[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]






































           1~~~~~~~~~                              *

















* U56
1 992





                         0~~~~~~~MM





                    United States
                    General Accounting Office
                    Washington, D.C. 20548

                    Resources, Community, and
                    Economic Development Division

                    B-245764                               Property of csc LibrarY

                    January 27, 1992

                    The Honorable Quentin N. Burdick
                    Chairman, Committee on Environment and
                      Public Works
                    United States Senate

                    The Honorable Daniel Patrick Moynihan
                    United States Senate

                    In response to your request of March 22, 1990, this report reviews reporting by countries on
                    their compliance with eight major international environmental agreements and identifies
                    measures that have been proposed to strengthen monitoring and implementation.

                    Copies of this report are being sent to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
                    Agency, the Secretary of State, and other interested parties.

                    This work was performed under the direction of Richard L. Hembra, Director, Environmental
                    Protection Issues, who may be reached at (202) 275-6111. Other major contributors to this
                    report are listed in appendix IV.





                    J. Dexter Peach
                    Assistant Comptroller General







                            U S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NOAA
                            COASTAL SERVICES CENTER
                            2234 SOUTH HOBSON AVENUE
                            CHARLESTON  SC  29405-2413



d-






Executive Summary







         p                         ~~~~~~~~~In'the last 20 years, nations have signed an increasing number of agree-
 Purpose                            ments to address an array of environmental concerns. While the devel-
                                     opment of these agreements in itself is noteworthy, their effectiveness
                                     depends on implementation by the parties. The agreements generally
                                     call for the parties to annually report on implementation. ConcernedI
                                     about how well these reporting obligations are being met, the Chairman
                                     of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and Senator
                                     Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Member of the Committee, asked GAO to
                                     determine (1) if the agreements are specific enough to allow implemen-
                                     tation to be measured and if parties are reporting required information
                                     and (2) if the administrative bodies for the agreements monitor imple-
                                     mentation. GAO also identified proposed measures for strengthening
                                     monitoring and implementation.


         Back  round               ~~~~Since 1972, when over 130 nations took part in the United Nations Con-
               g                   ~~~~~~ference on the Human Environment, the number of international envi-
                                     ronmental agreements in which the United States participates or in
                                     which it has a significant interest has grown from fewer than 50 to 168.
                                     Among these, eight agreements, which GAO reviewed, address environ-        't
                                     mental problems of global or regional significance: the Montreal Protocol
                                     (ozone depletion), the Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Protocol (acid rain, air pol-
                                     lution), the Basel Convention (hazardous waste disposal), the London
                                     Dumping Convention (marine pollution), the International Convention        t\
                                     for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPoL), the Convention on
                                     International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the InternationalJ
                                     Whaling Convention, and the International Tropical Timber Agreement
                                     (deforestation).

                                     Developing an international environmental agreement involves
                                     achieving a voluntary commitment among many nations with various
                                     levels of industrial development, technical capabilities, resources, and
                                     concern about the environmental problem. Parties implement an agree-
                                     ment domestically by establishing the necessary legislation, regulations,
                                     and administrative systems. To administer the agreement, parties create
                                       asecretariat, which they fund and to which they are to report periodi-   4
                                     cally. Because no supranational enforcement body exists, peer or public
                                     pressure-based in part on the information parties report about imple-
                                     mentation-is generally the primary mechanism for enforcing multilat-
                                     eral agreements. While there may be informal sources of information on
                                     implementation available, reports submitted by the parties to the secre-
                                     tariats are the only formal source of information available to all parties.



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                                        Executive Summary









   Results in Brief                    Six of the eight environmental agreements GAO reviewed specify how
                                        implementation is to be measured and require parties to periodically
                                        provide information. However, not all parties report complete and
                                        timely information to secretariats, particularly developing countries for
                                        which reporting is part of a larger problem related to their financial and
                                        technical capability to comply. Moreover, although secretariat officials
                                        believe they are aware of any important implementation problems, they
                                        generally do not have the authority or resources to monitor implementa-
                                        tion by verifying reported information or independently assessing coun-
                                        tries' compliance. Even operating within the mandate they do have,
                                        some secretariats, according to their officials, have been funded insuffi-
                                        ciently to allow them to carry out assigned duties or to assist parties in
                                        carrying out the agreements.

                                        Recognizing the seriousness of environmental problems, a number of
                                        international environmental experts have proposed measures to
                                        strengthen international oversight as well as parties' capability to
                                        comply with agreements. For example, some have suggested that envi-
                                        ronmental agreements be modeled after other types of international
                                        agreements that provide for monitoring and review, such as those gov-
                                        erning labor and human rights. Some agreements also include financing
                                        mechanisms to aid developing countries in complying. In any -case,
                                        efforts to strengthen monitoring and countries' capability to comply will
                                        require both the approval and financial support of parties.



   GAO's Analysis


k  Parties' Reporting Has              Of the eight agreements reviewed, six require parties to annually report
   Often Been Late and                 information on implementation to the secretariats. One agreement-the
Inoplt Basel Convention-is not yet in force. For the remaining agreement-
            Incomplete                ~~~the International Tropical Timber Agreement-parties submit reports
                                        that are not used to measure implementation but do allow for an overall
                                        annual assessment of the world tropical timber economy, including envi-
                                        ronmental aspects. For the seven agreements in force, many reports are
                                        submitted late or incomplete, or are not submitted at all. Eighty percent
                                        or more of the parties to the Montreal Protocol, the NOx Protocol, and the
                                        International Whaling Convention had submitted required reports as of
                                        the secretariats' most recent reporting periods. However, close to half of
                                        the reports submitted to the Montreal Protocol secretariat were incom-
                                        plete. For the other agreements-the London Dumping Convention,



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                                     Executive Summary









                                     MARPOL, CITES, and the International Tropical Timber Agreement-fewer
                                     than 50 percent of the parties reported. Although reports from devel-
                                     oped countries were late or missing, reporting was particularly a
                                     problem among developing countries, which, in many instances, lack the
                                     infrastructure and resources to collect and report the required informa-
                                     tion or otherwise implement the agreements. In some instances when
                                     reporting has been poor, secretariats have been unable to target finan-
                                     cial and technical assistance to those countries most in need, and the
                                     agreements' effectiveness has been called into question.


Secretariats Do Not Have             In general, secretariats have neither the authority nor the resources to
                 Authority or Resources to    monitor implementation. As established by the parties, the role of the
iAuthority or mlesren tion           secretariats generally is to help implement agreements by collecting and
Monitor Implementation               distributing information and providing some technical assistance. At
                                     various times, most of the secretariats have distributed lists of nonre-
                                     porting parties in order to generate peer pressure to stimulate future
                                     compliance with reporting provisions. However, with the exception of
                                     the CITES secretariat, which has a somewhat broader role, the secretar-
                                     iats have not been given the authority to monitor the agreements
                                     through verifying the information parties report or independently
                                     assessing compliance.

                                     The size of secretariats reflects their limited role. They are very small
                                     organizations, with staffs of 4 to 20 people and annual budgets of less
                                     than $1 million to $3 million in 1990. While these levels of resources are
                                     not always considered a problem, secretariat officials for three of the
                                     agreements-the London Dumping Convention, MARPOL, and CITES--
                                     believe funding is inadequate to allow them to fulfill aspects of their
                                     defined roles, such as providing technical assistance.


Measures Have Been                   Although secretariat officials believe they are aware of any major
Proposed to Strengthen               implementation problems, there is a growing sense within the interna-
Monitoring and Countries'    tional community that more systematic monitoring is warranted, given
                                     the seriousness of international environmental problems and the high
Capacity to Comply With              costs of correcting or preventing them. Officials of international envi-
Agreements                           ronmental organizations and others are now considering methods for
                                     strengthening monitoring, and the topic has been proposed for the
                                     agenda of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
                                     Development.




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                                     Executive Summnary









                                     Some proposals have surfaced already. Some observers point out that
                                     organizations overseeing international agreements on labor, human
                                     rights, and trade offer possible models for monitoring compliance
                                     through visits to countries and sites, public hearings, and other verifica-
                                     tion and assessment procedures. In addition, observers suggest that non-
                                     governmental organizations (public and private interest groups), which
                                     now play some part in monitoring or assessing the implementation of
                                     international environmental agreements, be given a more formal role.

                                     Additional monitoring may not be readily accepted by some nations and
                                     will in any case have to be accompanied by efforts to improve nations'
                                     capacity to comply. In recognition that the inability to comply with
                                     agreements is a serious underlying problem in many instances, some
                                     efforts have already been made to assist developing countries. A recent
                                     example is the Global Environmental Facility-jointly run by the World
                                     Bank and two United Nations organizations-which provides funding to
                                     aid developing countries in addressing certain environmental problems.


         Recommendations ~GAO is makting no recommendations in this report but plans to evaluate
    F  Recommendations             ~~in a future review options for strengthening oversight of the implemen-
                                     tation of international environmental agreements.


Agency Comments                     The Department of State, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
                                     and the secretariats to the agreements reviewed a draft of this report.
                                     EPA found the report to be an informative overview of the issues and
                                     raised a number of questions that, while important and perhaps the sub-
                                     ject of GAo's further work, are nevertheless outside the scope of this
                                     review. The State Department believed the premise of the report is that
                                     incomplete reporting implies less than full compliance. GAo is not sug-
                                     gesting that incomplete reporting necessarily equates to less than full
                                     compliance but, rather, that the level of compliance is difficult to judge
                                     because of incomplete reporting. Further, as GAO points out, incomplete
                                     reporting by developing countries is part of a larger problem related to
                                     their financial and technical capability to comply. The remainder of the
                                     State Department's comments provided technical corrections and clarifi-
                                     cations. These comments, along with those provided by the other
                                     reviewers, were incorporated into this report where appropriate. Com-
                                     ments provided by EPA and the State Department are reproduced in
                                     appendixes II and III.




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Contents







Executive Summary                                                                                        2

Chapter 1                                                                                                8
Introduction                        Global Environmental Problems Have Increasingly Been                 8
                                       Addressed by International Agreements
                                   Development and Implementation of Environmental                    10
                                       Agreements Depend on Voluntary Participation of
                                       Nations
                                   Eight Agreements Address Major International                       13
                                        Environmental Problems
                                   Objectives, Scope, and Methodology                                 17

Chapter 2                                                                                               20
Compliance With                     Most Environmental Agreements Reviewed Allow                        20
International                           Implementation to Be Measured
                                   Parties' Reporting Has Often Been Late and Incomplete              23
Environmental                       Secretariats Generally Do Not Verify or Assess                     28
Agreements Is Not                       Cmlac
Well Monitored                      Conclusions                                                         32

Chapter 3                                                                                              34
         Measures Have Been         Many Believe Oversight Deserves Greater Emphasis                   34
Proposed to                         Mechanisms Used by Other International Agreements                  36
                                        May Offer Models for Monitoring Implementation
Strengthen Monitoring   A More Formal Role for Nongovernmental Organizations                           42
and Countries'                          Has Been Suggested
                                nt Nations' Capability to Implement Agreements Could Be               43
Capacity to Implemen                    Strengthened 
Agreements                          Conclusions                                                        44
                                   Agency Comments on This Report                                     45     1

Appendixes                          Appendix I: Organizations Contacted by GAO                         46
                                   Appendix II: Comments From the Environmental                       49
                                        Protection Agency
                                   Appendix III: Comments From the U.S. Department of                 52

                                   Appendix IV: Major Contributors to This Report                     60

Tables                              Table 1.1: Major International Environmental Agreements             14


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                                  Contents








                                  Table 2.1: Performance Standards in International               21
                                       Environmental Agreements
                                  Table 2.2: Staffing and Funding for Secretariats of             31
                                       International Environmental Agreements, 1990
                                   Table 3.1: Selected Mechanisms Used by International            37
                                       Organizations to Monitor Compliance

Figures                           Figure 1.1: Number of International Environmental                10
                                       Agreements Involving the United States, 1949
                                       Through 1989
                                   Figure 1.2: Process for Developing and Implementing             11
                                       International Environmental Agreements
                                   Figure 2.1: Reporting Status of International                   24
                                       Environmental Agreements















                                   Abbreviations

                                   CITES    Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
                                               Wild Fauna and Flora
                                   EPA     Environmental Protection Agency
                                   GAO     General Accounting Office
                                   GATT    General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
                                   IO      International Labor Organization
                                   IMO     International Maritime Organization
                                   MARPOL  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
                                               Ships
                                   NGO     nongovernmental organization
                                   NOx     nitrogen oxides
                                   UNEP    United Nations Environment Program


                                   Page 7            GAO/RCED-92-43 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored




Chapter I

1Introduction







                                      In response to increased industrialization and populations, and the
                                      accompanying pollution, as well as better scientific information about
                                      the global and transboundary nature of environmental problems,
                                      nations have signed an increasing number of multilateral agreements to
                                      address an array of these problems.1 While the development of these
                                      agreements in itself is a noteworthy accomplishment, their effectiveness
                                      in correcting problems depends on implementation by the parties. More-
                                      over, because of the high costs often involved in compliance, uneven
                                      implementation may place those countries that carry out the agreements
                                      at a competitive disadvantage compared to countries that do not.


Global Environmental    The number and severity of environmental problems with global impli-
                                      cations have increased significantly over recent years. Stratospheric
Problems Have                      ozone depletion, hazardous waste disposal, air and marine pollution, and
Increasingly Been                  the destruction of living natural resources pose environmental threats
Addressed by                       internationally:
International                    * Stratospheric ozone depletion, caused by the catalytic reactions of
A~greements                        chlorofluorocarbons and related chemicals in the upper atmosphere,
                                      could lead to a worldwide increase in the incidence of skin cancer, crop
                                      damage, and the destruction of marine life.
                                    * Hazardous wastes produced by developed countries have been trans-
                                      ported to and improperly disposed of in developing countries, poten-
                                      tially contaminating soil and water supplies and posing serious long-
                                      term health problems.
                                    * The widespread dispersal of air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide and
                                      nitrogen oxides (Nox), has produced acid rain and has led to the death of
                                      numerous lakes and forests in North America and Europe.
                                    * Marine pollution from oil, chemicals, and garbage dumped into the
                                      oceans has killed marine life and degraded coastal areas worldwide.
                                    * Many plant and animal species, valued for their uniqueness as well as
                                      their potential medical and chemical value, are threatened with extinc-
                                      tion from deforestation.

                                      Awareness of these kinds of global environmental problems has height-
                                      ened over the last 20 years as industrialization and the stress caused by
                                      population growth have spread through the world, increasing pollution

                                       'Throughout this report, several terms are used for international environmental agreements. While
                                      these terms are often used interchangeably, "treaty" has been defined as an international agreement
                                      concluded between two or more states in written form and governed by international law; "conven-
                                      tion" tends to be used for a multilateral treaty; and "protocol" usually denotes a treaty amending, or
                                      supplementing, another treaty.


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Chapter 1
Introduction








and environmental degradation. At the same time, more sophisticated
monitoring techniques have yielded new and better information about
the effects of industrial activities on the earth's atmosphere, oceans, and
ecosystems.

In 1972, over 130 nations took part in the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment (referred to as the Stockholm Conference) in
the recognition that solving many types of environmental problems
would require concerted efforts worldwide. The conference resulted in
the creation of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP),
charged with promoting international cooperation on environmental
issues and coordinating environmental activities within the United
Nations system.

Since the Stockholm Conference, the number of global, regional, and
bilateral environmental agreements to which the United States is a
party or in which it has a significant interest has increased steadily. As
shown in figure 1.1, only 44 agreements had been signed as of 1969, but
by the end of the 1970s, the number had doubled to 88, and by 1989,
had reached 168.2






















 2 International Agreements to Protect the Environmeht and Wildlife, U.S. International Trade Com-
 mission, Report to the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, on Investigation No. 332-287
 Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Publication No. 2351 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1991), pp.
 G3-G13.


 Page 9             GAO/RCED-92-43 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored






                                      Chapter 1
                                      Introduction








Figure 1.1: Number of International
Environmental Agreements Involving the  180  Number of Agreements
United States, 1949 Through 1989
                                      160

                                      140

                                      120

                                      100




                                       40

                                       20


                                      1949 (16)       1969 (31)        1969 (44)        1979 (88)       1989 (168)

                                      Years
                                      Source: GAO's analysis of data from the U.S. International Trade Commission.

                                      International efforts to address major environmental issues continue
                                      and are focused on the United Nations Conference on Environment and
                                      Development, to be held in Brazil in 1992. The conference's agenda
                                      includes a number of major issues, including addressing global climate
                                      change and protecting the diversity of plant and animal species. Nations
                                      are currently considering conventions on these issues, and conference
                                      officials hope that the agreements will'be ready for signing in 1992.


                                      As is the case with international agreements in general, a nation's ratifi-
                                      cation of an environmental agreement represents the nation's pledge to
Implementation of                    create the laws and systems necessary to meet the agreement's objec-
                                      tives. However, as is also typical of international agreements, there are
Environmental
                                      generally no penalties imposed on parties failing to implement environ-
                                      mental agreements. Instead, the pressure of public opinion is the usual
on Voluntary                         means for ensuring that parties meet their commitments.

Participation of                     Developing a multilateral environmental agreement generally involves
Nations                              achieving a broad consensus among many nations with various indus-
                                      trial development, technical capabilities, resources, and environmental
                                      consciousness or concern. The agreement to phase out the production of



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                                      Chapter 1
                                      Introduction









                                      ozone-depleting substances, for example, included over 60 nations in
                                      treaty negotiations. Thus, the development process can be very lengthy,
                                      proceeding in several stages.



Figure 1.2: Process for Developing and
Implementing International
Environmental Agreements                      Development                           Implementation


                                               Nations Nations Develop
                                               I  Negotiate  URelevant Laws
                                              Agreement                             d Infrastructur
                                                                                Natdions

                                                                                            National Implementation


                                              Nations Sign
                                            and Provisionally                       atons Report
                                           Accept Agreement                        to Secreat





                                               Nations                           Secretariat Collects
                                              Ratify and                          and Disseminates
                                            Formally Accept                         Information
                                              Agreement


                                                                                            International Administration


                                              Agreement                            Public Pressure
                                              Enters Into                            Applied to
                                                Force                                       Noncomplying Nations




                                       The process begins as nations negotiate the terms of the agreement and
                                       adopt the text, which generally includes (1) a statement of common con-
                                       cerns, (2) definitions of terms, (3) requirements for parties to institute
                                       regulatory mechanisms and report information on implementation, and
                                       (4) the designation of a secretariat to administer the agreement. Only
                                       after a specified number of nations have voluntarily accepted and rati-
                                       fied the agreement does it enter into force.




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Chapter I
Introduction








Each party is responsible for developing the laws, regulations, and
infrastructure necessary to fulfill the provisions of the agreement. Typi-
cally, a designated national authority reports to the international secre-
tariat on efforts to implement and comply with the treaty domestically.
Using these domestic reports, the secretariat compiles comparative
information on implementation and compliance and disseminates it
among the parties. Public and private interest groups, typically referred
to as nongovernmental organizations (NGO), may also independently col-
lect and review information on nations' efforts.

The enforcement of compliance with international agreements generally
depends on peer or public pressure on nations because no supranational
body with the authority to enforce compliance exists. To some extent,
this arrangement reflects nations' belief that if compliance mechanisms
were more stringent, fewer nations would participate and treaty obliga-
tions would be weaker. Some environmental agreements include provi-
sions allowing parties to use arbitration as a mechanism for resolving
disputes. However, each nation involved in the dispute generally must
voluntarily agree to participate in this process. The International Court
of Justice, the judicial organ of the United Nations, is also available to
settle disputes. However, each nation involved must grant the Court
jurisdictional authority. While some environmental treaties have
encouraged the use of the Court for settling disputes, parties generally
have been reluctant to require its use.

The public dissemination of information about parties' progress in fulfil-
ling treaty obligations plays a key role in the implementation of environ-
mental agreements. Specifically, the information serves to assure each
party that others are sharing the burden of implementation as agreed,
which is particularly important in light of the high costs and the effects
on international competitiveness that may result from implementing an
agreement. When the information about implementation reveals that
certain parties are not abiding by the treaty, this knowledge provides

the basis for applying public pressure and encouraging compliance.











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                                      Chapter 1
                                      Introduction









Eight Agreements                      Among the 168 international environmental agreements to which the
                                      United States is a party or in which it has a significant interest, 8 gener-
Address Major                         ally have been singled out by environmental experts as addressing major
International                         global or regional environmental problems. As shown in table 1.1, these
Environmental                         problems include stratospheric ozone depletion, hazardous wastes, air
                                      and water pollution, the loss of plant and animal species, and deforesta-
Problems                              tion. Seven of these eight agreements were signed after the 1972 Stock-
                                      holm Conference. With the exception of the Basel Convention, all are in
                                      force. At the time of our review, the number of parties to these agree-
                                      ments ranged from 16 to 112.








































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                                                Chapter 1
                                                Introduction











Table 1.1: Major International Environmental Agreements
                                                                                                        Year agreement
                                                                                                            entered into         Number of
Agreementa                       Problem addressed                 Secretariat and its locationb                 force  parties ratifyingc
Montreal Protocol on             ozone depletion                   UNEP
Substances that Deplete the                                        Nairobi, Kenya
Ozone Layer, 1987                                                                                                 1989                  75
Protocol to the 1979 Convention  acid rain and air pollution       United Nations Economic
on Long-range Transboundary                                        Commission for Europe
Air Pollution Concerning the                                       Geneva, Switzerland
Control of Emissions of Nitrogen
Oxides or Their Transboundary
Fluxes, 1988 (NOx Protocol)                                                                                       1991                  17
Basel Convention on the Control generation, transport, and         UNEP
of the Transboundary             disposal of hazardous wastes    Geneva, Switzerland
Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal,
1989                                                                                                                   d                16
Convention on the Prevention of marine pollution caused            International Maritime
Marine Pollution by Dumping of  primarily by ships' dumping at   Organization (IMO)
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972   sea wastes generated on land   London, England
(London Dumping Convention)                                                                                       1975                  65
International Convention for the  marine pollution caused by       IMO
Prevention of Pollution from     ships                             London, England
Ships, 1973 and amended in
1978 (MARPOL)                                                                                                 1983-88e               61,46f
Convention on International      loss of species                   UNEP
Trade in Endangered Species of                                     Lausanne, Switzerland
Wild Fauna and Flora, 1973
(CITES)                                                                                                           1975                 112
International Convention for the  loss of species                  Secretary to the International
Regulation of Whaling, 1946                                        Whaling Commission
                                                                    Cambridge, England                             1948                  36
International Tropical Timber    deforestationg                    International Tropical Timber
Agreement, 1983                                                    Organization
                                                                    Yokohama, Japan                                1985                  48
                                                aThe dates in this column reflect when nations signed and provisionally accepted the agreements.
                                                bUNEP and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) perform duties other than serving as secretar-
                                                iats to environmental agreements. As indicated in this column, UNEP relies on three subunits located in
                                                different places to function as secretariats for three agreements, while two separate subunits of IMO
                                                serve as secretariats for two agreements.
                                                CNumbers in this column are as of dates that range from November 1990 to November 1991, depending
                                                on the agreement.
                                                dAs of November 1991, the Basel Convention had not entered into force.
                                                eAnnex I (pertaining to pollution by oil) of MARPOL entered into force in 1983, annex II (bulk liquid
                                                chemicals) in 1987, and annex V (garbage) in 1988. Annexes Ill (packaged hazardous substances) and
                                                IV (sewage) had not entered into force as of August 1991.
                                                fAs of November 1990, annexes I and II had been ratified by 61 nations, annex V by 46.
                                                9While addressing an environmental problem, the International Tropical Timber Agreement is intended
                                                to address all relevant aspects of the tropical timber economy, including international trade and the
                                                management of tropical forests.



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                                      Chapter 1
                                      Introduction









Montreal Protocol                   The primary objective of the Montreal Protocol, negotiated within the
                                      framework of the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
                                      Ozone Layer, is to limit and reduce the use of specific substances that
                                      deplete the ozone layer. Parties to the protocol agree to reduce their con-
                                      sumption3 of the controlled substances-chlorofluorocarbons and
                                      halons-in accordance with agreed-upon deadlines and percentages.
                                      The protocol was signed in September 1987 and entered into force in
                                      January 1989. As of November 1991, 75 parties, including developed
                                      and developing countries, had ratified the protocol.4


NOx Protocol                        The Nox Protocol was negotiated under the framework of the 1979 Con-
                                      vention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, which obliges par-
                                      ties to limit and gradually reduce and prevent air pollution, including
                                      that generated in one country and dispersed to another. Parties to the
                                      protocol agree to adopt measures to control and reduce their annual NOx
                                      emissions so that by the end of 1994, emissions do not exceed an estab-
                                      lished baseline. The protocol was signed in October 1988. When it
                                      entered into force in February 1991, it had been ratified by 17 nations,
                                      some of them Eastern European; all parties are industrialized countries.


Basel Convention                    The main objective of the Basel Convention is to control and manage the
                                      generation, transboundary movement, and disposal of hazardous
                                      wastes. The convention was designed to ensure that nations importing
                                      hazardous wastes understand the risks involved and have the necessary
                                      capability to dispose of the wastes. To this end, the convention requires
                                      that parties establish a system under which the prospective exporting
                                      nation must first obtain the permission of the importing nation, as well
                                       as every nation through which the shipments will be transported. In
                                       March 1989, 116 nations adopted the convention; however, as of
                                       November 1991, it had not been ratified by the number of countries
                                       needed for it to enter into force (20). According to a secretariat official,
                                       the convention could enter into force in early 1992.







                                       3 The protocol defines "consumption" as the sum of domestic production and imports, minus exports.
                                       4 Seventy-four nations and, as a single entity, the European Community constitute the 75 parties to
                                       the protocol. All 12 nations within the Community are also among the 74 nations.


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                                     Chapter I
                                     Introduction







         London Dumping ~~The general objective of the London Dumping Convention is to control
ConventDmiong                       all sources of marine pollution effectively, particularly by controlling
         Convention                ~~~~ships' disposal of wastes generated on land. Implementing the conven-
                                     tion requires that national authorities establish a permit system gov-
                                     erning the types and amounts of wastes that ships can dispose of at sea.
                                     Adopted in December 1972, the convention entered into force in August
                                     1975, and as of November 1991, it had been ratified by 65 nations,
                                     including industrialized and developing nations.


MARPOL                              In contrast to the London Dumping Convention, which governs marine
                                     pollution primarily from ships' disposal of wastes generated on land,
                                     MARPOL was adopted to control pollution from ships themselves. Signed
                                     in 1973 and amended in 1978, MARPOL requires parties to adopt specific
                                     standards governing the design, construction, and operation of ships and
                                     their equipment, as well as port facilities. To ensure that ships meet
                                     these standards, each party is supposed to (1) inspect and certify the
                                     ships that carry its flag before putting them into service and (2) perform
                                     a follow-up inspection at least twice during the 5-year certification
                                     period. A party may also inspect ships entering its ports. The agreement
                                     also requires that parties equip ports with waste reception facilities.
                                     Annexes I and II Of MARPOL, each ratified by 61 nations, entered into
                                     force in 1983 and 1987, respectively; annex V, ratified by 46 nations,
                                     entered into force in 1988. Parties to these annexes include both indus-
                                     trialized and developing countries. As of August 1991, annexes III and
                                     IV were not yet in force.


CITES                               The main purpose Of CITES is to regulate international trade in species
                                     that are either threatened with extinction or may become endangered if
                                     their trade is not regulated. CITES requires that parties establish trade
                                     permit systems. In accordance with appendixes to the convention, par-
                                     ties specify which animals and plants may not be traded and which may
                                     be traded only in limited quantities. CITES was signed in 1973 and
                                     entered into force in 1975. As of October 1991, 112 nations had ratified
                                     the convention.


International Whaling               The objectives of the International Whaling Convention, which was
Convention                          signed in 1946 and entered into force in 1948, are to protect whales
                                     from excessive harvesting and to properly conserve them, thus making
                                     possible the orderly development of the whaling industry. In 1982, par-
                                     ties adopted a moratorium on commercial whaling, which remains in


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                                     Chapter I
                                     Introduction








                                     effect; currently, whales may be harvested only for aboriginal subsis-
                                     tence and scientific purposes. As of January 1991, 36 countries were
                                     parties, including both industrialized and developing countries.


         Internationl TropicalUnlike the other agreements, which have as a goal some specific envi-
Timber Agreement                    ronmental objective, the International Tropical Timber Agreement is
                                     intended to provide a forum for tropical timber producing and con-
                                     suming countries to consider a variety of aspects of the tropical timber
                                     economy, including trade, forest management, and marketing. The
                                     agreement aims to encourage the development of national policies pro-
                                     moting the sustainable utilization and conservation of tropical forests,
                                     and in May 1990, parties adopted guidelines for establishing such poli-
                                     cies. Adopted in 1983, the agreement entered into force in April 1985.
                                     As of May 1991, there were 48 parties. Of these, 22 are timber pro-
                                     ducers (developing countries), and 26 are consumers (primarily industri-
                                     alized countries).


         Objecties, Scoe, and       In March 1990, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment
         ObjectivesScope, andand Public Works and one of its Members, Senator Daniel Patrick
Methodology                         Moynihan, requested that we evaluate the monitoring and implementa-
                                     tion of international environmental agreements. Following discussions,
                                     we agreed to focus on the following questions:

                                  a Are the environmental agreements specific enough to allow implementa-
                                     tion to be measured?
                                  * Are parties to agreements reporting required information and, if not,
                                     why?
                                  * Do the secretariats that administer the agreements monitor implementa-
                                     tion by verifying the information received and independently assessing
                                     compliance?

                                     Because the United States is a party to or has a significant interest in
                                     more than 160 international environmental agreements, we examined
                                     the implementation of those agreements that address the most signifi-
                                     cant environmental problems requiring multilateral cooperation. On the
                                     basis of a review of relevant literature and discussions with officials of
                                     U.S. government agencies, international environmental organizations,
                                     and NGOS, we compiled a list of the primary agreements addressing the
                                     most significant environmental problems. We reviewed the list with key
                                     officials, who agreed that it covered the most significant problems and
                                     the most important treaties developed to address those problems. From


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Chapter 1
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this process, we identified eight major international environmental
agreements on which to focus our review-those described in the pre-
ceding section and outlined in table 1.1. Although one of these agree-
ments-the International Tropical Timber Agreement-addresses more
than environmental aspects of timber production and trade, we included
it because of its potential importance in dealing with the major interna-
tional environmental problem of deforestation. Though another of these
eight agreements, the Basel Convention, has not yet entered into force,
we included it in our review because it is the most important agreement
addressing the major problem that hazardous wastes present and
because we believed it was sufficiently well developed that an examina-
tion of it could offer useful information.

To determine whether the eight agreements have specific performance
standards, we reviewed the texts of the agreements, related legal docu-
ments, and other relevant literature. We also discussed the agreements
with secretariat officials, NGO representatives, and U.S. agency officials
responsible for implementing these agreements domestically.

To determine the extent to which parties have reported required infor-
mation, we reviewed reports on the annual meetings of parties. Also, we
reviewed secretariats' summaries, analyses, and special studies of par-
ties' compliance with annual reporting requirements. We did not meet
with representatives of parties, other than U.S. government officials.
However, we discussed reporting requirements and compliance with sec-
retariat officials and NGO representatives.

To determine whether secretariats monitor implementation by verifying
information received about compliance and independently assessing
compliance, we interviewed each secretariat's director or other respon-
sible representatives to obtain their views. We also reviewed (1) agree-
ment provisions and written policies delineating secretariats'
responsibilities, (2) financial reports covering requested revenues and
actual revenues collected, and (3) other budgetary information. We also
interviewed U.S. State Department officials to determine how the United
States allocates its contributions to international secretariats.

In interviewing officials of these organizations and in reviewing related
studies and other pertinent literature, we noted that various measures
have been suggested, and in some cases implemented, to strengthen
international oversight of environmental agreements and to improve
parties' capacity to comply. Thus, in recognition of the evolving nature
and importance of global environmental issues, this report presents an


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Chapter 1
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overview of these measures. To more fully understand these measures,
we interviewed officials from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, the International Trade Commission, and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) secretariat.

We conducted our work between March 1990 and September 1991 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The
specific organizations that we contacted are listed in appendix I. Offi-
cials from the Department of State, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), and the secretariats to the agreements reviewed a draft of
this report. Comments provided by EPA and the State Department are
discussed at the end of chapter 3 and included in appendixes II and III.






































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Chapter 24

Com-pliance With International Environmental


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                                   Although most agreements specify how implementation is to be mea-
                                   sured and require parties to report periodically on their performance,
                                   not all parties provide complete and timely information to the secretar-
                                   iats. Information on implementation may be available from informal
                                   sources, but reports submitted by parties represent the only formal
                                   source of information available to all parties. While both developed and
                                   developing countries provide incomplete and late reports, reporting is
                                   particularly a problem among developing countries, where it is part of a
                                   larger problem related to the financial and technical capability of these
                                   countries to comply with the agreements. Although some secretariat
                                   officials believe they have a sense of the level of compliance overall,
                                   secretariats generally do not have the authority to verify information or
                                   independently determine parties' compliance. Further, limited resources
                                   have prevented some secretariats from carrying out assigned duties and
                                   various activities that could improve implementation.


Most Environmental                    As noted earlier, of the eight agreements we reviewed, seven have
        Agreements                  ~~~~entered into force. Of those seven agreements, six are specific as to what
    AgreementsReviewed    constitutes implementation; that is, they contain measurable perform-
Allow  Implementation    ance standards, or norms, rules, and procedures for parties to follow.
           Be  Measured             ~~One of the seven agreements, the International Tropical Timber Agree-
to                                    BMesrdment, on the other hand, does not have provisions that allow for imple-
                                   mentation to be measured. Instead, parties have adopted a set of general
                                   principles and possible actions-guidelines that may be used as the
                                   basis for developing more specific national policies. The agreement not
                                   yet in force, the Basel Convention, had also not established measurable
                                   performance standards as of November 1991, but nations have agreed
                                   to set up a working group to develop technical guidelines. When agree-
                                   ments do not have measurable performance standards, it is difficult to
                                  judge whether parties are in compliance.

                                   As indicated in table 2. 1, the agreements we reviewed contain perform-
                                   ance standards that are either numerical or procedural (specifying4
                                   designs and/or operations).









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                                          Chapter 2
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Table 2.1: Performance Standards in
International Environmental Agreements    Agreement                      Standard                    Type of standard
                                          Montreal Protocol           Targets and timetables for    Numerical
                                                                      reducing use of ozone-
                                                                      depleting substances
                                          NOx Protocol                Targets and timetables for    Numerical
                                                                      limiting emissions of NOx
                                          Basel Convention            Notification system to       No measurable standard set
                                                                      regulate transboundary
                                                                      movement of hazardous
                                                                      wastes
                                          London Dumping Convention  Permit system and numerical  Procedural and numerical
                                                                      limits to regulate primarily
                                                                      ships' dumping at sea
                                                                      wastes that are generated on
                                                                      land
                                          MARPOL                      Design, construction, and    Procedural and numerical
                                                                      operation standards for
                                                                      ships; numerical limits on
                                                                      discharge of oil
                                          CITES                        Permit system and numerical  Procedural and numerical
                                                                      limits to regulate trade in
                                                                      endangered species
                                          International Whaling       Permit system, operation     Procedural and numerical
                                          Convention                  standards for whaling ships,
                                                                      and annual quotas on the
                                                                      whale harvest
                                          International Tropical Timber  Voluntary guidelines to   No measurable standard set
                                          Agreement                    improve management of
                                                                      internationally traded tropical
                                                                      timber


                                          Two agreements, the Montreal Protocol and the NOx Protocol, have set
                                          numerical targets for reducing the use or emission of the controlled sub-
                                          stances and allow nations flexibility in deciding which process or control
                                          scheme they will use to meet the targets. The Montreal Protocol pro-
                                          vides further flexibility by setting different timetables for developed
                                          and developing countries to achieve designated reductions in ozone-
                                          depleting substances. Similarly, the NOx Protocol provides parties with
                                          flexibility by allowing them to choose 1987 or any previous year as a
                                          baseline for limiting their NOx emissions.'

                                          Four other agreements-the London Dumping Convention, CITES,
                                          MARPOL, and the International Whaling Convention-include both proce-
                                          dural requirements and numerical limits. Under the London Dumping
                                          Convention, parties establish permit systems to regulate the dumping of


                                          l The NOx Protocol allows parties this choice to give credit to those that had taken steps to reduce
                                          their emission levels prior to 1987. The United States, for example, has selected 1978 as its base year.



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wastes and other matter. The convention categorizes substances in dif-
ferent appendixes depending on the nature of the substances and the
amounts that can be dumped. Similarly, CITES establishes a permit          a
system to regulate trade in wildlife. Parties can agree to move a species
from appendix II, which lists species that can be traded under nationally
set export quotas, to appendix I, which lists species that cannot be
traded at all. MARPOL requires parties to meet numerical limits on the
discharge of oil into the sea. Under this agreement, parties must also
follow specific procedures covering the design, construction, and opera-
tion of ships, including the practices for disposing of wastes. The Inter-
national Whaling Convention contains specific procedures for operating
whaling ships and for reviewing permits to harvest whales for scientific
purposes. Parties to the convention can set annual quotas on the number
of whales harvested for commercial purposes or aboriginal subsistence.
Using this means, the parties established a ban on all commercial
whaling, effective in 1986, a moratorium that was still in effect at the
time of our review.

The remaining two agreements-the International Tropical Timber
Agreement and the Basel Convention-have not defined measurable
performance standards. Parties to the International Tropical Timber
Agreement have adopted as an objective that by the year 2000 all trade
in tropical timber come from "sustainably" managed forests, but parties
have not defined "sustainable" management for the purpose of compli-
ance; instead, they have adopted a general set of principles for sustain-
able management that may be used by nations in developing their own
guidelines or standards. Beyond this, the International Tropical Timber
Organization has convened a panel of experts to develop possible
methods of defining and measuring sustainable forest management and
to develop a reporting format. The parties intend to discuss these issues.

Because the Basel Convention has only recently been developed, nations I
are still in the process of defining guidelines for managing hazardous
wastes. After the convention enters into force, national authorities will
only allow the transport and disposal of hazardous wastes-listed in the
convention-on the condition that they are managed in an "environmen-
tally sound" manner and disposed of in "adequate" facilities. Although
the convention requires parties to establish a notification system to reg-
ulate the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, the convention
does not set a measurable performance standard defining environmen-
tally sound management or adequate disposal. Nations have agreed to
establish a working group to develop technical guidelines on environ-
mentally sound management. The parties agreed to consider at their


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                                      Chapter 2
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                                      first meeting the working group's suggestions and to eventually adopt
                                      guidelines.


Parties' Reporting Has   Of the seven agreements that have entered into force and therefore
                                      require parties to report relevant information to the secretariats, three
Often Been Late and                  agreements-the Montreal Protocol, the NOx Protocol, and the Interna-
         Incomplete                 ~~~~tional Whaling Convention-have relatively high rates of reporting, as
                                      shown in figure 2. 1. That is, the majority of parties to these agreements
                                      had submitted required information as of the secretariats' most recent
                                      reporting periods. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, however, close to
                                      half of the reports were incomplete. For the other four agreements,
                                      reporting in general is a problem, with 47 percent or fewer of the parties
                                      providing required information. According to some secretariat officials,
                                      without these reports it is difficult to assess parties' compliance with
                                      the agreements and to determine the effectiveness of the agreements,
                                      and, in some cases, to target assistance to countries that need help in
                                      implementing the agreements. Although there may be other sources of
                                      information available from environmental groups, other NGOs, Or gov-
                                      ernments, the reports submitted by countries are the only formal source
                                      of information available to all parties. Information submitted by parties
                                      to the International Tropical Timber Agreement, while not used to
                                      assess compliance with the agreement, is nevertheless useful for
                                      assessing the world tropical timber economy.
























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                                                Chapter 2
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Figure 2.1: Reporting Status of
International Environmental Agreements           110
                                                110 Number of Countries
                                                100
                                                 90
                                                 80

                                                 70


                                                 50
                                                 40

                                                 30

                                                 20















                                                       m    Countries That Did Report
                                                Note: Figure reflects the most current data available at the time of our review and conveys the reporting
                                                status as of dates from February 1990 to January 1991, depending on the agreement. The number of
                                                parties required to report is sometimes lower than the number of parties listed in chapter 1 as ratifying
                                                the agreements because that chapter conveys ratification as of dates from November 1990 to
                                                November 1991. For the Montreal Protocol, the information to be reported was the consumption of con-
                                                trolled substances in 1986; for the NOx Protocol, emissions in 1987 or any previous year; London
                                                Dumping Convention, dumping permits issued in 1987; MARPOL, violations and penalties imposed in
                                                 1989; CITES, import and export certificates issued in 1989; Whaling Convention, whale harvests in 1989;
                                                Tropical Timber Agreement, data on trade in tropical timber in 1990.
                                                So: Countrce: GAO's analysis of data from secretariats.



                                                Montreal Protocol  As shown in figure 2.1, as of October 1990, 52 of the Montreal Protocol's
                                                65 parties, or 80 percent              ,  had responded  to  the  requirement for
                                                repor         t        i s sometimes lower tha on  th consum will be used to establish base-
                                                lines. The reporting countries  account for approximately 90 percent of
                                                the worldwie  consumption of the controlled substances. But while this
                                                reporting rate is relatively high, it is important to point out that just 29
                                                 of the  52 reporting parties submitted complete data,  although these 29




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                                     Chapter 2
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                                     parties account for 85 percent of the worldwide consumption. Sixteen of
                                     the reporting countries provided incomplete data, and seven reported
                                     that they had no data. Under the agreement, national consumption data
                                     are needed not only to determine compliance with the protocol's reduc-
                                     tion targets, but also to identify those countries that qualify for finan-
                                     cial and technical assistance. This assistance is provided to developing
                                     countries with low levels of consumption in order to help them phase
                                     out their use of ozone-depleting substances.

                                     Concerns about the lack of complete reporting led the parties to the
                                     Montreal Protocol to establish in June 1990 the Ad Hoc Group of
                                     Experts on the Reporting of Data. The group found several reasons for
                                     incomplete reporting: Some countries do not have the financial and tech-
                                     nical resources needed to gather the required data. In some cases, devel-
                                     oping countries that reported they had no data available asked for
                                     technical assistance from the secretariat to help collect the data. In addi-
                                     tion, some countries have not been able to use customs records to track
                                     imports and exports of the substances controlled under the agreement
                                     because the customs tracking system does not distinguish among indi-
                                     vidual substances. Finally, data on the controlled substances are often
                                     not given to customs officials because the importing companies treat the
                                     data as confidential.


NOx Protocol                        Although the NOx Protocol did not enter into force until February 1991,
                                      16 of 17 parties, or about 94 percent; submitted 1990 reports, which
                                     included baseline emission levels of NOx. These reports fulfilled
                                     reporting requirements under the umbrella convention of the NOx Pro-
                                     tocol, the 1979 Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention.
                                     Baseline data are essential for determining in the future whether parties
                                     limit their NOx emissions as called for under the protocol.

                                     Compliance with reporting requirements is high because, among other
                                     reasons, parties generally have the capacity to report. Unlike for most
                                     of the other agreements we reviewed, the NOx Protocol's parties mostly
                                     are European countries with either developed or reforming economies;
                                     none of the 17 parties is a developing country. The parties generally
                                     have the administrative structures, such as reporting stations, needed
                                     for data collection and reporting. Although some Eastern European
                                     countries still require technical assistance, these nations want to demon-
                                     strate their commitment to meet the protocol's requirements, according
                                     to a secretariat official.



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International Whaling                Because a ban on commercial whaling has been in effect since 1986, only
Convention                           those countries that harvest whales for aboriginal subsistence or scien-
                                     tific purposes are required to report under the International Whaling
                                     Convention. As shown in figure 2.1, of the six countries required to
                                     report on whale harvests in 1989, all submitted complete information on
                                     the number and types caught.


London Dumping                       As shown in figure 2.1, 19 of 64 parties to the London Dumping Conven-
Convention                           tion, or about 30 percent, reported on the number and types of dumping
                                      permits they issued in 1987. Of those reporting, 17, or 90 percent, were
                                      industrialized countries, which, secretariat officials claim, are among
                                      the most important parties for meeting the goals of the convention.
                                      However, as of April 1990 no reports had been submitted by 14 industri-
                                      alized countries, including the United States, and by 31 of the 33 devel-
                                      oping countries that are parties. According to secretariat officials, the
                                      United States submitted its report in March 1991.

                                      According to secretariat officials, a variety of reasons account for the
                                      absence of reports from industrialized countries, including difficulties in
                                      assembling information from numerous offices and the higher priority
                                      given to other activities. Among developing countries, reporting
                                      problems generally occur because these countries do not have the finan-
                                      cial resources, infrastructure, technology, and trained staff needed to
                                      fully comply with the convention's requirements, including the
                                      reporting provisions. An April 1990 report prepared by the Interna-
                                      tional Maritime Organization (IMO), which acts as the secretariat for the
                                      convention, pointed out that inadequate reporting by parties has
                                      resulted in a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the convention.


MARPOL                               Many nations-both developed and developing-have not complied
                                      with MARPOL'S annual reporting requirements. As shown in figure 2.1,
                                      only 13 of 57 parties (including 11 of the 27 industrialized countries), or
                                      about 23 percent, submitted reports summarizing 1989 violations and
                                      penalties imposed. Countries that reported the required information
                                      account for only about 27 percent of the world's gross shipping tonnage.
                                      Moreover, the two nations that together account for approximately
                                      20 percent of the world's gross shipping tonnage did not submit 1989
                                      reports. Although not shown in figure 2.1, the response rate for two
                                      other reporting requirements has also been low: As of October 1990,
                                      only 59 percent (36 of 61) and 41 percent (25 of 61) of the parties had



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                                       reported on the availability of reception facilities in ports for oily
                                       wastes and chemical wastes, respectively.

                                       According to secretariat officials, in general countries have not reported
                                       because they lack the financial and technical resources needed to imple-
                                       ment the agreement. According to an advisory group on implementation
                                       problems, many countries lack trained personnel to implement mARPoL's
                                       provisions. A secretariat official explained, for example, that one devel-
                                       oping country has only one government officer and two consultants to
                                       inspect ships. Many countries also cannot afford to install the required
                                       port reception facilities and cannot, by the reporting deadline, collect,
                                       compile, and report the necessary data from possibly numerous and geo-
                                       graphically dispersed ports. However, without more complete reporting,
                                       it is difficult for the secretariat, according to one official, to target finan-
                                       cial and technical assistance to those countries most in need. In the case
                                       of developed countries, reporting may be given a lower priority and
                                       fewer resources than other responsibilities of the designated national
                                       authority.


CITES                                As shown in figure 2.1, 25 of 104 parties to CITES, or about 24 percent,
                                       submitted by the reporting deadline the required annual reports summa-
                                       rizing their 1989 trade in listed species. Of the developed countries that
                                       are parties to CITES, only 10 of 26, or 38 percent, met the reporting
                                       requirements; of the developing countries, 15 of 78, or 19 percent,
                                       reported. According to secretariat officials, most parties either submit
                                       reports that are late, incomplete, or in the wrong format, or do not
                                       submit any report at all.

                                       According to a 1989 report on the implementation of CITES prepared for
                                       the secretariat, these types of reporting problems occurred throughout
                                       the 1980s.2 For example, from 1981 through 1987, late reports were sub-
                                       mitted 4 to 12 months after the deadline, with the average being
                                       8.4 months. Importantly, several nations whose volume of trade is high
                                       have submitted reports late. Late and incomplete reporting limits the
                                       ability of the secretariat to both identify instances of illegal activity and
                                       notify parties of those instances, as well as determine which species
                                       may be threatened by excessive harvesting and trading.



                                       2 C.S. Harcourt and R..Luxmoore, World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Wildlife Trade Moni-
                                       toring Unit, The Implementation of CITES in 1986 and 1987 as Demonstrated by the Trade Statistics
                                              in te AnualReprtsSubmtte bythe Parties (Cambridge, England: Aug. 1989), p. 5.


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                                     In the case of developing countries, poor reporting appears to be related
                                     to the capability of these countries to comply with the agreement. Many
                                     of these countries cannot fully implement CITES or fulfill their reporting
                                     obligations because they lack adequate enforcement legislation and suf-
                                     ficient administrative, technical, and financial resources. According to a
                                     U.S. State Department official, some developing countries have "one-
                                     person" wildlife departments to implement CITES as well as perform
                                     other tasks. Some countries may even lack sufficient resources to print
                                     the certificates needed to document and control trade in endangered spe-
                                     cies, according to a secretariat official. Moreover, according to an
                                     October 1989 report prepared by the secretariat, parties may lack
                                     enthusiasm for and an understanding of the usefulness of reporting;
                                     these factors could contribute to parties' failure to report.

                                     Among developed countries, late or incomplete reporting occurs for sev-
                                     eral reasons, according to a secretariat official. In some cases, the
                                     administrative body responsible for submitting data to the secretariat
                                     may find it difficult to get all necessary records from customs officials.
                                     In addition, the volume of trade may be very high in these countries,
                                     and there may not be sufficient personnel to complete the reports.


International Tropical               Although not used to measure compliance with the agreement, reports
Timber Agreement                     submitted by parties to the International Tropical Timber Agreement
                                     allow for an overall annual assessment of the world tropical timber
                                     economy, including environmental aspects. According to a secretariat
                                     official, only 22 of 47 parties, or 47 percent, submitted by the official
                                     deadline data on their harvesting and trading of timber in 1990 and on
                                     their projected harvesting and trading in 1991. Most of those reporting
                                     are tropical timber importers. Even though approximately half of the
                                     parties reported, a secretariat official noted that of the reports received
                                     on time, only a few were complete. Many reports included inaccurate
                                     figures, regardless of whether or not the reports were complete. Some
                                     developing countries did not report because they lack the resources and
                                     information networks to develop reliable data on timber trade,
                                     according to a U.S. Commerce Department official.


Secretariats Generally    Although the secretariats to the agreements we reviewed are required to
                                     collect and distribute information that parties report about implementa-
Do Not Verify or                     tion, they generally do not have the authority to monitor implementa-
Assess Compliance                    tion by verifying information submitted to them or independently
                                     assessing compliance. While some secretariat officials believe that on


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                                      the basis of existing information, they have a broad view of overall com-
                                      pliance, only one agreement-CITES-grants the secretariat specific
                                      authority to assess compliance and provides a formal mechanism for
                                      doing so. Because of their restricted roles, secretariats are small organi-
                                      zations with limited resources. Even operating within the mandate the
                                      parties have provided, some secretariats, according to their officials,
                                      have been funded insufficiently to allow them to carry out assigned
                                      duties or undertake activities that could improve implementation.


Secretariats Have Limited    As established by the parties to the agreements, the role of secretariats
Authority                            generally is to help implement agreements by coordinating and facili-
                                      tating the collection and exchange of information and providing some
                                      technical assistance or guidance. All of the agreements in force call on
                                      secretariats to compile information submitted by the parties and pre-
                                      pare and distribute periodic (generally annual) summary reports.3

                                      To fulfill this role, secretariats have taken steps to encourage parties to
                                      report data as required. For example, most of the secretariats have pro-
                                      vided parties with standardized formats to facilitate the reporting pro-
                                      cess, and most periodically call on parties to report required
                                      information. Moreover, at various times, most of the secretariats have
                                      distributed lists of nonreporting parties in order to generate peer pres-
                                      sure to stimulate future compliance with reporting provisions.

                                      The CITES secretariat goes somewhat beyond these measures to analyze
                                      the information countries report, in order to detect threats to wildlife
                                      and possible violations. Through a contractual arrangement with the
                                      Wildlife Trade Monitoring Unit-a private organization based in Cam-
                                      bridge, England-the secretariat analyzes the data it receives and pub-
                                      lishes reports detailing violations of the convention. In the case of
                                      particularly egregious violations, the secretariat may recommend that
                                      parties cease trading with a particular country. According to a secreta-
                                      riat official, these reports have led parties to apply more pressure on
                                      one another to comply with CITES and have helped to ensure that parties
                                      are responsive to requests for information.






                                      3 After the Basel Convention enters into force, the secretariat will be required to prepare and
                                      transmit reports based on information submitted by the parties.


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                                     Chapter 2
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                                     However, secretariats generally do not verify the information received
                                     or otherwise assess compliance. The London Dumping Convention secre-
                                     tariat, for example, publishes an annual report on the types and num-
                                     bers of dumping permits issued, but the secretariat does not
                                     independently verify data from parties, and the reports contain few con-
                                     clusions about compliance. Similarly, the MARPOL secretariat publishes
                                     annual reports summarizing data on the inspection of ships and viola-
                                     tions found, but does not verify information reported by parties.

                                     Despite the low rates of reporting and secretariats' lack of authority to
                                     verify information and independently assess compliance, officials of
                                     some secretariats believe that they have enough information to detect
                                     any major implementation problems. Secretariat officials with whom we
                                     spoke stressed that they are not expected to act as monitors and that
                                     they have neither the authority nor the resources to act in that capacity.
                                     Instead, most secretariat officials view themselves as information clear-
                                     inghouses and facilitators.


Secretariats Have Limited    In conjunction with their restricted roles, secretariats have limited and
Resokurces                           often unstable funding. As shown in table 2.3, the secretariats of the
                                     eight agreements we reviewed are small organizations, with staffs of 4
                                     to 20 people and annual budgets of less than $1 million to $3 million in
                                      1990.

                                     Generally, each secretariat is funded by voluntary financial contribu-
                                     tions from parties and/or by resources apportioned by a related parent
                                     organization, such as the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP),
                                     the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, or IMO. It is impor-
                                     tant to note that these parent organizations themselves operate largely
                                     on financial contributions from member nations.
















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                                            Chapter 2
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Table 2.2: Staffing and Funding for
Secretariats of International                 U.S. Dollars in millions
Environmental Agreements, 1990                                                                               Fundina
                                             Agreement                       Staffing a        Amount        Major sources
                                             Montreal Protocol                                               Parties' contributions and
                                                                                  4.0           $2.30      UNEP
                                             NOx Protocol                                                    United Nations Economic
                                                                                  7.5            1.83b     Commission for Europe
                                             Basel Convention                                                Nations' contributions
                                                                                  4.0            0.68      and UNEP
                                             London Dumping                                                  IMO
                                             Convention                             5.0            0.76
                                             MARPOL                                20.00           3.03      IMO
                                             CITES                                 18.0            2.46      Parties' contributions
                                             International Whaling                                           Parties' contributions
                                             Convention                            13.0            1.31
                                             International Tropical                                          Parties' contributions
                                             Timber Agreement                      20.0            2.10
                                             Note: The staffing and funding figures shown are for calendar year 1990, except for the International
                                             Whaling Convention. The figures for this convention are for its fiscal year (Sept. 1990-Aug. 1991).
                                             Funding figures represent either estimated or actual funds received.
                                             aStaffing figures include administrative and clerical personnel and any part-time employees.
                                             bThe calendar year 1990 budget for the Environment Program of the Economic Commission for Europe
                                             was about $1.83 million, a portion of which was used to fund secretariat services for the Air Pollution
                                             Convention and its protocols, including the NOx Protocol. The figure shown does not include funding for
                                             overall administration and conferences.
                                             CAn official of the MARPOL secretariat, a subunit of IMO, estimated IMO's resources (staffing and
                                             funding) devoted to administering the agreement. Though the secretariat has only three permanent
                                             employees, the official estimated that IMO provided an additional 17 staff years of services.
                                             Source: GAO's analysis of data from secretariats.

                                             In the case of three of the agreements we reviewed-the London
                                             Dumping Convention, MARPOL, and CITES-secretariat officials believe
                                             that funding is not adequate for the limited purposes for which the sec-
                                             retariats were created. IMO, for example, has experienced funding
                                             shortages over the last several years because not all members have paid
                                             their contributions. As of May 1991, IMo had received only 48 percent of
                                             the contributions pledged for 1991, which were due January 1, 1991. As
                                             a result, secretariats for the London Dumping Convention and MARPOL
                                             have had to reduce the technical assistance provided to developing
                                             countries because fewer trips can be made to those countries. Further,
                                             according to a London Dumping Convention secretariat official, IMO has
                                             been unable to hire two additional officers needed to help implement the
                                             convention. Similarly, CITES secretariat officials told us that parties have
                                             never approved a budget with sufficient funds to cover all of the activi-
                                             ties necessary to implement the agreement. These officials explained,




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                                     for example, that parties regularly have not approved funding
                                     requested by the secretariat for studies to help determine whether cer-
                                     tain species should be protected under CITES and for certain technical
                                      assistance.

                                     Secretariat officials for the five other agreements told us that while
                                     their organizations generally have not had any major funding shortfalls,
                                     in some cases, funding for their required activities has not been stable.
                                     In those cases, parties' contributions were sometimes incomplete and
                                     late, and funds had to be obtained from alternative sources. The secre-
                                     tariats for the Montreal Protocol and the Basel Convention, for example,
                                     periodically have received additional funds from UNEP to compensate for
                                     incomplete contributions from parties. But according to UNEP'S Execu-
                                     tive Director, those secretariats cannot continue to rely on UNEP for
                                      financial support; rather, parties must begin honoring their commit-
                                     ments to fund the secretariats. Also, because of shortfalls in contribu-
                                     tions from parties, the International Whaling Commission has used
                                      reserve funds to continue assessing whale populations. According to the
                                      U.S. State Department, the instability of funding caused by countries'
                                      (including the United States') late payments is a major problem for the
                                      International Tropical Timber Organization.


Conclusions                         While the international environmental agreements we reviewed gener-
                                      ally require parties to submit information that can be used to measure
                                      compliance, there is not a comprehensive view of compliance because
                                      often the information is late, incomplete, or not submitted at all. A
                                     variety of reasons seem to account for poor reporting among developed
                                      countries, but three that recur are difficulties in assembling information
                                      from disparate sources, a low priority given to reporting, and insuffi-
                                      cient resources devoted to it. These reasons appear to apply to devel-
                                      oping countries as well, but in these countries, poor reporting is more
                                      widespread and is part of a larger and more serious problem related to
                                     their financial and technical capability to implement the agreements.

                                      However, even if reporting by parties were better, the organizations
                                      responsible for administering agreements-the secretariats-still would
                                      have insufficient authority to verify the information reported or to inde-
                                      pendently assess parties' compliance. Moreover, secretariats currently
                                      are small organizations and do not have the resources that would be nec-
                                      essary for these tasks.





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Although most of the secretariat officials believe they have a general
sense of compliance, or at least of major problems, there is a growing
sense within the international community that more systematic moni-
toring is warranted, given the seriousness of international environ-
mental problems and the high costs of correcting or preventing them. In
chapter 3, we present an overview of some of the measures that have
been proposed to improve the monitoring and implementation of inter-
national environmental agreements.












































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Chapter 3

Measures Have Been Proposed to Strengthen

Monitoring and Countries' Capacity to

Implement Agreements


                                    Because of the perceived growing importance of global environmental
                                    problems, a number of measures have been proposed to strengthen
                                    international oversight of the implementation of international environ-
                                    mental agreements through improving information. While we plan to
                                    evaluate such measures further in a future report, we describe here a
                                    number of relevant proposals and precedents. Among them are the pro-
                                    visions for monitoring and review in other types of international agree-
                                    ments and the activities of their admidnistering organizations, such as the
                                    International Labor Organization (im). Some observers have suggested
                                    that public and private interest groups, or nongovernmental organiza-
                                    tions (NGO), be given a more formal role in the monitoring process.
                                    Finally, in recognition that in many instances the incapacity to comply
                                    with agreements is a serious underlying problem, some efforts have
                                    been undertaken to provide developing countries with greater financial
                                    and technical assistance.


Many                                  BleeWithin the last couple of years, United Nations officials, other interna-
                Believe             ~~~tional experts, and the U.S. International Trade Commission have sug-
Greater Emphasis                      environmental agreements now deserves greater emphasis and atten-
                                    tion. Historically, nations have conceded some of their sovereignty to an
                                    international organization and subjected themselves to public review
                                    only when dealing with issues of great international importance, such as
                                    arms control or nuclear proliferation. According to a number of
                                    observers, international environmental concerns, such as global
                                    warming, have now assumed a similar urgency, so nations' relevant
                                    actions warrant closer international scrutiny. Some experts also point
                                    out that because the costs to implement international agreements may
                                    be very great, nations may be more willing to open up their actions for
                                    review in order to ensure that implementation is equitable and that all
                                    parties are honoring their commitments. As a result, consideration of
                                    methods for strengthening monitoring has been proposed for the agenda
                                    of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
                                    ment. According to officials from some secretariats to the agreements
                                    moeefciemaso  oioigipeetto.Freapewe reviewed, parties have begun to express an interest in examiningI
                                    working committee of members of imo, which serves as the secretariat
                                    for the London Dumping Convention and MARPOL, has begun considering
                                    means to more effectively monitor implementation of imo conventions.




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Chapter 3
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One proposal to increase monitoring was suggested by the Executive
Director of UNEP at the May 1991 meeting of the organization's Gov-
erning Council. Noting that verification of implementation is a poten-
tially powerful way to enhance environmental protection through
juridical means, the Executive Director's report proposed to the Gov-
erning Council the possibility of creating an Inter-Secretariat Coordina-
tion Committee. The committee would, among other things, evaluate and
report to the Governing Council on means of improving the verification
mechanisms and practices under environmental agreements. The Gov-
erning Council could then include the committee's conclusions in its
reports to the United Nations General Assembly. The proposal also sug-
gested that the Governing Council consider inviting parties to establish
monitoring mechanisms in cases in which agreements themselves do not
provide for such mechanisms. According to the U.S. State Department,
the Governing Council deferred action in favor of leaving the initiative
for consideration during preparatory meetings for the 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development.

Another suggestion for increasing the quality and quantity of informa-
tion available on the implementation of international environmental
agreements was made by the U.S. International Trade Commission.
Responding to a request from the Senate Committee on Finance that it
suggest a method for periodically evaluating current and future environ-
mental treaties, the Commission, in a January 1991 report, noted that
there is no single source of information on the coverage or effectiveness
of international environmental agreements. The Commission therefore
recommended that the U.S. government prepare a report that would
include information on participation in and compliance with each of the
environmental agreements to which the United States is a party, as well
as a country-by-country assessment of the agreements covered.'












IInternational Agreements to Protect the Environment and Wildlife, U.S. International Trade Com-
mission, Report to the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, on Investigation No. 332-287
Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Publication No. 2351 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1991).


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                                     Chapter 3
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Mechanisms  Used by                   Some experts have suggested that environmental agreements be
                                     modeled after other types of international agreements that provide for
Other International                   monitoring and review, such as those covering labor, human rights, the
Agreements  May  Offer   production of nuclear materials, and trade. As with environmental
Models for Monitoring    agreements, parties to these other agreements must periodically report
                                     on compliance. However, these other international agreements also
Imrplementation                       require that additional steps be taken to verify or obtain information,
                                     generally through independent reviews of the data reported by coun-
                                     tries, visits to or inspections of relevant sites, hearings, and complaint
                                     procedures (see table 3. 1). Although the public dissemination of infor-
                                     mation and peer or public pressure continue to be the means to
                                     encourage compliance, these additional steps offer the possibility of
                                     increasing the amount and quality of information needed to do so.





































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                                           Chapter 3
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Table 3.1: Selected Mechanisms Used by International Organizations to Monitor Compliance
                                                                 Monitoring mechanisms
International              Independent review of   Visits to countries/on-
organization               reports countries submit  site inspections           Hearings                   Complaint procedures
[LO                       Worker and employer         Not applicable            ILO's Committee of         ILO reviews complaints
                          representatives review                               Experts presents its       from workers, employers,
                          and comment on reports                               analysis and other data to  and governments to
                          countries submit. ILO staff                          the Conference             determine if a party is in
                          analyze reports. ILO's                               Committee. If a party      violation.
                          Committee of Experts                                 appears to have
                          prepares written analysis                            compliance problems, it
                          of reports and other data.                           may be requested to
                                                                              testify and respond to
                                                                              complaints lodged against
                                                                              it. The results of these
                                                                              hearings are distributed at
                                                                              the annual conference of
                                                                              the parties.
United Nations Center for  The Human Rights          The Commission on          The Human Rights           The Commission on
Human Rights               Committee, composed of   Human Rights, a             Committee conducts         Human Rights
                          independent experts,      designated group under    hearings on information    investigates complaints of
                          reviews information       the United Nations         countries report and       human rights violations.
                          countries report on        Economic and Social       invites countries to testify.
                          compliance,                Council, can conduct fact-
                                                    finding missions within
                                                    nations being investigated
                                                    for violations.
International Atomic       Not applicable            The Agency's team of       The team's results are     Not applicable
Energy Agency                                        trained experts inspects    reported to and reviewed
                                                    nuclear facilities.       by the Agency's Board of
                                                                              Governors.
General Agreement on      To determine compliance,  GATT's Trade Policies       The GATT Council reviews  Through the GATT
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)    GATT's Trade Policies     Review Division staff visit  and discusses the results  secretariat, parties may
                          Review Division staff     countries.                 of the Trade Policies      request a consultation
                          examine information                                  Review Division's          with countries they believe
                          countries report.                                    examinations.              are violating the
                                                                                                        agreement. If the
                                                                                                        consultation fails, the
                                                                                                        parties may resort to a
                                                                                                        panel that hears disputes.




International Labor                          110, a specialized agency of the United Nations, coordinates the develop-
           Agreements ~~~~ment and implementation of international labor conventions intended to
           Agreements                       ~~~~safeguard workers' rights and ensure safe workplaces. A part of the
                                            United Nations system since 1946, ito is unique in that it includes repre-
                                            sentation of workers and employers, as well as the governments of 150
                                            countries. Its permanent secretariat is the International Labor Office,
                                            which oversees more than 160 conventions. With annual work-years of
                                            approximately 1,740 and an annual budget of more than $165 million,






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                                     Chapter 3
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                                     the ao secretariat is considerably larger than those that administer envi-
                                     ronmental agreements.

                                     The iLo Constitution requires that member states regularly submit
                                     reports to representatives of workers and employers for comments. An
                                     independent body appointed by ito-the Committee of Experts on the
                                     Application of Conventions and Recommendations-then analyzes com-
                                     pliance by reviewing the reports and accompanying comments, as well
                                     as an analysis of countries' reports that is prepared by the secretariat's
                                     Standards Department, which has about 60 staff members. The Com-
                                     mittee of Experts presents its findings in a publicly distributed annual
                                     report to the Conference Committee, which is composed of representa-
                                     tives of employees, employers, and governments.

                                     The Conference Committee holds a hearing on the annual report, during
                                     which government representatives from nations with identified compli-
                                     ance problems are invited to testify. Representatives from about 50
                                     countries are usually requested to appear annually. While a few govern-
                                     ments have failed to cooperate, most have sent representatives when
                                     requested, according to an official from the Standards Department. The
                                     results of these hearings are then summarized and distributed at the
                                     annual conference of the parties. If iw requests that a country institute
                                     a change as a result of this process, the organization also offers to pro-
                                     vide technical assistance in order to enable the country to comply. This
                                     step, according to secretariat staff, is important in encouraging coun-
                                     tries to institute changes.

                                     In addition to its annual review and hearing process, no also hears com-
                                     plaints made by employees, employers, and governments against parties
                                     and determines if they are complying with applicable conventions. The
                                     Governing Body, which supervises the work of the International Labor
                                     Office, can publish these complaints and the results of any
                                     determinations.


Human Rights Agreements   Like international labor agreements, human rights agreements also man-
                                     date some assessment and public disclosure of nations' performance.
                                     These tasks are performed under the auspices of the United Nations
                                     Center for Human Rights. The Center, which had an annual budget of
                                     approximately $8.7 million in 1990 and a staff of 115, serves as a secre-
                                     tariat for the Human Rights Committee and the Commission on Human
                                     Rights. The Human Rights Committee, composed of 18 independent



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                                    Chapter 3
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                                     experts elected by parties, is responsible for determining whether indi-
                                     vidual rights protected under the International Covenant on Civil and
                                     Political Rights and its optional protocol have been violated. The Com-
                                     mission on Human Rights, the group under the United Nations Economic
                                     and Social Council, is responsible for determining whether any nations
                                     have consistently violated human rights under a number of different
                                     agreements. Close to 90 countries were participating in the International
                                     Covenant and 45 in its protocol as of June 1989.

                                     The Human Rights Committee reviews the information countries report
                                     and holds hearings, during which representatives of parties suspected of
                                     violations are asked to testify. Under the optional protocol to the Inter-
                                     national Covenant, the Human Rights Committee may receive com-
                                     plaints from individuals in ratifying countries and determine whether
                                     violations have occurred. The Committee's final decisions are then made
                                     public.

                                     Responsible for determining if countries exhibit a consistent pattern of
                                     human rights violations, the Commission on Human Rights also has the
                                     authority to receive and investigate complaints. As part of its investiga-
                                     tions, the Commission may make fact-finding visits to nations and may
                                     report its findings to the United Nations Economic and Social Council.


Nuclear Materials                   Similarly, the International Atomic Energy Agency uses several moni-
Production Agreements               toring mechanisms to determine whether nuclear facilities and materials
                                     are being used for peaceful purposes and not for weapons production.
                                     Two conventions-the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
                                     Weapons and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
                                     America-use the Agency's program for monitoring nuclear materials
                                     production. Under this program, parties agree to make their nuclear
                                     facilities available for inspection and to establish a national accounting
                                     system for nuclear materials. In 1990, the 4gency, with 112 member
                                     nations, had an annual budget of $178.7 million and a staff of 2,175,
                                     with approximately $58.6 million and 479 staff dedicated to the
                                     program.

                                     To facilitate monitoring the amounts of nuclear materials produced, the
                                     Agency requires parties to maintain records and submit accounting
                                     reports. Agency staff also make on-site inspections to verify the accu-
                                     racy of accounting reports submitted by national authorities. In 1990,
                                     the Agency had approximately 208 inspectors to perform this function.
                                     On the basis of these inspections, the Agency prepares for its Board of


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                                      Governors an annual Safeguards Implementation Report disclosing
                                      whether any nuclear facilities or materials have been used for weapons
                                      production.


International Trade                  GATT, which was established to promote free trade, also includes several
Agreements                           mechanisms for monitoring compliance among its 122 parties. In 1990,
                                      the GATT secretariat had an annual budget of $42.6 million and over 400
                                      staff. 

                                      In 1989, GATT parties established the Trade Policies Review Division,
                                      with a staff of 20, to periodically assess parties' trade policies. In addi-
                                      tion to examining reports on national compliance submitted by GATT par-
                                      ties, Division staff visit countries to verify compliance. The staff then
                                      prepare a compliance report on each country. All reports-both those
                                      prepared by parties and by the Division-are sent to GATT's executive
                                      body, the GATT Council, for review and discussion. While the GATT
                                      Council cannot make binding recommendations, the results of its discus-
                                      sions are widely circulated in order to generate peer pressure for coun-
                                      tries to modify their practices.

                                      GATT also has a process for hearing complaints from parties. Under this
                                      process, any party that believes another party is violating the agree-
                                      ment can file a complaint and request a consultation with that party to
                                      try to resolve the dispute. If the alleged violator does not reply to the
                                      request for a consultation, or if the consultation is unsuccessful, the
                                      complainant may request the establishment of a dispute panel to
                                      examine the evidence. The panel issues a report stating whether or not
                                      the party violated the agreement. Subsequently, the panel's report must
                                      be approved by all parties to GATT, including the parties to the dispute.

                                      A bill introduced in the U.S. Senate in January 1991 proposes using the
                                      existing framework of GATIT to monitor and enforce international envi-
                                      ronmental agreements .2 The bill is intended to require the establishment,
                                      either within GATTI or separately, of a mechanism to monitor and enforce
                                      compliance with international environmental agreements that use trade
                                      measures. Specifically, the bill would require the United States Trade





                                      2 Senate bill S. 59, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for the Environment Act of 199 1 was
                                      introduced by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan on January 14, 199 1.


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Representative to report to Congress, within 2 years of the bill's enact-
ment, on, among other things, the Representative's efforts to establish a
GATT for the environmnent.3

Some restrictions on international trade have long been recognized as
being permissible. For instance, article XX Of GATT allows parties to
adopt or -enforce measures that may restrict trade if they are for envi-
ronmental, health, or safety purposes. GATT parties are obliged to show,
however, that such standards were established for the permissible rea-
sons only and that the standards have been applied in a nondiscrimina-
tory way.

Further, to ensure that domestic standards are not used as obstacles to
international trade, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Stan-
dards Code), signed by a subset of the parties to GATT, entered into force
in 1980. The code requires that parties either use internationally recog-
nized standards or circulate any proposed alternative standards to all
parties. If a dispute should arise concerning a domestic standard, the
code requires that a panel of scientific experts be established to settle
the dispute.

In recent years, parties to GATT' have shown an increasing interest in the
relationship between trade and the environment. In December 1990, for
example, members of the European Free Trade Association, including
Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, requested
that GATT's Working Group on Environmental Measures and Interna-
tional Trade be convened, with an "updated mandate" to provide a
forum for discussing the links between trade and environmental policy.
According to a GATT official, however, developing countries objected to
the request because of their concerns that efforts to link the environ-
ment and trade will ultimately lead to increased environmental require-
ments and increased costs to meet the requirements. Nevertheless, after
extensive negotiations, agreement was reached in October 1991 to con-
vene the Group with the understanding that its agenda would initially
be limited to consideration of the following issues: (1) trade provisions
contained in existing multilateral agreements, (2) the transparency of
national environmental regulations likely to affect trade, and (3) the
effects that new packaging and labeling requirements aimed at pro-
tecting the environment could have on trade.


3 Despite the bill's apparent multilateral approach, it would also require the Trade Representative to
take unilateral action against any nation whose acts, policies, or practices diminish the effectiveness
of any international environmental agreement.


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A  More Formal Role                 Since the 1972 Stockholm Conference, NGOS have played an important
                                     role in providing information on compliance with international environ-
for Nongovernmental                 mental agreements. Representatives of environmental NGOS are active,
Organizations Has                   for example, in attending and submitting documents to meetings of the
Been Suggested                      parties of the Montreal Protocol. Some parties include members of NGOs
                                     in their delegations attending meetings of the International Tropical
                                     Timber Organization. At times, NGOS have also identified and made
                                     public information about parties that have not fully implemented
                                     MARPOL. The International Chamber of Shipping, for example, a group
                                     representing major shippers, has conducted surveys disclosing the lack
                                     of, and problems with, port reception facilities worldwide. Similarly,
                                     two other NGOS, TRAFFIC and the International Union for the Conserva-
                                     tion of Nature and Natural Resources, have independently monitored
                                     CITES' implementation by conducting studies of nations' permit systems
                                     and studying species to determine whether or not they should be pro-
                                     tected under CITES.

                                     Generally, while NGOS have played an active role, their involvement in
                                     monitoring international environmental agreements has been informal.
                                     Some observers have suggested, however, that NGOS could play a more
                                      formal role in the international debate on environmental problems. In
                                      particular, in its 1987 report, the World Commission on Environment
                                      and Development recommended that in all relevant intergovernmental
                                      organizations, governments establish or strengthen procedures for offi-
                                      cial consultation with NGOs.4

                                      Some NGOS themselves have proposed that they be granted a more
                                      formal role in implementing international environmental agreements.
                                      According to representatives from several NGOS, formally incorporating
                                      these organizations into the monitoring process would provide a mecha-
                                      nism for verifying the information countries report and would increase
                                      public access to information on compliance. On the other hand, some of
                                      these NGO representatives told us that their organizations might not
                                      have the resources necessary to actively monitor implementation. Fur-
                                      ther, even if sufficient resources were available, these representatives
                                      noted that some process would have to be established for determining
                                      which NGOS would be given formal monitoring roles.





                                      4 Our Common Future, World Commission on Environment and Development (Oxford: 1987), p. 328.


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Nations' Capability to    Even those who have advocated additional monitoring recognize that it
                                      could be unpalatable to many nations and could discourage them from
Implement                            signing agreements in the future. Consequently, a number of observers
Agreements Could Be                  have recommended that any efforts to increase monitoring be accompa-
                                      nied by additional incentives for nations to comply. Providing financial
Strengthened
                                      and technical assistance, for example, or allowing some countries addi-
                                      tional flexibility in implementing an agreement might serve to increase
                                      nations' capability and willingness to comply.

                                      In addition, as noted in chapter 2, a fundamental obstacle to reporting,
                                      and to implementing environmental agreements generally, is the lack of
                                      financial and technical resources in developing countries. Over the last
                                      15 years or so, this has come to be recognized as a problem, and interna-
                                      tional efforts have been made to help developing countries strengthen
                                      their environmental institutions and administrative systems. Since the
                                      mid-1970s, when the United Nations General Assembly called on UNEP's
                                      Executive Director to provide technical assistance to developing coun-
                                      tries, UNEP has assisted 41 developing countries in creating environ-
                                      mental legislation and administrative systems.' In addition, in order to
                                      provide donors an opportunity to earmark funds to assist specific coun-
                                      tries or to go to certain projects, UNEP established a Clearinghouse Unit
                                      in 1983, according to a UNEP official.

                                      To various degrees, the texts or provisions of the agreements we
                                      reviewed address the issue of financial and technical assistance. The NOx
                                      Protocol, for example, states that parties should facilitate the exchange
                                      of technical information and assistance. Similarly, the London Dumping
                                      Convention calls for parties to support one another's requests for tech-
                                      nical assistance. In contrast, the Montreal Protocol goes beyond these
                                      more general encouragements for cooperation and establishes an interim
                                      multilateral fund to help developing countries reduce their use of the
                                      controlled substances. As of March 1991, the fund had received
                                      $160 million in commitments from 14 developed countries. Once the
                                      Basel Convention enters into force, it also may provide for financing
                                      training and the transfer of technology.

                                      Another recent effort is the Global Environmental Facility, which pro-
                                      vides grants and low-interest loans to developing countries in order to
                                      assist them in carrying out programs to relieve pressures on global eco-
                                      systems. The Facility, which is jointly run by the World Bank, UNEP, and

                                      5 New Directions in Environmental Legislation and Administration Particularly in Developing Coun-
                                      tries, UNEP, Environmental Law and Machinery Unit (Nairobi: 1989), p. 1.


                                      Page 43             GAO/RCED-9243 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored






                            Chapter 3
                            Measures Have Been Proposed to Strengthen
                            Monitoring and Countries' Capacity to
                            Implement Agreements







                            the United Nations Development Program, began operating in 1991 as a
                            3-year pilot project with initial commitments of about $1.5 billion.
                            Funding will be used for projects in four areas: protecting the ozone
                            layer, reducing and limiting emissions of greenhouse gases, reducing
                            marine pollution, and preserving biological diversity. Funds for projects
                            related to ozone depletion will be granted only to parties of the Montreal
                            Protocol. Likewise, the Facility gives priority to those projects that facil-
                            itate compliance with MARPOL and other agreements governing interna-
                            tional rivers, lakes, or seas. Also, funds for preserving biological
                            diversity have been designated for a project to support the enforcement

                            of CITs in selected African countries.


Conclusions ~~~Because of the seriousness of international environmental problems and
Conclusions               ~~~the costs involved in addressing them, a number of knowledgeable
                            observers have come to believe that measures ought to be adopted that
                            would strengthen the oversight of international environmental agree-
                            ments. By establishing measurable standards and requiring parties to
                            report on compliance, existing environmental agreements already con-
                            tain important elements of a monitoring system. However, increasing
                            the quantity and quality of information on compliance will require addi-
                            tional measures, and some that have been proposed merit further con-
                            sideration. Other international agreements, for example, offer some
                            models for improving information through independent review, site
                            visits, hearings, and other complaint procedures.

                            At the sane time, it is also recognized that some nations may not accept
                            additional monitoring and that additional monitoring might in fact dis-
                            courage nations from signing agreements. It is also apparent that moni-
                            toring alone will not strengthen compliance with agreements unless it is
                            accompanied by the financial and technical assistance needed to
                            improve countries' capacity to comply. Recent measures, such as the
                            Montreal Protocol's multilateral fund and the Global Environmental
                            Facility, may offer models for providing necessary financial and tech-
                            nical assistance in future agreements once more is known about how
                            well these measures work.

                            Any multilateral efforts to strengthen oversight of environmental agree-
                            ments will require strengthened international authorities responsible for
                            their implementation. Should nations decide to adopt additional mnoni-
                            toring mechanisms, they will clearly be required to commit far greater
                            resources to support these efforts. These efforts, however, could
                            improve the information available about compliance, and, given the


                            Page 44            GAO/RCED-92-43 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored






                                     Chapter 3
                                     Measures Have Been Proposed to Strengthen
                                     Monitoring and Countries' Capacity to
                                     Implement Agreements







                                     extent to which the enforcement of agreements depends on information,
                                     could ultimately improve compliance with the agreements as well.



A gency Commnents on                 Both the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of
           C7   ~~~~~~~State commented on this report. EPA found the report to be an informa-
This Report                          tive overview of the issues, but raised a number of questions about fac-
                                     tors besides monitoring that affect implementation, suggesting that
                                     these factors ought to be considered as well. While important and per-
                                     haps the subject of GAo's further work, these questions are nevertheless
                                     outside the scope of this review.

                                     The State Department took issue with what it believed to be the premise
                                      of our report, namely, that incomplete reporting implies less than full
                                      compliance. We are not suggesting, however, that incomplete reporting
                                      necessarily equates to less than full compliance, but, rather, that the
                                      level of compliance is difficult to judge because of incomplete reporting.
                                      In the case of developing countries, we point out that incomplete
                                      reporting is part of a larger problem related to their financial and tech-
                                      nical capability to comply. The remainder of the State Department's
                                      comments provided technical corrections and clarifications. These com-
                                      ments, along with those provided by all reviewers, were incorporated
                                      into the report where appropriate.

                                      The full texts of EPA's and the State Department's comments, as well as
                                      our responses, appear in appendixes 1I and III.






















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  Appendix I

  Organizations Contacted by GAO







           United States              ~~Council on Environmental Quality
rGovernment Agencies   Department of Commerce:
                                       International Trade Administration
                                       National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

                                     Department of State:
                                       Bureau of International Organization Affairs
                                       Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
                                         Affairs
                                       Office of the Legal Advisor
                                       Office of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations
                                          Environment Program (Kenya)
                                       U.S. Mission to the United Nations (Geneva)
                                       U.S. Mission to the European Community (Brussels)
                                       U.S. Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
                                         opment (Paris)

                                     Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

                                     U.S. International Trade Commission

                                     Office of the United States Trade Representative

                                     U.S. Coast Guard

                                     U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service


  International                        Commission of the European Communities:
                                       Environment, Nuclear Safety, and Civil Protection Directorate-
  Governmental                              General
  Organizations                        Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:
                                       Environment Directorate

                                     International Whaling Commission

                                     United Nations Environment Program:
                                       Industry and Environment Office
                                       Interim Secretariat for the Basel Convention on the Transboundary
                                         Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
                                       Office of the Deputy Executive Director


                                     Page 46             (iAO/RCED-92-43 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored






                                   Appendix I
                                   Organizations Contacted by GAO








                                   United Nations Environment Program (continued):
                                     Office of the Environmental Fund and Administration:
                                       Fund Program Management Branch
                                     Environmental Law and Institutions Unit
                                     International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals
                                     Oceans and Coastal Areas Program Activity Center
                                     Terrestrial Ecosystems Branch
                                     Secretariat for the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
                                       Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
                                     Secretariat for the Vienna Convention and its Montreal Protocol
                                     Washington, D.C., Office

                                   Other United Nations agencies:
                                     Economic Commission for Europe:
                                       Environment and Human Settlements Division
                                     International Labor Organization
                                     International Maritime Organization
                                     International Tropical Timber Organization
                                     Secretariat for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
                                     United Nations Center for Human Rights
                                     United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
                                     United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
                                     World Meteorological Organization:
                                       Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change


Nongovernmental                    Advisory Committee on Pollution of the Sea (London)
                                   Center for Marine Conservation (Washington, D.C.)
Organizations                      Climate Action Network (Brussels)
                                   Club of Rome (Paris)
                                   European Environment Bureau (Brussels)
                                   Greenpeace (Washington, D.C.)
                                   Humane Society of the United States (Washington, D.C.)
                                   Institute of Maritime Law (Southampton, England)
                                   International Chamber of Shipping (London)
                                   International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
                                      Resources (Geneva):
                                        Environmental Law Center (Bonn)
                                   Monitor (Washington, D.C.)
                                   Natural Resources Defense Council (Washington, D.C.)
                                   Oceanic Society (Washington, D.C.)
                                   Resources for the Future (Washington, D.C.)



                                   Page 47           GAO/RCED-92-43 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored






Appendix I
Organizations Contacted by GAO









TRAFFIC International (Cambridge, England)
TRAFFIC (USA) (Washington, D.C.)
World Conservation Monitoring Center (Cambridge, England)
World Resources Institute (Washington, D.C.)
World Wide Fund for Nature (London)













































AORED9-4 International Agreements                           Monitored



Page'" 0GAO/RCEDL92 43 Interna            nal Aree   A Not We'l Monitored





Appendix II


Comuments From the Envirornmental


Protection Agency







Note: GAO's comments
supplementing those in the
report text appear at the
end of this appendix.  ~      '~UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
                                                   WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460


                                                      1 5 991                    OFFICE OF
                                                                       POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION





                            Mr. Richard L. Hembra
                            Director, Environmental Protection Issues
                            Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division
                            U.S. General Accounting Office
                            Washington, D.C. 20548

                            Dear Mr. Hembra:

                                 Thank you for the opportunity for the Agency to review and
                            comment on the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report on
                            compliance with international environmental agreements. The
                            report is entitled "International Environment: International
                            Agreements Are Not Well Monitored". Your November I letter to
                            the Administrator asked for a response within 15 days. I
                            appreciate the earlier briefing for the Agency's senior managers.
                            and solicitation for their views on this issue.

                                 In the draft report, GAO addresses two separate but closely
                            related issues -- implementation of international environmental
                            agreements, measured in terms of compliance by signatory states
                            with obligations voluntarily assumed under such agreements, and
                            international efforts to verify implementation by monitoring both
                            the level of and quality of compliance with international
                            obligations of signatory states. The draft report makes an
                            excellent contribution to our understanding of these important
                            issues.

                                 one challenge in writing a report with as broad an aqenda as
                            the GAO report is adequately addressing all relevant issues. In
                            this respect, the Office of General Counsel believes that the
                            draft report might be improved by giving more attention to
                            factors other than inadequate monitoring which affect
                            implementation of international environmental agreements. While
                            better monitoring may have a positive impact on implementation
                            (perhaps by embarrassing non-complying states into compliance or
                            pointing out gaps in implementation states themselves are unaware
                            of), it is not the only means of improving implementation of
                            international environmental agreements. This point is made in
                            the report, but it could be underscored with a more detailed
                            discussion of other factors affecting implementation.









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     Appendix 11
     Comments From the Environmental
     Protection Agency














     Chapter 3 ("Measures Have Been Proposed to Strengthen
Compliance with Agreements") might be expanded beyond its brief
discussion of proposals to strengthen the financial and technical
capacity of developing countries to implement international
environmental agreements as an incentive for better compliance.
it could include an analysis of the various ways in which the
eight international environmental agreements covered by the
report provide incentives for contracting parties to comply
voluntarily with the terms of the agreement. The delayed time
frame for developing country compliance in the Montreal Protocol
might be one such example. The report might also state that
further research is needed into the question of how future
international agreements might more effectively encourage
voluntary compliance.

     In addition to a discussion of incentives for voluntary
compliance, the use of sanctions for non-compliance deserves
further attention ini the report. For example, the report might
analyze how trade measures are used in several of the eight
international agreements covered by the report to encourage
compliance by those who are parties as well as to encourage non-
parties to join the agreement. As a general matter, the
usefulness of measures denying benefits to non-parties and to
parties not in compliance with an international agreement might
be examined in greater detail.

     Finally, the report might include a discussion of the need
to understand better the factors which affect compliance at the
national level. If possible, this analysis should provide a
brief overview of compliance issues under U.S. law and practice
as well as the law and practice in other countries in order to
provide a valuable comparative perspective on this topic. At a
minimum, the report might mention that there is a need for
further analysis in this area, both domestically and in the
comparative context.

     I appreciate this opportunity to provide these comments and
hope that they are useful. I look forward to receiving the final
report.

                                   Sincerely,


                                       Richard    g D    ~2ter
                                   Acting Assistant Administrator















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Appendix H1
Comments From the Environmental
Protection Agency








The following are GAO'S comments on EPA'S letter of November 15,
1991.


Recognizing that our report already acknowledges that factors other
than monitoring affect the implementation of international environ-
mental agreements, EPA stated that this point could be underscored with
a more detailed discussion of these other factors, examples of which the
agency provided. We appreciate EPA'S suggestions and may examine
them further in our future work. However, such an expanded discussion
was beyond the scope of this review.








































Page 51            GAO/RCED-92-43 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored






Appendix III


Comments From the U.S. Department of State









Note: GAO's comments
supplementing those in the
report text appear at the
end of this appendix.                                                       United States Department of State

                                                                    Washington, D.C. 20520








                                                                   November 29, 1991



                                Mr. Richard L. Hembra
                                Director, Environmental Protection Issues
                                Resources, Community, and
                                Economic Development Division
                                General Accounting Office
                                441 G Street, NW,
                                Washington, DC 20548

                                Dear Mr. Hembra:

                                Enclosed are Department of State comments on your proposed
                                report International Environment: International Agreements
                                Are Not Well Monitored (GAO/RCED-92-43).

                                If you have any questions, please contact Margaret Shields
                                at (703) 875-6866.

                                                              Sincerely,


                                                              1Ii~rryJ
                                                              Associate Comptroller
                                                              Office of Financial Management


                                Enclosure













                                   Page 52             GAO/RCED-9243 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored







                                  Appendix HIl
                                  Comments From the U.S. Department of State















                              The State D~epartment appreciates the opportunity to comment on
                              the subject report, which addresses the monitoring of eight
                              key international environmental agreements. The report notes
                              that there have been some calls for adopting measures to
                              strengthen the oversight of such agreements. The premise of
See comment 1.                 the report is that incomplete reporting under these agreements
                              may indicate less than full compliance with their terms.

                              The United States attaches major importance to the issue of
                              compliance with environmental agreements. Generally, our view
                              is that questions of compliance with international agreements
                              should be addressed flexibly in the agreements themselves or
                              in arrangements on specific commitments. Since questions of
                              compliance and dispute settlement depend on the parties, the
                              subject matter, the character of the obligations, and the
                              terms of-each agreement, we do not believe a rigid or
See comment 2.                universal approach is the best way to proceed.  In this
                              regard, it must be emphasized that there is often an inverse
                              relationship between the intrusiveness of compliance
                             mechanisms and the strength of commitments that states are
                             willing to accept. Thus, it can be misleading to view
                             existing agreements as satisfactory except with respect to
                              their compliance mechanisms. In some cases, were the
                             compliance mechanisms more stringent, the substantive
                              obligations might be weaker or the number of parties would be
                              lower.

See comment 3.                With regard to the UNEP proposal to create an
                              inter-secretariat coordination committee toward this end, the
                             U.S. instead supported the idea of exploratory discussions
                             with the secretariats implementing the various conventions, to
                              determine what common problems of compliance may exist.
                              However, the Governing Council deferred action on compliance
                              on UNEP's part, in favor of leaving the initiative to the
                              UNCED preparatory process--specifically the Working Group on
                              legal and institutional issues.

























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                                  Appendix III
                                  Comments From the U.S. Department of State














                                                             -2-




See comment 4.                  It should also be noted that verifying compliance is not
                               limited to reviewing a country's reporting; a number of other,
                               more informal channels exist to determine this. For example,
                               in the case of the Montreal Protocol, industry in one country
                               might be in a position to know if another country's industry
                               is not adhering to production limits on controlled substances,
                               which have an important commercial value. Further,
                               international NGOs are often a valuable source of information
                               about environmental protection activities in other countries.
                               Thus, it is important not to focus on the question of
                               reporting to the exclusion of other approaches.

See comment 5.                  The State Department does not share the view reflected in the
                               report that secretariats should be entrusted with monitoring
                               compliance. This is a function ordinarily retained by the
                               parties, e.g., through a Conference of the Parties or
                               non-compliance committee, and not one given to international
                               civil servants working in a secretariat.

                               The GAO report correctly points out that in many cases, the
                               secretariats for environmental agreements are very small and
                               perhaps under-funded to fulfill their assigned functions. But
                               this is part of a larger problem of funding these agreements
                               in general, given the typically voluntary nature of
                               contributions. increased funding for secretariats, while in
                               principle not a bad idea, would have to come from-the
                               "program" portion of the agreement: conference costs, travel
                               expenses for developing country delegates, clearinghouse
                               functions, etc.

See comment 6.                  With respect to the ITTO, "compliance, takes on a different
                               character and is not generally applicable. The ITTO is a
                               forum for consultation, as the report points out. Members do
                               not take on obligations to comply with normative rules. The
                               only reporting requirement is the annual report on market
                               activities, which deals with an aspect of ITTO's activities
                               largely unrrelated to the environment. The failure of some
                               members to meet the market report obligation is due primarily
                               to a lack of country capacity to respond, not to a policy of
                               non-compliance. The fact that the ITTA has no environmental
                               compliance provision, and that therefore the concept of
                               environmental compliance is not directly applicable to the
                               ITTO, needs to be further clarified (see specific comments
                               below).














                                   Page 54            GAO/RCED-92-43 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored







                                  Appendix HI
                                  Comments From the U.S. Department of State



















                              The following are specific comments on the GAO report:

See comment 7.                 In our view, the paper does not sufficiently distinguish
                              several very discrete concepts: reporting, verification,
                              monitoring, and enforcement.

                                  o     "Reporting" constitutes a sharing of information
                                        between the parties, using the Secretariat only as
                                        a conduit.  Generally, the parties report how and to
                                        what extent they have exercised their rights/obliga-
                                        tions under an agreement (e.g., permits issued).
                                        Failure to report or tardiness in reporting means
                                        less information to share and therefore ultimately a
                                        less effective convention, but is not necessarily
                                        indicative of non-compliance with substantive
                                        obligations.

                                  o     "Verification" is generally assoc  ted with
                                        compliance, not reporting. It maybe appropriate
                                        where there is a substantial risk of non-compliance
                                        or if the issue of compliance is so sensitive that
                                        verification is an acceptable'safeguard (e.g. arms
                                        control). Verification is best performed by either
                                        the parties themselves or by a neutral body created
                                        for that purpose. Secretariats, which are generally
                                        administrative organs, are not usually appropriate
                                        for verification functions. Verification of
                                        reporting per se may not make much sense at all.

                                  o     The report uses the term "monitoring" quite loosely.
                                        Monitoring can connote many things, including the
                                        policing of an agreement or simply the technical
                                        collection of data. Secretariats by their very
                                        nature do not have and should not have the authority
                                        to police an agreement; it is the parties that should
                                        monitor compliance. Data collection is something
                                        best accomplished by expert bodies. The report may
                                        be using the term as equivalent of verification, in
                                        which case the previous comments apply.

                                 o     "Noncompliance" refers to a breach of substantive
                                        obligations under an agreement. Most international
                                        environmental agreements tq not have mandatory
                                        provisions for remedying non-compliance, because such
                                        provisions touch on sensitive questions of
                                        sovereignty and enforcement. In any event, as noted
                                        above, it is entirely inappropriate to associate
                                        Secretariats acting alone with any role vis-a-vis
                                        compliance.








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                                  Appendix III
                                  Conuments From the U.S. Department of State













                                                             -4-





See comment 8.                 The report also uses the terms "signatory," "party" and
                              "member" in inconsistent and inaccurate ways. A state that
                              signs a treaty is a "signatory." In the case of most
                              multilateral treaties, however, this is only the first step
                              toward becoming a "party." A mere signatory is not legally
                              bound to comply with the provisions of the treaty. A state
                              undertakes legally binding obligations under the treaty when
                              it fulfills all the formalities necessary to ratify or approve
                              the treaty, together with a sufficient number of other states,
                              and the treaty comes into force. At this point it is a
                              "party" and should no longer be called simply a "signatory."
                              There is no legal category of being a "member" of a treaty,
                              although states can become members of international
                              organizations (such as the United Nations) through becoming a
                              party to a treaty (i.e., the UN Charter).

See comment 9.                 We do not agree with the general statement in the background
                              section of the Executive Summary, where it is stated that
                              "because no supranational enforcement body exists, public
                              pressure ... is generally the primary mechanism for enforcing
                              multilateral agreements." This statement appears. to ignore
                              the role of the parties to an agreement, which, in our view,
                              play the primary role in inducing parties to comply with
                              agreements. Whether through political pressure (e.g.,
                              statements at meetings of the parties, diplomatic demarches)
                              or legal pressure (invocation of an agreement's dispute
                              settlement procedures), the parties themselves are the main
                              enforcement vehicle under most agreements.

Chart now on p. I1             The chart and footnote on p. 12 are misleading in that they
                              appear to characterize as irregular the U.S. practice of
Footnote deleted.              putting necessary implementing laws into place beor
See commentl10.                ratifying an agreement.  On the contrary, if a state were to
                              ratify an agreement and only later adopt the necessary
                              implementing laws, it would be putting itself in a possible
                              non-compliance situation during the period before the laws
                              were in place.

See comment 1 1.               We do not agree with the notion that "a federal agency be
                              designated to periodically evaluate compliance with present
                              and future international environmental agreements."
                              Unilateral action is not necessarily an effective approach to
                              monitoring compliance with multilateral treaties and could be
                              counterproductive. Issues involving monitoring and compliance
                              should be addressed in a coordinated way by the parties to
                              treaties.










                                   Page 56            GAO/RCED-92-43 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored







                                   Appendix HI
                                   Comments From the U.S. Department of State



















See comment 12.                We have the following specific comments with respect to the
                              ITTO:

Reference deleted.                  a     Page 3, under Parties Reporting:  It should be noted
                                         that the ITTA does not establish normative reporting
                                         requirements. The guidelines for sustainable
                                        management of production forests developed by ITTO
                                        constitute broad, international principles. The ITTO
                                        can encourage, but cannot call for, the development
                                        of step-down national guidelines by its members.

Now onp. 20.                       0      Page 25, para. 2:  ITTO guidelines are intended as an
                                         international reference standard to national
                                        decision-making, other international organizations
                                         and public interest groups. While the ITTO
                                        encourages their application, the guidelines have
                                        no legislative character.

Now on p. 21.                      0      Page 27, column 2:  Insert "internationally traded"
                                        before "tropical." ITTO guidelines apply primarily
                                        to timber entering international trade (less than 20
                                        percent of all timber). Although they could be
                                        broadly applicable or provide some useful examples
                                        on domestic trade, this is not their primary purpose.

Now onp. 22.                       o      Page 29, para. 2:  The ITTO is now formally in the
                                        process of developing a definition of sustainable
                                        forest management applicable in the timber trade
                                        context.

Now on p.32.                       0      Page 39, para. 1:  In the case of the ITTO, the
                                        instability of funding due to dues arrearages
                                        (including U.S. arrearages) is a major problem.























                                   Page57             GAO/RCED-9243 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored





                                     Appendix Ill
                                     Comments From the U.S. Department of State








                                      The following are GAO'S comments on the State Department's letter
                                      dated November 29, 1991.


GAO's  Comments                      1. We are not suggesting that incomplete reporting equates to less than
                                      full compliance, but rather that incomplete reporting makes it difficult
                                      to determine compliance. Nevertheless, in the case of developing coun-
                                      tries, we point out that incomplete reporting is part of a larger problem
                                      related to these countries' financial and technical capability to comply.

                                      2. Our report does not state or imply that a rigid or universal approach
                                      to compliance is appropriate. In fact, chapter I specifically recognizes
                                      that implementation of agreements depends on the nations' voluntary
                                      participation. We recognize that the more stringent the compliance
                                      mechanisms, the less willing nations may be to participate in agree-
                                      ments, a point we now make in chapter 1.

                                      3. We incorporated this information in chapter 3 of the report.

                                      4. We clarified our discussion in the executive summary and in chapter 2
                                      of the report to reflect this point and to note that information submitted
                                      by countries is the only formal source of information available to all
                                      parties. Moreover, we also note in chapter 3 that nongovernmental orga-
                                      nizations in some cases now play an important role and could assume an
                                      expanded role.

                                      5. While the report takes note of proposals to give secretariats a moni-
                                      toring role, we have not endorsed this or any of the other proposals
                                      identified in our report.

                                      6. We clarified our discussion in the executive summary and in chapter 2
                                      of the report. However, we note that the agreement itself calls for an
                                      assessment of environmental aspects of the world tropical timber
                                      economy.

                                      7. To the extent we believed necessary, we clarified these terms in our
                                      report.

                                      8. We made appropriate corrections throughout the report.

                                      9. We revised our discussion in the executive summary of the report to
                                      note that peer pressure-that is, pressure brought by other parties-is
                                      an element of the enforcement mechanism.


                                      Page 58             GAO/RCED-92.43 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored






Appendix DIl
Comments From the U.S. Department of State









10. We clarified our discussion in the executive summary and in
chapter I and corrected the chart to eliminate the implication that it is
unusual for a nation to enact national legislation prior to ratifying an
agreement.

11. We revised our discussion of a proposal made by the International
Trade Commission, which suggests that the U.S. government prepare a
report discussing parties' compliance.

12. We made appropriate changes in the executive summary and in
chapter 2 of the report.








































Page 59             GAO/RCED-9243 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored




Appendix IV

Major Contributors to This Report






                                  Peter F. Guerrero, Associate Director
Resources,                              Bernice Steinhardt, Assistant Director
Community,  and                         Timothy L. Minelli, Staff Evaluator
Economic                                Gesele E. Durham, Staff Evaluator
                                  Brian Sexton, Advisor
Development  Division,   John H. Skeen, III, Reports Analyst
Washington, D.C.


                                  Christina L. Warren, Evaluator-in-Charge
                                  Cheryl L. Goodman, Staff Evaluator






























(160043)                                Page 60              GAO/RCED-92-43 International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored
























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