[Senate Report 119-51]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 120
119th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 119-51
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026
_______
July 29, 2025.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Cotton, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany S. 2342]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 2342) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2026 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community
Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
and Disability System, and for other purposes, reports
favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Classified Annex to the Committee Report
Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on June 4, 2025,
that the request for the National Intelligence Program (NIP)
for Fiscal Year 2026 was $81.9 billion. Other than for limited
unclassified appropriations, the classified nature of United
States intelligence activities precludes any further
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee prepared
a classified annex to this report that contains a classified
Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of
Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 and has the legal status
of public law. The classified annex is made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976), as amended,
and the Rules of Procedure for the Committee.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2026 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) for Fiscal Year
2026.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2026 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 103 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 104. Limitation on transfer and reprogramming of funds
Section 104 clarifies that funds authorized to be
appropriated for the NIP may not be transferred or reprogrammed
until those funds are made available for purposes of Section
102A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 and may only be
transferred or reprogrammed as authorized by section 102A(d).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2026.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Section 301. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property
Section 301 establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized
access to IC property.
Section 302. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and
assets from unmanned aircraft.
Section 302 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 to allow authorized CIA personnel to better detect and
respond to threats posed to CIA facilities and assets by
unmanned aircraft.
Section 303. Modification of acquisition authorities
Section 303 amends Section 102A of the National Security
Act of 1949 to enhance the authority of the Director of the
National Security Agency (NSA) and the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to enter into transactions and
agreements to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research
and prototype projects in support of intelligence activities.
Section 304. Strategies for enhancing jointness during modernization of
Common Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination systems
Section 304 requires the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) to develop and submit
strategies for the use by the Department of Defense (DoD) of
the Distributed Common Ground System.
Section 305. Annual survey of analytic objectivity among officers and
employees of elements of the intelligence community
Section 305 requires the heads of each element of the IC to
conduct and submit to the congressional intelligence committees
an annual survey of analytic objectivity among such element's
officers and employees.
Section 306. Annual training requirement and report regarding analytic
standards
Section 306 modifies section 6312 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 to ensure analytic
training includes instructions on avoiding political bias.
Section 307. Estimate of cost to ensure compliance with Intelligence
Community Directive 705
Section 307 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an estimate of the amount of
obligations expected to be incurred by the Federal Government
to ensure that all sensitive compartmented information
facilities of the IC are compliant with Intelligence Community
Directive 705.
Section 308. Amendments regarding Presidential appointments for
intelligence community positions
Section 308 amends the requirements for Presidential
appointment and Senate confirmation of certain IC positions.
Section 309. Strengthening of Office of Intelligence and Analysis of
the Department of the Treasury
Section 309 amends Section 311 of Title 31 to establish
within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of
the Department of Treasury, the Office of Economic Intelligence
and Security, which replaces the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis.
Section 310. Counterintelligence support for Department of Treasury
networks and systems
Section 310 requires the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis of the Department of Treasury to implement policies
and procedures that ensure counterintelligence support to
Department of Treasury entities responsible for safeguarding
networks and systems, and to coordinate counterintelligence
threat mitigation, cyber network, and system defense efforts.
Section 311. Report on Director's Initiatives Group personnel matters
Section 311 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on personnel matters of the
Director's Initiatives Group.
Section 312. Prohibition on availability of funds for certain
activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Field
Intelligence Programs of the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security
Section 312 prohibits funds made available to the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland
Security from being used for certain activities of the Overt
Human Intelligence and Field Intelligence programs.
Section 313. Higher Education Act of 1965 special rule
Section 313 makes a technical correction to the Higher
Education Act of 1965, as amended by Section 7316 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, with
respect to officers or employees of elements of the IC.
Section 314. Annual Central Intelligence Agency workplace climate
assessment
Section 314 amends Section 30 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 to require the Director of the CIA to
complete and submit to the appropriate congressional committees
an annual workplace climate assessment that includes an
opportunity for Agency employees to express their opinions
regarding the manner and extent to which the Agency responds to
allegations of sexual assault and complaints of sexual
harassment, and the effectiveness of such response.
Section 315. Report on sensitive commercially available information
Section 315 requires each element of the IC to submit to
the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on
the access to, as well as collection, processing, and use of,
sensitive commercially available information by such element.
Section 315 further requires the DNI to make available to the
public, once every 2 years, a report on the policies and
procedures of the IC with respect to sensitive commercially
available information.
Section 316. Report on secure mobile communications systems available
to employees and of the intelligence community
Section 316 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the secure mobile
communications systems available to employees and officers of
the IC, disaggregated by element of the IC.
Section 317. Plan for implementing an integrated system spanning the
intelligence community for accreditation of sensitive
compartmented information facilities
Section 317 requires the DNI to develop and submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a plan to implement an
integrated tracking system for the accreditation of sensitive
compartmented information facilities.
Section 318. Counterintelligence threats to United States space
interests
Section 318 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an assessment of the
counterintelligence vulnerabilities of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. Section 318 also requires the head of
the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to develop and appropriately distribute an
assessment of the counterintelligence risks to commercial
spaceports.
Section 319. Chaplain Corps and Chief of Chaplains of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 319 amends Section 26 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 to make certain enhancements to the Chaplain
Corps of the CIA, including by requiring that the Chief of
Chaplains report directly to the Director of CIA and that the
Chaplain Corps have a global presence.
Section 320. Review by Inspectors General of reform efforts for special
access programs and controlled access programs
Section 320 requires the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community (IC IG) and the Inspector General of DoD
to jointly conduct a review of the processes, oversight, and
management of special access programs and controlled access
programs.
Section 321. Prohibition on contractors collecting or selling location
data of individuals at intelligence community locations
Section 321 prohibits contractors or subcontractors of an
element of the IC from collecting location data of individuals
at IC locations, except as necessary for the provision of
contracted services, and from selling such data to any
individual or entity that is not an element of the IC.
Section 322. Technical amendment to procurement activities of Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 322 makes a technical correction to Section 3(a) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
Section 323. Consolidation of reporting requirements applicable to All-
domain Anomaly Resolution Office
Section 323 amends 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3373a to consolidate
certain All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office reporting
requirements.
Section 324. Establishing processes and procedures for protecting
Federal Reserve information
Section 324 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI to
brief the Federal Reserve on foreign threats and work with the
Chair of the Board of Governors to implement security and
classification measures for protecting information collected,
generated, and stored by the Federal Reserve System.
Section 325. Plan to establish commercial geospatial intelligence data
and services program management office
Section 325 requires the Director of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Director of the NRO to
submit a plan to establish a joint program management office
for commercial geospatial and data services.
Section 326. Inspector General review of adequacy of policies and
procedures governing use of commercial messaging applications
by intelligence community
Section 326 requires the IC IG to submit a review of the
adequacy of policies and procedures governing the IC's use of
commercial messaging applications.
Section 327. Authority for National Security Agency to produce and
disseminate intelligence products
Section 327 permits the Director of the NSA to correlate,
evaluate, and disseminate intelligence related to national
security.
Section 328. Conditions on procurement of telecommunications equipment
by intelligence community
Section 328 directs the IC to utilize standard contractual
clauses to promote cybersecurity in the acquisition of
telecommunications products or services.
Section 329. Reforms to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security
Section 329 prohibits the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis from collecting information
or intelligence targeting United States persons, with
exceptions for sharing and receiving certain information or
intelligence.
Section 330. Procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly
available information concerning United States persons
Section 330 codifies IC Policy Guidance 107.1, which
requires each IC element to develop procedures for responding
to unmasking requests.
Section 331. Prohibiting discrimination in the intelligence community
Section 331 requires the DNI, in coordination with the head
of each element of the IC, to revise all regulations, policies,
procedures, manuals, circulars, courses, training, and guidance
to ensure such materials do not allow the use of NIP funds for
discriminatory practices prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or other Federal
law.
Section 332. Annual report on Federal Bureau of Investigation case data
Section 332 requires the FBI to submit a report on the
number of counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber
national security cases.
TITLE IV--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS
Section 401. Short title
Section 401 names the Title the ``Intelligence Community
Efficiency and Effectiveness Act of 2025.''
Section 402. Modification of responsibilities and authorities of the
Director of National Intelligence
Section 402 modifies the DNI's authority to prescribe
personnel policies and programs and eliminates certain
reporting requirements. Section 402 also eliminates the
authority to establish National Intelligence Centers, as well
as the authority to transfer personnel to those Centers (which
are replaced by National Intelligence Task Forces in Section
409), and permits the DNI to delegate to IC elements certain
foreign investment analyses and impact statements. Finally,
Section 402 requires the DNI to submit a plan to reform each IC
element's acquisition process so that the process uses existing
authorities to expedite acquisitions and includes a preference
for acquisition of commercial solutions, consistent with
current law.
Section 403. Reforms relating to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence
Section 403 requires the DNI to submit a plan within 90
days of enactment to reduce ODNI staff to a maximum number of
full-time equivalents, including assignees, detailees, and
contractors, that the DNI requires for the optimized execution
of the DNI's statutory authorities. Section 403 further
requires the DNI to initiate the staff reductions on a date
that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan is
submitted, or one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, whichever is later, with interim written updates to the
congressional intelligence committees. Section 403 requires the
DNI to certify that staff subject to the reductions will have
opportunities to accept alternative government employment, and
prohibits involuntary terminations, except in cases involving
documented security, counterintelligence, misconduct, or
performance issues.
Section 404. Appointment of Deputy Director of National Intelligence
and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence
Section 404 renames the Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence, the Deputy Director of National
Intelligence and creates DNI-appointed Assistant Directors of
National Intelligence for Mission Integration and Policy and
Capabilities.
Section 405. Reform of the National Intelligence Council and National
Intelligence Officers
Section 405 modifies the National Intelligence Council's
(NIC's) duties, including by clarifying that the NIC may
produce or coordinate the production of National Intelligence
Estimates.
Section 406. Transfer of National Counterintelligence and Security
Center to Federal Bureau of Investigation
Section 406 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI to
submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to transfer the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) to the
Counterintelligence Division of the FBI and the duties of
Director of the NCSC to the Assistant Director of the FBI for
Counterintelligence. Section 406 further requires the DNI to
initiate such transfers on a date that is at least 90 days
after the date on which the plan is submitted, or one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is
later, and to complete those transfers within two years, with
quarterly reports to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 406 further makes conforming amendments to the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002.
Section 407. Redesignation and reform of National Counterterrorism
Center
Section 407 redesignates the National Counterterrorism
Center the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics
Center and imposes limitations regarding domestic
counterterrorism intelligence.
Section 408. Transfer and reform of National Counterproliferation and
Biosecurity Center
Section 408 requires the DNI and the Director of the CIA to
submit a plan within 90 days of enactment to transfer the
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center (NCBC) to
the CIA and the duties of Director of the NCBC to the Director
of the CIA. Section 406 further requires the DNI to initiate
such transfers on a date that is at least 90 days after the
date on which the plan is submitted, or one year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, and to
complete those transfers within 455 days, with quarterly
reports to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 409. National intelligence task forces
Section 409 gives the DNI the authority to convene national
intelligence task forces from other IC elements for a limited
time, as necessary to address certain intelligence priorities.
Section 409 requires congressional notifications when such task
forces are convened. Section 409 further provides that if a
matter has not concluded within 540 days of convening the
respective task force, the DNI shall transfer responsibility to
a specific IC element.
Section 410. Repeal of various positions, units, centers, councils, and
offices
Section 410 repeals various positions, units, centers,
councils, and offices, including the Intelligence Community
Chief Data Officer (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3034b); Intelligence
Community Innovation Unit (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3034c); Office of
Engagement (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3062); Framework for Cross-
disciplinary Education and Training (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3192);
Foreign Languages Program (50 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 3201-03); and
Joint Intelligence Community Council (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3022).
Section 410 further provides that the DNI shall submit a plan
within 90 days of enactment to terminate the Foreign Malign
Influence Center (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3059), begin taking such
actions as may be necessary to terminate and wind down the
operations of the Center on a date that is at least 90 days
after the date on which the plan is submitted, or one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is
later, and complete such actions within 455 days. Section 410
also makes a technical correction to repeal the statute
establishing the Climate Security Advisory Council (50 U.S.C.
Sec. 3060), which terminated on December 31, 2024.
Section 411. Limitation on use of Intelligence Community Management
Account funds for certain entities
Section 411 prohibits ICMA funds from being used to support
analytic collaboration efforts by federally funded research and
development centers or non-profit entities that receive funds
from foreign governments (with the exception of the Five Eyes),
or by certain research or advocacy organizations that receive
funds from foreign adversaries.
Section 412. Transfer of National Intelligence University
Section 412 requires the DNI to transfer the functions of
the National Intelligence University to the National Defense
University within 180 days of enactment of this Act.
TITLE V--MATTERS CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Subtitle A--Foreign Countries Generally
Section 501. Declassification of information relating to actions by
foreign governments to assist persons evading justice
Section 501 requires the Director of the FBI to declassify
information relating to whether foreign government officials
assisted or facilitated any citizen or national of their
country in departing the United States while the citizen or
national was under investigation or awaiting trial or
sentencing for a criminal offense committed in the United
States.
Section 502. Enhanced intelligence sharing relating to foreign
adversary biotechnological threats
Section 502 requires the DNI to establish and submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a policy for streamlining
the declassification or downgrading and sharing of intelligence
information relating to biotechnological developments and
threats.
Section 503. Threat assessment regarding unmanned aircraft systems at
or near the international borders of the United States
Section 503 requires an assessment of the threat that
unmanned aircraft systems pose at or near United States
international borders.
Section 504. Assessment of the potential effect of expanded
partnerships among western hemisphere countries
Section 504 requires the NIC to conduct an assessment and
submit a report on the potential effect of expanding
partnerships among countries in the western hemisphere.
Subtitle B--People's Republic of China
Section 511. Countering Chinese Communist Party efforts that threaten
Europe
Section 511 requires the President to develop an
interagency strategy to counter the efforts of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) to expand its economic, military, and
ideological influence in Europe, which shall include an
assessment of the current efforts by the IC to brief members of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on intelligence
and influence activities by the CCP in Europe.
Section 512. Prohibition on intelligence community contracting with
Chinese military companies engaged in biotechnology research,
development, or manufacturing
Section 512 prohibits the IC from contracting with certain
Chinese military companies engaged in biotechnology research,
development, or manufacturing.
Section 513. Report on the wealth of the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party
Section 513 requires the DNI, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, to post publicly a report on the wealth
of the leadership of the CCP.
Section 514. Assessment and report on investments by the People's
Republic of China in the agriculture sector of Brazil
Section 514 requires the DNI, in consultation with the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Agriculture, to assess
the extent of the People's Republic of China's (PRC)
investments in Brazil's agriculture sector.
Section 515. Identification of entities that provide support to the
People's Liberation Army
Section 515 requires the DNI to identify entities in the
PRC that support the People's Liberation Army.
Section 516. Establishing a China Economics and Intelligence cell to
publish China Economic Power Report
Section 516 requires the Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research and the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis to establish a China
Economics and Intelligence Cell and prepare for public release
an annual report on economic and technological developments
involving the PRC.
Section 517. Modification of annual reports on influence operations and
campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party
Section 517 amends 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3237 to expand annual
reporting requirements regarding influence operations and
campaigns in the United States by the CCP, to include certain
PRC law enforcement and academic entities.
Subtitle C--The Russian Federation
Section 521. Assessment of Russian destabilization efforts
Section 521 amends Section 1234 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, which requires an
annual report on military and security developments involving
the Russian Federation, to include an assessment of Russia's
efforts to undermine or destabilize the national or economic
security of the United States or members of NATO.
Section 522. Enforcing imposition of sanctions with respect to the
shadow fleet of the Russian Federation
Section 522 requires the Secretary of the Navy to publish
quarterly lists of vessels that shipped Russian petroleum
products in violation of sanctions, oil tankers owned by fleet
operators based in Russia, and vessels that have engaged in
ship-to-ship transfers with such vessels, and to refer such
vessels for sanctions.
Subtitle D--Other Foreign Countries
Section 531. Plan to enhance counternarcotics collaboration,
coordination, and cooperation with the Government of Mexico
Section 531 requires the DNI to submit a plan to the
congressional intelligence committees, based on information
provided by the head of each element of the IC, to enhance
counternarcotics collaboration, coordination, and cooperation
with the Government of Mexico.
Section 532. Enhancing intelligence support to counter foreign
adversary influence in Sudan
Section 532 requires the Director of the CIA to develop a
plan to share with United States allies and partners
intelligence relating to foreign adversary efforts to influence
the conflict in Sudan, and to counter such efforts.
Section 533. Ukraine lessons learned working group
Section 533 amends Section 6413 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, which established the
Ukraine Lessons Learned Working Group, to include a requirement
to evaluate which lessons should be shared with Taiwan to
assist Taiwan's acquisitions decisions and capability
development.
Section 534. Improvements to requirement for monitoring of Iranian
enrichment of uranium-235
Section 534 amends Section 7413 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, which requires the DNI
to notify Congress of a significant enrichment activity of
Iran, to include notification of intelligence indicating a
decision to weaponize uranium.
Section 535. Duty to warn United States persons threatened by Iranian
lethal plotting
Section 535 requires each IC element, upon collecting or
acquiring credible and specific information indicating a lethal
threat to a United States person by Iran or an Iranian proxy,
to provide such information to the FBI. Section 535 further
requires the FBI to warn the intended victim and notify the
appropriate congressional committees.
TITLE VI--EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Section 601. Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Fund
Section 601 creates a fund to assist in transitioning IC
products, which have been demonstrated to meet an IC mission
need, from the research and development phase to the
contracting and production phase, with priority given to small
business concerns and nontraditional defense contractors.
Section 602. Enhancing biotechnology talent within the intelligence
community
Section 602 requires the DNI to establish a policy for how
existing and future funding and resources of the IC can be
directed to ensure the IC has sufficient cleared personnel,
including private sector experts, to identify and respond to
biotechnology threats.
Section 603. Enhanced intelligence community support to secure United
States genomic data
Section 603 requires the DNI to provide support to and
consult with the FBI, the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States, and other government agencies as
appropriate, when reviewing transactions relating to the
acquisition of genomic data by foreign entities.
Section 604. Ensuring intelligence community procurement of domestic
United States production of synthetic DNA and RNA
Section 604 requires the DNI to establish a policy to
ensure that elements of the IC may not contract with Chinese
biotechnology suppliers, including for products made using
synthetic DNA or RNA, that are determined by the Director to
pose a security threat.
Section 605. Deployment of advanced nuclear technologies
Section 605 requires the DNI to identify one or more IC
sites which could benefit from secure, resilient energy through
the deployment of advanced nuclear technologies. Section 605
further requires that fuel used for such reactors are
domestically sourced.
Section 606. Addressing intelligence gaps relating to outbound
investment screening for biotechnology
Section 606 requires the DNI to submit to the President and
the congressional intelligence committees a strategy for
addressing intelligence gaps relating to investment activity by
the PRC in the biotechnology sector of the United States.
Section 607. Additional functions and requirements of Artificial
Intelligence Security Center
Section 607 directs NSA's existing Artificial Intelligence
Security Center to establish a research test-bed to support
public-private partnerships focused on promoting artificial
intelligence (AI) security with frontier AI firms and
researchers.
Section 608. Artificial intelligence development and usage by
intelligence community
Section 608 applies AI procurement policies established on
April 3, 2025, by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
federal civilian agencies to the IC, to promote cost-
efficiency, interoperability, and performance-tracking for AI
models.
Section 609. High-impact artificial intelligence systems
Section 609 establishes requirements for high-impact AI
systems used by the IC, consistent with procedures established
by the current OMB guidelines and National Security Memorandum
25.
Section 610. Application of artificial intelligence policies of the
intelligence community to publicly available models used for
intelligence purposes
Section 610 ensures that publicly available AI models used
by the IC are governed by the same established oversight
procedures applied to govern commercial AI models used by the
IC.
Section 611. Revision of interim guidance regarding acquisition and use
of foundation models
Section 611 clarifies existing IC guidance that evaluation
of training data and other model characteristics should not be
a determinative factor in whether the IC's use of that model
constitutes ``collection.''
Section 612. Strategy on intelligence coordination and sharing relating
to critical and emerging technologies
Section 612 requires the DNI to develop a strategy for
intelligence relating to critical and emerging technologies
across the IC.
TITLE VII--CLASSIFICATION REFORM AND SECURITY CLEARANCES
Section 701. Notification of certain declassifications
Section 701 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
require the DNI to notify the congressional intelligence
committees and the Archivist if the Director exercises her
authority under section 3.1(c) of Executive Order 13526 to
declassify or downgrade properly classified information.
Section 701 also requires each IC element to notify the
congressional intelligence committees and the Archivist if the
element exercises the authority under section 3.1(d) of
Executive Order 13526 to declassify information where the need
to protect such information is outweighed by the public
interest in disclosure.
Section 702. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory
revocation of security clearances and access determinations
Section 702 removes the cap on compensatory damages for an
employee or former employee who was subjected to a reprisal
with respect to the current or former employee's security
clearance or access determination.
Section 703. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance
and access determinations
Section 703 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse
security clearance or access determination against a
whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that the agency would have made the same security clearance or
access determination in the absence of the whistleblower's
disclosure. Section 703 further establishes parity in the legal
standards applied to IC whistleblower matters.
Section 704. Reforms relating to inactive security clearances
Section 704 requires the DNI to review and evaluate the
feasibility of updating standards and procedure for security
clearance eligibility for individuals who have retired or
otherwise separated from the IC, including subjecting inactive
security clearances to continuous vetting.
Section 705. Protection of classified information relating to budget
functions
Section 705 requires Executive Branch departments and
agencies to use secure systems that protect NIP budget
functions and processes.
Section 706. Report on executive branch approval of access to
classified intelligence information outside of established
review processes
Section 706 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on approvals of interim
security clearances or other access to classified intelligence
information for IC employees that do not satisfy the
investigative and adjudicative standards established under
Executive Order 12968.
TITLE VIII--WHISTLEBLOWERS
Section 801. Clarification of definition of employee for purposes of
reporting complaints or information to Inspector General
Section 801 clarifies the definition of ``employee'' for
the purposes of submitting a matter of urgent concern to the IC
IG.
Section 802. Protections for whistleblower disclosures to office of
legislative or congressional affairs
Section 802 protects from reprisal IC whistleblowers who
submit a complaint to IC agency offices of congressional or
legislative affairs.
Section 803. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity
as act of reprisal
Section 803 prohibits knowing or willful disclosures that
reveal an IC employee's or IC contractor employee's identifying
information without consent, so as to identify such employee or
contractor employee as a whistleblower, except as necessary
during the course of an investigation. Section 803 further
establishes a private right of action for an IC whistleblower
if such disclosure is taken as a reprisal against the
whistleblower for bringing a complaint.
Section 804. Improvements regarding urgent concerns submitted to
Inspectors General of the intelligence community
Section 804 permits urgent concerns submitted by IC
whistleblowers to the inspectors general of the IC to be
provided directly to Congress rather than going through the
heads of agencies.
Section 805. Whistleblower protections relating to psychiatric testing
or examination
Section 805 amends Section 1104 of the National Security
Act of 1947 to establish that a decision to order psychiatric
testing or examination is a prohibited personnel practice when
taken or threatened as a reprisal for a protected disclosure.
TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS
Section 901. Standard guidelines for intelligence community to report
and document anomalous health incidents
Section 901 requires the DNI to issue standard guidelines
for IC personnel to document and report anomalous health
incidents (AHIs).
Section 902. Review and declassification of intelligence relating to
anomalous health incidents.
Section 902 requires the DNI to review IC holdings of AHIs,
including AHI reports, intelligence on foreign government
efforts related to AHIs, and assessments of the IC's success in
detecting such foreign government programs. Section 902 further
requires the DNI to perform a declassification review of such
AHI holdings for publication.
TITLE X--OTHER MATTERS
Section 1001. Declassification of intelligence and additional
transparency measures relating to the COVID-19 pandemic
Section 1001 requires the DNI to conduct declassification
reviews and publish intelligence on the origins of the COVID-19
pandemic.
Section 1002. Counterintelligence briefings for members of the Armed
Forces
Section 1002 requires the USD(I&S) to conduct
counterintelligence briefings for members of the Armed Forces.
Section 1003. Denial of visas to foreign nationals known to be
intelligence officers for accreditation to multilateral
diplomatic missions
Section 1003 requires the Secretary of State to deny visas
to certain foreign nationals, who are accredited to a United
Nations mission or other multilateral international
organization in the United States, if the Secretary determines
that such individuals have committed known or suspected
intelligence activities or espionage activities or are known or
suspected of being intelligence officers.
Section 1004. Policy toward certain agents of foreign governments
Section 1004 requires, as United States policy, that the
United States pursue parity regarding reciprocal privileges and
immunities of United States diplomatic personnel in
negotiations with countries conducting harmful intelligence
activities. Section 1004 further requires the Secretary of
State, the Director of the FBI, and the DNI to submit a report
documenting foreign governments engaged in intelligence
activities within the United States that receive diplomatic
benefits that exceed the reciprocal diplomatic benefits in such
country of official representatives of the United States.
Section 1005. Tour limits of accredited diplomatic and consular
personnel of certain nations in the United States
Section 1005 codifies limits for how long accredited
diplomatic and consular personnel of foreign adversaries who
are located in the United States can receive diplomatic
privileges and immunities.
Section 1006. Strict enforcement of travel protocols and procedures of
accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of certain nations
in the United States
Section 1006 codifies travel restrictions for accredited
diplomatic and consular personnel of certain nations in the
UnitedStates, including advance approval requirements and
penalties for noncompliance.
Section 1007. Offenses involving espionage, procurement of citizenship
or naturalization unlawfully, or harboring or concealing
persons
Section 1007 extends the statute of limitations for certain
espionage offenses, including criminal charges for acting as an
unregistered agent of a foreign government, gathering or
delivering defense information to a foreign government, or
unlawfully procuring citizenship while working at the direction
of a foreign government.
Section 1008. Identification of reallocable frequencies
Section 1008 amends the authorization of the Spectrum
Relocation Fund to clarify eligibility for Title 50 agencies
that utilize spectrum and whose usage could be impacted by
future reallocation decisions.
Section 1009. NEPA national security waivers for intelligence community
facilities
Section 1009 permits the President to waive requirements
for the IC to prepare certain environmental documents if
certain national security-related conditions are met.
Section 1010. Repeal of certain reporting requirements
Section 1010 modifies and repeals certain prior
congressional intelligence committee reporting requirements
that, for certain reasons, are no longer relevant or necessary
to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 1011. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States of transactions in real estate near intelligence
community facilities
Section 1011 extends a provision in the Foreign Investment
Risk Review Modernization Act that requires the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States to review land
transactions by foreign actors near United States military
installations to also apply to foreign land transactions near
IC-owned facilities.
Section 1012. Requiring penetration testing as part of the testing and
certification of voting systems
Section 1012 directs the Election Assistance Commission
(EAC) to provide for the conduct of penetration testing as part
of the voluntary testing, certification, decertification, and
recertification of voting system hardware and software.
Section 1013. Independent security testing and coordinated
cybersecurity vulnerability disclosure program for election
systems
Section 1013 directs the EAC to establish a voluntary
Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Vulnerability
Disclosure Pilot Program for Election Systems to test for and
disclose cybersecurity vulnerabilities in election systems.
Section 1014. Church committee historical intelligence records
processing
Section 1014 requires the Director of the CIA to take steps
to prepare for and expedite the required declassification of
the Church Committee archival files.
Section 1015. Foreign material acquisitions
Section 1015 permits the Secretary of Energy, acting
through the Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, to enter into contracts or other
arrangements for goods and services through the National
Laboratories or certain other Department of Energy entities,
for purposes of foreign material acquisition supporting
national security requirements.
Section 1016. Prohibition on admittance to national laboratories and
nuclear weapons production facilities
Section 1016 expands a prohibition enacted in section 3112
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
to restrict access to all national labs by certain foreign
adversary nationals, and provides for a waiver in certain
circumstances.
Section 1017. Extension of Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of
2015
Section 1017 extends the expiration of the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-113, Div. N) from
September30, 2025 to September 30, 2035.
Committee Comments and Direction
Prioritization of open source information related to PRC development
finance and influence abroad
For several years, the Committee has pushed the IC to
utilize commercially available information to track the PRC's
financial activity that undermines U.S. interests, ranging from
investments in critical technologies, to creating monopolies
through beneficial ownership, to growing influence abroad
through financing of infrastructure projects. This committee
has been particularly focused on PRC infrastructure investments
in partner countries that pressure governments to take policy
positions in opposition to U.S. positions, such as recognition
of Taiwan.
However, the IC has struggled to identify and utilize open
source data to track such PRC malign influence activity abroad.
Open source data sets tracking 20,985 PRC development finance
projects across 165 countries supported by grant and loan
commitments worth $1.34 trillion are now available. This
information covers all regions, sectors, and sources and types
of financial and in-kind transfers from government and state-
owned institutions in China.
Therefore, given the availability of commercially available
information that can inform analysis related to PRC malign
influence activity abroad, the Committee directs the DNI to
coordinate with heads of relevant IC agencies, including the
CIA, to prioritize collection of reliable, detailed open source
information on the PRC's use of foreign aid, debt, and equity
investments to influence outcomes in developed and developing
countries across economic, technological, political, military,
intelligence, and governance domains.
Ongoing Intelligence Community Efforts to Counter Cocaine Trafficking
In addition to the synthetic opioid crisis, the Committee
is concerned about the increasing cocaine production in South
America and its transshipment into the United States. Over the
last decade, cocaine overdose deaths among Americans have
surged from nearly 5,000 in 2013 to almost 30,000 in 2023. The
Committee is further concerned about cocaine trafficking as a
source of revenue for drug trafficking organizations engaged in
the production and shipment of illicit synthetic opioids to the
United States. Competition for control of the cocaine market is
resulting in rising violence and instability throughout Latin
America.
The Committee supports whole-of-government efforts to track
and interdict cocaine shipments to the United States and will
continue to ensure appropriate that IC resources are devoted to
countering cocaine trafficking.
Cryptocurrency Mining Threats to National Security
The Committee is concerned that Chinese-owned
cryptocurrency mining facilities inside the United States pose
a danger to national security. Located throughout the 50 states
and equipped with machinery made by Bitmain, a privately-owned
Chinese company with ties to the CCP, these mines are located
near sensitive defense installations or critical U.S.
infrastructure such as power grids, creating several disturbing
vulnerabilities.
First, co-location of Chinese-owned cryptocurrency mines
near sensitive defense installations gives China an opportunity
to pursue a full suite of intelligence collection activities
against those sites. Even if these Chinese-owned companies are
not connected to the CCP, they can be forced by the PRC to turn
over data in accordance with China's national security law.
This is an unnecessary counterintelligence risk to sensitive
defense installations.
Second, the Bitmain machines used in these facilities have
the capability to be remotely controlled by Bitmain personnel
in China. According to a New York Times article from October
13, 2023, ``In the past, researchers have found `back doors''
that would have allowed the company to covertly operate its
equipment. After one was discovered in 2017, the company
confirmed it could have remotely controlled its mining
machines.'' It is estimated that each mining facility houses
10,000 machines. Considering Bitmain's connections to the CCP,
having tens of thousands of machines whose operations can be
run from Beijing located near sensitive defense installations
is an unacceptable risk.
Lastly, it appears the majority of these Chinese mining
machines have made their way into the U.S. illegally. Customs
and Border Protection have discovered widespread customs fraud
when it comes to these machines entering the United States, to
include mis-manifestation of what these machines are and
undervaluation of their worth. It is estimated that the
financial loss to the United States government could be as much
as $10 billion and growing. Failure to address China's blatant
efforts to smuggle malicious crypto-mining machines inside our
country will undermine the Trump administration's policies to
better balance trade with China.
There have been some efforts to address the national
security threats these Chinese-owned facilities pose. For
example, one such facility in Cheyenne, WY, located near a
nuclear missile installation, was the subject of a review by
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States which
led to an Executive Order blocking the Chinese-backed firm from
owning the property near the installation in order to ``protect
national security.'' While this is a good start, the Committee
believes more needs to be done to address this egregious threat
to national security.
Therefore, the Committee directs the relevant elements of
the IC to work together with law enforcement partners in an
effort to shut down any Chinese cryptocurrency mining
operations that pose a threat to national security.
Assessment of Threat posed by TikTok to the Private Personal
Information of United States Citizens
The Committee is concerned that the declassified
Intelligence Information Report (IIR) (IIR 4 212 7305 20) by
the FBI further reinforces the vulnerability of U.S. personally
identifiable information (PII) posed by TikTok and other
adversary-nation controlled mobile applications. As documented
in the IIR, the government of the PRC in August 2020 collected
private user data from TikTok accounts in order to produce a
large amount of fraudulent drivers' licenses to allow foreign
nationals in the United States to vote in the 2020 election.
The Committee is further concerned that the IIR was recalled
and not subsequently re-issued even after the source of the
original IIR was re-interviewed and corroborated and after
20,000 fraudulent drivers licenses were seized by U.S. Customs
and Border Protection in 2020.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of the FBI,
in coordination with the heads of other federal agencies, as
appropriate, to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees within 180 days of enactment of this Act an
assessment of the threat posed by TikTok and other foreign
mobile applications to the private personal information of
American citizens. Specifically, such assessment shall include
all information, including metadata and content, that these
applications can collect from U.S. users and for what purposes
such information can be used for.
The Committee further directs the heads of other elements
of the IC to review their holdings for information that
corroborates the TikTok reporting of the original IIR.
COVID-19 Declassification
Section 1001 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 directs the DNI to undertake a
declassification review of intelligence relating to both the
origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and to efforts by the PRC to
disrupt the global response to the pandemic. The Committee is
concerned by efforts by the PRC to increase its global standing
in multilateral bodies, including global health agencies, and
believes that the American people and policymakers must have a
full accounting for the PRC's past mistakes and malfeasance in
responding to the most lethal and disruptive global health
emergency in decades. The Committee notes the important step
forward of the COVID-19 Origins Act of 2023 in releasing
valuable information to the public on the origins of the
pandemic, but believes more action is needed for full
transparency and accountability to occur.
Therefore, the Committee directs that in completing the
declassification review directed by Section 1001 of this Act,
the DNI should cooperate with the Public Interest
Declassification Board, to include delegating, as appropriate,
identification of and recommendations for declassification of
COVID-19-related intelligence. The DNI shall retain final
authority to declassify any identified intelligence and shall
not permit delegated actions to supersede the statutory
requirement to complete the declassification review within 180
days after enactment of this Act.
Vetting Support Agencies
Vetting Support Agencies (VSAs) are integral to the
national vetting enterprise in that they are responsible for
protecting the nation from terrorists, threats to public
safety, and threats to our national security. VSAs have seen a
surge in processing as a result of (1) additional vetting
requirements arising from Executive Order 14161 and (2)
increased categories of aliens needing to be vetted through the
National Vetting Center (NVC). The Committee supports the
importance of processing these vetting requests in a timely
manner, and recognizes many IC partners supporting this mission
require increased staff to meet the demand.
Therefore, the Committee recommends vetting support
agencies have adequate staffing for their caseloads, with a
minimum of one watch officer from the VSA available to support
the activities of the NVC 24 hours per day and 7 days per week.
Illicit Financing for Counternarcotics
The Committee is encouraged by the IC's enhanced focus on
illicit trafficking of synthetic opioids in recent years, as
evidenced by the establishment of a National Intelligence
Manager for Counternarcotics at the ODNI and other efforts.
However, despite the Committee's repeated inquiries regarding
collection, mapping, and interdiction of entities that provide
the financial infrastructure for narcotics production and
trafficking, including the use of cryptocurrency, money
laundering, and other methods, the Intelligence Community has
failed to demonstrate a clear focus and effort on this element
of the counternarcotics mission.
Therefore, the Committee directs that, not later than 90
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the DNI
conduct a review of intelligence collection and other
activities of the intelligence community related to countering
illicit financing for narcotics traffickers and narcotics
trafficking and submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the results of the review that includes
for each element of the intelligence community, the following:
(1) An accounting of the analytic and operational resources of
the element for countering illicit financing for narcotics
trafficking, including a breakdown of budgets and staffing
dedicated to countering such financing; and (2) An assessment
of the intelligence and resource gaps of the element related to
countering illicit financing for narcotics trafficking.
Requirement for the Central Intelligence Agency to Implement Certain
Recommendations Regarding Medical Care and Benefits for
Individuals Affected by Anomalous Health Incidents
In December 2024, the Committee's Audits and Projects Team
issued a report examining CIA's efforts to provide facilitated
medical care and benefits to individuals affected by AHIs. The
Committee directs CIA to prioritize implementing the report
recommendations pertaining to (1) developing written polices
for all medical care and benefit programs available to AHI
reporters that include clear eligibility criteria and
adjudication processes; and (2) developing and documenting a
comprehensive and resource-informed plan for how the Agency
will provide, facilitate, or support medical evaluations and
acute and long-term care for individuals affected by AHIs or
and other counterintelligence-related health incidents. The
Committee further directs the CIA to brief the congressional
intelligence committees on the progress of the CIA in
addressing these recommendations not later than 90 days after
the date of enactment of this Act.
Committee Action
On July 15, 2025, a quorum being present, the Committee met
to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The
Committee took the following actions:
Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex
By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman's and
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for
Fiscal Year 2026, the base text for purposes of amendment.
By unanimous consent, the Committee adopted for inclusion
in the en bloc amendment (1) an amendment by Chairman Cotton,
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to strike section 315 of
the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text; and (2) an
amendment by Senator Bennet requiring an assessment of the
potential effect of expanding partnerships among Western
Hemisphere countries.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc thirty-five
amendments to the bill as follows: (1) an amendment by Chairman
Cotton to consolidate certain All-Domain Anomaly Resolution
Office reporting requirements; (2) an amendment by Chairman
Cotton regarding protections for Federal Reserve information;
(3) an amendment by Chairman Cotton regarding processing of
Church Committee records; (4) an amendment by Chairman Cotton
requiring an assessment of investments by the PRC in Brazil's
agricultural sector; (5) an amendment by Chairman Cotton
requiring a report on the wealth of CCP leadership; (6) an
amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring a review by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States regarding
real estate transactions near IC facilities; (7) an amendment
by Chairman Cotton improving the requirement for monitoring
Iranian enrichment of Uranium-235; (8) an amendment by Chairman
Cotton requiring a duty to warn United States persons
threatened by Iranian lethal plotting; (9) an amendment by
Chairman Cotton requiring annual training and reporting on
analytic standards; (10) an amendment by Chairman Cotton
requiring an annual survey of analytic objectivity among IC
officers and employees; (11) an amendment by Chairman Cotton
establishing a China Economics and Intelligence Cell to publish
a China Economic Power Report; (12) an amendment by Chairman
Cotton establishing certain reforms of the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis; (13) an amendment by Chairman Cotton
codifying procedures regarding dissemination of nonpublicly
available information concerning United States persons; (14) an
amendment by Chairman Cotton requiring protection of classified
information related to budget functions; (15) an amendment by
Chairman Cotton establishing reforms of the ODNI and broader
IC; (16) an amendment by Chairman Cotton modifying section 307
of the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text regarding the
Deputy Director of the CIA's position; (17) an amendment by
Chairman Cotton prohibiting discrimination in the IC; (18) an
amendment by Chairman Cotton modifying certain reporting on CCP
influence operations; (19) an amendment by Vice Chairman
Warner, cosponsored by Senator Collins, to secure election
systems; (20) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to impose
certain limitations on reprogramming funds; (21) an amendment
by Vice Chairman Warner imposing additional functions and
requirements of the Artificial Intelligence Security Center;
(22) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner establishing
procurement conditions on IC telecommunications equipment; (23)
an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner applying IC AI policies to
publicly available models used for intelligence purposes; (24)
an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner revising interim guidance
regarding acquisition and use of foundation models; (25) an
amendment by Vice Chairman Warner regarding IC AI development
and usage; (26) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner regarding
high-impact AI systems; (27) an amendment by Vice Chairman
Warner to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text,
modifying certain IC acquisition authorities; (28) an amendment
by Vice Chairman Warner requiring a plan to establish a
Commercial Geospatial Intelligence Data and Services Program
Management Office; (29) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner
requiring an IC IG review of policies and procedures governing
the IC's use of commercial messaging applications; (30) an
amendment by Vice Chairman Warner requiring counterintelligence
support for Department of Treasury networks and systems; (31)
an amendment by Senator Moran permitting certain foreign
material acquisitions within the Department of Energy; (32) an
amendment by Senator Kelly requiring a report on Executive
Branch approval of access to classified intelligence
information outside of established review processes; (33) an
amendment by Senator Lankford requiring identification of
entities that provide support to the PLA; (34) an amendment by
Senator Young requiring a strategy on intelligence coordination
and sharing related to critical and emerging technologies; (35)
an amendment by Senator Budd authorizing the NSA to produce and
disseminate intelligence products; (36) an amendment by
Chairman Cotton, cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to strike
section 315 of the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's base text;
and (37) an amendment by Senator Bennet requiring an assessment
of the potential effect of expanding partnerships among Western
Hemisphere countries.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by Vice
Chairman Warner to extend the expiration date of the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, with Senator Wyden
recorded as a no. By unanimous consent, the Committee approved
Senator Wyden's request to submit a separate statement
regarding his vote.
By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted an
amendment by Chairman Cotton to prohibit access by certain
foreign nationals to National Laboratories and Nuclear Weapons
Production Facilities. The votes in person or by proxy were as
follows: Chairman Cotton--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator
Collins--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator
Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye; Senator Young--aye; Senator
Budd--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator
Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator
Gillibrand--no; Senator Ossoff--no; Senator Kelly--no.
By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to substitute a
second-degree amendment by Senator Wyden to his own original-
filed amendment providing certain protections, mandating that
incumbents in competitive service positions converted to
excepted service positions retain their competitive service
rights under Title 5, imposing reporting requirements on the IC
regarding termination authorities, and prohibiting the Director
of the CIA from terminating an officer or employee except in
accordance with guidelines and regulations submitted to the
congressional intelligence committees, unless the Director
determines that such compliance poses a threat to U.S. national
security and provides an explanation for such determination to
the committees. The second-degree amendment did the same, but
omitted the provisions regarding converted positions. By a vote
of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt Senator
Wyden's amendment, as amended. The votes in person or by proxy
were as follows: Chairman Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no;
Senator Collins--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no;
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no; Senator Young--no;
Senator Budd--no; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--
aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--
aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator
Kelly--aye.
By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a
second-degree amendment by Senator King to Senator Wyden's
amendment to require annual FBI reporting on the number of
counterintelligence, counterterrorism, domestic terrorism, and
cyber national security cases. The second-degree amendment
omitted the number of domestic terrorism cases. By voice vote,
the Committee adopted Senator Wyden's amendment, as amended.
By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee did not adopt
an amendment by Senator Wyden to require that, if the head of
an IC element transfers money from an Inspector General and
that Inspector General does not approve, the head of that IC
element has to explain to the relevant congressional committees
why it is in the vital national security interests of the
United States to do so. The votes in person or by proxy were as
follows: Chairman Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator
Collins--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; Senator
Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no; Senator Young--no; Senator
Budd--no; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye;
Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye;
Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--
aye.
By a vote of 5 ayes and 12 noes, the Committee did not
adopt an amendment by Senator Wyden to the classified annex.
The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman
Cotton--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator
Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator
Rounds--no; Senator Young--no; Senator Budd--no; Vice Chairman
Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator
King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator
Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--no.
Votes to report the committee bill
On July 15, 2025, the Committee voted to report the bill,
as amended, by a vote of 15 ayes and two noes. The votes in
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Cotton--aye;
Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye;
Senator Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye;
Senator Young--aye; Senator Budd--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--
aye; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--
aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator
Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye.
By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and
classified annex.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited
tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On July 16,
2025, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
Changes to Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to
expedite the business of the Senate.
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
The Fiscal Year 2026 Intelligence Authorization Act
represents a significant step backward for congressional
oversight of the Intelligence Community. First, the bill
eliminates the long-standing requirement that the general
counsels of the CIA and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence be confirmed by the Senate. This change would
leave a conspicuous hole in congressional oversight of national
security, given that the general counsels of the Department of
Defense, the Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Departments of
Homeland Security and Energy, as well as the Legal Advisor of
the State Department, are all Senate confirmed. It is
particularly troubling as Intelligence Community general
counsels operate secretly, making decisions and offering legal
advice on topics such as surveillance and torture, with no
public accountability other than the vetting and scrutiny that
comes from the confirmation process.
Second, the bill lacks a provision, which was included in
last year's Committee-passed bill, that would require the
Intelligence Community to explain to the Committee when the
heads of Intelligence Community entities exercise their
authority to fire personnel without any process or protections.
Given the rash of dubious and unexplained firings in recent
months, this lack of oversight hamstrings the Committee's
ability to scrutinize and mitigate efforts to politicize the
Intelligence Community workforce.
I have a number of concerns related to the bill's
provisions related to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and urge the Committee to conduct an in-depth
review of what reforms will advance, rather than undermine the
purposes for which the Office was created after 9/11. For
example, the bill renames the National Counterterrorism Center
the ``National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center,''
suggesting that two very different threats to the country
should be addressed under the same government framework,
relying on the same resources and personnel, and operating
under the same set of intelligence authorities. Such an
approach risks undermining the country's efforts to combat
both.
The bill extends for ten years the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015, whose passage I opposed due to
a lack of protections for Americans' personal information. In
September 2024, the Department of Homeland Security's Inspector
General issued a report (OIG-24-60) that found that the
government was not sharing cyber threat information with
companies, and that companies were not sharing cyber threat
information with each other or the government. These findings
highlight how the program has failed and is not worthy of
reauthorization.
I also have serious concerns about classified matters that
are either in the classified annex or that the annex fails to
address. At the same time, I am deeply troubled by increasing
impediments to Committee oversight. Abuses of both the ``Gang
of 8'' briefings, whereby the Intelligence Community withholds
information from the full Committee, and restrictions on staff
access to intelligence programs are the worst they have been in
20 years.
Several other topics related to the bill are worthy of
discussion. First, the bill prohibits the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
from ``engaging in the collection of information or
intelligence targeting any United States person.'' Given I&A's
abuses in Portland, Oregon, in 2020, I welcome efforts to rein
in its authorities, particularly if they have the effect of
prohibiting the compilation of dossiers of Americans' First
Amendment-protected speech and precluding I&A from secretly
infiltrating private communications, which the current nominee
to be Under Secretary for I&A has incorrectly asserted is
permissible. I am concerned, however, that this provision falls
short. The exception permitting I&A to collect from the
``private sector'' might be read to allow I&A to obtain
information on Americans through their landlords, their bosses,
their neighborhood grocery stores or data brokers. The
provision also fails to address collection on Americans by
other intelligence components within the Department of Homeland
Security, despite the Under Secretary's statutory mandate to
issue policies and guidelines for those components.
Second, the bill is being reported at a time of serious
threat to the independence of the inspectors general. The
Director of National Intelligence recently fired the IC IG's
acting counsel under a mistaken reading of the law that grants
IGs final approval for personnel decisions (50 U.S.C.
Sec. 3033(j)(3)). That statutory language originated with the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the report
to which clearly stated it was intended to bring the
authorities of the IC IG into conformity with the augmented
authorities created by the Inspector General Reform Act of
2008. That law established that ``each Office of Inspector
General shall be considered to be a separate agency'' and ``the
Inspector General who is the head of an office . . . shall,
with respect to such office, have the functions, powers, and
duties of an agency head or appointing authority under such
provisions.'' The IG's statutory personnel authorities
concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of
Inspector General is thus clearly intended to cover all OIG
personnel not detailed from another agency, rather than
creating an arbitrary and unworkable carve out of the IG's
authorities over its own personnel, as the DNI would have it.
It is in the context of this dispute that I offered an
amendment requiring that, if the head of an IC element
transfers money from an IG over the IG's objections, the IC has
to explain to the Committee why it is in the vital national
security interests of the United States to do so. The
Committee's defeat of this amendment represents another set-
back for oversight.
Despite these concerns, I am pleased that the bill includes
many provisions I put forward. These include protections for
whistleblowers, allowing them to come to Congress without
having to go through their agencies, ensuring that their
efforts to communicate with Congress through the IC's offices
of congressional and legislative affairs are protected from
reprisal, ensuring that their security clearances can't be
revoked on a pretext, removing the cap on damages for
retaliatory revocation of whistleblower clearances, and
prohibiting, as acts of reprisal, disclosures of
whistleblowers' identities as well as orders to undertake
psychological examinations. The bill also includes a provision
from last year's bill requiring congressional and public
reporting on the Intelligence Community's purchase and use of
sensitive data on Americans.
The bill further includes my provision prohibiting the
Intelligence Community from contracting with companies that
collect and sell geolocation data associated with intelligence
facilities, as well as my amendment requiring annual reporting
on FBI national security investigations.
Finally, the bill includes my provision requiring the FBI
to declassify any information related to whether foreign
government officials have helped their nationals flee the
United States while under investigation or awaiting trial or
sentencing for a crime committed in the United States. In 2016,
a Saudi national was accused in the hit-and-run death of Fallon
Smart, a 15-year-old Portland girl. The flight from the United
States of that Saudi national before trial prompted me to push
through legislation requiring the declassification of a 2019
FBI report describing a pattern of Saudi officials helping
Saudi nationals flee the country to avoid the U.S. justice
system. The subsequent adoption by the State Department of a
policy to identify and revoke the visas of foreign officials
responsible for these practices was an important step forward,
but implementation of the policy, as well as warnings to local
U.S. officials, depends on the declassification of any
additional information known to the United States government.
Ron Wyden