in population and economic activity. ulations and their needs for wood for fuel and There are relatively few discrepancies between construction. And finally, it must be remembered the environmental assumptions underlying the that the forestry projections assume that the net forestry projections and the future world envi- rate of deforestation will not increase with in- ronment implied by all of the projections. Serious creasing populations. soil deterioration is expected. In some tropical All things considered, the environmental as- areas there may, be potential for intensive silvi- sumptions underlying the forestry projections are cultural methods with pesticides, fertilizers, and generally consistent with the environment projec- fast-,growing species. However, this potential cer- tions, and environmental feedback is not likely to tainly does not extend to all of the areas expected alter the forestry projections significantly. If any- to be deforested, and where the potential does thing (as the forestry projections also conclude), exist, it will be reduced by the extinction of both the anticipated loss of only one-fifth of the world's locally adapted, fast-growing tree species and in- remaining forests over the next two decades "rep- sect predators, especially birds and predatory in- resents a mildly optimistic scenario." sects. The environment projections summarized in Feedback to the Water Projections Table 13-46 imply a significant increase in the As noted in the water projections, meaningful acidity and extent of acid rain. This development statements describing water supply can be made may reduce forest growth in some areas, espe- only for relatively small areas, and then only after cially in northern Europe, the northeastern U.S., detailed on-site investigations of the water re- southern Canada, and parts of the U.S.S.R. sources available. Unfortunately, data are not Acidification of soil may also occur over a period forthcoming for assessing global water resources of years. The acid rain phenomena will probably and their future on an area by area basis, and as reduce rates of growth and increase the difficulty a result the water projections are presented on of reforestation efforts. the basis of national and world averages. The environment projections also imply that The averaging process vastly overstates avail- significant forest areas will be inundated by water able water resources. Virtually every area as large development projects. For the most part the af- as a nation has areas with substantial surpluses of fected areas will be deforested before flooding; water as well as areas of water shortage. The U.S. so the primary effect on the forestry projections is an example. The Pacific Northwest as a region would be to reduce the area available for refor- has ample-even surplus-water, whereas the estation. Southwest has severe water limitations. The ag- The most significant environmental assumption gregation of the water resources of these two re- in the forestry projections is tha 't the adverse ef- gions into average figures for the U.S. implicitly fects of deforestation will not lead to regulation assumes that water from surplus areas can be and control. The adverse effects of deforesta- made available to water-limited areas. In reality, tion--deterioration of soils (permanent in some however, surplus water throughout the world goes cases), the extinction of hundreds of thousands unused. Some of it will continue to go unused of species, the destabilization of hydrologic flows, unless large numbers of very large, very expensive the increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide (C02), hydraulic works are constructed. Some of it will the loss of. large amounts of C02-absorbing veg- remain unused because of the energy and eco- etation-are all of such significance as to raise the nomic costs of lifting water considerable heights. possibility of a major change in forest policy The projections focus on rates of replenishment throughout the world, especially in the LDCs. of water resources. The rates of replenishment Although there are some small encouraging signs are assumed to be measured approximately by the in individual countries (as noted in Chapter 8 and total surface drainage from an area. This assump- in the forestry section of this chapter), large, rap- tion overestimates water resource replenishment idly growing populations of the rural poor in many in some areas and underestimates it in others. The LDCs make careful management of forests for assumption overestimates replenishment in areas timber production and other uses increasingly dif- drawing on fossil waters because here the replen- ficult. The forests of mountain regions, so essen- ishment is essentially zero. In other areas the as- tial to soil protection and runoff control, are sumption underestimates replenishment (or at particularly endangered by encroaching popula- least the availability of water of altered quality) tions of land-hungry rural poor. The slow-growing because it neglects reuse possibilities. 412 THE PROJEMONS The projections address both withdrawals of The LDC forests will be most affected. The water (water that is potentially available for tropical rivers of Africa and Latin America carry reuse) and co 'nsumptive use of water (largely enormous quantities of water and will become evaporative uses that preclude reuse) but do not highly destructive if their peak flows are aug- consider in-stream uses. Issues relating to trans- mented. Similar problems can be anticipated in portation, aquatic habitats, water as an energy parts of Africa and in Asia. The remaining forests resource, flood-@plain agriculture, and water qual- of the Himalayan range are particularly important ity are not considered. since the waters of the range feed a number of In addition to the assumptions and emphases large rivers that supply the needs of millions of mentioned above, the water resource projections persons. It is estimated that by the year 2000 the are based on several other important assumptions. Ganges Basin alone will contain 500 million per- The projections assume that an approximate 50 sons, who will be dependent on that river for ag- percent increase in world population and a 146 ricultural, industrial, and drinking water. percent increase in economic activities will roughly The steep and rugged terrain of the Himalayas double the demand for water in nearly half of the and the Andean ranges prohibit the construction countries of the world by the year 2000. They of the large dams that might tame their rivers and recognize that and regions will experience water regulate their flows. Consequently only vegetative shortages long before 2000 but do not address the cover and special land management can be em- shortages that will be entailed by the need to pre- ployed to control runoff. The denuding of catch- serve river flows for carrying away wastes. Exist- ments will exaggerate high flows and high sediment ing water quality problems for irrigation (i.e, salt) loads, and will reduce dry-season flows. These and potable water supplies (pathogens and toxic changes will in turn lead to extreme problems in substances) are noted but are not related quan- the management of irrigation systems and im- titatively to the water shortages already occurring poundments throughout the affected regions. in many localities. The projections set forth var- A world survey has yet to be made of the eco- ious ways to deal with water shortages: augmen- nomic impact on water projects of the sedimen- tation of supplies (storage and reuse), reduction tation, greater fluctuations in How, and more of water use (pricing policy, regulation, techno- frequent flood peaks that result from vegetative logical innovation), and allocation. The influence changes in steep catchments. It was expected that of possible climate changes and of anticipated large impoundments such as Volta Lake in Ghana land-use changes on supplies are not considered. or Lake Nasser behind the Aswan Dam would Interrelationships between water quality and flow have useful "lives" of 100 years or more, but these on the one hand and the living resources of and other lakes and dams will have much shorter streams, lakes, and the oceans on the other are lives if sedimentation increases. Wherever major not taken into account. denuding occurs upstream of a large reservoir, IA comparison of the assumptions underlying accelerated filling by sediments is likely to become the water projections with the environmental pro- evident by the year 2000, and in small rivers with jections brings out a number of discrepancies. high sediment loads, impoundments may become These discrepancies relate to the effects of (1) economically infeasible because of the short time land-use changes, (2) possible climate changes, it would take them to fill with sediment. (3) changes in consumptive uses, (4) changes in Deforestation would also affect ground-water water quality, and (5) habitat changes. recharge and, ultimately, flows from springs. This Effects of Land- Use Changes. Perhaps the most effect is well established, but the extent of its im- significant land-use change projected for 2000 is pact Across the world is undocumented and dif- extensive deforestation, which has dramatic im- ficult to assess because subsurface water movements plications for water availability. Lacking the reg- can only be determined by carefully executed sur- ulating effect of forests in the upper elevations of veys using radioactive isotopes or dyes. river basins, water flows will become more ex- Effects of Possible Changes in Climate. In ad- treme during both the high and low flow periods. dition to the effects of deforestation, potential Water supplies will be reduced in both quantity changes in' climate would certainly affect water and quality. The reduction in quantity will be a supplies. There is not full agreement among cli- result of rapid runoff, which cannot be retained matologists either as to the climate changes an- for later use. The reduction in quality will be a ticipated or as to their consequences for water result of the.increased silt loads that accompany supplies, but many climatologists associate in- increased erosion. creased variability and reduced rainfall with a ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 413 cooling trend, and increased rainfall (except per- rigated lands in and regions is inevitable. The haps in the south central area---dustbowl of the result downstream is water unfit for irrigation. 1930s-of the U.S.) with an increase in temper- This phenomenon has no solution other than the ature. removal of salts. Effects of Changes in Consumptive Uses. Over Desalting rivers is expensive. A 104-million gal- and above the effects of deforestation and possible lon per day desalting plant under construction at climatic change, water availability will be influ- Yuma, Arizona, will cost an estimated $315 mil- enced by increased consum tive uses of water for lion. It will reduce the salinity of the Colorado P River as it passes from the U.S. into Mexico from irrigation and for the discharge of waste heat 850 milligrams per liter (mg/1) to 115 mg/l in ac- through. evaporative cooling towers. Thermal cordance with a 1973 agreement. Without the electric (coal and nuclear) power plants discharge plant, the Bureau. of Reclamation projected that approximately two-thirds of their input energy as salinity levels would climb to 1,300 mg1l milligrams waste heat; increasingly these discharges are per liter by 2000, and that every additional mil- through evaporative cooling towers. By 2000 the ligram per liter of salt would cause an equivalent consumptive use of water for waste heat dis- of $230,000 in damages annually to water users charges is expected to be regionally significant in in the lower reaches of the river. 741 the U.S., Europe and Japan. Desalting rivers also requi -res energy. The The biggest increase in consumptive (evapo- Yuma plant will require 4.3 megawatts of hy- rative) use of water will come about as a result droelectric energy to run the pumps that supply of the growth in irrigated agriculture. pressure for reversed osmotic desalinization. The Irrigation is already the largest consumptive use electric generative use of the water, therefore, of water, and although the agricultural projections also competes with irrigation use. Of the plant's are not specific as to the amount of additional in ut waters, 70 percent emerge at 250 parts per irrigation implied, it is clearly large. The pioj&- P tions suggest that the pressure on water resources million (ppm) salt concentration and flow back due to irrigation of and lands is likely to increase into the river; 30 percent emerge at 9,000 ppm even more rapidly than pressures on arable land and flow into a briny lagoon. Wind and solar gen- resources, which will increase by only about 4 eration methods are being considered to reduce percent in area by the year 2000 over the 1971- the hydroelectric demands of the plant. If the assumption in the food and agriculture 75 average figure. The increased consumptive use projections is correct-namely that there will be of water in agriculture will decrease the supply of significant increases in the agricultural use of and water available for other uses, especially for en- lands through irrigation-large water losses ergy applications. (through evaporation) from the supplying streams Effects of Changes in Water Quality. Irrigation and rivers are inevitable. At the same time, salts will decrease water availability in yet another way. will be flushed out of the soils. More salt and less Salts washed out of the soils will enter streams water means higher salt concentrations down- and rivers, contributing to a general decrease in stream. Accordingly, one of two results will fol- water quality and in some areas effectively I re- low: Irrigated farming costs will either increase ducing water supplies by rendering water unfit for significantly so as to include the cost of salt re- reuse. moval, or the salts from the fields of farmers up- There is an important linkage between the en- stream will be added to those in the fields of vironmental implications of the agricultural and farmers downstream. water projections. The agricultural projections Salts are not the only way in which the envi- anticipate both increases, in irrigated land and a ronmental implications of the food projections net increase in arable land over and above land impact on water quality. The use of fertilizers, losses. To achieve the increase in arable and ir- pesticides, and herbicides is projected to double rigated land anticipated, marginal and lands will on a global average but to quadruple in the LDCs. be brought into cultivation, in some areas through The fertilizer runoff will lead to the eutrophication irrigation and the removal of soil salts. However, of many lakes and streams especially in the LDCs. the problems of salinization in irrigated soils are Contamination with pesticides will reduce the pos- resolved only by flushing salts out of the soil with sibilities for aquaculture; reducing the availability water. The rivers and streams that receive the of badly needed fish protein. Probably the net salt-laden drain water become increasingly salty. effect in the LDCs will be to reduce the amount As the water projections note, the buildup of con- of water that is safely available for fish culture centrations of salts in rivers flowing through ir- and for human consumption. 414 THE PROJECTIONS Other decreases in water quality will also occur. ing concern to water planners throughout the In addition to salts and pesticides, increasing world, and it is likely that a number of large water amounts of fertilizers, toxic substances, oil, dis- developments now planned in LDCs will be de- ease pathogens, acids (from mine drainage and layed or abandoned in the years ahead when their acid rain), and sediments can be expected to enter ecological implications are better understood. In the world's waters, especially in the LDCs. The this way ecological and habitat considerations will net effect will again be either a reduction in the feed back to influence the water projections. safety of the water available for various uses or The preceding comparisons of the assumptions increased costs of protecting water supplies. underlying the water projections with the envi- -The economic costs of water protection are sig- ronmental projections bring out a number of dis- nificant. In the U.S., for example, a predecessor crepancies relating to changes in land use, climate of EPA-the Federal Water Pollution Control (possibly), consumptive uses, water quality, ecol- Administration (FWPCA)-attempted to esti- ogy, and habitat. These discrepancies cannot be mate the ultimate costs of water protection in 1970 related quantitatively to the water projections, as this nation was beginning seriously to clean up but they all support the general conclusion of the its waters. The FWPCA concluded that it would water projections, namely that throughout the cost $4.4 billion to bring municipal water treat- world, even before the year 2000, shortages of ment systems up to desired standards, and that water of usable quality can be expected to become additional needs related to urban and suburban more frequent, more extensive, and more severe growth would bring the total to $10 billion for the than those being experienced today. 1970-75 period. I The total public expenditures in the U.S. on water-pollution control for the Feedback to the Food and Agriculture 1977-86 period is now estimated to be on the or- Projections der of $200 billion, " and the portion of these The environmental assumptions in the food and costs associated with potable water may go still higher. agriculture projections take into account some, but not all, of the influences that follow from the Habitat Changes. Both the water and the food environmental projections. The major environ- projections explicitly or implicitly assume the de- mental assumptions- underlying the food and ag - velopment of many more water-regulation proj- riculture projections are as follows: ects-dams," dikes, canals, etc. The severe Weather variability (but not global climate ecological consequences of many of these projects change) is analyzed as the principal variable in are beginning to be examined more carefully dur- the three alternative projections. of food pro- ing the planning process. As a result, some duction, and as a result climate overall is as- planned projects can be expected to be delayed, sumed to remain favorable over the next two redesigned, or dropped in the years ahead. decades. The LDCs can anticipate the largest ecological impacts as a result of future water development Some land is assumed to be lost tourbanization for two reasons. First, the industrialized nations (and perhaps other causes), but the amounts have already developed most of their water re- assumed lost to specific causes are not indicated. sources, and while some further development will. Trends in net arable area provide some clues occur, it will probably proceed with caution in- and are given in Chapter 6 in Table 6-12. By formed by the ecological results of earlier, less 2000, the amounts of arable land in North Af- cautious developments. Water resources in the rica, the Middle East, and South Asia are pr07 LDCs are less developed and more likely to pro- jected to decline (relative to areas under ceed with relatively less careful consideration of cultivation in 1985) as the "economic and en- the ecological consequences. vironmental costs of maintaining cultivated The second reason is that water development areas near physical maxima become prohibi- leads to a number of severe ecological changes in tive. " the LDCs that do not occur (or occur to a much The projections assume that increasing inputs lesser degree) in the industrialized nations. Prob- of fertilizer and irrigation and other energy-in- ably the most significant of these ecological tensive inputs will compensate for erosion and changes is the spread of habitat for disease vectors the other forms of land deterioration now being and hosts. The implications of large dams and experienced throughout the world. irrigation projects for the spread of malaria, schis- Deterioration of range lands is not specifically tosomiasis, and river blindness will be of increas- addressed in the projections and is assumed im- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 415 plicitly not to be a constraining factor on the soil deterioration processes at work throughout projected livestock production. the world. While soil deterioration is a less easily � The projections assume that substantially in- quantified phenomenon than land lost to urban creased amounts of water will be available for sprawl, its effects are being felt in both LDCs. and irrigation, but the specific water assumptions industrialized nations. are unclear. The text of Chapter 6 indicates that In the industrialized nations, the primary forms water management for irrigation could become of land deterioration are erosion, compaction ' the single most important constraint to increas- and salinization. The projections,assume that con- ing yields in the LDCs, but the quantitative im- ti.nued and increasing quantities of energy-inten- plications of water constraints are not analyzed. sive inputs (especially chemical fertilizers, but Also, the extent to which irrigation is leading also irrigation water, herbicides, and pesticides). to the salinization of soils is not discussed. will compensate for basic declines in soil condi- � The continuing losses of diverse local (and wild) tions and productivity. This assumption is sup- crop strains is implicitly assumed not to ad- ported by past experience. In the U.S., for versely affect the success of plant breeders in example, almost two-thirds of the crop land needs developing still higher-yielding varieties and treatment for erosion and compaction, but as a protecting food crops against pests and patho- result of increasing energy-intensive inputs, yields gens. Yields are assumed to continue increasing c.ontinue to increase and many large farms con- at essentially the same rates as in the past two tinue to make a profit. " decades. The discrepancy between the assumptions of � Pollution by pesticides and fertilizers is assumed the food projections for industrialized countries not to constrain the use of pesticides and fer- and the environmental projection involves the feasibility of continued increases in energy-inten- tilizers. Pollution is mentioned in Chapter 6 as sive inputs over the next two decades. Diminish- a potential problem particularly in the LDCs, ing returns are experienced; input costs are but it is also implied that these countries will increasing rapidly with energy prices; adverse ex- have neither the capacity nor the motivation to ternalities (such as the effects of toxic pesticides control fertilizer and pesticide pollution, espe- on human and animal health* and ground-water cially if controls would reduce yields. pollution) are becoming matters of concern. It is notable that the projections foresee only Although there, are admittedly some significant a small increase (about 4 percent) in arable land exceptions, the issue in most industrialized na- over the last quarter of this century, and after tions is not irreparable soil damage but the in- 1985 decreases are projected in some regions. creasing vulnerability of the agricultural sector of Land limitations and production constraints, es- the economy to disruption. Present practices lead pecially water shortages, lead to a decline in per to three forms of vulnerability. First, present capita food production relative to 1970 levels in farming practices with energy-'intensive inputs and North Africa, the Middle East, and the Central cost-cutting methods lead to soils that are less. able African LDCs, and only slight increases in South to absorb and retain water; rain and irrigation are Asia. In other words, over the period of the pro- both of less help to crops, and the soils Are more jections there will be no major improvement in vulnerable to wind erosion during a drought or the food supply for the world's poorest popula- a shift to a period of dryer climate. Second, di- tions, and what improvements do occur will re- minishing returns on increasingly expensive en- quire an increase of 95 percent in the real price ergy-intensive inputs can be sustained only to a of food. Against this sobering outlook, a comparison of *Many workers in LDC countries use pesticides without ad- the environmental assumptions in the food pro- equate training or protection. In Central America, for ex- ample, there were 19,300 medically certified pesticide poisonings jections with the environmental projections gives over the 5-year period 1971-76. Most of the poisonings (17,- little reason for optimism. Discrepancies- are ap- 000) occurred in El Salvador and Guatemala where there are parent in connection with land deterioration, about 360 cases per year for each 100,000 persons. By com- losses of genetic resources, pest and disease man- parison, intheU.S. there are only about 0. 17 cases per 100,000 agement problems, water problems, and the ef- persons. In Central America pesticides have also contaminated animals. In 1976 about 500,000 pounds of beef imported to fects of air pollution. the U.S. from El Salvador were rejected for levels of up to Effects of Land Deterioration. Erosion, salini- 95 parts per million of DDT; the U.S. threshold level is 5 zation, alkalinization, waterlogging, compaction, ("Toxic chemicals: How More than 50 Nations on Five Con- tinents Handle Their Most Deadly Pollutants," World Envi- and loss of organic matter are all aspects of the ronment Report, June 18, 1979, p. 2). 416 THE PROJECTIONS point, and along the way further soil damage jections are a fourfold increase in the use of fer- (especially erosion and compaction leading to tilizers, herbicides, and pesticides and a large hardpan soils) will accumulate. When damage is increase in irrigation. With the projected increase far enough advanced, productivity drops regard- in energy costs, and with- the environmental (and less of added fertilizers. Some U.S. soils have political) implications of the implied water de- reached and passed that point. "' Third, the food velopment, it seems unlikely that remedial or pre- needs of an increasing world population combined ventive measures will be able to counter the with rapid increases in energy prices could lead pressures for overuse. Furthermore, the environ- either to a very rapid increase in the cost of food mental projections suggest that deforestation will (effectively pricing a much larger portion of the increase the degradation of the LDC agricultural world's population out of the market) or to a rel- lands, both through more erratic strearnflows and atively sudden and disruptive shift away from en- increased erosion and through a fuelwood short- ergy-intensive methods of agriculture. Restoration age, which will result in an increase in the burning of mildly damaged soils could be accomplished of dung that would otherwise have been returned over a decade with fallowing and green manuring to the soil as nutrients. with leguminous cover crops, but restoration of The economic consequences of land deterio- severely damaged land would require much longer, ration are more immediate in the LDCs than in and a disruptive effect on production could be the industrialized cou 'ntries. Overgrazing, deser- expected during the restorative period. The food tification, and salinization are major problems. projections in Chapter 6 note that there are a Harold E. Dregne, chief of the U.N. Environment variety of cultural practices and management Programme's working groups on desertification, techniques available to reduce agricultural de- finds the total annual production losses due to pendence on energy-intensive inputs, but the pro- desertification and salinization (an estimated $15.6 jections question the ability of farmers to maintain billion') to be distributed as follows: $3.3 billion or expand production levels while shifting away due to waterlogging and salinization of irrigated from energy-intensive inputs. land; $6.7 billion due to range deterioration; $5.6 There is little question, however, that rising in- billion due to deterioration of rainfed crop land. put costs and further diminishing returns are in Most of these losses would be borne by the LDCs. prospect and that a careful and objective analysis Dregne computed the production loss potential of scientific and public policy options for reorien- at 40 percent of production on irrigated lands (due tating trends in agriculture is needed. Evidence to salinization), 60 percent on range land, and 25 is accumulating that present research and policy percent on rainfed crop land. Average gross in- priorities are in need of reorientation, ' but comes per hectare from lands not affected by de- short-term and institutional interests are also in- sertification or salinization were estimated at $400 volved. In this connection, David Vail of Bowdoin for irrigated land, $90 for rainfed crop land and College asks a very relevant question about ag- $3.50 for range land. riculture in the industrialized nations: "In view of Another measure of the economic impact of the power, objectives, and past behavior of the land deterioration is the estimated cost of reme- industries (and government agencies) that have dial measures. According to the Committee on shaped and promoted [energy-]intensive technol- Problems of the Environment of the International ogy, is it reasonable to expect a transformation Council of Scientific Unions (SCOPE), it would of priorities just because it would be in society's cost $25 billion to rehabilitate 50 million hectares long-run interest?""' with the heaviest salt damage.' The U.N. En- For the LDCs, the food projections assume that vironment Program estimates that it will cost $400 land deterioration will not be more serious than million a year to combat desertification. " So far in past decades because farmers will be aware of no global price tag has been placed on halting the problems, will institute practices preventing erosion or overgrazing. more extensive deterioration, and will charge Effects of Genetic Resource Losses. The food more for their crops to cover increased costs. and agriculture projections assume that yields will There is a significant discrepancy between these continue to increase at essentially the same rate assumptions and the environmental projections. as over the past two decades. The yield increases Basically, the environmental projections antic- come in part from distribution of technologies ipate significant increases in the intensity of use already demonstrated in field experiments and in of agriculture lands in the LDCs and very few part from further experimental improvements, preventive or remedial measures. The primary especially in seed. Improvements in seed involve LDC remedial measures implied by the food pro- both increased plant productivity and increased ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 417 (or at least maintained) resistance to plant pests problems will be managed through a global dou- and pathogens. To achieve these ends, local bling in the use of pesticides. A still larger increase strains of crop species are needed, and these are in pesticides is anticipated for the LDCs. being lost rapidly. By contrast, the environmental projections sug- The projected extinction of one-fifth of all spe- gest that pest and disease problems will increase, cies-plants and animals--on the planet is an in- especially if reliance continues to be placed pri- dication of the overall pressure on genetic marily on pesticides. The methods of integrated resources. Most of these extinctions will occur as pest management* may offer a more effective al- a result of tropical deforestation. The genetic ternative, but continued dependence on pesticides losses of most concern to agriculture are not so will enhance resistance in pests and decimate much located in tropical forests as in dry and predator populations. Extensive monocultures of marginal lands where local strains of important genetically identical plants will further increase food grains have evolved high-yield or disease- vulnerability. resistant traits. These local strains are being lost The economic impact of pest management in two ways. First, local strains are lost as more problems will be felt particularly in cash and ex- and more farm lands are put into production with port crops. The problems caused by heavy appli- commercial rather than local seed. Second, land- cations of pesticides have been well demonstrated clearing is destroying habitat for many local wild in cotton fields of the world... as well as on plan- 711 s' varieties. tations of tea, oil palm, vegetables, and fruits.' Concerned plant scientists are increasing their In Northeastern Mexico 250,000 hectares of cot- efforts to collect varieties of crops from all over ton were totally destroyed by the bollworm He- the world before they are lost. The International liothis when it became resistant to all of the Rice Research Institute has a collection of 45,000 pesticides used against it. 711 Similar problems of rice strains in Los Banos, Philippines but consid- resistance were experienced in Texas where the ers that its collection is only a fraction of the costs of protecting cotton in the Rio Grande Val- world's known rice germ plasm .712 There is little ley were higher than anywhere else-11 percent doubt that large numbers of local strains will be of the total production costs. In 1966 cotton farm- lost in the decades ahead. Without new genetic ers in the U.S. were using 47 9ercent of all pes- materials to work with, there are very real limits ticides used by U.S. farmers,' and pest control to what plant breeders can accomplish. costs had become inordinately high. Although the genetic losses most significant to Although many cotton farmers, especially in present-day agriculture are far more likely to oc- the U.S., Mexico, and Peru, are shifting to inte- cur in the fields of subsistence cultivators than in grated pest management techniques for cotton, tropical forests, the extinctions in tropical forests pesticides applied to cotton elsewhere in the world also have implications for future agriculture. continue to represent a large share of the total Tropical forests contain wild progenitors of many pesticide chemical usage. In fact, in LDCs export important crops--cocoa, rubber, oil palm, pine- corps (including cotton) receive most of the pes- apple, and many nuts and fruits, as well as me- ticides now used 757 dicinal plant species and many plants of unexplored The projected 100 percent increase in food pro- food and medical potential. Should the world's duction by 2000 is weakened to the extent that it climate become warmer and wetter, as many cli- assumes that a doubling of the world average ap- matologists believe likely, iliese and other tropical plication rate of pesticides to food crops (and a species could become exceedingly important. quadrupling of the application rate in the LDCs) Finally, it should be mentioned that, livestock will enhance production. Modest applications of genetic resources are also being lost at a rapid pesticides in conjunction with the ecological and rate and without extensive efforts at preservation. cultural techniques of integrated pest manage- Livestock, especially ruminants, are important in ment generally contribute to increased yields in the world's food future because of their capacity the short run, but massive increases in the use of to convert cellulose plant materials (indigestible pesticides alone will definitely increase the chances to humans) into high-quality protein. of major increases in pest resistance over the next Effects of Pest and Disease Management Prob- two decades, as has happened already in cotton. lems. The food projections assume that agricul- *"Integrated pest management" applies to a wide array of pest tural pests and diseases will not present more management techniques that greatly reduce the use of pesti- difficult problems in the future than they have in cides and rely more on biological controls and cultural tech- the past. The projections anticipate that these niques. 418 THE PROJECTIONS The assumption in the food projection that fur- of fertilizers. (The twofold increase is a world av- ther adoption of existing high-yield technology erage; a quadrupling of fertilizer use is anticipated will occur is in essence an assumption that larger in the LDCs.) The projections note that water monocultures of genetically identical strains will management could become the single most im- increase. This assumption implies increased vul- portant constraint on increasing yields in the de- nerability of food staples. The establishment of veloping world. still larger monocultures of rice, wheat, and corn The environmental projections lend strong sup- propagated from an excessively narrow genetic port to the concern over water constraints not base enhances the probability of crop epidemics only in the developing world, but also in indus- on a scale even larger than the 1972 corn blight trialized nations. Competition with energy devel- epidemic in the U.S. The potential economic im- opment will be intense in parts of many pact of such an epidemic is enormous. While a industrialized nations (e.g., the Western U.S.). useful quantification of this potential is not pos- While neither the water assumptions in the food sible, the possibility is real and is increased by the projections nor the water projections themselves trends assumed in the food projections. are sufficiently detailed to permit a close com- Effects of Air Pollution, The food projections parison, much examination of regional water sup- assume that the adverse effects of air pollutants plies would be needed to determine if the water on agricultural production will not increase over assumptions of the food projections are fully jus- the next two decades, but the environmental pro- tified. In addition to water supply, the environmental jections point to a number of potential increases project in air pollution, some of which can be expected ions point to two other aquatic develop- to affect agriculture adversely. ments that will affect the food projections. One The increased combustion of coal will produce concerns the acidity of rain water, the other, var- at least three combustion products of potential iations in supply. significance to agriculture, namely, sulfur oxides The increased emissions of sulfur oxides and (SO.), nitrogen oxides (NOJ and carbon dioxide nitrogen oxides from coal combustion are causing (CO,). Increased CO, in the air could increase rainfall over wide areas to become more acidic. plant growth, but SO,, and NO, emissions are Much of the eastern half of the United States and known to have adverse effects on plants. SO, parts of southern Canada, northern Europe, and emissions can be controlled with the technology southern Scandinavia have all been affected. The now available, so the extent of emissions depends effects of acid rain on crops and soils are only on national pollution control standards. In the beginning to be investigated, but it is already U.S., for example, present standards would re- known that simulated acid rain adversely affects duce SO,, emissions until about 1985, when emis- the growth of some food crops, including soybeans sions would start increasing again. NO,, emissions and kidney beans. It is also known that over a cannot be controlled with existing pollution con- period of 3-5 years simulated acid rain begins to trol technologies. The energy projections are not acidify soils. Most food crops do not grow well in sufficiently detailed or precise to permit an esti- acid soils. The extent to which acid rain will ad- mate of the areas that will be exposed to increased versely affect food production is still unknown, concentrations of SO,, and NO, but over the next 20 years it will probably have Air pollution already causes significant damage much more effect than 'is assumed in the food and to agricultural crops. In the U.S., air pollution agriculture projections in Chapter 6. damage to crops in Southern California alone cost The implications of the anticipated deforesta- farmers $14.8 million per year during the 1972- tion for strearnflows also apply to agriculture in 76 period. The losses amounted to 2 percent of large portions of the developing world. The ab- the crop categories affected. Celery, potatoes, sence of forest cover in the upper reaches of river and tomatoes were especially hard hit. basins tends to exaggerate both peak And mini- Over the next two decades the impact of air mum flows. As a result, flooding and erosion will pollutants on agriculture can be expected to in- be increased during rainy periods, and irrigation crease, especially for farmers downwind of in- potentials will be reduced during dry periods. This effect is not considered in the development of the dustrial centers. The effects may be particularly food projections. severe near industrial centers in LDCs. "" As the preceding paragraphs have indicated, Effects of Aquatic Changes. The food projec- there are apparently many discrepancies between tions assume that water resources will be available the environmental assumptions underlying the to effectively utilize a doubling in the application food projections and the environmental projec- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 419 tions made in the food and agriculture section of crease on a sustained basis; careful planning and this chapter. Land deterioration is likely to be management could, in theory, raise the harvest more extensive than assumed. The assumed pri- of natural marine production to 100 mint by mary reliance on chemical fertilizers to maintain 2000; and economic model projections based on soil fertility will lead to further soil deterioration continued population and GNP growth lead to as well as to increased costs and economic vul- a fish demand in 2000 of 81-83 mint. nerability. Lost genetic resources will reduce the For freshwater fisheries, the projections assume prospects for additional decades of yield in- that: creases. The assumed primary reliance on pesti- - Natural freshwater fisheries are fully exploited cides as a pest management strategy implies at the present 10 mint catch. further pesticide resistance in pest populations - Environmental deterioration will not adversely and decreased populations of pest predators. Air affect this natural freshwater catch. pollution will have adverse effects, as will acid rain. Although the water assumptions are not ex- For aquaculture (fresh- and saltwater), the pro- plicit, the adverse effects of deforestation on jections assume that: water supplies will further complicate an already - There is a significant potential for expanding difficult situation. the present 6 mint harvest of largely high-unit- If these apparent discrepancies could be taken value species. into account, the feedback from the environmen- -tal projection would alter the food projection in - This potential will not be seriously affected by several ways. Most basically, per capita food con- environmental developments over the next two sumption might well be less than that projected decades. in Alternative III in Chapter 6, namely, a 4 per- The environmental projections show develop- cent increase worldwide, a decline of 20 percent ments that will adversely affect natural production in Africa and the Middle East, and increases only of fish, both marine and freshwater, and that will in the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and in Eastern and reduce the potential for both freshwater and ma- Western Europe. The real cost of food might in- rine aquaculture. The only question is how soon crease more than the 100 percent projected, and will the adverse effects be felt. even before 2000 those LDC economies that are Feedback from both continued pollution of largely agrarian may experience a decline in the coastal waters and the loss of coastal habitat could growth of their GNP. significantly affect the marine fisheries projec- Feedback to the Fisheries Projections tions. Discharges of oil, pesticides, heavy metals, and other toxic substances are expected to con- The fisheries projections make several environ- tinue to increase, especially in LDC coastal mentally related assumptions concerning marine waters. By 2000, the impact on fisheries may not .fisheries, freshwater fisheries, and aquaculturc. be universal, but many areas will experience con- For marine fisheries, the projections assume tinuing or increasing contamination by long-lived that: pollutants that may decrease production region- � Increasing demand for marine fish will not lead ally or severely contaminate marine resources. to overfishing so severe that it depletes fish The continuing losses of coastal habitats--es- stocks. tuaries, salt marshes, mangrove communities, � Continuing pollution of coastal waters with oil, etc.-may not lead to a significant global decline pesticides, heavy metals, and other toxic sub- in marine fisheries by 2000. Nonetheless, it is stances will have an overall negative effect on known that most important marine species are the quality or quantity of marine fish catches. dependent at some point in their life cycles on However, the projections implicitly assume that such habitats, and continued loss of these habitats such pollution will not be severe by the year must ultimately have significant impacts on ma- 2000. rine fisheries-impacts that could begin to be felt � Continuing losses of estuaries and coastal wet- before 2000. lands will not significantly reduce natural ma- An example illustrates the economic signifi- rine productivity by 2000. cance of coastal marine habitats in the U.S.: Es- timates made in the northeastern United States � Improved fishing technologies will not be used and the Gulf of Mexico demonstrate that fish pro- in ways that threaten fisheries. duction alone on an acre of submerged coastal � The present world harvest of marine fish of wetlands has an annual value (in 1970 dollars) of about 60 million metric tons (mmt) will not in- $380, which over even.a relatively short 20-year 420 T14E PROJECTIONS life period represents $7,980 at a 5 percent dis- Coastal and estuarine breeding and spawning count rate. However, for every acre of coastal waters for many oceanic fish will also be affected, wetlands dredged or filled, the production of two especially in regional seas. In the Mediterranean, additional acres is lost because of the resulting for example, coastal aquaculture, which now disruption by siltation and other impacts. As a yields 165,000 tons of fish each year, is seriously result, a single acre of coastal wetlands lost to threatened by land-based pollution, as are the dredge and fill operations represents $23,940 in 700,000 tons caught annually in the open Medi- lost seafood production potential alone,@ and terranean. The $5.0 billion price tag on the coastal wetlands provide many other ecological cleanup of the Mediterranean Sea is well justified benefits that have not been included in this esti- by the benefits of conserving these fisheries re- 7-19 mate. sources as well as the 100 million visitor per year Marine fish production will also be affected b tourist industry and the 100 wetland sanctuaries y for birds and marine life.7" hydrologic developments on the land. The pro- ductivity of coastal waters is enhanced by the nor- Brackish-water fish ponds line the coasts of mal flows of rivers and the sediments and organic many Asian countries and yield highly prized matter they bring to the ocean food chain. This Chinese milkfish and shrimp. They too are seri- function of rivers is being increasingly impaired ously threatened by pollution, particularly pesti- by large dams which control floods, regulate cides in runoff but also by toxic substances in flows, and trap sediments and organic matter. The municipal and industrial effluents. 7"' Paddy rice food and the water projections implicitly assume cum fish culture operations are also jeopardized that a large number of dams and reservoirs will by pesticides in water and an important nutritional be constructed by 2000. The importance, magni- impact results, since snails, crabs, and small fish tude, and timing of the resulting impact on ocean which. normally inhabit flooded rice paddies are fisheries can be deduced from examples but ca a major source of protein for farm families n- 711 not be projected in any detail. (In some cases the throughout Asia. impact on marine fish production may be offset As the preceding paragraphs have indicated, to some degree by new fish production in the res- there are a number of potential and apparent dis- ervoirs.) The effect of the Aswan Dam on the crepancies between the assumptions of the fish- Mediterranean's sardine fishery is a well-known eries projections and the environmental example of this phenomenon. projections. If the apparent discrepancies could The effects of irrigation development, in- be eliminated in the analysis, the accumulative creased sewage discharge from LDC cities, and effects of the environmental trends, in conjunc- increased use of pesticides and fertilizers could tion with increasing demands for fishery products, seriously affect both the projected freshwater could lead to a decrease in the world's total fishery catch and aquaculture. Irrigation development resources. The anticipated environmental devel- often adversely affects habitats for freshwater fish opments will certainly have a negative effect on by increasing temperatures, reducing the oxygen these resources because the trends are largely content of the water and increasing salinity. The disruptive and poisoning. When these effects projected increase in the use 'of fertilizers will en- would be felt is open to speculation, but there is hance algal blooms, eutrophication, and depletion a distinct possibility that the adverse effects of of dissolved oxygen in reservoirs and lakes. Acid continued environmental deterioration will have rain from increased coal combustion will acidify noticeably affected many fishery resources before lakes in many industrialized nations, eliminating 2000. the use of the lakes for aquaculture or the natural Feedback to the Minerals Projections production of fish. Pesticide residues from a dou- The environmental projections are not likely to bling to a quadrupling of pesticide applications have significant direct feedbacks to the nonfuel will pollute streams, rivers, reservoirs, and lakes, minerals/projections because mineral production killing small fish. is not particularly sensitive to environmental con- *These figures are not intended. to establish a precise value for ditions. A change in air quality, for example, has coastal wetlands. Estimated values vary widely and are hard little direct effect on mining. to estimate (See "The Value of Wetlands" in Elinor Lander There are indirect feedbacks, however, that Horwitz, Our Nation's Wetlands: An Interagency Task Force may besignificant. As land disruption, water pol- Report, GPO stock no. 041-011-00045-9, Washington: U.S. lution, and air pollution affect human health and Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 28-29). The figures are used here only as an indication of real, non-zero value for the nonmining sectors of the economy, human coastal wetlands. institutions (e.g., governments, insurance coin- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 421 panies, etc.) may impose further regulations that the next two decades. The energy projections as- will reduce the environmental impacts of mining sume further that there will be no constraints on and increase mining costs. the water or energy needed for energy develop- The nonfuel mineral projections are not based ment. on any explicit environmental assumptions. Large amounts of water are needed for coal Implicitly, they assume that environmental reg- mining, synthetic fuel production, and oil-shale ulations will not significantly constrain world min- production, and at least in the arid west, these ing activities over the next two decades. They water needs will conflict with mining and agri- assume further than the nonfuel minerals sector cultural needs. In 1978, the U.S. Water Resource will receive all of the water and energy needed Council anticipated increasing pressures on water for the projected growth. All of these assumptions resources in the Missouri and Upper Colorado are somewhat questionable. River basins, where coal and oil-shale mining are Water, for example, is needed in the mining developing, but beyond those areas, the Council and processing of both fuel-mineral and nonfuel- foresaw no other major conflicts between the mineral ores, and water availability could be an water needs of the coal industry and of other water important constraint. While the amounts needed users."" The water picture in the U.S. may for mining are relatively small (in the U.S. they change, however, if there is a significant increase amount to only about 2 percent of total with- in the production of synthetic fuels, which require drawals), and while the water-quality require- large amounts of water. ments are relatively low, water resources will Water for evaporative cooling at nuclear and become increasingly constrained everywhere. coal-powered electric generating plants may also Competition for water between agriculture, min- present problems in some areas. In Western Eu- erals development, and energy production will rope, for example, withdrawals for evaporative become much more intense in the years ahead. cooling may present a constraint when added to The use of energy in mining and refining may all other water demands. In the U.S., consump- be more troubling. The energy requirements of tive cooling water withdrawals are expected to be declining ore grades has not yet been examined the fastest-growing component of water use over carefully, and the economics of mining -will cer- the 1975-2000 period, increasing from 1.3 to 7.8 tainly be affected by further increases in energy percent of total water consumption. Overall, costs. The economic recoverability of some re- water can be expected to become more of a con- sources now classed as (economically recovera- str;iint than is assumed in the energy, agriculture, ble) reserves may even be affected if energy prices and nonfuel minerals projections. continue to rise sharply. Like water, energy itself is a critical input in Finally, laws and regulations to preserve envi- energy development. The energy projections im- ronmental quality may be tightened in the future plicitly assume that adequate energy will be avail- as the projected increases in mining and refining able for energy development, conversion, and activities impact on land, air, and water resources. delivery. In fact, the energy efficiency of the en- However, the assumptions underlying the projec- ergy sector (end-use energy supplied per unit of tions-no tightening of the laws and regulations primary energy used) may decrease as a result of controlling the environmental impacts of min- the projected increases in primary energy con- ing-are consistent with the Global 2000 Study's version to secondary energy forms, especially overall assumption of no policy changes between electricity and (perhaps) synthetic fuels. This the present and the year 2000. means that the energy se 'ctor itself will require increasing amounts of primary energy in order to Feedback to the Energy Projections supply a given amount of end-use energy need in Like the nonfuel minerals projection, little or the economy. Net energy analysis and energy ef- no direct environmental feedback is expected to ficiency are not a part of the current energy pro- commercial energy production (coal, oil, gas, plus jections, and its seems likely that the energy nuclear and hydro generation) in the industrial- efficiency of the energy sector will be examined ized nations, but significant feedback may be in- more extensively in the years ahead. Ultimately, volved in the LDCs' use of organic fuels. some of the assumptions underlying the energy The energy and fuel mineral projections do not projections may be brought into question. make explicit assumptions about the future en- Energy development in the industrialized na- vironment but implicitly assume that environ- tions will produce significant environmental im- mental laws and regulations will not limit pacts over the next two decades, and the laws and development or significantly increase costs over regulations relating to its development may change 422 THE PROJECTIONS significantly. The energy Projections, however, loss of seafood production total ing-by one esti- assume no change in environmental regulations mate-nearly $24,000 for each acre of dredged and no significant increases in the cost of envi- coastal wetlands is but one example. *) Unfortu- ronmental protection. This assumption is consist- nately, available data on such losses are so incom- ent with the Global 2000 Study's overall assumption plete that the cost figures cannot even be termed of no policy change. spotty, but they make a basic point: The goods In the LDCs, there will be feedback from the and services provided by the environment-@-from environmental projections to the energy projec- the decomposition of wastes to the absorption of tions in two ways. First, deforestation from all carbon dioxide--contribute substantially but sub- causes will contribute to the growing shortages of tly to the GNP in each economic sector. Projected fuelwood. Second, deteriorating range conditions losses in environmental goods and services will may reduce the amount of dung available for fuel. significantly affect every economic sector, but es- pecially-but not exclusively-those involving re- Feedback to the GNP Projections newable resources. The feedback of the evironmental projections There will also be feedback from the nonre- to the GNP projections (and also to the popula- newable resource sectors. For example, different tion projections, which are considered next) is energy strategies allow for comparable degrees of more complex than the feedbacks considered so environmental protection with very different cap- far. The complexities arise both from the several ital (and GNP) implications. All of the projections linkages through which environmental feedback are based on the assumption of no capital con- influences GNP and from the indirect nature of straints. In actual fact, capital is scarce and ex- the feedbacks. pensive, and intense competition among the Environmental developments influence GNP in sectors can be expected over the next two decades at least three different ways. One way is, through as efforts are made to develop a new energy econ- the influence that environmental developments omy, raise food production, increase water avail- have on individual economic sectors, which in turn ability, increase mineral production, and protect influence the total GNP. Another is through the the environment. Increasing costs of obtaining influence that human health has on GNP. Finally, many resources can be expected to contribute to the economic activity associated with environ- inflation and capital scarcity, thus indirectly af- mental protection efforts also influences GNP. fecting GNP. These tfiree linkages from the environment to Feedback from environmental protection ef- GNP are not easily discerned in the assumptions forts to GNP is also subtle and complex. No stud- that underly the GNP projections. While there ies have yet been done of this feedback for are no explicit environmental assumptions in industrialized economies as a group, but the issue those projections, they seem to assume implicitly has been examined for'the U.S. economy. that the environment will continue to provide each The U.S. study, recently done by Data Re- economic sector with the same goods and services sources, Inc. (DRI) for the Environmental Pro- as in the past, but in substantially increased tection Agency (EPA), analyzes the economic amounts, without interruption and without in- effects of federal air and water pollution control crease in cost (generally taken to be zero). The programs over the 1970-86 period. The DRI study discrepancies that follow from this assumption arrived at the following conclusions: are, of course, somewhat different for the indus- trialized countries than for the LDCs. - The extra investment required for the federal air and water pollution control programs has a Feedback to the Industrialized Economies. positive economic effect until 1981, after which Feedback from the environment through the var- it turns slightly negative due to inflation and ious sectors of the economy have been discussed reduced productivity. As a result the real GNP in the preceding sections on forestry, water, food, would be 1.0 percent lower at the end of the fisheries, nonfuel minerals, and energy. These period than if there has been no incremental feedbacks involve parts of the environment that pollution control expenditures. are economically valued (e.g., land and forests), as well as parts that are not valued economically (e.g., populations of predator insects). An at- *The figures used here are only illustrative. Estimates vary tempt has been made to include in these discus- widely. (See "The Value of Wetlands," in Elinor Lander Hor- witz, Our Nation's Wetlands: An Interagency Task Forced Re- sions a few indications of the costs of lost port, GPO Stock No. 041-011-&J0454, Washington: U.S. environmental goods and services. (The estimated Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 28-29. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 423 �The federal air and water pollution control pro- tribute to increased GNP. But these are not the grams are slightly inflationary, adding 0.3 per- only effects. An improvement in health reduces cent to the overall rate of inflation each year the goods and services delivered by the medical through 1986. sector of the economy, thus diminishing GNP. �Employment benefits remain constant, even Similar subtleties occur in the case of soil health. after construction ends, due to the labor needed Declines in soil quality due to compaction and in operation and maintenance of pollution con- erosion are known to be occuring widely in the trol equipment and installations.'" U.S., but by replacing lost fertility with energy- At the time of the DRI study's release, s intensive inputs, declining soil productivity may administrator pointed out that the DRI study did actually increase GNP-but at the cost of (among not measure many of the benefits of cleaner air other things) increased dependence on foreign and water, and as a result depicted the worst pos- sources of energy. These two examples suggest sible economic impact. Had the study been more that in industrialized countries the linkages be- complete, the negative impacts might have been tween environmental developments and GNP largely counterbalanced or outweighed by consid- may be quite different from the linkages between eration of benefits such as enhanced agricultural environmental developments and national wel- production, greater fish harvests, lower mainte- fare. nance and depreciation costs for materials and Feedback to the LDC Economies. The model processes affected by air and water pollution, and used to develop GNP projections for the LDCs improved health."' makes environmental assumptions that are similar The EPA administrator's comments on the DRI to those contained in the GNP models of indus- study refer to the third type of feedback from the trial economies. Neither of the GNP models environment to GNP, namely the linkage through makes explicit assumptions about goods and serv,- human health. While again no studies for the in- ices provided by the environment; both assume dustralized nations as a group have been done, implicitly that environmental goods and services the impacts of air pollution on human health in will be available without interruption in much the U.S. have been studied in a report, also pre- larger quantities and at no increase in cost. Fur- pared for EPA, by a group of resource economists thermore, in the case of the model of the LDC at the University of Wyoming. Completed in economies, it is assumed that environmental con- 1979, the study documents a very significant lin- siderations are relatively unimportant compared kage between environment, health, and GNP. It with trade with developed nations. This last as- @oncludes that the health benefits from a 60 per- sumption is inherent in the model's structure, un- cent reduction in air pollution would amount to der which the LDC economies are assumed to a total annual savings of $40 billion ($185 per expand only through trade with industrialized person)-$36 billion representing a decrease in countries, and as a consequence, can grow only illnesses and $4 billion, a decrease in mortality when industrial economies are growing, This last rates*"" The major health benefits associated with assumption has been questioned both as'to its the reduction in air pollution particulates were necessity and its desirability for the LDCs. more on-the-job time for everyone and increased Actually, the same three types of linkages relate productivity of those people suffering from chronic environmental developments to GNP in the in- illnesses associated with air pollution. The Envi- dustrialized countries as in the LDCs. The three ronmental Protection Agency estimated on the linkages-through the economic sectors, through basis ofthe figures above that the 12 percent de- human health and productivity, and through ex- crease in particulates alone that has been achieved penditures on environmental protection-are between 1970 and 1977 provides $8 billion in probably even more important in determining health benefits each year compared to the total GNP (and welfare) in the LDCs than in the in- 1977 expenditures on all air pollutants from sta- dustrialized nations. tionary sources (the primary sources of particu- Linkages through the economic sectors illus- lates) of $6.7 billion.' trate this last point. In the LDCs, the industrial The linkages between the environment and sectors (such as oil, chemicals, steel, and manu- GNP involve a number of subtleties; the linkages facturing) are.by definition less developed (i.e., through human health and soil conditions provide industrialized). and the economic sectors based two interesting examples. In the case of human on renewable resources (forestry, fisheries, agri- health, improvements in air quality increase pro- culture) are the economic mainstays of the do- ductivity and time on the job, both of which con- mestic economy.'Environmental deterioration 424 THE PROJECTIONS strongly affects the renewable resource sectors. may find the LDCs increasingly attractive sites for Deforestation is, simply put, a matter of living their plants. Industries involved in the production from biological capital, not from its dividends, of toxic substances may become especially inter- and the LDCs' tropical forest capital will largely ested in LDC locations.' Increased industrial be spent by 2000. Fuelwood shortages will in- activity, even of the highly polluting sort, may crease the use of dung for fuel, reducing the re- increase the GNP of LDC economies-and per- cycling of nutrients to the soil, and so will haps even national welfare-but before this pos- adversely affect the agricultural sector. Defores- sibility is accepted as valid, the adverse effects of tation will exaggerate peak and minimum stream- the pollution on other economic sectors and on flows, which will increase erosion, degrade water human productivity need to be examined care- quality, and reduce productivity in the agricultural fully. * and fisheries sectors. Overgrazing will deplete In both LDCs and industrialized countries, en- grass and range land resources, which will speed vironmental developments influence GNP di- up desertification and adversely affect the agri- rectly through economic sectors, indirectly through cultural sector. Efforts to increase agricultural human health and productivity, and, subtly, production with pesticides, fertilizers, and irri- through expenditures on environmental protec- gation will require increasingly expensive energy- tion. The Global 2000 Study's.projections of GNP intensive inputs, which may in turn intensify bal- make no explicit assumptions about the environ- ance of payment problems to a greater extent than ment but implicitly assume that environmental they increase domestic GNP. The projected quad- developments will not reduce GNP growth in rupling of agricultural chemical usage would also either developed or developing countries. A com- adversely affect the fisheries sector. In short, pro- parison of this assumption with the preceding par- jected environmental developments in the LDCs agraphs reveals many discrepancies. While it is can be expected to have pervasive adverse effects not possible to modify the GNP projections to on GNP through the vitally important agricul- eliminate these discrepancies, a more adequate tural, forestry, and fisheries sectors of the econ- consideration of environmental developments in omies. the GNP projections would probably lead to lower The effects of environmental developments on estimates of GNP growth, especially in the LDCs. GNP via human health and productivity are In any case, environmental deterioration will im- equally strong. The projected increases in urban- pair the quality of life in both industrialized and ization in the absence of adequate sewage and developing countries, and "additions" to GNP potable water facilities can only lead to significant required to offset pollution or health damages increases in the incidence of fecally related con- might more properly be substituted since they do tagious disease and morbidity generally. The not involve a net increase in desired goods and quadrupled use of pesticides will (and already has) services. lead to major increases in worker illness and'poi- soning. The water development projects implied Feedback to the Population Projections by the food projections will expand habitats for Feedback from the environmental projections disease vectors, increasing the incidence of schis- to future population levels occurs through the ef- tosomiasis, river blindness, and malaria. Wide- fects of environmental changes on health, mor- spread malnutrition will complicate the increased tality, fertility, and migration. The feedback morbidity. The combined effects of the projected through health, mortality, and fertility will be environmental developments can be expected to most significant for the LDC population projec- significantly reduce human productivity and GNP in the LDCs. *M. Greg Bloche, a Yale medical student, has recently inter- To date many of the LDCs have not made ma- viewed the minister of health in the People's Republic of China jor investments in industrial pollution, control on the subject of the environmental and health impacts of technologies, and the GNP projections assume industrialization. He reports that China is having the same that laws and regulations affecting industrial pol- difficulties as industrialized nations in coping with rapid in- lution control expenditures in the LDCs will not creases (a doubling over two decades) in the illnesses of in- dustrialization-cancer, hypertension, and heart diseases. He be increased significantly over the next two dec- also reports familiar tensions in carefully and objectively ex- ades. This assumption is consistent with the atnining the merits of environmental standards and quotes the Global 2000 Study's overall assumption of no pol- minister of health as remarking tersely: "Of course the Min- icy change. istry of Health wants high standards and the Ministry of In- In the absence of stringent pollution control dustry wants low standards. You can spend less money on low standards." (M. Greg Bloche, "China Discovers Health Perils laws and regulations, multinational corporations Accompany Modernization," Washington Post, Aug. 19.1979, engaged in highly polluting industrial processes p. A21.) ENVIRONMENT PROJECrIONS 425 tions. The feedback through migration will also tions. have led to decreased mortality rates in the affect LDC demographics to a small extent and past, continued improvements will lead to similar will have a relatively long-lasting effect on pop- decreases in mortality rates in the future. ulations in some industrialized nations. There appear to be a number of discrepancies Feedback to the Population Projections for the between the Global 2000 Study's low-fertility, LDCs. The environmental assumptions underly- low-mortality population assumptions/projections ing the LDC population projections are largely and the Study's environmental projections. The subassumptions of the fertility and, mortality rate population projections assume continued im- assumptions. Fertility rates and mortality rates provements in human welfare throughout LDC are not projected by the population model, but societies. Discrepancies between this assumption rather are fed into the model as a large number and the environmental projections can be seen for of time-series assumptions/projections. The en- large aggregate areas of the LDC nations, for vironmental assumptions underlying the exter- large rural LDC areas, and increasingly for LDC nally developed fertility and mortality projections urban areas. are the assumptions that need examining here. The assumed continued moderate social and To understand how environmental assumptions economic progress throughout the LDCs appear to be contradicted by trends in GNP, food, and enter into the fertility and mortality assumptions/ energy. The per capita GNP projections-even projections, the methods by which these projec- without correction for decreased goods and serv- tions were developed must first be reviewed ices from the environment-do not show mod- briefly (a more detailed explanation will be found erate increases throughout the LDCs. In the in Chapters 2 and 15). The process is basically medium case, growth in per capita GNP slows to this: The fertility rate (or mortality rate) for the 0 1 percent per year for parts of South Asia for base year is estimated on the basis of available the 1985-2000 period. Per capita GNP growth for data and is then projected forward in time, using the entire African continent slows to less than 1.4 one or two methods--either a general continua- percent per year for the same period, and al- tion of past trends or the establishment of a "tar- though figures for the poorest countries in Africa get" figure for the final year of the projection. are not available separately, they are certain to Under both approaches, the projected fertility be much lower than the continental average. Food rate (or mortality rate) is adjusted upward or consumption per capita does not show moderate downward to take into account assumed influ- increases throughout the LDCs. For the LDCs ences of the environment and other factors, such overall, per capita daily caloric consumption- as the availability of family planning services.* again, with no reductions for anticipated environ- There are two environmentally related assump- mental problems-increases only slightly, from 93 tions used in developing and adjusting the pro- percent of FAO minimum standards for the 1973- jections of the LDC fertility rates: (1) continued 74 period to 94 percent, in 2000. This single per- moderate social and economic progress in all centage point increase masks declines for the LDCs throughout the projection period and (2) poorest LDC nations and for the poorest classes a more or less continuous decline in fertility rates in all LDC societies. Per capita daily calorie con- throughout LDC societies caused in part by the sumption in the Central African LDCs falls from assumed continuation of social and economic 90 percent of FAO minimum standards for the progress. The environmentally rel6ted assump- 1973-74 period to 77 percent in 2000. * The energy tion underlying the mortality rate assumption/pro- sector will also affect health. The projected dou- jection is basically that, to the extent that improved bling of world energy prices will force the LDC"s, sanitation, nutrition and environmental condi- chronically short of foreign exchange, to depend *At the request of the U.S. Agency for International Devel- increasingly on domestic organic ftiels. But the opment, two sets of demographic projections were developed Food and Agriculture Organization projects that for the Global 2000 Study. One set was developed by the U.S. by 1994 there will be a fuelwood shortfall of 650 Bureau of the Census, the other by thi Community and Family million cubic meters annually, approximately one Study Center (CFSC) of the University of Chicago. The two projections use basically the same environmental assumptions quarter of the fuelwood consumption projected but differ significantly in their assumptions concerning the ef- by FAO for the year 2000. The health hazards fectiveness of family planning progams. Further details on the associated with undercooked foods and inade- differences between the two sets of projections is provided in quate heat are well known. In short, the aggregate Chapte6 2 and 15 and in Paul Demeny, "On the End of the Population Explosion," Population and Development Review, *717he figures for per capita daily calorie consumption are from Mar. 1979, pp. 141-62, and in Donald J. Bogue and Amy Ong Alternative III of the food and agriculture projections in Chap- Tsui, "A Rejoinder to Paul Demeny's Critique," May 1979 ter 6-the only alternative that includes increasing energy (draft submitted to Population and Development Review). costs. 426 THE PROJEMONS projections of GNP, food, and energy--even rect these discrepancies by incorporating feedback without any correction for environmental deteri- from environmental projections into the demo- oration-do not suggest continued moderate graphic projections for the LDCs, some signifi- progress for all segments of the populations cant numerical changes would probably occur. throughout the LDCs. The projections for Pakistan are a case in point. Beyond the broad, aggregate trends, rural LDC The environmental and other projections for areas will experience problems uniquely their Pakistan do not support the general assumption own. The pressure on all agricultural lands will underlying the population projections, namely, increase enormously. The number of persons that continued moderate increases in social and eco- will have to be. supported per arable hectare will nomic welfare. Even before any environmental increase from 2.9 in the 1970-75 period to 5.3 by considerations are taken into account, growth in 2000. The expansion of irrigation facilities im- Pakistan's per capita GNP is projected essentially plicitly assumed in the food projections will sub- to come to a halt during the 1985-2000 period, stantially increase habitats for disease vectors. and there are many environmental considerations Malaria-carrying mosquitos are developing pro- to be taken into account in Pakistan. Virtually gressively greater resistance to the major pesti- every environmental feedback discussed in the cides used to control them. The quadrupled use past few paragraphs applies to Pakistan. There- of pesticides assumed in the food and agriculture fore, to the extent that the fertility and mortality projections will lead to increased pesticide pol- rates for Pakistan were assumed to be lowered by lution and poisonings. continued moderate increases in social and eco- The largest impacts on LDC health, however, nomic welfare, the rates are too low. If environ- may occur in the, urban areas. Over the last mental feedbacks had been explicitly taken into quarter of this century the urban population of account, life expectancies might have been pro- the world is projected to increase from 39 percent jected to remain about the same or to increase to almost 50 percent. The largest increases will only slightly rather than to rise by an average of occur in LDC cities. Mexico City is projected to nine years.* Similarly, something less than a 28 increase from 10.9 million in 1975 to 31.6 million percent decline in the crude birth rate (from 44.54 in 2000, roughly three times the present popula- to 32.12) might have been anticipated, even with tion of metropolitan New York City. Calcutta is a fairly strong family planning program. projected to reach nearly twice New York's pres- If environmental feedback were to be explicitly ent population by 2000. Jakarta's population more considered throughout the population projec- than triples to reach 16.9 million. Altogether, it tions, analogous adjustments would be necessary is projected that 1.2 billion additional persons-- in the projections for many other LDC countries, roughly a quarter of the present total world pop- including Haiti, Thailand, Mexico, India, Indo- ulation-will be added to LDC cities, and the nesia, Bolivia, Bangladesh, and the countries of most rapid growth will be in uncontrolled settle- sub-Saharan Africa. ments, where populations are now doubling every Feedback to the Population Projections for the 5-7 years. Financial resources are not likely to be Industrialized Countries. The feedbacks to the available to the poor in uncontrolled settlements population projections for the industrialized na- or to their city governments, even for providing tions are relatively few compared to those for the safe water. Sewage facilities "I be limited at best. LDC population. The linkages are primarily Fecally related diseases can be expected to in- through the health implications of energy devel- crease. The forestry and energy projections sug- opment and through migration. gest that warm, dry, uncrowded housing will be The energy projections show clearly that by even less available than now-a condition that 2000 a transition away from petroleum must be will foster the transmission of contagious diseases. well in progress for most industrialized nations. Pathogen resistance to the least expensive anti- The choices lie along a spectrum that ranges from biotics and other drugs is becoming more common the soft path (a highly efficient energy sector using in the treating of many diseases, including ma- a minimal amount of primary energy drawn as laria, typhoid, dysentery, and the venereal dis- much as possible from solar and other renewable eases. This increased resistance, along with sources) to the hard path (a relatively inefficient continued malnutrition, will make epidemics more energy sector using relatively large amounts of frequent and harder to control. primary energy drawn from coal and riuclear Overall, there appear to be significant discrep- ancies between the environmental projections and *For females, the projected increase over the 1975-2000 period the assumptions underlying the population pro- is from 53.63 to 63.95 years (19 percent) in the medium series jections for the LDCs. If it were possible to cor- of the Bureau of Census projections; for males the increase is from 54.50 to 62.30 years (14 percent). ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 427 sources). Most nations have yet to choose among increasing) immigration can also be expected for their options, but when the choice is made, it will parts of Europe and the Middle East. have significant health implications. The hard It is thus clear that feedback from the environ- path coal option implies increasing problems with mental projections to the population projections particulates, oxides of sulfur, and oxides of nitro- has implications for the population estimates for gen, all of which have health adverse effects. The both LDC and industrialized nations. For the in- hard path nuclear option implies increasing prob- dustrialized nations, migration may increase growth lems of disposal of radioactive wastes from ura- rates in some cases by one half of a percentage nium mining, from low-level nuclear wastes, and point or so. For the LDCs, the effects are more from spent nuclear fuel, and radiation problems complex and dependent on the situation in indi- as well. The soft-path renewable-resource options vidual countries. If environmental factors could also present a number of health problems. The have been taken into account explicitly through- energy projections do not extend to 2000, and it out the Global 2000 Study population projections, is not possible to predict how nations will make the total world estimates for 2000 might well have their energy choices. Whatever the choices are, been about the same as the present projection- however, th -ey can be expected to have significant a 46-64 percent increase to a total world popu- and varied health implications, but are unlikely lation of 5.9-6.8 billion in 2000-but for some- to significantly affect population growth. what different reasons: Birth rates would have The other major feedback from the environ- generally been somewhat higher and life expec- mental projections to the population projections tancies lower . for the industrialized nations involves migration. Summing Up International migration is a diffic 'ult subject from many perspectives, including that of the demog- The foregoing analysis of the enviconmental rapher. The demographer's problem is that mi- feedbacks to the Global 2000 projections reveals grants are often in violation of immigration laws, numerous and serious differences (discrepancies) and as a result avoid being counted in a census. between the projected future world environment Difficult as the problem is for demographers, and the assumptions that were used in the pop- the projected LDC population growth coupled ulation, GNP, and resource projections of Chap- with the projected LDC environmental trends ters 2-12. Many of the study projections assume suggests that there will be increasing pressures implicitly that terrestrial, aquatic, and atmos- from international migration. Although the flows pheric resources will continue to provide goods cannot be quantified and projected precisely, in- and services in ever increasing amounts without creased migration can be anticipated from North maintenance, moderation, or protection.t Such Africa to Europe, from South Asia to the oil-rich personal communication, 1979). Anne Ehrlich suggests that nations of the Middle East, and from Central to the figures are too high (personal communication, 1979). The North America (Mexico City, for example, is only Golden Door, a recent book on migration between Mexico about 500 miles from the Mexican-U.S. border). and the United States attempts to trace the history of the Even the limited statistics available for the 800,000 estimate (Paul R. Ehrlich, Loy Bilderback, and Anne United States illustrate the demographic signifi- Ehrlich, New York: Ballantine, 1979, p. 180). INS Staff In- cance of migration. The so-called natural increase vestigator E. Collison suggests the recent work of Clarice Lan- caster of the U.S. Department of HEW and Frederick (excess of births over deaths) for the U.S. is now Scheuern of the U.S. Social Security Administration as a roughly 1.3 million per year. Approximately widely accepted estimate. Clarice Lancaster and Frederick 400,000 foreign visitors per year remain in the Scheuern estimate that in 1970 there were between 2.9 and 5.7 country illegally, and in addition approximately million illegal aliens in the U.S. ("Counting the Uncountable: Some Initial Statistical Speculations Employing Capture-Re- 800,000 successfully enter the country illegally capture Technique," paper presented at the American Statis- each year, adding about 1.2 million persons to the tical Association Annual Meeting, 1977). U.S. population annually, an amount almost iden- tIn the U.S., this and related assumptions have been ques- tical with the natural increase of about 0.6 percent tioned with increasing frequency by many groups. The rela- per year. * As a result, the population growth rate tionship between the environment and human economic institutions is highly complex, and many environmental leaders for the U.S. is probably closer to 1.2 percent per believe that some basic value changes will be needed before year than the 0.6 percent per year estimate given a sustainable relationship can develop. Several feminist writers in Table 2-12 in Chapter 2. Similar (and probably have drawn interesting parallels between the values underlying the relationship between humankind and Mother Nature on *These estimates were obtained in 1976 by Justin Blackwelder, the one hand and values underlying relationships between men president of the Environmental Fund, Washington, from the and women. See, for example: Susan Griffin, Woman and U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and were Nature: The Roaring Inside Her, New York: Harper, 1978; published by the Environmental Fund in 1976 in "U.S. Pop- Mary Daly, GYNIECOLOGY.- The Metaphysics of Radical ulation Larger Than Official Census Figures." The INS has Feminism, Boston: Beacon, 1978; and DorothyDinnerstein, since stopped making such estimates, and will not now confirm The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and or deny the estimates (E. Collison, INS Staff Investigator, Human Malaise, New York: Harper, 1978. 428 THE PROJECTIONS assumptions are unrealistic. The Global 2000 sulting from salinization (which now affects half Study's environmental analyses point to many of the world's irrigated soils), or of the soil losses areas where the capacity of the environment to and hydraulic destabilization that will accompany provide goods and services can no longer be taken the projected deforestation. Nor did the Academy for granted. There are two reasons. First, the de- anticipate the rapid rise in the cost of energy-in- mand for environmental goods and services is tensive fertilizers and pesticides. In short, the vast outstripping the capacity of the environment to majority of the information that has become avail- provide, as both population and per capita con- able over the past decade suggests that the Acad- sumption expand. Second, in many areas the eco- emy's estimate is reasonable, perhaps even logical systems that provide the goods and services optimistic: The earth's carrying capacity, under are being undermined, extinguished, and poi- intensive management is about 10 billion persons soned. While informed and careful management "with some degree of comfort and individual of the environment might still increase the goods choice," and about 30 billion otherwise. and services it provides in some areas, in other The world's population picture has, of course, areas the demands placed on the environment are changed since the Academy's report in 1969, approaching, and in some areas have exceeded, when there were about 3.6 billion persons and the its sustainable carrying capacity. total was increasing at about 2 percent per year. Added insight into the meaning of the Global In 1979, there are approximately 4.3 billion per- 2000 Study's projections can be obtained by com- sons, and the number is increasing at about 1.8 paring them with a National Academy of Sciences percent per year. The Global 2000 Study's pro- estimate of the ultimate carrying capacity of the jections suggest that by 2000 there will be about global environment. The Academy's 1969 report, 6.35 billion persons, and that the number will in-, Resources and Man, concluded that the world crease at about 1.7 percent per year. Clearly@ if population must be stabilized at levels consider- present demographic trends continue, population ably lower than 10 billion, if human life is to be growth will not stop-i.e., the annual percentage comfortably sustained within the resource limits increase will not fall to zero-until well into the of the earth.'" The Academy also concluded that, 21st century. If a net reproductive rate of 1.0 even by sacrificing individual comfort and choice, (replacement fertility) could somehow be achieved the human population is unlikely ever to exceed in 2000, the world's population would peak at 30 billion persons. approximately 8.4 billion by about the year Information that has become available since 2100.' If it were to continue growing at the rate 1969 tends not only to confirm the Academy's projected for 2000 (1.7 per unit per year), the findings but to point to even more severe limits. world population would reach 10 billion in 2027, For example, the Academy based its conclusion and 30 billion in 2091. as to the earth's carrying capacity on the assumed As of 1980, the year 2027 is 47 years away. To availability of 61 million hectares more arable put it another way, a child born in 1980 will be land than was projected by the U.S. Department 47 years old in 2027. Persons now under the age of Agriculture for the Global 2000 Study, The of 24 years can expect to live to 2027 (assuming Academy's report assumed a sustainable fish a 70-year life expectancy). They may be living in catch 40 million tons per year higher than the a world whose population is approaching the max- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra- imum number that an intensively managed earth tion has estimated for the Global 2000 Study.* In can sustain with, as the National Academy puts its estimates, the Academy had assumed that one- it, "some degree of comfort and individual choice." half of the world's potentially arable land was What are the major environmental developments under cultivation so that a twofold increase in that these persons may observe? production could be expected by developing the The Global 2000 Study's environmental pro- other half, and two additional twofold increases jections, based on the assumption of no changes could be obtained by increased productivity and in policy, point to major changes in all three of innovation respectively, leading to an eightfold the earth's major environments-terrestrial, potential increase in food production. Its study aquatic, and atmospheric. The projections also made no mention of the productivity losses re- point to a group of emerging environmental prob- lems, some of which are global in scope, some of *It is perhaps notable that the historically steep upward trend which involve vicious circles of causality, and in marine fish catch peaked at 60 million tons just as the some, increased societal vulnerability. By and National Academy of Sciences made its estimate of a 100 mil. Jarge, these environmental problems will be dif lion ton potential. ficult to resolve, even with major policy changes. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 429 In the terrestrial environment, the basic change chemicals in varying amounts that tend to reduce to be anticipated is a general deterioration of soil concentrations of ozone in the upper atmosphere, quality over most of the earth. The immediate potentially increasing the amount of ultraviolet causes vary from one area to another, but gen- radiation, which is damaging to plants, animals, erally involve demands on local ecosystems and and humans. soils and population growth that will be impos- Several developments are anticipated that will sible to sustain. Desertification will claim large affect all three major environments (air, water, areas, in the LDCs of Africa, Asia, and Latin land). The release of toxic substances, including America, as will erosion following shortened fal- pesticides, is being controlled increasingly in in- low cycles and tropical deforestation. Erosion, dustrialized nations, but under present policies compaction, and hardpanning will affect increas- growing amounts of these substances can be ex- ingly large areas in the industrialized nations, as pected to enter the air, land, and water in LDCs. will salinization, alkalinization, and waterlogging Materials emitting low-level radiation will be re- of irrigated lands everywhere. Farm land will con- leased in increased amounts into all three envi- tinue to be lost to urban and village expansion. ronments. Oxides of nitrogen and sulfur from The global aquatic environment will also de- fossil fuel combustion will increase atmospheric teriorate generally, both in its saltwater and fresh- concentrations, acidify rain, and ultimately alter water portions. Freshwater will be slowed by chemical balances in surface waters and soils over dams and irrigation works, warmed by waste heat wide areas. The rate of extinctions of species in from energy facilities (thus reducing the oxygen all three environments will increase dramatically, content), reduced in@ flow by more consumptive leading to the loss of perhaps one-fifth of all plant (i.e., evaporative) uses such as irrigation and and animal species by 2000. evaporative cooling for energy facilities, salted by Some new classes of environmental problems irrigation drainage, eutrophied by fertilizer runoff will become more evident and more important- and sewage, acidified by acid mine drainage and among them: problems that require global co- acid rain, destablized by deforestation, and pol- operation; problems that are very long-lived; luted by silt, pesticides, and other toxic sub- problems that lead to increasing social vulnera- stances. Freshwater habitats for disease vectors bility; and problems that originate in vicious-circle will increase. Habitats for species that require types of causations. swift, clean, cool water (like salmon in the U.S.) Problems of the global commons-the earth's will decline. Coastal marine waters will suffer atmosphere and oceans--can be expected to be- from loss of important habitats-estuaries, salt come more important and urgent in the years marshes, mangroves, reefs-as well as from heavy ahead. Management of globalC02and ozone con- pressure on fish and mammal populations, con- centrations are probably the most important and tinued pollution by crude oil from offshore ex- difficult issues of the global commons, but the traction, marine transport, and terrestrial runoff, protection of marine mammal populations (a and an influx of toxic materials, the effects of global-commons problem on which some progress which will. continue to be experienced for decades, has already been achieved) will continue to be a at a minimum. concern. Institutional mechanisms for dealing The atmosphere. will-again, under the as- with these issues are limited. The International sumption of no change in present policies-re- Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) has ceive increasing amounts of effluents from coal made significant progress in dealing with oil pol- combustion. Oxides of nitrogen and sulfur Will lution from tankers, but has made little progress cause increased health problems and will produce in reducing the flow of toxic substances into the acid rain. Particulates will increase health prob- oceans. The U.N.-sponsored Law of the Sea Con- lems. Carbon dioxide emissions resulting from ference constitutes one of the broadest efforts deforestation and from all forms of fossil fuel com- made so far to deal with such problems, but the bustion (especially increased use of coal and syn- slowness of the progress made by this conference thetic fuels) will continue to increase the global and related follow-up activities illustrates the ex- concentration of CO, in the atmosphere, creating treme difficulties involved in achieving the nec- conditions that many scientists believe could raise essary cooperation on issues related to the global the average temperature of the earth, melt polar commons. Efforts to manage CO, and ozone con- ice, raise sea levels, and flood coastal areas during centrations on a global scale are just beginning, the 21st or 22nd century. Some spray-can pro- and considering the issues involved-fossil fuel pellents, and refrigerants, some high-altitude air- combustion, deforestation, high-alti.tude flight, craft flights, and nitrogen fertilizers will release perhaps even the rate of use of nitrogen fertil- 430 THE PROJECTIONS izers-agreements; can be expected to be at least (such as the Love Canal dumpsite in New York "2 as difficult to reach as in the case of the Law of State), contaminated river bottoms (such as the Sea. those of the Hudson River in New York"' and Multilateral cooperation on only a somewhat the James in Virginia),"' and contaminated lands smaller scale will be required to deal with a num- (such as the environs of Seveso, Italy)"' will con- ber of terrestrial, coastal, and freshwater envi- tinue to pose threats to animals-and human ronmental issues. Desertification problems often life-for many years to come. cross national boundaries, as do some of the herd- Another class of environmental pressures is ing populations involved. Deforestation is being leading to increased vulnerability, especially in driven not only by domestic needs, but also by the world's food production and energy systems. multinational markets and corporations. Protec- Food production around the world is leading to tion of regional seas will be impossible without various forms of soil deterioration, Fertility is multilateral cooperation, and the protection and being maintained, pests controlled, and yields en- management of many river basins will require co- hanced through energy-intensive (or more specif- operation among two or more nations as well. ically, fossil fuel-intensive) inputs of fertilizers, Since the needs of upstream and downstream chemicals, and fuels for tractors and irrigation users often conflict, river development and man- motors. The food needed to feed the population agement may become an increasing source of con- projected for 2000 can be produced only through flict among nations as water resources become the continued and increased dependence of ag- still more heavily committed. riculture on fossil fuels. The increased vulnera- Long-lived toxic pollutants also present a new bility that this trend implies is illustrated by the class of environmental problems. Many toxic sub- disruption in energy supplies caused recently by stances-heavy metals, radioactive materials, and the change of government in a single nation- some toxic chemicals---have very long lives, and Iran, by no means the largest of the world's energy their release or mobilization into the environment suppliers. The vulnerability of energy-intensive creates changes for which there is no apparent agriculture is increased further by expanded areas remedial action. Mercury, lead, high-level radio- of genetically similar (or identical) monocultures, active wastes, dioxin, and PCBs are examples. by expansion of agriculture into increasingly and Many metals, some of which bioaccumulate, are and marginal lands, and by the projected defor- highly toxic, and once mobilized by mining, re- estation (which exaggerates seasonal variations in fining, dredging, or industrial processes, are ex- water availability and thus increases vulnerability pected to produce adverse effects for decades- to drought). or centuries-to come, especially in the oceans. In the energy area, increased -reliance on nu- The consequences are many and varied. It is well clear energy will create another environmentally known, for example, that the utility of biological related vulnerability. The accident at Three Mile resources (e.g., fish and shellfish) has been de- Island in Pennsylvania demonstrated dramatically graded or destroyed by heavy metals, but it is less that nuclear accidents, whatever their probability, well known that some bacteria have developed can and do happen. In the Three Mile Island ac- resistance to mercury poisoning and as a conse- cident, relatively little damage was done to the quence also to several antibiotics. (Research with environment, but radioactive gases were released, the genus Vibrio and the genus Bacillus have led and thegovernor of Pennsylvania felt it necessary to the conclusion that the antibiotic and mercury to partially evacuate an area within five miles of resistances are genetically linked and caused by the stricken plant. As a result of the accident, and the mercury exposure.) High-level radioactive of concern over the safety of a second reactor at wastes are extremely toxic and must be kept safely the same site built by the same manufacturer, a separated from the environment for tens of thou- significant fraction of the electric energy supply sands of years, a period that exceeds the stable for Pennsylvania has been lost for a period of life of any civilization in history, and even exceeds years. Public concern is now such that another the period of recorded history. Long-lived toxic serious accident or a terrorist attack* could lead chemicals present similar problems. While several to a significant curtailment in nuclear generation industrial nations are now tightening regulations in many countries. The projected 226 percent in- for the use and disposal of toxic chemicals, the crease in nuclear generation by 1990 will increase controls are far from adequate. Even determining this vulnerability. which individual chemicals are toxic will be dif- ficult, and the problem of the synergistic toxicity *There have been a significant number of attacks on nuclear of two or more chemicals presently lacks a feasible installations. See Michael Flood, "Nuclear Sabotage," Bulletin solution."' Furthermore, old chemical dumps of the Atomic Scientists, Oct. 1976, pp. 29-36. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 431 Finally, there is a growing class of environ- mands ar e well established. This chapter has ana- mental problems that will be extremely difficult lyzed the environmental implications of the to resolve because of a vicious circle of causes and population, GNP, and resource projections and effects. This class of problems is particularly acute has attempted to close the feedback loops linking in the land-deterioration/population-growth phe- the projected future world environment back to nomenon in some of the poorest rural areas in the the other projections. While the feedback loops LDCs: Environmental deterioration is acceler- could not actually be closed, the environmental ated by further population growth; human repro- assumptions underlying the population, GNP, duction rates are kept up by poor living conditions and resource projections were identified and com- (and other social welfare problems);"' and living pared with the environmental future these pro- conditions* decline further as the environmental jections imply. The environmental assumptions resources deteriorate. implicit in the population, GNP, and resource The important linkages between the popula- projections amount in many cases to an assump- tion, welfare, and resource demands have long tion that the environment will provide its goods been recognized and included in development and services in much larger amounts, without in- plans a .nd projection models,, but the linkages terruption, and without increase in cost. The en- from the environment back to population, wel- vironmental analysis suggests that this assumption fare, and resources have often been neglected. So is, in many cases, unrealistically optimistic. The it is with the Global 2000 Sudy's projections. As analysis also shows that the goods and services illustrated in Figure 13-1, the linkages from the provided by the environment can no longer be population and GNP projections to resource de- taken for granted. REFERENCES Population Section 13. T. C. Byerly et al., The Role of Ruminants in Support 1. Wendell Berry, Unsettling of America, San Francisco: of Man, Morrilton, Ark.: Winrock International Live- Sierra Club, 1977, pp. 210-17. stock Research and Training Center, Apr. 1978; T. D. 2. See, for example, Colin M. Turnbull, The Forest People: Nguyen and H. A. Fitzhugh, WINROCK MODEL for A Study of the Pygmies of the Congo, New York: Simon Simulating Ruminant Production Systems, Morrilton: and Schuster, 1962. Winrock, Dec. 1977. 3. Raymond F Dasmann et al., Ecological Principles for 14. Robert B. Batchelder and Howard F. Hirt, "Fire in Trop- Economic Development, New York: Wiley, 1973, p. 82. ical Forests and Grasslands," U.S. Army Natick Labo- 4. Conservation and Rational Use of the Environment, ratories, June 1966, pp. 136, 169 (this excellent report UNESCO and FAO report to the U.N. Economic and is available from the National Technical Information Social Council, Mar. 12,1%8. Service). 5. Garrett Hardin and John Baden, eds., Managing the 15. Tropical Forest Ecosystems: A State of Knowledge Re- Commo;ns, San Francisco: Freeman, 1977. port, Natural Resources Research XIV, Paris: UNESCO/ 6. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of 'the Commons," Sci- UNEP/FAO, 1978, pp. 467-81. ence, Dec. 13, 1968, pp. 1243-48. 16. Ibid., p. 475. .7. For two particularly interesting -examples, see the story 17. Dasmann et al., op. cit. of the Tasaday in John Nance, The Gentle Tasaday: A 18. P. H. Nye and D. J. Greenland, The Soil Under Shifting Stone Age People in the Philippine Rain Forest, New Cultivation, Technical Communication No. 51, Bucks, York: Harcourt, 1975; and the story of the decline of the England: Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux, 1960. Mayan civilization as told in Harold M. Schmecht, Jr., 19. Tropical Forest Ecosystems, op. cit., pp. 470-76. "Study Depicts Mayan Decline," New York Times, Oct. 20. R. F. Waters, Shifting Agriculture in Latin America, 23, 1979, p. CI, and in E. S. Deevey et al., Mayan Ur- Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1971. banism: Impact on a Tropical Karst Environment," Sci- 21. Lester R. Brown, The Worldwide Loss of Cropland, ence, Oct. 19, 1979, pp. 298-306. Washington: Worldwatch Institute, Oct. 1978; "Deser- 8. See, for example, Colin M. Turnbull, The Mountain Peo- tification: An Overview," U.N. Conference on Deser- ple, -New York, Simon and Schuster, 1972. This phenom- tification, 1977; Erik P. Eckholm, Losing Ground: enon extends beyond herding societies. See, for example: Environmental Stress and World Food Prospects, New D. A. Schanche, "King, Cripple-Makers Rule Cairo's York: Norton, 1976. Army of Beggars," Washington Post, Sept. 2, 1978, p. 22. For further details, see the forestry section of this chap- A-1 1; Abdell Atti Hamed, Adventures of a Journalist at ter, also Chapter 8 and App. C, and "Proceedings of the the Bottom of Egyptian Society, Cairo: Akbar al Yom U.S. Strategy Conference on Tropical Deforestation," Publishing House, 1974. Washington: U.S. Agency for International Develop- 9. Arid Lands in Transition, Harold E. Dregne, ed., Wash- ment, 1978. ington: American Association for the Advancement of 23. U.N. Conference on Desertification, Earthscan Press Science, 1970. Briefing Document No. 6, Aug. 1977. 10. Ibid. 24. Eckholm, Losing Ground, op. cit.; App. C of this vol- 11. The State of Food and Agriculture. Rome: Food and ume; "Desertification: An Overview," op. cit. Agriculture Organization, Nov..1977 (draft), ch. 3, pp. 25. Environmental Quality 1978, annual report of the Council 3716. on Environmental Quality, Washington: Government 12. Ibid. Printing Office, 1979, ch. 3. 432 THE PROJEMONS 26. Ibid. Washington: Office of International and Environmental 27. Ibid. Programs, Smithsonion Institution, 1974, table 12, p. 42. 28. Ibid. 49. Peter H. Freeman, ed., The Urban Environment ofSeoul, 29. Ibid. Korea: A Case Study of Rapid Urbanization, Washing- 30. Denis Hayes, Repairs, Reuse, Recycling@First Steps To- ton: U.S. Agency for International Development, Nov., ward a Sustainable Society, Washington: Worldwatch In- 1974. stitute, Sept. 1978. 50. "World Population: The Silent Explosion," Department 31. Environmental Quality 1973, annual report of the Council of State Bulletin, Fall 1978, pp. 17-18. on Environmental Quality, Washington: Government 51. Ward, op. cit., p. 193. Printing Office, 1974, p. 204. 52. World Health Organization, "Community Water Supply 32. The obscuring of environmental impacts that results from and Wastewater Disposal," May 6, 1976, p.4. trade and commerce is brought out in Edward Goldsmith 53. Ibid., p. 5. and John P. Milton, eds., "The Future of America," The 54. J. R. Simpson and R. M. Bradley, "The Environmental Ecologist, Aug./Sept. 1977, pp. 245-340. Impact of Water Reclamation in Overseas Countries," 33. Hardin, "Tragedy of the Commons," op. cit. Water Pollution Control, vol. 77, no. 2, 1978, p. 223, 34. Garrett Hardin, "Political Requirements for Preserving 55. Ibid. Our Common Heritage," Ch. 20 in Council on Environ-, 56. Bruce McCallum, Environmentally Appropriate Tech- mental Quality, Wildlife and America, Washington: Gov- nology, Dept. of Fisheries and Environment, Canada, ernment Printing Office, 1979. Apr. 1977, pp. 109-11; Lane deMoll, ed., Rainbook: 35. Thane Gustafson, "The New Soviet Environmental Pro- Resources for Appropriate Technology, New York: gram: Do The Soviets Really Mean Business?" Public Schocken, 1977, pp. 191-94, Policy, Summer 1978, pp. 455-76; Marshall 1. Goldman, 57. World Health Organization, "Disposal of Community The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Wastewater," Technical Report Service no. 541, 1974. Soviet Union, Cambridge, Mass., MIT, 1972.; Donald 58. Elaine de Steinheil and Hilary Branch, "Enforcing En- R. Kelly et al., Economic Superpowers and the Environ- vironmental Law in Venezuela," World Environment ment: United States, Soviet Union and Japan, San Fran- Report, Feb. 27, 1978, p. 3. cisco; Freeman, 1976. 59. William F. Hunt et al., Guideline for Public Reporting 36. Susan Swannack-Nunn et al., State-of4he-Environment of Daily Air Quality: Pollutant Standards Index, U.S. Profile for the People's Republic of China, Washington: Environmental Protection Agency, Aug. 1976. National Council for U.S.-China Trade, Apr. 1979. Also 60. Loretta McLaughlan, "Peruvian Ecologist Urges Lima see B. J. Culliton, "China Adopts New Law for Envi- to Enact Air Pollution Law," World Environment Re- ronmental Protection," Science, Oct. 26, 1979, p. 429. port, Aug. 14, 1978, p. 5. 37. An excellent history of U.S. efforts to protect its envi- 61. Sam Cohen, "Sulphur Dioxide in Ankara's Air Found ronment will be found in J. Clarence Davies III and Twice that of WHO Standard," World Environment Re- Barbara Davies, The Politics of Pollution, 2d ed., Indi- port, Dec. 19, 1977, p. 5. anapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975; also see P. R. Portney, 62. R. Murali Manohar, "Massive Air Pollution in Bombay ed., Current Issues in U.S. Environmental Policy, Bal- Cause of Respiratory Ailments," World Environment timore: Johns Hopkins, 1978. Report, May 8, 1978, p-5. 38. Talbot Page, Conservation and Economic Efficiency: An 63. Ibid. Approach to Materials Policy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 64. Ibid. 19177, ch. 7; Kenneth J. Arrow, "The Rate of Discount 65. Erick Eckholm, The Other Energy Crisis: Firewood, for Long-Term Public Investment," in Holt Ashley et Washington: Worldwatch Institute, 1975. al., Energy and the Environment: A Risk Benefit Ap- 66. State of Food and Agriculture, op. cit., p. 25. proach, New York: Pergamon, 1976, pp. 113-41. 67. "Third World Urban Sprawl," op. cit. 39. Ibid. 68. Lester R. Brown, The Twenty-Ninth Day, New York: 40. The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends, Norton 1978. vol. 1, New York: U.N. Dept, of Economic and Social 69. "Trends and Prospects in Urban and Rural Population, Affairs, 1973. 1950-2000," op. cit. 41. "Trends and Prospects in Urban and Rural Population, 70. Council on Environmental Quality, U.S. Dept. of Hous- 1950-2000, as Assessed in 1973-74," New York: Popu- ing and Urban Development, and U.S. Environmental lation Div., U.N. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Protection Agency, "The Costs of Sprawl: Environmen- Apr. 25, 1975, p. 10. tal and Economic Costs of Alternative Residential De- 42. Ibid. velopment Patterns at the Urban Fringe," Washington: 43. An excellent introduction to this topic, prepared for the Government Printing Office, Apr. 1974; also see the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements, is Barbara Council's "The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control" Ward, The Home of Man, New York: Norton, 1976. and "The Growth Shapers," Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971, 1976. 44. "Trends and Prospects in Urban and Rural Population, 71. Hayes, op. cit. 1950-2000," op. cit., p. 11. 72. Executive Office of the President, "Ile National Energy 45. "Third World Urban Sprawl," ILO Information (U.S. Plan," Washington: Government Printing Office, Apr. ed.), vol. 6, no. 4, 1978, pp. 1, 9. 1977. 46. Ibid. 73. Ibid., p. VII. 47. "Trends and Prospects in the Populations of Urban Ag- 74. Ibid., pp. VIII, X glomerations, 1950-2000, as Assessed in 1973-1975," 75. Office of Technology Assessment, "Analysis of the Pro- ESA/P1WP-58, New York: Population Div., U.N. Dept. posed National Energy Plan," Washington: Government of Economic and Social Affairs, Nov. 21, 1975. Printing Office, Aug. 1977, pp. 197-80. 48. Peter H. Freeman, "The Environmental Impact of Rapid 75a. The Journey to Work in the United States: 1975, Wash- Urbanization: Guidelines for Policy and Planning," ington: Government Printing Office, July 1977; Spencer ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 433 Rich, "Auto Data Reflect an Abiding Passion," Wash- World Health Organization, Weekly Epidemiological ington Post, July 22, 1979, p. A20. Report, no. 22, 1972, pp. 129-30. 15b. L. R. Brown, C. Flavin, and C. Norman, Running on 97. World Health Organization, Weekly Epidemiological Empty: The Future of the Automobile in an Oil Short Record, Oct. 14-Nov. 11, 1977. pp. 325-70; June 23--30, World, New York: Norton, 1979. 1978, pp. 181-96. 76. Environmental Quality 1978, op. cit. p. 220; also see U.S. 98. Marietta Whittlesey, "The Runaway Use of Antibiotics," Bureau of the Census, Geographic Mobility: March 1975 New York Times Magazine, May 6, 1979, p. 122. to March 1978 and Social and Economic Characteristics 99. Ibid. of the Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Population: 100. Ibid; Janice Crossland, "Power to Resist," Environment, 1977 and 1970. Washington: Government Printing Of- Mar. 1975, pp. 6-11. fice, Nov. 1978. 101, Office of Technology Assessment, Drugs in Livestock 77. Environmental Quality 1978, op. cit., p. 227. Feed, vol. 1, Technical Report, Washington: Government 78. George J. Beier, "Can Third World Cities Cope?" Wash- Printing Office, 1979. ington: Population Reference Bureau, Dec. 1976. 102, Whittlesey, op. cit. 79. Eckholm, Losing Ground, op. cit.; Dasmann et al., op. 103. Ibid. cit.; Tropical Forest Ecosystems, op. cit. 104. Davidson R. Gwatkin, "The Sad News About the Death 80. Canada as a Conserver Society: Resource Uncertainties Rate," Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1978, op ed page; and and the Need for New Technologies, Ottawa: Science his "The End of an Era: A Review of the Literature and Council of Canada, Sept. 1977. Data Concerning Third World Mortality Trends," Wash- 81. U.N. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, The Deter- ington: Overseas Development Council, forthcoming. minants and Consequences of Population Trends: New 105. U.S. Public Health Service, National Center for Health Summary of Findings on Interaction of Demographic, Statistics, Vital Statistics of the United States, vol. 2, sec. Economic and Social Factors, vol. 1, New York, 1973. 5, Life Tables, Hyattsville, Md., 1977, pp. 5-45. 82. N. R. E. Fendall, "Medical Care in the Developing Na- 106. There is a very extensive literature on this topic. For a tions," in John Fry and W. A. J. Farndale, eds., Inter- small sample, see Michael J. Hill, "Metabolic Epide- national Medical Care, Wallingford, Pa.: Washington miology of Dietary Factors in Large Bowel Cancer," Square East, 1972, p. 220. Cancer Research, Nov. 1975, pp. 3398-3402; F. R. 83. World Bank, "Health," Sector Policy Paper, Washing- Lemon and T. T. Walden, "Death from Respiratory Sys- ton, Mar. 1975, annex 2, pp. 72-73; also see M. C. tem Disease Among SDA Men," Journal of the American McHale et al., Children in the World, Washington: Pop- Medical Association, vol. .198, 1966, p. 117; Roland L. ulation Reference Bureau, 1979, pp. 30-34. Phillips, "Role of Life-Style and Dietary Habits. in Risk 84. World Bank, op. cit. of Cancer Among Seventh-Day Adventists," Cancer Re- 85. Ibid., p. 7. search, Nov. 1975, pp. 351342; Denis P. Burkitt, "Ep- 86. Tim Dyson, "Levels, Trends, Differential and Causes of idemiology of Cancer of the Colon and Rectum," Cancer, Child Mortality-A survey," World Health Statistics Re- July 1971, pp. 3-13; "Statement of Dr. D. M. Hegsted"' port, vol. 30, no. 4, 1977, pp. 289-90. in U.S. Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Hu- 87. John Bryant, Health and the Developing World, Ithaca, man Needs, Dietary Goals for the United States, Wash- N.Y.: Cornell, 1969, p. 39. ington: Government Printing Office, Feb. 1975, p. 3; 88. W. J. van Ziji, "Studies on Diarrhoeal Diseases in Seven. Jacqueline Verrett and Jean Carper, Eating May Be Haz- Countries by the WHO Diarrhoeal Diseases Advisory ardous to Your Health: How Your Government Fails to Team," Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. Protect You from the Dangers in Your Food, New York: 35, no. 2, 1966, pp. 249-61. Simon and Schuster, 1974; Erik P. Eckholm, The Picture 89. Ibid. of Health: Environmental Sources of Disease, New York: 90. Lester R. Brown, World Population Trends: Signs of Norton, 1977. Hope, Signs of Stress, Washington: Worldwatch Institute, 107. U.S. Public Health Service, Health, United States 1978, Oct. 1976, pp. 15-25. Washington: Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, 91. Sheldon M. Wolff and John V. Bermetts, "Gram-Neg- 1978, pp. 220-21. ative Rod Bacteremia," New England Journal of Medi- 108. "Report to the President by the Toxic Substances Strat- cine, Oct. 3, 1974, pp. 733-34; Henry E. Simmons and egy Committee," Washington: Council on Environmen- Paul D. Stolley, "This is Medical Progress? Trends and tal Quality, Aug. 1979 (public review draft). Consequences of Antibiotic Use in the United States," 109. Richard Doll, "Introduction," and J. W. Berg, "World- Journal of the American Medical Association, Mar. 4, wide Variations in Cancer Incidence as Clues to Cancer 1974, pp. 1023-28; LaVerne C. Harold, "Transferable OTigins," in H. H. Hiatt et al., eds, Origins of Human Drug Resistance and the Ecologic Effects of Antibiot- Cancer, Cold Spring Harbor, New York: Cold Spring ics," in M. Taghi Farvar and John P. Milton, eds., The Harbor Laboratory, 1977. Also see Thomas H. Maugh Careless Technology, Ecology and International Devel- 11, "Cancer and Environment: Higginson Speaks Out," opment, Garden City: Natural History Press/Doubleday, Science, vol. 205, 1979, pp. 1363-66. 1972, pp. 35-46. 110. U.S. Public Health Service, Annual Summary for the 92. Wolff and Bennett, op. cit. United States, 1977: Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Di- 93. Eugene J. Gangarosa et. al,, "An Epidemic-Associated vorces, pp. 28-29, and Monthly Statistics Report-Pro- Episome?," Journal of Infectious Diseases, Aug. 1972, visional Statistics, Washington: Dept. of Health, Education, pp. 215-18. and Welfare, 1977, 1979. 94. Ibid, 111. Ibid. 95. J. Olarte and E. Galindo, "Factores de resistencia a los GNP Section antibi6ticos encontrados en bacterias enteropat6genas aisladas en la Ciudad de Mdxico," Reviews of Latin 112. Commission on Population Growth and the American American Microbiology, vol. 12, 1970, pp. 173-79. Future, Population and the American Future, Washing- Pan American Sanitary Bureau, Regional Office of the ton: Government Printing Office, Mar. 27, 1972, p. 48. 434 THE PROJECTIONS 113. Lester R. Brown, The Global Economic Prospect: New Population, Resources, Environment, San Francisco: Sources of Economic Stress, Washington: Woeldwatch Freeman, 1977, pp. 672-94; Ralph M. Rotty, "Energy Institute, May 1978, p. 6. and the Climate," Oak Ridge: Institute for Energy Anal- 114. J. Krieger et a]., "Facts and Figures for the U.S. Chem- ysis, Sept. 1976; Bert Bolin, "Energy and Climate," ical Industry," Chemical and Engineering News, vol. 57, Stockholm: Secretariat for Future Studies, Nov. 1975. 1979, pp. 32-68. More detailed information is provided in U.S. Commit- 115. U.N. Environment Programme, State of the Environment tee for the Global Atmospheric Research Program, Un- 1978, United Nations, Nairobi, 1978. derstanding Climatic Change: A Program for Action, 116. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1975; Study ment, Chemicals Committee, Chemicals in the Environ- of Man's Impact on Climate, Inadvertent Climate Mod- ment, Paris, 1977. ification, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1971; Study of Critical 117. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Environmental Problems (SCEP) Man's Impact on the Administration, "Occupational Exposure to 1,2-Di- Global Environment, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1970; bromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP) Occupational Safety Geophysics Study Committee, Energy and Climate, and Health Standards," Federal Register, Mar. 17, 1978, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1977. pp. 11514-33. 132. "Crop Yields and Climate Change: The Year 2000," 118. Thomas H. Milby, ed. Vinyl Chloride: An Information Washington: National Defense University, Dec. 1978, Resource, Washington: National Institutes of Health, (draft abstract of Task 11 final report). Mar. 1978. 133. Ibid. 119. U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 134. Rotty, op. cit. Transportation, Hazardous Materials Transportation: A 135. U. Siegenthaler and H. Oeschger, "Predicting Future Review and Analysis of the Department of Transporta- Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Levels," Science, vol. 199, tion's Regulatory Program, Washington: Government 1978, pp. 388-95. Printing Office, 1979, pp. 13-14. 136. Geophysics Study Committee, op. cit. 120. Environmental Defense Fund and the New York Public 137. For a relatively simple discussion of the phenomena, see Interest Research Group, Troubled Waters: Toxic Chem- G. M. Woodwell, "The Carbon Dioxide Question," Sci- icals in the Hudson River, New York, 1977. entific Americanj Jan. 1978, pp. 3443. Also see G. M. 121. Environmental Quality 1977, annual report of the Council Woodwell et al., "The Biota and the World Carbon on Environmental Quality, Washington: Government Budget," Science, Jan. 13, 1978, pp. 141-46; G. E. Printing Office, 1977, pp, 15-16. Hutchinson, "The Biochemistry of the Terrestrial At- 122. US Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Activities mosphere," in G. P. Kuiper, ed., The Solar System, Chi- Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-Fis- cago: University of Chicago, 1954, vol. 2, pp. 371-433. cal Year 1978, Washington: Government Printing Office, For a recent counteropinion, see W. S. Broecker et al., 1979, pp. 1-3. "Fate of Fossil Fuel Carbon Dioxide and the Global 123. Dick Kirschten, "The New War on Pollution is Over the Carbon Budget," Science, vol. 206, 1979, pp. 409-18. Land," National Journal, 1979, pp. 603-6; John Walsh, 138. Siegenthaler and Oeschger, op. cit. "Seveso: The Questions Persist Where Dioxin Created 139. Ibid. a Wasteland," Science, Sept. 9, 1977, pp. 1064-67; John 140. Peter G. Brewer, "Carbon Dioxide and Climate," C. Fuller, The Poison that Fell From the Sky, New York: Oceanus, Fall 1978, pp. 13-17. Random House, 1977, p. 94; Thomas Whiteside, "A 141. Siegenthaler and Oeschger, op. cit. Reporter at Large: Contaminated," New Yorker, Sept. 142. For an especially clear introduction, see the short report 4, 1978, pp. 34-81 (published also as The Pendulum and by Gordon J. F. MacDonald: An Overview of the Impact the Toxic Cloud, New Haven: Yale, 1979). of Carbon Dioxide on Climate, McLean Va.: MITRE 124. Report of the Governing Council of the United Nations Corp., Dec. 1978; also see U.S. Office of Technology Environment Programme on the Work of its Fifth Ses- Assessment, The Direct Use of Coal, Washington: Gov- sion, Governing Council Decision 85(v), Nairobi, May, ernment Printing Office, Apr. 1979, pp. 226-30; Carbon 1977. Dioxide Emissions from Synthetic Fuels Energy Sources, 125. World Bank, Sociological Planning and PoliticalAspects, Washington: Dept. of Energy, August 8, 1979. Aug. 1978, ch. 7. 143. Geophysics Study Committee, op. cit., p. 4. 126. Study Group on Unintended Occurrence of Pesticides, 144. George D. Robinson, "Effluents of Energy Production; The Problems of Persistent Chemicals: Implications of Particulates," in Geophysics Study Committee, op. cit. Pesticides and Other Chemicals in the Environment, Paris: 145. Ibid. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 146. A Miller and J. C. Thompson, Elements of Meteorology, ment, 1971. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1970; A. G. Borne, "Birth of An Island," Discovery, vol. 25, no. 4, 1964, p. 16. Climate Section 147. J. Ernst, "African Dust Layer Sweeps into SW North 127. "Climate Change to the Year 2000: A Survey of Expert Atlantic Area," Bulletin of the American Meteorological Opinion," Washington: National Defense University, Society, vol. 55, no. 11, 1974, pp. 1352-53; J. B. Lushine, 1978. "A Dust Layer in the Eastern Caribbean," Monthly 128. Ibid. Weather Review, vol. 103, no. 5, 1975, pp. 454-55. 129. P. R. Crow, Concepts in Climatology, New York: St. 148. R. A. Bryson and T. J. Murray, Climates of Hunger: Martin's, 1971, p. 480 ff.; C. E. P. Brooks, Climate Mankind and the World's Changing Weather, Madison: through the Ages, New York: Dover, 1949. University of Wisconsin, 1977. 130. Climate and Food: Climatic Fluctuation and U.S. Agri- 149. Robinson, op. cit., p. 70. cultural Production, Washington: National Academy of 150. Rotty, op. cit., p. 19. Sciences, 1976. 151. A. Kh. Khrgian, The Physics of Atmospheric Ozone, 131. Well-developed introductions to the issues of climatic Leningrad: Hydrometeorological Institute, 1973 (English change are provided in Paul R. Ehrlich et al., Ecoscience: translation, 1975), pp. 31-32. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 435 152. Environmental Impact of Stratospheric Flight. Biological duction," in S. F. Singer, ed., The Changing Global En- and Climatic Effects of Aircraft Emissions in the Strato- vironment, Dordrecht; Netherlands: Reidel, 1975, pp. sphere, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 25-44. 1975, pp. 5-7, 9-10. 185. A. H. Murphy et al., "The Impact of Waste Heat Release 153. "Response to the Ozone Protection Sections of the Clean on Simulated Global Climate," Laxenburg, Austria: In- Air Act Amendments of 1977: An Interim Report," ternational Institute of Applied Systems Analysis, Dec, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1977. 1976, p. 23. 154. Halocarbons: Environmental Effects of Chlorofluoro- 186. Geophysics Study Committee, op. cit., p. 4. methane Release, Washington: National Academy of Sci- 187. Ibid. ences, 1976. 188. See especially George M. Woodwell et al., The Carbon 155. Environmental Impact of Stratospheric Flight, op. cit. Dioxide Problem: Implications for Policy in the Manage- 156. Nitrates: An Environmental Assessment, Washington: ment of Energy and Other Resources, Washington: Coun- National Academy of Sciences, 1978; W. C. Wang et al., cil on Environmental Quality, July 1979; also see references "Greenhouse Effects due to Man-Made Perturbations of cited in Reference 142. Trace bases," Science, Nov. 12, 1976, pp. 685-90, Also 189. Woodwell et al., The Carbon Dioxide Problem, op. cit. see G. L. Hutchinson, A. R. Mosier, "Nitrous Oxide Emissions from an Irrigated Cornfield," Science, Sept. Technology Section 14, 1979, pp. 1125-27. 157. A. J. Grobecker et al., "The Effects of Stratospheric 190. Cynthia Gorney, "University Is Sued Over Development Pollution by Aircraft," report of the Climatic Impact of Sophisticated Harvesting Machines," Washington Post, Assessment Program, Washington: Department of Jan, 18, 1979, p. All. Transportation, 1975; Environmental Impact of Strato- 191. See, for example, the case histories in M. Taghi Farvar spheric Flight, op. cit. and John P. Milton, eds., The Careless Technology: 158. Nitrates, op. cit. pp. 362-63. Ecology and International Development, New York: 159. Halocarbons, op. cit.; Council on Environmental Quality Doubleday, 1972. and Federal Council for Science and Technology, "Fluo- 192. Raymond F. Dasmann et al., Ecological Principles for rocarbons and the Environment," Washington: Govern- Economic Development, New York: Wiley, 1973, pp. ment Printing Office, 1975. 182-235. 160. Nitrates, op. cit., p. 364. 193. E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if 161. Ibid., especially ch. 7. People Mattered, New York: Harper, 1973, p. 165. 162. Ibid., p. 362. 194. A thoughtful discussion of some of the options for a 163. Ibid. p. 361. postindustrial technological society is provided in Willis 164. Ibid., p. 363. W. Harman, An Incomplete Guide to the Future, Stan- 165. R. P. Turco et al., "SSTs, Nitrogen Fertilizer and Strat- ford, Calif.: Stanford Alumni Association, 1976. ospheric Ozone," Nature, Dec. 28, 1978, pp. 805-7; Paul 195. Colin Norman, "Soft Technologies, Hard Choices," J. Crutzen and Carleton J. Howard, "The Effect of the Washington: Worldwatch Institute, June 1978. HO, + NO Reaction Rate Constant on One-Dimen- sional Model Calculations of Stratospheric Ozone Per- Food and Agticulture Section turbations," Pure and Applied Geophysics (Milan), vol. 196. "Demand for Food Production Reduces Land's Capacity 116, 1978, pp. 497-510. to Produce," Council on Environmental Quality news 166. Environmental Impact of Stratospheric Flight, op. cit., p. release, Mar. 13, 1977, announcing publication'by the 7; Geophysics Study Committee, op. cit., p. 4. Council on Mar. 14, 1977, of Paul F. Bente, Jr., "The 167. Environmental Impact of Stratospheric Flight, op. cit., p. Food People Problem: Can the Land's Capacity to Pro- 45. duce Food Be Sustained?" 168. Ibid., p. 49. 197. Joint FAO/WHO ad hoc Expert Committee, "Energy 169. Ibid., pp. 177-221. and Protein Requirements," Rome: Food and Agricul- 170. Ibid., p. 13. ture Organization, 1973. 171. Ibid., pp. 222-31. 198. See, for example, Erik Eckholm, and Frank Record, The 172. Ibid., p. 11. Two Faces of Malnutrition, Washington: Worldwatch In- 173. Ibid., p. 47; Results of Research Related to Stratospheric stitute, 1976; World Food and Nutrition Study, interim Ozone Protection, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, report, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, Jan. 1978. 1975. 174. Environmental Impact of Stratospheric Flight, op. cit., p. 199. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economics, Statistics, 47. and Cooperative Service, "Report Assessing Global 175. Results of Research Related to Stratospheric Ozone Pro- Food Production and Needs as of March 31, 1978," tection, op. cit. Washington, Mar. 1978. 176. Section 153 of the Clean Air Act, as amended. 200. S. Reutlinger and M. Selowsky, Malnutrition and Pov- 177. Nitrates, op. cit., ch. 11. erty, World Bank Occasional Paper 23, Washington, 178. Ibid., p. 18. 1976. 179. Geophysics Study Committee, op. cit., p. 97. 201. Robert McNamara, "Address to the 1978 Annual Meet- 180. Weather Modification Board, "A U.S. Policy to Enhance ing of the World Bank-International Monetary Fund the Atmospheric Environment," Washington: Depart- Board of Governors," Washington, Sept. 1978. ment of Commerce, Oct. 21, 1977; "Desertification: An 202. Philip Handler, "On the State of Man," address tu the Overview," op. cit. annual convocation of Markle Scholars, National Acad- 181. Rotty, op. cit., p. 15. emy of Sciences, Sept. 29, 1974. 182. Ibid. 203. An excellent listing of the literature available in this area 183. SCEP, Man's Impact on the Global Environment, op. cit. will be found in Lester R. Brown, The Worldwide Loss 184. S. F. Singer, "The Environmental Effects of Energy Pro- of Cropland, Washington: Worldwatch Institute, Oct. 436 THE PROJEC`171ONS 1978; for U.S. data, see U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food," Science, Aug. 12, 1977, pp. 625-30; Brown, Economic Research Service, "American Agriculture: Its Worldwide Loss of Cropland, op. cit. Capacity to Produce," Washington, Feb. 1974. 225. Approximated from table 9.7 in Harry 0. Buchman and 204. Erik P. Eckholm, Losing Ground: Environmental Stress Nyle C. Brady, The Nature and Properties of Soils, 6th and World Food Prospects New York: Norton, 1976. ed., New York: Macmillan, 1960. 205. "Desertification: An Overview," U.N. Conference on 226. Calculated from data in ibid. and Pimentel et al., "Land Desertification, Aug. 1977, p. 11. Degradation," op. cit., table 1. 206. The State of food and Agriculture 1977, Rome: Food and 227. F. H. King, Farmers of Forty Centuries: Permanent Ag- Agriculture Organization (draft), calculated from table riculture in China, Korea, and Japan, Emmaus, Pa.: Ro- 3-28. dale, 1973, and New York: Gordon Press, 1977 (reprints 207. "Desertification: An Overview," op. cit.,. pp. 5-6; De- of the original 1911 ed.). sertification: Environmental Degradation in and Around 228. "Physical Environment," ch. 13 in Organization for Arid Lands, Boulder: Westview Press, 1977. Economic Cooperation and Development, Interfutures, 208. Erik Eckholm and Lester R. Brown, Spreading Deserts- Paris, May 16, 1977 (draft). The Hand of Man, Washington: Worldwatch Institute, 229. Brown, Worldwide Loss of Cropland, op. cit. Aug. 1977; State of Food and Agriculture 1977, op. cit., 230. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- table 3-14. ment, op. cit. 209. Ibid., p. 13; "Case Study on Desertification-Luni De- 231. Ibid. velopment Block, India," U.N. Conference on Deser- 232. Brown, Worldwide Loss of Cropland, op. cit. tification, Aug. 1977, especially pp. 39ff. 233. Luther J. Carter, "Soil Erosion: The Problem Persists 210. F. Kenneth Hare, "Climate and Desertification: Back- Despite the Billions Spent on It," Science, Apr. 22, 1977, ground Document," U.N. Conference on Desertifica- pp. 409-11. tion, Aug. 1977, p. 36. 234. U.S. General Accounting Office, op. cit. 211. "Population, Society and Desertification," U.N. Con- 235. See, for example, Environmental Quality 1970, p. 41, ference on Desertification, Aug. 1977. and 1971, pp. 107-8, annual reports of the Council on 212. "Desertification: An Overview," op. cit., pp. 7-8; "Syn- Environmental Quality, Washington: Government Print- thesis of Case Studies of Desertification," U.N. Confer- ing Office, 1970, 1971; U.N. Environment Programme, ence on Desertification, Aug. 1977. "Overviews in the Priority Subject Area-Land, Water 213. "Desertification: An Overview," op. cit., p. 12. and Desertification," Feb. 1975; "Technology and. De- 214. Calculated from data in ibid. and Production Yearbook sertification," op. cit. 1975, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1976. 236. An excellent introduction with extensive additional ref- 215. "Case Study on Desertification: Mona Reclamation Ex- erences is provided in the short Council on Environ- perimental Project, Pakistan," U.N. Conference on De- mental Quality (CEO) report by R. Blobaum, already sertification, Aug. 1977. cited, especially pp. 7-11. Also see CEO's Environmental 216. "Transnational Project to Monitor Desertification Proc- Quality 1970, op. cit., pp. 173-75; 1971, p. 63; 1973, pp. esses god Related Natural Resources in Arid and Semi- 215, 306; 1974, p. 343; 1975, pp* 163, 179-80, 451; 1977, Arid Areas of Southwest Asia," U.N. Conference on pp. 90-91; and CEO, The Costs of Sprawl, Washingtow. Desertification, Aug. 1977. Government Printing Office, Apr. 1974. 217;, "Trarisnational Project to Monitor Desertification Proc- 237. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Serv- esses and Related Natural Resources in Arid and Semi- ice, "Cropland Erosion," Washington, June 1977. Arid Areas of South America," U.N. Conference on 238. Brown, "Worldwide Loss of Cropland," op. cit. Desertification, Aug. 1977, p. 8. 239. R. Soderlund and B. H. Svensson, "The Global Nitrogen 218. Ibid., p. 12. . Cycle," in Svensson and Soderlund, eds., Nitrogen, Phos- 219. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, California Dept. of Water phorus, and Sulphur-Global Cycles, Stockholm: Eco- Resources, and California State Water Resources Con- logical Bulletin, 1976, p. 66. trol Board, Agricultural Drainage and Salt Management 239a Martin Alexander, Soil Microbiology, New York: Wiley, in the San Joaquin Valley, Fresno, Jan. 1979. 1961, pp. 263-66. 220. "Ecological Change and Desertification" and "Technol- 239b F. E. Allison, Soil Organic Matter and its Role in Crop ogy and Desertification," U.N. Conference on Deserti- Production, New York: Elsevier, 1973. fication, Aug. 1977. 239c Frank J. Stevenson, Chapter I in W.V. Bartholomew 221. "Haiti: A Study in Environmental Destruction," Con- and Francis E. Clark, eds., Soil Nitrogen, Madison, Wis.: servation Foundation Letter, Nov. 1977, pp. 1-7. American Society of Agronomy, 1965, p. 33. 222. Walter Parham, "LDC Deforestation Problem: A Pre- 239d V. W. Meints et al, "Long Term Trends in Total Soil liminary Data Base," U.S. Agency for International N as Influenced by Certain Management Practices," Soil Development, Technical Assistance Bureau, Mar. 8, Science, vol. 124, 1977, pp. 110-16. 1978 (manuscript), 239e Daniel Kohl, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo, 223. U.S. General Accounting Office, "To Protect Tomor- personal communication, 1979. row's Food Supply, Soil Conservation Needs Priority 240. Eutrophication: Causes, Consequences, Correctives, Attention," report to the Congress by the U.S. Comp- Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1969; Pro- troller General, Feb. 14, 1977. gramme on Man and the Biosphere, "Consultative 224. See, for example, Luther J. Carter, "Soil Erosion: Tlie Group on Project 9: Ecological Assessment of Pest Man- Problem Persists Despite the Billions Spent on It," Sci- agement and Fertilizer Use on Terrestrial and Aquatic ence, Apr. 22, 1977, pp. 409-411; D. Pimentel et al., Ecosystems (Parton Fertiliz:ers)," Rome: UNESCO, "Land Degradation: Effects on Food and Energy Re- Jan. 1974. sources," Science, Oct. 8, 1976, pp. 149-155; R. Blo- 241. Drinking Water and Health, Washington: National Acad- baum, "Loss of Agricultural Land," Washington: Council emy of Sciences, 1977, pp. 411-25. on Environmental Quality, 1974; R. A. Brink, "Soil 242. Nitrates: An Environmental Assessment, Washington: Deterioration and the Growing World Demand for National Academy of Sciences, 1978, pp. 5-15. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 437 243. Ibid. 258. Normal Myers, The Sinking Ark, New York: Pergamon, 244. "Pesticide Requirements in Developing Countries: Sum- 1979. mary of Replies to FAO Questionnaire," Food and Ag- 259. Jack R. Harland, "Genetics of Disaster," Journal of riculture Organization, 1975. Environmental Quality, 1972, pp. 212-15. 245. For but one small example, see P. Lernoux, "Crop Spray- 260. Judith Miller, "Genetic Erosion: Crop Plants Threatened ing in Northern Colombia Causing Ecological Disaster," by Government Neglect," Science, Dec. 21, 1973, p. L World Environment Report, New York: Center for In- 1232; G. L. Carefoot and E. R. Sprott, Famine on the ternational Environment Information, Sept. 1978. Wind: Man's Battle Against Plant Disease, Chicago: Rand -246. There is a growing literature on integrated pest manage- McNally, 1967, p. 81. ment. See for example: Council on Environmental Qual- 261. Carefoot and Sprott, op. cit., pp. 53, 54, 98, 117, 119, ity, Integrated Pest Management, Washington, Nov. 1972 130-32, 138, 139. and Integrated Pest Management: Status and Prospects in 262. Miller, "Genetic Erosion," op. cit., p. 1232. the United States (forthcoming, 1979); "Integrated Pest 263. Genetic Vulnerability of Major Crops, Washington: Na- Management," California Agriculture (special issue), tional Academy of Sciences, 1972, pp. 13, 14. Feb. 1978; Pest Control: Strategies for the Future, Wash- 264. Carefoot and Sprott, op. cit., pp. 194-201. ington: National Academy of Sciences, 1972; Committee 265. A. J. Ullstrop, "The Impacts of the Southern Corn Leaf on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic Blight Epidemic of 1970 and 1971, Annual Review of of China, Insect Control in the People's Republic of Phytopathology, 1972, pp. 37-50; L. A. Tatum, "The China, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, Southern Corn Leaf Blight Epidemic," Science, Mar. 19, 1972; D. Pimental, ed., World Food, Pest Losses, and 1971, pp. 1113-16; A. L. Hooker, "Southern Leaf Blight the Environment, Boulder: Westview Press, 1978, pp. 17- of Corn-Present Status and Future Prospects," Journal 38,163-84. of Environmental Quality, 1972, pp. 244-49. 247. See H. L. Harrison et. al., "Systems Study of DDT 266. Tatum, op. cit. Transport," Science, Oct. 30, 1970, pp. 503-8; G. M. 267. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Woodwell et. al., "DDT in the Biosphere: Where Does Service, unpublished data. It Go?," Science, Dec. 10, 1971, pp. 1101-7; Programme 268. M. W. Adams et al., "Biological Uniformity and Disease on Man and the Biosphere, "Expert Consultations on Epidemics," BioScience, Nov. 1, 1971, pp. 1067-70. Project 9: Ecological Assessment of Pest Management 269. C. E. Yarwood, "Man-Made Plant Diseases," Science, and Fertilizer Use on Terrestrial and Aquatic Ecosystems Apr. 10, 19709 pp. 218-20. (Part on Pesticides)," UNESCO, 1974. 270. W. C. Snyder et al., California Agriculture, vol. 19, no. 248. Environmental Quality 1975, op. cit., pp. 368-76. 5, 1963, p. 11. 249. A detailed discussion of the role of pesticides and pre- 271. A good overview of these problems is provided in Genetic dators in the control of plant-eating mites is provided in Vulnerability of Major Crops, Washington: National C. B. 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"Pest Control and Public Health, in Pest Control: An Academy of Sciences, 1976; Programme on Man and the Assessment of Present and Alternative Technologies, Biosphere, "Expert Panel on Project 8: Conservation of Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1976, vol. Natural Areas and of the Genetic Material They Con- 5, p. 219. tain," Morges, Switzerland: UNESCO, Sept. 1973; Myers, 252. Ibid. op. cit.; Commission on International Relations, Under- exploited Tropical Plants with Promising Economic Value, 253. Council on Environmental Quality, Integrated Pest Man- Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1975; Gren- agement 1972, op. cit., p. 4. ville Lucas and A. H. M. Synge, "The IUCN Threatened 254. Ray F. Smith and Harold T. 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Council on Environmental Quality, OCS Oil and Gas, 341. Assessing Potential Ocean Pollutants, Washington: Na- op. cit., pp. 106-111; Goldberg, Health of the Oceans, tional Academy of Sciences; 1975, pp. 190, 202. op. cit., p. 134; Donald F. Boesch et al., Oil Spills and 342. Ibid. pp. 191-202; Goldberg, op. cit., p. 66. the Marine Environment, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 343. Waldichuk, op. cit., p. 22, 1974, pp. 8-9; Frederick P. Thurberg, et al., "Some Phys- 344. Goldberg, op. cit., p. 48. iological Effects of the Argo Merchant Oil Spill on Several 345. Assessing Potential Ocean Pollutants, op. cit., p. 122. Marine Teleosts and Bivalve Molluscs," from In the Wake 346. George M. Woodwell et al., "DDT in'the Biosphere: of the Argo Merchant, Center for Ocean Management Where Does It Go?" Science, Dec. 10, 1971, pp. 1101-7. Studies, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, 1978; 347. Paul R. Spitzer et al., "Productivity of Ospreys in Con- George R. Gardner, "A Review of Histopathological necticut-Long Island Increases as- DDT Residues De- Effects of Selected Contaminants on Some Marine Or- cline," Science, Oct. 20, 1978, pp. 333-34; Daniel W. ganisms," Marine Fisheries Review, Oct. 1978, pp. 51- Anderson et al., "Brown Pelicans: Improved Reproduc- 52; John J. Stegeman, "Fate and Effects of Oil in Marine tion off the Southern California Coast," Science, Nov. Animals," and Jelle Atema, "The Effects of Oil on Lob- 21, 1975, pp. 806-8. sters," Oceanus, Fall 1977, pp. 59L-73. 440 THE PROJECTIONS - 374. John W. Farrington, "The Biogeochemistry of Oil in the NOAA Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory, Se- Ocean," Oceanus, Fall 1977, p. 9. attle, Aug. 1978. 375. Douglas Pimlott et al., Oil Under the Ice: Offshore Drill- 399. "Deep Ocean Mining Environmental Study-Phase I," ing in the Canadian Arctic, Canadian Arctic Resources progress report, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Committee, Ottawa, 1976. Administration, Boulder, Aug. 1976, pp. xii-xiv, 152-54. 376. Valiela and Vince, op. cit., pp. 14, 16. 400. Burns, op. cit. 377. William E. Odurn and R. E. Johannes, "The Response 401. Ibid. of Mangroves to Man-Induced Environmental Stress," 402, Ibid. in Tropical Marine Pollution, op.. cit.; Valiela and Vince, 403. "Marine Overview," op. cit.; p. 41. op. cit., pp. 14, 16. 404, Richard A. Frank, Deepsea Mining and the Environment, 378. Johannes, "Pollution and Degradation," op. cit., pp. 14- Report to the Working Group on Environmental Reg- 17; Johannes, "Life and Death of the Reef," op. cit., pp. ulation of Deepsea Mining, American Society of Inter- 48-50. national Law, St. Paul: West, 1976, p. 2. 379. Burrell, op. cit. 405. Goldberg, Health of the Oceans, op. cit., pp. 50, 51. 380. Johannes, "Pollution and Degradation," op. cit., pp. 14- 406. Waldichuk, op. cit., p. 38. 15; Johannes, "Life and Death of the Reef," op. cit., pp. 407. Ibid. 48-50. 408. U.N. Environment Programme, "Report of the Execu- 381. Ibid. tive Director," Feb. 20, 1978, pp. 139-M; Baruch Boxer, 382. Johannes, "Pollution and Degradation," op. cit., pp. 19, "Mediterranean Action Plan: An Interim Evaluation", 20; Johannes, "Life and Death of the Reef," op. cit., p. Science, Nov. 10, 1978, pp. 585-90. 50; "Marine Overview," op. cit., pp. 8, 40. 409. Goldberg, Health of the Oceans, op, cit., p. 19. 383. Johannes, "Pollution and Degradation," op. cit., pp. 21- 22. 384. Goldberg, Health of the Oceans, op. cit., p. 19; J. B. Forestry Section Coltron, Jr., "Plastics in the Ocean," Oceanus, vol. 18, 410. For a recent insightful analysis of the implications of no. 1, 1974, pp. 61--64; Edwin Carpenter et al., "Poly- tropical.forest losses, see Norman Myers, The Sinking styrene Spherules in Coastal Waters," Science, vol. 178, Ark, Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon, 1979. 1972 p. 749. 411. Peter Sartorius, "Sociological and Environmental Con- 385. Waldichuk, op. cit., pp. 31, 32; Carpenter et al., op. cit.; sequences of the Reduction or Elimination of Primary Gardner, op, cit., pp. 51, 52. Tropical Forests," in Technical Conference on the Trop. 386. Goldberg, Health of the Oceans, op. cit., p. 17. ical Moist Forests, Rome: Food and Agriculture Orga- 387. "Marine Overview," op. cit., p. 11. nization, 1977; Eneas Salati et al., "Origem e Distribucio 388. John Gulland, "The Harvest of the Sea," in W. W. Mur- das Chuvas na Amaz6nia," Interciencia, July-Aug. 1978, doch, ed., Environment: Resources, Pollution, and So_ pp. 200-05. ciety, Sunderland, Maine: Sinauer Press, 1975, pp. 167- 412. George P. Marsh, The Earth as Modified by Human 99; C. P. Idyll, "The Anchovy Crisis," Scientific Amer_ Action, New York: Scribner, 1885; Erik Eckholm, Los- ican, June 1973, pp. 22-29. ing Ground: Environmental Stress and World Food Pros- 389. Ehrlich et al., Ecoscience, op. cit., pp. 354-55. pects, New York: Norton, 1976. 390. Kenneth S. Norris, "Marine Mammals and Man," in 413. See, for example, the discussion of the poor habitat value Howard P. Brokaw, ed., Wildlife and America, Wash- of eucalyptus plantations, which are replacing millions ington: Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 320-21. of hectares of native forest in Minas Gerais, Brazil in 391. Sidney J., Hold and Lee M Talbot, ed., "The Conser- Planoroeste 11, 3 vols. Belo Horizonte: Secretaria de vation of Wild Living Resources," final report, Airlie Estado de Planejamento e Coordena@do Geral, Secre- House (Va.) Workshops, Feb., Apr. 1975, p. 4; Lee M. taria de Agricultura, Secretaria de Estado de Ciencia e Talbot, "History, Status and Conservation Problems of Tecnologia, 1978. the Great Whale Populations," Symposium on Endan- 414. Samuel H. Kunkle, "Forestry Support for Agriculture gered Species, American Association for the Advance- Through Watershed Management, Windbreaks, and ment of Science annual meeting, Feb. 28, 1974, p. 24. 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Goldberg, Health of the Oceans, op. cit., pp. 19. 1978, pp. 317-553; also Conservation and Rational Use 397. Ibid. of the Environment, U.N. ECOSOC, 44th Session, 398. Robert E. Bums, "Effect of a Deep Ocean Mining Test," Agenda Item 5(d), 1968; Raymond F. Dasmann et al., ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 441 Ecological Principles for Economic Development, New oratories, 1966; R. Rose Innes, "Fire in West African York: Wiley, 1973, pp; 51-75. Vegetation," in Proceedings, Tall Timbers Fire Ecology 418. M. L'voich, Global Water Resources and their Future, Conference, No. 11, Tallahassee: 1972, pp. 147-73; 0. Moscow, 1974; and Tropical Forest Ecosystems, op. cit., C. Stewart, "Fire as the First Great Force Employed by pp 35-56; Joseph A. Tosi, Jr., and Robert F. Voertman, Man," in W. L. Thomas, Jr., Man's Role in Changing "Some Environmental Factors in the Economic Devel- the Face of the Earth, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1956, opment of the Tropics," Economic Geography, vol. 40, pp. 115-33. no. 3, 1964; Norman Hudson, Soil Conservation, Ithaca: 432. M. Kassas, "Desertification versus Potential for Recov- Cornell University Press, 1971, pp. 179-95. ery in Circum-Sahara Territories," in Harold E. Dregne, 419. Raymond F. Dasmann et al., op cit., pp. 208-12; Robert ed., Arid Lands in Transition, Washington: American N. Allen, "The Anchicaya Hydroelectric Project in Col- Association for the Advancement of Science, 1970, p. ombia: Design and Sedimentation Problems," in M. To- 124. ghi Farrar and John P. Milton, eds., The Careless 433. S. K. Chauhan, "Tree Huggers. Save Forests", Devel- Technology: Ecology and International Development, opment Forum, Sept. 1978, p. 6. New York: Doubleday, 1962, pp. 31842. For coastal 434. "Forestry: A Sector Policy Paper," Washington: World sedimentation from interior erosion, see Carleton Ray, Bank, Feb. 1978. Marine Parks for Tanzania, Washington: Conservation 435. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for Inter- Foundation, Oct., 1968, pp. 11, 17. national Development, Proceedings of the U.S. Strategy 420. The State of Food and Agriculture 1977, Rome: Food and Conference on Tropical Deforestation, Washington, Oct. Agriculture Organization, Nov. 1977 (draft), pp. 3-4-3- 1978. 19, Lester R. Brown, The Global Economic Prospect: 436. A summary of the Seventh World Forestry Congress and New Sources of Economic Stress, Washington: World- a list of the 142 papers is in "Commission 1: The Silvi- watch Institute, May 1978, p. 9; also see the "Population" culturists," Unasylva, Special Issue, no. 104, 1972, pp. section of this chapter. 15-30; individual papers are available from the authors 421. Robert B. Batchelder, "Spatial and Temporal Patterns or on microfiche from the Food and Agriculture Orga- of Fire in the Tropical World", in Proceedings, Tall Tim- nization, Rome. The proceedings of the Eighth Congress bers Fire Ecology Conference, No. 6, Tallahasse, 1967, (Jakarta, 1978) should provide a comprehensive updated pp. 171-90. overview when available. 422, "Mountains," in A World Conservation Strategy, Morges, 437. Erik Eckholm, Planting for the Future: Forestry for Hu- Switzerland: International Union for Conservation of man Needs, Washington: Worldwatch Institute, February Nature and Natural Resources, Jan. 1978 (draft), p. 8. 1979. 423. Ibid., pp. 8-9; also see Appendix C, especially the cables 438. Chapter 8, this volume. from Dacca and New Delhi. 439. Jack Westoby, "Forestry in China," Unasylva, no. 108, 424, Dasmarm et al., op. cit.' 1975, pp. 20-28; Jack Westoby, "Making Trees Serve 425. Frank Wadsworth, "Deforestation-Death to the Pan- People," Commonwealth Forestry Review, vol. 54, no. ama Canal," in U.S. Agency for International Devel- 3-4, 1975; S. D. Richardson, Forestry in Communist opment, Proceedings of the U.S. Strategy Conference on China, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966; Tropical Deforestation, Washington, Oct. 1978. William K. Kapp, Environmental Policies and Develop- 426. Edward G. Farnworth and Frank B. Golley, eds., Fragile ment Planning in Contemporary China and Other Essays, Ecosystems: Evaluation of Research and Applications in Paris: Mouton, 1974; For an illuminating discussion of the Neotropics, New York: Springer, 1974. the extent to which China has extinguished species to 427. "Shifting Cultivation and Soil Conservation in Africa," provide more land for "useful" plants, see Anita Thor- Soils Bulletin 24, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organi- haug, ed., Botany in China, Stanford: Stanford Univ., zation, 1974; R. Persson, Forest Resources of Africa, forthcoming, 1980; and Plant Species in the Peoples' Re- Stockholm: Royal College of Forestry, 1977. public of China, Washington: National Academy of Sci- 428. Duncan Poore, "The Value of Tropical Moist Forest ences, 1978. Ecosystems and Environmental Consequences of their 440. Eckholm, Planting for the Future, op. cit.; pp. 11, 37; Removal," Unasylva, vol. 28, nos. 112-13, 1976 pp. 127- Forestry: A Sector Policy Paper, op. cit., p. 28. 43. 441. Hans Gregersen, "Appraisal of Village Fuelwood Plan- 429. Calculated from Reidar Persson, "The Need for a Con- tations in Korea," U.N./FAO, SIDA Project Case Study tinuous Assessment of the Forest Resources of the No. 2, St. Paul, Minn., 1977 (draft). World," Eighth World Forestry Congress, Jakarta, Oct. 442. N. Vietmeyer and B. Cottom, "Leucaena: Promising 16-28, 1978. Forage and Tree Crop for the Tropics," Washington: 430. For a general introduction to these problems, see Erik National Academy of Sciences, 1977; Michael D. Benge, Eckholm, "The Other Energy Crisis: Firewood," Wash- "Banyani: A Source of Fertilizer, Feed and Energy for ington: Worldwatch Institute, 1975; Eckholm, Losing the Philippines," USAID Agricultural Development Se- Ground, op. cit.; Erik Eckholm, and Lester R. Brown, ries, Manila, 1977. "Spreading Deserts-lbe Hand of Man," Washington: 443. R. M. Lawton, "The Management and Regeneration of Worldwatch Institute, July 1978. Also see "Arvores por Some Nigerian High Forest Ecosystems," in: Tropical Ferro, " Veja (Brazil), Nov. 8, 1978, pp. 77-78. Forest Ecosystems, op. cit., pp. 580-88; and H. Ray Grin- 431. Water Deshler, "An Examination of the Extent of Fire nell, "A Study of Agri-Silviculture Potential in West in the Grassland and Savanna of Africa Along the South- Africa," Ottawa: International Development Research ern Side of the Sahara," in Proceedings of the Ninth Centre, Oct. 1977. International Symposium on Remote Sensing of Environ- 444. Willem Meijer, Indonesian Forest and Land Use Plan- ment, Environmental Research Institute of Michigan, ning, Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky, Botany Depart- Ann Arbor, 1974, pp. 23-29. Also see Batchelder, op. ment, 1975. cit.; Robert B. Batchelder and Howard F. Hirt, Fire in 445. Ibid.; T. E. Lovejoy, "The Transamazonica: Highway Tropical Forests and Grasslands, U.S. Army Natick Lab- to Extinction," Frontiers, Spring 1973. 442 THE PROJECTIONS 446. Edouard Saouma, "Statement by the Dircctor-Gencral Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1975 and of FAO," Eighth World Forestry Congress, Jakarta, Oct. 1978; Erik Eckholm, Disappearing Species: The Social 16-28, 1978. Challenge, Washington: Worldwatch Institute, July 1978. 447. Larry Robter, "Amazon Basin's Forests Going Up in 467. Joseph A. Tosi, Jr., "Climatic Control of Terrestrial Smoke," Washington Post, Jan. 5, 1978, p. A14. Ecosystems: A Report on the Holdridge Model," Eco- 448. Ibid. nomic Geography, Apr. 1964, pp. 173-81, especially p. 449. Clive Cookson, "Emergency Ban on 2,45-T Herbicide 178. in U.S.", and Alistair Hay, "Dioxin: The 10 Year Battle 468. National Research Council. Soils of the Humid Tropics, that Began with Agent Orange," Nature, Mar. 8, 1979, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1972; Tamm pp. 1084)9. et al., op. cit; P. W. Richards, "The Tropical Rain 450. Rohter, op. cit. Forest," Scientific American, vol. 169, no. 6, 1973, pp. 451. "Daniel Ludwig's Floating Factory: A Giant Pulp Mill 58-67. for the Amazon Wilderness," Time, June 19, 1978, p. 469. Rohter, op. cit. 75. 470. Ibid. 452. J. G. Bene et al., "Trees, Food and People," Ottawa: 471. Tamm et al., op. cit.; Richards, op. cit.; Gomez-Pompa International Development Research Centre, 1977; Rob- et al., op. cit. ert 0. Blake@ 14Response to Date-institutions," in Pro- 472. See D. S. Simberloff and L. B. Abele, "Island Biogeog- ceedings of the U.S. Strategy Conference on Tropical raphy Theory and Conservation Practice," Science, vol. Deforestation, U.S. Dept. of State, Oct. 1978, pp.25-30; 171, 1976, pp. 285-86; J. Terborgh, "Island Biogeogra- "Forestry: A Sector Policy Paper," op. cit.; Jack C. phy and Conservation: Strategy and Limitations" (re- Westoby, "Forest Industries for Socio-Economic Devel- sponse to Simberloff and Abele), Science, vol. 193, 1976, opment, " Eighth World Forestry Congress, Jakarta, Oct. pp. 1028-29; T. E. Lovejoy and D. C. Oren, "Minimum 1978. Critical Size of Ecosystems," in R. L. Burgess and D. 453. Eckhohn, "Planting for the Future," op. cit. M. Sharpe,,eds., Forest Island Dynamics in Man-Dom- 454. Norman E. Johnson, "Biological Opportunities and inated Landscapes, New York: Springer, 1979; J. M. Risks Associated with Fast Growing Plantations in the Diamond and R. M. May, "Island Biogeography and the Tropics," Journal of Forestry, Apr. 1976. Design of Natural Reserves," in R. M. May, ed., The- 455. A. E. Lugo, "Ecological Role of Fertilizers in Relation oretical Ecology: Principles and Applications, Oxford: to Forest Productivity, and Dollar Subsidy by Man," in Blackwell. 1976, pp. 163-86; E. 0. Wilson and E. 0. Proceedings of the Florida Section, Society of American Willis, "Applied Biogeography," in M. L. Cody and J. Foresters, Gainesville, Fla., 1970, pp. 21-33. M. Diamond, eds., Ecology and Evolution of Commu- 456. "Watching the Trees Grow-From Space," Nation's nities, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975, Business, Jan. 1979, p. 57. pp. 522-34. 457. J. L. Keas, and J. V. Hatton, "The Implication of Full- 473. T. E. Lovejoy, "Bird Diversity and Abundance in Am- Forest Utilization on Worldwide Supplies of Wood by azon Forest Communities," Living Bird, vol. 13, 1975, Year 2000," Pulp and Paper International, vol. 17, no. pp. 127-91; C. S. Elton, "Conservation and the Low 6, 1975, pp. 49-52. Population Density of Invertebrates Inside Neotropical 458. A. Gomez-Pompa et al., "The Tropical Rain Forest: A Rain Forest," Biological Conservation, vol. 7, 1975, pp. Nonrenewable Resource," Science vol. 177, 1972, pp. 3-15; G. E. Hutchinson, Principles of Population Ecol- 762-65; Duncan Poore, "The Value of Tropical Moist ogy, New Haven: Yale Univ. 1978, Forest Ecosystems and the Environmental Consequences 474. E. Salati et al., "Origern e Distribuiqd das Chuvas na of Their Removal," Unasylva, vol 28, no. 112, 1976, pp. Amaz6nia,," Interciencia, vol. 3, 1978, pp. 200-5; and N. 127-43; J. Ewel and C. Conde, "Potential Ecological A. Villa Nova et al., "Estimativa da Evapotranspiraq5o Impact of Increased Intensity of Tropical Forest Utili- na Bacia Amaz6nica," Acta Amaz6.nica, vol. 6, 1976, pp. zation," Madison, Wis.: U.S. Department of Agricul- 215-28. ture, Forest Service Forest Products Research Laboratory, 475. J. Haffer, "Speciation in Amazonian Forest Birds," Sci- 1976 (manuscript). ence, vol. 165, 1969, pp. 131-37. 459. G. E. Likens et al., "Recovery of a Deforested Ecosys- 476. Ibid.; J. Haffer, Avian Speciation in Tropical South tem," Science, vol. 199, 1978, pp. 492-96. America, with a systematic Survey of the Toucans (Rain- 460. Carl Olof Tamin et al., "Leaching of Plant Nutrients phastidae) and Jacamars (Galbulidae)," Cambridge, from Soil as a Consequence of Forestry operations," Mass.: Nuttall.Ornithological Club, 1974; P. E. Vanzo- Ambio, vol. 3, no. 6, 1974, pp. 211-21, lini, "Paleoclimates, Relief, and Species Multiplication 461. William Gladstone, Manager, Tropical Forestry Re- in Equatorial Forests," in Meggers et al., op. cit., pp. search, Weyerhaeuser Company, personal communica- 255-58; G. T. Prance, "Phytogeographic Support for the tion, June 1978. Theory of Pleistocene Forest Refuges in the Amazon 462. Ibid. Basin, Based on Evidence From Distribution Patterns in 463. G. M. Woodwell et al., "The Biota and the World Car- Caryocaraceae, Chrysobalanaceae, Dichapetalaceae, and bon Budget," Science, Jan. 13, 1978, pp. 141-146. Lecythidaceae, " Acta Amaz6nica, vol. 3, 1973, pp. 5-28; 464. P. H. Raven et al., "The Origins of Taxonomy," Science, K. S. Brown, Jr., "Centros de Evoluqdo, Refdgios Qua- vol. 174, 1971, pp. 1210-13; "Trends, Priorities and tern6rios e Conservagdo de Patrim6nios Gendticos na Needs in Systematic and Evolutionary Biology," System- Regifio Neotropical: Padr6es de Diferenciagdo na Ith- atic Zoology, vol. 23, 1974, pp. 416-39. omiinae (Lipidoptera: Nymphalidae)", Acta Amaz6nica, 465. Environmental Quality 1978, annual report of the Council vol. 7, 1977, pp. 75-137. on Environmental Quality, Washington: Government 477. Brown, op. cit. Printing Office, Dec. 1978, pp. 328-30. 478. Support for a curve of this sort is suggested in A. Som- 466. For discussions of these points, see Underexploited Trop- mer, "Attempt at an Assessment of the World's Tropical ical Plants with Promising Economic Value and Conser- Forests," Unasylva, vol. 28, 1976, pp. 5-25. vation of Germplasm Resources: An Imperative, 479. T. E. Lovejoy, "Refugia, Refuges and Minimum Critical Methodology and Environmental Maps Methodology Maps The first five maps which follow depict the various ways in which the regions of the world are represented in five key methodologies used to develop the Global 2000 Study projections. These maps and methodologies are as follows: 0 GNP Projections (SIMLINK methodology) *.Population Projections (Cohort-component methodology) 0 Food Projections (GOL methodology) 0 Energy Projections (IEES methodology) 9 Nonfuel Minerals Projections (IOU methodology) Each methodology has its own way of dividing and aggregating the world into regions. These regional patterns differ. Moreover, some methodologies make many regional discriminations; others, only a few. In order to clarify these patterns and levels of regional detail, on each map a distinctive color is assigned to each region sepa- rately distinguished by the relevant methodology. Some methodologies develop projections for each region sepa- rately, with no simulated interactions between regions. The maps depicting these methodologies make use of very thick boundaries between regions: Other methodologies develop projections for each region on an interactive basis. The maps depicting these methodologies make use of thinner boundaries between regions: Though some methodologies simulate all endogenous regions in equal detail, others simulate different groups of regions at different levels of detail. Within rhaps depicting these latter methodologies, similar colors have been assigned to regions within groups simu- lated at the same level of detail: [7777, JE 1 4 More intense colors have been assigned to those regions modeled in greater detail: Less intense colors have been assigned to those regions modeled in lesser detail: " OF Environmental Maps The last five maps illustrate various themes developed in the en- vironmental projections. GNP Projections Simulated Tracfp1inkages (SIMUNIO Me v n" AS Z7 'Y'7 H (7 V, L C, Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative 0 1500 kilometers 0 1500 miles Partially Interactive Endogenous Regions Modeled in Equal Detail Regions exogenously represented as markets 1br LDC LDC regions endogenously represented exports of primary commodifie4 manufactured goods, and services India Japan and Oceania Low-income Africa North America Lower-middle income Western Europe Middle income Regions exogenously represented as markets for LDC exports of manufactured goods and services Upper-middle income Socialist countries Other South Asia Population Proje Me W 44@ A IJ led Bou@ndary representation is not necessarily authoritative f 0 1600 kilometers 0 1500 miles Independent Regions Modeled in Equal Detail Bangladesh Mexico Thailand Brazil Nigeria Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Eastern Europe Pakistan United States Egypt People's Republic of China Other Africa India Philippines Other Asia and Oceania Indonesia South Korea Other industrialized market countries Japan Temperate South America Other Latin America Food Projections Grain-Offredi-Livestock (GOL) Me iPI Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative 0 15 00 kilometers 1500 miles Interactive Regions Modeled at Different Levels of Detail-, Regic!ns which include detailed equations for Regions which include detailed equation for grain grain, livestock and daity products Central Africa Canada East Africa Japan Oceania East Asia, high income EMSouthern Africa East Asia, low income United States India Benelux,, France, Italy, West Germany Indonesia Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom North Africa and Middle East, high income North Africa and Middle East, low income Other Western Europe Thailand Regions which include detailed equations Venezuela for grain and livestock Other South America Argentina Other South Asia Brazil Other Southeast Asia Central America Regions which include only trade equation for grain and livestock China Eastern Europe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regions which include only trade equations for livestock and dairy products Rest of world Energy Projections rva Intemational Energy i6a&n system (IEES) Y, West Gulf E st a 'A @K =L=Z: Or Boundary representation is not necessarily authodtati@e 0 1500 "1 onne tore A 0 Interactive Regions Modeled at Different Levels of Detail Regions which include detailed equations Regions which include detailed exogenous fbr energy demand, petroleum refining, estimations of crude od production and electricity generation Indonesia r,--7-7-1 Nigeria, Gabon Australia, New Zealand Japan Austria, Switzerland Puerto Rico, Virgin Is. Iran Persian Gulf (Arab) Benelux Scandinavia Libya, Algeria Venezuela, Ecuador Regions which include only simpiffled Canada Spain, Portugal demand relationships France United Kingdom, Ireland Angola, Congo, Zaire Other Africa Greece, Turkey West Germany Asian exporters Other Asia M Italy Bolivia, Peru Other Caribbean Regions which include detailed equations for Egypt, Syria, Bahrain Other Latin America petroleum refining and electricity generation Mexico U.S. East Coast F.-all U.S. West Coast Regions for which supply and demand FGuIfj U.S. Gulf Coast calculations are largely exagenous Centrally planned economies Nonfuel Minerals Proje Intensity-6f; Use (IOU) Metho % '7 @\,,J\ 4- -A, 4 17@1 f @7 Independent Modeled in Equal Deta fl. .4, Africa sl China and other Communist Eastern Europe Japan j F7 Latin America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics United States Western Europe Boundary representation is Other Asia and Oceania not necessarily authoritative 0 1500 Members Other industrialized countries i I ; 0 1500 milos Extent of Commercial Acti 1- Ai I V@--@4f GNP per capita r@,, A Greater than $1, IF 200 $400-$1,200 v Less than $400 Its Principal railroads Data based on World Bank AtIa 1977. Boundary representation is r not necessarily authoritative 0 1500 kilometers 0 1500 miles ZE (n (D CD bo C> C> ok En 0 0 go DOOM a ta j 3 1 0 CL 0) 0 cn CD J to 0 01 0 -of AXVI X\ vr- Agricultural Production A r V Y -4 A g Cost reall I maximum productivity C A ove r 2 5. @Y 20-25 A -26 j 10-15 E 5-10 under 5 Source: P. Buringh at al -"The Absolute, Maximum Food'@roduction of the World in MOPRIA, A odal of Inlernationall o 1500 kilometers Relations in A riou ure Amsterdam: North Holland forthoon;ing. 0 1500 miles Land Use Patterns (19 7.1 0 1500 kilo.eters 0 1600 miles Large farms, temperate crops, Dairy farming plains agriculture Rice (paddy), usually interspersed Tropical plantation crops with mountains and forests Rich grazing lands supporting wild or domestic species interspersed Small farms; various systems including with sedentary agriculture mixed and shifting cultivation, excluding rice, often interspersed with forests Poor grazing lands FA Tropical forest hunting, fishing, Nomadic and semi-nomadic herding gathering, shifting cultivation interspersed with primitive cultivation, non-forested Temperate forests, forestry, hunting, fishing, gathering Unproductive land Aree. Range Grazing Pre., L U` S High H E Medium VI, E p Low Low Med, High CATTLE Tone gradationja be ad on species a 0 1500 kilometers density andpotential for overgrazing. "Sheep' includoe*goate. 0 1500 Milos J, ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 443 Size: Problems in the Conservation of the Neotropical Nitrogen Containing Pollutants Related to Acid Precip- Herpetofauna", in W. E. Duellman, ed., South American itation," unpublished report to the Environmental Pro- Herpetofauna: Its Origin, Evolution and Dispersal, Law- tection Agency; George M. Hidy et al., "International rence, Kan.: Museum of Natural History, Univ. of Kan- Aspects of the Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants," sas, 1979. report prepared for the U.S. Department of State, West- 480. G. B. Wetterberg, et al., "Umma Andlis de Prioridades lake Village, Calif.: Environmental Research and.Tech- em ConservaqAo da Natureza na Amaz6nia," Seria Tec- nology, Inc., Sept. 1978. nica No. 8, Brasilia: Ministerio da Agricultura, 1977. 499. 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Food and Agriculture Organization, Organic Materials, and Agriculture, op. cit. op. cit. ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 447 658. D. Thery and Van Giap, Dang, "The Chinese Biogas Metal and Nonmental Industries," in Bureau of Mines, Phenomenon" Ecodevelopment News, Dec. 1978, pp. 15- Minerals Yearbook 1975, Washington: Government 16. Printing Office, 1977. 659. Makhijani andfoole, op. cit. 684. Arthur Miller, "Philippines Seeking to Recycle, Reduce 660. W. M. Floor, "Energy Options in Rural Areas of the Waste in Mining Operations," World Environment Re- Third World," 8th World Forestry Conference, Jarkarta, port, Oct. 24, 1977, p. 5'. Oct. 1978. 685. Morning, op. cit. 661. Ibid.; National Research Council, Energy for Rural De- 686. Argonne National Laboratory, Land Reclamation Pro- velopment, op. cit., and Methane Generation, op. cit. gram Annual ReportJuly 1976-October 1977, ANULRP- 662. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil, op. cit.; Food and 2, Argonne, Ill., 1978, p. 7. Agriculture Organization, Organic Materials, op. cit. 687. Methods for Identifying and Evaluating the Nature and 663. Erik Eckholm, Losing Ground, New York: Norton, Extent of Non-Point Sources of Pollutants, EPA-430/9- 1976; also see the observations on environmental dete- 73-014, Washington: Environmental Protection Agency, rioration woven into, Peter Mat.thi.essen, The Snow Leop- Oct. 1973, p. 6. ard, New York: Viking, 1978. 688. Paone et al., op. cit. 664. D. French, "Firewood in Africa," Firewood Workshop, 689. "Czechs Reclaim Coal Strip Mines by Planting Acorns," USA16 Africa Bureau, Washington, June 1978. World Environment Report, Aug. 15, 1977, p. 8. - 665. Makhijani, Energy Policy, op. cit. 690. Human Resources Network, The Handbook of Corporate 666. Arnold and Jongma, op. cit. Social Responsibility-Profiles of Involvement, Radnor, 667. Makhijani, Energy Policy, op. cit.; National Research Pa.: Chilton; 1975, p. 179. Council, Methane Generation, op. cit.; Food and Agri- 691. Charles Harrison, "UNEP Hails Rehabilitation Of Lime- culture Organization, China: Recycling of Organic Wastes stone Quarry in Kenya," World Environment Report, in Agriculture, FAO Soils Bulletin No. 40, Rome, 1977; Feb. 27, 1978, p. 1. Thery and Dang, op. cit. 692. U.S. Soil Conservation Service, op. cit. 693. Environmental Quality 1977, annual report of the Council Nonfuel Minerals Section on Environmental Quality, Washington: Government 668. National Academy of Sciences and National Academy Printing Office, 1977, pp. 87-89. of Engineering, Man, Materials and Environment, Cam- 694. Ibid., p. 331. bridge, Mass.: MIT, 1973, p. 88. 695. David Sheridan, "A Second Coal Age Promises to Slow 669. U.S. Department of the Interior, "Environmental Issues Our Dependence on Imported Oil," Smithsonian, Aug. and the Mineral Industry," in Mining and Minerals Pol- 1977, p. 35. icy, Washington: Government Printing Office, July 1976, 696. J. R. LaFevers, et al., "A Case Study of Surface Mining Ch. 7, pp. 95-105. and Reclamation Planning, International Minerals, and 670. United Nations, Environmental Impacts on the Growth Chemical Corp. Phosphate Operations, Polk County, and Structure of the World Economy, E/AC.54/L.76, Fla.", Integrated Mine"rea Reclamation and Land Use 1975. Planning, vol. 3B, Argonne, Ill.: Argonne National Lab- 671. Richard A. Carpenter, "Tensions Between Materials and oratory,. 1977. Environmental Quality," Science, Feb. 20,1976, pp. 665- 697. Dasmann, op. cit. 68. 698. "Sweden Refuses Permits For Strip Mining of Slate," 672. U.S. Agency for International Development, Desert En- World Environment Report, Feb. 14,.1977, p. 6. croachment on Arable Lands: Significance, Causes and 699. "Create Land Reserve at Scene of Diamond Boom," Control, Washington, Aug. 1972. ' World Environment Report, Aug. 28, 1978, p. 8. " 673. See the forestry projections in Chapter 8. 700. Ariel Lugo, Council on Environmental Quality, personal 674. James Paone et al., Land Utilization and Reclamation in communication, 1979. the Mining Industry, 1930-71, Bureau of Mines Inforr 701. Environ m*ental Quality 1977, op cit., pp. 87; 89, 90. mation Circular 8642, Washington: Government Printing 702. Asbestos: The Need for and Feasibility of Air Pollution Office, 1974. Controls, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 675. Raymond F. Dasmann, Environmental Conservation, 1971; Relationship Between Environmental Quality, Health, New York: Wiley, 1976, p. 356. and Safety and the Availability and Price of Minerals, 676. J. M. Bradley, "W. Germany to Develop World's Largest Washington: Environmental Protection Agency, Nov. Open Pit Lignite Mine," World Environment Report, 17,1978. July 4, 1977, p. 5. 703. Ibid. 677. Don Lipscombe, "Australian Conservationists Lose to 704. Environment and Development, Washington: World Bank, Giant Alumina and Gas Projects," World Environment June 1975, pp. 17-18. Report, Sept. 11, 1978, p. 3. 705. S. N. Linzon, "Effects of Sulfur Oxides on Vegetation," 678. U.S. Soil Conservation Service, Status of Land Disturbed Canadian Forestry Chronicle, vol. 48, no. 4, 1972, pp. by Surface Mining in the United States as of July 1, 1977, 1-5. by States, Advisory CONS-5, Washington, Feb.'9, 1978. 706. Carl M. Shy, "Health Hazards of Sulfur Oxides," Amer- 679. Rehabilitation Potential of Western Coal Fields, Wash- ican Lung Association Bulletin, Mar. 1977, pp. 2-7. ington: National Academy of Sciences, 1974. 707. Luther J. Carter, "Uranium Mill Tailings: Congress Ad- 680. Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, Exploring dresses a LongmNeglected Problem," Science, Oct. 13, Energy Choices: A Preliminary Report, New York: Ford 1978, pp. 191-95. Foundation, 1974. 708. Ibid. 681. Paone et al., op. cit. 709. Ibid. 682. Peter Dewhirst, "OECD Reports on Waste Material Use 710. Ibid. in Road Construction," World Environment Report, July 711. Ibid. 3, 1978, p. 5. - 712.. Preliminary Findings, Radon Daughter Levels in Struc- 683. John L. Morning, "Mining and Quarrying Trends in the tures Constructed on Reclaimed Florida Phosphate Land, 448 THE PROJECTIONS Washington: Environmental Protection Agency, Oct. 737. Committee on Environmental Improvement, Cleaning 1975. Our Environment: A Chemical Perspective, Washington: 713. Phosphate-1977, Mineral Commodity Profiles MCP-2, American Chemical Society, 1978, p. 209. Washington: Bureau of Mines, May 1977, p. 14. 738. Richard A. Kerr, "Global Pollution: Is the Arctic Haze 714. Relationship Between Environmental Quality, Health, Actually Industrial Smog?," Science, July 20, 1979, pp. and Safety, op. cit. 290-93. 715. J. M. Bradley, "East and West Germany Squabble Over 739. "Gulf States to Attend Kuwait Conference," U.N. En- Polluted Werra River," World Environment Report, Oct. vironment Program, press release, Nairobi, Apr. 14, 24. 1977, p. 2. 1978. 716. A. E. Cullinson, "Collapse of Slag Yard Dams in Japan 740. Barry Castleman, "The Export of Hazardous Factories Pollutes Two Rivers," World Environment Report, June to Developing Nations," International Journal of Health 5, 1978, p. 5. Services, forthcoming, 1979; "Trouble for Export," 717. "Environmental Protection Unit Established in Philip- Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1979, p. A26. In addition, the pines," World Environment Report, June 20, 1977, p. 8. Health Hazard Export Study Group of the University of 718. "Japanese Agency Studies Filippino Mine Wastes," Connecticut Health Center will sponsor a conference on World Environment Report, May 22, 1978, p. 8. the Exportation of Hazardous Industries to Developing 719. Loretta McLaughlan, "Chemical Congress in Peru In- Countries on Nov. 2 and 3, 1979 at Hunter College, New dicts Copper Mine Pollution of Rivers," World Environ- York City. The conference will be held in conjunction ment Report, Dec. 5, 1977, p. 6; "New Peruvian Method with the annual meeting of the American Public Health Recovers Copper From Water," World Environment Association. Conference proceedings will be available in Report, July 4, 1977, p. 6. Jan. 1980 from ABT Associates, Cambridge, Mass. 720. Human Resources Network, op. cit., p. 180. 741. "Increasing Available Water Supplies Through Weather 721. "Reserve Mining Company to Remain in Minnesota," Modification and Desalination," New York: U.N. Water New York Times, July 8,1978, p. 35; M. Howard Gelfan, Resources Branch, 1976. "Mining Firm Wins a Round in Dumping Fight With 742. Clyde LaMotte, "The U.S. Plan to Control Water Pol- State," Washington Post, Feb. 1, 1977, p. 43. lutions," Ocean Industry, June 1970. pp. 39-45. 722. Irving J. Selikoff, "Asbestos in Water," in Water-Its 743. Environmental Quality 1978, annual report of the Council Effect on Life Quality, Seventh International Water on Environmental Quality, Washington: Government Quality Symposium Proceedings, Lombard, Ill.: Water Printing Office, 1978, p. 446. Quality Research Council, 1974. 744. David Pimentel et al., "Land Degradation: Effects on 723. D. B. Brooks and P. W. Andrews, "Mineral Resources, Food and Energy Resources," Science, vol. 194. 1976, Economic Growth and World Population," in P. H. pp. 149-55. Abelson and A. L. Hammond, eds., Materials: Renew- 745. See Conservation Foundation Newsletter, Dec 1978. able and Nonrenewable Resources, Washington: Amer- 746. Robert. C. Oelhaf, Organic Agriculture, New York: ican Association for the Advancement of Science, 1976, Wiley, 1979; also see William Tucker, "The Next Amer- pp. 41-47. ican Dust Bowl," Atlantic Monthly, July 1979, pp. 38- 724. D. E. Earl, "A Report on Charcoal," Rome: Food and 49. Agriculture Organization, 1974. 747. David Vail, "The Case for Organic Farming." Science, 725. "Arvores por Ferro," Veja (Brazil), Nov. 8, 1978, pp. July 13, 1979, pp. 180-81. 77-78. 748. Harold E. Dregne, cited in "Desertification: What is it? 726. Earl T. Hayes, "Energy Implications of Materials Proc- Where is it? Who has it? Is it expensive? How does it essing," in Abelson and Hammond, op. cit., pp. 33-37. happen?" IUCN Bulletin, (International Union for the 727. Ibid. Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources), Aug./ 728. Harry M. Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands: Sept., 1977, p. 45. Biography of a Depressed Area, Boston: Little, Brown, 749. Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment, 1963. "Arid Lands in Developing Countries: Environmental 729. Bradley op. cit. Effects," Paris: International Council of Scientific Unions, 1976. Closing the Loops 750. United Nations Environment Program press release, 730. William P. Elliot and Lester Machta, eds., Workshop on Nairobi, Sept. 14, 1977. the Global Effects of Carbon Dioxide from Fossil Fuels, 751. "Perennial Corn Hope," Development Forum, Mar. 1977, Washington: U.S. Department of Energy, May 1979, p. 5. 1979, p. 24. 752. "Riceless World?" Development Forum, Mar. 1979, p. 731. Report of the Scientific Workshop on Atmospheric Car- 5. bon Dioxide, 1976 Geneva: World Meteorological Or- 753. 0. Beingolea Guerrero, "Integrated Pest Control, Latin ganization, 1977, p. 13. America," Conference on Environmental Sciences in 732. World Climate Conference: Declaration and Supporting Developing Countries, Nairobi, Feb. 1974. Documents, Geneva: World Meteorological Organiza- 754. Lim Guan Soon, "Integrated Pest Control, Asia," Con- tion, Feb. 1979, p. 4. ference on Environmental Sciences in Developing Coun- 733. Ibid., p. 4. tries, Nairobi, Feb. 1975. 734. George M. Woodwell, et al., "The Carbon Dioxide Prob- 755. Guerrero, op. cit. lem: Implications for Policy in the Management of En- 756. Ray Smith, "Economic Aspects of Pest Control," Univ. ergy and Other Resources," Washington: Council on of Calif., Berkeley, 1970 (unpublished paper). Environmental Quality, July 1979. 757. The State of Food and Agriculture, 1976, Rome: Food 735. "Making the Most of the CO, Problem" Science News, and Agriculture Organization, 1976. Apr. 14, 1979, p. 244. Op. cit. 758. Richard M. Adams et al., Methods Development for 736. William W. Kellog, "Facing Up to Climatic Change," Assessing Air Pollution Control Benefits, vol. 3, A Pre- Ceres, vol. 11, 1978, pp. 13-17. Kellog, op. cit. liminary Assessment of Air Pollution Damages for Se- ENVIRONMENT PROJECTIONS 449. lected Crops Within Southern California, Washington: 768. National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Resources Environmental Protection Agency, Feb. 1979. and Man, Resources and Man, San Francisco: Freeman, 759. Anne K. Robas, South Florida's Mangrove-Bordered 1969, p. 5. Estuaries: Their Role in Sport and Commercial Fish Pro- 769. There is an extensive literature on this general subject. duction, Sea Grant Information Bulletin no. 4, Univ. of For a short introduction, see Lester R. Brown et al., Miami, 1970. Twenty-Two Dimensions of the Population Problem, 760. United Nations Environment Programme, The Mediter- Washington: Worldwatch Institute, Mar. 1976. For a well ranean Action Plan, Nairobi, 1977; also see the program's articulated Marxist perspective on this subject, see Mah- 1977 press releases nos. 85, 147, and 162, mood Mamdani, The Myth of Population Control, New 761. Coastal Zone Pollution in Indonesia with Emphasis on York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. Oil: A Reconnaissance Survey, Washington: Smithsonian 770. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, New Institution, 1974. York Bight Project Annual Report for FY 1976-76T, 762. Asia Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Develop- Boulder: Marine Ecosystems Analysis Program, Dec. ment, Environmental Assessment of the Small Farm 1977, p. 28. Systems in the Phillipines," Washington, 1978. 771. Council on Environmental Quality, Report to the Presi- 763. U.S. Water Resource Council, The Nation's Water Re- dent by the Toxic Substances Strategy Committee: Public source, 1975-2000, vol. 1, Summary,' Washington: Gov- Review Draft, Washington, Aug. 1979. ernment Printing Office, 1978. 772. Dennis Hanson, "Earthlog," Audubon, Nov. 1978, pp. 764. "The Macroeconomic Impact of Federal Pollution Con- 14, 16-17; "A Nightmare in Niagara," Time, Aug. 14, trol Programs: 1978 Assessment," report submitted to 1978, p. 46. the Environmental Protection Agency and the Council 773. Robert H. Boyle, "Getting Rid of the PCBs," Audubon, on Environmental Quality by Data Resources, Inc., Nov. 1978, p. 150; "N.Y. Plan to Remove PCBs" Science Cambridge, Mass; Jan. 11, 1979. News, July 15, 1978, p. 39, 765. D. M. Costle, "The Benefits of a Cleaner Environ- 774. Environmental Quality 1978, op. cit., p. 183; John C. mental," EPA Journal, Jan. 1979, pp. 2-3. Fuller, The Poison that Fell from the Sky, New York: 766. Thomas - D. Crocker et al., Methods Development for Random House, 1977, p. 94. ' Assessing Air Pollution Control Benefits, vol. 1., Exper- 775. John Walsh, "Seveso: The Questions Persist Where iments,in the Economics ofAir Pollution Epidemiology, Dioxin Created a Wasteland," Science, Sept. 9, 1977, pp. Washington: Environmental Protection Agency, Feb. 1064-67; Fuller, op. cit.; Thomas Whiteside, "A Re- 1979. porter at Large: Contaminated," New Yorker, Sept. 4, 767. "Health Benefits from Stationary Air Pollution Control 1978, pp. 34-81 (published also as The Pendulum and the Appear Substantially More than Costs," Environmental Toxic Cloud, New Haven: Yale, 1979). Protection Agency, press release, Mar. 29, 1979. 776. See references 769. 767a Castleman, op. cit. -1 Part 11 Analysis of Projection Tools: The Government's Global Model 14 The Government's Global Model: The Present Foundation This chapter introduces Part 11 of the Global describe and analyze each element of the set in- 2000 Study's Technical Supplement. Part I (Chap- dividually. This chapter can be thought of as pri- ters 1-13) responded to the first aspect of the marily examining the external relationships among President's directive establishing the Study: to a set of "black boxes," whereas Chapters 15-23 make a "study of the probable changes in the explore the internal contents of each black box world's population, natural resources, and envi- in detail. For the reader's convenience, a sum- ronment to the end of the century. " Part 11 (Chap- mary description of each "element" (or black ters 14-23) responds to the second aspect of the box) is provided at the end of this chapter. President's directive: that "this study will serve as the foundation of our longer-term planning." The "Government's Global Model" Specifically, Part II describes and analyzes the Throughout Part 11 of this volume, the set of set of formal computer-based models and less for- mal computational procedures used to develop formal models and the less formal computational the projections presented in Part 1. It is these procedures used to develop the Study's projec- models and procedures, rather than the projec- tions are referred to, collectively, as the "govern- tions themselves, that constitute the real "present ment's global model" (for projecting probable foundation" for the government's longer-term changes in the world's population, natural re- planning. This is because: sources, and environment to the end of the cen- tury). * Of course, the U.S. Government does not � These models and procedures embody@-in an presently have an integrated computer model of outward and visible form-many of the as- the world. In fact, it may at first seem inappro- sumptions present in the minds of those re- sponsible for the government's longer-term *Additional specialized terms and phrases used in Part 11: planning. Computer-based model-For the purposes of the Global � These models and procedures are actually used 2000 Study, a computer program which simulates the behavior by Government planners to help delineate the of some real-world phenomenon (for example, population implications of those assumptions, to test and growth or the patterns of world food trade) by using mathe- matical equations to make projections. revise those assumptions where appropriate, Input-Data (including assumptions) required before use and more generally to provide analytic support can be made of a computer-based model or other computa- for long-term policy decisions. tional procedure. Output-Data created as a result of making use of a com- A presentation of the government's present puter-based model or other computational procedure. foundation for longer-term planning requires both Endogenous calculations-Calculations performed by a a holistic overview of the entire set of models and computer-based model or other computational procedure. Exogenous calculations-Calculations performed either in procedures underlying the projections and a de- preparing input before making use of a computer-based model tailed examination of each model and procedure. or other computational procedure, or in preparing output after This first chapter of Part 11 provides the holistic making use of a computer-based model or other computational overview, while Chapters 15-23, which follow, procedure. Dynamically calculated projections-For the purposes of the Global 2000 Study, projections made endogenously for a fu- -,*Part III of this volume (Ch. 24-3 1) also responds to thesecond ture year that are dependent in part on projections (also made aspect of the President's directive by describing, analyzing. endogenously) for a preceding year or years. and comparing several highly integrated, long-term, global Statically calculated projections-For the purposes of the models not currently in extensive use by the U.S. government. Global 2000 Study, projections made endogenously for a fu- These models and their projections provide important addi- ture year that are independent of projections made endoge- tional insights for use in analyzing the Global 2WO Study*s nously for a preceding year or years. Exogenous changes in projections and otherwise strengthening the present founda- the input determine the year for which the projections are tion for the government's longer-term planning. being calculated. 453 454 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL priate for this report to make reference to this But in spite of the discipline established by the collection of analytic procedures as though it were Study to ensure consistency, a number of internal a fully integrated entity-with a food sector main- contradictions were inherent in the analysis and, tained by the Department of Agriculture, an en- unavoidably, they remain. To put it more simply, ergy sector maintained by the Department of the analysis shows that the executive agencies of Energy, an environmental sector scattered through the U.S. Government are not now capable of pre- many agencies, and so forth. senting the President with internally consistent Instead, each agency has its own idiosyncratic projections of world trends in population, re- way of projecting the future, based on its own sources, and the environment for the next two responsibilities and interests. These different ap- decades. proaches were never designed to be used as part These contradictions do not completely invali- of an integrated, self-consistent system like the date the overall results of the Study-in fact, the C6 government's global model." They were de- Study's projections are the most consistent such signed by different people, at different times, us- set the government has ever produced-but they ing different perspectives and methodologies, to do suggest that the results of the projections un- meet different needs. While many are widely rec- derstate the severity of potential future problems. ognized as making outstanding use of state-of-the- The analysis also points to ways in which the qual- art analytic procedures appropriate to their re- ity of the government's long-term analytic tools spective sectors, they produce projections that are can be improved. mutually inconsistent in important ways. One of the most important findings of the Study Nevertheless, there are at least three compel- is that the sectoral trends projected in Part I in- ling reasons for describing and evaluating these teract with each other in the real world in ways different approaches as a collective whole: that are not represented in the government's 1. The various sectoral models and calculation global model-essentially because of the institu- procedures (arbitrarily aggregated in this dis- tional context in which the elements of the model cussion into a set of 11 "elements") have, to were developed and are being used. This context a limited degree, actually been developed and emphasizes sectoral concerns at the expense of maintained in ways that involve mutual inter- interactions among sectors and leads to distorted actions via an informal, almost glacial process. and mutually inconsistent projections. Important 2. Projections developed using these elements decisions-involving billion-dollar federal pro- have generally been used by the government grams and even the national security@are par- and others as though they had been calculated tially based on these projections. on a mutually consistent basis. In the discussion that follows, the "present 3. These elements should be capable of being foundation" (the government's global model) is used on a mutually consistent basis-regard- first described in terms of its scope and in terms less of how they have actually been developed and maintained, and regardless of how their of the linkages between its elements. With this projections have generally been used. In fact, overall description to work from, the operation the President implicitly directed that the ele- of the elements as a collective whole is analyzed. ments be used and evaluated in this way when The implications of this analysis are then exam- he commissioned the Global 2000 Study. ined with regard to (1) interpreting the projec- tions and (2) strengthening the present foundation. The U.S. Govern 'ment has a large collection Of Finally, the 11 elements of the government's analytic procedures for anticipating future trends global model are summarized, using a fixed for- in a wide*range of areas. The Global, 2000 Study mat to facilitate comparisons. asked the federal agencies to develop projections The remainder of this chapter is divided into using the methodologies that they routinely use five sections and several subsections, as follows: for this purpose. Description of the Present Foundation These methodologies-or tools-can be consid- Scope of the Global 2000 Study ered collectively as elements of the.government's Linkages Prior to the Global 2000 Study overall global model. Normally these elements Linkages Under the Limited Discipline of the Global are not employed in ways that ensure that the 2000 Study -assumptions they use are mutually consistent. For Analysis of the Present Foundation the purposes of this study, ensuring consistency Inconsistent Variable Values Use of Diverse Sources of Information became a high priority, and every effort was made Absence of Feedback to enhance interactions and consistency among Structural Incompatibilities elements. Institutional Factors Underlying the Discrepancies THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 455 Interpreting the Projections the Study, and, finally, describes the linkages es- Validity of the Basic Findings tablished under the limited discipline imposed by Biases Due to Inconsistent Variable Values the Study. Strengthening the Present Foundation Need for an Ongoing Institutional Mechanism Scope'of the Global 2000 Study Potential Technical Improvements Incorporating Broader Improvements Within the scope of the President's directive, Summary Descriptions of the 11 Elements several decisions were made that played a major Population role in determining the ultimate shape of the Gross National Product Global 2000 Study by alternately selecting and Climate excluding factors and considerations related. to Technology long-term global analysis: Food Fish.eries, Forestry, Water 1. The mandate of the Global 2000 Study was Energy to focus on trends and changes rather than on Energy Residuals Fuel Minerals goals. The Study was to look ahead, primarily to Nonfuel Minerals the year 2000 but not much beyond. It was con-. Environment cemed with biophysical matters, as opposed to social, political, and economic developments. Description of the Present Foundation While economic considerations were introduced in a limited way to help tie the projections to- The government's present foundation for longer- gether, economic, political, and social, consider- term planning-the government's global model, ations were essentially outside the scope of the as previously defined-is more than the sum of Study. its parts. It is the sum both of its 11 elements and 2. Analytic methods were used wherever pos- of the linkages among them. For the reader's con- sible, to the exclusion of more normative or qual- venience, the projections and detailed discussions itatively descriptive approaches that might have in this volume related to each of the 11 elements been used to gather ideas and opinions from coun- are cross-referenced in Table 14-1. try and sectoral experts.* Naturally, the govern- The discussion that follows first reviews the ment makes use of many computational procedures decisions made in defining the scope of the Global for policy analysis other than those used by the 2000 Study, then describes the linkages that ex- Global 2000 Study, and many organizational units isted prior to the President's directive establishing make use of sources other than those relied on by the Study. But, in general, those other procedures TABLE 14-1 produce projections that are either not global and long-term, (i.e., to the end of the century,,as de- Index to Projections and Detailed Discussions fined by the President's directive) or not generally Related to Each of the 11 Elements of used by the governmental unit with primary re- the Government's Global Model sponsibility for developing the type of projections required for this Study. Hence, such procedures Projections Detailed were not included among the 11 elements com- Developed Description prising the government's global model appiopri- Using the of the Element Element Element ate for meeting the objectives of this Study. t 3. Wherever possible, use was made of the in the order presented in the last Part 1, Part II, tools, data, and capabilities available within the section of this chapter Chapter Chapter federal government. This choice was made to fa- I .Population 2 15 2. GNP 3 16 3. Climate 4 17 *For example, the field anomaly relaxation method for pro- 4. Technology' 5 23 jecting whole-body future patterns, developed by the Stanford 5. Food 6 18 Research Institute. 6. Fisheries, Forestry, Water 7,8,4 19 t Broad surveys of other models used by the U.S. Government .7. Energy 10 20 are provided in A Guide to Models in Governmental Planning 8: Energy residuals 10 20 and operations, Washington: Environmental Protection Agency, 9. Fuel minerals 11 21 Aug. 1974, and in G. Fromm et al., Federally Supported Math- 10. Nonfuel minerals 12 22 ematical Models: Survey and Analysis, Washington: National 11. Environment 13 19 Science Foundation, June 1975. A discussion of the evolving role of models in governmental processes is provided in M. A composite element, bringing together under asingle heading the various as- sumptions and approaches related to the technological innovations used by the Greenberger et al., Models in the Policy Process, New York: different elements, together with their deployments and impacts. Russell Sage Foundation, 1976. 456 HE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL cilitate an evaluation of the present foundation ation and Prospects to 1985 by the Department of for longer-range planning-but as a result of this Agriculture, Mineral Facts and Problems by the decision, the contributions of many tools available Bureau of Mines, and World Energy Prospects by in universities, the private sector, and other in- the Department of Energy's predecessor, the Fed- stitutions were omitted. A further consequence eral Energy Administration. of this choice is that individual agency views were Prior to the Global 2000 Study, such reports not cross-evaluated with other perspectives from were generally prepared largely independently of the private sector, except to the extent that these each other. * Little formal attempt was made to may have been incorporated in the views and crit- ensure that the assumptions used by one agency icisms of the Study's advisers. were consistent with those used by another. Little 4. Among the tools available in the federal gov- consideration was given to mutual interactions ernment, it was necessary to pick and choose spe- and feedback over time. Little heed was paid to cific topical areas within the broader categories intersectoral problem areas and concerns that of population, natural resources, and the envi- were not the immediate responsibility or a special ronment. Some of these choices were voluntary, interest of that particular agency. Instead, it was others were not. For example, grasslands are a implicity assumed that long-term issues relating resource that could not be evaluated in the time to population, natural resources, and the envi- available. While mineral consumption is pro- ronment could be studied and analyzed on a jected, mineral demand, supply, and price are not largely independent basis. projected because the government has no capa- Interaction among various elements of the gov- bility to project these on a global basis. The long- ernment's global model still tends to occur very term global environmental analysis was assembled infrequently. Even the activities of the inter- from a large number of sources, most of them agency task forces cited in Chapter 1 and dis- outside the government, since the government has cussed at greater length in Appendix A have done no capacity for such analysis that could be brought little to improve coordination among the govern- to bear on the Study. ment's numerous computational procedures. This 5. Among the many variables selected for pro- is due largely to the relatively narrow focus and jection, some basic disaggregations were made, brief life span of most of those procedures. They but disaggregation was not possible in every case tend to focus on a single set of narrowly conceived or, necessarily, in even the most significant cases. factors directly relevant to specialized sectoral For example, the number, age, and sex of the concerns and to give priority to more pressing and world's human populations were considered, but parochial short-term tasks. other factors (for example, educational, rural-ur- While it is true that the individual reports dis- ban, racial, religious, income, and other socio- cussed in Appendix A have been independently economic distributions) were not. Total energy prepared, there has always been some interaction consumption was considered, but not in terms of between the agencies as they proceeded to for- the end-use requirements for low-grade versus mulate their projections, But most interactions high-grade forms of energy; no net energy con- occur as part of a relatively slow process. In gen- siderations were included. Out of nearly 100 re- eral, one agency completes and publishes a study sources traded internationally, only 12 were report, which, when read by other agencies, in- considered. Competition among crops for arable forms the future study efforts of those agencies. land was not specifically considered. Also, the Those individual studies have not all been un- environmental projections could not be geograph- dertaken at the same time, of course, nor have ically disaggregated in many cases because of the they necessarily made use of mutually consistent limitations of available data. assumptions. Thus, while some feedback (and some interaction) does occur, as manifested in the Linkages Prior to the Global 2000 Study process just described (and occasionally in formal and informal task force collaborations), such feed- Each of the various agencies and departments back tends to be extremely limited. Nevertheless, of the executive branch of the federal government when viewed from this perspective, a quasi-inte- has always had some capacity to make long-term grated governmental global model can be seen assessments of global trends related to popula- tion, natural resources, and the environment- *The extent to which formal collaborative joint task force such as the assessments discussed in Appendix A. efforts were undertaken is discussed in Appendix A. The trend Recent examples include World Population: 1977 has been increasing, but the Global 2000 Study is the first by the Bureau of the Census, World Food Situ- official study to use all 11 elements concurrently. THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 457 that is more than the sum of a set of independent Providing - special opportunities for relevant elements and their respective projections. agency experts to exchange views with each A signal indication of the relative lack of direct other in order to encourage them to make their interaction among the elements and associated elements (and derived projections) more mu- experts (prior to the Global 2000 Study) was pro- tually consistent vided when the Global 2000 staff met with the Providing special opportunities for the various agency experts responsible for the maintenance agency experts to exchange views with and re- and operation of the 11 elements of the govern- ceive comments from various experts not di- ment's global model. With one or two exceptions rectly affiliated with the participating agencies. at the most, none of the agency experts had met This also was done to encourage the agency ex- each other previously, and none knew anything perts to make the elements (and their derived about the assumptions, structures, requirements, projections) more mutually consistent. and uses of the others' calculation procedures- although on occasion they were required to make The initial assignments of responsibility to the use of projections developed by the other ele- appropriate agencies have already been presented ments. in Chapter 1. The agencies identified experts, both inside and outside the agencies, whom the Linkages Under the Limited Discipline of the agencies considered most appropriate for dis- Global 2000 Study charging the responsibility of preparing the pro- jections requested by the Study's central staff. The various agencies' miscellaneous published These "agency experts" (identified in the Ac- projections could have, been used as the Global knowledgment section of the Preface) then,be- 2000 Study's projections, but while this would came responsible for selecting and utilizing have addressed the first aspect of the President's analytical procedures that they felt best met the directive establishing the Study, it would not have Study's criteria. addressed the second. The foundation thus estab- The agency experts were asked to producea lished would have been of unknown reliability, first draft of their projection in just six weeks, at making interpretation of the projections uncer- which time they, the Study staff, and a small group tain. Moreover, no basis would have been estab- of outside experts* met for a weekend synthesis lished for strengthening the present foundation. meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to im- Therefore, a special limited discipline was es- prove the consistency of the projections and to tablished for the Global 2000 Study-that is, a begin-at least subjectively-to consider the im-, conscious choice was made (1) to employ, wher- plications; of the natural resource and environ- ever possible, the very tools and data used within mental projections for the independently derived the federal government, and (2) to employ those projections of gross national product (GNP) and tools and data on the most coordinated basis fea- population. A certain amount of difficulty was sible within the constraints of the Study. In keep- anticipated in this preliminary meeting, and, in ing with this decision, the Global 2000 Study's fact, many inconsistencies were revealed. The ex- central staff established three criteria to be fol- perts then decided collectively how best to adjust lowed in developing the Study's projections, and modify the projections to improve the internal namely, that the projections be developed using consistency of the whole set. The final projections analytical procedures, wherever possible, which were prepared during the following two months. were essentially (1) long-term, (2) global, and (3). , The projections had to be undertaken as part in general use by the agencies primarily respon- of a sequential process, since the structures of the sible for the type of projections required by the elements themselves precluded their being,used Study. simultaneously. This process is illustrated in Fig- It was also clear that the normal linkages and ure 14-1. mode of operation of the government's global While this sequential process permitted some model were not adequate for the Global 2000 interaction among the various elements of the Study, and so a special effort was made to increase government's global model, many important link- linkages between the elements and to improve the ages could not be included at all. In particular, consistency of these assumptions by: the population and GNP projections that were Using the output from one element as the input *These experts are also identified in the Acknowledgments. to another whenever this was readily feasible section of the Preface to this volume. A discussion of their within the time and resource constraints of the activities, together with a summary of their views,' is presented Study. in Appendix B. 458 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL -,A j"i @h, VIII j@; J Policy Population GNP Climate rest Step- assumptions, projections projections projections % P I -C., 71= Resource projections Second Step. (food, fisheries, forestry, water, 0 energy, energy residuals, fuel minerals and nonfuel minerals) -x, ,Thiro Step. Environmental projections (including feedback implication,)] -P- Figure 14-1. Sequential steps followed in linking elements of the government's global model. prepared during the first step were based largely they were not used in preparing the climate, tech- on extrapolations of past trends and were unin- nology, fisheries, forestry, water, fuel minerals, formed by interactive feedback from the resource and nonfuel minerals projections. Nor were they and environmental projections or from each used explicitly in preparing the environmental other. The resource and environmental analyses projections derived from the other projections.t also projected developments that could signifi- The limited extent to which both vertical and cantly feed back to and influence each other, but horizontal linkages were actually established for these feedbacks were also not represented by ex- the Study is indicated in Figure 14-2. Additional plicit linkages. steps were taken by the Study in order to obtain Although an attempt was made to develop pro- some indication of the extent to which the envi- jections of resource consumption and environ- ronmental impacts projected by the Study would mental impacts using a single source for population have influenced the Study's other projections- projections and GNP projections, this effort was had they been available and taken into account only partially successful.* While projections pro- when those projections were made. These steps vided by these single sources were used in pre- were discussed previously in the "Closing the paring the Study's food and energy projections, Loops" section of Chapter 13 and are therefore *Another initial objective was to examine the implications of 15--23 to provide the reader with as much detailed numeric the projections as they applied to a specific geographic region. information as possible on one arbitrarily selected region @ Po' mpliyns, =In e,, vir-m including fee This examination would have provided another test of the North Africa. The interested reader may wish to examine fur- consistency of the projections and would also have given the ther the additional problems and inconsistencies exposed by global (sometimes nebulous) projections a more specific geo- drawing this information together for purposes of comparison. graphic reference for policy analysis. Unfortunately this ex- amination could not be completed within the time and resource t Similarly, it was not possible to ensure that the assumption constraints of the Study because of the major differences in of no significant policy change was followed in developing the the ways that the various models represent geographic regions. various projections (as shown later, in Table 14-2 and sum- Nonetheless, an effort was made in the preparation of Chapters marized in the element descriptions at the end of this chapter). THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 459 Climate 0 Gross national Population product Population (Census) (Chicago) Fuel 0 minerah N n Food Energy Water C3, A L D Fisheries F*r6stry IQ -0 ,Envkonment Ehyironme aictsy (non-energy impacts) :(eniirgy imp Figure 14-2. Linkages achieved between elements of the government's global model. Areas are pro- portional to the complexity of explicit quantitative relationships. The small squares represent negligible Complexity. not discussed further in this chapter, nor included that were prepared in making the resource and in Figure 14-2. environmental projections were largely obtained Attempts by the Study to link together the ele- by varying the population and GNP assumptions ments of the government's global model focused on which they were based. Most of the partici- entirely on linking the outputs of one element pating agency experts were reluctant to assign with the inputs of another. Because of the severe either statistical or subjective estimates of relative difficulties encountered in meeting even this lim- probability to these variations. ited objective, no attempt was made to evaluate Even under the limited discipline of the Global deeper linkage opportunities or the challenges 2000 Study, multiple sources for population and related to melding the various structure s and par- GNP projections were used in developing many adigms. of the Study's other projections. For this reason, A crude measure of uncertainty surrounding inconsistencies unavoidably abound in the Study's the projections was obtained as part of the limited collected set of projections-as well as for other discipline of the Global 2000 Study by requesting reasons which will be discussed later in this chap- all participants to provide high, medium, and low ter. Nevertheless, under the discipline of the variations of their projections wherever feasible. Study, more consistency was- achieved regarding In practice, the high, medium, and low variations linkages as basic as the use of consistent popu- 460 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL lation and GNP projections than in any previous projections are best evaluated in terms of how official governmental projections related to long- well the underlying equations are fitted to past term@ global trends in 'population, natural re- data. Others are best evaluated in terms of how sources, and the environment.* well the equations can be defended as logically representing relationships existing in the real Analysis of the Present Foundation world. Some projections are best evaluated in terms of how accurately and precisely they predict The tacit assumption underlying the develop- (1) the timing of events in the real world or (2) ment and use-of each separate element of the the particular values pertaining to certain varia- government's global model has been that long- bles at particular times. Others are best evaluated term global trends in population, natural re- in terms of how well they illuminate possible fu- sources, and the environment can be projected ture patterns of behavior, even if the timings and separately in an essentially consistent. and accu- magnitudes of the patterns they project are not rate manner. This assumption is*false. As will be precisely accurate. .seen in the following analysis, projections from J .the government's global model fail to meet the The various elements of the government'sl most fundamental test of consistency-that the global model were not designed to be used on a, basic conclusions of an analysis shall not contra- fully mutually consistent basis, even though pro-. dict its basic premises. And because the conclu- jections developed using them are often treated, sions are not mutually consistent, they cannot be as though they were. Therefore, it is in a sense, accurate.t unfair to the designers of these elements to ana-11 While. consistency is a necessary prerequi site lyze them on a- holistic basis---even though a hol- . for accuracy, consistency alone does not ensure istic perspective is, as discussed in the previous, accuracy. Projections which should be and are section, a basic requirement of the President's consistent can nevertheless be wrong. Moreover, directive creating the Study. Moreover, it would certain real-world phenomena in a state of dy- have been more unfair to the designers of the namic. dise'quilibrium (for example, markets where elements to note that the elements are capable of supply and demand are not in balance) would be performing a number of agency-specific functions inaccurately represented by projections in which not required under the mandate of the Global supply and demand were statically balanced in 2000 Study. accordance with a foolish consistency. Despite the numerous inconsistencies which are Nor does accuracy ensure usefulness. The ul- about to be analyzed, the projections developed! timate usefulness of a projection (and, in a sense, for this Study using the government's global-@' @its accuracy) can only be judged relative to its model are the most complete and internally con- intended purpose. And it is likely that different sistent ever developed by the executive agencies criteria should be used to evaluate different pro- of the government. The central staff of the Global jections, depending on the purposes for which the 2000 Study concluded, as have many of the@i, projections were developed. For example, some Study's advisers, that the overall findings are@ *Th e projections reported in this Study are based on the col- of Energy is exploring feedback relationships to GNP. The lective judgment of the agency experts who participated in the Central Intelligence Agency is developing an expanded ca- effort. In an effort to ensure internal consistency, several ad- pability for nonfuel minerals analysis and projections. The justments were required in individual agency projections. As World Bank has developed a new economic model which,a a result, the projections may not agree completely with pro- Bank analysts report, eliminates many of the problems iden-)', jections previously published by the participating agencies. tified in this report. New projections also differ from those , Since the manuscript has not been subjected to formal inter- prepared for the Global 2000 study. The world Bank is pro-' 4 agency clearance procedures, the agencies are not responsible jecting lower growth rates. The Department of Energy now - for any errors in fact or judgment that may have occurred in expects oil price increases to occur sooner than projected and making these adjustments. to have more impact on economic growth. The Department t One of the problems in analyzing models (and one of the of Agriculture anticipates increases in the real price of food strengths of models) is that models change over time. The to occur sooner. The Bureau of the Census now expects life models analyzed here are the models used to develop the expectancies to increase more slowly than projected in some Global 2000 Study projections. Since the projections were countries. While there have been changes in both individual developed, several of these models have been modified, im- models and projections, nothing has changed fundamentally proved, or expanded, in some cases in response to problems concerning the problems of inconsistency and internal contra- and issues identified in the course of this study. The Depart- diction that occur when an effort is made to integrate the ment of Agriculture has established links to the International projections from the various elements of the government*s Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Vienna and with the global model. The basic problem addressed by 'this chapter Mesarovic-Pestel World Integrated Model. The Department has not changed and is not soon likely to change significantly. THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 461 valid, for reasons that will be discussed later in with each other. * For example, one *set of pro- this chapter in the section entitled "Interpreting jections assumed that population growth rates in the Projections. " the less developed countries (LDCs) would de- The essential problem with the current ele- cline significantly, while another calculated that ments of the government's global model (and the they would not. One set of projections assumed projections derived from them) is, of course, the that per capita gross national product (GNP) in fact that they were designed to simulate sectoral the LDCs would increase significantly, while an- aspects of long-term global trends largely to the other calculated it would not. exclusion of interactions between and among sec- In order to help the reader understand the col- tors. This design is no institutional accident but lective implications of these numerous inconsist- is in conformity with the bureaucratic division of encies, the following discussion is divided into responsibility within the executive agencies.* But four subsections, each of which addresses an im- real-world phenomena interact-especially in the Portant set of inconsistent variable values (the longer term-in ways that do not conform to the overwhelming number of environmental projec- bureaucratic division of responsibility or to nar- tion findings-discussed at length in Chapter 13- rowly focused sectoral models. Hence, the gov- which explicitly contradict major variable values ernment's global model in its present form can involving virtually all the other elements, are not only imperfectly project the consequences of included). The first subsection concerns popula- these interactions. Furthermore, in the absence tion and GNP growth rates; the second and third, of ongoing institutional incentives to address commodity trade prices and volumes; the fourth, cross-sectional interactions, the present form of capital and resource utilization. Each subsection the government's global model is not likely to consists of a paragraph providing a brief perspec- change significantly in the foreseeable future. tive on a set of inconsistencies, a diagram visually summarizing the set, and an itemization of specific The following analysis of the government's inconsistencies. t The inconsistencies presented global model addresses six subjects: (1) the ubiq- are representative but not exhaustive; nor are the uitous and important inconsistencies in the gov-. four aggregates into which they have been grouped ernment's global model; (2) the extent to which exhaustive. Other aggregates could have been the inconsistencies result from the use of diverse assembled to make other points ' but these four sources of information; (3) the extent to which seemed sufficient to establish the ubiquity and the inconsistencies are due to the absence of im- seriousness of the inconsistencies. portant feedback relationships; (4) the various structural differences between the elements that Inconsistent Population and GNP Growth Rates make calibration difficult; (5) some of the insti- The Global 2000 Study population and GNP tutional factors that underlie the discrepancies- projections were developed independently of including the use of the elements to develop pro- each other and appear to be mutually inconsistent. jections intended primarily for advocacy pur- Because these projections were used to calibrate poses. several of the Study's other projections, the dis- tortions created by their inconsistencies have Inconsistent Variable Values skewed those other projections. Additional dis- The 11 elements of the government's global model make use of many of the same variables- *The variables described here as inconsistent are not always for example, population growth rates. Some as- precisely or even approximately commensurable. Therefore, surned values are assigned to these variables prior the "inconsistencies" cited in this discussion should be under- to making use of an element; while other values stood as apparent only and subject to further verification. it was not possible to reconcile them more closely with each are calculated as an intermediate or final step in other within the time and budget constraints of the Global developing an element's projections.. 2000 Study, In many cases, the values assigned to the same t In these somewhat technical itemizations. many methodol- variables by different elements are inconsistent ogies and reports are referred to by short names or abbrevi- ations-for example, the "cohort-component methodology" or the "WAES st4dy." Providing even a brief explanation of these terms in this context would have distracted the reader's *Tbis fragmented approach is not unique to the executive attention from the inconsistencies that are the focus of the branch. The U.S. Congress, through its committee structure, immediate discussion. The reader is referred to the final sec- faces similar (but somewhat different) difficulties in system- tion of this chapter for a brief explanation of these terms and atically analyzing interrelated issues. to Chapters 15-23, where each is described at greater length-. 462 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL crepancies were created when still other projec- hort-component methodology projected (in the tions in the preceding chapters utilized population medium-growth case, over the 1975-2000 period) and GNP projections developed independently of that the LDCs will not experience significantly the Study. lower total population growth rates over the 1985- Figure 14-3 illustrates some of the inconsist- 2000 period relative to the 1975-85 period-that encies regarding population and GNP growth is, the average annual growth rate over the 1985- rates. Four of the I I numbered "elements" con- 2000 period (2.09 percent) was projected to be sidered in this chapter are involved: population only 0.07 percentage points lower than the aver- (1), GNP (2), food (5), and nonfuel minerals (10). age annual growth rate over the 1975-85 period Four apparent inconsistencies are discussed be- (2.16 percent). * In contrast, the WAES study ar- low: (A) LDC social and economic development, bitrarily reduced all GNP growth rates (including (B) LDC population growth, (C) world popula- those of the LDCs) by roughly 10-30 percent (in tion growth, and (D) GNP growth in LDCs. The both WAES cases, over the 1985-2000 period) to arrows represent linkages that should or did oc- reflect the projected impact of assumed declining cur. The broad end of the arrow is attached to the population growth rates on GNP growth. source of a particular type of information; the C. World Population Growth. The population arrowhead indicates where the information is re- element (1) and the nonfuel minerals element (10) quired as an input. The plus and minus symbols appear to have posited different population growth locate points of apparent inconsistency in the link- rates for the industrialized nations relative to ages. world population growth rates. Specifically, the A. LDC Social and Economic Development. Census Bureau's cohort-component methodology The food element (5), the GNP element (2), and projected (in the medium-growth case, over the the population element (1), of the government's 1975-2000 period) that average annual U.S. and global model appear to have posited different U. S. S. R. population growth (0. 6 and 0. 8 percent, rates of LDC social and economic development. respectively) will be significantly lower than av- Specifically, the Department of Agriculture's erage annual world population growth (1.8 per- GOL (Grain, Oilseed, Livestock) model pro- centy-despite, for example, a projected 20 percent jected (in the medium-growth case, over the increase in U.S. fertility rates over the same pe- 1970-2000 period) that global per capita food con- riod. In contrast, the 1977 Malenbaurn Report sumption will increase only slightly and that this relied upon by the Department of the Interior increase will not be evenly distributed, so that assumed (in the one case presented, over the declines will be experienced in some LDCs. Sim- 1973-2000 period) that average annual U.S. and ilarly, the WAES (Workshop on Alternative En- U. S. S. R. population growth (1. 0 and 1. 3 percent, ergy Sources) study, which is an integral part of respectively) will be less dramatically lower than the GNP element (2), projected (in the medium- average annual world population growth (1.9 per- growth case, which averages the two WAES cent). cases, over the 1985-2000 period) that in some D. GNP Growth in LDCs. The GNP element countries (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, Bangladesh) real (2) and the nonfuel minerals element (10) appear per capita GNP (calculated using the Global 2000 to have posited different GNP growth rates in the Study's population projections) is likely to in- LDCs. Specifically, the WAES study projected crease only marginally and that in others (e.g. , (in the medium-growth case, which averages the Pakistan) real per capital GNP is likely to decline. two WAES cases, over the 1975-2000 period) that In contrast, the Census Bureau's cohort-compo- collectively African, Asian, and Latin American nent methodology assumed (in all three cases , GNP will increase roughly 5 percent per year. In over the 1975-2000 period) that all LDCs will contrast, the IOU (Intensity of Use) methodology continue to make moderate progress in social and relied upon by the Department of the Interior economic development. assumed (in the one case presented, over the B. LDC Population Growth. The population 1973-2000 period) that collectively African, Asian element (1) and the GNP element (2) appear to and Latin American GNP will increase roughly have posited different population growth rates in 3.5 percent per year. the LDCs. Specifically, the Census Bureau's co- *In the Bureau of the Census high-growth series, the average *The number following each element is the sequence number annual population growth rate in the LDCs actually increases arbitrarily assigned to that element in the last section of this from 2.32 percent per year over the 1975-85 period to 2.39 chapter. percent per year over the 1985-2000 period. THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 463 5. Food Element (only nominal increases and some dedines) (A) LDC Social and Economic Development (moderate i ncreases everywhere) A 1. Population Element 2. GNP Element I (does not slow (slows significantly) 414, signif icantly) 0 (6) LDC Population Growth "Z -5@1 (lower share pertaining to the industrialized nations) (higher growth rate) (C) World Population Growth (D) LDC GNP Growth --7 (higher share pertaining to the (lower growth rate) industrialized nations) 10. Nonfuel Minerals Element r @(lw-r g, Figure 14-3. Inconsistent population and GNP growth rates. 464 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL Jnconsistent Commodity Trade Prices over the 1975-90 period) that the various re- Major disparities exist among many of the ele- sources indirectly required to produce energy ments of the government's global model regarding (e.g., nonfuel minerals) will be available in un- commodity price projections. Not merely the ex- limited supply at current real prices. tent of real-price changes, but even the direction C. Food Prices. The food element (5) and the of such changes, is inconsistently projected with GNP element (2) appear to have posited different regard to fundamental price variables involving growth rates in real-world food prices--at least, fertilizer, nonfuel minerals, food, and energy. with respect to wheat. Specifically, the Agricul- Figure 14-4 illustrates major inconsistencies ture Department's GOL model projected that the regarding commodity price projections. Five ele- real price of wheat (in the medium-growth case, ments of the government's global model are in- over the 1970-85 period) will increase 2.1 percent volved: GNP (2), food (5), energy (7), fuel per year. In contrast, the World Bank's SIMLINK minerals (8), and nonfuel minerals (10). Four in- model assumed that -the real price of wheat (in all consistencies in commodity trade prices are dis- three cases, over the 1975-85 period) will decline cussed below: (A) fertilizer prices, (B) mineral at roughly 0.6 percent per year. prices, (C) food prices and (D) energy prices. D. Energy Prices. The energy element (7), the A. Fertilizer Prices. The nonfuel minerals ele- GNP element (2), and the fuel minerals element ment (10) and the food element (5) of the gov- (9) appear to have posited different growth rates ernment's global model appear to. have posited in energy prices-at least, with respect to petro- different growth rates in real fertilizer prices. Spe- leum prices. Specifically, preliminary projections cifically, the 1977 Malenbaum Report relied on made by the Energy Department's JEES model by the Department of the Interior projected "a for the Study showed that the world demand for gradual weakening of demand forces relative to petroleum is likely to exceed world supply (at con- supply forces" and concluded, therefore, that stant real 1978 prices) well before the year 2000; "the long-term tendency, 1985 and 2000, may thus therefore, new projections were developed arbi- be for lower materials prices tincluding those in- trarily assuming a 5 percent per year increase (in volved in the producti 'on of fertilizers] relative to the rising-energy-price case, over the 1980-1990 prices of the final products in which they are period), which showed that equilibrium condi- used." In contrast, the Department of Agricul- tions for supply-and-demand quantity and prices ture's GOL model assumed that fertilizer prices would be likely to be achieved under this as- will increase in response to rising energy prices sumption. In contrast, the World Bank's SIM- (in the risin . case and the pessimistic LINK model assumed that real petroleum prices . g-energy-price case, over the 1970-2000 period), though the ex- (in all three cases, over the 1975-85 period) will act assumed fertilizer price increases are not ex- remain constant at 1975 levels. Also in contrast, plicitly disaggregated from other cost assumptions- U.S. Geological Survey Circular 725 (from which B. Mineral Prices. The nonfuet minerals ele- the Study's U.S. oil and gas resource and reserve ment (10), the GNP element (2), and the energy estimates were derived) assumed a continuation element (7) appear to have posited different of 1974 prices and of price-cost relationships and growth rates in mineral prices-at least, with re- technological trends generally prevailing a few spect to copper and tin. Specifically, the 1977 years prior to 1974. Malenbaum Report relied on by the Department of the Interior projected "a gradual weakening of Inconsistent Commodity Trade Volumes demand forces relative to supply forces" and con- As in the case of commodity prices, major dis- cluded, therefore, that "the long-term tendency, parities exist among many of the elements of the 1985 and 2006, may thus be for lower materials government's global model regarding commodity prices relative to prices of the final products in trade volume projections. The GNP projections, which they are used." In contrast, the World for example, assumed lower growth rates in world Bank's SIMLINK (SIMulated trade LINKages) food trade than projected by the food element model assumed growth in average real prices for and higher growth rates in world minerals trade copper and tin (in all three cases, over the 1975- than projected by the nonfuel minerals element. 85 period) to be roughly 5.2 and 2.5, percent per Figure 14-5 illustrates some of the major in- year, respectively. Also in contrast, the Energy consistencies regarding commodity trade vol- Department's IEES (International Energy Eval- unies. Four elements of the government's global uation System) model assumed (in all four cases, model are involved: GNP (2), food (5), fisheries THE PRESENT FOUNDATION `465 10. Nonfuel Minerals Element (real declines) (real declines) (A) Fertilizer Prices (B) Mineral Prices /77 (real increases) (real increases) (constant) S. Food Element 7. Energy Element (real increases) (real increases) 1-C (C) Food Prices (D) Energy Prices eal declines) All (consto (constant) nt) 2. GNP Ele ment 9. Fuel Minerals Element Figure 14-4. Inconsistent commodity trade prices. 466 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL Zl- Z 6. Fisheries Element (no increase) (A) Fish, Supply (major increase) 5. Food W-mant 10. Nonfuell Minerals Element 01 x"TOP 1'. (higher share (lower share Df world total) of world total) & (B) U.S. Fertilizer Consumption (higher growth) (lower growth) -4 Jrw (C) d Trade (D) Minerals Trade (lower growth) (higher growth) 2. GNP Element @7 V@ I ;1 @7 7 Figure 14-5. Inconsistent commodity trade volumes. THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 467 (6), and nonfuel minerals (10). Four inconsist- D. Minerals Trade. The nonfuel minerals ele- encies are discussed below: (A) fish supply, (B) ment (10) and the GNP element (2) appear to U.S. fertilizer consumption, (C) food trade, and have posited different growth rates in quantities (D) minerals trade. of minerals traded in world markets-at least with A. Fish Supply. The fisheries element (6) and respect to aluminum and zinc. Specifically, the the food element (5) of the government's global IOU methodology relied upon by the Department model appear to have posited different growth of the Interior projected growth in world con- rates in world fish catches. Specifically, the Com- sumption of primary aluminum and zinc (in the merce Department's judgmental forecasting pro- one case presented, over the 1973-85 period) to cedures projected (in the me diurn case, the only be 4.2 and 3.3 percent per year, respectively. In case projected, over the 1975-2000 period) that contrast, the World Bank's SIMLINK model as- while catches of some species may increase, others sumed growth in trade in a collective category of are likely to decrease, keeping the total annual certain key minerals (namely, bauxite, lead, phos- fish catch essentially constant. In contrast, the phate rock, silver, and zinc) between the indus- Agriculture Department's total food submodel trialized nations and the LDCs (in all three cases, assumed in essence that the size of each country's over the 1975-85 period) to be 6.3 percent per fish catch (except in the case of Japan) will provide year. a constant percentage of the food needs of each country (in all four cases, over the 1975-2000 pe- inconsistent Capital and Resource Utilization riod), implicitly requiring that the annual fish No consistent accounting was made of capital catch for each country (except Japan) increase at and resource allocations among the eleven ele- essentially the same rate as population. . ments of the government's global model. Thus, B. U.S. Fertilizer Consumption. The food ele- significant omissions or double-counting may ment (5) and the nonfuel minerals element (10) .'have been implied in projected levels of water appear to have projected different growth rates availability and some forms of capital investment. in U.S. fertilizer consumption relative to growth Significant omissions or double-counting may also rates in the rest of the world-at least, with re- be involved in assumptions regarding the future spect to phosphate rock (which is used primarily allocation of land and labor. But it is impossible for fertilizer). Specifically, the Agriculture De- to compare these assumptions in this discussion, partment's fertilizer submodel projected growth since they were completely inexplicit in almost all in U.S. fertilizer consumption (in the medium, elements and could not be inferred without ex- constant-energy-price case, the only case pro- tensive analysis beyond the scope and resources jected, over the 1973-2000 period) to be some- of the Global 2000 Study. what lower (3.2 percent per year) than in the rest Figure 14-6 illustrates some of the significant of the world (4.0 percent per year). In contrast, omissions or double-counting that may have oc- the Interior Department's calculations (loosely curred regarding capital and resource utilization. based on the 1972 Malenbaum Report) projected Six elements of the government's global model growth in U.S. consumption of phosphate rock are involved: GNP (2), food (5), water (6), energy (in the most probable case, over the 1973-2000 (7), energy residuals (8), and nonfuel minerals period) to be significantly lower (2.6 percent per (10). Four inconsistencies are discussed below: year) than in the rest of the world (5.9 percent (A) water availability, (B) investment in agricul- per year). tural inprovement, (C) investment in pollution C. Food Trade, The food element.(5) and the control, and (D) LDC resource consumption. GNP element (2) appear to have posited different A. Water Availability. The water element (6), growth rates in world food trade-at least, with the food element (5), the GNP element (2), the respect to wheat. Specifically, the.Agriculture energy element (7), and the nonfuel minerals ele- Department's GOL model projected growth in ment (10) appear to have posited different levels trade in wheat between all countries (in the me- of water availability. Specifically, the judgmental dium-growth case, over the 1970-85 period) to be forecasting procedures used by the Study's water 4.1 percent per year. In contrast, the World consultants projected (in the medium case, the Bank's SIMLINK model assumed growth in trade only case presented, over the 1975-2000 period) in wheat between the industrailized nations and that problems of water shortage will be more the LDCs (in all @three cases, over the 1975-85 widespread and severe by 2000 than they are period) to be 2.5 percent per year. now-in part as a result of extensive deforesta- 468 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL 7-7 6. Water Element kk (shortages) (A) Water Availability 77 d (unconstrained 'unconstrained) (unconstrained) (unconstrained) A 5. Food Element 2. GNP Element 8; Energy Residuals 7. Energy Element 10. Nonfuel Minerals nt Element Eleme (enormous increases) (no major (no major increases) increa es) (major (no majo. 0 major (major increase.) increases) eases) increasesi 'VIA ON Rw TrP.NN Z@ (6) Investment in (C) Investment in (D) ILDC Resource Agricultural Improvement Pollution Control Consumption Figure 11" Inconsistent capital and resource utilization. IL \i(,r THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 469 tion. In contrast, the Agriculture Department's from recent historic experience. Also in contrast, GOL model assumed (in all four cases, over the the Energy Department's IEES model assumed 1970-2000 period) no explicit limitations on water (in all four cases, over the 1975-90 period) that availability (at current real prices), although lim- the real cost of applying technology to protect the itations on.arable land were explicitly considered. environment will not, significantly increase the Also in contrast, the World Bank's SIMLINK real cost of building or operating energy facilities model assumed (in all three cases, over the 1975- in the future. 85 period) that foreign exhcange earnings rather D. LDC Resource Consumption. The energy than savings, capital, or labor will constrain GNP element (7) and the nonfuel minerals element (10) growth in the LDCs; resource availability (e.g., appear to have assumed different growth rates in water) was not assumed to be a binding constraint. LDC resource consumption, although compari- Also in contrast, the Energy Department's IEES sons are not easily made. Specifically, the Energy model assumed (in all four cases, over the 1975- Department's IEES model implicitly assumed (in 90 period) that the various resources indirectly all four cases, over the 1975-90 period) that in- required to produce energy (e.g., water) will be dustrialization within the LDCs will not cause available in unlimited supply at current real LDC resource consumption (energy, in this case) prices. Also in contrast, the IOU methodology to increase faster than the LDCs growth in GNP. relied upon by the Department of the Interior In contrast, the IOU methodology relied upon by assumed (in the one case presented, over the the Interior Department assumed (in one case 1973-2000 period) that long-term growth in min- presented, over the 1973-2000 period) that in- erals and materials consumption will not be gov- dustrialization- within the LDCs will require them erned by supply limitations (e.g., water). to consume increasing amounts of resources (in B. Investment in Agricultural Improvement. this case, minerals and materials) per unit of per The food element (5) and the GNP element (2) capita GNP as industrialization proceeds. appear to have assumed different growth rates in investment for agricultural improvement. Specif- Use of Diverse Sources of Information ically, the Agriculture Department's GOL model There are a number of inconsistencies among assumed (in all four cases, over the 1970-2000 the elements of the government's global model period) that major increases in public and private due to the different elements making use of dif- investment will be made throughout the world to ferent sources of information for the same sets of increase cropped areas. In contrast, the World assumptions. Bank's SIMLINK model assumed (in all three For example, many federal agencies, including cases, over the 1075-85 period) that the propor- the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, and the tion of an LDC's GNP allocated for agricultural Interior have customarily made use of interna- improvement will not vary markedly from recent tional population estimates and projections de- historic experience. veloped by organizations other than the Bureau C. Investment in Pollution Control. The energy of the Census. These estimates vary widely, as residuals element (8), the GNP element (2), and may be seen in the following recent estimates of the energy element (7) appear to have assumed the average annual rate of LDC population different growth rates in investment for pollution growth in 1975: control. Specifically, the Energy Department's Percent IEES-ESNS (International Energy Evaluation U.S. Agency for International Development 1.88 System-Energy System Network Simulator) model U.S. Bureau of the Census 2.25 assumed (in all three cases, 1975-90) that an ex- U.N. Secretariat, Population Division 2.34 tremely large investment in pollution control tech- Environmental Fund (privately sponsored) 2.55 nologies will be made by all countries by 1985 so that by that time all energy conversion facilities Projections of future population growth rates are throughout the world will meet or will have been usually even more divergent than these estimates retrofitted to meet 1978 U.S. new source per- of past population growth rates. formance standards for carbon monoxide, sulfur Many federal agencies have Also often made dioxide, nitrous oxides, and particulates. In'con- use of divergent international GNP projections trast, the World Bank's SIMLINK model assumed developed by organizations other than the World (in all three cases, over the 1975-85 period) that Bank's Economic Analysis and Projections De- the.proporiion of an LDC's GNP allocated for partment. The State Department's Agency for environmental protection will not vary markedly international Development, for example, has cus- 470 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL TABLE 14-2 Selected Contrasting Assumptions of the 11 Elements of the Government's Global Model The 11 Elements of the Selected Selected Government's Selected Policy Population Selected GNP Selected Climate Technology Global Model Cases Presented Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions 1. Population a. High-growth Major extension Zero net Moderate social Not considered No major case of family migration and economic technology b. Medium- planning between regions progress breakthroughs growth. case. throughout the throughout the or setbacks c. Low-growth world world over the affecting fertility case 1975-2000 or mortality period rates 2. GNP a. High-growth Continuation or Major reduction GNP growth in Not considered Major increasing case implementation in population LDCs largely returns on most b. Medium- of prudent growth rates in dependent on LDC gross growth case policies to all countries industrial nation capital c. Low-growth maximize export over the 1985- GNP growth investment case earnings 2000 period 3. Climate a. Warming Deliberate Not explicitly Not explicitly Extreme climatic Deliberate case human efforts to considered considered change not human efforts to b. Constant modify climate considered modify climate temperature excluded excluded case c. Cooling case 4. Technology The same Extensive No major Major increasing Deliberate Major technology deployment of technical returns on most human efforts to technological assumptions family planning, breakthroughs LDC capital modify climate progress in usually applied nuclear-power or setbacks investment excluded almost all to all cases and air affecting fertility projections; no pertaining to a pollution- or mortality technological given element, abatement rates setbacks or no coordination technologies adverse side of assumptions (some of which effects among different may require anticipated elements significant policy changes in some countries) 5. Food a. Optimistic Major public a. Globa[2000 a. Global 2000 Explicit Widespread case and private low-growth high-growth assumption of deployment of b. Middle case investment in case case no climatic fertilizer and c. Pessimistic agricultural land b. Globa12000 b. Global 2000 change other yield- case development medium- medium- enhancing d. Rising- continued; growth case growth case inputs, energy-price worldwide shift c. GlobaI2000 c. GlobaI2000 producing case toward More high-growth low-growth steadily fossil-fuel- case case increasing intensive d. GlobaI2000 d. GlobaI2000 yields- agricultural medium- medium- comparable to techniques growth case growth case the increases experienced over the past two decades. THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 471 Selected Fisheries, Selected Forestry, and Selected lEnergy Selected Fuel Nonfuel Selected Selected Food Water Selected Energy Residuals Minerals Minerals Environmental Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Not explicitly Not explicitly Not explicitly Not explicitly Not explicitly Not explicitly Not explicitly considered considered considered considered considered considered considered (except as (except as noted (except as noted (except as noted (except as noted (except as noted (except as noted noted under under "Selected under "Selected under "Selected under "Selected under "Selected under "Selected "Selected GNP GNP GNP ' GNP GNP GNP GNP Assumptions") Assumptions") Assumptions") Assumptions") Assumptions") Assumptions") Assumptions") Lower trade Not explicitly Unlimited Notconsidered Unlimited Higher trade Not explicitly volumes at considered energy at energy at volumes at considered lower prices constant real constant real higher prices than Global prices prices than Global 2000 food 2000 nonfuel projections minerals projections Not explicitly Not explicitly Not explicitly Not explicitly Not explicitly Not explicitly Not explicitly considered considered considered considered considered considered considered Widespread Development of Widespread By 1985, all Continuation of Increasingly less Side effects of deployment of less wasteful deployment of countries' the price-cost intensive technology, fertilizer and methods for light-water energy facilities relationships and mineral use in coupled with other yield- harvesting nuclear electric retrofitted to technical trends highly institutional and enhancing nontraditional power plants meet U.S. new generally industrialized social problems, inputs, fish species;. source prevailing in countries; appear to be the producing development of performance years prior to increasingly root cause of steadily less wasteful standards for 1974 assumed in more intensive many of the increasing methods and of CO. SO, NO,. all U.S. oil and mineral use in world's most yields methods for and particulates gas resource and LDCs. serious comparable to exploiting reserve environmental the increases nontraditional estimates problems; but experienced forestry species; technology can over the past water also solve many two decades. assumptions problems unknown No major Major increases a. Constant Not considered No fuel resource No nonfuel No large scale increase in in fish catches energy price constraints minerals land degradation meat share of implicitly b. Constant (other than resource due to LDC diets assumed; energy price price) constraints environmental adverse impacts c. Global2000 (except energy or human of deforestation rising-energy- price effects) factors (other not considered; price case than explicit d. Global 2000 urbanization) assumption of rising-energy- and no increased unlimited water price case (In pest resistance. at constant real all cases, prices unlimited energy supply assumed at cited costs) 472 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL Table 14-2 (cont.) The 11 Elements of the Selected Selected Government's Selected Policy Population Selected GNP Selected Climate Technology Global Model Cases Presented Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions 6. Fisheries A single Improved Assumptions not Assumptions not Not considered Development of medium case. management of explicit explicit methods for fisheries and harvesting protection of the nontraditional marine fish species environment on a worldwide basis Forestry A single Some policy Assumptions not Assumptions not Not considered Development of medium case changes explicit explicit less wasteful throughout the production world regarding techniques and current of methods for deforestation exploiting practices nontraditional forestry species Water a. Higher case Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown b. Lower case 7. Energy a. Optimistic Implementation a. Global 2000 a. Global2000 Not considered Widespread case of more low-growth high-growth deployment of b. Middle case effective energy case case light-water c. Pessimistic conservation b. Global 2000 b. Global 2000 nuclear electric case programs within medium- medium- power plants d. Rising- the OECD growth case growth case energy-price countries; c. Globa12000 c. Global2000 case OPEC countries high-growth low-growth to supply oil to case case meet residual d. Global 2000 d. Globa[2000 demand up to medium- medium- their maximum growth case growth case production capacity 8. Energy a. Optimistic Major public Not explicitly Not explicitly Not considered By 1985, all residuals case and private considered considered countries' b. Middle case investment in air (except as (except as energy facilities c. Pessimistic pollution derived from derived from retrofitted to case abatement preceding preceding meet U.S. new technologies by energy energy source all countries projections) projections) performance standards for CO, SO., NO., and. particulates 9. Fuel A single Continuation of Not considered Not considered Not considered Continuation of minerals medium case 1974 prices the price-cost assumed in all relationships and U.S. oil and gas technical trends resource and generally reserve prevailing in estimates years prior to 1974 assumed in all U.S. oil and gas resource and reserve estimates THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 473 Selected Fisheries, Selected Forestry, and Selected Energy Selected Fuel Nonfuel Selected Selected Food Water Selected Energy Residuals Minerals Minerals Environmental Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Not considered Water Not considered Not considered Not considered Not considered No significant projections not pollution considered affecting growth of fishery stocks; no significant losses of estuarian areas Not considered Water Not considered Not considered Not considered Not considered No significant projections not impacts affecting considered forest growth (e.g., acid rain, increased UV radiation, or increased pest resistance) Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Not considered No nonfuel Net energy not Not considered Not directly No nonfuel ' Not explicitly resource explicitly related to the resource considered constraints in considered Study's fuel constraints the minerals (except as industrialized projections limited by GNP) countries (except as limited by GNP); bio- energy resource constraints in the LDCs -Not considered No resource a. Global 2000 No capital Not considered Not considered By 1985, all constraints optimistic investment countries' case constraints energy facilities b. Global 2000 retrofitted to middle case meet U.S. new c. Global 2000 source pessimistic performance case standards for CO, SO@, NO., and particulates Not considered Not explicitly Not directly Not considered Net energy not Not explicitly Not explicitly considered related to explicitly considered considered Study's energy considered projections 474 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL Table 14--2 (cont) The 11 Elements of the Selected Selected Climate Selected Government's Selected Policy Population Selected GNP Assumptions Technology Global Model Cases Presented Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Selected Assumptions_ 10. Nonfuel A single No changes Single set of Single set of Not considered Increasingly less minerals medium case projections projections intensive derived from based on mineral use in U.N. projections Malenbaum's highly personal industrialized judgment countries; increasingly more intensive mineral use in LDCs 11. Environ- Same cases as No policy Global 2000 Global 2000 Several Technologies are ment provided for changes (except medium case medium case environmental generally each element, as derived from developments available to but generally preceding assumed address the only medium projections) potentially world's most cases analyzed capable of serious influencing environmental global climate problems (e.g., soil erosion and deterioration); social and institutional problems (not technological problems) are often the primary impediment to environmental protection tomarily relied on the World Bank's generally Under the limited discipline achieved by the more optimistic individual country analyses. The Global 2000 Study, much more consistent use than Department of Agriculture's Economics, Statis- heretofore was made of the projections developed tics, and Cooperatives Service has customarily using the population and GNP elements by other used projections developed by the U.N. Food and elements of the government's global model. Agriculture Organization (FAO). The Depart- Nevertheless, inconsistent assumptions abound, ment of Energy's Energy Information Adminis- as shown in Table 14-2, which provides a cross- tration has used projections made by the index of selected, diverse assumptions used by the intergovernmental Organization for Economic elements. Many of these inconsistent assumptions Cooperation and Development (OECD). The In- are described in greater detail in the summaries terior Department's Bureau of Mines has relied of the various elements presented in the last sec- on international economic projections developed tion of this chapter and in Chapters 15-23. by Professor Wilfred Malenbaum of the Univer- sity of Pennslyvania.* Even a single set of assumptions may,contain internal inconsistencies as a result of being com- *The FAO and OECD projections have tended to be signif- piled from diverse sources. For example, the U.S. icantly higher than those of the World Bank and Professor , government does not maintain its own single, con- Malenbaum. Moreover, these projection differences have tended to be significantly greater on a regional or countr; by sistent source of GNP projections. The GNP pro- country basis than on a global basis. jections most frequently used pertaining to the THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 475 Selected Fisheries, Selected Forestry, and Selected Energy Selected Fuel Nonfuel Selected Selected Food Water Selected Energy Residuals Minerals Minerals Environmental Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Assumptions Not considered Explicit Explicit Explicit Explicit Explicit Explicit assumption of assumption of assumption of assumption of assumption of assumption of no resource no resource no no resource no resource no constraints constraints environmental contraints constraints environmental constraints constraints Global 2000 Gl6bal2000 Global2000 Global2000 Global 2000 Global 2000 Considered nsing-energy- medium case rising-energy- medium case medium case medium case extensively on a price case price case comprehensive, interrelated basis OECD countries* are those assembled by the U.S. government, it was not possible within the headquarters staff of the OECD. The most fre- mandate and constraints of the Global 2000 Study quently used GNP projections for the LDCs are to examine in any detail the assumptions under- those developed by the World Bank. The most lying the GNP projections routinely used by the frequently used GNP projections for the centrally government.* What information is available sug- planned economies are those developed by the gests that population, resources, and the environ- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. ment are not taken into account through any Each of these sources prepares its projections explicit functional relationships and are included using different statistical conventions and inde- only judgmentally, if at a. pendently developed assumptions regarding the Three further problems related to the use of future..Such GNP projections are therefore not diverse sources for GNP projections are noted internally consistent, as noted in Chapter 3. Be- below. They are representative of the types of cause they are not collectively maintained by the problems encountered when diverse sources are also used for population, food, energy, and other *The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- projections: ment includes the following countries: Australia, Austria, Bel- gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxem- bourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, *However, one important computer model used to develop Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, GNP projections (the World Bank's SIMLINK model) is dis- and the United States. cussed in some detail in Chapter 16. 476 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL 1. The GNP projections published by the Absence of Feedback OECD for its member nations are widely re- A second critical factor accounting for the in- garded as "pious hopes." To obtain a measure of consistencies previously presented is the general realism, the World Bank has routinely adjusted lack of feedback between elements of the gov- the OECD projections substantially downward ernment's global model. Under the limited dis- before using them. Further downward adjust- cipline (described earlier in this chapter) established ments were made by the WAES study* (and rec- by the Global 2000 Study, only a few basic link- ommended for Global 2000 Study use by World ages were made between the elements, as shown Bank analysts) to account for the fact that those schematically in Figure 14-2. But even if a much GNP projections have in the past been based on more strict and comprehensive discipline had the assumption made by individual OECD nations been possible (for example, the use of single that they will be able in the future to import un- sources of information for related input assump- realistically large amounts of OPEC oil. tions required by the elements), two fundamental 2. The World Bank's projections of LDC structural problems related to feedback would growth rates assume that the primary force driving have been encountered in attempting to link the LDC economic progress is growth in the econ- elements together on a consistent basis: omies of the industrialized countries. As yet, nei- ther the theory nor the specific numbers involved The elements have been designed to accom- in this assumption have been adequately vali- modate only the sequential unidirectional link- dated. The theoretical and numeric basis under- ages previously shown in Figure 14-1-that is, lying the GNP projections for the centrally planned the population and resource projections must economies are subject to even less general agree- precede the resource projections, which must ment. precede the environmental projections. 3. The Global 2000 Study's per capita GNP fig- ures come directly from combining the population The sets of assumptions which are made prior and GNP projections, which were developed in- to using many of the elements are "frozen" in dependently of each other and have been shown the sense of not being responsive to changed previously in this chapter to be mutually incon- conditions in the course of projection compu- sistent. Moreover, in projecting beyond about 10 tations. years, all the Study's GNP projections have been based on a simple exponential growth model in- These two problems are actually two dimen- volving an assumed percentage of annual com- sions of the same feedback issue. The first prob- pound growth. This exponential growth assump- lem, regarding sequential unidirectional linkages, tion. produces absurd results in the long runt and focuses on intersectoral distortions-the fact that assumes implicitly that no resources or environ- certain sectors are represented in the govern- mental constraints will be encountered that can- ment's global model as influencing others, but as ,not be overcome by unspecified technological not themselves being influenced by others. The developments (which themselves are further as- second problem, regarding "frozen" sets of as- sumed to create no constraining resource or en- sumptions, focuses on temporal distortions-the .vironmental problems). To the extent that the fact that the general absence of feedback produces GNP projections include any consideration of increasingly severe inconsistencies the further into population, natural resources, or the environ- the future the projections are extended. ment, that consideration is exogenous, judgmen- Sequential Unidirectional Linkages. In most of tal, and not open to examination or verification. the elements of the government's global model, population and GNP are conceived as "driving forces." Given assumed levels of population and *The World Alternative Energy Strategies study sponsored by GNP, the various elements calculate the con- the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which is discussed sumption of food, energy, minerals, and other in Chapter 16. The GNP projections for LIjCs developed for resources. But no calculations are made regarding that study are presented as part of the Global 2000 Study's the influence of the scarcity or abundance of food, GNP projections in Chapter 3. energy, minerals, and other resources-as pro- t World Bank analysts note that their official GNP projections jected by their respective elements-on popula- rarely extend more than 10 years into the future. The expo- tion or GNP. Similarly, no calculations are made nential growth rates mentioned above were developed as a special accommodation to the needs of the WAES study and regarding the influence of environmental fac- were never intended to be applicable beyond the year 2000. tors-as projected by the environmental ele- THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 477 ment--on population, GNP, or the various natural using the element and are not altered in response resources. * to changed conditions implied by calculations In the case of the population projections, for made by the element and by the other elements. example, certain extremely general assumptions In other words, there is no feedback from the are made regarding social and economic devel- element's computations to the original set of fro- opment, and in many cases these are inconsistent zen assumptions. with the projections developed by other elements. For example, as already shown in Figure 14-2: But there is little or no provision in the population - The population projections were developed element itself that'would allow precise, explicit, with fixed assumptions regarding social and quantitative adjustments in the element's calcu- economic progress. lations to be made in response to the precise, explicit, quantitative calculations made by the - The gross national product projections were other elements. developed with fixed assumptions regarding In short, the issue is not merely that the reverse population growth. linkages have noi been made (for example, from - The energy projections were developed with per capita food consumption to population) but fixed assumptions regarding population and that the current structural design of the elements GNP growth. generally precludes their being made. The pop- - The food projections were developed with fixed ulation and GNP elements are essentially incap- assumptions regarding increases in population, able of taking precise account of the results of the GNP, and energy prices. natural resource projections. And the population, - The population, GNP, and resource projections GNP, and natural resource elements are incapa- were developed with fixed assumptions, con- ble of taking precise account of the results of the cerning the environment. environmental projections. In actuality, of course, - The environmental projections were developed they take little or no account of them at all- with fixed assumptions concerning the popula- precise or imprecise. While the environmental tion, GNP, and resource projections. element is not capable of taking the results of the population, GNP, and resource elements pre- In some cases, the set of fixed or frozen as- cisely into account, it does at least consider them sumptions used by one element may summarize qualitatively. the projections developed through the complex It should also be noted here that even if the calculations of another element. Often these com.- models were structured so as to facilitate the es- plex calculations are summarized in the form of tablishment of the needed reverse linkages, many simple time-series data or fitted equations. In of the linkages would have to be established, con- other cases, the set of frozen assumptions may jecturally because the empirical evidence pres- come from a source entirely outside the govern- ently available is limited. However, even a con- ment's global model and may explicitly contradict jectural linkage would, in most cases, be far pref- calculations made by another element of that erable to the assumption of no linkage when such model. Often these frozen assumptions are not an assumption is known to be significantly in er- explicitly stated in quantitative terms, but may ror. Furthermore, if sensitivity tests show the lin- nevertheless be inferred-for exampl ei, in terms kage to be a critical and sensitive linkage, priority of some commodity being available in unlimited can thus be established for the collection'of supply or at constant real prices, or both. needed empirical data. The government's long-term global projections "Frozen" Sets of Assumptions. Each element implicitly assume either (1) that the use of frozen of the government's global model makes use of sets of assumptions would produce logically con- sets of assumptions (i.e., time-series inputs) which sistent projections or (2) that any inconsistencies may be thought of as "frozen." They are frozen would be relatively inconsequential in view of sim- in the sense that they are determined prior to plifications made in the overall representation of the global system and data uncertainty. These *The very significant effects that the environmental projec- assumptions tend to be valid for short-term (i.e., tions could be expected to have on the population, GNP, and 1-2 year) projections-where, in the absence of resource projections are discussed under "Closing the Loops" major dislocations, major trends generally tend in Chapter 13. However, as pointed out in that chapter, all of to perpetrate themselves forward smoothly-but the projections retain their basically open-loop character be- are increasingly dubious when the projections ex- cause none of the missing feedback linkages could actually be established through direct dynamic effects on the elements' tend for 5, 10, 20, or more years. As projections calculations. are extended further into the future, feedback in- 478 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL teractions become increasingly important as ma- tions for representing temporal change, which jor trends. collide with one 'another and are also adds to the difficulties of coordination. Some deflected from their original paths in complex elements are theoretically capable of projecting ways. The elements of the government's global well beyond the year 2000, others were not de- model are generally not structured and linked to- signed to project beyond 1985 or 1990. Some ele- gether in a way that allows such deflections to ments were designed to calculate equilibrium occur. As a result, the trends override one another balances between supply and demand at -equili- and produce increasingly serious inconsistencies brating prices and are fundamentally incapable of as the projections move further into the future. simulating change over time, except through Structural Incompatibilities changes in exogenous assumptions. This means that they cannot take into account dynamic dis- Any model of reality necessarily selects and equilibria. Other 'elements are fundamentally dy- excludes relationships and data in order to clarify naimic-that is, their basic purpose is to display the issues it is intended to simulate. Thus, the 11 trends and modes of behavior over time. elements of the government's global model nat- Other major structural differences and limita- urally embody simplifications, limitations, and tions include: omissions that may well have been entirely ap- - Many elements are based on analytic methods propriate for the purposes for which the elements that require crucial interdependent variables to were originally designed, but which make effec- be projected independently in advance. tiye coordination between elements extremely difficult. The inability or failure to transfer infor- . Many require these variables not to exceed his- mation represented in one element according to torial ranges or rates of growth. one set of structural conventions to a differe 'nt - Most are incapable of simulating fundamental element utilizing a different set of structural con- structural change. ventions provides a third explanation for the in I- - Many have limited capacity to integrate incon- consistencies previously presented. sistent inputs developed using other analytical Most elements, for example, make use of dif- methods. ferent conventions for representing the world geo- Many of these differences are summarized on graphically, which makes coordination difficult. an element by element basis in Table 14-3. A Som .e elements provide great detail on the West- more complex account of them is provided in the ern industrialized nations and little detail on the last section of this chapter and in Chapters 15-23. LDCs, or vice versa, while most provide almost no detail on the centrally planned economies. Some elements are fundamentally incapable of Institutional Factors Underlying the simulating interactions among separate geO- Discrepancies graphic regions except through changes in exog- Many institutional factors underlie the incon- enous assumptions (so that interregional sistencies. As Table 14-3 shows, each of the,11 adjustments cannot be taken into account by elements of the government's global model was them). Other elements are fundamentally interre- developed in a different bureaucratic context. It gional, that is, their basic purpose is to project would be surprising indeed if the elements did not future interregional trade balances, based on the significantly differ from each other since each was assumption that static economic equilibrium con- developed ditions will obtain in the future in a way that max- imizes total world economic efficiency for the - by different people (even experts differ among sector for which the projection is developed. themselves), A perspective on the geographic differences - at different times (the real world changes over among those elements with the most complex ex- time), plicit quantitative relationships is presented in the - using different perspectives and methodologies first five maps in the colored mag section. These (which use different simplifying assumptions maps illustrate the extent to which each element and different computational techniques), (1) aggregates (or disaggregates) the various re- * to meet different needs (affecting the selection gions of the world and (2) makes independent of assumptions and the validation of calcula- (or -interdependent) projections for those regions. tions). The maps also show the level of detail represented in each aggregate. Moreover, it would be naive not to recognize . Most elements make use of different conven- that projections and the procedures used to pro-' THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 479 TABLE 14-3 Selected Institutional and Structural Differences Among the Elements of the Government's Global Model Primary Major Number of Primary Source Computational First Major Geographic Temporal . Cases Element of Projections Procedures Use Representation Representation Examined 1. Population Census Bureau; Cohort-component Early 1930s The world in 23 1975-2000 3 Unive,rsity of methodology independent re- (dynamically Chicago gions calculated) 2. GNP WAES Study SIMLINK model; 1974 Primarily 6 LDC 1975-85 3. (MIT) and World judgmental extrapola- aggregates, with (dynamically Bank tion limited interac- calculated) tion 1985-2000 (informally extrapolated) 3. Climate National De- Weighted expert opin- 1977 The world in 8 1977-80, 3 fense University ion regions 1981-90, study (CIA) 1991-2000, (discontinuously calculated) 4. Technology Diverse inde- Diverse unrelated Diverse Usually global No consistent I per pendent sources methodologies only representation element 5. Food Department of GOL model 1974 The world in 28 1985 4 Agriculture interrelated re- 2000 gions (discontinuously calculated) 6. Fisheries, NOAA; CIA; No explicit quantita- Diverse Typically by in- 2000 1,1,2 forestry, and Department of tive model terrelated eco- (informally water the Interior system extrapolated) 7. Energy Department of IEES model 1977 The world in 5 1985. 4 Energy interrelated re- 1990 gions (essentially discontinuously calculated) 8. Energy re- Department of IEES-ESNS model 1978 The world in 5 1985 3 siduals Energy independent re- 1990 gions (discontinuously calculated) 9. Fuel Independent ex- Ecletic (based on many Diverse No consistent No temporal In general, minerals pert (affiliated previous studies) representation dimension I with the Depart- ments of Energy and the Interior) 10. Nonfuel Professor Mal- IOU methodology 1972 The world in 10 1985 1 minerals enbaum (Univer- independent re- 2000 sity of Pennsyl- gions (discontinuously vania) calculated) 11. Environment Multiple sources No explicit quantita- Diverse The industrial Generally No consistent coordinated by tive model and developing 2000 - selection of Study staff economies and (informally cases selected ecosys- extrapolated) tems, on an in- terrelated basis. duce them have frequently been criticized by its own constituencies, and its own pet projects. Congressional committees and others as subject Often, an agency finds it helpful touse advanced to influences not purely analytical in origin. Each analytic techniques (and associated projections) agency has its own responsibilities and interests, as weapons in the adversary process of initiating, 480 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL justifying, and defending its programs. As a re- to the elements of the government's global model sult, there have been many occasions in which the would change the basic thrust of the following elements (and associated projections) of the gov- findings. emment's global model have been used in support Population. Total world population growth of (or in opposition to) highly controversial pro- rates will not decline significantly by the year grams, and the credibility of the projections has 2000. Instead, roughly twice as many additional become a subject for debate. This has been es- new people will be added to the world's popula- pecially true in recent times, as both the issues tion over the 1975-2000 period (on a net basis) and the advanced analytic procedures used for as were added over the 1950-1975 period. A very examining the issues have become increasingly large proportion of this population growth will complex and, in a sense, incomprehensible to occur in the LDCs, particularly in South Asia, many nonexperts. Africa, and Latin America. Under these conditions, government agencies GNP. Per capita GNP Increases about 55 per- have occasionally been accused of falsifying the cent worldwide, but increases only marginally in data on which their projections are based or of several LDCs. The problems leading to the de- adding "fudge factors" to equations to produce cline in the growth of per capita GNP will become desired results. While these accusations are rel- more intense over the f985-2000 peri Iod. atively infrequent, agencies have often been ac- Climate. Should any climate change occur, its cused of carefully tailoring the assumptions most adverse effects (largely involving changes in underlying their analyses so as to ensure that de- average temperature, precipitation patterns, and sired results are attained in a way that is analyt- weather variability) are likely to be felt in the ically defensible. To the extent that these temperate regions, where most of the world's circumstances occur, they contribute to the in- major food-exporting nations are located. consistencies previously presented. Food. Global per capita food consumption will not increase significantly, despite major increases Interpreting the Projections in real food prices and in agricultural investment. The preceding analysis has identified inconsist- Declines in per capita food consumption will occur encies, incompatibilities, and other problems, in many of the poorest LDCs, with the most rapid which must inevitably raise questions regarding declines occurring over the 1985-2000 period. the validity of the projections presented in Part Resource Prices. The real prices of food, fish, 1, Chapters 2-13. Some of these problematic i lumber, water, and energy will increase signifi- sues are discussed below. is- cantly, with the steepest increases occurring over the 1985-2000 period.* Validity of the Basic Findings .The Environment. Major strains will be placed Before discussing the implications of the prob- on ecological systems throughout the world and, lems identified in the preceding section of this as a result, the goods and services that have here- chapter, it is important to point out that the pro- tofore been provided, by the environment can no jections presented in Part I nevertheless represent longer, be simply taken for granted. The signifi- the most consistent set of projections ever devel- cant deterioration in terrestrial, aquatic, and at- oped making use of the set of elements that con- mospheric environments prcjected to occur around stitute the government's global model. No the world will inevitably impact. adversely on ag- alternative governmental projections currently ricultural productivity, human morbidity and available provide a more logically coherent foun- mortality, overall economic development, and dation for the government's longer-term plan- perhaps even on climate-among other factors. ning. This is, of course, because the Global 2000 These strains are likely to be felt most strongly Study represents the first occasion in which even in the LDCs toward the end of the century, though an effort (regardless of its deficiencies) has been there is much current evidence of their existence. made to apply--collectively and consistently-the global,longer-term. methodologies routinely used This particular finding raises several important economic by the government to project trends regarding questions. If the real prices of these commodities increase as population, natural resources, and the environ- projected, for what corresponding commodities will real prices ment. decrease? If no compensating real-price decreases are pro- jected, what do these "real" price increases mean theoreti- With this in mind, it may be helpful for the cally-or even semantically? Unfortunately, even attempting reader to review some of the most basic findings to develop answers to these difficult questions would have of Part 1. Only the most fundamental adjustments exceeded the time and resource constraints of the study. THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 481 In short, increasingly severe stresses will be felt conditions in many parts of the world, especially on a global basis toward the end of the century. those with the most rapidly growing populations. * These stresses will be most severe in the world's Similarly, the assumptions about population poorest nations, but the industrialized countries that were made in order to develop the GNP pro- will also feet their effects. jections are contradicted by the population pro- It is the conclusion of the staff of the Global jections. Specifically, the GNP projections were 2000 Study and many of the Study's advisers that adjusted downward for the 1985-2000 period be- these basic findings are qualitatively correct, even cause of an assumption that population growth taking into account the many current deficiencies rates will have declined by that time. But the pop- of the government's global model. There are three ulation proje ctions. show the world population major reasons for holding this view: growth rate continuing at an essentially constant 1. They represent no radical departures., for the 1.8 percent per year. most part, from projections published over many If one begins by adjusting the GNP projections years by their respective sources. (to resolve the obvious inconsistency regarding 2. They are supported collaterally, for the most population), then they are adjusted upward (to part, by alternative projections developed by nu- take into account the lack of decline in population merous organizations with similar sets of sectoral rates). Potentially, this makes the GNP projec- concerns. tions consistent with the population projections 3. They are supported (in terms of many of their (leaving the population projections unchanged). most basic thrusts) by projections developed using If, on the other.hand, one begins by adjusting a set of less complex but more highly integrated global models.* the population projections (to resolve the obvious If anyth.ing, the severity of the effects of these inconsistency regarding GNP), then they are ad- basic trends may be understated, due to the very justed upward (to take into account the lack of limited feedback between the elements of the gov- improvement in social and economic conditions). ernment's global model. This view is largely cor- If the per capita GNP figures are then recalcu- roborated by projections developed using. more lated, social and economic conditions are seen to highly integrated models. be even worse than before and another upward It is also the conclusion of the staff of the Global adjustment to the population figures is required, 2000 Study and many of the Study's advisers-in and so on until a limit perhaps is reached (greatly view of the preceding analysis in the government's increasing the population projections). Con- global model-that it is impossible to assign a high v ersely, if the second step is to readjust the GNP probability to any of the specific numeric projec_ projections, a balance may then be struck making tions presented in the preceding chapters. the population projections consistent with the GNP projections (by significantly increasing both Biases Due to Inconsistent Variable Values the population and GNP projections). The complex patterns of bias caused by the in- Does one begin, then, by assuming the GNP consistent variable values used by different ele- projections to be correct and adjusting the pop- ments of the government's global model make ulation projections, or vice versa (or something adjustment extremely difficult. In particular, a in between)? Where is the lever and where is the chicken-and-egg problem is encountered in at- fulcrum? tempting to make simple quantitative adjustments These problems are compounded as more ele- ments and relationships are taken into consider- to any single set of projections developed by A ation--such Ias the following: single element of the model. For example, the assumptions about GNP that For example, the food projections show that in were made in order to develop the population certain regions of the world (notably North projections are contradicted by the GNP projec- Africa and the Middle East) there will be some tions. Specifically, the population projections declines in food per capita (even using the ap- were based on the assumption that significant re- parently too low population projections). This ductions in fertility will occur because of improved finding reinforces the finding of the per capita social and economic conditions throughout the world. But the projections of per capita GNP do It should be noted, however, that these per capita GNP not show significant improvements in economic projections do not take into account possible shifts in patterns of distribution that could either increase or decrease the per capita incomes of different economic groups within a given These nongovern ental projections are described, analyzed, population, even assuming a fixed level of overall per capita and compared in considerable detail in Part III of this volume. GNP. 482 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL GNP projections that social and economic con- Strengthening the Present Foundation ditions will not improve throughout the world. While few concrete, quantitative steps can. be The food projections also assume that there will taken to adjust the projections presented in Chap- "be no constraints on water development for ag- ters 2-13 in order to improve their reliability (for riculture. But this is contradicted by the water, reasons just discussed), several options exist for forestry, and environmental projections, imply- improving the current form of the - government's ing that a downward adjustment should be made global model itself, so that subsequent projections to the food projections. This in turn would lead will become significantly more reliable. In view to a downward adjustment to.the per capita food of the fact that billions of dollars in federal funds projections. are currently expended based on decisions using The food projections also assume that land de- projections developed by the various agencies, it terioration from intensive use will not occur. should not be difficult to develop cost justifica- But this is contradicted by the environmental tions for appropriate improvements. Several mi- projections,* implying the need for further nor improvements to the goviernment's global downward adjustments to the food projections model have already been made in the course of and per capita food projections. executing the present Study, and further minor Downward adjustments to the per capita food improvements are possible in the near future if projections would necessitate increases in the a moderate commitment of the necessary re- population projections, lowering further the per sources is made. But it should also be recognized capita food projections and requiring yet an- that major improvements will require (1) a new other round of adjustments. institutional commitment to the development of Higher population projections would in turn long-term, global analytic procedures throughout probably increase the severity of water prob- the government, and (2) a much greater invest- lems (due to more pressures from fuelwood de- ment in time and resources than was available to mand and increased deforestation) and the rate the Global 2000 Study. of land deterioration (due to more intensive farming practices), further lowering the food Need for an Ongoing Institutional Mechanism. projections and the per capita food projections. The numerous problems currently associated Thus, the adjustment process would have to with the government's global model are primarily continue until a limit was reached (if ever). symptoms of a deeper, more fundamental prob- Again, if one wanted to adjust the food, GNP, lem. The dubious assumptions, omissions, incon- or population projections for consistendy (as op- sistencies, and incompatibilities are only technical posed to attempting to actually adjust and rerun manifestations of a severe institutional problem: the elements themselves on some more integrated The executive branch of the government currently basis), where is one to begin--or end? Where is has no ongoing institutional entity with the explicit the lever and where is the fulcrum? responsibility and authority necessary for resotv- ing such technical and philosophical problems. In the absence of such an entity, it is difficult to Because the environmental projections show that the com- imagine how the government's capabilities for bined environmental impacts of all other projections have the longer-term analysis and planning can improve potential to alter almost all the other projections in generally adverse ways, there is some justification for concluding that significantly. the Global 2000 Study's projections are by and large "opti- The Study's agency experts are generally aware mistically" biased and in need of a "pessimistic" correction. of the limitations in the present elements of the But before projections can be meaningfully described as op- government's global model. With few exceptions timistic or pessimistic, the values by which they are being judged must be made clear. For whom, where, and atwhat the agencies are planning to develop new com- time are projections Optimistic Or pessimistic? Are projections putational procedures that will eventually replace of extensive firewood combustion optimistic or pessimistic for those used now. But unless some coordination is those who need heat now? Are the same projections optimistic provided, there is little reason to think that the or pessimistic for their children, or for plant breeders needing new procedures will be any more compatible, con- jenetic resources? Projections and models are not value free, and hence relative optimism or pessimism is very much in the sistent, or interactive than the present ones. A eye of the beholder. The perspectives and values of an Amer- . . y task, therefore, is to survey the devel- priont ican farmer and an improverished citizen from an LDC in opment plans related to long-term, global analysis evaluating the prospect of future food price increases by the of all of the relevant agencies-with the objective year 2000 might be very different, so that it is not necessarily helpful to attempt to characterize the projections as biased of coordinating the modification of existing sec- favorably or unfavorably without careful qualifications. toral elements (or, where appropriate, the devel- THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 483 opment of new sectoral elements) and of population projections could then be used to de- coordinating the specific needs of the agencies. velop new resource and environmental projec- Discussions with the Study's agency experts al- tions. If this cycle were repeated one or more ready indicate that several additional analyses are times, it might provide a stronger degree of tem-;/ needed if the completed Global 2000 Study is to poral and intersectoral interaction and consist- 1 7 be of maximum benefit to the agencies. Finding ency. But such cycles could only be executed on answers to the following questions deserves the a block-recursive basis-that is, a full set of,r-/ - , pro highest priority: jections would have to be obtained from one ele- 1. What are the strategic and economic implica- ment before making projections for another tions of the trends now foreseen? element that required the former element's pro- 2. What policy changes might be pursued to alter jections. At best, the procedure is likely to be the trends in a desirable manner? clumsy, time-consuming, and expensive, and, there 3. What technologies might contribute in t is no assurance that closure (or even moderate nificantly to the evolution of a more. desirab e convergence) -W-6uld be possible. Even if a major future? attempt had been made to resolve many of the Fortunately, the Study has already provided .a more obvious inconsistencies and incompatibili- basis for initiating an increased level of inter- ties among the elements, major structural incon- agency cooperation and coordination on data ex- sistencies would remain, making convergences change and model formulation. and the verification of convergences problematic. As Chapters 15-23 demonstrate, the present Pot.ential Technical Improvements elements of the government's global model are sufficiently dissimilar that incremental improve- The extent to which relatively modest incre- ments of the kinds discussed above would be of mental modifications of the government's existing only limited utility. Put simply, there is no pos- models could permit more synergistic interaction sibility that the present sectoral elements of the and feedback than was achieved in the Global government's global model could be used on a 2000 Study is clearly an important area for early fully integrated, simultaneous, and interactive investigation. Simple modifications (e.g., devel- basis. Severe structural and computational differ- oping projections in which all elements use the ences among the elements preclude their being Study's population and GNP projections) would. operated in this manner. Furthermore, to achieve be relatively inexpensive and could be made rel- even a modest degree of consistent, simultaneous atively rapidly. Similarly, somewhat more con- interlinkage would require such extensive modi- sistent projections could be achieved simply through fications of the present elements that the creation the imposition of a somewhat more extensive of an entirely new family of elements might well amount of coordination and arbitration. In many be more cost-effective. instances the agencies' choices of different, data It is doubtful, however, that the government sources and different simplifying assumptions may will find it convenient anytime soon to work with be inadvertent. The pressure of short-term tasks a single large computer model of the world. In often requires the agencies' modeling experts to fact, attempting to develop and maintain a single make expeditious simplifications, which are rarely all-purpose model might not be well advised, even reviewed in depth and which are difficult to revise in the long run. On the one hand, the departments once made. Other discrepancies may reflect real and agencies have individual and unique projec- differences of opinion among the agencies re- tion needs that could not be satisfied easily with sponsible. But whether inadvertent or substan- a single large global model. On the other hand, tive, these discrepancies should be amenable to one model is not likely to ever be capable of pro- resolution through interagency negotiation and viding the diverse perspectives on issues essential arbitration-if a'suitable institutional mechanism to the sound formulation of policy. A more plur- could be held responsible for identifying the dis- alistic approach would therefore appear to be both crepancies and encouraging the negotiation and desirable and necessary. arbitration. Such a pluralistic approach could incorporate Iterative adjustments might further improve the several of the following principles: projections., For example, the results of all the Global 2000 Study's projections could be used as All major development and use of analytic pro- the basis for a new set of assumptions in the ex- cedures related to long-term global projecting isting models for the development of new GNP in a government agency would continue to be .and population projections. These new GNP and undertaken by the agency or under its sponsor- 484 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL ship-using funds and personnel allocated spe- Modeling in educational institutions needs to be cifically for this purpose. encouraged to provide both new techniques and A major effort would be made to encourage diversity of perspectives in the available models. \mu.h more extensive development and use of Since other nations and international agencies e@ x -term global models. .isting and new long face similar analytical problems, more extensive Amajor effort would also be made to ensure and penetrating interaction among professionals th\at governmentwide protocols were estab- would be helpful in extending techniques and in- Ushed and enforced regarding documentation formation around the world. standards, access, reproducibility, and compar- 3. A more useful and internally consistent ca- "dard series projections, together pability for longer-range analysis and planning. isons with stan This must start with an improved exchange of in- with other steps to facilitate public understand- formation. At present, even the agency experts ing of the elements of the government's global model and derived projections, responsible for the development, use, and main- tenance of the individual sectoral elements of the government's global model have little knowledge Incorporating Broader Perspectives of the assumptions, methodologies, and require- Several important steps could be taken to en- ments of the other sectoral elements. The third sure that a broader range of perspectives is drawn volume of the Global 2000 Study will provide a upon than is currently the case in developing and reference manual on the various sectoral models, Making use of the government's global model. For but much more is needed. Opportunity should be example: provided not only for the agencies' modeling ex- perts, but also for experts from congressional 1. A coordinating body to improve understand- staffs, the private sector, educational institutions, ing of models. At present, information related to and the general public to learn about these models the Study projections and their underlying meth- and to gain experience in their use. Increased un- odologies is not easily examined by even the pol- derstanding and ideas for improvements are sure icymakers and members of Congress, let alone to result from such information exchanges. the private sector and general public. The basic 4. Improved documentation of the elements of documentation on the elements of the govern- the government's global model. Better documen- ment's global model is incomplete and of mixed tation is badly needed. The third volume of the quality and is only now being made available to Global 2000 Study provides an initial attempt to the public as the third volume of the Global 2000 draw the pieces together, but the basic reference Study. If the government's computer-based tools documents should be available from a single and models are to achieve their potential for ben- source. Furthermore, the quality of the docu- efiting policy analysis, ways must be found to fa- mentation--especially regarding descriptions of cilitate understanding of the assumptions on assumptions underlying the projections-needs to which they are based. One or more coordinating be improved. Impartial validation should also oc- bodies might give attention to this problem, rep- cur. resenting both the perspectives of analytic exper- tise and social, political, and economic experience. 2. Increased interaction with the private sector, educational institutions, other national efforts, and Summary Descriptions of the 11 international agencies. Since all models are sim- Elements plifications of reality, one basic purpose of a Each of the 11 elements of the government's model is to provide a basis for its own improve- global model is described here in terms of nine ment. An important part of any process for im- topics of particular relevance to the analysis pre- proving the sectors of the government's global sented earlier in this chapter. model is increased interaction with individuals and organizations that could help to improve the Source of the designated projections government models. The private sectorhas much Explicit linkages to other elements of the data and much familiarity with particular eco- government's global model nomic sectors. Therefore, an organized private Critical policy and technology assumptions sector review of the assumptions and structures Analytic methodology used to develop the of the government's longer-term models could projections both improve the models and reduce the number Brief description of the methodology of unanticipated changes in government policy. First major use of the methodology THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 485 Geographic representation within the meth- given population (each group of males or females odology born in the same year) is treated separately and Temporal representation within the meth- explicitly with respect to each major demographic - odology 14 component" (mortality, fertility, and net migra- Cases analyzed for the Global 2000 Study tion). Each set of projections was prepared using using the methodology somewhat different versions of a FORTRAN The 11 elements are described in the order in computer program of about 1,000 lines (including extensive comments). which they appear in Table 14-1. Much of the -1 Chicago's exogenous fertility projections also material presented below is encapsulated in Ta- make use of an additional, explicit quantitative bles 14-2 and 14-3. methodology. Given a population's 1975 fertility rate and the "strength" in 1975 of its family plan- 1. Population Element ning programs, Chicago's computer-based meth- Source. At the suggestion of the Agency for odology projects future fertility rates, relying International Development (AID) of the U.S. entirely on explicitly defined assumptions regard- Department of State, two independently devel- ing the future development and efficacy of family oped sets of population-projections were prepared planning programs; no other factors are consid- for. the Study. The Bureau of the Census of the ered in making these projections. U.S. Department of Commerce developed the Brief Description. The cohort-component projections that were subsequently used in pre- methodology projects population size and struc- paring the Study's energy and.food projections ture based on exogenous projections of mortality, and its per capita GNP projections. The Com- fertility, and net migration rates. munity and Family Study Center at the University Only demographic variables are considered in of Chicago developed alternative projections, developing the population projections. No ex- which highlight the potential impact of family plicit mathematical relationships are used at any planning programs on population size and struc- point that involve nondemographic factors-such ture. as the size and distribution of per capita income; Explicit Linkages to Other. Elements of the Gov- requirements for food, housing, schools, jobs,'or ernment's Global Model. The Census and Chicago medical facilities; likely welfare expenditures; ed- population projections were not developed taking ucational opportunities; work roles and oppor- -into explicit account any of the'Study's other pro- tunities for women or men; or the influence of jections. However, the Census projections were environmental factors on health. Internal migra- subsequently used in developing the Study's food tion (for example, between rural and urban areas and energy projections (and the derived energy- or between social classes) is not represented, nor residual and environmental-impact projections). are differential growth rates for separate ethnic, Critical Policy and Technology Assumptions. racial, or religious groups. With regard to policy, all population cases as- First Major Use. Although the cohort-compo- surned that almost all countries that do not already nent methodology, developed in the 1930s, has do so will make family planning services available been used extensively by demographers for dec- to an appreciable portion of the population during ades, it was not until the late 1960s that the Bu- the 1975-2000 period, and that countries with reau of the Census began making major use of it family planning programs now in operation will to develop international population projections, extend coverage, particularly in rural areas. This at the request of AID. At that time, AID asked meant, for example, that in the Census projec- Census to develop a model t 'hat would avoid what tions for Bangladesh (in the medium-growth case; appeared to be biases contained in U.N. popu- over the 1975-2000 period) fertility rates were lation estimates and projections, and subse- exogenodsly projected to decline 40 percent, as quently to perform various policy analyses. discussed in Chapter 15. Several years later, in August 1977, AID asked With regard to technology, no major break- the University of Chicago to develop a new pro- throughs or setbacks affecting fertility or mortality jection methodology and undertake projections rates (e.g., regarding birth control devices or which would take more explicit account of the medical discoveries) were assumed. likely future impact of family planning programs Analytic Methodology. Both the Census and (which AID was encouraging) on population size Chicago projections make use of the cohort-com- 'and structure. The Chicago population projec- ponent methodology. The name of this method- tions presented in the Study, developed in re- ology refers to the fact that each "cohort" of a sponse to this request, emphasize the potential 486 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL ,efficacy of AID's programs. Thus, the Chicago countries through 1985. * On the recommendation high, medium, and low world population projec- of Bank staff members, the Global 2000 Study tions for the year 2000 are 3 to 12 percent lower supplemented the Bank's projections with GNP than the Census projections. growth rates to the year 2000 developed. for the Geographic Representation. The cohort-com- 1977 Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies ponent methodology can be used to develop pro- (WAES), sponsored by the Massachusetts Insti- jections for any appropriately defined population. tute of Technology. Separate projections were prepared for 23 coun- The WAES group had first developed its own tries and subregions for the Global 2000 Study, projections for the Western industrialized na- at the request of the Study's central staff. These tions, and then-with the assistance of World 23 areas include collectively all the world's pop- Bank staff members-developed a consistent set ulation; moreover, the 12 less developed countries of LDC projections using World Bank analytic for which individual projections were made rep- tools. The World Bank and WAES projections resent 75 percent of the current total population were subsequently supplemented for the Global of the LDCs. 2000 Study with projections for the centrally In the case of the Global 2000 Study, projec- planned economies (CPEs), developed by the tions for each of the 23 countries or subregions U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Unfortunately, were made independently of each other, and the GNP projections for the CPEs presented in summed as appropriate. Migration between coun- this volume are considered unrealistically low by tries or subregions was assumed to be zero, for the CIA, when viewed together with the Study's analytic reasons explained in Chapter 15. other GNP projections (due to statistical differ- Temporal Representation. Projections of a given ences discussed briefly in Chapter 3). However, population's size and structure were made dynam- it should be noted that the CPE growth rates used ically--on a year by year, sequential basis. These by the World Bank in developing the LDC growth projections were based on exogenous projections rates for the WAES Study are much higher than of mortality and fertility. For the Global 2000 those reported in this volume. Study, projections were presented in Chapter 2 Explicit Linkages to Other Elements of the Gov- for each 5-year interval of the 1975-2000 period. ernment's Global Model. The GNP projections I Cases Analyzed. Three sets of projections were were not developed taking into explicit account developed by both Census and Chicago: a high- any of the Study's other projections, except that growth, a medium-growth, and a low-growth case. the per capita GNP projections were subsequently In general, Census and Chicago used different calculated using the Study's population projec- estimates of current population sizes and struc- tions (developed by the Bureau of the Census). tures and different mortality and fertility projec- However, the GNP projections were subse- -tions. Within both the Census and Chicago quently used in developing the Study's. food and projections, variations among the high-growth, energy projections and the derived energy-resid- medium-growth, and low-growth cases were based ual and environmental-impact projections. entirely on different fertility rate projections (and Critical Policy and Technology Assumptions. in the Census projections, in the case of China, No major policy changes were assumed. With re- on different estimates of actual population size in gard to technology, however, all the GNP pro- 1975). Mortality assumptions and the zero net jections for the LDCs, assumed that the productivity migration assumption did not vary within either of capital in almostall of the LDCs will increase the Census set of projections or within the Chi- significantly over the 1975-85 period. This meant, cago set of projections. for example, that in the other-South-Asia LDC group, a given investment could be thought of as 2. Gross National Product Element producing 60 percent more incremental GNP in 1985 than in 1977 (in constant dollars), as dis- Source. No U.S. agency is responsible for de- cussed in Chapter 16. veloping a consistent set of long-term GNP pro- Analytic Methodology. Most of'the GNP pro- jections for all the world's nations. Therefore, on jections (those for the LDCs) were developed the recommendation of the U.S. Agency for In- making use of a dynamic, block-recursive com- ternational Development of the U.S. Department puter model known as SIMLINK (SIMulated of State, the Global: 2000 Study turned to the of- trade LINKages). The model contains over 200 fice within the World Bank Group responsible for estimating consistent GNP projections for the *The World Bank Group is an international organization af- Western industrialized nations and less developed filiated with the United Nations. THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 487 econometric structural equations and is written in nor is trade between the industrialized nations and .approximately 1,500 lines of FORTRAN. the CPEs. I Brief Description. SIMLINK simulates world Several simplifying assumptions were made in trade between the industrialized nations and the developing the SIMLINK model. Within each of LDCs. Its purpose is to aggregate and adjust, as the six LDC aggregates, geographically and so- appropriate, the economic growth projections de- cioeconomically diverse LDCs-such as (1) Ar- veloped for individual LDC nations by World gentina, Jamaica, and Yugoslavia, or (2) Bolivia, Bank analysts, so as to take account explicitly and Thailand, and Morocco-are treated as if they consistently of likely limitations in the worldwide were single entities because they have roughly the availability of foreign trade earnings and foreign same levels of per capita income. Many LDCs are investment capital. If these adjustments were not not included in the model. For example, the made, projections made by both the individual OPEC income-surplus nations were not explicitly LDCs and World Bank analysts would sum to represented in the version of SIMLINK used for implausible levels'of world trade and foreign in- the WAES Study. However, those LDCs that are vestment. specifically included are said by Bank analysts to Trade between industrialized nations or be- represent most of the population and national in- tween LDCs is not explicitly represented in SIM- come of the LDCs. LINK,- nor is primary commodity trade between Temporal Representation. Projections of world trade directly affecting the LDCs are based on the LDCs and the CPEs. Current debt levels and exogenous projections of (1) Western industrial growth trends in these levels are also not explicitly and CPE growth rates, trade volumes, and prices accounted for. . No explicit account is taken by SIMLINK of for many major commodities and (2) inflation future population sizes and structures or of po- rates for all years to be covered by the projection. tential env,ironmental impacts. Resources are rep- After these exogenous projections are completed, SIMLINK projects LDC economic growth rates resented primarily on the basis of historic cost- sequentially, year by year. price relationships and past trends in growth of Bank analysts note that SIMLINK was not con- production. structed to make projections beyond 1985, First Major Use. An early version of SIMLINK that they have little confidence in using it to de- began to be applied in 1974. One of the first ap- velop longer-term projections, and that they have plications examined the potential direct effect of recently replaced it with a more comprehensive recent and potential changes in the international system of models. For the WAES Study, SIM- price of oil on LDC economic growth rates (which LINK projections were developed for the 1975- are of crucial financial importance to the World 90 period and extrapolated judgmentally to 2000. Bank). The model supported the Bank's view that Cases Anal@zed. High, medium, and low GNP the direct impact of changes in the price of oil on projections were used in the Global 2000 Study. LDC economic growth would be minor. How- The high and medium projections derive largely ever, the model also showed thatchanges in the from figures developed for the WAES Study. The growth rates of the industrialized nations, which high-growth case generally projects a continua- might also beaffected by changes in the price. of tion of 1960-72 growth patterns, whereas the low- oil, would have major direct impact on LDC eco- growth case projects a continuation of the patterns nomic growth. characteristic of the 1973-75 period-just suffi- Geographic Representation. SIMLINK treats ciently above that period's population growth to the Western industrialized and socialist nations allow an advance in real global GNP per capita. exogenously as four aggregates, each with its own The third (medium-growth) set of projections was GNP growth rate and elasticity of demand for developed by averaging the growth rates used in LDC exports of manufactured goods. The LDCs the high and low projections. are selectively represented by six aggregates: In- dia, other-South-Asia countries, low-income Af- rica, lower-middle-income countries, middle- 3. Climate Element income-countries, and upper-middle-income Source. The Global 2000 Study's climate pro- countries. Each aggregate is treated at the same jections were developed by the Central Intelli- level of detail. SIMLINK simulates trade between genc 'e Agency (CIA), based on an interagency each of the six LDC aggregates and (1) the West- research project on climate conducted by the Na- ern industrialized nations and (2) the CPEs. Trade tional Defense University (NDU), with partici- among the six LDC aggregates is not simulated, pation by the U.S. Department of Defense, the 488 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL U.S. Departmeni of Agriculture, and the Na- used in developing the NDU report was to seek tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and weigh a wide range of expert opinion. This of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The first synthesized survey approach seemed likely to of the NDU project's four tasks-to define and yield the most meaningful results obtainable, in estimate the likelihood of changes in climate dur- view of the fact that there is currently no single ing the next 25 years and to construct climate well-accepted quantitative model of the causal scenarios for the year 2000-was completed in forces thought to determine climate. February 1978, and the results were published in In the first of the NDU project's four tasks, a the National Defense University report entitled questionnaire defining five future climate possi- Climate Change to the Year 2000. * The remaining bilities was prepared and completed by a diverse three tasks of the NDU project included (1) es- group of climatological experts. The emphasis of timating the likely effects of possible climatic the project was placed primarily on assessing changes on selected crops in specific countries, probabilities related to (1) average global tem- (2) evaluating the domestic and international im- perature, (2) average latitudinal temperature, (3) plications of these specific climate-crop cases, and carbon dioxide and turbidity (including particu- (3) transmitting the research results to individuals lates), (4) precipitation change, (5) precipitation and organizations concerned with the conse- variability, (6) midlatitude drought, (7) Asian quences of climatic changes in fields other than monsoons, (8) Sahel drought, and (9) the length agriculture. of the growing season. Explicit Linkages to Other Elements of the Gov- Individual responses were weighted by each ernment's Global Model. The climate cases were participant's expertise, as evaluated by self and not developed taking into direct account any of peers, and responses to this questionnaire were the Study's other projections, nor were they used then used to calculate complex topographical in developing any of those projections, since, as probability functions associated with each speci- it turned out, none of the other elements used to fied case. develop the Study's other projections was capable First Major Use. The NDU methodology was of directly taking into account any climatic vari- first developed and used in connection with this ation -from patterns established over the past 2-3 particular NDU study in the mid-1970s, although decades. it is related to Delphi-survey techniques devel- Critical Policy and Technology Assumptions. oped over the past two decades. With regard to both policy and technology, delib- Geographic Representation. The NDU study erate human efforts to modify climate were ex- developed separate probability functions primar- cluded from the analysis. ily with regard to each of eight regions (polar, Analytic Methodology. A special survey meth- higher midlatitude, lower midlatitude, and sub- odology devised by the Institute for the Future tropical regions in both Northern and Southern (hereafter referred to as the NDU methodology) Hemispheres). Geographic causal linkages be- was used to gather, weigh, and consolidate the tween the phenomena occurring, in these regions views of numerous experts on climate. The pur- were informally assessed on an individual, un- pose of the NDU project was not to forecast cli- documented basis by each of the participants in mate change or reach a consensus on how climate the study. will change, but rather to synthesize reasonable, Temporal Representation. Probability functions coherent, and consistent possibilities for world were assessed for three time periods: 1977-80, climate to the end of the century, and to put plau- 1981-90, and 1991-2000. Temporal causal link- sible bounds on the likelihood of each of these ages between the phenomena occurring in these possibilities occurring. time periods were informally assessed on an in- Brief Description. The CIA developed three dividual, undocumented basis by each of the par- simplified cases for the Global 2000 Study, based ticipants. primarily on the more complex and highly qual- Cases Analyzed. The three climate cases de- ified findings of the NDU report. The approach veloped for the Global 2000 Study represent sim- plifications of three of the five NDU cases, These climate "projections" are actually scenarios (in the namely, they approximate the three more mod- sense of being internally consistent statements of possible fu- erate cases projected by the report as most prob- ture developments), rather than "projections" (in the sense able. However, it should be kept in mind that in of being foreseeable consequences of present trends). In order excluding the more extreme, large-scale changes, to facilitate comparisons with the other element descriptions in this chapter, they will henceforth be referred to as "cases the Global 20M Study has omitted consideration in this discussion. of climatological developments that could have an THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 489 extremely pronounced effect on the Study's other sumptions of those other elements (often incon- projections. sistently). The following three world-climate cases were' Critical Policy and Technology Assumptions. developed for the 1975-2000 period. They differ No explicit, consistent policy assumptions were primarily with regard to assumed future global made with regard to technological innovation, temperature and precipitation patterns. deployment, or impact. However, some repre- sentative critical technological assumptions are Case Temperature Precipitation cited below, under "Cases Analyzed." In general, No change Similar to 1941-70 Similar to 1941-70 technological progress is assumed, potential set- period (i.e., less period (i.e., less backs are not considered, and adverse side effects variability than over severe drought in are not considered. the past 100-200 the Sabel and less years). monsoon failure in Analytic Methodology. Over the years, govern- India than recently ment agencies have developed a wide variety of experienced). diverse methodologies for projecting (often im- Warming Global Annual . plicitly) technological assumptions. These tech- temperatures precipitation nological projections are then incorporated in increase by I' C, increases 5-10 projections and forecasts of other variables of in- with only slight percent and warming in the becomes less terest. In some cases, these technological projec- tropics. variable; probability tions are made in advance of making use of the of U.S. drought methodologies which comprise the other elements increases. of the government's global model; in other cases, Cooling Global Precipitation they are calculated concurrently with other cal- temperatures amounts decline culations made using the methodology. The actual decrease by 0.5' C, and variability techniques used by the various elements to project with only slight increases; cooling in the probability of U.S. technological innovation, deployment, and im- tropics. drought increases. pact are so idiosyncratic that a more explicit over- all description (such as that provided in Chapter 23) is not feasible here. 4. Technology Element Brief Description. Most technologies were pro- Source. This section brings together under one jected to yield increasing benefits over time at heading (As a major element of the government's exponential rates corresponding to recent histor- global model) the disparate methods used by the ical experience. In some cases, the deployment other elements of the government's global model of existing technology was projected to occur at to project rates of technological innovation, de- rates faster than recent historical experience (e.g., ployment, and impact. The fact is that no gov- in the population projections and energy-residual ernment agency has unique responsibility for projections). The potential adverse and dysfunc- projecting future rates of technological change for tional consequences of technological innovation use in other official projections and forecasts. As and deployment were almost never explicitly con- a result, each agency develops its own technolog- sidered, except in the environmental projections. ical projections and forecasts on a virtually in- First Major Use. The agencies' overall projdc- dependent basis. tion methodologies generally have unique ways This practice was also followed in developing of incorporating the underlying technology as- the Global 2000 Study's projections. The Study's sumptions. Therefore, the first major use of the assumptions concerning future rates of techno- diverse methodologies for technological projec- logical change were determined independently by tions tended to coincide with the first major use the various agencies for their individual contri- of the overall projection methodologies of which butions to the Study. they are a part. Little or no consistency was im- Explicit Linkages to Other Elements of the Gov- posed regarding the rate at which technological ernment's Global Model. No explicit linkages advance is projected in various fields (e.g., in re- were made between any of the other 10 elements sponse to allocations of federal research budgets), of the government's global model with respect to and the Global 2000 Study represents the first technology. Those elements from which projec- time the government's various approaches to tions were developed using projections developed longer-term, global technological projection have by other elements, however, could be thought of even been cursorily examined on a collective basis as incorporating implicitly the technology as- in an official executive branch report. 490 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL Geographic Representation. Most projections All the energy projections assumed the wide- assumed that all regions of the world will be cul- spread deployment of light-water nuclear elec- turally and physically capable of accepting tech- tric power plants. This meant, for example, that nological change to approximately the same extent electrical generation from nuclear and hydro- and at approximately the same rates. power sources was projected to increase about Temporal Representation. No systematic at- 200 percent over the 1975-90 period (in the tempt was made by the Study to assure the use medium case), as discussed in Chapter 5. of consistent assumptions regarding likely future All the energy-residual projections (i.e., pro- rates of technological innovation, deployment, jections of residuals such as pollutants or waste and impact collectively in the Study's projections. heat from energy conversion processes) as- Therefore, it is unlikely that the temporal rep- sumed implicitly that major public and private resentation of technological change among the investment will be made in pollution abatement various elements is to any degree consistent, al- technologies so that by 1985 all energy facilities though the inexplicit character of the way tech- in all countries will have met or have been re- nology is represented in many elements of the trofitted to meet 1978 U.S. new source per- government's global model makes this virtually formance standards for various emissions, as impossible to assess. discussed in Chapter 10. Cases Analyzed. No consistent, systematic pro- jections of technology per se were made for the 5. Food Element Study, but diverse technological assumptions were Source. The Study's food projections were de- incorporated in all of the other projections de- veloped by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's veloped for the Study. Some key examples are Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service. provided below: Explicit Linkages to Other Elements of the Gov- � All the population projections assumed that al- ernment's Global Model. The projections are most all countries that do not already do so will based on the Study's population projections (de- make family planning technologies and services veloped by the Bureau of the Census) and GNP available to an'appreciable portion of the pop- projections. In addition, the Study's rising-en- ulation during the 1975-2000 period, and coun- ergy-price projections were used in developing the tries with family planning programs now in two food cases (which assume increasing petro- operation will extend coverage, particularly in leum prices) and the Study's associated environ- rural areas. This meant, for example, that in the mental projections. However, no Study projections Census projections for Bangladesh (in the me- (other than population, GNP, and energy) were dium-growth case), fertility rates were exoge- directly used in developing the Study's food pro- nously projected to decline 40 percent over the jections (i.e., no use was made of the Study's 1975-2000 period, as discussed in Chapter 15. projections involving climate, fisheries, forestry, water, energy residuals, fuel minerals, nonfuel � Almost all the GNP projections for the LDCs minerals, or the environment). assumed that the productivity of capital in the Critical Policy and Technology Assumptions. LDCs will increase significantly over the 1975- With regard to policy, the projections all assumed 85 period. This meant, for example, that in the that major public and private investment in ag- other-South-Asia LDC group, a given invest- ricultural land development will be made. With ment could be thought of as producing 60 per- regard to technology, they assumed that wide- cent more incremental GNP in 1985 than in 1977 spread deployment and use of fertilizer and other (in constant dollars), as discussed in Chapter yield-augmenting inputs (together with other fac- 16. tors) will lead to further increased yields com- � All the food projections assumed that the wide- Parable to the increases experienced over the past spread deployment of fertilizer and other yield- two decades (the period of the Green Revolu- augmenting inputs (together with other factors) tion). This meant, for example, that annual LDC will lead to further increased yields comparable grain production (in the medium case, over the to the increases experienced over the past two 1975-2000 period) was projected to increase 125 decades (the period of the Green Revolution). percent. This meant, for example, that annual LDC grain Analytic Methodology. A computer-based static- production was projected to increase 125 per- equilibrium model known as the GOL (Grain, cent over the 1975-2000 period (in the medium Oilseed, Livestock) model was the primary tool case), as discussed in Chapter 5. used in developing the food projections. The THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 491 GOL model consists of approximately 930 econ- stock sectors. The centrally planned regions are ometric equations, which are solved simultane- represented solely by collapsed international trade ously. equations (that is, area yield and production pro- Three additional procedures were used to make jections are generated by "satellite" models, projections of arable area, total food production while consumption is calculated as production and consumption, and fertilizer use. They were plus or minus trade). developed since the fall of 1977 specifically for Temporal Representation. The GOL model is the Study, and were based on the application of a static equilibrium model. It is described as static comparatively simple computational procedures in that it does not dynamically develop projections to some of the results of the GOL calculations. on a year by, year basis. Instead, its projections These additional calculations were made without are derived from estimated values for an initial the use of a computer-based model. base period, directly adjusted to correspond to Brief Description. The GOL model projects anticipated equilibrium conditions in a final year, world production, consumption, and trade quan- without calculating successive values for the in- tities and prices in grains, oilseeds, and livestock tervening years. This process of one-step pro- products based on exogenous projections of pop- jecting is based on the assumption that the world's 41ation, GNP, growth in crop yields due to the grain-oilseed-livestock production and trade sys- deployment of more efficient yield-enhancing tem was in rough equilibrium (supply equaled technology, and other variables. The model's demand at the reported market price) in the base structure is most detailed for grain; other food period and that the solution calculated for any products are represented in less detail. Collec- single future year will also be in rough equilib- tively, the relationships incorporated in the model rium. The GOL model is thus extremely limited are said to represent approximately 70-80 percent in its capacity to simulate the many important of total world food production, consumption, and aspects of agricultural market behavior that are trade. No environmental considerations (other in a state of dynamic disequilibrium over periods than land scarcity and weather) are explicitly rep- exceeding one year. resented in the model. Similarly the public and GOL projections for 1985 and 2000 were de- social costs associated with developing and main- veloped for the Global 2000 Study starting with taining the productive capacity required by 2000 1969-71 (average) base-line conditions (adjusted are not explicitly represented in the model. * somewhat using data through 1976) and project- First Major Use. Along with other analyses, the ing to 1985 and 2000. model was initially used in 1974 to generate pro- Cases Analyzed. Four projections of world food jections supporting the U.S. position paper for production, consumption, and trade were devel- the Rome Food Conference sponsored by the oped for the Study, based on different assump- Food and Agriculture Organization. The model's tions for population growth, GNP growth, weather, initial projections showed that over the next dec- and the real price of petroleum. The four food ade the world could produce enough grain (at real cases* are summarized below: Real-Price prices above the relatively low prices of the late Population GNP Of 1960s) to meet the demands of (1) a largely cereal Cases Growth Growth Weather Petroleum diet in the developing world and (2) a moderately Medium Medium Medium Same as last Constant ($13/ three decades bbl., t978 rising grain-feed meat diet (based in part on grain- dollars) Optimistic Low High More favorable Constant (SIN fed livestock) in the industrial nations. The U.S. than last three bbl., 1978 position paper prepared for the conference made decades. dollars) Pessimistic High Low Less favorable Increasing (5 use of these projections to support policy views than last three percent per year favoring, in general, the limiting of government decades in real tcrms, 1980-2(XX)) intervention in domestic and world food markets, Rising energy Medium Medium Same as last Increasing (5 and questioning, in particular, the need for an Price three decades percent per year in real terms, extensive international system of government- 1980-20M) owned food reserves. *The "cases" are referred to as "alternatives" and "scenarios" Geographic Representation. A total of 28 closely in Chapters 6 and 18. Alternative I of Chapter 6 embodies interrelated regions are represented at varying both the medium and the rising-energy-price cases; Alternative levels of detail. The 28 regions consist of 8 regions II is the optimistic case; Alternative III is the pessimistic case. of Western industrial nations, 3 regions of cen- In these cases, the changes in assumptions regarding weather (a term used to refer to relatively short-term variations within trally planned economies, and 17 regions of less historic norms) are not considered equivalent to changes in developed countries (LDCs). All regions have assumptions regarding climate (a term used to refer to fun- crop equations, but not all regions have full live- damental long-term change). 492 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL 6. Fisheries, Forestry, Water Element sources were in conflict (for example, when eco- Source. Because of their methodological simi- logical and anthropological projections came to larities, the fisheries, forestry, and water projec- different conclusions regarding the sustainability tions are described together here as if they were of slash-and-burn agriculture), the source with the one element in the government's global model. stronger empirical evidence was preferred. The fisheries projections were developed by the Two sets of projec tions of water availability National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra- were presented by the Department of the Interior tion of the U.S. Department of Commerce and and the CIA: (1) the lower projection of increases by outside consultants. The forestry projections in the "consumption" (withdrawal) of "water con- were developed by the Central Intelligence Agency, trolled by man" over the 1975-2000 period was with assistance from the Department of Agricul- developed by C. A. Doxiadis; (2) the higher pro- ture and the Department of State (and its Agency jection of global water requirements by the year for International Development). The water pr - 2000 was developed by Russian hydrologist G. P. o Kalinin. The projections were apparently not cho- jections were developed by the Department of the sen by the Department of the Interior for their Interior, with assistance from the CIA and outside excellence, but because other global water pro- consultants. jections could not be found or developed. Explicit Linkages to Other Elements of the Gov- ernment's Global Model. The fisheries, forestry, First Major Use. The fisheries and forestry pro- and water projections were not developed taking jections were developed specifically for the Global into direct account any of the Study's other pro- 2000 Study. In the case of the water projections, jections or each other, nor were they used in de- the Doxiadis projections were originally pub- veloping any of the Study's other projections, lished in the report, "Water for Peace," prepared except the environmental impact projections. for the International Conference on Water for Critical Policy and Technology Assumptions. Peace held in Washington, D.C. , in 1967. The With regard to policy, the fisheries projections Kalinin projections were originally published in assume, on a worldwide basis, good management UNESCO's Impact of Science in Society, April- of fisheries and protection of the marine environ- June 1969. ment; the forestry projections assume some policy . Geographic Representation. Projections involv- changes throughout the world regarding current ing fisheries, forestry, and water resources are deforestation practices; the water projections' severely complicated by the fact that the bound- policy assumptions are unknown. With regard to aries of the political jurisdictions responsible for technology, the fisheries projections assume the gathering information on them and for managing invention of methods for harvesting nontradi- them do not coincide with the natural boundaries tional species; the forestry projections assume the of the ecological systems involved. These com- invention of both less wasteful production tech- plications are greatest in the case of the fisheries niques and methods for exploiting nontraditional projections, which had to be made largely on the species; the water projections' technology as- basis of species rather than geographic region. In sumptions are unknown. the case of the forestry projections, the supply, Analytic Methodology. Descriptive and judg- demand, and price of forest products were con- mental analyses (rather than elaborate mathe- sidered separately for each of the major forest matical models) were used in developing the regions of the world. A separate section was de- fisheries, forestry, and water projections. voted to the problems of the humid tropics. Brief Description. The fisheries production In the Study's water projections, the point is (supply) projections were based on empirical evi- made that there is no such thing as a global water dence and ecological theory. The fisheries con- economy in the same sense as, for example, a sumption (demand) projections were based' on global economy for minerals and fuels. Since the broadly generalized assumptions about the rela- cost of transporting water tends to be high when tionships between population, income growth, large distances are involved, water problems tend and income elasticities of demand for marine to be local or regional, rather than global. products. Together, these projections suggest that Temporal Representation. The fisheries, for- future fish consumption will be constrained by estry, and water projections are either based on production and price. straight-line (linear) or exponential (nonlinear) The forestry projections were based on a review extrapolations of past trends. of the literature of forest economics andecology, Cases Analyzed. Only a single medium case was combined with informed judgment. In cases where evaluated for the fisheries and forestry projec- THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 493 tions; both a lower and a higher set of water pro- incorporating significantly less detail for nuclear jections were presented. The specific assumptions energy, solar energy, energy conservation pro- behind these cases (to the extent they are known) grams, firewood, and emerging technologies. For are reported in Chapters 7, 8, and 9. example, solar energy is not explicitly represented and can be included in the projections only by an 7. Energy Element exogenous assumption of a given solar contribu- tion to electrical generation or to conservation. Source. The Study's energy projections were Supply of nuclear facilities is determined largely developed by the Energy Information Adminis- outside of the model by exogenous projections tration of the U.S. Department of Energy. and assumptions. Explicit Linkages to Other Elements of the Gov- The IEES system of models is structured around ernment's Global Model. The Study's population a single large integrating linear-programming ma- projections (developed by the Bureau of the Cen- trix representation. According to the model's the- sus) and GNP projections were used in developing 0 the energy projections. None of the Study's other ry, the world energy market operates as a free projections were used, but the energy projections market whose equilibrium minimizes the total cost were used in developing the Study's food, energy of meeting the world's energy demands at a spe- .residuals, and environmental projections (but not cific, assumed price of oil.* Demand and supply in developing the climate, fisheries, forestry, are balanced through a price mechanism that ad- water, fuel minerals, or nonfuel minerals projec- justs marginal costs of supply and demand to tions). equal values through iterative adjustments. The Critical Policy and Technology Assumptions. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries With regard to policy, all the energy projections (OPEC) is assumed to provide as much oil as assumed the implementation of more effective might be wanted (up to its maximum production energy conservation policies within the member capacity), independent of the price of oil assumed countries of the Organization for Economic Co- for the model run. operation and Development (OECD). With re- There are several important assumptions im- gard to technology, all the energy projections plicit in the operation of the IEES price niecha- assumed the widespread deployment of light- nism. In each year projected, energy production water nuclear electric power plants. This meant outside of OPEC is assumed to respond within that electrical generation from nuclear and hy- limits to prevailing energy prices, with little or no dropower sources was projected (in the medium time lag. Oil production outside of OPEC gen- case, over the 1975-2000 period) to increase more erally does not meet demand, and IEES achieves than 200 percent, as discussed in Chapter 5. supply-demand balance by assuming OPEC meets Analytic Methodology. The energy projections the residual demand (which in some runs exceeds were made with a computer-based static-equilib- the OPEC maximum production capacity) at riurn model known as the International Energy whatever oil price prevails in the year in question. Evaluation System (IEES). JEES is a family Of The energy production alternatives are assumed complex supply, demand, and production models, to be selected solely on the basis of meeting pro- integrated by means, of a large linear-program- jected demand at the lowest possible global cost. ming-matrix representation of approximately 2,- In general, only gross energy production figures 000 rows and 6,000 columns. The data quantifying are presented; net energy production figures (i.e., world energy supply and demand, and production gross energy production less the energy consumed and transportation costs necessary for these in- in obtaining the gross energy production) are not tegrating calculations, are supplied by six IEES calculated. Forms of energy supply which are not submodels. These submodels have been assem- generally traded internationally (except hydro- bled independently of one another, and are exe- power and geothermal energy) are not repre- cuted sequentially, drawing on their own outside sented in the model. data sources. Brief Description. The IEES model projects in the analyses performed for the Global 2000 Study, the world energy production, consumption, and trade, OPEC oil price scenario (constant at $13 per barrel in 1975 based on exogenous projections of population, dollars until 1980, then increasing at 5 percent per year) was GNP, trends in the international price of petro- assumed. However, the Department of Energy does have an leum, and other variables. The model emphasizes Oil Market Simulator (OMS) model with which the Depart- ment makes medium term forecasts of OPEC oil prices. OMS the fossil fuel sector by providing elaborate detail is calibrated to ILES and in forecasting runs annually equili- for petroleum (and related fuels) and coal while brated oil supply with the oil demand projected by ILES. 494 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL Since OPEC currently provides such a signifi- analyses, although all of the submodels produce cant share of the oil used by the U.S. and other data for every part of the world. In contrast, the nations, the IEES model's assumptions about energy economies of the LDCs are not treated in OPEC are of critical importance. IEES assumes detail and in fact contain significant omissions. (in all cases analyzed for this Study) that OPEC For example, the large proportion of LDC energy will provide as much oil as can be consumed in- economies based on firewood and other biofuels dependent of the exogenously projected price. is not represented. However, if projected OPEC production exceeds Temporal Representation. Although some of its OPEC capacity, an oil price increase is implied. submodels exhibit dynamic behavior, IEES is es- Generally, IEES is used to study the world bal- sentially a static-equilibrium model. Like the ance of energy supply and consumption for spe- GOL model used to develop the Study's food pro- cifically assumed oil prices-given essentially jections, IEES is "static" in that it does not dy- exogenous supply estimates for all energy sources. namically develop its projections year by year Interfuel trade-offs in consumption and conser- with developments in one year influencing op- vation are the key results calculated. portunities and difficulties in succeeding years. The social or environmental effects of the en- The IEES projections are made in a one-step ergy sector are not evaluated by IEES, nor is re- process that starts in a base year (e.g., 1975) and source depletion explicitly represented in the progresses directly to the final year (e.g., 1990) model. While gross national product is included under the assumption that the international en- as one of, the major determinants of energy de- ergy system is in equilibrium and optimally effi- mand, IEES implicitly assumes that GNP growth cient during the intervening years. is independent of energy availability and price. The time-dependent characteristics of the IEES First Major Use. IEES is based on the same projections derive entirely from exogenous pro- analytic structure as the Project Independence jections used as driving inputs to the IEES model. Evaluation System (PIES), the initial computer- In the main part of the IEES system, variables based model developed to analyze U.S. energy- change over time only in direct response to policy options following the 1973-74 oil em- changes in exogenously projected variables. bargo. * IEES makes international projections The model's static equilibrium projections for that are consistent with the PIES domestic pro- a given year are internally independent of its pro- jections. Thus, IEES is essentially a copy of the jections for all other years and may well be in- PIES structure (a few deviations were necessary) consistent with projections for other years. using international data. The first major public However, the demand submodel (which serves as analysis performed by IEES was released for dis- the basis for the initial demand estimates) is an tribution in 1978 @and previously circulated in annual dynamic model which imposes some in- 1977 in a form intended for limited distribution). tertemporal consistency. The model develops its It supports the view that petroleum demand is projections for a given year based on exogenously likely to exceed the production capacity of the projected economic and resource conditions for -OPEC nations in the mid-1980s, assuming real that one year only, without explicitly considering petroleum prices do not increase significantly developments that might be anticipated beyond above 1975 (real) prices in the near future. . the year in question. The model therefore oper- Geographic Representation. IEES simulates a ates as if the planners' goals were to optimize for modem competitive energy market that deals pri- just that year, without any further planning for marily in fossil fuels. Four groups of countries are successive years. One exception is that demand represented in the model at varying levels of de- data can be (and are) exogenously adjusted to tail: member countries of OECD, the OPEC reflect energy conservation measures expected to countries, the CPEs, and the less developed coun- be implemented by the OECD countries. tries. The OECD countries, which consume 80 Projections for the Study were made for 1985 percent of the world's oil production and are gen- and 1990, but not for 2000. IEES was not con- erally the world's most industrialized nations, are structed to project beyond 1990, and at this time treated most extensively in the demand submodel Department of Energy analysts have little confi- * PIES was originally used to analyze ways of achieving Pres- dence in using it to develop longer-term projec- ident Nixon's goal of energy independence for the United tions or in extrapolating such projections States by 1980. While the results showed that such a goal was judgmentally. unachievable by 1980, the model suggested that the goal could be attained by 1985, if the Administration's proposed energy Cases Analyzed. Four projections of world en- policies were adopted. ergy production, consumption, and trade were THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 495 developed for the Study. These projections were Brief Description. The simplified version of primarily based on different assumptions regard- ESNS; used in the Study makes repeated use of ing population growth, GNP growth, and the real the following equation, summed across end-use price of petroleum, as summarized below*: (sectoral) categories and across fuel-type cate- Popula- gones: tion GNP Real Price of Case Growth Growth Petroletim Total regional residuals generated (by emissions type) Medium Medium Medium Constant ($13/bbl., Total regional energy conversion (by fuel type) 1978 dollars) X residuals generated (by emission type) per unit High High Low Constant ($13/bbi., of energy conversion. 1978 dollars) Low Low High Constant ($13/bbl., The national (i.e., U.S.) ESNS model was mod- 1978 dollars) ified for use in this Study by adapting it to accept Rising Medium Medium - increasing (5% per energy year in real terms, (as input) the results of the International Energy price 1980-90) Evaluation System (IEES)-the model used to develop the Study's energy projections. The ad- 18. Energy Residuals Element aptation was difficult since (1) the international Source. The projections of energy residuals version could not be developed without making were developed by the Brookhaven National Lab- assumptions about emissions control standards on oratory, under contract to the Department of a worldwide basis, (2) the output from,the IEES Energy's Office of Technology Impacts. model (particularly the estimates of fuel con- Explicit Linkages to Other Elements of the Gov- sumption by end uses for the LDCs, the OPEC ernment's Global Model. Like the Study's energy regions, and the centrally planned economies) projections, the study's energy residuals projec- were too aggregated for use in the ESNS model, tions are derived (via the energy projections) from and (3) the IEES projections for the Global 2000 the Study's population and GNP projections. Study do not include a base case-such as 1.975- However, they neither influenced - any of the to which residuals in later years can be compared. Study's other projections (other than the envi- The adapted ESNS model is therefore severely ronmental projections) nor were they influenced limited by the capability of IEES, and the result- by any of the Study's other projections (i.e., cli- ing model is best thought of as the IEES-ESNS mate, food, fisheries, forestry, water, fuel min- model. An especially critical limitation to the erals, or nonfuel minerals projections). . value of the IEES-ESNS analysis is the assump- Critical Policy and Technology Assumptions. tion that by 1985 all countries will have met the With regard to policy and technology, all the en- U.S. new source performance standards discussed ergy residuals projections (i.e., projections of re- above. siduals such as pollutants or waste heat from First Major Use. ESNS itself was first developed energy conversion processes) assumed implicitly in 1975 to assist the U.S. Energy Research and that major public and private investment will be Development Agency (a predecessor agency of made in pollution abatement technologies so that the U.S. Department of Energy) in analyzing the by 1985 all energy conversion facilities throughout residuals implicit in the energy developmental the world will have been retrofitted to meet the programs it was advocating. The present Study 1978 U.S. new source emission standards for car- marks the first time the ESNS model has been bon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen used to make long-term global projections. and particulates. . Geographic Representation. The geographic Analytic Methodology. The energy residuals representation in ESNS is necessarily the same as in the IEES energy projections-that is, the World projections were developed using a highly sim- is represented as four major regions or groups of plified version of a computer-based network nations: OECD Countries (also represented sep- model or accounting tool known as the Energy arately), the OPEC countries, the centrally planned Systems Network Simulator (ESNS). ESNS is cur- economies, and the LDCs. rently capable of calculating the emissions of 435 Temporal Representation. The temporal rep- energy-conversion processes, using 69 exoge- resentation is necessarily the same as in the case nously derived coefficients to transform energy of the energy projections-i.e., projections were consumption figures into estimates of residuals. ; . .' , developed for 1985 and 1990 and not for previous Ile "cases" are referred to as "scenarios" in Chapters 10 or subsequent years. and 20. Cases Analyzed. The three cases analyzed are 496 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL necessarily the same as those analyzed in the en- sources differ significantly from country to coun- ergy projections-the low, medium, and high try. As a result, it has not been possible -to cases--except that the fourth (nismig-energy-price) describe a consistent systematic methodological ca@se was not analyzed. approach, even for individual fuel minerals. First Major Use. The USGS, in addition to re- 9. Fuel Minerals Element viewing other sources of information, has been Source. The Study's estimates of fuel minerals doing its own field geological research for decades reserves and resources we Ire developed from a to support its U.S. resource and reserve estimates. variety of sources since no one federal agency has However, in 1974, the USGS reported new oil exclusive responsibility for producing such esti- and gas estimates based on new techniques, which mates.' These sources included the U.S. Geolog- are discussed briefly in Chapter 2L The new oil ical Survey (USGS) of the Department of the and gas estimates are significantly lower than pre- Interior, the Department ofEnergy (DOE), and vious estimates, so the present USGS estimates some private organizations, most notably the may be thought of as dating from 1974. WEC World Energy Conference (WEC). A consistent started using its survey techniques to estimate re- set of estimates was compiled, compared, and in- serves and resources prior to World War II and terpreted for the Study by a'government expert has published estimates periodically ever since. who had worked with both DOE and Department DOE develops its own estimates of U.S. coal re- of the Interior's Bureau of Mines. serves using techniques developed by its various Explicit Linkages to -Other Elements of the Gov- predecessor agencies. For oil and natural gas re- ernment's' Global Model. The fuel minerals pro- serve figures, DOE relies largely on estimates jections were not derived from any of the Study's made by the U.S. Geological Survey, updated by other projections--including the Study's energy DOE's own survey's and augmented for the most projections-nor were they used in developing current months by data published by the Ameri- any of the Study's additional projections other can Petroleum Institute and the American Gas than the environmental projections. Association, trade associations of the oil and gas Critical Policy and Technology Assumptions. industries. With regard 'to Policy, the U.S. oil and gas re- Geographic Representation. No consistent pat- source and reserve estimates assume a continua- tern of geographic representation has been fol- tion of 1974 energy prices. With regard to lowed in developing the fuel minerals projections. technology, the U.S. oil and gas resourceand re- Temporal Representation. Both resource and serve estimates assume a continuation of price- reserve estimates are dynamic concepts. Explo- cost relationships and technological trends gen- ration shifts resources from the undiscovered cat- erally prevailing in years prior to 1974. egory to the identified category. Economic and Analytic Methodology. The methods used to technological developments move resources be- derive fuel resource and reserve estimates vary, tween the economic and subeconomic categories. to some extent, with the organization that gath- Reserves are those resources that are identified 'ered the estimates. In general, the organizations as economic and have not yet been depleted. cited above made use of secondary rather than The Global 2000 Study's resource and reserve primary sources of information-that is, they estimates do not have a dynamic perspective. The queried corporations and other organizations and estimates presented ate based on a static concept; totaled these various estimate s*, or they adapted they are applicable to a particular year but have estimates that other organizations had derived no other time dimension. In general, they are previously' from similar sources. based on the assumption that there will be a con- , Brief Description. While field surveys and ex- tinuation of current price-cost relationships and plorations are the best primary source of infor- technological trends, although the U.S. oil and rnation, it has been necessary in this Study to rely gas resource and reserve estimates (derived from primarily on secondary or tertiary sources. For USGS Circular 725) assume a continuation of example, the resource figures for solid fuels used 1974 prices and of generally prevailing pre-1974 in this Study are based on WEC estimates. The price-cost relationships and technological trends. WEC sends questionnaires to the participating Cases Analyzed. Only one set of estimates was @countries, requesting information on reserves, re- developed for the Study, but in many instances sources,@ maximum depth of deposit, minimum the probabilities associated with different meas- seam thickness, and other critical. factors. In many ures of statistical variance have also been indi- cases, methods of estimating reserves and re- cated'. THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 497 10. Nonfuel Minerals Element projected to be consumed per unit of per capita Source. The Study's nonfuel mineral-consump- GDP. tion projections were assembled by the Study's Brief Description. In the 1977 Malenbaum Re- central staff, with assistance from the U.S. De- port (which was the report relied upon primarily partment of the Interior's Bureau of Mines and by the Study) consumption projections for 12 outside consultants. Since the Bureau does not Minerals and materials were developed inde pend- have and could not produce the disaggregated in- ently of each other, using the IOU methodology- ternational projections needed for this Study, the They were based on exogenous projections of Study's projections were based in large part (at GDP and population, in combination with an ex- the suggestion of the Bureau) on projections de- trapolation of historic relationships between min- veloped in 1972 by Wilfred Malen6aum for the eral consumption and per capita GDP (developed National Commission on Materials Policy and according to IOU theory). were supplemented by projections prepared in IOU theory assumes that as less developed 1977 by Malenbaum for the National Science countries industrialize, they use increasing quan- Foundation. Malenbaurn's projections cover 12 tities of minerals per. unit of per capita GDP; con- minerals and materials, said to account for 80-90 versely, it assumes that as industrial countries percent of the value of the total world mineral move. toward postindustrial status, they use de- production. Consumption projections for an ad- creasing quantities of minerals per unit of per cap- ditional 75 minerals and materials have also been ita GDP. Malenbaum's use of IOU methodology developed by the Bureau of Mines, .making use also assumes explicitly that long-term growth in of Malenbaum's analysis. minerals and materials consumption will not be To facilitate review and comparison with the governed by supply limitations-whether 'due to other trends presented in this Study, only a: rep- depletion, environmental constraints, price in- resentative subset of these consumption projec- creases, or other factors. In particular, it assumes tions is presented in Chapter 12. This subset explicitly that future consumption of minerals and consists of 10 minerals and materials projected by materials Will be largely independent of price, Malenbaum and 9 additional minerals projected though Malenbaum notes that-to the vague and by the Bureau of Mines. imprecise degree that prices are considered-they Explicit price projections are not available from are projected to decline. either the Department of the Interior or from First Major Use. The IOU methodology is said Malenbauni's published analyses. to have been developed by the International Iron Explicit Linkages to Other Elements of the Gov- and Steel Institute in 1972 and tends to produce ernment's Global Model. The nonfuel minerals lower consumption projections than other meth- projections were not derived from any of the odologies (since it assumes that increasing eco- Study's other projections, nor were they used in nomic growth in the industrial countries requires developing any of the Study's additional projec- increasingly less consumption of minerals and tions (other than the environmental impact pro- materials per unit of per capita economic growth). jections). Ma.lenbaum's studies based on this particular Critical Policy and Technology Assumptions. methodology were used by the National Com- With regard to policy, no significant changes are mission on Materials Policy to demonstrate the assumed. With regard to technology, the projec- feasibility of striking a balance between the na- tions assume increasingly, less intensive mineral tional need to produce goods on the one hand and use in highly industrialized countries and increas- to protect the environment on the other. ingly more intensive mineral use in the LDCs. Geographic Representation. In the Malenbaum Analytic Methodology. Both the 1972 and 1977 mineral-consumption projections the world is di- Malenbaurn projections were developed u,sing a vided into 10 countries or groups of countries, methodology known as the Intensity of Use (IOU) treated independently and at the same level of analysis. This methodology utilizes simple arith- detail. ne Bureau of Mine's projections are dis- metic procedures based on the relative intensity aggregated geographically into only two parts: the with which a given commodity is projected to be United States and the rest of the world. consumed per unit of per capita gross domestic Temporal Representation. The IOU method- product (GDP). This relative intensity of use is ology involves no endogenous dynamic calcula- referred to as the material's IOU statistic. A rel- tions. Projections for any given year are based atively high IOU statistic indicates that a rela- entirely on exogenous population. and GDP pro- tively large quantity of a given commodity is jections and IOU assumptions. The exogenous 498 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL population and GDP assumptions must be aggre- pheric Administration, Woods Hole, gated in the same way as the data used to project Massachusetts. future trends in the IOU statistics and must be Explicit Linkages to Other Elements of the Gov- consistent with the historical data used to develop ernment's Global Model. The Study's environ- the IOU relationships. The 1977 Malenbaurn Re- mental projections were based primarily on the port presented historical estimates for the 1971- medium cases of all of the Study's other projec- 75 period and earlier, and projections for 1985 tions. Although they were directly used by none and 2000. of the Study's other projections, a serious attempt Cases Analyzed. For a variety of reasons it was was made to assess how feedback from the com- not possible to obtain nonfuel minerals projec- bined influence of all of the environmental im- tions specifically for the Global 2000 Study. As pacts would feed back to influence the population, a result it was necessary to rely entirely on pre- GNP, and resource projections. The basic con- viously published projections-namely, the 1977 clusion of this analysis was that feedback from the Malenbaum Report-which presents only one set environmental projections would have signifi- of consumption projections: the medium one. cantly altered the population, GNP, and resource This set of projections is based on Malenbaum's projections if it had been possible to include this population and GDP projections, which differ in feedback explicitly. complex ways from those of this Study (see Chap- Critical Policy and Technology Assumptions. ter 22). With regard to policy and technology, no major The Bureau of Mines' projections for an ad- changes were assumed other than those implicitly ditional 75 minerals and materials are made for carried forward from the other study projections three cases: a probable, high, and low case. How- from which the environmental impact projections ever, the Bureau's assumptions are not suffi- were derived. ciently explicit or documented to determine exactly Brief Description. The original plan of the Study how these assumptions relate to those of the called for each participating agency to analyze the Study, and so only the Bureau's probable case environmental implications of its own projections. projections have been presented in Chapter 12. It was assumed that in responding to the require- ments of the National Environmental Policy Act, 11. Environment Element each of the agencies would have developed a ca- Source. The environmental projections were pacity to analyze the environmental implications prepared by the Study's central staff, with assist- of its trend projections. As it turned out, most do ance from the Environmental Protection Agency, now have some capacity for environmental anal- the Agency for International Development of the ysis, but only rarely is the capability available for U.S. Department of State, the Council on Envi- examining the environmental implications of long- ronmental Quality, and outside consultants. In range global projections. As a result, the envi- particular, the.Council on Environmental Quality ronmental analyses that came appended to the and the Environmental Protection Agency con- agencies' projections, with some exceptions, were ducted extensive reviews of the drafts of Chapter minimal or nonexistent. Confronted with this sit- 13. On the basis of the first of these reviews, the uation, the Study's central staff was forced to Study's central staff rewrote the environmental strengthen the contributions that had been made chapter over a period of about six months. The and to prepare environmental analyses in those primary contributions to the final draft came from cases where none had been contributed. A num- several persons: Gerald 0. Barney, Study Direc- ber of consultants assisted to accelerate the work, tor; Jennifer Robinson, a member of the Study's but the extended environmental analysis unavoid- central staff; Peter Freeman, a free-lance envi- ably delayed the Study. Along the way it became ronmental and development consultant; Jeffrey clear that the government presently has only a Maclure, a member of the Study's central staff; very limited analytical capacity for integrated, Allan Matthews, a retired foreign service officer; long-term projections of global environmental Bruce Ross, an ecologist on the staff of the Cen- trends. tral Intelligence Agency; Thomas Lovejoy of the Analytic Methodology. The environmental pro- World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.; Paul jections were made using the descriptive, deduc- Lehr, a Washington-area writer specializing in tive, and inductive methods of scholarly and climatological issues; and Richard Hennemuth, scientific research. Whenever possible, the envi- Assistant Director of the Northeast Marine Fish- ronmental analyses emphasized the qualititative eries Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmos- and quantitative aspects of the ability of the en- THE PRESENT FOUNDATION 499 vironment to support human life and to provide Study; however, they are based on techniques that goods and services. Particular attention was given have been in widespread use for decades. to situations in which the goods and services pro- Geographic Representation. Like the fisheries, vided by healthy environmental systems are forestry, and water projections, the environmen- threatened for large portions of the world's pop- tal projections are complicated by the fact that ulation or over large geographical areas. Special the boundaries of the political jurisdictions re- attention was given to situations where wide-' sponsible for management and data collection do spread or irreversible damage to the environmen- not coincide with the natural boundaries of eco- tal systems now threatens to occur. Uncertainties logical systems. Whenever possible, the environ- were unavoidable in the environmental analysis mental analysis is presented in terms of because there are still many gaps in scientific geographical subdivisions that correspond to the knowledge and data in this field. areas of particular ecological systems (e.g., a river The environmental projections or analyses were basin or watershed). In many cases, data limita- made from two different perspectives. One per- tions made it necessary to use national subdivi- spective started with each of the other (nonen- sions in discussing specific examples of problems, vironmental) projections reported in the Study when ecological boundaries would have been and analyzed the implications of that projection more appropriate. for the environment. This perspective is analo- Temporal Representation. In most cases envi- gous to that involved in the preparation of the ronmental impacts are projected to the year 2000. environmental impact statements required by the They are developed generally from straight-line National Environmental Policy Act. The other (linear) and from exponential (nonlinear) extrap- perspective started with the overall environmental olations of past trends, and from inference from impacts of all the projected trends and analyzed ecological theory. the feedback implications of all these environ- Cases Analyzed. As previously noted, the en- mental impacts collectively on each of the other vironmental projections were based primarily on (nonenvironmental) projections. The government the medium cases of the Study's other projections. does not routinely perform analysis from this sec- Although they themselves were not used in de- ond (feedback) perspective, but parts of the an- veloping any of the Study's other projections, a nual Environmental Quality reports of the Council special analysis was subsequently prepared dis- on Environmental Quality are analogous in in- cussing many of the implications of the environ- tent. mental projections with regard to the other (nonenvironmental) projections of the Study. First Major Use. The environmental analyses This special analysis is presented as part of Chap- were necessarily developed specifically for this ter 13. 15 Population Census Projections Estimates of past population growth rates (de- The Bureau of the Census (in the U.S. Depart- rived from estimates of past mortality and fertility ment of Commerce) collects and publishes esti- rates and past population structures) illustrate mates and projections of worldwide population those differences. For example, the Census Bu- growth trends and demographic parameters, in reau estimates that the population of the less addition to its major task of gathering material on developed world was increasing at an annual rate the people and economy of the United States. of 2.25 percent in 1975, compared to the U.N. Responsibility for developing these estimates and estimate of 2.34 percent, a figure 4 percent projections rests with the International Demo- greater. Since estimates of underlying mortality graphic Data Center in the Bureau's Population and fertility rates are nearly the same for the two Division and with the Bureau's Foreign Demo- agencies for 1975, this difference in the growth rates is presumably due to the different estimates graphic Analysis Division. of the population age structure.* Other organiza- The Bureau of the Census's international de- tions show much wider differences in their esti- mographic program was initiated in 1954 but did mates of past growth rates in the less developed not receive any major impetus until the late 1960s, world. For example, AID estimates a 1975 growth when improved statistical support was required by rate of 1.88 percent and the Environmental Fund, the State Department's Agency for International 2.55 percent.' Development (AID). Previously, AID relied on Projections of the future are even more diver- official U.N. projections, published every five gent than estimates of the past. Some experts at@the years, which were sometimes influenced by the 1978 annual meeting of the American Association interests of member states and were not consid- for the Advancement of Science, for example, ered sufficiently timely or flexible to meet the suggested that by the year 2000, the world may policy analysis needs of the Agency. Thus, in contain a billion fewer people than shown in projec- response to the requirements of AID and other tions by the U.N. agencies and other organizations. federal agencies, the Bureau of the Census estab- Other experts disagree, pointing to recent increasing lished and maintains a comprehensive set of birth rates in countries as diverse as Taiwan and the population and related social and economic statis- United States. tics for all nations of the world, with particular Many federal agencies, including the Depart- emphasis on the less developed countries (LDCs). ments of Agriculture, Energy, and the Interior, Fully reliable mortality and fertility statistics for often rely on international population estimates most of these nations are not available from and projections developed by organizations other conventional sources, such as the official birth than the Bureau of the Census.-for example, the .and death registers maintained by most LDCs. U.N. Population Division or the World Bank- Therefore, in developing population projections apparently because the U.N. and World Bank (which require these statistics), the Bureau must estimates and projections are more widely known. estimate past mortality and fertility rates and Rarely, if ever, have these federal agencies criti- assess other demographic conditions from incom- cally compared the Census projections with those plete data, making adjustments where appropriate developed by other institutions. Other federal after evaluating all data for possible errors. Only agencies, particularly AID, make more extensive after such adjustments are made are the data use of the Census estimates and projections, in suitable as a base for making projections. As a conjunction with those developed by other orga- result, past demographic estimates (as well as nizations. future projections) are based on the professional judgment of the Bureau and may differ signifi- *Conversely, the U.N. projects that the LDC population cantly from estimates made by other professional growth rate over the 1995-2000 period will be 4 percent lower organizations. than in the medium growth Census Bureau projections. 501 502 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL Chicago Projections with respect to each major demographic "compo- At the suggestion of AID's Office of Population, nent" (mortality, fertility;,'and net Migration). for comparative purposes, an alternate set of Standard statistical procedures were applied to develop both the Census and Chicago exogenous population projections was provided to the Global estimates of initial population and future mortality 2000 Study by the University of Chicago's Com- rates. Similar procedures'were followed in devel- munity and Family Study Center. These projec- op.ing the Census exogenous estimates of future tions (hereafter referred to as the Chicago projec- fertility rates. But the Chicago exogenous esti- tions) utilize a methodology that emphasizes the mates of future fertility rates were based on the potential impact on population size of national application of a more complex quantitative meth- efforts to provide family planning services. The odology, which relied on different basic assump- projections are curTently being used by AID to tions regarding the principal factors that influence develop projections of the following critical social fertility rates. Both the Census and Chicago statistics related to population for selected coun- projections assume that no migration will occur tries: (1) size of the school-age population, labor between any countries of the world during the force, and elderly population; (2) requirements for period 1975-2000. food, housing, schools, jobs, and medical facili- The Chicago methodology for projecting fertility ties; and (3) trends in urbanization. trends was first developed at the University's Both the Census and Chicago projections have Community and Family Study Center in August been presented in Chapter 2. The high-, medium-, 1977, and is still being refined. The preliminary and low-growth Chicago projections of total popula- estimates dealt with the speed with which family tion in the year 2000 are, respectively, 12, 7, and 3 planning programs are likely to be adopted by the percent lower than the Census projections. These various nations of the world and probable efficacy differences reflect Chicago's lower baseyear esti- of these programs. These estimates were reviewed mates of population size and fertility and Chicago's by a panel of demographic experts in September assumption that means of regulating fertility will be 1977. The panel members were critical of many available throughout the world on an organized aspects of the study and, in general, felt that the basis by the year 2000. efficacy -of family planning programs was greatly Because of the need to focus the Global 2000 overstated. This criticism was supported by addi- Study on a limited number of scenarios and tional quantitative analyses already in progress.at because the Census projections were made by -a Chicago. federal agency, only the Census projections have Adjustments reducing the estimated effects of been used in developing the food and energy family planning programs on crude birth rates by projections of the Study, which required exoge- nous population projections. Other projection' approximately 50 percent were therefore made by methodologies used by the Study (which in many the Chicago group, and an extensive set of cases also required exogenous population projec- population projections for various countries and tions) made use of various other, independently regions of the world was prepared for the Global developed, projections. 2000 Study in October 1977, which were roughly 10-20 percent lower than the Census projections. Key Analytic Methodology A final set of projections for all countries of the world was provided to the Global 2000 project in Both the Census and Chicago projections are February 1978. They included a revision of re- based on the cohort-component method of popu- gional projections, for which only rough estima-, lation projection developed by the Scripps Foun- tions were available earlier. These are the projec- dation in the early 1930s. This method, now the tions, roughly 5-10 percent higher than Chicago's standard procedure for projecting population previous projections, which are presented in .throughout the world, uses exogenous estimates Chapter 2. of initial population size, disaggregated by age and Both sets of projections were developed with sex, and exogenous age- and sex-specific projec- the aid of computer programs written in FOR- tions of mortality, fertility, and net migration TRAN and run on IBM 370/168 computers. The trends in order to produce age- and sex-specific Census cohort-component program consists of projections of population size on a year by year approximately 1,100 lines of programming instruc- basis. The name "cohort-component" refers to tions, including extensive comments and sup- the fact that each "cohort" of total population ported by a program for estimating projected life (i.e., each group of males or females bom in the tables of approximately 200 fines and a program same year) is treated separately and explicitly for estimating projected age-specific fertility rates POPULATION 503 of approximately 15. lines.* The Chicago cohort- net migration rates for each year covered by the component program consists of approximately 800 projection, specified for each of the various popu- lines of programming instructions, including com- lation cohorts. A cohort of population (or, more ments. In addition, the Chicago fertility method- properly, a birth cohort) is the total number of ology utilizes a separate 30-line FORTRAN pro- males or females within a population born in the gram to calculate total fertility rates and a 15-line same year and therefore of the same age, though FORTRAN program to transform the total fertility cohorts can also be specified for periods other rates into age-specific fertility. than a year. For example, a 5-year cohort would refer to the group of males or females within a Bask Principles population born during the same 5-year period. Projections are developed sequentially on a The cohort-component methodology is focused year by year basis, starting with a base-year almost entirely on the following basic demo- estimate of the population structure of the region graphic equation: or country. Each cohort is projected to age a year Net population change = births - deaths � net migration. according to its exogenously estimated mortality In order for this relationship to hold, it must refer rate (expressed in terms of a survival ratio) and to a fixed territory, and there must be no measure- any exogenously estimated net migration (which ment error in any of the components. Regional may be expressed either in terms of a rate or an and total world population projections are ob- absolute number). Births are calculated by multi- tained by simply summing the relevant country plying each female cohort in the fertile ages by its and subregion projections, assumed independent exogenously estimated fertility rate for that year of each other. Additions to a population within a (expressed in terms of annual births per thousand given area are made when a birth occurs or a women of a given age group). These calculations migrant arrives; conversely, population numbers produce a new population structure, which differs are decreased through death or emigration. from the original base-year structure and is used . Factors that determine the rates at which these as the new base year for calculating the subse- events occur are peripheral to the methodology quent year's population structure. and their influence is almost always exogenously Because mortality, fertility, and net migration estimated. Explicit projections of mortality, fertil- rates are exogenously estimated for all years ity, and net migration are required by the cohort- covered by the projection in advance of any component methodology. However, the factors calculations to project overall population structure that underlie these projections are usually not for those years, the cohort-component methodol- explicitly specified. Not only are they not pre- ogy implicitly assumes that age-specific mortality, cisely quantified, but often they are not even fertility, and net migration rates are not directly precisely identified. The Chicago fertility projec- related to overall population structure. For exam- tions constitute a rare exception to.this rule. ple, although the total number of births projected Moreover, with regard to net migration,. any for a given year is dependent on the number and balancing of projected flows of immigrants and age composition of fertile women just projected emigrants between different populations must be for the preceding year, the fertility rates them- performed exogenously if country and subregion . selves are independent of other population statis- projections are to be consistent with each other. tics. This means, in effect, that the probability of Consistency was obtained in the case of the a woman having a child in a given year is assumed Global 2000 Study by assuming zero net migra- to be independent of the ratio of men to women tion. or the ratio of dependents to persons of working Under the cohort-component methodology, age. population projections are developed exclusively The cohort-component methodology also im- on the basis of (1) an initial estimated population plicitly assumes that exogenously estimated mor- structure for a given base year, in terms of the tality, fertility, and net migration rates are not various population cohorts by sex, and (2) a setDf directly related to the impact of future population exogenous projections of mortality, fertility, and size and structure on the allocation of economic resources or the development of social policy. For example, although exogenous projections of mor- Estimation of base-year demographic parameters by the tality rates are implicitly based on projected trends Bureau of the Census is also accomplished making use of in economic growth and the modernization of the,computer programs presented in the Bureau's Computer Programs for Demographic Analysis, by E. Arriaga, P. social programs, they are not explicitly based on Anderson, and. L. Heligman, (Washington,,GPO, 1976). precise, quantitative relationships involving any of 504 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL the following variables: per capita income; re- scientists as to the influence of population size quirements for food, housing, schools, jobs, or and structure on the economic and sociologic medical f@cilities; likely welfare expenditures (ex- variables that might, in turn, influence population plicitly taking into account a country's projected size and structure. Some economists assert that investment and foreign exchange requirements); high population growth creates pressures on lim- the influence of environmental factors; and poten- ited natural resources, reduces private and public tial fundamental economic, social, or political capital formation, and results in additions to change. capital resources being used to maintain, rather Most demographers making use of the cohort- than increase, the stock of capital per worker. component methodology agree that many of these Others point to positive effects, such as econo- relationships are important determinants of popu- mies of scale and specialization, the possible spur lation structure. However, they also point out that to favorable motivation caused by increased de- there is no general agreement among demogra- pendency, and the more favorable attitudes, ca- phers as to what kind of influence each of these pacities, and motivations of younger--compared factors has on mortality, fertility, and net migra- with older-populations. tion. Agreement is also lacking on how such Thus, rather than pick a set of explicit relation- influences should best be represented quantita- ships that might not be readily defensible on an tively in terms of equation structures and on the individual basis, Census Bureau demographers values that should be given to coefficients and prefer to state that levels and trends in mortality, exponents within particular equations. for example, are related to many factors, including Some demographers emphasize the importance the quantity and quality of food and housing, the of a country's cultural context, social norms, and degree of various economic pressures, the availa- general economic situation in determining fertility bility of medical knowledge, personnel, and sup- levels and trends. Many of these argue that high plies, and the extent of public health programs. fertility rates can be projected to decline only if They project levels and trends in mortality exoge- other major social changes are concurrently pro- nously as summary statistics with no specific jected. These might include the achievement of a accounting for the individual influence of each of large per capita increase in national income, a these factors and indicate that it may often be more equitable distribution of national income, a inappropriate to revise these exogenous projec- widely available good health care system, in- tions to take into account different assumptions creases in the number and scope of opportunities regarding any one variable (for example, food for women, improved opportunities for educating availability). According to the Census demogra- children, and the attainment of means--other than phers, given the large number of factors that large families--of guaranteeing security in old age. detennine mortality, different reasonable assump- Other demographers emphasize the importance tions regarding food availability could all be con- of facilitating the direct regulation of fertility itself sistent with previously projected mortality as- through the practice of contraception, sterilization, sumptions. or abortion. Many assert that changing socioeco- For similar reasons, both the Census and Chi- nomic contexts can have little influence in reduc- cago projections for the Global 2000 Study assume ing high fertility rates if information and technolo- that net migration between countries after 1975 gies related to fertility regulation are not widely will be zero. This assumption in part reflects a available. They also point out that projecting the decision to simplify the projections and meet the implementation of effective national programs to deadlines set by the project. The cohort-compo- make them available implicitly assumes that the nent methodology requires that the careful balanc-I other improvements in socioeconomic conditions ing of flows of immigrants and emigrants between,' will be occurring at the same time. separate populations be performed exogenously- Still other demographers question whether mak- a laborious process that the methodology does not ing available information and technologies related facilitate. Moreover, statistical material related to to regulating fertility is, likely to have much past international migration is largely incomplete influence in producing significant fertility rate and unreliable so that simple trend extrapolation reductions in many countries with strong pro- is difficult and of limited usefulness. natalist traditions. Some point out that higher per However, the zero net migration assumption capita incomes appear to be associated with also reflects the fact that there is only limited higher fertility rates in many LDC populations. agreement among economists or social scientists Demographers also point out that there is little as to what causal factors (in what equations with general agreement among economists and social what coefficient or variable values) are, or are POPULATION 505 likely to be, the main determinants of international rates). In other words, rapid fertility decline does migration trends under various circumstances. As not result solely from economic development or it happens, the zero net-migration assumption has family planning progress but from both at once. been approximately valid for most nations of the 4. The projected rate of fertility decline will be world in the past but has been clearly invalid for directly proportional to the amount of family several,-of which the United States is one of the planning effort and the quality of those efforts, most conspicuous. The assumption of zero net hich, in turn, encompasses some variation to be migration for the period 1975-2000 is thus based w more on lack of time, resources, data, and theory found across continents, cultures, religious than on a belief that this component will actually groups, and levels of economic activity. remain zero. Projecting major international migra- 5. The pace of decline of fertility will be that of tions, of course, could have had a significant a reverse S curve. When birth rates are high and impact on many of the other projections devel- family planning programs are still gaining social oped for the Global 2000 Study. But projecting the acceptance, the pace win be slow. As birth rates magnitude and direction of such migrations, as in fall to lower levels, the rate of decline will the case of projecting the dimensions and direction accelerate to a maximum when the crude birth of climatological change, would have been some- rate is between 20 and 38 births per thousand what arbitrary and extremely uncertain. members of the total population. In this interval, Many demographers feel that highly uncertain the pace may be very rapid. When the crude birth relationships should not be specified explicitly in rate reaches the lower 20s, complete saturation of developing population projections. The methodol- contraception will have been approached. Non- ogy, they feel, should either treat such relation- adopters at this point will likely be young people ships implicitly in developing exogenous mortality, starting families and a few reactionary late adop- fertility, and net migration projections, or it should ters. Fertility decline will continue, but at a disregard them altogether. The Chicago fertility decelerating rate until it reaches a replacement or' projection methodology represents an exception near-replacement level. to this rule. It makes comparatively daring as- These assumptions are explicitly quantified in a sumptions regarding the widespread adoption and set of tables that present projected declines in efficacy of family planning programs, expressing total fertility rates over the 1975-2000 period as a these assumptions in explicit, quantitative terms, function of the 1975 estimated values for (1) the and it uses the fertility projections thus obtained total fertility rate and (2) the level of effectiveness as exogenous inputs for making population projec- Of family planning programs within a given coun- tions. try or region. Only one set of tables is used to The Chicago fertility projection methodology is project fertility declines for all regions and coun- based on five major assumptions: tries f(,r a given scenario; each of the three Global 2000 Study scenarios has its own set of tables. 1. Two major factors in determining the future Only declines can be projected; no events or course of a nation's fertility are the date at which trends projected to occur after 1975 affect the it sponsors a national program to distribute fertil- fertility projections, which are solely a ftinction of ity regulation ervices and the level of effort at the two 1975 statistics noted above. The different which it implements that program. sets of tables used to create the different scenarios 2. Countries with no family planning programs embody different assumptions regarding the pace now may be expected to begin at least weak at which family planning programs might be (partial) programs within the very near ftiture, and adopted or strengthened and the projected effi- nations with weak or moderate family planning ciencies of the program. The tables were devel- programs may be expected to strengthen them oped by the Chicago staff on the basis of statistical substantially. By the end of the century, every analyses of selected countrii-,s and critical review nation on earth is expected to have at least some by other demographers. kind of a substantial public or private planning Many demographers have suggested that the effort. Chicago fertility projection methodology overem- 3. Steady but not necessarily spectacular prog- phasizes the influence of family planning programs ress may also be expected in other areas of on fertility rates, but few have proposed altema- economic and social development (i.e., efforts to tive methodologies to account for the influence of reduce infant mortality, promote adult literacy, these programs in combination with other factors. raise the standard of living, and promote commu- In fact, most demographers, though they argue nity development will continue at about present that the causality is more complex, agree with 506 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL assumptions I and 2 above regarding the wide- Both the Census and Chicago projections prem- spread adoption of family planning programs by ised their exogenous projections of declining the year 2000 and the subsequent decline in worldwide fertility rates on a continuation of fertility, though they argue that the causality is recent trends of improvement in economic and more complex. For example, the Census fertility social welfare. Yet the GNP projections for the projections were based on the following set of Global 2000 Study show rates generally below assumptions, which resembles the fertility as- recent historic experience. For some very poor sumptions used in preparing the U.N. population countries, per capita GNP and per capita food projections: consumption growth rates are in fact projected to be negative for the latter period. 1. The less developed countries will continue to Moreover, the fertility and mortality projections make moderate progress in social and economic also assume that, although moderate progress will development during the 1975-2000 period. be made in improving means of both death and 2. Fertility rates will decline as LDCs undergo birth control, no major technical breakthroughs social and economic development. In the long will occur. This is not considered unreasonable in run, fertility rates will decline more or less contin- view of the fact that breakthroughs, the major uously, though some temporary plateaus may be determinant of the decline in fertility and mortality encountered. will be the extent of diffusion of existing technol- 3. Almost all countries that do not already do ogies throughout the population, especially in so will make family planning services available to rural areas. A further assumption implicit in both an appreciable portion of the population during sets of population projections is that the extent the 1975-2000 period, and countries with family and rate of diffusion of existing technologies will planning programs now in operation will extend be greatly influenced by the abilities of govern- coverage, particularly in rural areas. ments to diffuse such technologies through family 4. Knowledge and methods of limiting family planning and public health programs. size will become better known and will be better As a result, although improvements in birth used among populations that wish to reduce. control technology-for example, an oral contra- fertility, and expansion of these practices will ceptive with fewer side effects, a pill that could expedite the process of fertility decline. In coun- be taken less frequently, a male pill, or reversible tries where rapid social and economic progress sterilization-may occur, as well as improvements and strong desires for smaller families coincide, in mortality-reduction technology, such as simple, fertility decline will be very rapid. easily applied, effective means for controlling gastroenteritis or eliminating schistosomiasis-it is Both the Census and Chicago assumptions unclear whether these technological advances will (regarding projected fertility declines) may suggest have an important effect on fertility and mortality to some that these fertility declines will be accom- levels by the year 2000. Accordingly, they are not panied by equally rapid, concomitant declines in represented in the projections. population growth rates in most countries. While It has also been implicitly assumed that there declining growth rates are projected for some will be no technological regression (for example, countries, it should be noted that although fertility no further accumulation of evidence of harmful rates declined in most regions of the world over side effects of birth control pills or of sterilization the 1960-75 period, total world population grew at or no major loss of effective means of controlling almost exactly the same rate during 1970-74 as smallpox). Technological breakthroughs or regres- during 1960--70 (1.9 percent per year), as shown in sions would only move the projections slightly Figure 15-1. It is not surprising, then, that al- closer to the low or high series considered likely though the Study assumes declining fertility rates to form the upper and lower population limits, for most countries over the 1975-2000 period, according to the demographers who prepared the world population growth is projected to continue projections for the year 2000. at a constant rate (1.8 percent per year) over most of this period (1975-95) in the Census medium- Basic Components growth projections. This assumes that in Bangla- desh, for example, fertility rates will decline In terms of the requirements of the Global 2000 roughly 40 percent over the 1975-2000 period; it Study, the cohort-component methodology pro- also assumes, in contrast, that fertility rates will duces explicit estimates of future population increase 20 percent in the United States and 10 growth based on exogenous estimates of mortal- percent in Western Europe over the same period. ity, fertility, and net migration (although the pro- POPULATION 507 1%0-" .......................................... ........ 1"0-74 tebmion ............ .......... ........................ ... .................... ........................ ............. 7 . ...................... .... ........ ........... .......... ........ Momia, ..................... .................. ... ................. 10110130, ..... ........................ Brazil .................. . -Pv-omn IT Zambia @ ................. .............. .......... 777 L TOM, @! ----------- ..................... .......... -1@;2 tot, ................ T', v@ 777 7 .7, EgW - ------- .................. 'n WO*LD,TOTAL ---- -- ............. ..... . . .............. .... ................ ........... 0-.v.v. ...... '140113M ............ -F sko. ................. Rae", .......... GWWAny (Fed. Rep.) S VC10 7 771=71 LW Xinpdsw Lo' Immiol @Oft vow_*. rf v-- FVwe 15-1. POPulation growth, selected countries, 1960-70 and 1970-74. (Social Indicators 1976, Bureau of the Census, 1977) 508 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL jections developed for the Global 2000 project TABLE 15-1 assume zero net migration). The Chicago projec- Re .ons', Subregions, and Countries for Which tions are based on a more explicit fertility fore- gi casting methodology, devised from exogenous Population Projections Were Developed estimates of the rate of implementation and likely Subregions and efficacy of family planning programs. Neither Region Countries a methodology takes explicit account of economic Africa Egypt growth, resource requirements and availabilities, Nigeria or environmental impacts. However, both Remainder of Africa methodologies assume 'that recent trends related Asia and Oceania People's Republic of China to these factors will continue without major ad- India justment or disruption. Indonesia Bangladesh Specifically, the cohort-component methodol- Pakistan ogy used in developing both sets of projections is Philippines executed by a dynamic computer-based model Thailand performing calculations on a year by year basis. South Korea Population projections are. developed independ- Remainder of Asia and ently for individual countries or regions. The Oceania (excluding Australia and New Census and Chicago projections prepared for the Zealand) Global 2000 Study were developed separately for Latin America Brazil the 23 countries and subregions listed in Table Mexico 15-i. The selection of the countries and subreg- Temperate South America ions was made by the. staff of the Global 2000 Remainder.of Latin America Study. U. S. S. R. and Eastern U.S.S.R. The 12 LDCs for which separate projections Europe Eastern Europe ' including were made represent about 75 percent of the Albania and Yukoslavia current total population of - the less developed Northern America, Western U.S. and Canada, including regions. A geographic perspective on the method- Europe, Japan, Australia Greenland, Bermuda, St. ology underlying these projections is provided in and New Zealand Pierre, and Miquelon one of the colored maps used to illustrate the Western Europe discussion in Chapter 14. Projections were pre- Japan pared for each of the 25 years in the 1975-2000 Australia New Zealand period, and are summarized in Chapter 2. Each . 2 C untries in italics are "more developed." All others are -less developed." projection reports the total population by age and hEostern Europe. includes Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, German Democratic sex.' Age is specified in terms of 5-year cohorts. Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. ' Western Europe includes Channel Islands, Denmark, Faeroe Islands. Fin- A high-growth, a medium-growth, and a low- land,. Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, 0_ And,",, Gilbrallar, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal. San Marino, Spain, growth projection were developed for each ge Austria, @Belgium, France. Federal Republic of Germany. Liechtenstein, Lux- graphic entity, representing the highest, the me- embourg, Monaco, Netherlands, and Switzerlan.d. dium, and the lowest population counts that could re.asonably be expected in future years, given present trends and knowledge. Actual population significance in shaping the three Census projec- growth is expected to follow a path close to the tions. The most recent year f6r which reliable medium projection. data was available for China was 1953. Hence, for The three projections originate from single base- 1975, three estimates of China's population have year estimates of .population age structure, mortal- been projected by the Bureau of the Census from ity, and fertility,although the Census and Chicago the 1953 base year, whereas the Chicago projec- projections in many case .s use significantly differ- tions use the same projection of Chinese popula- ent estimates as well a's different base, years. tion growth from 1953 to 1975. Geh6rally,J9375 was used in both sets of projec- The high, medium, and low Census projections tions, when reasonably firm estimates of popula- for each country and'subregion use the same tion size and fertility and mortality levels could be exogenous set of mortality projections. (China is established for that year. Otherwise, an earlier the single exception to this rule, because of the base.year was selected. The Census projection's great uncertainty associated with a Chinese de- treatment of the People's Republic of China is the mographic data.) Each Census projection also most.prominent example of a case where the uses the same exogenous set of migration projec- selection of an earlier base year was of major tions--narnely, that net migration after 1975 be- POPULATION 509 tween all countries will be zero.* Only the exoge- point in time. Only four countries have conducted nous fertility projections are varied to produce the two or more such censuses, and 10 have con- three population projections for each region and ducted two or more surveys that collected such country. data. Thus, it is possible to obtain estimates of The Chicago projections were developed in the trend in population growth for only a few of much the same way. They also assume zero net the 52 countries. Trends in the fertility component migration, but generally use different bas,&-year can be estimated for an additional 18 countries estimates and different mortality and fertility pro- that collected data on births from two censuses, jections. For the purposes of the Chicago fertility and for 15 countries that collected data on births projections, each country covered was further from two or more surveys. None of these data identified as having a strong, moderate, weak, or collections, however, provides annual estimates of no family planning effort, based on World Bank the level or trend in population 'growth or the assessments. components of change. As previously noted, much of the data underly- Existing vital registration systems afford the ing both projections is neither of good quality nor greatest potential for supplying regular and timely very timely. Theoretically, annual data on popu- estimates of change; however, the time lag be- lation growth or natural increase can be obtained tween collection and availability of data is often from national vital registration systems or ongoing several years (for census data it is sometimes as continuous surveys, but in practice neither of great as six years, for survey data, generally only these two data collection systems is prevalent in one to two years). While censuses and surveys the LDCs. Of 52 LDCs in a recent Census Bureau may be taken at regular intervals, they cannot Study 2only eight currently have vital registration provide annual estimates of population growth. systems for birth and death data that are at least With the exception of those few countries which 90 percent complete. With the exception of Sri have reliable vital registration data, demographers Lanka, all of these countries are in Latin America are only now receiving enough information to (Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, measure population changes that occurred in the Panama, and Uniguay). An additional five coun- late 1960s and early 1970s. tries (Egypt, Tunisia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the East Bank of Jordan) have registration of Basic Procedures births (but not deaths) with an estimated com- pleteness of as least 90 percent. Six countries Endogenous Population Size Projections have ongoing continuous surveys, of which three (Lesotho, India, and Brazil) are currently collect- The following steps are followed by the Census ing data that may be used to estimate growth rate Bureau's cohort-component program in develop- or rates of natural increase on an annual basis. s ing population projections for a given country or In the absence of reliable data from vital region: registration systems and continuous surveys, 1. Begin by reading in the exogenous base-year countries must rely on censuses and ad hoc estimates of the number of males and females in surveys for estimating levels and trends in popu- each 5-year cohort of the population (for example, lation growth. By using the censuses conducted the number of males aged 20-24). during the 1956-76 period, intercensal growth 2. Disaggregate these base-year estimates so rates can be derived for 35 -of the 52 countries that they are specified in terms of each single-year reviewed. Egypt, Tunisia, the Republic of South cohort of the population (for example, the number Korea, and the Philippines each conducted more of males aged 20). This disaggregation is accom- than two censuses during this period; therefore at plished using an interpolation function that gener- least two intercensal growth rates can be com-, ates a smooth convex curve relating decreasing puted for each of these countries. cohort size to increasing cohort age. Most of the countries reviewed have conducted 3. Then read in the exogenous mortality, fertil- at least one census or survey that collected data ity, and net migration, and fertility statistics esti- on both births and deaths; therefore they have mated to be applicable to the base-year population estimates of population growth for at least one during the base year. Mortality and net migration statistics are specified for each 5-year cohort of males and females, while fertility statistics are *For three countries in the Census' projections (Mexico, the Philippines, and South.Korea), migration through 1975 was specified for each 5-year cohort of fertile females projected in developing 1975 base year estimates utilizing (for example, births per thousand females aged earlier demographic data. 15-19). 510 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL 4. Disaggregate these mortality and net migna- 11. Use as the new base-year estimate the tion statistics so that they are specified in terms of number of males and females in each single-year each single-year cohort of the population. The cohort of the population, as most recently pro- mortality statistics are disaggregated using an jected, and repeat steps 5 through 11 until popu- interpolation function that generates a smooth lation figures have been calculated for all the convex curve relating decreasing survival ratios to years for which a projection is desired. increasing cohort age. The net migration statistics are disaggregated using an interpolation function A similar sequence of steps is followed by the that generates a skewed normal pattern with Chicago cohort-component program. increasing cohort age, reflecting the assumption that most migration occurs in the working-age Population Size: Egyptian. Example cohorts. The fertility statistics do not need to be disaggregated as annual births can be estimated In much of the rest of this chapter, Egypt has by, simply. applying the annual average fertility been used as an example to delineate similarities rate for a 5-year cohort to the number in the and differencs between the Census and Chicago cohort. uses of the cohort-component methodology. Dif- 5. Read in the mortality, fertility, and net ferences in these examples point up, among other migration statistics projected as applicable to a things, the extent to which projecting population somewhat changed population during a future statistics is an art rather than an exact science. year. As before, mortality and net migration Growth in the size of the Egyptian population statistics are, specified for each 5-year cohort of as projected by the Census use of the cohort- males and females, while fertility statistics are component methodology is presented in Figure specified for each 5-year cohort of females in the 15-2. As can be seen, Egyptian population grew fertile ages. at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent; dining the 1950-75 period and is projected to grow at almost 6. Disaggregate the new mortality, fertility, and the same rate (2.3 � 0.4 percent); during the net migration statistics so that they are specified 1975-2000 period. in terms of each single-year cohort of the popula- The same example from the Chicago projections tion using the same disaggregation procedures (Fig. 15-3) shows a significantly lower annual described in step 4. @ growth rate for Egypt during the 1975L2000. period 7. Calculate mortality statistics for the interven- (1.8 -L 0.1 percent) than either past experience or ing years, using simple linear extrapolation. the Census projections indicate. Both the Census 8. Calculate net migration statistics for the and Chicago projections estimate that in the year intervening years, using simple linear extrapola- 2000, Egyptian population will constitute 1.0 per- tion. cent of world population. 9. Calculate fertility statistics for the intervening The projections differ because they are derived years, using simple linear extrapolation. from different base-year estimates of Egyptian 10. Calculate successively, for each year for population size in 1975 and make use of different which mortality, fertility'and net migration statis- exogenous projections of mortality and fertility tics have been projected,'the number of males and rates. The Census 1975 population size estimate is &males, in each single-year cohort of the popula- lower than, the Chicago estimate and the Census -tion, according to the following sequence: mortality rate projections ar@ lower, but the Cen- sus fertility rate projections are higher, producing (a) add in half the year's net migration, which generally higher popula 'tion size projections for may be positive or negative; (b) survive the Egypt in the year 2000. Both projections assume population forward a year according to pro- that no net migration will occur, no new technol- jected survival ratios; (c) add in the other half ogies related to fertility or mortality rates will be of the year's net migration; (d) determine the developed, and recent trends in economic growth number of new births by taking the projected and modernization will continue. number of females in each fertile cohort during The difference between the two estimates of the year, averaging the number before and after Egyptian population size on July 1, 1975, arises the migration and survival calculations are because the Chicago projections are based on made, and multiplying by the appropriate fertil- World Bank estimaies of the 1975 population., In ity rate;,(e) determine the number of surviving contrast, the Census projections are based on the newborn infants at the end of the year, using preliminary count of the November 19176 Egyptian the relevant projected survival ratio. census (adjusted backward to July 1, 1975, based POPULATION 511 70 65 60 .55 50 45 40 41 41 35 30 25 20 1950 1955 -1965 19701 1975 im 7 1995 2000 Figure 15-2. Egyptian population growth, 1950-2000, Census projections. F.Iigures for 1950-75 are from World Population 1975: Recent Demographic Estimates for the Countries and Regions of the World, Bureau of the Census, 1976. Estimates were updated for the Global 2000 Study, resulting in a discontinuity at 1975 in the 1950-75 population time series. A revised, in consistent 1950-75 time series is being prepared ; conjunction with the Bureau's World Population: 1977, to be published in 1978. on registered births and'deaths, with births ad- Exogenous Mortality Rates justed for 2 percent underregistration and deaths adjusted for 4 percent underregistration). Since Both the Census and Chicago projections make only a preliminary census total was available, the use of the same two-step procedure in developing census was not adjusted for coverage error. Be- exogenous projections of mortality. First, target cause -no age distribution from the 1975 @ census life expectancies at birth are projected at 5-year was available, the age distribution for 1975 from intervals over the period for which the forecast is the- U.N. medium variant projections was also to be made. Then, these figures are translated into accepted as the base-year age, distribution for the survival ratios over the 5-year period for each 5- Bureau of Census projections as well as for the year cohort of the population (for example, males Chicago projections. aged 20-24). 512 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL A 65 '50 40 35- 30 ----- - ---- - ---- ------- 1950 1955@' -119,661 -1965, 7970,1 197@ 1980' 19815 IM 20,00 % -1 ----------- Figure 15-3. Egyptian population growth, 1950-2000, Chicago projections. Figures for 1950-70 are from World Bank Atlas, 1976. Target life expectancies at birth for each coun- pher. For example, where trends in mortality try are developed'in one of two ways. For some change can be detected, they are judgmentally countries, a target life expectancy at birth is extrapolated. Where projections of life expectancy chosen for the year 2000, with life expectancies in the year 2000 are ma('.z by the country con- for the intervening years obtained by assuming a cerned and judged reliable, those projections are reasonable pattern of change in mortality. For used. In fact, consideration is always given to other countries, the pattern and degree of change national projections and those made by interna- in mortality from year to year is projected, with tional organizations and to wialyses of mortality the eventual life expectancy in the year 2000 trends that have occurred in similar countries in falling out of this process. the same region that have already experienced The choice of method depends on the nature of that portion of the mortality transition relevant to available data and the judgment of the demogra- the countries under consideration. POPULATION 513 The Chicago mortality projections are derived Usually, life expectancies at birth are projected in part from U.N. studies of trends in mortality to rise more or less continuously, and related decline and projections of future declines in mor- crude death rates are similarly projected to decline tality, assuming that national and international more or less continuously. Thus, although Egyp- efforts to provide health and medical care to the tian crude death rates appeared to reach a plateau population continue. They are also derived from in the early 1970s, as shown in Table 15-2, future World Bank adjustments to the U.N. projections, plateaus of this sort are not generally anticipated which are-based on the observation that in recent in either set of projections for any country or years declines in mortality have not been as great region. as those anticipated by the United Nations in Once target life expectancies for males and certain countries, especially LDCs. In most cases, females at birth are projected for a given region or these revisions have been reviewed by the United country, they are translated into survival -ratios Nations, and future U.N. projections are expected for 5-year male and female cohorts of all ages to reflect the slower progress in mortality reduc- using four sets of Coale-Demeny regional model tion encountered in recent years. In developing its life tables3 labeled West, East, North, and South. projections, Chicago accepted the World Bank Each set contains 24 tables, calculated for males adjustments of U.N. mortality prcjections without and females separately, with equal spacing of the further change. The 1@ensus Bureau, in developing values of life expectancy at birth for females, its projections, used the World Bank adjustments ranging from 20 years (level 1) to 77.5 years (level as points of departure for further adjustments or 24). The mortality levels in the male tables differ as points of reference for independently developed from those in the female tables with which they projections. are paired, reflecting the typical relationship be- tween male and female mortality in particular Mortality Rates: Egyptian Example populations. In the case of Egypt, for example, the Census These tables are used to translate life expectan- and Chicago projections are based on slightly cies at birth to survival ratios for the variously different exogenous estimates of life expectancies aged cohorts. Although in some cases the Census at birth in 1975 and on slightly different exogenous Bureau Used these survival ratios without altera- estimates of increase in life expectancies at birth tion,for most of the individual projections pre- to the year 2000. These differences are based on pared for the Global 2000 Study, the pattern of the different professional judgments of demogra- change in survival ratios (as life expectancy phers at the Bureau of the Census and at the changes) implied by the,,Coale-Demeny tab 'les is World Bank (the Bank's mortality projections are used to'adjust the empirical life tables available used by Chicago). These exogenous projections for the base date. The East tables are based are considered by their authors to be roughly mainly on Central European experience, whereas consistent with the comparable past experience of the North and South tables were derived from life other representative LDCs that have moved tables of Scandinavian and South European coun- through levels of economic and social develop- tries, respectively. The West tables, on the other ment that the Census and Chicago projections hand, ate representative of a broad residual group, assume will be applicable to Egypt in the future including Canada, the United States, Australia, (in contrast to the lower economic growth projec- New Zealand, South Africa, Israel, Japan, and tions presented in Chapter 2). In gener-al, projections of future life expectari- TABLE 15-2 cies at birth are judgmental and are often extrap-- olated directly on graph paper by a hand-drawnt. Egyptian Crude D.eath'Rates, 1950-75 curve or line, as shown in Figure.15-4, based on Death, Rate the results of the'analysis previously discussed. They are not based on- any explicitly defined Thdusa'nd quantitative relationships involving factors other 1950-54 than life expectancies or increases in life expect- 1-955-59 1'0.9. ancy.- It should be noted, incidentally, that when 1960-64 18.6 1965-69 15.8- life expectancies at birth are projected.for subse- 1970-74 13.7 quent use by the cohort-component methodology, 1972 13.2 they are projected separately for males and fe- 1973 118.. males and are,not averaged for summary.presen- 1974 13.0 tation as they are in Figure 15-4. 19t 12.2 514 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL --------------- '64 62 60 01, 58 0 56 54 / . . ... . .... . '52, ---- ----- ---------- - ---------------- -- 48 1950 1955 '1960 145' 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1970, Year,s Figure 15-4. Projected Egyptian life expectancies, 1950-2000, medium growth case. Figures for 1950-65 are from V. G. Valaorgs, Population Analysis of Egypt, 1950-70 (with Special Reference to Mortality), Cairo Demographic Centre Occasional Paper No. 1, Cairo, 1972, Tables 18-21. Taiwan, as well as a number of countries from of the early and mid-20th century), whereas the Westem Europe. Chicago projections developed from the South The differences in the age and sex patterns of tables (corresponding to South European experi- mortality in the four regional models are slight in ence of the early. and mid-20th century). Infant some respects, pronounced in others, and vary in mortality levels are higher in the South than in the character with levels of mortality. Thus, no simple North tables. These differences, based on the rules can summarize the extent to which the use diIffering professional judgments of demographers of one set instead of another will affect the at the Bureau of the Census and the World Bank, outcome in any particular application. are summarized in Table 15-3. Thus, in the case of Egypt, the Census and Chicago projections are based on slightly different disaggregations of slightly different life expectan- Exogenous Fertility Rates: Census cies at birth. The Census projections are disaggre- gations developed from the North model life As already noted, the Census and Chicago tables (corresponding to Scandinavian experience projections are based on exogenous fertility pro- POPULATION 515 TABLE 15-3 - Expressed desired family size in the population; and Age-Specific Egyptian Mortality Estimates, 1975 - Fertility assumptions made by international (Probability of survival between 5-year cohorts) agencies such as the U.N. and the World Bank. Males Females In determining the assumed range of total 5-Year Cohorts fertility rate levels in the year 2000, the guideline Census Chicago Census Chicago followed was: the higher the level of fertility at 0-4 to 5-9 .95130 .92858 .97729 .93971 the base date and the greater the uncertainty 5-9 to 10- 14 .97991 .98542 .98968 .98601 about current fertility levels and trends, the wider 10-14 to 15-19 .98338 .98751 .98999 .98720 the range. 15-19 to 20-24 .97709 .98119 .98509 .98270 20-24 to 25-29 .97242 .97729 .98207 .97937 Three assumptions about future trends in total 25-29 to 30-34 .97085 .97588 .98110 .97751 fertility rates were made for each country or 30-34 to 35-39 .96797 .97278 .97922 .97554 subregion, generally by setting the most likely 35-39 to 40-44 .96255 .%700 .97558 .97252 rate, in the judgment of the Bureau of the Census, 40-44 to 45-49 .95437 .95770 .96955 .96831 45-49 to 50-54 .94122 .94345 .95843 .95955 for the year 20M. This served as the assumed 50-54 to 55-59 .92249 .92133 .94288 .94390 total fertility rate level for the Census Bureau's 55-59 to 60-64 .89358 .88682 .91865 .91506 medium series. Assumed levels and trajectories 60-64 to 65-69 .84662 .83434 .87763 .86544 for the year 2000 were also selected for the high 65-69 to 70-74 .77613 .75282 .81600 .78531 and low series. 70-74 to 75-79 .67664 .63614 .72546 .66586 Thereafter .42108 .42065 .46330 .44643 Virtually every industrialized country has made its own official national projections, and the assumptions in these projections were used with, jections developed very differently. However, as in some instances, slight modification. The popu- in the case of mortality projections, both make lations of Eastern and Western Europe were use of a two-step procedure in developing exoge- projected on the basis of the 1975 populations as nous projections of fertility. First, total fertility shown in the U.N. medium series, adjusted rates are projected over the period for which the slightly by the U.S. Bureau of the Census to take forecast is to be made (at 5-year intervals in the into account later fertility data. Trends in total case of the Census projections and yearly in the fertility (as well as mortality) rates for 1975 to case of the Chicago projections). These total .2000 were borrowed from the U.N. projections, fertility rates are then disaggregated into age- which were based on national projections made specific fertility rates for each 5-year cohort of by the individual countries. famales in the fertile ages (for example, females After the Census analysts developed their as- aged 15-19). sumptions on fertility levels and paths, the as- In the case of the Census projections, no sumptions for all countries and regions Were mathematical model of fertility change was used compared for general consistency and reviewed in developing the total fertility rate projections. within the Bureau. Next, the individual country Instead, the projections were made on ajudgmen- and regional base data and fertility assumptions tal basis by demographers who have worked with were discussed with a group of demographers the demographic and related socioeconomic data for the individual countries for a number of years. familiar with less developed countries, drawn from For the less developed countries for which indi- universities, federal agencies, an international vidual projections were made, the demographer agency, and a research institute '. Appropriate set the target fertility levels and paths of fertility adjustments were then made by the Bureau. decline by taking into consideration the following In general, therefore, Census projections of major factors: future total fertility rates are judgmental-as are Census and Chicago mortality projections--and � Current levels and recent trends in fertility; are also often extrapolated directly onto graph � Recent fertility trends in countries with similar paper in hand-drawn curves, based on the results cultural, social, and economic conditions and of the analysis previously discussed. prospects; � Current levels and recent trends in socioeco- nomic development; Exogenous Fertility Rates: Chicago � Current status and past performance of family In contrast, the Chicago projections of total planning and public health programs; fertility rates are based on an explicit quantitative � Government policy on population matters; methodology, whose underlying philosophy has 516 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL already been described. It is based primarily on in 1975 (FP), and its per capita GNP in 1975, as Tabte,15-4, which relates, declines in crude birth follows: rates of a,re,gion or country to Its current birth TFR75= i1741.255+ 1 0.5519 (TFR6'8) rate and the strength of its current family planning 119.274(CBR 2t4O)* programs. The extreme right-hand. ("None") col- + 301.053 (30 :sCBR :5 39) umn of the table gives the estimated 'annual - 587.635 (strong FP)* - 86.437 (median FP) .decline in.the crude birth rate expected on the + 0.028 (per capita GNP), basis of modernization alone, with no special In order to compare empirically the annual efforts at providing family planning information crude birth rate change observed with what was and services. The anticipated downward trend is projected, an equation to convert TFR decline almost linear, with alone-point decline in the into CBR decline was used:4 crude birth rate every four or five years (shown in the -table - as a decline of .20 or .25 per year). CBR = 0.007 (TFR) + .2453 Under this set of conditions, it would require The results indicated that the amounts of de- about '135 years f6r a population to make the cline,initially projected (approximately twice the demographic transition from a crude birth rate. of rates of decline used in the final projections and 45 to: the replacement level of about 15. per presented in Table 15@A) were too optimistic. thousand, which is applicable to many nations. About one-half the projected decline was observed The "'Strong" column of Table 15-4 gives the in the data and because additional uncertainty was annual decline in the crude birth- rate that may be implicit in the estimating procedures, simple expected in the presence of a strong, sustained, rounded values, about twice the originally esti- well-financed, well-organized, and well-adminis- mated values, were inserted in the original version tered family planning program reaching the @ entire of Table 15-4. urban and rural population. Under these condi- Because TFR is the unit of measure usually tions, it is estimated that the annual rates of decline are two . to.four times those that would employed in the population projection procedure, and' in order to escape several methodological occur in the absence of a program--an accelera- difficulties pertaining to age composition, sex tion able to bring about a complete demographic ratios, and interaction between fertility and mor- transition from a- crude birth rate of 45 to one of tality, this table was* then translated into another 15 in about 38 years, or about one-fourth the time table, which related declines in total fertility rates required in the absence of a family planning in a region or country to its current total fertility program. rate and the strength of its current family planning The table was based in part on two regression program. The following slightly different regres- equations developed to measure a nation's fertility sion Irelationship was used, based on estimating change as affected by its current fertility level and total fertility rates as a function of crude birth- family planning program status. The first equation rates:s determined the.totAl fertility rate (TFR) of a region or country TA975 (TFR75) as a ftinction of its TFR = 137.94 (CBR) + 106.16t TFR in 1968 (TMJ, its crude birth rate in @ 1975 This basic TFR-table wa's then transcribed into (CBI@), the. stre gth of, its family planninp, program sets of tables to facilitate the projection of a region TABLE 15-4 or country's total fertility rates, based solely on its total fertility rate and,the strength of its, family Assutned-Annual Declines in Crude Birth Rate,' planning program in 1975 (each country was Chicago Projections classified as Strong, Moderate, Weak, or None, according to the level of its family planning effort). Crude Birth Strength of Family Planning Effort Three sets of tables were developed for high, Rate medium, and low fertility projections. (The me- Strong Moderate Weak None .45 and over .40 .333 .25 .20 dium. growth, set of tables is presented in Table 40 44 .60 .50 .30 .20 15-5..) The three sets of tables were based on the 35-39 .80 .667 .40 .25 following assumptions: '30-34 1-00 .75' .50 .25 25-29 1.00 .667 .40 .25 *These variables assume a value of I if the condition within .20 .50 .30 .20 the pare 20-24 ntheses is applicable, 0 if it is not. 15-19 .60 .333 .25 .20 tAccording to Chicago demographers, a transposition of 13-14 .40 .25 .15 .15 the earlier equation expressing CBR as a function of TFR Used indirectly in all three growth cases, as explained in the text.. cannot be used here, given the separate error terms. POPULATION 517 TABLE 15-51 Projected Annual Declines in Total Fertility Rates, Chicago Projections, Medium Gro.wth Case Family Total Planning Fertility 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 Program Rate in 1975 in 1975 Strong 6245 55.18 55564244 82.76 4866-5555 110.35 4176-4865 137.94 Same as 1976-80 3487-4175 137.94 2797-3486 110.35 2107@2796 82.76 1899-2106 55.18 Moderate @! 6245 45.52 48.28 51.04 55.18 55.18 5556-6244 68.97 73.11 77.25 82.76 82.76 4866-5555 92.42 97.94 103.46 110.35 110.35 4176-4865 103.46 114.49 125.53 137.94 137.94 3487-4175 92.42 107.59 122.77 137.94 137.94 2797-3486 68.97 82.76 96.56 110.35 110.35 2107-2796 45.52 57.93 70.35 82.76 82.76 1899-2106 34.49 41.38 48.28 55.18 55.18 Weak @ 6245 34.49 38.62 42.76 45.52 51.04 5556-6244 41.38 49.66 59.31 68.97 75.87 4866-5555 55.18 67.59 80.00 92.42 100.70 4176-4865 68.97 80.00 91.04 103.46 120.00 3487-4175 55.18 67.59 80.00 92.42 114.49 2797-3486 41.38 49.66 59.31 68.97 89.66 2107-2796 34.49 38.62 42.76 45.52 64.83 1899-2016 20.69 24.83 28.97 34.49 44.14 None 6245 27.59 31.73 34.49 45.52 51.04 5556-6244 27.59 34.49 41.38 68.97 75.87 4866-5555 34.49 45.52 51.18 92.42 102.08 4176-4865 34.49 52.42 68.97 103.46 120.01 3487-4175 34.49 45.52 55.18 92.42 114.49 2797-3486 27.59 34.49 41.38 68.97 89.66 2107-2796 27.59 31.73 34.49 45.52 78.63 1899-2016 20.69 20.69 20.69 34.49 44.14 High fertility prcj4@ctions assumed that each Low fertility projections (deemed less likely but country would follow the schedule of changes possible) assumed that strengthening of family indicated for its status by Table 154. planning programs would take place as follows: Medium fertility projections (deemed most likely to take place) assumed that, in addition to - Nations with no present programs will trend the schedule of fertility declines shown in Table toward a weak program by 1985, a moderate 15-4, the nations Would strengthen their family one by 1990, a strong program by 1995. planning programs as follows: @ - Nations with weak programs will trend toward � Nations with no programs will remain in that a moderate program by 1985, toward a strong status until 1980, then trend toward a weak one by 1995, and will remain in that status until program by 1985, a moderate one by 1990, and 2000. a strong program by 2000. - Nations with moderate programs will trend � Nations with weak programs will remain in that toward a strong program by 1980 and will status until 1980, then trend toward a moderate remain in that status until 2000. program by 1990, and a strong one by 2000. - Nations with strong programs will remain in � Nations with moderate programs will trend that status through 2000, but the efficacy of toward a strong program by 1990 and remain in their programs will improve from the present that status until 2000. 38-year transition time to half that amount (19 � Nations with strong programs will remain in years), equivalent to doubling the coefficients in that status through 2000. Table 15-4, for the strong program. 518 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL if carried out without special adjustments, some series was chosen because of the great uncertainty of these assumptions (especially those used for in future fertility trends in Egypt. the low projections) would produce absurdly low The Census Egyptian fertility projections also birth rates. It is therefore assumed that when birth take into account the large fertility decline that rates approach repI *acement levels (considered took place in Egypt since the mid-1960s, but that roughly equivalent to a crude birth rate of 14 or a ended abruptly in 1972. Fertility has been rising total fertility rate of 2. 1), there is no strong sharply ever since. Although all three series resistance to further fertility decline, and the birth assumed this fertility rise will abate, they differ as rates are allowed to sink to a minimum level and to the time it will take to return to 1972 levels. remain at this level for the rest of the century. The high series assumes it will take 16 years, the These minimum levels per 1,000 females in the medium series 8 years, and the low series 4 years. fertile-age groups are: With this constraint, TFRs for the intermediate High-projection TFR= 2000 (CBR of about 14) years were obtained by graphic interpolation be- Medium-projection TFR= 1900 (CBR of about 13.5) tween the 1975 and 2000 levels on the assumption Low-projection TFR = 1800 (CBR of about 13) that fertility will change according to a logistic or S-curve pattern. Thus, the medium and low projections permit The Chicago fertility projections for Egypt were fertility levels in a few countries to fall somewhat developed according to Chicago's unique fertility below projected - replacement levels in the year projection methodology, described above, which 2000. The nations of Western Europe and North would produce identical projections for any region America are already below these levels. The or country with a 1975 total fertility rate estimated projections assumed that they will remain in this at 5.2 and a current family planning program of state for 10 years and will then trend linearly moderate" strength. toward replacement by the year 2000; for medium In assessing these fertility projections for Egypt, and low projections, the rates trend linearly to- two apparently countervailing phenomena not ward 1900 and 1800 respectively. As these coun- necessarily unique to Egypt need to be pointed tries reach a stage of absolute zero growth, it is out. First, in Egypt in 1975, higher household expected that systems of subsidies and other expenditure levels were apparently correlated with inducements will be launched to encourage fertil- larger numbers of children per household, as ity in order to prevent declines in population size. shown in Table 15-6. Second, although the Egyp- Fertility Rates: Egyptian Example TABLE 15-6 Not unexpectedly, the use of different total Egyptian Personal Expenditure Distributions, fertility rate projection procedures by the Census 1974-75 and Chicag 'o demographers led to somewhat dif- (Egyptian pounds) ferent total fertility rate projections for most Rural Urban countries and subregions. For example, in the Pe r- Per- case of Egypt, the Chicago fertility projections are House- Expendi- sons Expendi- sons 30 percent lower than the Census projections, as hold ture s per tures per shown in Figure 15-5. Expendi- per House- per House- In the Census Egyptian fertility projections, the ture Person hold Person hold estimated 1975 fertility'rate of 5.8 was assumed to 0-50 28.7 1.3 33.0 1.1 have declined by the year 2000 to 4.6 in the high 50-75 32.1 L9 45.8 1.4 series, to 3.6 in the medium series, and to 2.6 in 75-100 29.2 3.0 38.9 2.2 the low series. In the medium series, the rate for 100-150 34.3 3.7 43.9 2.9 150-2W 38.5 4.5 46.8 3.7 the year 2000 was based on the ideal family size 200-250 42.7 5..3 48.4 4A in Alexandria in the mid-1960s and in Cairo in 250-306 45.9 6.0 57.6 4.8 19170, adjusted downward 10 percent to aflow for 300-350 49.3 6'6 64.0 5.1. infertility and for an expected decline in the 350-4W 6.7 64.9 5.8 400-500 61.5 7.1 72.3 5.9 desired family size as the actual level of fertility 500-6W 69.9 7.7 87.6 6.3 declines. The 3.6 figure is also the same as that 600-800 81.4 8.5 105.4 6.5 for 1995-20W in the U.N. medium variant projec- 800-1000 98.0 9.0 147.1 6.0 tions. The total fertility rate for the year 20M in 1000-1400 149.8 8.0 168.0 6.8 1400--2000 150.8 10.6 261.9 6.7 the high and low series was assumed to be plus or 2000- 418.7 9.2 358.6 6.9 minus one 'child from the rate for the medium Average 63.0 99.9 5.6 series. A large nange between the high and low POPULATION 519 7.0 @.o . .. ... 5.0 A0-- '3.0 . . .. . ......... . .... .. . . .... - - - --_ .... . .. 2.0 .1.0 1966 0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Figure 15-5. Projected Egyptian total fertility rates, 1950-2000, medium growth case. Figures for 1950-66 are from A. R. Omran, ed., Population Problems and Prospects: Egypt, Chapel Hill, N.C.: Carolina Population Center, 197 1, Table 4. Figures are unadjusted register data. Real fertility rate declines may be masked by increasingly complete registration during the 1950- 66 period. tian Government has promoted family planning In the Census Egyptian f@rtility projections, the programs for several years, few expert observers age pattern of fertility in 1975 was based on the with experience in Egypt believe that these pro- age pattern of fertility in 1973, the latest year for grams have yet had much impact on Egyptian which such data are available. F6r.the Egyptian fertility levels. These factors raise questions as to low series in the year 2000 the age pattern of the extent to which higher per capita incomes and fertility was assumed to be that of Cyprus in 197.5., a continuation or intensification of family planning Cyprus was selected because its, current age- programs are likely to lead, to lower fertility rates. specific fertility rates (ASFR) 'are known and Just as the Census and Chicago mortality 'pro- because it currently has a total fertility rate, very jections used different procedures for disaggregat- close to the low seri.es,target rate for Egy pt, for ing a summary statistic (life expectancy at birth) the year 2000 and is in the same region as Egypt. into age-specific statistics (survival ratios for 5- Cyprus is also part Moslem and therefore was al- year cohorts), so too the Census and Chicago so considered a reason 'able proxy for Egypt in the fertility projections used different procedures for year 2000 for purposes of disaggregating. fertility disaggregating total fertility rates into age-specific rates. All otherASFRs, including the medium and fertility rates. As a result, significant differences high series patterns in the year 2000, were linearly may be observed in Table 15-7 regarding Census interpolated between the 1975 ASFRs and year and Chicago estimates related to the fertility of 2000 low ASFRs, on the assumption that ASFRS younger, as compared to older, Egyptian women. were linearly related to total fertility rates. 520 THE GOVFRNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL TABLE 15-7 Migration: Egyptian Example Estimated Age-Specific Egyptian Fertility Rates, As previously noted, both the Census and Chicago projections assume zero net migration for 1975 all countries and subregions. In the case of Egypt (Births per thousand females) (and many other countries) this is a serious simplification, since Egyptian migration levels are Age Group Census Chicago high and have a major impact on the nation's 15-19 27.1 88.6 economy. 20-24 192.6 240.4 In the preliminary 1976 Egyptian census, over 25-29 293.3 259.9 1.4,miflion Egyptians were estimated to be tem- 30-34 263.6 218.5 porarily residing abroad, with over 20 percent 35-39 230.3 148.2 estimated to be working in neighboring oil-export- 40-44 105.9 72.0 ing countries (representing anywhere from 2.5 to 45-49 50.8 14.3 10 percent of the total Egyptian labor force). This Total Fertilitv Rate a migration has two major effects on the Egyptian 5.8 5.2 economy in the opinion of some analysts: (1) a Per womarr. The total fertility rate in a given year basically represents the positive contribution is made to the balance of average number of children each woman would have over her lifetime. assuming payments through foreign exchange remittances, the age-specific fertility rates for that year applied to her lifetime. it is five times but (2) since - migration is selective and since it ,he sum of the age-specific fertility rates. divided by 1.000. tends to remove from the domestic labor force some of the best elements across the full range of professions and skills, a heavy cost is incurred. In the Chicago fertility projections, the World Because of this simplification, neither the Cen- Bank's age-specific disaggregation patterns were sus nor Chicago projections are able to provide used. These show relatively higher fertility rates any indication regarding the implications of a in younger females and lower rates in older continuation or change in these migratory females. trends. REFERENCES 1. For a comparison of Census Bureau estimates with those 3. A. Coale and P. Demeny, Regional Model Life Tables of other organizations, see R. Kramer and S. Baum, and Stable Populations, Princeton: Princeton University "Comparison of Recent Estimates of the World Popula- Press, 1966. tion Growth," paper to be presented at the 1978 meetings 4. Donald J. Bogue, Demographic Techniques of Fertility of the Population Association of America. Analysis, Family Planning Research and Evaluation Man- 2. J. Spitler and N. Frank, "The Feasibility of Measuring ual No. 2, Chicago: Community and Family Study Population Growth in Developing Countries," Bureau of Center, 1971. the Census, 1977 (mimeo). 5. Ibid., p. 16, 16 'Gross National Product The Agency for International Development are physically located within or outside of that (AID) in the Department of State is responsible country. In most less developed countries, GDP for administering most of the U.S. Government's and GNP differ by only a few percent and grow at foreign assistance activities and economic assist- about the same rate. Therefore, presenting GNP ance programs. In carrying out this responsibility, growth rates as equivalent to GDP growth rates ,the Agency must analyze the probable future for LDCs is a reasonable procedure. Industrialized economic growth of countries throughout. the GNP growth rates were projected directly and world. Because of recent budget cuts, AID relies therefore did not require conversion from GDP. almost entirely on data and projections developed Fortunately, GNP projections to the year 2000 by other, largely international agencies. For infor- on a country by country basis that are roughly mation on world GNP (gross national product), consistent with official World Bank projections the Agency depends largely on the World Bank. have recently been published. Although these The World Bank Group, an international coop- projections have not been officially endorsed by erative organization associated with the United the Bank, they were prepared with the assistance Nations, consists of three institutions: the Inter- of members of its staff and were acce pted for use national Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- by a blue-ribbon panel of international energy ment (IBRD), the International Development As- experts. In early 1976, the MIT-sponsored Work- sociation (IDA), and the International Finance shop on Alternative Energy Strategies (WAES) Corporation (IFC). The common objective of asked members of the Bank's Development Policy these institutions is to help raise standards of Staff for assistance in making GNP projections of living in less developed countries (LDCs) by likely -economic growth to.the year 2000 f@r all channeling financial resources from industrial- LDCs, and a report making such projections was ized countries to the developing world. published in 1977.* The Bank's projections of the likely future Two sets of GNP growth projections for the economic growth of its LDC member countries, LDCs were developed for the WAES study: a summarized in its annual Prospects for Develop- high-growth and a low-growth scenario for 1976- ing Countries, are developed in the Comparative 85 and 1985-2000. The high-growth case, in gen- Analysis and Projections Division of the Bank's 6ral, projects a continuation, of, 1960-72 growth Economic Analysis and Projections Department. patterns, whereas the low-growth.case projects a Ordinarily, these projections would not meet the continuation of the pattern characteristic of the needs of the Global 2000 Study because they do 1973-75 period and just sufficiently above that not extend beyond 1985, are not disaggregated by period's population growth to allow an advance in individual countries, and do not project economic real global GNP per capita. In both scenarios, all growth in terms of GNP. Instead, projections are GNP growth rates were reduced by roughly 10-30 presented for three regional groups of industrial- percent for the period 1985-2000 by WAES ana- ized countries and for six groups of less developed lysts to take into account the future impact of countries (representing about 87 percent of the declining population growth rates on GNP growth. population and national income of all LDCs). Because the two WAES projections cover vir- These projections are made in terms of GDP tually all countries outside of communist areas on (gross domestic product) rather than GNP, but the a country by country basis and extend to the year difference is minor. GDP represents the total 2000, they serve as the source for the high and value of the net outputs of all units of production low GNP figures presented in Chapter 3 of this physically located within a country. GNP repre- volume. A third set of medium-growth projections sents the total value of the flow of goods and was developed for Global 2000 Study by averaging services becoming available to the citizens and enterprises associated with a country, without Energy: Global Prospects, 1985-2000. New York: Mc-, regard to whether the income sources or recipients Graw-Hill, 1977. 521 522 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL the growth rate used in the high and low projec- developed by analysts on an independent, country tions. It should be noted, that the WAES high- by country basis, relying on a combination of growth case corresponds approximately to World professional judgment and the use of specialized ,Bank'midlevel projections* for the 1976-85 period. country or regional models. (2) Using a computer- , Projections for GNP growth in communist based model, the various country projections were areas were provided to the, Global 2000 Study aggregated and adjusted on a globally consistent by CIA regional economic specialists.t basis to reflect probable economic growth con- straints due to likely limitations in the availability of foreign trade earnings and foreign investment Key Analytic Methodology capital. (3) The projections were further judgmen- tallyadjusted by Bank and WAES analysts. The CIA projections for the various Soviet bloc World Bank projections for individual countries, countries and the People's Republic of China were generally based only on the completion of step developed using a combination of professional one, reflect Bank's optimistic but realistic assess- judgment and basic econometric techniques, in-: ment of growth rates that could be achieved under cluding simple trend extrapolations and produc- optimal circumstances (including high economic tion-ftinction calculations.$ growth rates for the Western industrialized na- The WAES projections for the industrialized tions). Thus, they are not necessarily forecasts. countries were developed on an independent, However, in preparing global reports that aggre- country by country basis by panels of experts gate individual LDCs into groups, the Bank staff assembled by WAES. The panels' projections has in the past completed steps two and three in were based on the use of available econometric order to ensure that the aggregate projections are models, official government forecasts, and the realistic in view of expected total LDC export judgment of government experts.� They preceded earnings and the expected availability of foreign the development of the GNP projections for investment capital. It is thus assumed that not all LDCs. Official World Bank projections for the LDCs could experience optimal circumstances industrialized countries are developed in much the simultaneously. For the WAES study, following same way but tend to be higher because they give completion of these three steps, these aggregate more weight to official national forecasts. projections were then disaggregated for individual The GNP projections for the LDCs in the LDCs, extended to the year 2000, and further WAES study, which complemented those made adjusted to reflect the views of the WAES staff earlier for the industralized countries, were devel- regarding the impact of energy shortages and oped by the World Bank staff in much the same unspecified declines in population growth rates. way as official global World Bank projections-as Step two has been performed in the past for the part of a three-step process: (1) Projections were World Bank and for the WAES study with the assistance of a World Bank econometric model known as SIMLINK (SIMulated trade LINK- As contained in "Prospects for Developing Countries ages).* This model performs the calculations 1977-85," World Bank Staff Study, Sept. 1976. which, on an explicit quantitative basis, adjust t Some confusion resulted from this process because the r base-year (1975) figures used by the CIA and the World initial economic growth rates to correspond to the Bank were derived using different conversion methodolo- projected availability of foreign trade earnings and gies. The net result is that the low-growth rate of 2.5 foreign investment capital, taking into account the percent for China and 1976 GNP figure for the U.S.S.R. are growth rates of the industrialized countries and regarded by the CIA as being too low. It should be noted, the LDCs simultaneously. It was during this step however, that the World Bank model used for the WAES study to develop the 'GNP projections for the LDCs as- that the lower WAES GNP projections for the sumed a 6 percent growth rate for the socialist bloc for all industrialized countries were substituted for the growth cases, which significantly exceeds current CIA higher World Bank projections. estimateg. I Development of the SIMLINK model was be- * 'the methodology currently used by the CIA to make gun by the World Bank in early 1974 in order to Soviet economic projections', which is representative of the analyze trade linkages and growth prospects for methodologies underlying the other CIA projections, is briefly described in Soviet Economic Problems and Pros- pects, Joint Economic Committee, Aug. 8, 1977, pp. 29-30. *Described'officially in The SIMLINK Model of Trade and � These are described in some detail in Workshop on Growth for the Developing World, World Bank Staff Work- Alternative Energy Strategies, Energy Supply-Demand In- ing Paper-No. 220, October 1975 and also in Norman L. legrations to the Year 2000: Global and National Studies, Hicks et al., "A Model of Trade and Growth for the Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1977. Developing World," European Economic Review 7, 1976. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 523 LDCs under alternative scenarios of development 'models that used a static share-relationship to and inflation in the industrialized world'. By the balance world exports and imports. Another effort end of April 1974, a working version of SIMLINK had been made to combine large econometric was available and was used as the basis for the models 'and world trade relationships (Project first annual issue of Prospects for the Developing LINK), but it had not proven useftil for studies of Countries. One of the first analyses to be pro- the less developed world, since most of the duced by SIMLINK was the effect on LDC models were short-term forecasting models of the economic growth rates of potential changes in the industrialized world without the dynamics of the international price of oil. The model supported the commodity markets and without adequate LDC view that the direct impact of changes in the price models. In addition, the LINK system, was con- of oil on LDC growth would be minor. However, sidered by the World Bank staff to be too the same analysis also indicated that the impact of unwieldy, to provide timely analyses of policy changes in the growth rates of the industrialized alternatives. nations on LDC growth would be major. Subse- ISIMLINK was developed by a team of eight quently, the WAES study examined in greater professionals with expertise in economics and detail the extent to which the economic growth econometrics. It has always been a part-time rates of the industrialized nations might be signift- project for those involved with it, so that the cantly reduced by changes in the international cumulative resources invested in it to date are price of oil. The WAES study established that equivalent to roughly three years of one person's such impacts could be significant, in which'case ftiU-time effort. Major enhancements since 1974 the indirect impact of changes in the international have included the development of more detailed price of oil on LDC growth would be major. commodity specifications, more meaningful coun- Since its development, SIMLINK has under- try aggregations, and improved trade dynamics. It gone a series of major enhancements and has contains over 200 econometric structural equa been adapted to meet changing economic percep- tions, not counting definitional equations and tions and World Bank needs. Version V (1975-76) identities. It is written in approximately 1,500 lines served as the basis for the WAES study. Version of FORTRAN, including extensive comments and VI (1976-77), the most recent version, was utilized is run on the Bank's Burroughs 7700 computer. by the Bank's Development Policy Staff until mid- Before developing SIMLINK, World Bank 1977 and thus, indirectly, by AID and other economists generally used simple calculations and federal agencies. For this reason, and because the judgment in adj 'usting"regional economic growth projections to be consistent with the likely availa- SIMLINK V runs supporting the WAES study bility of foreign investment @cap'ital'and foreign are no longer available, a set of three SIMLINK exchange. earnings. While SIMLINK has allowed runs based on Version VI was developed by the the Bank to make these adjustments;on a'more World Bank staff for the Global 2000 Study as the explicit, consistent, and sophisticated basis, many basis for this methodological discussion. These members of its Development Policy Staff have runs correspond to the high, medium,. and low become uncomfortable with SIMLINK's simplic- GNP growth scenarios and do not incorporate the ity relative to econometric models used for other subsequent judgmental adjustments customarily performed by Bank and WAES analysts (step 3). purposes and have been developing larger, more detailed and sophisticated regional and global At the time of its development, SIMLINK was econometric models to take the place of SIM- neither considered nor intended to represent a LINK. These new models are expected eventually theoretical breakthrough in econometric modeling. to be more capable structurally of simulating LDC It combined several. existing modeling techniques internal investment processes, reciprocal trade in a comprehensive system intended to fUlnish linkages between LDCs and the, industrialized -information for policy d ecisions on a timely basis. countries, technological charige';2 resource deple- Comprehensive in nature, the model was simple tion, and structural change within LDC econorn- enough to be calculated quickly. ies. In particular, the new models are expected to Previous modeling efforts involving LDCs con- produce acceptable re@sults for a wider range of sisted largely of parallel, but often unconnected, variation in economic indicators and structure work along three broad lines: country models that than is possible with SIMLINK., No major en- concentrated on one country and assumed the rest hancements to SIMLINK are currently planned. of the world as exogenously given; commodity While it is clear that th 'e, SIMLINK approach models that examined market equilibrium condi- has many limitations, it must be emphasized that tions for a single' commodity; and world trade SIMLINK was not explicitly designed for the 524 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL purposes to which Global 2000 has put it. Accord- projections -and roughly 10 percent higher than the ing to World Bank Analysts if more time had 1975-85 judgmental final- projections used by the been available f6r the completion of the Global ,WAES study and the Global 2000 Study. 2000 Study, most" if not all of the model's major n fact be remedied. In an In order to perform its calculations, SIMLINK shortcomings could i y event, they note, imperfect as it is, SIMLINK i requires exogenous projections of four major sets is vastly superior to any'model or system that could of.variables, which must be separately specified have been used for World Bank purposes. How- foreach year being projected. Projections of these ever, they feel that should the Global 2000 analy- sets of variables were developed by various World sis be continued somewhere in the U.S. govern- Bank country and commodity specialists, largely ment, it is clear that a high priority must be given on an independent basis, and then aggregated..as to the development of a much more sophisticated appropriate for SIMLINK. They are. the major and suitable global economic model. sets of variables changed in creating new scetra- -rios and include the following: Basic Principles Real economic growth 'rates for the Western The purpose of SIMLINK@'.is to Iaggregate and ,industrialized nations (aggregated into three groups adjust, as appropriate, the economic growth pro- jections developed for individual LDCs by World Real prices for the 25 primary commodities and odity groups exported by the LDCs. Bank analysts, so as to take explicit account on a comm consiste 'n't,basis. of likely limitations in the. Four separate inflation indices'. wide availability of foreign. trade earnings and Estimates of the maximum potential gap be- foreign investment capital. If individual Bank tween export earnings and import ' expenditures, prpjections were aggregated without these Adjust- on current account, which the' LDCs (aggre- ments, total world'trade and foreign investment gated into six groups) are likely to be able to wou, sustain. These estimates act as, a surrogate for ld e 'xcecd plausible. levels. estimates of likely foreign capital flows into the Those 1975-85 projections were adjusted (gen- LDCs. erally downward) for the WAES study to reflect judgmental estimates by World Bank and WAES Other exogenous projectionsare also,required analysts of the likely impact of additional factors by, SIMLINK but are almost never varied in (particularly changes in energy prices and - availa- creating different SIMLINK scenarios. For ex- bdities) on real GNP growth (Table 16-1)., SIM- ample, for,each LDC group, SIMLINK requires LINK projections for most LDCs were roughly exogenous'projeuions of the proportional mix of 5 percent lower than the Bank's initial individual exported primary commodities and other goods TABLE i6-1 Projected Average Annual Real GNP Growth, by Adjustment Steps, Medium Growth Case, 1975-85 Percent) Step I Step 2 Step 3 SIMLINK SIMLINK Individual Judgmental vs. VS. Individual Judgmental Countries" SIMLINK" FinaP, Countries Final Western industrialized nations 4.1 4.1 4.0 0.0 0.1 Socialist nations 6.0 6.0 3.Oc 0.0 3.0 LDC Groups d. India 3.1 3.6 3.6 0.5 Other South Asian countries 4.9 4.9 3.6 0.0 1.3 Low-income Africa 4.8 4.6 3.6 -0.2 .1.0 Lower-middle income 6.4, 5.8 5.4 -0.6 0.2 Middle income 5.0 4.9 5.6 -0.6 0.6 Upper-middle income 5.5 5.1 4.4 -0.4 -0.6 : Calculated using estimates of 1975 levels of economic activity, which differ from tbose presented in Chapter 3. Analysts at the World Bank, which developed both ets of 1,97@ estimates (using different methodological assumptions), recommended that the Global 2000 Study make use ofthern in this way. bAsp .resented in the WAES study and in Chapter 3 of this volume. The WAES study did not publish this figure, which summarizes the projections for the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe presented in this study. Constituent countries are identified subsequently in the discussion, under the heading "Basic Components." GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 525 and services for each year being projected; as a excluded.* LDC economic growth rates have no result, the proportional mix of exports for each impact on the growth rates of: the industrialized LDC group can be and is specified to change over nations, which, in turn, are not projected to have time, although the specifications themselves, once any impact in the ability of the industrialized made, are rarely changed. In contrast, the propor- nations to invest in the LDCs. tional mix of imports for each LDC group is not Commodity price projections are exogenously exogenously specified but is incorporated in the estimated and generally updated by Bank analysts model's structure in the form of linear equations every six months. These projections are consistent whose constants and coefficients do not change. with the Bank's current projections of economic Other. examples of variables requiring exoge- growth rates,in the industrialized nations. How- nous projections that are rarely changed include: ever, in developing separate high, medium, and economic growth rates of the socialist nations; low growth scenarios, a single set of exogenous elasticities of demand for manufactured goods commodity price. projections is used. The prices from the LDCs (as a single aggregate) with respect are thus independent of changes in the Study's to economic growth rates in the Western indus- specification of economic growth rates in the trialized and socialist nations (four aggregates)*; industrialized nations, as well as independent of and proportional compound growth rates in ex- trade volumes and LDC economic growth I rates ports of manufactured goods for each of, the six calculated by the model. groups of LDCs. A single set of demand elastici- Each LDC group contains countries with per ties with respect to LDC exports of manufactured capita incomes falling into certain predesignated goods is used,for all years being projected. The ranges. Thus, countries as diverse as Bolivia, proportional compound growth rates in expor 'ts of Thailand, and Morocco--or Argentina, Jamaica, manufactured goods for each group of LDCs are and Yugoslavia--are grouped together on the se Iparately specified for each year being projected. assumption that they behave economically in SIMLINK then calculates: structurally equivalent ways, despite their obvious sociopolitical and geographic differences. Earlier � World trade volumes for the various primary versions of SIMLINK had far more homogeneous commodities. regional and income groups. The present country � Export earnings (in dollars) associated with groups were subsequently created by Bank ana- these trade volumes adjusted for inflation and lysts to ensure that SIMLINK would noVappear terms of trade. to be analyzing country-specific policies. Allocations of these export earnings to each of SIMLINK is also premised on the common the six groups-of LDCs. assumption used in short-term econometric Total balances available to pay for imports into models that no major structural changes Will occur each LDC group (export earnings plus the within the groups or the international economic maximum potential gap between export earnings order during the period for which it generates and import expenditures, a surrogate for foreign projections. It cannot be used to produce mean- capital flows into the LDCs). ingful results based on exogenous inputs that Real growth rates for each of the six groups of assume that such changes will take place, and it LDCs, based on their capacity to pay for cannot project such changes endogenously. Indi- imports from export earnings and foreign capital vidual country models developed by World Bank flows. analysts may, to some extent, incorporate as- The relative efficiency of SIMLINK is achieved sumptions regarding structural change, which are through simplicity. LDC economic growth rates in turn reflected in the exogenous assumptions are projected solely as a function of internal used by SIMLINK. But except for these adjust- investment rates, capital flows from the industrial- ments, SIMLINK implicitly assumes, for exam- ized nations, and trade with the Western indus- ple, either (1) that significant resource or environ- trialized and socialist nations (as projected by mental contraints will not be encountered, major SIMLINK, based on differential inflation rates, technological change will not take place, the industrialized economic growth rates, and exoge- LDCs will not succeed in raising the relative nous price projections). Trade between LDCs is prices of primary commodities through carteliza- tion, the industrialized nations will not implement *According to Bank analysts, these elasticities have proved to be one of the weaker parts of SIMLINK. Final results *Bank analysts note that any existing trade between LDCs turn out to be extremely sensitive to the assumptions made is implicit in the model's parameters, which cover the here. behavior of the past. 526 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL increasingly protectionist policies, rising LDC the Bank still lacks a formal -analytic methodology debt levels will not significantly impede LDC for projecting future GNP growth of LDCs be- economic growth, and major military, political,, or yond 1985. SIMLINK was extended through the cultural,change will not occur; or (2) that such 1985-90 period for the WAES study, but simple events will have no net impact on present patterns GNP trend extrapolations, jud.gmentally adjusted of economic behavior and hence may be disre- downward, were used to provide projections for garded. the remaining 1990-2000 period. This procedure The model thus implicitly also assumes (1) that was felt to be sounder and less misleading than the existing economic system and associated fi- attempting to run this medium-term model well nancial institutions and facilities are fundamentally beyond the time span it was designed to simulate. sound, (2) that the industrial nations and the Judgmental analysis was also used to extend the LDCs have a reciprocal interest in maintaining results of the adjusted formal modeling analysis to and developing the existing. system, and (3) that countries not explicitly included in the country this reciprocalinterest is based on the unavoidable groups represented in the model. dependence of the poor on the prosperity of the rich. These assumptions may seem to imply that recent demands of the LDCs for a "new economic Basic Components order" will not be met;@SIMLINK, however, was not designed to analyze this issue. Such a new In terms of the objectives of the Global 2000 jor changes in economic order would involve ma Study, SIMLINK has been used to provide the the structure 'of world industry, a new intema- economic growth projections required to develop tional division of labor, and a dramatic shift in the the Study's food and energy projections, and the relative influence of the Western world on the same projections have been used as a point Of international economic system. As set forth in the reference in discussing economic growth issues in 1975 Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial relation to population, resource, and environmen- Development Issues,* these various demands are tal trends to the year 2000. SIMLINK itself does given concrete form in a single goal: by the year not take explicit account of population growth,' 2000, LDCs should account for at least 25 percent resource depletion, or environmental impacts. of the world's industrial production. However, some of these factors are taken into SIMLINK is structurally incapable of simulat- account prior to running the model (in developing ing the major changes implied by this 25 percent some of the exogenous projections required for goal.tIn fact, according to the GNP projections SIMLINK) and after running the model (in judg- developed for the Global 2000 Study using SIM- mentally adjusting SIMLINK's calculations). The LINK (see Chapter 3), several LDCs are likely to assumptions made regarding these factors in many experience negligible per capita economic growth cases are not explicit and, because they involve and possible decreases in per capita consumption the Bank's politically sensitive individual country over the 1985-2000 period. This would be in models, were not made available to the Global contrast to recent historic trends, as well as to 2000 Study by the Bank. SIMLINK does, how- LDC expectations and might produce .severe so- ever, take explicit account of a range of projected cial and political tensions, which are also not commodity prices and volumes in international represented in the model. trade. These were made available by th e Bank and will be discussed later. Because of many of these structural limitations, World Bank analysts are 'reluctant to use SIM- Although global SIMLINK-developed World LINK to make projections beyond 1985. While Bank *projections are a primary source of GNP the Bank's new regional and global models have projections used by AID and other federal agen- been designed to take into account many more cies, altematiVe growth projections have also been near-term structural variations than SIMLINK, used by these agencies. AID, for example, tends to rely more on the Bank's individual country analyses than on the Bank's aggregate global At the meeting of the U.N. Organization for Industrial analyses developed using SIMLINK. The Depart- Development at Lima in 1975. ment of Agriculture's Economics, Statistics and tBank analysts disagree; in their view, such changes could Cooperatives Service uses projections mal by be built into SIMLINK fairly easily. They explain that these the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) adjustments have not been made to SIMLINK because a new system capable of looking into such issues is now being The Energy Information Administration of the designed and implemented, as previously mentioned. Department of Energy uses projections made by GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 52T the U.N. and the Organization for Economic various versions of SIMLINK.* In SIMLINK VI, Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Bu- grouped primarily by per capita 'income, they are: reau of Mines. relies on international economic 1. India. projections developed by Wilfred Malenbaum, as described in Chapter 22. The FAO, U.N., and 2. Other .South Asian Countries: Bangladesh, OECD projections tend to be higher than those of Pakistan, Sri Lanka. WAES or the World Bank; Bureau of Mines projections tend to be lower. 3. Low-income Africa: Ethiopia, Kenya, Mada'- gascar, Tanzania. In terms of internal structure, SIMLINK is essentially a block recursive model representing 4. Lower-middle income: Bolivia, Cameroon, three groups of industrialized nations, the socialist Egypt, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Morocco, bloc, and six representative groups of LDCs. It the Philippines, Senegal, Sudan, Thailand. covers trade in 25 primary commodities, projected 5. Middle income: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, roughly 10 years into the future. "Block recur- Guatemala, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,, Peru, sive" refers to the fact that each major component Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Zambia., of the model is solved for all years projected before the next major component is solved. This 6. Upper-middle income: Argentina, Jamaica, means, for example, that LDC commodity export Yugoslavia. projections are calculated for all years to be The less developed OPEC countries are not simulated in one subprogram block, based on represented. A geographic perspective on the unadjusted LDC growth projections (which are methodology underlying these projections is pro- adjusted later in a separate subprogram block). vided in one of the colored maps used to illustrate This computational approach reflects the as- the discussion in Chapter 14. sumption that LDC commodity export levels are The 25 primary export commodities and com- essentially independent of LDC 'economic growth. modity groups represented in SIMLINK were Although many of SIMLINK's commodity sub- chosen because each accounts for more than 3 models are specified in .part as functions of percent of the total export earnings for each LDC economic growth rates in the Western industrial- group (or, in a few cases, for particular countries). ized nations (excluding the socialist bloc), changes These include: I I commodities or commodity in these rates have only very limited effect in groups involving food exports; 9 involving non- changing LDC commodity export levels. The food agricultural exports; and 5 involving minerals constant dollar value of LDC exports of primary and metal exports. Eleven endogenous subm'odels commodities varies by less than 10 percent. This containing from 3 to 25 equations are incorporated is because commodity price levels are exoge- within SIMLINK for projecting export volumes nously specified, and the specification is not. (or total production) of beef, cocoa, coffee, cop- varied with changes in the exogenous specification per, fats and oils (including coconut oil, copra, of the economic,growth rates of the industrialized groundnuts, gfoundnut oil, and palm oil), iron ore, nations. However, changes in economic growth rice, rubber, sugar, tea, and tin. rates of the Western industrialized and socialist Ten commodities are projected using simple nations have a major effect in changing levels for compound growth formulas (generally derived LDC exports of manufactured goods and services. from the results of the World Bank's independ- The constant dollar value of these exports.varies ently run commodity models). These include:. by more than 30 percent. cotton, jute, maize, petroleum, timber@ tobacco, Within SIMLINK, the Western industrialized wheat, miscellaneous food exports, miscellaneous nations are grouped geographically into North nonfood agricultural exports, and miscellaneo .us America, Western Europe, and Japan-Oceania. A mineral and metal exports. socialist country group is also represented but interacts with othercomponents of the model to a lesser extent than the Western industrialized na- *The discussion that follows,is based on the current version of SIMLINK, Version VI. The tables are based on SIM- tions. An OPEC importing market for LDCs has LINK VI, run under the same exogendus assumptions that been represented in the model for certain special- the WAES study used to run SIMLINK V. Complete ized World Bank analyses but not for the WAES documentation and runs associated with,the original WAES analysis. study and SIMLINK V are not presently available, and in any event would not represent the current methodology The six representative groups of less developed used (indirectly) by AID and other federal agencies in countries have been defined differently in the projecting GNP. 528 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL All commodity price forecasts are exogenous likely to reflect microeconomic rather than ma- and are not changed for the high-, medium-, and croeconomic determinants. low-grOwth cases. For this reason, the endoge- nously projected commodity quantities are also very similar for all three cases, regardless of Basic Procedures changes to the GNP growth rates of industrialized The sequential operation of the SIMLINK countries. Trade volumes of other LDC exports model is shown in Figure 16-1. to the industrialized nations (i.e., manufactured The exogenous GNP growth assumptions for goods and services), however, do change signifi- the Westem industrialized nations and the socialist cantly. nations used in the Global 2000 Study medium- World Bank estimates of potential GDP growth growth projections (as run on SIMLINK VI) are and foreign capital needs for individual LDCs are summarized in Table 16-2. In this analysis, the politically sensitive and therefore confidential. It North American economic growth rate is pro- would not be unusual, however, for an LDC jected to be high relative to that of the past 20 member of the World Bank to forecast its official years, while economic growth in Westem Europe average annual economic growth rate at 10 per- and Japan-Oceariia is quite low relative to the cent, for World Bank country experts to project it same period. Because North America's elasticity more realistically at a maximum of, for example, of demand for LDC manufactured goods with 7 percent under optimal circumstances, and for respect to North America's GNP growth is pro- aggregate forecasts to be between 5 and 6 percent. jected within SIMLINK, at 3.5, to be more than More common is the relatively poor country, twice that of Westem Europe, at 1.7, or Japan- whose plan calls for 6 percent, where Bank Oceania, at 1.5, these differences should not be analysts are likely to project 4.5, percent, and thought of as balancing each other. where aggregate forecasts would decrease it to 3 Based on economic experience of the past 2-3 percent. years, World Bank analysts suggested (after the Global 2000 Study was well underway) adjusting In many cases, these intemal Bank projections the GNP growth rates of the Westem industrial- are based on detailed econometric models main- ized nations somewhat upward. This would have tained by the Bank, though the results of those led to corresponding upward adjustments to pro- models are subject to extensive heuristic adjust- jected growth rates under SIMLINK (due to ments before being used by SIMLINK. In other increased LDC export purchases by the Westem cases, they are developed using less formal pro- industrialized nations). CIA experts, on the other cedures. The exogenous commodity prices are hand, suggested that lower average annual growth generally also derived from detailed econometric rates would be more Rely over the next decade models for individual commodities and, like all of for both the Westem industrialized nations and the exogenous inputs, are subject to judgmental adjustment before being entered into SIMLINK. TABLE 16-2 SIMLINK intemal coefficients and exogenous inputs are derived from data covering the period Historical and Projected Average Annual Real 1960-75, collected by the World Bank or the GNP Growth for the Western Industrialized and United Nations. In general, most available eco- Socialist Nations nomic data on LDCs are at least two years old, (Pet-cent) although mote current data are available on LDC debt balances and regarding overall economic Historical Projected' activity within the Westem industrialized coun- Country Group 1955- 1961- 1971- 1977- 1980- tries. The quality of most LDC data is hot good, 60 70 75 80 85 as economic definitions vary across countries and North America 3.2 4.2 2.4 4.4 4.0 across time. Sampling and reporting error is great, Western Europe 4.9 4.7 2.9 3.7 3.7 and data are generally collected only on an annual Japan-Oceania 7.3 9.5 5.0 4.9 4.9 basis. Because of changes in the basic economic Total Western structure of most LDCs, data preceding 1960 in . industrialized 4.1 4.9 2.7 4.2 4.0 general have no validity for projections, so that Socialist countries" 6.0 6.0 no more than 10-15 annual observations are Note: Actual rates used in the SIMLINK model are specified for each year generally available. Moreover, in many LDCs an being projected and change more gradually than the average annual rates specified in the table. industry sector consists of one or two principal Medium-growth case. companies, so that data changes over time are Historical rates are not readily available on a comparable basis. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 529 Economic growth rates Commodity prices Economic gr of the Western indus- and inflation owth rate of the socialist nations trialized nations indices 77-7 7 7 Commodity Other trade models models 1-7 Export volumes; Export and import prices, adjusted for terms of trade L --- 7-77-7-11 Capit.all flows from LDC economic growth the industriali d models notions @ LDC economic growth rates Figure 16-1. Sequential operation of the SIMLINK model. the LDCs.* Because these recommended adjust- from the model's key assumed linkage bet w@een ments were not consistent, and because the focus LDC economic growth and LDC foreign tra@e of the Global 2000 Study was not directed toward earnings, based entirely on trade with the Western GNP analysis, the original WAES projections industrialized and socialist nations. SIMLINK is were not adjusted for purposes of the Study. incapable of projecting the implications of the The degree of sensitivity of LDC economic alternative internal LDC developmental strategies growth rates in SIMLINK to changes in assump- that are based on factors other than the economic t.ions regarding Western industrialized growth growth rates of the Western industrialized a 'nd rates is shown in Table 16-3. These-changes anse socialist nations. As previously noted, these growth rates affect only export volumes and not export prices or capital flows. The CIA also felt that the Study's GNP growth rate In its first major programming block, SIMLINK figures for the People's Republic of China and for a few I other socialist countries were understated, as previously calculates world trade volumes for a wide range F@,,.nomic r. h rate 'I C.mZ m LDCn:mic' growth , ts noted. of primary commodities. for all years to be pro- 530 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL TABLE 16-3 from many of the growth trends in trade for the Projected Average Annual Real GNP Growth for same commodities reflected in the Global 2000 the High, Medium, and Low Growth Cases, Study's other federal agency 'projections. For 1977-85 example, average annual growth rates in world (Percent) consumption of aluminum, lead, phosphate rock, silver, and zinc for the 1973-85 period are pro- Med. Med. iected at only 4.4, 3.6, 4.4, 2.1, and 3.4 percent, High Med. Low vs. VS. respectively, for the Global 2000 Study, all of High Low which are significantly below the 6.3 percent (1) (2) (3) (2)-(1) (2)-(3) average used in SIMLINK. Crude oil export Western volumes are projected to increase roughly 4 per- industrialized cent each year for the 1976-85 period (significantly countries 4.8 4. P 3.3 -0.7 0.8 above SIMLINK's 2.8 percent annual growth rate Socialist countries 6..0 6.0' 6.0 0.0 0.0 for the 1977-85 period), and wheat exports Are LDC Groups projected to increase 4.1 percent each year foe the India 4.3 3.8 3.4 -0.5 0.4 1970-85 eriod (also significantly above SIM- Other South p . Asian LINK's 2.5 percent for 1977-85). Since most countries 5.8 5.0 4.0 -0.8 1.0 LDCs tend to be net exporters of minerals and Low-income Af- metals and net importers of food and fuel, these rica 5.3 4.8 4.5 -0.5 0.3 volume growth adjustments, if made in the SIM- Lower-middle income 7.6 5.6 4.5 -2.0 1.1 LINK model, might significantly lower the proj- Middle income 8.3 6.4 4.8 -1.9 1.6 ected foreign exchange earnings of the LDCs, Upper-middle thereby lowering their projected economic growth income 5.8 4.5 3.4 -1.3 1.1 rates. These figures are consistent with the figures in Table 16-1 that were calculated The exogenous SIMLINK price projections are for 1975-85 to correspond to the presentation of GNP projections made in Chapter 3. Because SIMUNK, Version V1, projections are not actually made also significantly different from other price projec- for 1975 and 1976 (because historical estimates were available), those years are tions used by the Global 2000 Study. SIM- omitted in this table and the several tables that follow. LINK's mineral and metal prices are higher; jected, based in many cases on exogenous projec- SIMLINK's food and fuel prices are lower. If tions of Western industrialized economic growth, adjustments were also made to the exogenous on elasticities of demand with respect to these commodity price projections used in SIMLINK growth rates, on .exogenous price forecasts, and so that they corresponded to the project's other on other Ivariables. However, in other cases, projections, the projected foreign exchange earn- commodity trade volume projections are inde- ings and resulting growth rates for the LDCs pendent of changes in any exogenous variable. would be lowered still further. For example, the For example, projections of the production Of SIMLINK projections are based on the exoge- nous assumption that real prices for copper and several significant commodities involve only basic com Iund growth formulas with the following tin will increase by roughly 5.2 and 2.5 percent I po per year (in constant dollars) respectively, during structure. the 1975-85 period. Quantity, = Quantity,-, (I+ compound interest rate) . In contrast, the projections developed for the Thus, trade volumes in many minerals and metals Global 2000 Study regarding the same metals (namely, bauxite, lead, phosphate rock, silver, assumed that their real prices will remain constant and zinc) are collectively projected to increase at or decline Over the same period. Conversely, the an average annual rate of 6.3 percent, regardless SIMLINK projections are based on the exoge- of variations in price or in economic growth rates nous assumption that petroleum prices will remain projected for the industrialized nations or the constant in real terms,* while the projections LDCs. Similarly, timber trade volumes are com- developed for the Global 2000 project assumed an pounded at 4.1 percent annually, petroleum at 2.8 increase in real prices of 5 percent per year percent, wheat at 2.5 percent, and cotton 1.7 beginning in 1980. The SIMLINK projections are percent, regardless of changes in any variables. also based on the assumption that projected wheat While these projections are often merely sum- prices will decrease by roughly 0.6 percent per mary representations of more complex interac- * Bank analysts point out that this assumption was made tions simulated on the Bank's commodities because the Bank did not wish to appear to take a position models (which ate confidential) in advance Of with regard to the likelihood of potential changes in petro- running SIMLINK, they are markedly different leum prices, it was not necessarily intended as a forecast. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 531 year (in constant dollars, calculated using a 5-year for each of the six LDC groups for the medium base period), whereas the projections prepared for growth case are shown in Table 16-7. Export the Global 2000 project assumed an increase.of growth projections for each Pf the various classes roughly 2.1 percent per year during the 1970-85 of LDC exports for a representative LDC group period. (the lower-middle income group for the medium In its next major programming block, after growth case) are presented Table 16-8. calculating world trade volumes for the major In its final block of programming, SIMLINK primary commodities and commodity groups, iteratively on a year by year basis (1) calculates SIMLINK calculates the demand of the industrial- the level of imports necessary to sustain a given ized nations and the socialist bloc for LDC level of GDP growth, (2) compares this figure with manufactured goods and services. These calcula- endogenously projected available export earnings, tions are based on exogenous,'historically derived plus an allowable gap (exogenously specified) estimates of the income elasticities of demand of between import and export earnings (reflecting the each.group of industrialized nations for manufaC- extent to which projected foreign investment cap- tured LDC goods; they are in turn used with ital will be permitted to be used to offset the gap), adjustments to calculate demand for all LDC and (3) adjusts the initially given level,of GDP exports other than primary commodity exports growth as necessary and returns to step I until a and are the same for all three growth cases. These stable solution is reached within the acceptable assumed elasticities, in conjunction with the pro- range of the gap. jected economic growth rates, imply that the In a strict economic sense, the "allowable gap" Western industrialized and socialist nations win, just referred to represents an estimate of projected compared to 1975, almost double their imports of "excess'.' demand rather than of the projected LDC manufactured goods by 1980 and almost availability of foreign capital. Nevertheless, triple those imports by 1985, as shown in Table World Bank analysts believe these estimates are 16-4. What this would imply for the year 2000 is roughly consistent with projected flows of offi- an open question. Projected growth in export cial and private capital for the industrialized volumes of manufactured goods for each LDC nations. This might seem to imply that such group is shown in Table 1675. capital flows are assumed by SIMLINK never I.A complex set of additional calculations, which to be higher or lowerfor any LDC group than interact as part of the same programming block, is the LDC group's gap on current account be- then used to project growth rates for other LDC tween import expenditures and export earnings. exports, which are individually allocated to each However, bank analysts note that many of group of LDCs and adjusted to reflect terms of the other parameters used in SIMLINK are trade. Growth rate projections for each of the derived from historical. experience or individual various classes of LDC exports for all three country models which, in many cases, may scenarios as calculated by SIMLINK, are shown have incorporated other capital flow assump- in Table 16-6. Projected growth in export earnings tions. Representative projections for the TABLE 16-4 Projected Demand for LDC Exports of Manufactured Goods (Percent) Average Annual Economic Average Annual Growth in Index of Imports of LDC Demand for LDC Manufactured GoodSb.e Growth' I d b Country Group Elasticity Manufactured Goo s 1977-80 1980-85 1977-80 198 " 5 1975 1980 1985 North America 3.5 4.4 4.0 15.4 14 *0 1.000 Western Europe 1.7 3.7 3.7 6.3 6.3 1.715 2.848 Japan-Oceania 1.5 4.9 4.9 7.4 7.4 Socialist 1.5 6.0 6.0 9.0 9.0 - Elasticity (of demand for LDC exports of manufactured goods) with respect to economic growth. This elasticity is pro*tcd not to change over the 1977-85 period and remains unchanged for the high, medium, and low growth cases. Medium growth case. ; SIMLINK makes use of an aggregate index rather than regional indices. This index is derived from the regional elasticities and growth rates presented in this table, hrough complex calculations involving, in addition, other LDC exports and terms of trade. Thus, according to Bank analysts, it would be misleading to present in this table the changes in regional shares of total demand for LDC exports of manufactured goods implied by just these regional elasticities and growth rates, since such calculations are not made by SIMLINK. 532 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL TABLE 16-5 TABLE 16-7 Projected Average Annual Growth of Export of Average Annual Growth of All LDC Exports, by LDC Manufactured Goods, by LDC Group,a LDC Group,' Medium Growth Case Medium Growth Case (Percent) Average Annual LDC Group 1977 1980 1985 Growth in LDC Group 1975-80 1980-85 Earnings India 6.3 7.1 1977-85 Other South Asia 6.2 7.0 billions of constant 1975 dollars percent Low-income Africa 5.4 7.5 India 5,979 6,625 8,970 5.2 Lower-middle income 13.6 10.8 South Asia 2,417 2,856 3,744 5.6 Middle income 12.7 11.3 Low-income Upper-middle income 7.2 5.4 Africa 2,923 2,899 3,508 2.3 ; As me ured in constant dollars, including adjustments to reflect the effects of Low-middle rojectedasterins of trade. income 18,358 21,600 29,683 6.2 Middle income 49,856 58,317 89,167 7.5 lower-middle income group are presented in Table Upper-middle 16-9. income 13,009 15,576 21,338 6.4 Crucial to this sequence of calculations is the Adjusted for projected terms of trade. iterative computation of LDC import expendi- Table 16-10 can, in fact, be collapsed into the tures, as show 'n in Table 16-10. following single linear equation: The relationships expressed in Equations 1-6 in Table 16-10 were separately estimated for each Total required imports = 872.4 + (.2824 x GDP). LDC group, based on historic data from the 1965- While SIMLINK thus assumes that each of 75 period, using least-squares linear regression each LDC group's import components will be a techniques. They are based on the assumption constant linear function of each LDC group's that the ratio of incremental units of each kind Of GDP, SIMLINK, as previously noted, does not import per incremental unit of GNP is fted. This assume that each of each LDC group's export necessarily means that the mix of incremental components will be a constant linear function of imports of capital goods, intermediate goods, fuel, each LDC group's GNP. The import component @ervices, food, and consumer goods (as measured assumptions thus appear to imply a static internal m constant 1975 dollars) is assumed to remain economic structure within each LDC, whereas the constant for each group of LDCs as industrializa- export component assumptions appear to imply tion progresses. The various equations shown in internal dynamic change. Especially critical with the sequence of LDC Table 16-6 import calculations shown in Table 16-10 is the Projected Average Annual Growth of All LDC calculation of required gross investment associ- Exports, by Type of Exporta ated with a given level of total GDP. Although it is expressed in SIMLINK as a constant linear (Percent) function of total GDP, a variable incremental 1975-80 1980-85 capital output ratio (as if investment were ex- - pressed in this model as a function of incremental High Med. Low High Med. Low GDP) can be inferred ftorn. the model's results.* Such an incremental capital ratio provides a Food 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.4 3.3 3.3 measure of the implied assumptions regarding Nonfood changes in the productivity of investment capital. agricultural 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.0 Specifically, the ratio indicates the units of new Minerals and metals 4.4 3.9 4.0 4.5 4.2 4.0 investment capital associated with one unit of Petroleum and fuels 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 World Bank analysts note that the investment relation- Manufactured ships in SIMLINK for the. 1965-75 period were generally goods 12.6 11.4 10.1 12.5 10.7 8.8 estimated using distributed lag formulations. However, Services 9.6 8.5 7.4 9.6 8.1 6.4 these formulations were transformed into constant linear Total Primary functions for insertion into SIMLINK, Version VI. Prior Commodities" 2.9 2.7 2.7 3.5 3.3 3.2 versions of SIMLINK incorporated distributed lag formula- Adjusted to reflect the effects of projected terms of trade. tions directly, but they were found to be somewhat unstable Includes food, nonfood agriculture, and minerals and metals. for projections beyond 1980 and so were taken out. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 533 TABLE 16-8 Projected Exports for LDC Lower-Middle Income Group, by Type of Export, Medium Growth Case Proportional Mix Value Average Annual Type of Export Growthin 1977 1980 1985 1977 1980 1985 Values 1977-85 percent billions of constant 1975 dollars percent Food 27 26 24 5.0 5.6 7.1 4.5 Nonfood Agricultural 16 15 13 2.9 3.2 3.9 3.8 Minerals and Metals 16 17 16 2.9 3.7 4.8 6.5 Petroleum and Fuels 5 6 6 .9 1.3 1.8 9.1 Manufactures 14 16 19 2.6 3.5 5.6 10.1 Services 22 22 22 4.0 4.8 6.5 6.3 TOTAL 100 102b 100 18.4 21.6 29.7 6.2 Does hot include adjustments to reflect the effects of projected terms of trade. Does not sum to 100 due to rounding. TABLE 16-9 SIMLINK Calculations for the Low-Middle Income LDC Group, Medium Growth Case, 1977-85 (Millions of Constant 1975 U.S. dollars) Allowable Gap Terms Between of Required Required Imports Unadjusted Trade Adjusted Import Gross Gross Gross Gross and Export Adjust- Export Expendi- Domestic Domestic Invest- Domestic Exports' Earnings" ment' Earnings" turesu Product' Income' ment" Savings 1977 4,325 18,304 54 18,358 22,683 77,698J 77,751 17,749i 13,424 1978 4,806 19,524 -634 18,890 23,696 82,338 81,104 19,002 14,196 1979 4,734 21,075 -1,125 19,950 24,684 85,831 84,706 19,899 15,164 1980, 4,509 22,863 -1,263 21,600 26,109 90,882 89,619 21,195 16,686 1981 4,572 24,621 -1,522 23,099 27,671 96,418 94.896 22,615 18,044 1982 4,763 26,171 -1,693 24,478 29,241 101,973 100,280 24,041 19,278 1983 4,842 28,039 -1,965 26,074 30,9 -15 107,900 105,935 25,561 20,720 1984 4,923 29,844 - 2,@ 195 27,649 32,572 113,767 111,573 27,067 22,144 1985 4,805 32,087 -2,404 29,683 34,488 120,547 118,144 28,806 24,002 Average annual growth 1977-80 1.4% 7.7% - 5.6% 4.8% 5.4% 4.Wo 6.1% 7.5% 1980-85 .1.3% 7. Wo 13.7% 6.6% 5.7% 5.8% 5.7% 6.3% 7.5% - Exogenously specified. Although the allowable gap technically represents an estimate of projected "excess" demand rather than of the projected availability of foreign capital flows, World Bank analysts believe it is roughly consistent with projected flows of official and private capital from the industrialized nations. Calculated by SIMLINK, using exogenous price projections and endogenous trade models. Calculated by SIMLINK, applying different inflation indices to different components of LDC imports and exports. Calculated by SIMLINK, by adding terms of trade adjustments to unadjusted export earnings. Calculated by SIMLINK, in conjunction with calculating gross domestic product, and including adjustments for projected terms of trade. A GDP growth rate is determined which equates important expenditures to adjusted export earnings plus the allowable gap between imports and exports (representing foreign investment flows). Calculated by SIMLINK, as part of the process of calculating import expenditures. Calculated by SIM LIN K, by adding terms of trade adjustment to GDP. Calculated by SIMLINK, using a formula in'the following form: Required gross investment = a constant + a coefficient x GDP. Part of this investment is assumed to come from foreign sources, as represented by the allowable gap between imports and exports. Calculated by SIMLINK, by subtracting foreign investment (as represented by the allowable gap between imports and exports) from required gross investment. Exogenously specified for 1977. additional GDP. In the case of the lower-middle anywhere from roughly 5 to 40 percent over the income group, it falls slightly (from 4.6 to 4.3) same period, indicating that major increases in the between the periods 1977-79 and 1983-85, indicat- productivity of investment capital are assumed for ing that a given investment can be thought of as all LDC groups. For example, the GNP projec- producing about 7 percent more incremental GDP tions assume that, in the case of the other South in 1985 than in 1977 (in constant dollars). For the Asian LDC group (with an incremental capital other LDC groups, it is projected to decline output ratio declining from roughly 2.9 to 1.8), a 534 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL TABLE 16-10 Representative LDC Import Calculations,' Lower-Middle Income Group, Medium Growth Case Equation 1: Required Gross Investment a constant + (acoefficient) + (gross domestic product) 1977 Estimate 17,749' -2,122.09 .25656 77.698b 1985 Targeted c 30,575 -2,122.09 .25656 127,446 1985 Probable 28,805 -2,122.09 .25656 120.547 Equation 2: Imports of Capital Goods a constant + (a coefficient) + (required gross investment) 1977 Estimate 5,423 186.6 .2%0 17,749 1985 Targeted c. 9,140 186.6 .2%0 30,595 1985 Probable 7,911 186.6 .2%0 28,805 Equation 3: Imports of Intermediate Goods a constant + (a coefficient) + (gross domestic product) 1977 Estimate 5,654 -2,170.3 .1007 77.698 1985 Targeted c 10,664 -2,170.3 .1007 127.446 1985 Probable 9,%9 -2,170.3 .1007 120.547 Equation 4: imports of Fuel a constant + (a coefficient) + (gross domestic product) 1977 Estimate 2,561 129.2 .0313 77.698 1985 Tdrgetede 4,118 129.2 .0313 127,446 1985,Probable 3,902 129.2 .0313 120.547 Equation 5: imports of Services a constant + (a coefficient) + (gross domestic product) 1977 Estimate 3,%7 703.7 .042 77,698 1985 Targeted c 6,056 703.7 .042 127,446 1985 Probable 5,767 703.7 .042 120,547 Equation 6: Imports of Food and Consumer Goods a constarif + (a coefficient) + (sum of 2-4, above) 1977 Estimate 5,171 3039.3 .1563 13,638 1995 Targe* led 6,793 3039.3 .1563 24,019 1985 Probable 61569 3039.3 .1563 22,584 Equation 7: Total Required Imports sum 'of 2-6, above 1977 Estimate 22,776 22,776 1985 Targeted' 36,869 36,868 1985 Probable 34,920 34,920 *Does not include adjustments to reflect the effect of projected terms of trade. * Exogenously estimated; not calculated by SIMUNK. The "targeted" figures represent the calculations that would be made if there were no limit to the extent to which import expenditures could exceed export earnings. given investment can be thought of as producing this gap represents roughly 20 percent of annual about 60 percent more incremental GDP in 1985 gross investment and accumulates over the 1977- than in 1977 (in constant dollars).t 85 period to about 35 percent of 1985 GDP. The It was previously pointed out that one major other major component of gross investment, gross component of gross investment, namely foreign domestic savings, is calculated as a residual figure, investment, was exogenously estimated for each as Can also be seen in Table 16-9. Its calculation LDC group in terms of an allowable gap, on as a residual is a necessary consequence of the current account, between export expenditures and structure of the model, which considers foreign import earnings. In the case of the lower-middle exchange, rather than savings, capital, or labor, income LDC group, as can be seen'in Table 16-9, as the binding constraint limiting growth in the developing World. While Bank analysts view this as a serious simplification, since the model is t World Bank analysts note that the uncertainties surround- being used to'develop projections for a period ing future incremental capital output ratios are compounded during which deteriorating terms of trade and by the fact that for several middle-income LDCs, technolog- suboptimal export volume growth are generally ical change is likely to affect productivity of investment projected to squeeze foreign exchange earnings, capital in ways not readily deducible from historical expert- ence. To this extent, projections of future incremental they consider it to be acceptable in the context of capital output ratios must necessarily incorporate significant the types of analysis for which the model was subjective judgment. designed. 17 Climate Several government agencies have existing re- Task III. To evaluate the domestic and inter- search programs on climate (National Oceanic and national policy implications of the climate/crop Atmospheric Administration, National Aeronau- scenarios, and to identify climatic variables of key tics and Space Administration, National Science importance in the choice of policy options. Foundation); others fund or conduct special obser- Task IV: To transfer the climate/crop research vation and analysis programs or maintain a sub- results and generalized climate response method- stantial level of research because their operations ology to individuals and organizations concerned are affected by variations in climate (Department with the consequences of climatic changes in of Defense, Department of the Interior, Energy fields other than agriculture, and to identify areas Research and Development Administration). An- of research that might refine or extend the findings other group of federal agencies are user or policy of the first three tasks. agencies with interests or concerns for climate In February 1978 work on the first task was and climatic fluctuations but little or no climate completed, and the results were published as a researr-h effort (Department of Agriculture, De- report, Climate Change to the Year 2000. The partment of Health, Education, and Welfare, climate scenarios developed in the NDU study Department of State, Department of Transporta- have already been described in Chapter 4. The tion, Environmental Protection Agency). methodology used, as described in the NDU There was, therefore, no logical place to turn report, is as follows. for climate predictions for the Global 2000 Study. Moreover, it soon became clear that there is a Key Analytic Methodology great deal of disagreement among climatologists about what changes are likely in global climate The study is based on the perceptions of future and even about how to predict such changes. climate made by a panel of 24 experts from the One attempt to quantify the likelihood of signif- United States and six other countries. Panelists icant changes on the basis of the opinions of were selected both for their competence in clima- leading climatologists is being made in an interde- tology and for their diversity of views. Each partmental research project conducted by the panelist was asked to respond to a set of questions Research Directorate of the National Defense about climatic factors, including variability, 'over University (NDU) in Washington, D.C. The study the next 25 years, to assign probabilities to is sponsored jointly by the Department of De- specific climate changes, and to give the rationale fense, the Department of Agriculture, and the for their answers. Individual responses were National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra- weighted by each panelist's expertise as'rated by tion. Technical assistance is provided by the himself and his peers. Institute for the Future, Menlo Park, California. This was a first attempt to have a group of The project is guided by an Advisory Group experts address a common set of questions and drawn from a cross section of government and express their judgments of climate changes in civilian agencies and institutions. The major objec- terms of quantitative probabilities, rather than on tives of the NDU study.are embodied in four a "what if" basis. The responses were aggregated tasks: into five possible scenarios, which indicate some Task 1: To define and estimate the likelihood of broad measure of the likelihood of climate change changes in climate during the next 25 years, and over the next 25 years. to construct climate scenarios for the year 2000. Task II: To estimate the likely effects of Basic Principles and Components possible climatic changes on selected crops in specific countries, and to develop a methodology Atmospheric models, actuarial experience, and for combining crop responses and climate proba- existing theories of climate are inadequate to meet bilities into climate/crop scenarios for the year the needs of policymakers for information about 2000. future climate. For the present, there is no choice 535 536 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL but to rely on expert judgments-subjective and The following comments by panelists reflect contradictory though they may be-about future these concerns: world climate and its effects on agriculture and To the best of rhy knowledge, there exist, in other sectors of the economy. general, no techniques for making climate fore- The survey method (described in more detail in casts that have demonstrated skill in the sense Chapter 4) was chosen as the best means of that the forecasts are better than a forecast of the quantifying such judgments. Its purpose is not to long-term aver-age statistics. Knowledge of even forecast climate change nor to reach a consensus the long-term aver-age statistics (means, variances, on the issue of how climate will change by the extremes, conditional probabilities, etc.) would be year 2000, but to- portray reasonable, coherent, most useful for some purposes, but even this data and consistent possibilities for world climate at is not readily available. the end of the century and to put plausible bounds I think that the strongest message to come from on the likelihood' of the occurrence of these your questionnaire will be that we lack the basis possibilities. for predicting even the grossest aspects of climate. J The questionnaire to which the panelists re- We possess no skill for forecasting beyond a short sponded dealt with' 10 climatic variables or geo- period,, other than that which probabilities based graphic regions of interest: on a frequency distribution can provide. Only a I .Average global temperature change deterioration of climate will fire the imagination of the experts. Prophets become known for. their 2. Average latitudinal temperature change prophecies of doom. A prophecy of status quo or 3. Carbon dioxide and turbidity improvement would not be interesting. 4. Precipitation change 5. Precipitation variability There is a good deal of guesswork involved, due 6. Midlatitude drought and persistence of to uncertainties about feedback mechanisms, the drought importance of aerosols, the general circulation in 7. Outlook for 1977 crop year the atmosphere and oceans, .and many other 8. Asian monsoons factors. 9. Sahel drought I feel that one of the most important outcomes of 10. Length of growing season your study could be a clear statement of our Each of the 10 involved three elements: probabi- present ignorance. That in itself should clearly indicate the need for contingency plans. listic (or equivalent) forecasts of a-particular climatic variable; reasons for quantitative esti- mates; and self and peer expertise rating. Self and Peer Ratings An interesting and useful feature of the ques- Basic Procedures tionnaire was the concept of self and peer ratings. The following is an excerpt of the instructions Most respondents, as well as some of the provided at the end of each question and designed invited panelists who declined to participate, to assess the respondents' expertise: voiced some degree of apprehension or concern Using the self-ranking definitions provided in the about the questionnaire and the use (and possible instructions, please indicate your level of substan- abuse) of the information derived from their tive expertise on this major question. responses. These concerns centered on the follow- 5-4- 3 -2- 1 ing issues: Again using the self-ranking guide, please identify � The lack of sufficient actuarial experience, those other respondents whom you would rate as comprehensive theories, or adequate models to "expert (5)" or "quite familiar (4)" in their support the quantitative estimates given in the answer to this particular question. questions; � TIhe possible suppression of the full range of The categories from 5 to I (expert, quite uncertainty accompanying responses; and familiar, familiar, casually acquainted, and unfa- miliar) were carefully defined in the questionnaire. � The risk of being an unwitting party to "science Table 17-1 shows a sample of the degree of by consensus . correlation between self and peer ratings for five the NDU project team gave considerable attention respondents on Question 1. The general agreement to the foregoing concerns in analyzing the data between self and peer ratings is fairly evident by and aggregating the range of views-and the a scan of the two right-hand columns in the table. expressed qualifications-provided by the re- A detailed analysis of the correlation between self spondents. ratings and the mean of peer ratings shows it to CLIMATE 537 TABLE 17-1 global mean temperature (used here as equivalent Correlation Between Self and Peer Ratings to annual mean temperature between O'@ and .80* north latitude), was a pivotal question.. because (Examples from Question 1) perceptions of global mean temperature greatly@, FreIquency of Peer Rati ngs influence perceptions, with respect to the climate variables treatedr in subsequent questions., The Self Quite question is. based on Figure 17-1 a plot of Respondent Rating Expert Familiar historical changes in,annual mean temperature@ A , Epert .10 3 during the.. past century. Each, respondent was,- B Expert 4, 3 asked to provide, three estimates of the ftiture: C Quite familiar - 3 course of possible D Quite familiar 1 2 1 -changes in global temperature.. E Familiar - - to the year 2000. zThe, first estimate was to be, a. tempe'rature,path to the,year 2000 such that there have a value of 0.52 at a significance level of was only I chance in 10 that the actual path could 0.007. This is considered a fairly high correlation... be even. lower. The second estimate, was to be: a A simple averaging,of self and peer ratings for path with an even chance that temperature could each respondent on each question, rounded to.the be either lower or higher; and the third, was a path nearest .integer value, provided- a weighting that, based on I chance in 1,0 that it could, be . even was subsequently used in aggregating responses. - higher. The particular weighting scale that was used is Figure 17-2 shows a.sample response to Ques- shown in Table 17-2. Levels of expertise falling, tion I by a single respondent. Each of the three below "familiar" (",casually acquainted",and "un- estimates could be drawn@ in any functional form familiar")'were not used in the processing. Of the, desired. Percentiles of 10, 50, or 90 can be, read three levels shown in Table 17-2, the "expert" off for any year between the "present" (the end category was weighted twice as heavily as the of the plot in Fig. 17-1) and the year 2000. quite familiar" category and the "quite faniffiar". The processing of responses will be illustrated was weighted twice as heavily as "familiar.," In., using the answers to this question, by a. . single effect, this reflects the largely empirical and intui- respondent. Figure 17-3 is, a plot of the informa- tive notion that an expert's opinion is worth about tion shown in Figure 17-2 for the year 2000; twice as much as one who is "quite familiar," converted to a cumulative probability function, in which in turn is worth twice as much as an which the ends of the function have been ex'-' individual who is ranked as "familiar" with a tended beyond the 90th percentile and below the,", topic. 10th percentile in a linear approximation. For example, the respondent has indicated a 10 per- Processing of Responses cent -chance that the temperature Iwill change by The general schema for processing the informa- 0.04* C,,or less, a 50 percent chance that it will tion from the questionnaires was as. follows: , change by 0.2' C or. less, and a 90 percent. chance., � Tabulate each respondent's probability density that it will change by 0.47" C or less. (These function with respect to change about a partic- temperature changes are in relation to ithe zero ular variable at a given time, or'derive the reference., base period j 188044, as shown in Fig. probability density function from graphical in- 17-1.) Similar values can, of cou 'rse, be obtained formation provided by the respondent. , . for any other year from Figure 17-2. � Multiply each probability density fun .ction .by rhe next step is to convert the cumulative the @ appropriate expertise weight (as described. probability'furiction" into an,eqUivalent density earlier). function by taking the first derivative of the @ plot Figure 11-3. Since the'plot'co'nsisfs,of, two � Add the weighted density functions of respond, in ents. straightline segments, we have basically two, de- � Divide the weighted and aggregated 'density TABLE 17-2 fiiiietions by the sum of expertise weights W normalize the group response. Con@ersion'of Expeirtise Rankingto Wgighted � Combine the panel Is responses on each cl imatic Scale variable into a set of scenarios spanning the Expertise Weight range of uncertainty or,range of conditions described by the respondents. Expert 4. Quite familiar 2 Question 1, dealing with, possible changes in Familiar 538 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2 low 1880 1900 '19X 1940 1960 1980 2000 Figure 17-1. Global temperatures; historical record of changes in annual mean temperature during the past century for the latitude band 0'-80oN. The period 1880-84 is the zero reference base. (Mitchell, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) 0.8 0.6 0.47 CO (S) ------ 0.4 ..... .... . ......... ............ .... ........ 0.2 0 @20 ...... . 0.04 Co (.1) 0 0. 2 1860 -1880 1920 1940 1,960 1980 2000 J ---------- Figure 17-2. Sample response to Question 1; actual example of a single response to the instructions. The period 1880-84 is the zero reference base. CLIMATE 539 ji , V_ 01 1.00 0.47 Q.80 0.60- 0.20 0.,40- 6.20- 0.04 -13 V V 'J, Figure 17-3. Cumulative probability function for Question 1. The period 1880-84 is the zero reference base. grees of freedom, or two levels in the density a summary of the aggregated responses of the function, which is shown in Figure 17-4. The area panelists with respect to global temperature. under the curve intercepted by any particular In aggregating the responses by the method of temperature range is equal to the probability of weighted averages, it has been assumed that the occurrence of that particular temperature range, 'respondents are drawing from the same general and the total area under the curve in Figure 17-4 information base and, therefore, that their infor- is unity. mation is highly dependent. In such cases of Figure 17-5 shows unweighted density functions information dependence among respondents, it is from each of two respondents. The two functions customary to use the method of weighted averages are next weighted by the appropriate expertise to aggregate responses. All responses are used weights, added, and then divided by the sum of and weighted by the respondents' expertise as the weights to obtain the combined and normal- perceived by themselves and their peers. The ized density function for the two respondents. shape and range of the aggregated curves are not Again, the area under the curve of this combined acutely sensitive to the weighting system used. and normalized density function, shown in Figure The method is "conservative" in the sense that 17-6 is equal to unity. the derived probability curves tend to be broad The procedure outlined above was repeated for and to overstate uncertainty as a result of the the responses of each of the other panelists. additive treatment of the individual subjective Figure 17-7 is a plot of the aggregated normalized probabilities. Had the responses been based on responses of the full panel for the year 2000. An independent information, a multiplicative treat- analogous procedure yields probability density ment of the individual probabilities would have functions of mean global temperature change for been more appropriate, and the derived probabil- the years 1975, 1980, and 1990. The information ity curves would have shown less dispersion. contained in the probability density functions is shown in Figure 174 as extensions to the curve Climate Scenarios in Figure 17-1. The extensions on the curve show the I Oth, 50th, and 90th percentiles for each year A convenient procedure for dealing with a range from the "present" to the year 2000. Intermediate of uncertainty when it is not possible to construct percentiles are also plotted. Thus, Figure 17-8 is quantitative models is through the use of scena- 540 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL - - ----------------- 2.30 2.00 1.30 ............ 1.00 0.50 -X 2.0 -1.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 T-Weraturo Change (OC) by the Y- 2000 Rjure 17-4. Equivalent density function for Question 1. The period 1880-84 is the. zero reference base. 2.50 2.00 - 1.50 - 'XXXXXXXX 1.00 Expert Quite Familiar X: ............. .......... x ............. .......... . . ........ 0.50- XXI . . . . . . .... "I .... ....... X X -41 . . . . . . ...... ;1.0 .0!5 1!0 2.10 iR. I Ct Unip"ture Change (OCI by the Yom 2000' Figure 17-5. Adding two density functions for Question 1. The period 1880-84 is the zero reference base. CLIMATE 541 2.50 2'.0'0 1.50 1.00 .. ................ . 0.50 X.:X ............. 1. 1.0 .0,5: 00 '43 3, 1.0 2.0 7, (PC) by-" siar Figure 17-6. Normalized density function for. two respondents to Question 1. The period 1880-84 is the zero reference base. rios, which may be considered plausible se- TABLE 17-3 quences of events or trends. Scenarios, describe Definition of Temperature Categories interconnection&--perhaps even causal processes- and highlight, where possible, decision points. In a sense, a scenario is a possible "slice of future Change in Mean North- ern Hemisphere Temper- history." Temperature ature from Present' by Category the Year 2000 Probability Constructing Scenarios Large cooling 0.3oC to 1.2*C colder 0.10 Moderate cooling 0.051C to OXC colder 0.25 In the present instance, since responses on Same as last 30 0.05'C colder to 0.25*C global temperature are pivotal in setting the stage years warmer 0.30 for other climate variables, the plot in Figure 17-7 Moderate warming 0.25'C to 0.6'C warmer 0.25 can be used as a basis for dividing the perceived Large warming 0.6'C to 1.8C warmer 0.10 temperature range into a number of categories. "'Present" temperature is defined as the end point on the graph in Figure 17, These categories then become the bases for con- the average temperature for the 5-year period ending in 1%9. structing scenarios. The number of categories (and scenarios) is, in a sense, arbitrary and can be ranges, according to where the bulk of each three or five or even a larger number, if desirable. respondent's probability density function lies. Ta- Table 17-3 shows the perceived temperature range ble 17-4 is a matrix showing each of the five divided into five categories. They range from large temperaturecategories arrayed as rows and the 19 global cooling to large global warming. Associated respondents in five groups arrayed as columns of with each temperature range is a probability of the matrix. Note in the table that the bulk of each occurrence where, in fact, the temperature ranges group's probability density functions lies along the were selected to make these probability ranges diagonal element of the 5x5 matrix (one respond- symmetrical. ent at each end, three and four at the intermediate In order to process information with respect to ranges, and 10 in the middle range). other climate variables, it is useful to group The results of the information collected under respondents with respect to these five temperature Task I have been embodied in a set of five 542 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL ").00 . . .... .... ........... S601, A, .1.0 0.5, 2.0. 2.0 -0.5 0.0,_ A$ 0.3 Trrra :@h-ge, (OP by the. Aw_ 2M FIgure 17-7. Probability of mean Northern Hemisphere temperature change by the year 2000 as determined by the panel of climatic experts. Scale A is based on the period 1880-84 as the zero reference basc-(see Fig. 17-1). Scale B is based on the period 1965-69 as the zero reference base (see the end point on Fig. 1-1). scenarios described in Chapter 4 of this volume.* Each respondent is first assigned to a -global The scenarios are labeled in accordance with the temperature category, as'described in Table glob-al temperature categories in Table 17-3. One 17-4. purpose is to provide an integrated summary of Responses within each temperature category perceptions of climatologists on climate change are combined for all other climatic variables and variability to the year 2000. An equally (except for precipitation and precipitation vari- important purpose is to provide a point of ability, where all responses were availablet). Responses are integrated into a narrative, sup- Aeparture for structuring questions in Task 11 and ported by summary tables. to: trace the, impact of such possible. climatic thanges on food production and on the choice of The processing steps for Questions 11 through policy options. X are identical to those for Question I except that, The procedure for creating scenarios corre- of course, in these other instances, density func- sponding to the five global temperature categories is as follows: tFor questions on precipitation and precipitation variability only, information was obtained from each respondent based *the responses to Question VII, "Outlook for 1977 Crop on conditional assumptions with respect to global tempera- Year," are not included in the scenarios. ture. CLIMATE 543 1.0 1.0 0.950(.9)'@,' 0.8 Change (*C) in annual mom ature, 0.80 latitwe 0.6 0.6 0-459o) 0.4- 0.2 0.2 0 -@O .0.21 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940' 1960@- 1980 2-OW Figure 17-8. Probability of mean Northern Hemisphere temperature change to the year'2600- as determined byL the panel of climatic experts. The period 1880-84 is the zero reference. base.. TABLE 17-4 TABLE 17-5 Percentage of Grouped Probability Densities Frequency of Drought in U.S. mi 1"1-2000 Lying in Each Temperature @Category Respondents Assigned to' Temperature Number'of Respondents Moderate Infre- Categories 1 3 10 4 1 Warming Expertise Frequent, Average quent A 3 0.25 0.50 0.25 Large cooling 99 12 2 - - B 3 0.60 0.20 0.20 Xoderate cooling 1 68 24L 10 - 0.66 0.20 2 .,Same as last 30 years 20 @52 31 - C 5 0. G, 44 20 Weighted. average 0.54 0.25. d.Ii Moderate warming La rge warming 15 80 - Nature of Scenarios ii6n's or equivalents are provided directly by the Each scenario seelks to'describe. average cli- respondents and need riot be derived through the matic conditions as they might exist in a.period of ..use of cumulative probability. years around 2000 AD., The conditions do not, refer The sequence of steps is illustrated by using specifically to that year; its climate is likely..to Question VI, which concerns midlatitude drought. differ from the scenario projection to anr.-extent Table 17-5 illustrates how responses for one of consistent with normal year to,year climate. varia- the time periods (i.e., 1991 to, the year 2000) were bility. Some indication of the course of climate weighted and aggregated in the.Moderate Warm- changes between the present time and the end of ing scenario. The process outlined for Question the century is also given in the narrative and in VI is repeated for.each of the other questions. the tables appended to each scenario. 544 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL Each scenario is. assigned a "probability of ing a probability as high as that indicated for the scenario." This probability is a derived value scenario as a whole. Conditional probability infor- based on the panelists' probabilistic temperature mation, given in the tables included with each forecasts and a weighting scheme to take into scenario, can be combined with the overall prob- account each respondent's expertise as rated by ability of the scenario to assess the absolute level himself and his peers. Therefore, it reflects the of confidence to be placed in future events speci- range of judgments expressed by the climate panel fied in the scenarios. For example, one can find the overall "probability" of a specified event and the strengths of their beliefs, as well as their (e.g., "frequent" drought in the U.S. for the level of expertise.* period 1991-2000) by first calculating for each This probability should not be construed as the scenario the product of the "probability" of the likelihood that the total scenario will actually scenario and the conditional probability of the materialize in the future. The correct interpreta- event for that scenario, and then summing the tion of the "probability of scenario" involves the products for all five scenarios. following considerations: The "probability" is essentially a measure of the Validation confidence, expressed collectively by the climate In June 1977, the project Advisory Group panel, that the global temperature change be- recommended that an ad hoc panel review early tween circa 1970 and circa 2000 will lie in the drafts of the five scenarios for intemal and mutual range indicated by the scenario. This measure of confidence bears an unknown relationship to the consistency. Accordingly, project staff met in July probability that the scenario will actually occur. with six climatologists at the National Center for it was assumed that the global temperature change Atmospheric Research at Boulder, Colorado. The indicated by the scenarios has a negligible proba- reviewers paid particular attention to the large and bility of being greater than + 1.8' C (the upper moderate warming and cooling scenarios, i.e., limit of Large Warming) or less than - 1.2' C (the those constructed from the smaller data bases. lower limit of Large Cooling). In this respect, the The details and the conditional probabilities of five scenanos, taken together, are considered to these end scenarios, therefore, reflect the judg- bracket all realistic outcomes--i.e., the probabili- ments of more people than the limited number of ties of the five scenarios sum to unity. panelists who responded to the questionnaires Details are given in each scenario which elaborate along the lines of these scenarios. The review on the scenario in respects other than stipulated process, which essentially strengthened the data global temperature change. These are considered bases of the end scenarios, resulted in significant by the climate panel to be reasonable inferences changes to only one of them, the Large Global about future climatic developments that are con- sistent with the global temperature change. These Cooling scenario. details by no means exclude other possible devel- opments. Hence, they are not necessarily to be Documentation construed, individually or in combination, as hav- The NDU study is described in detail in its *A "probability" of 0.25, for example, does not mean that report on the results of Task 1, Climate Change there was universal agreement that the scenario in question to the Year 2000, from which the above descrip- would occur with probability 0.25. Nor does it mean that 25 tion of the methodology used in analyzing re- percent of the panelists "voted" for that particular temper- sponses to the questionnaire was taken. The NDU ature change to the exclusion of other changes. Roughly report also includes the questions used, a discus- speaking, the "probability 0.25" is an amalgam of the sion of the. scenarios and climatic probabilities, proportion of panelists who gave some credence to that particular temperature change, the strength of their individ- and a summary of the number of responses and ual "beliefs" in the change (their individual probabilities of average expertise ratings for each of 'the ques- occurrence) and their individual expertise. tions. Food and Agriculture The Foreign Demand and Competition Division of the first static equilibrium models to take into of the Department of Agriculture's Economics, account the broad range of feed7livestock relation- Statistics, and Cooperatives Service is responsible ships at the regional and -world' level. 'It was for preparing the federal government's projections specifically designed to link the grain-oriented of long-tenn food supply and - demand. throughout food economies of the developing regions with the the world, in order to assist in the formulation and livestock-oriented food economies of the indus- execution of U.S. agricultural and trade policy. trialized regions in a more complete and consistent manner than had been done in the past.t Key Analytic Methodology In the fall of 1974, an early' draft of 1985 regional projections produced by the 00L model Department of Agriculture projections of long- was made available to the World Food Confer- term world food production, consumption, and ence in Rome. Formal publication of the,projec- trade are made with the assistance of a computer- tions followed in December. These projections based static equilibrium model known as OOL showed that, over the next decade, the world (because it deals with the world's grain, oilseed, could produce enough grain, oilseed, and livestock and livestock economy). Although the GOL products at reasonable prices to supply the largely model is viewed by the Department -as merely one cereal diet of the developing world and -- meef a mathematical model among several available for moderately rising feed demand in the industrial_@ analyzing future agricultural prospects, it is the ized nations. They were used (in conjunction with only Departmental model capable of analyzing other projections And analyses) by the Secretary broad issues regarding worid food prospects in of Agriculture 'to support his views favoring-the relatively detailed commodity and regional terms. limiting of government intervention in the domes- For the purposes of the Global 2000 Study, three tic 'and world food markets and questioning the additional submodels were used by the Depart- need for an extensive system of international ment to provide projections of arable area, total reserves.t food production and consumption, and fertilize r use.* tThe Department's Economics, Statistics. and Cooperatives Service has prepared extensive, official documentation- of the GOL model under the title, Alternative Futures for The GOL Model World Food in, 1985 by Anthony Rojiko, et al. Volume 1, by entitled World GOL Model Analvtic Report, was published The present GOL model, developed in 1974 1 April 1978 as Foreign Agricultural Economic Report a team of economists and requiring the equivalent 'me 2, entitled World.G.OL Model Suppl:y- Number 146. Volu of about seven years of full-time effort, was one 6istribution and Related Tables, and volume 3, entitled World GOL Model 'Stritcti@re find Equatio@ns, were pub- lished, respectively, in May and June, 1978, and given *The various Department of Agriculture projections pre- report numbers 149 and 151. Volume 4, the final volume, is pared for the Global 2000 Study are not necessarily the expected to be, pubfished in the fall of 197.8 under the title., same as the projections published by the Department for World GOL Model Users Manual. specific food products or regions, which are often developed utilizing different assumptions and incorporating output @The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) con- from other, more detailed models. However, because the tinues to express concern (e.g., in,.a recent press release parameters used in the GOL model are based in large part is@ued by the' FAO in conjunction with its 1977 BiehnQ. on the outputs of those other models, adjusted judgmentally Conference), that the world food situation remains . fragile,' by commodity and regio.nal speciahsts within the Depart- and that there are no grounds for complacency . According@. ment, the GOL projections are considered by Department to the Conference, world food production appeared to have analysts to be essentially consistent with projections dev& risen by only 1.5 percent during 1977, or by less than'the oped using other Departmental models. Because the addi- population growth of nearly 2 percent. The Conference was tional projections developed using the three submodels were especially concerned that progress in production had been derived directly from the GOL model's projections, and slowest in Africa and, in general, in the poorest developing especially because they were subsequently reviewed and regions, where food needs are the greatest. The Conference adjusted (as appropriate) by Department experts, they are noted that this had widened the gap not only between the also considered by the Department to be essentially consist- industrialized and developing countries but also between the ent with other Departmental projections. better and worse-off developing countries. 545 546 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL .Since then, the region-specific models that pro- the Global 2000 Study. They were not pro- vide parameter estimates used by the GOL model grammed for automated execution. Because they and the GOL model itself have been significantly were developed rapidly (in approximately three enhanced, and the GOL model has been used to weeks) to meet specific needs, there are no examine a broad range of issues for various present plans to refine or extend their use, al- federal agencies. For example, the model has though alternative approaches to projecting the been used to analyze the potential impact on same variables are under consideration by the international food trade of various U.S. agricul- Department of Agriculture. tural parity pricing policies and, to analyze the The arable area submodel was based on equa- potential impact of alternative assistance programs tions for each of 27 regions with reliable historical for the U.S. Agency for International Develop- data. These equations define total arable area as a ment. function of GOL and non-GOL product prices, In its present form, the GOL model consists of trend growth in the extent Of arable area, and 930 econometric equations (embodying economic, estimates of maximum potential arable area. The physical, and policy variables), which are solved arable area equations were solved independently simultaneously. A matrix generator facilitates data of each other, using projection's developed by the input and a report writer presents results. The GOL model. equations are specified and solved using the MPS- The total food production and consumption 3 programming language, and all programs are submodel was based on region-specific, supply executed on an IBM 370/168 computer. The and demand equations for products not covered program produces approximately 30 tables con- in the GOL model. These equations defined the taining basic data on supply and distribution, production and consumption of non-GOL prod- prices, per capita production and consumption, ucts in terms of historical relationships between and growth rates, as well as special summary GOL and non-GOL products. The production tables. levels calculated for non- GOL products (using the Plans to incorporate major improvements into non-GOL supply equations) were checked against the model are currently under review. A second- the production levels implied by the-residual generation model has been planned, and some arable area for non-GOL crops (calculated as the sections are currently under development (e.g., difference between total arable area and arable market studies of the British, Iranian, and Vene- area used for GOL crops) times trend growth in zuelan economies). Areas targeted for improve- non-GOL product yields. The consumption levels ment'over the next 3-4 years include: calculated for non-GOL products (using the non- � Expanding coverage of the world's agricultural GOL demand equations) were checked against economy (e.g., livestock specifications are ab- historic income and price relationships and chang- breviated for many developing countries; water, ing taste, and in all cases were found to be within fertilizer, pesticide, and herbicide are treated one standard error of the trends in the historic exogenously; products such as tropical fruit and data. Each set of region-specific, supply and vegetables, starches, fish for human consump- demand equations was solved independently of tion, and certain other products are completely the other sets using projections developed by the omitted in the first-generation model). GOL model - � Endogenizing to a greater extent measures of The fertilizer use submodel was based on re- !nacroeconomic feedback (e.g., the potential gion-specific equations defining fertilizer use in impact of changes in foreign exchange positions relation to total food production and on combined on commodity trade and economic growth, time-series and cross-sectional input-output rela- which are now treated exogenously). tionships. These were also solved independently -Building in recursive, dynamic behavior (e.g., of each other using projections from both the because this is a static equilibrium model, GOL model and the total food production sub- output is limited to measuring net long-term model. adjustments; the model can say little about the year to year adjustments needed to reach the solutions calculated for 1985 or 2000). Basic Principles The Three Subrnodels The GOL Model The three submodels (related to arable area, 'As previously noted, the purpose of the GOL total food production and consumption, and ferti- model is to generate projections of worid produc- lizer use) were developed in late 1977 for use in tion, consumption, trade, and prices of grain, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 547 oilseed, and livestock products to 1985 and 2000. zero for all commodities, i-.e-.,-world grain rese rves The model's emphasis is on capturing the interac.7 do not increase to keep pace with changes in tion of the predominantly cereal economies of the world population. developing world with the livestock economies of A wide range and, large number of assumptions the industrialized world as they compete for the are incorporated into the 28 interactive regional world's agricultural resources. The calculations of submodels. These assumptions are clearly distinct the three submodels that expand this analysis. to from conclusions based on the GOL model'.s consider arable area usage, total food production calculations. Some of the most critical or repre- and consumption, and fertilizer use. are made sentative assumptions are cited below: subsequent to executing the GOL model and thus do not influence its calculations. The GOL model's main strength. lies, in its -No major wars, natural disasters, or changes in scope, coupled with its level of commodity, re- the. existing international economic system are gional, and price detail. For example, the model assumed to occur (other than petroleum price includes variables that simulate competition for increases). This is because such changes could . . only be arbitrarily projected and would com-' resources across the crop sector and competition pletely overshadow the historical relationships among consumers for different crops for food and on which the GOL model is based. - While feed use. It incorporates physical input-output optimistic and pessimistic weather assumptions rates in its feed and livestock sector and crop are included in the Global 2000 Study's high and sectors. It differentiates in its regional detail low projections, no climatic change is projected, between producing and consuming regions as well nor is large-scale land degradation assumed to as between regions at different economic growth occur due to environmental or human factors and income levels. However, because the GOL other than urbanization. model draws heavily on earlier models that fo- -Technology-measured in terms of growth in cused more exclusively on grain, the model tends yields, and ultimately dependent largely on the, to emphasize grains, while livestock products producer prices gener-ated under a particular- receive less coverage. scenario--4s assumed to continue to evolve at One of the GOL model's main weaknesses is rates comparable to the rapid growth of the last two decades; it is assumed that the industrial- that it is a static equilibrium model. Changes over ized nations and, to a lesser extent, the less time in such dynamic factors as population and developed countries, will take advantage of income growth are calculated exogenously in teehnology--depending on the incentives sup- advance of running the -.model and are thus not plied by changes in factor-and-product prices. influenced by the calculations of the model. More- -Aspects of the international food, system related over' the model's static equilibrium projections to food Iprocessing, distribution, and rnerchan- for a given year are independent of its projections dising (which would also be affected by changes for any other year and may be inconsistent with in factor and product prices) are not explicitly those projections. In addition, static equilibrium represented in the model. models are incapable, by their very nature, of The countries of Western Europe are assumed capturing aspects of market behavior that are to continue to maintain somewhat protectionist fundamentally in 'a state of dynamic disequilib- agricultural and trade policies aimed at greater rium. self-sufficiency. It is also assumed that price The 930 equations in the GOL model retlect not poli,cies of other Western European countries only physical variables and economic behavioral will result. in price levels similar'to those in . the patterns, but also reflect institutional settings, European Economic Community. policy constraints, and changes in consumption The level of U.S.. trade with the U.S.S.R., the preferences. The model's region-specific equations People's Republic of China, and Eastern Europe may be thought of as constituting 28 interactive is assumed to be affected more by political than regional submodels of widely varying size and economic factors in the long run. Though no specific long-range multicommodity trade agree- complexity ranging from as few as 40 to over 100 ments have been assumed between the United equations. Economic activity between regions is States and the centrally planned countries, the related by explicitly incorporating international levels of trade projected are in line with the trade quantity and price variables, which [email protected] be quantities outlined in recent bilateral agree- consistent for each commodity, and by requiring ments. world production and consumption volumes for Each region's import or export prices are, as- each commodity to balance. For the Global 2000 sumed to be related to the region's demand or Study, stock adjustments were assumed to equal supply price through generally constant margins. -_548 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL s' est EQUATION I(A): A imated prior to use in GOL model Dependent variable Terms and variables treated as independent of each other -Total grain area under cultivation = 22,766.5 + 125 (years since 1970) + 15.34 (wheat supply price) EQUATION I(B): As used in GOL model Endogenous variables, treated as independent Exogenous expressions Total grain area under cultivation - 15.34 (wheat supply price) = 22,766.5 + 125 (years since 1970) EQUATION 1(0: As subsequently presented in this chapter Exogenous expressions Total &ain area under cultivation 22,766.5 + 125 (years since 1970) + 15.34 (wheat supply price) It should also be recognized that the reports expressions of exogenous variables and associated produced by- the GOL model are reviewed by the coefficients and exponents. Department's commodity and country specialists For ease of computation, a standardized com- to ensure that the model's calculations correspond puter programming package, developed to execute to their professional judgment regarding the future linear programming calculations, is used to solve prospects of world grain, oilseed, and livestock, this set of relationships. First, the vector of trade. In many cases, this means that coffficients expressions, D, on the tight-hand side of the ultimately used within the GOL model are based equation is solved using exogenously projected on the judgment of country and commodity an,a- values for the exogenous variables, collapsing lysts as well as on statistical analyst .s. them into a vector of values, S. Then X is solved The 930 equations of the GOL model are solved accordiiig to the following fon-nula, using linear simultaneously after they have been coded in programming algorithms to obtain the unique matrix form. Prior to being coded, each equation's solution to the fainiliar problem of solving n structure and coefficients are separately eSti- equations for n unknowns: mated, using standard statistical techniques with X = A IS subsequent review by commodity and country analysts. In many, cases this review leads to Matrix A and vector X, the endogenous (simul- reevaluation and adjustment of the original equa- taneoUs) part, of the model, must express only tions by Department analysts prior to running the linear relationships, since linear programming al- GOL model. as a unit. A simple representative gotithms are used to solve the 930 equations. equation thus estimated (for the low-income North However, in many cases, linear formulations tend Africa and Middle East region) has the structure to misrepresent real-world relationships, either and coefficients of Equation I(A). understating or overstating them. For example, at In preparing such an equation for simultaneous high price levels, linear equations tend to generate solution with the other GOL equations, it is exaggerated price responses. Thus, nonlinear re- rewritten so that the endogenous variables (those lationships. must be and have been simulated by solved simultaneously within the model) are all on reestimating coefficients and rerunning the model the left-hand side of the equation and the exoge- with modified coefficients in cases of initially nous variables. (those which are projected pr 'Jor to extremely high or low prices. Such adjustments runningthe model) are all on the ri ght-hand, side. have been made, for example, to represent the Thus, Equation. I(A) would be rewritten. a&Eqiia- different impacts of very high, food prices due to tion 1 (13). rising energy p 1rice,s and the impact of support When all equations are thus transposed, the price- and acreage restrictions in the U.S. at very left-hand side contains 930 expressions with 930 low prices. variables whose values must be determined. The The exogenous expression vector D is not equations can then be thought of as having the limited to expressing only linear relationships, form since it is solved using exogenously projected AX=D variable values prior Ito making use of the. linear where A is a square matrix of all the coefficients programming algorithms. The form of each of the (exogenously estimated) of the endogenous. varia- various expressions in vector D depends on the bles; X. is a vector of all the endogenous variables assumptions made with respect to the kind of (to be solved by the model), and D is a vector of impact expected from the exogenous variables, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 549 and may include, for.example, exponential rela- product prices, income, and population. The price tionships to express compound growth rates. elasticities allow variance in both total food de- Although an. objective function is technically mand for grain and the relative shares of individ- specified in the case of the GOL model,* the ual grains. Demands for meats and dairy products model solves for the unique solution for its 930 are modeled similarly. Consumer preferences are equations. Hence, no minimization or maximiza- reflected in the. product's own price and cross- tion takes place. The model also does not cur- price elasticities and income elasticities. Equations rently have a transportation matrix, A transporta- in this sector typically have been constructed in tion matrix could theoretically be added, but there the following form: are no current plans to do so. To simplify further discussion of the'model, its Demand for wheat for use as food = f (price of wheat, matrix-related characteristics will henceforth be corn, rice-, per capita income; population; changes in taste). disregarded, and equations will be shown in the Demand for beef =f (price of beef, pork, and poultry; per form of Equation I(C), even though all endoge- capita income; population; changes in taste). nous variables are in fact solved simultaneously. Thus, endogenous variables which appear on the The sector that represents livestock production right-hand side of the equals sign for the purposes of and demand for grain used as food for livestock is discussion, 'should be understood to be no more more complex. Meat,production is a function of corriputationally "independent," as mathematical meat prices, feed prices, and productivity. The convention might otherwise suggest, than those ap- incorporation of individual meat prices allows pearing on the left-hand side. competition between the meats. Grain and oilseed The GOL model includes supply, demand, and feed prices influence the cost of producing meats. trade sectors for most commodities. Within the Equations in this sector have typically been con- crop supply sector, the key endogenous variable structed in the following form: is total harvested area, defined as a function of Beef production = f (price of beef, pork, corn, the prices for the region's most important crops, and oilseed meal; changes in productivity). trend growth, constraining potential arable area Feed demand is a function of appropriate grain maxima, and historical and physical data on the share of GOL crops in the arable area total. prices, oilseed prices, meat prices, and livestock Individual GOL crops compete for total area production. Crop prices allow competition be- based on historic shares, physical limitations on tween feeds. The coefficients for livestock prod- land allocation among crops,.and projected rela- ucts are largely physical input-output rates-that tive prices. Production is determined from total relate the tons of grain fed to produce a ton of harvested area and an endogenous yield projection livestock product. Livestock product prices are based on absolute and relative prices, levels of used to adjust feed demand, essentially modifying input usage, and trend growth included to account the feeding rate, which forms a second set of for wider adaptation of existing technology. relations between crop prices and livestock prices. Equations in this sector have typically been con Grain supply equations for a region typically structed in the following form: have been constructed in the following form: Total area f (wheat and other crop prices; trend Demand for oilmeal for use as feed = f (production and price of beef, pork, poultry, eggs, arid milk; price of growth in arable area, subject to physical con- corn and meal). straints defining maximum arable area). Wheat area = f (total area; price of wheat, and Supply and demand prices for crops and meats other food crops competing for arable area). are usually related through constant margins. As Wheat production = f (wheat, area; base wheat previously noted, however, price margins fluc- yields; changes in wheat yields due to changes tuate in the few selected regions where historical in wheat prices; other product prices; changes data indicate that margins widen or narrow as in input usage; trend growth). price levels change. Demand for grain for direct use of food by people is a function of grain prices, other food The Three Submodels *Ordinarily, a linear programming model would include The three subincidels - amble area, total food such a function, to allow the program to find a solution (production and consumption), and total fertilizer which would maximize or minimize the value of a specified use - were extremely simple, but they can be variable. For example, a linear program might be used to determine the,best way to utilize a farm's resources in order described only approximately because the Depart- to maximize its profits. ment was unwilling or unable to provide documen- 550 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL tation. The descriptions that follow are based fertilizer use. The projections are highly aggre- largely on oral responses to questions about the gated. The relative amounts of nitrogen, phospho- subinodels. rbus and potassium are not given. The aggregate The submodels have a few common character- projections are based on regional time-series and istics. They were all specified seperately for each cross-sectional relationships involving yields per region in the GOL model for which reliable hectare and growth in crop production. The rela- historical data were available. The submodels tionship between fertilizer use and crop produc@ were all executed after the GOL model and were tion levels is generally assumed to be linear, but dependent on the GOL model in various ways. the coefficients are adjusted by Departmental The function of the submodels and their various analysts (depending on the length of the projection assumptions must be described separately. being developed) to reflect assumptions of The arable area submodel supplements the creasing return to scale. Decreasing returns to GOL model'by providing projections of arable scale are thus specified indirectly (as a function of area. The availability -of arable land depends on time) rather than directly (as a function of fertilizer many trends, including urbanization 'and land use). reclamation. It is assumed in this submodel that there is a finite amount of land that is potentially Basic Components arable, and projections are'not allowed to exceed s, this constraint. Up to this constraint, arable area In terms of the Global 2000 Study's objective is projected to increase on the basis of time trends the GOL model and derivative submodels use' and an index of GOL food prices (intended to population and income growth rates to project reflect economic incentives). It is assumed.that 'worldwide food production, consumption, and' there will be no large-'scale loss or degradation of trade. Little account is taken of environmental arable land due to mismanagement or environmen- facto Irs, except to the extent that they are imolic- tal deterioration. itly projected to influence the costs of production. The total food submodel augments the GOL Specifically, the. GOL model is a formal econo- pr9jections (of grains, oilseeds and livestock) to metric model which includes I I principal com- arrive at total food projections. The procedures modities-wheat, rice, coarse grains, oilmeal, soy- involved were extremely simple. Growth in total beans, beef and veal, pork, poultry, milk, butter, food was in most cases projected as a function of and cheese. A more detailed listing is presented in growth in the GOL commodities (grain, oilseeds Table 18-1. and livestock) based on historic trends. Their TABLE 18-1 relationship was almost always assumed to be constant over time and linear. Sugars, starches, Food Commodities Specified in the GOL Model- tropical products and other.livestock were taken into' account,, as appropriate, in the various re- TOTAL WHEAT Wheat for human demand gions. Fish catches for human consumption were Wheat for livestock feed not explicitly taken into account for any region TOTAL RICE (except Japan), but, were included in the analysis Rice for human demand of a miscellaneous category. This miscellaneous Rice for livestock feed category was assumed to provide the same per- TOTAL COARSE GRAINS (including corn, barley, rye.'oatsl@ centage of the. food supply in the future as in the sorghum, millet, and mixed grains) Coarse giains,for human demand past. This -in turn means that (for all regions Coarse grains for livestock feed except Japan) the fraction of food needs met by TOTAL OILSEEDS. (meal equivalent, including principally fish consumption will be constant, unless substi- soybeans .but also cotton s 'eed@ linseed,' rapeseed, tuted:by another, food in the miscellaneous cate- fishmeal, sunflower meal, groun -dnuts, and copra), gory (e.g., bananas, goats, camels, etc.). Since Oilseeds for human foods, . Oilseeds for livestock feed food consumption is projected to grow dramati- TOTAL MEAT cally in all regions, it follows that (in the absence Beef (including veal) of major shifts to other foods in the miscellaneous Pork category) there,will be dramatic growth in the Poultry Mutton (including lamb) global fish catch. Such growth in fish catch TOTAL MILK AND DAIRY PRODIfCT� contradicts the Global 2000 Study's fisheries pro- Fluid Milk jections. Butter The fertilizer use @submodel supplements the Cheese GOL model by providing projections of total Eggs FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 551 TABLE 18-2 GOL Model Regions Regions Countries INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES United States United States Canada Canada Western Europe European Community Euro Six Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy Euro Three Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom Other Western Europe Austria, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland Japan Japan Oceania Australia, New Zealand South Africa Republic of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland CENTRALLY PLANNED COUNTRIES Eastern Europe Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland,. Romania, Yugoslavia Soviet Union Soviet Union China China LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES Middle America Mexico, Bahamas, Bermuda, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,, Belize, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama,, Trinidad and Tobago, other Caribbean isles South America Argentina Argentina Brazil Brazil Venezuela Venezuela Other South America Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay North Africa Middle East North Africa Middle East-high Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait. Libya, Oman, Qatar. Saudi income Arabia, United Arab Emirates I North Africa Middle East-low Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey; Yemen income (Sana), Yemen (Aden) Other Africa East Africa Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia Central Africa Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Empire; Chad, Congo, Benin, Ethiopia, Afars and Issas, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania. Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Upper Volta, Zaire South Asia India India Other South Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka Southeast Asia Thailand Thailand Other Southeast Asia Burma, Cambodia, Laos East Asia Indonesia Indonesia Other East Asia@-high income Hong Kong, Singapore,'South Korea, Taiwan, Brunei 'Other, East Asia-4ow. income Malaysia, Philippines Rest of World North Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, Cuba, Pacific Islands,* Papua-New Guinea@l "Rest of World" is also comprised of those regions and countries not yet explicitly modeled. Within the GOL model, 28 regions are repre- projections is provided in one of the colored maps sented-8 regions of industrialized (noncommu- used to illustrate the discussion on the Govern nist) countries, 3 regions of centrally planned ment's Global Model in Chapter 14. countries, and 17 regions of less developed coun- The GOL model relationships are said by De- tries,(LDCs). Table 18-2 lists the countries in- partment analysts to involve approximately 70-80 cluded under each of the 28 regions. A geographic percent of total world food. production and con- perspective on the methodology underlying these sumption, and an even larger share of, trade. All 552 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL regions have some crop equations, but not all nous components. These are largely based on the regions have livestock equations. The centrally judgment of Department analysts regarding future planned regions have collapsed international trade prospects for world grain, oilseed, and livestock equations only; production levels are determined products. However, since the endogenous variables exogenously, with consumption based on the are mutually interdependent, this an'alysis is interaction of the production and trade projec- suggestive only. In the case of wheat production tions. These relationships are summarized in Ta- in the low-income North Africa and Middle East ble 18-3. region, the factors contributing to the exogenous variable projections, as determined by Departmen- Basic Procedures tal analysis, are noted in Table 18-4. The impor- While there is no simple way to illustrate all the tance of exogenous area and production variables complex interactions involved conceptually in varies widely by region, depending on the extent solving a square matrix of 930 equations simulta- to whichthe agricultural sector is commercialized neously or in solving the many derivative submod- and on the extent to which resource availability el equations, some representative equations that -i.e., constrained arable area in low income focus on a particular food product in a particular North Africa and the Middle East-limit the region can suggest the nature of many of these impact of market factors on future growth. interactions. For the purpose of illustration, this T.he equation and associated calculations that section will briefly review the equations pertaining project domestic wheat consumption are pre- to wheat in the low-income North Africa and sented in Table 18-5. Again, changes in the Middle East region, as projected in the medium- exogenous variables account for over 90 percent growth, fising-energy-price scenario. of the increase in production between 1985 and 2000 for this region.* Given the importance of The GOL Model these exogenous projections, it should be noted in alcu . g that while the GOL model's population The three GOL equations and associated c passin lations directly related to domestic wheat produc- figures were adjusted to be consistent with the tion are presented in Table 18-4. As can be seen population projections provided by the Bureau of in the table, roughly 80 percent of the increase *in the Census, the adjustment was not exact (Table "grain area under cultivation" between 1970 and 18-6). Other minor discrepancies between the 1985 is due to an exogenous time trend estimate GOL exogenous projections and other Global involving a ju4gmentally adjusted coefficient. 2000 Study projections are also to be found in the Since roughly 45 percent of the increase in "wheat per capita GNP growth rate projections.. area under cultivation" over the same period is The equations used to estimate price relation- due to increases in "grain area under cultivation" ships for the low-income North Africa and Middle and roughly 45 percent due to another exogenous East region are presented in Table 18-7. As can time trend, about 80 percent of the increase in be seen, these relationships are not projected to I Iwheat area under cultivation" can be attributed change over the 1970-2000 period. The apparently to the influence of exogenous time trends and anomalous phenomenon of a demand price sub- judgmental adjustments.* Similar reasoning shows stantially below a supply price is explained by that about 85 percent of the projected increase in Department analysts as due to historic food sub- "domestic wheat production" over the 1970-85 sidy programs in several of the largest countries period is attributable to similar exogenous influ- of the region. Egypt, a major wheat consumer, ences (roughly 90 percent for the 1985-2000 pe- imports wheat concessionally and disposes of it riod). domestically at subsidized prices. Turkey, the This means that 85-90 percent of the increase major producer in the region, provides its farmers in wheat production included in the model's with a substantial subsidy for wheat production. projections is essentially an exogenous input to The negative margin between the region's supply the model---a premise rather than a conclusion of and demand prices points up one of the many the modeling exercise. Other "projections" of the problems inherent in breaking the world down model also incorporate significant, directly exoge- into multicountry regions. Regional projections are highly aggregated and consequently should be *Departmental analysts note that these exogenous trends seen as broad parameters rather than precise and adjustments are estimated on the basis of the Depart- ment's analysis of regional arable area potential and regional *Departmental analysts point out that this region is not one cropping patterns, developed prior to running the GOL of the detailed GOL regions and that market interaction is model. more important in most other regions TABLE 18-3 Variables Used in the GOL Model Total Grain Total Meat Total Dairy Products Coarse Oilseed Beef Beef Mutton Wheat Rice Grain Meal Cuts Products Pork Poultry & Lamb Milk Cheese Eggs Industrialized countries United States DF PA D PA DF PA F PA D P D P D P D P D D S D S P Canada DF PA D DF PA F PA D P D P D P D S D S P Euro Six DF PA D PA DF PA F PA D P D P D P D P D S D S P Euro Three DF PA D PA DF PA F PA D P D P D P D P D S D S P Other Western Europe DF PA D PA DF PA F PA D P D P D P D P D S' D S Japan D PA DF PA DF PA DF PA D P D P D P D P, D S D S P Australia/New Zealand DF PA D PA DF PA F PA D P D P D P D D S D S P South Africa D PA D DF PA F S D P D P P D P DS Less developed countries Middle America DF PA D PA DF PA F PA D P D P Argentina D PA D PA DF PA F PA D P D P D P Brazil D PA D PA DF PA F PA D P D P Z Venezuela D PA D PA DF PA F PA a Other South America D PA D PA DF PA F PA > 0 High-income North Africa and Middle East D PA D PA DF PA F Low-income North Africa and Middle East D PA D PA DF PA East Africa D PA D PA DF P A Central Africa D D S D S T India D PA D PA DF PA F PA Other South Asia D PA D PA D PA Thailand D D PA DF PA Other Southeast Asia D D PA DF S Indonesia D D PA D PA D PA High-income East Asia D PA D PA DF PA F PA Low-income East Asia D D PA DF PA S Centrally planned countries Eastern Europe T T T T T T Soviet Union T T T T T China T T T T T Rest of world T T T T D = Demand, total or nonfeed P = Production S Supply F = Derived demand for feed A = Area T Foreign trade, net TABLE 18-4 Representative Supply Equations: Wheat, Low-Income North Africa and Middle East (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case) Functional form Exogenous expressions Total grain area under cultivation 22,766.5 + (coefficient') (years since 1970) + 15.34 (wheat supply price) Variable values in 1970 23,965.0 0 0 78.13 Variable values projected for 1985 26,292.4 125 15 101.50 Variable values projected for 2000 28,475.6 110 30 144.52 Functional form Exogenous expressions M Wheat area un- total grain area z 1257.53 + 81 (years since 1970) .549 + 25.26 (wheat supply price) 11. 11 (coarse grain supply price) dcr cultivation under cultivation 0 Variable values in 1970 6 13,155.0 0 23,965.0 78.13 64.61 tv Variable values projected for 1985 t, 15,970.1 15 26,292.4 101.50 82.63 Variable values projected for 2000 18,911.2 30 28,475.6 144.52 128.10 Functional form Exogenous expressions index of YFars Domestic wheat 815 + @875 cost of since) ient 1970 coeffic, a wheat area wheat 15,194.09 13 's,@ rsJ + 1.05 under + 17.68 supply physical for incr YFn e production inputs" in yields, 1970 cultivation price Variable values in 1970 13,815.0 0 1. 0 0 13,155.0. 78.13 Variable values projected for 1985 21,309.1 0 11.5 275 15 15,970.1 101.50 Variable values projected for 2000 38,840.9 -.01 130 700 30 18,911.2 144.52 This coefficient provides for trend growth in arable area. The coefficient was estimated on the increasing energy prices are thus assumed to be (and are treated as) negligible for this function basis of multiple regression analyses defining changes in area as a function of time as well as for this region. investment and changes in real food product prices and input costs. The coefficient declines c This coefficient combines the effects on yield of (1) trend growth and (2) technological growth. beyond 1985 to 2000 due to provision for absolute constraints on arable area. The effect o, these two factors influencing yield i,% further combined with the effect of changes " This index is ordinarily used by the Department of Agriculture to evaluate policies involving in area, to calculate changes in production. In 1985, the 275,000-ton annual increase is based on accelerated growth in fertilizer usage. According to Department of Agriculture analysis. the a 10 kilogram per hectare trend increase in yields, plus the equivalent of 165,000 tons of annual downward adjustment of this index for the year 2000 projection is due to the need to intensify increase in production due to trend increase in yields on base and expanded area. The the effects of declining returns to scale for fertilizer user. However, for other regions, a similar respective figures to 2000 are 20 kilograms per hectare and 4R000 tons of annual increase due adjustment is made to reflect rising energy prices. No such adjustment was made for this to area change. region, since its agricultural methods are not considered to be energy intensive. The effects of TABLE 18-5 Representative Demand Equations: Wheat, Low-income North Africa and Middle East (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case) Z 0 Functional form > Exogenous expressions years Domestic wheat Per capi case gain rice a -at consumption 88.07 + 19,771 + .05 GNPgro%1t+ P gp'o"t 61.62 dw=d + 31.31 demand + 23.72 demand 171 b rate rate J price price price Variable values in 1970 19,771.0 0 0 10 64.17 63.15 125.00 Variable values projected for 1985 29,599.0 .0330 .0235 1'5 87.54 82.63 198.21 Variable values projected for 2000 42,696.2 .0429 .0229 f") 130.56 128.10 274.88 All wheat consumed in this region is assumed to be used directly as food for humans and not assumptions (as reported in the GOL model output) to those developed for the Global 2000 as food for livestock. Study (see Chapter " is problematical and could not be readily resolved by Department Average annual growth rate since 1970. The relationship of these per capita GNP growth rate analysts. tit 556 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL TABLE 18-6 Comparison of Average Annual Projected Population Growth Rates, Medium Series 1975-85 1975-2000 Region/Country Agri- Census Dif- Agri- Census Dif- cultureb Bureau 0 ference culture b Bureau I ference Industrialized countries 0.69 0.59 -.12 0.52 0.63 -.11 United States 0.70 0.75 0 0.55 0.60 -.05 Western Europe 0.33 0.38 0 0.43 0.38 +.05 Japan 0.87 0.76 +.01 0.59 0.70 -.11 Centrally planned countries 1.25 1.17 0 1.21 1.22 -.01 Eastern Europe 0.68 0.65 0 0.57 0.62 -.05 U.S.S.R. 0.92 0.89 +.01 0.68 0.78 -.10 People's Republic of China 1.41 1.31 +.01 1.42 1.41 +.01 Developing countries 2.49 2.49 +.01 2.37 2.41 -.04 Latin America 2.87 2.84 +.04 2.61 2.69 -.08 Africa and Asia 2.40 2.39 +.10 2.30 2.33 -.03 World 1.78 1.78 +.01 1.77 1.76 +.01 Categories are those of the Department of Agriculture. Comparable Census Bureau Categories are: Agriculture Census Bureau Industrialized countries = United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Western Europe Centrally planned countries = U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe. People's Republic ofChina Developing countries = Developing countries, excluding People's Republic of China Africa and Asia (North Africa/Middle East, other de- veloping African countries. South Asia. Southeast Asia, East Asia) I= Africa and Asia, excluding People's Republic of China b As summarized by Department of Agriculture analysts for this chapter; not perfectly consistent with Table 6-1, also prepared by the Department. As summarized, on a comparable basis, by Census Bureau analysts. TABLE 18-7 Representative Wheat Trade and Price Equations: Low-Income North Africa and Middle East (Medium-Growth,, Rising Energy Price Case) Functional form: Wheat imports Domestic wheat consumption - Domestic wheat production 1970 5378.0 19771.0 13815.0 1985 8289.9 29599.0 21309.1 2000 4138.3 42969.2 38830.9 Functional form: Wheat supply price 13.96 + Wheat demand -price 1970 78.13 64.17 1985 101.5 87.54 2000 144.52 130.56 Functional form: Wheat demand price 1.27 + Wheat trade price 1970 64.17 62.90 1985 87.54 86.27 2000 130.56 129.29 projections to be broken down into individual to allow the use of a major trading country's price country totals. - as a world price proxy. Thus, the U.S. price No single equation or subset of equations in: the serves as a proxy for the world market wheat model -sets the international trade price of wheat. price, while Thai export prices and Australian- The trade price is determined by the solution of New Zealand export prices play the same proxy the model's multiple wheat production and con- roles for rice and livestock products, respectively. sumption equations. However, the export prices The continuing projected role of the United of the major surplus producers and the import States as the world's largest exporter of wheat prices in the deficit regions of the world are linked can be seen in Table 18-8, which shows the U.S. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 557 TABLE 18-8 Projected Net Exporters of Wheat (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case)- (Million metric tons) Average Annual Growth 1970 1985 2000 Percent Exports % Exports % Exports % 1970-85 1985-210M Share Share Share United States 17,881 39 48,838 58 58,226, 57 7 1 Australia-New Zealand 8,300 18 12,165 15 16,084 16 3 2 Argentina 1,640 4 6,410 8 13,974 14 10 5 Canada 11,750 26 15,288 18 7,311 7 2 -1 South Africa 60 - 839 1 4,108 4 19 11 U.S.S.R. 4,799 11 127 - 1,995 2 -22 20 India - - - - 166 - - - Euro Six 1,170 3 - - - - - - 'Total 45,600 101h 83,667 100 101,862 100 4 1 a These figures are representative of the lowest level of disaggregation within the GOL model and are cited to illuminate the GOL methodology. While Department analysts are reasonably confident of the GOL model's computations at the higher levels of aggregation presented in Chapter 6, they would prefer that these more disaggregated projections not be cited as Global 2000 Study pr*ctions. 'Does not sum to 100 due to rounding. share of international wheat exports growing from the rapidity with which the submodel was devel- 39 percent in 1970 to 57 percent in the year 2000. oped, Department of Agriculture analysts were This growth is based on a 109 percent increase -in reluctant to provide the exact form of the function total U.S. wheat production between 1970 and for publication. But they noted that the function 2000. Argentina's total wheat production is pro- assumed a 0.05 price elasticity with respect to jected to increase even more-222 percent-over area (that is, a I percent increase in real returns the same period, and South Affica's total wheat to farmers after costs) was projected to generate a production is projected to increase 406 percent.* 0.05 percent increase in arable area-area in These projected increases in total wheat pro- crops as well as area in less intensive uages, duction lie behind the projected 123 percent including pasture - in the absence of binding increase in world wheat exports which is associ- constraints. They also noted that positive time ated with the projected 106 percent increase in the trends generally represented improvements in land real trade price of wheat over the 1970-2000 and crop technologies as well as investment in period. Similar increases are also projected for' reclamation, development of improved soft man- some countries that are not net exporters. For agement practices, and other improvements. Neg- example, total Wheat production in East Africa is ative time trends, in contrast, incorporated varia- projected to grow 128 percent* and in Brazil, 277 bles such as urbanization, which work to contract percent.@ rather than expand arable area over time. The projections for this region are not, in fact, The Three Submodels calculated by this function but instead represent The arable area submodel's functional variables binding constraints affecting the maximum ara .ble and variable values for the same case and the area assumed to be available. The maximum same region are shown in Table 18-9. Because of arable area is assumed to decline by 3 percent over the 1971-2000 period, from 94 million to 91 million hectares. This decline reflects increased *Department analysts point out that because of interannual urbanization and its claim on land in a region with variation in food production levels, the selection of 1970.as a number of countries with severe area problems. a base year for the purpose of discussion (because it was Because the total grain area under cultivation is used originally to calibrate the GOL model) may be some- what misleading, since 1970 tended to be a year of relatively projected to grow by 19 percent, &om .24.0 to 28.5 low food production levels. For example, the U.S. share of million hectares over the. same period-and since world wheat exports was roughly 45 percent in 1973-75. only part of the increase can be expected to be in Similarly, the 109 percent increase in U.S. wheat production the form of multiple cropping-the projections to the year 2000, using 1970 as a base, represents only a 45 imply the gradual switch of pasture and other tow percent increase in production over the levels of the 1973- 75 period. This should be remembered in evaluating all intensity land uses toward more intensive crop 1970-2000 comparisons. cultivation. Although the Global 2WO Study's 558 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL TABLE 18-9 Arable Area Submodel, Low-Income North Africa and Middle East Medium- Growth, Rising Energy Price Case Functional form: Arable Area =f (GOL aggregate food price index," years since 1971-75) 1970 91.5 million hectares" 100.0 0 1985 92.5 million hectares" 112.12 12 2000 91.0 million hectares, 129.27 27 An index of grain, oilseed, and livestock producer prices, weighted by quantities produced from the GOL model results.. The maximum potential area for this region was exogenously estimated for 1970 to be 94.0 million hectares, but the potential was not reached in 1970. Exogenously estimated maximum potentiad area for this region for the year specified. Calculations developed using the function on the right-hand side ofthe equation exceeded this value and as a result the maximum potential area was used instead. TABLE 18-10 Total Food Submodel, Low-Income North Africa and Middle East Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case Functional Form: Total food production index" coefficient X GOL food production index", 1970 102 1.02001 100 1985 146 1.02001 144 2000 253 1.02001 248 Functional Form: Total food consumption index" coefficient X GOL food consumption index" 1970 102 1.02001 100 1985 167 1.02001 164 2000 276 1.02001 271 Weighted caloric index. Relationship estimated based on historic data. A caloric index of grain, oilseed, and livestock production, weighted by quantities produced from GOL model results. dA caloric index of grain, oilseed, and livestock consumption, weighted by quantities produced from GOL model results. TABLE 18-11 Fertilizer Submodel, Low-Income North Africa and Middle East Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case Functional form: Fertilizer Usage coefficient" X weighted caloric value of crop products" 1971-75 1,950 0.13 15,000 1985 4,250 0.17 25,175 2000 8,750 0.24 35,875 In thousands of nutrient tons' hEstimated. based on the -historic relationship for the region combined with cross-sectional relationships involving the physical response of crops to increasingly intense fertilizer application. The increase in the coefficient represents the effect of declining returns to scale. Caloric value of crop production calculated using the results of the total food production submodel (excluding livestock production). environmental analysis indicates that additional increased multiple cropping and increased cultiva- large '-scale land degradation is occurring for rea- tion of land previously used for pasture. Total sons other than urbanization, this was not taken food consumption is projected to increase even into. account in the submodel. faster, using a ftinction similar to that for total . The total food submodel's functional form and food production, as may be seen in the second variables for the same case and region with. regard half of Table 18-10. to total food production are shown in Table 18- The fertilizer use submodel's functional form 10. As can be seen from *the first half of the table, and variables 'for the same case and region are GOL food production is projected to increase an shown in Table 18-11. Fertilizer use (for food average 2.5 percent per year during the 197(W985 crops) for this region is projected to icrease at period and to increase to an average 3.7 percent about 5 percent per year throughout the 1970- per year during the 1985-2000 period. During the 2000 period. same periods, total food production is expected to Summaries of the key GOL model and submo- increase at roughly the same rates, suggesting del projections for this region are presented in FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 559 TABLE 18-12 Summary Supply Statistics: Low-Income North Africa'and Middle Eada Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case Average Annual Percent Growth 1970 1985 2000 1970-85 1985-2000 POPULATION AND PER CAPITA GNP Population (millions) 116.5 165.1 229.8 2.4 2.2 Per Capita GNpb (constant 1970 dollars) 188 663 3.3 5.3 ARABLE AREA Total arable area (million hectares) 91.5 92.5 91.0 0.1 -0.1 Total grain area under cultivationc (million hectares) 24.10 26.3 28.5 0.6 0.5 Wheat area under cultivation (million, hectares) 13.2 16.0 18.9 1.3 1.1 Rice area under cultivation (million hectares) 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.9 1.5 Coarse grains area under cultivation (million hectares) 10.3 9.5 8.6 -0.5 -0.7 FERTILIZER USE AND YIELDS Fertilizer use for food crops (million nutrient tons) 2.0 4.3 8.8 5.2 4.9 Total grain yield' (tons per hectare) 1.2 1.6 2.3 1.9 2.4 Wheat yield (tons per hectare) 1.1 1.3 2.1 i.1 3.2 Rice yield (tons per hectare) 3.4 3.5 3.6 0.2 0.2 Coarse grain yield (tons per hectare) 1.3 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.1 PRODUCTION Total food production (1970 = 100) 100 144 248 2.5 3.7 GOL food production (1970 = 100) 100 144 248 2.5 3.7 Total grain productionc (million metric tons) 29.0 41.9 64.7 2.5 2.9 Wheat production (million metric tons) 13.8 21.3 38.8 2.9 4.1 Rice production (million metric tons) 1.9 2.7 3.5 2.4 1.7 Coarse grain jrodu'ction (million metric tons) 13.3 17.9 22.4 2.0 1.5 PERCENT OF WORLD SUPPLY Percent of world total grain production, 2.7 4.2 4.7 Percent of world wheat production 4.3 8.2 11.6 Percent of world rice production 0.9 1.4 .1.2 Percent of world coarse grain production 2.4 3.3 2.9 'These figures are representative of the lowest level of disaggregation within the GOL model and arc therefore cited to illuminate the GOL methodology. While Department analysts are reasonably confident of the GOL model's computations at the higher levels of aggregation presented in Chapter 6. they would prefer that these more disaggregated projections not be cited as Global 2000 Study projections. b The relationship of these exogenous growth rate assumptions (as reported in the GOL model output) to those developed for the Global 2000 Study (see Chapter 3) is problematical and could not be readily resolved by Department analysts. 'Total grain includes wheat. rice, and coarse grains but eicliides pulses. As shown in Table 18-3, there are no equations in the GOL model that represent pulses, meat, or -meat and dairy products on a disaggregatid basis for this region. Tables 18-12 and 18-13. Since GOL meat projec- of total grain consumption (including pulses) used tions are generally not computed for individual for livestock food in the LDCs is relatively LDC regions (but for LDCs. as an aggregate, constant at roughly 10 percent, whereas it grows instead), they are summarized separately in Table from roughly 70 percent to rou hly 80 percent in 9 18-14. Over the 1970-2000 period, the percentage the industrialized nations over the same period. 560 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL TABLE 18-13 Summary Demand and Trade Statistics: Low-Income North Africa and Nfiddle East" (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case) Average Annual Percent Growth 1970 1985 2000 1970-85 198.5-2000 POPULATION AND PER CAPITA GNP Population (millions) 116.5 165.1 229.8 2.4 L2 Per Capita GNP" (constant 1970 dollars) 188 306 663 3.3 .5.3 CONSUMPTION Total food consumption (1970 = 100) 100 164 271 3.4 3.4 GOL food consumption (1970 = 100) 100 164 271 3.4 3.4 Total grain consumption, (million metric tons) 35.3 52.8 77.5 2.7 :2.6 Wheat food usage (million metric tons) 19.8 29.6 43.0 2.7 2.5 Rice food usage (million metric toils) 1.5 2.2 3.7 2.6 .3.5 Coarse grains food usage (million metric toils) 9.4 14.3 21.2 2.8 17 Coarse grains feed usage (million metric tons) 4.6 6.7 9.6 2.5 2.4 NET TRADE Total grain imports `(million metric tons) 5.3 11.0 12.8 5.0 1.0 Wheat imports (million metric tons) 5.4 8.3 4.1 2.9 -4.6 Rice imports (million metric tons) -0.4 -0.4 0.2 0.0 - Coarse grains imports (million metric tons) 0.3 3.2 8.5 17.1 6. 7 REAL PRICES Wheat trade price (constant 1970 dollars per metric Ion) 62.90 86.27 129.29 2.1 2.7 Rice trade price (constant 1970 dollars per metric ton) - 204.21 280.85 - I I Coarse grain trade price (constant 1970 dollars per metric tait) 80.03 125.50 3.0 -These figures are representative of the lowest level of disaggregarion within the GOL model and are cited to illuminate the GOL methodology. While Department analysts are reasonably confident of the GOL model's computations at the higher levels of aggregation presented in Chapter 6, they would prefer that these more disaggregated projections not be cited as Global 2000 Study projections. h The relationship of these exogenous growth rate assumptions (as reported in the GOL model output) to those developed for the Global 2000 Study (see Chapter 3) is problematical and could not be readily resolved by Department analysts. 'Total grain includes wheat, rice, and coarse grains but excludes pulses. As shown in Table 18-3, them are no equations in the GOL model that represent pulses, meat, or meat and dairy products on a disaggregated basis for this region. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 561 TABLE 18-14 Summary Meat -Statistics: Less Developed Countries and Industrialized Nationsa (Medium-Growth, Rising Energy Price Case) Average Annual Percent Growth 1970 1985 2WO 1970-85 1985-2WO MEAT PRODUCTION (million metric tons) Less developed countries 6.5 10.5 19.6 3.2 4.2 Industrialized nations 46.6 63.1 75.2 2.0 1.2 MEAT CONSUMPTION (Million metric tons) Less developed countries 5.6 9.3 16.1 3.4 3.7 Industrialized nations 47.3 63.2 77.1 2.0 1.3 PER CAPITA MEAT CONSUMPTION' (kilograms) Less developed countries 3.2 3.7 4.6 1.0 1.5 Industrialized nations 67.6 82.9 94.3 1.4 0.9 PER CAPITA GRAIN CONSUMPTION FOR FOOD' (kilograms) Less developed countries 155.9 181.7 188.6 1.0 0.2 Industrialized nations 172.5 170.2 163.4 -0.1 -0.3 PER CAPITA GRAIN CONSUMPTION FOR FEED' (kilograms) Less developed countries 17.0 19.4 23.8 0.9 1.4 Industrialized nations 362.0 440.1 585.6 1.3 1.9 @As shown in Table 18-3, there are no equations in the GOL model that represent meat supply and demand for the centrally planned countries. However,.meat products are disaggregated within the GOL model for the less developed countries and industrialized nations, also as shown in Table 18-3. Not perfectly consistent with Tables 6-6 and 6-8, due to discrepancies noted in footnote b ofTable 1". Total grain includes wheat, rice, and coarse grains but excludes pulses. As shown in Table 18-3, there are no equations in the GOL model that represent pulses, meat, or meat and dairy products on a disaggregated basis for this region. 19 Renewable Resources There is at present no adequate, formal and goods." No agents keep track of free goods, and precise means of projecting world trends for the incentive for the systematic monitoring of renewable resources such as water, forestry, fish- renewable resources, particularly on a world level, eries, soil, and the environment. In some cases has been almost nonexistent. Thus firm concepts (fisheries and forestry), agency experts have hu- and data bases for making forecasts are lacking. As mored the staff of the Global 2000 Study by free goods in our economic system, renewable re- developing world forecasts of renewable resources sources have been the dependent variables of to the year 2000, but with one exception,* none commodities with higher priorities. The fate of has presented the Study with a forecast based on forest lands is apt to be determined by agricultural an explicit mathematical model. In fact, all were or grazing needs; water, as it flows from one use to convinced that in their areas of expertise descrip- another, becomes laden with wastes; estuaries are tive and judgmental analyses were more accurate, wiped out in the course of urbanization. All these objective, and illuminating than projections based circumstances baffle attempts at measurement, on mathematical models, given the present state thwart record keeping, and make precision dif- of the art. ficult, so that the exact future of things tends to Description and judgmental analyses are some- become "anybody's guess." times depreciated as "unscientific." However, it In the last decade, local scarcities have wrought is just as possible to be scientific without being a few changes in the free goods mentality. The mathematical as it is to be mathematical without inclination to keep track of water, forest, fish, and being scientific. Indeed, applying mathematical soil resources has grown stronger. New technolo- techniques (e.g., regression analysis) prior to the gies have made the keeping of accounts easier. development of an adequate conceptual theory or Satellite photography has proved useful in gather- hypothesis leads to pseudo-scientific reasoning- ing global data, and computer-based data process- and often to precise but incorrect conclusions. ing has expedited the storing, sorting, and digest- Therefore, the renewable resource projections ing of information. The primary bottleneck to should not be considered less credible or less effective analysis at this moment is insufficient scientific because they are not mathematical. In institutional recognition of ecological concepts and fact, it might be more appropriate to respect the the absence of stable analytic institutions and analysts for applying tools appropriate to present coordination of efforts. Work is being done at limitations of knowledge in the areas in which universities scattered throughout the country and they are working. in various departments of government, and con- This chapter will discuss the methods by which cepts have been developed, but there is often no the renewable resource projections in this volume consensus--and in some cases, no communica- were made. All such forecasts were derived from tion--among experts working on the same re- verbal models, and each description of the method source problem. Where there is consensus, the used will be preceded by a few generalizations as means for implementing findings about effective to why verbal models were preferable and why resource management are often lacking. good quantitative forecasts could not be made for A second trait of renewable resources that that particular resource. thwarts projection is the tendency for one re- , What do water, forestry, fisheries, soil, and the source problem to become inextricably inter- environment have in common that make them twined with another. Consequently, problems are difficult to forecast? Por one thing, in the United difficult to examine in isolation. Hydrologic re- States all have historically been considered "free gimes and soil problems are greatly influenced by watershed management, which often is a forestry *The Brookhaven National Laboratory developed the math- matter. Forestry, in turn, is influenced by at- ematical model of the the energy sector's impacts on the tempts to extend agricultural production and by environment described at the end of this chapter. institutional questions, such as what cutting prac- 563 564 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL tices are permitted and how much grazing is Water is a fluid substance in more ways than permissable -in forest lands. Where wood is used one. On the supply side, it slips through all as a fuel, the prices and availabilities of alternative' attempts to achieve a uniform definition of "sup- fuels is also critical. in predicting the future of ply." Does one inventory surface Water? Grx)und- forestry. water? What about multiple usage? How does one Lastly, renewable resources are difficult to take into account water that would be available if fdrecast because their dynamics frequently include the transportation system were adequate'? A dif- circumstances where cause and effect are widely ferent answer to any of the above questions could separated, in time, space, or in both. Trees halve or double "water supply." planted now will not become harvestable timber On the demand side, it is difficult to hold water until after the year 2000. Gradual increases in to fixed relationships. Where water has been' intensity of exploitation of soil systems may have considered a "free good," the pattern of water no noticeable effect until a severe drought sets in. utilization is - the product of complex forces of Toxins can be carried through the food chain for cultural and technological evolution. The amounts long periods of time until they become sufficiently of water required for specific industrial processes concentrated in the higher predators and cause often vary by a factor of two or more, without severe damage. In such situations, it is often not significant cost savings associated with the more quite clear what is happening until after, it has water-intensive process.@ Per capita consumption happened, and thechances of subtle changes in in national cross sections does not closely follow renewable resourre systems being overlooked are per capita incomes. In short, there is very little to high'. hang onto in making predictions; water'use pat- tems are highly variable and could assume forms Water quite different from those we observe today The institutional history of water projections is should water scarcity become a problem. an interesting contrast to those of other resources. Given this nebulousness, the methodology'of The U.S. Geological Survey has taken an interest global water forecasts is quite arbitrary, and the in.. predicting water supply since the time of forecasts themselves not especially meaningful- Theodore Roosevelt, and national assessments which is why Chapter 9, "Water Projections," have taken place on a regular basis since the confined itself largely to descriptions of the nature 1950s. The net experience of these years of of -water as a resource and explanations of why forecasting has turned the Survey somewhat meaningful forecasts are not possible. The two against. attempting to make forecasts of a general forecasts of global water demand for the year 2000 nature over broad regions, using simple quantita- were chosen not for their excellence but because tive measures. They have found local m'qw'n*es other global water forecasts could not be found. and "problem identification" approaches more The two estimates dfffer by more than an Orderdf useful. The reason, as described in an early draft magnitude, and the assumptions on which they of the water forecast for the Global 2000 Study, is were based are not publicly documented. that: The water forecast chapter concludes with a statement to the effect that local water shortage There is really no such thing as a global water problems will be much more common by 2000 economy in the same sense as for example, than they are now, but that quantitative forecasts minerals and fuels. A surplus in one place is of on a global basis are simply not possible. little use elsewhere. Cost limits the transport of water. Water problems are usually local, rather than global. Fisheries Thus, while in other areas there has been mount- No U.S. government agency is vested @with the ing pressure in the government to keep national responsibility to make long-term global forecasts, inventories-and global inventories where there is of the fish catch, but the Global 2000 Stud, turned reason to-4he trend in water forecasting has been to the one agency capable of producing such one of increasing emphasis on problem-specific f6recasts: the National Marine Fisheries Service studies. Nevertheless, the Water Resources Divi- of the Commerce Department's National Oceanic sion of the U.S. Geological Survey provided the and Atmospheric Administration. It was decided Global 2000 Study with some global water fore- that, given the present state of the art of fisheries casts, describing how they were constructed and modeling, a verbal description of the operational adding commentary for the purpose of identifying characteristics of marine resource behavior com- the" problems involve Id. bined with inferences drawn .from historical data RENEWABLE RESOURCES 565 on the fish catch would better serve the Study's A separate section is devoted to the problems of purposes than output from a formal model. Thus, the humid. tropics. the fisheries f@recasts (Chapter,7) are based on The strongest stru. ctural concept developed was empirical evidence and on ecological reasons why the distinction between forest usage patterns in certain outcomes can or cannot.be expected. the industrialized countries and in the less devel- Ecological analysis can provide statements oped countries. The former countries have sub- about potential supply but not about demand. In stantially more wood per capita and use their the marine resources forecast, statements of de- forest resources primarily in forest products iridus- mand were synopsized from FAO sources and tries, while the latter, with less wood per capita, from the work 'of, Frederick W ' Bell and his use.a. large portion of the.ir wood as fuel. The ,two colleagues at the National Marine Fisheries Ser*v_ patterns are expected to lead to very different ice. Both demand forecasts were. based on as- consequences by 2000.. No formal. mathematical sumptions 'about population and income growth structure was developed. and income elasticities of dernands for marine products. The Bell analysis also took into.account Environment supply constraints and the, pressure on prices generated by inelastic supplies. As the Global 2000 Study was originally de- The. concepts, precepts,, and methodologies of signed, each agency forecast was to include an, ecology and economics are fundamentally differ- analysis of the environmental ramifications of its ent and stand at odds with one another. This,, projections. As forecasts were received, the Study disagreement appears clearly in the fisheries re- team began to realize that the original design was source forecast. The ecologically derived supply unrealistic. While most agencies have some capac- estimates state that it will be reasonable to expect ity to do environmental analyses, that capability a global r catch of around 60 million metric tons in can seldom -be adapted to making long-term fore- the year 2000-if environmental degradation does casts ona global basis. The analyses of environ- not reduce the basic productivity of the oceans. mental implications appended to most of the The economically derived FAO projection states forecasts were minimal or nonexistent. As a result that demand for marine harvests. in 1985 will have. it was necessary for the Global 2000 Staff to reached 1106.5 million metric tons with the i .mpli-, contract out part of the environmental analysis cation -that it will probably increase thereafter. and undertake part of this' work itself On the The economic estimate by Bell projects. that basis of recommendations made by the staffs of demand in the year 20.00 will have reached 83.5 the'Environmental. Protection Agency and the million metric tons. It is left to the reader to Council on Environmental Quality, the water-en- reconcile the difference between supply and de- vironmentforeca9t was contracted to Threshhold, mand forecasts. Inc., a Washington, D.C.,' environmental consult- ing company; the manne-environment section was Forestry contracted to the Marine Laboratory at Duke University and to George Woodwell at Woods No U.S. government agency keeps records or Hole Marine Biological Laboratory; and the seC7 does analysis of forestry on a worldwide basis. tion on habitat loss 'and species extinction was The Global.2000 Study turned to the CIA's produced by the World Wildlife Fund, Washing- Environmental and Resources Center for assist- ton, D.C. ance. The projections provided by the Center The energy-enviromnent forecast was alone in were based on a review of the'literature of forest proceeding more or less according to the original economics and ecology, combined with informed plan. The Department of Energy contracted to judgment. Where sources were in conflict-as, for have Brookhaven National Laboratory prepare an example, when ecologic and anthropologic fore- analysis of the environmental implications of the casts came to different conclusions about sustain- energy projections. This was interpreted by the ability of slash-and-burn agriculture-the source Glo bal 2000 Study Staff after receiving comments with the stronger empirical evidence was pre- and ctiticisms from analysts at the Environmental ferred. Protection Agency. The focus of the projections presented in Chap- The energy-environment forecast was'based on ter 8 is the anticipated supply and demand for a computer analysis of the energy use figures forest products and the costs incurred in supplying forecast by the energy model. The methodology, them. These variables were considered separately f6cus, arid structure of that model is described for each of the major forest'regions of the world. below. Other sections of the environmental fore- 566 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL casts were made using the normal, judgmental Aries'was developed using estimates for, end-use techniques of scholarly research. distribution of fuel types from the WAES (Work- Environment was defined for this study as shop on Alternative Energy Strategies) study.* "ability to support fife," and emphasis was placed The WAES scenarios used in both these cases for on qualitative and quantitative aspects of the IEES low, medium, and high rates of growth ability to support human life and to stabilize and were, for 1985: sustain environmental systems. Particular atten- low WAES scenario D tion was given to situations where large portions medium Weighted average of high of the world's population or surface areas would and low be affected, or where widespread irreversible high WAES scenario C damage'might be incurred by changes affecting and for 1990: the environment. Environmental forecasts followed the basic low WAES scenario D7 . medium and high Scaled from 1985 ftures *in structure of the other forecasts. For each main forecast, an environmental forecast was made. proportion to total fuel Both the ways in which the environment might be use expected to be influericed, according to the fore- Estimates for the centrally planned economies cast, - and the ways in which environmental were based on the estimates for Eastern Europe changes might influence the forecast were dis- and China presented in the 1977 Annual Review cussed. Where there was a clear overlapping of of Energy.t subject matter, as with agriculture, forestry, and Finally, the IEES estimates included neither water, the subject matter was apportioned accord- base-case figures nor estimates for years after ing to the analyst's best judgment. 1990, which limited the Brookhaven analysis to projections for 1985 and 1990. Energy-Environment Mo del The Energy Systems Network Simulator Mechanics of the ESNS Model (ESNS) was developed at Brookhaven National Mechanically, the IEES adaptation of the Laboratory in 1974. The model is designed to ESNS model is simply an accounting device that permit highly detailed analyses of the envirortmen- calculates annual emissions inventories. Basically, tal impacts of energy flows in the U.S. - energy it entails no more than repeated use, of the system. It feeds on data from the Brookhaven following formula and summations across end-use Energy Data Base and other data bases. (se6toral) categories and across fuel-type cate- Through a process of aggregation of disaggre- gories: gated categories, simplification of mathemat- ical structure, and replication of the simplified Total regional energy end use (by fuel type) structure for various regions, the U.S. ESNS x Emissions generated (by emission type) pe r unit of energy end use (by fuel type) model has been adapted to interface with the Total regional emissions generated (by International Energy Evaluation System (IEES) emission type). described in Chapters 10 and 20. The adaptation was not made without dffficulty. Mathematically, the operations are carried out The International version required assumptions using matrix algebra; thus the multiplier, mulfipli- about emissions control standards on a worldwide cand, and product in the ibove formula are all basis. Without estimates of pollution control tabular blocks of numbers (matrices) when the measures to be taken in other regions of the actual operations are carried out. Sample values world, the Brookhaven analysts assumed that for one of the 187t matrix multiplications per- U.S. regulatory practices would be adopted on a formed by the model matrices are. shown in'. the global basis. While a few countries may adopt accompanying example. more stringent regulatory policies than the U.S., Identical calculations were performed for each most will probably apply lower standards.. Thus of the 17 regions considered in the model. Similar the model tends to understate emissions. The output from the IEES model, in particular *Energy.- Global Prospects 1985-2000, New' York: McGraw- the estimates for fuel consumption by end uses Hill, 1977. for the LDCs, the OPEC regions, and the cen- _tJack M. Hollander, ed., Annual Review ofEnervy vol. 2, trally planned economies, were far too aggregated Palo Alto, Calif., 1977. for use in. the ESNS model. The required degree tEleven emissions categories are estimated for each.of 17 of disaggreg'ation for the LDCs and OPEC coun- regions. RENEWABLE RESOURCES 567 Sample Calculation Performed by the ESNS Model Fuel Use, Canada, 1985 (1015 Btu per year) Household Electric Synthetic Indus- Trans- and Raw Energy Utilities Fuels trial portation Commer- Materials Sector cial Coal -0.55 -0.11 0.14 0 0.01 0 0 Oil -0.11 0 0.65 2.55 1.34 0.44 0.55 Gas -0.06 0.11 0.82 0 0.74 0 0.40 Electric 1.48 .0 0.64 0 0.66 0 - 0.18 Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hydro-geothermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MULTIPLIED BY Sulfur Dioxide (in short tons) per 1012 Btu of Fuel* Hydro- Coal. oil Gas Electric Nuclear Geo- thermal Electric utilities 202.0 320.0 0.293 0 0 0 Synthetic fuels 31.7 0 0 0 0, 0 Industrial 603.0 .393.0 0.291 0 0 0 0 transportation 0 15.0 0 0 0 Household and commercial 1,240.0 113.0 0.276 0 0. 01 Raw materials 603.0 393.0 0.291 '6 0 0 Energy'sectois 663.0 393.0 0.291 .0: 0 0 EQUALS Sulfur Dioxide Generation (in 105 short tons) per Year, Canada, 1985 Hydro- Coal Oil Gas Electric Nuclear Geo- thermal Electric utilities 78.78 35.20 0.018 0 0 0 Synthetic fuels 3.80 0 0 0 0 0 Industrial 84.42 235.8 0.230 0 0 0 Transportation 0 41.4 0 0 01 0 Household and commercial 12.40 136.7 0.209 0 0 0 Raw materials 0 169.0 0 0 0 0 Energy sector 0 220.1 0.116 0 0 0 'Me same matrix is used for all regions, all years. calculations were performed for each of the fol- Tritium emissions lowing I I classes of environmental effects: Populationexposure to ionizing radiation Carbon dioxide Solid high-level (nuclear) wastes Carbon monoxide Given the uncertain nature of the IEES outputs, Sulfur dioxide these calculations are only first approximations. Oxides of nitrogen As the model's structure is static and linear, the Hydrocarbon emissions Particulate emissions quality of outcomes are totally dependent on the Land use associated with fuel combustion quality of the input and the emissions coefficients. (e.g., powerplants) The model's structure will shed no insight into the Solid waste dynamics of the question being asked. Much of 568 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL the data used for fuel-specific end-use estimates The ESNS results produced for the Global 2000 of energy consumption for the centrally planned Study are little more than a demonstration of how economies has had to be guessed at or inferred. global emissions inventories could be developed if The reliability of the IEES inputs used to drive time, money; and data were made available to the model is not above question (as described in undertake the calculations. Beyond this, the, Chapter 20). model does provide a first-cut approximation of) environmental effects of the energy sector. For alb And it is almost certain that the emissions its arbitrary assumptions, this estimate may bei estimates for many regions--because they antici- more realistic than the intuitive guesses that mostl pate the adoption of U.S. new-source emission- experts would make without a mathematical cal@: standards--are too low. culating device. 20 Energy The Energy Information Administration of the Key,Analytic Methodology U.S. Department of Energy has lead responsibility within the federal government for collecting and All of -the international quantitative forecasts disseminating energy information and performing provided by the Energy Information Administra- energy forecasting. The agency produces short-, tion are based on the International Energy Evalu- mid-, and long-range forecasts both of individual ation System (IEES). IEES is a mathematical fuels and of integrated multifuel, multisector bal- representation of the world energy market and is ances. The international forecasts, which make therefore only a partial equilibrium model. The use of both domestic and international work done heart of IEES is a linear programming matrix that by several divisions of the agency, are the respon- combines large amounts of international energy sibility of the International Analysis Division. market data to make the final forecasts. The linear The International Analysis Division in the Of- programming model approximates the workings of fice of Integrative Analysis of the Energy Infor- a competitive economic market. Supplying the mation Administration produces forecasts of inter- data to the matrix are six IEES "submodels," national energy statistics for use within the which may themselves be forecasting computer Department of Energy. To reflect the range of models maintained by the International Analysis uncertainty in basic assumptions, the forecasts are Division or may be simply procedures for obtain- usually made in multiple sets, each based on ing and adapting data from outside sources. The different policy or scenario assumptions. As in six submodels are named for the type of data they most forecasting exercises, the Division feels yield for use in the linear programming matrix: more confident of its methods in performing demand; supply; transportation; electric utilities; relative impact analyses than in making single refining; and miscellaneous conversions. point estimates. Analyses are focused on the The methods used to produce the input data to' industrialized countries and are done in less detail the linear program vary with the submodel. Each for the entire world. The only documented set of of the six submodels relies on considerable outside forecasts produced by the Division to date are data; even the submodels that consist primarily of those contained in World Energy Prospects, a computer models require input data from outside report prepared in what was then the Federal the International Analysis Division. How (and Energy Administration (FEA) and released for how much) each submodel processes its input limited official use in mid-1977. data to produce data for the linear program varies, To make its forecasts for the Global 2000 Study, however. The demand submodel produces original the International Analysis Division recalculated all econometric forecasts on the basis of certain data dependent on population or GNP as inputs economic and demographic input data. The elec- (this is much of the demand sector data), using tric utilities submodel uses computer programs to the Global 2000 forecasts for these variables. convert international industrial statistics into esti- Since the demand sector forecast is based on an mates of regional electric production capacities, econometric analysis of past behavioral response technologies, and costs. The supply, transporta- to relative fuel prices and GNP, the Division did tion, refining, and miscellaneous conversions sub- not think it appropriate to extend the forecasts models simply collect data from outside sources, beyond 15 years and chose to stop at 1990. Since for the most part, making adjustments where the Energy Information Administration is cur- necessary. rently developing a long-run forecasting capability, The creation of the IEES model was part of the it was unwilling to reproduce any other single federal government's response to the exporters' forecast as an official government projection. oil embargo of 1973-74. The embargo aroused Instead, the division surveyed competing views concern within the U.S. over the nation's exten- on the international energy market in the year sive reliance on imports for its energy supply. 2000 (see Chapter 10). That winter, President Nixon expressed the inten- 569 570 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL fion of the government to help make the country linear programming package on an IBM 370/168 energy independent by the year 1980. Activities to computer. Solving the matrix itself takes about 30 this end were designated "Project Independence." minutes of computer (CPU*) time, but arranging The Federal Energy Administration was created, the large volume of input data for the run and in May of 1974 to handle many of the govern- printing out the results in an understandable ment's energy-related activities. Within it, several format takes another hour of computer (CPU) divisions as a group were to handle all energy time. The model is principally written in data management and forecasting. Of these, the GAMMA, a matrix generation code, while the Supply and Integration Division was responsible econometric demand submodel utilizes TSP.t for combining the information compiled by the other divisions to evaluate both the ability of the Basic Principles nation to attain its Project Independence goal and the impact of alternative policies and scenarios on IEES forecasts international energy market var- this ability. iables by mathematically representing the world To this end, it organized the quantitative data energy system as a competitive market. Demand produced by the various divisions into a single and supply are assumed to equilibrate through the body according to an accounting framework, price mechanism. In addition, the IEES organizes which it developed, called the Project Independ- the energy flows that equilibrate supply and ence Evaluation System (PIES). The staff of the demand so that the total cost of the processes that Supply and Integration Division, consisting pri- convert primary fuels to delivered consumable marily of economists and operations researchers, energy products--transportation, refining, conver- developed PIES into a single linear programming sion, and electrical generation-is minimized, un- model of the U.S. national energy system that der the assumption that this is approximately how draws on the data banks and quantitative forecast- a real competitive market operates. The data ing procedures developed by the other divisions quantifying world energy supply, demand, and the for its input data. costs necessary for these calculations are supplied Meanwhile the FEA International Division, re- by the six IEES submodels, which act largely sponsible for the same types of estimates and independently of one another and draw on their forecasts on a worldwide basis, began develop- own outside data sources. The data are arranged ment of a parallel model called the International into a single linear programming matrix, which is Energy Evaluation System, which has been briefly solved to meet the world's final energy demands described above. IEES is, in effect, an adaptation at the minimum cost. If supply and demand do of PIES. The International Division staff, also not balance in the solution, the matrix is rerun primarily economists and operations researchers, iteratively with adjustments in the input data until reproduced the PIES methods and structure al- the two,are nearly equal. most exactly for the sake of consistency. Data The final forecasts made by IEES consist of an limitations required a few deviations. The model- "energy balance" for each separate world region. ing capability behind PIES and IEES has survived This is a table that includes the quantities of each several reorganizations of the federal energy agen- primary fossil fuel the region will produce and the cies. The maintenance and running of PIES is quantities of each final energy product it will now the responsibility of the Office of Analytic consume. Prices are also determined by the IEES Methods within the Energy Information Adminis- but, to an extent, these are not forecasts unless tration, and, as already mentioned, updating and some constraint is placed on OPEC production. running IEES is the function of the International The demand and supply quantities are forecasted Analysis Division (IAD). initially from an exogenously assumed set of To make the energy forecasts for the Global prices. These prices are adjusted in the process of 2000 project, IAD carried through the standard equilibrating supply and demand, and the adjusted IEES analysis with the project's forecasts of prices are output by IEES. Thus the price fore- population and GNP. The Global 2000 forecasts casts are partially dependent on the assumption of replaced the population and GNP estimates IAD price used as input in the IEES analysis. usually relies on. Otherwise the special run of Like PIES, IEES is meant to simulate a modem IEES used the input data IAD has compiled for competitive energy market that deals primarily in its standard runs of IEES. fossil fuels. Member countries of the Organization When all of the necessary data of the six types for Economic Cooperation and Development have been supplied, the IEES linear program (OECD), which consume 80 percent of the matrix contains approximately 2,000 rows and 6,000 columns. It is solved by the WHIZARD Computer processing unit. t Time senes processor. ENERGY 571 world's oil production and are generally the mized). In each solution, including the final one world's most industrialized nations, are treated used as the basis, for the forecasts, the linear most extensively in the submodel analyses, though program selects the fuel sources, transportation the submodels produce data for every part of the routes, and processing procedures that make the world. (T Ihe different treatment IEES gives to total world cost of all of these things together an various regions of the world is depicted graphi- absolute minimum. This formulation follows clas- cally in the color map section in the map entitled sical micro-economic. theory in that demand and "Energy Projq6tions: International Energy Evalu- supply quantities at the point in time under ation System Methodology.") Petroleum, natural analysis are assumed to balance exactly, and the gas, and coal are the only fuels explicitly modeled human actors involved are assumed to act so as in IEES. Estimates of electrical capacity from to minimize cost (they are implicitly assumed not nuclear, hydro, and -geothermal power made by only to want to keep energy-related costs at a outside sources are entered into the calculations minimum, but to actually have the knowledge, for any one year as constants. The model does ability, and motivation to do so). The JEES not forecast their growth, but by making multiple formulation differs from classical economics in runs with different nuclear and hydro capacity that individuals or firms are not necessarily as- assumptions IEES can evaluate the impact of sumed to be minimizing their own costs or maxi- different growth patterns of these energy sources. mizing profits. All choices of production, transpor- Because the so-called soft energy sources-wood, tation, and conversion are made and coordinated solar and wind--are not traded internationally, around the world to minimize the total global c -ost they are not explicitly represented in IEES; nor of these activities. The profits and costs of individ- are they ordinarily, the subject of impact analyses ual persons or firms are not explicitly modeled. made with IEES. Issues not directly related to the international Actual market. perturbations are included in market for fossil fuels are generally neglected by IEES wherever possible. The 're are two ways in IE8S. It does not include political factors or which the actions of the OPEC countries are evaluate the social or environmental effects of the represented. In any one run it is assumed either energy industry. Nor is resource depletion mod- (1) that OPEC sets its oil production at a definite eled. Gross national product (GNP), is included amount and takes whatever price for oil prevails, as one of the major determinants of energy or (2) that OPEC sets a price on all of its oil and demand, but within IEES no energy market sells as much at that price as is needed. In the variables influence it in turn; GNP is implicitly first case, IEES assumes that the world buys all treated as independent of the energy market. of the OPEC oil, then resorts to other sources for IEES does include energy conservation, which is the rest of its needs. The market sets oil price. In represented as a reduction in energy demand. the second case, the OPEC oil price is automati- The six submodels that supply data. to the linear cally assumed to be the price for all oil in the program operate largely independently. Each world. To meet demand, the world buys as much works under its own set of assumptions, about OPEC oil as it needs to supplement other produc- how the sector it models operates. Data are not tion. In neither type of run is OPEC assumed to typically passed between the submodels while have any direct control over the natural gas or they are making forecasts that will go into the coal markets. U.S. price controls are represented integrating linear program. extensively. There is also some average pricing of The demand submodel yields one forecast of natural gas and electricity throughout the world. quantity demanded for each final fuel product and In the case of electricity, the cost of electrical each region. For each OECD region except the generation in JEES depends on the marginal cost U.S., it also produces one estimate of the price of its fuel inputs, but the price of electricity elasticity of demand for each final fuel product; depends on the average cost of generation. Price these elasticities are not entered into the linear controls in foreign countries are also, included, but programming matrix but are used later in the less comprehensively than those in the U.S. equilibration of supply and demand. The data are because information on them is less complete. all forecasted for the year under analysis. If the The assumptions of supply-demand, equilibrium run of the linear program is to produce forecasts and cost minimization are what justifies calling for 1985, the demand data must pertain to 1985 IEES a model of a "competitive" energy market. also. The methods used to obtain the demand As explained later, the IEES linear programming forecasts differ significantly between regions and matrix is solved several times until supply and fuels, with by far the more extensive analysis demand are equal (or, technically, until the sum devoted to the OECD countries and the major of consumers' And producers' surplus is maxi- fuels. The energy demand quantities of noncom- 572 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL munist, non-OECD, regions are simply assum ed to The econometric model captures behavioral be a constant fraction 'of GNP; the modelers response to pnces but not policy-mandated con- estimate this ratio *from historical consumption: servation strategies. Conservation per se is repre- and, GNP data. For the U.S 'and the communist sented by exogenous adjustments of the demand regions, the IAD staff collects forecasts of net data to reflect estimates of the savings in energy imports from outside sources. These are inter- fuels resulting from specific OECD policies. preted as theamounts of energy fuels the regions The supply:dAta passed to the IEES linear will export or import; their:demarid is not explic- programalso consist of a quantity for each:region itly modeled. No demand elasticities are' calcu- and each primary energy@ product and of a price lated for the U.S. or' the non-OECD countries; elasticity for@ some regions and each primary these regions'are. assumed to consume a quantity product, but the method of their derivation is of energy that is fixed relative to price. generally simpler. The U.S. and communist region Themon-U.S. -OECD demand data come from quantities, like demand, are taken from-forecasts an iter-Ative econometric forecasting @ model. The of net import positions. But. for all other regions, model itself forecasts only -demand quantiti@s, -but outside experts are asked for estimates of 1975 by varying the 'price inputs'to the rnodel and regional energy production. With historical well- comparing the resulting quantity, forecasts, the head prices, these establish a single point on each model is used to estimate price elasticities, too.@ supply curve. The elasticities of supply for these ne quantities of major,fuels demanded by impor- regions are assumptions 'of the IAD; for most tant economic sectors (iron And steel, other man- energy types and regions, the elasticity is assumed ufacturing, residential/cornmercial) are forecasted to be 0, 1 when forecasts are made for 1985 and by "budget" - equations, the most sophisticated 0.26 when -forecastsare made for 1990. type used in the demand' model.' In the budget The transportation costs are actual current costs formulation, regions determine first how many as reported, by outside sources. They must be@ British thermal, units (Btu) -of fuel per capita they adjusted, slightly, because the IEES does not want to buy based on an energy price index, on represent every major port in -the world; instead, gross domestic product (GDP) per'cap'ita, and on: each region 1has one location, called a centroid, to last year's BTU per capita fuel budget. Then they and from which all fuels are assumed to be decide what fraction of the total budget to devote shipped. Real transportation costs are assumed to each fuel, based on individual fuel prices and constant regardless of how far in the future the last , year's, purchase . of the fuel ,@ The @budget forecasts Are made. formulation allows for product substitution by IThe electric utilities submodel includes a com- consumers. For less important fuels and other puter program to convert outside plant data into sectors, quantity demanded is generally forecasted estimates of regional generation capacities and by a single eq'uation,inwhicb demand is a function costs. Nuclearand hydro, capacities are then of time or GDP,"and substitatiodis' hot modeled. added; they are not variable. These data are given Because it uses the lagged variables mentioned to the linear program, which then interprets them above, (last year's BTU budget, last year's fuel as a description of the limitations on the consump- purrIhase.),.the. demand model must forecast itera- tion of electricity: The data tell the program that tively from a base year. The base year forecasts getting more electricity from an oilburning plant are made with historical data. For the Global 2000 means taking more oil; total consumption within a Study run, 1975 price, GDP, and population data region cannot exceed total plant capacity; and so were used to make 1976 demand forecasts. From on. Included in these data are limits on the these 1976 forecasts -the model made 1971 fore- permissible rates of retirement of generation ca- casts, and from these, 1978 forecasts, and so on pacity; generally, plants cannot be removed at a out to 1990. The ' demand forecasts are d riven' rate faster than 3 percent per year. There is-no largely by the input'f6recasts of ptice,.G :Df, and limit on the, creation of new productive capacity population., These data all come from outside in the data. 'the absolute amount of productive sources, including nongovernment computerfore-, capacity that can be'removed and created in one casting models.and from experts both inside and run thus varies with the time period of the, outside the federal 'government working from forecasts. The utilities data do not vary from judgment. None of the input data sources refer IEES run to IEES run otherwise. Hence average, routinely to the IAD econometric demand model electrical generation costs vary in real terms only or to the data of .the other IEES submodels in as the mix of new and old plants varies. making their forecasts. The U.S. demand quan7 The refining and miscellaneous conversions tities are taken from the output of PIES. data are-similar to the utilities data. They describe ENERGY 573 the processes -by which raw fuels are converted to lar order, it is easiest to catalogue the variables of various refined, derivative, and synthetic fuels. the IEES by going through the submodels as No upper bound is put on refining capacities, but energy fuels actually flow through the market: the miscellaneous conversions data include limits from supply to transportation, through the various on the volume of conversions, the LP (linear conversions, to demand. program) matrix can, select to achieve its lowest The supply submodel yields one quantity-the cost solution, to make sure it does not become estimated quantity that will be supplied in the unreasonably high. In a run of the JEES to make forecast year-for each of 33 world regions and forecasts for 1985, miscellaneous conversions are the primary energy fuels the region produces, as allowed to be no more than twice their historical listed in Tables 20-1 and 20-2. In addition, an 1975 level; for forecasts of later years, the conver- estimate of the price, elasticity of supply to pertain sions are given a higher limit. All other data in the to all fuels and regions is made by the IAD.supply submodels, including costs and technology speci- staff. Where there is evidence that the ela sticity fications, remain the same for each IEES run. for.a particular fuel and a particular region is When the final LP matrix is filled with the data likely to be quite,different from this world esti- from each of the submodels and solved for the mate, a. separate estimate.is made. All of the data first time, supply and demand probably will not produced by the subrrodel are thus judgmental match. Supply and demand quantities are deter- estimates either from outside agencies or the IAD. mined by the exogenously estimated future prices. The transportation submodel yields one vector The chances that the quantities so derived will of descriptive data for each ordered pair of the match exactly after the, LP matrix works out the world's 33 regions and each of some 13 modes of details of transportation and conversions are slim. transportation that apply to the region pair., For So prices are adjusted and demand and supply examplejor any two regions in Europe there are quantities are recalculated with the new prices two vectors: one corresponding to rail and one to and the supply and demand elasticities. The barge transport. Each vector consists of one code demand model is not rerun with the new prices to number for each of the two: regions, one for the get the new demand quantities; presumably the mode of transport, and an.estimate of the unit elasticities derived from it are a sufficiently accu- cost of shipping fuel by that mode from the rate representation' of its response to, price 11centroid" of.the originating region to that of the changes. The LP matrix is then resolved with the terminating region. Each mode of transport is new supply and demand quantities replacing the available in the model to ship only certain fuel old. This process is repeated until supply and demand in the solved matrix are acceptably close. TABLE 20-1 The 33 EEES Regions, 6rouped According. Basic Components to Energy Position Classification The focus of the IEES model makes it ex- tremely useful to the Global 20M Study in some, OECD Region: U.S. East Coast United Kingdom/Ireland international energy issues, especially those deal- U.S. Gulf Coast Benelux/Denmark ing with the developed world, but less so in other U.S. West Coast West Germany issues. The IEES forecasts are for international Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands France fossil fuel production and trade, and to that extent Canada Australia/Switzerland are most valuable for assessing the future market Japan Spain/Portugal Australia/New Zealand Italy energy position of industrialized regions. The Scandinavia Greece/Turkey implications of the forecasts for nonenergy global sectors, such as environment and . agriculture, OPEC Region: Venezuela/Ecuador 'Indonesia must be made judgmentally. The level of detail Libya/Algeria ..Iran contained within the model varies; it is generally Nigeria/Gabon Persian Gulf-Arab finer for the OECD countries and the economi- LDC Oil Exporters Region: cally more important fuels. The detail of the Bolivia/Peru Angola/Congo/Zaire output (the forecasts) is roughly the same for all Egypt/Syria/Bahrain Asian Exporters regions of the world and all energy forms repre- sented in the IEES. Other Regions: Latin America Sino-Soviet To describe the variables used in the IEES, it is Africa Sumed Pipeline most convenient to group them by submodel. Mexico Caribbean Though the submodels need be run in no particu- Asia 574 THE GOVERNMENT; S GLOBAL MODEL TABLE 20-2 Applicable Fue]Type Regiona The 59 Priinary Fuel Types in the IEES Supply Submodel San Joaquin Valley U.S. West Coast Los Angeles Basin U.S. West Coast Applicable Fuel Type Regiona Metallurgical coal COAL VarioUSb CRUDE OIL Steam coal VariouSb Arab OPEC and OAPEC Crudes:' Lignite Variousb Algeria Libya/Algeria Egypt/Syria/Bahrain Egypt/Syria/Bahrai NATURAL GAS Iraq Persian Gulf-Arab Natural gas VadoUSb Kuwait Persian Gulf-Arab "Applicable Region" is the IEES region from which the fuel type is supphe-d Libya Libya/Algeria b "Various" indicates that the fuel is supplied from more than one region within Qatar/United Arab Emirates Persian Gulf-Arab the 1EES. Saudi Arabia light Persian Gulf-Arab Saudi Arabia heavy Persian Gulf-Arab types; the 13 modes and the fuels they can be Non-Arab OPEC Crudes: used to ship are fisted in Table 20-3. Beca 'use no Ecuador VenezueWEcuador limit on shipping capacity is assumed in most Indonesia Indonesia cases, the vectors include no capacity entry. The Iran light Iran input data to the transportation submodel are Iran heavy Iran themselves estimates of transportation costs of Nigeria/Gabon Nigeria/Gabon Venezuela Venezuela/Ecuador different modes between ports; the IAD staff Other Export Crudes: adjusts them to account for the difference in Angola/Congo/Zaire Angola/Congo/Zaire distance between the routes for which they were Bolivia/Peru Bolivia/Peru made and the hypothetical centroid to centroid Canada Canada routes used in IEES. China Sino-Soviet The refining submodel produces data vectors Mexico Mexico Norway Scandinavia distinguished according to 43 types, of crude oil Russia Sino-Soviet refined, 8 regions, 6 final product types, and 10 South Asia mix Asian Exporters niarkets. The 43 crude oil types are a subset of Trinidad Caribbean those fisted in Table 20-2. The eight regions are United Kingdom United Kingdom/Ireland the regi .ons that actually do significant refining, Nonexport Crudes: Australia Australia/New Zealand including some OECD regions and some others. Tar Sands VariouSb The six product types modeled are liquid gas, Japan Japan gasoline, jet fuel, distillate fuel, residual oil, and Denmark Benelux/Denmark 11 other refined products." The vector for any one West Germany West Germany type of refining within a region includes data on France France the technology used (quantities output per unit Austria Austria/Switzerland Spain Spain/Portugal input), the productive capacity forecasted to exist, Italy Italy and the costs of building and operating plants. No Turkey Greece/Turkey U.S. Domestic Crudes: TABLE 20-3 Alaska North Slope U.S. West Coast Alaska South U.S. West Coast The 13 1EES Transport Modes and the Pacific offshore U.S. West Coast Fuels Carried Wyoming mix U.S. Gulf Coast Shale oil U.S. Gulf Coast Mode Fuel Louisiana onshore U.S. Gulf Coast Medium tanker Crude oil Louisiana offshore U.S. Gulf Coast Medium tranship Crude oil Texas Gulf Coast U.S. Gulf Coast U.S. tanker Crude oil East Texas mix U.S. Gulf Coast Large tanker Crude oil West Texas mix U.S. Gulf Coast VLCC (supertanker) Crude oil Padd 11, indigenous U.S. Gulf Coast Product tanker Refined products Oklahoma mix U.S. Gulf Coast Crude pipeline Crude oil Padd 1, indigenous U.S. East Coast Product pipeline Refined products Heavy crude, V U. S. West Coast Bulk carrier Coal Heavy crude, IV U. S. Gulf Coast Liquid natural gas carrier Natural gas Heavy crude, III U. S. Gulf Coast Gas pipeline Natural gas Heavy crude, II U.S. Gulf Coast Rail Coal NPR-l U.S. West Coast Barge Coal Synthetic crude U. S. Gulf Coast ENERGY 575 limit on the creation of new capacity is included, linear program use by a separate computer pro- so it can increase in any IEES run to meet gram. refining demand, albeit at a cost. The data neces- The demand submodel produces one demand sary to construct the refinery data vectors are, as quantity forecast and demand elasticity for each in the case of transportation, the same types of non-U.S. OECD region.and final energy product, data actually in the vectors; they require for the and one demand quantity for each product for all most part only compilation and adjustment to be other regions. The final energy products included ready for use in IEES. in the demand forecasts 'Used in the IEES linear The miscellaneous conversions submodel pro- program are listed in Table 204. The input data duces a data vector for each OECD region and required to produce these differ widely from conversion process contained within the region. region to region. The U.S. demand quantities are The four conversion processes treated are metal- output of a run of PIES that uses price and GNP lurgical coal to coke, lignite to briquettes, liquid inputs consistent with those used in the IEES run. oil fuels and coal to synthetic gases, and coke to The U.S. demand quantities require no other data blast furnace gas. Each vector includes data that collection by the IAD, but ultimately depend -on quantifies the technology used within the region all of the input data to PIES. The other OECD in the process (physical input-output ratios) and regions' data are estimated econometrically for the estimated 1975 productive capacity. In addi- the major fuels from energy prices, population, tion, an upper limit on increases in productive GNP, and historical demand quantities. For other capacity is supplied in.lieu of any other restric- fuels the input data are usually time or GNP. tions on new capacity construction; costs of the Demand for non-OECD regions is generally taken plants or production are not included in the data. directly from outside sources with adjustments The inpu t data to the miscellaneous conversions made as necessary. Because refining, miscella- submodel are international statistics from outside neous conversions, and electrical generation are sources; they are collected and adjusted for use in not modeled fo 'r non-OECD regions, the demands the IEES linear program. for such converted products from these regions The electric utilities submodel produces a vec- are changed to their primary fuel equivalents. tor for each OECD region and 'fossil fuel plant type found within the region. The generation plant Basic Procedures types are residual oil, crude oil, distillate, hard coal, lignite, blast furnace gas, and natural gas. A run of the IEES begins with the collection of Each vector -includes data on generation effi- the input data to the six submodels. Much of this ciency, capacity, and cost. A maximum capacity actually remains the same from run to run and so retirement amount, usually corresponding to a 3 need not be redone for each; data already com- percent per year retirement of total plant capacity, piled can be used. These data must then be is also included. No limit on increases in electrical adjusted for use in the linear programming matrix. generation capacity is made. In addition, estimates Again, much of this does not change between of nuclear and hydro generation capacity are runs and so can draw on past work. Lastly, the produced. No variations in these capacities are linear program is run iteratively until a world allowed. The data sets corresponding to one energy market solution with demand and supply generation type are also assigned a load type or nearly,equal is reached. By virtue of the way the load types. Nuclear plants are always base load plants; distillate plants are always peak load; TABLE 20-4 hydro and existing oil and coal plants can be base, intermediate, or peak, depending on cost con- Final Energy Products in the IEES siderations in the running of the linear program; Linear Program new oil and coal plants can be base or interme- Petroleum Products: diate. Residual oil One set of three: numbers-one for base load, Gasoline one for intermediate load, and one for peak---are Distillate also produced to tell what percentage of each Liquid propane gas Jet fuel region's total generation capacity must come from Coal: each load type. The data for the electrical utilities Hard coal submodel comes from various outside sources and Lignite consists primarily of powerplant statistics for the Natural Gas OECD countries. They are adapted for IEES Electricity 576 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL linear programming problem is set up, the energy all demand data are in hand, the demand quan- flows between supply and demand that the IEES tities are reduced by standard percentages to relies on to equilibrate the two are the flows that reflect the effects of conservation. To establish minimize the costs of transportation and conver- these pe rcentages, the IAD commissioned a study sion. The entire process is depicted diagrammati- by the private consulting firm Resource Planning cally in Figure 20-1. Associates. The demand data for the U.S. are taken from The supply quantity estimates for oil and natu- the PIES output. In the case of the IEES runs ral gas are takenfrom the Department's Office of made for the Global 2000 Study, the PIES runs International Affairs and from the International from which demand data were taken were done Coal Federation for coal. The estimates apply to with standard PIES assumptions, except that the 19175 and so must be adjusted to give an initial U.S. GNP forecasts and fuel price forecasts supply quantity for the forecast year with which provided by the Global 2000 project were used in the linear program can begin its iterations. This is place of the standard PIES data for those varia- done with price elasticities (assumed for almost all bles. The OECD demand data are estimated from fuels and regions to be 0.1 for a forecast year of GNP, population, arid price forecasts. The GNP 1985 and 0.26 for 1990) and with forecasted prices. and population forecasts for the Global 2000 runs The prices are the ones used in econometric were those supplied by the Study, as listed in demand forecasting, with estimated average trans- Chapter 3 of this volume. For large countries, portation and refinery costs subtracted. This is IEES normally uses GNP forecasts taken from meant to yield "wellhead" primary fuel prices DRI (Data Resources, Incorporated) econometric that correspond to the final product prices used in projection service. DRI is a Boston-based firm the demand submodel. that provides economic data and forecasts to a Transportation costs are taken mostly from the broad business and research clientele. The GNP rates published by the Association of Ship Brokers forecasts for the remaining OECD regions are and Agents. Like the costs for electric utilities, taken from official OECD publications. The pop- refining, and miscellaneous conversions, they are ulation forecasts are normally taken from United assumed to be constant in real terms in the future Nations estimates. The price forecasts are tYPi- and so need not be recalculated for separate IEES cally an assumption rather than something esti- nins. The data frorn'these four submodels, as well mated from detailed background information. The as the supply data, were nearly identical in all Global 2000 Study runs of the IEES incorporated runs made for the Global 2000 Study. two different oil price assumptions. The first had, The plant data necessary for the electric utilities OPEC holding the world oil price constant at $13 submodel comes primarily from publications of per barrel indefinitely. The second assumed that the European Economic Community. These are world oil prices would start at $13, then rise at a entered into a computer model that compiles them rate of 5 percent annually beginning in 1981. In into IEES regional data, and adds data describing both cases, as is customary in IEES runs, the load types and load type distributions. prices of non-oil fossil fuels were assumed to start The refining data come primarily from two at about present levels and.then to vary according major sources. The- capital expenditure and yield to market forces, as represented in the linear (input-output) data are taken from,the RPMS* oil program. industry computer model developed by Bonner The communist region demand data are taken and Moore of Houston. Capacity and operating from forecasts made by the International Affairs cost data -are from the Oil and Gas Journal. Office of the Department of Energy, (or some- These are adjusted for use in the IEES linear times from CIA forecasts), of the regions' net program. , import positions. If a region is cited by these Miscellaneous conversion data for fuel gas, sources as being a net importer of a fuel, its blast furnace gas, etc., come from 1975 OECD imports are entered into the IEES as its demand statistics. Costs for the processes are assumed to for fuel on the world market. Demand quantities be at U *S. values when data fr6m outside sources for the noncommunist non-OECD, regions are are not available. calculated from the GDP forecasts by assuming Once it contains all necessary data, the IEES that energy demand is a constant fraction of GDP. linear program is solved. However, in the solution Because refining, conversions, and electrical gen- demand and supply may not match. This is not eration are not modeled for the non-OECD coun- something that can be foreseen because of the tries, their demands must be expressed as de- mands for primary fuels, not final products. Once Refinery Petrochemical Modeling System. 7_ V OUTSIDE. SUSMODEL OUTPUT/ LINEAR FINAL COLLECTED DATA r,-SUBMODEI, OPERATIONS 114AR PROGRAM DATA SOURCES PROGRAM OUTPUT HFUT Fir' A@' @t WA omnvtio"s Population forecasts U.N. C OECD sconomwic OECD demand demand fmasting quantities and elasticities Dot Cos Lgo country 'V GDP forecasts Noncommunist, Noncommunist, boa-OECD region nm-OECD region f OECD dermad calculation demand quantities, GDP forecasts -p, A 41, US not import U.S. demand quantities PIES I pop on arecosts -tif Demand @V quantities by ft region and Communist region not D& lnl@.;Jj_& Communist room Office jmPC;rt pOeitim foreC demand quamiti., energy pr-!@ 'T not CIA Communist region posinan Weeasts EES Unecar Assumod,wipply Supply 010 kities 1Z -ograrn i'ies Pw quantities e @4A Communist region clemci quantities Supply nd q antities by U m an 7 regi d DDE Inter Other regions Other regions notionall primary fuel all and gas supply, oil and go, supply Affairs Office quardity sil tes quantity estimates J other regions International Coal i 4, Feder ition 001 $up,* 1 quantity esti is `7 uantity esti q c 7777, _77 'A"L", Load An ritegrating OECD region OECC region electric EEC r electric vitilities, data 0,5 capacities and costs Con" Prices by, energy product information Is -IN vp I and Energy OE region nuclear OECD r I Administration poveer capacity intimati i i s C primary fuel OECD r!gio@ OECD region OECD hydro-electric Pcrwer -POww c"I'Mitift '7-1 7 77 `3@--4r-"' hydrO capacity estimate U__ M w', Adi -of In Tw@iafic;. Winnow I ri`,@ @IE S onsportartion costs I _1 "M Ship Brokers calculat transportation cmh and Agents IF V.- Refinery capacities L Refinery capacities Journal and opwafing cash offing costs and oper Refinery ields and yi" RPMS @=Ij and capital expencill capital akponclitures r-11 OECD region OECD OECD region conversions data coriversions, data -41 L111c, Figure 20-1. Structure of the International Energy Evaluation System (IEES). (In all runs made for the Global 2000 Study, population and GNP data came from Study sources, not the customary JEES data sources described in the text,, supporting PIES runs made for the Study used the Study's U.S. GNP forecasts.) 578 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL complications of transportation and conversion the linear program is repeated until supply and processes that lie between primary fuel production demand are acceptably close. and final product sale. So prices are adjusted in a fashion that is expected to bring the two quantities Documentation and Validation closer together. Supply and demand quantities for the OECD regions are then recalculated from the The Department of Energy has engaged a old quantities, new prices, and price elasticities. private firm to completely, document the Interna- The PIES and the econometric demand model, tional Energy .Evaluation System. The docu- which originally produced the OECD demand ment6tion was published in 1978 in two vol- data, are not rerun to get the new demand umes. quantities. The IEES linear program is resolved The econometric demand model estimates have with the new demand and supply quantities. The been compared to actual historical data with process of estimating new quantities and resolving generally satisfactory results. 21 Fuel'Mnemls No one federal agency has exclusive responsi- to, make U.S. resource estimates for decades. J bility for producing estimates of world fuel mineral Since before World War 11, the World Energy J1 reserves and resources. Parts of this task have Conference (WEC) has done world resource and been handled in the past by the Bureau of Mines reserve estimation by survey and published com-' and the United States Geological Survey (both in plete 'sets,of estiftiates' periodically. The Congres- the Department of the Interior) and by the Depart- sional Research Service in the Library of Con- ment of Energy. In addition, some private organi- gress commissioned a similar. set of resource and zations, most notably the World Energy Confer- reserve estimates, which were released in 1977, ence, publish estimates widely' regarded,as because no% recent WEC figures were available at authoritative. The Geological Survey estimates the the time, although new ones have since been resources of the United States. The Department published. The estimates were commissioned after of Energy is responsible for U.S. reserve esti- the Congressional Research Service had received mates. The World Energy Conference periodically a request for a set of such estimates from the estimates both world reserves and world re- House Subcommittee on Energy and Power and sources.* the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Estimates of the energy production potential Resources. When the Department of Energy from renewable sources, such as solar radiation, (DOE) was 'formed out of various other federal tides, and waterways, are not as frequently made agencies, it inherited the U.S. reserve estimate by established agencies or organizations, and so responsibilities of those agencies. DOE makes its must be gathered from diverse sources. own estimates of U.S. coal reserves. For oil and To compile, compare, and interpret the data natural gas reserve figures, it relies largely on from all of the above sources, the Global 2000 estimates made by the American Petroleum Insti- Study engaged Walter G. Dupree (formerly in the lure and the American Gas Association. Department of Energy and presently with the Bureau of Mines) as an independent expert. Basic Principles Key Analytic Methodology Though mineral resources and reserves are physical quantities that can, theoretically, be The methods used to derive fuel resource and measured at any point in time, there is no one reserve estimates differed to some extent, depend- standard and infallible method of measuring them. ing on the, organization that gathered the esti- Because the organizations providing resource and mates. Actual field estimates come from a combi- reserve estimates in Chapter I I do not completely nation of sample drilling and expert judgment, coordinate their data, assumptions, and proce- However, the organizations cited here did not dures, they have obtained different results. Fur- generally do this geologic research themselves, thermore, refinements in procedure over time may Rather, they surveyed corporations and other result in significant revision of previous estimates, organizations to obtain size estimates of various as, for example, when the Geological Survey in mineral deposits and totaled them, or adapted the 1975 reduced its estimate of U.S. oil resources by estimates that other organizations had derived in over one-half (in the publication cited in "Docu- this manner. I mentation and Validity," below). Nonetheless, An exception is the United States Geological some general description of the geological testing Survey, which, in addition to conducting surveys, methods and other techniques on which the esti- has been doing its own original geological research mates presented in, Chapter I I are based is possible. The estimates of resources and reserves used in the Oil and Gas. The primary oil and gas resource nonfuel minerals analysis appear in various official publica- numbers used were complied by M. King Hubbert tions, as referenced in Chapter 22 ("Minerals and Mate- for the Congressional Research Service. As Hub- rials"). bert pointed out, potential oil-bearing regions may 579 580 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL be classified according to their degree of explora- tidal power, subsurface temperature for geother- tion into three groups: mal power, and solar insolation for solar power. 1. Regions in a mature state of explonation. For Discussions of these power sources in this study these regions, reasonable estimates of iultimdtely take their estimates of potential fro Iin oth,erpybli- recoverable oil can be made by use of 'the cations, which base their estimates on'suc .h 'spot statistics on the quantitY, of drilling and the measurements. corresponding oil discoveries per well'or per foot. This is basically'the macroanaly@tical 'approach, 'which models empirical relationships in aggre- Basic Components gaidd discovery or production data. Chapter 11, "Fuel MinerWs Prcjections," fo- 2. Regions in an early'stage of exploration. For cuses on world' resources and reserves of fuel these regions, estimates of ultimately recoverable minerals and on power potential estimates of the oil can be based on early successes or failures in renewable' energy sources competing with them. drilling.' Early successes imply @ significant quan- Fi.ne regional disaggregations of the data:, which tities of oil (or gas) and vice versa. are not consistently available" were gener-Ally not 3. Virgin undrilled territories. According to presented. Consideration of energy production, Hubbert, the only basis for judgment, as to w- consumption,@ and'trade was left to the energy sources is geological analogy. If the virgin area is analysis in Chapter 10. found by geological and geophysical surveys to be very similar to a productive mature area, then the ,virgin area is expected to yield comparable quan- Bask Procedures tities, of oil and gag per unit of area or volume. 'Aside from general geological considerations, This is basically the microanalytic approach, the relevant assumptions for the estimation of the which models structural relationships in the explo- reservies of a mineral are the current product price ration process. and extraction technology within the industry. Solid Fuels. The resource figures for solid fuels Assessing these' items is Jeft primarily to the used in this study are based on World Energy geologist 'making the estimates. Resource esti- Conference estimates. The WEC sends question- mation theoretically depends on assumptions of naires to the participating countries, requesting potential future prices-and technology. The U.S. information on reserves, resources, maximum oil and gas estimates (made by the U.S. Geologi- depth of deposit, minimum@seam thickness, and cal Survey) assume a continuation of price-cost the like, How each country estimates its reserves relationships and technological trends generally and resources will 'differ-and in some instances prrvailing in recent years prior to 1974. Price-cost the resulting dider6rices'in data may be significant; relationships and production since 1974 were not hence, it is impossible to describe the methodoi- taken into account, nor was an explicit assumption ogy used, It should be pointed out, however, that about future prices made. The price and technol- the geology of co@l is relatively simple and uni- ogy assumptions underlying the world resource form over wide areas, and most coal deposits are estimates have not been made explicit by their closer to the surface than oil or gas. Thus, data various authors. on solid fuels are, in general, based on more accurate geological data than oil and are less Documentation and Validation subject to revision. The U.S. Geological S ,urvey discusses its re- .@ Uranium. The resource figures for uranium source estimation methods in USGS Circular 725, used in this study are also based on WEC Geological Estimates of Undiscovered Recovera- .estimates. 'As with solid, fuels., questionnaires are ble Oil and Gas Resources in the United States, .sentIto the,participating countries,and the returns published in 1975. The World Energy Conf6rence tabulated. Differences in methodology make gen- outlines its data @collection methods in WEC eralizations difficult. Activities in the@Field of Surveying World Energy Hydro, Geothermal, and Solar Power. Proce- Resources, published in M. Grenon, ed., First dures for estimating the energy potential of thesc 11ASA Conference on Energy Resources, Inter- power sources are less well established, and national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, resource and reserve estimates tend to be less Laxenburg, Austria. certain than those made for fuel minerals. In . The Bureau of Mines, USGS, DOE, and the general, estimates of potential are derived from WEC have made no formal tests of the reliability spot measurements of the relevant variables, such of their respective resource and reserve estimation as strearnflow for hydropower, tide volume for methods. 22 Nonfuel Minerals The Bureau of Mines of the U.S. Department It presented a single set, rather than a range, of of the Interior is responsible for helping to ensure forecasts. In October 1977 Malenbaurn updated the continued strength of the domestic minerals his 1972 study at the request of the National and materials economy and the maintenance of an Science Foundation,* dropping some of his origi- adequate minerals and materials base. In carrying nal commodities and adding others. out this responsibility, the Bureau develops fore- Current Bureau of Mines forecasts are loosely casts of future trends in the supply and demand of based on the 1972 Malenbaum Report, judgmen- minerals and materials on a global basis for the tally adjusted and extrapolated by members of the purpose of identifying changes that might affect Bureau staff, using basic arithmetical procedures. the national interest. These forecasts, published in Members of the Bureau staff expect that future the Secretary of the interior's annual report to official Bureau projections will be based on the Congress, assist the Secretary in carrying out his 1977 M Ialenbaurn Report. Therefore, on the rec- responsibilities under the Strategic and Critical ommendation of Bureau staff members, the Global Materials Stock Piling Act, which directs him to 2000 Study projections in Chapter 12 substitute investigate the production and utilization of min- the. latest Malenbaum figures in place of current erals and materials. Bureau figures where this is feasible.t Projections of future consumption, referred to A comparison of the projections in the 1972 by the Bureau as de m'and forecasts, are published Malenbaum Report, used in current Bureau of every 5 years in detail in the Bureau's Xineral Mines publications, with those in the 1977 Malen- Facts and Problems and, in summary form in its baum Report is presented in Table 22-1. The table Mineral Trends and Forecasts. The last complete shows that the 1977 Malenbaum projections are set of these forecasts was published in 10,75. significantly lower than earlier projections made Recent forecasts for selected'minerals and mate- by Malenbaum or the Bureau of Mines for a few rials are published in an interim report series commodities (aluminum, cobalt, copper, and entitled Mineral Commodity Profiles. nickel) and significantly higher for a few others Theofficial Bureau f6re.casts provide high, low, (manganese, tin, and tungsten).t and most probable projections of minerals and materials consumption for 1985 and 2000 in (1) the Key Analytic Methodology United States and (2) the rest of the world as a whole. The latter forecasts are based in large part Prior to 1968, the Bureau of Mines did not on a study prepared in November 1972 for the make Jong-r 'ange projections of minerals and ma- U.S. Commission on Materials Policy by Profes- terials consumption, either for the V.S. or on a sor Wilfred Malenbaurn of the University of global basis. In 1968, using 1966 data, the Bureau Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Finance and began making projections internally, relying on Commerce.* the judgment of Bureau analysts and simple rule- This study (known as the 1972, Malenbaum Report) divided the world into 10 regions and "World Demand for.Raw Materials in 1985 and 2000," projected trends in overall economic growth, pop- Philadelphia, Oct. 1977. f Malenbaum's latest projections cover 12 minerals and ulation growth, and growth in primary consump- materials; 10 of these 12 are considered in Chapter 12. tion of I I minerals and materials for each region. * An extensive comparison between the methods used by Malenbaurn in making regional forecasts and the methods `Materials Requirements in the United States and Abroad used by the Bureau in making "rest of the world" forecasts, in the Year 2000," National Commission on Materials with respect to projecting copper and aluminum consump- Policy, Ma@r. 1973 (the original report was submitted Nov. tion, is contained in a paper presented to the Eighth World 30, 1972). The Bureau of Mines' use of this report is briefly Mining Congress in Lima, Peru, by the Bureau's Sheldon discussed in the Introduction to the Bureau's. Mineral Facts Wimpfen and Alvin Knoerr, entitled "World Resources vs. and Problems, 1975 edition (p. 21, as preprinted in the Copper and Aluminum Demand to the Year 2000," Nov. Bureau's Bulletin 667). 1974. 591 582 THE GOVERNMENT'S.GLOBAL MODEL TABLE 22-1 World Consumption of 14 Minerals and Materials in the Year 2000 Percent Percent Change Change Malenbaum '77 Bureau of Malenbaum '77 vs. Malenbaum. Mines Malenbaum vs. Bureau, of '72 Current '77 Malenbaum '72 Mines A (thousands of metric tons) Primary aluminum 46,761 54,160b 36,516 -22 -3j' Chrome ore - 17,600c 16,018 9 Cobalt - 72 58 - 19 Refined copper 19,693 22,113 it 16,839 -14 -24 Fluorspar 15,870 14,797 - - - iron ore 1,086,000 1,025,000 919,000 -15 -to Manganese - 41,770- 48,060 - 15 Nickel - 1,546 1,314 -15 Platinum group (thousand troy ounces) - 13,113r 14,030 7 Crude steel 1,332,000 1,279,000a 1,315,000 - 1 3 Sulfur 100,424 112,000h - - Tin - 3521 393 12 Tungsten - 79J 93 - 18 Zinc 13,448 11,200k 12,022 -11 7 To facilitate comparisons, all Bureau of Mines data (with one exception) have been converted to metric tons: I short ton = 0.9072 metric tons; I long ton 1.016 metric tons. The single exception is the platinum group data, which is specified in thousands of troy ounces. Includes only primary (not nonmetallic) aluminum. This figure converts the Bureau of Mines figure for contained chromium metal in ore to units of ore as specified in the Malenbaum Report, assuming an average grade of chrome ore to be 27.4 percent chromium. I Bureau of Mines data excludes old copper, whereas refined copper in the Malenbaum Reports includes secondary old copper. Therefore, based on the traditional ratio between refined copper and old copper, and the Malenbaum data, the Bureau of Mines forecasts have been increased by 25 percent to be comparable with Bureau of Mines forecasts (i.e., 17,690 x 1.25 = 22,113 thousand metric tons). I The Malenbaum data must be for manganese ore rather than manganese. To be comparable to Malenbaum data, the Bureau of Mines data on contained manganese has been converted to metric tons of manganese ore, averaging 48 percent manganese: (20,049 meiric tons of contained Mn)/0.48 41,770, which is comparable to the Malenbaum figure. Data includes secondary metal. Data includes iron and steel foundry products and steel mill products. h Customarily specified in long tons; converted here to metric tons. I Includes only primary tin, converted from long tons to metric tons. J Includes only primary tungsten, converted from 1,000 pounds to metric tons. Includes only primary Xinc. ok humb relationships. These relationships were rials, as projected in the 1972 Malenbaum Report; based on leading U.S. economic indicators and however, arithmetic relationships were estimated historic patterns of global minerals and materials using procedures less complex than those used to production and consumption. Presented in the project U.S. consumption. No explicit price pro-- 1970 edition of Mineral Facts and Problems (and jections were used in making forecasts either for summarized in the 1970 edition of Mineral Trends U.S. consumption or consumption in the rest of and Forecasts), they included price as well. as the world, and no price forecasts were published. consumption projections. Supply was assumed to Both the 1972 Malenbaum Report and'its 1977 equal demand at the prices specified. revision are based on a methodology- known as The methodological procedures on which these intensity-of-use (IOU) analysis.* This methodol- initial 1970 projections were based were severely ogy produces lower projections of growth in I min ral an criticized, particularly those used in developing globa e s d materials consumption by the price projections. As a result, different procedures year 2000 than the simple trend extrapolations were, followed in the 1975 edition of Mineral Facts used.previously by the Bureau of Mines. It also and Problems. For. U.S. consumption forecasts, tends to produce lower projections for U.S. min- reliance was placed on. the use of leading U.S. eral consumption than most other methodologies, economic indicators in elaborate linear regression as they have been used to date by groups outside equations. For consumption forecasts for the rest of the world (treated as an aggregate), reliance *The development and several applications of the IOU was placed on making use of trends in world methodology are briefly discussed in D. B. Brooks and P. economic growth, population growth, and growth W. Andrews, "Mineral Resources, Economic Growth, and in consumption of selected minerals and mate- World Population," Science, July 5, 1974, p. 13. NONFUEL MINERALS 583 the Bureau (for example, the input-output tech- background of the changes taking place in the niques us Ied by Resources for the Future in its energy sector and the intensifying debate regard- 1972'report to the U.S. Commission on Population ing potential limits to economic growth that the Growth and the American Futuret). National Science Foundation asked Maleribaurn Although the Bureau has made extensive use of to revise his original report. the 1972 Malenbaurn Report in revising its own The 1977 Malenbaum Report did not re-examine projections and plans to make future use of the the former projections regarding solid fuels, liquid 1977 Malenbaurn Report, the Bureau did not fuels, natural gas, and other energy sources, but it commission either report. The earlier report was did re-evaluate projections regarding the consump- prepared for the U.S. National Commission on tion of aluminum, copper, iron, steel, and zinc. Materials Policy, which was responsible for ex- All were revised downward, as shown in Table amining the feasibility of striking a balance be- 22-1, using the same procedures that were used in tween the national need to produce goods on the the 1972 Report. As Malenbaurn pointed out in one hand and to protect the environment on the his revised report, these lower projections were in other. The Malenbaurn projections helped the no way based on the arguments advanced by the Commission demonstrate the feasibility of striking limits-to-growth proponents, since both the 1972 such a balance, since IOU analysis assumes that and 1977 Reports assume that the commodities increasing economic growth in the industrialized whose consumption is being forecast will essen- nations requires increasingly less intensive con- tially be inexhaustible and available at current real sumption of minerals and materials per unit of prices throughout the period of the forecast. economic growth. The long-term environmental Instead, the revised report reflects lower exoge- implications of the other major assumption of IOU nous projections of economic growth rates in both analysis---that increasing economic growth in the the industrialized nations and LDCs and lower less developed countries (LDCs) requires increas- exogenous projections, of the intensity with which ingly more intensive consumption of minerals and minerals and materials are likely to be used by materials per unit of economic growth-were not nations in both categories. examined by the Commission. The environmental The exogenous economic and population impacts of such increasingly intensive use of growth rates used in the 1977 Malenbaum Report minerals and materials by the LDCs could rapidly differ from those provided to the Global 2000 escalate in the period beyond the year 2000, if Study. The Global 2000 Study's economic growth recent rates 'of LDC economic growth are sus- rates are significantly higher for Africa, Asia, and tained into that period. Latin America and significantly lower for Eastern Events surrounding the 1973 oil embargo called Europe, Japan, and the U.S.S.R., as shown in forth energy analyses that differ significantly some Table 22-2.- The economic growth rates used in of the projections contained in the 1972 Malen- these two studies are not strictly comparable, baurn Report. For example, according to that however, since they are applied to dfferent his- report, U.S. energy consumption in the year 2000 toric base estimates, with somewhat different was *projected to reach levels almost three times proportionalities (see Table 22-3). The population as great as those of the 1966-69 period, including projections also differ, but the differences appear a doubling of U. S. natural gas consumption. to be less significant (Table 22-4). Japan's energy consumption was projected to The 1977 Malenbaum Report cites the following increase by a factor of six over the same period. sources for historical gross domestic product Most subsequent energy studies project much (GDP) data: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook lower rates of growth for energy consumption, (annual); U.N., Yearbook of National Account based on considerations involving limited supplies, Statistics (annual); International Bank for Recon- increasing prices, and strategic and balance-of- struction and Development, World Bank Atlas, payment positions. These factors are not explicitly 1975. The 1977 Malenbaurn Report, in addition, taken into account in Malenbaum's methodology, cites the following sources for historical popula- although the basic principles of IOU analysis tion data: U.N., Demographic Yearbook, various could be @ adapted to methodologies that do take issues (1948-1974); U.N., Population by Sex and those factors into account. It was against the Age for Regions and Countries, 1950-2000 as Assessed in 1973: Medium Variant (1976); U.N., t Leon Fischman Iand Hans H. Landsberg, "Adequacy of World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1%8 Noniuel Minerals and Forest Resources," in Commission (1973). Chapter III of the 19177 Malenbaurn Report on Population Growth and the American Future, Population explains in some detail how "the projected growth Resourres and the Environment, Washington, 1972. rates reflect the judgment of the principal investi- 584 THE GOVERNMENr s GLOBAL MODEL TABLE 22-2 TABLE 22-4. Average Annual Economic Growth to the Year Representative Population Projections 2000 (millions) (Percent) Malenbaum Malenbaum Globa12000 Malen- Malen- Global Global '72 '77 Study - baum baum* 2000 2000 197i 2000 1971-75 2000 1975 2000 '72 '77 Study Study Minus U.S. 210 300 214 281@ 2 1 6-z 248 GDP GDP GNP Malen- U.S.S.R. 245 375 250 336. 254 309 1970- 1975- 1975- baum Japan 105 140 108 133 .112 133 2000 2000 2000 '77, All other - nations 3,224 5,615 3,276 5,608 3,508 5,661 Africa 3.4 3.4 4.9 1.5 World 3,784 6,430 3,848 6,358 4,090 6.351 Asia 3.5 3.2 4.8 1.6 China" 4.2 3.3 3.7 .4 Eastern Europe 3.5 3.5 2.9 -.6 Japan' 5.0 4.1 3.5 -.6 Latin America 3.6 5.0 1.4 The methodology and assumptions underlying U.S." 3.8 3.2 3.5 .3 the Global 2000 Study's GNP projections are U.S.S.R. 4.0 3.4 2.9 -.5 presented 'in Chapter 16, which notes, regarding Western Europe 3.5 3.2 3.5 .3 the LDCs, that in most cases, GNP and GDP are Other industrial- virtually equivalent and therefore, used inter- ized nations 3.7 3.3 3.5 .2 1 World I .3.'8 3.3 3.6 .3 changeably by the Global 2000 Study. The meth- " Not a precise comparison, due to different base years, base year estimates, odology and assumptions underlying the Study's and statistics measuring economic growth. population projections are presented in Chapter Including Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam. 15. Including Puerto Rico and other overseas U.S. islands. The Global 2000 staff investigated the feasibility of recalculating the minerals and materials con- sumption forecasts of the 1977 Malenbaum Report TABLE 22-3 on the basis of the Study.'s economic growth and Base Year National Income population projections. Because Malenbaum's his- torical GDP data are not consistent with the GNP (Billions of dollars) figures obtained by the Global 2000 Study from the World Bank Atlas of 1976, because the IOU Global methodology requires consistent figures, and be- Malen- Makn- 2000 cause the differences could not be reconciled in baum '72 baum '77 Study the time available for the Global 2000 Study, a GDP;, % GDPI, % GNP' % new set of consumption projections for minerals Africa, 65 2 71 2 128 2 and materials, consistent with the project's ew- Asia 236 6 201 5 348 6 n6mic growth and population projections, could China" 137 4 144 4 301 5 not be developed. Eastern Europe 195 5 227 6 330 5 Japan 240 7 258 7 495 8 Latin America 201 6 200 5 319 5 U.S., 1,025 28 1,122 28 1,516 25 Basic Principles U.S.S.R. 510 14 617 16 666 11 Western Europe 900 25 936 24 1,634 27 The purpose of intensity-of-use analysis is to Other industrial- project I the consumption of a given mineral or ized nations .160 4 183 5 288, 5 material within a given region in a given year. The World 3,670 101f 3,960 102F 6,025 99t analysis considers only .primary use and disregards 1970 figures in 1971 dollars. An average of 1971-75 figures in 1971 dollars. subsequent shipments of processed or manufac- 1975 figures, in 1975 dollars. tured minerals or materials to other regions. dincluding Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Including Puerto Rico and other overseas U.S. islands. Hence, Japan, for example, is represented as Does not sum to 100, due to roundia& having exceptionally high consumption levels, since Japanese exports are disregarded. gator, with full regard to other research and Total world consumption of a given mineral or appraisals available on the current scene with material is calculated as the sum of the consump- respect to world economic development." tion levels for that commodity projected for each NONFUEL MINERALS' 585 region. Calculations regarding future consumption levels are, independent of similar; calculations in- volving that region's consumption of any other mineral, material, or commodity, and independent a of any other region's consumption levels of any commodity. They are also independent of any explicit considerations regarding potential changes in supply levels, prices, or strategic or balance-of- payment positions. According to the' principles of ,OU analysis consumption of a given mineral or material within a, given year can be -reliably calculated on the basis of just three components: An exogenous projection of.the level of overall economic activity (GDP) within a given region in a given year. Pw "Pift GDP � An exogenous projectiod'of the''total 'population within the same region in the same year. Figure 22-1. Intensity-of-use curve of a nation whose economy � An "IOU table" showing the quantity of a is moving from an industrializing economy to a given mineral.or material likely to be consumed post-industrialization service economy. within that region per unit of that region's. total IOU f,,,(GDP,/population,,,) GDP. (a ratio known as the commodity',s,inten- Consurription,@,= GDP - X IOU@r, ry sity of us6) at various levels of regional per Worldwide consumptionm',,= I @onsurnptionmry capita GDP. According to the 1977 Malenbaum Report, the A relatively high IOU statisticlor a: particular IOU statistic has several noteworthy aspects: commodity I(in a given region at a'given level' of First, it is readily@ available over past years, per capita G D IP) indicates that a 'relatively large given [reliable) statistics on a nation's use of [the quantity of 'that commodity is *projected to be commodity in question]. consumed 'per unit of total GDP (in that region 'at Second, the very concept of an input and th.at level of per capita- GDP). According to IOU output relationship has a technological dimension. theory,. LDCs that are industrializing require in- It, must reflect changes in use and efficiency of creasing amounts of minerals and materials 'per inputs to yield outputs, with account taken of unit of total GDP as their econornies expand and changes in techniques (for input or output) and per capita incomes grow (that is, their IOU changes'in -market relationships associated with supply, demand-, and public policy bearing on statistic increases as'a function of increasing per inputs and, outp uts. capita GDP).. However, industrialized nations that Third, and of particular interest, the historical are moving toward postindustfial service econom- evidence on intensity of use suggests there, are ies require decreasing amounts of minerals and patterns of behavior of the me'asure. And these materials per unit of total GDP as their economies patterns be identified with underlying theory and expand and per capita incomes grow (that is, their empirical time observation. Indeed@ it is this IOU statistic decreases a's a ftinc@tion of increasing systematic behavior of the measure that indicates per capit.a GDP). Thus,. mineral and,metal con- -its potential usefulness in demand analysis for raw sumption lev .els within a 'region whose economy. is materials. moving from. industrialization to postindustriatiza- However, the, 1977 Malenbaum Report also -tion are projected using IOU statistics at various points out that application of IOU analysis is still levels of per capita GDP that form, the, inverted preliminary and that "there remain further and .U-shaped curve shown in Figure 22-1. additional tasks to pursue, particullarly. with, re- Mathematically, the computations used to-pro- spect to the specific causes of differences in ject worldwide consumption of a given. mineral or intensity-of-use m6asures,over time and, among material in a given year, according to IOU analy- regions." sis, can be summarized by the following three The actual estimation of IOU statistics to,.be equations, where m represents a particular- mate- associated with future levels of per capita GDP rial, r represents a particular region, and y repre- (for various commodities within various regions) sents A particular year: is based 'on his .toric ,data but is @liighly 586 THE GOVERNMENT"S GLOBAL MODEL judgmental.* Historic IOUs are plotted as a func- is that smaller inputs of material accomplish tion of per capita GDP for each region and ' essentially what larger inputs did earlier--more commodity, and, apparent trends are extrapolated efficient fuel utilization, development in alloys, more or less linearly. According to the 1977 precision designing, and the like, as the U.S. Malenbaurn Report, these extrapolations reflect experience has demonstrated. consistent judgments, conditioned by a vast 3. Substitution. The substitution of one material assembly of pertinent data (and published and for another and of synthetic for natural materials other expert opinion), the economic, rationale of will continue to characterize economic growth. past performance, and theories of economic equi- These forces will proceed as technology, demand, librium change and growth." and supply bear upon relative market prices and It is relatively simple to make new consumption public policy. These are probably universal forces, projections for minerals and materials for regions although .special circumstances (relative impor- for which-IOU relationships have already been tance of domestic production, for example) may defined, based on new GDP and population govern the timing if not the direction of the shift pro je'ctions, which must,be consistent with the his- pattern in some parts of the world. In the past, toric GDP and population data used to develop this substitution process contributed to marked the IOU tables. Considerably more effort and downward movements in IOU in some materials sophistication are needed to make new projections and to decisive upward movements in others. that require the formulation of new IOU tables. A Broadly speaking, these trends are projected to representative IOU table from the 1977 report continue, although at more moderate rates. (showing the IOU relationships for refined copper .f6r 10 regions) is reproduced graphically in Figure One fundamental premise underlies the way the 22-2. 1977 Maienbaum Report takes these determinants The somewhat different curves for each mineral into consideration, namely: or material in each region are explained by 'the The growth of nations has an internal dynamic. unique economic characteristics of each region,-, That is, long-term growth is not governed by influenced by three economic determinants pecu- supply limitations of any specific input materials liar to each mineral and material. The three nor is it limited by',any inelasticity of total output determinants cited by Malenbaurn are: imposed by supply or demand of materials. This assumption [has] made it possible to project 1. Demandforces. These change the composi- national and worideconomic growth in one part of tion of GDP. In rich lands, the tendency toward, the research effort without regard to the material relative expansion of the services component of needs appraised in the other part of the study. GDP will 'persist, perhaps increase; materials use The existence and independence of this internal per unit of GDP will on the whole tend to decline. dynamic,,As described by Malenbaum, is thus In poor lands, modernization will continue and clearly identified as a premise rather than a with it the creation of a higher proportion of total conclusion .of'Malenbaum's study. The theory of output in industrial sectors. Both considerations IOU analysis also assumes that (1) the countries suggest the persistence of a relationship in which comprising a @'region for which each IOU function IOU first increases with per capita income-per- is developed have historically had comparable haps rapidly--and sooner or later decline with. per economies with respect to the mineral or material capita income--perhaps slowly, for which the function is developed, (2) the same 2. Technological progress. This plays an impor- countries have also had comparable per capita tant-role in intensity of use, serving to lower it. GDP levels and-will maintain roughly identical On. the whole, throughout the world we can growth rates during the forecast period, and (3) expect continuation of atrend where'the'net eff6ct their various commodity consumption rates can be projected independently of each other, without *Malenbaum cites a wide range of sources for his historical explicitly accounting for interregional competition data regarding minerals and materials consumption: Metal-, or. commodity' substitution. Bulletin Limited, Metal Bulletin Handbooks (1909-76); In addition Malenbaum assumes that environ- National Commission on Materials Policy; Overseas Geo- mental constraints will not limit the ftiture avaa- ,logical Surveys, Mineral Resources Div., Statistical Sum- mary of the Mineral Industry: Production, Exports, and bility of minerals and materials. Thus, the 1977 Imports, (1934-71); and the following annuals: Metalgesells- Malenbaum Reportobserves: chaft Aktiengesellschaft, Metal Statistics; United Nations, The Steel Market; United Nations, World Trade Annual The fact that the present [projections] represent a and Its Supplement (1971-74); U.S.. Bureau of Mines, 15 percent reduction [from the projections made z'Minerals Yearbooks (1934-74). in the 1972 Malenbaum Report] must be attributed .1 1 F-1 Western Asi 3,200 400 Africa f ther Industrialized Nations Ze 30,',' '2W @W, 'Per 11N E 2,00@ Eur U.S.S.R. 1;200 - .,ir, America Projeded China 0, "0 !?,460' 4,bOO 41'800 5 61400 Slow 10,2001, 11 197 f U.S.' "too Figure 22-2. Graphic representation of the 1977 Malenbaum Report's intensity-of-use table for refined copper. Solid lines indicate historic 00 experience; broken lines indicate projections. ("China" includes Mongolia. North Korea, and North Vietnam.) 588 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL to A judgment on man's aspirations for progress - may be explained in part because the GNP and the skills he employs to that end; the fact projections also assumed higher annual growth cannot be attributed to the weight of imminent rates in world trade in in -ost minerals and materials materials resource exhaustion or of environmental than the 1977 Malenbaum Report. For example, deterioration. trade in bauxite, phosphate, silver, and zinc was However, the report also notes that expectations collectively projected to increase at 6.3 percent of basic materials scarcities have "undoubtedly per yeau,over the 1975-1985 period, whereas the encouraged man and society to cope with shortage 1977 Malenbaum Report projects average annual through more intensive materials use." world consumption of primary 'alumiiuim to@ in- Malenbaum's analysis also disregards sociopol- crease at 4.2 percent and of zinc at 3.3 percent itical factors that might influence future consurnp- over the same period. tion levels. Thus, factors involving producer con- One 'of Malenbaum's two most basic IOU trol (for example, potential cartelization arising assumptions-that as LDCs progres Isively indus- from the irregular global distribution of resources trialize, they require increasing ainounts.of min'- among countries) or producer impotence (for erals and materials per unit of total GDP@seems example, potential civil disruption arising from to be inconsistent with an assumption underlying resistance to increasing levels of pollution associ- the Department of Energy's projections for the ated with increasing extraction activities or from Global 2000 Study. The Study's energy methodol- resistance to uncompensated boom-bust cycles) ogy assumed that LDC energy imports (measured are ignored, as are any potential changes in the in Btu's) would be a fixed percentage of GDP. international economic or political order. Eco- Historical IOU statistics for the LDCs generally normc cycles are also disregarded (including their seem to support Malenbaurn's position-at least destabilizing impacts on demand and prices). in the case of Africa (Table 22-5). However, past Malenbaum's analysis furthermore assumes that Affican IOU statistics.for cobalt and tin revrese .nt future consumption of minerals. and materials is important exceptions to 'this rule since they did independent of price,, except to the very. limited not,increase steadily,over time.'.Mo' o ', Mal- re ver extent that-price changes are implicitly considered enbaurn appears to violate his own rule in project- in extrapolating historic IOU relationships. To the ing African IOU statistics for nickel and tw*`sm'-ce degree they are, they are projected to decline in the IOU statistics for these metals,aie projected real terms. The 19.77 Malenbaurn Report projects to decline rather than increase. He explains this 61a gradual, weakening of demand forces relative anomaly in the case of tin but not in the case of .to supply forces" and concludes, therefore, that nickel. '.'the long term tendency, 1985 and 2000, may thus . The other basic IOU assumption--that as indus- be for lower materials prices rtlative to prices of trialized nations progressively develop posti@ndusl_ the final products in.which they are used." trial service economies, they require decreasing This price prediction is a judgmental. interpreta- amounts of minerals and materials per unit of total tion of the results of the IOU analysis contained GDP-is contradicted by the Global 2000 Study's in the 1977 Report rather than a direct IOU GNP projections. The GNP methodology assumed calculation, since the IOU methodology does not that, in general, LDC mineral and metal export project prices, demand curves, or supply curves. volumes to the industrialized nations would in- The price prediction is based instead on compar- crease faster than economic growth in the indus- ing past growth rates in minerals and materials tralized nations. consumption (5-10 percent per year) with pro- Historical IOU statistics for the industrialized jected growth rates in minerals and materials nations do not offer the same degree of support consumption (3-4 percent per year) and inferring for Malenbaum's position, at least not, for example, a reduction in demand pressure relative to supply, in the case of U.S. refined copper consumption. calculating these rates as the sum of non-U.S. Table 22-6 presents U.S. refined copper IOU demand and U.S. net imports. statistics on both an average and incremental basis This price projection directly contradicts the (incremental IOU can be defiried as incremental price projections for minerals and materials that mineral consumption divided by incremental.GDP were used in projecting. worldwide GNP growth growth-i.e., the amount of additional mineral con- rate.s fou the Global 2000 Study. These assumed, sumption associated with an additional unit of GDP for example, that average prices for copper and growth). While average IOU values have generally tin will increase by roughly 5.2 and 2.5 percent declined, supporting Malenbaurn's position, incre- per year, respectively, in constant dollars, during mental IOU values have not exhibited a continuous the 1975-1985 period. However, this difference pattern of decline. Thus, at least in the case of U.S. NONFUEL MINERALS 589 TABLE 22-5 Intensity of Use Statistics: Africa (excluding South Africa), 1951-2W (units per billion dollars GDP, in constant 1971 dollars) 1951-55 1961-65 1971-75 1985 2000 Primary aluminum (metric tons) 36.7 163.2 559.2. 600.0 900.0 Chrome ore (metric tons) 346.0 416.0 486.0 750.0 800.0 Cobalt (metric tons)8 13.3 12.0 9.9 10.5 11.0 Refined copper (metric tons) 217.8 266.7 291.4 350.0 400.0 Iron ore (thousand metric tons) 46.4 57.9 53.2 70.0 80.0 Manganese (thousand metric tons) 3.8 4.9 6.7 7.5 8.5 Nickel (thousand metric tons)' 3.9 16.0 49.4 55.0 50.0 Platinum group (troy ounces) 11.0 95.0 534.0 600.6 725.0 Crude steel (thousand metric tons) 49.3 57.6 68.9 75.0 85.0 Tin (metric tons)' 46.6 64.2 21.6 60.0 55.0 Tungsten (metric tons) 2.3 1.7 9.6 10.0 10.2 Zinc (metric tons) . 22.9 122.0 327.5 350.0 400.0 * ffistoric pattern contradicts IOU theory; extrapolation supports IOU theory. * ffistoric pattern supports IOU theory; extrapolation contradicts IOU theory. Data includes South Afti a. * ffistoric pattern is ambiguous; extrapolation contradicts IOU theory; 1971-75 figure is tentative. refined copper consumption, the general decline in though gains in technological efficiency can signif- average IOU values since 1936 can be accounted for icantly reduce mineral consumption (as industrial- arithmetically as due solely to the high-IOU com- ization progresses), the increasing use of technology position of the U.S. industrial base `ioor to 1936, by an, industrialized society (in more and more since -the average value always inco'rp6rates this areas of human activity from which it was ptevi- dominating component. It clearly doe'@ not decline ously excluded) at some point more than compen- arithmetically because of a consistent, continuing sates for gains in technological efficiency. Under trend of lower and lower IOU increments to that these circumstances, the average IOU statistic for base. an industrialized nation might well begin to in- crease (in the absence of supply constraints or This naturally raises questions regarding the price restraints). But, of course, this is merely a extent to which continuing declines in average __speculation neither confirmed nor denied, by'Mal- IOU values for the industrialized nations can be enbaum's analysis, since Malenbaum did not pro- projected indefinitely into the future with any vide. extensive analytic support for the basic confidence. It may well be, for example, that even premises of his methodology. TABLE 22-6 Intensity of Use Statistics: United States, Refined Copper, 1934-75 Average Valuesn 1934-38 1951-56 1956-61 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 Refined copper consumptionh 581.38 1298.12 1258.64 1681.26 1891.06 GDPc 213.396 557.108 640.160 773.222 .942.137 1122.094 Intensity of Used 2724.0 2330.1 1966.1 2174.4 2006.8 1680.9 Incremental Values, 1936-53 1953-58 1958-63 1963-68 1968-73 Refined copper consumption' 716.74 -39.48 422.62 209.80 -4.98 GDP` 343.712 83.052 133.062 169.095 179.777 Intensity of used 2085.3 -475.4 3176.6 1240.7 -27.7 Figures are specified with the same precision as in the 1977 Malenbaurn Report. h Millions of metric tons. Billions of 1971 constant do Ilars. dMetric torts r billions of 1971 constant dollars. The 1936-53liencremental value, for example, equals the difference between the 1951-56 average value and the 1934-38 average value. 590 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL Although the IOU methodology assumes that which is clearly an exception). In all cases, as the intensity and rate of consumption of various shown in the same table, the African share of minerals and materials within a region will change world mineral and material consumption is pro- over time (in response to changes in the region's jected to change very little. rates of GDP and population growth), it does not assume that these intensities and rates will change in the same way for all minerals and materials. This may be seen, for example, in the projections developed for Africa,. which are presented in Bask Components Table 22-7. In these projections the average annual In terms of the requirements of the Global 2000 economic growth rate for Africa declines during Study, IOU analysis produces explicit estimates the 1975-2000 period to only 70 percent of the of future resource consumption related to minerals rate during the 1951-1975 period. Also during the and materials, based on exogenous estimates of 1975-2000 period, the average annual population economic and population growth. As already growth rate declines to 90 percent of the rate stated, resources are generally assumed to be during the 1951-1975 period. Associated with inexhaustible and available at constant real prices. these decreases is a wide range of changes in No explicit account is taken of environmental consumption growth rates for minerals and mate- factors. rials. Some.new rates are over 80 percent below Specifically, IOU analysis is an uncomplicated previous rates (aluminum and platinum); one is arithmetic procedure for using IOU tables (which over 500 percent higher than previous rates (tin, estimate the intensity with which minerals or TABLE 22-7 Minerals and Materials Consumption: Africa, (excluding South Africa), 1951-2000 Average Annual Growth Share of World Total (percent) (percent) 1951-75 1975-85 1985-2000 1953a 19731, 1985 2000 Commodities: Primary aluminum 20.5 4.0 6.2 - .3 .3 .4 Chrome ore 8.8 4.2 3.7 .3 .7 .8 .9 Cobalt 3.6 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.0 3.1 3.4 Refined copper 6.7 4.9 4.3 .2 .3 .3 .4 Iron ore 6.o 6.2 3.8 .8 .9 1.3 1.5 Manganese 9.2 4.4 4.2 L 1 2.4 2.7 3.1 Nickel' 19.8 4.3 2.7 .7 .8 .8 Platinum group 27.4 4.3 4.7 - .7 .7 .9 Crude steel 6.9 4.0 4.3 .6 .8 .9 1.1 Tin 1.2 d 12 .9d 7.0 .8 .7 d 2.3 2.5 Tungsten 12.8 3.8 3.4 .3 1.7 1.8 2.0 Zinc 20.4 3.6 4.3 0 .4 .5 .6 Economic Growth: Malenbaum '77 (GDP) 5. 1 3.5 3.3 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 Global 2000 Study (GNP) - 5.5 4.6 - 2.11 2.4 2.9 Population Growth: Malenbaum '77 2.4 2.7 2.2 8.4 9.2 10.0 10.7 Global 2WO Study - 2.9 2.9 - 9. l" 10.2 12.0 An average of 1951-55 figures. An average of 1971-75 figures. Inc Jude'South Africa. Maleribaum notes that the 1971-75 figure for tin is tentative. 1975. NONFUELMINERALS materials will be consumed within a given country 2. Obtain, for the year in which the projection or region relative to per capita GDP levels) to is to be made, exogenous regional (a) GDP and translate exogenous GDP and population projec- (b) population pr;ojections and calculate regional tions into minerals and materials consumption per capita GDP for that year. These exogenous projections. Such tables could be developed for projections must be consistent with the historical any mineral or material with respect to any given GDP and population data used in developing the country or region. However, the only IOU tables IOU table. currently considered to be timely and useful by 3. Determine from the IOU table the appropri- members of the Bureau of Mines staff are those ate IOU value (expressed in terms of commodity contained in the 1977 Malenbaum Report. That units per unit of -total GDP) for the regional. per report contains IOU tables for the following 12 capita GDP level just calculated, interpolating or minerals and materials, which are said in the extrapolating as necessary. report to account collectively for 80-90 percent of 4. Multiply this IOU value by the exogenously the value of total world mineral production: aluminum -copper nickel ti,n estimated total regional GDP for that year, in chrome iron platinum tungsten order to calculate the estimated regional mineral cobalt manganese steel zinc or material consumption for the year for which Each IOU table presents separate IOU curves for the projection is being developed. each of the following 10 countries or groups of An example of how the 1977 Malenbaum Re- countries, as did the IOU tables contained in the port projected African copper consumption for the 1972 Malenbaum Report: year 12000 is provided below: �Africa (except South Africa) 1. Refer to the IOU table for copper in Figure �Asia (except Israel, Japan, China, and the 22-2. countries listed with China below) 2. Assume an annual African GDP growth rate �China, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Viet- of 3.4 percent and an annual African population nam growth rate of 2.4 percent for 1975-2000. This �Eastern Europe (Soviet bloc countries plus yields a total African GDP in the year 2000 of Albania and Yugoslavia) $178 billion (denominated in constant 1971 dollars) �Japan and, an African population of 680 million in the �Latin America- year 2000. Per capita GDP is thus $262.* �United States (including Puerto Rico and other 3. From Figure 22-2, assuming an African per overseas U.S. islands) capita GDP of $262, it can be determined that the �U.S.S.R. appropriate IOU value for this per capita GDP �Western Europe (that is, Western European level is approximately 400 metric tons per billion members of the Organization for Economic dollars of GDP.t Cooperation and Development) 4. Multiply the exogenously estimated total �Other industrialized nations (Australia, Canada, African GDP level ($178 billion) by the converted Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa) IOU value (400 metric tons per $1 billion of GDP) A geographical perspective on the methodology - underlying these projections is provided in one of the colored maps used to illustrate the discussion in Chapter 14 on the Government's Global Model. The Iactual calculation in the 1977 Malenbaum Report estimated that average annual African GDP was $71 billion during the period 197145; economic growth at 3.4 percent Basic Procedures per year was then calculated for 27.5 years; the same calculation was made with respect to Oopulation. Roughly Given an existing table of IOU relationships, comparable calculations using the Global 2000 project's .the following sequence of steps is followed in medium projections would forecast an African GNP level of executing an IOU analysis based on new, exoge- $427 billion in constant 1975 dollars, a population level of 497million, and a resulting per capita GNP of$859 by the year nous GDP and population projections: 2000. 1. Obtain an existing IOU table that relates the t It would be misleading to apply the Global 2000 Study's quantity (per unit of re onal GDP) of a mineral or per capita GNP projections to the chart in the figure, since, gi as previously noted, the historical figures used in developing material &ely to be consumed within that region the chart could not be made consistent@in the time avail- to the per capita GDP of the region. able-with the GNP figures used by the Global 2000 project. 592 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL in order to obtain estimated African refined cop- they explain why sudden somewhat less abrupt per consumption in the year 2000 (71 thousand downturns were estimated for the U.S.S.R., and metric tons).* "Other Industrialized Nations," in sharp contrast In the absence of an existing table of IOU to historical experience in those regions. As in the relationships, there are apparently no explicit rules case of copper, they also do not explain why the to follow in developing new IOU tables, other than extrapolated IOU curves are linear, why they to begin by plotting historical experience and then have the particular slopes shown, or why particu- to use judgment in proceeding. In the case of the lar variations exist among the industrialized na- copper IOU table shown in Figure 22-2, several tions or among the LDCs. The explanatory factors factors are cited in the 1977 Malenbaum Report as cited in the 1977 Malenbaum Report are: influencing the way the historical relationships Substitution and displacement forces have ... have been extrapolated for the various had an important [role* in reducing the IOU of industrialized nations and LDCs. These factors do steel in developed nations), probably from the not explain, however, why the extrapolated IOU early 1950s. On the one side there was continuous technical innovation from mining (agglomeration curves are linear, why they have the particular and berieficiation of iron ore) through processing slopes shown, or why particular variations exist (basic oxygen converters, electric-arc furnaces) among the industrialized nations or among the and final goods production (alloying, light steel). LDCs. The primary explanatory factors cited in the On the other side, there are inroads from substi- 1977 Malenbaurn Report are: tute materials, notably concrete, plastics and par- ticularly aluminum. Mostly, copper use has been affected by the These technological forces are expected to be substitution potential of other metals, notably present but with less weight in the poor-nation aluminum, for use in producer durables, construc- world than in today's rich lands. While open tion, motor vehicles and especially in electrical hearth processes have become of much smaller transmission. . . . For the most part, these dis- importance everywhere and while hydro power placements are irreversible in a given installation.. and low capital costs encourage electfic-arc and Prices of aluminum and plastics have been direct reduction processes in some poor nations, adversely affected by energy and especially petro- the prospect of parallel application of new meth- leum costs. . . . For these and perhaps other ods remain much smaller over the next decade reasons not yet clear, copper use seems to have and generation. Alternative products are less com- stabilized. petitive, steel scrap is less available, iron ore is [Projected] declines [in the IOU of copper] in often mined directly: such considerations weigh in rich lands are moderate. favor of a lower technological horizon in many There is as yet little evidence of rapid shifts .poor nations over the years to 1985 and 2000. away from copper that (would] impede the grow- [IOU relationships are] thus projected at higher ing [IOU of copper] of poor lands. levels in these years. The explicit application of IOU theory-in devel- The most difficult case for the application of oping IOU tables is even less clear in the case of IOU theory is in the development of IOU tables some other metals and materials. For example, in for aluminum. Aluminum is the one major com- the case of the steel IOU table presented in the modity whose historical IOU relationships do not 1977 Malenbaum Report, the projected IOU rela- exhibit the inverted-U pattern found for other tionships depart sharply from historical experience minerals and materials. However, in accordance in many-cases, as shown in Figure 22-3. with IOU theory, the extrapolated IOU relation- As in the case of copper, several factors have ships for aluminum in the 1977 Malenbaum Report been cited to explain the way the historical IOU have been estimated to exhibit significantly lower relationships for steel have been extrupolated for slopes than historical experience alone would the various industrialized nations and LDCs. suggest (see Figure 22-4). However, these factors do not explain why an As in the cases of copper and steel, several abruptly lowered IOU relationships (With rising factors are cited to explain the way the historical per capita GDP) as estimated for China. Nor do IOU relationships for aluminum have been extrap- olated for the various industrialized nations and LDCs. However, there is no explicit quantitative This represents 0.4 percent of world copper consumption accounting of the extent to which the higher in the year @@, as compared to 0.3 percent in 1973-but a energy prices mentioned (though how much higher 76 percent increase in African per capita copper consump- is unspecified) are expected to affect aluminum tion over the period 1973-2000 (to 0. 1 kg per person, as compared to 0.3 kg per person as a world average in the prices. Nor is there a quantitative accounting of year 2000). the extent to which higher aluminum prices are -- -- --------- 200' 360, China 160- 320 2ilO 120 Eastern Europe Asia 2 - ---- - -- 40 so U.S.S.R. 200 Africa Iz C@ % U S 0 300 Ito 200' Aw Other Industrialized 0 Europe Nricni, Latin America - - - - Projtd @,40 0, 800 1,00 2,400 31200 'C'000 4,800 5,600 6ADO 7,200 8,000 8,800 9,600 10,400 Per I-P;I- GDP jin com lazit '1971 U, S. dfiars) n sity-of-use curv for,crude steel. Solid lines indicate historic Figure 22-3. Graphic representation of the 1977 Malenbaurn Report's i ten e experience; broken lines indicate projections. ("China" includes Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam.) Asia L 'ic. " [Af 9 InIOWty f 2AOO 01 7,200 IAOD Asia China I 200 6,400 01 goo Africa 400 ----- - -- -------- 5,600 r- ----------- --------- -------- ----------- --- 0 4w, 0 100 150 200 1, 250 300 366 -0 for capita GDP 0 -4,800 -------------- -- - - ------- J apan 4,000 - - - ----- - ------- - - --------- 00 - --- ----------- ---------- - ------ ------- 1,200 - - - -------- ------ ------- - ------ w estern u iE rope tz Easiern !t Europe ---- --- ----- - - --- ---- - ----- -------- -- ---------- ------------- 2,400 ------- C 1,600 ------- ------- ---------- ----- ------ ---- - --------- -------------- -------- - -- --- - --------- -- - ------- - ------- U.S. Projected U-S-S.R' -------------- --- ------- - -------- -- -- ----- ---- - ------------ Latin Ot r (ndustrialifed Nations Ameri - -------- ------- - -------- --- - ---- 0 800 1,600 2ADO 3,200 4,000 4,800 5,600 ,6,400 7,200 8,000" 8,800 9,600 10,200, Per capita GDP (in constant 1971 U.S. dollars) 'A . . . . . ... . . . Figure 22-4. Graphic representation of the 1977 Malenbaum Report's intensity-of-usc table for,primary aluminum. Solid lines'indicatc historic experience; broken lines indicate projections. ("China" includes Mongolia, North Korea. and North Vietnam.): NONFUEL MINERALS 595 expect@dto moderate consumption levels, either ... [especially with regard to] the expanding role through abstinence, improved efficiency of use, or of aluminum in transmission. Construction and substitution of other materials. An explicit quanti- transportation equipment (automobiles particu- tative accounting is also missing with regard to larly) and an expanding array of consumer goods the extent to which decreasing IOU values for have become greater users of aluminum in most copper and steel in the industrialized nations are parts of the world. The rapid growth in [the intensity of use of more properly explained by aluminum substitution aluminum] in poor lands combines a high income (which could account for the increasing IOU effect as the economies develop (or at least values for aluminum in the industrialized nations) industrialize), supplemented by what is generally rather than by the transition of industrialized a positive substitution effect. [Howeverj ... nations to postindustrial service economies (which there-is as yet little evidence of rapid shifts away is a basic premise of IOU theory). These more from copper [in the less developed nations]. - - - general assumptions are not discussed in detail in The copper prospect and especially the uncertain the 19177 Malenbaum Report, although the follow- price prospect for alurninurn over the next dec- ing points, among others, are made: ades of energy shortage arc consistent with [the extrapolation]. There remains an impressive and still widening For the rich world negative income effects are technical scope for further displacement by alu- more than offset by substitution. It is hard to minum of iron ore, nickel, tin, and zinc in metal visualize a turning point for [the IOU of production, and of steel and copper metal goods aluminum]. 23 Technology No government agency is uniquely responsible nological change. In projecting the future based for developing consistent assumptions regarding on a continuation@of these historic relationships, future rates of technological change for use in the agencies implicitly assume that technological official forecasts. The Office of Science and Tech- change will continue to contribute to the correla- nology Policy and the Office of Technology As- tion of variables in the future as it has in the past. sessment are responsible for advising the Presi- Four explicit quantitative methodologies used in dent and the Congress, respectively, on Particular developing the Global 2000 Study projections aspects of technology and for assessing probable make particularly extensive use of historic rela- social and economic impacts. No federal agency tionships: the SIMLINK (SIMulated trade LINK- routinely assists other agencies in preparing con- ages) model in the GNP projections; the IEES sistent assumptions about future rates for techno- (International Energy Evaluation System) model, logical change to be used in official quantitative in the energy. projections; the GOL (grain, oilseed, projections. As a result, the agencies contributing livestock) model in the food and agricultural to the present study made their own assumptions projections; and the regression equations used by regarding rates of technological change, as neces- the Bureau of Mines in the nonfuel minerals sary, when they developed their projections. projections. The projection of historic rates of While each agency has made technological technological change is also implicit in the less assumptions over the years in forecasting other systematic procedures, for example, those used to variables of interest, there is no well-delineated develop the environmental projections. history of technological forecasting, . nor is any An example of how a more systematically well-established methodology in widespread use. specified model makes implicit end9genous calcu- Several methodologies, of course, are in use by lations of rates of technological change is provided federal agencies for projecting rates of - technologi- by the way the GNP projections incorporate cal change, based on rates of public and private assumptions regarding the productivity of new expenditure fof. research and development, past capital investment-assumptions that implicitly rates of technol6gical change, and other factors, incorporate factors related to technological but because such projections do not make, use of change. Within SIMLINK, the model ueed to a consistent set of assumptions, their methodolo- develop the GNP projections, linear equations are gies cannot be used collectively to evaluate the used to relate new gross investment to total GDP relative impact of different levels of public and for each LDC group. A variable incremental private investment in research and development. capital output ratio (as if new investment were related to incremental GDP instead of total GDP) can be inferred from the model's results. Such an Key Analytic Methodologies incremental -capital output ratio provides a meas- Four basic methods of deterTnining the direc- ure of the implied assumptions regarding changes tions and rates of the development and adoption in the productivity of investment capital associ- of technology were used by the agencies contrib- ated with one unit of additional GDP. These uting to the Global 2000 Study: implicit and changes are due to many factors, including, im- explicit.endogenous calculations and implicit and plicitly, projected rates of technological changes. explicit exogenous calculations. For almost all LDC groups, the incremental capital output ratio is projected to decline any- where from roughly 5 to 40 percent over the 1977- implicit EndogenousCalculations 85 period, indicating major increases in the pro- Almost all Global 2000 Study projections are ductivity of investment capital. For example, the based to a considerable extent on historic relation- GNP projections assume that, in the case of the ships (e.g., in the form of regression equations), "Other South Asian LDC- group (with an incre- which implicity incorporate historic rates of tech- mental capital output ratio declining from roughly 597 598 THE GOVERNMENT'S GLOBAL MODEL 4.1 to 2.5), a given investment can be thought of rates are based on the assumption that the LDCs as producing 60 percent more incremental GDP in will continue to make moderate progress in social 1985 than in 1977 (in constant dollars). and economic development during the 1975--.2000 period. As the LDCs progress in social and Explicit Endogenous Calculations economic development, the fertility level is ex- pected to decline more or less continuously but Some projections make use of explicitly speci- with some temporary plateaus. This decline is due fied cost factors, in -conjunction with explicitly to many factors, including the increasingly wide- specified maximum market penetration, rates. The spread deployment of birth control technologies, JEES energy model, in particular, makes exten- as methods of family limitation become better sive use of endogenous calculations involving the known and are accepted by couples wishing to development and deployment of various energy reduce their fertility. technologies not currently in widespread use. For As a result of these implicit assumptions involv- example, with the JEES model, the deployment ing the rates at which technological. change is rate for technologies capable of producing syn- adopted over the 1975-2000 period, fertility rates thetic gas from coal is explicitly modeled endoge- in Bangladesh are projected to decline 39 percent. nously In Mexico, the projected decline is 37 percent First, a maximum level of deployment is speci- over the same period and in the People's Republic fied exogenously for each year for which a of China, 38 percent. Projected fertility declines projection is developed. For 1985, this maximum are generally even greater in the case of the level is twice the 1975 production level and, for projections made by the Community and, Family 1990, three times the 1975 production level in the Study Center of the University of Chicago. case of coal and gasification technologies. Then the, model calculates endogenously the economic competitiveness of this synthetic gas in Explicit Exogenous Calculations relation to alternative fuels in each region repre- sented in the model. Afew projections make use of exogenous time- Those electrical generation plants represented trend variables to capture explicitly the impact of in the model that can bum synthetic gas can also technological change. Coefficients for these varia- use natural gas and sometimes other fuels. The bles are generally derived from the statistical model projects them to use the fuel that adds the measurement of historical data, although they are least cost to the global energy production system. also subject to major judgmental adjustment. The This is only rarely coal-derived gas because of the GOL model, in particular, makes extensive use of efficiency losses and extra transportation involved this approach to explicitly modeling technological in the- process. Demand for the gas from other change in making the food projections. Unexplained variations in historic yields from sectors cannot always be satisfied with ' other those implied by the model's regression equations fuels, but it is likely to be small, though growing- are assumed to be attributable to technological As a result, the deployment of synthetic gas change regarding both the development and de- technologies rarely reaches the maximum levels ployment of the technologies. These historically specified. derived rates then serve as the basis for projecting future change. To project future technological Implicit Exogenous Calculations change, analysts enter coefficients for time-de- All the methodologies used in developing the pendent variables into the model's yield equa- Global 2000 Study projections make extensive use tions. Major adjustments to the historically re- of judgmental adjustments to information entered gressed coefficients are made by expert analysts into the model. Often these adjustments implicitly to ensure that the model produces results that incorporate projections of future rates of techno- they consider reasonable. logical change. For example, the population pro- In the case of wheat production in low-income jections incorporate input data (mortality and North Africa and the Middle East, for example, a fertility assumptions) based on demographers' ex- coefficient is applied to a time-trend variable to pectations regarding the development and deploy- project growth in wheat production due to the ment of medical and birth control technologies. combined influence of trend growth and techno- These assumptions are then reflected numerically logical growth. Over 50 percent of the growth in in the model's calculation procedures. wheat production in this region over the 1970-85 In the case of the Census Bureau's population period is due to this factor, and an even larger projections, for example, these projected fertility percentage over the 1985-2000 period. TECHNOLOGY 599 Basic Principles Basic Components Although many different methods are used by The procedures used to choose the indicators the agencies in developing their technological and variables representing technological change assumptions, a few generalizations can be made are not consistent, In the case of the more explicit about philosophical approach. quantitative methodologies, the procedures cho- In general, the agencies assume a continuation sen tend to focus on variables of traditional of past technological trends with no surprise interest rather than on variables likely to be of developments. For example, the rapid rates of concern in the future. For example, in developing change associated with the Green Revolution of the food projections, the technological variables the l%Os are projected to continue unabated to chosen primarily focus on,yield per acre (and do the year 2000, None of the projections assumes not address technological indicators related to the that any technologies not now conceived will be energy and water required per unit of production). available and in widespread use by 2000. All the In contrast, the nonquantitative projections were projections assume that currently acceptable tech- able to take into account more recently proposed nologies will continue to be acceptable in 2000 measures of technological progress. (e.g., birth control pills will not be found to cause The geographic focus of the technological pro- cancer, nor will insects develop further immunities jections varies with the particular projection. Most to pesticides). of the mathematical projections (energy, food, The many factors that directly influence the population, GNP, and nonfuel minerals) adjust rate at which technological change and its con- their measures of technological progress for each comitant effects take place are usually not 'given geographic region considered. However, the explicit consideration. For example, the various model used in the Global 2000 Study to make resource, environmental, economic, social, and global projections of the residuals and pollutants institutional conditions necessary for the develop- associated with energy conversion processes as- ment and widespread deployment of major tech- sumes the complete adoption of U.S. new-source nological change are rarely explicitly analyzed. emission-standards uniformly throughout the Instead, the projections simply assume, implicitly, world by 1985. that these conditions will not represent a future barrier to a continuation of past rates of change. Similarly, the resource, environmental, economic, and social consequences of developing and de- Documentation and Validation pfoying emerging technologies are also rarely explicitly analyzed. However, most projections No published documentation of the methods implicitly assume that the impact of technological used by the agencies to project rates of technolog- change on whatever variables are represented in ical change is, currently available. No formal the projection models will be similar to such validity tests of the technological projections have impacts in the past. been made by the agencies. Part III Analysis of the Projection Tools: Other Global'Models p I 24 Introducfion The Global 2000 Stfidy utilizes the following natural environment for fulfillment of basic needs'', standard institutional means of problem-solving. A resulting in increased grazing and firewood gath- policyrnaker needing information gives a question ering and more overall pressure Ion the land). to an analyst (referred to as the primary analyst). Environmental degradation catised by economic The question is.either too large for the primary and population pressures have serious conse- analyst to answer personally, or else the analyst quences for agriculture and water availability. feels that it would be politic to involve other Food shortages and environmental degradation analysts in whose jurisdictions parts of the 4ues- have significant effects on human health, and thus tibn fall. The question is therefore divided into on population dynamics. By the year 2000 this subquestions tailored to fit the bureaucratic firame- crisscrossing of influences may have put the globd work. These are handed over to secondary ana- into a state quite differert from that predicted by lysts in various bureaus whose fields are appropri- the separate answers to subquestions on popula- ate to the subquestions. Some ground rules are tion, GNP, energy, agriculture, water, and envi- set forth to avoid inconsistencies. If the primary ronment. After 2000, the effect will be even more analyst is worried about consistency, he may profound. provide opportunities and incentives for the sec- Second, piecemeal bureaucratic analysis tends ondary analysts to receive input from each other's to understate difficult but critical questions-such analyses. However, the secondary analysts are as technological change, attitude shifts, and insti-@ not likely to be enthusiastic about incorporating tutional change-that do not fall into someone's inputs from other secondary analysts, into their tidy jurisdiction but affect the outcomes of all own analyses, so the gain in consistency is often secondary analyses. The primary analyst tries to minimal. fill in the gaps as best he can but seldom has time When the secondary'analysts have completed to do @ a thorough job and is likely to understate their work, they deliver their results to the pri- the importance of the intangibles. In the long- mary analyst, who then pieces together the re- term, these factors will be critical. If in the next sponses to subquestions. In the process, he will decade the nations of the world make a commit- have to edit out much of what has been said, fill ment to decentralized renewable energy supply in things that have not been said, and stretch systems, we or our descendents will live in quite meanings here and there so as to bring the a different world 20 or 100 years hence. VAfich subanalyses into a cogent whole. way the energy system goes will be determined This approach works reasonably well for nor- by public opinion and technological and institu- mal, short-terin problem-solving and gives the tional factors that the Global 2000 Study has not overbusy policymaker.a reasonably concise anal- been able, for the reasons given above, to incor- ysis based on,a broad spectrum of information. porate into its analysis in a consistent and inte- However, it.has two serious shortcomings for grated fashion. long-term analysis. One way of circumventing these shortcomings First, over the long term, the relationships is to supplement the piecemeal, subquestion anal- between subquestions become increasingly impor- yses with an integrated analysis, performed by a tant to the whole question. For example, the single analytic group using appropriate inputs from linkage between energy questions and economic related analytic groups. There are obvious dangers questions is critically important to agriculture, in this approach. If used as a primary mode of, (because of increased input prices and, if econ- analysis, it would concentrate political power by omies are adversely affected, reduced demand for giving the integrated analysis group a direct line agricultural products) and environment (inflation to the policyrnaker, while making it only margin- in the commercial system causes the world's poor ally answerable to outside analyses. However, the rural communities to lean more heavily on their need for integrated analysis in long-term planning 603 604 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS does justify the experimental use of , suc 'h an incomplete recovery. Stabilization is likely when approach. it may err due to deficiencies in. ana- the resource is self-renewing and the population is lytic methodology or to the arnilysts'. personal kept in check by.predation, parasitism,.or species biases.,'But the :system of divided analysis is behaviors that limit reproduction, such as territo- almost certain. to err due to its neglect of system riality. Oscillation results when the dynamics of linkages. Moreover, it too will be subject to the *'interdependent populations-particularly predator- biases of the primary analyst's personal judgment. prey systems-put them. out of phase with one The next five chapters will be devoted to long- another. When predators overexploit their prey, term global models that look at the world on an they bring on the demise of their own populations integrated basis. Themodels represent a variety and create an opportunity for the prey to recover of analytic approaches for making integrated fore- its Aumbers and restart the cycle. Human interfer- casts and serve as case studies to highlight some ence commonly disrupts the checks and balances of the problems encountered in managing inte- that control such interdependent populations. Prey grated forecasting groups. The case study analyses whose predators have -been eliminated by man will be followed by cross-section analyses of what commonly increase to the point where they be- the models reveal about trends in population, come pests in managed ecosystems (e.g., erup- resources, and the environment to the year 2000. tions of insect populations in agricultural crops) or The discussion will be prefaced by a review of to the point where they overexploit the environ- ecological concepts, because.ecology is the sci- ment, that supports them and starve in great ence that deals with the relationships among numbers (e.g., grazing mammals when large car- populations, resources, and environments. (It is nivores are exterminated). In the latter situation, assumed that most readers are already familiar oscillations are converted to overshoot and col- with the economic concepts introduced-into the lapse. The overshoot mode will also be observed discussion.) Some of the ecological concepts will when, a population depends on a resource that be manifested in the models to be analyzed. cannot@be replenished-as in the bloom and bust Others will be conspicuous by their absence, and of a test-tube yeast culture. their absence should be considered as a significant Secondi many populations are limited by mufti- deficiency in the integrated models. ple resource constraints. For plants, light, water, and a number of soil nutrients are limiting. Often one resource is much more limiting than another Carrying Capacity (in desert environments it is usually water). The availability of this most limiting resource will If a population requires resources in proportion to its numbers, and " if resources are limited, then determine the system's carrying capacity. Should the population cannot grow beyond the size estab- the Most limiting resources become suddenly fished by the resource limit. Economists refer to available,'as when phosphorus is made available thisI"carrying capacity" as Malthusian logic; to fresh Water algae cultures, the population will grow until it encounters some other resource biologists think of it as commonsense. Population limitation. In the process, it may seriously disrupt biologists.have developed the concept in many other populations that share its local environ- directions and subjected it to empirical and exper- ment-as happens in the case of an algal bloom ime *ntal testing. The basic theory has been ex- produced by phosphorus infusion into a phospho- tended to include cases with more than one rus-limited fresh water system. resource, with different sorts of resources, and .niore than One population---competition models Simple mathematical models of population dy- and predator-prey models being common in- namics based on carrying capacity concepts have stance'9 of multiple population forms. been around-since the 1920s. These are as familiar .In simplified terms, the insights shed on the to the 'ecologist as 'supply-demand curves are to the economist. Many ecologists will put human question of population, resources, and environ- ment by the carrying capacity concept are as population into a carrying capacity model just as follows. readily as they will any other specie and, at least First, three basic patterns of population growth in conversation, many will express the opinion can evolve in populations operating within . the that we are in danger of exceeding the . global confines of a finite carrying capacity: stabilization carrying capacity for our species. at or below the c .arrying capacity; oscillation Carrying capacity concepts will show up in all around or below capaciIty; and overshooting the models discussed in the next five chapters, except capacity, which is followed by extinction or the U.N. world model, and win be responsible for INTRODUCTION 605 virtually all of the pessimistic outcomes generated simplification make it impossible to build a credi- by the model set. In two cases-the Latin Ameri- ble model of the effects of biological simplifica-' can world model and MOIRA (model of interna- tion. Thus quantitative models take no account of tional relations in agriculture@-carrying capacity the problem. Rather, biological simplification man- will be reduced to a curve showing diminishing ifests itself as an ill-defined fear, which makes the returns to investment and labor in the agriculturtil matter hard to deal with in a rational fashion. sector. World 2 and World 3 and the Mesarovit- Pestel world model have much more complex Ecological Buffering formulations of the concept, including interdepen- dent populations (human and machine), multiple- Closely related to the concept of stability-and constraints (particularly the World 2 and 3 diversity is the notion of ecological buffering- models), and the function of interregional trade in basically a notion that living growing things ,, as allowing regions to extend their local carrying well as dead organic matter, cushion the interface capacities (Mesarovic-Pestel only). between the air and the geologic surface of the earth. Plants hold soil in place and protect it from Stability and Diversity the impact of falling rain. "Sod absorbs rain and prevents it from running off 'in a, great flood. In ecology the relationship between stability Living things bind up nutrients, which will reduce and diversity tends to generate 'a philosophical the environnent's carrying capacity if they are argument-one that can go@ in many directions not present in sufficient quantities and prevent depending on how one defines stability and -diver- then! from being leached out by rain or from sity@. Both terms are elusive, but there is some seeping down and forming a hard parf below the consensus among ecologists that genetic sirripfifl-' upper layers of soil surface. In general, the cation, either through reduction of the number of buffering role of biological matter is thought to be species in a community or through reduction of more critical in warmer,climates where chemical the genetic diversity of a population', is prone to reactions and decomposition of,organic matter make the community less stable. Extended, this (i.e., reduction of the sponge-like nature of soil to line of reasoning leads to some of the prevalent pure clay, silt, or sand) are more rapid. ecological nightmares. It gives theoretical.credibil- While the particulars are complex, as a general ity to the fear of a crop plague decimating the rule simplification of an ecological, system tends genetically simplified stands of high-yielding vari- to reduce its capacity as an ecological buffer. ety grains that support an increasing fraction of Thus, overgrazing, overcutting of timber, and, the world's population, as well as to the fear that various forms of overcultivation play havoc with a virulent, drug-resistent disease will develop and ecological systems and greatly reduce their ability take heavy tolls in human lives. On a less t6 support life. dramatic level, the stability-diversity relationship ' In principle,'the maintenance and destruction ' of suggests that the difficulty of controlling insects ecological buffers is fairly, straightforward and and other crop pests is likely to increase as could be easily modeled. In practice, however, cultivation pructices become more intensive, ex- modelers experience great difficulty in doing this.. tensive, and s 'tandardized throughout,the world. The way an ecological buffering system works, is Thus the reduction of crop losses anticipated in often site-specific. For any given location there many analyses, including the Latin American are often critical points beyond which a system world* model and MOIRA may never mature. cannot be simplified without extensive and possi- The potential effects of simplification of biolog- bly irreversible damage. The location of critical ical systems on long-term interrelationships, be- points varies according,to factors of climate.and tween population, resources, and environment geography. A region of steep slopes in the humid have been excluded from all global models under tropics is apt to'be much more susceptible to consideration and are either extremely rare or damage via disruption of its buffers than a temper- completely absent in regional models as well. The ate-zone flatland region. Thus it is difficult t ' o barrier to inclusion appears to be representational, come up with a global or large-region representa- combined with absence of data. The absence of tion of the ecological buffering 'problem. Of the operational definitions and precise conceptualiza- models to be examined, only World 3 attempts to tion of how the system is influenced by genetic capture the dynamics of ecological buffering. 25 Worlds 2 and 3 Man has skyrocketed from a defensive position, such as rapid population growth, resource deple- largely subordinated to Nature's alternatives, to tion, pollution, and hunger-and explained how a new and dominant one. From it, he not only the system dynamics method could help sort out can and does influence everything else in the an world but, voluntarily or unwittingly, can and d clarify these problems. To demonstrate, he indeed does determine the alternatives of his constructed during the following month a small own future-and ultimately must choose his model called World 1, linking five basic options for it. In other words, his novel power variables-population, capital, resources, pollu- condition practically compels him to take up tion, and food. He presented World I to the Club, new regulatory functions that willy-nilly he has one of whose members, Eduard Pestel, subse- had to discharge with respect to the world's quently arranged for the Volkswagen Foundation mixed natural-human systems. Having pene- to fund elaboration of the model. Forrester com- trated a number of the erstwhile mysteries and pleted and published World 2 4 a more polished being able to sway events massively, he is now version of the first simple model, and simultane- vested with unprecedented, tremendous respon- ously assembled an international team of research- sibilities and thrown into the new role of moder- ers ator of life on the planet-including his own life. under the direction of Dennis Meadows to make a still more detailed and careMy quantified version. This final version, called World 3, took a The above words I were written by Aurelio year to construct and was the basis for the book Peccei, who commissioned the models known as The Limits to Growth. I Worlds 2 and 3. He describes his own state of Peccei and other members of the Club of Rome mind previous to the time at which he commis- looked on computer simulation models World 2 sioned those models as "perplexed and worried and World 3 as means to their ends. It was hoped by the orderless, torrential character of this pre- that by making the human predicament quantita- cipitous human progress." Perceiving the world's tive and clear, the models would wake people up problems as highly interconnected and global in and set them to looking for solutions. As Peccei nature, he was convinced that something funda- put it, "We wanted to start a world-wide debate mental should be done before it was too late .2 as soon as possible. ` 6 Though he found no difficulty finding people to Modelers have motives as often as model agree with him that there was a problem, he found commissioners, and Forrester probably had an it difficult to translate that agreement into action. interest in promoting the system dynamics meth- In order to push ahead to actual programs, he odology, which he strongly believes is a useftil founded the Club of Rome, a loose association of tool for understanding complex, interrelated prob- businessmen, intellectuals, and nonelected govern- lems of the sort that concerned the Club of Rome. ment officials from many countries. The Club was The members of the Meadows team, which conceived not as a debating society but as an produced The Limits to Growth, probably had action-oriented organization with two, main objec- less well-defined aspirations. They were relatively tives: (1) "to promote and disseminate a more young (average age below 30) and for the most secure in-depth understanding of mankind's pre- part at the start of their careers. Meadows and his dicament" and (2) "to stimulate the adoption of wife had just returned from a year in Asia, during new attitudes, policies and institutions capable of which they had become concerned about prob- redressing the present situation. 113 lems of development and the environment, and Jay Forrester, the developer of the system were eager to explore the causes and possible dynamics method of computer simulation, was cures of such problems. Most of the team mem invited to a Club of Rome meeting in June 1970. bers were formally trained in science, engineering He pointed out some of the interactions he saw or system dynamics, rather than the social sci- among problems of interest to Peccei-problems ences. 607 608 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS The Models and Their Lindtatiolls The breadth of focus and coherent conceptual development of the World models ensure their Worlds 2 and 3 are models of, the, long-term utility for clarifying the nature of long-term global relationships between population, resources, and problems. However, their limitations render environment. They outline the general patterns of them unsuitable a@ primary tools of analysis or causation by which these three. factors interact as tools for detailed analysis of global problems and feed back on one another. Worlds 2 and 3 are and their solutions. the only models considered in the Global 2000 Study that include the study's three maior focal variables on an equal footing. The other models Method considered either omit environmental factors or World 2 and World 3 are both Isystem dynamics give them only cursory treatment. Two of the models-the U.N. world model and MOIRA models. System dynamics is a form of simulation (model of international relations in agriculture)-- modeling that incorporates a well-articuiated phi- include population only as an exogenous variablej losophy' precepts about how models should be and two-the. Latin American world model and constructed, and a set of symbolic representa- MOI RA-take no account of the depletion of tional tools (including the DYNAMO computer mineral resources and fossil ftiels. language and various diagrammatic formats used in model formulation and description), all of which Worlds 2 and 3 do have limitations, despite the embody the system dynamics methodology. Jay appropriateness of their focus. They are general, Forrester w as the primary developer of the system strategy-oriented models and make no attempt to dynamic's methodology. IThe team that con- develop specific, detailed analyses. They familiar- struc,06d World 3 was.made up of people who had ize one with basic tendencies in @ populdtion-rt.; studied under Forrester at MIT. Both models 'can source-en;vironment systems but donot speak to therefore be considered pure system dynamics the problems of specific regions. As stated in The models, and their methodological bases -can best Limits of Growth: be described by quoting extracts from the system We can say very little at this point about the dynamics literature. The following description has practical, day-by-day steps that might be taken to been extracted from a paper written by Nathaniel reach a desirable, sustainable state of global Mass, a senior member of the MIT System equilibrium. Neither the world model nor our own Dynamics Group, and Richard Day, Chairman of' thoughts have been developed in sufficient detail the Department of Economics at the University of to understand all the implications of the transition Southern California. from growth to equilibrium. Before any part of the world's society embarks deliberately on such a A system dynamics model is, most fundamen- transition, there must be much 'more discussion, tally, a theory of how change occurs in a social or more extensive analysis, and many new ideas economic system. The means for describing the contributed by many different people. If we have process of change is a set of simultaneous first- stimulated each reader of this book to begin order differential or integral equations. Underlying pondering how such a transition might be carried this representation is the assumption that change out, we have accomplished our immediate goal. 7 in Social systems occurs through the process of Further problems with the World models in- integration. The form of system dynamics models clude (1) the fact that they are based on a series thus differs intrinsically from that of simultaneous- of controversial assumptions, including the inabil- equation models which describe equilibrium rather ity of technology to alleviate natural limits to than ifitertemporal relationships, and in which growth and thus cannot be employed without change in internal system variables can only occur generating debate; (2) their focus on metal re- as a result of change in exogenous variables., sources and inattention to fossil fuels; (3) omission System dynamics assumes that all variables in of social factors, such as income distribution and a system can be subdivided into two fundamental the- international order, which may pose limiting categories: levels and rates. This dichotomy cor- problems well before actual physical limits are responds closely to the distinction between stocks encountered; (4) weakness- of data base and aggre;- and flows in economics or the distinction between gation of items with dissimilar behavior in the balance-sheet and incom Ie-statement variables in pollution sector; 'and (5) failure to allow for accounting. Level variables describe the state of qualitative changes in the nature of economic the system at any point in time. In contrast, rate growth that could make it less demanding on variables are instantaneous rates of flow which limiting resources. alter the system levels. WORLDS 2 AND 3. 6W Characteristics of the rate-equation structure of them well suited, for representation of problems a system'dynamics model include: where 'time phasing 'of cumulative events has -(a)-Rate equations are formulated on the b .asis of important ramifications for system behavior, as, observation of the underlying real-life decision for example, in the delayed effects,of toxins on processes. All information inputs to a rate equa, biological systems. tion are information sources actually available to The emphasis on inclusion of nonmeasured the decision-maker and employed in decision- variables, on operational (as opposed to abstract making. Rate equations should not bebased'on or @statistical) meaning, and on robustness under a theory of equilibrium or optimal economic extreme conditions often make system dynamics behavior. models seem strange, if not heretical, to conven- (b) In a well-formulated model, parameterswill tional analysts who base their models on existing each have clear and independent real-life mean- theory,and rely on statistical validation as,a test ing. , . . A typical parameter might represent "The average'length of time orders for capital of empirical truth. The same constellation of equipment are planned and negotiated internally attributes, however, tends to make system dynam- before an actual order is placed with suppliers." . ics models attructive 'to nonacademic audiences Parameters should have operational significance by freeing them from the artificiality of abstract to actors in the real system, not just abstract theory and imbuing them with the realism that statistical meaning. Parameters should never be comes of including familiar terminology and proc- inserted just to correct units of measure or to esses that interuct in a recognized fashion. increase equation fit with data. An essential part of using operational variables (c) Proper rate-equation formulations should in- and constructing models that will not break down corporate all influences on the corresponding under extreme conditions or outside the-range of real-Iffe action, including intangible or non-meas' observed system behavior is the use of nonlinear ured variables. Non-measured variables or van- functional relationships. It is common in any ables for which little data exist should be,for- functional relationship for extr Ieme conditions to mulated and incorporated into the model in as lead to increasing or diminishing returns. Hence, reasonable a way as possible, given data limita- the gut'feeling that one cannot, in many situations, tions. Simulation experiments should then be I 1pu performed at a1ater stage to assess the sensitiv- sh things too far" without facing a change in ity of model behavior and policy outcomes to the way the system responds. System dynamicists the exact measurement and specification of in-- i freely transpose descriptive information of such tangible or non-measured influences. Such Sim- situations into nonlinear functional relationships. ulation experiments can guide further data-col- For example, upon being told by a person familiar lection and parameter-specification efforts. with a system that past a certain point not much (d) Rate-equation formulations should be robust happens when you increase this or that input, the and not break down at extreme, conditions or modele -r will be likely to draw a curve of diminish- ,outside the range of observed system behavior., ing returns that levels off around. the:point indi- Such robustness of rate equations is important cated. The system dynamicist's tools make this because it can seldom be 'presumed a pfibri that sort of representation simple to incorporate, thus future behavior or behavior resulting from appli- encouraging its use. As all mathematician's know cation of a new policy will fall only within the the inclusion of nonlinearities tends to make range of past behavior. 11 systems on equations intuitively unpredictable. The rate4evel structure of system dynamics Thus, when system dynamics models are made models has important consequences. For. one to operate in extreme value regions for critical thing, it makes them.effective tools for represen- parameters-or when their own structural tend-; tation of dynamic feedback processes. System encies drive them into extreme regions over the dynamicists are almost unique among social sci- course of time-they often manifest unfamiliar ence modelers because they routinely analyze the modes of behavior. From this arises the "coun- behavior of theirmodels- in terms of positive and negative feedback loops.* For another, it makes back is equilibrating or goal-seeking behavior, in which changes in a variable that move it away from the value at Positive feedback loops are self-reinforcing. behavioral which. it finds equilibrium will stimulate forces that drive trends, such as "vicious circles" or ',snowball effects," the variable back toward its equilibrium value. A negative where increases in a stock result in increases in'the volume feedback loop can also be called a control mechanism. A of a flow that increases that stock. Growth in population thermostat is a classic example of a negative feedback leading to increases in the number of births per unit time is system. However, negative feedback will be fourid'control- a familiar example. Positive feedback results either in ling many things that.stay in balance and are not completely exponential growth or exponential decline. Negative feed- inert. 610 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS terintuitive behavior" that system: dynamicists determined by environmental factors of other see as one of the most insight-generating,,contri- sorts. The two populations, human population and bu'tions of their models-the place% where' com- 'machine population (called in the models capital puter analysis, at least theoretically@ can surpass investment or industrial and service capital) are the, analyzing power of the human brain. by nature tied into' positive feedback loops and thus inclined to expotential growth. Increases in Structure population lead to increases in the number of births per year, which leads to further growth of World 3 is a structural analoi of World 2, with population. Increases in machines lead to in- a higher.degree of detail and ftirther substantiated creases in output, which produces more funds for through parameterization and structur@al justifica- investment and thus more machines. Both growth tions taken from scholarly literature. Increase in trends will tend to be exponential. detail leads to an increase in size. World 2 The basic relationship between human and contains around 40 equations and 5 levels while machine populations might be.termed symbiotic. World 3 contains closer to 150 equations and 21 Ther Ie are functional relationships in the models state variables.* Table 25-1 shows the lines along whereby Iincreases in population tend to increase which World 2 has been expanded to arrive'at the growth of the industrial infrastructure and World 3. whereby growth industrial infrastructure tends to A full description of either model's structure hasten. population growth rates. Structural obser- would be impractical to include here. Those vations could lead a modeler to deduce that the seeking such a description should refer to the relationship between capital growth an d popula- rhodeler's own documentation of their work. 9 The ti n P, growth is quite strong (increased industrial present analysis entails some concdptuaf"distorti6ii capacity can greatly extend the carrying capacity by describing the two models as representations for human beings), while the relationship between of ecological carrying capacity. population grow Ith and industrial growth is rela- - As carrying capacity models, Worlds 2 and 3 tively weak (increase in human population does can be seen as systems including two populations, not greatly increase the carrying capacity for both of which have carrying capacities partially machines). Observation of model behavior will determined by the other population and partially confirm these deductions: In'model runs industrial growth tends to continue even when population TABLE 25-1 growth has equilibrat ed, while collapses of the A Comparison of Levels in World 2 and World 3 industrial structure result in similarly large col- lapses of population. World 2 World 3 The apparent symbiosis is not straightforward. Population Ages .0-14 In some ways, machine and human populations 15-44 are antipathetic and retard one another's growth. 45-64 65+ The machine population generates pollution, 5 delays a which can raise death rates for the population of Natural resources Nonrenewable iesources human beings. If human population increases ou 't Capital investment Industrial capital of proportion to its food supply, investment be- Service capital comes diverted from the industrial to agricultural 7 delays use, which in effect reduces the rate at which Fraction of capital Arable land industrial capital grows. investment in agriculture Potentially arable land Beyond the system of mutual constraints and Urban-industrial land stimuli and between the human and machine Land fertility populations are a set of constraints created by 2 delays Pollution Persistant pollution natural systems. Primary. among these are the 7 delays limitation on agricultural production created by -A delay is a commonly used structural unit in system dynamics models that the limited r'esources of arable and potentially serves to delay the effects of changes happening in the system. Structurally, arable land and the limitations brought about by a delays are levels. A single delay may be made of one, two, three, or more levels. finite supply of nonrenewable natural resources. In both cases, these are modeled not as absolute Technical definitional problems for "equation" and "state limits but as. situations wherein the costs of variable" make it impossible to assign exact numbers resource development increase expotentially as without careful stipulation of terms. the total available supply begins to be exhausted. WORLDS 2 AND 3-@ 611 As modeled, a further difficulty is embedded in costs, and less food per capita. The negative the structure of the agricultural sector. Its carrying feedback, signals become stronger as population capacity is erodable., Overly intensive use of ag- and capital grow toward environmental limits. 3. Delays in the negative feedback signals. arise ricultural resources leads to a decline in sod fertility for two reasons. First, some delays, such as and to decreased agricultural production. Declines those inherent in population - aging, pollution in agricultural production will stimulate increas 6d transfers, and land fertility regeneration, are investment in, the agricultural sector and further inescapable consequences of physical or bio- intensification of agricultural production. These,'in logical laws. Second, some delays are caused turn, will hasten the decline in sod fertility. Unless by the time intervals necessary for society to strong forces counteract these trends, their net ef- perceive new environmental situations and to fect will be an exponential decline in agricultural @diust its values, institutions, and technologies production and massive starvation of the human in response. . population for which the agricultural production A system that posses these three characteris- has established a carrying capacity. tics-rapid growth, environmental limits, and Worlds 2 and 3 also tend to be'structurally feedback delays-is inherently unstable. Because unstable and prone to collapse because the man- the rapid growth persists while the feedback machine symbiosis permits and encourages both signals that oppose it are delayed, the physical populations to grow beyond the natural limits of system can temporarily expand well beyond its land and natural resources. The inertia inherent in 'ultimately sustainable limits. During this period of the levels representing human and machine popu- overshoot, the short-term efforts required to main- tain the excess population and capital are espe- lations (neither human population nor stocks of cially likely to erode or deplete the resource base. machinery will respond quickly to changes in their The environmental. carrying capacity may be so outside environment) prevents them from re- diminished that it can support only a much smaller sponding quickly when they approach their re- population and lower material standard of living spective natural limits. Thus both'are inclined to than would have been possible before the over- overshoot their carrying capacities. This over- shoot. The result is an uncontrollable decline to shoot, in conjunction with the overshoot resulting lower levels of population and capital. from erosion of agricultural carrying capacity, is With this understanding of the system charac- responsible for the crash in human population and teristics that lead to instability, it becomes rela- industrial infrastructure that makes the World t,ively easy to evaluate alternative policies for models so startling and so sobering in their increasing stability and bringing about a sustaina-m prognostications. ble equilibrium. For example: 1. Short-term technologies designed to mask the Conclusions initial signals of impending limits, and to pro- mote further growth will not be effective in the The conclusions the modelers themselves d Iraw long term. Rather, they will disguise,the need from their models are perhaps best stated in'their for social value change, lengthen the system's own words from Dynamics of Growth in a Finite response delays, and increase the probability, World, the technical report on World 3: the,speed, and the magnitude of the eventual overshoot and collapse. The dominant behavior mode of World 3 is 2. Policies that combat the erosion of the earth's caused by three basic assumptions about the resource base will7certainly reduce the severity population-capital system: of decline after an overshoot. However, so I. The prevailing social value system strongly long as growth is still emphasized and feedback favors the growth of population and capital. delays persist, resource conservation will not Therefore, these quantities tend to grow unless in itself prevent overshoot. Furthermore, the severely pressed by physical limitations. Their overstressed system may not be able to afford growth is exponential because of the inherent the costs of conservation during a period of positive feedback nature of *industrial produc- overshoot. tion and human reproduction. 3. Social value changes that reduce the forces 2. Feedback signals about the negative conse- causing growth, institutional innovations that quences of growth are generated by the envi- raise the rate of technological or social adapta- ronmental systems that support population and tion, and long-term forecasting methods that capital. These signals take the form of -pres- shorten feedback delays may be very effective sures against growth, such as diminishing re- in reducing system instability. turns to investment-in agricultural inputs, the 4. Ajudicious combination of policies designed to buildup of harmful. pollutants, increased &vel- prevent the erosion of resources, foresee the opment. costs for new land, increased resource effects of approaching limits, and bring a 612 OTHER GLOBAIL MODELS deliberate end to material and demographic People testing the models'have come to differ- growth. can circumvent the overshoot mode, ing conclusions about the way the models func- -altogether and lead to a sustainable equillb- tion. Forrester and members of the Meadows rium. team are generally impressed by how robust the models' behaviors are. They find that the over- Although these conclusions seem to be simple shoot and collapse behavior persists in the face of and self-evident, most economic and political many measures that seem certain to eradicate it. decisions made today are based implicitly on a Strong measures to curb population and resource world view very dfferent from the -one presented growth and extensive industrial growth are the here. The dominant contemporary model contains the assumptions that physical growth can and only measures that they found effective in averting should continue; that technology and the price the famed collapse mode. On the other hand, Aer system can eliminate scarcities withAittle delay; testing the model's sensitivity to parameter that the resource base can be expanded but never changes, a team of investigators from the Science reduced; that the solution of short-term problems Policy Research Institute at Sussex University will yield desirable long-term results; and that concluded: "The model appears to be very sensi- population and capital, if they must ever stabilize, tive to input parameters which have a wide margin will do so automatically, and at an optimal level. 10 of error and in fact it would appear that according The conclusions reached by readers of The to World 3, high rate of growth is just as Rely as Limits to Growth vary with the sophistication of a catastrophic collapse.- 12 For the most part, the the reader. People who have not previously been Sussex group's parameter changes were based on confronted with the set of problems the World the expectation that technological change would models deal with often react emotionally and find constantly extend global limits over time and that the work depressing. The following comment is the main constraining factor would be the rate at typical: "Basically the prediction is that mankind which technology could progress. In particular, has perhaps 40 or 50 years left. . . . The human they found that flattening the cost curves (which race will be wiped out-mostly or completely--by relate costs of resource extraction and cost of the year 2100." 11 People to whom the problem of agricultural development of new land to the re- limits is not a novelty tend to react less emotion- spective fractions of these factors remaining un- ally. Others have such readymade defenses developed or unused) makes continued economic against the limits argument as the following: "Yes, growth much less of a problem than it was shown but they do not include technology." "You can to be in the Forrester and Meadows studies. The rig a model to say anything you want. " Or "I reader who would like to assess for himself the don't believe their numbers are correct." Others relative merits of these two arguments is referred to Chapter 9 of Models of Doom I I and to Chapter are favorably predisposed to the concept that 7 of Dynamics of Growth in a Finite World. 14 material growth must cease and so are inspired to work for global equilibrium. Statements are sometimes made to the effect Worlds 2 and 3 are probably among the most that The Limits to Growth has been disproven tested computer models ever developed. Not only and that errors have been found in the World models. In fairness to the World modelers, it must have they been extensively tested by the modelers be said that there probably isn't a social system themselves, they have alsb been subjected to model in existence that could not be disproven by extensive testing by the models' critics, by s .ym- cntics who change the model's assumptions or pathetic academics, and by students at various attack its data base. Had the other models de- universities. There are two principal reasons why scribed in the following chapters been subjected the World models have undergone so much test- to the extensive testing lavished on the World ing: (1) They are highly visible and present a models, there is little question but that they, too, challenge to users who attempt to get the system would have been "disproven" or found in effor. to produce different outcomes, and (2) they are easily tested by anyone having access to the appropriate computer hardware. Their computer Documentation programs are published and are sufficiently short that they can be transferred without difficulty onto World 2 and World 3 are clearly and thoroughly any system with a DYNAMO compiler. Once on documented. The equations on which they are the system, they are easy to test, for DYNAMO based have all been published, and it is possible was written in a way that deliberately encourages for anyone with access to a DYNAMO compiler testing. to reproduce the results without difficulty. The WORLDS 2 AND 3 613 equations have also been explained in two of the The fam 'e'achieved by Worlds 2 and 3 probably works cited below. 15 And,.of course, the popular owes. asmuch to the clear and provocative style and readable Limits to Growth has reached an of their documentation as to the attention-com- impressive number of readers-about 4 million manding descriptors applied to the documents copies having been printed to date, in over,20 themselves: "MIT Study" and "Report of the languages. 16 Club 4 Rome." REFERENCES, 1. Aurelio Peccei, The Human Quality, oxford: Pergamon, 9. Dennis L. Meadows et Al., Dynamics of Growth in a 1977, p. 2. Finite World, Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen, 1974; 2. Ibid., p. 62. Forrester, World Dynamics. 3. Ibid.,'p.73. 10..Meadows et al., 1974, pp. 561-63. 4. Jay W. Forrester, World Dynamics, Cambridge,'Mass.: 11. Theodor H., Nelson, Computer Lib, Chicago: Hugo's Wright-Allen, 1971. Book Service, 1974. 5. Donella H. and Dennis L. Meadows et al., The Limits 12. H. S. D. Cole, ed., Models of Doom, New York: to Growth, Washington: Potomac Associates, 1972 6. Peccei, p. 78. Universe, 1973, p. 130., 7. Meadows et al., p. 185 13. Ibid., Ch. -9. 8. Nathaniel J. Mass and Richard H. Day, "Economics 14. Meadows et al., 1974, Ch. 7. and System Dynamics," undated memo D-2426, circu- 15. Forrester; Meadows et al., 1974. lated in the MIT System.Dynamics Group. 16. Peccei. 26 Mesarovic-Pestel World Model The World 2 and 3 models constructed by Jay that of Forrester and Meadows. In introducing Forrester and the Meadows group were prime their models, Mesarovic and Pestel stress that targets for critics. They were highly publicized their model is scientific and based on real num- and documented in such a way that their assump- bers. 2 tions were fairly clear, and it was obvious that Despite the modelers' attempts to set them- their approach contradicted many established selves apart from previous world-modeling efforts, techniques of problem analysis, particularly those the Mesarovic-Pestel world model was inspired by used by economists. But none of the features of much the same set of motives as World 2 and the World 2 and 3 models that came under fire World 3. Once again, there was an attempt to was so widely attacked as the fact that the consider problems on a global scale, to make modelers aggregated all nations of the globe into a sense out of the bewildering interconnections of single operative unit. This disturbed the modelers' things that either are currently going wrong or sponsors as. well as the critics. In. the words of might do so soon, and to seek means of directing Aurelio Peccei and Alexander King, founders of the global system toward ends for the betterment the Club of Rome: of mankind. Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel were One of the deliberate limitations of the Previous both systems analysts. As original members of the [Forrester and Meadows] research was. its adop- Club of Rome, they watched the World 2 and 3 tion of worldwide aggregations. This was a matter models develop and apparently concluded that of choice, prompted by the objective of complet- they could improve on those models. They sug- ing the project rapidly, providing at the same time an initial overall perspective of the trend and gested as much, got support from the Club of constraints inherent in the dynamics of the total Rome, and secured financial sponsorship from the system. We knew, of course, that the heterogeny Volkswagen Foundation, which also sponsored of the world, with its innumerable cultural and the World 3 project. Work on the Mesarovic- environmental dffer-ences, varying levels of devel- Pestel model (also known as the world integrated opment and uneven distribution of natural re- model, or WIM) was begun in Hannover, Ger- sources, means the consequences of growth in many, and later transferred to Case Western different places is likewise heterogeneous. Thus Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio. the average curves and trends, as outlined in the first report, could not be adopted as a guide to detailed policy decisions in any particular country. We appreciated therefore the urgent need to Method follow up this initial global model with disaggre- In system dynamics, there is unity between the gated studies that could lead to a deeper under- modelers' world view and the mathematical con- standing of the wide nange of world, regional and structs used to build the models. Forrester and nati nal prospects and to their being coupled with the 0 Meadows see the world as a mechanism-not a practical business of politics. And, conse- -Pestel Study clockwork mechanism, but a closed, state-deter- quently, we supported the Mewovic which aims to do just this. rmned system, full of nonlinearities, too complex for the human mind to follow. The Mesarovic- The data base for Worlds 2 'and 3 has also Pestel world model does not incorporate quite the drawn severe criticism. Critics have used such same literal translation of world view into mathe- adjectives as' "unscientific" and "dubious" to matical methodology. Instead, the modelers' describe the empirical base on which the models world view-which they term "hierarchical sys- rest. Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel have tems theory"--detennines their conceptualization made a deliberate attempt to gain approbation of the world system, and mathematical and com- from the skeptical segment of the intellectual puter-science techniques are used eclectically to community and to disassociate their work from capture the essence of their conceptualizati6n. 615 616 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS Both the modelers' world view and their math- ical stratum) have been represented in the most ematical methods are of interest, the former for explicit terms and take up,the bulk of the model's its influence on the model's overall conceptuali- content. The modelers have attempted to allow zation, the latter because they determine what for the group stratum-that is, political and insti- happens when the model is run through the tutional factors--by making the model interactive computer. and turning over to the model user the function of estimating social group behavior. It is unclear how The World View the technology stratum has been included, al- The modelers' world view is discussed at though technological influences are implicit in length--4hough not in a fashion that will convey a many places in the demographic-economic-model. clear understanding of hierarchical systems the- Here, a note on the question of "counter- ory-in the popularization of their work, Mankind intuitive behavior" is in order. As, mentioned in at the Turning Point. Basically they envision the the methodological description of Worlds 2 and 3 world as stratified into multiple planes, each of in Chapter 25, Jay Forrester and most other which operates with a degree of autonomy. These system dynamicists propound the notion that strata, as the modelers call them, are hierarchi- complex systems are often internally structured in cally arranged, as in Figure 26-1. At the top is the such a way that the human mind is incapable of individual stratum; below it, in descending order, correctly sensing how they behave. That is, com- are the group, the demographic-economic, the plex systems-which.-in For-rester's world view technological, and the environmental (ecological means higher-order nonlinear. systems-behave in and geophysical) strata. The documentation does counterintuitive ways. The hypothesized counter- not inform us how or why these strata are distinct, intuitive behavior of social systems is not a. trivial nor does it explain their ordering. or an esoteric point; on it rests the basic justifica- . In practice the strata are not equally repre- tion for system simulation modeling-the claim sented in the model. The demographic-economic that computer simulation can pull us through the stnaturn and the environment stratum (apparently complex logical sequences that baffle or trick our a meld of the geophysical stratum and the ecolog- intuitive perceptions. Like Forrester, Mesarovic and Pestel see social V--@ 7-- --'7 _777_777177_T7-_,,,7 tems as structured in ways beyond the ken of 771 Sys un aided human intuition. However, they offer a Individual different explanation of how such systems exceed stratum our powers.of intuitive understanding. The prob- lem, as they see it, arises out of the hierarchical ion of these systems. In normal times construct different hierarchical strata behave almost inde- Group stratum pendently of one another. However, some condi cause the separate strata to become tions can -active. These conditions, the modelers i highly inter tell us, are what we commonly call "crises"; in L Demographic such crises the system can adopt modes - of economic i 1:@ I -, 1,1 @ i behavior so different from those of normal expe- stratum rience that they surpass our intuition. I Mes.arovic T 1 7 and Pestel's message appears to be that the model T" they have produced can assist us in fathoming the _A-Z Technology behavior of both present and fliture crises. stratum If we try to place the Mesarovic-Pestel strata among familiar concepts, we find they follow system cleavages that others have followed be- Environment fore. The environment stratum" seems to Corre- stratum spond to the natural "carrying capacity." The J economic and demographic substrata, although combined in a single stratum, coincide with the human and machine populations that coexist in -1. The r Worlds 2 and 3 in a blend of symbiosis and Figure 26 ive interrelated planes into which the world is stratified in the, Mesarovic7Pestel world model. antipathy. And Mesdrovic and Pe.stel have found MESAROVIC-PESTEL WORLD MODEL 617 the technological and group (social) strata as hard number of people who so understand this model to specify as have other modelers. will probably remain small. The model contains @ @ Another world-view notion stressed by the feedback loops, but the information streams that modelers is that of organic versus undifferentiated control -these loops flow through multiple cris- growth. Organic growth they see as internally crossing channels. Following these can become regulated, integrated, controlled, and sustainable. quite confusing. And yet if one cannot follow Undifferentiated growth they see as uncontrolled, them, it is difficult to say whether model behavior unsustainable, and dangerous. Several times in is a faithful representation of world processes or a' Mankind at the Turning Point, they emphasize result of some fluke in the way the model was the desirability of moving toward an organic'form hooked up. of growth for the global system. To illustrate their . In short, the Mesarovic-Pestelmodel.is a disag- point, they use as an example of organic growth gregated dynamic feedback model. The structure the leveling off of the growth processes of an oak is quite complex. Its complexity requires that one tree4-a disturbing analogy when one reflects that either put in weeks-or months--of effort to senescence and death are characteristic of all understand. the structure or else accept it without organisms and that a leveling off of organic growth question and trust that the.modelers have faith- is followed by decline and death. The analogy is fully represented the way the world works. not too important, however, since it is not at all clear how--or if-it influences the model structure Relevance or shapes its conceptual development. There is no question of the Mesarovic-Pestel model's basic, relevance. for studying long-term The Mathematical, Methodology interactions, at leastIbetween population and re- Mathematically, as, oppos 'ed, to conceptually, sources. In many ways it seems to come closer the Mesarovic-Pestel. model is somewhat like a than any existing model to the detailed, integrated, system dynaintics model *in which state variables policyToriented planning model that projects like are replaced by matrices of state variables, and the Global 2000 Study are seeking. It moves the necessary equipment is added to describe toward uniting the equivalents of the models used interaction between the elements into which the in making the projections presented in Part 11 of single variables have been disaggregated. (V6r this volume. That is, it comes close to being instance, one-can.think of the model as having GOL, SIMLINK, IEES, and a demographic been regionalized through first building a 'single model all rolled into one. It speaks to the trading regional model structure and then replicating it 10 between the grain-rich and the oil-rich, as well as or 12 times, using parameter. differences and to the starvation of those who have neither grain perhaps computer subroutines Ito make the indi- nor oil. vidual regional model conform to characteristics From the environmentalist's point of view, the of the world's region.) Thereafter it.was necessary m6del leaves much to be'desired. It either ex- to link the regiom in a trade network. This cludes, or treats in a very superficial manner, required more thinking, more equations, and more forests, fisheries, and resources of soil, water, and data. air. It makes little attempt to trace the ecological The same sort of disaggregation process that destruction that can be expected as marginal land took place to develop regionalized representation and mineral resources aire brought in to use. It has taken place in many other places in the apparently does not even consider the increasing model. Populations are broken into 85 separate costs of their extraction and development. Thus, age groups. Energy resources.are categorized into it fails to represent what might be called the five types. Where data permit, regional economics world's growth pains. have been disaggregated by sector, each sector Many of the things the modelers excluded could having its own capital stock. And so forth. be put into the model, at least in principle, but not The net effect (in both senses of the word without making the model much larger, more net") is hard to follow. There are probably very complex, and less easy to understand. As it is, few people in the world who understand the the model's size already poses enough problems model well enough to look at an output and say that the modelers sometimes find it impractical to that a given pattern of model behavior was caused run the full system intact. Instead, they drive it in by such and such a feature of the model's two segments., the one driving the other (hence no structure. And because the model's complexity feedback) in some cases making off-line adjust- seems to be growing rather than shrinking, the ment's to compensate for the feedback linkages 618 OTHER GLOBALMODELS that are severed when running the model in capacity world model with populations of men pieces. and machines. However, World 2 and 3 included In fairness to the modelers, it should* be noted one population of men and one or two populations that the problems created by complexity are of'machines. By contrast, the Mesarovic-Pestel inherent in putting dynamic feedback into a de- model includes a dozen or so geographically .tailed model. Any modeler attempting to build a differentiated human population groups (the exact mathematical structure incorporating similar de- number varies in different versions of the model), grees of detail and interdependence of variables each divided into 85 age categories.1t also in- would firid himself faced with the same problems cludes about half a dozen categories of machines, in operating, comprehending, and explaining his two@ sources of agricultural capital, capital for model. It is to the modelers' credit that they are producing fish, mineral extracting capital, and so presently doing what they can to simplify the on. Most of these are geogr-aphically differentiated model's structure and make it more readily com- and some are disaggregated again into usage prehensible to conventional analysts. Whether categories. For example, in each region five they will succeed remains to be seen. varieties of energy capital are./fecognized and as The many ecological features that one might many as 19 varieties of industrial capital. want to include would present great difficulties. Correspondingly, the model's carrying capacity They extend across ecosystems whose boundaries is much more complex than that of World 2 or do not conform to the political-regional boundaries World I Its most binding resources appear to be defined in the model. 'Problems peculiar to arid oil (petroleum), the availability of oil substitutes, regions, rainforests, tundra, or combelts are be- and agricultural land. The model allows for the yond the model's powers because its regionaliza- market to make adjustments between use of one tion scheme aggregates across major @ ecological source of energy and another and to allow for zones. Similarly, problems like the firewood crisis transfer of energy and agricultural products be- of the Third World would be difficult to represent tween regions. Thus one region's carrying capac- because the model makes no separate account of ity can, if it had something to trade, be extended the social classes that glean their fuel from the beyond the bounds imposed by its own resource natural environment. base. . Here again, the modelers cannot be blamed. Though more complex, the carrying capacity The world in which they operate is not dominated constraints in the Mesarovic-Pestel model are less by concepts of ecological or social class structure. diverse than those in World 3, and probably less Its data are aggregated in political categories, not potent as well. Pollution, in the model, does not by income groups or in ecologically meaningful decrease agricultural productivity, intensive culti- units. The questions critics have most frequently vation does not erode agricultur-al potential when asked the. modelers have probably not been unmatched by investment for land maintenance, strongly oriented toward ecology or social equity. energy seems to be more seriously constrained by Under the circumstances one would have to be the speed at which new reserves can be developed personally dedicated in an obstinate way to social than by absolute scarcity, and shortages of natural equity or environmentalism to persist with repre- resources other than energy cannot feed back into sentations that would speak to questions such as the economic sector in a way that alters growth the fate of poor farmers, the firewood crisis, or patterns. Moreover, the man-machine symbiosis destruction of agricultural lands through inade- appears to be more strongly represented in the quate environmental management. Mesarovic-Pestel model. Labor and machinery There are other environmental questions, how- are figured as complementary inputs in economic ever, that the model could- be adapted to address. production (i.e., as described below, a Cobb- These include calculation of amounts of pollutants Douglas production function is used). However, generated, land disturbance through mining, and Mesarovic and Pestel have added one new way in effects of climatic change. Presumably, these which biological limits can constrain human-eco- questions would be incorporated into the model if nomic systems--one that becomes pernicious in an interested client were found to support the less developed countries. High rates of starvation necessary work. reduce the capital-output ratio. Where agricultural production is inadequate and there is little to trade, therefore, an increase in population will Structure precipitate reduction of industrial output-to the detriment of investment and capital accumulation. Like World 2 and World 3, the Mesarovic- Thus the model can be expected to be sensitive Pestel world model can be seen as a carrying when it comes to striking a balance between MESAROVIC-PESTEL WORLD MODEL 619 population, industrialism, and agriculturalism (and to a state in which the results of further invest- some of the sensitivity may be a reflection of the ment are subect to rapidly diminishing returns. real world situation). This stifles further agricultural growth. In the Carrying capacity concepts, however, are not energy and resource submodels, production uses the terms in which the model has usually been up reserves. While reserves may *be replenished viewed. More commonly, it is looked at.through by further resource discoveries, a time comes the economist's eyes. From that point of view, when there are no more undiscovered reserves to the model is a collection of regional models. Each be developed. Actually, as formulated, undiscov- represents economic production using a Cobb- ered reserves will never be totally exhausted, for Douglas production function.* The capital for use the model is str ,uctured in such a way that the in the Cobb-Douglas function is generated endog- resource discovery rate is proportional to the enously through investment processes. The popu- fraction of the original total of stock of reserves lation that provides labor is also generated endog- remaining undiscovered. Thus discoveries will enously. Labor force participation is a function of approach zero as all of the undiscovered reserves population age structure. In the regions for which come to be discovered. they could be produced, input-output tables have Falling off of the discovery rate means that been used to allow a more detailed representation reserves are not replenished and supply shortfalls of economic production. This detail allows greater drive up price. Because the model accounts for precision in estimating resource usage patterns. substitution between fuel types governed by For example, the models are made more complete cross-price elasticities, when resource depletion by breaking gross regional products into such causes escalation of energy prices, the price groupings as more energy-intensive, more labor- .,mechanism will cause the system to shift to the inventive, less labor-intensive, etc. use of sources of energy other than the one that . Broadly put, agricultural investment in the was depleted. Shortfalls in energy supply also model comes as a spin-off of economic growth- curtail economic growth, so that in the event of 'with the rate of investment regulated by the price an energy shortage, the capital ratio of the model of agricultural products. Investment in agriculture, goes up. Higher capital output ratios obviously through encouraging land development and foster- reduce output. ing mechanized and fertilizer-intensive practices, Much of what has just been described is miti- increases agricultural output and food per capita. gated by international trade. In most cases, supply So in the long run, agricultural supply is a function and demand shortfalls and excesses stimulate of capital investment as constrained by land international trade. Goods will then flow from resources. region to region, as constrained by. trade-policy Demand for agricultural products is a function barriers and limitations of balances of payments. of income per capita. The balance between supply Adjustments are added as appropriate to compen- and demand for agricultural products determines sate for, the cost of transport and to allow for price, which in turn can induce or discourage regional differences in price. investment in Agriculture. In addition to being viewed in carrying capacity Energy @production and resource production, terms and in economic terms, the model structure like economic output in general, are driven by can be viewed as a computational sequence, as in accumulations of capital stock. Here again, invest- Figure 26-2. The sequence might be expected, ment is partially controlled by price-the higher perhaps, to follow the hierarchical order. How- the resource price, the greater the investment in ever, this does not seem to be the case. resource capital. And again the price is deter- mined by the forces of supply and demand. Conclusions Demand for energy in resources is a function of economic output. It is hard to summarize the conclusions to be In both the agricultural and resource structures, drawn from the Mesarovic-Pestel world model. capital accumulation and the dispersion of unused The. modelers have reported their conclusions in resource supplies eventually put the system up many places, but thestyles of reporting, if not the against natural constraints. In the agricultural conclusions themselves, vary greatly, depending system, investment eventually brings the 'System on the uses to which they are put. In Mankind at the Turning, Point, it's very In its standard form, difficult to tell which conclusions were built into Output = labor' X capital` X factor". the model and.which were drawn from it. Many a, the time factor, and r are statistically estimated constants. The time factor is often equated with technological advance. of the concepts stressed in that book appear to be 620 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS population Lobo, Economic Aid and and food supply b capacity loon Y and demand education investment decisions Machinery material demand demand _j Energy Food demand demand =-A Machinery Material 1 production production food Energy production Production Trod@- Trade - capability Trade and .1 import and adjustment payments from export balances capabilities payments 4 r Energy Agriculture Machinery i Material surplus prices a prices and nd prices and resources computation resources population Education Economic L dynamics dynamics dynamics _777_@ Figure 26-2. Computational sequence of the Mesarovic-Pestel world model. (Case Western Reserve University, Systems Research Center)- a priori conclusions. For example, in the itali- anced and undifferentiated growth which is at the cized* portion. of the Prologue to the book, the heart of the most urgent problem facing human- authors conclude: "It is this pattern of unbal- ity-and a path which leads to its solution is that F , of organic growth.." 5. "The analyses in this The passages in italics here and in what follows were book extend over a period of 50 years. If, during italicized in the original. this coming hao"century a viable world emerges, MESAROVIC-PESTEL WORLD MODEL 621 an organic growth pattern will have been estab- goes on and on. The model is versatile, and the lishedfor mankind to follow thereafter. If a viable conclusion list could be extended almost indefi- system does not develop, projections for the nitely, as long as the modelers were funded for decade thereafter may be academic. 1' 6 research. Then in the' Epilogue, they draw such conclu- Like the conclusions extracted from Mankind sions as "Underlying these limits 'crises' is a gap at the Turning Point, those above are not sup- between man and nature which is widening at an ported by clear references to the model form used alarming rate. To bridge that gap man has to to generate them. The problem seems to be one develop a new attitude to nature based on har- of money and priority. Adequate specification monious relationships rather than conquests." would be an expensive and time-consuming proc- The Epilogue continues: . ess, and the number of people that would read the Mankind cannot wait for a change to occur specifications would be very small. spontaneously and fortuitously. Rather, man must Presumably the exact specifications used to initiate on his own changes of necessary but produce all published model output are on file tolerable magnitude in time to avert intolerable somewhere, so that it would be possible for a and massive and externally generated change. A highly motivated person with appropriate status to strategy for such change can be evolved only in examine them to see what has been assumed in the spirit of truly global cooperation, shaped in the process of reaching the conclusions. And it is free partnership by the world's diverse regional. always possible to ask the modelers, personally, communities and guided by a rational master plan what was assumed. But neither arrangement per- for long-term organic growth. All our computer simulations have shown quite clearly that this is mits the sort of active peer review necessary to the only sensible and feasible approach to avoid guarantee quality.in scientific work, much less to major regional and ultimate global catastrophe, open it to public scrutiny. and that the time that can be wasted before The matter of making assumptions available for developing such a global world system is running examination is politically as well as intellectually out. Clearly the only alternati 'ves are, division and critical. There are a multitude of ways that a conflict, hate and destruction. 8 model like the Mesarovic-Pestel world model can, Unfortunately, only a little of the computer deliberately or accidentally, be rigged to produce output used to generate these conclusions is an outcome. It isn't, for example, pointed out in shown in the book, and that little is not identified the available documentation that the version of in a manner that allows the reader to determine the model used in making runs for the U.S. which sections of the model were involved in Association for the Club of Rome assumed that generating the output. raw materials for nucleur power were available in Elsewhere, the modelers are more prosaic and unlimited quantities, or that its use posed any literal-minded in reporting conc 'lusions about their significant problems. Yet these assumptions must model. In a document prepared for the U.S. have influenced the energy self-sufficiency, fast- Association of the Club of Rome Systems Re- nuclear scenario presented in Figure 26-5. It could search Center in June 1977, they report conclu- lead to politically serious misconceptions if this sions such as: run were interpreted without an understanding of Historical Scenario [Fig. 26-3] indicates two dis- the assumptions behind it. And it is entirely turbing eventualities in the world food situation: conceivable that a half dozen equally controversial (a) severalfold increase in world food prices (in assumptions exist, unidentified, in the model's real terms) that would most certainly drive domes- computer program. tic food prices unbearably high. (b) A strong The modelers have also begun to put them- possibility of periods of food shortages in various selves in direct competition with other futurists by regions of t 'he world which would lead to starva- using their models to test scenarios and assump- tion on a disastrous scale. 9 tions made by others. In a Systems Research Scenario Two isolationist [Fig. 26-4]: Domestic Center paper of September 1977, prepared for the food prices could be kept down by restricting. food U.S. Association for the Club of Rome, the exports. Consequences of such an Isolationist modelers reported testing scenarios from Herman Scenario would be truly disastrous. Additional tens of millions could starve (under favorable but Kahn's book, The Next Two Hundred Years. feasible conditions of food supply) because of They found the Hudson Institute's conclusions failure of USA to produce or export food. 10 full of effors. For example: The modelers have used the model to test a large It is impossible to design any energy program in number of policies, and the list of conclusions Western Europe.or Japan which could, over a 622 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS Population Inca" Per coota, South and Sautfwat Asia f Crude birth raft Death due to stor@on, South arid Southwat Asia 0 Inconve per caofo,.USA Price of food on the world market @Aft 1975 1980 1915 1990 I"S 2000 2003' 2010 2015 2020 2025 Figure 26-3. Historical-pattern no-change scenario, 1975-2020. (Case Western Reserve University, Systems Research Center) ten-year period, reduce energy demand and in- ready been made apparent. In addition to policy crease production of energy from non-petroleum testing, the modelers state that their model has sources sufficiently to compensate for the loss Of undergone appropriate historical validation. How- the Persian Gutf by 1987; The Hudson report ever, the available model documentation presents statement regarding the ease of adjustment to a little or no evidence of the model's validity. quick disappearance of oil reserves is therefore Neither statistical test results nor evidence of the erroneous. I I model's ability to replicate historical patterns of Scenarios of MIT's Workshop on Alternative behavior are presented in the ordinary documen- Energy Strategies were similarly tested and docu- tation. mented in a Systems Research Center paper in' This is not to say that the model has not November 1977.12 undergone validity testing. Gholamreza Mirzak- hani, a graduate student, working under Mesa- Testing and Validation rovic at Case Western Reserve University, de- voted his M.S. thesis to historical validation of the That the Mesarovic-Pestel world model has economic and trade model. 13 Mean errors and been extensively used for policy testing has al- standard deviations for percentages of forecast MESAROVIC-PESTEL WORLD MODEL 623 Population Income per capito,,South and Southeast Asia - -Crude 6irth rate Death due to starvation 0 income per capita, USA - - - Prke of food on the world market .1975 1980 IM 1"o 1995 _M 2W5 "10 2015 2020 M5 -- -- --------- Figure. 26-4. Isolationist Scenario, 1975-2020. (Systems Research Center) error for model forecasts vs. historical data were is important that these be shown. Otherwise 'calculated f6r key model parameters. A few fairly intelligent criticism of the model is blocked. Dis- high (10-30 percent) rates of mean error were plays of'the model's empirical strengths and identified. The greatest difficulties seemed to arise weaknesses have not been a priority item in the iin predicting investment imports, exports, and, in modeler's tight schedules and budgets. Thus the some regions, values-added in sectors 2 and 4@ public is left to judge the model without display of (unfortunately, not identified in the text). Aside its validity. from these troublesome areas, most mean errors were under 10 percent, and many were under 5. Docu .mentation In graphical output of actual versus predicted, the litwo fit into each other, hand in glove, at some Documenting the Mesarovic-Pestel world model -;times, while at others the divergence was signifi- in a thorough fashion would be a Herculean, not -scant and the model seemed to show an entirely to say an unrewarding, task. Much of the material I t different sort of behavior than the historica rend that would be needed, such as descriptions of (Figs. 26-6 and 26-7). how the various parameters were constructed If there are subjects on which the model makes from the flimsy data sources available would be significant errors in replicating historical trends,.it tedious, both to read and to write. The documen- 624 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS Cars of' cod @produced,,USA _'-w- World price, of off 0 GNP of USA _M" between storts, of new -'ruic!vdi _'@_ -USA" WWW oil pro&ction .000 @@Ooe 2020 2025 1990 ji@s 2000 2003 2010 1975, -419W Ms, FIgure 26-5. Energy self-sufficiency fast-nuclear scenario,' 1975-2020. (Systems Research Center) tation task is further complicated by the fact that out of date, description of model equations 14; and the model has not attained a finalized form. manuals designed for various users at various Things written about the model today may be times. inaccurate tomorrow and outright misleading two The Mesarovic-Pestel world model is hard to years from now. Worse still, no one has been keep track'of It is not a single entity but an willing to pay the cost involved in careful, thor- evolving stream of integrating concepts. As with ough, organized documentation. most large models, neither the pressures nor the Existing documentation includes numerous incentives exist to document this stream in a short papers, such as scenario analyses and model fashion to make it easy of access and understand- summaries, geared to presentation to specific able to anyone other than those involved in the audiences; a fairly complete, though somewhat model-building process. MESAROVIC-PESTEL WORLD M015EL 625 550:1 ................. ............ ......... ......... ......... ........ Z! 10 2 10:47: ......... ......... ......... ......... ................... ......... 51 9: 2 3 534.7 CDC; 119:19 V V 529.@ COO 9.883: 523 C 9.68. 5,1 50.4: J 9311: 9 - 2 9.". VV 503. :cc 9:09: ......... '497.'7: ......... ......... ................... ... cc .......... 894 ............................. ......... ......... :.,v ...... .9 .5. 6:7 . V C 8 64: V 8." cc 9 VV: ,6 cc 8.:3250: 6 1 C 8.0b. V 2:': V 46 C 7:90: VV 7 75 45'.6 .5 D 5: CC! 7. D ......... .......... 11: ......... ......... ............................. ................. 44 05 1 ......... ......... ;C 7 .. .1. D 7:3L: V 434 CDC 7 16 V 429 6 VV 4 .14.3 coo 3@6 V CCO :.71. .19.1 C.0 VV cc D? Vvy 403.4. COO 398.1. CCD 392:9: ......... ......... ......... :aco ......... 6:12. 0 0.... ......... .......... 5.9.7 ......... ........ VV ......... ......... ......... 307 6 5 82:--*-:-******. 1 2:4 VVV DODO 38 CJD 5:18: 377 5 53 VV DDD :0 0; 66:97: 5.3 . 0 371 no 00 DO 361.4. CC DJO 523 :VVV 00 DO 6. C S: V 93. VY: ,3 DOODOO. @c 4. 7 . VV DO 4 '. C,4: ......... ......... :.v VV DO ': ......... D .................................................. 4. V ...... :...... 000 .......... ......... .......... .315.9 ,4D.5 335. 2: 4.49 3 0. VV;V - .;DDDDOO 33 0 IZ: 324:7: cc 4.' VVVV ;DDDOOOOD 319.5. dD ,.."4 14 2 CCDO 0 c 0 3-75. DDD. c 3:60: WV D Na C 3 45 VVDOOOO : 3.30.VVVDO. 293.3C 00 5VVDD 29 .5.cc Do 3.I 288.ODD; ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ........ 3 DIV VD ............................................. 9V 160 1962 1964 1966 1968 ..... ;;74 1974 Figure 26-6. Actual (D's) vs. predicted (C's) consumption Figure 26-7. Actual (D's) vs. predicted (V's) value added in for Western Europe; one of the model's best predictions. the Japanese extractive industries; one of the model's worst (G. Mirzakhani, Case Western Reserve University thesis) predictions. (G. Mirzhakhani) REFERENCES 1. Quoted in Mihajlo D. Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel, 10. Ibid., p. 29. Mankind at the Turning Point. New York: Dutton, 1974, p. 202. 11. Barry B. Hughes and Mihajlo 1). Mesarovic, "Testing 2. Ibid., pp. vii, viii, and x. the Hudson Institute Scenarios," Washington: U.S. Association for the Club of Rome, Sept. 1977 (mimeo), 3. Ibid., p. 53. p. 22. 4. Ibid., p. 8. 5. Ibid., p. 7. 12. Barry B. Hughes and Patricia Strauch, "Scenario Anal- 6. Ibid., p. 17. ysis Using WIM System," Case Western Reserve Uni- 7. Ibid., p. 153. versity, Systems Research Center, Nov. 1977. 8. Ibid., p. 156-57, 13. Gholamreza Mirzakhani, "Historical Validation of the 9. "A Computer Based Policy Analysis Tool (The API World Economic.and Trade Model," M.S. Thesis, Case System) and Its Use for U.S. Policy Evaluation in a Western Reserve University, June 1977. Global Context," Case Western Reserve University, Systems Research Center, June 3, 1977 (summary of 14. Ram Dayal, "Equation-Specifications for the World demonstration at meeting of the, U.S. Association for Integrated Model (WIM);- Case Western Reserve Uni- the Club of Rome). versity, Systems Research Center, Jan. 1977 (mimeo). 27 MOIRA: Model of Intemational Relations in Agriculture In 1972 Aurelio Peccei and the Club of Rome, system. As of 1973, more copies of the Club of upon the recommendation of Jan Tinbergen, com- Rome's Limits to Growth had been sold in Dutch missioned a team headed by Hans Linnemann at than in any other language 3and the sponsorship the Free University of Amsterdam to conduct a of the MOIRA project seems to have originated study of the effect on the global food system of a from the genuine interest of the Dutch people and doubling of world population. The resulting model government in the fate of the world and its people. applies mature analytic techniques to the age-old The project, which started early in 1973, was not problem of the world's poor and the world's lavishly endowed. Funds and manpower were hungry. The modelers were motivated by the tight, and the work progressed slowly. The study sentiment that human suffering is morally wrong was substantially completed by the end of 1976, and by a desire to minimize world hunger. Their but due to manpower problems was not scheduled forthcoming study, which incorporates the model, to appear before 1978. opens with a quote from Mahatma Gandhi: To the poor man God dare not appear except in Method the form of bread and the promise of work. If all the computers in the world were to break Persons harboring such sentiments in the early down, MOIRA, of all the models reviewed in the 1970s could only bave been distressed by the Global 2000 Study, is probably the only one that bleak outlook for the future. The bad harvests of would remain a useful analytic tool. The modelers '72 and '73 intensified the forebodings of famines themselves call it an algorithmic model. The fabric emanating from the Club of Rome models and of the model is a series of interconnected, com- broadcast in such popular works as Famine 1975 monly nonlinear mathematical relationships, sta- and The Population Bomb. The modelers observe tistically estimated from such data as the modelers in theirstudy: "The historical record suggests that could find. Documentation of the modelers' work hunger and malnutrition have remained with us is interspersed with analytical approaches not throughout the decades, affecting more and more found in other Global 2000 Study models, such as people as time passes." The observation is fol- taking partial derivatives of nonlinear functions. lowed by questions: Why is it so? Is it true that Many of the functions used come straight out of the world is dangerously close to the limits of its economic theory. Standard graphical techniques capacity to produce food? Or is it a problem of used in economics, such as supply and demand distribution? Are there ways open to the poorer curves and figures relating profit curves to cost nations to improve their food situation in a stable, curves are used freely to elucidate the@ text. self-sufficient way? I The computer is used in the model as a device These are the questions that are addressed by to permit disaggregation and iteration of functional the Linnemann team's MOIRA (model of interna- relationships that were postulated before the com- tional relations in agriculture). In the modelers' puter era. Instead of the one- or two-nation words, "It attempts, firstly, to describe the world models developed in pre-computer economics, 106 situation in terms of its underlying causal nations or groups of nations are considered. factors ... [and secondly] to provide considered Within each of these (except for the three cen- judgments regarding the policy measures that may trally planned economies), 12 income-occupation redirect future developments toward improve- classes are considered. Thus, when the classical ments of the world food situation, with special relationship---consumption as a function of in- emphasis on international policy measures. 112 come-is modeled, instead of bein used once, MOIRA was supported by the government of twice, or three times as it might be in a manual the Netherlands through the Dutch university model, it is replicated more than 1,200 times. As 627 628 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS the modelers put it, the model,is also "disaggre- perhaps more realistic) goal of setting the books gated in time." It is solved by yearly, increments, straight on the subject of global agriculture. so that.in a 50-year simulation, these 1,200 curves will expand into solutions of about 60,000 equa- Relevance tions"-obviously not a task to be undertaken manually. Taken at fare value MOIRA appears irrelevant In modeling, there seems to be a trade-off for purposes of the Global 2000 Study. Certainly between amount of detail and degree of closure. it is not the ideal model of long-term relationships Analysts who attempt to close highly detailed between population resources and environment. models and to forgo exogenous variables usually Population is, exogenous; resources by and large wind up in rather large messes. In this trade-off, are omitted; and the model says nothing directly the Linnemann group has opted for detail. They about environment. Problems such as erosion, make it quite clear that their model is meant as a desertification, salinization, and pollution are com- partial model-a model of the agricultural sector. pletely excluded. But despite these omissions, the Critical variables such as gro Iwth of nonagricul- model is far from irrelevant. It is based on what tural gross domestic product, population growth, appears to be the most careful analysis of global and the price of fertilizer are left as exogenous agriclutural carrying capacity ever to have been variables. The values input for those variables are conducted. The modelers began their project by critical factors in determining model behavior. developing-from up-to-date 1974 UNESCO/FAO Thus the model outcome, can be looked at as an soil maps-a detailed estimate of how much exploration of what the agricultural sector of the biomass growth the nations of the world could world might do inthe event the world economy support and of the capital costs that would. be took this or that hypothetical turn.'The modelers required to develop lands for cultivation. As may discussion of methodology places a premium on be recalled from the discussion of the World 2 detail, Its tone implies that they would have built and 3 models in Chapter 29, agricultural capacity a more detailddmodel were it not for the con- and the cost at which it can be extended is critical straints placed on them by the lack of data'. One in evaluation of probable world futures; the anal- 'senses, however, from the effort they have taken yIses on Iwhich previous studies had depended for I to overcome the data constraint in the case of their estimates were highly conjectural.* income distribution, as contrasted to the ease with The estimates of potential biomass production which they have aggregated all agricultural output and land development costs produced by the into units of vegetable protein, despite the exist- MOIRA study are, admittedly, necessarily rough. ence of voluminous fine-.grained data on individ For estimating potential biomass production, a formula for photosynthetic potential was used, crops, that the modelers are much more'discri*mi- nating in their use of disaggregation than the with appropriate modifications to account for methodological description implies. 'The implicit regional differences in soil quality, climate, avail- message is: Disaggregate if-it's important to your ability of irrigation, and similar factors. The data focal problem; if not, don7t bother. for making such approximations is rough, not to mention scarce. Much of the earth's land surface Some attempt at statistical verification seems to has not been subjected to careful soil surveys. have been made for almost every equation in the model'. In this process, cross-sectional data has Numerous assu m*ptions must be made in specify- consistently been used. ing how much land can be irrigated. The quanti- tative relationship between photosynthetic poten- A strong attempt has been made to avoid tial-and potential to produce foodstuffs that human extensive use of monetary units and to incorporate beings can consume can only be guessed at. use of physical units wherever possible. Yield Furthermore, as the modelers themselves state, ftinctions are based on analysis of photosynthetic "The ecological implications of such a massive relationships. Food consumption is measured in expansion of agricultural production remain rather units of vegetable protein. uncertain. 114 No attempt has been made to take In sum, MOIRA is an attempt to link together into account the ecological problems associated all the pieces of the global agricultural scene, with monocultures or the problems of maintaining using old-fashioned tried and true methods. The modelers make no pretense of discovering any- *A study of this type was conducted in conjunction with the thing counterintuitive or of developing a new GOL (grains, oilseeds, livestock) model described in Chap- methodology forlooking at the world. Rather they ter 18. Similarities and differences between MOIRA and have set for themselves the more humble (and GOL are pointed out in the Note at the end'of this chapter. MOIR-A 629 agricultural production in ecologically frail @ envi- producers are free, willing, and able to act on the ronments. basis- of their perfect -information-that is, no Nonetheless, the estimates produced are based institutional baniers cause farmers to fall into on the best available data, using consistent tech- economically inopportune modes of behavior, and, niques, and could be replicated and altered sys- the, agricultural sector does not feel the effective tematically if one disagreed with the assumptions, influence of social values in conflict with profit- on,which they are based. maximizing tactics (e.g., preference for leisure The model could also prove highly useful in over profit, taste- and/or religious sanctions oper7 that conclusions could be drawn from it by ating against. the most profitable cropping pattern); inference. A geographical biologist, operating from and (3) that individuals will operate in a way that data the model generates on intensities of cultiva- maximizes sectoral (not individual) profits, despite tion, could probably. construct a fairly graphic the fact that the two.are frequently in conflict. image of where and when environmental problems Putting aside the q uestion of whether sectoral such as desertification, erosion, and other symp- profit maximization is a realistic assumption, the toms of overexploitation of land resources; can be next question- is: How is sectoral optimum calcu- expected to break out. lated?.Maximurn expected profits occur when the difference between production costs and income (price x output) is greatest. The costs tallied in. Structure the.model are fertilizer costs.and capital costs. Prices of both are,exogenous in the model. The MOIRA, according to its modelers, quantities used are determined via the optimiza- is a model of intemational relations in the field,@ of tion. procedure and take into account a yield food and agriculture which is developed as a response function, to be described shortly. Labor linkage of national models. It describes, the food and land -are considered fixed means of produc- sector of individual countries, and links these tion. Rents and, agricultural wages, therefore, are sectors by means of an equilibrium model of not counted as costs but are considered part of international trade in food. At. the national level, farm sectorincome. two sectors are distinguished: agriculture and Expected . income is the product - of expected nonagr iculture; the rate of development of the latter sector is (laxgely) Iexogenous. The conflict of producer price and Tsectoral output minus. produc- tion costs. Expected, producer price is the average interest between the agriculture and nonagticul- ture population is explicitly' taken into account. of the prices actually received over the last two. The agricultural 'production decision is described years. Production costs are. not.assumed to de- for the agricultural sector [of a nation] as a whole; crease due to disembodied technical. progress. the food consumption decision is modeled for Output is a 'nonlinear function of capital employed twelve income classes per country,-six classes for (CE), labor.employed (LE), available land (A), each sector. Average food consumption per in- and@fbur coefficients-one (YASY) indicating the come class is compared with a country-specific region's maximum photosynthetic potential and food consumption norm, from which the extent of three (ce, 6, y) describing the shape of the curve hunger and malnutrition follows. At the interna- by which, it will. approach that potential with the tional level, the role of policies in developed countries receives special attention.' application of proper inputs.* Because labor and land are considered fixed inputs, capital is the' The production function, which is repeated for only factor that .the producers may. vary in quest each nation in the model, is based on -the assump- of maximum incomes. (Fertilizer usage is deter- tion that the agricultural sector as a whole will mined in the model..as a dependent function of operate in a manner that maximizes its expected income. However, actual income may deviate from expected income through unanticipated *The,equations used are:. changes in crop prices or abnormal weather. Sectoral income maximization, of course, is a Y YASY Z mathematically convenient assumption, for the TASY + Z calculus is quite effective in determining maxima. Z=a( E+,S LE In real-world terms, however, income maximiza- -,/g-) + Y tion is a strong and optimistic assumption. Implic- where Y yields, Z = yield response factor, a, and,-/ itly it assumes that (1) producers have perfect are coefficients, A =. land available, CE = capital employed, knowledge of the situation-baning possible MiS- LF = labor employed, and YASY _@- maximum photosyn- calculations about the weather and prices; (2) that thetic potential (national average). 630 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS yield; by varying capital, one automatically varies incomes. Increases in the degree of processing fertilizer usage.) along with the forces of supply and demand create Coefficient values for the function have been changes in food price. Increases in food price feed statistically estimated, but the desired data was back to lower real income and thus decrease food not always, available and some rather sketchy demand. Quadr-atic equations are used to relate proxies had to be used. For example, data on consumption of food to income in all the functions tractors had to be used to represent capital described above. employed. 6 Supply and demand for vegetal protein confront Output, as determined by the producer's pro- each other through the following model mecha- duction function is further modified by weather. nism. The six agricultural income groups in each The modifications made are based on the assump- country remove from the total amount they have tion that future weather patterns are likely to produced the amounts their incomes imply they resemble those of the past. The assumption is should consume. The remaining product is placed implemented by the use of exogenous data inputs on the market. National markets buffer them- that impose---on the production functions-varia- selves from the international markets by tariffs or bilities in yield that replicate historically observed price subsidies, which are determined in the (mostly weather-induced) annual variations in model by a combination of a set of structural yield. constants and variables indicating per capita in- In the usual fashion of market models, MOIRA, come in the agricultural sector, the share of after calculating supply, balances, it against de- agriculture, and GDP. However, the buffering is mand. But the modelers are not so naive as to do incomplete, partly because imported food is priced this directly. They recognize that there is often a at world prices and partly because the modelers great difference between agricultural crop prod- have allowed for a "seepage" effect that tends to ucts-the output that their model calculates--and drive domestic prices toward world prices. The the real-world demand for food. For one thing, world market balances the sum of surplus produc- much of the vegetal output of many regions is tion figures from all nations against the sum of used to feed livestock. For another, the amount unfilled demand figures. The balance determines of economic activity that food-processing sectors world market price, which in turn influences in developed economies put into food processing domestic prices. All this has been accomplished is comparable to the economic activity taking through simultaneous equations.. Thus, it cannot place on the farm. Thus, they model demand in be said that one factor feeds back upon another, two stages: demand for vegetal protein, and rather that all are simultaneously determined and demand for processing. Both are functions of real interrelated-, income@per capita. Since real income is a ftinction Price information, in turn, becomes an input of food and nonfood prices, demand (itself a into the producer's production decision, which, in function of real income) is partially a ftinction of turn determines supply. This entails genuine dy- food prices. Food-processing demand functions namic feedback, as production decisions are made have been estimated separately for agricultural on the basis of the previous year's prices. and nonagricultural populations in 103 nations. The product market is augmented by a labor- Protein demands are modeled, in addition, for migration mechanism that responds to the differ- each of the six income groups in agricultural and ence between agricultural and nonagricultural in- nonagricultural populations, which leaves the comes. In effect, this mechanism, in the way that model with over 1,000 food demand equations. it links the agricultural labor supply in one year to In the formulations used, consumption demand the agricultural labor supply in the next year is static, processing demand is dynamic. Con- completes a negative feedback loop. If agricultural sumption, measured in units of vegetable protein, labor becomes too scarce, it affects a decrease in is determined by the real income at the time for agricultural production and thus an increase in which it is to be estimated. The extent to which crop prices. Increased prices will generate higher food, is processed is constrained by the speed at agricultural incomes, and these will tend to de- which food processing can grow. Thus, the crease the outflow of labor from agriculture and amount of processing per unit of food consumed so tend to stabilize the agricultural labor force and in one year is a function of the amount of keep -agricultural incomes on par with other in- processing per unit of food in the previous year, comes. However, in the fashion in which the plus the amount of additional processing brought model is normally run-with exogenously intro- on by demand changes'associated with changes in duced income growth of 4 percent in the devel- MOIRA 631 oped world and 7 percent in the less developed observed facts. The following passage is repre- nations-the loop would need to be very powerftd sentative: "Simpson (1967) reports a maximum to achieve the equilibrium it seeks. The loop is yield of wheat in northwestern United States of strongest when the return on labor inputs is quite 14.5 ton's per hectare, for which we calculated 15 high-i.e., in labor-scarce agricultural sectors. to 18 tons of grain equivalent.'17 In the draft Therefore, it will come closest to achieving bal- reviewed for this Study, the model is not validated ance between agricultural and nonagricultural in- through comparison of model outputs to historical comes and to stopping outflow of labor from the behavior. That is, there are no assurances of. the agricultural sector in less populated and less, model's ability to replicate historical behavior intensely fanned regions of the world. other than the fact that it has been calibrated for The modelers' schematic of the main variables critical variables using 1965-72 time series data. in their model is shown in Figure 27-1. Superim- No information has been available on the total posed upon their diagram is this study's own extent to which the model has been tested. In the sweeping generalization of the causal flows im- available documentation, two sorts of testing are plicit in the structure. reported. First, there is testing of model sensitivity What modes of operation does the structure fall to assumed exogenous changes-specifically, to into? When the model is run, demand is regularly different rates of income growth in the nonagricul- pushed upward by population growth and by tural population and varying rates of population increases in income (both exogenously generated). growth, as well as alteration of income distribu- Rising demand leads to rising prices, which stim- tion. 11 Secondly, there is testing with a normative ulate added supply; however, due to the costs intent-specifically, looking for policy measures associated with added supply, supply increases that would be appropriate to alleviating world more slowly than demand. Because the model hunger problems. Policies tested in these@ simula- takes income distribution into account, the rise in tions include reductions of food consumption in prices is reflected across a spread of people, some the rich countries, food aid on a large scale, of whom can--and many who cannot-purchase market stabilization, trade liberalization, and food at the going market price. This situation world food market price policies. results in many people "demanding" less food The modelers' presentation of these sensitivity than they actually need. In more meaningful and policy tests is admirably clearheaded on two terms, high food prices relative to people's in- points where many modelers go astray in inter- comes, result in people going hungry. The model preting their model results. First, precision is not tallies up the total amount by which demands fall confused with accuracy. Indeed, the modelers short of needs and thus arrives at an index of the vehemently warn their readers: magnitude of hunger in separate nations and in the world at large. in view of the imperfections of MOIRA as a model of the real world, the numerical results should not be taken too literally. The seemingly Testing and Validation hard numbers and their variations over time may Much of MOIRA is constructed around statisti- be interpreted only as indicating tendencies that cally estimated parameters. These are often pre- will manifest themselves in the world food situa- tion under specific assumptions---and the reader sented in the text, along with parameters such as will notice that many ad-hoc assumptions had to R2 and t statistics that give some indication of be made. 9 statistical validity, but they are scattered through- Second, verbal descriptions of mouel results out the text-at least in the draft available for this Study-and not systematically set forth in any show acute consciousness of the extent to which one place. Therefore, anyone attempting to assess model behavior is a function of model structure. the model as a whole for its statistical validity The common tendency of confusing the model would find himself confronted with a painstaking with the real world is refreshingly absent. For task. In the case of estimates for maximum example, in discussing why, in a particular simu- agricultural potential, which was calculated more lation, high prices do not stimulate greater produc- or less deductively through theoretical models of tion increases in Latin America, the modelers give photosynthetic potential rather than inductively as their reason: "Under the assumptions of the through observed data, validation takes place standard run ... the Latin American production through presentation of crop yield statistics from growth rate comes close to the upper limit of various regions showing that the yield calculated production growth of four percent per annurn built on a theoretical basis is reasonable on the basis of into MOIRA. This constraint ... prevents addi- 632 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS -1 Relatkinships as specified in MOIRA. psic&'supply control 6V (GWxd 2000 Study -M Labor migration control loop (G61 2000 Study staff) Prke-demand control loop (C"d 2000 Study stafi) Desired 1008*0 domestic domiestic food price food price Equilibrium disposable Export income policy Variables (nonagric) Total Equilibrium Real incomis nortogric a- world World mkt p- capita prive fc@ food in ogrk Jncome Market 4-@ r Red iricome 'd Equilibrium clesired population per capita Labor (domestic IN in ogric gromrth 16. oufflow food price) Namirw Not food supply, cork Nonogric population to nonagric ivicami, sector Price Expected Labor XP--W total yield in owic by producer Nonogric food supply Tatal yield Expiocted agric income weatildOr j i Plane food Expected Food Conditions consumption rW income consuimptim (11MOW-) (OWK per caPft in 09rK sector) (09ric) Figure 27-1, Channels of causal influence and major feedback controls in MOIRA. (Hans Unnemann, MOIRA: A Model of International Relations in Agriculture, forihcoming) MOIRA 633 tional effects from finther increases to production growth for nonagricultural GDP.. This run shows growth.' t 10 somewhat more than a doubling of food produc- In some cases, analytic mathematical tech- tion by the year 2000 and an increase in average niques, have also been used to test model sensitiv- food consumption per capita from 50 kg consum- ity. Specifically, partial derivatives of some of the able protein in 19175 to 68 kg in 2000. However, as model's functions have been taken in order to the modelers emphasize, these seemingly advan- derive information on multiplier effects. This work tageous outcomes are coupled with a marked is done sporadically throughout the chapters de- increase in the number of people suffering from scribing model structure and is not presented hunger (defined as eating less than two-thirds of systematically in a fashion that allows the reader the biological requirement for protein). The num- to make easy comparisons or draw systematic ber of hungry people in the world will have conclusions. increased from 350 million in 1975 to 740 million in 2000 and to 1160 million in 2010. Likewise, Assumptions and Conclusions over the 1975-2000 period the total food deficit, When transposed onto the real world, MOIRA measuredin protein required but not consumed, assumes that the world possesses the following will have increased from 2.9 billion to 6.2 billion attributes: kilograms. The above trends are accompanied by asubstantial increase in the role of North America � Agriculture operates independently of the rest as a food exporter and a decrease in agricultural of the world except for the outside influences of self-sufficiency in most other regions. I I nonagricultural GDP growth and population Sensitivity tests were conducted by alternately growth. In"particular, debts, surpluses, and reducing the rates of nonagricultural, GDP growth trade imbalances resulting from oil imports and and population growth by half. Under slower exports do not influence agriculture; no ecolog- ical problems are encountered other than those nonagricultur-al income growth, the quantities of already reflected in historical yield response food demanded, and hence food prices, rose more statistics; and no radical shift in agricultural slowly. @ Amid many other ramifications this scen- technology takes place. ario resulted, on the average, in 35 percent more � World prices for, food are. established on a hunger than did the standard run. 12 Halving competitive equilibrium basis. National prices population growth rates while holding GDP are modified by tariff policy but also reflect the growth to its previously assumed rate resulted in world market price. substantially lower food prices than in the stand- � Food consumption is a function of price and ard run, and hence to relative depression in the income. Implicitly, if the- poor get richer, they agricultural, as opposed to the nonagricultural, will repeat the pattern of increasing consump- sector. However, it did reduce hunger. In this tion of meat observed in the currently wealthy scenario, the aver-age amount of hunger over the nations. Further, the rich will continue to prefer 1975-2010 period was around 30 percent lower meat to vegetable protein. , - than in.the standard run. � The schedule of technical relationships, i.e., the Another sensitivity test was conducted by grad- constant production parameters assumed by the ually reducing income inequality in the nonagricul- modelers, is correct and will remain unchanged tural sector in such a way that income inequality pritil the year 2010, or whichever year the model was reduced by about half over the 1975-2010 is run to. period. This change greatly increased demand for � The agricultural sector as a whole operates in a food. Thus it increased prices, stimulated produc- way that maximizes expected sectoral profits. tion in regions with significant reserve agricultural MOIRA has been tested in two ways, resulting production capacity, and increased the need for in two types of conclusions. Sensitivity tests lead food imports in regions such as South Asia where to conclusions about the behavior of the agricul- the costs of increasing production would be ex- tural sector under different patterns of nonagricul- tremely high. In this scenario in the years after tural income growth, population growth, and in- 1990 (by which time incomes had undergone come distribution. Policy tests lead to conclusions considerable leveling), world hunger was reduced about the ways in which various instruments of to less than half what it was in the standard run. 13 policy tend to influence agricultural prices and In the policy tests, four basic policy measures production and, more importantly, the alleviation were tried and evaluated for their success in of world hunger. alleviating world hunger. 14 These included two . The standard run, to which all other runs are measures intended to achieve a redistribution of compared, assumes a "relatively high" rate of available food in the world: 634 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS � A reduction of food consumption by the rich hand and international food aid (actually given to countries; people under the food norm only) on the other. 16 � Food purchases by an international food aid organization (financed by the rich countries) Documentation that would distribute this food to the underfed population groups. MOIRA has undergone two bouts of documen- tation. The first occurred during the preparation The other two measures were intended to stimu- of a paper to be Vresented at a September 1975 late ibod production in the less developed coun- symposium on the models sponsored jointly by tries: the United Nations Environment Programme and � Regulation of the world food market in order to the International Institute for Applied Systems stabilize international prices (the price target Analysis. I I Thereafter, documentation on MOIRA pursued on the world market was a policy was expanded and revised and should appear in variable whose influence had been tested); book form soffietime in 1978. The-MOIRA study � The effect that liberalization of international has faced an additional problem: In order to be trade would have on developments in the world accessible to more than the relatively small num- food situation., ber of people who read Dutch, it has had to be translated out of the language in which it was Based on the findings of the individual policy written. tests, combinations of policy measures were de- The MOIRA manuscript made available to. the vised to find the package that would best help the Global 2000 Study is in various stages of prepara- world food supply over the simulation period. . tion, ranging from first to third drafts. For the To make a long story short, it was found that most part, it comprises factual reporting of the both reduction of food consumption by the rich model's contents, assumptions, and outputs. At- countries and liberaUation of international trade tempts to interpret, dramatize, or construct a would result in lowered food prices, decreases in MOIRA philosphy are relegated to the Introduc- incentives to agricultural production, and in- tion in the manuscript but may eventually be creases in total world 'hunger. On the other hand, incorporated into the final chapter. The bulk of it was found that food aid, at a level requiring the work is oriented toward the specialist. Never- about 0.5 percent of the rich nations' GNPs, could theless, it includes considerable elementary eco- completely eliminate hunger, provided the food nomic theory with which most readers will already was purchased at prevailing market prices and be familiar. then given away. 15 It was also concluded that Although the text provides a good basic under- maintaining high and stable agricultural market standing of the model's operation, it is far from prices could stimulate production in the poor adequate for the purpose of reconstructing the countries to an extent that would reduce, but not model and testing its output. For that, one would eliminate, world hunger. Logically, high food presumably have to secure computer programs prices tended to reduce agricultural poverty but to from the modelers, and it is uncertain whether the increase hunger in nonagnicultural sectors. programs so obtained would. be documented in The policy package the modelers find most such a way as to make them usable to -.anyone effective includes three policy elements-price other than their creators. At least in manuscript stabilization, food aid, and price level policy. It is form, the model documentation is not well ar- clear from the documentation that the modelers ranged for users' convenience. For example, there are sensitive to the fact that they are contradicting is no complete listing of 'equations and variable widely accepted notions by concluding that food definitions, and the reader must led back through aid will not depress agricultural prices but that pages' of text to find the definitions for variables trade liberalization will. They conclude a lengthy whose meanings he has forgotten. discussion of the operative effects of food aid with the following qualifying remarks: Note: MOIRA bears a strong structural re- semblance to the GOL (grains, oilseed, lives- As long as the rich countries are able and willing tock) model -described in Chapter 19. The most to provide the ftinds needed for buying food for significant difference between the two models is aid purposes and provided that these transactions in what they have disaggregated. GOL has dis- do not constitute a large part of the total world aggregated crops, whereas MOIRA has mea- market transactions, there is little possibility of sured all agricultural output in terms of vegetal conflict between the objective of a stable and proteins. MOIRA has disaggregated consumers relatively high world market food price on one into 12 income groups, whereas GOL aggregates MOIRA 635 all consumers into a.single income class. In ef- agricultural sector models. Both began from esti- fect, MOIRA is more concerned with human wel- mates of maximum production potential for the fare, and GOL with the specifics of agricultural geographical units they encompassed. Both lean trade. MOIRA also differs from GOL in that it heavily on traditional economic theories for their considers more geographical, units- 106 to be formulations, and both see the world as being exact. controlled through market supplies, demands, and Aside from these differences, the two models prices. Likewise, both consider nonagricultural are alike in that both are world models disaggre- income growth and population growth as exoge- gated into multiple geographical regions. Both are nous variables. REFERENCES 1. Hans Linnemann, MOIRA: A Model of International 8. Ibid., Ch. 10. Relations in Agriculture, forthcoming (probably Am- 9. Ibid., Ch. 10, p. 10. sterdam: North Holland Publishing Co.), Ch. 1, pp. 2, 10. Ibid., Ch. 10, p. 9. 3. (Chapter and page references are to the drafts 11. Ibid., Ch. 1, appendix, p. 10a, run I 11. supplied to the Global 2000 Study by the Food for a 12. Ibid., Ch. 10, p. 4. Doubling World Population Project, Institute for Eco- 13. Ibid., Ch. 10, p. 10. nomic and Social Research, Free University, Amster- dam.) 14. Ibid., Ch. 11, p. 5. 2. Ibid., Ch. 1, p. 3. - 15.. Ibid., Ch. 11, p. 8. 3. Potomac Associates, Inc., Memorandum, June 20, 1973. 16. Ibid., Ch. 11, p. 21. Subject: Foreign editions of The Limits to Growth. 17. Gerhart Bruckmann, ed., "MOIRA: Food and Agricul- 4. Linnemann, Ch. 1, p. 9. ture Model," Proceedings, Third IIASA Symposium on 5. Ibid., Ch. l,'p. 4. Global Modelling, Sept. 22-25, 1975, International Insti- 6. Ibid., Ch. 4. tute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 7. Ibid., Ch. 2, p. 51. Feb. 1977. 28 The Latin American World Model One of the most perturbing questions that came on the uneven distribution of power, both between out of the work of Donella and Dennis Meadows nations and within nations. The result is oppres- and Jay W. Forrester was this: "What will happen sion and alienation, largely founded on exploita- to the poor people and the poor nations of . the tion. The deterioration of the physical environ- globe if natural constraints put the brakes on ment is not the inevitable consequence of human economic growth?" The Meadows group was progress, but the result of social organization clearly troubled by- this problem. In the final based largely on destructive values .2 chapter of The Limits to Growth, they say that The origin of the Latin American world model equilibrium may not be so bad for the poor. "It is is described in the Preface to the documentation possible in the steady state economy that new of that work: freedoms might also arise--universal and unlim- The idea of building this model emerged at a ited education, leisure for creativity and inventive@ meeting sponsored by the Club of Rome and the ness, and, most important of all, the freedom from Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas de Rio de hunger and poverty enjoyed by such a small Janeiro in Rio de Janeiro in 1970. The meeting fraction of the world's people today." I The Mes- had been held to analyze and discuss "Model arovic-Pestel world model leaves less hope for the World III," which had been built by a group poor. In it, rich and poor nations are grouped directed by Dennis L. Meadows at the Massachu- separately. Using this representation and the setts Institute of Technology. Out of that meeting model's structural assumptions, there appears to came the decision by the Latin Americans present be no realistic means of preventing massive star- to commit the Foundaci6n Batiloche in Argentina vation in South Asia. to building a model based on the points of view . . expressed during the debate. The Latin American world model had its ongin A committee composed of Carlos A. Mallmann, in the refusal of many third world persons to Jorge Sibato, Enrique Oteiza, Amilcar 0. Her- accept scenarios that suggest that the very growth rera, Helio Jaguaribe, and Osvaldo Sunkel was they hoped might save them from their poverty is established to outline the general aims of the about to be curbed by natural limits. Basically, project and to effect its implementation. The first the model says that Forrester, Meadows, and four members of the committee then produced a Mesarovic-Pestel were asking the wrong ques- document stating the hypotheses and variables to tions. The focal questions in the eyes of the be used in the model by the end of 1971. At a persons who created the Latin American world later meeting attended by all committee members model is not "What will happen when the struc- and some specialists, the general features of the tures in place in the world have advanced in time model to be built were established ' Thus, the type of society-egalitarian, fully by 20 or 100 years?" but rather "How can the participatory, nonconsuming-, the concept of resources of the world be used most effectively to basic needs and its central role in the model, the improve the lots of all people?" use of a production function with substitution The model assumes that a well-run, ideal, between capital and labour, the criteria with which human-ofiented society will be wise enough in its the problems of natural resources, energy, and management of resources not to be constrained pollution would be treated, and the division of the by natural limi6. In the modelers' views, the world into regions, were defined.:' ecological and resource problems that the wofld presently faces ate not inherent in the process of Method fulfilling the needs of a growing population but are the result of westem materialism. In the modelers' In modeling, it is desirable that the methods words: match the purpose. It is appropriate that the Latin American world model,. which attempts to chart The major problems facing society are not physi- aneffective route by which to work for fulfillment cal but sociopolitical. These problems are based of- basic human needs, should use different meth- 637 638 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS ods than its predecessors, which were investiga- may lead one astray. For example, if a Cobb tions of a behavioral tendencies inherent in the Douglass production function is assumed; the current world order. The Latin American model method may give reasonable estimates for the uses. optimal control - techniques, that is, it is a labor, capital, and technological coefficients from mathematical device that seeks the "best" way of only a few data points-assuming the system advancing toward a goal-in this case the exten- possesses the sort of substitutability and the sion of fife expectancy. complementarity of labor and capital assumed by Conceptually, optimization is a simple method- a Cobb Douglass function. Or, if fertility and life ology. In the Latin American world model, it is expectancy are hypothesized to be an interrelated quite complex. The mathematics that the modelers function of several economic and social indicators, have used to describe the world's operating mech- the method can estimate parameters that will anisms render the task of locating the optimum establish excellent statistical fits through whatever solution next to impossible. The normal mode of data points are available for the hypothesized solving an optimization problem involves setting indicators. However, if real world demographic up analytic equations for a surface map of possible change does not follow the hypothetical rules used solutions and using a computer to trace the slopes for making the estimation, this procedure will not and ridges of this map to find its highest or lowest generate reliable forecasts. point. However, the modelers have formulated In summary, the Latin American group has their representation of the world in a way that is used optimal control technique as its leading neither differentiable nor even expressible in ana- methodology. They have used optimization both lytic terms. They have conceived of a surface on in seeking a' normative optimal solution and in which one cannot always find slopes. Moreover, seeking to optimize the statistical fittings of their the surface, which contains within its specifica- parameters. The technique is well suited to the tions a linear optimization routine, cannot be problem. Optimization is appropriate to a norma- mapped using a set of analytic equations. tive model, and optimal fitting techniques are Indeed, the modelers have come dangerously appropriate to the sparse data situations that are close to defining.a problem that they themselves frequently encountered in dealing with Third cannot solve. In order to calculate a solution the World problems. These advantages are not with- modelers have had to reformulate the problem in out cost. The mathematics involved are fairly different terms, and there is reason to believe that esoteric. It would require at least a couple of their redefinition of the problem altered its solu- courses of graduate-level mathematics to under- tion. Even after making simplifications, the mod- stand completely the model's mathematical rou- elers found it necessary to use sophisticated and tine. At a minimum, understanding requires a bit esoteric mathematical techniques to work the of control theory and some topology. The techni- calculations.. cal side of the model may well escape criticism Optimal control techniques have been used to for the reason that critics cannot comprehend the parameterize the model as well as to solve it. mathematics used in the model. Instead of using regression techniques, such as ordinary least squares, the modelers postulated a Relevance set of functional relationships between several variables, plugged into the scattered data available The most important way in which the Latin to them (for example, data from 1960 and 1970 American world model is relevant to the question censuses), and devised an optimization routine to of population, resources, and environment is the find the set of parameter values that would spirit in which it was conceived, namely, that the establish the closest fit when the included varia- world should @seek to manage its resources and bles were estimated simultaneously. This tech- environment in a way that will fulfill the basic nique has the advantage over standard econome- needs of all its people and that the model should tric techniques of requiring less data and is not so be directed toward achieving that end. susceptible to incorrect estimations due to inac- Whereas the other models considered in this curate data. It also avoids some of the statistical study all ask the question "Whither are the difficulties encountered in estimating relationships mechanisms of the world economy carrying us?" of highly interrelated systems of variables by the Latin American world model asks the more examining one functional relationship at a time. positive question "What is the most effective way On the other hand, the technique has a disad- of getting where we' want to go?" Instead of vantage: If the functional relationship postulated examining the forces that seem most likely to in making the estimation is incorrect, the method bring about massive economic deprivation and LATIN AMERICAN WORLD MODEL 639 starvation, the Latin American world model ex- Structure plores procedures that would optimize the well- being of the world's poor. The general structural features of the Latin The model is also of interest because it sets American world model have been introduced forth and parameterizes an explicit and fairly indirectly in the preceding-text. The model's basic detailed hypothesis on the forces that govern construct is an optimization problem in which life fertility, mortality, and life expectancy. The pos- expectancy at birth is optimized. The control tulation of this hypothesis is important because variables, whose allocations are altered in finding the absence of a dependable theory of demo- the formula that maximizes life expectancy, are graphic change is one of the major bottlenecks to labor and capital. These two inputs are divided accurate forecasts of population, resources, and between five economic production sectors, each environment. If the Latin American group's hy- of which directly or indirectly influences the life pothe's'is holds, it will mark a great advance in expectancy. Three of the sectors are associated global modeling-but unfortuna 'tely, the only ap- with basic human needs: food, housing, and parent way of testing the hypothesis will be to education. The remaining two are capital goods, follow global demographic variables for another which are required for economic growth, and decade or two to see if the model's behavior is other goods and services, which have only minor reproduced. and indirect effects on the system's behavior. Aside from the spirit in which the Latin Ameri- Production, consumption, and demographic func- can world model was constructed and the theory tions are considered separately for four regions: behind its demographic sector, the model is almost the industrialized countries, Latin America, Af- the antithesis of what the Global 2000 Study is rica, and Asia. seeking. Rather than dealing with the problems of The basic production function used for all resources and environment, the modelers began sectors and in all regions is the Cobb Douglass with an assumption of no problems-particularly production function, written in a fashion'that no serious resource problems. Their analysis assumes automatic growth through technological muchresembles that presented by Herman Kahn progress. On a sector by sector basis, the assumed in The Next 200 Years. annual rates of technology-induced growth are as Some elementary physical constraints have follows: capital goods, 1.5 percent; food, I per- been introduced into the agricultural sector. Land cent; housing, I percent; education,, 0.5 percent;' development costs approach a limiting value as a other goods and services, I percent. of the arable land becomes cultivated.* Yield . Because the controls in the model are used to response to agricultural inputs levels'off at a given maximize life expectancy at birth, the mechanisms maximum output level. Otherwise potential phys- by which capital and labor allocations impact ical problems are excluded or played down. The upon life expectancy (in other words, the mecha- costs of erosion control and soil maintenance are nisms of the demographic sector) are critical to included in the costing functions for the, agricul- the way the model behaves. tural sector, but since their payment is automatic, the model excludes any possibility of soil loss or The web of causal influences assumed in. the deterioration. Energy resources, minerals, pollu- model's demographic structure is shown in Figure tion, ecological destabilization, deforestation, de- 28-1. This seemingly complex formulation repre- sertification, and other biological or physical re- sents one straightforward hypothesis. In the mo- source problems in the present world situation are delers' words: "The only truly adequate way of not considered in the model's formulation. controlling population growth is by improving This exclusion is unfortunate. It would be quite basic living conditions.' 14 desirable if a model concerned with the normative, The way that this hypothesis works itself into human needs like the Latin American world the model's structure can be seen in the figure by, model were combined with a realistic representa- examining the variables that affect birth rates and tion of some of today's critical and pressing life expectancy. Pronounced among these are resource and environmental problems. levels of basic needs satisfaction-food, housing, and education. Increases in any of these variables will increase life expectancy and/or decrease-birth *There is some question on this point. The conventions rates. Factors relating to employment conditions used for mathematical operators in the model documentation have also been taken into consideration. The are not defined in the text, and the land development cost higher the percentage of the population in agricul- equations are therefore not clearly defined. ture, the lower the life expectancy; the more ... ... ...... -77 7 Allocation of capital Y., nd labor so as to a Capital for 3 Labor Force @V, maximize life 'Z, allocation expectancy at birth 4, Jv- 4 -Vf 'W i4 0, 7,:" -7 -7 POPULATION Allocation ,i@ Allocation Allocation to 7 =-7 Allocation Al ation, to to agriculture to housing to education other goods c tall Np @7, and stirvies for on 6 T 3 L Eli @Z, 'v Deatl '7, ir s t B, th -@@-Ct C-if, opu!at v- , % School a* of r in Housing Labor in in pop@u!at see ca; ta stock Owl 0 enrollment 1-,r, 777771@' sectors -741 m Mortal ity Birth schedule rate Housing per capita X @,l Life expectanc y S tate, ble A,; L-4 7 at birth A t ion cuItLW r full, Birth rate Hou :-=Ob*fi"Junttion and 101019111ilizilif 'Von '7 'q, Z Figure 28-1. The demographic sector and objective function of 1he Latin American world model. LATIN AMERICAN WORLD MODEL 641 labor in secondary sectors, the greater life expect- HR =Housing rate defined as 100 x (Number of ancy at birth. houses)/(Total population). These flows of influence are compounded in The notable thing about the above equation set that increases in birth rate lead to increases in life .@is its use of exponentials, which provides that expectancy; and increases in life expectancy de- 'each factor's contribution of life expectancy or crease the birth rate. Furthermore, decreases in birth rates will be subject to diminishing returns. the birth rate (through slowing population growth) This creates a condition where the efficacies of eventually lead to increases in per capita availabil- different allocation patterns will shift in rather ity of the output of the basic need sectors. Thus, complex fashion as the model works through they lead to further decreases of birth rates in simulated time, as well as making it impossible, stabilization of population with higher life expect- under the most ideal conditions, for life expect- ancy. ancy to extend much beyond 70 years. . In sum, investment in any of the basic need The operations of the allocation procedure are sectors and shifts toward industrialized production somewhat more complicated. In many places the leads to higher life expectancy with lower birth model is constrained so as to permit only so much rates. The mathematical problem of the model is increase in output of a sector in a given time calculation of the distribution of resources among period. The constraint situation is further compli- the sectors that works most effectively toward cated by the fact that the program allows the that end. However, direct allocations to fulfill model to violate some of its constraint in the needs are not the only variables in the equation. process of finding optimal solutions. There is also the need and the possibility of In the course of simulated time, resource allo- allocating labor and capital to the capital goods cation will shift back and forth between sectors as sector, where they will increase the capital avail- one or another sector shows higher returns per able for production in all sectors. Thus capital, unit of labor or capital added to its production too, competes for resources in the model's allo- processes. The model's parameterization will de- cation decision. termine the relative importance of labor and Clearly, the manner in Which the model allo- capital to its five'economic: sectors as well as to cates resources will be greatly influenced by the the situations in- which each sector becomes a shapes and slopes of the curves relating life priority area for allocation of labor and capital. expectancy to each of the variables influencing it. The modelers state that "the results of the run- For example, if all were linear functions, it would nings of the Model show that education is one of always be most effective to allocate resources to the most important factors on demographic evo- the variable whose effect on life expectancy had lition and particularly on life expectancy. 116 From the steepest slope. But this approach' would be this, we infer that the estimated model parameter- ridiculous, for it would allow life expectancy to be ization has given great weight to education as a extended indefinitely so long as there were more factor influencing life expectancy. resources to be invested. The system of equations Though the education sector may be the most that the models have used-' is shown bel9w: important sector of the model in terms of its operation, the food and agriculture sector is gen- LE 0.052492531 E2.5693255, + 0.054749165 eraffy considered more important by observers. It E2.5607114 - 0.006852093 B1.8622645 - 0.096,24172 is by far the model's most complicated sector. It AG 1.1916027 +55.153412. 0.16189216 contains three subsectors: agriculture, livestock, B = - 0.39895642. 10-12 TK3.725411 - pS 1.251819 and fisheries. Of these, agriculture is the most - 0.17435076 E0m8319 + 366.18269 LE-0.695212 0.62262631 HRO.981753 + 29.0057. important and the most complex, containing where within itself an optimization routine that allocates resources available to agriculture between land LE =Life expectancy at birth development and production of agricultural input.@ * =Enrollment, defined as It also contains mechanisms to account for the 100 x (Matriculated children 6-18 years old)/ process of new land brought into cultivation (Total pootilation 6-18 years old). through investments in land development. The * =Birth rate defined as number of live births- per 1,000 inhabitants land development mechanisms include what AG =Percentage of the labor force in agriculture amounts to an assumption of diminishing return to TK =Total caloric intake per person per day investment as more land is brought into cultiva- PS =Percentage of the labor force in the secondary tion. The cost of land development is an S shaped sector curve between $1,200 and $6,000 per hectare as 642 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS the fraction of arable land under cultivation ranges are fulfilled. The building of new houses is defined from zero -to one.* in the model as urbanization. Education is defined Thealternative use for agricultural capital, how- as providing schooling, to the 6-18 age group. ever, is also subject to diminishing returns. Addi- Higher education is not included in the education tional funds spent on agricultural input lead to sector but is assumed under the category of other increasing input per hectare, but .incremental yield goods and services. responses, after increasing exponentially, turn to The structure of the capital sector and the zero past a given level. Beyond, thatlevel, further sector producing other goods and services is not investment in agricultural: inputs will be nonopti- discussed in the. documentation. It is, however, mal, and the incentive to invest further wil .I be nil. stated in the documentation of model output that, As both land development and investment in in the standard run., the percentage of GNP agricultural input are subject to diminishing re- allocated to other goods and services is con- turns, there will be states in the model's behavior strained so that it.cannot.fall below 45 percent of where agricultural investment y .ields no significant total production or increase with respect to the returns. When this happens, the optimizing mech- 1976 level until basic. needs have been satisfied .7 anism will find it profitable to put its money In the same text passage, it is stated that the elsewhere-in the livestock or fishery sector, or maximum rate of investment, i.e.,. allocation to Away from the food sector entirely. the capital sector., is fixed at 25 p@ercent. These Two optimistic assumptions are included in the constraints would seem to have been imposed to formulations of the agricultural sector. First, the prevent the model from allocating all funds away model assumes that the cost of fertilizer will from other goods and services (which contribute remain constant over the optimization period. very little in. the model to increasing life expect- Second, it assumes that food processing losses in ancy) and to prevent the model from allocating the developing regions will automatically decrease unrealistical 'ly large sums of investment in capital every year through the optimization procedure (which drive economic growth through the Cobb until they reach the rates found in developed Douglass production function). For want of other regions. infonnation, one assumes that the model uses a The fisheries and livestock subsectors are rela- standard Cobb' Douglass production function in tively simple. Both allow for investment in pro- the capital sector and the sector producing other duction to increase yields up to a maximum goods and services. The model also includes a simplistic intema- carrying capacity figure. The livestock sector also tional trade sector. The modelers' fundamental allows for some of the inedible waste portions of assumptions used for international trade in the the agriculture sector to be used for livestock model are as follows: fodder. It also allows for excess agricultural products to be used as feed for livestock after the (a) As the data for 1960 are not'complete, it is dietary needs of the human population have been assumed that the global level of trade of each met. Food wastes and foods are then transformed block for that year is proportional to its total into measures of meat consumption, using a GNP, taking 1970 as the base year. The biological conversion efficiency ratio. volume of trade for each sector in 1960, as Note, in passing, that the maximum potential well as for the years after 1970, is assumed to fish catch used in the model, one taken from FAO be proportional to its contribution to the total (Food and Agriculture Organization) data, is con- G INP, taking also 1970 as the base year. siderably higher than the maximum catch figure (b) The disequilibfium in the balance of payments presented in Chapter 7 (120 million metric tons of the regions is gradually reduced, until per year, as opposed to 60 million). It is also of e .quilibrium is reached in 20 years from the interest that the model does not account for time of implementation of the policies pro- posed (1980). problems that might arise from overgrazing. The housing and education sectors are strai ht- Although, as already. stated, the model is an forward and similar. The costs of new housing optimization model, in practice it has two modes and education both begin to iise when basic needs of operation. Over the historical period, the mod- elers use it as a simulation model, running it at *This seems to be what the documentation means, but it is the outset of a run without use of the optimization difficult to see how it works. If the S curve is used and routine and substituting the assumption of con- costs do level at $6,000 per hectare, it would seem to be possible in the model for more than 100 percent of the total formance to of observed trends for the assumption arable land to be brought into cultivation. of optimalizing behavior over the first 20 or so LATIN AMERICAN WORLD MODEL 643 years of the model run. This is done essentially as lation, being outside the calibration pe riod; do a check on model accuracy. constitute a meaningful test of the model's ability Briiefly, the model's most'important structural to operate accurately in the historii@al simulation features from the Pro ctive of population re- mode. spe sources and en 'vironment are: (1) - The -model Since the basic-op6rational structure-of the envisions a society.that allocates its capital and model is altered as the model, shifts from historical labor in such a way as to maximize life expect- simulation to 'optimization mode, it is not totally ancy; (2) life expectancy is a function of satisfac- clear how the model's ability to predict in simula- tion of basic needs and various other social tion mode attests to the validity of its findings indicators; (3) economic output is a function of when operating in optimization mode. complementary inputs of labor and capital and of (exponentially increasing) growth induced by tech- 'Me model is run from 1%0 to 2060 in most of nological advance by sector'; and (4) agricultural the runs. Even if the same mode of model yield and investment's in land development are operation were to be applied throughout this subject to diminishing returns.' I , period, it is not clear how well 'an ability to Other resources are as .sumed available in unlim- predict 8 years in the future can serve as a basis ited quantities and at cons ,tant cost: (5) Forms of for judgment of 'ability -to predict 90 years in the environmental maintenance such as forest man- future, especially when the model does not con- agement, soil conservation, and, p .ollution abate- sider energy problems and limitations, ecological ment, are automatic and not subject to misman- viability, or other problems encountered in i main- agement (soil maintenance has an attached cost; taining economic growth within our fixed natural other forms of environmental maintenance are resource space. implicitly free); (6) technological improvements Though there are difficult questions as to how contribute, at.no cost, to economic production at to validate a normative model, there is no diffi- a rate of 0.5-1.5 percent growth per year, with the culty about its use for policy testing. The Latin magnitude of the contribution varying with the American world model has been so used for at economic. sector; and (7).within an economic least four tests. Three of the tests shown in the region, income is divided with complete equality. available documentation include (1) a standard run, (2) a technological stagnation run (in which the technological growth, instead. of increasing Testing economic production by a steady 0.5, 1.0, or 1.5 How does one test the validity of a normative percent per year,* diminishes to zero between the model? One can conceptionally, testit by observ- years 1980 and 2000--and stays -at zero there- ing the assumptions implicit in its structure and after), and (3) a run in -which industrialized passing judgment on -those a:ssumptions. One can countries -transfer capital (aid) to Asia and Aftica also.perform a sort of experiential testing by beginning at a rate of 0.2 percent of GNP in 1980 running the model under varied assumptions to and increasing thereafter at a rate of 0.2 percent see if it behaves reasonably.. per year until a rate of capital transfer of 2 percent To some extent, the modelers have circum- of GNP is achieved. The model has also been restructured in order to make one additional vented testing difficulties by creating a model that policy test (4) namely, the effect of income can run both in a normative, optimizing mode and distribution on economic growth. In this reformu- in a mode that supposedly simulates past system lation, the model was run separately for 15 behavior.They routinely run the model from 1 1%0 regions, each of which had its population disaggrie- to 1980 using the history-simulating mode before gated into six income groups. in these runs, basic they perform the optimization run. As the model needs were assumed to have been satisfied when has been calibrated using 1%0-70 data, it would the income level of the poorest group reached the be seriously amiss if it failed to reproduce ob- level that would allow satisfaction of basic needs. served behavior over that time,period, so the The Iparameter used as an indicator of the 1960-70 run does not constitute a meaningful test. satisfaction of basic needs is the GNP per capita The 1%0-70 simulation seems to be mainly a at which basic needs were met in the standard safety check to establish that nothing in the model run.' Findings from these four policy tests will be has gotten into disorder through accidental described below. changes of the computer program or through other mishaps that'bedevil computer'modelers. On the other hand, the 1970-78 phases of historical siniu- *Different rates apply for different sectors. 644 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS Conclusions the very high rate of investment needed in Latin America and Africa,to maintain the rates of The standard run of the model for the, industrial- growth shown. Both regions move rapidly toward ized countries is shown in Figure 28-2. Runs for the maximum investment rate that the model will Latin America closely resemble those of African allow,. once it. begins using the optimization mode, countries. The findings in these -simulations corre- and stays at that rate (25 percent per year) spond to surprise-free projections similar to those throughout. the entire simulation. given in. Herman kahn's The Next' 200 Years. However, in Asia, as can be seen from Figure GNP growth, is steady, basic material well being I 28-3, even optimal resource allocation does not rises to a level at which all basic r needs are I allow sustained improvement of human welfare. satisfied, and the economy steadily moves toward The modelers describe the run: producing more economic frills (other goods and services). Once basic needs are satisfied, popula- tion growth rates begin to stabilize, leaving more The problem in Asia arises in the food sector. By of everything for everyone. the only thing in 2010, all available land is being cultivated. There- after, economic effort in the sector is devoted to these runs that does not look like something, that increasing livestock and fisheries. This, I however, Kahn's Hudson Institute might have forecast is is not enough to feed the growing population (25) (9470) (21.6) 4 (85.4) 4 2 0 (213) 4 U U U 4100) .... .. ....... SO ....... (qD.. ...... (q2> ........8q@ ......... 3 4 (495) 4q@) 6 (14.1) U 5 5 Figure 28-2. Latin American world U 5 5 5 (8.1) model standard simulation for devel- (59-1) ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ 0q&........4q@ ....... W (98) oped countries. (Catastrophe or 4 (0.8) New.Soci ety? p. 84) 5 6 Key: (84.8) T (5) Per Icent- GNP allocated to (0.71) C........ @qD ........ ........ 40q& ........ ........ q@r ........ (Do ........4q& ........ (3200) sector 5 7 V A 8 c 2980) C E (71.4) 2 q(B) Birth rate 9 E E 3 (4) Percent GNP to other goods I ( .2) P P P P P (1177) and services 10 $ (1 02) 4 (U) Urbanization P 5 (A) Population growth rate 11 P (946.6) 6 (M) Enrollment 7 q(Vq) Houses per family 8 q(6qQ@ Total calories per.capita 9 (E) Life expectancy 0 ($q), GNP per capita I I '(P) Total population (0.04)' qL qL qL qL qL 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 20q50 2060 LATIN AMERICAN WORLD MODEL 645 C (2984) Asia's economy typically collapses in the Mesa-w (25) .5 5 5 5 rovic-Pestel world model. In testimony to the a 4 strong effect education has on life expectancy (the 242) (58.2) C variable optimized in the model), 'school enroll- 98 ........ ...... ment stays high throughout the run (98 percent). A (1.53) C a Housing improves steadily but quite slowl@ (0.809 V U (858)@ throughout the run until about the year 2040, at (66.8) V (6792) -Which time the run is terminated. A severe decline V U 66.55) E E in food per capita begins in the year 2008. P 2495) Meanwhile, due to the sustained high investment (0 433) V U (569.50 rate of 25 percent, economic growth continues. 2 v V U The last 20 years of the optimization run for Asia (40.7) 4 P are not shown: "The runs were stopped at the 3 5 (16 year 2040 because after that date the indicators 4 B 37.8) U P (particularly life expectancy) ceased to have any 5 C 6 meaning."10 Also, the modelers state, "The life 5 4(49.7) E expectancy function is meaningful only when food 6 Cr41985) P intake is adequate to keep a person alive and to (32.3) 11" 4 (47.91) allow levels of physical activity that currently 7(Er U 4 exists in the poorer societies." Apparently, food 8 &0 7.6E consumption drops in the model to levels that one 9 (D(89 7)p 10 (V('4 8.o 6 (23A) would expect to create rising death rates, at which 'V( '1544) point the model, which lacks mechanisms by which starvation can increase mortality, starts to behave in -a very unrealistic fashion. 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 The results of simulations showing stagnation of Figure 28-3. Latin American world model standard simu- technological progress are disastrous,for every lation for Asia. (Catastrophe or New Society? p. 92) place except the industrialized countries. In Latin Key: America "the basic needs can be satisfied though I (A) Population growth rate only over a longer period than in the standard 2 (V) Houses per family run, particularly in the cases of food and 3 (5) Percentage of GNP allocated to Sector 5 housing."" However, "in Africa, as in Asia, the 4 (B) Birth rate minimum objectives cannot be achieved if tech- 5 (4) Percentage of GNP to other goods and services nological progress stops; the economic system 6 (C) Total calories per capita finally collapses.... Of the basic needs, only 7 (M) Enrollment 8 (U) Urbanization food reaches the target level, and then only for a 9 ($) GNP per capita in 1960 dollars brief period." 12 In a technological stagnation 10 (E) Life expectancy simulation for Africa, for instance, investment,in 11 (P) Total population capital formation falls off and GNP per capita adequately, and consumption drops rapidly to actually declines rather than grows exponentially below the minimum needed for survival. as it did in the collapse of the standard run for The rapid increase in the cost of producing Asia. Population increases relentlessly. All of the food, due to the development of new land for basic needs sectors, including education, begin a agriculture, takes resources from the rest of the nose dive somewhere between 1990 and 2020. economy, causing backwardness and also hinder- Life expectancy peaks around 2015 and declines ing the satisfaction of the other basic needs. In thereafter. summary, the delay in reaching adequate levels of The tests considering capital transfer from the well-being leads to a sustained high population industrialized countries to Asia and Africa have growth rate, and a vicious circle develops: in- the following results: The industrialized countries creased population and the increased cost Of grow faster because they maintain higher invest- producing food make it more and more difficult to satisfy basic needs. ment rates. They end with markedly higher per capita income than in the standard run-$14,250 In short, the economy of Asia collapses in a as opposed to $9,670 (in U.S. dollars). This aid fashion reminiscent of the way the world economy doesn't have much impact on human welfare in collapses in the food-system constrained runs of Asia and Africa. While it leads to higher GNP Worlds 2 and 3 and in the way in which South growth (an infusion of capital obviously will), it 646 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS h'as very little effect on infant mortality or life rates with which the desired objectives are expectancy and not a great deal of influence on achieved are, as was seen in the previous chapter, the amount of time needed for fulfillment of basic those considered normal in the current economic needs.'The 'unstated implication is that capital situation. The goals are therefore achieved not by transfer will have a negligible effect on the biggest very high economic growth, but by a reduction in nonessential consumption; increased investment; upcoming human welfare problem in the world- the elimination of socioeconomic and political food shortages in Asia. barriers, which currently hinder the rational use The tests on income distribution show that of land@ both for food production and for urban egalitarian distribution leads to much more rapid planning; the egalitarian distribution of basic fulfillment of basic needs. ("As. can be seen, in goods and services; and, in developing countries, the under-developed countries, the GNP per cap- the implementation of an active policy to eliminate ita needed to satisfy the basic needs in egalitarian deficits in international trade. conditions is something between 3 to 5 times less The growth rates necessary to achieve these than that required if current income distribution objectives, and which can be easily attained structures are maintained." 13) without imposing intolerable social sacrifice, con- The conclusions the modelers draw from the trast with those required to satisfy, in approxi- modeling exercise are somewhat different from mately the same period of time, the basic needs within the current income structure, or the same those in the above description. Here, we quote socioeconomic organization. These economic the modelers' conclusions in full: growth rates, which for developing countries., vary The results of the model ... demonstrate that, between 10 and nearly 12 percent, are in fact impossible to attain, for the reasons set out in the if the policies proposed here are applied, all of previous section. To propose this type of "solu- humanity could attain an adequate standard of tion," therefore, is only to propose a preservation living within a period a little longer than one of the current status quo and to misunderstand the generation. The satisfaction of the most essential true causes of the crisis that currently affects the physical and cultural needs, which has been one world. of the central objectives of man from his beg!*n- nings, could be fulfilled for most of the countries One of the most interesting results of the model of the Third.World toward the end of the century, is the light it sheds on the effect that possible or in the first years of the next. international aid, in particular the transfer of The only problem of physical limitation that resources from the industrialized countries to the arises, and which is of a local nature, is the poor countries, would have. Even if a greater exhaustion of the supply of cultivatable land in level of international aid than that advised by the Asia in the middle of the next century. However, United Nations is implemented, it may contribute the large reserves of cultivatable land in other to raise the level of well-being at the time of regions could easily cover this deficit. Since the transfer, but in no way decisively. What has been effects of this limitation would only begin to be seen with regard to income distribution clearly felt in 80 years, Asia has enough time tolook for demonstrates that international aid, in the condi- its own solutions to the problem, such as increas- tions currently prevailing in most developing ing the yield of crops, which has been assumed to countries, would only contribute to increasing be well below the theoretically possible levels; sp6nding by privileged sectors, and would have producing food from nonconventional sources; the little or no effect on the living conditions of the application of an effective family planning policy majority of the population. The effect of the that would enable the population to achieve a transfer of capital is only significant for the general balance within a shorter period than predicted by well-being if there are conditions of social equality the model; etc. similar to those proposed in the model. The model also shows that it is possible to International solidarity can take forms other control population growth to the point of equilib- than the net transfer of resources from rich to rium by raising the general standard of living, poor countries. The model shows the recovery particularly with relation to basic needs. This that developing countries can achieve in economic equilibrium could be achieved on a global scale growth precisely at the decisive stage of attaining well before the earth's capacity to produce food- the satisfaction of basic needs-through the elimi- the only foreseeable physical limitation within the nation of a negative balance of payments. The time horizon of the model-is fully exploited even developed countries can help to, bring, forward the if food production continues to be based on attainment of this objective by fixing fair prices currently available technology. for the products of underdeveloped countries to The obstacles that currently stand in the way of replace present prices that, rather than represent- the harmonious development of humanity are not ing a just distribution between the factors of physical or economic in the strict sense, but production of the two production sectors into essentially sociopolitical. In effect, the growth which the world is divided, are the consequence LATIN AMERICAN WORLD MODEL 647 of an unequal distribution of economic, political, 1977 technical Handbook of the Latin American and military power. Moreover, with a reduction in Model, distributed on a limited scale. by their growth rates, as proposed in the model, the UESCO . 5The former publication does not pre- ri ch countries could contribute to relieving the sent model equations but does a very respectable pressure on available resources, helping the poor job of conveying conceptually how the model countries indirectly in this way. works, as well as presenting model output and ... it was shown that in the year 2060 (at numerous theoretical arguments supporting posi- which the computer runs were terminated) there tions taken in the model. Descriptions of complex would still be inequalities, expressed in economic indicators, between the levels of well-being in the mathematical models are inevitably confusing. developed and poor countries, particularly with However, this book is written in such a way that, respect to Asia. To evaluate correctly the signifi- for a non-technicatly oriented reader, it almost cance of this remaining gap, it should be borne in always helps to clarify the model without conftis- mind that the results of the model over such a ing the issues. long period of time could change considerably The modelers are humanistic socialists, and with relatively small fluctuations in some of the their values are quite apparent throughout the variables used; a moderate increase in the rate of documentation. Often one senses that they are technological progre@s, for example, could easily close the gap. interpreting things through the bias of their value Lastly the model shows, within the obvious system. However, these biases are sufficiently limitations of this type of work, that the fate of overt and clearly stated so that a reader who does man does not depend, in the last instance, on not share the modelers' values can easily reinter- insurmountable physical barriers but on social and pr@t their normative statements. political factors that man must modify. Their The technical handbook is appropriate for math- solution is not at all easy, because to change the ematicians, computer programmers, and mathe- organization and values of society, as history has shown, is much inore difficult than overcoming matical economists. It describes some (not a) of physical limitations. To attempt the task, how- the model equations and goes a long way toward ever, is the only way open to an improved documenting the model's data base and presenting humanity. references for its conceptual premises--except for It could possibly be said that this proposal is occasional problems with undefined equations and utopian, and that it would be more realistic to poorly identified symbols. It has an orderly ar- propose solutions that involve less radical modifl- rangement of subjects and a consistency of usages cations to the sociopolitical structure of the world. that spares the reader many of the frustrations Those who hold this position should be reminded frequently associated with large sets of equations. of the words of John Stuart Mill more. than a century ago: The computer program is published along with the model documentation and is well annotated. Ap- '.'For a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small result; it simply does not parently, it would allow a person desiring to do so produce any results at all." 14 to transfer the model to another system and use it without outside help from the modelers. This, however, is a subjective impression. Documentation Documentation describing an application of the The available documentation on the Latin model to Brazil and a criticism of it by the Science American world model is quite good. There exists Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex both the nontechnical Catastrophe or New Soci- have also been prepared for UNESCO and distrib- ety? A Latin American World Model 2 and the uted on a limited scale. 15 REFERENCES 1. Donella H'and Dennis L. Meadows et aL, The Limits 8. Ibid., p. 104. to Growth, Washington: Potomac Associates, 1972, p. 9. Ibid., p. 93. 184,* 10. Ibid., p. 93. 11. Ibid., p. 97. 2. Amilcar 0. Herrera et al., Catastrophe or New Society? 12. Ibid. A Latin American World Model, Ottawa: International 13. Ibid., p. 104. Development Research Center, 1976, p. 8. 14. Ibid., pp. 107-108. 3. Ibid., p. 5. 15. H. S. D. Cole, "The Latin American World Model as a 4. Ibid., p. 8. Tool of Analysis and Integrated Planning at a National 5. Handbook of the Latin American World Model, Paris: and Regional Level in Developing Countries," UNESCO, UNESCO, July 1977, p. 25. Aug. 1977; Carlos Ruiz, Irene Louisean, and Hugo D. 6. Ibid., p. 117. Scolnik, "Adaptation of the Banloche Model to Brazil," 7. Herrera, p. 85. Paris: UNESCO, Oct. 1977. 29 U.N. World Model The conclusions drawn from the World 2 and Each process, be it the manufacture of steel, the World 3 models and the Mesarovic-Pestel world education of youth or the running of a family model were obviously unpalatable to poor nations household, generates certain output and absorbs a of the world operating under the hope that growth specific combination of input. Direct interdepend- would eventually extricate them from their ence between two processes arises whenever the poverty. Likewise, the notion that resources for output of one becomes an input of the other: growth were beginning to run out was unsettling Coal, the output of the coal mining industry, is an input of the electric power generating sector. The to those U.N. agencies involved in formulation chemical industry uses coal not only directly as a strategies for improving the condition of the raw material but also indirectly in the form of world's poor. electrical power. A network of such length com- The U.N. world model can be considered a plicates the system of elements which depend manifestation of this discomfort. In late 1972, in upon each other directly, indirectly, or both .2 ,conjunction with the International Development 3. If it is the world we want to model, we can Strategy adopted by the General Assembly of the enhance the above visualization by dividing the U.N. in 1970, Wassily Leontief was asked to world into regions and representing, separately, construct a model of the world economy to assess whether physical limitations to economic growth flows within a region and flows between regions. would pose a significant obstacle to the economic Mathematically, the structure that has been targets set forth in the Strategy. Funding for the used to represent the above visualization is quite project was provided by the Netherlands. The simple, albeit immense. It is one vast system of work had an auspicious beginning: Leontief was simultaneous linear equations with more un- awarded a Nobel Prize in economics in 1973. In knowns than equations. This system is solved his acceptance speech, he described the structural using exogenously specified values for key varia- concepts on which the model was to be con- bles to make the number of equations equal to the structed. I The task of transforming the basic number of unknowns. To obtain a glimpse of the structure into a working model was undertaken by systems unfolding over time, the exogenous vari- Anne Carter, Peter Petri, and others at Br-andeis ables as well as some of equations' coefficients University. Joseph J. Stem of Harvard served as are projected forward-in this case by 5-year coordinator for the project. increments to the year 2000---and the system is solved again. The system provides latitude as to which variables are to be treated as endogenous Method and which as exogenous in any given simulation. Probably the most demanding part of construct-. The U.N. world model sets forth an input- ing such a model is gathering the data and filling output view of the world economy. The basic in where data don't exist. If one counts time- elements of this view are: updates for structural coefficients, the model's number of coefficients is in excess of 10,000. A 1. We cannot predict the future of the world large portion of these were adapted from other economy. However, we can rule out of our data bases. Many of them, most importantly the expectations ftiture scenarios that are intemally input-output ratios (technical coefficients) for inconsistent and thus impossible. some of the world's less developed regions, have 2. To rule out internally inconsistent expecta- had to be estimated by means of cross-section tions we need to construct a model that guaran- inferences from known data for other regions. tees internal consistency. This we can do by Statistical techniques have been used extensively visualizing the world as a system of interdepen- to work over data and to ensure that data from dent processes in which one source are consistent with data from another. 649 650 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS Many of the coefficients going into the model accounts, it is difficult to avoid double counting are based on the informed judgment of others. and omissions. For example, estimates for input-output coeffi- But the model does not answer all the relevant cients for future years have been borrowed from questions. When asked about the model's treat- the'w'orks of many technological forecasters. ment of the environment, Anne Carter replied Although in some ways highly empirical, the frankly that it was quite superficial. 3 She made no method also requires a good deal of judgment. pretense that the tallying of pollutants and mineral Many important decisions about how to employ and fossil fuel resources by the model provides statistics-for example, deciding how to forecas *t adequate indices of the state of the environment. trade matrices for the People's Republic of The model Idoes not speak to the way ecological China-involve a large amount of subjective judg- systems will be affected by the development that ment. Likewise, construction of scenarios is suffi- it forecasts. It does not keep track of the states of ciently dependent on a "feel" for what is impor- forests, grasslands, bodies of water, soil, and tant in the real world and for the model's other natural systems. It cannot address the capabilities that it is more of an art than a science. firewood crisis.- Carter was of the opinion that the model could be @ made much. rmore relevant for some of these Relevance purposes by distinguishing between urban and rural economies. This, she indicated, would result The U.N. worid model can speak to the follow- in better inferences about stresses on land pro- ing sorts of questions: For a given scenario Of duced by intensive agriculture and other land uses population growth and GNP growth with a speci- as well as a better means of attacking problems, fied standard of pollution abatement, how much such- as concentration of pollutants, that are of what mineral resources would have been used primarily urban affbLirs. by 1980, 1985, 1990, or the year 2000? How much pollutant of various sorts would have been gener'- ated by those same years? The model also tells us Structure what to expect in the way of changing sectoral compositions of output for growing economies; it The model consists of 15 regional models, tells us the magnitudes of anticipated trade flows which taken together represent the whole world. under a set of simplifying assumptions about the In structure, these 15 submodels are identical. mechanisms governing international trade. The Each has 175 equations and 229 variables. The 15 model's strongest claim is that it will give consist- regional subinodels are linked interface through ent forecasts. That is, it will not allow one 'to world trade equations. In the following text the forecast the growth of one segment of the econ- structure of the regional submodels is described omy without taking account of the demands that first, then the Imanner in which they are linked. that segment places on other sectors of the The entire world system' of equations is solved economy. Nor will it allow users to forecast the simultaneously, however, so no causal sequence imports and exports of a given region without should be inferred from any of the descriptions. making sure that these are balanced against the Each regional model (Fig. 29-1) can be thought imports and exports of other regions--that is, for of as'a device that first calculates the economy's each product, global imports equal global exports entire demand for the products of each of 40 for all regions, It also can go into questions Of economic' sectors (total demand) and then, from economic development in great detail-detail that total demand, estimates resource usage, pollution brings attention to the explicit structural details of generated, labor employed, and capital employed. economic development. In a sense, the model in fact, it is more complicated than that, for prepares a sort of global and national-econo'mic pollution generates abatement activities, which in shopping list for all of the elements that will be turn add to total demand. Likewise, capital re- required for the world to grow. quirements generate investments, and this too Such exercises are quite relevant to planning adds to total demand. for long-term interrelationships between popula- Total demands for the products of each sector tion resources and environment. There is great are calculated in the normal fashion of summing need for internal consistency in our forecasting. up the national income accounts. First, the final And it is important that we do look at things on a demands are calculated by adding up consump- matter-of-fact, item by item basis in concrete real tion, government spending, and investment. To terms. Unless someone keeps careful and detailed final demands are added those demands generated targets o., tment Consu tic Government 7- 7- L Export + Import levels irchases PC 2, prod I G P on Detailed i --Z' World Environment Final demands ban exports W ur POP standards 77[ Intermediate Total demands _A@ Detailed World z demands 43 40 % A, Production, E on-- x1ractil Trade balance emissions I 0 J -7@ extraction 43' limits Net G)_ K K Resour Gross em L Price in* -a! required ti P, "Key Major, blacks of-. A ., , Fj, Y )i caofi wents, x diitermlnes'y Number of variables x A"s exagenous Yc itibble of typo x 43 Figure 29-1. Internal structure of a region. Major structural coefficients; A, interindustry inputs; B, composition of investment of consumption; E, generation of gross pollution, G, composition of government purchases; K, capital inputs; L, labor in import- Opulati levels L Price abor r9qu ections dependence ratios; S, shares of world export markets. (Peter*A. Petri, "An Introduction to the Structure and Application of the United Nations World Model," Applied Mathematical Modeling, June, 1977) 652 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS in the process of fffling final demands (intermedi- Thus depletion of mineral reserves induces in- ate demands) and the. net of export demands creased importing of minerals and increased inter- minus import demands. (The input-output matrix national trading in minerals. is used to -calculate the intermediate -demand from Minerals, poflutants, and agricultural products the final demand.) - are treated in real terms. Manufactured goods and The model permits two fundamentally different services are treated in price terms. The use of ways of looking at income determination. One can physical units, as opposed to monetary units, has specify, exogenously, target rates of GNP growth advantages for the modeler. It permits utilization for the model's various,regio'ns and let the model of physical data, such as mineral reserve esti- calculate consumption eindogenously as the resid- mates, while at the same time letting the modeler ual of what would be left over after the indicated take advantage of physical realities, such. as the investments, government expenditures, etc., took laws of preservation of matter and biological facts place. Alternatively, one can specify specific de- about nutritional needs. Moving in the' direction velopmental constraints (limits on balance-of-pay- 6f,these. advantages, the modelers have departed ment deficits, avaflable savings, or labor force) from the purely monetary flows found in most and have the model determine what rates of input-output models and have substituted a mixed economic growth would be possible within the accounting system, using both real and physical specified constraints. units. The model computes the investment rates that Prices are gener-ated in a separate model. Basi- wiH be required, either to create the industrial cally the price of sectoral output is equated to capacity needed for target GNP'growth rates or to sectoral production costs. Production costs allow the growth rates determined by the specJfied change with, changing interindustry structure, (in- development constraints. Investment is divided put-output structures). These take into considera- into the following categories: plant, equipment, tion such matters as changes in production effi- irrigation, and land. The amount invested in each ciencies, input substitution (e.g., plastics for wood category is determined by a set of technical and metals), and higher input requirement for coefficients that relate investment needs to final production of mineral resources as resource re- demand for all of the model's sectors. serves become depleted. For some simulations, Imports'and exports, the remaining categories resource prices are projected outside the model contributing (or deducting) from final demand, and set exogenously, Consistent prices for all comprise the bridge that connects regional econ- other sectors are then computed. ,omies to the world trade model. The modelers Exogenous forecasts of technologicaLchange in have kept their representations of imports and each of the regions are also fed into the main exports simple, almost artificially so, in order to model. These forecasts were ma& using, cross- render the complex problem of international trade section studies of the relationship between per as. transparent as possible and to allow for chang- capita income and interindustry structure to derive ing. of assumptions at a later date. Most regional estimates of how inten*ndust .ry flows would change imports. are determined via import-dependence as regions undergo economic growth. Technologi- ratios, which are exogenously varied over time, cal forecasts were superimposed on these. Numer- relating imports required to output produced on a ous assumptions are unavoidably put into these sector by sector basis. "Import requirements are technological forecasts, including controversial is- then summed across regions and the resulting sues, such as assumptions about the extent to world demands are allocated to the regions as which nuclear power will substitute for conven- exports. The -allocations %are accomplished by tional energy sources. The huge number-of the. export-share coefficients specific to each traded assumptions made in estimating time trends for commodity. These regional export shares are input-output matrices makes for confusion when it presently projected with regression studies based comes to considering the model as whole. There on historical and cross section data." In the case are so many assumptions that one is hard put.to of manufactured imports, dependency ratios are evaluate the reasonableness of the total picture. constant and estimated by regression analysis. For Though the modelers tell us they have been exhaustible .resource commodities such as min- moderate in'their choice of assumptions and have erals, "importing regions, are assigned output consistently utilized what seems to be the best levels consistent with the amount of regional guess of accepted experts, it would still seem resource reserve still available, and imports are desirable to have an easy way of checking the used to fiI1 all the remaining unsatisfied demands. 4 assumptions used. U.N. WORLD MODEL 653 Testing one final scenario, investment, instead of being driven by targeted GDP growth, was presumed to The U.N. world model needs a lot of parameter follow past trends, and GDP growth was gener- testing and could be utilized for a wide range Of ated endogenously according to several con- policy testing. The modelers' limited time and straints: apparently realistic balance of payments, limited budgets have barely allowed them to the labor available, and the monies available for scratch the surface of the testing that could and investment after' consumption had spent its share. should be done. The model contains a huge The constraints used varied from re .gion to region. number of somewhat arbitrary parameters. One (This last test, by the way, produces dim. eco- would have a lot more confidence in the model if nomic prospects for the developing world, and is it had been determined through testing that these downplayed in the U.N. documentation.) parameters were not unduly sensitive. It would In the process of working out the above policy also be useful to have, identified which parameters scenarios, the modelers found that the minimum are sensitive in orderlo ascertain areas of greatest targets for growth set by the International Devel- uncertainty. This knowledge would serve as a opment Strategy, if implemented, would barely basis for determining priorities for further data suffice to keep the gap between rich and poor collection and research. That is, it is much more nations from growing, much less to narrow the important that a careful job be done researching gap. Accordingly, the growth rate per capita parameters to which the model is sensitive than income in less de 'veloped countries (LDCs) was researching things that don't much matter. adjusted upward in such a way that the income The policy tests for which the model has been gap between LDCs and industrialized countries used have generally conformed to the interests of would just about halve its proportionate size by organizations commissioning use of the model. In the year 2000. Consistent with the objective of real terms, this means that the model has been evening out income levels, growth fates across used to: (1) test economic and-to the extent that the board were adjusted so as to be inversely the model can show environmental happenings-- related to present income per capita. The richer environmental consequences of the growth targets regions were assumed to grow slowly, the poorer established, by the International Development regions to grow most rapidly. The growth rate for Strategy; (2) examine the ramifications of resource the basic scenarios used in the model are shown conservation strategies for the Canadian govern- in Table 29-2. ment's Economic Council of Canada; (3) investi- In the work conducted for the U.S. Department gate for the U.S. Department of Commerce the of Commerce, the friodelers compared a business- consequences of energy conservation on global as-usual constrained growth run with one in which economic development; and (4) examine a few all regions of the world adopt the highest reason- scenarios that the modelers themselves felt were able curtailment of fossil fuel consumption over useful and meaningful. The results of the Canadian the next 20 years. Their conservation maximum study have yet to be publicly documented; results was adopted from the most extreme of the energy of the other three tests follow. conservation scenarios prepared by Cavendish The documented work done for the U.N. OPer- Laboratories of - Cambridge University for the ates around eight policy scenarios '5As prescribed World Energy Conference of October 1977. They by the International Development Strategy, most assumed that energy conservation would be ac- of these are based on exogenously given forecasts of population growth and growth of income per TABLE 29-1 capita. The three population and income growth alternatives considered are shown in Table 29-1. Alternative Assumptions Concerning Income The base case, or standard forecast, denoted UN/ Targets and Future Population Growth B in the table, is the case with medium population growth and high gross domestic product (GDP) Per Capita GDP per capita growth in developing regions and mod- Population Growth Targets erate growth in developed regions. Further tests Developed Devel ping Developed Developing were conducted by altering this base case by 0 changing assumptions, e.g., by assuming more Regions Regions Regions .Regions optimistic estimates of resource endowments, as UN/B medium medium high high well as increased foreign aid, constraints on bal- UN/A-1 low 'low low high ance-of-payment deficits, and faster agricultural UN/A-2 high high low high lowce: Wassily Leontief et aL, The Future ofihe World E( on 11.v. New York: investment in the low-income Asian countries. In Oxford. 1977, p. 26. 654 OTHER GLOBAL MODELS TABLE 29-2 The findings on minerals were more optimistic. Growth Rates and Income Gap Under the In general, it was found that mineral resource Assumptions of Basic Scenarios X and C limitations would not, prove to be 'a binding constraint on economic growth by the year 2000. in the United Nations Model With the exception of lead and zinc, the model Less did not show the world running out of any Indus- Devel- minerals by 2000. trialized oped In view of that the fact that the model produces Scenario Countries Countries use estimates for nine critical geologic resources- Perc@nt copper, bauxite, nickel, zinc, lead, iron, crude Growth rate petroleum, natural gas, and coal-the forecast that Gross product X 4.0 7.2 only lead and zinc are in danger of being used up C 3.6 6.9 by 2000 is significant, although it becomes some- Population X 0.7 2.3 C 0.6 2.0 what less significant if one considers that World Gross product X 3.3 4.9 3, which has generally been called a pessimistic .per capita C 3.0 4.9 model, indicates that in the aggregate 70 percent Income gap in the year 2000 LDCv=100 of our mineral resources will remain in the year Gross product X 769 100 2000. In that model shortages do not become per capita C 715 100 critical until around 2020.8 Source: Wassily Leontiefet aL, The Future t)fthe World E(ouomv, New York: Furthermore, it is not immediately clear what is Oxford, 1977, p. 31. behind the conclusion that resources are ample enough to last to 2000. It is known that the model complished by substituting labor and capital for does assume to some unspecified extent that energy.6 nuclear power and gasified coal will be used to substitute for petroleum by 2000, also that the model assumes active recycling of minerals. 9 Th 'e Conclusions I Ino running out" finding can, thus, only be interpreted to mean that we can avoid running out The tests described above tend to the conclu- through appropriate technical solution. The mod- sion that economic prospects for the LDCs are elers also conclude that the resources that will not in general optimistic. For such countries to be available to us will probably be at a higher meet the targeted growth rates, investment ratios cost. Price, however, as described earlier, is not of unprecedented magnitude would have to be determined within the main model. This conclu- maintained, and consumption for private use kept sion, therefore, must stem from either our off-line at very low levels. For example, if target growth analysis or from a supplementary model. rates were kept up in the year 2000, none of the Leontief's analysis of the model concludes that developing regions would have a level of personal although pollution is a great problem for human- consumption in excess of 63 percent of income, ity, it is a technologically manageable problem" and none would have a level of private investment and that the economic cost of keeping pollution of less than 20 percent. It was also found that in within manageable limits is not unbearable. 10 order to meet food requirements in a standard Model output implied that if fairly stringent abate- scenario, agricultural production in the year 2000 ment standards were to be applied to all the would have to be increased to about four times pollutants now regulated in the United States, present figures. In many places, higher rates of abatement costs would come to about 1.4-1.9 increase were called for. In low-income Latin percent of gross product. Under less stringent America and low-income Asia ' it-was found that standards-and in the model it was assumed that agricultural output would have to increase by less stringent standards would be applied in coun- more than 500 percent; in an and and tropical tries with lower income per capita than the U.S.- Africa and centrally planned Asia, increases of the total cost of abatement activities would come 400 to 500 percent were indicated; 'in the Middle to about 0.5-0.9 percent of gross product. East, the output showed that a 950 percent In the energy conservation tests conducted for increase in agricultural output would be required the Department of Commerce, the following tend- to keep economic growth patterns on target. In encies were noted: In the developed regions, currently high-income regions, most of the indi- which were modeled as having labor-constrained cated agricultural, growth rates were below 200 growth rates, energy conservation's greatest effect percent .7 was to reduce balance-of-payment deficits. In the U.N. WORLD MODEL 655 LDCs, where GDP growth was constrained by development would probably require faster growth balance-of-payment deficits, energy conservation, of heavy industry than of other industrial sectors; in reducing balance of payment deficits, lessened (2) high income-elasticities of demand for imports the main constraint to economic growth and would likely, create severe balance-&-payment thereby resulted in increased GDP growth as well. problems for LDCs under accelerated develop- In all regions, the capital requirements for energy ment strategies; and (3) "to insure accelerated conservation caused the energy conservation development general conditions are necessary: scenario to require more savings, and thus less first, far-reaching internal changes of a social, consumption. The required change in savings political and institutional character in the devel- rates was large enough to imply the need for an oping countries, and second, significant changes appreciable change in distribution of money be- in the world economic order. Accelerated devel- tween savings and consumption-an increase in opment leading to a substantial reduction of the savings of about 17 to 23 percent. I I income gap between the developing and the In policy tests of the modelers' own design, the developed countries can only be achieved through modelers constructed scenarios to compare the a combination of both these conditions." 13 economic consequences for LDCs of adopting standard patterns of development instead of pol- lution-intensive export strategy. The purpose of Wcumentation the test was to ascertain whether.LDCs would be dimming their prospects for economic growth if The publicly available documentation of the .they avoided becoming specialized Jiqst@ for the U.N. world model is adequate to give an informed dirtier industries, which, presumably, 'Industrial- reader a good basic understanding of the model's ized nations might like to exclude from within structure and how it operates. However, to gain their boundaries. From these tests, the modelers an understanding of its particulars, how it is concluded that parameterized, where data came from, and what the pollution-intensive approach is found to be sorts of statistical measures are to be associated more expensive in terms of capital, and requires with which estimated parameters, one would al- more input. This approach would also imply most have to *personally discuss the question with sizable shifts in the output mix of the developing the modelers themselves. Anne Carter informed economy and might create non-negligible environ- the Global 2000 Study staff that the modelers have mental repercussions. . . . In sum, several ecO- kept careful records and that technical documen- nomic criteria mitigate in favor of the conventional tation is being supplied to the United.Nations. and against the pollution-intensive strategy-pro- Resources are not available for documenting the vided, and this is quite important-that a choice exists at all. 12 work for a wider audience. Furthermore, the modelers view their work in current form as Other conclusions emanating from the model incomplete and would like it to undergo consider- study centered on consequences of accelerated able further testing, refinement; and development development in the less developed countries. Most before. preparing detailed documentation for public important among these were: (1) Accelerated circulation. 14 REFERENCES 1. Wassily Leontief, "'Structure of the World Econorny: U. s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Outline of a Simple Input-Output Formulation" (Nobel and Economic Pblicy, at Brande.'s University, Nov. Memorial Lecture), American Economic Review, Dec. 1977, p. 2 1977, pp. 823-34. 7. Leontief et al., The Future of the World Economy. 2; Ibid, p. 823. 8. Dennis L. Meadows et al.,- Dynamics of Growth in a 3. Anne Carter, verbal communication to the Global 2000 Finite World, Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen, 1974, p. Study staff, Nov. 14, 1977. 5011. 9. Anne Carter, verbal communication. 4. Peter A. Petri, "An Introduction to the Structure and 10. Leontief et al., The Future of the World Ecimom.y. p. Application of the United Nations World Model," 7. Applied Mathematical Modeling, June 1977, p. 263. 11. Anne P. Carter and Alan K. Sin. 5. Wassily Leontief et al., The Future of the World 12. Petri, p. 267. Economy, New York: Oxford, 1977. 13. Leontief et al_ The Future of the World Econom.y; p. 6. Anne P. Carter and Alan K. Sin, "An Energy Conser- 11. vation Scenario for the World Model," prepared for the 14. Anne Carter, verbal communication. I Part IV Comparison of Results 30 Introducfion to Model Compajisons The Global 2000 Study seeks answers to two models. This comparison will stress the ways that questions: What are probable trends for global models' conceptual and mathematical structures population, resources, and environment to the affect their findings and conclusions and the ways year 2000? and How does the complex institu- that institutional factors affect model conceptuali- tional structure of the U.S. federal government zation. A model's idea content is at least coequal derive its expectations about these matters? The with its parameterization in shaping the model's latter question is examined to assess the projec- projections. The text is deliberately weighted to tion capabilities of agencies of the executive show that there is more to modeling than the branch, to describe their strengths and weak- "garbage in, garbage out" cliche implies. In fact, nesses, and to examine alternative methodologies if this cliche has an appropriate application, it is that might overcome weaknesses that are found to characterize models having static, linear struc- to exist. tures without endogenous feedback. The methodological question has been pursued Finally, an attempt will be made to answer the in this volume as follows: First, the implications of question "How would the conclusions of the projection by means of a collection of separately Government's Global Model be different if the developed and operated models have been dis- model were more integrated?" A conceptually cussed in Chapter 14. That discussion emphasized attractive experimental approach has been used to the distorting effect of making fragmentary projec- tackle this question. Two of the integrated models tions of a highly integrated world. Second, specific previously described (the World 3 and the World projection tools developed and utilized in federal Integrated Model were selected on the basis of agencies-or elsewhere in cases such as GNP their availability for the experiment and were projections--have been described in Chapters 15 restructured by breaking the internal feedback through 23. Third, in Chapters 25 through 29, five loops so that they bore some resemblance to the case studies of nongovernment global models that Government's Global Model, as described in are more integrated than the government's model Chapter 14. Comparison of the output from the have been discussed. original integrated versions of the models with the The following chapter brings together loose results from the less integrated modified versions ends in the discussion of modeling methodology was then used as a basis for determining how through two exercises. First, a comparison will be government projections would differ if the govern- made of the five nongovernment integrated ment's model were more integrated. 659 31 The Comparisons Comparison of Integrated Global Models among alternative uses? These questions are: Where will resource demands come from? How Global modeling is not yet on solid footing. will they evolve over time? How will the growth Most of the funding for the world models de- of demand interface with changes in the economic scribed in this volume has come from private structures and natural resource stocks required to sources. None of the models is linked to the create supply? governmental decision-making process in a stable The two basic forms of growing needs that fashion. The Mesarovic-Pestel world model and show up in integrated models are basic human the U.N. world model have been used as analysis needs associated with population growth and tools by government decision-making bodies, but economic needs associated with growth and main- as marginal information inputs only, not as pri- tenance of economic systems. This expansion of mary tools of analysis. The absence of regular the model domain has marked effects on the clients is a serious constraint to the further results of analysis. The effects in terms of popu- development of global models. A fairly large lation and resources will be observed below, and portion of the human capital developed for the the general failure of even the expanded approach construction of global models is currently devoted to adequately incorporate environment will be to the search for funding to permit further devel- discussed. opment of existing models. Some global modelers have moved on to greener pastures. The difficulties encountered in adapting global Population and Basic Human Needs modeling to the political structure appear to be When population dynamics are introduced into inherent in the institutional structure of the politi- models of the global system, physical needs as cal decision-making process. The only people well as economic demands compet 'e for recogni- empowered to deal with global problems on an tion. If population's needs are not met, people integrated basis are highly placed and generally die, migrate, or alter their 'basic patterns of lack the time required to learn how to utilize economic behavior so that their needs can be inputs from global models. No agency has a filled (e.g., by substitution of one type of goods sufficiently broad mandate to justify commission- for another or by alteration of the system of ing and supporting a model with a broad inter- production). In other words, it becomes necessary agency focus. Existent interagency bodies are to observe system adjustment processes other already swamped with information and con- than that of the price mechanism. , strained in their actions by political necessities. The real-world linkages between need fulfill- Integrated modeling, if it is to make a positive ment and population behavior are tenuous. Mod- contribution to government, must build a style of elers approach them in various ways. In MOIRA operation that (1) simplifies information flows (Model of International Relations in Agriculture), (i.e., results in lighter work inflows through in- unfulfilled food needs are counted, and relative boxes, fewer meetings and telephone calls, and welfare between rural and urban locations is used more concise and compact discussion of the as a drive mechanism for the model's migration issues) and (2) receives the cooperation and polit- function. In the World 2 and 3 models and the ical support of the agencies whose independent Mesarovic-Pestel model, the extent of fulfillment jurisdictions operate together in the model. of economic and food needs effects birth and death rates. In some versions of the Mesarovic- Pestel model, nonfulfillment of needs results in Structure reduction of economic production. Need fulfill- Integrated global models tend to expand into ment is the heart of the Latin American world several broad questions the traditional question of model, and attention to human needs is the motive economics: How are scarce resources allocated for the model's adoption of an allocation mecha- 661 662 COMPARISON OF RESULTS nism in which capital and labor are allocated in gional representations of land constraints inter- the fashion that maximizes life expectancy at linked by trade are used for the Latin American birth. No feedback from need fulfillment to eco- world model and for the Mesarovic-Pestel model. nornic performance is'included in the U.N..world None of the other models attempts MOIRA's model; instead, apparent problem areas are iden- amount of detail, however, and the Latin Ameri- tified off-line and taken to indicate places where can model de-emphasizes the role of trade. The the model is unrealistic. land resource constraint indirectly affects the model's nonagricultural economy in both the Resources.and Economic Needs World 2 and 3 models and the Mesarovic-Pestel Many resource inputs, including land, water, model. When'the demand for food is high and minerals, energy, and renewable biological re- returns on investment low, the models divert sources are important in the global system. Any significant amounts of capital away from other of these could be locally, if not globally, limiting. economic sectors and invest it in agriculture. This How binding the limits posed by such resources often cramps economic growth outside the agri- become, depends on what substitutions are made, cultural sector. In the Mesarovic-Pestel model, how successfully limits are overcome by technol- this is particularly apt to occur in the South Asian ogy and how well growth is channeled into regional model. patterns that do not conflict with resource limits. Mesarovic-Pestel, the World 2 and 3 models, Only one of the -models in our study set does and the U.N. world model, all include mineral not include endogenous natural resource limits- and/or energy resources. In the U.N. model, the the U.N. world model. (It does, however, include representation is little more than an accounting labor and capital constraints in some of its modes device that tabulates resources used. The World of operation, and the capital constraint could models and the Mesarovic-Pestel model use for- become an implicit natural resource constraint if mulations wherein depletion of reserves slows the exogenous resource pricing function makes production, raises prices, and dampens the basic minerals and energy very expensive.) All of the processes of economic growth. The Mesarovic- other models include a land constraint-in each Pestel model includes multiple energy and re- case, a function formulated so as to make the source categories and makes substitution among costs of-expanding agricultural production rise as energy sources explicit by permitting the relative the system exhausts its supply of unused arable prices of substitutable resource groups to govern land. In all of the models examined, this constraint the direction of investment in resource develop- can potentially become a dominant feature of ment--4.e., investment goes to the energy type system- structure by constricting the expanse of showing the highest returns on investment. In agriculture and thus creating food deficits. The operation, energy deficits in the Mesarovic-Pestel models exhibit great difference in their formula- model generally come about because investment tions of where the land constraint manifests itself. in energy capital has not been rapid enough to In the World 2 and 3 models@ it is encountered as create supplies rather than because of actual a global aggregate, and the land's productive resource shortages. In the World 2 and 3 models, capacity has two-dimensions capable of constrain- extraction costs rise as the fraction of reserves ing food production: soil fertility and land under remaining gets very low. Cost rises feed back to cultivation. Because the other models considered slow economic growth. here use geographically disaggregated. land con- I The combination of finite, depletable and/or straints that recognize only land availability (i.e., erodable resource stocks and exponentially grow- they disregard soil fertility), -which puts the World ing economies and populations makes all the 2 and 3 models in the paradoxical position of global models considered here, with the exception using, 'simultaneously, the most complex, least of the U.N. world model, susceptible to economic detailed formulation of the land constraint. collapse. The collapse mode's persistence depends . MOIRA@l in comparison, is highly detailed and on how severe the modelers have made the conceptually simple. It includes 106 separate agri- resource constraints on growth. Where'the model cultural production functions. In each, the invest- has been parameterized with large amounts of ment in land within a given geopolitical region undeveloped arable land with low development leads to increased food production, subject to costs, then agricultural growth will proceed unhin- diminishing returns. Trade, through a market dered to 2000, and perhaps well beyond. Growth formulation, moves food from areas with less may also proceed unimpaired by resource con- heavily utilized land resources to areas with tight straints where energy and mineral sectors have land constraints. Simular formulations with re- been initialized as having large reserves, where THE COMPARISONS 663 sub stitution to an unlimited resource base is problems are likely to unfold, it makes more sense permitted in model formulations (as in the Mesa- to consider groups of similarly, behaving systems, rovic-Pestel model, in which the raw materials for such as industrial cities, grasslands, rice paddies, nuclear energy are presumed to be available in estuaries, and tropical rain forests, than to group unlimited supply, though at fairly high cost), or such units according to the national boundaries where technology has been empowered to in- within which they are found. crease production exponentially with no resource Usually the response to the suggestion that cost (as in some of the runs conducted by the environmental analysis should proceed through University of Sussex group on World 3).* Where aggregation of similar ecological systems is met such saving assumptions are not built into global by, "Yes, it's a nice idea, but we simply don't models, they almost invariably simulate economic have the data." But is the absence of data a collapse., binding constraint? Given good organization, a small amount of data can be made to go far. Environment Think, for instance, of all that an archeologist With the exception of the World 2 and 3 infers from a few jaw fragments. Or recall the models, which allow for both land degradation labors of the macro-economists in the 1930's when and biological destruction caused by pollution, National Accounts data were just beginning to be none of the models studied accounts for the collected. There should be a way to weld together (highly likely) possibility that human manipula- the fragments of ecological studies, satellite data, tions of physical systems will influence biological environmental monitoring data, climatological rec- systems in ways that affect economic, agricultural, ords, and soil studies currently available into a or population dynamics. Virtually all of the possi- plausible framework for study of the global envi- ble environmental problems discussed in the en- ronment-one that could be used to identify what vironmental forecast are thereby ignored. data ought to be collected in the future in order to The basic way in which information Is orga- provide better indices of environmental develop- nized in most models seems to preclude effective ments. environmental modeling. To date, the primary It is clear that the real world, with its high unit for collecting data is the nation. The focus of degree of interconnectedness and strong system most data collection is economic or demographic. interlinkages is not going to behave as the inde- However, increasing quantities of environmental pendently developed agency forecasts suggest. It data-sometimes in forms that are not aggregated is not clear, however, wherein the differences by political units-are coming to us through between the real world and the modeled world environmental monitoring and satellite scanning. will lie. In order to gain insight into this question, So long as global models are organized around the Global 2000 Study has commissioned use of the concepts implicit in older data sources, their the World 3 model (see Chapter 25) and the World treatment of environmental problems will remain Integrated Model . (the latter day version of the superficial. Ecological systems do not conform to Mesarovic-Pestel world model described in Chap- ter 26) to examine the effects of cutting system political boundaries. Attempting to keep track of ecological developments through use of national linkages on model simulation results. data bases makes only slightly more sense than attempting to perceive political relationships by The Government's Global Model vs. the arranging nations in alphabetical order--or at- World 3 Model tempting to understand chemical reactions by classifying chemicals by color rather than atomic The World 3 model consists of five interactive structure. sectors: population, capital, agriculture, nonre- Before modelers can build meaningful environ- newable resources, and persistent pollution.* In mental models capable of deriving realistic fore- the simulations undertaken for the Global 2000 casts for environmental problems such as deserti- Study, all linkages between sectors were broken fication, erosion, water management, forest and exogenous data inputs were substituted for management, and fisheries, it will be' necessary the information that had previously been passed for them to think of environmental problems in between sectors. Thus the model's intersectoral terms of aggregates of similarly functioning eco- linkages were changed from the highly interactive logical units. In understanding how environmental * For a full description of the sectors, see Dennis L. H. S. D. Cole, ed., Models of Doom, New York: Meadows et al., Dynamics of Growth in a Finite World, Universe Books, 1973, pp. 117-19. Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen Press, 1974. 664 COMPARISON OF RESULTS 7 71, Mode boundary 41 '4 N 0 o OPP Population rA Agriculture Capital en po u ion Persist t 11 t* Nonrenewable resources 4f. Model J Figure 31-1. World 3 model sector linkages before linkage breaking. 7 . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - -- Persistent Pollution Agricul r Ode/ 160 Capit X 0 Population Agricultur Capital tion Nonrenewable 41- resources Nonrene,,,,, d el Ory resources Z@ PO Pulotion e Ex no dr ve Figure 31-2. World 3 model after breaking of sectoral linkages and introduction of exogenous drives. THE COMPARISONS 665 TABLE 31-1 The results of open-loop simulations will be Exogenous Inputs and Assumptions in World 3 compared to these. In the open-loop simulation, Simulations for the Global 2000 Study population was driven by the exogenous data Input Assumption inputs for industrial output, service output, food, Industrial capital Continued exponential growth at 3.7 per- and pollution shown in Table 31-1. Thus driven, cent per year. population was transformed by the dynamics of Industrial output Same pattern as industrial capital (expo- the population sector from a fast-growing popula- nential growth at 3.7 percent per year). tion with a very high fertility and moderately high Service output Continuation'of historical trend, growth mortality to a slowly growing population with low at 3.0 percent per year. fertility and low mortality. Population did not Arable land Decreasing rate of increase until an equi- completely stabilize by 2100; however, it was librium figure of 27 billion hectares is reduced to about 13.5 billion-about 4 billion less reached by 2010.a than the 17.6 billion calculated for 2100 under the Food Growth of output at 2.0.percent per year assumption of a constant growth rate of 1.2 (historic rate). percent per year. On' the other hand, the resulting Population Exponential growth at historic rate of 1.2 population was higher by about 8.5 billion than percent per year, reaching 5.3 billion that of 2100 in the standard run of World 3. by 2000 and 17.6 billion by 2 100. 1 The marked differences in output result, of Pollution Level of persistent pollution held con- course, from mo Idel structure. Unlike simulations stant at zero value. with the fully linked model, the simulation from "T'his figure is unrealistically high, but in the context in which it is used its magnitude does not appear critical. the population sector with exogenous inputs was structure shown in Figure 31-1 to the exogenously not linked to industrial and agricultural structures programmed structure shown in Figure 31-2. The that collapse in the process of attempting to exogenous inputs used to drive the nonlinked maintain continued exponential growth in a con- version are specified in Table 31-1. text of finite land and mineral resources. Rather, As can be seen in Figure 31-3, in the open loop it is faced with input assumptions of continued simulation, several variables are exogenously fed material growth. into one sector of the model at the same time as It should be observed that while the differences they are endogenously calculated in another sec- between the closed-loop and open-loop forecasts tor. For example, population is exogenously fed have become acute by 2100, they are not greatly into the capital sector while it is endogenously noticeable by 2000. (Compare Figs. 31-4 and 31- calculated in the population s *ector. if this dual 5.) This suggests that on the basis of global appearance of variables is not noted, interpretation aggregates, the effects of system interlinkages on of the simulation outputs that appear in the population dynamics will notbe terribly significant following pages will become quite confusing. by 2000. The progress of exogenously driven variables over time is shown in Figure 31-3. The modelers Capital. In the open-loop simulation, the capital chose to extend the simulation period until 2100 sector was driven by the exogenous inputs for because marked difference. between the more and population, food, and arable land (Fig. 31-6). In less integrated model structures does not become addition, the fraction of capital allocated to obtain- fully visible until well into the 21st century. ing resources was held constant at 5 percent (the The arrangement created by the cutting of rate of investment observed in the World 3 model linkages is such that the exogenous inputs used in in times when there are no resource shortages), one unlinked sectoral forecast will be endoge- and the fraction of industrial output allocated to nously calculated in another. For example, the agriculture was held constant at 10 percent (the population estimates calculated in the population fraction allocated used in World 3 in "normal" sector are different from the population forecasts times, when the system is not straining against the fed into the capital sector. If this dual appearance limits of availability of agricultural land). of variables is not noted, interpretation of the Formulated in this fashion, the capital sector simulation outputs that appear in the following was freed from the resource constraints that cause pages will become quite confusing. its decline in the standard version of World 3. Results Decreasing returns on investment and declining food availability per capita do not shift investment Population. The results of the standard inte- away from the capital sector to the agricultural grated version of World 3 are shown in Figure sector as they do in the standard version, and 31-4. increasing cost for resource extraction do not cut 666 COMPARISON OF RESULTS U4 0 LQ U 4 rn (,1 4 rn @r Z) 00 N @n 4T N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I P4 I U 04 @4 W W I M 04 Ln cn Ln I- I-) Ln I a4 Ln'n La 04 a4 Lo. U C-4 rn -4 1@41 4 34 qM rn IN @4 04 Cn U @4 0 -4 @4 + I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a4 Q4 . I (n . . . . . Ew . . + + W 1@4 a4 U U4 0 ,4 .3,0 1 1 1 04 U) r-4 0 In q" a. a4 U) U 1. r-4 @0 In 1 04 @k 04 U1 U QL4 0 In @0 1* 04 0. V1 U r" @14 0 ,or- 1 1 04 04 04 1 V) W U1 r-4 r'- 1 0 0 N N Ia. 04 W (a rL. a. . 0 1 04 04 a4 a4 04 1 WXWWD4UU 0 0 0 a4 a. a4 a4 04 C., r.[.NWWWWMM qU U -4 -4 + L0 rn Q 0 In UQ (Al U1 Ca (a (n V) Ln U U U U 0 0 0 0 ++4 un M H 7% 1-4 N CN Figure 31-3. Exogenous inputs to different sectors of the World 3 model. Key to Figures 31-3 through 31-5 B = Birth rate L=Arable land in hectares C = Industrial capital 0=Industrial output in dollars D = Death rate P=Population (persons) F = Food per capita (vegetal equivalent) in kilograms R=Fraction of resource remaining ,per year* SService output in dollars per year I = Industrial output per capita in dollars XIndex of persistent pollution (dimensionless) Calculated by adding kilograms of vegetable food consumed plus 7 times the kilograms of animal food consumed (i.e., if one eats I kg of rice and I kg of beef, one has consumed the equivalent of I + 7 kg of vegetable food). NOTE to FIGURES 31-3 through 31-11 If the page is turned clockwise so that the letters in these figures can be read in their normal position, the numbers at the top (above the " 1900" axis) give the scale used for the variables plotted in the output. The variables associated with each scale are indicated to the right (in the direction of reading). the effective returns on investment in the capital the exogenous data inputs described in Table, 31- sector. Thus, industrial output per capita, instead 1. The last was held constant at q10 percent. With of growing until about 2020 and then declining as intersectoral linkages thus severed, the agricultural in the standard version of World 3, grows expo- sector gives a more optimistic forecast than in the nentially at a rate higher than that observed even standard run. Nevertheless, agricultural output during the growth phase of the standard run. continues to peak and crash--the difference being (Compare Figs. 31q-4 and 31q-6.). that the peak in food per capita is half again as high in the unlinked forecast as it is in the Agriculture. In the agriculture sector, linkages standard run, and the decline begins around 30 from industrial output, population, and the frac- years later. (Compare Figs. 31q-4 and 31q-7.) tion of output a4qf4qlocated to agriculture were cut Decline occurs in the unlinked forecasts for two (Fig. 31q-74q). The first two inputs were replaced by reasons: u 12.5 25 37.5 u 12.5 25 37.5 5U DE U b 16' 24 u 8 16 24 32 X U 4.UL+9 ' b.UL+9 1.2E+lU u 4.UE+9 8.UE+9 1.2E+lU 1.6E+lU P u 25U 5ou 75U 0 2bu 5ou 75U louu Fi 0 U.25 u.5 U.75 19UU X I P F- - - - - - D B - - - 19UU X IP - - - F - - - - - - - - D- x I P F D B x Ip F D x I P F D B x Ip F D x I P F D x I P F D x I P F D x I P F D x Ip F D x I P F D B x IP F D X I P- F B x IP F D x I P F D x ip F D B x IP F @D x I P F D b A IP F D 1950 X IP- -F- D - - - - - B 1950 -X- - IP- F - D- - - - - B x IP F D. .B X p F 1). . B x IP. F D :B X IP FD B x IP. FD B CL A p DF B to X P. D F B. x IP D B. x IP D F B V x IP D F. B 0 x P D F B E. x PD F B x P D F. x PD B R x DP F B x ri P F. B x L) PI F 2UUU X - - - D P FB R V, 2UUu x - - - - - D - P IF- -B- - - x D p FS R x D P FI B x D P BF R x D P FS I x D B F I S* X D Ib RF DIB P F. CD x D B P F I cm X x D. B P F I bb Fp 0 CD x D. B p F 0. 1 R-BDF P x D B p F < I R BX D P x D. B P F I R.F XB P D. .x D B P F. 0 1 1% FX B P D 2U5U I - R X- -BP - - - D- 2U5U X D -B - - - - - P -F- x D B P F I RX F PB D x L) B p F I XR F. P B D x 1) B p F. I X R F. P B D x D B P. IX R F. P 8 D x D B P. I XR F. P B D x D B p IXR F . P B D x D B P IXR F.P B D. x D B p x R F.P B D x D B p X R FP 6 D -21UU X D, B - - - - - - - - - P- .21UU IX- R -FP - - - - - - - b - - - D- 668 COMPARISON OF RESULTS A U3 1-11 1 1 1 =1 0- ,I + cN + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W LO 04 @A 'D + Ln I . . . . . . . . . H P1 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W N 1 1 04 04 1 1 04 04 OW a4 al a4 01 C, ID @D :D LO :> N Figure 31-6. Capital sector with exogenous inputs. Kev to Figures 31-6 through 31-8 F Food per capita (vegetal equivalent) in kilograms P Population (persons) per year X Index of persistent pollution (dimensionless) I Industrial output per capita in dollars * Calculated by adding kilograms of vegetable food consumed plus 7 times the kilograms of animal food consumed (i.e., if one cats I kg of rice and I kg of beef, one has consumed the equivalent of I + 7 kg of vegetable food). � Intensification of agricultural- production, partic- in mode of behavior: Food per capita peaked later ularly when it has been forced by dire food and at a higher plateau than in the previous shortages, leads in the World 3 agricultural unlinked run (compare Figs. 31-7 and 31-8), but it sector to insufficient rates of investment in soil still rose to a high level and declined. maintenance and thus decline of basic soil productive capacity. Nonrenewable Resources. In the unlinked ver- � The agricultural sector is faced with diminishing sion, the nonrenewable resource sector is driven returns on inputs and exponentially increasing by the exponentially growing population and in- costs on land development. Thus, it is unable to dustrial capital data inputs described in Table 31- expand production in pace with an exponentially 1. The linkage from nonrenewable resources to growing population. industrial production was preserved in this simu- The mechanisms involving soil deterioration are lation (Fig. 31-9) and the performance of industrial not included in the government's agricultural output per capita has been used as an index of model andbaw been deleted in a further run of system performance. Two variants of the isolated the unlinked agricultural sector to strengthen the nonrenewable resource sector were simulated: In analogy between the unlinked Worid 3 model and the first, which corresponds to the formulation the government forecasts (Fig. 31-8). The result used in the World 3 model, the marginal cost of was a change in timing and magnitude, though not resource extraction rises very- rapidly as the 8 16 24 32 X u 8 16 24 0 4. UE+9 8. UE+9 I 2E+lU 1.6E+10 P u 4 . OE+9 8 . OL+9 1 . 2E+lU 500 75U lUUU FI 0 25u 506 750 u 25U 1900 X I P - F - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1900 X I P - F - - - - - - - - - - - x I p F x I k? F x I 'P F x I p F x I p F, x I p F x I p F x I p F X I P F x I p F X, I p F x I p F x I P F x I p F X I P F x I- P F x I p F x I p F E; .1950 X -I- P @F - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1950 X -I- P - - - F - - - - - - - - - x I p F x I P F x IP F x IP F =r X IP. F x IP. F x IP F > ILO x IP F x p F. x p F. x P F EL x P F X Pi F x Pi F S, x pI F x p I F a x p I F x p I F 2UUU X - - - - - - P - I F - - - - - - - - 2uou x - - - - - - p - I F x p I F x p I F x p I F =r A p F x p I F x p IF x p F. x p FI. x p F I x p 2 x p F I x p F x P F x P F p F x p F x p F x p F. 205U X - - - - - - - - - - - - P- F 2U50 X - - - - - - - - - - - - PF - - - x P@ F x F p 5 x p F x F p x p F x F p x p F x F p x PF x F x F p x F x F p x F x F. x F x F x F X - - - - - - - - - - - - - F- - - - - - - 21UU X -F - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 670 COMPARISON OF RESULTS Figure 31-9. Renewable resource sector with exogenous inputs. Key to Figures 31-9 through 31-11 1 Industrial output per capita in dollars. R = Fraction of resources remaining P Population (persons) X = Index of persistent pollution (dimensionless) fraction of reserves remaining approaches zero. In shown in Table 31-1 were substituted for endoge- the second, marginal costs were held constant. nous inputs from other model sectors, the persist- Where increasing marginal costs were included, ent pollution sector was driven, not by forces that the influence of diminishing resource reserves and expanded and collapsed but by a series of expo- increasing extraction costs combine with exponen- nentially growing variables (Fig. 31-11). Conse- tial population growth to cause a sudden and quently, instead of growing and declining as in the percipitous decline in industrial output per capita. standard model run, the index of persistent pollu- Because population grows exponentially without tion grows exponentially to the point where by checks in the unlinked resource sector, per capita 2030 it is around three times as severe as it was at growth declines even faster than in the World 3 any time in the standard run; thereafter, it contin- standard run. (Contrast Figs. 31-4 and 31-9.) The ues to grow--a growth that would probably poi- assumption of constant marginal costs breaks the son the entire biosphere should it ever come to feedback that causes extraction to halt as reserves pass. are exhausted. The simulation under this assump- tion, therefore, shows unrestrained exponential Observations growth of industrial output per capita, despite the The sectorally disassembled version of the fact that resource reserves are not only totally World 3 model bears sufficient resemblance to the exhausted, but actually turn negative (Fig. 31-10). government's model that comparing it with the Persistent Pollution. The persistent pollution integrated version of World 3 may provide insight sector is driven by input indices of population, into how the government model might behave if it industrial output, food, arable land, and agricul- were integrated. However, the analogy is not tural inputs per hectare (assumed in this exercise tight. The government's model is regionally disag- to grow exponentially). When the growth rates gregated. World 3 is not. The government's model HE COMPARISONS 671 + 0 H 1 04 1 I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 + I a4 1P4 I'D P, 00 04 (n D P-4 a, 0. + In 1-41 a4 1-1 CI4 - a4 H M I a4 a@ 04 A4 a. a4 N a4 a4 a. 14 a. Z.) In Figure 31-10. Nonrenewable resource sector with exogenous inputs assuming constant marginal cost of the resource. Cq 0 :D 'n q --DI. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + a4 a4 a4 + C4 I x -j +CD I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Q4 x OD ChM +Ln I. . . . . . . . . a, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W" 04 C4 x C, I Ia4 a4 a4 a4 a4 04 04H 04 a4 N a4 a4 al @-i @-4 x x x xx x x x x x x x x X"X x I. . . . . . . . . :D CD Ln C.) Ln IN Figure 31-11. Persistent pollution sector with exogenous inputs. 672 COMPARISON OF RESULTS stresses energy, World 3 omits it. The govem- ing previously exogenous variables (i.e., closing of ment's model pprceives many of the mechanisms feedback loops through exogenous variables) or of economic growth in much less straightforward through including more -of the details of system terms than those shown in Worid 3. (For example, interaction between the variables endogenous few government analysts would agree to the within a model. Conversely, a model can be made specification that industrial output is simply the less integrated either by cutting internal feedbacks product of the capital output ratio and the indus- and replacing the formerly fed-back information trial capital stock.) The assumed schedule of with fed-in, exogenous information-as was done exogenous inputs (Table 31-1) doesn't entirely in the just described exercises using the World 3 coincide with present official expectations, and model-or by cutting out internal feedbacks in there are probably some strong but explicit as- such a way that former variables become con- sumptions about technological solutions and re- stants-as was done in the exercises with the source substitution in the government's model World Integrated Model. that do not figure in World 3. The internal linkages that were severed in the Keeping these differences in mind, however, less integrated version of the World Integrated the exercise suggests that the following conse- Model (WIM) include the following: quences might be expected, were the govern- ment's model to include some linkages such as In. the normal model version, energy deficits those specified in Worid 3: arising in the energy sector cause a drop in economic productivity in the economic sector. 1. Competition for available capital between In the less integrated version, there is no change maintenance and expansion of the agricultural in the economic sector when energy supplies sector, development of new energy reserves, and are insufficient (i.e., response is constant). investment in service and industrial sectors would In the normal version, mortality increases when lead to significant decreases in real GNP growth. available calories and/or protein are insufficient, Barring major technological advances, the pres- particularly in the oldest and youngest age ence of increasing costs (diminishing returns) for categories. In the less integrated version, mor- investment in minerals extraction and in agricul- tality is riot influenced by food availability. tural development will increase the amount of In the non-nal version, fertility patterns change economic activity needed for each unit of product with changes in income in such a way that, as a produced, thus causing a sort of resource-cost region's per capita income approaches those of modem industrialized countries, so will its pat- inflation. tem of fertility. In the less integrated version, 2. The rising food prices and regional food income has no effect on fertility distributions. shortages projected in the agricultural model - In the normal version, a region's capacity to Would be intensified by the fact that agriculture is import is constrained by its balance of pay- not the only sector wanting capital to cope with ments; thus, developing regions may find them- increasing population demands and diminishing selves unable to import food or machinery when returns. Land degradation caused by intense pres- they have accumulated sizable trade deficits. In sure on the land and by pollution would tend to the less integrated version, the ability to import make the projection of agricultural output more- is not constrained by the availability of foreign gloomy. exchange. .3. Slower GNP and agricultural growth could Figure 31-12 shows how the first three of these have marked effects on demographic processes. alterations fit into the model structure. The "nor- Death rates may rise because of starvation. Lack mal" version of the model used in these exercises of improvement in standards of living may prevent was not the most integrated version of the model people from choosing to have smaller families. that has been developed. There are versions of 4. Despite these indications of overly optimistic WIM that include feedback between starvation projections from the government's models, the and economic productivity thus (dotted line in possible transition into decline will not take place Fig.31-12), building into the model the vicious for a decade or two after the year 2000. cycle wherein destitution reduces a region's ca- pacity to improve its lot. In other versions of The Government's Global Model vs. the WIM, environmental degradation may adversely World Integrated Model effect agricultural production and economic growth and increase mortality. Both of these A model can become more integrated, either channels of influence have been omitted from the through integration of the mechanisms determin- version of the model used in these exercises due N, Population Food Deaths Births demand. Energy price 100e Economic output per capita per capita Investment --i Energy in x Food % Labor @W-demcmd energy pIrice force % 100, 101, > Agricultural output Economic Energy Energy tPut shortage Reserves capita I 0 Investment 4 W JEnergy- Agricultural Capital ion production development !2 J f 04,00, at, d J k", Cho-els, a rq*a*1 1,61F I" ireff A C VIA -,,a f inflyorl" Figure 31-12.: Major linkages in the World Integrated Model with designation of linka integration ges broken in model experiment. Trade linkages@and broken feedback from balance of payments to ability to import-not shown. @A 101- 674 COMPARISON OF RESULTS to the difficulty' of substantiating them with precise outputs, a 25-year simulation is sufficient to pro- quantitative information. duce sizable differences between the more and It should be noted that in most cases considered less integrated versions of the model. Differences in this'exercise, the omission of a linkage isprima are even more significant on a regional basis, for facie, an optimistic act. It is a roseate depiction of some regions are at the present time quite sensi- the world that assumes energy deficits will not tively balanced and can be brought into markedly slow economic growth, food deficits won't cause different states over a relatively short period by starvation, starvation won't harm economic prog- altering the structure of the system pressures that ress, shortages of foreign exchange won't stifle control their development. growth in the less developed countries, and abuse of the environment won't adversely effect agricul- Results tural production and human health. The only way The outcomes of@ the less integrated version of that cutting linkages has removed optimism is in the model were generally comparable to the severing the tendency of increased income to lead government forecasts prepared for the Global 2000 to decreased family sizes. Naive though they Study. In the Study's forecasts, global economic seem, these assumptions are implicit in most production had grown to 17.4, 14 7, and 12.4 nonintegrated gl Iobal models-including the gov- trillion dollars by the year 2000 in, *respectively, ernment's. the high, medium, and low forecasts. In the less For fiirthercontrast of results, other versions of integrated WIM, the equivalent figure for 2000 the "normal," more integrated model were devel- was'14.8 trillion dollars. In the Global 2000 Study oped using less optimistic assumptions about (1) population forecasts made by the Bureau of the the growth of fossil fuel supplies, (2) the growth Census high, medium, and low population esti- of agricultural production, and (3) the amount of mates for 2000 were, respectively, 6.8, 6.4, and capital made available to the LDCs by the indus- 5.9 billion. The less integrated WIM calculated 6.2 trialized nations. In the optimistic normal case, it billion for 2000. In the Study's agricultural fore- was assumed that annual global oil discoveries casts made by the U.S. Department of Agricul- would grow above the base of the early 1970 .s ture, world grain production grows from 1,109 until the early 1990s and reach a peak approxi- mmt (million metric tons) in the 1969-1971 base ,mately 50 percent higher than the annual discov- year to 2,175 mint in 2000, an increase of 96 eries of the early 1970s-an optimistic forecast percent. In the less integrated model simulation, when contrasted to the forecasts made by the using a somewhat different scheme for measuring Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies and grain production, world grain production is calcu- the World Energy Conference, both of which lated to grow from 1,278 mint in 1975 to 2,647 in projected near stable annual discoveries of oil 2000, an increase of 107 percent. In conjunction resources. In the pessimistic version (which many with these gains in output, the less integrated would still call optimistic) it was assumed that the WIM calculates an increase of fertilizer use from discovery rate would not increase'above that of 88.6 to 227 mint by the year 2000; correspond- the early 1970s. In another pessimistic run, it was ingly, the Department of Agriculture forecasts assumed that agricultural yields would be reduced project an increase from 80 to 199 mmt. The less roughly 20 percent on an average by the year integrated WIM's energy projection-with global 2000-a change that the modelers considered energy consumption in 2000 standing at 94.5 might be anticipated if the worid is confronted billion barrels of oil equivalent per year (about 550 with significant changes in global climate and/or quadrillion Btu) is consistent with projections serious ecological disturbances. In a third test, the made by the World Energy Conference and with amount of capital transfered from industrialized those of the Workshop on Alternative Energy countries to LDCs was reduced to an extent Strategies. Comparison with the Global 2000 where the LDCs wouldriot accumulate unreason- Study estimate is not possible as the Department ably'large (over 50 percent of GDP) foreign debts, of Energy has provided estimates only for the and, in a final test, all three pessimistic hypotheses years 1985 and 1990. were introduced simultaneously. Here, only the combined-problems version of the more pessimis- More Integrated WIM. The outcomes of simu- tic runs will be considered. It will be referred to lations using the normal, more integrated version as the integrated-pessimistic version. of the WIM were less sanguine than those of the In most of the simulations performed for this less integrated version. The aggregate global eco- study, the model was run only to the year 2000. nomic product was 21 percent lower than that of As will be evident in the material showing model the less integrated version: $11.7 billion instead of THE COMPARISONS '675 $14.8 -billion. Economic growth was fastest in the grain-fed, increased by .57 percent over the 25 earlier years of the simulation and slowed consid- year simulation * I : erable, after 1990 when the energy situation began In the. test in which all three pessimistic as- to put a serious drag on economic growth. Popu- sumptions were included in the more integrated lation grew to only 5.9 billion in 2000, as con- model, outcomes were considerably worse than in trasted to 6.2 billion in the less integrated ver- the optimistic-integrated or less integrated simula- sions. Part of the lower growth was due to tions. Aggregate global income reached only 10.4 starvation (a cumulative total of 158 million star- trillion dollars by 2000, and cumulative starvation vation deaths were projected by 2000). Another deaths totaled.291 Million people. World grain part was due to lower fertility rates brought about production reached only 2,032 mmt in 'stead of by increasing incomes in those areas where eco- 2,367 in the optimistic-integrated version and 2,647 nomic growth surpassed population growth over in the less.integrated case. The year 2000 world the simulation period. Instead of the 107 percent grain price reached $415 per metric ton, as op- increase in agricultural production projected in the posed to $245 in the optimistic-integrated and $240 less integrated WIM, the integrated . version in the less integrated version. The,three simula- showed only an 85 percent increase. This led, tions can be compared (Figs. 31-13 and 31-14). however, to an increase of less than 85 percent in the grain available,for human consumption due to Extension of Time Horizon. In World 3 signifi- the fact that global meat production, much of it cant change in the model's mode of behavior does -'k 7 6 model 1. Less integrated 2. Optimistic-integrated version 3. Pessimistic-integrated version 4 3 j@ 1975 19 7- JP C Figure 31-13. Global population projections for three versions of the World Intergrated Model. 676 COMPARISON OF RESULTS not set in until after the year 2000. Many demo- grated versions of the' model are operating: in'@ a graphic changes have much stronger &&ts in the continued growth mode; while the pessirriis'tic- second generation than in the first. Growth rates integrated version appears to :have'slackened its on the order of 1-5 percent a year, with'doubling rate of economic growth to the point where per times of 70 to 14 years-as experienced for the capita income will begin to decline. population and economic growth rates in Most Regional Differences. The .'12 regions consid- long-term models-will lead to significantly differ- ered in the World , Integrated Model begin with ent balances and disturbances of balance after 50 differing initial conditions, which leave,.ihem bal- years than after 2.5, years. Thus, it can be expected anced in states that. .vary in their ability to that the differences between the pessimistic-inte- withstand stress. Thus, different regions undergo grated, optim i stic -integrated and less integrated different patterns in the .ir internal readju.stment to versions, of the @ World Integrated Model will system stresse's as simulations progress over time. become much more acute.if the model's time For example, regions such as'South Asia,,where .horizon is extended. large and. fast growing human. needs are coupled This proves indeed to be the case'. As can be with poor endowments of economic or natural seen in Figures 31-13 and 31-14, differences in resources required to fill human needs, are likely global GNP and population in the year 2000 to undergo more stress than regions such ,as North appear small by contrast to those of the year America, which still have untapped resources and 2025. Moreover, by 2025 it begins to look as whose rates of population growth are relatively though the less integrated and optimistic-inte- slow. Thus, they are more likely to experience 30 '.00 1. Less integrated model 2. Optimistic-integrated version 3. Pessimistic-integrated version 2 20 15 -0.0 TO 1075 100 N 3, Rp -M A 4 T Figure 31-14. Global GNP projections for three versions of the World Integrated Model. THE COMPARISONS. 677 declines of previously growing variables and real- tions. As may be seen for GNP per capita by locations of economic resources., comparing Figures 31-15, 31-16, and 31-17, the . Much.of what has been termed "stress" in the three model versions behave similarly for North preceding paragraph is,.in abstract terms, infor- America, while producing wide divergence in mation passed through the feedback loops that behavior for Latin America and South Asia. In integrate the World Integrated Model. It follows, the less integrated version,.Latin American GNP then, that differences between the more and less grew faster than did that of North America, integrated versions of the model (i.e., versions though differences in population growth rates with moreand less feedback) would be greater for caused incomes in Latin America capita to grow regions under severe stress and that the more more slowly than those in North America. stressful pe ss imi stic -integrated version of the The model's behavior does not entirely corre- model would show' more signs of basic shifts in spond to ourreasoned expectations, however. In model balance'than would the optimistic-irite- the South Asian region, GNP per capita in 2000 is grated version. higher in the pessimistic-integrated case than it This inference is confirmed by model simula- does in the optimistic-integrated case.. This ap- N, Na 4 Y@g -0, 4 TKO 1. Less in ed model 2. Optimistic-integrated version 3. Pessimistic-integroted version 2- 10 z 6. 00e, 31 IZ17 _J 'hf i__@ @_%k W- 03@ !%Va, 4 Figure 31-15. Projections of North American GNP per capita for three versions of the World Integrated Model. 678 COMPARISON OF RESULTS G 1. Less integrated model 2. Optimistic-integrated version 3. Pessimistic-integrated version @,J -_ q@ S y@ ,a Figure 31-16. Projections of Latin American GNP per capita for three versions of the World Integrated Model. THE COMPARISONS 679 A V -X ILess integrated model -2. Optimistic-integrated version 3. Pessimistic-integrated version A. Pessimistic-integrated version without starvation iffi, 0 3- 0 q Figure 31-17. Projections of South Asian GNP per capita for four versions of the World Integrated Model. pears to happen because starvation becomes so tiOn imposed on government forecasts by the lack powerful in reducing population that income per of integration in the methodology by which they capita, begins to rise. In the pessimistic-integrated are produced? The.question is not easily an- WIM, cumulative starvation has reached a value swered. Before it can be approached, a decision that amounts to about 20 percent of the living must be made.as to how much one is to believe population by the year 2000 (Fig. 31-18). the outputs of the World Integrated Model. (The apparent gain in average income per capita Should one take seriously the differences in timing brought about by starvation need not be taken as and magnitude in the spurts of growth and reces- indicative of the way the real system is likely to sion brought about by different formulations of behave. It may well be an aberration of the the model in Figure 31-11? Should it be taken model's structure. Had the linkage by which seriously that China and the Middle East are starvation conditions detract from economic pro- relatively unaffected by differences in model for- ductivity been included into the model's structure, mulation while Eastern Europe and South Asia it is quite likely that the pe ssim i stic -integrated are quite sensitive? Should we believe the esti- simulation would have ended with far lower mated magnitudes-for example, should the esti- income per capita in Figure 31-17 than did its mates for starvation be taken literally? optimistic counterpart. Here, clearly, the model's Behind these questions lie other, more impor- conceptual structure is more than the parameteri- tant questions: Do the linkages in the model zation that shapes its behavioral tendencies.) correspond sufficiently well tq1those in the 'real Observations world to make the model credible? Are important linkages, such as.the linkage that causes economic What can be inferred from the experimentation deterioration under famine conditions omitted with the World Integrated Model about the distor- even from the more integrated version of the 680 COMPARISON OF RESULTS X 1. Pessimisfic-integroted version 3 2. Optimistic-integrated versi n 1"5 V � @,44 Yl, Now Sf 2- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Figure 31-18. Projections of South Asian cumulative tarvation as a percentage of population for two'versions of the World Integrated Model. model? Do the specified linkages exaggerate or population growth. A value difference of 50 per- understate the importance of interconnections? cent for regional income (GNP) for 2000 is not Will the real world follow the rules written into uncommon among different model structures, the model's structure when it has to choose while differences of 20 percent would be extreme between agriculture, energy, and other sectors in for population. This stands to reason. Human allocating scarce capital resources? (Investment reproductive patterns are biologically constrained; functions are uncertain ground in modem econom- within a culture, they can be expected to change ics. No formula has been found that can explain over the course of generations, whereas economic observed long-term investment behavior with patterns appear to be relatively vulnerable to good statistical results.) Will energy shortages short-term perturbations. curtail economic production in the fashion that the 2. The effects of breaking linkages depend on model describes? Will they have more or fewer the linkages that are broken. In this exercise, the lasting effects? More or fewer severe effects? Will broken linkages involve trade, human birth and the fuel type substitutions described in* the model death rates, and the effect of energy shortages on be possible? economic growth. Consequently, the regions most If the questioning becomes too insistent, the affected were those modeled as deficient in energy model-and most other social system models with supplies, as dependent on foreign trade for eco- it-retreats behind a thick hedge of debatable nomic development, or as operating at levels of assumptions. The response to most of the ques- income where differences in income can be ex- tions asked can only be "I don't know." pected to have relatively large influences on rates Despite the uncertainty surrounding specific of childbearing and mortality. Had another set of findings from experiments investigating the effects linkages been broken-'for example, had the level of eliminating linkages in the World Integrated of investment in agriculture not been responsive Model, a few generalizations can be made: to the price of food-linkage breaking would have 1. With a 25-year simulation interval, economic had different effects with different geographical growth is more subject to alteration of its simu- distributions. lated behavior through addition of linkages than is 3. It is everv bit as arbitraty to omit linkages- THE COMPARIsONS 681 and, thereby, implicitly assume that they have no period and may become paramount over a 50-year effect on system behavior-as it is to include span. Error is likely to be greater for regional linkages of which one is unsure. There are, for forecasts than for the global aggregate. example, many valid guesses about the effect of Experiments with both the World 3 and the energy deficits on economic growth. "No effect" World Integrated Model suggest that omissions of is one of the least likely outcomes in the set, but linkages has made the government's forecasts by default it seems to be the most commonly overly optimistic. The experiments with the World made assumption. While the art of global model- Integrated Model suggest. that the collective GNP ing is still at a stage where one must take the forecasts for the year 2000 derived on a noninte- output of an integrated model with a great deal of grated basis for the Global 2000 Study might have skepticism, understanding of system linkages has been 15-20 percent lower if a more integrated progressed to the state where one must be even model specification had been used.. For some more skeptical of models that do not consider the regions the extent of overestimation may have probable effects of system interactions on long- been well over 50 percent. term system behavior. However- the problem is not a simple question Of integrate@ vs., nonintegrated models. The man- Conclusions ner in which 'models are integrated is critical. Markedly different results could have been de- Exercises cutting feedback within integrated rived from both the World 3 Model and the World world models reveal that the omission of system Integrated Model if different linkages had been linkages greatly influences the results of forecasts, included in the.original models, orAf different which suggests that the Government's Global linkages had been severed in the experiments Model, in that it leaves out important system performed with model closure. It is therefore feedbacks, is presenting a distorted picture of the important that various schemes of model integra- probable future. The predictive error incurred by tion 'be used in analyses of global problems and omissions of feedback is cumulative over time: in that the schemes used are documented and main- most cases it is not highly significant over a 5- tained in a fashion that makes them available for year period but becomes important in a 20-year criticism---and improvement. APPENDIXES Appendix A Ussons from the Past* A survey of some of the commissions, studies, and task forces of the past 70 years whose experiences might be helpful to those now attempting to provide methods and instructions in support of decision-making for international efforts in population, resources, and the environment. Introduction committees, commissions, and boards have flow- A study of the world's population, natural ered and wilted from time to time. For the most part, this futures work covered the nation's natu- resources, and environment, made at this Junc- ral resources and materials and produced results ture, must be viewed in historical perspective. If that have proved helpful in some measure. Rarely, the study is to serve as a foundation for the however, did such groups consider global poten- nation's longer-term planning, as directed by the tials and problems, and then only superficially. President, it must take cognizance of the similar Over the years, government has tended to wait major efforts that have gone before and consider until crises occur and then has reacted to them- their strengths and weaknesses. Experiences of the pa .st have much to teach us about what rather than study and analyze issues bef@rehand. arrangements will and will not lead to quality On those occasions when groups have addressed problems with an eye to the future, a President- analysis, decisions, and actions addressed to im- and others who initiate such studies-have seldom portant long-term issues. This appendix will sustained the original level of interest, although briefly examine studies, commissions, and institu- much valuable data has been developed, alterna- tional efforts conducted during this century on tive choices have been explored, and options have population, natural resources, environment, and been presented in the form of recommendations. related subjects to see what lessons can be learned In most cases, suggestions, or recommendations from these experiences that, might be applicable have been made for the formation of an institution today. Commissions reviewed in this appendix to carry on the work of looking at future prob- have incommon high-level governmental connec- lems, but none of the recommendations has led to tions and include for the most part presidentially establishing a -permanent group. Thus decision- appointed or designated groups looking into na- makers and the public have never had the benefits tional and international issues concerned with population, natural r .esour'ces, or the environment. that would accrue if a long-range study group at a high level of government, free from pressures for There has never been an organized, continuing immediate results, had been in existence. to offer effort inthe federal governmentto take a-holistic alternatives that might help avert or-solve future approach toward consideration of probable difficulties. changes in population, natural. resources, and the environment. Yet a number of attempts to tackle parts of the problem have been undertaken during the last 70 years. Starting with the second Theo- Historical Perspective, 1908-1%7 dore Roosevelt Administration, continuing through 10 years of Franklin D. Roosevelt's - Administra- The Theodore Roosevelt Administration tion, and during the 25 years from Truman to Wational Conservation Commission (1908). Ford, temporary. presidential and congressional Even as far back as the first decade of the 20th century, when. natural resources seemed virtually *As noted in, the acknowledgments, this appendix 'is the inexhaustible, a few conscientious conservation- commissioned work of Robert Cahn and Patricia' L. Cahn. ists were looking into the future to a time of The opinions expressed are those of the authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the participating agencies or their scarcities and shortages. "The Nation is in the representatives. position of a man, who, bequeathed a fortune, has 685 686 APPENDIX gone on spending it recklessly, never taking the Hague for the purpose of considering the conser- trouble to ask the amount of his inheritance, or vation of the natural resources of the entire globe. how, long it is likely to last." That picture, Efforts to institutionalize concern for preservation probably overly grim for its time, was painted at of natural resources faded, however, after William the initial meeting in 1908 of the executive com- Howard Taft became President in March 1909, mittee of the newly appointed National Conserva- and the international conference was never held. tion Commission. The group promptly agreed to The intense congressional opposition accorded have a study made to estimate the existing avail- these efforts resulted not so much from objections able natural resources, the proportion that had to the subject matter as from reaction to what the already been used or exhausted, the rate of legislators regarded as the President's attempt to increase in their consumption, and the length of bypass Congress by appointing too many presi- time these resources would last if the present rate dential commissions. The opposition prevented of use was to continue. Thus began the first the National Conservation - Commission and its national inventory of natural resources. - inventory of resources from becoming a congres- President Theodore Roosevelt created the Com- sionally mandated effort. Gifford Pinchot, whom mission as an outgrowth of the May 1908 White Roosevelt had appointed.as head of the National House Conference on Natural Resources. He Conservation Commission, did keep the Commisr appointed 49 members, with about equal represen- sion alive, but without President Taft's approval .tation among scientists, industry leaders, and and at his own expense, and the Commission public officials, but when the President requested evolved into a kind of private.lobby for conserva- funds of Congress to carTy out the inventory, the tion. Senate voted down the bill. Nevertheless, by presidential order Roosevelt directed the heads of The Hoover Administration several bureaus to make investigations as re- quested by the Commission in the areas of min- President's Research Committee on Social erals, water resources, forests, and soils. Trends (1929). The first organized effort in the The full Commission met on December 1, 1908, area of social reporting was made in the-autumn to hear the reports of experts, which were later of 1929, when President Herbert Hoover ap- transmitted to the President in three volumes. pointed a President's Research Committee on This first inventory of the nation's natural re- Social Trends. The six-member committee, sources was "but an approximation to the truth," chaired by Wesley C. Mitchell, included Charles wrote resource expert Charles Richard Van Hise E. Merriam (who, with Mitchell, was to become a in 1911. "But it is an immense advance over member of Franklin D. Roosevelt's original three- guesses as the natural wealth of the nation ... man National Planning Board) and William ' F. [and] furnishes a basis for quantitative and there- Ogburn, who was designated director of research. fore scientific discussion of the future of our The Committee was called upon "to examine and resources." The Commission's report was pub- report upon recent social trends in the United lished as a Senate document in a limited edition. States with a view to providing such a review as (The Commission's recommendation for a popular might supply a basis for the formulation of large edition had been turned down by the House national policies looking to the next phase in the Committee on Printing.) Nation's development." The Committee issued Before leaving office, President Theodore Roo- annual reports, under the editorship of Ogburn, sevelt sought to broaden interest in the conserva- for five years-until the end of the Hoover tion of resources beyond U.S. boundaries. He Administration in 1933. invited the governors of Canada and Newfound- Ogburn then published a book, Recent Social land and the President of Mexico to appoint Trends, comprising a report by the Committee, to Natural Resource Commissioners and send repre- which a group of papers by experts had been sentatives to a meeting with his National Conser- added. In a Foreword, dated October 1932, Hoo- vation Commission. At this first North American ver wrote: "It should serve. to help all of us to see Conservation Conference, held in Washington, where social stresses are occurring and where D.C., in February 1909, a Declaration of Princi- major efforts should be undertaken to deal with ples was issued@ and the founding of permanent them constructively." The Committee claimed conservation commissions in each country was that the importance, of their reports and of the recommended. ' book was in the effort to interrelate the disjointed In a separate action, President Roosevelt re- factors and elements in the social life of America quested all the world powers to meet at The and to view the situation as a whole. LESSONS FROM THE PAST 687 Many government organizations and private scientist Charles Merriam and economist Wesley citizens contributed to the study, but the work Mitchell. The following year, when Congress.by received its major funding from the Rockefeller joint resolution asked the President for a compre- Foundation. The book did not take up war, peace, hensive plan for the development of the nation's or foreign policy, nor did it mention the economic rivers, Roosevelt, sought to make the Planning situation that was developing into the Great Board a part of the White House and to give it Depression, and there was no chapter devoted to the lead role in the river-planning project. Ickes, social science research itself. The topics discussed aided by.other Cabinet officers, fought the Presi- were population, utilization of natural wealth, the dent's idea, and a compromise resulted in the so- influence of invention and discovery, communica- called National Resources Board, its six Cabinet tion, shifting occupational patterns, the rise of officers under Ickes, as Chairman, outnumbering metropolitan communities, the status of racial and the three members of the former Planning Board. ethnic groups, the family and its functions, the In December 1934, the new Board produced an activity of women outside the home, childhood' extensive report. Its almost 500 pages, the Board and youth, the people as consumers, health and claimed, "brings together for the first time -in our medical practice, public welfare activities, and history, exhaustive studies by highly competent government and society. inquirers of land use, water use, minerals, and In a- 1969 article, social scientist Daniel Bell, related public works in their relation to each other harking@back to Recent Social Trends, com- and to national planning." The report addressed mented on the report's chapter on medicine, itself to such problems as "Maladjustments in which dealt with the rise of specialized medical Land Use and in the'Relation of Our Population practice, the divergence between research and to Land, and Proposed Lines of Action." It also general practice, and the consequences of geo- included an inventory of water resources, a dis- graphical concentration. If the signposts in that cussion of policies for their use and control, chapter had been heeded, he wrote, they "would recommendations for a national mineral policy have gone far to avert the present crisis in the and a discussion of its international aspects. delivery of health care." Bell also claimed that the The December 1934 report to the President chapter on metropolitan communities was an pointed to the significance of the recommenda- accurate foreshadowing of postwar suburban problems. tions. from the two technical committees that had assisted in preparing the report-one on land-use The Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration planning and one on water planning. Both com- National Planning Board; National I Resources mittees recommended the need for a permanent Board; National Resources Planning Board 1933- planning organization, The report repeated a rec- 43. For the first 10 years of Franklin D. Roose- ommendation of the former Planning Board that a velt's Presidency, the availability of natural re- permanent national planning agency be estab- lished. In'defense of planning, the report stated: sources to meet future needs for at least six years ahead was a primary consideration of the National It is not necessary or desirable that a central Resources Planning Board and its two predecessor system of planning actually cover all lines. of organizations. Two special commitments of the activity or forms of behavior. Such planning President-conservation of natural resources and overreaches itself. Over-centralized planning must government planning to achieve social goals- soon begin to plan its Own decentralization, for were linked in Roosevelt's use of this Board. good management is local self-government under The effort started in 1933 when a National a central supervision. Thus wise planning provides Planning, Board was established under Interior for the encouragement of local and personal Secretary Harold Ickes' Public Works Administra- initiative. tion to coordinate the planning of public works Bills to institutionalize a national planning projects. The President's uncle, Frederick De- lano,* was a Board member along with political agency were defeated in Congress during-the next four years, with opposition coming fTom antiplan- ?I Delano had been chairman of a privately funded citizens ners in Congress, &om. within the Administration study of the Joint Committee on Bases of Sound Land (notably the, Army Corps of Engineers, the Forest Policy, which in 1929 issued a 168-page report What About Service, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the the Year 2000? This was an economic summary of answers Bureau of Reclamation),. and from a powerful to the questions: "Will our land area in the United States meet the demands of our future population?" and "How lobbying group known as the Rivers and Harbors are we to determine the best use of our land resources?" Congress. 688 APPENDIX Finally, in 1939, after Roosevelt had succeeded ning into other futures efforts and subjects that in getting his executive reorganization plan had largely been neglected.* through Congress and establishing an Executive Part of the Roosevelt boards' poor relations :Office of the President (without the planning with Congress. derived from the members' belief agen cy, of which Congress unrelentingly disap- that as a staff arm of the President they should proved); he reconstituted his planning group into not develop close relationships with Congress. the National Resources Planning Board and The National Resources Planning Board gave little placed it in his Executive Office by presidential encouragement to members of Congress who were order. Although this action was unpopular with sympathetic, and its work (some Congressmen Congress, Roosevelt used his personal influence thought) enhanced the power of the Presidency' to get about $1 million a year appropriated for the unduly and contributed to loss. of power by goar@d's activities. Congress. From 1934 to 1939, Delano, -Merriam, and The Truman, Administration Mitchell had continued to serve as a planning board and as planning advisers to the President. President's Materials Policy Commission (1951). As members of the revised National Resources After the high rate of consumption of natural Planning Board, the three established a number of resources, especially minerals, during World War technical committees and a field organization. By 11, potential scarcities of industrial materials 1043 t 'he Board had 150, full-time Washington threatened the nation. Then the Korean War employees, 72 field employees, and 35 per them caused prices of materials to rise sharply, and the consultants, As its staff proliferated, however, it fact that - the nation's resources strength was lost much of the influence it had gained as a indeed limited.became increasingly recognized. coordinating body and became merely one agency On the recommendation of W. Stuart Symington, @among many. It met formally with the President then chairman of the National Security Resources More than 50 times, and held many informal Board, President Harry S. Truman created the meetings for discussion of long-range problems. President's Materials Policy Commission in Janu- Its proposals, however, did not ordinarily include ary 1951. He charged the new Commission to detailed recommendations 'for implementation, ."make an objective enquiry into all major aspects and the Board did not strive for action. In 1939, of the problem of assuring an adequate supply of when World War 11 began, the Board shifted its production materials for our long-range needs and priority to postwar planning. After the 1940 elec- to make recommendations which will assist me@ in tion, President Roosevelt instructed the Board "to formulating a comprehensive policy on such ma- -collect, analyze, and collate all constructive plans terials." In a letter to Commission Chairman for significant public and private action in the William S. Paley (Columbia Broadcasting System post-defense period insofar as these have to do Board Chairman), President Truman wrote: "We with the natural and human resources of the cannot allow shortages of materials to jeopardize Nation. our national security nor to become a bottleneck Although Roosevelt had been the Board's chief to our econo, 'mic expansion." (and sometimes its only) power base, he finally When the President called Mr. Paley and the became resigned to the fact that it could not be four other members of the blue-ribbon citizen permanently established and in 1943 signed an Commission to his office late in January 1951, he appropriations bill directing that the National included in his directions the need to make their Resources Planning Board be abolished and that study international in scope and to consider the its functions not be transferred to any other needs and resources of friendly nations. The 18- a _y. genc month study was the most comprehensive of its During the 10 years of their existence, the Board and its predecessors issued numerous re- Significant titles include: Economics of Planning of Public search publications, including extensive data col- Works; Human Resources; Trends in Urban Government; Rural Zoning; Our Cities, Their Role in the National lections and studies of many national problems. Economy; Technology and Planning; Consumer Incomes; They conducted statistical and analytical studies Problems of a Changing Population; A Plan for New on subjects such as river basin development and England Airports; Urban Planning and Land Policies; frequently aided some federal agencies in getting Housing Progress and Problems; War-Time Planning in their ideas up to the President. More than' 300 'Germany; Rates and Rate Structure; Transportation Coor- dination; Railroad Financing; After Defense-What?; The publications reveal how ' Roosevelt's boards had Future of Transportation; The Framework of an Economy expanded from natural resource studies and plan- of Plenty; and Post-War Problems of the Aircraft Industry. LESSONS FROM THE PAST 689 type ever done. Seven Cabinet departments and branches of government and be an advisory body 25 federal agencies or conin issions made I special located in the Executive Office of the President, investigations, loaned personnel, and gave con- framing recommendations for"long-range policy sulting help. Research assistance was 'provided by (as much as 25 years ahead). The Commission 20 universities, as well as by experts from more somewhat perfunctorily recommended as a possi- than 40 industries, the International Materials ble solution that the existing National Security Conference, the International Bank for Recon- Resources Board (NSRB) in the Executive Office struction and Development, and,the International of the President serve this function. The NSRB Monetary Fund. could, if given funds and authority, collect in one The resulting 5-volume report, Resources for place the facts, analyses and program plans of Freedom, published in June 1952, contained some other agencies on materials and energy, problems. far-reaching recommendations, but it did not cre- The Board could also evaluate materials programs ate any great public -splash, nor did it have an and policies "in all these fields; it could recommend immediate effect on national policy. It was, how- appropriate action for the guidance of the Presi- ever, the' first major study to perceive the re- dent, the Congress, and the Executive agencies, sources situation as a problem not of absolute and report annually to the President on the long- shortages but of dealing with rising "real costs," term outlook for materials, with emphasis on which would be at least as pernicious than short- significant - new problems, major changes in out- ages. In' retrospect, it is easy to see that the look,'and necessary modifications of policy or Commission neglected several areas now per- program. The Paley Commission suggested that to ceived as vital, such as population trends and the fullest extent consistent with national security, environmental factors relating to the new techno- the annual reports should be made public. logical developments that the Commission 'as- The Paley Commission report reached President sumed would alleviate many future shortage pkob- Truman in June 1952. By then the resources lems. While the report emphasized the danger of scarcity issue had lost its political priority and increased U.S. dependence on foreign sources of failed to arouse public's concern. Truman took raw materials, it saw as the main problem the the logical step of directing the NSRB to review technical difficulties of obtaining materials fiom the report and its recommendations and 'to advise less developed countries without first considering him of follow-up actions deemed appropriate. He the trade or political factors that might'block wrote to NSRB Chairman Jack Gorrie -on July 9, access to the resources. 1952, asking the Security Resources Board to The Commission's inventory of resources, its studies, and its projections for the ensuing 25 initiate a continuing review of materials (including years were extremely valuable, and a number of energy) policies. and programs within the execu- tive branch, along the lines recomme nded by the its recommendations were prescient'. In projecting Commission, and report annually to the President materials availability a quarter of a century ahead, on the progress of materials programs and policies it proved remarkably accurate several areas. and the long-term outlook for materials,,with The Commission recomme nded that the nation emphasis on significant new programs. should have "a comprehensive. energy policy and program which embraces, all the 'narrower and The NSRB had been established within the more specific policies and programs relating to Executive Office of the President under the Na- each type of energy and.which welds these pieces tional Security Act of 1,947, and its function was together into a consistent and mutually supporting to advise the President on the coordination of pattern wit'h unified direction." military, industrial, and civilian mobilization. The concluding chapter of the Commissio In's Thus, many of its activities were concerned with first volume addressed the problem of "Preparing materials. Serving on the Board were the, Secre- for Future Policy." It stated that no single study taries of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and by a temporary group can deal adequately with Labor. and the heads of the National. Security the immensely complicated situation 1, cutting Agency, the Defense Materials Procurement across the ent ire ecIonomy, persisting indefinitely, Agency, and the Defense Production Administra- .and changing from. year to year." tion. . I I The report: recommended that a single agency- NSRB Chairman Gorrie submitted his report.to not an operating agency-should survey the total President Truman in. 1953, six weeks before Tru- p.attem of activities in the materials and energy man,left office. It included a recommendation for field, make periodic reports to Iindustry, the I pub- the President to "ask the Congress to provide the lic, and to the legislative as well as executive NSRB with adequate funds to enable the Board 690 APPENDLX to develop policy designed to improve the national Budget and a conservative critic of the New Deal, position. with respect to resources affecting the to serve as Conference chairman, Adams compro- Nation's security, and to carry out the directives inised. He agreed that Eisenhower would be the in the President's memorandum of July 9, 1952." Conference keynote speaker but insisted that the Truman left office without iaking any action on Conference should not be sponsored by the White this recommendation. The new Eisenhower House. The resulting 3-d4y Mid-Century Confer- Administration, committed in the election cam- ence on Resources for the Future drew 1,600 paign to a lessening of federal intervention and a participants in December 1953. Although it en- cutting back of government agencies, ignored the dorsed:no legislative or political proposals, the Commission's recommendations, and NSRB Conference did call attention to the need for eventually faded out of existence. policy. changes and, continuing research in re-., sources management. Resources for the Future (1952). William Paley, . Resources for the Future carried on some of foreseeing the problem posed by lack of a contin- the work of the Paley Commission. Although it uing body to carry out recommendations of the could not directly influence government policy President's Materials Policy Commission, set up and was not ordinarily international in scope, it an office with his own funds to respond, to continued to make long-range projections of the questions about the Commission's report, to keep national economy based on population, the labor some of the statistics up to date, and to keep force, productivity, and other factors. It then tried public interest alive. He established his small to predict from these findings the probable re-' offi6e in 1952 as a nonprofit corpor-ation with the source requirements, and match them against name Resources for the Future. possible supply, with attention to prices. Paley About this time, a group of conservationists, continued to serve on the board of directors and led by former National Park Service Director w .as partly responsible for the inauguration of a Horace M. Albright (who was also prominent 'in major study, published in 1963, Resources in the mining industry) were trying to interest the America's Future, 1960-2000. Ford Foundation in establishing a fund to provide fiancial assistance to conservation organizations. Among Albright's 25 cosponsors was Paley, Who The Eisenhower Adininistration also served on a Ford Foundation program devel- Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Com- opment committee on natural resources. This mission (1958). One of the most successful presi- committee recommended establishment of an in- dential commissions in recent times-in terms of dependent resources center to provide up-to-date getting its major recommendations implemented- information in conservation and natural resources was the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review and a continuous evaluation of the long-range Commission, which spanned two administrations. programs of the federal government. The commit- Congress passed the Act establishing the Commis- tee also recommended a 'White House National sion in June 1958 after many years of lobbying by Resources Conference, patterned after Theodore conservation groups. Although the Commission Roosevelt's 1908 Conference on Natural Re- was not established by presidential request, Eisen- sources. hower readily signed the law and, after a delay of As a result of these recommendations, the Ford several months, appointed the respected philan- Foundation agreed to back the conference and to, thropist and conservationist Laurance S. Rocke- set,up a research center-for which purpose Paley feller Chair-man. Eight congressmen and six public then turned over his nonprofit corporation, Re- figures representing widespread interests in out- sources for the Future. At a, December 1952 door recreation rounded out the Commission. meeting in New York, Albright succeeded in Although the timing of the Commission's report getting President-Elect Dwight D. Eisenhower to of its study violated one of the basic axioms of agree to sponsor the White House Conference. presidential commissions (don't start a study in But shortly after inauguration, the President's one Administration and present the results to a Chief of Staff Sherman Adams sought to, kill the new Administration-especially an Administration Conference because, according to Albright, Ad- of the other political party), almost everything else ams thought he detected a strong odor of "ex- about the Commission was a perfect example of New Dealers,.'.'.idealists, and planners on the staff how a presidential 'commission can operate to and board of directors 'of Resources for the achieve its ends. The law establishing the Com- Future. After Albright and Paley persuaded Lewis mission was carefully drawn so as to involve W. Douglas, former director of the Bureau of the members of Congress who could later sponsor LESSONS FROM THE PAST 691 legislation to carry out the Commission's recom- Establishment of a Bureau of Outdoor Recrea- mendations. The law provided for the appoint- tion in the Department of the Interior to coordi- ment of two majority and two minority members nate the recreation activities of the federal of both the Senate and House Interior Commit- agencies, to assist state and local governments tees. This provision ensured stability in case of with technical aid, to administer a grants-in-aid changes in congressional assigriments. program for acquisition planning for develop- The law also provided for an Advisory Council ment and acquisition of needed areas, and to act as a clearinghouse for information. composed of the Secretaries of federal depart- ments and the heads of independent agencies with Development of a federal grants-in-aid program a direct interest and responsibility in outdoor with initial grants to states of up to 75 percent of the total costs for planning and 40-50 percent recreation, as well as 25 citizen members covering of acquisition costs. most interests and geographic areas. Chairman Rockefeller had national sta .ture and Provision of guidelines for managing areas, with a common system of classifying recreation an aptitude for working with Congress, the exec- lands. utive branch, and citizen groups. He attracted a bright, capable staff with administrative abilities (it included the future Governor of Massachusetts When the Commission report was submitted to and the first head of the National Endowment for President Kennedy by Chairman Rockefeller in the Arts). January 1962, it had the unanimous approval of The research undertaken by the Commission the 1,5 commissioners. The timing of its release gave a solid base to its recommendations and was was propitious. The popularity of outdoor recrea- valuable as well as newsworthy. The recommen- tion was booming. Federal and state land-manage- dations included an institution through which ment agencies were finding it difficult to cope Commission goals could be carried out. A follow- with the growing numbers of visitors, and Con- on citizen lobbying and information activity was gress welcomed help in devising solutions. organized by the Commission chairman to stimu- I Rockefeller did not leave implementation of the late continuous press and public interest and to recommendations to chance or political whim. work for implementation of the recommendations. With private funds and the cooperation of the The Act creating the Commission set forth other citizen members of the Commission, he three basic goals. They were to determine: (1) the immediately established the Citizens Committee outdoor recreation wants and needs of the Ameri- for the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review can people at that time'and for the years 1976 and Commission Report. Two full-time coordinators 2000; (2) the recreation resources of the nation were hired, both experienced conservationists fa- available to satisfy those needs-f6r, the same miliar with congressional procedures. Working three periods; and (3) policies and programs that principally through citizen groups, the organiza- would ensure that present and future needs would tion concentrated in 1963-.64 on acquainting citi- be adequately met. zens with the Commission's report and stimulating The Commission staff, working with federal discussion and resolution of public policy issues agencies and private groups, devised a system of in the light of its findings and recommendations. classifying outdoor recreation resources so as to A. booklet, "Action for Outdoor Recreation for provide a common firamework and serve as a tool Americans," was widely circulated and served as in recreation management. Particular types of a follow-up to the report. Leaders of the Senate resources and areas would be managed for spe- and House Interior Committees who had served cific uses such as high density recreation, unique on the Commission introduced legislation to im- natural areas, wilderness, or historic and'cultural plement its major recommendations. sites. Congress created the Bureau of Outdoor Rec- Five joint two-day meetings were held by the reation in the Department of the Interior to serve- Commission with the Advisory Council, during as a focal point for outdoor recreation at the which they made on-site inspections of the various federal level and as a liaison point for similar state types of federal and state recreation areas, includ- and local agencies. A Land and Water Conserva- ing some where they camped out overnight. When tion Fund was established by Congress to. assist the Commission adopted a draft of its recornmen- states and local governments and federal agencies dations, they submitted the recommendations to to.acquire land for recreation'. The fund was the Advisory Council for additions or changes. ' generously endowed with a share of .the income . The major items among the 53 recommenda- from federal offshore oil revenues. In 19@4, Con- tions of the Commission were: gress passed the National Wilderness Act, provid- 6.92 APPENDIX ing for a national wilderness. system, as recom- The Committee held a number of seminars led mended by the Commission. by me m-bers of the Committee and each bringing together 20 to 30 experts from government, indus- President's' Commission on National Goals try, and academia to discuss issues', to be covered (MO). A year before leaving office, Preside .nt in seven reports: Renewable Resourc es., Water Eisenhower appointed the President's Commis- Resources, Environmental Resources (never com- sion on National Goals "to develop a broad pleted), Mineral Resources, Energy Resources, outline of coordinated policy and programs to. set Marine Resources, and Social and Economic up a series of goals in various areas of national activity." This privately financed activity was Aspects of Natural 'Resources. After each semi-. nar, the Committee. convened for a week to revise sponsored by the American Assembly (Eisen- its papers and discuss vreparatiofi@lof a summary hower had requested that the effort be nonpartisan document. Although Frank N otestein of, the Pop- and have no connection with the government). ulation Council was 'a Committee member, no" The v 10 members of the Commission were all from major population-related studies were undertaken-. the private sector; Henry M. Wriston served as Two of the six completed reports -are of special chairman and William P. Bundy as director of the interest here. "Energy Resources" by M. King Commission's staff. Approximately 100 people Hubbert,'then employed by the Shell Develop-, tpok@partin discussions sponsored by the Com- ment Company, estimated the nation's crPde oil mission, and 14 individuals submitted essays, reserves at about 175 billion barrels. He p .redicted which were subsequently published in 1960, just that, production would peak in the late, 1960s and before Eisenhower left office. that thereafter domestic production and Yeserves The publication's two major sections covered would decline (an estimate that has proved highly. U.S. domestic goals and the U.S. role in the accurate). However, Interior's then Assistant world. There were. chapters on education, science, Chief Geologist Vincent E. McKelvey, had au- the quality of American culture, and technological change, but there were no formal recommenda- thored, a st 'udy for, the U.S. Geological Survey which estimated that total domestic oil reserves tigns, and no follow-up activity took place. were on the o ,rder of 590 billion barrels. McKelvey the Kennedy Administration predicted that production would not peak for many years and that scarcities would not occur National Academy of Sciences Committee, on for 30 years or so. As a result of this disagree- Natural Resources (1963). At the suggestion of ment, the committee's summary report did not Presidential Science Adviser Jerome Weis n@er, base its recommendations on Hubbert's projec- President John F. Kennedy announced in a Spe- tions and did not present the oil-'depletion issue. in cial Message on Natural Resources, February a form that made clear the consequences and the 1961, that he would be asking the National course of 'action that should be taken if Hubbert Academy of Sciences to undertake was correct. a thorough and broadly based study and evaluation I Gil bert White's report "Social and Economic of the 'present state of research underlying the. Aspects of Natural Resources" considered the conservation, development, and use of natural, worldwide effects of population growth and distri- resources, how they are formed, replenished and bution on natural resources and also identified the may be substituted for, and giving particular many natural resource areas'thAt required coordi- attention to needs for basic research and to projects nation between resource devel opment and the that will provide a better basis for natural resources overall welfare of society. White stressed the need planning and policy formulation. to compare demand with supply in both energy Since Detlev W. Bronk, then President of the and mineral production, to determine who would NAional Academy of Sciences, lacked a back- bear the costs'of meeting future energy require- ground in natural resources, he appointed a Com- ments. mittee on Natural Resources to lead the study. The Committee's summary report to the Presi- The- 'Committee consisted of 13 Academy mem- dent made ll.major recommendations, of which bers, one of whom also represented government, the last stressed the need for a small central Roger Revelle, then Science Adviser to the Sec- natural resources group within the federal gov6in- retary of the Interior. Bronk did not appoint a rnent.'Such a group should be capable of conduct- Committee chairman but convened the organizing ing a continuing overall evaluation of research sessions himself and gave most of the responsibil- problems 'related to resources, of'bringing to ity for preparing the summary report to John S. public attention evaluations of-riatufal resources Coleman of the Academy staff. research needs, and of initiating and supporting LESSONS FR'OM THE PAST 693 research that falls outside the interests and com- Public Land Law Review Commission (1965). petencies of existing agencies. The group should Many observers believe that inclusion of powerful also provide support for international cooperation members of Congress on a commission leads to a in resources research. high rate of implementation, as in the case of-the Submitted to the President in November 1962, Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commis- the Academy report was referred to Presidential sion. Perry R. Hagenstein, who was appointed Science Adviser Wiesner, who'in turn referred it senior staff member of the Public Land Law to the President's Science Advisory Council and Review Commission in 1965, believes that having the Federal Council for Science and Technology. members of Congress on a commission is no Whatever interest Wiesner had been able to guarantee that legislative proposals may. ensue. generate at the, presidential level at the beginning In a paper "Commissions and Public Land of the project had evaporated by the time the Policies: Setting the Stage for Change" (presented report was completed. Although the Academy at an April 1977 Denver Conference on the Public was eventually asked to design specific programs Land Law Review Commissions), Hagenstein to implement two of the -I I recommendations, no wrote: new research programs were undertaken, and no Being party to @ a commission's report does not continuing institution was 'established. bind, a member to support its recommendations. In the opinion of John Coleman, who was Within 48 hours of the release of the [1970] Public responsible for the summary report, a temporary Land Law Review Commission report, one of the body such as: the Academy's Committee on Nat; Commission's influential congressional members ural Resources had little opportunity to. build a had already denounced the report roundly and constituency for its recommendations in Congress disassociated himself from some of.its major or among the public. And without supporters in recommendations. In addition, members of Con- positions of power or influence, there was no way gress face the realities of change too. Although to implement the findings. The Academy did, only one of the 13 congressional members of the Public Land Law' Review Commission failed to however, involve more than one hundred experts serve in the Congress follo .wing release .of the in the course of preparing the reports, and Cole- Commission's report, six more, including the man suggests that uncounted benefits came from Chairman, had dropped by the wayside in the the attention given to future research problems by next Congress,. the 93rd. Today (seven years later) these experts.. only two members of the PLLRC,.the Chairmen of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources The Johnsoh Administration Committee and the House Interior and Insular National Commission on Technology, Auto- Affairs Cornmittee, remain in Congress. mation, and Economic Progress' (1964). In the Hagenstein notes that the Public Land Law course of its work, the Na tional Commission on Review Commission, although -structured along Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress the lines of the Outdoor Recreation Resources (established by Congress in 1964 with, 14 members Review Commission, was actually not a presiden- appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson) con- tial commission. Twelve of its members, plus the sidered national goals, and a system of social chairman, - were chosen by Congress from Con- reporting. The Commission's report to the Presi- gress; there were only six presidential appointees. dent early in 1966 stated that formation of a Hagenstein added: national body of distinguished 'citizens represent- : I ..' . - . . ing diverse interests and constituencies and de- Participation by the Executive Branch in this voted to a continuing discussion of national goals predominately congressional effort was necessary would be valuable. "Such a body would be to give the Commission credibility with recreation and preservation interests and to gain a semblance concerned with 'monitoring' social change, fore- of. commitment to its recommendations from the casting possible social trends, and suggesting pol- Executive Branch itself. Some congressional icy alternatives to deal with them," the report members found it difficult to separate their public stated. "Its role would not be' to plan the future" posture in committee hearings and with constitu- but to point out what alternatives are achievable ehts from the private -deliberations at the C.ommis- and at what cost." Five of the C ommission sion meetings. members insisted on including a footnote express- Timing,and the political atmosphere also played ing regret that the report -did not explicitly recom7 a part in hampering follow-up to the Public Land mend establishing such a national body, but Law Review Commission: nothi ng was done about the matter by the Presi- dent or by Congress. It was conceived during President Kennedy's 694 APPENDIX term, the public members were appointed by Report'," was submitted to the President by HEW President Johnson, and it reported to President Secretary Wilbur Cohen nine days before Johnson Nixon. It had no home in the White House, and left office. its recommendations, many of which were based Three of its seven chapters were titled: "Health on criticism of the way in which the laws were and Illness" (Are we becoming healthier?); "Our being administered, did not have the enthusiastic Physical Environment" (Are conditions improv- support of the public land management agencies. ing?); and "Public Order and Safety" (What is the Chairman [Wayne] Aspinall stated at various impact of crime on our lives?) A final chapter times that once the Commission finished its work, discussed the need for continuing studies of social the next step would be up to the Congress. indicators and how to apply them in formulating Some three months after the 92nd Congress policy. convened and nine months after the Commission's Although no institutional apparatus for policy- .report had been filed, H.R. 7211, a bill that put a making resulted from "Toward a Social Report," number of the Commission recommendations in a one of the members of the Panel on Social cumbersome package, was introduced by Chair- Indicators, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, continued to man Aspinall. The bill in its entirety had a advocate social reporting when appointed Coun- constituency of one, although that one, Aspinall, was in a position as Chairman of the Interior and selor to President Nixon in 1969. Also, the Census Insular Affairs Committee to make the bill move. Bureau representative to the Social Indicators ... Power in the Congress accumulates slowly, Panel, Julius Shiskin, went on to the Office of but erodes rapidly, and Aspinall was unable to Management and Budget (OMB), where he bring, H.R. 7211 to a floor vote following his headed the staff that produced the OMB report defeat in a primary some weeks before the 92nd "Social Indicators of 1973." (An updated version, Congress adjourned. Faced with its own problems "Social Indicators of 1976," was issued by OMB of timing, elections and politics, the Congress is in December 1977.) not the, place to center responsibility for follow- The mid-1960s saw two other efforts in the UP. social area. In 1967, Senator Walter G. Mondale ' Toward a Social Report (1967) and Other supported by 10 other senators, introduced "The Studies of the Mid-1960s. Johnson's Secretary of Full Opportunity and Social Accounting Act," Health, Education, and Welfare John Gardner which proposed a Council of Social Advisers in became interested in social indicators and per- the Executive Office of the President, and the suaded the President to assign to his Department publication for transmittal to Congress of an the task of developing "the necessary social annual Social Report by the President, similar to statistics and indicators to supplement those pre- the yearly Economic Report of the Council of pared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Economic Advisers. The Mondale bill twice Council of Economic Advisers. With these yard- passed the Senate (in 1970 and 1972), but no sticks we can better measure the distance we have action was ever taken by the House. come and plan the way ahead. " Johnson - so In the private sector, Daniel Bell organized the directed in his Message to Congress on Domestic Commission on the Year 2000, ftinded by the Health and -Education. Carnegie Corporation and run by the American Under prodding from HEW Under Secretary Academy of Arts and Sciences. About 30 promi- Wilbur J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for Planning nent social scientists and other experts concerned William Gorham hired Mancur Olson in 1967 as about preparations for the future and alternative Deputy Assistant Secretary for Social Indicators, policy choices held working sessions for three to lead in preparing a social report. With the help days in 1965 and for two days in 1966. During of a panel cochaired by social scientist Daniel Bell 1967 they contributed papers and participated in and HEW Assistant Secretary Alice M. RivIin, the discussions of eight working parties. The Olson sought to devise. a system of social indica- Commission's 350-page report, "Toward the Year tors-which he defined as measures of the level 2000: Work in Progress," was widely distributed of well-being in a society-for measuring the after publication as the entire Summer 1967 issue social progress or retrogression of the nation. The of Daedalus, the journal of the American Acad- study was scheduled to be completed in mid-1969, emy of Arts and Sciences. but when President Johnson announced he would This private-sector commission made no formal not run again and Richard M. Nixon was elected, recommendations, however. According to Bell, Olson rushed the study to completion ahead of the Commission avoided issues related to natural schedule so it could be published before Johnson resources, environment, and. population because left office. The document, "Toward a Social there were too many variables. Instead, the Com- LESSONS FROM THE PAST 695 mission t ried to identify technological trends in Council on Environmental Quality terms of a 10-year lead time. And they also looked As a declaration of national environmental pol- at changes in social frameworks, such as those in icy, Section 101 (b) of the 1%9 Act provided that: a postindustrial society. it is the contm*um'g responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consist- The Last Decade ent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, National Environmental Policy Act of 1%9 ftinctions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may- Improving the quality of the environment has been the objective of a number of laws passed by (1) ftilfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding Congress and executive orders issued by Presi- generations; dents in the last two decades. Only one law, (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful'. however, served to provide for a long-range, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing holistic approach to decision-making throughout surroundings; the government and established an institution that (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of had the potential, on paper at least, for advising the environment without degradation, risk to the President on how to prepare for some of the health or safety, or other undesirable and unin- problems of the future. This law, the National tended consequences; Environmental Policy Act of 1%9, required "en- (4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and vironmental impact statements" by the responsi- maintain, wherever possible, an environment ble official for all major federal actions "signifi- which supports diversity'and variety of individual cantly affecting the quality of the human choice; environment." It also provided for establishing in (5) achieve a balance between population and the Executive Office of the President a three- resource use which will permit high standards of member Council on Environmental Quality. living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; The legislation was developed by congressional (6) enhance the quality of renewable resources committees without. assistance from the Nixon and approach the maximum attainable recycling White House. While Congress was considering of depletable resources. the legislation, President Nixon had established In preparing environmental impact statements, by executive order his own 'Cabinet-level Environ- responsible federal officials were required to in- mental Quality Council in May 1%9. clude: Nixon's Council consisted of the President as - The environmental impact of,the proposed ac- Chair-man, the Vice President (serving as Chair- tion; man in the President's absence), the Secretaries of six Departments-Agriculture; Commerce-, . Any adverse environmental effects which can- not be avoided should the proposal be imple- Health, Education, and Welfare; Housing and mented; Urban Development; Interior; and Transporta- . Alternatives to the proposed action; tion-and the Science Adviser to the President, who was named Executive Secretary. The general * The relationship between local short-term uses purpose of the Council was to "assist the Presi- of man's environment and the maintenance and dent with respect to environmental quality mat- enhancement of long-term productivity; ters." One of its specific duties was to "review * Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments the adequacy of existing systems for monitoring of resources which would be involved in the and predicting environmental changes so as to proposed action should it be implemented. achieve effective coverage and efficient use of The Council on Environmental Quality was facilities and other resources." The Cabinet-level specifically given the duty "to develop and rec- Council met only a few times and accomplished ommend to the President national policies to very little. foster and promote the improvement of environ- Congress ignored White House opposition and mental quality to meet the conservation, social, passed the National Environmental Policy Act in economic, health, and other requirements and December 1%9. The Act was signed into law on goals of the Nation" and also to assist and advise January 1, 1970, by the President, who subse- the President in the preparation of an annual quently dropped his Cabinet-level council and Environmental Quality Report. appointed three members to the new Council on The annual report was to set forth such things Environmental Quality required by the Act. as 696 APPENDIX Current and foreseeable: trends in the quality.,' The National Goals Research Staff consisted of management and utilization of such environ- a small group,of experts, whoseprinary task was ments and the effects of those trends on the to prepare a report annually, at least until 1976, social, economic, and other requirements of the setting forth some of the.key policy choices facing Nation; and, the nation, together with the consequences of' The adequacy of available natural resources for those choices. The goals group was not a planning fulfilling human and economic requirements of' agency; it was to provide, information and analysis the Nation.in the light of expected population-, so that those making decisions "might have a pressures. better idea of the direction in which events, are moving, the seeming, pace of those movements, Another section. of the, National Environmental an& alte rative directions and speeds that possibly. Policy Act required that.all. agencies, of the federal could be achieved, were policies to be shifted in government should one direction or another." That statement, by re IcogInize the worldwid6'and logg-range.charac .ter Moynihan, prefaced the first report of the Goals of environmental problems and, where. consistent Research,Staff, published on July 4, 1970, under with the foreign-policy of the.United States,'Iend the title "Toward Balanced Growth; Quantity appropriate suvvort to initiatives, resolutions, and with Quality.". programs designed to maximize international co- Moynihan had conceived of the report as a operation in anticipating and preventing, a decline social report, rather than an inventory of natural in the quality@ of the 'environment. or collection of statistics. In the an- resources past nouncement of July 1969, President Nixon said While there have been. efforts over the the new Goals Staff would f6.r the first time create seven years.to carry,out these basic provisions of within the White House "a unit specifically the Act, its implementation has been far less than charged, with the long perspective; it promises to its framers intended. Federal officials have . in provid Ie the researr-h tools with which we at last most cases followed the, letter of the law',s require- can deal with the future in an informed and ment that they. consider the environmental impact informative way." The President also said the of major decisions and altemative courses Of Goals Staff would provide for "new mechanisms action that might be'better for the nation. How- which can enable government to respond to ever, only rarely have officials submitted such emerging needs early enough so that the response statements before a decision is made, as the law can be effective." requires. The functions of the National Goals Research While President Nixon did,not include the Staff were to include Council on Environmental Quality among his foremost advisers, he -relied on it to prepare his forecasting ftiture developments, and assessing the environmental legislative program. The Council pe - longer-range consequences of present social r trends; measuring the probable future impact of formed'other useful functions in developing major alternative courses of act Iion, including measuring new studies, reviewing international environmental the degree to which change in one area would be activities, coordinating domestic environmental ac- likely to affect another; estimating the actual range tivities, and overseeing the environmental impact of social choice-that is, what altemative sets of statement process. goals might be attainable, in light of the availabil- ity of resourres and possible rates of progress; developing and monitoring social indicators that National Goals Research Staff (1969) can reflect the present and future quality of American life, and the direction and rate of @ its In July 1969, President Nixon' established a change; summarizing integrating, and correlating National Goals.. Research Staff in the White the results of related research activities being House. The impetus came largely from Daniel carried on within the various Federal agencies, Patrick Moynihan, then counselor to the President and by State and local governments and private and head of the newly created Urban Affairs organizations. Council, operating, out of the White House base- The President announced that the first assign- ment.* ment of the new group would be to assemble data *Moynihan had been aiming at such a futures study since trends and to study the most probable longer-range conse- his first days in office,.. when he had appointed an Urban quences of major policy alternatives, as well as to anticipate Affairs Research Committee to develop, projections and developments for "an improved assessment of current forecasts with a comprehensive, long-range perspective on priorities ... useful in articulating feasible national goals.", LESSONS FROM THE PAST 697 that could help illumine the possible range of regularly published social. statistics using available national goals for the nation's 1976 Bicentennial. data,. but thiswork was not published in the 1970 The public report to be delivered by July 4, report. No efforts w iere made to *include foreign 1970--and, 'arm'ually thereafter- would make pos-. policy issues, as in the- Eisenhower Commission sible, discussion, of key choices . and their conse- on National Goals. quences The Goals Staff worked instead on a relatively while, there still is time to make the choices few issues; it 'tried.to,define the questions, analyze effective. Only shortly beyond the 200th the "emerging"- debates, and examine the alter- anniversary lies the year 2000. These dates, to@, native sets of consequences. Garment believes gether, can be targets for our aspirations. Our that the main strength of the goals work was its need now is to seize on the. future as the key bringing ' forward for debate s6me'' issues 'which dimension in our - decisions, and to chart that were ahead of their time, such as national growth future as.,.consciously as we are accustomed to policy, revenue sharing, and technology assess- charting the past'. ment. Civil rights, the Vietnam war, and other Even before release of the President's st ate- issues with which the, public:, was. already preoc-' ment, a power struggle ha Id arisen within the cupied were entirely ignored. White House over who would direct this. .goals Even with the program's shortcomings, the July resdarch' Would it be Moynihan as Execu ,tive 41 1970, "Toward Balanced Growth'I provided a Secreta .ry of Ithe Council for Urban Affairs? Or springboard for national debate on a number of would it be Arthur Bums, also a 'Counselor to the vital issues. The report concentrated 'on popula- President and head of the Offic& I of, ]Program tion growth. and distribution,,envirorunent, educa- Developriient? Nixon 'solved the controversy by tion, basic natural,, science.' technology assess- ment, consumerism and economic choice, and naming his Special Consultant, Leonard Garment, director of t6e National'Goals Research Staff. balanced growth,: Garment found out about his new "job' I shortly Confronted with the trend toward ever greater before leaving on a long trip to the'Soviet Union concentration of a growing population in already to. set up a'cultural exchange'program. When he crowded metropolitan regions, should. we. accept returned, he brought in some futures experts, the present trend? Or, if,not, to what extent including the ' Hudson Institute's Herman Kahn, should the focus of public policy be on encourag- the Harvard Business'School's Raymon& Bauer, ing. the spread of population into sparsely popu- and Brookings Institution's Director Charles lated areas, fostering the growth of existing mid- Schultz, to assist him in setting up the group. dle-sized cities and towns, or experimenting with Garment soon encountered difficulties in imple- the development of new cities outside of existing menting his task, as funds -for. the project. were. metropolitan areas? Given the present threat to our natural environment, how should We balance limited, and it Was necessary-to borrow some of changes r in patterns of production and. consump- the 10 members of the staff from federal agencies. tion with.new mean's of waste disposal or recy- He hired Bauer as senior consultant and 'staff cling-and how should be allocate the costs? report coordinator and appointed Charles Williams Should they be bome by producers, by con- of the National Science Foundation as staff direc- surners, by the general publip-or by what com- tor. Garment, who rnodestly claimed "my main bination of these? How can consumer protection job was to protect the work," had the President's best be advanced without so interfering with the ear -a.nd was able to maintain Mr. Nixon's support, market mechanism as to leave the consumer although he had to bypass the normal channels to worse off in the long run? keep the, President informed of the Goals Staff's The report, published without White House or activities. Bureau of the Budget interferencei made some One of the early ideas was to build a-network instance: bold statements. For among state, regional, and local planning groups in order'to obtain ideas about national goals FHA and IVA mortgage insurance, the interstate, through interaction with citizens. This effort was highway system, Federal and State tax policies, discontinued after one public 1earing because of State and local land use programs, all contributed opposition from the White House staff. The Goals to the massive suburbanization of the last 25 Staff, however, was. able to bring in consultants in years- various fields. Defense contract awards have accelerated the Some" work was done with the Bureau of the population booms @ in Southern California and Buqget',s Offic'e of Statistical Policy in developing along the Gulf Coast. 698 APPENDIX Agricultural research and support programs have sector leaders, the Conference Board's Executive accelerated depletion of the rural population. Council agreed to study the possibility of putting These policies make individually positive contri- together a Center for National Goals. White butions to society, but their collective impact may House officials said that President Nixon would not be desirable from the standpoint of distribu- announce formation of the institution when he tion of population and economic opportunity. issued the first National Goals. Report on July 4, The discussion in the population section was 1970. The private sector representatives did not even more bold: believe that they could get a structure ready in so short a time. The timing problem did not develop, A considerable number of population experts however, because no presidential statement was strongly endorse the goal of a zero rate of issued on July 4. increase-that is, a stationary population-as soon In June, a month before the Goals Research as we can achieve it. This means that in the Staffs report was due to be published, the staff interest of society, all American families should found out that its first report would also be its have an average of two children. Even many of those who do not see the problem as pressing see last. The President had decided to create a Do- this as a desirable goal. mestic Council under John Ehrlichman, who felt This choice implies a significant change in the Domestic Council could carry on any addi- public policy. It calls for a deliberate government tional goals and alternatives work. (In fact, how- effort to promote the reduction in the growth rate ever, it did not perform truly lon -range policy .9 until population stability is achieved. It also im- analysis.) plies that we must not leave the possibility of The -National Goals Research Staff was dis- population stability to chance. It means, we may banded when the July 4, 1970, report was com- have to do more than rely upon liberalized abor- pleted. @ Moynihan' had prepared an introductory tion laws in the States, and upon the distribution statement for the President to sign, but the of free contraceptives, to the poor, who are the President decided he should not focus of most U.S. family-planning; programs. We be so directly may also have to devise ways of changing individ- associated with the report, and the Moynihan ual and social attitudes, governmental policies and introduction appeared as a "statement of the incentives, and through these, the motivation of Counselor to the President." The document young people and adults in all socio-economic emerged, finally, as a report from the National groups. Goals Research Staff to the President. Even if the country elects the goal of arresting The report was published just before the Fourth the growth of U.S. population by the end of the of July, while the President was in California, and century, it is not at all clear whether or not the no presidential statement was issued. Press cov- Government can bring about a societal consensus voluntarily to control- the growth of the U. S. erage was accordingly light. population within a generation. More active public policies might be required than "moral encourage- Proposal for a Center'for National Goals and ment .11 Changes in tax laws and health insurance programs might help. An extreme form of an Alternatives (1970) active public policy would be to regulate family With the White House goals' mission apparently size by flat. Some persons have even gone so far ended, the Senior Executives Council, an advisory as to suggest enforced sterilization when each group to the Conference Board (an independent family reaches its maximum allowance. Less dras- nonprofit business research organization) never- tic forms of coercion could be devised. But whatever the form, coercion in the regulation of theless decided to continue its investigation of the family size is likely to be unacceptable to the possibilities for a private sector effort for estab- American people." lishing national goals. The Council is composed of 36 chief executives, 25 of them from business and Several months before publication of the report, the rest from universities, foundations, and public Garment and Williams formed an ad hoc commit- institutions. They finance their own studies and tee to evaluate the possibilities for setting up an activities and operate independently of the Confer- institute or organization in the private sector that ence Board. Board President H. Bruce Palmer would be the equivalent of the governmental goals was interested in the subject, having been one of effort. Williams-,discovered that the Senior Exec- the sponsors for the formation of the Institute for utive Council of the Conference Board was al- the Future. The Senior Executives Council put up ready considering something along similar lines. $60,000 to study the best design for such an At a White House meeting chaired by Garment in organization, and the National Endowment for the March 1970 and attended by a half dozen private Humanities contributed $9,800 for the study. Wil- LESSONS FROM THE PAST 699 lis W. Harman of the Stanford Research Institute problems for the future because they had been was selected to do a 4-month analysis, assisted by "too successful," inferTing, that we had not pre- representatives from Arthur D. Little Company, pared in advance to cope with the results. For the Institute for the Future, the Center for a instance: Voluntary Society, the Senior Executives Council, Prolonging the life span had resulted in ov Ierpopu- and Anthony Wiener of the Hudson Institute, who lation and problems of the aged. had been a research consultant for the National Goals Research Staff. Weapons for national defense had resulted in the In December 1970, the Harman group submitted hazard of mass destruction through nuclear and its report to the steering committee of the Senior biological weapons. Executives Council. The report proposed forming Replacement of manual and routine labor by a Center for National Goals and Alternatives. The machines had exacerbated unemployment; effi- essential function of the proposed Center would ciency had resulted in dehumanization of the be to address four basic issues: (1) how to world of work. understand the processes of social change, inter- Growth in the power of systematized knowledge pret the present moment in history, and anticipate produced threats to privacy and freedom, and erected a knowledge barrier to the underprivi- the consequences of alternative actions; (2) how leged, to explore the range of attainable social choices; Affluence had increased per capita environmental (3) how best to clarify bases for value choices and impact, pollution and energy shortages. goals selection; and (4) how to identify, evaluate, Satisfaction of basic needs had produced a world- and implement alternative policies and strategies. wide revolution of rising expectations, rebellion The Center, at least in theory, would be free of against nonmeaningful work, and unrest among domination by any power group; it would foster affluent students. an interdisciplinary approach and would have a permanent staff as well as visiting fellows, schol- Although Jonsson's review of the Harman pro- ars, and interns. Joint involvement of public, posal approved the technical basis of the proposed private, and voluntary sectors would be provided organization, some members of the Senior Exec- through the mechanism of a Forum that would utives Council raised questions, and further study give a broad representational base for steering the was ordered in 1971 under the guidance of Robert Center and would ensure objectivity and promote 0. Anderson, chairman of the Board of the credibility. Forum members would select a third Atlantic Richfield Company and new head of the of the members of the Board of Trustees. The Senior Executives Council. The proposal was estimated budget was $7.5 million for the first accordingly refined to create an Institute for three years, and $5 million per year after that. National Objectives-A Center for Integrative Two-thirds of the budget would be obtained from Studies of National Policies, Priorities, and Alter- nongovernment sources, one-third from the fed- natives. Its 12- to 30-man Board of Trustees eral government. would include representatives from the Adminis- The Conference Board's Senior Executive's tration, Congress, and the National Science Foun- Council asked Erik Jonsson of Texas Instruments, dation, and perhaps one or more governors or former Mayor of Dallas and head of Goals for mayors. Involvement of public, private, and vol- Dallas, to assess the viability of the proposal for a untary sectors would be reinforced through an Center. In answer to questions raised by Jons- Advisory Council of up to 50 members elected for son's assessment, Harman prepared a paper justi- 3-year terms, plus about 20 members elected by fying the need to discover whether the future the Advisory Council itself. Business, founda- would be more or less an unbroken extrapolation tions, and labor and voluntary organizations of the past, or whether, after a tumultuous period would be asked to participate in funding; half the of a few decades, radical societal change would initial $10 million would be sought from the be required. National Science Foundation, the National Insti- In the absence of any solid knowledge on which tutes of Health, Congress, and other federal the nation could base its choice of a course to sources. follow, Hannan felt the Center should formulate Robert 0. Anderson and Erik Jonsson pre- means with which to examine national goals, sented the proposal for the new Institute to the priorities, and policies in both contexts. In support President in January 1972. Nixon agreed that of the need for approaches to meet radical societal something should be done. He felt that a govern- changes, he presented a table showing how "suc- ment effort would be viewed as political, but if cesses" of the technological era had resulted in the Institute originated as a private organization, 700 APPENDIX he would 'see that government funds were made before Johnson left office. He did not meet with available. He put John Ehrlichman in charge of the Committee to receive the report, nor make a Administration cooperation fo 'r the project. Nixon statement on it. said that the Institute's sponsors would have to be In early 1969, Rockefeller's pressure for a credible and outside of politics, and that the presidential commission was abetted by presiden- money would have to come from several pockets. tial Counselor Moynihan, who convinced Nixon Although some members of the Senior Execu- that the time had come to face the problems of tives Council still expressed reservations, $115,000 population. The President asked in his message to was raised initially. Robert Anderson placed the Congress that a Commission be assigned to de- project under Joseph Slater, head of the Aspen velop population projections and estimate the Institute for Humanistic Studies (Anderson serves impact of an anticipated 100 million increase in as board chairman of the Institute), but Slater was U.S. population by the year 2000. For the interim, unable to get the necessary additional funding the President called for more research "on birth from foundations, and the project, as proposed by control methods" and for the establishment, as a the Senior Executives Council, was terminated. national goal, of "the provision of adequate family However, the Aspen Institute developed the con- planning services within the next five years for all cept in its own way, proposing an Institute for those who want them but cannot afford them." In Analysis of Public Choices, free of all federal ties. his message to Congress, Nixon stated: The proposal was submitted to Nelson Rockefeller One of the most serious challenges to human in 1973 and, according to Slater, influenced the destiny in the last third of this century will be the direction Rockefeller took when he started his growth of the population. Whether man's re- Commission on Critical Choices for Americans. sponse to that challenge will be a cause for pride The Aspen Institute is now seeking to turn many or for despair in the year 2000 will depend very of its own programs toward developing analysis of much on what we do today. If we now begin our choices in decision-making. work in an appropriate manner, and if we continue to devote a considerable amount of attention and Commission on Population Growth and the energy to this problem, then mankind will be able American Future (1970) to surmount this challenge as it has surmounted so many during the long march of civilization. In July 1969 President Nixon sent to Congress a historic first population message, recommending When the Congress passed a bill in March 1970. the establishment by legislation of a blue-ribbon creating the Commission on Population Growth commission to examine the growth of the nation's and the American Future, President Nixon named population and the impact it will have on the John D. Rockefeller III chairman of the 24-mem- American future. John D. Rockefeller 111, who ber group, which included four women, two had started the Population Council, had been college students, three blacks, two senators, and urging since the early days of the Eisenhower two representatives. About 20 full-time profession- Administration that such a commission be estab- als and 10 consultants supervised a 2-year effort lished. Lyndon Johnson had refused to see Rock- which resulted in the release of a controversial efeller in 1964, but by 1968, he was ready to yield final report in March 1972, plus seven volumes of to pressure and established the President's Com- research papers. More than 100 research projects mittee on Population and Family Planning, co- were conducted, and more than 100 witnesses chaired by Rockefeller and HEW Secretary Wil- testified at public hearings in Washington, Los bur Cohen. Angeles, Little Rock, Chicago, and New York. The Committee established by President John- Additional information concerning public attitudes son was not a ftill-blown commission. Its report, was obtained through a special detailed public sent to the President at the end of 1968, "Popula- opinion poll. tion and Family Planning: The Transition from The Commission's conclusion was that no sub- Concern to Action," suggested the establishment stantial benefits would result from continued of a presidential commission to give the problem growth of the nation's population: further study. It recommended that family plan- The population problem, and the growth ethic ning services be extended to every American with which it is intimately connected, reflect woman unable to afford them. It also recom- deeper external conditions and more fundamental mended an increase in the budgets of HEW and political, economic, and philosophical values. the Office of Economic Opportunity for the pur- Consequently, to improve the quality of our pose of population research. The report was existence while slowing growth, will require noth- released without publicity in January 1969, just ing less than a basic recasting of American values. LESSONS FROM THE PAST 701 The more than 60 Population Commission rec- Westoff. "But we hadn't quite appreciated how ommendations included: much these recommendations were going to dom- �Creation of an Office of Population Growth and inate the response to the report." Distribution within the Executive Oflice of the The timing of the report was unfortunate in that President; during the three years since Nixon's population �Establishment, within the National Institutes of message, the public had come to agree on stabiliz- Health, of a National Institute of Population ing population growth, and the goal of the two- Sciences to provide an adequate institutional child family was already being achieved in the framework for implementing a greatly expanded statistics . program of population research; No recommendations were made by the Com- �Legislation by Congress establishing a Council mission in the resources and environment areas. of Social Advisers, with one of the main func- The Commission staff chose a basis methodol- tions the monitoring of demographic variables; ogy for its extensive research efforts, which were �The addition of a mid-decade census of the published in six large volumes. The research was population; and organized basically around one simple question: �National planning for a stabilized population. What difference will it make if the U.S. population grows at a two-child per family rate, or if it grows These recommendations were overshadowed, at a three -child per family rate? This approach at least in the publicity given them, by the was adopted in all research efforts except where it recommendations that states adopt legislation per- was not appropriate, as in migration studies. The mitting minors "to receive contraceptive and research documents used U.S. Bureau of the prophylactic information and services in appropri- Census statistics in its projections, and extensive ate settings sensitive to their needs and concerns" new data on these assumptions was supplied by and "that present state laws restricting abortion the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Depart- be liberalized along the lines of the New York ment of Commerce. statute, such abortion to be performed on request Volume III, Population, Resources and the by duly licensed physicians under conditions of Environment, contained extensive research on the medical safety." The Commission also recom- relative impacts of the two growth scenarios on mended that abortion be covered by health insur- resources and the environment. Chapters were ance benefits, and that federal, state, and local devoted to: the economy; resource requirements governments make funds available to support and pollution levels; energy; outdoor recreation abortion in states with liberalized statutes. and congestion; agriculture, population, and the President Nixon was unhappy with the Com- environment; future water needs and supplies; mission report, released in March 1972 at the urban scale and environmental quality; and eco- beginning of his re-election campaign, largely logical perspectives. because of the recommendations on liberalized The other volumes covered: Demographic and abortion and the furnishing of contraceptives to Social Aspects of Population Growth (Vol. 1); teen-agers (which in 1972 was a bigger issue than Economic Aspects of Population Change (11); abortion). The President met only a few minutes Governance and Population: The Governmental with Mr. Rockefeller. He perftinctorily received Implications of Population Change (IV); Popula- the Commission report, but issued a statement tion Distribution and Policy (V); Aspects of Pop- repudiating it. No word of support was forthcom- ulation Growth Policy (VI). Research on global ing for the stabilized population concept thathe population and resources was not a part of the had backed in 1969. Commission mandate. Although all members of the Commission Despite the lack of White House support, showed their support for the report by signing it, Commission members and staff sought ways to several members wrote trinofity statements about disseminate to the public the findings of the report certain recommendations, especially the one on and the research materials. Chairman Rockefeller abortion. The Commission debated whether to testified before congressional hearings. A privately finesse the two controversial issues, since these financed Citizens Committee on Population and recommendations were not of major demographic the American Future, formed after release of the importance. But Chairman Rockefeller felt it was report, took the leading role in spreading the only right that the majority of the Commission be findings; it tried to create a dialogue on the issues able to state an opinion on all relevant issues. and lobbied in Congress for passage of some of "We went ahead, realizing we would get our the recommendations. It also sponsored two large heads cut off," said the staff director, Charles conferences. 702 APPENDIX A privately financed film version of the Popula- ing the People's Re public of China, the Soviet tion Commission report, which had been in prep- Union, and the East European countries, none of aration for more than a year, was issued about six which had been considered by the Paley Commis- months after the Commission made its report and sion of 1951. A number of other reports were received wide distribution. It was shown over the prepared by independent contractors. National Educational Television network, a num- Advisory panels from industry participated by ber of individual TV stations, and by many submitting information and assisting with more schools. A set of teaching materials was prepared than a dozen meetings and hearings conducted for the classroom use. The film stressed the around the nation. Federal agencies also supplied impacts of too much population and did not dwell data and analysis. on the Commission's recommendations. The summary report of the National Materials The deputy director of the Population Commis- Policy Commission and its special publications sion staff, Robert Parke, felt that the report and have proved useful to a number of federal agen- the research volumes made a strong base for cies and to industry. As with earlier studies, the ftiture efforts at meeting population growth prob- involvement of several hundred public officials lems. And he believed the Commission and its and industry participants helped to educate a staff had learned at least one valuable lesson: A sizable cadre in the need for forward-looking commission studying a controversial subject analyses. should not publish its report during a presidential The major recommendations of the Commis- carnpaign. sion, when it reported to the President and Congress in June 1973, were mostly general policy National Commission on Materials Policy (1970) directives: Congress legislated a new National Commission Strike a balance between the "need to produce on Materials Policy in the fall of 1970 as a part of goods" and the "need to protect the environ- the Resources Recovery Act. Although the chief ment" by modifying the materials system so that J. all resources, including environmental, are paid sponsor of the Commission was a Republican for by users. Strive for an equilibrium between Caleb Boggs, of Delaware, the Wliite House did the supply of materials and the demand for their not look with favor on the Commission, and use by increasing primary materials production President Nixon delayed almost a year before and by conserving materials through accelerated appointing the five public members to join the waste recycling and greater efficiency-of-use of Secretaries of Interior and Commerce. There were materials. Manage materials policy more effec- three Secretaries of Commerce during the term of tively by recognizing the complex interrelation- the Commission. Only the first, Maurice Stans, ships of the materials-energy-environment sys- attended Commission meetings; the last, Freder- tem so that laws, executive orders, and ick Dent, issued a separate statement disagreeing administrative practices reinforce policy and not with many of the Commission's major recommen- counteract it. dations. Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton More specific recommendations of-the Commis- did not personally attend meetings. sion included creation of a comprehensive Cabi- Commission Chairman Jerome Klaff was head net-level agency for materials, energy, and the of a secondary materials processing company; environment, and the formation of a joint commit- Staff Director James Boyd was a former director tee of Congress having legislative jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines and, at the time, head of roughly parallel to the proposed new agency. a'mining company. A full-time staff of 25 was By the time the Commission report was com- hired. pleted, the Commission's chief sponsor in the The Materials Policy Commission did not at- Senate had been defeated in a bid for re-election, tempt a materials resources inventory and update and the White House, for its part, showed no of the Paley Commission but rather concentrated interest in publicizing the report. its attention on the policy area and emphasized After release of the report in June 1973, Staff the environmental aspects of resources problems, Director Boyd set up a small office on his own an area which the Paley Commission had ignored. (with some financial help from his company) to The new Commission contracted for a study of follow through on the Commission study and to the estimated demand for 10 commodities to the Ary to get some of the recommendations imple- year 2000. A report was made on basic mineral mented. Much of the follow-up was done by stocks, reserves, production data, consumption, working with members of Congress, congressional and exports for selected foreign countries, includ- staffs, and federal agencies, with Boyd testifying LESSONS FROM THE PAST 703 at congressional hearings on the usefulness of the are fully involved in the question," but gave no report and the need for implementation of some further particulars. GAO concluded: of the recommendations. We believe that the results of, the study on a IBecause the report.had appeared after passage national materials policy could have been more of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the beneficial if it had been directed to more specific Administration was required by law to at least problem areas and had specified recommended respond to the findings. A task group and subcom- actions. Also, preparation of an executive branch mittee of the President's Domestic Council drafted response, as required by the Federal Advisory an executive branch response'which noted that Committee Act, is not enough to insure successftil implementation of a study commission's report. some of the recommendations were simplistic and Effective machinery for implementation and fol- subjective, that some were inappropriately worded low through must be established and monitored at or did not reflect ongoing activities in the execu- the highest level in the executive branch. tive agencies, and that there was no clear ordering One of the Commission members, University of of priorities in the report. The White House position was that regular program activities of the Indiana political scientist Lynton K. Caldwell, Department of the Interior and the Environinental@ disagreed that this Commission, or any other, Protection Agency would accomplish most of -the should try to be too specific or try to dictate actions recommended by the Commission, and legislation. "Anyone who has been around Gov- that a separate mechanism to insure their imple- ernment.knows that the surest way to kill some- mentation was unnecessary. An Interior Depart- thing is to make it so specific that no one else can ment spokesman pointed out at a congressional ever adopt it as his own," Caldwell has said. hearing that many. of the Commission's 177 rec- "People feel inclined to reject specific recommen- ommendations were encompassed by nine broader dations so they can come up with something that recommendations in the Secretary of the Intenior's reflects exactly what they want to do." June 1973 Second Annual Report under the Min- Some observers felt that the report would have ing and Minerals Policy Act of 1970. been more influential if the Commission's chair- A report by the General Accounting Office man had been more nationally prominent. The (GAO) entitled "Better Followup System Needed general problem of a commission having been . osed on the President by legislation without to Deal with Recommendations by Study Com- imp missions in the Federal Government" (RED-76,7L his concurrence also worked against its effective- 33, Dec. 4, 1975), used the Materials Policy ness. The stated disagreements of Commission Commission as one of its four exarriples.. ' member Frederick Dent (the Secretary of Com- GAO criticized the White House response doc- merce) were detrimental. ument for not being specific regarding the nature and timing of the action to be taken "and there- National Growth Policy Reports (1972, 1974, and fore it cannot be considered an effective vehicle 1976) for implementing the recommendations." It . Section 703(a) of the 1970 Housing and Urban pointed to one recommendation in the Commis- Development Act directed the President, "in or- -sion report calling for "improved utilization and der to assist in the development of a National conservation of groundwater through early com- Urban Growth Policy, to prepare every even- pletion -of surveys of the Nation's major aquifers, numbered year beginning with 1972 a 'Report on using them for planning the optimum management Urban Growth.' " The Act called for the report of ground and surface supplies, and monitoring to include identification of significant trends and aquifers from which substantial withdrawals are developments, a summary of significant problems being made." The executive branch response, facing the nation as a result of these trends, a according to GAO, was confined to its concur- statement of current and foreseeable needs in the rence in principle and stated that "Interior and areas served by policies, plans, and programs Agriculture are working toward these ends. In- designed to carry out an urban growth policy, and creased activity will be required."- recommendations for programs and policies for GAO added that other responses to recommen7 carrying out the urban growth policy. dations with which the executive branch ex- Members of the Nixon Administration opposed pressed concurrence or concurrence in principle this part of the legislation, claiming they were described the actions to be taken in general working out policy for urban and national growth language such as "current efforts are under way," in their own way, chiefly through the Cabinet efforts are being made," or "interested agencies Committee on National Growth Policy, appointed 704 APPENDIX . by President Nixon and chaired by the Secretary To what extent should a national growth policy of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and attempt to achieve welfare and social goals? including the Secretaries of Agriculture, Com- The small group at HUD .preparing the 1974 merce, Labor, and Transportation,. the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and, the report was never fin-nished the answers to this questionnaire. They were told by the White Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. The Administration also disliked the Act's specific House, only to avoid putting in any new policy provision that the Domestic Council was to be recommendations. The draft went from HUD to "adequately organized and staffed for the purpose the White House late in 1973, but no action was [of carrying out the legislative mandate]." taken for almost a year. Then the Domestic Council under President Gerald Ford revised the John Ehrlichman, as head of the Domestic draft and submitted it. to Congress under the title Council, decided early in 1971 that the biennial "Report on National Growth and Development." report should be assigned to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The resulting It came out early in 1975, almost a year late, and contributed little to any analysis of future national draft report featured a number of new housing growth Iproblems or preparations to meet them. It and urban initiatives that HUD Secretary George listed 13 "national goals related to growth" (one Romney hoped to institute, with a budget-busting sentence per goal), and stated that the policymak price tag. Ehrlichman rejected the report and had ers' task was to understand how and whether the Domestic Council revise it completely. The report the President submitted to Congress'in present and proposed actions would affect these February 1972 bore iittle resemblance to what goals. This would require "systematic review in Congress had envisioned. It was called a "Report the course of decision-making of the possible on National Growth." The introductory statement effects, not just on the mission goal of each explained that the term "national urban growth decision-maker, but on other national goals as policy" was too narrow. Instead, the report would well; and improved evaluation of existing. activities cover national growth policy, "recognizing that with emphasis on both attainment of the missio n rural and urban community development are goal and effects on other goals;- inseparably linked." The report also interpreted The report concluded that such evaluation was the 1970 Act narrowly, pointing out that the much easier said than done." It then suggested statute required only that the report "assist in the developing an agreed-upon set of guidelines for development" of national policy; it was not re- the decision-making process. It did not, however, quired to "enunciate" such policy. produce any such guidelines. Most of the 1972 report featured Census Bureau The 1976 report, without measuring up to statistics about population growth and distribu- congressional expectations, was a decided im- tion, a recitation of the Nixon Administration's provement over the two earlier reports. HUD achievements in its first two years, and promo- convened a technical research program and se- tional descriptions of White House proposals then lected a 25-member federal interagency task force before Congress, including a proposed Depa:rt- to help delineate growth trends, identify problems ment of Community, Development, general and and present broad policy options. For the first social revenue sharing, national land use plan- time, public participation was permitted through ning, powerplant siting, and -welfare reform. seminars on regional growth and development Before the 1974 report was prepared, Ehrlich- held in Washington, D.C., Kansas City, and San man sent a detailed questionnaire to the Secre- Francisco. Also, HUD received funding with taries of HUD, Transportation, HEW ''and Com- which it let a number of contracts for preparation merce. Among the 135 questions were these: of technical materials as the basis for public and interagency discussion. A draft report was circu- Is there any reliable estimate of alternative lated for review and comment to 35 public-interest futures for the country in the absence of a national groups, trade groups, state and local government growth policy? representatives, areawide organizations and Con- Are there growth objectives which can safely gress, and HUD publicized the comments in a be said to have widespread or universal support separate volume. which are not being promoted by present Federal The 1976 report was subtitled "The Changing policy? Issues for National Growth." While the report How do we define the national interest-how identified ongoing problems, it did not offer de' do we balance the relative weights of economic, tailed analyses of their relation to the ftiture, nor social, and other considerations? did it adequately identify the options and altema- LESSONS FROM THE PAST 705 tives available. The principal recommendations reports, Senator Humphrey wrote that it had two for addressing the issues, the report stated, "can great flaws: be found in the Budget Message, the State of the Union Messag& and legislative proposals now First, even though it contains. considerably before the Cofigress." more information than earlier reports, it does not really help us to understand the meaning of the The report did, however, make suggestions for information it presents. increased public participation "to provide for Second, as in the past the report does not orderly and direct communication to the President confront the high priority problem presented by and the Congress of a wide range of perceptions the structure of decisionmaking processes that of national growth issues," and "to increase impede the formulation of growth and develop- public awareness of future implications of the ment policy for the United States. present policies and of the necessity to plan for the future." The report also suggested that, be- Humphrey recommended that the timing of the cause federa I assisItance for state and local growth report be changed so that it would be ready for each new Congress, that future reports contain planning efforts is fragmented and uncoordinated, "a designated element of the Executive Branch important research findings and relevant policy under the auspices of the Domestic Council recommendations presented elsewhere by the should accomplish the rationalization of Federal Administration, that the growth report receive planni ng assistance programs and requirements @Vider distribution, and that future reports give across department and agency lines." . increased attention to the problem of improving The first four chapters of the 19 176 report public access to the growth policy planning pro- cess. described national trends and the changes that "The fundamental issue in growth policy today were. appearing in the national economy -and is that the Federal Government, in both its society. Another nine chapters examined broad legislative,and executive branches, is not struc- policy alternatives in several areas of growth (such tured in such a way that it can systematically as energy impacts and promises and problems of assess long-range policy and program questions or alternative energy sources), growth consequences estimate long-range impacts of current decisions," of environmental regulations and environmental stated Humphrey and Senator Jacob Javits in a impacts on the location of. growth, choices in Joint Economic Committee document that re- natural resources, transportation policy, housing viewed the 1976 report. They added: "There is policy, and balanced economic growth. growing public concern about the performance of The National Forurn on Growth Policy, a Government, in part because of Government private. organization, comprising over 40 organi- promising more than it can deliver. We believe zations involved in business, the design profes- that this public concern is the result of an aware- sions, public interest matters, public affairs, the ness on the part of the public that the, Federal environment, civil rights, banking, and state and Government has failed to develop the capacity to local govermnent, sponsored a critique of the 1976 make public policy decisions in a rational, in- report, pointing out that the report did "not formed, future-oriented, and coherent way." contain recommended national goals, policy or One HUD official involved in the biennial programs." It was said that the report lacked a reports said that such one-shot studies were highly "theoretical framework needed to interpret the inadequate. An institution vested close to the meaning of the analytical information" and that it President, he believed, should be created for long- failed "to clearly articulate its assumptions and range studies and planning. The institution should define its terms." The Forum recommended that be in a position to cycle major presidential initia- the 1978 report should evaluate and recommend tives, like the state of the union address and the new institutions to improve the process of policy budget, through its members for response and development and should focus on revitalization of policy suggestions. The group should also be in a the central city, national housing policy, environ- position to consult with state and corporate lead- mental quality, and growth policy. ers and with members of Congress. Hubert Humphrey, as cochairman of the Senate For the 1978 report, the Democratic Administra-@ Joint Economic Committee's Subcommittee on tion recommended a revision of the 1970 Housing Economic Growth and Stabilization, submitted to and Urban Development Act in order to convert the HUD a detailed critique of the 1976 report, which biennial urban growth report into a national urban was longer than the report itself. Although he saw policy report. This change was made to reflect the it as an improvement over the 1972 and 1974 patterns of population and job movements and the 706 APPENDIX continuing decline of some older established cities mechanisms were needed for the study of critical since the 1970 Act. global problems. He selected energy as the study The President appointed the HUD Secretary in topic because he felt the world was moving March 1977 to head a federal working group that steadily, and with little apparent concern, toward would formulate the urban policy and recommen- a new and massive energy crisis. The catalytic daiions for national government action. Participat- ingredient of this new study was its use of people ing agencies included HUD, The Departments of who had major standing in their own communities Treasury, Labor, Transportation, and Commerce, and who had access to a network of influence in The Environmental Protection Agency, Commu- their own country. nity Services Administration, ACTION, and The Wilson assembled people who, rather than Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. In- being technical experts in energy, were high-level volvement of nonfederal groups was extensively representatives of large energy users or producers sought and encompassed the views of state and or government officials having some responsibility local officials, civil-rights, labor, and corporate for energy policy. Participants were from Canada, leaders, public-interest and volunteer groups, busi- Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iran, Italy, nessmen and businesswomen, and private citi- Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Swe- zens. den, the United Kingdom, the United States, and The President announced on March 27, 1978, a Venezuela. One-third of all the participants were comprehensive urban policy, based on the work- from government. ing group's recommendations and extensive White Each participant was required to choose and House discussion with many interest groups, provide funding for at least one associate who congressional representatives, and the public * could work nearly full-time for the Workshop and The urban policy set forth a framework of secure the necessary data and technical expertise concern for urban areas with special emphasis on for his country. Associates met 13 times for 1-2 remedial actions to help the older, more distressed week sessions over a period of 28 months. Partic- communities as well as preventative actions to ipants met seven times, 2-4 days at a time. The. avoid hurting them in the future. goals of the study were: Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies (1974) . To develop a useful method of projecting na- The Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies tional supply and demand for energy; (WAES) was a private sector initiative that in- cluded government and business decision-makers - To study supply and demand to 1985 and 2000 from 15 countries. It is included here as one Of for the countries participating in the Workshop, two nongovernmental examples of such a group which, together, consume most of the world's because it offers some valuable insights into energy; organizing for effectiveness on an international - To develop a method for estimating global scale. production of oil, gas, coal and nuclear power; Over a 3-year period ending in 1977, the Work- and shop produced the first energy assessment to the To determine whether and when prospective year 2000 on a nearly global scale (communist global shortages of certain fuels are likely to countries were not included). The project was led occur and how rapidly they might grow. by Carroll L. Wilson of the Massachusetts Insti- tute of Technology and -supported by a number of The report, published in a book, Energy: private philanthropic foundations, three corporate Global Prospects 1985-2000, contained conclu- foundations, and the National Science Founda- sions but did not make recommendations. tion. From the start, the project participants kept in Wilson had, in recent years, initiated and led a mind the need for adequate dissemination of the number of other studies such as the "Study of findings. Most members briefed the editorial Critical Environmental Problems'! (1969) and boards of the leading newspapers in their coun- "Man's Impact on Climate" (1970). He con- tries in advance of the release of the report. Press cluded, however, that while these and similar conferences were held on the same day in the studies received recognition in academic circles, capitals of the countries. Wilson testified before they were not adequately presented to decision- energy hearings in Congress, and participants makers. from several other countries communicated the The Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies information to their governments or to the private was bom of Wilson's belief that more effective sector. LESSONS FROM THE PAST 707 International Institute for Applied Systems lern to decision-making. The final energy project Anaylsis (1972) report is expected in 1979. Although IIASA is composed of scientific rep- A unique institution with a holistic approach to resentatives from industrial nations, the food and common problems that cannot be solved by any agriculture program is concerned also with a single country alone is the International Institute number of less developed countries (LDCs) that for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). The Insti- have agricultural economies-. The program objec- tute is situated near Vienna, Austria, and supports tives are to evaluate the nature and dimensions of about 100 research scientists. It is conside.red the world food situation, to study alternative nongovernmental because its members are scien- policy actions -at the national, regional, and global tific institutions from the participating nations and level that may alleviate existing and emerging food not the political entitites of the governments problems, and to determine how to meet the themselves. It was founded in October 1972 on nutritional needs of the growing global population. the initiative of the academies of science or Typical projects include developing a model.of equivalent institutions in 12 industrial nations, the dynamic interdependence between migration both East and West .(institutions from five other and human settlement patterns and agricultural countries have sm*ce joined the the institute). The technology, identifying and measuring the envi- Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. ronmental consequences of water use in agricul- National Academy of Sciences (funded through ture as constraints on agricultural production, and the National Science Foundation) contribute the modeling the agricultural structures of some pilot largest part of the financial support, and private LDCs-4esczibing their agricultural policy objec- sources such as philanthropic or corporate foun- tives and devising planning models suitable for dations contribute about $1 million a year. estimating the consequences of alternative na- IIASA's programs are classified as either tional policies. "global" (programs that affect and can be re- solved only by the actions of more than one nation) and "universal" (those that affect and can National Commission on Supplies and be resolved by actions of individual nations but Shortages; Advisory Committee on which all nations share). As the name of the National Growth Policy Processes (1975) Institution indicates,,its scientific research and . Another Nixon-Ford era initiative in the mate- study concentrate on applying modem methods of rials field with a major institutional objective was analysis to contemporary problems of society, the National Commission on Supplies and Short-' using the tools of modem management, such as ages and its separate Advisory Committee on systems theory, operations research, and cyber- National Growth Policy Processes. These activ- netics. Emphasis is placed on attempting to bridge ites, like the 1971-73 National Commission on the gap between scientists and decision-makers. Materials Policy, were conceived by Congress. The results of studies are widely communicated During 1974 Senate Majority Leader Mike Mans- through publications distributed by member sci- field pushed for legislation that resulted in creation entific institutions, and an effort is made to inform of the National Commission on Supplies and the nonexpert of the results of studies of interna- Shortages. He drew support from other members tional problems. of Congress concerned with the 1973-74 oil crisis Two current major global projects are on energy as well as shortages of other materials in the early systems and on food and agriculture. The energy 1970s. They believed that the shortages were a project is concentrating on finding strategies for symptom of inadequate preparation by govem- the transition over the next 15 to 50 years from an ment and that existing institutions were not doing, energy economy based on oil, gas, and conven- enough to identify and anticipate such shortages. tional coal to an economy based on the virtually They were also concerned that the data on inexhaustible resource s-solar, nuclear, and materials being collected in various agencies of geothermal-as well as to some extent on new the government, were not being systematically sources of coal. Research activities include study- coordinated and transmitted to the appropriate ing systems implications of the exploitation of agencies and to Congress. scarce energy resources; energy demand studies, However, Senator Mansfield's concern reached .such as one that projects global energy demand beyond shortages of materials. As Majority with regard to the development of regions, world Leader, he had become increasingly troubled and population growth, and changes in lifestyle; and a frustrated over the inability of government to study of strategies relating the nuclear-risk prob- identify resource availability problems in a timely 708 APPENDIX fashion and to suggest alternatives, for dealing with Defense. Production Act of 1950. The strategy them. Mansfield felt so -strongly about this that he worked, and the Congress approved the Mans- worked with Republican Senate leader Hugh Scott field-proposed National Commission on Supplies to get cooperation from the White House for the and Shortages, along with its Advisory Committee legislation and to work out an arrangement for on National Growth Policy Processes,. as part of making appointments to the Commission in a way the defense bill. President Ford signed the legisla- that would be satisfactory to President Nixon, tion in September 1974, a few weeks after taking who was not enthusiastic over the new Commis- office. sion. After a number of meetings, the White After almost a year's delay, resulting from the House agreed to back the bill, which would give inability of the White House to come up with Ahe President the opportunity to appoint 9 of the selections for the five private-sector members, the Commission's 14 members, 4 to be senior officials Commission finally got under way in September from the executive branch and 5 private citizens 1975. Donald Rice, president of the Rand Corpo- selected in consultation with the Majority and ration (a former assistant director of the Office of Minority Leaders of the Senate. Management and Budget), became chairman. . The original idea was for a 6-month study using Many of the administration and congressional existing data but focusing on institutional changes members of the Commission did not personally that could aid in examination and anticipation of attend Commission meetings, which were held shortages. When the enabling legislation went to 'every six weeks or so; they sent delegates instead. the floor. for passage, however, it provided for a The early Commission meetings were not an- one-year study. On the day the bill was to be nounced in the Federal Register, although osten- voted on in the Senate, Hubert Humphrey intro- sibly they were open to the public. Later meet- duced an amendment to add a Citizens Advisory ings, at which decisions were made, were-open Committee and expand the list of study areas only to Commission members. beyond materials and into almost all parts of the The Commission did not attempt any new data Government. Humphrey's purpose was to de- collection or make supply-and-demand projections velop recommendations for establishing a more into the future. Instead it analyzed available adequate economic policyrnaking process and information, concluding that "we see little reason structure within the executive and legislative to fear that the world will run out of natural br-anches-. resources during the [next] quarter Century." For years, Humphrey had been interested in 'Nine case studies were prepared that examined getting better institutional arrangements for devel- the causes of shortages in certain materials during oping economic policies and alternatives to deal the 1973-74 period. The Commission's major with future problems. Earlier in 1974, as part of a recommendations were for improvement of data Humphrey legislative proposal for a Balanced collection and analysis in specific government National Growth and Development Act, the Sen- agencies, with emphasis on line agencies. On the ator had proposed a National Citizens Council on subject so important to Senator Mansfield-a new the American Future. institution for policyrnaking-the Commission When Humphrey introduced his amendment to wound up recommending the creation within the the Mansfield bill, the Majority Leader opposed Office of Management and Budget of a unit of 20- the surprise amendment because he thought it 30 "sectoral and industry specialists" to monitor would unnecessarily burden his bill. But Hum- key materials industries and sectors, to develop a phrey was insistent, and Mansfield eventually framework for analyzing the comprehensive ef- agreed to a watered-down version of the amend- fects of proposed major federal policy actions, ment. When the amended bill was approved by and to monitor the basic data collection, data the Senate, many observers believed the Hum- analysis, and policy analysis activities of the line phrey-proposed Advisory Committee would be agencies and departments. They also recom- eliminated in a Senate-House Conference. mended adding 10 senior staff positions to to the For several weeks a good deal of political President's Council of Economic Advisers to build maneuvering took place as presidential support up sectoral and industry analysis capabilities in for the Mansfield bill waned. White House offi- the materials area. cials felt that another presidential commission was The Commission's report, "Government and unnecessary. Late in September, however, Mans- the Nation's Resources," was released the first field used the tactic of offering the entire bill, week of 1977. The timing could not have been which already had passed the House, in the form worse. Not only had Senator Mansfield left office, of an amendment to another bill to change the but both of the senators who served on the LESSONS PROM THE PAST 709 Commission had been defeated, -and one of the institutionalization of @the planning process in an two House members had left office. The Admin- independent executive branch agency to be cre- istration was changing, and the mining industry ated by Congress and called the National Growth was upset over one of the recommendations and Development Commission. The new Commis- concerning the U.S. Bureau ofMines. Staff Direc- sion would,have the mandate "to examine emerg- tor -George Eads spent January 1977 working at ing issues of middle- to long-range growth and the'Council of Economic Advisers, seeking to get -development., and to suggest feasible alternatives some of the Commission's ideas implemented. for the Congress, the President, and the public." The only bright -spot was a hearing held by the The Commission would provide an early warning Senate Subcornmittee on Science, Technology, system that would identify and examine policy andt Space (of the Commerce Committee), which issues before they surfaced as crises. It Would gave-some visibility to the report's findings and have no executive, legislative, or judicial powers. recommendations. The Advisory Committee recommended that ena- While the National Commission on Supplies bling legislation to establish the National Growth and Shortages was making its year-long,study and and Development Commission should require the preparing its report, its Advisory Committee on President and Congress- to respond in some fash- National Growth Policy Processes had been at ion to the Commission's reports. The proposed work along separate, and sometimes conflicting Commission would conduct its affairs openly and lines. The- Advisory Committee's 19 members all hold public hearings. It would submit an annual came from outside 'Government and included a@ report to Congress and the President, setting forth former Cabinet member and a noted presidential its proposed research agenda, the status of ongo- historian. Industrialist Arnold A. Saltzman was, ing work, and a summary of the reaction'from named Advisory Committee- Chairman. The staff Congress, the President, and the public to pre- director, James E. Thornton, had been the Author vious reports. The new Commission would re- of the Humphrey amendment that established the ceive an initial budget authorization for eight years Committee, and while working on the Senate to ensure its continuity. To balance presidential Agriculture and Forestry Committee had helped and congressional influence, the chairman of the Humphrey on his proposal for achieving balanced Commission would be appointed by the President, national growth and development. but the President would be required to zconsult The legislation authorizing the Advisory Com- with the congressional leadership before making mittee provided.a wide-ranging mandate ("to Commission appointments. The Advisory Com- develop recommendations, as to the establishment mittee report also suggested that the new Commis- of a policyrnaking process and structure within sion consist of nine people, *five full-time and four the executive and, legislative branches of the part-time (allowing for participation by those not Federal Government as a means to integrate the able- to accept full-time appointments). Terms of study of supplies and shortages of resources and offlice would run for five years. No member could commodities into the total problem of balanced be, removed except for cause, and @ all appoint- national growth and development"). The Advisory ments would require Senate confirniation. , , Committee, however, had a sparse budget that .The Advisory Committee was not unanimous supported only a staff director and one Assistant, on this recommendation. @ One Committee member and many of the Committee members paid their argued that it would give too much power to "the own expenses when attending monthly meetings. group of wise men," as the Cortimittee members Members wrote their *own papers. and worked up informally referred to the members of the pro- proposals between meetings. 'The issue that re- posed Commission. ceived most attention was-the Attempt to deter- Another institutional recommendation of the mine how:to improve the long-range policyrnaking Advisory Committee was the creation of a Center processes of government in both the executive for Statistical Policy and Analysis to coordinate and.legislative branches. : . I @ statistical support for the work 'of the President In its report to the President and Congress, the and Congress. The Center would be an independ- Advisory Committee urged that the nation become ent agency. in the executive'branch, but outside not a planned society, but a planning society. the Executive Office of the President. Adequate and open planning for the future would I Among recommendations of the Advisory Com- result in less governmental interference, and the mittee that dealt with Congress was one that necessary government intervention would be more would require each congressional committee r6- considered, more timely, and less heavy-handed. port accompanying proposed legislation to include The report's, prime recommendation was for the an outline of the bill'sToreseeable indirect middle- 710 APPENDIX to long-range effects, as well as a concise state- in scope, at least to the extent of considering the ment of the general goals and specific objectives needs and resources of friendly nations. But while of the bill. , the harmful effects of population growth, resource Reflecting one'of the major differences of ap- consumption, and pollution spread across borders proach between the parent National Commission and oceans, the international approach to long- on Supplies and Shortages and its Advisory Com- range planning for solutions to these problems mittee, the Commission in its report expressed continues to be neglected. ' doubts concerning creation of an independent new 4. When commissions or other bodies have National Growth and Development Commission, as -recommended by the Advisory Committee. In been formed to consider long-term problems in the formal letter to the President and to Congress population, natural resources, and the environ- submitting the Advisory Committee's report, ment, their effectiveness has been hampered by Commission Chairman Rice stated that the Com- lack of provisions for following up on their mission believed that the proposed new institution recommendations. In several cases the heads of "fails the test of feasibility and that the aims commissions felt so strongly about the need for sought would be better met by the proposals we ongoing institutions that they set up private orga- have made in our own report for improving the nizations on their own to follow up with their analytical capabilities of existing agencies and group's recommendations, which have led to departments." The impact of the two groups' some efforts of ongoing analysis. reports was marred by this disagreement. 5. One recommendation has been made by Conclusions virtually every presidential commission on popu- lation, natural resources, or the environment: the Some Observations establishment of a permanent body somewhere high in the executive branch for performing con- 1. For the past 70 years the nation's leadership tinuous futures research and analysis. Although has perceived periodically a need for long-term ideas for location of such a permanent group have analysis of problems relating to natural resources, varied, proposals have generally indicated that a population, or the environment. For the most statutorily created institution with access to the part, these issues have been addressed on an ad President could explore potential goals, watch for hoc basis by appointing presidential commissions trends, and look at alternate possibilities for or other temporary groups to study the situation, accomplishing stated objectives. make their reports, and then disband. As a result, decision-makers continue to deal primarily with immediate problems, while consideration of how Lessons from the Past to prepare for conditions that might exist 10, 20, The recommendation of President Truman's or 30 years in the future is postponed for lack of Materials Policy Commission for an advisorybody adequate. and systematic information on the op- in the Executive Office of the President to,frame tions available and on the social, economic, and recommendations for policy up to 25 years ahead environmental impacts of alternate choices. went unheeded. The National Goals Research .2. Future-oriented commissions or study groups Staff was terminated by President Nixon after have generally studied natural resources problems completing only one of its scheduled annual separately from problems related to population reports on goals, and before it could complete its and the environment. There has been insufficient work of setting up in the private sector a National recognition of the interTelation of these three Center for Goals and Alternatives to work with issues. Each succeeding year, as the problems the governmental efforts at decision-making for become more complex and the interrelationships the future. The National Materials Policy Com- more involved, the need for a holistic approach to mission (appointed by President Nixon in 1971), decision-making becomes more urgent. recommended creation of a comprehensive Cabi- net-level agency for looking at the future in terms 3. Most analyses of ftiture problems in popula- of materials, energy, and the environment, but the tion, natural resources, and the environment have recommendation produced no results.. And the been made only on a national basis. President 1976 recommendation of the National. Commission Truman recognized the need for assessing global on Supplies and Shortages' Advisory Committee implications of natural resources when he in- on National Growth Policy Processes, calling for structed his Materials Policy Commission in 1951 a permanent National Growth and Development to make its study of materials policy international Commission, was submitted in the last few weeks LESSONS FROM THE PAST of the outgoing Ford Administration, too late to the other Commissions and groups dealing with fu- be acted upon. The Advisory Committee had ture problems. urged that a permanent institution for planning Involvement of the private sector in the activi@ conduct its affairs 'openly, hold public hearings, ties of a permanent future-oriented high-level and submit an annual report setting forth its advisory group would serve both to educate proposed research agenda, the status of ongoing citizens and build a-constituency for carrying out work, and a summary of reactions fi7om Congress recommendations. This was demonstrated by the and the President to previous reports. 1958 Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Com- In the one case in which a President did mission when it formed an advisory council that establish-without congressional authorization-a include& 25 citizen leaders representing varied mechanism for long-range planning and advice, citizen organizations. The Commission held joint the institution was often at odds with other meetings and field trips with the advisory council, agencies and with the Congress and was finally and Commission recommendations were submit- legislated out of existence by Congress. This was ted in draft form to the advisory council for Franklin D. Roosevelt's National Resources Plan- consideration. A Citizens Committee that was ning Board and its earlier entities. When the formed after completion of the Commission report Board helped to coordinate activities of some helped obtain support for implementing the rec- Cabinet agencies and to get their ideas before the ommendations. The seminars and public hearings President, it had some success. But when it tried held by the 1970 Commission on Population to establish its own field staff and do its own Growth and the American Future served an planning, it incurred 'hostility from regular line educational purpose. And the Commission's Citi- agencies. Roosevelt's Board also did most of its zens Committee, which promoted a film and an work in secret, which aroused further antagonism. education program on the Commission's work, On the other hand, in the one case in which provided new avenues for dissemination of the Congress enacted legislation (the National Envi- findings. Public participation in the 1976 National ronmental Policy Act of 1969) to establish a Growth and Development report through seminars permanent Council on Environmental Quality to in San Francisco, Kansas City, and Washington, advise the President regularly on long-term na- provided advisory assistance to the HUD team tional environmental policies, the results were preparing the report. A draft of the report was indecisive and the Council has not yet been used circulated for review and comment to 35 public to its statutory potential. groups and Congress. These activities proved A permanent advisory group could provide helpful to a report which previously had inputs early warning of problems so that public officials only from a few people in the White House and private citizens would have time to prepare Domestic Council and the Department of Housing contingency plans. As demonstrated by the presi- and Urban Development. dential commissions, research and analysis of long-term impacts can have a significant educa- The Matter of Timing tional influence, even if no actions are taken A permanent institution would have much more immediately as a result of recommendations. Tru- freedom in choosing the moment to present new man's Materials Policy Commission and the 1%1- ideas, and thus avoid the timing and politics- 62 National Academy of Sciences Committee'on related problems that have often hindered activi- Natural Resources brought large numbers of sci- ties of temporary presidential commissions. The entists and other experts together to work on interest of a President or Congress or the public future problems and thus formed a cadre of proved to be much greater at the time a study is individuals who continued to enlighten others. started than when it is completed. The Materials The study groups also helped to coordinate re- Policy Commission was appointed by President search efforts among government, universities, Truman in January 1951, when military involve- and industry. An immeasurable educational factor ment in Korea had reintroduced fears of shortages was present in the activity of the Commission on that were still fresh in the minds of administrators Population Growth and the American Future and the public following World War 11. But when (1970-72) through Commission-sponsored semi- the Commission's report went to the President in nars with experts, public hearings, a film, and June 1952, the scarcity issue had lost its priority brochures. The research work directed by the and public concern. When President Nixon sent a Commission also resulted in extensive new knowl- Message to Congress in 1969 asking for creation edge and its dissemination through publication of of a commission to study population growth, the its research papers. The same has been true of ail subject was politically attractive inasmuch as 712---- APPENDIX people were concerned about rising birthrates. Another problem.of timing was the frequent long But by the time the Population Commission's delays between the request for a commission and report was submitted, statistics showed that the its creation, or between the time the law was birthrate in the nation had already: declined to a passed, and the President appointed the public stability rate-two children per family-and the members. Sometimes the period allowed for a subject had less political importance. Another study was too short, as with the preparation of unfavorable timing factor was that the report was "Toward a Social Report." That study also ran sent to the President at the start of his 1972 re- into a frequent timing problem: having been election campaign; some of the Commission's started, by one President' the study,is then submit- recommendations raised controversy, causing the ted either at the end of his term or to his President to. repudiate the Commission's work. successor. .On the other hand, the release of the report of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commis- For all of these reasons, many observers- have sion came at a time. when the popularity of urged the establishment by law of:a permanent outdoor recreation was@ booming, and Congress group in the Executive Office of the President to welcomed help in devising solutions to the prob- institutionalize the coordination of long-term lems connected with the growing recreation use of global - and holistic considerations of population, public lands, national parks, and national forests. resources, environment, and their related issues. Appendix B Advisory Views: A Critique of the Study The agency experts who prepared the Global Study's projections had been based on the; as- 2000 Study projections were assisted by the coun- sumption that real petroleum prices would be sel of two groups of advisers. These advisers, constant throughout the 1975-2000 period. whose names and affiliations are given in the Although many of the insights and criticisms,of Preface to this volume, provided the agency these two groups have been previously taken into experts with counsel, insights, and criticisms from account throughout this report, numerous insights the perspectives of corporations, foundations, na- and criticisms which they provided could not be tional and international governmental organiza- taken into account because of the,particular focus tions, and the academic community. of the Study, because of time and resource The first group consisted of over one hundred constraints, and because of basic limitations in the informal advisers who received. early drafts of current ability of the government to develop long- sections of the Study related to their areas of terrn global projections. A,summary of a repre- expe rtise. Throughout the course of the Study, sentative selection of these comments is presented they provided a flow of marginal comments, in this appendix in the hope that it will provide correspondence, supporting materials, and direct additional perspectives on ways of improving the discussions, which greatly enhanced the final government's foundation for longer-term planning. quality of the Study. The somewhat diffuse summary that follows The second group consisted of seven experts consolidates the views of many individual advis- with unique experience in analyzing-on a coher- ers. It does not necessarily represent a consistent ent, interrelated basis-long-term global trends set of positions supported by any single person or involving population, resources,.and the environ- organization associated with the Global 2000 ment. These "outside" experts (so called to Study. In fact, many advisers of both groups as distinguish them from the agency experts prepar- well as other participants in the Study would ing the projections) participated in extended dis- probably disagree with many of these criticisms. cussions with the agency experts on two occa- sions during the course of the Study. The first Chamcteristics of the Recent Past occurred immediately after the first drafts of the projections were developed. This meeting of the Many advisers were concerned that the Study's two groups of experts lasted two days and led to projections were based to a large extent on the several key revisions in the initial drafts. The extrapolation of trends and relationships charac- second meeting took place after the final projec- teristic of the past two or three decades only. tions had. been developed. It lasted one day and They asserted that data pertaining to the past two provided many additional interpretative insights. or three decades is often misleading and that quite The wisdom and expertise that these two different trends or relationships can be perceived groups shared with the Global 2000 Study has when a longer past period is taken into considera- influenced the Study in innumerable ways. Per- tion. haps the single most dramatic instance of this With respect to weather, for example, they influence was the collective decision of the agency pointed out that the three decades preceding 1970 and outside experts, during their first meeting, to were unique in recorded history in three respects: include the assumption that real petroleum prices (1) There were no major global geophysical pertur- will rise 5 percent annually from 1980 to 2000 as a bations; (2) on balance, crop-growing weather basic component of the Study's most likely pro- worldwide was not only remarkably close to jdctions, wherever feasible. Previously, all of the optimal conditions, but was also remarkably non- 713 714 APPENDIX variable; and (3) at no time was there a global, as important trends over the 1978-2000 period are opposed to local, depression of crop production not likely to be adequately identified, described, traceable to a global perturbation. or interpreted unless longer-term future perspec- .Most advisers felt that the Global 2000 Study tive is taken into account. should have used a much longer past period of One adviser provided the following examples of weather history as its basis for projecting the events in the past that might have been more potential impacts of weather variability over the favorably influenced if their longer-term implica- next 22 years. Many felt that the use of a shorter, tions had been better understood at the time of anomalous period has given the Study's projec- their incidence: tions an unduly optimistic bias-for instance, with - The dysfunctional use of new chemical agents pro- regard to the likely impact of weather on future duced from the bonding of halogens and hydrocar- crop yields. They speculated that other anomali es bons (e.g., DDT and PCBs). of the past two to three decades involving varia- - The low nonmarket pricing of natural gas and bles other than weather may also have distorted underpricing of oil that caused many industrial the projections. processes to be unsuitably fueled and many power- Many advisers were concerned also that the plants to be converted from coal to these fuels in Study tended to project only those characteristics recent decades. of the recent past for which "hard" quantitative The failure to balance the benefits of subsidizing data were readily available. For example, they family farms at modest levels against the socioeco- noted that the GNP projections ignored the major nomic costs of driving the rural poor into city slums segments of LDC economies that were not cash and endless welfare problems. economies, that the energy projections ignored Another adviser, looking to the longer-term firewood consumption (a major fuel in the LDCs), future, suggested that the uncritical development and that the food, energy, and mineral projections of energy resources (which she perceives to be ignored water consumption. They felt, in addition, taking place today) might have similarly dysfunc- that the available hard data was often used in tional consequences in the future--consequences ways that implied that it was of higher quality might be avoided or ameliorated if they were than was in fact the case.* properly perceived and responded to today. In her These advisers asserted that, in general, a more view, the greatest problem is not, as most think, ,extensive attempt should have been made---on a how to obtain what we need, but that we will use best-effort basis-to project those characteristics too much of it. Most energy projections for of the recent past for which hard data were not developed countries are far too high-but not readily available. Specifically, they felt that the because we might not actually use that much if it Study should have first attempted to identify were available. The danger is that we would- important issues related to population, resources, with disastrous results for the ecosphere and, and the environment, and only thereafter should inevitably, for ourselves. Such rapidly rising en- have proceeded to (1) identify the trends that must er-gy use would also put enormous pressure on be projected in order to analyze those issues on a other resources. balanced basis, and (2) develop projections of Still other advisers, also looking to the longer- those trends in the best way possible under the term future, suggested that the most important constraints of the Study, with explicit notes in- changes currently taking place-changes that are cluded regarding ranges of potential error. likely to produce major unforeseen dysfunctional consequences if they are not properly perceived Beyond the Year 2000 and responded to-are socioeconomic and cultural Many advisers were concerned that, in general, rather than biophysical. The pervasive fragmenta- the Study's projections do not extend beyond the tion they perceive to be taking place in Western year 2000. They asserted that some of the most industrialized society has been particularly well outlined, according to one observer, by Bertram *One adviser felt that the population projections were Gross: particularly unbalanced. He observed that, on the one hand, From the broader point of view, [there are] many inappropriately elaborate computational procedures were forms of fragmentation in the emerging service society: applied to what are essentially very rough estimates of -in technology, the fr-a mentation of knowledge, future fertility, mortality and migration (taken to be zero) .9 rates, while, on the other hand, no explicit relationships -in macrosystems, the fragmentation of responsibility were used to relate social, economic, and cultural (as and accountability, opposed to "demographic") factors into the projection of -in extended Iprofessionalism, the fragmentation of fertility, mortality and migration rates. social role, skills, and culture, ADVISORY VIEWS 715 -in extended urbanism, the fragmentation of commu- NATURAL SURPRISES nity life. 1. Disasters To this, [must be added] the fragmentation of the 1. Weather family and the individual.* a. Large scale crop or livestock destruc- Some even, suggested that this fragmentation tion (e.g., due to frost, drought, flood, ought to be examined in the context of the or snow) Decline-of-the-West perspective adopted by some b. Societal disruption (e.g., due to floods scholars and statesmen. One adviser quoted or blizzards) Andr6 Malraux: 2. Earthquake We are living at the end of a quite unprecedented 3. Disease era, the end of the 1450-1950 cycle, which was a a. Crop or livestock epidemic (e.g., corn model of complete civilization. 1450 marked the begin- blight) ning of the great discoveries, and the conquest of-the b. Severe flu or other human diseases world by the Europeans. Within two or three years of on the same scale (e.g., Legionnaire's 1950, we had Mao in PLking and Nehru's speech-in disease and similar epidemics) other words the liberation of China and India. 11. Other We are more or less aware that we live in a world 1. Resources-unexpected discoveries (e.g., that is dying, and we find it very difficult to imagine huge petrochemical resources on continen- another one. There was also, I suppose, the end of tal margins or in marine basins) Rome, but by the time people became aware of the 2. Food--extraordinary growing seasons re- fact it was already well and truly dead. We, on the sulting in food surpluses. other hand, are actually living out the process.* Another adviser commented that projecting TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISES trends only to the year 2000 reminded him of the 1. Distribution failures story about the man failing from a very tall 1. New York City-ty0e blackout-longer or buflding who, when asked how he was doing as wider area he passed the 10th floor, responded, "Things are 2. Water system failure (e.g., Trenton in great so far!" Many severe supply constraints, 1976) increases in. demand, and socioeconomic and 3. Gas or oil pipeline failure ecological changes may well occur shortly after 4. Toxic I .eak-4e.g., chlorine or ammonia in 2000-and be, completely overlooked by the a population center) Study's projections because the projections do not 5. Nuclear mishap--generation, transport, or extend,beyond 2000. Other severe changes that . waste do occur prior to 2000 may also be disregarded 6. Prolonged temperature inversion causing because, in the absence of a post-2000 perspec- serious air pollution incidents tive, they may not be perceived or their signifi- 11. Design or concept failures cance may not be understood. 1. Chemicals appearing in unpredicted places (e.g., PCBs) Absence of Shocks 2. Chemicals with long lasting and/or highly Many advisers were concerned that the focus toxic degradation products of the Global 2000 Study on projecting foreseeable 3. Bridge, building, or.dam failure trends -necessarily excluded projecting shocks 111. Advances whose incidence, severity, and specific impacts 1. Solution to clean fusion could only be arbitrarily specified. They asserted 2. Water recycling technology or acceptance that assuming a complete absence of such shocks breakthrough was unrealistic and produced an overly optimistic 3. Tide or ocean thennal power breakthrough assessment of the future. 4. Cancer or heart disease cure One adviser provided the following taxonomy 5. Development of self fertilizing crops to suggest the range of potential "surprises" that had been excluded from the Study's projections: SOCIAL SURPRISES 1. Overthrow of,government *Bertram M. Gross, "Planning in an Era of Social Revolu- 11. Widespread social disorder tion", Public Administration Review, May/June 1971, p. 111. Collapse of a social system 281. *"Interview with Andre@ Malraux", The Guardian, Apr. 13, in many cases, the Study's advisers believed 1974, p. 14. the transient effects of such shocks would be far 716 APPENDIX more severe than their long-term impacts. For have profound effects on the kinds and amounts of example, many felt that the shock of the 1973 environmental impact from energy use and mobiliza- quadrupling of the international price of oil was tion, on economic systems, on politics (local to inter- far more damaging to most countries than the national), and on social values such as pers 'onal liberty. anticipated long-tertri impact of the price rise was Many advisers were concerned that the Global li kely to be. 2000 Study_by ignoring potential shocks, might Many advisers also believed that the projected encourage policyrnakers to disregard impacts on emergence of increasing international and national system resilience-i.e., a system's ability to.with- economic interdependencies and other trends stand different types of potential future shocks- (e.g., increasing agricultural reliance on mon0cul- in evaluating alternative policy options, when in ture 'Production) is likely to increase the severity fact this should be an important evaluative crite- of such shocks when they do occur. For example, rion. They were also concerned that the Study even simple variations in weather patterns similar tended to disregard the differential impact of to those experienced in the past may create shocks (and more gradual change) on . smaller impacts disregarded in the Study. According to groups, disaggregated by region, income, race, one adviser: religion, and other factors. The U.S. economy is increasingly moving in the Potential Discontinuities direction of very tight coupling between importing fuel and paying for fuel imports by exporting crops. Amer- To a large extent, the Global 2000 Study's ica's ability to purchase fuel will thus be increasingly projections were based on extrapolations of past influenced by its crop-growing weather (which will trends and relationships, although minor adjust- affect U.S. production) and crop-growing weather in ments to such trends were incorporated in many the countries that import most of America's exported cases. This was an area of concern to many crops (which will affect foreign demand for U.S. advisers who considered that,the future is likely crops). As a result, the American energy supply and demand situation will be increasingly sensitive to a to be fundamentally discontinuous with the past variety of types of weather perturbation, which collec- in significant ways. tively have a probability close to one of occurring at They pointed out, for example, that real energy 22-year intervals. Other, less expected perturbations prices have been declining for most of the past (e.g., blights, the discovery of unacceptable side ef- century, encouraging the use of energy-intensive fects associated with fertilizer, herbicide, or pesticide products (e.g., aluminum, automobiles, high-yield use, the politicization of international food production varieties of grain), and in general facilitating the or distribution, climatic change, or civil or intema- substitution of capital for labor. Real food and tional disruption) could have far more severe impacts. mineral prices have also generally been declining. Many advisers also believed that many current They felt that the reversal of these basic trends U.S. policy alternatives would be likely to have indicated in the Study's projections was likely to different potential impacts in increasing or de- severely alter domestic and international socioec- creasing America's future vulnerability to such onomic systems so that in the future they would shocks. One adviser thought that this was partic- behave in ways not at all characteristic of 'the ularly true with regard to choosing to emphasize past. nuclear or alternative energy sources: Many advisers insisted that this is not only Once the choice has been made---especially if the possible but probable, in view of what they choice is to put all our eggs in one nuclear basket- perceive to be the following general trends: future options may be foreclosed. If the first choice - Approaching exhaustion of the world's, inexpensive proves disastrous, it may not be possible to abandon it fluid fuel reserves. and start over because of resource contraints, includ- - Approaching limits to the environmental absorptive ing energy. In @contrast, many advantages would accrue capacity and agricultural productive capacity of the to a strategy based on a diverse decentralized mix of planet-which may be prevented only by massive energy sources designed to minimize waste and match capital investment (which is either not likely to be source to end use. Among the advantages .would be made or which is likely to be characterized by efficiency in the use of energy (reducing environmental increasingly high marginal costs). impacts), probably a lower overall pressure on re- sources -per unit of energy (because a wider variety - Shifts in international strategic goals from ensuring would be needed for various types of development and access to markets to ensuring access to raw mate- because of efficiency), and flexibility in the energy rials. economy. If one mode proves unsatisfactory, its loss - Shifts in power from countries with large industrial could be made up from several others without disrupt- resources to countries with large raw material m- ing the entire system. Which direction is chosen will sources. ADVISORYVIEWS 717 �Shifts in economic goals from stimulated supply And merely projecting past trends and relationships. demand to stimulated conservation. According to some advisers, many of these scen- �Shifts in social goals from growth to equity. atios might appear to be more desirable than those likely to be attained through incremental decision- Some advisers were particularly concerned that making practices, which they believed would be the following specific political factors (and policy implicitly encouraged by the Study's lack of changes which might be associated with them) normative analysis. In. their . view, the Study were not taken into account in most of the Study's neither (11.) presents an array of goalsi to strive for projections: (while demonstrating the feasibility of attaining, �Negotiations over a new international economic these goals), nor (2) indicates which present policy order, which may affect the availability and price of decisions, are the most critical in defining the many raw m .aterials. future. They viewed these as the two most *Other North-South disputes (e.g., those involved in important objectives of future-oriented research the Law of the Sea negotiations), which may make and considered the Study seriously deficient, for international environmental cooperation increasingly disregarding them. -difficult. Some advisers argued that the absence of �The new shift in development models toward meet- normative analysis from the Study has probably ing basic human needs, which may lead to new led to irrelevance and bias. One adviser submitted pressures on available resources. the following quote to support his points: Increasing poverty in the poorest LDCs, which may A few decades, ago the view prevailed that demo- lead to significant political unrest. graphic -"stagnation" was bad;,yet.today many people They felt that the Study should have explicitly favor a stable, or nearly stable population. Economic taken such factors into account by making major stagnation, on the other hand, is still felt to be bad. rather than minor adjustments to variables involv- Perhaps in the year 2000, more of us will favor John Stuart Mill's "stationary state," not only in the ing the supply and demand for resources, and by demographic sphere but also in much of the economic making major adjustments to all models to reflect sphere (though.. not in culture). If this happens,, eco- projected severe environmental impacts. nomic growth-will be smaller than we now project on the basis of the current trade-off between more goods Absew@e of Normative Analysis and more leisure. By the same token, -people will care less about economic growth. Thus, our predictions All of the Study's projections assumed, in regarding economic growth will not only be rather general, a continuation of past policies or past inaccurate, but they will describe what, by the year policy trends (in part because policy changes are 2000, will be quite an uninteresting feature.* difficult to project and in part because. debate As a result of these and other considerations, regarding projected policy changes can attract many advisers regretted that the Study did noV attention Away from underlying problems)., Never- theless, many of the Study's advisers. noted that incorporate normative analyses of the following policies are likely'to change in response to chang- types of issues: ing circumstances, and that not taking such Political issues 'e.g., whefher the Western in- change into. account produces trend projections that are likely to be severely biased. dustrialized nations are likely to encourage or IThey pointed out, moreover, that people often even permit, faster growth of energy use in the look ahead and change their current behavior in LDCs while curbing the ir own growth (or, more order to achieve their future goals, just as people generally, whether resource competition will lead often change their current goals to take into to international conflict). account anticipated future circumstances. Thus, Ethical issu'es--e.g., whether investment in pol-, they felt, it may be seriously misleading to project lution control in the U.S. (assuming minor health the future, as the Study has done, Without taking benefits) is ethically acceptable, given the much into consideration that behavior and goals can higher returns in health that the same investment change well in advance of changing circumstan- ces. might produce in the LDCs. By not explicitly projecting potential changes in Budgetary issues@e-g_ whether current U.S. goals and goal-seeking behavior, the Study missed budgetary decision s'affecting, for example, de- an important opportunity to identify a broad set of alternative future scenarios which might well be *Fred Charles lkle, "Can Social Predictions Be Evalu Iated?" significantly different from those identifiable by Daedalus, Summer 1967, p. 750. 718 APPENDIX fense, energy, food, and welfare programs conflict One- adviser commented that, for example, with U.S. long-term international goals regarding many of the Study's projections are in effect population, resources, and the environment. tautologies-oremises masquerading as conclu- sions. He felt:that, in many cases, the projections Many advisers emphasized, in particular,'their mere Ily provide a frarn'ework for making prejudices feeling that problems related to the unequal distri-' consistent. In his view:, butionof population and resources are likely to e more significant in the future-than proble s Many of the projeciion tools that will be used to make the resource and food projections require GNP projec- related, for example, to potential physical li ts tions as inputs. But how can we predict GNP? to growth. But because of the absence in the Economic models can do so only by assuming some Study of normative analyses of political, ethical, appropriate algorithm and investing future habits with budgetary, and other issues, they felt that an current mores. Moreover, such models almost cer- adequate foundation had not been established, in tainly require such inputs as the capital and energy requirements for resource exploitation and population the context of the Study, for commenting exten- growth. But where are those data to be found, or sively on these distributional problems. elucidated? Thus, the Study's projections must remain Many also regretted that the Study's focus (as essentially pious hopes in which "high" economic well as time and resource contraints) did not growth may be attractive to a politician, but unattrac- permit more penetrating economic analysis-es- tive to an environmentalist. pecially one taking potential normative change Some advisers observed that in many cases even into consideration. One adviser noted, in particu- this limited form of consistency was not achieved lar, that within a given set of projections. To paraphrase one of their criticisms with regard to the energy the assumptions of formal economics are not inexora- projections: ble laws of nature, like the laws of thermodynamics. Their truths are, in part, fiction-that is to say, made In one instance the assertion is made that the past truths. They are true as long as people believe in and wide availability and low price of petroleum have, act in accordance with them; their validity is a function allowed Americans and consumers to substitute energy of their acceptance. As values change, some of the for labor and other inputs on an unprecedented scale. assumptio -ns of formal economics and the behavior of Such an assertion is in accord with a conceptual model economic systems are also likely to change in ways that assumes that low energy prices (relative to the that might be anticipated or even guided. cost of labor) stimulate an energy-for-labor substitu- tion, which, by implication, would tend to increase Many advisers were concerned that the Study, unemployment, increase rates of resource depletion, by not incorporating normative analysis, might pollution,. and crime, increase government expendi- encourage policymakers to debate issues only at tures, decrease capital availability for other purposes, the instrumental level (i.e., how best to accom- and decrease the rate of economic growth. In fact, every step of that causal pathway can be documented plish well-understood and widely accepted goals) in longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses of all without evaluating alternative goals or even as- available data. sessing whether, in many cases, presumed exist . In contrast, in another instance, the assertion is Ing made that apart from the very real possibility of a goals are in fact well understood or widely ac- supply disruption for political or other reasons, the cepted. major problem faced by the United States and other energy consuming countries is the threat of large increases in real energy prices and the associated Hidden Premises reduction in economic growth and aggravation of All the Study's projections were developed unemployment and inflation. In fact, the causal path- making use of available data and were structured way .postulated here is the opposite to that postulated as previously, and there is no support for it in longitudinal and manipulated according to existing theory, or cross-sectional analysis of national or international represented in the methodological tools used by data. the various agencies. This was an object of I this logical inconsistency raises important misgiv- concern to several advisers. They asserted that ings regarding the usefulness of the energy projections. various hidden premises, missing variables, and The establishment. of a realistic, consistent conceptual inadequate data and methodologies inherent in model of the relationship between energy prices and this approach may have created projections that other economic@ variables is an absolute prerequisite to disseminate misconception and error rather than making any kind of. credible projection of energy knowledge. supply or energy dernand. ADVISORY VIEWS 719 Missing Variables Similar concerns related to consistent accounting (and ethics) are likely to arise with regard to. the Many advisers felt that crucial variables and deployment of labor and capital. For example, entry- variable linkages were omitted from the projec- level labor, at'least for the next 20 years, will decline tions. A small repr Iesentative sampling is provided in the United States and increase rapidly in Mexico below: (and in many Caribbean countries). Wages, however, are variously estimated at up to 10 times greater in the United States than in Mexico. In the foreseeable The population projections omit health factors. future, at entry-level employment, migrants--legal and Unfortunately, none of the Study's population scen- illegal.--could be adding more new workers to the U.S. arios assumes increased mortality rates, although these labor force than entry-level U.S. citizens. are a real possibility in poor countries, especially the In contrast, in the developing world the unskilled poorest and hungriest. The projections' unanimous worker population is growing at an unprecedented rises in life expectancy in industrialized nations I also rate. By the 1980s, industries relying heavily on a large find dubious. Have you noticed the soaring cancer rate entry-level labor force-for example, fast-food chains- in the U.S. and Europe? It is believed that at least 80 will face a shrinking labor pool. (U.S. high school percent of cancers are environmentally induced, and graduating classes are beginning to decline now.) U.S. exposure of the public to environmental carcinogens industries, then, must consider at least (1) whether this has increased enormously in the last few decades. type of 'needed labor will be available where and when Other environmentally related diseases (particularly a new plant is built, and (2) whether some types of respiratory ones) are also increasing in frequency. plants and industries should be located outside the United States because of the large pool of available The fisheries projections omit pollution factors. entry-level labor. My review draft contains the rather surprising state- ment that "it is probable that the amount of pollution Inadequate Data and Methodologies will peak in the next 10 years and decline thereafter." Regarding weak data and methodologies, one There is no indication of where this surmise comes adviser provided three thoughtful quotations con- from. I consider this assumption highly unlikely for several reasons: (a) we will remain in an oil economy cerning the limitations and opportunities inherent till the year 2000; tt-ansportation of oil by tanker will in making projections. They are presented at some increase during this period, with an inevitable increase length at the conclusion of this appendix because in barrels of oil spilled; (b) as terrestrial sources of of the critical insights they provide into the kinds energy increase, aerial fallout of released pollutants of understanding that can realistically be expected will fall predominantly in the sea; (c) the preceding of a study of this nature. point is simply a corollary of the larger point that as long as we assume an increase in GNP between now Our information regarding reality is limited. and 2000, there will be an increase in the volume of toxic material released to the environment and an Numerical operations with economic data im- increase in thermal pollution, there being no historical pose their own requirements. Without knowledge of basis for assuming otherwise. These considerations errors, the feeding of economic data into high-speed imply a lower fish harvest in the decades ahead than computers is a meaningless operation. The economist one based on an assumption that pollution will de- shoul¬ believe that "correct" solutions of many crease. linear equations and of other computations, such as multiple correlations, Are necessarily meaningful. This No consistent accounting is made of land, labor, and is true even when only two linear equations in two capital deployment. unknowns are involved. The following example, which could of course be generalized, shows what enormous A lot of people are talking about growing biomass differences very slight errors of observations will (e.g., grains) specifically to make alcohols, but one produce in the solution. must keep in mind that this would be in direct The equations competition to growing food. If we are assuming all . X -y= available arable land will be used for food production, X - 1.00001 y = 0 then there won't be any available for energy planta- tions. I suspect that in the competition between food have the solution x = 100,00 1, y 100,000, while the and fuel, we will usually be willing to pay more for almost identical equations food. Since the calorie conversion efficiency of grain X - Y= I to alcohol fuel is even worse than that of grain Ao X - 0.999999 y = 0 livestock feed, growing grain (or other biomass) in the have the solution x = - 99,999, y = - 100,000. The use for fuel raises the same ethical questions regarding coefficients in the two sets of equations differ by at the needs of the LDC's that feeding our grain to cattle most two units in the fifth decimal place, yet the for meat raises. solutions differ by 200,000. 720 APPENDIX If one recalls how easily equations are sometimes is something dependable about the behavior of that written down purporting to show -eConomic relation- -system. There are relatively few,distinct ways in ships and how shaky is our determination of the which social systems'are dependable. The different parameters,.it will be realized what difficulties have methods of futures research are based essentially on to be overcome in constructing and, applying an various combinations of six principles that character- empirically significant theory. If the number of equa- ize complex, highly interconnected social systems. tions is even moderately large, it becomes far from One:. Continuity. First of all, societies exhibit trivial to find out whether or not the determinant continuity. Social systems change smoothly,from one actually. vanis .hes.* state, to another; generally. they do not change in Our ability to make effective use of our information is discontinuous jumps. (Even during relatively disrup- limited. tive and seemingly discontinuous periods,,such as the American Civil War orthe French Revolution, much The difficulties of parameter estimation are not the of the culture, social roles, and institutional frame- most serious problems in the study of complexity. work of' a society persists without fundamental Suppose that we did know the interrelations among change.) T .hus, in making forecasts we commonly and all parts of a system and could describe the rate of reasonably extrapolate from past experience. This change of each variable as a function of the others. principle of continuity is used in all sorts of projec- Then we would have a very large set of simultaneous tions of trends and cycles-for' forecasting demo- non-linear equations in a vast number of variables graphic trends, economic cycles, and annual energy . ... depending on so, many parameters-the estimation consumption; for anticipating future attitudes from of each of which may take a lifetime. polling data; for estimating future financial perform- These equations [would probably] be insoluble. ance-to mention only a few. . . . They would be likely to be too numerous to compute. If we could compute [them], the solution would be Two: Self-consistency. A second guiding principle simply a number. If we could solve the equations, the underlying futures research is that societal systems answer would be a complicated expression in the tend to be internally self-consistent. That is, the parameters that would have no meaning for us. There- behavior of one sector of society does not generally fore the only way to understand a complex system is contradict that of another. For instance, basic re- to study something else instead. search is not likely to be well supported and flourish- That something else is a model. A model is a ing when the economy is depressed. theoretical construction, a collection of objects and The principle of self-consistency underlies one of relations some, but not all of which correspond to the popular, if less systematic, techniques for exam- components of the real system. In one sense it is a ining the future-namely, scenatio-writing. The pur- simplification of nature.... We replace the universal pose of writing scenarios about the future is to insure but trivial statement "things are different, intercon- that the characteristics asserted, whether arrived at nected, and changing" with a structure that specifies from trend projections or other methods, "hang which things differ in what ways, interact how, together" and make a reasonable story. A plausible change in what directions.... future has to feel like it might be lived in. Familiar Models differ in the aspect of reality preserved, examples of scenario-writing include Edward Bel- the departures from reality, and in their manipulative lamy's Looking Backward, Aldous Huxley's Brave possibilities. They can therefore give different results. New World, and George Orwell's 1984. Since it is not always clear which consequences Three: Similarities among social systems. Because derive from the properties of nature, it is often the individuals making up varied social systems have necessary to treat the same problem with different fundamental characteristics in common, the systems models. A theorem is then called robust if it is a themselves inevitably exhibit certain similarities. Ac- consequence of different models, and fragile if it cordingly, one group will tend to behave somewhat depends on the details of the model itself. The search like another under similar circumstances. This obser- for robustness leads to the proposition that truth is vation of similarities across groups is used in anthro- the intersection of independent lies.* pological approaches to the study of the future, in gaming methods where an individual assumes the role Many effective approaches do exist for making use of of a group or a nation, and in cross-cultural compari- our information. sons (e.g., of stages of economic development). If one presumes to say anything at all about the Historical analogies in particular, if not carried too future of a social system, he must assume that there far, can be useful in suggesting possible future scenarios. For example, studies of historical occur- rences of revolutionary cultural and political transfor- *Oskar Morgenstern, on the Accuracy of Economic Obser- mations suggest possible parallels today. vations, 2nd ed., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 109-110. Four: Cause-effect relationships. Social systems *R. Levins, "Complex Systems," in C. H. Waddington exhibit apparent cause-effect connections or statisti- ed., Towards a Theoretical Biology, vol. 111, Chicago: cal correlations that imply cause and effect relation- Aldine, 1970, pp. 75-76. ships. For instance, when making economic projec- ADVISORY VIEWS 721 tions we assume that if scarcities occur, prices will being to obtain refined jud .gments (but not necessarily rise, or that if the rate of inflation is lowered by consensus). manipulating the money supply, unemployment will Six: Goal-seeking. Societies have 'goals. They act increase. Such presumed cause-effect linkages under- with apparent intentionality, although the goals that lie much economic and simulation modeling. They might be inferred from observation are not necessar- are the basis for the models in the Club of Rome's ily declared ones. Just as individuals have aims of study The Limits to Growth which has generated which they are but dimly aware, so do societies seek much controversy since its publication in 1972. They destinies that they have never explicitly proclaimed. form the basic principle in the widely used method of In short, social change is not aimless, however cross-impact analysis (in which aspects of the future obscured the goal. Modern industrialized society is are studies through the. presumed interactions of confronted with a set of dilemmas that it seeks to contributing even 'ts on one another). r.esolve. Goals that once inspired commitment and Five: Holistic trending. In their process of evolving loyalty no longer have the same power, and new and -changing, social systems behave like integrated priorities are being formed. The possible futures are organic wholes. They have to be perceived in their distinguished, as much as anything, by the ways entirety; thus there is no substitute for human obser- society seeks resolution of its dilemmas, and by the vation and judgment about the future state of a kinds of new goals that emerge.* system. To overcome the problem of bias of an individual observer, collective opinion can be sought *Reprinted with permission of The Portable Stanford, Stan-' in various ways. One of these is the so-called Delphi ford Alumni Association, from An Incomplete Guide to the technique wherein the opinions of a number of judges Future by Willis W. Harman, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford are systematically processed and the results fed back Alumni Association, 1976 (New York: W. W. Norton, to each of the judges as additional input, the object forthcoming). Appendix C Embassy Reports on Forestry and AgricWtural Trends In preparation for the Global 2000 Study, a BANGLADESH request was made to a number of countries via Summary. Deforestation and land degradation U.S. Embassies to supplement the meager infor- are not considered significant problems in Bangla- mation available on forestry and agricultural desh at present. However, the country's modest trends. The hope was that new, but as yet forest resources could be exhausted by the. end of unpublished, data might exist which would be the century if not effectively managed. Loss of useful in assessing global conditions. The follow- forest cover in Bangladesh itself does not pose a ing questions were asked of a score of Embassies significant threat to agricultural land, but defores- in African, Asian, and Latin American countries: tation in neighboring areas could cause flooding Forestry. How much deforestation (land units problems here. In its development efforts the per year) is taking place? Are good forestry government of Bangladesh has focused on improv- practices being used? Is there any effective re- ing the productivity of existing arable land. For- forestation? To what extent are existing forests estry management has received considerably less showing signs of stress from forest grazing, fire- attention. Data generated in the planning process wood gleaning, expanded or accelerated slash- is not invariably consistent, and the projections and-bum agriculture, etc.? To what extent does based on them involve assumptions of limited disruption of watershed cover appear to be caus- reliability. In light of this, the following responses ing problems downstream (erratic stream flow, to questions are suggestive rather than conclusive. dam siltation, etc.)? What institutional programs are in effect to improve forestry practices? Are Forestry. Some deforestation as a result of these adequate? illegal cutting and "slash and bum" agriculture is Soil. If agricultural land is being lost to cultiva- evident from aerial observation, but the amount tion through problems such as erosion, saliniza- has not been quantified. About 15 percent of the tion, waterlogging, desertification, laterization, country is covered by forest, mainly in the Sun, etc., please specify cause and magnitude (units derbans area in the southwest and in the hilly, less per time period). Specify problems either cur- densely populated border areas of the Chittagong rently visible or foreseeable concerning mainten- hill tracts and Sylhet. Forest cover in these areas ance of fertility in currently used crop land. What has not decreased. significantly, but village groves institutions exist to promote soil conservation? scattered throughout the country are disappearing Are these adequate? as the population (and thus the demand for agricultural land and fuel) increases. Land Development. How much does it cost to There is no concerted reforestation program at bring an additional hectare of land into cultiva- present. Some forest areas (e.g., the mangrove tion? How are costs distributed between public forests of the Sunderbans and bamboo groves and private costs (e.g., for irrigation projects)? elsewhere) regenerate fairly quickly if left alone, What addition to crop production can be antici- but the large hardwood forests of the Chittagong pated as a result of expansion of arable land? hill tracts are slow to recover from cutting. Yield Gains from Technological Change. What Cultivation of products such as pineapples. in estimates of yield gains attained by technological previously uncultivated areas of the Chittagong change are available? Has any effort been made hill tracts has caused some soil erosion and to quantify the inputs and capital costs necessary increased runoff. The acreage involved at present to achieve such gains? is small but could pose future problems as the amount of land under such cultivation increases. The following sections are abstracted from the The major watershed disruption problem facing Embassy responses. Bangladesh concerns deforestation in the regions 723 724 APPENDIX upstream, from which an immense volume of that.increased use of HYVs in conjunction with water flows to the Bay of Bengal through the fertilizer application and irrigation could generate Brahmaputra and Meghna River systems. Observ- rice yields of .898 tons per acre'compared to .582 ablei removal of forestcover has occurred in the tons per acre fo ,r traditional varieties. The Asian areas bordering Sylhet; increased deforestation Development Bank, using assumptions leading to could exacerbate flooding problems in Bangla- a higher production growth rate, estimated that desh. foodgrain production could rise to 26.22 million The government is undertaking, with FAO long tons by 1985 in a "high growth" scenario, or assistance, to develop programs for a systematic 21.35 million long tons in,a "low growth" scena- survey of forestry resources and reforestation rio. through its Forestry Research Institute in Chitta- In its 1973-78 five year plan, the government of gong. These programs are just getting under way. Bangladesh proposed to supply agricultural inputs Soil. Some land . iIs being lost for cultivation (HYV seeds, fertilizer, and plant protection) through expansion of the, large urban centers of worth 6.4 billion taka ($426 million at 15 taka Dacca-Naray-Angarj (combined population over 2 equal. to one U.S. dollar) to farmers, for which million) and Chittagong (population 889,000). Oth- the latter would pay 5.2 billion taka, leaving a subsidy of about 1.2 billion, approximately 19 erwise the amount of land under cultivation has I . . remained relatively constant. percent of the total. In addition, the plan proposed The Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council to spend 5.8 billion taka ($387 million) for iniga- tion facilities of which 1.5 billion taka would be and Horticulture Development Board both have paid for by the users. However, due to a variety programs designed to promote good cropping of circumstances, neitherthe expenditure targets practices. Traditional cropping practices have not significantly damaged the soil. 'However fertility or the anticipated foodgrain output of 15.4 million and thus crop yields could be greatly improved by long tons have been achieved. increased application of fertilizer. The World Bank has developed a scenario: for increasing foodgrain production by 500,000 tons Land Development. The cost Of. bringing an per year (the increase necessary to achieve the additional hectare of land into production has not projections discussed above). It envisages the been quantified, as nearly all available arable land following yearly increases in inputs: (1) installation is.now being cultivated and there is little potential of 1,000 low lift pumps, 5,000 shallow tubewells, for adding significantly to acreage presently de- 1,000 deep tubewells, and 30,000 hand tubewells voted to agriculture. Even so, the Bangladesh to provide irrigation' to an additional 158,000 acres Water Development Board has been directed to of paddy and 60,000 acres.of wheat; (2) application prepare a master plan for reclamation in the of 74,000 tons of fertilizer; and (3) use of an coastal areas and offshore islands. No cost figures additional 2-400 tons of HYV wheat seeds-, 1,400 have been developed yet and in any case the tons of HYV' Aman rice seeds, 800 tons of HYV increase in acreage will not be great. Rather than AUS and 400 tons of HYV Boro. The World stretching the total acreage the government has Bank has not projected cost figurpsJor these concentrated its efforts on increasing cropping inputs.. intensity and food production, The costs and quantity of inputs involved in this effort, are Comment. By the end, of the century Bangla- discussed below, under','Yield Gains." desh is expected to have a population of 150 .Gains in production attributable to increased million. In the face of this prospept, the govern- acreage are not expected to be significant., How- ment has bent its resources toward increasing ever, the potential for gains in yield is considera- food production by enhancing the output of exist- ble, as discussed.below. ing agricultural land. Assuming an adequate sup- Yield Gains. Various estimates of the potential ply of necessary inputs, land degradation does not increase in food production have been made. All loom as a serious problem. However pressure on of them emphasize that increased use of high- forested areas, both to increase cultivated areas yielding varieties (HYVs) of rice, fertilizer, and and to provide fuel, could result in the destruction irrigation could greatly increase crop yields, crop- of the country's extractable timber by the year ping intensity, and consequently overall output. 2000. The- environmental impact of this in terms USAID has calculated that the addition of one of increased runoff and erosion would be most pound of fertilizer per acre of paddy increases the significant in the Chittagong hill tracts. Elsewhere yield by about 3.5 pounds. The Bangladesh gov- most deforested areas would be relatively level ernment, in its 1973-78 five year plan, projected and would subsequently be cultivated. APPENDIX 725 Should population pressures lead to large-scale them to adapt foreign technology in this sector to removal of forest cover in -Nepal,and Assam, Brazilian conditions of climate and soil. Evidence Bangladesh as a whole would be adversely af- of this is the fact that Brazil had reportedly fected by the increased runoff. Under present managed to obtain average productivity of 45 conditions the country is subject to periodic cubic meters per hectare-year in the last 10 years, severe flooding and the prospect of more frequent as opposed to an average of 18 cubic meters and damaging floods would threaten both the before the fiscal incentive program started. The productivity of the land and large portions of the European average (particularly in-the planting of population. This may be the most significant eucalyptus and pinus) is, according to Brazilian environmental problem facing Bangladesh by the experts, between 4 and 10 cubic meters per year 2000. hectare-year. BOLIVIA Forestry. Most of the following data were taken from an article on the subject that recently ap- Forestry. Deforestation has increased, in the last peared. in the jornal do Brasil. Material for the few, years and is estim ated to total 250,000 to article was collected through research and inter- 300 000 hectares in 1978. Approximately 90 per'-. views with Brazilian officials and businessmen ceni" ofr the ground cover is destroyed, and very little'tiniber is cut for later uses. Overgrazing . and from the 500 Brazilian private companies that operate in the area of reforestation in Brazil. slash and burn agriculture have changed river Brazil had originally about 5.2 million, square flows and have also stripped off top soils exposing kilometers.of natural forest area. It now has less the underlying clay of sandy soils. than 3.5 million. Eighty percent of Wazi I's current Reforestation plans are-. limited. Forestry orga- forests are concentrated in the Amazon Area, and nizations have some plans for, the future. Various the most deforested areas are located in the ,,government organizations have prepared programs southern and southeastern regions of the country. and,studi@s concerning forestry practices. Budget The Amazon region has lost 840,000 square kilo- hmitatiom and lack of trained personnel have meters of forests, which corresponds to 24 percent hampered these efforts. of its original reserve. Experts have reportedly Soil. Problems of erosion, salinization, deserti- estimated that if current deforestation rates con- fication, and laterization are increasing and are tinue, the Amazon forest will disappear in less caused.by the following: improper,use of the land, than 30 years. overgrazing, colonization, and Aestruction of Sources in the Brazilian Institute for Forest ground cover either by slash and burn,methods or Development have reportedly stated that tree by using machinery which not only destroys the cutting in Brazil had totaled about 160 million jungle'but also the physical composition of the cubic meters' 120 million of which were used as soil. firewood or in the production of charcoal-Only On the Altiplano, grazing animals remove vir- 40 million cubic meters were used in the produc- tually all plant life. Most grazing, however, occurs tion of higher-valued materials, such as lumber, on the fallow fields that are maintained as grazing essential oils, and pulp. areas by the small communities that control land -Deforestation figures in some states in Brazil areas. are as f6llows. Parana: 370,000 hectares per year; Estimates as to the extent and rate of erosion the state has lost 70 percent of its native reserves are difficult @to make. The silt -composition of the in the last 10 years. Rio Grande do Sul: In the last rock formations. and the steep terrain, lead to 20 years the state's original reserves have de- substantial rates of natural erosion. Human activ- creased from 43.3 percent to 1.8 percent. Minas ity also -has an important impact, but no data Gerais: In the last 15 years the state has lost 3 exists-about its relative magnitude. million hectares of dense forest and 6.5 million hectares of savannas (cerrados). Sdo Paulo: 80 BRAZIL percent of state territory was covered by forest a century ago;'that percentage is now reduced to 7 Summary. Notwithstanding the decrease -in re- percent. sources for reforestation in the last three years, In view. of seriousness of the deforestation Brazilian experts unanimously state that the fiscal picture in Brazil, the government in 1966 decided ,incentive program adopted by. the Brazilian gov- to adopt a reforestation program through which it ernment has.not only alerted Brazilians to their delegated to the private sector the task of provid- enormous forestry potential but.has also enabled ing the raw material necessary to meet the de- 726 APPENDIX mand for wood in all its varied applications. The reserves and develop new ones, these efforts are, law creating the program (No. 5,106 of 1966) on a national scale, inadequate. A requirement provided that investments in companies that op- for alternative fuel sources'is indicated. However, erated in the area of reforestation could be de- no economically feasible solution is presently ducted from income tax to be paid both by anticipated. Furthermore, it-is believed that defor- corporation and private individuals. This fiscal estation, along with traditional 'live stock, manage- incentive program was highly successful until ment practices, is having, a serious effect on soil three years ago, when resources for reforestation fertility levels. This is certainly true in the Sahe- started to decrease. The following figures show lian portion of the country. One portion of Chad, the success of the program in the 12 years of its which has been the site of considerable observa- existence. Before the program, the annual nation- tion, is the rangelands. located southeast of Lake wide planting rate was less than 40,000 hectares Chad. In this area, food crop production is only per year. Current rate is of the order of 300,000- marginal and range management experts have 400,000 hectares per year. Five hundred private determined that, due to overgrazing, the range is companies are currently engaged in reforestation in a state of rapid decline. There has been no in Brazil. The reforested area has practically evidence observed regarding changes in watershed, doubled since 1966; 2.5 million hectares, repre- due to forestry practices. However, one might senting 5.6 million trees have been planted. Brazil suspect that the impact of human populations is is now surpassed in reforestation practices only contributing to long-term changes in the water by three countries-China, the Soviet Union, and levels of Lake Chad. The final conclusion is that the United States. Investments in the primary unless the trend is reversed, severe land degrada- sector of reforestation have totaled 26 billion tion over much, of Chad will be evident by the cruzeiros (1.6 billion U.S. dollars) since 1966. year 2000. Leading states in reforestation are: Minas Ger- No data are available regarding land develop- ais, with 690,000 hectares; Sao Paulo, with ment and crop yields. 570,000 hectares; Parana, with 520,000 hectares; and Mato Grosso, with 240,000 hectares. Most COLOMBIA planted trees are eucalyptus (1.3 million hectares) Forestry. As a result of many processes, such and pinus 865 thousand hectares)--both non-na- as farming practices, erosion, and colonization tives. settlements, it is estimated that approximately Brazilian experts and companies involved in 908,000 hectares of natural forest land are being reforestation have expressed concern about the lost each year. Forestry. practices are being used decrease in the reforestation rate in the last three on only a small portion of the land. years, due to changes in legislation, which have At the present time, only approximately 5,000 resulted in a decrease in resources allocated to hectares-are being reforested each year. Plans are private companies. Those sources estimate that in effect,. however, that would bring, a total of Brazil will face a deficit of 1.7 million hectares by 1980, since internal demand for wood by that time approximately. 540,000, hectares into reforestation during the period 1%5-95.4 Significant portions of will be on the order of 2.9 million hectares, and existing forests are showing stress for all the Brazil would not be'able to reforest more than 1.2 reasons indicated. million hectares at present rates. Tremendous watershed problems result from CHAD the disruption of the watershed cover, although they cannot be documented. One institutional Virtually no statistical data are available with program to improve forestry practices involves regard to the questions raised. Deforestation paying c.ampesinos 2 pesos (5 U.S. cents) for each throughout the country has been significant during seedling planted. All programs of this type are the past decade and is likely to continue through recognized as inadequate and in need of expan- the year 2000 with aggravated results. The com- sion. One measure 'of hope is the recent creation mon perception of most observers in Chad is that of the Forestry Fund by the Colombian govem- the demand for cooking fuel is the primary and ment. unabated cause of unquantified but significant level of deforestation. The secondary causes are Soil. No specific datalare available on mainte7 uncontrolled expansion of slash and bum agricul- nance of cropland fertility, but fertilizers are tural practices and forage demands for livestock. widely used on. commercial crops. The major While the forestry service is making an effort, institution to promote soil conservation is the along with a few aid donors, to maintain existing Instituto.Colombiano Agropecuario, under the APPENDIX 727 Ministry of Agriculture. It is efficacious, but not donor assistance, however, the government is fully adequate. taking steps to rectify the problem through the A study entitled "Land Erosion 'in Colombia," installation of a tile drainage system in the delta published in 1977 by the Ministry of Agriculture's and other irrigated areas. Extensive projects, National Institute of. Renewable Natural Re- principally financed by IBRD, will provide drain- sources and the Environment, printed the follow- age for approximately one-fifth of the total cultiv- ing tabl&: able land areas by 1981 and prevent further loss due to salinity. If projects are fully implemented on schedule, the Ministry foresees no increase in Type of Erosion and Intensity Area, lands lost to salinity and waterlogging. Further- Percent more, existing tosses should be restored to pro- Square Of - Kilometers Country duction. Areas without serious e'rosion An even greater threat to cultivable lands is the proc Iesses 282,000 24.8 rapid urbanization in Cairo and Alexandria, which Areas affected principally by annually claims highly productive acres in the surface water erosion 586,000 .51.4 river valley or delta. Fertility maintenance on Minor to light intensity 415,000 36.4 Light to medium intensity 12.8 existing land is becoming increasingly difficult Medium to strong intensity 7,000 0 .r6 with absence of the annual resilting due to con- Strong to very strong intensity 18,000 1.6 struction of the Aswan High Dam. The Egyptian Areas affected principally by mass Ministry of Agriculture, however, has a program earth movements 268,000 23.5 Minor to light intensity 28,000 2.5 underway to increase the use of chemical fertil- Light to medium intensity 233,000 20.4 izers and to rotate certain crops to replenish soils. Medium to strong intensity 7,000 0.6 Areas affected principally by wind,, Land Development. The Aswan High Dam has erosion 3,000 0.3 contributed to reclamation of approximately I Strong to very strong intensity 3,000 0.3 Total country area 1,139,000 100.0 million feddans (one feddan equals slightly more than one acre) since its construction. The cost of Land Development., The variables involved in reclamation has not been matched by significantly answering these questions of land development are increased productivity. Virtually all reclamation tremendous. No data are available at present. costs have been bome by the government. The peculiar circumstances of Egypt make it impossi- ble to project production increases from the EGYPT expansion of arable lands, because the costs of The principal published data source for the desert reclamation (averaging about $2,000 per questions raised is the 1975 USAID/USDA study acre) are far in excess of the projected potential "Egypt: Major Constraints to Agricultural Produc- returns during the short or mediurn term. More- over, reclaimed lands reach optimum production tivity." Little new information is available. While levels 7-10 years after they are brought into the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture has several production; only then can increased productivity technical people familiar with data collection, the be evaluated. The majority of the reclaimed Egyp- Ministry lacks full resources for compilation, inte- tian lands have not yetattained optimum Oroduc- gration, and analysis of such information. tion levels. This factor understandably contributes Soil. Salinity and waterlogging have @become significantly to the high cost of reclamation. unexpectedly urgent problems in the past few years due to the farmers' traditional overuse of Yield Gains. The principal impact of technolog- the available water supply, which was increased ical advance has been the introduction of new with the completion of the Aswan High Dam and varieties of existing crops-e.g., rice, cotton, and the subsequent introduction of widespread irriga- wheat. In this area, measured gains have been tion. Traditional methods of the seasonal soaking/ impressive, but widespread application of techno- flooding of crops cbntributed to the sudden, logical advances has been slow. The Ministry of unanticipated increase. in the incidence of prob- Agriculture, *in a recent submission for the 1978- lems due to the rise in water tables'. The Ministry 82 five year plan, made the point that the agricul@ of Agriculture estimates that . 50,000 to 60,000 tural sector's principal problem is the failure to acres (roughly I'percent of the cultivable. land implement widespread technical changes rapidly. area) have been lost to production due to these Consequently, many potential gains in productiv- complications over the last five-year -period.'With ity are lost. 728 APPENDIX INDIA (Calcutta) of trees, especially saplings, for., fuel and the construction,of homes by the poor people. This Forestry and Soil. Forestry is certainly an problem is most acute in the tribal areas of West important subject in. eastern India. There. are Bengal. There is an acute shortage of land both regional forestry officials of the government of for cultivation and for grazing cattle,:and intense India located in Calcutta and in West Bengal, a overgrazing of forest areas. The overgrazing has central and populous but not territorially extensive led to the loss of the porosity of the soil, which state of the region. has -retarded the development of humus.. This in West Bengal technicians offered.the following turn has caused widespread soil erosion. information for the state area. The indiscriminate cutting of trees in the wa- tershed areas,, especially in hilly regions@ has A. Area Under Forests in West Bengal (in square kilome- affected the flow of rivers andstreams. The flow ters) is becoming more seasonal instead of being rel'a-w Total Forest Area 1901 13,491 tively constant through the year. The disruption 1951 12,225 of the watershed cover has.also caused a general 1974 11,837 lowering of the ground-water -table. @ The down- stream effects of this are an increase in the B. River (in hectares per 100 kM2) Annual Rate of frequency and intensity of flooding during the Siltation monsoon and, a reductiom of the water flow during Tee sta 98.40 the dry season. This in turn has led to a silting up Mayurakshi 16.43 of not only agricultural land in the flood plains but Panchet 10.00 also a silting up of the reservoirs of river valley Kangsabati 3.76 projects and an alarmingly high rate of sedimen- C. Areas Under Shifting Cultivation tation in the rivers. Percentage of Net Slash, and bum farming is widely practiced in Shown Area Where most pails of northeastem. India. The area af-, Shifting Cultivation 1,000 Hectares Is Practiced fected by shifting cultivating is estimated at about State 2.7 million hectares. (A similar system prevails in Assam 498.3 3 the hill forests of Orissa and Andhra Pradesh over Meghalaya 416.0 46 an area of about 0.3, million hectares.) Owing to Manipur 100.0 43 Tripura 220.9 9 the growing pressure ''of population on landl@ the Nagland 608.0 72 cycle of slash and bum agriculture., which for- Mizoram 604.0 90 rnerly covered a period.of 20-30 years, now Andhra Pradesh 248.6 80 Total 2,695.7 occurs every 4-6, years. Consequently; despite offi6ial activities to curb slash and burn agriculture and encourage settled cultivation, forests are being In West Bengal approximately 1.7 million hec- denuded very rapidly, and soil erosion in these tares of agricultural land suffers from different areas is intenser and widesp Iread. Inadequate ter- kinds of soil erosion/land deterioration, and ap.-. racing of areas under permanent cultivationis also proximately 148,000 hectares of barren land under a problem. the administration of the Forest Department re- The central and state governments are aware of quire rejuvenation. The table below gives tentative the importance of preserving forests, but they are estimates of the different types of detedot-Ation Of handicapped by a shortage of funds and trained agricultural land and the areas affected: personnel and by the poverty of the people, who Area cannot 'afford to buy fuel or shelter and conse- Type of Deterioration (in hectares) quently have no alternative but to encroach on the Waterlogging 500,000 forests. In recent years the ftinding.of the govem- Sheet, rill, and gully 6QO,000 ment of West Bengal for development of forests Flood-prone 400,000 has increased. In U.S. dollar equivalents, 'the Salinity 150,000 budget for 1977 was $1.5 million, while the Landslides and landslips 16,000 Total 1,666,000 estimated budget for 1978 is 31.8 million. The government has reportedly also finalized a $2.6 Officials who are.working in this field also made million program forr rehabilitating more than 1,000 more general observations: hectares'of degraded forests and over 2,500 hec- Forest in eastern India are gradually being tares of. plantations. This program is scheduled to denuded. One of the main causes is illegal cutting begin in Fiscal Year 19178. APPENDIX 729 According to officials of 'the West Bengal For- Millions of Loss of Forests estry Department, the plans prepared by it for the hectares (deforestation) protection and the development of forests are 1.973 74.57 0.03 very comprehensive, but there is often a shortage Average loss of forests per year, 1970-73 106 700 ha* of funds and the gap between the preparation of I plans and their execution is often very wide. Soil *Actual deforestation. is expected to be more because of some increase by, m officials stressed the Jack of trained and experi- forestation. enced personnel, which often means that the SedIimentation data for 23 selected reservoirs financial resources available cannot be properly have been collected. The trend of the sedimenta- used. tion in the reservoirs varies from 2.5 to 18- hectare- Significant areas in North Bengal (adjoining meters per square kilometer (54 to 382 acre-feet Nepal and Bangladesh) are adversely affected by per 100 square miles) of the catchment per year. changes in the courses of the rivers. Statistics are For example the sediment rate for the period not readily available on the population or the total 1965-70 (five years) is 7,358 acre-feet per year for areas affected by this problem, but it is considered Mayurakshi Reservoir, 'which is three times the serious. 6untermeasures required extensive re- expected rate of siltation. search and planning, interstate and international Soil. Agricultural land loss through: cooperation, and very large financial investments, which are probably beyond any current capacities Gully erosion (total) 2.3 million ha (1974) of the state. Ravages of water and wind erosion 80,000 ha/year (estimate) MIA (New Delhi) Salinity (total) 7 million ha (estimate) Deserts No data collected Forestry. The combination of both overgrazing Land recovered: and stripping of trees for fuel is making a serious Ravines 70,000 ha in 15 years impact on the Himalayan watershed. Effects are Alkali soil 20,000 ha in 3 years seen in landslides, flooding in the Gangetic Plain, Over a 25-year period, 22 million ha were re- lowering of the ground-water table, and reser- covered for agriculture use by various soil conser- voir siltation. No studies have been made to vation programs. estimate the total 'environniental and economic Several good institutions 4e concerned with cost of deforestation. Resolving the sociological soil conservation, notably. problems of forestry management would appear to be as problematical as finding the resources for Central Soil and Water Conservation Research and Train- reforestation. Supplying an alternate means.for ing Institute (ICAR), Dehra Dun Central Arid Zone Research Institute, Jodhpur the economic survival of the people currently Central Soil Salinity Research Institute, Karnal using the forests for their livelihood must proceed Indian Grassland and Fodder Research Institute, Jhansi simultaneously with good forestry practices. A Soil Conservation Directorate, Faridabad. summary of some of the more important data Forest Research Institute and Colleges, Dehra Dun points is given below. Their budgets are too small, however, to make dramatic. impacts. Land Use Classification as.of 1973 Land Development. Approximate cost per hec- Millions of tare of development of land for agriculture in 1970 hectares Total geographical area 328.05 (100 01o) was: Agriculture or cultivated land 152.27,(45.4) Forests 74.57 (22.7) Rupees Other uncultivated land 42.18 (13.0) Ravines 6,000 (including cost of irrigation) Nonagricultural uses 16.25 ( 5.0) Alkali soil 5,000-6,000 (including cost of irrigation) Barren arid. uncultivated land' 42.78 (12.9) Terracing 3,000--5,000 Manmade forests in India created up to 1969 1,546,4W ha Anticipated crop production for each additional hectare -of land recovered is 2-3 tons of food Forest Areas, 1970-73 grains. Millions of Loss of Forests hectares (deforestation) 04DONESL4, 1970 74.89 19171 74.83 0.05 Forestry. Total, land area in Indonesia is 190.5 1972 74.60 0.23 million hectares. Of this, about 122.2 million 730 APPENDIX hectares are in forests. The most common esti- the program. The Directorate General of Forestry mate of the current rate of deforestation is 400,000 is training about 2,500 new field workers a year to hectares per year. The most important cause, attempt to overcome the problem. The effective- accounting for at least half of the total, is slash ness of the greening program is highly variable. and bum agriculture on islands other than Java, I The objective of the two programs is to even- Madura, and Bali. The next most important cause tually rehabilitate a total of 42 million hectares of of deforestation is considered to be unwise land. land classified as follows (in millions of hectares): use, i.e., cultivating too high up mountain slopes. No data on whether good forestry practices are Critical being used was obtained. About 50 million hec- Condition Other Total Dry agricultural land 3 3 tares of forest cutting concessions have been "Alang-alang" grassland, granted. Theconcession agreements include regu- abandonediand,and lations regarding methods and rates of cutting, other 13 3 16 size of trees that can be cut, replanting, etc. Deforested land 4 19 23 However, enforcement of the regulations is diffi- Total 20 22 42 cult. Therefore, forestry practices vary greatly Soil. While agricultural land is being lost, very' from concession holder to concession holder. little data exist to describe the extent of the problem. River and dam siltation, flooding, etc., are One study of the upper Solo River. Basin im central serious problems, especially on Java, but no Java, one of the most intensely cultivated areas in quantitative data on this problem were uncovered. the country shows erosion in some places of as The government has two programs for returning much as 4 cm annually. land to forest or agricultural productivity: the reforestation program and the "greening" pro- Land Development. No data were located on gram. The reforestation program is carried out by what it costs to bring an additional hectare of land the Directorate General of Forestry on govem- into development. However, the Minister of Re- ment-owned land; 1,600 trees (usually pine spe7 search estimates that a total of 41 million hectares cies) per hectare are planted. Costs for this of land could be brought into cultivation in program are from 30,000-W,000 rupiah (415 rupiah Indonesia. equal one U.S. dollar) per hectare in the first year, 15,000-30,000 rupiah in the second year ' I Yield Gains. The Central Research Institute for and 7,500 in the third year. The greening program Agriculture in Bogor has estimated yields that is carried out by the Department of Public Works could be otained by farmers using already avail- with Inpres C (presidential instruction) money and able technology for the following crops: in cooperation with the Department of Interior. Current Potential Under this program 600 trees per hectare are (metric tons) planted, usually agricultural species such as fruit Corn 1.2 4 trees, cloves, oil palm, etc. The government Rice 1.3 5 subsidy is 16,250-rupiah per hectare when terrac- Soybeans .76 2 ing is required, and 5,250 rupiah without terracing- Cassava 9 30 The amount of land rehabilitated under these Sweet potatoes 8.1 30 programs since.1972 is shown below (in thousands of hectares): Reforesta- LIBERIA tion Greening Total Forestry. In an attempt to diversify its economy 1972/73 82.7 42.3 125.0 1973/74 78.8 40.0 118.8 from dependence on iron ore and rubber, the 1974M 84.3 57.0 141.3 government of Liberia has started to implement a. 1975/76 25.3 37.8 63.1 1976 feasibility study on oil palm and coconut 1976/77 162.8 302.6 465.4 plantations. The study calls for the @ establishment 1977/78 (Projected) 800 of 22,500 acres of industrial oil palm estates, 1978/79 (Projected) 15,000 acres of smallholder oil palm plantations, and 20,000 acres of smallholder coconut planta- One source stated that probably only about 60 tions in eastern Liberia. The total cost of the percent of the total figure for 1976/77 was actually project is estimated at $99.8 million, and the achieved. Shortages of trained field workers is average rate of return is projected at @about 6.5 one of the main limiting factors to expansion of percent. Foreign loans and grants have been or APPENDIX 731 will be obtained to finance the project. Its imple- MAURITANIA mentation has been delayed by failure to get the Forestry. Inquiries confirm that problems Of target acreage of 2,500 acres cleared at one of deforestation and land degradation are indeed'' three sites in 1977. There is some apprehension acute here, but no meaningful data exist on rate that the 1978 goal of clearing 5,000 acres of land of loss. Officials concerned with the problem cite may not be attained. , @ the rapid loss already of small-tree population here as due to the practice of breaking instead of cutting branches to enable small animals to feed MALAYSIA and to the use of live trees for charcoal produc- The embassy has collected as much data as tion. The extent of the concern about reforestation possible on areas concerned. In many cases the is best illustrated by the fact that the 325 hectare data is "unofficial," and many of the comments project run by the Lutheran Federation outside of are subjective in nature. Nouakchott is the only known reforestation effort in Mauritania. Forestry. Over the past 10 years Malaysian Soil and Land Development. Information is forests, primarily in the States of Sabah and limited to the visible evidence that desertification Sarawak, have been logged at the rate of 500,000 is an active process. acres per year. Malaysia is, however, starting to become more conservation conscious, and small- MEXICO scale replanting programs have , been started in various parts of the country. Soil erosion is one of Mexico's greatest prob- lems. The government has recently launched a Soil. While agricultural land is presently being National Reforestation and Social Betterment Pro- lost due to deforestation, exhaustion of soil fertil- gram in the state of Jilotepec as part of the Portillo ity, and shifting cultivation, it is not possible to Administration's "Alliance for Production." The quantify the amounts of land involved. The Ma- intent of the new program is to halt erosion, laysian Agricultural and Research Development protect the environment, and promote forestation. Institute, the Rubber Research Institute, and the Various government agencies will be involved in Forest Department are involved in soil conserva- this effort. tion efforts. The following analysis is based largely on. "unofficial" data and observations of key person- Land Development. Malaysia has a unique land nel in soil and water conservation at the Agricul- development approach, operated by the Federal ture and Water Resources Secretariat (SARH). Land Development Authority (FELDA). FELDA's approach is to provide all necessary infrastructure, Forestry. We have no estimate of total defores- i.e., housing, roads, schools, etc.,. as well as to tation in Mexico, but have a partial estimate open new land and plant it, usually with rubber showing that, in tropical zones only, some 80,000 and oil palm. This approach is more expensive hectares annually are being.subjected to slash and than many others, and FELDA reports that they bum techniques, which leads at hest to two good spend $3,000 per acre for developing rubber land harvests. Then the land is lost. Good forestry and $2,800 per acre for developing palm oil land. practices have not been used until now (with The government of Malaysia plans to develop I some exceptions). As noted above, a major refor- million acres in this manner during the third estation program is just beginning. Whether the Malaysia plan (1976-80). new program will prove adequate has yet to be determined. Yield Gains. Yield gains through technological Soil. We have no figures but are convinced that change are difficult to estimate. Malaysia's corpo- all the processes [mentioned in the questions on rate agriculture is very progressive and quick to soil) are occurring here and contributing to signif- take advantage of changes in technology. Past icant loss of agricultural land to cultivation. SARH experience has shown that smallholders are more - ncemed with the problem, but efforts to date conservative in their acceptance of chan ges, but Is co they did readily accept new rice varieties when have not markedly reduced the deterioration. twin yield, disease resistance, and pest resistance Land Development. It is estimated that it costs were demonstrated. Government estimates on 50,000 to 60,000 pesos to develop an additional where the country will be in 1981 are contained in hectare of irrigated land (22.6 pesos equals. one the third Malaysia plan. U.S. dollar). Seasonal land can be developed, 732 APPENDIX with drainage, for 25,000 to 30,000 pesos per reforestation is taking place. Disruption of wa- hectare. Some 12 million hectares have a potential tershed cover is responsible for declining soil for irrigated cultivation, and. some 18 million fertility, accelerated soil erosion, and increasingly hectares for seasonal cultivation. An eightfold severe flooding. increase in crop production is said to be theoreti- The silt load in the Indus Basin, the principal cally possible by the year 2000, though there are hydrological system of Pakistan, is high, particu- doubts that this could really -be brought about in larly on the upper reaches of the Indus River itself practice. before it joins with the other less heavily silted Yield Gains. No data were available on yield major rivers of the system. At Tarbela, the silt gains attainable from technological change. load has been estimated at 440 million tons a year. The forestry institutes, which direct the few PAKISTAN programs, have proven to be inadequately fi- nanced and unable to meet either the immediate Reliable'data on the questions, posed are rare. or long-term needs of forest preservation. Forestry. The Himalayan region of Pakistan has Soil. Data on soil conservation efforts in re- never been heavily forested. Only 3.4 percent Of sponsIe to problems of erosion, salinity, and water- Pakistan's 200 million acre land area is generally logging is also impre'ssionistic. There is* some reported as forested. This compares with. 1965 concern, and work on the problem is being carried estimates that 9.8 percent of West Pakistan's land out,. but a comprehensive, quantitative picture is was forested at the time of partition. Available not yet available. Quantifiable data.are being data are insufficient to permit estimating the net gathered by a World Bank-managed study on the rate of deforestation taking place or to test the high rate suggested by the two figures above, but Indus Basin, with soil salinity surveys over a very nearly all estimates are that there is a net loss. wide area. Data are now being proc 'essed by .The Pakistan Statistical Yearbook of 1976 cites computer, and-preliminary results on rate of soil a 21.45 million cubic feet total out-turn from loss through salinity may be available from the forests, of which 7.8 million cubic feet were used World Bank. The low values of output per capita as timber and 13.6 million cubic feet for fire wood, in Pakistan, whether measured in terms of value a nearly 2:1 ratio of firewood to timber. The or of nutritional content, reflect the fact that importance of firewood as a fuel was confirmed agricultural yields in the area are among the lowest of all countries where agriculture is prac- from a 1975 Survey of Households and Establish- ticed on a large scale. Not only are farm yields ments, which showed firewood as the principal source of energy for both urban and rural house- low.in Pakistan, but their growth continues to be holds in all strata sampled. There isno apparent constrained by a low rate of investment in both public or private, concern over these practices., inputs and infrastructure in comparison to need. Plans to limit forest gleaning were stymied by As to waterlogging' the water table represents a 44 grandfather clauses" permitting families engaged dynamic equilibrium among evaporation, infiltra- in the timber business at the time of the legislation tion of river, rain, and irrigation water, and to retain their means of livelihood. underground flows. This equilibrium has been Pakistan's high rate of population growth (3 upset by leakage from the new water courses and percent plus) amplifies the pressure of the rural overwatering of fields. By some estimates, at least and landless poor on the resources of the land, a third of the water diverted to the canals perco- and a steady depletion*of woodland has been the lates downward to the water table, greatly increas- result. Many landless poor have minor livestock ing the overall rate of infiltration. Most serious is such as goats, which destroy ground cover. Ac- the capillary rise and evaporation of the under- cordingto Erik P. Eckholm,* both the needy and ground water that occurs whenever the water the entrepreneurs are forced to poach for fuel- table is within 10 feet of the surface. In an area wood in the protected (and economically and where underground water has.a salinity of 1,000 ecologically essential) national forest reserves. parts per million, evaporation at a rate of 2 feet The scale of the problem overwhelms scattered per year (a typical value where the water table is attempts to reverse the negative trends. Good only a few feet deep) will raise the salt content of forestry practices are not implemented, and no the top 3 feet of soil to about I percent in 20 one really knows how much, if any, effective years. This is said to be too high for even the hardiest crops. "The Other Energy Crisis: Firewood," Washington: Ground-water evaporation is only one of the Worldwatch Institute, 1975. causes of high salinity in the soils of the Punjab. APPENDIX 733 IrTigation practices have also contributed to salt amount of distribution of water among farmers are. accumulation. Percolation through the silt soils is often inappropriate but difficult to change. In slow; consequently, some of the, irrigation water addition to such @ physical constraints as salinity washes down very far beneath the root zone and waterlogging (and financial ones like a lack of before it evaporates, and. the residue of salt left resources to inv6st in the use of fertilizer, high- by evaporation remains-. in the upper soil layers. yield varieties, and pesticides) farmers are often In the Indus Plain, according to a special IBRD. reluctant to@ risk trying new methods of cultiva- study, an estimated 18 million acres should be tion. These factors all hold agricultural production reclaimed. This is roughly 20 percent of the canal- down. irrigated area'and 15 percent of the cultivated area in the Punjab District within the Indus Plain., SENEGAL Fifteen years ago, waterlogging and salinity The following sketchy information was obtained damage in the Punjab reached seriou s_ proportions. from local sources, the few studies available, and Investigators were convinced it could be cured or the government's fifth quadren trial plan. arrested in areas of relatively fresh and usable Foresty. The Department of Eaux et For^ets ground-water by constructing a System of large wells to provide vertical drainage. This program reports show that approximately 100,000 tons of continues and is having success, but a conse .nsIus charcoal are consumed annually for fuel in Sen'e- is growing that sizable investments on surface gal. Of this, 80 'percent is used in the Cap Vert draina@ge will also be required. A further problem region. This represents 500,000 tons of wood,.or is that, as drainage is used to reduce the rate of all the wood produced on 10,000 ha of unclassified salinization in the upper Indus irrigation systeml@ forests. At present, Eaux et For@ts reports, all the salt content of water used by 'farmers on the unclassified forests in the Cap Vertathies area are lower Indus in the Sind increases. depleted. Eau'x et For@t,s I.de.fines an unclassified' A critical area for researc .h and analysis is depleted forest as one where all first growth wood finding the extent and significance of soil- deterio- has been removed and shrubs have' taken over. ration as a consequence of the'salt or of the' This type growth. will.*Iyield'O.5 to 0.7 tons' of conjunctive'use of marginal quality ground-water. charcoal per hectare per ,year,'whereas a properly What are the forms of deten*o'ration? It is difficult managed forest under average Senegal 'conditions to obtain a firm quantitative measure of the effect will yield 5.5 to 7 tons.'Eaux et For@ts further that waterlogging and salinity ha Ive had on agricul- estimates that all unclassified forests in Senegal tural production, and shifts in cropping patterns will be depleted in 30 years at the present rate. have occurred in'response to other factors as well. 4ndications in reports are that, in addition to the However, the costs in human terms have been heavy fuel requirement for wood, extensive burn- substantial. ing and uncontrolled grazing are doing As much damage as rapid harvest for charcoal and other Land Development. This question is -too general wood products. The government of Senegal rec- and.the problem it addresses contains too many ogniz.es thi problem, as reflected in their fifth four interdependent variables for a reasonable estimate year plan (i.e., plarimid expenditures of more than to be given. There are too many mixed costs, $40 million through'. 18Aux et For&s for such depending on whether it ishill land that.needs to projects m forest seedling. nurseries, forest reserve be.terraced or irrigated land in which salts must management, new forest preserves, fire protec- be leached out-or if there is an extension of an tion, and windbreak and village woodlot plant-, irrigation system to previously unirrigated land. ings). Regarding additions to crop production, there is the generally acknowledged, dilemma of Tesolving Soil. Data with respect, to soil are weak. Of the uncertain yield. potentials of. present agricultural approximately - 2,300,000 hectares of land classed. technology and feasible methods. by which this as permanent cropland, 822,000 are badly eroded new technology can be communicated, to farmers. from wind. On the erosion scale of USDA's.Soil Conservation Service,. this would probably be Yield Gains. Agricultur .al output in Pakistan is classed as a level 3 erosion. Based on a I to 5 limited by adverse physical conditions and other scale, with, 1 being slight, this erosion is c 'ritical. factors. The total cultivated area is increasing at An additional 4,000,000 hectares would be classed about 1.3 percent a year and agricultural produc- as a level 2 erosion. The remaining approximately tion methods hold the output per acre virtually 500,000 hectares would actually gain some soil constant in'a situation of rapid population growth. from windblown deposits and water-eroded sedi- The'traditional practices governing the timing and- ment. Reports and studies done by USAID. in 734 APPENDIX project planning indicate the practice of allowing Soil. As indicated by the above desertification land to lie fallow is the exception rather than the statistics, substantial agricultural land is being lost. rule, thus indicating very strong pressure on the About 600,000 acres in northern Sudan. are af7 land. The fifth four year plan (1977-81) recognizes fected by salinity problems. Sheet and gully the need for improvements: $45 million in projects erosion are common problems. No unit per time affecting basic food crops (i.e., cereals, crop estimates are available of loss of agricultural soil. rotation, fertilizers, etc.). Additionally, approxi- Current rainfed mechanized agricultural tech- mately $50 million are planned for irrigation proj- niques generally require abandonment of cultiva- ects during this,same period. , tion after about five years. Introduction of differ- Land Development. Little information exists ent technologies perhaps could have a major that would show that additional land, other than impact. Various institutions exist to promote soil through irrigation, is available to bring into pro- conservation, but they are inadequately staffed ... duction. Estimates of new land that could be Land Development. Land development costs irrigated with water available or water that could vary substantially. Irrigated land can be developed be developed would not exceed 300,000 hectares for about $2,000 per acre. These have been almost at a cost of $5,000 per hectare. This would entirely public costs. However, in terms of new represent an investment requirement of $1.5 bil- private sector agriculture developments, Sudan lion dollars. has started some concessionary assistance for Yield Gains. Yield gains under proper manage- infrastructure (pumps, canals) whereas at the time ment of rainfed agriculture (i.e., crop rotation, of project inception all of these costs were to be water conservation measures, weed control, fertil- borne by the project. Costs of development of mechanized rainfed areas are'about 10 percent of izer, and better varieties) could double yields on irrigated costs and generally are private costs. traditional crop lands. Again, some effort is being Expansion of arable land will have substantial made by the government and outside donors. impact on crop production. About 500,000 addi- SUDAN tional acres of irrigated land will be added in the next two to three years, and other projects to We do not have a high degree of confidence in irrigate more than I million acres may be started the data, but the consensus is that desertification in the next five years. Cultivation of 3-4 million and deforestation problems in the Sudan are very additional rainfed acres is also projected in the serious. next six years. Forestry. Annually, about 3 million acres are Yield Gains. Scattered estimates are available cleared-2 million for mechanized crop production of what changes a particular technology would and I million for traditional agriculture and forest produce. However, in isolation these statistics are products. Only inside forestry reserves (0.5 per- not very useful. Concerning the 2.3 million acre cent of the total area of the Sudan) are good Gezira scheme, several agronomists have com- forestry practices followed. Expansion of forestry mented that they believe that, with modest capital, reserves is planned to cover 15 percent of the inputs and some new technologies and incentives, Sudan by 2000. Within reserves reforestation is production could be doubled or tripled within five taking place at the rate of 50,000 acres per year. years. Changes in rainfed technology also proba- Existing forests are showing severe signs of stress. bly could achieve great increases in yields, partic- Overgrazing is common, and 500,000-800,000 ularly for acreage that has been cultivated for square kilometers are burned each year, removing more than two years. about 300 million tons of foliage. Fuel wood consumption is estimated at 30 million stacked THAILAND cubic meters. (Nomadic tribes uproot about 550 million acacia trees annually for firewood.) De- Summary. The rate of deforestation in Thailand forestation has caused a pronounced problem in is accelerating and far outstrips efforts to control many water courses in central Sudan. Desertifica- it. Less than 39 percent of the total land area tion is moving southward at a rate of 5-6 kilome- remains in forests; at the present rate, this will ter per year, according to a 1975 study of the drop to 17 percent by 1981 and effectively to zero National Council of Research. Other sources think by the end of the decade. Agricultural land the movement may be faster-perhaps 8-10 kilo- expanded by 20 percent from 1971 to 19175 at the meter per year. Institutional programs to improve expense of the forests, but problems of water forestry generally are inadequate. control remain more significant than land availa- APPENDIX 735 bility. Only 5.6 million hectares of land are single hectare of forest with modern equipment is irrigated or inigable, and 12 percent of this land is $600. Squatters moving into the cleared area can in the northeast, the region most susceptible to cultivate the land for one to two years, but by the drought and flooding. High costs of irrigation and third year it has been taken over by imperata and@ technological innovation preclude rapid dissemi- peniseturn grass-pest grass that effectively pre- nation of more modem services and facilities to vents further cultivation. The pest grasses are the majority of Thai farmers. particularly vulnerable to fire in the dry seasons and frequent grass fires destroy any chance for Forestry. One of the more significant problems natural reforestation of the area. The result is that facing Thailand now and in the immediate future without some assistance by man, nature in Thai- is the excessive rate of deforestation. Based on land cannot arrest or reverse the destruction of satellite imagery from the Earth Resources Tech- the forest once begun by the perpetrator, man nology Satellite ERTS-I in 1973, it was reported himself. Present government reforestation pro- that the area of forest in Thailand totaled grams do not balance the present rate of defores- 20,074,900 hectares, or 39 percent of the country. tation and even the most optimistic estimates of An earlier study (1970) demonstrated that the the rate of destruction offer no hope of significant annual consumption ofwood and wood products forest stands in Thailand beyond 1993. in Thailand averaged 63.5 million cubic meters Land Development. Although by consensus it is (mcm), of which 12.0 mcm was sawnwood, 1.5 agreed that agricultural land is being lost to mcm poles, and 50.0 mcm ftielwood requirements. cultivation through problems relating generally to A survey of Thai forests determined that 532,000 water control, the direct correlation has not been hectares of forest were required to satisfy such quantified to date. A study completed by the needs with an additional 255,000 hectares of forest Ministry of Agriculture and Agriculture Coopera- also lost annually for shifting cultivation, or a total tives (MAAC) in 1972 reveals that of the total of 1.14 million hectares of forest cleared in 1970. area of land in Thailand, 51.4 million hectares, Assuming that the rate of consumption will in- only about 29.7 million hectares are suitable for crease in proportion to the rate of population agricultural production. A later study, in 1975, growth, or 2.55 percent per year, it is estimated revealed that from 1971 to 1975 the land area that there will remain less than 9 million hectares devoted to farm holdings had increased from 15.5 of forest in Thailand in 1981, or 17 percent of the million to 18.6 million hectares, or by about 20 country, and by 1987 the entire forest area of percent, and that most of this expansion was at Thailand will be effectively cleared. the expense of forested areas. During the same The Royal Thai government has recognized the period, the MAAC and other government agencies seriousness of the deforestation problem and, has ed increasing problems of alternate flooding enacted measures to control it. There is already not an established system of national parks and game and drought in the north and northeast, the preserves covering 2.26 million hectares, or 4.39 regions most seriously denuded of their past percent of the country. In addition, all areas extensive and protective forest areas. Controlled above 600 meters elevation are protected by law water availability is a problem at least as signifi- against any logging or clearing for cultivation. cant in agricultural production as land scarcity, These laws hold little relevance for the hill tribes and MAAC estimates "irrigable land" at about 3.2 million hectares and "irrigated land" at about system of shifting cultivation. The government 2.4 million hectares, although irrigation is primar- reforestation program claims some success to ily supplemental during an adequate rainy season. date: 94,000 hectares of new forest have been Less than a third of a million hectares represent replanted in the 10 years ending in 1976. Plans areas with adequate water control to permit dou- call for an additional 320,000 hectares of forest to ble cropping. It is of interest to note that the be replanted each year over the next five years. northwest region, the region in which virtual total While this target falls far short of the yearly rate deforestation has been achieved, contains only 12 of deforestation and is far beyond the present rate percent of the total irrigable land. of reforestation, it does represent an increasing official awareness of the seriousness of the prob- Yield Gains. Given the close correlation that lem. However, despite all efforts to preserve the exists between controlled moisture availability, remaining forests and to replant those already crop yields, and return on investments in pur- cleared, illegal log poaching and subsequent illegal chased inputs, it is quite understandable that the cultivation of forest land persists. A very rough poorest farmers are found in those areas with estimate of the cost to a log poacher to clear a limited irrigation facilities and unpredictable rain- 736 APPENDIX fall distribution patterns: These are also the groups eroded uplands are much less productive and may facing the greatest risks in, terms oftechnological lose 50 percent of their potential productivity as a innoy 'ation, and,they are thus prone.to follow low- result of small increases in the intensity of use. yield, low7risk, traditional methods of production. Regarding forestry pr-actices,, the government's The high costs of irrigation have. precluded suffi- Forest Service personnel play a protective role ciently large scale projects that might benefit exclusively-i.e.., :they attempt.:to regulate the cut significant numbers of poorJarmers, and without on.. essentially - unmanaged forestland by prohibit- adequate technology adapted to the prevailing ing the taking of live wood. There are less than rainfed con 'ditions of the majority of Thai farmers, 500 hectares of plantations more than. 20, years little relief can be expected in the-f6reseeable old. These have not been managed, that is,'there future. has been no' fire protection, no thinning, no UPPERNOLTA planned harvesting. Since 1970, several hundred hectares of plantations'have 'been established,, but Forestry. Deforestation and degradation.6f agri- again there is little-in place.(personnel, operating cultural land cannot be readily quantified because budgets, equipment,' marketing.outiets) that would it is. an ongoing process. People do recognize, its permit their long-term "management.. Some natural extent and importance because they feel its con- forest stands have been inventoried. However, no sequences. Rather than attempt to quantify it in treatments have. been prescribed or implemented terms- of area of deforested land (which, depends except on an experimental scale. In brief, f6rest on -the definition of "deforested" and which has management and forestry in general have yet to meaning only in- relation to the prior equilibrium be practiced in Upper Volta on a significant scale. density of forest cover), one can argue: that Before 'this can' be'done, 'Much more must be deforestation and degradation are better measured leamed about regenerating local species and natu- in terms of their impact on people: the number of ral stands, about' the silviculture of mixed@@spe- people made hungry by declining crop yields, the cies/savanna fo,restlan'd,ahd about the concepts of number of people made poorer- by loss of live- planned harvests and regeneration. stock, and the loss of revenue from agricultural Aegarding effective reforestation, only several and forestry Activities in general as a -result of hundred hectares, mostly eucalyptus and gm6lina 'decreased. productivity of the resource base. It-is ar6orea, had been planted prior to 1974. Between not presently feasible to add,up, from year to year .1974 and, 1977, 2693 hectares have been planted in the Area of "deforested land."" At besL one can four different projects. By 1980 the' government systematically sample the density and composition plans to establish over 5,000 hectares of mechd- (species present and their'relative frequency) of nized plantations for firewood production. In the vegetative, cover, in order to document, the summary,- we can conclude that population condition and trend of the vegetation, and list the growths, in Upper Volta; lack. of firewood planta- formerly --abundant species that have become tions in the face. of growing demand, misuse or scarce. Many species that play crucial roles in overuse of existing resources, ,and climatic disas- protecting agricultural harvests, in maintaining soil ters have led to a condition where forest resources fertility (and thus crop yields), and in forage -in Upper Volta must, be characterized as '@'se- production for livestock are being lost-through verely stressed." deforestation and land degradation processes. . The government has initiated or attempted to Similarly, one, cannot document the number of initiate programs to improve.its, institutional ca- hectares "lost t6the desert" 'from year to year, pacity to improve forest management practices. It as there-is no advancing boundary (from east to 'has,undertaken programs to increase.the forestry west below the Sahara) between desert 'and sa- school,student capacity and has developed train- Ivanna pasture'or farmland. Rather,' desertification - ing programs to enable the forest service to absorb is also a process reflecting the fact that. land has and manage larger-scale reforestation and. forest been' exploited beyond 'its capacity to regenerate management programs. Programs and initiatives ,itself and to sustain its productivity. Declines in have suffered from lack of operating funds - and the.productivity or in- the biomass of the vegeta- lack of,qualified personnel, particularly at the tion can be documented.. There are, however, village level. such tremendous variations within small areas, that regional generalizations are of doubtful value. For -Sofl.- Productivity of agricultural. -land is being example, several hectares in the forested lowland lost annually on. a large scale from erosion, may be more productive and remam,so, in spite of laterization, and desertification. Since only 6,700 increased 'use, while several adjacent'hoctares of hectares are under irrigation in Upper Volta, there APPENDIX 737 has been little damage frorn salinization or water- ZAIRE logging. None of the government -agencies queried has Soil fertility. has, been maintained primarily quantitative data with projections through the year through sparse and sporadic spreading of manure 2000. Individual studies exist for certain areas of in fields close to homesteads and through a system Zaire, but given the@ immense variety of @ terrain, of crop rotation that is frequently violated by the soil, vegetation, and climate, it is impossible to exigencies of pressures to mea food Production extrapolate and generalize for the entire country. necessities. For example, AID/Zaire is preparing a study on Land Development. Under the auspices, of the land usage, soils, and agricultural yields in the government's Authority for the. Development of region of northern Shaba, where AID is com- .the 'Volta Valleys (AVV), a program has been mencing a large-scale maize project. However, established to facilitate settlement and develop- conditions there are completely different from ment of areas cleared of the black fly,. which mountainous regions in Kivu or the tropical rain transmits ofichocer .ciasis`@fiver'blindness). Using forests of the. Zaire River Basin. The information the program as an example of bringing an addi- given, below is drawn from conversations with tional hectare of land intocultivation, we estimate knowledgeable officials and advisers of the gov- the costs to be about $1,450 per hectare. This emment. figure represents an,AVV program that costs about $14,500 to settle a family into a river basin Forestry. With about I. million square kilome- (the family brings about 10 hectares into pr6duc- ters of forests (about 45, percent of the land area), tion). This.AVV family settlement -program is I a deforestation was not considered a problem until costly method of, bringing. new land into produc- recently. Lumber companies have done relatively tion in Upper, Volta, the costs of,which'are bome little harm over the previous decades, since.they as a public expenditure, In contrast with the cut only 12 varieties of the approximately 100 government-sponsored AVV program 'are sponta- kinds of trees that grow in Zaire. Currently about neous settlement, resettlement,' and expansion of 500,000 cubic meters of wood per year are cut for commercial purposes, and about one-third of that arable land. Although reliable figures are not available the cost *per hectare associated with is exported. However, with the.rapid population spontaneous settle _ment would be significantly increase of the cities@ deforestation around urban lower than the AVV example'c,ited and the cost areas is becoming increasingly evident. Six per- would represent private rather than public! expend- cent of the population has electricity, and the iture. majority. cannot afford kerosene. Consequently, the government estimates that abou -t.20 million Yield Gains. Reliable data in Upper Volta are cubic meters of wood per year are consumed for not readily available'that would allow us to state heat and.to make charcoal for cooking. In.the with authority how much of crop production yield relatively heavily populated region of Bas Zaire, gains are attainable -from or attributed to techno- 60 percent of the forests have already been@ cut logical change. One reason is the absence of base- and the remaining major forest of 100,000 hectares line information and uneven data collection pro- at Mayombe is being heavily exploited. cedures. Another reason is that production yields I The government began planting trees (mainly have fluctuated widely over the past 15 years, eucalyptus) around Kinshasa and in Bas. Z 'aire in 'with declines 'registered in the early and mid- 1,968. The goal is to expand the activity to 1970s because-of the drought. Our best estimate deforested areas. around other cities. The replant- is that over, the past 15 years about a 20 percent ing brigade is currently under control of the crop production yield gain can be attributed to Bureau de Prdservation de Terre in the Depart- technological changes such-as introduction of, or mea of, Environment, Conservation of. Nature, improved use of, fertilizers, pesticides, animal and Tourism. Previously, lumber companies paid traction, irrigation,. and timing and density of a tax to Zaire to cover.reforestation costs. How- .production. ever, the government's reforestation efforts in Planning projections to the year 2000 by the logged areas proved inadequate, and in a speech government calls for doubling crop production. on November 25, 1977,, President Mobutu re- Government strategy to double production would pealed the ux and asked lumber companies to be brought about by increased productivity, new . assume responsibility for replanting. and improved technology, reducing the vulnerabil- ity of 'agriculture production to drought, and by Soil. Although erosio,n.has been accelerated by opening new lands to cultivation @'minifig and slash and bum land clearing, especially 738 APPENDIX on the Biano Plateau in southeastern Zaire, lateri- tionally clear new land every three years, allowing zation and leaching of soil is endemic to most of used land to lie fallow for 12, years or so. Zaire due to extremely heavy rain and heat, which Commercial farmers are well aware that yield breaks.down humus. In the areas of sandy type increases dramatically, especially for palm oil and soil, there is more siltation due to increased land certain other crops@ when fertilizer is added to utilization. Ironically, the biggest natural problem leached soil, but no fertilizer is manufactured on rivers is caused by rapidly spreading water locally and the current shortage of foreign ex- hyacinth, which was introduced in the early 1960s change has made fertilizer very scarce. With and is now clogging rivers and lakes. The previ- completion of the Inga Dam, Zaire will have ously mentioned Bureau and a division within the tremendous electrical production, which could be Department of Agriculture promote soil conserva- used for manufacturing fertilizer, but this is far in tion, but their efforts are inadequate. the future. The costs of bringing additional hec- tares into production differ enormously for sub- sistence farmers who slash and bum, and com- Land Development. In a country where 50 mercial, mechanized farmers. Costs to commercial percent of the territory is potentially arable but farmers rise dramatically the further the land is only I percent is actually cultivated, farmers can located from highways, railroads, and navigable increase yield more rapidly and more cheaply by rivers. Fuel is currently very scarce in the interior, cultivating new land rather than by investing in which greatly adds to the cost of cultivating new technological change. Subistence farmers tradi- land far from Kinshasa or Lubumbashi. Appendix D: Metric Conversion Factors It was intended that all units used in this study would be metric. Unfor tunately, in the rush to prepare the manuscript, it was not possible to maintain uniformity of metric units. To help the reader convert units as necessary, it was decided to include an appendix of conversion factors. The best table of conversion factors that the Global 2000 Study was able to locate was the following alphabetical list, prepared jointly by the American Society for Testing Materials and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers in a short report "Metric Practice." Copies of the complete report (no. IEEE Std 268-1976) can be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, 395 East 45th St., New York, N.Y. 10017. General:.. The following tables of con- Further example of use of tables: version factors are intended to serve two purposes. To convert from: to: Multiply by: To expre@ss'the definitions of miscel- pound-force per square foot Pa 4.788 026 E+01 laneous units of measiire as exact numerical inch m 2.540 000*E-02 multiples of coherent "metric" -units. Rela- means 1 lbf/ ft2 = 47.880 26 Pa tionships that are exact in terms of the base 1 inch = 0.0254 m (exactly) unit are followed by an asterisk. Relation- ships that are not, followed by an asterisk are either the results of physical measure- Organization: ments or are only approximate. The conversion factors are listed in To provide multiplying factors for two ways-alphabetically and classified by converting expressions of measurements physical quantity. -Both lists contain those given by numbers and miscellaneous units to units which have specific names and com- corresponding new numbers and metric pound units derived from these specific units. units. The classified list contains the more Notation. frequently used units for each physical quan- tity. Conversion factors are presented for ready adaptation to computer readout and The conversion factors for other electronic data transmission. The factors are compound units can easily be generated written as a number greater than one and from numbers given in the alphabetical list less than ten with six or less decimal places. by the substitution of converted units, as This number is followed by the letter E (for follows: exponent), a plus or minus symbol, and two EXAMPLE: To find conversion factor of lb-ft/s to digits which indicate the power of 10 by kg-m/s: which the number must be multiplied to first convert 1 lb to 0.453 592 4 kg obtain the correct value. For example: and 1 ft to 0.3048 m 3.523 907 E-02 is 3.523 907 x 1U-2 then substitute: or 0.03523907 (0.453 592 4 kg)-(0.3048 m)/s Similarly: = 0.138 255 kg-m/s 3.386 389 E+03 is 3.386 389 x 103 thus the factor is 1.382 55 E-01 or 3386.389 EXAMPLE: To find conversion factor of oz-in' to An asterisk (*) after the sixth kg- M2: decimal place indicates that the conversion first convert 1 oz to 0.028 349 52 kg factor is exact and that all subsequent digits and 1 in2 to 0.000 645 16 m2 are zero. All other conversion factors have then substitute: been rounded to the figures given in accord- (0.028 349 52 kg) - (0.000 645 16 in) ance with 4.4. Where less than six decimal places are shown, more precision is not 0.000 018 289 98 kg-m 2 warranted. thus the factor is 1.828 998 E-05 739 740 APPENDIX Alphabetical List of Units (Symbols of S1 units given in parentheses) To convert from to Multiply by abampere ..................... ampere (A) ................. 1.000 000*E+01 abcoulomb .................... coulomb (C) ................ 1.000 000*13+01 abfarad ...................... farad (F) .................. 1.000 000*13+09 abhenry ....................... henry (H) .................. 1.000 000*E-09 abmho ....................... siemens (S) ................. 1.000 000*E+09 abohm ....................... ohm (0) .................. 1.000 000*E-09 abvolt ....................... volt (V) ................... 1.000 000*E-08 acre foot (US survey)12 ........... meter3 (M3) . .............. 1.233 489 E+03 acre (US survey)12 ............... meter2 (m2) ................ 4.046 873 E+03 ampere hour ................... coulomb (C) ................ 3.600 000*E+03 are ......................... meter2 (M2) ................ 1.000 000*E+02 angstrom ..................... meter (m) .................. 1.000 000*E-10 astronomical unit 13 .............. meter (m) .................. 1.495 979 E+11 atmosphere (standard) ............ pascal (Pa) .............. . . 1.013 250*E+05 atmosphere (technical = 1 kgf/CM2 ) ... pascal (Pa) .......... * ...... 9.806 650*E+04 bar ......................... pascal (Pa) ...... * .......... 1.000 000*E+05 2 barn ........................ meter (m2) ................ 1.000 000*E-28 barrel (for petroleum, 42 gal) ........ meter3 W) ................. 1.589873 E-01 board foot ..................... meted (M3) ................ 2.359737 E-03 British thermal unit (International Table)14 .................... joule (J) ............... I.... 1.055056 E+03 British thermal unit (mean) ......... joule (J) ................... 1.05587 E+03 British thermal unit (thermochemicai) . . joule (J) ................... 1.054350 E+03 British thermal unit (39'F) ......... joule (J) ................... 1.05967 E+03 British thermal unit (59'F) ......... joule (J) ................... 1.05480 E+03 British thermal unit (60'F) ......... joule (J) ................... 1.05468 E+03 Btu (International Table)- ft/h.ft2.'F (k, thermal conductivity) ......... watt per meter kelvin (W/m-K) ... 1.730 735' E+00 Btu (thermochemical)-ft/h-ft2 -OF (k, thermal conductivity) ......... watt per meter kelvin (W/m-K) ... 1.729577 E+00 Btu (International Table)-in/h-ft2 -OF (k, thermal conductivity) ... ...... watt per meter kelvin (W/m-K) ... 1.442279 E-01 Btu (thermochemical)- in/h - ft2 - * F .(k, thermal conductivity) ......... watt per meter kelvin (W/m- K) ... 1.441314 E-01 Btu (International Table)-in/s-ft2 -OF (k, thermal conductivity) ......... watt per meter kelvin (Wlm-K) ... 5.192204 E+02 Btu (thermochemical)- in/s- ft2 - 0 F (k, thermal conductivity) ......... watt per meter kelvin (W/m- K) ... 5.188732 E+02 12 Since 1893 the US basis of length measurement has been derived from metric standards. In, 1 959 a small refine- ment was made in the definition of the Yard to resolve discrepancies both in this country and abroad, which changed its length from 3600/3937 m to 0.9144 m exactly. This resulted in the new value being shorter by two parts in a million. At the same time it was decided that any data in feet derived from and published as a result of geodetic surveys within the US would remain with the old standard (1 ft = 1200/3937 m) until further decision. This foot is named the US survey foot. As a result all US land measurements in US customary units will relate to the meter by the old standard. All the conversion factors in these tables for units referenced to this footnote are based on the US survey foot, rather than the international foot. Conversion factors for the land measure given below may be determined from the following relationships: I league = 3 miles (exactly) 1 rod = 16V2 feet (exactly) 1 section = 1 square mile (exactly) 1 township = 36 square miles (exactly) 13 This value conflicts with the value printed in NBS 330 (17). The value requires updating in NBS 330. 14 This value was adopted in 1956. Some of the older International Tables use the value 1.055 04 E+03. The exact conversion factor is 1.055 055 852 62*E+03. METRIC CONVERSION FACTORS 741 To convert from to- Multiply by Btu (International Table)/h watt (W),, ............ 2.930711 E-01 Btu (thermochemical)/h ........... watt (W) ................... 2.928 751 E-01 Btu (thermochemical)/min ......... watt (W) ................... @..7 5,7 2'50 E+01 Btu (thermochemical)/s ........... watt (W) .................. 1.054 350 E+03 Btu (Iriternational'Table)/ft2 ......... joule per meter2 p/M2) ......... 1.135653 E+04 Btu (thermochemical)/W ........... joule per-meter2 pjM2) ........ 1.134893 E+04 Btu (thermochemical)/ft2 -h ......... watt per meter2 (W/M2) ........ 3.152481 E+00 Btu (therniochemical)/ft2 -min ....... watt per meter2 (W/M2) ........ 1.891489 E+02 Btu (thermochemical)/ft2 _S ......... watt per meter2 (WIM2) ........ 1.134893 E+04 Btu (thermochemical)/in2 g ......... watt per meter2 (WIM2) ......... 1.634 246 E+06 Btu (International Table)/h - ft2 . 0 F I (C, thermal conductance) ......... watt per meter2 kelvin (W/M2 - K) 5.678263 E+00 Btu (thermochemical)/h.ft2 -OF (C, thermal conductance) ......... watt per meter2 kelvin,(W/M2 -K) 5.674466 E+00 Btu (International Table)/s- ft2 -OF .... watt per meter2 kelvin (W/M2 -K) 2.044175 E+04 Btu.(thermochemical)/S.ft2 -OF ...... watt.per meter2 kelvin (W/M2 -K) 2.042808. E+04 Btu (International Table)/lb ......... joule. per kilogram (j/kg) 2.326,000*EtO3, Btu. (thermochemical)/Ib .......... joule per kilogram (J/kg) 2.324.444. E+.03 Btu (International Table)/Ib-'F I (c, heat capacity) ............... joule.per kilogram kelvin (J/kg-K) 4.186 800*E+03 Btu (thermochemical)jlb,-OF (c,: heat capacity) ............... joule per kilogram kelvin (J/kg- K) .4.184 000 E+03 bushel (US) ........... I........ meter3 (m3) ................ 3.523 907 1E-0 .2 caliber (inch) .... ............... meter (in) .......... 1..., a .... 2.540 000*E-02 calorie (International Table) ........ joule (J) ................... 4.186 800*E+00 calorie (mean) .................. joule (J) ............... 1. - @ ..4A90 02, E+00 calorie (thermochemical) ........... joule (J) ............... 4.184 006@EtOO calorie (1 5'C) ................. joule (J) .................. 4.185-80 E+00 calor.ie (20'C) .................. joule (J) .................... :C181 90 E+00: calorie (kilogram, International Table) ..joule (J) ................... 4.186 800*E+03 calorie (kilogram, mean) ........... joule (J) .I . .1. 4 ........ .... 4.190 02 E+03 calorie (kilogram, thermpchemical) joule (J), ............... 4.484 000*E+03 cal (thermochernl'cal)/CM2 .... joule per meter2 p/M2) .... 4.184 000*E+04 cal (International Table)/g .......... joule per kilogram (J/kg) ......... 4:186 800*E+03@ cal (thermochemical)/g Joule, per kilogram (J/kg) ......... 4,184 000*E+03 cal (International Table)/g-OC ....... joule per kilogram kelvin (J/kg-K) ; 4.@186 800*E+03' cal (thermochemical)/g-O.C joule' per kilogram kelvin (J/kg@,K) % -4.184 000*E+03 cal (thermoc hemical)/miri watt (W) 0 -02 ... ................. 6;.973 333 -E cal (thermochemicaj)/s watt (W) ............... 4.184- 000#E+00 6aJ (thermochemical)/c.@2*, min watt per meter2 (W/M2) ........ 6.973 333 E+02 cal (thermochemical)/,@,,2 -s ........... watt per meter2 '(W./M2 ) ..... ... 4.184 000*E+04 cal (thermochemical)/cm '-OC ...... watt per meter kelvir@ (W/mi K) ... 4.184 000*&@02 carat (metric) kilogram (kg) ........ .... 2.000 0004! I . -e E_ 04. centimeter of mercury .... pascal (Pa) ............ ..... 1.333 22 E+03 centimeter of water (40C) .......... pascal (Pa) ................. 9.806 38 E+61 centipoise'. 'pascal second (Pa-s) ........... 1.000,000*E-03, centistokes .................... meter2 per second (M2 is) ....... 1.000 000*E-06 circular mii meter'2 @ml) ................... 5.067075 E-10 cJ0 ... ..................... kelvin MeteP@per watt (K-m2/W) . . 2.003712 E-01 Cup ................... meter3 (in3 ......... 2.365882 E- 04 curie ........................ 6ecquerel (Bq) .............. 3.700 000*E+10 742 APPENDIX To convert from to Multiply by day (mean solar) ................ second (s) .................. 8.640 000 E+04 day (sidereal) .................. second (s) .................. 8.616 409 E+04 degree (angle) .................. radian (rad) ................ 1.745 329 E-02 degree Celsius .................. kelvin (K) ........... tK = t. C + 273.15 degree centigrade ................ [see 3.4.2] degree Fahrenheit ................ degree Celsius ........ toC = (toF 32)/1.8 degree Fahrenheit ............... kelvin (K) ........... tK =(toir + 459.67)/1.8 degree Rankine ........ ........ kelvin (K) ........... tK = t.,/1.8 'F-h-ft2 /Btu (International Table) (R, thermal resistance) ........... kelvin meter2 per watt (K- M2 /W) 4.761 102 E-01 OF-h-ft' /Btu (thermochemical) (R, thermal. resistance) ........... kelvin metej2 per watt (K-M2 /W) 1.762 280 E-01 denier ....................... kilogram per meter (kgJm) ....... 1.111 Ill E-07 dyne ........................ newton (N) ................. 1. 000 000 *E- 05 dyne-cm ..................... newton meter (N-m) ......... : . 1.000 000*E-07 dyne/cm2 ..................... pascal (Pa) .................. 1.000 000*E-01 electronvolt ................... joule (J) ................... 1.602 19 E-19 EMU of capacitance .............. farad (F) .................. 1.000 000*E+09 EMU of current ................. ampere (A) ................. 1.000 000*E+01 EMU of electric potential .......... volt (V) ................... 1.000 000*E-08 EMU of inductance .............. henry (H) 1.000,000*E-09 EMU of resistance ................. ohm (n) .................. 1.000 000*E-09 ESU of capacitance .............. farad (F) .................. 1.112 650 E-12 ESU of current ................. ampere(A) ................ . 3.335 6 E-10 ESU of electric potential ........... volt (V) ................... 2-9979 E+02 ESU of inductance ............... henry (H) .................. 8.987554 E+l 1 ESU of resistance ................ ohm (n) .................. 8.987 554 E+11 erg ......................... joule (J) ................... 1. 000 000 * E- 07 erg)lcm2 -s ..................... watt per meter2 (W/m2) ........ 1.000 000*E-03 erg/s ............. "I ..... ..... watt (W) .................. 1.000 000*E-07 faraday (based on carbon-12) ........ coulomb (C) ................ 9.648 70 E+04 faraday (chemical) ............... coulomb (C) ................ 9.649 57 E+04 faraday (physical) ............... coulomb (C) ................ 9.652 19 E+04 fathom ...................... meter (m) .................. 1.8288 E+00 fermi (femtometer) ............. meter (m) .................. 1.000 000*E- 15 fluid ounce (US) ................ meteT3 (rn3 ) ................ 2.967 353 E-05 foot ........................ meter (m) .................. 3.048 000*E-01 foot (US survey) 12 .............. meter (m) .................. 3.048 006 E-01 foot of water (39.2'F) ....... .... pascal (Pa) ................. 2.988 98 E+03 ft . ..................... 0 meter2 (M2) ................ 9.290 304*E-02 ft2/h (thermal diffusivity) .......... meter2 per second (M21S) ....... 2.580 640*E-05 ft2/S ........................ meter2 per second (M2/S) ....... 9.296 304*E-02 ft3 (volume; section modulus) ....... meter3 (M3) ................ 2.831 685 E-02 ft 3/ min ...................... meter3 per second (M3/S) ....... 4.719 474 E-04 W/s ........................ meter3 per second (m3/S) ....... 2.831 685 E-02 ft 4(moment of section)' 5 .......... meter4(M4) ................ 8.630 975 E-03 ft/h ........ :................ meter per second (m/s) ......... 8.466 667 E-05 ft/min ....................... meter per second (m/s) .......... 5.080 000*E-03 ft1s ......................... meter per second (m/s) ......... 3.048 000*E-01 ft/S2 ........................ meter per second2 (M/S2 ) ....... 3.048 000*E-01 footcandle .................... lux (lx) ................... 1.076 391 E+01 footlambert ................... candela per meter2 (cd/M2 ) ...... 3.426 259 E+00 This is sometimes called the moment of inertia of a plane section about a specified axis. METRIC CONVERSION FACTORS 743 To convert from to Multiply by ft-lbf ........................ joule (J) ................... 1.355 818 E+00 ft-lbf/h ...................... watt (W) .................. 3.766 161 E-04 ft-lbf/min ..................... watt (W) ................... 2.259 697 E-02 ft-lbf/s ...................... watt (W) .................. 1. 35 5 818 E+00 ft-poundal .................... joule (J) ..................... 4.214 011 E-02 free fall, standard (g) .............. meter per second2 (M/62 ) ....... 9.806 650*E+00 gal ........................... meter per second2 (M/S2) ;...... 1.000 000*E-02 gallon (Canadian liquid) ........... meter3 (M3 ) ................ 4.546090 E- 03 gallon (UK liquid) ............... meter3 (m3) ................. 4.546092 E-03 gallon (US dry) ................. meter3 (m3) ................ 4.404884 E- 03 (m ................ 3.785412 E-03 gallon (US liquid) ............... meter3 3) gal (US liquid)/day ............... meter3 per second (m3 /S) ....... 4.381 264 E- 08 gal (US liquid)/min .............. meter3 per second (M3 /S) ....... 6.309020 E-05 gal (US liquid)/hp-h (SFC, specific fuel consumption) .... meter3 per joule (m3 /J) ......... 1.410089 E- 09 gamma ....................... tesla (T) ................... 1.000 000*E-09 puss ........................ tesla (T) .................... 1.000 000*E-04 gilbert ....................... ampere (A) ................. 7.957 747 E-01 gill (UK) ..................... meter3 (M3) ................ 1.420 654 E-04 gill (US) ...................... meter3 (m3) ......... ; ....... 1.182 941 E-04 .grad ......................... degree (angular) .............. 9.000 000*13-01 grad ........................ radian (rad) ................ 1.570 796 E-02 grain (1/7000 lb avoirdupois) ........ kilogram (kg) ............... 6.479 891*13-05 grain (lb avoirdupois/7000)lgal m per meter'(kg1m3) (US liquid) ................... kilogra . ..... 1.711 806 E-02 gram ........................ kilogram (kg) ............... 1.000 000*E-03 g/cm3 ....................... kilogram per meter3 (kg/M3) ..... 1.000 000*E+03 gram-force/cm2 ................. pascal (Pa) ................. 9.806 650*E+01 hectare ...................... meter2 (M2 ) ................ 1.000 000*E+04 horsepower (550 ft-lbf/s) .......... watt (W) .................. 7.456 999 E+02 horsepower (boiler) .............. watt (W) .................. 9.809 50 E+03 horsepower (electric) ............. watt (W) .................. 7.460 000*E+02 horsepower (metric) .............. watt (W) .................. 7.35499 E+02 horsepower (water) .............. watt (W) .................. 7.46043 E+02 horsepower (U.K.) ............... watt (W) .................. 7.4570 E+02 hour (mean solar) ............... second (s) ..... 3.600000 E+03 hour (sidereal) .................. second (s) ... ......... 3.590170 E+03 hundredweight (long) ............. kilogram (kg) ........... 6.080235 E+01 hundredweight (short) ............ kilogram (kg) ............ I ... 4.535924 E+01 inch ........................ meter (m) .................. 2.540 000*E-02 inch of mercury (32oF) ............ Pascal (Pa) ................. 3.386 38 E+03 inch of mercury (60'F) ............ Pascal (Pa) ................. 3.376 85 E+03 inch of water (39.2*F) ............ Pascal (Pa) ................. 2.49082 E+02 inch of water (60'F) ............. Pascal (Pa) ................. 2.4884 E+02 in2 ...................... 2 2 -04 ... meter (m )................ 6.451 600*E in3 (volume; section modulus)16 ..... meter3 (M3) ................ 1.638 706 E-05 in3/min ...................... meted per second (m'/s) ....... 2.731 177 E-07 in4 (moment of section) .. ........ meter4 (M4) ................ 4.162 314 E-07 in/s ......................... meter per second (m/s) .......... 2.540 000*E-02 in/s2 ........................ meter per second2 (M/S2) ........ 2.540 000*E-02 kayser ....................... 1 per meter (1/m) ............ 1.000 000*E+02 kelvin ....................... degree Celsius ............ toc tK 273.15 16 The exact conversion factor is 1.638 706 4-E-05. 744 APPENDIX` .To convert from to Multiply by kilocalorie (International Table) ...... j6ulle (J) .................... 4.186 ,860*E+03 kilocalorie (mean) ............... joule (J) ......... ....... 4.190 02 E+03 kilocalorie (thermochemical) ........ joule (J) .................... 4.194 000*E+03 kilocalorie (thermochemical)/min ..... . watt (W) ............... ... 6.973 333 E+01 kilocalorie (thermochemical)/s ........ watt (W) .................. 4.18i 060*E+03 kilogram-force (kgf) ... newton (N) ............ .9.806 650*E+00 kgf-m ........................ newton meter (N-m) ............ 9.A06 650*E+00 kgf - s2 /m (mass) kilogram (kg) 9:806 650*E+00 kgf/rm*l ......... Pascal (Pal ................. 9.806 650*E+04 ................ .... Pascal (Pa) @ ............ 9.1806 650*E+00 kgf)mm2 ...................... Pascal (Pa) ............. 9.806 650*E+06 km/h .................... .... meter per second (m/s) ......... 2.777 778 E-01 kilopond ..................... newton (N) @ ................ 9.806 650*E+00 kW-h ........................ joul ,e (J) .................. @.660 0'00*E+06 kip (1000 lbf) .... :.............. newton (N) ................. 4.448 222 E+03 kip/in2 (ksi) .................... Pascal (Pa) . ................ 6.894 757 E+06 knot (international) .......... ... meter per second (m/s) ......... 5.144 444 E-01 lambert .... .................. candela per meter2 (cd/M2) ...... 1/@T *E+04 lambert ....................... candela per meter2 (ed/M2) ...... 3.183 099 E+03 langley ................ ... joule per meter2 p/M2) ..... ... 4.184 000*E+04 league ....................... meter (m) .................. [see footnote 12] light @ear ... ................. meter (m) .................. 9.460 55 E+15 liter . ........................ metei3 (M3) ................ 1.000 000*E-03 maxwell ....................... Weber (Wb) ................. 1.000 000*E-08 mho ........................ slemens (S) ................. 1.000 000*E+00 microin,ch ..................... meter (m) ...................... @2.540 000*E-08 micron ....................... meter (m) .................. 1.000 000*E-06 ........................... meter (m) ........... ....... 2.540 000*E-05 mile (international) ............... I meter (m) ..................... 1.609 344*E+03 mile (statute) .................. meter (m) .................. 1.609 3 E+03 mile (US survey) 12 ............... meter (m) .................. 1.609 347 E+03 mile (international nautical) .... meter (m) .................. 1.852 000*E+03 mile (VK nautical) ............... meter (m) ................ 1.853 184*E+03 mile (.US nautical) ................. meter (m) .................. 1.852 000*E+03 MO (in Iternational) ......... I........ meted (M2 ) ................. 2.589 988 E+06 mi2 (US survey) 12 .............. meted (M2) ................ @.589 9,98 E+06 mi/h (international) .............. meter per second (m/s) ......... 4.470 400*E-01 mi/h (international) ................. kilometer per hour (km/h) ....... 1.609 344*E+00 mi/min (international) .......... meter per second (m/s) .......... 2.682 240*E+01 mi/s (international) ................ meter per second (m/s) ..... @1.609 344*E+03 millibar ...................... Pascal (Pa) ............ 1.000 000*E+02 millimeter of mercury (O'C) ........ Pascal (Pa) ....... ........... 1.333 22' E+02 minute (angle) .................... radian (rad) ................ 2@908 8k E-04 minute (mean solar) .............. second (s) .................. 6.000000 E+01 minute (sidereal) ................ second (s) .................. 5;983 617 E+01 month (mean calendar) ............ second (s) .................. 2.'628 000 E+06 oersted ...................... ampere per meter (A/m) ........ 7.957 747 E+01 ohm centimeter ................. ohm meter (2-m) ............ 1.000 000*E-02 ohm circular-mil per ft ............ ohm millimeter' per meter (n MM2 /m) ......... ..... 1.662 1426 E-03, 171n@1964 the General Conference on Weights and Measures adopted the name liter as a special name for the cubic decimeter. Prior to this decision the liter differed slightly (previous @value, 1.000 028 dm' and in expression of precision volume measurement this fact must be kept in mind, METRIC CONVERSION FACTORS 745 To convert from to Multiply by ounce (avoirdupois) ......... ... kilogram (kg) ............... 2.8214 952 E-02 ounce (troy or apothecary) ......... kilogram (kg) ............... 3.110348 E-02 ounce (UK fluid) ................ meter3 (M3) ................ 2.841 307 E-05 ounce (US fluid) ................ meter3 (M3) ... .............. 2.957 353 E-05 ounce-force .................... newton (N) ................. 2.780.1:39 E-01 ozf-in ....................... newton meter (N.m) .......... 7.061 552 E-03 oz (avoirdupois)/gal (UK liquid) ...... kilogram per meter 3(kg/M3) ..... 6.236021 E+00 oz (avoirdupois)/gal (US liquid) . .... kilogram per meter3 (kg/M3) ..... 7.489 152 E+00 oz (avoirdupois) Jin3 .............. kilogram per meter3 (kg/m'l ) ..... 1.729 994 E+03 oz (avoirdupois )/ft2 .............. kilogram per meter 2(kg/M2) ..... 3.051 517 E-01 oz (avdirdupois)/yd2 ............. kilogram per meter 2(kg /M2 ) ..... 3.390 575 E-02 parsec 13 ..................... meter (m) .................. 3.085 678 E+16 peek (US) ........... ......... Meter3 (M3) ................ 8.809 768 E-03 pennyweight ................... kilogram (kg) ............... 1.555 174 E- 03 lperm (OoC) .................... kilogram per pascal second meter (kg/Pa- S-M2 ).............. 5.721 35 E-11 perm (23'C) ................... kilogram per pascal second meter 2 2 (kg/Pa-s-m . ............... 5.745 25 E-11 perm- in (00 C) .................. kilogram per pascal second meter (kg/Pa-s-m) ............... 1.453 22 E- 12 perm- in (23'C) ................. kilogram per paseal second meter ., (kg/Pa-s-m) ............... 1.459 29 E-12 phot ........................ iumen per meter 2 (IM/M2) . . . . . . .1.000 000*E+04 pica (printer's) ................. meter (m) .................. 4.217 518 E-03 pint (US dry) .................. meter3 (m 3) ................ 5.506 105 E-04 pint (US liquid) ................. meter 3 (M3) ................ 4.731 765 E-04 point (printer's) .................. meter (m) .................. 3.514 598*E-04 poise (absolute viscosity) ............ pascal second (Pa - s) .......... 1.000 000*E-01 pound Qb avoirdupois)18 .......... kilogram (kg) ............... 4.535 924 E-01 pound (troy or apothecary) ......... kilogram (kg) ............... 3.732 417 E-01 lb- ft2 (moment of inertia) .......... kilogram meter 2(kg-ln2) ....... 4.214 011 E-02 lb- in2 -(moment of inertia) ......... kilogram meter 2(kg- M2) ....... 2.926 397 E- 04 lb/ft-h ................. I. . ; . . pascal second (Pa-s) ........... 4.133 789 E- 04 lb/ft-s ....................... pascal second (Pa-s) ........... 1.488 164 E+00 lb /ft2 . . . ..................... kilogram per meter2 (kg/M2 ) ..... 4.882428 E+00 lb/ft . ....................... kilogram per meter3 (kg/M3) ..... 1.601 846 E+01 lb/gal (UK liquid) .............. kilogram per meter 3(kg/M3) .... 9.977 633 E+01 Ig/gal (US liquid) ................ kilogram per meter3 (kg/ml ) ..... 1.198264 E+02 lb/h ......................... kilogram per second (kg/s) ....... 1:259 979 E- 04 lb/hp-h (SFC, specific fuel consumption ..... kilogram per joule (kg/J) ........ 1.689659 E- 07 Ig/in . ........................ kilogram per meter3 (kg/ M3) ..... 2.767 990 E+04 lb/min ................ ...... kilogram per second (kg/s) ....... 7.559 873 E- 03 lb/s .......... .............. kilogram per second (kg/s) ....... 4.535 924 E-01 lbJyd3 ................ ....... kilogram per meter3 (kg/ml) ..... 5.932764 E-01 poundal ....... .............. newton (N) ................. 1.382550 E-01 poundal/ft2 ................... pascal (Pa) ................. . 1488 164 E+00 poundal-Sift2 .................. pascal second (Pa.s) ........... 1.488 164 E+00 pound-force (Ibf)19 .............. newton (N) .................. 4.449222 E+00 Ibf-ft ......................... newton meter (N - m) .......... 1.355 818 E+00 lbf - ft/in ...................... newton meter per meter (N-m/m) . .5.337 866 E+01 lbf-in ........................ newton meter (N - m) .......... 1.129848 E-01 lbf-in/in ...................... newton meter per meter (N-m/m) . .4.448 222 E+00 lbf-s/ft2 ........... *.......... pascal second (Pa.s) ............ 4.788026 E+01, ii-The.ct conversion factor is 4.535 923 7-E-01. 19 The exact con@ersion factor is 4.448 221 615 260 5*E+00. 746 APPENDIX To convert from to Multiply by lbf/ft ........................ newton per meter (N/m) ........ 1.459 390 E+01 lbf/ft . ....................... pascal (Pa) ................. 4.788026 E+01 lbf/in ........................ newton per meter (N/m) ........ 1.751 268 E+02 lbf/in 2 (pSi) ................... pascal (Pa) ................. 6.894 757 E+03 lbf/lb (thrust/weight [mass I ratio) . . . . newton per kilogram (N/kg) . . . . . . 9.806650 E+00 quart (US dry) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . meter' (m' ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.101 221 E- 03 quart (US liquid) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . meter 3 (M3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.463 529 E- 04 rad (radiation dose absorbed) ........ gray (Gy) .................. 1.000 000*E-02 rhe ......................... I per pascal second (1/Pa-s) ...... 1.000 000*E+01 rod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . meter (m) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .[see footnote 12] roentgen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . coulomb per kilogram (C/kg) . . . . . 2.58 E-04 second (angle) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . radian (rad) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.848 137 E-06 second (sidereal) ................ second (s) .................. 9.972 696 E-01 section ....................... meter 2 (m2)............... [see footnote 12] shake ........................ second (s) .................. 1.000 000*E-08 slug ......................... kilogram (kg) ........ * ... 1.459 390 E+01 Slug/ft-S ...................... pascal second (Pa-s) ........... 4.788 026 E+01 SlUg/ft3 ................... * .... kilogram per meter 3(kg/M3 ) ..... 5.153 788 E+02 statampere .................... ampere (A) ................. 3.335 640 E-10 statcoulomb ................... coulomb (C) ................ 3.335 640 E-10 statfarad ..................... farad (F) .................. 1.112650 E-12 stathenry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . henry (H) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8.987 554 E+1 I statmho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Siemens (S) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.112 650 E-12 statohm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ohm (Q) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8.987 554 E+11 statvolt ...................... volt (V) ................... 2.997 925 E+02 stere ........................ meter 3 (MI) ................ 1.000 000*E+00 stilb ........................ candela per meter 2(ed /M2) . . . . . . 1.000 000*E+04 stokes (kinematic viscosity) ......... meter 2 per second (M2 IS) ....... 1.000 000*E-04 tablespoon ................ ... meter 3 (M3................ 1.478 676 E-05 teaspoon ...................... meter3 (M3................ 4.928 922 E-06 tex ......................... kilogram per meter (kg/m) ....... 1.000 000*E-06 therm ....................... joule (J) ................... 1.055 056 E+08 ton (assay) .................... kilogram (kg) ............... 2.916 667 E-02 ton (long, 2240 lb) ............... kilogram (kg) ............... 1.016 047 E+03 ton (metric) ................... kilogram (kg) ............... 1.000 000*E-.F03 ton (nuclear equivalent of TNT) ...... joule (J) ................... 4.184 E +0920 ton (refrigeration) ............... watt (W) .................. 3.516800 E+03 ton (register) ................... meter 3 (m3)................ 2.831 685 E+00 ton (short, 2000 lb) .............. kilogram (kg) ........ .... 9.071 847 E+02 3 3 ton (long)Jyd ................. kilogram per meter (kgIM3) ..... 1.328939 E+03 ton (short)/h ................... kilogram per second (kg/s) ....... 2.519958 E-01 ton-force (2000 lbf) .............. newton (N) .............. . . 8.896 444 E+03 tonne ....................... kilogram (kg) ............... 1.000 000*E+03 torr (mm Hg, OOC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pascal (Pa) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.333 22 E+02 township . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . meter 2 (M2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [see footnote 121 unit pole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . weber (Wb) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.256637 E-07 W-h ........................ joule (J) ................... 3,600 000*E+03 W-s ......................... joule (J) ................... 1,000 000*E+00 W/CM2 ....................... watt per meter 2 (W/M2) . . . . . . . . 1.000 000*E+04 W/in2 ....................... watt per meter2 (W /M2 . . . . . . . . 1.550 003 E+03 20 Defined (not measured) @alue. METRIC CONVERSION FACTORS 747 To convert from to Multiply by yard ........................ meter m) .................. 9.144 000*E-01 yd 2 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .meterl((nri2 ................ 8.361 274 E-01 yd 3 : .... *.... * ..... ,, , * .... meter 3 ( m 3 ................ 7.645 549 E-01 yd 3/min ....................... meter3 per second (in 3/s) ....... 1.274 258 E-02 year (calendar) .................. second (s) .................. 3.153 600 E+07 year (sidereal) .................. second (s) .................. 3.155 815 E+07 year (tropical) .................. second (s) .................. 3.155693 E+07 INDEX INDEX, Adams, Sherman, 690 Angola, 323 Advisory Committee on National Growth Policy Processes, Ankara, Turkey, 242 707, 708, 709, 710 Antarctic Region, 311 Afghanistan, 279, 322 Aquaculture. See Fisheries. Africa Arctic Region, 311 Aquaculture, 342 Argentina, 32-33, 127, 259, 279, 285, 323, 389, 406, 557 Arable land in, 97 Argonne National Laboratory, 386 Copper consumption, 591 Arizona, 343, 383 Deforestation, 320-325, 332, 412 Armco Steel, 388 Desertification, 277 Army Corps of Engineers, 687 Food demand, 85 Arthur D. Little Co., 699 Forests and, 127-129 Asbestos, 388 Fuelwood and desertification, 406 Asia Future food production problems, 104 Arable land in, 97 Future mineral development, 390 Coral reefs, 304 Intensity of use statistics, 1951-2000, 589 Deforestation, 320-325, 412 Irrigation, 150-152 Desertification, 277 Mangrove communities, 304 Dung fuel, 377 Migration and, 32, 36 Fish demand, 113 Mineral demand, 209 Food demand, 85 Minerals and materials consumption, 1951-2000, 590 Forests and, 129-131 Population trends, 14-20 Forest resources, distribution of, by region, 130 Rangeland deterioration, 235 Fuelwood and desertification, 406 Reuse of waste water, 341 Future food production problems, 104 Sheep and goat population, 234 Increased death rate in poor crop years, 248 Terrestrial environment (2000), 401 Irrigation, 151-152 Water projection, 153 Latin American world model standard simulations for, 645 Wood fuel, 375, 376 Migration and, 33 See also Sahel Region. Mineral demand, 209 Agenc@ for International Development. See U.S. Agency for Population trends, 14-20 International Development. Sheep and goat populations, 234 Agent Orange, 324 South Asia fuelwood, 375-376 Agriculture. See Food and agriculture. Southeast Asian diet, 275 Agriculture Department. See U.S. Department of Agriculture. Terrestrial environment, 2000, 401 AID. See U.S. Agency for International Development. Water, 153 Air quality and pollution Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 700 Crop damage due to pollution, 418 Aspinall, Wayne, 694 Deterioration from pollution, 429 Assam, 321 Emissions estimates compared for 1990, 184 Association of Ship Brokers and Agents, 576 Emission projections, 1985, 1990, 181, 182, 183 Aswan Dam, 281, 339, 412, 420 Impact of pollution on health, 423 Atlantic Ocean, 306 Less developed countries and, 243 Australia, 14-20, 79, 95, 104, 125, 259, 304, 383, 387, 389 Mineral production and, 387 Austria, 363 Particulate levels, 181-183, 263-264 Automobiles, 178, 221, 245 Projected annual emissions, 1985 and 1990, low growth case, Averitt, Paul, 193 351 Sulfur dioxide, 183-184 Aircraft, 264 Bahamas, 304 Albania, 14 Balanced National Growth and Development Act (1974), 708 Albright, Horace M., 690 Bangkok, Thailand, 340 Algeria, 166 Bangladesh, 34, 36, 320-325, 340, 406, 485, 490, 723-725 Alkalinization, 279-280 Barney, Gerald 0., 498 Allied Chemical, 305 Bauer, Raymond, 697 Amazon, 320, 390 Bell, Daniel, 687, 694 American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 694 Bell, Frederick W., 114, 115, 565 American Assembly, 692 Bitumen, 199-200 American Association for the Advancement of Science, 501 Boggs, J. Caleb, 702 American Chemical Society, 305 Bolivia, 33, 95, 127, 223, 322, 406, 725 American Metal Climax, 386-388 Bombay, India, 243-244 American Society for International Law, 316 Bonner and Moore, 576 Amish, 232 Boyd, James, 702 Anderson, Robert 0., 699, 700 Brazil, 32-33, 79, 143, 198, 280, 323, 324, 326, 377, 389, 406, Andrews, P.W., 389 509, 557, 725-726 750 INDEX 751 British West Indies, 33 Center for National Goals and Alternatives, 698-700 Bronk, Detlev W., 692 Center for Statistical Policy and Analysis, 709 Brookhaven Energy Data Base, 566 Central African Republic, 129 Brookhaven National Laboratory, 175, 178, 180, 184, 261, Central Intelligence Agency. See U.S. Central Intelligence 347, 350, 495, 565 Agency. Brooks, D.B.,389 CEQ. See U.S. Councilon Environmental Quality. Brown, Lester R., 244, 253, 281-282 Ceylon, 289, 292 Bryant, John, 247 CFSC. See Community and Family Study Center. Buenaventura, Colombia, 242 Chad, 277, 322, 726 Bundy, William P., 692 Chauhan, S.K., 322 Bureau of Mines. See U.S. Bureau of Mines. Chemicals Bureau of the Census. See U.S. Bureau of the Census. Coastal area pollution, 304-313 Burma, 129, 280, 321 Effect of a gradual reduction in use of DDT, 307 Burns, Arthur, 697 Heavy metals, 307, 308, 309 Burundi, 280 History of use of, 253-256 Bustamente, Carlos, 243 Regulation of, 254-255 Chile Anchovies, 108 Copper, 223 Cabinet Committee on National Growth Policy, 703 Deforestation and mining, 389 Cadmium, 308 Forests, 127 Calcutta, India, 242, 340, 426 Industrial wood, 323 Caldwell, Lynton K., 703 Migration and, 33 California Population data from, 509 Nuclear power plants, 363 China, People's Republic of Pesticide pollution, 342 Bio-gas, 378 Pesticides and, 286 Census Bureau projections for, 508 Soil deterioration, 279-280 Energy estimates, 566 California Distributed Energy Study, 367, 373 Energy for agriculture, 297 Cahfornia Rural Legal Assistance, 271 Forest management, 326 Cambodia, 339, 406 Forests, 129, 130, 131 Cameroon, 128, 129 Irrigation, 339 Canada Migration and, 34, 36 Acid rain, 336, 411 Mortality trends, 10 Climate, 52 Oil shale, 198 Climate trends and, 259 Pond culture, 106-107 Coal reserves, 193 Radioactive pollution by, 309 Crude oil resources, 352 Reforestation, 323, 726 Effects of mining on land, 382 Water use, 143 ESNS sample calculations, 567 Wood fuel, 376 Fish demand, 113 Chlorofluoromethanes, 404 Food exports, 95 CIA. See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Food production, 79 Citizens Committee for the Outdoor Recreation Resources Forest, 133 Review Commission Report, 691 Forest inventories, 118, 123-124 Citizens Committee on Population and the American Future, Gas reserves, 192 701 Migration and, 33 Claude, Georges, 201 Roosevelt resources conference, 686 Climate Soft energy studies, 367 Criticism of Study on, 713-714 Sulfur oxide emissions, 418 Definition of temperature categories, 541 Tar sands, 199-200 Deforestation and, 412-413 WAES participation, 706 Difficulties of, 51 Canadian Forest Service, 124 Drought, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 64 Cancer, 250, 265 Environmental consequences of scenarios, 257-259 Cape Verde Islands, 335 Government agencies research on, 535 Caracas, Venezuela, 243 Government model analyzed, 487-489 Carbon dioxide, 51, 53, 181, 184, 259-262 Large global cooling, 52-53, 54-55 Carbon monoxide, 184 Large global warming, 62-64 Carpenter, Richard A., 381 Man and, 269 Carson, Rachel, 286 Methodology of studies, 535 Carter, Anne, 649, 650, 655 Methodology procedures, 536-539 Carter, President Jimmy, 3, 455, 706 Models and, 51 - Carter, Luther, 283 Moderate global cooling, 53, 56-57 Case Western Reserve University, 615 Moderate global warming, 53, 60-61 Systems Research Center, 621 Percentage of grouped probability densities in each tem- Cavendish Laboratories, 653 perature category, S43 Census Bureau. See U.S. Bureau of the Census. Precipitation, 52-54, S6, 58, 60, 62, 65 Center for a Voluntary Society, 699 Principles and components of studies, 535-536 752 INDEX Projections summarized, 256 Czechoslovakia, 150, 151, 386 Safiel region, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 64 "Same as last years," 53, 58-59 Scenarios, development of, 257, 539-544 Dale Jorgenson Associates, 175 Summary conclusions, 51, 52, 64-65 Data Resources Inc., 422 Technology and, 68 Day, Richard, 608 Temperature, 52-54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 65 Defense Production Act of 1950, 708 Warming trend by 2000, 403 Deforestation. See Forests. Yield variations due to assumptions regarding weather con- Delano, Frederick, 687, 688 ditions, 79 Democratic Republic of Germany, 388 Club of Rome, 607, 615, 627 Denmark, 370-372, 706 Coal Desertification, 241, 277-279, 416, 429 Data sources for, 576, Dent, Frederick, 702, 703 Environmental problems of, 354-355 DDT. See Pesticides. Hard path options, 358-363 Dibromochloropropane, 254, 342 Industrial regions shift towarlds,,405 Douglas, Lewis W., 690 Resources, 192-193 Doxiadis water projections, 70, 148, 149, 492 Coastal areas Dregne, Harold E., 416 Conclusions, 316-318 Drought, 55, 57, 59, 61. 63, 64 Coral reefs, 304 Dupree, Walter G., 579 Dredging and, 302 Dynamo, 608 Estuaries and wetlands, 303-304 Fossil fuel pollution of, 310' Mangrove communities,'-303,3.04 Eads, George, 709 Pollution. of , 13 East Africa, 557 Pollution of and fisheries projections, 419 East Asia, 275 Salt marshes, 303 Economic Council of Canada, 653 Sewage pollution and, 311 Egypt Solid waste pollution, 312-313 Age-specific fertility rates, estimated, 1975,520 Urbanization and, 302 Age-specific mortality estimates, 1975, 515 Wetlands, 311-312 Assumed annual decline in crude birth rate, 516 Cohen, Wilbur J., 694, 700 Birth data, 509 Coleman, John S., 692, 693 Crude death rates, 1950-1975, 413 Colombia, 33, 726-727 Diarrhea, incidence of, in children, 248 Colorado, 383, 389 Embassy reports from, 727 Colorado River, 343, 413 Exogenous fertility rates, 514-520 Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, 700 Food demand, 95 Commission on Materials Policy, 581, 583, 690 Growth projection methodology, 510-520 Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, Irrigation, 152, 339-340 252,583 Land iosses'to development, 281 Commission on the Year 2000, 694 Migration and, 520 Results from, 711 Nile River Basin development, 406 Committee on Problems of the Environment, 416 Personal expenditure distribution, 1974 1-75,518 Community and Family Study Center Population growth, 1950-2000, 511, 512 - Average annual population grow 'th rates; world, major re- Soil deterioration, 279 gions, selected countries, 31 Water supply, 140 Estimated total fertility rate;, world, major regions, selected Wheat imports, 552 countries, 30 Ehrlichman, John, 698, 700, 704 Fertility assumptions, 24-25 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 690-692@ Methodology compared to Census Bureau, 502-520 EI Salvador, 33, 249, 509 Population projections explained, 7-8 Energy Projected crude birth rates; world, major regions, selected. Alternative sources, future, 178-180 countries, 33 Alternative technologies, 2000, 178, 179 Projection of total population; world, major regions, se- Annual per capita consumption, most populous countries, lected countries, 28-29, 1974,239 Congo,128,129 - Assumptions, 161-170 Congo River, 320 Bio-gas, 378 Copper, 308, 387, 588, 589 British study, 371-373 Congressional Research Service, 579 Charcoal use, 376-377 Costa Rica, 280, 509 Climate change and, 266 Council on Environmental Quality, 695ff. Coal gasification,. 172, 179 Carbon dioxide, 403 Coal,resource development, 175 Costs of sprawl, 245 Conclusions, 161, 175, 185 Environmental projections for Study, 498 Conservation and, 164, 166, Food problems, 273-274 Consumption, per capita, 1975-1990, 162. Hard and soft paths compared, 367-370 Criticism of Study on, 714 Solid waste, estimated., 239 Cumulative world discovery and oil production, 177, Cuba, 33, 108 Danish study, 370 INDEX 753 Desalination and, 413 Assumptions about minerals and,. 420-421 Dung and crop residues, 377-378 Atmospheric (2000), 403-404 Economic problems, 353-354 Charcoal and, 377 Environment and industrialized nations, 373-74 Carbon dixoide and, 259-262 Environment assumptions inherent in projections on, 421- Climate scenarios and, 257-259 422 Conclusions, 251 Environmental implications, 1.80-185 Defined, 227, 556, Forests and, 325 Discrepancies in assumptions about, 40&410 Food supply and, 292-297 Ecological buffering, 605 Fuelwood, 406 Effect on projections, 408-427' Geothermal, 580 Effects of larger heat additions to the atmosphere, 268 Global primary use, by type, 1975 and 1990, 346 Energy and, conclusions, 374 Global projections compared, 1975-2000, 174 Energy options and, 354-381 GNP growth rate assumptions, 165 Energy projections and, 346-381, 421-422 Government model analyzed, 493-496 ESNS model and, 566-568 Growth of GNP and commercial energy use, U.S., 1850- Fertilizers and, 283-285 1976, 355 Fish projections and assumptions about, 419 Hard path options, 357-363 Food and, 273-277 Hydraulic resources, 194, 195 GNP projections and, 422-424 Inconsistencies in government model for, 464 Government model analyzed, 498-499 Increase in nuclear energy forecast, 309 Herding cultures and, 232-238 Less developed oil-producing countries: production, re- History of forecasts, 565 serves, population, income, 170 Impact of forests management, 326 Methodology of Study, 569-570 Impact of low and high energy growth futures, 370 Midrange forecasts, 1985-1990, 164-171 Industrial regions shift to coal, impact of, 405 Minerals projections and, 421 Institutional mechanisms for problem-solving, 429-430 Nuclear power development, 175 Models compared, 663 Ocean thermal energy conversion, 357 Noncommercial fuels, prospects for, 379, 380 Oil balance, 2000, 174 Oceans and, 300-302 Oil potential, 175 Pesticides and, 285-288 Oil shale, 172, 178, 179, 198-199, 217 Population assumptions and, 424-427 Per capita global primary ene.-gy use (1975 and 1990),347 Population methodology and, 231 Population growth rate assumptions, 165 Population in industrialized cultures and, 238-241 Price impacts on food sector, 85-88 Populations of shifting cultivators and, 235-238 Projections, 171-178, 421-422 Population in traditional cultures, 232-238 Projections summarized, 345-346 Projected changes in global vegetation and land resources, Recovery rate, 177 1975-2000, 401 Regional balances with high OPEC prices, 171, 172 Shift of industrialized nations to nuclear energy, impact on, Regional balances (1985), 167-168 405-406 Regional distribution of global primary energy use, 1975 Source documents on the effects of pollutants, 349 and 1990, 347 Species extinction, 402 Requirements for recovery of iron, titanium, aluminum, 214 Stability and diversity, impact of in studies, 6,05 Selected annual supply rates, 267 Study methodology and, 227-230 Soft path options, 363-373 Summary of changes by 2606, 428-430 Solar, 200-202, 364-367 Summary of impacts on, as implied in the Study, by major Solar Sweden study, 364---367 environments, 392-400 Supply projections, 1977 and 2000, 370 Technology and, 71-72, 270-272 Tar sands, 199-200 Terrestrial, in 2000, 392-397, 401-402 Technology and, 70, 178-80, 354-357 Urbanization and, 241-246 Total world consumption, average annual growth rates, Environmental Protection Agency. See U.S. Environmental 1975-1990, 166 Protection Agency. Trade, 19t-1990, 163 EPA. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Transport cost estimates, 576 Equador, 322 Uncertainties, 165, 166 Erickson, Ralph, 219 Urbanization and, 244-245, 282 Eskimos, 232, 233 U.S. food chain and, 295 ESNS. See Energy System Network Simulator. Vulnerability of (2000), 404 Estonia, 198 Vulnerability of system, 430 Estuaries. See Coastal Areas. Wood, 374-376 Ethiopia, 277, 298, 322, 406 World demand, 2000, 173 Europe World maximum production of oil, 177 Arable land in, 97. See also Geothermal energy; Nuclear energy; Solar energy. Birth rates, 27 Energy System Network Simulator (ESNS), 180, 263, 495, Cattle populations, 234 566--568 Coal reserves, 193 Environment Crop damage due to air pollution, 418 Acuteness of problems in LDC's, 431 Crop failures, 289 Aquatic, 2000, 404 Crude oil reserves, 352 Assumptions about, inherent in population, GNP and re- Eastern European energy estimates, 566 source projections, 410 Fertilizer application rates, 342 754 INDEX Fertility trends, 8 Phytoplankton communities, 107, 306 Food cost policies, 101 Pollution and, 111-112 Food supply and demand. 85 Technology and, 70 Forests, 121-123, 133, 326, 411 Total catch, 105 Gas reserves, 192 Trends for 2000, 404 HCB pollution. 307 World aggregate consumption of fishery products, projec- Migration and, 31-32 tion, 1975-2000, 115 Mineral production, 382 Zooplankton, 107, 306 Nuclear energy, 363, 405 Florida, 304, 386, 387, 390 Population trends, 14-20 Food and agriculture Water scarcity in, 405 Acid rain, 337 European Economic Community, 576 Air pollution and, 418 Alternative scenarios, 77 Annual grain consumption per capita, most populous coun- FAO. See Food and Agriculture Organization. tries (1975), 239 Federal Advisory Committee Act, 703 Aquatic changes and, 418 Federal Council for Science and Technology, 693 Arable area per capita, by major regions, 99 Federal Energy Administration. 85. 570 Arable land, actual and projected, 97 Federal Republic of Germany, 33, 363, 382, 383, 385, 388, Arable land for (2000), 402 390, 706 Arable land increase, 415 Federal Reserve Board (U.S.), 71 Arable, potentially arable and grain area, 98 Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, 414 Areas with severe problems, future, 104 Fendall, N. R. E., 246-247 Biases due to inconsistencies of values, 481-482 Fertility. See Population. Conclusions, 77, 79, 85, 88--90, 95-97, 99 Fertilizer Continuing trends in, 88-89 Consumption, actual and projected, 100 Cost and investment policids, 100-101 Energy expenditures and, 88 Critical factors for the future, 297-298 Environment and, 283-285 Crop vulnerability, 288-292 Europe, 342 Daily caloric consumption, less developed countries, 95 Global use levels, 284 Deforestation and, 280 Impact of expanded use, 104 Deterioration of soils and, 276-283 Inconsistencies in government model and, 464, 467 Difficulties, 73 Increase in LDCs, 413 Effects of land deterioration, 415-417 Japan,342 Energy flow and, 295 Ozone layer and, 264, 266 Energy prices, impact of, 85-88 Submodel, low-income North Africa and Middle East, 1970- Energy required for different means of production, 296 2000,558 Environmental assumptions inherent in projections for, 414- Technology and, 69-70 415 Water quality and, 284-285, 342-344 Environmental implication, 101, 104 World food production and fertilizer consumption, 102, 103 Erosion and, 280-281 Fettweis, Gunther, 193 Fallow cycle, 237, 241 Finland, 706 Fertilizer consumption, actual and projected, 101 Fisheries and fish Government model analyzed, 490-492 Acid rain and, 336-337 Government model and World 3 model compared, 666,669 Annual catch, 1940-2000, 106 Grain and total food production, consumption and trade, Aquaculture, 112 80-81, 91-92 Catch, by continent and leading countries, 1975, 108 Grain and total food production, consumption and trade, Composition of global catch, 313-314 actual and projected, by major regions and selected coun- Demand for, 113-115, 313 tries, 80-81 Environment assumptions and, 419, 420 Grain and total food production, consumption and trade, Extinction of species, 314, 344 by major regions and selected countries, 91-92 Fish meal, demand for, 113 Grain consumption, per capita, by major regions, 1975- Freshwater resources, 106-107 2000,74 Government model analyzed, 492 Grain production and consumption growth rates, 79 History of projections, 564 Grain trade, by major regions, 1975-2000, 75 Inconsistencies of government model for, 467 Inconsistencies in government model for, 464, 467 Increase in world catch and animal feed requirements, 89 Increasing soil vulnerability, 415-416 Krill, 105, 106, 111 Indices of world grain production, area and yield, actual and Leading species, world catch, 1970 and 1975, 108 projected, 84 Living potential resources, 107-111 International price indices, 96 Major catch, by areas, 1975, 108 Land loss, reversibility of, 283 Major species groups, 107 Land losses to development, 281-282 Marine protein, 105 Level of investment for improvement in, inconsistencies of Missing variables, in Study for, 719 assumptions on, 469 Ocean climate, 106 Losses due to desertification, 416 Ozone layer and, 265 Methodology of studies, 545-546 Per capita national incott e Ys. income elasticity of fisheries Models and methodology, 73, 77 demand, 114 MOIRA and, 627 INDEX 755 Monocultures, dangers of, 288-292 Europe, distribution of (1970s), 121 Natural resources and, 96-100 Forest and open woodland, Europe (2000), 122 Nonrenewable fossil fuels and, 292-297 Government model analyzed, 492 Per capita consumption, certain regions, 419 History of forecasts, 565 Per capita grain and total food production, consumption and Impact of change in forest environments, 132-134 trade, 82-83, 93-94 Industrialized nations and, 120-125 Pesticide use and, 417 Less developed nations and, 117, 118, 119, 125-131 Pork and poultry proportion of total meat supply, 89 Major traders of forest products, 1974, 119 Production and consumption rates, 79 Management of, 325, 326, 332 Projections summarized,.272-273 North American resources, 1970's, 123 Resource-augmenting inputs, 99-100 Products of, 118-119 Shifting cultivation and, 235-238 Projections summarized, 318-319 Species extinction, 417 Prospects for the future, 322-325 Study methodology, 274 Reforestation, 134, 726 Submodel, low-income North Africa and Middle East, 1970- Resources per capita, by region, 1970's, 120 2000, 558 Species extinction, 417 Supply variability, 88 Technology and, 70 Technology and, 68-70 Tropical moist forests, 131-132 Virgin forests and, 237 World forested area, by region, 1973, 118 . Vulnerability of system, 430 World resources, estimated, 1975, 2000, 134 Vulnerability of, 2000" 404 Forrester, Jay, 607, 608, 612, 615, 616, Water resourcesand, 100 France, 32, 309, 388, 706 Wheat, 552-559 Freeman, Peter, 498 World capacity, 77-78 Fuel minerals World food production and fertilizer consumption, 102, 103 Classification of, 188 World grain and overall food balances, 89 Government model analyzed, 496-497 World grain trade quantities, 96 Methodology of Study, 579 World grain yields, 1960-2000, 76 Oil resources,, recoverable, 189-191 Yield variations, 79 Principles of, 579-580 See also Fertilizer; Fisheries; GOL Model. Recoverable world nonrenewable energy resources, 187 Food and Agriculture Organization Resource estimates, 187 Aquaculture, 112 Technology and, 70 Cattle populations, 234 Terminology, 187-189 Demand for fish, 113-115 World solid reserves and fuel resources, 19 Dung fuel, 377 See also Nonfuel minerals. Fish meal, demand for, 1975, 1985, 113 Full Opportunity and Social Accounting Act, 694 Fish species groups, 107 Forests, 129, 130 Fuelwood shortfall, 406 Gabon,128,129 Industrialized nations, food consumption, 250 Gandhi, Mahatma, 627 Marine forecasts, 565 Ganges River, 320 Minimum caloric requirements, 274 Gardner, John, 694 Pesticide pollution in LDCs, 342 Garment, Leonard, 697, 698 Pesticide use in LDCs, 285 Gas Water projection, 150 Environmental problems of, 355:-356 Water resources and food production, 100 Estimates of remaining resources, 1970, 191 World forest inventory, 118 Resources, 191-192 Wood fuel, 375, 376 Sources of data for, 579-580 Ford, Gerald, 704, 708 U.S. consumption, W * Ford, Henry, 271 World cumulative production, ultimate production.. future Ford Foundation, 363, 690 resources, by region, 1976, 192 Forests World reserves, 1978, by region, 192 Acid rain and, 336 General Accounting Office (U.S.), 281, 703 Agriculture and, 237 General Electric, 306 Area estimates, 117 Genesis, Book of, 233 Asia, resource distribution, 130 Geothermal Energy, 195, 197-198 Biomass of world's forests and woodlands, 119 Germany, West. See Federal Republic of Germany Biotic diversity reduction and, 327-331 Ghana, 128, 377, 412 Carbon dioxide content of atmosphere and, 133 Global 2000 Study Climate change and, 266, 327 Absence of consideration of shocks, 715-716 Conclusions, 332-333 Absence of normative analysis" 717-718 Defor6station, 117, 125-131, 280, 375, 402, 412 Critique of, 713-721 Desertification, 429 Exogenous inputs and assumptions in, 665 Destruction of tropical regions, 407 Discontinuities with past,@716-717 Embassy reports on, 723-738 Hidden premises of, 718 Energy needs and, 325 Inadequate data and methodology,, 719-721 Environmental assumptions and, 410-411 La'tin American model,and., Estimates of world resources, 1978 and 2000, 319 Linkages during study,. 457-460 756 INDEX Linkages prior to, 456-457 Projected net exporters of wheat (1970-2000), 557 Missing variables, 719 Regions of, 551 Origin of, 455 Representative demand equations: wheat, low-income North Problem-solving means, 603 Africa, and Middle East, 555 Scope of, 455 Representative supply equations: wheat, low-income North Shortcomings of methodology, 603 Africa' and Middle East, 554 Time limit of, 714-715 Representative wheat trade and price equations, low-income Validity of the basic findings of, 480-481 North Africa and Middle East, 556 GNP. See Gross National Product. Strengths and weaknesses of, 547 GOL model. See Grain, oilseed, and livestock Model. Submodels, 546, 549-550, 557-559 Goldberg, Edward, 315 Summary demand and trade statistics: low-income North Gorham, William, 694 Africa and Middle East, 560 Gorrie, Jack, 689 Summary meat statistics: LDCs and industrialized nations, Government global model 561 Absence of feedback in, 476-478 Summary supply statistics: low-income North Africa and Assumptions of, 460-461 Middle East, 559 Biases due to inconsistencies, 481 Technology and, 68-70 Climate element analyzed, 487-489 Technology projections and, 597 Compared with World 3 model, 663-670 Variables in, 553 Conclusions on, 681 Wheat price projection, 464 Contrasting assumptions of elements in, 470-475 Wheat trade assumptions, 467 Diverse sources of information for, 469, 47"76 Great Canadian Oil Sands, Ltd., 199 Energy element analyzed, 493-496 Grain. See Food and agriculture. Environment element analyzed, 498-499 Grants, New Mexico, 387 Fisheries element analyzed, 492-493 Great Britain. See United Kingdom. Food element analyzed, 490-492 Gross, Bertram, 714-715 Forestry element analyzed, 492 Gross National Product Frozen assumptions of, 477478 Annual growth rate assumptions, table, 41 Fuel minerals element analyzed, 496-497 Assumptions, 40-41 GNP element analyzed, 486-487 Average annual economic growth to the year 2000, 584 Implications of, 391 Base year national incomes, 584 Inconsistent assumptions on capital and resource allocation, Criticism of Study on, 714 467-469 Data sources for, 521 Inconsistent commodity trade prices, 464, 465 Defined, 39 Inconsistent commodity trade volumes in, 464, 466-467 Differences in projections from differing sources, 476 Inconsistent population and GNP growth rates, 463 Difficulties of, 39 Inconsistent variable values, 461-476 Energy and, 165 Institutional factors underlying discrepancies, 478-480 Environmental assumptions and, 410 Limitations of, 391, 454 Environmental assumptions inherent in, 422-424 Nonfuel minerals element analyzed, 497-498 Estimates (1975), projections and growth rates (1985, 2000), Population element analyzed, 485-486 by country, 44-47 Reasons for evaluation of, 454 Estimates (1975), projections and growth rates (1985, 2000), Significance of procedures, 453 by major regions and selected countries, 48 Steps in linkages, 458 Government model analyzed, 486-487 Strengthening of, 482484 Growth in LDC's, 462, 463 Structural incompatibilities in, 478 Historical and projected average annual growth for Western Technology element analyzed, 489-490 industrialized and socialist nations, 528 Water element analyzed, 492 Importance of for environment, 252 Grain, oilseed, and livestock model (GOL) Inconsistencies of government model for, 461-463 Assumptions of, 547-548 Methodologies, 39, 41 Climate scenarios and, 64 Models, 39, 40 Components of, 550-552 Per capita estimates (1975), projections and growth rates Described, 490-491 (1985, 2000), 50 Environmental issues and, 101, 104 Pollution and, 252 Equations of, 548 Population estimates (1975), projections and'growth rates Explained, 73, 77 (1985, 2000), by major regions and selected countries, 49 Fertilizer price projection, 464 Projected average annual real growth for high, medium. and Food commodities specified in, 550 low growth cases, 1977-85, 530 Improvements to, 546 Projected average annual real growth rate, medium growth Inconsistencies of model, 462 case, 1975-85, 524 Level of investment for agricultural improvement assumed, Projections summarized, 251 469 Resource consumption and, 253 Level of water availability assumed, 469 Technology and, 67-68 Limitations of, 90 Total growth, map by regions (1975-2000), 42 MOIRA and, 634 Total growth, per capita, map,by regions (1975-2000), 43 .Origin of, 545 Trends (1975-2000), medium growth rate, 252 Principles of, 546-550 Waste generation and, 252 Procedures of, 552-559 Grossling, Bernardo F., 190 INDEX, 757 Guatemala, 249, 509 Loss of agricultural lands, 1960-2000, 282 Guinea, 223 Population and environment of, 238-241 Resource consumption in, 238 Guyana, 509 Guzman, Raphael,.280 Shift to coal, 405 Shift to nuclear energy, 405-406 Urbanization and, 244-246, 408 Hdfele, Wolf, 342 Water pollution,.2000, 404 Hageristein, Perry R., 693 . Institute for the Future, 535, '698, 6�9 Haiti, 95, 280, 298 Intensity of use, analysis.. See Malenbaum. Halogenated hydrocarbons, 307 Interior Department (U.S.) model, 462 Handier, Philip, 275-276, 292: International Bank for Reconstruction'and Development. See Hardeman County, Tenn., 254. World Bank Group. Hardin, Garrett, 233, 240, 332 International Board for Plant Genetic Resources, .291, Harlan, Jack, 291 International Coal Federation, 576, Harman, Willis W., 699 International Conference'on Wat 'er for Peace., 492 Hawaii, 304 International Development Association. See World Bank Hayes, Earl, 389 Group. Hennemuth, Richard, 498 International Energy Evaluation System (IEES) Herbicides. See Pesticides. Assumptions of, 70 Hexachlorobenzene, 306, 307 Components of, 573-575 Holdren, John P., 348 Described, 493 Hoover, Herbert, 686-687 Emissions projections, 181,' 183 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, 703, 705 Energy market fo irecasts, 165 Housing and Urban Development, Department of (U.S.), 704 Energy projections, .180 Hubbert, M. King, 101, 579, 692 Final energy products in linear program,' 575 Hudson Institute, 621-622, 699 Interface with Energy System Network Simulator (ESNS), Humphrey, Hubert, 705, 708 566 Hungary, 197 Level of investment for pollution control assumed, 469 Hunt, Larry, 333 Level of water availability assumed, 469 Limitations of, 567, 571 Primary fuel types in supply submodel, 574 Iceland, 301 Principles of, 570-573 Ickes, Harold, 687 Procedures, 575-578 IEES. See International Energy Evaluation System. Rate of resource consumption in LDCs', 469 Illinois 281 Regional classifications,, 573 Iltis, i4ugh H., 290 Structure of 577 India Submo,dels @f, 573-575 Bio-gas, 378 Transport modes and fuels cafried, 574 Charcoal smelting, 389 International Federation of Institutes of A&anced Study ,370 Chipko Andolan tree hugger movement,- 322-3.23 International Finance Corporation. See World Ba -nk Group. Climate trends and, 259 - International Institute of Applied Systems Analysi ' 267, 634, is, Deforestation, 280, 320-325 707 Dung fuel, 377, 378. International Institute for Environment and Development,,371 Embassy reports from, 728-729 International Labor Office, 32 Forests, 133 International Maritime Consultative Organization, 429, Fuelwood shortage, 406, International Materials Confere Ince, 68.9 Loss of agricultural land, 281 International Monetary Fund, 689. Mangrove communities, 304 International Rice Research Institute, 417 Migration and, 33-34, 36 International Seabed Resource Authority, 224 Pesticide use.in, 285 International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Nat- Population data, 509 ural Resources, 316, 344 Radioactive pollution by, 309 International Whaling Commission 314 Water use, 148, 151 IOU. See Malenbaum reports, Intensity of use analysis. Water withdrawals, 150 Iowa, 281 Wood fuel, 375, 376. Iran, 148, 169, 248, 322, 706 Indians, American, 233 Iraq, 152, 343 Indonesia, 129, 130, 166, 280, 321, 323, 729-730 Ireland, 289 Industrialized nations. Irish Sea, 305 Causes of de ath, 249-250 Irrigation. See Water. Energy and environmental prospects, 3173-374 Ismir, Turkey, 242 Energy development in, 421-422 Israel, 298 Energy projections, difficulties with, 348. Italy, 31, 706 Environment and GNP,, 422 IUCN. See International Union for the Conservation of Nature Environment and health issues in, 249-251 and Natural Resources. Environment and population projections, 426-427 Ivory Coast, 128, 280 Food consumption statistics, 274 Land deterioration in, 415 Jakarta, 426 Life expectancies in, 249. Jamaica, 33, 223, 509 758 INDEX Japan Latin American model Aquaculture, 112 Cobb Douglass production function, 639 Arable land in, 97 Conclusions on, 644--647 Cadmium poisoning, 308 Criticism of, 639 Cattle populations, 234, Demographic sector and objective function of, 640 Coal, 363 Documentation on, 647 Diet, 301 Global 2000 study and, 639 Earthquakes and, 388 -Methodology of, 637-638 Energy consumption estimated, 583, 584 Relevance of, 638-639 Fertilizer, 342 Standard simulations for Asia, 645 Fish catch, 108 Structure of, 639-643 Food cost policies, 101 Testing of, 643 Food demand, 85, 90 LDCs. See Less developed countries. Forests, 124, 125, 129, 133 Lehr, Paul, 498 Nuclear waste disposal, 185 Leontief, Wassily, 649, 654 Population trends, 14-20 Leopold, Aldo, 332-333, 409, 410 Silviculture, 326 Lesotho, 509 WAES participation, 706 Less developed countries (LDCs) Water use, 143, 151 Acuteness of problems in, 431 Japan International Cooperation Agency, 388 Air quality and, 243 Java, 133 Arable land increases, 415 Javits, Jacob, 705 Charcoal for fuel, 376-377 Johnson, Lyndon B., 693-694, 700 Chemical pollution in, 306 Jonsson, Erik, 699 Crop failures and, 291-292 Jordan, East Bank, 509 Current oil production, reserves, population, income, 170 Daily caloric consumption, 95 Kahn, Herman, 621, 639, 697 Deforestation, 117, 118, 125-131, 320-325, 412 Kalinin water projections, 70, 149, 157, 492 Diet improvement prospects, 275 Kennecott Copper Corporation, 387 Differing estimates in average annual population growth Kennedy, John F., 691-693 rates, 469 Kenya, 277, 323, 377, 386 Drug resistant diseases in, 249 Kepone,254,305 Energy assumptions and, 165 King, Alexander, 615 Environment and GNP, 423 Klaff, Jerome, 702 Environment and population projections for, 425 Korea, 89, 129-131, 148, 323, 326, 509 Fertilizers and, 283-285 Korean War, 688 Fertilizer and pesticide increase, 413 Kuwait, 34, 166, 169 Food costs and investment, 101 Food demand and distribution, 78 Food production and, 79, 88-90 Lake Superior, 388 Forests, 118, 119, 120, 125-131, 133 Arable area submodel, 1970-2000, 558 Fuelwood shortages, 406 Land GNP assumptions and, 40 Arable land per capita, 1955, 1975, 2000, 403 GNP growth rate, 462-463 Climate change and, 266--267 Habitat changes, 414 Declining soil quality, 402 Hydropower potential, 338-340 Embassy reports on, 723-738 Inconsistencies in assumptions on resource'consumption in, Major agents of soil deterioration, 277-283 469 Soil deterioration, 429 Inconsistencies of government model for, 462-463 See also Forests. Incremental capital output ratio; 597 Land and Water Conservation Fund, 691 Irrigation, 420 Laos, 321, 339, 406 Losses due to desertification, 416 Lapps,232,233 Malnutrition in, 275 Latin America Migration to cities, 244 Aquaculture, 342 Mineral demand, 209 Arable land in, 97 Modeling efforts for, 523 Child mortality for selected diseases, 250 Mortality assumptions, 27 Deforestation, 332, 412 Mortality statistics for, 247 Diet improvement prospects, 275 Loss in natural productivity, 402 Dung fuel, 377 Noncommercial fuels and, 374-380 Forests and, 127 Nonfuel mineral production, 222-225 Fuelwood shortage, 406 Nuclear energy demand, 363 Future food production problems, 104 Oceans and, 301 Irrigation, 151-152 Per capita mineral output, 382 Migration and, 32-33, 36 Per capita use of drinking water, 1970, 144 Mineral demand, 209 Pesticide use in, 285, 342-344, 417 Population trends, 14-20 Population data for, 509 Terrestrial environment, 2000, 401 Population estimates for cities, 1960-2000, 242. Water, 153 Population trends, 11-20 INDEX 759 Projected average annual growth of all exports (1975-1985), Meadows, Dennis, 607, 612, 615 532 . Mekong River, 320, 339 Projected average annual growth of export of manufactured Mercury, 305, 308, 317, 318 goods (1975-1980), 532 Merriam, Charles E., 686, 687, 688 Projected demand for exports of manufactured goods, 531 Mesarovic, Mihaijlo, 615 Projected exports for lower middle income group, by type Mesarovic-Pestel Model of export, medium growth, 533 Criticism of, 619-622 Representative import calculations, lower middle income Documentation of, 623-625 group, medium growth, 534 History of, 615 Solid waste pollution, 340 Limits of, 617-618 Statistical problems in, 501 Methodology of, 615-617 Transnational river basin development, 406 Relevance of, 617-618 Tropical forest policy, 323-325 Structure of, 618-619 UN Model and, 654 Testing of, 622-623 Urban services and, 242, 243 Methemoglobinemia, 285 Urbanization and the environment in, 241--w244 Mexico Urbanization of, 407-408 Colorado River agreement, 343 Water4elated diseases and, 343-344 Crop destruction, 417 Liberia, 223, 730-731 Crude oil resources, 352 Libya, 169 Drug-resistant diseases in, 249 Linnemann, Hans, 627 Embassy reports from, 731-732 Livestock, 234, 235-237 Food demand, 95 Los Angeles, Calif., 264, 266 Migration and, 33, 36 Love Canal, N.Y., 254, 430 Oil pricing, 166 Lovejoy, Thomas E., 327, 498 Pesticides, 285 Lovins, Amory, 201, 357, 374 Reuse of water, 341 Lubell, Harold, 244 Roosevelt Conservation Commission, 686 Ludwig, Daniel, 324 Teosinte, 290 L'vovich, M.I., 152 WAES participation, 706 Water use, 151 Water withdrawals, 150 Mexico City, 242, 426 McKelvey, Vincent, 216-219, 187, 189, 202, 692 Micronesia, 304 Maclure,, Jeffrey, 498 Mid-Century Conference on Resources for the Future, 690 Madura, 133 Migration. See Population. Malaria, 152, 247, 286, 426 Minamata Bay, Japan, 305, 317 Malawi, 323 Minerals. See Fuel minerals; Nonfuel minerals. Malaysia, 129, 304, 321, 323, 383, 389, 731 Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, 703 Malenbaum reports Minnesota, 388 Application of, 592 Mirzakhani, Gholamveza, 622 Evaluation of, 584-595 Mitchell, Wesley C., 686, 687, 688 History of, 581 MITRE Corporation, 358-363 Intensity of use (IOU) analysis, described, 582 Mobutu, Joseph, 737 Limitations of, 588 Model of International Relations and Agriculture. See MOIRA. Major determinants in, 586 Models Phosphate rock consumption, U.S., 467 Government model and World Integrated Model compared, Procedures of, 591 672-691 Projections (1977), 497 Government model and World 3 model compared, 661-672 Sample projections, 584 State of the art, 661 Sources of, 583 Structures compared, 661-663 Technology and IOU curves, 71 Ultimate, usefulness of, 460 U.S./U.S.S.R. population growth, 462 See also Government modeL individual models. U.S. copper consumption, 588, 589 MOIRA (Model of International Relations and Agriculture) Malenbaum, Wilfred, 205, 209, 474, 581 Assumptions of, 633-634 See also Malenbauni reports. Conclusions, 634 Mali, 277 Documentation of, 634 Malraux, Andrd, 715 GOL model and, 634 Manganese Nodules, 224 History of, 627 Mansfield, Mike, 707, 708 Methodology of, 627-628 Maracaibo, Venezuela, 242 Objectives of, 627 Marine animals. See Fisheries. Relevance of, 628-629 Marine Environment. See Fisheries; Oceans; Water quality. Structure of, 629-631 Marine kelp, 201 Testing of, 631-633 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 314 Mona Irrigation Project, Pakistan, 151 Maryland, 336 Mondale, Walter G., 694 Mass, Nathaniel, 608, Mongolia, 129, 131 Matthews, Allan, 498 Monsoon, 52-55, 57, 59,61, 63,.64 Mauritania, 223, 277, 731 Montana, 353 760 INDEX Morocco, 223, 323 Environmental assumptions inherent in projections, 420- Mortality. See Population. 421 Morton, Rogers C.B., 702 Environmental effects of land, 382-387 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 694, 696, 698, 700 Geographic distribution of selected minerals, by region (1974),223 Government model analyzed, 497-498 National Academy of Sciences Imports as a percentage of consumption (1976), 205 Carbon dioxide concentrations, 261, 269 Inconsistencies in government model and, 464, 467 Chloroform and, 344 Indirect effects oh'lamd, 388-389 HCB pollution, 307 Land reclamation and,i385-387 Malnutrition, 275-276 -Land use and, 382-387 Nonfuel minerals, 381 Life expectancies of 1974 world reserves of some commod- Ozone layer, 264, 266 ities, 212 Particulates, 264 McKelvey Box, 216-218 @Pesticides and, 286-287, Methodology of Study, 581-584 Ultimate carrying capacity of the global environment, 428 Ocean mining, 389 National Academy of Sciences Committee. on Natural Re- Per person consumption of new materials, 1975,- 384 sources, 692 Percentage of U.S. reserves needed to meet total energy National Center for Atmospheric Research, 544. demand for some commodities (1975-1990), 211 National Citizens Council on the American Future, 708 Phosphate mining, 387 - National Commission on Materials Policy, 702, 707, 710,311 Political issues and, 222-224 National Commission on- Supplies and, Shortages, - 70.7, 708, Price projections, 213, 216 709, 710 Price projections compared (2000), 216 National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Eco- Prices of some commodities (2000), 213 nomic Progress (1964), 693 Recycling and, 220, 221, National Conservation Commission (1908), 685, 686 Solid wastes generated from, annually, 1976-2000, 386 National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 52, 64, 257, Supply, 205, 212-213 267, 487, 535 Surface mining in U.S., 383 National Educational Television, 702 Technology and, 70-71, 217, 219 National Endowment for the Humanities, 698 Trade and, 222 National Energy Plan, 245 . , , Undersea deposits, 223, 224 National Environmental Policy Act, 695, 711 Wastes from, 385 .: National Forum on Growth Policy, 705 Water quality and, 387-388 National Goals Research Staff, 696, 697, 698i 710 World consumption of (2000), 582 - National Growth and Development Report, 704, 711 World demand for (1985, 2000), 206-207 National Marine Fisheries Service, 564 World production and reserves, other resources, resource National Resources Planning Board, 687, 688, 711 potential, etc., 219 National Science Foundation, 583, 706 See also Energy; Fuel minerals. National Security Resources Board, 688, 689 Norris, Kenneth, 314 National Wilderness Act (1964), 691-692 North Africa, 235, 376, 552-559 Natural gas. See Gas. North America - Near East, 235,307, 376 Birth rates, 27 Nehring, Richard, 352 Cattle populations, 234 Nepal, 321, 322, 377, 406 Forests and, 123-124, 326 Netherlands, 33, 304, 649, 7016 Migratio 'n and, 3.1 Nevada, 363 Population trends, 14-20 New Caledonia, 383 North American Conservation Conference, 686, New England, 336 North Carolina, 363 New Mexico, 363 Norway, 108, 136, 405, 706 New York City, 242, 303, 426 Notestein, Frank, 692 New York State, 306, 336 Nuclear Energy ,New Zealand, .14-20, 125, 326 Emission levels, 184, 185 Nicaragua, 509 Environmental problems of, 356 Niels Bohr Institute, 370 Hard path options, 358-363 Niger,.277,.322 Increased reliance on, 430 Nigeria, 10, 128, 166, 323 Power plant siting, 363 Nixon, Richard M., 695, 696, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 710 Resources and reserves, 193-194 Noncommercial fuels. See.Wood, Charcoal, etc. Shift of industrialized nations to, 405-406 Nonfuel minerals Uranium requirements for, 194 Africa, consumption of (1951-72000), 590, Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, 194 Air quality and, 387 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.), 36.3 Average annual demand by energy industries, for some com- modities (1975-1990), 210 Conclusions, 224, 389@-390 Oceania, 390 Consumption per capita,by region, 208 Oceans Cost of maintaining an adequate.stock, 220 Annual litter estimates, 313 Decision-making process, 215-222 Categories and effects of pollution of, 301 Demand projections, 205-212 Conclusions, 316-318 INDEX 761 Continued pollution of, 70, Peru 105, 108, 127, 279, 322, 387-388 Deep-sea mining, 316 Pestel, Eduard, 607, 615 Estimates of petroleum hydrocarbons introduced annually, Pesticides 311 Environment and, 285-288 Major role of, 300-302 Future prospects, 286 Pollution of open areas, 315-316 Impact of expanded use, 104 Radioactive contamination of, 309-310 Integrated pest management, 285 Sea-bed mining, 389 Irrigation and, 343 Total artificial radionuclides in (1970-2000), 310 LDC use and, 413, 417 See also Coastal areas-, Water quality. Water pollution from, 342-344 OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and De- Peterson, Russell, 202 velopment. Petri, Peter, 649 Ogburn, William F., 686 Petrol. See Gas; Oil. Oil Petroleum. See Oil. Arab embargo, 245, 583 Philippines, 129, 130, 140, 148, 280, 3011, 304, 321, 323, 385, Depletion of resources, 352 509 Distribution and production of, 352 Philippine'Interagency Committee on Environmental Protec- Density of drilling, selected areas, 1975, 191 tion, 388 Estimates of world ultimate production since 1970, 189 Pimental, David, 294 Geologically estimated production rates compared with con- Pinchot, Gifford, 686 sumption rates (1950-75), 354 Plutonium, 363 Ocean pollution, 310-311 Polychlorinated biphenyls, 254, 305, 306 Possible production rate curves for crude, 353 Population Sources of data for, 579-580 Age composition, 16-19 World cumulative production, ultimate production., future Assumptions, 7, 8, 10, 425 resources, by region (1976), 190 Average annual increment in life expectancy at birth, in World reserves (1978), by region, 191 years, 238 See also Energy; Fuel minerals. Carrying-capacity concept, 604@605 Olsen, Lyman J., 387 Census Bureau annual decline in crude birth rate,,26 Olson, Mancur, 694 Census Bureau assumptions, 506 OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Census Bureau average annual population growth rate, 24 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Census Bureau estimated and projected crude birth rates, Chemical trade, 254 26 Coal mining waste, 385 Census Bureau estimated and projected crude death rates, Conversion data for fuel gas, 576 25 Energy assumptions of, 493 Census Bureau projected total fertility rate, 22-23 Oil consumption of, 570-571 Census Bureau projected total population, 20-22 Projections of nuclear generating, capacity (1985), 364 Census Bureau projection, average annual population growth Urbanization trends., 282 rate; world, major regions, selected countries, 24 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Census Bureau projection of crude birth rate; world', major Demand projections for oil (1976-1990), 169 regions, selected countries, 26 Energy assumptions and, 161 Census Bureau projections, crude death rate; world, major Energy price controls, 164 regions, selected countries, 25 GNP assumptions and, 40 Census Bureau projections, total fertility rate; world, major Less developed countries: production, reserves, population, regions, selected countries, 22-23 income, 170 Census Bureau projections, total population; world, major Pricing policy, 166-171 regions, selected countries, 20-22 Production policies, 175, 177 Census Bureau summary data (1975-2000), 8 Regional energy balances with high OPEC prices, 171, 172 Changes in functional age groups and total population Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (1958), (1975-2000),19 690, 693, 711, 712 CFSC assumptions, 24-28, 505 Overton, Scott, 333 CFSC estimated and projected crude birth rates, 33 Oxides of nitrogen, 180, 184 CFSC estimated and projected crude death rates, 32 Ozone, 184, 259, 403-404, 429 CFSC estimated total fertility rate, 30 CFSC estimated total fertility rate; world, major regions, Pakistan, 34, 36, 133, 151-152, 320-325, 426, 732-733 selected countries, 30 Paley, William S., 688, 689, 690 CFSC projected average annual population growth rates, Paley Commission, 689, 702 31 Palmer, H. Brute, 698 CFSC projected average annual population growth rates; Panama, 321, 509 world, major regions, selected countries, 31 Panama Canal, 321 CFSC projected crude birth rates; world, major regions, Paraguay, 33, 127, 406 selected countries, 33 Pardo, Avid, 223 CFSC projected total population, 28-29 Parke, Robert, 702 CFSC projections analyzed, 502-520 Peccei, Aurelio, 607, 615, 627 CFSC projections of total population; world, major regions, Pecos River Irrigation Project, U.S., 151 selected countries, 28-29 People's Republic of China, See China. Comparison of average annual projected growth rates, me- Perrson, Reidar, 118, 128 dium series (1975-1985 and 1975-2000), 556 762 INDEX Comparison of population projections', with and without President's Commission on Population and Family Planning'. migration (1975, 2000), 35 700, 711, 712 Contrastsbetween less and more developed regions, 11-20, President's Research Committee on Social Trends (1929), 686- Crude birth rate, 7,* 11, 12, 14, 15, 26, 33 687 Crude death rate, 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 25, 32 Project Independence Report, 209, 570 Difficulties of projections, 7 Project Independence Evaluation System (U.S.), 164, 494, 570 Distribution of and the environment, 241-246 Public Land Law Review Commission (1965), 693 Energy and, 165 Puerto Rico, 304, 387 Environment and, 203, 410 Environmental assumptions inherent in projections, 424- 427 Rangeland Estimates of total population growth, 10, 12 Causes of deterioration, -232 Family planning and, 8, 26-27, 67, 516-518 Protection of, 232 Fertility assumptions, 8, 24-28 Results of deterioration, 233-234 Four-level sector with exogenous inputs, 667 Significance of deterioration, 233 Government model analyzed, 485, 486 See also Land. Growth (1975--2000 figure), by region, 13 Raritan Bay, New York, 309 Growth, by region (map), 9 Real Estate Research Corporation, 245 Growth, selected countries, 1960-74 and 1970-74, 507 Republic Steel, 388 Growth rate, 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 31 Reserve Mining Company, 388 Growth rates, actual and projected, 78 Resources Health issues and, 246-251 Environmental assumptions and, 410 Herding cultures and, 232-235 Forecasting problems, 563 Inconsistencies of government model, 461-63 Inconsistencies of models on LDC consumption rates, 469 Increase in world population, 1975-2000, 231 Models compared, 662-663 Industrialized cultures and, 238-241 Nonrenewable, models compared, 668, 670, 671 Infant mortality, causes of, 248 Resources for the Future, 583, 690 Less developed countries, 8, 462 Resources Recovery Act of 1970, 702 Levels and trends of life expectancy at birth, 1950-2000, 248 Revelle, Roger, 692 Life expectancy and, 246-247 Rice, Donald, 708, 710 Methodology problems in LDCs, 501 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 242 Migration and, 29-37, 427 - Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, 386 Missing variables, 719 Robinson, Jennifer, 498 Models compared, 661-662 Rockefeller Foundation, 687 MOIRA and, 627 . Rockefeller, John D. 3rd, 700, 701 Mortality assumptions, 10, 27 Rockefeller, Laurance S., 690, 691 Mortality statistics, 247 Rockefeller, Nelson A., 700 National goals report on, 698 Rome Food Conference, 491 Percent distribution of population (1975 and 2000), and Romney, George, 704 1975-2000 increase, 18 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 687-688 Population estimates (1975), projections and growth rates Roosevelt, Theodore, 564, 685, 686. (1985, 2000), 49 1 . Ross, Bruce, 498 Population size, net growth and percent of world population Rzoska, Julian, 339, 340 (1975-2000),15-16 Projected annual decline in total fertility rates, mcdium@ growth, 517 Sahel Region Projection of lik expectancies, 513 Climate changes and, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 64 Quality of data, 509 Climate trends and, 259 Rate of natural increase, 7, 11, 12, 14, 15 Drought (1968-73), 277-278, 279 Regions for study, 14, 15 Fertility losses, 104 Regions, subregions, and countries for which projections Food production prospects, 95 were developed, 508 Fuelwood and, 406 Representative projections (1071-2000), 584 Rangeland deterioration, 235 Shifting cultivation and environment, 23-5-238 Wood fuel, 376 Summary of projections, 20, 230 Salinity. See Water. Technology and, 67 Salt Lake City, Utah, 387 Total fertility rate, 7, 22-23, 30 Saltzman, Arnold A." 709 Traditional cultures and, 232-238 San Joaquin Valley, Calif., 402 Trends by major region and selected countries 14-20 Sao Paulo, Brazil, 242, 243 Uncertain relationships in studies, 505 Saouma, Edouard, 324 Urban, in.cities of 100,000 or more, 242 Saudi Arabia, 166, 169 Urbanization and, 37 Scandinavia, 418 World growth, 462 Schistosomiasis, 152 Population Council, 700, Schultz, Charles, 697 Schaumacher, E. F., 271 Portugal, 32, 1 .08 Science Policy Research Institute, 612 Precipitation. See Climate. Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment of the President's Commission on National Goals, 692 International Council of Scientific Unions, 284 INDEX 76-3 Scotland, 199 Stanford Research Institute, 174, 175 Scott, Hugh, 708 Stans, Maurice, 702 Senegal, 277, 733-734 Stern, Joseph J., 649 Senior Executives Council, 699, 700 Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, 581 Seoul, Korea, 242 Study Team on Environmental Problems Associated with Seveso, Italy, 254, 430 Metallic and Nonmetallic Mineral Resources, 381 Seychelles, 304 Sudan, 277, 322, 406, 734 Shiskin, Julius, 694 Sulfur dioxide, 183-184, 243 Siberia, 390 Sulfur oxide, 408 Silviculture. See Forests. Sullivan, Ind., 386 SIMLINK (SIMulated trade LINKages) Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 386 Assumptions of, 525-526 Surinam, 33, 223 Calculations for low-middle income LDC group, medium Sweden, 336, 363-367, 373, 386, 405, 706 growth (1975-85), 533 Symington, W. Stuart, 688 Components of, 526-528 Syncrude Canada, Ltd., 199 Copper and tin price assumptions, 464 Syria, 152 Described, 486-487 Development of, 522-524 Taft, William Howard, 686 Efficiency of, 525 Taiwan, 89, 24@ Key minerals trade assumptions, 467 Tanzania, 277, 323 Level of investment for agricultural improvement assumed,, Tar sands, 199-200 469 Technology Level of investment for pollution control assumed, 469 Assumptions, 67 Level of water availability assumed,,469 Climate and, 68 Limitations of, 526 Difficulties, 67 Procedures of, 528-534 Embassy reports on, 723-738 Purposes and principles of, 524,526 Energy and, 70 Sequential operation of, 528-529 Environment and, 71-72 Technology projections and, 597 Fertilizer and, 69-70 Wheat trade assumptions, 467 Fisheries and, 70 See also World Bank. Food and, 6840 Simulated trade linkages. See SIMLINK. Forestry and, 70 Singapore, 304 Fuel minerals and, 70 Slater, Joseph, 700 Solar energy GNP and, 67-68 Government model analyzed, 489-490 Difficulties of, 200 Methodology of Study, 597-599 Environmental problems of, 356-357 Nonfuel minerals and, 70-71 Sources of data for, 580 Nonfuel mineral production 'and, 217, 219 Swedish study, 364-367 Population and, 67 See also Energy; Nuclear energy. Projections summarized, 270 Solid waste Rice production in Thailand, 69 Amounts generated and recovered (1977), 240 Water and, 70 Coastal area pollution, 312-313 Temperature. See Climate. Discarded, 239 Tennessee Valley Authority, 687 GNP and, 252 Texas, 417 1 P LDC pollution problems from, 340 Thailand, 69, 79, 129, 130, 133, 280, 304, 331, 339, 377, 406, Mineral-generated, annually (1976-2000),.386 734-736 Somalia, 277 Thorium, 194 South Africa, 32, 95, 108, 557 Thornton, James E. 709 South Korea. See Korea; Seoul. Three Mile Island, 363, 406, 430 South and Southeast Asia. See Asia. Threshhold, Inc., 565 Soviet Union Tigris River Irrigation Project, Iraq, 151 Cattle populations, 234 Tinbergen, Jan, 627 Climate trends and, 259 Tokyo Bay, 305 Coal reserves, 193 Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 306 Fish catch, 108 Trinidad and Tobago, 33 Food production on and, 89 Truman, Harry, 688-690 Forests, 118, 120, 121, 133, 411 Tunisia, 509 Gas reserves, 192 T urkey, 31, 243, 552 Geothermal energy, 197 Oil shale, 198 Radioactive pollution by, 309 Uganda, 406 Reforestation, 726 U.N. World Model Water use, 151 Alternative assumptions concerning income targets and fu- Water withdrawals, 150 ture population growth, 653 Spain, 32, 108 Conclusions, 654-655 Species extinction, 417 Documentation of, 655 SriLanka,509 Growth rates and income gap assumptions, 654 764 INDEX History of, 649 Land deterioration in, 415 Methodology of, 649-650 Land use for mineral production, 1930-71, 383 Relevance of, 650 Long-range energy projections, 174-175 Structure of, 650-652 Life expectancy in, 249 Testing of 653-654 Migration and, 29-37 United Ara@ Emirates, 34, 169 Mineral production, 382 United Kingdom, 33-34, 156, 151, 309, 371, 385, 706 Natural gas consumption, 583 United Kingdom Meteorological Office, 267 Natural increase, population, 427 United Nations Nuclear power plant siting, 363 Committee for Coordination of Investigations, 339 Nonfuel mineral reserves needed to meet total energy de- Conference on Desertification, 238, 2716, 277,.280, 282 mand (1975-1990), 211 Conference on Science and Technology for Development, Per person consumption of new mineral material (1975), 384 271 Radioactive pollution by, 309 Conference on Trade and Development, 224 Recent projections (2000), 176 Conference on the Law of the Sea, 224, 429 Reforestation, 726 Costs of desertification, 416 Reuse of waste water, 341 Economic Commission for Asia, 142 Soil deterioration, 279 Economic Commission for Europe, 121, 142 Source documents of the effects of pollutants, 349 Economic Commission for the Far East, 142 Sulfur oxide emissions, 408 Economic, Social and Cultural Organization, 309, 310 Surface mining, 383 Environment Programme, 254, 374 Tar sands, 199-200 GNP, 39 Thermal water pollution, 342 Industrial Development Organization Conference, 211 Thorium, 194 Migration, 30-31, 34, 36 Total fish catch (1975), 108 MOIRA and, 634 Uranium tailings, 387 Mortality studies, 27 WAES participation, 706 Mortality trends, 10 Water pollution control costs, 414 Ocean zones protection, 317 Water scarcity for coal processing, impact of, 405 Pollution abatement costs from minerals, 381 Water supply, 140 Population studies, 8 Water use, 143, 151 Shifting cultivation,, 236-237 Water withdrawals, 150 Symposium on Population, Resources and Environment, Upper Volta, 277, 736-737 389 Uranium, 193, 194, 363, 385, 387, 580 Urbanization, 241 Urban Affairs Council, 696, 697 Water Conference, 344 Urbanization See also U.N. World Model. Climate change and, 266, 267 United States (see "U.S.," below, for government agencies) Coastal areas and, 302 Aquaculture, 112 Deterioration of urban environments, 407-408 Climate, 53 Defined, 37 Climate trends and, 259 Food supply and, 281-282 Coal mining waste, 385 Industrialized nations, 244-246 Coal reserves, 193 Population distribution and the environment 241-246 Coastal water pollution, 305 Population of all cities over 100,000 (1950, 1975, 2000), 407 Copper consumption, 588, 589 Uruguay, 32, 406, 509 Copper smelting, 387 U.S. Agency for International Development. Corn data, 292, 293, 294 Deforestation, 280 Corn failure, 289 Environment projections for Study, 498 Crop damage due to air pollution, 418 GOL model and, 546 Crude oil reserves, 352 International population projections requested, 485 Dependence on automobiles, 245 U.S. Association for the Club of Rome. 621 - . Discarded industrial waste, 239 U.S. Bureau of Mines, 71, 205-212, 496, 497, 581, 597, 709 Drought frequency (1991-2000), 543 U.S. Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, 691 Electric power plant siting, 363 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 413, 687 Energy prices and food production, 85-89 U.S. Bureau of the Census Environment and GNP, 422-423 Cohort-component methodology, 506, 508-510 Fish demand, 113 Contrasts between less and more developed regions, 12 Food exporting role, 95 Family planning technology and, 67 Food production, 79 Government model and, 485-486 Forest growth, 411 Inconsistencies of methodology, 462 Forest inventories, 118, 123-124 International program of, 501 Future food production problems, 104 Life expectancy assumptions and, 247 Gas reserves, 192 Mandate of, 501 Geothermal energy, 197 Methodology analyzed, 502-520 brain sales, 275 Migration and, 37 Growth of GNP and commercial energy use (1850-1976), Population projections by major regions, 15 355 Population projections explained, 74 HtB pollution, 307 Projection of average annual population growth rate; world, Intensity of use statistics, 589 major regions, selected countries, 24 INDEX 765 Projection of crude birthrate-,* world, major regions, selected U.S. Water Resources Council, 342, 421 countries, 26 U.S.S.R. See Soviet Union. Projection of crude death rate; world', major regions, se- Utah, 383 lected countries, 24 Projections of total fertility rate, world, rdajor regiohs,@se- lected countries, 22-23 Vail, David, 416 Projections of total population;- world, major regions, se- Van Hise, Charles Richard, 686 lected countries, 20-22 Velikanov, A. L., 342 Summary data (1975-2000), 8 Venezuela, 32-33, 199-200, 248, 407, 706 Total -population projections, 10, 11 Vietnam, 301, 304, 321@324, 339, 406 - U.S. dependence on automobiles, 245 Vinyl chloride monomer, 254, World estimates and projections, 10 Virgin Islands, 304 See also Population. Volkswagen Foundation, 607, 615 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Voorhoeve, C. C. van., 378 Climate projections, 487 Voyageurs National Park, 336 Crude oil resources, 352 Fisheries, forests and water projections, 492 Forest projections, 565 WAES. See Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies. GNP forecasts, 67 Wales, 386 GNP projections for Study, 486 Washington, State, 363, 383 Growth projections for Soviet Bloc and China, 522 Water Water projections, 152 Acid rain, 335-337, 415, 418 U.S. Department of Agriculture Annual. circulation of hydrosphere, 138 Energy prices and food production, 85 Aquatic environment, 2000, 404,- Fertilizer application rates, Japan, 342 Augmentation methods, 157-158 Fertilizer submodel, 467 Available global supply, by continents and selected nations, Global levels of fertilizer use, 284 1 141 Small-scale farming, 294 Average annual withdrawal per unit of land area, selected Total food submodel assumptions, 467 units, 149 U.S. Department of Commerce, 39, 653 Average rate of replenishment, 139-140 U.S. Department of Energy Chloroform, 344 Basis for projections, 346 Climate@change and, 337 Communist region, energy demand data '576 Conclusions, 344 Energy Information Administration, 165, 175, 358-363, 493, Consumptive use increases, 413 569 Deforestation and, 335 Food production and, 88 Desalination, 413 Hard path options, 358-363 Deterioration of aquatic environment 429 Implications of energy projections for the environment, 346- Deterioration of catchments and river basins, 334-335. 348 Diseases and, 343-344 Office of Technology Impacts, 495 Distribution of withdrawals among major use categories, Projections, limitations of, 348-350 1965, 142 Soft path studies, 367-370 Doxiadis projections, 70, 148, 149 Warming trend and carbon dioxide levels, 403 Energy expense of irrigation, 88 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 704, Environmental assumptions and, 411-414 U.S. Department of the Interior, 213, 467, 469, 492 Environmental developments and, 334-345 Interior Department model, 462 Estimated use, 1976, 2000, 150 U.S. Department of the Treasury, 39 Eutrophication, 312 U.S. Energy Research and Development Agency, 495 Extinction of freshwater species, 344 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency FAO projection, 150 Carbon monoxide level of Caracas, 243 Fertilizer use levels and, 284-285 DBCP ban, 342, 343 Food production and, 100 Emissions standards, 184 Future resources, 157@159 Environment projections for Study, 498 Government model analyzed, 492 Global 2000 Study and, 229 Habitat changes and, 414 Reclamation of land from mining use, 385 History of projections, 564 Thermal water pollution, 341-342 Hydraulic works and, 338-340 U.S. Federal Reserve Board, 71 Hydroelectric power resources, 194-196 U.S. Forest Service, 123, 124; 687 Hydropower, 580 U.S. General Accounting Office, 281,-703 Importance of, 137 U.S. Geological Survey, 142, 195, 209, 212, 464, 496, 564, 579 Inconsistencies of assumptions on availability of, 467, 469 U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 316, Interstate disputes over, 153 492 Irrigation, 150-152, 339, 343, 402 U.S. National Science Foundation, 583, 706 Irrigation and drainage in developing market economies, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 363 1978, 1990, 153 U. S. Office of Management. and Budget, 71 Kalinin projection, 70, 149 U. S. Office of Science and Technology Policy, 597 Less developed countries and, 242 U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 1245, 271, 597 Mineral production and, 387-388 U.S. Soil Conservation Service, 281, 283 Major tidal power projects; 196 766 INDEX Minerals projections and, 421 Exogenous inputs to different sectors, 666 Per capita availability, by nation table (1971, 2000), 156- Extension of time horizon, 675-676 157 History of, 607 Per capita. availability maps, 154, 155 Limitations of, 608 Per capita use of drinking water in LDCs, 1970, 144 Model standard run, 667 Pollution abatement costs, 414 Worlds 2 & 3 Pollution from urban/industrial sources, 340-M2 Comparison of levels in, 610 Pollution of agricultural origin, 342-344 Conclusions, 612 Pollution of regional seas, 406 Criticism of, 615 Projected global supply and demand (2000), 334 Methodology of, 608-610 Projections summarized, 333-334 Structure of, 610-611 Properties of resources, 137-139 Testing of, 612 Quality, 150-152, 413 World Bank Group Regional projections, 152-159 Chemical regulation and, 255 River basin development, 338-340 Cuajone project, 387 River basin development, international, 406 Dung fuel use, 378 Salinity, 151, 152, 159, 279-280 Foodgrain production, 724 Soil deterioration and, 279-280 GNP, 39, 40 Study limits, 137 GNP data on, 521 Summary, 158-159 GNP projections for study, 486 Supply of, 139-141 Growth projection methodology, 521-534 Technology and, 70 Malnutrition in LDCs, 275 Thermal pollution, 341-342 Mortality statistics, 247 Tidal power project sites, 196 Mortality studies, 27 Use in selected countries, 1968, 152 Pollution cleanup in Peru, 388 Use ratio, 143 Population data (1975), 510 Uses of, 141-148 Population studies, 8 Uses, varied, by continent and selected nations, 147 Projections for individual countries, 522 Withdrawal problems, 143, 147-148 Projections used, 469 Withdrawals, projected, for four Asian countries, 148 See also SIMLINK. Waterlogging, 279-280 World Climate Conference, 403 Weather. See Climate. World Energy Conference (WEC), 189, 190, 193, 357, 358, WEC. See World Energy Conference. 462, 496, 579, 580,\653, 674 Weisner, Jerome, 692, 693 World Food Conference, 545 West Germany. See Federal Republic of Germany. World Forest Inventory (FAO), 118 West Virginia, 336 World Health Organization, 142, 151, 242 Westoff, Charles, 701 World Integrated Model (WIM) Wetlands. See Coastal Areas. Compared to government model, 672-691 Whales, 314-315 Questions on, 679-681 White, Gilbert, 692 Regional differences, 676-679 White House Conference on Natural Resources, 686, 690 Time horizon, 675-676 WHIZARD, 570 World Meteorological Organization, 403 Wiener, Anthony, 699 World Wildlife Fund, 565 Williams, Charles, 697, 698 Wriston, Henry M., 692 Wilson, Carroll L., 706 Wyoming, 383 WIM. See World Integrated Model. Winrock International Livestock Research and Training Cen- ter, 235--237 Wood, 374-376 Yemen, 322 Woodwell, George, 565 Yugoslavia, 14 Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies, 39, 40, 67, 172, Yuma, Ariz., 413 174-177, 486, 522, 622, 674, 706 World 1, 607 World 2, 607, 608 World 3 Zaire, 128, 199, 223, 737-738 Assumptions of, 611 Zambia, 223, 224, 323 Compared with government model, 663-670 Zooplankton, 107 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1980 0- 256 -752 66 ;E 00002 95 5 -66