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# NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027

## R E P O R T

[TO ACCOMPANY S. 4784]

ON

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

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UNITED STATES SENATE

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*2d Session*

SENATE

REPORT
119–127

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

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JUNE 15, 2026.—Ordered to be printed

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Mr. WICKER, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the following

# R E P O R T

[To accompany S. 4784]

The Committee on Armed Services reports favorably an original bill (S. 4784) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense for, military construction, and for Defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes and recommends that the bill do pass.

## PURPOSE OF THE BILL

This bill would:

(1) Authorize appropriations for (a) procurement, (b) research, development, test, and evaluation, (c) operation and maintenance and the revolving and management funds of the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2027;

(2) Authorize the personnel end strengths for each military Active-Duty component of the Armed Forces for fiscal year 2027;

(3) Authorize the personnel end strengths for the Selected Reserve of each of the reserve components of the Armed Forces for fiscal year 2027;

(4) Impose certain reporting requirements;

(5) Impose certain limitations with regard to specific procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation actions and manpower strengths; provide certain additional legislative authority; and make certain changes to existing law;

(6) Authorize appropriations for military construction programs of the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2027; and

(7) Authorize appropriations for national security programs of the Department of Energy for fiscal year 2027.

## COMMITTEE OVERVIEW

Each year, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorizes funding levels and provides authorities for the U.S. military and other critical defense priorities, ensuring America's forces have the training, equipment, and resources they need to carry out their missions.

On June 10, 2026, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted 18–9 to advance the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2027 to the Senate floor.

The committee passed this bill in response to an increasingly dangerous threat environment and a rapidly evolving battlefield landscape. Recognizing those trends, the committee approved a substantial increase in our national security investment—the largest defense dollar figure in American history.

There is one goal behind this heightened funding: maintaining American deterrence in the most complex threat environment since World War II. The dictators ruling China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have formed an axis of aggressors. They share both ambitions and weapons. Together, they hope to weaken American leadership and fracture the free world. Often, they pursue those aims with weapons only this century could have produced. Ships and aircraft remain vital tools of conflict. But the wars of today are often fought remotely, with soldiers far from the front line piloting drones, launching space-based weapons, firing hypersonic strike weapons, wielding artificial intelligence technologies, or spinning internet-based cognitive warfare schemes.

America must keep pace. The alternative is to invite aggression. On those points, the Congress, the White House, and the Department of Defense agree. In this NDAA, the committee acted on those convictions.

The defense industrial base has begun humming, spurred by Federal investment, the geopolitical threats at hand, and the indomitable drive of America's innovators and entrepreneurs. This NDAA authorizes increased defense spending—a necessary action, and one still cheaper than failing to deter war. These funds will shore up our traditional platforms and adopt emerging technologies. But the bill also enacts reforms to ensure those dollars are spent wisely. The committee built on last year's acquisition reforms to further trim bureaucratic excess and streamline Pentagon budgeting.

The result is an NDAA tailored to 21st century conflict but written to shield Americans from it. As always, the surest guarantee of peace is remaining fully prepared for war.

## BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF THIS ACT (SEC. 4)

The committee recommends a provision that would require that the budgetary effects of this Act be determined in accordance with the procedures established in the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–139).

## SUMMARY OF DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS AND BUDGET AUTHORITY IMPLICATION

The administration's budget request for national defense discretionary programs within the jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Armed Services for fiscal year 2027 was $1,098.8 billion for base Department of Defense (DOD) programs and $41.4 billion for national security programs in the Department of Energy (DOE).

The committee recommends an overall discretionary authorization of $1,140.1 billion in fiscal year 2027, including $1,099.0 billion for base DOD programs, $41.1 billion for national security programs in the DOE, and $11.9 billion for defense-related activities outside the jurisdiction of the NDAA.

The table preceding the detailed program adjustments in Division D of this bill summarizes the direct discretionary authorizations in the committee recommendation and the equivalent budget authority levels for fiscal year 2027 defense programs. The table summarizes the committee's recommended discretionary authorizations by appropriation account for fiscal year 2027 and compares these amounts to the request.

# DIVISION A—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

# TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

## Subtitle A—Authorization of Appropriations

### Sec. 101—Authorization of appropriations

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for procurement activities at the levels identified in section 4101 of division D of this Act.

## Subtitle B—Army Programs

### Sec. 111—Multiyear procurement authority for Infantry Squad Vehicle program

The committee recommends a provision that would allow the Secretary of the Army to enter into one or more multiyear contracts, beginning in 2027, for the procurement of Infantry Squad Vehicles.

### Sec. 112—Inclusion of Army National Guard in Army Arctic strategy and force structure

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Army to integrate the Army National Guard into its Arctic strategy.

## Subtitle C—Navy Programs

### Sec. 121—Modification and extension of procurement authorities for certain amphibious shipbuilding programs

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 129 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) to remove limitations on the number of amphibious warfare ships under the multiship authority and to extend the sunset of the authority.

### Sec. 122—Funding for refueling and complex overhauls of the U.S.S. *John C. Stennis* and U.S.S. *Harry S. Truman*

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 123(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) to allow the limitation on incremental funding authority to extend from 6 years to 8 years for the refueling and complex overhaul of the U.S.S. *John C. Stennis* and U.S.S. *Harry S. Truman*. The committee notes the delays in redelivering the U.S.S. *John C. Stennis* will impact the undocking of the U.S.S. *Harry S. Truman*.

**Sec. 123—Vessel construction manager and commercial design and construction requirements for cable laying and repair ships**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of the Navy to use a vessel construction manager to acquire future cable laying and repair ships if the Secretary intends to purchase such vessels.

**Sec. 124—Conveyance of F–14D Tomcat aircraft from the Navy to the U.S. Space and rocket center commission in Huntsville, Alabama**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the conveyance of 3 F–14D Tomcat aircraft from the Navy to the U.S. Space and Rocket Center Commission in Huntsville, Alabama.

**Sec. 125—Prohibition on destruction or scrapping of World War II-era aircraft**

The committee recognizes the profound contributions of American naval aviators during World War II and the lasting importance of preserving the aircraft they flew. As the number of surviving veterans of that conflict continues to decline, the aircraft that remain in the Department of the Navy's possession serve as tangible, irreplaceable links to a defining era in American and world history.

The committee emphasizes that these aircraft are national assets and must be treated with the respect appropriate to their historical value. These aircraft are not only critical to honoring those who served but also to inspiring future generations with the legacy of service and sacrifice.

The committee is concerned that many of these historically significant aircraft, particularly those produced prior to December 31, 1945, are currently housed on external display and/or are abandoned as wartime crash wreckages still under Department of the Navy ownership and control. These aircraft are at increasing risk of irreversible degradation due to environmental exposure. Without urgent action to relocate these aircraft into indoor, climate-controlled environments, their long-term preservation may no longer be viable.

Therefore, the committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of the Navy to preserve these aircraft.

The committee also directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing, not later than April 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the Department of the Navy's plan to relocate, preserve, and sustain its World War II-era aircraft currently on external display, while also seeking policy reforms that will allow properly qualified American museum entities to recover abandoned World War II-era crash wreckages that are not deemed to be wartime aircrew graves. The briefing should address the following:

(1) A plan to initiate the phased relocation of historic aircraft produced prior to December 31, 1945, from external to indoor display facilities, with priority given to F4F and FM1/2 Wildcats, F6F Hellcats, F4U/ FG–1 Corsairs, SBD Dauntlesses, SB2C Helldivers, PBJs (B–25s), P2Bs (B–29s), JD–1s (A–26s),

PBY Catalinas, PB4Y Privateers, R4Ds (C–47s), R5Cs (C–46s), SNBs (C–45s), and SNJs;

(2) A proposed priority framework for relocation, favoring institutions such as the National Naval Aviation Museum, the National Museum of the Marine Corps, the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, National Naval Aviation Museum-affiliated partner museums, National Museum of the Marine Corps-affiliated partner museums, other Department of Defense service museums, and national air museums of allied and partner nations;

(3) A plan for modifying or superseding existing loan agreements that only permit external display, in order to favor applicants with:

(a) indoor, climate-controlled display capabilities;

(b) demonstrated ability to conduct historical restoration and preservation; and

(c) public access commitments;

(4) An assessment of opportunities for artifact trades to enhance National Naval Aviation Museum and National Museum of the Marine Corps collections or broader Department of the Navy heritage efforts;

(5) A long-term framework for the de-accessioning of at-risk aircraft that cannot be preserved under these conditions within 5 years, including authority to:

(a) offer such aircraft for sale with proceeds directed to National Naval Aviation Museum and/or National Museum of the Marine Corps activities;

(b) transfer aircraft on an as-is, where-is basis, with no cost or guarantee of condition to the Department of the Navy; and

(c) remove end-use restrictions from de-accessioned assets;

(6) A plan for the Department of the Navy to revise its World War II-era abandoned aircraft crash wreckage ownership policy to allow U.S. 501(c)(3) museum entities to gain ownership for such artifacts upon recovery, which will allow for preservation, restoration, and indoor display. This excludes aircraft crash wreckages that are known aircrew grave sites. It includes World War II-era crash wreckages on land, in lakes, and in the world's oceans. This generally reflects a policy long instituted by the Department of the Navy. The Congress has an established track record of empowering such recoveries for historic preservation purposes;

(7) A reaffirmation that no aircraft produced prior to December 31, 1945, may be destroyed, scrapped, or otherwise damaged by the Department of the Navy; and

(8) A process for granting waivers for continued external display where environmental conditions, such as those in arid regions, significantly reduce the risk of corrosion and physical decay.

The committee intends to closely monitor the Department of the Navy's stewardship of these artifacts to ensure their preservation for future generations.

**Sec. 126—Procurement authority for E–2D Advanced Hawkeye Aircraft Program**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of the Navy to procure 12 or more E–2D aircraft by entering into one block buy contract.

## Subtitle D—Air Force Programs

**Sec. 131—Modification of inventory requirements for Air Force fighter aircraft**

The committee recommends a provision that would modify section 9062(i) of title 10, United States Code, to maintain a total aircraft inventory of fighter aircraft of not less than 1,800 aircraft, and further to maintain a total aircraft inventory of combat-coded fighter aircraft of not less than 1,369 aircraft by December 31, 2030.

**Sec. 132—Multiyear procurement authority for F–35 aircraft**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Department of Defense to enter into multiyear procurement contracts for F–35A, F–35B, and F–35C aircraft without requiring additional appropriations.

**Sec. 133—Multiyear procurement authority for F–15EX aircraft**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Department of Defense to enter into multiyear procurement contracts for F–15EX aircraft without requiring additional appropriations, as long as the Secretary of Defense can certify the contractor's ability to increase production to achieve objective inventory goals.

**Sec. 134—MQ–9 aircraft**

The committee recommends a provision that would:

(1) Prohibit the Secretary of the Air Force from divesting any MQ–9 aircraft through September 30, 2031;

(2) Require the Secretary to achieve a minimum inventory of 180 MQ–9 aircraft by October 1, 2028;

(3) Direct the Secretary, in coordination with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to conduct an analysis of alternatives on options for a medium-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft replacement that would meet or exceed the capability offered by the MQ–9; and

(4) Require the Secretary to submit a report and briefing on the findings of such analysis, not later than December 1, 2027.

**Sec. 135—Airborne warning and control system aircraft**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 9062 of title 10, United States Code, to require the Air Force to maintain at least 16 E–3 airborne warning and control system aircraft and would prohibit the Air Force from retiring, preparing to retire, or placing any E–3 aircraft in storage or backup inventory if doing so would reduce the fleet below that level. The limitation may be waived only after sufficient E–7 Wedgetail aircraft are pro-

cured and delivered to meet mission requirements, at which point the E–3 inventory may fall below 16. The provision would also prohibit the Air Force from pausing, canceling, or terminating the E–7 Wedgetail program.

**Sec. 136—Limitation on availability of funds pending submission of report on acquisition strategy for Airborne Command Post capability**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2027 travel funds for the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force until the Secretary of the Air Force submits the report required by section 154 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60).

The committee also directs the Secretary of the Air Force to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on an assessment of the feasibility and affordability of a business jet solution to host associated Looking Glass-Next aircrew and required hardware and software, as well as platform dependencies such as capability and capacity of additional seating, power, cooling, internal aircraft and offboard line-of-sight and beyond line-of-sight communications, and information technology and security infrastructure.

**Sec. 137—Mobility capabilities strategic plan**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command and in consultation with the commanders of the geographic combatant commands, to submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than January 1, 2027, a comprehensive strategic plan, and a briefing on the plan, for the development, acquisition, modernization, and integration of Department of Defense total force mobility capabilities through fiscal year 2047.

The committee believes a comprehensive mobility capabilities strategic plan is needed to ensure that the Department of Defense can project and sustain forces in an increasingly contested and dispersed environment. Adversaries are developing capabilities to disrupt logistics networks and challenge U.S. mobility and access, while operational demands continue to grow in scale and complexity. The committee is concerned that current planning does not fully reflect the innovation, integration, and use of emerging technologies and commercial partnerships required to meet these challenges. Accordingly, the committee encourages the Department of the Air Force to adopt a more forward-looking and analytically rigorous approach to ensure a long-term, integrated strategy that aligns requirements, investments, and modernization efforts across the Joint Force through 2047 and maintains resilient and effective mobility capabilities.

**Sec. 138—Extension of requirement and prohibition related to C–130 aircraft**

The committee recommends a provision that would extend the current requirement for maintaining a minimum C–130 inventory

and the prohibition on reduction of C–130 aircraft in the National Guard through 2028.

## Items of Special Interest

### Air Force combat search and rescue forces

The committee is concerned about combat search and resecure (CSAR) force structure in the Air Force. In recent years, the Air Force truncated the buy of HH–60Ws and has since transferred 26 HH–60Ws from units responsible for CSAR operations to the Air Force District Washington (AFDW) to replace H–1 helicopters. AFDW uses these helicopters to support contingency response, homeland operations, and ceremonial honors in the National Capital Region.

The committee believes that these actions have left CSAR forces unnecessarily short of the forces needed to support CSAR operations in a major contingency. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a study of CSAR requirements and capabilities, including HH–60Ws and HC–130Js, and provide a report and briefing on that study to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027.

Furthermore, the committee directs the Secretary to avoid making any changes in CSAR force structure until the study is completed and he or she has provided the results of that study to the Congress.

### Anti-ship air-launched missiles

The committee notes Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environments present the need for new, more capable weapons such as the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment II (OASuW Inc II)/ Hypersonic Air Launched OASuW (HALO) program. HALO is intended to be a carrier-suitable, higher-speed, longer-range, air-launched weapon that will significantly increase the Navy's capacities for long-range fires in A2/AD environments. The Navy had intended to accelerate the fielding of HALO to support early operational capability in fiscal year 2029.

However, in early fiscal year 2025, the Department of the Navy notified the committee of its intent to cancel the solicitation for the OASuW Inc II/HALO engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) effort, citing insufficient funds. In March 2025, the Navy discontinued work on the HALO approach to transition to EMD and directed a restructuring program to emphasize technology maturation in May 2025. The committee is concerned that development for OASuW Inc II/HALO is languishing, even though the requirement for such capability remains valid.

Additionally, the committee is also aware of promising opportunities associated with the Multi-mission Affordable Capacity Effector. The weapon is intended as a smaller, shorter-range, lower-cost capability to augment the existing Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). However, the committee further notes that the Department has expressed an intent to significantly increase production rates of LRASM over the next 5 years.

Carrier aviation faces unique constraints on sortie numbers, range, and onboard stores of munitions. These limitations make op-

timization of the Navy's air-launched, anti-ship weapon portfolio critical to ensuring mission success. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 1, 2027, on the planned portfolio of air-launched, anti-ship weapons in development and procurement over the next decade. This briefing shall include, but is not limited to:

(1) Recommended missile mix and loadouts, considering cost per engagement considerations;

(2) Current threshold and objective range requirements for the anti-ship missile portfolio, and any recent changes made to these requirements; and

(3) The intended acquisition pathway for these programs.

**Arctic wargaming and operational simulation capability**

The committee recognizes the growing strategic importance of the Arctic region and the increasing operational challenges posed by extreme cold weather environments, contested logistics, limited infrastructure, and expanding military activity by strategic competitors. The committee believes that the Department of Defense must continue to improve its ability to plan, train, and operate in Arctic and high-latitude environments across all domains.

The committee notes the importance of advanced wargaming and operational simulation capabilities to support planning and preparedness for Arctic operations, including multi-domain operations, contested logistics, maritime security, and crisis response scenarios. The committee further believes that such capabilities can support improved coordination among the combatant commands, the military services, the Coast Guard, interagency partners, and allied and partner nations operating in the Arctic region.

The committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to continue developing and expanding Arctic-focused wargaming and simulation capabilities to support operational planning, experimentation, and exercises in extreme cold weather and high-latitude environments. In doing so, the committee encourages the Department to prioritize: (1) Simulation and modeling of multi-domain operations in Arctic environments; (2) Testing and analysis of contested logistics networks in remote and austere regions with limited infrastructure; (3) Development of operational concepts and response protocols for maritime security, environmental incidents, and crisis response in the Arctic; (4) Use of high-fidelity virtual models of Arctic terrain, maritime chokepoints, and gray zone scenarios; and (5) Deployment of mobile or expeditionary simulation capabilities that can support units operating in remote locations where permanent infrastructure is limited.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing, not later than February 3, 2027, to the congressional defense committees on the Department's efforts to develop and expand Arctic-focused wargaming and operational simulation capabilities. The briefing shall include: (1) An update on current and planned initiatives; (2) A list of participating organizations; (3) A description of how the capabilities integrate with combatant command planning and exercises; (4) Details on coordination with al-

lies and partners; and (5) Any identified capability gaps or resource requirements associated with Arctic operational simulation and training.

**Army Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Modular Open Suite of Standards Mounted Form Factor program**

The committee commends the Army's progress advancing Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) technologies such as the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C5ISR) Modular Open Suite of Standards (CMOSS) to speed technology refresh, reduce life cycle costs, and increase industry competition. The committee further commends the Army for progressing the CMOSS Mounted Form Factor (CMFF) program as the flagship program that the Portfolio Acquisition Executive Command and Control and Counter Command-and-Control will use to demonstrate the value of the Department of Defense's November 7, 2025 acquisition memo principles, including prioritizing speed, MOSA implementations, and industrial agility.

The committee strongly encourages the Army to accelerate CMFF program resourcing. Army prioritization of CMFF will benefit efforts across the Department including the Army Next Generation Command and Control initiative, the Marine Corps ground electronic warfare (EW) and communication programs, and Navy surface fleet EW initiatives. Failure to effectively resource and accelerate this early MOSA program will slow industry adoption and prevent the services from realizing the benefits of the evolving CMOSS standard that hundreds of companies have adopted.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than April 1, 2027, to the congressional defense committees on the schedule to accelerate CMFF along with a detailed list of vehicles and platforms that will host CMFF.

**Army investment in autonomous surface vessels**

The committee recognizes the potential of integrating commercial autonomous surface vessel technologies into the Army watercraft fleet for logistics support.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report, not later than March 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, on its efforts related to autonomous surface vessel technology. The report shall include:

(1) An overview of current and planned Army investments in autonomous surface vessel programs, including a detailed breakdown of efforts to leverage commercially available platforms and technologies;

(2) An assessment of:

(a) how those investments address gaps identified in operational plans for contested and uncontested environments; and

(b) the suitability of vessels being procured for needs in the Indo-Pacific theater, such as sea state survivability,

payload capacity, range, survivability, resilient communications, and navigation;

(3) Plans to test and evaluate available platforms, including under contractor-owned, contractor-operated arrangements;

(4) A description of collaboration with other services on autonomous surface vessel development activities; and

(5) A 5-year roadmap for expanding investment in commercial autonomous surface vessel offerings, with consideration of operational priorities, budgetary planning, and industrial base capacity.

**Army Mobile Tactical Cannon modernization and artillery automation**

The committee remains concerned that current towed and semi-automated artillery systems place significant physical and cognitive burdens on cannon crews, particularly during sustained high-intensity and large-scale combat operations. The committee notes that manual loading, ammunition handling, and resupply of 155mm artillery systems contribute to crew fatigue, reduce sustained rates of fire, increase logistical strain, and extend the amount of time artillery units remain stationary and vulnerable to counter-battery fires and unmanned aerial system threats.

The committee believes the Army's Mobile Tactical Cannon (MTC) modernization efforts present an important opportunity to improve survivability, lethality, mobility, and soldier effectiveness through the integration of advanced automation technologies. The committee further believes that increased automation across the full kill chain and sustainment cycle can reduce soldier workload, improve operational tempo, support "shoot-and-move" tactics, and enable smaller crew sizes while sustaining or increasing combat effectiveness.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Army to prioritize highly automated solutions in the development and acquisition of future MTC systems. In evaluating modernization approaches, the committee encourages the Army to consider systems that incorporate: (1) Automated ammunition handling and chambering systems designed to increase the rate of fire while reducing manual lifting and repetitive physical strain on soldiers; (2) Digital fire-control systems that reduce manual data entry requirements and support automated laying and targeting functions; and (3) Autonomous or semi-autonomous ammunition resupply and transfer mechanisms capable of improving survivability and reducing resupply timelines between ammunition carriers and firing platforms.

Furthermore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than March 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the MTC acquisition and modernization strategy. The briefing shall include: (1) A comparison of estimated soldier physical workload requirements between current artillery systems and proposed automated solutions; (2) An explanation of how automation, crew reduction, and soldier workload reduction are being evaluated within ongoing self-propelled howitzer modernization efforts; (3) A description of plans to integrate automated or autonomous ammunition resupply capabilities into future artillery formations; and (4)

An assessment of how automation may improve survivability, operational tempo, sustained rates of fire, and force structure requirements for future field artillery units.

**Army rifle-mounted aiming laser strategy**

The committee supports the Department of the Army's efforts to improve soldier lethality through modernization of its inventory of legacy close combat weapons, ammunition, and individual aiming and fire control systems. The Army is currently pursuing several development programs to modernize its inventory of infantry weapons, ammunition, and aiming systems like the AN/PEQ–15. However, the committee is concerned that the Army has not yet developed a strategy for replacing their aging rifle-mounted aiming and illumination lasers and notes numerous commercially available alternatives.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report, not later than March 31, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the assessment of commercially available rifle-mounted aiming lasers to replace current legacy systems.

**Army small unmanned aerial systems munitions**

The committee is concerned that the Army lacks a clear roadmap for mass production of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) munitions, despite adequate funding.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than April 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on weapons systems delivered through sUAS. The briefing shall describe: (1) The quantity of droppable or kinetic weapon systems delivered through sUAS required for the Army; (2) The current number of qualified weapons suitable to support the sUAS lethality needs of the Army; (3) A roadmap with fielding options to fulfill lethality needs; and (4) The status of funding provided for such munitions systems included in the fiscal year 2028 president's budget request and across the future years defense program.

**Army small Unmanned Aircraft Systems scaling and deployment strategy**

The committee recognizes the increasing operational importance of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) at the tactical level, particularly for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, force protection, offensive capabilities, and combined arms maneuvers. The war in Ukraine underscores the decisive advantage conferred by rapidly deployable, attritable, and networked sUAS capabilities in contested environments. The committee is concerned that the Army's current approach to procuring, scaling, and fielding sUAS to tactical units remains fragmented and insufficient to meet emerging operational requirements. While the Army has made progress through experimentation and limited fielding, the committee lacks a comprehensive understanding of how these efforts are being integrated into a sustained, large-scale deployment of sUAS as a core element of tactical unit capability.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than February 12, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives that describes its strategy to scale the production, procurement, and deployment of sUAS to tactical units. The strategy shall include: (1) An assessment of current and projected sUAS requirements across echelons from squad through brigade, including mission sets and anticipated quantities; (2) A description of programs of record, rapid acquisition efforts, and progress made in collaboration with Department of Defense initiatives intended to field sUAS capabilities to tactical units; (3) An explanation of how the Army plans to leverage nontraditional defense partners, especially those with battlefield tested solutions, commercial solutions, and modular or open-architecture designs to accelerate scaling and reduce cost; (4) A discussion of sustainment, training, logistics, and data integration requirements necessary to employ sUAS effectively at the tactical level; (5) An assessment of vulnerabilities related to counter-UAS threats, electronic warfare, cyber security, and supply chain risks, and how the Army intends to mitigate those vulnerabilities; (6) Identification of statutory, regulatory, or resource constraints that may limit the Army's ability to rapidly scale and deploy sUAS capabilities; and (7) Any recommended legislative actions.

**Assessment of Army night vision capabilities**

The committee supports the Army's development of advanced night vision capabilities, including its new Soldier Borne Mission Command (SBMC) and Enhanced Night Vision Goggle-Binocular (ENVG–B) program. The committee understands that while SBMC is in development, ENVG–B is being fielded today and provides superior night vision capabilities. The committee strongly believes soldiers first and foremost need to be able to see, fight, and win at night and wants to better understand the capabilities SBMC and other night vision devices provide when evaluated.

The committee is also concerned with the threat from adversary forces' night vision capabilities related to infrared lasers and the Army's ability to own the night.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report, not later than January 1, 2027, to the congressional defense committees that tests the night vision capabilities of SBMC against all other fielded night vision devices, including PVS–14, PVS–31, and ENVG–B. The report shall include details regarding the following, at a minimum: (1) Detection and recognition of low light and thermal sensors; (2) Weight; and (3) Discussion of power consumption, battery use, including weight of batteries required to conduct a standard mission. Additionally, the report shall address any activities the Army is taking to conceal our ability to target at night from threat forces, including using novel technologies such as short-wave infrared for aiming lasers and any current and future plans for budgeting and procuring these types of technologies.

**Assessment of commercially available aviation night vision systems**

The committee is aware of the Department of the Army's continued reliance on large inventories of legacy aviator night vision imaging systems despite efforts to produce replacement capabilities. The committee understands that the commercial industry is producing advanced light-weight night vision systems that meet Federal Aviation Administration flight certification requirements and are in use by select U.S. law enforcement and military units. These systems meet or exceed Army requirements for image intensification, field of view, weight, and compatibility.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than March 31, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives that includes:

(1) A summary of night vision systems currently in use across Army aviation force structure, including performance specifications and inventory quantities for each system;

(2) A description of operational improvements sought to current capabilities to include image intensification and increased panoramic field of view;

(3) An assessment of the impact of the weight of the current night vision system on aviator neck strain and injuries;

(4) An assessment of commercial, off-the-shelf night vision systems that meet or exceed Army requirements as suitable replacements for existing aviation night vision systems; and

(5) An analysis of fielding such commercial, off-the-shelf solution(s) to replace legacy aviator night vision imaging systems in lieu of continuing existing advanced development efforts, including a comparison of fielding timeline and cost.

**B–21 force structure and production strategy**

The committee is concerned that the current program of record for the B–21 Raider may be insufficient to meet the requirements of the 2026 National Defense Strategy. The committee notes that the program of record for 100 aircraft has remained unchanged since 2015, despite significant changes in the security environment, including the expansion of China's nuclear forces. The committee further recognizes that a range of senior national security leaders, including the Chair of the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission and former commanders of U.S. Strategic Command, have called for an expansion of the B–21 fleet. The committee also notes that Congress has provided funding to expand B–21 production capacity.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command and the Direct Reporting Program Manager for the Critical Major Weapon Systems Programs, to submit a report and provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the force structure and production strategy for the B–21 aircraft. The report shall include:

(1) An assessment of the number of B–21 aircraft required to meet the nuclear and conventional mission requirements of the 2026 National Defense Strategy, including the analytical basis and assumptions used to determine such requirement;

(2) A comparison of the required number of aircraft described in paragraph (1) with the current program of record, including an assessment of any capability gaps or risks associated with the current program;

(3) A production plan to meet the required quantity of aircraft identified pursuant to paragraph (1), including options for production rates and timelines, as well as options to accelerate production;

(4) An assessment of the industrial base capacity and investments required to support the production plan described in paragraph (3);

(5) A strategy for procuring the necessary spares, maintenance, and sustainment capabilities to support the required fleet, including depot and workforce requirements; and

(6) An assessment of the aerial refueling tanker capacity required to support the fleet size identified pursuant to paragraph (1), including any associated force structure or procurement implications.

**Body armor technology production capacity**

The committee recognizes the importance of maintaining sufficient capacity within the defense industrial base to meet peacetime body armor requirements and to surge production in wartime. The committee is concerned that current procurement practices risk limiting the defense industrial base's ability to respond to body armor requirements during periods of increased operational demand, particularly in support of large-scale combat operations.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, to submit a report, not later than March 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the Department of Defense's strategy to meet its body armor requirements over the future years defense program.

The report shall be submitted in an unclassified form and may include a classified annex. This report should include:

(1) A description of the adequacy of current body armor inventories, including an analysis of the impact of previously provided or planned U.S. security assistance to allied and partner nations on Department inventories and readiness;

(2) A forecast of future requirements of both existing and new technologies;

(3) A holistic assessment of industrial base capacity across the supply chain to meet Department requirements, including an assessment of domestic supply chain vulnerabilities, risks, and surge capacity;

(4) A focused assessment of domestic industrial base capacity for ceramic body armor materials, including minimum sustaining production rates, surge capacity requirements, and identification of capacity at risk due to demand uncertainty; and

(5) Any other elements the Secretary deems relevant.

**Briefing on autonomous air-to-air cruise missile and drone defense**

The committee is concerned that large-scale attacks involving low-cost cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems, such as the April 13, 2024, attack by Iran against Israel, expose significant limitations in current air-to-air defensive concepts that rely on high-cost, quantity-limited interceptors. The committee notes ongoing advances in autonomous technologies that may enable more effective and scalable defenses using lower-cost weapons.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Director of the Air Force Research Laboratory and the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on plans to develop and field autonomous or semi-autonomous air-to-air capabilities to counter cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems.

The briefing shall include:

(1) A description of relevant ongoing and planned efforts;

(2) The feasibility of employing lower-cost weapons, including onboard guns and the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System;

(3) Expected impacts on pilot workload and engagement effectiveness;

(4) Planned timelines, funding, and acquisition pathways;

(5) Plans to field capabilities to forward-deployed forces, including in the Indo-Pacific; and

(6) Key barriers to implementation and any recommendations for legislative action.

**Briefing on E–11 Battlefield Airborne Communications Node capability replacement**

The committee is aware of the Department of the Air Force's decision to cancel the E–11 Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) capability, which has historically provided critical communications relay and data translation functions enabling joint and coalition operations, particularly in contested and communications-degraded environments. The committee is concerned about the operational risk associated with the loss of the E–11 BACN capability and the lack of clarity regarding the Department's plan to mitigate resulting gaps in airborne communications, data integration, and battle management.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the Department's plan to address capability gaps resulting from the cancellation of the E–11 BACN capability.

The briefing shall include:

(1) A detailed justification for the decision to cancel the E–11 BACN capability, including cost, survivability, and operational considerations;

(2) An assessment of the operational risks created by the cancellation, including impacts on joint all-domain command and control, communications interoperability, and support to combatant commander requirements;

(3) A description of alternative capabilities, programs, or concepts of operation the Department plans to employ to replicate or replace E–11 BACN functionality, including any space-based, airborne, or ground-based solutions;

(4) Associated timelines, funding requirements, and acquisition strategies for such alternatives;

(5) A description of how the Department will ensure continuity of communications relay and gateway capabilities in contested environments during any transition period; and

(6) An assessment of impacts to joint and coalition interoperability, including any risks to ongoing operations or contingency plans.

**Briefing on F–15E/EX training plan**

The committee requires a clear understanding of the Air Force's short- and long-term plans for training F–15 pilots and weapons system officers (WSOs). The Air Force operates the F–15C/D, F–15E, and F–15EX, and plans to retain all variants through at least 2030. All Basic Course (B Course) and Transition Course (TX) training occurs at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, and all Weapons Instructor Course training occurs at Nellis Air Force Base.

The committee is concerned that F–15 aircrew and WSO production may be constrained by limited instructor capacity, minimal Air National Guard participation in the two F–15 Formal Training Units (FTUs), unclear F–15EX mission priorities, declining FTU fleet health, delayed aircraft upgrades, extended TXs for non-fighter aircrew, and uncertainty regarding WSOs in the F–15EX. These challenges are compounded by two FTUs training students across three variants with competing Unit Summary Statements. The committee seeks clarity on how the Air Force and Air National Guard plan to meet aircrew requirements following the reduction of FTUs from three to two.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on a plan for the short- and long-term organization, training, and equipping of units producing F–15 aircrew and WSOs across active and reserve components.

**Briefing on F–47 sustainment**

The committee encourages the Department of the Air Force to ensure full organic sustainment capability for the F–47 aircraft and emphasizes the importance of establishing such capability prior to initial aircraft delivery, with sufficient lead time to ensure all required resources are in place. The committee notes that achieving full organic sustainment will require timely acquisition of intellectual property and technical data, as well as adequate planning for depot infrastructure, workforce capacity, and long-term resourcing.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the Department's plan to achieve full organic sustainment of the F–47 aircraft. The briefing shall include:

(1) A description of how the Department will acquire and maintain the intellectual property and technical data necessary to sustain the platform;

(2) The planned roles and responsibilities of the Air Force Sustainment Center;

(3) Required depot-level maintenance capabilities and associated infrastructure;

(4) Workforce requirements and considerations;

(5) An assessment of projected costs and the adequacy of current and future funding to support full organic sustainment; and

(6) Key milestones and risks associated with implementation, including any challenges that could delay the establishment of organic sustainment capability prior to aircraft delivery.

**Briefing on Marine Aviation Plan**

The committee understands that the U.S. Marine Corps has specific force structure modernization goals, but the committee needs more information and more frequent communication on legislative barriers, such as policy and military construction, that inhibit the implementation of the Marine Aviation Plan.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than February 1, 2027, regarding the Marine Corps Marine Aviation Plan, including the implications for Marine Corps aircraft force structures, recapitalization, training, and the sustainment of the active and reserve components of the Marine Corps.

**Briefings on Air Force sustainment funding and spare parts availability**

The committee remains concerned that current Air Force aircraft sustainment funding levels and spare parts availability may be insufficient to meet evolving global mission requirements. Current spare parts funding levels for the Air Force are estimated to support approximately 80 to 85 percent of weapon system sustainment requirements, contributing to grounded aircraft, cannibalization of parts, and reduced mission-capable rates across multiple fleets of the Air Force.

It is the committee's belief that the Secretary of the Air Force should improve the mission capable rates of Air Force aircraft by addressing spare parts shortages, depot repair backlogs, sustainment supply chain risks, and limitations on organic repair capability.

To ensure a clear understanding of these challenges, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, detailing aircraft sustainment metrics for the below-specified platforms over the previous 5 fiscal years. This report should include an analysis of enacted sustainment and spare parts funding compared to requested levels, an assessment of industry's capacity to meet these requirements, and an evaluation of the resulting mission risks for each platform.

To ensure rigorous oversight of the Air Force's readiness efforts, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide

quarterly reports to the congressional defense committees following the submission of the initial sustainment metrics report. Such quarterly updates shall include current data and trends for:

(1) The Air Force's progress toward achieving full sustainment funding requirements for each designated aircraft;

(2) Aircraft mission capable rates;

(3) Spare parts availability; and

(4) Cannibalization rates.

Aircraft to be included in the initial and quarterly reports are: F–35, F–15, F–16, RC–135, KC–135, and KC–46.

**Cargo projectile munition production**

The committee understands that cargo projectile munitions remain a critical instrument of war on the modern battlefield. In particular, the committee is aware that area effect cargo carrying projectiles, such as the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition, have proved to be a valuable tool in the arsenal of partner nations like Ukraine. Further, the committee notes that urgent requirements for area effects cargo carrying projectiles have depleted U.S. arsenals, necessitating new production.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report, not later than February 26, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the Department of the Army's plans to procure cargo projectile munitions. The report shall include:

(1) An analysis of the strategic and operational impact of Ukraine's employment of United States-supplied cargo projectiles, including cluster munitions, on Russia's ability to prosecute military operations in Ukraine since the February 2022 full-scale invasion;

(2) An analysis of the impact of this expenditure of cluster munitions on United States and allied stockpiles of cluster munitions and cargo projectiles more broadly;

(3) An analysis of current defense industrial base cargo munition production capacity, including within the defense organic industrial base, including the capability to surge production;

(4) Minimum sustaining production rates for cargo projectiles within the defense organic industrial base;

(5) Projected cargo munition procurement under the future years defense program; and

(6) Analysis of the workforce requirements needed to sustain projected production rates.

**CH–47 lightweight ballistic protection system upgrades**

The committee recognizes the importance of modernizing the CH–47 fleet with the latest advances in lightweight ballistic protection. Next-generation systems can reduce armor weight by up to 25 percent, which would enable the Army to meet current and future operational requirements while increasing payload capacity and extending range.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than February 26, 2027, to the Committees on

Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, including the following:

(1) The Army's plans for integrating lightweight ballistic protection system upgrades across the CH–47 fleet;

(2) Projected investment in rotary-wing ballistic protection across the future years defense program; and

(3) Plans to improve ballistic protection across the Army's rotary-wing fleet.

**Collaborative Combat Aircraft**

The committee notes the progress of the Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) Increment 1 and supports transition to full-rate production. The committee encourages the Navy and Marine Corps to leverage Air Force designs, technologies, and collaboration models to accelerate the development of their own CCA capabilities; however, the committee notes that the Navy and Marine Corps have provided comparatively limited updates on their CCA efforts relative to the Air Force and expects improved visibility going forward.

The committee supports keeping costs low without sacrificing capability and expects future CCA increments to provide sufficient range, speed, and power to enable autonomous self-deployment from the United States and effective operation in contested environments. The committee further notes the importance of maintaining a diverse set of propulsion options across CCA variants to support mission diversity, resilience, and supply chain risk reduction.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the impact of cost considerations on CCA requirements. The briefing shall address effects on platform characteristics and fleet-wide costs, including propulsion choices, and identify technology approaches, including commercial and modified off-the-shelf solutions, to reduce attrition and improve operational flexibility. The briefing shall also include the Navy's and Marine Corps' incorporated development strategies and technology leveraged from the Air Force CCA program, opportunities to update the tri-service agreement to align capabilities and resources, and the potential to field CCA as complementary to, or in place of, existing programs of record.

The committee also supports expanding exports to allies and partners through Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales and encourages the Department of Defense to facilitate exportability as expeditiously as possible.

**Commercially available extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles fielding acceleration**

The committee supports the Navy and the Defense Innovation Unit's (DIU) efforts to competitively demonstrate commercially available extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles (XLUUVs) capable of deploying large payloads across extended ranges in contested environments. Open competitions conducted by the Navy and the DIU in 2025 have identified commercial XLUUV platforms capable of providing scalable, cost-effective solutions to address

longstanding operational requirements in priority theaters, including U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to accelerate the Navy's adoption of XLUUV platforms down-selected as part of the Navy's Combat Autonomous Maritime Platform program in order to transition XLUUVs from experimentation to operational deployment and equip priority commands with the capabilities needed to meet fleet requirements.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on plans to accelerate the adoption and fielding of XLUUVs and associated payloads utilizing existing production contracts. The briefing shall include:

(1) A projected timeline for fielding XLUUV platforms selected by the Navy and the DIU to operational commands;

(2) The Navy's plan to accelerate the integration, demonstration, and deployment of commercial and government-furnished payloads deployed from XLUUVs;

(3) Options to leverage new approaches to operations, including commercially-owned, commercially-operated models to accelerate transition and reduce doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities costs; and

(4) Any other matters the Secretary deems relevant.

**Complementary radar solutions for low, slow, small, unmanned aircraft systems integrated defeat systems**

The committee believes that certain commercial radar solutions may be effective as complementary radar solutions for low, slow, small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) integrated defeat systems (LIDS).

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Joint Interagency Task Force 401, to conduct an evaluation of commercially available radars capable of enhancing the Army's LIDS effort. In conducting the evaluation, the Army should assess:

(1) The ability of complementary, commercial hybrid, and/or passive, distributed radar solutions to operate from fixed sites, mobile platforms, elevated platforms, unmanned ground vehicles, and/or tethered to UAS;

(2) The ability of complementary solutions to easily hand off tracks to Ku Band radars integrated into modern Army command and control systems to cue kinetic and/or non-kinetic interceptors;

(3) The technical maturity, reliability, maintainability, cybersecurity, and operational suitability of complementary solutions;

(4) The extent to which the capability supports repairability, sustainment affordability, and reduced vendor lock;

(5) Feedback from military operators on ease of use, deployability, mobility, survivability, user interface, and operational utility, as available;

(6) The affordability of complementary systems, including procurement cost, operating and sustainment cost, manpower requirements, and cost-exchange ratio; and

(7) The ability of the complementary system to be integrated through government-owned or licensed interfaces.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than June 30, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on its findings in its evaluation. The briefing shall include:

(1) A description of the capabilities assessed;

(2) The test methodology, operational scenarios, and evaluation criteria used;

(3) An assessment of the ability of the complementary solutions to enhance LIDS;

(4) Feedback from the military users in the assessment;

(5) An assessment of integration requirements, including interfaces, data rights, cybersecurity requirements, command-and-control integration, and sustainment considerations;

(6) An assessment of affordability, including procurement cost, operating and sustainment cost, manpower requirements, and cost-exchange ratio; and

(7) Any other elements the Secretary deems relevant.

**Comptroller General review of Army light tactical wheeled vehicle program management**

The committee recognizes that the Army is pivoting its tactical vehicle strategy toward lighter, unarmored systems like the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) to better suit Indo-Pacific operations. Evidence suggests that key performance parameters for reliability and survivability may have been de-scoped to justify production despite documented test failures. Furthermore, the heavy use of commercial-off-the-shelf components may leave the Army without the technical data needed for long-term maintenance, creating a "vendor lock" scenario. By utilizing accelerated acquisition authorities, the service is bypassing traditional oversight and suppressing durability benchmarks to meet aggressive 2030 fielding timelines.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review the Army's Light Tactical Vehicle program management, addressing the following: (1) The extent to which the Army's decision to move the ISV to full-rate production in 2023–25 involved formal waivers of reliability and other standards; (2) How plans to procure Tactical Wheeled Vehicles are structured to secure sufficient intellectual property for maintenance of commercial-off-the-shelf platforms like the ISV; (3) The projected effects of the Army's decision to cease Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) procurement on estimated sustainment costs and the long-term viability of the tactical wheeled vehicle industrial base; (4) The effect of the Army's JLTV decision, as the Joint Program Executive Office, on other services' JLTV acquisition efforts; and (5) The extent to which the use of middle tier of acquisition or other rapid-fielding authorities for the ISV and future "Mobile Brigade Combat Team" platforms achieve Office of the Secretary of Defense-level testing approvals or involve waiving durability benchmarks.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than April 16, 2027, with a report to follow in a mutually agreed upon format and time frame.

**Comptroller General review of Counter-small Unmanned Aerial Systems**

The committee notes the increased role of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) on the battlefield, especially in current conflicts in Ukraine and Iran. In August 2025, the Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for Counter-small UAS (C–sUAS) and directed the Army to establish Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) 401 to align authorities and resources. At that time, the Secretary of Defense emphasized the need to focus on speed in outpacing threats and ensuring air sovereignty and directed the completion of specific activities to better assure the success of this organization. Additionally, the Congress modified section 199(g) of title 10, United States Code, to require the Task Force Director to report annually to the congressional defense committees on their progress.

The committee is supportive of the Department of Defense's efforts and is committed to ensuring that funds are used to develop C–sUAS capabilities that protect warfighters. To that end, the committee seeks to better understand how the Army has addressed the Secretary of Defense's requirements for JIATF 401 and is using this task force to acquire needed C–sUAS capabilities.

The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review the Army's efforts to establish the task force and use it to develop and acquire C–sUAS capabilities or procure commercially available solutions. This assessment should: (1) Assess whether the Army has completed the tasks directed in the Secretary of Defense's August 2025 memo; (2) Assess the Army's processes for identifying current and future requirements for C–sUAS capabilities; (3) Evaluate the extent to which the Army's efforts to acquire C–sUAS technologies are consistent with relevant leading practices pertaining to product development and risk management; and (4) Assess improved communication across the Joint Force on C–sUAS capabilities.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than April 16, 2027, on the preliminary findings of the assessment, with additional work to follow at a mutually agreed upon time and in a mutually agreed upon format.

**Comptroller General review of Soldier Borne Mission Command systems**

The committee notes the critical role that battlefield awareness and integrated systems play in soldiers' decision-making. As the Army works to deliver a single platform to improve sensing and situational awareness, the committee remains supportive of an integrated soldier-borne solution for the tactical community. The committee remains committed, however, to provide oversight of the new acquisition pathway being pursued by the Army to deliver on the Soldier Borne Mission Command (SBMC) initiative given the

history of the program's cost, schedule, and user acceptance challenges.

The committee seeks to better understand how the Army's acquisition approach will support iterative development of a solution that will out-perform current equipment, be accepted by soldiers, and accept modular upgrades to keep pace with a changing battlefield. Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review: (1) The extent to which the Army is using iterative development informed by user feedback; (2) How the Army is addressing challenges with previous prototypes such as wearability and low-light performance; (3) How the Army plans to ensure the SBMC system meets user needs in operationally realistic environments before proceeding with production; (4) The extent to which the SBMC is being developed using a modular open systems approach to enable future upgrades; (5) Whether the Army's cost, scope, and schedule estimates of the SBMC program are reliable and consistent with Government Accountability Office leading practices; and (6) Whether the Army's contracting approach and risk reduction steps include the acquisition of data rights needed to maintain and sustain key capabilities.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide a briefing, not later than April 16, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the question of a single integrated system, with additional work to address the question of alternative options to follow at a mutually agreed upon time and in a mutually agreed upon format.

**Conversions to Air National Guard Contingency Response Groups**

The committee understands that the Air National Guard is converting several units to Contingency Response Groups (CRG). The committee is interested in the progress associated with these conversions, including the necessary funding for manning and equipment to support conversions. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than February 1, 2027, that includes the following:

(1) A list of the units identified for conversion;

(2) The planned timeline for conversion of each unit;

(3) Current manning of each unit identified for conversion;

(4) Manning necessary for each newly established CRG and planned timeline for reaching required CRG manning levels;

(5) Equipment necessary for the new CRGs, existing equipment gaps for each converting unit, and plan, including timeline, for fully equipping each unit;

(6) Funding necessary for the conversion for each unit, whether funding has yet been allocated for each conversion and reasoning why funding has not yet been allocated or has been diverted from the conversion; and

(7) Risks to the mission should the deadlines for conversion not be met, including impacts on recent operations such as Operation Epic Fury.

**Counter small uncrewed aerial systems at southern border**

The committee notes with concern reports of increased uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) activity along the southern land border of the United States, including their potential use for reconnaissance and smuggling by transnational criminal organizations. The committee commends recent Department of Defense efforts to address domestic UAS incursions but remains concerned that forces operating along the southern border are not yet widely equipped with counter-UAS systems that can effectively mitigate threats within the Homeland.

Therefore, the committee encourages Joint Interagency Task Force 401 and Joint Task Force—Southern Border to prioritize collaboration on the rapid delivery of cost-effective, low-collateral-effects interceptors capable of safe kinetic mitigation of UAS along the southern land border within the United States. The committee further notes that operational challenges exist in this threat environment including the need to account for safety risks in mitigating drones over civilian inhabited areas, including the risk of falling debris from disabled UAS.

**Counter—unmanned aircraft systems low-altitude detection capabilities**

The committee is concerned with the increasing use of small, low-altitude unmanned aircraft systems to conduct surveillance, disrupt operations, or threaten military installations and other Department of Defense facilities. Effective counter—unmanned aircraft system operations require persistent detection and tracking of small, slow-moving airborne objects operating in complex, low-altitude environments.

The Department has long employed avian radar systems to mitigate bird-aircraft strike hazards at military airfields. The committee believes that commercially available avian radar technologies incorporate detection, tracking, and classification capabilities that may be adaptable for counter—unmanned aircraft system missions. The committee understands that such systems are already deployed at military and civilian facilities and believes that they may offer a cost-effective, non-kinetic, dual-use option to complement existing counter—unmanned aircraft system sensor architectures.

Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and in coordination with the military departments, to assess the operational utility of adapting existing avian radar technologies for counter—unmanned aircraft system detection and tracking at fixed installations, including opportunities for limited pilot efforts and integration with existing command and control systems, as appropriate.

**DDG 51 multiyear procurement**

The committee notes that the Navy's Golden Fleet announcement in December 2025 laid out a new path forward for large surface combatants with the transition from the design of the current next generation destroyer, DDG(X). That plan also includes a new guid-

ed missile battleship, BBG(X). A critical part of this plan is the need to continue to build DDG–51 Flight III destroyers well into the future.

The current DDG–51 multiyear procurement (MYP) contract ends in fiscal year 2027. The committee supports the need for a new MYP contract beginning in fiscal year 2028 and directs the Secretary of the Navy to plan for such a contract in fiscal year 2028 for up to 15 ships.

**Department of Defense approach to countering cellular-enabled unmanned aerial systems**

The committee recognizes the growing threat posed by commercially available unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that leverage cellular networks, including 4G LTE and 5G, for command and control and data transmission. These systems can operate beyond line-of-sight, evade traditional radio frequency-based countermeasures, and blend into civilian telecommunications traffic, complicating detection, attribution, and mitigation efforts.

The committee believes that the Department of Defense must adopt a proactive, layered, and technology-driven approach to countering cellular-enabled UAS threats, prioritizing capabilities that operate across the full spectrum of detection, identification, and mitigation, while ensuring coordination with civil authorities and minimizing disruption to lawful civilian communications.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing, not later than April 16, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the Department's approach to countering cellular-enabled UAS. The briefing shall include:

(1) An assessment of the current and projected threat, including the use of commercial cellular infrastructure and autonomous capabilities, as well as gaps in threat characterization and planned or feasible means to address these gaps;

(2) An evaluation of the Department's ability to detect, identify, and track such systems, including gaps in existing radio frequency-based approaches and feasible solutions to address these gaps;

(3) A description of available and planned non-kinetic and kinetic mitigation options, including the feasibility of network-enabled or cyber-based effects;

(4) An assessment of operational, legal, and policy limitations associated with countering such threats within the United States;

(5) A description of coordination efforts with interagency partners and commercial telecommunications providers; and

(6) Recommendations that can be enacted within 180 days for a funded pilot to address the challenges of this emerging threat.

The committee further encourages the Department to prioritize the development and fielding of capabilities that enable persistent sensing, integration with telecommunications data where appropriate, and "left-of-launch" disruption of threats, while minimizing impacts to lawful civilian communications.

**Drone Center of Excellence in Army National Guard**

The committee recognizes the significant role drones play in current military operations and is concerned that the Army does not have a plan to expand the capability into the Army National Guard. The committee believes that a Drone Center of Excellence (COE) within the Army National Guard at a National Guard training site would not only build capability and readiness in the Guard but expand the Army's ability to contribute to the Joint Force.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report, not later than April 16, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the advisability and feasibility of establishing a Drone Center of Excellence within the Army National Guard at a National Guard training site. The Secretary shall consider the following functions of said COE when making his determination: (1) Certification of operators of unmanned aerial systems during annual training periods; (2) Development of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the operation of such systems; (3) Experimentation on integrating artificial intelligence applications for target recognition and real-time situational awareness into the operation of such systems; and (4) Conduct of force-on-force unmanned aerial systems exercises, including brigade-level "drone wars" experimentation integrated with infantry, armor, and joint formations.

**Enabling integration of additional capabilities into Integrated Battle Command System**

The proliferation of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack unmanned aerial systems, combined with the prospect of raid-sized and prolonged attacks, places a premium on integrated air and missile defense architectures that maximize battlespace awareness, improve shot doctrine, and preserve advanced interceptor inventories. The Army's Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) is the Army's primary effort to realize an any-sensor, best-interceptor architecture that can integrate additional sensors and effectors, expand the defended area, and improve magazine depth by matching the most appropriate interceptor to each threat.

The Army's current approach to integrating sensors and effectors into the IBCS focuses on "1–N" integration. Instead, the Army should consider a more agile and scalable approach that enables the concurrent integration of multiple sensors and effectors through open architecture, leveraging software-driven development, and close collaboration with industry partners. The committee encourages the Army to accelerate the integration of joint and allied sensors and effectors.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than February 26, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, on efforts to accelerate the integration of the IBCS. The briefing shall include: (1) An update on progress on integrating the IBCS; (2) A description of barriers, including cost, to expanding integration efforts; (3) A discussion on operational lessons incorporated from recent conflicts into integration efforts; (4) A description of how the Army is leveraging the IBCS to improve shot doctrine, conserve ad-

vanced interceptors, and sustain magazine depth during protracted operations; and (5) How the service intends to expand the number of allies and partners that are acquiring and deploying the IBCS to strengthen missile defense integration across theaters of operation.

**Evaluation of wing-in-ground effect craft**

The Department of Defense requires a range of flexible, survivable, and rapidly deployable mobility platforms to support distributed operations, contested logistics, and maritime maneuvers across multiple theaters.

The committee understands that the Marine Corps has undertaken development, prototyping, and operational evaluation activities related to wing-in-ground effect craft as part of broader efforts to support logistics for Stand-In Forces and Marine Littoral Regiments. The committee views these efforts as a valuable contribution to the Department's broader understanding of the potential military utility of wing-in-ground craft in making a contribution to solving the contested logistics problems facing the Department.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's assessment of wing-in-ground effect craft. The report should include the following:

(1) An overview of the Department's plans for experimentation, testing, and evaluation activities related to wing-in-ground effect craft across the military departments and combatant commands;

(2) An assessment of potential operational roles for such platforms in support of joint missions, including distributed maritime operations, logistics support, special operations, and maritime interdiction;

(3) A description of how the Department may be considering the integration of wing-in-ground effect craft into joint and service-level concepts of operations;

(4) An assessment of potential advantages associated with wing-in-ground effect craft, including survivability, sustainment, basing, interoperability, and command and control considerations;

(5) A projection of the resources that would be required to support further experimentation, concept development, and potential integration of wing-in-ground effect craft into joint operations; and

(6) A discussion of any policy, acquisition, or regulatory barriers that could affect development, testing, or operational employment of wing-in-ground effect craft.

**FireGuard access to commercial data**

The committee recognizes the importance of the National Guard's FireGuard program in equipping State National Guard units to detect wildfires, notify authorities, and develop products for dissemination to firefighting networks nationwide. Relying on satellites from the National Interagency Fire Center, U.S. Forest Service, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, FireGuard is particularly helpful at detecting wildfires in remote locations and at

abnormal times. Yet the committee would also note the maturation of commercial satellite technology to deliver rapid-refresh, high-resolution, multispectral infrared data, particularly within wildfire satellite monitoring constellations. There may be opportunities to incorporate commercial data into the FireGuard program to expand its capabilities, improve accuracy, deliver high-quality data to emergency managers, and ultimately free up exquisite national assets for higher priority missions without risking firefighting efforts.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, which should include an assessment of the feasibility and advisability of purchasing and integrating rapid-refresh, high-resolution, multispectral infrared data from commercial wildfire satellite monitoring providers.

**Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Integration**

The committee notes that the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) program represents an innovative and cost-effective capability developed by industry at significant private expense, including the establishment of dedicated production infrastructure without initial government investment. The program demonstrates a strong approach to diversifying and strengthening the defense industrial base by combining established prime contractors with new market entrants, creating a more resilient and competitive supply chain that complements efforts such as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System—Extended Range.

The committee further recognizes the significant export potential of this capability, which can enhance allied interoperability and strengthen partner nation deterrence at lower cost and with rapid fielding potential.

Additionally, the committee highlights the successful integration of GLSDB with the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, supported through reconciliation and developmental funding, and notes the expectation for continued rapid progress toward operational deployment. This effort underscores the value of leveraging existing platforms with advanced munitions to deliver affordable, scalable, and near-term combat capability for the Joint Force and allied partners.

**Increasing and diversifying munitions inventories**

The committee supports the Department of Defense's efforts to increase production capacity for critical munitions. However, the committee is concerned that the Department's proposals largely focus on expanding output along existing, traditional production lines and do not sufficiently broaden the industrial base or diversify the inventory with affordable, mass producible munitions. A more balanced mix of munitions combining exquisite capabilities with affordable, mass-produced systems is needed to reset the economics of "cost-per-kill" and ensure sufficient magazine depth for sustained operations. In support of these initiatives, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) provided the Department with multiyear procurement author-

ity for multiple lower cost weapons programs to generate a consistent demand signal for lower-cost munitions providers.

However, the committee believes the Department needs to have additional lower cost munitions to complement exquisite capabilities, diversify munitions inventory, and mitigate risks associated with insufficient capacity to effectively sustain long-range fires in a protracted conflict. The Department, in coordination with the services, should increase capacity by providing a multi-year demand signal through multiple complementary affordable, mass producible munitions programs of record, and the accelerated identification and scaling of production-ready capabilities. Additionally, the committee believes that the Department should consider affordability and manufacturability in developing the Department's munitions requirements.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than January 1, 2027, on munitions programs. The briefing shall, at a minimum, address the following:

(1) The total munitions requirements over the future years defense program for all munitions, including the quantities needed to meet urgent, high-volume surge capacity in the event of conflict;

(2) The planned total munitions inventory over the future years defense program for all programmed munitions;

(3) An identification of production-ready lower cost munitions that could be capable of closing identified inventory gaps that the Department has assessed for affordability and capability of scaling production quantities; and

(4) A detailed strategy for implementing a mixture of exquisite and affordable munitions to fill munitions requirements.

**Long Range Fires acquisition strategy**

The committee recognizes the high importance of next generation artillery rounds, such as the M1128 and XM1113, to deliver increased range to the warfighter. The committee also understands the need to expeditiously scale production of these rounds to replenish depleted artillery war stocks. Additionally, the committee understands the complexity of the supply chain to deliver critical rounds to the warfighter.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report, not later than March 31, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the Army acquisition strategy for the procurement of M1128 and XM1113 artillery rounds.

**Navy destroyer production**

The committee notes that the Navy plans to begin advance procurement of a battleship program in fiscal year 2027, called the BBG(X). This effort is to design and build a ship that would carry a high capacity of offensive missiles in addition to Standard Missile air defense weapons.

For several years, the Navy has been designing a follow-on to the *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyers (DDG–51). The program is called the DDG(X) program. The goal of this effort is to provide major up-

grades to the current destroyer design and continue to build destroyers to replace the early DDG–51 destroyers that are approaching the end of their useful service lives. These ships will begin retiring at a rate of three to five per year starting in the mid-2030s.

Initial estimates of the unit cost of the BBG(X) are between $12.0 billion and $13.0 billion. At that price point, the Navy cannot afford to replace retiring DDG–51s with BBG(X) battleships on a one-for-one basis.

Therefore, the committee believes that:

(1) The Navy needs to continue work on the DDG(X) program so it will have options for replacing the early DDG–51s when their useful service lives have expired;

(2) Work on the DDG(X) program needs to continue along roughly the same schedule as was envisioned last year; and

(3) Design and construction of the BBG(X) should not supplant the important work that needs to continue on the DDG(X).

**Networked autonomous kinetic capability against small unmanned aerial systems**

The committee recognizes that recent conflicts have demonstrated the rapid proliferation, increased lethality, and evolving sophistication of Group 1 and Group 2 unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to include First-Person-View drones and coordinated swarming tactics capable of targeting across the battlefield. The committee notes that these threats have proven increasingly resilient against current countermeasures and have exposed significant vulnerabilities across the force.

The committee notes that many existing Department of Defense counter-UAS investments have focused on high-cost, low-density air defense solutions that are not suitable for broad deployment across formations. The committee is concerned that efforts to adapt legacy remote weapon stations for counter-UAS missions have not produced scalable or sufficiently autonomous capabilities needed to protect maneuver and sustainment formations in contested environments.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Army to establish requirements for a networked, autonomous kinetic counter-UAS capability designed to protect ground combat, support, and on-the-move formations against Group 1 and Group 2 UAS threats. Such capabilities should seek to minimize soldier cognitive burden, leverage common-service weapons and existing platform architectures where feasible, enable autonomous and robotic operations, and provide a cost-effective solution suitable for large-scale deployment across tactical formations.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 26, 2027, on the assessment of current capability gaps, integration challenges, and operational requirements associated with fielding scalable autonomous counter-UAS protection systems for maneuver and sustainment formations.

**Non-kinetic effectors for point defense**

The committee appreciates the Department of Defense's focus on counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) technology evaluation and investment in preparing for emerging threats. However, repeated reports of drone incursions at critical Air Force installations in the Homeland and abroad causes the committee to be concerned that the Air Force's investments in counter-UAS technologies for air base air defense systems (ABADS) are insufficient.

Of particular note is the Air Force's lack of plans to employ non-kinetic effectors for point defense. The committee encourages the Air Force to accelerate the evaluation and potential deployment of non-kinetic effectors, such as high power microwave systems, to defend critical points against UAS threats.

The committee directs the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in coordination with the Commander of Air Combat Command, to deliver a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, that includes:

(1) A summary of existing non-kinetic solutions for critical point defense under the ABADS architecture and plans for the evaluation of emerging technologies, such as high power microwave systems;

(2) An analysis of options for accelerating the adoption of non-kinetic effectors for critical point defense, as well as associated resourcing requirements;

(3) A review of interagency barriers impeding the rapid deployment of non-kinetic effectors in domestic airspace, including efforts to alleviate such barriers alongside interagency stakeholders; and

(4) Any further matters deemed necessary by the Chief of Staff.

This report should be unclassified but may include a classified annex.

**Non-kinetic solutions for Counter-small Unmanned Aerial System swarms**

The committee recognizes the Department of Defense's efforts to develop low-cost Counter-small Unmanned Aerial Systems (C–sUAS) solutions against drone swarms. The committee also notes that defending personnel and infrastructure in high-collateral areas requires cost-effective, non-kinetic technology with multi-target capability and enhanced lethality against Groups 1–3 UAS. The committee observes that aerial non-kinetic effectors with high-powered microwave capabilities have demonstrated significant technical maturity but have received only incremental funding since 2019. The committee believes that transitioning such capabilities from prototypes to a program of record is essential to achieving "cost-per-kill" savings and aligns with Department priorities.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing, not later than February 26, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the Department's plan to complete the development and to begin procurement of low-collateral, non-kinetic solutions for C–sUAS swarms. The briefing shall include the following:

(1) Flyout capabilities and limitations of kinetic versus non-kinetic effectors against Groups 1–3 UAS, UAS swarms, and tethered UAS;

(2) A comparison of available low-collateral, non-kinetic solutions with effective ranges greater than 5 kilometers that meet near-term requirements and provide significant "cost-per-kill" savings;

(3) A description of how development efforts for aerial non-kinetic effectors align with the C–sUAS Capability Development Document and its associated annexes; and

(4) Recommendations on the funding and schedule required to field tactically meaningful quantities of identified non-kinetic systems for deployed forces globally and in defense of critical Homeland infrastructure.

**Organic cannon tube production**

The committee recognizes the significant contributions of Watervliet Army Arsenal as a historic and critical component of the organic industrial base, particularly in its longstanding role as the only organic capability at scale for large- and medium-caliber cannon tubes. The committee further emphasizes the enduring requirement for Watervliet Arsenal to remain the premier government-owned, government-operated capability for the technical expertise and skilled labor that it currently provides, in addition to the other services it provides in support of national defense and combat readiness. The committee underscores that continued long-term modernization efforts at Watervliet Arsenal and the Army's Combat Capabilities Development Command Armaments Center will ensure predictable and substantive growth in the U.S. organic industrial base's capabilities, production capacity, and product quality.

The committee is concerned that the Army does not have a sufficiently robust and resourced plan to address its own noted challenges in its organic industrial base—personnel shortages, aging infrastructure, obsolete machinery, antiquated processes, inconsistent delivery schedules, and defective tubes due to poor raw materials. These issues are particularly concerning at the Nation's only organic capability to build cannon tubes, whose relevance continue to be proven on today's battlefields.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report, not later than March 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on modernization plans for Watervliet Arsenal, including: (1) The most recent Army study, analysis, and/or strategy for artillery; (2) A detailed description of all modernization efforts at Watervliet Arsenal; (3) An assessment of the apprenticeship program with Hudson Valley Community College, which serves as a primary training and hiring pipeline for the majority of their machinists, technical operators, and other production floor positions; (4) A description of other personnel reforms intended to address any existing shortfalls; (5) Any changes in quality assurance processes related to raw material acceptance; (6) A description of efforts to modernize processes and improve delivery timelines; and (7) An evaluation by the Army to determine whether an additional limited-scope facility is required

to meet projected Army and foreign military partner requirements or whether those requirements can be satisfied through modernization of existing Arsenal facilities.

**Over-the-horizon targeting and operational authorities**

The committee notes the increasing importance of over-the-horizon targeting (OTH–T) capabilities to enable Joint Force operations in contested and denied environments. OTH–T capabilities are essential to providing timely, accurate, and resilient targeting data to support long-range precision fires, maritime strikes, and integrated deterrence objectives.

The committee is concerned by reports of potential disruptions to existing OTH–T architectures, including uncertainties related to the delineation and integration of activities conducted pursuant to title 10, United States Code, and title 50, United States Code. The committee recognizes that effective OTH–T often depends on close coordination between military operational forces and intelligence community elements. However, ambiguity in roles, responsibilities, resourcing, and oversight mechanisms may create seams that could degrade operational readiness and combat effectiveness.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that OTH–T capabilities required for operational plans remain fielded, interoperable, and resilient during any transition to future systems or programs of record.

To that end, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense and intelligence committees, not later than July 1, 2027, on:

(1) The current architecture supporting OTH–T for combatant commanders, including dependencies on title 50 authorities or intelligence community capabilities;

(2) Any identified or projected gaps or disruptions to OTH–T capability over the future years defense program;

(3) Current research, development, test, and evaluation efforts to improve OTH–T capabilities;

(4) The Department of Defense's plan to transition critical OTH–T capabilities into enduring programs of record, where appropriate;

(5) Governance mechanisms to clarify title 10 and title 50 roles and responsibilities for OTH–T-related activities; and

(6) Steps being taken to ensure uninterrupted operational support to combatant commanders during capability transitions.

**Rapid integration of weapons onto fighter aircraft**

The committee recognizes the growing need to rapidly integrate advanced weapons and capabilities onto fielded aircraft to respond to evolving threats and sustain combat power in high-intensity conflict. The committee notes that current delays associated with the integration of new weapons, software, and subsystems onto legacy aircraft platforms due to limited government software engineering capacity and proprietary operational flight program (OFP) architectures. These delays result in slowing the fielding of critical capabilities to U.S. and allied warfighters.

The committee further notes that technologies capable of implementing new capabilities outside the traditional OFP modification and test cycle may provide a promising pathway to accelerate the fielding of new weapons and mission systems onto legacy aircraft. Such approaches could enable more rapid integration of weapons and other emerging capabilities needed to support distributed operations and maintain combat power in contested environments.

Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a demonstration of integrating advanced stand-off weapons onto fielded Air Force aircraft using non-traditional integration approaches. The committee believes that such a demonstration should provide a valuable test case for rapidly integrating new capabilities onto fielded aircraft and increasing operational flexibility across the Joint Force.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027, on plans to conduct such a demonstration, including potential demonstration dates, locations, participating units, candidate technologies, and resource requirements.

**Report on acquisition and sustainment strategy for spare parts for low mission capable Air Force aircraft**

The committee remains concerned with persistently low mission capable rates across portions of the Department of the Air Force fleet and the degree to which spare parts shortages, diminishing manufacturing sources, and limited supplier competition continue to degrade aircraft availability and readiness.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on actions taken and plans to improve the availability of spare parts for Air Force aircraft with low mission capable rates. The Secretary may provide a briefing in lieu of the report if the briefing includes all required elements.

The report or briefing shall include:

(1) A list of Air Force fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft platforms with:

(a) a fleet-wide full mission capable rate of 50 percent or less during the preceding fiscal year; or

(b) a critical mission capable rate of 40 percent or less for primary mission aircraft inventory, as determined by the Secretary;

(2) The mission capable rates for each such platform and trends over the preceding 3 fiscal years;

(3) An identification of spare parts for such platforms that are subject to diminishing manufacturing sources or material shortages, including an explanation of the primary drivers of such constraints and their impact on readiness;

(4) A description of actions taken, or planned, to expand competition and qualify additional vendors for the procurement of such spare parts, including the use, as appropriate, of reverse engineering, advanced manufacturing, additive manufacturing,

and digital engineering and technical data package development;

(5) A description of steps taken to mitigate technical data, intellectual property, or proprietary limitations that inhibit the competitive production of spare parts, including the use of existing authorities to acquire or license such data;

(6) The extent of participation by small business concerns in the supply chain for such spare parts, including the amount and percentage of contract obligations awarded to such concerns;

(7) An assessment of measurable changes in aircraft availability attributable to actions taken to improve spare parts availability, including any cost savings or cost avoidance achieved; and

(8) Any recommendations for legislative action the Secretary considers necessary to improve spare parts availability and sustainment outcomes.

**Report on F–35 Power and Thermal Management System modernization program**

The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, to provide a report, not later than March 1, 2027, on the F–35 Power and Thermal Management System (PTMS) Modernization Program. The report shall include, but is not limited to, the following:

(1) The current status of the Power Thermal Management Upgrade (PTMU) trade study, including total cooling requirements, the capacity of the defense industry to support design requirements, and the expected timeline for a PTMU down select following the analysis;

(2) How the F–35 Joint Program Office plans to ensure growth margin on a new PTMS to support the cooling needs for all future and planned service life requirements of the F–35;

(3) How the F–35 Joint Program Office plans to ensure any PTMS option will provide cooling that, at minimum, meets the requirements validated by the Joint Strike Fighter Executive Steering Board; and

(4) The resources needed, by service, to ensure aircraft integration of a new PTMS system by 2033.

**Report on ground vehicle signature management simulation capability**

The committee believes that as the Army introduces new platforms to its ground combat vehicle fleet, including the XM30 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and next-generation optionally manned platforms, a common modeling and simulation tool capable of characterizing thermal management and electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) signatures of these platforms during system development will be a critical component to operational survivability. The committee is concerned that adversarial EO/IR sensor systems, such as passive infrared-guided anti-tank missiles, drone-mounted thermal cameras, and overhead persistent infrared platforms, present a growing and lethal threat to Army ground combat vehicles and be-

lieves that effective signature management is a critical survivability measure.

The committee believes that the procurement of these signature management systems, without a common, enterprise-wide modeling and simulation tool to underpin selection and pre-fielding performance verification, creates risk that fielded systems may not perform as intended against actual threats. The committee is aware that the Army's Combat Capabilities Development Command Ground Vehicle Systems Center has conducted EO/IR signature modeling and analysis under a series of research contracts but is concerned that this capability exists on an ad hoc, contract-by-contract basis.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than April 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the Army's current thermal and EO/IR signature simulation capabilities, including gaps in the assessment of current and next-generation vehicle platforms and the advisability and feasibility of establishing a common, enterprise-wide modeling and simulation tool for signature management analysis.

**Report on integration of unmanned aerial systems in National Guard**

The committee recognizes the rapidly evolving role of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in modern warfare, including their extensive use in recent conflicts to enhance reconnaissance, targeting, and distributed operations in contested environments.

The committee further acknowledges the unique dual-status mission of the Army National Guard and its potential to provide scalable, cost-effective UAS capabilities for both Federal and state missions, including domestic response and Homeland defense.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report, not later than March 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives that assesses the value, feasibility, and operational effectiveness of establishing dedicated UAS formations within the Army National Guard. The report shall include: (1) An assessment of the operational benefit of creating Army National Guard unmanned aerial system companies; (2) An evaluation of the improved interoperability such companies would provide with Regular Army formations; (3) The identification of current capability gaps in small UAS intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the Army National Guard; (4) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of scaling such companies across the Army National Guard; and (5) Recommendations for permanent authorization or modifications.

**Review of Air Operations Center processes and performance**

The committee recognizes the central role of Air Operations Centers (AOC) in planning, directing, coordinating, and assessing joint and combined air operations. As operational demands continue to increase in complexity and scale, the committee believes it is important to assess whether current Air Operations Center processes, staffing, authorities, training, and supporting systems are optimized to support contemporary and future operational requirements. The committee is also concerned about proposals to reduce,

replace, or eliminate squadron intelligence debriefs and Mission Reports (MISREPs) along with other operational reporting mechanisms that have historically provided commanders and planners with timely assessments of mission execution and operational outcomes.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a comprehensive review of Air Operations Center processes and provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than January 25, 2027, on the results of that review. The review shall assess operational planning, intelligence integration, target development, dynamic targeting, battle management, command-and-control procedures, communications systems, information-sharing practices, legal coordination, personnel staffing, training, and coordination with joint, interagency, coalition, and supporting organizations. The review shall also assess the current and planned role of MISREPs and other mission reporting processes in supporting operational command and control, operational and battle damage assessment, lessons learned, and information-sharing across operational and tactical echelons.

The briefing shall identify procedural, organizational, technological, and manpower challenges affecting operational effectiveness and evaluate the adequacy of existing doctrine, training, authorities, and systems. The briefing shall include an assessment of the operational impacts, risks, and potential benefits associated with any effort to reduce, replace, automate, or eliminate MISREPs, including effects on commander situational awareness, operational assessment, targeting, intelligence integration, historical recordkeeping, and lessons-learned processes, as well as any recommendations to improve operational responsiveness, decision-making, information flow, command and control, and integration across the Joint Force.

**Special operations one-way attack unmanned aerial systems**

The committee believes that maintaining a sufficient inventory of one-way attack unmanned aerial systems is an important component of ensuring the operational effectiveness of U.S. Special Operations Forces. The committee encourages U.S. Special Operations Command, in partnership with the military services, to continue efforts to identify, assess, and procure innovative one-way attack unmanned aerial systems.

**Stratospheric balloon capability in Army National Guard**

The committee recognizes the cost-effective, long-duration capability that stratospheric balloons provide and supports examining the feasibility and advisability of establishing this capability within the Army National Guard. The committee recognizes the tactical contributions of stratospheric balloons and believes expanding this capability into the Army National Guard would improve the Army's ability to support the Joint Force in contingency operations and expand National Guard contributions when operating under other state and Federal authorities.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than March 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on

the advisability and feasibility of establishing one or more Army National Guard units responsible for the operation of stratospheric balloons. The briefing shall assess and provide recommendations with respect to the following elements:

(1) The current capacity of the Joint Force to quickly deploy stratospheric balloons in response to contingencies;

(2) The necessary number of units that would be required within the Army National Guard to establish a deployable capability;

(3) The required force structure of any such unit;

(4) The resources required to establish and maintain any such unit, including personnel, equipment, facilities, and training costs;

(5) An assessment of best available basing in proximity to adequate training space; and

(6) Any other considerations the Secretary deems relevant.

**Universal armament interface**

The committee desires a better understanding of Universal Armament Interface (UAI) and Common Flexible Weapons Interface (CFWI) programs to inform policy and oversight of the integration of military aircraft and munitions. The committee is pleased to see that a universal interface standard has enabled success stories of the rapid fielding of new munitions to some existing platforms (for example, the F–16 and GBU–56) and is concerned that non-UAI/non-CFWI platforms and munitions slow the fielding of new, advanced weapons. The committee is concerned that a lack of widespread UAI/CFWI adoption amongst joint aircraft might slow the development and fielding of new weapons, limiting the lethality of the Joint Force.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Navy to provide to the congressional defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027, a joint briefing on the UAI/CFWI programs and their adoption amongst all Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps combat aircraft and associated munitions.

This should include, but not be limited to, detailed assessments of:

(1) Developmental (DT&E) and operational test & evaluation (OT&E) success stories resulting from UAI/CFWI-compatible aircraft and munitions;

(2) Any existing UAI and/or CFWI mandates, timelines, or decision points;

(3) Limitations to implementing a joint mandate for the adoption of UAI and/or CFWI, to include defining costs associated with making every platform compliant, and;

(4) Policy or resourcing limitations inhibiting universal adoption of UAI and/or CFWI.

**Unmanned surface and underwater vehicle detection and deterrence**

The Department of Defense has been correctly concerned about the threats from unmanned systems. The Department established the Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF 401) to rapidly develop, acquire, and field Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Sys-

tems (C–sUAS). That is appropriate, but it does not cover all of the threats from unmanned systems.

Specifically, the committee is concerned with the continued proliferation of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and underwater vehicles (UUVs) by both state and nonstate adversaries. JIATF 401 is not dealing with these threats. The committee believes that the threat posed by autonomous and semi-autonomous surface and underwater vehicles requires not only persistent, high-fidelity detection but also scalable kinetic and non-kinetic mitigation solutions, which together could operate at a cost-exchange ratio favorable to the United States.

The committee considers the absence of detection and mitigation solutions a critical oversight in the Navy's strategic planning for maritime domain awareness, power projection, and force protection. The committee believes that the Navy should establish an organization similar to JIATF 401 that would deal with countering unmanned surface and subsurface threats. The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to establish such a task force.

The committee directs the Chief of Naval Research to provide, not later than March 1, 2027, a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the Navy's efforts to develop, demonstrate, and field integrated counter-UUV and USV capabilities. This briefing should include results or plans for a series of technical demonstrations in fiscal years 2026 and 2027 that would evaluate:

(1) Integrated detection and identification that yields persistent, scalable, and cost-effective systems capable of rapid deployment, real-time detection, high-bandwidth communications, and AI-enabled classification of UUV threats, specifically emphasizing the capture of weak acoustic or electronic signals in high-clutter environments;

(2) Kinetic and non-kinetic mitigation solutions for the neutralization of UUV and USV threats once identified, including, but not limited to, directed energy, small-form-factor torpedoes, and electronic jamming;

(3) Industrial base diversity, including an assessment of how the Navy is engaging with both traditional defense primes and non-traditional commercial technology partners to accelerate the development of these detection and mitigation systems at scale and at a sustainable cost exchange ratio; and

(4) An evaluation of the Navy's counter-UUV detection and identification requirements based upon the lessons learned in these demonstrations, including desirable deployment characteristics, such as size, mobility, cooling requirements, or infrastructure, and the plans to formalize such requirements.

**Wireless control capabilities for Expeditionary Airfield Lighting System**

The committee recognizes the importance of the Expeditionary Airfield Lighting System (EALS) in supporting Agile Combat Employment and operations from austere and dispersed airfields, such as those in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. While the current EALS configuration provides energy-efficient lighting capable of battery and solar operation, it continues to rely on wired command and

control cabling and lacks remote health and status monitoring capability.

The committee is concerned that, even when configured for standalone self-power battery and solar operation, the system continues to rely on wired command and control cabling and also lacks remote health and status monitoring capability. The committee is concerned that continued reliance on wired systems reduces deployment agility, increases logistics burden and constrains rapid reconfiguration of expeditionary airfields. Similarly, the lack of remote health and status monitoring increases the risk of degradation and reduced readiness when deployed. The committee understands that the Department of the Air Force has identified this capability gap as a formal deficiency within the program.

The committee understands that industry has developed, and the Air Force has validated, a secure wireless control and monitoring capability to address this deficiency. The committee strongly encourages the Air Force to pursue the incorporation of this capability into the EALS system.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than January 1, 2027, on the opportunities that exist to address the reliance on wired command and control cabling and lack of remote health and status monitoring capabilities. The briefing should include, but not be limited to, the following:

(1) A transition and acquisition strategy for incorporating said wireless control and monitoring capability into future EALS procurements, including key decision points and contracting approach; and

(2) An assessment of the feasibility, cost, and schedule for upgrade kits or other retrofit approaches to enable the incorporation of wireless capability into previously fielded systems.

# TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

## Subtitle A—Authorization of Appropriations

### Sec. 201—Authorization of appropriations

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for research, development, test, and evaluation activities at the levels identified in section 4201 of division D of this Act.

## Subtitle B—Program Requirements, Restrictions, and Limitations

### Sec. 211—Improving the requirement for an alternative test and evaluation pathway for designated defense acquisition programs

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 218(f) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) to clarify that Software Acquisition Pathways under section 3603 of title 10, United States Code, are covered under the Alternative Test & Evaluation Pathway.

### Sec. 212—Development, test, evaluation, demonstration, and transition to production of alternative low-cost weapon systems

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to initiate and pursue accelerated acquisition programs for alternative low-cost systems in eight critical categories: (1) Alternative low-cost hypersonic strike systems; (2) Alternative low-cost cruise missiles; (3) Alternative shoulder-launched missiles; (4) Alternative extended range munitions; (5) Alternative mid-range integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) interceptors; (6) Alternative exoatmospheric interceptors; (7) Alternative short-range IAMD interceptors; and (8) Alternative medium-range air-to-air missiles.

The committee is concerned by the high expenditure of precision-guided munitions and interceptors during recent operations. These expenditures rapidly depleted stocks of weapons that cost millions of dollars per unit and have production lead times measured in years, often exceeding 3 years from contract award to the delivery of additional inventory.

Many of these systems were originally designed and developed decades ago to meet the most demanding high-end threat requirements against peer adversaries. While they have performed very effectively, they were not optimized for manufacturability, rapid scalability, or cost-effective mass production. As a result, the United States now faces challenges in rapidly replenishing inven-

tories to restore readiness for potential future contingencies, particularly in a protracted conflict or against multiple theaters simultaneously.

The committee recognizes that the Department of Defense requires a balanced portfolio of capabilities. High-end systems will continue to play a critical role against the most sophisticated threats. However, the Department also needs complementary, alternative, and low-cost weapon systems that can fulfill the majority of mission requirements in many scenarios, provide survivability and attrition tolerance for the high-end inventory, create necessary magazine depth for sustained operations, and enable rapid replenishment during conflict. Such systems must emphasize significantly reduced unit costs, shorter manufacturing lead times, greater use of commercial supply chains and components, modular designs, and the ability to be produced at scale in a contested or wartime environment.

To address these gaps, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide a classified briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027, addressing each of the categories listed in the provision. The briefing shall include:

(1) Results of market research and competitive analysis conducted to identify innovative technologies, potential vendors (including non-traditional defense contractors), and cost-reduction opportunities;

(2) Detailed funding plans, including amounts requested, obligated, and expended from all sources for each alternative low-cost program, as well as any barriers to execution;

(3) Key performance parameters achieved or projected, challenges encountered, mitigation strategies, and any adjustments to program timelines or requirements;

(4) Transition plans to production and fielding, including integration with existing platforms and any recommended legislative or policy changes to accelerate deployment; and

(5) Any other information the Under Secretary determines relevant.

**Sec. 213—Modification to the advisory role of the JASON scientific advisory group**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 222(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) to align the responsibilities for supporting the functions of the JASON scientific advisory group to the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and modify the scope of how financial support is provided for enterprise services like classified network support and facilities.

**Sec. 214—Modified and streamlined process for developing, negotiating, and concluding certain international agreements**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to promulgate a modified and streamlined process for developing, negotiating, and concluding international

agreements relating to science and technology cooperation, including memoranda of understanding and project agreements.

The committee is concerned with the length of time it takes for the Department of Defense to develop, negotiate, conclude, and finalize agreements with international partners, particularly for bilateral and multilateral science and technology-related partnership agreements. The committee is aware that it often takes years to finalize partnership agreements, including with key allies. The committee is also aware that the vast majority of partnership agreements commit the Department to fund projects with relatively small amounts of already appropriated funding on an equitable basis with the partner or partners. The committee believes that the Department should develop a streamlined, risk-based process that minimizes or eliminates low-value-add and duplicative steps.

**Sec. 215—Repeal of authority relating to temporary hiring of students and university faculty**

The committee recommends a provision that would repeal section 249 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283). The committee notes that this authority is no longer needed as it is addressed elsewhere in title 10, United States Code.

**Sec. 216—Limitation on availability of funds for Test Resource Management Center containerized instrumentation programs pending report on a common architecture for unmanned maritime test instrumentation**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the availability of funding to not more than 75 percent of fiscal year 2027 funds authorized for the Test Resource Management Center's containerized instrumentation programs until the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering submits a report to the Congress. The report would evaluate the feasibility, costs, benefits, and scalability of shifting to a common unmanned maritime architecture for telemetry, flight safety, and test data collection. The committee notes the progress made by Point Mugu Test Range's Blue Water Instrumentation effort in fielding such an unmanned maritime system using foreign military sales funding to support accelerated and cost-effective testing of long-range missiles.

**Sec. 217—Limitation on availability of funds for Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering travel**

The committee recommends a provision limiting the obligation or expenditure of 10 percent of fiscal year 2027 travel funds for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering until the congressional defense committees receive a briefing as required by section 219(d)(6) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328). The briefings required by the Directed Energy Working Group are important in understanding the progress being made in directed energy, which can hold certain classes of targets at risk with a low cost and deep magazine.

**Sec. 218—Limitation on availability of funds for Integrated Combat Systems of the Department of the Navy**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the availability of funding to not more than 75 percent of fiscal year 2027 funds authorized for integrated combat systems of the Department of the Navy until the Secretary of the Navy certifies to the congressional defense committees that the Navy has installed and demonstrated, aboard one or more destroyers, an operational prototype of the warfighting data ecosystem.

**Sec. 219—Limitation on the use of travel funds for the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for operations and maintenance to support travel expenses for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering until the Secretary of Defense provides two reports that were previously tasked by the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) and have not been submitted.

**Sec. 220—Codification of Department of Defense Research Security Program**

The committee recommends a provision that would codify existing research security provisions from recent National Defense Authorization Acts in chapter 305 of title 10, United States Code. The provision also codifies the prohibition on contracts between certain foreign entities and institutions of higher education conducting Department of Defense (DOD)-funded research. In addition, it adds a new requirement for institutions of higher education that receive DOD funding for research and have a total of more than $50.0 million in total research funding annually to designate a Chief Research Security Officer.

**Sec. 221—Codification of Department of Defense Science, Technology, and Innovation Board**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 303 of title 10, United States Code, to codify the establishment of the Science, Technology, and Innovation Advisory Board.

**Sec. 222—Alternative programs to expand inventory of air defense interceptors**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to establish alternate methods to increase the inventory of air defense interceptors.

**Sec. 223—Improvements to personnel management authority to attract experts in science, engineering, and certain other disciplines at Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 4092(b)(1)(B) of title 10, United States Code, to allow for not

more than 40 employee billets to be occupied by the same 2 employees for not more than a period of 90 days.

**Sec. 224—Extension of limitation on availability of funds for fundamental research collaboration with certain academic institutions**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the Department of Defense from using any funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2027 to make an award to an institution of higher education for fundamental research in collaboration with an academic institution included on the list developed pursuant to section 1286(c)(9) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232).

## Subtitle C—Plans, Reports, and Other Matters

**Sec. 231—Assessment framework for future quantum computing programs**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, to develop a framework for assessing the development or acquisition of future quantum computing systems, algorithms, or hybrid-quantum computing services informed by the practices developed under the Quantum Benchmarking Initiative.

**Sec. 232—Execution of the Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Propellant systems**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Army to determine, not later than 60 days after the enactment of this Act, if the Additive Manufacturing process for Rocket Propellant systems should be formally established as a program of record.

**Sec. 233—Report on emerging technology and cognitive warfare**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, to submit to the congressional defense committees a report, not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, on the implications of emerging technologies to support Department of Defense cognitive warfare.

**Sec. 234—Department of Defense electronics requirements study**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive study on current and future electronics requirements for defense systems, and to provide a report on the findings of the study to the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

## Budget Items

### Army

### Navy

#### Lowell Observatory Navy Precision Optical Interferometer

The committee notes that in the section 4201 table for Research Development Test and Evaluation, Navy, there is an increase to PE 61153N, Defense Research Sciences, of $10.1 million for the Navy Precision Optical Interferometer (NPOI) at Lowell Observatory.

The committee believes the Department of the Navy should acknowledge the validity and continuing relevance of the 1992 agreement between Lowell Observatory, the U.S. Naval Observatory, and the Naval Research Laboratory regarding the NPOI, as well as associated correspondence. The committee notes that all three parties abided by the terms of the Agreement for over 30 years and that internal Navy documents referenced the Agreement and its terms during that period. The committee further stresses the importance of the Department engaging in good faith negotiations with Lowell Observatory to resolve outstanding issues in a timely and constructive manner.

### Air Force

### Defense Wide

#### Defense Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research

The committee notes that in the section 4201 table for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-wide, there is an increase to PE 61110D8Z, Basic Research Initiatives, of $40.0 million for the Defense Established Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (DEPSCoR) program.

The committee continues to be supportive of the DEPSCoR program, which helps build and expand the national innovation base for research and education by funding research activities in science and engineering areas responsive to the needs of national defense. The committee welcomes the fact that DEPSCoR was included as part of the budget request for fiscal year 2027 but notes that the amount was well below levels requested by the Congress for the past several years. The program is intended to increase the number of university researchers and improve the capabilities of institutions of higher education in eligible jurisdictions to perform competitive research relevant to the Department of Defense (DOD). The committee also views DEPSCoR as a component in any effort by the DOD to identify, shape, and foster innovation ecosystems that support DOD research and technology needs. Along with other funding programs and authorities available to the Department, DEPSCoR should be considered as a means to expand and diversify the innovation ecosystem for the DOD.

#### Automated textile manufacturing program

The committee notes that in the table for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-wide, there is an increase to

PE 0607210D8Z, Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment, of $50.0 million for the automated textile manufacturing program.

The committee notes the importance of the domestic textile industrial base to warfighter readiness for the production of Berry-compliant uniforms, footwear, and other textile and fabric applications. The committee encourages the Department of Defense to use the automated textile manufacturing program to identify and fund opportunities to expand production capacity and enhance competition within the domestic textile industrial base.

**Trusted and assured microelectronics**

The committee notes that in the section 4201 table for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-wide, there is an increase to PE 64294D8Z, Trusted and Assured Microelectronics, of $350.0 million, and an increase to PE 65294D8Z of $100.0 million to restore funding reductions to these lines and increase support for microelectronics development; standards development; and validation, verification, and security activities for the Department of Defense (DOD), especially in areas of advanced packaging and for microelectronics materials other than traditional silicon-based systems, such as gallium nitride, silicon germanium, and silicon carbide.

The committee notes its disappointment at the DOD's shortsighted decision to reduce these programs by $392.4 million and $81.6 million, respectively. The committee believes such reductions threaten the ability of the Department to fully capitalize on the foundational investments made as part of the Chips and Science Act to help reinvigorate the domestic industrial base for microelectronics, and to continue to invest in the new and novel devices and packaging techniques the DOD needs to compete with adversaries in the future information environment. The needs of the DOD are unique compared to commercial microelectronics, and while the Department can ride the wave of such investments, it also needs parallel and complementary investment to deal with challenges like radiation hardening, new and novel materials, and innovative design and packaging approaches. The committee believes that additional prototyping activities that can be demonstrated through the Microelectronics Commons program will help transition more capabilities into the hands of the warfighter and may have spillover benefits for the domestic commercial microelectronics sector.

Further, the committee notes that the Department still has significant work ahead to demonstrate and validate evidence-based assurance techniques as a complement to existing security approaches. The committee also notes that with the recent update of the charter for the Joint Federated Assurance Center, there are increasing opportunities to leverage those capabilities within the Government, as well as with key industry partners. Additional resources will assist with that expansion of activities.

The committee also encourages the DOD to leverage these additional activities to support the development of resilience in the supply chain for microelectronics, like diversifying the printed circuit board supply chain, and to demonstrate new interconnect technologies to increase device throughput and performance.

### Microelectronics Commons priority research and demonstration projects

The committee notes that in the section 4201 table for Research Development Test and Evaluation, Defense-wide, there is an increase to PE 62669D8Z, Microelectronics Commons-Applied Research, of $50.0 million.

The committee recognizes that advanced microelectronics are foundational to the ability of the Department of Defense to field munitions, sensors, space systems, electronic warfare systems, secure communications, and autonomous systems at the speed and scale required for operational plans. The committee further recognizes that the Microelectronics Commons was established to accelerate the transition of microelectronics innovations from laboratory research to domestic prototyping, fabrication, packaging, test, and manufacturing ecosystems. The committee notes the importance of rapidly advancing microelectronics technologies essential to addressing the Department of Defense's most pressing challenges.

The committee notes that in section 4201 of this Act, the committee provides $50.0 million for the Secretary of Defense for the Microelectronics Commons for the purposes of focusing on near-term defense mission needs, domestic industrial base capacity, trusted and assured supply chains, and transition to programs of record or domestic manufacturers. The committee expects the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to ensure that projects selected under this section include measurable technical and transition milestones and leverage the regional hubs of the Microelectronics Commons and their industry, university, laboratory, defense industrial base, and nontraditional partner networks. The committee further expects coordination with relevant program executive offices, combatant-command-validated requirements, defense laboratories, acquisition executives, and industrial-base officials to increase the likelihood that successful prototypes transition into operational systems or domestic manufacturing capacity.

Additionally, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than February 1, 2027, on the following: (A) Ongoing efforts by the Department of Defense to leverage the Microelectronics Commons programs to establish a mechanism by which other Federal departments and agencies can utilize the Microelectronics Commons program as the primary platform to access microelectronics design, prototyping, and fabrication capabilities in pursuit of Microelectronics Commons goals; and (B) How the Microelectronics Commons program is accelerating technology development and prototyping across the Department with a focus on the technology areas essential to addressing the most pressing national security challenges.

## Items of Special Interest

### Autonomous escort capabilities for Army watercraft

The committee recognizes the increasing operational risk faced by Army watercraft conducting logistics, maneuver, and sustainment missions in joint, contested, and distributed operating

environments. Many Army watercraft possess limited organic defensive capabilities, increasing vulnerability to asymmetric threats, unmanned systems, and indirect fires.

The committee believes the Army should possess an indigenous unmanned surface vessel (USV) capability to escort and support Army watercraft, providing enhanced force protection, early warning, sensing, and defensive effects while reducing risk to personnel.

The committee commends the Army's use of competitive experimentation and prototyping activities, including initiatives such as xTech Pacific, to evaluate autonomous watercraft and escort concepts. The committee further applauds the Army's emphasis on engaging U.S. industry to identify mature, proven autonomy solutions and encourages continued consideration of commercially available capabilities where appropriate.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than February 1, 2027, assessing the feasibility, operational utility, and acquisition pathways for an indigenous USV escort capability for Army watercraft. The report shall include:

(1) A description of operational mission sets and threat environments in which autonomous or semi-autonomous escort vessels could enhance the survivability of Army watercraft;

(2) An assessment of existing and emerging autonomy technologies, including commercially available solutions from U.S. industry, relevant to escort, sensing, and force protection missions;

(3) A summary of ongoing experimentation and prototyping efforts, including lessons learned from competitive events and demonstrations;

(4) An evaluation of potential acquisition approaches to transition successful prototypes into operational use and, where appropriate, programs of record; and

(5) An assessment of projected resource requirements and considerations for sustaining investment in autonomous escort capabilities in future budget submissions.

**Autonomous welding**

The committee continues to be interested in the Department of Defense addressing and achieving a reduction in depot maintenance backlogs and reduced throughput across the organic industrial base.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of piloting autonomous welding across the organic industrial base. The briefing shall include: (1) An evaluation of current and projected capabilities and technologies that offer available, versatile, artificial intelligence-powered robotic welding systems that can rapidly adapt to joints specification and variability, allowing quick, precise, and efficient welding to military specifications; (2) Any potential impacts to the operations of the defense industrial base from using autonomous welding systems; (3) Any potential cost savings, productivity increases, and decreased repair turnaround time for the Joint Force;

(4) Any impacts to the organic industrial base to recruiting and retention based on the use of autonomous welding; and (5) An evaluation of any associated reductions in safety incidents from using autonomous welding.

**Briefing on use of high-power nuclear fission for space operations**

The committee supports the Air Force Research Laboratory's Joint Emergent Technology Supplying On-Orbit Nuclear Power (JETSON) program and recognizes high-power nuclear fission as a critical component of sustained U.S. preeminence in space. The committee notes prior investment in early-stage demonstration programs, including the Kilopower Reactor Using Stirling Technology program. However, the committee is concerned that the Department of Defense has not yet established clear operational requirements, validated mission needs, or developed an execution pathway to transition these technologies into operational in-space nuclear fission power capabilities.

As the Department's reliance on maneuverable and power-intensive systems increases, enduring and resilient power generation will be essential to support missile intercept, offensive and defensive space control, long-duration mobility, high-duty-cycle sensing, secure communications, and autonomous operations. The committee believes that without defined operational requirements, a coordinated acquisition strategy, and a funded plan for maturation and testing, the Department will be unable to field nuclear fission power systems necessary to sustain U.S. military advantage in space.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Chief of Space Operations, to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's plan to develop and field operational nuclear fission power systems for in-space operations. The briefing shall include: (1) Operational nuclear fission power requirements across anticipated missions, including in low earth orbit, mid-earth orbit, geosynchronous orbit, cislunar space, and other deep-space environments; (2) An assessment of barriers and capability gaps that have prevented JETSON or other nuclear fission efforts from conducting in-space deployment and testing; (3) An overview of previous congressional funding and Department expenditure related to in-space nuclear fission capabilities since fiscal year 2017; (4) A proposed architecture and acquisition pathway for operational in-space nuclear fission power capabilities, including technology maturation milestones, test and evaluation plans, and integration with Space Force programs; and (5) A funding and resource plan identifying required investments through fiscal year 2035, including opportunities for interagency and commercial collaboration.

**Capability gaps and policy development of robotics for medical evacuation and other high-risk operational tasks**

The committee recognizes increasing lethality and mobility constraints that characterize modern and future operating environ-

ments, which have complicated the execution of medical evacuation, mine detection, and emergency response operations. Traditional casualty extraction and medical resupply operations often require personnel to enter contested or denied areas, increasing risk to both wounded servicemembers and responding forces while potentially delaying life-saving care. Autonomous and semi-autonomous robotic systems, including unmanned ground vehicles, hybrid platforms, and humanoid or semi-humanoid systems, have the potential to reduce risk to personnel, accelerate lifesaving interventions, and improve the survivability of forces and civilians in both combat and disaster response scenarios.

To ensure the quick integration of robotics and other autonomous and semi-autonomous systems into the hands of warfighting units in contested environments, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than June 30, 2027, on the status of current fielding of and policy and doctrinal development around these capabilities. The briefing shall include:

(1) An assessment and capability gap analysis of existing proven military capabilities for autonomous, semi-autonomous, teleoperated, and robotic systems, to support missions such as casualty extraction; medical evacuation; early life-saving interventions, such as hemorrhage control, injury sensing, and autonomous casualty assessment; medical resupply; mine detection and explosive hazard identification efforts; emergency response and victim recovery in confined spaces or other hazardous environments; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts;

(2) A review of current and planned Department of Defense research, development, and experimentation efforts attempting to fill the gaps identified in (1);

(3) An assessment of the average timeline and process by which the Joint Force has already integrated proven capabilities from (1) to units within the combatant commands; and

(4) Specifically for medical missions, an assessment of the status of policy, doctrine, and governance around the testing, development, and fielding of robotic medical support systems, including considerations related to autonomous medical decisions, medical device certification, and international humanitarian law in operational and international environments.

**Comptroller General review of military specifications related to biotechnology**

The committee recognizes the strategic importance of biomanufacturing and supports efforts to enable the Department of Defense (DOD) to procure and deploy biotechnology-derived products and biomaterials. The committee believes that facilitating access to innovative biotechnology solutions can enhance mission assurance, operational resilience, and the availability of bioindustrial materials, while maintaining rigorous safety and performance standards. The committee encourages a review of military specifications (MIL–SPEC), which establish standardized technical requirements that serve as a common language across the defense industrial

base, ensuring that products manufactured by different stakeholders meet the same performance, quality, and functional standards.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a comprehensive audit of MIL–SPECs and associated development, validation, and approval processes to determine whether they intentionally or unintentionally disadvantage biotechnology-derived products and biomaterials, to assess whether reforms are necessary to enable the DOD to purchase and adopt biotechnology-derived products while maintaining mission assurance, safety, and performance standards.

The audit shall consider that many MIL–SPECs were developed around legacy materials and conventional production methods, which may inadvertently restrict the adoption of biotechnology-derived products, even when such products meet or exceed required performance standards.

The audit shall also assess the DOD's implementation of section 248(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60). The audit shall include a review of structural and procedural barriers within the MIL–SPEC and military standard (MIL–STD) framework, including:

(A) The extent to which specifications and standards rely on prescriptive requirements tied to legacy materials or production pathways rather than performance-based criteria;

(B) Whether testing, validation, and verification processes are technology-neutral and appropriately calibrated to assess biotechnology-derived and biomaterial-based products; and

(C) Whether institutional practices or risk postures create intentional or unintentional preconceptions against biotechnology solutions.

Not later than April 1, 2027, the Comptroller General shall submit a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, with a report to be provided at a mutually agreed upon date, that:

(A) Identifies structural, procedural, or cultural impediments within the MIL–SPEC and MIL–STD framework that limit biotechnology adoption;

(B) Evaluates whether the DOD's actions under section 248(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 are sufficient to enable biotechnology companies to demonstrate, validate, and verify compliance with Departmental requirements; and

(C) Provides recommendations for legislative and administrative action to modernize military specifications and standards to enable the DOD to purchase and adopt biotechnology-derived products while maintaining mission assurance, safety, and operational effectiveness.

**Counter-unmanned aircraft systems left-of-launch capability and indications and warning**

The committee notes the rapid proliferation and operational effectiveness of low-cost unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) across multiple theaters during 2025 and 2026, including their use in reconnaissance, targeting, and one-way attack missions by both state

and non-state actors. The committee further notes that these systems are increasingly employed in distributed, low-observable, and time-compressed attack profiles that challenge traditional air defense and counter-UAS systems designed primarily for post-launch detection and defeat.

The committee observes that recent incidents, as well as findings from the Department of Defense Inspector General (Report No. DODIG–2026–045), demonstrate that existing policies, authorities, and capabilities are insufficiently integrated and, in some cases, unclear or inconsistently implemented across installations, limiting commanders' ability to effectively counter persistent UAS threats.

The committee recognizes that the most actionable indicators of UAS threats increasingly occur prior to launch, including adversary reconnaissance, staging, logistics activity, and other preparatory behaviors. The committee believes that improving the Department's ability to identify, fuse, and act upon these pre-operational indicators is essential to expanding warning time, reducing operational surprise, and enabling more effective prioritization of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and countermeasure resources.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing, not later than April 30, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the Department's approach to "left-of-launch" counter-UAS operations. The briefing should include:

(1) A description of current left-of-launch counter-UAS capabilities;

(2) An assessment of current gaps in data integration, analytic capacity, and operational workflows;

(3) Recommendations for additional authorities or resources required; and

(4) Metrics for evaluating effectiveness, including improvements in warning time, reduction in successful UAS attacks, and impact on adversary operational networks.

**Directed energy for surface combatants**

The committee recognizes the importance of deploying directed energy capabilities aboard Navy surface combatants and supports continued experimentation, operational assessment, and sustainment of the High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) system aboard USS Preble (DDG–88). Directed energy systems have the potential to significantly enhance ship self-defense, improve magazine depth, and provide cost-effective options against increasingly sophisticated unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, and other emerging threats.

Further, the committee recognizes the Navy's plan to field directed energy on the battleship but does not view the fiscal year (FY) 2027 budget as supporting the investments required and therefore encourages the Navy to increase its funding and commitment to maturing directed energy for operational use on Navy combatants.

Therefore, the committee recommends the Navy to: (1) Sustain HELIOS aboard USS Preble (DDG–88), including testing, training, modeling and simulation, and development of tactics, techniques,

and procedures; and (2) Procure a next-generation spectrally beam-combined HELIOS laser weapon system in FY 2028 for delivery within the future years defense program. Such a system should leverage existing industrial base technologies, operate in the 100–150 kilowatt class to expand engagement range, and integrate with existing ship combat systems while adhering to DDG 51-class space, weight, and power requirements.

**Drone and interceptor manufacturing hub**

The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense lacks a manufacturing hub for joint autonomous maneuver systems, low-cost interceptors, and their key component technologies. While the committee agrees that a commercial-first approach is key to innovation, particularly for small autonomous systems, we do believe that there is an urgent need and long-term demand for the organic industrial base to have sufficient manufacturing capacity for larger autonomous maneuver systems. Limiting factors to full-scale manufacturing for these systems include supply chain gaps, high production costs, and a small number of available military-grade test sites.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report, not later than April 15, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on ongoing efforts to support the production, testing, and sustainment of autonomous maneuver systems, their components, and low-cost interceptors.

The report shall include:

(1) An overview of efforts to accelerate production and fielding of next-generation autonomous systems and low-cost interceptor capabilities;

(2) A description of activities to strengthen and expand domestic supply chains for critical drone and counter-drone components, including motors, batteries, sensors, and related technologies;

(3) How the Army is enabling rapid scaling of drone production and low-cost interceptor systems through advanced manufacturing;

(4) An assessment of how advanced manufacturing techniques may support increased production capacity and surge requirements;

(5) An overview of how testing, requirements development, and evaluation activities are coordinated across the Department, including through designated test ranges and relevant Army organizations involved in autonomous systems development, production, and sustainment, including next-generation maneuver systems technologies led by the Ground Vehicle Systems Center and sustainment operations at the Tank-automotive Armaments Command; and

(6) A discussion of potential applications of advanced manufacturing technologies to support repair, maintenance, and sustainment activities for autonomous systems and low-cost interceptors.

**Ensuring commercialization for shelf-stable blood prototype**

The committee applauds the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) research and prototyping of shelf-stable blood through the Fieldable Solutions for Hemorrhage with bio-Artificial Resuscitation Products (FSHARP) program. Utilizing biotechnology, this innovation has the potential to save countless warfighters' lives by enabling rapid access to blood at the front lines. The committee is eager to see this research successfully transitioned to operational use and commercialized for deployment.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 1, 2027, on the status of the shelf-stable blood program. The briefing shall include:

(1) The current status of the research and prototyping efforts;

(2) Efforts to commercialize the research, including the identification of transition partners within the Department of Defense;

(3) Challenges to commercialization and a plan to address those challenges;

(4) The known and anticipated benefits of fielding shelf-stable blood, including cost savings and a quantitative assessment of warfighter lives saved; and

(5) A plan for deployment and operational fielding of the shelf-stable blood product.

**Environmental Security Technology Certification Program**

The committee recognizes the significant success of the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) in identifying, demonstrating, and transitioning innovative technologies that improve military capability, installation resilience, energy security, and environmental performance. The committee notes that ESTCP has proven effective in validating emerging technologies in operational environments, accelerating technology adoption, reducing lifecycle costs, strengthening mission assurance, and enhancing military readiness across the Armed Forces.

The committee further recognizes the value of ESTCP-supported projects focused on energy resilience and infrastructure modernization at National Guard facilities operating in harsh cold-weather environments. The committee notes that these projects are helping evaluate and demonstrate resilient energy technologies, advanced microgrid capabilities, distributed energy resources, and high-efficiency heating and energy systems designed to improve reliability, reduce operational energy costs, and support continued mission operations during severe weather events and grid disruptions. The committee believes these demonstrations provide scalable models that can strengthen energy security and installation resilience across other Department of Defense facilities facing similar environmental and infrastructure challenges. The committee encourages the Department of Defense to continue investing in ESTCP projects as a mechanism for improving operational effectiveness and enhancing installation resilience across the military departments.

**Feasibility of using large unmanned aerial vehicles for missile integration and development as a service**

The committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Direct Reporting Program Manager for Golden Dome for America, and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a program to use large unmanned aerial vehicles provided via a contracted service model to assist with missile technology development, testing, integration, and operations.

In preparing this briefing, the Under Secretary should evaluate, at a minimum: (1) Desirable payload and range requirements; (2) The viability of unmanned systems to simulate adversarial missile threats during live-fire test events and exercises; (3) Utility for provision of telemetry and other test assessment functions; (4) Potential efficacy of unmanned systems to provide real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support for missile targeting and guidance systems; (5) Capability to support testing for vehicle mounted strike payloads and defensive countermeasures; (6) Cybersecurity risks and metrics for evaluating software security for potential vendor offerings; and (7) Opportunities and risks of collaboration with allied governments.

**High-altitude warfare strategy**

The committee recognizes the stratosphere as an emerging, competitive, and largely unclaimed operational domain with significant potential to provide resilient, near-space capability across sensing, communications, positioning, navigation, command and control, and effects delivery in contested environments. The committee views high-altitude capabilities as a critical layer in a diversified and survivable architecture aligned with the National Defense Strategy's emphasis on mass, scale, and deterrence through denial using low-cost, attritable systems.

While the Department of Defense has made sustained investments in stratospheric platforms, including high-altitude balloons, pseudo-satellites, and other unmanned systems, the committee is concerned that fragmented funding, limited coordination, and the absence of a unified acquisition strategy have slowed the transition of these capabilities from experimentation to operational, scalable use. The committee further notes that high-altitude balloon systems, in particular, offer a cost-effective, persistent capability, but the Department has not fielded any of them at scale or adequately integrated them into operational planning.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and with inputs from the geographic combatant commands, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on a comprehensive concept for sustained high-altitude and stratospheric operations.

The briefing shall include:

(1) An overview of current investments and coordination across the Department;

(2) An integrated operational concept spanning missions including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; communications; positioning; navigation; command and control; integrated fire control; air defense; long-range fires; and indications and warning;

(3) The role of low-cost, attritable systems, including high-altitude balloons, in enabling mass, persistence, and distributed operations;

(4) Strategies to leverage commercial technologies;

(5) Policy, budgetary, and industrial base changes needed to accelerate adoption;

(6) An assessment of requirements, plans, and risks for establishing and sustaining a necessary stockpile of prepositioned high-altitude balloons and payloads to support combatant command contingency plans; and

(7) The Department's acquisition strategy, distribution plan, and concept of operations to ensure these capabilities are fielded at scale and integrated into operational use.

**High-power microwave research**

The committee strongly supports continued investment in directed energy systems by the Air Force to counter emerging aerial threats to air bases and aerial platforms. Specifically, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Air Force to identify opportunities to realize the benefits associated with directed energy and high-power microwave (HPM) systems. As the Air Force works with industry to apply mature HPM technology to defeat emerging threats, the committee supports the continuation of such research, in collaboration with the Department of Energy, and encourages the expansion of work on solid-state HPM to deliver operational capabilities.

**Hypersonic test infrastructure under Multi-Service Advanced Capability Hypersonic Test Bed program**

The committee supports the efforts underway by the Department of Defense to increase the cadence of hypersonic flight tests under the Multi-Service Advanced Capability Hypersonic Test Bed (MACH–TB) program. Congress has supported this effort through substantial funding to rapidly scale this national security imperative. The committee believes the testing enabled by the MACH–TB program is foundational to the success of development and procurement of operational weapons capability.

**Interagency contribution to centralized repository on critical infrastructure**

The committee notes the Department of Defense (DOD) manages one of the largest physical infrastructures in the Federal Government. Research related to the Department's energy consumption, resilience investments, grid modernization efforts, and operational energy requirements represents high value unclassified information that must be curated accordingly. In fiscal year 2026, Congress directed the establishment of a centralized repository through the

Department of Energy for publicly available research produced by national laboratories, universities, and entities across the energy infrastructure sector. The repository is intended to provide a secure, independently managed platform where stakeholders in regulated utility industries can access and evaluate research, policy issues, and the operational impacts of decisions affecting the provision of power to Federal agencies. The committee believes that expanding access to this information would improve research visibility, accelerate innovation, and strengthen national resilience across the energy and cybersecurity sectors.

The committee also notes that a persistent challenge is that the DOD relies heavily on civilian power infrastructure it does not control and has limited visibility into the electric grid beyond installation boundaries, while utilities often lack insight into the current and future power demands of nearby military installations. Further, aging infrastructure, increasing demand from advanced technologies, and growing cyber threats continue to strain grid reliability and create risks to mission readiness.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the DOD to contribute to the repository based on research results of unclassified data. Additionally, the DOD should continue to invest in its aging infrastructure to improve both physical and cyber vulnerabilities.

**JASON's study on co-authorship metrics and university research security**

The committee is aware of increased focus on protecting Department of Defense-funded university research from exploitation by potential adversaries. The committee is also aware that in recent years there has been a growing reliance by government agencies, external analysts, and third-party vendors on publication co-authorship data as a proxy for assessing potential national security risk in university and national laboratory research partnerships. In particular, the mere presence of an international co-author, sometimes affiliated with an entity or country of concern, has increasingly been used to suggest problematic collaboration, despite the fact that academic co-authorship often reflects limited, indirect, or historical scholarly engagement rather than active or significant institutional partnership that poses legitimate national security risks.

The committee believes that a deeper assessment of this challenge would be useful in tailoring approaches to research security and understanding the true vulnerabilities that might exist, especially when some level of engagement might actually be helpful to our understanding of the rate of progress for some of those adversary countries. The committee is concerned that co-authorship based analyses risk producing false positives that conflate open scientific norms with malign activity. This is particularly acute in fields where large, international author lists are standard, or where datasets, methodologies, or software are reused across borders without sustained collaboration.

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering to conduct a study through the independent scientific advisory group known as JASON to examine the validity of the use of academic publication co-authorship as an indi-

cator of potential national security risk associated with U.S. university research and national laboratory partnerships and deliver a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than December 1, 2027. The study shall assess the following: (1) The scientific validity and limitations of using publication co-authorship data to infer research collaboration, technology transfer, or institutional partnership risk; (2) The extent to which co-authorship accurately reflects the nature, depth, and intent of collaboration in fields involving fundamental research; (3) Distinctions between benign scholarly exchanges and collaborations that may present national security, export control, or foreign influence concerns; (4) Methodological risks, including false positives, misattribution, and lack of contextual information, associated with the use of co-authorship-based analyses in risk assessments; (5) Differences in the relevance of co-authorship metrics across disciplines, including but not limited to the physical sciences, life sciences, engineering, and computational fields; (6) The degree to which reliance on co-authorship metrics may disproportionately affect open research environments at institutions of higher education and have a chilling effect on beneficial international collaborations; (7) Best practices for incorporating co-authorship data, if at all, into holistic research security and counterintelligence assessments; and (8) Alternative or complementary indicators that may provide a more accurate, contextualized, and risk informed basis for evaluating university research partnerships. The final report shall be unclassified but may include a classified annex.

**Low-cost undersea effectors**

The committee recognizes that the Navy's existing undersea weapons programs, including heavyweight and lightweight torpedoes, are highly capable and optimized for high-end conflict against peer adversary naval platforms such as capital ships, submarines, and larger resupply vessels. However, these munitions-launched from submarines, surface ships, and antisubmarine warfare aircraft-are expensive and limited in quantity, and it is essential to preserve these high-cost capabilities for appropriate high-end threats.

The committee is aware of the Defense Innovation Unit's (DIU) Low Cost Undersea Effectors (LCUE) Problem Set 1 (PS1), which is designed to accelerate the development of affordable, small unmanned underwater vehicles capable of serving as kinetic weapons. These platforms could leverage the existing lightweight torpedo form factor while being optimized for a distinct target set and compatible with a broader range of launch platforms. These systems are intended to support subsea and seabed warfare, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, and expeditionary missions while delivering scalable kinetic effects against lower-end maritime targets. Given that current and future naval combat scenarios are likely to involve both high-end naval combatants and large numbers of lower-end quasi-naval and maritime militia vessels, the Joint Force must field both high-end capabilities and, in significant quantities, low-cost undersea effectors.

The committee believes that funding and executing LCUE PS1 to its intended scope, while rapidly transitioning viable systems into scaled production and operational use, could provide the mass and capacity required for distributed maritime operations. The committee further believes the Department of the Navy should leverage rapid acquisition authorities, including other transaction authorities; appropriate research, development, test, and evaluation; and procurement accounts, to accelerate procurement and fielding of successful LCUE PS1 systems.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the director of the Defense Innovation Unit, to submit a briefing to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 1, 2027, including:

(1) Plans to transition capabilities and solutions emerging from LCUE PS1 into fleet experimentation, procurement, and programs of record;

(2) Plans to begin limited procurement of successful LCUE PS1 awardees for operational experimentation and fleet integration; and

(3) Any additional recommendations for funding or acquisition guidance, including any necessary legislative changes, that would accelerate the deployment of LCUE PS1 capabilities.

**Net assessment of biotechnology efforts of China**

The committee is concerned that the U.S. Government is inadequately informed about its current position in global biotechnology competition relative to other countries, especially near-peer countries like China.

Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the Office of Net Assessment, in coordination with the Biotechnology Management Office established as part of section 242 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the current state of biotechnology, not later than April 1, 2027. The briefing shall include an assessment of the state of bioindustrials, biomanufacturing, and other non-pharmaceutical biotechnology applications in the United States vis-à-vis near-peer competitors. The briefing shall also assess factors related to U.S. competitiveness in developing, scaling, and commercializing biotechnology, including research, workforce, infrastructure, supply chain vulnerabilities, and available private capital.

**Next generation ballistic eye protection**

The committee is concerned by the disproportionate impact of optical trauma on the battlefield, noting that eye injuries represent 13 to 14 percent of all casualties. With improved composite technology achieving greater than the currently required 660 feet-per-second fragmentation protection in lightweight eyewear, the committee is interested in Army efforts to integrate these advanced capabilities into its formations. The committee supports the development of next-generation ballistic eye protection across lightweight

spectacles, goggles, Rapid Light Adaptive Eyewear, and other compatible systems.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than February 26, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representative on the status of the Army's efforts to provide improved ballistic eye protection. The briefing shall include: (1) The status of current ballistic eye protection programs; (2) The status of next-generation eye protection development; (3) Timeline for Authorized Protective Eyewear list certification; (4) A description of Army efforts to integrate improved ballistic eye protection with modernization efforts such as Soldier Borne Mission Command; (5) Projected fielding schedule of approved advanced capabilities; and (6) Any additional matters the Secretary deems relevant.

**Plan for public-private partnerships for drone capabilities development**

The committee is encouraged by the efforts undertaken by the Department of Defense, especially with regard to the Drone Dominance Program, to rapidly scale the domestic U.S. drone manufacturing base and field significant numbers of low-cost attack drones and training. Real-world combat environments in Europe and the Middle East have demonstrated the clear need for the fielding of significant numbers of low-cost drones to accomplish a range of mission sets including offensive operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) actions. Given the pace of global innovation in the use of low-cost drones, including rapid changes to the base technology through the equipping of modifiers like fiber optic cables, changes in battlefield tactics like the use of larger bomber drones to degrade resupply capabilities, and beyond, being able to not only field drones at scale but also rapidly train and retrain personnel in their use and the most effective battlefield tactics is critical. The committee is concerned that current Department processes and capabilities may be insufficient to effectuate the large-scale training of personnel necessary to field the drones procured through the Drone Dominance Program and that the adoption of best practices and tactics gleaned from European and Middle Eastern conflicts is not occurring rapidly enough given the pace of battlefield innovation.

The Department has long enjoyed a synergistic relationship with the private sector and academia, which is a key source of innovation in the U.S. economy and a unique differentiator in the development of U.S. defense capabilities. As such, the committee urges the Department to consider ways to further cooperate with the private sector and academia to provide training and support in the use of drones and related technologies such as counter-UAS systems and electronic warfare to armed forces personnel.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than February 28, 2027, on:

(1) The Department's existing efforts related to training armed forces personnel in drone operations, maintenance, and battlefield tactics, including any partnerships with private sector entities and academia;

(2) An estimate of how many personnel will be trained through existing and planned programs by the end of 2028 and how this aligns with the current Department objectives for fielding drones at scale;

(3) An assessment of how the Department could leverage public-private partnerships to expedite the training of armed forces personnel in the operations and maintenance of drone technologies;

(4) An assessment of the use of existing public-private partnerships to provide drone training and tactics to armed forces and personnel in recent conflict environments in Europe and the Middle East and the potential for integrating best practices into U.S. efforts and plans; and

(5) A strategy for the development of a pilot program for drone training public-private partnerships which:

(a) contain no fewer than three U.S.-based facilities;

(b) would begin training within 12 months;

(c) would include identified potential partners such as universities and community colleges with existing drone training programs;

(d) identifies funding and payment mechanisms necessary to execute the pilot program;

(e) examines the use of grants to develop such partnerships; and

(f) identifies any authorities, resources, and organizational structure changes necessary to execute the pilot program.

**Report on electric and hybrid-electric powertrain options for special operations light tactical vehicles**

The committee notes ongoing advancements in commercial automotive propulsion technologies and believes these developments may hold long-term utility for military applications. Integrating alternative power systems into tactical mobility platforms could enhance operational capabilities and provide key efficiencies in theater. However, the committee recognizes that introducing new technologies into complex, asymmetric operational environments presents logistical and performance trade-offs that require careful study.

Because special operations forces are uniquely positioned to evaluate and iterate on these types of technological innovations, further analysis is required to balance battlefield modernization with existing mission constraints.

Therefore, the committee directs the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the availability and suitability of electric and hybrid-electric powertrain technologies for Lightweight Tactical All-Terrain Vehicles (LTATVs).

The report shall include the following:

(1) A survey of modular electric powertrain systems available from domestic small businesses and nontraditional defense contractors that are capable of augmenting or replacing internal combustion engines on existing LTATV chassis, including systems providing silent mobility, thermal signature reduction,

vehicle-mounted electrical power export, and autonomous or remotely operated movement capabilities;

(2) An analysis of the acoustic, thermal, and electromagnetic signature reduction benefits of such systems and their operational relevance to special operations missions, including clandestine target approach, offset infiltration, and operations in fuel-denied environments; and

(3) Recommended acquisition pathways for transitioning mature electric powertrain technologies from small business developers into the LTATVs program of record, including the use of other transaction authority under sections 4021–4022 of title 10, United States Code, and the Small Business Innovation Research program (as described in section 9 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 638)).

The required report shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

**Reusable hypersonics development and transition**

The committee continues to support the development of reusable hypersonic aircraft and associated technologies that can enhance the Department of Defense's ability to rapidly develop, test, and field advanced air systems. The committee is tracking departmental plans for reusable hypersonic flight demonstrations and related technology maturation efforts. However, the committee remains concerned about schedule delays resulting from insufficient budget planning and the absence of a clearly defined transition strategy to guide promising technologies from research and development through testing, acquisition, and operational use.

Reducing schedule risk will require maximizing the use of mature and previously demonstrated technologies, including propulsion systems like turbine engines and scramjets, high-temperature materials, fuels, flight controls, and other enabling capabilities rather than initiating duplicative development efforts. The committee believes that leveraging investments made across the Department, including those undertaken by military departments, defense agencies, federally funded research and development centers, and industry partners can accelerate progress and improve affordability.

To ensure effective integration of existing hypersonics investments and to support timely transition of reusable hypersonic capabilities, the committee directs the Principal Director for Hypersonics to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than June 30, 2027, on Department-wide efforts to leverage prior and ongoing hypersonics development activities. The briefing should include: (1) Current plans for transitioning reusable hypersonic technologies from demonstration and experimentation into testing, evaluation, acquisition, and operational use; (2) Projected funding requirements needed to maintain planned schedules; and (3) Any anticipated funding, administrative, industrial base, or technology development challenges that could delay progress.

**Special operations unmanned aerial systems**

The committee notes the importance of rapidly fielding and sustaining uncrewed aerial system capabilities to meet mission requirements in a dynamic operating environment. Further, the committee recognizes the value of integrated enterprise approaches that improve visibility, compliance, and speed in emerging technology procurement.

The committee is aware of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command program, "Buying Drones by the Kilo" (BDK) Emerging Technology Platform initiative, which is intended to transform how autonomous systems are identified, tested, procured, fielded, and sustained. The committee encourages the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to identify and pursue opportunities to scale the BDK Emerging Technology Platform to facilitate enhanced access to approved autonomous systems, improve sustainment and lifecycle visibility, and reduce administrative friction for end users.

The committee directs the Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and the Chief of Staff of the Army to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than December 1, 2026, on ongoing or planned efforts to scale and sustain the BDK Emerging Technology Platform in future fiscal years.

**Torpedo tube launch and recovery capability for unmanned undersea vehicles**

The committee recognizes the critical importance of advancing undersea warfare capabilities to maintain strategic and tactical superiority in maritime operations around the world. The deployment of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) from submarines, using the autonomous torpedo tube launch and recovery (TTL&R) capability that has been repeatably demonstrated during Project RATTRAP in real-world conditions, is a key capability that enhances the submarine fleet's operational flexibility and effectiveness. RATTRAP TTL&R could provide substantial benefits to national security by enabling submarines to deploy and recover UUVs discreetly, thereby extending their tactical reach well beyond their covert position. This capability could enable our naval forces to conduct more productive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, mine countermeasure operations, and other valuable undersea activities with substantially reduced risk to the submarine, the crew, and the U.S. Government. Further, the technologically advanced capability would substantially increase operational reach without compromising submarine stealth characteristics.

The committee commends the Navy and the Defense Innovation Unit for their investments to add this critical capability to our undersea warfare strategy and directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than January 1, 2027, on the Navy's plans to integrate UUVs with RATTRAP TTL&R functionality across the entire submarine fleet, including planned budgetary allocations for the acquisition and sustainment of TTL&R-capable UUVs through future budget requests.

**Trusted foundry**

The committee remains concerned about keeping the defense microelectronics supply chains secure and protected from adversarial influence, especially considering that a majority of the global semiconductor foundry production occurs abroad. The committee notes the continuing work of the Trusted Access Program within the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA), which is responsible for accrediting secure suppliers for mission-critical efforts. DMEA's work ensures that the U.S. military and the Department of Defense maintain access to a secure supply of microelectronics through trusted suppliers, despite the fact that much of the microelectronics industry has rushed to take advantage of low-cost Chinese products without trusted and assured supply chain verification.

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide a briefing on the use of trusted foundries to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than December 1, 2026. The briefing shall include: (1) How DMEA will continue validating requirements for trusted microelectronics; (2) How the Department will continue to maintain and resource DMEA and Trusted Foundries in the outyears of the future years defense plan; (3) How the Department will increase access and research and development opportunities for suppliers to utilize the Trusted Access Program; and (4) How access to trusted suppliers might be broadened to include adjacent markets for which secure, assured supply is needed.

**University affiliated research centers**

The committee recognizes that universities, University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), and their partners serve as trusted, long-term collaborators with the Department of Defense (DOD), maintaining specialized capabilities essential to mission success that are not readily available in the commercial sector. The committee believes that universities in rural regions of the United States have significant contributions to make to the Department's research mission that remain underutilized, specifically in Defense Established Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (DEPSCoR) states. The committee further believes that sustained investment by the Department in university research, including UARCs and their partners, helps ensure the United States maintains its technological edge over near-peer competitors in emerging technologies and critical defense capabilities.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to assess the feasibility and advisability of establishing new UARCs or other research partnerships with universities located in DEPSCoR states and provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 15, 2027. The briefing shall include the following: (1) A process for assessing topical areas of interest for the Department where a UARC might serve DOD needs; (2) A process for identifying and soliciting proposals from relevant, eligible universities in DEPSCoR states; (3) Assessment criteria the DOD would use for evaluating proposals; and (4) Description of the kinds of resources or support required

from the host institution or institutions for which they will be responsible under a proposed UARC agreement.

**Unmanned surface vessel experimentation for Naval Special Warfare**

The committee recognizes that critical capability gaps must be rapidly addressed to assure Naval Special Warfare achieves operational maritime dominance in contested maritime environments. The committee applauds the ongoing unmanned surface vessel experimentation and assessment conducted by U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Naval Special Warfare Command.

The committee encourages SOCOM and Naval Special Warfare to continue with their rapid assessment and deployment of mature technologies, prioritizing those with modular and mission-tailorable payload features and those which are low-cost.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Commander, SOCOM, to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the status of their experimentation with low-cost, scalable, open architecture unmanned surface vessel platforms. The briefing should include lessons learned, programmatic planning and status, and details on which capabilities possess the following features:

(1) Open architecture;
(2) Interoperability with Joint and allied forces;
(3) Low cost;
(4) Rapid scalability; and
(5) Program development and challenges.

**Unmanned undersea vessels for long-range subsea logistics support**

The committee recognizes the growing operational challenges associated with sustaining distributed maritime forces across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific theater. In particular, the ability to move critical supplies, equipment, and mission payloads between forward locations while minimizing risk to crewed platforms will be essential to maintaining operational resilience in a contested environment. The committee believes that long-range unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) offer significant potential to augment existing logistics capabilities by enabling low-signature, persistent delivery of mission-critical supplies to distributed forces and forward operating locations. Such systems could provide an important complement to traditional surface and air logistics platforms, particularly in denied or contested maritime environments.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Department of the Navy to:

(1) Accelerate the evaluation, experimentation, and operational testing of long-range UUV platforms capable of supporting logistics and resupply missions;

(2) Leverage ongoing prototyping, commercial technologies, and autonomous maritime systems development efforts for low-cost, low-maintenance UUV platforms that can be stored, assembled, loaded, and deployed at the point of deployment with minimal manpower;

(3) Prioritize the evaluation of these capabilities in support of operational requirements within the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility and in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; and

(4) Pursue acquisition strategies that enable rapid fielding of proven systems to support distributed maritime operations and enhance logistics resilience across the Indo-Pacific theater.

**Use of non-destructive inspection and automated defect recognition techniques in the Department of Defense**

The committee is concerned that current U.S. Marine Corps body armor inspection systems rely on two-dimensional x-ray scans and manual testing, which often miss defects and structural issues, are slow and laborious, and involve inefficient life-cycle management processes. Modern computed tomography technology, supported by artificial intelligence, can enable rapid and comprehensive three-dimensional scanning of body armor and increase the detection of defects, delamination, and other structural issues through non-destructive inspection (NDI) and automated defect recognition (ADR). These capabilities have the potential to enhance warfighter protection and military readiness, avoid unnecessary replacement costs, and support faster, data-driven decisions. The committee notes modern NDI and ADR capabilities have been successfully demonstrated through academic partners.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than December 1, 2026, on the feasibility of expanding the use of these capabilities across the Department. The briefing shall include the following: (1) The readiness risk of outdated armor inspection systems in the military departments; (2) Potential avenues to adopt NDI and ADR for body armor in the military departments; (3) An assessment of using NDI and ADR in inspecting other forms of military materiel; (4) The feasibility and advisability of establishing multi-site pilot programs for automated or high-throughput armor NDI and ADR; and (5) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of creating an NDI/ADR Center of Excellence to develop standard operating procedures, training, and regular performance reporting with key performance parameters related to NDI and ADR approaches.

**Western Regional Range Complex demonstration**

The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense's test and evaluation capacity for electronic warfare (EW), electromagnetic spectrum operations, and their impact on multi-domain autonomous systems is insufficient to meet growing threats. Spectrum warfare, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), counter-UAS operations, and joint all-domain contested environments are increasingly decisive, yet limited range access and long wait times continue to slow development and fielding.

The committee therefore directs the Director of the Test Resource Management Center, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027, on how the Western Regional Range Complex demonstra-

tion, required under section 227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), will provide an integrated multi-domain demonstration of joint all-domain command and control of unmanned aerial systems in a highly contested electromagnetic environment. The briefing shall include an assessment of the adequacy of existing military installations and the feasibility and advisability of establishing a permanent test-range capability that minimizes disruptions to overhead air traffic and surrounding civilian populations and provides streamlined, equitable access for nontraditional contractors and new entrants developing capabilities on private capital.

# TITLE III—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

## Subtitle A—Authorization of Appropriations

### Sec. 301—Authorization of appropriations

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for operation and maintenance activities at the levels identified in section 4301 of division D of this Act.

## Subtitle B—Energy and Environment

### Sec. 311—Modifications to Advanced Nuclear Transition Working Group

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 319 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) to reassign the Chair of the Advanced Nuclear Transition Working Group from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment.

### Sec. 312—Prioritization of deployment of expeditionary solid waste disposal systems

The committee recommends a provision that would prioritize the deployment of expeditionary solid waste disposal systems to contingency locations where open air burn pits remain in use and other locations where members of the Armed Forces face elevated exposure risk due to the absence of feasible waste disposal alternatives.

### Sec. 313—Authorization of sustainable aviation fuel procurement

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Department of Defense to procure sustainable aviation fuel above the market rate for traditional aviation fuel, as part of the Department's sustainable aviation fuel pilot program.

### Sec. 314—Grid resiliency and energy redundancy

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2911(e) of title 10, United States Code, to require the Secretary of Defense to consider the value of operational redundancy in both the primary procurement sourcing of energy and the specific physical categories of energy utilized for critical mission infrastructure, ensuring the continuous availability of independent baseload generation capacities in the event of commercial or regional utility disruption, for the purpose of developing and implementing the energy performance goals and energy performance master plan.

**Sec. 315—Mandatory grid impact and infrastructure power requirements for enhanced use leases**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that any enhanced use lease executed, extended, or renewed under sections 2667 and 2662 of title 10, United States Code, for the purposes of infrastructure, facility modernization, or energy production of the Department of Defense shall include a comprehensive assessment of localized grid impacts and infrastructure power demands.

**Sec. 316—Storage capacity enhancements**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Secretaries of the military departments, to submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a comprehensive master plan to expand, harden, and optimize bulk storage capacity at strategic locations worldwide.

**Sec. 317—Revision of policy on use of open-air burn pits not controlled by Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to revise the policy of the Department of Defense governing the use of open-air burn pits consistent with the findings and recommendations contained in the report by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DODIG–2024–107).

**Sec. 318—Assessment of energy supplied to installations and operational forces of the Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command and the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency, to submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, a comprehensive assessment of the current status, sourcing, and security of all forms of energy supplied to installations and operational forces of the Department of Defense.

**Sec. 319—Requirement of notice on updates to public dashboard on remediation of perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Department of Defense to provide semiannual notices to the Environmental Protection Agency and to the Congress when it updates its public dashboard on remediation of perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

**Sec. 320—Revisions to technical assistance for public participation in defense environmental restoration activities**

The committee recommends a provision that would revise regulations relating to technical assistance for public participation in defense environmental restoration activities.

**Sec. 320A—Study on contracting process of Department of Defense for remediation of perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study of the contracting process of the Department of Defense for remediation of perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances, and to report to the Congress the findings of that study at a mutually agreed upon time.

**Sec. 320B—Initiation of remedial actions with respect to perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to select no fewer than 50 Department of Defense sites for perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substance remediation, provided that doing so would be consistent with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and any other applicable law.

**Subtitle C—Logistics and Sustainment**

**Sec. 321—Implementation of Comptroller General recommendations on exercises and wargames in the Indo-Pacific region**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the service Secretaries to develop a plan, not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, and implement several open recommendations made by four reviews of the Comptroller General of the United States. The four reviews include: (1) Recommendations 16 through 20 in the January 30, 2026, report titled, "Weapon Systems Maintenance: DOD Needs Enhanced Assessments and Exercises to Prepare for an Indo-Pacific Conflict" (GAO–26–107710C); (2) Recommendations 7 through 11 in the June 26, 2025, report titled, "Fuel Supply: DOD Is Not Prepared for a Contested Environment in the Indo-Pacific" (GAO–25–107216C); (3) Recommendations 7 and 8 in the March 14, 2024, report titled "Force Structure: Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges Developing New Multi-Domain Units" (GAO–24–106266C); and (4) Recommendations 1 and 2 in the January 30, 2026, report titled, "Military Readiness: Actions Needed to Ensure the Reserve Component Will Be Ready to Rapidly Respond to a Potential Conflict" (GAO–26–107579C).

**Sec. 322—Integration of unmanned systems into the Installation Physical Security Program**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the development of a plan for the implementation of an Unmanned Systems for Installation Physical Security Program for installations and facilities of the Department of the Army within the United States.

**Sec. 323—Guidance regarding governance structure of organic industrial base of the Army**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Army to establish and publish updated governance

guidance for the Army Organic Industrial Base (OIB) within 180 days of the date of the enactment of this Act. The legislation seeks to clarify roles and responsibilities among Army Materiel Command; the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; Army Sustainment Command; and other organizations involved in managing OIB operations, workload, and modernization.

The provision would also require comprehensive multi-year planning for production, repair activities, modernization investments, and resourcing strategies across Army arsenals, depots, and ammunition facilities. Additionally, the provision would increase congressional oversight by requiring annual modernization plans and notification to the Congress of significant workload reductions at OIB sites.

**Sec. 324—Extension of deadline for designation of roles and responsibilities relating to sustainment and readiness of certain naval surface vessels**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 8698(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, by extending the start of implementation for the requirements of such section by 1 year.

The committee notes that the Department of the Navy is working to implement the requirement for Portfolio Acquisition Executives (PAEs). The roles and responsibilities for sustainment activities, including life cycle planning at PAE Maritime and PAE Undersea and maintenance, repair, and overhaul execution at PAE Industrial Operations, have not been clearly described to the committee. The committee emphasizes the need for the type commanders to have increased responsibilities with respect to surface ship sustainment.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, on a proposed organizational structure for ship sustainment. The briefing shall describe clear lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability for the ship sustainment enterprise. The committee will use the briefing to inform any modifications to section 8698 of title 10, United States Code, that may be required.

**Sec. 325—Acquisition and sustainment strategy for spare parts for low mission capable aircraft**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to establish an acquisition and sustainment strategy for aircraft spare parts, applicable to any covered aircraft platform, to maximize competition and expand the defense industrial base supply chain for sustainment.

**Sec. 326—Helicopter support for Kwajalein Atoll and Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range, Marshall Islands**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Army, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to ensure that a sufficient quantity of rotary wing assets, including air and maintenance crews, spares and sup-

port equipment, and any other mission critical personnel or material necessary to support all planned test events, installation maintenance requirements, and personnel movement or evacuation contingencies are located on Kwajalein Atoll and available for mission support and tasking by United States Army-Kwajalein Atoll and the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range.

**Sec. 327—Capital expenditure write-offs for Department of Defense depots and arsenals**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to eliminate any internal Department of Defense depreciated costs or cancel any internal Department debts associated with depots and arsenals from accounts of a military department or the Department that are associated with certain capital expenditures that no longer generate revenue due to mission changes.

**Sec. 328—Modification of requirements relating to production in factories or arsenals owned by the United States**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 7532 of title 10, United States Code, to require several certifications if the Secretary of the Army chooses to make munitions or weapon systems outside the organic industrial base of the Army.

**Subtitle D—Reports**

**Sec. 341—Report on strategy to maintain and upgrade conventional munitions storage facilities**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of the Army to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, on the strategy of the Department of Defense to maintain and upgrade conventional munitions storage facilities, both in the continental United States and outside the continental United States, in order to ensure the safe, effective, and long-term storage of current and future conventional munitions inventories.

**Sec. 342—Risk assessment of air traffic control systems of Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a risk assessment to evaluate the air traffic control systems owned and operated by any entity of the Department of Defense and operated within U.S. airspace, and to submit the assessment and plan to modernize the systems to the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and then to update the report yearly thereafter.

**Subtitle E—Other Matters**

**Sec. 351—Modification of depots for which minimum capital investment is required**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2476(f)(1) of title 10, United States Code, to include Blue

Grass Army Depot, Sierra Army Depot, and Hawthorne Army Depot to the list of depots for which minimum capital investment is required.

**Sec. 352—Implementation of Department of Defense Inspector General recommendations relating to evaluation of management of canine welfare under military working dog program**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of the Air Force to implement recommendations contained in the Inspector General of the Department of Defense report dated February 17, 2026, and titled, "Evaluation of the DoD Military Working Dog Program's Management of Canine Welfare" (DODIG–2026–057).

**Sec. 353—Prohibition on operation of connected vehicles of concern on military installations and other property of the Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the operation of connected vehicles designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign entity of concern on Department of Defense property after January 1, 2029. The Secretary of Defense must provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on an implementation plan by April 1, 2027.

**Sec. 354—Limitation on availability of funds for travel expenses of the Office of the Secretary of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of 25 percent of the funding authorized or otherwise made available for the travel expenses of the Office of the Secretary of Defense until various overdue reports and other documents are submitted to the congressional defense committees.

**Sec. 355—Limitation on use of travel funds for Secretary of the Air Force until briefing on West Lab Project at Lincoln Laboratory**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the use of certain travel funds of the Secretary of the Air Force until the Secretary provides a briefing on the status of the West Lab Project at the Lincoln Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

**Sec. 356—Naming of certain assets of the Department of Defense in the Commonwealth of Virginia**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, to implement the naming recommendations for assets of the Department of Defense in the Commonwealth of Virginia that were recommended by the renaming commission established under section 370(b) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283).

### Sec. 357—Administrative requirements for Military Aviation and Installation Assurance Clearinghouse

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 183a of title 10, United States Code, to require the Secretary of Defense to complete any review under subsection (d) of that section, including any mitigation discussions that the Secretary deems appropriate, and to issue a final determination within 180 days after the Department of Defense receives notice of a proposed project, and for other purposes.

## Budget Items

### Redistribution of funding associated with proposed alternative military basic pay increase

The committee notes that the President's budget request proposes an alternative military pay raise structure of 7 percent for members in grades E–5 and below, 6 percent for members in grades E–6 through 0–3, and 5 percent for members in grades 0–4 and above, at an estimated cost of approximately $2.3 billion above the statutory 3.6 percent Employment Cost Index (ECI)-based pay adjustment required under section 1009 of title 37, United States Code.

The committee recognizes the importance of maintaining competitive compensation for members of the Armed Forces and notes that Congress enacted a targeted 14 percent pay increase for junior enlisted servicemembers in the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159). The committee further notes that the Department's own Fourteenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) raised concerns regarding the long-term effects of disproportionate increases concentrated within a single segment of the basic pay table, including the potential for increased compression across enlisted pay grades. The QRMC also recommended benchmarking military compensation against the 75th percentile of civilian earnings for individuals of comparable age and experience and noted that junior enlisted compensation already exceeded that benchmark prior to the enactment of the fiscal year 2025 pay increase. Currently, junior enlisted pay is well over the 90th percentile of civilian pay.

At the same time, the committee remains concerned about inadequacy in some areas of the budget related to quality of life and readiness. The Defense Health Program has experienced chronic underinvestment in recent years, contributing to persistent challenges related to healthcare access, staffing, and long-term readiness. Testimony of the senior enlisted members of each military service before the Personnel Subcommittee in February 2026 reinforced this concern, as many of these members raised concerns about access to quality healthcare for servicemembers. The committee also notes ongoing challenges in recruiting and retaining civilian personnel in certain high-demand fields and geographic areas, creating additional workforce pressures across the Department. The committee further recognizes that targeted investments in workforce support, quality-of-life initiatives, recruiting infra-

structure, and retention incentives remain critical to sustaining a high-quality military and civilian workforce across the Department.

The committee recognizes the importance of maintaining competitive compensation for members of the Armed Forces and supports the statutory ECI-based military pay raise for fiscal year 2027. The committee further recommends redistributing the funding associated with the proposed alternative military pay raise in order to sustain the statutory ECI-based pay adjustment while prioritizing targeted investments in healthcare, workforce support, readiness, and retention initiatives across the Department. These investments include an additional $1.77 billion for the Defense Health Program; $250.9 million for civilian personnel compensation; $126.9 million for military special and incentive pays; $40.0 million for the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency; $38.7 million for child and youth programs; $28.3 million for tuition assistance and credentialing assistance programs; $20.0 million for the Military Entrance Processing Command to support recruiting operations; $10.0 million for the Defense Suicide Prevention Office; $10.0 million for the Defense Commissary Agency; and $5.0 million for guardianship transfer support.

## Items of Special Interest

### Arctic domain awareness

The committee notes that the rapid strategic emergence of the Arctic region presents an urgent multi-domain national security challenge, demanding enhanced domain awareness to ensure navigational safety and strategic deterrence against peer adversaries. The Department of Defense's 2024 Arctic Strategy explicitly acknowledges that the Joint Force's primary operational barrier is the environment itself, which is further hampered by a lack of localized sensors and data needed to accurately forecast and adapt to longer-term climate projections. This deficit creates dangerous intelligence gaps and operational security vulnerabilities, as demonstrated during recent drone trials in Alaska and exercise Arctic Edge 2025, where sub-zero temperatures down to $-20°C$ and severe magnetic distortions caused rapid battery degradation, instrumentation failures, and navigation disruptions, limiting the endurance of autonomous systems and potentially masking adversary submarine or research vessel incursions.

To mitigate these gaps, the committee believes the Department must transition from isolated test cycles to a scalable network of resilient monitoring infrastructure by leveraging existing facility, human, and technological resources already established. Creating an integrated "Arctic Watchtower" network framework will allow the Department to collaboratively gather continuous data sets, field-test cold-resistant unmanned aerial vehicles and autonomous underwater vehicles, and rapidly insert mature sensing technologies into remote frontier sites. This persistent, place-based research and monitoring footprint is vital to providing the Joint Force with the close-to-real-time environmental intelligence and multi-domain awareness required to maintain an uncontested strategic posture in the polar regions.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 28, 2027, on the Department's strategy to field resilient monitoring networks and overcome domain awareness gaps in the Arctic. The briefing shall include: (1) Current and future requirements to ensure Arctic domain awareness; (2) Current and planned autonomous detection and tracking systems; (3) An assessment of current capability gaps regarding material fatigue, battery life, communications, data integration and processing, and navigation disruptions in polar environments; (4) A plan to expand layered sensing networks by utilizing geographically remote frontier sites and existing gateway research infrastructure; (5) A framework for scaling interagency, academic, and tribal collaborations, including the Arctic Watchtower network concept; and (6) Recommendations on mitigating existing capability gaps and improving Arctic domain awareness.

**Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast services for Air Force flying installations**

The committee is concerned by reports that Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B) service contracts at Air Force installations within the United States, including Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, are approaching renewal and that the Air Force may shift responsibility for funding these services to individual installations. The committee notes that ADS–B capabilities are critical to the safe integration of military and civilian aircraft operating within the National Airspace System and provide enhanced situational awareness, aircraft identification, and air traffic deconfliction capabilities for military air traffic controllers and aircrews.

The committee further notes that ADS–B capabilities support the safe and efficient flow of military and civilian air traffic operating in the region, including aircraft utilizing multiple civilian airports.

The committee believes that access to ADS–B services should be sustained through a deliberate, enterprise-wide strategy that ensures continued aviation safety, operational readiness, and training effectiveness across Air Force flying installations.

Therefore, the committee urges the Secretary of the Air Force to assure multi-year, funded access to ADS–B services by all U.S. Air Force flying units to ensure deconfliction of civilian and military aircraft operating in the United States.

**Autonomous or remote-controlled self-propelled railcars**

The committee notes that the Army operates and maintains more than 1,000 miles of railroad track across 60 installations and upward of 140 diesel locomotives to support heavy equipment, munitions, and materiel movements, primarily for switching operations on base. Significant reductions in U88 rail specialists since 2015 have resulted in delays and cancellations of equipment for training and rehearsals. According to the Government Accountability Office report, published August 23, 2021, titled "Defense Transportation: The Army Should Take Action to Better Ensure Adequate Rail Support to Combatant Commanders" (GAO–21–411), there are spe-

cific concerns over Army readiness for heavy equipment mobilization that point to weakened operational readiness—particularly Army mobility. There is a pending demonstration at the Army Reserve's Operation Sentinel Justice training exercise in June 2026 of autonomous or remote-controlled self-propelled railcars, which have been shown to reduce the mechanical and manpower burden for private sector operators.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than February 1, 2027, on potential costs and benefits, including manpower and maintenance savings, through the deployment of autonomous operating capability, either through the replacement of Army diesel electric locomotives with new locomotives with autonomous capability or upgrading existing locomotives with autonomous operating capability. The briefing should also include a notional Army Transportation Command plan for implementing any alternatives identified during the review. The briefing should also examine the potential contribution of such a capability for operating in contested environments.

**Badlands Bombing Range project**

The committee remains concerned with the pace and scope of environmental restoration efforts relating to munitions and unexploded ordnance (UXO) on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. The committee believes the Secretary of the Army, acting through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Secretary of the Air Force should be conducting government-to-government consultation with the Oglala Sioux Tribe with respect to all environmental restoration activities on the Pine Ridge Reservation funded through the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, including activities funded through the Formerly Used Defense Sites account and the Environmental Restoration, Air Force account. The committee notes that such consultation should be consistent with Executive Order 13175, the Department of Defense American Indian and Alaska Native Policy, and the requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Public Law 96–510), including the provisions governing Federal facilities and consultation with affected Tribes and communities.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on the resources required for environmental restoration activities on the Pine Ridge Reservation, including activities funded through the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, not later than January 7, 2027. The briefing should include considerations on the resources needed for the investigation, assessment, remediation, mitigation, and public outreach efforts relating to UXO and associated hazards on the Reservation, as well as what resources would be required to expedite and then sustain the pace of remediation necessary to protect the health and safety of tribal members, including increasing the resources necessary to carry out the Oglala Sioux Tribe's UXO mitigation efforts through the Badlands Bombing Range Project.

**Briefing on defense reactor spent fuel management**

Given the Department of Defense's stated plans to deploy nuclear reactors on military installations, the committee believes that the Department of Defense should fully assess and share with the Congress its plans for managing used nuclear fuel.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy and the Chair of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to submit a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department of Defense's framework for managing spent nuclear fuel associated with its deployment of nuclear power systems, including the expected quantities, characteristics, and lifecycle profiles of spent fuel and associated high-level waste streams. The briefing shall include: (1) An assessment of the expected quantities, characteristics, and lifecycle profiles of used nuclear fuel and associated high-level waste streams, including advanced fuel forms, generated by projected Department of Defense deployments of small modular reactors or other advanced nuclear systems at installations and potential forward or remote locations; (2) A description of current Department of Defense and Department of Energy authorities, policies, and infrastructure applicable to the handling, transportation, storage, recycling, reuse, or disposition of used nuclear fuel generated by such systems; (3) An evaluation of logistical, sustainment, and security considerations associated with used nuclear fuel management, including challenges unique to forward or austere environments; (4) An assessment of options to recycle, reuse, or otherwise extract value from used nuclear fuel, including pathways such as material recovery, fuel recycling, and waste minimization approaches to reduce long-term waste volumes, recover usable materials, or enable future energy, industrial, or national security applications, consistent with applicable law and safety requirements; (5) Identification of potential future uses of used nuclear fuel that could support Department of Defense missions, energy resilience, or broader national security objectives, including a discussion of technical, regulatory, and policy barriers to such uses; (6) Identification of opportunities to align Department of Defense initiatives, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, with Department of Energy Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campus efforts to strengthen domestic fuel-cycle, advanced manufacturing, and waste-management capabilities supporting defense requirements; and (7) Identification of gaps in policy, planning, interagency coordination, or statutory authority that could impede responsible deployment of nuclear power systems or the effective management, recycling, or reuse of used nuclear fuel by the Department of Defense.

**Briefing on installation energy resilience for Navy scientific and training commands**

The committee recognizes the contributions of the Navy's Small Boat Training Command, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command, Naval Oceanographic Office, and Naval Research Laboratory to the readiness, operational effectiveness, and technological superiority of the Joint Force. These organizations provide essential capabilities in maritime training, environmental intel-

ligence, oceanographic analysis, and advanced research that underpin naval operations, support global force posture, and enable decision advantage across all domains.

The committee emphasizes that these missions are highly dependent on assured, resilient, and reliable installation energy resources. Disruptions to energy supply—whether from extreme weather, physical attack, or cyber threats—pose unacceptable risks to the continuity of operations at these facilities. The committee views installation energy resilience as a foundational requirement for sustaining these capabilities and ensuring mission assurance.

The committee appreciates the Department of Defense's (DOD) ongoing efforts to implement the President's May 23, 2025, Executive Order 14299 titled, "Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security," and recognizes the Department of Defense's actions to evaluate the role of advanced nuclear energy systems, including microreactors, in enhancing installation resilience and supporting critical defense missions.

The committee further notes that the Department of the Navy issued a Request for Information in October 2024 identifying seven Navy and Marine Corps installations on the East Coast and in the Mid-Atlantic region as potential sites for microreactor deployment. While this effort represents a meaningful step forward, the committee believes that the strategic importance of the aforementioned commands and activities warrants broader consideration of additional locations. In particular, the committee encourages the Department of the Navy to evaluate installations and facilities along the Gulf Coast, where several of these critical functions are located and where enhanced energy resilience would provide substantial operational benefit.

The committee strongly encourages the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of the Navy to consider expanding the scope of their microreactor deployment efforts to include a wider range of installations supporting high-priority missions. Lastly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of installing DOD-funded microreactors on federal property where the DOD is a tenant but not the landowner. The briefing shall include: (1) An assessment of statutory and regulatory challenges associated with such installations; (2) An analysis of resourcing considerations, including cost allocation and mechanisms for shared investment; (3) An evaluation of interagency frameworks necessary to facilitate coordination with host departments and agencies; (4) Options for the sharing, distribution, or sale of excess energy capacity to offset life cycle costs, consistent with applicable law and policy; and (5) Any additional issues or recommendations the Secretary deems relevant to advancing the deployment of microreactor technologies in support of national security objectives.

**Briefing on operational energy requirements and scope of Project Janus and the Advanced Nuclear Power for Installations Program**

The committee notes that future military operations around the world will continue to be characterized by contested logistics, ex-

tended distances, and persistent threats to fuel supply chains. The committee also notes that the domestic electrical grid, on which the Department of Defense heavily depends to power the majority of its installations in peacetime and conflict, is increasingly at risk due to aging infrastructure and the proliferation of non-kinetic and low-cost kinetic capabilities—a potentially significant challenge for the dispersal concepts for Golden Dome for America and supporting domain awareness sensors such as the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System, Cobra Dane, Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, Upgraded Early Warning Radars in Greenland and Cape Cod, and the Alaska Radar System. The committee notes that all of these facilities require resilient power sources to sustain operations while reducing reliance on vulnerable resupply methods and degrading energy grids.

The committee understands that the Army's Project Janus and the Air Force's Advanced Nuclear Power for Installations Program seeks to prototype microreactor power plants at fixed installations by 2030. However, there remain significant unanswered questions regarding regulatory pathways, costs, and other concerns that must be explained before the Army, the Air Force, and the Department at large can fully demonstrate the capability to see a reactor project through commissioning and startup.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on an implementation plan to integrate advanced nuclear microreactor solutions into the Army's operational energy requirements and the scope of Project Janus. The report shall include: (1) An assessment of the requirements for mobile advanced nuclear systems capable of supporting forward operating locations, expeditionary basing, and distributed maneuver forces in contested environments and on military installations; (2) An evaluation of the technical and logistical feasibility of self-contained systems designed for rapid deployment and relocation across the combatant commands' areas of responsibility; (3) A description of how deployable nuclear microreactors align with current warfighting concepts of operation, contested logistics doctrine, and operational energy strategies; (4) An assessment of the application of these systems in support of emergency response, including natural disasters, grid outages, or kinetic attacks on critical infrastructure in remote regions; and (5) An identification of the regulatory, safety, and diplomatic challenges associated with the domestic and theater-wide deployment of mobile nuclear systems and a mitigation plan to address such challenges.

**Briefing on sourcing standards for domestically produced synthetic graphite**

The committee notes that the Department of Defense is increasingly pursuing advanced nuclear energy solutions—including small modular reactors, microreactors, and other technologies—to deliver more resilient energy for military installations. Synthetic graphite is a critical supply chain element for these efforts, serving multiple

roles in advanced reactor development as a structural component, reflector, and moderator in high-temperature gas reactors.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, not later than March 1, 2027, to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on Department of Defense progress in establishing and implementing sourcing standards to prioritize the procurement, for use in military nuclear energy projects, of domestically produced synthetic graphite, as well as provide an overview of the state of the domestic synthetic graphite manufacturing market.

**Briefing on the beddown of Air Force Special Operation Command's Power Projection Wing at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base**

The committee notes that on August 2, 2023, the Department of the Air Force announced Davis-Monthan Air Force Base as the preferred location to host the 492nd Special Operations Wing (SOW) as an Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) Power Projection Wing. The committee believes that the successful relocation and transformation of the 492nd SOW into a power projection wing will help to enable AFSOC to properly prepare, prevent, and prevail against any adversary in today's challenging security environment.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing, not later than December 1, 2026, on the status of the 492nd Power Projection Wing beddown at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. At a minimum, the briefing should include, for each basing action:

(1) An assessment of any additional resourcing or authorities that may be needed to complete the activation of the 492nd Power Projection Wing; and

(2) Any other matters deemed relevant by the Secretary.

**Capability Portfolio Execution for Simulation, Training, and Test Support**

The committee recognizes that modeling, simulation, and advanced synthetic training environments are essential to preparing the Joint Force to deter and, if necessary, defeat peer and near-peer adversaries in complex and contested operational environments. The organization currently known as Capability Portfolio Execution for Simulation, Training, and Test Support (CPE ST3), formerly the Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation, provides critical capabilities supporting Army and Joint Force readiness through the development, integration, and sustainment of modeling, simulation, instrumentation, and training technologies. These capabilities enable large-scale collective training, experimentation, and operational preparation across multiple domains and echelons, including through live, virtual, and constructive training environments supporting combat training centers and other operational training venues worldwide.

The committee believes sustaining and expanding these capabilities is important to supporting Army readiness, modernization priorities, and initiatives associated with Transformation in Contact and the National Defense Strategy. As such, the committee strong-

ly encourages the Secretary of the Army to retain CPE ST3 capabilities and preserve the organization's core mission and portfolio of programs supporting Army and Joint Force training, testing, and readiness requirements. The committee further encourages the Secretary to continue leveraging the expertise resident within CPE ST3 to advance modeling, simulation, instrumentation, and synthetic training technologies necessary to support operations in contested and multi-domain environments.

Lastly, the committee encourages the Secretary to assess opportunities to expand the capabilities and programs executed by CPE ST3 to address emerging operational requirements and evolving threats. Such efforts may include activities related to unmanned and autonomous systems, artificial intelligence and advanced data-driven simulation technologies, cyber and electronic warfare training environments, and other emerging technologies or operational concepts that enhance the realism, scale, and effectiveness of Army and Joint Force training and experimentation.

**Comptroller General recommendation on prepositioned assets in Indo-Pacific Region**

The Indo-Pacific region is of critical strategic importance to the Department of Defense (DOD), and ensuring that the United States has combat-ready and well-equipped forces with capabilities to prevail against peer and near-peer competitors in the region is vital to defense planning. The committee recognizes significant challenges inherent in operating in the Indo-Pacific region, including management of prepositioned assets. However, the committee is concerned about the lack of a comprehensive plan to address challenges and risks in managing prepositioned materiel in the Indo-Pacific region.

The committee notes that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in June 2025, titled, "Defense Prepositioning: DOD Should Develop a Plan to Address Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region and Report to Congress" (GAO–25–106991C), that recommended the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, assess the extent of ongoing challenges in managing prepositioned materiel in the Indo-Pacific region and develop a comprehensive plan to address those challenges and risks related to storage, maintenance, personnel shortages, and contractor support. The plan should include an estimate of the costs and expected timeline for implementation.

The committee believes it will be important for the DOD to implement the GAO's recommendation in an expeditious manner to bolster deterrence, enable rapid crisis response, and reduce reliance on strategic sealift and airlift. Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretaries of the military departments to submit any relevant plans and implementation reports regarding the GAO recommendation to the congressional defense committees and the Comptroller General of the United States, not later than March 1, 2027. Such plans shall address the actions the military departments have taken or plan to take to implement the GAO's recommendation. If the military departments do not intend to implement the rec-

ommendation, the plans should identify both their rationale for not doing so and alternative actions they intend to take in order to mitigate the issues and challenges identified by the GAO.

**Expanding required contested logistics reporting**

The committee notes that section 323 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) assigned responsibility for contested logistics to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Those responsibilities included: (1) Mitigating vulnerabilities and risks associated with contested logistics for the Department of Defense on a global basis; and (2) Planning and operations of the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise relating to contested logistics across all domains, including the movement of forces and material from the source of supply to the designated point of need of the commander of the combatant command receiving support. This section also required a report from the Commander, TRANSCOM within 1 year of the date of the enactment of that Act on various aspects of the contested logistics problem.

The committee believes that the required report should include a fulsome discussion of details behind a solution to the problem, including:

(1) Sensing, data integration, and situational awareness related to logistics;

(2) Mission planning, prioritization, and decision-support tools, including artificial intelligence-enabled logistics capabilities;

(3) Command and control of logistics forces and assets in multi-domain and contested environments, including denied and degraded communication environments; and

(4) Supply chain security, redundancy, and analysis.

The committee also believes the report would benefit from consultation with other combatant commanders.

**Firefighting on military installations**

The committee understands that the Department of Defense (DOD) is experiencing a shortfall in personnel and readiness for firefighting on military installations and is concerned that those shortfalls will result in unacceptable levels of risk.

An April 2025 Government Accountability Office report, titled, "Federal Civilian Firefighters: DOD Should Take Action to Address Long-Standing Staffing Gaps" (GAO–25–107288) found that the DOD has not identified an enterprise-wide strategy to close staffing gaps. The report recommended that the Army, Air Force, Space Force, Navy, and Marine Corps each develop and implement a Fire and Emergency Services civilian strategic human capital plan and ensure that the plan assesses the current state of their branch's civilian firefighter workforce and forecasts future workforce requirements.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the relevant personnel within each military service, to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, re-

garding: (1) The vacancy rate of firefighters for each military service; (2) An assessment of the readiness to prepare for and respond to building and wildland fire events on military installations; (3) The impact to readiness caused by section 388 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) and the provisions of section 2465 of title 10, United States Code; (4) Any resource and statutory recommendations to address shortcomings identified in the briefing; (5) Estimates of the average amount of scheduled and unscheduled overtime that DOD firefighters are working per week at each military installation and site; and (6) The number of current vacant firefighter positions per military service and a description of the plans of any military service to either eliminate the use of overtime among firefighters or to enter into contract with a private entity for firefighting services in order to comply with minimum staffing regulations.

**FireGuard autonomous vertical takeoff and landing capabilities**

The committee recognizes the importance of persistent and resilient intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for the FireGuard program. The committee notes that while space-based sensing and data products are essential for fire detection, monitoring, and decision support, the FireGuard mission may benefit from complementary autonomous vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) systems. Such platforms can provide localized, responsive ISR, enhance data quality, and provide redundancy if satellite coverage is constrained, delayed, or degraded.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to conduct a study on how the FireGuard program could employ autonomous VTOL ISR capabilities to improve interoperability with satellite-derived data products and provide redundancy to space-based sensing. At a minimum, the study shall include the following:

(1) Priority FireGuard mission threads and operating concepts for autonomous VTOL ISR employment by National Guard units, including in degraded space or communications environments;

(2) Technical integration and performance considerations, including data interoperability with satellite-based products, candidate sensor packages, and quality assurance between space-based and airborne sensors; and

(3) Trade-offs among payload weight, endurance, autonomy, and cost, and implications for launch/recovery and sustainment.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than March 28, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the findings of this study, along with recommendations and proposed next steps.

**First Army Division**

The committee understands that, in accordance with the Army's Continuous Transformation Initiative, First Army headquarters is

assuming the functions of Division East and Division West. First Army provides a crucial service in carrying out its critical mission of advising and assisting the reserve component to ensure readiness. As the senior operational command at the Rock Island Arsenal, First Army supports hundreds of high-skilled military and civilian jobs, which bolsters the Army commands co-located at the Rock Island Arsenal, such as Army Sustainment Command, Joint Munitions Command, and the Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center, and contributes significantly to the regional defense ecosystem. The committee remains supportive of the First Army headquarters' critical role at the Rock Island Arsenal.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on any changes to the First Army's structure, alignment, and personnel. The briefing shall include any changes to personnel basing as it relates to the changing functions and shall cover how the First Army fits into the establishment of the new U.S. Army Western Hemisphere Command and the new U.S. Army Transformation and Training Command.

**Fort Polk modernization**

The committee commends the Secretary of the Army for advancing the Army Transformation Initiative (ATI) to posture the force for emerging and future threats, including peer and near-peer competition across all domains. The committee recognizes that modernizing Combat Training Centers (CTCs), including Fort Polk, is a critical enabler of this transformation and supports the Secretary's objective of ensuring formations are prepared to operate in complex, contested environments. The committee further recognizes that the evolving character of warfare—including contested communications, cyber and electronic warfare, unmanned systems threats, and degraded sustainment environments—underscores the strategic importance of CTCs in generating readiness for large-scale combat operations. Accordingly, the committee strongly encourages the Secretary to appropriately modernize Fort Polk's multi-domain capabilities in order to support training for large-scale combat operations against near-peer adversaries.

Consistent with ATI objectives and Army manning guidance, the committee also encourages the Army to prioritize CTCs for senior-grade and high-experience personnel fills, ensuring the most qualified leaders are assigned to Observer/Controller-Trainer, opposing force, and enabling roles essential to high-fidelity training. The committee further encourages the Army to prioritize available endstrength growth to maximize adversary force, sustainment, and enabling unit manning at CTCs and the Army's highest-tempo and deploying brigade combat teams.

Lastly, not later than March 1, 2027, the Secretary shall brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on: (1) The progress of Fort Polk modernization; (2) Force structure adjustments; (3) Adversary force and sustainment manning improvements; (4) Required resources; (5) Alignment with ATI objectives; and (6) Measurable impacts on readiness.

**Ground fuel distribution system**

The committee recognizes that both the Army and the Marine Corps rely on ground fuel distribution systems that were largely designed for permissive operating environments and are increasingly challenged by contested logistics conditions.

The committee notes that the Marine Corps does not operate heavy expanded mobility tactical truck fueler variants and instead relies on medium tactical vehicle replacement fuel trucks and logistics vehicle system replacement-towed legacy fuel tank trailers, primarily the M970 family, for bulk fuel transport. The committee is concerned that these trailer-based systems present survivability, mobility, and operational risks in distributed and expeditionary operations.

The committee further recognizes the Army's Tactical Fuel Distribution System (TFDS) as a modular capability typically configured to store and dispense approximately 3,000 to 5,000 gallons of fuel per site, enabling more distributed and survivable fuel operations when compared to legacy bulk fuel tankers. The committee believes TFDS-like capabilities are increasingly relevant to Marine Corps operational concepts, including Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Navy, to assess opportunities to expand the application of modular and distributed fuel distribution capabilities, including TFDS, to Marine Corps operations. Such an assessment should include consideration of integration with existing Marine Corps vehicle fleets, expeditionary shelter and protection systems, and training at Combat Training Centers and Marine Corps training installations.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on efforts to modernize ground fuel distribution across the Joint Force. The report shall address: (1) Current Army and Marine Corps fuel distribution capabilities; (2) Survivability and mobility challenges associated with legacy fuel tank trailers; (3) The applicability of TFDS and similar modular systems to Marine Corps operations; (4) Funding requirements and legal authorities needed to expand such capabilities; and (5) A recommended path to transition these systems into enduring programs of record where appropriate.

**Importance of Eglin Gulf Test and Training Range**

The committee recognizes the significant value of the Eglin Gulf Test and Training Range to the testing, training, and operational readiness of the Armed Forces. The committee notes that the Department of Defense's 2018 study, "Preserving Military Readiness in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico," concluded that no other area in the world provides the U.S. military with ready access to a comparably instrumented, network-connected, surrogate environment for military operations relevant to the Northern Arabian Gulf and the Indo-Pacific theater. That same study cautioned that the eastward extension of oil and gas development across the Military Mission

Line, absent sufficient surface-limiting stipulations or activity restrictions mutually agreed upon by the Department of Defense and the Department of the Interior, would diminish military flexibility in the region and severely affect test activities. The committee believes that a clear, current understanding of the range's contribution to recent operations is essential to informing future decisions regarding its use and protection.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Navy, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the capabilities of the Eglin Gulf Test and Training Range to recent military operations of the Armed Forces and to military activities worldwide.

The briefing shall include, at a minimum: (1) A description of the specific types of testing conducted at the Eglin Gulf Test and Training Range; (2) How those capabilities aided weapons platforms employed in military operations during the 5 fiscal years preceding the date of the briefing, including Operation Epic Fury, Operation Absolute Resolve, and Operation Southern Spear; and (3) An assessment of the implications of any reduction in the square mileage of the range or movement of the Military Mission Line, including the impacts such reduction or movement would have on the national security of the United States and on military testing by the Armed Forces. A classified annex may be provided.

**Intermittent fault detection and isolation technology**

One of the major cost drivers for the Department of Defense (DOD) is the maintenance of electronics and electrical systems that control and operate a wide-ranging inventory of weapons and weapon systems. Related to this cost driver, the Department's most recent estimate (April 2022) is that nearly $5.5 billion in non-value-added costs and over 383,254 non-mission capable days annually were incurred as the result of operationally induced intermittent electronic faults that could not be identified and isolated. When a failed system is tested with legacy equipment the Services have been using for nearly 20 years, the result is almost always "No Fault Found," "Cannot Duplicate," or "No Trouble Found"—essentially false readings to the effect that there is no problem even for a non-functioning weapon system.

A DOD report to Congress, dated October 5, 2021, titled, "Assessment of Electronics Maintenance as a Leading Driver of Weapon Systems Non-Availability," stated that "there is an available test technology that could detect and reverse the intermittent fault problem across the spectrum of DoD weapons systems," with the initial targets being various aircraft, including the F–35, F–16, and F/A–18. Additionally, a January 2020 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, "Military Depots: DoD Can Benefit from Further Sharing of Best Practices and Lessons Learned" (GAO–20–116), highlighted the major improvements in flight hours, repair times, and cost savings that resulted from the use of this technology. The GAO report specifically describes the Intermittent Fault Detection and Isolation System (IFDIS) produced by a single vendor.

The committee commends the DOD for attempting to address this issue by implementing and funding a related component of the Rapid Sustainment Improvement Program (RSIP), which was intended to pull readily available commercial solutions, such as IFDIS, into the sustainment enterprise to reduce costs and improve readiness. However, the Services, with the exception of the Air Force, effectively ignored the direction of the DOD and this committee to acquire the technology (IFDIS) that has been proven to successfully address this issue and either: (1) In the case of the Navy, used the RSIP funding to acquire equipment that does not successfully address the problem; or (2) In the case of the Army, simply used the funds to "study" the problem, as opposed to solving it. The committee strongly believes that meaningful funding for RSIP should be restored with aggressive oversight, by the Secretary of Defense, over the use of such funding by the Services.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, not later than March 1, 2027, to deliver a briefing to the congressional defense committees detailing the status of any planned restoration of RSIP, specifically identifying the programs and technologies for inclusion in RSIP and a specific plan for oversight of the Services for implementation of RSIP components within their enterprise. In the event that RSIP is not reestablished, the committee directs the Secretary to allocate sufficient funds to materially address the serious issue of "No Fault Found" as specified in the DOD's October 2021 report and in the GAO's 2020 report as described above. The committee believes this issue is solvable with readily available technology and that its resolution is long overdue to alleviate highly detrimental, ongoing impacts to funding and readiness.

**Joint logistics software systems ecosystem assessment**

The committee recognizes the emphasis the Department of Defense (DOD) has placed on developing software systems to support joint logistics operations and is encouraged by the investments made through pace-setting initiatives. However, the committee has not received the briefings required under section 347 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), which directed the use of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled software systems in logistics operations, and is concerned that these efforts lack a clear strategy, direction, and ownership. The committee is further concerned that without a coherent plan for how these systems will function as an integrated ecosystem, the Department's significant investments in logistics software modernization will fail to deliver the joint and contested logistics capabilities the warfighter requires.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the military services, to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than February 1, 2027, on the current state, planned integration, and capability gaps of joint logistics software systems. The report shall include the following: (1) An inventory of current and planned joint logistics software systems and an assessment of how the Department plans to employ these systems as an integrated ecosystem; (2) An assessment of the ability of such systems to integrate enterprise, oper-

ational, and tactical logistics data across the Joint Force and to provide real-time analytics and decision support to commanders; (3) An assessment of the ability of such systems to support logistics planning and execution in contested, degraded, intermittent, or denied communications environments, including through edge-first software architectures and resilient mesh networking; (4) An assessment of interoperability with joint, allied, and partner forces and across the processes and systems of each military service; (5) An assessment of the cybersecurity and data integrity capabilities of such systems; and (6) An identification of capability, integration, and interoperability gaps, including gaps in AI integration and compliance with DOD policy requiring prioritization of commercial off-the-shelf software solutions, and a plan to address those gaps.

**National Guard Special Forces unit for the Arctic region**

The committee notes the importance of the Arctic to United States national security as the Arctic increasingly becomes a contested domain, given Russia's expanded military infrastructure, China's self-designation as a "near-Arctic state," and the opening of Arctic sea lanes to expanded maritime traffic. Further, the committee notes the importance of maintaining Arctic-capable units within the Department of Defense.

The committee directs the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than January 1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a dedicated, Arctic-capable National Guard Special Forces unit to support NORTHCOM activities and operations in the Arctic region.

**Nuclear propulsion training**

The committee recognizes the importance of Nuclear Power Training Unit (NPTU) Ballston Spa as a critical component of the Navy nuclear propulsion training enterprise. The committee directs, not later than March 1, 2027, the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the Director of Naval Reactors, to submit a plan to the congressional defense committees to improve and expand training resources at NPTU Ballston Spa that includes, at a minimum, the following:

(1) An assessment of current training throughput at NPTU Ballston Spa;

(2) An identification of infrastructure, personnel, regulatory, and other constraints in increasing training throughput at NPTU Ballston Spa; and

(3) A detailed estimate of funding, resource, and military construction requirements necessary to expand training capacity at NPTU Ballston Spa.

**Perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances destruction validation**

The committee recognizes the Department of Defense's efforts to focus on finding safe perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) destruction and disposal solutions to protect human health and the environment, including through updated PFAS disposal

guidance to include the use of innovative destruction technologies. The committee also recognizes the Department's need to verify these technologies in line with Department of Defense and Environmental Protection Agency guidelines.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's use of PFAS destruction technology or a combination of technologies that have been demonstrated to have, including through independent third-party testing using validated methodologies, a destruction and removal efficiency of no less than 99.99 percent for PFAS compounds detectable using Environmental Protection Agency validated analytical methods. The briefing should also cover the feasibility and steps needed to ensure regulated PFAS compounds are not released to any environmental medium at concentrations exceeding applicable regulatory standards.

**Photovoltaic modules and inverters report**

The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense has issued Buy America waivers to purchase photovoltaic modules from foreign sources when domestic supplies exist. The committee continues to support the purchase of energy infrastructure, including photovoltaic modules with domestically made cells and inverters, from domestic sources that are not foreign entities of concern (FEOC). The Build America, Buy America Act (Public Law 117–58) requires these systems to be procured domestically, and section 847 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) further prohibits the Department of Defense from purchasing photovoltaic modules and inverters from any foreign entity of concern. The committee further recognizes the national security benefit of using non-FEOC and domestic energy infrastructure when it acquires electricity through power purchase agreements and energy savings contracts.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Department of Defense to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than December 31, 2026, that includes the following elements: (1) The Buy America and FEOC waivers that have been granted in the last 2 calendar years for photovoltaic modules and inverters; (2) The steps the Department has taken to assess the availability of domestic sources of modules with domestically made cells and inverters; (3) The Department's progress in implementing section 847 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026; and (4) The steps the Department is taking to ensure third-party sourced energy is not reliant upon FEOC energy infrastructure, including photovoltaic modules and inverters.

**Preservation of Force and Family**

The committee strongly supports the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) program under the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to enhance the readiness and resilience of special operations forces (SOF) personnel and their families. The committee recognizes the POTFF program as an integrated, multi-domain approach addressing the unique physical, psychological, spir-

itual, social, and cognitive needs of SOF personnel to improve their long-term well-being and operational readiness.

The committee believes that a robust data collection and evaluation framework is critical to ensuring the POTFF program provides effective and responsive support to SOF personnel and families. The committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and the Commander, SOCOM to submit, not later than January 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a plan to implement a unified approach to data collection and program evaluation, consistent with evidence-based best practices. The required plan shall, at a minimum:

(1) Assess the effectiveness of services provided to SOF personnel and families, across all elements of the POTFF program;

(2) Establish specific, measurable performance metrics goals for the POTFF program;

(3) Establish a process for continuous monitoring of the POTFF program that identifies opportunities for improvement;

(4) Describe initiatives aimed at reducing the stigma associated with seeking care; and

(5) Any other matters deemed relevant by the Assistant Secretary and the Commander.

**Project Arcana**

The committee notes that U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) initiated Project Arcana beginning in fiscal year 2024 and remains interested in ensuring the program is fulfilling SOCOM requirements. The committee directs that the Commander, SOCOM provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 31, 2027, detailing how funds appropriated since fiscal year 2024 have been executed to date, including a description of how all previously appropriated funds for Project Arcana are being used to refine, scale, and operationalize workflows, production methods, and quality controls that support authorized national security users in identifying illicit activity relevant to national security.

**Report on integration of Joint Munitions Command and Army Sustainment Command**

The committee remains concerned that the Army has not fully implemented or clearly articulated the details, structure, and implications of the proposed integration of the Joint Munitions Command and the Army Sustainment Command. The committee remains intensely focused on the modernization, expansion, and effective management of the Army organic industrial base and believes that clear lines of authority, responsibility, and oversight are essential to achieving these objectives. The committee is concerned that the current structure and responsibilities of Army Materiel Command subordinate organizations, as well as their respective roles in overseeing and managing the organic industrial base, remain insufficiently defined.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report, not later than March 31, 2027, to the Committees on Armed

Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the status of the planned integration of the Joint Munitions Command and the Army Sustainment Command. The report shall include:

(1) A description of the overall status of the planned integration;

(2) An organizational chart and accompanying explanation identifying how key leadership and personnel positions were retained, modified, or consolidated as part of the integration, including an assessment of the impact of the new personnel structure on management and oversight of the organic industrial base;

(3) The number of authorized, filled, and unfilled positions within the integrated command structure;

(4) A mapping of the current and former responsibilities of the Joint Munitions Command and an identification of where those responsibilities reside within the integrated command;

(5) An explanation of how the integrated command will interact with Army Materiel Command and the broader organic industrial base enterprise; and

(6) A description of how the Army has communicated these organizational changes and their anticipated impacts to the Army workforce.

**Report on use of unmanned, autonomous systems for maintenance and logistics**

The committee recognizes how the extensive use and integration of unmanned systems for resupply, precision delivery and maritime logistics in the Ukraine War and Operation Epic Fury have demonstrated how uncrewed systems can enhance resilience, reduce risk to personnel, and sustain distributed forces in contested environments where traditional resupply methods are vulnerable or impractical. The committee is especially concerned that the Department of Defense (DOD) lacks a clearly defined and resourced pathway for using unmanned aerial systems for ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship logistics across the naval and Joint Force. As the United States prepares for potential crises in the Indo-Pacific—an operating environment characterized by vast distances and increased threats to manned logistics platforms—the committee believes that the development and fielding of cheap, attritable, autonomous logistics capabilities is essential.

To ensure the continued experimentation of uncrewed logistics capabilities in contested environments, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to provide a report and a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than February 1, 2027, on gaps and opportunities related to uncrewed aerial, surface, and undersea systems capable of supporting logistics and maintenance missions, including overland delivery, ship-to-shore transfer, and ship-to-ship resupply of critical parts, tools, repair materials, and maintenance consumables. The report and briefing should include, but not be limited to, the following:

(1) An assessment of the performance of currently fielded uncrewed systems capable of supporting logistics and maintenance missions, an assessment that should include a capability

gap analysis that identifies key mission gaps across all the Services that uncrewed systems could fill for contested logistics and maintenance missions but are still being left unaddressed, especially in contested maritime environments such as the Indo-Pacific;

(2) A review of lessons learned from recent conflicts and operational demonstrations regarding the employment of unmanned logistical platforms, including survivability, payload integration, partner interoperability (if applicable) and ease of use;

(3) An assessment of current DOD investments in research and development of new uncrewed and autonomous systems capable of supporting logistics and maintenance missions, including for uses such as modular uncrewed systems to deliver spare parts to deployed units. This assessment should include a summary of important opportunities and existing barriers to expanding these investments;

(4) Identification of promising foreign partners with interest and capability in co-production of uncrewed logistics and maintenance capabilities; and

(5) Recommendations for authority changes, resourcing or other assistance that the Congress can provide to accelerate prototyping, testing, fielding, and scalable uncrewed logistics and maintenance capabilities.

**United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command**

The committee is concerned that existing manning for U.S. Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is well below its authorized end strength. The committee is concerned that this shortfall in manning, particularly in high-demand, low-density Military Occupational Specialties, challenges the ability of MARSOC to meet growing demands from the geographic combatant commanders. The committee notes that MARSOC, and the broader special operations enterprise, plays an increasingly key role in Department of Defense operations around the world, across the spectrum of competition and conflict, and believes that addressing the shortfall in MARSOC manning should be addressed.

Therefore, not later than February 1, 2027, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, to provide the congressional defense committees with a briefing on the plan to address unfilled military manning for MARSOC, including a detailed description of any ongoing or planned actions by the U.S. Marine Corps to increase manning allocated to MARSOC, and identify any challenges to filling MARSOC manning.

# TITLE IV—MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

## SUBTITLE A—ACTIVE FORCES

### Sec. 401—End strengths for active forces

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize active-duty end strengths for fiscal year 2027, as shown below:

| Service | FY 2026 Authorized | FY 2027 | | Change from | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | FY 2027 Request | FY 2027 Recommendation | FY 2027 Request | FY 2027 Authorized |
| Army | 454,000 | | 469,000 | | 15,000 |
| Navy | 344,600 | | 356,600 | | 12,000 |
| Marine Corps | 172,300 | | 173,700 | | 1,400 |
| Air Force | 301,500 | | 330,400 | | 8,900 |
| Space Force | 10,400 | | 13,200 | | 2,800 |
| DOD Total | 1,302,800 | | 1,342,900 | | 40,100 |

## Subtitle B—Reserve Forces

### Sec. 411—End strengths for Selected Reserve

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize end strengths for Selected Reserve personnel for fiscal year 2027, as shown below:

| Service | FY 2026 Authorized | FY 2027 | | Change from | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | FY 2027 Request | FY 2027 Recommendation | FY 2027 Request | FY 2027 Authorized |
| Army National Guard | 328,000 | | 331,300 | | 3,300 |
| Army Reserve | 172,000 | | 172,000 | | 0 |
| Navy Reserve | 57,500 | | 56,500 | | −1000 |
| Marine Corps Reserve | 33,600 | | 34,700 | | 1,100 |
| Air National Guard | 106,300 | | 107,400 | | 1,100 |
| Air Force Reserve | 67,500 | | 67,400 | | −100 |
| Coast Guard Reserve | 8,500 | | 8,500 | | 0 |
| DOD Total | 773,400 | | 777,800 | | 4,400 |

### Sec. 412—End strengths for Reserves on active duty in support of the Reserves

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize full-time support end strengths for fiscal year 2027, as shown below:

| Service | FY 2026 Authorized | FY 2027 | | Change from | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | FY 2027 Request | FY 2027 Recommendation | FY 2027 Request | FY 2027 Authorized |
| Army National Guard | 30,845 | | 31,154 | | 309 |
| Army Reserve | 16,511 | | 16,511 | | 0 |
| Navy Reserve | 10,409 | | 10,649 | | 240 |
| Marine Corps Reserve | 2,400 | | 2,400 | | 0 |
| Air National Guard | 25,982 | | 25,533 | | −449 |
| Air Force Reserve | 6,218 | | 6,278 | | 60 |
| DOD Total | 92,365 | | 92,525 | | 160 |

## Sec. 413—End strengths for military technicians (dual status)

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize military technician (dual status) end strengths for fiscal year 2027, as shown below:

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize military technician (dual status) end strengths for fiscal year 2027, as shown below:

| Service | FY 2026 Authorized | FY 2027 | | Change from | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | FY 2027 Request | FY 2027 Recommendation | FY 2027 Request | FY 2027 Authorized |
| Army National Guard | 21,294 | | 20,037 | | −1,257 |
| Army Reserve | 6,258 | | 5,870 | | −388 |
| Air National Guard | 10,405 | | 10,824 | | 419 |
| Air Force Reserve | 6,455 | | 6,450 | | −5 |
| DOD Total | 44,412 | | 43,181 | | −1,231 |

The provision would also establish limits on the number of temporary technicians authorized to be employed within the end strengths set forth by this section to not more than 25 percent of the total authorized strength for each component.

The provision would also prohibit the coercion of a military technician (dual status) by a State into accepting an offer of realignment or conversion to any other military status, including as a member of the Active, Guard, and Reserve program of a reserve component. The provision would further specify that if a technician declines to participate in such a realignment or conversion, no further action may be taken against the individual or the individual's position.

## Sec. 414—Maximum number of reserve personnel authorized to be on active duty for operational support

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize end strengths for Reserve personnel on active duty for operational support for fiscal year 2027, as shown below:

| Service | FY 2026 Authorized | FY 2027 | | Change from | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | FY 2027 Request | FY 2027 Recommendation | FY 2027 Request | FY 2027 Authorized |
| Army National Guard | 17,000 | ..... | 17,000 | ..... | 0 |
| Army Reserve | 13,000 | ..... | 13,000 | ..... | 0 |
| Navy Reserve | 6,200 | ..... | 6,200 | ..... | 0 |
| Marine Corps Reserve | 3,000 | ..... | 3,000 | ..... | 0 |
| Air National Guard | 16,000 | ..... | 16,000 | ..... | 0 |
| Air Force Reserve | 14,000 | ..... | 14,000 | ..... | 0 |
| DOD Total | 69,200 | ..... | 69,200 | ..... | 0 |

## Subtitle C—Authorization of Appropriations

### Sec. 421—Military personnel

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for military personnel activities at the levels identified in section 4401 of division D of this Act.

# TITLE V—MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY

## Subtitle A—Officer Personnel Policy

### Sec. 501—Notification requirements for delayed promotions

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 624(d) of title 10, United States Code, to ensure timely congressional notification when the promotion of an officer is delayed, including the basis, expected duration, and status of any associated review or investigation, and to require advance written notice to the officer in all cases.

### Sec. 502—Temporary withholding of officer nominations and promotion recommendations

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to temporarily withhold the processing of officer nominations and promotion recommendations for up to 30 days and would require timely disposition or, in cases of extended withholding, a written justification and notification to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

### Sec. 503—Enhanced authority for early discharges

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 580a(a) of title 10, United States Code, to reauthorize and extend the authority through October 1, 2030.

### Sec. 504—Officer retirement determinations

The committee recommends a provision that would amend sections 1370, 1370a, and 12741 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary concerned to conditionally retire officers pending investigations or other administrative actions and to clarify the circumstances under which an officer's service may be determined to be unsatisfactory for the purposes of determining their final retired grade.

### Sec. 505—Retirement of regular Navy warrant officers and Marine Corps Marine Gunner warrant officers for years of service

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1305(a) of title 10, United States Code, to adjust mandatory retirement timelines for certain regular Navy and Marine Corps warrant officers.

### Sec. 506—Authority to improve retention for permanent professors of the United States Army War College

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 7153(a) of title 10, United States Code, and establish a new

section 7219 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a permanent professor position for senior military members assigned as faculty at the United States Army War College.

**Sec. 507—Congressional notification of relief or early departure of certain general and flag officers**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 35 of title 10, United States Code, by adding a new section requiring the Secretary of Defense to notify the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 5 days after the relief, removal, reassignment, resignation, retirement, request for retirement, or other departure of a general or flag officer in the grade of O–9 or O–10 from a position before the expected completion of that officer's tour of duty. The provision would also require the Secretary of Defense to submit a detailed report to the committees not later than 30 days after such action.

## Subtitle B—Reserve Component Management

**Sec. 511—Clarification on computation of total years of service**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 14706 of title 10, United States Code, to clarify the computation of total years of service for certain members who attend service-approved advanced education programs.

**Sec. 512—Authorized strengths for Navy Reserves and Marine Corps Reserves on full-time reserve component duty**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend sections 12011(a)(2) and 12012(a) of title 10, United States Code, to revise the authorized grade distribution tables for Navy Reserve officers and senior enlisted members and Marine Corps Reserve senior enlisted members serving on full-time reserve component duty.

**Sec. 513—National Guard military technician (dual status) conversions and phase-out**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the phased-in conversion of military technicians (dual status) to either Federal civilian employees under title 5, United States Code, or to members of the active, guard, and reserve (AGR) program under title 32, United States Code. The provision would require the consent of an employee to conversion or transfer and would provide employment protections for employees who are within 3 years of earning an unreduced Federal civilian annuity.

The committee believes it is important that the Department of Defense thoughtfully consider the appropriate force mix between civilian employees and AGRs as it implements this phased conversion. To that end, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct an independent analysis of the impacts of such conversions or transfers on readiness, workload, military force structure, lethality, operational effectiveness, stress on the military force, State disaster relief capabilities, and the fully burdened costs asso-

ciated with such conversions or transfers. Such analysis shall evaluate the full range of conversion and transfer options and force mix available under this authority. The Secretary shall transmit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives the results of this analysis, not later than July 1, 2027.

### Sec. 514—Study and analysis for enhanced maritime surge maintenance, repair, and production capacity

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a feasibility study and business case analysis to expand the industrial capabilities of the Navy Reserve.

## Subtitle C—General Service Authorities and Military Records

### Sec. 521—Remote personnel processing in the military departments

The committee recommends a provision that would require each Secretary of a military department to implement capabilities to enable the remote in-processing and out-processing of members of the Armed Forces and civilian employees of the military departments to enhance efficiency and user experience.

### Sec. 522—Repeal of sunset of authority relating to non-medical counseling services for military families

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1781(d) of title 10, United States Code, to repeal the 3-year limitation on the authority to provide non-medical counseling services to military families through the Department of Defense Military and Family Life Counseling Program.

### Sec. 523—Guidance on public disclosure of personally identifiable information for certain members of the Armed Forces

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to issue guidance, not later than March 1, 2027, on the public release of personally identifiable information in administrative announcements in order to mitigate security and counterintelligence risks and ensure consistent safeguards across the military departments.

### Sec. 524—Prohibition on reduction in the number of personnel assigned to a service review agency

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1559 of title 10, United States Code, to extend the prohibition on reducing personnel assigned to service review agencies through December 31, 2031.

### Sec. 525—Reauthorization of temporary authority to develop and provide additional recruitment incentives

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 522(h) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92) to extend the temporary authority to develop and provide additional recruitment incentives.

**Sec. 526—Relief for former service members requesting review of discharge or dismissal on the basis of post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury related to combat or military sexual trauma**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1552(h) of title 10, United States Code, to clarify the scope of relief available under the liberal consideration standard, while ensuring requests for medical retirement or disability separation are evaluated under consistent Disability Evaluation System evidentiary standards.

**Sec. 527—Modification of whistleblower protections**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, to specify retaliatory reviews of security clearances and mental health examinations as prohibited personnel actions under this section, and to clarify that nondisclosure agreements do not abrogate a servicemember's right to make protected communications under the authority of this section.

**Sec. 528—Authority for collection of personally identifiable information regarding prospective recruits**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to collect information on individuals who are at least 17 years of age and eligible for service in the Armed Forces for the purpose of enhancing military recruiting, marketing, advertising, and outreach efforts.

**Sec. 529—Modification of service obligations for cadets obtaining employment as professional athletes**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend sections 7448, 8459, and 9448 of title 10, United States Code, to increase from 5 to 10 the number of graduates of each military service academy who may obtain employment as a professional athlete before completing their active-duty service obligation. The provision would authorize the Secretary concerned to waive that numerical limitation only upon determining that participation by additional graduates is in the national interest and would provide a significant recruiting, retention, public affairs, or other strategic benefit to the Armed Forces. The provision would also require the Secretaries of the military departments to prescribe regulations governing eligibility, participation, and compliance with the program.

**Sec. 529A—Requirement of equal opportunity, racial neutrality, and exclusive use of merit in military personnel actions**

The committee recommends a provision that would require military personnel actions related to promotions, nominative assignments, command selection, and selection for military and civilian schooling to be based exclusively on individual merit, fitness, capability, and performance. The provision would also prohibit consider-

ation of an individual's sex, race, ethnicity, or national origin in making personnel decisions.

**Sec. 529B—Prohibition on participation of males in athletic programs or activities, and males entering privacy spaces, at the military service academies that are designated for women or girls**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to prohibit participation by males in athletic programs or activities designated for women or girls at the military service academies and schools operated by the Department of Defense, including Department of Defense Education Activity schools, and to require such institutions to provide sex-separated restrooms, changing rooms, and sleeping quarters, subject to specified exceptions.

**Sec. 529C—Modification of provisions related to diversity, equity, and inclusion**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend sections 573, 612, and 14102 of title 10, United States Code, to remove the requirement that officer promotion selection boards represent the diverse population of the armed force concerned to the extent practicable. This provision would also repeal section 986 of title 10, United States Code, relating to Department of Defense policy regarding the identification of gender or personal pronouns in official correspondence. This provision would also amend section 2001 of title 10, United States Code, to revise the content of required human relations training to emphasize instruction on core military values, including honor, courage, commitment, integrity, and excellence.

**Sec. 529D—Sex-neutral occupational performance standards**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 543 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103–160) to require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that any member of the Armed Forces who meets the applicable occupational standards is eligible for qualification, assignment, and continued service in that occupational career field under sex-neutral standards and without differential evaluation based on sex.

**Subtitle D—Military Justice and Other Legal Matters**

**Sec. 531—Wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual images**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to analyze the feasibility and advisability of amending article 117a(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 917a(a)), wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual images, to remove the element of the offense that requires conduct that has a reasonably direct and palpable connection to a military mission or military environment. This provision would require the Secretary to submit a report on the analysis to the Com-

mittees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than December 31, 2027.

The committee is aware of concerns by military prosecutors that this element is unnecessary and challenging when the victim of this offense is a civilian with no military connection.

**Sec. 532—Expansion of victim access to Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend article 6b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 806b) to explicitly provide the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces jurisdiction over Court of Criminal Appeals rulings on a petition for a writ of mandamus under that article.

**Sec. 533—Technical amendment to completion of appellate review under article 57 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend article 57(c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 857(c)) to ensure that its language relating to the completion of a case's appellate review mirrors the expansion of Supreme Court jurisdiction for petitions arising from military criminal appeals.

**Sec. 534—Review of courts-martial records**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend article 65 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 865) to conform with section 544 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) regarding legal review of certain general and special courts-martial records. The provision would also amend article 69 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 869) to correct a cross-reference error regarding review of cases by the Judge Advocate General.

**Sec. 535—Authority of special trial counsel to enter into pretrial agreements with respect to certain offenses occurring before effective date of military justice reforms**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend article 24a(c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 824a(c)) to provide a judge advocate detailed as a special trial counsel with the authority to enter into a pretrial agreement with an accused for an offense that was allegedly committed before January 1, 2019, the effective date of the amendments made by the Military Justice Act of 2016 (division E of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328)), and would thereby facilitate the efficient resolution of such cases by special trial counsel.

**Sec. 536—Clarification of court of criminal appeals review of sentencing**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend article 66(e)(1) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 866(e)) to clarify that, when the accused is sentenced to confinement for a specification alleging a criteria offense or when the confinement portion of the sentence for a specification alleging a parameter offense exceeds the parameter range, a Court of Criminal Appeals

will engage in a sentence appropriateness analysis of only the portion of a court-martial sentence providing for confinement for such a specification or specifications.

**Sec. 537—Updating subpoena authority for military investigations**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend article 30a(a)(1)(B) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 830a(a)(1)(B)) to authorize military judges to issue subpoenas for electronic communications pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. 2701–2713).

**Sec. 538—Extension of Special Victims' Counsel services to domestic violence victims**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1044e of title 10, United States Code, to extend special victims' counsel services to victims of domestic violence.

**Sec. 539—Treatment of hazing under Uniform Code of Military Justice**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct an analysis, and provide a report not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, of how hazing is treated under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and whether any modifications should be made to the Code based on that analysis.

**Sec. 539A—Notification of the issuance or termination of military protective orders to victims of domestic violence or sexual assault**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1567a of title 10, United States Code, to require notification to victims of domestic abuse or sexual assault in the event of the issuance or termination of a military protective order.

**Sec. 539B—Military domestic violence emergent housing policy**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to establish and implement a policy to require commanders, in response to credible reports or complaints of domestic violence, to impose a military protective order and, whenever practicable, separate the victim and alleged offender into separate housing. The provision also requires a briefing, not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives concerning any additional authorities necessary to properly implement this policy.

**Sec. 539C—Annual report on findings of the Department-wide review of the military legal system**

The committee recommends a provision that would require an annual report on the Department of Defense review of the military legal system initiated pursuant to the Secretary of Defense memorandum dated May 8, 2026.

**Sec. 539D—Clarification of authority to order to active-duty certain persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice for matters relating to offenses during specified periods incident to inactive-duty training**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 802) to clarify the authority to order to active duty certain persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice for matters relating to offenses during specified periods incident to inactive-duty training.

**Sec. 539E—Inapplicability to retired members of punitive articles affecting political speech**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 802) to exempt certain types of speech by a retiree from being subject to punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

**Subtitle E—Member Education, Training, and Transition**

**Sec. 541—Limitation on authority to reorganize the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of a military department to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives prior to reorganizing a unit of a Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and would ensure that affected students are able to complete commissioning requirements without being required to transfer to another educational institution.

**Sec. 542—Discharge of midshipmen for unsatisfactory conduct or inaptitude**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 8462 of title 10, United States Code, to align the U.S. Naval Academy's standards and processes for discharging midshipmen for unsatisfactory conduct or inaptitude with those applied at the other military service academies.

**Sec. 543—Modification to program on encouragement of postseparation public and community service**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 553(c)(2) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232) to ensure that persons still eligible to participate in the postseparation public and community service program can appropriately register their public service employment with the Department of Defense and receive the benefits for which they are eligible.

**Sec. 544—Limited authority to waive time-in-grade requirement for service academy graduates detailed as students at law schools**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2004 of title 10, United States Code, to permanently expand the maximum number of members authorized in each military service to be detailed as students at law schools at government ex-

pense to 35 and to authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to waive the minimum 2 year service requirement for up to 5 graduates of each military service academy per year.

**Sec. 545—Elimination of the right of cadets to automatic reexamination**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend sections 7451 and 9451 of title 10, United States Code, to provide the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy with greater discretion in cadet reexaminations to better align their processes with the U.S. Naval Academy.

**Sec. 546—Revision to decision timeframe for expedited transfers at the military service academies**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend sections 7461, 8480, and 9461 of title 10, United States Code, to extend the decision timeframe for expedited transfer requests at the military service academies from 72 hours to 5 calendar days to align with the decision timeframe applicable to the regular components of the Armed Forces.

**Sec. 547—Establishment of program to promote participation of foreign students in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps**

The committee recommends a provision that would establish a program to promote the participation of foreign students in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps.

**Sec. 548—Designation of senior official for military-to-civilian transition**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 58 of title 10, United States Code, by adding a new section requiring the Secretary of Defense to designate a senior Department of Defense official to oversee policies and programs related to the transition of members of the Armed Forces from active duty to civilian life or service in a reserve component.

**Sec. 549—Payment of tuition for off-duty training or education**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2007 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize tuition assistance funds to be used for institution fees in addition to tuition and other educational expenses. The provision would also authorize the Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations increasing the tuition assistance cap to not more than $350 per semester hour.

**Sec. 549A—Improvement of transition of medics in the Armed Forces to the civilian workforce in health care occupations**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to develop recommendations to improve the transition of medics serving

in the Armed Forces into civilian health care occupations, including as certified nursing assistants, licensed practical nurses, and medical assistants.

**Sec. 549B—Standards and requirements for institutions of higher learning seeking to participate in Department of Defense education programs**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the Secretary of Defense from restricting servicemember participation in eligible educational programs at accredited institutions of higher education or denying educational assistance to otherwise eligible servicemembers, except in specified circumstances involving national security concerns, violations of law, or material noncompliance by an institution of higher education.

**Sec. 549C—Government copyright for work produced at Defense Security Cooperation University**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 105(d)(2) of title 17, United States Code, to add the Defense Security Cooperation University to the list of military institutions eligible for copyright protections.

**Sec. 549D—Promoting the use of standardized testing at military service academies and DoDEA schools**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that each service academy accepts scores from not fewer than three nationally recognized standardized assessments that meet specified criteria. The provision would also require the Director of the Department of Defense Education Activity to offer eleventh-grade students the opportunity to take not fewer than three standardized assessments that meet the same criteria.

**Sec. 549E—Department of Defense-wide hate symbol policy and recruiter and workforce training requirement**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Department of Defense to implement a policy banning the display of hate symbols in the Department of Defense, including actions for removal.

## Subtitle F—Military Family Readiness and Dependents' Education

### Part I—Dependents' Education

**Sec. 551—Certain assistance to local educational agencies that benefit dependents of military and civilian personnel**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize $50.0 million in Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide, for continuation of the Department of Defense (DOD) assistance program to local educational agencies impacted by the enrollment of dependent children of military members and DOD civilian employees.

The provision would also authorize $10.0 million in Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide, for impact aid payments for children with disabilities as enacted by the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106–398), using the formula set forth in section 363 of that Act, for continuation of DOD assistance to local educational agencies that benefit eligible dependents with severe disabilities.

Furthermore, the provision would authorize the Secretary of Defense to use an additional $20.0 million for payments to local educational agencies determined by the Secretary to have higher concentrations of military children with severe disabilities.

Finally, the provision would require the Secretary to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than September 30, 2027, on the Department's evaluation of each local educational agency with higher concentrations of military children with severe disabilities and the DOD's subsequent determination of the amounts of impact aid each such agency should receive.

### Sec. 552—Educational technologists at Department of Defense Education Activity schools

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) to ensure that each school district has, at a minimum, one staff member dedicated to facilitating educational technology. The provision would also require the Director of DODEA to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2028, on the implementation of such requirement.

## Part II—Child Care and Related Matters

### Sec. 555—Expansion of eligible child care providers for Department of Defense programs

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1798(b) of title 10, United States Code, to remove the prior service requirement for certain Department of Defense child care providers, thereby expanding the pool of eligible personnel available to support military child development centers.

### Sec. 556—Standardized reporting on Department of Defense child care readiness

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to standardize the collection and reporting of data related to child care capacity, workforce readiness, and waitlists across the Armed Forces and military installations, including disaggregated data on utilization, staffing, unmet demand, and fee assistance programs. The provision also requires the Secretary of Defense to provide recurring briefings to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on trends, gaps, and actions to improve access to child care.

**Sec. 557—Update to pay system for child and youth programs operated by nonappropriated fund instrumentalities**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, not later than January 1, 2027, to update Department of Defense policy governing the pay system for employees of child and youth programs operated by nonappropriated fund instrumentalities to strengthen recruitment and retention, including through modifications to pay band structures and compensation rates, consistent with section 589A of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159).

## Part III—Other Matters

**Sec. 561—Department of Defense Fellowship Program for Military Spouses**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend subchapter I of chapter 88 of title 10, United States Code, to require the Secretary of Defense to establish a fellowship program for military spouses, to enhance career opportunities for military spouses, and support the readiness of military families.

**Sec. 562—Consideration in member assignments process of colocation of members and civilian employee spouses**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to require each of the Armed Forces to have in place a policy for considering a military spouse's status as a Department of Defense civilian employee in the assignment process for servicemembers.

**Sec. 563—Review of Exceptional Family Member Program**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to initiate a review of the Exceptional Family Member Program and to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the results of such review, not later than April 30, 2028.

**Sec. 564—Improved counseling and access to information relating to foster care for military families**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to: (1) Require that all counselors assigned to a Family Advocacy Program or Military and Family Life program at a military installation be trained in the requirements and resources relating to foster care in the state in which the installation is located; (2) Require the inclusion of foster care information on Military OneSource; and (3) Consult with the Administration for Children and Families of the Department of Health and Human Services to obtain resources relating to foster care for military families.

**Sec. 565—Reporting on gaps between senior and junior enlisted security forces that could hinder effective oversight and leadership at Protection Level One locations**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 585 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81) to extend the period of reporting through 2032 and include a new reporting criterion relating to gaps between senior and junior enlisted security forces personnel.

## Subtitle G—Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps

**Sec. 571—Update of guidance and evaluation of Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps instructor pay scale**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to update Department of Defense guidance for the Junior Reserve Officers' Training program, including evaluation of the standardized instructor pay scale and bonus authorities, and establish consistent metrics to assess instructor recruitment and retention across the services.

**Sec. 572—Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps programs in Department of Defense Education Activity schools**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that each Department of Defense Education Activity secondary school that meets eligibility requirements under section 2031 of title 10, United States Code, establishes and maintains a Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps unit.

## Subtitle H—Decorations and Other Awards, Miscellaneous Reports, and Other Matters

**Sec. 581—Authorization for award of the Distinguished-Service Cross to Isaac "Ike" Camacho for acts of valor in Vietnam**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 592 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) by striking "posthumous" in the section heading.

**Sec. 582—Authorization for award of the Distinguished-Service Cross for Joseph P. Lynch for acts of valor in the Republic of Vietnam**

The committee recommends a provision that would waive the time limitations specified in section 7274 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of the Army to award the Distinguished-Service Cross to Joseph P. Lynch for acts of valor in the Republic of Vietnam.

**Sec. 583—Submission to Congress of information for consideration of certain military awards**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend sections 7274, 8298, and 9274 of title 10, United States Code, to require the Secretaries of the military departments to submit an

unredacted package of information relating to any reconsideration of an award that would require the waiver of time limitations.

**Sec. 584—Medal of Honor review procedures and reconsideration and upgrade requirements**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapters 737, 837, and 937, of title 10, United States Code, to require certain review responsibilities, consistent with current practice, for each military services' Medal of Honor review process.

**Sec. 585—Time limitations**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1130 of title 10, United States Code, to set a time requirement for proposals to be considered under this authority. The provision would also amend section 1552 of title 10, United States Code, to strike subsection (j).

**Sec. 586—Production of award files**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives information on all decorations awarded under the authorities of sections 7271, 7272, 7279, 8291, 8292, 8295, 9271, 9272, and 9279 of title 10, United States Code, between January 1, 2025, and December 31, 2026. The provision would also limit the obligation or expenditure of not more than 90 percent of Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide, funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2027 for travel expenses for the Office of the Secretary of Defense until the Secretary of Defense submits such information.

## Items of Special Interest

**Assessment of Department of Defense space law requirements**

The committee recognizes that operational demands in the space domain have grown, including reliance on commercial integration, allied and partner cooperation, and dual-use technologies. Strategic competition increasingly includes efforts to shape legal and normative frameworks. The committee is concerned that current legal, policy, and institutional structures within the Department of Defense may not have kept pace with the complexity of space operations.

The Department currently relies primarily on the office of the Air Force General Counsel and the Air Force Judge Advocate General's Corps for legal support to space operations. The U.S. Space Force lacks its own legal corps, formalized training pipeline, or enduring mechanism to develop a specialized space law expertise. The growing complexity of international space law, civil-military partnerships, commercial integration, dual-use technologies, and industrial base considerations require enhanced, domain-specific legal capacity.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations, the Com-

mander, U.S. Space Command, the Defense Legal Services Agency, and other relevant components, to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Department's current and projected requirements for space law expertise. A report on these findings shall be submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives by December 1, 2027, along with a briefing on the report. The report should include, at a minimum:

(1) An inventory of legal personnel supporting space operations, including training, experience, and organizational alignment;

(2) Identification of gaps, if any, in legal readiness related to international space law, operational employment, commercial and civil partnerships, dual-use technologies, and industrial base considerations;

(3) Options for establishing a dedicated legal organization within the Air Force, Space Force, or Space Command;

(4) Assessment of requirements for advanced, domain-specific education and professional military education in space law; and

(5) Opportunities to expand academic and research partnerships to support training, workforce development, and legal research relevant to national security space operations.

**Briefing on Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Test special purpose adjunct to address computational thinking**

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide an updated briefing, not later than April 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the implementation of section 594 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283), including an assessment of the effectiveness of administering a special purpose adjunct test to address computational thinking for recruitment and identifying appropriate assignments.

**Briefing on command climate and suicide**

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing, not later than March 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on existing policies for assessing command climate in conjunction with suicides and suicide attempts, including any information on known correlations between command climate and suicidal attempts or suicides.

**Briefing on military service recruitment task force findings and outcomes**

The committee recognizes the growing challenges associated with recruiting in a constrained demographic environment, including a projected decline of approximately 13 percent in the population of military-aged individuals over the next 15 years, and is concerned these trends may further limit the pool of eligible and willing applicants.

The committee expects the Department of Defense to proactively adapt its recruiting, advertising, and outreach strategies to account for these trends, including leveraging modern marketing tools and data-driven approaches to better compete for talent.

The committee notes the June 13, 2025, memorandum from the Secretary of Defense establishing the Military Service Recruitment Task Force to develop solutions to strengthen recruiting across the Department. Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives upon completion of the task force, and not later than January 1, 2027. At a minimum, the briefing shall include:

(1) The findings and recommendations of the task force;

(2) Actions taken or planned by the Department and the military services in response to such findings;

(3) Any changes to recruiting, advertising, and outreach strategies, including the use of data-driven tools and modern marketing approaches;

(4) An assessment of barriers to recruitment and accession, including eligibility constraints and administrative processes;

(5) Metrics used to evaluate recruiting performance and any planned changes to such metrics; and

(6) Any recommended legislative proposals.

**Briefing on Navy Enlisted Classification code alignment**

The Secretary of the Navy is directed to submit a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than July 1, 2027, regarding ongoing efforts to ensure that Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes accurately reflect the technical experience, specialized training, and mission-essential competencies of sailors and are aligned with billet requirements.

The briefing should include the following:

(1) A description of the current process used to determine whether an NEC requirement may be satisfied through documented on-the-job experience and proficiency or requires completion of a formal course of instruction, including any efforts to validate existing NEC codes against demonstrated technical competencies;

(2) A description of the process used to review and modernize billet requirements, including how NEC codes assigned to positions are evaluated to ensure they accurately reflect the technical tasks, qualifications, and competencies required for such positions;

(3) A description of any framework, methodology, or ongoing effort to map technical competencies across ratings, NECs, or related workforce classifications to improve personnel flexibility and support the assignment of sailors with requisite skills to mission requirements;

(4) A description of the Navy's use of assignment, proficiency, readiness, or other performance data to identify discrepancies between assigned NECs and demonstrated workforce requirements, assess assignment success, and optimize talent management and career-long placement decisions. (5) An overview of

the Rating Mastery Working Group, Battle Ready Sailor Implementation Plan, MyNavySextant, and any related initiatives intended to improve the measurement, validation, and assignment of technical competencies across the Fleet.

**CATCH a Serial Offender program expansion**

The committee remains committed to eradicating sexual harassment across the Armed Forces, their adult dependents, Department of Defense civilians, and veterans. Anonymous reports are an important tool in bringing forward voices that may otherwise feel they may not be able to safely publicly report an incident, but in some cases they may allow repeat offenders to avoid accountability. In the context of sexual assault, the Department sought to address this challenge through the Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) program. However, the committee notes that integrating sexual harassment complaints into the current architecture may present significant structural challenges, as sexual harassment is not universally categorized as a criminal offense under broader State and Federal law.

Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 15, 2027, on the feasibility of expanding the CATCH program to include sexual harassment. The briefing shall include, at minimum, the following:

(1) An assessment of the feasibility of adding confidential or informal reports of sexual harassment into the CATCH program architecture;

(2) A detailed technical analysis of the changes that would need to be made to the CATCH system to facilitate the inclusion of sexual harassment reports;

(3) A detailed analysis of the specific statutory, regulatory, or policy changes required to grant Military Criminal Investigative Organization agents or appropriate investigative bodies access to the necessary databases to track sexual harassment offenders; and

(4) Recommendations for alternative interagency procedures, processes, or framework modifications that would yield the intended result of tracking and identifying serial sexual harassment offenders.

**Child care fee application clarity and transparency**

The committee recognizes that basic allowance for housing (BAH) is a core component of a servicemember's total compensation package and supports the Department of Defense's use of a standardized, non-locality BAH rate in calculating total family income (TFI) for child care fees to promote equity and consistency across duty stations.

The committee notes, however, that current application materials and processes may not clearly reflect how this non-locality rate is applied, which may increase the risk of inconsistent or inaccurate data entry.

To improve transparency and ensure families can accurately complete applications and anticipate fee determinations, the com-

mittee encourages the Department to enhance the clarity and usability of application materials, including through plain-language explanations and targeted outreach during the enrollment process.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretaries of the military departments to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, that includes:

(1) A description of how each military department ensures that BAH inputs used in child care fee applications reflect the standardized, non-locality BAH rate;

(2) The extent to which application systems automate or validate such inputs to reduce user error;

(3) Any identified challenges or inconsistencies in how TFI is calculated across the Department; and

(4) Planned or ongoing efforts to improve application usability, transparency, and data accuracy.

**Comprehensive review of awards associated with noncombatant evacuation operations at Hamid Karzai International Airport**

The committee notes that the Department of Defense has initiated a comprehensive review of actions and awards associated with the withdrawal from Afghanistan and is concerned that the initial public announcement and award actions focused narrowly on Company G, 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, despite the participation of adjacent and supporting units, including elements of the Marine Expeditionary Unit and other personnel operating in direct support of the Abbey Gate mission.

The committee notes that servicemembers from multiple units, occupational specialties, and supporting elements operated under similarly dangerous conditions during the evacuation and response operations at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), including personnel who were killed or wounded while conducting security, sustainment, medical, engagement, and support functions. Furthermore, the committee notes that servicemembers served with valor and distinction for 20 years in Afghanistan, and many members made the ultimate sacrifice for their country during this conflict.

The committee believes any review of valor and meritorious awards associated with the Afghanistan conflict should be undertaken holistically and with appropriate consideration of the actions and contributions of all units and personnel involved in the conflict, rather than limiting review to a single infantry company or narrowly defined organizational element associated with one mission or period of operations within a broader 20-year conflict.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the ongoing Afghanistan Withdrawal Special Review Panel conducts a comprehensive review of awards associated with operations at HKIA during the August 2021 noncombatant evacuation operations, including appropriate consideration of the actions and contributions of supporting and adjacent units and personnel involved in those operations, rather than limiting review to a single unit or narrowly defined mission set. The committee further directs the Secretary to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed

Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, on the scope, methodology, status, and findings of the review, including an explanation of how the Department ensured equitable consideration of awards recommendations across participating units and occupational communities.

**Comptroller General of the United States assessment on academic preparedness**

The committee remains concerned about the declining share of the military-age population that meets academic eligibility standards for military service and the potential long-term implications for military readiness and recruitment. The committee notes that literacy, numeracy, and other foundational cognitive skills are developed over the course of childhood, including during the early childhood years prior to entry into the kindergarten through grade 12 education system, and that research suggests early educational attainment may have effects on academic preparedness, workforce participation, and military eligibility.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to provide a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than December 31, 2028, assessing the extent to which literacy, numeracy, and academic preparedness, including foundational skills developed in early childhood prior to entry into the kindergarten through grade 12 education system, affect eligibility for military service. The report should include an assessment of:

(1) Performance of military applicants on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, including Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) category distributions and trends over at least the previous, and not fewer than, 10 fiscal years;

(2) The rate at which applicants are disqualified or experience delayed accession due to failure to meet minimum academic eligibility thresholds, disaggregated by military department and, to the extent practicable, by State, Tribal community, and region;

(3) The relationship between AFQT scores and military occupational specialty qualification, including the extent to which below-threshold scores limit access to critical or high-demand military occupational specialties (MOS);

(4) Participation in, and outcomes of, the Future Servicemember Preparatory Course and any analogous preparatory or remediation programs offered by the military departments, including effects on accession rates, retention, MOS qualification, and performance relative to standard entry recruits;

(5) Demographic and geographic variation in academic preparedness among the qualified military available population, including by State, Tribal community, region, rurality, and educational attainment level;

(6) Any correlation between secondary educational outcomes, including high school graduation rates, standardized assessment performance, and participation in career and technical education, and military accession and performance outcomes; and

(7) The relationship between participation in high-quality early childhood education programs, including programs funded under the Head Start Act (42 U.S.C. 9831 et seq), State-funded prekindergarten programs, other evidence-based early learning programs, and AFQT performance and accession eligibility outcomes, to the extent that data permit such analysis.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to include recommendations for:

(1) Improving coordination between Federal and State education systems and the Department of Defense to strengthen the education-to-military-service pipeline at both the early childhood and secondary education levels;

(2) Enhancing the effectiveness and scalability of existing preparatory and remediation programs; and

(3) Identifying Federal investments in early childhood education quality that may have measurable downstream effects on the size and academic preparedness of the military-eligible population.

In conducting the assessment, the committee directs the Comptroller General to consult with the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the military departments, the Secretary of Education, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and, as appropriate, representatives of Indian Tribes, Tribal education agencies, territorial education agencies, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies.

**Comptroller General review of judge advocate support to Department of Justice operations**

The committee notes that, within the Department of Defense (DOD), each service except the Space Force maintains a Judge Advocate General's (JAG) Corps or equivalent organization. JAG officers, also known as judge advocates, are responsible for providing legal counsel to commanders, administering and trying courts-martial, representing servicemembers in legal matters, and ensuring military policies align with legal standards, among other responsibilities. Recently, judge advocates have been used to support the missions of executive departments other than the DOD. In September 2025, the DOD authorized up to 600 judge advocates to serve as immigration judges to help address a large backlog of immigration court cases. Further, in January 2026, the DOD authorized judge advocates to serve as Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys in cities across the country at greater numbers than before and in cases with no direct connection to the military. In both cases, judge advocates served in support of the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess the DOD's use of judge advocates, to include: (1) A description of the process employed to identify judge advocates to support DOJ operations; (2) The training required by the DOJ prior to assuming these roles and the extent to which this training is adequate for judge advocates to assume these roles; (3) The extent to which the DOD collects key information on judge advocates selected for support of DOJ operations, including rank, role prior to selection, component, similar experience within the JAG Corps relative to their cross-departmental assignment, mobilization

authority, and duration of assignment; (4) Efforts by the DOD to identify and mitigate any potential effects of the use of judge advocates to support DOJ operations on the DOD's legal missions, such as the timeliness of courts-martial and the availability of legal advice for commanders; (5) The assignments from which judge advocates were reassigned to support DOJ operations and any impacts on readiness resulting from these reassignments; (6) Impacts of assignments to support DOJ operations on the morale and readiness of the judge advocate general corps; (7) The DOJ operations to which the judge advocates were assigned and whether the role or function performed by each judge advocate with the DOJ had a substantial nexus to the Armed Forces; and (8) Any other matters that the Comptroller General deems appropriate.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 16, 2027, with the results of the review to follow in a mutually agreed upon format and timeframe.

**Comptroller General review of use of non-disclosure agreements within Department of Defense**

The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct an assessment of the use of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) within the Department of Defense (DOD). The assessment should generally include: (1) A description of the statutory and regulatory framework governing the Department's use of NDAs and any identified areas of concern or potential conflict; (2) The extent to which the DOD conducts centralized oversight of NDAs, to include use of NDAs by DOD contractors; (3) The extent to which the DOD collects data on the use of NDAs; (4) The effect NDAs have on the perception by servicemembers of their rights; and (5) Any other matters the Comptroller General deems appropriate.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 16, 2027, with the results of the review to follow in a mutually agreed upon format and timeframe.

**Degree conferral for medically disqualified cadets and midshipmen**

The committee recognizes the significant investment and commitment of cadets and midshipmen at the military service academies and notes that, in limited cases, individuals who are otherwise in good standing may be medically disqualified from commissioning during their final year through no fault of their own. The committee believes that such individuals, having substantially completed the academic requirements for a degree, may warrant consideration for degree conferral consistent with institutional standards and good order and discipline.

The committee encourages the Secretaries of the military departments to review current policies and practices regarding the conferral of undergraduate degrees to cadets and midshipmen who are medically disqualified from commissioning in their final year and

to consider approaches that appropriately recognize academic achievement while maintaining accountability for the investment made by the Department of Defense.

The committee directs the Secretaries of the military departments to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, that includes, for each service academy:

(1) The number of cadets or midshipmen who were medically disqualified from commissioning during their final year of study over the preceding 5 academic years;

(2) The number of such individuals who were awarded a degree and the basis for such determinations;

(3) A description of current policies governing degree conferral in such cases; and

(4) Any considerations, challenges, or recommendations regarding potential changes to such policies.

**Department of Defense information sharing on Wounded Knee**

The committee seeks to understand the process used to review the Medals of Honor awarded to soldiers for conduct at Wounded Knee Creek in December 1890. According to the memorandum directing the review, the scope of the review was limited to examining each awardee's actions at Wounded Knee, though they were also allowed to "consider the context of the overall engagement as appropriate, including as necessary to understand each recipient's individual actions." The Department of Defense has announced the results of the review but not explained what it did and did not consider as part of the review process. Numerous stakeholders, including descendants of the Wounded Knee victims, have expressed concern about precisely which historical sources, experts, and bodies of law were considered in this review.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide the full report and unredacted materials in addition to briefing the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, including: (1) A list of and copies of all documents considered, eyewitness accounts reviewed, and individuals with whom the panelists met; (2) Which panelists visited the Wounded Knee site; (3) Whether and how the panel considered the Treaty of Fort Laramie and any other applicable Indian treaty law, the Lieber Code and any other applicable laws of war, and the totality of the context of the overall engagement; (4) An explanation of how the panelists weighed the various sources of evidence; (5) An explanation of what engagement the panelists had with Tribal descendants of Wounded Knee victims; (6) An explanation of any historical review conducted by historians employed by the Federal Government; (7) An explanation of what documents were excluded from the review and why; and (8) Any other matters relevant to the conclusions drawn in the review.

**Department of Defense science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education**

The committee is encouraged by recent Department of Defense efforts to invest in science, technology, engineering, and mathe-

matics (STEM) education for K–12 students. Students studying STEM will become the core of the workforce that the Department needs to serve our military installations, increase production of munitions, and modernize the industrial base to meet evolving warfare needs with respect to drones, artificial intelligence, and cyberwarfare. Therefore, the committee urges the Department to retain this investment in STEM education as a foundational part of this modernization effort, particularly efforts with a strong evidence base, including teacher professional development in geographies with military-connected families.

**Development of core Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations curriculum**

The committee believes Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) are coordinated military actions to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic environment (JP 3–85). EMSO is a core competency of the Department of Defense (DOD), which requires a trained cadre of competent warfighters and federal workforce to achieve superiority across the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) enterprise. Modern military operations require that every warfighter and DOD civilian serving in a mission support role across each of the services should be required to learn about the EMS in the same foundational way before specializing first by competency, then by each military service, as Joint personnel, and finally as senior leaders.

The committee notes that modern military operations require every warfighter to learn about the EMS in the same foundational way. The committee recognizes the value of EMSO education and encourages the military service academies to consider opportunities to incorporate both core competency fundamentals and service-specific fundamentals into their curricula. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to:

(1) Conduct a comprehensive survey of existing EMSO courseware in service academies, Senior Service Colleges, and the Joint Forces Staff College to determine alignment with requirements for both core competency fundamentals and service-specific fundamentals, including Joint Force EMSO and Senior Leaders EMSO; and

(2) Provide a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than December 31, 2027. The report shall include:

(a) Findings from the survey, specifically how/if existing courseware aligns with Goal 3 of the Department of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy (2020), which emphasizes advancing EMSO education and training to strengthen operational readiness;

(b) Recommendations for curriculum integration; and

(c) An assessment of associated costs required to implement EMSO curriculum across military educational institutions.

**Duty status modernization**

The committee recognizes ongoing efforts by the Department of Defense, in coordination with the Congress, to streamline and modernize the wide range of duty statuses across the reserve compo-

nents. The committee understands that the current framework of numerous duty statuses can create unnecessary complexity, limit transparency, and result in inconsistent access to pay and benefits for servicemembers.

The committee acknowledges that the Department is actively working to develop proposals to consolidate and standardize duty statuses in a manner that improves administrative efficiency while maintaining appropriate distinctions in authorities and benefits. The committee supports these efforts and expects continued engagement with the Congress as proposals are refined. The committee notes that, despite the Department's ongoing work, formal legislative proposals have not yet been transmitted to the Congress due to delays in review by the Office of Management and Budget but expects such review to be completed expeditiously so that proposals may be provided for congressional consideration.

The committee intends to continue working closely with the Department to advance duty status modernization and emphasizes the importance of timely, consistent communication to ensure legislative proposals are accurately scoped, executable, and aligned with shared objectives.

**Expanding opportunities for veterans in emerging technologies**

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, a report on expanding training and career pathway opportunities in emerging technologies for separating servicemembers.

The report should include a feasibility assessment of creating an Emerging Technologies Program to fund graduate, trade, or vocational training for members of the Armed Forces who are separating from active duty. The report should also assess how the Department of Defense leverages programs such as the SkillBridge Program and the Transition Assistance Program to expand information, opportunities, and career pathways for separating servicemembers in emerging technology and high-demand technical fields, including but not limited to biotechnology and the geospatial field.

The report should further examine opportunities to support workforce development in biotechnology and the geospatial community, including pathways for servicemembers to apply relevant military skills toward civilian employment and further education. This examination should include potential partnerships with industry and the feasibility of pilot programs within the Transition Assistance Program to highlight such careers for separating servicemembers with relevant skills, training, and experience.

**Fairness and efficiency for discharge review boards**

The Secretary of each military department shall submit a report on the timeliness, backlog, and adjudication of discharge upgrade applications to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than May 1, 2027. This report shall include a description that:

(1) Explains the current backlog of applications before the service review agencies of the military department concerned;

(2) Identifies the number of personnel assigned to such agencies and the number of personnel required to meet applicable timeliness goals under section 1557 of title 10, United States Code;

(3) Includes a plan to:

(a) reduce the backlog of applications; and

(b) maintain the resources necessary to meet such timeliness goals; and

(4) Describes any actions taken or planned to modernize the application intake, case management, and adjudication processes of such agencies.

Each report shall also include, for the most recent fiscal year available:

(1) The number of applications received and adjudicated, disaggregated by board and military department;

(2) The average and median processing times for such applications, disaggregated by board and military department;

(3) The number and percentage of applications adjudicated within applicable internal timeliness standards, if any;

(4) The number and percentage of cases exceeding such standards, and the primary factors contributing to delays;

(5) The outcomes of applications (including granted, denied, or partially granted), disaggregated by board and military department;

(6) The number and percentage of cases in which "liberal consideration" was applied;

(7) A description of the methods used by the military department to track and evaluate adjudication timeliness and consistency; and

(8) A description of any actions taken to improve transparency, timeliness, or consistency in the adjudication of discharge upgrade applications.

**Feasibility and advisability study for increasing United States Air Force Academy cadet end strength**

The committee recognizes the important role of the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) in commissioning future leaders of the Air Force and the Space Force. The formal establishment of the Space Force in 2019 impacted the number of officers commissioned into the Air Force. The USAFA graduating class of 2025 included 93 officers commissioning into the Space Force.

The committee supports the consideration of increasing the cadet end strength at USAFA to 4,400 cadets, consistent with the authorized strength under section 9342 of title 10, United States Code.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a feasibility and advisability study of increasing the current USAFA cadet end strength to 4,400. The study shall include:

(1) An assessment of the current physical infrastructure sufficiency;

(2) An assessment of the additional personnel required to support the increased cadet end strength, including academic faculty, military cadre, and installation support staff;

(3) An analysis of the impact to other sources of commission; and

(4) Any other considerations deemed relevant by the Secretary.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a report, not later than April 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the findings of the required study.

**Military relief society support to National Guard and Reserve members**

The committee recognizes the important role of military relief societies designated under section 2566 of title 10, United States Code, in providing emergency financial assistance to servicemembers and their families. The committee seeks to better understand how these organizations support members of the National Guard and reserve components, particularly given the unique duty status and geographic dispersion of these populations.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretaries of the military departments to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 31, 2027, on the provision of emergency financial assistance to members of the National Guard and Reserve through the military relief societies designated under section 2566 of title 10, United States Code.

The briefing shall include:

(1) A description of eligibility criteria, outreach, and utilization rates for members of the National Guard and Reserve across the Army Emergency Relief Society, Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society, Air Force Aid Society, Inc., and Coast Guard Mutual Assistance;

(2) An assessment of the accessibility and sufficiency of support provided to members of the National Guard and Reserve, including any barriers related to duty status, geographic location, or awareness;

(3) Data on the number and type of financial assistance cases involving members of the National Guard and Reserve over the previous 5 fiscal years, to the extent practicable;

(4) A comparison of how each military department ensures equitable access to relief services for active and reserve component personnel; and

(5) The Secretaries' assessments of whether existing military relief societies adequately meet the needs of National Guard and Reserve members and their families, including any recommendations for administrative improvements.

**Military to civilian credentialing**

The committee recognizes that over 150,000 service members transition from active duty each year, many with highly technical, operationally validated skills in fields such as aviation maintenance, aviation operations, cybersecurity, logistics, medical services, and the skilled trades. Despite extensive training and years of demonstrated proficiency, transitioning servicemembers routinely face unnecessary barriers in obtaining civilian occupational

credentials that fail to account for experience gained while in uniform.

The committee notes that while existing federal programs, including the Credentialing Opportunities On-Line program, the United States Military Apprenticeship Program, SkillBridge, and various Military Occupational Specialty crosswalk tools, provide useful support to transitioning service members, these programs are mostly voluntary and go underutilized during the chaotic last several months a servicemember spends on active duty. No broad government-wide framework exists that requires civilian licensing boards, federal regulatory agencies, or private credentialing bodies to recognize military qualifications as satisfying baseline civilian occupational requirements, although certain occupation-specific pathways, such as the military competency pathway for pilot certification under 14 CFR 61.73, demonstrate feasibility.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, to conduct a comprehensive review of military-to-civilian occupational credentialing and to submit a report to the congressional defense committees and the Committees on Veterans' Affairs of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than June 1, 2027. The report shall contain the following:

(1) An assessment of not fewer than five and not more than ten military occupational specialties, qualifications, or credentialing pathways across the Armed Forces where military training, operational qualification, and experience most directly correspond to civilian occupational credentials, including at a minimum one specialty from each of the following domains: aviation, cybersecurity and information technology, logistics and transportation, medical and emergency services, and the skilled trades, and any additional specialties the Secretary determines appropriate;

(2) With respect to each military specialty identified in accordance with paragraph (1):

(a) identify the corresponding civilian credential, certification, or license that is most directly equivalent;

(b) conduct a comparison of military training, qualification standards, and operational experience requirements with corresponding civilian credentialing requirements;

(c) assess the substantive gaps between military and civilian qualification standards, distinguishing differences in scope of practice from administrative or procedural barriers; and

(d) offer recommendations identifying any additional civilian-specific content genuinely necessary to satisfy regulatory, safety, or scope-of-practice requirements; and

(3) For each occupational domain, identify opportunities and barriers to broader recognition of military qualifications as satisfying baseline civilian occupational requirements and provide recommendations for actions within the authorities of the Department of Defense, other Federal agencies, and Congress. The committee expects the review to consider:

(a) opportunities to expand the use of military competency pathways, analogous to the existing pathway under 14 CFR 61.73, where appropriate, to recognize military qualifications and experience while preserving any necessary civilian-specific regulatory requirements;

(b) which statutory, regulatory, or administrative barriers within Federal agencies currently limit recognition of military qualifications, barriers identified through consultation with state licensing authorities or private credentialing bodies that may warrant congressional consideration;

(c) the use of standardized Department of Defense certification documents as evidence of equivalency for federal and state licensing purposes; and

(d) an assessment of actions the Department of Defense, other Federal agencies, and Congress could take to reduce barriers to civilian credential recognition for qualified servicemembers.

In conducting this review, the committee expects the Secretary of Defense to consult with relevant federal regulatory agencies, major private-sector credentialing bodies, state licensing authorities, and veteran service organizations. The committee expects the heads of the departments and agencies identified herein to fully participate in and contribute to this review. The committee further expects the review to reflect the following considerations:

(1) Equivalency determinations should focus on the qualification and demonstrated operational experience level, not merely on the completion of initial military schoolhouse training. A servicemember who has completed advanced qualifications, accumulated meaningful operational experience, and demonstrated sustained proficiency in a military specialty is more appropriately compared to civilian credentialing standards than a recent schoolhouse graduate;

(2) Equivalency mechanisms should establish clear, objective thresholds, such as specific qualification levels combined with minimum time in rating or specialty, that trigger presumptive equivalency, rather than relying on a case-by-case review;

(3) Any remaining civilian-specific requirements imposed on service members who meet established military equivalency thresholds should be narrowly tailored to address genuine differences in regulatory frameworks, documentation standards, or scope of practice, and should not function as barriers to entry; and

(4) Medical and emergency medical services credentialing may require distinct treatment given the role of state licensing authorities and scope-of-practice considerations, and the report should address this domain separately where appropriate.

The report shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex if necessary.

**Modernizing military personnel retention strategies**

The committee observes that the military services primarily measure retention success based on achieving authorized end strength, with limited visibility into how retention efforts prioritize

high-performing and critically skilled servicemembers. The committee believes retention strategies should be aligned with long-term operational requirements and focused on retaining the talent most critical to mission success.

The committee recognizes that the U.S. Marine Corps and the Department of the Army are advancing retention models that place greater emphasis on identifying and retaining high-performing and critically skilled personnel, including through targeted incentives, assignment flexibility, and more deliberate retention timing and contracting approaches. The committee encourages all the military services to build on these efforts and to continue developing more deliberate, performance-based retention models.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretaries of the military departments to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on how each service is ensuring that retention efforts extend beyond meeting end strength requirements. At a minimum, the briefing should include:

(1) The methods used to identify high-performing and critically skilled personnel;

(2) How retention bonuses and other incentives are targeted to such personnel, including any use of differentiated or performance-based incentives;

(3) The extent to which retention tools are applied broadly versus selectively, and any plans to refine such approaches;

(4) Metrics used to assess retention success beyond end strength; and

(5) Any planned reforms to transition toward more deliberate, performance-based retention models.

**Navy Reserve Supply Corps Force Structure and Readiness**

The committee recognizes the critical role of the Navy Reserve Supply Corps in providing expeditionary logistics, contracting support, and specialized expertise to fleet and joint operations. The committee is concerned that increasing demands associated with distributed maritime operations and the growing reliance on Reserve personnel for logistics support may be outpacing the current force structure, resourcing, and integration of the Navy Reserve Supply Corps. The committee is further concerned that any misalignment in these areas could create avoidable risk to operational readiness and sustainment in a contested environment.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on the force structure, resourcing, and readiness of the Navy Reserve Supply Corps. The report shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of current Navy Reserve Supply Corps end strength, rank structure, and billet distribution. This assessment shall include quantitative data on manning levels comparing manpower requirements to overall manning;

(2) An assessment of recruiting, accession, and retention trends for the Navy Reserve Supply Corps over the previous 5 years, including the identification of critical skill shortfalls, prior-service accessions, and possible impacts from promotion

opportunity and career progression on retention, as well as identification of barriers to recruitment and retention; and

(3) An assessment of the extent to which Navy Reserve Supply Corps units and individuals are fully integrated into Navy logistics planning, exercises, and operational deployments, including the frequency and nature of such participation, roles performed, and any limitations that reduce their effective employment in operational plans and exercises.

**Personnel life cycle and workforce management software**

The committee recognizes the importance of modern, secure software platforms to support Department of Defense personnel functions across recruiting, accession, and in-service career management. The committee notes that fragmented and legacy systems limit visibility, coordination, and decision-making for servicemembers, commanders, recruiters, and career counselors.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Department of Defense to evaluate secure, interoperable personnel software and workforce management technologies that improve continuity of information across recruiting and in-service functions. Such capabilities may include advanced data analytics, automation, and responsible artificial intelligence-enabled decision support tools to enhance recruiter effectiveness, career pathway guidance, workforce planning, and servicemember engagement.

The committee further encourages the Department to assess opportunities to leverage modern software platforms to reduce administrative burden, improve data accuracy, and enhance coordination across the military services, while ensuring appropriate safeguards for data security, privacy, and service-specific requirements.

**Purple Heart review**

The committee notes the importance of recognition in regard to servicemember receipt of the Purple Heart. The nature of warfare has evolved over time, and the regulations surrounding awards have changed with it.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments, to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, on the current guidelines and regulations for the award of the Purple Heart. The briefing shall include but not be limited to: (1) Current data being collected on ongoing military operations on the award of the Purple Heart for mild traumatic brain injury; (2) Data from the award of the Purple Heart for mild traumatic brain injury from the last 5 years; (3) An assessment of the current regulations, including whether a medical officer determination for mild traumatic brain injury is feasible; and (4) Any other matters relevant to the review.

**Recognition of United Service Organizations**

The committee recognizes the United Service Organizations (USO) as a critical partner in sustaining the morale, welfare, and resilience of servicemembers and their families amid an increasingly complex global security environment. Through a global net-

work of more than 250 locations and a wide range of expeditionary and mobile programs, the USO delivers essential support that directly contributes to force readiness and operational effectiveness. The committee notes that the USO maintains a presence in high-threat, remote, and austere locations, including support to servicemembers deployed in Operation Epic Fury, often where no other military support organizations operate, ensuring continuity of care for servicemembers regardless of location or mission.

**Report on conflicts of interest in Department of Defense financial literacy program**

The committee is concerned about the challenges associated with new members of the Armed Forces being enrolled into direct deposit programs offered by financial institutions without sufficient financial literacy education to highlight potential conflicts of interest associated with financial product offerings by those same institutions.

The Department of Defense's financial management regulations mandate participation in the Direct Deposit Program for all newly enlisted and appointed military personnel. Enrollment in direct deposit programs can involve military service partnerships with financial institutions and typically occurs during initial entry training. These new recruits may be vulnerable to coercive practices, with many recruits managing their finances for the first time and simultaneously being trained to trust authority figures. The committee seeks to ensure that new recruits are provided with a meaningful opportunity to make the most informed decisions regarding their finances, as financial security is an important element of military readiness. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than February 1, 2027, a report outlining the financial literacy training and direct deposit process for new recruits. The report shall include the following information:

(1) An assessment of the process for enrolling new members of the Armed Forces into the direct deposit programs of financial institutions; whether that process differs for new members who have a bank account before joining the Armed Forces; and whether the information and paperwork provided to new members includes any information about account fees or penalties—including overdraft fees—charged by financial institutions.

(2) A description of the terms and requirements for a financial institution to operate on a military installation and the process by which installation leadership solicits potential financial institutions, reviews the bids, and selects institutions for the provision of direct deposit services, financial literacy training under section 992 of title 10, United States Code, and any other services under the Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation.

(3) A description of how the Department of Defense ensures that the financial institutions operating on military installations, employees of such institutions, and financial literacy instructors and counselors do not have any conflicts of interest related to the advice they provide or the products they discuss.

(4) A discussion of the importance of financial literacy training in ensuring the financial readiness of members of the Armed Forces that includes, for each of the 3 years preceding submission of the report, the number of servicemembers who as a result of personal financial issues were denied or lost security clearances, were denied or lost overseas postings, or suffered other career-related setbacks.

(5) With respect to training provided as a component of the initial entry training under subsection (a)(2)(A) of section 992 of title 10, United States Code, and with respect to all other mandatory training under that section, the following:

(a) A description of the content of the training;

(b) A copy of all paperwork provided to members as a part of the training;

(c) A notification of references to any mentions of "overdraft fees" in in-person or virtual training materials;

(d) A statement indicating when the training is offered, including whether the training is offered before new members sign financial paperwork regarding the direct deposit of their salaries from the Department of Defense;

(e) A discussion of how the training prepares new members for the financial decisions they must make during their military service, including the financial challenges associated with domestic permanent changes of station, overseas permanent changes of station, deployments, government shutdowns, temporary duty assignments, separation from service, transition from regular component to reserve component, retirement, and similar events;

(f) A description of who provides the training, including whether those trainers are independent third parties that are not associated with a financial institution;

(g) The percentage of training sessions that are led by each of the following: trained instructors (including the percentage of those instructors that are spouses of members), accredited financial counselors (including a list of all the accepted forms of accreditation), or any other relevant categories of training providers;

(h) For each of the 3 years preceding, the percentage of training sessions that were provided by banks, credit unions, or other financial institutions; and for servicemembers who completed a training session provided by a financial institution, the percentage of those servicemembers who then purchased a product from, opened an account with, or otherwise began a financial relationship with the same financial institution within 90 days of the training session; and

(i) Copies of the materials, including any videos and in-person instructor guides, provided by the Department of Defense to individuals being trained to conduct the training; and

(6) An assessment of whether the training provided as a component of the initial entry training pursuant to section 992(a)(2)(A) of title 10, United States Code, informs members

with respect to the predatory marketing tactics of financial institutions.

**Report on impact of permanent change of station on dual-military families**

The committee recognizes the critical role that dual-military families play in sustaining the all-volunteer force and maintaining readiness across the Armed Forces but is concerned by the persistent challenges faced by dual-military couples in securing co-located Permanent Change of Station assignments. The committee is concerned that inconsistent implementation of co-location policies, delays in assignment coordination and limited transparency in the assignment process continue to create avoidable hardship for servicemembers married to other servicemembers. The committee expects the Department of Defense to prioritize policies that strengthen family stability, enhance retention of highly trained personnel and ensure equitable treatment of dual-military couples across all Services.

The committee notes that current Department of Defense policy directs the Services to make every reasonable effort to station dual military couples together, or within reasonable commuting distance, when operational requirements allow. However, there is significant variance in how the Services interpret "reasonable effort," as well as disparities in the availability of synchronized assignment cycles, career progression flexibility, and waiver authorities.

The committee is particularly concerned by reports that dual-military couples often bear a disproportionate administrative burden in securing co-location. Many couples must repeatedly advocate for themselves with assignment monitors, career managers, and personnel offices, sometimes over multiple assignment cycles. The committee finds that this reliance on persistent self-advocacy—rather than standardized, proactive coordination by the Services—creates inequitable outcomes, disadvantages junior personnel unfamiliar with the system, and contributes to unnecessary stress and uncertainty for affected families. The committee believes that co-location should not depend on the persistence, personal networks, or advocacy skills of individual servicemembers but rather on consistent, transparent, and Service-driven processes.

Therefore, not later than March 1, 2027, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments, to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the Department's efforts to improve co-location outcomes for dual-military couples. The briefing should include:

(1) An evaluation of existing co-location policies across the Services, including identification of gaps, inconsistencies, and barriers to effective implementation;

(2) A review of assignment processes, including timelines, synchronization challenges between Services, and the extent to which career managers are empowered to coordinate across Services on co-location solutions;

(3) Historical data for the previous 5 fiscal years on the number of dual-military couples requesting co-location, the number

approved, the number denied, and the primary reasons for denial;

(4) An assessment of how co-location challenges affect retention, promotion, and career progression for dual-military servicemembers; and

(5) Proposed authority, resourcing, policy, process, or other changes that could improve colocation outcomes while maintaining operational readiness, including potential recommended updates to DOD Instruction 1315.18 and related Service policies to improve transparency, predictability, and fairness for dual-military families.

**Report on legally owned student loan cancellation for servicemembers**

Servicemembers and their families may be eligible for several forms of federal student loan cancellation, including, but not limited to, Public Service Loan Forgiveness, Total and Permanent Disability discharge, and Borrower Defense to Repayment. However, those who qualify for student loan cancellation through such programs often do not receive it for various reasons, such as administrative red tape, mismanagement by federal loan servicers, or a lack of knowledge about loan cancellation programs.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review servicemembers' and military families' access to federal student loan cancellation programs. This review should address:

(1) How often servicemembers and their families receive federal student loan cancellation, broken down by loan cancellation program;

(2) How often servicemembers and their families are unable to access the federal student loan cancellation that they are eligible for, and the most frequent reasons for such instances;

(3) The extent to which the Department of Education is fulfilling its responsibility to accurately and efficiently provide servicemembers and their families with the federal student loan cancellation that they are eligible for under federal law; and

(4) Any recommendations for the Congress and Federal agencies to improve servicemembers' and their families' access to federal student loan cancellation programs.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to periodically brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the status of this review and publish a report on the review, not later than March 1, 2027.

**Soldier digital lifecycle modernization**

The committee encourages the Secretary of the Army to make use of existing digital infrastructure and systems of the Army to establish a unified digital experience that creates a secure digital identity record enabling continuity of data from recruitment through separation and seamless integration with Department of Veterans' Affairs programs; provides integrated, role-based, and personalized digital services to soldiers; reduces routine soldier administrative workflows to eliminate manual processing and data

reentry; and enables the deployment of analytics and decision-support tools to inform readiness and retention decisions.

The committee further encourages the Secretary to leverage commercially available technologies, modular architectures, and open standards in implementing this initiative to accelerate delivery and improve user experience.

Therefore, the Secretary of the Army is directed to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than May 1, 2027. The report should include a description of:

(1) A potential implementation plan for an initiative creating a secure, digital experience through the lifecycle of a member of the Army, including during recruitment and after separation;

(2) Key design and integration milestones for this initiative;

(3) Estimated costs by fiscal year for this initiative;

(4) Performance metrics to measure improvements in user experience, administrative burden reduction, retention indicators, and transition outcomes for this initiative; and

(5) Any additional authorities the Secretary determines are required.

**Standardization of performance metrics for Transition Assistance Program**

The committee recognizes the importance of ensuring that transition assistance programs carried out under chapter 58 of title 10, United States Code, effectively prepare servicemembers for successful transition to civilian life. The committee is aware of ongoing efforts to improve transition programming but remains concerned that inconsistent performance and outcome metrics across the military departments limit the Department of Defense's ability to evaluate program effectiveness, identify best practices, and ensure accountability.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the participation, performance, and outcome metrics used to evaluate transition assistance programs and related transition support activities under chapter 58 of title 10, United States Code.

The report should include, at a minimum:

(1) An identification of existing participation, performance, and outcome metrics used by each military department;

(2) An assessment of differences in eligibility criteria, participation requirements, and data collection methodologies across the Armed Forces;

(3) An evaluation of the extent to which current metrics measure both short-term and long-term outcomes for transitioning servicemembers, including employment, education, credential attainment, and other indicators of successful transition;

(4) Identification of gaps in data collection, reporting, and interagency data coordination that limit assessment of program effectiveness;

(5) Recommendations for standardizing core performance and outcome metrics across the Department;

(6) Recommendations for improving data collection, analysis, and appropriate data sharing to support evidence-based improvements; and

(7) Findings and recommendations for administrative or legislative actions necessary to improve the effectiveness and accountability of transition assistance programs.

**Student support services in Department of Defense Education Activity schools**

The committee recognizes the highly mobile nature of military-connected students served by the Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) and the challenges that frequent transitions can pose to academic continuity and student well-being. The committee notes that these disruptions may delay the identification of learning challenges, including dyslexia, and that early literacy screening can support timely intervention. The committee further recognizes that the DODEA provides student support through a multidisciplinary model that includes school counselors, school psychologists, social workers, and other personnel who support academic, social-emotional, and school-based mental health needs.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on staffing and early literacy efforts within DODEA schools. The briefing should include:

(1) Current student-to-staff ratios for school counselors and other student support personnel, including school psychologists and social workers, disaggregated by school level and geographic region;

(2) A description of how the DODEA allocates and manages student support personnel across schools, including those providing school-based mental health services, and the extent to which staffing decisions reflect student need, geographic considerations, and the use of shared or rotational staffing models;

(3) An overview of early literacy screening practices across DODEA schools, including tools used, grade levels assessed, and the frequency of screening; and

(4) Any planned efforts to improve early identification of reading difficulties and ensure continuity of support for highly mobile students.

**Women in combat study report and briefing requirement**

The committee notes the Department of Defense mandated a review regarding the operational effectiveness of Army and Marine Corps ground combat units, which was originally the subject of a December 18, 2025, memorandum issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The committee understands that this study was subsequently reassigned to the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory from the Institute for Defense Analyses. To ensure proper congressional oversight of military personnel policies and unit readiness, the committee believes it is critical to have full visibility into both the final out-

comes and the underlying research process and methodology of this review.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide the full, unredacted final review, including any and all preliminary findings, methodology, and information evaluated or considered by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, to the congressional defense committees, not later than 7 days after its completion. Furthermore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 30 days after the submission of the review. This briefing shall comprehensively cover the full, unredacted findings of the review as well as the specific report methodology utilized.

Additionally, to preserve transparency regarding the evolution of this study, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide Congress with any and all preliminary findings, methodology, and information delivered by the Institute for Defense Analyses to the Department of Defense related to this study prior to its reassignment to the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, not later than 7 days after the submission of the review.

# TITLE VI—COMPENSATION AND OTHER PERSONNEL BENEFITS

## Subtitle A—Pay and Allowances

### Sec. 601—Modification of reimbursement of expenses relating to travel for inactive-duty training and muster duty

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 452(j)(1) of title 37, United States Code, and section 623 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159) to require the Department of Defense to reimburse travel expenses for members performing inactive-duty training and muster duty when travel exceeds the specified distance threshold.

### Sec. 602—Fiscal year 2027 increase in military basic pay

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize a pay increase of 3.6 percent for all members of the uniformed services, effective January 1, 2027.

### Sec. 603—Reimbursement of costs of long commutes for members assigned to remote or isolated installations in areas without affordable housing

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 453 of title 37, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of Defense to reimburse members of the Armed Forces for commuting expenses incurred as a result of assignment to remote or isolated installations where affordable housing is unavailable.

## Subtitle B—Special and Incentive Pay

### Sec. 611—One-year extension of certain expiring bonus and special pay authorities

The committee recommends a provision that would extend, through December 31, 2027, certain expiring bonus and special pay authorities relating to Reserve forces; health care professionals; nuclear officers; consolidated special, incentive, and bonus authorities under title 37, United States Code; and temporary increases in rates of basic allowance for housing.

### Sec. 612—Increase in maximum amount of aviation bonus

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 334(c)(1)(B) of title 37, United States Code, to increase the maximum amount of the aviation bonus.

**Sec. 613—Authorization of board certification incentive pay for veterinary comparative medicine officers**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 335(c)(2) of title 37, United States Code, to add the attainment of a comparable qualifying Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree, as determined by the Secretary concerned, as an alternative qualification to board certification for eligibility of incentive pay for veterinary comparative medicine officers.

**Sec. 614—Modification of bonus authority for Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps cadets and midshipmen**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 336 of title 37, United States Code, to increase the maximum bonus for Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps cadets and midshipmen.

**Sec. 615—Increase in maximum amounts of hostile fire pay and imminent danger pay**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 351(b) of title 37, United States Code, to increase the maximum monthly amounts of hostile fire pay and imminent danger pay.

**Sec. 616—Medical providers qualified to recertify catastrophic injuries or illnesses qualifying members for special compensation**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 439 of title 37, United States Code, to expand the categories of licensed medical providers authorized to recertify eligibility for Special Compensation for Assistance with Activities of Daily Living.

**Subtitle C—Commissary and Exchange Benefits**

**Sec. 621—Authorized patrons of commissary and exchange stores**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 54 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a comprehensive statutory framework that defines and codifies existing categories of authorized patrons of commissary and exchange stores, including uniformed members, retirees, dependents, and certain civilian personnel.

**Sec. 622—Modification of operating expenses of commissary stores**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2483(b) of title 10, United States Code, to clarify that operating dollars may be used for construction, repair, improvement, and maintenance of physical infrastructure.

**Sec. 623—Pilot program on access of civilian employees to commissary stores**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to carry out a pilot program to assess the fea-

sibility of, demand for, and financial impact of extending access to commissary stores to civilian employees of the Department of Defense while maintaining the benefit of such access for members and retired members of the Armed Forces and their families.

## Subtitle D—Other Matters

### Sec. 631—Authority for shipment and storage of privately owned vehicles of members moving between authorized locations

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 453(c)(4) of title 37, United States Code, to authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to permit the shipment or storage of more than one privately owned vehicle for a member of the Armed Forces in connection with a temporary or permanent change of station between authorized locations.

### Sec. 632—Reimbursement of guardianship costs incurred as a result of relocations

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 453 of title 37, United States Code, to authorize the reimbursement of qualifying guardianship costs for a member of the uniformed services.

### Sec. 633—Provision of counseling on housing for members of the Armed Forces

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 992 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to enter into contracts to provide counseling with individuals and organizations that provide counseling with respect to housing.

### Sec. 634—Special priority travel authorization for personnel stationed at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2641b of title 10, United States Code, to authorize certain personnel stationed at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and eligible dependents to purchase available seats on Department of Defense aircraft and permit the Department to retain associated revenues to support transportation services.

### Sec. 635—Program to assist members in obtaining personal driver's licenses

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide assistance to a member of the Armed Forces for expenses incurred in obtaining a personal driver's license under the laws of a State while serving in the Armed Forces.

### Sec. 636—Student loan relief for members of Selected Reserve

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 16301(b) of title 10, United States Code, to increase the max-

imum annual repayment amount under the Selected Reserve Student Loan Repayment Program from 15 percent to 20 percent of a participant's outstanding student loan balance.

**Sec. 637—Enhancement of Air Force rated officer retention demonstration program**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 604 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) to enhance the Air Force rated officer retention demonstration program by increasing assignment flexibility for participating rated officers.

**Sec. 638—Pilot program on career intermissions for certain Air Force fighter aircrew**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Air Force to establish a pilot program, under the authority provided by section 710 of title 10, United States Code, to permit certain Air Force officers to take a one-time career intermission and assess whether targeted career intermissions improve retention of experienced fighter aircrew.

## Items of Special Interest

**Combat-related special compensation review**

The committee recognizes the Department of Defense's ongoing review of the Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) program, as directed in the March 2, 2026, memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and commends the Under Secretary for undertaking a comprehensive assessment of how the program is administered.

The committee affirms the importance of appropriately recognizing combat-related disabilities incurred by servicemembers and ensuring that eligible retirees receive the benefits they have earned in a timely and efficient manner. The committee believes the burden of navigating the CRSC process should not fall disproportionately on the individual retiree and expects the military departments to ensure timely and efficient adjudication of claims.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than October 1, 2026, and every 90 days thereafter until the review is complete, on the status of the review, any preliminary findings, and planned actions to improve the program. Upon completion of the review, the Under Secretary shall provide a final briefing that includes the findings of the review, planned improvements, and any recommended legislative proposals.

**Cyber incentive pay standardization**

The committee recognizes the importance of attracting, developing, and retaining a highly skilled cyber workforce in support of the Cyber Force Generation Model and U.S. Cyber Command. The committee notes that the military departments currently apply differing approaches to incentive pay for members performing similar

cyber work roles, which may result in disparities in compensation for comparable qualifications and responsibilities.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, that includes:

(1) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of establishing a standardized approach to cyber skill incentive pay across the military departments under existing authorities;

(2) A description of current incentive pay programs for cyber work roles in each military department, including eligibility criteria, payment amounts, and covered work roles;

(3) An evaluation of the extent to which differences in incentive pay affect recruiting, development, and retention of cyber personnel;

(4) Any challenges or limitations associated with standardizing such incentive pay, including impacts on a Service's flexibility and budgetary considerations; and

(5) Any recommendations for legislative or policy changes to improve the effectiveness and consistency of cyber incentive pay across the Department of Defense.

**Government travel charge card use and servicemember financial risk**

The committee is concerned that servicemembers executing permanent change of station (PCS) or temporary duty (TDY) orders may be exposed to financial and credit risk as a result of Department of Defense travel policies and processes, particularly where delays in voucher processing, reimbursement, or split disbursement contribute to Government Travel Charge Card (GTCC) delinquency. While the committee recognizes the GTCC as an important tool for official travel, the committee is concerned that administrative and reimbursement challenges within the defense travel system may be placing servicemembers at avoidable financial risk. The committee seeks to better understand the extent to which Department processes contribute to delinquency and adverse credit outcomes.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Space Operations to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 1, 2027, on GTCC policies, usage, and associated financial readiness impacts within their respective Services.

The briefing should include, for each Service:

(1) Current policies governing mandatory or directed use of the GTCC for PCS and TDY travel, including any circumstances under which use is waived or alternatives are provided;

(2) An assessment of the primary drivers of GTCC delinquency, including the extent to which delayed voucher processing, delayed reimbursement, split disbursement errors, or PCS-related expenses contribute to such delinquency;

(3) Data on the proportion of servicemembers who do not possess a GTCC, including those deemed ineligible due to creditworthiness or other reasons, and how such members execute official travel without incurring personal financial risk;

(4) An overview of financial literacy, counseling, and command notification practices related to GTCC use, including how servicemembers are informed of risks associated with delayed reimbursement; and

(5) Any Service-specific challenges and recommendations to reduce delinquency attributable to administrative or reimbursement delays and to better protect servicemembers from adverse financial or credit consequences arising from official travel requirements.

**Military family diaper assistance**

The committee recognizes that there are over 350,000 children under age 5 in active-duty servicemember households. The committee further recognizes that the average cost of diapering one child is about $100 a month, while families experiencing diaper need report being able to afford a median of $65 per month for diapers. The committee notes that some national surveys have found that as many as 47 percent of families with young children experience diaper insecurity, defined as the inability to afford an adequate supply of diapers for their children, and seeks to better understand the extent to which diaper insecurity affects military families and the resources available to address such needs.

The committee recognizes that the Department of Defense provides a variety of resources to support new parents, including the New Parent Support Program and partnerships such as the What to Expect Project. These efforts are primarily designed to provide education, outreach, and short-term assistance to new parents. The committee further notes that Military OneSource and home visitors may provide referrals to community resources, such as local diaper banks, but it remains unclear whether there are unmet diapering needs among military families with young children.

The committee seeks to better understand the extent to which military families experience challenges obtaining diapers and diapering supplies and whether existing Department programs adequately address such needs. Therefore, not later than March 1, 2027, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the programs available to military families in need of diaper assistance. Specifically, the briefing should include:

(1) A list of programs the Department offers to military families with children ages 0 to 3 and a description of the specific mechanisms by which such programs provide tangible diaper assistance to such families;

(2) A demographic breakdown by Service of servicemembers with one or more dependent children under the age of 4 enrolled in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System, including rank and marital status;

(4) An analysis of the impact of the programs described in (1), including how many children were served in the previous calendar year and how many children were on waiting lists, if applicable. The data should be disaggregated by military Service and program;

(5) Recommendations by the Department on how to improve uniformity in implementation policy, transparency, and data collection across the military Services; and

(6) Recommendations by the Department on whether additional authorities, resources, or programmatic changes are needed to address identified gaps in access to diapers and diapering supplies for military families. Recommendations should include an anticipated timeframe for when the Department aims to implement such changes.

**National Guard Travel-in-Kind program**

The committee recognizes the essential contributions of National Guard personnel to national security, homeland defense, domestic response, counterdrug operations, and support to civil authorities. The committee remains concerned that certain categories of National Guard personnel may not receive benefits comparable to similarly situated members of the reserve components despite performing equivalent duties and meeting similar service obligations.

In particular, the committee notes concerns regarding the administration of Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) for members serving on Full-Time National Guard Duty—Counterdrug (FTNGD–CD) orders and the availability of travel and lodging support for Army National Guard members required to travel significant distances to perform Inactive Duty Training (IDT). The committee understands that statutory and policy differences affecting these programs may result in inconsistent treatment among servicemembers, create barriers to recruitment and retention, and adversely affect readiness and force management.

The committee further notes that FTNGD–CD personnel and Active Guard and Reserve personnel both serve in full-time National Guard duty statuses that provide long-term career opportunities and perform critical missions in support of national security and public safety objectives. The committee is also aware of concerns that Army National Guard members may incur significant out-of-pocket expenses associated with travel and lodging for IDT that are not borne by similarly situated members of the Army Reserve.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on options to improve parity in benefits and support provided to National Guard personnel. The briefing shall include:

(1) An assessment of current statutory, regulatory, and policy authorities governing:

(a) BAH determinations for FTNGD–CD personnel; and

(b) Travel and lodging support for Army National Guard members performing IDT;

(2) An assessment of the scope of each issue, including:

(a) How BAH is currently administered for FTNGD–CD personnel across the States and Territories, including the extent of variation among jurisdictions; and

(b) The current out-of-pocket costs incurred by Army National Guard members for travel and lodging associated with IDT requirements;

(3) An evaluation of the feasibility and advisability of:

(a) Amending section 403(g)(6)(A) of title 37, United States Code, to include FTNGD–CD personnel and align BAH determinations with duty location; and

(b) Establishing a comprehensive Lodging-in-Kind and travel support program for Army National Guard members that achieves parity with comparable Army Reserve programs;

(4) An assessment of the effects that such changes would have on recruitment, retention, readiness, force management, and mission effectiveness within the National Guard;

(5) Legislative, regulatory, administrative, and policy options to address each issue, including the advantages and disadvantages of each option;

(6) Detailed cost estimates associated with each proposed option, including:

(a) Estimated costs of extending duty-location-based BAH treatment to FTNGD–CD personnel; and

(b) Estimated costs of providing Lodging-in-Kind for Army National Guard members residing more than 50 miles from their assigned drill location and travel reimbursement for Army National Guard members residing more than 150 miles from their assigned unit or serving in critically short specialties; and

(7) Recommendations from the Department of Defense regarding any legislative changes necessary to ensure equitable treatment of National Guard personnel performing comparable duties or meeting comparable training requirements.

**Review of credentialing assistance programs**

The committee recognizes the value of credentialing assistance programs in enabling servicemembers to obtain industry-recognized certifications and postsecondary credentials that translate into civilian career opportunities. The committee notes that credentialing assistance is currently administered inconsistently across the military departments, with significant variation in eligibility criteria, funding limits, approved credential lists, cost controls, and vendor oversight mechanisms. The committee is concerned that this fragmentation limits equitable access for servicemembers across the force and has contributed to cost management challenges in recent years.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments, to conduct a comprehensive review of credentialing assistance programs across the Armed Forces and submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than June 1, 2027.

The report should include, at a minimum:

(1) A description of each military department's credentialing assistance program, including eligibility requirements, annual funding limits, approved credential categories, and vendor oversight policies, with particular attention to areas of inconsistency across the services;

(2) Servicemember participation and utilization data for the previous 5 fiscal years, to the extent practicable, disaggregated by military department, enlisted grade, officer grade, component, and occupational specialty, to identify patterns of utilization and any gaps in access;

(3) An assessment of credential quality assurance mechanisms across the services, including how each department evaluates the labor market value and the portability of approved credentials, and whether current approved lists align with high-demand civilian occupations;

(4) An assessment of cost growth, cost overruns, and administrative challenges experienced within credentialing assistance programs, including the root causes of any program suspensions or restructurings and corrective actions taken;

(5) An identification of barriers to servicemember participation, including awareness gaps, administrative burden, timing constraints related to deployment or training cycles, and limitations on eligible credential types; and

(6) Recommendations for reforms to standardize, streamline, and strengthen credentialing assistance programs across the force, including any recommended legislative changes and associated regulations necessary to ensure uniform access, sound fiscal management, and alignment with servicemember transition and workforce development goals.

**Service member housing relief**

The committee notes that current law authorizes the Secretary of Defense to temporarily adjust basic allowance for housing (BAH) rates when actual housing costs in a military housing area exceed established BAH rates by more than 20 percent. The committee further notes that section 624 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) directed a comprehensive review of BAH methodology, housing affordability, and alternative approaches for calculating BAH rates. As the Department of Defense continues this effort, the committee is interested in understanding whether modifications to the existing authority for temporary BAH adjustments would provide meaningful relief to servicemembers experiencing rapidly changing housing costs.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, assessing the feasibility, advisability, and potential costs associated with lowering the threshold for temporary BAH adjustments to 15 percent. The briefing should also evaluate how such a change would interact with ongoing Department efforts to review and modernize military housing compensation, including any planned or proposed changes to the methodology used to determine BAH rates, and should include any legislative recommendations the Secretary considers appropriate.

# TITLE VII—HEALTH CARE

## Subtitle A—Tricare and Other Health Care Benefits

### Sec. 701—Digital system for beneficiary assistance at military medical treatment facilities and through managed care support contractors

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a digital system that will enable TRICARE beneficiaries who receive care at a military treatment facility or through a managed care support contractor under the TRICARE program to electronically file a complaint, raise awareness about an issue, or provide positive feedback relating to that care. The provision would require the Secretary to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives an annual report for 3 years on complaints or issues filed under this system.

### Sec. 702—Expansion of access to dental care for certain dependents

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1077 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize postgraduate dental residents to provide dental care in military dental treatment facilities to certain military dependents on a space-available basis.

### Sec. 703—Expansion of eligibility for hearing aids to include children of retired members of the Uniformed Services enrolled in family coverage under TRICARE Select

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1077 of title 10, United States Code, to expand eligibility for hearing aids to include children of retirees enrolled in family coverage under TRICARE Select.

### Sec. 704—Evaluation of inclusion of additional accrediting bodies for purposes of qualifications for licensure of mental health professionals under TRICARE Program

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Director, Defense Health Agency, to: (1) Evaluate the feasibility and advisability of permitting reimbursement under the TRICARE program of certified mental health counselors who hold a master's or higher level degree in counseling from a program that is accredited by certain accrediting bodies; (2) Submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than July 1, 2027, on the evaluation; and (3) If recommended by the report, to implement the recommendation to permit reimbursement of counselors with a degree from a program accredited by a covered institution.

**Sec. 705—Improvement of provider directory accuracy for specialty care providers under the TRICARE program**

The committee recommends a provision that would require: (1) The Director, Defense Health Agency to ensure that future managed care contracts under the TRICARE program include specified requirements to improve provider directory accuracy; (2) The Inspector General of the Defense Health Agency to conduct random tests of the accuracy of information relating to specialty care providers contained in provider directories; (3) The Director, Defense Health Agency to provide an annual briefing for 4 years to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the progress in improving provider directories; and (4) The Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a holistic review of provider directory accuracy under the TRICARE program.

**Sec. 706—Modification of requirement to provide start-up time for certain TRICARE contractors**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1095c(b) of title 10, United States Code, to require a minimum of 1 year start-up time for claims processing for new contractors awarded a contract to provide managed care support under the TRICARE program.

**Sec. 707—Corrections to pilot program for supplemental coverage relating to cancer**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 734 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) to postpone the date of implementation to January 31, 2028, to require information about the pilot program to be posted on the public-facing website of the TRICARE program, and to make other technical changes.

**Sec. 708—Coverage of cranial orthotic devices for deformational plagiocephaly under TRICARE Program**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1079(a) of title 10, United States Code, to authorize cranial orthotic devices for deformational plagiocephaly to be provided as a part of a reconstructive medical treatment.

**Sec. 709—Technical amendments to the Public Health Service Act**

The committee recommends a provision that would provide technical changes to include the Defense Health Agency in certain language regarding the responsibilities of military health care under the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201).

**Sec. 710—Licensure of mental health professionals in TRICARE program**

The committee recommends a provision that would expand the qualifications for licensure as a certified mental health counselor under the TRICARE program.

**Sec. 711—Requirements relating to wellness checks for health and welfare of certain members of the Armed Forces**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to issue policies establishing wellness checks for service members sustaining significant injuries, illnesses, or being on sick call.

**Sec. 712—Requirement to offer medical chaperones during sensitive medical examinations**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to establish and implement a Department-wide policy requiring that a medical chaperone be offered and made available to be present during any sensitive medical examination conducted at a military medical treatment facility.

**Sec. 713—Pilot program on reciprocal access to health care facilities, personnel, and services of Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs**

The committee recommends a provision that would establish an access to health care pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of expanding reciprocal access to health care facilities, personnel, and services between the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs.

**Sec. 714—Medical screening for members of the Armed Forces who served at data masked or classified locations**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to modify the service records of covered members to indicate service at certain data-masked or classified locations, require exposure-related hazard screenings during specified medical examinations, and ensure that identified exposures and the results of any screenings or evaluations are documented in the member's permanent medical record and transmitted to the Department of Veterans Affairs upon separation or retirement.

**Sec. 715—Medical testing and related services for firefighters of Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Department of Defense to offer appropriate medical testing and services to detect and document certain cancers for Department of Defense Federal firefighters.

**Subtitle B—Health Care Administration**

**Sec. 721—Development of capability prototype on secure access to health record for members of the Armed Forces**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to develop and implement a capability prototype that is interoperable with the electronic health record of the Department of Defense to digitally collect medical records of active-duty members of the Armed Forces through a covered health record

platform before the members separate from active duty. The provision would also require the Secretary to carry out a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of using the capability prototype described above. The provision would also require the Secretary to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, on the capability prototype developed pursuant to this provision.

**Sec. 722—Inventory and annual catchment area assessment of military-civilian health care partnerships**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director, Defense Health Agency, to: (1) Develop and maintain a centralized inventory of military-civilian health care partnerships throughout the Department of Defense (DOD); and (2) Conduct an annual catchment area assessment of military-civilian health care partnerships and resource-sharing agreements of the DOD. The provision would require the Secretary to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the results of the catchment area assessments, not later than April 1, 2027, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years.

**Sec. 723—Requirement for review before actions to downsize, realign, or reduce scope of services at military medical treatment facilities**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1073d of title 10, United States Code, to require the Secretary of Defense to certify to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives that a comprehensive review of any future actions to downsize, realign, or otherwise reduce the scope of services at a military medical treatment facility has been conducted. The provision would also require the Secretary to have a consultative discussion with such committees regarding an action to downsize, realign, or otherwise reduce the scope of services at a military medical treatment facility, not later than 1 year before conducting the action.

**Sec. 724—Policy on provider notification to commanders regarding imminent risk of suicide for members of the Armed Forces**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a policy throughout the Department of Defense regarding the notification of commanders when a healthcare provider determines that a member of the Armed Forces is at imminent risk of suicide. The provision would also require the Secretary to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a briefing, not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, detailing the policy developed in this provision.

**Sec. 725—Authority over Defense Health Program**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1073 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary

of Defense to have authority over the entirety of the Defense Health Program.

**Sec. 726—Enterprise Revenue Cycle Improvement Initiative**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to implement an enterprise-wide cycle improvement initiative to: (1) Standardize revenue cycle management processes; (2) Strengthen governance and accountability; (3) Improve workforce capability; and (4) Increase the accuracy, timeliness, and yield of third-party collections and claims management across the military health system.

**Sec. 727—Notification to licensing and medical boards of States in case of investigation or misconduct**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to notify the appropriate State licensing and medical boards not later than 30 days after the initiation of an investigation into alleged misconduct by a covered healthcare professional that could result in criminal charges, or upon the filing of such charges.

**Sec. 728—Additional review of disclosure requirements under processes and forms relating to health care provider credentialing and privileging of Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 720 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) to require the Secretary of Defense to review all processes and forms relating to health care provider credentialing and privileging of applicants for a position as a health care professional to identify questions, required disclosures, or other information regarding mental, behavioral, psychological, or other related health conditions of the applicant.

**Sec. 729—Expansion of Individual Longitudinal Exposure Record**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 966 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize changes to the individual longitudinal exposure record at the discretion of the Department of Defense.

**Sec. 730—Pilot program on modernization of drug testing using voice-based risk assessment**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to carry out a pilot program at up to five military installations to evaluate the use of voice-based risk assessment technology in support of targeted drug testing.

**Subtitle C—Combat and Operational Health Support**

**Sec. 741—Establishment of Joint Disease and Non-Battle Injury Surveillance and Readiness System**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code, to require the Secretary of

Defense to establish and maintain a Joint Disease and Non-Battle Injury Surveillance and Readiness System within the Defense Health Agency to provide standardized, interoperable, and real-time monitoring of disease and non-battle injury across the Armed Forces.

**Sec. 742—Preservation of dedicated aeromedical evacuation capability of Medical Service Corps of the Army**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Army to maintain a dedicated aeromedical evacuation capability, including personnel, training, doctrine, and aircraft specifically configured for aeromedical evacuation missions.

**Sec. 743—Establishment of partnership program between United States, Indo-Pacific region, and Arctic region for military trauma care, disease and non-battle injury, health systems support, and research**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with appropriate combatant commands, to seek to enter into partnerships, not later than June 1, 2027, with governmental counterparts in the Indo-Pacific and Arctic regions to establish a joint program focused on military trauma care and research.

**Sec. 744—Aerial transport and Department of Defense-wide capability for high-consequence infectious diseases**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to establish, sustain, and resource a program to provide for the safe, long-range aerial transport of personnel of the Department of Defense known to be or suspected of being infected by a high-consequence infectious disease.

**Sec. 745—Requirement for annual large-scale combat casualty estimation report**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on projected casualties of the Armed Forces in large-scale combat operations.

**Sec. 746—Report on the organization, performance, and standardization of emergency medical services within the Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, a report on the organization, oversight, capabilities, and performance of emergency medical services across military installations.

**Sec. 747—Expansion of health care license portability for medical providers of the National Guard**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1094(d)(3)(B) of title 10, United States Code, to provide health

care license portability to medical providers of the National Guard when providing care under title 32, United States Code, to a member of the uniformed services.

**Sec. 748—Joint forces medical capabilities development and standardization**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the Defense Health Agency, to develop a process for establishing the Joint Force medical capabilities required to meet the operational planning requirements of the combatant commands.

**Sec. 749—Expansion of authorities to enable interoperability among military health care professionals of the United States and partner countries**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1094 of title 10, United States Code, to expand the list of foreign countries whose licensed health care professionals may be treated as meeting Department of Defense licensure requirements.

**Sec. 750—Task force on international agreements for Indo-Pacific medical partnerships**

The committee recommends a provision that would establish a task force responsible for securing and negotiating the international agreements required to implement the Indo-Pacific Medical Readiness Program established under section 735 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159) to ensure the Armed Forces of the United States can partner with foreign medical facilities during peacetime and wartime operations for military medical care, casualty evacuation, and storage relevant to military medical preparedness.

**Sec. 751—Pilot program for Indo-Pacific regional medical data sharing**

The committee recommends a provision that would establish a pilot health information technology platform with the capability to function across military and civilian medical facilities in the United States and foreign countries in the area of operations of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

**Subtitle D—Reports and Other Matters**

**Sec. 761—Review of chaperone policies within facilities of the Defense Health Agency**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Director, Defense Health Agency (DHA), not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to review the compliance by all facilities of the DHA with the chaperone policies required by DHA Policy Memorandum 25–020, dated December 15, 2025, "Chaperones/Standbys within Defense Health Agency Facilities." The provision would require the Director to submit a report

to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, on the findings of this review and actions planned or taken pursuant to the review.

**Sec. 762—Unfunded priorities report of the Defense Health Agency**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Director of the Defense Health Agency (DHA) to submit an annual report on the unfunded priorities of the DHA to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the congressional defense committees.

**Sec. 763—Evaluation of certain research related to menopause, perimenopause, or mid-life women's health**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the results of completed research related to menopause, perimenopause, or mid-life women's health among women who are members of the Armed Forces and to submit a report on the results of such review to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 31, 2028.

**Sec. 764—Notification of material failure at military medical treatment facilities affecting patient care**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to notify the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than 30 days after a material failure affects patient care in an operating room, critical care unit, intensive care unit, or emergency department at a military medical treatment facility. The provision would require the Secretary to brief the committees on a quarterly basis for 3 years on the aggregated data on the notifications and funding to mitigate the material failures.

**Sec. 765—Study on military health system**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to seek to enter into a contract with a federally funded research and development center, not later than June 1, 2027, to conduct a study on the military healthcare system and the future of TRICARE. The provision would also require the Secretary, not later than March 1, 2028, to submit an unredacted copy of the report from such study to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives and also to brief the committees on the report by said date.

**Sec. 766—Establishment of Warfighter Performance Optimization Initiative, Total Force Fitness**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a comprehensive Warfighter Performance Optimization Initiative to enhance the readiness, performance, and resilience of members of the Armed Forces.

**Sec. 767—Military Family Limb Loss and Limb Difference Support Program**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to establish, beginning in fiscal year 2028, the Military Family Limb Loss and Limb Difference Support Program to enhance holistic rehabilitative care for covered beneficiaries with limb loss or limb dysfunction through peer mentoring, education, and community outreach.

**Sec. 768—Briefing on primary care provided at military medical treatment facilities on installations of the Air Force**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Director of the Defense Health Agency to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, on civilian primary care providers at military treatment facilities on Air Force installations.

**Sec. 769—Assessment of access, fairness, and transparency under TRICARE pharmacy benefits program**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct an audit of the Department of Defense TRICARE pharmacy benefits program.

**Sec. 770—Comptroller General review of influenza vaccine requirements of Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a review of the Department of Defense influenza vaccine requirements.

## Items of Special Interest

**Access to Military OneSource**

The committee recognizes the continued need for confidential, non-medical, prevention-focused behavioral health and wellness resources that support the readiness and well-being of servicemembers and their families across the total force.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to assess opportunities to pilot, integrate, or otherwise leverage commercial, off-the-shelf behavioral health and wellness technologies as part of Military OneSource's non-medical support ecosystem. These efforts should focus on expanding access to self-directed and peer-enabled resources that support relationship skills, stress management, coping strategies, adjustment challenges, and other life skills consistent with the authorized scope of non-medical counseling. The committee further encourages the Secretary to consider how validated commercial solutions may improve coordination, continuity, and cost-effective delivery of non-medical support services across the force, and to use lessons learned to inform future program design and resource allocation decisions.

**Advancing non-opioid alternatives for chronic pain**

The committee recognizes the significant impact of chronic pain on thousands of servicemembers and the over-reliance on opioids to manage chronic pain conditions. The committee is concerned that, despite advances in expanding access to non-opioid alternatives for acute pain, significant barriers remain for chronic pain that limit servicemembers' and TRICARE beneficiaries' treatment options.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing, not later than March 1, 2027, on: (1) The availability of non-opioid treatment options approved by the Food and Drug Administration to manage chronic pain conditions; (2) The number of patients that are utilizing these therapies; (3) The identification of incentives to improve access to non-opioid alternatives for chronic pain; and (4) Recommendations that would further alleviate chronic pain issues for TRICARE beneficiaries.

**All-hazards military medical response**

The committee is aware of the Department's policy for emergency management related to medical emergencies caused by blast, burn, and/or penetrating injuries. However, given the current and more complex "All Hazards"' threat environment in both Contiguous United States and Outside the Contiguous United States scenarios, the committee believes that the Department's medical response plans related to exposure to chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, potentially in addition to more traditional injuries, should be reviewed and updated. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on the following:

(1) A description of current capabilities to detect, treat, and safely transport patients with injuries related to chemical, biological, and radiological exposure, both in isolation and when combined with blast, burn, and penetrating injuries;

(2) An assessment of gaps in current capabilities to detect, treat, and safely transport patients with injuries related to chemical, biological, and radiological exposure, both in isolation and when combined with blast, burn, and penetrating injuries; and

(3) A summary of policy, technology, manpower, and other resource requirements needed to resolve these capability gaps.

**Assessment of behavioral health and social health conditions at remote and isolated installations**

The committee is aware of the unique nature of remote and isolated installations, as they conduct specialized operational mission requirements with very limited services and housing on base or in the vicinity, leading to extended commute times and compounded challenges.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Defense Health Agency, to assess the behavioral health and social health conditions of the military personnel and their families related to their assignment to remote and isolated installations. This assessment should utilize tools such as site

assistance visits, behavioral health epidemiological consultations, and community-wide assessments. The assessment should:

(1) Establish what behavioral health and social health outcomes impact individual, family, and unit readiness at remote and isolated installations;

(2) Identify factors, including unique social and occupational stressors, affecting the behavioral health and social health of servicemembers and their families stationed at remote and isolated installations; and

(3) Make recommendations to address these challenges and to improve the health and readiness of servicemembers and their families stationed at remote and isolated installations, and, in doing so, advance military readiness.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the methods used to conduct the assessment and on the findings and recommendations of the assessment.

**Briefing on dietary supplement safety of Department of Defense**

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Office of Operation Supplement Safety, to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on efforts to ensure the safety of dietary supplement use among members of the Armed Forces.

The briefing shall identify the resources required to fully implement Department of Defense Instruction 6130.06, including any gaps in funding, personnel, or infrastructure that may hinder effective execution of the Instruction.

In addition, the briefing shall assess coordination between the military departments and the Office of Operation Supplement Safety with respect to the implementation of dietary supplement education and training programs. The assessment shall include the format, frequency, and delivery methods of training provided to servicemembers, as well as data on the number of servicemembers reached by such programs, disaggregated by military department.

Finally, the briefing shall describe efforts to expand third-party certification requirements for dietary supplements, consistent with section 1087(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), to additional military departments, including any challenges associated with such expansion and recommendations for legislative or administrative action.

**Briefing on Helicobacter pylori in Department of Defense**

The committee recognizes that Helicobacter pylori (H. pylori) is a stomach bacterium that may affect military readiness, deployments, and long-term gastrointestinal health. Some studies suggest about 25 percent of U.S. servicemembers have evidence of the infection, and broader global military estimates are even higher—around 32 percent prevalence.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate

and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, to include the following:

(1) The estimated prevalence of H. pylori infection among active-duty members, reserve component members, and other covered beneficiaries;

(2) A comparison of prevalence rates across the military departments, occupational specialties, and demographic categories, as appropriate;

(3) An assessment of infection acquisition associated with deployment, including geographic variation and trends over time;

(4) An identification of primary risk factors for H. pylori infection among members of the Armed Forces, including:

(a) deployment to regions with elevated endemic rates;

(b) food and water sanitation conditions;

(c) living conditions in operational and training environments; and (d) other relevant environmental or occupational exposures;

(5) Current policies and clinical guidelines for screening and testing within the Military Health System;

(6) The extent to which H. pylori infection is considered in pre-deployment health assessments;

(7) An estimate of the direct and indirect costs associated with H. pylori infection, including testing, treatment, and complications;

(8) The impact on Military Health System utilization, including outpatient visits, hospitalizations, and specialty care;

(9) A description of ongoing or planned research efforts related to H. pylori within the Department of Defense; and

(10) Any recommendations the Secretary determines appropriate to improve prevention, diagnosis, treatment, surveillance, and readiness outcomes related to H. pylori infection.

**Briefing on impact of drone warfare on combat casualties**

The committee recognizes the growing importance of understanding the emerging medical and operational implications of injuries caused by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and how these injuries differ from those historically associated with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). As these technologies proliferate and evolve, it is essential that the Department of Defense (DOD) fully understand the medical consequences of UAV-related injuries and ensure that our military medical system is prepared to prevent, treat, and rehabilitate these wounds.

The committee notes that UAVs target the head and upper body, and IEDs target the lower body. These differences may include variations in blast exposure, fragmentation patterns, burn injuries, and trauma resulting from top-down detonation profiles. Such distinctions could have meaningful implications for battlefield medicine, protective equipment, training, evacuation procedures, rehabilitation protocols, and long-term care for wounded servicemembers.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, regarding the impact of drone warfare on combat casualties. The

briefing should, at a minimum, include the following: (1) An assessment of how unmanned aerial systems are affecting casualty rates, injury patterns, and survivability; (2) An evaluation of impacts on casualty evacuation timelines, including the feasibility of meeting established evacuation benchmarks in contested environments; (3) An analysis of the effects on patient flow across echelons of care, including disruptions to traditional evacuation chains and the positioning of medical personnel and other resources; (4) A description of the DOD's current capabilities to provide prolonged field care in denied or contested environments; (5) A description of any capability gaps in medical operations resulting from the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems; (6) A summary of ongoing or planned efforts to mitigate such risks, including doctrine, training, materiel solutions, and force design changes; (7) Opportunities for collaboration with outside experts, including organizations supporting wounded servicemembers, trauma specialists, and veterans' advocacy groups; (8) Recommendations for legislative or policy changes necessary to address identified gaps; and (9) Any other matters the Department wishes to consider.

**Briefing on parental access to medical records**

The committee recognizes that access to a child's medical information is a foundational expectation for most families and is closely tied to a parent's ability to make informed decisions regarding their child's health and well-being. However, within the Department of Defense, the issue of parental access to minor dependents' medical records has many complexities, including the balancing of parental rights, minor confidentiality, medical ethics, and overlapping federal and state legal requirements.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, that provides: (1) The current process by which a parent can access a minor dependents' health records; (2) Challenges and opportunities, including the cost of providing this access; and (3) The steps required to enable this access for parents and minor dependents in the future.

**Briefing on privileging and credentialing within the Military Health System and potential integration with Department of Veterans Affairs**

The committee is aware of persistent challenges within the Department of Defense in achieving timely, standardized, and portable provider privileging and credentialing across the Military Health System. The committee notes that variations in processes among military treatment facilities and across the military departments can contribute to delays in onboarding providers, underutilization of clinical staff, and inefficiencies that may affect access to care. The committee also notes ongoing efforts to improve coordination between the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs, particularly as providers transition between the two systems or serve dual roles. However, the committee remains concerned that the lack of interoperability in credentialing and

privileging systems creates unnecessary duplication, administrative inefficiencies, and delays in patient care.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, to provide a briefing, not later than April 1, 2027, on the following:

(1) Secretary of Defense focus to:

(a) establish uniform standards, criteria, and documentation requirements for credentialing and privileging;

(b) enable portability of credentials and privileges across military treatment facilities without redundant review, to the maximum extent practicable;

(c) incorporate digital credentialing tools and automation to reduce processing time and administrative burden; and

(d) identify statutory, regulatory, or policy barriers to the full implementation of a standardized system; and

(2) Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Veterans Affairs focus to:

(a) evaluate options for a shared or federated credentialing database accessible to both their respective departments;

(b) assess the feasibility of reciprocal recognition of credentials and privileges for providers practicing in both systems;

(c) identify information technology requirements, including cybersecurity considerations, necessary to support interoperability;

(d) propose common data standards and governance structures to ensure data integrity and accountability; and

(e) identify any legislative changes required to enable full interoperability.

**Briefing on treatment of miscarriages in military health system**

The committee recognizes that miscarriage and early pregnancy loss are common medical events that can have significant physical and psychological effects. While not unique to the military, the committee is concerned that operational demands, access to care, and policy inconsistencies may affect how servicemembers and dependents experience and recover from pregnancy loss. The committee seeks to better understand whether current Department of Defense (DOD) policies and systems adequately support affected individuals and ensure consistent, high-quality health care across all duty locations.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the following:

(1) The collection and tracking of miscarriages and pregnancy loss among active-duty servicemembers and their dependents within the Military Health System;

(2) The clinical guidelines that are used across the Military Health System for managing miscarriage and pregnancy loss;

(3) The process by which the DOD ensures timely access to obstetric, gynecological, and emergency care for miscarriage management and the challenges that exist at:

(a) remote or overseas duty stations; and

(b) deployed environments;

(4) The mental health services available following pregnancy loss; and

(5) The research the DOD has conducted on potential links between miscarriage and:

(a) occupational exposures (e.g., chemicals, blast overpressure);

(b) physical demands or training requirements; and

(c) the mitigation measures that are in place to reduce risk.

**Combat casualty care triage**

The committee is concerned that conflicts in contested environments would challenge military medics' capacity for identifying which servicemembers most need timely medical care and their ability to triage cases accordingly. The committee notes the significant advancements in technology that perform continuous physiological monitoring such as wearable sensors. Pairing these devices with artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled software could facilitate the automation of casualty triage, increasing the ability of medics to determine each servicemember's current physical condition and prioritize evacuations for those most severely wounded.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Director of the Defense Health Agency to provide a briefing, not later than February 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on AI-enabled mass-casualty triage. Specifically, the briefing should include an assessment of:

(1) The Department of Defense's current capabilities to perform autonomous triage and continuous physiological monitoring in high-casualty, resource-constrained environments;

(2) The feasibility and advisability of using wearable sensors and AI-enabled software to automate casualty triage, prioritize evacuation, and support medics operating in the field;

(3) How the Department could leverage small businesses and the unique acquisition pathways open to them to incorporate autonomous triage capabilities into the force;

(4) The anticipated costs of implementing these technologies; and

(5) Whether the Department intends to request such capabilities in future budgets.

**Comptroller General review of access to care at military medical treatment facilities within United States**

The committee remains concerned about TRICARE beneficiaries' access to care at the Defense Health Agency's direct care system of military medical treatment facilities (MTFs), particularly those located in rural areas within the continental United States (CONUS).

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study on TRICARE beneficiaries' access

to health care at CONUS MTFs that should include: (1) A description of current access to care at CONUS MTFs, including those located in rural areas; (2) The methods and data used to measure access to care and an assessment of the steps taken to ensure the reliability of these data; (3) How MTFs use these data to identify any access issues; and (4) The steps MTFs have taken to address any access issues they identify, particularly in rural areas.

This study should also assess: (1) How MTFs work with the regional TRICARE managed care support contractors to ensure that the composition of their local civilian provider networks complement care being provided at their facilities; and (2) Impacts that network changes, such as hospital closures, can have on MTFs.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 31, 2027, with a report to follow by a date mutually agreed upon at the time of the briefing.

**Comptroller General review of joint qualification billets for health-related specialties**

The committee remains concerned about the lack of progress with the development and creation of joint qualification billets for medical or health related specialties within the Department of Defense (DOD). The committee notes that the Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Committee Print No. 3) directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a briefing related to this topic, not later than April 1, 2026, in which the DOD indicated limited progress on the development of joint qualification billets for these specialties. Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a review of the following:

(1) The status of the implementation of the joint qualification billets from the DOD briefing submitted in response to the Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Committee Print No. 3);

(2) Department efforts to identify and designate a stakeholder responsible for the development and implementation of such joint qualification billets;

(3) The plan of action and milestones from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for the Defense Health Agency, Uniformed Services University, and other relevant organizations within the Military Health System;

(4) Any anticipated challenges or costs; and

(5) Any steps the Department is taking to move forward with the development of joint qualification billets for medical related specialties, including additional authorities and resources.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide a briefing, not later than April 30, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, with the results to follow in a mutually agreed upon format and timeframe.

**Comptroller General review of TRICARE pharmacy program**

The committee remains concerned about the ability of the Department of Defense's (DOD) TRICARE pharmacy program to meet the needs of its beneficiaries. The program is administered by a contractor who has administered the program since 2009. The contractor has responsibilities that include developing and maintaining a network of retail pharmacies and operating a mail order pharmacy. Information on the current management of the TRICARE pharmacy program, including the adequacy of the networks and the DOD's oversight of the program, will help to ensure the program is delivering the benefit in the most effective and cost effective manner.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a series of studies on the TRICARE Pharmacy program that include:

(1) A review of beneficiary access and network adequacy, including:

(a) any geographic disparities in access, especially for rural and underserved areas;

(b) differences in access to in-person pharmacies by pharmacy type;

(c) reliance on mail-order pharmacy services;

(d) the timeliness of prescription fulfillment, including home delivery and specialty pharmacy services;

(e) adequacy of access to care; and

(f) any associated impacts on patient care;

(2) A review of prescription drug costs under the program and the extent to which the contractor's practices affect those costs, including whether the Department achieves cost savings and receives the full value of negotiated discounts;

(3) An assessment of the Defense Health Agency's (DHA) management and oversight of the program, including:

(a) an assessment of whether the contract, and its requirements and performance metrics, is structured in a way to enable the DHA to effectively oversee the program and minimize program integrity risks, such as those related to fraud, waste, and abuse, including improper payments and the effectiveness of safeguards to prevent inappropriate billing;

(b) an examination of the accuracy and completeness of contractor-reported data, and the Department's process for validating such data, including visibility into participating pharmacy locations, pricing, rebates, and fees;

(c) an assessment of any conflicts of interest in the program, including the extent to which vertically integrated business arrangements or affiliated pharmacies create potential conflicts of interest or affect competition; and (d) an analysis of the adequacy of beneficiary access to in-person pharmacy options, by pharmacy type, including an assessment of differences in offered contract terms to in-network pharmacies and the impact on beneficiary access;

(4) A comparison of the TRICARE Pharmacy Program to other Federal health care programs and commercial best

practices, including with respect to network adequacy, prescription drug costs, incentives, and oversight;

(5) Any differences in reimbursement rates between affiliated pharmacies and non-affiliated pharmacies, including volume and type of prescriptions dispensed, direct and indirect remuneration fees, or other price concessions and clawbacks, as well as review of all the administrative fees received for each prescription filled; and (6) For any affiliated pharmacy or pharmacy under common ownership with the pharmacy contractor, an analysis of:

(a) the percentage of total prescriptions dispensed by such pharmacies to individuals enrolled in such plan or coverage;

(b) a description of drugs dispensed by such pharmacies to individuals enrolled in such plan or coverage; and

(c) other strategic matters germane to the administration of such pharmacies.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, with a report to follow at an agreed upon date. The committee expects that the results of this review will inform future legislative and oversight actions related to the administration of the TRICARE pharmacy program and broader pharmacy benefit manager practices within the DOD.

**Enhance awareness of self initiated mental health referrals**

The committee recognizes the importance of ensuring that servicemembers are aware of available mental health resources and avenues for obtaining confidential care. Section 704 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81) established the self-initiated referral process for mental health evaluations of members of the Armed Forces, and section 705 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) clarified that authority. The committee also acknowledges the Department of Defense's efforts to implement these requirements, including the issuance of Directive-type Memorandum 23–005, "Self-Initiated Referral Process for Mental Health Evaluations of Service Members."

Despite these efforts, the committee remains concerned by reports of inconsistent awareness, education, and implementation of the self-initiated referral process across the Armed Forces. While some servicemembers have successfully used the process to obtain mental health evaluations and care, the committee is aware that some commanders and supervisors have sought additional guidance regarding their responsibilities and that units have requested additional training and educational materials. The committee believes that improving awareness of the process among servicemembers and leaders may increase access to care, reduce stigma associated with seeking mental health treatment, and support suicide prevention efforts.

Accordingly, the committee is interested in the feasibility and advisability of requiring prominent, standardized signage at military installations informing servicemembers of their rights under the

Brandon Act and the procedures for requesting and obtaining a self-initiated referral for a mental health evaluation. The committee is also interested in requiring standardized annual training for all servicemembers on the referral process, available protections, and mental health resources, as well as enhanced training for commanders, supervisors, and noncommissioned officers regarding their responsibilities under the Brandon Act and Directive-type Memorandum 23–005.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of implementing such requirements. The briefing shall include:

(1) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of requiring standardized Brandon Act awareness signage in prominent and high-traffic areas at military installations, military treatment facilities, reserve component facilities, and other locations frequented by servicemembers, and public-facing installation-adjacent locations;

(2) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of requiring annual training for all members of the Armed Forces on the self-initiated referral process, including how to request a referral, protections against retaliation, confidentiality protections, and available mental health resources;

(3) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of requiring enhanced Brandon Act training for commanding officers, supervisors, and noncommissioned officers in grades E–5 and above regarding their responsibilities when receiving a request for a self-initiated referral;

(4) An evaluation of the anticipated impact of such measures on awareness, utilization of mental health services, and suicide prevention efforts;

(5) Identification of any legal, operational, administrative, or logistical challenges associated with implementing such requirements; and

(6) A detailed estimate of the one-time and recurring costs associated with implementing and sustaining such requirements throughout the Department of Defense.

**Enhancing musculoskeletal medicine in the Military Health System**

The committee recognizes that musculoskeletal injuries threaten servicemembers' medical readiness and notes the demonstrated value of existing collaboration among the Defense Health Agency, the Uniformed Services University, and initiatives that advance orthopedic surgical skills, research, and clinical outcomes improvement.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027. The briefing shall include: (1) The Department of Defense's initiatives related to advanced orthopedic surgical training; (2) The Department's analysis and application of outcomes data derived from the Military Orthopedic Tracking Injuries and Outcomes Network;

(3) The development of evidence-based clinical practice guidelines across the continuum of musculoskeletal care within the Military Health System; (4) The Department's efforts to address data access, analytic support, and integration of findings into professional education and clinical communities; (5) Mechanisms to assess programmatic impacts on readiness; and (6) The feasibility of the Department entering into a memorandum of understanding or agreement with organizations that participate in advanced orthopedic surgical skills, research, and clinical outcomes improvement.

**Feasibility and advisability of establishing pilot program on filling positions at remote military treatment facilities**

The committee notes that remote military medical treatment facilities often face significant challenges in recruiting and retaining qualified healthcare professionals due to their geographic isolation, limited local labor markets, and competition with civilian health care systems that may offer more attractive compensation and career opportunities.

The committee is concerned that these staffing shortages can reduce access to timely primary care services for servicemembers, military families, and other beneficiaries while also increasing workloads for existing medical personnel and potentially affecting military medical readiness. The committee notes that while the Department of Defense possesses several hiring and compensation authorities designed to attract healthcare providers, these tools have not consistently addressed persistent vacancies at remote locations.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretaries of the military departments, in consultation with the Director of the Defense Health Agency, to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a pilot program to improve recruitment and retention of primary care personnel at remote military medical treatment facilities using existing hiring and compensation authorities for highly qualified applicants, including enhanced pay authorities, student loan repayment programs, and recruitment, relocation, and retention incentives provided under:

(1) Section 1599c of title 10, United States Code (relating to appointment and rates of pay);

(2) Section 5379 of title 5, United States Code (relating to student loan repayments); and

(3) Sections 5753 and 5754 of such title 5 (relating to recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention bonuses, respectively).

**Healthcare associated infections**

The committee recognizes the public health crisis caused by healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) and that respiratory infections are the number one contributor to HAIs. Servicemembers treated by the military healthcare system for a condition or injury should not be subject to additional infections developed during their treatment in military treatment facilities (MTFs). Preventable HAIs lead to unnecessary loss of life and increase healthcare costs.

To date, efforts to reduce respiratory HAIs have had limited success.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Defense Health Agency to prioritize the development of ultraviolet wearable pathogen inactivation devices for use by patients in MTFs who have respiratory infections. These devices should be designed to eliminate pathogens in exhaled breath, without filters to allow easy patient breathing, to reduce the spread of these infections.

**Improving brain injury prevention efforts**

The committee remains concerned by the prevalence of brain injuries among servicemembers, including those caused by blast overpressure exposure and by reporting that brain injuries may also be prevalent among fighter pilots and speedboat crews. Additionally, the committee further notes its concern about repeated blast overpressure exposure among military instructors who are training others to use weapons systems, as well as reporting on blast overpressure exposure among explosive ordnance technicians. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department of Defense's efforts to evaluate, prevent, and mitigate blast overpressure exposure and brain injuries among these at-risk servicemembers. The briefing shall include the following information:

(1) Efforts to evaluate, prevent, and mitigate brain injury risks among fighter pilots, speedboat crews, military instructors training others to use weapons systems, and explosive ordnance technicians;

(2) The results of Project Odin's Eye and any steps the Department and any of the Services have taken to evaluate, prevent, and mitigate brain injury risks based on findings from Project Odin's Eye;

(3) Efforts to evaluate, prevent, and mitigate brain injury risks in other air and amphibious operations;

(4) Military occupational specialties that may be at higher risk for brain injury due to exposure in air and amphibious operations;

(5) DOD's efforts to integrate brain injury risks among fighter pilots, speedboat crews, military instructors training others to use weapons systems, explosive ordnance technicians, and those at higher risk of exposure due to air and amphibious operations into its Warfighter Brain Health Initiative and statutory requirements related to brain health in the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159).

**Messenger ribonucleic acid vaccine technology**

The committee is aware that significant scientific advances are being made as a result of better understanding, characterization, and application of messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) technology. One particularly relevant application supporting warfighter health and medical readiness is the use of mRNA-based vaccines. For instance, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that over 95

percent of active-duty servicemembers were vaccinated against COVID–19 by late 2021, with the majority of those servicemembers receiving an mRNA vaccine. However, the committee is also aware that in August 2025, the Department of Health and Human Services announced approximately $500.0 million in federal funding cuts for mRNA vaccine development.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, regarding the impact of federal funding cuts to vaccine research and regulatory uncertainty for new vaccines on servicemembers, military families, and military readiness. The briefing should include: (1) The identified vaccine research priorities to protect servicemembers, including a list of existing DOD vaccine projects; (2) The quantified vaccine research funding levels over the last 5 years; (3) The identified challenges for regulatory pathways that new vaccines may face; and (4) The risks to servicemembers and military readiness if vaccine research priorities are not met.

**Military medical manning end strength**

The committee remains concerned about military medical end strength in the military departments. Moreover, the committee is concerned with the long-term commitment of the services to ensure military treatment facilities have the dedicated manning to support the dual missions of warfighting support and the peacetime health benefit. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later April 1, 2027, on how they will ensure military medical manning meets the dual mission of warfighter support and peacetime health benefit and is in compliance with section 731 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81).

**Military-civilian medical surge system**

The committee notes that section 712 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) created the Military-Civilian Medical Surge Program to enhance the interoperability and medical surge capability and capacity of the National Disaster Medical System. While the committee supports the implementation of this program and believes it represents a significant step forward in enabling the Department of Defense to better care for wounded servicemembers during military contingencies, the committee understands that further work is yet required to handle the demands of casualty care from large-scale combat operations.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, in consultation with the Director of the Defense Health Agency, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, on expanding the Military-Civilian Medical Surge Program. Specifically, the briefing shall include, but not be limited, to:

(1) An assessment of the Department's current emergency response plan for military health emergencies and recommendations for improvements for coordinating military and civilian health service support under conflict scenarios;

(2) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of establishing regional medical operations coordination centers or other entities with a defined set of minimum capabilities at strategic hubs, including likely points of debarkation, to assist with patient triage, patient regulation, patient load balancing, and overall case management during a military health emergency;

(3) An assessment of the financial impacts to civilian partner health facilities involved in a sustained medical mobilization in response to a military health emergency; and

(4) Any legislative or policy recommendations that better position the program should a contingency requiring use of the program arise.

**Molecular diagnostic test modernization**

The committee is aware that coverage for molecular diagnostic tests used in oncology and transplant care requires modernization within the TRICARE program to align with prevailing standards of Medicare, state Medicaid programs, and private insurers.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Defense Health Agency to consider coverage under the TRICARE program of Medicare Local Coverage Determinations that are approved for the Proprietary Lab Analysis. These advanced diagnostics provide clinically validated improvements in accuracy, early detection, and treatment decision support compared to traditional methods.

The committee further encourages the Department of Defense to evaluate current TRICARE coverage policies to ensure they reflect contemporary evidence-based practice and support timely access to molecular diagnostics for servicemembers and their families.

**Neurorehabilitation protocols for mild traumatic brain injury**

The committee is concerned about the long-term effects of chronic mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) among servicemembers. Concussions, repetitive low-level blast exposure, training incidents, and other service-related events may contribute to mTBI that often goes undiagnosed and untreated. The committee recognizes that certain nonprofit providers have developed targeted neurorehabilitation protocols for mTBI that may help address symptoms earlier and improve long-term outcomes.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to improve early identification and treatment of mTBI, including through partnerships with nonprofit providers with demonstrated expertise in such neurorehabilitation protocols.

The committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than May 1, 2027, on: (1) The prevalence of mTBI among servicemembers; (2) Efforts to improve early intervention; (3) Existing non-profit partnerships; and (4) Opportunities for such partnerships.

**Position trackers for maneuver soldier monitoring systems**

The committee is aware of the high incidence of heat-related injuries and medical emergencies during physically demanding and geographically dispersed training conducted at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Georgia. The committee notes that modern physiological and geospatial monitoring systems have demonstrated effectiveness in improving cadre situational awareness, accelerating emergency response, and reducing preventable training injuries.

Therefore, the committee strongly urges the Secretary of the Army to modernize Soldier Monitoring Systems used during maneuver training by fielding next-generation monitoring capabilities that integrate real-time location tracking with physiological indicators such as heart rate, temperature, and movement.

**Review of Defense Health Agency's combat support resources**

The committee notes that the Military Health System (MHS) performs a range of medical readiness functions that support operational effectiveness, force health protection, combat casualty care, and the readiness of the Armed Forces. The committee further recognizes that these functions are executed across the Defense Health Agency (DHA) and the military departments and are funded through a combination of Defense Health Program (DHP) and military department resources.

The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense (DOD) has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of MHS medical readiness-related programs, functions, requirements, authorities, and funding responsibilities. The committee believes that a clear understanding of which activities directly contribute to operational medical readiness is necessary to ensure appropriate governance, resource allocation, and accountability. The committee is further concerned that inconsistencies may exist in the alignment of readiness-related functions with statutory requirements, Department guidance, and funding responsibilities, which may result in solvency issues or delays in care.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, to conduct a comprehensive review of MHS medical readiness related programs, functions, requirements, and associated funding. The results of such review shall be submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027.

The review shall include the following elements:

(1) An inventory of medical readiness-related programs, activities, and functions performed by the DHA and the military departments;

(2) Assessment of the statutory, regulatory, policy, and operational requirements associated with each identified program, activity, or function;

(3) Identification of military department readiness-related program functions and requirements;

(4) Identification of DHP-funded medical readiness-related functions and requirements;

(5) An assessment of the extent to which each program, activity, or function contributes to operational medical readiness, force health protection, combat casualty care capability, deployment readiness, and support to combatant command requirements;

(6) An evaluation of the alignment of identified programs and activities with DOD guidance, readiness requirements, and strategic objectives;

(7) Identification of any duplicative, overlapping, fragmented, or inconsistent requirements, responsibilities, authorities, or funding arrangements among the DHA and the military departments;

(8) An assessment of risks to operational effectiveness and mission readiness associated with any identified capability gaps;

(9) Recommendations regarding governance, oversight, accountability, and funding responsibilities for medical readiness-related programs and functions; and

(10) Recommendations for any legislative, policy, organizational, or resource changes necessary to improve the management and execution of medical readiness requirements.

At a minimum, the review shall include an assessment of the following programs and functional areas: the Armed Services Blood Program, emergency medical services, immunization programs, occupational health programs, optical laboratories, installation support functions, educational developmental intervention services, operational medicine capabilities, real property in support of medical readiness activities, war reserve materiel infrastructure, and any additional medical readiness-related program, activity, or function identified by the Secretary of Defense during the review.

The committee further directs the Secretary to include recommendations regarding the appropriate assignment of responsibilities and funding alignment for MHS and DHP-funded readiness functions and requirements. All recommendations regarding funding realignment or program ownership shall be advisory, and decisions regarding MHS and DHP funding responsibilities will be made by the committee.

**Report on feasibility and advisability of a sharing agreement between Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs to have Mobile Medical Units provide medical services to servicemembers stationed on military installations designated as remote and isolated**

The committee notes that the Department of Veterans Affairs utilizes Mobile Medical Units for rural healthcare purposes which provide an option for localized on-site primary care, preventative health screenings, and ancillary care, such as blood and lab work, to veterans living in rural areas.

The committee is concerned about the medical challenges facing servicemembers who are stationed at military bases designated as remote and isolated installations. These servicemembers face significant medical challenges, including limited on-site care and shortages of providers, which force personnel to travel hours for routine care.

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and the Committees on Veterans Affairs of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of developing a sharing agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs in regards to Mobile Medical Units providing medical services to servicemembers on remote and isolated military installations.

**Report on supply chain of prosthetics and assistive technology**

The committee acknowledges that preserving U.S. access to secure durable medical equipment (DME), including prosthetics, and assistive technology devices (AT) is critical to achieve the Department of Defense's (DOD) mission. Enabling DOD civilian employees and disabled servicemembers to perform their duties is a matter of national security. If foreign adversaries or affiliated companies from foreign covered countries gain access to DME or AT used by DOD civilians or active-duty or Reserve servicemembers—or the data and information collected by such devices—it could make DOD personnel vulnerable to adversary sabotage, surveillance, and other dangers.

The committee recognizes that the Defense Health Agency acquires DME, including prosthetics, through a robust acquisitions and procurement process to provide TRICARE beneficiaries with essential, even lifesaving equipment. Further, the DOD Computer/Electronic Accommodations Program provides assistive technology to three populations that could become vulnerable to a range of nefarious exploitation if the supply chain of those technologies is not well protected: (1) DOD civilian employees; (2) Wounded servicemembers awaiting a medical evaluation board (MEB); and (3) Wounded servicemembers returning to duty. According to a RAND study from 2024, "Projections of Disability in the Department of Defense Workforce Through 2031," from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2020, the DOD provided AT to 12,933 returning servicemembers and 9,136 servicemembers awaiting an MEB—on top of thousands of DOD civilians.

The committee notes that efforts on supply chain security often focus on weapons systems or platforms and information technology systems. However, modern DME and AT are increasingly interconnected, with many utilizing artificial intelligence, all while supply chains for such devices remain complex and subject to political and economic policies. The committee therefore urges the Department to ensure that the security of DME and AT used by DOD personnel and servicemembers are prioritized as well.

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Health Agency and the Secretaries of the military departments and services, to provide a report, not later than December 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the cybersecurity and supply chain security of DME (including prosthetics) and AT used by DOD

civilian and uniformed personnel. The report shall include a risk assessment and a Department mitigation plan, at the appropriate level of classification. The report shall also:

(1) Summarize current policies and processes regarding screening DME and AT currently issued to servicemembers and/or DOD civilian employees for supply chain security purposes;

(2) Review whether any component of any DME and AT currently issued to servicemembers and/or DOD civilian employees have any commercial association with a company from a foreign covered country or an entity wholly owned or controlled by a company from a foreign covered country;

(3) Provide a risk assessment describing the major risks to national security and personnel privacy of any found vulnerabilities;

(4) A plan to mitigate and ultimately eliminate the risks found in (3), including additional procurements, replacements, upgrades, and any other actions; and

(5) Recommendations for changes to authorities, resourcing, policies, or processes to improve cybersecurity resilience and supply chain security of DME and AT.

**Termination of eligibility for TRICARE Reserve Select**

The committee understands that members of the reserve components are confused about the timing of the termination of their eligibility for TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) when transferring to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) or separating from the Reserves. Apparently, their eligibility is tied to the issuance of transfer or separation orders, but the servicemembers are not able to predict with any certainty when the orders will be issued and thus cannot make arrangements for other health insurance.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the challenges with respect to TRS that members of the reserve components face when transferring to the IRR or separating from the Reserves and the actions the Secretary will take to address these challenges.

**Traumatic brain injury accession processing feasibility briefing**

The committee recognizes that traumatic brain injury treatment and protection are evolving at a rapid pace. Moreover, the committee encourages the Department of Defense to approach brain health, blast overpressure exposure tracking, and suicide risk analysis as vital components of servicemember force health protection.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on the following matters:

(1) The feasibility of establishing baseline cognitive testing during accession processing prior to entry into the Armed Forces to include:

(a) an estimate cost of this cognitive testing;

(b) any challenges and opportunities that would be created;

(c) the periodicity of recurring cognitive testing and the stages where this testing would be mandated, like periodic health assessment, post deployment health assessment, separation from service, and any other points in a servicemember's career;

(d) the process by which this testing would be included and stored in a servicemember's electronic health record; and

(e) the review process for evaluating cumulative exposure using blast overpressure logs and traumatic brain injury logs;

(2) The feasibility of developing a comprehensive exposure logging system that would include:

(a) blast overpressure exposure logs;

(b) traumatic brain injury logs; and

(c) integration of the logs into the Individual Longitudinal Exposure Record; and

(3) Any relevant recommendations the Secretary determines appropriate to improve prevention, diagnosis, treatment, surveillance, and readiness outcomes related to traumatic brain injury.

# TITLE VIII—ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS

## Subtitle A—Acquisition Policy and Management

### Sec. 801—Multi-year procurement for certain munitions

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize multi-year procurement for certain munitions in accordance with section 3501 of title 10, United States Code.

### Sec. 802—Limitation on availability of funds pending report on and revisions of software acquisition pathway implementation

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the availability of funds for travel of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to not more than 95 percent, pending a report on the implementation of the March 6, 2025, memo by the Office of the Secretary of Defense titled, "Directing Modern Software Acquisition to Maximize Lethality."

### Sec. 803—Report on multiyear procurement

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Department of Defense to submit an exhibit of eligible programs for multiyear procurements along with the President's budget request.

**Sec. 804—Modifications to technical data rights**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 3771(b) of title 10, United States Code, to include government purpose rights for detailed manufacturing and process data for the purposes of operations, maintenance, installation, and training under certain urgent and emergency conditions. The provision would also require contractors to establish clear and convincing evidence for applying restrictive rights markings to technical data, computer software, and computer software documentation delivered to the Department of Defense.

**Sec. 805—Accountability and training for defense acquisition**

The committee recommends a provision that would require standardized scorecards and reporting for portfolio acquisition executives of the Department of Defense. The provision would also create a pilot program on senior commercial acquisition executives and a pilot training program for contracting officers to receive an advanced financial certification.

Subtitle B—Amendments to General Contracting Authorities, Procedures, and Limitations

**Sec. 811—Consolidation and rationalization of restrictions on procurement from certain foreign countries**

The committee recommends a provision that would establish a new chapter in title 10, United States Code, to consolidate and rationalize existing procurement restrictions.

**Sec. 812—Requirements for information relating to supply chain risk**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 3252 of title 10, United States Code, to clarify that the supply chain risk determination authority shall not be invoked for contract disputes. It shall only be invoked to protect critical defense systems from adversary exploitation.

**Sec. 813—Limitations on certain missile contracts or other agreements**

The committee recommends a provision that would impose limitations on certain missile contracts or other agreements for the Munitions Acceleration Council missile programs authorized under section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60).

The provision would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of Department of Defense funds on covered contracts (for systems including Patriot Advanced Capability-3, Tomahawk Cruise Missile, Joint Air-to-Air Standoff Missile, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, Standard Missile–6, Standard Missile–3 Block IB, Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, Low-Cost Hypersonic Strike Systems, and low-cost cruise missiles) unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense committees that the contract does not authorize the government to remove or install contractor personnel or direct the contractor's internal resources unless the Department paid for such re-

sources as a direct cost. For pre-existing covered contracts that contain non-conforming clauses, the Secretary would be required to seek bilateral negotiations to remove them without consideration. The provision would also prohibit modifications to covered contracts or other agreements to alleviate performance issues and require strict enforcement of contract terms as written, with an exception for modifications made pursuant to extraordinary contractual relief authorities under Public Law 85–804.

**Sec. 814—Limitations on the centralized commercial item capability**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit funds for the centralized commercial item capability required by section 3456(a) of title 10, United States Code, until the Secretary of Defense certifies that comprehensive guidance implementing commercial requirements in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) is issued to include higher standards for approving non-commercial item determinations for certain capability areas. The provision also includes a review by the Comptroller General of the United States.

**Sec. 815—Limitations relating to capital distributions for defense contractors**

The committee recommends a provision that would, beginning on June 15, 2027, prohibit the Secretary of Defense from entering into a contract for goods or services, unless the contractor agrees to not purchase equity security, pay dividends, or make any other capital distribution with respect to equity securities unless the contractor has a waiver from the Secretary of Defense based on a qualifying defense investment plan.

**Sec. 816—Prohibition of procurement of molybdenum, gallium, or germanium from non-allied foreign nations and authorization for production from recovered material**

The committee recommends a provision that would clarify the implementation date for section 844 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60).

**Sec. 817—Other transaction authority reporting**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Department of Defense to report other transactions to the searchable public website established by the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–282).

**Sec. 818—Limitation on procurement of cut flowers and cut greens**

The committee recommends a provision that would require any funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense may only be used for the procurement of a cut flower or cut green if grown in the United States.

**Sec. 819—Audit and mitigation of covered cellular modules in the Department of Defense systems and infrastructure**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a Department of Defense-wide audit to identify the presences of covered cellular modules within covered systems and submit, not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, a report on the audit and mitigation activities carried out under this section.

**Sec. 820—Improving transparency of foreign influence on Department of Defense contractors**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 847(a)(3) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) by lowering the threshold for disclosure from $5.0 million to $500,000.

**Sec. 821—Reporting of price increases**

The committee recommends a provision that would create section 3710 of title 10, United States Code, to require contractors on cost-reimbursable contracts to report on price increases greater than 25 percent for an item procured within the last year and 50 percent for an item procured within the last 5 years.

**Sec. 822—Late submission of cost and pricing data as invalid defense to contract price reductions for defective cost or pricing data**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 3706(c) of title 10, United States Code, to disallow a prime contractor or subcontractor from submitting updated cost or pricing data after the date of agreement on the price of a contract.

**Subtitle C—Industrial Base Matters**

**Sec. 831—Establishment of the Supply Chain Risk Management Integration Cell**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to establish, not later than March 1, 2027, a Supply Chain Risk Management Integration Cell within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy.

**Sec. 832—Expansion of reverse engineering authority for prototype projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 4022(e)(5)(B) of title 10, United States Code, to expand the use cases for using other transaction authority for reverse engineering.

**Sec. 833—Competition requirement for certain munitions**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to introduce second sources for solid rocket motors (SRM) of certain munitions. Further, the committee underscores the importance of the SRM industrial base. The committee has supported multiyear procurement (MYP) authority for several critical munitions programs and has also provided funding for ex-

isting and emerging SRM providers and the SRM industrial base. The committee understands that the Department of Defense is considering several options to meet today's munitions demands.

The committee also directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, including the following:

(1) An update on the MYP contract negotiations between the Department and the producers of critical munitions and the status of contract negotiations with SRM providers; and

(2) An update on the options the Department is pursuing to incentivize and encourage munitions subcontractors to maintain elevated production levels to meet overall munitions needs.

**Sec. 834—Analyses of certain activities for action to address sourcing and industrial capacity**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, to review: (1) Boron carbide; (2) Copper foil; (3) Synthetic diamond; and (4) Silicon carbide, to determine and develop appropriate actions to maintain access to critical defense industry components and materials and to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on the analyses, recommendations, and actions that come out of the review.

**Sec. 835—Regulations applicable to wearing optional combat boots**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations requiring that any optional combat boots being sold at military exchanges be certified by the combat boot quality assurance program conducted by the relevant military service to ensure that the combat boots meet regulations regarding durability, quality, and uniform standards.

**Sec. 836—Report on domestic nonavailability determinations granted for critical materials**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide a report, not later than May 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the issuance of domestic nonavailability determinations for strategic and critical materials covered by sections 4863 and 4872 of title 10, United States Code.

**Sec. 837—Limitation on availability of funds pending information on the small unmanned aircraft system industrial base**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the obligation or expenditure of not more than 80 percent of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2027 for the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group, and not more than 95 percent of Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide,

funds for travel expenses for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, until the Department of Defense submits to the appropriate congressional committees the reports required under section 914(e)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) and section 162(c) of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159).

**Sec. 838—Energetics industrial base roadmap**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Director of the Joint Energetics Transition Office, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy and the Secretaries of the military departments, to submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, a roadmap for the future desired state for the energetics industrial base.

**Sec. 839—Supply chain, capability, and capacity study of high-demand items in the textile industrial base**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to contract with a federally funded research and development center to conduct a detailed assessment of the textile industrial base providing uniform items to the military services.

**Sec. 840—Pilot program on providing subsidies for combat boots**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Army, not later than June 1, 2027, to establish and implement a pilot program to provide subsidies for the cost of certain combat boots to members of the Army that receive a uniform allowance.

**Sec. 841—Cross-functional team for the textile industrial base**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments, to institute, not later than April 1, 2027, a cross-functional team on the textile industrial base to improve supply chain stability and resiliency. The provision also requires that the cross-functional team shall establish a pilot program, no later than January 1, 2028, to revitalize supply chains in the domestic textile industrial base.

**Sec. 842—Assessing and addressing risk related to adversarial capital**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to designate, not later than March 1, 2027, within the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, an office with primary responsibility for identifying, assessing, monitoring, and mitigating risks related to adversarial capital in the defense industrial base.

**Sec. 843—Modifications to requirement for public reporting of Chinese military companies operating in the United States**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) by clarifying and streamlining the authorities under the section.

**Sec. 844—Amendments to requirements pertaining to printed circuit boards**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 4873 of title 10, United States Code, to include copper clad laminate, copper foil, or glass as additional restrictions.

**Sec. 845—Report on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a strategic partnership on defense industrial priorities between the United States and Israel**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to submit a report with a plan, not later than March 30, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives for the establishment of a partnership between the Department of Defense and the appropriate counterparts of the Government of Israel in order to enhance market opportunities for United States-based and Israel-based defense technology companies, among other purposes.

**Sec. 846—Prohibition on the use of Chinese-manufactured optical fiber by the Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the Department of Defense from procuring, obtaining, or using optical fiber and optical fiber cable that are produced, manufactured, or assembled by the People's Republic of China.

**Sec. 847—Promoting the United States drone industrial base**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 848(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92), to expand the components that are limited from manufacture by covered foreign countries or entities domiciled in a covered foreign country.

**Sec. 848—Pilot program for domestic antimony and copper production for defense applications**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a pilot program to support the recovery of antimony and copper as byproducts of mineral production in the United States.

**Sec. 849—Full accountability for Chinese military companies**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) to: (1) Remove the requirement for a Chinese military company to be located in the United States; (2) Extends the sunset to 2035; (3) Re-

quires rulemaking to implement; and (4) Clarifies and expands certain definitions.

## Subtitle D—Small Business Matters

### Sec. 861—Department of Defense Mentor-Protege Program

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 4902 of title 10, United States Code, to make technical corrections to the Department of Defense Mentor-Protege Program.

### Sec. 862—APEX Accelerator funding

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 4955(a) of title 10, United States Code, to increase the funding caps for APEX Accelerators.

### Sec. 863—Test program for negotiation of comprehensive small business subcontracting plans

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 834(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101–189) by extending the program to December 31, 2037.

### Sec. 864—Application of the bona fide place of business to certain contracts

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize, for the purposes of a construction contract awarded by the Department of Defense under section 8(a)(11) of section 637(a)(11) of title 15, United States Code, the geographic requirement be deemed satisfied if the program participant establishes a staffed, physical office in the geographic area required not later than 60 days after the date of the contract award.

## Subtitle E—Other Matters

### Sec. 871—Technical corrections related to National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 provisions

The committee recommends a provision that would make technical corrections to various provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60).

### Sec. 872—Limitation on availability of funds pending implementation of certain requirements relating to munitions

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the obligation or expenditure of not more than 90 percent of Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide, funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2027 for travel expenses for the Office of the Secretary of Defense until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees the report required under section 364 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) and certifies that the requirement under paragraph (9) of section 222c of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 361 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, has been met.

**Sec. 873—Repeal of amendments providing for submission by subcontract offeror of recent price history in satisfaction of cost or pricing data requirements**

The committee recommends a provision that would repeal the amendment to section 3702(a)(3) of title 10, United States Code, created by section 815 of the Servicemember Quality of Life and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159).

**Sec. 874—Competitive procedures for certain pharmaceutical contracts**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that any contract awarded for the purpose of pharmaceutical drug, active pharmaceutical ingredients, or other pharmaceutical materials stockpiling, manufacturing, onshoring, or supply chain expansion, is awarded using competitive sourcing procedures.

The committee recognizes the importance of pharmaceutical supply chain security and encourages the Department of Defense to avoid single points of failure in the pharmaceutical supply chains and to ensure market competition so servicemembers and their families can be treated with high quality products.

**Sec. 875—Enhancement of defense supply chain resilience and secondary source qualification**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 865(f) of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159) to create a process for an expedited qualification panel and contractor incentives to provide rights in technical data.

**Sec. 876—Limitation pending Army conformance with portfolio acquisition executive requirements**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit funding for the travel of the Office of the Secretary of the Army to not more than 75 percent of the funds authorized by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2027 until the Secretary of the Army certifies that all portfolio acquisition executives of the Army are certified acquisition officials.

**Sec. 877—Procurement of medical countermeasures for overseas personnel of the Department of Defense for acute radiation syndrome and thermal burns**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the procurement of medical countermeasures to diagnose, prevent, and treat acute radiation syndrome, cutaneous radiation injury, and thermal burns. The use of a nuclear device in an overseas conflict can cause acute radiation burns. Medical technology is available to triage such injuries for evacuation and further treatment and should be utilized to the greatest extent possible.

**Sec. 878—Procurements on behalf of the Department of Defense by the Department of Veterans Affairs for planning, design, and construction projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 801(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181) by no longer requiring a certificate of compliance for the planning, design, and construction of projects in the case of the procurement of property or services on behalf of the Department of Defense by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

**Sec. 879—Leasing of vessels, aircraft, and combat vehicles**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 3671(b)(1) of title 10, United States Code, to add an accelerated delivery schedule as a valid rationale for certifying a lease greater than 5 years.

**Sec. 880—Prohibition on modems or routers acquisitions involving entities owned or controlled by China**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the Department of Defense from acquiring any modem or router manufactured or offered by China.

**Sec. 881—Prohibition on television acquisitions involving entities owned or controlled by China**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the Department of Defense from acquiring televisions manufactured or offered by China.

**Sec. 882—Prohibition for defense contractors providing sensitive information related to synthetic biology to foreign entities of concern**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit a covered entity from providing a digital sequence of synthetic DNA or RNA or other synthetic protein designed by humans or artificial intelligence systems to a foreign entity of concern.

**Sec. 883—Reporting on contractor operations related to China**

The committee recommends a provision that would require contractors performing on Major Defense Acquisition Programs to disclose the entity's operations related to China.

**Sec. 884—Ensuring Department of Defense contractor compliance with disability hiring goals**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct an audit of the compliance of defense contractors with the 7 percent utilization goal for employment of qualified individuals with disabilities established by section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 793).

## Items of Special Interest

### Accelerate report on perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substance-free chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protective garments

The committee understands that perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS)-free textile technologies can provide new performance capabilities for individual Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) protective equipment. Individual CBRN protection is a key part of strategic deterrence against our adversaries. The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense may not be able to provide the servicemembers with advanced individual CBRN protection equipment unless it accelerates efforts to acquire and field PFAS-free textile technologies. In the Senate report accompanying S. 2296 (S. Rept. 119–39) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, the committee requested a briefing on ongoing efforts and a strategy to acquire PFAS-free textile technologies for individual CBRN protective equipment but has yet to receive the required briefing.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than February 1, 2027, on the Department's assessment to acquire PFAS-free textile technologies for individual CBRN protective equipment as soon as feasible. The briefing should include:

(1) Current efforts to secure the industrial base for PFAS-free textile technologies for individual CBRN protective equipment;

(2) A description of how advanced performance may enable new CBRN doctrines that enhance survivability and lethality in contested environments; and

(3) Any resources or legislative authorities necessary or beneficial to ensure these new technologies can be fielded by fiscal year 2028.

### Acceleration of small attritable ground robotics capabilities

The committee is aware of strategic adversaries' rapid adoption of scalable ground autonomous systems and the operational challenges this presents to U.S. forces. Existing investments and resources supporting ground autonomy initiatives present opportunities to accelerate the deployment of small autonomous ground vehicle (AGV) systems. The committee encourages the Army to prioritize existing resources and modernization investments to enable rapid acquisition pathways.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing, not later than February 26, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the Army's efforts to accelerate adoption of ground autonomous capabilities. The briefing shall include:

(1) A capability investment strategy and modernization roadmap to scale AGV and swarming autonomy and transition emerging AGV technologies into programs of record;

(2) An evaluation framework for attritable ground systems, including small, medium, and large classification standards

modeled on unmanned aircraft system standards, and metrics for operational effectiveness and scalability;

(3) Plans to optimize portfolio resources to support rapid experimentation, verification, and validation aligned with combatant command priorities; and

(4) Efforts to leverage private capital and nontraditional contractors, with priority for U.S. manufacturers, to rapidly field capabilities.

**Acquisition workforce metrics**

The committee believes that strengthening accountability for the Department of Defense acquisition workforce, including program managers and contracting officers, is essential to improving acquisition program performance, ensuring timely deliveries, and safeguarding taxpayer resources. The committee notes that an empowered acquisition workforce is necessary to fully utilize the many acquisition authorities the Department has been provided, and that high performing acquisition professionals should be rewarded professionally.

However, the committee notes that oversight failures have contributed to delays in sustainment, maintenance, and modernization programs that directly affect operational readiness. Audit findings frequently occur years after oversight deficiencies take place, at which point responsible personnel may have rotated to new assignments or separated from service, limiting meaningful accountability.

The committee believes that as the Secretary of Defense implements key performance objectives established under section 826 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 60–119) for the acquisition workforce, the Department of Defense should create and maintain a formal process for tracking the performance of individuals within the acquisition workforce and assessing their performance against the key performance objectives.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the implementation of section 826 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 including the development of a performance tracking system for members of the acquisition workforce. This briefing should also include an update on implementing relevant findings and recommendations from the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Government Accountability Office, and contract administration and audit agencies. If the Portfolio Acquisition Executive validates any deficiencies identified through oversight or audit activities, the deficiencies should be documented and reflected in the performance evaluations of the individuals concerned.

The committee expects the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to include a description of the implementation of this tracking and accountability process in the required semiannual reports to the congressional defense committees.

**Artificial intelligence-enabled biological threat detection**

The committee recognizes the growing role of artificial intelligence and advanced computational methods in changing the landscape of biological threats and in strengthening defensive capabilities for biological threat detection, characterization, and mitigation, including through medical countermeasures. The committee notes that research efforts supported by the Department of Defense, including those undertaken by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, have advanced artificial intelligence-enabled biological sequence analysis capabilities with potential operational applications across these mission areas.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on: (1) How advancements in artificial intelligence and biotechnology are changing the landscape and complexity of biological threats; (2) Practical integration of artificial intelligence-enabled biological threat detection and characterization tools into Department biosurveillance, early warning, and operational decision-support programs; (3) Barriers to the transition of such capabilities from research and development efforts into operational deployment; and (4) Acquisition or pilot pathways available to accelerate the evaluation and the potential deployment of such tools.

**Biochemical sensing technologies for warfighter readiness and threat detection**

The committee recognizes that the ability to detect physiological stress, injury, and exposure, as well as external chemical and biological threats, in real time is increasingly critical to warfighter readiness, operational safety, and mission effectiveness. The committee is aware of ongoing research and development efforts by the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM), including DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory and DEVCOM Chemical and Biological Center, to develop real-time biochemical sensing technologies.

The committee further notes that expanding biochemical sensing beyond currently fielded or studied indicators to include additional biomarkers could significantly enhance the Department of Defense's ability to assess warfighter readiness, cognitive and physical performance, brain health, and exposure to toxic industrial chemicals or chemical agents.

The committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's efforts to develop, evaluate, and transition biochemical sensing technologies for the detection of physiological biomarkers and external environmental threats. The briefing shall include: (1) An overview of Department of Defense research, development, test, and evaluation activities related to robust and scalable real-time biochemical sensing technologies; (2) A description of ongoing and planned efforts to expand physiological biomarker detection at the edge beyond current indicators; (3) An assessment of how biochemical sensing technologies are being developed or evaluated to detect external chemical and biological

threats; (4) A discussion of how the Department envisions integrating internal biomarker sensing and external threat detection data to support early warning, medical response, force protection, and operational decision-making; (5) An identification of the offices, laboratories, and program elements responsible for advancing biochemical sensing research and engineering; (6) A description of supply chain and manufacturing considerations relevant to biochemical sensing technologies; and (7) Planned investments and milestones to mature, prototype, test, and transition biochemical sensing technologies for both physiological monitoring and external threat detection in operationally relevant conditions.

**Bolstering critical minerals workforce with separating servicemembers**

The committee is concerned that shortages in the domestic workforce for mineral processing and critical minerals separations continue to constrain U.S. production of materials essential to defense systems. The Department of Defense has made and is continuing to explore investments in critical minerals mining, processing, refining, and recycling capabilities. The committee is concerned that these efforts may be limited by insufficient trained personnel in these advanced fields. The separating members of the Armed Forces possess technical experience highly relevant to mineral processing and represent a potential underutilized workforce source for domestic critical minerals opportunities.

The committee is aware of several ongoing workforce development initiatives within the Office of Industrial Base Policy. Accordingly, to encourage the advancement of a servicemember transition pathway into the critical minerals field, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than May 1, 2027, that includes, at a minimum:

(1) Potential opportunities for partnerships with mining companies, mineral processing operators, mineral recyclers, and academic institutions to recover or conduct research into defense-relevant critical minerals;

(2) Projected workforce needs for domestic recovery and processing of defense-prioritized critical minerals over the next 10 years;

(3) The feasibility of a transitioning servicemember-focused workforce initiative for critical minerals entities, including estimated costs and participant throughput; and

(4) Potential opportunities for coordination with the SkillBridge program, the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment program, and the Manufacturing Technology program.

**Carbon black**

The committee understands that carbon black is an essential industrial input used in defense platforms, military vehicles, aircraft tires, seals, hoses, coatings, plastics, and other defense critical applications. Global carbon black supply chains are concentrated in

foreign countries, including countries of concern, and domestic production of carbon black is limited and has not significantly expanded in more than 5 decades. Given this, the committee is concerned that disruptions in the supply of carbon black would pose a significant risk to the defense industrial base.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, assessing vulnerabilities in the domestic and global supply chains for carbon black that are relevant to the defense industrial base. The briefing shall include but not be limited to: (1) A comprehensive assessment of current and projected defense demand for carbon black across defense platforms, systems, and sustainment activities; (2) An analysis of the risks associated with reliance on foreign sources of carbon black, including sources located in countries of concern; (3) An analysis of the risks associated with supply disruptions, aging production facilities, or limited domestic production capacity of carbon black; and (4) Recommendations to strengthen domestic production capacity and supply chain resilience for carbon black.

**Comptroller General review of commercial technology to support contested logistics**

The committee commends the Department of Defense for its investments in commercial technology and in its efforts to advance capabilities to support operating in a contested logistics environment. The Department and the military services have made significant investments aimed at retiring technical debt and transitioning to modern, commercial-based finance, logistics, and other business systems. The committee believes that continuing these efforts is critical to improving the Department's ability to operate in contested logistics environments.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 2, 2027, that analyzes:

(1) The Department's use of commercial technology, business systems, and business practices to operate in contested logistics environments;

(2) The extent to which the Department considers the use of resilient logistics technology and business systems to support contested logistics capability instead of acquiring bespoke solutions;

(3) Opportunities to engage original equipment and software manufacturers to maximize the investment of the Department and military services in commercial technology and business systems; and

(4) Options to hold prime contractors accountable to maximize the use of commercial original equipment and software business system manufactures.

**Defense Civilian Training Corps**

The committee continues to support the Defense Civilian Training Corps (DCTC) as a talent development program that aligns

with the Department's acquisition transformation agenda and provides an important pathway to attract top talent to the Department of Defense (DOD). The committee appreciates the effort by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)) and the Acquisition Innovation Research Center (AIRC) to experiment, adapt, and iterate over the past 3 years to build a DCTC talent development prototype that can be scaled.

The committee notes a key lesson learned during the DCTC prototyping phase. The universities that produce talent operate largely independently from the DOD organizations that recruit, hire, and employ talent, with different cycle times, resources, and incentives. This disconnect reveals a talent valley of death, which requires sponsorship between promising talent on the one side and the integration and application of that talent, at scale, to implement DOD priorities.

The committee intends for the DCTC to bridge this talent gap, by extending talent development into post-secondary education to meet specific Department needs and connecting that talent with those in the DOD that need it. The OUSD(A&S) alone cannot scale a talent development pipeline into the robust factory needed to continuously produce new talent through experiential and project-based learning. Pursuant to the authority in section 2200g of title 10, United States Code, the committee intends for the services to identify specific universities as talent partners and for the AIRC to provide the necessary talent development needed by specific DOD organizations. Pursuant to the amendments made by section 823 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), the services have the hiring authority needed to bring on students as term employees during the development phase and transition to full-time employees upon graduation, if they meet expectations. The committee encourages full use of this authority in partnership with the services to develop new talent with critical thinking, digital fluency, and a transformational mindset and to smoothly transition that talent into the civilian workforce of the Department.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the AIRC to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on efforts by the OUSD(A&S), the AIRC, and the services to bridge the talent valley of death using the DCTC. The briefings shall include: (1) An explanation of how the services use DCTC authority; (2) How the OUSD(A&S) measures success; and (3) The annual Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Account funding needed for the services to conduct strategic planning and expansion of the DCTC talent development program.

**Design for manufacturing for munitions and energetics**

The committee is pleased to note the Department of Defense's (DOD) increased focus on munitions and energetics production. However, the committee believes that as the Department of Defense takes steps to increase munitions and energetics production, the DOD should focus on incorporating modern manufacturing processes to speed production and reduce waste. This is particu-

larly important as the Department of the Army continues to modernize and expand the usage of the arsenals, ammunition plants, and depots in the organic industrial base. Modern manufacturing processes—such as design simplification to minimize part counts and reduce reliance on bespoke tooling, testing components at the lowest value state to minimize scrap rates, prioritizing automation from the beginning of the manufacturing design process, focusing on building production lines that can be scaled to meet demand, developing testing points along the manufacturing process to prevent revisions, and others—have the potential to significantly reduce both the cost and schedule of producing munitions and energetic materials.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments and the Joint Energetics Transition Office, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 31, 2027, on the automation and efficiency of munitions production, including:

(1) An assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of current munitions and energetics manufacturing processes, with a focus on enumerating the manual processes that exist and the justification for why automation is not technically or economically feasible. This assessment should delineate any roadblocks to expanding the production lines if required;

(2) Recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of current munitions and energetics manufacturing processes;

(3) An assessment of how automation and streamlined processes are being incorporated into the Army's organic industrial base;

(4) An update on the Joint Energetics Transition Office's efforts to identify raw material waste during the explosives manufacturing process and opportunities for implementation; and

(5) Any other areas the Secretary identifies to improve efficiency or capacity in munitions and energetics production.

**Digital modernization of the organic industrial base**

The committee commends the military departments for ongoing efforts to modernize the organic industrial base in collaboration with the Nation's digital manufacturing institute. The committee believes that sustained progress toward a digitally enabled organic industrial base is essential to improving readiness, expediting production and maintenance timelines, and ensuring the Department of Defense's ability to meet wartime munition demands.

The committee encourages the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments to continue working with the Nation's digital manufacturing institute to pilot scalable approaches that improve supply chain awareness and support the transition from peacetime operations to sustained wartime production.

**Enhancing military intelligence regarding biological threats**

The committee recognizes the importance of developing and accessing the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) related to the

threat that manmade and naturally occurring biological agents pose to Department of Defense personnel and operations.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to take steps necessary to ensure that the biological weapons threat receives appropriate prioritization within the defense intelligence organizations by: (1) Directing that the next Defense Intelligence Strategy specifically addresses the biological threat; (2) Providing formal input during the development of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework regarding biological intelligence needs and information gaps; (3) Ensuring that the threat of biological weapons is specifically addressed by Military Intelligence Program planning, programming, and budgeting activities; and (4) Identifying areas where biological threat intelligence collection and analysis activities should be adjusted to better align with military intelligence priorities. Further, the committee directs the Under Secretary to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees regarding the implementation of these actions, not later than March 31, 2027.

**Ensuring preparedness for biological threats to servicemembers**

The committee is concerned about emerging biological threats, including anthrax, which remains the leading biological agent threat posed by malign actors to servicemembers stationed abroad and at home. The committee recognizes the need for a robust and secure stockpile of medical countermeasures to use in countering the effects of anthrax, including both an antitoxin and a prophylactic and is concerned that the Department of Defense and interagency partners are not fully meeting requirements for this threat. Investing in the sustainable stockpiling and forward-deployment of anthrax countermeasures, including antitoxins, ensures the health and safety of the warfighter and civilians and provides deterrence value.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense, Policy and Programs to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on any strategic implementation plans enacted to ensure adequate stockpiling, sustainability, and forward-deployment of anthrax countermeasures by the Department and interagency partners, including replenishment of current stocks consistent with required levels.

**Heavy press aluminum extrusions in national defense industrial base**

The committee commends the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for its execution of the Aluminum Wargame, the third wargame conducted under the DLA Industrial Base Campaign of Learning series, and the first wargame to focus on a critical mineral. The committee notes that aluminum was appropriately selected given its essential role across U.S. military platforms and systems, as well as national security concerns regarding the resilience and long-term stability of the domestic aluminum industrial base.

Building on the insights generated through this wargame, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, to submit an unclassified report to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, assessing the role of large-scale aluminum extrusion capabilities in supporting current and projected national defense requirements.

The report shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of the potential benefits to the Department of Defense and the defense industrial base of establishing a hard alloy aluminum extrusion press within the United States, including implications for defense-unique manufacturing, supply chain resilience, surge capacity, and long-term sustainment of critical weapons systems;

(2) An evaluation of the current domestic aluminum production and extrusion landscape relevant to defense applications, including geographic dispersion, regional concentrations, identified gaps, and potential single-point-of-failure risks;

(3) A comparative assessment of U.S. aluminum extrusion press capabilities relative to those of allied and competitor nations, including: the number, size, and technical sophistication of large-scale extrusion presses operated domestically versus abroad; the extent to which foreign extrusion capacity supports defense or dual-use applications; and risks to U.S. defense supply chains associated with reliance on non-U.S. extrusion capabilities;

(4) An assessment of workforce, permitting, infrastructure, and energy considerations associated with sustaining or expanding large-scale aluminum extrusion press capabilities in the United States; and

(5) Identification of policy, acquisition, or investment options the Department is undertaking or considering to mitigate identified risks or gaps in domestic aluminum extrusion capacity, including potential public-private partnerships or other industrial base support mechanisms, as appropriate.

The committee further directs that the report includes any recommendations the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate to ensure the United States maintains sufficient aluminum extrusion press capacity to meet current and projected national security requirements.

**Implementation of Shared Classified Commercial Infrastructure Pilot Program**

The committee notes that section 874 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) directed the establishment of a Shared Classified Commercial Infrastructure Pilot Program to expand access to classified facilities and networks for the defense industrial base, academia, and non-traditional contractors. The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense has not moved with sufficient alacrity to implement this authority and has not established the policies, timelines, organizational capacity, or network access frameworks necessary to enable rapid provisioning of classified connectivity at commercial facilities. In particular, the committee is concerned that delays in classified network delivery, limited use of commercial transport,

and the absence of standardized risk management and reciprocity policies continue to constrain participation by small businesses and emerging technology firms.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense and the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency, to submit a report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than December 1, 2026, detailing progress and remaining barriers to implementation. The report shall include the following:

(1) A plan to accelerate classified network provisioning processes, including streamlined procedures for delivering classified connectivity to Shared Classified Commercial Infrastructure locations using commercial transport;

(2) Department-wide timeline targets and accountability metrics for classified network delivery, including maximum deployment timelines and reporting on delays exceeding 30, 60, and 90 days;

(3) Pilot and scaling activities validating the operational effectiveness, cybersecurity posture, and cost efficiency of commercial transport paired with Type 1 encryption;

(4) A plan to modernize classified transport delivery, including the development and fielding of software-defined network architectures;

(5) A unified risk management and reciprocity framework for commercial-circuit-based classified transport that reduces duplicative security assessments;

(6) Policies governing access to classified commercial cloud environments, including publication of average account provisioning timelines; and

(7) Identification of an individual designated as responsible for authorizing classified networks that extend across the boundaries of multiple security regions.

**Legacy semiconductor industrial base**

The committee continues to be concerned that a lack of support for legacy semiconductors in the Department of Defense (DOD) presents major supply chain challenges due to obsolescence, limited manufacturing capacity, and national security risks. Many chips in military systems were designed decades ago and are no longer produced by original manufacturers. As the semiconductor industry shifts to advanced nodes, fewer foundries maintain the older process technologies needed for defense applications, making sourcing legacy semiconductors difficult and expensive. When chips become unavailable, costly alternatives must be explored, requiring significant time and resources.

To mitigate these risks, the Department is investing in stockpiling critical components, expanding trusted foundry partnerships, and developing reverse-engineered replacements. However, sustaining military readiness in an era of shrinking legacy chip availability will require long-term policy and funding commitments to ensure secure and reliable semiconductor access.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide a briefing to the

Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on DOD efforts to support the defense industrial base in sourcing legacy semiconductors to support the readiness and sustainment of military capabilities. This briefing shall include: (1) Ongoing efforts by the Defense Microelectronics Activity to reverse engineer and develop technical data packages for legacy semiconductors no longer in production; (2) Efforts by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy to find new potential suppliers of legacy semiconductors, including when furnished with technical data by the Department; (3) The potential for the DOD to stockpile critical semiconductors; and (4) The potential for the use of the Defense Production Act and Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment program to support investment into the defense industrial base to support the production of legacy semiconductors to meet DOD demand.

**Manufacturing USA network**

The committee appreciates the importance of the Department of Defense (DOD) Manufacturing Technology Office, the Manufacturing Innovation Institutes, and the broader Manufacturing USA network for revitalizing the domestic defense industrial base through supporting manufacturing ecosystems, workforce development, and manufacturing technology development and implementation.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, detailing the work of the DOD Manufacturing Technology Office, the Manufacturing Innovation Institutes, and the broader Manufacturing USA network in supporting the U.S. defense industrial base. The briefing shall: (1) Describe the relevant metrics and milestones by which the Department of Defense measures their impact; (2) Lay out any barriers they have confronted in achieving their mission; and (3) Note ways in which the Congress can help support their work in strengthening American manufacturing.

**Materials workforce for munitions**

The committee recognizes the indispensable role of advanced materials, including composites, in munitions programs and is concerned that current workforce pipelines are not producing enough candidates with the requisite technical skills and experience to satisfy munitions production staffing requirements for modern composite fabrication. As munitions demand continues to increase for long range precision fires, counter unmanned aircraft systems, missile defense, and other applications, shortfalls in a skilled workforce could hinder production of these urgently required systems.

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on programs to support the development, training, and retention of the munitions industrial base workforce to support increased production demand. This briefing shall include the Department's use of existing authorities, such as those within the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment

Support program, to close composite materials skills gaps and maintain a sufficient pipeline of qualified technicians to meet modern composite fabrication requirements for the munitions industrial base.

**Medium caliber munitions industrial base**

The committee recognizes that allowing new entrants into the medium caliber portfolio could foster increased competition and improve the long-term resilience of the industrial base.

Accordingly, the committee expects the Army to implement the Medium Caliber Family Buy 4 (MCFB4) acquisition strategy in a manner that enables new contractors to participate across the full medium caliber portfolio, rather than through segmented competition that limits scale and investment. The committee emphasizes that MCFB4 should be executed in a way that preserves the viability of new entrants, incentivizes private capital investment, increases competition, reduces supply chain risks, and strengthens surge readiness.

**Pharmaceutical supply chains of Department of Defense**

The committee remains concerned about the strength and security of the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chains for pharmaceutical materials based on findings from the report required by section 860(a) of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263). Additionally, a DOD Inspector General report (Report No. DODIG–2021–126) evaluated the Department's mitigation of foreign suppliers in the pharmaceutical supply chain. The Inspector General report concluded that:

(1) The Department did not mitigate the risks of disruptions to its pharmaceutical supply chain, which is reliant upon foreign suppliers;

(2) The Department did not have implementing guidance on supply chain risk management for Department material; and

(3) The Department's reliance on foreign suppliers for pharmaceuticals is a public health, readiness, and national security risk.

The resiliency of the pharmaceutical supply chain is imperative for the health, well-being, and operational advantage of the warfighter.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's implementation of the findings described in the report published pursuant to section 860(a). Specifically, the briefing shall include:

(1) Short-term risk mitigation efforts for pharmaceuticals whose active pharmaceutical ingredients are sourced from foreign entities of concern or have been subject to supply chain disruptions;

(2) Ongoing Department efforts to work with relevant stakeholders to encourage investment in domestic, allied, and part-

ner research and manufacturing in the pharmaceutical space; and

(3) Department plans to partner with other federal stakeholders on leveraging existing medical countermeasure stockpiling to alleviate potential supply chain disruptions and encourage investment in domestic, allied, and partner manufacturing capabilities.

**Portfolio Acquisition Executive scorecards**

The committee notes that the effectiveness of the Department of Defense's acquisition enterprise depends on the performance and accountability of its Program Acquisition Executives (PAEs). The committee notes the Department's utilization of performance scorecards as a tool to assess these executive-level roles and the programs they oversee.

The committee is interested in how these scorecards provide visibility into the defense acquisition lifecycle and ensure rigorous oversight. Specifically, the committee emphasizes that these evaluations should maintain a standardized focus on the number and quality of technology transitions and insertions, measurable improvements in user outcomes, and the timely divestment of resources from non-performing efforts.

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide an annual report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, and continuing through March 1, 2030, on the results of these scorecards. Each report shall include, at a minimum:

(1) Aggregated data on the number and quality of successful technology transitions and insertions achieved;

(2) Metrics detailing measurable improvements in user outcomes, including warfighter feedback, capability effectiveness, and mission performance enhancements, directly attributable to PAE-managed programs;

(3) Data on the identification, assessment, and divestment of non-performing efforts, including resources reallocated as a result of such divestments and the resulting improvements in portfolio efficiency; and

(4) Recommended improvements to the scorecard process to better capture technology transition performance, user outcome results, and divestment effectiveness while enhancing data accuracy and executive accountability.

**Requirements for concurrent and rapid detection of biological and chemical agents**

The threat of aerosolized biological and chemical attacks on our military's operational readiness and continuity of operations is increasing. Aerosol biological and chemical agents are both easy and inexpensive to produce and provide adversaries with new ways to target critical U.S. infrastructure. China continues to engage in biological and chemical activities, and Russia continues to research and deploy biological and chemical weapons capabilities—as seen in Ukraine—in violation of the Biological and Chemical Weapons

Conventions. Renewed attention to this threat is vital, especially for combatant commands.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense, Policy and Programs to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the current and future requirements for the procurement, deployment, and maintenance of sensors capable of detecting biological and chemical agents in operational environments rapidly and concurrently.

**Technologies for modernization of logistic yard operations**

The committee recognizes the importance of improving the efficiency, throughput, and resiliency of Department of Defense logistics yard operations. Recent advances in artificial intelligence, computer vision, sensor integration, and data analytics have enabled commercial solutions capable of providing real-time visibility of vehicles, equipment, cargo, and material flow across complex logistics environments.

The committee notes that commercial technologies have demonstrated the potential to improve asset utilization, reduce congestion and delays, enhance safety, and support more efficient logistics operations while minimizing infrastructure requirements and implementation timelines.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Department of Defense, including the Defense Logistics Agency and military departments, to evaluate commercially available smart technologies and identify opportunities to improve logistics yard operations through the adoption of artificial intelligence-enabled, software-defined capabilities.

The committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency and the Secretaries of the military departments, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's efforts to evaluate and deploy commercial smart technologies to enhance and modernize logistics yard operations. The briefing shall include an assessment of operational benefits, implementation challenges, interoperability considerations, potential applications across defense logistics installations, and recommendations for broader adoption where appropriate.

**Uncrewed Aerial System acoustic detection**

The committee is concerned that traditional radar and radio frequency-based sensors generate excessive false positives in urban environments and remain blind to certain autonomous threats. The committee recognizes the success of agile rapid prototyping, which has generated significant detection accuracy improvements at operationally relevant ranges within a single sprint effort.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a briefing, not later than March 1, 2027, to the congressional defense committees on the integration of Tactical Assault Kit integrated acoustic sensors to improve detection and reduce coverage costs per square kilometer.

# TITLE IX—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

## Subtitle A—Office of the Secretary of Defense and Related Matters

### Sec. 901—Economic Defense Unit

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 4 of title 10, United States Code, to establish the Department of Defense Economic Defense Unit.

### Sec. 902—Extension of pilot program on capital assistance of Office of Strategic Capital

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 149(e)(9) of title 10, United States Code, to extend the pilot program on capital assistance to 2038.

### Sec. 903—Requirement for professional code of conduct for certain Department of Defense positions

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to develop, not later than August 1, 2027, a professional code of conduct for individuals serving in certain specified positions in the Department of Defense, or adopt or modify an existing code of conduct to apply to those positions, to ensure that individuals in those positions have clear guidance on the ethics and standards governing their professional behavior.

The committee is concerned that the use of new tools, such as loans, loan guarantees, or equity stakes, may be leaving some ambiguity in the application of conflict of interest rules to the behavior of employees. The committee believes that a code of conduct can help employees avoid any appearance of impropriety or conflict of interest. With the high possibility for distorting markets or corruption, the committee believes that employees in these sectors need to be above reproach and should go above and beyond when it comes to professional and ethical standards of behavior. The committee is aware that in the financial community there are professional codes of conduct that financial advisors adhere to and that infractions can result in legal ramifications as well as the loss of professional certifications and standing. The committee believes that the adoption of similar practices could be beneficial for this nascent community of practice in the Department.

### Sec. 904—Redesignation of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; reorganization of Assistant Secretaries of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 136 of title 10, United States Code, to redesignate the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Health Affairs.

**Sec. 905—Responsibility for cyber matters in Office of Secretary of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would establish a new Under Secretary of Defense for Cyber, Information, and Networks, to be effective on January 20, 2029.

## Subtitle B—Combatant Commands

**Sec. 911—Unified combatant command for Africa**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a unified combatant command for Africa.

**Sec. 912—Unified combatant command for the Middle East and Central Asia**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a unified combatant command for the Middle East and Central Asia.

**Sec. 913—Unified combatant command for Europe**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a unified combatant command for Europe.

**Sec. 914—Unified combatant command for North America**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a unified combatant command for North America.

**Sec. 915—Unified combatant command for Central America, South America, and the Caribbean**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a unified combatant command for Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.

**Sec. 916—Unified combatant command for the Indo-Pacific region**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a unified combatant command for the Indo-Pacific region.

**Sec. 917—Establishment of United States Robotic and Autonomous Systems Command**

The committee recommends a provision that would permit the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to establish a Robotics and Autonomous Systems Combatant Command.

## Subtitle C—Other Department of Defense Organization and Management Matters

### Sec. 921—Organization of responsibilities relating to unmanned systems

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Navy to submit a plan, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, to consolidate responsibilities for generating, organizing, training, and equipping unmanned systems in the Department of the Navy—other than Group 4 and Group 5 unmanned aerial systems—under a single accountable official. The provision would also require the Chief of Naval Operations to submit a plan for the reorganization of the office, including an assessment establishing a dedicated resource sponsor for robotic autonomous systems. It also would require the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a plan, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, to consolidate responsibilities for Group 1 through Group 3 unmanned aerial systems under a single accountable official. It would further direct the Requirements and Resourcing Alignment Board to include a joint working group on robotic autonomous systems responsible for integrating investment strategies and identifying cross-service efficiencies.

The committee notes the role of the Defense Autonomous Working Group in providing leadership in fielding unmanned systems. While the Defense Autonomous Working Group is a helpful step toward aligning the military service efforts, it does not replace the long-term need for the services to organize themselves to prioritize the requirements, resourcing, acquisition, force generation, and sustainment of unmanned systems. Responsibilities for unmanned systems are dispersed across the Navy's resource sponsors and type commands, providing it a low priority in the budget, little opportunity for rationalizing programs, and few opportunities as a career path for sailors.

### Sec. 922—Composition of cross-functional team for emerging threat relating to anomalous health incidents; reports

The committee recommends a provision that would specify the composition of the Department of Defense cross-functional team established in section 910 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81) to address national security challenges posed by anomalous health incidents and would require quarterly reports on the activities of the cross-functional team.

### Sec. 923—Comptroller General review of Anomalous Health Incidents Cross-Functional Team

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a review of the Department of Defense Anomalous Health Incidents Cross Functional Team.

**Sec. 924—Establishment of Center for the Study of the National Guard**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 1 of title 32, United States Code, to establish a Center for the Study of the National Guard. The committee notes that research into the National Guard has historically been difficult, requiring visits to over 58 separate archives, museums, and military headquarters. Moreover, traditional Army and Air Force research centers are not mandated to collect and preserve non-federalized operations—such as title 32 and state active-duty roles. These non-federalized roles, however, are vital to domestic response efforts, like disaster relief and civil unrest management. This effort would address significant gaps in historical research while supporting the Department of Defense's strategic planning and analysis of National Guard missions.

**Sec. 925—Civil-Military Coordination Center**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to maintain and continue operating the Civil-Military Coordination Center until December 31, 2027.

**Sec. 926—Modifications to unmanned aircraft system definitions for Joint Interagency Task Force 401**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 199(h) of title 10, United States Code, to modify the definition of unmanned aircraft systems.

**Sec. 927—Maximizing funding efficiency for Homeland Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 199 of title 10, United States Code, to identify interagency initiatives in Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems programs and align them with the Joint Interagency Task Force 401 efforts.

**Sec. 928—Prohibition on the reduction of funding for foreign language training for members of the Armed Forces**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the reduction of funding for foreign language training for members of the Armed Forces.

**Sec. 929—Records retention requirement**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that all records related to U.S. strikes in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific are retained in accordance with existing records retention laws and policies and may be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration under those policies.

## Items of Special Interest

### Feasibility study on alternate transportation methods for Crane Army Ammunition Activity

The committee notes that the Department of Defense should continue to look at more effective methods to transport munitions.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Army to provide a report, not later than April 16, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, on the feasibility and advisability of developing alternative transportation methods for munitions supplied by Crane Army Ammunition Activity. The report should include:

(1) Current transportation methods used to support the movement of munitions, materiel, and related items to and from Crane Army Ammunition Activity;

(2) Existing transportation constraints, vulnerabilities, and infrastructure deficiencies affecting the efficiency of the transportation of munitions, materiel, and related items to and from Crane Army Ammunition Activity;

(3) The feasibility of alternative transportation methods, including the improvement of existing airfield infrastructure at Jefferson Proving Ground, the use of military aircraft to transport munitions from Crane Army Ammunition Activity, and any other transportation method the Secretary determines appropriate;

(4) The costs and benefits associated with each alternative transportation method identified under paragraph three, including maintenance costs, operational benefits, scalability, resilience, and impacts on readiness;

(5) Any effects of such alternative transportation methods on ammunition transport safety, explosive safety requirements, security, and environmental compliance;

(6) The extent to which such alternative transportation methods could reduce delivery time for munitions being transported from Crane Army Ammunition Activity and could enhance the ability of the Crane Army Ammunition Activity to meet current and projected mission requirements;

(7) Any infrastructure investments, Federal or state approvals, or intergovernmental agreements that may be necessary to implement such alternative transportation methods; and

(8) Any legislative, regulatory, or budgetary barriers to the implementation of such alternative transportation methods.

### High-power microwave technologies for airfield and installation defense

The committee recognizes the growing threat posed by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), including coordinated drone attacks against military installations and airfields with concentrated aircraft assets. The committee believes that high-power microwave (HPM) technologies offer significant potential to provide non-kinetic, scalable, and cost-effective protection against massed UAS threats while reducing reliance on expensive interceptor-based defenses.

The committee remains concerned that the Army has not transitioned promising HPM capabilities into operational use de-

spite continued congressional support and the demonstrated need to protect critical facilities and high-value aircraft from emerging aerial threats. The committee further believes that installations with dense concentrations of fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft represent attractive targets for adversaries and require layered counter-UAS defenses that include directed energy capabilities.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Joint Interagency Task Force 401, to provide a briefing, not later than April 5, 2027, to the congressional defense committees on the feasibility and operational utility of employing high-power microwave technologies to defend airfields and other facilities with high concentrations of aircraft. The briefing shall include at a minimum:

(1) An assessment of current and projected UAS threats to aviation facilities and other high-value installations;

(2) The potential role of HPM systems within layered air and missile defense architectures;

(3) Any operational lessons learned from demonstrations, exercises, or experimentation involving HPM technologies; and

(4) Planned investments, resourcing requirements, and acquisition timelines for fielding HPM capabilities to protect critical installations.

**Plan for identification and adoption of cutting-edge global technologies**

The committee is encouraged by the efforts undertaken by the Department of Defense to foster the growth of the defense industrial base and to leverage the U.S. technology industry for real-world battlefield advantage. Given the pace of global innovation in dual-use and defense technologies, especially related to ongoing global conflicts, there exists an opportunity to strengthen the Department's capabilities by identifying and leveraging technological innovations developed by early-stage technology companies around the world while also preventing such innovations and related intellectual property from being co-opted by adversary nations. The committee acknowledges that the Department has several different offices and authorities that could be leveraged for partnership, investment, and adoption of novel technologies and capabilities with allies and partners. However, this approach does not appear to be sufficiently coordinated nor aligned with other activities of the Department and the broader interagency.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on: (1) The Department's existing authorities, activities, and offices engaged in monitoring developments and making investments or partnerships in early-stage technology companies, including participation in any international organizations with allies and partners; (2) Assessment for how the Department could utilize the Office of Strategic Capital's authorities to identify and leverage global technologies; (3) Any details on existing efforts and plans to partner with private sector and nonprofit investors to advance the Department's objectives and prevent adversary access to global technologies; and (4)

Any recommended authorities, resources, and organizational structure changes required to fully execute this mission.

**Subsea and seabed warfare**

The committee recognizes the importance of subsea and seabed warfare capabilities as well as the necessity to integrate those capabilities across the Joint Force.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and the combatant commanders to submit to the congressional defense committees a report, not later than March 31, 2027, on the current state of the subsea and seabed warfare enterprise and the strategy for integrating subsea and seabed warfare capabilities across the Joint Force and interagency. At a minimum, the report shall include the following:

(1) A description and assessment of current and planned efforts to address the cross-functional nature of the subsea and seabed warfare domain, including an evaluation of how the Joint Staff is mitigating challenges related to global demand for subsea and seabed warfare-capable platforms and related capabilities;

(2) A description of how current subsea and seabed warfare mission development efforts and investments are being prioritized to support National Defense Strategy objectives on a global scale;

(3) An evaluation of the feasibility and advisability of establishing a dedicated coordinating body or Joint Task Force to oversee prioritization, investment, campaigning, and execution of subsea and seabed warfare operations;

(4) A summary of findings and lessons learned from recent subsea and seabed warfare tabletop exercises and planning, specifically addressing the coordination gaps identified in these events; and

(5) Any other matters deemed relevant by the Chairman.

# TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS

## Subtitle A—Financial Matters

### Sec. 1001—General transfer authority

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $6.0 billion of fiscal year 2027 funds authorized in division A of this Act to unforeseen higher-priority needs in accordance with normal reprogramming procedures. Transfers of funds between military personnel authorizations would not be counted toward the dollar limitation in this provision.

### Sec. 1002—Department of Defense financial statement audit readiness, reporting relief, and related reforms

The committee notes that Article I, section 9 of the Constitution of the United States requires a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of public funds. In addition, section 3515(a) of title 31, United States Code, requires Federal agencies to prepare auditable annual financial statements, while the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–208) requires Federal financial systems to provide reliable information necessary to manage and control Government costs. Despite these longstanding requirements, the Department of Defense (DOD) has yet to achieve an unmodified audit opinion on its consolidated financial statements and continues to face significant weaknesses in financial management, internal controls, and business systems integration. However, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) requires the DOD to achieve an unmodified opinion by December 31, 2028.

The committee further notes that the Government Accountability Office has continued to designate DOD financial management as a "high-risk" area due to persistent challenges in accountability, financial reporting, and cost control. Although the DOD has made incremental progress since initiating Department-wide financial statement audits in fiscal year 2018, substantial deficiencies remain.

Accordingly, the committee recommends a provision that would suspend certain recurring reporting requirements upon the Department achieving an unmodified audit opinion on its consolidated financial statements, while reinstating certain reporting requirements should the Department subsequently fail to maintain such an opinion. The provision would establish enhanced qualification requirements for senior financial management officials if the Department fails to achieve an unmodified audit opinion by December 31, 2028. The committee believes that requiring professional accounting credentials or demonstrated experience overseeing organi-

zations that achieved unmodified audit opinions will strengthen financial leadership, improve accountability, and accelerate remediation efforts.

In addition, the committee supports investments to improve financial statement accuracy, strengthen auditability, and reduce reliance on manual processes that contribute to audit deficiencies. Therefore, the committee authorizes $250.0 million in Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide, and $250.0 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-wide, for automation and artificial intelligence initiatives intended to accelerate remediation efforts and modernize financial management systems supporting the audit of DOD financial statements.

The provision also would establish the position of a Deputy Inspector General for Financial Statement Audits within the DOD Office of Inspector General to strengthen the oversight of independent financial statement audits and improve accountability across the Department.

**Sec. 1003—Expansion of requirements for submittal to Congress of reports and justification books**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that unfunded priority lists are provided to the congressional defense committees not later than 7 days after any "covered document" is delivered to the Congress. The provision would define "covered document" to include the military personnel (M–1), operation and maintenance (O–1), revolving and management fund (RF–1), procurement (P–1 and P–1R), research, development, test, and evaluation (R–1), and military construction (C–1) budget exhibits, as well as any successor documents. The provision would also require the Secretary of Defense to transmit the corresponding justification books to the Congress not later than 7 days after the submission of such covered documents.

**Sec. 1004—Financial statements: opening balances for audit purposes**

The committee recommends a provision that would establish beginning balances for specific Department of Defense (DOD) financial accounts. The committee believes this will better position the DOD to pass an audit for accounts where historical documentation is unavailable or insufficient.

**Sec. 1005—Prohibition on provision of support to Department of Homeland Security**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2027 for support to the Department of Homeland Security until the Secretary of Defense certifies that the Department of Defense has been reimbursed for support provided to the Department of Homeland Security since October 1, 2025.

## Subtitle B—Naval Vessels

### Sec. 1011—Design and construction of new Global-class auxiliary general oceanographic research ships

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Navy to submit to the congressional defense committees, within 90 days of the date of the enactment of this Act, a strategy for the design and construction of new Global-class auxiliary general oceanographic research (AGOR) ships to replace the AGOR 23–25 ships, including a cost estimate and delivery timeline, with a report on the plan to follow 90 days later.

### Sec. 1012—Limitation on use of funds in the National Defense Sealift Fund to purchase certain used foreign constructed vessels

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2218 of title 10, United States Code, to require the Secretary of Defense to procure one new domestic sealift vessel for the Ready Reserve Force for every used foreign constructed vessel procured above the limitation of 12 foreign-constructed vessels.

### Sec. 1013—Modifications to vessel construction managers for the construction of certain Navy vessels

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 129 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) to make the following changes to vessel construction manager (VCM) authorities: (1) Increase the number of vessels required under the Landing Ship Medium program; (2) Direct the use of a VCM only if the Secretary of the Navy decides to proceed with the light replenishment oiler program; and (3) Expand the VCM authority to include unmanned vessels and other vessels not included in the battle force.

### Sec. 1014—Development of industrial base for distributed submarine and surface vessel shipbuilding

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than October 1, 2027, on a plan to expand cooperation and information sharing with state university systems, community college systems, technical college systems, and state educational agencies to scale workforce development for distributed submarine and surface vessel shipbuilding. It would also require the Secretary to develop a strategy, not later than October 1, 2027, to modernize the maritime industrial base supply chain by optimizing its geographic reach to incorporate capable suppliers and manufacturers beyond traditional centers in the United States, as well as to develop a consolidated online portal for suppliers.

### Sec. 1015—Report and briefing on submarine tender requirements and capacity

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report, not later than March 1, 2027, and provide a briefing, not later than April 1, 2027, to the congressional defense committees on the required number of sub-

marine tenders to support the current and planned force structure of attack submarines, guided-missile submarines, and ballistic missile submarines, particularly in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility.

**Sec. 1016—Increase in minimum number of amphibious warfare ships**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 8062(b) of title 10, United States Code, to increase the minimum number of amphibious warfare ships from 31 to 33 and require a report, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, on plans of the Department of the Navy to meet the goal of increased forward presence of amphibious readiness groups.

**Sec. 1017—Prohibition on retiring and decommissioning oceanographic research vessels of the Navy**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit fiscal year 2027 funding from being used to retire or decommission oceanographic research vessels.

**Sec. 1018—Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 8039 of title 10, United States Code, related to the Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair.

**Sec. 1019—Construction of vessels in foreign shipyards**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 8679 of title 10, United States Code, to remove the presidential waiver on the prohibition on the construction of vessels in foreign shipyards. The provision would also provide the authority to construct not more than two vessels of a bulk fuel vessel class and a strategic sealift class of vessels, provided that the construction ensures concurrent direct capital investments in the United States maritime industrial base resulting in subsequent ships being built in the United States.

**Sec. 1020—Limitation on authority of the Secretary of the Navy to change vessel names**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 8662 of title 10, United States Code, to require that only Senate-confirmed Secretaries of the Navy may rename a vessel and only if justified with a notification to the Congress 30 days before such a vessel is renamed.

**Subtitle C—Counterterrorism**

**Sec. 1021—Extension of prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release of individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1033 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232), as most recently

amended by section 1032 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), to extend through December 31, 2027, the prohibition on the use of funds provided to the Department of Defense to transfer or release individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States.

**Sec. 1022—Extension of prohibition on use of funds to construct or modify facilities in the United States to house detainees transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1034(a) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232), as most recently amended by section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), to extend through December 31, 2027, the prohibition on the use of funds provided to the Department of Defense to construct or modify facilities in the United States to house detainees transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

**Sec. 1023—Extension of prohibition on use of funds for transfer or release of individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to certain countries**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1035 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232), as most recently amended by section 1034 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), to extend through December 31, 2027, the prohibition on the use of funds provided to the Department of Defense to transfer or release individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to certain countries.

**Sec. 1024—Extension of prohibition on use of funds to close or relinquish control of United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1036 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91), as most recently amended by section 1035 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), to extend through the end of fiscal year 2027 the prohibition on the use of funds provided to the Department of Defense to: (1) Close or abandon United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; (2) Relinquish control of Guantanamo Bay to the Republic of Cuba; or (3) Implement a material modification to the Treaty between the United States and Cuba, signed in Washington, D.C., on May 29, 1934, which modification would constructively close United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

## Subtitle D—Miscellaneous Authorities and Limitations

### Sec. 1031—Prohibition on use of funds to support entertainment projects with ties to the Government of the People's Republic of China

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act to be made available for providing active and direct support to any film, television, or other entertainment project if the Secretary of Defense has demonstrable evidence that the project has complied, or is likely to comply, with a demand from the government of China or the Chinese Communist Party to censor content of the project in a material manner to advance the national interest of China.

### Sec. 1032—Waiver authority for limitation on live fire trauma training

The committee recommends a provision that would modify section 1050 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) to provide a waiver authority in specified circumstances, with associated reporting requirements.

### Sec. 1033—Prohibition on availability of funds for removal of Army prepositioned stocks from Europe

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit any funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available to be used to transport Army Prepositioned Stock-2 (APS–2) equipment, so assigned as of March 1, 2026, outside of the European area of operations for the purposes of maintenance or divestment.

The committee is concerned by the lack of priority placed on the build out and refurbishment of APS–2 to meet U.S. deterrence and defense requirements in the European theater. We strongly encourage the Army to invest adequate funds in such efforts as expeditiously as possible.

### Sec. 1034—Implementation of National Transportation Safety Board recommendations for Department of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to implement Department of Defense-related recommendations included in the National Transportation Safety Board report dated January 27, 2026, and entitled, "Midair Collision over the Potomac River PSA Airlines Flight 5342, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) RJ Aviation CL–600–2C10 (CRJ700) and US Army Priority Air Transport Flight 25, Sikorsky UH–60L" (Aviation Investigation Report AIR–26–02), as the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate and practicable.

### Sec. 1035—Modification of support of special operations for irregular warfare

The committee recommends a provision that would modify section 127d of title 10, United States Code, to increase the level of authorized support and to make changes to the notification requirements. The provision also includes a technical amendment to section 130g of title 10, United States Code.

**Sec. 1036—Designation of southwest land border activities, support, and operations as named operation**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to designate activities, support, and operations conducted by the Department of Defense in support of civil authorities at the southwest land border as a named operation.

## Subtitle E—Studies and Reports

**Sec. 1041—Threat assessment regarding unmanned aircraft systems at or near the international borders of the United States**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Commander, U.S. Northern Command: (1) To conduct a threat assessment on: (a) the occurrence of unmanned aircraft systems operated at or near an international boundary of the United States by a malign actor; and (b) the adequacy of Federal agencies to identify, assess, and mitigate those threats in coordination with relevant agencies; and (2) To produce a report for the congressional defense committees on the findings of that assessment with any recommendations for clarifying the authorities and responsibilities of Federal agencies and any resource needs.

**Sec. 1042—Extension of Afghanistan War Commission**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1094(e)(2)(A)(ii)(I) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81) to grant the Afghanistan War Commission an additional year to complete its report.

**Sec. 1043—Extension of briefing requirement regarding civil authorities at the Southwest border**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1070 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) by extending the briefing requirement regarding civil authorities at the southwest border through December 31, 2028, and expanding the requirement to include a report on the costs associated with the assistance provided by the Department of Defense to the Department of Homeland Security every 90 days and annually.

**Sec. 1044—Drone posture review**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a drone posture review for uncrewed aerial, ground, surface, and undersea vehicles and their enabling systems in order to identify capability gaps and vulnerabilities, and submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than March 1, 2027.

**Sec. 1045—Quarterly reports on unmanned aerial system incursions over military installations, sensitive sites, and the southern border**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs to submit quarterly reports to the congressional

defense committees on unmanned aerial system incursions over military installations, sensitive sites, and the southern border until December 31, 2031.

**Sec. 1046—Report on progress on implementation of Department of Defense instruction on civilian harm mitigation and response**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, not later than March 15, 2027, to provide a report to the congressional defense committees on the progress made to fulfill the requirements under section 1082 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) and Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 3000.17 relating to civilian harm mitigation and response.

The committee recognizes that the U.S. military goes to great lengths to prevent and mitigate civilian harm in U.S. military operations. DOD Instruction 3000.17 directed a number of actions to support the Department's ongoing work to prevent and address civilian harm. The committee is concerned that recent efforts to reorganize and reallocate resources within the Department have impacted the Department's ability to meet the requirements of section 184 of title 10, United States Code, to operate a Civilian Protection Center of Excellence and to implement DOD Instruction 3000.17.

**Sec. 1047—Report on transfer of property by Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would require a report to the congressional defense committees every 180 days regarding the transfer of any controlled or non-controlled property by the Department of Defense pursuant to section 2576a of title 10, United States Code.

**Sec. 1048—Oversight of Department of Defense rules of engagement**

The committee recommends a provision that would require an annual report on the rules of engagement authorized by the Department of Defense.

**Sec. 1049—Strategy to address intelligence-gathering shortcomings in area of responsibility of United States Africa command**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Commander, U.S. Africa Command, in consultation with the head of any other relevant Federal agency, as appropriate, to submit to the congressional defense committees a strategy, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to address intelligence gathering shortcomings in the area of responsibility of the U.S. Africa Command.

## Subtitle F—Equity Investments and Related Matters

### Sec. 1051—Authority for equity investments by Office of Strategic Capital

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 149 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the authority for equity investments under the Office of Strategic Capital.

### Sec. 1052—Ownership review for equity investments

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 149 of title 10, United States Code, by adding a new section which would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a review of the ownership structure of an entity, including any potential conflicts of interest with U.S. Government officials, and provide this review to the congressional defense committees before obligating or disbursing any funds for an equity investment.

### Sec. 1053—Notifications with respect to debt and equity investments

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 149 of title 10, United States Code, to insert a new section requiring notifications with respect to debt and equity investments.

The committee notes the importance of robust and clear communication between the Department of Defense and the Congress on investments the Department is making in the defense industrial base, especially when such investment could distort markets or have potentially harmful long-term consequences. However, the Department has not been forthcoming on providing information to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on equity investments made by the Department in the defense industrial base in a timely manner. Without this information, the committees are unable to assess the merits of individual deals or the use of equity as a tool for supporting the industrial base. The committee expects the Department to be forthcoming and timely in responding to congressional requests for additional information regarding these investments.

### Sec. 1054—Modifications to authorities of Industrial Base Fund

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 4817 of title 10, United States Code, to clarify authorities of the Industrial Base Fund.

### Sec. 1055—Briefings on Economic Defense Unit; limitation on use of funds

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide quarterly briefings to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, starting not later than January 31, 2027, on the activities of the Economic Defense Unit. The provision would also limit the use of funds appropriated by this Act, any previous Act, or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense for the Economic Defense Unit or any activities of the Economic Defense Unit until the Deputy Secretary of Defense provides the first brief-

ing required by this section, the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees an ownership review of all companies in which the Department of Defense holds equity, and the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense committees that the Department of Defense does not hold, and does not have the option to hold, any seat on the board of directors or any other form of voting representation or control in any entity in which the Department holds equity.

**Sec. 1056—Approval authority for expenditures from Industrial Base Fund**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 4817 of title 10, United States Code, to require that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment be the authority to review and approve all expenditures from the fund of less than $75.0 million.

**Sec. 1057—Quarterly briefings on Business Operators for National Defense (BOND) Program**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to provide to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 31, 2027, and every 90 days thereafter until January 31, 2029, a briefing on the activities of the Business Operators for National Defense Program. The provision would also limit the use of funds obligated or expended by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the Program until the first briefing has been provided.

**Subtitle G—Other Matters**

**Sec. 1061—Extension of admission to Guam, Wake Island, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for certain H–2B nonimmigrants**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 6(b)(1)(B) of the Joint Resolution titled, "A Joint Resolution to approve the 'Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America', and for other purposes" (48 U.S.C. 1806(b)(1)(B)), approved March 24, 1976, by extending the deadline for certain nonimmigrant H 2B workers to 2031.

The committee notes that this provision would support the realignment of U.S. forces to Guam by addressing limited workforce availability in Guam. The committee understands that current labor market conditions are constrained by recovery from Typhoon Mawar and that, without this provision, construction costs for the Department of Defense will increase due to labor shortages as well as degraded readiness, since construction would also be delayed. Finally, the committee understands that lead times are crucial to planning and cost estimates for contractors. Should an additional extension be necessary, the committee strongly encourages the Department of Defense to begin engagements with the Congress, specifically the committees of jurisdiction, not less than 3 years before the authority expires.

**Sec. 1062—Notification to congressional defense committees of combat wounded in action**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary concerned to provide the congressional defense committees notification of any member of the Armed Forces wounded in action in a theater of combat within 24 hours, along with a brief description of the incident without personally identifiable information.

Additionally, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, identifying any lessons learned from previous wounded in action notification processes, including any potential improvements to notification procedures during combat operations during Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and Freedom Sentinel.

**Sec. 1063—Americas Defense Initiative**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to establish an Americas Defense Initiative, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to carry out prioritized activities to enhance the defense and security of the United States, counter transnational criminal organizations and malign foreign actors, and strengthen the capacity of partner nations in the Western Hemisphere. The provision would also require that, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary, in consultation with the Commander, U.S. Southern Command, submit to the congressional defense committees a report on future-year activities and resources of the Initiative and include a detailed budget display for the Initiative in the Department of Defense budget materials submitted to the Congress. Additionally, the provision would require the Secretary, not later than March 1, 2027, and annually thereafter, to provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the budget proposal for and programs of the Initiative, including the budget display information for the applicable fiscal year.

**Sec. 1064—Briefings on homeland defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the U.S. Northern Command and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to jointly brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives every quarter on the status of Department of Defense planning for, and implementation of, core Homeland defense priorities, including plans for responding to a major attack on the Homeland in the context of military operations in other areas of responsibility.

**Sec. 1065—Independence of Stars and Stripes**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to ensure the independence of the Stars and Stripes publication.

**Sec. 1066—Identification, assessment, and mitigation of critical defense sites**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to designate an existing or new office or official within the Department of Defense to lead the identification, assessment, prioritization, and mitigation of risks to critical defense sites in the defense industrial base, including privately owned or commercially operated facilities. The provision would further require that, not later than 180 days after such designation, the responsible office compile and maintain a classified list of such sites and rank them by the potential impact on national security if disrupted. Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary would be required to submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes the list and prioritization of sites, an unclassified definition of "single point of failure," an assessment of current protection levels and gaps, a description of associated national security risks, and a path forward with options, costs, recommended authorities, and implementation timelines, with annual updates for 5 years.

The committee recognizes that the defense industrial base relies on privately owned facilities and capabilities that are essential to military production, sustainment, and readiness and is concerned that certain sites may constitute single points of failure whose disruption—whether by physical attack, unmanned aircraft systems incursions, sabotage, or other threats—could have catastrophic consequences with no readily available substitutes. The committee is further concerned that the Department of Defense has not clearly assigned responsibility for addressing these risks and that existing efforts do not comprehensively extend to privately owned defense industrial base sites. Accordingly, the committee believes a comprehensive approach is required to define, identify, prioritize, and mitigate these vulnerabilities and improve the resilience and security of critical defense sites.

**Sec. 1067—Administrative support for commissions**

The committee recommends a provision that would include technical fixes to congressionally authorized commissions to permit the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate to provide resources to those commissions.

**Sec. 1068—Requirement to assign conventional names to critical munitions**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the service chiefs to identify critical munitions under their management and, not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to assign each a clear, conventional English-language name in place of acronyms or alphanumeric designations. Further, the committee directs the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of

Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Space Operations to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 2 years, detailing the munitions reviewed, the names assigned, the rationale for each name, the associated costs, and the incorporation of operational feedback.

The committee intends these names to be easily understood and suitable for operational use and training. The provision would require coordination across the Department of Defense to ensure consistency and avoid conflicts, with the Deputy Secretary of Defense resolving any disputes over management responsibility.

**Sec. 1069—Technical corrections to National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026**

The committee recommends a provision that would make technical corrections to three provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60).

**Sec. 1070—Development of cognitive warfare strategy**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to develop and submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a comprehensive strategy for cognitive warfare for the Department of Defense.

**Sec. 1071—Notification requirements for sensitive military operations**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 130f(a) of title 10, United States Code, to require the Secretary of Defense to submit a written notification to the congressional defense committees not later than 7 days following a sensitive military operation. The provision would also make other clarifying changes to the existing notification requirements.

**Sec. 1071A—Declassification guidance for Department of Defense original classification authorities**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to issue written guidance for the ad hoc declassification of Department of Defense information by Department of Defense original classification authorities.

**Sec. 1072—Post-government employment restrictions applicable to certain senior military officers and senior civilian employees of the Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91) to synchronize the post-government restrictions included in this section with the existing criminal post-government employment statutes while maintaining the extended post-government employment "cooling off period" restriction for the Department of Defense's most senior personnel.

**Sec. 1073—Repeals of existing reporting requirements**

The committee recommends a provision that would repeal certain required briefings and reports.

**Sec. 1074—Report and briefing on Worldwide Expeditionary Multiple Award Contract Territorial Integrity of the United States contract**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report and briefing on the use of the Department of Defense's Worldwide Expeditionary Multiple Award Contract Territorial Integrity of the United States contract designed to expedite the award process for construction and operation of detention facilities.

**Sec. 1075—Documentation of verbal approval of requests for assistance**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1707 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) to expand the reporting requirement to apply to Requests for Assistance from all Federal agencies, and to require that all approvals of Requests for Assistance are documented in writing and transmitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

**Sec. 1076—Increase of the Working Capital Fund, Capital Investment Program threshold**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2208(k)(2) of title 10, United States Code, by increasing the Capital Investment Program threshold from $250,000 to $500,000.

**Sec. 1077—National Guard Rural Revival and Modernization Plan**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Army to develop a comprehensive strategy, not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, to optimize Army National Guard readiness, force posture, and infrastructure in remote or isolated areas to include the Arctic.

**Sec. 1078—Redesignation of the Department of Defense as the Department of War**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend the name "Department of Defense" to "Department of War" wherever it occurs in titles 10, 32, and 37 of the United States Code.

**Sec. 1079—Service-wide enterprise strategy for human performance**

The committee recommends a provision that would require each Secretary of a military department to establish, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, a service-wide human performance strategy to identify requirements and policies for the acquisition and use of human performance technologies and services.

**Sec. 1080—Records preservation processes for certain at-risk Afghan allies**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to establish a process by which an individual may apply to the Secretary of Defense for classification as an Afghan ally.

**Sec. 1081—Prohibition on covered transactions involving prediction market contracts**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit members of the Armed Forces, civilian employees of the Department of Defense, and employees of entities that contract with the Department of Defense from using material non-public information derived from their position as a means for making a profit on a prediction market contract. The provision also requires a report by the designated agency ethics official to the Secretary of Defense on any transactions covered by this prohibition.

**Sec. 1082—Prohibition on use of prediction markets by personnel of the Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations prohibiting members of the Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department of Defense (DOD) from entering into transactions on prediction markets that relate to various matters associated with the activities of DOD and its subordinate components. The regulations would also create similar prohibitions to be included in contracts governed by the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement.

**Sec. 1083—Ban on bets on military operations**

The committee recommends a provision that would make it unlawful for any person to place, accept, or facilitate the placement or acceptance of a wager regarding a military operation. The provision would also amend sections 1952 and 1955 of title 18, United States Code, section 5362 of title 31, United States Code, and section 5c of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 7a–2) to make it unlawful for any commodity exchange market to facilitate exchanges based on U.S. Armed Forces military operations.

**Sec. 1084—Universal guidance on remote and isolated installation designations**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, to issue guidance applicable to all military departments establishing a standardized definition and tiered classification system for determining the remote and isolated designation status of military installations for the purposes of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation and resale; workforce shortages; providing critical services to members and families; and infrastructure.

**Sec. 1085—Declassification of information concerning United States personnel classified as prisoner of war or missing in action during certain conflicts**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to declassify or make such information available for family members to review any record, live-sighting report, or other information in the custody of the Department of Defense that relates to the location, treatment, or condition of any personnel classified as prisoner of war or missing in action from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

**Sec. 1086—Requirement for markings on lethal military platforms**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the Secretary of Defense from employing a manned platform with offensive lethal weapons capabilities to conduct an attack if such platform does not include markings to signify its affiliation with the U.S. Armed Forces, and to distinguish itself from the civilian population, equipment, or platforms when conducting an attack. The provision includes a rule of construction that specifies that this prohibition shall not apply to the employment of a manned platform with integrated weapons capabilities of a purely defensive character.

**Sec. 1087—Extension of National Defense Strategy Commission**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize a 1-year extension of the National Defense Strategy Commission established in section 1095(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60).

**Sec. 1088—Prohibition on use of funds for transfer of individuals located at Camp As Sayliyah**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the funds that are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of Defense to be used to transfer Afghan nationals housed at Camp As Sayliyah to Afghanistan. The provision includes a waiver for individuals for whom there is pre-existing derogatory information that would preclude that individual from settling in the United States or Qatar.

**Sec. 1089—Analysis of force requirements for alternative warfighting scenarios**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Program Evaluation Competitive Analysis Cell and the Director of the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, on force structure requirements for alternative warfighting scenarios to include protracted and simultaneous conflicts in not fewer than two geographic combatant commands.

**Sec. 1090—Guidance on the treatment of claims under the HAVANA Act**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to issue guidance on the treatment of claims under the HAVANA Act (Public Law 117–46) with respect to the inclusion of current and former members of the U.S. Armed Forces.

**Sec. 1091—Assessment of Department of Defense phosphate supply chain vulnerabilities; related land exchange authorization**

The committee recommends a provision that would: (1) Require the Secretary of Defense to complete a comprehensive assessment of the vulnerabilities in the Department of Defense phosphate supply chain; (2) Authorize the use of certain non-Federal land in Salt Lake City, Utah, for valid public purposes and requirements; (3) Require the Secretary of the Interior, subject to the availability of appropriations, to complete the Continental Divide National Scenic Trail as a continuous route; and (4) Authorize a withdrawal of certain Bureau of Land Management land in New Mexico.

**Sec. 1092—Plan for domain awareness at the southern land border**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to develop and submit to the congressional defense committees a plan for the Department of Defense to contribute to a common operating picture to improve domain awareness on the southern land border.

**Sec. 1093—Prohibition on implementation of any policy that alters the requirements for chaplains to display visible officer rank on military uniforms**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the implementation of any policy of the Department of Defense that would alter the requirements for chaplains to display visible officer rank on military uniforms.

## Items of Special Interest

**Base defense modernization**

The committee recognizes the critical and growing need for the protection of military installations from full-spectrum, all-domain threats. The committee notes that the proliferation of low-altitude, small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) presents an immediate, asymmetric risk to defense critical infrastructure. Industrial base installations present a unique security challenge: they possess vast physical footprints that are highly vulnerable to intrusion, infiltration, and aerial surveillance, yet they are typically secured by relatively small, manned security forces. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, the Department of Defense should transition from a reliance on outdated surveillance systems toward integrated security architectures.

The committee notes that recent advancements in commercial technology have demonstrated the immediate availability and effi-

cacy of various platforms and enhanced capabilities such as leveraging existing infrastructure to integrate wide-area surveillance tools, including radar, Light Detection and Ranging, unattended ground sensors, and non-lethal deterrents.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, on the Army's plans to address the full spectrum of all-domain threats to its military installations. The briefing shall include:

(1) An operational assessment and after action review of the Lake City Army Ammunition Plant pilot program conducted in April 2026;

(2) A prioritized list of high-value Army installations, ammunition plants, and depots designated where this capability could be fielded; and

(3) A technical evaluation of incorporating prioritized follow-on capability updates, including acoustic UAS detection, open-source intelligence feed integration, and advanced seismic sensors.

**Comptroller General assessment of antisemitism training within Department of Defense**

The committee notes that a professional military workplace free from antisemitism strengthens trust, morale, and mission effectiveness, and that antisemitism threatens unit cohesion, undermines command authority, and erodes military readiness.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a review of the Department of Defense's antisemitism training applicable to members of the Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department. The review should assesses the status and efficiency of antisemitism training within the Department, including:

(1) An identification of actions taken by the Department to create an environment free of antisemitism;

(2) An accounting of any antisemitism training in the previous 5 years that has been provided to members of the Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department; and

(3) Any other items the Comptroller General deems appropriate.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide a report on their findings to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027.

**Comptroller General review of security clearance due process and transparency**

The committee believes that a robust and efficient security clearance process is vital to maintaining a high-quality national security workforce and enabling the mobility of that workforce across the defense and intelligence enterprises. However, the committee is concerned about impediments to that mobility. In particular, the committee is concerned about the transparency and consistency of due process protections, including rights to an appeal following clearance revocation or suspension, in the security clearance proc-

ess, particularly for government personnel with eligibility to access Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) within the intelligence community (IC).

The committee is also concerned by descriptions of instances in which outstanding adjudicative issues are not resolved and the related effects they can have on the careers of government personnel attempting to transfer between or within the IC and the Department of Defense (DOD), particularly for personnel with eligibility to access SCI. The committee further notes inconsistencies in the due process protections and rights to an appeal following clearance revocation or suspension available to government personnel at some agencies compared to contractor and other personnel at the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals, as well as a lack of transparency regarding when personnel are informed of outstanding adjudicative issues with their clearances.

Finally, the committee would like to better understand the due process protections for government personnel who receive an adverse determination with respect to their eligibility to access SCI.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct an assessment of the processes, policies, and transparency of SCI determinations within the DOD and the IC. The assessment should include: (1) An evaluation of the effect of unresolved adjudicative issues on personnel mobility; (2) The consistency of due process protections for personnel who experience unresolved adjudications or clearance revocations or suspensions across the government; (3) The timelines for resolving issues; and (4) Any additional matters the Comptroller General deems relevant.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide a briefing, not later than March 31, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the congressional intelligence committees, with the results of the review to follow in a mutually agreed upon format and timeframe.

**Comptroller General review of sensitive activities coordination and integration**

The committee notes that U.S. Special Operations Forces play a key role in establishing access in sensitive areas to support critical military objectives. Coordinating and synchronizing policies and oversight mechanisms for these efforts across the national security enterprise is a challenging task. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has taken steps to develop a coordinated approach between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Intelligence Community (IC), yet challenges to coordinating and synchronizing policies and oversight mechanisms for these efforts remain. The Congress has directed further action to institutionalize these coordination and oversight efforts.

The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess the DOD's efforts to synchronize special operations forces and other DOD components with the IC on sensitive activities and the implementation of efforts to organize, empower, and resource the Special Reconnaissance and Enabling Command

(SREC) to meet current and future needs. This review should assess, at a minimum, whether:

(1) DOD components and the IC adequately coordinate and synchronize sensitive activities policies and oversight mechanisms;

(2) DOD has processes for globally synchronizing and coordinating activities with the IC;

(3) Requirements are being effectively generated, staffed, and planned between the DOD and the IC;

(4) DOD is effectively implementing congressional direction related to the conduct of sensitive activities, including:

(a) the Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Committee Print 119 2), which directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Commander, SOCOM to submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to establish and maintain the SREC;

(b) section 1621 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), which directed the Secretary of Defense to establish, maintain, continuously update, and use a secure, centralized technical capability to facilitate oversight, deconfliction, and risk assessments of all commercial vendor support to the DOD for clandestine activities; and

(c) section 1622 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, which directed the Secretary of Defense to keep the congressional defense committees fully and currently informed of DOD sensitive activities; and

(5) Any other matters determined relevant by the Comptroller General.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, with the results of the review to follow in a mutually agreed upon format and timeframe.

**Comptroller General review of whistleblower protections**

The committee reiterates the importance of whistleblowers in detecting violations of law, gross management, waste, abuse, and threats to safety. Given the need to ensure that whistleblowers within the Department of Defense (DOD) are given adequate protections to come forward to report such abuses and violations and that DOD inspectors general and investigating officers have the fulsome knowledge and training to be able to investigate cases of reprisal, restriction, or retaliation, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study that covers the following:

(1) The adequacy of training, including recurring training, for DOD Inspector General (IG) investigators, the DOD IG-delegated service-level investigators, service-level IG investigators, and command-level IG investigators appointed, designated, or designed to conduct whistleblower reprisal inves-

tigations in support of potential administrative punishments and non-judicial punishment within the Department of Defense;

(2) The performance of the DOD IG in fulfilling timeliness and quality goals for handling whistleblower reprisal complaints;

(3) The performance of the DOD IG in fulfilling efforts to protect the confidentiality of whistleblower reprisal complainants;

(4) Trends tracked by the DOD in the types of whistleblower complaints investigated, including if there are concentrations of complaints in certain Services, installations, or other characteristics;

(5) Barriers for whistleblowers coming forward to report protected communications under section 1034(c)(2) of title 10, United States Code;

(6) The standards of evidence and burdens of proof under military, civilian, contractor, and intelligence community statutory whistleblower statutes, including an analysis of the adequacy of such standards of evidence and burdens of proof in the life of the populations protected; and

(7) Any recommendations for improving protections for whistleblowers and training for investigations into complaints of reprisal, restrictions, or retaliation prohibited under section 1034 of title 10, United States Code.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 2, 2027, with the results of the review to follow in a mutually agreed upon format and timeframe.

**Department of Defense audit capabilities using advanced software and artificial intelligence**

The committee recognizes the Department of Defense's growing adoption of advanced software and artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities across various operational and administrative functions. The committee notes that the Department of the Navy, in particular, has demonstrated successful implementation of digital tools for program management.

The committee believes these technological capabilities present a significant opportunity to transform the Department's financial management and auditability. The Department has yet to achieve an unmodified audit opinion but continues to work toward achieving one by December 31, 2028, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31).

The committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to expand existing software and AI applications within the Department to further modernize and improve accountability. Specifically, the committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to:

(1) Assess current software and AI platforms within the Department that could be expanded or adapted to provide continuous financial monitoring and audit capabilities across all military services and Defense Agencies;

(2) Identify integration requirements to connect disparate financial systems across the Department into unified platforms capable of providing enterprise-wide financial visibility; and

(3) Evaluate how real-time audit capabilities could support the annual audit process, along with improved financial decision-making, fraud detection, and resource allocation.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's plans to expand the use of advanced software and artificial intelligence technologies and its evaluation of real-time audit capabilities.

**Dismantlement and disposal of nuclear-powered submarines**

The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing, not later than March 1, 2027, on plans for the dismantlement and disposal of nuclear-powered submarines. The briefing should include, but will not be limited to, the following: (1) A summary of activities required for dismantlement and disposal; (2) The regulatory requirements related to managing radioactive materials; (3) The cost and schedule baseline for such activities to occur at naval shipyards; and (4) An assessment of the estimated cost and schedule for such activities to be performed by one or more commercial entities.

**Distributed shipbuilding**

The committee notes that, as the United States seeks to revitalize the American shipbuilding industry and increase naval production rates, distributed shipbuilding has emerged as an essential component of this revitalization strategy. Realizing the benefits, however, may require clear definitions and structured, scalable frameworks that distinguish true distributed production from routine subcontracting. In this way, distributed shipbuilding functions not as supply chain management but as a production system that, if governed effectively, can reduce bottleneck critical shipyard constraints.

The committee is interested in whether a clear, outcome-based definition could help ensure federal investment is directed toward distributed shipbuilding models that produce installation-ready modules rather than being applied broadly to component outsourcing, labor pass-through arrangements, or training activities.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on the advisability of formulating and codifying a standard statutory definition of "distributed shipbuilding" for use across naval vessel construction programs. In preparing the briefing, the Secretary shall consult with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, the Administrator of the Maritime Administration, and the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, as appropriate, to incorporate applicable lessons learned from other Federal vessel programs. The briefing shall address the following elements:

(1) Whether the definition should require the execution at a facility operationally distinct from the final assembly shipyard;

(2) Whether the producing entity must execute the work under its own independent planning, material management, or quality control systems;

(3) Whether the work must be delivered as inspection-ready, configuration-controlled, and install-ready product;

(4) Whether the activity must demonstrably reduce the planning, integration, or production management burden of the final assembly shipyard during vessel construction;

(5) Whether the definition should expressly exclude activities that do not transfer integrated production responsibility from the final assembly shipyard, including:

(a) component-level outsourcing that delivers individual parts requiring receiving inspection and installation sequencing at the final assembly shipyard;

(b) labor pass-through arrangements in which workers are supplied without production responsibility for an integrated, install-ready outcome; and

(c) fabrication of unoutfitted structural elements without trade integration, preservation, or configuration control; and

(6) Any additional statutory, regulatory, contracting, or resource considerations that would affect the advisability and feasibility of adopting such a definition.

**Enterprise resource management systems for requirements traceability**

The committee notes the significant efforts of the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform, established by section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81). In its final report, the commission highlighted the need to improve and consolidate the Department of Defense's resource management systems and to create a common analytics platform to support more effective, data-driven decision-making across the PPBE process.

The committee believes that end-to-end requirements traceability and enhanced resource visibility are critical to addressing long-standing challenges in the PPBE process, to improving agility, and to ensuring resources are aligned with strategic priorities and warfighter needs.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to deliver a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027. The briefing shall include a plan for implementing common standards for commercially available tools across the Department that:

(1) Enable end-to-end integration of programmatic, operational, and financial data across components and mission areas;

(2) Interoperate with existing enterprise platforms, including Advana, the Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System, the General Fund Enterprise Business System, and Navy Enterprise Resource Planning tools;

(3) Support predictive obligation tracking and execution forecasting; and

(4) Provide real-time decision support at the program and portfolio level without necessitating the decommissioning of existing functional systems.

**Improvements to aviation safety**

The committee is dedicated to improving aviation safety, especially the interactions between military and civilian aircraft in light of the crash involving American Airlines flight 5342 and a Blackhawk helicopter in January of 2025. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released its analysis into causal factors of the crash in January 2026, including specific recommendations for the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army.

The committee believes it is necessary for the safety of all passengers in American airspace that the Department of Defense implement these recommendations to the broadest extent possible. For any recommendation that the Department believes it cannot implement as written, it must brief the committee about all implementation challenges and develop solutions to address the risks identified in that recommendation. Recognizing that this effort may take significant resources, but cognizant of the gravity of ensuring the American airspace is safe for commercial and military aircraft, the committee requests close collaboration with the Department throughout this process.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing, not later than January 15, 2027, and every 90 days thereafter, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the implementation of the recommendations from the NTSB Aviation Investigation Report AIR–26–02, including:

(1) Progress on implementation of each recommendation directed to the Department of Defense;

(2) Progress on implementation of each recommendation directed to the Department of the Army and implementation of those recommendations by the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force;

(3) Description of barriers to any recommendation by the Department of Defense or any military department;

(4) Proposed solutions to any identified barriers that address the risk identified in the NTSB recommendations;

(5) Any other relevant information as determined by the Secretary.

**Improvements to aviation safety briefing**

The committee is dedicated to improving aviation safety, especially the interactions between military and civilian aircraft in light of the crash involving American Airlines flight 5342 and a Blackhawk helicopter in January of 2025. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released its analysis into causal factors of the crash in January 2026, including specific recommendations for the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army. The committee believes it is necessary for the safety of all passengers in American airspace that the Department of Defense im-

plement these recommendations to the broadest extent possible. For any recommendation that the Department believes it cannot implement as written, it must brief the Committee about all implementation challenges and develop solutions to address the risks identified in that recommendation.

Recognizing that this effort may take significant resources, but cognizant of the gravity of ensuring the American airspace is safe for commercial and military aircraft, the committee requests close collaboration with the Department of Defense throughout this process.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing, not later than October 1, 2026, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the implementation of the recommendations from NTSB Aviation Investigation Report AIR–26–02.

**Increasing shipbuilding and repair capacity**

The committee recognizes the strategic importance of a robust domestic maritime industrial base to the national security and economic resilience of the United States. The committee is concerned that existing domestic shipbuilding, ship repair, dry dock availability, and associated waterfront infrastructure is at times inaccessible to the full range of military, government-owned, and U.S.-flag commercial vessels and therefore poses a risk to strategic sealift readiness, force projection capabilities, and sustainment operations.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the Maritime Administration, to identify opportunities to strengthen domestic shipbuilding and repair capacity through investments in infrastructure, industrial modernization, and workforce development. Such efforts may include the expansion or rehabilitation of dry docks; modernization of ship repair facilities and waterfront infrastructure; upgrades to heavy-lift and crane capacity; dredging and navigation improvements necessary to accommodate larger vessels and increased throughput; and other capital improvements that enhance the ability of the United States to construct, maintain, and repair military and commercially useful sealift vessels. The committee further encourages the Department of Defense to prioritize projects that demonstrate a clear nexus to national defense objectives, including support for surge sealift readiness, contested logistics operations, distributed maritime operations, maintenance and sustainment of Navy and Military Sealift Command vessels, strategic commercial shipping capacity, and the operational readiness of the U.S.-flag fleet. The committee also encourages consultation with private industry, public shipyards, commercial repair facilities, and relevant Federal agencies to ensure a comprehensive approach to strengthening the Nation's maritime industrial base.

**Joint Integration Coordination Cell resourcing**

The committee recognizes that the ongoing war in Ukraine has generated significant operational lessons regarding the employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (cUAS), lessons that are directly relevant to current and future theaters of

operation. The committee notes testimony from the Commander, U.S. European Command, which confirmed the importance of partnering closely with Ukraine to ensure we are rapidly capturing and implementing these lessons across the Joint Force and also highlighted the value of additional funding. The committee further notes that timely resourcing is necessary to translate battlefield observations into deployable capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Therefore, the committee supports full funding for the Joint Integration Coordination Cell and the Special Operations Command Europe theater innovation laboratory, including their work to accelerate the collection, analysis, and transfer of UAS and cUAS lessons learned from the European theater to operational forces worldwide.

**Navy shipbuilding software and artificial intelligence applications for surface combatants**

The committee recognizes the Navy's successful deployment of advanced software and artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities in submarine construction and commends these efforts to modernize shipbuilding processes. The integration of digital tools, including AI-enabled design optimization, production planning systems, and quality assurance platforms, has demonstrated meaningful improvements in construction efficiency, cost management, and schedule adherence in the submarine industrial base. The committee believes these technological advances should not remain limited to submarine programs. The same software and AI capabilities that have proven effective for submarine construction hold significant potential to enhance productivity and reduce costs across the Navy's entire shipbuilding portfolio, including surface combatants, amphibious vessels, auxiliary ships, and unmanned platforms.

The committee notes that modern commercial shipbuilding operations worldwide increasingly rely on integrated software systems to manage complex construction workflows, optimize material logistics, and ensure quality control. The Navy's surface ship and auxiliary vessel construction programs would benefit from similar technological modernization. Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to expand the application of software and artificial intelligence tools beyond submarine programs to all classes of naval vessels. This expansion should include:

(1) Assessment of current software and AI applications in submarine construction that could be adapted for surface ship and auxiliary vessel programs;

(2) Development of a comprehensive plan to integrate advanced digital tools across all surface combatant shipbuilding programs, including specific timelines and expected performance improvements;

(3) Identification of any regulatory, contractual, or cultural barriers within the shipbuilding industrial base that may impede adoption of these technologies; and

(4) Coordination with public and private shipyards to ensure shipbuilding software and AI capabilities are implemented in a manner that enhances workforce productivity rather than displacing skilled labor.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on efforts to expand shipbuilding software and AI applications across all vessel classes.

**Office of Net Assessment**

The committee commends the contributions of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) and reaffirms the value of its longstanding partnership with the Congress. The ONA provides long-term, strategic, and independent analysis in service of the national defense, and when properly resourced and supported by leadership, it has made significant contributions to the strategic direction and understanding for senior Department of Defense decision-makers.

The committee believes that ONA's work is crucial and of significant interest to a broad range of policymakers and senior leaders striving for deeper, strategic understanding of the future problems facing the Department. The committee expects the Department to preserve and reinforce the office's analytical independence, institutional standing, and sufficient funding level. The committee further encourages the Department to provide the ONA with the resources, access, and authorities necessary to fulfill its mission, particularly as it produces assessments on the character of future warfare, geoeconomic competition, and the long-term balance of military power between the United States and its adversaries.

**Potable water purification systems for new surface combatants**

The committee remains concerned that, despite over a decade of repeated congressional direction and dedicated funding, hazardous bromine cartridge systems continue to be used for potable water disinfection on certain Navy surface combatants. These systems unnecessarily expose sailors to health hazards and impose significant recurring costs related to the handling and disposal of hazardous materials.

The committee notes that reliance on "inherited" baseline designs—rather than deliberate, forward-looking requirements decisions—has resulted in these outdated systems being incorporated by default into new ship classes. This lack of modernization at the design phase risks locking obsolete and hazardous technology into platforms that will remain in the fleet for decades, ultimately requiring far more expensive post-award retrofits or modernization efforts.

Mixed-oxidant electrolytic disinfectant generator systems have been successfully deployed on Navy aircraft carriers and amphibious ships for more than 20 years, and more recently on the *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyers (DDG–51) and littoral combat ship platforms. These systems generate a disinfectant solution on demand using only common salt and electricity, effectively eliminating the need for bromine cartridges. The failure to transition smaller surface combatants to this safer technology appears to be driven by acquisition sequencing rather than technical limitations.

The committee expects potable water disinfection to be treated as a class-specific design requirement for every new platform.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that modern, non-hazardous potable water purification systems are evaluated, selected, and integrated during the initial design phases of new classes of surface combatants. These systems must be incorporated into the baseline design and not deferred to post-award retrofit or modernization. The committee expects potable water disinfection to be treated as a class-specific design requirement for each platform.

**Report on feasibility and advisability of Arctic operational and surge floor**

The committee remains concerned by the increasingly complex security environment in the Arctic, marked by growing strategic competition and expanding military activity by near-peer adversaries. The committee recognizes that protecting U.S. national security interests and strengthening integrated deterrence across the areas of responsibility of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) will require a sustained and adaptable military presence capable of operating in the Arctic environment.

The committee also recognizes that force posture decisions in the Arctic present unique operational, logistical, and infrastructure challenges. While permanent stationing or homeporting of forces may provide certain advantages, a flexible mix of forward presence, rotational deployments, and surge capacity may offer greater responsiveness to evolving threats and operational requirements. Accordingly, the committee believes it is important for the Department of Defense to assess the appropriate balance between enduring Arctic capabilities and the ability to rapidly reinforce the region when necessary.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments and the Commander, NORTHCOM, the Commander, EUCOM, and the Commander, INDOPACOM to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than June 1, 2027, assessing the feasibility and advisability of maintaining a persistent and scalable Department of Defense presence in the Arctic.

The report shall include:

(1) An assessment of the operational feasibility and strategic value of maintaining a baseline level of Arctic-capable assets across the maritime, aviation, ground, and multi-domain environments;

(2) An identification of the capabilities, capacity, and force structure required to sustain domain awareness, deterrence, and rapid response capabilities across the Arctic regions relevant to NORTHCOM, INDOPACOM, and EUCOM.

(3) An evaluation of options for maintaining a scalable surge capability, including the personnel, platforms, logistics infrastructure, and mobility requirements necessary to reinforce the region during periods of increased tension or conflict;

(4) A description of any capability gaps, force structure limitations, or infrastructure shortfalls that could affect the Department's ability to sustain operations in the Arctic; and

(5) An analysis comparing the costs, benefits, readiness implications, and risks associated with alternative force posture models, including permanent stationing, homeporting, rotational deployments, and other approaches for maintaining Arctic presence and responsiveness.

**Report on Navy's use of synthetic oil**

The committee notes that the Navy is working to meet major increases in mission demand, operating tempo, and service life for its limited number of ships. Measures need to be taken to extend existing fleets' operating capability, decrease operational failures and maintenance costs, improve safety, and widen performance boundaries. One cost-effective way to extend operating capability and service life is to use synthetic oil to replace the Navy's existing petroleum-based oil. Synthetic technology improves systems performance at low temperatures, enables ship commanders to confidently press performance limits in high tempo environments, and improves overall motion control, propulsion, weapons, and acoustic performance. Synthetic oils reduce onboard fire hazards, maintain stability over large temperature ranges, and resist seawater contamination, oxidation, and corrosion. Tests have shown that synthetic lubricants significantly extend the duration between oil changes by at least a factor of two and result in less corrective operations and maintenance associated with carbon and varnish build-up on critical components. Synthetic lubricants can also greatly reduce signature levels, mitigating noise and improving stealth and precision benefits and survivability of the platforms they support.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Navy's assessment of increased usage of synthetic lubricants. The briefing shall include any current plans by the Navy to increase the use of synthetic lubricants, an outline of its current use, costs and benefits of increased usage, conversion costs, and any additional funding required to realize the benefits of increased lifecycle savings and reduced corrective downtime.

**Support for military aviation demonstration teams**

The committee recognizes the important role that military aviation demonstration teams play in supporting recruiting, retention, and public outreach efforts across the Armed Forces. The committee specifically acknowledges the contributions of the United States Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron (Blue Angels) and the United States Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron (Thunderbirds), whose performances showcase the skill, professionalism, and capabilities of the men and women of the Armed Forces while strengthening ties between the military and the communities they serve. The committee encourages the continued support of military aviation demonstration teams and related outreach activities, recognizing that air shows, aviation demonstrations, and similar events promote public understanding of military service, inspire future generations of servicemembers, and serve as valuable tools for recruiting and community engagement.

**United States Africa Command advise and assist**

The committee is aware that U.S. Special Operations Forces have been assisting the Somali Armed Forces in countering al-Shabaab in Somalia, but desires more information on constraints limiting their effectiveness.

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to provide a briefing, not later than February 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the advise and assist mission in Somalia against al-Shabaab and other violent extremist organizations. At a minimum, the briefing should detail strategic objectives, an assessment of the current operating environment, an identification of any limitations, to include, but not be limited to, rules of engagement, authorities, permissions, current lines of operation and lines of effort, and both policy and resourcing limitations that challenge the AFRICOM mission to counter al-Shabaab and other violent extremist organizations in Somalia.

**Zumwalt-class destroyer homeporting**

The Navy has just notified the committee of a change of home port for the USS *Zumwalt* (DDG–1000) from Pascagoula, Mississippi, to San Diego, California. The ship has been undergoing upgrades at a shipyard in Mississippi. The Navy had originally planned to change the home port for the ship to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. To support that decision, the Navy had requested funding for upgrades to facilities in Pearl Harbor in fiscal year 2026. Congress appropriated $83.0 million in fiscal year 2026 for "DDG–1000 Ship Support Infrastructure Upgrades" under the Continuing Appropriations, Agriculture, Legislative Branch, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Extensions Act, 2026 (Public Law 119–37) based on that Navy request.

The committee understands that the Navy may also be planning to change homeports from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to San Diego, California, for the other two *Zumwalt*-class destroyers, the USS *Michael Monsoor* (DDG–1001) and the USS *Lyndon B. Johnson* (DDG–1002). The Navy has not briefed the plan to change home ports for the *Zumwalt*-class destroyers or the rationale for doing so. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than October 1, 2026, on the home porting decision for the USS *Zumwalt* and the potential follow-on homeporting decisions for the remainder of the *Zumwalt*-class destroyers. The briefing shall include:

(1) The Navy's justification for changing the home port of the USS *Zumwalt* from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to San Diego, California, from an operational, administrative, and financial standpoint;

(2) The Navy's future plans for home porting the remainder of the *Zumwalt*-class of destroyers, the USS *Michael Monsoor* and the USS *Lyndon B. Johnson*;

(3) The status of the Navy's plan to repair and upgrade the piers at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, to receive all *Zumwalt*-class destroyers;

(4) An assessment of how a decision to relocate the home port of the USS *Zumwalt*, and potentially the USS *Michael Monsoor* and the USS *Lyndon B. Johnson*, from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to San Diego, California, would affect the private ship repair maintenance workload in Hawaii and California;

(5) Any Navy plans to potentially homeport additional *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyers at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam.

(6) Any other matters the Secretary deems relevant to the home porting decisions for the USS *Zumwalt*, the USS *Michael Monsoor*, the USS *Lyndon B. Johnson*, and other warships at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.

# TITLE XI—CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MATTERS

### Sec. 1101—Prevailing rate determinations for defense industrial base

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 81 of title 10, United States Code, to allow the Secretary of Defense to establish the pay of wage-grade employees located at any defense industrial base facility, in order to make rates of pay comparable to the private sector and surrounding areas.

### Sec. 1102—Job grading system for prevailing rate employees at defense industrial base facilities

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 81 of title 10, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of Defense to establish and maintain a job grading system for wage-grade employees who are located at any defense industrial base facility, in order to establish pay that is competitive with the private sector.

### Sec. 1103—Probationary period for civilian personnel of the United States Cyber Command

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1599f(i) of title 10, United States Code, to change the length of the probationary period for Cyber Excepted Service employees to 2 years.

### Sec. 1104—Enhanced authority for transfers between cyber excepted service and competitive service

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1643(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, to enhance authority for transfers between the Cyber Excepted Service and the competitive service.

### Sec. 1105—Removal of Direct Support Activities from personnel limitation on the Office of the Secretary of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would remove direct support positions of the Washington Headquarters Services, supporting the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, from a personnel limitation that applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

### Sec. 1106—Prohibition on the use of funds for carrying out a hiring freeze, reduction in force, or hiring delay without cause at a public shipyard

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit funds authorized by this Act from being used to carry out a hiring

freeze or a reduction in force, or to delay filling a vacant Federal civilian position at public shipyards.

**Sec. 1107—Prohibition on the use of funds for carrying out certain hiring freezes, reductions in force, and hiring delays**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit funds authorized by this Act from being used to carry out a hiring freeze or a reduction in force, or to delay filling a vacant Federal civilian position within the workforce funded by a working capital fund.

**Sec. 1108—Disclosure of telework, remote work, and exemptions for return-to-in-person-work requirements in Department of Defense vacancy announcements**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments, not later than June 1, 2027, to ensure that the disclosure of telework and remote work eligibility, as well as exemptions for return-to-in-person-work requirements, is considered for all announcements of vacant positions in the Department of Defense to encourage all agencies of the Department to utilize these flexibilities to support the employment of military spouses.

**Sec. 1109—Pilot program to retain high-performing supervisors and managers within the Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision to authorize the Secretary of Defense to establish a pilot program to reward high-performing supervisors and managers with incentive pay.

**Sec. 1110—Congressional notification of certain changes to civilian workforce of Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1597 of title 10, United States Code, to require the Secretary of Defense to notify the congressional defense committees of any changes to civilian personnel in the Department of Defense that would result in a reduction in force of 50 or more personnel.

## Items of Special Interest

**DOD contracting with industrial base facilities that offer competency based-apprenticeships**

The committee greatly values the United States' defense industrial base workforce and notes the importance of training the next generation of defense industrial base contractors and employees to lead future defense production. The committee is aware that some defense industrial base facilities offer competency-based registered apprenticeship programs, which are established to train workers efficiently. These programs can result in faster production of key products in the industrial base, such as munitions, airplanes, boats, submarines, spacecraft, and unmanned aircraft systems.

Therefore, the committee encourages the Department of Defense to assess its contracting with industrial base producers that have

competency-based registered apprenticeship programs and to continue to contract with these facilities wherever practicable.

**Japan pilot health insurance enhancement briefing**

The committee recognizes the challenges faced by Department of Defense (DOD) civilian employees serving in Japan in accessing health care consistent with American standards of care and notes the Department's ongoing Pilot Health Insurance Enhancement program as a meaningful but incomplete response to those challenges.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a briefing, not later than February 1, 2027, assessing the following: (1) Outcomes and utilization of the Pilot Health Insurance Enhancement program for DOD Civilian Employees in Japan through its current period of performance; (2) Identified gaps in program coverage, including dependent eligibility and specialty care access; (3) Options for a durable funding mechanism to continue or expand the program, including an assessment of appropriate departmental jurisdiction between the DOD and the Office of Personnel Management; and (4) The feasibility of applying a similar model to DOD civilian employees serving in other overseas locations.

**Study on improving civilian employee performance management**

The committee is grateful for the hard work and dedication of the career civil servants who serve in the Department of Defense. In particular, civil servants in managerial or supervisory roles are vital to carrying out the Department's many critical national security missions, serving as an anchor for productivity, high standards, and a positive work environment. In any enterprise, supervisors and managers are critical for ensuring a well-trained and functioning workforce.

The committee notes that in order to continue to grow a strong, more competitive, and efficient workforce, empowering supervisors to have a greater say in shaping the force that they manage could lead to better hiring decisions, stronger teams, and a more productive work environment. In recent years, the Department has carried out attempts to shape the workforce through Department-wide policies that sometimes lead to a one-size-fits-all approach, which fails to provide the nuanced approach to employee performance management that supervisors and managers are otherwise able to provide.

In 2017, the Institute for Defense Analysis published a study titled, "Civilian Personnel Reform at the Department of Defense: Lessons from the Failure of the National Security Personnel System." Among other things, the study recommended amending the 2-year probationary period to require performance manager review before an employee's tenure became fixed. The committee notes that civil servants in supervisory roles are already in an ideal position to conduct such a performance review.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study on improving supervisor oversight, employee per-

formance, and the efficiency of the Department's performance evaluation system, including recommendations for authorities or reforms that could be implemented at the supervisory level to achieve improved employee performance and management. The study shall include a report on the advisability and feasibility of implementing supervisory review and concurrence upon the expiration of an employee's 2-year probationary period.

The committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to provide an initial briefing on the progress of this study to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 16, 2027, with follow-on briefings to occur at a mutually agreed upon time.

# TITLE XII—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

## Subtitle A—Assistance and Training

### Sec. 1201—Authority to provide assistance to military forces of Jordan

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the provision of assistance to the military forces associated with the Jordanian government.

### Sec. 1202—Modification of authority to provide defense institution capacity building for friendly foreign countries

The committee recommends a provision that would modify section 332 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize legal defense institution capacity building.

### Sec. 1203—Modification of authority to build capacity

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 333(a) of title 10, United States Code, to add disaster risk reduction or response operations, space domain awareness and space operations, and foreign internal defense operations to the authorized capability areas.

### Sec. 1204—Abraham Accords Defense Cooperation Initiative

The committee recommends a provision that directs the Secretary of Defense to establish an initiative to bolster defense cooperation among the United States and signatories of the Abraham Accords, as well as any regional, Arab, or Muslim-majority country that has sought to normalize relations with the State of Israel since 2020.

### Sec. 1205—Redesignation of Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School as Special Boat Training Command

The committee recommends a provision that would modify section 352 of title 10, United States Code, to redesignate the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School as the Special Boat Training Command.

### Sec. 1206—Extension of Defense Operational Resilience International Cooperation Pilot Program

The committee recommends a provision that would extend the Defense Operational Resilience International Cooperation pilot program authorized by section 1212 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) through December 31, 2032.

**Sec. 1207—Feasibility report on multinational jungle warfare exercises in area of responsibility of United States Southern Command**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Commander, U.S. Southern Command, to conduct a study to determine the feasibility and advisability of establishing a program of recurring multinational jungle warfare exercises with partner countries in South America and provide a report on the study to the congressional defense committees not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

**Sec. 1208—Redesignation of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies as the James M. Inhofe Center for Africa Security Studies**

The committee recommends a provision that would modify section 342 of title 10, United States Code, to redesignate the Africa Center for Strategic Studies as the James M. Inhofe Center for Africa Security Studies.

**Sec. 1209—Notification of intent to decrease United States Armed Forces presence in North Atlantic Treaty Organization member country**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, not less than 120 days before decreasing permanent or rotational troops in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country, to submit an assessment of the impact of such reductions on the ability of NATO to meet its deterrence and defense requirements.

**Subtitle B—Matters Relating to the Middle East**

**Sec. 1211—Assistance to Lebanese Armed Forces for countering Hezbollah and other terrorist groups**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize $36.0 million for the Lebanese Armed Forces to counter Hezbollah, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and all United States-designated terrorist organizations in Lebanon. The provision would condition this support on the Lebanese Armed Forces' willingness to confront and disarm Hezbollah.

**Sec. 1212—Extension of authority for reimbursement of certain coalition nations for support provided to United States military operations**

The committee recommends a provision that would extend section 1233 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181), which provides for the reimbursement of certain coalition nations for support provided to U.S. military operations.

**Sec. 1213—Extension and modification of authority to provide assistance to vetted Syrian groups and individuals**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1209 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon Na-

tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291) to extend and modify the authority to provide assistance to vetted Syrian groups and individuals.

**Sec. 1214—Extension and modification of authority to provide assistance to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1236 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291) to extend and modify the authority to provide assistance to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

**Sec. 1215—Modification of United States-Israel subterranean operations cooperation**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1279 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92) to broaden cooperation between the United States and Israel on subterranean operations.

**Sec. 1216—Modification of United States-Israel cooperation to counter unmanned systems in all warfighting domains**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1278(b)(4) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) to increase, by $30.0 million, funding for United States-Israel cooperation for countering unmanned aerial systems.

**Sec. 1217—United States-Israel Framework for Upgraded Technologies, Unified Research, and Enhanced Security (FUTURES) Act of 2026**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Minister of Defense of Israel, to establish a cooperative initiative to be known as the "United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative," to expand and accelerate bilateral defense technology research, development, testing, evaluation, coordination, and industrial cooperation between the United States and Israel.

**Subtitle C—Matters Relating to Europe and the Russian Federation**

**Sec. 1221—Extension of prohibition on availability of funds relating to sovereignty of the Russian Federation over internationally recognized territory of Ukraine**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1245(a) of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–236) to extend the prohibition of funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for fiscal year 2027 from being obligated or expended to implement any activity that recognizes the sovereignty of Russia over the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine.

**Sec. 1222—Oversight of United States military posture in Europe**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available to reduce the total number of members of the Armed Forces permanently stationed in or deployed to the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility below 76,000, to divest of property, to remove or redeploy major equipment, or to relinquish command of the position of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe until 90 days after the Secretary of Defense submits an assessment and certification to the appropriate committees of the Congress regarding such action.

The committee remains deeply concerned about Russian aggression in the EUCOM area of responsibility. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members have seen a sharp increase in threats from Russia including manned and unmanned air incursions, sabotage activities, and malign influence campaigns. The committee directs the Department to maintain robust U.S. troop presence in Europe, including along NATO's eastern flank, to sustain the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to provide forward defense of the United States and contribute to NATO's defense and deterrence posture.

**Sec. 1223—Intelligence support for Ukraine**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to provide intelligence support to the Ukrainian government for the purpose of supporting military operations to defend or take back the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine.

**Sec. 1224—United States-Ukraine Strategic Defense Innovation Working Group**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to engage with the Government of Ukraine to establish a defense innovation working group.

The committee notes that Ukraine is best positioned to provide up-to-date, validated, and battle-tested expertise on low-cost scaled production of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and counter-UAS technology and employment. The U.S. Department of Defense should make every effort to learn Ukraine's hard-earned best practices in preparation for current and future worldwide military engagements.

**Sec. 1225—Notification of gray zone activities by the Russian Federation against North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to notify appropriate committees of the Congress not later than 7 days after the Department of Defense is made aware of any gray-zone activities on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally known or reasonably suspected to be carried out by Russia.

**Sec. 1226—Extension and modification of Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92) to extend the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) through December 31, 2030, and authorize $750,000,000 for fiscal year 2027. The provision would also clarify the conditions under which foreign contributions may be used to replace weapons or articles provided to Ukraine under this authority via contributions from the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List.

**Sec. 1227—Synchronization of defense readiness with North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the defense readiness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180 days thereafter through 2034.

**Sec. 1228—Co-development and co-production program with Germany for certain munitions**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, not later than March 1, 2027, to seek to engage with appropriate officials of Germany in a joint program for the purpose of enabling the fielding of air defense and air-to-air munitions, including co-development and co-production of such capabilities, for the Armed Forces of the United States and the Bundeswehr of Germany, consistent with applicable United States law and existing bilateral defense cooperation agreements.

**Sec. 1229—Report and assessment relating to United States force posture adjustments in Europe**

The committee recommends a provision that would require U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to submit an updated risk assessment addressing its ability to execute its theater campaign plan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) plans, and NATO defense and deterrence requirements following recent force posture reductions in the EUCOM area of responsibility. The provision would also require an independent Government Accountability Office assessment of the sufficiency of the process and analysis used to inform such reductions.

**Subtitle D—Matters Relating to the Indo-Pacific Region**

**Sec. 1231—Extension and modification of designation of senior official for Department of Defense activities relating to, and implementation plan for, the AUKUS partnership**

The committee recommends a provision that would designate the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Armaments Cooperation as the senior civilian official of the Department of Defense (DOD) responsible for overseeing DOD activities relating to the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States (AUKUS) part-

nership. The provision would also modify and extend reporting requirements related to DOD activities to implement the AUKUS partnership.

**Sec. 1232—Extension and modification of Pacific Deterrence Initiative**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1251 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) to extend the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) through fiscal year 2027. The provision would also require that the requirements of the subordinate unified commands of United States Indo-Pacific Command, including United States Forces Korea and United States Forces Japan, are included in the PDI.

**Sec. 1233—Extension, modification, and redesignation of Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1323 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159). The amendment redesignates the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative as the First Island Chain Security Cooperation Initiative and authorizes assistance for the national security forces of the Government of the Philippines.

**Sec. 1234—Updates to National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual regarding AUKUS**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, to submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to identify, mitigate, and remove, as appropriate, procedures and regulations contained in the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual that unnecessarily constrain or impede government and industry from meeting the objectives of the partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (commonly known as "AUKUS").

**Sec. 1235—Oversight of United States military posture on the Korean Peninsula**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act to reduce the total number of members of the Armed Forces permanently stationed in or deployed to the Republic of Korea below 28,500 or to complete the transition of wartime operational control of the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command from United States-led command to Republic of Korea-led command until 90 days after the Secretary of Defense submits an assessment and certification to the appropriate committees of the Congress regarding such action.

**Sec. 1236—Indo-Pacific Regional Sustainment Framework**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to establish and maintain a regional sustainment framework in the area of responsibility of the U.S.

Indo-Pacific Command, to be known as the "Indo-Pacific Regional Sustainment Framework," to foster co-sustainment efforts focused on providing the logistics support, sustainment activities, and personnel services necessary to maintain defense platforms, systems, subsystems, and components.

**Sec. 1237—Extension of annual report on military power of the People's Republic of China**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65) by extending the China Military Power Report to January 31, 2032.

**Sec. 1238—Strategy for crisis management in South China Sea**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the head of any other appropriate Federal department or agency, to develop, not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, a strategy for crisis management in the South China Sea.

**Sec. 1239—Master plan for facility requirements to support rotational force presence in the Philippines**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, to submit, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to the congressional defense committees a master plan outlining facility requirements to support a rotational presence of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines.

**Sec. 1240—Master plan for infrastructure requirements to support rotational force presence in Australia**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, to submit, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to the congressional defense committees a master plan outlining infrastructure requirements to support a rotational presence of the U.S. Armed Forces in Australia.

**Sec. 1241—Extension of pilot program to develop young civilian defense leaders in the Indo-Pacific region**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1261(e) of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) to extend the pilot program authorized by that Act to develop young civilian defense leaders in the Indo-Pacific region through December 31, 2031.

**Sec. 1242—Extension of pilot program to improve cyber cooperation with covered foreign military partners in Southeast Asia**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1256(e) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) by extending the pilot program to improve cyber cooperation with cov-

ered foreign military partners in Southeast Asia through December 31, 2030.

**Sec. 1243—Extension of authority to transfer funds for Bien Hoa dioxin cleanup**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1253(b) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) to extend the authority of the Secretary of Defense to transfer funds to the Secretary of State for the Bien Hoa dioxin cleanup in Vietnam through fiscal year 2027.

**Sec. 1244—Limitation on availability of funds for travel expenses of the Office of the Secretary of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of 25 percent of the funding authorized or otherwise made available for the travel expenses of the Office of the Secretary of Defense until various overdue reports and other documents relating to the Indo-Pacific region are submitted to the congressional defense committees.

**Sec. 1245—Report on Japanese counterstrike capabilities**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to provide the congressional defense committees with a report, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, outlining Department of Defense efforts to support Japan in the fielding of an operational counterstrike capability.

**Sec. 1246—Strategy for cyber cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a strategy to enhance and institutionalize cyber cooperation between the Department of Defense and allies and partners of the Indo-Pacific region.

The committee believes cyber cooperation with allies and partners is foundational to broader efforts to achieve a free and open Indo-Pacific region. As part of these efforts, the committee believes cyber cooperation with the Pacific Island countries (PICs) should be increased as these countries continue to expand their digital connectivity and face new and emerging cybersecurity concerns. The committee recognizes that Department of Defense cooperation with the PICs can be made complex by their unique size, distributed geography, limited resources, and other challenges. However, the criticality of this region for the security of the Indo-Pacific, including to U.S. military activities, means that cyber security efforts must be prioritized.

**Sec. 1247—Extension and modification of Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92) to extend the Indo-Pacific Maritime Se-

curity Initiative through calendar year 2031. The provision would also expand the types of assistance provided under this authority to allow for the operational test, evaluation, and demonstration of uncrewed systems and asymmetric autonomous concepts.

**Sec. 1248—Annual assessment of contribution of certain artificial intelligence chips to military capabilities of the People's Republic of China**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration to submit annual reports on the contribution of covered artificial intelligence chips to the military capabilities of China.

**Sec. 1249—Modification of authorization of sales to Australia of in-service *Virginia* class submarines to provide for sale of additional in-service submarine in lieu of new construction submarine**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend subsection (a) of section 1352 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) to modify the authorization of sales to Australia of *Virginia*-class submarines to allow for the sale of an additional in-service submarine in lieu of a new construction submarine.

**Sec. 1250—War Reserve Stock Program for Taiwan**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the establishment of a war reserve stock program for Taiwan.

**Sec. 1251—Sense of Congress on defense alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region**

The committee recommends a provision that would express the sense of the Congress on the importance of defense alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.

**Subtitle E—Other Matters**

**Sec. 1261—Western Hemisphere strategy**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, to develop and submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a comprehensive strategy for advancing U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere.

**Sec. 1262—Enhanced cooperation in North Atlantic and Arctic regions**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to invite the Kingdom of Denmark to assign a permanent liaison officer to the U.S. Northern Command.

**Sec. 1263—Report on capabilities and illicit activities of cartels**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the capabilities and illicit activities of certain cartels.

**Sec. 1264—Report on threats to United States interests in Africa**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a report on threats to U.S. interests in the AFRICOM area of responsibility and an assessment of the resources needed to address them.

**Sec. 1265—Reports on Arctic and High North defense integration**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit reports on defense integration in the Arctic and High North to the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

**Sec. 1266—Briefing on military and intelligence presence of Cuba in the Western Hemisphere**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, to submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, a report on the military and intelligence activities of Cuba in the Western Hemisphere.

**Sec. 1267—Continuation of Joint Interagency Task Force—Counter Cartel**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to support and carry out, through December 31, 2030, the activities and functions of the Joint Interagency Task Force—Counter Cartel, in coordination with appropriate Federal departments and agencies, consistent with applicable law, and to transmit an annual report on the progress of the Joint Interagency Task Force—Counter Cartel to the congressional defense committees.

**Sec. 1268—Plan to enhance defense cooperation with Morocco**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to enhance United States defense cooperation with Morocco. The provision would also require the submission of the

United States-Morocco Defense Cooperation Roadmap signed April 2026 to the Congress.

**Sec. 1269—Extension of Public Law 115–68 and related security cooperation programs**

The committee recommends a provision that would modify section 1210E of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) to extend the underlying authority through 2029. The provision would also amend section 1208 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) by extending the underlying authority through 2029.

**Sec. 1270—Modification of requirements for Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 342(b)(1)(B) of title 10, United States Code, to include operational simulation and analysis.

## Items of Special Interest

**Appreciation for Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish Partners in Countering Islamic State of Iraq and Syria**

The committee commends the deep partnership of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Syrian Democratic forces with the United States in degrading and defeating the threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The committee is deeply concerned that there is significant risk in pivoting away from the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, which served as the primary United States partner in defeating the ISIS caliphate in Syria, and relying instead on the Syrian government to counter ISIS and other terrorist groups that could pose a threat to the United States Homeland.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing, not later than October 1, 2026, on the performance of the Syrian government in countering terrorist groups and actors within Syria, including foreign terrorists.

Furthermore, the committee has concerns that the Department of Defense did not request funding to train and equip the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in its 2027 budget request for the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund.

Therefore, the committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing, not later than October 1, 2026, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on: (1) The Department's plans for the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund; (2) The rationale for not including such funds in the budget request; and (3) Plans to improve the ability of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces to support counterterrorism operations with the Iraqi Security Forces and the United States.

**Assessment of Chinese Communist Party malign influence within the Republic of Korea**

The committee notes that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to use hybrid tactics to project its influence outside of

China's borders and to undermine the interests of the United States and its allies in the region and globally. Of particular concern are China's malign influence efforts in the Republic of Korea.

Therefore, the Secretary of Defense shall, not later than May 1, 2027, provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, detailing malign influence by the Chinese Communist Party within the Republic of Korea and its implications for the national security and commercial interests of the United States. At a minimum, the required briefing shall include an assessment of the extent to which China's malign influence:

(1) Creates human intelligence and national security risks to United States Forces stationed in the Republic of Korea; and

(2) Negatively impacts the availability of dual-use commercial goods that are essential to security cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea, including with respect to defense industrial base cooperation.

**Assessment of Hezbollah**

To better understand the security environment in southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah's de facto control has been virtually uncontested by the legitimate Lebanese government for approximately 2 decades, the committee directs the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than January 1, 2027, assessing changes in the security environment in southern Lebanon from October 8, 2023, to the present day, including: (1) An assessment of the damage to Hezbollah infrastructure, capabilities, and personnel due to Israeli operations; (2) The extent to which the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed to southern Lebanon consistent with the November 2024 ceasefire and January 2025 ceasefire extension; (3) The extent to which the Lebanese Armed Forces has been willing to counter, and/or has been effective in countering, Hezbollah at any point since 2006, whether within southern Lebanon, northern Lebanon, or Beirut; (4) An assessment of Hezbollah's strength over the same period, including its remaining power projection capabilities into Israel; (5) An assessment of the means and financial networks used and relied upon by Hezbollah to fund its reconstitution; (6) An evaluation of efforts being made by the Lebanese Armed Forces to plan for further disarmament of Hezbollah throughout other parts of Lebanon, including in South Beirut and the Bekaa Valley; (7) An assessment of actions taken by the Government of Lebanon to demonstrate its willingness to exert authority over Lebanon, including through political steps and military steps to disarm Hezbollah and counter the abilities of Hezbollah to reconstitute; and (8) An assessment of the steps that can be taken to undermine Hezbollah's control in southern Lebanon, south Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley.

**Assessment of Taiwan's liquefied natural gas supply chains**

The committee notes that Taiwan imports the overwhelming majority of its energy and is heavily dependent on liquefied natural gas (LNG) for electricity generation. The committee is concerned that a disruption of such supplies through blockade or other means could negatively impact Taiwan's ability to effectively defend itself in a contingency.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of other departments and agencies, as appropriate, to provide a classified briefing to the congressional defense committees, the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, not later than October 1, 2026, regarding: (1) The current state of Taiwan's LNG supply chain and potential vulnerabilities; (2) The potential impact of a disruption of LNG supplies through blockade or other means that could negatively impact Taiwan's ability to effectively defend itself in a contingency; and (3) Potential opportunities to mitigate the risk posed by a disruption of LNG imports to Taiwan.

**Assessment of United States-Republic of Korea integration and operational use of emerging technologies**

The committee strongly supports efforts to build the combined capabilities of the United States and Republic of Korea militaries and believes that the integration and operational use of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, cyber tools, and unmanned systems, within combined military operations enhance interoperability and mission effectiveness.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, not later than January 15, 2027, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on efforts to enhance combined United States-Republic of Korea operational capabilities and interoperability using emerging technologies, including recommendations, if any, for legislative or resource changes to accelerate such efforts.

**Briefing on industrial base cooperation between United States and India**

The committee recognizes the strong bond between the United States and India and the growing importance of the defense industrial relationship within the broader bilateral relationship. The committee notes the progress of the India-United States Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS–X), which is intended to facilitate partnerships among defense companies, investors, universities, and accelerators in both countries, as well as the conclusion of a Security of Supply Arrangement between the Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defense of India in 2024.

The committee believes the Department should seek to identify steps to further expand co-development, co-production, and reciprocal sourcing with India in areas of mutual strategic interest. The committee further believes that legal, regulatory, acquisition, and export-control barriers to deeper industrial cooperation should be identified and, where appropriate, addressed.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the Secretary of State, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than December 1, 2026, that:

(1) Identifies priority sectors for expanded United States-India co-production and co-sustainment;

(2) Assesses barriers to greater participation by Indian firms in Department of Defense supply chains and by United States firms in defense manufacturing partnerships in India;

(3) Evaluates the implementation status and practical utility of the Security of Supply Arrangement;

(4) Describes steps taken under INDUS–X to move from pilot projects and start-up engagement toward fielded capability and programmatic acquisition outcomes; and

(5) Provides recommendations, including any legislative recommendations, regarding authorities, pilot programs, procurement flexibilities, and export-control reforms needed to strengthen United States-India defense industrial integration.

**Briefing on space cooperation between United States and India**

The committee believes that the maturation of the military space programs of our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically India, is in our national security interest given the growing space threat posed by China.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on efforts to expand and deepen bilateral military exercises with India in the space domain. This would include the potential integration of Indian commercial space entities that could help mature the Indian military's space program while enabling the U.S. Space Force's multi-domain operations with ally and partner nations. The exercises considered in this matter include but are not limited to Cope India, Yudh Abhyas, and Tiger Triumph.

**Comptroller General review of impact of delays in foreign military sales to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Philippines**

The committee remains concerned about delays in the delivery of military capabilities to allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region via the foreign military sales process and the impact of such delays on the ability of the Department of Defense to establish and maintain deterrence against Chinese military aggression in the First Island Chain.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a review and submit to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the manner in which delays in United States weapons sales to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines through the foreign military sales process affect the ability of the Department of Defense to build, posture, and sustain a strong denial defense in the First Island Chain. At a minimum, the required report shall include the following:

(1) A description of the benefits to United States national security of United States arms deliveries to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and the importance of inter-

operability in the event of a contingency across the Taiwan Strait;

(2) A description of:

(a) the current status of major defense equipment sales to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines that have been approved but have not been completed; and

(b) relevant metrics for identifying delays in the timelines for delivery on such major defense equipment sales, including such delays attributable to:

(i) Department of Defense review, procurement, and administration processes for the foreign military sales mechanism;

(ii) production constraints on the United States defense industrial base with respect to materiel currently under contract with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines; or

(iii) Department of Defense prioritization of arms deliveries to allies and partners in the midst of conflict, such as allies in the Middle East region;

(3) An assessment of possible impacts of such delays on the ability of the Department of Defense to build, posture, and sustain a strong denial defense in the First Island Chain, including by enabling interoperability with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines; and

(4) An evaluation, as applicable, of the impact any other relevant authority for arms sales or transfers to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines may have on the ability of the Department of Defense to build, posture, and sustain a strong denial defense in the First Island Chain.

Not later than July 7, 2027, the Comptroller General shall brief the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on the review, with final results provided in a mutually agreed upon format and timeframe. To the maximum extent practicable, the required report shall be submitted in unclassified form without any designation relating to dissemination control and shall contain a classified annex.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide the Comptroller General with timely access to any appropriate information, data, and analyses requested by the Comptroller General necessary to develop, in a timely, thorough, and independent manner, the required report.

**Expediting the refueling of Israeli aircraft**

The committee affirms that the U.S. Government's commitment to providing Israel with the means and resources to defend itself by itself must remain enduring and ironclad. The people of the United States and the people of Israel are bound closely by civilizational values and mutual interests. They face common threats in the Middle East, and these threats are constantly evolving in scope, scale, and lethality. The committee appreciates the new opportunities to deepen operational collaboration between the Israel Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces that the as-

sumption by U.S. Central Command of combatant command responsibility for U.S. forces in the State of Israel in 2021 enabled.

The committee notes that the Twelve-Day War in June 2025 reaffirmed Israel's central role in advancing the United States' national security interests in the Middle East by severely degrading Iran's nuclear and long-range missile programs. Such operations were impressive despite Israel's use of 50- to 60-year-old "Ram" refueling aircraft. To modernize their tanker forces, Israel has signed multiple contracts with the U.S. Government to purchase six Boeing KC–46 refueling aircraft for the Israeli Air Force, the first two of which are scheduled to be delivered in 2026. The presence of these aircraft should strengthen deterrence against Iran and its proxies. The committee encourages the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to provide any appropriate assistance the Israelis may request in enhancing aerial refueling capabilities.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide, not later than September 30, 2026, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a briefing that includes an assessment of the aerial refueling operational requirements for the Israeli government during the 12-Day War against Iran in 2025, including: (1) An assessment of the tempo of the Israeli Air Force's Ram tanker fleet during those 12 days, versus an estimate of what the refueling tempo might have been with two or four KC–46s as part of their tanker fleet; (2) The extent to which any assistance was provided by United States Air Force aerial refueling tankers to support Israeli Air Force operations; (3) The estimated date of delivery to Israel of the remainder of the KC–46 aircraft procured by the Government of Israel to date; and (4) A detailed description of any actions the U.S. Government is taking to expedite the delivery to Israel of KC–46 aircraft procured by the Israeli government, while minimizing adverse impacts to United States defense readiness, including strategic forces readiness and any additional actions the U.S. Government could take to expedite such delivery.

**Report on addressing Patriot Advanced Capability–3 interceptor production and shipments to Ukraine**

The committee remains concerned about Ukraine's continuing requirements for integrated air and missile defense capabilities to defend civilian populations, critical infrastructure, and military assets against ongoing Russian ballistic missile and unmanned aerial system attacks. The committee recognizes the importance of Patriot air defense systems and Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC–3) interceptors in supporting Ukraine's self-defense and notes continued concerns regarding interceptor availability, production capacity, and the impact of transfers on United States military readiness.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than October 1, 2026, assessing the feasibility of increasing deliveries of PAC–3 interceptors to Ukraine. The report shall include:

(1) An assessment of current and projected Ukrainian requirements for PAC–3 interceptors over the next 12 months;

(2) An assessment of the availability of PAC–3 interceptors from existing Department of Defense inventories for transfer to Ukraine and the impact of such transfers on United States military readiness and operational plans;

(3) An evaluation of options to accelerate production of PAC–3 interceptors, including through multiyear procurement authorities, advance procurement, expanded supplier capacity, and other industrial-base investments;

(4) An assessment of the feasibility of increasing annual PAC–3 interceptor production and the anticipated timeline for achieving such increases;

(5) An identification of any statutory, regulatory, contractual, or supply-chain barriers to increasing interceptor deliveries to Ukraine;

(6) An assessment of opportunities for allied and partner nations operating Patriot systems to contribute additional PAC–3 interceptors to Ukraine, including options for United States backfill arrangements; and

(7) Recommendations for legislative or administrative actions that would enable increased interceptor deliveries to Ukraine while maintaining acceptable levels of United States military readiness.

The committee further directs the Secretary to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on the findings of the report, not later than 15 days after its submission.

**Report on personnel and capability transfers from United States Indo-Pacific Command**

The committee strongly agrees with the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy that it is critical for the United States to maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific favorable to our interests.

Therefore, the committee directs the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) to provide a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than October 1, 2026, on transfers of personnel, platforms, equipment, munitions, and other capabilities previously allocated or assigned to INDOPACOM to other combatant commands since May 1, 2025. At a minimum, the report shall include:

(1) A detailed accounting of personnel, platforms, equipment, munitions, and other capabilities previously allocated or assigned to INDOPACOM;

(2) The current status of personnel, platforms, equipment, munitions, and other capabilities identified under (1);

(3) A plan and expected timeline for returning or replacing capabilities identified under (1);

(4) A description of efforts to mitigate any capability or readiness shortfalls;

(5) The independent assessment of the Commander with respect to global munitions inventories, including those designated on the critical munitions list of the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, relative to deterrence and warfighting requirements in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility; and

(6) Any other matters deemed relevant by the Commander.

**Report on United States and South Korean cooperation on nuclear powered submarines**

The committee notes the release of the Joint Fact Sheet describing President Donald J. Trump's meeting with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung on November 13, 2025. The fact sheet expresses support for South Korea's effort to build nuclear powered attack submarines and commits the United States to work to support requirements for this shipbuilding project, including by sourcing nuclear fuel. The committee supports bilateral cooperation on submarine manufacturing with South Korea and acknowledges the potential positive implications for stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with a report, not later than February 1, 2027, that:

(1) Defines the scope of bilateral cooperation in developing a nuclear powered, conventionally armed submarine for South Korea;

(2) Describes all bilateral working groups and lines of effort supporting the development and fielding of a South Korean nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarine;

(3) Assesses the impact on regional stability and security in the Indo-Pacific of South Korea's acquisition of a nuclear powered, conventionally armed submarine;

(4) Evaluates the cost to South Korea of fielding a fleet of nuclear powered, conventionally armed submarines and the corresponding impact of this cost on efforts to achieve the conditions-based transition of wartime operational control of the South Korean military to South Korea; and

(5) Evaluates the proliferation risks associated with South Korea acquiring a nuclear powered, conventionally armed submarine.

**Resilient command, control, and communications for Taiwan**

The committee recognizes that resilient communications between the United States and Taiwan are essential to support effective coordination during both steady-state operations and crisis scenarios. The committee is concerned that disruption or degradation of communications infrastructure in a contested environment could significantly limit Taiwan's ability to communicate with United States forces and partners. The committee believes it is necessary to assess current capabilities and address gaps now to ensure continuity of communications under stressed conditions.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, assessing the extent to which mobile ad hoc networking and commercially derived communications systems in

Taiwan support United States operational requirements in contested or degraded environments. The briefing shall include:

(1) Key Taiwan communications networks across civil and military organizations necessary to support United States and coalition operations;

(2) Connectivity and integration of Department of Defense systems with such networks;

(3) Gaps in Taiwan's ability to communicate with United States forces under contested conditions;

(4) Network architectures enabling resilient, infrastructure-independent communications, including secure, segmented data transmission;

(5) Opportunities to rapidly field and scale solutions, including through the use of existing equipment;

(6) Cybersecurity and supply chain risks affecting such communications; and

(7) Prioritized potential actions to improve resilient and interoperable communications, including continued progress on coalition information.

**United States national security interests related to the war in Sudan**

The committee remains deeply concerned by the ongoing conflict in Sudan, the resulting mass displacement and atrocities, the destabilizing effects of that conflict on the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region, and the role of external actors in fueling the war.

The committee is concerned that the conflict in Sudan has implications not only for regional humanitarian conditions but also for U.S. national security interests related to Red Sea maritime security, strategic competition, illicit trafficking, regional partner stability, and the potential expansion of malign foreign influence.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of relevant U.S. Government departments and agencies, to submit to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, a report on Sudan and the Red Sea corridor.

The report shall include:

(1) An assessment of United States national security interests affected by the conflict in Sudan, including implications for Red Sea maritime security, regional force posture, access, overflight, logistics, and partner engagement in the Horn of Africa and adjoining theaters;

(2) An assessment of the roles of foreign state and non-state actors in supporting, enabling, financing, arming, equipping, training, or otherwise sustaining parties to the conflict in Sudan;

(3) An assessment of the implications of the Sudan conflict for strategic competition, including Russian efforts to expand military access or basing along the Red Sea and Iranian efforts to expand regional influence or materiel support networks;

(4) An assessment of illicit trafficking and other transnational threats associated with the conflict, including

arms flows, drone proliferation, sanctions evasion, gold or other resource smuggling, and the movement of foreign fighters or mercenary personnel;

(5) A description of current and planned Department of Defense activities, including intelligence support, security cooperation, regional coordination, maritime domain awareness, and efforts to support interagency objectives related to conflict mitigation, atrocity prevention, and the protection of civilians;

(6) An assessment of the extent to which existing authorities, resources, posture, and coordination mechanisms are sufficient to protect United States interests related to Sudan and the Red Sea corridor;

(7) Recommendations for any additional legislative authorities, interagency mechanisms, partner-capacity initiatives, or oversight measures needed to address the threats posed by the conflict; and

(8) A description of how the Department will coordinate with allies and partners to monitor and respond to developments arising from the conflict in Sudan that affect the Red Sea and surrounding region.

**Vietnam Wartime Accounting Initiative**

The committee notes that section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81) authorized the establishment of a cooperative program with the Ministry of Defense of Vietnam and other entities of the Vietnamese government to assist in accounting for Vietnamese personnel missing in action. The committee recognizes and appreciates the decades of assistance from the government and people of Vietnam in locating the remains of hundreds of missing United States servicemembers and believes the cooperative program authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 makes an important contribution to the overall United States-Vietnam bilateral relationship. The committee also notes that there remain significant numbers of Vietnamese categorized as missing in action and recommends that the Department of Defense continue funding the Vietnam Wartime Accounting Initiative.

# TITLE XIII—COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

## Sec. 1301—Cooperative Threat Reduction Funds

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize $221.3 million for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, define the funds as authorized to be appropriated in section 301 of this Act, and authorize CTR funds to be available for obligation for fiscal years 2027, 2028, and 2029.

## Items of Special Interest

### Waste water surveillance

The committee notes waste water surveillance is an important tool for pathogen outbreak and monitoring. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program has a long and successful history in tracking and securing weapons of mass destruction, which includes dangerous pathogens, especially associated with laboratories securing and handling these materials.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of developing partnering efforts to strengthen waste water and other potential environmental and clinical sampling as a means to track the spread of such pathogens as part of an overall effort to secure these biological materials. Such a cooperative effort will also serve as a deterrence function to the potential use of biological agents.

# TITLE XIV—OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

## Subtitle A—Military Programs

### Sec. 1401—Working capital funds

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for the defense working capital funds at the levels identified in section 4501 of division D of this Act.

### Sec. 1402—Chemical agents and munitions destruction, defense

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Defense, at the levels identified in section 4501 of division D of this Act.

### Sec. 1403—Drug interdiction and counter-drug activities, defense-wide

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-wide, at the levels identified in section 4501 of division D of this Act.

### Sec. 1404—Defense Inspector General

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense at the levels identified in section 4501 of division D of this Act.

### Sec. 1405—Defense Health Program

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for Defense Health Program activities at the levels identified in section 4501 of division D of this Act.

## Subtitle B—National Defense Stockpile

### Sec. 1411—Amendments to Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 98 of title 50, United States Code, to make technical and conforming amendments.

### Sec. 1412—Pilot program on public-private partnerships for recycling strategic and critical materials

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, to establish a public-private part-

nership program on recycling strategic and critical materials, not later than May 1, 2027.

The committee strongly encourages the Department of Defense to accelerate domestic commercial-scale recycling of strategic and critical materials and to retain value from Department of Defense scrap assets within the United States.

### Sec. 1413—Inclusion of recovery and recycling of strategic and critical materials in national emergency planning assumptions for National Defense Stockpile

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 98h–5(b) of title 50, United States Code, to include the extent to which expanded processing, recovery, or recycling capacity in the commercial critical materials markets can assist with meeting defense needs, to include e-waste.

## Subtitle C—Other Matters

### Sec. 1431—Extension of Authority for Joint Department of Defense-Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Facility Demonstration Fund

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1704(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84) to extend the Joint Department of Defense-Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Facility Demonstration Fund from September 30, 2027, to September 30, 2028.

### Sec. 1432—Extension of Department of Defense-Department of Veterans Affairs Health Care Sharing Incentive Fund

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 8111(d)(3) of title 38, United States Code, to extend the Department of Defense-Department of Veterans Affairs Health Care Sharing Incentive Fund by 1 year to September 30, 2027.

### Sec. 1433—Modifications to Advisory Council

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1516 of the Armed Forces Retirement Home Act of 1991 (Public Law 101–510) to make modifications to the Advisory Council.

## Items of Special Interest

### Domestic antimony and copper recovery for defense applications

The committee remains concerned about the continued reliance of the United States on foreign sources of antimony and copper, both critical minerals essential to the defense industrial base. The committee notes the potential opportunity to recover antimony and copper as byproducts of domestic mineral production and the possible benefits such recovery could provide for supply chain resilience and national security.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Defense Logistics Agency, to conduct a feasibility and advisability study regarding the establishment of a

pilot program to support the recovery of antimony and copper as byproducts of mineral production in the United States. The study should assess: (1) The technical feasibility of recovering antimony and copper from domestic mineral production streams using multiple recovery processes and techniques; (2) The potential for developing process design plans necessary to scale such recovery activities to demonstration-level production; (3) The feasibility of generating representative sample materials for independent testing and validation of suitability for defense applications; (4) The ability of domestic producers to manufacture antimony materials that meet Defense Logistics Agency specifications; (5) The estimated costs, schedule, and resource requirements associated with establishing and executing such a pilot program; (6) The expected benefits to domestic supply chain resilience and reductions in dependence on foreign sources of antimony and copper; and (7) Any legislative or administrative actions needed to support the establishment of such a pilot program. The committee further directs the Secretary to submit the feasibility and advisability study to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than March 31, 2027.

**Recovery of critical minerals from lithium-ion battery waste**

The committee finds that the secure domestic recovery of critical minerals is a matter of significant national security. When properly recycled, lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) yield several of the most strategically important minerals in the U.S. supply chain, including those essential for national defense such as graphite, manganese, nickel, cobalt, and lithium. As the volume of LIB scrap continues to escalate, the Department of Defense should view its own waste streams as a strategic source for these materials rather than a disposal liability.

The committee notes that the Defense Logistics Agency Hazardous Waste Disposition Services does not currently recycle LIBs internally. Instead, it classifies them as hazardous or universal waste, consolidates them at Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) sites, and ships them under contract to certified recyclers or treatment facilities—with some of those materials eventually being exported to geopolitical rivals for further recovery. As the demand for U.S.-sourced critical minerals and other metals increases, recycling can prove a viable option based on changes in recovery technology and methods and changes in the market. The committee is concerned about the limited information regarding the composition of the waste stream generated by DLA, making it difficult to ensure these strategic minerals are being recovered.

Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on how the DLA tracks, characterizes, and reports the composition of critical minerals present in DLA-managed LIB waste streams. The briefing shall include the following: (1) An assessment of current LIB data collection practices, including any existing tracking of mineral content and a plan to improve systematic tracking of materials contained in LIB waste streams; (2) Opportunities to integrate advanced sorting, sensing, or analytical technologies to improve the characterization of waste

streams; (3) Identification of required changes to the DLA's logistics, contracting, or hazardous waste management systems to enable accurate, material-level tracking; (4) An evaluation of the statutory authorities and specialized capabilities required to implement a recovery program, including the ability of the domestic industrial base to provide these services; (5) An assessment of the costs to capture critical minerals and materials through these processes; (6) Which material streams may ultimately be exported; and (7) Any additional matters the agency wishes to consider.

**Report on domestic tungsten supply chain**

The committee notes that the Department of Defense is currently developing strategic plans to strengthen domestic supply chains for critical materials, including tungsten, which is essential for a wide range of industrial and defense applications. Tungsten is a strategically important material, and the United States has the potential to establish a robust domestic supply chain capable of reducing reliance on foreign sources and supporting both commercial and defense needs.

The committee is concerned about the current reliance on foreign sources of tungsten and the associated risks to national security, supply chain resilience, and defense readiness. The lack of a fully developed domestic tungsten supply chain presents challenges in ensuring consistent access to materials necessary for critical defense systems and industrial applications. The absence of a domestic tungsten scrap utilization and recycling process constitutes a policy failure, one made more acute by adversaries who have moved to capitalize on what the United States has left unrealized.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's plan to establish a domestic tungsten supply chain in the United States. The report shall include the following elements: (1) An assessment of existing domestic tungsten production capacity, including mining, processing, refining, and recycling capabilities, and recommendations for increasing domestic supply; (2) Strategies to establish a resilient supply chain through investment in integrated U.S.-based tungsten mining, processing, refining, and recycling infrastructure; (3) Identification of opportunities to support research, development, and testing capabilities necessary to ensure tungsten meets defense-grade performance requirements; and (4) Recommendations for aligning procurement policies to prioritize and support the domestic mining, production, and recycling of tungsten.

# TITLE XV—SPACE ACTIVITIES, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

## Subtitle A—Space Activities

### Sec. 1501—Modification of acquisition and operation of space systems for space warfighting and control

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2275d of title 10, United States Code, to ensure that the Secretary of Defense shall acquire, hold title to, and operate space systems to be used primarily for warfighting in and from space to meet the requirements specified by one or more combatant commanders in carrying out the responsibilities set forth in section 164 of title 10, United States Code, to ensure an Armed Force owns and operates a space warfighting weapon system.

### Sec. 1502—Modification of special authority for provision of space launch support services to increase space launch capacity

The committee recommends a provision that would amend 2276a of title 10, United State Code, by narrowing the scope of the overhead structure to Air Force properties which the Space Force utilizes for launch operations.

Section 1602 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) created an overhead structure for the use of launch facilities by private rocket companies on major launch ranges. These ranges are Cape Canaveral Space Force Station and Vandenberg Space Force Station. The original provision as written applies to the entire Department of Defense, creating potential conflicts with private ranges on non-Department-owned land when the airspace must be closed for a launch.

### Sec. 1503—Extension of indirect cost limitations and reporting requirements for space launch activities on a military installation

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2276a(e) of title 10, United States Code, to preserve, through fiscal year 2031, predictable range costs while the Department of Defense establishes a uniform, transparent, and auditable methodology for indirect cost recovery.

The committee supports extending the temporary cap on reimbursable indirect costs. In the absence of a standardized Department-wide approach, the committee is concerned that inconsistent overhead charges could create uncertainty for operators and complicate planning for government and commercial missions.

Continuation of the current cap, which is the lesser of 30 percent of reimbursable direct costs or $5.0 million (in fiscal year 2024 con-

stant dollars) per year, provides appropriate transitional guardrails, reduces administrative burden, and enables range personnel to prioritize readiness and mission support. The committee further notes that predictable range economics sustain a competitive commercial launch base and enhance capacity, flexibility, and resilience for national security missions.

**Sec. 1504—Replacement of Space Launch Complex 46 at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station**

The committee recommends a provision, incorporating by reference the Memorandum of Understanding between the Navy and the Space Force, dated April 2, 2026, "Memorandum of Agreement Between Director Strategic Systems Programs and the United States Space Force for the Development and Acceptance of Replacement Facilities for Space Launch Complex 46 (SLC–46)," that would ensure that the Navy will not be forced to move from Space Launch Complex (SLC) 46 until such time as SLC–51 is built and fully satisfies the capability for Navy's fleet ballistic missile test program and other activities performed by the Navy Strategic Systems Program at SLC–46.

The Cape Canaveral Space Force Station is experiencing rapid growth. The number of launches increased by 354% since 2019, with 109 launches in 2025. Of particular concern is the requirement for super heavy vehicle launch sites capable of lifting more than 110,000 pounds to low earth orbit. These vehicles, which use liquid methane-oxygen fuel, have very large blast radiuses. As a result, an effort is underway to move the Navy Strategic Systems Program Naval Ordnance Test Unit from SLC–46 further south on the Cape, to a new site called SLC–51, which has yet to be built but which will be paid for by the private entity that takes possession of SLC–46 for super heavy launch operations either at SLC–46 or adjacent to it at other launch sites. Since the 1980s, SLC–46 has been the principal launch pad to test the Trident D–5 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) as part of our Nation's nuclear deterrent. It is planned to test the Trident D5–LE2 SLBM for the Columbia ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). The Columbia-class SSBN will carry upward of 66% of our Nation's nuclear deterrent and is the guaranteed response capability of our nuclear triad.

This report language should not be interpreted to change the content or intent of the Memorandum of Agreement of this provision.

**Sec. 1505—Integration of space weather into space domain awareness and operations**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that space weather is incorporated as a core component of space domain awareness within the U.S. Space Force by integrating space weather data, modeling, and forecasting into operational systems and processes, updating doctrine and requirements to reflect its operational relevance, and incorporating space weather considerations into the design, acquisition, and sustainment of space domain awareness capabilities, while leveraging, to the maximum extent practicable, existing Fed-

eral capabilities and commercial data. The provision would further require the Secretary to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, detailing implementation status, planned investments, capability gaps, interagency coordination, and any recommended legislative actions.

**Sec. 1506—Delivery of Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to ensure delivery of the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System, not later than December 31, 2028. It also directs the Secretary to submit, within 30 days of the date of the enactment of this Act, an acquisition strategy to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives outlining how the Department of Defense will meet this delivery deadline.

**Sec. 1507—Acquisition of space-based tactical data capability**

The committee recommends a provision that directs the head of an agency that is contracting for space-based functional data capability, to the maximum extent practicable, to ensure that space acquisitions maximize competition and comply with interfaces and standards that maximize resilience and interoperability within the Department of Defense.

**Sec. 1508—Space Launch Enterprise billet sufficiency review and alignment plan**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations, the Commander of Space Systems Command, the Commander of Space Launch Delta 45, and the Commander of Space Launch Delta 30, to conduct a comprehensive billet sufficiency review of the Space Launch Enterprise to determine whether military end strength authorizations are sufficient to support current and projected launch operations through fiscal year 2032, and then to submit a plan based on the review to the congressional defense committees, not later than September 30, 2027.

**Sec. 1509—Flexibility for Department of Air Force to implement acquisition structure for optimal support of new portfolio acquisition executive system within Space Force**

The committee recommends a provision that would repeal statutory requirements relating to the Space Development Agency (SDA) and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO), thereby providing the Secretary of the Air Force greater flexibility to determine the optimal organizational structure for the Space Force acquisition enterprise, including potential alignment under a unified acquisition framework. The provision would also transfer certain personnel management authorities and acquisition authorities currently vested in the SDA and Space RCO to the Secretary of the Air Force for application across the Space Force, increasing flexibility to re-

cruit and allocate acquisition, science, and engineering talent throughout the enterprise.

**Sec. 1510—Arctic connectivity and downlink resiliency initiative**

The committee recommends a provision that would require, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chief of Space Operations and the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, to submit to the congressional defense committees a strategy to secure, high-speed downlink capability and persistent connectivity in high-longitudinal and polar regions.

## Subtitle B—Nuclear Forces

**Sec. 1511—Prohibition on reduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United States**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2027 funds to reduce deployed U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles' (ICBM) responsiveness, alert level, or quantity to fewer than that specified by section 9062(n) of title 10, United States Code. The provision would provide an exception to this prohibition for activities related to maintenance, sustainment, and replacement or activities to ensure safety, security, or reliability.

The committee notes that the modernization of the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad of the United States is vital to the security of the Homeland and a core component of the Homeland defense mission and that extending the life cycle of the current Minuteman III system is both costly and an unsustainable long-term option for maintaining a ready and capable ground-based leg of the nuclear triad. The committee also recognizes that the breach of chapter 325 of title 10, United States Code, by the Sentinel ICBM program to modernize the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad should be addressed in a way that balances the national security need with fiscally responsible modifications to the program that prevent future unanticipated cost overruns, but this does not alter the fundamental national security imperative for the modernization program, which should remain robustly funded and active.

**Sec. 1512—Exception for below-threshold modifications of nuclear missiles to limitation on modification of major items of equipment scheduled for retirement or disposal**

The committee recommends a provision that would create an exception to section 2244a(b) of title 10, United States Code, for below-threshold nuclear missile modifications of less than $500,000 in base year 2027 dollars.

**Sec. 1513—Procurement authority for certain parts of intercontinental ballistic missiles, reentry vehicles, and associated equipment**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of the Air Force and the Direct Reporting Program Manager for Critical Major Weapon Systems to enter into contracts for

the life-of-type procurement of covered parts of intercontinental ballistic missiles, reentry vehicles, and associated equipment, valued at up to $115.0 million for fiscal year 2027.

**Sec. 1514—Limitation on availability of funds pending submission of the strategy to sustain the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile and maximize end of life margin**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2027 Office of the Secretary of the Air Force travel funds to no more than 85 percent until the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees the strategy required by section 1641 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60).

**Sec. 1515—Integration of ICBM maintenance equipment into the LGM–30G weapon system designation**

The committee recommends a provision that includes unique maintenance equipment as part of the LGM–30G weapon system and requires the System Program Office to develop preventative maintenance and/or replacement schedules for such equipment to increase overall weapon system readiness.

The LGM–30G Minuteman III weapon system has been in continuous service since 1970. In the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review, the weapon system boundary was expanded beyond the actual missile and launch control center but did not include the unique maintenance equipment that Air Force personnel use to maintain the system. As a result, many of these maintenance items are essentially orphaned and maintained in an ad-hoc fashion at wing-level repair facilities.

**Sec. 1516—Contract authority for intercontinental ballistic missiles, replacement equipment, and reentry vehicle test equipment and components**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of the Air Force and the Direct Reporting Program Manager for Critical Major Weapon Systems to enter into one or more contracts for the procurement of not more than 125 arming and fuzing assemblies, 48 nuclear certified tractors and trailers, 116 arm/disarm switch replacements, and 13 test support equipment systems. The provision would also authorize the use of contracts for advance procurement and material and equipment in economic order quantities associated with the procurement of such items.

**Sec. 1517—Modification to strategy to sustain Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile and maximize end-of-life margin**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1641 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) to modify the officials responsible for establishing and executing the strategy to sustain the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile and maximize end-of-life margin.

**Sec. 1518—Modifications to portfolio management framework for nuclear forces**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 499c of title 10, United States Code, to change the definition of "nuclear forces" to include "military, civilian, and contractor workforces," add the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile to the list of capabilities that must reach initial operational capability prior to the termination of the requirements of this section, and establish January 1, 2027, as the required date for the Secretary of Defense to implement a revised portfolio management framework for the nuclear forces of the United States.

**Sec. 1519—Modifications to reports on nuclear force reductions**

The committee recommends a provision that would integrate portions the legislative language of section 495 of title 10, United States Code, into section 494 of title 10, United States Code; make technical corrections to the consolidated language of section 494 of title 10, United States Code; and repeal section 495 of title 10, United States Code.

**Sec. 1520—Modifications to biennial report on the plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, nuclear weapons delivery systems, and nuclear weapons command and control system**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 492a of title 10, United States Code, by extending the reporting period of this section through 2033, simplifying the directive text, and establishing the future years defense program and the future years nuclear security program following the date of the report as the period of assessment for this section.

**Sec. 1521—Multipolar nuclear deterrence strategy and theater-range nuclear capabilities**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize, consistent with section 6120 of title 10, United States Code, the establishment of up to two new or modified nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems, provided one such capability is primarily intended to be surface-launched and one such capability is primarily intended to be air-launched. The provision would also require the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to submit a report, not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, on a revised strategy of the Department of Defense for deterring multiple nuclear-armed adversaries. The provision would also establish a requirement that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually brief the congressional defense committees on their joint efforts to implement the conclusions and recommendations of the strategy.

The committee recognizes that the United States is entering a fundamentally new strategic era characterized by the concurrent presence of two nuclear peer competitors, China and Russia, each

possessing expanding, diversifying, and increasingly sophisticated nuclear arsenals. This emerging multipolar nuclear environment represents the most significant shift in the global strategic balance since the end of the Cold War and poses unprecedented challenges for U.S. deterrence strategy and force planning. China is engaged in a rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear forces, including the large-scale construction of intercontinental ballistic missile silos, the development of advanced delivery systems, and the fielding of theater-range nuclear capabilities designed to coerce the United States and its allies. Russia continues to expand and modernize its nuclear arsenal, including a substantial inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons and novel systems intended to exploit perceived gaps in United States and allied deterrence posture. These challenges are further exacerbated by North Korea's continued expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal, which poses unique threats to the United States, its allies, and interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

The committee believes the scale, pace, and diversity of these developments increasingly strain the assumptions underpinning a U.S. nuclear posture designed for a bipolar strategic environment. The committees also believes that the most recent National Defense Strategy fails to adequately recognize, characterize, or operationalize the requirements of deterring two nuclear peer adversaries simultaneously and that it lacks the specificity necessary to guide force structure, posture, and capability development decisions. In particular, the National Defense Strategy does not provide sufficient detail regarding how the Department of Defense will ensure the ability to hold at risk a sufficient number and diversity of targets across multiple nuclear-armed adversaries to maintain a counterforce strategy consistent with the Law of War, nor does it identify the force structure implications of such requirements. The absence of clear guidance in the National Defense Strategy risks delaying necessary investments, obscuring critical capability gaps, and undermining the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments.

The committee strongly believes that the modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad, including the *Columbia*-class ballistic missile submarine, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, the B–21 bomber, the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon, and the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, remains essential and should be fielded on expedited timelines. The committee also believes that additional theater-range nuclear capabilities will likely be required to ensure the United States can credibly deter limited nuclear use and manage escalation across multiple theaters simultaneously. The committee considers the recapitalization of the nuclear security enterprise by the National Nuclear Security Administration to be indispensable to sustaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and believes these efforts should be accelerated wherever possible, using all available policy, regulatory, and statutory tools at the administration's disposal. In parallel, the committee urges the Administrator for Nuclear Security to accelerate efforts to modernize production capabilities and strengthen the workforce of the Nuclear Security Enterprise.

The committee also recognizes that military capabilities are only part of the solution to the deterrence of nuclear threats and that the Department of Defense has not provided sufficient clarity or analytical rigor in the National Defense Strategy regarding the implications of a multipolar nuclear environment for U.S. strategy, force structure, and operational planning. The committee strongly believes the Department should promptly revise and supplement its strategic guidance to explicitly address the requirements of deterring and, if necessary, responding to nuclear coercion or employment by multiple peer adversaries. This requires the United States to urgently adapt its nuclear posture to ensure the capability to hold at risk a sufficient number, variety, and geographic distribution of targets across more than one nuclear-armed adversary simultaneously, while preserving a targeting strategy that relies on holding militarily-significant locations and capabilities at risk. In doing so, the committee believes the Department should assess, develop, and, as appropriate, deploy additional theater-range nuclear capabilities to address identified deterrence gaps and provide the President with credible, flexible response options, as a failure to clearly define and resource a strategy for multipolar nuclear deterrence risks eroding strategic stability, weakening allied confidence, and inviting adversary miscalculation.

## Subtitle C—Missile Defense

### Sec. 1531—Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system and Israeli cooperative missile defense program co-development and co-production

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize funding for the procurement of the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system, David's Sling Weapon System, and Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program as outlined under the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and the government of Israel for cooperative missile defense programs.

### Sec. 1532—Enduring operational capability for the Guam Defense System Command and Control Facility

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, as the Senior Official Responsible for the Missile Defense of Guam, pursuant to section 1660(b)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263), to certify to the congressional defense committees that, before the Guam command and control facility is declared operational, there is a continuity of operations plan and that there are facilities that can assume the functions of the command and control facility if it were to become non-operational.

The Guam Missile Defense System comprises a large array of sensors and integrated air and missile defense interceptors deployed across the island. These sensors and interceptors are integrated into a command-and-control architecture. The Guam Missile Defense Command and Control facility located on the island will orchestrate the battle management command and control of this architecture. Given the singular importance of the facility, it is ap-

parent to the committee that there must be a continuity of operations plan and appropriate facilities if the command-and-control facility were to become non-operational.

The committee further requires that when such certification is made the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command brief the congressional defense committees on the continuity plan and facilities within 45 days.

**Sec. 1533—Further limitation on availability of funds pending independent analysis of space-based missile defense capability**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the obligation or expenditure of 25 percent of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2027 for Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide, and available to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering for travel purposes, until the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits the report required by section 1671(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31).

**Sec. 1534—Modification of Golden Dome missile defense system annual reporting**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1652 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) to modify the official responsible for preparing and submitting, to the congressional defense committees, annual reports on the Golden Dome missile defense system from the Secretary of Defense to the Direct Reporting Program Manager for Golden Dome for America.

**Sec. 1535—Limitation on availability of funds pending submission of the briefing on sea-based launch platforms for ballistic missile defense targets**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the obligation or expenditure of 10 percent of fiscal year 2027 Office of the Secretary of the Navy travel funds until the Secretary provides the briefing required on page 278 of Senate Report 119–39, accompanying S. 2296.

**Sec. 1536—Comprehensive integrated air and missile defense sensor coverage of Guam**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, and in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Army Portfolio Acquisition Executive—Fires, to take such actions as are required to ensure full operational capability for the Aegis Guam System, including emplacement of no fewer than two AN/TPY–6 radars, by not later than September 30, 2030.

**Sec. 1537—Repeal of requirement for Government Accountability Office to review and assess missile defense acquisition programs**

The committee recommends a provision that would repeal section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81), as most recently amended by section 1664 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31).

**Sec. 1538—Improvements to air and missile defense acquisition**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to complete an assessment of U.S. Armed Forces and foreign specified partner air and missile defense systems and interceptors in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility and submit a report on the findings to the congressional defense committees.

## Subtitle D—Other Matters

**Sec. 1541—Sense of the Senate, Inspector General review, and restoration and remediation plans for United States Army, Kwajalein Atoll, and the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range**

The committee recommends a provision that would express the Sense of the Senate that the condition of U.S. facilities located on the Kwajalein Atoll represents an abject failure of U.S. Army leadership and that the persistent lack of progress in rectifying such conditions amounts to an abdication of the Army's responsibility to maintain the capabilities of the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range, sustain the associated infrastructure for U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll, and adequately provide for the health and welfare of the full complement of military, civilian, and contractor personnel assigned to the installation. The provision would also: (1) Require the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DOD), within 150 days of the date of the enactment of this Act, to conduct a review of the condition of DOD infrastructure on Kwajalein Atoll and evaluate the circumstances that led to the current state of the facilities; (2) Require the Deputy Secretary of Defense to develop an initial plan for restoring DOD test and evaluation capabilities and remediating infrastructure on the atoll and submit said plan to the congressional defense committees; (3) Require the Secretary of the Army to annually update said plan and provide a cost estimate for implementing said plan; and (4) Require the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct an annual review of DOD facilities located on the atoll, submit a report on findings, and brief the congressional defense committees.

The committee is profoundly concerned that the Army's inability to maintain these capabilities has jeopardized billions of dollars in critical investments to modernize U.S. munitions stockpiles, develop a national integrated air and missile defense architecture through the Golden Dome for America initiative, and recapitalize the Nation's nuclear deterrent forces. The committee expects the Secretary of the Army to immediately prioritize efforts to restore

U.S. facilities on the Kwajalein Atoll to a state of full mission capability and to establish clear standards of performance for the future to ensure that the Army does not repeat the actions that led to the current state of affairs.

**Sec. 1542—Limitation on the reallocation of funds for the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range and United States Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the reallocation of any appropriated funds or funds otherwise made available for the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range or United States Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll and require such funds be obligated or expended only for the purposes for which funds are authorized and appropriated or otherwise made available.

**Sec. 1543—Notifications with respect to relocating Department of Defense systems out of certain spectrum frequencies**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Department of Defense (DOD) Chief Information Officer (CIO) to notify the congressional defense committees within 30 days of initiating any study to relocate DOD systems out of spectrum frequencies assigned to non-Federal entities. Following notification, the CIO must complete a cost and operational readiness assessment and provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees within 60 days, and then the CIO must submit a written report within 90 days. This provision also prohibits the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2027 funds for any such relocation until both the briefing and report requirements have been fulfilled.

**Sec. 1544—Annual briefing on Department of Defense activities associated with participation in the International Telecommunication Union World Radio Conference**

The committee recommends a provision requiring annual briefings, starting on March 31, 2027, and continuing each calendar year through 2031, on activities by the Department of Defense with respect to participation in events leading up to and in the International Telecommunication Union World Radio Conference (WRC), which is held every 3 to 4 years. The committee must understand the cost and readiness impacts of any proposal for studies and especially the adoption of any WRC studies on the Department.

The briefing shall be delivered by the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with delegation as necessary. In developing the briefing, the Chairman shall take into account the views of the Chiefs of each of the Armed Forces to represent the readiness of the Department as a whole.

**Sec. 1545—Report on efforts to counter foreign espionage and intellectual property theft targeting defense assets**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of such other Federal agencies as the Secretary considers appropriate, to submit

a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, on efforts of the Department of Defense (DOD) to counter espionage and intellectual property theft by China targeting DOD installations, research institutions, and the defense industrial base.

**Sec. 1546—Department of the Air Force electronic warfare roadmap**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend chapter 25 of title 10, United States Code, by requiring the Secretary of the Air Force to develop an integrated air and space capabilities electronic warfare roadmap, not later than March 31, 2027.

Currently, the utilization of electronic warfare capabilities resides in each Armed Service within the Department of the Air Force with little apparent integration between them. The purpose of this roadmap is to integrate the two Services' capabilities in presentation of electronic warfare effects to a combatant command and to minimize any duplication.

This roadmap shall be updated every odd year based upon a rolling 10-year threat assessment. The committee expects the roadmap to represent an integrated capabilities framework between air and space systems. Examples include the use of space data layer networks as a means to rapidly update air frame electronic attack and defensive systems. Since this roadmap is the first of its kind, the committee requires an assessment by the Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Executive Committee (EW EXCOM) as defined in chapter 25 of title 10, United States Code. If successful, the committee's expectation is that other Armed Forces will develop a similar roadmap to be reviewed by the EW EXCOM for a Joint Force presentation of effects to the combatant commands. Finally, the congressional defense committees shall be briefed on the roadmap produced every odd year in consultation with the EW EXCOM.

**Sec. 1547—Using operational electronic intelligence assets to engage high-value targets**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the National Security Agency approves, directs, and enables the direct and immediate dissemination of all operational electronic intelligence data collected on high-value targets to military command nodes in the U.S. Indo-Pacific and European Command areas of responsibility.

## Items of Special Interest

**Affordable dual-capable air-launched strike capabilities**

The committee is concerned that the evolving security environment increasingly requires the United States to deter and, if necessary, prevail in simultaneous or overlapping crises across multiple theaters. The committee notes that potential adversaries continue to expand and diversify their inventories of long-range conventional and nuclear-capable strike systems, including cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and hypersonic weapons designed to hold United States forces, allies, and partners at risk.

The committee further recognizes that current and planned United States air-launched strike capabilities often involve highly specialized systems optimized for either conventional or nuclear missions, are procured in relatively limited quantities, or may not be affordable to produce at the scale required for sustained operations in a protracted conflict. As a result, the committee believes the Department of the Air Force should evaluate opportunities to leverage common technologies, production infrastructure, and modular designs to develop more affordable and scalable air-launched weapons capable of supporting both conventional and strategic deterrence requirements.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, to conduct an assessment of options for developing a family of affordable, dual-capable air-launched cruise missiles, air-launched ballistic missiles, and air-launched hypersonic glide vehicles to include a conventional variant of the Long Range Stand-Off Weapon that could be produced at scale and employed by both fighter and bomber aircraft.

The assessment shall examine:

(1) Operational requirements for dual-capable air-launched weapons across the Indo-Pacific, European, and other geographic combatant command theaters;

(2) Opportunities to employ common airframes, propulsion systems, guidance packages, launch interfaces, and other subsystems across conventional and nuclear mission sets;

(3) Options for integrating such weapons onto current and planned Air Force fighter and bomber aircraft;

(4) Anticipated acquisition, procurement, sustainment, and lifecycle costs associated with alternative concepts;

(5) Production capacity, supply chain considerations, and opportunities to maximize surge manufacturing capability during crisis or conflict;

(6) The extent to which commercially derived technologies, digital engineering approaches, open-system architectures, and nontraditional defense contractors could reduce development timelines and program costs;

(7) The relative advantages, limitations, and operational risks associated with cruise missile, ballistic missile, and hypersonic glide vehicle approaches;

(8) Opportunities to increase magazine depth and provide commanders with a broader range of survivable strike options at short-, medium-, and long-range distances; and

(9) Any legislative, budgetary, policy, or infrastructure-related considerations relevant to the development, deployment, and sustainment of such capabilities.

Not later than April 1, 2027, the Secretary of the Air Force shall brief the congressional defense committees on the results of the assessment, including recommendations for potential prototype efforts, technology demonstrations, acquisition strategies, and investments necessary to support the development of affordable, scalable dual-capable air-launched strike systems.

**Assessing Department of Defense and National Nuclear Security Administration compliance with congressional direction on the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile**

The committee is deeply concerned by the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) apparent reticence in expediting the development and fielding of the nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM–N) program, despite clear statutory direction to do so and public endorsements on the urgent need for this capability by our Nation's highest ranking military officers—including successive Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chiefs of Naval Operations. Despite repeated assurances by DOD and NNSA personnel of their commitment to the program, it is difficult for this committee to interpret the failure to request fiscal year 2027 funding in support of this obligation, even as the Department submitted an unprecedented $1.5 trillion budget, as anything but an absolutely unnecessary programmatic risk given the potential for successive continuing resolutions and a clear disregard of explicit congressional intent.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy, the Administrator for Nuclear Security, the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs, without delegation and not later than August 1, 2026, to brief the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces on: (1) The status of the SLCM–N program; (2) DOD actions to enable the program to achieve the statutorily directed fielding dates; and (3) The policies and procedures to be implemented to ensure the Department will consistently and adequately resource the SLCM–N program to fully comply with statutory obligations specifically and congressional intent generally.

**Assessment of orbital data center services**

The committee recognizes the increasing volume of data generated by national security space systems and the potential operational benefits of emerging commercial capabilities that enable data processing, storage, and analytics in space. The committee notes that orbital data center services and space-based cloud computing capabilities may offer advantages in reducing latency, improving resilience, and enhancing mission effectiveness in contested environments.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Innovation Unit, to conduct an assessment of the viability and military utility of commercially available orbital data center services and space-based cloud computing capabilities for national security space and joint mission requirements. The assessment should evaluate potential operational use cases, integration with existing and planned Department of Defense architectures, resilience and mission assurance benefits, and any challenges associated with adoption or transition to operational use and should be conducted not later than December 31, 2027.

The committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2028, on the results of the assessment, including

mission applications evaluated, key findings, lessons learned, and recommendations regarding future acquisition strategies or operational employment of orbital data center services.

**Autonomous Electromagnetic Spectrum Dominance and Edge Resilience**

The committee recognizes that the 2026 National Defense Strategy identifies electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) superiority as a prerequisite for maintaining U.S. military advantage and deterring adversaries in increasingly contested operational environments. The committee acknowledges that the Army Research Laboratory's collaborative research efforts through Project Autonomous EMS Dominance and Edge Resilience (AEDER) to develop leap-ahead capabilities in communications, sensing, data processing, and electronic warfare. By integrating artificial intelligence and machine learning with cyber and electromagnetic operations, Project AEDER seeks to accelerate the development of autonomous capabilities capable of detecting, identifying, and responding to adversary actions at machine speed while protecting friendly systems from interference and attack.

The committee is particularly encouraged by research efforts focused on resilient communications and adaptive antenna technologies, autonomous swarm and counter-swarm operations, advanced multi-modal sensing and positioning capabilities, and AI-driven tactical edge computing. These technologies have the potential to enhance situational awareness, strengthen resilient communications in contested environments, improve protection against electronic attack, and accelerate decision-making at the tactical edge.

Accordingly, the committee emphasizes that sustained funding for Project AEDER is critical to maturing these technologies, accelerating their transition to the warfighter, and achieving and maintaining dominance across the electromagnetic spectrum.

**Briefing on a unified intercontinental ballistic missile depot**

The committee appreciates the efforts of the Direct Reporting Program Manager for Critical Major Weapon Systems (DRPM (CMWS)) to improve integration across the Air Force intercontinental ballistic missile mission space, especially the enhanced focus on managing the sustainment of the LGM–30G Minuteman III (MMIII) system until it can be fully replaced by the LGM–35A Sentinel. However, the committee remains concerned that the extended transition period between these two weapon systems will simultaneously present a unique sustainment challenge at both the field and depot levels, and the Air Force will be hard-pressed to manage this effort without identifying opportunities to streamline maintenance support in a way that allows for common equipment usage across both weapons systems.

Accordingly, the committee directs the DRPM (CMWS), in coordination with the Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command and the Commander, Air Force Materiel Command, to brief the Senate Armed Services Committee on the feasibility of establishing a unified intercontinental ballistic missile depot approach to concurrently support the continued operational fielding of the MMIII

and the transition from MMIII to Sentinel, while maximizing commonality across support equipment, tooling, and maintenance personnel training. The DRPM (CMWS) should provide this briefing not later than February 1, 2027.

**Briefing on acquisition of Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor**

The committee recognizes the critical importance of Golden Dome for America and advancing our missile defense capabilities to counter emerging and evolving threats posed by both ballistic and maneuverable hypersonic missiles. The successful deployment of advanced missile defense systems is paramount in maintaining national security and ensuring the defense of the Homeland. In this regard, the committee strongly emphasizes the significance of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) capability, which underwent exhaustive competition and deployment of a successful prototype under the Missile Defense Agency. The HBTSS provides real-time tracking and early detection of hypersonic and ballistic missiles over an operationally relevant range of threat trajectories, enabling timely and effective interception. The space-based sensor network is essential for providing continuous global coverage, high-resolution tracking, and improved discrimination of complex threat environments.

To this end, in the spirit of the Acquisition Transformation Strategy's focus on delivering capability and speed and scale, embracing proven capabilities that are ready-now, the committee directs the U.S. Space Force to prioritize acquisition and operational deployment of a full constellation of at least 45 space vehicles equipped with proven HBTSS payloads within the anticipated Missile Defense Tranche 3 (MDT3) program. In consideration of the urgent need for this capability, the committee recommends that the U.S. Space Force expedite the MDT3 program by utilizing the flexibility of other transaction authorities (OTA) to move already competed, successful prototype demonstrations into production to streamline the acquisition process. This approach will facilitate rapid development and deployment while maintaining rigorous oversight and accountability.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to provide a detailed briefing to the committee, not later than March 1, 2027, outlining the comprehensive acquisition plan for the MDT3 HBTSS constellation, including timelines, cost estimates, and the intended use of sole source contracts and OTAs. The briefing shall also address risk mitigation strategies and coordination efforts with other relevant defense programs to ensure seamless integration and functionality of the HBTSS.

**Briefing on Air Force implementation of section 1634 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60)**

The committee directs the Direct Reporting Program Manager for Critical Major Weapon Systems, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear

Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than October 1, 2026, on the progress of the B–21 Raider program office specifically, and the Air Force generally, in implementing the requirements of section 1634 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), including: (1) A description of system development and testing objectives and nuclear certification processes and milestones required to fulfill section 1634 statutory requirements; (2) Program resourcing adjustments in the current year of execution and across the current future years defense program that the Air Force has taken to enable the fulfillment of section 1634; and (3) Any other related matters the directed officials believe relevant.

**Briefing on continuity of operations for Space Development Agency ground infrastructure**

The committee recognizes the critical importance of resilient ground infrastructure to support space-enabled command and control, including space domain awareness, custody, and fire control integration functions associated with proliferated space architectures. The committee further notes that future contested and degraded operational environments will require the ability to maintain uninterrupted ground operations and mission management functions supporting space-based capabilities.

The committee is interested in ensuring that the Department of Defense maintains continuity of operations for mission-critical ground systems supporting space warfighting capabilities, including geographically distributed resilience and the ability to operate through disruption or attack.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Director of the Space Development Agency, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the Department's plan to ensure continuity of operations for ground infrastructure supporting space domain awareness, custody, and fire control missions associated with proliferated space architectures. The briefing shall include: (1) The Department's approach to establishing geographically distributed continuity of operations capabilities to ensure resilient and uninterrupted ground operations under degraded or contested conditions; (2) How existing Space Operations Center infrastructure is being leveraged or adapted to support continuity of operations requirements; (3) The integration of mission management functions within the broader ground infrastructure supporting space-enabled command and control; (4) The resources, infrastructure, and personnel required to achieve and sustain continuous 24-hour, 7-day-per-week operational capability; and (5) Key milestones, implementation timelines, and risks associated with achieving full operational capability for distributed continuity of operations functions.

**Briefing on execution and results of allied and theater missile defense review**

The committee notes that the President's Executive Order (14186) on Iron Dome for America, dated January 27, 2025, which established the Golden Dome for America integrated air and mis-

sile defense initiative, also directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct ". . . a review of theater missile defense posture and initiatives to identify ways in which the United States and its allies and partners can: (a) Increase bilateral and multilateral cooperation on missile defense technology development, capabilities, and operations; (b) Improve theater missile defenses of forward-deployed United States troops and allied territories, troops, and populations; and (c) Increase and accelerate the provision of United States missile defense capabilities to allies and partners."

However, despite repeated inquiries with the Department of Defense, the committee has been unable to ascertain the status of this review, despite its apparent priority as a directive from the President and the potential value of these activities to the long-term success of the Golden Dome for America initiative.

The committee recognizes the value of allied contributions and cooperative development activities on missile defense operations and technologies, appreciates the focus on these efforts within the President's Executive Order, and strongly believes there exists significant potential for expanding the scale and scope of these efforts to address rapidly growing air and missile threats.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than December 1, 2026, on the status of the theater air and missile defense review directed by the President's Executive Order on Iron Dome for America, including any follow-on actions resulting from said review, as appropriate.

**Briefing on expanded use of medium-range air defenses for Homeland defense**

The committee recognizes that medium-range air defense systems have protected the National Capital Region continuously since 2005, are currently being acquired to support operations of U.S. forces overseas, and serve allied and partner nations. Recent combat operations in Ukraine have demonstrated effectiveness rates exceeding 90 percent in engagements against cruise missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and air-breathing threats in all weather conditions with significantly low downtime. These medium-range systems feature substantial U.S. manufacturing content, utilize interceptor missiles already in Department of Defense inventory, and have procurement timelines within 24 months from contract award to fielding.

The committee is concerned that existing production capacity constraints and current backlogs for interceptor systems may limit near-term availability for Homeland defense missions. The committee believes that diversifying interceptor options, rather than further stressing existing production bottlenecks, will enhance overall air and missile defense capacity while supporting the defense industrial base goals established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60).

Therefore, the committee directs the Direct Reporting Program Manager for Golden Dome for America to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than December 1, 2026, on opportunities to expand the use of medium-range air defense systems in the U.S. Homeland defense strategy and architecture. The briefing

shall include, at a minimum: (1) A description and depiction of the current and objective Homeland air defense posture and laydown; (2) Currently deployed defense systems to counter cruise missile, unmanned aerial systems, and air-breathing threats; (3) An assessment of the current posture against these medium-range threats and an identification of gaps or vulnerabilities against these threats; (4) An assessment of available and feasible options to enhance medium-range air defense capabilities, including those systems and interceptors with production capacity available within 24 months that do not exacerbate current munitions backlogs or create further supply chain risk; (5) The schedule and cost projections for fielding and deploying the identified medium-range air defense systems; and (6) An addressing of current and projected defense industrial base demand when assessing the availability and feasibility of the air defense system and interceptor options.

**Briefing on feasibility of designating Air Force Global Strike Command as the National Center for Conventional-Nuclear Integration**

The committee notes that section 9068 of title 10, United States Code, establishes Air Force Global Strike Command and provides that its Commander is the single accountable officer responsible for carrying out all aspects of Air Force nuclear and long-range strike missions in support of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), including nuclear command, control, and communications systems and the development of employment strategies, concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures for strategic deterrence, nuclear deterrence operations, and long-range strike operations.

Consistent with this designation, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than April 15, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of establishing Air Force Global Strike Command as the Department of the Air Force's "National Center for Conventional-Nuclear Integration," (CNI) consistent with the roles, responsibilities, and functions of Air Force Global Strike Command and its Commander under section 9068 of title 10, United States Code. At a minimum, the briefing should include an assessment of the following responsibilities for inclusion in the designation described above: (1) Develops and maintains Air Force-wide CNI operational concepts, standards, and implementation guidance to integrate conventional and nuclear planning, command and control, and execution in support of STRATCOM-assigned missions; (2) Establishes a governance and coordination framework to synchronize CNI efforts across relevant Air Force major commands, field commands, and centers, and to align Air Force CNI implementation with STRATCOM's operational requirements; (3) Identifies required training, education, and exercise objectives to institutionalize CNI proficiency across the force, including incorporation into appropriate operational plans and readiness constructs; and (4) Identifies CNI-related capability gaps and resourcing priorities, including doctrine, interoperability, decision support, and command and control enablers.

The briefing shall also address: (1) The organizational approach and resourcing strategy for the National Center for CNI, should

such a designation be implemented; (2) Notional objectives and milestones for institutionalizing CNI across doctrine, training, exercises, and operational employment; and (3) An assessment of the extent to which the designation advances the statutory responsibilities of Air Force Global Strike Command under section 9068 of title 10, United States Code, in support of STRATCOM's nuclear and long-range strike missions.

**Briefing on feasibility of designating Joint Global Strike Operations Center as an alternate command post to United States Strategic Command Global Operations Center**

The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and the Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than June 1, 2027, on the feasibility, military utility, risks, and resource requirements of designating the Joint Global Strike Operations Center (J–GSOC) at Barksdale Air Force Base as an alternate command post to STRATCOM Global Operations Center. At a minimum, the briefing shall address: (1) A proposed concept of operations describing how the J–GSOC would assume and sustain alternate command post responsibilities to support STRATCOM-assigned nuclear and long-range strike missions across steady-state operations, crisis response, and major conflict; (2) The proposed command relationships, authorities, and supported/supporting arrangements for the alternate command post, including required coordination with STRATCOM, Air Force Global Strike Command, Eighth Air Force, and associated operational command and control nodes; (3) An assessment of required communications and interoperability capabilities (including redundancy, resiliency, and survivability) necessary to perform alternate command post functions, including interfaces with nuclear command, control, and communications systems supporting STRATCOM-assigned missions; (4) Identification of required facilities, infrastructure, and military construction improvements, with cost estimates and a notional execution timeline; (5) Identification of required manpower to sustain continuous operations at the readiness level required, including any specialized requirements necessary to support nuclear and long-range strike command and control; and (6) Identification of required funding resources across the future years defense program to establish, operate, and sustain the alternate command post, including near-term resourcing actions and any legislative authorities the Secretary determines necessary.

**Briefing on in-space mobility, logistics, and sustainment capabilities**

The committee recognizes that future space operations will require the ability to maneuver, sustain, and reconstitute space systems in orbit in order to support credible deterrence, resilience, and sustained operations in a contested space domain. The committee further notes that U.S. Space Command has identified space mobility, logistics, and sustainment as a critical capability gap, particularly with respect to on-orbit maneuver, transportation, refueling,

servicing, resupply, and reconstitution of space assets across multiple orbital regimes.

The committee believes that establishing clear operational requirements and an acquisition plan for in-space logistics and sustainment is necessary to address this gap, enable more resilient space architectures, and support sustained deterrence and warfighting effectiveness. The committee further notes that development of these capabilities would help strengthen the domestic space industrial base by creating sustained demand for emerging on-orbit service technologies.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Space Command, to provide a report and briefing to the congressional defense committees on space mobility, logistics, and sustainment requirements and capabilities, not later than June 1, 2027. The report and briefings shall include: (1) The process and timeline for developing operational requirements and an acquisition plan for space mobility, logistics, and sustainment capabilities; (2) The defined requirements to enable on-orbit maneuver, transportation, refueling, servicing, resupply, and reconstitution of space assets across orbital regimes; (3) How these capabilities will be integrated into joint and combined operational concepts, planning, and deterrence strategies; (4) An assessment of how space mobility, logistics, and sustainment capabilities will support resilience, crisis response, and sustained operations in a contested environment; (5) Implications for force development, including organizational constructs, roles, and responsibilities needed to operationalize these capabilities; and (6) An assessment of how these capabilities may support and accelerate the growth of a domestic industrial base for on-orbit servicing and logistics technologies.

**Briefing on Lower Tier Air Missile Defense System Sensor sparing and sustainment plan**

The committee notes that the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) is the Army's primary radar for the Integrated Air and Missile Defense used by the United States and its allies and partners. Additionally, the committee notes that the Army has been designated the lead to integrate the LTAMDS into the existing Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) weapon system architecture for the United States and its 19 PATRIOT partner nations across the globe.

The committee understands that global missile defense posture will rely heavily on LTAMDS capabilities to meet growing demand for defense against advancing tactical ballistic missile and air breathing threats and to withstand increased requirements for radiation or "burn time" necessary to prevent threat leaks through the layered defense architecture.

However, the committee is concerned that the Army has not adequately defined the sparing package required for each LTAMDS radar to ensure the system stays fully mission capable to meet demanding unified combatant commands' commander requirements for air defense of forward-deployed forces. The lack of a dedicated sparing risks undermining billions of dollars in LTAMDS procurement over the Department of Defense's future years defense pro-

gramming as the warfighter will not have on hand the necessary spares required to keep the radar operational. This lack of adequate sustainment planning is seen in the extreme case of the Army's current usage of a second LTAMDS radar in Guam solely for cannibalization of parts for the other radar in testing.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the sustainment and sparing plan for LTAMDS. The briefing shall address, at a minimum:

(1) A system sustainment strategy overview and support concept that details the sustainment needs of the LTAMDS radar for warfighter requirements;

(2) A maintenance planning framework that ensures long-term readiness of deployed systems;

(3) A supply support-approach that supports initial and recurring spares and repairs;

(4) A plan for sustaining engineering services;

(5) Identification of near-term mission support gaps and mitigation recommendations related to currently deployed systems; and

(6) Any additional considerations the Secretary deems necessary.

**Briefing on options for development of low-cost space-based interceptors in support of Golden Dome for America**

The committee is concerned about emerging threats to the Homeland as near-peer adversaries build and diversify their missile inventories. The drastic increase in the volume and capability of cruise, ballistic, hypersonic, and space-based missile threats over the last several years requires a transformational response. The air and missile defense system proposed by Executive Order 14186, commonly known as Golden Dome for America, may provide the architecture necessary to provide a lasting, modern defense against these emerging threats. The architecture's effectiveness is reliant on the successful development and deployment of a proliferated space-based interceptor (SBI) network of constellations to defeat incoming threats. In addition to a proliferated SBI network, the Department of Defense must deploy an all-inclusive mesh command and control solution that connects all capabilities into a single domain to provide theater-level insights for all potential threats.

The committee is aware of commercially available terminals able to combine electronic warfare for terrestrial and space domain awareness, artificial intelligence for electronic warfare and sensor fusion applications, and secure tactical communications with a software-defined radio and on-orbit software programmable crypto developed specifically to address these challenges. Commercially available space terminal providers offer qualified low earth orbit (LEO) space payloads and relevant application experience to meet Golden Dome and Space Force needs and may aid in driving down costs for an SBI constellation.

The committee encourages the U.S. Space Force to procure, test, and evaluate commercial terminals launched and qualified in LEO for integration into the future Golden Dome architecture that can demonstrate electronic warfare for terrestrial and space domain

awareness, artificial intelligence for sensor fusion applications, and secure tactical communications with software-defined radio and programmable crypto. The terminals evaluated should, at a minimum, provide target detection, identification, geolocation, sensor fusion, and target tracking to meet the relevant LEO space platform mission requirements.

The committee both acknowledges the need for an SBI capability and recognizes the potentially high cost associated with the development, procurement, and sustainment of even a deployed interceptor capacity. Therefore, the committee encourages the Department of Defense to prioritize affordable, scalable, mass-producible SBI capabilities to ensure effectiveness while reducing the cost per successful intercept.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Research and Engineering, and the Chief of Space Operations, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the development, procurement, and operational deployment strategies for the SBI program. The briefing shall cover, at a minimum: (1) Projected costs to achieve the minimum capacity of the Department's operational deployment strategy of SBIs, including the projected cost of development, procurement of interceptor rounds, launch, and fleet replenishment; (2) An initial assessment of industry options that meet defined criteria for affordability and scalability, including technological readiness, integration potential with current systems, and how these options align with the overall strategic objectives of the SBI program; and (3) Analyses regarding the effect private capital investments have on the speed to ramp production and affordability.

**Briefing on plan for defending Golden Dome assets from autonomous and remotely piloted aircraft**

The committee notes that the growing proliferation of autonomous and remotely piloted aircraft represents a growing threat to U.S. installations, facilities, and equipment worldwide. In light of this risk, the committee is concerned about the vulnerability of critical ground assets to autonomous and remotely piloted threats to the Golden Dome for America (GDA) architecture. To ensure the survivability of radars, satellite communication nodes, and interceptor sites, the committee believes that the Department of Defense should develop a tailored approach to defending these assets and prioritize counter-unmanned aircraft systems (cUAS) investments appropriately.

Accordingly the committee directs the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Direct Reporting Program Manager for Golden Dome for America, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027, on the Department's assessment of:

(1) The vulnerability of critical GDA assets to autonomous and remotely piloted aircraft threats;

(2) Non-kinetic solutions uniquely suited for the defense of critical assets in the Homeland, including high power microwave systems;

(3) Plans to accelerate the deployment of non-kinetic point defense solutions, including associated resourcing requirements;

(4) Any policy and regulatory barriers to the effective employment of non-kinetic cUAS initiatives under the GDA and the current pathway for system approval by interagency stakeholders as required; and

(5) Ongoing efforts to test and evaluate commercially available technologies for critical point defense against UAS threats in the Homeland.

**Briefing on progress of reconversion of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine missile tubes**

The committee notes that as part of the United States' efforts to comply with the provisions of the now-expired treaty between the United States and Russia on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, or New START, a number of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine missile launch tubes underwent a conversion process to remove the capability of these tubes to carry or launch ballistic missiles. Public Law 119–21 contained a provision for the enhancement of resources for nuclear forces, providing $62.0 million to reconvert these tubes and make them once again operationally available to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command as a means of offsetting the rapid growth and diversification of China's and Russia's nuclear arsenals.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the Direct Reporting Program Managers for Submarines and the Director of Navy Strategic Systems Programs, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than January 15, 2027, on the Navy's progress toward executing the funding for missile tube reconversion, as well as any such related actions, including the procurement of additional Trident II ballistic missiles, necessary to fully reactivate these missile tubes.

**Briefing on proliferated space architectures**

The committee notes the importance of proliferated space architectures for enabling resilience and mission assurance for national security needs derived from space-based capabilities. The committee observes that proliferated space architectures in low earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) for communications, missile warning, and other space control missions disproportionately benefit from the resilience provided by proliferation.

The committee further notes that proliferated architectures for these mission areas provide an asymmetric advantage to the U.S. national security community and deny first-mover advantage to adversaries targeting space-based capabilities. Furthermore, the committee expresses interest in the potential for the Department of the Air Force to leverage "productized," domestically produced commercial satellite buses to accelerate the deployment of these constellations while reducing non-recurring engineering costs.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the benefits of transitioning core mission areas of the U.S. Space Force to proliferated space architec-

tures in LEO and GEO. The briefing should include the following: (1) An assessment of how the core functions of the U.S. Space Force would benefit from more proliferated space architectures across all mission areas and orbital regimes; (2) An assessment of the benefits of proliferated space architectures in ensuring persistent mission availability that denies adversaries first-mover advantage in times of conflict; (3) An evaluation of the cost, schedule, and performance implications of transitioning to proliferated space architectures while leveraging commoditized, domestically produced buses, including production metrics such as yearly production rates of a single design that measure the ability to deliver buses at scale and on rapid timelines; (4) An assessment of how such scalability and production capacity contribute to survivability and continuity of operations; and (5) An identification of the challenges of transitioning to such an architecture within the next 24 months and a mitigation plan to address those challenges.

**Briefing on radiation source testing capacity**

The committee is concerned that existing radiation source testing capacity is insufficient to meet the current and future demands of simultaneously modernizing Department of Defense nuclear, missile defense, and space capabilities.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Direct Reporting Program Manager for Critical Major Weapon Systems, and the Direct Reporting Program Manager for Golden Dome for America, to brief the congressional committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on anticipated gaps in strategic radiation testing capabilities needed for nuclear weapon system modernization and missile defense, including Fast Burst Reactor availability.

**Briefing on reactivation of Grand Forks Air Force Base nuclear facilities**

The committee notes that Grand Forks Air Force Base once housed two legs of the nuclear triad and all the support facilities that went along with that task. The B–52 nuclear mission was housed there from 1963 to 1994, and the base's intercontinental ballistic missile mission lasted from 1966 to 1998. In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense reduced its nuclear force capacity and closed or developed alternative missions for numerous facilities. However, as a new era of expanded nuclear competition with Russia and China has dawned, the committee believes it is prudent to reexamine the current limited nuclear footprint and begin assessing options for increased dispersal, resilience, and increased operational flexibility.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, detailing: (1) The condition of the nuclear storage facilities on Grand Forks Air Force Base; and (2) The feasibility of refurbishing and certifying such facilities to handle and store nuclear weapons again.

**Briefing on resource sufficiency for National Strategic Research Institute**

The committee recognizes that, in 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) established a university-affiliated research center (UARC) at the University of Nebraska, sponsored by the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). As the only DOD UARC aligned to a combatant command, the National Strategic Research Institute (NSRI) is uniquely positioned to be responsive to warfighter perspectives in ways that other UARCs are not institutionally capable.

The committee recognizes that this arrangement, lacking the traditional military service sponsor, has constrained budgetary resources to support vital research for STRATCOM and the DOD on the policy and technical dimensions of strategic deterrence and escalation dynamics, multi-actor deterrence, peer-to-peer multi-domain strategic competition, extended deterrence with partners and allies, nuclear command and control modernization, and electromagnetic spectrum warfare, control, and management.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Commander, STRATCOM, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than October 1, 2026, on options to enhance enduring resources to support NSRI research activities, including an assessment of the advisability of transferring sponsorship of the NSRI from STRATCOM to the United States Air Force account, consistent with other UARCs.

**Briefing on space and nuclear risk reduction measures among the United States, Russia, and China**

The committee recognizes that intensifying strategic competition among the United States, Russia, and China is occurring alongside increasing reliance on space-based capabilities and the continued salience of nuclear deterrence. The committee notes that the absence of sufficient transparency, predictability, and risk reduction mechanisms in both the nuclear and space domains increases the potential for miscalculation, escalation, and unintended conflict. In the absence of treaty-based mechanisms, measures for consistent analytical reporting and transparency between the executive branch and Congress remain important for informed oversight of United States nuclear policy, force posture decisions, strategic stability, and risk reduction among the United States, Russia, and China.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense, Policy and Programs, in coordination with the Administrator for Nuclear Security, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, and the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than April 15, 2027, on existing and potential nuclear and space risk reduction measures. At a minimum, the briefing shall include:

(1) A detailed description and assessment of existing bilateral and multilateral defense mechanisms, agreements, and informal arrangements involving the United States, Russia, and China that are intended to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict and escalation, as well as miscalculation in the space domain;

(2) An evaluation of potential options for further actions the Department of Defense, in coordination with interagency and allied partners, could pursue to strengthen space security and reduce space-related nuclear risks, including:

(a) measures to mitigate and respond to the creation and proliferation of orbital debris, including debris resulting from anti-satellite weapons testing or use;

(b) initiatives to promote responsible behavior in space, including norms, rules, and transparency measures;

(c) approaches to improve the resilience and protection of critical space-based systems that support nuclear command, control, and communications and other strategic missions; and

(d) opportunities for bilateral or multilateral engagement with strategic competitors aimed at reducing the risks of misinterpretation or escalation stemming from activities in space;

(3) An evaluation of the feasibility, risks, and limitations associated with integrating additional verification and transparency measures into current or future nuclear systems, postures, and operations, including:

(a) the potential benefits and drawbacks of increased transparency for strategic stability;

(b) technical and operational challenges associated with implementing such measures;

(c) risks to the survivability, security, and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces and supporting systems; and

(d) potential vulnerabilities arising from adversary exploitation of transparency or verification mechanisms, including risks to sensitive information, operational security, and deterrence credibility; and

(4) An assessment of how proposed or existing risk reduction measures in the nuclear and space domains affect U.S. allies and partners, including implications for extended deterrence, assurance, and allied space capabilities, as well as any recommendations for additional initiatives that may increase stability.

**Briefing on space debris reduction through transient materials**

The committee is aware of the growing accumulation of man-made debris in low Earth orbit and the risks such debris poses to national security space systems, commercial satellites, and civil space activities. The committee notes that emerging technologies, including transient and degradable materials, may offer innovative approaches to mitigating long-term orbital debris while preserving mission effectiveness.

The committee believes the Department of Defense should further explore the feasibility and operational utility of such technologies, including through collaboration with institutions of higher education, federally funded research and development centers, and commercial partners with expertise in advanced materials and space systems.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Space Operations, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the feasibility, operational effectiveness, and potential implementation pathways of transient-material technologies for space debris reduction.

The briefing shall include: (1) An assessment of material degradation timelines, performance characteristics, and compatibility with existing and planned space systems, including implications for mission assurance; (2) An evaluation of operational, environmental, and safety considerations; (3) Identification of opportunities for collaboration with academic, commercial, and federally funded partners; and (4) Preliminary recommendations for future research, development, testing, and evaluation efforts, including pilot programs or demonstrations.

**Briefing on space-based solar power and commercial solar technologies for proliferated architectures**

The committee supports the Department of Defense's focus on rapidly delivering capability to the warfighter, strengthening the domestic defense industrial base, and leveraging commercial innovation and non-traditional suppliers to maintain advantage in a contested space domain. The committee further recognizes that the growth of proliferated space architectures and layered missile defense systems will require a significant increase in space-based systems, which in turn depends on a resilient and scalable domestic industrial base capable of producing space-qualified power components at volume.

The committee is interested in understanding how the United States Space Force plans to leverage commercially available, domestically manufactured silicon-based photovoltaic technologies to support rapid deployment of space systems, including technologies capable of high-volume production and modular integration to support proliferated architectures.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the Space Force's plans to incorporate commercially scalable solar power technologies into future space architectures. The briefing shall include:

(1) Space capabilities and programs under consideration for transition to a more proliferated and distributed architecture;

(2) An assessment of the ability of commercially available silicon photovoltaic technologies, including advanced and modular solar cell designs, to meet the power requirements of those capabilities and programs;

(3) A comparison of relevant solar power approaches, including advanced multi-junction technologies and commercially produced silicon-based solutions, in supporting emerging mission needs; and

(4) An assessment of how increased use of commercially produced solar technologies could improve mission assurance, supply chain resilience, and operational flexibility for space-based systems.

**Briefing on strategic radioisotope supply chains**

The committee believes that securing supply chains for radioisotopes is a top national defense priority across the Department of Defense. The committee notes that radioisotopes are a key material component for several critical national security technologies, including power systems, radiation detection equipment, and non-destructive material analysis.

The committee further notes that the supply chains to produce, recover, process, or otherwise make available strategic radioisotopes domestically, or acquire strategic radioisotopes from ally countries, remain vulnerable and subject to disruption. The committee recognizes that foreign adversaries are using strategic radioisotopes to develop advanced military technology and that the United States cannot lag behind in developing competing and superior radioisotope-based technologies. Therefore, the Department of Defense should prioritize efforts to bolster strategic radioisotope supply chains as part of the larger national effort to reinvigorate the national defense industrial base.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Secretary of the Navy, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on:

(1) The status of current strategic radioisotope supply chains, including domestic production and availability across the full life cycle from feedstock access (including government-owned materials) through recovery, purification, processing, and preparation of radioisotopes into forms usable for defense manufacturing and integration, and known vulnerabilities in these chains;

(2) Projected Department of Defense demand for strategic radioisotopes necessary to sustain existing capabilities and to enable advanced energy and power technologies to support operations in austere environments, including commercial radioisotope power systems for subsea and space applications, with specific consideration of strontium-90 and americium-241 over the coming future years defense program;

(3) Opportunities to better secure existing radioisotope supply chains through expanded use of Department of Defense support programs, such as the Industrial Base Fund established under section 4817 of title 10, United States Code; and

(4) Recommendations to strengthen domestic strategic radioisotope supply chains, including statutory adjustments, investments, or policy actions to improve access to feedstock, processing capacity, and manufacturing ready material.

**Briefing on strategy and funding for Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services program**

The committee is highly interested in ensuring continued and stable funding for the Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services (EMSS) program, including the EMSS Gateway located in Wahiawa, Hawaii, and the associated remote feeder link at Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania. The committee views the EMSS program and

its supporting infrastructure as a critical national security capability that provides assured global connectivity for the Joint Force, interagency partners, allies, and coalition partners.

The committee is concerned that the EMSS program and Gateway are not currently resourced with sufficient stability and predictability to sustain operational requirements, including cybersecurity, life cycle sustainment, and end-of-life replenishment. The committee further notes the importance of ensuring that the EMSS program evolves to meet emerging mission needs, including through research and development, the expansion of operational capabilities, and enhanced functionality for users.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than January 1, 2027, on the status of the EMSS program. The briefing shall include an assessment of the Department's plan to ensure stable and predictable funding for the program, including: (1) Consideration of centralized funding mechanisms; (2) The approach to sustaining and modernizing the EMSS Gateway and associated infrastructure; and (3) How the Department will ensure the program meets current and future mission requirements, including research and development, capability expansion, and improved user functionality.

**Briefing on Transportable Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal Increment 1**

The committee notes that an important element of nuclear command, control, and communications is the ability for the reconstitution of forces after or during deployment. This aspect is addressed through the Transportable Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal Increment 1 kits. Thus far, the committee has been unable to determine the number of such kits that will be required.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, not later than March 31, 2027, to brief the congressional defense committees on: (1) The number of such kits required and their respective functional users; (2) Where the kits will be stored; (3) How they will be maintained and through what Air Force depot; and (4) The expected unit cost per kit.

**Briefing on very low earth orbit**

The committee recognizes the benefits of very low earth orbit (VLEO) to national security, including increased communications, improved Earth imaging, and a self-cleaning orbital environment. Further, the committee recognizes that resilient VLEO operations, enabled by advances in propulsion, materials, autonomous orbital management, and power systems can provide enhanced responsiveness, higher-resolution sensing, orbital diversity, and deterrence against debris-generating and nuclear radiation threats through inherent survivability and rapid reconstitution, improving continuity of operations under contested conditions.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, to identify opportunities and gaps in research, development, test, and evaluation that require further exploration and testing by the Department of Defense. The briefing

should include how those opportunities and gaps can be addressed by funding research at institutions of higher education, what resources would be required by the Department to fund this research, and how the capabilities of non-profits and academic institutions bring expertise in real-time modeling and in-space measurement that complements commercial and government capabilities.

**Cislunar space situational awareness mission and support**

The committee notes the cislunar region, a vast and strategically important orbit, lacks adequate U.S. space domain awareness, creating a vulnerability to adversarial activities. Expanding programs to include distributed sensing, autonomous command and control frameworks, communication, and deep-space positioning and navigation systems will enhance U.S. capabilities in this critical, contested region. Developing capabilities and operating within cislunar space is imperative for the Nation to ensure national security, science and technology, and economic advantages. The committee believes the Secretary of the Air Force should prioritize and expand space situational awareness, command and control, communication and positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities using an evolutionary acquisition approach for additional space vehicles and expanded experimentation in cislunar space.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on actions taken to assess the value of cislunar space to the Department of Defense.

**Commercial satellite communications integrator innovative acquisition**

The committee recognizes the increasing strategic, operational, and tactical importance of resilient satellite communications (SATCOM) for command and control and situational awareness across all domains to enable successful U.S. warfighting and lethality.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than May 1, 2027, assessing acquisition approaches for commercial SATCOM that maximize resilience, interoperability, and cost-effectiveness. The briefing shall: (1) Assess the operational benefits of communications path diversity using multi-vendor capable commercial integrators that combine multi-orbit, multi-bandwidth SATCOM services with available terrestrial-based networks and private network gateways; (2) Describe the potential costs savings of using multi-vendor capable integrators as opposed to singular contractual vehicles for specific frequency bands or vendors that provide a single SATCOM pathway; and (3) Investigate the need for a hardware and software full stack solution that allows for field-replaceable, software-defined upgrades.

**Comptroller General assessment of airborne moving target indicator capabilities**

The committee notes that the Department of Defense has begun to invest in space-based airborne moving target indicator (AMTI) capabilities while planning to divest of multi-role airborne plat-

forms such as the E–3 Sentry and to limit recapitalization of such platforms. While the committee supports the acquisition of space-based AMTI and other related capabilities, the committee is concerned about how the Department plans to coordinate future space-based systems, operate these systems, and organize, train, and equip future battle managers. Synchronizing these functions, currently conducted, in many cases, within a single aircraft, is critical to enabling the future fight.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a review of: (1) How the department plans to coordinate taskings, collections, and operations of space-based AMTI systems across users and providers to meet combatant command and service needs; (2) The extent to which the Department is prepared to operate AMTI systems to provide intelligence within operationally relevant timelines, including plans to organize, train, and equip battle managers for these systems; and (3) Other matters deemed necessary during the conducting of this review.

The Comptroller General shall provide an initial briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, with a report due at a time mutually agreeable between the Comptroller General and the congressional defense committees.

**Comptroller General assessment of Department of Defense missile defense systems acceleration efforts**

The committee notes that the Department of Defense (DOD) is placing increased emphasis on the acceleration of missile defense systems and at theater and regional levels. This places large challenges on the acquisition and production capability of the existing production base to meet these acquisition demands.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review the:

(1) DOD activities related to increasing production of theater and regional missile defense interceptors and related missile defense systems, including but not limited to radars and other sensors that the Comptroller General deems appropriate;

(2) Efforts to increase production capacity, throughput, and inventory levels of the same;

(3) Details on the levels of government investment into new or enhanced facilities, authorities for advanced procurement, expanding the industrial base to new vendors, and other related efforts;

(4) Whether the efforts undertaken are likely to result in timely increased production at the levels needed to meet demand for the national missile defense systems;

(5) U.S. military demands for theater and regional systems to be mobile or emplaced outside the U.S.;

(6) Demand from allies and other international customers; and

(7) The expected increase in production rate by year and how that aligns with demand.

Not later than May 1, 2027, the Comptroller General shall brief the congressional defense committees on the assessment regarding the DOD's effort to increase production and inventory levels of mis-

sile defense interceptors and related missile defense systems, any risks or challenges associated with these efforts, including issues related to available suppliers and production capacity, and cost and schedules associated with these efforts.

**Comptroller General assessment of Golden Dome for America missile defense system**

The committee acknowledges that, over the past 20 years, the Government Accountability Office has provided important support to the Congress and the congressional defense committees by annually reviewing the missile defense activities of the Missile Defense Agency. That effort has now greatly expanded with the initiation of the Golden Dome for America missile defense system.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review the Department of Defense activities related to integrated missile defense acquisition efforts intended for Homeland defense currently being pursued under the Golden Dome for America missile defense initiative. In particular, this review shall: (1) Identify the plans and status of efforts to develop, integrate, and field a national missile defense architecture; (2) Any cost, schedule, or technical risks and Department of Defense efforts to address these risks; (3) Plans to develop timely and cost-effective sustainment of these systems; and (4) Any other topic that the Comptroller General deems appropriate in consultation with the congressional defense committees.

The committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure the Comptroller General has necessary access to information at appropriate classification and facilities to carry out such an assessment.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than May 1, 2027, and annually thereafter through 2031, of the results of this assessment and determine a mutually agreeable framework for a report to the congressional defense committees on the assessment.

**Comptroller General assessment of operational fielding of directed energy systems**

The committee notes that directed energy technologies have been the subject of long-term research and development across the Department of Defense (DOD). As witnessed in Ukraine and the Middle East, the modern evolving battlefield has increasingly featured uses of drones and other previously novel modes of attack. Traditional technologies, such as interceptors, have been used to defend against these attacks but are only available in limited quantities, and the cost of developing and fielding those interceptors and related systems is high. In some cases, reports identify that interceptors, costing in some cases millions of dollars, are being used to shoot down drones or other unmanned systems that cost one thousand dollars or less.

In recent years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported on directed energy systems, such as lasers and high-powered microwaves, for defense against drones, unmanned aircraft, and other attacks. The GAO has reported that the advantages of

these systems include low cost per shot and potentially unlimited magazines available for defense.

In order to assist the committee as it considers options to protect facilities, platforms such as ships, fielded troops and for other purposes, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to provide a review of current DOD plans for developing and fielding directed energy weapons. This review shall: (1) Identify what systems are being developed; (2) The planned and actual schedule for developing and fielding these systems; (3) The expected and actual cost of these programs; (4) What technical or other challenges these programs are witnessing; and (5) Other matters deemed important by the Comptroller General.

The committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Comptroller General has necessary access to information at appropriate classification and facilities to carry out such an assessment.

Not later than May 1, 2027, the Comptroller General shall brief the congressional defense committees and determine whether to provide a report to the congressional defense committees on the assessment.

**Comptroller General assessment of reentry vehicles**

The committee notes that, over the next decade, the Department of the Air Force will continue to design, develop, and field the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system to replace the fielded Minuteman III ICBM. Regular and sustained reviews by the Government Accountability Office, as established by the Senate report accompanying S. 2943 (S. Rept. 114–255) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328), have been essential to the congressional defense committees' oversight of this program.

An important aspect of this oversight is the research, development, acquisition and industrial based efforts related to these future ICBM capabilities, particularly the next-generation reentry vehicles intended to ensure the continued capability of the ground leg of the nuclear triad.

To ensure that this review process continues, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to continue these reviews through 2031 and to brief the congressional defense committees on a periodic basis mutually agreeable to both parties.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that the Comptroller General has appropriate access to classified information and facilities to continue this oversight function.

**Digital backbone of United States Space Force**

The committee recognizes that the current Department of the Air Force human resources information technology architecture consists of numerous legacy and fragmented systems that may not adequately support the operational, workforce management, auditability, and readiness requirements associated with implementation of the Personnel Management Act. Space Force has identified the need for a unified and scalable human resources management capability capable of integrating personnel data, automating workflows, improving workforce analytics, and supporting

force readiness requirements across sustained-duty and non-sustained-duty Guardian populations. The committee believes that the modernization of Space Force personnel systems is important to supporting operational agility, talent management, readiness visibility, and enterprise data management in support of the service's evolving warfighting mission. The committee further recognizes that modern enterprise systems may improve accountability, transparency, and interoperability in support of the Department of Defense's objective of achieving a clean audit by 2028.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the status of Space Force human resources information technology modernization efforts. The briefing shall include:

(1) An assessment of projected cost savings and operational efficiencies associated with modernization efforts;

(2) An explanation of how modernization efforts will support audit readiness and enterprise data management objectives;

(3) A description of commercial technologies, cloud-based architectures, automation capabilities, and data integration tools being evaluated or implemented; and

(4) Any additional resources, authorities, or legislative actions required to achieve full operational capability by fiscal year 2028.

**Electromagnetic pulse capabilities of China**

The committee remains concerned that advances in China's electromagnetic pulse (EMP) research, development, and acquisition activities could pose a significant threat to Taiwan. Given Taiwan's threat environment and geographic positioning, a successful EMP or high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) strike could rapidly degrade the island's ability to sustain its civilian population and mount an effective defense. Given Taiwan's unique vulnerabilities, the committee is concerned that China may view such an attack as an attractive first strike in a conflict with the island because the effects can be catastrophic while remaining below the threshold of conventional armed attack.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Energy, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the following:

(1) The operational, research, and development capabilities of China with respect to EMP and HEMP weapons, including delivery systems and deployment strategies;

(2) An assessment of Taiwan's current vulnerabilities across civilian and defense-critical infrastructure, including power generation and distribution, financial systems, communications, transportation, and water and healthcare systems;

(3) An assessment of existing United States-Taiwan cooperation on EMP and HEMP resilience, including any bilateral programs, security assistance efforts, or information-sharing arrangements, and the current status and progress of such efforts; and

(4) Recommendations for how the United States can support Taiwan in strengthening its infrastructure survivability against EMP and HEMP threats, including through technical assistance, joint exercises, and security cooperation.

**Electronic warfare workforce at Fort Huachuca Electronic Proving Ground**

The committee notes that the workforce for electronic warfare and testing is a small and highly skilled workforce sometimes taking decades to train and typically having an outsized impact on Department of Defense electronic warfare programs. The committee is concerned about staffing at the Electronic Proving Ground (EPG), given recent actions on force reduction in the Department.

Therefore, not later than March 1, 2027, and annually thereafter through March 1, 2030, the Secretary of the Army shall brief the congressional defense committees on staffing levels at the EPG. The briefing shall include: (1) The number of full-time employees as of the end of the preceding fiscal year; (2) Efforts to ensure the EPG staffing is capable of performing its necessary testing mission; and (3) A description of any actions and the reason for force reductions of such skilled staff at the EPG.

**Enhancing adversarial testing for United States space assets**

The committee notes that space systems, supporting terrestrial infrastructure, and commercial space services integrated into Department of Defense (DOD) operations face sophisticated, evolving cyber threats, and that emerging acquisition requirements for annual government-led adversarial cybersecurity testing require a scalable execution model. The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the Chief of Space Operations and in coordination with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, to assess and brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the development of a repeatable framework for government-led adversarial cybersecurity testing of DOD space Programs of Record, associated ground segments, supporting commercial space services, and relevant launch infrastructure.

This briefing shall address: (1) A framework description: governance, roles, authorities, and a methodology for persistent adversarial engagement; (2) A method to emulate nation-state tactics, techniques, and procedures and produce mission impact findings assessing operational consequences; (3) The ability to conduct testing on not fewer than two major space programs, including ground infrastructure, with prioritized remediation actions and assigned timelines; and (4) The capability to extend testing to ground stations, launch infrastructure, critical supporting utilities, and commercial space services upon which DOD operations depend.

**Expanding electronic warfare and counter-electronic warfare integration and testing facilities**

The committee notes that the Department of Defense (DOD) must prioritize developing and implementing robust, integrated counter-electronic warfare (EW) systems and hardware quickly and at scale across all components. Counter-EW capabilities are a crit-

ical gap for the DOD, and recent battlefield experiences in Ukraine, Gaza, and other conflict zones demonstrate the vulnerability of unmanned systems and munitions to EW attack and interference. If DOD unmanned systems and munitions lack counter-EW systems and hardware, they will be ineffective at deterring peer competitors or prevailing in peer-to-peer conflict. Most current and future DOD unmanned systems and munitions should include integrated counter-EW systems that harden them against EW attack and interference, including communications, signal, multi-spectrum, and global positioning system jamming and spoofing.

The committee believes that this hardware should be integrated, because without an integrated counter-EW hardware, unmanned systems are functionally ineffective under real-world contested conditions. Accordingly, the DOD will accelerate development, procurement, adoption, and implementation of robust counter-EW systems and hardware, prioritizing capabilities that protect command and control and the precision, navigation, and timing of any unmanned systems and munitions. This hardware must be integrated into new contracts, systems, and munitions and must also be integrated into existing contracts, systems, and munitions.

**Facility damage at Space Force launch ranges due to launch**

The committee notes that recent launch and landing activities at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station and Vandenberg Space Force Base involving heavy and potentially super-heavy rockets have caused damage to government facilities. This damage is primarily attributed to shock waves generated during reentry, commonly referred to as "sonic booms". These operations are conducted by participants in the National Security Space Launch program, who effectively lease launch and landing sites from the Air Force. Reported impacts include shattered windows and, in some cases, damage to structural elements of facilities.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on procedures for restitution of the government facilities damaged from the shock waves caused by launch and landing, how long this restitution can take, and potential legislation, if any, that can expedite restitution or other such preventive actions, if so required.

**Feasibility and advisability of expanding Operation Olympic Defender**

The committee recognizes that Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender (MNF–OOD), which reached initial operating capability in April 2025 with seven allied nations and has already demonstrated successful on-orbit operations and interoperability, is a key framework for strengthening deterrence, resilience, and responsible behavior in space. Expanding participation to additional Indo-Pacific allies, including Japan and the Republic of Korea, would further reinforce burden sharing and enhance collective space domain awareness in a strategically contested region.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations to submit to the congressional defense committees a report, not later than March 31, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of ex-

panding the MNF–OOD to include additional allies in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan and the Republic of Korea. The Chief of Space Operations shall also provide a briefing on the findings of such report, on the same date, to the congressional defense committees.

The report shall include:

(1) A description of current activities and initiatives to support potential expansion of the MNF–OOD to allied countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan and the Republic of Korea;

(2) An identification of any policy changes required by the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea, or other identified allied governments to enable a formal invitation to join the MNF–OOD;

(3) An identification of any funding or policy changes required by the U.S. Government to support the accession of Japan, the Republic of Korea, or other identified allied countries; and

(4) An assessment of:

(a) the implications of such accession for U.S. national security interests;

(b) the feasibility of accession for Japan and the Republic of Korea and whether such accession would be in the national interest of the United States; and

(c) any additional resources or authorities required to execute such expansion.

**Feasibility of establishing Joint Commercial Operations cells in the Indo-Pacific region**

The committee notes that the development of joint partner nations' commercial space operations is an important mechanism for sharing space domain awareness information and expanding the capability for beyond-line-of-sight communications. In particular, given the large area encompassing the Indo-Pacific region, there are advantages to developing such joint commercial space operations cells with regard to Department of Defense operations.

Therefore, not later than May 1, 2027, the Commander, U.S. Space Command, shall brief the congressional defense committees on the feasibility and advisability of establishing additional Joint Commercial Operations cells in the Indo-Pacific region to complement existing such joint commercial cells in Australia and New Zealand.

The briefing shall include the following: (1) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability of establishing Joint Commercial Operations cells in Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, and any other jurisdiction in the Indo-Pacific region the Commander considers appropriate; and (2) An identification of any funding or policy change necessary to feasibly establish Joint Commercial Operations cells in Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, and any other jurisdiction in the Indo-Pacific region the Commander considers appropriate.

**Fort Huachuca electronic proving ground assessment**

The committee recognizes the critical role of the Electronic Proving Ground (EPG) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in supporting testing

and evaluation of electronic warfare, communications, and spectrum-dependent capabilities across the Department of Defense. The committee also recognizes that the EPG operates the only National Security Agency-certified TEMPEST facility in the United States, and their personnel are level II certified. The committee further recognizes the increasing importance of these capabilities to the missions of the Space Force, particularly in contested electromagnetic environments.

Therefore, given these unique attributes, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations and the Secretary of the Army, to conduct a feasibility assessment of the utility of using Space Force systems at the EPG. This assessment should also include using Space Force Operational Test and Training Infrastructure at the EPG, which is isolated from spectrum interference and from light pollution—essential for optical systems.

Not later than May 1, 2027, the Secretary of the Air Force shall brief the congressional defense committees detailing the findings of the assessment, along with any recommendations for legislative or administrative action.

**Future space launch capacity**

The committee remains concerned about the Nation's ability to maintain sufficient, resilient, and geographically diverse launch capacity to meet current and projected national security space requirements and has consistently emphasized the importance of assured access to space, launch infrastructure resilience, and the availability of multiple launch providers capable of supporting Department of Defense missions. The committee is aware of the recent New Glenn launch vehicle anomaly at Space Launch Complex 36 at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station. Given the importance of resilient launch infrastructure and sufficient launch capacity to support national security space requirements, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report and provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than December 1, 2026.

The report shall include:

(1) A summary of the known facts regarding the anomaly and the status of any ongoing investigations;

(2) An assessment of the impact of the anomaly and any resulting infrastructure damage on the availability of launch capacity and launch infrastructure supporting national security space missions;

(3) An assessment of any resulting impacts to National Security Space Launch program requirements, mission assurance, launch resiliency, and assured access to space objectives;

(4) An evaluation of the extent to which the anomaly affects the assumptions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations developed pursuant to section 1608 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), titled, "Spaceport of the Future Initiative and Study on Future Space Launch Capacity";

(5) An assessment of the risks associated with the loss, degradation, or temporary unavailability of a major launch vehicle

or launch site, including the risks to future launch capacity projections, surge capability, and launch infrastructure resilience; and

(6) Any recommendations for modifications to the Spaceport of the Future Initiative, future launch infrastructure investments, launch capacity planning assumptions, resiliency requirements, or acquisition strategies based on lessons learned from the anomaly.

The report shall also identify any additional actions the Department considers necessary to ensure adequate launch capacity and resilient launch infrastructure to meet projected national security space requirements.

**Golden Dome modeling, simulation analysis, and reporting**

The committee notes that the Golden Dome for America (GDA) initiative, established by Executive Order 14186 on January 27, 2025, represents the most ambitious Homeland air and missile defense effort in a generation. The committee further notes that the GDA architecture is a "system of systems" comprising space-, air-, ground-, and sea-based sensors, kinetic and non-kinetic interceptors, and an integrated battle management, command, and control system intended to operate at machine speed. The verification and validation of such an architecture against the full spectrum of mixed-raid threats, including coordinated ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile attacks combined with low-cost unmanned aerial systems, requires modeling, simulation, and analysis (MS&A) capabilities of a fidelity, scale, and speed that exceed those of legacy Department of Defense MS&A infrastructure originally fielded to support discrete weapon systems rather than continental-scale, multi-domain defense architectures.

In addition, the committee recognizes that the broader commercial economy, including the autonomous vehicle, physical artificial intelligence, electronic design automation, and industrial digital twin sectors, has developed simulation, digital engineering, and physical artificial intelligence capabilities of a sophistication and scale that, in important respects, surpass MS&A capabilities developed exclusively for defense applications. Non-traditional defense contractors and their underlying commercial products represent a significant resource for the Department of Defense in scaling MS&A capacity to meet the GDA mission.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of Golden Dome for America, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, to submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, a report on the use, integration, and effectiveness of commercial and defense-adjacent modeling, simulation and analysis (MS&A) capabilities in support of Golden Dome for America.

At a minimum, the report should include the following:

(1) An inventory of commercial, defense-adjacent, and Government-developed MS&A tools, digital proving ground capabilities, and supporting high-performance computing resources currently in use, planned for acquisition, or under evaluation

in support of GDA, including for each the originating vendor or laboratory, the security accreditation status, the verification, validation, and accreditation status, and the Government data rights position;

(2) A description of the open, modular, government-owned reference architecture established for GDA MS&A, including measures taken to prevent vendor lock-in, the role of common authoritative threat models and scenarios, and the mechanisms by which GDA performers and prime contractors are required to interoperate with the reference architecture;

(3) An identification of capability gaps in current commercial, defense-adjacent, and Government MS&A offerings—including with respect to threat phenomenology, sensor modeling, command and control representation, electronic warfare and cyber effects, and human-in-the-loop integration—and a plan, with associated funding requirements by fiscal year, to close such gaps;

(4) A description of how MS&A capabilities developed or procured under this direction are being made available as shared services to the Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Space Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the military departments, the National Guard Bureau, and other appropriate entities, including any limitations on such availability and any associated cost-sharing arrangements; and

(5) Any legislative, regulatory, or policy recommendations the Deputy Secretary of Defense considers necessary or appropriate to accelerate the adoption, accreditation, and integration of commercial and defense-adjacent MS&A capabilities in support of GDA.

The report should be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The committee further directs the Deputy Secretary of Defense, or a designee, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on the contents of each report, not later than 30 days after submission, and to be available to respond to questions of the committees.

**In-space mobility industrial base and supply chain risk**

The committee recognizes that in-space mobility is a critical enabler for national security space missions, permitting maneuver, survivability, orbital logistics, and freedom of sustained action in contested environments where the adversary is already perfecting orbital warfare techniques. The committee is concerned that key components underpinning in-space mobility, particularly propulsion, including thrusters, valves, and related subsystems, are sourced from a fragile and highly constrained industrial base, creating potential single-point failures and strategic vulnerabilities. These industrial vulnerabilities inhibit the Department of Defense's ability to generate, sustain, and reconstitute space combat power, therefore requiring a resilient and scalable industrial base to achieve and maintain space superiority in support of Joint Force operations across all domains.

The committee notes that many propulsion and fluid-control components essential to in-space mobility are produced by a limited number of domestic suppliers, rely on foreign sources or foreign

sub-tier dependencies, or lack sufficient surge capacity to support rapid scaling in anticipation of sustained conflict. The committee further notes that these vulnerabilities could constrain the Department of Defense's ability to field and operate space systems capable of maneuvering, repositioning, refueling, servicing, or rapid reconstitution.

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on supply chain risks associated with in-space mobility capabilities.

The briefing shall include: (1) An assessment of the current domestic and allied industrial base for propulsion components and other critical components required for in-space mobility; (2) Identification of supply chain vulnerabilities; (3) An evaluation of how these vulnerabilities impact the Department of Defense's ability to field resilient, maneuverable, and sustainable space architectures; (4) An assessment of ongoing Department of Defense efforts to mitigate these risks; and (5) Recommendations for acquisition, industrial base, and policy actions, within existing authorities, to strengthen domestic production, reduce foreign dependence, and ensure assured access to critical in-space mobility components.

**Incorporating lessons learned from allies and enabling international cooperation related to Golden Dome for America**

The committee acknowledges and appreciates the value of allied experience in missile defense development and production programs, as well as with real-world missile defense operations and believes that it is vitally important to utilize these lessons learned to inform ongoing efforts for the Golden Dome initiative. The committee also strongly encourages the Department of Defense to fully implement section 4 of Executive Order 14186, or "Iron Dome for America," and substantially increase cooperation on missile defense efforts with allied and partner nations. The committee believes it is imperative to consider lessons learned from Israeli missile defense programs such as Iron Dome; David's Sling; Arrow I, II, and III; and Iron Beam.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on:

(1) How lessons learned from Israeli integrated air and missile defense operations, particularly since October 7, 2023, are being incorporated into doctrinal development central to Golden Dome, ensuring concepts reflect continuous, real-world air defense operations; and

(2) An assessment of how the Department of Defense plans to increase bilateral and multilateral cooperation on missile defense technology development, capabilities, and operations with trusted allies under current defense agreements and arrangements, including:

(a) How pre-existing allied integrated air and missile defense capabilities, including U.S.-Israel Cooperative Missile Defense Programs and programs under the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework among the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, can support next-generation integrated air and missile defense architecture;

(b) Consistent with section 1214 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159), whether utilizing Israeli air defense systems at scale within the Golden Dome architecture could expand interceptor capacity and coverage at comparable cost to United States-only force designs for theater-level defense capabilities;

(c) Recommendations on how to create standard, shared network protocols to assist integration with trusted allies under current defense agreements and arrangements within next-generation integrated air and missile defense architecture;

(d) Recommendations to streamline or waive export control and related technology transfer authorities to enable precleared, but closely monitored, development that also protects security and intellectual property of all involved parties;

(e) The extent to which Israel's inclusion in next-generation integrated air and missile defense architecture could serve as a model for a global defense framework with other allies and partners and increase partner burden-sharing and supply chain resiliency; and

(f) Any other matters the Secretary considers relevant to further increase bilateral and multilateral cooperation with trusted allies under current defense agreements and arrangements.

**Infrastructure requirements for National Security Space Launch operations at Kodiak**

The committee recognizes the growing importance of responsive and resilient access to space for national security missions and the strategic value of the Pacific Spaceport Complex Alaska as a launch location capable of supporting polar and high-inclination missions. The committee understands that additional infrastructure investments may be required to support current and future national security space launch requirements at Kodiak.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a report and associated briefing on the report to the congressional defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027, assessing the infrastructure, capability, funding, and authority requirements necessary to support current and future national security space launch operations at Kodiak.

The report should identify the modifications, upgrades, and investments and feasibility thereof required to enable future and expanded Space Force and national security launch activities; provide estimated costs associated with such investments; and identify any

statutory, regulatory, funding, organizational, or authorities-related gaps that could impede development of these capabilities.

The report should also include an assessment of requirements for:

(1) Permanent classified mission support infrastructure, including Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, SIPRNET connectivity, JWICS connectivity, and other secure communications capabilities;

(2) Climate-controlled vehicle integration facilities, payload processing facilities, cleanrooms, and other weather-resilient infrastructure necessary to support launch vehicle assembly, payload integration, spacecraft processing, and mission assurance activities in Arctic operating conditions;

(3) Modular and vehicle-agnostic launch pad infrastructure capable of supporting multiple commercial and government launch providers;

(4) Range safety, radar, telemetry, tracking, and command-and-control systems necessary to support increased launch cadence and complex national security launch trajectories;

(5) Fuel and propellant storage, transportation, and handling infrastructure necessary to support responsive launch operations;

(6) Resilient energy and power generation capabilities, including microgrids and backup power systems; and

(7) Housing, transportation, port, road, and logistics infrastructure required to support military personnel, contractors, and sustained launch operations.

The committee further directs the Secretary to identify opportunities for public-private partnerships and commercial investment that could accelerate infrastructure development at Kodiak and provide recommendations regarding how such investments could be leveraged to support future Department of Defense missions, including investments supporting launch vehicle integration, payload processing, and responsive space operations.

**Initial Operational Capability of space control weapon systems**

The committee notes that a key acquisition feature of Department of Defense weapon systems is to spiral the acquisition development so that the warfighter is given not a perfect solution but one that works initially and is refined thereafter. The concept of a weapon system for the U.S. Space Force and, in particular, a space control weapon system is relatively new given the U.S. Space Force itself is 6 years old. Issues such as test and training are essentially new concepts for space warfighting systems. Yet in the other title 10 Services, spiral development and test and training are longstanding objectives. Space Force Instruction 13–604, "System Acceptance," is the first integrated approach to fielding space weapons systems. The first step, however, is entry into the system acceptance process. The normal nomenclature would be Initial Operational Capability, which in effect drives down into the acquisition process a date by which system development should be pressurized to achieve. It is not a complete solution, but it does get the weapon

system into the warfighter's use for additional test and training in order to give feedback for material improvement.

This iterative process, starting with an Initial Operational Capability, is found in a Chief of Space Operations note to Guardians, C–Note #38, April 24, 2026, "Space Acquisitions—A Warfighting Imperative." It states, "An 80 percent solution in the warfighters' hands today is infinitely more valuable than a 100 percent solution that arrives late. Well-intentioned setbacks are not failures, but rather a means to learn and improve. In fact, taking more calculated risk in capability delivery can decrease operational risk in the end."

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations to review all ongoing Space Control Weapons System acquisition programs to determine if these programs are set with an Initial Operational Capability date to pressurize the acquisition program development not for a 100 percent solution but one that is 80 percent. The Chief of Space Operations shall brief the congressional defense committees on his findings, with recommendations, not later than March 1, 2027.

**Integration of space domain awareness in joint exercises and training**

The committee recognizes that space domain awareness (SDA) is a foundational capability for the Joint Force. It underpins the ability to detect, track, characterize, and respond to threats in an increasingly congested and contested space environment. Peer and near-peer adversaries are expanding their on-orbit and counterspace capabilities. Persistent and resilient space domain awareness is therefore essential to protecting United States and allied space assets and to maintaining freedom of operation in the Indo-Pacific region.

The committee further recognizes that joint and combined exercises with allies and partners are a critical venue for testing and maturing expeditionary and deployed SDA capabilities. Commercial providers are key contributors to these emerging capabilities. The committee believes structured pathways are needed to transition technologies demonstrated in exercises into programs of record and other acquisition vehicles. The committee also values interoperability with allies and partners, and it is concerned that classification barriers and data-sharing constraints may limit allied participation in SDA exercise scenarios.

Therefore, the committee directs the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations and the Commander, U.S. Space Command, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the integration of SDA capabilities into joint and combined military exercises with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. The briefing shall include the following:

(1) An identification and description of each joint and combined exercise conducted or planned in the area of responsibility of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command that incorporates or is planned to incorporate expeditionary or deployed space domain awareness capabilities, including the scope of allied and partner participation in each such exercise;

(2) An assessment of current capability gaps in space domain awareness for Joint Force exercises in the Indo-Pacific region;

(3) A description of how commercial and emerging space domain awareness technologies, including artificial intelligence and machine learning-enabled analytics, advanced sensing systems, and outputs from applied research and rapid prototyping programs, are tested, evaluated, or demonstrated in operationally relevant exercise environments;

(4) An assessment of the role of small business and early-stage dual-use technology companies in developing and providing space domain awareness capabilities tested or demonstrated during such exercises;

(5) An identification of structured pathways for transitioning space domain awareness technologies demonstrated in exercises, including technologies that have been transitioned or are in the process of transitioning because of demonstrations during exercises, into programs of record or other acquisition vehicles, and a description of any barriers to such transition, including funding gaps, classification constraints, and acquisition process timelines, and recommendations for legislative or administrative actions to accelerate SDA technology transition from exercise demonstration to operational fielding; and

(6) An assessment of ally and partner interoperability with respect to space domain awareness in exercises.

**Investigation of Global Positioning System Next Generation Operational Control System**

The committee notes that in 2010, the Air Force initiated the Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX) for the Global Positioning System (GPS) Satellite System III. This control system was to take full advantage of military grade encryption as well as cyber hardness. The contract for production was awarded to Raytheon at roughly $3.7 billion with work to be performed at its Aurora, Colorado, facility and completed by 2016. A key tenet of the acquisition acceleration was for the Government to accept the product under a Department of Defense Form 250 (DD250) before final operational acceptance. Normally, a DD250 acceptance is not obtained until all defects or liens under the contract are resolved. Due to poor performance with the Development, Security, and Operations software production framework to incorporate cyber security, the program was forced to undergo a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach (section 4375 of title 10, United States Code) as per section 1610 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328). The program was to be subsequently re-baselined with a service cost position of $8.3 billion and was ready to transition to operations (RTO) in the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2022. An independent cost position was $8.5 billion with an RTO date of the 1st quarter of fiscal year 2023. Due to ongoing delays and cost-overruns, the OCX was not transferred to the Department until the summer of 2025.

On April 17, 2026, the congressional defense committees were informed that the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment cancelled the program, stating that, "The OCX program has long been plagued by technical challenges, inadequate

systems engineering processes, and vendor underperformance that has resulted in numerous schedule slips and associated cost growth." Further, the statement said that the existing GPS control system built by Lockheed Martin would be modified to meet cyber security requirements in order to control the GPS III and IIIF constellation.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct an Acquisition Incident Review (AIR) of the OCX program and to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than January 31, 2027. Sixty days after receipt of the AIR, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to independently review the AIR and brief its findings to the congressional defense committees.

The committee and the Comptroller General have closely followed the OCX program since its inception, pointing out problematic decisions by both the Air Force and the prime contractor Raytheon. It is important to perform an examination of the failed effort to understand the root causes and avoid repeating them in the future.

**Launch ranges for medium and small lift capacity**

The committee notes that the Public Law 119–21 provided significant mandatory funding for National Security Space Launch (NSSL) infrastructure to support assured access to space, launch resiliency, and increased launch capacity in response to growing NSSL demand. While the two existing Space Force ranges, the Eastern Range and the Western Range, are capable of heavy and super heavy launch capacity, a wide range of non-Space Force ranges exist capable of NSSL medium and small lift capacity. They can take the increasing launch rate burden from the two major Space Force ranges. This is important given that the blast radius of heavy and super-heavy launch pads is so large that adjacent launch operations cannot proceed for long periods of time, affecting other launch providers, including those that provide medium and small lift capacity.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on efforts to utilize these non-Space Force launch ranges as a means to ease the launch burden on the Eastern Range and the Western Range, and to list support given to these ranges for their use.

**Prioritization of commercial off-the-shelf tools at National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency**

The committee recognizes the growing importance of multimodal artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities across the defense intelligence enterprise, particularly semantic search functionality applied to geospatial datasets. The committee encourages the Department of Defense (DOD) and the defense intelligence enterprise, especially the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), to prioritize investigation and adoption of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions where appropriate, rather than defaulting to custom-built tools that may duplicate existing commercial capabilities. The committee appreciates the value of domain-specific develop-

ment for certain mission-unique requirements but believes that broader adoption of COTS AI and semantic search platforms would allow the DOD and the NGA to better focus their skilled workforces toward tradecraft and tools that are unique to their mission sets.

The committee believes that the NGA and the broader defense intelligence enterprise should take a more deliberate approach to evaluating COTS solutions as part of their AI investment strategy, including for multimodal and semantic search applications. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the NGA to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than June 1, 2027, addressing the following: (1) The NGA's approach to semantic search; (2) The NGA's overall AI investment strategy; and (3) An assessment of tools broken out comparing COTS AI tools versus government-developed AI solutions.

**Proliferated space architectures**

The committee notes the importance of proliferated space architectures for enabling resilience and mission assurance for national security needs derived from space-based capabilities. Proliferated space architectures in low earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) for fire control, communications, missile warning, and other space control missions disproportionately benefit from the resilience provided by proliferation. Proliferated architectures for these missions' areas provide asymmetric advantage to the U.S. national security community and deny first-mover advantage to adversaries targeting space-based capabilities.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on how the core mission areas of the Space Force would benefit from transitioning to proliferated space architectures in LEO and GEO through the acquisition of productized, domestically produced commercial satellite buses. The briefing shall include: (1) An assessment of how the core functions of the Space Force would benefit from more proliferated space architectures across all mission areas and orbital regimes; (2) An assessment of the benefits of proliferated space architectures in ensuring persistent mission availability that denies adversaries first-mover advantage in times of conflict; (3) The cost, schedule, and performance implications of transitioning to proliferated space architectures while leveraging commoditized domestically produced buses; and (4) The challenges of transitioning to such an architecture within the next 2 years and a mitigation plan to address those challenges.

**Rapid rocket resupply for contested logistics**

The committee recognizes that future conflicts may involve contested environments in which traditional airlift, sealift, and fixed logistics infrastructure are degraded or denied during the opening phase of operations. The committee believes that space-enabled contested logistics initiatives, including globally deployed, cost-effective, mass-producible terrestrial suborbital delivery concepts and related rapid-response launch capabilities, may provide a globally available tactical resupply capability to support the delivery of

high-priority supplies into denied terrestrial environments when conventional pathways are disrupted.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the Chief of Space Operations, to assess the ongoing and planned rapid rocket resupply initiatives for contested logistics within space access, mobility, and logistics efforts. The assessment shall include: (1) Operational use cases; (2) Integration with joint logistics planning processes; (3) Technical and regulatory barriers to fielding; and (4) Pathways to accelerate operational demonstration.

The Secretary shall brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on findings and any recommended policy or legislative changes necessary to advance space-enabled contested logistics capabilities.

**Report on acceleration of commercial dynamic space operations capabilities**

The committee recognizes that domestic commercial space companies have made significant investments in innovative spacecraft, services, and technologies relevant to Dynamic Space Operations (DSO), including in-space mobility, servicing, logistics, and autonomous operations. The committee believes that integrating mature commercial capabilities can accelerate deployment timelines, reduce costs, and enhance operational flexibility to meet national security objectives. Accordingly, the committee encourages the Department of the Air Force and the U.S. Space Force to prioritize the rapid adoption and fielding of commercial DSO capabilities.

The committee further supports the establishment of an integrated acquisition approach for DSO capabilities within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration to serve as the lead for acquiring and integrating operational DSO systems and services. The committee expects such an effort to improve cross-mission integration, align requirements with operational needs, and enable the transition of demonstrated capabilities into operational use on an accelerated timeline.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Chief of Space Operations, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, and in consultation with the Commander, U.S. Space Command and the head of Space Systems Command, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than June 1, 2027, and to submit a report on the same date, on efforts to accelerate the development, integration, and fielding of DSO capabilities.

The briefing and report shall include: (1) An inventory of current and planned investments in DSO capabilities across the future years defense program, including associated program elements, schedules, and identified capability gaps; (2) Opportunities for enhanced collaboration with the domestic commercial space industry, including the use of rapid acquisition authorities, commercial item procedures, and service-based acquisition approaches; (3) A roadmap to field additional DSO capabilities outside existing programs of record within 18 months, including technology transition pathways, milestones, decision points, and risk management considerations; (4) A funding profile by fiscal year required to execute such

a roadmap; (5) A plan to define necessary government interfaces to ensure appropriate operational authority and control while minimizing government ownership; and (6) Identification of statutory, regulatory, or policy barriers to accelerated fielding, along with recommendations to address such barriers.

The committee expects the briefing and report to prioritize the adoption of mature commercial capabilities and to describe how DSO capabilities will be integrated into joint operational concepts and tasking. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

**Report on dynamic spectrum sharing and strategic spectrum capabilities**

The committee recognizes the increasing demand for electromagnetic spectrum and the necessity of advancing national security requirements with commercial innovation simultaneously. The committee notes the Department of Defense's ongoing efforts to implement section 9203 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) and the potential for Advanced Dynamic Spectrum Sharing (ADSS) to optimize this finite resource.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the Department's progress in developing dynamic spectrum sharing technologies and its progress in fulfilling the requirements of section 9203 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. The report should include: (1) A summary of the findings from the 2025 ADSS demonstration including technical feasibility impacts on incumbent military radar systems; (2) An evaluation of the technological maturity of interferences-mitigation features necessary to protect critical mission functions during shared use; (3) An assessment of the Department's current ability to dynamically share spectrum with non-Federal entities; (4) A roadmap to full capability maturation; and (5) Recommendations for real-world deployments.

**Report on Guam Defense System programmatic performance**

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on:

(1) A life cycle cost estimate of the fully integrated Guam Defense System, including total phased costs in then-year dollars, the estimate's underlying ground rules and assumptions, and any additional analyses to validate the estimate's costs or range of costs, such as risk and uncertainty analyses. At a minimum, the report shall address the costs to:

(a) procure missile defense hardware, including:

(i) sensors and radars;

(ii) missiles and launchers;

(ii) command and control systems; and

(iv) network and communication systems;
(b) transport and field missile defense hardware;
(c) research, develop, test, and evaluate hardware specifically for Guam Defense System activities, including activities of the fully integrated system;
(d) software development, specifically the Joint Integrated Battle Manager;
(e) military construction;
(f) operations and sustainment, including advanced planning and infrastructure sustainment, renovation, and maintenance funds;
(g) munitions; and
(h) civilian and military personnel, including quality of life supporting functions;

(2) The integrated master schedule for the Guam Defense System, including an update on the status to meet and achieve key acquisition milestones and a summary of risks to the program schedule, including:
(a) program milestones based on current scheduled activities;
(b) logical sequencing;
(c) resource loading;
(d) a schedule basis document to define the organization of the integrated master schedule, schedule fields, and other key schedule characteristics; and
(e) a schedule risk assessment;

(3) An independent technical risk assessment for the Guam Defense System, including:
(a) critical technologies and their technology readiness levels;
(b) the status of software development efforts;
(c) the technology and engineering risks to integrate the system;
(d) the status and risks of system development and mission capability progress; and
(e) the mitigation or maturation plan for technologies that do not meet requirements; and

(4) Other such matters as the secretaries consider appropriate.

**Report on risk reduction measures for Next Generation Interceptor**

The committee directs the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, not later than February 1, 2027, to submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the costs and benefits of implementing risk mitigation measures for the development and production of the Next Generation Interceptor solid rocket motors, including at a minimum:

(1) A systematic, quantitative, cost-benefit analysis of identified risk mitigation measures for the Next Generation Interceptor solid rocket motor development and production, such as:
(a) conducting a non-intercept boost vehicle flight test prior to conducting the first all-up round intercept flight test;

(b) using a launch pad to conduct a boost vehicle flight test and/or the first all-up round intercept flight test;

(c) increasing opportunities for competition by maintaining two contractors for the first stage solid rocket motor through:

(i) an all-up round production readiness review;

(ii) a boost vehicle flight test and/or the first all-up round intercept flight test;

(iii) completion of all-up round interceptor qualification; and

(iv) production of the first 20 all-up round tactical interceptors;

(d) increasing opportunities for competition by maintaining two contractors for the second stage solid rocket motor; and

(e) any other measures identified by the Director; and

(2) A description of the costs and benefits associated with each risk reduction measure assessed as they relate to program cost, schedule, resources, risk, and any other metric the Director deems relevant; and

(3) An explanation of the methodology employed to perform the assessment, including any caveats, assumptions, or limitations.

**Report on space-based environmental monitoring governance and program structure**

The committee recognizes that accurate and timely environmental monitoring and weather forecasting are foundational to military success across space, air, missile warning, ground, naval, and global strike missions. The committee notes with concern that legacy space-based environmental monitoring systems, including the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, are projected to cease operations in the near term, while replacement capabilities such as the Weather System Follow-on-Microwave are not yet fully operational or accessible. The committee is concerned that this transition period may create gaps in environmental awareness that could adversely impact operational effectiveness.

The committee further notes longstanding ambiguity regarding responsibility within the Department of the Air Force for space-based environmental monitoring capabilities, including the acquisition and integration of commercial weather data. While the Space Force has been identified as the responsible Service, the committee is concerned that existing efforts have not been formalized with the requirements, acquisition structure, and lifecycle resourcing typically associated with a program of record. The committee believes that clear governance, ownership, and resourcing are necessary to ensure continuity of capability, provide a sustained demand signal to the commercial industrial base, and enable effective congressional oversight.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations and other appropriate officials, to provide a report and briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a dedicated program of

record and associated organizational construct within the Space Force for space-based environmental monitoring, including the acquisition and integration of commercial capabilities. The report and briefing shall include:

(1) An assessment of current and projected capability gaps and operational risks associated with the degradation or loss of legacy space-based environmental monitoring systems;

(2) An evaluation of the feasibility and advisability of establishing a formal program of record within the Space Force, including the benefits and risks of such an approach compared to alternative governance and acquisition models;

(3) Options for assigning clear responsibility and organizational ownership within the Department of the Air Force, including consideration of whether a dedicated office or program executive structure is required to manage space-based environmental monitoring capabilities;

(4) An analysis of requirements, acquisition authorities, and planning, programming, and budgeting processes necessary to support a sustained capability, including options to provide a consistent demand signal to the commercial industrial base;

(5) An assessment of approaches for acquiring, integrating, processing, and disseminating commercial environmental monitoring data to operational users, including measures to ensure resilience and avoid single points of failure;

(6) A plan to ensure continuity of environmental monitoring capabilities during the transition from legacy systems to future architectures, including timelines and key milestones;

(7) Projected funding requirements across the future years defense program and options for presenting such funding to provide transparency and oversight; and

(8) Any recommendations for legislative or administrative actions needed to implement the preferred approach.

**Responsive Electro-Optical Follow On**

The committee notes that the Responsive Electro-Optical Follow On (REFO) program is an established effort to provide responsive electro-optical space and ground capabilities in support of time-sensitive targeting and related indications and warning missions. The committee believes REFO is a key contributor to left of launch monitoring and to enhancing decision time and battlespace awareness for combatant commanders.

The committee directs the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, not later than March 31, 2027, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on: (1) The REFO funding profile and capability delivery plan across the future years defense program; (2) The strategy and timelines for integrating dual-use commercial capabilities into REFO; and (3) How REFO will be employed, in coordination with other space-based and terrestrial sensors, to support left of launch monitoring and next generation missile defense.

**Review of National Security Space Launch Phase 3 acquisition strategy**

The committee notes that the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Phase 3 construct is intended to ensure assured access to space for the integrated space architecture at affordable prices through a dual-lane approach, with Lane 1 designed to expand competition and enable higher-risk missions and Lane 2 structured as a block buy to provide stability, cadence assurance, and high mission assurance for critical national security payloads. While this framework was intended to balance innovation, resilience, competition, and predictability, the committee observes that rapid advancements in commercial launch capabilities and evolving mission requirements raise questions regarding whether both lanes are achieving their intended outcomes in practice.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the performance and structure of NSSL Phase 3 across both Lane 1 and Lane 2.

The briefing shall include: (1) An assessment of cost, schedule, performance, mission assurance, and competition outcomes for both lanes; (2) An evaluation of the extent to which Lane 1 has achieved its objectives of expanding competition, enabling new entrants, and driving affordability; (3) An assessment of whether the Lane 2 block buy construct continues to deliver intended benefits in cost predictability, cadence stability, industrial base sustainment, and mission assurance; (4) An analysis of how task order development, requirements formulation, and contracting structures across both lanes affect competition, pricing, and innovation; and (5) An examination of whether the current dual-lane construct remains optimally aligned with evolving commercial launch capabilities and mission needs, and what alternative structures or adjustments may better achieve program objectives of affordability, resilience, and assured access to space.

**Solar Observing Optical Network**

The committee recognizes the importance of the Solar Observing Optical Network (SOON) to provide critical solar observations through monitoring sunspots to predict the occurrence of a flare or coronal mass ejection. Along with other systems, SOON notifies the military of solar events, enabling them to protect assets and personnel. However, the committee remains concerned about progress transitioning from SOON to the Next-Generation Global Oscillations Network Group—Operational (ngGONG–O) which is set to replace it and will be shared between the Space Force, the National Solar Observatory (NSO), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The committee expects to be kept apprised of Space Force negotiations with NSO and NOAA to set forth a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) detailing an acquisition strategy, a cost-sharing agreement, and a sustainment strategy for the future ngGONG–O system.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Space Force to work expeditiously to complete the MOA with NSO and NOAA. Further-

more, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than February 1, 2027, which should include: (1) A detailed update on the Space Force's discussions with NSO and NOAA regarding the MOA; (2) A list of outstanding issues regarding cost, acquisition, and utilization/sustainment; and (3) Any congressional assistance that may be needed to finalize an agreement and mitigate risk for military systems and personnel.

**Space Based Infrared System security, reliability, and maintainability**

The committee is concerned that the U.S. Space Force has not been able to prioritize the reliability and maintainability of the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) constellation during the integration and eventual transition to the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) Constellation, leaving Defensive Cyber Operations-Space with insufficient resources to modernize, refresh, and update critical hardware and software, harden SBIRS systems against attack, or deploy enterprise SBIRS/OPIR cyber defenses as scheduled. This exposes the SBIRS, a high value target, to an unacceptable risk of adversary exploitation. As such, the committee recognizes the importance of updating SBIRS for security, reliability, and maintainability.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the status of Defensive Cyber Operations-Space actions to harden the SBIRS against a cyberattack.

**Space data network strategy and ground architecture**

The committee is concerned by the absence of a clearly articulated, Department of the Air Force-wide strategy for integrating space-based transport layers with terrestrial ground networks to deliver data to tactical users. The committee notes the potential for overlapping efforts across the Department of the Air Force and multiple ground architectures being developed in parallel. Without a coherent approach, these efforts risk fragmentation, unnecessary duplication, and misalignment with user terminal fielding.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations, the Director of the Space Development Agency, and the Commander, U.S. Space Command, to provide a report and briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the Department's strategy for space and terrestrial ground networks and the delivery of space-based data to tactical users. The report shall include:

(1) A description of the Department's concept for connecting data from low earth orbit, mid earth orbit, and geosynchronous orbit constellations to tactical users in 2027, 2030, and 2035, including backhaul, front haul, laser communication common standards, and network orchestration functions;

(2) An overview of current and planned terrestrial ground networks supporting the delivery of space-based data, including the Space Data Network, the Proliferated Warfighter Space

Architecture ground segment, and other Government-owned or contractor-operated networks used to ingest, route, or distribute data from military and commercial space systems;

(3) A description of the roles and responsibilities of relevant program offices and agencies, including plans to deconflict capabilities, avoid unnecessary duplication, and identify areas in which duplication is maintained for resiliency;

(4) A description of the strategy for delivering legacy tactical data links, including Link 16, and broadcast services, including the Integrated Broadcast Service, through current and planned satellite constellations and ground architectures, and an assessment of whether new communication standards or waveforms are required;

(5) If new standards or waveforms are required, an assessment of associated user terminal programs, including fielding timelines, required quantities across the Joint Force, and any capability gaps between the fielding of space and ground architectures and user terminals;

(6) A description of any planned consolidation or restructuring of ground network infrastructure or operations centers, and the relationship between the Space Data Network and the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture across current and planned tranches;

(7) An assessment of workforce and basing implications for Space Force and Space Development Agency locations with ground network infrastructure; and

(8) The estimated cost of the Space Data Network through full operational capability and the planned acquisition strategy.

The committee further directs the Secretary to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than December 15, 2026, on the Department's preliminary approach to these matters, including any near-term decisions regarding architecture, governance, and acquisition.

**Space domain awareness**

The committee notes that the U.S. Space Force's space domain awareness (SDA) mission is a critical part of military operations. It allows the U.S. Space Force and other space organizations to understand and monitor the space domain, ensure the safety of U.S. space assets, and respond to potential threats. In recent years, numerous space companies and organizations have increased the number of satellites they operate in low earth orbit, increasing the total number of space objects that the U.S. Space Force needs to include in SDA efforts. In addition, adversary nations have demonstrated increased capability to threaten U.S. space assets in recent years. Taken together, there is increased need for specialized SDA systems to monitor these threats. The U.S. Space Force uses a variety of space and ground-based systems to monitor, characterize, and track objects in space for the benefit of military, civil, and commercial space organizations. Some of these systems are operational, and the Space Force is developing a variety of others to contribute to this mission. Additionally, SDA may be important to support missile defense capabilities.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a review examining: (1) How the U.S. Space Force is assessing its needs for future SDA systems at a portfolio level to enable comprehensive identification, characterization, and tracking of all relevant space objects; (2) What systems the Department of Defense is using and/or developing to meet its SDA needs, including existing capabilities, new acquisitions, commercial solutions, enhanced data processing, and other methods; (3) The extent to which existing and developing systems will meet the needs identified by U.S. Space Force assessments and any challenges to meeting those needs; (4) Use of SDA tools for battle damage assessment of objects in space; (5) How, if at all, the U.S. Space Force is coordinating with other defense and civil users on determining and meeting SDA needs; and (6) Other matters deemed relevant by the Comptroller General.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than May 1, 2027, on the review and to determine a mutually agreeable time to provide a report on the assessment.

**Space modeling, simulation, and analysis hub**

The committee strongly encourages the use of modeling, simulation, and analysis (MS&A) at the Air Force Research Laboratory's Space Vehicles Directorate's Analysis and Simulation Branch, the MS&A hub, at Kirtland Air Force Base. The rigorous environment of the MS&A hub facilitates space superiority by informing force structure decisions, satellite design, and space operations and conducting training, wargaming, and the development of tactics. The MS&A hub directly supports rapid acquisition efforts that seek to deliver first-of-their-kind operational space capabilities by affording an environment to assess and validate assumptions in threat-informed scenarios for existing and future programs of record.

**Space Training and Readiness Command Guardian workforce development and long-term training infrastructure**

The committee recognizes that the Space Force depends on a highly trained Guardian workforce to operate, defend, and reconstitute space capabilities across all mission areas, including missile warning; space domain awareness; satellite communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; and space control, in an increasingly contested and congested environment. The Space Training and Readiness Command (commonly known as "STARCOM"), headquartered at Patrick Space Force Base, Florida, is the primary organization of the Space Force responsible for developing doctrine, conducting training, and producing operationally ready Guardians across the full spectrum of space missions, yet it receives a disproportionately small share of investment relative to the acquisition of the space systems it supports. STARCOM's unique co-location at Patrick Space Force Base with Space Launch Delta 45, the Air Force Technical Applications Center, and one of the Nation's most active space launch ranges creates an unmatched environment for training Guardians in direct proximity to operational space systems, live launch activities, and real-time space domain

awareness missions, an advantage that no purpose-built training facility could replicate at comparable cost.

The committee believes that sustained investment in Guardian training infrastructure, simulation capabilities, doctrine development, and professional military education at STARCOM is essential to ensuring that space systems procured at great expense to the taxpayer are operated by personnel with the depth of expertise required to employ those systems effectively in competition and conflict. Congress has a long-term interest in establishing STARCOM as a permanent center of excellence for space warfighter development, ensuring that future generations of Guardians are trained to the highest standard regardless of which space systems, missions, or adversary threats define the strategic environment at the time of their service.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027, on the long-term training infrastructure, doctrine development capacity, and Guardian workforce requirements of STARCOM at Patrick Space Force Base, together with a plan for sustained investment in such capabilities over the future years defense program. The report shall include:

(1) An assessment of STARCOM's current training capacity, including available simulation systems, live training ranges, classroom and laboratory facilities, and embedded operational training opportunities afforded by co-location with active space launch and operations units;

(2) A gap analysis identifying shortfalls in Guardian training throughput, doctrine development personnel, advanced simulation infrastructure, and professional military education pathways, with estimated costs to address each identified shortfall over a 5-year period;

(3) A plan for achieving STARCOM full operational capability for space warfighter development, including recommended milestones, resource requirements, and metrics for evaluating the readiness of graduating Guardians to operate space systems in contested environments;

(4) Recommendations for legislative or programmatic action to ensure that STARCOM training and doctrine development capacity scales proportionally with planned growth in Space Force end strength and the number of space systems entering operational service; and

(5) Any administrative, budgetary, or organizational barriers that impede STARCOM from fully executing its training and doctrine development mission, together with recommendations to address such barriers.

The committee also directs the Chief of Space Operations, in close coordination with the Commander, STARCOM to, not later than April 1, 2027, submit to the Secretary of the Air Force a comprehensive Guardian workforce development strategy covering a 10-year planning horizon. Such a strategy shall address training pipeline capacity, advanced warfighter education, tactics and doctrine development, simulation and synthetic training environment investment, and the integration of emerging mission areas into STARCOM's curriculum. The Commander, STARCOM, shall lever-

age the unique operational training environment at Patrick Space Force Base, including proximity to active launch operations and space domain awareness activities, in developing such strategy.

The committee directs an associated briefing on both the report and the workforce strategy to be presented to the congressional defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027.

**Space Training and Readiness Command resourcing and other training capabilities**

The committee recognizes the critical role of the Space Force's Space Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM) in training Guardians, developing space warfighting doctrine; developing its tactics, techniques, and procedures; and testing and evaluating Space Force capabilities. The committee further recognizes the increasing importance of realistic, on-orbit training environments to prepare Guardians to recognize, characterize, and respond to increasingly complex and aggressive behaviors by near-peer competitors in the space domain.

The committee notes that commercially operated on-orbit systems now provide mature capabilities that may support operational test, training, and exercise activities in ways that are not fully achievable through ground-based or purely simulated systems. These capabilities include, but are not limited to, rendezvous and proximity operations, inspection, maneuver characterization, space domain awareness, and other mission-relevant activities associated with contested space operations. The committee encourages the Department of the Air Force to leverage such commercial capabilities to the maximum extent practicable in support of STARCOM-led training and the Space Systems Command Operational Test and Training Infrastructure (OTTI) construct.

Therefore, the committee directs the Commander of STARCOM, in coordination with the Commander of Space Systems Command, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on STARCOM resourcing and the integration of commercial on-orbit capabilities into Space Force training and test activities.

The briefing shall include:

(1) An assessment of how STARCOM is currently resourced to execute its mission set, including the training of Guardians, the development of doctrine and tactics, and the test and evaluation of Space Force capabilities;

(2) A plan to integrate commercially available on-orbit capabilities into OTTI-supported training, test, and exercise activities;

(3) The funding strategy and contracting mechanisms to be used to procure and sustain such commercial capabilities, including the use of Other Transaction Authority, Commercial Solutions Opening, Broad Agency Announcement, and reimbursable agreements;

(4) A proposed timeline for initial operational use of commercial on-orbit assets, including a goal of incorporating such capabilities into guardian training events before the end of 2028;

(5) An assessment of any policy, classification, acquisition, or statutory barriers that may inhibit the use of commercial systems for training and test purposes; and

(6) An evaluation of how integration of commercial on-orbit capabilities will enhance training realism, improve space warfighting readiness, and support operations in a contested space domain.

**Space-based systems to support long-range targeting and engagement**

The committee notes the ability to remotely target and employ long-range weapons to engage adversaries is critical for a variety of military actions and plans across warfighting domains. The space domain is poised to support long-range targeting of adversary locations and assets through planned space-based sensing and data transmission capabilities. Space domain systems for sensing, processing, and disseminating sensor data; command and control; communications; and battle management all support long-range targeting and the use of long-range weapons, particularly those needed by the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. However, the Department of Defense (DOD) faces challenges maturing technologies as well as acquiring and integrating needed systems at a relevant scale. Further, the DOD's emerging Golden Dome for America plans may levy additional requirements on such systems.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a review of space domain acquisitions the DOD plans or has underway to support targeting and the use of long-range weapons to assess: (1) The extent to which the DOD is using space-based capabilities to enable long-range targeting and use of weapons; (2) The extent to which the DOD is communicating to necessary stakeholders the space-based capabilities, systems, and processes required to enable long-range targeting and weapons employment; (3) The extent to which the systems critical to enabling long-range targeting and weapons employment can support the DOD's planned increases in munitions procurement quantities; (4) What challenges, if any, the DOD faces in coordinating capabilities to support long-range targeting and weapons employment across geographic or mission areas; and (5) Other matters deemed relevant by the Comptroller General.

The Secretary of the Air Force shall ensure that the Comptroller General has the necessary access to information at appropriate classification and facilities to carry out such an assessment.

Not later than May 1, 2027, the Comptroller General shall brief congressional defense committees and discuss whether to provide a report on the assessment or if further briefings are warranted.

**Suitability of the Enterprise Logistics Management System for lifecycle management of vehicles used in missile field operations by Air Force Global Strike Command**

The committee notes that vehicles used by the Air Force Global Strike Command for missile field operations and maintenance routinely exceed 200,000 miles. However, these vehicles are not replaced in a timely fashion and in turn become increasingly harder to maintain, affecting missile field wing readiness. For example,

2014 F350 pickup trucks can exceed 200,000 miles, 2006 F650 box trucks can exceed 140,000 miles, and 2010 F350 cargo trucks can exceed 150,000 miles. The property accountability system used to assess vehicle replacement versus continued maintenance is referred to as the Enterprise Logistics Management System (ELMS). The committee notes that ELMS is designed for Department of Defense vehicles that do not receive such high mileage and wear as found in the geographically large intercontinental ballistic missile fields, often under harsh weather. As a result, mission capable rates may be skewed for vehicles not physically possessed by Missile Wing's Logistics Readiness Squadron for repair. Additionally, ELMS may not capture other key metrics that would provide a more complete picture of the health of the vehicle fleet used to support missile field operations.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review: (1) If ELMS over-reports the mission capability rate of vehicles based on how it calculates possession of the vehicle; (2) Whether ELMS adequately captures break rates for vehicles; and (3) Whether there are additional metrics that should be assessed to provide a more complete picture of the health of the vehicle fleet used to support missile field operations.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to assess the capability of the ELMS to adequately determine when vehicles used in these large and remote missile field locations should be replaced versus undergoing continued, time-consuming maintenance at high mileage and wear rates.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to provide initial observations to the congressional defense committee, not later than March 31, 2027, with a report to be provided based upon a mutually agreed upon date.

**Support for United States-Mexico intelligence sharing**

The committee recognizes the persistent and evolving threat posed by transnational criminal organizations, including drug cartels operating in Mexico, which continue to undermine regional stability and threaten the security of the United States. The committee notes that these organizations are responsible for significant volumes of illicit narcotics trafficking, violence, and other nefarious activity that impact communities on both sides of the United States-Mexico border.

The committee supports continued and enhanced security cooperation between the Armed Forces of the United States and the Mexican government, particularly efforts focused on identifying high-value cartel leaders and weakening cartel networks. The committee believes that bilateral cooperation—including intelligence sharing and capacity building—remains essential to disrupting cartel command structures and degrading operational capabilities.

The committee encourages the Department of Defense, in consultation with the Department of State, the intelligence community, and other relevant agencies, to expand collaboration with vetted Mexican security forces to support efforts to combat cartels.

The committee further encourages the Department of Defense to assess opportunities to improve real-time intelligence sharing and communications synchronization with Mexican counterparts to in-

crease the effectiveness of joint efforts targeting cartel leadership networks.

**United States critical infrastructure resilience against electromagnetic pulse weapons**

The committee remains concerned about the growing strategic threat posed by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons to the United States. The United States' ability to defend its critical infrastructure against such attacks is critical, as a successful strike would deny civilian populations access to life-critical services—including clean water, healthcare, communications, and transportation—creating mass panic and disruption. The committee recognizes that these weapons could provide adversaries with an asymmetric means of coercion that may be more attractive than conventional military force in a conflict with the United States.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on the following:

(1) An assessment of current U.S. vulnerabilities across military and civilian critical infrastructure, including energy, water, healthcare, communications, and transportation systems;

(2) The status and adequacy of hardening, mitigation, and recovery efforts across Department of Defense systems and platforms; and

(3) Recommendations to strengthen U.S. resilience against EMP and HEMP threats.

**United States Telecommunications Training Institute**

The committee notes the importance of the United States Telecommunications Training Institute (USTTI) to help the Department of Defense work with allies and partners as they develop high-risk communications infrastructure around the world. This is particularly important in developing nations, in order to counter China's aggressive strategy with respect to proposals at the World Radio Conference. The training courses the USTTI provides, many times with the participation of the Department, forge long-term relationships with the host nation, ensuring their future strategies also align with United States national defense strategies, especially with respect to spectrum allocations through the International Telecommunications Union.

**Vandenberg public-private partnership**

The committee is encouraged by the launch of Space Vandenberg as a new public-private partnership to support the Western Range. Innovative public-private partnerships can play an important role in accelerating spaceport development, leveraging state, local, and private capital to advance infrastructure priorities, and maximizing the innovation potential of the ranges through university partnerships and the creation of mission development zones for researchers and entrepreneurs to innovate new space technologies. We encourage the U.S. Space Force to continue these innovative collabo-

rations to advance the Spaceport of the Future initiative and national space priorities.

**Weather satellites**

The U.S. Air Force and Navy have previously testified that over 90 percent of their weather forecasting data comes from satellites, emphasizing the need for continued, secure, and modernized weather data.

Yet, weather satellite funding is virtually non-existent in the annual U.S. Space Force budget request. While demonstrations and prototypes have been funded, nothing yet has transitioned into a significant program of record, continuing the Space Force's reliance on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for critical weather data. This lack of U.S. warfighter capability includes potential threats to military readiness, as well as weakens support for new initiatives such as Golden Dome, which relies on accurate weather and atmospheric models to counter hypersonic, missile, and space-borne threats.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Department of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than March 1, 2027. This briefing should include steps the Space Force will take to ensure the Space Force is not relying solely on non-military entities for future military weather requirements. It will also assess the potential for the Space Force to leverage the Golden Dome initiative and military modernizations for the purposes of reinvigorating Department of Defense space-based weather programs and capabilities.

**Wireless intrusion detection**

The committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than February 1, 2027, providing a detailed assessment of Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems requirements across the military services, the combatant commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the defense agencies to enhance the security of Secure Compartmented Information Facilities and Special Access Program Facilities. The briefing shall, at a minimum, provide an implementation plan and associated resource requirement to integrate Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems across the Department of Defense security facility enterprise.

# TITLE XVI—CYBERSPACE RELATED MATTERS

## Subtitle A—Matters Relating to Cyber Operations and Cyber Forces

### Sec. 1601—Independent study on the authorities and organizational structure of the principal cyber advisors

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to enter into an agreement with a federally funded research and development center or independent entity, not later than March 1, 2027, to conduct a study on the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and resourcing of the Principal Cyber Advisors (PCA) of the military departments. The study shall assess whether current authorities under section 392a(c) of title 10, United States Code, are sufficient to enable PCAs to execute their statutory responsibilities and examine the organizational relationships between PCAs and other senior cyber and information technology officials within each military department. The conducting entity shall submit a report to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees, not later than January 1, 2028. The Secretary of Defense shall provide a briefing on the findings to the congressional defense committees, not later than January 15, 2028.

The committee notes that the PCA role has existed for over 6 years. Over that period, resourcing for PCA offices has evolved, and the approach to organizing and employing the PCA varies considerably across the military departments. The committee believes this variation makes it an appropriate time to assess whether the PCA construct has the authorities, organizational placement, and resourcing necessary to provide effective civilian oversight and advocacy for service cyber forces. The committee further notes that as the Department of Defense invests in the implementation of the Department of Defense Revised Cyber Force Generation Model, known more commonly as CYBERCOM 2.0, ensuring that the PCA offices are well-positioned to support the Department's evolving cyber workforce needs is an important consideration.

### Sec. 1602—Funding for reserve component support to cyber-peculiar operations

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to obligate or expend up to $5.0 million for fiscal year 2027 in operation and maintenance funds to support reserve component participation in cyber-peculiar operations. The provision requires CYBERCOM to notify the congressional defense committees within 15 days each time cumulative obligations exceed $500,000 increments and to submit an annual report, not later than December 31, 2027, detailing activi-

ties conducted, reserve participation, and standards applied to determine cyber-peculiar requirements.

The committee believes that reserve component cyber personnel offer unique and specialized skills that are a valuable asset to the cyberspace mission. The committee recognizes that many of these personnel maintain strong ties to the private sector, providing unique access to industry best practices and technical expertise. The committee notes that under current authority in section 167b of title 10, United States Code, CYBERCOM does not have independent authority to fund the ordering of reserve component members to duty on its own. Instead, the command must coordinate through the military services for such funding. The committee understands that CYBERCOM has at times faced challenges securing sufficient access to these forces when needed, as demand for this funding is high across the services. This limited-duration authority serves as a targeted solution to provide CYBERCOM a more direct mechanism to order reserve component forces to duty for cyber-peculiar requirements, while generating data to assess whether a longer-term legislative solution is warranted.

**Sec. 1603—Amendment of annual reporting requirements on support for United States Cyber Command**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 391a of title 10, United States Code, to revise the annual reporting requirements on military department support for U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). The provision requires the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy to submit an annual report to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, and annually thereafter, on the readiness, capability gaps, and mitigation plans across the military departments in support of operational cyber requirements.

The committee acknowledges the measurable improvements the military departments and CYBERCOM have made in overall cyber readiness. The committee also recognizes the Department of Defense's ongoing work to develop and implement the Revised Cyber Force Generation Model, commonly referred to as CYBERCOM 2.0, which sets a more ambitious and comprehensive standard for force readiness and capability. The committee believes success in meeting those standards will require a sustained, whole-of-department commitment to the investments and obligations outlined in the CYBERCOM 2.0 implementation plan. To support this effort, the committee believes reorienting existing reporting structures toward this initiative is beneficial and, therefore, directs that the annual readiness reporting required under this provision be refocused to track military department support for CYBERCOM 2.0.

**Sec. 1604—Scaling cyberspace access generation and maintenance capabilities**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize a pilot program to contract with private sector entities to conduct limited contractor-owned, contractor-operated cyber operations for access generation and maintenance, under the operational authority of the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, and subject to direct oversight by cleared Department of Defense civilian employees or

military members. The Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than 90 days after the termination of the pilot program.

**Sec. 1605—Cyber operational readiness assessments of the Department of Defense information network**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Department of Defense (DOD) Cyber Defense Command (DCDC) to submit annual reports to the congressional defense committees on the implementation and findings of the Cyber Operational Readiness Assessment program, beginning March 1, 2027, and annually thereafter through December 31, 2030.

The committee commends the transition from static, compliance-based inspections toward a proactive, risk-based model that emphasizes operational readiness, threat intelligence, and continuous assessment of the DOD Information Network. The committee views this transition as an important step in ensuring that DOD networks are evaluated against real-world threats rather than point-in-time compliance checklists. The committee also supports the investments DCDC is making in tools to support network defense and operational technology visibility and expects future reporting to address the pace of adoption, operational utility, and whether those tools are delivering the intended outcomes across the enterprise. The committee will continue working with the Department to ensure it has the resources and authorities necessary to succeed.

**Sec. 1606—Independent study on United States Cyber Command organization and resourcing**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to enter into an agreement with a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) or other independent entity, not later than March 1, 2027, to conduct an independent study on the organizational constructs and resourcing of the U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and develop not fewer than two alternative models for the organization and resourcing of the CYBERCOM headquarters. The FFRDC or independent entity shall deliver a presentation on the study to the Secretary of Defense, not later than December 31, 2027. Not later than April 30, 2028, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees an implementation plan for the preferred model presented by the FFRDC or independent entity.

The committee commends CYBERCOM for its accomplishments in assuming enhanced budget authority and control over its resources, as well as the significant work undertaken to establish a Program Executive Office in preparation for the transition of the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture to the command in 2027. The committee believes that the Department of Defense is at a natural inflection point to assess whether the command's current resources and organizational structure allow for the Department to fully realize the potential of these expanded authorities and responsibilities, without requiring the command to accept trade-offs between service-like responsibilities and the operational demands of a combatant command. While the committee acknowledges the remarkable progress CYBERCOM has achieved under this construct, it is con-

cerned that over the long-term, these trade-offs will increasingly limit the command's ability to build and advance cyber capabilities at the pace and scale the nation requires.

The committee encourages the entity conducting this assessment to explore alternative models, such as those within U.S. Special Operations Command, which operates under a dual-track staff in which one element is aligned to service-like responsibilities, and a separate element is aligned to combatant command responsibilities.

**Sec. 1607—Modification to quarterly reporting for cyber operations**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 484 of title 10, United States Code, to modify that section's reporting requirements for cyber operations.

**Sec. 1608—Repeal of authority to use operations and maintenance funds for cyber-peculiar development**

The committee recommends a provision that would repeal section 1640 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92).

**Sec. 1609—Strategy for integration of National Guard physical range capabilities into cyber testing activities**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy for integrating National Guard physical ranges with cyber-peculiar capabilities or cyber-peculiar test and evaluation requirements, and submit a report to the congressional defense committees on this strategy not later than January 15, 2028. The Secretary of Defense must also evaluate the adequacy of current funding models under the Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation for funding National Guard cyber ranges, and submit a report to the congressional defense committees on this evaluation not later than January 15, 2028.

**Sec. 1610—Updated cyber readiness reporting methodology**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy and the Principal Cyber Advisors of the military departments, to develop and implement an updated methodology for reporting cyber force readiness, not later than January 1, 2028.

**Sec. 1611—Expansion of entities included in coordination between United States Cyber Command and private sector**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1508 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81) to expand the authority to engage with entities beyond information technology and cybersecurity, and to extend the annual reporting requirement to 2031.

## Subtitle B—Matters Relating to Department of Defense Cybersecurity and Information Technology

### Sec. 1621—Improving reserve component network account continuity

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (CIO), in coordination with the CIOs of the military departments, to establish minimum standards for reserve component personnel accounts on unclassified and classified networks, not later than March 1, 2027. The provision also directs the Department of Defense Inspector General to conduct an audit of implementation and provide findings to the congressional defense committees, not later than October 1, 2028.

The committee is aware that members of the reserve components frequently encounter avoidable network access issues when transitioning between duty statuses, including repeated account reactivation or credential resets. This persists despite policies intended to maintain access for longer periods in recognition of the intermittent nature of reserve service, creating unnecessary administrative burden and detracting from readiness.

### Sec. 1622—Reducing administrative burden in the Department of Defense risk management framework implementation

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Department of Defense (DOD) Chief Information Officer (CIO) to reduce administrative burden in the implementation of the Risk Management Framework (RMF) across the Department. The provision requires the DOD CIO to issue standardized RMF policy guidance, not later than October 1, 2027; directs each military department's CIO to publish consistent implementing guidance, not later than December 1, 2027; and requires modernization of the enterprise platform supporting RMF approvals and documentation, not later than October 1, 2028. Not later than April 1, 2027, and annually thereafter through April 1, 2032, the DOD CIO shall provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on the status of the new policy guidance and implementation.

The committee recognizes that repeated congressional and DOD efforts to address burdensome and inconsistent RMF implementation have yielded mixed results. The committee is concerned that the accelerating pace of software delivery makes the cost of the current process increasingly acute, creating compounding risk to warfighter capability and security.

The committee believes that many of the root causes of these challenges were surfaced in industry responses to the DOD's Software Fast Track Initiative. This provision reflects the continuation of that effort by directing the establishment of a standardized, consistent process across all DOD services and components, addressing the friction that has prevented prior reciprocity provisions from being fully realized, and correcting the inconsistent application of control inheritance that has been a key barrier to progress. The committee further directs modernization of the current platform to

enable the ingestion of machine-readable security data and real-time monitoring.

**Sec. 1623—Science, Technology, and Innovation Board study on software-as-a-service in classified networks**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to task the Science, Technology, and Innovation Board (STIB), not later than February 1, 2027, to study the enablement of commercial software-as-a-service (SaaS) offerings on classified networks of the Department of Defense (DOD). The STIB would deliver an interim briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than August 1, 2027; a final report, not later than January 15, 2028; and a briefing on the findings of such study, not later than January 31, 2028.

The committee recognizes that commercial SaaS offerings could deliver significant operational and innovation benefits to the DOD on classified networks, but that no clear or transparent pathway currently exists for vendors to bring such offerings to scale. The committee is aware that while some vendors have obtained authorizations and sponsorship, the process spanning technical, security, and contractual requirements lacks consistency and transparency, and the investments required are substantial, particularly for small businesses and nontraditional defense contractors. The committee believes this study would provide industry a defined path toward certification, authorization, and contract eligibility. The committee believes that without such clarity, the DOD risks forgoing the innovation benefits a competitive classified SaaS marketplace could provide.

**Sec. 1624—Streamlining Department of Defense governance process for cross-domain solution approvals**

The committee recommends a provision directing the Department of Defense (DOD) Chief Information Officer (CIO) to streamline cross-domain solution (CDS) approval governance by eliminating unnecessary procedural steps and governance body involvement that does not contribute a meaningful security benefit. Not later than December 15, 2027, the DOD CIO shall submit a report to the congressional defense committees assessing current processes and a plan to establish a risk-tiered review framework. Additionally, the DOD CIO shall provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2028, on the implementation status of the findings of the report.

The committee recognizes that robust protections are essential when moving data across classification boundaries, but finds that the current CDS approval process has grown unnecessarily bureaucratic, introducing latency into a domain where the balance of speed and security is paramount. Consensus-based decision requirements, full board reviews regardless of risk level, and limited use of reciprocity authorities risk imposing real operational costs on warfighters, who require timely access to information across domains. The committee believes that rigorous process review and the integration of automation can meaningfully reduce procedural steps that add no genuine security value.

**Sec. 1625—Data center infrastructure strategy and roadmap for military installations**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment, to develop and submit to the congressional defense committees a data center infrastructure strategy and roadmap for the build-out of private data centers on military installations, not later than January 15, 2028.

The provision requires the Secretary to designate a senior lead official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to oversee and coordinate all related activities, including negotiations with external vendors. The strategy and roadmap must include a capacity and requirements analysis, an installation infrastructure study, and a governance structure for negotiating land use rights with external vendors.

**Sec. 1626—Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification assessment grants for small businesses and new entrants**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to establish the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Assessment Grant Program, not later than July 1, 2027, to award one-time grants of up to $100,000 to eligible small businesses and nontraditional defense contractors seeking CMMC Level 2 certification, with total grant funding not to exceed $50.0 million. The provision also directs the Secretary of Defense to submit annual reports to the congressional defense committees beginning July 1, 2028, through December 31, 2031.

**Sec. 1627—Harmonization of Department of Defense security boundaries to enable reciprocity**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to standardize security boundaries across the Department of Defense (DOD) to maximize security control inheritance and reduce duplicative security assessments. The provision requires the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) to update all applicable policy and guidance, not later than October 1, 2027, and military department CIOs to publish implementing guidance, not later than December 1, 2027. All programs and systems must be brought into compliance not later than October 1, 2030, and annual briefings to the congressional defense committees are required, not later than April 1, 2027, and continuing through April 1, 2031.

The committee is concerned that inconsistent security boundary definitions have been a persistent barrier to effective reciprocity. The committee notes that when authorizing officials attempt to apply the DOD reciprocity handbook, inconsistent boundary constructs force them to decipher which documents apply to which portions of their review. This introduces ambiguity that often undermines prior authorization work and negates the intent of existing reciprocity policy. The committee views boundary standardization as foundational to realizing the full potential of reciprocity and as an essential complement to broader Risk Management Framework reform efforts currently underway.

**Sec. 1628—Expansion of cyber scholarship program to include operational technology**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2200(a) of title 10, United States Code, and add operational technology as a key educational area for the Department of Defense cyber scholarship program.

**Sec. 1629—Limitation on availability of funds for Alpha-1 Development Activities**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for obligation or expenditure for the War Data Platform in Program Element 0604133D8Z until the Department of Defense Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer provides a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee that includes a comprehensive application strategy for the War Data Platform, including a plan for competing out aspects of the program.

**Sec. 1630—Limitation on the use of funds for information systems development**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Information Technology Development Initiative (PE 0605027D8Z) until the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the program managers for the Armed Forces pay and personnel systems, provides to the congressional defense committees the briefing related to the modernization of pay systems across the Department of Defense, including the impacts on military service integrated pay and personnel systems.

**Sec. 1631—Post-quantum cryptography adoption**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to set specific adoption timelines for the cryptographic solutions of the Department of Defense.

**Sec. 1632—Improvements to high-performance computing roadmap**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1532(c) of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 119–60) by including additional elements to the reporting requirement.

**Sec. 1633—Pilot program on Department of Defense partnerships with institutions of higher education recognized in the National Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity program for Cyber Research**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a pilot program to assess the feasibility of partnering advanced cyberspace operations and information aggressor units of the Department of Defense with institutions of higher education recognized in the National Centers of Academic

Excellence in Cybersecurity program for Cyber Research, Cyber Defense, or Cyber Operations by the National Security Agency.

**Sec. 1634—Insider threat reporting and voluntary guidance for large artificial intelligence contractors**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, regarding insider threat reporting requirements for artificial intelligence contractors.

**Sec. 1635—Requirement for memoranda of agreement regarding vulnerability disclosure and prohibition on procurement from IT providers who share cyber vulnerabilities with countries of concern**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to include a memorandum of agreement on any contract for commercial information technology systems to ensure an entity discloses vulnerabilities impacting department systems prior to disclosure to any other entity including trusted partners.

**Sec. 1636—Strategy for artificial intelligence-accelerated vulnerability discovery and remediation**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, to assess risks and opportunities arising from the use of advanced artificial intelligence capabilities to discover, validate, exploit, remediate, or reverse engineer vulnerabilities in software, weapons systems, and information systems.

**Sec. 1637—Ensuring competition in artificial intelligence procurement**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to require a competitive process for each procurement of advanced computing systems and artificial intelligence applications.

**Sec. 1638—Phishing resistant authentication for defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to ensure that only phishing-resistant authentication is used by all Department of Defense personnel, not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

**Subtitle C—Data and Artificial Intelligence**

**Sec. 1641—Establishing an ecosystem for use of artificial intelligence agents at scale and speed**

The committee recommends a provision directing the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO), to establish a Department of Defense (DOD)-wide ecosystem for the deployment and enterprise use of agentic artificial intelligence (AI) systems at scale and speed. The Secretary

must submit an implementation roadmap and briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than January 15, 2028.

The committee commends the Department for its investment in agentic AI, particularly through the seven pace-setting projects. However, the committee is concerned that the DOD is overlooking the importance of translating the lessons from these projects into a broader ecosystem that supports the speed and scale of development and adoption and is, instead, treating it as an afterthought to individual program success.

Effective commercial agentic ecosystems include governance, best practice forums, agent discovery applications, and deployment platforms. They are also designed for both technical developers and non-technical end users, who have proven equally capable of leveraging agents for daily tasks.

Without such an ecosystem, the Department risks not being able to consistently replicate the success of the pace-setting projects at speed and scale. Rather, each fast follow-on project and those after will be forced to rebuild and relearn from scratch rather than drawing on shared infrastructure, common standards, and reusable agents.

**Sec. 1642—Security standards and framework for Department of Defense agents**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to develop and issue authoritative security standards and guidance for artificial intelligence (AI) agents across the Department of Defense (DOD), not later than December 15, 2027.

As the DOD continues to expand its use of AI agents, the committee believes appropriate security policies are essential. The committee cautions the Department, however, against creating a compliance-focused process versus a security-focused, risk-informed one. The former approach risks slowing adoption and technological advancement rather than securing those activities.

**Sec. 1643—Assessment of generative artificial intelligence platform impact on workforce acumen**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to provide annual briefings to the congressional defense committees on the utilization of the Department of Defense (DOD) generative artificial intelligence platform, commonly referred to as GenAI.mil, and on what that utilization reflects about the state of artificial intelligence adoption and acumen in the DOD general workforce.

**Sec. 1644—Demand forecast model for artificial intelligence**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer, to develop a unified, Department of Defense-wide demand forecast model for artificial intelligence (AI) and establish an automated data collection process providing the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation direct access to all AI demand data.

**Sec. 1645—Strategy and governance for adversarial artificial intelligence**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the effects of the adoption of artificial intelligence systems by personnel of the Department of Defense on the maintenance and retention of essential warfighter skills, and require the Secretary to designate a senior official to be responsible for overseeing such efforts.

**Sec. 1646—Inclusion of alternative models in Department of Defense generative artificial intelligence platform**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer, to expand the number and diversity of models and applications on the Department of Defense enterprise generative artificial intelligence platform, GenAI.mil, including capabilities for language translation, coding assistance, and data analysis, with particular attention to removing barriers to participation by small business concerns. The provision would require a 4-year expansion strategy submitted to the congressional defense committees, as well as an annual roadmap briefing.

**Sec. 1647—Policy and guidance related to autonomous weapon systems and artificial intelligence capabilities acquisition**

The committee recommends a provision that would create a new section in title 10, United States Code, to codify policies related to the acquisition of autonomous weapon systems and artificial intelligence capabilities. Elements of this policy, based on the Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, would do the following: (1) Codify in statute the review process for autonomous weapon systems and artificial intelligence capabilities in development and before fielding; (2) Specify in more detail the definition for appropriate levels of human judgment for such systems; (3) Provide direction on validation, verification, and test and evaluation for such systems; (4) Provide exceptions to the policy, as well as proscribe certain prohibitions for the use of such systems; (5) Require the establishment of a working group to support Departmental decisions for these systems; and (6) Require the establishment of a centralized repository for reporting, collecting, and analyzing incidents involving autonomous weapon systems used by the Department of Defense.

**Sec. 1648—Update to the Department of Defense data strategy and implementation plan**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer as the Chief Data Officer of the Department of Defense (DOD), to update the 2020 DOD Data Strategy, not later than September 15, 2027, to serve as the authoritative guiding document for how the DOD hosts, manages, and makes discoverable Department data in support of data sharing and artificial intelligence readiness. The Secretary shall also submit to the

congressional defense committees an implementation plan for the strategy across the future years defense program.

**Sec. 1649—Assessment of artificial intelligence effects on warfighter skill retention and operational readiness**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the effects of the adoption of artificial intelligence systems by personnel of the Department of Defense on the maintenance and retention of essential warfighter skills, and the Secretary shall designate a senior official to be responsible for overseeing such efforts.

**Sec. 1650—Derived sourcing requirements for artificial intelligence outputs**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to require that any vendor providing artificial intelligence capabilities to the Department of Defense implement a sourcing mechanism that affixes cited sources to generated content.

**Sec. 1651—Improvements regarding guidance and prohibition on use of certain artificial intelligence**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 1532 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) by expanding the list of Chinese artificial intelligence companies covered by the restriction, and making some additional technical clarifications.

**Sec. 1652—Artificial intelligence functional bill of materials**

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the Department of Defense from entering into, renewing, or extending a contract for the procurement of goods or services that utilize artificial intelligence, unless the contractor submits and maintains a functional bill of materials, which would include hardware, software, and data bills of material incorporated into such good or service.

**Sec. 1653—Requirements for human oversight of use of force by the Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations that the use of force remains subject to an identifiable human in the chain of command and control, and to develop a joint doctrine for autonomous warfare.

**Sec. 1654—Biosecurity procurement requirements for covered artificial intelligence models**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense to develop a framework for biosecurity evaluation of artificial intelligence models to mitigate risks to the Department of Defense from malicious use of such models.

### Sec. 1655—Prototyping secure artificial intelligence data centers

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in consultation with the Director of the National Security Agency and the Head of the Center for Artificial Intelligence Standards and Innovation, to carry out a test and evaluation program for unique security requirements for artificial intelligence data centers.

## Items of Special Interest

### Access to Department of Defense-unique data for commercial development

The committee commends the Department of Defense (DOD) for its efforts to reduce barriers to fielding commercial solutions but believes acquisition reform alone is insufficient. For commercial solutions to effectively support the warfighter, commercial companies, particularly small businesses and nontraditional defense contractors, need access to DOD data, or appropriately representative data, to develop and validate their solutions. Currently, obtaining such access places a significant burden of time and financial investment on the commercial entity, slowing the pathway from solution development to deployed capability.

The committee notes that early access to relevant data can more quickly demonstrate the value of a commercial solution and, if performant, can accelerate integration into deployed capabilities for the warfighter. Much of the DOD's data is unique to military operations and has no commercial equivalent, and the committee believes the Department should develop an open-source and unclassified data platform, to include synthetic data representative of classified datasets, organized around specific mission problem sets for which the Department seeks commercial solutions.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO), in coordination with the service and Joint Staff Chief Data Officers (CDOs), to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 15, 2027, on a roadmap for such a platform. This briefing should address the following: (1) Prioritization of mission problem sets for which open or synthetic data should be developed; (2) A governance model defining the roles of the CDAO, the service CDOs, and the Joint Staff CDO; and (3) An assessment of investments required to build and sustain the platform.

### Army investment in operationalizing data through teams and operations centers

The committee commends the Army for its investment in and integration of data products at the tactical level through the establishment of Operational Data Teams (ODTs) and the Army Data Operations Center (ADOC). As the Army progresses in its modernization initiatives and develops low-code/no-code platforms for agile software development in support of rapidly evolving battlefield requirements, these teams and this capability will become increasingly critical to operational effectiveness.

The committee advocates for the continued growth and resourcing of this effort and strongly encourages the other military departments to evaluate a similar concept at appropriate echelons for the establishment of comparable functions. The committee further advocates for the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office, in its capacity as the Chief Data Officer (CDO) of the Department of Defense (DOD), to consider both the ODT concept and the ADOC model in any forthcoming rewrite of the DOD Data Strategy. The committee intends to continue monitoring the progress of this initiative and seeks to better understand its concept of operations.

Therefore, the committee directs the CDO of the Department of the Army to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 15, 2027. The briefing shall address the following: (1) An update on the status and development of Operational Data Teams and the Army Data Operations Center; (2) The development of the concept of operations; (3) Integration with Army software development capabilities, including low-code/no-code platforms; (4) Experimentation and integration with the Next Generation Command and Control platform; and (5) Any challenges or barriers to implementation.

The committee further directs the CDO of the Department of the Navy and the CDO of the Department of the Air Force to each provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 15, 2027, on their evaluation of a concept similar to the Army's ODTs and ADOC. The briefings shall address the following: (1) The various organizational and functional models considered during the evaluation; (2) The justification for the final determination reached by each military department; and (3) Any planned next steps or barriers to implementation.

**Army network edge security and remote access modernization**

The committee supports the U.S. Army's efforts to modernize security for off-base and remote users. The committee remains concerned that the Army's legacy, perimeter-based network architecture is not positioned to meet security requirements for off-base network access from which a significant and growing portion of the total force operates. The current hardware-heavy model creates latency and security gaps for users accessing the network outside of military installations.

The committee encourages the Secretary of the Army to prioritize the assessment and acquisition of commercially available, software-defined, cloud-delivered solutions that deliver secure access service edge capabilities, including an integrated, agentless browser workspace to enforce security controls directly within the browsing environment and to provide low-latency, high-performance connectivity for geographically dispersed components.

Therefore, the committee directs the Army Chief Information Officer to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Army's approach to modernizing its edge security and remote access approach. The briefing

should include: (1) A description of any additional resources needed to ensure a consistent security posture for remote network users; (2) Projected cost savings from the reduction of on-premises hardware; and (3) Plans to integrate security orchestration and automation capabilities into the Army Unified Network Plan 2.0 to improve threat detection and response.

**Artificial intelligence decision support system adoption**

The committee notes that the Department of Defense (DOD) announced in March 2026 that it is transitioning Maven Smart Systems (MSS) to become a formal Program of Record (POR) within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and under the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office to accelerate artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled decision making for the Joint Force. The committee remains cautiously optimistic, but like other recent moves to institutionalize rapid capability development efforts into PORs, the committee remains vigilant to ensure that proper planning and due diligence is also being exercised. The committee also believes that documentation of lessons learned will be an important mechanism for identifying best practices and necessary policy changes across DOD components and other military services for future POR transitions of joint warfighting capabilities.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office MSS Program Office, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, to conduct an independent review to document lessons learned from MSS and deliver a report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than December 15, 2027. The review should assess the state of MSS prior to its program of record designation and track operational momentum for 12 months post-POR designation, and cover the following: (1) Pre- and post-POR designation user adoption rates; (2) Time-from-requirement-to-deployment; (3) Noteworthy innovations; (4) Notable incidents; (5) Challenges in managing and modifying doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy; and (6) Standardized servicemember and user feedback across combatant commands and networks.

The committee notes that such review should expand on how the POR transition will advance a framework to guide investments, measure progress, and ensure oversight and accountability for the adoption of AI solutions, especially for the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control initiative required in section 1509 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60). The committee notes the importance of transparency and oversight during transitions to a formal POR.

**Artificial intelligence shared services cost recovery model study**

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense (DOD) has made initial progress toward centralizing artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities through platforms such as GenAI.mil, operated by the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO). As the

DOD continues to expand its enterprise-wide AI infrastructure, including large language models, applications, application programming interfaces, and AI agents, the committee believes it is important to assess whether a shared services cost recovery model could improve security, accountability, and buying power across the AI enterprise. However, the committee is uncertain whether existing financial mechanisms, such as a Working Capital Fund (WCF), are sufficient to enable DOD components to access and pay for centrally hosted AI capabilities across both the Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) and the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet).

Therefore, the committee directs the CDAO, in coordination with the DOD Chief Information Officer, to conduct a study on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a shared services cost recovery model to centrally host and manage enterprise-wide AI capabilities available to DOD components and other authorized entities and to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than December 15, 2026. The study shall evaluate: (1) The feasibility of a centralized AI hosting architecture accessible across NIPRNet and SIPRNet; (2) The advisability of a shared services cost recovery model, including whether a WCF or other existing financial mechanisms could support such a program; (3) The security, efficiency, and cost benefits of centralization, including consolidation of security authorization and enterprise licensing; and (4) Whether existing DOD mechanisms already provide similar functionality and are sufficient to meet enterprise needs.

**Collaborative planning and briefing platforms**

The committee notes that there is an increasing number of collaborative planning and briefing tools available that can help automate Department of Defense staff functions that are typically manual and time consuming. These platforms can support real-time, multi-user military staff workflow planning and are increasingly used by the Joint Staff, combatant commands, military departments, and National Guard components across multiple command echelons and coalition partner networks to develop and execute operational plans, facilitate coordination, and improve the speed, quality, continuity, and auditability of commander decision-making.

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on the Department's use of collaborative planning and briefing platforms. The briefing shall include the following: (1) An assessment of the tools available and currently being used within the Department; (2) Approaches for evaluating such tools in ongoing exercises, including the identification of possible exercise venues for demonstration; (3) Processes for managing access to such tools at an enterprise level to ensure availability across Department of Defense users; (4) Notional timelines and resource needs for the expansion of the availability of such platforms; and (5) Metrics to be used to assess the efficacy of such capabilities.

**Commercial cyber threat intelligence**

The committee understands the critical importance of developing and integrating cyber threat intelligence to support and inform cyber operations. The committee also recognizes that commercial cyber threat intelligence can provide a valuable source of information to layer on to traditional intelligence produced by the defense intelligence enterprise. In addition to being based on deep technical understanding of software code and vulnerabilities, such commercial products have an additional benefit of often being unclassified and thus easily sharable across Department of Defense (DOD) components, industry, and allied partners.

The committee is also aware that the way the DOD procures commercial cyber threat intelligence can often be fragmented. The committee enacted section 1521 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81) to provide an enterprise solution to accessing such commercial cyber data products. However, the Department still has not adequately addressed the concerns from the committee on the use of that authority.

Therefore, the committee directs the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO), in coordination with the CIOs of the military departments, to provide a strategy for increasing access to the number of providers and diversity in sources for commercial cyber threat intelligence products. The committee directs the CIO to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 30, 2027, on this strategy. The briefing shall include: (1) A summary of Department entities utilizing the cyber threat intelligence products and their utilization rates, including through the use of the authority in section 1521 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022; (2) An overall assessment of the impact of this utilization on the Department's cybersecurity posture; (3) An identification of technical, policy, or resource-based limitations that restrict the ability of Department entities to access and effectively utilize the cyber threat intelligence; and (4) A summary of enterprise-wide program procurement cost savings versus individual procurement expenditures on cyber threat intelligence services.

**Comptroller General review of reforms to processes for authority to operate on Department of Defense networks**

The committee recognizes that through legislative direction and Department actions, the Department of Defense continues to make progress in identifying and addressing procedural and other challenges that impede effective and efficient Assessment and Authorization (A&A) processes for information systems to operate on the Department of Defense Information Network. Recent legislation has required the Department to seek additional efficiencies to achieve the security goals of the Risk Management Framework (RMF) in a manner that reduces the time and effort required for Authorizing Officials to provide the required Authority to Operate (ATO). The Department has also publicly announced plans under the Software Fast Track initiative to substantially streamline and modify its implementation of the RMF process. The committee is still concerned that challenges remain in terms of measurable ob-

jectives, the structure of the processes, and the resources to execute them.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess the Department's progress in the implementation of improvements to the RMF and A&A process, including: (1) Implementing reciprocity in the ATO process; (2) Updating the Enterprise Mission Assurance Support Service to handle digital data; (3) Assessing and addressing any challenges related to the personnel and capacity of Authorizing Officials; and (4) Any other matter the Comptroller General deems relevant.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, with results to follow in a format and timeframe mutually agreed upon.

**Comptroller General review of role of Chief Data Officers in Department of Defense**

The committee recognizes that artificial intelligence (AI) represents a transformative technology with the potential to fundamentally revolutionize the battlespace and sustain U.S. decision advantage over adversaries. However, the committee is concerned that the broad focus on AI development and adoption has had the unintended consequence of deprioritizing investments and governance associated with the data upon which AI depends. The committee acknowledges the ongoing efforts of the Department of Defense (DOD) to consolidate data catalogs as a meaningful step forward but believes substantially more sustained work is required to achieve true data centricity across the enterprise.

Central to this concern is the committee's uncertainty regarding the current state of the Chief Data Officer (CDO) function across the DOD. The committee is not confident that CDOs possess the organizational prominence, authorities, or resources necessary to drive the cultural and structural changes required to make data a true warfighting asset.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the CDO function across the DOD enterprise, including: (1) The organizational placement of each CDO and the degree to which that placement enables or inhibits their ability to influence enterprise data policy and practice; (2) The level of authority each CDO possesses to direct his or her respective organization to implement data governance guidance, and the degree to which that authority is actually exercised; (3) The degree to which each CDO's perceived responsibilities align with statutory requirements, including any authorities or responsibilities not currently being executed; (4) Each CDO's approach to advancing data centricity, including efforts to make data discoverable, accessible, and interoperable across his or her organization; (5) The effectiveness of existing forums and mechanisms for coordination and information sharing among CDOs across the enterprise; (6) The adequacy of CDO office resourcing in terms of personnel, funding, and tools; (7) The maturity and enforcement of data governance frameworks, policies, and standards within each CDO's organization; (8) The sufficiency of enterprise data management practices—including data labeling, lineage, and

quality assurance—to support AI and machine learning adoption at speed and scale; (9) The degree to which CDOs are influencing requirements, acquisition, and programming processes to ensure data considerations are embedded from the outset; and (10) Recommendations for improving the prominence, authority, resourcing, and coordination of the CDO function across the DOD enterprise, including any legislative changes the Comptroller General deems appropriate.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, with a report to follow in a format and timeframe mutually agreed upon.

**Comptroller General review of software factories**

The committee notes that over the past decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) has made significant investments in software factories to develop and field software capabilities at the speed and agility demanded by the modern battlefield. Under the DOD Software Modernization Implementation Plan, software factories and their broader ecosystem serve critical functions in scaling software delivery. The rapid emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities that can write code and build applications at scale presents new opportunities to accelerate software development across the force. These developments also demand a hard look at whether the policies and directives governing software factories are being followed and how these should be updated to seize the opportunity this technology presents. The committee is concerned by the lack of clarity, standardization, and data around the Department's use of software factories. The committee believes that without a clear governance framework and standard that all software factories consistently follow, the ecosystem will fail at the tasks of scaling those solutions that provide benefit and discarding those that are either duplicative or do not deliver value.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a comprehensive review of the Department's and the military services' use of software factories, to include: (1) An assessment of existing policy and guidance governing software factories, the degree to which such guidance is being followed across the Department, and whether such guidance remains adequate and appropriate in an AI-enabled environment; (2) An analysis of current operating practices across the software factory ecosystem to identify areas of compliance and non-compliance with existing guidance; and (3) An analysis of the cumulative costs and work product of the Department's software factory ecosystem to identify redundancies and assess overall return on investment.

Furthermore, the committee directs the Comptroller General to complete the review and provide a briefing on its findings to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 15, 2027, with a final report to be delivered at a mutually agreed time. The committee also directs that such report be provided to the Science, Technology and Innovation Board in support of a review they are tasked to conduct under section 907 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60).

**Comptroller General review of status of Zero Trust implementation efforts**

The committee is concerned with the Department of Defense's efforts to implement a Zero Trust cybersecurity framework in response to continued and increasing cybersecurity threats. In fiscal year 2022, the committee directed the Department to enact a Zero Trust strategy and related implementation plans. In these plans, the Department established a goal of fiscal year 2027 for a baseline Zero Trust capability. However, both the Department's Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office have identified deficiencies in the Department's policies, plans, and progress for this effort, and the committee remains concerned with the Department's ability to meet the 2027 deadline.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review the status and implementation of the Department's Zero Trust efforts, the challenges the Department faces meeting its stated goals, and the steps it is taking to address these challenges.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the results of its review, not later than April 15, 2027, with the final report on the results of the review to follow in a mutually agreed upon format and timeframe.

**Containerized commercial artificial intelligence**

The committee is encouraged by the progress the Department of Defense (DOD) has made in advancing enterprise artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities but believes it is important not to lose sight of AI at the tactical edge. Operations in air-gapped, disconnected, or contested environments preclude reliance on cloud-based infrastructure and demand advanced on-premise compute and containerized AI models. The committee notes that a number of commercial vendors have developed such capabilities for both commercial and defense-specific use cases and that the DOD should be better leveraging these solutions. The committee is further concerned that commercial AI software acquired by the Department may carry inherent dependencies on cloud-based application programming interfaces for core functionality, creating unacceptable operational risk in denied or degraded network environments.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the DOD Chief Information Officer, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer, to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, a strategy and implementation plan for accelerating the adoption of containerized commercial AI capabilities for local, on-premise execution in air-gapped or disconnected operational environments. The strategy and implementation plan shall include: (1) A plan to transition mission-critical AI applications to containerized architectures capable of local execution across tactical-edge infrastructure; (2) A framework for the secure transfer, validation, and updating of containerized models in air-gapped environments; (3) An evaluation of current inventory and future requirements for ruggedized, on-premise compute hardware

capable of hosting large-scale AI models at the tactical edge; (4) A review to ensure commercial AI software acquired by the DOD is not inherently dependent on cloud-based application programming interfaces for core functionality; and (5) Identification of acquisition pathways, including commercial solutions openings and the Software Acquisition Pathway, that enable the DOD to maintain competition and procurement flexibility across both traditional and nontraditional vendors.

**Coordination of Open Centralized Unit Distributed Unit Ecosystem**

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense (DOD), in partnership with industry and academia, has made progress in advancing open architecture wireless infrastructure through the Future G Office. The committee is also aware that partnership with stakeholders, such as the Open Centralized Unit Distributed Unit (OCUDU) Ecosystem Foundation, is critical to bringing next-generation wireless technology to the Department. The intent of OCUDU is to develop open-source software for the centralized unit and distributed unit components of next-generation wireless networks, which represent a critical layer of secure, resilient, tactical, and strategic telecommunications architecture.

Open source development provides significant operational advantages for 5G, emerging 6G, and future iterations of advanced wireless infrastructure at the tactical edge. By establishing a shared community-governed software foundation, the OCUDU Ecosystem enables faster innovation, greater joint force interoperability, and reduced duplication of effort across both government and industry. Transparent and neutral governance ensures that no single vendor controls critical national security network infrastructure while broad participation strengthens supply chain diversity and resilience against peer adversaries.

The committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the DOD Chief Information Officer to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than May 1, 2027, on the progress of the OCUDU Ecosystem. The briefing shall include the following: (1) A description of technical progress, including the development of centralized unit and distributed unit software capabilities, including for tactical and enterprise operations; (2) An assessment of industry and academic participation, including contributions from non-traditional entities with a specific emphasis on U.S.-owned businesses and domestic manufacturing partners; (3) A description of deployment activities and the transition of capabilities into operational environments; (4) An evaluation of the impact of the OCUDU ecosystem on interoperability security and supply chain resilience; (5) A description of coordination with other federal initiatives related to wireless communications and advanced network technologies; and (6) Any recommendations for further actions to support continued adoption and scaling, particularly across the military departments and combatant commands.

**Cyber warfare engineering officer reserve component career field**

The committee recognizes the significant progress the Department of the Navy has made in developing skilled cyber professionals, particularly within the Cyber Warfare Engineering (CWE) officer community. CWE officers possess highly specialized technical skills in areas that have proven invaluable to cyber operations and are in exceptional demand across both government and industry. The committee recognizes that retention of cyber professionals is a broader challenge facing the Department of Defense and notes that efforts are underway to address it across the cyber workforce. Nevertheless, the committee believes it is critical that CWE officers who transition out of active duty have the option to continue serving in a reserve capacity should they choose to do so.

Currently, the Navy does not maintain a CWE career field within its reserve component, limiting the ability of separating active duty CWE officers to continue contributing their unique skills in a part-time uniformed capacity. The committee acknowledges the resources required to establish and sustain career fields in the reserve component but believes the operational and strategic benefits of retaining access to this specialized talent pool justify the investment.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy, and the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, to conduct a feasibility and advisability study on establishing a CWE career field in the Navy Reserve. The study shall assess, at a minimum, the following: (1) The requirements necessary to support a CWE career field in the Navy Reserve, including personnel, training, and infrastructure needs; (2) Opportunities to share resources with the active component, including matrixed options for career field management; (3) The operational benefits of establishing such a career field; (4) The risks associated with not establishing such a career field; and (5) How the Navy would structure reserve billets at sufficient grades to enable meaningful career progression for CWE officers within the reserve component, including pathways for advancement in rank.

The Secretary of the Navy shall provide a briefing on the findings of this study, along with recommendations and proposed next steps, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 15, 2027.

**Cybersecurity at Defense Health Agency**

The committee remains concerned about the increasing frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks targeting the healthcare sector, including entities that provide medical services, systems, and devices in support of the Department of Defense (DOD). Recent cyber incidents involving defense contractors underscore the potential risk to military medical readiness, the security of sensitive health data, and the integrity of network-connected medical devices used by the Armed Forces. The committee notes that many defense contractors and suppliers supporting military medical operations, including those providing network-enabled medical devices, may be

subject to varying cybersecurity standards, creating potential vulnerabilities within the broader defense health ecosystem.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Health Agency and other relevant Department of Defense medical components, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, that assesses the cybersecurity posture of defense-associated health systems and medical device providers that support the Department. This briefing shall include: (1) An evaluation of current cybersecurity standards and requirements applicable to contractors providing medical services, systems, or devices to the Department; (2) Identification of gaps between existing requirements and current cybersecurity best practices, particularly with respect to advanced persistent threats; (3) An analysis of risks posed by network-connected medical devices used in military treatment facilities and operational environments; (4) Recommendations to improve cybersecurity training, compliance, and oversight for contractors and suppliers supporting military health operations; and (5) Options to modernize Department policies and acquisition requirements to ensure that all entities supporting the Defense Health System implement robust and up-to-date cybersecurity measures.

**Data readiness and analytical modernization across Joint Force**

The committee recognizes that common operating picture applications, while critical for operational planning, represent only a fraction of the analytical work combatant commands perform. Theater cooperation, assessments, policy development, and interagency coordination generate substantial data demands that existing tools currently available to the combatant commands do not address. Many commercial solutions are capable, however, of filling these gaps if procured, while also complementing operational applications.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on how the Joint Staff is consolidating and building requirements for the combatant commands to support the full range of data and analytical needs. The briefing shall address: (1) The feasibility and advisability of establishing a unified, accredited repository for publicly available information and information environment operations; (2) The feasibility and advisability of developing a minimum fieldable artificial intelligence trust package inclusive of data provenance standards, attribute-based access control, and continuous monitoring; (3) How automated workflows can reduce the burden of manual database searches and accelerate actionable intelligence production; and (4) Current efforts to enable small businesses and non-traditional providers to contribute to Department of Defense analytical missions.

**Defense of critical infrastructure**

The committee is concerned that adversary cyber campaigns against U.S. critical infrastructure could impede or delay military

mobilization, force flow, logistics, and sustainment in a crisis or conflict. The committee notes that the Department of Defense (DOD) depends heavily on civilian-owned and civilian-operated infrastructure to move personnel, equipment, fuel, munitions, and information within the homeland and to ports of embarkation. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) has publicly warned that China has established persistent access in U.S. critical infrastructure for possible use in a contingency or crisis and has emphasized the importance of defending adjacent government, partner, and critical infrastructure networks that underpin military operations. Public reporting and outside analysis have likewise highlighted the vulnerability of the air, rail, maritime, communications, and energy systems that support military mobility and mobilization.

Accordingly, in parallel to the force mobilization exercise in section 283 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60), the committee directs the Commander, CYBERCOM, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy; the Commander, U.S. Northern Command; the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in consultation with other relevant Federal departments and agencies as the Commander considers appropriate, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than January 15, 2027, on the Command's assessment of cyber risks to military mobilization and force projection in the event of a crisis or conflict.

The briefing shall include: (1) An identification of the critical infrastructure sectors, systems, and key nodes within the United States whose cyber disruption would most significantly impair military mobilization, deployment, distribution, sustainment, or command and control; (2) An assessment of the roles and responsibilities of the DOD, including CYBERCOM, in preparing for, mitigating, and responding to cyber threats against such infrastructure during competition, crisis, and armed conflict; (3) An assessment of gaps in current authorities, operational constructs, information-sharing arrangements, planning, defense support for civil authorities, exercises, and public-private coordination mechanisms relevant to securing the cyber aspects of mobilization; (4) Options for legislative, policy, organizational, or operational changes to improve the security and resilience of infrastructure supporting military mobilization; (5) The role that the National Guard and private cybersecurity companies can and should play in supporting this mission; and (6) Any recommendations for additional authorities or resources needed for the Department to better support the defense of critical infrastructure essential to mobilization.

The committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than 90 days after the briefing, a report setting forth a plan of action to address identified gaps, including proposed timelines, lead organizations, estimated resource requirements, and, as appropriate, legislative proposals.

**Department of Defense lead for remediating threat of locational services to overseas military installations**

The committee finds that foreign adversaries are actively exploiting commercially available data, including publicly available information and commercially available information, to identify, track, and characterize U.S. Armed Forces personnel, installations, and operational activity. In times of conflict, competition, and crisis, this capability can be used to target personnel, anticipate operational movements, and undermine U.S. strategic advantage.

The committee finds that the Department of Defense (DOD) lacks a designated lead and consistent department-wide strategy to assess and mitigate this exposure and finds that current efforts are fragmented and episodic. Certain policy-based remediation measures, particularly restrictions on location-enabled devices in hostile threat environments, can and should be implemented immediately. The committee recognizes, however, that durable solutions will also require dedicated technological investment.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to designate a primary integrator for digital force protection and signature management for overseas military installations of high threats, who shall coordinate with the DOD Chief Information Officer, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Enterprise Installations and Environment, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, to develop a mitigation strategy for locational data threats from personal and official devices on overseas military installations in hostile threat environments.

This lead shall develop and provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 15, 2027, on a strategy to remediate such risks to high threat overseas military installations. The briefing shall address: (1) Current policy and technological gaps with respect to locational data exposure; (2) Near-term policy actions and longer-term technological solutions; and (3) A plan for establishing persistent, Department-wide capability to assess and reduce the digital exposure of U.S. forces and installations.

**Documenting lessons learned and doctrine related to integration of cyber forces**

The committee recognizes the exceptional performance of cyber forces across the Department of Defense (DOD) since June of 2025. Recent world events have demonstrated the maturation of cyber forces and, more critically, the pivotal progress achieved in integrating cyber capabilities into Joint Force operations. The timing, tempo, and close coordination exhibited by these forces reflect a significant evolution in how cyber effects are delivered and synchronized within the Joint Force.

The committee believes it is essential that the lessons learned from these operations, and their doctrinal implications, be formally documented. The committee acknowledges, however, that the nature of the cyber domain presents unique challenges to conventional lessons learned and doctrine development processes. Threats, techniques, and operational contexts in the cyber domain evolve in weeks and months, while updates to doctrine and lessons learned documents are often measured in years. The committee believes

there remains enduring value in deliberate, thorough, and validated lessons learned processes that support longer-term doctrinal development and directs U.S. Cyber Command, the service cyber components, and the Joint Staff to update current doctrine and lessons learned documents to ensure that recent operational insights are captured and not lost.

At the same time, the committee encourages these same organizations to explore supplemental mechanisms and venues to capture and share lessons learned at a pace commensurate with the speed of change in the cyber domain, so that operationally relevant insights are made available to practitioners in a timely manner.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command and the service cyber components, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 15, 2027, on the Joint Staff's doctrine update process for incorporating cyber operations across all joint publications. The briefing shall include: (1) A description of the current process and timeline for updating joint doctrine publications to reflect lessons learned from cyber operations; (2) Identified gaps or impediments in the existing doctrine development process that prevent timely incorporation of cyber lessons learned; and (3) Proposed or existing mechanisms to accelerate the sharing of operationally relevant cyber lessons learned outside of formal doctrine update processes.

**Election security**

The committee strongly agrees with General Joshua Rudd, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, and his statement during testimony before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that "the electoral process is fundamental to our democratic values" and "[a]ny foreign threat to the electoral process should be viewed as a national security concern." Adversary information operations and cyber operations are real threats that the federal government must be prepared to defend against.

However, the committee is concerned that it did not receive a post-election report from U.S. Cyber Command after the 2024 election cycle. The committee therefore reiterates its request in the Senate report (S. Rept. 117–130) of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 for a pre-election briefing and a post-election unclassified report with a classified annex for each Federal election through the 2032 election cycle.

**Evaluation of virtual cyber training environments for operator development**

The committee is aware that U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) has undertaken efforts to develop and field virtual persistent cyber training environments across the military services to develop advanced-proficiency cyber operators and analysts. The committee recognizes the importance of scalable and operationally realistic training infrastructure to support the objectives of CYBERCOM's Campaign Plan 2.0, which demands a highly proficient cyber workforce capable of executing the full spectrum of offensive and defensive cyber operations.

The committee is encouraged by the progress made in developing these environments and believes that continued investment in platform capacity, responsiveness, and operationally realistic scenarios across all proficiency levels will be essential to fully realizing their potential. The committee further believes that consistent integration of readiness data generated through training activities with existing readiness tracking systems will enable commanders to make more informed assessments of operator proficiency and support the long-term development of the cyber workforce.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment, through a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC), on the capacity and suitability of current virtual persistent cyber training environments, disaggregated by each of the military services. In the course of this study, the selected FFRDC shall consult with the principal cyber advisor of each military department and the cyber component commander of each Armed Force.

The study shall assess the following: (1) The capacity of each environment to support concurrent users and training activities at scale; (2) Platform responsiveness, including time required to access, authenticate, and load training content; (3) The availability and operational realism of training scenarios across foundational, journeyman, and advanced operator and analyst proficiency levels; (4) The extent to which each environment supports training for offensive and defensive cyber operations across the full spectrum of cyber missions; (5) The degree to which each environment is integrated with readiness tracking systems and whether readiness data must be captured or reported manually; and (6) Categories of training or training tasks that cannot be conducted on each environment and the technical, programmatic, or resource constraints that preclude such training.

Not later than November 1, 2027, the FFRDC shall submit to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy and the congressional defense committees a report on the findings of the study, including recommendations for improvements to each environment disaggregated by the military services and any cross-cutting findings applicable across the Armed Forces.

**Funding software activities**

The committee is aware of persistent challenges in matching funding from different appropriations types to software acquisition activities within the Department of Defense. The committee has heard from program managers, contracting officials, and financial managers that the iterative nature of modern software development does not align clearly to traditional appropriations categories and that, despite various efforts to address this tension, issues remain. In practice, the manner in which a software activity is executed or the way a vendor delivers a solution can necessitate a change in the programmed appropriations type, triggering funds transfers, reprogrammings, or technical corrections that delay delivery and consume management resources. The committee is sympathetic but notes that the instances relayed to the committee to date are largely anecdotal and that data on the frequency, magnitude, root causes, and operational impact of such events is need-

ed before the most appropriate solution can be identified. The committee further notes that these challenges are not confined to secretariat-level decisions and that any meaningful assessment must capture experiences across all levels of the acquisition and contract management enterprise.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study on the extent to which existing appropriations authorities and Financial Management Regulation (FMR) guidance adequately address the realities of modern software acquisition and delivery. The study shall include: (1) The frequency and aggregate dollar value of funds transfers, reprogrammings, and technical corrections attributable to appropriations type misalignments for software activities, disaggregated by account type and military department or defense agency; (2) An identification of the specific activity types, vendor delivery models, and FMR provisions most frequently associated with such misalignments; (3) An assessment of the extent to which more deliberate budget planning practices and expanded use of Budget Activity 08 could reduce the frequency of such misalignments, and the circumstances under which such approaches might not be sufficient to resolve the underlying challenge; (4) An assessment of resulting delays and impacts to warfighter capability and readiness; and (5) Recommendations for statutory, regulatory, or policy changes to better align existing appropriations authorities and financial management guidance to the modern software development and delivery cycle.

The Comptroller General shall brief the results of such study to the congressional defense committees, not later than December 15, 2026, with a report to be provided at a mutually agreed date.

**Golden Dome command and control cybersecurity plan**

The committee remains concerned that the Golden Dome for America program lacks a defined cybersecurity strategy for its command and control (C2) architecture. Converging enterprise information technology and operational technology across C2 nodes expands attack surfaces that traditional tools cannot adequately protect.

Therefore, the committee directs the Direct Reporting Program Manager (DRPM) for Golden Dome to develop a comprehensive cyber defense plan for Golden Dome C2 infrastructure. Not later than March 1, 2027, the DRPM shall brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on a plan that addresses: (1) How each C2 component will be secured, including sensors, data links, and processing nodes; (2) The implementation of Zero Trust principles across C2 networks and the tactical edge; (3) The use of artificial intelligence-driven capabilities for real-time threat detection and automated cyber defense; and (4) Methods to ensure data integrity and chain-of-custody protections for sensor feeds entering and transiting the C2 architecture.

**Information repository and joint communications marketplace**

The committee is aware that the military services are evaluating new communications technologies. The Department of Defense

(DOD) Information Repository (IR) and Joint Communications Marketplace (JCM) have traditionally aided commercial and defense vendors in conducting waveform development through the DOD IR Waveform Catalog, providing global interoperability across line-of-sight, beyond-line-of-sight, and networked communications modes.

The committee recognizes the importance of a well-maintained IR and the enforcement of software standards that ensure software distribution, interoperability, and security are prioritized and that provide a basis for vendors to develop collaboratively and enhance existing modes. The committee believes there is significant strategic advantage in preserving and broadening this model, especially as communications technologies continue to advance and become increasingly integrated.

Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in consultation with the DOD Chief Information Officer, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than December 1, 2026, detailing the military services' current plans for the JCM and the IR, including: (1) A comprehensive accounting of the current waveform inventory, including waveforms in use with partners and allies; (2) How the services plan to validate interoperability across joint, coalition, and multi-vendor environments; (3) Cybersecurity protocols and software assurance frameworks applied to waveforms distributed through the IR, including known vulnerabilities and planned remediation; (4) Mechanisms in place to protect vendor intellectual property within the IR and the JCM; (5) Known or assessed electronic warfare vulnerabilities associated with cataloged waveforms and processes for identifying and mitigating them; and (6) The degree to which waveforms in the IR are portable across vendor platforms and hardware architectures and plans to address any identified gaps.

**Interoperable multi-cloud architecture**

The committee remains concerned that the current approach of the Department of Defense (DOD) to cloud infrastructure has resulted in a proliferation of stove-piped systems that are not interoperable, do not promote data portability, and inhibit adaptation to changing requirements and technological advances. Despite the direction to address this challenge in section 1514 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159), the DOD has not shown any indication that it recognizes or is attempting to address the problem. The committee believes the Department's mission is best served by an interoperable multi-cloud environment that provides flexibility, security, redundancy, and resiliency by promoting competition and incentivizing innovation.

Therefore, the committee directs the DOD Chief Information Officer to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's plans for ensuring an interoperable, multi-cloud architecture. The briefing shall include the following: (1) An inventory of existing cloud contracts and associated licenses; (2) A summary of security challenges regarding multi-cloud implementation, including issues related to

reciprocity and the harmonization of authority to operate; (3) A description of current technical standards and a recommendation for new standards to be used in the multi-cloud architecture; and (4) A description of the technical, process, procurement, and policy changes necessary to transition to a vendor agnostic, multi-cloud architecture.

**Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture**

As the Department of Defense continues to mature its cyber operational capabilities, the committee reiterates the importance of ensuring that defense investments result in operationally relevant capabilities that enable offensive cyber operations at speed and scale. The committee notes actions taken by U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to refactor the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture pursuant to section 1545 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159). The committee further notes the importance of continued progress in this effort in light of the evolving cyber threat environment and the Department's requirement to effectively integrate relevant advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI). The committee is aware of CYBERCOM's use of AI-enabled programs, such as the PATHFINDER platform, that leverage commercial technologies and capabilities to increase targeting and access.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Commander, CYBERCOM to submit a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, detailing the use of commercially developed AI platforms to support targeting and access development, such as the PATHFINDER program, as well as planned resourcing across the future years defense program.

**Joint Force common operating picture scaling and federated ontology strategy**

The committee recognizes that warfighters across multiple domains require a common operating picture capable of rapidly ingesting and connecting data to support time-sensitive targeting, intelligence fusion, and operational data integration. Platforms such as the Maven Smart System have demonstrated that a shared, artificial intelligence (AI)-backed data ontology can satisfy this requirement and deliver meaningful decision advantage. Having validated this approach, the committee believes the Department of Defense (DOD) should evaluate whether and how scaling this capability across the Joint Force would further satisfy warfighter requirements by ensuring that all service components operating within and supporting combatant commands share a common understanding of the battlespace regardless of service or component.

Additionally, the committee recognizes that deployed platforms are generating a valuable data ontology. This ontology includes the structured, semantic relationships between entities, events, and data across DOD operations, which represent a growing institutional asset. Realizing its full value requires that DOD tools, applications, and data sources, including intelligence community holdings, interagency partners, and allied and coalition partners, be

able to both contribute to, and benefit from, these semantic relationships. Without a strategy to federate this data into a shared ontological framework, critical data sources will remain semantically isolated, limiting the common operating picture and constraining the broader DOD AI ecosystem.

Therefore, the committee directs the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer, in his or her capacity as Chief Data Officer of the DOD and program manager for joint AI-enabled operational platforms, to develop a strategy for scaling common operating picture capabilities across the Joint Force and federating their underlying data ontologies and to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 15, 2027.

The strategy shall include the following: (1) An evaluation of the feasibility and advisability of expanding this capability to all service components within the combatant commands, including an assessment of the degree to which scaling would further satisfy warfighter requirements for a common operating and intelligence picture; (2) A governance framework for managing the Department's operational data ontology as a DOD enterprise asset extendable across the broader DOD AI ecosystem; (3) Technical approaches for enabling data and applications residing outside of existing platforms to integrate with and contribute to these ontological relationships, including through open, vendor-neutral standards and federation mechanisms that do not require physical data ingestion into any single platform; and (4) An assessment of opportunities to extend ontology-based data sharing to the intelligence community, interagency partners, and allied and coalition partners, and recommendations for addressing any legislative, policy, contractual, or resource barriers to implementation.

**Modernization plan for commercial solutions for classified program**

The committee notes that the Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) program at the National Security Agency (NSA) has been an important tool to find industry solutions to Department of Defense (DOD) needs for classified systems, especially tactical systems. However, the committee believes that the program would benefit from a comprehensive review of its processes to determine if the changing state of technology and policy would offer an opportunity for modernization.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the NSA, to submit a report to the congressional defense and intelligence committees, not later than August 1, 2027, on a comprehensive roadmap that details the modernization of the CSfC program, as well as a plan to modernize the DOD and the NSA's policies and procedures associated with CSfC.

The roadmap shall include the following: (1) An assessment of structural and operational limitations within the current CSfC framework, including the responsiveness of Capability Packages and Protection Profiles to evolving warfighter needs, cyber threats, and technological advances; the impact of certification and validation processes on fielding secure commercial technologies; and the extent to which prescriptive architecture standards and barriers to

vendor participation limit adoption, competition, innovation, and cost efficiency; (2) An actionable plan to modernize CSfC governance, certification, and compliance mechanisms, including a transition from static Protection Profiles and Capability Packages to modular, risk-based, and continuously updated guidance; (3) An evaluation of mission areas across the DOD where CSfC implementation would enable commander's intent, improve system performance, and reduce system cost without compromise to mission assurance; (4) An evaluation of coordination mechanisms to ensure the synchronization of CSfC policy to warfighter needs, joint and coalition interoperability requirements, and DOD initiatives aimed at the acceleration of systems acquisition and fielding and weapon systems modernization; and (5) A detailed timeline with key milestones, including programmatic decision points, required policy, regulatory, and standards updates; resourcing, acquisition, and workforce needs; and risk assessments and mitigation strategies.

**Reciprocity by exception for artificial intelligence platforms**

The committee recognizes that maintaining technological superiority over near-peer adversaries requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to field advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems at nearly the pace they are developed commercially. Frontier AI developers release updated models on a cadence of weeks, yet the current security authorization framework has not kept pace with that cycle. The committee believes a targeted review is warranted to ensure processes reflect genuine security requirements and that our warfighters have access to the best available technology.

Inherited controls and reciprocity are foundational to efficient risk management. When an AI model is hosted on a cloud platform that has already been granted an Authority to Operate through a centralized DOD mechanism, such as GenAI.mil or a Defense Information Systems Agency-managed offering, subsequent model updates should be evaluated against a clear, consistent standard for what constitutes a security-relevant change. While prudent as a general matter, the committee questions whether, in the specific context of model updates on already accredited cloud platforms, this revalidation meaningfully improves security posture or has become a process burden without commensurate security return.

The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program has recently established criteria distinguishing genuine security changes from routine updates. The committee encourages the Department to evaluate this approach and, if appropriate, adopt comparable standards. The committee acknowledges that the DOD reciprocity handbook requires authorizing officials to independently locate and revalidate documentation of controls already assessed at the Department level.

The committee therefore directs the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) to evaluate: (1) Whether current guidance and reciprocity handbooks appropriately distinguish security-relevant AI model changes from routine updates for models hosted on centrally accredited cloud platforms; (2) Whether authorizing official revalidation of inherited controls in this context provides security benefit beyond existing centralized review; and (3) What risks, if any, would result from directing full reciprocity for model updates al-

ready approved through centralized platforms, removing that revalidation burden from service-level authorizing officials.

The DOD CIO shall brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the results of this evaluation, not later than April 1, 2027.

**Recommendation to transition Workforce Transformation Cyber Initiative pilot to program of record**

The committee supports the continuation of the Workforce Transformation Cyber Initiative pilot program at the National Security Agency (NSA), which offers certificate-based courses through a Center of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity. The committee supports the intentions of the Department of Defense (DOD) to codify the pilot program as a permanent program of record. The committee encourages prioritization of funding to the successful "train the trainers" curriculum, which provides scholarships to military veterans, first responders, and minority-serving institutions to access certificate-based courses that address secure coding, artificial intelligence, quantum, and cybersecurity, which are all critical national needs in responding to cyber threats.

The committee supports the inclusion of new capabilities in the program and recommends the DOD transition the NSA's Workforce Transformation Cyber Initiative into a program of record and identify an academic institution to serve as a management center to synchronize, coordinate, and direct the activities of participating programs to dynamically align with DOD priorities and workforce requirements. This central management institution should be a designated research university that has participated in the pilot program since its inception and has experience with developing cybersecurity curriculum in collaboration with a variety of academic partners.

**Report on agile telecommunications technologies**

Near-peer adversaries continue to advance signals intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities designed to intercept and disrupt Joint Force communications. The committee notes that while the Department of Defense (DOD) has integrated commercial 4G and 5G waveforms into tactical settings, these systems often rely on static frequencies that can be vulnerable to detection in contested environments.

The committee is aware of existing research and development efforts into emerging technology that enable operators to apply antijam capabilities such as frequency-hop communications through randomized, alternative frequencies in contested and congested multidomain environments, similar to other tactical communications systems.

The committee directs the Director of the DOD 5G Cross-Functional Team and the Director of the FutureG Office to provide a briefing on frequency and modality agile technologies to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027. The report shall include: (1) An assessment of how frequency- and modality-agile emergent technologies could enable more secure and resilient communications in contested, congested, and constrained electromagnetic spec-

trum environments; (2) An analysis of commercially available frequency- and modality-agile technologies; (3) A description of how such technologies could operate within the existing Joint All-Domain Command and Control architecture; (4) A strategy for working with commercial providers, including Open Radio Access Network companies, on integrating such technologies into their solutions for warfighting systems; and (5) A plan to integrate frequency- and modality-agile technologies into the theater plans for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

**Review of Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification program approach following release of cyber-focused generative artificial intelligence models**

The committee recognizes that point-in-time security and compliance frameworks present an inherent and growing vulnerability as the interval between assessments increases. The recent emergence of sophisticated cyber-focused generative artificial intelligence (AI) models has materially accelerated this risk by providing adversaries with powerful new capabilities to identify and exploit security gaps within the defense industrial base (DIB). The committee believes this development warrants a critical examination of whether the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) program, as currently structured, remains sufficient to protect DIB contractors and subcontractors against this evolving threat environment.

The committee acknowledges the considerable financial and administrative investment that CMMC certification imposes on DIB vendors and does not take lightly the burden that any programmatic evolution may present. Nevertheless, the committee believes the security of the DIB must remain paramount and that the maturation of cyber-focused generative AI necessitates a serious evaluation of whether a transition from periodic, point-in-time assessments to a model of continuous evaluation is both necessary and achievable within the existing CMMC framework.

Therefore, the committee directs the Department of Defense (DOD) Chief Information Officer (CIO) to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the CMMC program and provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 15, 2027, on the outcomes of that evaluation.

The evaluation and briefing shall address the following: (1) An assessment of the ability of the current CMMC framework to protect the DIB against threats enabled by cyber-focused generative AI, including the identification of any programmatic gaps or vulnerabilities; (2) A determination of the CMMC certification level or levels at which a transition to continuous evaluation would be necessary to adequately mitigate the identified threat; (3) A proposed timeline and implementation plan for transitioning from point-in-time assessments to continuous evaluation, including any required regulatory, contractual, or programmatic changes; (4) An assessment of the impact such a transition would have on the Third Party Assessment Organization (3PAO) evaluation model, including any changes to 3PAO roles, responsibilities, accreditation standards, or capacity; and (5) An assessment of how cyber-focused

generative AI technologies could themselves be leveraged by the DOD or authorized assessment bodies to strengthen continuous monitoring of DIB contractor cybersecurity posture and CMMC compliance.

**Risk mitigation and acceleration of Zero Trust implementation for operational technology**

The committee welcomes recent updates to the Department of Defense's (DOD) Zero Trust Strategy 2.0 but remains concerned with the strategy's ability to scale across the full DOD enterprise and maintain continuous monitoring across all threat vectors, including operational technology (OT), in the face of rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled threats. Fragmented point solutions and manual processes continue to impede progress toward Target Level Zero Trust maturity, leaving Defense Critical Infrastructure and mission-critical OT environments at unacceptable risk. The committee is concerned that, as a result of these shortfalls, the DOD does not expect to achieve Target Level Zero Trust for OT systems until the end of fiscal year 2030.

To address these concerns, the committee believes that the DOD should accelerate the adoption of platform-centric architectures that unify data models, enable AI-driven security operations, and enforce Zero Trust controls continuously across the enterprise, including within disconnected, intermittent, and low bandwidth and browser environments. The committee believes this approach will reduce latency, ease network defender workload, and ensure security policies adapt dynamically to emerging threats.

To this end, the committee directs the DOD Chief Information Officer to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on how the Zero Trust Strategy 2.0 will scale across the full DOD enterprise, including OT environments, and address the architectural, funding, and acquisition challenges necessary to ensure continuous protection against AI-enabled threats. The briefing shall specifically address: (1) A roadmap to achieve 100 percent visibility into all OT systems; (2) The feasibility of accelerating Target Level OT outcomes for all Tier 1 Mission Assurance installations to fiscal year 2028, and not later than fiscal year 2029 for the broader enterprise; (3) An assessment of funding required to achieve these goals; (4) How acquisition efforts align with AI-driven security operations; and (5) Estimated cost savings and operational efficiencies achieved through capability consolidation and automation.

**Security and risk management for commercial artificial intelligence**

The committee recognizes that the Department of Defense (DOD) is expanding its integration of commercial frontier artificial intelligence (AI) models to support critical mission functions and that the security of these models presents an evolving and multi-dimensional challenge. Recent incidents, including the reported theft of model weights from leading AI developers, underscore that adversaries are actively targeting the foundational assets of commercial AI systems. The committee believes that the United States' com-

petitive advantage in AI is inseparable from its ability to protect the technology and that a collaborative security posture with industry is essential to sustaining that advantage.

The committee is concerned that the DOD has not yet developed a comprehensive, standardized approach to applying the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF) to its engagements with commercial frontier AI model providers. Threat vectors—including data poisoning, model weight exfiltration, backdoor insertion, supply-chain compromise, and insider threats—are evolving rapidly and require an adaptive, cooperative strategy.

Therefore, the committee directs the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO), in coordination with the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer and the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, to develop a comprehensive strategy for managing AI security risks in DOD partnerships with commercial frontier AI model providers. The strategy shall include the following: (1) A plan for applying the NIST AI RMF to DOD contracts with commercial frontier AI providers, including minimum standards for model integrity, training data integrity, and infrastructure protection; (2) An approach for collaboratively assessing and mitigating insider threat risks with commercial AI partners, recognizing that effective mitigation requires trust, information sharing, and joint investment in security practices; (3) A framework for incident notification requiring timely reporting to the Department of any theft or unauthorized access of model weights, corruption or unauthorized alteration of training data, discovery of a material vulnerability permitting unauthorized model modification or misuse, or concerning model behavior affecting DOD mission integrity; and (4) A roadmap for evolving this strategy as AI capabilities and threat vectors develop, including mechanisms for sustained engagement with industry partners. The CIO shall provide a briefing on the strategy to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than July 15, 2027.

**Space domain awareness software**

The committee is aware that the space domain is becoming increasingly congested and contested, with rapid growth in resident space objects, more frequent deployment events, and adversary behaviors designed to exploit ambiguity below the threshold of armed conflict.

The committee further notes that adversaries are employing Camouflage, Concealment, Deception, and Maneuver (CCDM) tactics, including the introduction of unexpected objects, novel configurations, and atypical behaviors that challenge existing space domain awareness (SDA) processes.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than June 1, 2027, on how the Space Force and Air Force plan to operationalize machine learning-enabled object classification and anomaly detection tools that identify suspected CCDM, flag unexpected object behaviors during deployment events, and integrate with existing SDA architectures. The briefing shall include: (1) The plan to transition this capability from prototype to oper-

ational deployment; (2) Integration pathways with existing Space Force command and control systems; (3) Performance metrics for anomaly detection, classification accuracy, and analyst workload reduction; and (4) Plans to potentially extend this capability to support cislunar space domain awareness.

**Strategy for leveraging artificial intelligence tools for medical countermeasures development**

The committee notes that significant progress is being made in the capabilities for advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems, and their application for a broad range of uses in the Department of Defense continues to expand. The committee is aware that the use of such systems with domain specific data is for focused technical needs. While the Department has invested in generalized large language models for broad application, the committee believes the Department needs to emphasize additional attention on these domain specific needs.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy for leveraging AI tools for medical countermeasures development and deliver a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than December 1, 2027. The strategy shall include: (1) An assessment of the current and projected threat landscape for biological and chemical threats against which the Department requires medical countermeasures; (2) A prioritized list of near-term and long-term medical countermeasures platforms needed by the Department; (3) Proposals to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate relevant Department components to most effectively leverage AI tools for medical countermeasures development; (4) Identification of any issues, problems, or roadblocks that would impede progress; (5) Opportunities to leverage support from non-Departmental entities; (6) Resources required, including personnel, facilities, and funding; (7) Implementation timeline over the next 5 years, including budget estimates and key milestones; (8) Recommendations for improving or formalizing interagency coordination and support mechanisms; and (9) Any required policy or legislative changes that would enable implementation of the strategy.

**Study on use of software agents in cyber operations**

The committee recognizes that the Department of Defense (DOD) is increasingly exploring the application of autonomous capabilities across all warfighting domains, including the use of software agents in cyberspace. However, the committee is not aware of a comprehensive, Department-wide assessment of how such software agents are being developed, resourced, and operationalized within the cyber domain, including offensive and defensive cyber operations, network operations, and Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) operations.

Therefore, the committee directs the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to conduct a comprehensive study on the use of software agents in the cyber domain and provide a report on the findings and recommendations of that study to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than November 1, 2027.

The study must be coordinated with the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy; the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should include: (1) A review of all current DOD investments, programs, and resources dedicated to the development and employment of software agents in cyberspace, including offensive cyber operations, defensive cyber operations, network operations, and DODIN operations; (2) An assessment of existing policies, doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities frameworks as they pertain to the employment of software agents in the cyber domain; (3) A review of relevant operational plans, strategies, and concepts of operations that contemplate or direct the use of software agents in cyberspace; (4) An assessment of how software agents in the cyber domain can support and enhance Joint Force operations, including the integration of autonomous cyber tools into joint operational planning, the potential to enable or accelerate effects across other warfighting domains, and the role of software agents in supporting combatant command requirements and theater campaign objectives; (5) An assessment of technology readiness levels and current operational capabilities, including autonomous agents, machine learning systems, and emerging science and technology concepts such as self-recursive training and related techniques; (6) An identification of barriers to the adoption and deployment of software agents, including cybersecurity requirements, security policies, legal and policy constraints, and authorities; and (7) An assessment of future plans and recommended strategies necessary to responsibly develop, field, and sustain software agents in the cyber domain.

**Third-party hardware evaluation and independent analysis program**

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense (DOD) has conducted pilot tests using novel commercial technology to directly interrogate electronic equipment, identify individual components, and compare their behavior against libraries of known characteristics. Testing at a large defense agency, aboard operational Navy vessels, and at a developmental 5G network installation revealed that a meaningful percentage of devices exhibited supply chain anomalies warranting further investigation. The committee is concerned that such anomalies may reflect systemic vulnerabilities across the DOD's commercial supply chains and believes a structured, Department-wide assessment is essential to determine the full scope of the problem.

The committee directs the Chief Information Officer (CIO), in cooperation with the DOD Inspector General, to conduct a feasibility assessment, not later than January 15, 2027, of establishing a program to do third-party hardware evaluation and independent analysis. The objective of this program would be to assess the scope of DOD supply chain security problems across a representative sample of vendors and DOD components.

Not later than February 15, 2027, the CIO shall brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the following: (1) The results of the feasibility

study, including the analytic framework by which the study was conducted; (2) A proposed structure, resourcing, and implementation timeline for a program to do third-party hardware evaluation and independent analysis, if recommended; (3) Proposed remediation efforts and investments required to address identified supply chain vulnerabilities at scale; and (4) Findings and anomalies identified during prior pilot assessments and their implications for broader DOD supply chain integrity.

Further, the committee encourages the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, through the Directors of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency and the National Security Agency, to engage commercial information technology vendors to understand how unauthorized components enter their supply chains and to develop remediation plans and investment strategies necessary to prevent such occurrences at scale.

**U.S. Cyber Command science and technology investment strategy**

The committee recognizes the significant progress U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) has made in advancing its science and technology (S&T) investments and programs and commends the processes established in response to the Senate report accompanying S. 4543 (S. Rept. 117–130) of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. With the continued maturation of CYBERCOM under CYBERCOM 2.0, the advancement of its workforce, and the establishment of the Cyber Warfare Innovation Center, the committee believes this moment presents a natural opportunity to build on those successes, candidly assess what is working well, and position the command for continued growth in its approach to S&T investment.

To that end, the committee believes it is timely to conduct a thorough examination of the current S&T process, including: (1) How CYBERCOM collects operational requirements and capability gaps and transmits them to appropriate development partners; (2) How the command selects among the military services, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO), the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), and other organizations to best address a given requirement; (3) How S&T projects are consolidated, tracked, and transitioned to operational use to maximize their impact; (4) How the relative distribution of S&T investments across those organizations aligns with CYBERCOM's evolving needs; and (5) How investments are categorized as S&T versus capabilities appropriate for direct development and fielding by the command, in light of the command's increasing maturity and the advancing technological readiness of emerging capabilities.

Beyond an assessment of the mechanics of the current process, the committee believes the evaluation should also: (1) Examine whether the overall S&T investment approach is achieving its intended outcomes; (2) Identify opportunities for improvement; (3) Determine whether any new or revised authorities are needed to better enable the command to meet its S&T objectives; and (4) Assess whether the current limitations on budget authority for S&T

investment remain appropriate given the command's continued evolution.

Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy, the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the Principal Cyber Advisors of the military departments, the Director of DARPA, the Director of the SCO, and the Director of the DIU, to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the matters described above and provide a briefing on the results to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 15, 2027.

# DIVISION B—MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATIONS

## Summary and explanation of funding tables

Division B of this Act authorizes funding for military construction projects of the Department of Defense (DOD). It includes funding authorizations for the construction and operation of military family housing as well as military construction for the reserve components, the Defense Agencies and Field Activities, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program. It also provides authorization for the base closure accounts that fund military construction, environmental cleanup, and other activities required to implement the decisions made in prior base realignment and closure rounds.

The tables contained in this Act provide the project-level authorizations for the military construction funding authorized in division B of this Act and summarize that funding by account.

The fiscal year 2027 budget request included $38.0 billion for military construction and housing programs. Of this amount, $36.9 billion was requested for military construction, $119.2 million for the construction and operation of family housing, $372.3 million for base closure activities, and $604.4 million for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program.

The committee recommends the authorization of appropriations for military construction, housing programs, facilities sustainment, and base closure activities totaling $38.0 billion. The total amount authorized for appropriations reflects the committee's continued commitment to investing in the recapitalization of DOD facilities and infrastructure.

## Sec. 2001—Short title

The committee recommends a provision that would designate division B of this Act as the "Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027."

## Sec. 2002—Expiration of authorizations and amounts required to be specified by law

The committee recommends a provision that would establish the expiration date for authorizations in this Act for military construction projects, land acquisition, family housing projects and facilities, and contributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program as October 1, 2029, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2030, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2003—Effective date**

The committee recommends a provision that would provide an effective date for titles XXI through XXVII of October 1, 2026, or the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later.

# TITLE XXI—ARMY MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

## Summary

The budget request included an authorization of appropriations of $1.6 billion for military construction and $95.1 million for family housing for the Army for fiscal year 2027.

The committee recommends an authorization of appropriations of $2.2 billion for military construction for the Army and $95.1 million for family housing for the Army for fiscal year 2027.

Further details on projects authorized can be found in section 4601 of this Act.

## Sec. 2101—Authorized Army construction and land acquisition projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize Army military construction projects for fiscal year 2027. The authorized amount is listed on an installation-by-installation basis.

## Sec. 2102—Family housing

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize new construction, planning, and design for Army family housing units for fiscal year 2027. This provision would also authorize funds for facilities that support family housing, including housing management offices, housing maintenance, and storage facilities.

## Sec. 2103—Authorization of appropriations, Army

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for the active component military construction and family housing projects of the Army authorized for construction for fiscal year 2027. This provision would also provide an overall limit on the amount authorized for military construction and family housing projects for the active component of the Army. The state list contained in this report is the binding list of the specific projects authorized at each location.

## Sec. 2104—Extension of authority to carry out fiscal year 2021 project at Fort Gillem, Georgia

The committee recommends a provision that would extend the authorization contained in section 2101 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2105—Extension and modification of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2022 projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would extend certain authorizations contained in section 2101 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

The provision would also modify an authorization contained in the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 to construct 193,347 square feet of barracks.

**Sec. 2106—Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2023 projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would extend the authorization contained in section 2101 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2107—Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2024 projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would extend the authorization contained in section 2101 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2108—Modification of authority to carry out fiscal year 2025 project at Grafenwoehr, Germany**

The committee recommends a provision that would modify an authorization contained in the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159) to construct an Operational Readiness Training Complex underground electric line.

**Sec. 2109—Modification of authority to carry out fiscal year 2026 project at Joint Region Marianas, Guam**

The committee recommends a provision that would modify an authorization contained in the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) to construct a 2,496 square foot pump house and a 648,000 gallon non-portable water storage tank.

# TITLE XXII—NAVY MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

## Summary

The budget request included an authorization of appropriations of $19.2 billion for military construction for the Navy for fiscal year 2027.

The committee recommends an authorization of appropriations of $20.3 billion for military construction for the Navy for fiscal year 2027.

Further details on projects authorized can be found in section 4601 of this Act.

## Sec. 2201—Authorized Navy construction and land acquisition projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize Navy and Marine Corps military construction projects for fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an installation-by-installation basis.

## Sec. 2202—Family housing

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize new construction, planning, and design for Navy family housing units for fiscal year 2027. This provision would also authorize funds for facilities that support family housing, including housing management offices, housing maintenance, and storage facilities.

## Sec. 2203—Authorization of appropriations, Navy

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for the active component military construction and family housing projects of the Department of the Navy authorized for construction for fiscal year 2027. This provision would also provide an overall limit on the amount authorized for military construction and family housing projects for the active components of the Navy and the Marine Corps. The state list contained in this report is the binding list of the specific projects authorized at each location.

## Sec. 2204—Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2023 projects

The committee recommends a provision that would extend the authorization contained in section 2201 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2205—Extension and modification of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2024 projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would extend the authorization contained in section 2201 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2206—Modification of authority to carry out fiscal year 2026 project at Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii**

The committee recommends a provision that would modify an authorization contained in the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) to expand airfield pavement areas to 280,000 square meters.

# TITLE XXIII—AIR FORCE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

## Summary

The budget request included an authorization of appropriations of $9.7 billion for military construction and $24.1 million for family housing for the Air Force in fiscal year 2027.

The committee recommends an authorization of appropriations of $10.4 billion for military construction and $24.1 million for family housing for the Air Force for fiscal year 2027.

Further details on projects authorized can be found in section 4601 of this Act.

### Sec. 2301—Authorized Air Force construction and land acquisition projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize Air Force military construction projects for fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an installation-by-installation basis.

### Sec. 2302—Family housing

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize improvements to existing housing, planning, and design for Air Force family housing units for fiscal year 2027. This provision would also authorize funds for facilities that support family housing, including housing management offices, housing maintenance, and storage facilities.

### Sec. 2303—Authorization of appropriations, Air Force

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for military construction and family housing projects of the Department of the Air Force authorized for construction for fiscal year 2027. This provision would also provide an overall limit on the amount authorized for military construction and family housing projects for the active component of the Air Force and the Space Force. The state list contained in this report is the binding list of the specific projects authorized at each location.

### Sec. 2304—Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2019 projects

The committee recommends a provision that would extend the authorization of certain projects contained in section 2903 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2305—Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2020 projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would extend certain authorizations contained in sections 2301(a) and 2912(a) of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 117–81) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2306—Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2023 projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would extend certain authorizations contained in section 2301 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2307—Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2024 projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would extend the authorization contained in sections 2301 and 2302 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2308—Authority to carry out family housing improvement projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of the Air Force to carry out family housing improvement projects to restructure agreements under the Military Housing Privatization Initiative under subchapter IV of chapter 169 of title 10, United States Code. The authorized amounts are listed on an installation-by-installation basis.

**Sec. 2309—Authority to carry out project at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of the Air Force to carry out a military construction project to construct a 6,934 square meter Joint All-Domain Command and Control and Air Battle Management Systems Test Facility at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, in the amount of $87.8 million.

# TITLE XXIV—DEFENSE AGENCIES MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

## Summary

The budget request included an authorization of appropriations of $5.9 billion for military construction for the Defense Agencies for fiscal year 2027.

The committee recommends an authorization of appropriations of $5.9 billion for military construction for the Defense Agencies for fiscal year 2027.

Further details on projects authorized can be found in section 4601 of this Act.

### Sec. 2401—Authorized Defense agencies construction and land acquisition projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize military construction projects for the Defense Agencies for fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an installation-by-installation basis.

### Sec. 2402—Authorized Energy Resilience and Conservation Investment Program projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to carry out Energy Resilience and Conservation Investment Program projects for fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an installation-by-installation basis.

### Sec. 2403—Authorization of appropriations, Defense Agencies

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for the military construction and family housing projects of the Defense Agencies authorized for construction for fiscal year 2027. This provision would also provide an overall limit on the amount authorized for military construction and family housing projects for the Defense Agencies. The state list contained in this report is the binding list of the specific projects authorized at each location.

### Sec. 2404—Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2023 projects

The committee recommends a provision that would extend certain authorizations contained in sections 2401(a) and 2402(a) of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2405—Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2024 projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would extend the authorization contained in sections 2401 and 2402 in the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

# TITLE XXV—INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS

## Summary

The budget request included an authorization of appropriations of $604.3 million for military construction of fiscal year 2027 for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program.

The committee recommends an authorization of appropriations of $654.3 million for military construction of fiscal year 2027 for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program.

## Subtitle A—North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program

### Sec. 2501—Authorized NATO construction and land acquisition projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to make contributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program in an amount equal to the sum of the amount specifically authorized in section 4601 of this title and the amount of recoupment due to the United States for construction previously financed by the United States.

### Sec. 2502—Authorization of appropriations, NATO

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations of $654.3 million for the U.S. contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program for fiscal year 2027.

## Subtitle B—Host Country in-Kind Contributions

### Sec. 2511—Republic of Korea funded construction projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to accept seven military construction projects totaling $416.5 million from the Republic of Korea as in-kind contributions.

### Sec. 2512—Republic of Poland funded construction projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to accept two military construction projects totaling $134.0 million from the Republic of Poland as in-kind contributions.

# TITLE XXVI—GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES FACILITIES

## Summary

The budget request included an authorization of appropriations of $611.0 million for military construction in fiscal year 2027 for facilities for the National Guard and reserve components.

The committee recommends an authorization of appropriations of $946.5 million for military construction for the National Guard and reserve components. The detailed funding recommendations are contained in the state list table included in this report.

Further details on projects authorized can be found in the tables in this title and section 4601 of this Act.

### Sec. 2601—Authorized Army National Guard construction and land acquisition projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize military construction projects for the Army National Guard for fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an installation-by-installation basis.

### Sec. 2602—Authorized Army Reserve construction and land acquisition projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize military construction projects for the Army Reserve for fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an installation-by-installation basis.

### Sec. 2603—Authorized Navy Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve construction and land acquisition projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize military construction projects for the Navy Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve for fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an installation-by-installation basis.

### Sec. 2604—Authorized Air National Guard construction and land acquisition projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize military construction projects for the Air National Guard for fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an installation-by-installation basis.

### Sec. 2605—Authorized Air Force Reserve construction and land acquisition projects

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize military construction projects for the Air Force Reserve for fiscal

year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an installation-by-installation basis.

**Sec. 2606—Authorization of appropriations, National Guard and Reserve**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for the reserve component military construction projects authorized for construction for fiscal year 2027 in this Act. This provision would also provide an overall limit on the amount authorized for military construction projects for each of the reserve components of the military departments. The state list contained in this report is the binding list of the specific projects authorized at each location.

**Sec. 2607—Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2023 projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would extend certain authorizations contained in sections 2601, 2602, 2603, and 2604 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2608—Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2024 projects**

The committee recommends a provision that would extend the authorization contained in sections 2601, 2602, 2604, and 2605 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

**Sec. 2609—Modification of authority to carry out fiscal year 2026 project at Colonie, New York**

The committee recommends a provision that would modify the authorization contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60) for Colonie, New York.

# TITLE XXVII—BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ACTIVITIES

### Sec. 2701—Authorization of appropriations for base realignment and closure activities funded through Department of Defense Base Closure Account

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for ongoing activities that are required to implement the decisions of the 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005 base realignment and closure rounds.

# TITLE XXVIII—MILITARY CONSTRUCTION GENERAL PROVISIONS

## Subtitle A—Military Construction Program

### Sec. 2801—Modification of master plans for major military installations

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2864 of title 10, United States Code, to align major military installation master plans to the new definition for military installation resilience requested last year by the Department of Defense and adopted in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119–60).

### Sec. 2802—Prohibition on use of repair projects to expand footprint of existing facilities or infrastructure

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2811 of title 10, United States Code, to clarify that the expansion of the footprint of existing facilities or infrastructure is not allowed outside of very limited criteria.

### Sec. 2803—Increase of authority for Indo-Pacific posture unspecified military construction projects

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2810(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31) by increasing the minor military construction threshold from $30.0 million to $35.0 million.

### Sec. 2804—Use of certain amounts for electrical or infrastructure upgrades on Barbers Point, Hawaii

The committee recommends a provision that would amend 2814(i)(1) of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of Defense to use existing funding in the Ford Island Improvement Account to make electrical upgrades on Barbers Point, Hawaii.

### Sec. 2805—Temporary adjustment of unspecified minor military construction requirements

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2805 of title 10, United States Code, to increase the unspecified minor military construction threshold from $9.0 million to $15.0 million and relieve area cost factor adjustments for Alaska, Hawaii, and other islands in the Indo-Pacific for a period of 5 years. The provision would also make additional conforming and clarifying changes to the underlying statute to improve understanding within the Department of Defense.

**Sec. 2806—Modification of authority for transactions other than contracts and grants for purposes of facility construction or repair**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2808a of title 10, United States Code, with a technical correction.

## Subtitle B—Military Housing

**Sec. 2821—Exclusion of window opening control devices from requirement for window fall prevention devices in military family housing units**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2857(a)(3) of title 10, United States Code, to clarify that a window fall prevention device in military family housing units does not include a device that is solely a window opening control device.

**Sec. 2822—Health and safety requirements for military housing**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that all housing project agreements and renewals for privatized military housing are compliant with the appropriate environmental health and safety standards and that all maintenance personnel, contracted mold assessors, indoor environmental professionals, and mold remediators responsible for assessing or remediating mold and water damage in covered housing shall possess and maintain current certifications issued by a nationally recognized, third-party, nonprofit certifying body.

**Sec. 2823—Expansion of protection from reprisal or retaliation against tenants of privatized military housing units who report housing-related issues**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2890(e) of title 10, United States Code, to expand protected communications of tenants of privatized military housing who report housing-related issues relative to the privatized housing.

**Sec. 2824—Transparency and strategic planning for housing**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to ensure that any enhanced-use lease executed, extended, or renewed under section 2662 or 2667 of title 10, United States Code, consider a range of more transparent and strategic planning considerations with respect to military housing.

**Sec. 2825—Development and implementation of minimum health and safety standards for military family housing**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to mandate specific standards for housing and environmental health and safety protections for members of the Armed Forces and their families residing in military family housing.

**Sec. 2826—Treatment of nondisclosure agreements with respect to privatized military housing**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2890(f) of title 10, United States Code, to prohibit a landlord from requesting that a tenant or prospective tenant of a privatized housing unit sign a nondisclosure agreement.

**Sec. 2827—Improvement of privatized military housing complaint database**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2894a of title 10, United States Code, to improve the complaint database for privatized military housing.

**Sec. 2828—Requirement relating to any reprogramming request relating to funding for housing or facilities of Department of Defense**

The committee recommends a provision that would, in the event the Department of Defense (DOD) requests approval to reprogram funding for military housing or any other facility, require the DOD to provide: an assessment of the condition of the facility from which funding is requested to be reprogrammed, any accompanying documentation, any outstanding maintenance requests at such facility, the number of servicemembers at such facility, any anticipated impacts to readiness, and an analysis by the DOD on why the request was made.

## Subtitle C—Land Conveyances

**Sec. 2841—Land conveyance, Milan Army Ammunition Plant, Tennessee**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of the Army to convey approximately 5,000 acres currently located at the former Milan Army Ammunition Plant to the University of Tennessee, for the purposes of expanding the University of Tennessee Research and Education Center at Milan.

**Sec. 2842—Land conveyance, Army Reserve Center, Opelika, Alabama**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of the Army to convey land that contains an Army Reserve Center and 4.5 acres to the City of Opelika, Alabama, for the purpose of meeting increased healthcare demands from the center.

**Sec. 2843—Report on land withdrawal at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Army to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, on all land withdrawal actions that are necessary to support training at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona.

**Sec. 2844—Report on necessary modifications to military land withdrawal of Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, on any necessary modifications to the military land withdrawal of Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada, under subtitle G of the Military Land Withdrawals Act of 2013 (title XXIX of Public Law 113–66), as added by section 2901 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (division B of Public Law 117–263), regarding the management of withdrawn and reserved land, road reconstruction and treatment of existing roads and rights-of-way, reconstruction and relocation requirements, and treatment of livestock grazing permits.

**Sec. 2845—Land exchange, Camp Pike and Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Arkansas**

The committee recommends a provision that would grant permissive authority to the Secretary of the Army to convey a certain parcel of real property located at Camp Pike, North Little Rock, Arkansas, in exchange for property located at Camp Joseph T. Robinson, North Little Rock, Arkansas.

**Sec. 2846—Removal of conditions on use of certain land conveyed to the State of Indiana**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2858 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (division B of Public Law 104–106), as amended by section 2838 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (division B of Public Law 105–85) and section 2843(i) of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (division B of Public Law 105–261) by striking subsection (d) and inserting new conditions on the release of covenants.

**Sec. 2847—Review and report on conveyance of Lambert St. Louis International Airport**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive review of the feasibility and advisability of conveying to the City of St. Louis, Missouri, certain lands to the Lambert St. Louis International Airport.

**Sec. 2848—Review and report on conveyance of Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Anchorage, Alaska**

The committee recommends a provision that would require a review and report on a potential conveyance specific to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska.

**Subtitle D—Other Matters**

**Sec. 2861—Authority of combatant commands to recover and reinvest operational energy cost savings**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2912 of title 10, United States Code, to include combatant

commands as eligible entities to recover and reinvest operational energy cost savings.

**Sec. 2862—Energy control requirements for electrical infrastructure upgrades**

The committee recommends a provision that would ensure that electrical systems within facilities of the Department of Defense are capable of operating in islanded mode during grid outages, thereby enhancing energy resilience, security, and operational continuity.

**Sec. 2863—Modification of calculation of minimum capital investment for facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2680 of title 10, United States Code, to include operation and maintenance resources obligated under eligible performance-based contracts to count toward the minimum capital investment for facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization.

**Sec. 2864—Requirements relating to leasing of land in Hawaii**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of the Army to seek from the State of Hawaii on terms acceptable to both the Army and the State, a renewal of expiring leases, pursuant to section 2667 of title 10, United States Code. The provision would also direct the Secretary of the Army to resubmit an environmental impact statement for additional review that responds to and addresses any deficiencies.

**Sec. 2865—Department of Defense Laboratory Facility Investment Program**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend subchapter I of chapter 169 of title 10, United States Code, to establish the Department of Defense Laboratory Facility Investment Program to fund military construction projects that improve, modernize, or recapitalize the physical infrastructure of defense laboratories critical to national security.

**Sec. 2866—Consideration of modular construction methods for military construction projects with protective design elements**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to consider the use of modular construction when determining the most effective method for a military construction project, and to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act.

**Sec. 2867—Standardized methodology for basing decisions for the Air Force**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that all future basing decisions

utilize specific methodology to increase transparency and take into account lifecycle costs.

The committee notes that the Department of the Air Force is expected to make critical basing decisions within the next 24 months for both F–35 and KC–46A aircraft. The committee supports the methodology used in recent basing decisions, including consideration of cost, infrastructure, readiness, and mission requirements, as a fair and transparent approach to strategic basing. The committee does believe, however, that additional data would assist the Air Force in considering life cycle costs over a longer time period.

**Sec. 2868—Pilot program on replacement of substandard chillers or facilities that support subsistence resiliency**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize a pilot program to replace a chiller or chiller-related facilities that support subsistence resiliency within the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command at locations that have been deemed remote and isolated.

**Sec. 2869—Department of Defense pilot program for development and use of online real estate inventory tool**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2866 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (division B of Public Law 116–283) to expand the pilot program for the online real estate inventory tool for the entire Department of Defense.

**Sec. 2870—Transfer of amounts for development of Ford Island, Hawaii, and electrical upgrades and Barbers Point, Hawaii**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of the Navy to transfer all amounts in the account associated with the Ford Island Master Development Agreement to the Ford Island Improvement Account.

**Sec. 2871—Expansion of defense community infrastructure pilot program to include installations of the Coast Guard**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 2391 of title 10, United States Code, to allow the U.S. Coast Guard to compete for funding available through the Defense Community Infrastructure Program.

**Sec. 2872—Plan on remediation of certain equipment and computational facilities owned or controlled by a foreign adversary**

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, and the Secretaries of the military departments, and in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, to submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, a plan to identify, prioritize, and remediate the presence of equipment and computational facilities owned or controlled by a foreign adversary in the electric grid of the United States.

## Items of Special Interest

### Accounting for force protection and weather concerns for B–21 Bomber shelter budgeting

The committee continues to support the Air Force's efforts to defend air bases and recognizes that technology and tactics for unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and first person view (FPV) drones, demonstrated in Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb and Israel's Operation Roaring Lion, challenge the suitability of open-sided environmental protection shelters (EPS) in comparison to traditional hangars for B–21 bomber aircraft, especially for priority alert missions. Furthermore, the matter of operational security and information control relating to strategic nuclear and stealth assets has been underappreciated in discussions that originally focused on weather conditions, which, prior to the rapid emergence of UAS and FPV threats, determined that the current EPS design is inadequate for blizzard conditions often experienced at the future Main Operating Base for the B–21.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Department of the Air Force to take these issues under consideration when programming for aircraft sustainment as well as military construction and to coordinate with both force protection and construction agents when planning for design allocation funding over the future years defense program.

### Adoption and integration of additive construction technologies

The committee supports efforts by the Department of Defense and the military services to accelerate the adoption of additive construction technology for construction projects. The committee notes additive construction's potential to reduce the time and cost of projects compared to traditional construction. The committee supports Department initiatives to pursue additive construction technology demonstration projects for rapid construction in contingency environments as well as organic additive construction capabilities within garrison engineering units such as the ongoing demonstrations at Ellsworth Air Force Base and the U.S. Air Force Academy. The committee further notes that recent updates to the Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC), UFC 3–301–01, specifically address additively constructed concrete (ACC) structures to allow for broader adoption and further innovation. However, the committee is concerned that some limitations in current regulations, such as limiting ACC buildings to a height of no more than two stories, will hinder broader adoption and thus require further research, demonstration, and refinement of UFC and other Department regulations or policies.

Accordingly, the committee strongly encourages the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the military services, to pursue further research and demonstration of multi-story ACC structures, including required seismic certification and compliance with other safety requirements. The committee believes this research should inform and enable revisions to current Department regulations and policies to permit future additive construction of larger projects such as barracks, schools, and office space, as well as garrison and

expeditionary structures to harden and defend high-value defense assets such as aircraft hangers that will house the B–21 strategic bomber and other exquisite platforms.

Additionally, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the military services, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later than January 31, 2027, on the status of Department research and demonstration of multi-story ACC structures. The briefing shall include: (1) An overview of Department efforts to demonstrate and certify the use of ACC for multi-story structures; (2) An explanation of any barriers to revision of Department regulations or policies enabling the use of ACC for multi-story structures; (3) A review of the benefits of broader adoption of organic additive manufacturing capabilities within garrison engineering units; and (4) An assessment of the use of additive construction for structures to harden aircraft hangers and other structures that defend high value assets against drones, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other threats.

**Air Force cyber facilities**

The committee recognizes the acute deficiencies in the facilities of the 16th Air Force and applauds efforts to build a new consolidated campus for the unit and its associated missions and partner agencies across the Cyber Mission Force. The committee supports the Air Force exploring efforts to construct new facilities in a manner that can deliver a new facility more expeditiously and cost-effectively than the traditional military construction process.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Air Force to work with entities proposing to build such facilities and directs the Secretary to brief the Senate Armed Services Committee on the status of the discussions, not later than January 15, 2027.

**Army National Guard training center range improvement**

The committee recognizes the Army National Guard's critical role as part of the Army's Operational Reserve and its contributions to the Joint Force. Army National Guard training sites across the country, including Camp Navajo, Florence Military Reservation, and the Buckeye Training Site (in partnership with the U.S. Army Reserve), provide diverse and complementary training environments that are well-suited for realistic and effective readiness training across a range of missions, terrain, and operating conditions and are essential to sustaining the readiness of units that must be prepared to respond to both federal and domestic missions.

Nationwide, Army National Guard training sites support Army National Guard soldiers and enable joint and allied training, underscoring their broader value to the Joint Force. Continued modernization of these ranges would further enhance proficiency in core warfighting tasks—including squad defense, fire and movement, and convoy defense. The committee notes that Army National Guard training sites must have the infrastructure and facilities necessary to support local training with modern weapon systems, strengthen lethality and maneuver competencies, and prepare units for National Training Center rotations, deployment mo-

bilizations, and Multi-Domain Operations as part of the Joint Force.

Accordingly, the committee urges the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to fund efforts to modernize and expand training infrastructure at Army National Guard training sites nationwide, including those at Camp Navajo, Florence Military Reservation, and the Buckeye Training Site. The committee further encourages the Secretary to identify and prioritize Army National Guard training infrastructure requirements that address capability gaps, increase training efficacy, improve access to realistic training environments, and ensure range and facility modernization remains aligned with broader Army modernization objectives. The committee notes that such investments will strengthen readiness, improve interoperability, and ensure Army National Guard soldiers are prepared to deploy as capable and effective warfighters.

**Army Reserve component facilities joint use with Army National Guard**

The committee notes with concern the fiscal and operational challenges facing the Army's reserve components regarding facility sustainment. The Army National Guard's (ARNG) 2,200 Readiness Centers have an average age of 48 years, with an estimated $60.0 billion required to remedy a 40 percent total space deficit. The committee is aware that despite the ARNG managing a significant portion of the Army's facility inventory, its share of military construction funding has been disproportionately low, leading to a projected 130-year modernization timeline that is unsustainable and degrades readiness.

The committee believes the current model of operating separate, single-component facilities for the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and the ARNG may be inefficient and fail to maximize the use of taxpayer dollars. This model of facility management can lead to costly redundancies and the deterioration of valuable federal assets when units are realigned. The committee believes that the Army's Total Force Policy, which seeks to integrate the active and reserve components into a unified operational force, should be reflected in how the Army manages its real property.

Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Army to assess the feasibility and benefits of transferring sustainment responsibility of USAR facilities to the ARNG. The committee notes that USAR and ARNG are already planning such facility transfers in Texas and Connecticut and commends those efforts.

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 1 year following the date of the enactment of this Act, on the feasibility of such a transfer program. This report shall include: (1) A detailed analysis of any cost savings realized by leveraging the ARNG's federal-state cost-sharing model and state contracting mechanisms; (2) An assessment of the operational benefits, including efficiencies in maintenance and repair; (3) An evaluation of how this model can support force structure changes resulting from the Army Transformation Initiative; and (4) Recommendations on the feasibility of expanding

this program and any legislative or regulatory changes needed to facilitate the conversion of single-component facilities to joint-use facilities.

**Cargo pier at United States Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll**

The committee recognizes the enduring strategic value of Kwajalein Atoll to the Department of Defense. As the location of the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range, Kwajalein provides irreplaceable capabilities for ballistic missile defense developmental and operational testing, long-range missile flight testing, space domain awareness, and space object tracking. Its position in the central Pacific has taken on heightened importance as the Department reorients toward strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, and the United States' access to the atoll represents a significant national security interest. The committee believes that sustained investment in the installation's enabling infrastructure is essential to preserving these capabilities over the long term.

The committee is concerned, however, that the extreme remoteness of Kwajalein Atoll and its near-total dependence on maritime resupply place a premium on resilient and sufficient cargo-handling infrastructure that current port facilities may not provide. The committee understands that the atoll's existing pier infrastructure is aging and constrains cargo throughput and that these limitations may complicate the timely delivery of sustainment cargo, military construction materiel, and mission-critical equipment. The committee is particularly concerned that existing facilities lack roll-on/roll-off capability, requiring that wheeled and tracked vehicles, rolling stock, and outsized equipment be handled by lift-on/lift-off methods that are slower, more labor- and equipment-intensive, and ill-suited to the efficient movement of vehicular cargo. The committee is further concerned that the lack of redundant pier capacity creates a potential single point of failure that could jeopardize installation readiness, particularly in the event of damage to existing facilities or a contingency requiring surge logistics support.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than February 1, 2027, on the feasibility and estimated cost of constructing a new cargo pier at U.S. Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll. The briefing shall include, at a minimum: (1) An assessment of current cargo handling capacity and identified deficiencies, including the absence of roll-on/roll-off capability; (2) The projected cargo throughput and resilience requirements needed to support current and anticipated missions; (3) An evaluation of options for new or expanded pier construction, including roll-on/roll-off capability, with a rough order of magnitude cost estimate and notional construction schedule for each; (4) An assessment of associated dredging, landside, staging, and supporting infrastructure requirements and costs; and (5) A discussion of relevant environmental, regulatory, and host-nation considerations under applicable agreements with the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

**Comptroller General review of military installations**

The committee recognizes the growing risk of increasingly frequent and extreme heat events and remains concerned by data in-

dicating that heat illness was among the top five most reported medical events among U.S. active-duty servicemembers in 2024. The committee encourages the Department of Defense to prioritize the development of policies to identify opportunities to better prepare for extreme heat events to ensure military readiness and operational efficiency on military installations.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review the Department's and Services' policies and procedures for data gathering, assessment, mitigation, and response of military installations to extreme heat events by assessing: (1) Safety mechanisms and procedures for outdoor training events that take place during extreme heat events; (2) Whether and how the Services track and treat military personnel with heat-related illnesses; (3) What extreme heat-related infrastructure vulnerabilities exist, if any, at military installations and what mitigation measures can be used to enhance their resiliency; (4) Considerations for the use of decision support tools, such as heat risk management applications, on at-risk military installations; and (5) Recommendations to improve the Department's implementation of existing extreme heat preparedness and response efforts.

The Comptroller General should brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on this review, not later than March 1, 2027.

**Ensuring department budgets for plant replacement value investment requirement**

The committee notes that section 2841 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159) established a binding statutory requirement that the Secretaries of the military departments invest in the budget for facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization (FSRM) an amount equal to no less than 4 percent of the total plant replacement value (PRV) of all their respective department facilities by fiscal year 2030 and sustain that level in each subsequent fiscal year. The law further establishes a structured schedule of interim statutory investment obligations: 1.75 percent of total PRV in fiscal year 2027; 2.5 percent in fiscal year 2028; 3.25 percent in fiscal year 2029; and 4.0 percent in fiscal year 2030 and each fiscal year thereafter.

The committee notes that the Department of Defense reported an FSRM investment rate of 1.75 percent of total PRV in fiscal year 2027, nominally satisfying the first statutory milestone established under Section 2841 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025. However, the committee finds that this result was achieved only through the application of funds provided under the Public Law 119–21, a reconciliation measure constituting mandatory spending. The committee notes that while satisfaction with the section 2841 statutory milestone through one-time mandatory spending does comply with the intent of the law, it does not demonstrate the Department's resolve in fulfilling the statutory requirement by allocating appropriate resources in its discretionary budget. The committee notes that reconciliation is a non-recurring budgetary mech-

anism and cannot serve as the programmatic foundation for a sustained, multi-year infrastructure investment obligation.

The committee also believes it is important to note that the Department requested a repeal of section 2841 even though the military departments are supportive of the original measure. The committee is unambiguous in its direction: the Department must program and budget for FSRM investments at the levels required by Section 2841 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025—92.5 percent of total PRV in fiscal year 2028, 3.25 percent in fiscal year 2029, and 4.0 percent in fiscal year 2030—through the base discretionary budget, reflected fully across the future years defense program.

Accordingly, beginning no later than the President's budget submission for fiscal year 2028, the committee expects each military department's budget justification materials to demonstrate compliance with the applicable PRV milestone through programmed Operation and Maintenance funds, without reliance on supplemental, emergency, or mandatory spending.

**Gila Bend Air Force Auxiliary Field North Turnaround**

The committee recognizes the critical role of Gila Bend Air Force Auxiliary Field (GBAFAF) in supporting pilot training and combat readiness for aircraft operating from Luke Air Force Base and throughout the Barry M. Goldwater Range complex. As a key training and emergency divert airfield, GBAFAF supports high-tempo flight operations for Air Force, Air National Guard, and partner nation aircraft.

The committee notes that the existing north turnaround does not meet current Unified Facilities Criteria requirements and operates under a waiver, creating operational and safety challenges. The committee understands that replacing and expanding the north turnaround would provide immediate compliance with applicable standards, improve aircraft maneuverability and safety, and enable parking for additional aircraft. The committee further notes that the project would enhance airfield capacity and support continued operations for current and future aircraft missions.

The committee is concerned that failure to modernize this infrastructure could increase operational risk, constrain airfield operations, and degrade the airfield's ability to support readiness requirements and training activities. Therefore, the committee urges the Secretary of the Air Force to prioritize funding for the north turnaround replacement and expansion project at GBAFAF in fiscal year 2028.

**Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning replacement at Luke Air Force Base**

The committee remains concerned by the condition of aging heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems across Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, and notes that funding for necessary replacements was not included in the fiscal year 2027 budget request. The committee understands that HVAC systems, including the main cooling tower, at Luke Air Force Base have exceeded their ex-

pected service lives, resulting in increased maintenance requirements, reduced reliability, and higher operating costs.

The committee further notes that Luke Air Force Base is located in one of the hottest regions of the United States, where summer temperatures routinely approach 120 degrees Fahrenheit. Reliable climate control is essential to maintaining safe working conditions for airmen and civilian personnel, protecting mission-critical equipment, and sustaining installation readiness. HVAC failures during periods of extreme heat can adversely affect personnel health and productivity while disrupting mission operations.

The committee emphasizes that continued reliance on aging HVAC infrastructure is both a readiness concern and a fiscal inefficiency. Accordingly, the committee strongly urges the Secretary of the Air Force to prioritize funding for HVAC replacement projects at Luke Air Force Base and to ensure that future budget requests adequately address facility sustainment requirements at installations operating in extreme climate conditions.

**Marine Corps Air Station Yuma airfield security**

The committee recognizes the critical national security mission performed by Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma, Arizona, the busiest air station in the Marine Corps and home to the F–35B Lightning II aircraft. MCAS Yuma also hosts the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One Weapons and Tactics Instructor course twice annually, providing advanced training essential to the readiness of Marine aviation forces. The committee is aware that MCAS Yuma operates a shared use airfield with Yuma International Airport, creating unique security challenges and increasing the importance of robust installation and airfield security measures.

The committee is aware of vulnerabilities along the installation perimeter and the need for enhanced airfield security systems. The committee understands that the Marine Corps has identified a requirement to replace aging and end-of-life portable security monitoring systems with fixed-base perimeter security infrastructure, including security cameras and associated monitoring capabilities at multiple locations along the installation perimeter.

Therefore, the committee urges the Secretary of the Navy, acting through the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to prioritize funding for airfield security camera and perimeter security fence upgrades at MCAS Yuma in fiscal year 2028. The committee notes that these improvements would provide continuous and sustainable electronic monitoring of perimeter fence areas, improve early detection of unauthorized access to the airfield and critical infrastructure, and enable more rapid security force response to potential threats. The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than February 1, 2027, on the status of airfield security upgrades at MCAS Yuma.

**Public Schools on Military Installations program**

The committee remains concerned about the physical condition and capacity of public schools located on military installations, which play a vital role in supporting the morale and readiness of

military families. The committee notes that several facilities located outside the contiguous United States require significant modernization, construction, or repair to meet adequate educational and safety standards.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the costs associated with constructing, renovating, and repairing public schools located on military installations in states eligible for public schools serving military installations located outside the contiguous United States or in a non-contiguous state or territory and that are currently included on the Deputy Secretary of Defense's Public Schools on Military Installations (PSMI) Priority List.

The briefing should include:

(1) A comparison of the estimated costs to renovate each school on the priority list against the estimated costs to completely replace each such school through new construction;

(2) An assessment of and specific recommendation on which schools should be targeted for replacement versus those suited for renovation;

(3) For each school where renovation is recommended, an assessment of whether the proposed renovation would successfully extend the facility's useful life by at least 30 years;

(4) A recommended federal and state cost share ratio for funding schools; and

(5) Any other issues the Secretary of Defense, or his or her designee, deems relevant to the PSMI program.

**Report on military construction in Freely Associated States**

The military services are making large infrastructure investments in the Freely Associated States (FAS) for the first time in generations, and local on-the-ground engagement with the national and local governments in these countries will greatly reduce risks of construction delay and cost increases.

To better understand what actions can be taken in the FAS to address these risks, the committee directs the Indo-Pacific Command's Joint Task Force-Micronesia, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy, and Environment; Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment; and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Energy, Installations, and Environment to provide a report, not later than February 1, 2027, summarizing:

(1) Action taken to date to improve the civilian-military relationship for major planned military construction; and

(2) Potential options for and advisability of building an enduring capability, to include permanent government civilian or military personnel stationed in the FAS, to improve coordination to address local workforce, environmental approvals, and community relations issues.

**Requirement for Camp Navajo entry bridge replacement**

In the event of a conflict, it is critical to have reliable access to munitions in storage and the ability to expediently ship munitions. The committee acknowledges that the transport of munitions often

relies on rail transportation to expeditiously move munitions from the interior of the United States to munition ports to be shipped outside the contiguous United States to the theater of operations.

The committee acknowledges that properly maintaining the infrastructure, such as bridges and overpasses, at military installations operating munitions storage missions along the Strategic Rail Corridor Network, including Camp Navajo in Bellemont, Arizona, is important for our national security. However, the condition and size of the current bridge limits the portion of the strategic national rail line underneath the overpass to one lane of travel, creating a limiting factor to support contingencies, logistics, and resupply in the Indo-Pacific area of operations.

Therefore, the committee directs the Army and the Army National Guard to provide a briefing to the committee, not later than March 1, 2027, on efforts to replace the overpass bridge at Camp Navajo, an exploration of public-private partnership funding to do so, and a budget estimate for the replacement.

**Waterfront production facility**

The committee notes that waterfront production facilities are critical elements of the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) which seeks to more efficiently collocate shops, engineering, and project teams closer to dry docks for increased productivity and ultimately lower costs over time.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, regarding the Navy's plan to construct a waterfront production facility at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii. The briefing shall include: (1) The total cost of the proposed waterfront production facility or facilities; (2) The scope of the proposed waterfront production facility or facilities, including whether the Secretary intends to build one large facility or multiple smaller facilities, and if the latter, how many buildings are planned and their respective sizes; (3) The intended location or locations of the waterfront production facility or facilities on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam; and (4) The timing of the planned construction, including planning and design efforts, and proposed military construction start and end dates for the facility or facilities.

Lastly, if the Secretary intends to build the waterfront production facility or facilities at a location other than the previously planned site on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, former dry dock 3, the briefing shall include an assessment of how the Secretary intends to achieve similar optimization and workflow efficiency goals contemplated by the SIOP, including: (1) A comparison of the expected level of optimization, workflow efficiency, and maintenance throughput envisioned for the previously planned facility at the site of former dry dock 3 and the expected level of optimization, workflow efficiency, and maintenance throughput envisioned at the new location or locations of the waterfront production facility or facilities; and (2) A comparison of the expected level of occupational safety and health, including workforce welfare initiatives, protection, and conveniences envisioned for the previously planned facility at the site of former dry dock 3 and the expected level of occu-

pational safety and health, including workforce welfare initiatives, protection, and conveniences envisioned at the new location or locations of the facility or facilities.

# DIVISION C—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

## TITLE XXXI—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

### Subtitle A—National Security Programs and Authorizations

#### Sec. 3101—National Nuclear Security Administration

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the appropriation of funds for the activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration and authorize one new plant project.

#### Sec. 3102—Defense environmental cleanup

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the appropriation of funds for the Department of Energy's defense environmental cleanup activities.

#### Sec. 3103—Other defense activities

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the appropriation of funds for the Department of Energy's other defense activities.

#### Sec. 3104—Nuclear energy

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the appropriation of funds for the Department of Energy's nuclear energy activities.

### Subtitle B—Program Authorizations, Restrictions, and Limitations

#### Sec. 3111—Delegation of authorities to Administrator for Nuclear Security

The committee recommends a provision that would require the delegation of approval authority for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) capital projects to the Administrator for Nuclear Security.

The committee appreciates the efforts of the NNSA leadership to reexamine entrenched policies and procedures and explore innovative solutions to expedite the recapitalization of the U.S. nuclear enterprise. The committee believes that decision-making authority should be decentralized to as low a level as prudently possible to maximize the agility and adaptability of the NNSA.

**Sec. 3112—Protection of Office of Secure Transportation vehicles and equipment from unmanned aircraft**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 6227 of title 10, United States Code, to clarify that National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Secure Transport equipment and special nuclear material transport activities are included in the authorization for counter-unmanned aerial system defense measures.

The proliferation of autonomous and remotely piloted aircraft has reshaped modern battlefields and presents a rapidly growing threat to mobile assets as well as fixed sites around the world. It is incumbent upon the Department of Energy to ensure special nuclear material, whether secured in a fixed location or in transit, remains protected from all types of threats.

**Sec. 3113—Authorization to establish public-private partnerships for nuclear effects testing**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Administrator for Nuclear Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to establish one or more public-private partnerships to provide nuclear effects testing capabilities in support of the mission requirements of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Defense. The provision would also require the Administrator to submit a report to the congressional defense committees outlining the specifics of the partnerships within 180 days of the establishment of such a partnership.

**Sec. 3114—Limitation on availability of funds pending submission of report on restoration of a domestic uranium enrichment capability**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2027 travel funding for the Administrator for Nuclear Security to no more than 80 percent until the Administrator submits the report required by section 3123 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159).

The committee appreciates the efforts of the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to promote the development and deployment of nuclear technologies, including the reestablishment of a complete domestic nuclear fuel cycle. However, accomplishment of this goal necessitates the restoration of a comprehensive enrichment capability for unencumbered uranium. The committee recognizes this and directed the NNSA, in the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, to evaluate at least two geographically disparate possible locations in the United States that would by 2035 be best suited to host a modular, scalable facility for the domestic enrichment of unencumbered uranium, including highly enriched uranium suitable for defense applications. However, the NNSA has yet to provide the required report.

**Sec. 3115—Briefing on activities by the Director for Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 3221 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act, division C, title XXXII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65) to require annual briefings by the Director of the Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE) Office of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) through fiscal year 2031.

Until fiscal year 2018, under section 2411(g) of title 50, United States Code, the Director of CEPE of the NNSA was required to report on activities conducted during the prior fiscal year. Given the importance of ongoing nuclear modernization activities at the NNSA, the committee recommends amending section 3221(g) of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act, division C, title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, to require a briefing by the Director of CEPE to the congressional defense committees on activities conducted in the prior fiscal year as well as assessments of major atomic energy defense acquisition programs, per section 2411(i) of title 50, United States Code. This briefing is to occur at or about the same time as the submission of the President's budget request, per section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.

While the NNSA has now established a rigorous process for the modernization of nuclear weapons, the committee believes it is important to understand major construction programs under review by the Director of CEPE.

**Sec. 3116—Modification to selected acquisition reports requirement**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 6125(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, to modify the submission deadline to the Congress for annual Selected Acquisition Reports on each new nuclear weapon system program, including those undergoing life extension or major alteration, to within 30 days of the date on which the President transmits the budget to the Congress for the following fiscal year.

**Sec. 3117—Modification to the program for acceleration of replacement of cesium blood irradiation sources**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 6156(b)(2) of title 10, United States Code, to allow for payment of the full per-device cost of replacing blood irradiation devices.

**Sec. 3118—Briefings on nuclear-related autonomous or remotely-piloted aircraft incursions**

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Administrator for Nuclear Security, in coordination with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical and Biological Defense Policy and Programs, to brief the congressional defense committees quarterly on all instances occurring over the previous calendar year of remotely-piloted or autonomous system incursions into secured areas or airspace in or around nuclear-weapons related areas. The

provision would allow briefings conducted pursuant to section 130i of title 10, United States Code, to partially fulfill this requirement and would terminate the requirement entirely on August 31, 2031.

**Sec. 3119—Conceptual and construction design**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 6277(b) of title 10, United States Code, by striking "$5,000,000" each time it appears and inserting "$10,000,000 in fiscal year 2026 dollars."

**Sec. 3120—Annual public workshops and nuclear science advisory committee reviews**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 3173(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112 239) by striking paragraph (4).

**Sec. 3121—Limitation on use of funds until certain criteria are met**

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2027 funds for Federal Salaries and Expenses and available to the Office of the Administrator for Nuclear Security for travel purposes to:

(1) Not more than 50 percent until the date on which the Administrator notifies the congressional defense committees that site selection has been completed and construction has commenced for projects 21–D–510 High Explosives Synthesis Formulation and Production Facility, Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas, and 18–D–650 Tritium Finishing Facility, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina;

(2) Not more than 80 percent until the date on which the Administrator notifies the congressional defense committees that initial long-lead component, equipment, and commodity requirements have been identified for projects 21–D–510 High Explosives Synthesis Formulation and Production Facility, Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas, and 18–D–650 Tritium Finishing Facility, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina; and

(3) Not more than 90 percent until the date on which the Administrator notifies the congressional defense committees that 25 percent of the value of the identified initial long-lead component, equipment, and commodity requirements have been submitted to vendors for projects 21–D–510 High Explosives Synthesis Formulation and Production Facility, Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas, and 18–D–650 Tritium Finishing Facility, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

**Sec. 3122—Continuation of National Nuclear Security Administration pay and performance system**

The committee recommends a provision that would amend section 3116(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91) by striking ", until" and all that follows through "this Act."

## Subtitle C—Other Matters

### Items of Special Interest

#### Briefing on National Nuclear Security Administration plans for recapitalizing Pantex Plant infrastructure and facilities

The committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to provide a detailed briefing, not later than December 1, 2026, on long-term recapitalization plans for the Pantex Plant, including critical high explosives facilities and the materials staging capability. The briefing shall include a 10-year outlook focused on the necessary assets and resources, including special tooling development and supply chain requirements, as well as actions required, to modernize the critical capabilities needed to deliver warheads on schedule. The committee believes that a focused 10-year strategy with steady state funding may yield cost savings while advancing the mission.

#### Briefing on plutonium pit production and reuse planning

The committee notes that the expansion of plutonium pit production capabilities and the revitalization of associated facilities and infrastructure are critical in facilitating the modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The committee further notes that consistent communication between the National Nuclear Security Administration and the congressional defense committees is necessary to ensure that emerging execution challenges are identified and addressed in a timely manner.

Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than December 1, 2026, on: (1) The progress of Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) plutonium pit production capability expansion to enable the production of at least 100 pits by the end of calendar year 2028; (2) Opportunities for the Savannah River Site to facilitate expanded plutonium pit production at LANL; (3) Progress on establishing a complementary production capability at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF); and (4) Options where the reuse of existing plutonium pits may support a bridging strategy for meeting Department of Defense stockpile requirements until pit production targets are met at LANL and SRPPF.

#### Briefing on procurement of United States-origin unobligated enriched uranium

The committee is concerned about the adequacy of current and future capacity to supply U.S.-origin, unobligated uranium, including the mining and conversion needed to replenish defense inventories on an enduring basis.The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) made an initial round of purchases of natural uranium from U.S. mining companies in 2022 to begin filling the strategic uranium reserve managed by the NNSA. These purchases illustrate that the necessary infrastructure, permits, and licenses to transport and store the uranium in the reserve are in place. However, longer-term contracts with uranium producers, refiners,

converts, and enrichers are necessary to provide the price and supply certainty needed to support the operation of uranium mines and conversion facilities.

Further, the committee is concerned over the lack of domestic enrichment capacity that meets international unobligated uranium requirements, including the apparent lack of progress in reestablishing enrichment capabilities pursuant to section 3123 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–159). These requirements require that not only natural uranium inputs be domestically procured but that the enrichment technology used must be of U.S. origin. Current U.S. enrichment capacities do not meet these requirements.

The committee directs the NNSA to examine and identify gaps in the existing supply chain for mining, conversion, and enrichment capable of supplying U.S.-origin, unobligated uranium for defense purposes, including small modular reactors (SMR), microreactors, the nuclear Navy, and other advanced nuclear requirements under development.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than December 1, 2026. The briefing shall include:

(1) An analysis of current and projected defense needs, including SMR and microreactor requirements under development;

(2) How projected increases in U.S. and global commercial demand for mined uranium, conversion services, and enrichment will impact the availability of U.S.-origin, unobligated uranium for defense needs;

(3) Estimates of the cost of replenishing uranium inventories for defense needs, including for mined uranium, conversion services, and enrichment;

(4) Options and recommendations for the procurement of U.S.-origin, unobligated uranium, conversion, and enrichment; and

(5) How the NNSA is accounting for the concerns outlined above in its efforts to comply with section 3123 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, which directed the evaluation of at least two geographically disparate possible locations in the United States that would, by 2035, be best suited to host a modular, scalable facility for the domestic enrichment of unencumbered uranium, including highly-enriched uranium suitable for defense applications.

Further, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on a strategy for the United States to ensure continuity for the supply of unobligated uranium, including conversion and enrichment capabilities.

**Briefing on recycling spent fuel into long-duration radioisotope power systems**

The committee is concerned about the indefinite storage of spent nuclear fuel in “temporary” storage pools and casks. The National

Nuclear Security Administration estimates that current stockpiles of unobligated uranium and nuclear fuel will run out by 2040.

Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management, to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than April 15, 2027, on the feasibility of establishing a pilot-scale demonstration of proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel recycling technologies to address the concerns established above. The briefing should address, at a minimum:

(1) Identification of defense applications for long-duration radioisotope power systems derived from recycled materials, particularly for distributed logistics, space, maritime, and autonomous systems;

(2) A description of operational requirements for long-duration power systems;

(3) Potential applications of such technologies in fission generation technologies including small modular reactors and microreactors for defense purposes;

(4) Any other potential applications of nuclear fuel recycling technologies for national security purposes;

(5) Notional experimentation and validation milestones;

(6) Acquisition and commercial buying pathways, including an assessment of options for risk-sharing and cost recovery structures consistent with private-capital-led deployment;

(7) An examination of interagency and regulatory relationships and frameworks necessary to carry out such a demonstration; and

(8) Any statutory adjustment necessary to improve the efficiency or cost effectiveness of such a demonstration.

**Briefing on use of artificial intelligence to support weapons design and stockpile stewardship**

The committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear Security to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on ongoing activities related to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to support the nuclear security mission of the administration and efforts to characterize, assess, and reduce the risk of and potential impact from AI-related nuclear incidents, including the generation of weapons-relevant technical information, risks to nuclear command and control, and exploitation by foreign adversary technologies.

**Briefings on nuclear explosive test readiness**

The committee notes that the United States last conducted a nuclear explosive test in 1992. Since 2000, the three National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) laboratory directors have affirmed that there are no known technical issues in the stockpile that would necessitate a return to testing. Last year, the National Ignition Facility conducted fusion yield producing experiments with plutonium, achieving a stockpile assessment goal set in 1992 after the investment of approximately $10.0 billion. Likewise, the U1A underground site at the Nevada National Security Site is conducting experiments with bulk quantities of plutonium 1,000 feet

underground. Above ground, Los Alamos National Laboratory conducts bulk plutonium experiments under explosive compression with the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Facility.

Section 6114(5) of title 10, United States Code, requires that part of the biannual nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, management, and responsiveness plan address nuclear test readiness as a capability.

Therefore, the committee directs that the Administrator for Nuclear Security brief the congressional defense committees, not later than February 1, 2027, on the NNSA's efforts to maintain the readiness of U.S. capabilities to conduct nuclear explosive testing if required. The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess the extent to which the NNSA has addressed section 6114(5) of title 10, United States Code, and to brief the congressional defense committees on these findings, not later than March 31, 2027.

**Comptroller General review of management and operating contractor construction burden**

The committee notes that the Government Accountability Office reported in a February 2026 report, "Nuclear Security Enterprise: Assessments of National Nuclear Security Administration Major Projects," (GAO–26–107777), that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and its management and operating (M&O) contractors are carrying out nearly 30 major construction projects estimated to cost a total of more than $30.0 billion. In addition, M&O contractors carry out hundreds of smaller projects, which collectively add billions of dollars in investment to the agency's overall construction portfolio.

Under M&O contracts, the contractor is responsible for nearly all aspects of site operation, security, maintenance, and construction, as well as mission-related work, including research and weapons production. M&O contract terms are generally long, and new or large-scale construction efforts may not have been contemplated at the time of the NNSA's initial awarding of the M&O contract. The Department of Energy has used M&O contracts since the Manhattan Project and remains the primary user of these unique contracts to this day.

A feature of M&O contracts is that the contractor is responsible for managing construction acquisition processes and applies its overhead rates to these services. Especially for the major projects, these costs can be considerable. Given M&O contractors' poor records of performance in delivering projects on budget and on schedule, the committee is seeking to understand whether alternative management approaches could reduce cost and improve project delivery.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess: (1) The benefits, costs, and challenges associated with using M&O contractors to manage construction projects at their sites; and (2) The extent to which the NNSA has used or considered alternatives to M&O contracts to manage construction projects and the benefits, costs, and challenges of these alternatives.

The committee further directs the Comptroller General to provide a one-time, preliminary briefing on the results of its assessment to the congressional defense committees at a mutually agreed upon date, not later than March 31, 2027, with final results to follow in a mutually agreed upon format and timeframe.

**Comptroller General review of National Nuclear Security Administration approaches to incentivizing contractors' performance**

The committee notes that since its establishment in 2000, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has changed its performance evaluation approach for management and operating (M&O) contractors several times, and there has been frequent discussion of the benefits of different contract incentive structures to incentivize desired performance outcomes. In the 2000s, the NNSA used detailed performance criteria specific to each contract to make decisions on awarding incentives. Since 2013, the NNSA has used broad, more subjective NNSA-wide performance criteria to make award fee decisions. In a 2019 report, the Government Accountability Office found that the NNSA generally awarded M&O contractors high ratings and most available performance incentives, except in cases of significant safety or security incidents. This pattern has seemed to hold since then.

Throughout this period, while the NNSA's modernization efforts and program of record have changed and expanded significantly, cost and schedule performance have continued to raise concerns, particularly in areas such as large construction projects and infrastructure recapitalization. Further, challenges in recruitment and retention of contractors' workforces are essential to address in order to achieve modernization objectives. Several external reviews, such as the Augustine-Mies report and the NNSA's own Enhanced Mission Delivery Initiative, have called for the NNSA to move away from award fees to fixed fees as it is unclear that award fees have been meaningful for performance. Further, as the NNSA seeks to speed up its efforts and reduce project costs while also evaluating how regulation can be streamlined, getting its contract incentives right is essential.

The Federal Acquisition Regulation discusses various types of potential contract incentives that establish realistic and achievable targets that are clearly communicated to the contractor, that include appropriate incentive arrangements designed to motivate contractor efforts that might not otherwise be emphasized, and that discourage contractor inefficiency and waste. Different incentives may be appropriate depending on the nature of the work. NNSA sites conduct a variety of work, including research, production, construction, maintenance, and site operations, but generally only use award fees and fixed fees as incentives.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess: (1) The extent to which current incentives align with the scope of the work the NNSA seeks to incentivize; (2) Opportunities that alternative incentive structures could provide to improve contractor motivation and performance; and (3) The views of stakeholders and experts regarding what incentives drive and re-

ward contractors to exceptional performance and hold them accountable when performance is lacking.

The Comptroller General shall brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, and meet with the congressional defense committees to determine a mutually agreeable time for a final report.

**Comptroller General review of National Nuclear Security Administration efforts to sustain science, technology, and engineering facilities**

The committee realizes that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) relies on unique science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) facilities across the U.S. nuclear security enterprise to assess and certify weapon performance and to research and develop new materials, designs, technologies, and production processes for modernizing the nuclear deterrent. The NNSA has reported that ongoing stockpile stewardship and modernizations are placing greater demand on these facilities than at any time in the past 30 years. Many of these facilities and supporting infrastructure are relatively new and well-maintained compared to the production infrastructure in the nuclear security enterprise. However, these facilities are still decades old and in need of substantial sustainment and, in some cases, recapitalization to ensure that they continue to support stockpile stewardship and modernization, even as the NNSA plans replacement capabilities in the future for some facilities. The NNSA funds its ST&E facility sustainment activities through multiple programs' operations budgets, rather than as line-item projects, limiting visibility into the full scope and estimated cost of these efforts, particularly in the agency's budget materials.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess: (1) The NNSA's ongoing and planned inventory of ST&E sustainment efforts and any risk assessments of these facilities; (2) The costs and schedules for the sustainment efforts and the program budgets through which these efforts are carried out; and (3) Any opportunities to improve the visibility of these efforts in the NNSA's budget materials to ensure budgetary needs can be fully considered.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, and meet with the congressional defense committees to determine a mutually agreeable time for a final report.

**Comptroller General review of National Nuclear Security Administration use of digital engineering**

The committee recognizes that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has recently announced a Digital Transformation Initiative, which aims to fully digitize aspects of the nuclear security enterprise, including its supply chain, product flow, inventory, and legacy data in the coming years. This initiative, which is being led jointly by the NNSA and Sandia National Laboratories, will establish the use of "digital threads" and "digital twins" to reduce the time involved in the design and qualification of weapon components and systems. A digital thread refers to a

common source of information connecting stakeholders with real-time data across the product life cycle to inform product decisions. A digital twin (of a component or system) is used during design modeling and simulation to connect to a physical component or system through sensors or by collecting enough data to build the twin digitally. A digital twin can ensure that manufacturing outcomes match design intent by simulating the production process before physical manufacturing begins. The NNSA aims to use some of these digital tools for the W93 program.

To better understand the NNSA's plans for its Digital Transformation Initiative, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess: (1) The tools and resources (such as networks and data centers) that the NNSA plans to acquire as part of this initiative; and (2) The benefits and challenges of applying these tools to the W93 program and future nuclear weapon acquisition programs.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, and meet with the congressional defense committees to determine a mutually agreeable time for a final report.

**Comptroller General review of Office of Environmental Management economic opportunities**

The committee recognizes that the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for substantial tracts of land that were either never contaminated or have been successfully remediated. Meanwhile, many industries, such as electricity generators developing small modular reactors and artificial intelligence data centers, are looking for sites ready for development. In addition, the Office of EM possesses various materials, including cesium and strontium capsules, that may be commercially viable and could be of use for industrial or other beneficial purposes.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess the Office of EM's economic opportunities, including: (1) What portions of DOE-owned land are currently clean enough for industrial use; (2) The steps involved in the DOE's land-transfer policies and processes; (3) The potential economic benefits of land transfers for the DOE and surrounding communities; (4) What materials the Office of EM possesses that could be sold to private companies, including the potential economic value of those materials; and (5) Any barriers the Office of EM faces in realizing such benefits.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the congressional defense committees on the status of its review, not later than March 1, 2027, with a report to follow at a time mutually agreed upon with the congressional defense committees.

**Comptroller General review of Office of Environmental Management research and development efforts**

The committee recognizes that research and development (R&D) has played a critical role in the Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management's (EM) efforts to clean up radioactive and hazardous contamination from decades of nuclear weapons pro-

duction and energy research. To fulfill its responsibility for cleaning up contaminated sites, the Office of EM relies on capital asset projects, which can be technically complex and, in some cases, can rely on first-of-a-kind technology. In October 2021, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the Office of EM's collaboration across its 15 sites and 11 national laboratories on R&D was strong, but the GAO found areas for improvement, including that the Office of EM did not take a comprehensive approach to prioritizing R&D.

The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review the steps the Office of EM has taken to integrate its R&D program into the cleanup mission. Specifically, the Comptroller General shall review: (1) Steps the Office of EM has taken to encourage or invest in innovative technologies; (2) How the Office of EM incorporates innovative technologies from other industries or countries; (3) How, if at all, the Office of EM incentivizes its contractors to pursue and incorporate technological innovations into its cleanup efforts; and (4) The barriers, if any, that prevent the Office of EM from incorporating innovative technologies into its cleanup efforts.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the congressional defense committees on the status of this review, not later than March 1, 2027, with a report to follow at a time mutually agreed upon with the congressional defense committees.

**Comptroller General review of Office of Environmental Management site-specific cleanup activities**

The committee notes that the Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for cleaning up 15 remaining sites contaminated by decades of nuclear weapons production and nuclear energy research. These sites manage a range of cleanup activities, including remediating contaminated soil and groundwater; deactivating and decommissioning contaminated buildings; and designing, constructing, and operating facilities to treat millions of gallons of radioactive waste stored in underground tanks. The committee recognizes that it may benefit from periodic briefings on site-specific issues that arise over the course of the National Defense Authorization Act consideration cycle. In particular, the committee is interested in topics such as: (1) The acceleration of site closure at the Portsmouth and Paducah sites; (2) Technology readiness and throughput of the Direct-Feed Low-Activity Waste facility at the Hanford Site; (3) The Office of EM's future plans for operation of H–Canyon at the Savannah River Site; (4) The status of the Office of EM's plans for the dilute and dispose strategy for surplus plutonium; and (5) Opportunities for the Office of EM to increase coordination with the National Nuclear Security Administration to address newly generated waste such as by leveraging existing cleanup capabilities.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to brief the congressional defense committees on the status of this review, not later than March 1, 2027, with a report to follow at a time mutually agreed upon with the congressional defense committees.

**Comptroller General review of Office of Environmental Management use of contracting for cleanup activities**

The committee notes that the Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management (EM) spent about 90 percent of its $8.0 billion fiscal year 2025 annual cleanup budget on contracts. The Office of EM's reliance on contractors, contract management, and effective performance evaluation is critical to the office's ability to reduce the federal government's environmental liability and receive the highest return on federal investment. The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess the Office of EM's use of contractually related mechanisms—such as contract types, terms, evaluation, fees, and extensions—to hold contractors accountable and to incentivize performance. Further, the committee directs the Comptroller General to assess and report on any aspects of the Office of EM's contracting approach that may provide perverse incentives that hinder cleanup progress.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the congressional defense committees on the status of its review, not later than March 1, 2027, with a report to follow at a time mutually agreed upon with the congressional defense committees.

**Comptroller General review of opportunities to accelerate Office of Environmental Management cleanup missions**

The committee notes that the Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for cleaning up 15 remaining sites contaminated by decades of nuclear weapons production and nuclear energy research. Office of EM documents indicate that these cleanup efforts could cost over a half trillion dollars in life cycle costs and could continue into the 2090s. The Government Accountability Office and other independent organizations have recommended that the Office of EM take a more risk-informed approach to cleanup, including by targeting EM resources to more quickly reduce risks to human health and the environment and reduce the overall costs of the Office of EM's cleanup mission.

The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to review the extent to which the Office of EM has assessed and implemented options for accelerating cleanup across the EM complex to reduce its mission duration, what sites or cleanup projects, if any, could be accelerated, and the potential effect on the Office of EM's environmental liabilities by taking an accelerated approach to cleanup.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the congressional defense committees on the status of its review, not later than March 1, 2027, with a report to follow at a time mutually agreed upon with the congressional defense committees.

**Comptroller General review of the W93 modernization program**

The committee recognizes that the W93 modernization program was established to augment Navy forces with a survivable weapon deployable on the *Ohio*-class and *Columbia*-class submarines starting in the mid-2030s. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has reported that the warhead will be anchored on previously tested nuclear components and will incorporate modern

technologies that improve safety and security and ease of manufacturing, maintenance, and certification. Further, the W93 program is managed jointly with the Navy to develop a new reentry body for the warhead, known as the Mk7. In December 2024, the Government Accountability Office reported that the program faces risks in areas such as maturing technologies, manufacturing components, and flight testing that could impact the program's overall schedule. As of March 2025, the program proceeded into the design definition and cost study phase, during which the NNSA will refine the warhead's design, qualification plans, production requirements, program schedule, and life cycle cost estimates.

To better understand the progress, challenges, and potential costs to the W93 program, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to assess the NNSA's efforts to manage the technical, programmatic, and other risks and challenges facing the program and the key cost drivers of the program.

The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, and to meet with the congressional defense committees to determine a mutually agreeable time for a final report.

**Genesis Mission**

The committee commends the Department of Energy for its strategic vision in the initiation of the Genesis Mission. An integrated platform connecting cutting-edge, high-performance computing, experimental facilities, artificial intelligence systems, and unique datasets across every major scientific domain will have a significant impact on scientific discovery and should provide significant value to national security. The National Nuclear Security Administration should capitalize on the successful model from the Exascale Computing Initiative to bring together industry, academia, and government in partnership to drive the Genesis Mission and accelerate security improvements and the effectiveness of U.S. strategic assets.

# TITLE XXXII—DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

**Sec. 3201—Authorization**

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the appropriation of funds for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

# DIVISION D—FUNDING TABLES

## Sec. 4001—Authorization of amounts in funding tables

The committee recommends a provision that would provide for the allocation of funds among programs, projects, and activities in accordance with the tables in division D of this Act, subject to reprogramming in accordance with established procedures.

Consistent with the previously expressed views of the committee, the provision would also require that decisions by an agency head to commit, obligate, or expend funds to a specific entity on the basis of such funding tables be based on authorized, transparent, and statutory criteria or merit-based selection procedures in accordance with the requirements of sections 2304(k) and 2374 of title 10, United States Code, and other applicable provisions of law.

# TITLE XLI—PROCUREMENT

**Sec. 4101—Procurement**

# TITLE XLII—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

## Sec. 4201—Research, development, test, and evaluation

# TITLE XLIII—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

**Sec. 4301—Operation and maintenance**

# TITLE XLIV—MILITARY PERSONNEL

**Sec. 4401—Military personnel**

# TITLE XLV—OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

**Sec. 4501—Other authorizations**

# TITLE XLVI—MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

**Sec. 4601—Military construction**

# TITLE XLVII—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

**Sec. 4701—Department of Energy national security programs**

## SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027

(In Thousands of Dollars)

| | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| **DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE** | | | |
| **NATIONAL DEFENSE BASE BUDGET** | | | |
| **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (BUDGET SUB-FUNCTION 051)** | | | |
| **DIVISION A: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS** | | | |
| **TITLE I—PROCUREMENT** | | | |
| AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, ARMY | 1,933,769 | –127,217 | 1,806,552 |
| MISSILE PROCUREMENT, ARMY | 12,130,430 | –173,738 | 11,956,692 |
| PROCUREMENT OF W&TCV, ARMY | 3,728,159 | 0 | 3,728,159 |
| PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, ARMY | 5,469,588 | 252,000 | 5,721,588 |
| OTHER PROCUREMENT, ARMY | 12,667,053 | 168,490 | 12,835,543 |
| AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, NAVY | 26,947,023 | –79,629 | 26,867,394 |
| WEAPONS PROCUREMENT, NAVY | 11,769,111 | –275,194 | 11,493,917 |
| PROCUREMENT OF AMMO, NAVY & MC | 1,958,597 | 50,000 | 2,008,597 |
| SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION, NAVY | 60,176,117 | –3,060,664 | 57,115,453 |
| OTHER PROCUREMENT, NAVY | 18,866,679 | 950,000 | 19,816,679 |
| PROCUREMENT, MARINE CORPS | 6,288,905 | 0 | 6,288,905 |
| AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE | 26,985,236 | 405,109 | 27,390,345 |
| MISSILE PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE | 6,811,174 | 845,000 | 7,656,174 |
| PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, AIR FORCE | 910,116 | 0 | 910,116 |
| PROCUREMENT, SPACE FORCE | 9,645,353 | 12,816 | 9,658,169 |
| OTHER PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE | 39,199,963 | 15,000 | 39,214,963 |
| PROCUREMENT, DEFENSE-WIDE | 10,354,868 | 649,056 | 11,003,924 |
| DEFENSE STRATEGIC CAPITAL CREDIT PROGRAM | 216,000 | 0 | 216,000 |
| **SUBTOTAL, TITLE I—PROCUREMENT** | **256,058,141** | **–368,971** | **255,689,170** |
| **TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION** | | | |
| RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, ARMY | 18,708,826 | 995,227 | 19,704,053 |
| RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, NAVY | 32,386,619 | 549,260 | 32,935,879 |
| RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, AF | 73,075,614 | 1,578,423 | 74,654,037 |
| RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, SF | 38,373,489 | –1,113,439 | 37,260,050 |
| RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, DW | 55,736,724 | –953,051 | 54,783,673 |
| GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA FUND | 397,971 | 0 | 397,971 |
| OPERATIONAL TEST & EVAL, DEFENSE | 112,365 | 70,000 | 182,365 |
| **SUBTOTAL, TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION** | **218,791,608** | **1,126,420** | **219,918,028** |
| **TITLE III—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE** | | | |
| OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY | 64,114,683 | –5,812,897 | 58,301,786 |
| OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY RES | 3,112,634 | –421,315 | 2,691,319 |
| OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARNG | 8,703,824 | –1,312,062 | 7,391,762 |
| OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY | 82,568,546 | –5,009,071 | 77,559,475 |
| OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS | 15,988,817 | –3,702,133 | 12,286,684 |
| OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY RES | 1,477,216 | –79,149 | 1,398,067 |
| OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, MC RESERVE | 404,680 | –112,976 | 291,704 |

**SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027**—Continued

**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE | 74,039,636 | –6,854,829 | 67,184,807 |
| OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, SPACE FORCE | 9,265,917 | –1,625,523 | 7,640,394 |
| OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AF RESERVE | 4,748,987 | –411,913 | 4,337,074 |
| OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ANG | 8,130,689 | –537,102 | 7,593,587 |
| OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, DEFENSE-WIDE | 64,251,581 | 1,638,960 | 65,890,541 |
| MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS | 21,698 | 0 | 21,698 |
| MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS | 78,187 | 30,000 | 108,187 |
| MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS | 221,332 | 0 | 221,332 |
| MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS | 37,478 | 0 | 37,478 |
| MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS | 282,444 | 0 | 282,444 |
| MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS | 305,246 | 0 | 305,246 |
| MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS | 320,060 | 0 | 320,060 |
| MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS | 8,957 | 0 | 8,957 |
| MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS | 238,927 | 0 | 238,927 |
| **SUBTOTAL, TITLE III—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE** | **338,321,539** | **–24,210,010** | **314,111,529** |
| **TITLE IV—MILITARY PERSONNEL** | | | |
| MILITARY PERSONNEL | 190,771,931 | –2,119,526 | 188,652,405 |
| MEDICARE-ELIGIBLE RETIREE HEALTH FUND CONTRIBUTIONS | 14,349,269 | 0 | 14,349,269 |
| **SUBTOTAL, TITLE IV—MILITARY PERSONNEL** | **205,121,200** | **–2,119,526** | **203,001,674** |
| **TITLE XIV—OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS** | | | |
| WORKING CAPITAL FUND | 7,507,993 | 10,000 | 7,517,993 |
| CHEM AGENTS & MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION | 55,972 | 0 | 55,972 |
| DRUG INTERDICTION & CTR-DRUG ACTIVITIES, DEF | 918,002 | 133,352 | 1,051,354 |
| OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL | 506,343 | 27,000 | 533,343 |
| DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM | 42,517,115 | 1,780,000 | 44,297,115 |
| COUNTER ISIS TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF) | 303,099 | 0 | 303,099 |
| **SUBTOTAL, TITLE XIV—OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS** | **51,808,524** | **1,950,352** | **53,758,876** |
| **TOTAL, DIVISION A: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS** | **1,070,101,012** | **–23,621,735** | **1,046,479,277** |
| **DIVISION B: MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATIONS** | | | |
| **MILITARY CONSTRUCTION** | | | |
| ARMY | 1,931,638 | 5,825,514 | 7,757,152 |
| NAVY & MARINE CORPS | 8,266,703 | 7,427,116 | 15,693,819 |
| AIR FORCE | 10,688,980 | 6,894,341 | 17,583,321 |
| DEFENSE-WIDE | 3,375,211 | 561,310 | 3,936,521 |
| ARMY NATIONAL GUARD | 358,909 | 1,333,184 | 1,692,093 |
| ARMY RESERVE | 209,913 | 431,093 | 641,006 |
| NAVY RESERVE & MARINE CORPS RESERVE | 132,272 | 180,095 | 312,367 |
| AIR NATIONAL GUARD | 525,221 | 762,891 | 1,288,112 |
| AIR FORCE RESERVE | 22,172 | 211,022 | 233,194 |
| NATO SECURITY INVESTMENT PROGRAM | 604,270 | 50,000 | 654,270 |

**SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027**—Continued

**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| INDOPACIFIC COMBATANT COMMAND | 27,740 | 184,169 | 211,909 |
| **SUBTOTAL, MILITARY CONSTRUCTION** | **26,143,029** | **23,860,735** | **50,003,764** |
| **FAMILY HOUSING** | | | |
| CONSTRUCTION, ARMY | 240,495 | 0 | 240,495 |
| O&M, ARMY | 468,407 | 0 | 468,407 |
| CONSTRUCTION, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS | 361,870 | 0 | 361,870 |
| O&M, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS | 385,609 | 0 | 385,609 |
| CONSTRUCTION, AIR FORCE | 243,022 | 0 | 243,022 |
| O&M, AIR FORCE | 366,756 | 0 | 366,756 |
| O&M, DEFENSE-WIDE | 63,064 | 0 | 63,064 |
| IMPROVEMENT FUND | 8,412 | 0 | 8,412 |
| UNACCMP HSG IMPRV FUND | 501 | 0 | 501 |
| **SUBTOTAL, FAMILY HOUSING** | **2,138,136** | **0** | **2,138,136** |
| **BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE** | | | |
| ARMY BRAC | 151,293 | 0 | 151,293 |
| NAVY BRAC | 108,325 | 0 | 108,325 |
| AIR FORCE BRAC | 111,381 | 0 | 111,381 |
| DEFENSE-WIDE BRAC | 1,318 | 0 | 1,318 |
| **SUBTOTAL, BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE** | **372,317** | **0** | **372,317** |
| **TOTAL, DIVISION B: MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATIONS** | **28,653,482** | **23,860,735** | **52,514,217** |
| **TOTAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (BUDGET SUB-FUNCTION 051)** | **1,098,754,494** | **239,000** | **1,098,993,494** |
| **ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES (BUDGET SUB-FUNCTION 053)** | | | |
| **DIVISION C: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCY AUTHORIZATIONS** | | | |
| **DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AUTHORIZATIONS** | | | |
| **ENERGY PROGRAMS** | | | |
| NUCLEAR ENERGY | 160,000 | 0 | 160,000 |
| **SUBTOTAL, ENERGY PROGRAMS** | **160,000** | **0** | **160,000** |
| **NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION** | | | |
| FEDERAL SALARIES AND EXPENSES | 577,097 | 0 | 577,097 |
| WEAPONS ACTIVITIES | 26,941,950 | 74,000 | 27,015,950 |
| DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION | 2,389,595 | 0 | 2,389,595 |
| NAVAL REACTORS | 2,393,692 | –65,000 | 2,328,692 |
| **SUBTOTAL, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION** | **32,302,334** | **9,000** | **32,311,334** |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL AND OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP | 6,983,318 | 5,000 | 6,988,318 |

**SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027**—Continued

**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES | 1,184,721 | 0 | 1,184,721 |
| **SUBTOTAL, ENVIRONMENTAL & OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES** | **8,168,039** | **5,000** | **8,173,039** |
| DEFENSE URANIUM ENRICHMENT D&D | 253,000 | –253,000 | 0 |
| **SUBTOTAL, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AUTHORIZATIONS** | **41,382,582** | **–239,000** | **41,143,582** |
| **INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCY AUTHORIZATION** | | | |
| DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD | 45,000 | 0 | 45,000 |
| **SUBTOTAL, INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCY AUTHORIZATION** | **45,000** | **0** | **45,000** |
| **TOTAL, DIVISION C: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCY AUTHORIZATIONS** | **41,427,582** | **–239,000** | **41,188,582** |
| ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES (BUDGET SUB-FUNCTION 053) | 41,427,582 | –239,000 | 41,188,582 |
| **TOTAL, NATIONAL DEFENSE (BUDGET FUNCTION 050)** | **1,140,182,076** | **0** | **1,140,182,076** |
| **MEMORANDUM: NON-DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS** | | | |
| TITLE XIV—ARMED FORCES RETIREMENT HOME (FUNCTION 600) | 77,000 | 0 | 77,000 |
| **MEMORANDUM: TRANSFER AUTHORITIES (NON-ADDS)** | | | |
| TITLE X—GENERAL TRANSFER AUTHORITY | 10,000,000 | | 6,000,000 |

**SUMMARY DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **NATIONAL DEFENSE (050)** | | | |
| DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (051) | 1,098,754,494 | 239,000 | 1,098,993,494 |
| ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES (053) | 41,382,582 | –239,000 | 41,143,582 |
| **TOTAL, NATIONAL DEFENSE (050)** | **1,140,137,076** | **0** | **1,140,137,076** |

**TRANSFER OF AUTHORIZED AMOUNTS TO NON-DEFENSE FUNCTIONS**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **TRANSFER FROM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (051)** | | | |
| CAPTAIN JAMES A. LOVELL FEDERAL HEALTH CARE CENTER | –174,000 | 0 | –174,000 |
| BIEN HOA DIOXIN CLEANUP | 0 | –15,000 | –15,000 |

**SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027**—Continued

**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| **SUBTOTAL, TRANSFER FROM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (051)** | **–174000** | **–15,000** | **–189,000** |
| **OTHER DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS—PROGRAMS OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE OR ALREADY AUTHORIZED** | | | |
| **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (051)** | | | |
| DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT PURCHASES | 477,287 | 0 | 477,287 |
| INDEFINITE ACCOUNT: DISPOSAL OF DOD REAL PROPERTY | 7,799 | 0 | 7,799 |
| INDEFINITE ACCOUNT: LEASE OF DOD REAL PROPERTY | 37,220 | 0 | 37,220 |
| **SUBTOTAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (051)** | **522,306** | **0** | **522,306** |
| **DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES (054)** | | | |
| **OTHER DISCRETIONARY PROGRAMS** | | | |
| **SUBTOTAL, DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES (054)** | **11,916,000** | **0** | **11,916,000** |
| **TOTAL, OTHER DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS (050)** | **12,438,306** | **0** | **12,438,306** |
| **DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY IMPLICATIONS (050)** | | | |
| **NATIONAL DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS (050)** | | | |
| DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (051) | 1,099,276,800 | 239,000 | 1,099,515,800 |
| ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES (053) | 41,427,582 | –239,000 | 41,188,582 |
| DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES (054) | 11,916,000 | 0 | 11,916,000 |
| **TOTAL, DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY IMPLICATION, (050)** | **1,152,620,382** | **0** | **1,152,620,382** |

# TITLE XLI—PROCUREMENT

## SEC. 4101. PROCUREMENT.

SEC. 4101. PROCUREMENT
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | | Senate Change | | Senate Authorized | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| | **AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, ARMY** | | | | | | |
| | **FIXED WING** | | | | | | |
| 1 | MQ–1 UAV | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | FUTURE UAS FAMILY | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 3 | SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS | 0 | 291,472 | | | 0 | 291,472 |
| 4 | UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) | 0 | 52,398 | | | 0 | 52,398 |
| 5 | HADES PLATFORM, PAYLOADS/PED, AND INTEGRATION | 0 | 227,569 | | | 0 | 227,569 |
| | **ROTARY** | | | | | | |
| 6 | UH–72 LAKOTA LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTER | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 7 | AH–64 APACHE BLOCK IIIA REMAN | 0 | 1,552 | | | 0 | 1,552 |
| 9 | FUTURE VERTICAL LIFT FAMILY OF SYSTEMS | 0 | 127,217 | 0 | –127,217 | 0 | 0 |
| | Realignment to Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation for operational test aircraft | | | [0] | [–127,217] | | |
| 10 | UH–60 BLACKHAWK M MODEL (MYP) | 1 | 39,257 | | | 1 | 39,257 |
| 11 | UH–60 BLACKHAWK M MODEL (MYP) | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 12 | CH–47 HELICOPTER | 5 | 210,645 | | | 5 | 210,645 |
| 13 | CH–47 HELICOPTER | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **MODIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT** | | | | | | |
| 15 | MQ–1 PAYLOAD | 0 | 53,190 | | | 0 | 53,190 |
| 16 | GRAY EAGLE MODS2 | 0 | 2,556 | | | 0 | 2,556 |

SEC. 4101. PROCUREMENT
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | | Senate Change | | Senate Authorized | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 17 | AH–64 MODS | 0 | 251,645 | | | 0 | 251,645 |
| 18 | SCALABLE CONTROL INTERFACE (SCI) | 0 | 2,061 | | | 0 | 2,061 |
| 19 | CH–47 CARGO HELICOPTER MODS (MYP) | 0 | 108,408 | | | 0 | 108,408 |
| 20 | UTILITY HELICOPTER MODS | 0 | 120,013 | | | 0 | 120,013 |
| 21 | NETWORK AND MISSION PLAN | 0 | 29,235 | | | 0 | 29,235 |
| 22 | COMMS, NAV SURVEILLANCE | 0 | 14,384 | | | 0 | 14,384 |
| 23 | DEGRADED VISUAL ENVIRONMENT | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 24 | AVIATION ASSURED PNT | 0 | 55,055 | | | 0 | 55,055 |
| 25 | GATM ROLLUP | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **GROUND SUPPORT AVIONICS** | | | | | | |
| 27 | AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT | 0 | 125,050 | | | 0 | 125,050 |
| 28 | CMWS | 0 | 21,511 | | | 0 | 21,511 |
| 29 | COMMON INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES (CIRCM) | 36 | 140,636 | | | 36 | 140,636 |
| | **OTHER SUPPORT** | | | | | | |
| 30 | COMMON GROUND EQUIPMENT | 0 | 29,778 | | | 0 | 29,778 |
| 31 | AIRCREW INTEGRATED SYSTEMS | 0 | 15,229 | | | 0 | 15,229 |
| 32 | AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL | 0 | 11,044 | | | 0 | 11,044 |
| 33 | LAUNCHER, 2.75 ROCKET | 0 | 3,864 | | | 0 | 3,864 |
| | **TOTAL AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, ARMY** | **42** | **1,933,769** | **0** | **–127,217** | **42** | **1,806,552** |
| | **MISSILE PROCUREMENT, ARMY** | | | | | | |
| | **SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM** | | | | | | |
| 1 | LOWER TIER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE (AMD) SEN | 0 | 2,036,358 | | | 0 | 2,036,358 |
| 2 | TERMINAL HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE (THAAD) | 27 | 907,162 | 0 | –173,738 | 27 | 733,424 |
| | Realignment to Operation and Maintenance | | | [0] | [–173,738] | | |
| 3 | M-SHORAD—PROCUREMENT | 14 | 712,690 | | | 14 | 712,690 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | MSE MISSILE | 244 | 1,297,528 | | | 244 | 1,297,528 |
| 5 | PRECISION STRIKE MISSILE (PRSM) | 680 | 1,226,526 | | | 680 | 1,226,526 |
| 6 | INDIRECT FIRE PROTECTION CAPABILITY INC 2–I | 0 | 1,626,004 | | | 0 | 1,626,004 |
| 7 | MID-RANGE CAPABILITY (MRC) | 0 | 370,351 | | | 0 | 370,351 |
| | **AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEM** | | | | | | |
| 9 | JOINT AIR-TO-GROUND MSLS (JAGM) | 269 | 104,059 | | | 269 | 104,059 |
| 11 | LONG-RANGE HYPERSONIC WEAPON | 0 | 301,777 | | | 0 | 301,777 |
| | **ANTI-TANK/ASSAULT MISSILE SYS** | | | | | | |
| 12 | JAVELIN (AAWS-M) SYSTEM SUMMARY | 1,316 | 417,031 | | | 1,316 | 417,031 |
| 13 | TOW 2 SYSTEM SUMMARY | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 14 | GUIDED MLRS ROCKET (GMLRS) | 0 | 1,014,937 | | | 0 | 1,014,937 |
| 15 | GUIDED MLRS ROCKET (GMLRS) | 0 | 49,106 | | | 0 | 49,106 |
| 16 | MLRS REDUCED RANGE PRACTICE ROCKETS (RRPR) | 600 | 7,412 | | | 600 | 7,412 |
| 17 | HIGH MOBILITY ARTILLERY ROCKET SYSTEM (HIMARS | 96 | 745,682 | | | 96 | 745,682 |
| 20 | FAMILY OF LOW ALTITUDE UNMANNED SYSTEMS | 0 | 139,191 | | | 0 | 139,191 |
| | **MODIFICATIONS** | | | | | | |
| 21 | PATRIOT MODS | 0 | 796,837 | | | 0 | 796,837 |
| 22 | STINGER MODS | 0 | 10,786 | | | 0 | 10,786 |
| 23 | AVENGER MODS | 0 | 6,823 | | | 0 | 6,823 |
| 24 | MLRS MODS | 0 | 289,496 | | | 0 | 289,496 |
| 25 | HIMARS MODIFICATIONS | 0 | 54,363 | | | 0 | 54,363 |
| | **SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS** | | | | | | |
| 26 | SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS | 0 | 6,698 | | | 0 | 6,698 |
| | **SUPPORT EQUIPMENT & FACILITIES** | | | | | | |
| 27 | AIR DEFENSE TARGETS | 0 | 9,613 | | | 0 | 9,613 |
| | **TOTAL MISSILE PROCUREMENT, ARMY** | **3,246** | **12,130,430** | **0** | **–173,738** | **3,246** | **11,956,692** |
| | **PROCUREMENT OF W&TCV, ARMY** | | | | | | |
| | **TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 1 | ARMORED MULTI PURPOSE VEHICLE (AMPV) | 196 | 1,150,759 | | | 196 | 1,150,759 |
| 3 | ASSAULT BREACHER VEHICLE (ABV) | 0 | 17,807 | | | 0 | 17,807 |
| 4 | M10 BOOKER | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |

SEC. 4101. PROCUREMENT
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | | Senate Change | | Senate Authorized | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 5 | XM30 MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLE (MICV | 19 | 546,990 | | | 19 | 546,990 |
| | **MODIFICATION OF TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 7 | STRYKER UPGRADE | 0 | 45,725 | | | 0 | 45,725 |
| 8 | BRADLEY FIRE SUPPORT TEAM (BFIST) VEHICLE | 0 | 4,863 | | | 0 | 4,863 |
| 9 | BRADLEY PROGRAM (MOD) | 0 | 161,979 | | | 0 | 161,979 |
| 10 | M109 FOV MODIFICATIONS | 0 | 74,070 | | | 0 | 74,070 |
| 11 | PALADIN INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT (PIM) | 0 | 84,193 | | | 0 | 84,193 |
| 12 | IMPROVED RECOVERY VEHICLE (M88 HERCULES) | 10 | 106,036 | | | 10 | 106,036 |
| 13 | JOINT ASSAULT BRIDGE | 18 | 163,354 | | | 18 | 163,354 |
| 14 | ABRAMS UPGRADE PROGRAM | 22 | 654,969 | | | 22 | 654,969 |
| 15 | VEHICLE PROTECTION SYSTEMS (VPS) | 0 | 16,134 | | | 0 | 16,134 |
| | **WEAPONS & OTHER COMBAT VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 16 | PERSONAL DEFENSE WEAPON (ROLL) | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 17 | M240 MEDIUM MACHINE GUN (7.62MM) | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 18 | MACHINE GUN, CAL .50 M2 ROLL | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 19 | MORTAR SYSTEMS | 0 | 3,575 | | | 0 | 3,575 |
| 20 | LOCATION & AZIMUTH DETERMINATION SYSTEM (LADS | 0 | 10,420 | | | 0 | 10,420 |
| 21 | XM320 GRENADE LAUNCHER MODULE (GLM) | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 22 | PRECISION SNIPER RIFLE | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 24 | NEXT GENERATION SQUAD WEAPON | 0 | 372,641 | | | 0 | 372,641 |
| 25 | COMMON REMOTELY OPERATED WEAPONS STATION | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 26 | HANDGUN | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **MOD OF WEAPONS AND OTHER COMBAT VEH** | | | | | | |
| 28 | M777 MODS | 0 | 1,569 | | | 0 | 1,569 |
| 29 | SNIPER RIFLES MODIFICATIONS | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 30 | M119 MODIFICATIONS | 0 | 4,453 | | | 0 | 4,453 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **SUPPORT EQUIPMENT & FACILITIES** | | | | | | |
| 31 | ITEMS LESS THAN $5.0M (WOCV-WTCV) | 0 | 512 | | | 0 | 512 |
| 32 | PRODUCTION BASE SUPPORT (WOCV-WTCV) | 0 | 308,110 | | | 0 | 308,110 |
| | **TOTAL PROCUREMENT OF W&TCV, ARMY** | **265** | **3,728,159** | **0** | **0** | **265** | **3,728,159** |
| | **PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, ARMY** | | | | | | |
| | **SMALL/MEDIUM CAL AMMUNITION** | | | | | | |
| 1 | CTG, 5.56MM, ALL TYPES | 0 | 114,418 | 0 | 20,000 | 0 | 134,418 |
| | 5.56 Munition Procurement | | | [0] | [20,000] | | |
| 2 | CTG, 7.62MM, ALL TYPES | 0 | 41,356 | 0 | 50,000 | 0 | 91,356 |
| | 7.62 Munition Procurement | | | [0] | [50,000] | | |
| 3 | NEXT GENERATION SQUAD WEAPON AMMUNITION | 0 | 536,695 | | | 0 | 536,695 |
| 4 | CTG, HANDGUN, ALL TYPES | 0 | 6,719 | 0 | 2,000 | 0 | 8,719 |
| | 9mm Munition Procurement | | | [0] | [2,000] | | |
| 5 | CTG, .50 CAL, ALL TYPES | 0 | 50,861 | 0 | 20,000 | 0 | 70,861 |
| | .50 cal Munition Procurement | | | [0] | [20,000] | | |
| 6 | CTG, 20MM, ALL TYPES | 0 | 9,427 | | | 0 | 9,427 |
| 7 | CTG, 25MM, ALL TYPES | 0 | 34,038 | | | 0 | 34,038 |
| 8 | CTG, 30MM, ALL TYPES | 0 | 164,116 | | | 0 | 164,116 |
| 9 | CTG, 40MM, ALL TYPES | 0 | 146,105 | | | 0 | 146,105 |
| 10 | CTG, 50MM, ALL TYPES | 0 | 58,221 | | | 0 | 58,221 |
| | **MORTAR AMMUNITION** | | | | | | |
| 11 | 60MM MORTAR, ALL TYPES | 0 | 67,727 | | | 0 | 67,727 |
| 12 | 81MM MORTAR, ALL TYPES | 0 | 123,745 | | | 0 | 123,745 |
| 13 | 120MM MORTAR, ALL TYPES | 0 | 192,826 | | | 0 | 192,826 |
| | **TANK AMMUNITION** | | | | | | |
| 14 | CARTRIDGES, TANK, 105MM AND 120MM, ALL TYPES | 0 | 421,735 | | | 0 | 421,735 |
| | **ARTILLERY AMMUNITION** | | | | | | |
| 15 | ARTILLERY CARTRIDGES, 75MM & 105MM, ALL TYPES | 0 | 48,841 | | | 0 | 48,841 |
| 16 | ARTILLERY PROJECTILE, 155MM, ALL TYPES | 0 | 120,703 | 0 | 85,000 | 0 | 205,703 |
| | 155mm Projectile Procurement | | | [0] | [50,000] | | |
| | Advanced manufacturing propulsion facility | | | [0] | [35,000] | | |

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(In Thousands of Dollars)

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 17 | PRECISION ARTILLERY MUNITIONS | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 18 | ARTILLERY PROPELLANTS, FUZES AND PRIMERS, ALL | 0 | 431,328 | | | 0 | 431,328 |
| | **MINES** | | | | | | |
| 19 | MINES & CLEARING CHARGES, ALL TYPES | 0 | 47,012 | | | 0 | 47,012 |
| 20 | CLOSE TERRAIN SHAPING OBSTACLE | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 21 | MINE, AT, VOLCANO, ALL TYPES | 0 | 4,026 | | | 0 | 4,026 |
| | **ROCKETS** | | | | | | |
| 22 | SHOULDER LAUNCHED MUNITIONS, ALL TYPES | 0 | 50,235 | | | 0 | 50,235 |
| 23 | ROCKET, HYDRA 70, ALL TYPES | 0 | 92,772 | | | 0 | 92,772 |
| | **OTHER AMMUNITION** | | | | | | |
| 24 | CAD/PAD, ALL TYPES | 0 | 11,615 | | | 0 | 11,615 |
| 25 | DEMOLITION MUNITIONS, ALL TYPES | 0 | 21,691 | | | 0 | 21,691 |
| 26 | GRENADES, ALL TYPES | 0 | 66,845 | | | 0 | 66,845 |
| 27 | SIGNALS, ALL TYPES | 0 | 44,927 | | | 0 | 44,927 |
| 28 | SIMULATORS, ALL TYPES | 0 | 11,508 | | | 0 | 11,508 |
| | **MISCELLANEOUS** | | | | | | |
| 30 | AMMO COMPONENTS, ALL TYPES | 0 | 4,109 | | | 0 | 4,109 |
| 31 | ITEMS LESS THAN $5 MILLION (AMMO) | 0 | 16,290 | | | 0 | 16,290 |
| 32 | AMMUNITION PECULIAR EQUIPMENT | 0 | 14,007 | | | 0 | 14,007 |
| 33 | FIRST DESTINATION TRANSPORTATION (AMMO) | 0 | 18,712 | | | 0 | 18,712 |
| 34 | CLOSEOUT LIABILITIES | 0 | 101 | | | 0 | 101 |
| | **PRODUCTION BASE SUPPORT** | | | | | | |
| 35 | INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES | 0 | 2,331,763 | 0 | 75,000 | 0 | 2,406,763 |
| | Industrial Facilities Modernization | | | [0] | [75,000] | | |
| 36 | CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS DEMILITARIZATION | 0 | 161,179 | | | 0 | 161,179 |
| 37 | ARMS INITIATIVE | 0 | 3,935 | | | 0 | 3,935 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **TOTAL PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, ARMY** | **0** | **5,469,588** | **0** | **252,000** | **0** | **5,721,588** |
| | **OTHER PROCUREMENT, ARMY** | | | | | | |
| | **TACTICAL VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 1 | FAMILY OF SEMITRAILERS | 0 | 129,602 | | | 0 | 129,602 |
| 2 | HI MOB MULTI-PURP WHLD VEH (HMMWV) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 60,000 | 0 | 60,000 |
| | Modernization over 350 HMMWVs for the Army Reserves | | | [0] | [60,000] | | |
| 3 | GROUND MOBILITY VEHICLES (GMV) | 0 | 526,796 | | | 0 | 526,796 |
| 4 | ARNG HMMWV MODERNIZATION PROGRAM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 140,000 | 0 | 140,000 |
| | Modernization over 750 HMMWVs for the Army National Guard | | | [0] | [140,000] | | |
| 5 | JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE FAMILY OF VEHICL | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 6 | TRUCK, DUMP, 20T (CCE) | 0 | 17,030 | 0 | 35,000 | 0 | 52,030 |
| | M917A3 Heavy Dump Truck procurement | | | [0] | [35,000] | | |
| 7 | FAMILY OF MEDIUM TACTICAL VEH (FMTV) | 0 | 283,344 | | | 0 | 283,344 |
| 8 | FAMILY OF COLD WEATHER ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLE (C | 0 | 38,294 | | | 0 | 38,294 |
| 9 | FIRETRUCKS & ASSOCIATED FIREFIGHTING EQUIP | 0 | 40,203 | | | 0 | 40,203 |
| 10 | FAMILY OF HEAVY TACTICAL VEHICLES (FHTV) | 0 | 169,404 | | | 0 | 169,404 |
| 11 | FAMILY OF COMMON TACTICAL TRUCKS | 0 | 80,187 | | | 0 | 80,187 |
| 12 | TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLE PROTECTION KITS | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 13 | MODIFICATION OF IN SVC EQUIP | 0 | 28,583 | | | 0 | 28,583 |
| | **NON-TACTICAL VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 14 | NONTACTICAL VEHICLES, OTHER | 0 | 12,029 | | | 0 | 12,029 |
| | **COMM—JOINT COMMUNICATIONS** | | | | | | |
| 15 | TACTICAL NETWORK COMMUNICATION | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 16 | C2 INFRASTRUCTURE | 0 | 1,293,203 | | | 0 | 1,293,203 |
| 17 | C2 TRANSPORT | 0 | 1,581,863 | | | 0 | 1,581,863 |
| 18 | JCSE EQUIPMENT (USRDECOM) | 0 | 39 | | | 0 | 39 |
| | **COMM—SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS** | | | | | | |
| 19 | SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 21 | DEFENSE ENTERPRISE WIDEBAND SATCOM SYSTEMS | 0 | 73,959 | | | 0 | 73,959 |
| 22 | ASSURED POSITIONING, NAVIGATION AND TIMING | 0 | 243,303 | | | 0 | 243,303 |
| | **COMM—COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS** | | | | | | |

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(In Thousands of Dollars)

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 25 | HANDHELD MANPACK SMALL FORM FIT (HMS) | 0 | 516,045 | | | 0 | 516,045 |
| 26 | ARMY LINK 16 SYSTEMS | 0 | 33,711 | | | 0 | 33,711 |
| 27 | UNIFIED COMMAND SUITE | 0 | 20,187 | | | 0 | 20,187 |
| 28 | COTS COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT | 0 | 5,188 | | | 0 | 5,188 |
| 30 | ARMY COMMUNICATIONS & ELECTRONICS | 0 | 54,428 | | | 0 | 54,428 |
| | **COMM—INTELLIGENCE COMM** | | | | | | |
| 31 | CI AUTOMATION ARCHITECTURE-INTEL | 0 | 16,382 | | | 0 | 16,382 |
| 32 | MULTI-DOMAIN INTELLIGENCE | 0 | 243,732 | | | 0 | 243,732 |
| | **INFORMATION SECURITY** | | | | | | |
| 33 | INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY PROGRAM-ISSP | 0 | 853 | | | 0 | 853 |
| 34 | COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) | 0 | 145,507 | | | 0 | 145,507 |
| 35 | BIOMETRIC ENABLING CAPABILITY (BEC) | 0 | 65 | | | 0 | 65 |
| | **COMM—BASE COMMUNICATIONS** | | | | | | |
| 36 | INFORMATION SYSTEMS | 0 | 133,046 | | | 0 | 133,046 |
| 37 | BASE EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION | 0 | 50,644 | | | 0 | 50,644 |
| 38 | INSTALLATION INFO INFRASTRUCTURE MOD PROGRAM | 0 | 335,050 | | | 0 | 335,050 |
| | **ELECT EQUIP—TACT INT REL ACT (TIARA)** | | | | | | |
| 42 | TITAN | 0 | 368,672 | 0 | –81,510 | 0 | 287,162 |
| | Realignment to Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation | | | [0] | [–81,510] | | |
| 43 | TERRESTRIAL LAYER SYSTEMS (TLS) | 0 | 172,558 | | | 0 | 172,558 |
| 44 | COLLECTION CAPABILITY | 0 | 5,914 | | | 0 | 5,914 |
| 46 | DCGS-A-INTEL | 0 | 1,075 | | | 0 | 1,075 |
| 47 | TROJAN | 0 | 48,885 | | | 0 | 48,885 |
| 48 | MOD OF IN-SVC EQUIP (INTEL SPT) | 0 | 12,441 | | | 0 | 12,441 |
| | **ELECT EQUIP—ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)** | | | | | | |
| 50 | AIR VIGILANCE (AV) | 0 | 106,497 | | | 0 | 106,497 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 52 | ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLANNING & MGMT TOOLS (EWP | 0 | 46,570 | 0 | 46,570 |
| 53 | FAMILY OF PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE CAP. | 0 | 163 | 0 | 163 |
| 54 | COUNTERINTELLIGENCE/SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES | 0 | 8,427 | 0 | 8,427 |
| | **ELECT EQUIP—TACTICAL SURV. (TAC SURV)** | | | | |
| 56 | SENTINEL MODS | 0 | 485,840 | 0 | 485,840 |
| 57 | NIGHT VISION DEVICES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 58 | SMALL TACTICAL OPTICAL RIFLE MOUNTED MLRF | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 59 | BASE EXPEDITIARY TARGETING AND SURV SYS | 0 | 1,818 | 0 | 1,818 |
| 60 | INDIRECT FIRE PROTECTION FAMILY OF SYSTEMS | 0 | 18,000 | 0 | 18,000 |
| 61 | FAMILY OF WEAPON SIGHTS (FWS) | 0 | 15,340 | 0 | 15,340 |
| 62 | ENHANCED PORTABLE INDUCTIVE ARTILLERY FUZE SE | 0 | 13,228 | 0 | 13,228 |
| 63 | SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS | 0 | 9,848 | 0 | 9,848 |
| 64 | FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED (IFLIR) | 0 | 84,134 | 0 | 84,134 |
| 65 | COUNTER SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (C-SUAS) | 0 | 994,127 | 0 | 994,127 |
| 66 | JOINT BATTLE COMMAND—PLATFORM (JBC-P) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 67 | JOINT EFFECTS TARGETING SYSTEM (JETS) | 0 | 7,663 | 0 | 7,663 |
| 68 | COMPUTER BALLISTICS: LHMBC XM32 | 0 | 6,382 | 0 | 6,382 |
| 69 | MORTAR FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM | 0 | 2,391 | 0 | 2,391 |
| 70 | MORTAR FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS MODIFICATIONS | 0 | 7,139 | 0 | 7,139 |
| 71 | COUNTERFIRE RADARS | 0 | 196,522 | 0 | 196,522 |
| 72 | ADVANCED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS SYSTEMS | 0 | 397,286 | 0 | 397,286 |
| | **ELECT EQUIP—TACTICAL C2 SYSTEMS** | | | | |
| 73 | ARMY COMMAND POST INTEGRATED INFRASTRUCTURE ( | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 74 | FIRE SUPPORT C2 FAMILY | 0 | 3,559 | 0 | 3,559 |
| 75 | AIR & MSL DEFENSE PLANNING & CONTROL SYS | 0 | 61,127 | 0 | 61,127 |
| 76 | IAMD BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM | 0 | 1,052,868 | 0 | 1,052,868 |
| 77 | AIAMD FAMILY OF SYSTEMS (FOS) COMPONENTS | 0 | 16,446 | 0 | 16,446 |
| 78 | LIFE CYCLE SOFTWARE SUPPORT (LCSS) | 0 | 5,265 | 0 | 5,265 |
| 79 | NETWORK MANAGEMENT INITIALIZATION AND SERVICE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 82 | MOD OF IN-SVC EQUIPMENT (ENFIRE) | 0 | 16,673 | 0 | 16,673 |
| | **ELECT EQUIP—AUTOMATION** | | | | |
| 83 | ARMY TRAINING MODERNIZATION | 0 | 4,303 | 0 | 4,303 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 84 | AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING EQUIP | 0 | 99,039 | | | 0 | 99,039 |
| 86 | HIGH PERF COMPUTING MOD PGM (HPCMP) | 0 | 75,004 | | | 0 | 75,004 |
| 87 | CONTRACT WRITING SYSTEM | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 0 | 1,577 | | | 0 | 1,577 |
| | **CHEMICAL DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 88 | BASE DEFENSE SYSTEMS (BDS) | 0 | 143 | | | 0 | 143 |
| 89 | CBRN DEFENSE | 0 | 65,020 | | | 0 | 65,020 |
| | **BRIDGING EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 90 | TACTICAL BRIDGE, FLOAT-RIBBON | 0 | 35,806 | | | 0 | 35,806 |
| | **ENGINEER (NON-CONSTRUCTION) EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 92 | ROBOTICS AND APPLIQUE SYSTEMS | 0 | 84,303 | | | 0 | 84,303 |
| 93 | RENDER SAFE SETS KITS OUTFITS | 0 | 12,461 | | | 0 | 12,461 |
| 94 | FAMILY OF BOATS AND MOTORS | 0 | 8,028 | | | 0 | 8,028 |
| | **COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 95 | HEATERS AND ECU'S | 0 | 15,021 | | | 0 | 15,021 |
| 97 | GROUND SOLDIER SYSTEM | 0 | 193,491 | | | 0 | 193,491 |
| 98 | MOBILE SOLDIER POWER | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 99 | FORCE PROVIDER | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 100 | FIELD FEEDING EQUIPMENT | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 101 | CARGO AERIAL DEL & PERSONNEL PARACHUTE SYSTEM | 0 | 39,505 | | | 0 | 39,505 |
| 103 | ITEMS LESS THAN $5M (ENG SPT) | 0 | 4,129 | | | 0 | 4,129 |
| | **PETROLEUM EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 104 | DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS, PETROLEUM & WATER | 0 | 133,881 | | | 0 | 133,881 |
| | **MEDICAL EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 105 | COMBAT SUPPORT MEDICAL | 0 | 93,705 | | | 0 | 93,705 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 106 | MOBILE MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS | 0 | 58,997 | | | 0 | 58,997 |
| | **CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 107 | CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT | 0 | 72,582 | | | 0 | 72,582 |
| | **RAIL FLOAT CONTAINERIZATION EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 108 | ARMY WATERCRAFT ESP | 0 | 75,717 | | | 0 | 75,717 |
| 109 | MANEUVER SUPPORT VESSEL (MSV) | 0 | 104,705 | | | 0 | 104,705 |
| 110 | ITEMS LESS THAN $5.0M (FLOAT/RAIL) | 0 | 22,021 | | | 0 | 22,021 |
| | **GENERATORS** | | | | | | |
| 111 | GENERATORS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIP | 0 | 79,456 | | | 0 | 79,456 |
| | **MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 112 | FAMILY OF FORKLIFTS | 0 | 6,238 | 0 | 15,000 | 0 | 21,238 |
| | Crane procurement | | | [0] | [15,000] | | |
| | **TRAINING EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 113 | COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS SUPPORT | 0 | 141,848 | | | 0 | 141,848 |
| 114 | TRAINING DEVICES, NONSYSTEM | 0 | 140,860 | | | 0 | 140,860 |
| 115 | SYNTHETIC TRAINING ENVIRONMENT (STE) | 0 | 115,535 | | | 0 | 115,535 |
| 116 | GAMING TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF ARMY TRAINING | 0 | 4,180 | | | 0 | 4,180 |
| | **TEST MEASURE AND DIG EQUIPMENT (TMD)** | | | | | | |
| 117 | INTEGRATED FAMILY OF TEST EQUIPMENT (IFTE) | 0 | 18,570 | | | 0 | 18,570 |
| 118 | TEST EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION (TEMOD) | 0 | 53,597 | | | 0 | 53,597 |
| | **OTHER SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 119 | PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEMS (OPA3) | 0 | 137,271 | | | 0 | 137,271 |
| 120 | BASE LEVEL COMMON EQUIPMENT | 0 | 19,889 | | | 0 | 19,889 |
| 121 | MODIFICATION OF IN-SVC EQUIPMENT (OPA–3) | 0 | 41,358 | | | 0 | 41,358 |
| 122 | PRODUCTION BASE SUPPORT (OTH) | 0 | 362,356 | | | 0 | 362,356 |
| 123 | BUILDING, PRE-FAB, RELOCATABLE | 0 | 10,878 | | | 0 | 10,878 |
| 124 | SPECIAL EQUIPMENT FOR TEST AND EVALUATION | 0 | 88,721 | | | 0 | 88,721 |
| | **OPA2** | | | | | | |
| 126 | INITIAL SPARES—C&E | 0 | 7,323 | | | 0 | 7,323 |
| | **TOTAL OTHER PROCUREMENT, ARMY** | **0** | **12,667,053** | **0** | **168,490** | **0** | **12,835,543** |

SEC. 4101. PROCUREMENT
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | | Senate Change | | Senate Authorized | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| | **AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, NAVY** | | | | | | |
| | **COMBAT AIRCRAFT** | | | | | | |
| 1 | F/A–18E/F (FIGHTER) HORNET | 0 | 49,088 | 0 | 48,000 | 0 | 97,088 |
| | F/A–18 IRST capability | | | [0] | [48,000] | | |
| 2 | JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER CV | 8 | 995,707 | | | 8 | 995,707 |
| 3 | JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER CV | 0 | 651,081 | | | 0 | 651,081 |
| 4 | JSF STOVL | 0 | 62,363 | | | 0 | 62,363 |
| 5 | JSF STOVL | 0 | 77,963 | | | 0 | 77,963 |
| 6 | CH–53K (HEAVY LIFT) | 22 | 3,044,450 | | | 22 | 3,044,450 |
| 7 | CH–53K (HEAVY LIFT) | 0 | 429,295 | | | 0 | 429,295 |
| 8 | V–22 (MEDIUM LIFT) | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 9 | H–1 UPGRADES (UH–1Y/AH–1Z) | 0 | 5,974 | | | 0 | 5,974 |
| 10 | P–8A POSEIDON | 12 | 4,227,350 | 0 | –127,629 | 12 | 4,099,721 |
| | Early to need | | | [0] | [–127,629] | | |
| 11 | E–2D ADV HAWKEYE | 6 | 2,075,025 | | | 6 | 2,075,025 |
| 12 | E–2D ADV HAWKEYE | 0 | 550,000 | | | 0 | 550,000 |
| | **OTHER AIRCRAFT** | | | | | | |
| 15 | KC–130J | 11 | 1,601,906 | | | 11 | 1,601,906 |
| 16 | MQ–4 TRITON | 0 | 104,326 | | | 0 | 104,326 |
| 17 | MQ–25 | 3 | 771,177 | | | 3 | 771,177 |
| 18 | MQ–25 | 0 | 80,965 | | | 0 | 80,965 |
| 19 | MARINE GROUP 5 UAS | 5 | 118,600 | | | 5 | 118,600 |
| 20 | OTHER SUPPORT AIRCRAFT | 10 | 204,476 | | | 10 | 204,476 |
| | **MODIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT** | | | | | | |
| 21 | F–18 A-D UNIQUE | 0 | 36,951 | | | 0 | 36,951 |
| 22 | F–18E/F AND EA–18G MODERNIZATION AND SUSTAINM | 0 | 563,832 | | | 0 | 563,832 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 23 | MARINE GROUP 5 UAS SERIES | 0 | 179,603 | 0 | 179,603 |
| 24 | AEA SYSTEMS | 0 | 37,125 | 0 | 37,125 |
| 26 | INFRARED SEARCH AND TRACK (IRST) | 0 | 171,345 | 0 | 171,345 |
| 27 | ADVERSARY | 0 | 24,732 | 0 | 24,732 |
| 28 | F–18 SERIES | 0 | 858,716 | 0 | 858,716 |
| 29 | H–53 SERIES | 0 | 91,903 | 0 | 91,903 |
| 30 | MH–60 SERIES | 0 | 236,555 | 0 | 236,555 |
| 31 | H–1 SERIES | 0 | 304,267 | 0 | 304,267 |
| 32 | E–2 SERIES | 0 | 96,428 | 0 | 96,428 |
| 33 | TRAINER A/C SERIES | 0 | 12,359 | 0 | 12,359 |
| 34 | C–130 SERIES | 0 | 185,266 | 0 | 185,266 |
| 35 | FEWSG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 36 | CARGO/TRANSPORT A/C SERIES | 0 | 20,100 | 0 | 20,100 |
| 37 | E–6 SERIES | 0 | 270,832 | 0 | 270,832 |
| 38 | EXECUTIVE HELICOPTERS SERIES | 0 | 57,319 | 0 | 57,319 |
| 39 | T–45 SERIES | 0 | 191,139 | 0 | 191,139 |
| 40 | POWER PLANT CHANGES | 0 | 23,765 | 0 | 23,765 |
| 41 | JPATS SERIES | 0 | 28,059 | 0 | 28,059 |
| 43 | COMMON ECM EQUIPMENT | 0 | 365,990 | 0 | 365,990 |
| 44 | COMMON AVIONICS CHANGES | 0 | 246,728 | 0 | 246,728 |
| 45 | COMMON DEFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEM | 0 | 11,028 | 0 | 11,028 |
| 46 | ID SYSTEMS | 0 | 3,199 | 0 | 3,199 |
| 47 | P–8 SERIES | 0 | 381,014 | 0 | 381,014 |
| 48 | MAGTF EW FOR AVIATION | 0 | 20,686 | 0 | 20,686 |
| 49 | V–22 (TILT/ROTOR ACFT) OSPREY | 0 | 641,715 | 0 | 641,715 |
| 50 | NEXT GENERATION JAMMER (NGJ) | 0 | 458,658 | 0 | 458,658 |
| 51 | F–35 STOVL SERIES | 0 | 428,881 | 0 | 428,881 |
| 52 | F–35 CV SERIES | 0 | 135,612 | 0 | 135,612 |
| 53 | QRC | 0 | 27,686 | 0 | 27,686 |
| 54 | MQ–4 SERIES | 0 | 157,849 | 0 | 157,849 |
| | **AIRCRAFT SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS** | | | | |
| 58 | SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS | 0 | 4,511,417 | 0 | 4,511,417 |

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(In Thousands of Dollars)

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| | **AIRCRAFT SUPPORT EQUIP & FACILITIES** | | | | | | |
| 59 | COMMON GROUND EQUIPMENT | 0 | 666,140 | | | 0 | 666,140 |
| 60 | AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES | 0 | 113,513 | | | 0 | 113,513 |
| 61 | WAR CONSUMABLES | 0 | 56,577 | | | 0 | 56,577 |
| 62 | OTHER PRODUCTION CHARGES | 0 | 61,970 | | | 0 | 61,970 |
| 63 | SPECIAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 218,318 | | | 0 | 218,318 |
| | **TOTAL AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, NAVY** | **77** | **26,947,023** | **0** | **–79,629** | **77** | **26,867,394** |
| | **WEAPONS PROCUREMENT, NAVY** | | | | | | |
| | **BALLISTIC MISSILES** | | | | | | |
| | **MODIFICATION OF MISSILES** | | | | | | |
| 1 | CONVENTIONAL PROMPT STRIKE | 12 | 750,387 | –6 | –375,194 | 6 | 375,193 |
| | CPS six missiles | | | [–6] | [–375,194] | | |
| 2 | TRIDENT II MODS | 0 | 3,912,267 | | | 0 | 3,912,267 |
| | **STRATEGIC MISSILES** | | | | | | |
| 4 | TOMAHAWK | 58 | 1,015,106 | | | 58 | 1,015,106 |
| | **TACTICAL MISSILES** | | | | | | |
| 5 | AMRAAM | 106 | 167,439 | | | 106 | 167,439 |
| 6 | SIDEWINDER | 306 | 174,750 | | | 306 | 174,750 |
| 7 | JOINT ADVANCE TACTICAL MISSILE (JATM) | 0 | 557,806 | | | 0 | 557,806 |
| 8 | STANDARD MISSILE | 106 | 733,159 | 0 | 100,000 | 106 | 833,159 |
| | SM–6 solid rocket motor second sourcing | | | [0] | [100,000] | | |
| 10 | SMALL DIAMETER BOMB II | 512 | 166,688 | | | 512 | 166,688 |
| 11 | RAM | 116 | 119,166 | | | 116 | 119,166 |
| 12 | MSE MISSILE | 23 | 97,835 | | | 23 | 97,835 |
| 13 | JOINT AIR GROUND MISSILE (JAGM) | 282 | 73,226 | | | 282 | 73,226 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 | AERIAL TARGETS | 0 | 179,931 | 0 | 179,931 |
| 16 | OTHER MISSILE SUPPORT | 0 | 3,877 | 0 | 3,877 |
| 17 | LRASM | 129 | 670,456 | 129 | 670,456 |
| 18 | NAVAL STRIKE MISSILE (NSM) | 32 | 75,972 | 32 | 75,972 |
| 19 | NAVAL STRIKE MISSILE (NSM) | 0 | 2,103 | 0 | 2,103 |
| 21 | PRECISION ATTACK STRIKE MUNITION (PASM) | 4 | 4,019 | 4 | 4,019 |
| | **MODIFICATION OF MISSILES** | | | | |
| 22 | TOMAHAWK MODS | 0 | 799,139 | 0 | 799,139 |
| 23 | ESSM | 290 | 521,006 | 290 | 521,006 |
| 24 | AARGM-ER | 0 | 20 | 0 | 20 |
| 25 | AARGM-ER | 0 | 5,210 | 0 | 5,210 |
| 26 | STANDARD MISSILES MODS | 0 | 69,579 | 0 | 69,579 |
| | **SUPPORT EQUIPMENT & FACILITIES** | | | | |
| 27 | WEAPONS INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES | 0 | 62,403 | 0 | 62,403 |
| 28 | INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS | 0 | 640 | 0 | 640 |
| | **ORDNANCE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 29 | ORDNANCE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 43,261 | 0 | 43,261 |
| | **TORPEDOES AND RELATED EQUIP** | | | | |
| 30 | SSTD | 0 | 3,969 | 0 | 3,969 |
| 31 | MK–48 TORPEDO | 141 | 571,274 | 141 | 571,274 |
| 32 | ASW TARGETS | 0 | 47,277 | 0 | 47,277 |
| | **MOD OF TORPEDOES AND RELATED EQUIP** | | | | |
| 33 | MK–54 TORPEDO MODS | 0 | 112,126 | 0 | 112,126 |
| 34 | MK–48 TORPEDO ADCAP MODS | 0 | 67,279 | 0 | 67,279 |
| 35 | MARITIME MINES | 0 | 251,724 | 0 | 251,724 |
| | **SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 36 | TORPEDO SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 160,445 | 0 | 160,445 |
| 37 | ASW RANGE SUPPORT | 0 | 4,438 | 0 | 4,438 |
| | **DESTINATION TRANSPORTATION** | | | | |
| 38 | FIRST DESTINATION TRANSPORTATION | 0 | 6,011 | 0 | 6,011 |
| | **GUNS AND GUN MOUNTS** | | | | |
| 39 | SMALL ARMS AND WEAPONS | 0 | 13,946 | 0 | 13,946 |

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(In Thousands of Dollars)

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| | **MODIFICATION OF GUNS AND GUN MOUNTS** | | | | | | |
| 40 | CIWS MODS | 0 | 7,939 | | | 0 | 7,939 |
| 41 | COAST GUARD WEAPONS | 0 | 49,537 | | | 0 | 49,537 |
| 42 | GUN MOUNT MODS | 0 | 84,004 | | | 0 | 84,004 |
| 43 | LCS MODULE WEAPONS | 10 | 2,190 | | | 10 | 2,190 |
| 44 | AIRBORNE MINE NEUTRALIZATION SYSTEMS | 0 | 14,265 | | | 0 | 14,265 |
| | **SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS** | | | | | | |
| 46 | SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS | 0 | 167,242 | | | 0 | 167,242 |
| | **TOTAL WEAPONS PROCUREMENT, NAVY** | **2,127** | **11,769,111** | **–6** | **–275,194** | **2,121** | **11,493,917** |
| | **PROCUREMENT OF AMMO, NAVY & MC** | | | | | | |
| | **NAVY AMMUNITION** | | | | | | |
| 1 | GENERAL PURPOSE BOMBS | 0 | 45,607 | | | 0 | 45,607 |
| 2 | JDAM | 1,292 | 96,935 | | | 1,292 | 96,935 |
| 3 | AIRBORNE ROCKETS, ALL TYPES | 0 | 92,145 | | | 0 | 92,145 |
| 4 | MACHINE GUN AMMUNITION | 0 | 14,832 | | | 0 | 14,832 |
| 5 | PRACTICE BOMBS | 0 | 46,782 | | | 0 | 46,782 |
| 6 | CARTRIDGES & CART ACTUATED DEVICES | 0 | 63,064 | | | 0 | 63,064 |
| 7 | AIR EXPENDABLE COUNTERMEASURES | 0 | 121,059 | | | 0 | 121,059 |
| 8 | JATOS | 0 | 8,179 | | | 0 | 8,179 |
| 9 | 5 INCH/54 GUN AMMUNITION | 0 | 44,136 | | | 0 | 44,136 |
| 10 | INTERMEDIATE CALIBER GUN AMMUNITION | 0 | 40,095 | | | 0 | 40,095 |
| 11 | OTHER SHIP GUN AMMUNITION | 0 | 43,106 | | | 0 | 43,106 |
| 12 | SMALL ARMS & LANDING PARTY AMMO | 0 | 48,801 | | | 0 | 48,801 |
| 13 | PYROTECHNIC AND DEMOLITION | 0 | 9,510 | | | 0 | 9,510 |
| 15 | AMMUNITION LESS THAN $5 MILLION | 0 | 1,692 | | | 0 | 1,692 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16 | EXPEDITIONARY LOITERING MUNITIONS | 0 | 165,662 | 0 | 50,000 | 0 | 215,662 |
| | Increase expeditionary loitering munitions | | | [0] | [50,000] | | |
| | **MARINE CORPS AMMUNITION** | | | | | | |
| 17 | MORTARS | 0 | 181,464 | | | 0 | 181,464 |
| 18 | DIRECT SUPPORT MUNITIONS | 0 | 29,715 | | | 0 | 29,715 |
| 19 | INFANTRY WEAPONS AMMUNITION | 0 | 142,179 | | | 0 | 142,179 |
| 20 | COMBAT SUPPORT MUNITIONS | 0 | 12,510 | | | 0 | 12,510 |
| 21 | AMMO MODERNIZATION | 0 | 19,009 | | | 0 | 19,009 |
| 22 | ARTILLERY MUNITIONS | 0 | 723,278 | | | 0 | 723,278 |
| 23 | ITEMS LESS THAN $5 MILLION | 0 | 8,837 | | | 0 | 8,837 |
| | **TOTAL PROCUREMENT OF AMMO, NAVY & MC** | **1,292** | **1,958,597** | **0** | **50,000** | **1,292** | **2,008,597** |
| | **SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION, NAVY** | | | | | | |
| | **FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILE SHIPS** | | | | | | |
| 1 | COLUMBIA CLASS SUBMARINE | 0 | 3,329,047 | | | 0 | 3,329,047 |
| 1 | COLUMBIA CLASS SUBMARINE | 1 | 6,904,785 | | | 1 | 6,904,785 |
| 2 | COLUMBIA CLASS SUBMARINE | 0 | 4,763,342 | | | 0 | 4,763,342 |
| | **OTHER WARSHIPS** | | | | | | |
| 3 | CARRIER REPLACEMENT PROGRAM | 0 | 641,907 | | | 0 | 641,907 |
| 4 | CARRIER REPLACEMENT PROGRAM | 0 | 1,940,566 | | | 0 | 1,940,566 |
| 5 | CVN–81 | 0 | 1,447,882 | | | 0 | 1,447,882 |
| 6 | VIRGINIA CLASS SUBMARINE | 2 | 8,402,316 | | | 2 | 8,402,316 |
| 7 | VIRGINIA CLASS SUBMARINE | 0 | 4,143,618 | | | 0 | 4,143,618 |
| 8 | SURFACE SHIP INDUSTRIAL BASE | 0 | 0 | 0 | 550,000 | 0 | 550,000 |
| | DDG–51 wage commitment | | | [0] | [100,000] | | |
| | Surface combatant shipyard infrastructure and strategic sourcing | | | [0] | [450,000] | | |
| 9 | BBG(X) | 0 | 1,000,000 | 0 | –1,000,000 | 0 | 0 |
| | Advance procurement early to need | | | [0] | [–1,000,000] | | |
| 10 | CVN REFUELING OVERHAULS | 0 | 4,418,902 | 0 | –2,400,000 | 0 | 2,018,902 |
| | Incremental funding extended | | | [0] | [–2,400,000] | | |
| 11 | CVN REFUELING OVERHAULS | 0 | 53,070 | | | 0 | 53,070 |
| 12 | DDG 1000 | 0 | 66,516 | | | 0 | 66,516 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 13 | DDG–51 | 1 | 2,954,238 | 1 | 2,500,000 | 2 | 5,454,238 |
| | Second DDG–51 ship for FY27 | | | [1] | [2,500,000] | | |
| 14 | DDG–51 | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 16 | FFG-FRIGATE | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 17 | FF(X) | 1 | 1,429,000 | | | 1 | 1,429,000 |
| | **AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS** | | | | | | |
| 18 | LPD FLIGHT II | 1 | 2,188,700 | | | 1 | 2,188,700 |
| 19 | LPD FLIGHT II | 0 | 355,950 | | | 0 | 355,950 |
| 21 | LHA REPLACEMENT | 1 | 3,850,319 | | | 1 | 3,850,319 |
| 24 | MEDIUM LANDING SHIP | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **AUXILIARIES, CRAFT AND PRIOR YR PROGRAM COST** | | | | | | |
| 26 | AS SUBMARINE TENDER | 2 | 4,444,000 | –1 | –2,100,000 | 1 | 2,344,000 |
| | Second ship early to need, unjustified savings | | | [–1] | [–2,100,000] | | |
| 28 | TAO FLEET OILER | 2 | 1,946,063 | | | 2 | 1,946,063 |
| 31 | TAGOS SURTASS SHIPS | 1 | 610,664 | –1 | –610,664 | 0 | 0 |
| | Third ship early to need | | | [–1] | [–610,664] | | |
| 32 | TOWING, SALVAGE, AND RESCUE SHIP (ATS) | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 35 | STRATEGIC SEALIFT | 1 | 450,000 | | | 1 | 450,000 |
| 36 | OUTFITTING | 0 | 741,270 | | | 0 | 741,270 |
| 37 | SHIP TO SHORE CONNECTOR | 4 | 733,895 | | | 4 | 733,895 |
| 38 | SERVICE CRAFT | 0 | 177,079 | | | 0 | 177,079 |
| 39 | AUXILIARY PERSONNEL LIGHTER | 0 | 83,000 | | | 0 | 83,000 |
| 40 | BULK FUEL VESSEL | 1 | 450,000 | | | 1 | 450,000 |
| 43 | LCAC SLEP | 2 | 37,998 | | | 2 | 37,998 |
| 44 | AUXILIARY VESSELS (USED SEALIFT) | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 45 | COMPLETION OF PY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS | 0 | 2,611,990 | | | 0 | 2,611,990 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **TOTAL SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION, NAVY** | **20** | **60,176,117** | **–1** | **–3,060,664** | **19** | **57,115,453** |
| | **OTHER PROCUREMENT, NAVY** | | | | | | |
| | **SHIP PROPULSION EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 1 | SURFACE POWER EQUIPMENT | 0 | 22,668 | | | 0 | 22,668 |
| | **GENERATORS** | | | | | | |
| 2 | SURFACE COMBATANT HM&E | 0 | 103,871 | | | 0 | 103,871 |
| | **NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 3 | OTHER NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT | 0 | 83,510 | | | 0 | 83,510 |
| | **OTHER SHIPBOARD EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 4 | SUB PERISCOPE, IMAGING AND SUPT EQUIP PROG | 0 | 344,885 | | | 0 | 344,885 |
| 5 | DDG MOD | 0 | 1,000,278 | | | 0 | 1,000,278 |
| 6 | FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT | 0 | 177,708 | | | 0 | 177,708 |
| 7 | COMMAND AND CONTROL SWITCHBOARD | 0 | 2,259 | | | 0 | 2,259 |
| 8 | LHA/LHD MIDLIFE | 0 | 131,315 | | | 0 | 131,315 |
| 9 | LCC 19/20 EXTENDED SERVICE LIFE PROGRAM | 0 | 766 | | | 0 | 766 |
| 10 | POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT | 0 | 22,506 | | | 0 | 22,506 |
| 11 | SUBMARINE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 330,951 | | | 0 | 330,951 |
| 12 | VIRGINIA CLASS SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 83,297 | | | 0 | 83,297 |
| 13 | LCS CLASS SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 15,815 | | | 0 | 15,815 |
| 14 | SUBMARINE BATTERIES | 0 | 26,211 | | | 0 | 26,211 |
| 15 | LPD CLASS SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 213,723 | | | 0 | 213,723 |
| 16 | DDG 1000 CLASS SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 58,284 | | | 0 | 58,284 |
| 17 | STRATEGIC PLATFORM SUPPORT EQUIP | 0 | 72,163 | | | 0 | 72,163 |
| 18 | DSSP EQUIPMENT | 0 | 7,440 | | | 0 | 7,440 |
| 19 | SMALL UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLES | 0 | 585 | 0 | 100,000 | 0 | 100,585 |
| | Increase small unmanned surface vessels | | | [0] | [100,000] | | |
| 20 | LCAC | 0 | 22,515 | | | 0 | 22,515 |
| 21 | UNDERWATER EOD EQUIPMENT | 0 | 20,575 | | | 0 | 20,575 |
| 22 | ITEMS LESS THAN $5 MILLION | 0 | 69,425 | | | 0 | 69,425 |
| 23 | CHEMICAL WARFARE DETECTORS | 0 | 2,425 | | | 0 | 2,425 |
| | **REACTOR PLANT EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 24 | SHIP MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND MODERNIZATION | 0 | 2,737,140 | | | 0 | 2,737,140 |
| 25 | REACTOR COMPONENTS | 0 | 519,821 | | | 0 | 519,821 |
| | **OCEAN ENGINEERING** | | | | | | |
| 26 | DIVING AND SALVAGE EQUIPMENT | 0 | 33,013 | | | 0 | 33,013 |
| | **SMALL BOATS** | | | | | | |
| 27 | MEDIUM UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLE (MUSVS) | 0 | 121,130 | | | 0 | 121,130 |
| 28 | STANDARD BOATS | 0 | 97,746 | | | 0 | 97,746 |
| | **PRODUCTION FACILITIES EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 29 | OPERATING FORCES IPE | 0 | 492,100 | | | 0 | 492,100 |
| | **OTHER SHIP SUPPORT** | | | | | | |
| 30 | LCS COMMON MISSION MODULES EQUIPMENT | 0 | 30,565 | | | 0 | 30,565 |
| 31 | LCS MCM MISSION MODULES | 0 | 65,113 | | | 0 | 65,113 |
| 32 | LCS SUW MISSION MODULES | 0 | 1,719 | | | 0 | 1,719 |
| 33 | LCS IN-SERVICE MODERNIZATION | 0 | 315,272 | | | 0 | 315,272 |
| 34 | SMALL & MEDIUM UUV | 0 | 110,955 | | | 0 | 110,955 |
| 35 | LARGE UUV | 0 | 222,998 | | | 0 | 222,998 |
| 36 | EXTRA LARGE UUV | 0 | 135,802 | | | 0 | 135,802 |
| | **LOGISTIC SUPPORT** | | | | | | |
| 37 | LSD MIDLIFE & MODERNIZATION | 0 | 240 | | | 0 | 240 |
| | **SHIP SONARS** | | | | | | |
| 39 | AN/SQQ–89 SURF ASW COMBAT SYSTEM | 0 | 142,355 | | | 0 | 142,355 |
| 40 | SSN ACOUSTIC EQUIPMENT | 0 | 454,161 | | | 0 | 454,161 |
| | **ASW ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 42 | SUBMARINE ACOUSTIC WARFARE SYSTEM | 0 | 68,881 | | | 0 | 68,881 |
| 43 | SSTD | 0 | 14,857 | | | 0 | 14,857 |
| 44 | FIXED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM | 0 | 490,548 | | | 0 | 490,548 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 45 | SURTASS | 0 | 72,190 | 0 | 72,190 |
| | **ELECTRONIC WARFARE EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 46 | AN/SLQ–32 | 0 | 653,483 | 0 | 653,483 |
| | **RECONNAISSANCE EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 47 | SHIPBOARD IW EXPLOIT | 0 | 701,667 | 0 | 701,667 |
| 48 | MARITIME BATTLESPACE AWARENESS | 0 | 8,652 | 0 | 8,652 |
| | **OTHER SHIP ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 49 | COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT CAPABILITY | 0 | 33,932 | 0 | 33,932 |
| 50 | NAVAL TACTICAL COMMAND SUPPORT SYSTEM (NTCSS) | 0 | 10,108 | 0 | 10,108 |
| 51 | ATDLS | 0 | 52,758 | 0 | 52,758 |
| 52 | NAVY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (NCCS) | 0 | 16,167 | 0 | 16,167 |
| 53 | MINESWEEPING SYSTEM REPLACEMENT | 0 | 14,879 | 0 | 14,879 |
| 54 | NAVSTAR GPS RECEIVERS (SPACE) | 0 | 43,097 | 0 | 43,097 |
| 55 | AMERICAN FORCES RADIO AND TV SERVICE | 0 | 289 | 0 | 289 |
| | **AVIATION ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 56 | ASHORE ATC EQUIPMENT | 0 | 83,057 | 0 | 83,057 |
| 57 | AFLOAT ATC EQUIPMENT | 0 | 62,581 | 0 | 62,581 |
| 58 | ID SYSTEMS | 0 | 35,620 | 0 | 35,620 |
| 59 | JOINT PRECISION APPROACH AND LANDING SYSTEM ( | 0 | 2,976 | 0 | 2,976 |
| 60 | NAVAL MISSION PLANNING SYSTEMS | 0 | 54,487 | 0 | 54,487 |
| | **OTHER SHORE ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 62 | TACTICAL/MOBILE C4I SYSTEMS | 0 | 48,262 | 0 | 48,262 |
| 63 | INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) | 0 | 11,824 | 0 | 11,824 |
| 64 | CANES | 0 | 493,046 | 0 | 493,046 |
| 65 | RADIAC | 0 | 38,000 | 0 | 38,000 |
| 66 | CANES-INTELL | 0 | 43,028 | 0 | 43,028 |
| 67 | GPETE | 0 | 31,462 | 0 | 31,462 |
| 68 | MASF | 0 | 5,822 | 0 | 5,822 |
| 69 | INTEG COMBAT SYSTEM TEST FACILITY | 0 | 6,454 | 0 | 6,454 |
| 70 | EMI CONTROL INSTRUMENTATION | 0 | 3,435 | 0 | 3,435 |
| 71 | IN-SERVICE RADARS AND SENSORS | 0 | 338,946 | 0 | 338,946 |
| | **SHIPBOARD COMMUNICATIONS** | | | | |

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(In Thousands of Dollars)

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 72 | BATTLE FORCE TACTICAL NETWORK | 0 | 125,661 | | | 0 | 125,661 |
| 73 | SHIPBOARD TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS | 0 | 50,350 | | | 0 | 50,350 |
| 74 | SHIP COMMUNICATIONS AUTOMATION | 0 | 156,605 | | | 0 | 156,605 |
| 75 | COMMUNICATIONS ITEMS UNDER $5M | 0 | 15,097 | | | 0 | 15,097 |
| | **SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS** | | | | | | |
| 76 | SUBMARINE BROADCAST SUPPORT | 0 | 173,069 | | | 0 | 173,069 |
| 77 | SUBMARINE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT | 0 | 88,071 | | | 0 | 88,071 |
| | **SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS** | | | | | | |
| 78 | SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS | 0 | 57,961 | | | 0 | 57,961 |
| 79 | NAVY MULTIBAND TERMINAL (NMT) | 0 | 57,768 | | | 0 | 57,768 |
| 80 | MOBILE ADVANCED EHF TERMINAL (MAT) | 0 | 202,305 | | | 0 | 202,305 |
| | **SHORE COMMUNICATIONS** | | | | | | |
| 81 | JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT (JCSE) | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 82 | INFO SYSTEMS SECURITY PROGRAM (ISSP) | 0 | 349,099 | | | 0 | 349,099 |
| 83 | MIO INTEL EXPLOITATION TEAM | 0 | 1,063 | | | 0 | 1,063 |
| | **CRYPTOLOGIC EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 84 | CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNICATIONS EQUIP | 0 | 7,419 | | | 0 | 7,419 |
| | **OTHER ELECTRONIC SUPPORT** | | | | | | |
| 91 | COAST GUARD EQUIPMENT | 0 | 67,106 | | | 0 | 67,106 |
| | **DRUG INTERDICTION SUPPORT** | | | | | | |
| 92 | OTHER DRUG INTERDICTION SUPPORT | 0 | 57,568 | | | 0 | 57,568 |
| | **SONOBUOYS** | | | | | | |
| 93 | SONOBUOYS—ALL TYPES | 0 | 300,151 | 0 | 100,000 | 0 | 400,151 |
| | Sonobuoys—All Types Increase | | | [0] | [100,000] | | |
| | **AIRCRAFT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 94 | MINOTAUR | 0 | 4,831 | 0 | 4,831 |
| 95 | WEAPONS RANGE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 119,900 | 0 | 119,900 |
| 96 | AIRCRAFT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 69,065 | 0 | 69,065 |
| 97 | ADVANCED ARRESTING GEAR (AAG) | 0 | 23,551 | 0 | 23,551 |
| 98 | ELECTROMAGNETIC AIRCRAFT LAUNCH SYSTEM (EMALS | 0 | 36,908 | 0 | 36,908 |
| 99 | METEOROLOGICAL EQUIPMENT | 0 | 7,477 | 0 | 7,477 |
| 100 | AIRBORNE MCM | 0 | 9,507 | 0 | 9,507 |
| 101 | AVIATION SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 116,873 | 0 | 116,873 |
| 102 | UMCS-UNMAN CARRIER AVIATION(UCA)MISSION CNTRL | 0 | 211,216 | 0 | 211,216 |
| | **SHIP GUN SYSTEM EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 103 | SHIP GUN SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT | 0 | 6,962 | 0 | 6,962 |
| | **SHIP MISSILE SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 104 | HARPOON SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 195 | 0 | 195 |
| 105 | SHIP MISSILE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 431,069 | 0 | 431,069 |
| 106 | TOMAHAWK SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 116,208 | 0 | 116,208 |
| | **FBM SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 107 | CPS SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 188,430 | 0 | 188,430 |
| 108 | STRATEGIC MISSILE SYSTEMS EQUIP | 0 | 327,941 | 0 | 327,941 |
| | **ASW SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 109 | SSN COMBAT CONTROL SYSTEMS | 0 | 165,416 | 0 | 165,416 |
| 110 | ASW SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 25,105 | 0 | 25,105 |
| | **OTHER ORDNANCE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 111 | EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL EQUIP | 0 | 48,252 | 0 | 48,252 |
| 112 | DIRECTED ENERGY SYSTEMS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 113 | ITEMS LESS THAN $5 MILLION | 0 | 2,592 | 0 | 2,592 |
| | **OTHER EXPENDABLE ORDNANCE** | | | | |
| 114 | ANTI-SHIP MISSILE DECOY SYSTEM | 0 | 606,241 | 0 | 606,241 |
| 115 | SUBMARINE TRAINING DEVICE MODS | 0 | 73,681 | 0 | 73,681 |
| 116 | SURFACE TRAINING EQUIPMENT | 0 | 218,181 | 0 | 218,181 |
| | **CIVIL ENGINEERING SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | |
| 117 | PASSENGER CARRYING VEHICLES | 0 | 3,567 | 0 | 3,567 |
| 118 | GENERAL PURPOSE TRUCKS | 0 | 4,801 | 0 | 4,801 |

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(In Thousands of Dollars)

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 120 | CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE EQUIP | 0 | 91,269 | | | 0 | 91,269 |
| 121 | FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT | 0 | 17,107 | | | 0 | 17,107 |
| 122 | TACTICAL VEHICLES | 0 | 46,796 | | | 0 | 46,796 |
| 123 | AMPHIBIOUS EQUIPMENT | 0 | 53,916 | | | 0 | 53,916 |
| 124 | POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT | 0 | 3,586 | | | 0 | 3,586 |
| 125 | ITEMS LESS THAN $5 MILLION | 0 | 131,449 | | | 0 | 131,449 |
| 126 | PHYSICAL SECURITY VEHICLES | 0 | 998 | | | 0 | 998 |
| | **SUPPLY SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 127 | SUPPLY EQUIPMENT | 0 | 67,828 | | | 0 | 67,828 |
| 128 | FIRST DESTINATION TRANSPORTATION | 0 | 4,732 | | | 0 | 4,732 |
| 129 | SPECIAL PURPOSE SUPPLY SYSTEMS | 0 | 323,644 | | | 0 | 323,644 |
| | **TRAINING DEVICES** | | | | | | |
| 130 | TRAINING SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 10,608 | | | 0 | 10,608 |
| 131 | TRAINING AND EDUCATION EQUIPMENT | 0 | 331,016 | | | 0 | 331,016 |
| | **COMMAND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 132 | COMMAND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 55,202 | | | 0 | 55,202 |
| 133 | MEDICAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 54,862 | | | 0 | 54,862 |
| 135 | NAVAL MIP SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 5,213 | | | 0 | 5,213 |
| 136 | OPERATING FORCES SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 15,107 | | | 0 | 15,107 |
| 137 | C4ISR EQUIPMENT | 0 | 33,975 | | | 0 | 33,975 |
| 138 | ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 60,467 | | | 0 | 60,467 |
| 139 | PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT | 0 | 218,037 | | | 0 | 218,037 |
| 140 | ENTERPRISE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY | 0 | 40,490 | | | 0 | 40,490 |
| | **OTHER** | | | | | | |
| 142 | NEXT GENERATION ENTERPRISE SERVICE | 0 | 223,647 | | | 0 | 223,647 |
| 143 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES | 0 | 7,131 | | | 0 | 7,131 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 0 | 42,813 | | | 0 | 42,813 |
| | **SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS** | | | | | | |
| 144 | SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS | 0 | 765,711 | 0 | 750,000 | 0 | 1,515,711 |
| | Increase for ship spares and repairs | | | [0] | [750,000] | | |
| | **TOTAL OTHER PROCUREMENT, NAVY** | **0** | **18,866,679** | **0** | **950,000** | **0** | **19,816,679** |
| | **PROCUREMENT, MARINE CORPS** | | | | | | |
| | **TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 1 | AAV7A1 PIP | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT VEHICLE FAMILY OF VEHICLES | 0 | 237,336 | | | 0 | 237,336 |
| 3 | LAV PIP | 0 | 68,825 | | | 0 | 68,825 |
| | **ARTILLERY AND OTHER WEAPONS** | | | | | | |
| 4 | 155MM LIGHTWEIGHT TOWED HOWITZER | 0 | 5,709 | | | 0 | 5,709 |
| 5 | ARTILLERY WEAPONS SYSTEM | 0 | 341,085 | | | 0 | 341,085 |
| 6 | WEAPONS AND COMBAT VEHICLES UNDER $5 MILLION | 0 | 50,299 | | | 0 | 50,299 |
| | **GUIDED MISSILES** | | | | | | |
| 8 | NAVAL STRIKE MISSILE (NSM) | 103 | 204,639 | | | 103 | 204,639 |
| 9 | NAVAL STRIKE MISSILE (NSM) | 0 | 14,391 | | | 0 | 14,391 |
| 10 | GROUND BASED AIR DEFENSE | 0 | 1,274,446 | | | 0 | 1,274,446 |
| 11 | ANTI-ARMOR MISSILE-JAVELIN | 193 | 63,020 | | | 193 | 63,020 |
| 12 | FAMILY ANTI-ARMOR WEAPON SYSTEMS (FOAAWS) | 0 | 808 | | | 0 | 808 |
| 13 | ANTI-ARMOR MISSILE-TOW | 0 | 1,265 | | | 0 | 1,265 |
| 14 | GUIDED MLRS ROCKET (GMLRS) | 0 | 61,355 | | | 0 | 61,355 |
| | **COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS** | | | | | | |
| 15 | COMMON AVIATION COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (C | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **REPAIR AND TEST EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 16 | REPAIR AND TEST EQUIPMENT | 0 | 65,665 | | | 0 | 65,665 |
| | **OTHER SUPPORT (TEL)** | | | | | | |
| 17 | MODIFICATION KITS | 0 | 1,047 | | | 0 | 1,047 |
| | **COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (NON-TEL)** | | | | | | |
| 18 | ITEMS UNDER $5 MILLION (COMM & ELEC) | 0 | 140,929 | | | 0 | 140,929 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 19 | AIR OPERATIONS C2 SYSTEMS | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **RADAR + EQUIPMENT (NON-TEL)** | | | | | | |
| 20 | GROUND/AIR TASK ORIENTED RADAR (G/ATOR) | 0 | 55,622 | | | 0 | 55,622 |
| | **INTELL/COMM EQUIPMENT (NON-TEL)** | | | | | | |
| 21 | ELECTRO MAGNETIC SPECTRUM OPERATIONS (EMSO) | 0 | 79,269 | | | 0 | 79,269 |
| 22 | GCSS-MC | 0 | 3,435 | | | 0 | 3,435 |
| 23 | FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM | 0 | 136,070 | | | 0 | 136,070 |
| 24 | INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 395,854 | | | 0 | 395,854 |
| 26 | UNMANNED AIR SYSTEMS (INTEL) | 0 | 262,815 | | | 0 | 262,815 |
| 27 | DCGS-MC | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 28 | UAS PAYLOADS | 0 | 14,834 | | | 0 | 14,834 |
| | **OTHER SUPPORT (NON-TEL)** | | | | | | |
| 29 | MARINE CORPS ENTERPRISE NETWORK (MCEN) | 0 | 190,282 | | | 0 | 190,282 |
| 30 | COMMON COMPUTER RESOURCES | 0 | 15,950 | | | 0 | 15,950 |
| 31 | COMMAND POST SYSTEMS | 0 | 442,308 | | | 0 | 442,308 |
| 32 | RADIO SYSTEMS | 0 | 764,001 | | | 0 | 764,001 |
| 33 | COMM SWITCHING & CONTROL SYSTEMS | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 34 | COMM & ELEC INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT | 0 | 37,640 | | | 0 | 37,640 |
| 35 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES | 0 | 19,854 | | | 0 | 19,854 |
| 36 | UNMANNED EXPEDITIONARY SYSTEMS | 0 | 1,001 | | | 0 | 1,001 |
| | **CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 0 | 2,029 | | | 0 | 2,029 |
| | **ADMINISTRATIVE VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 40 | COMMERCIAL CARGO VEHICLES | 0 | 27,582 | | | 0 | 27,582 |
| | **TACTICAL VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 41 | MOTOR TRANSPORT MODIFICATIONS | 0 | 22,460 | | | 0 | 22,460 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 42 | JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE | 341 | 244,941 | | | 341 | 244,941 |
| 43 | TRAILERS | 0 | 136,438 | | | 0 | 136,438 |
| | **ENGINEER AND OTHER EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 44 | TACTICAL FUEL SYSTEMS | 0 | 112,197 | | | 0 | 112,197 |
| 45 | POWER EQUIPMENT ASSORTED | 0 | 34,219 | | | 0 | 34,219 |
| 46 | AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 29,042 | | | 0 | 29,042 |
| 47 | EOD SYSTEMS | 0 | 24,297 | | | 0 | 24,297 |
| | **MATERIALS HANDLING EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 48 | PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT | 0 | 151,740 | | | 0 | 151,740 |
| | **GENERAL PROPERTY** | | | | | | |
| 49 | FIELD MEDICAL EQUIPMENT | 0 | 227,761 | | | 0 | 227,761 |
| 50 | TRAINING DEVICES | 0 | 136,639 | | | 0 | 136,639 |
| 51 | FAMILY OF CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT | 0 | 115,681 | | | 0 | 115,681 |
| 52 | ULTRA-LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE (ULTV) | 0 | 972 | | | 0 | 972 |
| | **OTHER SUPPORT** | | | | | | |
| 53 | ITEMS LESS THAN $5 MILLION | 0 | 54,228 | | | 0 | 54,228 |
| | **SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS** | | | | | | |
| 54 | SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS | 0 | 18,925 | | | 0 | 18,925 |
| | **TOTAL PROCUREMENT, MARINE CORPS** | **637** | **6,288,905** | **0** | **0** | **637** | **6,288,905** |
| | | | | | | | |
| | **AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE** | | | | | | |
| | **STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE** | | | | | | |
| 1 | B–21 RAIDER | 0 | 2,230,615 | | | 0 | 2,230,615 |
| 2 | B–21 RAIDER | 0 | 1,005,667 | | | 0 | 1,005,667 |
| | **TACTICAL FORCES** | | | | | | |
| 3 | F–35 | 24 | 2,393,723 | 0 | 232,480 | 24 | 2,626,203 |
| | Program increase | | | [0] | [232,480] | | |
| 4 | F–35 | 0 | 738,103 | | | 0 | 738,103 |
| 5 | COLLABORATIVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT | 0 | 996,528 | | | 0 | 996,528 |
| 6 | COLLABORATIVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT | 0 | 150,500 | | | 0 | 150,500 |
| 7 | F–15EX | 24 | 2,656,716 | | | 24 | 2,656,716 |
| 9 | JOINT SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT | 0 | 52,695 | | | 0 | 52,695 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| | **TACTICAL AIRLIFT** | | | | | | |
| 10 | KC–46A MDAP | 15 | 3,520,530 | | | 15 | 3,520,530 |
| | **OTHER AIRLIFT** | | | | | | |
| 11 | C–130J | 0 | 636,680 | | | 0 | 636,680 |
| | **UPT TRAINERS** | | | | | | |
| 12 | ADVANCED PILOT TRAINING T–7A | 23 | 529,464 | | | 23 | 529,464 |
| 13 | ADVANCED PILOT TRAINING T–7A | 0 | 69,690 | | | 0 | 69,690 |
| | **HELICOPTERS** | | | | | | |
| 14 | MH–139A | 4 | 252,949 | 0 | 127,629 | 4 | 380,578 |
| | Procure 8 MH–139A aircraft | | | [0] | [127,629] | | |
| 15 | COMBAT RESCUE HELICOPTER | 0 | 69,395 | 0 | 35,000 | 0 | 104,395 |
| | Realignment from HH60W Modifications | | | [0] | [35,000] | | |
| | **MISSION SUPPORT AIRCRAFT** | | | | | | |
| 16 | C–37A | 1 | 208,000 | | | 1 | 208,000 |
| 17 | C–40 FLEET EXPANSION | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 18 | CIVIL AIR PATROL A/C | 0 | 3,219 | | | 0 | 3,219 |
| | **OTHER AIRCRAFT** | | | | | | |
| 20 | TARGET DRONES | 10 | 31,912 | | | 10 | 31,912 |
| 21 | COMPASS CALL | 3 | 660,000 | | | 3 | 660,000 |
| 22 | E–7 | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 24 | RQ–20B PUMA | 6 | 15,513 | | | 6 | 15,513 |
| | **STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT** | | | | | | |
| 25 | B–2A | 0 | 178,668 | | | 0 | 178,668 |
| 26 | B–1B | 0 | 146,862 | | | 0 | 146,862 |
| 27 | B–52 | 0 | 422,399 | 0 | 45,000 | 0 | 467,399 |
| | Procurement of 10 F130 engines for B–52 CERP | | | [0] | [45,000] | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 28 | LARGE AIRCRAFT INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES | 0 | 66,638 | 0 | 66,638 |
| | **TACTICAL AIRCRAFT** | | | | |
| 29 | COLLABORATIVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT MODS | 0 | 822 | 0 | 822 |
| 30 | E–11 BACN/HAG | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 31 | F–15 | 0 | 140,204 | 0 | 140,204 |
| 32 | F–15EX | 0 | 214,176 | 0 | 214,176 |
| 33 | F–16 MODIFICATIONS | 0 | 946,747 | 0 | 946,747 |
| 34 | F–22A | 0 | 1,052,088 | 0 | 1,052,088 |
| 35 | F–35 MODIFICATIONS | 0 | 335,973 | 0 | 335,973 |
| 36 | F–15 EPAW | 0 | 141,233 | 0 | 141,233 |
| 37 | KC–46A MDAP | 0 | 85,515 | 0 | 85,515 |
| | **AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT** | | | | |
| 38 | C–5 | 0 | 10,308 | 0 | 10,308 |
| 39 | C–17A | 0 | 59,867 | 0 | 59,867 |
| 42 | OSA-EA MODIFICATIONS | 0 | 136,786 | 0 | 136,786 |
| | **TRAINER AIRCRAFT** | | | | |
| 43 | GLIDER MODS | 0 | 164 | 0 | 164 |
| 44 | T–6 | 0 | 131,747 | 0 | 131,747 |
| 45 | T–1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 46 | T–38 | 0 | 84,452 | 0 | 84,452 |
| | **OTHER AIRCRAFT** | | | | |
| 47 | U–2 MODS | 0 | 297 | 0 | 297 |
| 50 | C–130 | 0 | 23,546 | 0 | 23,546 |
| 51 | C–130J MODS | 0 | 315,308 | 0 | 315,308 |
| 52 | C–135 | 0 | 158,715 | 0 | 158,715 |
| 53 | COMPASS CALL | 0 | 506,265 | 0 | 506,265 |
| 54 | CVR (CONNON ULF RECEIVER) INC 2 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 18 |
| 55 | RC–135 | 0 | 252,846 | 0 | 252,846 |
| 56 | E–3 | 0 | 841 | 0 | 841 |
| 57 | E–4 | 0 | 30,779 | 0 | 30,779 |
| 58 | H–1 | 0 | 17,872 | 0 | 17,872 |
| 59 | MH–139A MOD | 0 | 5,021 | 0 | 5,021 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 60 | H–60 | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 61 | HH60W MODIFICATIONS | 0 | 46,662 | 0 | –42,000 | 0 | 4,662 |
| | Realignment to Combat Rescue Helicopter | | | [0] | [–35,000] | | |
| | Realignment to Initial Spares/Repair Parts | | | [0] | [–7,000] | | |
| 62 | HC/MC–130 MODIFICATIONS | 0 | 257,742 | | | 0 | 257,742 |
| 63 | OTHER AIRCRAFT | 0 | 102,052 | | | 0 | 102,052 |
| 64 | MQ–9 MODS | 0 | 105,966 | | | 0 | 105,966 |
| 65 | SOFTWARE DEFINED USER EQUIPMENT | 0 | 25,847 | | | 0 | 25,847 |
| 66 | SENIOR LEADER C3 SYSTEM—AIRCRAFT | 0 | 32,654 | | | 0 | 32,654 |
| 67 | CV–22 MODS | 0 | 168,042 | | | 0 | 168,042 |
| | **AIRCRAFT SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS** | | | | | | |
| 68 | INITIAL SPARES/REPAIR PARTS | 0 | 1,441,052 | 0 | 7,000 | 0 | 1,448,052 |
| | Realignment from HH60W Modifications | | | [0] | [7,000] | | |
| | **COMMON SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 71 | AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT SUPPORT EQUIP | 0 | 252,808 | | | 0 | 252,808 |
| | **POST PRODUCTION SUPPORT** | | | | | | |
| 73 | B–2B | 0 | 95,457 | | | 0 | 95,457 |
| 74 | B–52 | 0 | 114 | | | 0 | 114 |
| 75 | C–17A | 0 | 3,027 | | | 0 | 3,027 |
| 76 | CV–22 POST PRODUCTION SUPPORT | 0 | 5,088 | | | 0 | 5,088 |
| 78 | F–15 | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 79 | F–15EX | 0 | 16,930 | | | 0 | 16,930 |
| 80 | F–16 POST PRODUCTION SUPPORT | 0 | 57,781 | | | 0 | 57,781 |
| 81 | HC/MC–130 POST PROD | 0 | 20,415 | | | 0 | 20,415 |
| 82 | JOINT SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT POST PRODUCTION SUPPORT | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 83 | MQ–9 POST PROD | 0 | 15,365 | | | 0 | 15,365 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS** | | | | | | |
| 84 | INDUSTRIAL RESPONSIVENESS | 0 | 20,590 | | | 0 | 20,590 |
| | **WAR CONSUMABLES** | | | | | | |
| 85 | WAR CONSUMABLES | 0 | 85,387 | | | 0 | 85,387 |
| | **OTHER PRODUCTION CHARGES** | | | | | | |
| 86 | OTHER PRODUCTION CHARGES | 0 | 2,528,401 | | | 0 | 2,528,401 |
| | **CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 0 | 15,800 | | | 0 | 15,800 |
| | **TOTAL AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE** | **110** | **26,985,236** | **0** | **405,109** | **110** | **27,390,345** |
| | **MISSILE PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE** | | | | | | |
| | **MISSILE REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT—BALLISTIC** | | | | | | |
| 1 | MISSILE REPLACEMENT EQ-BALLISTIC | 0 | 27,006 | | | 0 | 27,006 |
| 2 | MISSILE REPLACEMENT EQ-BALLISTIC | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **BALLISTIC MISSILES** | | | | | | |
| 3 | GROUND BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT | 0 | 107,602 | | | 0 | 107,602 |
| | **STRATEGIC** | | | | | | |
| | **TACTICAL** | | | | | | |
| 5 | LONG RANGE STAND-OFF WEAPON | 0 | 506,047 | | | 0 | 506,047 |
| 6 | LONG RANGE STAND-OFF WEAPON | 0 | 456,810 | | | 0 | 456,810 |
| 7 | REPLAC EQUIP & WAR CONSUMABLES | 0 | 23,575 | | | 0 | 23,575 |
| 8 | ADVANCED PRECISION KILL WEAPON SYSTEM (APKWS) MISSILE | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 9 | AGM–183A AIR-LAUNCHED RAPID RESPONSE WEAPON | 0 | 452,035 | | | 0 | 452,035 |
| 10 | FAMILY OF AFFORDABLE MASS MISSILE (FAMM) | 0 | 55,000 | 3,000 | 845,000 | 3,000 | 900,000 |
| | 3,000 Family of Affordable Mass Missile (FAMM) | | | [3,000] | [845,000] | | |
| 11 | HYPERSONIC ATTACK CRUISE MISSILE | 0 | 403,974 | | | 0 | 403,974 |
| 12 | JOINT AIR-SURFACE STANDOFF MISSILE | 491 | 967,866 | | | 491 | 967,866 |
| 13 | JOINT ADVANCED TACTICAL MISSILE | 0 | 608,743 | | | 0 | 608,743 |
| 14 | JOINT STRIKE MISSILE | 100 | 384,607 | | | 100 | 384,607 |
| 15 | LRASM0 | 111 | 500,916 | | | 111 | 500,916 |
| 16 | SIDEWINDER (AIM–9X) | 648 | 419,238 | | | 648 | 419,238 |
| 17 | AMRAAM | 38 | 115,856 | | | 38 | 115,856 |

SEC. 4101. PROCUREMENT
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | | Senate Change | | Senate Authorized | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 19 | SMALL DIAMETER BOMB | 220 | 44,596 | | | 220 | 44,596 |
| 20 | SMALL DIAMETER BOMB II | 373 | 194,509 | | | 373 | 194,509 |
| 21 | STAND-IN ATTACK WEAPON (SIAW) | 155 | 401,607 | | | 155 | 401,607 |
| | **INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES** | | | | | | |
| 22 | INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS/POL PREVENTION | 0 | 931 | | | 0 | 931 |
| | **CLASS IV** | | | | | | |
| 23 | ICBM FUZE MOD | 0 | 169,747 | | | 0 | 169,747 |
| 25 | MM III MODIFICATIONS | 0 | 9,865 | | | 0 | 9,865 |
| 26 | AIR LAUNCH CRUISE MISSILE (ALCM) | 0 | 30,407 | | | 0 | 30,407 |
| | **MISSILE SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS** | | | | | | |
| 27 | MSL SPRS/REPAIR PARTS (INITIAL) | 0 | 15,621 | | | 0 | 15,621 |
| 28 | MSL SPRS/REPAIR PARTS (REPLEN) | 0 | 123,224 | | | 0 | 123,224 |
| | **SPECIAL PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 30 | SPECIAL UPDATE PROGRAMS | 0 | 168,578 | | | 0 | 168,578 |
| | **CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 0 | 622,814 | | | 0 | 622,814 |
| | **TOTAL MISSILE PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE** | **2,136** | **6,811,174** | **3,000** | **845,000** | **5,136** | **7,656,174** |
| | **PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, AIR FORCE** | | | | | | |
| | **ROCKETS** | | | | | | |
| 1 | ROCKETS | 0 | 102,059 | | | 0 | 102,059 |
| | **CARTRIDGES** | | | | | | |
| 2 | CARTRIDGES | 0 | 157,508 | | | 0 | 157,508 |
| | **BOMBS** | | | | | | |
| 3 | GENERAL PURPOSE BOMBS | 0 | 168,469 | | | 0 | 168,469 |
| 4 | MASSIVE ORDNANCE PENETRATOR (MOP) | 0 | 755 | | | 0 | 755 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | JOINT DIRECT ATTACK MUNITION | 1,150 | 129,568 | | | 1,150 | 129,568 |
| 6 | B61–12 TRAINER | 0 | 24,226 | | | 0 | 24,226 |
| | **OTHER ITEMS** | | | | | | |
| 7 | CAD/PAD | 0 | 45,448 | | | 0 | 45,448 |
| 8 | EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) | 0 | 7,168 | | | 0 | 7,168 |
| 9 | SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS | 0 | 626 | | | 0 | 626 |
| 10 | FIRST DESTINATION TRANSPORTATION | 0 | 2,873 | | | 0 | 2,873 |
| 11 | ITEMS LESS THAN $5,000,000 | 0 | 5,468 | | | 0 | 5,468 |
| | **FLARES** | | | | | | |
| 13 | EXPENDABLE COUNTERMEASURES | 0 | 99,180 | | | 0 | 99,180 |
| | **FUZES** | | | | | | |
| 14 | FUZES | 0 | 141,149 | | | 0 | 141,149 |
| | **SMALL ARMS** | | | | | | |
| 15 | SMALL ARMS | 0 | 25,619 | | | 0 | 25,619 |
| | **TOTAL PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, AIR FORCE** | **1,150** | **910,116** | **0** | **0** | **1,150** | **910,116** |
| | **PROCUREMENT, SPACE FORCE** | | | | | | |
| | **SPACE PROCUREMENT, SF** | | | | | | |
| 1 | AF SATELLITE COMM SYSTEM | 0 | 54,391 | 0 | 10,000 | 0 | 64,391 |
| | Bigelow restoration and tri-band antenna construction | | | [0] | [10,000] | | |
| 3 | AUXILIARY PAYLOADS | 0 | 241,076 | | | 0 | 241,076 |
| 5 | COUNTERSPACE SYSTEMS | 0 | 459,466 | 0 | –80,000 | 0 | 379,466 |
| | Realignment to Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation for PDM | | | [0] | [–80,000] | | |
| 7 | EVOLVED STRATEGIC SATCOM (ESS) | 0 | 139,700 | | | 0 | 139,700 |
| 8 | FAMILY OF BEYOND LINE-OF-SIGHT TERMINALS | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 11 | GROUND MOVING TARGET INDICATOR (GMTI) | 0 | 1,016,612 | 0 | –213,184 | 0 | 803,428 |
| | Realignment to advance procurement | | | [0] | [–120,000] | | |
| | Realignment to Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation | | | [0] | [–46,592] | | |
| | Realignment to Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation for Space-Based Moving Target Indicator | | | [0] | [–46,592] | | |
| 12 | GROUND MOVING TARGET INDICATOR (GMTI) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 120,000 | 0 | 120,000 |
| | Realignment for advance procurement | | | [0] | [120,000] | | |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 13 | GENERAL INFORMATION TECH—SPACE | 0 | 14,895 | | | 0 | 14,895 |
| 14 | GPSIII FOLLOW ON | 2 | 680,875 | | | 2 | 680,875 |
| 15 | GPS III SPACE SEGMENT | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 16 | GLOBAL POSTIONING (SPACE) | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 17 | SPACEBORNE EQUIP (COMSEC) | 0 | 95,061 | | | 0 | 95,061 |
| 18 | MILSATCOM | 0 | 38,067 | | | 0 | 38,067 |
| 20 | SPECIAL SPACE ACTIVITIES | 0 | 2,021,299 | | | 0 | 2,021,299 |
| 21 | MOBILE USER OBJECTIVE SYSTEM | 0 | 50,640 | | | 0 | 50,640 |
| 22 | NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE LAUNCH | 13 | 3,370,958 | | | 13 | 3,370,958 |
| 24 | PTES HUB | 0 | 12,046 | | | 0 | 12,046 |
| 25 | SPACE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY LAUNCH | 9 | 835,197 | | | 9 | 835,197 |
| 26 | SPACE DIGITAL INTEGRATED NETWORK (SDIN) | 0 | 5,119 | | | 0 | 5,119 |
| 27 | SPACE MODS | 0 | 448,674 | 0 | 176,000 | 0 | 624,674 |
| | Realignment from Operation and Maintenance for AEP fielded GPS ground system | | | [0] | [78,000] | | |
| | Realignment from Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation for AEP technical refresh | | | [0] | [98,000] | | |
| 28 | SPACELIFT RANGE SYSTEM SPACE | 0 | 64,885 | | | 0 | 64,885 |
| 29 | WIDEBAND SATCOM OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS | 0 | 81,483 | | | 0 | 81,483 |
| | **SPARES** | | | | | | |
| 30 | SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS | 0 | 971 | | | 0 | 971 |
| | **NON-TACTICAL VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 31 | USSF VEHICLES | 0 | 6,032 | | | 0 | 6,032 |
| | **SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 33 | POWER CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT | 0 | 7,906 | | | 0 | 7,906 |
| | **TOTAL PROCUREMENT, SPACE FORCE** | **24** | **9,645,353** | **0** | **12,816** | **24** | **9,658,169** |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **OTHER PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE** | | | | | | |
| | **PASSENGER CARRYING VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 1 | PASSENGER CARRYING VEHICLES | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **CARGO AND UTILITY VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 2 | MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLE | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 3 | CAP VEHICLES | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 4 | CARGO AND UTILITY VEHICLES | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 5 | JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE | 0 | 103,304 | | | 0 | 103,304 |
| 6 | SECURITY AND TACTICAL VEHICLES | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 7 | SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 8 | FIRE FIGHTING/CRASH RESCUE VEHICLES | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **MATERIALS HANDLING EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 9 | MATERIALS HANDLING VEHICLES | 0 | 2,132 | 0 | –2,132 | 0 | 0 |
| | Realignment to Mission Support Vehicles | | | [0] | [–2,132] | | |
| | **BASE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT** | | | | | | |
| 10 | RUNWAY SNOW REMOV AND CLEANING EQU | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 11 | BASE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT VEHICLES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25,000 | 0 | 25,000 |
| | ICBM base maintenance support vehicle replacement procurement | | | [0] | [25,000] | | |
| | **MISSION SUPPORT VEHICLES** | | | | | | |
| 12 | MISSION SUPPORT VEHICLES | 0 | 439,892 | 0 | 2,132 | 0 | 442,024 |
| | Realignment from Materials Handling Vehicles | | | [0] | [2,132] | | |
| | **COMM SECURITY EQUIPMENT(COMSEC)** | | | | | | |
| 14 | COMSEC EQUIPMENT | 0 | 374,613 | | | 0 | 374,613 |
| | **INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 16 | INTERNATIONAL INTEL TECH & ARCHITECTURES | 0 | 19,060 | | | 0 | 19,060 |
| 17 | INTELLIGENCE TRAINING EQUIPMENT | 0 | 5,531 | | | 0 | 5,531 |
| 18 | INTELLIGENCE COMM EQUIPMENT | 0 | 37,717 | | | 0 | 37,717 |
| | **ELECTRONICS PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 19 | AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL & LANDING SYS | 0 | 58,313 | | | 0 | 58,313 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 20 | NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 21 | BATTLE CONTROL SYSTEM—FIXED | 0 | 3,391 | | | 0 | 3,391 |
| 22 | THEATER AIR CONTROL SYS IMPROVEMEN | 0 | 11,640 | | | 0 | 11,640 |
| 23 | 3D EXPEDITIONARY LONG-RANGE RADAR | 0 | 430,607 | | | 0 | 430,607 |
| 24 | WEATHER OBSERVATION FORECAST | 0 | 33,111 | | | 0 | 33,111 |
| 25 | STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL | 0 | 89,931 | | | 0 | 89,931 |
| 26 | CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN COMPLEX | 0 | 7,434 | | | 0 | 7,434 |
| 27 | MISSION PLANNING SYSTEMS | 0 | 23,927 | | | 0 | 23,927 |
| 28 | STRATEGIC MISSION PLANNING & EXECUTION SYSTEM | 0 | 9,435 | | | 0 | 9,435 |
| | **SPCL COMM-ELECTRONICS PROJECTS** | | | | | | |
| 29 | GENERAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY | 0 | 234,417 | | | 0 | 234,417 |
| 30 | AF GLOBAL COMMAND & CONTROL SYS | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 32 | MOBILITY COMMAND AND CONTROL | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 33 | AIR FORCE PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM | 0 | 1,770,698 | | | 0 | 1,770,698 |
| 34 | SAMTEC COMMUNICATIONS | 0 | 17,641 | | | 0 | 17,641 |
| 35 | COMBAT TRAINING RANGES | 0 | 94,378 | | | 0 | 94,378 |
| 36 | MINIMUM ESSENTIAL EMERGENCY COMM N | 0 | 279,516 | | | 0 | 279,516 |
| 37 | WIDE AREA SURVEILLANCE (WAS) | 0 | 17,000 | | | 0 | 17,000 |
| 38 | C3 COUNTERMEASURES | 0 | 163,127 | | | 0 | 163,127 |
| 39 | DEFENSE ENTERPRISE ACCOUNTING & MGT SYS | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 40 | THEATER BATTLE MGT C2 SYSTEM | 0 | 460 | | | 0 | 460 |
| 41 | AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER (AOC) | 0 | 23,778 | | | 0 | 23,778 |
| | **AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS** | | | | | | |
| 42 | BASE INFORMATION TRANSPT INFRAST (BITI) WIRED | 0 | 125,702 | | | 0 | 125,702 |
| 43 | AFNET | 0 | 325,839 | | | 0 | 325,839 |
| 44 | JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT (JCSE) | 0 | 16,267 | | | 0 | 16,267 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 45 | USCENTCOM | 0 | 15,328 | | | 0 | 15,328 |
| 46 | USSTRATCOM | 0 | 5,013 | | | 0 | 5,013 |
| 47 | USSPACECOM | 0 | 195,370 | | | 0 | 195,370 |
| | **ORGANIZATION AND BASE** | | | | | | |
| 48 | TACTICAL C-E EQUIPMENT | 0 | 162,835 | | | 0 | 162,835 |
| 49 | NEXT GENERATION SURVIVAL RADIO (NGSR) | 0 | 80,321 | | | 0 | 80,321 |
| 51 | RADIO EQUIPMENT | 0 | 36,874 | | | 0 | 36,874 |
| 52 | BASE COMM INFRASTRUCTURE | 0 | 158,113 | | | 0 | 158,113 |
| | **MODIFICATIONS** | | | | | | |
| 53 | COMM ELECT MODS | 0 | 220,855 | 0 | –10,000 | 0 | 210,855 |
| | Realignment to RDT&E for Over-the-Horizon Backscatter Radar | | | [0] | [–10,000] | | |
| | **PERSONAL SAFETY & RESCUE EQUIP** | | | | | | |
| 54 | PERSONAL SAFETY AND RESCUE EQUIPMENT | 0 | 87,994 | | | 0 | 87,994 |
| | **DEPOT PLANT+MTRLS HANDLING EQ** | | | | | | |
| 55 | POWER CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT | 0 | 14,444 | | | 0 | 14,444 |
| 56 | MECHANIZED MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIP | 0 | 24,594 | | | 0 | 24,594 |
| | **BASE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT** | | | | | | |
| 57 | BASE PROCURED EQUIPMENT | 0 | 81,686 | | | 0 | 81,686 |
| 58 | ENGINEERING AND EOD EQUIPMENT | 0 | 247,989 | | | 0 | 247,989 |
| 59 | MOBILITY EQUIPMENT | 0 | 288,930 | | | 0 | 288,930 |
| 60 | FUELS SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (FSE) | 0 | 81,066 | | | 0 | 81,066 |
| 61 | BASE MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 0 | 68,127 | | | 0 | 68,127 |
| | **SPECIAL SUPPORT PROJECTS** | | | | | | |
| 63 | DARP RC135 | 0 | 31,496 | | | 0 | 31,496 |
| 64 | DCGS-AF | 0 | 316,157 | | | 0 | 316,157 |
| 66 | SPECIAL UPDATE PROGRAM | 0 | 5,099,420 | | | 0 | 5,099,420 |
| | **CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 0 | 27,241,704 | | | 0 | 27,241,704 |
| | **SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS** | | | | | | |
| 67 | SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS (CYBER) | 0 | 8,657 | | | 0 | 8,657 |
| 68 | SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS | 0 | 14,129 | | | 0 | 14,129 |
| | **TOTAL OTHER PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE** | **0** | **39,199,963** | **0** | **15,000** | **0** | **39,214,963** |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| | **PROCUREMENT, DEFENSE-WIDE** | | | | | | |
| | **MAJOR EQUIPMENT, DCSA** | | | | | | |
| 23 | MAJOR EQUIPMENT | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **MAJOR EQUIPMENT, DHRA** | | | | | | |
| 37 | PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION | 0 | 82,438 | | | 0 | 82,438 |
| | **MAJOR EQUIPMENT, DISA** | | | | | | |
| 7 | INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY | 0 | 27,652 | | | 0 | 27,652 |
| 8 | TELEPORT PROGRAM | 0 | 93,512 | | | 0 | 93,512 |
| 9 | ITEMS LESS THAN $5 MILLION | 0 | 24,013 | | | 0 | 24,013 |
| 10 | DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEM NETWORK | 0 | 392,650 | | | 0 | 392,650 |
| 12 | WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATION AGENCY | 0 | 611,216 | 0 | –100,000 | 0 | 511,216 |
| | Unjustified growth | | | [0] | [–100,000] | | |
| 13 | SENIOR LEADERSHIP ENTERPRISE | 0 | 81,584 | | | 0 | 81,584 |
| 14 | JOINT REGIONAL SECURITY STACKS (JRSS) | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 15 | JOINT SERVICE PROVIDER | 0 | 53,596 | | | 0 | 53,596 |
| 16 | FOURTH ESTATE NETWORK OPTIMIZATION (4ENO) | 0 | 60,808 | | | 0 | 60,808 |
| | **MAJOR EQUIPMENT, DLA** | | | | | | |
| 22 | MAJOR EQUIPMENT | 0 | 19,707 | | | 0 | 19,707 |
| | **MAJOR EQUIPMENT, DMACT** | | | | | | |
| 44 | MAJOR EQUIPMENT | 0 | 6,854 | | | 0 | 6,854 |
| | **MAJOR EQUIPMENT, DPAA** | | | | | | |
| 1 | MAJOR EQUIPMENT, DPAA | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| | **MAJOR EQUIPMENT, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY** | | | | | | |
| 40 | VEHICLES | 0 | 99 | | | 0 | 99 |
| 41 | OTHER MAJOR EQUIPMENT | 0 | 8,963 | | | 0 | 8,963 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 42 | DTRA CYBER ACTIVITIES | 0 | 900 | | | 0 | 900 |
| | **MAJOR EQUIPMENT, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY** | | | | | | |
| 26 | THAAD | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 28 | AEGIS BMD | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 29 | BMDS AN/TPY–2 RADARS | 0 | 17,840 | | | 0 | 17,840 |
| 30 | SM–3 IIAS | 22 | 778,964 | | | 22 | 778,964 |
| 31 | ARROW 3 UPPER TIER SYSTEMS | 1 | 150,000 | | | 1 | 150,000 |
| 32 | SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (SRBMD) | 1 | 30,000 | | | 1 | 30,000 |
| 33 | DEFENSE OF GUAM PROCUREMENT | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 35 | IRON DOME | 1 | 20,000 | | | 1 | 20,000 |
| 36 | AEGIS BMD HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE | 0 | 39,256 | | | 0 | 39,256 |
| | **MAJOR EQUIPMENT, OSD** | | | | | | |
| 2 | MAJOR EQUIPMENT, OSD | 0 | 213,031 | | | 0 | 213,031 |
| | **MAJOR EQUIPMENT, TJS** | | | | | | |
| 24 | MAJOR EQUIPMENT, TJS | 0 | 11,689 | | | 0 | 11,689 |
| 25 | COUNTER-SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS | 0 | 800,000 | | | 0 | 800,000 |
| | **MAJOR EQUIPMENT, WHS** | | | | | | |
| 6 | MAJOR EQUIPMENT, WHS | 0 | 453 | | | 0 | 453 |
| | **MAJOR EQUIPMENT, USCYBERCOM** | | | | | | |
| 45 | CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS | 0 | 103,855 | 0 | 20,000 | 0 | 123,855 |
| | Hunt kits for reserve component | | | [0] | [20,000] | | |
| | **CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 0 | 3,587,405 | | | 0 | 3,587,405 |
| | **AVIATION PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 46 | ARMED OVERWATCH/TARGETING | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 50 | ROTARY WING UPGRADES AND SUSTAINMENT | 0 | 185,930 | 0 | 72,000 | 0 | 257,930 |
| | SOCOM UPL—SOF Mobility combat loss | | | [0] | [72,000] | | |
| 51 | SKYRAIDER II | 2 | 59,894 | –2 | –59,894 | 0 | 0 |
| | Realignment to SOCOM UPL | | | [–2] | [–59,894] | | |
| 52 | UNMANNED ISR | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 53 | NON-STANDARD AVIATION | 0 | 72,650 | 0 | 37,600 | 0 | 110,250 |
| | SOCOM UPL—Non-standard aviation | | | [0] | [37,600] | | |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost | Qty | Cost |
| 54 | U–28 | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 55 | MH–47 CHINOOK | 0 | 168,411 | | | 0 | 168,411 |
| 56 | CV–22 MODIFICATION | 0 | 9,479 | | | 0 | 9,479 |
| 57 | MQ–9 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE | 0 | 75,841 | 0 | 5,400 | 0 | 81,241 |
| | SOCOM UPL—Adaptive Airborne Enterprise Group 3 sUAS | | | [0] | [5,400] | | |
| 58 | PRECISION STRIKE PACKAGE | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 59 | AC/MC–130J | 0 | 366,857 | 0 | 55,750 | 0 | 422,607 |
| | SOCOM UPL- SOF Mobility combat loss | | | [0] | [55,750] | | |
| | **SHIPBUILDING** | | | | | | |
| 60 | UNDERWATER SYSTEMS | 0 | 76,879 | 0 | 13,400 | 0 | 90,279 |
| | SOCOM UPL—Mission critical Dry Combat Submersible battery upgrade | | | [0] | [13,400] | | |
| | **AMMUNITION PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 61 | ORDNANCE ITEMS <$5M | 0 | 237,153 | 0 | 148,200 | 0 | 385,353 |
| | SOCOM UPL—Ground organic precision strike systems | | | [0] | [25,500] | | |
| | SOCOM UPL—Munitions War Reserve | | | [0] | [118,000] | | |
| | SOCOM UPL—Small cruise missile development | | | [0] | [4,700] | | |
| | **OTHER PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS** | | | | | | |
| 62 | INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS | 0 | 319,241 | | | 0 | 319,241 |
| 63 | DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND/SURFACE SYSTEMS | 0 | 0 | | | 0 | 0 |
| 64 | OTHER ITEMS <$5M | 0 | 119,047 | | | 0 | 119,047 |
| 65 | COMBATANT CRAFT SYSTEMS | 0 | 33,858 | 0 | 9,100 | 0 | 42,958 |
| | Special Operations Craft—Riverine | | | [0] | [9,100] | | |
| 66 | SPECIAL PROGRAMS | 0 | 130,462 | | | 0 | 130,462 |
| 67 | TACTICAL VEHICLES | 0 | 36,983 | | | 0 | 36,983 |
| 68 | WARRIOR SYSTEMS <$5M | 0 | 511,016 | 0 | 190,300 | 0 | 701,316 |
| | SOCOM UPL—Electromagnetic warfare family of systems | | | [0] | [79,900] | | |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | SOCOM UPL—Ground infiltration protection system | | | [0] | [39,200] | | |
| | SOCOM UPL—SOF-P pre-positioned stocks | | | [0] | [71,200] | | |
| 69 | COMBAT MISSION REQUIREMENTS | 0 | 4,988 | | | 0 | 4,988 |
| 70 | OPERATIONAL ENHANCEMENTS INTELLIGENCE | 0 | 28,074 | | | 0 | 28,074 |
| 71 | OPERATIONAL ENHANCEMENTS | 0 | 360,595 | 0 | 257,200 | 0 | 617,795 |
| | SOCOM UPL—Accelerated fielding of Group 3 UAS | | | [0] | [36,600] | | |
| | SOCOM UPL—Armored ground mobility system | | | [0] | [48,000] | | |
| | SOCOM UPL—Ground infiltration protection system | | | [0] | [12,000] | | |
| | SOCOM UPL—Operational capacity enhancement | | | [0] | [160,600] | | |
| | **CBDP** | | | | | | |
| 72 | CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS | 0 | 223,166 | | | 0 | 223,166 |
| 73 | CB PROTECTION & HAZARD MITIGATION | 0 | 117,859 | | | 0 | 117,859 |
| | **TOTAL PROCUREMENT, DEFENSE-WIDE** | **27** | **10,354,868** | **–2** | **649,056** | **25** | **11,003,924** |
| | **DEFENSE STRATEGIC CAPITAL CREDIT PROGRAM** | | | | | | |
| | **DEFENSE STRATEGIC CAPITAL CREDIT PROGRAM** | | | | | | |
| 1 | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC CAPITAL LOAN PROGRAM | 0 | 216,000 | | | 0 | 216,000 |
| | **TOTAL DEFENSE STRATEGIC CAPITAL CREDIT PROGRAM** | **0** | **216,000** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **216,000** |
| | **TOTAL PROCUREMENT** | **11,153** | **256,058,141** | **2,991** | **–368,971** | **14,144** | **255,689,170** |

# TITLE XLII—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

## SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION.

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, ARMY** | | | |
| | | **BASIC RESEARCH** | | | |
| 1 | 0601102A | DEFENSE RESEARCH SCIENCES | 215,322 | 85,000 | 300,322 |
| | | Increase for basic research activities | | [75,000] | |
| | | Innovative Energetic Materials | | [10,000] | |
| 2 | 0601103A | UNIVERSITY RESEARCH INITIATIVES | 63,102 | | 63,102 |
| 3 | 0601104A | UNIVERSITY AND INDUSTRY RESEARCH CENTERS | 53,598 | 25,000 | 78,598 |
| | | Increase for basic research activities | | [25,000] | |
| 4 | 0601121A | CYBER COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH ALLIANCE | 0 | | |
| 5 | 0601275A | ELECTRONIC WARFARE BASIC RESEARCH | 64,031 | | 64,031 |
| 6 | 0601601A | ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING BASIC RESEARCH | 0 | | |
| | | **SUBTOTAL BASIC RESEARCH** | **396,053** | **110,000** | **506,053** |
| | | **APPLIED RESEARCH** | | | |
| 7 | 0602002A | ARMY AGILE INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT-APPLIED RESEARCH | 0 | | |
| 8 | 0602134A | COUNTER IMPROVISED-THREAT ADVANCED STUDIES | 0 | | |
| 9 | 0602135A | COUNTER SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS (C-SUAS) APPLIED RESEARCH | 26,523 | 4,000 | 30,523 |
| | | C-UAS Detect, track and defeat | | [4,000] | |
| 10 | 0602141A | LETHALITY TECHNOLOGY | 232,046 | | 232,046 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11 | 0602143A | SOLDIER LETHALITY TECHNOLOGY | 68,018 | 18,000 | 86,018 |
| | | Army Pathfinder Airborne | | [5,000] | |
| | | Domestic Silicon Production Initiative | | [5,000] | |
| | | Pathfinder Air Assault | | [8,000] | |
| 12 | 0602144A | GROUND TECHNOLOGY | 44,146 | 30,000 | 74,146 |
| | | Isostatic High-Pressure Advanced Armor Production | | [10,000] | |
| | | Large Area Additive Deposition | | [10,000] | |
| | | Polar Proving Ground | | [5,000] | |
| | | Roadway Repair Materials Development | | [5,000] | |
| 13 | 0602145A | NEXT GENERATION COMBAT VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY | 70,540 | 14,000 | 84,540 |
| | | Advancing Autonomous Ground Vehicle Research | | [5,000] | |
| | | Ground Vehicle Research Center Lightweight Prototype | | [9,000] | |
| 14 | 0602146A | NETWORK C3I TECHNOLOGY | 53,373 | | 53,373 |
| 15 | 0602147A | LONG RANGE PRECISION FIRES TECHNOLOGY | 24,086 | | 24,086 |
| 16 | 0602148A | FUTURE VERTICLE LIFT TECHNOLOGY | 17,727 | | 17,727 |
| 17 | 0602150A | AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY | 36,113 | 5,000 | 41,113 |
| | | Counter-UAS Testing and Research Center | | [5,000] | |
| 18 | 0602180A | ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING TECHNOLOGIES | 0 | | |
| 20 | 0602182A | C3I APPLIED RESEARCH | 0 | | |
| 21 | 0602183A | AIR PLATFORM APPLIED RESEARCH | 43,700 | 10,000 | 53,700 |
| | | On-the-Edge Modeling for Next-Gen Passive Sensors | | [10,000] | |
| 22 | 0602184A | SOLDIER APPLIED RESEARCH | 2,429 | | 2,429 |
| 23 | 0602213A | C3I APPLIED CYBER | 63 | | 63 |
| 24 | 0602275A | ELECTRONIC WARFARE APPLIED RESEARCH | 51,184 | | 51,184 |
| 25 | 0602276A | ELECTRONIC WARFARE CYBER APPLIED RESEARCH | 9,857 | | 9,857 |
| 26 | 0602345A | UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS LAUNCHED EFFECTS APPLIED RESEARCH | 22,871 | | 22,871 |
| 27 | 0602386A | BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR MATERIALS—APPLIED RESEARCH | 14,979 | | 14,979 |
| 29 | 0602785A | MANPOWER/PERSONNEL/TRAINING TECHNOLOGY | 14,275 | 3,000 | 17,275 |
| | | Musculoskeletal Health Technologies | | [3,000] | |
| 30 | 0602787A | MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY | 149,221 | | 149,221 |
| 9999 | 9999999999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 32,883 | | 32,883 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL APPLIED RESEARCH** | **914,034** | **84,000** | **998,034** |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT** | | | |
| 31 | 0603002A | MEDICAL ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 17,876 | 10,000 | 27,876 |
| | | Drug Development for traumatic brian injury | | [10,000] | |
| 32 | 0603007A | MANPOWER, PERSONNEL AND TRAINING ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 11,113 | | 11,113 |
| 33 | 0603025A | ARMY AGILE INNOVATION AND DEMONSTRATION | 3,325 | | 3,325 |
| 34 | 0603040A | ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES | 0 | 8,000 | 8,000 |
| | | Preserving AI performance over time | | [8,000] | |
| 35 | 0603041A | ALL DOMAIN CONVERGENCE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 3,575 | | 3,575 |
| 36 | 0603042A | C3I ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 1,211 | | 1,211 |
| 37 | 0603043A | AIR PLATFORM ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 23,471 | | 23,471 |
| 38 | 0603044A | SOLDIER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 3,951 | | 3,951 |
| 39 | 0603116A | LETHALITY ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 31,812 | 10,000 | 41,812 |
| | | SLING BLADE Mid-Range Kinetic Counter-UAS Capability | | [10,000] | |
| 40 | 0603118A | SOLDIER LETHALITY ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 125,121 | | 125,121 |
| 41 | 0603119A | GROUND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 25,043 | 22,000 | 47,043 |
| | | Autonomous Tip-Extending Robots for the Transparent Battlefield Collaboration | | [5,000] | |
| | | Cold Regions Advanced Materials and Manufacturing | | [10,000] | |
| | | Fuel Cell Multi-Modular Use | | [5,000] | |
| | | Robotics Autonomous Floating Transit System (RAFTS) | | [2,000] | |
| 42 | 0603134A | COUNTER IMPROVISED-THREAT SIMULATION | 0 | | |
| 43 | 0603135A | COUNTER SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS (C-SUAS) ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 156,520 | | 156,520 |
| 44 | 0603275A | ELECTRONIC WARFARE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 156,326 | | 156,326 |
| 45 | 0603276A | ELECTRONIC WARFARE CYBER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 15,278 | | 15,278 |
| 46 | 0603345A | UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS LAUNCHED EFFECTS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 33,129 | | 33,129 |
| 47 | 0603386A | BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR MATERIALS—ADVANCED RESEARCH | 22,402 | | 22,402 |
| 48 | 0603457A | C3I CYBER ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT | 8,509 | | 8,509 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 49 | 0603461A | HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTING MODERNIZATION PROGRAM | 215,090 | 10,000 | 225,090 |
| | | High performance computing modernization program | | [10,000] | |
| 50 | 0603462A | NEXT GENERATION COMBAT VEHICLE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 118,207 | 14,000 | 132,207 |
| | | Electronic Signature Management Coatings | | [4,000] | |
| | | Next Generation Vehicle Automated Testing Infrastructure | | [10,000] | |
| 51 | 0603463A | NETWORK C3I ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 48,490 | | 48,490 |
| 52 | 0603464A | LONG RANGE PRECISION FIRES ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 422,590 | 7,500 | 430,090 |
| | | Missile Delivered Launched Effects – Virtual Test Range | | [7,500] | |
| 53 | 0603465A | FUTURE VERTICAL LIFT ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 14,984 | | 14,984 |
| 54 | 0603466A | AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 63,924 | 11,000 | 74,924 |
| | | C-UAS Detect, track and defeat | | [11,000] | |
| 56 | 0603920A | HUMANITARIAN DEMINING | 7,619 | 5,000 | 12,619 |
| | | Humanitarian Demining | | [5,000] | |
| 9999 | 9999999999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 80,717 | | 80,717 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT** | **1,610,283** | **97,500** | **1,707,783** |
| | | **ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROTOTYPES** | | | |
| 58 | 0603305A | ARMY MISSLE DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTEGRATION | 8,367 | | 8,367 |
| 59 | 0603308A | ARMY SPACE SYSTEMS INTEGRATION | 59,573 | | 59,573 |
| 60 | 0603327A | AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING | 0 | | |
| 61 | 0603619A | LANDMINE WARFARE AND BARRIER—ADV DEV | 31,374 | | 31,374 |
| 62 | 0603627A | SMOKE, OBSCURANT AND TARGET DEFEATING SYS-ADV DEV | 5,596 | | 5,596 |
| 63 | 0603639A | TANK AND MEDIUM CALIBER AMMUNITION | 277,248 | 5,000 | 282,248 |
| | | Large caliber automated ammunition resupply | | [5,000] | |
| 64 | 0603645A | ARMORED SYSTEM MODERNIZATION—ADV DEV | 23,594 | | 23,594 |
| 65 | 0603747A | SOLDIER SUPPORT AND SURVIVABILITY | 4,109 | | 4,109 |
| 66 | 0603766A | TACTICAL ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM—ADV DEV | 98,331 | | 98,331 |
| 67 | 0603774A | NIGHT VISION SYSTEMS ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT | 5,310 | | 5,310 |
| 68 | 0603779A | ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY TECHNOLOGY—DEM/VAL | 19,499 | | 19,499 |
| 69 | 0603790A | NATO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT | 5,145 | | 5,145 |
| 71 | 0603804A | LOGISTICS AND ENGINEER EQUIPMENT—ADV DEV | 12,822 | | 12,822 |
| 72 | 0603807A | MEDICAL SYSTEMS—ADV DEV | 1,017 | | 1,017 |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 73 | 0603827A | SOLDIER SYSTEMS—ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT | 56,122 | | 56,122 |
| 74 | 0604017A | ROBOTICS DEVELOPMENT | 20,290 | | 20,290 |
| 75 | 0604019A | EXPANDED MISSION AREA MISSILE (EMAM) | 235,593 | | 235,593 |
| 77 | 0604035A | LOW EARTH ORBIT (LEO) SATELLITE CAPABILITY | 319 | | 319 |
| 78 | 0604036A | MULTI-DOMAIN SENSING SYSTEM (MDSS) ADV DEV | 99,471 | | 99,471 |
| 79 | 0604037A | TACTICAL INTEL TARGETING ACCESS NODE (TITAN) ADV DEV | 4,123 | | 4,123 |
| 80 | 0604100A | ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES | 10,077 | | 10,077 |
| 84 | 0604114A | LOWER TIER AIR MISSILE DEFENSE (LTAMD) SENSOR | 162,074 | | 162,074 |
| 85 | 0604115A | TECHNOLOGY MATURATION INITIATIVES | 314,671 | 100,000 | 414,671 |
| | | SRM second sourcing and qualification | | [100,000] | |
| 86 | 0604117A | MANEUVER—SHORT RANGE AIR DEFENSE (M-SHORAD) | 460,980 | | 460,980 |
| 87 | 0604120A | ASSURED POSITIONING, NAVIGATION AND TIMING (PNT) | 18,993 | | 18,993 |
| 88 | 0604121A | SYNTHETIC TRAINING ENVIRONMENT REFINEMENT & PROTOTYPING | 219,137 | | 219,137 |
| 89 | 0604129A | ADVANCED POWER APPLICATIONS | 48,000 | | 48,000 |
| 90 | 0604134A | COUNTER IMPROVISED-THREAT DEMONSTRATION, PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING | 0 | | |
| 91 | 0604135A | STRATEGIC MID-RANGE FIRES | 211,848 | | 211,848 |
| 92 | 0604182A | HYPERSONICS | 82,939 | | 82,939 |
| 96 | 0604531A | COUNTER—SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT | 0 | | |
| 98 | 0604541A | UNIFIED NETWORK TRANSPORT | 0 | | |
| 99 | 0305251A | CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS FORCES AND FORCE SUPPORT | 22,889 | | 22,889 |
| 9999 | 9999999999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 261,466 | | 261,466 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROTOTYPES** | **2,780,977** | **105,000** | **2,885,977** |
| | | **SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION** | | | |
| 100 | 0604201A | AIRCRAFT AVIONICS | 30,658 | | 30,658 |
| 101 | 0604270A | ELECTRONIC WARFARE DEVELOPMENT | 2,807 | 5,000 | 7,807 |
| | | Electronic Warfare Development increase | | [5,000] | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 102 | 0604601A | INFANTRY SUPPORT WEAPONS | 55,296 | | 55,296 |
| 103 | 0604604A | MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLES | 23,763 | | 23,763 |
| 104 | 0604611A | JAVELIN | 10,217 | | 10,217 |
| 105 | 0604622A | FAMILY OF HEAVY TACTICAL VEHICLES | 43,003 | 10,000 | 53,003 |
| | | Data Integration for Ground Systems | | [10,000] | |
| 108 | 0604642A | LIGHT TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES | 6,142 | | 6,142 |
| 110 | 0604710A | NIGHT VISION SYSTEMS—ENG DEV | 418,427 | | 418,427 |
| 111 | 0604713A | COMBAT FEEDING, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT | 6,701 | | 6,701 |
| 112 | 0604715A | NON-SYSTEM TRAINING DEVICES—ENG DEV | 29,685 | | 29,685 |
| 113 | 0604741A | AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE—ENG DEV | 14,276 | | 14,276 |
| 114 | 0604742A | CONSTRUCTIVE SIMULATION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 5,618 | | 5,618 |
| 115 | 0604746A | AUTOMATIC TEST EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT | 9,625 | | 9,625 |
| 116 | 0604760A | DISTRIBUTIVE INTERACTIVE SIMULATIONS (DIS)—ENG DEV | 7,883 | | 7,883 |
| 117 | 0604798A | BRIGADE ANALYSIS, INTEGRATION AND EVALUATION | 26,602 | | 26,602 |
| 118 | 0604802A | WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS—ENG DEV | 124,881 | | 124,881 |
| 119 | 0604804A | LOGISTICS AND ENGINEER EQUIPMENT—ENG DEV | 65,238 | | 65,238 |
| 120 | 0604805A | COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS—ENG DEV | 5,541 | | 5,541 |
| 121 | 0604807A | MEDICAL MATERIEL/MEDICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT—ENG DEV | 9,744 | | 9,744 |
| 122 | 0604808A | LANDMINE WARFARE/BARRIER—ENG DEV | 17,586 | | 17,586 |
| 123 | 0604818A | ARMY TACTICAL COMMAND & CONTROL HARDWARE & SOFTWARE | 42,584 | | 42,584 |
| 124 | 0604820A | RADAR DEVELOPMENT | 58,260 | | 58,260 |
| 126 | 0604827A | SOLDIER SYSTEMS—WARRIOR DEM/VAL | 5,663 | | 5,663 |
| 127 | 0604852A | SUITE OF SURVIVABILITY ENHANCEMENT SYSTEMS—EMD | 78,331 | | 78,331 |
| 128 | 0604854A | ARTILLERY SYSTEMS—EMD | 709,192 | | 709,192 |
| 129 | 0605013A | INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 121,525 | | 121,525 |
| 130 | 0605018A | INTEGRATED PERSONNEL AND PAY SYSTEM-ARMY (IPPS-A) | 102,694 | | 102,694 |
| 131 | 0605030A | JOINT TACTICAL NETWORK CENTER (JTNC) | 21,561 | | 21,561 |
| 132 | 0605031A | JOINT TACTICAL NETWORK (JTN) | 50,390 | | 50,390 |
| 133 | 0605035A | COMMON INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES (CIRCM) | 11,573 | | 11,573 |
| 134 | 0605036A | COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (CWMD) | 5,605 | | 5,605 |
| 135 | 0605037A | EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND DETAINEE PROCESSING | 5,513 | | 5,513 |
| 136 | 0605038A | NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE (NBCRV) SENSOR SUITE | 13,864 | | 13,864 |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 137 | 0605041A | DEFENSIVE CYBER TOOL DEVELOPMENT | 3,519 | | 3,519 |
| 138 | 0605042A | TACTICAL NETWORK RADIO SYSTEMS (LOW-TIER) | 3,804 | | 3,804 |
| 139 | 0605047A | CONTRACT WRITING SYSTEM | 4,777 | | 4,777 |
| 140 | 0605049A | MISSILE WARNING SYSTEM MODERNIZATION (MWSM) | 0 | | |
| 141 | 0605051A | AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY DEVELOPMENT | 106,621 | | 106,621 |
| 142 | 0605052A | INDIRECT FIRE PROTECTION CAPABILITY INC 2—BLOCK 1 | 175,352 | | 175,352 |
| 143 | 0605053A | GROUND ROBOTICS | 192,185 | | 192,185 |
| 144 | 0605054A | EMERGING TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES | 147,881 | | 147,881 |
| 145 | 0605058A | TERMINAL HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE (THAAD) RDTE | 1,053,983 | | 1,053,983 |
| 146 | 0605144A | NEXT GENERATION LOAD DEVICE—MEDIUM | 2,380 | | 2,380 |
| 147 | 0605148A | TACTICAL INTEL TARGETING ACCESS NODE (TITAN) EMD | 35,769 | 81,510 | 117,279 |
| | | Realignment from procurement | | [81,510] | |
| 151 | 0605224A | MULTI-DOMAIN INTELLIGENCE | 49,594 | | 49,594 |
| 152 | 0605231A | PRECISION STRIKE MISSILE (PRSM) | 288,304 | | 288,304 |
| 153 | 0605232A | HYPERSONICS EMD | 446,616 | 5,000 | 451,616 |
| | | Low Cost Hypersonic Test Bed | | [5,000] | |
| 154 | 0605233A | ACCESSIONS INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (AIE) | 33,770 | | 33,770 |
| 155 | 0605235A | STRATEGIC MID-RANGE CAPABILITY | 82,550 | | 82,550 |
| 156 | 0605236A | INTEGRATED TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS | 0 | | |
| 157 | 0605241A | FUTURE LONG RANGE ASSAULT AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT | 2,140,569 | 127,217 | 2,267,786 |
| | | Realignment from procurement for operational test aircraft | | [127,217] | |
| 159 | 0605244A | JOINT REDUCED RANGE ROCKET (JR3) | 16,014 | 15,000 | 31,014 |
| | | Programmatic increase to support HIMARS platforms | | [15,000] | |
| 161 | 0605275A | ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 99,691 | | 99,691 |
| 162 | 0605330A | C2 TRANSPORT | 45,370 | | 45,370 |
| 163 | 0605331A | C2 APPLICATIONS | 488,401 | | 488,401 |
| 164 | 0605332A | C2 DATA | 306,019 | | 306,019 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 165 | 0605333A | C2 INFRASTRUCTURE | 64,849 | | 64,849 |
| 166 | 0605345A | UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS LAUNCHED EFFECTS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 816,433 | | 816,433 |
| 167 | 0605347A | COUNTER UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS (UAS) DEVELOPMENT | 359,182 | | 359,182 |
| 169 | 0605457A | ARMY INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE (AIAMD) | 126,623 | | 126,623 |
| 170 | 0605531A | COUNTER—SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS SYS DEV & DEMONSTRATION | 695 | | 695 |
| 172 | 0605625A | MANNED GROUND VEHICLE | 290,069 | 20,000 | 310,069 |
| | | Unmanned Ground Vehicles Development | | [20,000] | |
| 173 | 0605766A | NATIONAL CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION (MIP) | 17,211 | | 17,211 |
| 174 | 0605812A | JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE (JLTV) ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING DEVELOPMENT PHASE (EMD). | 2,749 | | 2,749 |
| 175 | 0605830A | AVIATION GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT | 951 | | 951 |
| 176 | 0303032A | TROJAN—RH12 | 3,946 | | 3,946 |
| 178 | 0304270A | ELECTRONIC WARFARE DEVELOPMENT | 125,301 | | 125,301 |
| 9999 | 9999999999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 89,121 | | 89,121 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION** | **9,760,747** | **263,727** | **10,024,474** |
| | | **MANAGEMENT SUPPORT** | | | |
| 179 | 0604256A | THREAT SIMULATOR DEVELOPMENT | 60,233 | | 60,233 |
| 180 | 0604258A | TARGET SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 16,488 | | 16,488 |
| 181 | 0604759A | MAJOR T&E INVESTMENT | 106,140 | 20,000 | 126,140 |
| | | Ground Based Radar—Kwajalein radome and digital modernization | | [20,000] | |
| 182 | 0605103A | RAND ARROYO CENTER | 10,737 | | 10,737 |
| 183 | 0605301A | ARMY KWAJALEIN ATOLL | 7,051 | 140,000 | 147,051 |
| | | Deferred maintenance backlog reduction | | [140,000] | |
| 184 | 0605326A | CONCEPTS EXPERIMENTATION PROGRAM | 55,596 | | 55,596 |
| 186 | 0605601A | ARMY TEST RANGES AND FACILITIES | 469,723 | | 469,723 |
| 187 | 0605602A | ARMY TECHNICAL TEST INSTRUMENTATION AND TARGETS | 62,303 | | 62,303 |
| 188 | 0605604A | SURVIVABILITY/LETHALITY ANALYSIS | 31,283 | | 31,283 |
| 189 | 0605606A | AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION | 1,983 | | 1,983 |
| 190 | 0605706A | MATERIEL SYSTEMS ANALYSIS | 19,013 | | 19,013 |
| 191 | 0605709A | EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN ITEMS | 10,481 | | 10,481 |
| 192 | 0605712A | SUPPORT OF OPERATIONAL TESTING | 60,733 | | 60,733 |

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 193 | 0605716A | ARMY EVALUATION CENTER | 65,565 | | 65,565 |
| 194 | 0605718A | ARMY MODELING & SIM X-CMD COLLABORATION & INTEG | 15,608 | | 15,608 |
| 195 | 0605801A | PROGRAMWIDE ACTIVITIES | 52,978 | | 52,978 |
| 196 | 0605803A | TECHNICAL INFORMATION ACTIVITIES | 27,004 | | 27,004 |
| 197 | 0605805A | MUNITIONS STANDARDIZATION, EFFECTIVENESS AND SAFETY | 44,851 | | 44,851 |
| 198 | 0605857A | ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY TECHNOLOGY MGMT SUPPORT | 3,256 | | 3,256 |
| 199 | 0605898A | ARMY DIRECT REPORT HEADQUARTERS—R&D - MHA | 54,276 | | 54,276 |
| 200 | 0606002A | RONALD REAGAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TEST SITE | 118,585 | 90,000 | 208,585 |
| | | Deferred maintenance backlog reduction | | [90,000] | |
| 201 | 0606003A | COUNTERINTEL AND HUMAN INTEL MODERNIZATION | 5,802 | | 5,802 |
| 202 | 0606118A | AIAMD SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT & INTEGRATION | 653,653 | | 653,653 |
| 203 | 0606942A | ASSESSMENTS AND EVALUATIONS CYBER VULNERABILITIES | 6,468 | | 6,468 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL MANAGEMENT SUPPORT** | **1,959,810** | **250,000** | **2,209,810** |
| | | **OPERATIONAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT** | | | |
| 205 | 0603778A | MLRS PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM | 17,780 | 20,000 | 37,780 |
| | | GLSDB integration on HIMARS | | [20,000] | |
| 206 | 0605024A | ANTI-TAMPER TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT | 6,613 | | 6,613 |
| 207 | 0607101A | COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (CWMD) PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT | 488 | | 488 |
| 208 | 0607131A | WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS | 21,553 | 10,000 | 31,553 |
| | | Weapons and Munitions Product Improvement Programs | | [10,000] | |
| 209 | 0607136A | BLACKHAWK PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM | 35,147 | | 35,147 |
| 210 | 0607137A | CHINOOK PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM | 7,277 | | 7,277 |
| 211 | 0607139A | IMPROVED TURBINE ENGINE PROGRAM | 0 | | |
| 213 | 0607145A | APACHE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT | 30,759 | 30,000 | 60,759 |
| | | Apache Modernization | | [30,000] | |
| 214 | 0607148A | AN/TPQ–53 COUNTERFIRE TARGET ACQUISITION RADAR SYSTEM | 90,981 | | 90,981 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 215 | 0607150A | INTEL CYBER DEVELOPMENT | 13,694 | | 13,694 |
| 216 | 0607212A | TENCAP ENHANCEMENTS | 20,982 | | 20,982 |
| 219 | 0607665A | FAMILY OF BIOMETRICS | 1,640 | | 1,640 |
| 220 | 0607865A | PATRIOT PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT | 219,046 | | 219,046 |
| 221 | 0203728A | JOINT AUTOMATED DEEP OPERATION COORDINATION SYSTEM (JADOCS) | 11,255 | | 11,255 |
| 222 | 0203735A | COMBAT VEHICLE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS | 492,364 | | 492,364 |
| 223 | 0203743A | 155MM SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER IMPROVEMENTS | 0 | | |
| 224 | 0203752A | AIRCRAFT ENGINE COMPONENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM | 239 | | 239 |
| 225 | 0203758A | DIGITIZATION | 1,615 | | 1,615 |
| 226 | 0203801A | MISSILE/AIR DEFENSE PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM | 2,054 | | 2,054 |
| 229 | 0205778A | GUIDED MULTIPLE-LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM (GMLRS) | 73,639 | | 73,639 |
| 232 | 0303140A | INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY PROGRAM | 15,932 | | 15,932 |
| 234 | 0303142A | SATCOM GROUND ENVIRONMENT (SPACE) | 4,870 | | 4,870 |
| 237 | 0305179A | INTEGRATED BROADCAST SERVICE (IBS) | 6,870 | | 6,870 |
| 238 | 0305219A | MQ–1 GRAY EAGLE UAV | 2,590 | | 2,590 |
| 239 | 0708045A | END ITEM INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES | 68,097 | 25,000 | 93,097 |
| | | Letterkenney Directed Energy Research | | [25,000] | |
| 9999 | 9999999999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 47,342 | | 47,342 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL OPERATIONAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT** | **1,192,827** | **85,000** | **1,277,827** |
| | | **SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY PILOT PROGRAMS** | | | |
| 240 | 0608041A | DEFENSIVE CYBER—SOFTWARE PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT | 94,095 | | 94,095 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY PILOT PROGRAMS** | **94,095** | **0** | **94,095** |
| | | **TOTAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, ARMY** | **18,708,826** | **995,227** | **19,704,053** |
| | | **RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, NAVY** | | | |
| | | **BASIC RESEARCH** | | | |
| 1 | 0601103N | UNIVERSITY RESEARCH INITIATIVES | 0 | 75,000 | 75,000 |
| | | Increase for basic research activities | | [75,000] | |
| 2 | 0601153N | DEFENSE RESEARCH SCIENCES | 525,399 | 15,100 | 540,499 |
| | | Precision interferometer at Lowell Observatory | | [10,100] | |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Quantum algorithms for chemistry and computational fluid dynamics | | [5,000] | |
| | | **SUBTOTAL BASIC RESEARCH** | **525,399** | **90,100** | **615,499** |
| | | **APPLIED RESEARCH** | | | |
| 3 | 0602114N | POWER PROJECTION APPLIED RESEARCH | 38,838 | | 38,838 |
| 4 | 0602123N | FORCE PROTECTION APPLIED RESEARCH | 137,779 | | 137,779 |
| 5 | 0602131M | MARINE CORPS LANDING FORCE TECHNOLOGY | 57,567 | | 57,567 |
| 6 | 0602235N | COMMON PICTURE APPLIED RESEARCH | 40,433 | | 40,433 |
| 7 | 0602236N | WARFIGHTER SUSTAINMENT APPLIED RESEARCH | 60,350 | 5,000 | 65,350 |
| | | Slip Resistance Testing for corrosion resistant marine decking testing | | [5,000] | |
| 8 | 0602271N | ELECTROMAGNETIC SYSTEMS APPLIED RESEARCH | 74,603 | | 74,603 |
| 9 | 0602435N | OCEAN WARFIGHTING ENVIRONMENT APPLIED RESEARCH | 64,693 | 30,000 | 94,693 |
| | | Autonomous Sense-Making of the Undersea Battlespace | | [12,000] | |
| | | Ocean Warfighting Environment Applied Research | | [3,000] | |
| | | Resilient Autonomous Sensing in the Arctic (VIPER) | | [15,000] | |
| 10 | 0602651M | JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS APPLIED RESEARCH | 4,105 | | 4,105 |
| 11 | 0602747N | UNDERSEA WARFARE APPLIED RESEARCH | 52,515 | | 52,515 |
| 12 | 0602750N | FUTURE NAVAL CAPABILITIES APPLIED RESEARCH | 305,357 | | 305,357 |
| 13 | 0602782N | MINE AND EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE APPLIED RESEARCH | 24,634 | | 24,634 |
| 15 | 0602861N | SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT—ONR FIELD ACITIVITIES | 74,378 | | 74,378 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL APPLIED RESEARCH** | **935,252** | **35,000** | **970,252** |
| | | **ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT** | | | |
| 16 | 0603123N | FORCE PROTECTION ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 50,869 | 7,000 | 57,869 |
| | | Secure power data analytics and AI | | [7,000] | |
| 17 | 0603271N | ELECTROMAGNETIC SYSTEMS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 8,635 | | 8,635 |
| 18 | 0603273N | SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY FOR NUCLEAR RE-ENTRY SYSTEMS | 114,767 | | 114,767 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19 | 0603640M | USMC ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION (ATD) | 287,897 | 40,000 | 327,897 |
| | | Bullseye Missile Integration and Demonstration | | [40,000] | |
| 20 | 0603651M | JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 8,727 | | 8,727 |
| 21 | 0603673N | FUTURE NAVAL CAPABILITIES ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 445,977 | | 445,977 |
| 22 | 0603680N | MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM | 79,132 | | 79,132 |
| 23 | 0603729N | WARFIGHTER PROTECTION ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 0 | | |
| 24 | 0603758N | NAVY WARFIGHTING EXPERIMENTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS | 66,395 | 7,500 | 73,895 |
| | | Remote and Resilient Edge Computing | | [7,500] | |
| 25 | 0603782N | MINE AND EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 0 | | |
| | | **SUBTOTAL ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT** | **1,062,399** | **54,500** | **1,116,899** |
| | | **ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROTOTYPES** | | | |
| 27 | 0603128N | UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM | 35,706 | | 35,706 |
| 29 | 0603207N | AIR/OCEAN TACTICAL APPLICATIONS | 76,141 | 19,000 | 95,141 |
| | | Dual-Modality Large Displacement UUV | | [19,000] | |
| 30 | 0603216N | AVIATION SURVIVABILITY | 20,010 | | 20,010 |
| 31 | 0603239N | NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES | 7,726 | | 7,726 |
| 32 | 0603254N | ASW SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 20,070 | | 20,070 |
| 33 | 0603261N | TACTICAL AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE | 3,239 | | 3,239 |
| 34 | 0603382N | ADVANCED COMBAT SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY | 32,263 | | 32,263 |
| 35 | 0603502N | SURFACE AND SHALLOW WATER MINE COUNTERMEASURES | 32,451 | | 32,451 |
| 36 | 0603506N | SURFACE SHIP TORPEDO DEFENSE | 9,920 | | 9,920 |
| 37 | 0603512N | CARRIER SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 8,806 | | 8,806 |
| 38 | 0603525N | PILOT FISH | 1,339,052 | | 1,339,052 |
| 39 | 0603536N | RETRACT JUNIPER | 275,300 | | 275,300 |
| 40 | 0603542N | RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL | 704 | | 704 |
| 42 | 0603561N | UNDERSEA WARFARE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT | 132,885 | 15,000 | 147,885 |
| | | 21st Century Polymers for Submarines | | [15,000] | |
| 44 | 0603563N | SHIP CONCEPT ADVANCED DESIGN | 353,893 | –177,000 | 176,893 |
| | | ARSV unjustified request | | [–177,000] | |
| 45 | 0603564N | SHIP PRELIMINARY DESIGN & FEASIBILITY STUDIES | 666,640 | | 666,640 |
| 46 | 0603570N | ADVANCED NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS | 392,426 | | 392,426 |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 47 | 0603573N | ADVANCED SURFACE MACHINERY SYSTEMS | 269,961 | | 269,961 |
| 48 | 0603576N | CHALK EAGLE | 149,351 | | 149,351 |
| 49 | 0603581N | LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) | 12,576 | 22,576 | 35,152 |
| | | FREEDOM-Class LCS Supply Chain Risk Analysis and Radar Remediation Demonstration | | [22,576] | |
| 50 | 0603582N | COMBAT SYSTEM INTEGRATION | 18,819 | | 18,819 |
| 51 | 0603595N | OHIO REPLACEMENT | 331,577 | | 331,577 |
| 52 | 0603596N | LCS MISSION MODULES | 46,239 | | 46,239 |
| 53 | 0603597N | AUTOMATED TEST AND RE-TEST (ATRT) | 18,070 | | 18,070 |
| 54 | 0603598N | ATRT ENTERPRISE RAPID CAPABILITY | 87,585 | | 87,585 |
| 55 | 0603599N | FRIGATE DEVELOPMENT | 212,041 | | 212,041 |
| 56 | 0603609N | CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS | 10,216 | | 10,216 |
| 57 | 0603635M | MARINE CORPS GROUND COMBAT/SUPPORT SYSTEM | 521,995 | | 521,995 |
| 58 | 0603654N | JOINT SERVICE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DEVELOPMENT | 43,568 | | 43,568 |
| 59 | 0603713N | OCEAN ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 15,903 | | 15,903 |
| 60 | 0603721N | ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION | 19,347 | | 19,347 |
| 61 | 0603724N | NAVY ENERGY PROGRAM | 59,591 | 30,800 | 90,391 |
| | | Battery develop safety—accelerate MBSE, field DIU standard batteries, sUAS safety certs | | [8,300] | |
| | | High value target protection program | | [17,500] | |
| | | Power and energy supply chain | | [5,000] | |
| 62 | 0603725N | FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT | 13,738 | | 13,738 |
| 63 | 0603734N | CHALK CORAL | 995,658 | | 995,658 |
| 64 | 0603739N | NAVY LOGISTIC PRODUCTIVITY | 929 | | 929 |
| 65 | 0603746N | RETRACT MAPLE | 655,551 | | 655,551 |
| 66 | 0603748N | LINK PLUMERIA | 498,853 | | 498,853 |
| 67 | 0603751N | RETRACT ELM | 87,999 | | 87,999 |
| 68 | 0603764M | LINK EVERGREEN | 593,835 | | 593,835 |
| 69 | 0603790N | NATO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT | 5,513 | | 5,513 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 70 | 0603795N | LAND ATTACK TECHNOLOGY | 985 | | 985 |
| 71 | 0603851M | JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS TESTING | 14,152 | | 14,152 |
| 72 | 0603860N | JOINT PRECISION APPROACH AND LANDING SYSTEMS—DEM/VAL | 73,813 | | 73,813 |
| 73 | 0603889N | COUNTERDRUG RDT&E PROJECTS | 6,500 | | 6,500 |
| 74 | 0603925N | DIRECTED ENERGY AND ELECTRIC WEAPON SYSTEMS | 94,825 | 9,000 | 103,825 |
| | | Ship-board high powered microwave counter-UAS development | | [9,000] | |
| 76 | 0604027N | DIGITAL WARFARE OFFICE | 182,205 | | 182,205 |
| 77 | 0604028N | SMALL AND MEDIUM UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLES | 24,598 | 100,000 | 124,598 |
| | | Increase low cost undersea effector | | [100,000] | |
| 78 | 0604029N | UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE CORE TECHNOLOGIES | 62,460 | 25,000 | 87,460 |
| | | Liberty Cage—Refuel stations for UUVs (N97) | | [5,000] | |
| | | Ocean Explorer (OEX) commercial battery for XXL UUV (N97) | | [20,000] | |
| 80 | 0604031N | LARGE UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLES | 0 | 120,000 | 120,000 |
| | | Increase Liberator and RAPTOR | | [120,000] | |
| 81 | 0604112N | GERALD R. FORD CLASS NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIER (CVN 78—80) | 111,241 | | 111,241 |
| 82 | 0604127N | SURFACE MINE COUNTERMEASURES | 17,762 | | 17,762 |
| 83 | 0604272N | TACTICAL AIR DIRECTIONAL INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES (TADIRCM) | 14,974 | | 14,974 |
| 84 | 0604286N | NAVY ADVANCED MANUFACTURING | 10,016 | 5,000 | 15,016 |
| | | Advanced Naval Casting for Hardware and Operational Repairs (ANCHOR) | | [5,000] | |
| 85 | 0604289M | NEXT GENERATION LOGISTICS | 24 | | 24 |
| 86 | 0604292N | FUTURE VERTICAL LIFT (MARITIME STRIKE) | 5,314 | | 5,314 |
| 87 | 0604295M | MARINE AVIATION DEMONSTRATION/VALIDATION | 47,152 | 60,000 | 107,152 |
| | | USMC unmanned vertical take off/landing aerial vehicle | | [60,000] | |
| 88 | 0604320M | RAPID TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITY PROTOTYPE | 125,999 | | 125,999 |
| 89 | 0604454N | LX (R) | 18,574 | | 18,574 |
| 90 | 0604536N | ADVANCED UNDERSEA PROTOTYPING | 164,512 | 50,000 | 214,512 |
| | | Advanced sea mines project scylla | | [50,000] | |
| 92 | 0604636N | COUNTER UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (C-UAS) | 20,833 | | 20,833 |
| 93 | 0604659N | PRECISION STRIKE WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM | 206,873 | | 206,873 |
| 94 | 0604707N | SPACE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE (SEW) ARCHITECTURE/ENGINEERING SUPPORT | 8,657 | | 8,657 |
| 95 | 0604786N | OFFENSIVE ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE WEAPON DEVELOPMENT | 104,527 | | 104,527 |
| 97 | 0605513N | UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLE ENABLING CAPABILITIES | 255,135 | 377,000 | 632,135 |

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Containerized payloads for MUSV | | [325,000] | |
| | | Increase USV enabling capabilities | | [52,000] | |
| 98 | 0605514M | GROUND BASED ANTI-SHIP MISSILE | 16,307 | | 16,307 |
| 100 | 0605518N | CONVENTIONAL PROMPT STRIKE (CPS) | 1,341,416 | –541,416 | 800,000 |
| | | CPS unjustified increase | | [–541,416] | |
| 101 | 0105519N | NUCLEAR-ARMED SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (SLCM-N) SUPPORT | 0 | 250,000 | 250,000 |
| | | Restoration of statutorily-directed funding | | [250,000] | |
| 102 | 0207147M | COLLABORATIVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT | 213,934 | | 213,934 |
| 103 | 0303260N | DEFENSE MILITARY DECEPTION INITIATIVE | 0 | | |
| 104 | 0303354N | ASW SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT—MIP | 3,206 | | 3,206 |
| 105 | 0304240M | ADVANCED TACTICAL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM | 1,979 | | 1,979 |
| 106 | 0304270N | ELECTRONIC WARFARE DEVELOPMENT—MIP | 0 | | |
| 107 | 0304797N | UNDERSEA ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE / MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML) | 13,563 | | 13,563 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROTOTYPES** | **11,237,683** | **364,960** | **11,602,643** |
| | | **SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION** | | | |
| 108 | 0603208N | TRAINING SYSTEM AIRCRAFT | 80,617 | | 80,617 |
| 109 | 0604038N | MARITIME TARGETING CELL | 216,514 | | 216,514 |
| 110 | 0604212N | OTHER HELO DEVELOPMENT | 976 | | 976 |
| 112 | 0604215N | STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT | 4,399 | | 4,399 |
| 113 | 0604216N | MULTI-MISSION HELICOPTER UPGRADE DEVELOPMENT | 88,855 | | 88,855 |
| 114 | 0604230N | WARFARE SUPPORT SYSTEM | 73,080 | | 73,080 |
| 115 | 0604231N | COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS | 73,534 | | 73,534 |
| 116 | 0604234N | ADVANCED HAWKEYE | 390,260 | | 390,260 |
| 117 | 0604245M | H–1 UPGRADES | 66,446 | | 66,446 |
| 118 | 0604261N | ACOUSTIC SEARCH SENSORS | 48,875 | | 48,875 |
| 119 | 0604262N | V–22 | 252,335 | | 252,335 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 120 | 0604264N | AIR CREW SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 21,582 | 21,582 |
| 121 | 0604269N | EA–18 | 131,683 | 131,683 |
| 122 | 0604270N | ELECTRONIC WARFARE DEVELOPMENT | 168,985 | 168,985 |
| 123 | 0604273M | EXECUTIVE HELO DEVELOPMENT | 69,438 | 69,438 |
| 124 | 0604274N | NEXT GENERATION JAMMER (NGJ) | 50,332 | 50,332 |
| 125 | 0604280N | JOINT TACTICAL RADIO SYSTEM—NAVY (JTRS-NAVY) | 409,318 | 409,318 |
| 126 | 0604282N | NEXT GENERATION JAMMER (NGJ) INCREMENT II | 497,011 | 497,011 |
| 127 | 0604307N | SURFACE COMBATANT COMBAT SYSTEM ENGINEERING | 425,060 | 425,060 |
| 128 | 0604329N | SMALL DIAMETER BOMB (SDB) | 64,428 | 64,428 |
| 129 | 0604366N | STANDARD MISSILE IMPROVEMENTS | 539,279 | 539,279 |
| 130 | 0604373N | AIRBORNE MCM | 8,567 | 8,567 |
| 131 | 0604378N | NAVAL INTEGRATED FIRE CONTROL—COUNTER AIR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING | 42,177 | 42,177 |
| 132 | 0604501N | ADVANCED ABOVE WATER SENSORS | 67,900 | 67,900 |
| 133 | 0604503N | SUBMARINE SWFTS MODERNIZATION | 195,361 | 195,361 |
| 134 | 0604504N | AIR CONTROL | 41,610 | 41,610 |
| 135 | 0604512N | SHIPBOARD AVIATION SYSTEMS | 30,970 | 30,970 |
| 136 | 0604516N | SHIP SURVIVABILITY | 7,861 | 7,861 |
| 138 | 0604522N | AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE RADAR (AMDR) SYSTEM | 96,642 | 96,642 |
| 139 | 0604530N | ADVANCED ARRESTING GEAR (AAG) | 60,518 | 60,518 |
| 140 | 0604558N | NEW DESIGN SSN | 237,103 | 237,103 |
| 142 | 0604567N | SHIP CONTRACT DESIGN/ LIVE FIRE T&E | 19,429 | 19,429 |
| 143 | 0604574N | NAVY TACTICAL COMPUTER RESOURCES | 3,415 | 3,415 |
| 144 | 0604601N | MINE DEVELOPMENT | 158,666 | 158,666 |
| 145 | 0604610N | LIGHTWEIGHT TORPEDO DEVELOPMENT | 102,159 | 102,159 |
| 146 | 0604654N | JOINT SERVICE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DEVELOPMENT | 8,509 | 8,509 |
| 147 | 0604657M | USMC GROUND COMBAT/SUPPORTING ARMS SYSTEMS—ENG DEV | 69,478 | 69,478 |
| 148 | 0604703N | PERSONNEL, TRAINING, SIMULATION, AND HUMAN FACTORS | 8,316 | 8,316 |
| 149 | 0604727N | JOINT STANDOFF WEAPON SYSTEMS | 1,447 | 1,447 |
| 150 | 0604755N | SHIP SELF DEFENSE (DETECT & CONTROL) | 156,167 | 156,167 |
| 151 | 0604756N | SHIP SELF DEFENSE (ENGAGE: HARD KILL) | 296,261 | 296,261 |
| 152 | 0604757N | SHIP SELF DEFENSE (ENGAGE: SOFT KILL/EW) | 196,761 | 196,761 |
| 153 | 0604761N | INTELLIGENCE ENGINEERING | 6,426 | 6,426 |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 154 | 0604771N | MEDICAL DEVELOPMENT | 6,900 | | 6,900 |
| 155 | 0604777N | NAVIGATION/ID SYSTEM | 3,388 | | 3,388 |
| 156 | 0604850N | SSN(X) | 315,914 | | 315,914 |
| 157 | 0605013M | INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 14,380 | | 14,380 |
| 158 | 0605013N | INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 149,089 | | 149,089 |
| 159 | 0605024N | ANTI-TAMPER TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT | 3,459 | | 3,459 |
| 160 | 0605180N | TACAMO MODERNIZATION | 1,662,723 | | 1,662,723 |
| 161 | 0605212M | CH–53K RDTE | 139,273 | | 139,273 |
| 162 | 0605215N | MISSION PLANNING | 82,618 | | 82,618 |
| 163 | 0605217N | COMMON AVIONICS | 133,855 | | 133,855 |
| 164 | 0605220N | SHIP TO SHORE CONNECTOR (SSC) | 4,519 | | 4,519 |
| 165 | 0605285N | NEXT GENERATION FIGHTER | 68,498 | | 68,498 |
| 166 | 0605414N | UNMANNED CARRIER AVIATION (UCA) | 0 | | |
| 167 | 0605450M | JOINT AIR-TO-GROUND MISSILE (JAGM) | 189,866 | | 189,866 |
| 168 | 0605500N | MULTI-MISSION MARITIME AIRCRAFT (MMA) | 87,173 | | 87,173 |
| 169 | 0605504N | MULTI-MISSION MARITIME (MMA) INCREMENT III | 52,951 | | 52,951 |
| 170 | 0605516N | LONG RANGE FIRES | 186,735 | | 186,735 |
| 171 | 0605611M | MARINE CORPS ASSAULT VEHICLES SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT & DEMONSTRATION | 12,461 | | 12,461 |
| 172 | 0605813M | JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE (JLTV) SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT & DEMONSTRATION | 2,413 | | 2,413 |
| 173 | 0204202N | DESTROYERS GUIDED MISSILE (DDG–1000) | 50,166 | | 50,166 |
| 174 | 0301377N | COUNTERING ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CACW) | 15,563 | | 15,563 |
| 175 | 0302315N | NON-KINETIC COUNTERMEASURE SUPPORT | 23,146 | | 23,146 |
| 181 | 0304785N | ISR & INFO OPERATIONS | 274,478 | | 274,478 |
| 183 | 0306250M | CYBER OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 8,962 | | 8,962 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION** | **8,977,280** | **0** | **8,977,280** |
| | | **MANAGEMENT SUPPORT** | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 184 | 0604256N | THREAT SIMULATOR DEVELOPMENT | 16,453 | | 16,453 |
| 185 | 0604258N | TARGET SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 22,653 | | 22,653 |
| 186 | 0604759N | MAJOR T&E INVESTMENT | 112,458 | | 112,458 |
| 187 | 0605152N | STUDIES AND ANALYSIS SUPPORT—NAVY | 4,336 | | 4,336 |
| 188 | 0605154N | CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES | 28,310 | | 28,310 |
| 191 | 0605853N | MANAGEMENT, TECHNICAL & INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT | 124,898 | | 124,898 |
| 192 | 0605856N | STRATEGIC TECHNICAL SUPPORT | 4,260 | | 4,260 |
| 193 | 0605863N | RDT&E SHIP AND AIRCRAFT SUPPORT | 170,699 | | 170,699 |
| 194 | 0605864N | TEST AND EVALUATION SUPPORT | 470,492 | | 470,492 |
| 195 | 0605865N | OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION CAPABILITY | 31,902 | | 31,902 |
| 196 | 0605866N | NAVY SPACE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE (SEW) SUPPORT | 21,498 | | 21,498 |
| 197 | 0605867N | SEW SURVEILLANCE/RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT | 25,144 | | 25,144 |
| 198 | 0605873M | MARINE CORPS PROGRAM WIDE SUPPORT | 70,013 | | 70,013 |
| 199 | 0605898N | MANAGEMENT HQ—R&D | 33,533 | | 33,533 |
| 200 | 0606295M | MARINE AVIATION DEVELOPMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT | 19,165 | | 19,165 |
| 201 | 0606355N | WARFARE INNOVATION MANAGEMENT | 35,931 | | 35,931 |
| 202 | 0606942N | ASSESSMENTS AND EVALUATIONS CYBER VULNERABILITIES | 11,282 | | 11,282 |
| 203 | 0305327N | INSIDER THREAT | 2,214 | | 2,214 |
| 204 | 0902498N | MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS (DEPARTMENTAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES) | 2,054 | | 2,054 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL MANAGEMENT SUPPORT** | **1,207,295** | **0** | **1,207,295** |
| | | **OPERATIONAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT** | | | |
| 208 | 0604840M | F–35 C2D2 | 469,779 | | 469,779 |
| 209 | 0604840N | F–35 C2D2 | 428,545 | | 428,545 |
| 210 | 0605520M | MARINE CORPS AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS SYSTEMS | 133,041 | | 133,041 |
| 211 | 0607658N | COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT CAPABILITY (CEC) | 120,782 | | 120,782 |
| 212 | 0101221N | STRATEGIC SUB & WEAPONS SYSTEM SUPPORT | 1,051,736 | | 1,051,736 |
| 213 | 0101224N | SSBN SECURITY TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM | 65,856 | | 65,856 |
| 214 | 0101226N | SUBMARINE ACOUSTIC WARFARE DEVELOPMENT | 114,279 | | 114,279 |
| 215 | 0101402N | NAVY STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS | 88,572 | | 88,572 |
| 216 | 0204136N | F/A–18 SQUADRONS | 271,429 | | 271,429 |
| 218 | 0204229N | TOMAHAWK AND TOMAHAWK MISSION PLANNING CENTER (TMPC) | 76,653 | | 76,653 |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 219 | 0204311N | INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM | 71,901 | | 71,901 |
| 220 | 0204313N | SHIP-TOWED ARRAY SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS | 954 | | 954 |
| 221 | 0204413N | AMPHIBIOUS TACTICAL SUPPORT UNITS (DISPLACEMENT CRAFT) | 1,526 | | 1,526 |
| 222 | 0204460M | GROUND/AIR TASK ORIENTED RADAR (G/ATOR) | 66,255 | | 66,255 |
| 223 | 0204571N | CONSOLIDATED TRAINING SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 115,839 | | 115,839 |
| 224 | 0204575N | ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) READINESS SUPPORT | 198,560 | | 198,560 |
| 225 | 0205601N | ANTI-RADIATION MISSILE IMPROVEMENT | 80,491 | | 80,491 |
| 227 | 0205632N | MK–48 ADCAP | 123,011 | | 123,011 |
| 228 | 0205633N | AVIATION IMPROVEMENTS | 108,505 | | 108,505 |
| 229 | 0205675N | OPERATIONAL NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS | 252,893 | | 252,893 |
| 230 | 0206313M | MARINE CORPS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS | 268,983 | 4,700 | 273,683 |
| | | Dismounted microturbine power generation (USMC E20) supports EABO | | [4,700] | |
| 231 | 0206335M | COMMON AVIATION COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (CAC2S) | 0 | | |
| 232 | 0206623M | MARINE CORPS GROUND COMBAT/SUPPORTING ARMS SYSTEMS | 79,031 | | 79,031 |
| 233 | 0206624M | MARINE CORPS COMBAT SERVICES SUPPORT | 19,915 | | 19,915 |
| 234 | 0206625M | USMC INTELLIGENCE/ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS | 149,055 | | 149,055 |
| 235 | 0207161N | TACTICAL AIM MISSILES | 122,518 | | 122,518 |
| 236 | 0207163N | ADVANCED MEDIUM RANGE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE (AMRAAM) | 24,675 | | 24,675 |
| 237 | 0207255N | MQ–25 STINGRAY | 513,308 | | 513,308 |
| 238 | 0208043N | PLANNING AND DECISION AID SYSTEM (PDAS) | 3,491 | | 3,491 |
| 242 | 0303138N | AFLOAT NETWORKS | 68,369 | | 68,369 |
| 243 | 0303140N | INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY PROGRAM | 79,128 | | 79,128 |
| 244 | 0305192N | MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (MIP) ACTIVITIES | 5,187 | | 5,187 |
| 245 | 0305205N | UAS INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY | 0 | | |
| 246 | 0305208M | DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND/SURFACE SYSTEMS | 0 | | |
| 247 | 0305220N | MQ–4C TRITON | 10,515 | | 10,515 |
| 248 | 0305232M | RQ–11 UAV | 19,842 | | 19,842 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 249 | 0305241N | MULTI-INTELLIGENCE SENSOR DEVELOPMENT | 49,898 | | 49,898 |
| 250 | 0305242M | UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS (UAS) PAYLOADS (MIP) | 20,750 | | 20,750 |
| 251 | 0305421N | MQ–4C TRITON MODERNIZATION | 344,890 | | 344,890 |
| 252 | 0307577N | INTELLIGENCE MISSION DATA (IMD) | 787 | | 787 |
| 253 | 0308601N | MODELING AND SIMULATION SUPPORT | 16,401 | | 16,401 |
| 254 | 0702207N | DEPOT MAINTENANCE (NON-IF) | 8,097 | | 8,097 |
| 255 | 0708730N | MARITIME TECHNOLOGY (MARITECH) | 1,710 | | 1,710 |
| 9999 | 9999999999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 2,755,838 | | 2,755,838 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL OPERATIONAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT** | **8,402,995** | **4,700** | **8,407,695** |
| | | **SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY PILOT PROGRAMS** | | | |
| 256 | 0608013N | RISK MANAGEMENT INFORMATION—SOFTWARE PILOT PROGRAM | 13,017 | | 13,017 |
| 257 | 0608231N | MARITIME TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL (MTC2)—SOFTWARE PILOT PROGRAM | 25,299 | | 25,299 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY PILOT PROGRAMS** | **38,316** | **0** | **38,316** |
| | | **TOTAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, NAVY** | **32,386,619** | **549,260** | **32,935,879** |
| | | **RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, AF** | | | |
| | | **BASIC RESEARCH** | | | |
| 1 | 0601102F | DEFENSE RESEARCH SCIENCES | 296,535 | 25,000 | 321,535 |
| | | Increase for basic research activities | | [25,000] | |
| 2 | 0601103F | UNIVERSITY RESEARCH INITIATIVES | 91,394 | 30,000 | 121,394 |
| | | Increase for basic research activities | | [30,000] | |
| | | **SUBTOTAL BASIC RESEARCH** | **387,929** | **55,000** | **442,929** |
| | | **APPLIED RESEARCH** | | | |
| 3 | 0602020F | FUTURE AF CAPABILITIES APPLIED RESEARCH | 44,029 | | 44,029 |
| 4 | 0602022F | UNIVERSITY AFFILIATED RESEARCH CENTER (UARC)—TACTICAL AUTONOMY | 0 | | |
| 5 | 0602102F | MATERIALS | 139,872 | 10,000 | 149,872 |
| | | High Energy Synchrotron X-Ray Research | | [10,000] | |
| 7 | 0602202F | HUMAN EFFECTIVENESS APPLIED RESEARCH | 103,170 | 2,000 | 105,170 |
| | | Ceramic Oxygen Generation System for Aircrew Life Support | | [2,000] | |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8 | 0602203F | AEROSPACE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES | 397,809 | 20,000 | 417,809 |
| | | Extreme Environment Power-to-AI Systems for Air and Space Operations | | [10,000] | |
| | | Scaling Autonomous Cruise Missile Defense | | [10,000] | |
| 9 | 0602204F | AEROSPACE SENSORS | 164,962 | | 164,962 |
| 11 | 0602298F | SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT—MAJOR HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITIES | 10,285 | | 10,285 |
| 12 | 0602336F | NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS TECH EXPLORATION | 27,031 | | 27,031 |
| 13 | 0602602F | CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS | 130,146 | | 130,146 |
| 14 | 0602605F | DIRECTED ENERGY TECHNOLOGY | 91,798 | | 91,798 |
| 15 | 0602788F | DOMINANT INFORMATION SCIENCES AND METHODS | 149,174 | 35,000 | 184,174 |
| | | Future Flag Operational Experimentation Testbed | | [10,000] | |
| | | Quantum Technology Innovation Center | | [15,000] | |
| | | UAS Airspace Integration and Air Domain Awareness for Airspace Safety, Management, and Counter-UAS Operations. | | [10,000] | |
| | | **SUBTOTAL APPLIED RESEARCH** | **1,258,276** | **67,000** | **1,325,276** |
| | | **ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT** | | | |
| 16 | 0603032F | FUTURE AF INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY DEMOS | 282,004 | | 282,004 |
| 17 | 0603112F | ADVANCED MATERIALS FOR WEAPON SYSTEMS | 32,808 | 10,000 | 42,808 |
| | | Metals Affordability Initiative | | [10,000] | |
| 18 | 0603199F | SUSTAINMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) | 13,277 | | 13,277 |
| 19 | 0603203F | ADVANCED AEROSPACE SENSORS | 72,149 | 3,000 | 75,149 |
| | | Aerospace Thermoplastic Composites | | [3,000] | |
| 20 | 0603211F | AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY DEV/DEMO | 260,212 | 10,000 | 270,212 |
| | | Collaborative Combat Aircraft Propulsion Technology Integration | | [10,000] | |
| 22 | 0603273F | SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY FOR NUCLEAR RE-ENTRY SYSTEMS | 165,949 | | 165,949 |
| 23 | 0603456F | HUMAN EFFECTIVENESS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 20,338 | | 20,338 |
| 24 | 0603601F | CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY | 131,397 | | 131,397 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25 | 0603605F | ADVANCED WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY | 13,744 | | 13,744 |
| 26 | 0603680F | MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM | 99,908 | | 99,908 |
| 27 | 0603788F | BATTLESPACE KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION | 31,938 | | 31,938 |
| 28 | 0604776F | DEPLOYMENT & DISTRIBUTION ENTERPRISE R&D | 29,109 | | 29,109 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT** | **1,152,833** | **23,000** | **1,175,833** |
| | | **ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROTOTYPES** | | | |
| 30 | 0603036F | MODULAR ADVANCED MISSILE | 15,099 | | 15,099 |
| 31 | 0603260F | INTELLIGENCE ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT | 4,012 | | 4,012 |
| 32 | 0603677F | IN-TRANSIT VISIBILITY (ITV) MODERNIZATION | 0 | | |
| 33 | 0603742F | COMBAT IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY | 25,888 | | 25,888 |
| 34 | 0603790F | NATO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT | 2,320 | | 2,320 |
| 35 | 0603851F | INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE—DEM/VAL | 72,112 | | 72,112 |
| 36 | 0604001F | NC3 ADVANCED CONCEPTS | 14,394 | | 14,394 |
| 37 | 0604003F | ADVANCED BATTLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (ABMS) | 1,040,945 | | 1,040,945 |
| 38 | 0604004F | ADVANCED ENGINE DEVELOPMENT | 0 | | |
| 39 | 0604005F | NC3 COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT & PROTOTYPING | 61,355 | | 61,355 |
| 40 | 0604007F | E–7 | 0 | 1,500,000 | 1,500,000 |
| | | Restore full funding for E–7 | | [1,500,000] | |
| 41 | 0604009F | AFWERX | 3,589 | | 3,589 |
| 42 | 0604010F | NEXT GENERATION ADAPTIVE PROPULSION | 513,681 | | 513,681 |
| 43 | 0604015F | LONG RANGE STRIKE—BOMBER | 2,862,677 | | 2,862,677 |
| 46 | 0604033F | HYPERSONICS PROTOTYPING | 345,769 | | 345,769 |
| 47 | 0604041F | FAMILY OF AFFORDABLE MASS MISSILES (FAMM) | 525,223 | | 525,223 |
| 48 | 0604060F | NORAD & USNORTHCOM (N&NC) EXPERIMENTATION | 39,257 | | 39,257 |
| 49 | 0604183F | HYPERSONICS PROTOTYPING—HYPERSONIC ATTACK CRUISE MISSILE (HACM) | 806,142 | | 806,142 |
| 50 | 0604257F | ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND SENSORS | 38,756 | | 38,756 |
| 52 | 0604317F | TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER | 2,196 | | 2,196 |
| 53 | 0604327F | HARD AND DEEPLY BURIED TARGET DEFEAT SYSTEM (HDBTDS) PROGRAM | 186,385 | | 186,385 |
| 54 | 0604336F | NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS PROTOTYPING | 91,550 | | 91,550 |
| 55 | 0604343F | ADVANCED TANKER SYSTEMS | 13,036 | | 13,036 |
| 56 | 0604414F | CYBER RESILIENCY OF WEAPON SYSTEMS-ACS | 44,377 | | 44,377 |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 57 | 0604609F | REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS & CONCEPT MATURATION | 57,575 | | 57,575 |
| 58 | 0604668F | JOINT TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (JTMS) | 57,802 | | 57,802 |
| 59 | 0604776F | DEPLOYMENT & DISTRIBUTION ENTERPRISE R&D | 5,136 | | 5,136 |
| 60 | 0604858F | TECH TRANSITION PROGRAM | 166,061 | | 166,061 |
| 61 | 0604860F | OPERATIONAL ENERGY AND INSTALLATION RESILIENCE | 61,000 | 61,000 | 122,000 |
| | | Operational energy and installation resilience increase | | [61,000] | |
| 62 | 0605057F | NEXT GENERATION AIR-REFUELING SYSTEM | 0 | | |
| 64 | 0606004F | NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT | 1,105 | | 1,105 |
| 65 | 0606005F | DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OFFICE | 183,398 | | 183,398 |
| 67 | 0207147F | COLLABORATIVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT | 1,373,740 | | 1,373,740 |
| 68 | 0207179F | AUTONOMOUS COLLABORATIVE PLATFORMS | 57,217 | | 57,217 |
| 69 | 0207420F | COMBAT IDENTIFICATION | 1,692 | | 1,692 |
| 71 | 0207455F | THREE DIMENSIONAL LONG-RANGE RADAR (3DELRR) | 22,335 | | 22,335 |
| 72 | 0207522F | AIRBASE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (ABADS) | 85,305 | | 85,305 |
| 73 | 0207606F | JOINT SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT (JSE) | 302,801 | | 302,801 |
| 74 | 0208030F | WAR RESERVE MATERIEL—AMMUNITION | 14,663 | | 14,663 |
| 75 | 0302060F | LOOKING GLASS NEXT | 65,277 | | 65,277 |
| 76 | 0303010F | AF ISR DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE | 24,455 | | 24,455 |
| 77 | 0305236F | COMMON DATA LINK EXECUTIVE AGENT (CDL EA) | 26,401 | | 26,401 |
| 78 | 0305601F | MISSION PARTNER ENVIRONMENTS | 0 | | |
| 79 | 0305913F | PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE | 29,325 | | 29,325 |
| 80 | 0701200F | ENTERPRISE SELECT CLASS II | 949 | | 949 |
| 81 | 0708051F | RAPID SUSTAINMENT MODERNIZATION (RSM) | 27,475 | | 27,475 |
| 82 | 0808736F | SPECIAL VICTIM ACCOUNTABILITY AND INVESTIGATION | 1,652 | | 1,652 |
| 83 | 0808737F | INTEGRATED PRIMARY PREVENTION | 4,271 | | 4,271 |
| 84 | 0901410F | CONTRACTING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEM | 25,815 | | 25,815 |
| 85 | 1206415F | U.S. SPACE COMMAND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT | 34,719 | | 34,719 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **SUBTOTAL ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROTOTYPES** | **9,338,932** | **1,561,000** | **10,899,932** |
| | | **SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION** | | | |
| 86 | 0604200F | FUTURE ADVANCED WEAPON ANALYSIS & PROGRAMS | 35,142 | | 35,142 |
| 87 | 0604201F | PNT RESILIENCY, MODS, AND IMPROVEMENTS | 710,780 | | 710,780 |
| 88 | 0604222F | NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUPPORT | 86,921 | | 86,921 |
| 89 | 0604270F | ELECTRONIC WARFARE DEVELOPMENT | 260,233 | | 260,233 |
| 90 | 0604281F | TACTICAL DATA NETWORKS ENTERPRISE | 110,151 | | 110,151 |
| 91 | 0604287F | PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT | 8,743 | | 8,743 |
| 92 | 0604288F | SURVIVABLE AIRBORNE OPERATIONS CENTER (SAOC) | 2,218,921 | | 2,218,921 |
| 93 | 0604602F | ARMAMENT/ORDNANCE DEVELOPMENT | 96,762 | | 96,762 |
| 94 | 0604604F | SUBMUNITIONS | 3,599 | | 3,599 |
| 95 | 0604617F | AGILE COMBAT SUPPORT | 19,348 | | 19,348 |
| 96 | 0604706F | LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS | 21,328 | | 21,328 |
| 97 | 0604735F | COMBAT TRAINING RANGES | 132,783 | 10,000 | 142,783 |
| | | Overland electronic warfare test and training range feasibility study | | [10,000] | |
| 98 | 0604932F | LONG RANGE STANDOFF WEAPON | 565,679 | | 565,679 |
| 99 | 0604933F | ICBM FUZE MODERNIZATION | 0 | | |
| 100 | 0605056F | OPEN ARCHITECTURE MANAGEMENT | 43,482 | | 43,482 |
| 101 | 0605223F | ADVANCED PILOT TRAINING | 72,174 | | 72,174 |
| 102 | 0605238F | GROUND BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT EMD | 4,521,370 | | 4,521,370 |
| 103 | 0605296F | MICROELECTRONICS SECURE ENCLAVE | 224,664 | –150,000 | 74,664 |
| | | Unjustified growth | | [–150,000] | |
| 104 | 0101125F | NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION | 23,066 | | 23,066 |
| 105 | 0102417F | OVER-THE-HORIZON BACKSCATTER RADAR | 173,975 | 19,200 | 193,175 |
| | | Realignment from Operation and Maintenance and Procurement | | [19,200] | |
| 106 | 0207039F | COGNITIVE ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE | 50,496 | | 50,496 |
| 107 | 0207110F | F–47 | 5,037,904 | | 5,037,904 |
| 108 | 0207279F | ISOLATED PERSONNEL SURVIVABILITY AND RECOVERY | 16,001 | | 16,001 |
| 109 | 0207328F | STAND IN ATTACK WEAPON | 115,882 | | 115,882 |
| 110 | 0207407F | ELECTROMAGNETIC BATTLE MANAGEMENT (EMBM) | 45,322 | | 45,322 |
| 111 | 0207701F | FULL COMBAT MISSION TRAINING | 6,501 | | 6,501 |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 112 | 0303008F | SATURN | 4,771 | | 4,771 |
| 115 | 0305155F | THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE & SECURITY SYSTEM | 0 | | |
| 116 | 0305282F | JOINT FIRES NETWORK (JFN) | 313,982 | | 313,982 |
| 117 | 0401221F | KC–46A TANKER SQUADRONS | 543,788 | | 543,788 |
| 118 | 0401319F | VC–25B | 555,195 | | 555,195 |
| 119 | 0401334F | LARGE AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY SYSTEMS (LASS) | 17,996 | | 17,996 |
| 120 | 0701212F | AUTOMATED TEST SYSTEMS | 15,900 | | 15,900 |
| 121 | 0804772F | TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS | 4,947 | | 4,947 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION** | **16,057,806** | **–120,800** | **15,937,006** |
| | | **MANAGEMENT SUPPORT** | | | |
| 123 | 0604256F | THREAT SIMULATOR DEVELOPMENT | 44,526 | | 44,526 |
| 124 | 0604759F | MAJOR T&E INVESTMENT | 235,405 | | 235,405 |
| 125 | 0605101F | RAND PROJECT AIR FORCE | 13,312 | | 13,312 |
| 127 | 0605712F | INITIAL OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION | 13,562 | | 13,562 |
| 128 | 0605807F | TEST AND EVALUATION SUPPORT | 1,802,502 | | 1,802,502 |
| 131 | 0605829F | ACQ WORKFORCE—CYBER, NETWORK, & BUS SYS | 439,592 | | 439,592 |
| 132 | 0605831F | ACQ WORKFORCE—CAPABILITY INTEGRATION | 1,206,669 | | 1,206,669 |
| 134 | 0605833F | ACQ WORKFORCE—NUCLEAR SYSTEMS | 342,650 | | 342,650 |
| 135 | 0605898F | MANAGEMENT HQ—R&D | 6,209 | | 6,209 |
| 136 | 0605976F | FACILITIES RESTORATION AND MODERNIZATION—TEST AND EVALUATION SUPPORT | 367,369 | | 367,369 |
| 137 | 0605978F | FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT—TEST AND EVALUATION SUPPORT | 298,924 | | 298,924 |
| 138 | 0606017F | REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS AND MATURATION | 21,678 | | 21,678 |
| 139 | 0606398F | MANAGEMENT HQ—T&E | 7,507 | | 7,507 |
| 140 | 0208201F | OFFENSIVE SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (SUAS) | 30,187 | | 30,187 |
| 141 | 0303255F | COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION, AND COMPUTERS (C4)—STRATCOM | 18,068 | 27,000 | 45,068 |
| | | Enhanced National Strategic Research Institute research scope | | [5,000] | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Evaluation of electromagnetic warfare and dynamic spectrum sharing technologies | | [2,000] | |
| | | NC3 network sensor demonstration | | [10,000] | |
| | | Rapid Engineering Architecture Collaboration Hub—NC3 architecture | | [10,000] | |
| 142 | 0308602F | ENTEPRISE INFORMATION SERVICES (EIS) | 80,342 | | 80,342 |
| 143 | 0702806F | ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT | 12,132 | | 12,132 |
| 144 | 0804776F | ADVANCED DISTRIBUTED LEARNING | 238 | | 238 |
| 145 | 0901215F | PRODUCTIVITY INVESTMENTS | 4,017 | | 4,017 |
| 147 | 1001004F | INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES | 4,514 | | 4,514 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL MANAGEMENT SUPPORT** | **4,949,403** | **27,000** | **4,976,403** |
| | | **OPERATIONAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT** | | | |
| 148 | 0604222F | NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUPPORT | 10,029 | | 10,029 |
| 149 | 0604233F | SPECIALIZED UNDERGRADUATE FLIGHT TRAINING | 22,071 | | 22,071 |
| 150 | 0604283F | BATTLE MGMT COM & CTRL SENSOR DEVELOPMENT | 44,187 | | 44,187 |
| 152 | 0604840F | F–35 C2D2 | 1,128,748 | | 1,128,748 |
| 153 | 0605018F | AF INTEGRATED PERSONNEL AND PAY SYSTEM (AF-IPPS) | 31,777 | –31,777 | |
| | | Realignment to Service-Wide Support | | [–31,777] | |
| 154 | 0605024F | ANTI-TAMPER TECHNOLOGY EXECUTIVE AGENCY | 130,610 | | 130,610 |
| 155 | 0605117F | FOREIGN MATERIEL ACQUISITION AND EXPLOITATION | 4,676 | | 4,676 |
| 156 | 0605229F | HH–60W | 87,881 | | 87,881 |
| 157 | 0605278F | HC/MC–130 RECAP RDT&E | 34,932 | 25,000 | 59,932 |
| | | Nonrecurring engineering for the LC–130J program | | [25,000] | |
| 158 | 0606018F | NC3 INTEGRATION | 36,521 | | 36,521 |
| 159 | 0101113F | B–52 SQUADRONS | 1,478,648 | | 1,478,648 |
| 160 | 0101122F | AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (ALCM) | 570 | | 570 |
| 161 | 0101126F | B–1B SQUADRONS | 273,552 | | 273,552 |
| 162 | 0101127F | B–2 SQUADRONS | 418,178 | | 418,178 |
| 163 | 0101213F | MINUTEMAN SQUADRONS | 79,313 | | 79,313 |
| 164 | 0101316F | WORLDWIDE JOINT STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS | 44,424 | | 44,424 |
| 165 | 0101318F | SERVICE SUPPORT TO STRATCOM—GLOBAL STRIKE | 56,203 | | 56,203 |
| 166 | 0101328F | ICBM REENTRY VEHICLES | 733,182 | | 733,182 |
| 168 | 0102110F | MH–139A | 7,046 | | 7,046 |

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**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 169 | 0102326F | REGION/SECTOR OPERATION CONTROL CENTER MODERNIZATION PROGRAM | 709 | | 709 |
| 170 | 0102417F | OVER-THE-HORIZON BACKSCATTER RADAR | 0 | | |
| 171 | 0202834F | AVIATION SUPPORT EQUIPMENT—GENERAL | 1,028 | | 1,028 |
| 172 | 0203345F | OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) | 45,000 | | 45,000 |
| 173 | 0205219F | MQ–9 UAV | 16,723 | | 16,723 |
| 174 | 0205671F | JOINT COUNTER RCIED ELECTRONIC WARFARE | 2,816 | | 2,816 |
| 175 | 0207040F | MULTI-PLATFORM ELECTRONIC WARFARE EQUIPMENT | 0 | | |
| 176 | 0207133F | F–16 SQUADRONS | 527,739 | | 527,739 |
| 177 | 0207134F | F–15E SQUADRONS | 322,889 | 48,000 | 370,889 |
| | | F–15 IRST capability | | [48,000] | |
| 178 | 0207136F | MANNED DESTRUCTIVE SUPPRESSION | 8,128 | | 8,128 |
| 179 | 0207138F | F–22A SQUADRONS | 950,375 | –96,000 | 854,375 |
| | | Decrement F–22 sensor enhancments | | [–96,000] | |
| 180 | 0207142F | F–35 SQUADRONS | 47,388 | | 47,388 |
| 181 | 0207146F | F–15EX | 133,274 | | 133,274 |
| 182 | 0207161F | TACTICAL AIM MISSILES | 98,861 | | 98,861 |
| 183 | 0207163F | ADVANCED MEDIUM RANGE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE (AMRAAM) | 53,277 | | 53,277 |
| 184 | 0207172F | JOINT ADVANCED TACTICAL MISSILE (JATM) | 500,422 | | 500,422 |
| 186 | 0207238F | E–11A | 0 | | |
| 187 | 0207242F | SPECIAL PROGRAM APPLICATIONS | 35,149 | | 35,149 |
| 188 | 0207247F | AF TENCAP | 50,913 | | 50,913 |
| 189 | 0207249F | PRECISION ATTACK SYSTEMS PROCUREMENT | 14,602 | | 14,602 |
| 190 | 0207253F | COMPASS CALL | 66,514 | | 66,514 |
| 191 | 0207268F | AIRCRAFT ENGINE COMPONENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM | 205,938 | | 205,938 |
| 192 | 0207325F | JOINT AIR-TO-SURFACE STANDOFF MISSILE (JASSM) | 133,092 | | 133,092 |
| 193 | 0207327F | SMALL DIAMETER BOMB (SDB) | 25,497 | | 25,497 |
| 194 | 0207410F | AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER (AOC) | 158,871 | | 158,871 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 195 | 0207412F | CONTROL AND REPORTING CENTER (CRC) | 18,137 | 18,137 |
| 196 | 0207418F | AFSPECWAR—TACP | 5,206 | 5,206 |
| 198 | 0207431F | COMBAT AIR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM ACTIVITIES | 33,700 | 33,700 |
| 199 | 0207438F | THEATER BATTLE MANAGEMENT (TBM) C4I | 7,014 | 7,014 |
| 200 | 0207439F | ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE INT REPROG (EWIR) | 73,523 | 73,523 |
| 202 | 0207452F | DCAPES | 5,254 | 5,254 |
| 203 | 0207457F | AIR FORCE SPECIAL WARFARE (SPECWAR) | 24,423 | 24,423 |
| 204 | 0207461F | FLIGHT OPERATIONS SYSTEMS | 15,978 | 15,978 |
| 205 | 0207521F | AIR FORCE CALIBRATION PROGRAMS | 2,220 | 2,220 |
| 207 | 0207590F | SEEK EAGLE | 36,710 | 36,710 |
| 208 | 0207611F | READINESS DECISION SUPPORT ENTERPRISE | 6,823 | 6,823 |
| 209 | 0207697F | DISTRIBUTED TRAINING AND EXERCISES | 83,659 | 83,659 |
| 210 | 0207701F | FULL COMBAT MISSION TRAINING | 6,644 | 6,644 |
| 211 | 0208006F | MISSION PLANNING SYSTEMS | 122,175 | 122,175 |
| 212 | 0208007F | TACTICAL DECEPTION | 48,857 | 48,857 |
| 213 | 0208087F | DISTRIBUTED CYBER WARFARE OPERATIONS | 71,868 | 71,868 |
| 214 | 0208088F | AF DEFENSIVE CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS | 76,758 | 76,758 |
| 218 | 0208288F | INTEL DATA APPLICATIONS | 7,511 | 7,511 |
| 219 | 0301025F | GEOBASE | 403 | 403 |
| 220 | 0301113F | CYBER SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT | 0 | |
| 226 | 0301377F | COUNTERING ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CACW) | 1,343 | 1,343 |
| 228 | 0301401F | AF MULTI-DOMAIN NON-TRADITIONAL ISR BATTLESPACE AWARENESS | 2,754 | 2,754 |
| 229 | 0302015F | E–4B NATIONAL AIRBORNE OPERATIONS CENTER (NAOC) | 50,873 | 50,873 |
| 230 | 0302315F | NON-KINETIC COUNTERMEASURE SUPPORT | 4,024 | 4,024 |
| 232 | 0303089F | CYBERSPACE AND DODIN OPERATIONS | 0 | |
| 233 | 0303131F | MINIMUM ESSENTIAL EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK (MEECN) | 254,837 | 254,837 |
| 234 | 0303133F | HIGH FREQUENCY RADIO SYSTEMS | 33,215 | 33,215 |
| 235 | 0303140F | INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY PROGRAM | 117,658 | 117,658 |
| 236 | 0303248F | ALL DOMAIN COMMON PLATFORM | 71,312 | 71,312 |
| 237 | 0303260F | JOINT MILITARY DECEPTION INITIATIVE | 0 | |
| 238 | 0304100F | STRATEGIC MISSION PLANNING & EXECUTION SYSTEM (SMPES) | 89,663 | 89,663 |
| 239 | 0304109F | THRESHER | 109 | 109 |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 242 | 0304260F | AIRBORNE SIGINT ENTERPRISE | 98,319 | | 98,319 |
| 243 | 0304310F | COMMERCIAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS | 1,713 | | 1,713 |
| 246 | 0304784F | LONG ENDURANCE—AIRBORNE ISR | 16,570 | | 16,570 |
| 248 | 0305020F | CCMD INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY | 0 | | |
| 249 | 0305022F | ISR MODERNIZATION & AUTOMATION DVMT (IMAD) | 16,188 | | 16,188 |
| 250 | 0305099F | GLOBAL AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (GATM) | 4,210 | | 4,210 |
| 251 | 0305103F | CYBER SECURITY INITIATIVE | 318 | | 318 |
| 252 | 0305111F | WEATHER SERVICE | 29,331 | | 29,331 |
| 253 | 0305114F | AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, APPROACH, AND LANDING SYSTEM (ATCALS) | 61,895 | | 61,895 |
| 254 | 0305116F | AERIAL TARGETS | 1,704 | | 1,704 |
| 257 | 0305128F | SECURITY AND INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES | 9,642 | | 9,642 |
| 258 | 0305146F | DEFENSE JOINT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES | 2,469 | | 2,469 |
| 259 | 0305155F | THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE & SECURITY SYSTEM | 24,364 | | 24,364 |
| 260 | 0305158F | TACTICAL TERMINAL | 0 | | |
| 261 | 0305179F | INTEGRATED BROADCAST SERVICE (IBS) | 18,266 | | 18,266 |
| 262 | 0305206F | AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS | 34,273 | | 34,273 |
| 263 | 0305207F | MANNED RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS | 17,114 | | 17,114 |
| 264 | 0305208F | DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND/SURFACE SYSTEMS | 85,365 | | 85,365 |
| 266 | 0305221F | NETWORK-CENTRIC COLLABORATIVE TARGETING | 9,146 | | 9,146 |
| 267 | 0305238F | NATO AGS | 0 | | |
| 268 | 0305240F | ISR TRANSPORT AND PROCESSING | 312,037 | | 312,037 |
| 269 | 0305249F | AF JWICS ENTERPRISE | 19,324 | | 19,324 |
| 270 | 0305600F | INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY AND ARCHITECTURES | 62,000 | | 62,000 |
| 271 | 0305836F | C2IMERA | 11,393 | | 11,393 |
| 272 | 0305903F | COCOM MOBILE COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTERS (MCCCS) | 2,013 | | 2,013 |
| 273 | 0305984F | PERSONNEL RECOVERY COMMAND & CTRL (PRC2) | 1,783 | | 1,783 |
| 274 | 0307577F | INTELLIGENCE MISSION DATA (IMD) | 3,151 | | 3,151 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 275 | 0401119F | C–5 AIRLIFT SQUADRONS (IF) | 76,233 | | 76,233 |
| 276 | 0401130F | C–17 AIRCRAFT (IF) | 178,130 | 7,000 | 185,130 |
| | | C–17 data bus recording upgrade | | [7,000] | |
| 277 | 0401132F | C–130J PROGRAM | 16,628 | 7,000 | 23,628 |
| | | C–130 advanced maintenance analytics data kits | | [7,000] | |
| 278 | 0401134F | LARGE AIRCRAFT IR COUNTERMEASURES (LAIRCM) | 12,323 | | 12,323 |
| 279 | 0401218F | KC–135S | 121,742 | 7,000 | 128,742 |
| | | KC–135 vertical wipers | | [7,000] | |
| 280 | 0401318F | CV–22 | 45,699 | | 45,699 |
| 281 | 0401334F | LARGE AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY SYSTEMS (LASS) | 50,111 | | 50,111 |
| 282 | 0408011F | SPECIAL TACTICS / COMBAT CONTROL | 0 | | |
| 283 | 0708610F | LOGISTICS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (LOGIT) | 21,518 | | 21,518 |
| 284 | 0801380F | AF LVC OPERATIONAL TRAINING (LVC-OT) | 23,472 | | 23,472 |
| 285 | 0804743F | OTHER FLIGHT TRAINING | 1,950 | | 1,950 |
| 286 | 0901202F | JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY AGENCY | 2,035 | | 2,035 |
| 287 | 0901218F | CIVILIAN COMPENSATION PROGRAM | 4,248 | | 4,248 |
| 288 | 0901220F | PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION | 2,678 | | 2,678 |
| 289 | 0901226F | AIR FORCE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS AGENCY | 81,252 | | 81,252 |
| 291 | 0901538F | FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 3,316 | | 3,316 |
| 292 | 0901554F | DEFENSE ENTERPRISE ACNTNG AND MGT SYS (DEAMS) | 38,301 | | 38,301 |
| 293 | 1201921F | SERVICE SUPPORT TO STRATCOM—SPACE ACTIVITIES | 700 | | 700 |
| 9999 | 9999999999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 29,113,107 | | 29,113,107 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL OPERATIONAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT** | **39,930,435** | **–33,777** | **39,896,658** |
| | | **TOTAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, AF** | **73,075,614** | **1,578,423** | **74,654,037** |
| | | **RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, SF** | | | |
| | | **BASIC RESEARCH** | | | |
| 1 | 0601102SF | DEFENSE RESEARCH SCIENCES | 20,833 | | 20,833 |
| 2 | 0601103SF | UNIVERSITY RESEARCH INITIATIVES | 14,426 | | 14,426 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL BASIC RESEARCH** | **35,259** | **0** | **35,259** |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **APPLIED RESEARCH** | | | |
| 4 | 1206601SF | SPACE TECHNOLOGY | 234,190 | 10,000 | 244,190 |
| | | Establishment of Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis Hub | | [10,000] | |
| | | **SUBTOTAL APPLIED RESEARCH** | **234,190** | **10,000** | **244,190** |
| | | **ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT** | | | |
| 5 | 1206310SF | SPACE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT | 313,738 | | 313,738 |
| 6 | 1206616SF | SPACE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT/DEMO | 126,427 | | 126,427 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT** | **440,165** | **0** | **440,165** |
| | | **ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROTOTYPES** | | | |
| 7 | 0604002SF | SPACE FORCE WEATHER SERVICES RESEARCH | 3,581 | | 3,581 |
| 8 | 1203010SF | SPACE FORCE IT, DATA ANALYTICS, DIGITAL SOLUTIONS | 45,971 | | 45,971 |
| 9 | 1203164SF | NAVSTAR GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (USER EQUIPMENT) (SPACE) | 0 | | |
| 10 | 1203622SF | SPACE WARFIGHTING ANALYSIS | 128,546 | | 128,546 |
| 11 | 1203710SF | EO/IR WEATHER SYSTEMS | 144,434 | | 144,434 |
| 12 | 1203955SF | SPACE ACCESS, MOBILITY & LOGISTICS (SAML) | 9,724 | | 9,724 |
| 13 | 1206410SF | SPACE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND PROTOTYPING | 1,246,316 | | 1,246,316 |
| 14 | 1206427SF | SPACE SYSTEMS PROTOTYPE TRANSITIONS (SSPT) | 87,730 | | 87,730 |
| 15 | 1206438SF | SPACE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY | 62,031 | | 62,031 |
| 16 | 1206458SF | TECH TRANSITION (SPACE) | 241,056 | | 241,056 |
| 17 | 1206617SF | OPERATIONAL TEST & TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE | 265,215 | | 265,215 |
| 18 | 1206730SF | SPACE SECURITY AND DEFENSE PROGRAM | 102,140 | | 102,140 |
| 19 | 1206760SF | PROTECTED TACTICAL ENTERPRISE SERVICE (PTES) | 155,885 | | 155,885 |
| 20 | 1206761SF | PROTECTED TACTICAL SERVICE (PTS) | 449,434 | | 449,434 |
| 21 | 1206855SF | EVOLVED STRATEGIC SATCOM (ESS) | 0 | | |
| 22 | 1206857SF | SPACE RAPID CAPABILITIES OFFICE | 9,950 | | 9,950 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 23 | 1206862SF | TACTICALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE | 86,306 | 10,000 | 96,306 |
| | | Orbital Pre-Positioned Tactically Responsive Space capability enhancement | | [10,000] | |
| | | **SUBTOTAL ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROTOTYPES** | **3,038,319** | **10,000** | **3,048,319** |
| | | **SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION** | | | |
| 24 | 1203269SF | GPS III FOLLOW-ON (GPS IIIF) | 123,793 | | 123,793 |
| 25 | 1206421SF | COUNTERSPACE SYSTEMS | 43,702 | 80,000 | 123,702 |
| | | Realignment from procurement for PDM | | [80,000] | |
| 26 | 1206422SF | WEATHER SYSTEM FOLLOW-ON | 34,756 | | 34,756 |
| 27 | 1206425SF | SPACE SITUATION AWARENESS SYSTEMS | 1,317,841 | | 1,317,841 |
| 28 | 1206431SF | ADVANCED EHF MILSATCOM (SPACE) | 10,157 | | 10,157 |
| 29 | 1206433SF | WIDEBAND GLOBAL SATCOM (SPACE) | 0 | | |
| 30 | 1206440SF | NEXT-GEN OPIR—GROUND | 761,425 | | 761,425 |
| 31 | 1206442SF | NEXT GENERATION OPIR | 209,851 | | 209,851 |
| 32 | 1206443SF | NEXT-GEN OPIR—GEO | 485,703 | | 485,703 |
| 33 | 1206444SF | NEXT-GEN OPIR—POLAR | 0 | 500,000 | 500,000 |
| | | Restore funding to Next Generation Polar | | [500,000] | |
| 34 | 1206445SF | COMMERCIAL SATCOM (COMSATCOM) INTEGRATION | 68,554 | | 68,554 |
| 35 | 1206446SF | RESILIENT MISSILE WARNING MISSILE TRACKING—LOW EARTH ORBIT (LEO) | 3,564,176 | | 3,564,176 |
| 36 | 1206447SF | RESILIENT MISSILE WARNING MISSILE TRACKING—MEDIUM EARTH ORBIT (MEO) | 1,413,662 | | 1,413,662 |
| 37 | 1206771SF | COMMERCIAL SERVICES | 23,752 | | 23,752 |
| 38 | 1206853SF | NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE LAUNCH PROGRAM (SPACE)—EMD | 2,748 | | 2,748 |
| 39 | 1206855SF | EVOLVED STRATEGIC SATCOM (ESS) | 1,838,718 | | 1,838,718 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION** | **9,898,838** | **580,000** | **10,478,838** |
| | | **MANAGEMENT SUPPORT** | | | |
| 42 | 1206392SF | ACQ WORKFORCE—SPACE & MISSILE SYSTEMS | 260,731 | | 260,731 |
| 43 | 1206398SF | SPACE & MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER—MHA | 13,717 | | 13,717 |
| 44 | 1206399SF | SSC ENTERPRISE ENGINEERING & INTEGRATION | 230,848 | | 230,848 |
| 45 | 1206759SF | MAJOR T&E INVESTMENT—SPACE | 65,731 | | 65,731 |
| 46 | 1206860SF | ROCKET SYSTEMS LAUNCH PROGRAM (SPACE) | 19,965 | | 19,965 |
| 47 | 1206864SF | SPACE TEST PROGRAM (STP) | 29,598 | | 29,598 |

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| | | **SUBTOTAL MANAGEMENT SUPPORT** | **620,590** | **0** | **620,590** |
| | | **OPERATIONAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT** | | | |
| 49 | 1201212SF | SERVICE-WIDE SUPPORT (NOT OTHERWISE ACCOUNTED FOR) | 28,425 | 41,377 | 69,802 |
| | | Realignment from AF Integrated Personnel and Pay System | | [31,777] | |
| | | Realignment from Operation and Maintenance for HR IT automation | | [9,600] | |
| 50 | 1203001SF | FAMILY OF ADVANCED BLOS TERMINALS (FAB-T) | 0 | | |
| 51 | 1203040SF | DCO-SPACE | 481,251 | | 481,251 |
| 52 | 1203109SF | NARROWBAND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS | 855,860 | | 855,860 |
| 53 | 1203110SF | SATELLITE CONTROL NETWORK (SPACE) | 92,537 | | 92,537 |
| 54 | 1203154SF | LONG RANGE KILL CHAINS | 1,392,025 | | 1,392,025 |
| 55 | 1203155SF | SPACE-BASED MOVING TARGET INDICATOR | 253,355 | 83,134 | 336,489 |
| | | Realignment for execution | | [–10,050] | |
| | | Realignment from procurement | | [46,592] | |
| | | Realignment from procurement for Space-Based Moving Target Indicator | | [46,592] | |
| 56 | 1203156SF | DATA TRANSPORT AND NETWORKING | 164,974 | | 164,974 |
| 57 | 1203165SF | NAVSTAR GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (SPACE AND CONTROL SEGMENTS) | 115,000 | | 115,000 |
| 58 | 1203173SF | SPACE AND MISSILE TEST AND EVALUATION CENTER | 22,487 | | 22,487 |
| 59 | 1203174SF | SPACE INNOVATION, INTEGRATION AND RAPID TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 10,538 | | 10,538 |
| 60 | 1203182SF | SPACELIFT RANGE SYSTEM (SPACE) | 56,781 | | 56,781 |
| 61 | 1203330SF | SPACE SUPERIORITY ISR | 64,290 | | 64,290 |
| 62 | 1203636SF | SPACE DATA NETWORK | 0 | | |
| 63 | 1203873SF | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE RADARS | 0 | | |
| 64 | 1203906SF | NCMC—ITW/AA SYSTEM | 25,092 | | 25,092 |
| 65 | 1203909SF | BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM (BMEWS) | 128,630 | | 128,630 |
| 66 | 1203913SF | NUDET DETECTION SYSTEM (SPACE) | 114,004 | | 114,004 |
| 67 | 1203940SF | SPACE SITUATION AWARENESS OPERATIONS | 294,902 | | 294,902 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 68 | 1206423SF | GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM III—OPERATIONAL CONTROL SEGMENT | 332,313 | –98,000 | 234,313 |
| | | Realignment to procurement for AEP technical refresh | | [–98,000] | |
| 72 | 1206772SF | RAPID RESILIENT COMMAND AND CONTROL (R2C2) | 109,190 | | 109,190 |
| 73 | 1207440SF | AUTOMATE SAT C2 | 1,524,300 | –1,500,000 | 24,300 |
| | | Unjustified growth | | [–1,500,000] | |
| 74 | 1208053SF | JOINT TACTICAL GROUND SYSTEM | 92,731 | | 92,731 |
| 9999 | 9999999999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 17,330,381 | –239,950 | 17,090,431 |
| | | Program realignment from SB-MTI | | [10,050] | |
| | | Unjustified growth | | [–250,000] | |
| | | **SUBTOTAL OPERATIONAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT** | **23,489,066** | **–1,713,439** | **21,775,627** |
| | | **SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY PILOT PROGRAMS** | | | |
| 75 | 1208248SF | SPACE DOMAIN AWARENESS/PLANNING/TASKING SW | 617,062 | | 617,062 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY PILOT PROGRAMS** | **617,062** | **0** | **617,062** |
| | | **TOTAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, SF** | **38,373,489** | **–1,113,439** | **37,260,050** |
| | | **RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, DW** | | | |
| | | **BASIC RESEARCH** | | | |
| 1 | 0601000BR | DTRA BASIC RESEARCH | 15,070 | | 15,070 |
| 3 | 0601108D8Z | HIGH ENERGY LASER RESEARCH INITIATIVES | 17,667 | | 17,667 |
| 4 | 0601110D8Z | BASIC RESEARCH INITIATIVES | 87,091 | 95,000 | 182,091 |
| | | Defense Established Program to Stimulate Competitive Research | | [40,000] | |
| | | Increase for Minerva program | | [15,000] | |
| | | Increase for Vanevar Bush fellowships | | [40,000] | |
| 6 | 0601120D8Z | NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION PROGRAM | 165,488 | | 165,488 |
| 7 | 0601122E | EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES | 387,633 | | 387,633 |
| 8 | 0601228D8Z | HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES/MINORITY INSTITUTIONS | 99,706 | 20,000 | 119,706 |
| | | Historically Black Colleges and Universities/Minority Institutions | | [20,000] | |
| 9 | 0601384BP | CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM | 27,425 | | 27,425 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL BASIC RESEARCH** | **800,080** | **115,000** | **915,080** |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **APPLIED RESEARCH** | | | |
| 11 | 0602000D8Z | JOINT MUNITIONS TECHNOLOGY | 32,145 | | 32,145 |
| 12 | 0602023E | ACCESS AND AWARENESS | 110,096 | | 110,096 |
| 13 | 0602024E | WARFIGHTING PERFORMANCE | 364,141 | | 364,141 |
| 14 | 0602025E | MAKING, MAINTAINING, SUPPLY CHAIN AND LOGISTICS | 1,624,523 | | 1,624,523 |
| 15 | 0602026E | EFFECTS | 0 | | |
| 17 | 0602128D8Z | PROMOTION AND PROTECTION STRATEGIES | 4,260 | | 4,260 |
| 18 | 0602230D8Z | DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION | 43,405 | | 43,405 |
| 19 | 0602234D8Z | LINCOLN LABORATORY RESEARCH PROGRAM | 10,045 | | 10,045 |
| 20 | 0602251D8Z | APPLIED RESEARCH FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF S&T PRIORITIES | 59,560 | | 59,560 |
| 22 | 0602384BP | CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM | 207,186 | | 207,186 |
| 23 | 0602668D8Z | CYBER SECURITY RESEARCH | 18,575 | 35,000 | 53,575 |
| | | Pacific Intelligence and Innovation Initiative | | [5,000] | |
| | | University Consortium for Cybersecurity | | [30,000] | |
| 24 | 0602669D8Z | MICROELECTRONICS COMMONS—APPLIED RESEARCH | 0 | 50,000 | 50,000 |
| | | Program increase | | [50,000] | |
| 29 | 0602718BR | COUNTER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION APPLIED RESEARCH | 157,287 | | 157,287 |
| 30 | 0602751D8Z | SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE (SEI) APPLIED RESEARCH | 7,069 | | 7,069 |
| 31 | 0602890D8Z | HIGH ENERGY LASER RESEARCH | 50,408 | | 50,408 |
| 32 | 0602891D8Z | FSRM MODELLING | 6,635 | | 6,635 |
| 33 | 1160401BB | SOF TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 50,856 | 10,000 | 60,856 |
| | | Cognitive Warfare and Narrative Intelligence | | [10,000] | |
| | | **SUBTOTAL APPLIED RESEARCH** | **2,746,191** | **95,000** | **2,841,191** |
| | | **ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT** | | | |
| 34 | 0603000D8Z | JOINT MUNITIONS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 64,251 | | 64,251 |
| 36 | 0603055D8Z | OPERATIONAL ENERGY CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENT | 165,060 | | 165,060 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 38 | 0603122D8Z | COMBATING TERRORISM TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT | 73,618 | 200,000 | 273,618 |
| | | U.S.-Israel Cooperation to Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems | | [100,000] | |
| | | U.S.-Israel Subterranean Operations Cooperation | | [100,000] | |
| 39 | 0603133D8Z | FOREIGN COMPARATIVE TESTING | 24,950 | | 24,950 |
| 40 | 0603142D8Z | MISSION ENGINEERING & INTEGRATION (ME&I) | 144,454 | | 144,454 |
| 41 | 0603160BR | COUNTER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 509,160 | | 509,160 |
| 42 | 0603176C | ADVANCED CONCEPTS AND PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT | 0 | | |
| 43 | 0603180C | ADVANCED RESEARCH | 482,573 | 25,000 | 507,573 |
| | | Advanced Research for Blood Platelet Treatments | | [10,000] | |
| | | Autonomous Surface Vessel Support | | [15,000] | |
| 44 | 0603183D8Z | JOINT HYPERSONIC TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT &TRANSITION | 424,422 | 15,000 | 439,422 |
| | | Hypersonic Ground Test Infrastructure | | [15,000] | |
| 45 | 0603225D8Z | JOINT DOD-DOE MUNITIONS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 45,375 | | 45,375 |
| 48 | 0603288D8Z | ANALYTIC ASSESSMENTS | 36,917 | | 36,917 |
| 49 | 0603289D8Z | ADVANCED INNOVATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCEPTS | 51,960 | | 51,960 |
| 50 | 0603330D8Z | QUANTUM APPLICATION | 60,333 | | 60,333 |
| 51 | 0603331D8Z | FUTURE GENERATION WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES | 5,000 | | 5,000 |
| 52 | 0603342D8Z | DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT (DIU) | 522,559 | 5,000 | 527,559 |
| | | Defense Innovation Unit OnRamp Hub Expansion | | [5,000] | |
| 53 | 0603375D8Z | TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION | 982,694 | –350,000 | 632,694 |
| | | Unjustified growth | | [–350,000] | |
| 54 | 0603379D8Z | ADVANCED TECHNICAL INTEGRATION | 79,268 | | 79,268 |
| 55 | 0603384BP | CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM—ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT | 310,308 | | 310,308 |
| 56 | 0603467E | DARPA ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 1,568,124 | –93,000 | 1,475,124 |
| | | Cut to Perfect Victory and HATS | | [–93,000] | |
| 57 | 0603468E | ADVANCED COMPLEX SYSTEMS | 540,362 | | 540,362 |
| 58 | 0603469E | ADVANCED ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES | 331,007 | | 331,007 |
| 59 | 0603618D8Z | JOINT ELECTRONIC ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY | 49,083 | | 49,083 |
| 60 | 0603662D8Z | NETWORKED COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES | 696,297 | | 696,297 |
| 62 | 0603680D8Z | DEFENSE-WIDE MANUFACTURING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM | 581,847 | 20,000 | 601,847 |
| | | Hypersonic Advanced Materials | | [8,000] | |
| | | Manufacturing Advancement for Novel Technology Innovation and Sustainment (F–47) | | [12,000] | |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 63 | 0603680S | MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM | 49,787 | | 49,787 |
| 64 | 0603712S | GENERIC LOGISTICS R&D TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS | 18,791 | | 18,791 |
| 65 | 0603716D8Z | STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH PROGRAM | 60,774 | | 60,774 |
| 66 | 0603720S | MICROELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT | 139,923 | | 139,923 |
| 67 | 0603727D8Z | JOINT WARFIGHTING PROGRAM | 0 | | |
| 72 | 0603781D8Z | SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE | 10,227 | | 10,227 |
| 73 | 0603834D8Z | BIOSURVEILLANCE PROGRAM ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 9,800 | | 9,800 |
| 74 | 0603838D8Z | DEFENSE INNOVATION ACCELERATION (DIA) | 310,977 | | 310,977 |
| 75 | 0603924D8Z | HIGH ENERGY LASER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM | 201,125 | 5,000 | 206,125 |
| | | Ultra-Short Pulsed Laser Weapons | | [5,000] | |
| 76 | 0603941D8Z | TEST & EVALUATION SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY | 3,834,080 | –1,455,706 | 2,378,374 |
| | | MACH-XL program increase | | [200,000] | |
| | | Unjustified growth | | [–1,655,706] | |
| 77 | 0603945D8Z | INTERNATIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVES | 158,345 | | 158,345 |
| 79 | 0604055D8Z | OPERATIONAL ENERGY CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENT | 0 | 55,000 | 55,000 |
| | | Energy mission planning—program increase | | [50,000] | |
| | | Innovative high energy density sodium battery | | [5,000] | |
| 80 | 1160402BB | SOF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 126,085 | | 126,085 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT** | **12,669,536** | **–1,573,706** | **11,095,830** |
| | | **ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROTOTYPES** | | | |
| 81 | 0603161D8Z | NUCLEAR MATTERS, ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT & PROTOTYPES | 44,685 | 15,000 | 59,685 |
| | | Advanced prototyping acceleration | | [15,000] | |
| 82 | 0603600D8Z | WALKOFF | 227,158 | | 227,158 |
| 83 | 0603851D8Z | ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY TECHNICAL CERTIFICATION PROGRAM | 125,066 | 3,000 | 128,066 |
| | | STED program increase—accelerate SOF warfighter technologies | | [3,000] | |
| 84 | 0603881C | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TERMINAL DEFENSE SEGMENT | 0 | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 85 | 0603882C | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SEGMENT | 1,360,611 | –75,000 | 1,285,611 |
| | | Unjustified growth | | [–75,000] | |
| 86 | 0603884BP | CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM—DEM/VAL | 391,307 | | 391,307 |
| 87 | 0603884C | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SENSORS | 865,420 | | 865,420 |
| 88 | 0603890C | BMD ENABLING PROGRAMS | 1,457,437 | –15,000 | 1,442,437 |
| | | DEEP SENTRY tool development | | [5,000] | |
| | | Program decrease | | [–20,000] | |
| 89 | 0603891C | SPECIAL PROGRAMS—MDA | 1,742,778 | –100,000 | 1,642,778 |
| | | Unjustified growth | | [–100,000] | |
| 90 | 0603892C | AEGIS BMD | 927,870 | | 927,870 |
| 91 | 0603896C | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL, BATTLE MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS (C2BMC). | 939,987 | | 939,987 |
| 92 | 0603898C | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE JOINT WARFIGHTER SUPPORT | 50,430 | | 50,430 |
| 93 | 0603904C | MISSILE DEFENSE INTEGRATION & OPERATIONS CENTER (MDIOC) | 57,892 | | 57,892 |
| 94 | 0603906C | REGARDING TRENCH | 29,807 | | 29,807 |
| 95 | 0603907C | SEA BASED X-BAND RADAR (SBX) | 274,204 | | 274,204 |
| 96 | 0603913C | ISRAELI COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS | 300,000 | | 300,000 |
| 97 | 0603914C | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TEST | 1,065,474 | | 1,065,474 |
| 98 | 0603915C | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TARGETS | 518,506 | 27,000 | 545,506 |
| | | Advanced Target Front End (ATFE) Configuration 3 (C3) Risk Reduction | | [7,000] | |
| | | Development of full-scale, low-cost hypersonic vehicle target | | [10,000] | |
| | | Expanded operational testing | | [10,000] | |
| 99 | 0603923D8Z | COALITION WARFARE | 10,082 | | 10,082 |
| 100 | 0604011D8Z | NEXT GENERATION INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (5G) | 0 | | |
| 101 | 0604016D8Z | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CORROSION PROGRAM | 2,675 | | 2,675 |
| 102 | 0604023D8Z | JOINT MUNITIONS COMPONENT PROTOTYPING | 7,893 | | 7,893 |
| 103 | 0604102C | GUAM DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT | 212,413 | 100,000 | 312,413 |
| | | Program increase | | [100,000] | |
| 104 | 0604115C | TECHNOLOGY MATURATION INITIATIVES | 59,700 | | 59,700 |
| 106 | 0604125D8Z | ADVANCED MANUFACTURING COMPONENTS AND PROTOTYPES | 52,122 | 10,000 | 62,122 |
| | | Advanced Manufacturing Pilot Research Facility for Large Scale, Large Volume, Agile, Additive and Hybrid Manufacturing. | | [10,000] | |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 107 | 0604162D8Z | CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ELIMINATION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 945 | | 945 |
| 108 | 0604181C | HYPERSONIC DEFENSE | 213,783 | | 213,783 |
| 109 | 0604250D8Z | ADVANCED INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES | 2,626,130 | 150,000 | 2,776,130 |
| | | HGWS/MDACS integration and test | | [150,000] | |
| 110 | 0604294D8Z | TRUSTED & ASSURED MICROELECTRONICS | 156,743 | 350,000 | 506,743 |
| | | Restore funding for microelectronics activities | | [350,000] | |
| 111 | 0604331D8Z | RAPID PROTOTYPING PROGRAM | 238,800 | 140,000 | 378,800 |
| | | Covert Acoustic Communications | | [5,000] | |
| | | HALE/HAPS | | [5,000] | |
| | | Rapidly Scalable Affordable Mass Group 2/3 UAS | | [100,000] | |
| | | Unmanned Fleet Expansion | | [30,000] | |
| 113 | 0604341D8Z | DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT (DIU) PROTOTYPING | 0 | 330,000 | 330,000 |
| | | Alternative low-cost exoatmospheric interceptor | | [75,000] | |
| | | Alternative low-cost ground-launched extended-range munition | | [25,000] | |
| | | Alternative low-cost medium air-to-air missile | | [35,000] | |
| | | Alternative low-cost medium-range integrated air and missile defense interceptor | | [40,000] | |
| | | Alternative low-cost short-range integrated air and missile defense interceptor | | [35,000] | |
| | | Alternative low-cost shoulder launched missile | | [20,000] | |
| | | Ramjet munition from a responsive strike aircraft | | [100,000] | |
| 114 | 0604400D8Z | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) UNMANNED SYSTEM COMMON DEVELOPMENT | 2,024 | | 2,024 |
| 115 | 0604539D8Z | DEFENSE AUTONOMOUS WARFARE GROUP | 1,000,000 | | 1,000,000 |
| 116 | 0604551BR | CATAPULT INFORMATION SYSTEM | 7,500 | | 7,500 |
| 117 | 0604555D8Z | OPERATIONAL ENERGY PROTOTYPING—NON S&T | 53,505 | 40,000 | 93,505 |
| | | Operational energy prototyping | | [40,000] | |
| 119 | 0604679D8Z | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC CAPITAL (OSC) | 18,955 | 231,045 | 250,000 |
| | | Establish OSC equity account | | [250,000] | |
| | | Reduction for program no longer executed by OSC | | [–18,955] | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 120 | 0604682D8Z | SUPPORT FOR STRATEGIC ANALYSIS | 2,802 | | 2,802 |
| 122 | 0604791D8Z | MULTI-DOMAIN JOINT OPERATIONS (MDJO) | 32,001 | | 32,001 |
| 123 | 0604797D8Z | JOINT ENERGETIC TRANSITION OFFICE | 6,278 | | 6,278 |
| 124 | 0604826J | JOINT C5 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT, INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY ASSESSMENTS | 28,314 | | 28,314 |
| 125 | 0604834D8Z | BIOSURVEILLANCE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT & PROTOTYPING | 7,000 | | 7,000 |
| 126 | 0604873C | LONG RANGE DISCRIMINATION RADAR (LRDR) | 125,074 | | 125,074 |
| 127 | 0604874C | IMPROVED HOMELAND DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS | 1,344,824 | | 1,344,824 |
| 128 | 0604876C | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TERMINAL DEFENSE SEGMENT TEST | 0 | | |
| 129 | 0604878C | AEGIS BMD TEST | 61,969 | | 61,969 |
| 130 | 0604879C | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SENSOR TEST | 52,919 | | 52,919 |
| 131 | 0604880C | LAND-BASED SM–3 (LBSM3) | 25,102 | | 25,102 |
| 132 | 0604887C | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE MIDCOURSE SEGMENT TEST | 53,761 | | 53,761 |
| 133 | 0604924D8Z | HIGH ENERGY LASER ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT & PROTOTYPE | 44,485 | | 44,485 |
| 134 | 0202057C | SAFETY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT | 2,146 | | 2,146 |
| 135 | 0208059JCY | CYBERCOM ACTIVITIES | 31,735 | | 31,735 |
| 137 | 0208086JCY | CYBER TRAINING ENVIRONMENT (CTE) | 120,814 | | 120,814 |
| 139 | 0305103C | CYBER SECURITY INITIATIVE | 2,160 | | 2,160 |
| 140 | 0305245D8Z | INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND INNOVATION INVESTMENTS | 15,047 | 5,000 | 20,047 |
| | | Geospatial Workforce Development Program | | [5,000] | |
| 142 | 1206895C | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM SPACE PROGRAMS | 95,819 | | 95,819 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL ADVANCED COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT AND PROTOTYPES** | **17,094,152** | **1,211,045** | **18,305,197** |
| | | **SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION** | | | |
| 144 | 0604123D8Z | CHIEF DIGITAL AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (CDAO)—DEM/VAL ACTIVITIES | 11,197 | | 11,197 |
| 145 | 0604133D8Z | ALPHA–1 DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES | 969,825 | –250,000 | 719,825 |
| | | Unjustified growth for Alpha–1 activities | | [–250,000] | |
| 146 | 0604161D8Z | NUCLEAR MATTERS, SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT & DEMONSTRATION | 14,919 | | 14,919 |
| 147 | 0604384BP | CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM—EMD | 261,947 | | 261,947 |
| 148 | 0604771D8Z | JOINT TACTICAL INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (JTIDS) | 10,200 | | 10,200 |
| 149 | 0605000BR | COUNTER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 16,713 | | 16,713 |
| 150 | 0605013BL | INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT | 13,620 | | 13,620 |
| 151 | 0605021SE | HOMELAND PERSONNEL SECURITY INITIATIVE | 9,334 | | 9,334 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 152 | 0605022D8Z | DEFENSE EXPORTABILITY PROGRAM | 5,943 | 50,000 | 55,943 |
| | | Increase for Defense Exportability Features program | | [50,000] | |
| 153 | 0605027D8Z | OUSD(C) IT DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES | 273,253 | –50,000 | 223,253 |
| | | Unjustified growth for OUSD(C) IT development | | [–50,000] | |
| 154 | 0605080S | DEFENSE AGENCY INITIATIVES (DAI)—FINANCIAL SYSTEM | 51,265 | | 51,265 |
| 155 | 0605141BR | MISSION ASSURANCE RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (MARMS) | 0 | | |
| 156 | 0605210D8Z | DEFENSE-WIDE ELECTRONIC PROCUREMENT CAPABILITIES | 7,918 | | 7,918 |
| 157 | 0605294D8Z | TRUSTED & ASSURED MICROELECTRONICS | 51,202 | 100,000 | 151,202 |
| | | Restore funding for microelectronics activities | | [100,000] | |
| 158 | 0605310D8Z | MILITARY AVIATION AND INSTALLATION ASSURANCE SITING CLEARINGHOUSE | 4,072 | | 4,072 |
| 159 | 0605649D8Z | ACQUISITION INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY (AI2) | 92,689 | | 92,689 |
| 160 | 0605755D8Z | RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE MODERNIZATION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION. | 3,090 | | 3,090 |
| 161 | 0605772D8Z | NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, & COMMUNICATIONS | 2,985 | | 2,985 |
| 162 | 0205401JCA | COUNTER—SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (JIATF–401) | 580,348 | | 580,348 |
| 163 | 0305282D8Z | JOINT FIRES NETWORK (JFN) | 0 | | |
| 164 | 0305282K | JOINT FIRES NETWORK (JFN) | 35,000 | | 35,000 |
| 165 | 0305304D8Z | REAL PROPERTY ANALYTICS | 2,573 | | 2,573 |
| 166 | 0305310D8Z | COUNTERPROLIFERATION ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT | 12,751 | | 12,751 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION** | **2,430,844** | **–150,000** | **2,280,844** |
| | | **MANAGEMENT SUPPORT** | | | |
| 168 | 0603829J | JOINT CAPABILITY EXPERIMENTATION | 12,332 | | 12,332 |
| 169 | 0604122D8Z | JADC2 DEVELOPMENT AND EXPERIMENTATION ACTIVITIES | 2,109,895 | –650,000 | 1,459,895 |
| | | Unjustified growth for JADC2 | | [–650,000] | |
| 171 | 0604774D8Z | DEFENSE READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM (DRRS) | 8,921 | | 8,921 |
| 172 | 0604875D8Z | JOINT SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT | 11,094 | | 11,094 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 173 | 0604940D8Z | CENTRAL TEST AND EVALUATION INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT (CTEIP) | 1,153,754 | | 1,153,754 |
| 174 | 0604942D8Z | ASSESSMENTS AND EVALUATIONS | 0 | | |
| 175 | 0605001E | MISSION SUPPORT | 108,101 | | 108,101 |
| 176 | 0605100D8Z | JOINT MISSION ENVIRONMENT TEST CAPABILITY (JMETC) | 234,700 | | 234,700 |
| 177 | 0605126J | JOINT INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION (JIAMDO) | 69,820 | | 69,820 |
| 178 | 0605128D8Z | CLASSIFIED PROGRAM USD(P) | 0 | | |
| 179 | 0605131D8Z | LIVE FIRE TESTING | 9,020 | | 9,020 |
| 180 | 0605142D8Z | SYSTEMS ENGINEERING | 21,992 | | 21,992 |
| 181 | 0605151D8Z | STUDIES AND ANALYSIS SUPPORT—OSD | 5,255 | | 5,255 |
| 182 | 0605161D8Z | NUCLEAR MATTERS MANAGEMENT SUPPORT | 21,862 | | 21,862 |
| 183 | 0605170D8Z | SUPPORT TO NETWORKS AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION | 26,878 | 3,000 | 29,878 |
| | | Third-Party hardware evaluation and independent analysis | | [3,000] | |
| 184 | 0605200D8Z | GENERAL SUPPORT TO OUSD(INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY) | 10,695 | | 10,695 |
| 185 | 0605384BP | CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM | 89,467 | | 89,467 |
| 192 | 0605711D8Z | CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS | 10,913 | | 10,913 |
| 193 | 0605790D8Z | SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION RESEARCH (SBIR)/ SMALL BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (STTR) ADMINISTRATION. | 8,435 | | 8,435 |
| 194 | 0605797D8Z | MAINTAINING TECHNOLOGY ADVANTAGE | 35,512 | | 35,512 |
| 195 | 0605798D8Z | DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY ANALYSIS | 165,450 | | 165,450 |
| 196 | 0605801KA | DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER (DTIC) | 57,576 | | 57,576 |
| 197 | 0605803SE | R&D IN SUPPORT OF DOD ENLISTMENT, TESTING AND EVALUATION | 34,359 | | 34,359 |
| 198 | 0605804D8Z | DEVELOPMENT TEST AND EVALUATION | 35,106 | | 35,106 |
| 199 | 0605898E | MANAGEMENT HQ—R&D | 5,383 | | 5,383 |
| 200 | 0605998KA | MANAGEMENT HQ—DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER (DTIC) | 3,489 | | 3,489 |
| 201 | 0606005D8Z | SPECIAL ACTIVITIES | 19,260 | | 19,260 |
| 202 | 0606100D8Z | BUDGET AND PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS | 10,678 | | 10,678 |
| 203 | 0606114D8Z | ANALYSIS WORKING GROUP (AWG) SUPPORT | 11,668 | | 11,668 |
| 205 | 0606220D8Z | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR ENTERPRISE TRANSFORMATION AND MODERNIZATION | 75,000 | | 75,000 |
| 206 | 0606225D8Z | ODNA TECHNOLOGY AND RESOURCE ANALYSIS | 3,264 | | 3,264 |
| 207 | 0606300D8Z | DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | 6,307 | | 6,307 |
| 208 | 0606301D8Z | AVIATION SAFETY TECHNOLOGIES | 986 | | 986 |
| 209 | 0606771D8Z | CYBER RESILIENCY AND CYBERSECURITY POLICY | 30,746 | | 30,746 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 210 | 0606774D8Z | DEFENSE CIVILIAN TRAINING CORPS | 0 | 20,000 | 20,000 |
| | | Defense civilian training corps increase | | [20,000] | |
| 211 | 0606775D8Z | JOINT PRODUCTION ACCELERATOR CELL (JPAC) | 6,215 | | 6,215 |
| 212 | 0606829D8Z | SUSTAINMENT TRANSITION CAPABILITIES | 29,408 | | 29,408 |
| 213 | 0606853BR | MANAGEMENT, TECHNICAL & INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT | 0 | | |
| 214 | 0203345D8Z | DEFENSE OPERATIONS SECURITY INITIATIVE (DOSI) | 0 | | |
| 215 | 0204571J | JOINT STAFF ANALYTICAL SUPPORT | 5,088 | | 5,088 |
| 216 | 0207834D8Z | BIOSURVEILLANCE PROGRAM | 7,000 | | 7,000 |
| 217 | 0208045K | C4I INTEROPERABILITY | 72,581 | | 72,581 |
| 218 | 0303169D8Z | INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RAPID ACQUISITION | 6,416 | | 6,416 |
| 219 | 0305172K | COMBINED ADVANCED APPLICATIONS | 5,566 | | 5,566 |
| 221 | 0305208K | DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND/SURFACE SYSTEMS | 2,951 | | 2,951 |
| 222 | 0305248J | JOINT STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DATA OFFICER (OCDO) ACTIVITIES | 67,007 | | 67,007 |
| 223 | 0804768J | COCOM EXERCISE ENGAGEMENT AND TRAINING TRANSFORMATION (CE2T2)—NON-MHA | 90,424 | | 90,424 |
| 224 | 0808709SE | DEFENSE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (DEOMI) | 0 | | |
| 225 | 0808737SE | INTEGRATED PRIMARY PREVENTION | 5,768 | | 5,768 |
| 226 | 0901598C | MANAGEMENT HQ—MDA | 31,863 | | 31,863 |
| 227 | 0903235K | JOINT SERVICE PROVIDER (JSP) | 0 | | |
| 9999 | 9999999999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 36,977 | | 36,977 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL MANAGEMENT SUPPORT** | **4,775,182** | **–627,000** | **4,148,182** |
| | | **OPERATIONAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT** | | | |
| 229 | 0604011D8Z | NEXT GENERATION INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (5G) | 5,893 | | 5,893 |
| 231 | 0604538D8Z | ECONOMIC DEFENSE UNIT (EDU) | 403,903 | –350,000 | 53,903 |
| | | Transfer to OSC | | [–250,000] | |
| | | Unjustified growth for Economic Defense Unit | | [–100,000] | |
| 232 | 0607162D8Z | CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ELIMINATION TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENT | 2,931 | | 2,931 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 233 | 0607210D8Z | INDUSTRIAL BASE ANALYSIS AND SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT | 1,177,356 | 97,000 | 1,274,356 |
| | | Automated textile manufacturing program | | [50,000] | |
| | | Fan-Out Water-Level Packaging | | [10,000] | |
| | | MUDCAT: Secure Manufacturing and Integration Capability | | [22,000] | |
| | | Multi Domain Operations (MDO) and Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) Range | | [10,000] | |
| | | Stem+M Shipbuilding Workforce Education Program | | [5,000] | |
| 234 | 0607310D8Z | COUNTERPROLIFERATION MODERNIZATION | 11,304 | | 11,304 |
| 235 | 0607327T | GLOBAL THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS (G-TSCMIS) | 6,010 | | 6,010 |
| 236 | 0607384BP | CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE (OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT) | 82,695 | | 82,695 |
| 237 | 0607385BR | COUNTER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 4,108 | | 4,108 |
| 238 | 0607757D8Z | RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE MODERNIZATION OPERATIONAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT | 2,794 | | 2,794 |
| 239 | 0208085JCY | ROBUST INFRASTRUCTURE AND ACCESS | 155,613 | | 155,613 |
| 240 | 0208097JCY | CYBER COMMAND AND CONTROL (CYBER C2) | 85,958 | | 85,958 |
| 241 | 0208099JCY | DATA AND UNIFIED PLATFORM (D&UP) | 84,687 | | 84,687 |
| 245 | 0302019K | DEFENSE INFO INFRASTRUCTURE ENGINEERING AND INTEGRATION | 13,312 | | 13,312 |
| 246 | 0302609V | COUNTERING THREATS AUTOMATED PLATFORM | 11,710 | | 11,710 |
| 247 | 0303126K | LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS—DCS | 10,508 | | 10,508 |
| 248 | 0303131K | MINIMUM ESSENTIAL EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK (MEECN) | 10,307 | | 10,307 |
| 250 | 0303140D8Z | INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY PROGRAM | 35,214 | | 35,214 |
| 252 | 0303140K | INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY PROGRAM | 33,502 | | 33,502 |
| 253 | 0303153K | DEFENSE SPECTRUM ORGANIZATION | 49,466 | | 49,466 |
| 254 | 0303171K | JOINT PLANNING AND EXECUTION SERVICES | 10,615 | | 10,615 |
| 257 | 0303430V | FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY | 50,900 | | 50,900 |
| 265 | 0305104D8Z | DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE (DIB) CYBER SECURITY INITIATIVE | 17,077 | | 17,077 |
| 269 | 0305146V | DEFENSE JOINT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES | 6,751 | | 6,751 |
| 270 | 0305172D8Z | COMBINED ADVANCED APPLICATIONS | 18,912 | | 18,912 |
| 272 | 0305186D8Z | POLICY R&D PROGRAMS | 11,740 | | 11,740 |
| 275 | 0305199D8Z | NET CENTRICITY | 55,673 | | 55,673 |
| 277 | 0305208BB | DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND/SURFACE SYSTEMS | 0 | | |
| 282 | 0305387D8Z | HOMELAND DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM | 1,730 | | 1,730 |
| 283 | 0305601K | MISSION PARTNER ENVIRONMENTS | 15,464 | | 15,464 |
| 293 | 0306250JCY | CYBER OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT | 1,303,094 | 115,000 | 1,418,094 |

**SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Artificial Intelligence for cyberspace operations | | [30,000] | |
| | | CYBERCOM 2.0 | | [35,000] | |
| | | Extending technical service support | | [50,000] | |
| 294 | 0307609V | NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS (NISS) | 19,840 | | 19,840 |
| 297 | 0708012K | LOGISTICS SUPPORT ACTIVITIES | 2,051 | | 2,051 |
| 298 | 0708012S | PACIFIC DISASTER CENTERS | 0 | 9,500 | 9,500 |
| | | Pacific Disaster Centers | | [9,500] | |
| 299 | 0708047S | DEFENSE PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM | 2,829 | | 2,829 |
| 302 | 1160403BB | AVIATION SYSTEMS | 216,781 | 6,510 | 223,291 |
| | | SOCOM UPL—Adaptive Airborne Enterprise Group 3 sUAS | | [6,510] | |
| 303 | 1160405BB | INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT | 109,227 | 10,000 | 119,227 |
| | | Ultra-light Group 1 sUAS | | [10,000] | |
| 304 | 1160408BB | OPERATIONAL ENHANCEMENTS | 279,478 | 33,200 | 312,678 |
| | | SOCOM UPL—Ground infiltration protection system | | [25,700] | |
| | | SOCOM UPL—Operational capacity enhancements | | [7,500] | |
| 305 | 1160431BB | WARRIOR SYSTEMS | 435,074 | 43,100 | 478,174 |
| | | SOCOM UPL—Electromagnetic warfare family of systems | | [3,500] | |
| | | SOCOM UPL—Ground infiltration protection system | | [4,000] | |
| | | SOCOM UPL—Ground organic precision strike systems | | [5,000] | |
| | | SOCOM UPL—Munitions War Reserve | | [8,500] | |
| | | SOCOM UPL—Small cruise missile development | | [22,100] | |
| 306 | 1160432BB | SPECIAL PROGRAMS | 25,761 | | 25,761 |
| 307 | 1160434BB | UNMANNED ISR | 0 | | |
| 308 | 1160480BB | SOF TACTICAL VEHICLES | 0 | | |
| 309 | 1160483BB | MARITIME SYSTEMS | 351,721 | 12,300 | 364,021 |
| | | Open-architecture unmanned surface vessel experimentation | | [10,000] | |
| | | SOCOM UPL—Mission critical Dry Combat Submersible battery upgrade | | [2,300] | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 310 | 1160490BB | OPERATIONAL ENHANCEMENTS INTELLIGENCE | 25,747 | | 25,747 |
| 311 | 1203610K | TELEPORT PROGRAM | 22,244 | | 22,244 |
| 9999 | 9999999999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 8,923,353 | | 8,923,353 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL OPERATIONAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT** | **14,093,333** | **–23,390** | **14,069,943** |
| | | **SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY PILOT PROGRAMS** | | | |
| 312 | 0608140D8Z | ENTERPRISE PLATFORMS AND CAPABILITIES—SOFTWARE PILOT PROGRAM | 481,775 | | 481,775 |
| 313 | 0608500D8Z | WEAPONEERING CODE SUSTAINMENT | 23,071 | | 23,071 |
| 314 | 0608648D8Z | ACQUISITION VISIBILITY—SOFTWARE PILOT PROGRAM | 64,364 | | 64,364 |
| 315 | 0608775D8Z | ACCELERATE THE PROCUREMENT AND FIELDING OF INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES (APFIT) | 0 | | |
| 316 | 0608776D8Z | DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT FIELDING | 433,867 | | 433,867 |
| 317 | 0303150K | GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM | 124,329 | | 124,329 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY PILOT PROGRAMS** | **1,127,406** | **0** | **1,127,406** |
| | | **TOTAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, DW** | **55,736,724** | **–953,051** | **54,783,673** |
| | | **GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA FUND** | | | |
| | | **RESEARCH, DEV, TEST & EVAL** | | | |
| 9 | 0604139D8Z | GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA—MDA | 367,000 | | 367,000 |
| 15 | 0901159D8Z | GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA | 30,971 | | 30,971 |
| | | **SUBTOTAL RESEARCH, DEV, TEST & EVAL** | **397,971** | **0** | **397,971** |
| | | **TOTAL GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA FUND** | **397,971** | | **397,971** |
| | | **OPERATIONAL TEST & EVAL, DEFENSE** | | | |
| | | **MANAGEMENT SUPPORT** | | | |
| 1 | 0605118OTE | OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION | 101,365 | 70,000 | 171,365 |
| | | Additional support for data analysis activities and testing for AI systems | | [50,000] | |
| | | Cyber assessments | | [20,000] | |
| 2 | 0605131OTE | LIVE FIRE TEST AND EVALUATION | 11,000 | | 11,000 |
| 3 | 0605814OTE | OPERATIONAL TEST ACTIVITIES AND ANALYSES | 0 | | |
| | | **SUBTOTAL MANAGEMENT SUPPORT** | **112,365** | **70,000** | **182,365** |

SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Program Element | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | TOTAL OPERATIONAL TEST & EVAL, DEFENSE | 112,365 | 70,000 | 182,365 |
| | | TOTAL RDT&E | 218,791,608 | 1,126,420 | 219,918,028 |

# TITLE XLIII—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

## SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE.

**SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY** | | | |
| | **OPERATING FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | MANEUVER UNITS | 5,309,790 | 43,205 | 5,352,995 |
| | Winter equipment | | [43,205] | |
| 020 | MODULAR SUPPORT BRIGADES | 375,682 | | 375,682 |
| 030 | ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE | 1,193,028 | 173,738 | 1,366,766 |
| | Realignment from procurement for THAAD battery support | | [173,738] | |
| 040 | THEATER LEVEL ASSETS | 2,395,049 | | 2,395,049 |
| 050 | LAND FORCES OPERATIONS SUPPORT | 1,273,674 | | 1,273,674 |
| 060 | AVIATION ASSETS | 1,930,557 | | 1,930,557 |
| 070 | FORCE READINESS OPERATIONS SUPPORT | 7,186,195 | | 7,186,195 |
| 080 | LAND FORCES SYSTEMS READINESS | 888,277 | | 888,277 |
| 090 | LAND FORCES DEPOT MAINTENANCE | 2,022,115 | 120,000 | 2,142,115 |
| | Depot Equipment Maintenance | | [120,000] | |
| 100 | MEDICAL READINESS | 786,815 | | 786,815 |
| 110 | BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT | 10,390,174 | 12,656 | 10,402,830 |
| | Increase Child and Youth Program Funding | | [12,656] | |
| 120 | FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION | 5,435,364 | –5,435,364 | |
| | Transfer to Division B | | [–5,435,364] | |
| 130 | MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS | 287,812 | | 287,812 |
| 140 | ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES | 383,610 | | 383,610 |

**SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 150 | RESET | 117,880 | | 117,880 |
| 160 | US AFRICA COMMAND | 693,812 | | 693,812 |
| 170 | US EUROPEAN COMMAND | 510,862 | 15,000 | 525,862 |
| | EUCOM -Joint Intelligence Coordination Center | | [15,000] | |
| 180 | US SOUTHERN COMMAND | 464,769 | | 464,769 |
| 190 | US FORCES KOREA | 77,775 | | 77,775 |
| 200 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES—CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS | 366,311 | | 366,311 |
| 210 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES—CYBERSECURITY | 579,954 | | 579,954 |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES** | **42,669,505** | **–5,070,765** | **37,598,740** |
| | **MOBILIZATION** | | | |
| 220 | STRATEGIC MOBILITY | 53,602 | | 53,602 |
| 230 | ARMY PREPOSITIONED STOCKS | 1,125,709 | | 1,125,709 |
| 240 | INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS | 3,172 | | 3,172 |
| | **SUBTOTAL MOBILIZATION** | **1,182,483** | **0** | **1,182,483** |
| | **TRAINING AND RECRUITING** | | | |
| 250 | OFFICER ACQUISITION | 193,530 | | 193,530 |
| 260 | RECRUIT TRAINING | 70,431 | | 70,431 |
| 270 | ONE STATION UNIT TRAINING | 96,115 | | 96,115 |
| 280 | SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS | 503,896 | | 503,896 |
| 290 | SPECIALIZED SKILL TRAINING | 1,204,230 | | 1,204,230 |
| 300 | FLIGHT TRAINING | 1,381,437 | | 1,381,437 |
| 310 | PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION | 201,481 | | 201,481 |
| 320 | TRAINING SUPPORT | 609,925 | | 609,925 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 330 | RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING | 712,092 | | 712,092 |
| 340 | EXAMINING | 0 | | |
| 350 | OFF-DUTY AND VOLUNTARY EDUCATION | 216,256 | 4,224 | 220,480 |
| | Increase Tuition/Credentialing Assistance | | [4,224] | |
| 360 | CIVILIAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING | 218,683 | | 218,683 |
| 370 | JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS | 218,598 | | 218,598 |
| | **SUBTOTAL TRAINING AND RECRUITING** | **5,626,674** | **4,224** | **5,630,898** |
| | **ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 390 | SERVICEWIDE TRANSPORTATION | 1,483,938 | | 1,483,938 |
| 400 | CENTRAL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES | 703,829 | | 703,829 |
| 410 | LOGISTIC SUPPORT ACTIVITIES | 634,879 | | 634,879 |
| 420 | AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT | 525,732 | | 525,732 |
| 430 | ADMINISTRATION | 402,276 | | 402,276 |
| 440 | SERVICEWIDE COMMUNICATIONS | 2,252,914 | | 2,252,914 |
| 450 | MANPOWER MANAGEMENT | 324,069 | | 324,069 |
| 460 | OTHER PERSONNEL SUPPORT | 961,851 | | 961,851 |
| 470 | OTHER SERVICE SUPPORT | 2,179,562 | 65,979 | 2,245,541 |
| | Increase to Civilian Personnel Compensation | | [65,979] | |
| 480 | ARMY CLAIMS ACTIVITIES | 139,480 | | 139,480 |
| 490 | REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT | 308,271 | | 308,271 |
| 500 | FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND AUDIT READINESS | 434,778 | | 434,778 |
| 510 | DEF ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNT | 37,654 | | 37,654 |
| 520 | INTERNATIONAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS | 760,520 | | 760,520 |
| 530 | MISC. SUPPORT OF OTHER NATIONS | 28,681 | | 28,681 |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 3,457,587 | | 3,457,587 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | **14,636,021** | **65,979** | **14,702,000** |
| | **UNDISTRIBUTED** | | | |
| 600 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 0 | –812,335 | |

SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Unobligated balances | | [–812,335] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED** | **0** | **–812,335** | |
| | **TOTAL OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY** | **64,114,683** | **–5,812,897** | **58,301,786** |
| | **OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY RES** | | | |
| | **OPERATING FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | MODULAR SUPPORT BRIGADES | 15,213 | | 15,213 |
| 020 | ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE | 674,766 | | 674,766 |
| 030 | THEATER LEVEL ASSETS | 121,223 | | 121,223 |
| 040 | LAND FORCES OPERATIONS SUPPORT | 664,612 | | 664,612 |
| 050 | AVIATION ASSETS | 37,490 | | 37,490 |
| 060 | FORCE READINESS OPERATIONS SUPPORT | 380,473 | | 380,473 |
| 070 | LAND FORCES SYSTEMS READINESS | 41,301 | | 41,301 |
| 080 | LAND FORCES DEPOT MAINTENANCE | 37,429 | | 37,429 |
| 090 | BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT | 577,337 | | 577,337 |
| 100 | FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION | 411,093 | –411,093 | |
| | Transfer to Division B | | [–411,093] | |
| 110 | MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS | 27,810 | | 27,810 |
| 120 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES—CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS | 2,725 | | 2,725 |
| 130 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES—CYBERSECURITY | 19,422 | | 19,422 |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES** | **3,010,894** | **–411,093** | **2,599,801** |
| | **ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 140 | SERVICEWIDE TRANSPORTATION | 15,237 | | 15,237 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 150 | ADMINISTRATION | 11,708 | | 11,708 |
| 160 | SERVICEWIDE COMMUNICATIONS | 4,165 | | 4,165 |
| 170 | MANPOWER MANAGEMENT | 7,300 | | 7,300 |
| 180 | OTHER PERSONNEL SUPPORT | 63,330 | | 63,330 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | **101,740** | **0** | **101,740** |
| | **UNDISTRIBUTED** | | | |
| 220 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 0 | –10,222 | |
| | Unobligated balances | | [–10,222] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED** | **0** | **–10,222** | |
| | **TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY RES** | **3,112,634** | **–421,315** | **2,691,319** |
| | **OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARNG** | | | |
| | **OPERATING FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | MANEUVER UNITS | 807,777 | | 807,777 |
| 020 | MODULAR SUPPORT BRIGADES | 233,114 | | 233,114 |
| 030 | ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE | 1,143,423 | | 1,143,423 |
| 040 | THEATER LEVEL ASSETS | 84,598 | | 84,598 |
| 050 | LAND FORCES OPERATIONS SUPPORT | 344,161 | | 344,161 |
| 060 | AVIATION ASSETS | 1,096,948 | | 1,096,948 |
| 070 | FORCE READINESS OPERATIONS SUPPORT | 864,172 | | 864,172 |
| 080 | LAND FORCES SYSTEMS READINESS | 93,367 | | 93,367 |
| 090 | LAND FORCES DEPOT MAINTENANCE | 171,055 | | 171,055 |
| 100 | BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT | 1,326,854 | | 1,326,854 |
| 110 | FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION | 1,065,363 | –1,065,363 | |
| | Transfer to Division B | | [–1,065,363] | |
| 120 | MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS | 1,116,559 | | 1,116,559 |
| 130 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES—CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS | 6,831 | | 6,831 |
| 140 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES—CYBERSECURITY | 24,785 | | 24,785 |

SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES** | **8,379,007** | **–1,065,363** | **7,313,644** |
| | **ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 150 | SERVICEWIDE TRANSPORTATION | 6,604 | | 6,604 |
| 160 | ADMINISTRATION | 50,221 | | 50,221 |
| 170 | SERVICEWIDE COMMUNICATIONS | 24,846 | | 24,846 |
| 180 | OTHER PERSONNEL SUPPORT | 239,142 | | 239,142 |
| 190 | REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT | 4,004 | | 4,004 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | **324,817** | **0** | **324,817** |
| | **UNDISTRIBUTED** | | | |
| 220 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 0 | –246,699 | |
| | Unobligated balances | | [–246,699] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED** | **0** | **–246,699** | |
| | **TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARNG** | **8,703,824** | **–1,312,062** | **7,391,762** |
| | **OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY** | | | |
| | **OPERATING FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | MISSION AND OTHER FLIGHT OPERATIONS | 8,324,572 | | 8,324,572 |
| 020 | FLEET AIR TRAINING | 3,128,764 | | 3,128,764 |
| 030 | AIR SYSTEMS SUPPORT | 1,469,165 | | 1,469,165 |
| 040 | AIRCRAFT DEPOT MAINTENANCE | 2,219,583 | | 2,219,583 |
| 050 | AVIATION LOGISTICS | 2,664,360 | | 2,664,360 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 060 | MISSION AND OTHER SHIP OPERATIONS | 7,424,752 | 230,000 | 7,654,752 |
| | Maritime unmanned operating forces | | [225,000] | |
| | Sailor Quality of Life Survey | | [5,000] | |
| 070 | SHIP OPERATIONS SUPPORT & TRAINING | 1,713,065 | | 1,713,065 |
| 080 | SHIP DEPOT MAINTENANCE | 14,292,873 | | 14,292,873 |
| 090 | SHIP DEPOT OPERATIONS SUPPORT | 2,597,722 | | 2,597,722 |
| 100 | COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE | 1,821,744 | | 1,821,744 |
| 110 | MEDICAL READINESS | 661,800 | | 661,800 |
| 120 | SPACE SYSTEMS AND SURVEILLANCE | 572,000 | | 572,000 |
| 130 | WARFARE TACTICS | 1,038,456 | | 1,038,456 |
| 140 | OPERATIONAL METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY | 496,272 | | 496,272 |
| 150 | COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES | 2,476,987 | 700 | 2,477,687 |
| | Special Boat Training Command operations and maintenance enhancement | | [700] | |
| 160 | EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE AND DEPOT OPERATIONS SUPPORT | 62,570 | | 62,570 |
| 170 | COMBATANT COMMANDERS CORE OPERATIONS | 105,379 | 5,000 | 110,379 |
| | INDOPACOM community engagement for Red Hill and training land lease negotiations | | [5,000] | |
| 180 | COMBATANT COMMANDERS DIRECT MISSION SUPPORT | 1,994,139 | 50,000 | 2,044,139 |
| | Contracted Seaplane capacity—INDOPACOM | | [50,000] | |
| 190 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES | 662,040 | | 662,040 |
| 200 | STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL STRIKE DETERRENCE | 2,220,083 | | 2,220,083 |
| 210 | WEAPONS MAINTENANCE | 1,833,006 | 22,400 | 1,855,406 |
| | Mobile utilities support equipment employment | | [22,400] | |
| 220 | OTHER WEAPON SYSTEMS SUPPORT | 834,752 | | 834,752 |
| 230 | ENTERPRISE INFORMATION | 2,196,932 | | 2,196,932 |
| 240 | SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION AND MODERNIZATION | 4,891,828 | –4,891,828 | |
| | Expeditionary unmanned infrastructure | | [65,000] | |
| | Transfer to Division B | | [–4,956,828] | |
| 250 | BASE OPERATING SUPPORT | 6,069,456 | 19,891 | 6,089,347 |
| | Increase Child and Youth Program Funding | | [9,891] | |
| | Red Hill long-term monitoring, research, and remediation | | [10,000] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES** | **71,772,300** | **–4,563,837** | **67,208,463** |

**SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **MOBILIZATION** | | | |
| 260 | SHIP PREPOSITIONING AND SURGE | 378,073 | | 378,073 |
| 270 | READY RESERVE FORCE | 881,029 | | 881,029 |
| 280 | SHIP ACTIVATIONS/INACTIVATIONS | 831,641 | | 831,641 |
| 300 | COAST GUARD SUPPORT | 27,729 | | 27,729 |
| | **SUBTOTAL MOBILIZATION** | **2,118,472** | **0** | **2,118,472** |
| | **TRAINING AND RECRUITING** | | | |
| 310 | OFFICER ACQUISITION | 198,743 | | 198,743 |
| 320 | RECRUIT TRAINING | 17,813 | | 17,813 |
| 330 | RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS | 193,797 | | 193,797 |
| 340 | SPECIALIZED SKILL TRAINING | 1,163,755 | | 1,163,755 |
| 350 | PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION | 280,521 | | 280,521 |
| 360 | TRAINING SUPPORT | 504,282 | | 504,282 |
| 370 | RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING | 261,140 | | 261,140 |
| 380 | OFF-DUTY AND VOLUNTARY EDUCATION | 75,600 | 18,800 | 94,400 |
| | Increase Tuition/Credentialing Assistance | | [18,800] | |
| 390 | CIVILIAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING | 60,191 | | 60,191 |
| 400 | JUNIOR ROTC | 60,219 | | 60,219 |
| | **SUBTOTAL TRAINING AND RECRUITING** | **2,816,061** | **18,800** | **2,834,861** |
| | **ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 410 | ADMINISTRATION | 1,396,823 | 76,387 | 1,473,210 |
| | Increase to Civilian Personnel Compensation | | [76,387] | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 430 | CIVILIAN MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT | 244,308 | | 244,308 |
| 450 | MILITARY MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT | 642,260 | | 642,260 |
| 470 | FOREIGN CURRENCY FLUCTUATION | 5,517 | | 5,517 |
| 480 | DEF ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNT | 60,440 | | 60,440 |
| 490 | SERVICEWIDE TRANSPORTATION | 279,134 | | 279,134 |
| 510 | PLANNING, ENGINEERING, AND PROGRAM SUPPORT | 605,530 | | 605,530 |
| 520 | ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND OVERSIGHT | 822,580 | | 822,580 |
| 530 | INVESTIGATIVE AND SECURITY SERVICES | 1,076,664 | | 1,076,664 |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 728,457 | | 728,457 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | **5,861,713** | **76,387** | **5,938,100** |
| | **UNDISTRIBUTED** | | | |
| 770 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 0 | –540,421 | |
| | Unobligated balances | | [–540,421] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED** | **0** | **–540,421** | |
| | **TOTAL OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY** | **82,568,546** | **–5,009,071** | **77,559,475** |
| | **OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS** | | | |
| | **OPERATING FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | OPERATIONAL FORCES | 3,113,102 | | 3,113,102 |
| 020 | FIELD LOGISTICS | 2,807,429 | | 2,807,429 |
| 030 | DEPOT MAINTENANCE | 344,750 | | 344,750 |
| 040 | MARITIME PREPOSITIONING | 280,543 | | 280,543 |
| 050 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES | 351,199 | | 351,199 |
| 060 | SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION | 3,629,008 | –3,629,008 | |
| | Transfer to Division B | | [–3,629,008] | |
| 070 | BASE OPERATING SUPPORT | 3,175,027 | 3,223 | 3,178,250 |
| | Increase Child and Youth Program Funding | | [3,223] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES** | **13,701,058** | **–3,625,785** | **10,075,273** |

**SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **TRAINING AND RECRUITING** | | | |
| 080 | RECRUIT TRAINING | 45,521 | | 45,521 |
| 090 | OFFICER ACQUISITION | 1,346 | | 1,346 |
| 100 | SPECIALIZED SKILL TRAINING | 242,438 | | 242,438 |
| 110 | PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION | 64,994 | | 64,994 |
| 120 | TRAINING SUPPORT | 838,526 | | 838,526 |
| 130 | RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING | 363,287 | | 363,287 |
| 140 | OFF-DUTY AND VOLUNTARY EDUCATION | 47,840 | 957 | 48,797 |
| | Increase Tuition/Credentialing Assistance | | [957] | |
| 150 | JUNIOR ROTC | 33,292 | | 33,292 |
| | **SUBTOTAL TRAINING AND RECRUITING** | **1,637,244** | **957** | **1,638,201** |
| | **ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 180 | SERVICEWIDE TRANSPORTATION | 154,026 | | 154,026 |
| 190 | ADMINISTRATION | 416,349 | 11,970 | 428,319 |
| | Increase to Civilian Personnel Compensation | | [11,970] | |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 80,140 | | 80,140 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | **650,515** | **11,970** | **662,485** |
| | **UNDISTRIBUTED** | | | |
| 310 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 0 | –89,275 | |
| | Unobligated balances | | [–89,275] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED** | **0** | **–89,275** | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **TOTAL OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS** | **15,988,817** | **–3,702,133** | **12,286,684** |
| | **OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY RES** | | | |
| | **OPERATING FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | MISSION AND OTHER FLIGHT OPERATIONS | 787,622 | | 787,622 |
| 020 | AIR SYSTEMS SUPPORT | 9,733 | | 9,733 |
| 030 | AIRCRAFT DEPOT MAINTENANCE | 215,547 | | 215,547 |
| 040 | AVIATION LOGISTICS | 27,703 | | 27,703 |
| 050 | COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS | 19,652 | | 19,652 |
| 060 | COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES | 196,376 | | 196,376 |
| 070 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES | 288 | | 288 |
| 080 | ENTERPRISE INFORMATION | 30,811 | | 30,811 |
| 090 | SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION AND MODERNIZATION | 59,386 | –59,386 | |
| | Transfer to Division B | | [–59,386] | |
| 100 | BASE OPERATING SUPPORT | 111,177 | | 111,177 |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES** | **1,458,295** | **–59,386** | **1,398,909** |
| | **ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 110 | ADMINISTRATION | 2,747 | | 2,747 |
| 120 | MILITARY MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT | 14,944 | | 14,944 |
| 130 | ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT | 1,230 | | 1,230 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | **18,921** | **0** | **18,921** |
| | **UNDISTRIBUTED** | | | |
| 170 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 0 | –19,763 | |
| | Unobligated balances | | [–19,763] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED** | **0** | **–19,763** | |

SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY RES** | **1,477,216** | **–79,149** | **1,398,067** |
| | **OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, MC RESERVE** | | | |
| | **OPERATING FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | OPERATING FORCES | 142,416 | | 142,416 |
| 020 | DEPOT MAINTENANCE | 23,213 | | 23,213 |
| 030 | SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION AND MODERNIZATION | 100,709 | –100,709 | |
| | Transfer to Division B | | [–100,709] | |
| 040 | BASE OPERATING SUPPORT | 128,902 | | 128,902 |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES** | **395,240** | **–100,709** | **294,531** |
| | **ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 050 | ADMINISTRATION | 9,440 | | 9,440 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | **9,440** | **0** | **9,440** |
| | **UNDISTRIBUTED** | | | |
| 060 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 0 | –12,267 | |
| | Unobligated balances | | [–12,267] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED** | **0** | **–12,267** | |
| | **TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, MC RESERVE** | **404,680** | **–112,976** | **291,704** |
| | **OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE** | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **OPERATING FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | PRIMARY COMBAT FORCES | 1,798,263 | 150,000 | 1,948,263 |
| | A–10 service life extension | | [150,000] | |
| 020 | COMBAT ENHANCEMENT FORCES | 3,117,205 | | 3,117,205 |
| 030 | AIR OPERATIONS TRAINING (OJT, MAINTAIN SKILLS) | 2,770,832 | | 2,770,832 |
| 040 | DEPOT PURCHASE EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE | 6,092,998 | | 6,092,998 |
| 050 | FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION | 6,100,395 | –6,100,395 | |
| | Transfer to Division B | | [–6,100,395] | |
| 060 | CYBERSPACE SUSTAINMENT | 320,297 | | 320,297 |
| 070 | CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND SYSTEM SUPPORT | 11,647,415 | | 11,647,415 |
| 080 | FLYING HOUR PROGRAM | 7,265,480 | | 7,265,480 |
| 090 | BASE SUPPORT | 11,318,037 | 27,933 | 11,345,970 |
| | AFSAS, MFOQA, Space Safety Support, RPA, BASH | | [18,000] | |
| | Increase Child and Youth Program Funding | | [9,933] | |
| 100 | GLOBAL C3I AND EARLY WARNING | 1,214,408 | –9,200 | 1,205,208 |
| | Realignment to RDT&E for Over-the-Horizon Backscatter Radar | | [–9,200] | |
| 110 | OTHER COMBAT OPS SPT PROGRAMS | 2,146,977 | | 2,146,977 |
| 120 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES | 1,155,815 | | 1,155,815 |
| 130 | TACTICAL INTEL AND OTHER SPECIAL ACTIVITIES | 1,992,280 | | 1,992,280 |
| 140 | MEDICAL READINESS | 561,626 | | 561,626 |
| 150 | US NORTHCOM/NORAD | 746,165 | 20,000 | 766,165 |
| | Military Infrastructure and Supply Chain Hardening Program | | [20,000] | |
| 160 | US STRATCOM | 656,448 | | 656,448 |
| 170 | US CENTCOM | 405,438 | | 405,438 |
| 180 | US SOCOM | 42,261 | | 42,261 |
| 190 | US TRANSCOM | 694 | | 694 |
| 200 | CENTCOM CYBERSPACE SUSTAINMENT | 0 | 1,000 | |
| | Cyber cooperation with the Kingdom of Jordan | | [1,000] | |
| 210 | USSPACECOM | 555,147 | | 555,147 |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 81,694 | | 81,694 |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES** | **59,989,875** | **–5,910,662** | **54,078,213** |

SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **MOBILIZATION** | | | |
| 220 | AIRLIFT OPERATIONS | 3,782,668 | | 3,782,668 |
| 230 | MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS | 321,889 | | 321,889 |
| | **SUBTOTAL MOBILIZATION** | **4,104,557** | **0** | **4,104,557** |
| | **TRAINING AND RECRUITING** | | | |
| 240 | OFFICER ACQUISITION | 267,971 | | 267,971 |
| 250 | RECRUIT TRAINING | 70,462 | | 70,462 |
| 260 | RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS (ROTC) | 143,686 | | 143,686 |
| 270 | SPECIALIZED SKILL TRAINING | 589,549 | | 589,549 |
| 280 | FLIGHT TRAINING | 1,122,297 | | 1,122,297 |
| 290 | PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION | 280,908 | | 280,908 |
| 300 | TRAINING SUPPORT | 192,608 | | 192,608 |
| 310 | RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING | 254,720 | | 254,720 |
| 320 | EXAMINING | 7,261 | | 7,261 |
| 330 | OFF-DUTY AND VOLUNTARY EDUCATION | 232,768 | 4,245 | 237,013 |
| | Increase Tuition/Credentialing Assistance | | [4,245] | |
| 340 | CIVILIAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING | 354,678 | | 354,678 |
| 350 | JUNIOR ROTC | 114,790 | | 114,790 |
| | **SUBTOTAL TRAINING AND RECRUITING** | **3,631,698** | **4,245** | **3,635,943** |
| | **ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 360 | LOGISTICS OPERATIONS | 1,124,763 | | 1,124,763 |
| 370 | TECHNICAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES | 159,721 | | 159,721 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 380 | ADMINISTRATION | 1,292,758 | 49,277 | 1,342,035 |
| | Increase to Civilian Personnel Compensation | | [58,877] | |
| | Realignment to Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation for HR IT automation | | [–9,600] | |
| 390 | SERVICEWIDE COMMUNICATIONS | 43,892 | | 43,892 |
| 410 | OTHER SERVICEWIDE ACTIVITIES | 1,666,547 | 22,500 | 1,689,047 |
| | MEEP to AFGSC, engine sustainment, training support | | [22,500] | |
| 420 | CIVIL AIR PATROL | 32,984 | | 32,984 |
| 430 | DEF ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNT | 58,936 | | 58,936 |
| 440 | SECURITY PROGRAMS | 202,400 | | 202,400 |
| 450 | INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT | 77,853 | | 77,853 |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 1,653,652 | | 1,653,652 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | **6,313,506** | **71,777** | **6,385,283** |
| | **UNDISTRIBUTED** | | | |
| 460 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 0 | –1,020,189 | |
| | Unobligated balances | | [–1,020,189] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED** | **0** | **–1,020,189** | |
| | **TOTAL OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE** | **74,039,636** | **–6,854,829** | **67,184,807** |
| | **OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, SPACE FORCE** | | | |
| | **OPERATING FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | GLOBAL C3I & EARLY WARNING | 1,056,824 | | 1,056,824 |
| 020 | SPACE LAUNCH OPERATIONS | 415,322 | 50,000 | 465,322 |
| | Launch Capacity | | [50,000] | |
| 030 | SPACE OPERATIONS | 1,266,939 | –78,000 | 1,188,939 |
| | Realignment to procurement for AEP fielded GPS ground system | | [–78,000] | |
| 040 | EDUCATION & TRAINING | 783,168 | | 783,168 |
| 050 | SPECIAL PROGRAMS | 733,761 | | 733,761 |
| 060 | DEPOT MAINTENANCE | 83,803 | | 83,803 |

**SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 070 | FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION | 1,384,326 | –1,384,326 | |
| | Transfer to Division B | | [–1,384,326] | |
| 080 | CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS AND SYSTEM SUPPORT | 2,096,381 | | 2,096,381 |
| 090 | SPACE OPERATIONS -BOS | 551,196 | | 551,196 |
| 100 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES | 289,958 | | 289,958 |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 118,478 | | 118,478 |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES** | **8,780,156** | **–1,412,326** | **7,367,830** |
| | **ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 110 | LOGISTICS OPERATIONS | 36,164 | | 36,164 |
| 120 | ADMINISTRATION | 449,597 | 4,880 | 454,477 |
| | Increase to Civilian Personnel Compensation | | [4,880] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | **485,761** | **4,880** | **490,641** |
| | **UNDISTRIBUTED** | | | |
| 140 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 0 | –218,077 | |
| | Unobligated balances | | [–218,077] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED** | **0** | **–218,077** | |
| | **TOTAL OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, SPACE FORCE** | **9,265,917** | **–1,625,523** | **7,640,394** |
| | **OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AF RESERVE** | | | |
| | **OPERATING FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | PRIMARY COMBAT FORCES | 2,138,964 | | 2,138,964 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 020 | MISSION SUPPORT OPERATIONS | 217,542 | | 217,542 |
| 030 | DEPOT PURCHASE EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE | 787,861 | | 787,861 |
| 040 | FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION | 187,022 | –187,022 | |
| | Transfer to Division B | | [–187,022] | |
| 050 | CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND SYSTEM SUPPORT | 654,233 | | 654,233 |
| 060 | BASE SUPPORT | 632,638 | | 632,638 |
| 070 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES | 1,655 | | 1,655 |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES** | **4,619,915** | **–187,022** | **4,432,893** |
| | **ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 080 | ADMINISTRATION | 100,998 | | 100,998 |
| 090 | RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING | 11,620 | | 11,620 |
| 100 | MILITARY MANPOWER AND PERS MGMT (ARPC) | 15,893 | | 15,893 |
| 110 | AUDIOVISUAL | 561 | | 561 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | **129,072** | **0** | **129,072** |
| | **UNDISTRIBUTED** | | | |
| 130 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 0 | –224,891 | |
| | Unobligated balances | | [–224,891] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED** | **0** | **–224,891** | |
| | **TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AF RESERVE** | **4,748,987** | **–411,913** | **4,337,074** |
| | **OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ANG** | | | |
| | **OPERATING FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS | 2,744,277 | | 2,744,277 |
| 020 | MISSION SUPPORT OPERATIONS | 663,367 | | 663,367 |
| 030 | DEPOT PURCHASE EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE | 1,210,460 | | 1,210,460 |
| 040 | FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION | 531,241 | –531,241 | |

SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Transfer to Division B | | [–531,241] | |
| 050 | CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND SYSTEM SUPPORT | 1,632,461 | | 1,632,461 |
| 060 | BASE SUPPORT | 1,128,729 | | 1,128,729 |
| 070 | CYBERSPACE SUSTAINMENT | 26,354 | | 26,354 |
| 080 | CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES | 81,720 | | 81,720 |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES** | **8,018,609** | **–531,241** | **7,487,368** |
| | **ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 090 | ADMINISTRATION | 64,249 | | 64,249 |
| 100 | RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING | 47,831 | | 47,831 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | **112,080** | **0** | **112,080** |
| | **UNDISTRIBUTED** | | | |
| 110 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 0 | –5,861 | |
| | Unobligated balances | | [–5,861] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED** | **0** | **–5,861** | |
| | **TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ANG** | **8,130,689** | **–537,102** | **7,593,587** |
| | **OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, DEFENSE-WIDE** | | | |
| | **OPERATING FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF | 534,218 | | 534,218 |
| 020 | JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF—JTEEP | 1,393,798 | | 1,393,798 |
| 030 | JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF—CYBER | 9,103 | | 9,103 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 040 | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE—PSYOP | 325,609 | | 325,609 |
| 050 | SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND COMBAT DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES | 2,589,383 | 433,600 | 3,022,983 |
| | SOCOM UPL—Accelerated fielding of Group 3 UAS | | [3,600] | |
| | SOCOM UPL—Operational capacity enhancements | | [325,000] | |
| | SOCOM UPL—Strategic airlift | | [105,000] | |
| 060 | SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND MAINTENANCE | 1,388,865 | 46,200 | 1,435,065 |
| | SOCOM UPL—Electromagnetic warfare family of systems | | [1,300] | |
| | SOCOM UPL—Ground infiltration protection system | | [15,300] | |
| | SOCOM UPL—Ground organic precision strike family of systems | | [3,600] | |
| | SOCOM UPL—Munitions War Reserve | | [2,900] | |
| | SOCOM UPL—Non-standard aviation | | [15,600] | |
| | SOCOM UPL—SOF-P pre-positioned stocks | | [7,500] | |
| 070 | SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND MANAGEMENT/OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS | 180,691 | | 180,691 |
| 080 | SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND THEATER FORCES | 3,695,859 | | 3,695,859 |
| 090 | SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES | 78,512 | | 78,512 |
| 100 | SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND INTELLIGENCE | 1,130,849 | 8,000 | 1,138,849 |
| | SOCOM UPL—Identity and Signature Management Modernization | | [8,000] | |
| 110 | SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT | 1,796,851 | 11,100 | 1,807,951 |
| | SOCOM UPL—Identity and Signature Management Modernization | | [11,100] | |
| 120 | CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS | 1,880,381 | 130,000 | 2,010,381 |
| | Combat ready Department of Defense Information Network (DoDIN) | | [60,000] | |
| | Extending technical service support | | [70,000] | |
| 130 | USCYBERCOM HEADQUARTERS | 303,726 | 8,000 | 311,726 |
| | Facilities—Pentagon presence | | [8,000] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES** | **15,307,845** | **636,900** | **15,944,745** |
| | **TRAINING AND RECRUITING** | | | |
| 140 | DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY | 193,017 | | 193,017 |
| 150 | JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF | 173,748 | | 173,748 |
| 160 | SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND/PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION | 30,040 | | 30,040 |
| | **SUBTOTAL TRAINING AND RECRUITING** | **396,805** | **0** | **396,805** |

SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 170 | CIVIL MILITARY PROGRAMS | 118,488 | | 118,488 |
| 180 | DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY—CYBER | 3,825 | | 3,825 |
| 190 | DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY | 611,600 | | 611,600 |
| 200 | DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY | 1,462,988 | | 1,462,988 |
| 210 | DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY—CYBER | 42,367 | | 42,367 |
| 220 | DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCY | 1,035,974 | | 1,035,974 |
| 240 | DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCY—CYBER | 16,885 | | 16,885 |
| 250 | DEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCES ACTIVITY—CYBER | 49,611 | | 49,611 |
| 260 | DEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCES ACTIVITY | 1,505,352 | 70,967 | 1,576,319 |
| | Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO) | | [10,000] | |
| | Increase Child and Youth Program Funding | | [3,075] | |
| | Increase to Civilian Personnel Compensation | | [32,892] | |
| | Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM) | | [20,000] | |
| | New Authorization: Guardianship Transfer Fees | | [5,000] | |
| 290 | DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY | 3,873,222 | | 3,873,222 |
| 300 | DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY—CYBER | 602,017 | | 602,017 |
| 310 | DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY | 147,620 | | 147,620 |
| 320 | DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY | 585,610 | | 585,610 |
| 330 | DEFENSE MEDIA ACTIVITY | 207,551 | | 207,551 |
| 340 | DEFENSE POW/MIA OFFICE | 160,358 | 55,000 | 215,358 |
| | Defense POW/MIA Office | | [40,000] | |
| | Defense POW/MIA Office records scanning and digitization efforts for declassification | | [15,000] | |
| 350 | DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY | 3,780,757 | 1,506,000 | 5,286,757 |
| | First Island Chain Security Cooperation Initiative (formerly TSCI) | | [500,000] | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Innovative International Security Cooperation Programs | | [250,000] | |
| | Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence | | [6,000] | |
| | Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative | | [750,000] | |
| 360 | DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION | 47,101 | | 47,101 |
| 370 | DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY | 637,514 | | 637,514 |
| 390 | DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY—CYBER | 73,477 | | 73,477 |
| 400 | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EDUCATION ACTIVITY | 3,493,232 | 80,000 | 3,573,232 |
| | Impact Aid | | [50,000] | |
| | Impact Aid for children with severe disabilities | | [30,000] | |
| 410 | MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY | 487,235 | | 487,235 |
| 420 | OFFICE OF THE LOCAL DEFENSE COMMUNITY COOPERATION | 142,597 | | 142,597 |
| 430 | JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF—JIATF | 431,652 | | 431,652 |
| 470 | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE—CYBER | 81,163 | 58,945 | 140,108 |
| | Cyber Service Academies | | [50,000] | |
| | Grow ASD Cyber Policy and civilian oversight of cyber | | [8,945] | |
| 480 | OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE | 3,832,831 | 131,148 | 3,963,979 |
| | Afghanistan War Commission | | [11,400] | |
| | Anomalous Health Incidents Attribution Research | | [10,000] | |
| | AUKUS Pillar 2 Signature Project | | [15,000] | |
| | Bien Hoa Dioxin Cleanup | | [15,000] | |
| | China Strategic Initiative | | [3,000] | |
| | CMMC small business grants | | [50,000] | |
| | Commission on the National Defense Strategy | | [5,000] | |
| | Establish a deterrence based track 1.5 with the Philippines | | [2,500] | |
| | Legacy Resource Management Program | | [13,348] | |
| | National Commission on the Future of the Navy | | [5,000] | |
| | Reduction for the Business Operatives for National Defense (BOND) program | | [–25,100] | |
| | Regional Sustainment Framework for the Indo-Pacific | | [5,000] | |
| | REPI | | [20,000] | |
| | Support for USTTI training | | [1,000] | |
| 490 | HOMELAND DEFENSE INITIATIVES | 0 | | |
| 500 | TAIWAN PRESIDENTIAL DRAWDOWN REPLACEMENT FUND | 0 | | |

SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 510 | WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES | 536,546 | | 536,546 |
| 9999 | CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS | 24,579,358 | | 24,579,358 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES** | **48,546,931** | **1,902,060** | **50,448,991** |
| | **UNDISTRIBUTED** | | | |
| 540 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 0 | –900,000 | –900,000 |
| | Unobligated balances | | [–900,000] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED** | **0** | **–900,000** | **–900,000** |
| | **TOTAL OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, DEFENSE-WIDE** | **64,251,581** | **1,638,960** | **65,890,541** |
| | **MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | | | |
| | **UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES** | | | |
| 010 | US COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, DEFENSE | 21,698 | | 21,698 |
| | **SUBTOTAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES** | **21,698** | **0** | **21,698** |
| | **TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | **21,698** | **0** | **21,698** |
| | **MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | | | |
| | **OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN, DISASTER, AND CIVIC AID** | | | |
| 010 | OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN, DISASTER AND CIVIC AID | 78,187 | 30,000 | 108,187 |
| | OHDACA—Humanitarian Assistance | | [20,000] | |
| | OHDACA—Humanitarian Mine Action | | [10,000] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN, DISASTER, AND CIVIC AID** | **78,187** | **30,000** | **108,187** |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | **78,187** | **30,000** | **108,187** |
| | **MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | | | |
| | **COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION ACCOUNT** | | | |
| 010 | COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION | 221,332 | | 221,332 |
| | **SUBTOTAL COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION ACCOUNT** | **221,332** | **0** | **221,332** |
| | **TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | **221,332** | **0** | **221,332** |
| | **MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | | | |
| | **ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT** | | | |
| 010 | ACQ WORKFORCE DEV FD | 37,478 | | 37,478 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT** | **37,478** | **0** | **37,478** |
| | **TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | **37,478** | **0** | **37,478** |
| | **MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | | | |
| | **ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, ARMY** | | | |
| 050 | ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, ARMY | 282,444 | | 282,444 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, ARMY** | **282,444** | **0** | **282,444** |
| | **TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | **282,444** | **0** | **282,444** |
| | **MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | | | |
| | **ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, NAVY** | | | |
| 060 | ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, NAVY | 305,246 | | 305,246 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, NAVY** | **305,246** | **0** | **305,246** |

SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | **305,246** | **0** | **305,246** |
| | **MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | | | |
| | **ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, AIR FORCE** | | | |
| 070 | ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, AIR FORCE | 320,060 | | 320,060 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, AIR FORCE** | **320,060** | **0** | **320,060** |
| | **TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | **320,060** | **0** | **320,060** |
| | **MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | | | |
| | **ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, DEFENSE** | | | |
| 080 | ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, DEFENSE | 8,957 | | 8,957 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, DEFENSE** | **8,957** | **0** | **8,957** |
| | **TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | **8,957** | **0** | **8,957** |
| | **MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | | | |
| | **ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, FORMERLY USED DEFENSE SITES** | | | |
| 090 | ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION FORMERLY USED SITES | 238,927 | | 238,927 |
| | **SUBTOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, FORMERLY USED DEFENSE SITES** | **238,927** | **0** | **238,927** |
| | **TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS** | **238,927** | **0** | **238,927** |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE | 338,321,539 | –24,210,010 | 314,111,529 |

# TITLE XLIV—MILITARY PERSONNEL

## SEC. 4401. MILITARY PERSONNEL.

SEC. 4401. MILITARY PERSONNEL
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| **MILITARY PERSONNEL** | | | |
| **MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS** | | | |
| MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS | 190,771,931 | –2,119,526 | 188,652,405 |
| Increase Air Force Incentive Pays (Enlisted) | | 1,114 | |
| Increase Air Force Incentive Pays (Officers) | | 8,793 | |
| Increase Air Force Special Pays (Enlisted) | | 11,748 | |
| Increase Air Force Special Pays (Officers) | | 10,912 | |
| Increase Army Incentive Pays (Enlisted) | | 1,646 | |
| Increase Army Incentive Pays (Officers) | | 1,703 | |
| Increase Army Special Pays (Enlisted) | | 20,388 | |
| Increase Army Special Pays (Officers) | | 9,789 | |
| Increase Marine Corps Incentive Pays (Enlisted) | | 178 | |
| Increase Marine Corps Incentive Pays (Officers) | | 1,111 | |
| Increase Marine Corps Special Pays (Enlisted) | | 6,627 | |
| Increase Marine Corps Special Pays (Officers) | | 504 | |
| Increase Navy Incentive Pays (Enlisted) | | 2,388 | |
| Increase Navy Incentive Pays (Officers) | | 4,118 | |
| Increase Navy Special Pays (Enlisted) | | 33,100 | |
| Increase Navy Special Pays (Officers) | | 11,595 | |
| Increase Space Force Incentive Pays (Enlisted) | | 1 | |
| Increase Space Force Incentive Pays (Officers) | | 2 | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Increase Space Force Special Pays (Enlisted) | | 1,089 | |
| Increase Space Force Special Pays (Officers) | | 125 | |
| Redistribute basic pay increase | | [–2,300,000] | |
| Redistribution of 449 AGR positions to National Guard Personnel, Air Force Administration and Support | | 65,829 | |
| Redistribution of 449 DSG positions from National Guard Personnel, Air Force Pay Group A | | [–12,286] | |
| **SUBTOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS** | **190,771,931** | **–2,119,526** | **188,652,405** |
| **MEDICARE-ELIGIBLE RETIREE HEALTH CARE FUND CONTRIBUTIONS** | | | |
| MEDICARE-ELIGIBLE RETIREE HEALTH CARE FUND CONTRIBUTIONS | 14,349,269 | | 14,349,269 |
| **SUBTOTAL MEDICARE-ELIGIBLE RETIREE HEALTH CARE FUND CONTRIBUTIONS** | **14,349,269** | **0** | **14,349,269** |
| **TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL** | **205,121,200** | **–2,119,526** | **203,001,674** |

# TITLE XLV—OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

## SEC. 4501. OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS.

**SEC. 4501. OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **WORKING CAPITAL FUND** | | | |
| | **WORKING CAPITAL FUND, ARMY** | | | |
| 010 | INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS | 20,563 | | 20,563 |
| | **SUBTOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND, ARMY** | **20,563** | **0** | **20,563** |
| | **WORKING CAPITAL FUND, NAVY** | | | |
| 010 | NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTERS | 266,212 | | 266,212 |
| | **SUBTOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND, NAVY** | **266,212** | **0** | **266,212** |
| | **WORKING CAPITAL FUND, AIR FORCE** | | | |
| 010 | TRANSPORTATION | 0 | | |
| 020 | CRITICAL SPARES | 4,245,563 | | 4,245,563 |
| 030 | SUPPLIES AND MATERIALS | 194,851 | | 194,851 |
| | **SUBTOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND, AIR FORCE** | **4,440,414** | **0** | **4,440,414** |
| | **NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE TRANSACTION FUND** | | | |
| 010 | DEFENSE STOCKPILE | 5,700 | | 5,700 |
| | **SUBTOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE TRANSACTION FUND** | **5,700** | **0** | **5,700** |
| | **WORKING CAPITAL FUND, DEFENSE-WIDE** | | | |
| 010 | DEFENSE FINANCE OPERATIONS—DIRECT | 273,760 | | 273,760 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 020 | ENERGY MANAGEMENT—DEF | 0 | | |
| 030 | SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT—DEFENSE | 0 | | |
| 040 | UNDISTRIBUTED | 1,000,000 | | 1,000,000 |
| | **SUBTOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND, DEFENSE-WIDE** | **1,273,760** | **0** | **1,273,760** |
| | **WORKING CAPITAL FUND, DECA** | | | |
| 010 | WORKING CAPITAL FUND, DECA | 1,501,344 | 10,000 | 1,511,344 |
| | Commissary Operations | | [10,000] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND, DECA** | **1,501,344** | **10,000** | **1,511,344** |
| | **TOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND** | **7,507,993** | **10,000** | **7,517,993** |
| | **CHEM AGENTS & MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION** | | | |
| | **OPERATION & MAINTENANCE** | | | |
| 1 | CHEM DEMILITARIZATION—O&M | 0 | | |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE** | **0** | **0** | **0** |
| | **RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION** | | | |
| 2 | CHEM DEMILITARIZATION—RDT&E | 55,972 | | 55,972 |
| | **SUBTOTAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION** | **55,972** | **0** | **55,972** |
| | **TOTAL CHEM AGENTS & MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION** | **55,972** | **0** | **55,972** |
| | **DRUG INTERDICTION & CTR-DRUG ACTIVITIES, DEF** | | | |
| | **DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER DRUG ACTIVITIES** | | | |
| 010 | COUNTER-NARCOTICS SUPPORT | 658,191 | | 658,191 |
| | **SUBTOTAL DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER DRUG ACTIVITIES** | **658,191** | **0** | **658,191** |
| | **DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAM** | | | |
| 020 | DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAM | 135,745 | | 135,745 |
| | **SUBTOTAL DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAM** | **135,745** | **0** | **135,745** |

SEC. 4501. OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG PROGRAM** | | | |
| 030 | NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG PROGRAM | 117,418 | 100,000 | 217,418 |
| | Increase to National Guard Counter-Drug Program | | [100,000] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG PROGRAM** | **117,418** | **100,000** | **217,418** |
| | **NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG SCHOOLS** | | | |
| 040 | NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG SCHOOLS | 6,648 | 33,352 | 40,000 |
| | Increase to National Guard Counter-Drug Schools | | [33,352] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG SCHOOLS** | **6,648** | **33,352** | **40,000** |
| | **TOTAL DRUG INTERDICTION & CTR-DRUG ACTIVITIES, DEF** | **918,002** | **133,352** | **1,051,354** |
| | **OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL** | | | |
| | **OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL** | | | |
| 010 | OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE | 501,371 | 27,000 | 528,371 |
| | Restore funding for DOD Office of the Inspector General | | [27,000] | |
| 020 | OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE | 2,073 | | 2,073 |
| 030 | RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION | 1,506 | | 1,506 |
| 040 | PROCUREMENT | 1,393 | | 1,393 |
| | **SUBTOTAL OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL** | **506,343** | **27,000** | **533,343** |
| | **TOTAL OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL** | **506,343** | **27,000** | **533,343** |
| | **DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM** | | | |
| | **OPERATION & MAINTENANCE** | | | |
| 010 | IN-HOUSE CARE | 10,863,317 | 1,000,000 | 11,863,317 |
| | Military Treatment Facility Operations and Support | | [1,000,000] | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 030 | CONSOLIDATED HEALTH SUPPORT | 2,375,175 | 280,000 | 2,655,175 |
| | Combat Support Agency | | [280,000] | |
| 040 | INFORMATION MANAGEMENT | 2,600,177 | | 2,600,177 |
| 050 | MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES | 304,382 | | 304,382 |
| 060 | EDUCATION AND TRAINING | 349,460 | 40,000 | 389,460 |
| | Graduate Medical Education, Undergraduate Medical Education and Force Health Protection | | [40,000] | |
| 070 | BASE OPERATIONS/COMMUNICATIONS | 2,463,042 | 350,000 | 2,813,042 |
| | Facilities Restoration and Modernization | | [350,000] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE** | **18,955,553** | **1,670,000** | **20,625,553** |
| | **RDT&E** | | | |
| 080 | R&D RESEARCH | 41,924 | | 41,924 |
| 090 | R&D EXPLORATRY DEVELOPMENT | 185,153 | 10,000 | 195,153 |
| | Biological Stress, Recovery, and Resilience for Military Readiness | | [10,000] | |
| 100 | R&D ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT | 361,241 | | 361,241 |
| 110 | R&D DEMONSTRATION/VALIDATION | 186,018 | | 186,018 |
| 120 | R&D ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT | 124,662 | | 124,662 |
| 130 | R&D MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT | 100,912 | | 100,912 |
| 140 | R&D CAPABILITIES ENHANCEMENT | 19,452 | | 19,452 |
| | **SUBTOTAL RDT&E** | **1,019,362** | **10,000** | **1,029,362** |
| | **PROCUREMENT** | | | |
| 150 | PROC INITIAL OUTFITTING | 25,555 | | 25,555 |
| 160 | PROC REPLACEMENT & MODERNIZATION | 231,382 | | 231,382 |
| 170 | PROC JOINT OPERATIONAL MEDICINE INFORMATION SYSTEM | 31,203 | | 31,203 |
| 180 | PROC MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM—DESKTOP TO DATACENTER | 78,588 | | 78,588 |
| | **SUBTOTAL PROCUREMENT** | **366,728** | **0** | **366,728** |
| | **PRIVATE SECTOR CARE PROGRAM** | | | |
| 010 | PRIVATE SECTOR CARE | 22,175,472 | 100,000 | 22,275,472 |
| | Access to care and network adequacy | | [100,000] | |
| | **SUBTOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR CARE PROGRAM** | **22,175,472** | **100,000** | **22,275,472** |

SEC. 4501. OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Line | Item | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **TOTAL DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM** | **42,517,115** | **1,780,000** | **44,297,115** |
| | **COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA TRAIN AND EQUIP** | | | |
| | **COUNTER-ISIL TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF)** | | | |
| 010 | IRAQ | 118,899 | | 118,899 |
| 020 | SYRIA | 130,000 | | 130,000 |
| 030 | LEBANON | 36,000 | | 36,000 |
| 040 | JORDAN | 18,200 | | 18,200 |
| | **SUBTOTAL COUNTER-ISIL TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF)** | **303,099** | **0** | **303,099** |
| | **TOTAL COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA TRAIN AND EQUIP** | **303,099** | **0** | **303,099** |
| | **TOTAL OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS** | **51,808,524** | **1,950,352** | **53,758,876** |

# TITLE XLVI—MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

## SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION.

SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **ARMY** | | | | | | |
| Army | Alabama | Anniston Army Depot | COST TO COMPLETE: ACCESS CONTROL POINT | 0 | 53,000 | 53,000 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army | Alaska | Fort Wainwright | BARRACKS (INC 2) | 24,000 | 0 | 24,000 |
| Army | Alaska | Fort Wainwright | DINNING FACILITY | 0 | 147,000 | 147,000 |
| Army | Arizona | Fort Huachuca | LIBBY ARMY AIRFIELD FLIGHT CONTROL TOWER (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,000 | 4,000 |
| Army | Arizona | Yuma Proving Ground | POLE LINE ROAD—REPLACE (DESIGN) | 0 | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| Army | Florida | Naval Air Station Key West | COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITY (INC 2) | 160,000 | –150,000 | 10,000 |
| Army | Georgia | Fort Gordon | CYBER FACULTY OPERATIONS AND AUDITORIUM FACILITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 14,700 | 14,700 |
| Army | Georgia | Fort Stewart | ENLISTED UNACCOMPANIED PERSONNEL BARRACKS (DESIGN) | 0 | 12,000 | 12,000 |
| Army | Germany | Grafenwoehr | UNDERGROUND ELECTRIC LINES | 12,800 | 0 | 12,800 |
| Army | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | PDI: GUAM DEF SYS, EIAMD, PHASE 2 (INC 2) | 190,000 | –50,000 | 140,000 |
| Army | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | PDI: GUAM DEF SYS, EIAMD, PHASE 3 | 155,000 | –95,000 | 60,000 |
| Army | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | PDI: LAND ACQUISITION | 29,000 | 0 | 29,000 |
| Army | Hawaii | Fort Shafter | COST TO COMPLETE: CLEARWELL AND BOOSTER PUMP | 71,000 | 0 | 71,000 |
| Army | Hawaii | Helemano | COST TO COMPLETE: WELLS AND STORAGE TANKS | 72,000 | 0 | 72,000 |
| Army | Hawaii | Schofield Barracks | COST TO COMPLETE: ELEVATED TANK AND DISTRIBUTION LINES | 26,000 | 0 | 26,000 |
| Army | Hawaii | Schofield Barracks | COST TO COMPLETE: WATER STORAGE TANK | 21,000 | 0 | 21,000 |
| Army | Hawaii | Schofield Barracks | FIRE STATION | 30,000 | 0 | 30,000 |
| Army | Hawaii | Wheeler Army Air Field | AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR (INC 1) | 90,000 | –40,000 | 50,000 |
| Army | Hawaii | Wheeler Army Airfield | AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER | 0 | 79,000 | 79,000 |
| Army | Hawaii | Wheeler Army Airfield | AIRCRAFT CLEAR WATER RINSE FACILITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 3,300 | 3,300 |
| Army | Honduras | Soto Cano Air Base | VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP | 0 | 17,000 | 17,000 |
| Army | Illinois | Rock Island Arsenal | CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER (DESIGN) | 0 | 5,000 | 5,000 |
| Army | Indiana | Crane Army Ammunition Activity | AMMUNITION STORAGE | 0 | 27,000 | 27,000 |
| Army | Italy | Caserma Renato Del Din | ACCESS CONTROL POINT | 17,000 | 0 | 17,000 |
| Army | Japan | Kadena Air Base | COST TO COMPLETE: VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP | 69,000 | 0 | 69,000 |
| Army | Louisiana | Fort Polk | JRTC ROTATIONAL UNIT BILLETING AREA, INC #3 | 0 | 157,000 | 157,000 |

**SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army | Maine | Lola-Dana Training Site | AUTOMATED QUALIFICATIONS TRAINING RANGE (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,700 | 4,700 |
| Army | Maryland | Aberdeen Proving Ground-South | REPAIR EDGEWOOD WATER DISTRIBUTION (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,100 | 4,100 |
| Army | Michigan | Camp Grayling | COMPANY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING, COLLECTIVE TRAINING (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,400 | 4,400 |
| Army | Missouri | Fort Leonard Wood | CENTRAL ISSUING FACILITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 12,000 | 12,000 |
| Army | New York | Fort Drum | AIRFIELD FIRE AND RESCUE STATION (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,600 | 4,600 |
| Army | New York | Fort Drum | AUTOMATED RECORD FIRE PLUS RANGE | 25,000 | 0 | 25,000 |
| Army | New York | Fort Drum | SIMULATOR BUILDING (DESIGN) | 0 | 2,400 | 2,400 |
| Army | New York | Watervliet | CHROME PLATING FACILITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 11,100 | 11,100 |
| Army | New York | Watervliet | WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT (DESIGN) | 0 | 2,850 | 2,850 |
| Army | North Carolina | Fort Bragg | COST TO COMPLETE: AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR | 31,000 | 0 | 31,000 |
| Army | North Carolina | Fort Bragg | JOINT DEPLOYMENT WARFIGHTING COMPLEX (DESIGN) | 0 | 54,000 | 54,000 |
| Army | Oklahoma | Fort Sill | AUTOMATION AIDED INSTRUCTION BLDG | 0 | 93,000 | 93,000 |
| Army | Texas | Fort Bliss | SHIPPING AND RECEIVING BUILDING | 35,000 | 0 | 35,000 |
| Army | Texas | Fort Hood | VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP (MP #72) | 0 | 81,000 | 81,000 |
| Army | Texas | Joint Base San Antonio | ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING BARRACKS-METC (INC) | 303,000 | –200,000 | 103,000 |
| Army | Utah | Dugway Proving Ground | TWO-COMPANY SATELLITE FIRE STATION / THREE-COMPANY HQ FIRE STATION (DESIGN) | 0 | 3,300 | 3,300 |
| Army | Washington | Joint Base Lewis-McChord | AIRFIELD FIRE AND RESCUE STATION | 89,000 | 0 | 89,000 |
| Army | Wisconsin | Fort McCoy | FITNESS CENTER (DESIGN) | 0 | 1,700 | 1,700 |
| Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN | 173,421 | 0 | 173,421 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M) | 0 | 5,435,364 | 5,435,364 |
| Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | HOST NATION SUPPORT | 53,521 | 0 | 53,521 |
| Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | PDI: MINOR CONSTRUCTION | 76,270 | 25,000 | 101,270 |
| Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION | 178,626 | 100,000 | 278,626 |
| **Subtotal Military Construction, Army** | | | | **1,931,638** | **5,825,514** | **7,757,152** |
| **NAVY & MARINE CORPS** | | | | | | |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Australia | Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin | PDI: AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR (INC) | 46,958 | 0 | 46,958 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Australia | Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin | PDI: MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FACS (INC) | 33,955 | 0 | 33,955 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | California | Camp Pendleton | FIRE/EMERGENCY RESPONSE STATION (53 AREA) REPLACE | 43,000 | 0 | 43,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | California | Camp Pendleton | LANDFILL LINER, PHASE 3 AND 4 | 53,150 | 0 | 53,150 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | California | Naval Air Station Lemoore | STRIKE FIGHTER CENTER OF EXCELLENCE PACIFIC (INC) | 155,939 | –130,000 | 25,939 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | California | Naval Base Coronado | FORD CLASS CVN INFRASTRUCTURE UPGRADE (INC) | 33,000 | 0 | 33,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | California | Naval Base San Diego | RECONFIGURABLE CYBER LABORATORY | 0 | 68,000 | 68,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | California | Naval Base Ventura County Point Mugu | COMMUNITY & AIRFIELD AREA FLOOD PROTECTION | 164,000 | –129,000 | 35,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | California | Naval Support Activity Monterey | NAVAL INNOVATION CENTER (INC) | 50,000 | 0 | 50,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Connecticut | Naval Submarine Base New London | SUBMARINE PIER 8 REPLACEMENT (INC) | 142,124 | –122,000 | 20,124 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Connecticut | Naval Submarine Base New London | SUBMARINE SUPPORT STORAGE MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS FACILITY | 0 | 50,000 | 50,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Connecticut | Naval Submarine Base New London | WEAPONS MAGAZINE & ORDNANCE OPERATIONS FACILITY (INC) | 79,600 | 0 | 79,600 |

SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Navy & Marine Corps | District of Columbia | Naval Research Laboratory | BIOMOLECULAR SCIENCE & SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY LAB | 157,000 | –80,000 | 77,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Federated States of Micronesia | Palau | PDI: PALAU PORT AND HARBOR IMPROVEMENTS (INC) | 384,560 | 0 | 384,560 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Federated States of Micronesia | Yap | PDI: YAP PORT AND HARBOR IMPROVEMENTS (INC) | 142,235 | 0 | 142,235 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Florida | Cape Canaveral Space Force Station | CAPE CANAVERAL RAILHEAD & TRANSFER FACILITIES | 60,990 | 0 | 60,990 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Florida | Marine Corps Support Facility Blount Island | COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE (INC) | 46,075 | 0 | 46,075 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Georgia | Naval Air Station Albany | CONSOLIDATED COMMUNICATION FACILITY | 86,350 | 0 | 86,350 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Georgia | Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay | TRANSIT PROTECTION PROGRAM FACILITY (INC) | 100,000 | 0 | 100,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Georgia | Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay | TRIDENT REFIT FACILITY EXPANSION—COLUMBIA SUB (INC) | 30,000 | 0 | 30,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Guam | Andersen Air Force Base | PDI: JOINT CONSOLIDATED COMMUNICATIONS CENTER (INC) | 132,416 | 0 | 132,416 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Guam | Apra Heights | PDI: INNER APRA HARBOR RESILIENCY (INC) | 13,400 | 0 | 13,400 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | PDI: JOINT COMMUNICATION UPGRADE (INC) | 60,000 | 0 | 60,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | PDI: POLARIS POINT ELECTRICAL CAPACITY UPGRADE | 122,000 | –110,000 | 12,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | PDI: POLARIS POINT SUBMARINE PIER (INC) | 171,800 | –90,000 | 81,800 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Hawaii | Ford Island | PACIFIC WARFIGHTING CENTER EXPANSION | 183,760 | –133,760 | 50,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Hawaii | Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam | DRY DOCK 3 REPLACEMENT (INC) | 507,453 | 0 | 507,453 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Hawaii | Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam | WATER TREATMENT PLANT (INC) | 248,170 | 0 | 248,170 |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Navy & Marine Corps | Hawaii | Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay | 3D MLR ARMORY EXPANSION | 76,550 | 0 | 76,550 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Hawaii | Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay | ATC CO M COMPOUND | 134,090 | –111,800 | 22,290 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Hawaii | Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay | ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION AND MODERNIZATION | 0 | 25,000 | 25,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Hawaii | Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay | MAIN GATE ENTRY CONTROL POINT | 49,260 | 0 | 49,260 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Hawaii | Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands | PDI: AIRFIELD PAVEMENT UPGRADES (INC) | 142,470 | 0 | 142,470 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Illinois | Naval Station Great Lakes | FIREFIGHTING, TRAINING AND DAMAGE CONTROL WET TRAINER FACILITY | 0 | 25,000 | 25,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Indiana | Naval Weapons Station Crane | HIGH ENERGY TEST & ABUSE FACILITY | 0 | 25,000 | 25,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Japan | Kadena Air Base | AIRCRAFT INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE FACILITY | 31,780 | 0 | 31,780 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Maine | NCTAMS LANT Det Cutler | UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING (DESIGN) | 0 | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Maine | Portsmouth Naval Shipyard | CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER (DESIGN) | 0 | 2,500 | 2,500 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Maine | Portsmouth Naval Shipyard | MULTI-MISSION DRYDOCK #1 EXTENSION (INC) | 50,755 | 0 | 50,755 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Maine | Portsmouth Naval Shipyard | POWER RELIABILITY & WATER RESILIENCE UPGRADE (INC) | 138,875 | 0 | 138,875 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Maine | Portsmouth Naval Shipyard | UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING (DESIGN) | 0 | 25,000 | 25,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Maryland | Naval Air Station Patuxent River | TC–7 REPLACEMENT (DESIGN) | 0 | 1,100 | 1,100 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Maryland | United States Naval Academy | STORM WATER MANAGEMENT FACILITIES | 0 | 86,000 | 86,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Mississippi | Naval Construction Battalion Center Gulfport | BATTALION MAINTENANCE FACILITIES (DESIGN) | 0 | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Nevada | Naval Air Station Fallon | RANGE TRAINING COMPLEX IMPROVEMENTS | 387,570 | 0 | 387,570 |

SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Navy & Marine Corps | New Hampshire | Portsmouth Naval Shipyard | SAILOR CAMPUS (DESIGN) | 0 | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | North Carolina | Camp Lejeune | 10TH MARINES OPERATIONAL COMPLEX (INC) | 77,520 | 0 | 77,520 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | North Carolina | Camp Lejeune | AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINT UPGRADE PHASE II (INC) | 15,451 | 0 | 15,451 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | North Carolina | Camp Lejeune | COMBAT WATER SURVIVAL TRAINING FACILITY | 141,880 | –111,880 | 30,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | North Carolina | Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point | 2D LAAD MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS FACILITIES (DESIGN) | 0 | 11,500 | 11,500 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | North Carolina | Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point | COST TO COMPLETE: CH–53K GEARBOX REPAIR AND TEST FACILITY | 17,941 | 0 | 17,941 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | North Carolina | Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point | COST TO COMPLETE: AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR | 47,560 | 0 | 47,560 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | North Carolina | Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point | F–35 AIRCRAFT SUSTAINMENT CTR (INC) | 89,181 | 0 | 89,181 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | North Carolina | Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point | MAINTENANCE FACILITY & MARINE AIR GROUP HQS (INC) | 62,575 | 0 | 62,575 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Pennsylvania | Naval Support Activity Mechanicsburg | MACHINERY CONTROL DEVELOPMENT CENTER (INC) | 79,140 | 0 | 79,140 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Rhode Island | Naval Station Newport | CONSOLIDATED RDT&E INTEGRATION LABORATORY | 40,000 | 0 | 40,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Rhode Island | Naval Station Newport | NEXT GENERATION SUBMARINE PLATFORM FACILITY | 73,000 | 0 | 73,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Rhode Island | Naval Station Newport | SUBMARINE PAYLOAD INTEGRATION LABORATORY | 40,000 | 0 | 40,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | South Carolina | Charleston Air Force Base | NUCLEAR POWER TRAINING FAC SIMULATION EXPANSION (INC) | 161,700 | –80,000 | 81,700 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Spain | Naval Station Rota | UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING FOR PERMANENT PARTY | 64,080 | 0 | 64,080 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Virginia | Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story | CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER | 65,640 | 0 | 65,640 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Virginia | Naval Air Station Oceana | CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER | 104,340 | –94,340 | 10,000 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Navy & Marine Corps | Virginia | Naval Station Norfolk | CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER | 93,040 | –83,040 | 10,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Virginia | Naval Station Norfolk | CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER | 84,940 | 0 | 84,940 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Virginia | Naval Station Norfolk | ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM UPGRADES (INC) | 124,965 | 0 | 124,965 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Virginia | Naval Station Norfolk | MQ–25 AIRCRAFT LAYDOWN FACILITIES (INC) | 54,622 | 0 | 54,622 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Virginia | Naval Weapons Station Yorktown | COST TO COMPLETE: CONTAINERIZED LONG WEAPONS STORAGE MAGAZINE | 16,170 | 0 | 16,170 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Virginia | Naval Weapons Station Yorktown | COST TO COMPLETE: CONVENTIONAL PROMPT STRIKE TEST FACILITY | 13,710 | 0 | 13,710 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Virginia | Naval Weapons Station Yorktown | WEAPONS MAGAZINES (INC) | 100,782 | –80,000 | 20,782 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Virginia | Norfolk Naval Shipyard | DRY DOCK 3 MODERNIZATION (INC) | 189,353 | 0 | 189,353 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Washington | Naval Air Station Whidbey Island | EA–18G AIRCRAFT REGIONAL SERVICE FACILITY | 202,000 | –180,000 | 22,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Washington | Naval Air Station Whidbey Island | NAVAL OCEAN PROCESSING FACILITY EXPANSION | 0 | 15,000 | 15,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Washington | Naval Air Station Whidbey Island | P–8A AIRCRAFT RESERVE HANGAR | 0 | 108,000 | 108,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Washington | Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor | COLUMBIA SUBMARINE REPAIR FACILITY EXPANSION (INC) | 64,000 | 0 | 64,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Washington | Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor | COLUMBIA SUBMARINE TRAINING FACILITY EXPANSION | 90,900 | –67,000 | 23,900 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Washington | Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor | REGIONAL OPTICS REPAIR CENTER | 0 | 35,000 | 35,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Washington | Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton | MISSILE ASSEMBLY BUILDING REPLACEMENT | 195,227 | –163,000 | 32,227 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Washington | Puget Sound Naval Shipyard | MULTI-MISSION DRY DOCK (INC) | 245,000 | 0 | 245,000 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN | 1,163,477 | 0 | 1,163,477 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION (NAVY) (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M) | 0 | 4,956,828 | 4,956,828 |

SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION (MARINE CORPS) (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M) | 0 | 3,629,008 | 3,629,008 |
| Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION | 289,224 | 125,000 | 414,224 |
| **Subtotal Military Construction, Navy & Marine Corps** | | | | **8,266,703** | **7,427,116** | **15,693,819** |
| **AIR FORCE** | | | | | | |
| Air Force | Alabama | Redstone Arsenal | SPACE FORCE OPERATIONAL FACILITY | 250,000 | –150,000 | 100,000 |
| Air Force | Alabama | Redstone Arsenal | USSPACECOM HQ | 450,000 | –320,000 | 130,000 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Eielson Air Force Base | JPARC RANGE OPERATIONS CENTER | 91,000 | –50,000 | 41,000 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | FTR: ADAL FIELD TRAINING DETACHMENT (FTD) | 56,000 | 0 | 56,000 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | FTR: CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS COMPLEX | 132,300 | 0 | 132,300 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | FTR: DORMITORY | 451,500 | 0 | 451,500 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | FTR: FLIGHT SIMULATOR | 93,800 | 0 | 93,800 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | FTR: FUEL CELL MAINTENANCE | 31,250 | 0 | 31,250 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | FTR: INFRASTRUCTURE & UTILITIES | 422,100 | 0 | 422,100 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | FTR: LOW OBSERVABLE AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE | 63,250 | 0 | 63,250 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | FTR: OPERATIONS AND GENERATION HANGAR | 127,500 | 0 | 127,500 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | FTR: PGM RELOCATION | 359,100 | 0 | 359,100 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | FTR: PUBLIC TRAFFIC ROUTE REALIGNMENT | 50,000 | 0 | 50,000 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | FTR: SQUADRON 1–1 AIRFIELD PAVEMENTS | 125,250 | 0 | 125,250 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | FTR: SQUADRON 1–1 FLOWTHROUGH HANGARS | 154,000 | 0 | 154,000 |
| Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | JOINT INTEGRATED TEST AND TRAINING CENTER (INC) | 42,000 | 0 | 42,000 |
| Air Force | Arizona | Davis-Monthan Air Force Base | ADAL CORROSION CONTROL FACILITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 8,250 | 8,250 |
| Air Force | Arizona | Davis-Monthan Air Force Base | COMPASS CALL TASK FORCE HQ (DESIGN) | 0 | 11,400 | 11,400 |
| Air Force | Arizona | Davis-Monthan Air Force Base | CONSOLIDATED CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER (DESIGN) | 0 | 8,000 | 8,000 |
| Air Force | Arizona | Davis-Monthan Air Force Base | DORMITORY (DESIGN) | 0 | 10,200 | 10,200 |
| Air Force | Arizona | Davis-Monthan Air Force Base | HANGAR/AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE UNIT | 15,000 | 0 | 15,000 |
| Air Force | Arkansas | Ebbing Air National Guard Base | F–35 GROUP OPS FACILITY | 0 | 18,000 | 18,000 |
| Air Force | Arkansas | Little Rock Air Force Base | CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER | 27,000 | 0 | 27,000 |
| Air Force | California | Beale Air Force Base | MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS COMPLEX | 126,000 | 0 | 126,000 |
| Air Force | Colorado | Schriever Space Force Base | SPACE FORCE OPERATIONAL FACILITY | 250,000 | –150,000 | 100,000 |
| Air Force | Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands | Tinian | COST TO COMPLETE: FUEL TANKS WITH RECEIPT PIPELINE & HYDRANT SYSTEM | 0 | 26,300 | 26,300 |
| Air Force | Djibouti | Chabelley Airfield | CHABELLEY POWER PLANT AND PRIMARY DIST | 27,000 | 0 | 27,000 |
| Air Force | Federated States of Micronesia | Yap | PDI: RUNWAY EXTENSION, INC | 27,000 | 0 | 27,000 |

**SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air Force | Florida | Cape Canaveral Space Force Station | BASE SUPPORT WAREHOUSE | 64,000 | 0 | 64,000 |
| Air Force | Florida | Cape Canaveral Space Force Station | COMMAND FACILITY | 85,000 | 0 | 85,000 |
| Air Force | Florida | Cape Canaveral Space Force Station | COMMUNICATIONS PLANT WAREHOUSE | 48,400 | 0 | 48,400 |
| Air Force | Florida | Cape Canaveral Space Force Station | LAUNCH SUPPORT FACILITY | 84,000 | 0 | 84,000 |
| Air Force | Florida | Cape Canaveral Space Force Station | LRS VEHICLE MAINTENANCE FACILITY | 80,400 | 0 | 80,400 |
| Air Force | Florida | Cape Canaveral Space Force Station | SECURITY FORCES OPERATIONS FACILITY | 48,000 | 0 | 48,000 |
| Air Force | Florida | Eglin Air Force Base | JADC2 AND ABM TEST FACILITY | 87,800 | 0 | 87,800 |
| Air Force | Florida | Eglin Air Force Base | KING HANGAR BUILDING 130 (DESIGN) | 0 | 7,000 | 7,000 |
| Air Force | Florida | Eglin Air Force Base | PHYSICAL FITNESS COMPLEX (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,200 | 4,200 |
| Air Force | Florida | Tyndall Air Force Base | AFCEC RDT&E FACILITIES AND GATE | 160,000 | –90,000 | 70,000 |
| Air Force | Florida | Tyndall Air Force Base | FIRE/CRASH RESCUE STATION | 0 | 48,000 | 48,000 |
| Air Force | Georgia | Moody Air Force Base | MILITARY WORKING DOG KENNEL | 0 | 15,870 | 15,870 |
| Air Force | Georgia | Robins Air Force Base | CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER | 0 | 52,000 | 52,000 |
| Air Force | Hawaii | Maui Optical and Super-computing Site | SECURE INTEGRATION SUPPORT LAB W/ LAND ACQ | 3,600 | 0 | 3,600 |
| Air Force | Illinois | Scott Air Force Base | AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR | 0 | 79,000 | 79,000 |
| Air Force | Indiana | Grissom Air Reserve Base | AIRCREW READINESS FACILITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 2,600 | 2,600 |
| Air Force | Japan | Kadena Air Base | THEATER STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS HUB | 99,000 | –45,000 | 54,000 |
| Air Force | Japan | Misawa Air Base | F–35 FIGHTER JET FLIGHT SIMULATOR | 0 | 89,000 | 89,000 |
| Air Force | Mississippi | Columbus Air Force Base | T–7A ALLIED SUPPORT | 11,800 | 0 | 11,800 |
| Air Force | Missouri | Whiteman Air Force Base | B–21 ADAL FIELD TRAINING DETACHMENT, B152 | 89,000 | 0 | 89,000 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air Force | Missouri | Whiteman Air Force Base | B–21 WEAPONS LOADER TRAINER | 80,000 | 0 | 80,000 |
| Air Force | Montana | Malmstrom Air Force Base | SENTINEL LAND ACQUISITION (INC) | 43,500 | 0 | 43,500 |
| Air Force | Montana | Malmstrom Air Force Base | SENTINEL OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE COMPLEX, INC | 95,000 | –40,000 | 55,000 |
| Air Force | Nebraska | Offutt Air Force Base | REPLACE VEHICLE SEARCH AREA, STRATCOM GATE, B511 (DESIGN) | 0 | 1,500 | 1,500 |
| Air Force | Nebraska | Offutt Air Force Base | SAOC SUPPLY STORAGE FACILITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 15,000 | 15,000 |
| Air Force | Nebraska | Offutt Air Force Base | STRATCOM BASE AND OPERATIONS MOBILITY CENTER (DESIGN) | 0 | 11,200 | 11,200 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Creech Air Force Base | MISSION SUPPORT FACILITY | 0 | 55,000 | 55,000 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Creech Air Force Base | WARRIOR FITNESS TRAINING FACILITY | 0 | 104,000 | 104,000 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 2–BAY FUEL CELL (F–35) | 52,000 | 0 | 52,000 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 AGE WASHRACK | 500 | 0 | 500 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 AIRCRAFT WASHRACK & SUPPORT FACILITY | 4,000 | 0 | 4,000 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 APRON COMPLEX | 192,500 | 0 | 192,500 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 COMBINED OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE HANGAR (COMH) | 177,800 | 0 | 177,800 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 CONSOLIDATED MAINTENANCE FACILITY | 32,000 | 0 | 32,000 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 FUEL CELL | 28,000 | 0 | 28,000 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 FUEL STATION | 10,000 | 0 | 10,000 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 LOW OBSERVABLE CORROSION REPAIR FACILITY | 38,700 | 0 | 38,700 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 MAINTENANCE TRAINING FACILITY | 29,000 | 0 | 29,000 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 R–11 EAST SIDE SHADE STRUCTURE | 1,800 | 0 | 1,800 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 REPAIR MUNITIONS ADMIN FACILITY | 4,600 | 0 | 4,600 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 RE-PROGRAMMING LAB | 61,000 | 0 | 61,000 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 SIMULATOR FACILITY | 62,000 | 0 | 62,000 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 WEAPONS LOAD TRAINING FACILITY | 34,000 | 0 | 34,000 |
| Air Force | Nevada | Nellis Air Force Base | F–47 WEAPONS STORAGE FACILITY | 2,800 | 0 | 2,800 |
| Air Force | New Jersey | Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst | CYBER OPERATIONS FACILITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,000 | 4,000 |
| Air Force | New Mexico | Cannon Air Force Base | DORMITORY | 10,000 | 0 | 10,000 |

SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air Force | New Mexico | Holloman Air Force Base | HIGH SPEED TEST TRACK | 0 | 72,750 | 72,750 |
| Air Force | New Mexico | Kirtland Air Force Base | EOD Facility (INC) | 0 | 7,750 | 7,750 |
| Air Force | New Mexico | Kirtland Air Force Base | SPACE FORCE OPERATIONAL FACILITY | 250,000 | –150,000 | 100,000 |
| Air Force | North Carolina | Seymour Johnson Air Force Base | AIRCREW READINESS FACILITY | 0 | 13,000 | 13,000 |
| Air Force | North Dakota | Grand Forks | PAVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE FACILITY | 0 | 71,000 | 71,000 |
| Air Force | North Dakota | Grand Forks Air Force Base | SPACE FORCE OPERATIONAL FACILITY | 250,000 | –150,000 | 100,000 |
| Air Force | North Dakota | Minot Air Force Base | SENTINEL CONSOLIDATED VEHICLE MAINTENANCE COMPLEX | 124,000 | –75,000 | 49,000 |
| Air Force | North Dakota | Minot Air Force Base | SENTINEL SECURITY FORCES OPERATIONS COMPLEX | 108,000 | 0 | 108,000 |
| Air Force | Ohio | Wright-Patterson Air Force Base | AI SUPERCOMPUTING RESOURCE CENTER (DESIGN) | 0 | 46,000 | 46,000 |
| Air Force | Oklahoma | Tinker Air Force Base | BOMBER AGILE COMMON HANGAR (INC) | 112,000 | –105,000 | 7,000 |
| Air Force | Oregon | Mountain Home Air Force Base | HOMELAND DEFENSE OVER-THE-HORIZON RADAR (INC) | 33,650 | 0 | 33,650 |
| Air Force | Spain | Morón Air Base | PARKING APRON | 75,500 | 0 | 75,500 |
| Air Force | Tennessee | Arnold Air Force Base | INSTALLATION ACP GATE 2 UPGRADE | 0 | 17,600 | 17,600 |
| Air Force | Tennessee | Arnold Air Force Base | COOLING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DEFENSE GROUND TEST FACILITIES (DESIGN) | 0 | 5,500 | 5,500 |
| Air Force | Texas | Dyess Air Force Base | B–21 FLIGHT SIMULATOR FACILITY | 63,000 | 0 | 63,000 |
| Air Force | Texas | Dyess Air Force Base | B–21 LOW OBSERVABLE CORROSION CONTROL FAC | 74,000 | 0 | 74,000 |
| Air Force | Texas | Dyess Air Force Base | B–21 UTILITIES SITE IMPROVEMENTS ELECTRIC | 23,000 | 0 | 23,000 |
| Air Force | Texas | Dyess Air Force Base | B–21 FIELD TRAINING DETACHMENT FACILITY | 0 | 84,000 | 84,000 |
| Air Force | Texas | Fort Sam Houston | METC—BARRACKS/SHIPS/DORMS #1 (INC) | 308,000 | 0 | 308,000 |
| Air Force | Texas | Goodfellow Air Force Base | PIPELINE STUDENT DORMITORY | 12,000 | 0 | 12,000 |
| Air Force | Texas | Joint Base San Antonio | MILITARY WORKING DOGS LARGE CAPACITY KENNEL | 180,000 | –100,000 | 80,000 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air Force | Texas | Lackland Air Force Base | 91 CYBER OPERATIONS CENTER | 96,000 | –60,000 | 36,000 |
| Air Force | Utah | Hill Air Force Base | F–35 MAINTENANCE FACILITY, PHASE 1 (INC) | 100,000 | 0 | 100,000 |
| Air Force | Utah | Hill Air Force Base | T–7A DEPOT MAINTENANCE COMPLEX, INC | 72,000 | 0 | 72,000 |
| Air Force | Virginia | Joint Base Langley-Eustis | FUEL SYSTEM MAINTENANCE DOCK | 49,000 | 0 | 49,000 |
| Air Force | Wake Island | Wake Island | PDI: AIRCRAFT PARKING APRON, PHASE 1 (INC) | 129,000 | 0 | 129,000 |
| Air Force | Washington | Fairchild Air Force Base | KC–135 ADAL PARTS WAREHOUSE (DESIGN) | 0 | 2,500 | 2,500 |
| Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN | 2,490,612 | 0 | 2,490,612 |
| Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION (AIR FORCE) (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M) | 0 | 6,100,395 | 6,100,395 |
| Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION (SPACE FORCE) (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M) | 0 | 1,384,326 | 1,384,326 |
| Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION | 315,810 | 145,000 | 460,810 |
| Air Force | Wyoming | F.E. Warren Air Force Base | GBSD OPERATIONS GROUP FACILITY | 171,000 | –141,000 | 30,000 |
| Air Force | Wyoming | F.E. Warren Air Force Base | GBSD UTILITY CORRIDOR (INC) | 461,158 | 0 | 461,158 |
| **Subtotal Military Construction, Air Force** | | | | **10,688,980** | **6,894,341** | **17,583,321** |
| **DEFENSE-WIDE** | | | | | | |
| Defense-Wide | Alabama | Maxwell Air Force Base | MAXWELL ELEMENTARY/MIDDLE SCHOOL ADDITION | 44,000 | 0 | 44,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Alabama | Redstone Arsenal | POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID | 0 | 90,000 | 90,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Bahrain | Naval Support Activity Bahrain | POWER GENERATION | 0 | 5,900 | 5,900 |
| Defense-Wide | Belgium | Sterrebeek Annex | BRUSSELS UNIT SCHOOL ANNEX | 33,000 | 0 | 33,000 |
| Defense-Wide | California | Camp Edwards | POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID | 0 | 79,000 | 79,000 |
| Defense-Wide | California | Naval Base Coronado | MULTI-MISSION DRY SUBMERSIBLE CAMPUS (DESIGN) | 0 | 35,000 | 35,000 |

SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Defense-Wide | Colorado | Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO)—Colorado Springs | GENERAL PURPOSE WAREHOUSE | 85,000 | 0 | 85,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Florida | Eglin Air Force Base | POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID | 0 | 43,000 | 43,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Florida | Homestead Air Reserve Base | SOF CLIMATE CONTROLLED TACTICAL STORAGE WAREHOUSE | 33,000 | 0 | 33,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Florida | Naval Air Station Jacksonville | AMBULATORY CARE CENTER SUBSTANCE ABUSE REHABILITATION PROGRAM (SARP) REPLACEMENT | 40,000 | 0 | 40,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Germany | Ramstein Air Base | VEHICLE FUELING FACILITY | 20,500 | 0 | 20,500 |
| Defense-Wide | Germany | Rhine Ordnance Barracks | MEDICAL CENTER REPLACEMENT (INC 13) | 95,002 | 0 | 95,002 |
| Defense-Wide | Germany | U.S. Army Garrison Ansbach | POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID | 0 | 72,000 | 72,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Germany | U.S. Army Garrison Rheinland-Pfalz | BAUMHOLDER MIDDLE/HIGH SCHOOL | 140,000 | 0 | 140,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | PDI: GDS, COMMAND CENTER (INC) | 99,700 | 0 | 99,700 |
| Defense-Wide | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | PDI: GDS, EIAMD, PHASE 1 (INC) | 75,113 | 0 | 75,113 |
| Defense-Wide | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | PDI: GDS, EIAMD, PHASE 3 | 179,446 | 0 | 179,446 |
| Defense-Wide | Japan | Camp Butler | PDI: TRUCK OFFLOAD FACILITIES | 37,900 | 0 | 37,900 |
| Defense-Wide | Japan | Yokota Air Base | PDI: BULK STORAGE TANKS PHASE 2 | 88,200 | 0 | 88,200 |
| Defense-Wide | Kentucky | Fort Knox | SCOTT MIDDLE SCHOOL | 117,000 | –85,000 | 32,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Korea | Kunsan Air Base | AMBULATORY CARE CENTER REPLACEMENT | 65,000 | 0 | 65,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Maryland | Bethesda Naval Hospital | MEDCEN ADDITION/ALTERATION (INC 10) | 87,275 | 0 | 87,275 |
| Defense-Wide | Maryland | Bethesda Naval Hospital | SUPPORT FACILITIES REPLACEMENT (INC) | 55,000 | 0 | 55,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Maryland | Fort Meade | CYBER NATIONAL MISSION FORCE MISSION OPERATIONS FACILITY (INC) | 98,411 | 0 | 98,411 |
| Defense-Wide | Maryland | Fort Meade | NSAW EAST CAMPUS BUILDING #5 (INC 2) | 180,000 | 0 | 180,000 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Defense-Wide | Maryland | Fort Meade | NSAW EAST CAMPUS SITE INFRASTRUCTURE | 52,000 | 0 | 52,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Nebraska | Offutt Air Force Base | DPAA LABORATORY | 0 | 69,000 | 69,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Nevada | Creech Air Force Base | AMBULATORY CARE CENTER ADDITION/ALTERATION | 25,381 | 0 | 25,381 |
| Defense-Wide | North Carolina | Camp Lejeune | SOF MARINE RAIDER BATTALION OPERATIONS FACILITY | 80,000 | 0 | 80,000 |
| Defense-Wide | North Carolina | Camp Lejeune | SOF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FACILITY | 72,000 | 0 | 72,000 |
| Defense-Wide | North Carolina | Fort Bragg | SOF OPERATIONAL TRAINING FACILITY | 50,000 | 0 | 50,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Pennsylvania | Defense Distribution Center, Susquehanna | MICROGRID | 0 | 58,000 | 58,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Puerto Rico | Fort Buchanan | EMERGENCY WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM | 0 | 33,500 | 33,500 |
| Defense-Wide | Texas | Brooks Army Medical Center | POWER GENERATION AND ENERGY UPGRADES | 0 | 55,500 | 55,500 |
| Defense-Wide | United Kingdom | Menwith Hill Station | FIRE STATION REPLACEMENT | 35,000 | 0 | 35,000 |
| Defense-Wide | United Kingdom | Royal Air Force Lakenheath | HOSPITAL REPLACEMENT, PHASE 2 (INC) | 78,000 | 0 | 78,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Utah | Camp Williams | NSAU CONSOLIDATION—MISSION FACILITY (INC) | 50,000 | 0 | 50,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Virginia | Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story | SOF LAUNCH & RECOVERY FACILITY | 36,000 | 0 | 36,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Wake Island | Defense Fuel Support Point | PDI: FUELING FACILITIES | 100,000 | 0 | 100,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Washington | Joint Base Lewis-McChord | SOF TACTICAL EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE FACILITY | 35,000 | 0 | 35,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Washington | Naval Base Kitsap | POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID | 0 | 65,000 | 65,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Washington | Yakima Training Center | POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID | 0 | 73,000 | 73,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | CHILLERS AND SUBSISTENCE RESILIENCY PILOT | 0 | 150,000 | 150,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DEFENSE LABORATORY FACILITY INVESTMENT PROGRAM | 0 | 250,000 | 250,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN—JOINT ANALYSIS CENTER OF EXCELLENCE | 5,000 | 0 | 5,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN (DEFENSE-WIDE) | 16,783 | 0 | 16,783 |

SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN (DHA) | 45,813 | 0 | 45,813 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN (DLA) | 100,511 | 0 | 100,511 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN (DODEA) | 26,625 | 0 | 26,625 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN (MDA) | 42,846 | 0 | 42,846 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN (NSA) | 33,700 | 0 | 33,700 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN (SOCOM) | 81,628 | 0 | 81,628 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | ENERGY RESILIENCE AND CONSERV. INVEST. PROG. | 694,307 | –694,307 | 0 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | ERCIP DESIGN | 39,346 | 0 | 39,346 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | EXERCISE RELATED MINOR CONSTRUCTION | 13,328 | 50,000 | 63,328 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | PAX SYSTEM SUPPORT | 13,000 | 0 | 13,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UFC SYSTEM SUPPORT | 12,000 | 0 | 12,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION (DEFENSE-WIDE) | 3,000 | 50,000 | 53,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION (DLA) | 14,237 | 20,000 | 34,237 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION (DODEA) | 10,000 | 20,000 | 30,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION (MDA) | 2,659 | 25,000 | 27,659 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION (NSA) | 9,000 | 20,000 | 29,000 |
| Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION (SOCOM) | 24,500 | 25,000 | 49,500 |
| Defense-Wide | Wyoming | F.E. Warren Air Force Base | POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID WITH GEO-THERMAL HEATING AND COOLING | 0 | 51,717 | 51,717 |
| **Subtotal Military Construction, Defense-Wide** | | | | **3,375,211** | **561,310** | **3,936,521** |
| **ARMY NATIONAL GUARD** | | | | | | |
| Army National Guard | Alabama | Fort McClellan Training Center and Clarke Range | REGIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTE (DESIGN) | 0 | 2,250 | 2,250 |
| Army National Guard | District of Columbia | Armed Forces Retirement Home | ACCESS CONTROL POINT | 0 | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| Army National Guard | District of Columbia | Armed Forces Retirement Home | COLLECTIVE TRAINING UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING | 0 | 10,000 | 10,000 |
| Army National Guard | District of Columbia | Armed Forces Retirement Home | COLLECTIVE TRAINING UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING | 0 | 10,000 | 10,000 |
| Army National Guard | District of Columbia | Armed Forces Retirement Home | COLLECTIVE TRAINING UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING | 0 | 10,000 | 10,000 |
| Army National Guard | District of Columbia | Armed Forces Retirement Home | COLLECTIVE TRAINING UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING | 0 | 10,000 | 10,000 |
| Army National Guard | District of Columbia | Armed Forces Retirement Home | MESS HALL (HISTORIC REBUILD) | 0 | 6,000 | 6,000 |
| Army National Guard | District of Columbia | Armed Forces Retirement Home | NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER-GRANT BLDG | 0 | 21,700 | 21,700 |
| Army National Guard | District of Columbia | Armed Forces Retirement Home | NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER-LAGARDE | 0 | 16,000 | 16,000 |

**SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army National Guard | District of Columbia | Armed Forces Retirement Home | VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP | 0 | 1,300 | 1,300 |
| Army National Guard | District of Columbia | Hill East RFK Area 02 | CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM READY BUILDING | 0 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| Army National Guard | Florida | Camp Blanding | AUTOMATED MULTI PURPOSE TRAINING RANGE | 28,000 | 0 | 28,000 |
| Army National Guard | Idaho | Orchard Training Area | MISSION TRAINING COMPLEX (SMALL) | 27,000 | 0 | 27,000 |
| Army National Guard | Illinois | Forest Park | NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,300 | 4,300 |
| Army National Guard | Illinois | Peoria | NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER | 0 | 8,000 | 8,000 |
| Army National Guard | Kentucky | Jackson Field | VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP CONSTRUCTION | 0 | 18,500 | 18,500 |
| Army National Guard | Louisiana | Abbeville Readiness Center | NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER | 23,000 | 0 | 23,000 |
| Army National Guard | Maine | Camp Keyes Training Site | COMBINED SUPPORT MAINTENANCE SHOP (DESIGN) | 0 | 7,700 | 7,700 |
| Army National Guard | Maine | Saco | SOUTHERN MAINE READINESS CENTER (DESIGN) | 0 | 7,900 | 7,900 |
| Army National Guard | Massachusetts | Camp Edwards | NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER | 43,000 | 0 | 43,000 |
| Army National Guard | Minnesota | Anoka | NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,000 | 4,000 |
| Army National Guard | Minnesota | Camp Ripley | ACCESS CONTROL POINT | 0 | 17,000 | 17,000 |
| Army National Guard | Mississippi | Camp Shelby | BOBBY CHAIN ARMY AVIATION SUPPORT FACILITY AND READINESS CENTER (DESIGN) | 0 | 12,000 | 12,000 |
| Army National Guard | Mississippi | Camp Shelby | SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITY (SCIF) (DESIGN) | 0 | 5,000 | 5,000 |
| Army National Guard | Nevada | Henderson Army National Guard Readiness Center | READINESS CENTER EXPANSION (DESIGN) | 0 | 2,371 | 2,371 |
| Army National Guard | New Hampshire | Pease Air National Guard Base | NEWINGTON READINESS CENTER (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,000 | 4,000 |
| Army National Guard | New York | Colonie Readiness Center | NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER | 90,000 | 0 | 90,000 |
| Army National Guard | Oklahoma | Tulsa Army Aviation Support Facility | AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE BAY | 18,500 | 0 | 18,500 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army National Guard | Oregon | Raymond F. Rees Training Center | FACILITY ADDITION (DESIGN) | 0 | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| Army National Guard | South Dakota | Sturgis | VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP (DESIGN) | 0 | 3,700 | 3,700 |
| Army National Guard | Tennessee | Volunteer Training Site—Smyrna | AASF ROTARY WING HANGARS (DESIGN) | 0 | 15,000 | 15,000 |
| Army National Guard | Utah | Camp Williams | UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,100 | 4,100 |
| Army National Guard | Virginia | Sandston | ARMY AVIATION SUPPORT FACILIITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 21,000 | 21,000 |
| Army National Guard | Washington | Yakima Training Center | DINING FACILITY | 18,000 | 0 | 18,000 |
| Army National Guard | West Virginia | Martinsburg Readiness Center | NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER ADD/ALT | 20,000 | 0 | 20,000 |
| Army National Guard | Wisconsin | Black River Falls | NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER | 0 | 20,000 | 20,000 |
| Army National Guard | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN | 71,909 | 0 | 71,909 |
| Army National Guard | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M) | 0 | 1,065,363 | 1,065,363 |
| Army National Guard | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION | 19,500 | 20,000 | 39,500 |
| **Subtotal Military Construction, Army National Guard** | | | | **358,909** | **1,333,184** | **1,692,093** |
| **ARMY RESERVE** | | | | | | |
| Army Reserve | Colorado | Fort Carson | EQUIPMENT CONCENTRATION SITE | 92,000 | 0 | 92,000 |
| Army Reserve | Illinois | Fort Sheridan | AREA MAINTENANCE SUPPORT ACTIVITY | 38,000 | 0 | 38,000 |
| Army Reserve | Virginia | Richmond Reserve Center | ARMY RESERVE CENTER | 48,000 | 0 | 48,000 |
| Army Reserve | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN | 10,413 | 0 | 10,413 |
| Army Reserve | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M) | 0 | 411,093 | 411,093 |
| Army Reserve | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION | 21,500 | 20,000 | 41,500 |
| **Subtotal Military Construction, Army Reserve** | | | | **209,913** | **431,093** | **641,006** |
| **NAVY RESERVE & MARINE CORPS RESERVE** | | | | | | |

SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Navy Reserve & Marine Corps Reserve | Florida | Naval Air Station Jacksonville | RAMP EXPANSION & RTC | 47,000 | 0 | 47,000 |
| Navy Reserve & Marine Corps Reserve | Texas | Fort Worth | HANGAR 1050 MODERNIZATION (INC) | 56,870 | 0 | 56,870 |
| Navy Reserve & Marine Corps Reserve | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN | 6,578 | 0 | 6,578 |
| Navy Reserve & Marine Corps Reserve | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION (MARINE CORPS RESERVE) (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M) | 0 | 100,709 | 100,709 |
| Navy Reserve & Marine Corps Reserve | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION (NAVY RESERVE) (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M) | 0 | 59,386 | 59,386 |
| Navy Reserve & Marine Corps Reserve | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | MCNR UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION | 2,522 | 20,000 | 22,522 |
| Navy Reserve & Marine Corps Reserve | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | USMCR DESIGN | 19,302 | 0 | 19,302 |
| **Subtotal Military Construction, Navy Reserve & Marine Corps Reserve** | | | | **132,272** | **180,095** | **312,367** |
| **AIR NATIONAL GUARD** | | | | | | |
| Air National Guard | Alabama | Sumpter Smith Air National Guard Base | ADAL AIRCRAFT PARKING APRON | 0 | 33,000 | 33,000 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air National Guard | Alabama | Sumpter Smith Air National Guard Base | SECURITY AND SERVICES BUILDING (DESIGN) | 0 | 1,500 | 1,500 |
| Air National Guard | Colorado | Buckley Space Force Base | MUNITIONS COMPLEX (DESIGN) | 0 | 17,500 | 17,500 |
| Air National Guard | Delaware | New Castle Air National Guard | CONSOLIDATED MXS/LRS COMPLEX (DESIGN) | 0 | 7,700 | 7,700 |
| Air National Guard | Indiana | Fort Wayne International Airport | F16: MISSION TRAINING FACILITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 1,800 | 1,800 |
| Air National Guard | Maine | Bangor | AIRFIELD PAVEMENTS REPAIR (DESIGN) | 0 | 3,800 | 3,800 |
| Air National Guard | Michigan | Selfridge Air National Guard Base | F–15EX MAINTENANCE COMPLEX | 0 | 81,000 | 81,000 |
| Air National Guard | Michigan | Selfridge Air National Guard Base | MITIGATE RUNWAY ENCROACHMENT | 110,000 | –100,000 | 10,000 |
| Air National Guard | Michigan | Selfridge Air National Guard Base | TAXIWAY ALPHA EXTENSION | 28,000 | –28,000 | 0 |
| Air National Guard | Michigan | Selfridge Air National Guard Base | TAXIWAY BRAVO EXTENSION | 24,000 | –24,000 | 0 |
| Air National Guard | Minnesota | Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport | FUEL CELL HANGAR (DESIGN) | 0 | 5,200 | 5,200 |
| Air National Guard | Mississippi | Key Field Air National Guard Base | FUEL HYDRANT SYSTEM (DESIGN) | 0 | 9,000 | 9,000 |
| Air National Guard | Mississippi | Key Field Air National Guard Base | MAINTENANCE HANGAR (DESIGN) | 0 | 7,000 | 7,000 |
| Air National Guard | Mississippi | Key Field Air National Guard Base | SIMULATOR FACILITY BUILDING ADDITION (DESIGN) | 0 | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| Air National Guard | Missouri | Rosecrans Memorial Airport | AIRCRAFT PARKING APRON | 0 | 63,000 | 63,000 |
| Air National Guard | New York | Eastern Air Defense Sector | AIR CONTROL AND WARNING OPERATIONS BUILDING (DESIGN) | 0 | 10,000 | 10,000 |
| Air National Guard | New York | Gabreski Air National Guard Base | LOGISTICS READINESS COMPLEX (DESIGN) | 0 | 2,900 | 2,900 |
| Air National Guard | Oregon | Kingsley Air Force Base | F–35 FTU ACADEMIC TRAINING CENTER | 80,000 | 0 | 80,000 |

SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air National Guard | Oregon | Kingsley Field Air National Guard Base | ACADEMIC TRAINING CENTER (DESIGN) | 0 | 8,000 | 8,000 |
| Air National Guard | South Dakota | Joe Foss Field | AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR | 0 | 40,000 | 40,000 |
| Air National Guard | Tennessee | McGhee Tyson Airport | ROAD, BRIDGE, AND ECP | 0 | 28,000 | 28,000 |
| Air National Guard | Tennessee | Volunteer Training Site—Smyrna | AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,000 | 4,000 |
| Air National Guard | Tennessee | Volunteer Training Site—Smyrna | BERRY FIELD GATE REPLACEMENT (DESIGN) | 0 | 1,250 | 1,250 |
| Air National Guard | Texas | Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth | C–130J ADAL MAINTENANCE HANGAR B1676 | 27,000 | 0 | 27,000 |
| Air National Guard | Utah | Salt Lake City International Airport | FUEL CELL AND CORROSION CONTROL HANGAR (DESIGN) | 0 | 5,500 | 5,500 |
| Air National Guard | Virginia | Joint Base Langley-Eustis | CONSOLIDATED HEADQUARTERS FACILITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 3,200 | 3,200 |
| Air National Guard | West Virginia | McLaughlin Air National Guard Base | C–130J APRON EXPANSION (DESIGN) | 0 | 5,000 | 5,000 |
| Air National Guard | West Virginia | McLaughlin Air National Guard Base | COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| Air National Guard | West Virginia | McLaughlin Air National Guard Base | SQUADRON OPERATIONS FACILITY (DESIGN) | 0 | 3,300 | 3,300 |
| Air National Guard | Wisconsin | Volk Field Air National Guard Base | ADAL ACS COMPLEX | 0 | 18,000 | 18,000 |
| Air National Guard | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN | 247,221 | 0 | 247,221 |
| Air National Guard | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M) | 0 | 531,241 | 531,241 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air National Guard | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION | 9,000 | 20,000 | 29,000 |
| **Subtotal Military Construction, Air National Guard** | | | | **525,221** | **762,891** | **1,288,112** |
| **AIR FORCE RESERVE** | | | | | | |
| Air Force Reserve | Pennsylvania | Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station | COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY | 19,500 | 0 | 19,500 |
| Air Force Reserve | Nebraska | Lincoln Air National Guard Base | PARKING APRON (DESIGN) | 0 | 4,000 | 4,000 |
| Air Force Reserve | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN | 1,347 | 0 | 1,347 |
| Air Force Reserve | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M) | 0 | 187,022 | 187,022 |
| Air Force Reserve | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION | 1,325 | 20,000 | 21,325 |
| **Subtotal Military Construction, Air Force Reserve** | | | | **22,172** | **211,022** | **233,194** |
| **NATO SECURITY INVESTMENT PROGRAM** | | | | | | |
| NATO | Worldwide Unspecified | NATO Security Investment Program | NATO SECURITY INVESTMENT PROGRAM | 604,270 | 50,000 | 654,270 |
| **Subtotal NATO Security Investment Program** | | | | **604,270** | **50,000** | **654,270** |
| **INDOPACIFIC COMBATANT COMMAND** | | | | | | |
| MILCON, INDOPACOM | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | INDOPACOM MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PILOT PROGRAM | 27,740 | 184,169 | 211,909 |
| **Subtotal INDOPACOM MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PILOT PROGRAM** | | | | **27,740** | **184,169** | **211,909** |
| **TOTAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION** | | | | **26,143,029** | **23,860,735** | **50,003,764** |
| **FAMILY HOUSING** | | | | | | |
| **FAMILY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, ARMY** | | | | | | |
| Fam Hsg Con, Army | Germany | South Camp Vilseck | FH REPLACEMENT CONSTRUCTION (44 UNITS) | 95,060 | 0 | 95,060 |

SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fam Hsg Con, Army | Japan | Camp Zama | FH IMPROVEMENT CONSTRUCTION (68 UNITS) | 106,356 | 0 | 106,356 |
| Fam Hsg Con, Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FAMILY HOUSING DESIGN | 39,079 | 0 | 39,079 |
| **Subtotal Family Housing Construction, Army** | | | | **240,495** | **0** | **240,495** |
| **FAMILY HOUSING O&M, ARMY** | | | | | | |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FURNISHINGS | 18,177 | 0 | 18,177 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | LEASED HOUSING | 132,820 | 0 | 132,820 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | MAINTENANCE OF REAL PROPERTY FACILITIES | 172,866 | 0 | 172,866 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT | 42,802 | 0 | 42,802 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVE | 42,026 | 0 | 42,026 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | MISCELLANEOUS | 92 | 0 | 92 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | SERVICES | 10,130 | 0 | 10,130 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UTILITIES | 49,494 | 0 | 49,494 |
| **Subtotal Family Housing Operation And Maintenance, Army** | | | | **468,407** | **0** | **468,407** |
| **FAMILY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, NAVY & MARINE CORPS** | | | | | | |
| Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Marine Corps | District of Columbia | Marine Barracks Washington (8th Street & I) | COST TO COMPLETE: W/H REVITALIZATION, QUARTERS #1 (1 UNITS) | 1,532 | 0 | 1,532 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Marine Corps | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | COST TO COMPLETE: REPLACE ANDERSEN HOUSING, PHASE V (74 UNITS) | 25,876 | 0 | 25,876 |
| Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Marine Corps | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | COST TO COMPLETE: REPLACE ANDERSEN HOUSING, PHASE VI (52 UNITS) | 44,920 | 0 | 44,920 |
| Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Marine Corps | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | COST TO COMPLETE: REPLACE ANDERSEN HOUSING PHASE 8 (62 UNITS) | 33,771 | 0 | 33,771 |
| Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Marine Corps | Guam | Joint Region Marianas | REPLACE ANDERSEN HOUSING PHASE 9 (149 UNITS) (INC) | 144,495 | 0 | 144,495 |
| Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Marine Corps | Japan | Yokosuka Naval Base | WHOLE HOUSE & UTILITY REVITALIZE, IKEGO TH PHASE 6 (32 UNITS) | 44,128 | 0 | 44,128 |
| Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN | 14,971 | 0 | 14,971 |
| Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | NAVY SOUTHEAST MHPI (2ND RESTRUCTURE) (100 UNITS) | 52,177 | 0 | 52,177 |
| **Subtotal Family Housing Construction, Navy & Marine Corps** | | | | **361,870** | **0** | **361,870** |
| **FAMILY HOUSING O&M, NAVY & MARINE CORPS** | | | | | | |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FURNISHINGS | 17,252 | 0 | 17,252 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | HOUSING PRIVATIZATION SUPPORT | 60,997 | 0 | 60,997 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | LEASING | 66,242 | 0 | 66,242 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | MAINTENANCE | 119,152 | 0 | 119,152 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | MANAGEMENT | 54,612 | 0 | 54,612 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | MISCELLANEOUS | 445 | 0 | 445 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | SERVICES | 14,394 | 0 | 14,394 |

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(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Marine Corps | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UTILITIES | 52,515 | 0 | 52,515 |
| **Subtotal Family Housing Operation & Maintenance, Navy & Marine Corps** | | | | **385,609** | **0** | **385,609** |
| **FAMILY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, AIR FORCE** | | | | | | |
| Fam Hsg Con, Air Force | Alaska | Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson | MHPI RESTRUCTURE—JBER, PHASE 2 (1,194 UNITS) | 156,964 | 0 | 156,964 |
| Fam Hsg Con, Air Force | Japan | Yokota Air Base | YOKOTA PAIP 10 PHASE 1 (32 UNITS) | 36,100 | 0 | 36,100 |
| Fam Hsg Con, Air Force | United Kingdom | Royal Air Force Croughton | CROUGHTON (REPLACEMENT) (12 UNITS) | 24,104 | 0 | 24,104 |
| Fam Hsg Con, Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | DESIGN | 25,854 | 0 | 25,854 |
| **Subtotal Family Housing Construction, Air Force** | | | | **243,022** | **0** | **243,022** |
| **FAMILY HOUSING O&M, AIR FORCE** | | | | | | |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FURNISHINGS | 28,691 | 0 | 28,691 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | HOUSING PRIVATIZATION SUPPORT | 40,627 | 0 | 40,627 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | LEASING | 5,523 | 0 | 5,523 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | MAINTENANCE | 160,528 | 0 | 160,528 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | MANAGEMENT | 64,841 | 0 | 64,841 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | MISCELLANEOUS | 2,492 | 0 | 2,492 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | SERVICES | 12,957 | 0 | 12,957 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UTILITIES | 51,097 | 0 | 51,097 |
| **Subtotal Family Housing Operation And Maintenance, Air Force** | | | | **366,756** | **0** | **366,756** |
| **FAMILY HOUSING O&M, DEFENSE-WIDE** | | | | | | |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FURNISHINGS (DIA) | 566 | 0 | 566 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | FURNISHINGS (NSA) | 93 | 0 | 93 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | LEASING (DIA) | 34,693 | 0 | 34,693 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | LEASING (DSCA) | 8,792 | 0 | 8,792 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | LEASING (NSA) | 14,320 | 0 | 14,320 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | MAINTENANCE (NSA) | 37 | 0 | 37 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UTILITIES (DIA) | 4,548 | 0 | 4,548 |
| Fam Hsg O&M, Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | UTILITIES (NSA) | 15 | 0 | 15 |
| **Subtotal Family Housing Operation And Maintenance, Defense-Wide** | | | | **63,064** | **0** | **63,064** |
| **FAMILY HOUSING IMPROVEMENT FUND** | | | | | | |
| Family Housing Improvement Fund | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES—FHIF | 8,412 | 0 | 8,412 |
| **Subtotal Family Housing Improvement Fund** | | | | **8,412** | **0** | **8,412** |
| **UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING IMPROVEMENT FUND** | | | | | | |

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(In Thousands of Dollars)

| Account | State/ Country | Installation | Project Title | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unaccompanied Housing Improvement Fund | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES—UHIF | 501 | 0 | 501 |
| **Subtotal Unaccompanied Housing Improvement Fund** | | | | **501** | **0** | **501** |
| **TOTAL FAMILY HOUSING** | | | | **2,138,136** | **0** | **2,138,136** |
| **DEFENSE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE** | | | | | | |
| **BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE, ARMY** | | | | | | |
| BRAC, Army | Worldwide Unspecified | Base Realignment & Closure, Army | BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE | 151,293 | 0 | 151,293 |
| **Subtotal Base Realignment and Closure—Army** | | | | **151,293** | **0** | **151,293** |
| **BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE, NAVY** | | | | | | |
| BRAC, Navy | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE | 108,325 | 0 | 108,325 |
| **Subtotal Base Realignment and Closure—Navy** | | | | **108,325** | **0** | **108,325** |
| **BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE, AIR FORCE** | | | | | | |
| BRAC, Air Force | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE | 111,381 | 0 | 111,381 |
| **Subtotal Base Realignment and Closure—Air Force** | | | | **111,381** | **0** | **111,381** |
| **BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE, DEFENSE-WIDE** | | | | | | |
| BRAC, Defense-Wide | Worldwide Unspecified | Unspecified Worldwide Locations | BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE | 1,318 | 0 | 1,318 |
| **Subtotal Base Realignment and Closure—Defense-Wide** | | | | **1,318** | **0** | **1,318** |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **TOTAL DEFENSE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE** | **372,317** | **0** | **372,317** |
| **TOTAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FAMILY HOUSING, AND BRAC** | **28,653,482** | **23,860,735** | **52,514,217** |

# TITLE XLVII—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

## SEC. 4701. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS.

**SEC. 4701. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Program | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Discretionary Summary by Appropriation** | | | |
| **Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies** | | | |
| **Appropriation Summary:** | | | |
| **Energy Programs** | | | |
| Nuclear Energy | 160,000 | 0 | 160,000 |
| **Atomic Energy Defense Activities** | | | |
| **National Nuclear Security Administration:** | | | |
| Weapons Activities | 26,941,950 | 74,000 | 27,015,950 |
| Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation | 2,389,595 | 0 | 2,389,595 |
| Naval Reactors | 2,393,692 | –65,000 | 2,328,692 |
| Federal Salaries and Expenses | 577,097 | 0 | 577,097 |
| **Total, National Nuclear Security Administration** | **32,302,334** | **9,000** | **32,311,334** |
| Defense Environmental Cleanup | 6,983,318 | 5,000 | 6,988,318 |

**SEC. 4701. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Program | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| Defense Uranium Enrichment D&D | 253,000 | –253,000 | 0 |
| Other Defense Activities | 1,184,721 | 0 | 1,184,721 |
| **Total, Atomic Energy Defense Activities** | **41,222,582** | **–239,000** | **40,983,582** |
| **Total, Discretionary Funding** | **41,382,582** | **–239,000** | **41,143,582** |
| **Nuclear Energy** | | | |
| Safeguards and security | 160,000 | 0 | 160,000 |
| **Total, Nuclear Energy** | **160,000** | **0** | **160,000** |
| **National Nuclear Security Administration** | | | |
| **Weapons Activities** | | | |
| **Stockpile management** | | | |
| **Stockpile modernization** | | | |
| B61–12 LEP | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| B61–13 | 46,428 | 0 | 46,428 |
| W88 ALT 370 | 0 | 150,000 | 150,000 |
| Restoration of statutorily-directed funding | | (150,000) | |
| W80–4 LEP | 1,048,340 | 0 | 1,048,340 |
| W80–5 Modification Program | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| W87–1 Modification Program | 913,231 | 0 | 913,231 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| W93 Program | 1,106,106 | 0 | 1,106,106 |
| Future Programs | 99,794 | 0 | 99,794 |
| **Subtotal, Stockpile modernization** | **3,213,899** | **150,000** | **3,363,899** |
| Stockpile Operation | 1,885,290 | 0 | 1,885,290 |
| Weapons dismantlement and disposition | 90,760 | 0 | 90,760 |
| Production operations | 1,146,586 | 0 | 1,146,586 |
| Nuclear enterprise assurance | 121,015 | 0 | 121,015 |
| Realignment of improperly applied reconciliation funds | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Total, Stockpile management** | **6,457,550** | **150,000** | **6,607,550** |
| | | | |
| **Production Modernization** | | | |
| **Primary Capability Modernization** | | | |
| **Plutonium Modernization** | | | |
| **Los Alamos Plutonium Modernization** | | | |
| Los Alamos Pit Production | 1,460,791 | –30,000 | 1,430,791 |
| Unjustified growth | | (–30,000) | |
| 21–D–512 Plutonium Pit Production Project, LANL | 812,100 | 0 | 812,100 |
| 15–D–302 TA–55 Reinvestments Project, Phase 3, LANL | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 07–D–220-04 Transuranic Liquid Waste Facility, LANL | 10,000 | 0 | 10,000 |
| 04–D–125 Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project, LANL | 110,000 | 0 | 110,000 |
| **Subtotal, Los Alamos Plutonium Modernization** | **2,392,891** | **–30,000** | **2,362,891** |
| **Savannah River Plutonium Modernization** | | | |
| Savannah River Pit Production | 302,000 | 0 | 302,000 |
| 21–D–511 Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility, SRS | 1,946,523 | 0 | 1,946,523 |
| **Subtotal, Savannah River Plutonium Modernization** | **2,248,523** | **0** | **2,248,523** |
| Enterprise Pit Production Support | 270,897 | 0 | 270,897 |
| **Total, Plutonium Modernization** | **4,912,311** | **–30,000** | **4,882,311** |
| **High Explosives & Energetics** | | | |
| High Explosives & Energetics | 251,765 | 0 | 251,765 |
| 21–D–510 HE Synthesis, Formulation, and Production, PX | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Project Continuation | 0 | 42,000 | 42,000 |

**SEC. 4701. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Program | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| Restoration of statutorily-directed funding | | (42,000) | |
| 15–D–301 HE Science & Engineering Facility, PX | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Subtotal, High Explosives & Energetics** | **251,765** | **42,000** | **293,765** |
| **Total, Primary Capability Modernization** | **5,164,076** | **12,000** | **5,176,076** |
| **Secondary Capability Modernization** | | | |
| Secondary Capability Modernization | 1,728,546 | 0 | 1,728,546 |
| 18–D–690 Lithium Processing Facility, Y–12 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Project Continuation | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 06–D–141 Uranium Processing Facility, Y–12 | 290,000 | 0 | 290,000 |
| **Total, Secondary Capability Modernization** | **2,018,546** | **0** | **2,018,546** |
| **Tritium and Defense Fuels Program** | | | |
| Tritium and Defense Fuels Program | 880,781 | 0 | 880,781 |
| 18–D–650 Tritium Finishing Facility, SRS | 0 | 50,000 | 50,000 |
| Restoration of statutorily-directed funding | | (50,000) | |
| **Total, Tritium and Domestic Uranium Enrichment** | **880,781** | **50,000** | **930,781** |
| **Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization** | | | |
| Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization | 258,008 | 0 | 258,008 |
| 26–D–511 MESA Photolithography Capability (MPC), SNL | 51,000 | 0 | 51,000 |
| 26–D–510 Product Realization Infrastructure for Stockpile Modernization (PRISM), LLNL | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 22–D–513 Power Sources Capability, SNL | 140,000 | 0 | 140,000 |
| **Total, Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization** | **449,008** | **0** | **449,008** |
| **Capability Based Investments** | **203,163** | **0** | **203,163** |
| Warhead Assembly Modernization | 47,965 | 0 | 47,965 |
| 18–D–680 Material Staging Capability, PX | 22,500 | 5,000 | 27,500 |
| Expedited construction | | (5,000) | |
| **Total, Warhead Assembly Modernization** | **70,465** | **5,000** | **75,465** |
| **Total, Production Modernization** | **8,786,039** | **67,000** | **8,853,039** |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Stockpile research, technology, and engineering** | | | |
| **Assessment Science** | | | |
| Assessment Science | 1,243,267 | –29,000 | 1,214,267 |
| Unjustified growth | 0 | (–29,000) | |
| 26–D–512 LANSCE Modernization Project (LAMP), LANL | 15,200 | 0 | 15,200 |
| 24–D–513 Z-pinch Experimental Underground System (ZEUS) Test Bed Facilities Improvement (ZTBFI), NNSS | 91,700 | 0 | 91,700 |
| 17–D–640 U1a Complex Enhancements Project, NNSS | 154,142 | 0 | 154,142 |
| **Total, Assessment Science** | **1,504,309** | **–29,000** | **1,475,309** |
| **Engineering** | | | |
| Engineering | 230,043 | 0 | 230,043 |
| Establishment of Rapid Capabilities Development Office | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 26–D–513 Combined Radiation Environments for Survivability Testing, SNL | 105,000 | 0 | 105,000 |
| **Total, Engineering** | **335,043** | **0** | **335,043** |
| Rapid & Advance Capabilities | 499,209 | 0 | 499,209 |
| Inertial Confinement Fusion | 829,736 | 15,000 | 844,736 |
| Enhanced sustainment for Omega Laser Facility | 0 | (15,000) | 0 |
| 26–D–514 NIF Enhanced Fusion Yield Capability, LLNL | 84,000 | 0 | 84,000 |
| **Total, Inertial Confinement Fusion** | **913,736** | **15,000** | **928,736** |
| Advanced simulation and computing | 909,765 | 0 | 909,765 |
| Weapons technology and manufacturing maturation | 405,413 | 0 | 405,413 |
| Academic programs | 0 | 80,000 | 80,000 |
| Program restoration | | (80,000) | |
| **Total, Stockpile research, technology, and engineering** | **4,068,266** | **66,000** | **4,134,266** |
| **Infrastructure and operations** | | | |
| **Operating** | | | |
| Operations of facilities | 1,752,310 | 0 | 1,752,310 |
| Safety and Environmental Operations | 217,902 | –50,000 | 167,902 |
| Unjustified growth | | (–50,000) | |
| Maintenance and Repair of Facilities | 1,384,323 | –90,000 | 1,294,323 |
| Unjustified growth | | (–90,000) | |

**SEC. 4701. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Program | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recapitalization | 1,203,127 | 0 | 1,203,127 |
| **Total, Operating** | **4,557,662** | **–140,000** | **4,417,662** |
| **Mission enabling construction** | | | |
| 24–D–510 Analytic Gas Laboratory, PX | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 23–D–517 Electrical Power Capacity Upgrade, LANL | 65,000 | 0 | 65,000 |
| 27–D–512 Plutonium Engineering Support Building, LANL | 88,700 | 0 | 88,700 |
| 25–D–510 Plutonium Mission Safety & Quality Building, LANL | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 25–D–511 PULSE New Access, NNSS | 50,000 | 0 | 50,000 |
| **Total, Mission enabling construction** | **203,700** | **0** | **203,700** |
| **Total, Infrastructure and operations** | **4,761,362** | **–140,000** | **4,621,362** |
| **Secure transportation asset** | | | |
| Operations and equipment-STA | 443,075 | 0 | 443,075 |
| Program direction-STA | 143,996 | 0 | 143,996 |
| **Total, Secure transportation asset** | **587,071** | **0** | **587,071** |
| **Defense nuclear security** | | | |
| Operations and maintenance—DNS | 1,305,793 | 0 | 1,305,793 |
| **Construction:** | | | |
| 17–D–710 West End Protected Area Reduction Project, Y–12 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Subtotal, Construction** | **0** | **0** | **0** |
| **Total, Defense nuclear security** | **1,305,793** | **0** | **1,305,793** |
| Information Technology and Cybersecurity | 935,000 | –69,000 | 866,000 |
| Unjustified growth | | (–69,000) | |
| Legacy Contractor Pensions and Settlement Payments | 40,869 | 0 | 40,869 |
| **Subtotal, Weapons Activities** | **27,441,159** | **74,000** | **27,515,159** |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total, Weapons Activities** | **27,441,159** | **74,000** | **27,515,159** |
| **Adjustments** | | | |
| Use of prior year balances | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Total, Adjustments** | **0** | **0** | **0** |
| **Total, Weapons Activities** | **26,941,950** | **74,000** | **27,015,950** |
| **Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation** | | | |
| **Material Management and Minimization** | | | |
| Conversion | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Reactor conversion and uranium supply | 117,820 | 0 | 117,820 |
| Nuclear material removal and elimination | 68,945 | 0 | 68,945 |
| Material disposition | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Plutonium Management | 79,039 | 0 | 79,039 |
| **Total, Material Management and Minimization** | **265,804** | **0** | **265,804** |
| **Global Material Security** | | | |
| International nuclear security | 61,013 | 0 | 61,013 |
| Radiological security | 193,104 | 0 | 193,104 |
| Nuclear smuggling detection and deterrence | 136,457 | 0 | 136,457 |
| **Total, Global Material Security** | **390,574** | **0** | **390,574** |
| Nonproliferation and Arms Control | 214,494 | 0 | 214,494 |
| **Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D** | | | |
| Proliferation detection | 296,170 | 0 | 296,170 |
| Nonproliferation stewardship program | 174,383 | 0 | 174,383 |
| Nuclear detonation detection | 318,447 | 0 | 318,447 |
| Restoral of orbital sensors | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Forensics R&D | 30,000 | 0 | 30,000 |
| Nonproliferation fuels development | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D** | **819,000** | **0** | **819,000** |
| **Nonproliferation Construction:** | | | |
| U.S. Construction | 0 | 0 | 0 |

**SEC. 4701. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Program | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| 18–D–150 Surplus Plutonium Disposition Project, SRS | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Total, Nonproliferation Construction** | **0** | **0** | **0** |
| **Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs** | **1,689,872** | **0** | **1,689,872** |
| **Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program** | | | |
| Emergency Management | 35,045 | 0 | 35,045 |
| Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation | 650,550 | 0 | 650,550 |
| **Total, Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program** | **685,595** | **0** | **685,595** |
| NNSA Bioassurance Program | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Legacy contractor pensions | 14,128 | 0 | 14,128 |
| **Subtotal, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation** | **2,389,595** | **0** | **2,389,595** |
| **Adjustments** | | | |
| Use of prior year balances | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cancellation of Prior Year Balances | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Total, Adjustments** | **0** | **0** | **0** |
| **Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation** | **2,389,595** | **0** | **2,389,595** |
| **Naval Reactors** | | | |
| Naval reactors development | 876,824 | 0 | 876,824 |
| Columbia-Class reactor systems development | 29,700 | 0 | 29,700 |
| S8G Prototype refueling | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Naval reactors operations and infrastructure | 645,050 | 0 | 645,050 |
| Program direction | 71,841 | 0 | 71,841 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Construction:** | | | |
| 14–D–901 Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project, NRF | 691,953 | –65,000 | 626,953 |
| Unjustified growth | | (–65,000) | |
| 21–D–530 KL Steam and Condensate Upgrades | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 22–D–531 KL Chemistry & Radiological Health Building | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 22–D–532 KL Security Upgrades | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 23–D–533 BL Component Test Complex | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 24–D–530 NRF Medical Science Complex | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 25–D–530 Naval Examination Acquisition Project | 80,000 | 0 | 80,000 |
| 26–D–530 East Side Office Building | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Total, Naval Reactors Construction** | **771,953** | **–65,000** | **706,953** |
| **Subtotal, Naval Reactor** | **2,395,368** | **–65,000** | **2,330,368** |
| Use of prior year balances | –1,676 | 0 | –1,676 |
| **Total, Naval Reactors** | **2,393,692** | **–65,000** | **2,328,692** |
| **Federal Salaries and Expenses** | | | |
| Program direction | 577,097 | 0 | 577,097 |
| Use of prior year balances | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Total, Federal Salaries and Expenses** | **577,097** | **0** | **577,097** |
| **TOTAL, National Nuclear Security Administration** | **32,302,334** | **9,000** | **32,311,334** |
| **Defense Environmental Cleanup** | | | |
| Closure sites administration | 500 | 0 | 500 |
| **Richland** | | | |
| River corridor and other cleanup operations | 69,000 | 0 | 69,000 |
| Central plateau remediation | 795,124 | 0 | 795,124 |
| Richland community and regulatory support | 12,000 | 0 | 12,000 |
| 18–D–404 Modification of Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 22–D–401 L–888 Eastern Plateau Fire Station | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 22–D–402 L–897 200 Area Water Treatment Facility | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 23–D–404 181D Export Water System Reconfiguration and Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 |

**SEC. 4701. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Program | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| 23–D–405 181B Export Water System Reconfiguration and Upgrade | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 24–D–401 Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility Supercell 11 Expans Proj | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Total, Richland** | **876,624** | **0** | **876,624** |
| **Office of River Protection:** | | | |
| Waste Treatment Immobilization Plant Commissioning | 466,000 | 0 | 466,000 |
| Rad Liquid Tank Waste Stabilization and Disposition | 984,000 | 0 | 984,000 |
| **Construction:** | | | |
| 23–D–403 Hanford 200 West Area Tank Farms Risk Management Project | 90,000 | 0 | 90,000 |
| 15–D–409 Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System | 75,000 | 0 | 75,000 |
| 18–D–16 Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant—LBL/Direct feed LAW | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 01–D–416 Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, RL | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 01–D–16D High-Level Waste Facility | 330,000 | 0 | 330,000 |
| **Subtotal, Construction** | **495,000** | **0** | **495,000** |
| **Total, Office of River Protection** | **1,945,000** | **0** | **1,945,000** |
| **Idaho National Laboratory:** | | | |
| Idaho cleanup and waste disposition | 472,726 | 0 | 472,726 |
| Idaho community and regulatory support | 3,295 | 0 | 3,295 |
| **Construction:** | | | |
| 22–D–403 Idaho Spent Nuclear Fuel Staging Facility | 2,000 | 0 | 2,000 |
| 22–D–404 Addl ICDF Landfill Disposal Cell and Evaporation Ponds Project | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 22–D–402 Calcine Construction | 2,000 | 0 | 2,000 |
| **Subtotal, Construction** | **4,000** | **0** | **4,000** |
| **Total, Idaho National Laboratory** | **480,021** | **0** | **480,021** |
| **NNSA sites and Nevada off-sites** | | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory | 1,955 | 0 | 1,955 |
| LLNL Excess Facilities D&D | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Separations Processing Research Unit | 950 | 0 | 950 |
| Nevada | 64,835 | 0 | 64,835 |
| Sandia National Laboratory | 1,030 | 0 | 1,030 |
| Los Alamos National Laboratory | 293,937 | 0 | 293,937 |
| Los Alamos Excess Facilities D&D | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Total, NNSA sites and Nevada off-sites** | **362,707** | **0** | **362,707** |
| | | | |
| **Oak Ridge Reservation:** | | | |
| OR Nuclear Facility D&D | 289,297 | 0 | 289,297 |
| U233 Disposition Program | 70,000 | 0 | 70,000 |
| OR cleanup and waste disposition | 85,800 | 0 | 85,800 |
| **Construction:** | | | |
| 14–D–403 Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment Facility | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 17–D–401 On-site Waste Disposal Facility | 57,828 | 0 | 57,828 |
| OR reservation community & regulatory support | 5,100 | 0 | 5,100 |
| OR technology development and deployment | 3,500 | 0 | 3,500 |
| **Total, Oak Ridge Reservation** | **511,525** | **0** | **511,525** |
| | | | |
| **Savannah River Site:** | | | |
| Savannah River risk management operations | 465,620 | 0 | 465,620 |
| Savannah River legacy pensions | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Savannah River community and regulatory support | 5,450 | 0 | 5,450 |
| Payment in lieu of taxes | 0 | 5,000 | 5,000 |
| Program restoration | | (5,000) | |
| Savannah River National Laboratory O&M | 90,719 | 0 | 90,719 |
| **Construction:** | | | |
| 20-D–401 Saltstone Disposal Unit #10, 11, 12 | 82,500 | 0 | 82,500 |
| 19–D–701: SR Security Systems Replacement | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 18–D–401 Saltstone Disposal Unit #8, 9, SR (SR-0014C) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 18–D–402 Emergency Operations Center | 0 | 0 | 0 |

**SEC. 4701. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS**
**(In Thousands of Dollars)**

| Program | FY 2027 Request | Senate Change | Senate Authorized |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Subtotal, Construction** | **82,500** | **0** | **82,500** |
| Radioactive liquid tank waste stabilization and disposition | 1,066,000 | 0 | 1,066,000 |
| **Total, Savannah River Site** | **1,710,289** | **5,000** | **1,715,289** |
| **Waste Isolation Pilot Plant** | | | |
| Waste Isolation Pilot Plant | 400,020 | 0 | 400,020 |
| **Construction:** | | | |
| 15–D–411 Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System, WIPP | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 15–D–412 Utility Shaft, | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 21–D–401 Hoisting Capability Project | 72,000 | 0 | 72,000 |
| **Total, Construction** | **72,000** | **0** | **72,000** |
| **Total, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant** | **472,020** | **0** | **472,020** |
| Program direction | 297,318 | 0 | 297,318 |
| Program support | 20,320 | 0 | 20,320 |
| Safeguards and Security—Defense Environmental Cleanup | 291,482 | 0 | 291,482 |
| Technology development and deployment | 16,012 | 0 | 16,012 |
| **TOTAL, Defense Environmental Cleanup** | **6,983,318** | **5,000** | **6,988,318** |
| **Defense Uranium Enrichment D&D** | **253,000** | **–253,000** | **0** |
| Improper allocation | | (–253,000) | |
| **Other Defense Activities** | | | |
| **Environment, health, safety and security** | | | |
| Environment, health, safety and security mission support | 150,761 | 0 | 150,761 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Program direction | 81,179 | 0 | 81,179 |
| **Total, Environment, health, safety and security** | **231,940** | **0** | **231,940** |
| | | | |
| **Office of Enterprise Assessments** | | | |
| Enterprise assessments | 32,183 | 0 | 32,183 |
| Program direction | 56,632 | 0 | 56,632 |
| **Total, Office of Enterprise Assessments** | **88,815** | **0** | **88,815** |
| | | | |
| Specialized security activities | 471,082 | 0 | 471,082 |
| | | | |
| **Legacy Management** | | | |
| Legacy Management Activities—Defense | 177,716 | 0 | 177,716 |
| Program Direction | 22,670 | 0 | 22,670 |
| **Total, Legacy Management** | **200,386** | **0** | **200,386** |
| | | | |
| Defense-Related Administrative Support | 187,475 | 0 | 187,475 |
| | | | |
| Office of Hearings and Appeals | 5,023 | 0 | 5,023 |
| **Subtotal, Other Defense Activities** | **1,184,721** | **0** | **1,184,721** |
| Use of prior year balances | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Total, Other Defense Activities** | **1,184,721** | **0** | **1,184,721** |

# LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS

## Committee Action

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ROLL CALL VOTES DURING FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027

In compliance with Rule XXVI 7(3)(b) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, listed below is a tabulation of the roll call votes.

1. MOTION: To include a provision that would provide for rights in technical data.

VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 27–0

In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, Moody, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: None

2. MOTION: To include a provision that would modify the treatment of nondisclosure agreements with respect to privatized military housing.

VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 18–9

In favor: Senators Rounds, Sullivan, Cramer, Sheehy, Moody, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, and Banks

3. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit the provision of support to the Department of Homeland Security.

VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 16–11

In favor: Senators Fischer, Ernst, Sullivan, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Cotton, Rounds, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

4. MOTION: To include a provision to rescind amounts made available by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act for development of space-based and boost phase intercept capabilities.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 8–19

In favor: Senators Blumenthal, Hirono, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, Moody, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Kaine, and King

5. MOTION: To include a provision to promote the use of standardized testing at military service academies and DoDEA schools.

VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 18–9

In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, Moody, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Kaine, and King

Opposed: Senators Reed, Blumenthal, Hirono, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

6. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit funding for National Guard seizures of certain election material.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

7. MOTION: To include a provision to require congressional notification of National Guard troops sent to polling places, and for other purposes.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

8. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit use of media from dignified transfers for political fundraising or promotional purposes.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

9. MOTION: To include a provision to provide for additional athletic eligibility for service academy graduates enrolled in graduate education programs.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 7–20

In favor: Senators Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Moody, and King

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Banks, Sheehy, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

10. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit use of funds to limit collective bargaining.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

11. MOTION: To include a provision to provide for term appointments for civilian faculty at the United States Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and the United States Air Force Academy.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

Opposed: Senators Ernst, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

12. MOTION: To include a provision to establish the Cyber Force.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Ernst, Scott, Sheehy, Moody, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Sullivan, Cramer, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Reed, Duckworth, Rosen, and Kelly

13. MOTION: To include a provision to provide for a reduction in authorized national defense funding.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

14. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit the use of funds for military operations and activities against Iran until Congress authorizes the use of military force against Iran, and to prohibit the use of operation and maintenance funds for the Office of the Secretary of Defense's travel expenses until the congressional defense committees receive a report on the manner in which military operations and activities against Iran since February 28, 2026 affect the readiness of U.S. armed forces.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

15. MOTION: To include a provision to provide for gender-neutral standards in the Armed Forces.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

16. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit the exclusion of members of the Armed Forces from assignments on the basis of gender.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

17. MOTION: To include a provision to modify certain provisions related to diversity, equity, and inclusion.

VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 14–13

In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

Opposed: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

18. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit any lease agreements for commercial data centers on military installations until the strategy and roadmap required under the original provision is delivered.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

19. MOTION: To include a provision to establish sex-neutral occupational performance standards.

VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 15–12

In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, Moody, Gillibrand, and Blumenthal

Opposed: Senators Cotton, Reed, Shaheen, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

20. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit the Office of Strategic Capital of the Department of Defense from making equity investments in entities in which certain senior government officials hold a significant interest.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

21. MOTION: To include a provision to eliminate the submission of cost and pricing data after agreeing on the contract price as a defense to contract price adjustments for defective cost and pricing data.

VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 14–13

In favor: Senators Sheehy, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, and Moody

22. MOTION: To include a provision to require a report on domestic deployments.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

23. MOTION: To include a provision to strike language regarding post-government employment restrictions applicable to certain senior military officers and senior civilian employees of the Department of Defense.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

24. MOTION: To include a provision to limit the authority of the Secretary of the Navy to change vessel names.

VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 20–7

In favor: Senators Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Banks, Sheehy, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Cotton, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, and Moody

25. MOTION: To include a provision to require congressional notification of calling the National Guard into Federal service.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

26. MOTION: To include a provision to provide fertility treatment under the TRICARE Program.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

27. MOTION: To include a provision to provide for the redesignation of the Department of Defense as the Department of War.

VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 14–13

In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

Opposed: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

28. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit the use of funds to assert control over any member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

29. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit the use of the WEXMAC vehicle for immigration enforcement.

VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13–14

In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin

Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody

30. MOTION: To favorably report to the Senate the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027.

VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 18–9

In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, Moody, Reed, Shaheen, King, and Rosen

Opposed: Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Kelly, and Slotkin

## Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

It was not possible to include the Congressional Budget Office cost estimate on this legislation because it was not available at the time the report was filed. It will be included in material presented during the Senate floor debate on the legislation.

## Regulatory Impact

Paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires that a report on the regulatory impact of the bill be included in the report on the bill. The committee finds that there is no regulatory impact in the case of the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2027.

## Changes in Existing Law

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the changes in existing law made by certain portions of the bill have not been shown in this section of the report because, in the opinion of the committee, it is necessary to dispense with showing such changes in order to expedite the business of the Senate and reduce the expenditure of funds.

## ADDITIONAL VIEWS

I've been a proud member of the Senate Armed Services Committee for more than 13 years. My work on the Committee is the highlight of my Senate service because of my deep connection to Virginia's military families and my deep respect for my colleagues.

The process that our Committee uses to carefully craft the National Defense Authorization Act—months of hearings to consider all dimensions of our nation's security challenges followed by a markup in which all members have the opportunity to shape the final product—is a model for how the Senate should operate. The leadership of the Committee, Senators Wicker and Reed, have ably carried out this long tradition whereby SASC is the only committee to do an authorizing bill every year and they do so in a way that guarantees significant bipartisan approval.

I've always voted for the NDAA in Committee and on the floor of the Senate. The bill is never perfect—often omitting items I advocated or including items I opposed. But it is usually so full of good provisions that a yes vote has always been an easy call. This year, for the first time, I voted against the NDAA. I did so with deep regret. I file this dissenting perspective to explain why.

This NDAA is much like earlier versions in containing solid policy, including many provisions I worked to include as the lead Democrat on the Seapower Subcommittee. Just as in past years, the Committee's leadership and dedicated staff put together a process that maximized inclusion of content from all members. In virtually every particular, this NDAA represents "business as usual" from a Committee for whom that phrase is actually a high compliment rather than a casual throwaway line.

But an exemplary process cannot obscure the fact that the times are anything but usual. Since last year's NDAA, our situation has changed dramatically. The United States is in the middle of an illegal and foolish war with Iran, initiated by the President for spurious reasons, that is harming our troops and causing massive damage to American families and the global economy. The United States is bombing boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific and killing those aboard in a campaign described as an "international armed conflict" against narco-traffickers even though many of these fatal strikes are carried out against boats containing no drugs. The United States invaded Venezuela to topple the Maduro regime, but has left the regime in place and thus far denied the legitimate political opposition the opportunity to build a Venezuela for Venezuelans. And the President has threatened military action against other nations—Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, Denmark—with more such threats likely to emerge at any given moment based on his whims and personal grievances.

All these Presidential actions to initiate armed conflict here, there, and everywhere have been unilateral decisions taken with-

out the consultation with Congress required by the Constitution. The President has chosen to make Congress a bystander in matters of war and, thus far, Congress has passively accepted that evisceration of its most solemn obligation.

This year's NDAA shows no self-awareness of this growing power grab by the executive branch and, in my view, even paves the way for more unilateral executive control over matters of war. To begin, the Administration proposes a massive increase in the Defense budget—growing the topline from $850 billion to $1.14 trillion while additionally seeking $350 billion more via reconciliation and hinting at a future supplemental request likely to add an additional $200 billion to the defense budget. This is a staggering increase of funding for Defense, particularly when counterposed with the sizable cuts being made to Medicaid, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance, and other programs relied upon by everyday Americans—and the fact that Social Security's trust fund is expected to be depleted by the end of 2032.

Efforts to amend the bill to fence off funds for the Iran war—at least until Congress authorizes it—failed, as did efforts to simply get accurate information about the war's costs. Efforts to provide protection against other threatened abuses, such as the deployment of the military to polling places during elections, failed. This NDAA would swell the Defense budget at the very moment when Congress shows a determined unwillingness to exercise any meaningful check on how the President uses the nation's military might.

The most telling single item in this year's NDAA, even beyond the dramatic increase in spending, is the provision ordering that the Department of Defense be renamed the "Department of War." The United States long had a Secretary of War, but President Truman and Congress, reflecting on the devastation of World War II, chose to embrace Defense rather than War as the descriptor of our national security mission, a change that closely matches the oaths still taken by all who wear the uniform of this country. The United States shouldn't prefer war. We must be committed to defense of our nation, our people, our allies and our values and, if that requires war, we must always be prepared and ready to succeed. But war is not the goal and it never should be.

When the United States embraced the "Department of Defense" nomenclature in 1947, we inspired other nations to do the same. Allies like the United Kingdom and France, former adversaries like Japan and Germany, current adversaries like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—they now all have Defense agencies rather than War agencies. The word "war" in the title of a nation's defense ministry is essentially extinct in the modern world. If the NDAA passes with this change intact, the United States will stand alone as the sole nation advertising War as the mission of its military. This unique status will be a stain on our country's reputation and will certainly be used by our adversaries in propaganda to isolate us from other nations.

The proposed change embraced by SASC reveals something sad about our nation's leadership at the current moment. A President who promised to end wars has transformed into one intoxicated by war. He is not the first leader to go down that path and won't be the last. But that's why our forefathers rejected tyranny 250 years

ago to create a democracy whereby the legislative branch could serve as a check against the natural tendency of an executive to seize more and more power. Because this year's NDAA doesn't recognize the gravest threat facing our nation at this moment, I cannot support it.

TIM KAINE.

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