Boston Harbor Management Study a final report

[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]

Judithi T. Kildow.,
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1981
no.81-15

MIT Sea Grant Massach, usetts MIT
ege, Program I n,,stj.'I,, utjteToi,, T ec hroology,
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4-1 'ZI 7

BOSTON HARBOR MANAGEMENT STUDY

A Final Report

Judith T. Kildow
Principal Investigator
MIT Department of Ocean Engineering

Sea Grant College Program
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Report Number: MITSG 81-15
NOAA Grant Number: NA 79AA-D-00101
Project Number: R/Z-1
November 1981

The Boston Harbor Management Study has been published by the MIT

Sea Grant College Program Communications Information Office. Copies

of the report and of unpublished appendices and color coded land-use

survey maps are available for room use or sale from the:

Marine Resources Information Center
Massachusetts Institute.of Technology
MIT Sea Grant College Program
Building E38-302 (292 Main Street)
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
(617) 253-3461

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE BOSTON HARBOR. 6

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE HARBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

DECISON-MAKING STRUCTURE FOR THE HARBOR . . . . . . . . . . 30

Characteristics oF the Decison-making Structures .33

Changes Underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

OBSERVATIONS OF OTHER URBAN HARBORS -
SOME COMPARISONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

Baltimore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

San Diego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Seattle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

BOSTON HARBOR: ISSUES AND ANALYSES

Public Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

The Port: Status and Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Marina Development . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 194

Commuter Boats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

.Water Quality Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

APPENDIX I: INITIAL REVIEWS AND RESPONSES
TO FINAL DRAFT REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

APPENDIX II: Another volume to be purchased separately,
including background papers

PREFACE

The Boston Harbor Management Projiect was conducted at the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology from June, 1979@to June, 1981. Funding was provided

by the Massachusetts Legislature, the.M.I.T. Sea Grant Program, Boston

Shipping Association, Massachusetts Port Authority, New England River Basins

Commission, Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Office and the Seaman's

Aid Society.

The Project was directed by Professor Judith Kildow of the Department

of Ocean Engineering. Associate Investigators were Professor Gary Hack, an

urban planner; Professor Richard de Neufville, civil engineer and transport-

ation analyst; Dr. Richard Tabors, economist and environmental engineer, and

Dr. Lee Warren, writer and editor. Others who assisted in the Project:

Steve Cassella and Amy Philipson worked with Dr. Tabors on the Land Use Atlas;

Cassella did the Other Cities Study under Professor Kildow's supervision;

Jim Spall, Koji Tsunokawa and Jennifer Zeien worked with Professor de Neufville

on Harbor transportation problems; George Blossom did the MDC case study;

Sue Resteghini did the Marina Development case study; Amy Stewart of

Wellesley College did the Commuter Boat study, and Kathleen Hoard worked with

Professor Kildow on the Institutional Structures and Charts.

The contributions of John Ames, former Director of Boston Harbor

Associates; Thom Ennen of the Special Commission on Development of Boston

Harbor, and Don Connors, Esq., of Choate, Hall and Stewart, of Boston, are
acknowledged with gratitude. Finally, special appreciation must go for the

major assistance of M.I.T. Sea Grant Office and its Director, Dean Horn.

J'Lgith Tegger Kildow
A.Oociate Professor of
Ocean Policy

INTRODUCTION

The Boston Harbor in the last century has undergone many changes, most

of which reflect fu.ndamental transitions in American society: changes in

population patterns, in transportation use, and in daily living. Massa-

chusetts can claim one of the oldest governments in the United States,

filled with tradition and spirit. Yet, while times and lifest@yles and the

Harbor have changed, physically and philosophically much of the governing

structure for the Commonwealth which governs the Harbor has remained the

same. Massachusetts' method of adjusting to change has mostly been to add

laws, programs and agencies to respond to immediate needs. For example,

the growth and reorganization of the Executive Branch in the mid 1970s

responded to the times by strengthening the basic governing structures and

mandates for environmental protection. Yet, the past decade has brought

new concerns and changes requiring a balanced approach--one which protects

the environment but at the same time encourages and assists developments

which can bolster economic conditions which have been of major concern,

especially to decaying urban areas. The absence of any structure to

balance the necessary constraining structures of environmental laws in

the statewide governing context is meaningfully illuminated in the current

state of what some might consider Massachusetts' most valuable set of assets,

the lands and waters of the Boston Harbor. Only the City of Boston has
undertaken, through the Boston Redevelopment Authority, to rehabilitate

according to an apparent planning process the decaying areas of its water-

front,which once bustled with traditional water-based activities. A few

other locations, such as Charlestown, Revere Beach and the Weymouth

residential developments are the only other,notable changes in the Boston

Harbor in many years.

Plans have been aired for other,toij@h jurisdictions for better

utilizing their waterfront areas as well, but thus far, Boston Harbor

developments have been piecemeal, representing the interests of a local

city or even a local developer scop6d by a limited set of regulations which

are primarily focused on water pollution abatement and@protection of

wetlands. Public concerns,. such as rights of access, to what has been

determined as an area to be protected for the public trust, and public

concerns regarding the larger economic benefits which might be delivered

from this valuable coastal resource have been neglected up to now. However,

public access has become a major focal point since the Massachusetts Supreme

Court Quirico Decision of last year, declaring that the waters and immediate

land areas of the Harbor must be protected in the public trust and cannot

be owned or controlled for private uses which do not serve the public. And,

the apparent limitations on land and the value inherent in waterfront

property have brought much attention to waterfronts for purposes of

economic development and revenue generation for local cities and towns,

particularly in light of the recent Proposition 2 112 referendum limiting tax

dollars to these cities.

While Boston Harbor is changing especially in the downtown Boston

waterfront, the redevelopment expansion continues with recurring patterns

of condos, hotels and restaurants, a monotonous pattern which could become

very uninteresting. In addition to the few cities and towns which are

developing plans for their waterfront area, most,cities and towns are either

unaware or unable to capture the values lying dormant there.

Two problems arise. First, Boston's renewal expansion outward from

its central waterfront will soon affect adjacent communities in numerous

ways, some positive, some negative. In either case these jurisdictions

should be prepared to buffer or accommodate the impacts. Apart from a few

coastal zone management planning efforts, there appears little preparation

or initiative. Second, the management mechanisms governing change in the

Boston Harbor are so complex, that they baffle the most experienced of

lawyers. In most other American urban harbors some group has taken the lead

and forced integrated Harbor planning and management. In some cases, it has

been state coastal zone management programs where they have had legislative
power (unlike Massachusetts); in others it has been a port authority, a

development commission5or a regional agency, consolidating or coordinating

jurisdictions. In most other harbors of the United States such as, Seattle,

San Francisco, San Diego, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York/New Jersey,

they have moved more rapidly than Boston to rejuvenate. While crises or

rapid major changes triggered some of the harbors into transition, others

chose to capture the moment and to respond to newly defined publ ic needs.

Other Harbor areas reflect reorganization and a focus of their decision-

making and management structures on their harbors. In contrast, nowhere

in the Commonwealth is there to be found an agency, an office or a visible

group to focus on the Boston Harbor as a place. Of particlular note is the

absence of any representation for the Harbor either in the Yegislative

or 4.xecutive branches. Comprising at least nine cities and towns,

depending on one's geographic definition, each reflecting the individuality

that characterizes the Commonwealth, and without any vehicle for coordination,

the Harbor lacks attention as an entity with an integrated vision or general

plan.

As was noted by one Massachusetts legislator, "Our existing governance

mechanisms find their historical foundations mainly in the need to represent

people as opposed to places." Since there are very few people who 'live'

in or on the waters of Boston Harbor,,the lack of any specific public body

controlling and speaking for the Harbor is understandable. Thus, in

determining the need to restructure or reorganize the governing mechanisms

which we currently have, close attention must be paid to the area's unique

geopolitical nature. While the water and Harbor provide the common denom-

inator for all to focus on the Harbor, the populations with interests and

rights in the Harbor reflect as broad a range as one would find anywhere.

Thus, this mechanism must be unusually representative and sensitive

enough to these interests, while at the same time not being so sensitive as

to get bogged down with personal agenda.

Certainly, the depressed economy, the pressure of increasing urban

populations on urban waterfront areas for entertainment and recreation, and

the declining state of much of the waterfront,is gradually awakening portions

of the Harbor. D-_@caying areas such as Charlestown, Chelsea, East Boston, and

Hull are currently focal points for redevelopment efforts. The question

which needs serious attention, and which has been the subject for this report,

is whether the marketplace is adequate to determine the development con-

figurations for the Harbor. Or, is there a need for public intervention to

assure that public as well as private interests are protected. At first glance

it is quite apparent that beaches, parks and estuaries and even small

businesses such as marinas are not adequately considered in the marketplace,

and must have public protection and encouragement. On the other hand, it is

also apparent that the regulatory system places constraints on revenue -

oriented developments to such an extent that not only private but also public

interests in the economic development of areas are sometimes compromised.

Hence, a better balance which tan more effectively respond to current

*See Finneran memo in Appendix.

lifestyles and public and private needs should be sought for the Boston

Harbor.

The recommendations which follow emanate from many sources of infor-

mation which have been gathered and analyzed over the past two years. They

are based on charting decision-making in the Harbor, mapping the uses of

Harbor lands, doing case studies of major unresolved issues in Boston Harbor

to determine what works and does not work, studying problems of public

access and problems of revenue-based activities for this harbor and studying

six other urban harbors in the United States. They focus on providing a

legitimate identity for the Harbor, on coordinating and enhancing developments

in the Harbor area and in general on making a significant difference in

bringing the entire Harbor alive.

Underlying most of the recommendations is a philosophical assumption

that the Boston Harbor has an inherent public value, which even private

landowners must consider. There must be adequate public recreation and

aesthetic resources and general access. There must also be a mechanism to

unleash the largely untapped sources of revenues in a well-planned

thoughtfully-developed way.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE

MANAGEMENT OF THE BOSTON HARBOR

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF BOSTON HARBOR

There should be a centralization of governing structures which serve

the Harbor toward the end of focusing directly on the development.and

preservation of the Boston Harbor. At the same time, it must represent

the multitudinous interests in the decision-making apparatus of the State.

That centralization can take place in any of several forms:

1. Keep the same basic governing structure, except to streamline the

current environmental permitting system, and to add a new mechanism--

a public/private non-profit entity--to facilitate and encourage

coordinated planning and development in the Harbor, such as a planning

and development commission with appropriate powers to carry out its

tasks of assistance in developing the Harbor in coordination with the

other agencies with powers in the Harbor.

2. Build a regional federation of state and local governing bodies under-

scored with strong legislative mandates to carry out specific duties

for the Harbor, requiring them to be housed in the same building,

gi.ving them a carefully designed legislative structure for coordination.

Such a federation would include all but Federal powers in the Harbor.

3. Build a superagency, such as might be created through a new body or

institutionalization of the current Special Legislative Commission for

the Boston Harbor with the appropriate representation, giving it

absolute power over all harbor-related activities through strong

legislation.

4. Use the existing governing structures without changes, pass a legis-

lative.package instructing all governing bodies with authority and

interest in the Harbor to operate under specific guidelines stated in

the legislation.
6

5. Use one of the existing agencies already dominant in the Harbor and

build it into the Super Harbor Agency through special legislation.

The five examples above represent a range of options one might

consider for the Boston Harbor. In assessing them, the first two inter-

mediary forms appear to have the most probability of success, although

they might be the most difficult to organize and implement at first glance.

The rationale for these forms comes from investigating other

U.S. harbors and how they are managed, as well as intimately studying the

existing management apparatus for the Boston Harbor. Several factors led

to the conclusions that the first two alternatives were most relevant for

the Boston Harbor.

1. The creation of a superauthority (#3 above) superceeding all other

structures, could not be easily placed above the current governing

structure and survive, for the several existing governing bodies are

too deeply entrenched in state powers and politics to permit their

strengths to be so eroded.

2. The creation of a superagency from an already existing dominant

agency for the Harbor (#5 above) such as was done in the case of the

San Diego Port Authority seemed out of the question as well. None

of the dominant groups reflect either the broad range of philosophies

and interests necessary to represent the Harbor nor the geographic

authority to carry out such a broad mandate. And there were several

equally strong governing bodies whose powers and position would be
difficult if not impossible to displace, e.g., Massport, City of

Boston, and the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA)

(through the functions of the Department of Environmental Quality
Engineering (DEQE) and the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC) in
particular).

3. While the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA) carries out

an integral and important regulatory function in Boston'Harbor, without

a balancing agency or arm for facilitating,, initiating and encouraging,

and coordinating development in the Harbor, the EOEA's functions to some

people have become an unbalanced constraint on Harbor activities. For

those wishing to develop Harbor lands, the management structure, while

fulfill ing necessary functions, is cumbersome and constraining without

any single governing mechanism to either assure the efficient functioning

of the regulatory arms or to help expedite the process. There is only
the Boston Redevelopment 'Authority (BRA) for the City of Boston,,

operating in a facilitating and initiating fashion to move things along

in rejuvenating the Harbor. Massport, too, has functioned similarly to

carry out industrial port developments, and peripheral activities such

as the Fish Pier and other commercial land developments. However, the

primary purpose of Massport is to run the airport and the shipping port,

not to carry out a real estate business of land development and land

speculation in the Harbor area. It is neither mandated@ nor structured

to carry out this facilitatinginitiating,and developmental function

in the general sense that is necessary to redevelop Boston Harbor.

4. There have been numerous attempts to change the management of Boston

Harbor over the past decade. Maintaining the same systemic structure

with only a legislated base to give emphasis to Harbor activities (#4 above

would probably fail to make a difference within a system and structure

which resists change as this one seems to. This solution would also have

no incentive.to change the waysof the past without financial incentives,

and there is no guarantee within'.the'current accounting system that the

monies would be spent on Harbor activities. If monies are to be allocated

for purposes.of improving the HarbWs.contributions in this area, there

should be a focal point for those monies@so that oversight of the

expenditures would be more easily carried out by the public as well as

the legislature.

Functions Of a Governing StructUrejor the Harbor:

1. Promote and carry out both a long-term and short-term integrated plan-

ning process for the uses of the waters and lands of the entire harbor,

demonstrating a regional view of the resource.

2. Provide a focal point for coordination of the land and water uses.

Set guides for resolving "highest and best use" criteria with water-

dependent and comprehensive planning needs.

3. Facilitate the necessary activities in the Harbor ranging from

environmental clean up to the development of revenue generating

activities, expediting the permit process and providing investment

incentives.

4. Provide the communication and information to and from the users and

regulators of the Harbor area.

5. Mediate conflicting use patterns and equity issues.

6. Provide the oversight for carrying out the Public Trust Doctrine as
designated under the Quirico Decision. Provide clear requirements
for potential developers to preserve public trust.

7. Expedit activities to upgradeand expand the public access and

recreational facilities in the Harbor area. Centralize responsibility

for those activities in a single office within a new structure.

8. Focus attention on public access an&public trust issues through for-

mation of public advisory committees and public meetings in the broadest

terms. The public is largely ignorant of the Harbor's potential and

actual value. Those constituencies which have Harbor interests are

fragmented and have rare occasion and limited, if any, channels through

which they can speak.

9. Refocus or restructure governing bodies and attitudes to be more

responsive and accountable to the public.

10. Provide a governing mechanism to protect equity.and preclude usurping by

an elite few the ever increasingly valuable public resources in the

Harbor.

11. Provide a shortened and simplified system for environmental review and

issuing.permits, especially for the small developer.

12. Consolidate investment and development activities into a single office

which should incorporate the benefits derived from the state Office of

Commerce and Development and Massport, for example, and coordinate with

other relevant groups such as the Chamber of Commerce to privide optimal

development incentives leading to investment and greater employment.

13. Encourage and assist the mayors of the cities and towns of the Harbor to

form an organization through which they can exchange ideas and issues

about the Harbor as they affect their localities. Representation in

such an organization should be weighted by population and/or shore miles

on the Harbor. This organization can.also function as the focal point

for representation enabling the'local governments to act as a bloc in

whatever governing process is relevant.

Because centralization of authority.for the Boston Harbor will take

some time to establish and because there are certain building blocks which

will make it more effective, the following list of interim steps should

be considered:

Recommendations for Interim Steps:

1. The Legislature should request that the current Harbor Commission appoint

a subcommittee to assess the status of all government-owned property along

the Harbor's edge--Federal, State and Local--to identify best uses for the

properties, including trades for appropriate but less valuable sites,

allowing the best possible uses of all Harbor land. This could set the

stage for the larger job of planning for the Harbor, which could begin

either under an interim body to a centralized Harbor body, or by the

Harbor entity itself.

2. The Legislature should immediately establish a Right of Way Commission,

possibly through the Public Access Board similar to that of Rhode Island,

to determine exactly and clearly mark where the public does have access

to the Harbor. This should be followed by a legislative mandate to the

new Harbor entity along with sufficient funds to realize the full poten-

tial of these areas.

3. The Permit Assistance office of the Governor needs to be expanded to
include Harbor permits as well, until a Harbor entity can expedite the

permitting process.

4. Both the executive and legislative brandies.of the Commonwealth must

address the private and public labor-management problems prevalent

throughout the Commonwealth, which toqether with the larqerincum-

bent construction costs associated with building and implementing

activities in the Harbor, often stifle growth and development and con-

tribute to low productivity and i'nefficient operations. In the public

area, the civil service and patronage systems are ridden with inequities

and inefficiencies. Both the strengths and weaknesses of both systems

form interdependencies which make the untangling of the problems that

much more difficult. In the private sector, the labor-management system

appears to have proceeded with an unspoken rule that costs can be passed

on to the consumer, no matter, so that much inefficiency is permitted in

the system to such an extent that the unlayering of what has gone on for

decades, a way of life, will also be difficult to undo. While the unleash-

ing of public funds to encourage developments in the Harbor might.be a

simpler solution, as the current Governor has attempted to do throughout

the state, the heart of the matter lies in the negotiated contracts and

the lack of productivity requirements built into either the public or
private sector arrangements. With particular reference to the Harbor

area, the successful launching of numerous public-oriented activities

has been impeded by labor-management problems and others are carried out

with gross inefficiency with losses to the public. The new Harbor

mechanism, if one is created, might experiment with new employee incen-

tive systems that reward efficiency, productivity and innovation. This

might also make its success more certain and provide models for other

divisions of state government.

13
5. The public's interest should be..enlistedl, structures should be developed

as a conduit for this interest and.to provide for appropriate response.

Private monetary sources should be-@ought through the Chamber of Commerce

and other financial sources to aid citizens' advisory activities in the

Harbor.

6. Water quality management in the Harbor'and adjacent Metropolitan areas

needs serious attention. The current structure of the MDC should be

reexamined to determine whether its current mandates and functions.are

appropriate. The MDC structure and its links must either be changed to

accommodate new directions and needs of society, or a more effective

organizational structure, more accountable to the public it serves, must

be substituted. For many years, a portion of the MDC staff, including

professional staff, has not been under either civil service or any other

screening mechanism for capabilities. Both the supply of water and

treatment of water are of fundamental importance to the region. Effec-

tive implementation and management of both of these mandates requires

deft placement of experienced and appropriately trained employees. There

must be objective review to assure that these standards are not compro-

mised by automatic civil service promotions or by inappropriate patronage

appointments. In any new Harbor management scheme, water quality

management must be integrated, either through a more effectively organ-

ized MDC that will provide planning, construction and operations for

water supply and for wastewater treatment, or through delegation of

power among critical bodies which could apply expertise to assure

satisfactory management. Or , if this is impossible, citizens could move

for a private, non-profit organization to be formed, financed by user

fees, to carry out this most important function.

7. As an advisory resource for a new Harbor:mechanism, some zoning, taxing

and Use guides must be developed as a basis upon'which to launch such a

new operation.

A. To assure incorporation'of coastal zone management philosophies,

coastal guidance packages similar to those used in Baltimore

might be prepared with the assistance of the state Coastal Zone

Management (CV1) Office.

B. The current tax assessment structure for the local cities and

towns should be changed to reflect better market values. The

current system is an impediment to development, because it is

based on assessments of current uses of the land and not on

market value. As a result, the most valuable piece of vacant

property in Boston Harbor is assessed at $1/square foot--as a

parking lot--instead of at its market value of millions of

dollars, a major loss of revenue to financially pinched govern-

ments. This system entourages landowners to keep property

vacant and let rundown property remain an eyesore, encourages land

speculation and inhibits the development of best possible uses

for the land. If there is a need to preserve land for open space

or future use, some incentives should be provided for owners to

use this land for park or recreation until further plans are

in order for development.

8. The determination of "highest and best use" often used by zoning and tax
boards needs to be reexamined and altered to include new societal values

and needs which are not always directly born out by dollar calculations.

For example, the best possible use from an economic point of view for the

owner of a particular parcel on the Fort Point Channel might be an office

tower which would yield a high rental per square foot. On the other hand,

if that "highest and best use" criteria were carried out on any scale in

the area, the result would be dead space from 5 P.M. to 9 A.M.--useless

and really undervalued under criteria that evaluate public amenities and

the multiplier effects of these amenities as the basis for calculating

best possible uses. The quality of life for the entire area, rather than

economic development for an individual piece of property must take priority,

for ultimately the value of the entire area is what must be assessed.

9. Zoning based on several categories of use--water-dependent, water-enhanced

and non-water-dependent--along with incentives for the most appropriate

use should be implemented for the entire Harbor with a public oversight

process.

10. Legislation should be passed which requires and defines public access for

every project involving government funds and eventually for all projects

bordering the Harbor. The final determinations for the Quirico Decision

should provide a significant mechanism for assuring public access and

public interests in the Harbor to be carried out through new Harbor manage-

ment. The decision to reactivate the Public Trust Doctrine will provide

a sound basis upon which to plan the Harbor and carry out extensive and

comprehensive development in the public interest. Examples of California,

Oregon and Washington, where the coastlines belong to the public, demon-

strate positive precedents for this model.

11. Provide better public information about the Harbor.

A. When public facilities are available, provide intense public

information about them, allocating appropriate funding levels to

do so. The Harbor Islands are an excellent example of strong
efforts to serve the public, wasted by poor, low-funded public

information procedures, that until recently let few know what is

available or how to use them.

B. Prepare a documentary film of.Boston Harbor, including brief

highl.ights of other harbors where much has been accomplished.

The film should envision what Boston Harbor might look like in

order to stimulate interest in coordinated planning.

12. Water-based commuter transportation systems.should.be given preference

over land-based to relieve crowding. A mechanism to coordinate land and

water-based commuter systems should be instituted. It should permit

private enterprise to enter on equal grounds as a competitive force with

public systems.

A. Currently all public carriers within the MBTA district must

be licensed by the MBTA through authority delegated to it by

the Department of Public Utilities (DPU). It is strongly
recommended that the DPU recover these powers to prevent
further restraint of th e market, particularly as it pertains

to Harbor transportation.

B. The marriage of the State Department of Transportation and

the MBTA under the current administration has resulted in the

total allocation of Massachusetts' Urban Mass. Transit Funds
(UMTA) by the State Department of Transportation (DOT) going
to the MBTA. Clearly a minor portion of these funds allocated
to water-based transportation could have provided good harbor
terminals and capital for*adequate commuter boats. The
abortive attempts at establishing such a service (see Case
Study on Commuter Boats) could have been turned into major

triumphs. The complexion of the Harbor could change, reflecting

the true benefits offered by the water through a different allocation

of these and other funds.

NOTE: For further elaboration and explanation of the roots for many of

these recommendations, please refer to the section,"Other Cities"

PP. 118-121 entitled "What is Transferable?"

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE HARBOR

Note: Members of the Project team prepared a land-use survey of the Harbor
and prepared thirteen color coded maps to illustrate their findings. A
written summary of the survey is included in this report, but the maps
themselves have not been reproduced because of the expense involved. The
MIT Sea Grant Program has several sets of the maps available for room use
in their reference center, or copies may be ordered from them for $13 a set.

SUMMARY OF THE LAND-USE SURVEY

The Annotated Land-use Survey reveals the following facts about the

Boston Harbor:

1. The Harbor is an underutilized area with high potential for public

use and revenue generating activities.

2. The Harbor is a place of mixed uses; it is residential, industrial,

commercial, recreational.

3. While most of the outer Harbor is residential in use, combined with

other uses, the Inner Harbor contains large areas of government-owned

land. This government ownership provides the space and the basis for

comprehensive Harbor planning. (See also, the jurisdictional charts,

.indicating large landowners in the Harbor: Massport, Boston, MDC.)

4. These large blocks of government land also provide the basis for land

trades where appropriate for more effective use of the land.

5. While there are numerous public rights of way, they are often ill-

defined, inaccessible, unmarked, undeveloped. (See Public Access

section.)

6. Shipping in the Harbor is heavily private, i.e., sugar and fuel, Sealand.

Massport, while a key participant, is but one of several major shipping
interests. (See The Port of Boston: Status and Prospects.)

7. Residential uses of the harbor are mixed in income, though segregated.

housing ranges from the Harbor Towers in the Inner Harbor to middle

income houses in Winthrop, to double and triple deckers north of the

city, to Columbia Point public housing. However, this economic mixture

may be temporary: almost all new.housing along the Harbor's edge is
luxury housing. (See Boston Globe, 1/11/81.) The exceptions to be

noted are the elderly and middle income subsidized housing units in

Revere and East Boston.

8. Harbor land use is rarely water dependent in terms of traditional

perspectives. Rather, many activities are either water enhanced or

totally land related and located on the Harbor because of the low cost

of low-lying land or general convenience to Boston.

Scope:

The survey's objectives were:

o to identify the major land use types and their predominant

locations in the Harbor;

o to identify the location of public properties within the Harbor;

o to identify, where possible, the areas of public access, either

structured or unstructured, to the Harbor;

o to identify areas for potential development.

Unlike most current Harbor surveys., the BHMP has not studied just the

inner downtown Harbor, but rather has used the general definition of the

Massachusetts Coastal Zone office. The Atlas covers the entire Boston Harbor,

from the Lynn/Revere town line on the North, to Nantasket Beach on the South.

The inner Harbor, as it is referred to in this report, is defined as the

area that reaches from the southeast corner of Logan Airport to Castle Island.

The outer Harbor is the remaining area.

The land uses identified were:

o Residential: All single through multi-family units are included.

No effort was made to separate out individual buildings in which

there was mixed commercial and residential usage.

o Commercial and industrial: With the exceptions of Public lands

and marine areas, all commercial and industrial land uses, including

commercial piers, were grouped together.

o Public land: Park facilities, beaches, and publicly owned buildings

within the coastal zone are separated from the generic category of

commercial and industrial uses.

o Marine: Largely water-based activities, such as marinas, dock

facilities, and mooring areas have been separated from commercial

industrial uses as a subcategory.

o Large institutional: These areas included the majority of the

properties owned by the state and federal government.

o Vacant/undeveloped: Vacant and/or undeveloped lands are identified.

These areas were limited and occurred generally north and south of

of the center of the Harbor.

The information gathered in the land use atlas was developed to be

presented simply on a series of maps illustrating general use of the Harbor.

Because of the particular needs of the BHMP, the level of detail was confined

to these six categories. It was not necessary for our purposes, nor, for

reasons of time and money, was it possible, to do a parcel by parcel assess-

ment of land ownership. Nor has the Project attempted to locate individual,

small parcels of land owned by public agencies or individual towns, but

rather has focused upon those parcels sufficiently large enough for there to

be potential for major private undertakings or public uses.

*The traditional definition of marine-dependent activity is used here.
We recognize that residential use of the Harbor is marine related, but have
chosen in this survey to separate actual water use from residential, visual,
water-enhanced use.

Information not traditionally available on a land use atlas has been,

included, through a numbering key which relates location on the map with a

set of roughly one hundred explanatory notes. This data identifies:

o Fbints of public access:

o Potentially recreational zones without public access, primarily

in suburban areas;

o Areas with public access but with limited or no parking facilities

and no close public transportation;

o Significant Harbor economic facilities, such as the major piers

and the LNG terminal.

Procedure:

The information used in the, Atlas has been compiled from the follow-

ing three sources:

o Windshield survey: The most reliable method of collection of the

general data has been the use of windshield surveys (visual';

surveys undertaken either driving, boating, or walking the shore

areas) of the coastal zone area. The windshield survey method

has the advantage of providing information on access and on

general conditions of specific portions of the Harbor that are

more recent than available aerial photographs.

o Aerial photographs: 'Information has been taken from existing

aerial photographs of specific portions of Boston Harbor, provided

to the group by Massport. This represented specific overflights,

ranging from 1969 to 1979, of Massport facilities. In addition,

the group has used a consistent set of aerial photographs of the

entire Harbor flown in March of 1976 (the latest full set available

commercially).

o Existing land use informatibn.t Where.possible the project has

utilized existing land use,data. Such information is available

for the City of Boston though it was found to be at too great a

scale of detail, not easily compatible with the remainderof the

analyses. Other sources of published information were found in

the Cmtal@Z6neklas and in Boston Harbor.

*Massachusetts Coastal.Zone Management Plan, Chapter 5,
Massachusetts Coastal.Regions and an Atlas Of Resources, Commonwealth of
Massachus-etts, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, Boston, June 1,
1977.

Land-Use Atlas

BOSTON HARBOR MAP KEY

Evere?t
26

HA
"J3 8 39

'K 2

Vipy'"Ooll

The base maps used for the land use materials
presented are taken from: Street Map Atlas
Metropolitan Boston and Eastern Massachusetts,
Arrow Publishing Company, Inc., Newton Upper Falls,
MA, 1979. (permission requested)

ATLAS NOTES

The notes which follow are keyed to the land use maps available

at extra cost. These notes relate to specific locations within the

Harbor and are designed specifically to identify points and quality of

access to the Harbor and to identify commercial activities of significance.

1. Point of Pines Road Access surrounding Residential area. Sea Wall,
separating road from small beach area. Limited parking.

2. Revere Beach and Crescent Beach (MDC) Access along full length with
parking off road as well as on roadside. No Parking outside of
this specific area.

3. Pines River Marsh Private Marinas. Limited slip capacity, primarily
moorings.

4. Abandoned Pier,

5. Rental facilities for small boats.

6. Beachmont: No public access, Private Property separating roadway
from water.

7. Short Beach (MDC@. No Parking.

8. Winthrop (Gravers Cliff). Private Property separating roadway from
water.

9. FAA Radar Station. No Public Access.

10. Winthrop Beach (MDC). No Parking.

11. Yirell Beach (Winthrop). Limited Parking. Limited Access.

12. Deer Island. No Public Access.
A. House of Correction (Suffolk County)
B. Sewage Treatment Facility (MDC)
C. Fort Dawes (GAO)

13. Crystal Cave. Private Boat Launching and Yacht club, Marina
Facilities. Limited public access.

14. The Basin, mooring area, public boat ramp and parking and public
park.

15. Cottage Park, Court Park. Access only at street endings.

16. Private Yacht club.

17. Government Property, No Access.

17A. Open Area.

18. Limited Marina area with moorings.

19. Orient Heights Beach/Constitution Beach (MDC) access by MBTA

20. U.S. Government Property, No Access

21. East Boston Piers 3, 4, & 5, Sheds Raised dead berthing only

22. East Boston Pier 1 - Storage Space

23. Small park, access to Park

24. Commercial Dock facility. Boston Fuel Transportation

25. Abandoned Wharf Space

26. Mario Umana Harbor School of Science and Technology

27. General Ship Corporation

28. Chelsea waterfront. All Industrial or commercial. No Public
Access, some vacant land.

29. Chelsea Navy Hospital

30. LNG Terminal, Distrigas

31. Revere Sugar

32. Moran Terminal

33. Mystic Pier
34. Charlestown Navy Yards (deactivated) Now Mixed Use Development

35. Old Ironsides

36. Hoosac Pier

37. New Charles River Dam

38. Yacht Basin

39. Urban Park Space with Hockey Rink

40. Coast Guard Station

41. North End Waterfront, predominately commercial space along Atlantic
Avenue

42. Commercial Wharf? - Private Marina

43. Lewis Wharf - re.sidential/commercial, private marina

44. Aquarium - Ferry Service, Sightseeing Facilities, Harbour Tours

45. Harbor Towers - private marina

46. Small dock / Pier facilities

Commonwealth Pier

48. Fish Pier

49. Shipyard, U.S. Government Property
50. Naval Shipyard (deactivated) Now Industrial Park and New Site for Massport
Container Facility
51. Reserve Channel - Commercial Access to #r 52 and 53.

52. Boston Edison Power Plant with Dock facilities

53. Dock facilities, Tank Farm

54. Warehouse space, Dock facility with Auto storage behind

55. Castle Island - Sea Land Terminal

56. Castle Island - Public Access New Massport Container Facility
57. Pleasure Bay - Public Access with Beach facilities (MDC)

58. L Street Beach (City of Boston)

59. Carson Beach (City of Boston)

60. U. Mass. Boston, access surrounding campus

61. J.F. Kennedy Memorial Library

62. Malibu Beach

63. Boat Ramp - public access on property owned by Boston Gas

64. Tenean Beach (MDC)

65. Marina Landing, Old Squantum Airport

66. Commuter boat service to Boston

67. Nickerson Beach

68. Squantum, No Public Access

69. Wollaston Beach

70. Private Beach Areas, Posted

71. Public Access, walkways to water

72. Beach behind seawall - public access, no parking

73. Nut Island Sewage Treatment Plant

74. Manet Beach

75. Quincy Shipyard

76. Wessagusset Beach (Weymouth)
77. Captain Will K. Webb Park (Weymouth)

78. Stodders Nech Park

79. Private Beach

80. Otishill. No Public Access

81. Bathing Beach, Hingham, Limited Parking

82. World's End; Public Access to Land Trust Area.

83. Residential Areas with no public access.

83A. Site for Proposed Public Marina

84. Residential Areas with no Public Access

85. Mariners Park, (Hull)

86. Hull, Limited Public Access

87. Nantasket Beach (MDC)

88. Paragon Park, Amusements

DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE

FOR THE HARBOR

DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE FOR THE HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
SUMMARY 31

INTRODUCTION 32

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE 33

A. No Representation for the Harbor 84

B. The Public Voice 35

C. A Concentration of Power 37
D. The Permitting Process and Relationships Among,Agencies 38

CHANGES UNDERWAY 51
A. Newly Enacted Programs to Address Jurisdictional Problems 51
B. Proposals to Address Jurisdictional Problems 55
C. Local Regulatory Reforms Proposed 64
D. FederalRegulatory Reforms Proposed 66

SUMMARY

In the analysis of the existing Boston Harbor management structure,

the basic and vital source for our conclusions is the information included

in several institutional charts. These charts allow a detailed look at the

range of government participants in Harbor decision-making. The first

chart is indexed according to federal, state and local agencies with their

respective legislative mandates and responsibilities, powers and permitting

jurisdictions as dictated by these statutes. The other charts classify

the same agencies from two other perspectives. The second chart aligns

the various agencies according to their powers, e.g., eminent domain,

permitting, and the third chart lists the agencies by their activity, e.g.,

environmental protection, construction, etc.

This approach has provided some clarity to an otherwise complicated

institutional system. As a result of comparing and contrasting, some of

the assets and liabilities of the managerial structure have become

apparent. The strengths and weaknesses in jurisdictional authority

frequently became self evident, establishing the basis for the management

recommendations. The following outline furnishes a brief description of

the results of the chart analysis.

*See Chapter I.
31

INTRODUCTION

The intent of this chapter is the identification and clarification of

the prevailing strenjths and problem areas for those who have interests in and

participate in decision making for Boston Harbor. This is achieved through

a consideration of different perspectives of the existing management

structure. For this purpose, three institutional charts of the Boston

Harbor have been compiled.

The first of these charts includes a comprehensive list of the

participants in the Boston Harbor's management. Accompanying each agency

andits corresponding legislative mandates and those responsibilities, powers

and permitting jurisdictions which the mandate requires.

The second chart categorizes these same agencies according to their

jurisdictional powers, e.g., eminent domain, permitting; and the third

chart completes the view by aligning federal, state and local agencies with

the type of activity in which they are involved, e.g., construction,

environmental protection.

These charts illuminate at least one perspective of the institutional

framework for the Harbor. Comparative studies of the charts reveal the

shortcomings in the system, such as jurisdictional overlaps, gaps, and

inefficiencies, as well as the strengths of the system, such as facilitators,

and points of initiative. These aspects of the existing management

structure also illuminate the complex system of interrelationships, both

beneficial and detrimental to utilization of the harbor's assets.

III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE

In the past, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has gained a reputation

for having a strong environmentally-conscious government maintaining a

strong emphasis on stringent environmental regulations and the permitting

processes which they require, such as are found in the landmark lietlands

Legislation and Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act. Commended as a

necessary part of the regulatory system to moderate the previously unchecked

practices of industry and other development projects, its complexity and

pervasiveness have led some to view aspects of implementation as unnecessary

constraints on economic development, especially in the coastal zone.

These constraints take two forms:

First, as a whole, they are structured in such a way that they can

become costly delaying mechanisms without justification if their time

phasing is not carefully monitored, merely due to the number of permits and

.agencies which can become involved. There appear to be continual attempts

to remedy this problem, although bureaucratic vested interests and tradition

sometimes inhibit these attempts.

The second form is quite separate from the system of environmental

regulation. It is a generic state government problem of imbalance. While

development opportunities are sought and stressed throughout the Commonwealth,

there has been no particular effort for the Boston Harbor, leaving a

vacuum in the Harbor development-orientated mechanisms relative to Harbor-

related environmental constraints. Added to this vacuum has been an absence

of organized public voice regarding public amenities for the Harbor area.

While several state agencies (MDC and DEM) effectively provide public

recreational facilities, there has been no broad-based vehicle for

coordinated public input, particularly from the publics which don't live

along the downtown Boston waterfront. Boston Harbor Associates, a private,

non-profit group has, at least, provided an outlet for the downtown

waterfront population.

Some-of these issues have been addressed by the currert state admini-

stration and corrective action has been sought to ameliorate aspects of the

situation. Noteworthy examples of this process are the implementation of a

Permit Development Assistance Program in the Governor's Office and the compi-

lation of a beneficial financial incentive package within the Department of

Communities and Development. The apparent flaw in the implementation is the'

exclusion of Boston Harbor from this program. The Harbor, having no status as

a singular decision-.making entity, appears to be neglected by these activities.

A. No Representation for the Harbor

As a rule, Boston Harbor does not have a status in government

priorities due to its lack of identity as an entity. Rather, it is repre-

sented as separate cities and towns which just happen to border the

Harbor. Clearly, Boston Harbor is a vital resource, not only to Boston

Harbor constituents and citizens but to the entire constituency of the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts and possibly New England as well. Yet,

because government representation has traditionally been carried out based

on a geographic location of people living in a particular area, functional

representation which transcends a specific geographic domicile receives no

credence in the governing mechanism unless special arguments and efforts

are made to bring it about.

Decisions, rulings and permits are handled on a case-by-case basis

by most agencies. If a situation requiring government intervention should

arise in Boston Harbor, it is treated like any other without due attention

to the Harbor's unique attributes or the full range of its implications

for the Harbor. Beyond this method of decision making, the actual structure

of local, state, and federal government lacks any focus on Boston Harbor.

Sometimes local, state and federal agencies whose jurisdictions legally

cover the Harbor, decline any involvement with the Harbor at all.

For example, the Massachusetts Department of Communities and Development

does not deal with any affairs directly concerning the Harbor, although its

financial incentive packages could prove invaluable assistance to commercial

and urban,development in the Harbor. Also, the Governor's Development Office,

which has initiated a Permit Assistance Program and has been designated as

a permit "expediter" by executive order, becomes involved only in permitting

problems which are external to the Harbor area. These two particular in-

stances are indicative of the lack of concern with Boston Harbor as a valuable

asset in state managerial techniques. This limited orientation of planning,

decision making and implementation for Boston Harbor has until now precluded

opportunities for enhancing the Harbor as an entity. Any long range

planning for the future growth and development of the Harbor has also been

constrained by this factor.

B. The Public Voice

In an effective decision-making structure, it is essential that there

be devices for public input. The Boston Harbor region is a point of

interest and concern for many constituencies throughout the Boston

Metropolitan area. Their desire for participation in the planning and

management process has resulted in the formation of the Boston Harbor

Citizens' Advisory Committee (BHCAC) the Boston Harbor Associates, the

Boston Marine Education Exchange, and others.

*Other Boston Harbor neighborhood groups and associations are active

as well.

Yet, the establishment of these organizations is not always

sufficient to ensure the optimal use of the Harbor in the public interest

despite the members' determined and sincere efforts to be represented. As

a result of the creation of the BHCAC, vital communication and coordination

linkages have been formed between private citizens and the federal and state

environmental agencies (EPA, EOEA).

The public interest sometimes is forfeited for development projects

which are financially advantageous to the city's tax structure. Hence,

recreational facilities such as public and private marinas, fishing piers and

public access points to the waterfront receive secondary status in development

considerations. In fact, water-based activities take secondary status to

land-based high income options, although zoning procedures could dictate

otherwise.

The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) is authorized to act on

behalf of the "public interest", although its objectives are often impeded by

compelling pressures to give traditional sources of finpncial return or

private interests a higher priority. Additionally, citizens' advisory

committees which possess the potential for voicing public opinion and

preference are underutilized. Insufficient funding has limited their

abilities to extend their public outreach and realize their intended

function, forcing accountability from government administration. There is

recent evidence that the increased media coverage and public meetings may
be having some impact. When specific concerns finally surface because of
neglect or conflict impasses, citizens groups have been effective through

public meetings in airing the issues and pushing for effective resolutions.

Such diverse issues as sewage treatment for Boston Harbor, the choice of a

37
harbor master, the need for a public boat basin, and the Long Wharf hotel

development received unusual public attention and forced governing bodies

to be more responsive to public needs. There is the need for public opinion

for major development plans in any government management framework. A

clear obligation of public agencies to their constituencies has been often

overlooked or ignored. As a result, the full value of Boston Harbor as a

public resource, recreational site and historical entity has not been fully

realized.

C. A Concentration 6f@P6wer

Although many entities are involved in decisions affecting Boston

Harbor, there exist but a few federal, state and local authorities which

actually exercise influence in Boston Harbor. The predominance of power

is found in: (1) the City of Boston through the Boston Redevelopment

Authority (BRA) and the Conservation Commission; (2) Massport;

(3) Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA) and its offices, the

Metropolitan District Commission and Department of Environmental Quality

Engineering; and, (4) the Federal Environmental Protection Agency. The

control that these agencies possess is not absolute (other agencies do

possess important functions, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Coast

Guard) but, in general, the managerial input of theEegroups dominates most

judgments and decisions concerning the Harbor and its surroundings.

The power of these agencies can be attributed to a variety of factors.

The fact that Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), Massachusetts Port

Authority (Massport), and the City of Boston under the auspices of the

Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) hold title to a good deal of waterfront

Public meetings are held but evidence of the use of meaningful
contributions by the public is rarely evident.

land in Boston Harbor and its vicinity seems to be a key determinant in the

power structure. Because these agencies also retain the power of eminent

domain, their influence is further supplemented, especially in development

projects which extend into their jurisdictional sphere of influence.

Also, because of the City of Boston's Board of Appeals and Boston

Redevelopment Authority'.s influence in zoning and building permits, the

fate of development projects is usually contingent upon the approval of

these bodies. While power really lies with these few groups, their mandates

and objectives as well as constituents are diverse and make coordination and

cooperation difficult in many instances. When they do have common objectives,

such as in the case of the Fish Pier, the process works well. One might

conclude there is a need for some agency to compel such coordination in cases

when objectives are not mutually agreeable.

D. The Permitting Process and Relationships Among Agencies

The lengthy and costly permitting process further accentuates the

existing jurisdictional inequality by preventing local or individual par-

ticipation in the development process. Oftentines the money and motivation

for a development project exists, but long delays, even up to two years,

e.g., National Pollution Discharge Elinimation System (NPDES) permits

and the associated lawyer's fees, eventually defeat the small entrepreneur's

efforts. The NPDES requires the involvement of both state and federal

permitting authorities (the state Department of Environmental Quality

Engineering - Division of Water Pollution Control and federal Environmental

Protection Agency). Until recently, there were reviews of the same

with little attention to coordination of effort or concurrency, so that

applicants incurred lawyer's costs of up to $200,000 and sometimes still

The Charlestown development is one such case.

lacked permit approval. Now arrangements between EPA and EOEA strive for

better coordination.

Costly permitting processes shift the influence in Boston Harbor

development to those capable of withstanding the financial burden, that is,

to state and federal agencies and large corporations: inherently, this

system allows those agencies capable of stalling the development process

to do so with little restraint. This type of situation can lead to

unhealthy means for gaining access to this inequitable management structure.

While efforts are underway to improve the permitting process, it is

understandable why the problem has persisted. There are numerous pieces of

legislation which must be coordinated. To preserve the water quality of

rivers and harbors of the United States, the Federal Water Pollution Control

Act (Clean Water Act) was passed in 1972 and the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) was designated the agency responsible for "establishing permit

requirements, state program requirements,and procedures for decision making"

for the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit

.program. In the footsteps of the Clean Water Act (CWA) followed a subordinate

yet equivalent piece of legislation referred to as the Massachusetts Clean

Water Act. This act provided for the Division of Water Pollution Control (DWPC)

within the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) with the

Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA). Its legislative mandate

required DWPC to adopt standards of water quality and prescribe limits, permits,

and procedures for the NPDES as well as pollution regulation for ground water

permits, water quality certification and industrial wastewater treatment

facilities approvals. Corresponding to their affirmative responsibility to

protect the water environment, the DWPC is obligated to approve reports and

plans of pollution abatement facilities, inspect construction of facilities,

direct planning for federal funding for construction and supervise operation

and maintenance of facilities. Undoubtedly, a determined effort has been

made to include every aspect of water pollution disposal regulations in order

to protect the waters of the Commonwealth. In essence, it is apparent that

there has been a distinct "vertical" separation between agencies with similar

goals. Each particular authority is,concerned with its own affirmative

responsibility whether it be regulatory, public works, financing, land use or

redevelopment. When considering development proposals for a particularly rich

and promising resource region such as Boston Harbor, it is essential that the

whole picture be seen.

The permitting process is one instance where the absence of a concerted

coordinated effort has led to duplicative and counter productive actions.

Duplication of permitting jurisdiction is particularly evident in the case of

federal/state overlaps, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency/Department of@

Environmental Quality Engineering (EPA/DEQE). Both of these agencies administer

programs which are similar in purpose, e.g. , Hazardous Waste Management, NPDES.

During the period of this Harbor project, these two agencies strengthened their

coordination through agreement to a single set of conditions for permitting and

attempting a more consolidated authority between them.

The problem of overlapping authority also extends into the state office
itself (DEQE). The Department, existing as the state's leading environmental

permitting authority, is responsible for several regulatory processes. It

allots a portion of this authority to divisions under its jurisdiction,

e.g., Division of Water Pollution Control (DWPC) and Division of Waterways.

The Division of Waterways' main permitting function is in connection with the

Chapter 91 Waterways License. The purpose of this legislation is the protection

of the public's rights in the waters of the Commonwealth and the land under

its waters. In actual implementation, the regulation is applied to projects

which include structures built on the tidelands below the low water mark.

A corresponding piece of legislation which is a mandatory prerequisite for

the Waterways License is the Wetlands Order of Condition which is issued by

local conservation commissions with an appeals process to the Department of

Environmental Quality Engineering. Its general purpose is also to protect

the public interest by regulating projects in the following areas:

1) Any bank, freshwater wetland, coastal wetland, beach, dune.

flat, marsh, meadow, or swanp which borders on the ocean,

estuary, creek, river, stream, pond or lake;

2) Land under any of the bodies listed above;

3) Land subject to tidal action;

4) Land subject to flooding.

Wetlands legislation and Chapter 91 Waterway Licenses overlap to a

large extent, although some who administer them defend their separation on

the basis of claiming different constituencies. Together they are compre-

hensive. Since they are not managed together, although their intent
appears overlapping, the consolidation, or at least smoother coordination of
the two pieces of legislation would provide better management.

Again, dredging in Boston Harbor is an important requirement for

any water dependent activity on the Harbor waterfront. The dredging process

itself must be strictly regulated to prevent the undue churning up of

hazardous and toxic sediments which could severely lower the level of

water quality. In order to prevent or at least mediate this effect,

several agencies attempt to execute the mandates of what is referred to as

the "section 40411 permit of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. The

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the ultimate authority in approval

of any dredging proposals. This situation is a direct consequence of

the Corp's active responsibility in performing the dredging operation.

Unfortunately, their approval is not granted until a Dredging and

Disposal of Dredged Material permit has been confirmed by DEQE.

The time lag between the two permit authorizations can often impede the

smooth progress of a development proposal. To further complicate matters

the Environmental Protection Agency establishes the requirements for

"404" state administered programs. Again the good intentions of a

multi-agency, multi-level environmental protection program may be

hindering the progress of water dependent activities without

notably increasing the level of environmental quality.

To supplement and facilitate the complete environmental protection

program, an environmental review process is necessary. Under the auspices

of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Massachusetts Environmental

Policy Act (MEPA) & Review and the Coastal Zone Management Office within

EOEA, this function has been more than adequately provided for bureauc-

ratically, in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The first two

agencies derive their power from the NEPA and MEPA legislation. This

mandate states that any public or private projects which may have a

significant impact on the environment or require a state or federal permit

are required to prepare an environmental impact report (MEPA) or state-
ment (NEPA). The appropriate agency reviews these reports and

circulates copies of the environmental impact reports.to other agencies

and the public.

Most development projects which will have any effect on the

environment are carefully considered so that these effects may be

minimized. On the basis of the results and criteria of the environmental

impact statements, equitable and intelligent decision making for land use

and development may ensue.

The Coastal Zone Management Office within the Executive Office of

Environmental Affairs was created under the auspices of the federal Coastal

Zone Management Act of 1972. Its establishment evolved from a desire within

the environmentalist community to regulate development within the coastal

zone and direct attention to the unique environmental and aesthetic character-
istics of the coastline. The CZM office accomplishes its environmental

review mandate by what is known as a "federal consistency" review which

involves the examination of any activities in the coastal zone which may have

any effect on the area, i.e., NPDES permits, Outer Continental5helf (OCS)

leases to verify compliance with federal regulations. In the process of

performing this function, the CZM office becomes involved in many federal,

state, and local interagency relationships. To achieve the necessary

cooperation and coordination, CZM follows what it terms the "networking"

principle. The absence of definite jurisdictional limits for CZM, allows

the CZM office to act as a "facilitator" between state agencies, i.e.,

DEQE (regulatory) and DEM (management and planning). CZM's placement

within the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs allows it to make

budget decisions over some of the subordinate departments, i.e., DEM,

DEQE, and thus influence their cooperation.

In addition, an attribute of the CZM program which sometimes proves

to be an important asset is its flexibility. Unlike other government

agencies which are staffed by civil service employees, the CZM office can

hire and fire as needs come and go, corresponding to the current direction

of the program. This factor can, on the one hand, enhance the office's

ability to react to situations as they occur, but on the other, contributes

to poor morale. The CZM office also retains certain freedom with the

allocation of its funds. Its budget may be apportioned to reflect the needs

of coastal towns and cities, a benefit to some and a problem for those

looking for consistency and accountability.

The aforementioned agencies are the key participants in the environ-

mental protection function of the Commonwealth. Without their input, there

is always the possibility that projects may not meet the standards which have

been set to protect the air, water, and land resources. However, the

environmental review process, as mandated by the National Environmental

Policy Act, Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, and the Coastal Zone

Management Act may very well be another case of repetitive effort. The

coordination has markedly improved over the past years between EPA, which

directs the NEPA policy, and EOEA, which is responsible for the corresponding

MEPA program. A development project will require one review or the other if

it is anticipated that certain environmental standards may not be met.

Usually the application of either review is dependent upon federal or state

funding and involvement, and the permit being requested. Fortunately, the

duplication problem is being avoided in this case by the agencies' (EPA,

EOEA/MEPA) careful analysis of the process and a desire to avoid duplication.

However, the same is not true of the coordination interrelationship

of the MEPA review office and the Coastal Zone office, both of which reside

under the authority of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs. Under

certain circumstances, which may involve non-adherence to specified MEPA

standards, a project may be deemed by MEPA capable of "an effect on the

coastal zone".

For further elaboration of the role of the Massachusetts office of
the Coastal Zone Management, see 4 June letter in Appendix I.

Ordinarily, this instance occurs when activities are presumed to be above

MEPA designated criteria limits or subject to an unappealed Wetland Order

of Conditions by a conservation commission or subject to MEPA review. In

this case, the Coastal Zone office commences its own form of review, under

the federal consistency mandate. This process explores the consistency

of the proposed action with the present governing legislation for the

coastal zone. This procedure, while initiated well after the application.

has gone its designated route, serves to lengthen the delays and exacerbate

the coordination problem which already plagues state environmental admini-

strators. While attempts are made to open lines of communication and take

.notice of the obvious working relationship which the law requires, this

problem still persists to some extent.

In addition to formulating comparable statutes, Massachusetts has

created many agencies to assume the responsibilities of administration,

implementation and enforcement. However, in order to hasten the adjustment

and enact the legislation as quickly as possible, attention to the

implications of the formation of new authorities was often lacking.

Generally, the newagencies created corresponded directly to the legislative

committee which recommended them. The possibility of bestowing new powers

to existing agencies or consolidating several agencies was often overlooked.

The resulting problem is proliferation of authoritative agencies, and in

addition, a further exacerbation of th&"vertical" separation of power. A

complete and balanced view of resource management cannot be effectively

attained when, for the most part, the agencies hold separate and distinct

viewpoints and interests in the Harbor. Collective and common objectives

are crucial to the development of the Harbor as a whole.

For example, in the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA)

alone, there is the Division of Water Resources within the Department of
Environmental Management; the Division of Water Supply, the Division
of Water Pollution Control, and the Division of Waterways all within
the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering;
and the Division of Water within the Metropolitan District Commission.

Undoubtedly, each of these authorities performs an important function, but

this functional management approach lacks the overall perspective that

one consolidated water resource agency could provide. This situation can

also confuse development procedures when the inevitable uncertainty of

jurisdictional limits occurs.

It should be noted, however, that a water resources commission, a

water policy group made up of agency and public representatives and co-

chaired by DEM and DEQE has been established for coordination purposes.

Also, the example of the Wetlands Protection Act (inland and coastal)

is useful in demonstrating the fragmentation of responsibility which arises

because of the proliferation of agencies. Within the Department of Environ-

mental Management exists the @Jetlands Re striction Program whose responsibility

is to protect wetlands by identifying and delineating wetlands areas and

attaching development restrictions to deeds. Responding to the need for a

regulatory permitting authority for this program, the Division of Wetlands

within DEQE gained the responsibility of protecting these wetlands by

requiring prospective developers to complete a comprehensive application.

This process originates with the local conservation commissions of the

affected wetland area who have singular responsibility if no appeal occurs.

However, total responsibility for protecting the wetlands does not belong to

any one authority unless appeal occurs to DEQE, and, therefore, the necessary

coordination of administration and uniform enforcement is often absent.

In a report compiled by the Governor's Commission to simplify rules

and regulations, it was stated that there are "351 local governments whose

boards and commissions issue permits that regulate land use." The second

chart of this report reiterates such proliferation with a listing of 21
distinct agencies (state, federal, local) which participate in the permitting

procedure. The coordination of this highly complex and diversified system

is not an easy task by any means. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts has made commendable progress in the resolution of this issue.

Upon completion of an in depth analysis of the permitting network,

initiated by Executive Order #155, a Development Permit Assistance Program

was established under the auspices of the Governor's Development Office.

The purpose of this directive was the creation of a single source of

information for all state permitting necessary to the development process.

At this one location, applicants are able to obtain current information on

applicable permits, regulations and procedures for development projects.

In addition to permit information, the staff also provides information

relative to state financing, incentive programs, development opportunities,

and sites available throughout the state.

In addition, all the permits required for a given project can

now be identified at the outset by means of a permit identification form.

The Office then monitors the identified permits through the review process

so that prescribed time schedules are met and delays minimized. Public
hearings and comment periods are coordinated so as to be as concurrent as

possible. Potential conflicts are even resolved early in-the application

process when the situation allows.

This program is an answer to many of the managerial inefficiencies

which have gradually developed and impeded the general permitting process.

However, the success of this program is heavily dependent on both its

implementation and its availability to potential developers and the public

as a whole. The latter of these two characteristics appears to be lacking

in the Governor's Development Office, particularly in the Harbor. Although

this Permit Assistance Program seems like the panacea which will ease

permitting difficulties, most prospective developers are unaware of its

existence. Its recent establishment warrants thorough and far reaching

publicity for the necessary public exposure.

Additionally, when it has been successfully employed as a permit

"expediter" its area of involvement has been outside of the Boston Harbor

region. This Development Office could become a key stimulant or at least

a facilitator of development in the Harbor if its beneficial services were

fully utilized and its personnel increased to meet the need.

An important aspect of managing land and water resources is the

maintenance of favorable environmental quality. In Massachusetts, the

chief state agency responsible for this objective is the Executive Office of

Environmental Affairs. Under its direction are the Departments of

Environmental Quality Engineering, Environmental Management , Fisheries,

Wildlife and Recreational Vehicles, Food and Agriculture and the Metropolitan

Bistrict Commission, as well as the offices of Coastal Zone Management,

Conservation Services, Law Enforcement, Massachusetts Environmental Policy

Act and Review and Policy and Management Analysis. The administration of

such a variety of agencies with a multitude of environmental duties and

objectives is not a simple one. The task is not made any simpler when a

particular segment of BEA, e.g., Metropolitan District.Commission, carries

a great deal more influence in development proposals because of its greater

budget allocation from the legislature. The Executi.ve Office of Environ-

mental Affair's difficulty in handling the multitude of environmental

issues confronting it is its inability to include an incentive system in

its often inhibiting framework. In other words, the only device with

which they can carry out their mandate is a stringent permitting process.

By assuring permits are properly condRioned they can achieve the desired

environmental standards which are necessary to uphold. However, the

unfortunate and inevitable side effect of this approach is the gradual

decline in project proposals, because of the anticipated costs and delays.

What is needed is a key linkage between environmental protectionist policies

and financial incentive/economic growth policies so that a reasonable

equilibrium may be attained. The point of connection for this linkage

would be particularly advantageous between EOEA and the Executive Office of

Communities and Development which already offers a complete package of

financial incentives for prospective urban and communities developers.

Effective management has been impeded in EOEA as individual responsi-

bilities have been distributed among too many departments and divisions.

The apportionment of tasks has created a situation of fragmentation of

authority, each separate division accepting responsibility for its own

narrow scope of interest or funding. Again, this is a problem where

consolidation of authority and the establishment of well-placed linkages

could facilitate a broadened perspective of environmental issues and thus,

allow faster review processes, comprehensive planning and more efficient

program implementation.

These linkages would ideally encompass the concept of interagency

relationships, particularly in gaining complete man.agerial control over

water resources. The interaction relationship should be supplemented

with an appropriate interagency task force or where possible, increased

attention to the interaction within the existing agencies may be sufficient.

These linkages should be applied to local/state activities, state/federal

activities as well as any internal state, federal, or local processes which

lack the ability to coordinate their internal affairs. Memos of under-

standing, however often used, are not adequate long-term solutions.

Boston Harbor as a single entity can claim responsibility for the

economic growth of Boston and its environs. It could be an area which offers

the public unusual benefits and opportunities. It could become an enviable

locale drawing and serving publics from all over this region. In the past,

attention was paid to water-dependent activities and commercial trans-

portation. The Harbor offers us a resource which is unavailable in much of

the Commonwealth or in all of New England and it is up to the manage rs,

planners, and decision,makers of Massachusetts to utilize its full economic

and recereational potential for the betterment of society. If state and

federal agencies continue to ignore the impact that land development has

on the use of the Harbor, its full capabilities may never be achieved.

It is apparent that there is totally lacking from this framework

an entity which has power and interest to oversee the Harbor's activities

both for the sake of assuring the effective use and development and to

protect the public's interests in an accountable way.

IV CHANGES UNDERWAY

A. Newly Enacted Programs to@M06ts Jurisdictional Problems

The previous chapter indicates it is apparent that the Boston Harbor

management structure lacks certain fundamental strengths which would

foster healthy economic development. However, many of these weaknesses

have been identified by state and federal authorities and though tful

remedies have been proposed and implemented. Below is a brief paraphrasing

of these proposals and the manner in which they address and resolve particular

jurisdictional shortcomings. These proposals were developed by the

Governor's Commission on Rules and Regulations, DEQE Advisory Committee,

and Executive Order.

1. Executive Order #167 August 28, 1979

A) Establish Development Permit Assistance within the Governor's

Development Office to aid major development projects in Commonwealth with

the permit and licensing process.

This program provides information and coordination for the agencies

and the developers to ensure a timely process. This is a step to achieve

expeditious state action and avoid delay While the Commission's study to

Simplify Rules and Regulations continues.

B) Within each Secretariat, the Secretariat designates one person to

serve as a coordinator of permitting within that Secretariat in order to

ensure responsive actions to normal permit requests.

This recommendation is an attempt to facilitate efficient cooperation

within individual agencies, lessening the chances of jurisdictional overlap

and unnecessary duplication of effort. If the designated "coordinator"

was able to encourage expeditious handling of environmental reviews, and

permit applications, the overall development process could be hastened.

See discussion of permitting problems, in previous section.

C) Before submitting an application for federal funds or programs,

the state agency which is applying shall, upon the request of the Office of

Development Permit Assistance, disclose in writing to that Office the nature

and details of any regulatory obligations which the state would take on

by accepting such funds or participating in such programs. Any state agency

applying for federal funds shall indicate on its "Notice of Intent" form

filed with the State Clearinghous,e (pursuant to OMB Circular A-95) whether

or not the proposed project or program for which federal funds are being

sought will have impact on the regulations of development in the Commonwealth.
D) At least thirty days before any state agency action to adopt,

repeal, or amend its regulations pursuant to G.L. C.30A s.2,3, that agency

shall submit a copy of such proposed action to the appropriate cabinet

secretary and to the Office of Development Permit Assistance.

E) Proposals for adoption, amendment or repeal of regulations shall

contain explanatory comments clearly detailing the scope and intent of such

agency action. This explanation shall also include a designation of local,

federal and other state rules and regulations concerning the same subject

or area and shall briefly explain how the.proposed action interacts with

these other rules and regulations.

The aforementioned proposals also address the issue that arises when

actions by state agencies are taken without due notice to the existing

regulatory framework. In order to avoid the inevitable inconsistencies that

this manner of decision making may induce, the King administration has

required all state authorities to examine their regulatory proposals and

determine the interrelationship, if any, with the present code of regulations.

In addition, the Office of Permit Development Assistance has been authorized

to review these regulatory proposals and confirm their validity.

2. Executive Order #168 August 28, 1979

Requiring the Cooperation of all State Permitting Agencies for Collection

of Certain Data

A) Each state agency required to renew, approve, or grant permits for

economic development projects shall submit to the Commission .on Rules and

Regulations on or before September 15, 1979 a list of all types of reviews,

approvals and permits administered by this agency. Specific application

forms, applicable agency regulations and/or rules, and the time period usually

required for permit application consideration, based on experience and statutory

or regulatory requirements, shall be included in the report of each agency.

B) Each permit granting agency shall evaluate its rules,@regulations,

criteria, standards, and overall policies guiding the issuance of permits.

By October 15, 1979 each agency shall forward to the Commission on Rules

and Regulations a written narrative of this evaluation which should include

identification, from the agencies' perspective, of the problems (lack of

jurisdiction, duplication of effort between agencies, etc.) it faces in

administering its permitting process. The narrative should also focus

on the specific criteria and standards used by the agency in the process

and whether these are formal or informal, written or oral. Agency
suggestions for improvement of the process (apart from budget or staff

increases) should similarly be included.

Executive Order #168 requires all state agencies to examine their

jurisdictional powers and responsibilities for the purpose of evaluating

the problems which affect the efficiency of the permitting process. By

requiring the agencies themselves to address the permitting issue, the

hidden or inherent flaws of the regulatory framework, with which state

officials are more familiar, may become evident and the appropriate remedies

may be more easily devised.

This Executive Order also requires the state agencies to list in

detail the specifics of their permitting processes. The Commission on

Rules and Regulations, after reviewing these regulatory policies and

processes, may be better equipped to identify the weaknesses and influence

the agencies' adherence to the regulations (i.e. regulatory deadlines).

3. -Division of Water Pollution Co-ntrol Management

Environmental Bill H3448

Places the Division of Water Pollution Control under the direction of

the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering. H3448 enables the

Commissioner of DEQE to exercise supervisory and legal control over one

of the most important Divisions within the Department.

The Division of Water Pollution Control has traditionally had direct

control of their permitting processes (i.e. NPDES, Water Quality Certification),

and to some extent, this has been reflected in a degree of inconsistency

and lack of cooperation with the Department of Environmental Quality

Engineering (DEQE) who is actually their bureaucratic superior. This

enactment should serve to promote a synergistic effort between the two

agencies and promote more effective environmental control'.

4. -Hazardous Waste Siting Bill

Guarantees local involvement in decisions to site hazardous waste disposal

facilities. This is the first attempt by any state to resolve conflicts

over the siting of hazardous waste facilities by insuring that communities

which accept such facilities will receive incentives'and compensations

55
for facility impacts.
As stated in the previous chapter, a public constituency is critical

to an equitable planning process. The Hazardous Waste Siting Bill clearly

represents an attempt to provide a voice for local communities in decisions

and actions which affect their health and well being.

Additional activities underway to address some of the problems regarding

the Harbor's waters include:

5. "Permitting@Guidelines." Development of permitting guidelines under the

energy issue to better manage progress.

6. "Management Coordination." A provision for coordinated management of water

quality clean up of Boston Harbor. EOEA chairs regular meetings with MDC

and DEQE and less frequent but regular meetings with other agencies such

as CZM, DEM, Boston Water and Sewer Commission, EPA, as well as public

interest groups like the Citizens' Advisory Com.ittee.

B. Proposals to Address Jurisdictional Problems By Other Groups and
'@overning Units

7. "Permit Coordination Unit"to oversee state permit process (clearing-

house). "Permit Coordination Unit" would notify state agencies having

jurisdiction over a proposed project. The state agency would then have

14 days to acknowledge jurisdiction; failure to acknowledge would waive

jurisdiction.

Additionally, agencies acknowledging jurisdiction would have 14 days

from receipt of completed application to notify applicant of sufficency

of application.

Consolidation of public hearings into one hearing.

Sixty days after public hearing, state agency must render final

decision on issuance of permit.

The aforementioned recommendations could reduce the time, cost and
confusion of the permitting process by simplifying the permitting procedure,

accelerating the decision-making,and making permit applications information

available at one location.

8. "Regulatory Calendar"

Legislation would require an agency to give advance notification of

any intent to promulgate new regulations in the so-called "Regulatory
Calendar" (on or before.April 15 or October 15 of each year).

Sixty days after notification, agency may proceed with procedure

for promulgation as specified by MGL C 30 A.

The present system requires state agencies to hold a public hearing

prior to enacting regulation. Usually the notice of public hearing is

published only 21 days prior to public hearing which leaves interested

parties little time to prepare substantiation for their position. Often-

times 21 days is not sufficient to allow even interested parties to

participate effectively.

9. "Official Documents Act" Provide for the presumption of validity of

agency administrative action (review of permit applications, convening of

pub lic hearings, issuance or denial of permits and approvals).

Present uncertainties of validation of permits impede development by

furthering costs and delays. This legislation would eliminate those who

would seek further validation of authority of administrators.
10."Cost/Benefit Analysis of Regulations." Incorporate this analysis into

an agency's decision to promulgate new,regulations.
Regulations oftentimes have far-reaching implications (economic and

social) which usually are not fully considered. This recommendation ident-

ifies this issue and ensures that the state agencies recognize the effects

of their decisions and actions. Overlaps, gaps and inefficiencies in

jurisdictional limits may be lessened by directing attention to their cause.

11. "Massachusetts Regulatory Council" is comprised of secretaries of each

secretariat for the purpose of reviewing and coordinating promulgation of

proposed regulations.

This council should provide the necessary communication which would

insure that jurisdictional overlap could be reduced.

The scope of new regulations will be interpreted by a summary which

will include subject matter and intent and purpose of proposed regulation.

12. Prompt Review of Permit Applications

Strict adherence to provision of MGL c30s62D which requires a maximum

90 day review period for permit applications.

The existing permitting processes, which often present a major

constraint on a developer's plans because of their costly duration,

have been identified by this recommendation. By requiring the state

agencies' cooperation with the existing deadlines, a more expeditious

process may be facilitated.

13. Consolidation of Water and Land Use Permits Under DEQE

Permits related to water supply, water use, water pollution control

and wetlands should be consolidated under authority of DEQE.

Develop single permit application form with separable components for

permits not affected by all authorities.

The multitude of environmental permits that confront him/her is an

obvious deterrent to a potential developer. The Governor's Commission on

Rules and Regulations has fully examined this problem and has discovered

that a consolidated permit application with a unified single authority

overseeing its procedure is the most effective method of resolving the

permitting confusion. Under a consolidated permit program, the applicant is

able to attain all his state permits with one application, and theoretically

in less time than the existing process. This consolidation would make

possible concurrent reviews and hearings and would facilitate permit

monitoring.

14. Streamline Role in Permitting

Present functions and permit authorities of Division of Waterways

should be reviewed by EOEA and revised.to abol ish duplicative state or
local reviews (i.e., 1) waterway permits.for construction activities

c9l s12A [Chapter 91 Waterways license] which duplicate Wetlands Protection
Act functions. 2) Return waterways functions such as dam inspection

and state pier operation to Department of Public Works.) As mentioned

before in the preceding chapter, the duplicative effort of the Division

of Waterways Chapter 91 Waterways License and the conservation commissions'

Wetland Order of.Conditions is a direct result of the similarity of scope of

the two permitting processes. This recommendation, if carefully implemented

to consider the diverse constituencies involved, should reduce the delays

unnecessarily caused by overlapping jurisdiction.

15. Wetlands Protection Act

In March 1979, the Commissioner of DEQE organized a task force to

revise Wetlands Protection Act regulations.

House Resolve #6-335 established a commission to conduct a similar
investigation. The DEQE Task Force was subsequently terminated. The
Commission established by the House Resolve was assigned to:
1) Investigate alternative procedures which might streamline time

required for wetland application processing.
2) Consider transfer of wetlands authority (c 131 s40) to cities and

towns.
3) investigate development of guidelines and criteria for development

of wetlands regulations.
4) Investigate policies for creating a positive economic climate for
development while still insuring protection of wetlands.

Appeal. procedures and time for DEQE review should be reduced from
its present 70 day duration.

- Legal-standing for appeals should be limited to the applicant, an

abuttor or an aggrieved party. Present legislation allows any 10 citizens

to appeal. Legislation should be modified to specify that the appeal must

show direct or indirect damage of the type that the Act is supposed to

prevent.

The Wetlands Protection Act and its corresponding permit, the Wetlands

Order of Conditions, is a fundamental prerequisite for many of the

environmental permits under the supervision of DEQE. Following this

statement is the premise that if the permitting process is unwieldy the
origin of this problem will be the origin of the process! It is in this

frame of mind that the Commission on Rules and Regulations focused some

attention on the streamlining of the Wetlands Protection Act.

16. River and Wetlands Restriction Programs

Coastal Wetlands Restriction Program - MGL C130 S105
Inlands Wetlands Restriction Program - MGL C130 S40A

Scenic and Recreational Rivers Act - MGL C21 S17B

These.programs are presently administered by DEM in EOEA. In order

to expedite the delineation of wetlands statewide, it is suggested that

the restriction programs be transferred from DEM to DEQE. This transferral

of authority will allow administration and enforcement of all state wetland

regula tions by one agency.

No development permits are associated with these programs.

*The "unwie"Idy" nature of the permitting process is an interpretation
dependent upon the beholder, be they developer or civil servant, and represents
a broad range of human values inherent in governing.

17. Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) 1973

Development projects which significantly affect the environment should

be carefully scrutinized under MEPA review. However, some environmentally

sound projects are subject to MEPA review simply because of'their physical
size (i.e.1) non-residential projects, subject to MEPA, present threshold
size - 25,000 ft2 gross interior floor space 2)residential projects

threshold - 50 units, 100 units or 200 units depending on the case).

It is advised that these particular MEPA regulations be revised to

exempt minimally polluting businesses and industries which otherwise would

be included because of physical size.

18. Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA)

Steps should be taken to formalizea negotiation procedure within

MEPA process for appropriate cases which would allow the applicant

to continue preliminary work and seek and have action taken on state and

local permits before EIR is completed. This expeditious handling of the

environmental review process will provide incentives for developers to

continue their plans in a cooperative atmosphere.

During the Lr-,nvironmental Impact Report (EIR) process, it may be possible

to,determine if a certain project may be built, if certain environmental

safeguards are included. (i.e. design modifications, technological
innovations, scaling down of project).

19. MEPA and Wetlands Protection Act

Under the Wetlands Protection Act (MGL C131 s40), local conservation

commissions can issue an Order of Conditions controlling activities on lands

subject to the Act. If an applicant finds the commission's decision

unjustifiable, he/she may appeal for a Superseding Order of Conditions

from DEQE. This appellate process will compel the applicant to become

involved in the MEPA process also. The delay encountered by this involve-

ment can be as much as 5 months for a minor project (ENF) or 6 to 9

months for a major project (EIR).

-Therefore, if an applicant appeals a local conservation commission's

Order of Conditions, the appeal should not trigger MEPA review.

- A DEQE Superseding Order of Condition upholding the conservation,

commissions decision should not trigger MEPA review.

.- Legal standing to appeal should be limited to applicant, an abuttor

or aggrieved party. Ten Residents clause should be modified to;specify

that the appeal must show direct or indirect damage of the type prevented

by Act.

Wastewater Management

EPA

EOEA

DWPC - 303e plan

MDC

MAPC - 208 plan

20. Comprehensive Planning for Clean Water

"Level B" studies are required under P.L. 92-500 as part of Comprehensive

Planning.Process for each major basin in country. (i.e. SENE - Southeastern

New England Boston)

Many recommendations concerning water supply, water quality, growth

management, recreation, flooding, coastal zone and facility location were

developed under SENE. However, the planning process seemed to terminate

62
with the publication of the report. Implementation of the recommendations

has been lacking.
Every attempt should be made to aid implementation. EPA does set
certain standards for 208 plans (Areawide planning - S208 of PL 92-500)
implementation. Some consistency requirements between "Level B" studies
and 208 plans might aid the planning process.

21. lanagement Planning
The focus of 208 planning projects (MAPC) has been largely on
structural solutions as the most effective means of implementation. 208
planning, although terminated, should-have continued but it should have

directed its attention towards long-ra.nge and areawide issues i.e., growth
management, water supply, urban runoff control (for more than single

communities) and non-point sources. EPA should be encouraged to support

town initiatives to develop nonstructural solutions by offering planning

grants. "Level B" studies could set the major goals, and individual studies

could set the major goals, and individual studies funded by EPA could focus

on specific areawide and nonstructural solutions under Section 208. However,

these federal funds will be terminated in the Commonwealth by June, 1982, an

unfortunat"e situation.

22. DEQE Advisory Committee Recommendations

- Office of Program Planning and Polic.y Coordination

- Consolidate all DEQE divisions into one building

- DWPC under direct supervision of Commissioner of DEQE

- Consolidate Regional Office of DWPC with existing DEQE Regional Offices

- Combine Wetlands and Waterways and develop single application

form covering requirements of both programs

- Repeal c9l S 12A

[limit lWaterways jurisdiction to traditionally navigable water

bodies],

- Eliminate sewer extension permits for projects previously approved

through DWPC construction grants.

- Study methods for instituting a regula@ employee reward/recognition

program.

- Program for cross-training of personnel of increasi-ng capabilities
in various programs. (Already begun.)

Establish permit tracking system. (Been completed.)

The Department of Environmental Quality Engineering Advisory Committee

has developed the above recommendations to.be incorporated in the final

report of the Governor's Commission on Rules and Regulations. The

intent of these proposals is to enable DEQE to institute improvements

in its management and operation of environmental regulatory responsibilities

and to facilitate an efficient permitting process.

23. Consolidation of Permit Applications

As of June 14, 1979, EPA established a consolidated permit application

program. This application will be utilized by permit applicants for the

NPDES, Hazardous Waste Management, Underground Injecti-on-Control and

Prevention of Significant Deterioration permit programs.

- The form will be utilized by any facility applying to EPA for.a.

permit under any of these 4 programs.

- - Questions common to all permit programs are in one part of the

application form (Form 1) so that applicants will not have to report

any information to EPA more than once.

- Questions relating to each specific permit are in separate forms

(Forms 2-5) so that applicants will not have, to report any information which

is not relevant to getting the specific permit it needs.

In developing the consolidated permit applications form, EPA

has attempted to consider all of the following:

- Avoid asking for information more than once.

- Avoid asking for information EPA does not need to know to write

an appropriate permit.

- Assure that EPA obtains essential information to write permits and

to protect the public against the introduction of harmful pollutants

into the environment.

Q.. Local Regulatory Reforms Proposed

24. Unify Local Permit Information

Governor's Development Office and Executive Office of Communities and

Development cooperate with Massachusetts Municipal Association, the

Massachusetts League of Women Voters and 13 Regional Planning Agencies

in providing technical assistance to communities which are interested

in unifying local permit procedure information.

By streamlining the permitting process at the local level, local

development (i.e. marinas) can be fostered. Not only will the length of

the overall permitting process be reduced but the necessary and often

lacking local community participation in decision making processes may be

facilitated.

Consolidate public hearings at the local level to expedite local

permit reviews and procedures.

Limit time for review and action on local permits to 60 days.

25. Conttruttibh'Code Reorganization

Executive Office of@Communities and Development is, directed to draft

and file legislation to consolidate all construction codes, boards and

inspectors under the authority and control of the Secretary of the Depart-

ment of Communities and Development.

26. Construction Codes Conflict Resolution

Building Code Commission should be given clear, unqualified

authority to resolve conflicts between building and specialized codes.

Technical.Code Council (within Building Code Commission) should hire

consultant to review State Building Code and various specialty codes.

27. Subsurface Sewage Disposal

DEQE should revise Title V of Environmental Code to reflect maximum

standards code-uniform throughout Commonwealth.

Exceptions to this code are appealable to DEQE, pending scientific

proof related to protection of public health.

28. Technical Assistance (Title V)

Governor should direct DEQE to disseminate the results of USGS

concerning groundwater testing to all local boards of health.

29. Technical Assistance

Special funding from Governor's budget recommendations for DEQE to

provide technical assistance, upon request, to local boards of health in

FY 1981 State Budget.

.D. Regulatory Reform atTederal Level Proposed

Governor and Massachusetts Congressional Delegation should draft

joint statement supporting President's efforts for regulatory reform

at federal levels.

Require joint executive/legislative review of all new federal

regulations prior to issuance and the elimination or consolidation of

existing regulations.

Require annual performance reviews, justification of need and

.increased accountability for all federal regulatory agencies.

- Establish default provisions for agency reviews after reasonable

time periods.

-Provide opportunity for concurrent review periods and hearing

schedules.

- Delegate to states those permit authorities that can be handled

more efficiently at state or regional level.

Agency Legislative Mandate Powers and Responsibilities Permit
Federal Agencies
Department National Flood Insurance Act National flood insurance
of Housing
and Urban
Development

National Fish spawning protection
Marine
Fisheries
Service

U.S. Wildlife habitat protection
Fish and
Wildlife
Department

Agency Legislative Mandate Powers and Responsibilities Permits

U.S. 1. Search and rescue operations A. Intercoastal navigation
Coast Guard
2. Law enforcement

3. Aids to navigation
4. Port security

5. Pollution

6. Regulations and inspections
for LNG and oil tankers

7. Clean-up of pollution
8. Regulation of ship-based
sewage
B. Approval for some MDC construc-
tion grants

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits.

Environmental A. Resource Conservation and A. Establish permit requirements A. Hazardous Waste Management
Protection Recovery Act (RCRA) (1976) for EPA-administered RCRA, UIC, Program
Agency (42 USC, S 6901) and NPDES programs and state
(EPA) B. Safe Drinking Water Act program requirements for RCRA, B. Underground Injection
(SDWA) (42 USC, S 300f) UIC, NPDES and "404" state- Program (UIC)
administered programs; establish
C. Clean Water Act (CWA) procedures for decision making C. NPDES
(33 USC, S 1251)
D. Clean Water Act (PWA) D. Dredge or Fill Program "404"
(33 USC, S 1251)
E. Clean Air Act (CAA) E. Prevention of Significant
(42 USC, S 7401) Deterioration (PSD)
F. Amendment to Ocean Dump- F. Responsible for restriction of
ing Act (1977) sewage sludge into ocean waters
by 31 December 1981

Age-ffcy Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

U.S. Army U.S. Codes 403, 320-9 A. Authorized to permit and A. "Section 10" Permit
Corps of prohibit any structures or work
Engineers Section 10: Rivers and affecting'the navigable waters of
Harbors Act of 1899 Permit the U.S.
for Alteration of
Navigable Waters B. Authorized to permit discharge B. "Section 404" Permit
or dredged material or fill
Section 404: Federal Water material in the waters of the U.S.
Pollution Control Act
C. Authorized to issue permits C.@ "Section 103" Permit.
Section 103: Marine Protection, covering transportation of
Research & Sanctuaries Act of dredged material for the purpose
1972 of dumping it into ocean waters D. Approval in some MDC Permits

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits
State Agencies

EOEA MGLc2lA s,3,5,7, 1. Determine consistency with 1. Involved in any federal or
8-11,13-18 Massachusetts Coastal Zone state licensing which affects
Coastal 22,23,25,27,28 Management regulations land or water in coastal zone
Zone
Management 2. involved with activities 2. Any permitting processes
Office involved with those activities
a. Federal agency or develop-
ment projects in coastal zone CZM is only involved with
b. Activities in land or water determining consistency, not a
of coastal zone which require permitting.authority
federal or state permit Applicant must submit
c. Department of Interior consistency determination if the
activities of exploration, proposed activity is determined
development, or production to have "any effects" on
in leased land on OCS coastal zone
d. Activities subject to "Effects" are presumed for
federal assistance under activities above MEPA thresholds
federal programs submitted and subject to unappealed Order
state and local governments of Conditions by a conservation
commission or subject to MEPA
3. Coordinate and manage the review
activities of all state agencies
which affect the coastal zone of
the state to assure that the State
Environmental Policies which are
the CZM policies are carried out
by state agencies in their permitting
activities as well as in the activities
they undertake

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

EOEA
(continued)

Massachusetts Massachusetts Environmental A. Requires an environmental impact I. Wetland Order of Conditions
Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) statement for public and private
Policy Act MGL C30 S 62-62H projects which -include 1) activities 2. Chapter 91 Waterways License
and Review receiving financial assistance from
state agencies; 2) activities 3. Dredging and disposal of
[MEPA and requiring permits from state agencies. dredged material
Review]
4. Mineral extraction from land
under coastal waters
B. Circulation of environmental
impact statements to other agencies 5. Construction and maintenance
and the public of dams

C. The approval is required by 6. Approval of waste disposal
activities conducted by state facility
agencies, activities receiving
financial assistance from state 7. Hazardous Waste License
agencies and activities require-
ments from state agencies 8. Discharge to Ground Permit

D. Requires the publication of 9. Industrial waste treatment
Notice of Intent, completion of facilities
an environmental Notification
Form and filing with the Secretary 10. NPDES
of EOEA
11. Marine Oil Terminal License

12. Approval of sewer extension
and/or connection

13. Approval to construct a new
source of air contaminants

14. Public Water System Permit

15. Cross-connection Permit

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

Massachusetts 16. Approval of subsurface sewage
Environmental disposal facilities
Policy Act
and Review 17.- Approval of septage disposal
(continued) facility
18. MDC construction grants
where MEPA.thresholds are met

N.B. All the above have specific
criteria for application of MEPA

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

DEQE A. MGL C 91, SS 12-23 (Waterways Department must act: A. Chapter 91 Waterways License
Permit) 1. Within 90 days after compli-
B. MGL C 21A, S 4; C 91, S 2, 52-5 ance with MEPA GLC 30, S 62D B. Dredging and disposal of dredged
2. Within 70 days for Superse- material
C. MGL C 21, S 54-6 ding Order of Conditions C. Mineral extraction from land under
GLC 131, S 40 coastal waters
D. MGL C 253, S 44-50 (amended) 3. Within 60 days for Air Pollu- D. Construction and maintenance of
tion Control regulations dams
E. MGL C 91, S 46-48, 50 310 CMR 7:02(2) E.-Breaking up of vessels (appeal)
F. MGL C 111, S 5G (compliance F. Public water system permit
with Federal Safe Drinking Water
Act
G. MGL C 111, S 160A G. Cross-connection permit
H. MGL C 21A, S 13 H. Approval of subsurface sewage
disposal facilities (>15,000 gal/day)
I. MGL C 111, S 17; C 21A, S 13 1. Approval of septage disposal
facilities

J. MGL C 111 S150 A J. Approval of waste disposal
facilities

K. Wetland Protection Act K. Wetland Order of Conditions (appeal]
(1972) (superseding)
L. MGL C 212 (Massachusetts L. Hazardous Waste License
Hazardous Waste Management Act)
(1979); RCRA (42 USC 3251)

Division of MIGI, C 111, S150A 1. Assignment of a refuse disposal
Solid Waste site for-agencies of the Commonwealth
Dispo.sal 2. Appeal of an Assignment of Site
for a solid waste waste facility

3. Solid waste disposal facility

Agency Legislative Mandate, Responsibilities and Powers Permits
EDEA
DEQE
(continued)

Division of MGL C 91, S 1-59 1. May excavate and dredge in
Waterways (Waterways Program) Boston Harbor wherever public
convenience requires

V'Boston Harbor" - that part of
the harbor lying westerly and
inside of a line drawn between
Point Allerton on the south and
Shirley on the north

2. Shall have immediate charge of
lands owned or acquired by the
Commonwealth upon or adjacent to
Boston Harbor waterfront except
for land under the control of MDC

3. In charge of construction of
piers and other public works in
the harbor other than those under
the control of DEM or MDC

4. Shall, with the consent of
Governor and Council, acquire by
purchase or eminent domain property
for the purpose of construc ting
or securing piers in connection
with highways, waterways, railroad
connections, storage yards, and
public warehouses
5. May license and prescribe terms 1. Chapter 91 Waterways License
for construction or extension of a 2. Dredging and Disposal of Dredged
wharf, pier, dam, seawall, road,
bridge, or other structure, or for Material Permit
the filling of lands or flats, or 3. Mineral extraction from land
the driving of piles in/over tide nder coastal waters
water below mean high water mark in u
coastal waters, in tidal and non-tidal
rivers and streams and in great ponds.

Agency Legislative Mandate. Responsibilities and Powers Permits
DEQE
(continued)
6. Massport must comply 'With
Chapter 91 Waterways License but
they are exempt from license fees

7. Jurisdiction over any river, 4. -Approval in some
stream, or great pond which public MbC permits
money was spent on for license

8. Ensure that navigable waters
remain unobstructed and that the
public's safety and right to
access and use is not infringed
upon by any structure or activity
within.program jurisdiction

9. Maintain and improve shores,
rivers, streams and ponds in the
Commonwealth

10. Act as coordinator for the state
permit granting process

11. Interface with the Division of
Water Pollution Control for Water
Quality Certification

12. Waits for other state permits to
be granted before acting, i.e. MEPA
approval, Water Quality Certification
and Order of Conditions

Agency Legislative Mandate, Responsibilities and Powers Permits

EOEA A. MGL C 21, S 43 (Discharge to 1. Approve reports and plans of A. Ground water permit
D14PC (DEQE) Ground); C-111, S 17 abatement facilities

B. MGL C 21, S 27 (12) (Massachu- 2. Inspect construction of abate- B. Water quality certification
setts Water Quality Standards); ment facilities (insures that Federally
Federal Water Pollution Control licensed or permitted projects
Act 3. Designate water abatement meet State water quality
districts for establishment of dis- standards and related require-
C. MGL C 21, S 27 (13) (Massacbu- trict commission with approval ments as well as applicable
setts Water Quality Standards) of water resources commission Federal effluent limitations
and standards)
4. May enlarge water abatement
districts with approval of C. Approval of new industrial
water resources commission waste water treatment facilities
D. MGL C 21, S 43 (Massachusetts or significant modifications of
Water Quality Standards) 5. Authorize city, town, special existing facilities
district or district commission
E. MGL C 21, S 50-50A to construct, own, separate, D. NPDES (joint program with EPA)
extend, or improve abatement
F. MGL C 21, S 43 facilities; to apply for E. Marine Oil Terminal License
Commonwealth financial assistance
F. Approval of sewer extension
6. Direct planning to maximize and/or connections
federal reimbursement and mini-
mize cost to Commonwealth

7. May grant district funds for
capital outlay

8. Shall supervise operation and
maintenance of facilities

9. Shall provide for research and
demonstration projects

10. Shall contract for development of
comprehensive river basin water quality
management or waste treatment plans
11. Adopt standards of H 20 quality

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

DWPC 12. Prescribe limits, permits, and
(continued) procedures for pollution disposal

13. Regulate cleanup of Boston
Harbor by MDC

14. Adoption and ammendment of
rules and regulations

15. Insure that Federally licensed
or permitted projects meet State
water qua 'lity standards and related
requirements as well as applicable
Federal effluent limitations and
standards

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits
MGL A. Authorized to acquire, Approval required for
C132A S 2A,2D,3 develop and maintain state parks, any public agency acquisition
RDEA MGL forest recreation areas and or public land sale, lease,
DEM C742 reservations use as a dump or refuse disposal
as amended
area, sand or gravel deposition
B. Responsible for acquisition, or for construction of any
development and management of the structure in, under or bordering
Boston Harbor Islands for the Boston Harbor.
purposes of recreation and
conservation

C. Assists in coordination of
A-95 review (state clearinghouse)
C. Federal Heritage Conserva- D. Responsible for updating of
Statewide Comprehensive Outdoor
tion and Recreation Service Recreation Plan

D. Massachusetts Scenic and E. Administers preservation and
Recreational Rivers Act (1971) protection of rivers and streams
MGL C21 S17B through deed restriction of
Cn certain alterations, developments,
and activities within 100 yards
of river or stream banks

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Termits
E') EA
DEM
(continued)

Wetlands A. MGL C 130, S 105 (Coastal A. Protect coastal wetlands
Restriction Wetlands Restriction) through order restricting dredg-
Program as amended ing, filling, alteration, or
pollution of coastal areas, in-
cluding salt marshes, tidal flats,
and barrier beaches (mapping of
wetlands and attaching develop-
ment restrictions to deeds)
B. MCL C 131, S 40A (Inland B. Restrict by orders of altera-
Wetlands Restriction) tion and pollution of flood
as amended plains or inland wetlands
C. MGL C 131, S 40A (Inland C. Responsible for the identifi-
Wetlands Restriction) cation and delineation of.areas
as amended included in coastal and inland
protection program except for
those in designated port areas,
those under NDC control, and
C) portions of barrier beaches
00

Bureau of MGL C 21A, S 2 1. Responsible for planning,
Solid Waste as amended organization,'implementation,
Disposal and administration of regional
solid waste management program
2.'Responsible for identification,
evaluation, selection, and imple-
mentation of resource recovery
alternatives

Agency legislative Mandate. Responsibilities and Powers Permits
EOEA
DEM
(continued)

Division of 1. Provide technical representa-
Water tion on interstate, statewide,
Resources and regional water supply studies
(including those conducted by
New England River Basins Commis-
sion and U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers)
2. Conduct ground water favora-
bility studies in various river
basins in cooperation with USGS

Water MGL C 21, S 39, 8, 12-15 1. Contracting authority for con-
Resources (Watershed Protection and struction
Commission Flood Prevention Act) 2. Supervises Division of Water
as amended
Resources
r-A 3. Responsible for watersheds,
00 water systems, storage basins,
underground and surface water
supplies
4. Construct or expand reservoirs
5. May acquire land for construc-
tion by eminent domain, purchase,
gift, or land and water rights
for protection of future water
needs of Commonwealth
6. Coordinating authority with
USGS

7. Grants assistance to localities
for recurrent water supply prob-
lems

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

EOEA
Metropolitan 1919 Consolidation of Metro- 1. Manage, control, and supervise
District politan Parks District and abatement facilities
Commission Metropolitan Water Board 2. Construct, acqu ire, improve,.
(MDC) (MGL C 21, S 30) maintain, and operate abatement
Federal Water Pollution facilities in metropolitan Boston
Control Act area
3. Pollution control, reservoir
A. MGL C 92, 95 maintenance, sewer system main- A. Construction with an MDC Ease-
tenance ment or near MDC mains
B. MCL C 92 (1972), or as amended 4. Acquire and develop recrea- B. Industrial User Discharge Permit
MGL C 705, S 12 (1975) tional parks and reservations
C. MGL 92, S 102 5. Commitment for Boston Harbor C. Maintenance permits of existing
cleanup (elimination of discharge of existing utilities--drains, water,
of sludge) sewer, gas, electric, telephone
D. MCL C 92; C 814 (1975) 6. Power of eminent domain D. Municipal service connection
E. MGL C 92, S 1 and 32 7. Power to issue bonds and notes E. Municipal services: water
F. MGL C 92, S 95 8. May acquire financial assis- - F. Overweight or oversize loads
C"i G. MCL C 92, S 95 tance from federal government G. Roadway/sidewalk construction and
00 or Commonwealth occupation
H. MGL C 92; C 814 (1975) 9. Shall adopt by-laws and regu- H. S@ecial connection
lations for the conduct of its
1. MGL C 92, S 10 affairs I. Surface water drainage disposal
16. May acquire, dispose of, and or discharge
J. MGL C 92, S 12, 13 encumber real and personal pro- J. Utility installation permits:
perty for purposes of District gas, electric, telephone
11. Construction of sewerage pro-
Jects requires approval of DWPC
(MGL C 21, S 27)

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

Department Public Utilities Laws 1. License for transportation of
of Public (MGL C 159B) hazardous waste
Utilities 2. Electric supply and communi-
cation lines, underground elec-
tric supply, etc. (regs)
3. LPG plants (regs)
4. Oil gas production plants
(construction, reconstruction,
and maintenance)

M
00

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

Energy MGL C 164, S 69 H-R 1. Adopt and publish rules and
Facilities regulations consistent with
Siting purpose
Council 2. Accept certificates of E.I.
Sec. of Administration 3. Conduct public hearings
Sec. of Consumer Affairs 4. Make recommendations
Sec. of EOEA
Sec. of Manpower Affairs 5. Issue or deny approvals of
and five others long range plans for electric,
gas, or oil facilities
6. Review NPDES application and
notify appropriate goverrment
agencies of application
7. Electric or gas companies may
petition to exercise power of
eminent domain

Agency Legislative Mandate Powers and Responsibilities Permits

Department CMR 420: 2 Financial incentives Application for a Certificate of
of Commerce MCL c 400, S 12 1. Massachusetts Business Convenience and Necessity to the
and - Development Corporation (MBDC) Industrial Finance Board and the
Development Department of Commerce and Develop-
2. Massachusetts Community ment regarding financial assistance
Development Finance Corporation

3. Massachusetts Small Business
Purchasing Program

4. Massachusetts Industrial
Finance Agency

5. Industrial Mortgage Insurance

6. Industrial Revenue Bonds

7. Massachusetts Technology
Development Corporation

8. Massachusetts Capital
LO Resource Company
00

9. Local Tax Exemption on Tangible Property

10. Loss Carryover for New Corporations

11. Urban Job Incentives

12. Sales Tax Exemption for Machinery

13. 3% Investment Tax Credit

14. Department of Manpower Development (DMD)

15. Factor Allocation Formula

16. Financing and Tax Reductions for Polution
Control Facilities and Alternative Energy Sources

Agency Legislative Mandate Powers and Responsibilities Permits

Department .17. Massachusetts Community
of Commerce Economic Development Assistance
and Corporation (CEDAC)
Development
(continued) 18. Massachusetts Export Sales Tax
Advantage

AKency I@egislative Mandate Powers and Responsibilities Permits

Executive A. CMR 780: 100 1. Provides a voice for local A. Building construction permit
Office of MGL C 143, S 3 government at the state level from local building inspector
Communities
and B. CMR 760: 30 2. Coordinates stste and federal B.. Appeals made to Housing
Development MCL C 23B, S 5A investments to promote increased Appeals Committee
housing production and the
(Department revitalization of residential,
of Community commercial and industrial
Affairs) areas

3. Provides technical assistance
to strengthen communities abilities
to plan for future development and to
improve local government management
capabilities

Agency Legislative Mandate- Powers and Responsibilities Permits
Department A. MGL C 143, S 15 A. Certification of approval plans
of Public and specifications
Safety B. CMR 521: 1 B. Construction, reconstruction, or
MGL C 22, S 13A alteration pertaining to handicap
access in public buildings

00
00

Ar2enc L@&@@andate Responsibilities and Powers Permits
"Umbrella" 1. Oversea Boston Harbor clean-up
Citizens program
Advisory 2. Funding and organization under
Committee MDC, DEQE, etc.

M
00

Agency Legislative Mandate Powers and Responsibilities Permits
Department MCL C 89, S 9 Permit issued by Permit Engineer
of Public (Main or District Office); denials
Works or appeals to DPW Commission

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

Department MGL C 21, S 17-17A I. Designate public access to
of Fisheries, great ponds, coastal and inland
Wildlife, and waters, and location of trails
Recreational and paths for snowmobiling, hik-
Vehicles ing, skiing, or other uses
Public 2. Acquire land by purchase, gift,
Access lease, or eminent domain for the
Board purpose of providing public
access facilities

3. Contracting authority for
design and construction of
public access facilities
4. May utilize public lands for
public access with consent of
department or agency which
owns the land

5. Department shall adopt,
after public hearings, regula-
tions governing the use of land
and water areas for public access

Agency Legislative Mandate Powers and Responsibilities Termits
State A. CMR 780: 126 A. Appeals process-State Building
Building Code MGL C 23B, S 23 Code Appeals Board
Commission
B. CMR 780: 1900 B. Regulations by State Building
MGL C 140, S 32A Code Commission and local officials

Agen Legislative Mandate Responsibilities & Powers Permit

County Agency-
Suffolk 1) Any aggrieved person
Superior unsatisfied with the Board
Court of Appeals' decision may
appeal within 15 days after
decision is recorded

2) Court may annul the
decision of the Board of
Appeal, may make another
decision and may restrain
by injunction any action
that violates the Zoning
Code

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits
City Agency
Boston Water Chapter 436, Acts of 1977 1. Plow, design, construct, 1. Joint MDC BWSC industrial
and Sewer operate, and maintain water waste discharge permits
Division distribution system within
(BWSC) Boston 2. Water and sewer connection
permits
2. Plow, design, construct,
operate, and maintain waste-
water collection system within
Boston

3. Purchase water in bulk and
wastewater disposal and treatment
services

4. Sell water and wastewater
services to persons, public and
private corporations, municipal-
ities, and state and federal
governments

5. Receive, administer and expend
gifts, grants, donations, and
M property

6. Acquire any water, water rights
and interests in land within Boston

Agen@c Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

Boston MGL C 121A, S 1-14A 1. Authorize or approve projects With approval of Mayor
Redevelopment in substandard areas for the
Authority "for public purpose" construction of residential,
commercial, industrial,
institutional, recreational,
or government facilities

2. Approve financing of project

3. May lease or sell real estate
that it owns for the purpose of
land assembly and redevelopment
or urban renewal purposes

4. Obligate itself to construct,
alter, relocate, or repair public
ways and sidewalks in the public
interest.

5. May undertake planning, con-
struction, or furnishing of parks,
LO playgrounds, schools, water, sewer,
or drainage facilities or other
public improvements

6. Projects exempt from taxation

7. Formation of urban development
corporations

8. Any such corporation may acquire
land by gift or purchase or, with
approval of BRA, by eminent domain

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

Boston 9. Studies appeals to the zoning
Redevelopment code and makes recommendations to
Authority the Board of Appeals (studies are
conducted by BRA advisor to Zoning
Commission
A) Judge the appeal from the
standpoint of needs and planning
goals of the whole 'city and the
local area

B) Ascertain that granting the
appeal would not adversely affect
the public good nor substantially
depart from the intent of the
zoning code

10. May request changes in the Zoning
Code

11. Allowed 20 days by law to review
amendment proposals conducted by zoning
commission and then makes recommendations
on the matter

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibil4ties and Powers

Economic MGL c 1097, Acts of 1. To promote industrial growth
Development 1971 and thereby expand industrial
& Industrial employment in the City of Boston,
Corporation EDIC generally has powers to:
(EDIC/Boston)
A) Acquire and develop land for
industrial use based on a publically
approved Economic Development Plan

B) Apply for and accept grants or
loans, or contributions in aid of
economic development projects

C) Issue revenue bonds of the
corporation for economic development
projects

D) Subject to the approval of the
City Council and of the mayor,
designate areas of the city as
Economic DdVelopment Areas

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permit

City of MGL 1) Adopt and amend Zoning Code
Boston Stat. 1956 c 665 for following reasons:
Zoning Ordinances 1961, c 9 & 10 A) Conserve health
Commission B) Secure safety from fire,
panic and other dangers
C) Prevent overcrowding of
land
D) Avoid undue concentration
of population, to facilitate
the adequate provision of
transportation, water, sewage9
schools, parks, and other
public requirements

E) Conserve value of land &
buildings

F) Encourage the most appropriate
use of land in city

G) Preserve and increase the city's
amenities
00
2) Relies heavily on BRA recommendations
in amendment process

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permit

City of MGL 1) Hears appeals related to A) Conditional Use Permit
Boston Board [Stat. 19381 c 479 s 117 Zoning Code & the Building
of Appeal [Stat. 1956] c 665 s 8 Code B) Variances for Forbidden
Use Permit
2) Applicant who has been
refused building or use permit Note: 1) Conditional Use
under the Zoning Code may appeal indicates that a proposed
within 45 days of date of building does not
refusal to the Board of Appeals meet Zoning Code requirements
2) Building Commisioner
3) Schedules public hearings issues permit
(6 to 8 weeks) after appeal is
submitted and sends notices to
1) appellant 2) BRA 3) owners
of property affected by appeal
(usu. abuttors)

4) Anyone who has requested to
be notified of hearings in the

area
Note: Board also advertises
in classified ads of Boston
Globe 7 days before hearing

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits
Local Wetlands Protection Act (1972) 1. Responsible for issuance of 1. Chapter 91 Waterways License
Conservation (MGL C 131, S 40) Wetland Order of Conditions for
Commission protection of coastal and inland 2. Dredging and disposal of
[including Wetlands Protection Bylaws wetlands dredged material permit
Boston 2. Wetland Order of Conditions 3. Mineral extraction from
Conservation is considered a prerequisite for land under coastal waters
Commission] permits 1-7
3. Required to protect the public's 4. Construction and maintenance of
interests in tbe-following areas dams
A) Public and private water 5. Waste disposal facility siting
supplies
B) Groundwater 6. NPDES
C) Flooding
D) Storm damage 7. Marine oil terminal license
E) Prevention of pollution
F) Fish 8. Wetland Order of Conditions
G) Shellfish

C:)

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

Local Boards A. MGL C 111, S 150A A. Site approval for waste dis-
of Health posal facility
B. MCL C 111, S 150A B. Site approval for hazardous
waste disposal facility
C. MGL C 111, S 142A-E C. Site approval for construction
of new source of air contaminants

D. MGL C 111, S 17 D. Site approval of septage disposal
MGL C 21A, S 13 Cacility
E. MGL C 111, S 143 E. Site approval forappropriate trades
F. MGL C 21A, S 13 F. Approval for surface sewage dis-
State Environmental Code posal facility (<15,000 gal/day)
G. MGL C 111, S31A .;G. Pumping or transportation of
septage permit

tThese permits are generally issued
by municipal boards of health based
upon regulations adopted by DEQE

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

City and Town A. Zoning Enabling Act A. Power to regulate and restrict 1. Industrial User Discharge Permit
Legislative (MGL C 40A, S 2) construction (commercial and 2. Access to water line in permit-
Bodies non-commercial) for promotion of ting process for municipal service:
health, safety, and welfare of water MOC permit
Zoning the inhabitants
Boards 3. Special connection/city or town
file for developer who wants to
connect to Metropolitan sewer
B. MGL C 91, S 12-23 B. Town selectmen must be noti- B. Chapter 91 Waterways License
fied by DEQE of Chapter 91 Water-
ways License

Local
Municipalities

Sewer
Division

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

Multi- MGL C 91A, S 1-10 1. Construct or acquire addition-
jurisdictional al facilities
Agencies 2. Investigate necessity for more
Massport expenditious handling of commerce
and improvement of commerce in
Boston and the surrounding
metropolitan area
3. Investigate necessity for more
expeditious handling commerce
4. Make studies, surveys, and
estimates on feasibility of
facilities

5. Issue revenue bonds (not to
exceed $15 million) to borrow
money for acquisition and con-
struction of trade and transpor-
tation center

6. Authority to fix, revise,
charge, and collect tolls, rates,
fees, rentals, etc., for the use
of projects
7. Control, operate, and maintain
airports

8. Establish its own rules and
regulations for the use of project
9. Authority to acquire by pur-
chase or eminent domain land,
property, rights of way, etc., for
construction or operation of any
project with approval of Governor
and Council and winin the limits
of authority granted by Legislature
10. In charge of all lands, piers,
and other structures and facilities
owned by Commonwealth in said port
except for MC land

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits.

Massport 11. Must comply with.Division of
(continued) Waterways C 91 license for,con-
struct-ion or'dredging below mean
high water mark

12. Subject to Wetlands Order of
Condition in the City,of Boston

Not subject to supervision
or regulation of Department of
Public Works, or any other
department, commission, board, or
bureau of Commonwealth

AgenLfy Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits
Metropolitan C14A (Title 11, S 208 and 303, Basin and area planning
Area C 40B
Planning
Council
(MAPC)

Agency Legislative Mandate Powers and Responsibilities Permits

Harbormaster MGL C 102, S 19-26 1. Mayor of a city, except Boston,
may appoint Harbormaster
2. Masters of vessels anchor their
vessels according to regulations
of Harbormaster

3. Permit for unloading lumber
In stream

4. Removal of vessels from harbor
5. Regulate and station all ves-- 5. Approval of floats or rafta
sels in streams or channels

6. Reports to Division of Water@,
ways any obstructions to naviga-
tion in harbor

A@ency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits.
Boston Harbor State/EPA Agreement 1. To enhance coordination be-
Interagency tween state and federal agencies
Coordinating and the public
Committee 2.'To provide a forum for sharing
(BHICC) information, discussing proposed
activities, and for expediting
processes

Agency Legislative-Mandate RP.&ponsiMlit-Jes njocl PoWers

Private Clean Water Act (established by Provides for public participation
Organizations EPA in 1976) in EPA and state programs

Boston Harbor
Citizens
Committee

Agency Legislative Mandate Responsibilities and Powers Permits

The Boston 1. To promote a sensible plan
Harbor for the development of Boston
Associates Harbor
(TBIIA)

Government Agencies Classified According to Their Legislative Powers

Permitting or Regulatory Powers

Local

1. Local Zoning Boards 8. Executive Office of Public Safety

2. Local Building Departments
Federal
3. Local Boards of Health
1. EPA
4. Local Conservation Commissions
2. Army Corps of Engineers

State 3. U.S. Coast Guard

1. EOEA 4. National Marine Fisheries Service

A. DEQE - Division of Wetland Protection 5. Fish and Wildlife Department
- Division of Waterways
- Division of Water Pollution Control 6. Department of Housing and
C:) - Division of Water Supply Urban Development
- Division of Hazardous Waste

B. DEM Multijurisdictional
C. MDC 1. Harbor Master

2. Department of Commerce and Development

3. Department of Public Utilities

4. Department of Public Works

5. Department of Public Safety

6. State Building Commission

7. Executive Office of Communities and Development

Government Agencies Classified According to Their Legislative Powers (continued) p.2

Promulgate Rules & Regulations Environmental Review Issue Bonds

1. EOEA 1. EOEA 1. BRA (C 121A S12)

A. DEQE A. Coastal Zone Management Office 2. EDIC/Boston

B . DEM B. MEPA Review Office 3. MDC (C 12 S30

C. MDC 2. EPA 4. Massport

2. Department of Fisheries,
Wildlife and Recreational
Vehicles

Eminent Domain

1. BRA (C121A Sll)

2. EOEA

A. MDC (C21 S30)

B. DEQE - Division of Waterways
(C91A SI,2)

3. Department of Fisheries, Wildlife
and Recreational Vehicles (Public
Access Board) (C21 S17A)

4. Massport (C91 S3)

Government Agencies Classified According to Their Activity

Environmental Control Land Use/Redevelopment

1. Local Conservation Commissions 4. EPA 1. BRA

2. Local Boards of Health 5. National Marine Fisheries Service 2. EDIC

3. EOEA 6. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Department 3. Department of Housing
& Urban Development
A. Coastal Zone Management 7. 'U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
4. Massport
B, DEQE

1) Division of Wetlands Protection

2) Division of Solid Waste Disposal

3) Division of Waterways

4) Division of Hazardous Waste

Division of Water Pollution Control

6) Division of Water Supply

C. DEM,

1) Division of Acquisition & Construction

2) Office of Planning

3) Division of Wetlands Restriction

4) Bureau of Solid Waste Disposal

5) Division of Water Resources

D. MDC

Government Agencies Classified According to Their Activity (continued)- p. 2

Financing Building/Construction Planning Citizens' Advisory Councils & Interest Groups

1. BRA 1. Local Zoning Boards 1. MDC - 1. BHCAC
Waste Water Plans
2. EDIC 2. City of Boston 2. TBHA
Zoning Commission 2. DWPC -
3. Department of Waste Water Plans 3. BHICC
Commerce & 3. City of Boston
Development Board of Appeal 3. MAPC 4. "Umbrel 1 a" Ci ti zens
4. Executive Office 4. BRA 4. EPA Advisory Committee
of Communities &
Development 5. Suffolk County

6. :Department of
Public Utilities

7. State Building Co-de
Commission

8. MDC

Navigation/Commerce Maintenance

1. Harbor Master I.' Boston Water and Sewer Division

2. Massport 2. MDC

3. U.S. Coast Guard 3. DPW

4. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 4. Massport

OBSERVATIONS OF OTHER URBAN HARBORS-

SOME COMPARISONS

OBSERVATIONS OF OTHER URBAN HARBORS: COMPARISONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
SUMMARY 115

WHAT'. 1S. TRANSFERABLE? 118

-.,A Regional Authority 118
- ExIpanded Mandates 118

- Environmental Permit Coordination 119

- Management Mechanisms 120
- Public Participation 121

SIX CITIES:

- Baltimore 123

Philadelphia 130

- New York 135

- San Diego 142

- San Francisco 147

- Seattle 152

114

S,UMMARY

Over the past 25 years the municipal institutions and authorities

that have managed our nation's harbors have had to confront revolutionary

developments in marine technology, a fluctuating economic environment, and

a pro liferation of regulations and regulatory agencies. While some insti-

tutions were able to adapt, other management systems needed to be modified

radically to keep up with the times. But not all cities made these necessary

institutional adjustments; a few relied on outdated institutions with

inadequate mandates and insufficient powers to solve modern problems. The

six harbors investigated in this chapter (Baltimore, New York, Philadelphia,

San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle) illustrate in varying degrees these

different approaches.

The catalyst for institutional change has been different from harbor

to harbor. In Baltimore the catalyst was the U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service; in New Jersey it was an environmentalist coalition; in New York

it was the Interstate Commerce Commission; in San Diego it was a business

115

116

community alliance; in San Francisco it was an environmental group and a

graphic picture of San Francisco Bay filled; and in Seattle it was a civic

organization and a TV documentary exprosing port mismanagement. Clearly

no single formula existed to incite change. A crisis evidently helped,

but as the San Diego business alliance demonstrated, it was not essential.

-Des.pi te 'the: diffe-rent,cata,lysts, apattern in the new institutions is

unmistakable. Regionalism is the common element. The Regional Planning

Council in Baltimore, the Hudson River Waterfront Commission in New Jersey,

the San Diego Unified Port District, the San.Francisco Bay Conservation

and Development Commission, and the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle

are examples of this trend to give regional authorities varying degrees

of power and influence in local land use planning.

The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 was a federal attempt to

bring greater coordination into waterfront land use planning. CZM programs

potentially could have been a rallying force for new harbor management

systems. But in many states these programs are too weak to have had

much of an effect. All of the CZM programs of the eastern states examined

in this chapter were developed from existing legislation and lacked the

mandate to coordinate harbor planning and management. C alifornia and

Washington, on the other hand, passed new comprehensive legislation that

required that local authorities develop waterfront master plans under state

guidelines. These master plans help define waterfront management structures.

But if anything is to be learned from this chapter, it should be that

many of the problems that have mired Boston Harbor management are not unique

117

to Boston. Other harbors have had to deal with these same issues; some

have had more success than others. This chapter reviews the problems

of each harbor, reveals the key actors, their mandates and powers,

examines management mechanisms, and suggests what is transferable to a

new system of Boston Harbor management.

118

What is Transferable?

A Regional Authority

1. All ports investigated in this study have some type of regional

body with varying mandates and powers; some are loosely defined while

others are well defined with extensive responsibilities. Representation

on the governing commissions vs, sometimes weighted to favor municipalities

with large populations. For Boston, representation could also be weiqhted

according to length of shorelines in communities.

2. The purposes of many of these regional councils are comprehensive

planning (including coordination of planning with local communities),

t
establishment of guidelines for future developmen, and facilitation

of future development and activities.

Expanded*Mand6tes

1. The Port of Seattle's mandate includes power over rail and

highway terrr.,inals which al.low the Port to offer the Overland Common

Point program. In this program the Port assembled small shipments

destined for the same place but in different containers into one

container to reduce shi pping costs. This strategy improved Seattle's

ability to compete with other West Coast ports. Massport's operations

could be more effective if its mandate could be broadened to encompass

such powers.

2. The New York/New Jersey Port Authority's mandate was expanded

to include the powers necessary for an industrial revitalization program.

Under certain conditions that reflected the broader public considerations

of Boston Harbor, Massport might be considered for this type of program.

119

Massport has the planning, marketing, and managerial structure as well

as the responsibility to promote, protect, and preserve commerce in the

Port of Boston.

3. The mandates of the Ports of San Diego and Seattle include

the protection of recreational interests. In Boston, it is essential

th,at- some agency's mandate be expan-ded to assume a lead role in the

promoti.on, creati,on and maintenance of recreational interests.

4. The Delaware River Basin Commission has allocation and

regulatory responsibilities in the 4-state area of the Delaware

River Basin. The mandate of the New England River Basins Commission

could be expanded to provide for a similar role in water quality

management.

Environmental PerMit Coordination

1. The State of Washington's Environmental Coordination Procedures

Act provides for a one stop permit system for all state permits needed

for development. A similar law in Massachusetts would help simplify the

complicated regulatory process. A Harbor agency could be the focal

agency for implementation of this act at least for Harbor activities.

2. New York City's Department of Planning has been advocating

a programmatic environmental assessment review. The Boston office

of Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill has a grant from HUD to develop a

guidebook for these reviews. This guide could help facilitate development

in Massachusetts.

120

Management Mechanisms

1, In the absence of legislationil Baltimorels Department.of

Planning requires that public access be included in all residential

projects with federal assistance. Massachusetts cities or a harbor

agency could by executive order adopt a similar requirement.

New YorVs Department of Ports and Terminals h-as released

a Request for Proposals (RFP) for development of a segment of the

East River Waterfront no longer suitable for marine use. The RFP strategy

has already been used by the MDC to develop Peddocks Island. This approach

might also be used by the City of Boston to develop Spectacle Island,

although the determination should be carried out in coordination with a

comprehensive Harbor planning process. The use of lease instead of sale

arrangements for water enhanced or water related development on vacant
waterfront land might be explored (with the exception of residential

development). Once the lease expires the land will once again be

available for water dependent uses.

3. The Charles Center Inner Harbor Management Inc. in Baltimore

has been a major success. That non-profit development corporation

strategy might be explored as a possible option for managing and developing

land around Boston Harbor.

4. Baltimore's Regional Planning Council coordinates development

of "Coastal Guidance Packages" for each locality in the region to maintain

consistency in coastal planning. In Boston Harbor the development of a

Harbor master plan or local coastal guidance packages could be coordinated

by,a new Harbor agency or in its absence, by the Coastal Zone Management

Office.

121

5. The Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro) has proven

to be an extremely effective structure for the management of water

quality. Metro could serve as a model for any reorganization of the

MDC.

Public Participation

1..'Events suchas Operation Sail.in New York and the Parade of

Sail in,Boston help build waterfront constituencies. Other events from

Boston harbor yacht regattas and transatlantic boat races to harbor

fishing contests and waterfront musical concerts could help build

advocacy groups for change in Boston Harbor.

2. Modele-d after the Regional Planning Council's Coastal Zone

Metropolitan Advisory Board in Baltimore, a board of non-qovernmental

representatives established to advise a new regional council managing

the Harbor would repre.sent a sound public participation component.

3. In the 1950's a TV expose of port mismanagement in Seattle

was a catalyst for change in the direction of the port. A similar

documentary on the range of problems of Boston Harbor management would

be a useful mechanis-m to catalyze change.

122

REGIONAL AUTHORITIES

Political Status Political Jurisdictions Governing Board Population Land Area Functions r.t@l@st Year Forme
Regional Planning regional City of Baltimore and 12 elected officials 2.2 million 2,259 1. Forum for 1963
Council (Balt Imore) commission 5 surrounding counties 6 members of plan- square planning
ning bodies, I State miles issues
[6 principal govern- 2. Devise
ments] Senator (a I ted
by Governor , I general
State Delegate (ap- development
pointed by Governor. plans
2 private citizens
(ap Int by ve
"M, I ;7oral
represen t ive
The Port Authority public 17 county goverimnts 6 commissioners 12 million 1,600 1. Development Interstate 1921
of New York and corporation 234 municipal govern- appointed by the square 4) f certain Commerce
New Jersey (bi-state) ments Governor of New York miles transporta- Commission
200+ special authori- 6 commissioners tion. termi-
ties and commissions appointed by the nal. and
Governor of New I other facili-
Jersey ties of
commerce
2. Protection and
promotion of
port commerce
Hudson River regional .11 mun.1 cipal I ties 39 members appoint- Rougtrly I., Conduct.a Alliance of 1979
Waterfront Study, commission ed by Governor. 4.000 thorough 26 local
Planning, and study of envirommen-
(temporary Includes mayors.of acres a
Development commission 15 municipalities. (from the v rious talist
Commission created by several other elect- River to alternatives groups
(New Jersey) executive ed officials. repre- the first for the plan-
order sentatives of paved ning and re-
governments, and public development
private citizens road) of the Hudson
River Water-
front
Delaware River public 2 counties in Pennsyl- 8 commissioners 1. Promotion and 1952
Port Authority corpora- vania and 8 counties appointed by Governoi protection of
tion In New Jersey gf New Jersey, marine com-
(bi-state) commissioners merce on
appointed by Governol Delaware
of Pennsylvania

2. Construction
and operation
of bridges.
3. Devel opment
and operation
of mass tran-
sit facilities
Delaware River regional Parts of 4 states Governors of New York, 32.000 1. Develop and 1961
Basin Commission commission New Jersey. Pennsyl- square effectuate
(4 states) vania. and Delaware miles plans, poli-
and one commissioner cies, and
appointed by the Pres- projects re-
ident of the United lating to the
States water resour-
ces of the
basin

San Diego Unified public 5 municipalities on 3 commissioners ap- I million 2,491 1. Promote the Bus I vies S 1962
Port District corporation San Diego Bay pointed by San Diego (roughly) acres of development community
City Council. 4 tide- of commerce, alliance
commissioners (I lands navigation.
appointed by each of around fisheries.
the other city coun- San Diego and recreation
cils) Say
Sari Francisco Bay regional 9 counties 9 county representa- @4.5 million 100 foot 1. Permit appro- Save the 1965
Conservation and commission 36 cities tives, band of val over land Bay Asso-
Development 4 city representatives, shore- use changes ciation
Commission 7 members of general line affecting the
public. 5 members of around Bay and its
various state and the Bay shoreline.
regional agencies. miles 2. Development of
2 representatives of ot a Say master
federal government avail ablel plan
Port of Seattle public 1 County 5 member commission 1.3 million 2.134 1. and
corporation 36 cities elected at large square operat on of 191
mi les marine ter-
minals. in-
cluding rail
and hiah@
1. Promot,

municipality of public I c6unty 9 members of, Kipg sewage disposal, Municipal 1956
Metropolitan corporation 37 local governments County Council. transportation League of
Seattle 9 members of Seattle MASS, water. Seattle
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SIX CITIES
Baltimore

A lesson in regionalism

Problems

Over the past few decades Baltimore has had to confront many of

the problems common to@the Bosto.n,W'aterfront. 'Decaying piers, under-

utilized land, inadeq.ua-te transportati-on linkage to the port, and a

complex regulatory system have complicated the redevelopment of both

harbors. But Baltimore's approach to these problems and its overall

waterfront redevelopment strategies have been quite different than

Boston's. Instead of relying only on traditional government institutions

Baltimore created new ones outside of existing bureaucracies.@

Key Actors

1. The Charles Center Inner Harbor Management Inc. is a private

non-profit corporation that provides management to Baltimore's downtown

redevelopment projects. Its origin extends back to 1956 when a group

of businessmen con,cerned about the future of Baltimore's downtown and

waterfront area formed the Greater Baltimore Committee. By 1958 they

had spent a quarter of a million dollars of private money in the develop-

ment of a conceptual plan for this area. This plan fostered an urban

renewal initiative to redevelop the central business district from

1960-65. As this project approached completion, the Charles Center Inner

Harbor Management Inc. was formed to undertake a 20 year renewal project

of the inner ha,rbor. The purpose of the corporation was to provide a

mechanism through which the business community could become involved

124

125

in the execution of projects.

Since 1965, buildings which represent a total of $775,000,000 in

new private and public investment are either completed, under construction,

or committed in the Charles Center and Inner Harbor projects. There are

plans representing $475,000,000 of additional investment making a total

ultimate investment of,$,1,250,000,000. Charles Center Inner Harbor

Management Inc.'s unique rol:e with the city has been indispensable in

attracting developers.

2. The Regional Planning Council (,RPC) was formed in the mid-sixties

to provide a forum for discussion of regional planning issues, coordinate

.regional open space planning,and produce a general development plan every

five years which would be coordinated with the plans of local jurisdictions.

RPC's jurisdiction includes the City of Baltimore and the five counties

surrounding it which altogether have a population of roughly 2.2 million.

The Council consists of 23 members: 12 elected officials, 2 from each

government; 6 members of the planning bodies, I from each government; I state

senator, appointed by the Governor; I state delegate, appointed by the

Governor, 2 private citizens appointed by the Governor; and I mayoral

representative of the region's incorporated towns, appointed by those

municipalities. The chairman is appointed by the Governor from the

membership.

The RPC became the lead agency in waterfront redevelopment in the

early seventies after the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service declared a

moratorium on all dredge and fill,permit reviews until a comprehensive

harbor plan had been completed. The Service felt it was impossible to

assess the impact of any specific project without a harbor plan agreed to

126

by all harbor related agencies. Since port activities had a direct effect

on the economy of the entire region, the Maryland Port Administration and

the City of Baltimore asked the RPC to be the lead agency in the development

of this plan.

In 1974 the RPC created the Harbor Advisory Committee which consisted

of representatives.of Pertinent gov-ernmenta,l agencies and the various

Jurirsdi.ctfons on. Ba.ltimore Ha-rbor. This group developed a set of guidelines

or recommendations rather than absolute prescriptions for Baltimore Harbor.

This plan was adopted by the RPC and.serves as the present guide for

development and redevelopment of Baltimore Harbor.

3. The Maryland Port Administration (MPA) a division of the Maryland

Department of Transportation, is the present public agency responsible for

the promotion and protection of marine commerce in Baltimore. The Port

of Baltimore has had several different managers during this century. In

the early part of the 1900's the City managed city-owned steamship

facilities and the City Harbor Master was general manager of the

Port. At that time Baltimore's excellent train linkages to the midwest

provided a substantial competitive advantage over many eastern ports. But

this competitive edge diminished substantially after World War II, as

trucks replaced railroads. As the interstate highway system grew, the

Port of Baltimore declined.

In 1956, the Maryland Port Authority, a public corporation, was

formed to protect the interests of the port by fostering waterborne

commerce to the maximum extent. But in 1971 the public corporation

strategy was abandoned in a major reorganization of state government. At

this time the Maryland Port Administration was formed to replace the port

authority.

127

Although MPA suffered a net loss of approximately $5,000,000 in

FY1979, the outlook for the future is bright. Truck linkages to the Port

will be improved by the new tunnel being built under Baltimore Harbor as

part of Interstate 95. The tunnel spoil is being used to fill a bulk-

headed site for the planned Seagirt General Cargo Facility. Additional

expansion is being comp,leted at the Dundalk Marine Terminal. Finally the

Masonville Marine Terminal container facility is planned to be completed

in ten years on a 300 acre marsh site.

The Port of Baltimore has also benefited greatly from the resurgence

of coal consumption caused by the increasing cost of oil. Baltimore's

rail linkages and proximity to Appalachian coal mines make it an ideal

location for coal export. At present three modern coal facilities are

planned for construction in Baltimore Harbor by private companies.

4. The Office of Water Quality Management within the Department of

Public Works is the city agency responsible for harbor water quality. The

city owns and operates two secondary wastewater treatment plants that serve

the city and the three surrounding counties. Over 100 million gallons of

effluent from one of these plants is reused for cooling purposes by

Bethlehem Steel. The effluent is then retreated before it is discharged

into Baltimore Harbor. This project has been in existence for 10 years

and represents one of the few large reuses of waste effluent.

Accompanied with land-side harbor improvements the city is trying to

expand recreational uses of the harbor. Improvement of water quality is

part of this program. The Office of Water Quality Management has secured

201 construction grants to eliminate 100 sanitary system overflows and is

also participating in a National Urban Runoff Program grant coordinated

126

by the Regional Planning Council.

Management Mechanisms

In addition to major mechanisms such as the Regional Planning Council

and Charles Center Inner Harbor Management Inc., there have been other programs

and policies that-have facilitated the redevelopment of Baltimore Harbor.

This section discus'.se@s si.x of the most*visible mechanisms.

1".. In the absence of legislation, Baltimore's Department of Planning

requires that pub lic access be included in all residential projects built

with federal assistance.

2. Maryland's Coastal Resources Division in the Department of Natural

Resources is administering a dredging permit simplification program. The

program plans to assemble a team of the pertinent agencies so that they

can consolidate information needs in order.to expedite the process.

3. The Coastal Resources Division formed the Coastal Resources

Advisory Committee which consists of representatives of local jurisdictions,

special interests groups, and non-voting representatives of the state and

federal government.. The Committee advises the Coastal Resources Division

on all coastal zone matters.

4. The RPC established the Coastal Zone Metropolitan Advisory Board

which consists primarily of non-governmental representatives of industry,

business, academic institutions, and special interests groups to advise

the RPC on coastal zone matters.

5. An RPC initiative resulted in EPA's selection of Baltimore as

one of 28 urban areas in the National Urban Runoff Program. The RPC will

coordinate the project and will be assisted by the U.S. Geological Survey,

the City of Baltimore, and Baltimore County.

129

6. The RPC coordinates development of "Coastal Guidance Packages"

for each locality in the region to maintain consistency in coastal planning.

What is transferable?

1. Baltimore's Regional Planning Council (RPC) certainly seems to

be a-success.-A Boston Harbor.Planning Council would include representatives

of all 'the towns and cities within the Coastal Zone Office's definition of

the Harbor. The citi:es of Boston and Quincy should have more than one

representative because of their larger populations. The mandate of the

Council should include the development of a master plan coordinated with the

plans of local jurisdictions.

2. The RPC Coastal Guidance Packages could be used in Massachusetts

with or without a council. The present CZM office could take on this function.

3. Copying Baltimore's Department of Planning, all state agencies

in Massachusetts could adopt immediately the administrative policy that no

development on the Harbor will receive state or federal assistance without

an adequate public access element.

4. Modeled after RPC's Coastal Zone Metropolitan Advisory Board,

a board of non-governmental representatives established to advise any new

or existing institutions managing the Harbor would represent a sound public

participation component.

5. Charles'Center Inner Harbor Management Inc. might be duplicated

in Boston. Although it has been a success in Baltimore, Philadelphia is

reevaluating the Penns Landing Corporation because of perceived failures.

This strategy needs further investigation.

130

SPRING GARDEN

I. FRANK
ONE
MARKET 7
ENTO CITY
SPRUCE

SNYDER
7

olluol z
,"Out

Philadelphia

Who does what?

Problems

The Ports, of Philadelphia* had more actors participating in harbor

management,,thlan any_of,the.other case studies. The Committee of Seventy,

a non-profit civic organization, recently compl@eted a Ports Governance

Study which 'claimed that the number,one problem facing the ports was the

fragmentation of responsibilities among existing port agencies: the

Delaware River Port Authority is responsible for marketing and promotion;

the Ph iladelphia Port Corporation provides basic administration; the

Philadelphia Port Corporation and the Department of Commerce carry out

planning and development; and the Philadelphia Marine Trade Association

supplies personnel management. This fragmentation exacerbated information

gathering problems. Furthermore, as responsibilities are delegated to

different agencies,overall accountability suffers and resources are

wasted in the needless duplication of effort, both severe problems in

Philadelphia and other ports along the Delaware.

In addition to these problems Philadelphia faces the generic problems

that confront many eastern ports. Maintenance dredging is stalled because

of problems with environmentalists and the failure to find adequate

disposal sites. Dilapidated and abandoned piers are scattered along

the river. Finally, the severe drought in the mid-Atlantic region has

lowered the river level but raised temoers over water allocations among

states.

*Defined by the Delaware River Port Authority as the ports of Philadelphia,
Camden, Chester, Gloucester, Trenton, Paulsboro. Marcus Hook, and
Wilmington.

131

132

Key Actors

1. The Philadelphia Port Corporation, a publ,ic corporation, was

formed in 1965 to 1) promote waterborne commerce; 2) maintain and

modernize existing facilities; and 3) design, construct, and manage

new facilities within the city limits of Philadelphia.

'A 33,member@board oversees the operation of the Port. This board

consi-sts of 9city directors (department and committee heads), 2

representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 2 representatives of

the Delaware River Port Authority, 9 Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce

members, and 11 public directors (prominent in the financial, commercial,

industrial, and professional community). An executive committee of 13

meets more frequently and manages most of the Port's affairs.

The Corporation acts primarily as the landlord of the Port, leasing

out the city owned waterfront facilities to private terminal operators.

Although its mandate includes the promotion of marine commerce, the

Corporation has done no formal marketing for the Port.
2. The Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA) is a public corporation

formed by a compact between Pennsylvania and New Jers.@n/ and approved by the

U.S. Congress in 1952. Its jurisdiction is Philadelphia and Delaware

counties in Pennsylvania,and Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May,

Cumberland, Gloucester, Ocean, and Salem counties in New Jersey. A 16

member commission oversees the operations of the DRPA. The Governors@of

Pennsylvania and New Jersey each appoint 8 commissioners to serve five

year terms,on the commission.

The DRPA's mandate includes: 1) the promotion and protection of

marine commerce on the Delaware; 2) the authority to acquire, build, and

133

Anals; 3), the construction and operation of bridges; and
and operation of mass transit facilities between New
tania. Although the DRPA has several port-related

it has restricted its activities to Port promotion.

Nare River Basin Commission was formed in 1961 by a
y the states of New,York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,and
Delaware. The purpose of the commission was to de@telop and effectuate
plans, policies, and projects relating to the water resources of the basin
including pollution control, water supply, flood protection, watershed
management, recreation, and hydroelectric power. The commission consists
of the Governors of the signatory states and one commissioner appointed

by the President of the United States,.
4. The Penns Landing Corporatic,n is a non-profit corporation
contracted by the City of Philadelphia to develop a 25 zicre site on the

Philadelphia waterfront.

Management Mechanisms
1. In the absence of a regional port authority for the tri-state-
area (Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey), the Delaware, River Port
Authority's World Trade Division promotes eight ports along the Delawar@_,@

as the "Ports of Philadelphia."
2. The Philadelphia City Planning Commission is in th(? process of
a riverfront study to provide a long range plan for the Ph-Jladelphia

waterfront.

3. The four state Dela,ware River Basin Commis.,sion has; reduced by

35% the volume.of drinking water that originates in-the rivei- basin and

is allocated to New York Cit3t. This action was taken in ordet' to

13.4

increase the amount of freshwater in the lower Delaware thus preventing

further salt,water intrusion, upriver.

135

--- ---------
174

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LEGEND

. . . . . . . . . .

The New York Commercial Exempt Zone prescribed by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to which TOFC/COFC Yards of
Conrail at Elizabeth , and Delaware & Hudson at Oak Island (New-
ar" have been added For further information see Port Authority
I T TransportationInfor tion Bulletin No. 9, available free of cha e
ma r'
I rom the Traff 1c 1vi,Port Authority of New York & New J r_
D sion e
2_1 sey, One World Trade Center, New York, N.Y. 10048 (Suite 63-S).
i17 -7 L 7 T i

New York/New Jersey

A crisis delays change

Problems

The Port of New York/New Jersey's coast exceeds that of Boston,

Baltimore, and Philadelphia combined. New York City alone has nearly

600 miles of coastline. All the generic problems experienced by east

coast ports can be found somewhere in the Port of New York: the

difficulty of finding dredge spoil sites; conflicts with environmentalists

over the Westway highway; Brooklyn's weak transportation linkages; old

abandoned finger piers along the Hudson; and a fragmented regulatory

system. Add to these problems New York's fiscal crisis and the result

is a waterfront largely neglected through most of the 70s.

Key Actors

1. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, a public cor-

poration, was established by an interstate compact approved by the U.S.

Congress in 1921. The Port District covers an area within approximately 25

miles of the Statue of Liberty. Within this district there are 17 county

governments, 234 municipal governments, more than 200 special purpose

authorities and commissions, and over 12 million people. Port Authority

Commissioners, six from each state, are appointed by the Governors of

New York and New Jersey and approved by the respective state legislatures.

The commissioners serve without pay for six year staggered terms.

Historically, the Port Authority has had two major responsibilities:

1) the development and operation of certain transportation, terminal,

and other facilities of commerce in the Port District and 2) the protection

136

137

and promotion of commerce moving to and from the port. In discharging

these responsibilities the Port Authority has financed, constructed, and

now operates 26 major facilities.

2. The Department of Ports and Terminals (P & T) is New York City's

building department on the waterfront. Its responsibilities include

management and control of all city owned wharf property, regulation of

coastal structures, and the design of marine terminals. In 1978 Mayor

Koch made P & T the lead waterfront development agency. At that time a

policy was established to use for other purposes land that is no longer

suitable for marine use.

3. The Department of City Planning (DCP) is the city agency

responsible for the development of a coastal zone management program for the

five boroughs of New York. Of all the case studies, New York is the only

state that does not have a federally approved coastal zone management

program.

4. The Bureau of Water Pollution Control within the Department of

Environmental Protection is the city agency responsible for water quality

in New York Harbor. The city's water quality improvement program is

concentrating on the cleanup of canals, streams, and remnants of old

creeks. They plan to build at least a dozen facilities as part of the

Tributary Program that will remove floating material and large solids as

well as disinfect the effluent.

5. The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) is the lead

agency for CZM in New Jersey. DEP has played a key role in the Liberty

Park development project and in the recent investigation completed by

the Hudson River Waterfront, Study, Planning, and Development Commission.

138

Management Mechanisms

1. In 1978 the Port Authority's legislated mandate was expanded to

include a program of industrial development. An industrial park master

plan was adopted in July 1979 that identified six urban sites on which

the Port Authority with municipal agreement could build, market, and

manage an industrial park in order to strengthen the region's economy

and create new jobs.

The Port Authority has projected that the program will create over
26,000 jobs and generate roughly $300 million in annual payroll. The public

investment would be about $500 million but almost $80 million would be

returned annually as state and l.ocal tax benefits, approximately a 20% return

on the investment.

2. The Department of Ports and Terminals (P & T)_ has released a

Request for Proposals (RFP) for a mixed use development on a segment of

the East River Waterfront no longer suitable for marine use.

P & T has established the following criteria as the basis for

reviewing submissions and selecting a developer.

1. Development program: the proposed development must be responsive

to special development such as height restrictions, compatibility

with existing neighborhoods, public access (a continuous water-

front esplanade is specified), view corridors, and density

restrictions.

2 Economic considerations: added weight will be given to proposals

with the least public sector investment and the maximum economic

benefit to the city.

3 Architecture and design: emphasis will be placed on the quality

139

of design, materials, and workmanship to ensure that the

development is appropriate to this waterfront site.

4 - Development and financial capability: management skills,

available financial resources, and prior performance will be

evaluated to ensure the applicant's ability to implement the

proposed development.

3. New York City's Department of Planning has been advocating a

programmatic environmental assessment review that would focus on area

specific,environmental impact reviews instead of the present site specific

review process.

4. New Jersey's Hudson River Waterfront Study, Planning, and Development

Commission (.HRC) focused on the key issues of revitalization on the New

Jersey Hudson waterfront. Although the Commission was forined in 1979

by an executive order from Governor Byrne, the real catalyst for the

commission was an alliance of 26 local environmental groups known as the

Waterfront Coalition of Hudson and Bergen.

The 39 member commission included the eleven mayors of the study

area, local officials, and private citizens. Despitelocal protest,

no representative of the Waterfront Coalition was included.,

After a year long investigation the Commissfon adopted a series of

recommendations concerning public access, environmental resources,

transportation, energy, industrial and port development, solid waste,

taxes, energy facilities and wastewater treatment. The most important

of all these recommendations was that a new permanent regional agency

be established to focus attention on the Hudson River waterfront.

140

In November 1980 a bill was introduced into the New Jersey

legislature to form a permanent 27 member regional commission. If this

bill is passed, the new commission's mandate will be to promote the

immediate revitalization, development, redevelopment, recreation, and

preservation of the Hudson River waterfront.. Its powers and responsibilities

will include: 1) the adoption of a master plan coordinated with the

plans of local jurisdictions; 2) the review of all land use applications

within the region; 3) the development of a program to divide property

tax revenues from all new development in the region among the municipalities

and counties within the region; and 4) the assumption of CZM regulatory

responsibilities now administered by the Department of Environmental

Protection.

5. Probably more than any event in the 70s, Operation Sail for the

Bicentennial celebration crea ted a new awareness of the plight and potential

of New York City's waterfront. The idea was conceived by an ad hoc

citizen's group and for many represents a second beginning for New York

harbor.

What is transferable?

1. The industrial revitalization efforts of the Port Authority could

be undertaken by Massport or some other public corporation in Massachusetts.

Massport might be an appropriate agency because of its existing planning,

marketing, and managerial skills and because of its responsibility to

promote, protect, and preserve the commerce of the Port of Boston.

2. The Department of Ports and Terminals RFP strategy has already

been used by the MDC to develop Peddocks Island. This approach might

also be used by Massport to develop the East Boston piers or by the City

141

to develop Spectacle Island,

3. The area specific programmatic environmental assessment review

advocated by.New York City's Department of Planning is a strategy that

is gaining popularity nationwide. The Boston office of Skidmore;

Owings, and Merrill has a grant from HUD to.develop a guidebook for these

reviews. This guidebook will be available in spring 1981.

4. The Hudson River Waterfront Study, Planning, and Development
Commission (HRC) is roughly analogous to Boston's newly legislated

Harbor Commission. The HRC's final report was issued in September 1980

and should be of particular interest to the Boston Harbor Commission. In

addition it would'be useful to follow the debate and progress of New

Jersey's bill to form a permanent regional commission.

5. Operation Sail served as a model for the Boston Harbor Associates

Parade of Sail in 1980. The ability of these events to build waterfront

constituencies should not be underestimated. Other events from Boston

Harbor yacht regattas and transatlantic boat races to harbor fishing

contests and waterfront musical concerts help build advocacy. groups for

change in Boston Harbor.

142

`[email protected];o it

'
Val kinin6,ointa,
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6 ri

Harbor Island hftetw 15

Shelter Island B Street Pie
r
SUM 94
Broadway Pier I Ith NavW
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Ten Lie
Poin't
'Island
North, i1ne- inal
61

\1 Naval
\Station

San
Diego
Bay
National City,
N Val
a
Nlean High Tide Line Arnphibious
Base National City
Tidelands
rine Terminal
Ma
Submerged Tidelands
Tidelands.. Th. Port's Jurisdiction
Chula Vista
a center of trade, shipping, commercial
fishing and recreation. Considered one of the world's
greatest natural harbors, it is 14 miles long and covers over 23 ....
square miles. There are 10,529 acres of water in the Bay apd
4,422 acres of tidelands around it.
corona@o
The broken line on the map above is the "mean high tide line."
Property on the bayward side of this line is the "tideland" area.
Much of the fill for this property came from various dredging
projects in the bay, including the dredging of the 1920s which was
AW
necessary as San Diego came to be a major naval base.
The Port District manages certain tidelands around the bay and sub-
merged lands under it. These areas are designated in the darker color
on the map. Substantial portions of the tidelands are owned by the
federal government and used by the Navy, Coast Guard and Marine
Corps. The state has retained ownership of the majority of submerged
lands under the bay; especially in channels.
Imperial Beach

San Diego

The All Powerful

Problems

Historically, the Port of San Diego's biggest problem has been its

inability to compete with the larger Californian ports for marine commerce.

This failure has had a profound effect on the type of industries that occupy

the tidelands of San Diego Bay. In the absence of marine commerce, water

dependent, water related recreation and tourism have become vitally im@

portant to the local economy. The San Diego Unified Port District's

revenues from property operations was more than three times qreater than

revenue from marine operations in FY1980.

Despite extraordinary successes in property management the Port

District sill confronts many of the generic problems of most American

ports. Land scarcity is increasingly a problem with no possibility of

creating new land. Demand for recreational boating slips has outstripped

supply even though there are more than 6,000 slips in San Diego Bay and

2,000 additional slips in nearby Mission Bay. And the San Diego Port

District has had its share of conflicts with environmentalists; the

Port District is presently appealing an imposed condition on its master

plan that requires the Port District provide and maintain a habitat for

the least tern.

Finally, community opposition has always existed against the Port

District's position on San Diego's airport location, but recently increased

displeasure has been expressed over what is called the Port District's lack

of responsiveness to community needs. The Port District's opposition to

143

144

a local Chicano park is an example commonly cited.

Key Actors

1. The San Diego Unified Port District is a public corporation and

is the major actor in San Diego Bay and probably the most powerful port

corporation in the U.S. Its mandate includes the power to promote the

development of commerce, navigation, fisheries, and recreation. With the

exception of federal property, the title of all tidelands resides in the

Port District. These lands are held in trust for the uses and purposes and

upon the conditions declared in the act.

The idea of a unified port district for San Diego began in the late

1950's when a group of businessmen got together who felt San Di.ego Bay's

resources were underutilized. They felt that a new marine terminal would

attract business to San Diego but the only available 'land for development

was in National City. Since National City's bonding capacity was too

small to pay for a new marine terminal, the unified port district concept

was introduced.

In 1962 the San Diego Unified Port District was created by an act

of the California legislature and approved by area voters in Coronado,

Chula Vista, Imperial Beach, National City, and San Diego. The Port

District is governed by seven member non-salaried commissioners. These

members are appointed by the city councils of each of the five participating

cities to serve four year terms; San Diego, the largest of the cities,

appoints three commissioners.

Ironically the new marine terminal constructed in National City has

been underutilized ever since its completion. On the other hand the Port

District has had tremendous success in property management. In FY1980

145

property management represented 40% of total revenues. More than 350 firms

are tenants of the Port District employing over 30,000 people.

Current projects on property leased from the Port District include:

an 1,100 room hotel complex with a 450 slip marina in Embarcadero Marina

Park.on the City of San Diego's waterfront; a 600 slip marina that will

.eventually be expanded to 1,000 slips in Chula Vista;.an 80 acre re-

plenished wildlife haven that is the largest manmade marsh in the country;

and the recent completion of Seaport Vill age, an early California theme

shopping, dining, and recreational village. The Port District is also directly
involved in the construction of a 192,000 square foot warehouse in

National City with connecting railroad spurs and a 420 foot commercial

fishing pier.

2. The Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps occupy a large portion

of San Diego Bay. Nearly one third of the U.S. Navy fleet is home-ported

here. There are 18 major naval installations in the metropolitan area.

3. The San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board has jurisdiction

over water quality control problems in a 4,800 square mile area around

San Diego including the Harbor. The Board consists of 9 members appointed

by the Governor for four year staggered terms. At present. water is

swimmable in nearly every section of the Bay.

Management Mechanisms

1. The San Diego Unified Port District developed a master plan that

was recently approved (with two conditions) by the California Coastal

Commission. This certification will allow the Port District to implement

the program through a permit system. The plan complies with state CZM

146

policies concerning port expansion in urban areas, dredge and fill activities,

pollution prevention, protection of commercial fishing facilities, and port

related developments.

What is transferable?

1. The recreational opportunities in San Diego Bay surpass those

of all other major port cities in the U.S. The legislative mandate of

some agency should be expanded to include promotion and protection of
recreational interests (see RECOMMENDATIONS).

2. The San Diego Unified Port District's property management has

been a very successful enterprise. Lease arrangements for water enhanced
or water related development on vacant waterfront land in Boston Harbor

might be explored (with the exception of residential development). Once the

lease has expired the land will once again be available for water

dependent uses.

3. The local coastal master Dlan used in California might also

be used in Massachusetts. A regional commission would establish guide-

lines (development, public access, conservation, water quality management,

etc.) for the master plan, local communities would prepare the plan with

technical assistance from the commission, and the plan would become

effective after commission approval.

147

VALLEJO

..........

ROCKETT

PI OLE MARTINE

RICTI .-OND

LEGEND

WATER-RELATED INDUSTRY

PORT
BERKELEY AIRPORT
3ALIT
EMERYVILL WATERFRONT PARK, BEACH
T
WILDLIFE AREA

TIDAL MARSH

SALT POND, MANAGED WETLAND
OAKLAND
SHIP CHANNELS

70'OR OVER

45'-60'
SAN RANCISCO 35'-45'

VISTA POINT

"ENTRANCE" VIEW FROM ROAD
SA LEA DVO FREEWAY --- 40L-

SUPERTANKER TERMINAL

AYVVARD SAN FRANCISCO BAY
_71

"tt, gi
SAN ANIATEr."," NEWARK

REDWOOL@ cay

PALO ALT0

'Ile

San Francisco Bay

The CZM model

Problems

San Francisco Bay has three problems that seem to plague all ports

in the U.S.: a scarcity of land suitable for development; an excess

demand for recreational boating slips; and water quality problems that

have caused among other things the decline of striped bass populations.

But it is not the generic problems that makes San Francisco interesting

to this project. Rather it is the mechanism that was created to deal

with them, namely, the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development

Commission.

Key Actors

Although there are several major actors within the.boundaries of

individual localities, the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development

Commission (BCDC) is the key,public agency that operates in all sectors

of the Bay.

The BCDC's oriqins extend back to the early 60"s when a small

citizens group called Save the Bay Association formed to bring to,the

public's attention the unchecked filling of the Bay. From 1850 to 1960

nearly one third of the Bay's 787 square miles of surface area had been

filled. If that pace continued in the areas where it is economically..

feasible to fill,:the Bay would be one half its present size in less than

50 years.

Save the Bay's persistent protest and lobbying efforts led to the
establishment of the BCDC by the California legislature in 1965. In

148

149

the next four years the BCDC developed a comprehensive plan for the Bay

and made recommendations for its protection. In 1969 the BCDC was made

a permanent agency.

The 27.member commission consists of 9 county representatives, 4 city

representatives, 7 members of the general public, 5 members of various

state and regional agencies, and 2 representatives of the federal govern-

ment. The BCDC's jurisdiction consists of a 100 foot band of shoreline

in 9 counties and 36 cities around the Bay with the exception of any

portion of this territory included in sub-divisions.

The powers of the BCDC include permit approval over 1) land use

changes affecting the Bay and its shoreline and 2) filling and dredging

in the Bay. This permit authority is used to ensure that prime shoreline

sites of the Bay are reserved for specific water oriented priority land

uses (ports, water related industry, airports, wil-dlife refuges, and

water related recreation). In the remainder, the BCDC is committed to

the provision of maximum feasible public access.

The BCDC has been dramatically successful in two areas: the prevention

of unnecessary fillinq and increased public access. Since 1965 the BCDC

has dramatically arrested the pattern of filling the Bay; less than one

hundred acres have been filled. In several cases the negative impacts of

this fil ling were mitigated by the mandatory enlargement of the Bay in

another section as a condition of the permit. During this same period

the BCDC inereased public access from an astonishingly low 10 miles to

over 90 miles of the Bay's 276 mile shoreline.

2. The Save the Bay As!;O'Ciation still has a membership in excess of

20,000 people. Its continued activism serves a watchdog function for

150

environmentalist an;d@,co,nslervationi5t'inte,rests.

3. The San.,-Franci-sco;,5ay Regional Water Quality.Control Board is

responsible for water qual-ity in the Bay and a 4,300 square mile region

around the Bay. The Board consists of 9 members,appointed by the

Governor for four year staggered terms. At the present time the most

important issue is the debate over the construction of the Peripheral

Canal. If constructed the canal,would,divert twice the present volume of

water from northern California to southern California.

Management Mechanisms
1. The BCDC originally submitted a master 'plan. to*the,California

legislature in 1969 after several years of study and public deliberation.

(Orts, water related
This plan reserves specific areas for priority uses o

industry, airports, wildlife refuges, and water related recreation) and.

serves as a guideline for development in other areas. 'The plan is updated

every 10 years.
2. The BCDt also produces Special Area Plans (SAP) with local

governments for waterfront areas needing more detailed planning guide-

lines than are contained in the Bay Plan. The SAP's are adopted by the

local government as ammendments to their general plans and by the BCDC as

an ammendment to the Bay Plan.

3. A referendum will be held withi'n a year to decide the fate of

the Peripheral Canal.

What is transferable?

1. A permanent regional commission, similar to the BCDC, with a

mandate to develop a master plan for Boston Harbor could make a valuable

151

Contribution. It should be pointed out that the BCDC-oriainated in an
Lnr'(
era of uncontrolled development. The BCDC's primary function was to
n,@
regulate, control, or-prevent any-developthent inconsistent with the Bay

Plan,, that failed to provide adequate--public access or that unnecessarily

proposed filling of the Bay. Boston's problems are substantially different.

In"Contrast to San Francisco Bay in,the ear y sixties, p
resent daydevelopers,
,shun Boston Harbor because of its expensive and compl,icated regulatory
_process. Only the largest and wealthiest developers will venture through
the process. A regional commission for Boston Harbor should'be primarily

designed to foster rather than inhibit appropriate development, but at the

same time be sensitive to environmental issues.

Public access isa much more sensitive issue in Massachusetts than

it is in California and Boston Harbor represents a special- set of resources

with special public interests which compel the maximum use of-these resources.

The Quirico Decision offers Massachusetts the same opportunities to Provide

for maximum feasible public access in all new developments in Boston Harbor.

5 0@
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PORT OF SEATTLE,
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Seattle

A success story

Problems

In the early 70's the Seattle economy was in a shambles, caused

primarily by the depression in the aerospace industry. But while the

rest of regional economy suffered, the Port of Seattle's early investments

in container-handling facilities began paying off. Major shifts in

waterborne cargo accompanied by the growth in grain exports and Alaskan

pipeline construction trade resulted in impressive growth for the Port

of Seattle throughout the 70's. Traffic through the Port more than

doubled during this period.

Most of the problems in the Port of-Seattle are related to this

enormous growth. Land transportation linkages to the,Port are weak; there

is a shortage in the availability of flat cars. Many people blame the

railroad companies for not being as aggressive as their shipping counter-

parts. Growth has caused an increasing scarcity in land available for

marine terminal facilities. And like many other ports this land scarcity

contributed to the shortage of recreational boat sliPs.

Major Actors

1. The Port of Seattle, a public corporation, is the most important

actor in Seattle's harbor. Created in 1911, it is one of the oldest port

authorities in the U.S. A 5 member commission elected at large oversees

the operation of the port and establishes general policy. But despite

the consistency in the governmental structure of the Port of Seattle, the

Port has had its ups and downs.

153

154

Several times in the 20's Seattle handled more cargo than any other

west coast port including Portland, San Francisco, L.A., and Oakland.
But gradually over the next 30 year@ Seattle's share of the market

decreased. By the 50's, the decline in cargo had become a serious

problem. A television expose entitled "Lost Cargo" called public

attention to the issue. At this point the business community, the

Municipal League of Seattle and King County, and several other civic

groups rallied in protest over the mismanagement of the port and its

failure to capitalize on its revenue generating capacity. These groups

supported the election of Frank Kitchell and John Hayden to the Port

of Seattle's Board of Commissioners. The new commission dismissed the

old leadership of the port, hired a new administration, and introduced

some innovative strategies that led to the turnaround of the Port of

Seattle.

In the sixties, the new leadership accurately recognized the importance

of containerization and invested heavily in new container facilities.

By the late 60's Seattle had become the most important port in the

Northwest and was a shining light during the Boeing crisis. In the 70's

the Port of Seattle's growth continued uninterrupted. By 1979 revenues

exceeded expenses by $7.6 million.

The Port of Seattle's mandate includes the promotion and operation

of marine terminals including rail and highway and the moorage and

facilities for small fishing and recreational craft. Recent port projects

include the total containerization of the -southeast harbor from Pier 35

South to Pier 24, the planned total redevelopment of Fisherman's Terminal

and the expansion of the 1,600 recreational slip Shilshole Bay Marina.

1,55

2. Seattle's Department of Construction and Land Use is the lead

agency for local implementation of Washington's CZM program known as the

Shoreline Management Program. As part of this program, local

governments prepare master plans along state guidelines that must include

classifications of priority uses and performance standards for each of

these classifications. This.master plan must be approved by Washington's

Department of Ecology. In order to implement the program the Department

of Construction and Land Use administers a permit system for all development

along Seattle's shoreline. These decisions can be appealed to the state

Shorel-ine Hearings Board.

The Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro) is a public

corporation that has responsibility for mass transit and water quality

in the Seattle area. It was formed in 1958 subsequent to strong local

protest led by the Municipal League of Seattle and King County over the

poor water quality of Lake Washington.

Metro's governing commission consists of 36 members; the 9 members

of King County Council, the county executive, the 9 members of the Seattle

City Council, the mayor of Seattle, 9 representatives from smaller,cities,

6 representatives from unincorporated areas, and I representative of the

sewer districts. Metro encompasses an area that includes 37 local

governments. In Seattle's harbor they are presently investigating the

feasibility of changing the point of discharge of a municipal waste plant

from the Lower Duwamish River to Puget Sound. In addition th ey have

applied to EPA for waivers for secondary treatment for three municipal

waste plants. If the waivers are not granted.substantial capital

expenditures will be needed to upgrade the facilities.

156

Management Mechanisms

1. The Port of Seattle's mandate includes the development, promotion,

and operation of transportation terminals including rail and highway. This

power has allowed the Port to develop advantageous programs that make it

one of the most competitive ports for eastbound cargos. The Port's

strategy is to consolidate cargoes-bound for the same destination, thus

reducing a shipper's transportation costs.

2. The Port of Seattle has gone beyond its mandate to provide public

access to the Harbor. The Port's recently completed Elliott Bay Park

near Terminal 86, a grain shipment terminal,includes approximately a mile

of bicycle and pedestrian paths as well as Seaman's Memorial. In

addition,the Port maintains a 510 foot public fishing pier completed one

year ago by Washington's Department of Fisheries.

3. Washington passed the Environmental Coordination Procedures Act

which allows fo@. concurrent submission of all state permits in a one

stop permit system aimed at expediting the regulatory process.

4. As part of the Sho@eline Management Program, Seattle has developed

a master plan for the waterfront and inventoried coastal resources.

What is transferrable?

1. The Port of Seattle's power over rail and highway terminals

contributes to Seattle's competitive advantage. Massport's mandate could

be expanded to include this power. This strategy might improve Boston's

ability to compete with other eastern ports.

2. As the Port of Seattle has demonstrated, even in the absence

of a clear mandate the Port can expand public access options. Massport

157

could follow their example or seek for an expansion of their mandate to

include the protection of recreational interests.

3. A law modeled after the Environmental Coordination Procedures

Act that provided for a one stop permit system for all state permits

needed for development in Boston Harbor would help simplify Massachusetts'

aomplicated regulatory process.

4. As was suggested in the San Diego and Baltimore sections, the

development of a waterfront masterplan by each community on Boston

Harbor,following predetermined guidelinesmight be a desireable strategy

to encourage development.

5. In the 50's a TV expo�,e of port mismanagement was a catalyst

for change in the direction of the port. A similar documentary on the

problems of Boston Harbor management would be a useful mechanism for

change.

BOSTON HARBOR: ISSUES AND ANALYSES

BOSTON HARBOR ISSUES AND ANALYSES: PUBLIC ACCESS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
INTRODUCTION 159

MAJOR MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS 161

SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR PUBLIC ACCESS IMPROVEMENT 175

158

INTRODUCTION

Use of Boston Harbor

Over the course of a year, only a small proportion of the three

million inhabitants of the Boston area routinely experience or use the

harbord.shoreline. Except in the downtown Boston area,and a few M.D.C.

beaches!', the water's edge is largely a forgotten re.s.ource hidden from

view, inaccessible, and mainly in private hands. For many residents,

Boston seems much more a river city, centered on the Charles, than an

Atlantic gateway. There is a huge latent demand for shoreline usage

that is not being satisfied by current facilities. The State Comprehensive

Outdoor Recreation Plan estimated that in 1975, less than 30% of the

demand for boating use and less than 20% of the demand for swimming

were satisfied by existing facilities in the Massachusetts Bay area.

But the problem is also perceptual:, even those facilities which exist

are often overlooked because they are not considered attractive, seem

inaccessible, or simply are not known about. Moreover, swimming and

boating are only two of the many possible kinds of uses of the shoreline,

and most other activities are totally neglected or precluded by current

development patterns.

Physical Character of the Harbor

San Francisco Bay is ringed by a necklace of communities whose

residents inevitably spend part of the day travelling along its shores

or traversing its breadth. The Bay is a point of orientation for

residents of the area, it has a clear identity as a single body of

159

160

water. When a constituency formed to "Save the Bay", its members

had little difficulty convincing others that it should be planned

and managed as a complete entity including both water and shorelines.

Chicago and Toronto are cities which have developed in linear

patterns along their lakefronts and have over the years grasped the

opportunity of locating important public spaces and institutions

alongtheir shores. Re:sidents have no difficulty in th,inking of

their lakefronts as continuous strips which need to be planned as a

unit. The centerpiece of the Burnham Plan for Chicago (and the part

most faithfully executed) was the system of lakefront parks which

have guaranteed perpetual public access to the shore along most of the

frontage within city boundaries. In Toronto, the islands located

short distances offshore serve the same purpose -- a "living room"

for the city -- as Chicago's lakefront park. Ferry access to the islands

is considered a legitimate responsibility of public transit.

Residents of Halifax, a city that is a peninsula, regard their

water's edge quite differently. Important vistas from Citadel Hill,

the city's central landmark, to distant points across the water are

carefully protected through height restrictions. The land areas with

special significance are the points where important streets descend

to the water's edge, not the perimeter of the peninsula as a totality.

These examples (and many others that could be cited) suggest

that it is worth examining the particular geographic character of an

area's waterfront for the clues to a management strategy. The need

for synoptic attention is most effectively argued for areas thought of

as and experienced as identifiable units.

161

MAJOR MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR A PUBLIC ACCESS PLAN IN

THE BOSTON HARBOR

1. It is important to take the particular geographic character

of an area into account when planning a management strategy for

the area.

a.. The Bo,ston,Harbor Water Surface con:sists of six quite

distinct areas., each with its own character, tradition of

usage, and set of associations with bordering communities:

OV@ A,@

- Broad Sound, bordered by Revere, Winthroot Lynn and Nahant;
- Winthrop Basin, bordered by Winthrop and East Boston;
The Inner Harbor, bordered by Boston proper, East Boston,
Chelsea, Everett, and Charlestown;

162

- Dorchester Bay, bordered by South Boston, Dorchester,
and Squantum. (Quincy);
- Quincy Bay, bordered by Quincy;
- Hingham Bay, bordered by Quincy, Hingham, Weymouth and
Hull.

Thus the Harbor should be planned as six sub-areas for public

.,ac.cess, rather than as a single unit.. Visually, each area is

relatively self-contained and the differing topography of each

suggests quite different approaches to use and access.

b. The Landforms which bound the six water bodies are

equally varied. However, geography ensures that a substan-

tial part of the water's edge borders the nine or more

isthmus communities which frame the bays. Each is largely

.insular with only a few connections to the mainland. Some

were formed by joining islands to the mainland via causeways.

Where beaches or other attractions are located on their

shore, there is usually evidence of a struggle to mitigate

the effects of "outsiders". Isolation has helped each

isthmus develop its own social ecology and unique patterns

of use of the water's edge.

The outer points of peninsulas and isthmuses often offer

spectacular views of downtown Boston and provide commanding

vistas of the bays they border.. Not incidentally, they

usually served in the past as the sites for fortifications

and traces of these great works often remain. More recently,

most have been appropriated for utilitarian purposes:

163

sewage treatment lagoons, a hospital, a prison, a high

school, and a radar installation among them. A program of

@unlocking these sites and increasing their public use would

do more in the way of tapping the visual potentials of the

Harbor than any other set of actions.

1-1 Irt4ts"h"n. A'VIII ilkj
0

.0 iv e"I

C. The Harbor Islands are unquestionably the greatest

of the forgotten resources of Boston Harbor. While many

164

know about th.em,only as a result of flight approaches to

Logan Airport, few residents of the region have ever visited

them. The comprehensive plan for their development pre-

pared in 1972 emphasizes their conservation as unique

resources. Uses of the more than 30 islands would be keyed

to their environmental capacities;,several would be closed

to the public, while the daily capacities of others would

be restricted. Limits would range from 10 persons (Button

Island) to 1500 persons (Georges Island and Peddock'S Island).

Their actual usage will, of course, depend upon the attrac-

tiveness of their facilities and the 'transportation avail-

able. Both are problematic at the moment.

2. It is important in planning to maintain traditions and

diversity in different areas.

Geography suggests that. shoreline uses and public access to

the Boston Harbor must be considered differently in each of the

six distinct sub-areas. Each isthmus considers its shores largely

a group private domain. on some, roadways border the.water's

edge; on others adjacent residences claim the shoreline. The

pattern would undoubtedly confound any attempts,to adopt uniform

approaches to public areas. Nor should there be uniformity.

Public access programs must weigh the objectives of sharing

unique resources against the possibility of affecting the fabric

of close-knit communities. The long tradition of each peninsula

and isthmus must be accounted for in planning for change. The

165

resolution will probably be different in each case.

From a geographic perspective, the Harbor Islands are

strategically located as stepping stones between the largely

developed points of the land bordering the harbor. They can be

thought of as principally natural areas, in effect the last pre-

s-erve:s of wi.ldern-e.ss within the city as the.comp-rehensive plan

s-ugges.t:s. But they could alternatively be keys to a strategy

to dramatically increase the range of experiences to be held at

the water's edge and the number of people.who can use it. As

the-latter, they could become attractive because of new water-

related uses located on them not intensive:commercial develop-

ment, but also not excluding private involvement: a summer stock

theatre tent on Georges Island and several restaurants located

in its caverns, an extensive public marina between Thompsons

Spectacle Islands, with land based facilitie:s commercially

operated to support these activities on each. It is important

not to preclude such options on the grounds that the islands are

too Valuable to be dedicated to specific groups. Among all the

islands there is ample room to accommodate the special interests

of many groups.

3. Eauitv in access to the waterfront bv all economic strata

is as important as physical opportunities.. Many areas to the

north of Winthrop and to the east of Quincy were initially

develope-d as second home areas. Later these homes were winter-

ized and spaces between were filled with homes constructed for

166

year-round occupancy. Because of this, many of the shorelines

in Hull, Hingham, Weymouth, Winthrop, and Revere contain an

incredible range of housing from inexpensive cottages to elaborate

estates, from modest apartments to luxury condominiums. They

are among the most socially and economically varied communities

in the.Boston area. It would be unfortunate-if-the unintended

effects of development policies were to change this condition.

New development should strive to serve an equally broad cross-

section of the public.

4. A true water-based transportation system appears key not only

to unlocking the Harbor Islands, but also to dramatically increase

the capacity of major recreation areas without eroding the quality

of surrounding communities. The boat trip itself is an enjoyable

excursion -- round-trip tourists often outnumber commuters on

the hovercraft -- but it needs to function as a transit link

equally dependable on weekdays and weekends. Shuttle buses from

landings to recreation sites would complete the system with

considerably less disruption to receiving communities than having

to accommodate the equivalent number of people arriving by car.

Accommodations for cyclists and for the paraphernalia involved

in an afternoon picnic would extend the range of people who

found the water transit attractive.

A dependable transit system could also aid in encouraging

the development of several key sites that have the potential to

.become new growth centers, thereby increasing the opportunities

167.

to live and work near the water without displacing current

residents. one such location is the Hingham Plaza commuter boat

terminal area, a large underutilized formerly industrial site,

ideally situated astride Route 3A. Nearby, the Weymouthport

Apartment development has already demonstrated that there is

plenty,of demand for rooms with a view above a marina.

Water-based transportation has to date fallen between the

cracks of agency responsibilities. It is unlikely that a purely

private system can deliver both the regular service required

by communities and the peak demands during summer recreation

periods. Most of all, what is needed is a transit system that

functions as such, not an experimental curiosity. Only by

making a long-term commitment to its development will it acquire

the dependability needed to encourage its regular usage.

168

5. Public access plans must be included in new developments:

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WN,

169

Two sides of the Weymouthport Apartment complex: having

captured the magnificent views at the head of the Weymouth

isthmus, developers conspicuously excluded outsiders from the

water's edge within the development's boundaries-. Lost is an

opportunity to walk or cycle on one of the few shorelines that

is elsewhere mostly accessible to the public. Such development

is shortsighted: with minor changes it could have served as an

example of knitting old and new communities. We could find no

case, except in the downtown waterfront, where public access

seemed to be a consideration in the form of new development.

6. Existing public access sites must be made both adequate and

accessible.

a. A map would be of great help -- not a service station

highway map but a color foldout that catalogs in one place

all the facilities available to the public along the edge of

the water. It needs to be detailed enough to distinguish

between public and private areas, showing the beaten track

but not neglecting forgotten corners. And beyond that, per-

haps a system of guideposts and signs could be installed which'

elaborate on the significance of places and explain their

context historical and current.

Rhode Island has created a commission to discover and

map rights-of-way, those acquired or retained in fee and

others obtained through prescription or longstanding use.

170

Having established what exists, an accounting can be made

of what more is needed.

b. Make what is currently psychically and physically

inaccessible, accessible.

There are many points of access to the waterfront, but

a combination of official and unofficial policies frustrate

people from using them. Rights-of-way aren't marked in many

locations. Where streets run down to the water, parking is

seldom allowed. Private fences (sometimes on public land)

prevent people from straying away from the street. Owners

fronting on a street along the shore sometimes "claim" the

shoreline by building private decks across the street from

their houses. The net effect is (intentionally) to make

outsiders feel they are intruding on a private domain,

whether or not the shore is legally that.

171

Private or Public?

What's clear is that the line is generally unclear,

perhaps deliberately so.

Amms-

7p,

Even when the beach is posted the gate is after all@, open.

172

Why are residents parking on the street if the signs

prohibit it? Where do the private yards end?

173

Can we walk along the shore beyond the private fence?@'

174

07 M low

If this is a public area, why have the residents built

private promontories across the street?

We are sure that there are perfectly reasonable explan-

ations for each. But not knowing the answers, most people

are unlikely to step across the imaginary line." The water's

edge seems to be a private area, whether or not it is legally.

A decent place to start in improving public access is to

remove the perceptual barriers.

175

SPECIFIC 'SUGGESTIONS FOR PUBLIC ACCESS IMPROVEMENT

Specific Suggestions

a. Make the workaday world ofthe harbor available.

Massive cranes assemble LNG tankers in Quincy, unload

containers in South Boston and Charlestown', load scrap metal

in Chelsea fishing boats and their portside complements bustle

on the Boston Fish Pier--all off limits. This is the "real"

harborfront, the part that couldn't exist elsewhere. Yet

children (or adults) have no adequate way of visiting or even

observing it. With a little thought and a few dollars of public

relations money (who doubts that Massport and General Dynamics

could use a better image?) a place surely could be found to

show people what-they are up to behind the chain link fences.

b. Make the Harbor Islands available.

Some of the islands are, of course, accessible if you

know about cruise lines and their schedules. But they can

only be reached from downtown Boston or Hull. It would make

more sense if they were connected to the areas they're close

to and if the cruise line schedules were, like MBTA schedules,

more readily known.and available. Now they are simply a

mystery to thousands who see them each day.

C. Make decent fishing piers available.

True, people fish off the piers in East Boston, at the

breakwater at Castle Island, at various locations in Hull, and

at a few places elsewhere in the Harbor. But none of them

are much of a setting for kids of all ages who are interested

176

in an afternoon of sport fishing. And there are plenty of

places where a fishing pier could be located -- complete with

a bait shop, a food concession and plenty of parking.

d. Make picnic tables available along the entire length of

the waterfront.

Even granting that we may have missed'one or two hidden

away, there is certainly not a site@@for@a company picnic, or

a family reunion, or a Fourth of July outing, or an outdoor

wedding, or any one of a thousand reasons why a,group may

wish to find a setting near the water. surveys reveal that

at least two-thirds of Bos@ton metropolitan residents consider

picnicking an important recreational activity. That's two

million people with no place on the waterfront.

e@ Make bicycle routes along the waterfront.

Perhaps a cyclist could find a way to traverse portions

of the water's edge, but aside from along the three large

beaches (Revere, Nantasket and Wollaston), a cyclist is no

better off than a motorist. Cycle routes can help distribute

people along more of the waterfront and can be a low-cost

and less conflict-riddeh way of providing increa.sed access

to the public.

f. Develop the headlands and points for public use.

Lands ends have a special fascination; surrounded by

water on three sides, they offer the finest distant views

177
and give the illusion of having left the city behind. But

finding them in the Boston Harbor is usually difficult and

involves unmarked side streets. And what one finds there,

aside from the view, is seldom worth the effort -- derelict

open spaces, sewage treatment works, institutions, radar

installations, etc.

g.. Accommodate the boat owners in Boston.

There are thousands of boat owners who keep their boats

miles from the city because the harbor lacks. space to launch

or moor. Additionally, visitors to Boston coming via water have

no place to dock their boats for the day or longer, either.*

There are many more places in the harbor where boat basins

and marinas could be located if ever a coordinated plan of

water and shore development could be agreed upon. One is

struck by how little use now is made of the harbor surface

for boating.,
h. Give beaches a more attractive face.

Grim strips do neither the MDC nor their towns credit.

Yet there are plenty of models for how to create a grand

avenue along the oceanfront, still retaining the temporary

architecture of a subway resort. Landscaping would help, as

would an arcade, occasional promontories to watch and be

watched fromi a fishing pier at the end, even a boardwalk to

celebrate walking. If they are to broaden their appeal they

need to reach beyond the most hardened sunspots. At the

moment, it appears that both the MDC and town maps end at

their respective curbs.

*A plan under current consideration by the Harbormaster
would provide a very limited member of anchoring spots for
visitors at the head of the Ft. Point Channel.

178

2. Specific Sites which might be Developed for Public Access

Backdoor Bay

7--

M@", _41,

'4'U"' q'O

The Coastal Zone Management office recently provided

Coastal Energy Impact Funds to study this area. While completed,

the details of this study are unavailable. The southern half of

Dorchester Bay is one of many forgotten areas of the harbor--

the back door to most of its bordering uses. While it may not be

possible (or desirable) to attempt to coordinate public access

for the entire harbor, this area is a manageable bite. It could

constitute a test case for ways of reconciling land and water use,

preserving the natural setting while making it more productive in

human terms. Quincy and Boston would need to cooperate in such

a venture; the State could take the lead in assisting technically

and financially. The result could be an agreement governing the

actions of each government.

179

Beaches in Search of-a More Attractive Face

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As
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180

Lands End Hull

j-7

For those who manage to find their way, this forgotten corner

of the Hull High School playfield offers a panorama of the entire

harbor: downtown Boston off in the distance; nearer are Georges

Island, Rainsford Island, even the Brewsters. Across Hull Gut,

the clay cliffs of Peddocks Island are within hailing distance.

Such a place demands a celebration, something special, a place

to linger, not the coarse rock of a disposal,site. Perhaps a

tower to extend the horizon a few more miles, and a-map'to help

find bearings; some landscaping and at least a few roadway markers

to guide one to the place. Points of prospect such as this could

make the most of the unique form of Boston Harbor.

BOSTON HARBOR ISSUES AND ANALYSES

THE PORT OF BOSTON: STATUS AND PROSPECTS

SUMMARY

The principal opportunities for change concern the shipment of

containers, even though this represents only a fraction of the cargo

moving through the Port of Boston.

Containers pass through facilities belonging to Massport. The

Authority is, thus, the dominant institution with which we should deal

in port activities.

Contrary to much popular opinion, the Port has been operating

efficiently compared to its competition. Day-to-day operations are much

improved. Strategically, Massport has successfully avoided the premature

investments in capacity which have plagued its competition.

Unfortunately, Boston is at a severe inherent disadvantage because

of the economies of scale that appear to exist in the provision of port

services. Because it is the smallest of its major rivals, it may always

exhibit higher real costs.

The prospects for revitalization of the Port of Boston by improving

container services are chancy. 'Cautious optimism' is the appropriate

byword. We may be optimistic because traffic is likely to increase

moderately if current fundamentals persist. We must be cautious, however,

181

182

because container traffic through Boston is extremely vulnerable to

deregulation--which could eliminate a large portion of its traffic--and

to changes in the economy.

Financing the development of the Port is unprofitable--although

valuable to the city and region. We must expect that it will always

be difficult to provide the money needed.

Massport, in cooperation with the city of Boston, appears to be

proceeding in appropriate directions. To build on its recent accomplish-

ments, priority now needs to be devoted to the resolution of controversies

about land access to the new South Boston container facilities, and to

aggressive efforts in marketing and trade development.

183

THE PORT OF BOSTON:

STATUS AND PROSPECTS

INTRODUCTION

This report presents the major findings and observations that result

from detailed analyses of the competitive position of the Port of Boston.

Our team tried to do something important that had not been tried before:

to determine how Boston really compares with its competition. This infor-

mation--which has been missing--is vital to realistic planning.

We looked at two principal issues:

(1) How economically--competitively--can Boston supply port services?

This question has two facets: the cap-ability of management to

utilize resources efficiently, and the limitations of being a

small port. We considered both.

(2) To what extent can Boston stimulate the demand for its services?

To answer this we investigated the economic and other reasons

that make East Coast ports attractive to shippers.

The supporting analyses are described in detail in the two Appendices:

"Productivity and Returns to Scale in Container Ports", and "Strategies for

Improving Boston's Competitiveness with Other Ports".

Following the findings and observations, we present a brief set of

recommendations.

184

FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIOMS

This section is organized around three topics. We begin with some

preliminary observations concerning the general economic situation for

the Port, and then proceed in turn to the supply of and demand for port

services.

1. General Economic Situation

la. The dynamic segment of the Port operations is the movement of

containerized cargo. The other major segment, the shipment of

bulk products such as petroleum and scrap metal, deals with

captive markets (due to the impracticality of trucking or

piping these commodities into or out of the region) and is

relatively static.

lb. Container cargo moves through facilities belonging to Massport.

The Authority is, thus, the dominant institution with which to

deal to improve port activities.

1c. Container operations have not been profitable for Boston, nor

are they likely to become money-makers in the future. This is

largely due to the substantial overcapacity among competitive

East Coast ports.

Id. Because the seaport is not--as different from the airport and the

toll roads--a money machine, it will always be difficult to

185

raise money for substantial developments for the Port of Boston.

Investors demand strong assurances of ample.., steady revenues

which the Port of Boston will find hard to Provide.

le. The justification ofAnvestments in the'Port is service to the

city and region. For the city, the Port activities have a

direct multiplier effect in terms of jobs and business. For

Massachusetts and New England, an active port gives them an

alternative to New York or Montreal, and, thus, minimizes the
possibility of monopolistic or discriminatory practices.

If. The twin issues of the container facilities as a safeguard for

the regions's economy and as an unprofitable operation imply a

balanced development policy: the facilities ought to be

sufficiently substantial to represent a credible alternative,

yet not too large to entail an excessive drain on the economy.

186

2. Supply of Container Services

2a. Contrary to much popular opinion, the Port has been op6rati.nq
efficiently.compared to its competition. The Port is doing

nearly the best it can within its inherent limitations.

2b. Massport has successfully managed to avoid the premature invest-
ments in capacity which have plagued its competitom Indeed,

each of its four major rivals on the East Coast inaugurated
major new facilities between 1974 and 1978, just when the traffic

leveled off. Except for Boston, all were thus confronted with
significant costs of paying for underused capacity, and with

substantial losses in productivity. Boston , however, stood out

for its increase in productivity, as the table illustrates.

PORT 1974-1978 PERCENT CHANGE IN:

PORT CONTAINER PRODUCTIVITY
.CAPACITY CARGO PER UNIT CAPACITY

Boston 0 21 21 Gain

New York 10 -5 -13

Philadelphia 50 10 -26
Losses
Baltimore 38 20 -12

Hampton Roads @,34. 5 -29

187

2c. Massport's plans for staged development of container facilities

in South Boston are likewise on the right track. The gradual

staging of new additions permits management to delay or

accelerate development if traffic increases differently than

originally projected. Specifically, the landfill at the former

Naval Annex could be dedicated to other uses if necessary or

alternatively, the operations could be expanded into the pro-

posed industrial area.

2d. In terms of day-to-day operations, Massport has recently improved

its management of container operations. Equipment has been

standardized, for example, leading to better control of spare

parts and greater reliability.

2e. Conflicts over work rules continue to exist between management

and labor. These are largely a consequence of the severe

dislocations that labor has experienced as container operations

have eliminated the piece-meal break-bulk cargo. These disputes

are disruptive and irritating. Similar problems occur at each

of Boston's competitors, however. So while many claim that

Boston is unduly disadvantaged by a history of poor relations

between labor and management, it is not obvious that this is

correct.

2f. Two major operational obstacles to improved service concern

the landside of the port. Access is both circuitous to truckers

188

and disruptive to communities. Space for storing containers

is tight and potentially the limiting factor on operations.

2g. Competitively, Boston is at a severe disadvantage compared to

its rivals because it is the smallest. Indeed, the provision

of container services is a field in which significant economies

of scale appear to exist: larger ports can inherently achieve

up to 50% greater productivity, as illustrated by the figure.

This is a disadvantage which no amount of good management or

labor could overcome. So long as the demand for service is

lowest for Boston, as appears likely, this disadvantage will

persist.

Productivity
New York

Boston
Technical
Upper Limit

Container Cargo
@Boston

189

3. Demand for Boston's Services

3a. The essential fact about Boston's position in the marketplace

is that it is inevitably overshadowed by New York. In this it

is the victim of a common phenomenon of customers going with the

winner, because the largest supplier has the size to provide a

level of service its rivals cannot match. In this instance,

New York provides much higher frequencies of sailings in the

foreign markets with which it competes with Boston. The result

is that shippers, even close to Boston, prefer to route their

containers through New York. Consequently, Boston's share of

these markets is proportionately lower than the service it

provides. This finding is summarized by the "S" shape curve,

as illustrated in the figure, typically used in market analyses.

Markpt 'Ilooo,
Share

..Ole Boston
loo, low traffic
despite service
Share of Sailings 1.0
in a Market

3b. It is difficult to persuade shipping companies to call at
'B

Boston: the cargo they obtain per sailing is much lower in

Boston than in New York, and a call in Boston is likely to be

less profitable than in New York..

190

3c. Conversely, the value of getting a ship to call at Boston is

not great in terms of stimulating demand. Secondary ports such

as Boston are caught in a Catch-22 situation.

3d. Secondary ports such as Boston are also especially sensitive to

changes in the economy. In a variant of the"last-hired-first-

fired" syndrome, they are the last places a shipping line adds

to its list of calls as traffic increases, and the first dropped

during a recession. This vulnerability is illustrated in the

Table below, showing changes in container traffic during the

1�74-78 economic slowdown and recovery.

PORT PERCENT CHANGES IN CONTAINER TRAFFIC:

TO BOTTOM TO RECOVERY RANGE

New York -3 +5 8

Secondary
Boston -41 +21 62

Philadelphia -23 +10 33

Baltimore -4 +20 24

Hampton Roads -23 -5 23

191

3e. Much of Boston's container traffic is carried by barqes to or from

New York. The existence of this traffic has been a consequence

of rules by the Interstate Commerce Commission and restrictive

agreements of the shipping cartels. Jointly, these have made it

impractical for shipping lines to offer the most economic services.

The regulations have limited them to providing service between

ports rather than to the ultimate customers somewhere inland.

When the shippers chose to save money by avoi'ding unprofitable and

time-consuming calls in Boston, they commit themselves to delivering

the containers destined for the port of Boston by an alternate

means: barge service.

3f. Barge service is an uneconomic way to service the ultimate customer.

Because a large portion of the cost of short-haul shipments is due

to the loading and unloading of containers, it would in general be

significantly cheaper to truck containers directly between New York

and the customer at some inland point such as Worcester, rather

than in barges to Boston and then trucks to the customer. The

direct route eliminates a costly cycle of loading and unloading.

It can also be much shorter and possibly save fuel (barge shipment

to the Worcester customer involves almost 300 miles by sea to avoid

about 100 miles net by road). Direct shipment by road is also

significantly faster. Barge service thus appears largely as a

perverse consequence of regulation.

192

3g. Boston's container traffic is., therefore, highly vulnerable to

deregulation. As much as a third of it could disappear if current

rules were voided and direct shipments became feasible.

3h. Deregulation would benefit customers in New England, because more

economical deliveries would be possible.

3i. Under favorable circumstances--of no recession and no deregulation--

Boston's traffic should increase faster than world trade generally.

This is because secondary ports grow faster in times of prosperity,

as indicated in (3a). Boston should have plans to cope with up to

5 or 7% annual increases in traffic, or to double capacity every

10 to 15 years.

3j. Demand may increase faster if Boston succeeds in establishing a

reputation as a dominant port in some particular market, as implied

in (3a). Because Boston cannot hope to compete with Mew York along

a broad front, it would have to target its efforts to particular

industries--electronic products for instance.

193

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Massport should continue its process of staged development of container

facilities: ready to move as traffic builds up or to pause if there is

a downturn. This approach is far superior to any commitment to a massive

plan, particularly when traffic is so vulnerable to elements beyond

Boston's control.

2. Massport and the city of Boston should, to their mutual benefit, intensify

their efforts to find viable, equitable solutions to the port's diffi-

culties in land access for trucks.

3. Massport should reactivate its marketing efforts to develop trade through

Boston. This might most effectively be done by preparing, in cooperation

with particular industries, attractive packages of special services that

might interest them in making Boston a regional center for the distri-

bution of their products.

BOSTON HARBOR ISSUES AND ANALYSES:
MARINA DEVELOPMENT IN THE HARBOR

SUMMARY:

I. High Economic Benefits, both direct & indirect, come with Marinas.
Demand i's high for marinas in Mass, but supply is low.

II. Problems in Marina Development
A. Economic Barriers
1. 4The current economic recess-ion affects recreational activities
severely.
2. The permitti.ng process is le'ngthy, duplicative, confusing, and
costly, both in itself and because of the time it takes.
3. The cost of dredging, both in itself and as a front-end risk,
is prohibitive.
4. Other economic barriers:
a. shorefront construction is costly
b. leasing is too short-term
c. borrowing is difficult

B. Political/Administrative Barriers
Crucial decisions are:
1. How valuable waterfront property will be used.,
2. Who will make those decisions. Opinions vary on whether the
state should take a strong role here, or whether state
interests and regulatory processes should be reduced.
3. Confusion about the Harbormaster reveals jurisdictional confusions.
4. Coast Guard has been reluctant to establish separate navigational
lanes for recreational and commercial interests.

C. Physical Barriers
1. Public Access issues are critical to recreational developments.
2. Public transportation is also an issue for marinas.
3. Water depth is so great in many places as to make pilings
difficult and expensive to get in place.

III. Conclusions and Recommendations
A. The role of government as it relates to marina operations must be
examined. Government currently helps (e,g., the Boston Plan, and
Federal, State and local monies), but it also prohibits growth
(e.g., the permitting process).
B. The role of the state in the permitting process must be examined: it
should either tighten management of the process, allowing tandem
permitting,applications, and not engage in administrative/structural
modifications;.:,-or redo the permitting process altogether (p. 62).
C. Financina for borrowing and shoreline construction must be
addressed.
D. The Harbormaster's responsibilities should be further classified,
e.g. the MDC, City of Boston and State's role, as well as the
Federal agencies of the Coast Guard, Army Corps and EPA
should be better coordinated and delimited.
E. Multiple use activities relevant to marinas must be promoted.

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Marina Development in the Boston Harbor

Recently, demand for more marinas in the Boston Harbor has been great.

The economic benefits of marina development and operation to the surrounding

community are also of significant dimensions. Yet marinas are not being

built at as great a rate as the demand would suggest.

This case study is undertak6n in an effort to understand what

is happening to the proposals for marinas and what is required for their

implementation. It takes place in the context of larger questions the

Boston Harbor Management Project is asking about the need for public

intervention in Harbor affairs, in order to facilitate growth and

development in response to market demand.

The study reveals a complex picture of demand and restraints which

to a large extent reflect those of the Harbor generally. It illustrates

problems that need to be answered for the Harbor as a whole, if the Harbor

is to be an active economic entity.

I. THE HIGH ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF MARINAS AND THEIR SUPPLY

What are marinas and what function do they serve among economic

priorities for the harbor? Any discussion of marina development begs the

broader issue of recreational opportunities in the harbor setting. Coastal

recreation benefits cannot be narrowly construed; recreation, as a

waterfront use, is advantageous as a renewal technique and can be used to

complement and enhance other land/water-use priorities. According to

Connolly,

Recreation sites and activities are good 'gateway enterprises'
attracting visitors who spend money on food, lodging and
tourist facilities. Recreation can also spur development and
impart high values to existing housing stock as well as
remaining open land. (1)

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This is as true for marinas as for any other recreational use. A

marina is an economically independent operation for berthing pleasure

boats. (13) Unlike a boat basin, with which this study will not deal, it

requires a landslide component equal in area to its waterside operation.

Marinas are usually targeted for industrial zone location, as their land-

side operation includes industrial marine operations such as launching

ramps, fuel docks, hull and engine repair shops, sales rooms, boat storage,

haul-out facilities and customer services. (2) They constitute major public

access routes to recreational waters and, as such, induce a significant

tourist and user trade in surrounding areas. Marinas are excellen t catalysts

for harbor development as they have an estimated multiplier effect of

2.5 (3)

Examination of the development and operational aspects of the Taylor's

Point Marina in Bourne, Massachusetts, will illustrate this "multiplier"

effect on the local economy. (4) According to 1975 data, the total

construction cost for the Taylor's Point marina was approximately 2.3

million dollars. One third of the total budget was allocated to labor,

another third to material and one third to equipment.

Based on economic marketing models, individual multipliers were derived

for each of these components. Labor had a 2.5 multiplier rate in terms of

wages having a direct ripple effect through the town of Bourne and surrounding

communities. Construction materials was rated at only 1.5, as only 20%

of the materials were available locally. All expenditures for equipment

were from outside the local area and there was little economic impact

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from these expenditures on the local economy. Construction costs al-

together had a direct regional economic impact of $430,000, an indirect

regional impact of $500,000 and a total regional economic impact of

$930,000. That is, approximately $1 million was returned to Cape commu-

nities from construction alone.

To these figures must be added the operational return. Revenue

from summer berthing, winter storage, marina store sales and other

operations (repair, ice, gasoline, etc.) generated approximately

$200,000 per year under "mature" operating conditions. A multiplier

of 2.4 for marina operational components was used. Applying the

multiplier to an investment of $2.3 million, ongoing operations have

had a total regional impact on the Cape of approximately $500,000 per

year.

These findings may be extrapolated to the Boston Harbor with

impressive results. Construction multipliers should be greater for

the Boston region, as significantly more materials and equipment can

be generated from the area thus keeping the original investment close

to home. Operational multipliers would most likely approximate those

of the Bourne example.

The preceding data illustrates the economic advantages of marina

development. Feasibility, however, must be determined upon a number of

additional factors, among them, user demands based on supply demand

@considerations and any mitigating circumstances.

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Individual marinas can very significantly in terms of their size,

types of berthing,Qffered (slips, mooring, ramps) and services offered.

Some are simple, offering only one type of berthing and minimum services,

while others may be extremely elaborate.., offering a full range of services

and ancillary accommodations. Although a 1973 Rhode Island survey of

boat owners revealed that the most important marina services were
1) availability of fuel and oil, 2) 24-hour security, 3) restrooms and

4) fresh water, (6), Massachusetts data indicate that owners in that state

tend to require substantially more in the way of ancillary services, such

as repair and maintenance services for wood-hull boats.

Boat owners in New England appear to be more affluent than in the

U.S. as a whole. Nearly 15% of all Massachusetts boat owners earn more

than $30,000 a year, 40% earn more than $20,000 a year, and 80% earn more

than $13,000 a year (7), figures which'are comparable to the national

average. The primary distinction comes in the number of households under
$14,000 who own boats. In Massachusetts this number is 19% compared with

the national figure of 28% (1970 data). (8)

Massachusetts residents tend to own larger boats as well as those

requiring significant maintenance services. Massachusetts has a smaller

percentage of Class A (under 16 ft.) boats than does the U.S. as a

whole, and a relatively high percentage of boats in the larger classes.

One reason for.this may be the coastal location and ocean orientation of

Massachusetts boaters. Although 55% of all boats registered in

Massachusetts are under 16 ft., 35% are between 16 ft. and 26 ft., and

10% are over 26 ft., these distinctions are important in establishing

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a marina's type of berthing and channel requirements.

While there is a relatively even distribution among wood, fiberglass,

and aluminum hulls for all registered boats in the U.S., Massachusetts and

Rhode Island show a significantly greater number of boats having wood

hulls (55% in Massachusetts compared with 30% nationwide). (9) Wood

hulls require considerably more maintenance and upkeep than fiberglass.

Thus, marinas in this state must provide maintenance services to meet

this need.

Despite the specific usage characteristics and service demands

enumerated above, Massachusetts operations remain a function more of supply

than of demand. As is noted below, marinas statewide are operating at

100% capacity, thereby putting an artificial limit on the amount of

demand which can be accommodated for services.

Between 1970 and 1973, Massachusetts experienced a 6% (12,000)

average annual increase in boat ownership. This compares with a 3.2%

increase in ownership for the New England region. During this time, the

increase in total population growth remained.at less than 1%. Historically,

the average age of boat ownership in Massachusetts has been approximately

45 years. The continued increase in boat ownership might suggest that

individuals born in the post-war "baby-boom" era are now affecting the

market.

Adjusted for registrations, the average annual rate of increase for

the three state region of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island is
expected to be 5% through 1985. .(10) (Registrations do not include all

boats owned because of different requirements in each state.) It is

estimated,that total boat ownership will increase at an average rate of

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14,000 per year. (11) This translates into an average annual dema nd for

1,900 - 3,000 new marina berths per year within the three state region.

Massachusetts would account for 80% of this, or 2,400 new sTips per year.

(12) Based on the 1976 figures projected for the current year, Massachusetts

can expect to have approximately 250,000 registered boats by 1980

compared with 200,000 in 1975 (200,000 baseline at 5% per year increase).

A 1965 study conducted by the Metropolitan Area Planning Council

conservatively projects a demand for 15,000 pleasure boat facilities per

day in the Boston Harbor by 1990. (15) The recommendations which were

generated by that study advocated the development of 300 acres of prime

mooring areas for 500 small boats, locker and winter storage provisions

on Rainsford Island in addition to a mooring area for 50 small boats on

Deer Island. (16)

Fourteen years later, in a 1979 study by Ryerson, only four marinas,

ten yacht clubs, three sailing clubs and several small boat basins were

shown to serve the recreational boating needs in the harbor. The total

number of boats berthed by these facilities was 4700. Summer dockage.

for the four marinas demonstrate that 65.8% of their slips were rented

by the larger cruise class (26-40 ft.) boats, which would indicate a need

for sophisticated ancillary services for this group. Yet this same study

indicates that only one of the four marinas has even a supply store, pump-

out station or laundry facilities. Only two of these facilities have

showers and restrooms and none provide for the priority need - oil and

gasoline sales. (19)

The sailing clubs appear to be prosperous, with 144 total boats.

The third club, which is a community non-profit organization, served

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5,200 adults and 2,300 young adults in 1979. One of the clubs declared

that its gross income increased from $37,000 to $250,000 in 1978. (20)

With the exception.of 20 slips on Georges Island, no public marinas

exist in the harbor. A municipal marina for 500 boats is presently being

planned for the town of Hull in the southern part of the harbor. The

projected date Of completion is 1984. Likewise, five of the piers

slated for marina construction in Charlestown are earmarked for municipal

ownership.

Marinas are currently operating at 100% capacity in most areas of the
state, including Boston Harbor. (13) Supply capacity is so restricted by

available sites and required capital investment (discussed below) that the

supply/demand inequities which presently exist can be expected to worsen

over the next decade. As of 1975, Boston Harbor experienced a supply

deficit of 69%. Presumably this deficit has increased in the intervening

years. (14)

Ii. PROBLEMS

Despite the high and continuing demand for berthing capability as

well as the economic benefits derived from marinas, supply in the harbor

remains chronically low - thereby suggesting that certain market forces

exist which negate otherwise favorable development prospects. Although

it would seem that the projected volume of activity would be sufficient to

enable suppliers to enjoy a market advantage, economic and physical forces

are at work which present difficult planning questions for the development

of marina facilities. (21)

The following analysis will explore four major problem areas which

presently constitute an adverse environment for successful marina

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development and operation.

(A) ECONOMIC BARRIERS

1. The Current Economic Recession

Recreational facilities and considerations have traditionally been the

first to experience restriction during periods of economic downturn.

Indicators relating to inflation and borrowing capability in New England

have demonstrated significant instability during the last several years,

particularly in 1979 and the first quarter of 1980. The negative ramifi-

cations of this regional and national situation have had acute impact upon

marina operations, due in part to the fact that marinas are particularly

vulnerable to the increased price of fuel.

According to Robert Davidoff, owner of the Constitutional Marina in

Charlestown, boating trends are now reflective of the economic situation;

boat sales are substantially reduced and increasing numbers of people have

turned to sail. Davidoff reports that the ratio of motorcraft to sail at

his marina has changed dramatically in the l,ast year, from 80/20 power

to sail, to a 50/50 split. Yet despite the disturbing economic indicators,

demand remains high. Davidoff attributes this to the fact that metropolitan

residents apparently now wish to moor their boats in the harbor rather than

along the outer coast, in order to stay closer to home. (22) Joseph

Boudreau of the Hull Redevelopment Authority confirms this observation.

His experience with the southern harbor area (Quincy Bay, Hull, Hingham

and Weymouth) suggest that demand there is equally high,

The extent to which this phenomenon can continue is, according to

other observers, limited. Jack Hannon, Director of the Massachusetts

Division of Waterways, Department of Environmental Quality Engineering,

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believes that the turn to sail will not be sufficient to save the boating

industry from eventual disaster. According to Hannon, "the economy is

going to croak that industry." (24) For example, sail will only

exacerbate the dredging problem (discussed below), as significantly

increased sail traffic will require an additional three to four feet of

dredging in some existing channels.

2. Permitting Process as an Economic Barrier

Under the best of economic conditions, certain barriers exist which

undermine the financial security and investment risk for marina development.

One of the more significant problems in this respect i's the permitting and

regulatory process governing marina construction, The primary economic

impact of the permitting process is revenue lost to the developer during the

time it takes to meet all regulatory requirements prior to construction.

Other related risks concern the front money needed to comply with the

permitting process, particularly for those projects requiring an Environmental

Impact Statement.

The appendix attached to this document is a "road map" of the permitting
process required for the proposed Charlestown marina. (25) That marina

(currently on hold because of budget overruns) is designed to accommodate

five hundred and fifty boats through both public and private ownership.

The entire project, including marina construction, required an Environmental

Impact Statement. The estimated length of time from preparation of the EIS

to actual marina construction was estimated to be four years, only one of

which is necessary for construction.

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Given the current rate structures for marina berthing in the harbor,

it is possible to extrapolate an estimation of the revenue lost during

three of these four years (assuming one full boating season was lost to

construction). Assuming that the Charlestown rates would be competitive

with those of the neighboring Constitution Marina at Hoosac Pier, the

seasonal cost for berthing per boat is approximately $1,000 ($34 per

foot, minimum slip size is 22 ft.). (26) This figure would suggest

marina revenues of $550,000 per year, given 100% operational capacity.

A certain percentage of this must be deducted for transient slip rentals

which generally operate at 80% capacity. (27) Thus, the proposed marina

at the Charlestown redevelopment site could have generated more than

$550,000 per year, not including multiplier effects on surrounding

economies.

The other cost related to permitting procedures is more direct,

yet less significant. Joseph Boudreau estimates that preparation of the

Environmental Impact Statement necessary for the Weir River marina in

Hull, Massachusetts will cost approximately $100,000. (28) The

permitting process will occur in tandem with this process. Tobiasson

further breaks this figure down by suggestiig that the engineering

consultation needed to prepare the actual permit applications can cost

from $6,000 to $20,000 for a large marina because professional draftsmen

are needed to draw scale models. (29)

This paper will not attempt to address the permitting process in

full, an undertaking requiring independent examination. Rather, two

lines of thought seem to be apparent, both of which might be appropriate

for consideration in a broader examination.

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One school of thought suggests that the permitting process can be

strengthened through tighter management and does not necessarily require

administrative/structural modification; the permitting application, when

conducted in tandem with the Environmental Impact procedure, can greatly

reduce wasted time. That is, the responsibility should reside with the

developer to g'enerate an Environmental Impact Statement immediately,

rather than wait to be told to do so by the government. Permitting

applications would flow from the Impact process automatically.

An excellent example of the need for tandem procedures is the case

presented by the Provincetown Harbor marina in Provincetown, Massachusetts.

(30) The developer initiated permit application procedures in February,

1972 (after four months of public discussion). Two and one half years

later the same developer voluntarily initiated steps for a draft Environmental

Impact Statement. This decision was made after one of the original Corps

of Engineers permits was suspended due to an unexpected environmental

shoaling condition. The developer could have saved two and one-half

years if the EIS had been pursued from the beginning of the process.

The total elapsed time from original Corps permit application to Final

Environmental Impact Statement was four years.

Another school of thought about the permitting procedure is that

expressed by representatives of the older, more established agencies

such as the Commonwealth's Waterways Division. This reasoning suggests.

that the permitting process is much too tight and too extensive and

that overall statutory and administrative orientation of the state fosters

such restriction. Such instant remedies as one stop permitting will not

work. Rather, the entire regulatory process needs to be rethought by a

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Task Force, now that we know what won't work." (32) Proponents of

this line of thinking believe that the regulatory framework, particularly

that provided by CZM as it now stands, is not sensitive to the need

for development during this period of economic adversity. Developers are

not provided with guidelines and encouragement for building in appropriate

areas. Rather, they are provided disincentives in the form of risky front-
end financial investment during a long and unnecessarily arduous process. (33)

3. Dredging as an Economic Barrier

Dredging in Boston Harbor presents a two-fold problem. One aspect

is purely fiscal; the other reflects a problem alluded to earlier,

regarding front-end risk-taking by the developer.

Dredging per se has become very expensive. Cost to a private

developer is approximately $10-15 per cubic yard. (34) Using the Weir

River Marina as an example, the 200,000 cubic yards of dredging projected

for that site would cost approximately $2,400,000 ($2 million for dredging

at bottom dollar plus $2 per cubic yard for the Chapter 91 Waterways Tidal

Fee). This constitutes approximately 69% of the total $3.6 million

estimated cost of the marina. (35)

The other problem is of an environmental nature and is related to the

regulatory process. Federal statute, as administered through three separate

agencies, governs the disposition of dredge spoils. Toxic dredge spoils may

not be dumped on land and used as fill. Recent legislation relative to

ocean dumping of dredge spoils provides a highly speculative situation for

the prospective marina developer. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers now

requires a developer to finance very expensive and sophisticated tests for

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spoil toxicity. These bio-assay and bio-accumulation tests for contamination

can cost a developer $25,000 to $35,000 dollars. A dredge permit for the

Boston Harbor is dependent upon the outcome of the contamination tests,

yet the tests alone, at $25,000, take place well into the planning and

developmental stage of the marina, Ocean dumping at the Harbor Foul

Site, 11 miles out of the harbor, was not permi tted by the Corps

of Engineers until recently. (36)

4. Other Economic Barriers

(a) Costly Infrastructure -

Shorefront construction (bulkheading, pier construction, etc.)

is very expensive and difficult for many private developers to accommodate.

Water-edge construction costs approximately $1,500 per lineal foot due

to the corrosive effects of sedimentation, tide and other coastal engineering

problems. Several analysts in the field believe that government monies,

used for such construction, might provide added incentive to the private

sector. (37)

(b) Leasing

Lease arrangements for water rights are another economic problem for

developers. Ideally, according to professionals in the field, (38) leases

should be as permanent or semi-permanent as possible. The financial

investment for marina development and construction is sufficiently risky

as to warrant long term lease arrangements for the developer. This arrangement

is particularly important given the cost of pilings for construction.

Pilings have a life expectancy of twenty-five years. Operators must

have some guarantee that this investment will be realized. The Constitution

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Marina is in a particularly precarious position because it has only a

ten-year lease arrangement with Massport. (39)

Borrowing is also very difficult at the present time. CUP monies

issued as loans from the Department of Commerce are a particular case in

point. The lending rate for CEIP monies tan range from a low of 5%

to approximately 15% (treasury bond rate). However, the rate is not

set until after an extensive loan application process has been completed by

the developer, reviewed and prioritized in Washington. A low interest

rate, which could have attracted the developer to apply initially, could

be reappraised at a higher and prohibitive rate after the application

process is completed. Again, this constitutes another example of a

developer placing financial resources and time in jeopardy as a front-end

commitment in a speculative process. (40) The major economic areas

enumerated above - permitting, dredging, costly infrastructure, leasing and

borrowing constraints collectively serve as a major impediment to

successful marina development. Because of these factors, the available

return on investment is generally not sufficient to induce the scale

of capital investment required, particularly from the private sector.

(B) POLITICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE

The political environment surrounding marina development has the

potential for being highly charged, primarily because crucial decisions
must soon be made about (1) how valuable waterfront property will be
used and, (2) who will make those decisions. Two of the many lines of

reasoning regarding this issue are presented below.

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(1) One perspective advocates a strong role for the state;
the contention is that states are the most logical
locus for government to establish overall planning
guidelines for urban waterfronts. Consequently, so the
thinking goes, states should be able to review and assist
in financing local waterfront masterplans. By virtue
of their broad based jurisdiction they are best in the
position to review major development projects or
jurisdictional disputes.
(2) A second perspective reflects the thought that the
state has become far too restrictive in its administrative
and regulatory procedures to the detriment of the business
community.

The Commonwealth's Office of Coastal Zone Management (CZM) serves

as the focal point for these two arguments. The Coastal Zone Management

Act of 1972 provided financial support to Massachusetts to develop a plan
(and role) for providing a rational land/water use framework for the

state. CZM now consists of a set of 27 policies intended to guide

environmentally sound and economically productive decisions within the

coastal zone (including Boston Harbor). Those who argue for a strong

state role in land/water-use decisions advocate a strengthened CZM program,

in terms of financial incentives and federal consistency criteria, (40)

Those who argue for a more restricted role for the state believe that a

revised@attitude or orientation is needed for the state - one which would

deemphasize CZM federal consistency provisions, and relax or redefine

regulatory procedures so as to make the state's administrative framework

more sensitive to the needs of the business community.

1. Harbormaster

The absence of clear patrol responsibilities under the Harbormaster

is evidence of jurisdictional confusion. Legislation is currently pending

before the General Court to change a Harbormaster position from Boston

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Harbor to a State.,agency. Adequate staffi.ng and authority for a

harbormaster is critical to the ongoing revitalization of the harbor.

As use of the harbor increases for all purposes, so will the traffic

and use conflicts.

The U.S. Coast Guard advocates the need for additional harbor

security beyond which the current harbormaster affords. Shipping

interests are already demanding separate lanes for commercial use --

similar to the model employed in New York. An automated anchorage

information system might be advisable for instant retrieval of moorage

information -- accessed to points all along the New England coast.
This would help to maximize the full complement of boating potential in

the harbor.

There has been an ongoing controversy about a Harbormaster for some

years. According to those associated with the harbor, this position

necessitates a broad functional approach -- the harbor and its issues

are complex. In addition to the policing responsibility, the Harbormaster

position must also incorporate a thorough knowledge of commercial shipping

and a solid administrative perspective.

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2. Other Administrative Issues

The Coast Guard has, to date, been reluctant to establish separate

navigation lanes for recreational and commercial interests, even though

it has the power to do so under the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978.

Planning efforts currently underway will examine the Coast Guard's ad-

ministrative r0uctance to designate such :fannels dESpite growing

commercial clamor.to do so.

Certain physical or geographical concerns related to public access

and construction/engineering considerations pose added constraints to

marina development in the harbor.

1. Public Access

Public access is a critical function of any recreational planning

on an urban waterfront, including that related to boating operations.

The recent increased demand for access to the waterfront has triggered a

variety of legal and administrative attempts to address the issue. The

Quirico decision, recently handed down by the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court, represents the single most significant impact upon the

problem - and will have far-reaching ramifications on public access

issues.

The Quirico Decision guarantees sovereignty of lands below mean

low water. According to the Decision:

The essential importance of this holding is that the land in
question is not like ordinary private land, held in fee-simple

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absolute, subject tc development at the sole whim of the owner,
but it is impressed with a public trust which gives the public's
representatives an interest and responsibility in its development
*it may be used only for a purpose approved by the Legislature
@S*a public use. (44)

As a result of this decision, the Massachusetts General Court is

presently assessing the scope of its new authority. It has to determine

the appropriate procedure for granting tidal lands to the public interest,

and still has to issue guidelines as to what constitutes-the public interest

in this respect - what kinds of conditions relative to public access and

land-use must now be set. (45)

2. Public Transportation

Public transportation is another major access consideration.

Generally, recreational opportunities in a harbor setting are maxirriZEA

if they are lGcated within easy access to trarsportation outlets. The

issue is more complex in regard to marina development in the Boston Harbor.

The average income of the Massachusetts boat owner-is relatively high (refer

above). Although the trend is moving in the direction of lower income

groups, the sport is still the province of the moderately well off. The

proposed Fort Point boat basin with its 400-500 boat potential is ideal

for this type of boat owner. The general public would stand to gain '

from the commercial spin-off generated by this type of operation in the

middle of the downtown waterfront. However, most of the remaining space

appropriate for boat moorings is in the southern areas of the harbor, not

as accessible to public transportation as the downtown Fort Point area.

Should additional public transportation be required to meet recreational

boating needs in the southern harbor area, the issue of user impact arises.

That is, for public funds to be used for transportation, a variety of income

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groups, including those on the lower end of the spectrum,'would have to be

able to use and benefit from the boating facilities. Aside from federal

regulations governing the use of public funds for transportation, this

policy is a de facto outcome of the Massachusetts legislative decision

making process. As Senator John Olver explained-in 1975:

How much can we justify for recreation within the total pattern
of state needs? The Legislature needs to know what the unit
'cost of recreation is; it must know who it is going to serve
. . . It has to question whether the groups to be served are
or are not where the state's priorities are. (46)

Senator Olver's statement came on the heels of a legislative defeat

for the original Harbor Islands bond authorization, because "only those

rich enough to own boats would go to the islands."

3. Water Depth

Water depth poses a fairly substantial cost/effective problem from

an engineering perspective in many of the prime marina sites in the harbor

(potential). In Charlestown and in East Boston at the Massport pier site,

the water is too deep to utilize standard piling techniques. The water

in these areas averages 30 ft. in depth, since it covers former commercial

shipping channels. Sixty foot pilings would be required for this depth

and are not feasible from an engineering perspective. According to

engineers concerned with this problem, (47) double pilings, braced

against each other would be needed at each piling location. This cost

is exorbitant. The estimated cost for pilings to be used in the

Charlestown Pier 6 construction (just one of the six to be constructed

(6) is approximately $250,000. This is a contributing factor to the

current budget problems facing that development. (48)

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Of the potential marina sites in the harbor, the Fort Point Channel

poses the least problem in terms of water depth. The other area under

active consideration is a site on the north side of Columbia Point,

scheduled for construction as part of the Columbia Point renewal project.

This site will require considerable dredging as it is only zero to two

feet deep in some areas at mean low water. (49)

III. CONCLUSION

Several significant market forces appear to be affecting marina

operations in a negative fashion. Additionally, certain barriers particular

to the Boston Harbor are adversely affecting operations specific to that

location. A paradox exists in that these forces seem to be hindering a

developmental endeavor which by virtue of its multiplier effect on

surrounding communities, buttressed by continued demand, would appear to

benefit the region's economy.

Before the difficulties marina development has encountered can

be eliminat ed, several problem areas will have to be addressed.

(1) The role of government as it relates to marina
operations must be examined in a more thorough fashion.
Although market forces are operating independently to a
certain extent, governmental activities are impacting such
operations in many ways, both positively and negatively.
Government has responded positively to the Harbor problem
by recognizing the need for action and initiating steps in
this direction. The Boston Plan for the Harbor, initiated
in 1977, is a primary example of the City's active role in
this direction. Funding packages with federal, state and
local monies have also provided a positive incentive.
State and federal permitting procedures, however, while
constituting a positive protection for the environment,,
in the view of many, also present a negative deterrent to
economic growth.

215

(2) Toward this end, the role of the state in the permitting
process must be examined at length. The permitting process must be
clarified and amended in such a fashion as to provide a reasonable
framework within which-harbor priorities may be realized.

(3) Financing for borrowing and shoreline construction must
be addressed. Communities might-be encouraged to investigate
leveraging mechanisms for these purposes. The proposed Hull Weir
River Marina package bears watching as a positive example. Other
packages might include EDA, HCRS, UDAG, CEIP and state Waterways
financing in addition to the private contribution.
(4) The powers and mandates of the office of the Harbormaster
need strengthening and clarification so that jurisdictional authority
is satisfactorily resolved and the allocation of responsibilities is
clear, effective and accountable to constituencies, and so that the
responsibilities can be effectively and adequately carried out.

(5) Multiple use activities, relevant to marinas, must be
promoted because of the severe competition for high value scarce land
along the waterfront. The Chelsea and Charlestown waterfront redevelop-
ment efforts are excellent examples of combined public access and recre-
ational opportunities, packaged for multi-user groups. The city of
Chelsea leveraged the largest UDAG (Urban Development Action) grant
ever given to a city under 50,000 ($6.7 million) to produce a combined
marina and urban park access route for its citizens. (This was included
in a development package also consisting of mixed income housing and
light industrial construction.) As was mentioned above, Charlestown
has produced similar results through redevelopment of the former
Charlestown Navy Yard. The marina affiliated with this development
is discussed above.

216

CHARLESTOWN MARINA PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

This section contains a step-by-step analysis of the application

procedure for the various environmental permits needed for the marina.

1) APPLY for license to store flammables from Public Safety
--T-ommission

2) Fire department inspects site

3) Fire department holds hearing

4) Public Safety Commission issues license to store flammables

5) APPLY for Order of Conditions by sending Notice of Intent to
B-o-ston Conservation Commission (BCC)
- BCC issues notice
- BCC has 21 days to hold a hearing
- after hearing, BCC has 21 days to issue a determination
- dissatisfied parties have 10 days to appeal this decision to
the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE)
Regional Office in Tewksbury
6) Simultaneously, APPLY for Chapter 91 license from DEQE - Regional
Office in Tewk-sB-ury
7) Simultaneously, APPLY for sewer extension@ permit from DEQE
Division of Water Pollution Control (DWPC)
--DWPC issues notice, has 21-day period for comments
- possible hearing
- after determination by DWPC, is 14-day period before permit is
issued

8) Simultaneousl Y, APPLY for discharge permit from Metropolitan District
Commission (MD_CT_
- application must be made jointly to MDC and to local municipality
- MDC will approve or deny application
- dissatisfied parties must appeal MDC permit.action within 10 days
- after appeal, MDC will issue ruling upon reconsideration
- dissatisfied parties must appeal within 30 days
- if there is an appeal from ruling upon reconsideration, a formal
hearing will be held
9) Simultaneously, APPLY for mlO permit from Army Corps of
Engineers (C-M-
- COE issues notice, has 30-day period for receiving comments
- possible hearing

217

10) Simultaneously, SEND copy of MEPA letter and copy of mlO permit
application to Coastal Zone Management (CZM)
- CZM issues notice, has 21,day period for comments
- possible hearing
- after comments (and hearing) CZM has 3 months to issue its
decision

11) Order of Conditions issued by BCC; sewer extention permit issued
by DWPC; discharge permit issued by MDC; consistency

12) SEND copy of Order of Conditions to DEQE
Ti-vision of Waterways

13) DEQE Division of Waterways issues Chapter 91 license

14) SEND copies of Chapter 91 license and CZM letter to COE

15) COE issues 10 permit

16) RECORD Order of Conditions in Registry of Deeds prior to starting
construction

17) COMPLETE installation of gas tanks within six months of issuance
of license to store flammables OR OBTAIN an extension of the
license; after installation of tanks must OBTAIN renewal of
license annually
18) RECORD Chapter 91 license in Registry of Deeds within one year of
issuance

19) BEGIN construction of marina within five years of issuance of
sewer extension permit OR OBTAIN extension of permit
20) COMPLETE.project within five years of issuance of Chapter'91
license

21) At time of opening of marina
- COMPLETE vapor recovery system
- COMPLETE waste oil retention facilities

22) 6 months after opening of marina
-COMPLETE SPCC plan
-SUBMIT semi 'annual discharge report to MDC and to local municipality

23) 1 year after opening of marina
- IMPLEMENT SPCC plan

218

FOOTNOTES

1. Mathew B. Conolly, Jr., "Coastal Recreation.in Massachusetts," Coastal
Recreation Resources in an Urbahi-2ing Environment, Cooperative
Extension Service - University of Massachusetts, August, 1977, p.5.

2. Gail Chmura, and Neil W. Ross, The Environmental Impacts of Marinas
and Their Boats: A Literature'Review With Management Considerations,
Rhode Island Department .of Environmental Management Marine Advisory
Service, Providence, Rhode IslanF, -p.3.

3. Taylor's Point Marina - Market Feasibility Study, Environmental Impact
Statement, Town of Bourne, Massachusetts, Appendix IV, 1976, p. D-19.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. D-28.

6. Ibid., p. D-11.

7. Ibid., p. D-28.

8. Ibid., p. D-13.

9. Ibid., p. D-27.

10. Ibid., p. D-18.

11. Ibid., p. D-19.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. D-28.

14. Ibid., p. D-47.

15. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, "Boston Harbor-Islands Comprehensive
Plan", October, 1972.

16. Ibid.

17. A. Ryerson, Boating In Boston -* A Report on Boating Facilities and
Related Issues in the Boston Harbor, 1979, p. 25.

18. Ibid., p. 27.

19. Ibid., p. 28

20. Ibid., p. 29.

21. Bruce Bender and David Winsor-, Marina Study: A Study of Marina Facilities
Planning at Two Case Study Locations, University of Rhode Island, 1979,
p. 1.

219

22. Robert Davidoff, owner - Constitution Marina, Charlestown, Ma.,
conversation - April 15, 1980.

23. Joseph Boudreau, Hull Redevelopment Authority, conversation
April 15, 1980.

24. Jack Hannon, Director, Division of Waterways, Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Quality Engineering, conversation
April 15, 1980.

25. Bruce 0. Tobiasson, Vice President, Childs Engineering Corporation,
Medfield, Ma., conversation - April 11, 1980.

26. Davidoff, .Op. cit.

27. Taylor's Point, Op. cit., p. D-20.
.28. Boudreau, IOp-. cit.

29. Tobiasson, 00. tit.

30. Final Environmental Impact Statement - Permit Application to Cee-
Jay Corporation . . . Prov'intet6wn Harb6f,-,, Ptovincetown, Ma.,
Volume I, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, June, 1976.

31. Hannon, Op. cit.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Tobiasson, Op. cit.

35. Weir River Marina, Environmental Notification Form, Massachusetts
Environmental Protection Agency, Hull Redevelopment Authority,
Hull, Ma., February, 1980,

36. Hannon, Op. cit.

37. Maurice Freedman, Principal, Sasaki Associates, Watertown, Ma.,
conversation - March 27, 1980.

38. Tobiasson, Op. cit.

39. Davidoff, Op. cit.

40. Peter Kortright, Grants Administrator, Massachusetts Office of
Coastal Zone Management, conversation - April 15, 1980.

41. Evelyn F. Murphy, Testimony on the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972 before the Subcommittee on Oceanography, Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, presented as Chairman, National
Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, October 10, 19

220

42. "Regulating Reforms", Boston Chamber of Commerce, Association of
General Contractors, Construction Industries of Massachusetts,
1979.

43. Boston Harbor Associates, "A Harbormaster for Boston - Summary of a
Boston Harbor Associates, Forum", March 5, 1980, Boston, Ma., p. 1.

44. Supreme Judicial Court, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Quirico
Decision, August 3, 1979.

45. Sarah Carrol, Staff Planner, Office of Coastal Zone Management,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, conversation - March 25, 1980.

46. Boston Harbor Associates, "Boston Harbor . . . Who Cares?", A
Summary Report of the Community"Conference, June 5, 1975,
Boston, Ma. p. 20.

47. Tobiasson, 0-p. cit.

48. Ibid.

49. Interview.

BOSTON HARBOR ISSUES AND ANALYSES: COMMUTER BOATS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY 222

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION 1973-1980 225

DEMONSTRATION AND TRIAL PERIOD 228

OTHER CITIES AND THEIR EXPERIENCES 232

GUIDELINES FOR A BOSTON HARBOR COMMUTER BOAT SYSTEM 236

FOOTNOTES 243

BIBLIOGRAPHY 245

APPENDICES 247

221

SUMMARY

A careful review and close-up look at the problem of establishing a

commuter and recreational boat service in Boston Harbor reveals a number

of weaknesses in the current management scheme of the Harbor which need

remedying, providing further indication of some generic and specific problem

areas, and some subtle strengths to be noted which could contribute to a

more effective and responsive system of Harbor management more generally.

Underlying much of what follows is a recognition which flows through

this entire report: that both current and potential uses of the Harbor

involve a dispersed, diverse and therefore highly fragmented group of

users who have in many cases no way to communicate common interests with

each other, who have no way of knowing about what can be or is happening

in the Harbor which could serve them. This fragmentation has the probable

effect of precluding opportunities and frustrating efforts which might

make the management system more responsive to dormant and not so dormant

public desires and needs.

This case indicates what a focal point for public demand can do under

the most difficult of circumstances. All harbor communities, however, are

not as fortunate as those on the.South Shore where a grass roots effort

and rare leadership maintained a continuous effort to retain a commuter

boat service. The Public can be a stronger constituency if afforded the

slightest opportunity. Yet the absence of strong substantial interest at

the state level could have made a large difference in these abortive

attempts without the influence of any other more regionally-oriented agent.

222

223

A regional harbor-oriented agent, however, could have acted on behalf of

those who initiated these efforts and might have more widely spread the

commuted idea to the northern section of the Harbor as well as coordinating

that possibility with recreational uses of the same service to make things

more cost effective. Hence, the following observations and suggestions

emerge from this case.

1) Commuting by water between Boston Harbor and other points on the

South Shore, in the inner Harbor, even on the North Shore, is held up not

by technological limitations (see other cities section), not by financial

limitations, not by space limitations, not by demand insufficiency, but by

simple lack of a commitment to the concept and its viability, despite proof

in other cities and study after study done in Boston and the Commonwealth.

2) The current and potential uses.of the Harbor's waters as a basic

resource are little understood, receive little high level official recog-

nition and have no forum or vehicle through which public interests and

needs can be communicated and therefore little change can occur until some

focus is provided.

3) Harbor water, with the support of Harbor lands, should be seen

as a public resource which can help to ease current transportation problems

in and around Boston's edges.

4) Strong governmental commitment to public harbor transportation

is necessary, from the highest levels in the state to the lowest in the

communities but with clear, not fragmented, responsibilities. Without this

commitment, the study shows, such transportation schemes falter and die.

224

5) Such a system.also requires strong citizen support, organized

constituent commitment to the enterprise. This support seems to be in

place already on the South Shore.

6) For this support to continue, a harbor transportation system needs

to provide strong incentives for use by the public; that is, the ride must

not take a significantly longer time than driving does, it cannot.be pro-

hibitively expensive, and it must be reliable. Further, it is crucial to

the success of such a venture that there be effective, convenient, rapid

linkages at both ends of the ride; that is, parking lots at the suburban

end and contiguous MBTA or other transport linkages at the Boston end.

This means, in part, finding good landing sites in Boston.

7) A separate agency with powers equivalent to the MBTA should be

established under,a Harbor Authority,, with formal links to the MBTA, the

Boston Transportation Department, and the State Department of Transportation.

This agency should share UMTA funds equitably with other Mass. Transit

activities. Since the local towns and cities.should form a strong organi-

zation related to a Harbor agency,-their participation should be assured.

Responsibility should not be fragmented among agencies, as it was in the

trial run.

All MBTA power currently exercised over alternative Mass. Transit

systems must be removed to a higher authority with more objectivity and

public responsiveness, e.g. back to the DPU-

8) Funding subsidies can be found in various ways: through property

and sales taxes, gas and,downtown parking taxes, bonds, and federal grants.

225

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION

In the 1880s boat service met recreational, commuter and commercial

needs with routes from' downtown Boston to East Boston, Hull, Nantasket,

Hingham Harbor, North Weymouth, Nahant, Gloucester, Plymouth, Province-

town and the Harbor Islands. 10,000 to 15,000 people a day were carried

on those steamers until government regulations and labor costs over-
whelmed them. 1

For the past 17 years, Mass. Bay Lines has run a slow (15 mph max-

imum) boat from Hull to Boston once every morning, and back again once

every night. The service has been steady, with a dedicated core of riders

averaging 125 passengers daily, and peak summer and Friday loads. Mass.

Bay Lines once made several daily summer trips to Nantasket. Bay State

Spray, Provincetown Steamship Co., has for several years been operating

a slow boat on one daily run from Hingham to Boston and back along with

seasonal service to Georges Island and one daily round trip to Province-

town. A.C. Cruises runs a seasonal Boston-Gloucester-Boston daily trip,

for three hours each way. Several of the boat lines operate harbor

cruises of various sorts during warm weather.

Beginning in 1973 a group of South Shore (Hingham, Weymouth, Hull,

Scituate, Cohasset, Norwell, Rockland) residents began to press for an

alternative to a new route 228. When they became aware of a high speed

semi-planing craft, the Hovermarine HM2, the citizen group (Route 228

committee) and the South Shore Chamber of Commerce surveyed the 12,000

area coast-to-Boston commuters regarding their interest in a 20-minute
water commute for $1.10 each way. The response was overwhelmingly positive. 2

226

In December of 1974 two route tests were made, one by the Hover-

marine, both successful. In 1975 a South Shore commuter convinced his

firm, Price Waterhouse, to do a cost-benefit study of the Hovermarine on

the Hingham-Boston rute. The South Shore Chamber of Commerce also did

a study of the issues and problems, the Hovermarine Corp. did a route

analysis, Fred Curtis of MIT did a demand analysis. All were presented

in 1975 to then Transportation Secretary Frederick Salvucci, as rep-

resentative of the Commonwealth.

Richard Nakashian (proprietor of Bay State Steamship Co.), impressed

with the viability of the Hull-Boston boat, approached Massport, the

South Shore Chamber of Commerce, and the owner of the Hingham Shipyard

with an offer to operate a similar commuter boat beginning in the Fall

of 1975.

Massport agreed, made major repairs to a Hingham pier and waiting

area, Nakashian ran the "Provincetown" for two months, getting an average

ridership of 76 in the morning, 86 in the afternoon, with lows in rain

and highs on Friday afternoons. The trip took 43-50 minutes depending
on the route; the boat averaged approximately 15 knots. 3

After Nakashian dropped the Hingham route, unsure of sufficient

ridership, two other lines made intermittent efforts during the next

year, both having trouble with profitability due to insufficient steady,

ridership, which in turn was largely due to the slowness of the total

trip as compared to private cars and/or the MBTA.

In the Fall of 1976 Massport wrote a proposal for federal funds

from UMTA (Urban Plass Transportation Administration) for a high speed

systems demonstration. New York City got $20 million for its 6000

227

passenger ferry; San Francisco got'$30 million for its entirely new

water commuter system. Boston got nothing because of its undistinguished

presentation.

In 1977 the commuter community rallied again. Edwin Colby, a

Hingham commuter, got a daily commitment from 150 people, and with that

persuaded Nakashian to run the slow boat again. Massport rented terminal

space in Hingham for the boat, and assisted with legal procedures. The

DPW provided parking space at the Hingham Shipyard under the fringe park-

ing program for rapid transit and the car pool user parking. DPW also

helped with publicity because there was reconstruction going on in the

Southeast Expressway. The MBTA provided free transfers to the subway on

the Boston end for commuters switching to the Blue Line at Long Wharf.

In 1977 Senator Allan Mckinnon (South Shore democrat) convinced the

legislature to pass a $50,000 supplemental line item in the FY78 budget.

This effectively served as the first state subsidy for a year-round harbor

commuter run. One million dollars in a transportation bond issue was

passed as well, in the early summer of 1977. It was understood, at the

time,that the bond money was to be used for capital expenditures only

(now it seems that it could have been used for certain service contracts

but then would have been impractical for credit reasons and others).

In December of 1977, EOTC (Executive Office of Transportation and
Construction) completed a feasibility study (updated in May 1978) for

running a high speed commuter craft on the Hingham to Boston route. In-

cluded in the report were conclusions on demand for a water commuter

system, suggestions for type and brand of craft, terminal locations,

preliminary cost estimations, which agency should control the system,

228

who should subsidize, how much, and for what.

Based on the EOTC study, using $458,000 from the bond issues, the
Hovercraft (HM2 Mark III) was purchased with a corporate buy-back provi-

sion. Floats and gangways were temporarily installed at the Aquarium
dock (for $20,000) and a wreck was removed from the Hingham pier.5 A

one year demonstration was to begin in Fall 1978.

The Demonstration and Trial Period

The Hovercraft ran from December 1978 to October 1979, with a year

round deficit of approximately $1.08 per passenger per trip. It worked

wel.1 and quite reliably during good weather months. Hard winter con-

ditions resulted in suspended trips -- up to 38% total scheduled in

December and January.

In.1979 the Hovermarine also made demonstration trips to the Harbor

Islands, Kennedy Library, the airport, and Chelsea. All showed time

improvement possibilities over cars, but had other problems, such as T

competition, poor access from water to land to offices, etc. Also, they

gave the vessel no time for rest and repair, which was very hard on the

Hovermarine.

In December of 1979 the EOTC evaluated the demonstration and noted

that most things were as anticipated in the feasibility study. Start-up

and insurance costs were higher than anticipated. Passenger complaints

and suggestions were consistently for more reliability, good downtown

access, faster total house-to-office trips, and variety of departure

times.

In Spring of 1980 all concerned decided to keep the Hovermarine

until something better could be found. All summer it was under repair.

It went back in the water in late August and had more mechanical problems.

229
The decision was made to sell it back to the Hovermarine Corporation.
Buyback value was estimated at $270,000 (which money would have reverted
to the Commonwealth's general fund rather than coinuuter boat allobilent and

would have to have been reallocated/appropriated if desired. Massachusetts
chose to extend this experimental period by one year, but due to a complex set

of errors by the bank holding the escrow account for payback, Massachusetts was
forced to inadvertently abort its option to sell back the boat and recover its

funds and now owns that boat.

Meanwhile, Bill Spence of Mass. Bay Lines, as principle of Hingham

Commuter, Inc., which actually holds both contracts, held the Hovermarine

contract and continued to run the big, slow (15 knots) boat for one run

per day A ile Hovermarine ran three round trips per day during late summer.

The commuters from the South Shore have clearly shown their interest,

their dedication to the water as an integrated commuter possibility.

They reiterated at every opportunity, however, their need for reliable,

speedy service, a demand which applies to any other public transit service
as well. 6

The Hingham, Cohasset, Weymouth, etc., group is a relatively small

subset of the total Boston commuter population. The South Shore, however,

is a fast growing area of New England, expensive and well-known for its

"bedroom" towns.

"As long as new office buildings keep going up in Boston, there
will be new commuters to fill them. 7 These people have need of trans-

portation to Boston. There are positive externalities for the area in

having fewer cars on the roads, thus providing less wear on the pavement,

fumes in the air, slowness through congestion, and energy inefficiency

through gas ccnsumption. The Red Line in Quincy and Braintree can pro-

vide enough convenience and economy to lure some commuters, but it,is far

230

from the Hingham, Cohasset commuters, and so competes ineffectively with

the private auto for convenience. Likewise, the parking lots at the T

stops are often full by 7:30 a.m., and the trains are often uncomfortably

crowded.

There is a demand. There has been an effort to meet that demand.

The effort to meet the demand, in the sense of providing a Iong term,

satisfactory solution for the substantial constituency for a water service,

has not been successful. A high speed boat was purchased, maintained,

utilized, but just for one year. Now only the slower boat remains,

unsatisfactory for the previous high-speed commuters because it only

makes one trip to Boston, at 7:20 a.m., one to Hingham, at 5:30 p.m.,

and is therefore limited to people who can be at work after 8:30, and

always leave work by 5:15.

Why was the high-speed service begun but not continued? Many

reasons can be found. It was begun first in response to the very strong

and organized support of the commuting South Shore residents themselves,

who were supported by Hingham State Senator Allan McKinnon who is

politically secure. Too, there was strong feeling in the Transportation
Department under former Governor Dukakis that if a commitment to a public
service, such as public transit, has been made, it should involve a
commitment to providing the best, most accomodating service feasible.
The significant transportation submarket, i.e., South Shore commuters,
which felt that a commuter boat ought to exist as an alternative and had
supported the idea, through personal efforts, studies and surveys, ought

to be given some attention and effort.

231

"The expressed purpose of the demonstration was to show whether the

HM-2 could perform reliably and economically in New England waters on a

year-round basis, and whether riders would find the high speed service
desirable."8 The demonstration was successful in terms of fulfilling its

goals. It demonstrated that there was indeed a responsive demand for the

high-speed, multi-scheduled service for Hingham, and also that many other

places in the Harbor might also benefit from water was well as land trans-

portation linkage.

Unfortunately, there were problems with the plan; these kept the,

short-term demonstration from immediately converting to a long-term

established system. The DPW owned the Hovermarine which was purchased

with the one million dollar transport bond, and maintained control of the

unused portion of the bond fund. It would have been inappropriate and

unrealistic to initiate an entirely new office or agency to handle a one

year demonstration service, so an existing agency was sought. Because the

South Shore was strongly united in rejecting the MBTA as operator of the

boat, and the MBTA was already overloaded with work, and uninterested in

taking the chance of coming in where it was already disfavored and

risking its reputation further, it wasn't chosen to coordinate and run

the service. Because there was strong displeasure with the whole boat

idea in sections of DPW, and the department overall was therefore somewhat
recalcitrant in its good faith, speedy efforts on the system, it wasn't

chosen. The likely choice, especially since the plan was for a demonstra-

tion just to decide whether or not a high-speed commuter boat should run

in Boston Harbor, was the EOTC which had already done so much for the

232

preliminary work anyway. Consequently, the EOTC took on the bureaucracy

of the operation, while the money and plant facilities remained in the

basically displeased DPW. It was not an ideal solution for the problem,

but it was considered temporary, and therefore bearable. At that point,

too, the EOTC expected that if the demonstration proved successful, the

problems largely defined and resolvable, the management could be turned

over.to the MBTA which already had a physical plant, legal departments, a

subsidy mechanism, back-up.bus capabilities for emergencies, and could

apply them at very low marginal cost to a small operation which served an

area that the commuter trains and rapid transit presently under-supplied.

Problems, too, occurred with the boat itself. It was chosen under

the awkward requirements ofthe Jones Act, which provides that only

American built boats may be purchased for government use and sail under the

American flag. The Hovermarine HM-2 was the only available high-speed boat

which approach ed the qualifications that the EOTC's 1977 Feasibility Report

had identified as economically and physically suitable for the service, and

was also American-built. Aqain, it was recognized that this was not the

ideal boat... it was smaller, and less stable than.was desired, but it was

acceptable for the experiment. It proved problematic, however, losing

ridership because it was unreliable, especially in the winter when the winds

went above 30 miles per hour. The life and reliability of any facility is

dependent on how hard it is driven. In the case of this craft it was not

given sufficient down-time for repairs based on the intent of its use relative

to that expected from its specifications, especially during the summer when

the Hovermarine did the commuter and excursion runs to the Harbor Islands.

It was overworked and subject to significantly increased breakdowns.

Other Cities and their Experiences

Harbor transportation systems pose problems in many cities in the U.S.

and abroad. While each situation has its unique locational differences and

233

problems, some of the solutions have some relevance to the situation in

Boston Harbor and might be applied.

The Staten Island Ferry in New York City is operated by the New York

City Department of Transportation. It is primarily a commuter service

between Staten Island and Manhattan, carrying both passengers and vehicles,

over 18 million of the former and 60,000 of the latter each year. It began

as the only direct connection from the Island to the rest of the city, and

was part of an elaborate ferry system connecting the Burroughs and

New Jersey. Bridges have replaced all but this ferry, which remains direct

and convenient. Clearly the primary focus now, since the building of the

Verrazano Narrows Bridge, is on walk-on commuters who either walk, are

dropped off, or park on Staten Island, and then walk or are publicly

transited to work on the downtown end. There are very strong public transit

systems on both terminal ends which serve a vital role in maintaining even

the Ferry ridership. Although the New Y ork system is old and developed more

by chance than concerted planning, and it obviously carries millions more

people than a city of Boston's size and geography might ever hope, it does
have climactic and political conditions similar to Boston. The Staten

Island Ferry is an absolutely integral part of the public transportation

system, providing a cheap, reliable peak-period commuting alternative to cars

on clogged bridges and highways and capacity-constrained rapid transit cars.

High-speed surface effect vehicles are under consideration as supplements to

the present system, although the trip is only five miles long, making the

primary concerns reliability and efficiency rather than speed.

San Francisco has a two route high-speed ferry system between downtown

San Francisco and Larkspur and Sausalito. The system,designed in 1977, was

234

planned, built,and operated with UMTA support as an alternative to

another cross-bay bridge. The Golden Gate Ferry, which is able to carry

up to 2,000 people per day, is serviced by free park and ride facilities

with limited feeder bus capacity. The targeted market for the water

service was private car users, so the system was designed with

ameniti'es similar to those found on other high quality transport modes

such as commuter trains. On the other hand, San Francisco has a very

different climate and marine geography from Boston, which spares many

technical difficulties. It is a ferry service with relevance to Boston

because it is so new and demonstrates how careful planning and open-minded

viewing of the uses of boats in place of cars,and land-situated capital

construction (i.e., circuitous roads, tunnels, and expensively maintained

bridges) can lead to a very efficient, speedy, and pleasurable, commuting

alternative.

Washing-ton state ferries, operating in Puget Sound, comprise a complex

system with 11 routes, 22 terminals, and 19 boats, carrying 17 million

passengers and 7 million vehicles each year. They serve as the main trans-

portation link between the mainland and the islands of Puget Sound. It is

not, however, a primarily walk-on commuter oriented system with 10-25

minute suburb-to-downtown trips. Of interest to Boston is the fact that

Washington's system deals with winter weather and fairly heavy seas with

long distance trips of up to 3 112 hours, similar to those which m;ght be

considered for Boston to North Shore and northern New England routes.

Washington is unique for its development from an old system of several

private operators to a new consolidated system which is accepted as the

best link.to numerous water bound islands and an efficient, integral part

of a total regional highway system. Waterways are used like roadways,

235

and boats like buses and cars to allow for the most direct trip to all

points. Also of significance is the fact that the Washington ferries

are subsidized entirely through State operating and capital funds of

$11,000,000 per year from the state's motor fuel tax. Fares are con-

trolled by a public board with an effort to maintaining a 75% return

on operating costs. There is no federal aid whatsoever.

Vancouver, B.C. has a two part water transport system, one half of

which is a passenger only Vancouver-North Vancouver service. This service

was expressly designed as an integral part of the urban transit system,

aiming to decrease the use of buses which cross the clogged three lane

Lion's Gate Bridge. The targeted market, then, was present mass transit

patrons, not private auto users. The North Vancouver terminal is currently

served by a bus-and-ride area with very limited park and ride space. The

ridership, nevertheless, is extremely encouraging, with 9,500 passengers on

weekdays and 1,250 on weekends, and far more can reasonably be expected with

the provision of park and ride facilities. The Vancouver SEABUS is a slow

boat (15 m.p.h.), but the trip is only 2 miles long and a docking system was

customdesigned along with the vessel, enabling phenomenal space and time
terminal efficiency which greatly compensates for the boat's speed.9 The

Seabus is subsidized, as a part of the entire transit network, at 70% of

operating costs. This system is of long term interest to Boston because

of its integration in the transit system and its use of underutilized

transportation routes to decrease the congestion of public transit on-roads
and bridges. 10

236

Guidelines for a Boston Harbor Commuter Boat System

The question now is: should Boston have a water-commuter system,

and if so, what needs to be done to implement it?

First, the effort has to be organized, with strong consistent

government support, of the sort that was lacking for the high-speed

demonstration. A privately run system for profit might be possible. Yet,

if the city and surrounding communities have a commitment to public transit,

a large enough part of the public can be best (i.e., most quickly,

comfortably, economically) served by water, and the beneficial externalities of

less highway.congestion, less pollution, less gas consumption accrue to

everyone, why shouldn't the water be integrated into a public transit system?

It is often argued in Boston that the potential commuter boat market is

limited to a small section of the South Shore which is within the calm, inner

harbor waters. Progress made for other commuter systems with high, rough

.seas in the United States and abroad prove the narrow-mindedness of such a

perspective. Nevertheless, the point remains that demand on the South Shore

alone is strong, and ought to be met if possible.

There is question of how a service should be managed. In New York City

the DOT handles the ferry. In Vancouver the mass transit authority handles

the SEABUS. In Washington state the highway department handles the waterway

transportation. Where the responsibility lies depends on how the system is

viewed. If, in fact, Boston's commitment to water transportation is limited

to the routes between Hingham and Boston and possibly Hull and Boston, perhaps

the MBTA is the appropriate'agency. That agency is already endowed with

the legal offices, maintenance facilities, back-up services for emergencies,

and financing mechanisms. Any water-based system needs landside

transportation coordination if it is to have broad based ridership

237

(i.e. transport from downtown terminal to offices further than a 15 minute

walk) and it is reasonable to have all phases under one aegis.

On the other hand, if Massachusetts makes a commitment to public water

transportation as a separate system, one which covers commuting as well as

recreational transportation to the Harbor Islands, and to the North Shore,

the Cape., etc., an agency which handles all Harbor passenger transportation

may well be justified. Such an agency might be modelled on the Nantucket

Steamship Authority and could coordinate scheduling, information, fees,

contracts, etc., most efficiently, operating under a permanent budget of
its own. 11

Either of these two alternatives would solidly nail a commuter boat

system in place, and demonstrate its importance as an integrated, neces-

sary alternative in the transportation network.

Then there is the problem of land-side facilities and who should

provide them, where and at what expense.

Sasaki Associates did a space study for the BRA in 1977 in which they

showed what boat space demands had existed in Boston Harbor in the past,

what in the present, and what was projected in the future. Space for

commuter/transit boat/excursion terminals was given priority in that 1977

study, and alternative sites were listed for a great many places including

the south side of Commercial Wharf; north side of Long Wharf; the end of

Long Wharf; between Long and Central Wharves; the north end of Rowes Wharf;
between Rowes and Fosters Wharf; and the south end of Fosters Wharf. 12 Although

there is clearly an abundance of underutilized land on the Boston Harbor water-

front there is a shortage of specific kinds of sites. Getting dock and terminal

space for commuter boats, with or without integration in a total boating network,

238

requires only a commitment from the city or from the Commonwealth to

such a transportation alternative. Thought must be given to a means of

connection with other phases of the transit system, particularly if there

is to be hope of allowing water commuting to expand to its full potential
for the Harbor.13

It was mentioned earlier in the chapter that, commuting by water

between Boston Harbor and other points on the South Shore, in the inner

harbor, even on the North Shore, is held up not by technological limitations

or space limitations, nor by demand insufficiency, but by lack of commitment
to the concept and its viability, despite proof in other cities and study

after study done in Boston. The city refuses to use Boston Harbor as a
transportation resource, a vital one, just as it.refused to use the Harbor

as a residential resource, a commercial resource, and a recreational

resource.

If the boat is to be a public service, i.e., available to the public,

like the subway, buses and trains, then it must be available to all incomes,

as the other modes are through subsidy. It is a form of income redis-

tribution which is again justified through externalities and also through

ethical equity issues. Finallyo the state subsidizes the MBTA for Boston

and other regional transportation systems (buses) in other parts of the

state, so there is some validity by analogy in demanding a subsidy for the

transportation of this regional sub-market.

The problem is, from where will the subsidy funds come? The MBTA
gets its su.bsidyl4 from general revenues from the state and from property

taxes from the 79 cities and towns in the operating district. It isn't

clear that such an apportionment is a fair one in terms of users being

239

charged. It is argued that immediately adjacent towns, particularly
the ones which actually have MBTA service running through them, should be

paying considerably more than western Massachusetts towns,.!whi:ch.-.hav_;e

almost no direct contact with the T and only benefit from a few of the

externalities created. Also, Boston's property taxes are high and

unevenly distributed among the poor and wealthy, so that the poor in

Boston (largely through filtration of property taxes into rents) pay a

very high price for the T, which they certainly use, but can't really

afford. In short, the property tax with regard to the T is a regressive

one for redistribution both on income and region. Additionally, all the

usual problems with property taxes as inefficient because they obscure

individual consumer preference allocations for personal income, and can

result in emigration of those able to move from higher tax areas, leaving

poor there, increasingly unable to pay, etc., apply.

Nevertheless of all taxes appropriate for the provision of an in-state

service which benefits a great number, if not all towns, in some degree,

property and sales taxes are the best options in terms of revenue production.

The sales tax, as the other most appropriate possible action,

would best be levied as a substitute user charge. For instance,

a selective sales tax on gasoline and parking facilities could be used

to discourage private automobile use (which now exacts a public cost
in road repair, pollution and high demands on energy resources). The

revenues could be used to subsidize alternative public transportation

such as the commuter boat.

240

The incidence o f such approximate user-charges is difficult to

determine. It is inefficient in the sense that some consumers who use

the cars and parking lots don't have public transit options. To adapt

for that, perhaps it is reasonable to charge extra parking fees only in

the Boston garages rather than those all around the state, since almost

everyone coming from anywhere has the option of picking up the T, commuter-

train, or now commuter boat somewhere along the line. As for the gas tax

there is no way to segregate the commuters from other natives, from the

vacation travellers, but they all use roads and pollute, so it seems that

they all must pay whatever very small amount is necessary to complete the

subsidy requirement beyond what the garages could provide.

Fortunately, since the percentage of the poor who commute to work by

car in Boston is very low (the public transit system being so well geared

through subsidy and routes to accommodate low income travellers already),

the tax would affect them very little, but they would receive the-benefits

provided from the tax paid by the externality creators. Therefore, the

program would be progressive for income redistribution.

If it is argued again that the western cities and towns of Massachusetts

will be paying for a primarily Boston and Boston suburb service and benefit,

the best response is that there is a cross subsidy going on; the whole state

241

also subsidizes the west's regional transport system. Also, because the

subsidy. requirement, at least for the present potential of the commuter
boat service is so low, 15 the. garage fee would easily provide a very

significant portion alone, and the gas tax could be very low (i.e.,

insignificantly burdensome).-

Taxes, then could quite reasonably cover the deficit operating

costs of the commuter boat, either as part of the present MBTA* or as a

system in another agency. Capital costs may be met in a better way.

There remains from the 1977 transportation bond issue roughly $500,000

plus $270,000 anticipated from the buy-back of the Hovermarine HM-2 by its

manufacturer.

Borrowing from the public via bond sales is especially good for cases

of allocation failures when the benefit is received in a future stream.

A heavy, infrequent, non-recurring expense such as the purchase of a boat

and the purchase or lease and repair of landside facilities (docking and
terminal space) is well financed in this way. 16

Finally, there remains the possibility of federal grants", such as UMTA

provided for New York and San Francisco, and might well be persuaded to give

to Boston if Boston were able to present an equally innovative, exemplary,

broad-minded, organized, and coordinated plan and demonstration of needs and

benefits. Most of that has already been done and could quickly be assembled

if there were city and state government support.

*The labor situation would have to improve markedly before the system
could be reasonably implemented under an MBTA.

242

In short, a demand for a water segment of Boston's present suburb to

downtown commuter system has been demonstrated from several perspectives:

comfort and convenience for affected users, and a series of pos itive comfort,

economic and environmental externalities for non-users. There are prece-

dents for innovative use of water as an integrated facet of public transit

systems around the nation and the world. Marine technology is well prepared

to handle Boston's particular climatic and geographical requirements. The

system has proven economically viable in other cities and in tests and

models done in Boston, even before externalities are accounted. Funding

mechanisms are available. Sites for terminal have been proposed and are

available. Agencies may ormay not be initiated for-the system, depending

on the philosophy of the planning. In either case there ar e good options.

Boston needs very little now to coordinate and initiate its own water

based section of its commuter system. It requires only an open-minded,

Harbor-and-people-oriented administration with an eye to economic feas-

ibility and the satisfying of reasonable constituent deman.ds.and a commit-

ment to action beyond talking.

243

FOOTNOTES

1. Reardon, Martha, "Commuter Boats in Boston Harbor p. 2.

2. Ibid, p. 4.

3. Ibid, p. 5.

'in summer).
4. TiScal. year 78 budget $50,000 (for single boat,
Fiscal year 79 budget $140,000 (for single boat plus high-speed demo).
Fiscal year 80 budget $200,000 (major increases necessary because of
rising fuel costs and demo costs were
originally underestimated, particularly
taxes and repairs).
Fiscal year 81 budget $299,000

5. The remaining $5 million remains in DPW possessio-n, earmarked for
commuter boat service with one end in Boston Harbor.

6. "The evidence indicates that transit ridership is more responsive to
improvements in service than reductions in fares; and reductions in
access times to and from the transit station, as well as transfer and
waiting times, are likely to be important in this regard". p. 461.
Domencich and Kraft, "Free Transit" in Edel, M. and Rothenberg, J.,
Readings in Urban Economics.

7. Charles English, explaining his efforts to initiate a commuter boat
service himself.

8. "Evaluation Report: Commonwealth of Massachusetts Commuter Boat
Demonstration", prepared by EOTC. p. 2.

9. Note that speed on short trips is a technoloqical problem; there is
too little time to accelerate and de-accelerate without taxing and
shortly damaging the engines.

10. Most details of other cities' ferry systems from "Planning Urban
Ferry Services: Issues and First Year Results". Roger Roess and
Philip Habib.

11. For discussion of several options, see "Feasibility Report: Commuter
Boat Service, Boston-South Shore" by EOTC and CTPS. p. 10-12.

12. For further discussion of downtown terminal locations, see above,
p. 29-35.

13. "Evaluation Report: Commonwealth of Massachusetts Commuter Boat
Demonstration", p. 8.

244

FOOTNOTES (continued)

14. The deficit of the total operating costs of the MBTA, which are
approximately $300 million for 1980, $40 million of which is capital
expense, and the revenues from various resources including fares of
$70 million, plus federal grants amounting to approximately $30 million
is $160 million. This amount is made up with $80 million of general
state revenues (primarily from income and sales and cigarette taxes)
and $80 million from property taxes from the 79 cities and towns in the
operating district - based on approximate figures from Barry Faulkner,
former director of CTPS.

15. If the service is run privately with state subsidy, there would be a
requirement of perhaps a 15-20% profit, on rate of return on investment.
Investment obviously depends on who owns the boat and landside facil-
ities, thus ranging from zero to several hundred thousand dollars, plus
company salaries and various overhead. An operating subsidy of about
$300,000 per year for'a boat running eight to ten trips a day, carrying
approximately 400 people round trip at an average fare'of $1.60 each
way ($1.75 individual, $1.50 per trip on a monthly pass, $1.25 on rare
yearly pass) would be required. This would.cover diesel fuel burned at
a rate of 45-50 gallons per hour on a high speed craft running at an
average of 22 knots per hour, making one round trip between Hingham and
Boston per hour, plus wages for one captain and two stewards, plus a
maintenance allowance. An unknown amount of revenue can also be expected
from an on-board sale of snacks and beverages.

(These figures and calculations are based on estimates being used by
Charles English in designing his own high-speed craft, preparing to
run a commuter boat under his company, Mass Bay Commuter Lines, a
private operator, with hope of subsidy as described. This is
similar to the subsidy now provided for the currently operating
slow boat between Hingham and Boston.)

16. Mr. Salvucci, former Secretary, of Transportation, recommended as one
somewhat less expensive option for acquiring docking space the taking
by eminent domain of a dock from the city by the state, at the discretion
of the BRA. The state would then repair the dock (not having paid to
purchase it) which the BRA recommended, and maintain ownership, leasing
the space and routes to private operators, or work out some other
authority coordination between public and private operation.

245

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. "Boston Harbor: Challenges and Opportunities for the 198Ws"
Sasaki Associates, 1978.

2. Edel, M. and Rothenberg, J., eds. Readings in Urban Economics
MacMillan Company, New York,,1972.

"Evaluation Report: Commonwealth of Massachusetts,Commuter
Boat Demonstration," Executive Office of Trans.portation
and Construction, December, 1979.

4. "Feasibility Report: Commuter Boat Service,. Bos,ton-South Shore,"
Executive Office of Transportation and Construction and
Central Transportation Planning Staff, December,,1977,
updated May, 1978.

5. Musgrave, R. and Musgrave, P. Public Finance in Theory and
Practice, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, 1976.

6. Reardon, M. "Commuter Boats in Boston Harbor," 1978.
(published in "Second International Waterborne Conference
Proceedings" ASCE, 1978)

7. Roess, R. and Habib, P. "Planning Urban Ferry Services, Issues
and First Year Results," Transportation Training and
Research Center, Polytechnic Institute of New York,
November, 1980.

INTERVIEWS

1. Nina Brown, Planner at Sasaki Assoc*iates, principle investigator
for Sasaki Space Study for Boston Harbor., 1977. -

2. Charles English, principle of Mass Bay Commuter Linesi designer of
own high speed boat with which he intends to run a private-
for-profit commuter boat operation in Boston Harbor. Long
time proponent of water commuter system.

3. Barry Faulkner, former head of Central Transportation Planning Staff.

4. Martha Reardon, South Shore Chamber of Commerce, major proponent of
commuter system, between Hingham and Boston, and'expanding.

246

Interviews, cont.

5. Frederick Salvucci, former Secretary of Transportation under
Gov. Dukakis, now lecturer at MIT, Center for Transportation
Studies.

6. Adrian Walters, Fellow at Joint Center for Urban Studies, Harvard
and MIT. Investigator on Boston Education Marine Exchange
Waterfront Planning Project; interviewer of principle harbor
concerns.

247

TIMELINE

1973 Formed Rte., 228

Members South Shore Communiti.es- Hingham, Weymouth Hull,

Scituate, Cohas&et, Norwell, Rockland

Purpose Finding alternative to proposed Rte. 228

Commi'ttee heard of Hovermarine.HM2.ves-sel, surveyed

coastal commuters to determine interest in 20 minute

boat commute at proposed cost of $1.16. Very positive

response. (Reardon reports una:nimous interest from

12,000 commuters)

N.R. In 1974 former Department of National Resources (now
DEM) had been designated terminal operator for B.H.

Islands service from Rowes Wharf. DNR also accepted res-

ponsibility for any long term leases negotiated with

private boat operators, Persuaded by South Shore group,

determined by BRA.

1974 Test In December - Two route tests, one of HM2,' which had

one successful run to Hingham. Instigated by Charles

English, Hovermarine made trip in 20-30 minutes.

1975 Study Cost Analysis
Undertaker Prince Waterhouse (convinced by Donald White,
employee and South Shore commuter) [pro bonfol

Purpose To do cost analysis of Hovermarine in attempt to

catalyze efforts to action.

South Shore Chamber of Commerce also did summary of

issues and problems. Hovermarine Corp. did a route

analysis. Fred Curtis of MIT did a demand analysis.

248

7/75 All presented to Trans. Sec. Salvucci, representingthe Commonwealth

8/75 Richard Nakashian (Bay State Steamship Co.) approached Massport,

South Shore Chamber, owner of Hingham Shipyard, offered to operate

commuter boat beginning in Fall 1975.

10-11/75 Massport agreed, made major repairs to a Hingham pier and waiting

area. Nakashian ran the "Provincetown" through October and

November of 1975. Average ridership was 76 in the morning, 86 in

the afternoon with lows on rainy days and highs on Friday after-

-noons. At 15 knots the trip took 45-50 minutes.

Nakshian was not convinced that there was sufficient ridership

to carry the service through the winter.

12/75 Bill Spence (Mass Bay Lines) leased a heated vessel. and ran it

on the Hingham route for three weeks until Christmas of 1975

before determining that it would not be profitable.

N.B.: Spence had been approached by South Shore committee in

10.74 about a route from Hingham to his place on Rowe's Wharf.

He was unable to take it on because he was a tenant at will

(i.e., 30 day lease repeated) on Rowe's Wharf.

Spence had also been runninq the Hull to Boston route since

1963 as a private-for-profit operation, as required by Mass-

port in return for the Boston to Nantasket (very profitable)

summer route.

1976 Commuters banded together again, negotiated with several harbor

operators for service. Convinced Matt Hughes (Boston Harbor

Cruises) who then ran 3 vessels intermittently during the summer

and into early fall. Ships all suffered in ridership (primarily due

to slowness) and were consequently economica Ily not viable.

249

Fall Massport applied for federal funds from UMTA (Urban Mass Trans-

portation Administration) for a systems demonstration. Didn't

get the award -- $20 million went to N.Y. for its 6000 passenger

ferry; $30 million to San Francisco.

1977 More commuter coordinated action. Hingham resident Edwin Colley got

a 150 person daily ridership commitment from 300,'previous boat ..........

commuters. Convinced Nakashian to try again. Ma&sport rented parking

and terminal space in Hingham,"assisted with series of agreements.

The DPWwas encouraging, assisting with a desigmated parking lot at

the Hingham Shipyard, under the fringe parking proqram for-rapid

transft and car pool user parking, and with publicity because

there was reconstruction going on in the Southeast Expressway.

..MBTA also provided free transfers to the subway on the Boston end
jor commuters switching to the Blue Line at Long @,Iharf.

1977 Sen. Allan McKinnon (South Shore democrat) convinced the Legislature
to pass a $50,000 supplemental line item in the FY78 1 budget. This

effectively served as the first state subsidy for a year-round

harbor commuter run.

One million dollars in the transportation bond issue was passed as well

in the early summer of 1977. It was understood at the time that the

bond money was to be used for capital expenditures only (now seems

that @it could have been used for certain service contracts but would

have been impractical for credit reasons and others).

Dec. completed a feasibility study (updated 5.78) for running a

,speed commuter craft on the Hingham to Boston route. Included

in the report were conclusions on demand for a water commuter system,

250

suggestions for type and brand of craft, terminal locations,

preliminary cost estimations, which agency should control the

system, who should subsidize and how much and for what.

Based on the EOTC study, using $458,000 from the bond issue, the

(HM-2 Mark III) Hovercraft was purchased with a corporate lay back

provision. Floats and gangways were temporarily installed at the

Aquarium dock (for $20,000) and a wreck was removed from the

Hingham pier.

N.B. The remaining $.5 million remains in DPW possession, earmarked

for commuter boat service with one end in Boston Harbor.

A one year demonstration was to begin in Fall 1978.

12/78
10/79 Hovercraft ran, year round deficit approximately $1,.08 per

passenger per trip. Worked well and quite reliably during good

weather months. Hard winter conditions resulted in suspended

trips - up to 38% of total scheduled in December and January.

In spring of 1980 all concerned decided to keep the Hovermarine

until something better could be found. All summer it was under

repair. Went back in the water in late August, had more mechanical

problems. Decision was made to sell it back to the Hovermarine

Corp. Buyback value estimated at $270,000 (which money will

revert to Commonwealth's general fund rather than commuter boat

allotment, and must be reallocated/appropriated if desired).

Meanwhile: Spence* (as principle of Hingham Commuter, Inc., which

actually holds both contracts) held the Hovermarine contract and

continued to run the big, slow (15 knot per'hour) boat for one

run per day while Hovermarine ran 3 round trips.

251

In 1979 the Hovermarine also made demonstration trips to the

Harbor Islands, Kennedy Library, the Airport, Chelsea. All showed

time improvement possibilities over cars, but had other problems,

such as T competition, poor access from water inland to offices,

etc. Also, gave vessel no downtime for rest and repair. Was

very,hard on Hovermarine.

FUTURE Charles English, principle of Mass. Bay Commuter Lines of Waltham,
has de,signed and nearly (75%) finished bu,il-di-ng a-149 passenger,

high speed craft to operate between Hingham and Boston, 10 round

trips per day. fie expects each one-way trip to take 30 minutes, and

to cost $1. 75 or $3.00 round trip with a monthly ticket. With or

without a subsidy he intends to run the boat (which is also equipped

for several other types of uses, depending on weather and demand),
provided he can find a dock.

N.B Other seemingly qualified people consider English grossly

optimistic about speed and finances.

FY budget $50,000 (for single boat in summer)

FY79 budget $140,000 (for single boat plus high speed demo)

FY80 budget $200,000-(major increases necessary because of rising

FY81 budget $299,000 (fuel costs and demo costs were originally

underestimated, particularly taxes and repairs)

RELEVANT QUESTIONS

Why does responsibility lie with OTC?

Why has the Hingham route been chosen and no others?

How does the boat compete in terms of revenue, subsidy demand,

ridership, time, efficiency with MBTA?

*Mass Bay Lines

252

What control/power does MBTA have in terms of a commuter boat

system?

Why is state subsidizing Hingham commuters at all?

What are major problems wi-th immediate running of high speed

(35 knots or greater, such as Hovermarine) commuter boat;

i.e., access to public transport, terminal space, dock space, etc.

What kind of coordination does or should exist between commuter

and recreation harbor transport?

BOSTON HARBOR ISSUES AND ANALYSES:

WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT

MDC

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY 254

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 256

CHANGING TIMES 257

MDC: THE WRONG AGENCY FOR WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT 259

ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS 261

RECOMMENDATIONS 266

253

SUMMARY

The Metropolitan District Commission (MDC) was formed in the

early part of this century to undertake large-scale engineering and

land use projects that served the entire metropolitan region. For

nearly 40 years the MDC performed this function with little-opposition

from the public. But in the last 20 years, public expectations and

legal, institutional, and regulatory framework for water quality manage-

ment have changed drastically, while the structure and mandate of the

MDC have remained the same. This has caused much public criticism which

has focused on the MDC's inability to address adequately problems such

as combined sewer overflows, sludge disposal, urban stormwater runoff,

and infiltration/inflows. But this criticism is largely misplaced.

Unfortunately, not enough attention is given to the fact that the MDC

was never designed as a comprehensive water resource planning agency.

This analysis has found that the MDC, as currently structured,

is incapable of satisfying the growing need and pleas for comprehensive

water resource planning in the Boston metropolitan area. Nevertheless,

this is exactly what a growing number of voices has been asking it

to do. In addition, the current structure and mandate of t he MDC make

it very difficult to hold the MDC accountable for inadequacies in

water resource management in the Boston metropolitan area.

254

255

Therefore, this study recommends,that the MDC either 1) be transformed

into a water resources commission with.an expanded mandate and be removed

from legislative and gubernatorial influence and become a separate entity,

or 2) be carefully restructured to better enable it to respond to both local

needs and the comprehensive task of accounting for total water needs from

wholesaling to proper treatment for its des.ignated geographic jurisdictions.

The new Commission could be operated as a public corporation supported

by user charges. A board of commissioners consisting of elected reDresenta-

tives from member communities, and appointed representatives from MAPC, NERBC.
EOEA, and possibly special interests groups would establish general policy

for the Commission. A permanent citizens' committee would assist the board

of commissioners and serve as a vehicle for public participation.

*It is far behond the scope of this work to recommend how the MDC
should be restructured, but it should be noted that the current Commissioner
of the MDC hired a consulting firm this past year for more than double the
cost of.this entire Harbor study, to make the MDC operations more effective.

256

Historical Background

The Metropolitan District Commission (MDO was formed fn 1919 by the

Massachusetts state legislature to undertake large-scale engineering

and land use projects that served the entire metropolitan region. Their

primary purpose was to protect the public health. The MDC was formed from

three fun-ct.ionall.y.separate construction-oriented organizattons managing parks,

water, and sewage. Since all metropolitan residents shared the benefits

of these services the legislature felt it was important to establish a

regional agency that was largely independent of local issues and politics.

A regional agency isolated from local politics could expedite geographically

extensive and technically intensive projects needed to protect the public

health and welfare.

To maintain this independence, the MDC's budget has remained part of

the state.budget approved by the legislature. Individual communities pay

back the state for MDC services according to an allocation formula developed

by the MDC with local input. However, local communities have very little

control over MDC planning and operations. The Secretary of Environmental

Affairs names the MDC Commissioner, subject to approval by the Governor.

The Commissioner administers the planning and operating divisions of the
Commission. The'Associate Commissioners are appointed by the Governor to,

complete the Commission. These arrangements further insulate the MDC from

direct local participation.

The Boston Harbor Management Project is particularly interested in

the MDC's respon-sibility to act as a wholesaler in the provision of wastewater

collection, treatment and disposal services in the Metropolitan Sewer
1
District (NSD). Although it is commonly misunderstood the MDC's mandate

11. The Commission.is in a similar position with regard to the provision of
water to cities and towns in the Metropolitan Water District.

was never to act as a water resource planning agency, but rather as a

sewerage department. Wastewater managers in the early part of this

century concerned themselves primarily with wastewater flows and not the

waters into which wastes were emptied. Water resource and related land-use

planning remained separate from the task of the sewaqe anency.

Changing Times

For nearly 40 years after its formation the MDC performed'many of

the duties of its legislated mandate with little opposition from the

public. But in the last two decades, the MDC has been increasingly under

attack. Environmentalist concerns over the impact of MDC activities on

water quality and a changing legal, institutional, and regulatory frame-

work have forced the MDC to reexamine its wastewater management efforts.

Public criticism has focused on the MDC's failure to provide comprehensive

planning in wastewater management, pointing to the need to incorporate

broad goals, objectives, and consideration of all the environmental impacts

in the planning process.

During the 60's and 70's a record number of environmental laws

were passed related to water quality control by both the state and federal

governments (i.e. the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, the National

Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the

Coastal Zone Management Act, and the Clean Water Acts). Accompanying

those new laws, agencies were created to manage those new regulations,

perform comprehensive planning responsibilities, and encourage and

incorporate public participation in the planning process. In Massachusetts

in the mid 1970's the Department of Natural Resources was reorganized into

the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA) which included the new

258

Department of Environmental Quality-Engineering (DEQE), the Department of

Environmental Management (DEM), and the office of Coastal Zone Management

(CZM). At the federal level the En'vironmental Protection Agency (EPA)

and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) emerged in

1970. In 1972 the Office of Coastal Zone Management (OCZM) was created

within NOAA.

The MDC, on the other hand, was transferred intact, into the Executive

Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA). Its legislated mandate and

public accountability structure are essentially the same as when it was

formed more than sixty years ago. Meanwhile, public expectations concerning

water quality planning have changed radically in the past twenty years. In

the absence of any agency with a clear mandate for comprehensive water

quality planning, the bulk of this.responsibility has fallen upon one of

the most visible polluters, the MDC. '

The MDC has performed this function with mixed results. Its originally

legislated mandate and traditional occupation involved the achievement of a

strictly circumscribed objective using a straightforward set of engineering

principles; its concern centered upon the wastes of the city. Today,

however, it i,s expected to perform a very intricate task in accomplishing

a very broad set of goals over a wide range of activities. It must now

focus upon the receiving waters of its discharges and all the problems of

the commons and responsibilities which go along with managing a public

good. Comprehensive water'quality planning places a heavy responsibility

upon the MDC by entrusting to it the management of the waters of Boston

Harbor in the interest of the public, to whom that good belongs.

259

MDC: The Wrong Agency for Water Quality Management

While public expectations and the legal, institutional, and

regulatory framework for water quality management have changed drastically

over the past two decades, the structure and mandate of the MDC have

remained the same. Public criticism has focused on the MDC's

inability to address adequately problems such as combined sewer overflows,

sludge disposal, urban stormwater runoff, and infiltration/inflows. But

this criticism is largely misplaced. Not enough attention is given to the

fact that the MDC was never designed as a comprehensive water resource

planning agency.

This analysis has found that the MDC, as currently structured, is

incapable of satisfying the growing need and pleas for comprehensive

waterresource planning in the Boston metropolitan area. Nevertheless,

this is exactly what a growing number of voices has been asking it to do.

Inappropriate Structure

The inappropriate structure of the MDC is the major reason for this

function-agency mismatch. As wholesalerthe MDC has no jurisdiction

over the MSD members' sewer systems (upstream of the MDC system).

The MDC has confined itself strictly to its legislated mandate and never

interfered with members' systems until they were recently compelled to

by EPA regulations. Not only has the MDC historically ignored problems
upstream, but they have refused to bear the full burden of poor operation

and maintenance of member systems. Inevitably diminished water quality
in Boston has been a consequence of this inappropriate structure. Since

the MDC mandate did not include the protection of Boston Harbor water

260

quality, MDC officials acted as if the problems of maintaining the public'

commons was none of their concern.

Furthermore, this inappropriate structure has made it very difficult

to hold the MDC accountable for an overburdened system. The present

structure places responsibility for sewer maintenance and pollution

2
abatement on member communities. Each member is,only accountable to
itself3 leaving little incentive for an individual community.to clean up

its system. Clean up is costly for a single community, and the meager

benefit accruing to a single community for improved Harbor water quality,

shared by all communities regardless of whether they cleaned their systems

or not; thus, there is an equity problem.

Until recently, the state legislature has had little incentive to

change the present structure of the MDC. Since the MDC needs legislative

approval of its capital and operating budgets, patronage has been a major

factor in MDC job appointments and contract awards. This abuse of power

inevitably resulted in inefficiency and waste. As the environmental and

political costs of the present structure have increased, so have the

pressures for change. Unfortunately most of these efforts have not been

aimed at the fundamental problem.-- the structure and mandate of the,MDC.

Furthermore, the MDC's placement within the Executive Office of Environmental

Affairs (EOEA), while desirable in its recognition of the Commission's key

role in protecting the environment, may actually weaken the role of

other departments in EOEA. It is possible that the regulatory powers

of the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) as well as

the influence of the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) and

2. See G. Blossom, "Accountability as a Problem in Water Quality Planning
and Wastewater Management. Case study - Boston" for a discussion of thi's
.problem with respect to combined sewer overflows.and stormwater runoff.

3. Only.recently have infiltrator/inflow analyses become,required; largely
due to federal regulation.

261

the Office of Coastal Zone Management (CZM) would be enhanced if the

MDC were not part of EOEA. Further investigation is needed to substantiate
this hypothesis. 4

Additional Problems

The inappropriate structure of the MDC has caused four additional

problems that further exacerbate this function-agency mismatch:

1) MDC's lack of accountability;

2) MDC's lack of coordination with other agencies;

3) MDC's failure to plan for meaningful public participation; and

4) MDC's inability to respond to information needs.

1) Lack of Accountability

Whereas citizen's groups and local communities complain that the

MDC has not been responsive to their water quality concerns, it is often

overlooked that the MDC was never designed to be accountable to these

constituencies. At the beginning of this century, the legislature

established the MDC as a regional agency that was to act,independent of

local issues and politics. At that time a need was felt for an agency

that could expedite large scale engineering and land use projects that

protected the public health and welfare; a regional commission,

isolated from local politics, appeared to be the solution.

However, the political climate and environmental conditions have

changed radically since the MDC was formed. Popular opinion demands a

broad view of water quality management. Sewerage management, a major

MDC function, is only one responsibility of a water resource agency; the

MOC has inadequately addressed other problems that people are concerned

4. The Commission's position as a state-co 'ntrolled entity often complicates
the enforcement efforts of the DEQE, especially, and those of the EPA (insofar
as the latter depends upon the state agency for assistance). The MDC is not
easily held accountable for inaction resulting from state bureaucratic delays.
See A.0. for examples of reasons for MDC delays in adhering to the
Enforcement Compliance Schedule Letter.

262

about. The inappropriate structure of the MDC is the major cause of

this lack of accountability.

2) Lack of Coordination With Other Agencies

The New England River Basins Commission (NERBC) and the Metropolitan

Area Planning Council (MAPC) also play a part in water quality planning

in the Boston area, predominantly through the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act (FWPCA) Amendments. However, the planning efforts of these

agencies have not significantly influenced decision-making for wastewater

.management, either because there was no linkage with the MDC to assure

that this occurred, or because the planning itself was inadequate, in

timing or in content. Neither organization has the influence to assure

coordination of wastewater management with their water resource planning

efforts. In particular the Southeastern New England water and related

land use plan (SENE) prepared by the NERBC was very successful in

tackling 1,arge scale issues in a comprehensive manner, but it has been

largely ignored. No agency has been willing to use the plan as a framework

for its specific small-scale planning efforts.

In addition the MDC with the policies of the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) has not been able to coordinate its wastewater management

strategies. The EPA's indecision over enforcement of secondary treatment

requirements has provided a convenient excuse, but also a real reason

for inadequate MDC planning efforts. A concerned public can hardly

hold the MDC accountable for inept planning if the federal government

cannot make up its mind. Rapid regulatory changes hinder planning
efforts and accountability attempts. 5

5. See Blossom, "Accountability," for a detailed discussion of the MDC and
the secondary treatment requirement and waiver.

263

Other government organizations, such as DEM and CZM, though charged

with planning tasks strongly related to wastewater management and water

quality, have had little role in wastewater planning efforts. Furthermore,

the MDC has seldom taken the initiative to coordinate its wastewater

management strategies with agencies (such as the Boston Water and Sewer

Commission) in member communities.

3) Failure to Plan for Meaningful Public Participation

The inappropriate structure of the MDC discourages local participation

in planning efforts. The MDC's insulation from local issues and politics

may have been a desirable feature 50 years ago, but is incompatible with

present participatory planning practices.

Informal citizens' groups established to push MDC to action have
had some impact on MDC planning.6 But this type of public participation

has generally come too late in the MDC planning process to effectively

improve the planning results and the public pressure is usually a reaction

to already formulated plans. Inevitably this kind of input results

in delay or cancellation of a project accompanied by further expensive

planning.

However, pressures for correcting the inadequacies in wastewater

management in Boston are growing. The Boston Harbor Citizen's Advisory

Committee (BHCAC) has had some success in promoting discussions with

the MDC about its (MDC's) planning efforts. BHCAC has also provided

a forum for public participation in water quality planning. A parallel

development on an agency level was the formation of the Boston Harbor
Interagency Coordinating Committee (BHICC). It was the outgrowth of a

6. See Blossom, "Accountability," for a detailed analysis of opposition
from Winthrop residents to the various sludqe incineration proposals at Deer
Island.

264

State Attorney General suit against the city of Boston for pollution. The

Boston Water and Sewer Commission (BWSC):responded to the suit by initiating

discussions among all relevant agencies.to get appropriate action. This

prompted the state to drop the suit. The BHICC has facilitated coordination

of water quality planningefforts among Massachusetts environmental agencies

and the EPA. Although it has only existed since 1979, the efforts. of the

Committee have proved reasonably successful. While the BHICC was not meant

as a substitute for comprehensive water quality planning, it has injected a

degree of comprehensiveness into the implementation of current projects.

These kinds of efforts are definitely a step in the right direction to meet

current needs. However, if similar problems are to be avoided in the future,

it will be necessary to make more fundamental changes in the structure of

wastewater management.6f.-the"MDC.

4) Inability to Respond to Information Needs

Although some limited studies were mandated by the waiver application,

the MDC has never carried out a consistent program of sampling or analysis of'

the effects of discharges from the MDC system upon the Harbor environment.

Such activities are far removed from its role as wholesaler. The MDC has,

therefore, relied heavily on studies done for other government agencies,

even though these have been sporadic and very limited in scope. In fact,

despite the availability of qualified research facilities near Boston, this

region lags far behind other areas of the country in its knowledge of the
effect of its municipal waste on the marine environment.7 It was the

evidence gathered from other coastal communities which led to the waiver

application process. These communities have been far better equipped to

7. For an example of perhaps the most advanced in-depth research of
this kind by wastewater agencies, see The Southern.Coastal Water Resources
Project Annual Report.

265

adapt to changing regulatory conditions (indeed, even to influence these

conditions) than the MDC. The adaptability of these areas has'minimized
wasted time and efforts especially with@regard to the secondary treatment

requirement and waiver.

Citizen's groups have continually requested concrete information

concerning the effects of wasteiAater on the marine ecology of Boston Harbor.

Although this kind of scientific data is essential to effective and

comprehensive water quality management, the MDC has never adequately

addressed these information needs. The insulated structure of the MDC

inhibits responses to these requests.

266

Recommendations

As currently structured, the MDC is the wrong agency for water

resource planning in-the Boston metropolitan area. For over 20 years

the MDC has shown that it is incapable of adapting to changes in the

legal, institutional, and regulatory framework of water quality manage-
ment. The solution is either extensive reorganization of the existing MDC,
or the creation of an entirely new entity for water cuality management.

Since the MDC serves metropolitan Bostons it would be more

appropriate if the MDC served the residents of this region directly and not
through state government. Therefore, this study suggests an alternate option
that the MDC might be transformed into a water resources commission, and exist
as a separate governmental entity. The new Commission could be oper-

ated as a public corporation supported by user charges. A board of

commissioners consisting of elected representatives from member-commun-

ities and appointed representatives from MAPC, EOEA, and

possibly special interests groups would establish general policy for

the Commission and hire an executive director who oversees day to day

operations. A permanent citizens' advisory committee should-assist

the board of commissioners and serve as a vehicle for public partici-

pation.

In addition, the Commission would need an expanded mandate.

The Commission.should have the responsibility as well as necessary

powers to intervene in communities that are not maintaining or oper-
ating their systems effectively. The Commission will need the power

to introduce and coordinate water resource protection actions and

policies in all represented communities.

*See MDC Reorganization Study, obtained from the MDC.

267

Furthermore, the Commission should have the.powers and responsi-

bility to maintain the public commons--in this case,, the water resources

in the Boston metropolitan area, particularly Boston Harbor.

This new structure and the expanded mandate @ould cive the

Commission the necessary power to deal with water quality management

problems that will be even more critical in the years ahead. There are

several advantages to this structure:

1) Many positive characteristics of the MDC would be retained in the

new structure. The ability and experience of the MDC in handling

problems which require an areawide solution are valuable assets

that should be preserved.

2) Elected representatives with the assistance of a citizens' advisory

committee would establish general policy, select alternatives, and

prioritize projects, which would make the new Commission more

accountable and responsive to local constituencies.

3) Coordination of wastewater management efforts would be improved by

the Commission's new powers within communities.
4) Patronage opportunities would probably be reduced once the budget

approval process was no longer a responsibility of the state

legislature.
5) Public participation would be ensured via the citizens' advisory

committee. This citizen input would probably make the Commission

more responsive to information requests.
6) Regulatory powers of DEQE and DEM would probably be enhanced if the

Commission were not part of EOEA. At the same time EOEA would con-

tinue to influence the operation and planning of the Commission

268

through its representative on the board of commission.ers.

7) Coordination of the MAPC, and the Commission's planning efforts

would be improved since the MAPC would have representatives on the

board of commissioners.

APPENDIX

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

STATE HOUSE, BOSTON 02133

THOMAS M. FINNERAN Committees on
15T)i SUFFOLK DISTRICT Banks and Banking
56 PLEASANT HILL AVE. Federal Financial Assistance
MATTAPAN. MA 02126 Vice-Chairman
Government Regulations

ROOM 42
TEL. 727.7502

COMMENTS ON BOSTON HARBOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT REPORT FOR THE
SPECIAL COMMISSION ON DEVELOPMENT OF BOSTON HARBOR

Representative Thomas Finneran, Chairman
Subcommittee to Review SeagEant Report

At the outset, it is important to note that our existing
.governance mechanisms find their historical foundations mainly
-in the need to represent people as opposed to places. Since
there are very few people who "live" in or on the waters of
Boston Harbor, the lack of any specific public body controlling
and speaking for the Harbor is understandable, but moreover,
in looking to create a new mechanism or to reorganize what we
have, close attention must be paid to the structure of such
an institution given the area's unique geopolitical nature.

Particular attention must also be paid to the current
crisis in our economy and in the distribution of public resource.s.
Improvements in the manner of doing public sector business in
.Boston Harbor which also spend the same or fewer dollars will
be much more attractive.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

11. "Specific Recommeladations"

(A.1, a, b) In several sentences, the author offers what seems
to be the central recommendation of the report. We
are teased with two options without any offering of
real substance, i.e., institutional structure,.-legal
foundation, likely or necessary participants, etc..
A discussion of the inherent weaknesses and strengths
of the options offered would be helpful. I need a
more complete picture to begin to understand where
the author is leading me.

(C.) Is the author suggesting that the Boston Harbor portion
of the CZM program should be placed under the direct
control of a Harbor Authority. If this is true, it
should be clearly stated. If something else is intended,
then say it. Ambiguity in a report of this type will
seriously hinder its effectiveness.

P_-@2 2 Renresentative Thomas M. Finneran

The proposed Harbor Authority should have a clearly defined
role in the development process --possibly as a clearinghouse
or project facilitator. This role should be spelled out
in this section.

(E.) Voluntary federations of governmental bodies have not
proved their value in our area. Extra staff are hired by
the various governmental bodies who are members, to attend
meetings where more "studies" is the usual conclusion.
Decision makers do not typically involve themselves so
no decisions are made and definite support for projects
is not forthcoming. I am not persuaded by this idea.

@F.) The Legislature must necessarily play a major role in
whatever new authority is created for the Harbor. A
pernanent oversight committee would be redundant if the
new harbor authority is properly.structured.

III. Recommendations for Interim Steps:

A. I oppose the concept of funding public interest groups by
the Legislature. My reasons are as follows:

1. Public interest and community groups are "grass roots"
by nature. The process of selecting who is to represent
the public should not be in the hands of the Legislature
as it impairs the legitimacy of this process.

2. Public interest groups like political office seekers
need the contact with their constituencies demanded by
fund raising. After all , there exists a market for
public representation and we do not need the government
interfering in the communities choice over who should
represent it and on what issues.

3. It is also unconscionable to offer financial support
(tax revenue) to harbor public interest groups when
the funding for more basic governmental services is
in question.

B. A good idea. The Special Commission on Development of Boston
Harbor should be given this task

E. What laborlmanagement problems? What public spirited activities
have been precluded? I am not saying that everything is
perfect, but I am saying that the lack of specifics hinders
the report� effectiveness and will lead to charges of shot
gunning.

F. The section on the NDC and water quality bears serious.a..:@d
open discussion. The Special Commission's lack of serl6us
examination of this area may need to be changed. I assume

Page 3,- Revresentative Thomas M. Finneran

Commissioner Geoghegan,will see to it that this discussion
occurs.

G2. Tax Assessment Practices

The author offers a rather sweeping change in the taxing
structure without addressing, some of the critical implications
of the change. At first glance, I can see several very
troubling results. I will mention only one.

The recommended change would put tremendous pressure on landowners
to develop. The building boom or bulge that would result might
not be in the public interest. New developments require expanded
public services which, given Proposition 2-112, may not be fully
funded by the amount of tax revenues which would be paid by these
developments. The cost of these services would be borne by
older properties and the residents of the city.

Certainly, landbanking or some sort of classification scheme
could be used to counter this pressure.

However, my point is that the author has dealt with one of the
most complex areas of public finance in a quick and light
fashion. What is offered is an interesting idea but demands
thorough study before it can be taken seriously. I would
appreciate some substantive comments from the city and town
members of the Special Commission on this idea.

G2. This point on zoning control of land use is well taken and has
serious and far reaching implications into the future of our
cities and towns. With limited land, we must use that land in
as many ways and for as many hours a day as possible. Also
our experience has been that costs for public safety (personal
safety and property protection) diminish when an area is
peopled beyond normal business hours.

Also, office or industrial workers gain a greater interest
in and identify with their work places and the local area when
they use the area for activities beyond the job.

While again, the author is writing briefly on a very complicated
matter, we must recognize and act on the problem identified.

I. Water Transportation

Major public water transportation for people and the delivery
of local goods is probably inevitable. With the increasing problems
,of funding roadways and public transit and increasing land-based
congestion, the substantially lower infrastructure a:-.d operating
costs of water-based systems is without question a lzs_ferred
alternative. The Special Commission has a subcommittee work_-Oig on
this matter and a complete recommendation should be offered even
if implementation is not immediate.

Page 4 - Representative Thomas M. Finneran

GENERAL C014NENTS

While the report identifies several areas and issues which
need our attention, I find difficulty with the way in which it
waves a somewhat ambiguous gesture at these concerns without
pointing directly at them and clearly describing their origins
or component parts. The recommendations which 'emerge are as a
consequence ill defined and strategically unsupported. The
report in this way invites all of the liabilities of criticism
without offering the advantage of a path to success.

The author has made certain leaps from a limited rationale
to a broad recommendation. I can not see the building blocks
which persuade me about the conclusions or recommendations.
In this way, the report can not stand alone but is possibly
understandable only with a great deal,of discussion with the
author. Unfortunately, the project is ending and we will have
only limited access to ongoing consultation.

I think that the Introduction and Recommendation sections
could be effectively rewritten in a way which would be clearer
and communicate more decisively, while not being overly long.

I have read but not dealt here with the other sections,
leaving them to the experts or those specifi cally involved in
those matters. I expect these sections to be well chewed before
a legislative recommendation emerges from the Commission.

A final note:

The author could find advantage in stating that these problems
of the Harbor are not the creation of the people who currently
hold elective or appointive public office. To be sure, I and
my constituents have many other problems with these officials.
My point, however, is that the support of these officials will
be much easier to enlist if they can be identified as part of
the solution. In working with the Commission to date, the
normally high level of resistance to change has not been prevalent.
Everyone seems to know we have a series of Harbor problems and
wishes to join in solving them.

1141%sholl

Thomas Ennen, Director
Boston Harbor Development Commission
The State House
Boston, MA 02133

Dear Thom:

You have asked for my comments on the "Final Draft" Report
of the Boston Harbor Management Project. It is my understanding
that within a few days the "Final Final" report will be sent to
the printer and that comments postponed may not be considered.
For this reason I am sending you brief comments at this time.
The remaining chapters on Ports and on Fort Point Channel have
not yet been received so I am unable to comment on them.

The report gives the impression that the aut-lDrs believe
the grass is greener and the water bluer in other cities. Some
of the efforts described as successful in other cities were
really no more effective than what has been done here in Boston.
Creative water pollution abatement programs by MDC and by Boston
Water and Sewer Commission and the Magenta Zone invented by the
BRA are examples of innovative and effective projects in Boston Harbor.

It seems extraordinary that in spite of many references to
the value of Boston Harbor as a public resource,, it is nowhere
simply stated what kind of resource it is for whom and for what.
Is it solely a development resource, its value measured by the
dollar value of its real estate? What public interests are
affected by development decisions, past, present and future?
Access., whether visual, pedestrian, or marine merits discussion
in depth, preferably with recommendations on at least one exemp-
lary project where the problems of public access were resolved.

In a less philosophical vein, I refrain from comment on
potential reorganization of the various entities of the Executive

Kevin H. White, Mayor/Boston Conservation Commission/'l 82 Tremont Street, 02111
CO!@@ 31

Thomas Ennen, Director
Boston Harbor Development Commission

Page 2

Office of Environmental Affairs.

The specific recommendation that Chapter 91 permits issued
by one of those entities, the Division of Waterways, be subsumed
in some way into the Chapter 131/40 Order of Conditions issued
by municipal conservation commissions is not a recommendation
that the Special Legislative Commission on Boston Harbor should
devote serious consideration to. Until recent years the Division
of Waterways was a part of the Department of Public Works. Its
historical mandate'was appropriately "marine or commercial
improvement ... piers, highways, waterways, railroad connections
and storage yards and sites for warehouses and commercial
establishments" (Chapter 91/8) and "general care and supervision
of the harbors and tidewaters of the commonwealth" (Chapter 91/10).
While these activities have environmental consequences, it is
the municipal conservation commissions which are mandated to
consider "public and private water supply, protection of fish
and shellfish, prevention of pollution and storm damage preven-
tion." (Chapter 131/40). Overlap between conservation commis-
sions and Waterways is insignificant. The recommendation is off
the mark.

Rather than reducing the scope of environmental interests
to be protected, it would be wise to ensure that full consider-
ation of environmental impacts such as those under Chapter 131/40,
be coordinated with the consideration of other interests. Recall
that under the now defunct Chapter 31-0 (1972) irrevocable licenses
were granted (in a limited geographical area) with consideration
of recreation, historic preservation, scenic views, and most
importantly, public access tothe water and water's edge.

It should not be forgotten that this Legislative Commission
was created "for the purpose of preparing a program for the
"Economic, social and environmental development of Boston Harbor"
(Chapter 25, Resolves of 1979). 1 hope the "Final Final" report
will reflect the importance of a coordinated permit procedure
encompassing expanded public interests and appropriate roles in
the provision for those interests by municipal conservation and
by the Commonwealth and its environmental secretariat.

Sincerely,

Eugenie Beal

9Ae -eommonweal,(.4, 0/A/,aSJe7,C/1aJe/1/61

MO Vam@ya@, Yeree@
COASTAL ZONE AAon, AWadecietti 092eQ
MANAGEMENT

June 4, 1981

Dr. Judith Kildow
Department of Ocean Engineering
Massachusetts Institu te of Technology
Cambridge, MA

Dear Dr. Kildow:

Thank you for this opportunity to comment on the Boston Harbor Management
Draft Final Report. CZM staff have reviewed the report in depth and find
several areas of potentially serious concern. I recognize the rather tight times
constraints you are under with regard to publishing the Final Report in June,
so we should meet as soon as possible to discuss the report in greater detail.
Consistent with CZM input in the past, our comments are meant to assist the MIT
team in producing a high quality report which will assist the Boston Harbor
Development Commission in it's difficult work.

The major issues we raise in this letter relate directly to aspects of the
CZM program as described inthe report, although we have additional questions
about the permitting section and several of the recommendations.

Federal Consistena

Specifically, the analysis of MUM's federal consistency process is mis-
leading. I direct your attention to page 38-40 of the M.I.T. Report where the
statement is made that "the CZM office accomplishes their environmental review
mandate by what is known as a 'federal consistency' review which involves the
examination of any activities in the coastal zone wbich may have any effect on
the area, i.e. N.P.D.E.S. permits, Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) leases, to
verify their compliance with federal regulations."

In fact, the federal consistency review procedure is clearly defined in
the CZM regulations (section 7.00 through 7.60). These regulations specify
activities which may be subjected to federal consistency review: activities con-
ducted or supported.by a federal agency; activities for which a federal permit
or license is required; activities described in OCS exploration, development or
production plans; and activities subject to applications for federal assistance
to state and local governments. Projects are chosen for review after careful
consideration of standards of effect on the coastal zone and are tailored to
each type of activity. For federal licenses or permits, the projects to be
reviewed are further specified by MEPA thresholds.

Dr. Kildow
M. I. T.
Page two

The review procedure involves the analysis of the applicant's consistency
certification. We determine if a particular action is consistent with CZM
policies, which are in large part implemented through existing state regulations.
This review does not involve an examination of any and all activities in the
coastal zone and certainly does not attempt to verify compliance with federal
regulations, as the report states.

CZM Networking Process

The networking process by which. the MUM program is implemented places very
specific jurisdictional limits on us. The Coastal Wetlands, Waterways, and
Water Pollution Control regulations, for example, limit CZM in the same way they
limit the agencies which have primary jurisdiction. The main intent of federal
consistency review is to allow states with approved management programs, such as
Massachusetts, to review the prescribed federal activities using the standards
provided in existing state regulations.

CZM and MEPA

On page 40 of the M.I.T. Report reference is made of the interrelationship
between the MEPA office and the CZM office. CZM follows MEPA thresholds for
projects requiring federal and state licenses. One of these MEPA thresholds
involves projects of certain types subject to a Superceding Order of Conditions.
If such a project is subject to an S.O.C., it is automatically subject to MEPA
in the way specified in section 3(b)(1) of Appendix C of the MEPA regulations.
If such a project has not been appealed and is therefore not subject to an S.O.C.,
it is still subject to federal consistency review as specified in section 7.23
(b) of the CZM regulations.

We recognize that many applicants unfamiliar with the regulatory process have
difficulty communicating with all of the appropriate agencies and those agencies
may have internal communicatiors problems@@s. well. Although it is the applicant's
responsibility to initiate the federal consistency review process, we attempt to
contact and inform applicants of federal consistency review procedures very early
on in the process. The two most obvious times to identify applicants is when
an ENF if filed with the MEPA office and when a Public Notice is published by the
Corp. of Engineers for a project. In the latter instance, the Corp. of Engineers
also notifies applicants of CZM federal consistency review procedures when
they apply for a permit.

CZM and MEPA do work closely on projects in the coastal zone contrary to the
impression the M.I.T. Report leaves the reader with. On relatively small
projects (not requiring the preparation of an EIR), an applicant may opt for
initiating the federal consistency review process during the MEPA review and our
review will proceed. If a project requires the preparation of an EIR however, it
may be premature for the applicant to.initiate the federal consistency review
process for two main reasons.

Dr. Kildow
M. I. T.
Page three

First of all, if the CZM federal consistency review begins simultaneously
with the start of the MEPA review our six month review time will probably expire
before the FEIR is completed. Under CZM regulations, we may not reach a federal
consistency review decision until the final MEPA decision is available .(section
7.25(c)). Other state regulatory agencies are bound by the principle that an
adequate analysis of the impacts of the alternatives be conducted before reaching
a decision. Secondly, both an EIR and.an EIS present several project alternatives,
from which a final project design is chosen. An applicant, therefore, may not be
prepared to apply for the federal permits for a specific project until the EIR
process leads to the selection of a chosen alternative. Since the federal
consistency review process is based on a specific federal action such as the
issuance of a permit or license, the process cannot be initiated until a specific
project is chosen and the federal permits and licenses are applied for. This
obviously allows for a speedier review based on the wierits of the project by
lessening delays caused by inadequate information.

It is unusual for us to delay a project beyond other state deadlines unless
the project proponent initiates the federal action (which triggers our review)
after completing the state permitting process. This can be a confusing process
at first glance, but one that could have been clarified for the M.I.T. team
through conversations with CM staff throughout the study.. It is unfortunate that
the comment period will not afford the apparent need for lengthy discussion.

General Recommendations

Unfortunately the Draft Final Report raises more questions than it answers
in regard to CZM. I refer to IIC. Specific Recommendations. Although there is
no doubt that a strengthened CZM office is desirable, it is unclear how the
office would.be strengthened with the implementation of the recommendations.
It is unclear how the permitting system could be shortened and what permits a
Boston Harbor Authority CZM office would issue. Since we do not issue any permits
presently, this should be clearly stated. It is also unclear whether there would
be a specific set of standards for CZM in Boston Harbor that would differ from
those in the rest of the state. Is the intent to have a Boston Harbor CZM
operating as an arm of the proposed Harbor authority and the rest of the CZM office
operating within EOEA? Would the entire CZM program be a part of the Harbor
Authority?

There is an obvious dilemma here. On the one hand, if a Boston Harbor CZM
was incorporated into the Harbor Authority and the other part of the program
stayed within EOEA, the program would be fragmented, a problem the M.I.T. team
cites throughout the report. In fact, this type of arrangement might lessen the
level of predictability of the permitting process by having two sets of operating
procedures and standards, not to mention two different directors. On the other
hand, how would the entire CZM program rest within the jurisdiction of the Harbor
Authority when the CZM mandate is statewide? The report should examine these
questions in detail.

NERBC New England 141 Milk Street. Third Flotu
Boston, Massachusetts 0210Q
River Basins Commission Tel. 61 '-2233-6244

July 7, 1981

Judith T. Kildow
Associate Professor of Ocean Policy
Room 5-215
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA 02139

Dear Professor Kildow:

Notice of your review session on Professor de Neufville's The Port
of Boston: Status and Prospects was received too late for our at-
tendance at the June 29 meeting. Our comments on the draft report
are summarized below:

0 There is no coverage of proprietary terminal operations or noncon-
tainerized traffic in Boston Harbor. We thought this was an objec-
tive.

* While the absence of recent investment in Massport container facili-
ties addsto capacity utilization, studies of Massport's container
terminal indicate comparatively higher labor costs. How can operat-
ing efficiency be comparable to competition under these circumstances?

9 What about the competitive impact on Boston of growing container
feeder services?

� two scheduled services in Providence with a container crane
on order;
� scheduled service in Portsmouth, New Hamphsire;
� planned service in Albany, New York; and
� proposed berth construction in Portland, Maine.

9 Which current regulations on shipping cause container barge service
to Boston? Further explanation is required.

9 How are the 5-7% annual increases in container traffic in Boston de-
rived and justified?

If you have any questions.on.our comments, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Robert H. Wardwell
Program Manager
Ports and Harbors Program

RHW/nmc

August 10, 1981

Robert H. Wardwell
Program Manager
Ports and Harbors Program
New England River Basins Commission
141 Milk Street, Third Floor
Boston, MA 02109

Dear Mr. Wardwell,

While I am revising my report taking into account your
and other suggestions, I diddwant to respond to your comments
directly. Let me simply do this point by point:

L) With regard to the compatibility of Boston's high
labor costs and efficiency: (a) We have to distinguish
between technical efficiency the ability to use resources
well, and economic efficiency the choice of the least
expensive technically efficient possibilities. My comments
refer primarily to technical efficiency. (b) Anyone should
be extremely suspidSous of studies of labor costs in U.S.
ports. Which expenses are treated as labor costs, which
labor costs are internalized, and which are treated above
board, these are questions that are essentially impossible
to resolve. The short of it is that I foumd no convincing
reason to believe that Boston's real labor costs were really
out of line with costs elsewhere. In particular, the New
York waterfront is hardly an easy place to do business.

2) The effect of new facilities in Portland, Albany#
etc.: If wishes were horses, beggars would ride. The
grim fact is that neither the construction of docks nor
the existence of service is sufficient to bring a commensurable
amount of traffic; if they were, Boston would have 3 to
5 times the traffic it does. The reluctance of shippers
to route cargo through secondary ports - such as Boston
- is redoubled for tertiary ports such as Portland or
Albany. My opinion is that Boston has nothing significant
to worry about in this direction.

3) The conference agreements fixing prices between
ports (rather than inland destinations) create the eurrent
demand for barge service. If these artificial constraints
were eliminated, as by the government withdrawing its permission
for U.S. companies to participate in the shipping cartels,
it is almost certain that barge traffic would evaporate.
This point is now explained more fully in the report.

4) No one can forecast the future container cargo
throughf Boston or any other port accurately. Pr6�ections
that have been made - as by Temple, Bar"r and Sloan -
are necessarily deficient on two important grounds. First,
any trend extrapolation is highly dependent on the period
selected for econometric analysis, due to the high variability
in the data; the equation estimated is highly unstable.
Second, eargo forecasts depend critically upon assumptions
about trade, oil prices, and other significant unknowns.
The net result is that these forecasts - however embellished
by fancy equations - are nothing more than projections
of one's guesses about economic trends. One might as well
guess directly. My entry - at some $100,000 or more less
expensive than TBSI - is equally likely to be right.

With all best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Richard de Neufville
Professor and Chairman

cc. Prof. J.T. Kildew

ANTHONY D. CORTESE, Sc. D.
Commissioner

June 16, 1981

Dr. Judith Kildow
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Ocean Engineering Department
Room 5 - 214
Cambridge, MA 02139

Dear Dr. Kildow:

Attached is a copy of the Characteristics of the Decision-
Making Structure and Changes Underway Sections of the Boston
Harbor Management Draft Final Report with some suggested
rewriting, deletions and comments in the margin. As you can
see from the comments I have some serious and significant
disagreements with certain portions of the report.

First of all, I feel the tone of the report concerning the
Characteristics of the Decision-Making Structure Section is
very negative and for the most part unsubstantiated. Where
this is the case I have noted such in the margin.

Secondly, portions of the Report do not accurately rep-
resent the way business is presently conducted within EOEA or
DEQE. One example of this is the lack of understanding of the
function of the Water Resources Commission which is a policy
making body with broad representation including both agency and
public officials and co-chaired by the Commissioner of DEM and
Commissioner of DEQE. Also within EOEA there is a staff person
assigned to deal with water policy issues and inter-program
activities within EOEA. These two examples certainly provide
some of the "linkages" which your report claims are necessary
and which your Report states presently do not exist.

My third concern is that in developing the two sections
of the Report which these comments are addressing, sufficient
research was not performed to understand and credit some of
the ongoing coordination and integration efforts dealing with
regulatory programs in general and Boston Harbor in particular.
In the FY - 81 State/Environmental Protection Agency Agreement
fSEAT, which you stated you had of copy of at our June 9, 1981
meeting, there are at least three issues which have some impact
on the issues you raised in your Report. First, there is an
issue in the SEA, the purpose of which is to bring responsible
State and Federal Agencies together to better understand and
manage dredging and disposal projects. Second, the Energy
Issue in the SEA will develop a permitting guideline for the
purpose of consolidating the administrative requirements and
review procedures for local, State and Federal permits for

Dr. Judith Kildow
June 16, 1981
page 2

new sources. This guideline could be applied to all sources,
including those in Boston Harbor. The third issue in the
SEA which provides better management of projects in Boston
Harbor is the Boston Harbor Issue. This issue allows the public
and all appropriate agencies to review and impact on decisions
relating to the cleanup of water quality in Boston Harbor.

In your Report, you criticize EOEA for not having a
facilitator for issuing permits and licenses in Boston Harbor.
Even though this is true, if you totally understood the res-
ponsibilities of EOEA and its agencies, you would realize that
this is not a proper role for the Agency to assume. However,
I do submit that EOEA and its agencies are effectively managing
its programs by providing good linkages which assure program
integration and coordination as I have described above.

In order for development in Boston Harbor to be properly
managed in a timely fashion, it may be necessary to establisV
an authority of some sort to act as a facilitator. If this
were done this entity could assist developers in understandinc
the regulatory processes and to promote the concurrent review
of projects by involved agencies.

I request that you carefully review this letter and
attached comments and make the appropriate changes to your
Report so that it will represent an accurate evaluation of
the programs within this Department. If you have any
questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at ?2?-2690.

'Sincerely,

David A. Fierra
Deputy Commissioner

DAF/lm

cc: Thomas Ennen
Gary Clayton, CZM

TO: Prof. Judith Kildow, MIT
FROM: Dean Johnson, TBHA
DATE: June 8, 1981
SUBJ: Proceedings of May 14, 1981 workshop on
Management Alternatives for Boston Harbor

The attached report summarizes the discussions of
each of the six groups. Unfortunately, I have not received
all of the notes from the discussion leaders or reporters.
In the case of Group 4, 1 have to wait until the reporter
returns from California in mid-June. I also do not have
complete records of all the participants in each group. I
am in the process of call4-ng members of various groups to
,reconstruct the full membc!rship.

These notes represent a draft of the comments I
received and1notes that I took. I forward them to you for
your use in revising the revort, although there were few
comments specifically on the draft. Rather, each group used
the draft as a starting point for their discussion, as we
had suggested. I am going to summarize these further as part
of a more coherent "summary of proc3edings" which will be sent
to every participant.

I am also attaching the list of participants, is
reasonably complete.

You should know that I have received many positive
comments from people who participated in the workshop and were
stimulated and excited by it. I am very pleased with the
response and hope to set up another discussion session in the
near future, perhaps in cooperation with the Chamber or other
groups. I will keep you posted on our plans.

ATTENDENCE AT THE BOSTON HARBOR ASSOCIATES WORKSHOP MAY 14, 1981

Meg Ackerman, TBHA
Kathy Abbott, D.E.M.
Claire Adams, Army Corps of Engineers
Robert Adler, Army Corps of Engineers
Charles Ames, Hill & Barlow
Laura Anderson, N.E. Merchants
Simone Auster, Boston Chamber of Commerce
Ann Aylward, Massport
Martha Bailey, BRA
Dudley Baker, NERBC
Edward Baumgartner, Harbor Commission, Hingham
Eugenie Beal, Harbor Commission, City of Boston
Richard Bennink, Fund for Preservation of Wildlife
Arthur Blackett, Commercial Wharf Properties
Joseph Boudreau, TBHA, Hull
Alice Boelter, Massport
Charles Button, Harbor Commission, Boston Water & Sewer
Tom Callaghan, Commission member
Helen Callahan, John Ordway & Assoc.
Steven Cassella, M.I.T
Curtis Chase, J.F.K. School of Gov.
Gary Clayton, CZM
Donald Connors, Choate, Hall & Stewart

Richard Delaney, CZM
Lorraine Downey, Neighborhood Develpoment, Boston

Thomas Ennen, Harbor.Commission

John Felix, DEQE
David Fierra, Commission, DEQE
Alan Fisher, G.'-,.. @;ry Consulting Engineers

Terrence Geoghegan, Harbor Commission, MDC
William Gillitt, Architect
Michael Glavin, Harbor Commission, Chelsea

Beth Harding, M.I.T Sea Grant
Kathy Hoard, M.I.T
Dean Horn, M.I.T Sea Grant
Paul Horn, EDIC
Susan Houston, Cabot, Cabot & Forbes

Dean Johnson, TBHA
Rush Kidder, Christian Science Monitor
Jay Kaufman, M.I.T Sea Grant
Judith Kildow, M.I.T
Peter King, P.S. King & Assoc.
Peter Koval, O'Brien & Gere
Ernesta Kracka, Exec. Off. of Communities & Dev.

Francis Lee, Boston Edison
Maggie Livsky, M.I.T
William Lydon, Harbor Commission, Itassport
Stepehn Lynch, Codman & Company

ATTENDENCE - MAY 14, 1981 p.2

John McHugh, New England Telephone
Phillip Mallard, DEQE
Anne Meyers, Massport
Neil Middleton, Jung-Brannan Assoc.
William Mitchell, Boston Pilots
Theo Moniz, U.S. Coast Guard

Julia O'Brian, MDC
Margery O'Malley, CZM
Henry O'Connell, Harbor Commission, Winthrop
Marc Older, BRA
Meyer Orlov, Fox, Cowin & Orlov
Kennpth Owens, John Hancock

Howard Palmer, Attorney General's Office
Barbara Passero, Coastal Environment Info. Svc.
Leon Popel, Marine Engineer
Michael Potter, Citicorp Real Estaie
Beth Powers, NERBC

Deborah Ross, TBHA, Water Music, Inc.
Deborah Rosser, Charlestown Savings Bank
Barbara Steen-Elton, 11IT
Mary Lu Shoemaker, Harbor Commission, Bay State Boat Owners
Michael Shooltz, Cabot, Cabot & Forbes
Duncan Smith, Museum Wharf
Lester Sutton, EPA
Robert Swett, Boston Properties

Rick.7,aylor, Boston
Edwin Tiffany, Turner Fisheries
Stella Trafford, TBRA

Marlym Ullman, TBHA

Wil.Uam Walters, TBHA
Thomas Walsh, Codman & Company
Robert Wardwell, NERBC
Robert Weiner, Boston State College
Nathaniel Wentworth, Fay, Spoffard & Thorndike
Nina Winiker, B.S. Costello

Robert Yaro, DEM

Carol Ann Zeimer, Execi, Off. of Transportation & Construction
Dirk Zvart, Army Corps of Engineers

GROUP 1 WATERFRONT LAND USE CRITERIA

Participants: Ann Aylward (Massport), Disucssion Leader
Martha Bailey (BRA)
Theo Moniz (U.S.C.G.)
Howard.Palmer (Asst. Attorney General)

Question: How do we resolve the conflicts between water
dependence and the public interest on the one hand
and highest and best use assumptions of the current
system on the other?

1. Current actors:

-Massport
_CZM
-Boston Conservation Commission
-Div. of Waterways (Chapter 91)
There is no central authority for resolution of conflict;
and no specific group/agency looking out for the public interest.
Although the Division of Waterways has broad jurisidiction, it has
no focus on Boston Harbor; its licenses are too broad in scope and
the agency is limited by understaffing.

2. What is needed:
- coordination of the permitting process, overall land use
development, zoning, etc. under one authority an agency
o"r en@r_ity to do a Master Plan for the harbor.
- checks and balances
the Legislature is responsible for protecting the Public
trust
- possibly some sort of declaratory procedure with Superior
Court to streamline the permitting process
- environmental policy for the harbor as part of the general
plan, including zoning procedures
3. Issues regarding a land use cont@ol agency:
cannot let any municipality control the harbor when the
waterfront is in the public trust and should be protected by
the state
- need for community involvement in comprehensive Planning
- communities should be allowed to supersede a master plan
to enforce stricter regulations than threshold requirements
of the plan, but how to define what is more restrictive?
- lessons of current experience - different levels of sophis-
tication in various communities in response to CZM principles;
CZM has,"no teeth" to enforce its mandate thus,no one oversees
the entire development problem; CZM has not performed well
in Boston Harbor because of the complexities of agencies.

Group 1, cont.

given current experience need an agency with POWER, obtained
through legislature's support

4. Role of a central harbor authority and tasks
- proposed authority would have ultimate authority over project
approvals - possible veto of that approval by local gov't?
- threshold criteria should be developed which are responsive
to historic trends of development; recognize that use change
over time

- uses are quantifiable; define their needs and incorporate
into a master plan

- financial return not necessarily the proper determinant
for defining best use; water dependence (e.g., Bethlehem
Steel) and public use (recreation, etc.) need to be
structured into criteria which govern private development.
Focal Point: the legislature will establish these criteria
with or without local approval.because of the Quirico decision
which establishes the public trust for the people of the state.
Quir.ico also sets limits on the.powers of the Legislature.

5. Structure of a Commission
local communities contiguous to Boston Harbor should be
represented
- water dependent activitips must be represented
- public agencies should be represented so that the membershio
reflects statewide interests in the harbor; thus, membership
should be broader than the existing Special Commission.

GROUP 2 EQUITY PROBLEMS

Participants: Dean Johnson (TBHA), discussion leader
Richard Bennink (Fund for Preservation of wildlife)
Arthur Blackett (Commercial Wharf Properties)
Donald Connors (Choate, Hall & Stewart)
Jay Kaufman (MIT Sea Grant)
Phillip Mallard (DEQE)
Anne Meyers (Massport)
Neil Middleton (June-Brannan Assoc.)
Kenneth Owens (John Hancock)
Deborah Rosser (Charlestown Savings Bank)
Thomas Walsh (Codman & Co.)
Nat Wentworth (Fay, Spofford & Thorndike)

Question: The harbor as a public resource has special public
interest conditions based in law which may conflict
with the rights and concerns of private and govern-
mental land owners. How should this conflict be
resolved?

1. Issues
- the Quirico decision (implicatl'ons discussed)
- needs of investors
- needs of conveyancers and owners (certainty)

2. Major points raised
the harbor is a dynamic place; uses and needs change and
evolve over time
we need to identify via -jphisticated urban design analysis
the public interest in the harbor and the water's edge.
Such analysis z.hould create a positive array of possibilities
(including ideas such as shared access) rather than a rigid
set.
- we need development to be able to serve the public interest
- toughest question is "Who pays?" (this was not addressed in
theMIT report)
- a proper incentive package neeas to be developed which
promotes private development that is consistent with the
public interest
- as an equity matter, public landowners may have an obligation
to the private owners to make clear their plans and intentions

3. Structure of a Harbor Authority to carry out above:
could not decide; the problem is "too political"

4. Additional comments
- need clarification on what kind of title or license required
to allow mortgage capital to be raised in areas below the
historic low water line
- Boston not such a bad place in which to develop; faster than
many cities
- MIT report tone too defense ive, almost antagonistic; focus on
new opportunities needed

i
GROUP 3 CONSTRAINTS ON DEVELOPMENT

Participants: Simone Auster (Boston Chamber), disucssion leader
Marjorie O'Malley (CZM), reporter
Rober Adler (Army Corps of Engineers)
Eugenie Beal (Environmental Affairs, Boston; Commission)
Alice Boelter (Massport)
Charles Button (Boston Water & Sewer)
John Felix (DEQE)
'Paul Horn (EDIC)
Susan Houston (C,C & F)
Marc Older (BRA)
Barbara Steen-Elton (MIT Sea Grant)
Michael Shooltz (C,C & F)
Duncan Smith (Museum Wharf)
Carol Ann Zeimer (EOTC)

Question: The governance system for the Harbor often retards
and obstructs development and therefore delays or
reduces public benefits which could accrue. At
worst tremendous opportunities-are lost. How can we
more effectively and efficiently support development
-while at the same time guaranteeing proper protection
of the public and environmental interests?

1. Discussion of Question
There was some disagreement on the types of constaints to
development and the role of the governance system. The point
was made that the problem is not in regulations but_.jn._tJ3_e
of shared int arge he regulatory prcc@ess
does what it is intencied to do, although one agency representative
a-sserted that ga.QL_aZency sets-i-ts own priorities, information
Eequirements (for permits) and layer s7d_r-r_e-g-u7-aZTT'C@_, @-@c3ng
e ative a-ITm-m-o-s-D-h7-e-re@fnr-@-T@e-v@-el-op-m-e@[email protected],n-z-o-r-@
fo opm
i os
veat
10 rs@ rs
develop'Mrs in uiNderstan @ing @e@re atory process thouqh efforts
are being made to assist them (example of development guide put
out by EDIC and the Boston Chamber of Commerce.)

2. Major problems:
- there is a general lack of water orientation among the various
agencies at different levels of government
- cost of testing and inconsistent data requirements; length of
time and cost of permitting process are hinderances
- recreation, public access and aesthetics are not considered.
in a systematic way
- the orientation of water-based users and land-based users
differ; the former are threatened by the latter.
- there is a lack of consensus on what are approDriate uses-and
what is in the best public interest
- lack of shared goals for growth and development throughout the
harbor

Group cont.

3. Waterfront development cost factors:
- land costs
- labor costs
- construction costs (floating cranes, barging, etc.)
- filling, rip rap, etc.,
- bulkheading
- inspection
- many of the factors which increase waterfront development
costs are-inherent in the site requirements rather than a
result of government interference, etc.

4. i4eeds
- systematic public access
- a rational process conducted by reasonable people that allows
for people to be heard yet protects broad public interest
- coordinated planning and goal-setting for entire harbor to
realize growth potential
- coordination of governmental activities to rationalize the
permitting process, remove overlapping and make needed
regulation more efficient

GROUP 4 INSTITUIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON CHANGE

Participants: Lorraine,Downey (N.D.A., Boston), disucssion leader
Curtis Chase (TBHA), reporter
Kathy Abbott (DEM)
Dudley Baker (NERBC)
Gary Clayton (CZM)
David Fierra (DEQE, Commission)
Ernesta Kracka (EOCD)-
Frank Lee (Boston Edison)

Question: Changes in government in the''Commonwealth have
historically taken the form of additional laws and
bureaucratic layers which,complicate and confuse the
process. Is this approach necessary and can it be
overcome in developing a new mechanism for the
management of Boston Harbor?

1. Conclusion
An additional layer of government to deal with the harbor is
not politically feasible. Yet there.is a clear need for a
central authority to deal with harbor issues.

2. Functions of an ideal entitiy:

coordination
facilitation
establish time frames and procedures for permitting

.3. Need for better information e@)ni
- is the regulatory process itself a significant constraint or
is the probi-em in the complexity of the issues?
- are there large tracts on underutilized public land in the
harbor?
- is there adequate access for water dependent uses? Any
evidence that such uses have been or are being denied?

(notes for this group not turned in yet; reporter out of town)

GROUP 5 COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION NETWORK INADEQUACIES

Participants: Beth Powers (NERBC), disucssion leader
Laura Anderson (New England Merchants Bank)
Ed Baumgartner (Hingham, Harbor Commission)
Tom Callaghan (Harbor Commission)
Peter King (P.S. King & Assoc.)
Peter Koval (O'Brien & Gere)
William Mitchell (Boston Pilots)
Barbara Passero (Coastal Enivronment Info. Serice)
Mary Lu Shoemaker (Bay State Boat Owners, Commission)
Marian Ullman (TBHA)

:'Question: Harbor constituency building and mobilization has
been stalled at a realtively primitive stage of
development in Boston Harbor. Other harbor regions
have overcome this problem. How can we?

1. Agreement on the ques-.-.iOft.

2. Reasons for the inadequacies.in Boston Harbor
- waterfront not visible from most of city, as in San Francisco
- waterfront blocked by highways and degraded by dilapidated
structures, debris, etc.
- Commercial interests "owned" the harbor; they resent intrusion
by other groups (tourists, boaters, etc.) which interfere with
their operations; thus no interest in TBHA, other harbor-wide
activities and groups
- there is no crisis to galvanize the interests and i'.." ',jrand
vision' of the harbor; therefore little'or no media attention
- private waterfront property owners n6( interested in inoreased
public activities because of the lack of a true sense of the
.public trust (versus the west coast experience)
- there is a fragmentation of public information dissemination
and a lack of promotion by key actors (ex. of the commuter
fe rry which was not advertised adequately by the state)
- there is not direct relationshib between residents, commuters
and harbor in Boston (although outlying community residents do
relate to their part of the harbor)
- government agencies at all levels do not have a unified focus
or vision of Boston Harbor, even within the same departmen.ts
- there is no unified power for mobilizing the business [email protected]
when promotion needed; a networking of power brokers is needed
yet there is no direct return to them for publicizing

3, How to stimulate, improve communication & information network
inadequacies:
- the group agrees with and supports the recommendations of
the MIT report but suggests in addition the following:
- need to target strategies to specific constituencies
,@--waterfront marine commercial interests
other waterfront proprietary interests

Group 5, cont.

- city residents
- commuters
- business community
(the problem of harbor visibility not so great in outlying areas)
- need to establish a central clearinghouse for public information
dissemination to and from other groups, media, etc.
- need to establish a direct relationship between the harbor
and the target constituencies
- need to find money to support these communications effol-ts

4. Some specific recommendations:
to establish a better relationship among marine commerc4Lal
interests on the waterfront, the group suggests th-a-fthe
Peci-a-I ommission ' T' these
C cST1 ogether a forum faL-just
ident fy common gripesr p
ij@teres s to roblems,._Ilopes and
d 1res-tor the harbor tor the next five yea-rs- or so; this
@7ould be a means of'Incluaing ERFFE79M insuring Unat their
concerns are included in solutions. Massport could be
asked to sponsor a social occasion, perhaps.
- @o establish a clearinghousg TBHA could serve this function
a
but ne-eds funTiPng;'Oa"s@1n Fomation clearinghouse and media/
government liaison, it could provide information *n r-reater
Boston Tourist & Convention Bureau, newspapers, TV, etc.
- tc im.-Prove business community involvement and to increase
fun,:,._- for nromoting the harbor:
-eat@@I@Iish @ab@usin@ess m@ed @t@work, as in Baltimore, that
can be drawn on to promote harbor when needed; such a networn
needs a key motivator who has respect of the community, time..
contacts, etc.
-approach corporations, especially the banks and others whose
advertising links them with New England's marine heritage,
for public service and funding
-to get property owners intere'sted, there must be a clarif-*Lcation
of the public trust and other inducements to show them it is
_L _'-I
in their interest to promote the harbor as a public resource,
question of how to do this; legislative mandate needed but
also time and money to get it passed
-programs in the schools can educate Boston Harbor users and
decision-makers about the future
-need a crisis but Proposition 2h may be biggest deterent
to increasing public/private interests in Boston Harbor at
this time.,;,.j

GROUP 6 BUILDING BLOCKS TOWARD EFFECTIVE HARBOR 14ANAGLI=T

Participants: Edwin Tiffany (Turner Fisheries), discussion leader
Claire Adams (Army Cor-@:s of Engineers)
Joseph Boudreau (TBHA, Hull Redevelopr-ent Auth)
Rich Delaney (CZM)
Terrence Geoghegan (MDC, Comr.ission)
Rush Kidder (Christian Science Monitor)
John McHugh (New England Telephone)
Julia O'Brien (MDC)
Stella Trafford (TBHA)
Robert Yaro (DEM)
Dirk Zwart (Army Corps of Engin-aers)

Ouestion: What are the guidelines or elements for a solution?
Who is part and necessary participant of the solution?
What is the formula for a process to surface the
best and most viable solution?

2. General points
'Mere appears to be a need for one central, probably non-profit
group to speak for all interests7 TBRA was suggested as a
candidate; however doing so is very difficult since interests
in and around the harbor are so varied. Yet such an approach
is needed to.help focus limited funding in the public sector.

As to the type of central agency or authority to coordinate
management of the harbor, there was little agreement; there
appears to b- 'Little desire cr,-, t1ie part of existing agencies
and offic_ials to surrender any p(,,@-.7er. There is also @ strong
feeling.against adding anothei laYer of bureaucracv.

ftnotes for this group were not submitted; still tracking down
participants)

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