Argo Merchant oil spill incident December 15, 1976 to February 15, 1977 : a report to the Administrator

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Coastal Zone)
information
Center

DISASTER SURVEY REPORT 77-1 ttkl OF CO
The@'ARGO MERCHANT Oil Spill
Incident:

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Dec. 15 9 1976 to Feb. 15, 1977
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A REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOW',@ I
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1977

DISASTER SURVEY REPORT 77-1

MAY 15 19728

C0ASTAL ZONE
INFORMATION CENTER

The ARGO MERCHANT Oil Spill Incident:
December 15, 1976 to February 15, 1977

A REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR

Property of CSC Library

Rockville, Maryland
July 1977

AUG 26 1997

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Jaunita Kreps, Secretary
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Robert M. White, Administrator

U.S. N.O.A.A
GC1212.M3 M3/1927
#6148391

Tanker ARGO MERCHANT foundering off the coast of Nantucket,
Mass. (U.S. Navy Photograph released by Department of De-
fense, Washington, D.C., January 10, 1977)

FOREWORD

On January 17, 1977, 1 requested Donald P. Martineau, Deputy Associate
Administrator for Marine Resources, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, to undertake a review of NOAA performance relative to
the ARGO MERCk ANT incident. Specifically, I requested a review to
determine the effectiveness of our organization in responding to both
our National Contingency Plan responsibilities as well as to short and
long-term assessments of the resulting impacts upon the marine ' environ-
ment and associated fishery resources. I was particularly interested
in establishing where any deficiencies might have existed that require
remedy to further improve our effectiveness in responding to any future
major oil spill incidents.

The enclosed report by Dr. Martineau and the survey team presents their
findings on the performance of all NOAA elements which participated
in providing data, information, equipment or other services associated
with the Federal response to the ARGO MMCHANT incident. The general
conclusion of the survey team is that the NOAA elements performed in an
outstanding manner in responding to one of the largest oil spills to
occur off our shores, often working under the most difficult of environ-
mental conditions in the Northwest Atlantic. The personnel involved are
to be highly commended for their diligence and dedication.

Robert M. White
Administrator

PREFACE

A NOAA survey team traveled to Massachusetts February 7-9, 1977, to
interview NOAA personnel, other Federal and state officials, and scientists
from local institutions associated with the NOAA participation in the ARGO
MERCHANT incident. In addition, other individuals were interviewed directly
in the Washington, D.C., area or through telephone interviews where time or
distance prevented visits. The survey team included Robert Beck, Deputy
Associate Administrator for Environmental Monitoring and Prediction; John
Mirabito, Office of theAssociate Administrator for Environmental Monitoring
and Prediction and alternate Commerce member to the National Response Team
under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
(NCP); Jean Snider, ecologist, Office of the Associate Administrator for
Marine Resources; Roland Paine, Public Affairs Officer (Oceanic Programs),
Office of Public Affairs; and the under.signed.

At the outset, the team established its purposes as the following: 1)
to determine the adequacy of response of NOAA elements both to the Regional
Response Teamis activities and to the On-Scene Coordinator's requirements
and needs, as defined by the NCP; and 2) to evaluate the response of NOAA
elements to the problem of assessing the potential damage to the marine
environment and fish stocks of the area, which is one of the most productive
fisheries areas of the world.

it was not the 'intent of the survey to describe the total response by
Federal, state,and private groups, nor was it the purpose of this survey to
evaluate the technical quality of the data or the resulting scientific assess-
ments. Data were still being evaluated and assessments made beyond the con-
cluding date of the period for the survey. A more complete description of
the scientific efforts is contained in The ARGO MERCHANT Oil Spill - A Pre-
liminary Scientific Report.*

The survey was limited to the period extending from December 15, 1976,
when the ARGO MERCHANT was grounded, to February 11, 1977, when the Coast
Guard determined that the wreckage contained no oil and that cleanup and
containment activities were no longer necessary. This survey constitutes the
first evaluation of a NOAA response to a major oil spill. The spill did not
occur within territorial seas, where the States have primary responsibility
for assessing damage to the marine environment and fishery resources, nor did
the oil go ashore during the period covered by the survey. Consequently, the
assessment of environmental and resource damage was predominantly a Federal
action, in which NOAA played the principal role. The survey provided an
opportunity to determine the extent of interaction not only among the many
NOAA elements involved, but also the extent of their interaction with Federal,
state, local, and private organizations and individuals.

NOAA Special Report: The ARGO MERCHANT Oil Spill - A Preliminary Scientific
Report. Edited by Peter L. Grose and James S. Mattson. March 1977. U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

The survey members were particularly impressed with the cooperation evi-
denced among Federal agencies and the local scientific community. The team
is indebted to the numerous individuals not only from within NOAA, but also
from other Federal and state agencies, and from the scientific community, for
their contribution to the survey. It would not-, have been possible without
their willing cooperation and assistance.

Donald P. Martineau
Deputy Associate Administrator for
Marine Resources
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

1. The ARGO MERCHANT incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. The grounding and break-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 1
B. Area of the incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2. NOAA response to the ARGO MERCHANT incident . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. National and regional contingency plans . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. NOAA implementation directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
C. NOAA reaction to the Regional Response Team . . . . . . . . . 9
D. Response by the NOAA/Coast Guard Spilled Oil Research team . . 9
E. Support to the National Response Team . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

3. Support to the On-Scene Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A. Marine forecasts . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Oil movement and behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C. Fisheries impact assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
D. Coordination of the scientific community . . . . . . . . . . . 18
E. Logistics support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
F. Public affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

4. Research and environmental damage assessment . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A. Resource damage assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
B. Environmental assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

5. Information dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A. News releases and press conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B. Congressional hearings and public meetings . . . . . . . . . . 27
C. Transition and termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

6. Logistics and administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A. Logistic support . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B. Administrative matters . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 30
C.' Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

7. Findings and recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A. National contingency planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B. Regional response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
C. NOAA response reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
D. Scientific coordination . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 34
E. Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 35
F. Administrative matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
G. Data management - chain of custody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
H. Information dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 37

1. THE ARGO MERCHANT INCIDENT

A. The Grounding and Break-Up

At 0710 EST, December 15, 1976, the U.S. Coast Guard Station on Nantucket
Island received a report from the Liberian tanker SS ARGO MERCHANT en route
from Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela, to Salem, Mass.,that she was aground in inter-
national waters about 28 miles (45 kilometers) southeast of Nantucket Island
on Fishing Rip. The vessel had a crew of 39 and was carrying approximately
7.7 million gallons of number 6 fuel oil. The report from the vessel stated
that the engine room was flooded and that she was.in danger of breaking up.
Coast Guard units arriving at the grounding site at approximately 0800 EST
reported weather conditions of overcast skies, temperature of 430F (60C),
winds from the southwest at 15 knots, seas of 6 feet (2 meters), and visi-
bility of 10 miles (16 kilometers).* Within I hour of the grounding, the
Regional Response Team was activated by the Commander, First Coast Guard
District.

The Coast Guard appraised the vessel's condition and indicated that the
potential spillage of oil was a grave and imminent threat to the coastline
and related interests of the United States. Because oil spill removal is
limited to thenavigable waters of the United States and to adjoining shore-
lines and waters of the contiguous zone under the National Contingency Plan,
the Commander, First Coast Guard District, Boston, requested authority to
implement the provisions of the Intervention Convention Act. This Act permits
the United States to assume full control of all salvage operations, including
all public and private efforts, towards eliminating the pollution danger if
actions by the owner/agent of the stranded vessel are considered to be inade-
quate, ill-timed, or inappropriate. The Commandant, Coast Guard, authorized
intervention on December 15, 1976.

On the day of the grounding, the On-Scene Coordinator was-advised that
the vessel was leaking oil from an underwater hole in A starboard tank and
he decided to evacuate 20 members of the crew. By late evening the vessel
had lost its emergency power supply due to flooding of the engine room. On
the next day, December 16, the Commander, First Coast Guard District, invoked
the Intervention Convention Act and assumed control of all salvage activities.
Later that day f looding became uncontrollable and conditions on the ARGO
MERCHANT became so critical that all remaining crew members were evacuated.

On December 17, the vessel developed a 5 to 10-degree starboard list and
the main deck astern was awash. A heavy oil slickextended to the northwest
for 5 miles (8 kilometers), then'westward for 3-1/2miles (5.6 kilometers).
Meanwhile, worsening weather conditions impeded'the salvage effort.

On December 18, the vessel continued to settle in the water with a list
of 15 degrees. The.Coast Guard estimated at the tLme that@approximately,
100,000 gallons of oil had been discharged and declared the incident to be a
major spill in accordance with the criteria contained in the National Contin-

gency Plan. Concentrations of oil were observed drifting from the starboard
side. Heavy pools of oil (pancakes) were observed 27 miles (43 kilometers)
east of the ship.

'The situation aboard the ARGO MERCHANT did not change appreciably during
December 19 and 20. Despite heavy seas and icing conditions, preparations
were made to pump out the remaining oil in the ship. During this time the
discharged oil had formed plumes averaging 2 miles (3.2 kilometers).wide and
16 miles (25.6 kilometers) long. Oil slicks were visible extending to the
east-northeast for a distance of 60 miles (97 kilometers).

On the morning of December 21, the ARGO MERCHANT broke in two sections
100 feet aft of the forward navigational bridge. At this time the Coast
Guard estimated that 50 to 75 percent of the cargo had been lost. An over-
flight of the area revealed a heavy slick extending eastward 6 miles (9.6
kilometers) averaging 2.5 miles (4 kilometers) wide. The sheen extended 8
miles (13 kilometers) east from mixed heavy concentrations that covered an
area 60 miles (97 kilometers). east and 257miles (40 kilometers) north.

On December 22 the bow section broke forward of the bridge, releasing
additional oil. During the next several days the discharged oil covered an
area east of the grounding approximately 100 miles (161 kilometers) long and
30 miles (48 kilometers) wide.

On December 31, the Coast Guard fired explosive projectiles into the
fore peak tank to prevent the relatively buoyant bow section from drifting
into the shipping lane. The release of trapped air also was intended to
stabilize the bow section, a serious hazard to the divers who were preparing
to examine the wreck and determine the amount of oil still on board.

The combination of strong currents, high seas, and severe weather condi-
tions prevented diving operations during the entire month of January. On
February 11, as a result of improving weather conditions-' a series of dives
was completed in which it was determined that all tanks of the ARGO MERCHANT
were open to the sea and devoid of oil. Overflights of the wreck site on
February 12 and 14 resulted in no sightings of oil. On February 15, 1977,
the Coast Guard announced that future air surveillance of the wreck site would
be conducted in conjunction with routine fisheries patrols.

B. Area of the Incident

Nantucket Shoals is the general name of the numerous different broken
shoals that lie southeast of Nantucket Island and make this one of the most
dangerous parts of the coast of the United States for navigation (figure 1).
Located at the southeastern edge.of Nantucket Shoals is Fishing Rip where
the grounding took place. Fishing Rip has depths of 3 to 10 fathoms and
is about 26 miles (42 kilometers) along its north-south axis and extends
6.5 miles (10.7 kilometers) from east to west.

Tidal currents in this area are strong and erratic, reaching a velocity
of 3 to 5 knots. They are caused by the obstruction of the shoals; in some
@.ases, they are deflected to such an extent as to cause the direction to

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Figure l.-Portion of bathymetric chart for Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank, depths in fathoms.
(National Ocean Survey, NOAA Chart 13009, Nov. 1925) 0indicates approximate
location of-ARGO MERCHANT grounding.

change 180 degrees from one side of a shoal to the other. Although mean sur-
face currents throughout this area are normally light, averaging 2 to 3
nautical miles per day, drifting northward, the combination of rotary tidal
currents and wind produce heavy seas within the shoals, making both surface
and subsurface operations very hazardous (figure 2).

There are relatively few clear and calm days in the Nantucket Shoals
area during the winter months. A rapid succession of storms invade this
region from the west and south,producing precipitation in the form of snow
and rain accompanied by fairly constant northwesterly and westerly winds with
velocities in exceas of 10 knots occurring nearly 50% of the time. In advance
of these storms there are short periods of easterly to southerly winds
(figure 3).

From December 15 to February 15, weather conditions at the scene of the
ARIGO MERCHANT were-unusually severe. A series of low pressure areas developed@
off the middle Atlantic and southeast coast and intensified as they moved
northward into New England waters. In additionfast moving low pressure areas
approaching from the Great Lakes area produced extremely low temperatures.

As fhese storms progressed northward they reinforced an intense low
pressure system in the vicinity of Labrador. As a result, a strong northerly
to northwesterly flow of frigid Arctic air persisted over New England on the
offshore waters. This produced strong gusty winds ranging from 20 to 40
knots, sub-freezing temperatures, structural icing, precipitation, and rough
seas with waves ranging from 10 to 20 feet high-. These rigorous meteoro-
logical conditions abated in early Februar:@ permitting the series of success-
ful diving operations to be completed on February 11, 1977.

The Nantucket Shoals-Georges-Bank region represents one of the most
productive fishing grounds in the world, supporting one of the Nation's
most active fishing industries. From 1968 to 1972, the catch from the Nan-
tucket Shoals@Georges Bank region represented approximately 57% of the total
catch made in New England waters, averaging approximately 500,000 metric tons
per year.

On Nantucket Shoals, the peak spawning activity of cod is from December
through February; haddock, February through April; yellowtail flounder, March
through May; and mackerel, April through June. These spawning concentrations
are in areas that could be affected by any oil release. In addition to the
presence of eggs during spawning, the larval stages of these species plus
others are present for even longer periods of time.

There is significant fishing activity in this area during the winter
months. Sizeable catches of silver hake, red hake, pollock, herring, and
mackerel are taken,as well as shellfish such as rock crab, lobster, sea
scallop, and conchs.

On Muskeget Island off Nantucket there is a small breeding colony of
10 to 15 gray seals. This is the only breeding colony of this species in
U.S. waters.

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approximations of prevailing ocean
current directions with speed (knots)
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Figure 3.--Satellite photograph Jan. 2, 1977, showing storm systems
moving across eastern United States.

2. NOAA RESPONSE TO THE ARGO MERCHANT INCIDENT

A. National and Regional Contingency Plans

The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
(NCP) is the basis for all Federal action to minimize pollution damage to
the navigable waters of the United'States from discharges of oil or hazardous
substances. The Plan became part of the Code of Federal Regulations in June
1970 pursuant'to the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, and assumed its
present format in August 1973 to comply with the provision of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. The current version of the
Plan was published in February 1975 with minor changes incorporated in March
1976.

The primary purpose of the Plan is to provide a coordinated Federal
response to an unexpected, and usually accidental, discharge of oil or
hazardous substance that poses a threat to the public health or welfare.
This is accomplished by establishing a flexible organization consisting of
individuals designated as Federal On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs) and advisory
groups capable of providing expertise and assistance as required. The latter
groups consist of Regional Response Teams (RRTs) and a National Response Team
(NRT). Normally, Federal On-Scene Coordinators are furnished by the Coast
Guard for coastal waters, the Great Lakes, and ports and harbors, and by the
Environmental Protection Agency on inland waters for the purpose of coordina-
ting and directing the Federal pollution control efforts at the scene of a
discharge or potential discharge. In the case of the ARGO MERCHANT, the
Coast Guard designated the On-Scene Coordinator.

The Coast Guard and Environmental Protection Agency are also responsible
for developing and implementing Regional Contingency Plans for their respec-
tive areas of responsibility. These plans identified 1) key personnel capable
of coping with potential problems within the region, 2) the environmental
resources that would be jeopardized should a discharge occur, and 3) pro-
cedures, equipment@and techniques available to protect and/or reduce damage
to the marine environment in the event of a pollution discharge.

The Regional Response Team (RRT) acts within a region on an emergency
basis to provide assistance to the OSC. They draw their membership from
regional components of Federal agencies. The National Contingency Plan
d-esignates as primary agencies the Departments of Transportation, Defense,
Commerce, and Interior,and.the Environmental Protection Agency. These
agencies are to be represented on allRRTs. However, the survey team found
that at the time of the ARGO MERCHANT grounding there was no designated
Department of Commerce representative on the appropriate Regional Response
Team.

The National Contingency Plan designates as advisory agencies the
Departments of Justice, State, Housing and Urban Development, Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

Additionally, appropriate State agencies are actively encouraged to partici-
pate as full members of the RRTs.

The National Contingency Plan specifies that:

the Department of Commerce, through NOAA, is to
provide support to the NRT, RRT and OSC with re-
spect to: Marine environmental data; living
marine resources; current and predicted meteoro-
logical,hydrologic and oceanographic conditions
for the high seas, coastal and inland waters; and
maps and charts, including tides-and currents for
coastal and territorial waters and the Great Lakes.
When requested by NRT, MARAD will provide advice
on the design', construction and operation of mer-
chant ships.

Both the National Weather Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service
were contacted by the Regional Response Team because of the expertise they
could provide. However, they were contacted directly by the Coast Guard and
not by a designated Department of Commerce representative on the Regional
Response Team.

B. NOAA Implementation Directives

NOAA Circular 72-12 dated January 25, 1972, sets forth guidelines for
implementing the NCP. It states in part that each Major Line Component (MLC)
with a significant involvement will coordinate with the appropriate regional
or district offices of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S.
Coast Guard. In addition, through inter-MLC coordination there will be
established a system for notifying all concerned NOAA personnel through the
appropriate Weather Service Forecast Office (WSFO). This WSFO will function
as'a single point of contact for the U.S. Coast Guard or EPA Regional Response
Team (RRT) to notify other NOAA elements. The selection of a WSFO to serve
in this alerting capacity is based on its 7 days, 24-hours per day operating
schedule.

Operations Manual Letter 72-21 dated December 4, 1972, issued by the
National Weather Service designates Weather Service Forecast Office Boston
as the single point of contact for EPA Region I and U.S. Coast Guard First
District. Regional Operations Manual.Letter E-15-76 dated June 28, 1976,
further delineates procedures for each Weather Service Forecast Office within
the National Weather Service, Eastern Region, for providing support to the
On-Scene Coordinator. In compliance with these directivesthe Weather Service
Forecast Office Boston has included in its Station Duty Manual instructions
relating special weather support to the On-Scene Coordinator.

In implementing its role in the National Contingency Plan, the National
Marine Fisheries Service has prepared Contingency Plans for each of its
Regions. The NMFS Contingency Plan of 1972 for the Northeast Region desig-
nates the Regional Director as the Response Coordinator for NMFS and the
Chief, Environmental Assessment Division of the Northeast Region, as his

alternate. The Plan also established the NortheastR--gional Office as the
primary Regional Response Center to coordinate whatever NMFS action may be
required.

C. NOAA Reaction to the Regional Response Team

On the morning of December 15, 1976, the marine forecaster from WSFO
Boston was informed by the Coast Guard of the grounding of the ARGO MERCHANT.
Immediately the WSFO alerting and supporting functions were implemented.
About 8:30 a.m., the Northeast Regional Office of the National Marine Fisheries
Service was advised of the stranded tanker by the chairman of the RRT. The
WSFO'Boston also discussed the situation with EPA Region I and informed the
National Weather Service Eastern Region headquarters of the latest develop-
ments. Late that afternoon the Commander, First Coast Guard District, Boston,
requested that special weather forecast services for the scene of the grounding
be provided every 6 hours. In addition the Coast Guard Research and Develop-
ment Center at Groton, Conn.,requested detailed 48-hour forecasts of surface
wind conditions in the Nantucket Shoals area as an input for computing oil
spill trajectories. These special forecast services commenced at 1700 EST
December 15, 1976 (figure 4).

The Regional Director, Northeast Region, as the NMFS participant on the
Regional Response Team, was notified by the RRT of the ARGO MERCHANT grounding
at approximately 0830 EST December 15, 1976. As early reports indicated that
the ship had run aground and that there was a reasonable chance for refloating,
the Regional Director waited until more information was available before
notifying the Northeast Fisheries Center at Woods Hole, Mass.,on December 16,
1976. NMFS Headquarters, however, was alerted on December 15. On the morning
of December 17, 1976, scientists from the Northeast Fisheries Center met with
local scientists at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution to discuss an
action plan that the Woods Hole scientificcommunity might pursue. This was
the initial session of meetings from which were developed the cruises for
assessing the resource and environmental damage. After the break-up of the
ARGO MERCHANT, the Regional Director, Northeast Region, NMFS, also initiated
a series of actions which included arrangements with the Boston Aquarium to
treat-any mammals that might have been contaminated.; the inauguration of
weekly reports from port agents on direct loss of catch or fouling or loss of
gear; a survey of seafood processors; and providing the means for cleaning
nets contaminated by the spilled oil.

D. Response by the NOAA/Coast Guard Spilled Oil Research Team

The Spilled Oil Research (SOR) team is an element of NOAA's Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Environmental Assessment Program (OCSEq), a major environ-
mental study being conducted by NOAA for the Department of Interior, Bureau
of Land Management. One of the objectives of OCSEAP is to understand the
processes goiFerning the behavior of oil in the marine environment in order to.
develop models for predicting oil spill trajectories. The need for field'
verification of.experimental models led to the formation of specially trained
teams-capable of responding rapidly to accidental oil spills. Such spills,
if studied within the first 72 hours, provide an unusual opportunity to
evaluate the movement of various types of oil under actual conditions and in

MONDAY DEC-20 1976

SPECIAL FORECAST FOR U.S. COAST GUARD

PASS TO:

CGCDONE BOSTON MA
INFO: OPS GROUP WOODS HOLE MA
OPS AIRSTA CAPE COD MA
CGC VIGILANT
CG OCEANOGRAPHIC UNIT WASHINGTON DC

SPECIAL FORECAST FOR THE FISHING RIP AREA.

GALE WARNINGS IN EFFECT.

SYNOPSIS..INTEMSIFYING GALE CENTER NORTHERN VERMONT WILL MOVE
TOWARD THE EASTNORTHEAST 25 TO 30 KNOTS. TRAILING COLD FRONT WILL
PASS THE TANKER SITE AROUND 09Z TUESDAY.

SOUTHERLY WINDS 20 TO 30 KNOTS AND GUSTY SHIFTING TO WEST AND
NORTHWEST WITH COLD FRONT PASSAGE AND INCREASING TO 30 To 40
KNOTS DURING TUESDAY. NORTHWEST WINDS 30 TO 35 KNOTS AND GUSTY
TUESDAY NIGHT. RAIN REST OF THE NIGHT CHANGING TO SNOW SQUALLS
DURING TUESDAY. TURNING SHARPLY COLDER TUESDAY WITH FALLING TMPS
DURING THE DAY DIPPING TO THE TEENS TUESDAY NIGHT WITH PSBLY SOME
FRZG SPRAY DEVELOPING. VISIBILITY FREQUENTLY BELOW A MILE DURING
MOST PRECIPITATION PERIODS. SEAS MAY BUILD TO 10 TO 20 FEET IN
THE NORTHWEST WINDS TUESDAY.

AVIATION: AHEAD OF THE FRONT..CEILINGS AND VISIBILITY VRBL TO
BELOW 5 HND FT AND A MILE-FOLLOWING THE FRONT CEILING 1 TO 2 THSD
FT AND VSBY AROUND X 5 MILES VARIABLE TO UNDER 1 THSD FTAND 3
MILES IN SNOW SQUALLS. BLUSTERY NW WNDS WITH FREEZING LEVEL LOWERING
TO NEAR SURFACE FURING THE DAY WITH LIGHT TO MDT ICG DVLPG IN
CLOUD AND PRECIPITATION..

ACF .... 202225E

Figure 4.--Example of special weather forecasts given by National
Weather Service for U.S. Coast Guard.

oceanographic and meteorological situations.

The Spilled Oil Research effort is conducted by teams comprised of per-
sonnel from NOAA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Alaska Department of Environ-
mental Conservation. These teams operate out of Juneau and Fairba@ks, Alaska;
Seattle, Wash.; Boulder, Colo.; and Washington, D.C.; and can respond to
spills occurring in Alaskan waters and off the west and east coasts of the
United States.

The SOR team's initial participation in the ARGO MERCHANT incident was
not a part of the NOAA response provided within the framework of the National
Contingency Plan. Instead,it represented the field phase of a research pro-
ject that was designed to make in-situ studies of the behavior of oil in the
marine environment.

The East Coast SOR team composed of scientists from the Center for
Experiment Design and Data Analysis of NOAA's Environmental Data Service first
learned of the ARGO MERCHANT incident from a headquarters representative of
the National Marine Fisheries Service about noon PnD_@cember 15, 1976. As a
--t-e@sult, team members of the East Coast Team arrived that night at Hyannis,
,Mass. On ttke- following day, December .16,. 1976, other members of the
SOR team assembled at Hyannis, which was selected as SOR headquarters because
it was adjacent to a commercial airfield where incoming shipments of supplies
could be readily picl-,.ed up and where small aircraft could be rented. The
first SOR team overfligttt of the grounded vessel was made on December 16 in a
rented aircraft. The SOR-team also contacted the On-Scene Coordinator and
made arrangements to fly as observers on daily mapping flights. These flights
began December 17, 1976. The SOR team, as requested by the Coast Guard, took
more responsibility in coordinating the efforts of the scientific community
until mid-January, when the Marine Ecosystems Analysis Program (MESA) Office
assumed responsibility for the study of long-term effects.

E. Support to the National Response Team

In reply to a request by the.National Response Team on January 13, 1977,
for a recommendation regarding disposition of the wreck of the ARGO MERCHANT,
assessments were made by the National Marine Fisheries %rvice, the SOR team,
and the National Weather Service.. The assessments dealt with the likely con-
sequences of destroying the wreck and releasing any possible remaining oil;
they evaluated such action in terms of both the potential impact on fishery
resources and of the oceanographic and meteorological conditions likely to be
experienced between January and early summer 1977.

By means of these assessments, NOAA recow-mended to- the NRT that: 1) if
possible, the oil remaining in the wreck not;6e,,.released by further destruc-
tion of the wreck; and 2) if, howeverp there,-VaJ-s`a,-hi_9h probability that the
wreck would break up by itself, with consequent release-d-f-4tbe oil, then the
remaining oil should be purposely released as soon as possible'@under the most
favorable oceanographic and mete orological conditions.

This recommendation was forwarded to the NRT on January 21, 1977 ith
an offer to support any action to minimize the potential adverse impact u@an

the environment and ecosystem.

Further disposition of the wreck and its cargo was not required as a
result of an inspection of the remains of the hulk by the Navy Superintendent
of Salvage on.February 11, 1977, at which time no oil was found in the wreck.

3. SUPPORT TO THE ON-SCENE COORDINATOR

The offshore location of the grounding, the magnitude of the spill,and
the proximity of one of the-world's most productive fisheries brought into
play.,several elements of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
in various supporting roles to the On-Scene Coordinator. This support in-
cluded special marine weather services, technical advice on oil movement,
fisheries assessment, logistics and coordination of the scientific effort,
._And public infoimation. This chapter describes the support services that
werIe provided.

A. Marine Forecasts

On December 15, 1976, WSFO Boston, after consultation with Coast
Guard officials, completed arrangements to supply the On-Scene Co-
ordinator with special forecasts of wind, weather, visibility, sea
and swell every 6 hours. Included were aviation forecasts in support
of flight operations.

All forecasts, warnings, and advisories were sent via direct teletype to
the Coast Guard District Office where they were relayed to the headquarters
of the On-Scene Coordinator at the U.S. Coast Guard Air Station, Cape Cod.
Additional addressees on all weather messages were the Coast Guard Cutters at
the scene, the Coast Guard Operations Group at Woods Hole, and the Coast
Guard Oceanographic Unit, Washington, D.C. On December 17, 1976, WSFO Boston
was requested to transmit the special wind forecast directly to the Coast
Guard Oceanographic Unit, Washington, D.C., instead of to the Research and
Developme,nt-Unit at Groton, Conn.

In addition to the forecast services described above, WSFO.Boston
provided weather briefings by telephone to the SOR team, the Coast
Guard, NOAA pilots, and the news media.

As a result of the great interest generated by the ARGO MERCHANT, WSFO
Boston was requested to supply meteorological information to the following:

Brookhaven National Laboratory
Department.of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey
Environmental Protection Agency
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Navy Oceanographic Office
Office of the Attorney General of the State
of Massachusetts
National Marine Fisheries Service

Critical hourly weather observations requested by the WSFO on December
15 were provided by the Nantucket Light Vessels throughout the ARGO MERCHANT
incident. These observations were relayed by teletype to WSFO Bostonvia
Coast Guard circuits. WSFO Boston at first di&hot receive weather obser-

vations that were being made by Coast Guard vessels at the scene of the wreck.
A meeting with the On-Scene Coordinator in which the importance of this infor-
mation was stressed resulted in the regular transmission and receipt of these
meteorological data. On February 11, 1977, the Coast Guard notified WSFO
Boston that the ARGO MERCHANT survey had been completed and that there was no
further requirement for special weather services,

B. Oil Movement and Behavior

Although the SOR team was not provided for within the National Contin-
gency Plan, it contributed substantially to the support of the OSC by pro-
viding him with information on oil spill movement and behavior, as well as a
general expertise on oil dynamics.

.Upon arrival, the SOR team contacted the OSC and was able to arrange for
team members to fly as observers on the Coast Guard daily mapping overflights.,
begun on December 17, 1976. On these flights,time series photographs of the
slick were taken, including infrared pictures; measurements were made to
determine the oil-surface water differential velocity; and oil samples were
collected for hydrocarbon analysis. This information was provided the Oceano-
graphic Unit of the Coast Guard for use in their forecast model. Visual
observations from these flights were transcribed to charts to display daily
movement and dispersion of the spill (figure 5). In most cases, the team
was working through the Coast Guard Oceanographic Unit, rather than the OSC.

The other activities performed by the SOR team, although not specifically
requested by the OSC, provided additional supportive information useful to
the Coast Guard in its effort to determine the distribution of'the oil. On
December 28, 1976, the SOR team requested satellite tracking buoys from the
National Data Buoy Office to aid in the tracking of the spill's movement
(figure 6). Within 48 hours of the request, one buoy, provided by Nova
University, arrived at Hyannis and was [email protected] the 31st in the center of
a large concentration of oil. The second, which was never used, arrived
about a day later, having been assembled in Santa Barbara, Calif. The de-
ployed buoy transmitted reliable data until at least January 13 when its tele-
metered position was found to be close to the sighted oil. In a further
attempt to determine the fate of the oil, the U.S. Navy was asked by the SOR
team to provide a diving team to make underwater observations and photographs
of the underside of the slick and the bottom. Such information supplemented
other data on the distribution and dispersion of the spill.

EDS provided an additional service to the OSC by running a trajectory
model based on historical wind data. This model yielded the statistical
probability of oil coming ashore and provided the OSC with extra information
on potential onshore impact (figure 7).

The survey team also noted that in addition to contributions by in-
house elements, the Sea Granters of the New England area were active in re-
sponding locally to the grounding and subsequent break-up of the ARGO
MERCHANT by providing support to the OSC and Federal agencies. On December
17,Sea Grant researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology con-
tacted the Coast Guard and offered to assist with computer model forecasting

6 T

ell

90 to 95%
Concentrations

41 41

Moderate
Pancakes

Heavy Concentrations of.
Pancakes and Streaks

DEC. 22,1976

Figure 5.--Representative oil spill map, Dec 22, 1976. (Courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard)
FO mixed oil, heavy to pancak;s
moderate oil concentration
oil spill boundary
trackline f lown
mammal sightings

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of spill trajectories and responses using environmental models previously
developed at MIT under Sea Grant support. The researchers were advised that
the Coast Guard computer models would be used. From December 16 to 19, other
MIT scientists visited the ARGO.MERCHANT to study first hand the dispersion,
spreading, and mass transport of the oil slick; to obtain in situ data and
oil/water samples for laboratory analysis; and to evaluate logistic problems
of the incident. As a result of these efforts a description of the oil, the
first available, was provided to all agencies requesting it. Additional
analyses of the oil and the effects of weathering were also arranged with Sea
Grant researchers at the University of Southern California.

C. Fisheries Impact Assessments

In response to a request by the On-Scene Coordinatoi, the Northeast
Fisheries Center-provided on December 28 an assessment of the potential
impact of the spill on the fisheries of the area, It stated thatif the oil
stayed primarily on the surface and dissipated rapidly the effects might not
be great and probably would not be long-lasting. The direct physical effect
of displacing fisheries from contaminated areas was considered to be of a
more immediate concern. However, that effect could not be predicted at the
time. Other than scientists from the Northeast Fisheries Center providing
back-up to the On-Scene Coordinator at meetings and press conferences, no
additional assessments of the impact upon fisheries were sought by or pro-
vided to him. Rather, surveys were undertaken to assess and provide the
basis for long-term assessment.

D. Coordination of the Scientific Community

The SOR team also was requested to aid the Coast Guard by providing an
interface between the On-Scene Coordinator and the scientific community in-
volved in research activities concerning the oil spill. This responsibility
was in addition to the research efforts of the team concerned with the move-
ment and behavior of the oil* Such assistance was requested on December 16
by a representative of the Coast Guard Oceanographic Unit who reported
directly to the On-Scene Coordinator.

In addition to serving as a focus of information for both the disposi-
tion of the oil spill and the related research activities being carried out,
the SOR team participated in and organized coordination meetings. The first
significant coordination efforts with the local scientific community occurred
at a meeting organized by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution on
December 17. This meeting was attended by local NOAA entities - the EDS
liaison representative and scientists from the Northeast Fisheries Center -
as well as by representatives from the SOR team. Sampling programs and ship
and equipment availability were discussed at this meeting and at one held on the
following day. At these meetings, the SOR team began its role of Federal
leadership and coordination of the local scientific community.

A 2-day workshop meeting also was organized by the SOR team to formulate
plans for the collection and analyses of samples from the area affected by
the oil spill. The meeting took place at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Insti-
tution on January 3 and 4 and was attended by 35 to 40 participants. A de-

tailed outline of a plan to evaluate the extent and magnitude of the area
possibly affected by oil in the bottom sediments resulted from this meeting.
It also provided the basis of an estimate for funding requirements to carry
out assessment efforts. The sub-sequent support provided by NOAA for the
activities aboard the University of Rhode Island's ship, the ENDEAVOR, re-
sulted,from this meeting. Subsequent to the organization of the scientific
cruises to acquire the information outlined at this workshop, the coordinating
responsibility of the SOR team was transferred to the MESA program for de@
velopment of a long-term assessment program. This latter effort was not to
support the On-Scene Coordinator, but rather to determine the long-term im-
pact upon the marine ecosystem of this important and productive fishing area.

E. Logistics Support

The forecast of onshore winds on December 25, 1976, raised fears that the
oil would flow toward the shores of Nantucket Island. In an effort to trace
its approach, drift cards were dropped to permit visual inspection of the
shoreward drift of the oil. Because of a shortage of drift cards, the On-
Scene Coordinator requested NOAA's assistance through the SOR team in this
matter. As a result, drift cards were shipped by air express from Boulder,
Colo., to Cape Cod and dropped by Coast Guard aircraft between the last-
known westernmost boundary of the oil slick and Nantucket Island.

A problem arose in early January when Coast Guard aircraft were not
available to conduct aerial surveys of the spilled oil. Because of the
operational need for information on oil movement, the OSC asked NOAA for
assistance. A NOAA C-130 aircraft was dispatched to Cape Cod, and conducted
oil mapping flights on January 12 and 13, 1977.

F. Public-Affairs

On several-occasions the On-Scene Coordinator or his staff requested
the assistance of elements of NOAA in dealing with the high.degree of news
media and public interest in the ARGO MERCHANT oil spill. At his request,
a statement was prepared by the Northeast Fisheries Center on the possible
effect of the oil spill on fisheries. Upon several occasions, members of the
SOR team briefed newsmen on behavior of the oil, when so requested by the
Coast Guard. At a press conference called by the On-Scene Coordinator in
Falmouth on December 28, representatives of both the Northeast Fisheries
Center and the SOR team were present to answer questions about their respec-
tive activities. SOR team members also assisted in a briefing for the
Secretary of Transportation on December 31.

4. RESEARCH AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Soon after the ARGO MERCHANT grounding, the local scientific community
undertook activities to assess the impact of the oil spill upon the ocean
resources and ecosystem. Shortly thereafter, the OSC asked the SOR team to
assist in coordinating these activities and to act as a liaison between the
Coast Guard and the scientific community. Following this initial short-term
response, the Administrator of NOAA,on December 29, directed the Environmental
Research Laboratories (ERL) to lead and coordinate NOAA's effort to assess
both the short-term and long-term impacts of the oil spill. These assessments
were undertaken in accordance with NOAA's statutory responsibilities, partic-
ularly under Title II of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
of 1972 and the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.

The Director of ERL designated the SOR team responsible for the short-
term assessment as a follow-on to its assignment from the Coast Guard. The
report, The ARGO MERCHANT Oil Spill - A Preliminary Scientific Report, March
1977,provides a summary of the preliminary findings from the scientific activ-
ities. The long-term assessment was assigned to the Marine Ecosystem Analysis
Program of ERL. Transition of responsibility was carried out during the joint
coordination of the cruises of the ENDEAVOR following the January 3-4 workshop
at Woods Hole, Mass.

At a meeting held January 5, 1977, in Washington, D.C., representatives
of the Coast Guard, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of the Interior,
Massachusetts Office of Environmental Affairs, and NOAA agreed that NOAA would
prepare a report of the preliminary results of the scientific activities during
the initial phase of the ARGO MERCHANT response. This report would be made
available to the other agencies to assist them in the preparation of reports
required of them. It was also agreed that NOAA-would lead the long-term
impact studies and head an Interagency Coordination Group.

The survey team recognizes that analysis of the full impact of the oil
spill and of the oil movement across the Nantucket Shoals and Georges Bank
will require months, and that longer-term efforts may be required to assess
possible chronic effects. From December 15, 1976,to February 15, 1977, only
initial assessments were undertaken.

A.. Resource Damage Assessments

The National Marine Fisheries Service, through both its Northeast Regional
Office and Northeast Fisheries Center, initiated actions to provide assess-
m&nts of the damage to the fisheries resources of the area--first, through
available information at the Center and knowledge of the spill, and later
through surveys of the area of Nantucket Shoals - Georges Bank and of the
local fishing industry.

Fishery Resources. In order to carry out direct assessments of the
impact upon fisheries, the Northeast Fisheries Center undertook a 1-1/2 day

survey cruise (figure 8) aboard the DELAWARE Il commencing on December 22 to
sample the fish, shellfish, and associated plankton populations both within
the oil slick and outside the affected area. Samples of sediment and surface
and subsurface water also were collected to examine for contamination. A
second survey of longer duration was made aboard the DELAWARE II from January
4 to 10. A total of 43 stations were completed and included temperature and
salinity samples, the release of seabed drifters, trawling, dredging, and
plankton sampling. The Northeast Fisheries Center also arranged for a third
survey to be conducted through the cooperation of scientists aboard the
research vessel WIECZNO of the Polish Institute of Sea Fisheries. Samples
collected aboard the WIECZNO are being analyzed by scientists from both the
Northeast Fisheries Center and Poland, as part of the on-going arrangement@
between the two organizations to study the fisheries of the northwestern
Atlantic Ocean.

In addition to the DELAWARE II cruises, the three cruises of the
ENDEAVOR were designed to continue the assessment of oil impact on the biology
of the affected area. While resources are not available for the analyses of
all the collected samples, an analysis of results from the DELAWARE II and
the ENDEAVOR is presently underway. The Northeast Fisheries Center Labora-
tories at Sandy Hook, N.J.; Narragansett, R.I.; Milford, Conn.; and Woods
Hole, Mass., have undertaken an analysis of the DELAWARE II cruise samples.
Fish and invertebrate species have been sent to the NOAA National Analytical
Facility in Seattle, Wash., for detailed hydrocarbon analyses.

Preliminary findings have been reported by the Northeast Fisheries Center
in a press brief of February 7 and in the report, The ARGO MERCHANT Oil Spill
A Preliminary Scientific Report, March 1977.

Mammals. The Northeast Region made arrangements with the Boston Aquarium
for the disposition and care of stranded animals. The Northeast Fisheries
Center also coordinated a marine mammals observation program aboard the
second cruise of the DELAWARE II (January 4-10). Besides this shipboard effort,
four fisheries surveillance flights involving NMFS observers were diverted
over the area of the spill for the purpose of observing marine mammals.

The SOR team made aerial observations of marine mammals from daily slick
mapping flights and provided support from December 29 to January 13 by a
trained observer who was a consultant1for the Marine Mammal Commission. The
team also asked fishermen and pilots in the area to join a "whale watch,"
requesting that they report any sightings to NOAA at the SOR team phone number.

In addition, workshops were held on December 28 and January 28. One was
sponsored by the Marine Mammal Commission and the other by NOAA. These
meetings were designed to make recommendations on 1) measures that would be
taken to help stricken marine mammals during the ARG6 MERCHANT spill, and
2) long-range research rec'ommendations on the effect of oil spills on marine
mammals. Such meetings served to disseminate information and to improve
coordination among the various groups. Members of the SOR team and/or the
NMFS Regional Office attended these meetings.

70 680 660

DELAWARE 11 CRUISES
C'@@\ 2 420
42* 0 o 76-13, DEC. 22-23,1976
3.
e 77-01, JAN. 4 -10,19,77
---OIL SLICK BORDER
cod, 6
: 007 9 10 12 160 17 .018
4 ;nu a CZZt ...* *..1' 0. 13 a
30 8 0 15
42 14 0 19
41 31 - - 0 - - - - - -
0 40 0-38- 28* 26 25
**' 2,41re o 3 9 T --- *_G__0
fS __27
300 - 20
29 0 113@ 0
[30 Li@.@o 24a
1 36 21
0 0., C) 0'_j 22
33 34 0
230

1100*

400 400

_T_
700 680 660

Figure 8.--Station locations of DELAWARE II cruises, DE 76-13 and DE 77-01. Oil slick borders
for Dec. 22, 1976, and Jan. 3, 1977, indicated by dashed lines.

Fishing Industry. Besides the surveys by the DELAWARE II, the Nortbeast
Region/NMFS initiated steps on December 22 -, 1976, to determine the impact of
the oil spill upon the local fishing and seafood processing industries. NNFS'
port agents interviewed commercial fishermen at seven ports in the course of
acquiring marketing and statistical information. A telephone survey of fish
processors was also conducted. A verbal directive was given by the Regional
Director on December 17 followed by a written memo on December 23 that out-
lined procedures for documenting interviews and for handling contaminated
samples. Weekly reports to the Director, Northeast Region, NMFS, from port
agents in response to the directive indicated that only 5 fishing trips among
the 4,000 fishing trips covered through January encountered direct loss of
catch or fouling.or loss of gear. All five instances occurred in areas south-
east of the oil spill. In addition, the Northeast Region arranged with the
Fairhaven Laboratory of the Massachusetts Department of Food and Drugs for
notification of any samples of fish landed that indicated the presence of oil.
A check at the request,of the survey team substantiated that no contaminated
samples from the ARGO MERCHANT had been received by that laboratory. At the
end of the period covered by this survey, port agents were continuing the
interview program.

B. Environmental Assessments

NOAA elements were inv olved in assessing the impact of the spill upon
the ocean environment primarily through a coordinating function and through
assistance in planning and financing scientific studies. NOAA scientists from
ERL and NMFS participated in cruises of the OCEANUS and ENDEAVOR from the
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WROI) and the University of Rhode Island
(URI), respectively. Sea Grant investigators from URI participated on the
initial cruise of the ENDEAVOR (December 28-30) that was designed to evaluate
.sediment contamination for hydrocarbons, make physical measurements, carry
out hydrocarbon identification, and determine species composition.of benthic
organisms.

The major involvement of NOAA elements was in the organization of the
workshop on January 3-4 and the subsequent support of ENDEAVOR cruises
EN003, EN004, and EN005 from January 26 through February 27. Arrange7
ments were also made for hydrocarbon analyzis of samples collected in the
initial assessment phase. An intertidal survey of beaches and inlets of
Nantucket Island was coordinated by NOAA when a wind shift threatened to
drive the oil onto the beaches of Nantucket Island. The survey was otga-
nized on December 26 by the Marine Ecosystems Analysis Program of ERL and
conducted over the following 2 days along three beach transects in order
to provide crude baseline data prior to any possible spill impact. Details
of the survey are described in the report, The ARGO M1'_,RCHANT Oil Spill - A
Preliminary Scientific Report, March-1977.

At the Woods Hole workshop, NOAA also assumed the critical function of
managing and tracking the scientific data and samples obtained from the
investigations of the many involved academic and Federal groups. Aware that
the data being collected in the ARGO MERCHANT incident might be introduced in
litigation, the Environmental Data Service, upon the request of EPA, instituted
a Chain of Custody procedure on January 7 based on EPA, Region I, guidelines.

Scientists and institutions involved in environment and resource impact assess-
ments were advised of the procedure for preservation of the integrity of
collected samples.

At the conclusion of the period covered by the survey, samples were
still under analysis, the ENDEAVOR cruises had not been concluded, and the
plans for long-term impact assessments were still in a formative stage, depen-
dent upon the results from initial studies and potential funding.

5. INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

Three permanent NOAA installations near where the ARGO MERCHANT ran
aground have regular contacts with the public and news media as part of their
normal operations. They were logical points of contact for the public and
for representatives of the news media, industry, and scientific groups seeking
information about relevant aspects of the oil spi 11. The three are the North-
east Regional Office, NMFS, Gloucester, Mass.; the Northeast Fisheries Center,
NMFS, Woods Hole, Mass.; and the Weather Service Forecast Office, NWS, Boston,
Mass.

Establishment of the Spilled Oil Research team at Hyannis, Mass., pro-
vided the potential for a fourth information point.. However, the SOR team
operations plan (Memorandum of July 30, 1976, from James Mattson to team
members) stipulated:

"Team members are cautioned against commenting to the news media while
responding to spills, and reminded that the Coast Guard has the responsibility
for such spills. NbAA team members should receive clearance for any news item
through the local USCG district affected. NOAA/ERL will have control over
any press release made by the NOAA team members."

As a result, the team did not initially provide information directly to
the public or the news media. In response to requests from the Coast Guard,
however, the SOR team from December 26 to 28 first began briefing newsmen on
the behavior of the oil from day to day, as observed from their overflights
and oil dynamics experiments. At this point, the SOR team became the fourth
NOAA point of contact for media inquiries on the spill.

Staff members of the Northeast Fisheries Center began receiving inquiries
from the press about possible effects of the ARGO MERCHANT grounding on the
first or second day after the event occurred. When the ship broke in two on
December 21 the volume of inquiries increased markedly. Media inquiries be-
gan at the Northeast Regional Office about 3 days after the grounding. The
Regional Director and Center Director conferred by telephone and agreed that
the Regional Office should reply toqueries wherever possible, with the Center
providing necessary information. The Deputy Regional Director was designated
to undertake this responsibility, and a scientist at the Center was designated
as liaison.

The two types. of queries most frequently received were: Where is the
spill headed? (these were referred to the Coast Guard), and What are the
effects on fish? The latter were responded to with general information on
the nature of the resource, and often with a statement to the effect that
the extent of the damage could not be surmised until more was known about the
behavior and movement of the oil. The Regional Office sometimes referred de-
tailed questions on the resources to the liaison scientist at the Northeast
Fisheries Center for a more complete reply.

On December 21, at a meeting of the Regional Response Team, the On-
Scene Coordinator asked that the NMFS Regional Office provide a statement on
the possible impact of the spill on fisheries, for use either as a news
release or as a back-up fact sheet for replying to queries. At the request
of the Regional Director, the Northeast Fisheries Center prepared the state-
ment and transmitted it to the On-Scene Coordinator, where it was used as
background but was not issued as a news release.

A. News Releases and Press Conferences

Press Conference, Boston. A press conference was held in Boston's
Logan Airport on December 22, incident to Congressional committee hearings
held that day-in Boston on the Federal response to the ARGO MERCHANT spill.
Present at the conference were a U.S. Senator, the Administrator of-the
Environmental Protection Agency, an Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and
the NOAA Administrator. The NOAA contribution to the news conference was
restricted to noting the facts as then known. It avoided speculation or
judgments about the ultimate fate of the oil or seriousness of the event.

Dropping of Drift Cards. On the night of December 25-26, drift cards
were flown by the SOR team from Boulder, Colo., to the Coast Guard station,
and subsequently deployed by the Coast Guard in front of the ARGO MERCHANT
oil slick. The cards were used to give advance warning of oil wash-up on
the beaches of Nantucket, a possibility because of predicted onshore winds.
Public notification of this effort was required in order that any wash-up
of drift cards be promptly reported to the Coast Guard, enabling clean-up
crews to be in place.

Accordingly, at the request of the Coast Guardthe SOR team worked with
Coast Guard public information pers.onnel at Otis to draft a news release.
On December 26, after the cards were deployed, the Coast Guard information
personnel telephoned the media in the Cape Cod and Boston areas, reading the
release to them and giving the telephone number of the SOR.team in Hyannis
as a source of further information.

Falmouth Press Conference. In view of the public and media interest
generated by the dropping of the drift cards, a member of the SOR team indi-
cated to a Coast Guard information officer a willingness to have SOR team
participation in a news conference to describe the research that they were
undertaking. The On-Scene Coordinator decided to hold a news conference on
all aspects of the spill, including the activities of the SOR team and pos-
sible impacts on fisheries as seen by the Northeast Fisheries Center, and
the conference was held December 28 in Falmouth.

Upon learning of plans for the conference, NOAA's Director of Public
Affairs, then on leave in Boston, went to Hyannis to assist in preparations.
A fact sheet entitled "Highlights of NOAA Participation--Atlantic Oil Spill"
was prepared, summarizing the activities of the SOR team, NMFS research from
the DELAWARE II, involvement of the Environmental Research Laboratories, and
special forecasts of the National Weather Service (Appendix II). Brief fact
sheets on two activities involving public participation, the drift card re-
leases and a NOAA whale watch, were also prepared.

The three fact sheets were made available to the press at the Falmouth
press conference, and.at the request of the On-Scene Coordinator represen-
tatives of the SOR team and the Northeast Fisheries Center were present to
answer questions.

Data Buoy Deployment. In an ef f ort to f ollow the drif t of the oil
slick on days when weather prevented aircraft overflights, the SOR team ob-
tained a small data buoy with capability to be tracked by Nimbus satellite,
and on December 31 deployed the buoy in the oil from a Coast Guard helicopter.
A team member informed the NOAA Office of Public Affairs of the plan on
December 29, and a news release was written and issued from Washington on
December 30 (Appendix III).

Hyannis News Briefing. Owing to the continuing media interest in the
spill , the SORteam requested that NOAA's Office of Public Affairs provide
an on-scene information officer to coordinate the replies and ease the bur-
den on their time. A public affairs representative worked in Hyannis
January 3-6. As the oil moved further away from shore and the threat to
beaches and fishery resources lessened,.media interest declined. The public
affairs representative and the team therefore agreed to close out the infor-
mation activities on the project with a news briefing at which a summary of
the activities thus far carried out could be presented. The briefing was
called for January 6 by a representative of the Northeast Fisheries Cen-
ter. Few newsmen attended.

B. Congressional Hearings and Public Meetings

.Public Meetings of Regional Fishery Management Councils. At public
meetings of both the New England Regional Fishery Management Council and
the Middle Atlantic Regional Fishery Management Council during December and
January, the Director of the Northeast Regional Office, NMFS,--a member of
both Councils by statute--briefed the meetings on the movement of the oil
and the possible effects on fishery resources, as then known.

Congressional Hearing, Boston. The Administrative Practices and Pro-
cedures Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held a public hearing
in Boston on December 22 to inquire into the spill. Among those giving
testimony or answering questions were representatives of the State of
Massachusetts, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Coast Guard, and the
NOAA Administrator.

Marine Mammal Meeting, Boston. The Marine Mammal Commission sponsored
a meeting in Boston on December.28 designed to evaluate both immediate needs
with respect to marine mammals and the ARGO MERCHANT spill, and any long-
term efforts that should be made. Participants were leading New England
scientists with interest in marine mammals. NOAA was represented by a staff
member of the Northeast Regional Office, NMFS, and by a member of the SOR
team who briefed the meeting on the progress of the spill.

Public Meeting, Providence, R.I. The Coastal Resources Council of the
State of Rhode Island held a public meeting at the State House January 5,
1977, to consider the impact of the ARGO MERCHANT oil spill and to plan for

future spills that might endanger the shore. Among those briefing the public
on the ARGO MERCHANT spill was a scientist from the Narragansett Laboratory
of the Northeast Fisheries Center.

Public Hearing, Falmouth, Mass. The Coast Guard held a public hearing
in Falmouth, Mass., on January 19, 1977, on the options of disposing any oil
that might remain in the hulk of the ARGO MERCHANT. NOAA's National Response
Team representative was present. Among the briefings presented to the public
at the hearing was one on research activities, presented by the head of the
MESA long-term assessment group then on the scene.

C. Transition and Termination

14ESA was assigned long-term assessment responsibilities. The head
of the 14ESA assessment group gradually became more involved in the
associated public information activities, and appeared at the January 19
hearing in Falmouth. This was the final public informational event in
the period covered by the survey team.

Subsequently, an analysis was made by the survey team of the news
coverage of NOAA's involvement in the ARGO MERCHANT disaster, as reflected
in newspaper and magazine clippings for the period. The purpose of the
analysis was to determine the adequacy of NOAA's response to the needs of
the media (Appendix I).

6. LOGISTICS AND ADMI NISTRATION

The response to the ARGO MERCHANT was of an unanticipated scale and
consequently required a major administrative effort. Most of the local
installations in thearea carried out their operation within their normal
administrative channels. Nevertheless, problems of support and funding were
experienced by the National Marine Fisheries Service. The greatest impact
noted, however, was upon the SOR team that responded to the area and was
requested to assume tasks beyond its original purpose.

A. Logistic Support

The NOAA response required the deployment of vessels and aircraft and
the use of uniquely available equipment.

Ships. As early as December 17 it was determined by scientists from
the Woods Hole Community that a vessel was needed for assessment purposes.
Initial inquiries within NMFS and ERL indicated that the DELAWARE II, on a
survey at that time, was unavailable due to required yard modifications to
be followed by a high priority project to investigate a serious anoxia con-
dition off the New Jersey-coast. However, on December 20 the vessel was
diverted at the direction of the Office of Fleet Operations after clearance
from the Office of the Associate Administrator for Marine Resources. The
vessel subsequently conducted DELAWARE cruise DE 76-13 from December 22 to 24
for the purpose of carrying out the initial assessment of impact upon
fisheries. It then continued to Sandy Hook, its homeport, and later returned
to Woods Hole for the DELAWARE cruise DE 77-01 from January 4 to 10. The
DELAWARE II was the only NOAA vessel that finally participated in the initial
assessments. Most of the fisheries and biological sampling was carried out
aboard it.

At the request of the Office of the Associate Administrator for Marine
Resources, for possible other ship support, the Office of Fleet Operations
also placed the crews of the Mt. MITCHELL, KELEZ, and RESEARCHER on stand-by
during the Christmas-New Years holiday until requirements were defined by the
SOR team and the period of operations determined for carrying out assessments
of the initial impacts. The workshop held at the Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution on January 3-4 established these requirements, and the Office of
Fleet Operations representative at the meeting indicated that none of the
NOAA vessels could meet the total requirements as developed. Consequently,
it was decided that the ENDEAVOR would better serve as the vessel for the
subsequent assessment cruises. The cruises of this vessel from January 26
to February 27 were supported by NOAA funding.

Aircraft. Most of the aircraft support for NOAA personnel was pro-
vided by the Coast Guard with H-3 helicopters and HU-16E fixed winged air-
craft. In addition, arrangements were made by the SOR team for NASA to carry
out overflights. No NOAA aircraft were operated in support of the SOR team
because of lack of resources. However, at the request of the Coast Guard,

the NOAA C-130 was deployed on a reimbursable basis for flights on January 12
and 13. None of the NOAA aircraft capabilities, including those of the C-130,
were reflected in the Regional Response Plan. The C-130 was only made avail-
able as a result of the MESA coordinator becoming aware of the Coast Guard
need. The aircraft was released for the purpose by the Director of ERL.

Equipment. In addition to employing their own equipment for research
and assessments, NOAA units also provided equipment to the Coast Guard..
Drift cards, which were deployed between the spill and the beaches of Nantuc-
ket on December 26, had to be supplied by aircraft from Boulder, Colo. The
National Data Buoy Office obtained an instrumented buoy from Nova University,
which was implanted on December 31 into a large pancake of oil. The National
Data Buoy Office also obtained a second buoy from the manufacturer in Los
Angeles. The first buoy was available within 2 days and the second in 4 days.
However, the equipment was not initially available when the NOAA elements
first responded. The SOR team also supplied to the Coast Guard sterile bag
samplers for collecting water samples for analysis of oil contamination.

B. Administrative Matters

The scale of the response operations could not be accommodated by the
Northeast Fisheries Center, the only NOAA facility in the immediate area of
the On-Scene Coordinator. The SOR team established its center of operations
in Hyannis, Mass., close to the nearest commercial airport. The activities
of the SOR team, both to carry out its own research and to coordinate the
efforts of the scientific community from this location, required the local
procurement of services and support. These procurements covered a wide range
from graphics repraduiction to scientific cruises and analysis of samples.

The arrangements for the services and support were made locally by the
SOR team and later the MESA coordinator. The processing and most authoriza-
tions for procurements were done by the procurement office in Boulder, Colo.,
the base for the SOR team and the MESA program. By and large, this arrange-
ment worked satisfactorily. However, with the variety of needs to be met
through procurement, several situations arose with regard to administrative
procedures and means for handling them. For example, the problem arose as to
the means for providing food to volunteers who offered to help the beach
investigations under most adverse weather conditions. Similarly, there was
uncertainty as to the types of items that were permissable under a contract
for housing and operations center logistics. There was no on-site administra-
tive or procurement officer, nor were there guidelines developed beforehand
to address such situations.

C. Funding

Costs associated with the initial responses of NOAA units were borne
within the existing resources of those units. The deployment of the
DELAWARE II in support of fishery assessments for NMFS was accomplished by
the rescheduling of operations, but the Analyses of the samples collected
aboard the DELAWARE II required additional funding resources. In the case of
the SOR team, initial support of its activities was provided from a reim-
bursable contract with the Bureau of Land Management. This contract was part

of the BLM sponsored OCS Environmental Assessment Program (OCSEAP) which in-
cluded a study of oil spills. The Coast Guard, which was part of the SOR team
with NOAA, also provided logistic support for their efforts, but only if those
efforts were in support of, or in conjunction with, Coast Guard operations.
No funding was made available to NOAA elements from the Coast Guard contingency
fund, except for reimbursement for the use of the C-130 aircraft. That fund
is for the purpose of clean-up, containment, and dispersal and not for research
or assessment purposes.

The lack of a prescribed institutional arrangement for funding in the
early stages of planning.was a matter of concern to the responding scientific
community, both Federal and academic. As the local institutions began to
develop plans to assess potential impacts, the question of funding became a
matter of concern. At the workshop organized by the SOR team on January 3-4
in Woods Hole, this question arose, and one of the results of that workshop
was a funding estimate to carry out the remainder of an initial assessment and
a longer-term effort of 1 year to 15 months. On the basis of these require-
ments it was decided by the Associate Administrator to provide funding for the
initial assessing, including the analyses of the first collected samples, by
reserve funds within the Department of Commerce and funding from the Depart-
ment of Interior. Funding for the longer-term assessment was to be sought by
NOAA through a supplemental budget request for FY 1977.

As early as December 20, the Assistant Secretary of Interior for Program
Development and Budget offered assistance to NOAA, including funding support.
Following the January 3-4 workshop it was agreed among NOAA, Interior, and EPA
that NOAA and Interior would jointly fund assessment activities and EPA would
provide for preparation of the required environmental assessment report. On
January 18 funds were released to NOAA from Secretary of Commerce's reserve
and on February 8, the Associate Administrator for Marine Resources executed
an Inter-Agency Agreement with BIM to cover the study of possible impacts from
the ARGO MERCHANT oil spill. With these funds the initial assessment was
supported. The request for an FY 1,977 Supplemental was sought and disallowed
by the Office of Management and Budget in early February 1977.

In addition to specific funding requirements, the deployment of person-
nel to the area involved travel and per them costs for periods of up to 4
weeks. Most of these costs were accommodated through travel funds of the re-
sponding elements. For At least one element, however, these expenses seriously
affected their travel ceiling authorizations. No separate travel fund or
authorization was established to accommodate costs incurred from the total NOAA
response to the ARGO MERCHANT incident.

7. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In responding to the ARGO MERCHANT incident, all elements of NOAA per-
formed in an outstanding manner. They provided expertise, knowledge, and
capabilities to the On-Scene Coordinator, and they also provided Federal
leadership to the many local groups, bringing them together in a way that made
possible a relatively coordinated assessment of damage to the ocean environ-
ment and marine resources of the area. Rather than detract from the contri-
butions and outstanding efforts of those involved in the NOAA response to the
ARGO MERCHAN@ incident, it is the intent of the survey team that its findings
and recommendations outline means whereby NOAA can be more responsive to major
oil spills in-the future.

The following sections outline the findings that resulted from the sur-
vey, and make recommendations that the team believes are required to improve
NOAA's effectiveness in responding to future major oil spills.

A. National Contingency Planning

The NOAAelements, as provided for in the National Contingency Plan
(NCP), responded to the ARGO MERCHANT incident by providing much information
to the NRT, the RRT and OSC in response to their requests. In addition, the
ARGO MERCHANT incident demonstrated that NOAA's capabilities are much broader
than those described in the NCP. For example, the applicability of NOAA ships,
buoys, and aircraft was ably demonstrated by the activities of NOAA elements.
Moreover, the present plan does not take into account that the Department of
Commerce, under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, is re-
sponsible for the management of resources lying within the fishery conservation
zone (3-200 nautical miles). The Department of Commerce therefore must take
steps to reduce adverse effects of oil spills such as that of the ARGO MERCHANT
to carry out its management responsibilities. As a consequence, the NOAA role
has not been adequately defined in the NCP and the team believes that this
contributed to the lack of a Federal focus in dealing with the local scien-
tific community in the early stages of the incident

The Department of Commerce should seek m6dificati6n'6f the NCP@to
reflect an appropriate role for NOAA it -the Federal..response.to@major oil
spills. The survey team considers it to .be in'the national interest that
NOAA capabilities for carrying out marine@environmental anUresource assess-
ments and for providing scientific and technical information'and'expertise
-be specifically incorporated into the national'plan and also reflected in
Regional Response Plans.

The working relations between NOAA and the Coast Guard and between
NOAA and EPA during the ARGO MERCHANT incident established patterns of co-
operation and relationships between agencies that should be more formally
developed. The survey teams believe that.'in.addition_.@to m6difying*the NCP,
NOAA should seek to deVelOp@inter,4genty..agroelfterits with@the Coast Guard and
EPA to delineate more explicitly ag6nc2*re8ponsibilities and use*6f agency

capabilities,

B. Regional Response

The basic means of notification for NOAA response And assistance to a
Regional Response Team and to the On-Scene Coordinator in the event of an oil
spill is through the Commerce representative'of the RRT. At the time of the
ARGO MERCHANT incident, there was no such designated Commerce representative
on the RRT in the First Coast Guard District. The local NOAA elements, NWS
and NMFS, were instead advised of the incident by-the@Coast-Guard, which re-
quested scientific and technical assistance.@ While the Directot@, Northeast
Regi6n,NMFS,has subsequently been@designated:.the@Commerce representAtive.on
the RRT, in the first Coast Guard District, tbe@Commerce repre entati6n on
all RRT's should be reviewed and a clear channel of communication And respon-
sibilities be established.

The established channel of communication.between the OSC and other
Federal agencies is through the RRT. Responsiblei senior regional NOAA
officials did provide data and expertise.to the OSC and RRT upon request.
However, it was primarily because of the direct contact between the OSC and
the SOR team that the wide range and availability of NOAA expertise and re-
sources were made known to the OSC. The survey team recognizes that some
confusion existed owing to the lack.of a single designated:NOAA focus; how-
ever, it is important that in the..futuro.NOAA-designated officials.exercise
strong initiative to coordinate witb@the OSC@and@RRT,@to make [email protected]
know the full extent of NOAA resources_.@that might,be brought .to bear, and
give them maximum assistance in sup2ort of clean-up and containment activities.

In many instances, oil spills are likely to occur in territorial waters,
which are within the jurisdiction of the states; in the cases of spills beyond
territorial waters there is often a high probability of impacts on coastal
state areas. It is, therefore, essential that effective communications be
established with responsible state agencies. In the case of ARGO MERCHANT,
the oil did not go ashore but at one point it appeared to threaten the beaches
of Nantucket Island. Contact was made with representatives of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts at working levels, but in the initial period there
was lack of a positive liaison with,.the state, particularly..at the relevant
policy levels. It is essential that NOAA@el6ments@establish contact with
their state counterparts and that:any designated NOAA.spokesman also establish
liaison with policy level spokesmen respongible;for state_related@activities.
These state spokesmen, or their.@designeds,@should to@the extent@_p6ssible be
considered active participants@in@NOAA response Activities, In the@case of
responses to spills in territorial waters., NOAA should work with the state
designees as well as the OSC.

C. NOAA Response Reaction

The lack-of a designated representative on the RRT and a NOAA-designated
focus for liaison with the'OSC resulted in delay in advising the Office of the
Administrator of the incident; this led to multiple inquiries by senior
management during the course of the NOAA response. There is at present no
formal procedure for advising the Administrator of a major oil spill or of the

total NOAA response to an incident. In future events, the Commerce revresen-
tatives on the resRonding RRT's should notify individuals within the Office
of the Administrator and should be responsible for recommending the types and
extent of NOAA participation required.

The coordination of a NOAA response was further impeded by the lack of a
designated NOAA-level spokesman at the scene of the incident. Within the
NMFS and NWS, spokesmen carried out their responsibilities for their respec-
tive activities in support of the OSC. In addition, the Coast Guard asked
the SOR team to coordinate all scientific activities, NOAA and non-NOAA
elements. However, the role of the SOR team with respect to other NOAA ele-
ments had not been,internally clarified. Given the*diverse range of capa-
bilities and organizational elements that did respond to the ARGO MERCHANT
incident, and that are likely to respond to future incidents, it is essential
that a single spokesman be designated-to coordinate, and direct if need be,
all NOAA elements participating in such-responses.

Each NOAA element tended to respond as an independent entity, particu-
larly in the initial period of the grounding and break-up of the ARGO MERCHANT,
Within NMFS, the Northeast Region and Northeast Fisheries Center did immedi-
ately develop a combined response, but coordination between Primary Operating
Elements was limited and only developed as involvement with non-NOAA groups
increased. The total NOAA response demonstrated that the agency can' provide
a wide range of services and capabilities, but a plan of action to issure a
more coordinated and integrated response should be developed for each regio
Such plans also should be periodically reviewed and updated and, when feasible,
practice exercises should be run.

The capabilities of NOAA to respond to oil spills are substantial, as
evidenced by the breadth of NOAA involvement in the Federal response to ARGO
MERCHANT. Many of these capabilities are unique. The Regional Response Plan
in effect at the time of the ARGO MERCHANT grounding did not have an up-to-
date inventory of these NOAA capabilities to assist the OSC. In order for
NOAA to be more effective in responding to future incidents, its cipabilities
should be inventoried both nationally and regionally, and should be reflected
in updated regional plans. Inventories should include not only in-house
capabilities but also those of contractors And grantees who can be called u0on.

The survey team also noted the immediate responsiveness of local Sea
Grant programs and the potential they possess for augmenting the NOAA in-house
efforts. Any NOAA regional plans should'recognize this capability And include
the regional Sea Grant activities as int6pril elements.

D. Scientific Coordination

In the evolution of the Federally sponsored response to the ARGO MERCHANT
incident, NOAA emerged as the.Federal spokesman for the coordination and con-
duct of the environmental and resource investigations that were carried out.
Initially, however, NOAA was unprepared to undertake a task of such magnitude.
The capability did exist to determine the impact upon fishery resources. The
DELAWARE II was diverted and rescheduled to acquire data for initial impact
investigations. The funding required for the analysis of the resulting

samples was not initially available so that this aspect of the NOAA response
was limited.

While no conceptual plan existed for carrying out necessary environmental
and resource investigations for impact assessments in response to major oil
spills, a preliminary plan developed by the SOR team for a planned controlled
oil spill did serve as a basis for coordinated study of spilled oil behavior.
The survey team considers the design of a conceptual plan an essential element
in future NOAA responses, recognizing that each incident will require uniquely
designed invest@gations to acquire data for assessment purposes.

The ability of the SOR team, once having been requested by the Coast
Guard to assist in coordinating the scientific efforts, was hampered inter-
nally within NOAA by lack of a clear delegation of authority to coordinate
the efforts of other NOAA elements and externally by the initial lack of
identified funding resources and confusion regarding Federal agency leader-
ship of assessment activities. The ERL role in the assessments was
communicated slowly throughout NOAA, although agreement was reached by
Primary Operating Element directors. The authority and responsibilities
of anydesignated lead element within NOAA in response to a future major
oil spill should be clearly_defined and understood by all levels Darti-
cipatingin the response.

E. Funding
The ARGO MERCHANT also demonstrated that the scientific community in the
area in which an incident occurs can provide essential expertise and capa-
bilities and should be used.. Many scientists in the area were exper-
ienced in the study of oil spills or in hydrocarbon research. Participation
in the ARGO MERCHANT incident, however, resulted in their being diverted from
their ongoing research, much of which is sponsored by general grants and con-
tracts. While funding was obtained from the Department of Commerce and the
Department of Interior for initial assessment purposes, the delays in deter-
mining the sources and amount of resources available affected the timing of
the investigations and the involvement of the scientific community. A source
of funding should be available to NOAA and non-NOAA elements for research on
future oil spills, and mechanisms should be established to make possible
prompt release of such funds so that the scientific community can be mobilized
and essential samples acquired.

Long-term sampling investigations require a commitment of investigators,
who in turn require funding. Not only must a source of funding be readily
identified to support such investigations, but arrangements must be made with
agencies sponsoring the ongoing research efforts of the investigators to
accommodate any delays they incur from participating in short- or long-term
assessments.

F. Administrative Matters

In addition to the need for funding resources, the experience from the
ARGO MERCHANT incident has shown that immediate need for services to support
operations and scientific investigations requires the development of pro-
curement procedures to support remote units at on-site locations in a timely

manner. The procurement procedures used by and large worked well, but better
communication between on-site and procurement personnel is required.

The amount of travel and per them incurred in a response to a major oil
spill can be significant. The costs incurred for the ARGO MERCHANT incident
seriously affected the travel ceilings of some programs. A separate travel
budget and ceiling is needed.for future responses so as not to inhibit the
response or seriously affect-ongoing NOAA programs.

The magnitude of the NOAA response also required considerable logistic
support. Aircraft and vessel support was for the most part provided by the
Coast Guard. Shore-based facilities and ground transportation were arranged
locally through lease or rental. The survey team does not believe that the
local NOAA facilities could have provided the necessary support for all re-
sponding NOAA elements that needed to be in close proximity to the OSC.

G. Data Management - Chain of Custody

The samples acquired by Federal and academic groups have the potential
of being used in any litigation arising from the oil spill. Therefore, they
must be handled in such a manner as to secure and document the chain of cus-
tody over them from the time of their collection. The survey team recommends
that the Environmental Data Service establish standard instructions for main-
taining the chain of custody during the processing, analysis, and storage of
samples collected during response to oil spills. Such instructions should be
developed in consultation with EPA. All NOAA elements responding to an oil
spill should be familiar with the instructions and assist non-Federal groups
to camply with them.

H. Information Dissemination

The ARGO MERCHANT incident was a news event of national significance.
The NOAA installations in the area and the SOR team were often queried by
the media as to the status of the oil spill and the consequences of its im-
pact. NOAA spokesmen carried out their efforts to inform the public in-a
responsible manner. When requested, they provided support for the Coast
Guard at press conferences. The survey team's analysis of press clippings
turned up no inconsistencies in the information provided to the media by the
four NOAA spokesmen. However, the survey team recommends that when responding
to future major oil spills, a single NOAA public affairs point of contact be
@designated. He should serve as a liaison between NOAA scientists and the
media so that media representatives have the opportunity to talk to the appro-
priate experts, and he should coordinate all public affair matters for the
NOAA responding elements.

APPENDIX I

Analysis of Clippings

The behavior and fate of the oil, and its potential impact on beaches
and on the living resources of the area, were of great interest not just to
scientists but to the general public and to state and local officials with
management responsibility in these areas. NOAA personnel were deeply involved
in relevant research, and it was therefore natural for news media represen-
tatives to question them upon numerous occasions; their replies as printed or
broadcast were important to public understanding of the event.

Because there was not a central NOAA information point through which data
and requests for information could be channeled, and because of the high
degree of public and media interest, the survey team decided as a part of its
responsibility to examine the adequacy of NOAA response to the media. One
tool for making this examination has been a detailed analysis of periodical
clippings covering the event. Obviously the televised interviews and radio
reports are not susceptible to such an analysis, but it can probably be
assumed that patterns emerging in the written media are not too different
from those in the electronic media.

National Weather Service forecasts, being a routine and regular service,
are not included in this analysis.

A total of 60 clippings from Boston and Cape Cod newspapers, wire service
reports, national weekly periodicals, and newspapers outside the Boston-Cape
Cod area were analyzed for the period Dec. 21 - Jan. 16. NOAA individuals
or organizations were quoted on 24 occasions in the clips; this excludes
duplications such as a wire service story that was published in several news-
papers.

Exclusive of the NOAA Administrator and National Weather Service
employees, the clippings quote or refer to by name:

One staff member of the Northeast Regional Office, NMFS; three members of
the SOR team; seven members.of the Northeast Fisheries Center, NMFS.

NOAA spokesmen were sometimes inaccurately identified in news stories,
but in no case was there a significant error or was-an individual labeled as
speaking for other than his own group within NOAA.

Prior to Dec.. 23, there were quotations from three NOAA spokesmen, one
,from the Northeast Regional Office, NMFS, and two from the Northeast Fisheries
Center, NMFS. ,In addition, there was one reference to. "Scientists at the
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and the National Marine Fisheries Service."
The.NMFS spokesmen discussed possible long-term effects of the oil on the
resource, possible short-term:effects on the fishing industry, and a plan to
monitor f ish landings.

On Dec. 23, the clips reflected statements by the NOAA Administrator
at the Boston press conference.

A North Carolina newspaper on Dec. 27 discussed the effects of oil on
fish and attributed the information to "scientists at the Woods Hole Ocean-
ographic Institute and the National Marine Fisheries Service." This was
apparently a rewrite of news dispatches.

On Dec. 27 and Dec. 29, a member of the SOR team was quoted about the
drift cards and on the weather's effect on slick movement, and again on Dec. 29
on possible bottom contamination.

In one of the Dec. 29 stories, a staff member of the Northeast Fisheries
Center reported on the apparent lack of contamination of fish or ocean bottom
by the spill.

Several articles on Dec. 31 reported the data buoy effort and SOR team
member responses to inquiries about it.

A Jan. 4 wire service story carried comments by an SOR team member
about the possible ultimate track of the oil if it became caught in the Gulf
Stream.

A Jan. 6 article drew extensively upon a National Marine Fisheries Service
scientist's comments about the effect of the spill on marine life and the
possible direction of the spill.

A weekly periodical dated Jan. 10 quoted a National Marine Fisheries
Service staff member on possible effects of the oil on lobsters, and an SOR
team member on the drift cards.

A Jan. 12 wire service report quoted two scientists from the Northeast
Fisheries Center on the possible effect of the event on living resources.

Other attributions to NOAA in late January and February show no deviation
from the pattern already established.

It should be noted that on several occasions there were strong statements
in the press, sometimes from Federal officials, that might have caused undue
concern or that apparently were not supportable by the evidence at hand. In
no case did these statements emanate from NOAA organizations or individuals.

In conclusion, the analysis showed that responses given by NOAA spokesmen
to media inquiries were an the whole both informative and carefully considered.
NOAA spokesmen did not go beyond the facts known at the particular time of the
inquiry. While they showed a commendable willingness to discuss alternative
possibilities when this was desirable to put known facts into context, they
also showed a commendable restraint in the face of possible spill. There was
remarkable agreement among the statements made by NOAA spokesmen from different
organizations, often interviewed separately by newsmen seeking the broadest
possible base of information. This is an indication of the care and skill
with which NOAA spokesmen madetheir comments, rather than of prearranged

coordination among,the different NOAA units. Finally, the number of indi-
viduals quoted on behalf of NOAA should occasion no surprise, owing to the
long period of time covered and the number and variety of organizations and
kinds of expertise involved.

APPENDIX II

Fact Sheet Released to the Press, December 28, 1976
at Falmouth, Mass.

Major components of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
from its Environmental Research Laboratories and Environmental Data Service,
to its National Weather Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, are at
work on the scene of the Nantucket oil spill.

With support from the Bureau of Land Management, NOAA's Spilled Oil
Research team has been in being for many months. Its primary goal is to
improve predictive modeling techniques to a point of high utility and
accuracy, not only in this spill but in such others as occur during the
Nation's drive for increased oil production. Four quick-response teams
have been formed--in Washington, Seattle, Juneau, and Fairbanks, comprising
personnel from NOAA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and state authorities of Alaska.
Coordination is through the NOAA Environmental Research Laboratories in
Boulder, Colo.

For more than a year, NOAA scientists have been collecting spill infor-
mation with a view to refining existing models and isolating key parameters
most in need of study. Major areas of interest include determining more
accurately the speed with which oil moves over surface water and how quickly
it breaks up and enters the water column.

The first members of the NOAA team arrived at Cape Cod on the day of the
spill. The force has since grown to an average of 15. Now, with the program
still far from finished, preliminary information has been found which is ex-
pected to prove useful throughout this incident and others which may follow.

Our first finding--one which has important and encouraging implications
for the fishing industry--came when a Navy team, diving beneath the path of
the oil at NOAA's request on Thursday, December 23, found the oil under a 30
foot diameter oil "pancake" to be as smooth on the bottom as on the top,
giving no indication of oil sinking towards the bottom. Since then, measure-
ments made by Dr. Jerry Milgram of MIT have confirmed the team's belief that
the oil is not sinking in large concentrations. The fact that divers on the
bottom beneath the path of the slick's travel found no visible oil indicates
that the level of bottom contaminants may well be expected to be small and
spread over a large area. Even though the divers looked at only one small
area, the predominantly tidal currents in the area assure us that the oil
slick had passed over that spot at least 14 times since the grounding.

On December 26, 3,000 drift cards were released between the oil and the
island of Nantucket; on December 27, another 3,000 were released somewhat
closer to shore. Should the oil come ashore., the bright orange squares
should provide nearly a day's advance warning--enough time to have cleanup
crews in position to function effectively.

The most accurate measurements thus far attained of the motion of oil on

the sea have been made through the use of simultaneous, independent views of
satellite and aerial photos and visual observations.

One of the great slicks from the spill--a 300-foot by 700-foot "pancake"
6 inches thick, containing at least a half-million gallons of oil--was found
on Christmas Day by Joe Deaver, a Coast Guard oceanographer, and Al Kegler of
the Department of Conservation,.State of Alaska, a member of the NOAA SOR
team. This mammoth slick has been labelled and is being constantly tracked.

Surface currents and the absolute velocity of oil have been measured by
"tagging" oil patches with drift cards. One 90-foot patch, tagged on Decem-
ber 19, was found again on the.25th. This pancake had travelled only 47
miles' to the southeast in 7 days.

Subsurface (i.e., just below the underside of a slick) water samples
are being taken from several ships and await analysis. Such analyses will
soon provide concrete information on how oil enters the water column.

The DELAWARE II, a National Marine Fisheries Service research ship, has
sampled fish life at 11 stations south and west of the spill site. It has
taken 15 species in the as yet unaffected area. They will be analyzed for
hydrocarbons and, should the spill penetrate the sampled area, it will be re-
visited to determine what changes have occurred. Samples of cod, pollock,
and sand lance eggs and larvae have been taken from another site. They will
be analyzed at NMFS laboratories with a view to determining their genetic
states. Next week, the DELAWARE II will go out again, this time to the scene
of the spill, to gather more information.

Shore sites are under study--sand, marsh, and embayment'areas--by a
team totalling 30 persons from a variety of institutions, assembled with the
assistance of NOAA's Environmental Research Laboratories. Thus far, the
bodies.of approximately 700 oil-soaked gulls have washed ashore and will go
to laboratories for analysis. The same shore site areas will be restudied
should oil fouling occur there.

Special forecasts have been provided by the National Weather Service for
all operations during the crisis. This service is continuing.

APPENDIX III

U.S. Department of Commerce News Release

RELEASE: Thursday Data Buoy to
December 30, 1976. Track Oil Spill

HYANNIS, MASS .... A Spilled Oil Research Team from the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Coast Guard tomorrow will
deploy a drifting buoy in the middle of the largest oil concentration from
the wrecked tanker ARGO MERCHANT, weather permitting. The buoy will be *
tracked twice daily by Nimbus satellite; permitting the team to follow the
drift of the oil without regard to weather conditions.

The particular "pancake" of oil to be tracked is the largest of many
thousands that make up the oil slick from the Liberian tanker. It was
spotted on Christmas day, 10 days after the vessel went aground on Nantucket
Shoal, and since then has been tracked by Coast Guard aircraft when weather
conditions permitted. The mass is about 700 feet long by 300 feet wide, and
up to four inches thick, "with the consistency of.peanut butter," said a
NOAA scientist.

The buoy, flown up on loan from Nova University, Fort Lauderdale, Fla.,
is a spar ten feet long, with a floatation collar. When deployed by Coast
Guard helicopter, three feet of the buoy will be above water. At noon and
midnight the buoy.position will be determined by NASA and relayed to the
NOAA/Coast Guard Spilled Oil Research Team at Hyannis.

Additional buoys of this type will be deployed at the wreck site,
weather permitting, if oil continues to leak from the vessel.

The buoy was developed by NOAA's Data Buoy Office in Bay Saint Louis,
Miss., and more than 100 are in use by oceanographic programs throughout the
world.

NOAA Public Affairs
(301) 443-8243

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