Senate Report 119-127 - NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027

[Senate Report 119-127]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

Calendar No. 436

119th Congress } { Report
2d Session } SENATE { 119-127
======================================================================

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027

R E P O R T

[TO ACCOMPANY S. 4784]

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

June 15, 2026.--Ordered to be printed

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-992 WASHINGTON : 2026
======================================================================

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI K. ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
TED BUDD, North Carolina GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JIM BANKS, Indiana JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
TIM SHEEHY, Montana MARK KELLY, Arizona
ASHLEY MOODY, Florida ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
Rick Berger, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

C O N T E N T S

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Page
REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 4784
PURPOSE OF THE BILL.............................................. 1
COMMITTEE OVERVIEW............................................... 1
BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF THIS ACT (SEC. 4)........................... 2
SUMMARY OF DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS AND BUDGET AUTHORITY
IMPLICATION.................................................... 3
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS................. 4
TITLE I--PROCUREMENT............................................. 4
Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations.................. 4
Sec. 101--Authorization of appropriations................ 4
Subtitle B--Army Programs.................................... 4
Sec. 111--Multiyear procurement authority for Infantry
Squad Vehicle program.................................. 4
Sec. 112--Inclusion of Army National Guard in Army Arctic
strategy and force structure........................... 4
Subtitle C--Navy Programs.................................... 4
Sec. 121--Modification and extension of procurement
authorities for certain amphibious shipbuilding
programs............................................... 4
Sec. 122--Funding for refueling and complex overhauls of
the U.S.S. John C. Stennis and U.S.S. Harry S. Truman.. 4
Sec. 123--Vessel construction manager and commercial
design and construction requirements for cable laying
and repair ships....................................... 5
Sec. 124--Conveyance of F-14D Tomcat aircraft from the
Navy to the U.S. Space and rocket center commission in
Huntsville, Alabama.................................... 5
Sec. 125--Prohibition on destruction or scrapping of
World War II-era aircraft.............................. 5
Sec. 126--Procurement authority for E-2D Advanced Hawkeye
Aircraft Program....................................... 8
Subtitle D--Air Force Programs............................... 8
Sec. 131--Modification of inventory requirements for Air
Force fighter aircraft................................. 8
Sec. 132--Multiyear procurement authority for F-35
aircraft............................................... 8
Sec. 133--Multiyear procurement authority for F-15EX
aircraft............................................... 8
Sec. 134--MQ-9 aircraft.................................. 8
Sec. 135--Airborne warning and control system aircraft... 9
Sec. 136--Limitation on availability of funds pending
submission of report on acquisition strategy for
Airborne Command Post capability....................... 9
Sec. 137--Mobility capabilities strategic plan........... 9
Sec. 138--Extension of requirement and prohibition
related to C-130 aircraft.............................. 9
Items of Special Interest................................ 10
Air Force combat search and rescue forces............ 10
Anti-ship air-launched missiles...................... 10
Arctic wargaming and operational simulation
capability......................................... 11
Army Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Modular Open Suite of Standards
Mounted Form Factor program........................ 12
Army investment in autonomous surface vessels........ 12
Army Mobile Tactical Cannon modernization and
artillery automation............................... 13
Army rifle-mounted aiming laser strategy............. 14
Army small unmanned aerial systems munitions......... 14
Army small Unmanned Aircraft Systems scaling and
deployment strategy................................ 14
Assessment of Army night vision capabilities......... 15
Assessment of commercially available aviation night
vision systems..................................... 16
B-21 force structure and production strategy......... 16
Body armor technology production capacity............ 17
Briefing on autonomous air-to-air cruise missile and
drone defense...................................... 18
Briefing on E-11 Battlefield Airborne Communications
Node capability replacement........................ 18
Briefing on F-15E/EX training plan................... 19
Briefing on F-47 sustainment......................... 19
Briefing on Marine Aviation Plan..................... 20
Briefings on Air Force sustainment funding and spare
parts availability................................. 20
Cargo projectile munition production................. 21
CH-47 lightweight ballistic protection system
upgrades........................................... 21
Collaborative Combat Aircraft........................ 22
Commercially available extra-large unmanned
underwater vehicles fielding acceleration.......... 22
Complementary radar solutions for low, slow, small,
unmanned aircraft systems integrated defeat systems 23
Comptroller General review of Army light tactical
wheeled vehicle program management................. 24
Comptroller General review of Counter-small Unmanned
Aerial Systems..................................... 25
Comptroller General review of Soldier Borne Mission
Command systems.................................... 25
Conversions to Air National Guard Contingency
Response Groups.................................... 26
Counter small uncrewed aerial systems at southern
border............................................. 27
Counter-unmanned aircraft systems low-altitude
detection capabilities............................. 27
DDG-51 multiyear procurement......................... 27
Department of Defense approach to countering
cellular-enabled unmanned aerial systems........... 28
Drone Center of Excellence in Army National Guard.... 29
Enabling integration of additional capabilities into
Integrated Battle Command System................... 29
Evaluation of wing-in-ground effect craft............ 30
FireGuard access to commercial data.................. 30
Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb and High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System Integration................ 31
Increasing and diversifying munitions inventories.... 31
Long Range Fires acquisition strategy................ 32
Navy destroyer production............................ 32
Networked autonomous kinetic capability against small
unmanned aerial systems............................ 33
Non-kinetic effectors for point defense.............. 34
Non-kinetic solutions for Counter-small Unmanned
Aerial System swarms............................... 34
Organic cannon tube production....................... 35
Over-the-horizon targeting and operational
authorities........................................ 36
Rapid integration of weapons onto fighter aircraft... 36
Report on acquisition and sustainment strategy for
spare parts for low mission capable Air Force
aircraft........................................... 37
Report on F-35 Power and Thermal Management System
modernization program.............................. 38
Report on ground vehicle signature management
simulation capability.............................. 38
Report on integration of unmanned aerial systems in
National Guard..................................... 39
Review of Air Operations Center processes and
performance........................................ 39
Special operations one-way attack unmanned aerial
systems............................................ 40
Stratospheric balloon capability in Army National
Guard.............................................. 40
Universal armament interface......................... 41
Unmanned surface and underwater vehicle detection and
deterrence......................................... 41
Wireless control capabilities for Expeditionary
Airfield Lighting System........................... 42
TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION............ 45
Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations.................. 45
Sec. 201--Authorization of appropriations................ 45
Subtitle B--Program Requirements, Restrictions, and
Limitations................................................ 45
Sec. 211--Improving the requirement for an alternative
test and evaluation pathway for designated defense
acquisition programs................................... 45
Sec. 212--Development, test, evaluation, demonstration,
and transition to production of alternative low-cost
weapon systems......................................... 45
Sec. 213--Modification to the advisory role of the JASON
scientific advisory group.............................. 46
Sec. 214--Modified and streamlined process for
developing, negotiating, and concluding certain
international agreements............................... 46
Sec. 215--Repeal of authority relating to temporary
hiring of students and university faculty.............. 47
Sec. 216--Limitation on availability of funds for Test
Resource Management Center containerized
instrumentation programs pending report on a common
architecture for unmanned maritime test instrumentation 47
Sec. 217--Limitation on availability of funds for Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
travel................................................. 47
Sec. 218--Limitation on availability of funds for
Integrated Combat Systems of the Department of the Navy 48
Sec. 219--Limitation on the use of travel funds for the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 48
Sec. 220--Codification of Department of Defense Research
Security Program....................................... 48
Sec. 221--Codification of Department of Defense Science,
Technology, and Innovation Board....................... 48
Sec. 222--Alternative programs to expand inventory of air
defense interceptors................................... 48
Sec. 223--Improvements to personnel management authority
to attract experts in science, engineering, and certain
other disciplines at Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency................................................. 48
Sec. 224--Extension of limitation on availability of
funds for fundamental research collaboration with
certain academic institutions.......................... 49
Subtitle C--Plans, Reports, and Other Matters................ 49
Sec. 231--Assessment framework for future quantum
computing programs..................................... 49
Sec. 232--Execution of the Additive Manufacturing for
Rocket Propellant systems.............................. 49
Sec. 233--Report on emerging technology and cognitive
warfare................................................ 49
Sec. 234--Department of Defense electronics requirements
study.................................................. 49
Budget Items................................................. 50
Army..................................................... 50
Navy..................................................... 50
Lowell Observatory Navy Precision Optical
Interferometer..................................... 50
Air Force.................................................... 50
Defense Wide............................................. 50
Defense Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive
Research........................................... 50
Automated textile manufacturing program.............. 50
Trusted and assured microelectronics................. 51
Microelectronics Commons priority research and
demonstration projects............................. 52
Items of Special Interest................................ 52
Autonomous escort capabilities for Army watercraft... 52
Autonomous welding................................... 53
Briefing on use of high-power nuclear fission for
space operations................................... 54
Capability gaps and policy development of robotics
for medical evacuation and other high-risk
operational tasks.................................. 54
Comptroller General review of military specifications
related to biotechnology........................... 55
Counter-unmanned aircraft systems left-of-launch
capability and indications and warning............. 56
Directed energy for surface combatants............... 57
Drone and interceptor manufacturing hub.............. 58
Ensuring commercialization for shelf-stable blood
prototype.......................................... 59
Environmental Security Technology Certification
Program............................................ 59
Feasibility of using large unmanned aerial vehicles
for missile integration and development as a
service............................................ 60
High-altitude warfare strategy....................... 60
High-power microwave research........................ 61
Hypersonic test infrastructure under Multi-Service
Advanced Capability Hypersonic Test Bed program.... 61
Interagency contribution to centralized repository on
critical infrastructure............................ 61
JASON's study on co-authorship metrics and university
research security.................................. 62
Low-cost undersea effectors.......................... 63
Net assessment of biotechnology efforts of China..... 64
Next generation ballistic eye protection............. 64
Plan for public-private partnerships for drone
capabilities development........................... 65
Report on electric and hybrid-electric powertrain
options for special operations light tactical
vehicles........................................... 66
Reusable hypersonics development and transition...... 67
Special operations unmanned aerial systems........... 68
Torpedo tube launch and recovery capability for
unmanned undersea vehicles......................... 68
Trusted foundry...................................... 69
University affiliated research centers............... 69
Unmanned surface vessel experimentation for Naval
Special Warfare.................................... 70
Unmanned undersea vessels for long-range subsea
logistics support.................................. 70
Use of non-destructive inspection and automated
defect recognition techniques in the Department of
Defense............................................ 71
Western Regional Range Complex demonstration......... 71
TITLE III--OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE............................. 73
Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations.................. 73
Sec. 301--Authorization of appropriations................ 73
Subtitle B--Energy and Environment........................... 73
Sec. 311--Modifications to Advanced Nuclear Transition
Working Group.......................................... 73
Sec. 312--Prioritization of deployment of expeditionary
solid waste disposal systems........................... 73
Sec. 313--Authorization of sustainable aviation fuel
procurement............................................ 73
Sec. 314--Grid resiliency and energy redundancy.......... 73
Sec. 315--Mandatory grid impact and infrastructure power
requirements for enhanced use leases................... 74
Sec. 316--Storage capacity enhancements.................. 74
Sec. 317--Revision of policy on use of open-air burn pits
not controlled by Department of Defense................ 74
Sec. 318--Assessment of energy supplied to installations
and operational forces of the Department of Defense.... 74
Sec. 319--Requirement of notice on updates to public
dashboard on remediation of perfluoroalkyl and
polyfluoroalkyl substances............................. 74
Sec. 320--Revisions to technical assistance for public
participation in defense environmental restoration
activities............................................. 74
Sec. 320A--Study on contracting process of Department of
Defense for remediation of perfluoroalkyl and
polyfluoroalkyl substances............................. 75
Sec. 320B--Initiation of remedial actions with respect to
perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances.......... 75
Subtitle C--Logistics and Sustainment........................ 75
Sec. 321--Implementation of Comptroller General
recommendations on exercises and wargames in the Indo-
Pacific region......................................... 75
Sec. 322--Integration of unmanned systems into the
Installation Physical Security Program................. 75
Sec. 323--Guidance regarding governance structure of
organic industrial base of the Army.................... 75
Sec. 324--Extension of deadline for designation of roles
and responsibilities relating to sustainment and
readiness of certain naval surface vessels............. 76
Sec. 325--Acquisition and sustainment strategy for spare
parts for low mission capable aircraft................. 76
Sec. 326--Helicopter support for Kwajalein Atoll and
Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range, Marshall
Islands................................................ 76
Sec. 327--Capital expenditure write-offs for Department
of Defense depots and arsenals......................... 77
Sec. 328--Modification of requirements relating to
production in factories or arsenals owned by the United
States................................................. 77
Subtitle D--Reports.......................................... 77
Sec. 341--Report on strategy to maintain and upgrade
conventional munitions storage facilities.............. 77
Sec. 342--Risk assessment of air traffic control systems
of Department of Defense............................... 77
Subtitle E--Other Matters.................................... 77
Sec. 351--Modification of depots for which minimum
capital investment is required......................... 77
Sec. 352--Implementation of Department of Defense
Inspector General recommendations relating to
evaluation of management of canine welfare under
military working dog program........................... 78
Sec. 353--Prohibition on operation of connected vehicles
of concern on military installations and other property
of the Department of Defense........................... 78
Sec. 354--Limitation on availability of funds for travel
expenses of the Office of the Secretary of Defense..... 78
Sec. 355--Limitation on use of travel funds for Secretary
of the Air Force until briefing on West Lab Project at
Lincoln Laboratory..................................... 78
Sec. 356--Naming of certain assets of the Department of
Defense in the Commonwealth of Virginia................ 78
Sec. 357--Administrative requirements for Military
Aviation and Installation Assurance Clearinghouse...... 79
Budget Items................................................. 79
Redistribution of funding associated with proposed
alternative military basic pay increase................ 79
Items of Special Interest.................................... 80
Arctic domain awareness.................................. 80
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast services for
Air Force flying installations......................... 81
Autonomous or remote-controlled self-propelled railcars.. 81
Badlands Bombing Range project........................... 83
Briefing on defense reactor spent fuel management........ 83
Briefing on installation energy resilience for Navy
scientific and training commands....................... 83
Briefing on operational energy requirements and scope of
Project Janus and the Advanced Nuclear Power for
Installations Program.................................. 84
Briefing on sourcing standards for domestically produced
synthetic graphite..................................... 85
Briefing on the beddown of Air Force Special Operation
Command's Power Projection Wing at Davis-Monthan Air
Force Base............................................. 86
Capability Portfolio Execution for Simulation, Training,
and Test Support....................................... 86
Comptroller General recommendation on prepositioned
assets in Indo-Pacific Region.......................... 87
Expanding required contested logistics reporting......... 88
Firefighting on military installations................... 88
FireGuard autonomous vertical takeoff and landing
capabilities........................................... 89
First Army Division...................................... 89
Fort Polk modernization.................................. 90
Ground fuel distribution system.......................... 91
Importance of Eglin Gulf Test and Training Range......... 91
Intermittent fault detection and isolation technology.... 92
Joint logistics software systems ecosystem assessment.... 93
National Guard Special Forces unit for the Arctic region. 94
Nuclear propulsion training.............................. 94
Perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances destruction
validation............................................. 94
Photovoltaic modules and inverters report................ 95
Preservation of Force and Family......................... 95
Project Arcana........................................... 96
Report on integration of Joint Munitions Command and Army
Sustainment Command.................................... 96
Report on use of unmanned, autonomous systems for
maintenance and logistics.............................. 97
United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command... 98
TITLE IV--MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS...................... 99
Subtitle A--Active Forces.................................... 99
Sec. 401--End strengths for active forces................ 99
Subtitle B--Reserve Forces................................... 99
Sec. 411--End strengths for Selected Reserve............. 99
Sec. 412--End strengths for Reserves on active duty in
support of the Reserves................................ 99
Sec. 413--End strengths for military technicians (dual
status)................................................ 100
Sec. 414--Maximum number of reserve personnel authorized
to be on active duty for operational support........... 100
Subtitle C--Authorization of Appropriations.................. 101
Sec. 421--Military personnel............................. 101
TITLE V--MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY............................... 103
Subtitle A--Officer Personnel Policy......................... 103
Sec. 501--Notification requirements for delayed
promotions............................................. 103
Sec. 502--Temporary withholding of officer nominations
and promotion recommendations.......................... 103
Sec. 503--Enhanced authority for early discharges........ 103
Sec. 504--Officer retirement determinations.............. 103
Sec. 505--Retirement of regular Navy warrant officers and
Marine Corps Marine Gunner warrant officers for years
of service............................................. 103
Sec. 506--Authority to improve retention for permanent
professors of the United States Army War College....... 103
Sec. 507--Congressional notification of relief or early
departure of certain general and flag officers......... 104
Subtitle B--Reserve Component Management..................... 104
Sec. 511--Clarification on computation of total years of
service................................................ 104
Sec. 512--Authorized strengths for Navy Reserves and
Marine Corps Reserves on full-time reserve component
duty................................................... 104
Sec. 513--National Guard military technician (dual
status) conversions and phase-out...................... 104
Sec. 514--Study and analysis for enhanced maritime surge
maintenance, repair, and production capacity........... 105
Subtitle C--General Service Authorities and Military Records. 105
Sec. 521--Remote personnel processing in the military
departments............................................ 105
Sec. 522--Repeal of sunset of authority relating to non-
medical counseling services for military families...... 105
Sec. 523--Guidance on public disclosure of personally
identifiable information for certain members of the
Armed Forces........................................... 105
Sec. 524--Prohibition on reduction in the number of
personnel assigned to a service review agency.......... 105
Sec. 525--Reauthorization of temporary authority to
develop and provide additional recruitment incentives.. 105
Sec. 526--Relief for former service members requesting
review of discharge or dismissal on the basis of post-
traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain injury
related to combat or military sexual trauma............ 106
Sec. 527--Modification of whistleblower protections...... 106
Sec. 528--Authority for collection of personally
identifiable information regarding prospective recruits 106
Sec. 529--Modification of service obligations for cadets
obtaining employment as professional athletes.......... 106
Sec. 529A--Requirement of equal opportunity, racial
neutrality, and exclusive use of merit in military
personnel actions...................................... 106
Sec. 529B--Prohibition on participation of males in
athletic programs or activities, and males entering
privacy spaces, at the military service academies that
are designated for women or girls...................... 107
Sec. 529C--Modification of provisions related to
diversity, equity, and inclusion....................... 107
Sec. 529D--Sex-neutral occupational performance standards 107
Subtitle D--Military Justice and Other Legal Matters......... 107
Sec. 531--Wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate
visual images.......................................... 107
Sec. 532--Expansion of victim access to Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces................................... 108
Sec. 533--Technical amendment to completion of appellate
review under article 57 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice................................................ 108
Sec. 534--Review of courts-martial records............... 108
Sec. 535--Authority of special trial counsel to enter
into pretrial agreements with respect to certain
offenses occurring before effective date of military
justice reforms........................................ 108
Sec. 536--Clarification of court of criminal appeals
review of sentencing................................... 108
Sec. 537--Updating subpoena authority for military
investigations......................................... 109
Sec. 538--Extension of Special Victims' Counsel services
to domestic violence victims........................... 109
Sec. 539--Treatment of hazing under Uniform Code of
Military Justice....................................... 109
Sec. 539A--Notification of the issuance or termination of
military protective orders to victims of domestic
violence or sexual assault............................. 109
Sec. 539B--Military domestic violence emergent housing
policy................................................. 109
Sec. 539C--Annual report on findings of the Department-
wide review of the military legal system............... 109
Sec. 539D--Clarification of authority to order to active-
duty certain persons subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice for matters relating to offenses
during specified periods incident to inactive-duty
training............................................... 110
Sec. 539E--Inapplicability to retired members of punitive
articles affecting political speech.................... 110
Subtitle E--Member Education, Training, and Transition....... 110
Sec. 541--Limitation on authority to reorganize the
Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps................ 110
Sec. 542--Discharge of midshipmen for unsatisfactory
conduct or inaptitude.................................. 110
Sec. 543--Modification to program on encouragement of
postseparation public and community service............ 110
Sec. 544--Limited authority to waive time-in-grade
requirement for service academy graduates detailed as
students at law schools................................ 110
Sec. 545--Elimination of the right of cadets to automatic
reexamination.......................................... 111
Sec. 546--Revision to decision timeframe for expedited
transfers at the military service academies............ 111
Sec. 547--Establishment of program to promote
participation of foreign students in the Senior Reserve
Officers' Training Corps............................... 111
Sec. 548--Designation of senior official for military-to-
civilian transition.................................... 111
Sec. 549--Payment of tuition for off-duty training or
education.............................................. 111
Sec. 549A--Improvement of transition of medics in the
Armed Forces to the civilian workforce in health care
occupations............................................ 111
Sec. 549B--Standards and requirements for institutions of
higher learning seeking to participate in Department of
Defense education programs............................. 112
Sec. 549C--Government copyright for work produced at
Defense Security Cooperation University................ 112
Sec. 549D--Promoting the use of standardized testing at
military service academies and DoDEA schools........... 112
Sec. 549E--Department of Defense-wide hate symbol policy
and recruiter and workforce training requirement....... 112
Subtitle F--Military Family Readiness and Dependents'
Education.................................................. 112
Part I--Dependents' Education............................ 112
Sec. 551--Certain assistance to local educational
agencies that benefit dependents of military and
civilian personnel................................. 112
Sec. 552--Educational technologists at Department of
Defense Education Activity schools................. 113
Part II--Child Care and Related Matters.................. 113
Sec. 555--Expansion of eligible child care providers
for Department of Defense programs................. 113
Sec. 556--Standardized reporting on Department of
Defense child care readiness....................... 113
Sec. 557--Update to pay system for child and youth
programs operated by nonappropriated fund
instrumentalities.................................. 114
Part III--Other Matters.................................. 114
Sec. 561--Department of Defense Fellowship Program
for Military Spouses............................... 114
Sec. 562--Consideration in member assignments process
of colocation of members and civilian employee
spouses............................................ 114
Sec. 563--Review of Exceptional Family Member Program 114
Sec. 564--Improved counseling and access to
information relating to foster care for military
families........................................... 114
Sec. 565--Reporting on gaps between senior and junior
enlisted security forces that could hinder
effective oversight and leadership at Protection
Level One locations................................ 115
Subtitle G--Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps.......... 115
Sec. 571--Update of guidance and evaluation of Junior
Reserve Officers' Training Corps instructor pay scale.. 115
Sec. 572--Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps
programs in Department of Defense Education Activity
schools................................................ 115
Subtitle H--Decorations and Other Awards, Miscellaneous
Reports, and Other Matters................................. 115
Sec. 581--Authorization for award of the Distinguished-
Service Cross to Isaac ``Ike'' Camacho for acts of
valor in Vietnam....................................... 115
Sec. 582--Authorization for award of the Distinguished-
Service Cross for Joseph P. Lynch for acts of valor in
the Republic of Vietnam................................ 115
Sec. 583--Submission to Congress of information for
consideration of certain military awards............... 115
Sec. 584--Medal of Honor review procedures and
reconsideration and upgrade requirements............... 116
Sec. 585--Time limitations............................... 116
Sec. 586--Production of award files...................... 116
Items of Special Interest.................................... 116
Assessment of Department of Defense space law
requirements........................................... 116
Briefing on Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
Test special purpose adjunct to address computational
thinking............................................... 117
Briefing on command climate and suicide.................. 117
Briefing on military service recruitment task force
findings and outcomes.................................. 117
Briefing on Navy Enlisted Classification code alignment.. 118
CATCH a Serial Offender program expansion................ 119
Child care fee application clarity and transparency...... 119
Comprehensive review of awards associated with
noncombatant evacuation operations at Hamid Karzai
International Airport.................................. 120
Comptroller General of the United States assessment on
academic preparedness.................................. 121
Comptroller General review of judge advocate support to
Department of Justice operations....................... 122
Comptroller General review of use of non-disclosure
agreements within Department of Defense................ 123
Degree conferral for medically disqualified cadets and
midshipmen............................................. 123
Department of Defense information sharing on Wounded Knee 124
Department of Defense science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics education.............................. 124
Development of core Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
curriculum............................................. 125
Duty status modernization................................ 125
Expanding opportunities for veterans in emerging
technologies........................................... 126
Fairness and efficiency for discharge review boards...... 126
Feasibility and advisability study for increasing United
States Air Force Academy cadet end strength............ 127
Military relief society support to National Guard and
Reserve members........................................ 128
Military to civilian credentialing....................... 128
Modernizing military personnel retention strategies...... 130
Navy Reserve Supply Corps Force Structure and Readiness.. 131
Personnel life cycle and workforce management software... 132
Purple Heart review...................................... 132
Recognition of United Service Organizations.............. 132
Report on conflicts of interest in Department of Defense
financial literacy program............................. 133
Report on impact of permanent change of station on dual-
military families...................................... 135
Report on legally owned student loan cancellation for
servicemembers......................................... 136
Soldier digital lifecycle modernization.................. 136
Standardization of performance metrics for Transition
Assistance Program..................................... 137
Student support services in Department of Defense
Education Activity schools............................. 138
Women in combat study report and briefing requirement.... 138
TITLE VI--COMPENSATION AND OTHER PERSONNEL BENEFITS.............. 141
Subtitle A--Pay and Allowances............................... 141
Sec. 601--Modification of reimbursement of expenses
relating to travel for inactive-duty training and
muster duty............................................ 141
Sec. 602--Fiscal year 2027 increase in military basic pay 141
Sec. 603--Reimbursement of costs of long commutes for
members assigned to remote or isolated installations in
areas without affordable housing....................... 141
Subtitle B--Special and Incentive Pay........................ 141
Sec. 611--One-year extension of certain expiring bonus
and special pay authorities............................ 141
Sec. 612--Increase in maximum amount of aviation bonus... 141
Sec. 613--Authorization of board certification incentive
pay for veterinary comparative medicine officers....... 142
Sec. 614--Modification of bonus authority for Senior
Reserve Officers' Training Corps cadets and midshipmen. 142
Sec. 615--Increase in maximum amounts of hostile fire pay
and imminent danger pay................................ 142
Sec. 616--Medical providers qualified to recertify
catastrophic injuries or illnesses qualifying members
for special compensation............................... 142
Subtitle C--Commissary And Exchange Benefits................. 142
Sec. 621--Authorized patrons of commissary and exchange
stores................................................. 142
Sec. 622--Modification of operating expenses of
commissary stores...................................... 142
Sec. 623--Pilot program on access of civilian employees
to commissary stores................................... 142
Subtitle D--Other Matters.................................... 143
Sec. 631--Authority for shipment and storage of privately
owned vehicles of members moving between authorized
locations.............................................. 143
Sec. 632--Reimbursement of guardianship costs incurred as
a result of relocations................................ 143
Sec. 633--Provision of counseling on housing for members
of the Armed Forces.................................... 143
Sec. 634--Special priority travel authorization for
personnel stationed at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba................................... 143
Sec. 635--Program to assist members in obtaining personal
driver's licenses...................................... 143
Sec. 636--Student loan relief for members of Selected
Reserve................................................ 143
Sec. 637--Enhancement of Air Force rated officer
retention demonstration program........................ 144
Sec. 638--Pilot program on career intermissions for
certain Air Force fighter aircrew...................... 144
Items of Special Interest.................................... 144
Combat-related special compensation review............... 144
Cyber incentive pay standardization...................... 144
Government travel charge card use and servicemember
financial risk......................................... 145
Military family diaper assistance........................ 146
National Guard Travel-in-Kind program.................... 147
Review of credentialing assistance programs.............. 148
Service member housing relief............................ 149
TITLE VII--HEALTH CARE........................................... 151
Subtitle A--Tricare and Other Health Care Benefits........... 151
Sec. 701--Digital system for beneficiary assistance at
military medical treatment facilities and through
managed care support contractors....................... 151
Sec. 702--Expansion of access to dental care for certain
dependents............................................. 151
Sec. 703--Expansion of eligibility for hearing aids to
include children of retired members of the Uniformed
Services enrolled in family coverage under TRICARE
Select................................................. 151
Sec. 704--Evaluation of inclusion of additional
accrediting bodies for purposes of qualifications for
licensure of mental health professionals under TRICARE
Program................................................ 151
Sec. 705--Improvement of provider directory accuracy for
specialty care providers under the TRICARE program..... 152
Sec. 706--Modification of requirement to provide start-up
time for certain TRICARE contractors................... 152
Sec. 707--Corrections to pilot program for supplemental
coverage relating to cancer............................ 152
Sec. 708--Coverage of cranial orthotic devices for
deformational plagiocephaly under TRICARE Program...... 152
Sec. 709--Technical amendments to the Public Health
Service Act............................................ 152
Sec. 710--Licensure of mental health professionals in
TRICARE program........................................ 152
Sec. 711--Requirements relating to wellness checks for
health and welfare of certain members of the Armed
Forces................................................. 153
Sec. 712--Requirement to offer medical chaperones during
sensitive medical examinations......................... 153
Sec. 713--Pilot program on reciprocal access to health
care facilities, personnel, and services of Department
of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs.......... 153
Sec. 714--Medical screening for members of the Armed
Forces who served at data masked or classified
locations.............................................. 153
Sec. 715--Medical testing and related services for
firefighters of Department of Defense.................. 153
Subtitle B--Health Care Administration....................... 153
Sec. 721--Development of capability prototype on secure
access to health record for members of the Armed Forces 153
Sec. 722--Inventory and annual catchment area assessment
of military-civilian health care partnerships.......... 154
Sec. 723--Requirement for review before actions to
downsize, realign, or reduce scope of services at
military medical treatment facilities.................. 154
Sec. 724--Policy on provider notification to commanders
regarding imminent risk of suicide for members of the
Armed Forces........................................... 154
Sec. 725--Authority over Defense Health Program.......... 154
Sec. 726--Enterprise Revenue Cycle Improvement Initiative 155
Sec. 727--Notification to licensing and medical boards of
States in case of investigation or misconduct.......... 155
Sec. 728--Additional review of disclosure requirements
under processes and forms relating to health care
provider credentialing and privileging of Department of
Defense................................................ 155
Sec. 729--Expansion of Individual Longitudinal Exposure
Record................................................. 155
Sec. 730--Pilot program on modernization of drug testing
using voice-based risk assessment...................... 155
Subtitle C--Combat and Operational Health Support............ 155
Sec. 741--Establishment of Joint Disease and Non-Battle
Injury Surveillance and Readiness System............... 155
Sec. 742--Preservation of dedicated aeromedical
evacuation capability of Medical Service Corps of the
Army................................................... 156
Sec. 743--Establishment of partnership program between
United States, Indo-Pacific region, and Arctic region
for military trauma care, disease and non-battle
injury, health systems support, and research........... 156
Sec. 744--Aerial transport and Department of Defense-wide
capability for high-consequence infectious diseases.... 156
Sec. 745--Requirement for annual large-scale combat
casualty estimation report............................. 156
Sec. 746--Report on the organization, performance, and
standardization of emergency medical services within
the Department of Defense.............................. 156
Sec. 747--Expansion of health care license portability
for medical providers of the National Guard............ 156
Sec. 748--Joint forces medical capabilities development
and standardization.................................... 157
Sec. 749--Expansion of authorities to enable
interoperability among military health care
professionals of the United States and partner
countries.............................................. 157
Sec. 750--Task force on international agreements for
Indo-Pacific medical partnerships...................... 157
Sec. 751--Pilot program for Indo-Pacific regional medical
data sharing........................................... 157
Subtitle D--Reports and Other Matters........................ 157
Sec. 761--Review of chaperone policies within facilities
of the Defense Health Agency........................... 157
Sec. 762--Unfunded priorities report of the Defense
Health Agency.......................................... 158
Sec. 763--Evaluation of certain research related to
menopause, perimenopause, or mid-life women's health... 158
Sec. 764--Notification of material failure at military
medical treatment facilities affecting patient care.... 158
Sec. 765--Study on military health system................ 158
Sec. 766--Establishment of Warfighter Performance
Optimization Initiative, Total Force Fitness........... 158
Sec. 767--Military Family Limb Loss and Limb Difference
Support Program........................................ 159
Sec. 768--Briefing on primary care provided at military
medical treatment facilities on installations of the
Air Force.............................................. 159
Sec. 769--Assessment of access, fairness, and
transparency under TRICARE pharmacy benefits program... 159
Sec. 770--Comptroller General review of influenza vaccine
requirements of Department of Defense.................. 159
Items of Special Interest.................................... 159
Access to Military OneSource............................. 159
Advancing non-opioid alternatives for chronic pain....... 160
All-hazards military medical response.................... 160
Assessment of behavioral health and social health
conditions at remote and isolated installations........ 160
Briefing on dietary supplement safety of Department of
Defense................................................ 161
Briefing on Helicobacter pylori in Department of Defense. 161
Briefing on impact of drone warfare on combat casualties. 162
Briefing on parental access to medical records........... 163
Briefing on privileging and credentialing within the
Military Health System and potential integration with
Department of Veterans Affairs......................... 163
Briefing on treatment of miscarriages in military health
system................................................. 164
Combat casualty care triage.............................. 165
Comptroller General review of access to care at military
medical treatment facilities within United States...... 165
Comptroller General review of joint qualification billets
for health-related specialties......................... 166
Comptroller General review of TRICARE pharmacy program... 167
Enhance awareness of self initiated mental health
referrals.............................................. 168
Enhancing musculoskeletal medicine in the Military Health
System................................................. 169
Feasibility and advisability of establishing pilot
program on filling positions at remote military
treatment facilities................................... 170
Healthcare associated infections......................... 170
Improving brain injury prevention efforts................ 171
Messenger ribonucleic acid vaccine technology............ 171
Military medical manning end strength.................... 172
Military-civilian medical surge system................... 172
Molecular diagnostic test modernization.................. 173
Neurorehabilitation protocols for mild traumatic brain
injury................................................. 173
Position trackers for maneuver soldier monitoring systems 174
Review of Defense Health Agency's combat support
resources.............................................. 174
Report on feasibility and advisability of a sharing
agreement between Department of Defense and Department
of Veterans Affairs to have Mobile Medical Units
provide medical services to servicemembers stationed on
military installations designated as remote and
isolated............................................... 175
Report on supply chain of prosthetics and assistive
technology............................................. 176
Termination of eligibility for TRICARE Reserve Select.... 177
Traumatic brain injury accession processing feasibility
briefing............................................... 177
TITLE VIII--ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, AND
RELATED MATTERS................................................ 178
Subtitle A--Acquisition Policy and Management................ 178
Sec. 801--Multi-year procurement for certain munitions... 00178
Sec. 802--Limitation on availability of funds pending
report on and revisions of software acquisition pathway
implementation......................................... 178
Sec. 803--Report on multiyear procurement................ 178
Sec. 804--Modifications to technical data rights......... 179
Sec. 805--Accountability and training for defense
acquisition............................................ 179
Subtitle B--Amendments to General Contracting Authorities,
Procedures, and Limitations................................ 179
Sec. 811--Consolidation and rationalization of
restrictions on procurement from certain foreign
countries.............................................. 179
Sec. 812--Requirements for information relating to supply
chain risk............................................. 179
Sec. 813--Limitations on certain missile contracts or
other agreements....................................... 179
Sec. 814--Limitations on the centralized commercial item
capability............................................. 180
Sec. 815--Limitations relating to capital distributions
for defense contractors................................ 180
Sec. 816--Prohibition of procurement of molybdenum,
gallium, or germanium from non-allied foreign nations
and authorization for production from recovered
material............................................... 180
Sec. 817--Other transaction authority reporting.......... 180
Sec. 818--Limitation on procurement of cut flowers and
cut greens............................................. 180
Sec. 819--Audit and mitigation of covered cellular
modules in the Department of Defense systems and
infrastructure......................................... 181
Sec. 820--Improving transparency of foreign influence on
Department of Defense contractors...................... 181
Sec. 821--Reporting of price increases................... 181
Sec. 822--Late submission of cost and pricing data as
invalid defense to contract price reductions for
defective cost or pricing data......................... 181
Subtitle C--Industrial Base Matters.......................... 181
Sec. 831--Establishment of the Supply Chain Risk
Management Integration Cell............................ 181
Sec. 832--Expansion of reverse engineering authority for
prototype projects..................................... 181
Sec. 833--Competition requirement for certain munitions.. 181
Sec. 834--Analyses of certain activities for action to
address sourcing and industrial capacity............... 182
Sec. 835--Regulations applicable to wearing optional
combat boots........................................... 182
Sec. 836--Report on domestic nonavailability
determinations granted for critical materials.......... 182
Sec. 837--Limitation on availability of funds pending
information on the small unmanned aircraft system
industrial base........................................ 182
Sec. 838--Energetics industrial base roadmap............. 183
Sec. 839--Supply chain, capability, and capacity study of
high-demand items in the textile industrial base....... 183
Sec. 840--Pilot program on providing subsidies for combat
boots.................................................. 183
Sec. 841--Cross-functional team for the textile
industrial base........................................ 183
Sec. 842--Assessing and addressing risk related to
adversarial capital.................................... 183
Sec. 843--Modifications to requirement for public
reporting of Chinese military companies operating in
the United States...................................... 184
Sec. 844--Amendments to requirements pertaining to
printed circuit boards................................. 184
Sec. 845--Report on the feasibility and advisability of
establishing a strategic partnership on defense
industrial priorities between the United States and
Israel................................................. 184
Sec. 846--Prohibition on the use of Chinese-manufactured
optical fiber by the Department of Defense............. 184
Sec. 847--Promoting the United States drone industrial
base................................................... 184
Sec. 848--Pilot program for domestic antimony and copper
production for defense applications.................... 184
Sec. 849--Full accountability for Chinese military
companies.............................................. 184
Subtitle D--Small Business Matters........................... 184
Sec. 861--Department of Defense Mentor-Protege Program... 185
Sec. 862--APEX Accelerator funding....................... 185
Sec. 863--Test program for negotiation of comprehensive
small business subcontracting plans.................... 185
Sec. 864--Application of the bona fide place of business
to certain contracts................................... 185
Subtitle E--Other Matters.................................... 185
Sec. 871--Technical corrections related to National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026
provisions............................................. 185
Sec. 872--Limitation on availability of funds pending
implementation of certain requirements relating to
munitions.............................................. 185
Sec. 873--Repeal of amendments providing for submission
by subcontract offeror of recent price history in
satisfaction of cost or pricing data requirements...... 186
Sec. 874--Competitive procedures for certain
pharmaceutical contracts............................... 186
Sec. 875--Enhancement of defense supply chain resilience
and secondary source qualification..................... 186
Sec. 876--Limitation pending Army conformance with
portfolio acquisition executive requirements........... 186
Sec. 877--Procurement of medical countermeasures for
overseas personnel of the Department of Defense for
acute radiation syndrome and thermal burns............. 186
Sec. 878--Procurements on behalf of the Department of
Defense by the Department of Veterans Affairs for
planning, design, and construction projects............ 187
Sec. 879--Leasing of vessels, aircraft, and combat
vehicles............................................... 187
Sec. 880--Prohibition on modems or routers acquisitions
involving entities owned or controlled by China........ 187
Sec. 881--Prohibition on television acquisitions
involving entities owned or controlled by China........ 187
Sec. 882--Prohibition for defense contractors providing
sensitive information related to synthetic biology to
foreign entities of concern............................ 187
Sec. 883--Reporting on contractor operations related to
China.................................................. 187
Sec. 884--Ensuring Department of Defense contractor
compliance with disability hiring goals................ 187
Items of Special Interest.................................... 188
Accelerate report on perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl
substance-free chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear protective garments............................ 188
Acceleration of small attritable ground robotics
capabilities........................................... 188
Acquisition workforce metrics............................ 189
Artificial intelligence--enabled biological threat
detection.............................................. 190
Biochemical sensing technologies for warfighter readiness
and threat detection................................... 190
Bolstering critical minerals workforce with separating
servicemembers......................................... 191
Carbon black............................................. 191
Comptroller General review of commercial technology to
support contested logistics............................ 192
Defense Civilian Training Corps.......................... 192
Design for manufacturing for munitions and energetics.... 193
Digital modernization of the organic industrial base..... 194
Enhancing military intelligence regarding biological
threats................................................ 194
Ensuring preparedness for biological threats to
servicemembers......................................... 195
Heavy press aluminum extrusions in national defense
industrial base........................................ 195
Implementation of Shared Classified Commercial
Infrastructure Pilot Program........................... 196
Legacy semiconductor industrial base..................... 197
Manufacturing USA network................................ 198
Materials workforce for munitions........................ 198
Medium caliber munitions industrial base................. 199
Pharmaceutical supply chains of Department of Defense.... 199
Portfolio Acquisition Executive scorecards............... 200
Requirements for concurrent and rapid detection of
biological and chemical agents......................... 200
Technologies for modernization of logistic yard
operations............................................. 201
Uncrewed Aerial System acoustic detection................ 201
TITLE IX--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT...... 202
Subtitle A--Office of the Secretary of Defense and Related
Matters.................................................... 202
Sec. 901--Economic Defense Unit.......................... 202
Sec. 902--Extension of pilot program on capital
assistance of Office of Strategic Capital.............. 202
Sec. 903--Requirement for professional code of conduct
for certain Department of Defense positions............ 202
Sec. 904--Redesignation of Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness; reorganization of Assistant
Secretaries of Defense................................. 202
Sec. 905--Responsibility for cyber matters in Office of
Secretary of Defense................................... 203
Subtitle B--Combatant Commands............................... 203
Sec. 911--Unified combatant command for Africa........... 203
Sec. 912--Unified combatant command for the Middle East
and Central Asia....................................... 203
Sec. 913--Unified combatant command for Europe........... 203
Sec. 914--Unified combatant command for North America.... 203
Sec. 915--Unified combatant command for Central America,
South America, and the Caribbean....................... 203
Sec. 916--Unified combatant command for the Indo-Pacific
region................................................. 203
Sec. 917--Establishment of United States Robotic and
Autonomous Systems Command............................. 203
Subtitle C--Other Department of Defense Organization and
Management Matters......................................... 204
Sec. 921--Organization of responsibilities relating to
unmanned systems....................................... 204
Sec. 922--Composition of cross-functional team for
emerging threat relating to anomalous health incidents;
reports................................................ 204
Sec. 923--Comptroller General review of Anomalous Health
Incidents Cross-Functional Team........................ 204
Sec. 924--Establishment of Center for the Study of the
National Guard......................................... 205
Sec. 925--Civil-Military Coordination Center............. 205
Sec. 926--Modifications to unmanned aircraft system
definitions for Joint Interagency Task Force 401....... 205
Sec. 927--Maximizing funding efficiency for Homeland
Defense................................................ 205
Sec. 928--Prohibition on the reduction of funding for
foreign language training for members of the Armed
Forces................................................. 205
Sec. 929--Records retention requirement.................. 205
Items of Special Interest.................................... 206
Feasibility study on alternate transportation methods for
Crane Army Ammunition Activity......................... 206
High-power microwave technologies for airfield and
installation defense................................... 206
Plan for identification and adoption of cutting-edge
global technologies.................................... 207
Subsea and seabed warfare................................ 208
TITLE X--GENERAL PROVISIONS...................................... 209
Subtitle A--Financial Matters................................ 209
Sec. 1001--General transfer authority.................... 209
Sec. 1002--Department of Defense financial statement
audit readiness, reporting relief, and related reforms. 209
Sec. 1003--Expansion of requirements for submittal to
Congress of reports and justification books............ 210
Sec. 1004--Financial statements: opening balances for
audit purposes......................................... 210
Sec. 1005--Prohibition on provision of support to
Department of Homeland Security........................ 210
Subtitle B--Naval Vessels.................................... 211
Sec. 1011--Design and construction of new Global-class
auxiliary general oceanographic research ships......... 211
Sec. 1012--Limitation on use of funds in the National
Defense Sealift Fund to purchase certain used foreign
constructed vessels.................................... 211
Sec. 1013--Modifications to vessel construction managers
for the construction of certain Navy vessels........... 211
Sec. 1014--Development of industrial base for distributed
submarine and surface vessel shipbuilding.............. 211
Sec. 1015--Report and briefing on submarine tender
requirements and capacity.............................. 211
Sec. 1016--Increase in minimum number of amphibious
warfare ships.......................................... 212
Sec. 1017--Prohibition on retiring and decommissioning
oceanographic research vessels of the Navy............. 212
Sec. 1018--Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and
Repair................................................. 212
Sec. 1019--Construction of vessels in foreign shipyards.. 212
Sec. 1020--Limitation on authority of the Secretary of
the Navy to change vessel names........................ 212
Subtitle C--Counterterrorism................................. 212
Sec. 1021--Extension of prohibition on use of funds for
transfer or release of individuals detained at United
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the
United States.......................................... 212
Sec. 1022--Extension of prohibition on use of funds to
construct or modify facilities in the United States to
house detainees transferred from United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.......................... 213
Sec. 1023--Extension of prohibition on use of funds for
transfer or release of individuals detained at United
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to certain
countries.............................................. 213
Sec. 1024--Extension of prohibition on use of funds to
close or relinquish control of United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.......................... 213
Subtitle D--Miscellaneous Authorities and Limitations........ 214
Sec. 1031--Prohibition on use of funds to support
entertainment projects with ties to the Government of
the People's Republic of China......................... 214
Sec. 1032--Waiver authority for limitation on live fire
trauma training........................................ 214
Sec. 1033--Prohibition on availability of funds for
removal of Army prepositioned stocks from Europe....... 214
Sec. 1034--Implementation of National Transportation
Safety Board recommendations for Department of Defense. 214
Sec. 1035--Modification of support of special operations
for irregular warfare.................................. 214
Sec. 1036--Designation of southwest land border
activities, support, and operations as named operation. 215
Subtitle E--Studies and Reports.............................. 215
Sec. 1041--Threat assessment regarding unmanned aircraft
systems at or near the international borders of the
United States.......................................... 215
Sec. 1042--Extension of Afghanistan War Commission....... 215
Sec. 1043--Extension of briefing requirement regarding
civil authorities at the Southwest border.............. 215
Sec. 1044--Drone posture review.......................... 215
Sec. 1045--Quarterly reports on unmanned aerial system
incursions over military installations, sensitive
sites, and the southern border......................... 215
Sec. 1046--Report on progress on implementation of
Department of Defense instruction on civilian harm
mitigation and response................................ 216
Sec. 1047--Report on transfer of property by Department
of Defense............................................. 216
Sec. 1048--Oversight of Department of Defense rules of
engagement............................................. 216
Sec. 1049--Strategy to address intelligence-gathering
shortcomings in area of responsibility of United States
Africa command......................................... 216
Subtitle F--Equity Investments and Related Matters........... 217
Sec. 1051--Authority for equity investments by Office of
Strategic Capital...................................... 217
Sec. 1052--Ownership review for equity investments....... 217
Sec. 1053--Notifications with respect to debt and equity
investments............................................ 217
Sec. 1054--Modifications to authorities of Industrial
Base Fund.............................................. 217
Sec. 1055--Briefings on Economic Defense Unit; limitation
on use of funds........................................ 217
Sec. 1056--Approval authority for expenditures from
Industrial Base Fund................................... 218
Sec. 1057--Quarterly briefings on Business Operators for
National Defense (BOND) Program........................ 218
Subtitle G--Other Matters.................................... 218
Sec. 1061--Extension of admission to Guam, Wake Island,
and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
for certain H-2B nonimmigrants......................... 218
Sec. 1062--Notification to congressional defense
committees of combat wounded in action................. 219
Sec. 1063--Americas Defense Initiative................... 219
Sec. 1064--Briefings on homeland defense................. 219
Sec. 1065--Independence of Stars and Stripes............. 220
Sec. 1066--Identification, assessment, and mitigation of
critical defense sites................................. 220
Sec. 1067--Administrative support for commissions........ 220
Sec. 1068--Requirement to assign conventional names to
critical munitions..................................... 220
Sec. 1069--Technical corrections to National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026................. 221
Sec. 1070--Development of cognitive warfare strategy..... 221
Sec. 1071--Notification requirements for sensitive
military operations.................................... 221
Sec. 1071A--Declassification guidance for Department of
Defense original classification authorities............ 221
Sec. 1072--Post-government employment restrictions
applicable to certain senior military officers and
senior civilian employees of the Department of Defense. 221
Sec. 1073--Repeals of existing reporting requirements.... 222
Sec. 1074--Report and briefing on Worldwide Expeditionary
Multiple Award Contract Territorial Integrity of the
United States contract................................. 222
Sec. 1075--Documentation of verbal approval of requests
for assistance......................................... 222
Sec. 1076--Increase of the Working Capital Fund, Capital
Investment Program threshold........................... 222
Sec. 1077--National Guard Rural Revival and Modernization
Plan................................................... 222
Sec. 1078--Redesignation of the Department of Defense as
the Department of War.................................. 222
Sec. 1079--Service-wide enterprise strategy for human
performance............................................ 222
Sec. 1080--Records preservation processes for certain at-
risk Afghan allies..................................... 223
Sec. 1081--Prohibition on covered transactions involving
prediction market contracts............................ 223
Sec. 1082--Prohibition on use of prediction markets by
personnel of the Department of Defense................. 223
Sec. 1083--Ban on bets on military operations............ 223
Sec. 1084--Universal guidance on remote and isolated
installation designations.............................. 223
Sec. 1085--Declassification of information concerning
United States personnel classified as prisoner of war
or missing in action during certain conflicts.......... 224
Sec. 1086--Requirement for markings on lethal military
platforms.............................................. 224
Sec. 1087--Extension of National Defense Strategy
Commission............................................. 224
Sec. 1088--Prohibition on use of funds for transfer of
individuals located at Camp As Sayliyah................ 224
Sec. 1089--Analysis of force requirements for alternative
warfighting scenarios.................................. 224
Sec. 1090--Guidance on the treatment of claims under the
HAVANA Act............................................. 225
Sec. 1091--Assessment of Department of Defense phosphate
supply chain vulnerabilities; related land exchange
authorization.......................................... 225
Sec. 1092--Plan for domain awareness at the southern land
border................................................. 225
Sec. 1093--Prohibition on implementation of any policy
that alters the requirements for chaplains to display
visible officer rank on military uniforms.............. 225
Items of Special Interest.................................... 225
Base defense modernization............................... 225
Comptroller General assessment of antisemitism training
within Department of Defense........................... 226
Comptroller General review of security clearance due
process and transparency............................... 226
Comptroller General review of sensitive activities
coordination and integration........................... 227
Comptroller General review of whistleblower protections.. 228
Department of Defense audit capabilities using advanced
software and artificial intelligence................... 229
Dismantlement and disposal of nuclear-powered submarines. 230
Distributed shipbuilding................................. 230
Enterprise resource management systems for requirements
traceability........................................... 231
Improvements to aviation safety.......................... 232
Improvements to aviation safety briefing................. 232
Increasing shipbuilding and repair capacity.............. 233
Joint Integration Coordination Cell resourcing........... 233
Navy shipbuilding software and artificial intelligence
applications for surface combatants.................... 234
Office of Net Assessment................................. 235
Potable water purification systems for new surface
combatants............................................. 235
Report on feasibility and advisability of Arctic
operational and surge floor............................ 236
Report on Navy's use of synthetic oil.................... 237
Support for military aviation demonstration teams........ 237
United States Africa Command advise and assist........... 238
Zumwalt-class destroyer homeporting...................... 238
TITLE XI--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MATTERS............................. 241
Sec. 1101--Prevailing rate determinations for defense
industrial base........................................ 241
Sec. 1102--Job grading system for prevailing rate
employees at defense industrial base facilities........ 241
Sec. 1103--Probationary period for civilian personnel of
the United States Cyber Command........................ 241
Sec. 1104--Enhanced authority for transfers between cyber
excepted service and competitive service............... 241
Sec. 1105--Removal of Direct Support Activities from
personnel limitation on the Office of the Secretary of
Defense................................................ 241
Sec. 1106--Prohibition on the use of funds for carrying
out a hiring freeze, reduction in force, or hiring
delay without cause at a public shipyard............... 241
Sec. 1107--Prohibition on the use of funds for carrying
out certain hiring freezes, reductions in force, and
hiring delays.......................................... 242
Sec. 1108--Disclosure of telework, remote work, and
exemptions for return-to-in-person-work requirements in
Department of Defense vacancy announcements............ 242
Sec. 1109--Pilot program to retain high-performing
supervisors and managers within the Department of
Defense................................................ 242
Sec. 1110--Congressional notification of certain changes
to civilian workforce of Department of Defense......... 242
Items of Special Interest.................................... 242
DOD contracting with industrial base facilities that
offer competency based-apprenticeships................. 242
Japan pilot health insurance enhancement briefing........ 243
Study on improving civilian employee performance
management............................................. 243
TITLE XII--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS................... 245
Subtitle A--Assistance and Training.......................... 245
Sec. 1201--Authority to provide assistance to military
forces of Jordan....................................... 245
Sec. 1202--Modification of authority to provide defense
institution capacity building for friendly foreign
countries.............................................. 245
Sec. 1203--Modification of authority to build capacity... 245
Sec. 1204--Abraham Accords Defense Cooperation Initiative 245
Sec. 1205--Redesignation of Naval Small Craft Instruction
and Technical Training School as Special Boat Training
Command................................................ 245
Sec. 1206--Extension of Defense Operational Resilience
International Cooperation Pilot Program................ 245
Sec. 1207--Feasibility report on multinational jungle
warfare exercises in area of responsibility of United
States Southern Command................................ 246
Sec. 1208--Redesignation of the Africa Center for
Strategic Studies as the James M. Inhofe Center for
Africa Security Studies................................ 246
Sec. 1209--Notification of intent to decrease United
States Armed Forces presence in North Atlantic Treaty
Organization member country............................ 246
Subtitle B--Matters Relating to the Middle East.............. 246
Sec. 1211--Assistance to Lebanese Armed Forces for
countering Hezbollah and other terrorist groups........ 246
Sec. 1212--Extension of authority for reimbursement of
certain coalition nations for support provided to
United States military operations...................... 246
Sec. 1213--Extension and modification of authority to
provide assistance to vetted Syrian groups and
individuals............................................ 246
Sec. 1214--Extension and modification of authority to
provide assistance to counter the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria.............................................. 247
Sec. 1215--Modification of United States-Israel
subterranean operations cooperation.................... 247
Sec. 1216--Modification of United States-Israel
cooperation to counter unmanned systems in all
warfighting domains.................................... 247
Sec. 1217--United States-Israel Framework for Upgraded
Technologies, Unified Research, and Enhanced Security
(FUTURES) Act of 2026.................................. 247
Subtitle C--Matters Relating to Europe and the Russian
Federation................................................. 247
Sec. 1221--Extension of prohibition on availability of
funds relating to sovereignty of the Russian Federation
over internationally recognized territory of Ukraine... 247
Sec. 1222--Oversight of United States military posture in
Europe................................................. 248
Sec. 1223--Intelligence support for Ukraine.............. 248
Sec. 1224--United States-Ukraine Strategic Defense
Innovation Working Group............................... 248
Sec. 1225--Notification of gray zone activities by the
Russian Federation against North Atlantic Treaty
Organization allies.................................... 248
Sec. 1226--Extension and modification of Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative.................................. 249
Sec. 1227--Synchronization of defense readiness with
North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies.............. 249
Sec. 1228--Co-development and co-production program with
Germany for certain munitions.......................... 249
Sec. 1229--Report and assessment relating to United
States force posture adjustments in Europe............. 249
Subtitle D--Matters Relating to the Indo-Pacific Region...... 249
Sec. 1231--Extension and modification of designation of
senior official for Department of Defense activities
relating to, and implementation plan for, the AUKUS
partnership............................................ 249
Sec. 1232--Extension and modification of Pacific
Deterrence Initiative.................................. 250
Sec. 1233--Extension, modification, and redesignation of
Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative................. 250
Sec. 1234--Updates to National Industrial Security
Program Operating Manual regarding AUKUS............... 250
Sec. 1235--Oversight of United States military posture on
the Korean Peninsula................................... 250
Sec. 1236--Indo-Pacific Regional Sustainment Framework... 250
Sec. 1237--Extension of annual report on military power
of the People's Republic of China...................... 251
Sec. 1238--Strategy for crisis management in South China
Sea.................................................... 251
Sec. 1239--Master plan for facility requirements to
support rotational force presence in the Philippines... 251
Sec. 1240--Master plan for infrastructure requirements to
support rotational force presence in Australia......... 251
Sec. 1241--Extension of pilot program to develop young
civilian defense leaders in the Indo-Pacific region.... 251
Sec. 1242--Extension of pilot program to improve cyber
cooperation with covered foreign military partners in
Southeast Asia......................................... 251
Sec. 1243--Extension of authority to transfer funds for
Bien Hoa dioxin cleanup................................ 252
Sec. 1244--Limitation on availability of funds for travel
expenses of the Office of the Secretary of Defense..... 252
Sec. 1245--Report on Japanese counterstrike capabilities. 252
Sec. 1246--Strategy for cyber cooperation in the Indo-
Pacific region......................................... 252
Sec. 1247--Extension and modification of Indo-Pacific
Maritime Security Initiative........................... 252
Sec. 1248--Annual assessment of contribution of certain
artificial intelligence chips to military capabilities
of the People's Republic of China...................... 253
Sec. 1249--Modification of authorization of sales to
Australia of in-service Virginia class submarines to
provide for sale of additional in-service submarine in
lieu of new construction submarine..................... 253
Sec. 1250--War Reserve Stock Program for Taiwan.......... 253
Sec. 1251--Sense of Congress on defense alliances and
partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region................ 253
Subtitle E--Other Matters.................................... 253
Sec. 1261--Western Hemisphere strategy................... 253
Sec. 1262--Enhanced cooperation in North Atlantic and
Arctic regions......................................... 253
Sec. 1263--Report on capabilities and illicit activities
of cartels............................................. 253
Sec. 1264--Report on threats to United States interests
in Africa.............................................. 253
Sec. 1265--Reports on Arctic and High North defense
integration............................................ 253
Sec. 1266--Briefing on military and intelligence presence
of Cuba in the Western Hemisphere...................... 253
Sec. 1267--Continuation of Joint Interagency Task Force-
Counter Cartel......................................... 253
Sec. 1268--Plan to enhance defense cooperation with
Morocco................................................ 253
Sec. 1269--Extension of Public Law 115-68 and related
security cooperation programs.......................... 255
Sec. 1270--Modification of requirements for Department of
Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies.......... 255
Items of Special Interest.................................... 255
Appreciation for Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish Partners in
Countering Islamic State of Iraq and Syria............. 255
Assessment of Chinese Communist Party malign influence
within the Republic of Korea........................... 255
Assessment of Hezbollah.................................. 256
Assessment of Taiwan's liquefied natural gas supply
chains................................................. 256
Assessment of United States-Republic of Korea integration
and operational use of emerging technologies........... 257
Briefing on industrial base cooperation between United
States and India....................................... 257
Briefing on space cooperation between United States and
India.................................................. 258
Comptroller General review of impact of delays in foreign
military sales to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and
Philippines............................................ 258
Expediting the refueling of Israeli aircraft............. 259
Report on addressing Patriot Advanced Capability-3
interceptor production and shipments to Ukraine........ 260
Report on personnel and capability transfers from United
States Indo-Pacific Command............................ 261
Report on United States and South Korean cooperation on
nuclear powered submarines............................. 262
Resilient command, control, and communications for Taiwan 262
United States national security interests related to the
war in Sudan........................................... 263
Vietnam Wartime Accounting Initiative.................... 264
TITLE XIII--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION......................... 265
Sec. 1301--Cooperative Threat Reduction Funds............ 265
Items of Special Interest.................................... 265
Waste water surveillance................................. 265
TITLE XIV--OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS.................................. 267
Subtitle A--Military Programs................................ 267
Sec. 1401--Working capital funds......................... 267
Sec. 1402--Chemical agents and munitions destruction,
defense................................................ 267
Sec. 1403--Drug interdiction and counter-drug activities,
defense-wide........................................... 267
Sec. 1404--Defense Inspector General..................... 267
Sec. 1405--Defense Health Program........................ 267
Subtitle B--National Defense Stockpile....................... 267
Sec. 1411--Amendments to Strategic and Critical Materials
Stock Piling Act....................................... 267
Sec. 1412--Pilot program on public-private partnerships
for recycling strategic and critical materials......... 268
Sec. 1413--Inclusion of recovery and recycling of
strategic and critical materials in national emergency
planning assumptions for National Defense Stockpile.... 268
Subtitle C--Other Matters.................................... 268
Sec. 1431--Extension of Authority for Joint Department of
Defense-Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Facility
Demonstration Fund..................................... 268
Sec. 1432--Extension of Department of Defense-Department
of Veterans Affairs Health Care Sharing Incentive Fund. 268
Sec. 1433--Modifications to Advisory Council............. 268
Items of Special Interest.................................... 268
Domestic antimony and copper recovery for defense
applications........................................... 268
Recovery of critical minerals from lithium-ion battery
waste.................................................. 269
Report on domestic tungsten supply chain................. 270
TITLE XV--SPACE ACTIVITIES, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, AND INTELLIGENCE
MATTERS........................................................ 271
Subtitle A--Space Activities................................. 271
Sec. 1501--Modification of acquisition and operation of
space systems for space warfighting and control........ 271
Sec. 1502--Modification of special authority for
provision of space launch support services to increase
space launch capacity.................................. 271
Sec. 1503--Extension of indirect cost limitations and
reporting requirements for space launch activities on a
military installation.................................. 271
Sec. 1504--Replacement of Space Launch Complex 46 at Cape
Canaveral Space Force Station.......................... 272
Sec. 1505--Integration of space weather into space domain
awareness and operations............................... 272
Sec. 1506--Delivery of Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack
Characterization System................................ 273
Sec. 1507--Acquisition of space-based tactical data
capability............................................. 273
Sec. 1508--Space Launch Enterprise billet sufficiency
review and alignment plan.............................. 273
Sec. 1509--Flexibility for Department of Air Force to
implement acquisition structure for optimal support of
new portfolio acquisition executive system within Space
Force.................................................. 273
Sec. 1510--Arctic connectivity and downlink resiliency
initiative............................................. 274
Subtitle B--Nuclear Forces................................... 274
Sec. 1511--Prohibition on reduction of intercontinental
ballistic missiles of the United States................ 274
Sec. 1512--Exception for below-threshold modifications of
nuclear missiles to limitation on modification of major
items of equipment scheduled for retirement or disposal 274
Sec. 1513--Procurement authority for certain parts of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, reentry vehicles,
and associated equipment............................... 274
Sec. 1514--Limitation on availability of funds pending
submission of the strategy to sustain the Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missile and maximize end of
life margin............................................ 275
Sec. 1515--Integration of ICBM maintenance equipment into
the LGM-30G weapon system designation.................. 275
Sec. 1516--Contract authority for intercontinental
ballistic missiles, replacement equipment, and reentry
vehicle test equipment and components.................. 275
Sec. 1517--Modification to strategy to sustain Minuteman
III intercontinental ballistic missile and maximize
end-of-life margin..................................... 275
Sec. 1518--Modifications to portfolio management
framework for nuclear forces........................... 276
Sec. 1519--Modifications to reports on nuclear force
reductions............................................. 276
Sec. 1520--Modifications to biennial report on the plan
for the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons
complex, nuclear weapons delivery systems, and nuclear
weapons command and control system..................... 276
Sec. 1521--Multipolar nuclear deterrence strategy and
theater-range nuclear capabilities..................... 276
Subtitle C--Missile Defense.................................. 278
Sec. 1531--Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system
and Israeli cooperative missile defense program co-
development and co-production.......................... 278
Sec. 1532--Enduring operational capability for the Guam
Defense System Command and Control Facility............ 278
Sec. 1533--Further limitation on availability of funds
pending independent analysis of space-based missile
defense capability..................................... 279
Sec. 1534--Modification of Golden Dome missile defense
system annual reporting................................ 279
Sec. 1535--Limitation on availability of funds pending
submission of the briefing on sea-based launch
platforms for ballistic missile defense targets........ 279
Sec. 1536--Comprehensive integrated air and missile
defense sensor coverage of Guam........................ 279
Sec. 1537--Repeal of requirement for Government
Accountability Office to review and assess missile
defense acquisition programs........................... 280
Sec. 1538--Improvements to air and missile defense
acquisition............................................ 280
Subtitle D--Other Matters.................................... 280
Sec. 1541--Sense of the Senate, Inspector General review,
and restoration and remediation plans for United States
Army, Kwajalein Atoll, and the Ronald Reagan Space and
Missile Test Range..................................... 280
Sec. 1542--Limitation on the reallocation of funds for
the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range and
United States Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll............ 281
Sec. 1543--Notifications with respect to relocating
Department of Defense systems out of certain spectrum
frequencies............................................ 281
Sec. 1544--Annual briefing on Department of Defense
activities associated with participation in the
International Telecommunication Union World Radio
Conference............................................. 281
Sec. 1545--Report on efforts to counter foreign espionage
and intellectual property theft targeting defense
assets................................................. 281
Sec. 1546--Department of the Air Force electronic warfare
roadmap................................................ 282
Sec. 1547--Using operational electronic intelligence
assets to engage high-value targets.................... 282
Items of Special Interest.................................... 282
Affordable dual-capable air-launched strike capabilities. 282
Assessing Department of Defense and National Nuclear
Security Administration compliance with congressional
direction on the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile... 284
Assessment of orbital data center services............... 284
Autonomous Electromagnetic Spectrum Dominance and Edge
Resilience............................................. 285
Briefing on a unified intercontinental ballistic missile
depot.................................................. 285
Briefing on acquisition of Hypersonic and Ballistic
Tracking Space Sensor.................................. 286
Briefing on Air Force implementation of section 1634 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2026 (Public Law 119-60)............................... 286
Briefing on continuity of operations for Space
Development Agency ground infrastructure............... 287
Briefing on execution and results of allied and theater
missile defense review................................. 287
Briefing on expanded use of medium-range air defenses for
Homeland defense....................................... 288
Briefing on feasibility of designating Air Force Global
Strike Command as the National Center for Conventional-
Nuclear Integration.................................... 289
Briefing on feasibility of designating Joint Global
Strike Operations Center as an alternate command post
to United States Strategic Command Global Operations
Center................................................. 290
Briefing on in-space mobility, logistics, and sustainment
capabilities........................................... 290
Briefing on Lower Tier Air Missile Defense System Sensor
sparing and sustainment plan........................... 291
Briefing on options for development of low-cost space-
based interceptors in support of Golden Dome for
America................................................ 292
Briefing on plan for defending Golden Dome assets from
autonomous and remotely piloted aircraft............... 293
Briefing on progress of reconversion of Ohio-class
ballistic missile submarine missile tubes.............. 294
Briefing on proliferated space architectures............. 294
Briefing on radiation source testing capacity............ 295
Briefing on reactivation of Grand Forks Air Force Base
nuclear facilities..................................... 295
Briefing on resource sufficiency for National Strategic
Research Institute..................................... 296
Briefing on space and nuclear risk reduction measures
among the United States, Russia, and China............. 296
Briefing on space debris reduction through transient
materials.............................................. 297
Briefing on space-based solar power and commercial solar
technologies for proliferated architectures............ 298
Briefing on strategic radioisotope supply chains......... 299
Briefing on strategy and funding for Enhanced Mobile
Satellite Services program............................. 299
Briefing on Transportable Global Aircrew Strategic
Network Terminal Increment 1........................... 300
Briefing on very low earth orbit......................... 300
Cislunar space situational awareness mission and support. 301
Commercial satellite communications integrator innovative
acquisition............................................ 301
Comptroller General assessment of airborne moving target
indicator capabilities................................. 301
Comptroller General assessment of Department of Defense
missile defense systems acceleration efforts........... 302
Comptroller General assessment of Golden Dome for America
missile defense system................................. 303
Comptroller General assessment of operational fielding of
directed energy systems................................ 303
Comptroller General assessment of reentry vehicles....... 304
Digital backbone of United States Space Force............ 304
Electromagnetic pulse capabilities of China.............. 305
Electronic warfare workforce at Fort Huachuca Electronic
Proving Ground......................................... 306
Enhancing adversarial testing for United States space
assets................................................. 306
Expanding electronic warfare and counter-electronic
warfare integration and testing facilities............. 306
Facility damage at Space Force launch ranges due to
launch................................................. 307
Feasibility and advisability of expanding Operation
Olympic Defender....................................... 307
Feasibility of establishing Joint Commercial Operations
cells in the Indo-Pacific region....................... 308
Fort Huachuca electronic proving ground assessment....... 308
Future space launch capacity............................. 309
Golden Dome modeling, simulation analysis, and reporting. 310
In-space mobility industrial base and supply chain risk.. 311
Incorporating lessons learned from allies and enabling
international cooperation related to Golden Dome for
America................................................ 312
Infrastructure requirements for National Security Space
Launch operations at Kodiak............................ 313
Initial Operational Capability of space control weapon
systems................................................ 314
Integration of space domain awareness in joint exercises
and training........................................... 315
Investigation of Global Positioning System Next
Generation Operational Control System.................. 316
Launch ranges for medium and small lift capacity......... 317
Prioritization of commercial off-the-shelf tools at
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency................ 317
Proliferated space architectures......................... 318
Rapid rocket resupply for contested logistics............ 318
Report on acceleration of commercial dynamic space
operations capabilities................................ 319
Report on dynamic spectrum sharing and strategic spectrum
capabilities........................................... 320
Report on Guam Defense System programmatic performance... 320
Report on risk reduction measures for Next Generation
Interceptor............................................ 321
Report on space-based environmental monitoring governance
and program structure.................................. 322
Responsive Electro-Optical Follow On..................... 323
Review of National Security Space Launch Phase 3
acquisition strategy................................... 324
Solar Observing Optical Network.......................... 324
Space Based Infrared System security, reliability, and
maintainability........................................ 325
Space data network strategy and ground architecture...... 325
Space domain awareness................................... 326
Space modeling, simulation, and analysis hub............. 327
Space Training and Readiness Command Guardian workforce
development and long-term training infrastructure...... 327
Space Training and Readiness Command resourcing and other
training capabilities.................................. 329
Space-based systems to support long-range targeting and
engagement............................................. 330
Suitability of the Enterprise Logistics Management System
for lifecycle management of vehicles used in missile
field operations by Air Force Global Strike Command.... 330
Support for United States-Mexico intelligence sharing.... 331
United States critical infrastructure resilience against
electromagnetic pulse weapons.......................... 332
United States Telecommunications Training Institute...... 332
Vandenberg public-private partnership.................... 332
Weather satellites....................................... 333
Wireless intrusion detection............................. 333
TITLE XVI--CYBERSPACE-RELATED MATTERS............................ 335
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Cyber Operations and Cyber
Forces..................................................... 335
Sec. 1601--Independent study on the authorities and
organizational structure of the principal cyber
advisors............................................... 335
Sec. 1602--Funding for reserve component support to
cyber-peculiar operations.............................. 335
Sec. 1603--Amendment of annual reporting requirements on
support for United States Cyber Command................ 336
Sec. 1604--Scaling cyberspace access generation and
maintenance capabilities............................... 336
Sec. 1605--Cyber operational readiness assessments of the
Department of Defense information network.............. 337
Sec. 1606--Independent study on United States Cyber
Command organization and resourcing.................... 337
Sec. 1607--Modification to quarterly reporting for cyber
operations............................................. 338
Sec. 1608--Repeal of authority to use operations and
maintenance funds for cyber-peculiar development....... 338
Sec. 1609--Strategy for integration of National Guard
physical range capabilities into cyber testing
activities............................................. 338
Sec. 1610--Updated cyber readiness reporting methodology. 338
Sec. 1611--Expansion of entities included in coordination
between United States Cyber Command and private sector. 338
Subtitle B--Matters Relating to Department of Defense
Cybersecurity and Information Technology................... 339
Sec. 1621--Improving reserve component network account
continuity............................................. 339
Sec. 1622--Reducing administrative burden in the
Department of Defense risk management framework
implementation......................................... 339
Sec. 1623--Science, Technology, and Innovation Board
study on software-as-a-service in classified networks.. 340
Sec. 1624--Streamlining Department of Defense governance
process for cross-domain solution approvals............ 340
Sec. 1625--Data center infrastructure strategy and
roadmap for military installations..................... 341
Sec. 1626--Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification
assessment grants for small businesses and new entrants 341
Sec. 1627--Harmonization of Department of Defense
security boundaries to enable reciprocity.............. 341
Sec. 1628--Expansion of cyber scholarship program to
include operational technology......................... 342
Sec. 1629--Limitation on availability of funds for Alpha-
1 Development Activities............................... 342
Sec. 1630--Limitation on the use of funds for information
systems development.................................... 342
Sec. 1631--Post-quantum cryptography adoption............ 342
Sec. 1632--Improvements to high-performance computing
roadmap................................................ 342
Sec. 1633--Pilot program on Department of Defense
partnerships with institutions of higher education
recognized in the National Centers of Academic
Excellence in Cybersecurity program for Cyber Research. 342
Sec. 1634--Insider threat reporting and voluntary
guidance for large artificial intelligence contractors. 343
Sec. 1635--Requirement for memoranda of agreement
regarding vulnerability disclosure and prohibition on
procurement from IT providers who share cyber
vulnerabilities with countries of concern.............. 343
Sec. 1636--Strategy for artificial intelligence-
accelerated vulnerability discovery and remediation.... 343
Sec. 1637--Ensuring competition in artificial
intelligence procurement............................... 343
Sec. 1638--Phishing resistant authentication for defense. 343
Subtitle C--Data and Artificial Intelligence................. 343
Sec. 1641--Establishing an ecosystem for use of
artificial intelligence agents at scale and speed...... 343
Sec. 1642--Security standards and framework for
Department of Defense agents........................... 344
Sec. 1643--Assessment of generative artificial
intelligence platform impact on workforce acumen....... 344
Sec. 1644--Demand forecast model for artificial
intelligence........................................... 344
Sec. 1645--Strategy and governance for adversarial
artificial intelligence................................ 345
Sec. 1646--Inclusion of alternative models in Department
of Defense generative artificial intelligence platform. 345
Sec. 1647--Policy and guidance related to autonomous
weapon systems and artificial intelligence capabilities
acquisition............................................ 345
Sec. 1648--Update to the Department of Defense data
strategy and implementation plan....................... 345
Sec. 1649--Assessment of artificial intelligence effects
on warfighter skill retention and operational readiness 346
Sec. 1650--Derived sourcing requirements for artificial
intelligence outputs................................... 346
Sec. 1651--Improvements regarding guidance and
prohibition on use of certain artificial intelligence.. 346
Sec. 1652--Artificial intelligence functional bill of
materials.............................................. 346
Sec. 1653--Requirements for human oversight of use of
force by the Department of Defense..................... 346
Sec. 1654--Biosecurity procurement requirements for
covered artificial intelligence models................. 346
Sec. 1655--Prototyping secure artificial intelligence
data centers........................................... 347
Items of Special Interest.................................... 347
Access to Department of Defense-unique data for
commercial development................................. 347
Army investment in operationalizing data through teams
and operations centers................................. 347
Army network edge security and remote access
modernization.......................................... 348
Artificial intelligence decision support system adoption. 349
Artificial intelligence shared services cost recovery
model study............................................ 349
Collaborative planning and briefing platforms............ 350
Commercial cyber threat intelligence..................... 351
Comptroller General review of reforms to processes for
authority to operate on Department of Defense networks. 351
Comptroller General review of role of Chief Data Officers
in Department of Defense............................... 352
Comptroller General review of software factories......... 353
Comptroller General review of status of Zero Trust
implementation efforts................................. 354
Containerized commercial artificial intelligence......... 354
Coordination of Open Centralized Unit Distributed Unit
Ecosystem.............................................. 355
Cyber warfare engineering officer reserve component
career field........................................... 356
Cybersecurity at Defense Health Agency................... 356
Data readiness and analytical modernization across Joint
Force.................................................. 357
Defense of critical infrastructure....................... 357
Department of Defense lead for remediating threat of
locational services to overseas military installations. 359
Documenting lessons learned and doctrine related to
integration of cyber forces............................ 359
Election security........................................ 360
Evaluation of virtual cyber training environments for
operator development................................... 360
Funding software activities.............................. 361
Golden Dome command and control cybersecurity plan....... 362
Information repository and joint communications
marketplace............................................ 362
Interoperable multi-cloud architecture................... 363
Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture..................... 364
Joint Force common operating picture scaling and
federated ontology strategy............................ 364
Modernization plan for commercial solutions for
classified program..................................... 365
Reciprocity by exception for artificial intelligence
platforms.............................................. 366
Recommendation to transition Workforce Transformation
Cyber Initiative pilot to program of record............ 367
Report on agile telecommunications technologies.......... 367
Review of Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification
program approach following release of cyber-focused
generative artificial intelligence models.............. 368
Risk mitigation and acceleration of Zero Trust
implementation for operational technology.............. 369
Security and risk management for commercial artificial
intelligence........................................... 369
Space domain awareness software.......................... 370
Strategy for leveraging artificial intelligence tools for
medical countermeasures development.................... 371
Study on use of software agents in cyber operations...... 371
Third-party hardware evaluation and independent analysis
program................................................ 372
U.S. Cyber Command science and technology investment
strategy............................................... 373
DIVISION B--MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATIONS................. 375
Summary and explanation of funding tables.................... 375
Sec. 2001--Short title................................... 375
Sec. 2002--Expiration of authorizations and amounts
required to be specified by law........................ 375
Sec. 2003--Effective date................................ 376
TITLE XXI--ARMY MILITARY CONSTRUCTION............................ 377
Summary...................................................... 377
Sec. 2101--Authorized Army construction and land
acquisition projects................................... 377
Sec. 2102--Family housing................................ 377
Sec. 2103--Authorization of appropriations, Army......... 377
Sec. 2104--Extension of authority to carry out fiscal
year 2021 project at Fort Gillem, Georgia.............. 377
Sec. 2105--Extension and modification of authority to
carry out certain fiscal year 2022 projects............ 378
Sec. 2106--Extension of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2023 projects.............................. 378
Sec. 2107--Extension of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2024 projects.............................. 378
Sec. 2108--Modification of authority to carry out fiscal
year 2025 project at Grafenwoehr, Germany.............. 378
Sec. 2109--Modification of authority to carry out fiscal
year 2026 project at Joint Region Marianas, Guam....... 378
TITLE XXII--NAVY MILITARY CONSTRUCTION........................... 379
Summary...................................................... 379
Sec. 2201--Authorized Navy construction and land
acquisition projects................................... 378
Sec. 2202--Family housing................................ 378
Sec. 2203--Authorization of appropriations, Navy......... 378
Sec. 2204--Extension of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2023 projects.............................. 378
Sec. 2205--Extension and modification of authority to
carry out certain fiscal year 2024 projects............ 380
Sec. 2206--Modification of authority to carry out fiscal
year 2026 project at Pacific Missile Range Facility
Barking Sands, Hawaii.................................. 380
TITLE XXIII--AIR FORCE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION..................... 381
Summary...................................................... 381
Sec. 2301--Authorized Air Force construction and land
acquisition projects................................... 381
Sec. 2302--Family housing................................ 381
Sec. 2303--Authorization of appropriations, Air Force.... 381
Sec. 2304--Extension of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2019 projects.............................. 381
Sec. 2305--Extension of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2020 projects.............................. 382
Sec. 2306--Extension of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2023 projects.............................. 382
Sec. 2307--Extension of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2024 projects.............................. 382
Sec. 2308--Authority to carry out family housing
improvement projects................................... 382
Sec. 2309--Authority to carry out project at Eglin Air
Force Base, Florida.................................... 382
TITLE XXIV--DEFENSE AGENCIES MILITARY CONSTRUCTION............... 383
Summary...................................................... 383
Sec. 2401--Authorized Defense agencies construction and
land acquisition projects.............................. 383
Sec. 2402--Authorized Energy Resilience and Conservation
Investment Program projects............................ 383
Sec. 2403--Authorization of appropriations, Defense
Agencies............................................... 383
Sec. 2404--Extension of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2023 projects.............................. 383
Sec. 2405--Extension of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2024 projects.............................. 384
TITLE XXV--INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS................................ 385
Summary...................................................... 385
Subtitle A--North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security
Investment Program......................................... 385
Sec. 2501--Authorized NATO construction and land
acquisition projects................................... 385
Sec. 2502--Authorization of appropriations, NATO......... 385
Subtitle B--Host Country In-Kind Contributions............... 385
Sec. 2511--Republic of Korea funded construction projects 385
Sec. 2512--Republic of Poland funded construction
projects............................................... 385
TITLE XXVI--GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES FACILITIES.................. 387
Summary...................................................... 387
Sec. 2601--Authorized Army National Guard construction
and land acquisition projects.......................... 387
Sec. 2602--Authorized Army Reserve construction and land
acquisition projects................................... 387
Sec. 2603--Authorized Navy Reserve and Marine Corps
Reserve construction and land acquisition projects..... 387
Sec. 2604--Authorized Air National Guard construction and
land acquisition projects.............................. 387
Sec. 2605--Authorized Air Force Reserve construction and
land acquisition projects.............................. 387
Sec. 2606--Authorization of appropriations, National
Guard and Reserve...................................... 388
Sec. 2607--Extension of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2023 projects.............................. 388
Sec. 2608--Extension of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2024 projects.............................. 388
Sec. 2609--Modification of authority to carry out fiscal
year 2026 project at Colonie, New York................. 388
TITLE XXVII--BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ACTIVITIES............. 389
Sec. 2701--Authorization of appropriations for base
realignment and closure activities funded through
Department of Defense Base Closure Account............. 389
TITLE XXVIII--MILITARY CONSTRUCTION GENERAL PROVISIONS........... 391
Subtitle A--Military Construction Program.................... 391
Sec. 2801--Modification of master plans for major
military installations................................. 391
Sec. 2802--Prohibition on use of repair projects to
expand footprint of existing facilities or
infrastructure......................................... 391
Sec. 2803--Increase of authority for Indo-Pacific posture
unspecified military construction projects............. 391
Sec. 2804--Use of certain amounts for electrical or
infrastructure upgrades on Barbers Point, Hawaii....... 391
Sec. 2805--Temporary adjustment of unspecified minor
military construction requirements..................... 391
Sec. 2806--Modification of authority for transactions
other than contracts and grants for purposes of
facility construction or repair........................ 392
Subtitle B--Military Housing................................. 392
Sec. 2821--Exclusion of window opening control devices
from requirement for window fall prevention devices in
military family housing units.......................... 392
Sec. 2822--Health and safety requirements for military
housing................................................ 392
Sec. 2823--Expansion of protection from reprisal or
retaliation against tenants of privatized military
housing units who report housing-related issues........ 392
Sec. 2824--Transparency and strategic planning for
housing................................................ 392
Sec. 2825--Development and implementation of minimum
health and safety standards for military family housing 392
Sec. 2826--Treatment of nondisclosure agreements with
respect to privatized military housing................. 393
Sec. 2827--Improvement of privatized military housing
complaint database..................................... 393
Sec. 2828--Requirement relating to any reprogramming
request relating to funding for housing or facilities
of Department of Defense............................... 393
Subtitle C--Land Conveyances................................. 393
Sec. 2841--Land conveyance, Milan Army Ammunition Plant,
Tennessee.............................................. 393
Sec. 2842--Land conveyance, Army Reserve Center, Opelika,
Alabama................................................ 393
Sec. 2843--Report on land withdrawal at Yuma Proving
Ground, Arizona........................................ 393
Sec. 2844--Report on necessary modifications to military
land withdrawal of Fallon Range Training Complex,
Nevada................................................. 394
Sec. 2845--Land exchange, Camp Pike and Camp Joseph T.
Robinson, Arkansas..................................... 394
Sec. 2846--Removal of conditions on use of certain land
conveyed to the State of Indiana....................... 394
Sec. 2847--Review and report on conveyance of Lambert St.
Louis International Airport............................ 394
Sec. 2848--Review and report on conveyance of Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson, Anchorage, Alaska................ 394
Subtitle D--Other Matters.................................... 394
Sec. 2861--Authority of combatant commands to recover and
reinvest operational energy cost savings............... 394
Sec. 2862--Energy control requirements for electrical
infrastructure upgrades................................ 395
Sec. 2863--Modification of calculation of minimum capital
investment for facilities sustainment, restoration, and
modernization.......................................... 395
Sec. 2864--Requirements relating to leasing of land in
Hawaii................................................. 395
Sec. 2865--Department of Defense Laboratory Facility
Investment Program..................................... 395
Sec. 2866--Consideration of modular construction methods
for military construction projects with protective
design elements........................................ 395
Sec. 2867--Standardized methodology for basing decisions
for the Air Force...................................... 395
Sec. 2868--Pilot program on replacement of substandard
chillers or facilities that support subsistence
resiliency............................................. 396
Sec. 2869--Department of Defense pilot program for
development and use of online real estate inventory
tool................................................... 396
Sec. 2870--Transfer of amounts for development of Ford
Island, Hawaii, and electrical upgrades and Barbers
Point, Hawaii.......................................... 396
Sec. 2871--Expansion of defense community infrastructure
pilot program to include installations of the Coast
Guard.................................................. 396
Sec. 2872--Plan on remediation of certain equipment and
computational facilities owned or controlled by a
foreign adversary...................................... 396
Items of Special Interest.................................... 397
Accounting for force protection and weather concerns for
B-21 Bomber shelter budgeting.......................... 397
Adoption and integration of additive construction
technologies........................................... 397
Air Force cyber facilities............................... 398
Army National Guard training center range improvement.... 398
Army Reserve component facilities joint use with Army
National Guard......................................... 399
Cargo pier at United States Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll 400
Comptroller General review of military installations..... 400
Ensuring department budgets for plant replacement value
investment requirement................................. 401
Gila Bend Air Force Auxiliary Field North Turnaround..... 402
Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning replacement at
Luke Air Force Base.................................... 402
Marine Corps Air Station Yuma airfield security.......... 403
Public Schools on Military Installations program......... 403
Report on military construction in Freely Associated
States................................................. 404
Requirement for Camp Navajo entry bridge replacement..... 404
Waterfront production facility........................... 405
DIVISION C--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS
AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS....................................... 407
TITLE XXXI--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS...... 407
Subtitle A--National Security Programs and Authorizations.... 407
Sec. 3101--National Nuclear Security Administration...... 407
Sec. 3102--Defense environmental cleanup................. 407
Sec. 3103--Other defense activities...................... 407
Sec. 3104--Nuclear energy................................ 407
Subtitle B--Program Authorizations, Restrictions, and
Limitations................................................ 407
Sec. 3111--Delegation of authorities to Administrator for
Nuclear Security....................................... 407
Sec. 3112--Protection of Office of Secure Transportation
vehicles and equipment from unmanned aircraft.......... 408
Sec. 3113--Authorization to establish public-private
partnerships for nuclear effects testing............... 408
Sec. 3114--Limitation on availability of funds pending
submission of report on restoration of a domestic
uranium enrichment capability.......................... 408
Sec. 3115--Briefing on activities by the Director for
Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation................. 409
Sec. 3116--Modification to selected acquisition reports
requirement............................................ 409
Sec. 3117--Modification to the program for acceleration
of replacement of cesium blood irradiation sources..... 409
Sec. 3118--Briefings on nuclear-related autonomous or
remotely-piloted aircraft incursions................... 409
Sec. 3119--Conceptual and construction design............ 410
Sec. 3120--Annual public workshops and nuclear science
advisory committee reviews............................. 410
Sec. 3121--Limitation on use of funds until certain
criteria are met....................................... 410
Sec. 3122--Continuation of National Nuclear Security
Administration pay and performance system.............. 410
Subtitle C--Other Matters.................................... 411
Items of Special Interest.................................... 411
Briefing on National Nuclear Security Administration
plans for recapitalizing Pantex Plant infrastructure
and facilities......................................... 411
Briefing on plutonium pit production and reuse planning.. 411
Briefing on procurement of United States-origin
unobligated enriched uranium........................... 411
Briefing on recycling spent fuel into long-duration
radioisotope power systems............................. 412
Briefing on use of artificial intelligence to support
weapons design and stockpile stewardship............... 413
Briefings on nuclear explosive test readiness............ 413
Comptroller General review of management and operating
contractor construction burden......................... 414
Comptroller General review of National Nuclear Security
Administration approaches to incentivizing contractors'
performance............................................ 415
Comptroller General review of National Nuclear Security
Administration efforts to sustain science, technology,
and engineering facilities............................. 416
Comptroller General review of National Nuclear Security
Administration use of digital engineering.............. 416
Comptroller General review of Office of Environmental
Management economic opportunities...................... 417
Comptroller General review of Office of Environmental
Management research and development efforts............ 417
Comptroller General review of Office of Environmental
Management site-specific cleanup activities............ 418
Comptroller General review of Office of Environmental
Management use of contracting for cleanup activities... 419
Comptroller General review of opportunities to accelerate
Office of Environmental Management cleanup missions.... 419
Comptroller General review of the W93 modernization
program................................................ 419
Genesis Mission.......................................... 420
TITLE XXXII--DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD............. 421
Sec. 3201--Authorization..................................... 421
DIVISION D--FUNDING TABLES....................................... 423
Sec. 4001--Authorization of amounts in funding tables........ 423
TITLE XLI--PROCUREMENT........................................... 425
Sec. 4101--Procurement....................................... 425
TITLE XLII--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION.......... 427
Sec. 4201--Research, development, test, and evaluation....... 427
TITLE XLIII--OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE........................... 429
Sec. 4301--Operation and maintenance......................... 429
TITLE XLIV--MILITARY PERSONNEL................................... 431
Sec. 4401--Military personnel................................ 431
TITLE XLV--OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS.................................. 433
Sec. 4501--Other authorizations.............................. 433
TITLE XLVI--MILITARY CONSTRUCTION................................ 435
Sec. 4601--Military construction............................. 435
TITLE XLVII--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS..... 437
Sec. 4701--Department of Energy national security programs... 437
LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS......................................... 604
Committee Action............................................. 604
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate.................... 609
Regulatory Impact............................................ 609
Changes in Existing Law...................................... 609
ADDITIONAL VIEWS................................................. 610
Additional Views of Mr. Kaine................................ 610

Calendar No. 436
119th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 119-127

======================================================================

_______

June 15, 2026.--Ordered to be printed

_______

Mr. Wicker, from the Committee on Armed Services,
submitted the following

R E P O R T

[To accompany S. 4784]

The Committee on Armed Services reports favorably an
original bill (S. 4784) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2027 for military activities of the Department of Defense
for, military construction, and for Defense activities of the
Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths
for such fiscal year, and for other purposes and recommends
that the bill do pass.

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

This bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for (a) procurement, (b)
research, development, test, and evaluation, (c)
operation and maintenance and the revolving and
management funds of the Department of Defense for
fiscal year 2027;
(2) Authorize the personnel end strengths for each
military Active-Duty component of the Armed Forces for
fiscal year 2027;
(3) Authorize the personnel end strengths for the
Selected Reserve of each of the reserve components of
the Armed Forces for fiscal year 2027;
(4) Impose certain reporting requirements;
(5) Impose certain limitations with regard to
specific procurement and research, development, test,
and evaluation actions and manpower strengths; provide
certain additional legislative authority; and make
certain changes to existing law;
(6) Authorize appropriations for military
construction programs of the Department of Defense for
fiscal year 2027; and
(7) Authorize appropriations for national security
programs of the Department of Energy for fiscal year
2027.

COMMITTEE OVERVIEW

Each year, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
authorizes funding levels and provides authorities for the U.S.
military and other critical defense priorities, ensuring
America's forces have the training, equipment, and resources
they need to carry out their missions.
On June 10, 2026, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted
18-9 to advance the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2027 to the Senate
floor.
The committee passed this bill in response to an
increasingly dangerous threat environment and a rapidly
evolving battlefield landscape. Recognizing those trends, the
committee approved a substantial increase in our national
security investment--the largest defense dollar figure in
American history.
There is one goal behind this heightened funding:
maintaining American deterrence in the most complex threat
environment since World War II. The dictators ruling China,
Russia, North Korea, and Iran have formed an axis of
aggressors. They share both ambitions and weapons. Together,
they hope to weaken American leadership and fracture the free
world. Often, they pursue those aims with weapons only this
century could have produced. Ships and aircraft remain vital
tools of conflict. But the wars of today are often fought
remotely, with soldiers far from the front line piloting
drones, launching space-based weapons, firing hypersonic strike
weapons, wielding artificial intelligence technologies, or
spinning internet-based cognitive warfare schemes.
America must keep pace. The alternative is to invite
aggression. On those points, the Congress, the White House, and
the Department of Defense agree. In this NDAA, the committee
acted on those convictions.
The defense industrial base has begun humming, spurred by
Federal investment, the geopolitical threats at hand, and the
indomitable drive of America's innovators and entrepreneurs.
This NDAA authorizes increased defense spending--a necessary
action, and one still cheaper than failing to deter war. These
funds will shore up our traditional platforms and adopt
emerging technologies. But the bill also enacts reforms to
ensure those dollars are spent wisely. The committee built on
last year's acquisition reforms to further trim bureaucratic
excess and streamline Pentagon budgeting.
The result is an NDAA tailored to 21st century conflict but
written to shield Americans from it. As always, the surest
guarantee of peace is remaining fully prepared for war.

BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF THIS ACT (SEC. 4)

The committee recommends a provision that would require
that the budgetary effects of this Act be determined in
accordance with the procedures established in the Statutory
Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-139).

SUMMARY OF DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS AND BUDGET AUTHORITY
IMPLICATION

The administration's budget request for national defense
discretionary programs within the jurisdiction of the Senate
Committee on Armed Services for fiscal year 2027 was $1,098.8
billion for base Department of Defense (DOD) programs and $41.4
billion for national security programs in the Department of
Energy (DOE).
The committee recommends an overall discretionary
authorization of $1,140.1 billion in fiscal year 2027,
including $1,099.0 billion for base DOD programs, $41.1 billion
for national security programs in the DOE, and $11.9 billion
for defense-related activities outside the jurisdiction of the
NDAA.
The table preceding the detailed program adjustments in
Division D of this bill summarizes the direct discretionary
authorizations in the committee recommendation and the
equivalent budget authority levels for fiscal year 2027 defense
programs. The table summarizes the committee's recommended
discretionary authorizations by appropriation account for
fiscal year 2027 and compares these amounts to the request.

DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE I--PROCUREMENT

Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations

Sec. 101--Authorization of appropriations
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for procurement activities at the levels
identified in section 4101 of division D of this Act.

Subtitle B--Army Programs

Sec. 111--Multiyear procurement authority for Infantry Squad Vehicle
program
The committee recommends a provision that would allow the
Secretary of the Army to enter into one or more multiyear
contracts, beginning in 2027, for the procurement of Infantry
Squad Vehicles.
Sec. 112--Inclusion of Army National Guard in Army Arctic strategy and
force structure
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Army to integrate the Army National Guard into its Arctic
strategy.

Subtitle C--Navy Programs

Sec. 121--Modification and extension of procurement authorities for
certain amphibious shipbuilding programs
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 129 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) to
remove limitations on the number of amphibious warfare ships
under the multi-ship authority and to extend the sunset of the
authority.
Sec. 122--Funding for refueling and complex overhauls of the U.S.S.
John C. Stennis and U.S.S. Harry S. Truman
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 123(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92) to allow the limitation on
incremental funding authority to extend from 6 years to 8 years
for the refueling and complex overhaul of the U.S.S. John C.
Stennis and U.S.S. Harry S. Truman. The committee notes the
delays in redelivering the U.S.S. John C. Stennis will impact
the undocking of the U.S.S. Harry S. Truman.
Sec. 123--Vessel construction manager and commercial design and
construction requirements for cable laying and repair ships
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of the Navy to use a vessel construction manager to
acquire future cable laying and repair ships if the Secretary
intends to purchase such vessels.
Sec. 124--Conveyance of F-14D Tomcat aircraft from the Navy to the U.S.
Space and rocket center commission in Huntsville, Alabama
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the conveyance of 3 F-14D Tomcat aircraft from the Navy to the
U.S. Space and Rocket Center Commission in Huntsville, Alabama.
Sec. 125--Prohibition on destruction or scrapping of World War II-era
aircraft
The committee recognizes the profound contributions of
American naval aviators during World War II and the lasting
importance of preserving the aircraft they flew. As the number
of surviving veterans of that conflict continues to decline,
the aircraft that remain in the Department of the Navy's
possession serve as tangible, irreplaceable links to a defining
era in American and world history.
The committee emphasizes that these aircraft are national
assets and must be treated with the respect appropriate to
their historical value. These aircraft are not only critical to
honoring those who served but also to inspiring future
generations with the legacy of service and sacrifice.
The committee is concerned that many of these historically
significant aircraft, particularly those produced prior to
December 31, 1945, are currently housed on external display
and/or are abandoned as wartime crash wreckages still under
Department of the Navy ownership and control. These aircraft
are at increasing risk of irreversible degradation due to
environmental exposure. Without urgent action to relocate these
aircraft into indoor, climate-controlled environments, their
long-term preservation may no longer be viable.
Therefore, the committee recommends a provision that would
direct the Secretary of the Navy to preserve these aircraft.
The committee also directs the Secretary of the Navy to
provide a briefing, not later than April 1, 2027, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the Department of the Navy's plan to
relocate, preserve, and sustain its World War II-era aircraft
currently on external display, while also seeking policy
reforms that will allow properly qualified American museum
entities to recover abandoned World War II-era crash wreckages
that are not deemed to be wartime aircrew graves. The briefing
should address the following:
(1) A plan to initiate the phased relocation of
historic aircraft produced prior to December 31, 1945,
from external to indoor display facilities, with
priority given to F4F and FM1/2 Wildcats, F6F Hellcats,
F4U/ FG-1 Corsairs, SBD Dauntlesses, SB2C Helldivers,
PBJs (B-25s), P2Bs (B-29s), JD-1s (A-26s), PBY
Catalinas, PB4Y Privateers, R4Ds (C-47s), R5Cs (C-46s),
SNBs (C-45s), and SNJs;
(2) A proposed priority framework for relocation,
favoring institutions such as the National Naval
Aviation Museum, the National Museum of the Marine
Corps, the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum,
National Naval Aviation Museum-affiliated partner
museums, National Museum of the Marine Corps-affiliated
partner museums, other Department of Defense service
museums, and national air museums of allied and partner
nations;
(3) A plan for modifying or superseding existing loan
agreements that only permit external display, in order
to favor applicants with:
(a) indoor, climate-controlled display
capabilities;
(b) demonstrated ability to conduct
historical restoration and preservation; and
(c) public access commitments;
(4) An assessment of opportunities for artifact
trades to enhance National Naval Aviation Museum and
National Museum of the Marine Corps collections or
broader Department of the Navy heritage efforts;
(5) A long-term framework for the de-accessioning of
at-risk aircraft that cannot be preserved under these
conditions within 5 years, including authority to:
(a) offer such aircraft for sale with
proceeds directed to National Naval Aviation
Museum and/or National Museum of the Marine
Corps activities;
(b) transfer aircraft on an as-is, where-is
basis, with no cost or guarantee of condition
to the Department of the Navy; and
(c) remove end-use restrictions from de-
accessioned assets;
(6) A plan for the Department of the Navy to revise
its World War II-era abandoned aircraft crash wreckage
ownership policy to allow U.S. 501(c)(3) museum
entities to gain ownership for such artifacts upon
recovery, which will allow for preservation,
restoration, and indoor display. This excludes aircraft
crash wreckages that are known aircrew grave sites. It
includes World War II-era crash wreckages on land, in
lakes, and in the world's oceans. This generally
reflects a policy long instituted by the Department of
the Navy. The Congress has an established track record
of empowering such recoveries for historic preservation
purposes;
(7) A reaffirmation that no aircraft produced prior
to December 31, 1945, may be destroyed, scrapped, or
otherwise damaged by the Department of the Navy; and
(8) A process for granting waivers for continued
external display where environmental conditions, such
as those in arid regions, significantly reduce the risk
of corrosion and physical decay.
The committee intends to closely monitor the Department of
the Navy's stewardship of these artifacts to ensure their
preservation for future generations.
Sec. 126--Procurement authority for E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Aircraft
Program
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of the Navy to procure 12 or more E-2D aircraft
by entering into one block buy contract.

Subtitle D--Air Force Programs

Sec. 131--Modification of inventory requirements for Air Force fighter
aircraft
The committee recommends a provision that would modify
section 9062(i) of title 10, United States Code, to maintain a
total aircraft inventory of fighter aircraft of not less than
1,800 aircraft, and further to maintain a total aircraft
inventory of combat-coded fighter aircraft of not less than
1,369 aircraft by December 31, 2030.
Sec. 132--Multiyear procurement authority for F-35 aircraft
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Department of Defense to enter into multiyear procurement
contracts for F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C aircraft without
requiring additional appropriations.
Sec. 133--Multiyear procurement authority for F-15EX aircraft
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Department of Defense to enter into multiyear procurement
contracts for F-15EX aircraft without requiring additional
appropriations, as long as the Secretary of Defense can certify
the contractor's ability to increase production to achieve
objective inventory goals.
Sec. 134--MQ-9 aircraft
The committee recommends a provision that would:
(1) Prohibit the Secretary of the Air Force from
divesting any MQ-9 aircraft through September 30, 2031;
(2) Require the Secretary to achieve a minimum
inventory of 180 MQ-9 aircraft by October 1, 2028;
(3) Direct the Secretary, in coordination with the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to conduct an
analysis of alternatives on options for a medium-
altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
aircraft replacement that would meet or exceed the
capability offered by the MQ-9; and
(4) Require the Secretary to submit a report and
briefing on the findings of such analysis, not later
than December 1, 2027.
Sec. 135--Airborne warning and control system aircraft
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 9062 of title 10, United States Code, to require the
Air Force to maintain at least 16 E-3 airborne warning and
control system aircraft and would prohibit the Air Force from
retiring, preparing to retire, or placing any E-3 aircraft in
storage or backup inventory if doing so would reduce the fleet
below that level. The limitation may be waived only after
sufficient E-7 Wedgetail aircraft are procured and delivered to
meet mission requirements, at which point the E-3 inventory may
fall below 16. The provision would also prohibit the Air Force
from pausing, canceling, or terminating the E-7 Wedgetail
program.
Sec. 136--Limitation on availability of funds pending submission of
report on acquisition strategy for Airborne Command Post
capability
The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2027 travel funds for
the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force until the
Secretary of the Air Force submits the report required by
section 154 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60).
The committee also directs the Secretary of the Air Force
to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than
March 31, 2027, on an assessment of the feasibility and
affordability of a business jet solution to host associated
Looking Glass-Next aircrew and required hardware and software,
as well as platform dependencies such as capability and
capacity of additional seating, power, cooling, internal
aircraft and offboard line-of-sight and beyond line-of-sight
communications, and information technology and security
infrastructure.
Sec. 137--Mobility capabilities strategic plan
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Commander,
U.S. Transportation Command and in consultation with the
commanders of the geographic combatant commands, to submit to
the congressional defense committees, not later than January 1,
2027, a comprehensive strategic plan, and a briefing on the
plan, for the development, acquisition, modernization, and
integration of Department of Defense total force mobility
capabilities through fiscal year 2047.
The committee believes a comprehensive mobility
capabilities strategic plan is needed to ensure that the
Department of Defense can project and sustain forces in an
increasingly contested and dispersed environment. Adversaries
are developing capabilities to disrupt logistics networks and
challenge U.S. mobility and access, while operational demands
continue to grow in scale and complexity. The committee is
concerned that current planning does not fully reflect the
innovation, integration, and use of emerging technologies and
commercial partnerships required to meet these challenges.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Department of the Air
Force to adopt a more forward-looking and analytically rigorous
approach to ensure a long-term, integrated strategy that aligns
requirements, investments, and modernization efforts across the
Joint Force through 2047 and maintains resilient and effective
mobility capabilities.
Sec. 138--Extension of requirement and prohibition related to C-130
aircraft
The committee recommends a provision that would extend the
current requirement for maintaining a minimum C-130 inventory
and the prohibition on reduction of C-130 aircraft in the
National Guard through 2028.

Items of Special Interest

Air Force combat search and rescue forces
The committee is concerned about combat search and resecure
(CSAR) force structure in the Air Force. In recent years, the
Air Force truncated the buy of HH-60Ws and has since
transferred 26 HH-60Ws from units responsible for CSAR
operations to the Air Force District Washington (AFDW) to
replace H-1 helicopters. AFDW uses these helicopters to support
contingency response, homeland operations, and ceremonial
honors in the National Capital Region.
The committee believes that these actions have left CSAR
forces unnecessarily short of the forces needed to support CSAR
operations in a major contingency. Therefore, the committee
directs the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a study of
CSAR requirements and capabilities, including HH-60Ws and HC-
130Js, and provide a report and briefing on that study to the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027.
Furthermore, the committee directs the Secretary to avoid
making any changes in CSAR force structure until the study is
completed and he or she has provided the results of that study
to the Congress.
Anti-ship air-launched missiles
The committee notes Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)
environments present the need for new, more capable weapons
such as the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment II (OASuW
Inc II)/Hypersonic Air Launched OASuW (HALO) program. HALO is
intended to be a carrier-suitable, higher-speed, longer-range,
air-launched weapon that will significantly increase the Navy's
capacities for long-range fires in A2/AD environments. The Navy
had intended to accelerate the fielding of HALO to support
early operational capability in fiscal year 2029.
However, in early fiscal year 2025, the Department of the
Navy notified the committee of its intent to cancel the
solicitation for the OASuW Inc II/HALO engineering and
manufacturing development (EMD) effort, citing insufficient
funds. In March 2025, the Navy discontinued work on the HALO
approach to transition to EMD and directed a restructuring
program to emphasize technology maturation in May 2025. The
committee is concerned that development for OASuW Inc II/HALO
is languishing, even though the requirement for such capability
remains valid.
Additionally, the committee is also aware of promising
opportunities associated with the Multi-mission Affordable
Capacity Effector. The weapon is intended as a smaller,
shorter-range, lower-cost capability to augment the existing
Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). However, the committee
further notes that the Department has expressed an intent to
significantly increase production rates of LRASM over the next
5 years.
Carrier aviation faces unique constraints on sortie
numbers, range, and onboard stores of munitions. These
limitations make optimization of the Navy's air-launched, anti-
ship weapon portfolio critical to ensuring mission success.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January
1, 2027, on the planned portfolio of air-launched, anti-ship
weapons in development and procurement over the next decade.
This briefing shall include, but is not limited to:
(1) Recommended missile mix and loadouts, considering
cost per engagement considerations;
(2) Current threshold and objective range
requirements for the anti-ship missile portfolio, and
any recent changes made to these requirements; and
(3) The intended acquisition pathway for these
programs.

Arctic wargaming and operational simulation capability

The committee recognizes the growing strategic importance
of the Arctic region and the increasing operational challenges
posed by extreme cold weather environments, contested
logistics, limited infrastructure, and expanding military
activity by strategic competitors. The committee believes that
the Department of Defense must continue to improve its ability
to plan, train, and operate in Arctic and high-latitude
environments across all domains.
The committee notes the importance of advanced wargaming
and operational simulation capabilities to support planning and
preparedness for Arctic operations, including multi-domain
operations, contested logistics, maritime security, and crisis
response scenarios. The committee further believes that such
capabilities can support improved coordination among the
combatant commands, the military services, the Coast Guard,
interagency partners, and allied and partner nations operating
in the Arctic region.
The committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to
continue developing and expanding Arctic-focused wargaming and
simulation capabilities to support operational planning,
experimentation, and exercises in extreme cold weather and
high-latitude environments. In doing so, the committee
encourages the Department to prioritize: (1) Simulation and
modeling of multi-domain operations in Arctic environments; (2)
Testing and analysis of contested logistics networks in remote
and austere regions with limited infrastructure; (3)
Development of operational concepts and response protocols for
maritime security, environmental incidents, and crisis response
in the Arctic; (4) Use of high-fidelity virtual models of
Arctic terrain, maritime chokepoints, and gray zone scenarios;
and (5) Deployment of mobile or expeditionary simulation
capabilities that can support units operating in remote
locations where permanent infrastructure is limited.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a
briefing, not later than February 3, 2027, to the congressional
defense committees on the Department's efforts to develop and
expand Arctic-focused wargaming and operational simulation
capabilities. The briefing shall include: (1) An update on
current and planned initiatives; (2) A list of participating
organizations; (3) A description of how the capabilities
integrate with combatant command planning and exercises; (4)
Details on coordination with allies and partners; and (5) Any
identified capability gaps or resource requirements associated
with Arctic operational simulation and training.

Army Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Modular Open Suite of Standards
Mounted Form Factor program

The committee commends the Army's progress advancing
Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) technologies such as the
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C5ISR) Modular
Open Suite of Standards (CMOSS) to speed technology refresh,
reduce life cycle costs, and increase industry competition. The
committee further commends the Army for progressing the CMOSS
Mounted Form Factor (CMFF) program as the flagship program that
the Portfolio Acquisition Executive Command and Control and
Counter Command-and-Control will use to demonstrate the value
of the Department of Defense's November 7, 2025 acquisition
memo principles, including prioritizing speed, MOSA
implementations, and industrial agility.
The committee strongly encourages the Army to accelerate
CMFF program resourcing. Army prioritization of CMFF will
benefit efforts across the Department including the Army Next
Generation Command and Control initiative, the Marine Corps
ground electronic warfare (EW) and communication programs, and
Navy surface fleet EW initiatives. Failure to effectively
resource and accelerate this early MOSA program will slow
industry adoption and prevent the services from realizing the
benefits of the evolving CMOSS standard that hundreds of
companies have adopted.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a briefing, not later than April 1, 2027, to the congressional
defense committees on the schedule to accelerate CMFF along
with a detailed list of vehicles and platforms that will host
CMFF.

Army investment in autonomous surface vessels

The committee recognizes the potential of integrating
commercial autonomous surface vessel technologies into the Army
watercraft fleet for logistics support.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Army to provide a report, not later than March 1, 2027, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, on its efforts related to autonomous surface
vessel technology. The report shall include:
(1) An overview of current and planned Army
investments in autonomous surface vessel programs,
including a detailed breakdown of efforts to leverage
commercially available platforms and technologies;
(2) An assessment of:
(a) how those investments address gaps
identified in operational plans for contested
and uncontested environments; and
(b) the suitability of vessels being procured
for needs in the Indo-Pacific theater, such as
sea state survivability, payload capacity,
range, survivability, resilient communications,
and navigation;
(3) Plans to test and evaluate available platforms,
including under contractor-owned, contractor-operated
arrangements;
(4) A description of collaboration with other
services on autonomous surface vessel development
activities; and
(5) A 5-year roadmap for expanding investment in
commercial autonomous surface vessel offerings, with
consideration of operational priorities, budgetary
planning, and industrial base capacity.

Army Mobile Tactical Cannon modernization and artillery automation

The committee remains concerned that current towed and
semi-automated artillery systems place significant physical and
cognitive burdens on cannon crews, particularly during
sustained high-intensity and large-scale combat operations. The
committee notes that manual loading, ammunition handling, and
resupply of 155mm artillery systems contribute to crew fatigue,
reduce sustained rates of fire, increase logistical strain, and
extend the amount of time artillery units remain stationary and
vulnerable to counter-battery fires and unmanned aerial system
threats.
The committee believes the Army's Mobile Tactical Cannon
(MTC) modernization efforts present an important opportunity to
improve survivability, lethality, mobility, and soldier
effectiveness through the integration of advanced automation
technologies. The committee further believes that increased
automation across the full kill chain and sustainment cycle can
reduce soldier workload, improve operational tempo, support
``shoot-and-move'' tactics, and enable smaller crew sizes while
sustaining or increasing combat effectiveness.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of the
Army to prioritize highly automated solutions in the
development and acquisition of future MTC systems. In
evaluating modernization approaches, the committee encourages
the Army to consider systems that incorporate: (1) Automated
ammunition handling and chambering systems designed to increase
the rate of fire while reducing manual lifting and repetitive
physical strain on soldiers; (2) Digital fire-control systems
that reduce manual data entry requirements and support
automated laying and targeting functions; and (3) Autonomous or
semi-autonomous ammunition resupply and transfer mechanisms
capable of improving survivability and reducing resupply
timelines between ammunition carriers and firing platforms.
Furthermore, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Army to provide a briefing, not later than March 1, 2027, to
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the MTC acquisition and modernization
strategy. The briefing shall include: (1) A comparison of
estimated soldier physical workload requirements between
current artillery systems and proposed automated solutions; (2)
An explanation of how automation, crew reduction, and soldier
workload reduction are being evaluated within ongoing self-
propelled howitzer modernization efforts; (3) A description of
plans to integrate automated or autonomous ammunition resupply
capabilities into future artillery formations; and (4) An
assessment of how automation may improve survivability,
operational tempo, sustained rates of fire, and force structure
requirements for future field artillery units.

Army rifle-mounted aiming laser strategy

The committee supports the Department of the Army's efforts
to improve soldier lethality through modernization of its
inventory of legacy close combat weapons, ammunition, and
individual aiming and fire control systems. The Army is
currently pursuing several development programs to modernize
its inventory of infantry weapons, ammunition, and aiming
systems like the AN/PEQ-15. However, the committee is concerned
that the Army has not yet developed a strategy for replacing
their aging rifle-mounted aiming and illumination lasers and
notes numerous commercially available alternatives.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army
to provide a report, not later than March 31, 2027, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the assessment of commercially available
rifle-mounted aiming lasers to replace current legacy systems.

Army small unmanned aerial systems munitions

The committee is concerned that the Army lacks a clear
roadmap for mass production of small unmanned aerial systems
(sUAS) munitions, despite adequate funding.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army
to provide a briefing, not later than April 1, 2027, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on weapons systems delivered through sUAS. The
briefing shall describe: (1) The quantity of droppable or
kinetic weapon systems delivered through sUAS required for the
Army; (2) The current number of qualified weapons suitable to
support the sUAS lethality needs of the Army; (3) A roadmap
with fielding options to fulfill lethality needs; and (4) The
status of funding provided for such munitions systems included
in the fiscal year 2028 president's budget request and across
the future years defense program.

Army small Unmanned Aircraft Systems scaling and deployment strategy

The committee recognizes the increasing operational
importance of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) at the
tactical level, particularly for intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, force protection, offensive capabilities, and
combined arms maneuvers. The war in Ukraine underscores the
decisive advantage conferred by rapidly deployable, attritable,
and networked sUAS capabilities in contested environments. The
committee is concerned that the Army's current approach to
procuring, scaling, and fielding sUAS to tactical units remains
fragmented and insufficient to meet emerging operational
requirements. While the Army has made progress through
experimentation and limited fielding, the committee lacks a
comprehensive understanding of how these efforts are being
integrated into a sustained, large-scale deployment of sUAS as
a core element of tactical unit capability.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Army to provide a briefing, not later than February 12, 2027,
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House
of Representatives that describes its strategy to scale the
production, procurement, and deployment of sUAS to tactical
units. The strategy shall include: (1) An assessment of current
and projected sUAS requirements across echelons from squad
through brigade, including mission sets and anticipated
quantities; (2) A description of programs of record, rapid
acquisition efforts, and progress made in collaboration with
Department of Defense initiatives intended to field sUAS
capabilities to tactical units; (3) An explanation of how the
Army plans to leverage nontraditional defense partners,
especially those with battlefield tested solutions, commercial
solutions, and modular or open-architecture designs to
accelerate scaling and reduce cost; (4) A discussion of
sustainment, training, logistics, and data integration
requirements necessary to employ sUAS effectively at the
tactical level; (5) An assessment of vulnerabilities related to
counter-UAS threats, electronic warfare, cyber security, and
supply chain risks, and how the Army intends to mitigate those
vulnerabilities; (6) Identification of statutory, regulatory,
or resource constraints that may limit the Army's ability to
rapidly scale and deploy sUAS capabilities; and (7) Any
recommended legislative actions.

Assessment of Army night vision capabilities

The committee supports the Army's development of advanced
night vision capabilities, including its new Soldier Borne
Mission Command (SBMC) and Enhanced Night Vision Goggle-
Binocular (ENVG-B) program. The committee understands that
while SBMC is in development, ENVG-B is being fielded today and
provides superior night vision capabilities. The committee
strongly believes soldiers first and foremost need to be able
to see, fight, and win at night and wants to better understand
the capabilities SBMC and other night vision devices provide
when evaluated.
The committee is also concerned with the threat from
adversary forces' night vision capabilities related to infrared
lasers and the Army's ability to own the night.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army
to provide a report, not later than January 1, 2027, to the
congressional defense committees that tests the night vision
capabilities of SBMC against all other fielded night vision
devices, including PVS-14, PVS-31, and ENVG-B. The report shall
include details regarding the following, at a minimum: (1)
Detection and recognition of low light and thermal sensors; (2)
Weight; and (3) Discussion of power consumption, battery use,
including weight of batteries required to conduct a standard
mission. Additionally, the report shall address any activities
the Army is taking to conceal our ability to target at night
from threat forces, including using novel technologies such as
short-wave infrared for aiming lasers and any current and
future plans for budgeting and procuring these types of
technologies.

Assessment of commercially available aviation night vision systems

The committee is aware of the Department of the Army's
continued reliance on large inventories of legacy aviator night
vision imaging systems despite efforts to produce replacement
capabilities. The committee understands that the commercial
industry is producing advanced light-weight night vision
systems that meet Federal Aviation Administration flight
certification requirements and are in use by select U.S. law
enforcement and military units. These systems meet or exceed
Army requirements for image intensification, field of view,
weight, and compatibility.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a briefing, not later than March 31, 2027, to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
that includes:
(1) A summary of night vision systems currently in
use across Army aviation force structure, including
performance specifications and inventory quantities for
each system;
(2) A description of operational improvements sought
to current capabilities to include image
intensification and increased panoramic field of view;
(3) An assessment of the impact of the weight of the
current night vision system on aviator neck strain and
injuries;
(4) An assessment of commercial, off-the-shelf night
vision systems that meet or exceed Army requirements as
suitable replacements for existing aviation night
vision systems; and
(5) An analysis of fielding such commercial, off-the-
shelf solution(s) to replace legacy aviator night
vision imaging systems in lieu of continuing existing
advanced development efforts, including a comparison of
fielding timeline and cost.

B-21 force structure and production strategy

The committee is concerned that the current program of
record for the B-21 Raider may be insufficient to meet the
requirements of the 2026 National Defense Strategy. The
committee notes that the program of record for 100 aircraft has
remained unchanged since 2015, despite significant changes in
the security environment, including the expansion of China's
nuclear forces. The committee further recognizes that a range
of senior national security leaders, including the Chair of the
2023 Strategic Posture Commission and former commanders of U.S.
Strategic Command, have called for an expansion of the B-21
fleet. The committee also notes that Congress has provided
funding to expand B-21 production capacity.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command and the Direct Reporting Program Manager for the
Critical Major Weapon Systems Programs, to submit a report and
provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not
later than March 1, 2027, on the force structure and production
strategy for the B-21 aircraft. The report shall include:
(1) An assessment of the number of B-21 aircraft
required to meet the nuclear and conventional mission
requirements of the 2026 National Defense Strategy,
including the analytical basis and assumptions used to
determine such requirement;
(2) A comparison of the required number of aircraft
described in paragraph (1) with the current program of
record, including an assessment of any capability gaps
or risks associated with the current program;
(3) A production plan to meet the required quantity
of aircraft identified pursuant to paragraph (1),
including options for production rates and timelines,
as well as options to accelerate production;
(4) An assessment of the industrial base capacity and
investments required to support the production plan
described in paragraph (3);
(5) A strategy for procuring the necessary spares,
maintenance, and sustainment capabilities to support
the required fleet, including depot and workforce
requirements; and
(6) An assessment of the aerial refueling tanker
capacity required to support the fleet size identified
pursuant to paragraph (1), including any associated
force structure or procurement implications.

Body armor technology production capacity

The committee recognizes the importance of maintaining
sufficient capacity within the defense industrial base to meet
peacetime body armor requirements and to surge production in
wartime. The committee is concerned that current procurement
practices risk limiting the defense industrial base's ability
to respond to body armor requirements during periods of
increased operational demand, particularly in support of large-
scale combat operations.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Army, to submit a
report, not later than March 1, 2027, to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
on the Department of Defense's strategy to meet its body armor
requirements over the future years defense program.
The report shall be submitted in an unclassified form and
may include a classified annex. This report should include:
(1) A description of the adequacy of current body
armor inventories, including an analysis of the impact
of previously provided or planned U.S. security
assistance to allied and partner nations on Department
inventories and readiness;
(2) A forecast of future requirements of both
existing and new technologies;
(3) A holistic assessment of industrial base capacity
across the supply chain to meet Department
requirements, including an assessment of domestic
supply chain vulnerabilities, risks, and surge
capacity;
(4) A focused assessment of domestic industrial base
capacity for ceramic body armor materials, including
minimum sustaining production rates, surge capacity
requirements, and identification of capacity at risk
due to demand uncertainty; and
(5) Any other elements the Secretary deems relevant.

Briefing on autonomous air-to-air cruise missile and drone defense

The committee is concerned that large-scale attacks
involving low-cost cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems,
such as the April 13, 2024, attack by Iran against Israel,
expose significant limitations in current air-to-air defensive
concepts that rely on high-cost, quantity-limited interceptors.
The committee notes ongoing advances in autonomous technologies
that may enable more effective and scalable defenses using
lower-cost weapons.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Director of the Air Force
Research Laboratory and the Director of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, to provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, on plans to develop and field autonomous or semi-
autonomous air-to-air capabilities to counter cruise missiles
and unmanned aerial systems.
The briefing shall include:
(1) A description of relevant ongoing and planned
efforts;
(2) The feasibility of employing lower-cost weapons,
including onboard guns and the Advanced Precision Kill
Weapon System;
(3) Expected impacts on pilot workload and engagement
effectiveness;
(4) Planned timelines, funding, and acquisition
pathways;
(5) Plans to field capabilities to forward-deployed
forces, including in the Indo-Pacific; and
(6) Key barriers to implementation and any
recommendations for legislative action.

Briefing on E-11 Battlefield Airborne Communications Node capability
replacement

The committee is aware of the Department of the Air Force's
decision to cancel the E-11 Battlefield Airborne Communications
Node (BACN) capability, which has historically provided
critical communications relay and data translation functions
enabling joint and coalition operations, particularly in
contested and communications-degraded environments. The
committee is concerned about the operational risk associated
with the loss of the E-11 BACN capability and the lack of
clarity regarding the Department's plan to mitigate resulting
gaps in airborne communications, data integration, and battle
management.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the Department's
plan to address capability gaps resulting from the cancellation
of the E-11 BACN capability.
The briefing shall include:
(1) A detailed justification for the decision to
cancel the E-11 BACN capability, including cost,
survivability, and operational considerations;
(2) An assessment of the operational risks created by
the cancellation, including impacts on joint all-domain
command and control, communications interoperability,
and support to combatant commander requirements;
(3) A description of alternative capabilities,
programs, or concepts of operation the Department plans
to employ to replicate or replace E-11 BACN
functionality, including any space-based, airborne, or
ground-based solutions;
(4) Associated timelines, funding requirements, and
acquisition strategies for such alternatives;
(5) A description of how the Department will ensure
continuity of communications relay and gateway
capabilities in contested environments during any
transition period; and
(6) An assessment of impacts to joint and coalition
interoperability, including any risks to ongoing
operations or contingency plans.

Briefing on F-15E/EX training plan

The committee requires a clear understanding of the Air
Force's short- and long-term plans for training F-15 pilots and
weapons system officers (WSOs). The Air Force operates the F-
15C/D, F-15E, and F-15EX, and plans to retain all variants
through at least 2030. All Basic Course (B Course) and
Transition Course (TX) training occurs at Seymour Johnson Air
Force Base, and all Weapons Instructor Course training occurs
at Nellis Air Force Base.
The committee is concerned that F-15 aircrew and WSO
production may be constrained by limited instructor capacity,
minimal Air National Guard participation in the two F-15 Formal
Training Units (FTUs), unclear F-15EX mission priorities,
declining FTU fleet health, delayed aircraft upgrades, extended
TXs for non-fighter aircrew, and uncertainty regarding WSOs in
the F-15EX. These challenges are compounded by two FTUs
training students across three variants with competing Unit
Summary Statements. The committee seeks clarity on how the Air
Force and Air National Guard plan to meet aircrew requirements
following the reduction of FTUs from three to two.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on a plan for the
short- and long-term organization, training, and equipping of
units producing F-15 aircrew and WSOs across active and reserve
components.

Briefing on F-47 sustainment

The committee encourages the Department of the Air Force to
ensure full organic sustainment capability for the F-47
aircraft and emphasizes the importance of establishing such
capability prior to initial aircraft delivery, with sufficient
lead time to ensure all required resources are in place. The
committee notes that achieving full organic sustainment will
require timely acquisition of intellectual property and
technical data, as well as adequate planning for depot
infrastructure, workforce capacity, and long-term resourcing.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the Department's
plan to achieve full organic sustainment of the F-47 aircraft.
The briefing shall include:
(1) A description of how the Department will acquire
and maintain the intellectual property and technical
data necessary to sustain the platform;
(2) The planned roles and responsibilities of the Air
Force Sustainment Center;
(3) Required depot-level maintenance capabilities and
associated infrastructure;
(4) Workforce requirements and considerations;
(5) An assessment of projected costs and the adequacy
of current and future funding to support full organic
sustainment; and
(6) Key milestones and risks associated with
implementation, including any challenges that could
delay the establishment of organic sustainment
capability prior to aircraft delivery.

Briefing on Marine Aviation Plan

The committee understands that the U.S. Marine Corps has
specific force structure modernization goals, but the committee
needs more information and more frequent communication on
legislative barriers, such as policy and military construction,
that inhibit the implementation of the Marine Aviation Plan.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy
to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees,
not later than February 1, 2027, regarding the Marine Corps
Marine Aviation Plan, including the implications for Marine
Corps aircraft force structures, recapitalization, training,
and the sustainment of the active and reserve components of the
Marine Corps.

Briefings on Air Force sustainment funding and spare parts availability

The committee remains concerned that current Air Force
aircraft sustainment funding levels and spare parts
availability may be insufficient to meet evolving global
mission requirements. Current spare parts funding levels for
the Air Force are estimated to support approximately 80 to 85
percent of weapon system sustainment requirements, contributing
to grounded aircraft, cannibalization of parts, and reduced
mission-capable rates across multiple fleets of the Air Force.
It is the committee's belief that the Secretary of the Air
Force should improve the mission capable rates of Air Force
aircraft by addressing spare parts shortages, depot repair
backlogs, sustainment supply chain risks, and limitations on
organic repair capability.
To ensure a clear understanding of these challenges, the
committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a
report to the congressional defense committees, not later than
March 31, 2027, detailing aircraft sustainment metrics for the
below-specified platforms over the previous 5 fiscal years.
This report should include an analysis of enacted sustainment
and spare parts funding compared to requested levels, an
assessment of industry's capacity to meet these requirements,
and an evaluation of the resulting mission risks for each
platform.
To ensure rigorous oversight of the Air Force's readiness
efforts, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force
to provide quarterly reports to the congressional defense
committees following the submission of the initial sustainment
metrics report. Such quarterly updates shall include current
data and trends for:
(1) The Air Force's progress toward achieving full
sustainment funding requirements for each designated
aircraft;
(2) Aircraft mission capable rates;
(3) Spare parts availability; and
(4) Cannibalization rates.
Aircraft to be included in the initial and quarterly
reports are: F-35, F-15, F-16, RC-135, KC-135, and KC-46.

Cargo projectile munition production

The committee understands that cargo projectile munitions
remain a critical instrument of war on the modern battlefield.
In particular, the committee is aware that area effect cargo
carrying projectiles, such as the Dual-Purpose Improved
Conventional Munition, have proved to be a valuable tool in the
arsenal of partner nations like Ukraine. Further, the committee
notes that urgent requirements for area effects cargo carrying
projectiles have depleted U.S. arsenals, necessitating new
production.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a report, not later than February 26, 2027, to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the Department of the Army's plans to
procure cargo projectile munitions. The report shall include:
(1) An analysis of the strategic and operational
impact of Ukraine's employment of United States-
supplied cargo projectiles, including cluster
munitions, on Russia's ability to prosecute military
operations in Ukraine since the February 2022 full-
scale invasion;
(2) An analysis of the impact of this expenditure of
cluster munitions on United States and allied
stockpiles of cluster munitions and cargo projectiles
more broadly;
(3) An analysis of current defense industrial base
cargo munition production capacity, including within
the defense organic industrial base, including the
capability to surge production;
(4) Minimum sustaining production rates for cargo
projectiles within the defense organic industrial base;
(5) Projected cargo munition procurement under the
future years defense program; and
(6) Analysis of the workforce requirements needed to
sustain projected production rates.

CH-47 lightweight ballistic protection system upgrades

The committee recognizes the importance of modernizing the
CH-47 fleet with the latest advances in lightweight ballistic
protection. Next-generation systems can reduce armor weight by
up to 25 percent, which would enable the Army to meet current
and future operational requirements while increasing payload
capacity and extending range.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a briefing, not later than February 26, 2027, to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, including the following:
(1) The Army's plans for integrating lightweight
ballistic protection system upgrades across the CH-47
fleet;
(2) Projected investment in rotary-wing ballistic
protection across the future years defense program; and
(3) Plans to improve ballistic protection across the
Army's rotary-wing fleet.

Collaborative Combat Aircraft

The committee notes the progress of the Air Force's
Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) Increment 1 and supports
transition to full-rate production. The committee encourages
the Navy and Marine Corps to leverage Air Force designs,
technologies, and collaboration models to accelerate the
development of their own CCA capabilities; however, the
committee notes that the Navy and Marine Corps have provided
comparatively limited updates on their CCA efforts relative to
the Air Force and expects improved visibility going forward.
The committee supports keeping costs low without
sacrificing capability and expects future CCA increments to
provide sufficient range, speed, and power to enable autonomous
self-deployment from the United States and effective operation
in contested environments. The committee further notes the
importance of maintaining a diverse set of propulsion options
across CCA variants to support mission diversity, resilience,
and supply chain risk reduction.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force and the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to
the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, on the impact of cost considerations on CCA requirements.
The briefing shall address effects on platform characteristics
and fleet-wide costs, including propulsion choices, and
identify technology approaches, including commercial and
modified off-the-shelf solutions, to reduce attrition and
improve operational flexibility. The briefing shall also
include the Navy's and Marine Corps' incorporated development
strategies and technology leveraged from the Air Force CCA
program, opportunities to update the tri-service agreement to
align capabilities and resources, and the potential to field
CCA as complementary to, or in place of, existing programs of
record.
The committee also supports expanding exports to allies and
partners through Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial
Sales and encourages the Department of Defense to facilitate
exportability as expeditiously as possible.

Commercially available extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles
fielding acceleration

The committee supports the Navy and the Defense Innovation
Unit's (DIU) efforts to competitively demonstrate commercially
available extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles (XLUUVs)
capable of deploying large payloads across extended ranges in
contested environments. Open competitions conducted by the Navy
and the DIU in 2025 have identified commercial XLUUV platforms
capable of providing scalable, cost-effective solutions to
address longstanding operational requirements in priority
theaters, including U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to
accelerate the Navy's adoption of XLUUV platforms down-selected
as part of the Navy's Combat Autonomous Maritime Platform
program in order to transition XLUUVs from experimentation to
operational deployment and equip priority commands with the
capabilities needed to meet fleet requirements.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide
a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027,
on plans to accelerate the adoption and fielding of XLUUVs and
associated payloads utilizing existing production contracts.
The briefing shall include:
(1) A projected timeline for fielding XLUUV platforms
selected by the Navy and the DIU to operational
commands;
(2) The Navy's plan to accelerate the integration,
demonstration, and deployment of commercial and
government-furnished payloads deployed from XLUUVs;
(3) Options to leverage new approaches to operations,
including commercially-owned, commercially-operated
models to accelerate transition and reduce doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel, and facilities costs; and
(4) Any other matters the Secretary deems relevant.

Complementary radar solutions for low, slow, small, unmanned aircraft
systems integrated defeat systems

The committee believes that certain commercial radar
solutions may be effective as complementary radar solutions for
low, slow, small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) integrated
defeat systems (LIDS).
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army,
in coordination with the Joint Interagency Task Force 401, to
conduct an evaluation of commercially available radars capable
of enhancing the Army's LIDS effort. In conducting the
evaluation, the Army should assess:
(1) The ability of complementary, commercial hybrid,
and/or passive, distributed radar solutions to operate
from fixed sites, mobile platforms, elevated platforms,
unmanned ground vehicles, and/or tethered to UAS;
(2) The ability of complementary solutions to easily
hand off tracks to Ku Band radars integrated into
modern Army command and control systems to cue kinetic
and/or non-kinetic interceptors;
(3) The technical maturity, reliability,
maintainability, cybersecurity, and operational
suitability of complementary solutions;
(4) The extent to which the capability supports
repairability, sustainment affordability, and reduced
vendor lock;
(5) Feedback from military operators on ease of use,
deployability, mobility, survivability, user interface,
and operational utility, as available;
(6) The affordability of complementary systems,
including procurement cost, operating and sustainment
cost, manpower requirements, and cost-exchange ratio;
and
(7) The ability of the complementary system to be
integrated through government-owned or licensed
interfaces.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a briefing, not later than June 30, 2027, to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
on its findings in its evaluation. The briefing shall include:
(1) A description of the capabilities assessed;
(2) The test methodology, operational scenarios, and
evaluation criteria used;
(3) An assessment of the ability of the complementary
solutions to enhance LIDS;
(4) Feedback from the military users in the
assessment;
(5) An assessment of integration requirements,
including interfaces, data rights, cybersecurity
requirements, command-and-control integration, and
sustainment considerations;
(6) An assessment of affordability, including
procurement cost, operating and sustainment cost,
manpower requirements, and cost-exchange ratio; and
(7) Any other elements the Secretary deems relevant.

Comptroller General review of Army light tactical wheeled vehicle
program management

The committee recognizes that the Army is pivoting its
tactical vehicle strategy toward lighter, unarmored systems
like the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) to better suit Indo-
Pacific operations. Evidence suggests that key performance
parameters for reliability and survivability may have been de-
scoped to justify production despite documented test failures.
Furthermore, the heavy use of commercial-off-the-shelf
components may leave the Army without the technical data needed
for long-term maintenance, creating a ``vendor lock'' scenario.
By utilizing accelerated acquisition authorities, the service
is bypassing traditional oversight and suppressing durability
benchmarks to meet aggressive 2030 fielding timelines.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General
of the United States to review the Army's Light Tactical
Vehicle program management, addressing the following: (1) The
extent to which the Army's decision to move the ISV to full-
rate production in 2023-25 involved formal waivers of
reliability and other standards; (2) How plans to procure
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles are structured to secure sufficient
intellectual property for maintenance of commercial-off-the-
shelf platforms like the ISV; (3) The projected effects of the
Army's decision to cease Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
procurement on estimated sustainment costs and the long-term
viability of the tactical wheeled vehicle industrial base; (4)
The effect of the Army's JLTV decision, as the Joint Program
Executive Office, on other services' JLTV acquisition efforts;
and (5) The extent to which the use of middle tier of
acquisition or other rapid-fielding authorities for the ISV and
future ``Mobile Brigade Combat Team'' platforms achieve Office
of the Secretary of Defense-level testing approvals or involve
waiving durability benchmarks.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to provide a
briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than
April 16, 2027, with a report to follow in a mutually agreed
upon format and time frame.

Comptroller General review of Counter-small Unmanned Aerial Systems

The committee notes the increased role of unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS) on the battlefield, especially in current
conflicts in Ukraine and Iran. In August 2025, the Secretary of
Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the Executive
Agent for Counter-small UAS (C-sUAS) and directed the Army to
establish Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) 401 to align
authorities and resources. At that time, the Secretary of
Defense emphasized the need to focus on speed in outpacing
threats and ensuring air sovereignty and directed the
completion of specific activities to better assure the success
of this organization. Additionally, the Congress modified
section 199(g) of title 10, United States Code, to require the
Task Force Director to report annually to the congressional
defense committees on their progress.
The committee is supportive of the Department of Defense's
efforts and is committed to ensuring that funds are used to
develop C-sUAS capabilities that protect warfighters. To that
end, the committee seeks to better understand how the Army has
addressed the Secretary of Defense's requirements for JIATF 401
and is using this task force to acquire needed C-sUAS
capabilities.
The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United
States to review the Army's efforts to establish the task force
and use it to develop and acquire C-sUAS capabilities or
procure commercially available solutions. This assessment
should: (1) Assess whether the Army has completed the tasks
directed in the Secretary of Defense's August 2025 memo; (2)
Assess the Army's processes for identifying current and future
requirements for C-sUAS capabilities; (3) Evaluate the extent
to which the Army's efforts to acquire C-sUAS technologies are
consistent with relevant leading practices pertaining to
product development and risk management; and (4) Assess
improved communication across the Joint Force on C-sUAS
capabilities.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not
later than April 16, 2027, on the preliminary findings of the
assessment, with additional work to follow at a mutually agreed
upon time and in a mutually agreed upon format.

Comptroller General review of Soldier Borne Mission Command systems

The committee notes the critical role that battlefield
awareness and integrated systems play in soldiers' decision-
making. As the Army works to deliver a single platform to
improve sensing and situational awareness, the committee
remains supportive of an integrated soldier-borne solution for
the tactical community. The committee remains committed,
however, to provide oversight of the new acquisition pathway
being pursued by the Army to deliver on the Soldier Borne
Mission Command (SBMC) initiative given the history of the
program's cost, schedule, and user acceptance challenges.
The committee seeks to better understand how the Army's
acquisition approach will support iterative development of a
solution that will out-perform current equipment, be accepted
by soldiers, and accept modular upgrades to keep pace with a
changing battlefield. Accordingly, the committee directs the
Comptroller General of the United States to review: (1) The
extent to which the Army is using iterative development
informed by user feedback; (2) How the Army is addressing
challenges with previous prototypes such as wearability and
low-light performance; (3) How the Army plans to ensure the
SBMC system meets user needs in operationally realistic
environments before proceeding with production; (4) The extent
to which the SBMC is being developed using a modular open
systems approach to enable future upgrades; (5) Whether the
Army's cost, scope, and schedule estimates of the SBMC program
are reliable and consistent with Government Accountability
Office leading practices; and (6) Whether the Army's
contracting approach and risk reduction steps include the
acquisition of data rights needed to maintain and sustain key
capabilities.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
provide a briefing, not later than April 16, 2027, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the question of a single integrated system,
with additional work to address the question of alternative
options to follow at a mutually agreed upon time and in a
mutually agreed upon format.

Conversions to Air National Guard Contingency Response Groups

The committee understands that the Air National Guard is
converting several units to Contingency Response Groups (CRG).
The committee is interested in the progress associated with
these conversions, including the necessary funding for manning
and equipment to support conversions. Therefore, the committee
directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to
the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than February 1,
2027, that includes the following:
(1) A list of the units identified for conversion;
(2) The planned timeline for conversion of each unit;
(3) Current manning of each unit identified for
conversion;
(4) Manning necessary for each newly established CRG
and planned timeline for reaching required CRG manning
levels;
(5) Equipment necessary for the new CRGs, existing
equipment gaps for each converting unit, and plan,
including timeline, for fully equipping each unit;
(6) Funding necessary for the conversion for each
unit, whether funding has yet been allocated for each
conversion and reasoning why funding has not yet been
allocated or has been diverted from the conversion; and
(7) Risks to the mission should the deadlines for
conversion not be met, including impacts on recent
operations such as Operation Epic Fury.

Counter small uncrewed aerial systems at southern border

The committee notes with concern reports of increased
uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) activity along the southern land
border of the United States, including their potential use for
reconnaissance and smuggling by transnational criminal
organizations. The committee commends recent Department of
Defense efforts to address domestic UAS incursions but remains
concerned that forces operating along the southern border are
not yet widely equipped with counter-UAS systems that can
effectively mitigate threats within the Homeland.
Therefore, the committee encourages Joint Interagency Task
Force 401 and Joint Task Force--Southern Border to prioritize
collaboration on the rapid delivery of cost-effective, low-
collateral-effects interceptors capable of safe kinetic
mitigation of UAS along the southern land border within the
United States. The committee further notes that operational
challenges exist in this threat environment including the need
to account for safety risks in mitigating drones over civilian
inhabited areas, including the risk of falling debris from
disabled UAS.

Counter--unmanned aircraft systems low-altitude detection capabilities

The committee is concerned with the increasing use of
small, low-altitude unmanned aircraft systems to conduct
surveillance, disrupt operations, or threaten military
installations and other Department of Defense facilities.
Effective counter--unmanned aircraft system operations require
persistent detection and tracking of small, slow-moving
airborne objects operating in complex, low-altitude
environments.
The Department has long employed avian radar systems to
mitigate bird-aircraft strike hazards at military airfields.
The committee believes that commercially available avian radar
technologies incorporate detection, tracking, and
classification capabilities that may be adaptable for counter--
unmanned aircraft system missions. The committee understands
that such systems are already deployed at military and civilian
facilities and believes that they may offer a cost-effective,
non-kinetic, dual-use option to complement existing counter--
unmanned aircraft system sensor architectures.
Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of
Defense, acting through the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment, and in coordination with the
military departments, to assess the operational utility of
adapting existing avian radar technologies for counter--
unmanned aircraft system detection and tracking at fixed
installations, including opportunities for limited pilot
efforts and integration with existing command and control
systems, as appropriate.

DDG 51 multiyear procurement

The committee notes that the Navy's Golden Fleet
announcement in December 2025 laid out a new path forward for
large surface combatants with the transition from the design of
the current next generation destroyer, DDG(X). That plan also
includes a new guided missile battleship, BBG(X). A critical
part of this plan is the need to continue to build DDG-51
Flight III destroyers well into the future.
The current DDG-51 multiyear procurement (MYP) contract
ends in fiscal year 2027. The committee supports the need for a
new MYP contract beginning in fiscal year 2028 and directs the
Secretary of the Navy to plan for such a contract in fiscal
year 2028 for up to 15 ships.

Department of Defense approach to countering cellular-enabled unmanned
aerial systems

The committee recognizes the growing threat posed by
commercially available unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that
leverage cellular networks, including 4G LTE and 5G, for
command and control and data transmission. These systems can
operate beyond line-of-sight, evade traditional radio
frequency-based countermeasures, and blend into civilian
telecommunications traffic, complicating detection,
attribution, and mitigation efforts.
The committee believes that the Department of Defense must
adopt a proactive, layered, and technology-driven approach to
countering cellular-enabled UAS threats, prioritizing
capabilities that operate across the full spectrum of
detection, identification, and mitigation, while ensuring
coordination with civil authorities and minimizing disruption
to lawful civilian communications.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing, not later than April 16, 2027, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the Department's approach to countering
cellular-enabled UAS. The briefing shall include:
(1) An assessment of the current and projected
threat, including the use of commercial cellular
infrastructure and autonomous capabilities, as well as
gaps in threat characterization and planned or feasible
means to address these gaps;
(2) An evaluation of the Department's ability to
detect, identify, and track such systems, including
gaps in existing radio frequency-based approaches and
feasible solutions to address these gaps;
(3) A description of available and planned non-
kinetic and kinetic mitigation options, including the
feasibility of network-enabled or cyber-based effects;
(4) An assessment of operational, legal, and policy
limitations associated with countering such threats
within the United States;
(5) A description of coordination efforts with
interagency partners and commercial telecommunications
providers; and
(6) Recommendations that can be enacted within 180
days for a funded pilot to address the challenges of
this emerging threat.
The committee further encourages the Department to
prioritize the development and fielding of capabilities that
enable persistent sensing, integration with telecommunications
data where appropriate, and ``left-of-launch'' disruption of
threats, while minimizing impacts to lawful civilian
communications.

Drone Center of Excellence in Army National Guard

The committee recognizes the significant role drones play
in current military operations and is concerned that the Army
does not have a plan to expand the capability into the Army
National Guard. The committee believes that a Drone Center of
Excellence (COE) within the Army National Guard at a National
Guard training site would not only build capability and
readiness in the Guard but expand the Army's ability to
contribute to the Joint Force.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a report, not later than April 16, 2027, to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
on the advisability and feasibility of establishing a Drone
Center of Excellence within the Army National Guard at a
National Guard training site. The Secretary shall consider the
following functions of said COE when making his determination:
(1) Certification of operators of unmanned aerial systems
during annual training periods; (2) Development of doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures for the operation of such
systems; (3) Experimentation on integrating artificial
intelligence applications for target recognition and real-time
situational awareness into the operation of such systems; and
(4) Conduct of force-on-force unmanned aerial systems
exercises, including brigade-level ``drone wars''
experimentation integrated with infantry, armor, and joint
formations.

Enabling integration of additional capabilities into Integrated Battle
Command System

The proliferation of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles,
and one-way attack unmanned aerial systems, combined with the
prospect of raid-sized and prolonged attacks, places a premium
on integrated air and missile defense architectures that
maximize battlespace awareness, improve shot doctrine, and
preserve advanced interceptor inventories. The Army's
Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) is the Army's primary
effort to realize an any-sensor, best-interceptor architecture
that can integrate additional sensors and effectors, expand the
defended area, and improve magazine depth by matching the most
appropriate interceptor to each threat.
The Army's current approach to integrating sensors and
effectors into the IBCS focuses on ``1-N'' integration.
Instead, the Army should consider a more agile and scalable
approach that enables the concurrent integration of multiple
sensors and effectors through open architecture, leveraging
software-driven development, and close collaboration with
industry partners. The committee encourages the Army to
accelerate the integration of joint and allied sensors and
effectors.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a briefing, not later than February 26, 2027, to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, on efforts to accelerate the integration of
the IBCS. The briefing shall include: (1) An update on progress
on integrating the IBCS; (2) A description of barriers,
including cost, to expanding integration efforts; (3) A
discussion on operational lessons incorporated from recent
conflicts into integration efforts; (4) A description of how
the Army is leveraging the IBCS to improve shot doctrine,
conserve advanced interceptors, and sustain magazine depth
during protracted operations; and (5) How the service intends
to expand the number of allies and partners that are acquiring
and deploying the IBCS to strengthen missile defense
integration across theaters of operation.

Evaluation of wing-in-ground effect craft

The Department of Defense requires a range of flexible,
survivable, and rapidly deployable mobility platforms to
support distributed operations, contested logistics, and
maritime maneuvers across multiple theaters.
The committee understands that the Marine Corps has
undertaken development, prototyping, and operational evaluation
activities related to wing-in-ground effect craft as part of
broader efforts to support logistics for Stand-In Forces and
Marine Littoral Regiments. The committee views these efforts as
a valuable contribution to the Department's broader
understanding of the potential military utility of wing-in-
ground craft in making a contribution to solving the contested
logistics problems facing the Department.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a
report to the congressional defense committees, not later than
March 1, 2027, on the Department's assessment of wing-in-ground
effect craft. The report should include the following:
(1) An overview of the Department's plans for
experimentation, testing, and evaluation activities
related to wing-in-ground effect craft across the
military departments and combatant commands;
(2) An assessment of potential operational roles for
such platforms in support of joint missions, including
distributed maritime operations, logistics support,
special operations, and maritime interdiction;
(3) A description of how the Department may be
considering the integration of wing-in-ground effect
craft into joint and service-level concepts of
operations;
(4) An assessment of potential advantages associated
with wing-in-ground effect craft, including
survivability, sustainment, basing, interoperability,
and command and control considerations;
(5) A projection of the resources that would be
required to support further experimentation, concept
development, and potential integration of wing-in-
ground effect craft into joint operations; and
(6) A discussion of any policy, acquisition, or
regulatory barriers that could affect development,
testing, or operational employment of wing-in-ground
effect craft.

FireGuard access to commercial data

The committee recognizes the importance of the National
Guard's FireGuard program in equipping State National Guard
units to detect wildfires, notify authorities, and develop
products for dissemination to firefighting networks nationwide.
Relying on satellites from the National Interagency Fire
Center, U.S. Forest Service, and the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, FireGuard is particularly helpful at
detecting wildfires in remote locations and at abnormal times.
Yet the committee would also note the maturation of commercial
satellite technology to deliver rapid-refresh, high-resolution,
multispectral infrared data, particularly within wildfire
satellite monitoring constellations. There may be opportunities
to incorporate commercial data into the FireGuard program to
expand its capabilities, improve accuracy, deliver high-quality
data to emergency managers, and ultimately free up exquisite
national assets for higher priority missions without risking
firefighting efforts.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau to provide a briefing to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, which should
include an assessment of the feasibility and advisability of
purchasing and integrating rapid-refresh, high-resolution,
multispectral infrared data from commercial wildfire satellite
monitoring providers.

Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb and High Mobility Artillery Rocket
System Integration

The committee notes that the Ground-Launched Small Diameter
Bomb (GLSDB) program represents an innovative and cost-
effective capability developed by industry at significant
private expense, including the establishment of dedicated
production infrastructure without initial government
investment. The program demonstrates a strong approach to
diversifying and strengthening the defense industrial base by
combining established prime contractors with new market
entrants, creating a more resilient and competitive supply
chain that complements efforts such as the Guided Multiple
Launch Rocket System--Extended Range.
The committee further recognizes the significant export
potential of this capability, which can enhance allied
interoperability and strengthen partner nation deterrence at
lower cost and with rapid fielding potential.
Additionally, the committee highlights the successful
integration of GLSDB with the High Mobility Artillery Rocket
System, supported through reconciliation and developmental
funding, and notes the expectation for continued rapid progress
toward operational deployment. This effort underscores the
value of leveraging existing platforms with advanced munitions
to deliver affordable, scalable, and near-term combat
capability for the Joint Force and allied partners.

Increasing and diversifying munitions inventories

The committee supports the Department of Defense's efforts
to increase production capacity for critical munitions.
However, the committee is concerned that the Department's
proposals largely focus on expanding output along existing,
traditional production lines and do not sufficiently broaden
the industrial base or diversify the inventory with affordable,
mass producible munitions. A more balanced mix of munitions
combining exquisite capabilities with affordable, mass-produced
systems is needed to reset the economics of ``cost-per-kill''
and ensure sufficient magazine depth for sustained operations.
In support of these initiatives, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60)
provided the Department with multiyear procurement authority
for multiple lower cost weapons programs to generate a
consistent demand signal for lower-cost munitions providers.
However, the committee believes the Department needs to
have additional lower cost munitions to complement exquisite
capabilities, diversify munitions inventory, and mitigate risks
associated with insufficient capacity to effectively sustain
long-range fires in a protracted conflict. The Department, in
coordination with the services, should increase capacity by
providing a multi-year demand signal through multiple
complementary affordable, mass producible munitions programs of
record, and the accelerated identification and scaling of
production-ready capabilities. Additionally, the committee
believes that the Department should consider affordability and
manufacturability in developing the Department's munitions
requirements.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees,
not later than January 1, 2027, on munitions programs. The
briefing shall, at a minimum, address the following:
(1) The total munitions requirements over the future
years defense program for all munitions, including the
quantities needed to meet urgent, high-volume surge
capacity in the event of conflict;
(2) The planned total munitions inventory over the
future years defense program for all programmed
munitions;
(3) An identification of production-ready lower cost
munitions that could be capable of closing identified
inventory gaps that the Department has assessed for
affordability and capability of scaling production
quantities; and
(4) A detailed strategy for implementing a mixture of
exquisite and affordable munitions to fill munitions
requirements.

Long Range Fires acquisition strategy

The committee recognizes the high importance of next
generation artillery rounds, such as the M1128 and XM1113, to
deliver increased range to the warfighter. The committee also
understands the need to expeditiously scale production of these
rounds to replenish depleted artillery war stocks.
Additionally, the committee understands the complexity of the
supply chain to deliver critical rounds to the warfighter.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a report, not later than March 31, 2027, to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
on the Army acquisition strategy for the procurement of M1128
and XM1113 artillery rounds.

Navy destroyer production

The committee notes that the Navy plans to begin advance
procurement of a battleship program in fiscal year 2027, called
the BBG(X). This effort is to design and build a ship that
would carry a high capacity of offensive missiles in addition
to Standard Missile air defense weapons.
For several years, the Navy has been designing a follow-on
to the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDG-51). The program is
called the DDG(X) program. The goal of this effort is to
provide major upgrades to the current destroyer design and
continue to build destroyers to replace the early DDG-51
destroyers that are approaching the end of their useful service
lives. These ships will begin retiring at a rate of three to
five per year starting in the mid-2030s.
Initial estimates of the unit cost of the BBG(X) are
between $12.0 billion and $13.0 billion. At that price point,
the Navy cannot afford to replace retiring DDG-51s with BBG(X)
battleships on a one-for-one basis.
Therefore, the committee believes that:
(1) The Navy needs to continue work on the DDG(X)
program so it will have options for replacing the early
DDG-51s when their useful service lives have expired;
(2) Work on the DDG(X) program needs to continue
along roughly the same schedule as was envisioned last
year; and
(3) Design and construction of the BBG(X) should not
supplant the important work that needs to continue on
the DDG(X).

Networked autonomous kinetic capability against small unmanned aerial
systems

The committee recognizes that recent conflicts have
demonstrated the rapid proliferation, increased lethality, and
evolving sophistication of Group 1 and Group 2 unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) to include First-Person-View drones and
coordinated swarming tactics capable of targeting across the
battlefield. The committee notes that these threats have proven
increasingly resilient against current countermeasures and have
exposed significant vulnerabilities across the force.
The committee notes that many existing Department of
Defense counter-UAS investments have focused on high-cost, low-
density air defense solutions that are not suitable for broad
deployment across formations. The committee is concerned that
efforts to adapt legacy remote weapon stations for counter-UAS
missions have not produced scalable or sufficiently autonomous
capabilities needed to protect maneuver and sustainment
formations in contested environments.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of the
Army to establish requirements for a networked, autonomous
kinetic counter-UAS capability designed to protect ground
combat, support, and on-the-move formations against Group 1 and
Group 2 UAS threats. Such capabilities should seek to minimize
soldier cognitive burden, leverage common-service weapons and
existing platform architectures where feasible, enable
autonomous and robotic operations, and provide a cost-effective
solution suitable for large-scale deployment across tactical
formations.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, not later than February 26,
2027, on the assessment of current capability gaps, integration
challenges, and operational requirements associated with
fielding scalable autonomous counter-UAS protection systems for
maneuver and sustainment formations.

Non-kinetic effectors for point defense

The committee appreciates the Department of Defense's focus
on counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) technology evaluation
and investment in preparing for emerging threats. However,
repeated reports of drone incursions at critical Air Force
installations in the Homeland and abroad causes the committee
to be concerned that the Air Force's investments in counter-UAS
technologies for air base air defense systems (ABADS) are
insufficient.
Of particular note is the Air Force's lack of plans to
employ non-kinetic effectors for point defense. The committee
encourages the Air Force to accelerate the evaluation and
potential deployment of non-kinetic effectors, such as high
power microwave systems, to defend critical points against UAS
threats.
The committee directs the Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
in coordination with the Commander of Air Combat Command, to
deliver a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not
later than March 1, 2027, that includes:
(1) A summary of existing non-kinetic solutions for
critical point defense under the ABADS architecture and
plans for the evaluation of emerging technologies, such
as high power microwave systems;
(2) An analysis of options for accelerating the
adoption of non-kinetic effectors for critical point
defense, as well as associated resourcing requirements;
(3) A review of interagency barriers impeding the
rapid deployment of non-kinetic effectors in domestic
airspace, including efforts to alleviate such barriers
alongside interagency stakeholders; and
(4) Any further matters deemed necessary by the Chief
of Staff.
This report should be unclassified but may include a
classified annex.

Non-kinetic solutions for Counter-small Unmanned Aerial System swarms

The committee recognizes the Department of Defense's
efforts to develop low-cost Counter-small Unmanned Aerial
Systems (C-sUAS) solutions against drone swarms. The committee
also notes that defending personnel and infrastructure in high-
collateral areas requires cost-effective, non-kinetic
technology with multi-target capability and enhanced lethality
against Groups 1-3 UAS. The committee observes that aerial non-
kinetic effectors with high-powered microwave capabilities have
demonstrated significant technical maturity but have received
only incremental funding since 2019. The committee believes
that transitioning such capabilities from prototypes to a
program of record is essential to achieving ``cost-per-kill''
savings and aligns with Department priorities.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a
briefing, not later than February 26, 2027, to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the Department's plan to complete the
development and to begin procurement of low-collateral, non-
kinetic solutions for C-sUAS swarms. The briefing shall include
the following:
(1) Flyout capabilities and limitations of kinetic
versus non-kinetic effectors against Groups 1-3 UAS,
UAS swarms, and tethered UAS;
(2) A comparison of available low-collateral, non-
kinetic solutions with effective ranges greater than 5
kilometers that meet near-term requirements and provide
significant ``cost-per-kill'' savings;
(3) A description of how development efforts for
aerial non-kinetic effectors align with the C-sUAS
Capability Development Document and its associated
annexes; and
(4) Recommendations on the funding and schedule
required to field tactically meaningful quantities of
identified non-kinetic systems for deployed forces
globally and in defense of critical Homeland
infrastructure.

Organic cannon tube production

The committee recognizes the significant contributions of
Watervliet Army Arsenal as a historic and critical component of
the organic industrial base, particularly in its longstanding
role as the only organic capability at scale for large- and
medium-caliber cannon tubes. The committee further emphasizes
the enduring requirement for Watervliet Arsenal to remain the
premier government-owned, government-operated capability for
the technical expertise and skilled labor that it currently
provides, in addition to the other services it provides in
support of national defense and combat readiness. The committee
underscores that continued long-term modernization efforts at
Watervliet Arsenal and the Army's Combat Capabilities
Development Command Armaments Center will ensure predictable
and substantive growth in the U.S. organic industrial base's
capabilities, production capacity, and product quality.
The committee is concerned that the Army does not have a
sufficiently robust and resourced plan to address its own noted
challenges in its organic industrial base--personnel shortages,
aging infrastructure, obsolete machinery, antiquated processes,
inconsistent delivery schedules, and defective tubes due to
poor raw materials. These issues are particularly concerning at
the Nation's only organic capability to build cannon tubes,
whose relevance continue to be proven on today's battlefields.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a report, not later than March 1, 2027, to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
on modernization plans for Watervliet Arsenal, including: (1)
The most recent Army study, analysis, and/or strategy for
artillery; (2) A detailed description of all modernization
efforts at Watervliet Arsenal; (3) An assessment of the
apprenticeship program with Hudson Valley Community College,
which serves as a primary training and hiring pipeline for the
majority of their machinists, technical operators, and other
production floor positions; (4) A description of other
personnel reforms intended to address any existing shortfalls;
(5) Any changes in quality assurance processes related to raw
material acceptance; (6) A description of efforts to modernize
processes and improve delivery timelines; and (7) An evaluation
by the Army to determine whether an additional limited-scope
facility is required to meet projected Army and foreign
military partner requirements or whether those requirements can
be satisfied through modernization of existing Arsenal
facilities.

Over-the-horizon targeting and operational authorities

The committee notes the increasing importance of over-the-
horizon targeting (OTH-T) capabilities to enable Joint Force
operations in contested and denied environments. OTH-T
capabilities are essential to providing timely, accurate, and
resilient targeting data to support long-range precision fires,
maritime strikes, and integrated deterrence objectives.
The committee is concerned by reports of potential
disruptions to existing OTH-T architectures, including
uncertainties related to the delineation and integration of
activities conducted pursuant to title 10, United States Code,
and title 50, United States Code. The committee recognizes that
effective OTH-T often depends on close coordination between
military operational forces and intelligence community
elements. However, ambiguity in roles, responsibilities,
resourcing, and oversight mechanisms may create seams that
could degrade operational readiness and combat effectiveness.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure
that OTH-T capabilities required for operational plans remain
fielded, interoperable, and resilient during any transition to
future systems or programs of record.
To that end, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence, to provide a briefing to the congressional
defense and intelligence committees, not later than July 1,
2027, on:
(1) The current architecture supporting OTH-T for
combatant commanders, including dependencies on title
50 authorities or intelligence community capabilities;
(2) Any identified or projected gaps or disruptions
to OTH-T capability over the future years defense
program;
(3) Current research, development, test, and
evaluation efforts to improve OTH-T capabilities;
(4) The Department of Defense's plan to transition
critical OTH-T capabilities into enduring programs of
record, where appropriate;
(5) Governance mechanisms to clarify title 10 and
title 50 roles and responsibilities for OTH-T-related
activities; and
(6) Steps being taken to ensure uninterrupted
operational support to combatant commanders during
capability transitions.

Rapid integration of weapons onto fighter aircraft

The committee recognizes the growing need to rapidly
integrate advanced weapons and capabilities onto fielded
aircraft to respond to evolving threats and sustain combat
power in high-intensity conflict. The committee notes that
current delays associated with the integration of new weapons,
software, and subsystems onto legacy aircraft platforms due to
limited government software engineering capacity and
proprietary operational flight program (OFP) architectures.
These delays result in slowing the fielding of critical
capabilities to U.S. and allied warfighters.
The committee further notes that technologies capable of
implementing new capabilities outside the traditional OFP
modification and test cycle may provide a promising pathway to
accelerate the fielding of new weapons and mission systems onto
legacy aircraft. Such approaches could enable more rapid
integration of weapons and other emerging capabilities needed
to support distributed operations and maintain combat power in
contested environments.
Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of the
Air Force to conduct a demonstration of integrating advanced
stand-off weapons onto fielded Air Force aircraft using non-
traditional integration approaches. The committee believes that
such a demonstration should provide a valuable test case for
rapidly integrating new capabilities onto fielded aircraft and
increasing operational flexibility across the Joint Force.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to
provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not
later than April 1, 2027, on plans to conduct such a
demonstration, including potential demonstration dates,
locations, participating units, candidate technologies, and
resource requirements.

Report on acquisition and sustainment strategy for spare parts for low
mission capable Air Force aircraft

The committee remains concerned with persistently low
mission capable rates across portions of the Department of the
Air Force fleet and the degree to which spare parts shortages,
diminishing manufacturing sources, and limited supplier
competition continue to degrade aircraft availability and
readiness.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to submit a
report to the congressional defense committees, not later than
March 31, 2027, on actions taken and plans to improve the
availability of spare parts for Air Force aircraft with low
mission capable rates. The Secretary may provide a briefing in
lieu of the report if the briefing includes all required
elements.
The report or briefing shall include:
(1) A list of Air Force fixed-wing and rotary-wing
aircraft platforms with:
(a) a fleet-wide full mission capable rate of
50 percent or less during the preceding fiscal
year; or
(b) a critical mission capable rate of 40
percent or less for primary mission aircraft
inventory, as determined by the Secretary;
(2) The mission capable rates for each such platform
and trends over the preceding 3 fiscal years;
(3) An identification of spare parts for such
platforms that are subject to diminishing manufacturing
sources or material shortages, including an explanation
of the primary drivers of such constraints and their
impact on readiness;
(4) A description of actions taken, or planned, to
expand competition and qualify additional vendors for
the procurement of such spare parts, including the use,
as appropriate, of reverse engineering, advanced
manufacturing, additive manufacturing, and digital
engineering and technical data package development;
(5) A description of steps taken to mitigate
technical data, intellectual property, or proprietary
limitations that inhibit the competitive production of
spare parts, including the use of existing authorities
to acquire or license such data;
(6) The extent of participation by small business
concerns in the supply chain for such spare parts,
including the amount and percentage of contract
obligations awarded to such concerns;
(7) An assessment of measurable changes in aircraft
availability attributable to actions taken to improve
spare parts availability, including any cost savings or
cost avoidance achieved; and
(8) Any recommendations for legislative action the
Secretary considers necessary to improve spare parts
availability and sustainment outcomes.

Report on F-35 Power and Thermal Management System modernization
program

The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, to provide a
report, not later than March 1, 2027, on the F-35 Power and
Thermal Management System (PTMS) Modernization Program. The
report shall include, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) The current status of the Power Thermal
Management Upgrade (PTMU) trade study, including total
cooling requirements, the capacity of the defense
industry to support design requirements, and the
expected timeline for a PTMU down select following the
analysis;
(2) How the F-35 Joint Program Office plans to ensure
growth margin on a new PTMS to support the cooling
needs for all future and planned service life
requirements of the F-35;
(3) How the F-35 Joint Program Office plans to ensure
any PTMS option will provide cooling that, at minimum,
meets the requirements validated by the Joint Strike
Fighter Executive Steering Board; and
(4) The resources needed, by service, to ensure
aircraft integration of a new PTMS system by 2033.

Report on ground vehicle signature management simulation capability

The committee believes that as the Army introduces new
platforms to its ground combat vehicle fleet, including the
XM30 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and next-generation optionally
manned platforms, a common modeling and simulation tool capable
of characterizing thermal management and electro-optical and
infrared (EO/IR) signatures of these platforms during system
development will be a critical component to operational
survivability. The committee is concerned that adversarial EO/
IR sensor systems, such as passive infrared-guided anti-tank
missiles, drone-mounted thermal cameras, and overhead
persistent infrared platforms, present a growing and lethal
threat to Army ground combat vehicles and believes that
effective signature management is a critical survivability
measure.
The committee believes that the procurement of these
signature management systems, without a common, enterprise-wide
modeling and simulation tool to underpin selection and pre-
fielding performance verification, creates risk that fielded
systems may not perform as intended against actual threats. The
committee is aware that the Army's Combat Capabilities
Development Command Ground Vehicle Systems Center has conducted
EO/IR signature modeling and analysis under a series of
research contracts but is concerned that this capability exists
on an ad hoc, contract-by-contract basis.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Army to provide a briefing, not later than April 1, 2027, to
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the Army's current thermal and EO/IR
signature simulation capabilities, including gaps in the
assessment of current and next-generation vehicle platforms and
the advisability and feasibility of establishing a common,
enterprise-wide modeling and simulation tool for signature
management analysis.

Report on integration of unmanned aerial systems in National Guard

The committee recognizes the rapidly evolving role of
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in modern warfare, including
their extensive use in recent conflicts to enhance
reconnaissance, targeting, and distributed operations in
contested environments.
The committee further acknowledges the unique dual-status
mission of the Army National Guard and its potential to provide
scalable, cost-effective UAS capabilities for both Federal and
state missions, including domestic response and Homeland
defense.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a report, not later than March 1, 2027, to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
that assesses the value, feasibility, and operational
effectiveness of establishing dedicated UAS formations within
the Army National Guard. The report shall include: (1) An
assessment of the operational benefit of creating Army National
Guard unmanned aerial system companies; (2) An evaluation of
the improved interoperability such companies would provide with
Regular Army formations; (3) The identification of current
capability gaps in small UAS intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance in the Army National Guard; (4) An assessment of
the feasibility and advisability of scaling such companies
across the Army National Guard; and (5) Recommendations for
permanent authorization or modifications.

Review of Air Operations Center processes and performance

The committee recognizes the central role of Air Operations
Centers (AOC) in planning, directing, coordinating, and
assessing joint and combined air operations. As operational
demands continue to increase in complexity and scale, the
committee believes it is important to assess whether current
Air Operations Center processes, staffing, authorities,
training, and supporting systems are optimized to support
contemporary and future operational requirements. The committee
is also concerned about proposals to reduce, replace, or
eliminate squadron intelligence debriefs and Mission Reports
(MISREPs) along with other operational reporting mechanisms
that have historically provided commanders and planners with
timely assessments of mission execution and operational
outcomes.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to conduct a comprehensive review of Air Operations
Center processes and provide a briefing to the congressional
defense committees, not later than January 25, 2027, on the
results of that review. The review shall assess operational
planning, intelligence integration, target development, dynamic
targeting, battle management, command-and-control procedures,
communications systems, information-sharing practices, legal
coordination, personnel staffing, training, and coordination
with joint, interagency, coalition, and supporting
organizations. The review shall also assess the current and
planned role of MISREPs and other mission reporting processes
in supporting operational command and control, operational and
battle damage assessment, lessons learned, and information-
sharing across operational and tactical echelons.
The briefing shall identify procedural, organizational,
technological, and manpower challenges affecting operational
effectiveness and evaluate the adequacy of existing doctrine,
training, authorities, and systems. The briefing shall include
an assessment of the operational impacts, risks, and potential
benefits associated with any effort to reduce, replace,
automate, or eliminate MISREPs, including effects on commander
situational awareness, operational assessment, targeting,
intelligence integration, historical recordkeeping, and
lessons-learned processes, as well as any recommendations to
improve operational responsiveness, decision-making,
information flow, command and control, and integration across
the Joint Force.

Special operations one-way attack unmanned aerial systems

The committee believes that maintaining a sufficient
inventory of one-way attack unmanned aerial systems is an
important component of ensuring the operational effectiveness
of U.S. Special Operations Forces. The committee encourages
U.S. Special Operations Command, in partnership with the
military services, to continue efforts to identify, assess, and
procure innovative one-way attack unmanned aerial systems.

Stratospheric balloon capability in Army National Guard

The committee recognizes the cost-effective, long-duration
capability that stratospheric balloons provide and supports
examining the feasibility and advisability of establishing this
capability within the Army National Guard. The committee
recognizes the tactical contributions of stratospheric balloons
and believes expanding this capability into the Army National
Guard would improve the Army's ability to support the Joint
Force in contingency operations and expand National Guard
contributions when operating under other state and Federal
authorities.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a briefing, not later than March 1, 2027, to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
on the advisability and feasibility of establishing one or more
Army National Guard units responsible for the operation of
stratospheric balloons. The briefing shall assess and provide
recommendations with respect to the following elements:
(1) The current capacity of the Joint Force to
quickly deploy stratospheric balloons in response to
contingencies;
(2) The necessary number of units that would be
required within the Army National Guard to establish a
deployable capability;
(3) The required force structure of any such unit;
(4) The resources required to establish and maintain
any such unit, including personnel, equipment,
facilities, and training costs;
(5) An assessment of best available basing in
proximity to adequate training space; and
(6) Any other considerations the Secretary deems
relevant.

Universal armament interface

The committee desires a better understanding of Universal
Armament Interface (UAI) and Common Flexible Weapons Interface
(CFWI) programs to inform policy and oversight of the
integration of military aircraft and munitions. The committee
is pleased to see that a universal interface standard has
enabled success stories of the rapid fielding of new munitions
to some existing platforms (for example, the F-16 and GBU-56)
and is concerned that non-UAI/non-CFWI platforms and munitions
slow the fielding of new, advanced weapons. The committee is
concerned that a lack of widespread UAI/CFWI adoption amongst
joint aircraft might slow the development and fielding of new
weapons, limiting the lethality of the Joint Force.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force and the Secretary of the Navy to provide to the
congressional defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027,
a joint briefing on the UAI/CFWI programs and their adoption
amongst all Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps combat aircraft
and associated munitions.
This should include, but not be limited to, detailed
assessments of:
(1) Developmental (DT&E) and operational test &
evaluation (OT&E) success stories resulting from UAI/
CFWI-compatible aircraft and munitions;
(2) Any existing UAI and/or CFWI mandates, timelines,
or decision points;
(3) Limitations to implementing a joint mandate for
the adoption of UAI and/or CFWI, to include defining
costs associated with making every platform compliant,
and;
(4) Policy or resourcing limitations inhibiting
universal adoption of UAI and/or CFWI.

Unmanned surface and underwater vehicle detection and deterrence

The Department of Defense has been correctly concerned
about the threats from unmanned systems. The Department
established the Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF 401) to
rapidly develop, acquire, and field Counter-small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS). That is appropriate, but it does not
cover all of the threats from unmanned systems.
Specifically, the committee is concerned with the continued
proliferation of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and
underwater vehicles (UUVs) by both state and nonstate
adversaries. JIATF 401 is not dealing with these threats. The
committee believes that the threat posed by autonomous and
semi-autonomous surface and underwater vehicles requires not
only persistent, high-fidelity detection but also scalable
kinetic and non-kinetic mitigation solutions, which together
could operate at a cost-exchange ratio favorable to the United
States.
The committee considers the absence of detection and
mitigation solutions a critical oversight in the Navy's
strategic planning for maritime domain awareness, power
projection, and force protection. The committee believes that
the Navy should establish an organization similar to JIATF 401
that would deal with countering unmanned surface and subsurface
threats. The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to
establish such a task force.
The committee directs the Chief of Naval Research to
provide, not later than March 1, 2027, a briefing to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the Navy's efforts to develop, demonstrate,
and field integrated counter-UUV and USV capabilities. This
briefing should include results or plans for a series of
technical demonstrations in fiscal years 2026 and 2027 that
would evaluate:
(1) Integrated detection and identification that
yields persistent, scalable, and cost-effective systems
capable of rapid deployment, real-time detection, high-
bandwidth communications, and AI-enabled classification
of UUV threats, specifically emphasizing the capture of
weak acoustic or electronic signals in high-clutter
environments;
(2) Kinetic and non-kinetic mitigation solutions for
the neutralization of UUV and USV threats once
identified, including, but not limited to, directed
energy, small-form-factor torpedoes, and electronic
jamming;
(3) Industrial base diversity, including an
assessment of how the Navy is engaging with both
traditional defense primes and non-traditional
commercial technology partners to accelerate the
development of these detection and mitigation systems
at scale and at a sustainable cost exchange ratio; and
(4) An evaluation of the Navy's counter-UUV detection
and identification requirements based upon the lessons
learned in these demonstrations, including desirable
deployment characteristics, such as size, mobility,
cooling requirements, or infrastructure, and the plans
to formalize such requirements.

Wireless control capabilities for Expeditionary Airfield Lighting
System

The committee recognizes the importance of the
Expeditionary Airfield Lighting System (EALS) in supporting
Agile Combat Employment and operations from austere and
dispersed airfields, such as those in U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command. While the current EALS configuration provides energy-
efficient lighting capable of battery and solar operation, it
continues to rely on wired command and control cabling and
lacks remote health and status monitoring capability.
The committee is concerned that, even when configured for
standalone self-power battery and solar operation, the system
continues to rely on wired command and control cabling and also
lacks remote health and status monitoring capability. The
committee is concerned that continued reliance on wired systems
reduces deployment agility, increases logistics burden and
constrains rapid reconfiguration of expeditionary airfields.
Similarly, the lack of remote health and status monitoring
increases the risk of degradation and reduced readiness when
deployed. The committee understands that the Department of the
Air Force has identified this capability gap as a formal
deficiency within the program.
The committee understands that industry has developed, and
the Air Force has validated, a secure wireless control and
monitoring capability to address this deficiency. The committee
strongly encourages the Air Force to pursue the incorporation
of this capability into the EALS system.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than January 1, 2027, on the
opportunities that exist to address the reliance on wired
command and control cabling and lack of remote health and
status monitoring capabilities. The briefing should include,
but not be limited to, the following:
(1) A transition and acquisition strategy for
incorporating said wireless control and monitoring
capability into future EALS procurements, including key
decision points and contracting approach; and
(2) An assessment of the feasibility, cost, and
schedule for upgrade kits or other retrofit approaches
to enable the incorporation of wireless capability into
previously fielded systems.

TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations

Sec. 201--Authorization of appropriations
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for research, development, test, and evaluation
activities at the levels identified in section 4201 of division
D of this Act.

Subtitle B--Program Requirements, Restrictions, and Limitations

Sec. 211--Improving the requirement for an alternative test and
evaluation pathway for designated defense acquisition programs
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 218(f) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) to clarify that Software
Acquisition Pathways under section 3603 of title 10, United
States Code, are covered under the Alternative Test &
Evaluation Pathway.
Sec. 212--Development, test, evaluation, demonstration, and transition
to production of alternative low-cost weapon systems
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to initiate and pursue accelerated
acquisition programs for alternative low-cost systems in eight
critical categories: (1) Alternative low-cost hypersonic strike
systems; (2) Alternative low-cost cruise missiles; (3)
Alternative shoulder-launched missiles; (4) Alternative
extended range munitions; (5) Alternative mid-range integrated
air and missile defense (IAMD) interceptors; (6) Alternative
exoatmospheric interceptors; (7) Alternative short-range IAMD
interceptors; and (8) Alternative medium-range air-to-air
missiles.
The committee is concerned by the high expenditure of
precision-guided munitions and interceptors during recent
operations. These expenditures rapidly depleted stocks of
weapons that cost millions of dollars per unit and have
production lead times measured in years, often exceeding 3
years from contract award to the delivery of additional
inventory.
Many of these systems were originally designed and
developed decades ago to meet the most demanding high-end
threat requirements against peer adversaries. While they have
performed very effectively, they were not optimized for
manufacturability, rapid scalability, or cost-effective mass
production. As a result, the United States now faces challenges
in rapidly replenishing inventories to restore readiness for
potential future contingencies, particularly in a protracted
conflict or against multiple theaters simultaneously.
The committee recognizes that the Department of Defense
requires a balanced portfolio of capabilities. High-end systems
will continue to play a critical role against the most
sophisticated threats. However, the Department also needs
complementary, alternative, and low-cost weapon systems that
can fulfill the majority of mission requirements in many
scenarios, provide survivability and attrition tolerance for
the high-end inventory, create necessary magazine depth for
sustained operations, and enable rapid replenishment during
conflict. Such systems must emphasize significantly reduced
unit costs, shorter manufacturing lead times, greater use of
commercial supply chains and components, modular designs, and
the ability to be produced at scale in a contested or wartime
environment.
To address these gaps, the committee directs the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide
a classified briefing to the congressional defense committees,
not later than April 1, 2027, addressing each of the categories
listed in the provision. The briefing shall include:
(1) Results of market research and competitive
analysis conducted to identify innovative technologies,
potential vendors (including non-traditional defense
contractors), and cost-reduction opportunities;
(2) Detailed funding plans, including amounts
requested, obligated, and expended from all sources for
each alternative low-cost program, as well as any
barriers to execution;
(3) Key performance parameters achieved or projected,
challenges encountered, mitigation strategies, and any
adjustments to program timelines or requirements;
(4) Transition plans to production and fielding,
including integration with existing platforms and any
recommended legislative or policy changes to accelerate
deployment; and
(5) Any other information the Under Secretary
determines relevant.
Sec. 213--Modification to the advisory role of the JASON scientific
advisory group
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 222(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92) to align the
responsibilities for supporting the functions of the JASON
scientific advisory group to the office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering and modify the scope of
how financial support is provided for enterprise services like
classified network support and facilities.

Sec. 214--Modified and streamlined process for developing, negotiating,
and concluding certain international agreements

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to promulgate a modified and streamlined
process for developing, negotiating, and concluding
international agreements relating to science and technology
cooperation, including memoranda of understanding and project
agreements.
The committee is concerned with the length of time it takes
for the Department of Defense to develop, negotiate, conclude,
and finalize agreements with international partners,
particularly for bilateral and multilateral science and
technology-related partnership agreements. The committee is
aware that it often takes years to finalize partnership
agreements, including with key allies. The committee is also
aware that the vast majority of partnership agreements commit
the Department to fund projects with relatively small amounts
of already appropriated funding on an equitable basis with the
partner or partners. The committee believes that the Department
should develop a streamlined, risk-based process that minimizes
or eliminates low-value-add and duplicative steps.

Sec. 215--Repeal of authority relating to temporary hiring of students
and university faculty

The committee recommends a provision that would repeal
section 249 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283).
The committee notes that this authority is no longer needed as
it is addressed elsewhere in title 10, United States Code.

Sec. 216--Limitation on availability of funds for Test Resource
Management Center containerized instrumentation programs
pending report on a common architecture for unmanned maritime
test instrumentation

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
availability of funding to not more than 75 percent of fiscal
year 2027 funds authorized for the Test Resource Management
Center's containerized instrumentation programs until the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering submits a
report to the Congress. The report would evaluate the
feasibility, costs, benefits, and scalability of shifting to a
common unmanned maritime architecture for telemetry, flight
safety, and test data collection. The committee notes the
progress made by Point Mugu Test Range's Blue Water
Instrumentation effort in fielding such an unmanned maritime
system using foreign military sales funding to support
accelerated and cost-effective testing of long-range missiles.

Sec. 217--Limitation on availability of funds for Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering travel

The committee recommends a provision limiting the
obligation or expenditure of 10 percent of fiscal year 2027
travel funds for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering until the congressional defense
committees receive a briefing as required by section 219(d)(6)
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
(Public Law 114-328). The briefings required by the Directed
Energy Working Group are important in understanding the
progress being made in directed energy, which can hold certain
classes of targets at risk with a low cost and deep magazine.

Sec. 218--Limitation on availability of funds for Integrated Combat
Systems of the Department of the Navy

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
availability of funding to not more than 75 percent of fiscal
year 2027 funds authorized for integrated combat systems of the
Department of the Navy until the Secretary of the Navy
certifies to the congressional defense committees that the Navy
has installed and demonstrated, aboard one or more destroyers,
an operational prototype of the warfighting data ecosystem.

Sec. 219--Limitation on the use of travel funds for the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
amount of funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for operations and maintenance to support travel
expenses for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering until the Secretary of Defense
provides two reports that were previously tasked by the James
M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023 (Public Law 117-263) and have not been submitted.

Sec. 220--Codification of Department of Defense Research Security
Program

The committee recommends a provision that would codify
existing research security provisions from recent National
Defense Authorization Acts in chapter 305 of title 10, United
States Code. The provision also codifies the prohibition on
contracts between certain foreign entities and institutions of
higher education conducting Department of Defense (DOD)-funded
research. In addition, it adds a new requirement for
institutions of higher education that receive DOD funding for
research and have a total of more than $50.0 million in total
research funding annually to designate a Chief Research
Security Officer.

Sec. 221--Codification of Department of Defense Science, Technology,
and Innovation Board

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 303 of title 10, United States Code, to codify the
establishment of the Science, Technology, and Innovation
Advisory Board.

Sec. 222--Alternative programs to expand inventory of air defense
interceptors

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to
establish alternate methods to increase the inventory of air
defense interceptors.

Sec. 223--Improvements to personnel management authority to attract
experts in science, engineering, and certain other disciplines
at Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 4092(b)(1)(B) of title 10, United States Code, to allow
for not more than 40 employee billets to be occupied by the
same 2 employees for not more than a period of 90 days.

Sec. 224--Extension of limitation on availability of funds for
fundamental research collaboration with certain academic
institutions

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the Department of Defense from using any funds authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal year 2027 to make an award to an
institution of higher education for fundamental research in
collaboration with an academic institution included on the list
developed pursuant to section 1286(c)(9) of the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public
Law 115-232).

Subtitle C--Plans, Reports, and Other Matters

Sec. 231--Assessment framework for future quantum computing programs

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, to develop a
framework for assessing the development or acquisition of
future quantum computing systems, algorithms, or hybrid-quantum
computing services informed by the practices developed under
the Quantum Benchmarking Initiative.

Sec. 232--Execution of the Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Propellant
systems

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Army to determine, not later than 60 days
after the enactment of this Act, if the Additive Manufacturing
process for Rocket Propellant systems should be formally
established as a program of record.

Sec. 233--Report on emerging technology and cognitive warfare

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Director of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, to submit to the
congressional defense committees a report, not later than 270
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, on the
implications of emerging technologies to support Department of
Defense cognitive warfare.

Sec. 234--Department of Defense electronics requirements study

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive study on
current and future electronics requirements for defense
systems, and to provide a report on the findings of the study
to the congressional defense committees, not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Budget Items

Army

Navy

Lowell Observatory Navy Precision Optical Interferometer

The committee notes that in the section 4201 table for
Research Development Test and Evaluation, Navy, there is an
increase to PE 61153N, Defense Research Sciences, of $10.1
million for the Navy Precision Optical Interferometer (NPOI) at
Lowell Observatory.
The committee believes the Department of the Navy should
acknowledge the validity and continuing relevance of the 1992
agreement between Lowell Observatory, the U.S. Naval
Observatory, and the Naval Research Laboratory regarding the
NPOI, as well as associated correspondence. The committee notes
that all three parties abided by the terms of the Agreement for
over 30 years and that internal Navy documents referenced the
Agreement and its terms during that period. The committee
further stresses the importance of the Department engaging in
good faith negotiations with Lowell Observatory to resolve
outstanding issues in a timely and constructive manner.

Air Force

Defense Wide

Defense Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research

The committee notes that in the section 4201 table for
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-wide,
there is an increase to PE 61110D8Z, Basic Research
Initiatives, of $40.0 million for the Defense Established
Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (DEPSCoR) program.
The committee continues to be supportive of the DEPSCoR
program, which helps build and expand the national innovation
base for research and education by funding research activities
in science and engineering areas responsive to the needs of
national defense. The committee welcomes the fact that DEPSCoR
was included as part of the budget request for fiscal year 2027
but notes that the amount was well below levels requested by
the Congress for the past several years. The program is
intended to increase the number of university researchers and
improve the capabilities of institutions of higher education in
eligible jurisdictions to perform competitive research relevant
to the Department of Defense (DOD). The committee also views
DEPSCoR as a component in any effort by the DOD to identify,
shape, and foster innovation ecosystems that support DOD
research and technology needs. Along with other funding
programs and authorities available to the Department, DEPSCoR
should be considered as a means to expand and diversify the
innovation ecosystem for the DOD.

Automated textile manufacturing program

The committee notes that in the table for Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-wide, there is an
increase to PE 0607210D8Z, Industrial Base Analysis and
Sustainment, of $50.0 million for the automated textile
manufacturing program.
The committee notes the importance of the domestic textile
industrial base to warfighter readiness for the production of
Berry-compliant uniforms, footwear, and other textile and
fabric applications. The committee encourages the Department of
Defense to use the automated textile manufacturing program to
identify and fund opportunities to expand production capacity
and enhance competition within the domestic textile industrial
base.

Trusted and assured microelectronics

The committee notes that in the section 4201 table for
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-wide,
there is an increase to PE 64294D8Z, Trusted and Assured
Microelectronics, of $350.0 million, and an increase to PE
65294D8Z of $100.0 million to restore funding reductions to
these lines and increase support for microelectronics
development; standards development; and validation,
verification, and security activities for the Department of
Defense (DOD), especially in areas of advanced packaging and
for microelectronics materials other than traditional silicon-
based systems, such as gallium nitride, silicon germanium, and
silicon carbide.
The committee notes its disappointment at the DOD's
shortsighted decision to reduce these programs by $392.4
million and $81.6 million, respectively. The committee believes
such reductions threaten the ability of the Department to fully
capitalize on the foundational investments made as part of the
Chips and Science Act to help reinvigorate the domestic
industrial base for microelectronics, and to continue to invest
in the new and novel devices and packaging techniques the DOD
needs to compete with adversaries in the future information
environment. The needs of the DOD are unique compared to
commercial microelectronics, and while the Department can ride
the wave of such investments, it also needs parallel and
complementary investment to deal with challenges like radiation
hardening, new and novel materials, and innovative design and
packaging approaches. The committee believes that additional
prototyping activities that can be demonstrated through the
Microelectronics Commons program will help transition more
capabilities into the hands of the warfighter and may have
spillover benefits for the domestic commercial microelectronics
sector.
Further, the committee notes that the Department still has
significant work ahead to demonstrate and validate evidence-
based assurance techniques as a complement to existing security
approaches. The committee also notes that with the recent
update of the charter for the Joint Federated Assurance Center,
there are increasing opportunities to leverage those
capabilities within the Government, as well as with key
industry partners. Additional resources will assist with that
expansion of activities.
The committee also encourages the DOD to leverage these
additional activities to support the development of resilience
in the supply chain for microelectronics, like diversifying the
printed circuit board supply chain, and to demonstrate new
interconnect technologies to increase device throughput and
performance.

Microelectronics Commons priority research and demonstration projects

The committee notes that in the section 4201 table for
Research Development Test and Evaluation, Defense-wide, there
is an increase to PE 62669D8Z, Microelectronics Commons-Applied
Research, of $50.0 million.
The committee recognizes that advanced microelectronics are
foundational to the ability of the Department of Defense to
field munitions, sensors, space systems, electronic warfare
systems, secure communications, and autonomous systems at the
speed and scale required for operational plans. The committee
further recognizes that the Microelectronics Commons was
established to accelerate the transition of microelectronics
innovations from laboratory research to domestic prototyping,
fabrication, packaging, test, and manufacturing ecosystems. The
committee notes the importance of rapidly advancing
microelectronics technologies essential to addressing the
Department of Defense's most pressing challenges.
The committee notes that in section 4201 of this Act, the
committee provides $50.0 million for the Secretary of Defense
for the Microelectronics Commons for the purposes of focusing
on near-term defense mission needs, domestic industrial base
capacity, trusted and assured supply chains, and transition to
programs of record or domestic manufacturers. The committee
expects the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering to ensure that projects selected under this section
include measurable technical and transition milestones and
leverage the regional hubs of the Microelectronics Commons and
their industry, university, laboratory, defense industrial
base, and nontraditional partner networks. The committee
further expects coordination with relevant program executive
offices, combatant-command-validated requirements, defense
laboratories, acquisition executives, and industrial-base
officials to increase the likelihood that successful prototypes
transition into operational systems or domestic manufacturing
capacity.
Additionally, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense to submit a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than February 1, 2027, on the following:
(A) Ongoing efforts by the Department of Defense to leverage
the Microelectronics Commons programs to establish a mechanism
by which other Federal departments and agencies can utilize the
Microelectronics Commons program as the primary platform to
access microelectronics design, prototyping, and fabrication
capabilities in pursuit of Microelectronics Commons goals; and
(B) How the Microelectronics Commons program is accelerating
technology development and prototyping across the Department
with a focus on the technology areas essential to addressing
the most pressing national security challenges.

Items of Special Interest

Autonomous escort capabilities for Army watercraft

The committee recognizes the increasing operational risk
faced by Army watercraft conducting logistics, maneuver, and
sustainment missions in joint, contested, and distributed
operating environments. Many Army watercraft possess limited
organic defensive capabilities, increasing vulnerability to
asymmetric threats, unmanned systems, and indirect fires.
The committee believes the Army should possess an
indigenous unmanned surface vessel (USV) capability to escort
and support Army watercraft, providing enhanced force
protection, early warning, sensing, and defensive effects while
reducing risk to personnel.
The committee commends the Army's use of competitive
experimentation and prototyping activities, including
initiatives such as xTech Pacific, to evaluate autonomous
watercraft and escort concepts. The committee further applauds
the Army's emphasis on engaging U.S. industry to identify
mature, proven autonomy solutions and encourages continued
consideration of commercially available capabilities where
appropriate.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to submit a
report to the congressional defense committees, not later than
February 1, 2027, assessing the feasibility, operational
utility, and acquisition pathways for an indigenous USV escort
capability for Army watercraft. The report shall include:
(1) A description of operational mission sets and
threat environments in which autonomous or semi-
autonomous escort vessels could enhance the
survivability of Army watercraft;
(2) An assessment of existing and emerging autonomy
technologies, including commercially available
solutions from U.S. industry, relevant to escort,
sensing, and force protection missions;
(3) A summary of ongoing experimentation and
prototyping efforts, including lessons learned from
competitive events and demonstrations;
(4) An evaluation of potential acquisition approaches
to transition successful prototypes into operational
use and, where appropriate, programs of record; and
(5) An assessment of projected resource requirements
and considerations for sustaining investment in
autonomous escort capabilities in future budget
submissions.

Autonomous welding

The committee continues to be interested in the Department
of Defense addressing and achieving a reduction in depot
maintenance backlogs and reduced throughput across the organic
industrial base.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Navy to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services
of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
March 1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of piloting
autonomous welding across the organic industrial base. The
briefing shall include: (1) An evaluation of current and
projected capabilities and technologies that offer available,
versatile, artificial intelligence-powered robotic welding
systems that can rapidly adapt to joints specification and
variability, allowing quick, precise, and efficient welding to
military specifications; (2) Any potential impacts to the
operations of the defense industrial base from using autonomous
welding systems; (3) Any potential cost savings, productivity
increases, and decreased repair turnaround time for the Joint
Force; (4) Any impacts to the organic industrial base to
recruiting and retention based on the use of autonomous
welding; and (5) An evaluation of any associated reductions in
safety incidents from using autonomous welding.

Briefing on use of high-power nuclear fission for space operations

The committee supports the Air Force Research Laboratory's
Joint Emergent Technology Supplying On-Orbit Nuclear Power
(JETSON) program and recognizes high-power nuclear fission as a
critical component of sustained U.S. preeminence in space. The
committee notes prior investment in early-stage demonstration
programs, including the Kilopower Reactor Using Stirling
Technology program. However, the committee is concerned that
the Department of Defense has not yet established clear
operational requirements, validated mission needs, or developed
an execution pathway to transition these technologies into
operational in-space nuclear fission power capabilities.
As the Department's reliance on maneuverable and power-
intensive systems increases, enduring and resilient power
generation will be essential to support missile intercept,
offensive and defensive space control, long-duration mobility,
high-duty-cycle sensing, secure communications, and autonomous
operations. The committee believes that without defined
operational requirements, a coordinated acquisition strategy,
and a funded plan for maturation and testing, the Department
will be unable to field nuclear fission power systems necessary
to sustain U.S. military advantage in space.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Director of the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Chief of Space
Operations, to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March
1, 2027, on the Department's plan to develop and field
operational nuclear fission power systems for in-space
operations. The briefing shall include: (1) Operational nuclear
fission power requirements across anticipated missions,
including in low earth orbit, mid-earth orbit, geosynchronous
orbit, cislunar space, and other deep-space environments; (2)
An assessment of barriers and capability gaps that have
prevented JETSON or other nuclear fission efforts from
conducting in-space deployment and testing; (3) An overview of
previous congressional funding and Department expenditure
related to in-space nuclear fission capabilities since fiscal
year 2017; (4) A proposed architecture and acquisition pathway
for operational in-space nuclear fission power capabilities,
including technology maturation milestones, test and evaluation
plans, and integration with Space Force programs; and (5) A
funding and resource plan identifying required investments
through fiscal year 2035, including opportunities for
interagency and commercial collaboration.

Capability gaps and policy development of robotics for medical
evacuation and other high-risk operational tasks

The committee recognizes increasing lethality and mobility
constraints that characterize modern and future operating
environments, which have complicated the execution of medical
evacuation, mine detection, and emergency response operations.
Traditional casualty extraction and medical resupply operations
often require personnel to enter contested or denied areas,
increasing risk to both wounded servicemembers and responding
forces while potentially delaying life-saving care. Autonomous
and semi-autonomous robotic systems, including unmanned ground
vehicles, hybrid platforms, and humanoid or semi-humanoid
systems, have the potential to reduce risk to personnel,
accelerate lifesaving interventions, and improve the
survivability of forces and civilians in both combat and
disaster response scenarios.
To ensure the quick integration of robotics and other
autonomous and semi-autonomous systems into the hands of
warfighting units in contested environments, the committee
directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than June 30, 2027, on the status of
current fielding of and policy and doctrinal development around
these capabilities. The briefing shall include:
(1) An assessment and capability gap analysis of
existing proven military capabilities for autonomous,
semi-autonomous, teleoperated, and robotic systems, to
support missions such as casualty extraction; medical
evacuation; early life-saving interventions, such as
hemorrhage control, injury sensing, and autonomous
casualty assessment; medical resupply; mine detection
and explosive hazard identification efforts; emergency
response and victim recovery in confined spaces or
other hazardous environments; and humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief efforts;
(2) A review of current and planned Department of
Defense research, development, and experimentation
efforts attempting to fill the gaps identified in (1);
(3) An assessment of the average timeline and process
by which the Joint Force has already integrated proven
capabilities from (1) to units within the combatant
commands; and
(4) Specifically for medical missions, an assessment
of the status of policy, doctrine, and governance
around the testing, development, and fielding of
robotic medical support systems, including
considerations related to autonomous medical decisions,
medical device certification, and international
humanitarian law in operational and international
environments.

Comptroller General review of military specifications related to
biotechnology

The committee recognizes the strategic importance of
biomanufacturing and supports efforts to enable the Department
of Defense (DOD) to procure and deploy biotechnology-derived
products and biomaterials. The committee believes that
facilitating access to innovative biotechnology solutions can
enhance mission assurance, operational resilience, and the
availability of bioindustrial materials, while maintaining
rigorous safety and performance standards. The committee
encourages a review of military specifications (MIL-SPEC),
which establish standardized technical requirements that serve
as a common language across the defense industrial base,
ensuring that products manufactured by different stakeholders
meet the same performance, quality, and functional standards.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General
of the United States to conduct a comprehensive audit of MIL-
SPECs and associated development, validation, and approval
processes to determine whether they intentionally or
unintentionally disadvantage biotechnology-derived products and
biomaterials, to assess whether reforms are necessary to enable
the DOD to purchase and adopt biotechnology-derived products
while maintaining mission assurance, safety, and performance
standards.
The audit shall consider that many MIL-SPECs were developed
around legacy materials and conventional production methods,
which may inadvertently restrict the adoption of biotechnology-
derived products, even when such products meet or exceed
required performance standards.
The audit shall also assess the DOD's implementation of
section 248(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60). The audit shall include a
review of structural and procedural barriers within the MIL-
SPEC and military standard (MIL-STD) framework, including:
(A) The extent to which specifications and standards
rely on prescriptive requirements tied to legacy
materials or production pathways rather than
performance-based criteria;
(B) Whether testing, validation, and verification
processes are technology-neutral and appropriately
calibrated to assess biotechnology-derived and
biomaterial-based products; and
(C) Whether institutional practices or risk postures
create intentional or unintentional preconceptions
against biotechnology solutions.
Not later than April 1, 2027, the Comptroller General shall
submit a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, with a report to be
provided at a mutually agreed upon date, that:
(A) Identifies structural, procedural, or cultural
impediments within the MIL-SPEC and MIL-STD framework
that limit biotechnology adoption;
(B) Evaluates whether the DOD's actions under section
248(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 are sufficient to enable biotechnology
companies to demonstrate, validate, and verify
compliance with Departmental requirements; and
(C) Provides recommendations for legislative and
administrative action to modernize military
specifications and standards to enable the DOD to
purchase and adopt biotechnology-derived products while
maintaining mission assurance, safety, and operational
effectiveness.

Counter-unmanned aircraft systems left-of-launch capability and
indications and warning

The committee notes the rapid proliferation and operational
effectiveness of low-cost unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)
across multiple theaters during 2025 and 2026, including their
use in reconnaissance, targeting, and one-way attack missions
by both state and non-state actors. The committee further notes
that these systems are increasingly employed in distributed,
low-observable, and time-compressed attack profiles that
challenge traditional air defense and counter-UAS systems
designed primarily for post-launch detection and defeat.
The committee observes that recent incidents, as well as
findings from the Department of Defense Inspector General
(Report No. DODIG-2026-045), demonstrate that existing
policies, authorities, and capabilities are insufficiently
integrated and, in some cases, unclear or inconsistently
implemented across installations, limiting commanders' ability
to effectively counter persistent UAS threats.
The committee recognizes that the most actionable
indicators of UAS threats increasingly occur prior to launch,
including adversary reconnaissance, staging, logistics
activity, and other preparatory behaviors. The committee
believes that improving the Department's ability to identify,
fuse, and act upon these pre-operational indicators is
essential to expanding warning time, reducing operational
surprise, and enabling more effective prioritization of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and
countermeasure resources.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing, not later than April 30, 2027, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the Department's approach to ``left-of-
launch'' counter-UAS operations. The briefing should include:
(1) A description of current left-of-launch counter-
UAS capabilities;
(2) An assessment of current gaps in data
integration, analytic capacity, and operational
workflows;
(3) Recommendations for additional authorities or
resources required; and
(4) Metrics for evaluating effectiveness, including
improvements in warning time, reduction in successful
UAS attacks, and impact on adversary operational
networks.

Directed energy for surface combatants

The committee recognizes the importance of deploying
directed energy capabilities aboard Navy surface combatants and
supports continued experimentation, operational assessment, and
sustainment of the High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-
dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) system aboard USS Preble
(DDG-88). Directed energy systems have the potential to
significantly enhance ship self-defense, improve magazine
depth, and provide cost-effective options against increasingly
sophisticated unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, and
other emerging threats.
Further, the committee recognizes the Navy's plan to field
directed energy on the battleship but does not view the fiscal
year (FY) 2027 budget as supporting the investments required
and therefore encourages the Navy to increase its funding and
commitment to maturing directed energy for operational use on
Navy combatants.
Therefore, the committee recommends the Navy to: (1)
Sustain HELIOS aboard USS Preble (DDG-88), including testing,
training, modeling and simulation, and development of tactics,
techniques, and procedures; and (2) Procure a next-generation
spectrally beam-combined HELIOS laser weapon system in FY 2028
for delivery within the future years defense program. Such a
system should leverage existing industrial base technologies,
operate in the 100-150 kilowatt class to expand engagement
range, and integrate with existing ship combat systems while
adhering to DDG 51-class space, weight, and power requirements.

Drone and interceptor manufacturing hub

The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense
lacks a manufacturing hub for joint autonomous maneuver
systems, low-cost interceptors, and their key component
technologies. While the committee agrees that a commercial-
first approach is key to innovation, particularly for small
autonomous systems, we do believe that there is an urgent need
and long-term demand for the organic industrial base to have
sufficient manufacturing capacity for larger autonomous
maneuver systems. Limiting factors to full-scale manufacturing
for these systems include supply chain gaps, high production
costs, and a small number of available military-grade test
sites.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a report, not later than April 15, 2027, to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
on ongoing efforts to support the production, testing, and
sustainment of autonomous maneuver systems, their components,
and low-cost interceptors.
The report shall include:
(1) An overview of efforts to accelerate production
and fielding of next-generation autonomous systems and
low-cost interceptor capabilities;
(2) A description of activities to strengthen and
expand domestic supply chains for critical drone and
counter-drone components, including motors, batteries,
sensors, and related technologies;
(3) How the Army is enabling rapid scaling of drone
production and low-cost interceptor systems through
advanced manufacturing;
(4) An assessment of how advanced manufacturing
techniques may support increased production capacity
and surge requirements;
(5) An overview of how testing, requirements
development, and evaluation activities are coordinated
across the Department, including through designated
test ranges and relevant Army organizations involved in
autonomous systems development, production, and
sustainment, including next-generation maneuver systems
technologies led by the Ground Vehicle Systems Center
and sustainment operations at the Tank-automotive
Armaments Command; and
(6) A discussion of potential applications of
advanced manufacturing technologies to support repair,
maintenance, and sustainment activities for autonomous
systems and low-cost interceptors.

Ensuring commercialization for shelf-stable blood prototype

The committee applauds the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency's (DARPA) research and prototyping of shelf-
stable blood through the Fieldable Solutions for Hemorrhage
with bio-Artificial Resuscitation Products (FSHARP) program.
Utilizing biotechnology, this innovation has the potential to
save countless warfighters' lives by enabling rapid access to
blood at the front lines. The committee is eager to see this
research successfully transitioned to operational use and
commercialized for deployment.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering to brief the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
not later than January 1, 2027, on the status of the shelf-
stable blood program. The briefing shall include:
(1) The current status of the research and
prototyping efforts;
(2) Efforts to commercialize the research, including
the identification of transition partners within the
Department of Defense;
(3) Challenges to commercialization and a plan to
address those challenges;
(4) The known and anticipated benefits of fielding
shelf-stable blood, including cost savings and a
quantitative assessment of warfighter lives saved; and
(5) A plan for deployment and operational fielding of
the shelf-stable blood product.

Environmental Security Technology Certification Program

The committee recognizes the significant success of the
Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP)
in identifying, demonstrating, and transitioning innovative
technologies that improve military capability, installation
resilience, energy security, and environmental performance. The
committee notes that ESTCP has proven effective in validating
emerging technologies in operational environments, accelerating
technology adoption, reducing lifecycle costs, strengthening
mission assurance, and enhancing military readiness across the
Armed Forces.
The committee further recognizes the value of ESTCP-
supported projects focused on energy resilience and
infrastructure modernization at National Guard facilities
operating in harsh cold-weather environments. The committee
notes that these projects are helping evaluate and demonstrate
resilient energy technologies, advanced microgrid capabilities,
distributed energy resources, and high-efficiency heating and
energy systems designed to improve reliability, reduce
operational energy costs, and support continued mission
operations during severe weather events and grid disruptions.
The committee believes these demonstrations provide scalable
models that can strengthen energy security and installation
resilience across other Department of Defense facilities facing
similar environmental and infrastructure challenges. The
committee encourages the Department of Defense to continue
investing in ESTCP projects as a mechanism for improving
operational effectiveness and enhancing installation resilience
across the military departments.

Feasibility of using large unmanned aerial vehicles for missile
integration and development as a service

The committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, in coordination with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Direct Reporting
Program Manager for Golden Dome for America, and the Director
of the Missile Defense Agency, to brief the congressional
defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027, on the
feasibility and advisability of establishing a program to use
large unmanned aerial vehicles provided via a contracted
service model to assist with missile technology development,
testing, integration, and operations.
In preparing this briefing, the Under Secretary should
evaluate, at a minimum: (1) Desirable payload and range
requirements; (2) The viability of unmanned systems to simulate
adversarial missile threats during live-fire test events and
exercises; (3) Utility for provision of telemetry and other
test assessment functions; (4) Potential efficacy of unmanned
systems to provide real-time intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance support for missile targeting and guidance
systems; (5) Capability to support testing for vehicle mounted
strike payloads and defensive countermeasures; (6)
Cybersecurity risks and metrics for evaluating software
security for potential vendor offerings; and (7) Opportunities
and risks of collaboration with allied governments.

High-altitude warfare strategy

The committee recognizes the stratosphere as an emerging,
competitive, and largely unclaimed operational domain with
significant potential to provide resilient, near-space
capability across sensing, communications, positioning,
navigation, command and control, and effects delivery in
contested environments. The committee views high-altitude
capabilities as a critical layer in a diversified and
survivable architecture aligned with the National Defense
Strategy's emphasis on mass, scale, and deterrence through
denial using low-cost, attritable systems.
While the Department of Defense has made sustained
investments in stratospheric platforms, including high-altitude
balloons, pseudo-satellites, and other unmanned systems, the
committee is concerned that fragmented funding, limited
coordination, and the absence of a unified acquisition strategy
have slowed the transition of these capabilities from
experimentation to operational, scalable use. The committee
further notes that high-altitude balloon systems, in
particular, offer a cost-effective, persistent capability, but
the Department has not fielded any of them at scale or
adequately integrated them into operational planning.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and
with inputs from the geographic combatant commands, to provide
a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later
than March 31, 2027, on a comprehensive concept for sustained
high-altitude and stratospheric operations.
The briefing shall include:
(1) An overview of current investments and
coordination across the Department;
(2) An integrated operational concept spanning
missions including intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; communications; positioning;
navigation; command and control; integrated fire
control; air defense; long-range fires; and indications
and warning;
(3) The role of low-cost, attritable systems,
including high-altitude balloons, in enabling mass,
persistence, and distributed operations;
(4) Strategies to leverage commercial technologies;
(5) Policy, budgetary, and industrial base changes
needed to accelerate adoption;
(6) An assessment of requirements, plans, and risks
for establishing and sustaining a necessary stockpile
of prepositioned high-altitude balloons and payloads to
support combatant command contingency plans; and
(7) The Department's acquisition strategy,
distribution plan, and concept of operations to ensure
these capabilities are fielded at scale and integrated
into operational use.

High-power microwave research

The committee strongly supports continued investment in
directed energy systems by the Air Force to counter emerging
aerial threats to air bases and aerial platforms. Specifically,
the committee encourages the Secretary of the Air Force to
identify opportunities to realize the benefits associated with
directed energy and high-power microwave (HPM) systems. As the
Air Force works with industry to apply mature HPM technology to
defeat emerging threats, the committee supports the
continuation of such research, in collaboration with the
Department of Energy, and encourages the expansion of work on
solid-state HPM to deliver operational capabilities.

Hypersonic test infrastructure under Multi-Service Advanced Capability
Hypersonic Test Bed program

The committee supports the efforts underway by the
Department of Defense to increase the cadence of hypersonic
flight tests under the Multi-Service Advanced Capability
Hypersonic Test Bed (MACH-TB) program. Congress has supported
this effort through substantial funding to rapidly scale this
national security imperative. The committee believes the
testing enabled by the MACH-TB program is foundational to the
success of development and procurement of operational weapons
capability.

Interagency contribution to centralized repository on critical
infrastructure

The committee notes the Department of Defense (DOD) manages
one of the largest physical infrastructures in the Federal
Government. Research related to the Department's energy
consumption, resilience investments, grid modernization
efforts, and operational energy requirements represents high
value unclassified information that must be curated
accordingly. In fiscal year 2026, Congress directed the
establishment of a centralized repository through the
Department of Energy for publicly available research produced
by national laboratories, universities, and entities across the
energy infrastructure sector. The repository is intended to
provide a secure, independently managed platform where
stakeholders in regulated utility industries can access and
evaluate research, policy issues, and the operational impacts
of decisions affecting the provision of power to Federal
agencies. The committee believes that expanding access to this
information would improve research visibility, accelerate
innovation, and strengthen national resilience across the
energy and cybersecurity sectors.
The committee also notes that a persistent challenge is
that the DOD relies heavily on civilian power infrastructure it
does not control and has limited visibility into the electric
grid beyond installation boundaries, while utilities often lack
insight into the current and future power demands of nearby
military installations. Further, aging infrastructure,
increasing demand from advanced technologies, and growing cyber
threats continue to strain grid reliability and create risks to
mission readiness.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the DOD to contribute
to the repository based on research results of unclassified
data. Additionally, the DOD should continue to invest in its
aging infrastructure to improve both physical and cyber
vulnerabilities.

JASON's study on co-authorship metrics and university research security

The committee is aware of increased focus on protecting
Department of Defense-funded university research from
exploitation by potential adversaries. The committee is also
aware that in recent years there has been a growing reliance by
government agencies, external analysts, and third-party vendors
on publication co-authorship data as a proxy for assessing
potential national security risk in university and national
laboratory research partnerships. In particular, the mere
presence of an international co-author, sometimes affiliated
with an entity or country of concern, has increasingly been
used to suggest problematic collaboration, despite the fact
that academic co-authorship often reflects limited, indirect,
or historical scholarly engagement rather than active or
significant institutional partnership that poses legitimate
national security risks.
The committee believes that a deeper assessment of this
challenge would be useful in tailoring approaches to research
security and understanding the true vulnerabilities that might
exist, especially when some level of engagement might actually
be helpful to our understanding of the rate of progress for
some of those adversary countries. The committee is concerned
that co-authorship based analyses risk producing false
positives that conflate open scientific norms with malign
activity. This is particularly acute in fields where large,
international author lists are standard, or where datasets,
methodologies, or software are reused across borders without
sustained collaboration.
Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense Research and Engineering to conduct a study through the
independent scientific advisory group known as JASON to examine
the validity of the use of academic publication co-authorship
as an indicator of potential national security risk associated
with U.S. university research and national laboratory
partnerships and deliver a report to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than December 1, 2027. The study shall assess the
following: (1) The scientific validity and limitations of using
publication co-authorship data to infer research collaboration,
technology transfer, or institutional partnership risk; (2) The
extent to which co-authorship accurately reflects the nature,
depth, and intent of collaboration in fields involving
fundamental research; (3) Distinctions between benign scholarly
exchanges and collaborations that may present national
security, export control, or foreign influence concerns; (4)
Methodological risks, including false positives,
misattribution, and lack of contextual information, associated
with the use of co-authorship-based analyses in risk
assessments; (5) Differences in the relevance of co-authorship
metrics across disciplines, including but not limited to the
physical sciences, life sciences, engineering, and
computational fields; (6) The degree to which reliance on co-
authorship metrics may disproportionately affect open research
environments at institutions of higher education and have a
chilling effect on beneficial international collaborations; (7)
Best practices for incorporating co-authorship data, if at all,
into holistic research security and counterintelligence
assessments; and (8) Alternative or complementary indicators
that may provide a more accurate, contextualized, and risk
informed basis for evaluating university research partnerships.
The final report shall be unclassified but may include a
classified annex.

Low-cost undersea effectors

The committee recognizes that the Navy's existing undersea
weapons programs, including heavyweight and lightweight
torpedoes, are highly capable and optimized for high-end
conflict against peer adversary naval platforms such as capital
ships, submarines, and larger resupply vessels. However, these
munitions-launched from submarines, surface ships, and
antisubmarine warfare aircraft-are expensive and limited in
quantity, and it is essential to preserve these high-cost
capabilities for appropriate high-end threats.
The committee is aware of the Defense Innovation Unit's
(DIU) Low Cost Undersea Effectors (LCUE) Problem Set 1 (PS1),
which is designed to accelerate the development of affordable,
small unmanned underwater vehicles capable of serving as
kinetic weapons. These platforms could leverage the existing
lightweight torpedo form factor while being optimized for a
distinct target set and compatible with a broader range of
launch platforms. These systems are intended to support subsea
and seabed warfare, intelligence surveillance and
reconnaissance, and expeditionary missions while delivering
scalable kinetic effects against lower-end maritime targets.
Given that current and future naval combat scenarios are likely
to involve both high-end naval combatants and large numbers of
lower-end quasi-naval and maritime militia vessels, the Joint
Force must field both high-end capabilities and, in significant
quantities, low-cost undersea effectors.
The committee believes that funding and executing LCUE PS1
to its intended scope, while rapidly transitioning viable
systems into scaled production and operational use, could
provide the mass and capacity required for distributed maritime
operations. The committee further believes the Department of
the Navy should leverage rapid acquisition authorities,
including other transaction authorities; appropriate research,
development, test, and evaluation; and procurement accounts, to
accelerate procurement and fielding of successful LCUE PS1
systems.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy,
in coordination with the director of the Defense Innovation
Unit, to submit a briefing to the Armed Services Committees of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
January 1, 2027, including:
(1) Plans to transition capabilities and solutions
emerging from LCUE PS1 into fleet experimentation,
procurement, and programs of record;
(2) Plans to begin limited procurement of successful
LCUE PS1 awardees for operational experimentation and
fleet integration; and
(3) Any additional recommendations for funding or
acquisition guidance, including any necessary
legislative changes, that would accelerate the
deployment of LCUE PS1 capabilities.

Net assessment of biotechnology efforts of China

The committee is concerned that the U.S. Government is
inadequately informed about its current position in global
biotechnology competition relative to other countries,
especially near-peer countries like China.
Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the Office
of Net Assessment, in coordination with the Biotechnology
Management Office established as part of section 242 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public
Law 119-60), to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the
current state of biotechnology, not later than April 1, 2027.
The briefing shall include an assessment of the state of
bioindustrials, biomanufacturing, and other non-pharmaceutical
biotechnology applications in the United States vis-a-vis near-
peer competitors. The briefing shall also assess factors
related to U.S. competitiveness in developing, scaling, and
commercializing biotechnology, including research, workforce,
infrastructure, supply chain vulnerabilities, and available
private capital.

Next generation ballistic eye protection

The committee is concerned by the disproportionate impact
of optical trauma on the battlefield, noting that eye injuries
represent 13 to 14 percent of all casualties. With improved
composite technology achieving greater than the currently
required 660 feet-per-second fragmentation protection in
lightweight eyewear, the committee is interested in Army
efforts to integrate these advanced capabilities into its
formations. The committee supports the development of next-
generation ballistic eye protection across lightweight
spectacles, goggles, Rapid Light Adaptive Eyewear, and other
compatible systems.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a briefing, not later than February 26, 2027, to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representative
on the status of the Army's efforts to provide improved
ballistic eye protection. The briefing shall include: (1) The
status of current ballistic eye protection programs; (2) The
status of next-generation eye protection development; (3)
Timeline for Authorized Protective Eyewear list certification;
(4) A description of Army efforts to integrate improved
ballistic eye protection with modernization efforts such as
Soldier Borne Mission Command; (5) Projected fielding schedule
of approved advanced capabilities; and (6) Any additional
matters the Secretary deems relevant.

Plan for public-private partnerships for drone capabilities development

The committee is encouraged by the efforts undertaken by
the Department of Defense, especially with regard to the Drone
Dominance Program, to rapidly scale the domestic U.S. drone
manufacturing base and field significant numbers of low-cost
attack drones and training. Real-world combat environments in
Europe and the Middle East have demonstrated the clear need for
the fielding of significant numbers of low-cost drones to
accomplish a range of mission sets including offensive
operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and
counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) actions. Given the pace
of global innovation in the use of low-cost drones, including
rapid changes to the base technology through the equipping of
modifiers like fiber optic cables, changes in battlefield
tactics like the use of larger bomber drones to degrade
resupply capabilities, and beyond, being able to not only field
drones at scale but also rapidly train and retrain personnel in
their use and the most effective battlefield tactics is
critical. The committee is concerned that current Department
processes and capabilities may be insufficient to effectuate
the large-scale training of personnel necessary to field the
drones procured through the Drone Dominance Program and that
the adoption of best practices and tactics gleaned from
European and Middle Eastern conflicts is not occurring rapidly
enough given the pace of battlefield innovation.
The Department has long enjoyed a synergistic relationship
with the private sector and academia, which is a key source of
innovation in the U.S. economy and a unique differentiator in
the development of U.S. defense capabilities. As such, the
committee urges the Department to consider ways to further
cooperate with the private sector and academia to provide
training and support in the use of drones and related
technologies such as counter-UAS systems and electronic warfare
to armed forces personnel.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a
report to the congressional defense committees, not later than
February 28, 2027, on:
(1) The Department's existing efforts related to
training armed forces personnel in drone operations,
maintenance, and battlefield tactics, including any
partnerships with private sector entities and academia;
(2) An estimate of how many personnel will be trained
through existing and planned programs by the end of
2028 and how this aligns with the current Department
objectives for fielding drones at scale;
(3) An assessment of how the Department could
leverage public-private partnerships to expedite the
training of armed forces personnel in the operations
and maintenance of drone technologies;
(4) An assessment of the use of existing public-
private partnerships to provide drone training and
tactics to armed forces and personnel in recent
conflict environments in Europe and the Middle East and
the potential for integrating best practices into U.S.
efforts and plans; and
(5) A strategy for the development of a pilot program
for drone training public-private partnerships which:
(a) contain no fewer than three U.S.-based
facilities;
(b) would begin training within 12 months;
(c) would include identified potential
partners such as universities and community
colleges with existing drone training programs;
(d) identifies funding and payment mechanisms
necessary to execute the pilot program;
(e) examines the use of grants to develop
such partnerships; and
(f) identifies any authorities, resources,
and organizational structure changes necessary
to execute the pilot program.

Report on electric and hybrid-electric powertrain options for special
operations light tactical vehicles

The committee notes ongoing advancements in commercial
automotive propulsion technologies and believes these
developments may hold long-term utility for military
applications. Integrating alternative power systems into
tactical mobility platforms could enhance operational
capabilities and provide key efficiencies in theater. However,
the committee recognizes that introducing new technologies into
complex, asymmetric operational environments presents
logistical and performance trade-offs that require careful
study.
Because special operations forces are uniquely positioned
to evaluate and iterate on these types of technological
innovations, further analysis is required to balance
battlefield modernization with existing mission constraints.
Therefore, the committee directs the Commander, U.S.
Special Operations Command to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027,
on the availability and suitability of electric and hybrid-
electric powertrain technologies for Lightweight Tactical All-
Terrain Vehicles (LTATVs).
The report shall include the following:
(1) A survey of modular electric powertrain systems
available from domestic small businesses and
nontraditional defense contractors that are capable of
augmenting or replacing internal combustion engines on
existing LTATV chassis, including systems providing
silent mobility, thermal signature reduction, vehicle-
mounted electrical power export, and autonomous or
remotely operated movement capabilities;
(2) An analysis of the acoustic, thermal, and
electromagnetic signature reduction benefits of such
systems and their operational relevance to special
operations missions, including clandestine target
approach, offset infiltration, and operations in fuel-
denied environments; and
(3) Recommended acquisition pathways for
transitioning mature electric powertrain technologies
from small business developers into the LTATVs program
of record, including the use of other transaction
authority under sections 4021-4022 of title 10, United
States Code, and the Small Business Innovation Research
program (as described in section 9 of the Small
Business Act (15 U.S.C. 638)).
The required report shall be submitted in unclassified form
but may include a classified annex.

Reusable hypersonics development and transition

The committee continues to support the development of
reusable hypersonic aircraft and associated technologies that
can enhance the Department of Defense's ability to rapidly
develop, test, and field advanced air systems. The committee is
tracking departmental plans for reusable hypersonic flight
demonstrations and related technology maturation efforts.
However, the committee remains concerned about schedule delays
resulting from insufficient budget planning and the absence of
a clearly defined transition strategy to guide promising
technologies from research and development through testing,
acquisition, and operational use.
Reducing schedule risk will require maximizing the use of
mature and previously demonstrated technologies, including
propulsion systems like turbine engines and scramjets, high-
temperature materials, fuels, flight controls, and other
enabling capabilities rather than initiating duplicative
development efforts. The committee believes that leveraging
investments made across the Department, including those
undertaken by military departments, defense agencies, federally
funded research and development centers, and industry partners
can accelerate progress and improve affordability.
To ensure effective integration of existing hypersonics
investments and to support timely transition of reusable
hypersonic capabilities, the committee directs the Principal
Director for Hypersonics to provide a briefing to the Senate
Armed Services Committee, not later than June 30, 2027, on
Department-wide efforts to leverage prior and ongoing
hypersonics development activities. The briefing should
include: (1) Current plans for transitioning reusable
hypersonic technologies from demonstration and experimentation
into testing, evaluation, acquisition, and operational use; (2)
Projected funding requirements needed to maintain planned
schedules; and (3) Any anticipated funding, administrative,
industrial base, or technology development challenges that
could delay progress.

Special operations unmanned aerial systems

The committee notes the importance of rapidly fielding and
sustaining uncrewed aerial system capabilities to meet mission
requirements in a dynamic operating environment. Further, the
committee recognizes the value of integrated enterprise
approaches that improve visibility, compliance, and speed in
emerging technology procurement.
The committee is aware of the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command program, ``Buying Drones by the Kilo'' (BDK) Emerging
Technology Platform initiative, which is intended to transform
how autonomous systems are identified, tested, procured,
fielded, and sustained. The committee encourages the U.S. Army
Special Operations Command to identify and pursue opportunities
to scale the BDK Emerging Technology Platform to facilitate
enhanced access to approved autonomous systems, improve
sustainment and lifecycle visibility, and reduce administrative
friction for end users.
The committee directs the Commander, U.S. Army Special
Operations Command, and the Chief of Staff of the Army to
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
December 1, 2026, on ongoing or planned efforts to scale and
sustain the BDK Emerging Technology Platform in future fiscal
years.

Torpedo tube launch and recovery capability for unmanned undersea
vehicles

The committee recognizes the critical importance of
advancing undersea warfare capabilities to maintain strategic
and tactical superiority in maritime operations around the
world. The deployment of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) from
submarines, using the autonomous torpedo tube launch and
recovery (TTL&R) capability that has been repeatably
demonstrated during Project RATTRAP in real-world conditions,
is a key capability that enhances the submarine fleet's
operational flexibility and effectiveness. RATTRAP TTL&R could
provide substantial benefits to national security by enabling
submarines to deploy and recover UUVs discreetly, thereby
extending their tactical reach well beyond their covert
position. This capability could enable our naval forces to
conduct more productive intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance missions, mine countermeasure operations, and
other valuable undersea activities with substantially reduced
risk to the submarine, the crew, and the U.S. Government.
Further, the technologically advanced capability would
substantially increase operational reach without compromising
submarine stealth characteristics.
The committee commends the Navy and the Defense Innovation
Unit for their investments to add this critical capability to
our undersea warfare strategy and directs the Secretary of the
Navy to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than January 1, 2027, on the Navy's plans
to integrate UUVs with RATTRAP TTL&R functionality across the
entire submarine fleet, including planned budgetary allocations
for the acquisition and sustainment of TTL&R-capable UUVs
through future budget requests.

Trusted foundry

The committee remains concerned about keeping the defense
microelectronics supply chains secure and protected from
adversarial influence, especially considering that a majority
of the global semiconductor foundry production occurs abroad.
The committee notes the continuing work of the Trusted Access
Program within the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA),
which is responsible for accrediting secure suppliers for
mission-critical efforts. DMEA's work ensures that the U.S.
military and the Department of Defense maintain access to a
secure supply of microelectronics through trusted suppliers,
despite the fact that much of the microelectronics industry has
rushed to take advantage of low-cost Chinese products without
trusted and assured supply chain verification.
Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide a briefing
on the use of trusted foundries to the Senate Armed Services
Committee, not later than December 1, 2026. The briefing shall
include: (1) How DMEA will continue validating requirements for
trusted microelectronics; (2) How the Department will continue
to maintain and resource DMEA and Trusted Foundries in the
outyears of the future years defense plan; (3) How the
Department will increase access and research and development
opportunities for suppliers to utilize the Trusted Access
Program; and (4) How access to trusted suppliers might be
broadened to include adjacent markets for which secure, assured
supply is needed.

University affiliated research centers

The committee recognizes that universities, University
Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), and their partners serve
as trusted, long-term collaborators with the Department of
Defense (DOD), maintaining specialized capabilities essential
to mission success that are not readily available in the
commercial sector. The committee believes that universities in
rural regions of the United States have significant
contributions to make to the Department's research mission that
remain underutilized, specifically in Defense Established
Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (DEPSCoR) states. The
committee further believes that sustained investment by the
Department in university research, including UARCs and their
partners, helps ensure the United States maintains its
technological edge over near-peer competitors in emerging
technologies and critical defense capabilities.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering to assess the feasibility
and advisability of establishing new UARCs or other research
partnerships with universities located in DEPSCoR states and
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January
15, 2027. The briefing shall include the following: (1) A
process for assessing topical areas of interest for the
Department where a UARC might serve DOD needs; (2) A process
for identifying and soliciting proposals from relevant,
eligible universities in DEPSCoR states; (3) Assessment
criteria the DOD would use for evaluating proposals; and (4)
Description of the kinds of resources or support required from
the host institution or institutions for which they will be
responsible under a proposed UARC agreement.

Unmanned surface vessel experimentation for Naval Special Warfare

The committee recognizes that critical capability gaps must
be rapidly addressed to assure Naval Special Warfare achieves
operational maritime dominance in contested maritime
environments. The committee applauds the ongoing unmanned
surface vessel experimentation and assessment conducted by U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and Naval Special Warfare
Command.
The committee encourages SOCOM and Naval Special Warfare to
continue with their rapid assessment and deployment of mature
technologies, prioritizing those with modular and mission-
tailorable payload features and those which are low-cost.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Commander, SOCOM, to
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the
status of their experimentation with low-cost, scalable, open
architecture unmanned surface vessel platforms. The briefing
should include lessons learned, programmatic planning and
status, and details on which capabilities possess the following
features:
(1) Open architecture;
(2) Interoperability with Joint and allied forces;
(3) Low cost;
(4) Rapid scalability; and
(5) Program development and challenges.

Unmanned undersea vessels for long-range subsea logistics support

The committee recognizes the growing operational challenges
associated with sustaining distributed maritime forces across
the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific theater. In particular,
the ability to move critical supplies, equipment, and mission
payloads between forward locations while minimizing risk to
crewed platforms will be essential to maintaining operational
resilience in a contested environment. The committee believes
that long-range unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) offer
significant potential to augment existing logistics
capabilities by enabling low-signature, persistent delivery of
mission-critical supplies to distributed forces and forward
operating locations. Such systems could provide an important
complement to traditional surface and air logistics platforms,
particularly in denied or contested maritime environments.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Department of the
Navy to:
(1) Accelerate the evaluation, experimentation, and
operational testing of long-range UUV platforms capable
of supporting logistics and resupply missions;
(2) Leverage ongoing prototyping, commercial
technologies, and autonomous maritime systems
development efforts for low-cost, low-maintenance UUV
platforms that can be stored, assembled, loaded, and
deployed at the point of deployment with minimal
manpower;
(3) Prioritize the evaluation of these capabilities
in support of operational requirements within the Indo-
Pacific area of responsibility and in coordination with
the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; and
(4) Pursue acquisition strategies that enable rapid
fielding of proven systems to support distributed
maritime operations and enhance logistics resilience
across the Indo-Pacific theater.

Use of non-destructive inspection and automated defect recognition
techniques in the Department of Defense

The committee is concerned that current U.S. Marine Corps
body armor inspection systems rely on two-dimensional x-ray
scans and manual testing, which often miss defects and
structural issues, are slow and laborious, and involve
inefficient life-cycle management processes. Modern computed
tomography technology, supported by artificial intelligence,
can enable rapid and comprehensive three-dimensional scanning
of body armor and increase the detection of defects,
delamination, and other structural issues through non-
destructive inspection (NDI) and automated defect recognition
(ADR). These capabilities have the potential to enhance
warfighter protection and military readiness, avoid unnecessary
replacement costs, and support faster, data-driven decisions.
The committee notes modern NDI and ADR capabilities have been
successfully demonstrated through academic partners.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees,
not later than December 1, 2026, on the feasibility of
expanding the use of these capabilities across the Department.
The briefing shall include the following: (1) The readiness
risk of outdated armor inspection systems in the military
departments; (2) Potential avenues to adopt NDI and ADR for
body armor in the military departments; (3) An assessment of
using NDI and ADR in inspecting other forms of military
materiel; (4) The feasibility and advisability of establishing
multi-site pilot programs for automated or high-throughput
armor NDI and ADR; and (5) An assessment of the feasibility and
advisability of creating an NDI/ADR Center of Excellence to
develop standard operating procedures, training, and regular
performance reporting with key performance parameters related
to NDI and ADR approaches.

Western Regional Range Complex demonstration

The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense's
test and evaluation capacity for electronic warfare (EW),
electromagnetic spectrum operations, and their impact on multi-
domain autonomous systems is insufficient to meet growing
threats. Spectrum warfare, unmanned aerial systems (UAS),
counter-UAS operations, and joint all-domain contested
environments are increasingly decisive, yet limited range
access and long wait times continue to slow development and
fielding.
The committee therefore directs the Director of the Test
Resource Management Center, in coordination with the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments, to
provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not
later than April 1, 2027, on how the Western Regional Range
Complex demonstration, required under section 227 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public
Law 119-60), will provide an integrated multi-domain
demonstration of joint all-domain command and control of
unmanned aerial systems in a highly contested electromagnetic
environment. The briefing shall include an assessment of the
adequacy of existing military installations and the feasibility
and advisability of establishing a permanent test-range
capability that minimizes disruptions to overhead air traffic
and surrounding civilian populations and provides streamlined,
equitable access for nontraditional contractors and new
entrants developing capabilities on private capital.

TITLE III--OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations

Sec. 301--Authorization of appropriations

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for operation and maintenance activities at the
levels identified in section 4301 of division D of this Act.

Subtitle B--Energy and Environment

Sec. 311--Modifications to Advanced Nuclear Transition Working Group

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 319 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) to reassign the Chair of
the Advanced Nuclear Transition Working Group from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and
Environment.

Sec. 312--Prioritization of deployment of expeditionary solid waste
disposal systems

The committee recommends a provision that would prioritize
the deployment of expeditionary solid waste disposal systems to
contingency locations where open air burn pits remain in use
and other locations where members of the Armed Forces face
elevated exposure risk due to the absence of feasible waste
disposal alternatives.

Sec. 313--Authorization of sustainable aviation fuel procurement

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Department of Defense to procure sustainable aviation fuel
above the market rate for traditional aviation fuel, as part of
the Department's sustainable aviation fuel pilot program.

Sec. 314--Grid resiliency and energy redundancy

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2911(e) of title 10, United States Code, to require the
Secretary of Defense to consider the value of operational
redundancy in both the primary procurement sourcing of energy
and the specific physical categories of energy utilized for
critical mission infrastructure, ensuring the continuous
availability of independent baseload generation capacities in
the event of commercial or regional utility disruption, for the
purpose of developing and implementing the energy performance
goals and energy performance master plan.

Sec. 315--Mandatory grid impact and infrastructure power requirements
for enhanced use leases

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that any enhanced use lease
executed, extended, or renewed under sections 2667 and 2662 of
title 10, United States Code, for the purposes of
infrastructure, facility modernization, or energy production of
the Department of Defense shall include a comprehensive
assessment of localized grid impacts and infrastructure power
demands.

Sec. 316--Storage capacity enhancements

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command, the Director of the Defense Logistics
Agency, and the Secretaries of the military departments, to
submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a
comprehensive master plan to expand, harden, and optimize bulk
storage capacity at strategic locations worldwide.

Sec. 317--Revision of policy on use of open-air burn pits not
controlled by Department of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to revise the policy of the Department of
Defense governing the use of open-air burn pits consistent with
the findings and recommendations contained in the report by the
Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DODIG-2024-
107).

Sec. 318--Assessment of energy supplied to installations and
operational forces of the Department of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Commander, U.S.
Transportation Command and the Director of the Defense
Logistics Agency, to submit to the congressional defense
committees, not later than 120 days after the date of enactment
of this Act, a comprehensive assessment of the current status,
sourcing, and security of all forms of energy supplied to
installations and operational forces of the Department of
Defense.

Sec. 319--Requirement of notice on updates to public dashboard on
remediation of perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Department of Defense to provide semiannual notices to the
Environmental Protection Agency and to the Congress when it
updates its public dashboard on remediation of perfluoroalkyl
and polyfluoroalkyl substances.

Sec. 320--Revisions to technical assistance for public participation in
defense environmental restoration activities

The committee recommends a provision that would revise
regulations relating to technical assistance for public
participation in defense environmental restoration activities.

Sec. 320A--Study on contracting process of Department of Defense for
remediation of perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a study of
the contracting process of the Department of Defense for
remediation of perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances,
and to report to the Congress the findings of that study at a
mutually agreed upon time.

Sec. 320B--Initiation of remedial actions with respect to
perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to select no fewer than 50 Department of
Defense sites for perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substance
remediation, provided that doing so would be consistent with
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act and any other applicable law.

Subtitle C--Logistics and Sustainment

Sec. 321--Implementation of Comptroller General recommendations on
exercises and wargames in the Indo-Pacific region

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
service Secretaries to develop a plan, not later than 180 days
after the enactment of this Act, and implement several open
recommendations made by four reviews of the Comptroller General
of the United States. The four reviews include: (1)
Recommendations 16 through 20 in the January 30, 2026, report
titled, ``Weapon Systems Maintenance: DOD Needs Enhanced
Assessments and Exercises to Prepare for an Indo-Pacific
Conflict'' (GAO-26-107710C); (2) Recommendations 7 through 11
in the June 26, 2025, report titled, ``Fuel Supply: DOD Is Not
Prepared for a Contested Environment in the Indo-Pacific''
(GAO-25-107216C); (3) Recommendations 7 and 8 in the March 14,
2024, report titled ``Force Structure: Army and Marine Corps
Face Challenges Developing New Multi-Domain Units'' (GAO-24-
106266C); and (4) Recommendations 1 and 2 in the January 30,
2026, report titled, ``Military Readiness: Actions Needed to
Ensure the Reserve Component Will Be Ready to Rapidly Respond
to a Potential Conflict'' (GAO-26-107579C).

Sec. 322--Integration of unmanned systems into the Installation
Physical Security Program

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
development of a plan for the implementation of an Unmanned
Systems for Installation Physical Security Program for
installations and facilities of the Department of the Army
within the United States.

Sec. 323--Guidance regarding governance structure of organic industrial
base of the Army

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Army to establish and publish updated
governance guidance for the Army Organic Industrial Base (OIB)
within 180 days of the date of the enactment of this Act. The
legislation seeks to clarify roles and responsibilities among
Army Materiel Command; the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; Army Sustainment
Command; and other organizations involved in managing OIB
operations, workload, and modernization.
The provision would also require comprehensive multi-year
planning for production, repair activities, modernization
investments, and resourcing strategies across Army arsenals,
depots, and ammunition facilities. Additionally, the provision
would increase congressional oversight by requiring annual
modernization plans and notification to the Congress of
significant workload reductions at OIB sites.

Sec. 324--Extension of deadline for designation of roles and
responsibilities relating to sustainment and readiness of
certain naval surface vessels

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 8698(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, by
extending the start of implementation for the requirements of
such section by 1 year.
The committee notes that the Department of the Navy is
working to implement the requirement for Portfolio Acquisition
Executives (PAEs). The roles and responsibilities for
sustainment activities, including life cycle planning at PAE
Maritime and PAE Undersea and maintenance, repair, and overhaul
execution at PAE Industrial Operations, have not been clearly
described to the committee. The committee emphasizes the need
for the type commanders to have increased responsibilities with
respect to surface ship sustainment.
Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition to brief
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, on a proposed
organizational structure for ship sustainment. The briefing
shall describe clear lines of authority, responsibility, and
accountability for the ship sustainment enterprise. The
committee will use the briefing to inform any modifications to
section 8698 of title 10, United States Code, that may be
required.

Sec. 325--Acquisition and sustainment strategy for spare parts for low
mission capable aircraft

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to establish an acquisition and
sustainment strategy for aircraft spare parts, applicable to
any covered aircraft platform, to maximize competition and
expand the defense industrial base supply chain for
sustainment.

Sec. 326--Helicopter support for Kwajalein Atoll and Ronald Reagan
Space and Missile Test Range, Marshall Islands

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Army, not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, to ensure that a sufficient quantity
of rotary wing assets, including air and maintenance crews,
spares and support equipment, and any other mission critical
personnel or material necessary to support all planned test
events, installation maintenance requirements, and personnel
movement or evacuation contingencies are located on Kwajalein
Atoll and available for mission support and tasking by United
States Army-Kwajalein Atoll and the Ronald Reagan Space and
Missile Test Range.

Sec. 327--Capital expenditure write-offs for Department of Defense
depots and arsenals

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of Defense to eliminate any internal Department
of Defense depreciated costs or cancel any internal Department
debts associated with depots and arsenals from accounts of a
military department or the Department that are associated with
certain capital expenditures that no longer generate revenue
due to mission changes.

Sec. 328--Modification of requirements relating to production in
factories or arsenals owned by the United States

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 7532 of title 10, United States Code, to require
several certifications if the Secretary of the Army chooses to
make munitions or weapon systems outside the organic industrial
base of the Army.

Subtitle D--Reports

Sec. 341--Report on strategy to maintain and upgrade conventional
munitions storage facilities

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of the Army to submit a report to the congressional
defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, on the strategy of the Department of
Defense to maintain and upgrade conventional munitions storage
facilities, both in the continental United States and outside
the continental United States, in order to ensure the safe,
effective, and long-term storage of current and future
conventional munitions inventories.

Sec. 342--Risk assessment of air traffic control systems of Department
of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to conduct a risk assessment to evaluate
the air traffic control systems owned and operated by any
entity of the Department of Defense and operated within U.S.
airspace, and to submit the assessment and plan to modernize
the systems to the congressional defense committees, not later
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
then to update the report yearly thereafter.

Subtitle E--Other Matters

Sec. 351--Modification of depots for which minimum capital investment
is required

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2476(f)(1) of title 10, United States Code, to include
Blue Grass Army Depot, Sierra Army Depot, and Hawthorne Army
Depot to the list of depots for which minimum capital
investment is required.

Sec. 352--Implementation of Department of Defense Inspector General
recommendations relating to evaluation of management of canine
welfare under military working dog program

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of the Air Force to implement recommendations
contained in the Inspector General of the Department of Defense
report dated February 17, 2026, and titled, ``Evaluation of the
DoD Military Working Dog Program's Management of Canine
Welfare'' (DODIG-2026-057).

Sec. 353--Prohibition on operation of connected vehicles of concern on
military installations and other property of the Department of
Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the operation of connected vehicles designed, developed,
manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by,
or subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign entity of concern
on Department of Defense property after January 1, 2029. The
Secretary of Defense must provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees on an implementation plan by
April 1, 2027.

Sec. 354--Limitation on availability of funds for travel expenses of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the obligation or expenditure of 25 percent of the funding
authorized or otherwise made available for the travel expenses
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense until various overdue
reports and other documents are submitted to the congressional
defense committees.

Sec. 355--Limitation on use of travel funds for Secretary of the Air
Force until briefing on West Lab Project at Lincoln Laboratory

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
use of certain travel funds of the Secretary of the Air Force
until the Secretary provides a briefing on the status of the
West Lab Project at the Lincoln Laboratory of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.

Sec. 356--Naming of certain assets of the Department of Defense in the
Commonwealth of Virginia

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, not later than 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, to implement the naming recommendations
for assets of the Department of Defense in the Commonwealth of
Virginia that were recommended by the renaming commission
established under section 370(b) of the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021 (Public Law 116-283).

Sec. 357--Administrative requirements for Military Aviation and
Installation Assurance Clearinghouse

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 183a of title 10, United States Code, to require the
Secretary of Defense to complete any review under subsection
(d) of that section, including any mitigation discussions that
the Secretary deems appropriate, and to issue a final
determination within 180 days after the Department of Defense
receives notice of a proposed project, and for other purposes.

Budget Items

Redistribution of funding associated with proposed alternative military
basic pay increase

The committee notes that the President's budget request
proposes an alternative military pay raise structure of 7
percent for members in grades E-5 and below, 6 percent for
members in grades E-6 through 0-3, and 5 percent for members in
grades 0-4 and above, at an estimated cost of approximately
$2.3 billion above the statutory 3.6 percent Employment Cost
Index (ECI)-based pay adjustment required under section 1009 of
title 37, United States Code.
The committee recognizes the importance of maintaining
competitive compensation for members of the Armed Forces and
notes that Congress enacted a targeted 14 percent pay increase
for junior enlisted servicemembers in the Servicemember Quality
of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159). The committee further
notes that the Department's own Fourteenth Quadrennial Review
of Military Compensation (QRMC) raised concerns regarding the
long-term effects of disproportionate increases concentrated
within a single segment of the basic pay table, including the
potential for increased compression across enlisted pay grades.
The QRMC also recommended benchmarking military compensation
against the 75th percentile of civilian earnings for
individuals of comparable age and experience and noted that
junior enlisted compensation already exceeded that benchmark
prior to the enactment of the fiscal year 2025 pay increase.
Currently, junior enlisted pay is well over the 90th percentile
of civilian pay.
At the same time, the committee remains concerned about
inadequacy in some areas of the budget related to quality of
life and readiness. The Defense Health Program has experienced
chronic underinvestment in recent years, contributing to
persistent challenges related to healthcare access, staffing,
and long-term readiness. Testimony of the senior enlisted
members of each military service before the Personnel
Subcommittee in February 2026 reinforced this concern, as many
of these members raised concerns about access to quality
healthcare for servicemembers. The committee also notes ongoing
challenges in recruiting and retaining civilian personnel in
certain high-demand fields and geographic areas, creating
additional workforce pressures across the Department. The
committee further recognizes that targeted investments in
workforce support, quality-of-life initiatives, recruiting
infrastructure, and retention incentives remain critical to
sustaining a high-quality military and civilian workforce
across the Department.
The committee recognizes the importance of maintaining
competitive compensation for members of the Armed Forces and
supports the statutory ECI-based military pay raise for fiscal
year 2027. The committee further recommends redistributing the
funding associated with the proposed alternative military pay
raise in order to sustain the statutory ECI-based pay
adjustment while prioritizing targeted investments in
healthcare, workforce support, readiness, and retention
initiatives across the Department. These investments include an
additional $1.77 billion for the Defense Health Program; $250.9
million for civilian personnel compensation; $126.9 million for
military special and incentive pays; $40.0 million for the
Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency; $38.7 million for child and
youth programs; $28.3 million for tuition assistance and
credentialing assistance programs; $20.0 million for the
Military Entrance Processing Command to support recruiting
operations; $10.0 million for the Defense Suicide Prevention
Office; $10.0 million for the Defense Commissary Agency; and
$5.0 million for guardianship transfer support.

Items of Special Interest

Arctic domain awareness

The committee notes that the rapid strategic emergence of
the Arctic region presents an urgent multi-domain national
security challenge, demanding enhanced domain awareness to
ensure navigational safety and strategic deterrence against
peer adversaries. The Department of Defense's 2024 Arctic
Strategy explicitly acknowledges that the Joint Force's primary
operational barrier is the environment itself, which is further
hampered by a lack of localized sensors and data needed to
accurately forecast and adapt to longer-term climate
projections. This deficit creates dangerous intelligence gaps
and operational security vulnerabilities, as demonstrated
during recent drone trials in Alaska and exercise Arctic Edge
2025, where sub-zero temperatures down to -20+C and severe
magnetic distortions caused rapid battery degradation,
instrumentation failures, and navigation disruptions, limiting
the endurance of autonomous systems and potentially masking
adversary submarine or research vessel incursions.
To mitigate these gaps, the committee believes the
Department must transition from isolated test cycles to a
scalable network of resilient monitoring infrastructure by
leveraging existing facility, human, and technological
resources already established. Creating an integrated ``Arctic
Watchtower'' network framework will allow the Department to
collaboratively gather continuous data sets, field-test cold-
resistant unmanned aerial vehicles and autonomous underwater
vehicles, and rapidly insert mature sensing technologies into
remote frontier sites. This persistent, place-based research
and monitoring footprint is vital to providing the Joint Force
with the close-to-real-time environmental intelligence and
multi-domain awareness required to maintain an uncontested
strategic posture in the polar regions.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 28, 2027, on the Department's strategy to field
resilient monitoring networks and overcome domain awareness
gaps in the Arctic. The briefing shall include: (1) Current and
future requirements to ensure Arctic domain awareness; (2)
Current and planned autonomous detection and tracking systems;
(3) An assessment of current capability gaps regarding material
fatigue, battery life, communications, data integration and
processing, and navigation disruptions in polar environments;
(4) A plan to expand layered sensing networks by utilizing
geographically remote frontier sites and existing gateway
research infrastructure; (5) A framework for scaling
interagency, academic, and tribal collaborations, including the
Arctic Watchtower network concept; and (6) Recommendations on
mitigating existing capability gaps and improving Arctic domain
awareness.

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast services for Air Force
flying installations

The committee is concerned by reports that Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) service contracts at
Air Force installations within the United States, including
Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, are approaching renewal and that
the Air Force may shift responsibility for funding these
services to individual installations. The committee notes that
ADS-B capabilities are critical to the safe integration of
military and civilian aircraft operating within the National
Airspace System and provide enhanced situational awareness,
aircraft identification, and air traffic deconfliction
capabilities for military air traffic controllers and aircrews.
The committee further notes that ADS-B capabilities support
the safe and efficient flow of military and civilian air
traffic operating in the region, including aircraft utilizing
multiple civilian airports.
The committee believes that access to ADS-B services should
be sustained through a deliberate, enterprise-wide strategy
that ensures continued aviation safety, operational readiness,
and training effectiveness across Air Force flying
installations.
Therefore, the committee urges the Secretary of the Air
Force to assure multi-year, funded access to ADS-B services by
all U.S. Air Force flying units to ensure deconfliction of
civilian and military aircraft operating in the United States.

Autonomous or remote-controlled self-propelled railcars

The committee notes that the Army operates and maintains
more than 1,000 miles of railroad track across 60 installations
and upward of 140 diesel locomotives to support heavy
equipment, munitions, and materiel movements, primarily for
switching operations on base. Significant reductions in U88
rail specialists since 2015 have resulted in delays and
cancellations of equipment for training and rehearsals.
According to the Government Accountability Office report,
published August 23, 2021, titled ``Defense Transportation: The
Army Should Take Action to Better Ensure Adequate Rail Support
to Combatant Commanders'' (GAO-21-411), there are specific
concerns over Army readiness for heavy equipment mobilization
that point to weakened operational readiness--particularly Army
mobility. There is a pending demonstration at the Army
Reserve's Operation Sentinel Justice training exercise in June
2026 of autonomous or remote-controlled self-propelled
railcars, which have been shown to reduce the mechanical and
manpower burden for private sector operators.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Army to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than February 1, 2027, on potential costs
and benefits, including manpower and maintenance savings,
through the deployment of autonomous operating capability,
either through the replacement of Army diesel electric
locomotives with new locomotives with autonomous capability or
upgrading existing locomotives with autonomous operating
capability. The briefing should also include a notional Army
Transportation Command plan for implementing any alternatives
identified during the review. The briefing should also examine
the potential contribution of such a capability for operating
in contested environments.

Badlands Bombing Range project

The committee remains concerned with the pace and scope of
environmental restoration efforts relating to munitions and
unexploded ordnance (UXO) on the Pine Ridge Reservation in
South Dakota. The committee believes the Secretary of the Army,
acting through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the
Secretary of the Air Force should be conducting government-to-
government consultation with the Oglala Sioux Tribe with
respect to all environmental restoration activities on the Pine
Ridge Reservation funded through the Defense Environmental
Restoration Program, including activities funded through the
Formerly Used Defense Sites account and the Environmental
Restoration, Air Force account. The committee notes that such
consultation should be consistent with Executive Order 13175,
the Department of Defense American Indian and Alaska Native
Policy, and the requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Public Law
96-510), including the provisions governing Federal facilities
and consultation with affected Tribes and communities.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army and the
Secretary of the Air Force to provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees on the resources required for
environmental restoration activities on the Pine Ridge
Reservation, including activities funded through the Defense
Environmental Restoration Program, not later than January 7,
2027. The briefing should include considerations on the
resources needed for the investigation, assessment,
remediation, mitigation, and public outreach efforts relating
to UXO and associated hazards on the Reservation, as well as
what resources would be required to expedite and then sustain
the pace of remediation necessary to protect the health and
safety of tribal members, including increasing the resources
necessary to carry out the Oglala Sioux Tribe's UXO mitigation
efforts through the Badlands Bombing Range Project.

Briefing on defense reactor spent fuel management

Given the Department of Defense's stated plans to deploy
nuclear reactors on military installations, the committee
believes that the Department of Defense should fully assess and
share with the Congress its plans for managing used nuclear
fuel.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy and the
Chair of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to submit a
briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on
the Department of Defense's framework for managing spent
nuclear fuel associated with its deployment of nuclear power
systems, including the expected quantities, characteristics,
and lifecycle profiles of spent fuel and associated high-level
waste streams. The briefing shall include: (1) An assessment of
the expected quantities, characteristics, and lifecycle
profiles of used nuclear fuel and associated high-level waste
streams, including advanced fuel forms, generated by projected
Department of Defense deployments of small modular reactors or
other advanced nuclear systems at installations and potential
forward or remote locations; (2) A description of current
Department of Defense and Department of Energy authorities,
policies, and infrastructure applicable to the handling,
transportation, storage, recycling, reuse, or disposition of
used nuclear fuel generated by such systems; (3) An evaluation
of logistical, sustainment, and security considerations
associated with used nuclear fuel management, including
challenges unique to forward or austere environments; (4) An
assessment of options to recycle, reuse, or otherwise extract
value from used nuclear fuel, including pathways such as
material recovery, fuel recycling, and waste minimization
approaches to reduce long-term waste volumes, recover usable
materials, or enable future energy, industrial, or national
security applications, consistent with applicable law and
safety requirements; (5) Identification of potential future
uses of used nuclear fuel that could support Department of
Defense missions, energy resilience, or broader national
security objectives, including a discussion of technical,
regulatory, and policy barriers to such uses; (6)
Identification of opportunities to align Department of Defense
initiatives, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law,
with Department of Energy Nuclear Lifecycle Innovation Campus
efforts to strengthen domestic fuel-cycle, advanced
manufacturing, and waste-management capabilities supporting
defense requirements; and (7) Identification of gaps in policy,
planning, interagency coordination, or statutory authority that
could impede responsible deployment of nuclear power systems or
the effective management, recycling, or reuse of used nuclear
fuel by the Department of Defense.

Briefing on installation energy resilience for Navy scientific and
training commands

The committee recognizes the contributions of the Navy's
Small Boat Training Command, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography
Command, Naval Oceanographic Office, and Naval Research
Laboratory to the readiness, operational effectiveness, and
technological superiority of the Joint Force. These
organizations provide essential capabilities in maritime
training, environmental intelligence, oceanographic analysis,
and advanced research that underpin naval operations, support
global force posture, and enable decision advantage across all
domains.
The committee emphasizes that these missions are highly
dependent on assured, resilient, and reliable installation
energy resources. Disruptions to energy supply--whether from
extreme weather, physical attack, or cyber threats--pose
unacceptable risks to the continuity of operations at these
facilities. The committee views installation energy resilience
as a foundational requirement for sustaining these capabilities
and ensuring mission assurance.
The committee appreciates the Department of Defense's (DOD)
ongoing efforts to implement the President's May 23, 2025,
Executive Order 14299 titled, ``Deploying Advanced Nuclear
Reactor Technologies for National Security,'' and recognizes
the Department of Defense's actions to evaluate the role of
advanced nuclear energy systems, including microreactors, in
enhancing installation resilience and supporting critical
defense missions.
The committee further notes that the Department of the Navy
issued a Request for Information in October 2024 identifying
seven Navy and Marine Corps installations on the East Coast and
in the Mid-Atlantic region as potential sites for microreactor
deployment. While this effort represents a meaningful step
forward, the committee believes that the strategic importance
of the aforementioned commands and activities warrants broader
consideration of additional locations. In particular, the
committee encourages the Department of the Navy to evaluate
installations and facilities along the Gulf Coast, where
several of these critical functions are located and where
enhanced energy resilience would provide substantial
operational benefit.
The committee strongly encourages the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the Department of the Navy to consider expanding the
scope of their microreactor deployment efforts to include a
wider range of installations supporting high-priority missions.
Lastly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief
the congressional defense committees, not later than March 1,
2027, on the feasibility and advisability of installing DOD-
funded microreactors on federal property where the DOD is a
tenant but not the landowner. The briefing shall include: (1)
An assessment of statutory and regulatory challenges associated
with such installations; (2) An analysis of resourcing
considerations, including cost allocation and mechanisms for
shared investment; (3) An evaluation of interagency frameworks
necessary to facilitate coordination with host departments and
agencies; (4) Options for the sharing, distribution, or sale of
excess energy capacity to offset life cycle costs, consistent
with applicable law and policy; and (5) Any additional issues
or recommendations the Secretary deems relevant to advancing
the deployment of microreactor technologies in support of
national security objectives.

Briefing on operational energy requirements and scope of Project Janus
and the Advanced Nuclear Power for Installations Program

The committee notes that future military operations around
the world will continue to be characterized by contested
logistics, extended distances, and persistent threats to fuel
supply chains. The committee also notes that the domestic
electrical grid, on which the Department of Defense heavily
depends to power the majority of its installations in peacetime
and conflict, is increasingly at risk due to aging
infrastructure and the proliferation of non-kinetic and low-
cost kinetic capabilities--a potentially significant challenge
for the dispersal concepts for Golden Dome for America and
supporting domain awareness sensors such as the Perimeter
Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System, Cobra Dane,
Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, Upgraded Early
Warning Radars in Greenland and Cape Cod, and the Alaska Radar
System. The committee notes that all of these facilities
require resilient power sources to sustain operations while
reducing reliance on vulnerable resupply methods and degrading
energy grids.
The committee understands that the Army's Project Janus and
the Air Force's Advanced Nuclear Power for Installations
Program seeks to prototype microreactor power plants at fixed
installations by 2030. However, there remain significant
unanswered questions regarding regulatory pathways, costs, and
other concerns that must be explained before the Army, the Air
Force, and the Department at large can fully demonstrate the
capability to see a reactor project through commissioning and
startup.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Army, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, to
provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March
1, 2027, on an implementation plan to integrate advanced
nuclear microreactor solutions into the Army's operational
energy requirements and the scope of Project Janus. The report
shall include: (1) An assessment of the requirements for mobile
advanced nuclear systems capable of supporting forward
operating locations, expeditionary basing, and distributed
maneuver forces in contested environments and on military
installations; (2) An evaluation of the technical and
logistical feasibility of self-contained systems designed for
rapid deployment and relocation across the combatant commands'
areas of responsibility; (3) A description of how deployable
nuclear microreactors align with current warfighting concepts
of operation, contested logistics doctrine, and operational
energy strategies; (4) An assessment of the application of
these systems in support of emergency response, including
natural disasters, grid outages, or kinetic attacks on critical
infrastructure in remote regions; and (5) An identification of
the regulatory, safety, and diplomatic challenges associated
with the domestic and theater-wide deployment of mobile nuclear
systems and a mitigation plan to address such challenges.

Briefing on sourcing standards for domestically produced synthetic
graphite

The committee notes that the Department of Defense is
increasingly pursuing advanced nuclear energy solutions--
including small modular reactors, microreactors, and other
technologies--to deliver more resilient energy for military
installations. Synthetic graphite is a critical supply chain
element for these efforts, serving multiple roles in advanced
reactor development as a structural component, reflector, and
moderator in high-temperature gas reactors.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, not later than March 1, 2027, to brief the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on Department of Defense progress in
establishing and implementing sourcing standards to prioritize
the procurement, for use in military nuclear energy projects,
of domestically produced synthetic graphite, as well as provide
an overview of the state of the domestic synthetic graphite
manufacturing market.

Briefing on the beddown of Air Force Special Operation Command's Power
Projection Wing at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base

The committee notes that on August 2, 2023, the Department
of the Air Force announced Davis-Monthan Air Force Base as the
preferred location to host the 492nd Special Operations Wing
(SOW) as an Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) Power
Projection Wing. The committee believes that the successful
relocation and transformation of the 492nd SOW into a power
projection wing will help to enable AFSOC to properly prepare,
prevent, and prevail against any adversary in today's
challenging security environment.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a briefing, not later than December 1, 2026,
on the status of the 492nd Power Projection Wing beddown at
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. At a minimum, the briefing should
include, for each basing action:
(1) An assessment of any additional resourcing or
authorities that may be needed to complete the
activation of the 492nd Power Projection Wing; and
(2) Any other matters deemed relevant by the
Secretary.

Capability Portfolio Execution for Simulation, Training, and Test
Support

The committee recognizes that modeling, simulation, and
advanced synthetic training environments are essential to
preparing the Joint Force to deter and, if necessary, defeat
peer and near-peer adversaries in complex and contested
operational environments. The organization currently known as
Capability Portfolio Execution for Simulation, Training, and
Test Support (CPE ST3), formerly the Program Executive Office
for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation, provides
critical capabilities supporting Army and Joint Force readiness
through the development, integration, and sustainment of
modeling, simulation, instrumentation, and training
technologies. These capabilities enable large-scale collective
training, experimentation, and operational preparation across
multiple domains and echelons, including through live, virtual,
and constructive training environments supporting combat
training centers and other operational training venues
worldwide.
The committee believes sustaining and expanding these
capabilities is important to supporting Army readiness,
modernization priorities, and initiatives associated with
Transformation in Contact and the National Defense Strategy. As
such, the committee strongly encourages the Secretary of the
Army to retain CPE ST3 capabilities and preserve the
organization's core mission and portfolio of programs
supporting Army and Joint Force training, testing, and
readiness requirements. The committee further encourages the
Secretary to continue leveraging the expertise resident within
CPE ST3 to advance modeling, simulation, instrumentation, and
synthetic training technologies necessary to support operations
in contested and multi-domain environments.
Lastly, the committee encourages the Secretary to assess
opportunities to expand the capabilities and programs executed
by CPE ST3 to address emerging operational requirements and
evolving threats. Such efforts may include activities related
to unmanned and autonomous systems, artificial intelligence and
advanced data-driven simulation technologies, cyber and
electronic warfare training environments, and other emerging
technologies or operational concepts that enhance the realism,
scale, and effectiveness of Army and Joint Force training and
experimentation.

Comptroller General recommendation on prepositioned assets in Indo-
Pacific Region

The Indo-Pacific region is of critical strategic importance
to the Department of Defense (DOD), and ensuring that the
United States has combat-ready and well-equipped forces with
capabilities to prevail against peer and near-peer competitors
in the region is vital to defense planning. The committee
recognizes significant challenges inherent in operating in the
Indo-Pacific region, including management of prepositioned
assets. However, the committee is concerned about the lack of a
comprehensive plan to address challenges and risks in managing
prepositioned materiel in the Indo-Pacific region.
The committee notes that the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) issued a report in June 2025, titled, ``Defense
Prepositioning: DOD Should Develop a Plan to Address Challenges
in the Indo-Pacific Region and Report to Congress'' (GAO-25-
106991C), that recommended the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Commander,
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, assess the extent of ongoing
challenges in managing prepositioned materiel in the Indo-
Pacific region and develop a comprehensive plan to address
those challenges and risks related to storage, maintenance,
personnel shortages, and contractor support. The plan should
include an estimate of the costs and expected timeline for
implementation.
The committee believes it will be important for the DOD to
implement the GAO's recommendation in an expeditious manner to
bolster deterrence, enable rapid crisis response, and reduce
reliance on strategic sealift and airlift. Accordingly, the
committee directs the Secretaries of the military departments
to submit any relevant plans and implementation reports
regarding the GAO recommendation to the congressional defense
committees and the Comptroller General of the United States,
not later than March 1, 2027. Such plans shall address the
actions the military departments have taken or plan to take to
implement the GAO's recommendation. If the military departments
do not intend to implement the recommendation, the plans should
identify both their rationale for not doing so and alternative
actions they intend to take in order to mitigate the issues and
challenges identified by the GAO.

Expanding required contested logistics reporting

The committee notes that section 323 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-
60) assigned responsibility for contested logistics to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and Commander, U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM). Those responsibilities included: (1) Mitigating
vulnerabilities and risks associated with contested logistics
for the Department of Defense on a global basis; and (2)
Planning and operations of the Joint Deployment and
Distribution Enterprise relating to contested logistics across
all domains, including the movement of forces and material from
the source of supply to the designated point of need of the
commander of the combatant command receiving support. This
section also required a report from the Commander, TRANSCOM
within 1 year of the date of the enactment of that Act on
various aspects of the contested logistics problem.
The committee believes that the required report should
include a fulsome discussion of details behind a solution to
the problem, including:
(1) Sensing, data integration, and situational
awareness related to logistics;
(2) Mission planning, prioritization, and decision-
support tools, including artificial intelligence-
enabled logistics capabilities;
(3) Command and control of logistics forces and
assets in multi-domain and contested environments,
including denied and degraded communication
environments; and
(4) Supply chain security, redundancy, and analysis.
The committee also believes the report would benefit from
consultation with other combatant commanders.

Firefighting on military installations

The committee understands that the Department of Defense
(DOD) is experiencing a shortfall in personnel and readiness
for firefighting on military installations and is concerned
that those shortfalls will result in unacceptable levels of
risk.
An April 2025 Government Accountability Office report,
titled, ``Federal Civilian Firefighters: DOD Should Take Action
to Address Long-Standing Staffing Gaps'' (GAO-25-107288) found
that the DOD has not identified an enterprise-wide strategy to
close staffing gaps. The report recommended that the Army, Air
Force, Space Force, Navy, and Marine Corps each develop and
implement a Fire and Emergency Services civilian strategic
human capital plan and ensure that the plan assesses the
current state of their branch's civilian firefighter workforce
and forecasts future workforce requirements.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the relevant personnel within
each military service, to brief the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than March 1, 2027, regarding: (1) The vacancy rate of
firefighters for each military service; (2) An assessment of
the readiness to prepare for and respond to building and
wildland fire events on military installations; (3) The impact
to readiness caused by section 388 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) and
the provisions of section 2465 of title 10, United States Code;
(4) Any resource and statutory recommendations to address
shortcomings identified in the briefing; (5) Estimates of the
average amount of scheduled and unscheduled overtime that DOD
firefighters are working per week at each military installation
and site; and (6) The number of current vacant firefighter
positions per military service and a description of the plans
of any military service to either eliminate the use of overtime
among firefighters or to enter into contract with a private
entity for firefighting services in order to comply with
minimum staffing regulations.

FireGuard autonomous vertical takeoff and landing capabilities

The committee recognizes the importance of persistent and
resilient intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities for the FireGuard program. The committee notes
that while space-based sensing and data products are essential
for fire detection, monitoring, and decision support, the
FireGuard mission may benefit from complementary autonomous
vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) systems. Such platforms can
provide localized, responsive ISR, enhance data quality, and
provide redundancy if satellite coverage is constrained,
delayed, or degraded.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief
of the National Guard Bureau, to conduct a study on how the
FireGuard program could employ autonomous VTOL ISR capabilities
to improve interoperability with satellite-derived data
products and provide redundancy to space-based sensing. At a
minimum, the study shall include the following:
(1) Priority FireGuard mission threads and operating
concepts for autonomous VTOL ISR employment by National
Guard units, including in degraded space or
communications environments;
(2) Technical integration and performance
considerations, including data interoperability with
satellite-based products, candidate sensor packages,
and quality assurance between space-based and airborne
sensors; and
(3) Trade-offs among payload weight, endurance,
autonomy, and cost, and implications for launch/
recovery and sustainment.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a briefing, not later than March 28, 2027, to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
on the findings of this study, along with recommendations and
proposed next steps.

First Army Division

The committee understands that, in accordance with the
Army's Continuous Transformation Initiative, First Army
headquarters is assuming the functions of Division East and
Division West. First Army provides a crucial service in
carrying out its critical mission of advising and assisting the
reserve component to ensure readiness. As the senior
operational command at the Rock Island Arsenal, First Army
supports hundreds of high-skilled military and civilian jobs,
which bolsters the Army commands co-located at the Rock Island
Arsenal, such as Army Sustainment Command, Joint Munitions
Command, and the Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center, and
contributes significantly to the regional defense ecosystem.
The committee remains supportive of the First Army
headquarters' critical role at the Rock Island Arsenal.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Army to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027,
on any changes to the First Army's structure, alignment, and
personnel. The briefing shall include any changes to personnel
basing as it relates to the changing functions and shall cover
how the First Army fits into the establishment of the new U.S.
Army Western Hemisphere Command and the new U.S. Army
Transformation and Training Command.

Fort Polk modernization

The committee commends the Secretary of the Army for
advancing the Army Transformation Initiative (ATI) to posture
the force for emerging and future threats, including peer and
near-peer competition across all domains. The committee
recognizes that modernizing Combat Training Centers (CTCs),
including Fort Polk, is a critical enabler of this
transformation and supports the Secretary's objective of
ensuring formations are prepared to operate in complex,
contested environments. The committee further recognizes that
the evolving character of warfare--including contested
communications, cyber and electronic warfare, unmanned systems
threats, and degraded sustainment environments--underscores the
strategic importance of CTCs in generating readiness for large-
scale combat operations. Accordingly, the committee strongly
encourages the Secretary to appropriately modernize Fort Polk's
multi-domain capabilities in order to support training for
large-scale combat operations against near-peer adversaries.
Consistent with ATI objectives and Army manning guidance,
the committee also encourages the Army to prioritize CTCs for
senior-grade and high-experience personnel fills, ensuring the
most qualified leaders are assigned to Observer/Controller-
Trainer, opposing force, and enabling roles essential to high-
fidelity training. The committee further encourages the Army to
prioritize available endstrength growth to maximize adversary
force, sustainment, and enabling unit manning at CTCs and the
Army's highest-tempo and deploying brigade combat teams.
Lastly, not later than March 1, 2027, the Secretary shall
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives on: (1) The progress of Fort Polk
modernization; (2) Force structure adjustments; (3) Adversary
force and sustainment manning improvements; (4) Required
resources; (5) Alignment with ATI objectives; and (6)
Measurable impacts on readiness.

Ground fuel distribution system

The committee recognizes that both the Army and the Marine
Corps rely on ground fuel distribution systems that were
largely designed for permissive operating environments and are
increasingly challenged by contested logistics conditions.
The committee notes that the Marine Corps does not operate
heavy expanded mobility tactical truck fueler variants and
instead relies on medium tactical vehicle replacement fuel
trucks and logistics vehicle system replacement-towed legacy
fuel tank trailers, primarily the M970 family, for bulk fuel
transport. The committee is concerned that these trailer-based
systems present survivability, mobility, and operational risks
in distributed and expeditionary operations.
The committee further recognizes the Army's Tactical Fuel
Distribution System (TFDS) as a modular capability typically
configured to store and dispense approximately 3,000 to 5,000
gallons of fuel per site, enabling more distributed and
survivable fuel operations when compared to legacy bulk fuel
tankers. The committee believes TFDS-like capabilities are
increasingly relevant to Marine Corps operational concepts,
including Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Littoral
Operations in a Contested Environment.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army and the
Secretary of the Navy, to assess opportunities to expand the
application of modular and distributed fuel distribution
capabilities, including TFDS, to Marine Corps operations. Such
an assessment should include consideration of integration with
existing Marine Corps vehicle fleets, expeditionary shelter and
protection systems, and training at Combat Training Centers and
Marine Corps training installations.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, on efforts to modernize ground fuel
distribution across the Joint Force. The report shall address:
(1) Current Army and Marine Corps fuel distribution
capabilities; (2) Survivability and mobility challenges
associated with legacy fuel tank trailers; (3) The
applicability of TFDS and similar modular systems to Marine
Corps operations; (4) Funding requirements and legal
authorities needed to expand such capabilities; and (5) A
recommended path to transition these systems into enduring
programs of record where appropriate.

Importance of Eglin Gulf Test and Training Range

The committee recognizes the significant value of the Eglin
Gulf Test and Training Range to the testing, training, and
operational readiness of the Armed Forces. The committee notes
that the Department of Defense's 2018 study, ``Preserving
Military Readiness in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico,'' concluded
that no other area in the world provides the U.S. military with
ready access to a comparably instrumented, network-connected,
surrogate environment for military operations relevant to the
Northern Arabian Gulf and the Indo-Pacific theater. That same
study cautioned that the eastward extension of oil and gas
development across the Military Mission Line, absent sufficient
surface-limiting stipulations or activity restrictions mutually
agreed upon by the Department of Defense and the Department of
the Interior, would diminish military flexibility in the region
and severely affect test activities. The committee believes
that a clear, current understanding of the range's contribution
to recent operations is essential to informing future decisions
regarding its use and protection.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force
and the Secretary of the Navy, to provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027,
on the capabilities of the Eglin Gulf Test and Training Range
to recent military operations of the Armed Forces and to
military activities worldwide.
The briefing shall include, at a minimum: (1) A description
of the specific types of testing conducted at the Eglin Gulf
Test and Training Range; (2) How those capabilities aided
weapons platforms employed in military operations during the 5
fiscal years preceding the date of the briefing, including
Operation Epic Fury, Operation Absolute Resolve, and Operation
Southern Spear; and (3) An assessment of the implications of
any reduction in the square mileage of the range or movement of
the Military Mission Line, including the impacts such reduction
or movement would have on the national security of the United
States and on military testing by the Armed Forces. A
classified annex may be provided.

Intermittent fault detection and isolation technology

One of the major cost drivers for the Department of Defense
(DOD) is the maintenance of electronics and electrical systems
that control and operate a wide-ranging inventory of weapons
and weapon systems. Related to this cost driver, the
Department's most recent estimate (April 2022) is that nearly
$5.5 billion in non-value-added costs and over 383,254 non-
mission capable days annually were incurred as the result of
operationally induced intermittent electronic faults that could
not be identified and isolated. When a failed system is tested
with legacy equipment the Services have been using for nearly
20 years, the result is almost always ``No Fault Found,''
``Cannot Duplicate,'' or ``No Trouble Found''--essentially
false readings to the effect that there is no problem even for
a non-functioning weapon system.
A DOD report to Congress, dated October 5, 2021, titled,
``Assessment of Electronics Maintenance as a Leading Driver of
Weapon Systems Non-Availability,'' stated that ``there is an
available test technology that could detect and reverse the
intermittent fault problem across the spectrum of DoD weapons
systems,'' with the initial targets being various aircraft,
including the F-35, F-16, and F/A-18. Additionally, a January
2020 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, ``Military
Depots: DoD Can Benefit from Further Sharing of Best Practices
and Lessons Learned'' (GAO-20-116), highlighted the major
improvements in flight hours, repair times, and cost savings
that resulted from the use of this technology. The GAO report
specifically describes the Intermittent Fault Detection and
Isolation System (IFDIS) produced by a single vendor.
The committee commends the DOD for attempting to address
this issue by implementing and funding a related component of
the Rapid Sustainment Improvement Program (RSIP), which was
intended to pull readily available commercial solutions, such
as IFDIS, into the sustainment enterprise to reduce costs and
improve readiness. However, the Services, with the exception of
the Air Force, effectively ignored the direction of the DOD and
this committee to acquire the technology (IFDIS) that has been
proven to successfully address this issue and either: (1) In
the case of the Navy, used the RSIP funding to acquire
equipment that does not successfully address the problem; or
(2) In the case of the Army, simply used the funds to ``study''
the problem, as opposed to solving it. The committee strongly
believes that meaningful funding for RSIP should be restored
with aggressive oversight, by the Secretary of Defense, over
the use of such funding by the Services.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, not later than March 1, 2027, to deliver a briefing to
the congressional defense committees detailing the status of
any planned restoration of RSIP, specifically identifying the
programs and technologies for inclusion in RSIP and a specific
plan for oversight of the Services for implementation of RSIP
components within their enterprise. In the event that RSIP is
not reestablished, the committee directs the Secretary to
allocate sufficient funds to materially address the serious
issue of ``No Fault Found'' as specified in the DOD's October
2021 report and in the GAO's 2020 report as described above.
The committee believes this issue is solvable with readily
available technology and that its resolution is long overdue to
alleviate highly detrimental, ongoing impacts to funding and
readiness.

Joint logistics software systems ecosystem assessment

The committee recognizes the emphasis the Department of
Defense (DOD) has placed on developing software systems to
support joint logistics operations and is encouraged by the
investments made through pace-setting initiatives. However, the
committee has not received the briefings required under section
347 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2026 (Public Law 119-60), which directed the use of artificial
intelligence (AI)-enabled software systems in logistics
operations, and is concerned that these efforts lack a clear
strategy, direction, and ownership. The committee is further
concerned that without a coherent plan for how these systems
will function as an integrated ecosystem, the Department's
significant investments in logistics software modernization
will fail to deliver the joint and contested logistics
capabilities the warfighter requires.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Chiefs of Staff of the military services, to submit a
report to the congressional defense committees, not later than
February 1, 2027, on the current state, planned integration,
and capability gaps of joint logistics software systems. The
report shall include the following: (1) An inventory of current
and planned joint logistics software systems and an assessment
of how the Department plans to employ these systems as an
integrated ecosystem; (2) An assessment of the ability of such
systems to integrate enterprise, operational, and tactical
logistics data across the Joint Force and to provide real-time
analytics and decision support to commanders; (3) An assessment
of the ability of such systems to support logistics planning
and execution in contested, degraded, intermittent, or denied
communications environments, including through edge-first
software architectures and resilient mesh networking; (4) An
assessment of interoperability with joint, allied, and partner
forces and across the processes and systems of each military
service; (5) An assessment of the cybersecurity and data
integrity capabilities of such systems; and (6) An
identification of capability, integration, and interoperability
gaps, including gaps in AI integration and compliance with DOD
policy requiring prioritization of commercial off-the-shelf
software solutions, and a plan to address those gaps.

National Guard Special Forces unit for the Arctic region

The committee notes the importance of the Arctic to United
States national security as the Arctic increasingly becomes a
contested domain, given Russia's expanded military
infrastructure, China's self-designation as a ``near-Arctic
state,'' and the opening of Arctic sea lanes to expanded
maritime traffic. Further, the committee notes the importance
of maintaining Arctic-capable units within the Department of
Defense.
The committee directs the Commander, U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, to provide a
briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than
January 1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of
establishing a dedicated, Arctic-capable National Guard Special
Forces unit to support NORTHCOM activities and operations in
the Arctic region.

Nuclear propulsion training

The committee recognizes the importance of Nuclear Power
Training Unit (NPTU) Ballston Spa as a critical component of
the Navy nuclear propulsion training enterprise. The committee
directs, not later than March 1, 2027, the Secretary of the
Navy, in coordination with the Director of Naval Reactors, to
submit a plan to the congressional defense committees to
improve and expand training resources at NPTU Ballston Spa that
includes, at a minimum, the following:
(1) An assessment of current training throughput at
NPTU Ballston Spa;
(2) An identification of infrastructure, personnel,
regulatory, and other constraints in increasing
training throughput at NPTU Ballston Spa; and
(3) A detailed estimate of funding, resource, and
military construction requirements necessary to expand
training capacity at NPTU Ballston Spa.

Perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances destruction validation

The committee recognizes the Department of Defense's
efforts to focus on finding safe perfluoroalkyl and
polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) destruction and disposal
solutions to protect human health and the environment,
including through updated PFAS disposal guidance to include the
use of innovative destruction technologies. The committee also
recognizes the Department's need to verify these technologies
in line with Department of Defense and Environmental Protection
Agency guidelines.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees,
not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's use of PFAS
destruction technology or a combination of technologies that
have been demonstrated to have, including through independent
third-party testing using validated methodologies, a
destruction and removal efficiency of no less than 99.99
percent for PFAS compounds detectable using Environmental
Protection Agency validated analytical methods. The briefing
should also cover the feasibility and steps needed to ensure
regulated PFAS compounds are not released to any environmental
medium at concentrations exceeding applicable regulatory
standards.

Photovoltaic modules and inverters report

The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense
has issued Buy America waivers to purchase photovoltaic modules
from foreign sources when domestic supplies exist. The
committee continues to support the purchase of energy
infrastructure, including photovoltaic modules with
domestically made cells and inverters, from domestic sources
that are not foreign entities of concern (FEOC). The Build
America, Buy America Act (Public Law 117-58) requires these
systems to be procured domestically, and section 847 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public
Law 119-60) further prohibits the Department of Defense from
purchasing photovoltaic modules and inverters from any foreign
entity of concern. The committee further recognizes the
national security benefit of using non-FEOC and domestic energy
infrastructure when it acquires electricity through power
purchase agreements and energy savings contracts.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Department of
Defense to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services
Committee, not later than December 31, 2026, that includes the
following elements: (1) The Buy America and FEOC waivers that
have been granted in the last 2 calendar years for photovoltaic
modules and inverters; (2) The steps the Department has taken
to assess the availability of domestic sources of modules with
domestically made cells and inverters; (3) The Department's
progress in implementing section 847 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026; and (4) The steps the
Department is taking to ensure third-party sourced energy is
not reliant upon FEOC energy infrastructure, including
photovoltaic modules and inverters.

Preservation of Force and Family

The committee strongly supports the Preservation of the
Force and Family (POTFF) program under the U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) to enhance the readiness and
resilience of special operations forces (SOF) personnel and
their families. The committee recognizes the POTFF program as
an integrated, multi-domain approach addressing the unique
physical, psychological, spiritual, social, and cognitive needs
of SOF personnel to improve their long-term well-being and
operational readiness.
The committee believes that a robust data collection and
evaluation framework is critical to ensuring the POTFF program
provides effective and responsive support to SOF personnel and
families. The committee directs the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and
the Commander, SOCOM to submit, not later than January 1, 2027,
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House
of Representatives a plan to implement a unified approach to
data collection and program evaluation, consistent with
evidence-based best practices. The required plan shall, at a
minimum:
(1) Assess the effectiveness of services provided to
SOF personnel and families, across all elements of the
POTFF program;
(2) Establish specific, measurable performance
metrics goals for the POTFF program;
(3) Establish a process for continuous monitoring of
the POTFF program that identifies opportunities for
improvement;
(4) Describe initiatives aimed at reducing the stigma
associated with seeking care; and
(5) Any other matters deemed relevant by the
Assistant Secretary and the Commander.

Project Arcana

The committee notes that U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) initiated Project Arcana beginning in fiscal year 2024
and remains interested in ensuring the program is fulfilling
SOCOM requirements. The committee directs that the Commander,
SOCOM provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
March 31, 2027, detailing how funds appropriated since fiscal
year 2024 have been executed to date, including a description
of how all previously appropriated funds for Project Arcana are
being used to refine, scale, and operationalize workflows,
production methods, and quality controls that support
authorized national security users in identifying illicit
activity relevant to national security.

Report on integration of Joint Munitions Command and Army Sustainment
Command

The committee remains concerned that the Army has not fully
implemented or clearly articulated the details, structure, and
implications of the proposed integration of the Joint Munitions
Command and the Army Sustainment Command. The committee remains
intensely focused on the modernization, expansion, and
effective management of the Army organic industrial base and
believes that clear lines of authority, responsibility, and
oversight are essential to achieving these objectives. The
committee is concerned that the current structure and
responsibilities of Army Materiel Command subordinate
organizations, as well as their respective roles in overseeing
and managing the organic industrial base, remain insufficiently
defined.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a report, not later than March 31, 2027, to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
on the status of the planned integration of the Joint Munitions
Command and the Army Sustainment Command. The report shall
include:
(1) A description of the overall status of the
planned integration;
(2) An organizational chart and accompanying
explanation identifying how key leadership and
personnel positions were retained, modified, or
consolidated as part of the integration, including an
assessment of the impact of the new personnel structure
on management and oversight of the organic industrial
base;
(3) The number of authorized, filled, and unfilled
positions within the integrated command structure;
(4) A mapping of the current and former
responsibilities of the Joint Munitions Command and an
identification of where those responsibilities reside
within the integrated command;
(5) An explanation of how the integrated command will
interact with Army Materiel Command and the broader
organic industrial base enterprise; and
(6) A description of how the Army has communicated
these organizational changes and their anticipated
impacts to the Army workforce.

Report on use of unmanned, autonomous systems for maintenance and
logistics

The committee recognizes how the extensive use and
integration of unmanned systems for resupply, precision
delivery and maritime logistics in the Ukraine War and
Operation Epic Fury have demonstrated how uncrewed systems can
enhance resilience, reduce risk to personnel, and sustain
distributed forces in contested environments where traditional
resupply methods are vulnerable or impractical. The committee
is especially concerned that the Department of Defense (DOD)
lacks a clearly defined and resourced pathway for using
unmanned aerial systems for ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship
logistics across the naval and Joint Force. As the United
States prepares for potential crises in the Indo-Pacific--an
operating environment characterized by vast distances and
increased threats to manned logistics platforms--the committee
believes that the development and fielding of cheap,
attritable, autonomous logistics capabilities is essential.
To ensure the continued experimentation of uncrewed
logistics capabilities in contested environments, the committee
directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to provide a
report and a briefing to the congressional defense committees,
not later than February 1, 2027, on gaps and opportunities
related to uncrewed aerial, surface, and undersea systems
capable of supporting logistics and maintenance missions,
including overland delivery, ship-to-shore transfer, and ship-
to-ship resupply of critical parts, tools, repair materials,
and maintenance consumables. The report and briefing should
include, but not be limited to, the following:
(1) An assessment of the performance of currently
fielded uncrewed systems capable of supporting
logistics and maintenance missions, an assessment that
should include a capability gap analysis that
identifies key mission gaps across all the Services
that uncrewed systems could fill for contested
logistics and maintenance missions but are still being
left unaddressed, especially in contested maritime
environments such as the Indo-Pacific;
(2) A review of lessons learned from recent conflicts
and operational demonstrations regarding the employment
of unmanned logistical platforms, including
survivability, payload integration, partner
interoperability (if applicable) and ease of use;
(3) An assessment of current DOD investments in
research and development of new uncrewed and autonomous
systems capable of supporting logistics and maintenance
missions, including for uses such as modular uncrewed
systems to deliver spare parts to deployed units. This
assessment should include a summary of important
opportunities and existing barriers to expanding these
investments;
(4) Identification of promising foreign partners with
interest and capability in co-production of uncrewed
logistics and maintenance capabilities; and
(5) Recommendations for authority changes, resourcing
or other assistance that the Congress can provide to
accelerate prototyping, testing, fielding, and scalable
uncrewed logistics and maintenance capabilities.

United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command

The committee is concerned that existing manning for U.S.
Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is well below
its authorized end strength. The committee is concerned that
this shortfall in manning, particularly in high-demand, low-
density Military Occupational Specialties, challenges the
ability of MARSOC to meet growing demands from the geographic
combatant commanders. The committee notes that MARSOC, and the
broader special operations enterprise, plays an increasingly
key role in Department of Defense operations around the world,
across the spectrum of competition and conflict, and believes
that addressing the shortfall in MARSOC manning should be
addressed.
Therefore, not later than February 1, 2027, the committee
directs the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict, to provide the congressional defense
committees with a briefing on the plan to address unfilled
military manning for MARSOC, including a detailed description
of any ongoing or planned actions by the U.S. Marine Corps to
increase manning allocated to MARSOC, and identify any
challenges to filling MARSOC manning.

TITLE IV--MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

SUBTITLE A--ACTIVE FORCES

Sec. 401--End strengths for active forces
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
active-duty end strengths for fiscal year 2027, as shown below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2027 Change from
FY 2026 -----------------------------------------------------
Service Authorized FY 2027 FY 2027 FY 2027 FY 2027
Request Recommendation Request Authorized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army.......................................... 454,000 ......... 469,000 ......... 15,000
Navy.......................................... 344,600 ......... 356,600 ......... 12,000
Marine Corps.................................. 172,300 ......... 173,700 ......... 1,400
Air Force..................................... 301,500 ......... 330,400 ......... 8,900
Space Force................................... 10,400 ......... 13,200 ......... 2,800
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DOD Total................................. 1,302,800 ......... 1,342,900 ......... 40,100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Subtitle B--Reserve Forces

Sec. 411--End strengths for Selected Reserve
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
end strengths for Selected Reserve personnel for fiscal year
2027, as shown below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2027 Change from
FY 2026 -----------------------------------------------------
Service Authorized FY 2027 FY 2027 FY 2027 FY 2027
Request Recommendation Request Authorized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army National Guard........................... 328,000 ......... 331,300 ......... 3,300
Army Reserve.................................. 172,000 ......... 172,000 ......... 0
Navy Reserve.................................. 57,500 ......... 56,500 ......... -1000
Marine Corps Reserve.......................... 33,600 ......... 34,700 ......... 1,100
Air National Guard............................ 106,300 ......... 107,400 ......... 1,100
Air Force Reserve............................. 67,500 ......... 67,400 ......... -100
Coast Guard Reserve........................... 8,500 ......... 8,500 ......... 0
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DOD Total................................. 773,400 ......... 777,800 ......... 4,400
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 412--End strengths for Reserves on active duty in support of the
Reserves
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
full-time support end strengths for fiscal year 2027, as shown
below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2027 Change from
FY 2026 -----------------------------------------------------
Service Authorized FY 2027 FY 2027 FY 2027 FY 2027
Request Recommendation Request Authorized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army National Guard........................... 30,845 ......... 31,154 ......... 309
Army Reserve.................................. 16,511 ......... 16,511 ......... 0
Navy Reserve.................................. 10,409 ......... 10,649 ......... 240
Marine Corps Reserve.......................... 2,400 ......... 2,400 ......... 0
Air National Guard............................ 25,982 ......... 25,533 ......... -449
Air Force Reserve............................. 6,218 ......... 6,278 ......... 60
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DOD Total................................. 92,365 ......... 92,525 ......... 160
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 413--End strengths for military technicians (dual status)
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
military technician (dual status) end strengths for fiscal year
2027, as shown below:
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
military technician (dual status) end strengths for fiscal year
2027, as shown below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2027 Change from
FY 2026 -----------------------------------------------------
Service Authorized FY 2027 FY 2027 FY 2027 FY 2027
Request Recommendation Request Authorized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army National Guard........................... 21,294 ......... 20,037 ......... -1,257
Army Reserve.................................. 6,258 ......... 5,870 ......... -388
Air National Guard............................ 10,405 ......... 10,824 ......... 419
Air Force Reserve............................. 6,455 ......... 6,450 ......... -5
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DOD Total................................. 44,412 ......... 43,181 ......... -1,231
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The provision would also establish limits on the number of
temporary technicians authorized to be employed within the end
strengths set forth by this section to not more than 25 percent
of the total authorized strength for each component.
The provision would also prohibit the coercion of a
military technician (dual status) by a State into accepting an
offer of realignment or conversion to any other military
status, including as a member of the Active, Guard, and Reserve
program of a reserve component. The provision would further
specify that if a technician declines to participate in such a
realignment or conversion, no further action may be taken
against the individual or the individual's position.
Sec. 414--Maximum number of reserve personnel authorized to be on
active duty for operational support
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
end strengths for Reserve personnel on active duty for
operational support for fiscal year 2027, as shown below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2027 Change from
FY 2026 -----------------------------------------------------
Service Authorized FY 2027 FY 2027 FY 2027 FY 2027
Request Recommendation Request Authorized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army National Guard........................... 17,000 ......... 17,000 ......... 0
Army Reserve.................................. 13,000 ......... 13,000 ......... 0
Navy Reserve.................................. 6,200 ......... 6,200 ......... 0
Marine Corps Reserve.......................... 3,000 ......... 3,000 ......... 0
Air National Guard............................ 16,000 ......... 16,000 ......... 0
Air Force Reserve............................. 14,000 ......... 14,000 ......... 0
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DOD Total................................. 69,200 ......... 69,200 ......... 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Subtitle C--Authorization of Appropriations

Sec. 421--Military personnel
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for military personnel activities at the levels
identified in section 4401 of division D of this Act.

TITLE V--MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY

Subtitle A--Officer Personnel Policy

Sec. 501--Notification requirements for delayed promotions
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 624(d) of title 10, United States Code, to ensure
timely congressional notification when the promotion of an
officer is delayed, including the basis, expected duration, and
status of any associated review or investigation, and to
require advance written notice to the officer in all cases.
Sec. 502--Temporary withholding of officer nominations and promotion
recommendations
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of Defense to temporarily withhold the processing
of officer nominations and promotion recommendations for up to
30 days and would require timely disposition or, in cases of
extended withholding, a written justification and notification
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House
of Representatives.
Sec. 503--Enhanced authority for early discharges
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 580a(a) of title 10, United States Code, to reauthorize
and extend the authority through October 1, 2030.
Sec. 504--Officer retirement determinations
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
sections 1370, 1370a, and 12741 of title 10, United States
Code, to authorize the Secretary concerned to conditionally
retire officers pending investigations or other administrative
actions and to clarify the circumstances under which an
officer's service may be determined to be unsatisfactory for
the purposes of determining their final retired grade.
Sec. 505--Retirement of regular Navy warrant officers and Marine Corps
Marine Gunner warrant officers for years of service
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1305(a) of title 10, United States Code, to adjust
mandatory retirement timelines for certain regular Navy and
Marine Corps warrant officers.
Sec. 506--Authority to improve retention for permanent professors of
the United States Army War College
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 7153(a) of title 10, United States Code, and establish
a new section 7219 of title 10, United States Code, to
establish a permanent professor position for senior military
members assigned as faculty at the United States Army War
College.
Sec. 507--Congressional notification of relief or early departure of
certain general and flag officers
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 35 of title 10, United States Code, by adding a new
section requiring the Secretary of Defense to notify the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than 5 days after the relief,
removal, reassignment, resignation, retirement, request for
retirement, or other departure of a general or flag officer in
the grade of O-9 or O-10 from a position before the expected
completion of that officer's tour of duty. The provision would
also require the Secretary of Defense to submit a detailed
report to the committees not later than 30 days after such
action.

Subtitle B--Reserve Component Management

Sec. 511--Clarification on computation of total years of service
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 14706 of title 10, United States Code, to clarify the
computation of total years of service for certain members who
attend service-approved advanced education programs.

Sec. 512--Authorized strengths for Navy Reserves and Marine Corps
Reserves on full-time reserve component duty

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
sections 12011(a)(2) and 12012(a) of title 10, United States
Code, to revise the authorized grade distribution tables for
Navy Reserve officers and senior enlisted members and Marine
Corps Reserve senior enlisted members serving on full-time
reserve component duty.

Sec. 513--National Guard military technician (dual status) conversions
and phase-out

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the phased-in conversion of military technicians (dual status)
to either Federal civilian employees under title 5, United
States Code, or to members of the active, guard, and reserve
(AGR) program under title 32, United States Code. The provision
would require the consent of an employee to conversion or
transfer and would provide employment protections for employees
who are within 3 years of earning an unreduced Federal civilian
annuity.
The committee believes it is important that the Department
of Defense thoughtfully consider the appropriate force mix
between civilian employees and AGRs as it implements this
phased conversion. To that end, the committee directs the
Secretary of Defense to conduct an independent analysis of the
impacts of such conversions or transfers on readiness,
workload, military force structure, lethality, operational
effectiveness, stress on the military force, State disaster
relief capabilities, and the fully burdened costs associated
with such conversions or transfers. Such analysis shall
evaluate the full range of conversion and transfer options and
force mix available under this authority. The Secretary shall
transmit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives the results of this analysis, not
later than July 1, 2027.

Sec. 514--Study and analysis for enhanced maritime surge maintenance,
repair, and production capacity

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Navy to conduct a feasibility study and
business case analysis to expand the industrial capabilities of
the Navy Reserve.

Subtitle C--General Service Authorities and Military Records

Sec. 521--Remote personnel processing in the military departments

The committee recommends a provision that would require
each Secretary of a military department to implement
capabilities to enable the remote in-processing and out-
processing of members of the Armed Forces and civilian
employees of the military departments to enhance efficiency and
user experience.

Sec. 522--Repeal of sunset of authority relating to non-medical
counseling services for military families

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1781(d) of title 10, United States Code, to repeal the
3-year limitation on the authority to provide non-medical
counseling services to military families through the Department
of Defense Military and Family Life Counseling Program.

Sec. 523--Guidance on public disclosure of personally identifiable
information for certain members of the Armed Forces

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to issue guidance, not later than March 1,
2027, on the public release of personally identifiable
information in administrative announcements in order to
mitigate security and counterintelligence risks and ensure
consistent safeguards across the military departments.

Sec. 524--Prohibition on reduction in the number of personnel assigned
to a service review agency

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1559 of title 10, United States Code, to extend the
prohibition on reducing personnel assigned to service review
agencies through December 31, 2031.

Sec. 525--Reauthorization of temporary authority to develop and provide
additional recruitment incentives

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 522(h) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92) to extend the temporary
authority to develop and provide additional recruitment
incentives.

Sec. 526--Relief for former service members requesting review of
discharge or dismissal on the basis of post-traumatic stress
disorder or traumatic brain injury related to combat or
military sexual trauma

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1552(h) of title 10, United States Code, to clarify the
scope of relief available under the liberal consideration
standard, while ensuring requests for medical retirement or
disability separation are evaluated under consistent Disability
Evaluation System evidentiary standards.

Sec. 527--Modification of whistleblower protections

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, to specify
retaliatory reviews of security clearances and mental health
examinations as prohibited personnel actions under this
section, and to clarify that nondisclosure agreements do not
abrogate a servicemember's right to make protected
communications under the authority of this section.

Sec. 528--Authority for collection of personally identifiable
information regarding prospective recruits

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretaries of the military departments to collect
information on individuals who are at least 17 years of age and
eligible for service in the Armed Forces for the purpose of
enhancing military recruiting, marketing, advertising, and
outreach efforts.

Sec. 529--Modification of service obligations for cadets obtaining
employment as professional athletes

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
sections 7448, 8459, and 9448 of title 10, United States Code,
to increase from 5 to 10 the number of graduates of each
military service academy who may obtain employment as a
professional athlete before completing their active-duty
service obligation. The provision would authorize the Secretary
concerned to waive that numerical limitation only upon
determining that participation by additional graduates is in
the national interest and would provide a significant
recruiting, retention, public affairs, or other strategic
benefit to the Armed Forces. The provision would also require
the Secretaries of the military departments to prescribe
regulations governing eligibility, participation, and
compliance with the program.

Sec. 529A--Requirement of equal opportunity, racial neutrality, and
exclusive use of merit in military personnel actions

The committee recommends a provision that would require
military personnel actions related to promotions, nominative
assignments, command selection, and selection for military and
civilian schooling to be based exclusively on individual merit,
fitness, capability, and performance. The provision would also
prohibit consideration of an individual's sex, race, ethnicity,
or national origin in making personnel decisions.

Sec. 529B--Prohibition on participation of males in athletic programs
or activities, and males entering privacy spaces, at the
military service academies that are designated for women or
girls

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to prohibit participation by males in
athletic programs or activities designated for women or girls
at the military service academies and schools operated by the
Department of Defense, including Department of Defense
Education Activity schools, and to require such institutions to
provide sex-separated restrooms, changing rooms, and sleeping
quarters, subject to specified exceptions.

Sec. 529C--Modification of provisions related to diversity, equity, and
inclusion

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
sections 573, 612, and 14102 of title 10, United States Code,
to remove the requirement that officer promotion selection
boards represent the diverse population of the armed force
concerned to the extent practicable. This provision would also
repeal section 986 of title 10, United States Code, relating to
Department of Defense policy regarding the identification of
gender or personal pronouns in official correspondence. This
provision would also amend section 2001 of title 10, United
States Code, to revise the content of required human relations
training to emphasize instruction on core military values,
including honor, courage, commitment, integrity, and
excellence.

Sec. 529D--Sex-neutral occupational performance standards

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 543 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160) to require the Secretary
of Defense to ensure that any member of the Armed Forces who
meets the applicable occupational standards is eligible for
qualification, assignment, and continued service in that
occupational career field under sex-neutral standards and
without differential evaluation based on sex.

Subtitle D--Military Justice and Other Legal Matters

Sec. 531--Wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual images

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to analyze the feasibility and
advisability of amending article 117a(a) of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 917a(a)), wrongful broadcast or
distribution of intimate visual images, to remove the element
of the offense that requires conduct that has a reasonably
direct and palpable connection to a military mission or
military environment. This provision would require the
Secretary to submit a report on the analysis to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives not later than December 31, 2027.
The committee is aware of concerns by military prosecutors
that this element is unnecessary and challenging when the
victim of this offense is a civilian with no military
connection.

Sec. 532--Expansion of victim access to Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
article 6b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C.
806b) to explicitly provide the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces jurisdiction over Court of Criminal Appeals rulings on a
petition for a writ of mandamus under that article.

Sec. 533--Technical amendment to completion of appellate review under
article 57 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
article 57(c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10
U.S.C. 857(c)) to ensure that its language relating to the
completion of a case's appellate review mirrors the expansion
of Supreme Court jurisdiction for petitions arising from
military criminal appeals.

Sec. 534--Review of courts-martial records

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
article 65 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C.
865) to conform with section 544 of the James M. Inhofe
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public
Law 117-263) regarding legal review of certain general and
special courts-martial records. The provision would also amend
article 69 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C.
869) to correct a cross-reference error regarding review of
cases by the Judge Advocate General.

Sec. 535--Authority of special trial counsel to enter into pretrial
agreements with respect to certain offenses occurring before
effective date of military justice reforms

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
article 24a(c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10
U.S.C. 824a(c)) to provide a judge advocate detailed as a
special trial counsel with the authority to enter into a
pretrial agreement with an accused for an offense that was
allegedly committed before January 1, 2019, the effective date
of the amendments made by the Military Justice Act of 2016
(division E of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328)), and would thereby
facilitate the efficient resolution of such cases by special
trial counsel.

Sec. 536--Clarification of court of criminal appeals review of
sentencing

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
article 66(e)(1) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10
U.S.C. 866(e)) to clarify that, when the accused is sentenced
to confinement for a specification alleging a criteria offense
or when the confinement portion of the sentence for a
specification alleging a parameter offense exceeds the
parameter range, a Court of Criminal Appeals will engage in a
sentence appropriateness analysis of only the portion of a
court-martial sentence providing for confinement for such a
specification or specifications.

Sec. 537--Updating subpoena authority for military investigations

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
article 30a(a)(1)(B) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(10 U.S.C. 830a(a)(1)(B)) to authorize military judges to issue
subpoenas for electronic communications pursuant to the Stored
Communications Act (18 U.S.C. 2701-2713).

Sec. 538--Extension of Special Victims' Counsel services to domestic
violence victims

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1044e of title 10, United States Code, to extend
special victims' counsel services to victims of domestic
violence.

Sec. 539--Treatment of hazing under Uniform Code of Military Justice

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to conduct an analysis, and provide a
report not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, of how hazing is treated under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, and whether any modifications should be made
to the Code based on that analysis.

Sec. 539A--Notification of the issuance or termination of military
protective orders to victims of domestic violence or sexual
assault

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1567a of title 10, United States Code, to require
notification to victims of domestic abuse or sexual assault in
the event of the issuance or termination of a military
protective order.

Sec. 539B--Military domestic violence emergent housing policy

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to establish and implement a policy to
require commanders, in response to credible reports or
complaints of domestic violence, to impose a military
protective order and, whenever practicable, separate the victim
and alleged offender into separate housing. The provision also
requires a briefing, not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives concerning any
additional authorities necessary to properly implement this
policy.

Sec. 539C--Annual report on findings of the Department-wide review of
the military legal system

The committee recommends a provision that would require an
annual report on the Department of Defense review of the
military legal system initiated pursuant to the Secretary of
Defense memorandum dated May 8, 2026.

Sec. 539D--Clarification of authority to order to active-duty certain
persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice for
matters relating to offenses during specified periods incident
to inactive-duty training

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C.
802) to clarify the authority to order to active duty certain
persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice for
matters relating to offenses during specified periods incident
to inactive-duty training.

Sec. 539E--Inapplicability to retired members of punitive articles
affecting political speech

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C.
802) to exempt certain types of speech by a retiree from being
subject to punishment under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.

Subtitle E--Member Education, Training, and Transition

Sec. 541--Limitation on authority to reorganize the Senior Reserve
Officers' Training Corps

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of a military department to provide a briefing to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives prior to reorganizing a unit of a Reserve
Officers' Training Corps program and would ensure that affected
students are able to complete commissioning requirements
without being required to transfer to another educational
institution.

Sec. 542--Discharge of midshipmen for unsatisfactory conduct or
inaptitude

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 8462 of title 10, United States Code, to align the U.S.
Naval Academy's standards and processes for discharging
midshipmen for unsatisfactory conduct or inaptitude with those
applied at the other military service academies.

Sec. 543--Modification to program on encouragement of postseparation
public and community service

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 553(c)(2) of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232) to
ensure that persons still eligible to participate in the
postseparation public and community service program can
appropriately register their public service employment with the
Department of Defense and receive the benefits for which they
are eligible.

Sec. 544--Limited authority to waive time-in-grade requirement for
service academy graduates detailed as students at law schools

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2004 of title 10, United States Code, to permanently
expand the maximum number of members authorized in each
military service to be detailed as students at law schools at
government expense to 35 and to authorize the Secretaries of
the military departments to waive the minimum 2 year service
requirement for up to 5 graduates of each military service
academy per year.

Sec. 545--Elimination of the right of cadets to automatic reexamination

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
sections 7451 and 9451 of title 10, United States Code, to
provide the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Air Force
Academy with greater discretion in cadet reexaminations to
better align their processes with the U.S. Naval Academy.

Sec. 546--Revision to decision timeframe for expedited transfers at the
military service academies

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
sections 7461, 8480, and 9461 of title 10, United States Code,
to extend the decision timeframe for expedited transfer
requests at the military service academies from 72 hours to 5
calendar days to align with the decision timeframe applicable
to the regular components of the Armed Forces.

Sec. 547--Establishment of program to promote participation of foreign
students in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps

The committee recommends a provision that would establish a
program to promote the participation of foreign students in the
Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps.

Sec. 548--Designation of senior official for military-to-civilian
transition

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 58 of title 10, United States Code, by adding a new
section requiring the Secretary of Defense to designate a
senior Department of Defense official to oversee policies and
programs related to the transition of members of the Armed
Forces from active duty to civilian life or service in a
reserve component.

Sec. 549--Payment of tuition for off-duty training or education

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2007 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize
tuition assistance funds to be used for institution fees in
addition to tuition and other educational expenses. The
provision would also authorize the Secretary of Defense to
prescribe regulations increasing the tuition assistance cap to
not more than $350 per semester hour.

Sec. 549A--Improvement of transition of medics in the Armed Forces to
the civilian workforce in health care occupations

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Homeland Security,
to develop recommendations to improve the transition of medics
serving in the Armed Forces into civilian health care
occupations, including as certified nursing assistants,
licensed practical nurses, and medical assistants.

Sec. 549B--Standards and requirements for institutions of higher
learning seeking to participate in Department of Defense
education programs

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the Secretary of Defense from restricting servicemember
participation in eligible educational programs at accredited
institutions of higher education or denying educational
assistance to otherwise eligible servicemembers, except in
specified circumstances involving national security concerns,
violations of law, or material noncompliance by an institution
of higher education.

Sec. 549C--Government copyright for work produced at Defense Security
Cooperation University

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 105(d)(2) of title 17, United States Code, to add the
Defense Security Cooperation University to the list of military
institutions eligible for copyright protections.

Sec. 549D--Promoting the use of standardized testing at military
service academies and DoDEA schools

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that each service academy
accepts scores from not fewer than three nationally recognized
standardized assessments that meet specified criteria. The
provision would also require the Director of the Department of
Defense Education Activity to offer eleventh-grade students the
opportunity to take not fewer than three standardized
assessments that meet the same criteria.

Sec. 549E--Department of Defense-wide hate symbol policy and recruiter
and workforce training requirement

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Department of Defense to implement a policy banning the display
of hate symbols in the Department of Defense, including actions
for removal.

Subtitle F--Military Family Readiness and Dependents' Education

Part I--Dependents' Education

Sec. 551--Certain assistance to local educational agencies that benefit
dependents of military and civilian personnel

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
$50.0 million in Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide, for
continuation of the Department of Defense (DOD) assistance
program to local educational agencies impacted by the
enrollment of dependent children of military members and DOD
civilian employees.
The provision would also authorize $10.0 million in
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide, for impact aid
payments for children with disabilities as enacted by the Floyd
D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001 (Public Law 106-398), using the formula set forth in
section 363 of that Act, for continuation of DOD assistance to
local educational agencies that benefit eligible dependents
with severe disabilities.
Furthermore, the provision would authorize the Secretary of
Defense to use an additional $20.0 million for payments to
local educational agencies determined by the Secretary to have
higher concentrations of military children with severe
disabilities.
Finally, the provision would require the Secretary to
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
September 30, 2027, on the Department's evaluation of each
local educational agency with higher concentrations of military
children with severe disabilities and the DOD's subsequent
determination of the amounts of impact aid each such agency
should receive.

Sec. 552--Educational technologists at Department of Defense Education
Activity schools

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) to ensure that
each school district has, at a minimum, one staff member
dedicated to facilitating educational technology. The provision
would also require the Director of DODEA to brief the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than February 1, 2028, on the
implementation of such requirement.

Part II--Child Care and Related Matters

Sec. 555--Expansion of eligible child care providers for Department of
Defense programs

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1798(b) of title 10, United States Code, to remove the
prior service requirement for certain Department of Defense
child care providers, thereby expanding the pool of eligible
personnel available to support military child development
centers.

Sec. 556--Standardized reporting on Department of Defense child care
readiness

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to standardize the collection and
reporting of data related to child care capacity, workforce
readiness, and waitlists across the Armed Forces and military
installations, including disaggregated data on utilization,
staffing, unmet demand, and fee assistance programs. The
provision also requires the Secretary of Defense to provide
recurring briefings to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives on trends, gaps, and
actions to improve access to child care.

Sec. 557--Update to pay system for child and youth programs operated by
nonappropriated fund instrumentalities

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, not later than January 1, 2027, to update
Department of Defense policy governing the pay system for
employees of child and youth programs operated by
nonappropriated fund instrumentalities to strengthen
recruitment and retention, including through modifications to
pay band structures and compensation rates, consistent with
section 589A of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement
and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
(Public Law 118-159).

Part III--Other Matters

Sec. 561--Department of Defense Fellowship Program for Military Spouses

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
subchapter I of chapter 88 of title 10, United States Code, to
require the Secretary of Defense to establish a fellowship
program for military spouses, to enhance career opportunities
for military spouses, and support the readiness of military
families.

Sec. 562--Consideration in member assignments process of colocation of
members and civilian employee spouses

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to require each of the Armed Forces to
have in place a policy for considering a military spouse's
status as a Department of Defense civilian employee in the
assignment process for servicemembers.

Sec. 563--Review of Exceptional Family Member Program

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to initiate a review of the Exceptional
Family Member Program and to submit to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a
report on the results of such review, not later than April 30,
2028.

Sec. 564--Improved counseling and access to information relating to
foster care for military families

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to: (1) Require that all counselors
assigned to a Family Advocacy Program or Military and Family
Life program at a military installation be trained in the
requirements and resources relating to foster care in the state
in which the installation is located; (2) Require the inclusion
of foster care information on Military OneSource; and (3)
Consult with the Administration for Children and Families of
the Department of Health and Human Services to obtain resources
relating to foster care for military families.

Sec. 565--Reporting on gaps between senior and junior enlisted security
forces that could hinder effective oversight and leadership at
Protection Level One locations

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 585 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81) to extend the period of
reporting through 2032 and include a new reporting criterion
relating to gaps between senior and junior enlisted security
forces personnel.

Subtitle G--Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps

Sec. 571--Update of guidance and evaluation of Junior Reserve Officers'
Training Corps instructor pay scale

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to update Department of Defense guidance
for the Junior Reserve Officers' Training program, including
evaluation of the standardized instructor pay scale and bonus
authorities, and establish consistent metrics to assess
instructor recruitment and retention across the services.

Sec. 572--Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps programs in
Department of Defense Education Activity schools

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that each Department of Defense
Education Activity secondary school that meets eligibility
requirements under section 2031 of title 10, United States
Code, establishes and maintains a Junior Reserve Officers'
Training Corps unit.

Subtitle H--Decorations and Other Awards, Miscellaneous Reports, and
Other Matters

Sec. 581--Authorization for award of the Distinguished-Service Cross to
Isaac ``Ike'' Camacho for acts of valor in Vietnam

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 592 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) by striking ``posthumous''
in the section heading.

Sec. 582--Authorization for award of the Distinguished-Service Cross
for Joseph P. Lynch for acts of valor in the Republic of
Vietnam

The committee recommends a provision that would waive the
time limitations specified in section 7274 of title 10, United
States Code, to authorize the Secretary of the Army to award
the Distinguished-Service Cross to Joseph P. Lynch for acts of
valor in the Republic of Vietnam.

Sec. 583--Submission to Congress of information for consideration of
certain military awards

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
sections 7274, 8298, and 9274 of title 10, United States Code,
to require the Secretaries of the military departments to
submit an unredacted package of information relating to any
reconsideration of an award that would require the waiver of
time limitations.

Sec. 584--Medal of Honor review procedures and reconsideration and
upgrade requirements

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapters 737, 837, and 937, of title 10, United States Code, to
require certain review responsibilities, consistent with
current practice, for each military services' Medal of Honor
review process.

Sec. 585--Time limitations

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1130 of title 10, United States Code, to set a time
requirement for proposals to be considered under this
authority. The provision would also amend section 1552 of title
10, United States Code, to strike subsection (j).

Sec. 586--Production of award files

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to submit to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
information on all decorations awarded under the authorities of
sections 7271, 7272, 7279, 8291, 8292, 8295, 9271, 9272, and
9279 of title 10, United States Code, between January 1, 2025,
and December 31, 2026. The provision would also limit the
obligation or expenditure of not more than 90 percent of
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide, funds authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2027
for travel expenses for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
until the Secretary of Defense submits such information.

Items of Special Interest

Assessment of Department of Defense space law requirements

The committee recognizes that operational demands in the
space domain have grown, including reliance on commercial
integration, allied and partner cooperation, and dual-use
technologies. Strategic competition increasingly includes
efforts to shape legal and normative frameworks. The committee
is concerned that current legal, policy, and institutional
structures within the Department of Defense may not have kept
pace with the complexity of space operations.
The Department currently relies primarily on the office of
the Air Force General Counsel and the Air Force Judge Advocate
General's Corps for legal support to space operations. The U.S.
Space Force lacks its own legal corps, formalized training
pipeline, or enduring mechanism to develop a specialized space
law expertise. The growing complexity of international space
law, civil-military partnerships, commercial integration, dual-
use technologies, and industrial base considerations require
enhanced, domain-specific legal capacity.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations, the
Commander, U.S. Space Command, the Defense Legal Services
Agency, and other relevant components, to conduct a
comprehensive assessment of the Department's current and
projected requirements for space law expertise. A report on
these findings shall be submitted to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives by
December 1, 2027, along with a briefing on the report. The
report should include, at a minimum:
(1) An inventory of legal personnel supporting space
operations, including training, experience, and
organizational alignment;
(2) Identification of gaps, if any, in legal
readiness related to international space law,
operational employment, commercial and civil
partnerships, dual-use technologies, and industrial
base considerations;
(3) Options for establishing a dedicated legal
organization within the Air Force, Space Force, or
Space Command;
(4) Assessment of requirements for advanced, domain-
specific education and professional military education
in space law; and
(5) Opportunities to expand academic and research
partnerships to support training, workforce
development, and legal research relevant to national
security space operations.

Briefing on Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Test special
purpose adjunct to address computational thinking

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide
an updated briefing, not later than April 1, 2027, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the implementation of section 594 of the
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283), including an
assessment of the effectiveness of administering a special
purpose adjunct test to address computational thinking for
recruitment and identifying appropriate assignments.

Briefing on command climate and suicide

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a
briefing, not later than March 1, 2027, to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
on existing policies for assessing command climate in
conjunction with suicides and suicide attempts, including any
information on known correlations between command climate and
suicidal attempts or suicides.

Briefing on military service recruitment task force findings and
outcomes

The committee recognizes the growing challenges associated
with recruiting in a constrained demographic environment,
including a projected decline of approximately 13 percent in
the population of military-aged individuals over the next 15
years, and is concerned these trends may further limit the pool
of eligible and willing applicants.
The committee expects the Department of Defense to
proactively adapt its recruiting, advertising, and outreach
strategies to account for these trends, including leveraging
modern marketing tools and data-driven approaches to better
compete for talent.
The committee notes the June 13, 2025, memorandum from the
Secretary of Defense establishing the Military Service
Recruitment Task Force to develop solutions to strengthen
recruiting across the Department. Accordingly, the committee
directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives upon completion of the task force, and not
later than January 1, 2027. At a minimum, the briefing shall
include:
(1) The findings and recommendations of the task
force;
(2) Actions taken or planned by the Department and
the military services in response to such findings;
(3) Any changes to recruiting, advertising, and
outreach strategies, including the use of data-driven
tools and modern marketing approaches;
(4) An assessment of barriers to recruitment and
accession, including eligibility constraints and
administrative processes;
(5) Metrics used to evaluate recruiting performance
and any planned changes to such metrics; and
(6) Any recommended legislative proposals.

Briefing on Navy Enlisted Classification code alignment

The Secretary of the Navy is directed to submit a briefing
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, not later than July 1, 2027, regarding
ongoing efforts to ensure that Navy Enlisted Classification
(NEC) codes accurately reflect the technical experience,
specialized training, and mission-essential competencies of
sailors and are aligned with billet requirements.
The briefing should include the following:
(1) A description of the current process used to
determine whether an NEC requirement may be satisfied
through documented on-the-job experience and
proficiency or requires completion of a formal course
of instruction, including any efforts to validate
existing NEC codes against demonstrated technical
competencies;
(2) A description of the process used to review and
modernize billet requirements, including how NEC codes
assigned to positions are evaluated to ensure they
accurately reflect the technical tasks, qualifications,
and competencies required for such positions;
(3) A description of any framework, methodology, or
ongoing effort to map technical competencies across
ratings, NECs, or related workforce classifications to
improve personnel flexibility and support the
assignment of sailors with requisite skills to mission
requirements;
(4) A description of the Navy's use of assignment,
proficiency, readiness, or other performance data to
identify discrepancies between assigned NECs and
demonstrated workforce requirements, assess assignment
success, and optimize talent management and career-long
placement decisions. (5) An overview of the Rating
Mastery Working Group, Battle Ready Sailor
Implementation Plan, MyNavySextant, and any related
initiatives intended to improve the measurement,
validation, and assignment of technical competencies
across the Fleet.

CATCH a Serial Offender program expansion

The committee remains committed to eradicating sexual
harassment across the Armed Forces, their adult dependents,
Department of Defense civilians, and veterans. Anonymous
reports are an important tool in bringing forward voices that
may otherwise feel they may not be able to safely publicly
report an incident, but in some cases they may allow repeat
offenders to avoid accountability. In the context of sexual
assault, the Department sought to address this challenge
through the Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) program. However,
the committee notes that integrating sexual harassment
complaints into the current architecture may present
significant structural challenges, as sexual harassment is not
universally categorized as a criminal offense under broader
State and Federal law.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to submit a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January
15, 2027, on the feasibility of expanding the CATCH program to
include sexual harassment. The briefing shall include, at
minimum, the following:
(1) An assessment of the feasibility of adding
confidential or informal reports of sexual harassment
into the CATCH program architecture;
(2) A detailed technical analysis of the changes that
would need to be made to the CATCH system to facilitate
the inclusion of sexual harassment reports;
(3) A detailed analysis of the specific statutory,
regulatory, or policy changes required to grant
Military Criminal Investigative Organization agents or
appropriate investigative bodies access to the
necessary databases to track sexual harassment
offenders; and
(4) Recommendations for alternative interagency
procedures, processes, or framework modifications that
would yield the intended result of tracking and
identifying serial sexual harassment offenders.

Child care fee application clarity and transparency

The committee recognizes that basic allowance for housing
(BAH) is a core component of a servicemember's total
compensation package and supports the Department of Defense's
use of a standardized, non-locality BAH rate in calculating
total family income (TFI) for child care fees to promote equity
and consistency across duty stations.
The committee notes, however, that current application
materials and processes may not clearly reflect how this non-
locality rate is applied, which may increase the risk of
inconsistent or inaccurate data entry.
To improve transparency and ensure families can accurately
complete applications and anticipate fee determinations, the
committee encourages the Department to enhance the clarity and
usability of application materials, including through plain-
language explanations and targeted outreach during the
enrollment process.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretaries of the
military departments to provide a briefing to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
not later than February 1, 2027, that includes:
(1) A description of how each military department
ensures that BAH inputs used in child care fee
applications reflect the standardized, non-locality BAH
rate;
(2) The extent to which application systems automate
or validate such inputs to reduce user error;
(3) Any identified challenges or inconsistencies in
how TFI is calculated across the Department; and
(4) Planned or ongoing efforts to improve application
usability, transparency, and data accuracy.

Comprehensive review of awards associated with noncombatant evacuation
operations at Hamid Karzai International Airport

The committee notes that the Department of Defense has
initiated a comprehensive review of actions and awards
associated with the withdrawal from Afghanistan and is
concerned that the initial public announcement and award
actions focused narrowly on Company G, 2d Battalion, 1st Marine
Regiment, despite the participation of adjacent and supporting
units, including elements of the Marine Expeditionary Unit and
other personnel operating in direct support of the Abbey Gate
mission.
The committee notes that servicemembers from multiple
units, occupational specialties, and supporting elements
operated under similarly dangerous conditions during the
evacuation and response operations at Hamid Karzai
International Airport (HKIA), including personnel who were
killed or wounded while conducting security, sustainment,
medical, engagement, and support functions. Furthermore, the
committee notes that servicemembers served with valor and
distinction for 20 years in Afghanistan, and many members made
the ultimate sacrifice for their country during this conflict.
The committee believes any review of valor and meritorious
awards associated with the Afghanistan conflict should be
undertaken holistically and with appropriate consideration of
the actions and contributions of all units and personnel
involved in the conflict, rather than limiting review to a
single infantry company or narrowly defined organizational
element associated with one mission or period of operations
within a broader 20-year conflict.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to ensure that the ongoing Afghanistan Withdrawal Special
Review Panel conducts a comprehensive review of awards
associated with operations at HKIA during the August 2021
noncombatant evacuation operations, including appropriate
consideration of the actions and contributions of supporting
and adjacent units and personnel involved in those operations,
rather than limiting review to a single unit or narrowly
defined mission set. The committee further directs the
Secretary to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than April 1, 2027, on the scope, methodology, status,
and findings of the review, including an explanation of how the
Department ensured equitable consideration of awards
recommendations across participating units and occupational
communities.

Comptroller General of the United States assessment on academic
preparedness

The committee remains concerned about the declining share
of the military-age population that meets academic eligibility
standards for military service and the potential long-term
implications for military readiness and recruitment. The
committee notes that literacy, numeracy, and other foundational
cognitive skills are developed over the course of childhood,
including during the early childhood years prior to entry into
the kindergarten through grade 12 education system, and that
research suggests early educational attainment may have effects
on academic preparedness, workforce participation, and military
eligibility.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General
of the United States to provide a report to the congressional
defense committees, not later than December 31, 2028, assessing
the extent to which literacy, numeracy, and academic
preparedness, including foundational skills developed in early
childhood prior to entry into the kindergarten through grade 12
education system, affect eligibility for military service. The
report should include an assessment of:
(1) Performance of military applicants on the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, including Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) category distributions
and trends over at least the previous, and not fewer
than, 10 fiscal years;
(2) The rate at which applicants are disqualified or
experience delayed accession due to failure to meet
minimum academic eligibility thresholds, disaggregated
by military department and, to the extent practicable,
by State, Tribal community, and region;
(3) The relationship between AFQT scores and military
occupational specialty qualification, including the
extent to which below-threshold scores limit access to
critical or high-demand military occupational
specialties (MOS);
(4) Participation in, and outcomes of, the Future
Servicemember Preparatory Course and any analogous
preparatory or remediation programs offered by the
military departments, including effects on accession
rates, retention, MOS qualification, and performance
relative to standard entry recruits;
(5) Demographic and geographic variation in academic
preparedness among the qualified military available
population, including by State, Tribal community,
region, rurality, and educational attainment level;
(6) Any correlation between secondary educational
outcomes, including high school graduation rates,
standardized assessment performance, and participation
in career and technical education, and military
accession and performance outcomes; and
(7) The relationship between participation in high-
quality early childhood education programs, including
programs funded under the Head Start Act (42 U.S.C.
9831 et seq), State-funded prekindergarten programs,
other evidence-based early learning programs, and AFQT
performance and accession eligibility outcomes, to the
extent that data permit such analysis.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
include recommendations for:
(1) Improving coordination between Federal and State
education systems and the Department of Defense to
strengthen the education-to-military-service pipeline
at both the early childhood and secondary education
levels;
(2) Enhancing the effectiveness and scalability of
existing preparatory and remediation programs; and
(3) Identifying Federal investments in early
childhood education quality that may have measurable
downstream effects on the size and academic
preparedness of the military-eligible population.
In conducting the assessment, the committee directs the
Comptroller General to consult with the Secretary of Defense,
the secretaries of the military departments, the Secretary of
Education, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and, as
appropriate, representatives of Indian Tribes, Tribal education
agencies, territorial education agencies, and the heads of
other relevant Federal departments and agencies.

Comptroller General review of judge advocate support to Department of
Justice operations

The committee notes that, within the Department of Defense
(DOD), each service except the Space Force maintains a Judge
Advocate General's (JAG) Corps or equivalent organization. JAG
officers, also known as judge advocates, are responsible for
providing legal counsel to commanders, administering and trying
courts-martial, representing servicemembers in legal matters,
and ensuring military policies align with legal standards,
among other responsibilities. Recently, judge advocates have
been used to support the missions of executive departments
other than the DOD. In September 2025, the DOD authorized up to
600 judge advocates to serve as immigration judges to help
address a large backlog of immigration court cases. Further, in
January 2026, the DOD authorized judge advocates to serve as
Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys in cities across the country
at greater numbers than before and in cases with no direct
connection to the military. In both cases, judge advocates
served in support of the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General
of the United States to assess the DOD's use of judge
advocates, to include: (1) A description of the process
employed to identify judge advocates to support DOJ operations;
(2) The training required by the DOJ prior to assuming these
roles and the extent to which this training is adequate for
judge advocates to assume these roles; (3) The extent to which
the DOD collects key information on judge advocates selected
for support of DOJ operations, including rank, role prior to
selection, component, similar experience within the JAG Corps
relative to their cross-departmental assignment, mobilization
authority, and duration of assignment; (4) Efforts by the DOD
to identify and mitigate any potential effects of the use of
judge advocates to support DOJ operations on the DOD's legal
missions, such as the timeliness of courts-martial and the
availability of legal advice for commanders; (5) The
assignments from which judge advocates were reassigned to
support DOJ operations and any impacts on readiness resulting
from these reassignments; (6) Impacts of assignments to support
DOJ operations on the morale and readiness of the judge
advocate general corps; (7) The DOJ operations to which the
judge advocates were assigned and whether the role or function
performed by each judge advocate with the DOJ had a substantial
nexus to the Armed Forces; and (8) Any other matters that the
Comptroller General deems appropriate.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, not later than April 16, 2027, with
the results of the review to follow in a mutually agreed upon
format and timeframe.

Comptroller General review of use of non-disclosure agreements within
Department of Defense

The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United
States to conduct an assessment of the use of non-disclosure
agreements (NDAs) within the Department of Defense (DOD). The
assessment should generally include: (1) A description of the
statutory and regulatory framework governing the Department's
use of NDAs and any identified areas of concern or potential
conflict; (2) The extent to which the DOD conducts centralized
oversight of NDAs, to include use of NDAs by DOD contractors;
(3) The extent to which the DOD collects data on the use of
NDAs; (4) The effect NDAs have on the perception by
servicemembers of their rights; and (5) Any other matters the
Comptroller General deems appropriate.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, not later than April 16, 2027, with
the results of the review to follow in a mutually agreed upon
format and timeframe.

Degree conferral for medically disqualified cadets and midshipmen

The committee recognizes the significant investment and
commitment of cadets and midshipmen at the military service
academies and notes that, in limited cases, individuals who are
otherwise in good standing may be medically disqualified from
commissioning during their final year through no fault of their
own. The committee believes that such individuals, having
substantially completed the academic requirements for a degree,
may warrant consideration for degree conferral consistent with
institutional standards and good order and discipline.
The committee encourages the Secretaries of the military
departments to review current policies and practices regarding
the conferral of undergraduate degrees to cadets and midshipmen
who are medically disqualified from commissioning in their
final year and to consider approaches that appropriately
recognize academic achievement while maintaining accountability
for the investment made by the Department of Defense.
The committee directs the Secretaries of the military
departments to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than April 1, 2027, that includes, for each service
academy:
(1) The number of cadets or midshipmen who were
medically disqualified from commissioning during their
final year of study over the preceding 5 academic
years;
(2) The number of such individuals who were awarded a
degree and the basis for such determinations;
(3) A description of current policies governing
degree conferral in such cases; and
(4) Any considerations, challenges, or
recommendations regarding potential changes to such
policies.

Department of Defense information sharing on Wounded Knee

The committee seeks to understand the process used to
review the Medals of Honor awarded to soldiers for conduct at
Wounded Knee Creek in December 1890. According to the
memorandum directing the review, the scope of the review was
limited to examining each awardee's actions at Wounded Knee,
though they were also allowed to ``consider the context of the
overall engagement as appropriate, including as necessary to
understand each recipient's individual actions.'' The
Department of Defense has announced the results of the review
but not explained what it did and did not consider as part of
the review process. Numerous stakeholders, including
descendants of the Wounded Knee victims, have expressed concern
about precisely which historical sources, experts, and bodies
of law were considered in this review.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide the full report and unredacted materials in addition
to briefing the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027,
including: (1) A list of and copies of all documents
considered, eyewitness accounts reviewed, and individuals with
whom the panelists met; (2) Which panelists visited the Wounded
Knee site; (3) Whether and how the panel considered the Treaty
of Fort Laramie and any other applicable Indian treaty law, the
Lieber Code and any other applicable laws of war, and the
totality of the context of the overall engagement; (4) An
explanation of how the panelists weighed the various sources of
evidence; (5) An explanation of what engagement the panelists
had with Tribal descendants of Wounded Knee victims; (6) An
explanation of any historical review conducted by historians
employed by the Federal Government; (7) An explanation of what
documents were excluded from the review and why; and (8) Any
other matters relevant to the conclusions drawn in the review.

Department of Defense science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
education

The committee is encouraged by recent Department of Defense
efforts to invest in science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics (STEM) education for K-12 students. Students
studying STEM will become the core of the workforce that the
Department needs to serve our military installations, increase
production of munitions, and modernize the industrial base to
meet evolving warfare needs with respect to drones, artificial
intelligence, and cyberwarfare. Therefore, the committee urges
the Department to retain this investment in STEM education as a
foundational part of this modernization effort, particularly
efforts with a strong evidence base, including teacher
professional development in geographies with military-connected
families.

Development of core Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations curriculum

The committee believes Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
(EMSO) are coordinated military actions to exploit, attack,
protect, and manage the electromagnetic environment (JP 3-85).
EMSO is a core competency of the Department of Defense (DOD),
which requires a trained cadre of competent warfighters and
federal workforce to achieve superiority across the
Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) enterprise. Modern military
operations require that every warfighter and DOD civilian
serving in a mission support role across each of the services
should be required to learn about the EMS in the same
foundational way before specializing first by competency, then
by each military service, as Joint personnel, and finally as
senior leaders.
The committee notes that modern military operations require
every warfighter to learn about the EMS in the same
foundational way. The committee recognizes the value of EMSO
education and encourages the military service academies to
consider opportunities to incorporate both core competency
fundamentals and service-specific fundamentals into their
curricula. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense to:
(1) Conduct a comprehensive survey of existing EMSO
courseware in service academies, Senior Service
Colleges, and the Joint Forces Staff College to
determine alignment with requirements for both core
competency fundamentals and service-specific
fundamentals, including Joint Force EMSO and Senior
Leaders EMSO; and
(2) Provide a report to the congressional defense
committees, not later than December 31, 2027. The
report shall include:
(a) Findings from the survey, specifically
how/if existing courseware aligns with Goal 3
of the Department of Defense Electromagnetic
Spectrum Superiority Strategy (2020), which
emphasizes advancing EMSO education and
training to strengthen operational readiness;
(b) Recommendations for curriculum
integration; and
(c) An assessment of associated costs
required to implement EMSO curriculum across
military educational institutions.

Duty status modernization

The committee recognizes ongoing efforts by the Department
of Defense, in coordination with the Congress, to streamline
and modernize the wide range of duty statuses across the
reserve components. The committee understands that the current
framework of numerous duty statuses can create unnecessary
complexity, limit transparency, and result in inconsistent
access to pay and benefits for servicemembers.
The committee acknowledges that the Department is actively
working to develop proposals to consolidate and standardize
duty statuses in a manner that improves administrative
efficiency while maintaining appropriate distinctions in
authorities and benefits. The committee supports these efforts
and expects continued engagement with the Congress as proposals
are refined. The committee notes that, despite the Department's
ongoing work, formal legislative proposals have not yet been
transmitted to the Congress due to delays in review by the
Office of Management and Budget but expects such review to be
completed expeditiously so that proposals may be provided for
congressional consideration.
The committee intends to continue working closely with the
Department to advance duty status modernization and emphasizes
the importance of timely, consistent communication to ensure
legislative proposals are accurately scoped, executable, and
aligned with shared objectives.

Expanding opportunities for veterans in emerging technologies

The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, a report on
expanding training and career pathway opportunities in emerging
technologies for separating servicemembers.
The report should include a feasibility assessment of
creating an Emerging Technologies Program to fund graduate,
trade, or vocational training for members of the Armed Forces
who are separating from active duty. The report should also
assess how the Department of Defense leverages programs such as
the SkillBridge Program and the Transition Assistance Program
to expand information, opportunities, and career pathways for
separating servicemembers in emerging technology and high-
demand technical fields, including but not limited to
biotechnology and the geospatial field.
The report should further examine opportunities to support
workforce development in biotechnology and the geospatial
community, including pathways for servicemembers to apply
relevant military skills toward civilian employment and further
education. This examination should include potential
partnerships with industry and the feasibility of pilot
programs within the Transition Assistance Program to highlight
such careers for separating servicemembers with relevant
skills, training, and experience.

Fairness and efficiency for discharge review boards

The Secretary of each military department shall submit a
report on the timeliness, backlog, and adjudication of
discharge upgrade applications to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than May 1, 2027. This report shall include a description
that:
(1) Explains the current backlog of applications
before the service review agencies of the military
department concerned;
(2) Identifies the number of personnel assigned to
such agencies and the number of personnel required to
meet applicable timeliness goals under section 1557 of
title 10, United States Code;
(3) Includes a plan to:
(a) reduce the backlog of applications; and
(b) maintain the resources necessary to meet
such timeliness goals; and
(4) Describes any actions taken or planned to
modernize the application intake, case management, and
adjudication processes of such agencies.
Each report shall also include, for the most recent fiscal
year available:
(1) The number of applications received and
adjudicated, disaggregated by board and military
department;
(2) The average and median processing times for such
applications, disaggregated by board and military
department;
(3) The number and percentage of applications
adjudicated within applicable internal timeliness
standards, if any;
(4) The number and percentage of cases exceeding such
standards, and the primary factors contributing to
delays;
(5) The outcomes of applications (including granted,
denied, or partially granted), disaggregated by board
and military department;
(6) The number and percentage of cases in which
``liberal consideration'' was applied;
(7) A description of the methods used by the military
department to track and evaluate adjudication
timeliness and consistency; and
(8) A description of any actions taken to improve
transparency, timeliness, or consistency in the
adjudication of discharge upgrade applications.

Feasibility and advisability study for increasing United States Air
Force Academy cadet end strength

The committee recognizes the important role of the U.S. Air
Force Academy (USAFA) in commissioning future leaders of the
Air Force and the Space Force. The formal establishment of the
Space Force in 2019 impacted the number of officers
commissioned into the Air Force. The USAFA graduating class of
2025 included 93 officers commissioning into the Space Force.
The committee supports the consideration of increasing the
cadet end strength at USAFA to 4,400 cadets, consistent with
the authorized strength under section 9342 of title 10, United
States Code.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to conduct a feasibility and advisability study of
increasing the current USAFA cadet end strength to 4,400. The
study shall include:
(1) An assessment of the current physical
infrastructure sufficiency;
(2) An assessment of the additional personnel
required to support the increased cadet end strength,
including academic faculty, military cadre, and
installation support staff;
(3) An analysis of the impact to other sources of
commission; and
(4) Any other considerations deemed relevant by the
Secretary.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to
provide a report, not later than April 1, 2027, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the findings of the required study.

Military relief society support to National Guard and Reserve members

The committee recognizes the important role of military
relief societies designated under section 2566 of title 10,
United States Code, in providing emergency financial assistance
to servicemembers and their families. The committee seeks to
better understand how these organizations support members of
the National Guard and reserve components, particularly given
the unique duty status and geographic dispersion of these
populations.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretaries of the
military departments to provide a briefing to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
not later than March 31, 2027, on the provision of emergency
financial assistance to members of the National Guard and
Reserve through the military relief societies designated under
section 2566 of title 10, United States Code.
The briefing shall include:
(1) A description of eligibility criteria, outreach,
and utilization rates for members of the National Guard
and Reserve across the Army Emergency Relief Society,
Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society, Air Force Aid
Society, Inc., and Coast Guard Mutual Assistance;
(2) An assessment of the accessibility and
sufficiency of support provided to members of the
National Guard and Reserve, including any barriers
related to duty status, geographic location, or
awareness;
(3) Data on the number and type of financial
assistance cases involving members of the National
Guard and Reserve over the previous 5 fiscal years, to
the extent practicable;
(4) A comparison of how each military department
ensures equitable access to relief services for active
and reserve component personnel; and
(5) The Secretaries' assessments of whether existing
military relief societies adequately meet the needs of
National Guard and Reserve members and their families,
including any recommendations for administrative
improvements.

Military to civilian credentialing

The committee recognizes that over 150,000 service members
transition from active duty each year, many with highly
technical, operationally validated skills in fields such as
aviation maintenance, aviation operations, cybersecurity,
logistics, medical services, and the skilled trades. Despite
extensive training and years of demonstrated proficiency,
transitioning servicemembers routinely face unnecessary
barriers in obtaining civilian occupational credentials that
fail to account for experience gained while in uniform.
The committee notes that while existing federal programs,
including the Credentialing Opportunities On-Line program, the
United States Military Apprenticeship Program, SkillBridge, and
various Military Occupational Specialty crosswalk tools,
provide useful support to transitioning service members, these
programs are mostly voluntary and go underutilized during the
chaotic last several months a servicemember spends on active
duty. No broad government-wide framework exists that requires
civilian licensing boards, federal regulatory agencies, or
private credentialing bodies to recognize military
qualifications as satisfying baseline civilian occupational
requirements, although certain occupation-specific pathways,
such as the military competency pathway for pilot certification
under 14 CFR 61.73, demonstrate feasibility.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of
Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, to conduct a comprehensive review of
military-to-civilian occupational credentialing and to submit a
report to the congressional defense committees and the
Committees on Veterans' Affairs of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than June 1, 2027. The report shall
contain the following:
(1) An assessment of not fewer than five and not more
than ten military occupational specialties,
qualifications, or credentialing pathways across the
Armed Forces where military training, operational
qualification, and experience most directly correspond
to civilian occupational credentials, including at a
minimum one specialty from each of the following
domains: aviation, cybersecurity and information
technology, logistics and transportation, medical and
emergency services, and the skilled trades, and any
additional specialties the Secretary determines
appropriate;
(2) With respect to each military specialty
identified in accordance with paragraph (1):
(a) identify the corresponding civilian
credential, certification, or license that is
most directly equivalent;
(b) conduct a comparison of military
training, qualification standards, and
operational experience requirements with
corresponding civilian credentialing
requirements;
(c) assess the substantive gaps between
military and civilian qualification standards,
distinguishing differences in scope of practice
from administrative or procedural barriers; and
(d) offer recommendations identifying any
additional civilian-specific content genuinely
necessary to satisfy regulatory, safety, or
scope-of-practice requirements; and
(3) For each occupational domain, identify
opportunities and barriers to broader recognition of
military qualifications as satisfying baseline civilian
occupational requirements and provide recommendations
for actions within the authorities of the Department of
Defense, other Federal agencies, and Congress. The
committee expects the review to consider:
(a) opportunities to expand the use of
military competency pathways, analogous to the
existing pathway under 14 CFR 61.73, where
appropriate, to recognize military
qualifications and experience while preserving
any necessary civilian-specific regulatory
requirements;
(b) which statutory, regulatory, or
administrative barriers within Federal agencies
currently limit recognition of military
qualifications, barriers identified through
consultation with state licensing authorities
or private credentialing bodies that may
warrant congressional consideration;
(c) the use of standardized Department of
Defense certification documents as evidence of
equivalency for federal and state licensing
purposes; and
(d) an assessment of actions the Department
of Defense, other Federal agencies, and
Congress could take to reduce barriers to
civilian credential recognition for qualified
servicemembers.
In conducting this review, the committee expects the
Secretary of Defense to consult with relevant federal
regulatory agencies, major private-sector credentialing bodies,
state licensing authorities, and veteran service organizations.
The committee expects the heads of the departments and agencies
identified herein to fully participate in and contribute to
this review. The committee further expects the review to
reflect the following considerations:
(1) Equivalency determinations should focus on the
qualification and demonstrated operational experience
level, not merely on the completion of initial military
schoolhouse training. A servicemember who has completed
advanced qualifications, accumulated meaningful
operational experience, and demonstrated sustained
proficiency in a military specialty is more
appropriately compared to civilian credentialing
standards than a recent schoolhouse graduate;
(2) Equivalency mechanisms should establish clear,
objective thresholds, such as specific qualification
levels combined with minimum time in rating or
specialty, that trigger presumptive equivalency, rather
than relying on a case-by-case review;
(3) Any remaining civilian-specific requirements
imposed on service members who meet established
military equivalency thresholds should be narrowly
tailored to address genuine differences in regulatory
frameworks, documentation standards, or scope of
practice, and should not function as barriers to entry;
and
(4) Medical and emergency medical services
credentialing may require distinct treatment given the
role of state licensing authorities and scope-of-
practice considerations, and the report should address
this domain separately where appropriate.
The report shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
include a classified annex if necessary.

Modernizing military personnel retention strategies

The committee observes that the military services primarily
measure retention success based on achieving authorized end
strength, with limited visibility into how retention efforts
prioritize high-performing and critically skilled
servicemembers. The committee believes retention strategies
should be aligned with long-term operational requirements and
focused on retaining the talent most critical to mission
success.
The committee recognizes that the U.S. Marine Corps and the
Department of the Army are advancing retention models that
place greater emphasis on identifying and retaining high-
performing and critically skilled personnel, including through
targeted incentives, assignment flexibility, and more
deliberate retention timing and contracting approaches. The
committee encourages all the military services to build on
these efforts and to continue developing more deliberate,
performance-based retention models.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretaries of the
military departments to provide a briefing to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
not later than March 1, 2027, on how each service is ensuring
that retention efforts extend beyond meeting end strength
requirements. At a minimum, the briefing should include:
(1) The methods used to identify high-performing and
critically skilled personnel;
(2) How retention bonuses and other incentives are
targeted to such personnel, including any use of
differentiated or performance-based incentives;
(3) The extent to which retention tools are applied
broadly versus selectively, and any plans to refine
such approaches;
(4) Metrics used to assess retention success beyond
end strength; and
(5) Any planned reforms to transition toward more
deliberate, performance-based retention models.

Navy Reserve Supply Corps Force Structure and Readiness

The committee recognizes the critical role of the Navy
Reserve Supply Corps in providing expeditionary logistics,
contracting support, and specialized expertise to fleet and
joint operations. The committee is concerned that increasing
demands associated with distributed maritime operations and the
growing reliance on Reserve personnel for logistics support may
be outpacing the current force structure, resourcing, and
integration of the Navy Reserve Supply Corps. The committee is
further concerned that any misalignment in these areas could
create avoidable risk to operational readiness and sustainment
in a contested environment.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Navy to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, on the force structure, resourcing, and
readiness of the Navy Reserve Supply Corps. The report shall
include the following:
(1) An assessment of current Navy Reserve Supply
Corps end strength, rank structure, and billet
distribution. This assessment shall include
quantitative data on manning levels comparing manpower
requirements to overall manning;
(2) An assessment of recruiting, accession, and
retention trends for the Navy Reserve Supply Corps over
the previous 5 years, including the identification of
critical skill shortfalls, prior-service accessions,
and possible impacts from promotion opportunity and
career progression on retention, as well as
identification of barriers to recruitment and
retention; and
(3) An assessment of the extent to which Navy Reserve
Supply Corps units and individuals are fully integrated
into Navy logistics planning, exercises, and
operational deployments, including the frequency and
nature of such participation, roles performed, and any
limitations that reduce their effective employment in
operational plans and exercises.

Personnel life cycle and workforce management software

The committee recognizes the importance of modern, secure
software platforms to support Department of Defense personnel
functions across recruiting, accession, and in-service career
management. The committee notes that fragmented and legacy
systems limit visibility, coordination, and decision-making for
servicemembers, commanders, recruiters, and career counselors.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Department of
Defense to evaluate secure, interoperable personnel software
and workforce management technologies that improve continuity
of information across recruiting and in-service functions. Such
capabilities may include advanced data analytics, automation,
and responsible artificial intelligence-enabled decision
support tools to enhance recruiter effectiveness, career
pathway guidance, workforce planning, and servicemember
engagement.
The committee further encourages the Department to assess
opportunities to leverage modern software platforms to reduce
administrative burden, improve data accuracy, and enhance
coordination across the military services, while ensuring
appropriate safeguards for data security, privacy, and service-
specific requirements.

Purple Heart review

The committee notes the importance of recognition in regard
to servicemember receipt of the Purple Heart. The nature of
warfare has evolved over time, and the regulations surrounding
awards have changed with it.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Secretaries of the military
departments, to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April
1, 2027, on the current guidelines and regulations for the
award of the Purple Heart. The briefing shall include but not
be limited to: (1) Current data being collected on ongoing
military operations on the award of the Purple Heart for mild
traumatic brain injury; (2) Data from the award of the Purple
Heart for mild traumatic brain injury from the last 5 years;
(3) An assessment of the current regulations, including whether
a medical officer determination for mild traumatic brain injury
is feasible; and (4) Any other matters relevant to the review.

Recognition of United Service Organizations

The committee recognizes the United Service Organizations
(USO) as a critical partner in sustaining the morale, welfare,
and resilience of servicemembers and their families amid an
increasingly complex global security environment. Through a
global network of more than 250 locations and a wide range of
expeditionary and mobile programs, the USO delivers essential
support that directly contributes to force readiness and
operational effectiveness. The committee notes that the USO
maintains a presence in high-threat, remote, and austere
locations, including support to servicemembers deployed in
Operation Epic Fury, often where no other military support
organizations operate, ensuring continuity of care for
servicemembers regardless of location or mission.

Report on conflicts of interest in Department of Defense financial
literacy program

The committee is concerned about the challenges associated
with new members of the Armed Forces being enrolled into direct
deposit programs offered by financial institutions without
sufficient financial literacy education to highlight potential
conflicts of interest associated with financial product
offerings by those same institutions.
The Department of Defense's financial management
regulations mandate participation in the Direct Deposit Program
for all newly enlisted and appointed military personnel.
Enrollment in direct deposit programs can involve military
service partnerships with financial institutions and typically
occurs during initial entry training. These new recruits may be
vulnerable to coercive practices, with many recruits managing
their finances for the first time and simultaneously being
trained to trust authority figures. The committee seeks to
ensure that new recruits are provided with a meaningful
opportunity to make the most informed decisions regarding their
finances, as financial security is an important element of
military readiness. The committee directs the Secretary of
Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees, not
later than February 1, 2027, a report outlining the financial
literacy training and direct deposit process for new recruits.
The report shall include the following information:
(1) An assessment of the process for enrolling new
members of the Armed Forces into the direct deposit
programs of financial institutions; whether that
process differs for new members who have a bank account
before joining the Armed Forces; and whether the
information and paperwork provided to new members
includes any information about account fees or
penalties--including overdraft fees--charged by
financial institutions.
(2) A description of the terms and requirements for a
financial institution to operate on a military
installation and the process by which installation
leadership solicits potential financial institutions,
reviews the bids, and selects institutions for the
provision of direct deposit services, financial
literacy training under section 992 of title 10, United
States Code, and any other services under the
Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation.
(3) A description of how the Department of Defense
ensures that the financial institutions operating on
military installations, employees of such institutions,
and financial literacy instructors and counselors do
not have any conflicts of interest related to the
advice they provide or the products they discuss.
(4) A discussion of the importance of financial
literacy training in ensuring the financial readiness
of members of the Armed Forces that includes, for each
of the 3 years preceding submission of the report, the
number of servicemembers who as a result of personal
financial issues were denied or lost security
clearances, were denied or lost overseas postings, or
suffered other career-related setbacks.
(5) With respect to training provided as a component
of the initial entry training under subsection
(a)(2)(A) of section 992 of title 10, United States
Code, and with respect to all other mandatory training
under that section, the following:
(a) A description of the content of the
training;
(b) A copy of all paperwork provided to
members as a part of the training;
(c) A notification of references to any
mentions of ``overdraft fees'' in in-person or
virtual training materials;
(d) A statement indicating when the training
is offered, including whether the training is
offered before new members sign financial
paperwork regarding the direct deposit of their
salaries from the Department of Defense;
(e) A discussion of how the training prepares
new members for the financial decisions they
must make during their military service,
including the financial challenges associated
with domestic permanent changes of station,
overseas permanent changes of station,
deployments, government shutdowns, temporary
duty assignments, separation from service,
transition from regular component to reserve
component, retirement, and similar events;
(f) A description of who provides the
training, including whether those trainers are
independent third parties that are not
associated with a financial institution;
(g) The percentage of training sessions that
are led by each of the following: trained
instructors (including the percentage of those
instructors that are spouses of members),
accredited financial counselors (including a
list of all the accepted forms of
accreditation), or any other relevant
categories of training providers;
(h) For each of the 3 years preceding, the
percentage of training sessions that were
provided by banks, credit unions, or other
financial institutions; and for servicemembers
who completed a training session provided by a
financial institution, the percentage of those
servicemembers who then purchased a product
from, opened an account with, or otherwise
began a financial relationship with the same
financial institution within 90 days of the
training session; and
(i) Copies of the materials, including any
videos and in-person instructor guides,
provided by the Department of Defense to
individuals being trained to conduct the
training; and
(6) An assessment of whether the training provided as
a component of the initial entry training pursuant to
section 992(a)(2)(A) of title 10, United States Code,
informs members with respect to the predatory marketing
tactics of financial institutions.

Report on impact of permanent change of station on dual-military
families

The committee recognizes the critical role that dual-
military families play in sustaining the all-volunteer force
and maintaining readiness across the Armed Forces but is
concerned by the persistent challenges faced by dual-military
couples in securing co-located Permanent Change of Station
assignments. The committee is concerned that inconsistent
implementation of co-location policies, delays in assignment
coordination and limited transparency in the assignment process
continue to create avoidable hardship for servicemembers
married to other servicemembers. The committee expects the
Department of Defense to prioritize policies that strengthen
family stability, enhance retention of highly trained personnel
and ensure equitable treatment of dual-military couples across
all Services.
The committee notes that current Department of Defense
policy directs the Services to make every reasonable effort to
station dual military couples together, or within reasonable
commuting distance, when operational requirements allow.
However, there is significant variance in how the Services
interpret ``reasonable effort,'' as well as disparities in the
availability of synchronized assignment cycles, career
progression flexibility, and waiver authorities.
The committee is particularly concerned by reports that
dual-military couples often bear a disproportionate
administrative burden in securing co-location. Many couples
must repeatedly advocate for themselves with assignment
monitors, career managers, and personnel offices, sometimes
over multiple assignment cycles. The committee finds that this
reliance on persistent self-advocacy--rather than standardized,
proactive coordination by the Services--creates inequitable
outcomes, disadvantages junior personnel unfamiliar with the
system, and contributes to unnecessary stress and uncertainty
for affected families. The committee believes that co-location
should not depend on the persistence, personal networks, or
advocacy skills of individual servicemembers but rather on
consistent, transparent, and Service-driven processes.
Therefore, not later than March 1, 2027, the committee
directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military
departments, to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives on the Department's
efforts to improve co-location outcomes for dual-military
couples. The briefing should include:
(1) An evaluation of existing co-location policies
across the Services, including identification of gaps,
inconsistencies, and barriers to effective
implementation;
(2) A review of assignment processes, including
timelines, synchronization challenges between Services,
and the extent to which career managers are empowered
to coordinate across Services on co-location solutions;
(3) Historical data for the previous 5 fiscal years
on the number of dual-military couples requesting co-
location, the number approved, the number denied, and
the primary reasons for denial;
(4) An assessment of how co-location challenges
affect retention, promotion, and career progression for
dual-military servicemembers; and
(5) Proposed authority, resourcing, policy, process,
or other changes that could improve colocation outcomes
while maintaining operational readiness, including
potential recommended updates to DOD Instruction
1315.18 and related Service policies to improve
transparency, predictability, and fairness for dual-
military families.

Report on legally owned student loan cancellation for servicemembers

Servicemembers and their families may be eligible for
several forms of federal student loan cancellation, including,
but not limited to, Public Service Loan Forgiveness, Total and
Permanent Disability discharge, and Borrower Defense to
Repayment. However, those who qualify for student loan
cancellation through such programs often do not receive it for
various reasons, such as administrative red tape, mismanagement
by federal loan servicers, or a lack of knowledge about loan
cancellation programs.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to review servicemembers' and military
families' access to federal student loan cancellation programs.
This review should address:
(1) How often servicemembers and their families
receive federal student loan cancellation, broken down
by loan cancellation program;
(2) How often servicemembers and their families are
unable to access the federal student loan cancellation
that they are eligible for, and the most frequent
reasons for such instances;
(3) The extent to which the Department of Education
is fulfilling its responsibility to accurately and
efficiently provide servicemembers and their families
with the federal student loan cancellation that they
are eligible for under federal law; and
(4) Any recommendations for the Congress and Federal
agencies to improve servicemembers' and their families'
access to federal student loan cancellation programs.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to
periodically brief the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives on the status of this
review and publish a report on the review, not later than March
1, 2027.

Soldier digital lifecycle modernization

The committee encourages the Secretary of the Army to make
use of existing digital infrastructure and systems of the Army
to establish a unified digital experience that creates a secure
digital identity record enabling continuity of data from
recruitment through separation and seamless integration with
Department of Veterans' Affairs programs; provides integrated,
role-based, and personalized digital services to soldiers;
reduces routine soldier administrative workflows to eliminate
manual processing and data reentry; and enables the deployment
of analytics and decision-support tools to inform readiness and
retention decisions.
The committee further encourages the Secretary to leverage
commercially available technologies, modular architectures, and
open standards in implementing this initiative to accelerate
delivery and improve user experience.
Therefore, the Secretary of the Army is directed to submit
a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than May 1, 2027. The
report should include a description of:
(1) A potential implementation plan for an initiative
creating a secure, digital experience through the
lifecycle of a member of the Army, including during
recruitment and after separation;
(2) Key design and integration milestones for this
initiative;
(3) Estimated costs by fiscal year for this
initiative;
(4) Performance metrics to measure improvements in
user experience, administrative burden reduction,
retention indicators, and transition outcomes for this
initiative; and
(5) Any additional authorities the Secretary
determines are required.

Standardization of performance metrics for Transition Assistance
Program

The committee recognizes the importance of ensuring that
transition assistance programs carried out under chapter 58 of
title 10, United States Code, effectively prepare
servicemembers for successful transition to civilian life. The
committee is aware of ongoing efforts to improve transition
programming but remains concerned that inconsistent performance
and outcome metrics across the military departments limit the
Department of Defense's ability to evaluate program
effectiveness, identify best practices, and ensure
accountability.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March
1, 2027, on the participation, performance, and outcome metrics
used to evaluate transition assistance programs and related
transition support activities under chapter 58 of title 10,
United States Code.
The report should include, at a minimum:
(1) An identification of existing participation,
performance, and outcome metrics used by each military
department;
(2) An assessment of differences in eligibility
criteria, participation requirements, and data
collection methodologies across the Armed Forces;
(3) An evaluation of the extent to which current
metrics measure both short-term and long-term outcomes
for transitioning servicemembers, including employment,
education, credential attainment, and other indicators
of successful transition;
(4) Identification of gaps in data collection,
reporting, and interagency data coordination that limit
assessment of program effectiveness;
(5) Recommendations for standardizing core
performance and outcome metrics across the Department;
(6) Recommendations for improving data collection,
analysis, and appropriate data sharing to support
evidence-based improvements; and
(7) Findings and recommendations for administrative
or legislative actions necessary to improve the
effectiveness and accountability of transition
assistance programs.

Student support services in Department of Defense Education Activity
schools

The committee recognizes the highly mobile nature of
military-connected students served by the Department of Defense
Education Activity (DODEA) and the challenges that frequent
transitions can pose to academic continuity and student well-
being. The committee notes that these disruptions may delay the
identification of learning challenges, including dyslexia, and
that early literacy screening can support timely intervention.
The committee further recognizes that the DODEA provides
student support through a multidisciplinary model that includes
school counselors, school psychologists, social workers, and
other personnel who support academic, social-emotional, and
school-based mental health needs.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, on staffing and early literacy efforts within
DODEA schools. The briefing should include:
(1) Current student-to-staff ratios for school
counselors and other student support personnel,
including school psychologists and social workers,
disaggregated by school level and geographic region;
(2) A description of how the DODEA allocates and
manages student support personnel across schools,
including those providing school-based mental health
services, and the extent to which staffing decisions
reflect student need, geographic considerations, and
the use of shared or rotational staffing models;
(3) An overview of early literacy screening practices
across DODEA schools, including tools used, grade
levels assessed, and the frequency of screening; and
(4) Any planned efforts to improve early
identification of reading difficulties and ensure
continuity of support for highly mobile students.

Women in combat study report and briefing requirement

The committee notes the Department of Defense mandated a
review regarding the operational effectiveness of Army and
Marine Corps ground combat units, which was originally the
subject of a December 18, 2025, memorandum issued by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The committee
understands that this study was subsequently reassigned to the
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory from the
Institute for Defense Analyses. To ensure proper congressional
oversight of military personnel policies and unit readiness,
the committee believes it is critical to have full visibility
into both the final outcomes and the underlying research
process and methodology of this review.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide the full, unredacted final review, including any and
all preliminary findings, methodology, and information
evaluated or considered by the Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory, to the congressional defense committees,
not later than 7 days after its completion. Furthermore, the
committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a
briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than 30 days after the
submission of the review. This briefing shall comprehensively
cover the full, unredacted findings of the review as well as
the specific report methodology utilized.
Additionally, to preserve transparency regarding the
evolution of this study, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense to provide Congress with any and all preliminary
findings, methodology, and information delivered by the
Institute for Defense Analyses to the Department of Defense
related to this study prior to its reassignment to the Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, not later than 7
days after the submission of the review.

TITLE VI--COMPENSATION AND OTHER PERSONNEL BENEFITS

Subtitle A--Pay and Allowances

Sec. 601--Modification of reimbursement of expenses relating to travel
for inactive-duty training and muster duty
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 452(j)(1) of title 37, United States Code, and section
623 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public
Law 118-159) to require the Department of Defense to reimburse
travel expenses for members performing inactive-duty training
and muster duty when travel exceeds the specified distance
threshold.
Sec. 602--Fiscal year 2027 increase in military basic pay
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize a
pay increase of 3.6 percent for all members of the uniformed
services, effective January 1, 2027.
Sec. 603--Reimbursement of costs of long commutes for members assigned
to remote or isolated installations in areas without affordable
housing
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 453 of title 37, United States Code, to authorize the
Secretary of Defense to reimburse members of the Armed Forces
for commuting expenses incurred as a result of assignment to
remote or isolated installations where affordable housing is
unavailable.

Subtitle B--Special and Incentive Pay

Sec. 611--One-year extension of certain expiring bonus and special pay
authorities
The committee recommends a provision that would extend,
through December 31, 2027, certain expiring bonus and special
pay authorities relating to Reserve forces; health care
professionals; nuclear officers; consolidated special,
incentive, and bonus authorities under title 37, United States
Code; and temporary increases in rates of basic allowance for
housing.
Sec. 612--Increase in maximum amount of aviation bonus
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 334(c)(1)(B) of title 37, United States Code, to
increase the maximum amount of the aviation bonus.
Sec. 613--Authorization of board certification incentive pay for
veterinary comparative medicine officers
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 335(c)(2) of title 37, United States Code, to add the
attainment of a comparable qualifying Doctor of Philosophy
(PhD) degree, as determined by the Secretary concerned, as an
alternative qualification to board certification for
eligibility of incentive pay for veterinary comparative
medicine officers.
Sec. 614--Modification of bonus authority for Senior Reserve Officers'
Training Corps cadets and midshipmen
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 336 of title 37, United States Code, to increase the
maximum bonus for Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps
cadets and midshipmen.
Sec. 615--Increase in maximum amounts of hostile fire pay and imminent
danger pay
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 351(b) of title 37, United States Code, to increase the
maximum monthly amounts of hostile fire pay and imminent danger
pay.
Sec. 616--Medical providers qualified to recertify catastrophic
injuries or illnesses qualifying members for special
compensation
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 439 of title 37, United States Code, to expand the
categories of licensed medical providers authorized to
recertify eligibility for Special Compensation for Assistance
with Activities of Daily Living.

Subtitle C--Commissary and Exchange Benefits

Sec. 621--Authorized patrons of commissary and exchange stores
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 54 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a
comprehensive statutory framework that defines and codifies
existing categories of authorized patrons of commissary and
exchange stores, including uniformed members, retirees,
dependents, and certain civilian personnel.
Sec. 622--Modification of operating expenses of commissary stores
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2483(b) of title 10, United States Code, to clarify
that operating dollars may be used for construction, repair,
improvement, and maintenance of physical infrastructure.
Sec. 623--Pilot program on access of civilian employees to commissary
stores
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of Defense to carry out a pilot program to assess
the feasibility of, demand for, and financial impact of
extending access to commissary stores to civilian employees of
the Department of Defense while maintaining the benefit of such
access for members and retired members of the Armed Forces and
their families.

Subtitle D--Other Matters

Sec. 631--Authority for shipment and storage of privately owned
vehicles of members moving between authorized locations
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 453(c)(4) of title 37, United States Code, to authorize
the Secretaries of the military departments to permit the
shipment or storage of more than one privately owned vehicle
for a member of the Armed Forces in connection with a temporary
or permanent change of station between authorized locations.
Sec. 632--Reimbursement of guardianship costs incurred as a result of
relocations
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 453 of title 37, United States Code, to authorize the
reimbursement of qualifying guardianship costs for a member of
the uniformed services.
Sec. 633--Provision of counseling on housing for members of the Armed
Forces
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 992 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the
Secretaries of the military departments to enter into contracts
to provide counseling with individuals and organizations that
provide counseling with respect to housing.
Sec. 634--Special priority travel authorization for personnel stationed
at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2641b of title 10, United States Code, to authorize
certain personnel stationed at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and eligible dependents to purchase
available seats on Department of Defense aircraft and permit
the Department to retain associated revenues to support
transportation services.
Sec. 635--Program to assist members in obtaining personal driver's
licenses
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of Defense to provide assistance to a member of
the Armed Forces for expenses incurred in obtaining a personal
driver's license under the laws of a State while serving in the
Armed Forces.
Sec. 636--Student loan relief for members of Selected Reserve
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 16301(b) of title 10, United States Code, to increase
the maximum annual repayment amount under the Selected Reserve
Student Loan Repayment Program from 15 percent to 20 percent of
a participant's outstanding student loan balance.
Sec. 637--Enhancement of Air Force rated officer retention
demonstration program
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 604 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) to
enhance the Air Force rated officer retention demonstration
program by increasing assignment flexibility for participating
rated officers.
Sec. 638--Pilot program on career intermissions for certain Air Force
fighter aircrew
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Air Force to establish a pilot program, under
the authority provided by section 710 of title 10, United
States Code, to permit certain Air Force officers to take a
one-time career intermission and assess whether targeted career
intermissions improve retention of experienced fighter aircrew.

Items of Special Interest

Combat-related special compensation review
The committee recognizes the Department of Defense's
ongoing review of the Combat-Related Special Compensation
(CRSC) program, as directed in the March 2, 2026, memorandum
from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, and commends the Under Secretary for undertaking a
comprehensive assessment of how the program is administered.
The committee affirms the importance of appropriately
recognizing combat-related disabilities incurred by
servicemembers and ensuring that eligible retirees receive the
benefits they have earned in a timely and efficient manner. The
committee believes the burden of navigating the CRSC process
should not fall disproportionately on the individual retiree
and expects the military departments to ensure timely and
efficient adjudication of claims.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness to provide a briefing to
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than October 1, 2026, and every 90
days thereafter until the review is complete, on the status of
the review, any preliminary findings, and planned actions to
improve the program. Upon completion of the review, the Under
Secretary shall provide a final briefing that includes the
findings of the review, planned improvements, and any
recommended legislative proposals.
Cyber incentive pay standardization
The committee recognizes the importance of attracting,
developing, and retaining a highly skilled cyber workforce in
support of the Cyber Force Generation Model and U.S. Cyber
Command. The committee notes that the military departments
currently apply differing approaches to incentive pay for
members performing similar cyber work roles, which may result
in disparities in compensation for comparable qualifications
and responsibilities.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a
briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027,
that includes:
(1) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability
of establishing a standardized approach to cyber skill
incentive pay across the military departments under
existing authorities;
(2) A description of current incentive pay programs
for cyber work roles in each military department,
including eligibility criteria, payment amounts, and
covered work roles;
(3) An evaluation of the extent to which differences
in incentive pay affect recruiting, development, and
retention of cyber personnel;
(4) Any challenges or limitations associated with
standardizing such incentive pay, including impacts on
a Service's flexibility and budgetary considerations;
and
(5) Any recommendations for legislative or policy
changes to improve the effectiveness and consistency of
cyber incentive pay across the Department of Defense.
Government travel charge card use and servicemember financial risk
The committee is concerned that servicemembers executing
permanent change of station (PCS) or temporary duty (TDY)
orders may be exposed to financial and credit risk as a result
of Department of Defense travel policies and processes,
particularly where delays in voucher processing, reimbursement,
or split disbursement contribute to Government Travel Charge
Card (GTCC) delinquency. While the committee recognizes the
GTCC as an important tool for official travel, the committee is
concerned that administrative and reimbursement challenges
within the defense travel system may be placing servicemembers
at avoidable financial risk. The committee seeks to better
understand the extent to which Department processes contribute
to delinquency and adverse credit outcomes.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Chief of Staff of
the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the
Chief of Space Operations to provide a briefing to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than January 1, 2027, on GTCC
policies, usage, and associated financial readiness impacts
within their respective Services.
The briefing should include, for each Service:
(1) Current policies governing mandatory or directed
use of the GTCC for PCS and TDY travel, including any
circumstances under which use is waived or alternatives
are provided;
(2) An assessment of the primary drivers of GTCC
delinquency, including the extent to which delayed
voucher processing, delayed reimbursement, split
disbursement errors, or PCS-related expenses contribute
to such delinquency;
(3) Data on the proportion of servicemembers who do
not possess a GTCC, including those deemed ineligible
due to creditworthiness or other reasons, and how such
members execute official travel without incurring
personal financial risk;
(4) An overview of financial literacy, counseling,
and command notification practices related to GTCC use,
including how servicemembers are informed of risks
associated with delayed reimbursement; and
(5) Any Service-specific challenges and
recommendations to reduce delinquency attributable to
administrative or reimbursement delays and to better
protect servicemembers from adverse financial or credit
consequences arising from official travel requirements.
Military family diaper assistance
The committee recognizes that there are over 350,000
children under age 5 in active-duty servicemember households.
The committee further recognizes that the average cost of
diapering one child is about $100 a month, while families
experiencing diaper need report being able to afford a median
of $65 per month for diapers. The committee notes that some
national surveys have found that as many as 47 percent of
families with young children experience diaper insecurity,
defined as the inability to afford an adequate supply of
diapers for their children, and seeks to better understand the
extent to which diaper insecurity affects military families and
the resources available to address such needs.
The committee recognizes that the Department of Defense
provides a variety of resources to support new parents,
including the New Parent Support Program and partnerships such
as the What to Expect Project. These efforts are primarily
designed to provide education, outreach, and short-term
assistance to new parents. The committee further notes that
Military OneSource and home visitors may provide referrals to
community resources, such as local diaper banks, but it remains
unclear whether there are unmet diapering needs among military
families with young children.
The committee seeks to better understand the extent to
which military families experience challenges obtaining diapers
and diapering supplies and whether existing Department programs
adequately address such needs. Therefore, not later than March
1, 2027, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel & Readiness, in coordination with the Secretaries
of the Military Departments, to provide a briefing to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the programs available to military families
in need of diaper assistance. Specifically, the briefing should
include:
(1) A list of programs the Department offers to
military families with children ages 0 to 3 and a
description of the specific mechanisms by which such
programs provide tangible diaper assistance to such
families;
(2) A demographic breakdown by Service of
servicemembers with one or more dependent children
under the age of 4 enrolled in the Defense Enrollment
Eligibility Reporting System, including rank and
marital status;
(4) An analysis of the impact of the programs
described in (1), including how many children were
served in the previous calendar year and how many
children were on waiting lists, if applicable. The data
should be disaggregated by military Service and
program;
(5) Recommendations by the Department on how to
improve uniformity in implementation policy,
transparency, and data collection across the military
Services; and
(6) Recommendations by the Department on whether
additional authorities, resources, or programmatic
changes are needed to address identified gaps in access
to diapers and diapering supplies for military
families. Recommendations should include an anticipated
timeframe for when the Department aims to implement
such changes.
National Guard Travel-in-Kind program
The committee recognizes the essential contributions of
National Guard personnel to national security, homeland
defense, domestic response, counterdrug operations, and support
to civil authorities. The committee remains concerned that
certain categories of National Guard personnel may not receive
benefits comparable to similarly situated members of the
reserve components despite performing equivalent duties and
meeting similar service obligations.
In particular, the committee notes concerns regarding the
administration of Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) for members
serving on Full-Time National Guard Duty--Counterdrug (FTNGD-
CD) orders and the availability of travel and lodging support
for Army National Guard members required to travel significant
distances to perform Inactive Duty Training (IDT). The
committee understands that statutory and policy differences
affecting these programs may result in inconsistent treatment
among servicemembers, create barriers to recruitment and
retention, and adversely affect readiness and force management.
The committee further notes that FTNGD-CD personnel and
Active Guard and Reserve personnel both serve in full-time
National Guard duty statuses that provide long-term career
opportunities and perform critical missions in support of
national security and public safety objectives. The committee
is also aware of concerns that Army National Guard members may
incur significant out-of-pocket expenses associated with travel
and lodging for IDT that are not borne by similarly situated
members of the Army Reserve.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau, to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than March 1, 2027, on options to improve parity in
benefits and support provided to National Guard personnel. The
briefing shall include:
(1) An assessment of current statutory, regulatory,
and policy authorities governing:
(a) BAH determinations for FTNGD-CD
personnel; and
(b) Travel and lodging support for Army
National Guard members performing IDT;
(2) An assessment of the scope of each issue,
including:
(a) How BAH is currently administered for
FTNGD-CD personnel across the States and
Territories, including the extent of variation
among jurisdictions; and
(b) The current out-of-pocket costs incurred
by Army National Guard members for travel and
lodging associated with IDT requirements;
(3) An evaluation of the feasibility and advisability
of:
(a) Amending section 403(g)(6)(A) of title
37, United States Code, to include FTNGD-CD
personnel and align BAH determinations with
duty location; and
(b) Establishing a comprehensive Lodging-in-
Kind and travel support program for Army
National Guard members that achieves parity
with comparable Army Reserve programs;
(4) An assessment of the effects that such changes
would have on recruitment, retention, readiness, force
management, and mission effectiveness within the
National Guard;
(5) Legislative, regulatory, administrative, and
policy options to address each issue, including the
advantages and disadvantages of each option;
(6) Detailed cost estimates associated with each
proposed option, including:
(a) Estimated costs of extending duty-
location-based BAH treatment to FTNGD-CD
personnel; and
(b) Estimated costs of providing Lodging-in-
Kind for Army National Guard members residing
more than 50 miles from their assigned drill
location and travel reimbursement for Army
National Guard members residing more than 150
miles from their assigned unit or serving in
critically short specialties; and
(7) Recommendations from the Department of Defense
regarding any legislative changes necessary to ensure
equitable treatment of National Guard personnel
performing comparable duties or meeting comparable
training requirements.

Review of credentialing assistance programs

The committee recognizes the value of credentialing
assistance programs in enabling servicemembers to obtain
industry-recognized certifications and postsecondary
credentials that translate into civilian career opportunities.
The committee notes that credentialing assistance is currently
administered inconsistently across the military departments,
with significant variation in eligibility criteria, funding
limits, approved credential lists, cost controls, and vendor
oversight mechanisms. The committee is concerned that this
fragmentation limits equitable access for servicemembers across
the force and has contributed to cost management challenges in
recent years.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Secretaries of the military
departments, to conduct a comprehensive review of credentialing
assistance programs across the Armed Forces and submit a report
to the congressional defense committees, not later than June 1,
2027.
The report should include, at a minimum:
(1) A description of each military department's
credentialing assistance program, including eligibility
requirements, annual funding limits, approved
credential categories, and vendor oversight policies,
with particular attention to areas of inconsistency
across the services;
(2) Servicemember participation and utilization data
for the previous 5 fiscal years, to the extent
practicable, disaggregated by military department,
enlisted grade, officer grade, component, and
occupational specialty, to identify patterns of
utilization and any gaps in access;
(3) An assessment of credential quality assurance
mechanisms across the services, including how each
department evaluates the labor market value and the
portability of approved credentials, and whether
current approved lists align with high-demand civilian
occupations;
(4) An assessment of cost growth, cost overruns, and
administrative challenges experienced within
credentialing assistance programs, including the root
causes of any program suspensions or restructurings and
corrective actions taken;
(5) An identification of barriers to servicemember
participation, including awareness gaps, administrative
burden, timing constraints related to deployment or
training cycles, and limitations on eligible credential
types; and
(6) Recommendations for reforms to standardize,
streamline, and strengthen credentialing assistance
programs across the force, including any recommended
legislative changes and associated regulations
necessary to ensure uniform access, sound fiscal
management, and alignment with servicemember transition
and workforce development goals.

Service member housing relief

The committee notes that current law authorizes the
Secretary of Defense to temporarily adjust basic allowance for
housing (BAH) rates when actual housing costs in a military
housing area exceed established BAH rates by more than 20
percent. The committee further notes that section 624 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public
Law 119-60) directed a comprehensive review of BAH methodology,
housing affordability, and alternative approaches for
calculating BAH rates. As the Department of Defense continues
this effort, the committee is interested in understanding
whether modifications to the existing authority for temporary
BAH adjustments would provide meaningful relief to
servicemembers experiencing rapidly changing housing costs.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to submit a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April
1, 2027, assessing the feasibility, advisability, and potential
costs associated with lowering the threshold for temporary BAH
adjustments to 15 percent. The briefing should also evaluate
how such a change would interact with ongoing Department
efforts to review and modernize military housing compensation,
including any planned or proposed changes to the methodology
used to determine BAH rates, and should include any legislative
recommendations the Secretary considers appropriate.

TITLE VII--HEALTH CARE

Subtitle A--Tricare and Other Health Care Benefits

Sec. 701--Digital system for beneficiary assistance at military medical
treatment facilities and through managed care support
contractors
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to establish a digital system that will
enable TRICARE beneficiaries who receive care at a military
treatment facility or through a managed care support contractor
under the TRICARE program to electronically file a complaint,
raise awareness about an issue, or provide positive feedback
relating to that care. The provision would require the
Secretary to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives an annual report for 3
years on complaints or issues filed under this system.
Sec. 702--Expansion of access to dental care for certain dependents
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1077 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize
postgraduate dental residents to provide dental care in
military dental treatment facilities to certain military
dependents on a space-available basis.
Sec. 703--Expansion of eligibility for hearing aids to include children
of retired members of the Uniformed Services enrolled in family
coverage under TRICARE Select
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1077 of title 10, United States Code, to expand
eligibility for hearing aids to include children of retirees
enrolled in family coverage under TRICARE Select.
Sec. 704--Evaluation of inclusion of additional accrediting bodies for
purposes of qualifications for licensure of mental health
professionals under TRICARE Program
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Director, Defense Health Agency, to: (1) Evaluate the
feasibility and advisability of permitting reimbursement under
the TRICARE program of certified mental health counselors who
hold a master's or higher level degree in counseling from a
program that is accredited by certain accrediting bodies; (2)
Submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than July 1,
2027, on the evaluation; and (3) If recommended by the report,
to implement the recommendation to permit reimbursement of
counselors with a degree from a program accredited by a covered
institution.
Sec. 705--Improvement of provider directory accuracy for specialty care
providers under the TRICARE program
The committee recommends a provision that would require:
(1) The Director, Defense Health Agency to ensure that future
managed care contracts under the TRICARE program include
specified requirements to improve provider directory accuracy;
(2) The Inspector General of the Defense Health Agency to
conduct random tests of the accuracy of information relating to
specialty care providers contained in provider directories; (3)
The Director, Defense Health Agency to provide an annual
briefing for 4 years to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives on the progress in
improving provider directories; and (4) The Comptroller General
of the United States to conduct a holistic review of provider
directory accuracy under the TRICARE program.
Sec. 706--Modification of requirement to provide start-up time for
certain TRICARE contractors
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1095c(b) of title 10, United States Code, to require a
minimum of 1 year start-up time for claims processing for new
contractors awarded a contract to provide managed care support
under the TRICARE program.
Sec. 707--Corrections to pilot program for supplemental coverage
relating to cancer
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 734 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) to postpone the date of
implementation to January 31, 2028, to require information
about the pilot program to be posted on the public-facing
website of the TRICARE program, and to make other technical
changes.
Sec. 708--Coverage of cranial orthotic devices for deformational
plagiocephaly under TRICARE Program
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1079(a) of title 10, United States Code, to authorize
cranial orthotic devices for deformational plagiocephaly to be
provided as a part of a reconstructive medical treatment.
Sec. 709--Technical amendments to the Public Health Service Act
The committee recommends a provision that would provide
technical changes to include the Defense Health Agency in
certain language regarding the responsibilities of military
health care under the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
201).
Sec. 710--Licensure of mental health professionals in TRICARE program
The committee recommends a provision that would expand the
qualifications for licensure as a certified mental health
counselor under the TRICARE program.
Sec. 711--Requirements relating to wellness checks for health and
welfare of certain members of the Armed Forces
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to issue policies establishing wellness
checks for service members sustaining significant injuries,
illnesses, or being on sick call.
Sec. 712--Requirement to offer medical chaperones during sensitive
medical examinations
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to establish and implement a Department-
wide policy requiring that a medical chaperone be offered and
made available to be present during any sensitive medical
examination conducted at a military medical treatment facility.
Sec. 713--Pilot program on reciprocal access to health care facilities,
personnel, and services of Department of Defense and Department
of Veterans Affairs
The committee recommends a provision that would establish
an access to health care pilot program to assess the
feasibility and advisability of expanding reciprocal access to
health care facilities, personnel, and services between the
Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Sec. 714--Medical screening for members of the Armed Forces who served
at data masked or classified locations
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to modify the service records of covered
members to indicate service at certain data-masked or
classified locations, require exposure-related hazard
screenings during specified medical examinations, and ensure
that identified exposures and the results of any screenings or
evaluations are documented in the member's permanent medical
record and transmitted to the Department of Veterans Affairs
upon separation or retirement.
Sec. 715--Medical testing and related services for firefighters of
Department of Defense
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Department of Defense to offer appropriate medical testing and
services to detect and document certain cancers for Department
of Defense Federal firefighters.

Subtitle B--Health Care Administration

Sec. 721--Development of capability prototype on secure access to
health record for members of the Armed Forces
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, to develop and implement a
capability prototype that is interoperable with the electronic
health record of the Department of Defense to digitally collect
medical records of active-duty members of the Armed Forces
through a covered health record platform before the members
separate from active duty. The provision would also require the
Secretary to carry out a pilot program to assess the
feasibility and advisability of using the capability prototype
described above. The provision would also require the Secretary
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
April 1, 2027, on the capability prototype developed pursuant
to this provision.
Sec. 722--Inventory and annual catchment area assessment of military-
civilian health care partnerships
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director, Defense
Health Agency, to: (1) Develop and maintain a centralized
inventory of military-civilian health care partnerships
throughout the Department of Defense (DOD); and (2) Conduct an
annual catchment area assessment of military-civilian health
care partnerships and resource-sharing agreements of the DOD.
The provision would require the Secretary to brief the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the results of the catchment area
assessments, not later than April 1, 2027, and annually
thereafter for the following 5 years.
Sec. 723--Requirement for review before actions to downsize, realign,
or reduce scope of services at military medical treatment
facilities
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1073d of title 10, United States Code, to require the
Secretary of Defense to certify to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives that a
comprehensive review of any future actions to downsize,
realign, or otherwise reduce the scope of services at a
military medical treatment facility has been conducted. The
provision would also require the Secretary to have a
consultative discussion with such committees regarding an
action to downsize, realign, or otherwise reduce the scope of
services at a military medical treatment facility, not later
than 1 year before conducting the action.
Sec. 724--Policy on provider notification to commanders regarding
imminent risk of suicide for members of the Armed Forces
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a policy
throughout the Department of Defense regarding the notification
of commanders when a healthcare provider determines that a
member of the Armed Forces is at imminent risk of suicide. The
provision would also require the Secretary to submit to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives a briefing, not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, detailing the policy
developed in this provision.
Sec. 725--Authority over Defense Health Program
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1073 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the
Secretary of Defense to have authority over the entirety of the
Defense Health Program.
Sec. 726--Enterprise Revenue Cycle Improvement Initiative
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to implement an enterprise-wide cycle
improvement initiative to: (1) Standardize revenue cycle
management processes; (2) Strengthen governance and
accountability; (3) Improve workforce capability; and (4)
Increase the accuracy, timeliness, and yield of third-party
collections and claims management across the military health
system.
Sec. 727--Notification to licensing and medical boards of States in
case of investigation or misconduct
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to notify the appropriate State licensing
and medical boards not later than 30 days after the initiation
of an investigation into alleged misconduct by a covered
healthcare professional that could result in criminal charges,
or upon the filing of such charges.
Sec. 728--Additional review of disclosure requirements under processes
and forms relating to health care provider credentialing and
privileging of Department of Defense
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 720 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) to require the Secretary
of Defense to review all processes and forms relating to health
care provider credentialing and privileging of applicants for a
position as a health care professional to identify questions,
required disclosures, or other information regarding mental,
behavioral, psychological, or other related health conditions
of the applicant.
Sec. 729--Expansion of Individual Longitudinal Exposure Record
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 966 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize
changes to the individual longitudinal exposure record at the
discretion of the Department of Defense.
Sec. 730--Pilot program on modernization of drug testing using voice-
based risk assessment
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to carry out a pilot program at up to five
military installations to evaluate the use of voice-based risk
assessment technology in support of targeted drug testing.

Subtitle C--Combat and Operational Health Support

Sec. 741--Establishment of Joint Disease and Non-Battle Injury
Surveillance and Readiness System
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code, to require the
Secretary of Defense to establish and maintain a Joint Disease
and Non-Battle Injury Surveillance and Readiness System within
the Defense Health Agency to provide standardized,
interoperable, and real-time monitoring of disease and non-
battle injury across the Armed Forces.
Sec. 742--Preservation of dedicated aeromedical evacuation capability
of Medical Service Corps of the Army
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Army to maintain a dedicated aeromedical evacuation capability,
including personnel, training, doctrine, and aircraft
specifically configured for aeromedical evacuation missions.
Sec. 743--Establishment of partnership program between United States,
Indo-Pacific region, and Arctic region for military trauma
care, disease and non-battle injury, health systems support,
and research
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with appropriate
combatant commands, to seek to enter into partnerships, not
later than June 1, 2027, with governmental counterparts in the
Indo-Pacific and Arctic regions to establish a joint program
focused on military trauma care and research.
Sec. 744--Aerial transport and Department of Defense-wide capability
for high-consequence infectious diseases
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to establish, sustain, and resource a
program to provide for the safe, long-range aerial transport of
personnel of the Department of Defense known to be or suspected
of being infected by a high-consequence infectious disease.
Sec. 745--Requirement for annual large-scale combat casualty estimation
report
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on projected casualties of the Armed Forces in
large-scale combat operations.
Sec. 746--Report on the organization, performance, and standardization
of emergency medical services within the Department of Defense
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, to submit to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, a
report on the organization, oversight, capabilities, and
performance of emergency medical services across military
installations.
Sec. 747--Expansion of health care license portability for medical
providers of the National Guard
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1094(d)(3)(B) of title 10, United States Code, to
provide health care license portability to medical providers of
the National Guard when providing care under title 32, United
States Code, to a member of the uniformed services.
Sec. 748--Joint forces medical capabilities development and
standardization
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of
the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Director of the Defense Health Agency, to
develop a process for establishing the Joint Force medical
capabilities required to meet the operational planning
requirements of the combatant commands.
Sec. 749--Expansion of authorities to enable interoperability among
military health care professionals of the United States and
partner countries
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1094 of title 10, United States Code, to expand the
list of foreign countries whose licensed health care
professionals may be treated as meeting Department of Defense
licensure requirements.
Sec. 750--Task force on international agreements for Indo-Pacific
medical partnerships
The committee recommends a provision that would establish a
task force responsible for securing and negotiating the
international agreements required to implement the Indo-Pacific
Medical Readiness Program established under section 735 of the
Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159) to
ensure the Armed Forces of the United States can partner with
foreign medical facilities during peacetime and wartime
operations for military medical care, casualty evacuation, and
storage relevant to military medical preparedness.
Sec. 751--Pilot program for Indo-Pacific regional medical data sharing
The committee recommends a provision that would establish a
pilot health information technology platform with the
capability to function across military and civilian medical
facilities in the United States and foreign countries in the
area of operations of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

Subtitle D--Reports and Other Matters

Sec. 761--Review of chaperone policies within facilities of the Defense
Health Agency
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Director, Defense Health Agency (DHA), not later than 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, to review the
compliance by all facilities of the DHA with the chaperone
policies required by DHA Policy Memorandum 25-020, dated
December 15, 2025, ``Chaperones/Standbys within Defense Health
Agency Facilities.'' The provision would require the Director
to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, on the
findings of this review and actions planned or taken pursuant
to the review.
Sec. 762--Unfunded priorities report of the Defense Health Agency
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Director of the Defense Health Agency (DHA) to submit an annual
report on the unfunded priorities of the DHA to the Secretary
of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
congressional defense committees.
Sec. 763--Evaluation of certain research related to menopause,
perimenopause, or mid-life women's health
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to evaluate the results of completed
research related to menopause, perimenopause, or mid-life
women's health among women who are members of the Armed Forces
and to submit a report on the results of such review to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than January 31, 2028.
Sec. 764--Notification of material failure at military medical
treatment facilities affecting patient care
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to notify the Committees on Armed Services
of the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than
30 days after a material failure affects patient care in an
operating room, critical care unit, intensive care unit, or
emergency department at a military medical treatment facility.
The provision would require the Secretary to brief the
committees on a quarterly basis for 3 years on the aggregated
data on the notifications and funding to mitigate the material
failures.
Sec. 765--Study on military health system
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to seek to enter into a contract with a
federally funded research and development center, not later
than June 1, 2027, to conduct a study on the military
healthcare system and the future of TRICARE. The provision
would also require the Secretary, not later than March 1, 2028,
to submit an unredacted copy of the report from such study to
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and also to brief the committees on the report
by said date.
Sec. 766--Establishment of Warfighter Performance Optimization
Initiative, Total Force Fitness
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to establish a comprehensive Warfighter
Performance Optimization Initiative to enhance the readiness,
performance, and resilience of members of the Armed Forces.
Sec. 767--Military Family Limb Loss and Limb Difference Support Program
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to establish, beginning in fiscal year
2028, the Military Family Limb Loss and Limb Difference Support
Program to enhance holistic rehabilitative care for covered
beneficiaries with limb loss or limb dysfunction through peer
mentoring, education, and community outreach.
Sec. 768--Briefing on primary care provided at military medical
treatment facilities on installations of the Air Force
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Director of the Defense Health Agency to provide a briefing to
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, on civilian primary care providers at
military treatment facilities on Air Force installations.
Sec. 769--Assessment of access, fairness, and transparency under
TRICARE pharmacy benefits program
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Comptroller General of the United States to conduct an audit of
the Department of Defense TRICARE pharmacy benefits program.
Sec. 770--Comptroller General review of influenza vaccine requirements
of Department of Defense
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a review of
the Department of Defense influenza vaccine requirements.

Items of Special Interest

Access to Military OneSource
The committee recognizes the continued need for
confidential, non-medical, prevention-focused behavioral health
and wellness resources that support the readiness and well-
being of servicemembers and their families across the total
force.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of
Defense to assess opportunities to pilot, integrate, or
otherwise leverage commercial, off-the-shelf behavioral health
and wellness technologies as part of Military OneSource's non-
medical support ecosystem. These efforts should focus on
expanding access to self-directed and peer-enabled resources
that support relationship skills, stress management, coping
strategies, adjustment challenges, and other life skills
consistent with the authorized scope of non-medical counseling.
The committee further encourages the Secretary to consider how
validated commercial solutions may improve coordination,
continuity, and cost-effective delivery of non-medical support
services across the force, and to use lessons learned to inform
future program design and resource allocation decisions.
Advancing non-opioid alternatives for chronic pain
The committee recognizes the significant impact of chronic
pain on thousands of servicemembers and the over-reliance on
opioids to manage chronic pain conditions. The committee is
concerned that, despite advances in expanding access to non-
opioid alternatives for acute pain, significant barriers remain
for chronic pain that limit servicemembers' and TRICARE
beneficiaries' treatment options.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing, not later than March 1, 2027, on: (1)
The availability of non-opioid treatment options approved by
the Food and Drug Administration to manage chronic pain
conditions; (2) The number of patients that are utilizing these
therapies; (3) The identification of incentives to improve
access to non-opioid alternatives for chronic pain; and (4)
Recommendations that would further alleviate chronic pain
issues for TRICARE beneficiaries.
All-hazards military medical response
The committee is aware of the Department's policy for
emergency management related to medical emergencies caused by
blast, burn, and/or penetrating injuries. However, given the
current and more complex ``All Hazards''' threat environment in
both Contiguous United States and Outside the Contiguous United
States scenarios, the committee believes that the Department's
medical response plans related to exposure to chemical,
biological, and radiological weapons, potentially in addition
to more traditional injuries, should be reviewed and updated.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, on the following:
(1) A description of current capabilities to detect,
treat, and safely transport patients with injuries
related to chemical, biological, and radiological
exposure, both in isolation and when combined with
blast, burn, and penetrating injuries;
(2) An assessment of gaps in current capabilities to
detect, treat, and safely transport patients with
injuries related to chemical, biological, and
radiological exposure, both in isolation and when
combined with blast, burn, and penetrating injuries;
and
(3) A summary of policy, technology, manpower, and
other resource requirements needed to resolve these
capability gaps.
Assessment of behavioral health and social health conditions at remote
and isolated installations
The committee is aware of the unique nature of remote and
isolated installations, as they conduct specialized operational
mission requirements with very limited services and housing on
base or in the vicinity, leading to extended commute times and
compounded challenges.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Defense Health Agency, to assess the
behavioral health and social health conditions of the military
personnel and their families related to their assignment to
remote and isolated installations. This assessment should
utilize tools such as site assistance visits, behavioral health
epidemiological consultations, and community-wide assessments.
The assessment should:
(1) Establish what behavioral health and social
health outcomes impact individual, family, and unit
readiness at remote and isolated installations;
(2) Identify factors, including unique social and
occupational stressors, affecting the behavioral health
and social health of servicemembers and their families
stationed at remote and isolated installations; and
(3) Make recommendations to address these challenges
and to improve the health and readiness of
servicemembers and their families stationed at remote
and isolated installations, and, in doing so, advance
military readiness.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the methods
used to conduct the assessment and on the findings and
recommendations of the assessment.
Briefing on dietary supplement safety of Department of Defense
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Office of Operation Supplement Safety, to
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on
efforts to ensure the safety of dietary supplement use among
members of the Armed Forces.
The briefing shall identify the resources required to fully
implement Department of Defense Instruction 6130.06, including
any gaps in funding, personnel, or infrastructure that may
hinder effective execution of the Instruction.
In addition, the briefing shall assess coordination between
the military departments and the Office of Operation Supplement
Safety with respect to the implementation of dietary supplement
education and training programs. The assessment shall include
the format, frequency, and delivery methods of training
provided to servicemembers, as well as data on the number of
servicemembers reached by such programs, disaggregated by
military department.
Finally, the briefing shall describe efforts to expand
third-party certification requirements for dietary supplements,
consistent with section 1087(b) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60), to
additional military departments, including any challenges
associated with such expansion and recommendations for
legislative or administrative action.
Briefing on Helicobacter pylori in Department of Defense
The committee recognizes that Helicobacter pylori (H.
pylori) is a stomach bacterium that may affect military
readiness, deployments, and long-term gastrointestinal health.
Some studies suggest about 25 percent of U.S. servicemembers
have evidence of the infection, and broader global military
estimates are even higher--around 32 percent prevalence.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, to include the following:
(1) The estimated prevalence of H. pylori infection
among active-duty members, reserve component members,
and other covered beneficiaries;
(2) A comparison of prevalence rates across the
military departments, occupational specialties, and
demographic categories, as appropriate;
(3) An assessment of infection acquisition associated
with deployment, including geographic variation and
trends over time;
(4) An identification of primary risk factors for H.
pylori infection among members of the Armed Forces,
including:
(a) deployment to regions with elevated
endemic rates;
(b) food and water sanitation conditions;
(c) living conditions in operational and
training environments; and (d) other relevant
environmental or occupational exposures;
(5) Current policies and clinical guidelines for
screening and testing within the Military Health
System;
(6) The extent to which H. pylori infection is
considered in pre-deployment health assessments;
(7) An estimate of the direct and indirect costs
associated with H. pylori infection, including testing,
treatment, and complications;
(8) The impact on Military Health System utilization,
including outpatient visits, hospitalizations, and
specialty care;
(9) A description of ongoing or planned research
efforts related to H. pylori within the Department of
Defense; and
(10) Any recommendations the Secretary determines
appropriate to improve prevention, diagnosis,
treatment, surveillance, and readiness outcomes related
to H. pylori infection.
Briefing on impact of drone warfare on combat casualties
The committee recognizes the growing importance of
understanding the emerging medical and operational implications
of injuries caused by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and how
these injuries differ from those historically associated with
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). As these technologies
proliferate and evolve, it is essential that the Department of
Defense (DOD) fully understand the medical consequences of UAV-
related injuries and ensure that our military medical system is
prepared to prevent, treat, and rehabilitate these wounds.
The committee notes that UAVs target the head and upper
body, and IEDs target the lower body. These differences may
include variations in blast exposure, fragmentation patterns,
burn injuries, and trauma resulting from top-down detonation
profiles. Such distinctions could have meaningful implications
for battlefield medicine, protective equipment, training,
evacuation procedures, rehabilitation protocols, and long-term
care for wounded servicemembers.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, regarding the impact of drone warfare on
combat casualties. The briefing should, at a minimum, include
the following: (1) An assessment of how unmanned aerial systems
are affecting casualty rates, injury patterns, and
survivability; (2) An evaluation of impacts on casualty
evacuation timelines, including the feasibility of meeting
established evacuation benchmarks in contested environments;
(3) An analysis of the effects on patient flow across echelons
of care, including disruptions to traditional evacuation chains
and the positioning of medical personnel and other resources;
(4) A description of the DOD's current capabilities to provide
prolonged field care in denied or contested environments; (5) A
description of any capability gaps in medical operations
resulting from the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems;
(6) A summary of ongoing or planned efforts to mitigate such
risks, including doctrine, training, materiel solutions, and
force design changes; (7) Opportunities for collaboration with
outside experts, including organizations supporting wounded
servicemembers, trauma specialists, and veterans' advocacy
groups; (8) Recommendations for legislative or policy changes
necessary to address identified gaps; and (9) Any other matters
the Department wishes to consider.
Briefing on parental access to medical records
The committee recognizes that access to a child's medical
information is a foundational expectation for most families and
is closely tied to a parent's ability to make informed
decisions regarding their child's health and well-being.
However, within the Department of Defense, the issue of
parental access to minor dependents' medical records has many
complexities, including the balancing of parental rights, minor
confidentiality, medical ethics, and overlapping federal and
state legal requirements.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, that provides: (1) The current process by
which a parent can access a minor dependents' health records;
(2) Challenges and opportunities, including the cost of
providing this access; and (3) The steps required to enable
this access for parents and minor dependents in the future.
Briefing on privileging and credentialing within the Military Health
System and potential integration with Department of Veterans
Affairs
The committee is aware of persistent challenges within the
Department of Defense in achieving timely, standardized, and
portable provider privileging and credentialing across the
Military Health System. The committee notes that variations in
processes among military treatment facilities and across the
military departments can contribute to delays in onboarding
providers, underutilization of clinical staff, and
inefficiencies that may affect access to care. The committee
also notes ongoing efforts to improve coordination between the
Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs,
particularly as providers transition between the two systems or
serve dual roles. However, the committee remains concerned that
the lack of interoperability in credentialing and privileging
systems creates unnecessary duplication, administrative
inefficiencies, and delays in patient care.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, to provide a briefing, not later than April 1, 2027,
on the following:
(1) Secretary of Defense focus to:
(a) establish uniform standards, criteria,
and documentation requirements for
credentialing and privileging;
(b) enable portability of credentials and
privileges across military treatment facilities
without redundant review, to the maximum extent
practicable;
(c) incorporate digital credentialing tools
and automation to reduce processing time and
administrative burden; and
(d) identify statutory, regulatory, or policy
barriers to the full implementation of a
standardized system; and
(2) Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Veterans
Affairs focus to:
(a) evaluate options for a shared or
federated credentialing database accessible to
both their respective departments;
(b) assess the feasibility of reciprocal
recognition of credentials and privileges for
providers practicing in both systems;
(c) identify information technology
requirements, including cybersecurity
considerations, necessary to support
interoperability;
(d) propose common data standards and
governance structures to ensure data integrity
and accountability; and
(e) identify any legislative changes required
to enable full interoperability.
Briefing on treatment of miscarriages in military health system
The committee recognizes that miscarriage and early
pregnancy loss are common medical events that can have
significant physical and psychological effects. While not
unique to the military, the committee is concerned that
operational demands, access to care, and policy inconsistencies
may affect how servicemembers and dependents experience and
recover from pregnancy loss. The committee seeks to better
understand whether current Department of Defense (DOD) policies
and systems adequately support affected individuals and ensure
consistent, high-quality health care across all duty locations.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
March 1, 2027, on the following:
(1) The collection and tracking of miscarriages and
pregnancy loss among active-duty servicemembers and
their dependents within the Military Health System;
(2) The clinical guidelines that are used across the
Military Health System for managing miscarriage and
pregnancy loss;
(3) The process by which the DOD ensures timely
access to obstetric, gynecological, and emergency care
for miscarriage management and the challenges that
exist at:
(a) remote or overseas duty stations; and
(b) deployed environments;
(4) The mental health services available following
pregnancy loss; and
(5) The research the DOD has conducted on potential
links between miscarriage and:
(a) occupational exposures (e.g., chemicals,
blast overpressure);
(b) physical demands or training
requirements; and
(c) the mitigation measures that are in place
to reduce risk.
Combat casualty care triage
The committee is concerned that conflicts in contested
environments would challenge military medics' capacity for
identifying which servicemembers most need timely medical care
and their ability to triage cases accordingly. The committee
notes the significant advancements in technology that perform
continuous physiological monitoring such as wearable sensors.
Pairing these devices with artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled
software could facilitate the automation of casualty triage,
increasing the ability of medics to determine each
servicemember's current physical condition and prioritize
evacuations for those most severely wounded.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Director of the
Defense Health Agency to provide a briefing, not later than
February 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives on AI-enabled mass-
casualty triage. Specifically, the briefing should include an
assessment of:
(1) The Department of Defense's current capabilities
to perform autonomous triage and continuous
physiological monitoring in high-casualty, resource-
constrained environments;
(2) The feasibility and advisability of using
wearable sensors and AI-enabled software to automate
casualty triage, prioritize evacuation, and support
medics operating in the field;
(3) How the Department could leverage small
businesses and the unique acquisition pathways open to
them to incorporate autonomous triage capabilities into
the force;
(4) The anticipated costs of implementing these
technologies; and
(5) Whether the Department intends to request such
capabilities in future budgets.
Comptroller General review of access to care at military medical
treatment facilities within United States
The committee remains concerned about TRICARE
beneficiaries' access to care at the Defense Health Agency's
direct care system of military medical treatment facilities
(MTFs), particularly those located in rural areas within the
continental United States (CONUS).
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to conduct a study on TRICARE beneficiaries'
access to health care at CONUS MTFs that should include: (1) A
description of current access to care at CONUS MTFs, including
those located in rural areas; (2) The methods and data used to
measure access to care and an assessment of the steps taken to
ensure the reliability of these data; (3) How MTFs use these
data to identify any access issues; and (4) The steps MTFs have
taken to address any access issues they identify, particularly
in rural areas.
This study should also assess: (1) How MTFs work with the
regional TRICARE managed care support contractors to ensure
that the composition of their local civilian provider networks
complement care being provided at their facilities; and (2)
Impacts that network changes, such as hospital closures, can
have on MTFs.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March
31, 2027, with a report to follow by a date mutually agreed
upon at the time of the briefing.

Comptroller General review of joint qualification billets for health-
related specialties

The committee remains concerned about the lack of progress
with the development and creation of joint qualification
billets for medical or health related specialties within the
Department of Defense (DOD). The committee notes that the Joint
Explanatory Statement to Accompany the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Committee Print No. 3)
directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a briefing related
to this topic, not later than April 1, 2026, in which the DOD
indicated limited progress on the development of joint
qualification billets for these specialties. Therefore, the
committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States
to conduct a review of the following:
(1) The status of the implementation of the joint
qualification billets from the DOD briefing submitted
in response to the Joint Explanatory Statement to
Accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Committee Print No. 3);
(2) Department efforts to identify and designate a
stakeholder responsible for the development and
implementation of such joint qualification billets;
(3) The plan of action and milestones from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for
the Defense Health Agency, Uniformed Services
University, and other relevant organizations within the
Military Health System;
(4) Any anticipated challenges or costs; and
(5) Any steps the Department is taking to move
forward with the development of joint qualification
billets for medical related specialties, including
additional authorities and resources.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
provide a briefing, not later than April 30, 2027, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, with the results to follow in a mutually
agreed upon format and timeframe.

Comptroller General review of TRICARE pharmacy program

The committee remains concerned about the ability of the
Department of Defense's (DOD) TRICARE pharmacy program to meet
the needs of its beneficiaries. The program is administered by
a contractor who has administered the program since 2009. The
contractor has responsibilities that include developing and
maintaining a network of retail pharmacies and operating a mail
order pharmacy. Information on the current management of the
TRICARE pharmacy program, including the adequacy of the
networks and the DOD's oversight of the program, will help to
ensure the program is delivering the benefit in the most
effective and cost effective manner.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General
of the United States to conduct a series of studies on the
TRICARE Pharmacy program that include:
(1) A review of beneficiary access and network
adequacy, including:
(a) any geographic disparities in access,
especially for rural and underserved areas;
(b) differences in access to in-person
pharmacies by pharmacy type;
(c) reliance on mail-order pharmacy services;
(d) the timeliness of prescription
fulfillment, including home delivery and
specialty pharmacy services;
(e) adequacy of access to care; and
(f) any associated impacts on patient care;
(2) A review of prescription drug costs under the
program and the extent to which the contractor's
practices affect those costs, including whether the
Department achieves cost savings and receives the full
value of negotiated discounts;
(3) An assessment of the Defense Health Agency's
(DHA) management and oversight of the program,
including:
(a) an assessment of whether the contract,
and its requirements and performance metrics,
is structured in a way to enable the DHA to
effectively oversee the program and minimize
program integrity risks, such as those related
to fraud, waste, and abuse, including improper
payments and the effectiveness of safeguards to
prevent inappropriate billing;
(b) an examination of the accuracy and
completeness of contractor-reported data, and
the Department's process for validating such
data, including visibility into participating
pharmacy locations, pricing, rebates, and fees;
(c) an assessment of any conflicts of
interest in the program, including the extent
to which vertically integrated business
arrangements or affiliated pharmacies create
potential conflicts of interest or affect
competition; and (d) an analysis of the
adequacy of beneficiary access to in-person
pharmacy options, by pharmacy type, including
an assessment of differences in offered
contract terms to in-network pharmacies and the
impact on beneficiary access;
(4) A comparison of the TRICARE Pharmacy
Program to other Federal health care programs
and commercial best practices, including with
respect to network adequacy, prescription drug
costs, incentives, and oversight;
(5) Any differences in reimbursement rates between
affiliated pharmacies and non-affiliated pharmacies,
including volume and type of prescriptions dispensed,
direct and indirect remuneration fees, or other price
concessions and clawbacks, as well as review of all the
administrative fees received for each prescription
filled; and (6) For any affiliated pharmacy or pharmacy
under common ownership with the pharmacy contractor, an
analysis of:
(a) the percentage of total prescriptions
dispensed by such pharmacies to individuals
enrolled in such plan or coverage;
(b) a description of drugs dispensed by such
pharmacies to individuals enrolled in such plan
or coverage; and
(c) other strategic matters germane to the
administration of such pharmacies.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to provide a
briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027,
with a report to follow at an agreed upon date. The committee
expects that the results of this review will inform future
legislative and oversight actions related to the administration
of the TRICARE pharmacy program and broader pharmacy benefit
manager practices within the DOD.

Enhance awareness of self initiated mental health referrals

The committee recognizes the importance of ensuring that
servicemembers are aware of available mental health resources
and avenues for obtaining confidential care. Section 704 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public
Law 117-81) established the self-initiated referral process for
mental health evaluations of members of the Armed Forces, and
section 705 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31) clarified that authority.
The committee also acknowledges the Department of Defense's
efforts to implement these requirements, including the issuance
of Directive-type Memorandum 23-005, ``Self-Initiated Referral
Process for Mental Health Evaluations of Service Members.''
Despite these efforts, the committee remains concerned by
reports of inconsistent awareness, education, and
implementation of the self-initiated referral process across
the Armed Forces. While some servicemembers have successfully
used the process to obtain mental health evaluations and care,
the committee is aware that some commanders and supervisors
have sought additional guidance regarding their
responsibilities and that units have requested additional
training and educational materials. The committee believes that
improving awareness of the process among servicemembers and
leaders may increase access to care, reduce stigma associated
with seeking mental health treatment, and support suicide
prevention efforts.
Accordingly, the committee is interested in the feasibility
and advisability of requiring prominent, standardized signage
at military installations informing servicemembers of their
rights under the Brandon Act and the procedures for requesting
and obtaining a self-initiated referral for a mental health
evaluation. The committee is also interested in requiring
standardized annual training for all servicemembers on the
referral process, available protections, and mental health
resources, as well as enhanced training for commanders,
supervisors, and noncommissioned officers regarding their
responsibilities under the Brandon Act and Directive-type
Memorandum 23-005.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of
implementing such requirements. The briefing shall include:
(1) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability
of requiring standardized Brandon Act awareness signage
in prominent and high-traffic areas at military
installations, military treatment facilities, reserve
component facilities, and other locations frequented by
servicemembers, and public-facing installation-adjacent
locations;
(2) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability
of requiring annual training for all members of the
Armed Forces on the self-initiated referral process,
including how to request a referral, protections
against retaliation, confidentiality protections, and
available mental health resources;
(3) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability
of requiring enhanced Brandon Act training for
commanding officers, supervisors, and noncommissioned
officers in grades E-5 and above regarding their
responsibilities when receiving a request for a self-
initiated referral;
(4) An evaluation of the anticipated impact of such
measures on awareness, utilization of mental health
services, and suicide prevention efforts;
(5) Identification of any legal, operational,
administrative, or logistical challenges associated
with implementing such requirements; and
(6) A detailed estimate of the one-time and recurring
costs associated with implementing and sustaining such
requirements throughout the Department of Defense.

Enhancing musculoskeletal medicine in the Military Health System

The committee recognizes that musculoskeletal injuries
threaten servicemembers' medical readiness and notes the
demonstrated value of existing collaboration among the Defense
Health Agency, the Uniformed Services University, and
initiatives that advance orthopedic surgical skills, research,
and clinical outcomes improvement.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027. The briefing shall include: (1) The
Department of Defense's initiatives related to advanced
orthopedic surgical training; (2) The Department's analysis and
application of outcomes data derived from the Military
Orthopedic Tracking Injuries and Outcomes Network; (3) The
development of evidence-based clinical practice guidelines
across the continuum of musculoskeletal care within the
Military Health System; (4) The Department's efforts to address
data access, analytic support, and integration of findings into
professional education and clinical communities; (5) Mechanisms
to assess programmatic impacts on readiness; and (6) The
feasibility of the Department entering into a memorandum of
understanding or agreement with organizations that participate
in advanced orthopedic surgical skills, research, and clinical
outcomes improvement.

Feasibility and advisability of establishing pilot program on filling
positions at remote military treatment facilities

The committee notes that remote military medical treatment
facilities often face significant challenges in recruiting and
retaining qualified healthcare professionals due to their
geographic isolation, limited local labor markets, and
competition with civilian health care systems that may offer
more attractive compensation and career opportunities.
The committee is concerned that these staffing shortages
can reduce access to timely primary care services for
servicemembers, military families, and other beneficiaries
while also increasing workloads for existing medical personnel
and potentially affecting military medical readiness. The
committee notes that while the Department of Defense possesses
several hiring and compensation authorities designed to attract
healthcare providers, these tools have not consistently
addressed persistent vacancies at remote locations.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretaries of the
military departments, in consultation with the Director of the
Defense Health Agency, to brief the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than March 1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability
of establishing a pilot program to improve recruitment and
retention of primary care personnel at remote military medical
treatment facilities using existing hiring and compensation
authorities for highly qualified applicants, including enhanced
pay authorities, student loan repayment programs, and
recruitment, relocation, and retention incentives provided
under:
(1) Section 1599c of title 10, United States Code
(relating to appointment and rates of pay);
(2) Section 5379 of title 5, United States Code
(relating to student loan repayments); and
(3) Sections 5753 and 5754 of such title 5 (relating
to recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention
bonuses, respectively).

Healthcare associated infections

The committee recognizes the public health crisis caused by
healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) and that respiratory
infections are the number one contributor to HAIs.
Servicemembers treated by the military healthcare system for a
condition or injury should not be subject to additional
infections developed during their treatment in military
treatment facilities (MTFs). Preventable HAIs lead to
unnecessary loss of life and increase healthcare costs.
To date, efforts to reduce respiratory HAIs have had
limited success.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Defense Health
Agency to prioritize the development of ultraviolet wearable
pathogen inactivation devices for use by patients in MTFs who
have respiratory infections. These devices should be designed
to eliminate pathogens in exhaled breath, without filters to
allow easy patient breathing, to reduce the spread of these
infections.

Improving brain injury prevention efforts

The committee remains concerned by the prevalence of brain
injuries among servicemembers, including those caused by blast
overpressure exposure and by reporting that brain injuries may
also be prevalent among fighter pilots and speedboat crews.
Additionally, the committee further notes its concern about
repeated blast overpressure exposure among military instructors
who are training others to use weapons systems, as well as
reporting on blast overpressure exposure among explosive
ordnance technicians. The committee directs the Secretary of
Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than March 1, 2027, on the Department of Defense's
efforts to evaluate, prevent, and mitigate blast overpressure
exposure and brain injuries among these at-risk servicemembers.
The briefing shall include the following information:
(1) Efforts to evaluate, prevent, and mitigate brain
injury risks among fighter pilots, speedboat crews,
military instructors training others to use weapons
systems, and explosive ordnance technicians;
(2) The results of Project Odin's Eye and any steps
the Department and any of the Services have taken to
evaluate, prevent, and mitigate brain injury risks
based on findings from Project Odin's Eye;
(3) Efforts to evaluate, prevent, and mitigate brain
injury risks in other air and amphibious operations;
(4) Military occupational specialties that may be at
higher risk for brain injury due to exposure in air and
amphibious operations;
(5) DOD's efforts to integrate brain injury risks
among fighter pilots, speedboat crews, military
instructors training others to use weapons systems,
explosive ordnance technicians, and those at higher
risk of exposure due to air and amphibious operations
into its Warfighter Brain Health Initiative and
statutory requirements related to brain health in the
Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public
Law 118-159).

Messenger ribonucleic acid vaccine technology

The committee is aware that significant scientific advances
are being made as a result of better understanding,
characterization, and application of messenger ribonucleic acid
(mRNA) technology. One particularly relevant application
supporting warfighter health and medical readiness is the use
of mRNA-based vaccines. For instance, the Department of Defense
(DOD) reported that over 95 percent of active-duty
servicemembers were vaccinated against COVID-19 by late 2021,
with the majority of those servicemembers receiving an mRNA
vaccine. However, the committee is also aware that in August
2025, the Department of Health and Human Services announced
approximately $500.0 million in federal funding cuts for mRNA
vaccine development.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
March 1, 2027, regarding the impact of federal funding cuts to
vaccine research and regulatory uncertainty for new vaccines on
servicemembers, military families, and military readiness. The
briefing should include: (1) The identified vaccine research
priorities to protect servicemembers, including a list of
existing DOD vaccine projects; (2) The quantified vaccine
research funding levels over the last 5 years; (3) The
identified challenges for regulatory pathways that new vaccines
may face; and (4) The risks to servicemembers and military
readiness if vaccine research priorities are not met.

Military medical manning end strength

The committee remains concerned about military medical end
strength in the military departments. Moreover, the committee
is concerned with the long-term commitment of the services to
ensure military treatment facilities have the dedicated manning
to support the dual missions of warfighting support and the
peacetime health benefit. Therefore, the committee directs the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military
departments to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later April 1,
2027, on how they will ensure military medical manning meets
the dual mission of warfighter support and peacetime health
benefit and is in compliance with section 731 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-
81).

Military-civilian medical surge system

The committee notes that section 712 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-
60) created the Military-Civilian Medical Surge Program to
enhance the interoperability and medical surge capability and
capacity of the National Disaster Medical System. While the
committee supports the implementation of this program and
believes it represents a significant step forward in enabling
the Department of Defense to better care for wounded
servicemembers during military contingencies, the committee
understands that further work is yet required to handle the
demands of casualty care from large-scale combat operations.
Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs, in consultation with the Director
of the Defense Health Agency, to provide a briefing to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, on expanding the
Military-Civilian Medical Surge Program. Specifically, the
briefing shall include, but not be limited, to:
(1) An assessment of the Department's current
emergency response plan for military health emergencies
and recommendations for improvements for coordinating
military and civilian health service support under
conflict scenarios;
(2) An assessment of the feasibility and advisability
of establishing regional medical operations
coordination centers or other entities with a defined
set of minimum capabilities at strategic hubs,
including likely points of debarkation, to assist with
patient triage, patient regulation, patient load
balancing, and overall case management during a
military health emergency;
(3) An assessment of the financial impacts to
civilian partner health facilities involved in a
sustained medical mobilization in response to a
military health emergency; and
(4) Any legislative or policy recommendations that
better position the program should a contingency
requiring use of the program arise.

Molecular diagnostic test modernization

The committee is aware that coverage for molecular
diagnostic tests used in oncology and transplant care requires
modernization within the TRICARE program to align with
prevailing standards of Medicare, state Medicaid programs, and
private insurers.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Defense Health
Agency to consider coverage under the TRICARE program of
Medicare Local Coverage Determinations that are approved for
the Proprietary Lab Analysis. These advanced diagnostics
provide clinically validated improvements in accuracy, early
detection, and treatment decision support compared to
traditional methods.
The committee further encourages the Department of Defense
to evaluate current TRICARE coverage policies to ensure they
reflect contemporary evidence-based practice and support timely
access to molecular diagnostics for servicemembers and their
families.

Neurorehabilitation protocols for mild traumatic brain injury

The committee is concerned about the long-term effects of
chronic mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) among
servicemembers. Concussions, repetitive low-level blast
exposure, training incidents, and other service-related events
may contribute to mTBI that often goes undiagnosed and
untreated. The committee recognizes that certain nonprofit
providers have developed targeted neurorehabilitation protocols
for mTBI that may help address symptoms earlier and improve
long-term outcomes.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of
Defense to improve early identification and treatment of mTBI,
including through partnerships with nonprofit providers with
demonstrated expertise in such neurorehabilitation protocols.
The committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, not later than May 1, 2027, on: (1)
The prevalence of mTBI among servicemembers; (2) Efforts to
improve early intervention; (3) Existing non-profit
partnerships; and (4) Opportunities for such partnerships.

Position trackers for maneuver soldier monitoring systems

The committee is aware of the high incidence of heat-
related injuries and medical emergencies during physically
demanding and geographically dispersed training conducted at
the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Georgia. The
committee notes that modern physiological and geospatial
monitoring systems have demonstrated effectiveness in improving
cadre situational awareness, accelerating emergency response,
and reducing preventable training injuries.
Therefore, the committee strongly urges the Secretary of
the Army to modernize Soldier Monitoring Systems used during
maneuver training by fielding next-generation monitoring
capabilities that integrate real-time location tracking with
physiological indicators such as heart rate, temperature, and
movement.

Review of Defense Health Agency's combat support resources

The committee notes that the Military Health System (MHS)
performs a range of medical readiness functions that support
operational effectiveness, force health protection, combat
casualty care, and the readiness of the Armed Forces. The
committee further recognizes that these functions are executed
across the Defense Health Agency (DHA) and the military
departments and are funded through a combination of Defense
Health Program (DHP) and military department resources.
The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense
(DOD) has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of MHS
medical readiness-related programs, functions, requirements,
authorities, and funding responsibilities. The committee
believes that a clear understanding of which activities
directly contribute to operational medical readiness is
necessary to ensure appropriate governance, resource
allocation, and accountability. The committee is further
concerned that inconsistencies may exist in the alignment of
readiness-related functions with statutory requirements,
Department guidance, and funding responsibilities, which may
result in solvency issues or delays in care.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs, to conduct a comprehensive review of MHS medical
readiness related programs, functions, requirements, and
associated funding. The results of such review shall be
submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027.
The review shall include the following elements:
(1) An inventory of medical readiness-related
programs, activities, and functions performed by the
DHA and the military departments;
(2) Assessment of the statutory, regulatory, policy,
and operational requirements associated with each
identified program, activity, or function;
(3) Identification of military department readiness-
related program functions and requirements;
(4) Identification of DHP-funded medical readiness-
related functions and requirements;
(5) An assessment of the extent to which each
program, activity, or function contributes to
operational medical readiness, force health protection,
combat casualty care capability, deployment readiness,
and support to combatant command requirements;
(6) An evaluation of the alignment of identified
programs and activities with DOD guidance, readiness
requirements, and strategic objectives;
(7) Identification of any duplicative, overlapping,
fragmented, or inconsistent requirements,
responsibilities, authorities, or funding arrangements
among the DHA and the military departments;
(8) An assessment of risks to operational
effectiveness and mission readiness associated with any
identified capability gaps;
(9) Recommendations regarding governance, oversight,
accountability, and funding responsibilities for
medical readiness-related programs and functions; and
(10) Recommendations for any legislative, policy,
organizational, or resource changes necessary to
improve the management and execution of medical
readiness requirements.
At a minimum, the review shall include an assessment of the
following programs and functional areas: the Armed Services
Blood Program, emergency medical services, immunization
programs, occupational health programs, optical laboratories,
installation support functions, educational developmental
intervention services, operational medicine capabilities, real
property in support of medical readiness activities, war
reserve materiel infrastructure, and any additional medical
readiness-related program, activity, or function identified by
the Secretary of Defense during the review.
The committee further directs the Secretary to include
recommendations regarding the appropriate assignment of
responsibilities and funding alignment for MHS and DHP-funded
readiness functions and requirements. All recommendations
regarding funding realignment or program ownership shall be
advisory, and decisions regarding MHS and DHP funding
responsibilities will be made by the committee.

Report on feasibility and advisability of a sharing agreement between
Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs to
have Mobile Medical Units provide medical services to
servicemembers stationed on military installations designated
as remote and isolated

The committee notes that the Department of Veterans Affairs
utilizes Mobile Medical Units for rural healthcare purposes
which provide an option for localized on-site primary care,
preventative health screenings, and ancillary care, such as
blood and lab work, to veterans living in rural areas.
The committee is concerned about the medical challenges
facing servicemembers who are stationed at military bases
designated as remote and isolated installations. These
servicemembers face significant medical challenges, including
limited on-site care and shortages of providers, which force
personnel to travel hours for routine care.
Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, to provide a report to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, and the Committees on Veterans Affairs of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April
1, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of developing a
sharing agreement between the Department of Defense and the
Department of Veterans Affairs in regards to Mobile Medical
Units providing medical services to servicemembers on remote
and isolated military installations.

Report on supply chain of prosthetics and assistive technology

The committee acknowledges that preserving U.S. access to
secure durable medical equipment (DME), including prosthetics,
and assistive technology devices (AT) is critical to achieve
the Department of Defense's (DOD) mission. Enabling DOD
civilian employees and disabled servicemembers to perform their
duties is a matter of national security. If foreign adversaries
or affiliated companies from foreign covered countries gain
access to DME or AT used by DOD civilians or active-duty or
Reserve servicemembers--or the data and information collected
by such devices--it could make DOD personnel vulnerable to
adversary sabotage, surveillance, and other dangers.
The committee recognizes that the Defense Health Agency
acquires DME, including prosthetics, through a robust
acquisitions and procurement process to provide TRICARE
beneficiaries with essential, even lifesaving equipment.
Further, the DOD Computer/Electronic Accommodations Program
provides assistive technology to three populations that could
become vulnerable to a range of nefarious exploitation if the
supply chain of those technologies is not well protected: (1)
DOD civilian employees; (2) Wounded servicemembers awaiting a
medical evaluation board (MEB); and (3) Wounded servicemembers
returning to duty. According to a RAND study from 2024,
``Projections of Disability in the Department of Defense
Workforce Through 2031,'' from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year
2020, the DOD provided AT to 12,933 returning servicemembers
and 9,136 servicemembers awaiting an MEB--on top of thousands
of DOD civilians.
The committee notes that efforts on supply chain security
often focus on weapons systems or platforms and information
technology systems. However, modern DME and AT are increasingly
interconnected, with many utilizing artificial intelligence,
all while supply chains for such devices remain complex and
subject to political and economic policies. The committee
therefore urges the Department to ensure that the security of
DME and AT used by DOD personnel and servicemembers are
prioritized as well.
Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel & Readiness, in coordination with the
Director of the Defense Health Agency and the Secretaries of
the military departments and services, to provide a report, not
later than December 1, 2027, to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the
cybersecurity and supply chain security of DME (including
prosthetics) and AT used by DOD civilian and uniformed
personnel. The report shall include a risk assessment and a
Department mitigation plan, at the appropriate level of
classification. The report shall also:
(1) Summarize current policies and processes
regarding screening DME and AT currently issued to
servicemembers and/or DOD civilian employees for supply
chain security purposes;
(2) Review whether any component of any DME and AT
currently issued to servicemembers and/or DOD civilian
employees have any commercial association with a
company from a foreign covered country or an entity
wholly owned or controlled by a company from a foreign
covered country;
(3) Provide a risk assessment describing the major
risks to national security and personnel privacy of any
found vulnerabilities;
(4) A plan to mitigate and ultimately eliminate the
risks found in (3), including additional procurements,
replacements, upgrades, and any other actions; and
(5) Recommendations for changes to authorities,
resourcing, policies, or processes to improve
cybersecurity resilience and supply chain security of
DME and AT.

Termination of eligibility for TRICARE Reserve Select

The committee understands that members of the reserve
components are confused about the timing of the termination of
their eligibility for TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) when
transferring to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) or
separating from the Reserves. Apparently, their eligibility is
tied to the issuance of transfer or separation orders, but the
servicemembers are not able to predict with any certainty when
the orders will be issued and thus cannot make arrangements for
other health insurance.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the
challenges with respect to TRS that members of the reserve
components face when transferring to the IRR or separating from
the Reserves and the actions the Secretary will take to address
these challenges.

Traumatic brain injury accession processing feasibility briefing

The committee recognizes that traumatic brain injury
treatment and protection are evolving at a rapid pace.
Moreover, the committee encourages the Department of Defense to
approach brain health, blast overpressure exposure tracking,
and suicide risk analysis as vital components of servicemember
force health protection.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, on the following matters:
(1) The feasibility of establishing baseline
cognitive testing during accession processing prior to
entry into the Armed Forces to include:
(a) an estimate cost of this cognitive
testing;
(b) any challenges and opportunities that
would be created;
(c) the periodicity of recurring cognitive
testing and the stages where this testing would
be mandated, like periodic health assessment,
post deployment health assessment, separation
from service, and any other points in a
servicemember's career;
(d) the process by which this testing would
be included and stored in a servicemember's
electronic health record; and
(e) the review process for evaluating
cumulative exposure using blast overpressure
logs and traumatic brain injury logs;
(2) The feasibility of developing a comprehensive
exposure logging system that would include:
(a) blast overpressure exposure logs;
(b) traumatic brain injury logs; and
(c) integration of the logs into the
Individual Longitudinal Exposure Record; and
(3) Any relevant recommendations the Secretary
determines appropriate to improve prevention,
diagnosis, treatment, surveillance, and readiness
outcomes related to traumatic brain injury.

TITLE VIII--ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED
MATTERS

Subtitle A--Acquisition Policy and Management

Sec. 801--Multi-year procurement for certain munitions

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
multi-year procurement for certain munitions in accordance with
section 3501 of title 10, United States Code.

Sec. 802--Limitation on availability of funds pending report on and
revisions of software acquisition pathway implementation

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
availability of funds for travel of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to not more than 95
percent, pending a report on the implementation of the March 6,
2025, memo by the Office of the Secretary of Defense titled,
``Directing Modern Software Acquisition to Maximize
Lethality.''

Sec. 803--Report on multiyear procurement

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Department of Defense to submit an exhibit of eligible programs
for multiyear procurements along with the President's budget
request.

Sec. 804--Modifications to technical data rights

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 3771(b) of title 10, United States Code, to include
government purpose rights for detailed manufacturing and
process data for the purposes of operations, maintenance,
installation, and training under certain urgent and emergency
conditions. The provision would also require contractors to
establish clear and convincing evidence for applying
restrictive rights markings to technical data, computer
software, and computer software documentation delivered to the
Department of Defense.

Sec. 805--Accountability and training for defense acquisition

The committee recommends a provision that would require
standardized scorecards and reporting for portfolio acquisition
executives of the Department of Defense. The provision would
also create a pilot program on senior commercial acquisition
executives and a pilot training program for contracting
officers to receive an advanced financial certification.
Subtitle B--Amendments to General Contracting Authorities,
Procedures, and Limitations

Sec. 811--Consolidation and rationalization of restrictions on
procurement from certain foreign countries

The committee recommends a provision that would establish a
new chapter in title 10, United States Code, to consolidate and
rationalize existing procurement restrictions.

Sec. 812--Requirements for information relating to supply chain risk

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 3252 of title 10, United States Code, to clarify that
the supply chain risk determination authority shall not be
invoked for contract disputes. It shall only be invoked to
protect critical defense systems from adversary exploitation.

Sec. 813--Limitations on certain missile contracts or other agreements

The committee recommends a provision that would impose
limitations on certain missile contracts or other agreements
for the Munitions Acceleration Council missile programs
authorized under section 804 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60).
The provision would prohibit the obligation or expenditure
of Department of Defense funds on covered contracts (for
systems including Patriot Advanced Capability-3, Tomahawk
Cruise Missile, Joint Air-to-Air Standoff Missile, Long-Range
Anti-Ship Missile, Standard Missile-6, Standard Missile-3 Block
IB, Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense, Low-Cost Hypersonic Strike Systems, and
low-cost cruise missiles) unless the Secretary of Defense
certifies to the congressional defense committees that the
contract does not authorize the government to remove or install
contractor personnel or direct the contractor's internal
resources unless the Department paid for such resources as a
direct cost. For pre-existing covered contracts that contain
non-conforming clauses, the Secretary would be required to seek
bilateral negotiations to remove them without consideration.
The provision would also prohibit modifications to covered
contracts or other agreements to alleviate performance issues
and require strict enforcement of contract terms as written,
with an exception for modifications made pursuant to
extraordinary contractual relief authorities under Public Law
85-804.

Sec. 814--Limitations on the centralized commercial item capability

The committee recommends a provision that would limit funds
for the centralized commercial item capability required by
section 3456(a) of title 10, United States Code, until the
Secretary of Defense certifies that comprehensive guidance
implementing commercial requirements in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) is
issued to include higher standards for approving non-commercial
item determinations for certain capability areas. The provision
also includes a review by the Comptroller General of the United
States.

Sec. 815--Limitations relating to capital distributions for defense
contractors

The committee recommends a provision that would, beginning
on June 15, 2027, prohibit the Secretary of Defense from
entering into a contract for goods or services, unless the
contractor agrees to not purchase equity security, pay
dividends, or make any other capital distribution with respect
to equity securities unless the contractor has a waiver from
the Secretary of Defense based on a qualifying defense
investment plan.

Sec. 816--Prohibition of procurement of molybdenum, gallium, or
germanium from non-allied foreign nations and authorization for
production from recovered material

The committee recommends a provision that would clarify the
implementation date for section 844 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60).

Sec. 817--Other transaction authority reporting

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Department of Defense to report other transactions to the
searchable public website established by the Federal Funding
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-
282).

Sec. 818--Limitation on procurement of cut flowers and cut greens

The committee recommends a provision that would require any
funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available
to the Department of Defense may only be used for the
procurement of a cut flower or cut green if grown in the United
States.

Sec. 819--Audit and mitigation of covered cellular modules in the
Department of Defense systems and infrastructure

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to conduct a Department of Defense-wide
audit to identify the presences of covered cellular modules
within covered systems and submit, not later than 1 year after
the date of the enactment of this Act, a report on the audit
and mitigation activities carried out under this section.

Sec. 820--Improving transparency of foreign influence on Department of
Defense contractors

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 847(a)(3) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92) by lowering the threshold
for disclosure from $5.0 million to $500,000.

Sec. 821--Reporting of price increases

The committee recommends a provision that would create
section 3710 of title 10, United States Code, to require
contractors on cost-reimbursable contracts to report on price
increases greater than 25 percent for an item procured within
the last year and 50 percent for an item procured within the
last 5 years.

Sec. 822--Late submission of cost and pricing data as invalid defense
to contract price reductions for defective cost or pricing data

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 3706(c) of title 10, United States Code, to disallow a
prime contractor or subcontractor from submitting updated cost
or pricing data after the date of agreement on the price of a
contract.

Subtitle C--Industrial Base Matters

Sec. 831--Establishment of the Supply Chain Risk Management Integration
Cell

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to establish, not later than March 1,
2027, a Supply Chain Risk Management Integration Cell within
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial
Base Policy.

Sec. 832--Expansion of reverse engineering authority for prototype
projects

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 4022(e)(5)(B) of title 10, United States Code, to
expand the use cases for using other transaction authority for
reverse engineering.

Sec. 833--Competition requirement for certain munitions

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to introduce second sources for solid
rocket motors (SRM) of certain munitions. Further, the
committee underscores the importance of the SRM industrial
base. The committee has supported multiyear procurement (MYP)
authority for several critical munitions programs and has also
provided funding for existing and emerging SRM providers and
the SRM industrial base. The committee understands that the
Department of Defense is considering several options to meet
today's munitions demands.
The committee also directs the Secretary of Defense to
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April
1, 2027, including the following:
(1) An update on the MYP contract negotiations
between the Department and the producers of critical
munitions and the status of contract negotiations with
SRM providers; and
(2) An update on the options the Department is
pursuing to incentivize and encourage munitions
subcontractors to maintain elevated production levels
to meet overall munitions needs.

Sec. 834--Analyses of certain activities for action to address sourcing
and industrial capacity

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, acting through the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, to review: (1) Boron
carbide; (2) Copper foil; (3) Synthetic diamond; and (4)
Silicon carbide, to determine and develop appropriate actions
to maintain access to critical defense industry components and
materials and to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, on the analyses, recommendations, and actions
that come out of the review.

Sec. 835--Regulations applicable to wearing optional combat boots

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to issue regulations requiring that any
optional combat boots being sold at military exchanges be
certified by the combat boot quality assurance program
conducted by the relevant military service to ensure that the
combat boots meet regulations regarding durability, quality,
and uniform standards.

Sec. 836--Report on domestic nonavailability determinations granted for
critical materials

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to
provide a report, not later than May 1, 2027, to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the issuance of domestic nonavailability
determinations for strategic and critical materials covered by
sections 4863 and 4872 of title 10, United States Code.

Sec. 837--Limitation on availability of funds pending information on
the small unmanned aircraft system industrial base

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
obligation or expenditure of not more than 80 percent of the
funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available
for fiscal year 2027 for the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group,
and not more than 95 percent of Operation and Maintenance,
Defense-wide, funds for travel expenses for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, until the Department of Defense submits
to the appropriate congressional committees the reports
required under section 914(e)(1) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) and
section 162(c) of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement
and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
(Public Law 118-159).

Sec. 838--Energetics industrial base roadmap

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Director of the Joint Energetics Transition Office, in
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Base Policy and the Secretaries of the military
departments, to submit to the congressional defense committees,
not later than March 1, 2027, a roadmap for the future desired
state for the energetics industrial base.

Sec. 839--Supply chain, capability, and capacity study of high-demand
items in the textile industrial base

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to contract with a federally funded
research and development center to conduct a detailed
assessment of the textile industrial base providing uniform
items to the military services.

Sec. 840--Pilot program on providing subsidies for combat boots

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Army, not later than June 1, 2027, to
establish and implement a pilot program to provide subsidies
for the cost of certain combat boots to members of the Army
that receive a uniform allowance.

Sec. 841--Cross-functional team for the textile industrial base

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of
the military departments, to institute, not later than April 1,
2027, a cross-functional team on the textile industrial base to
improve supply chain stability and resiliency. The provision
also requires that the cross-functional team shall establish a
pilot program, no later than January 1, 2028, to revitalize
supply chains in the domestic textile industrial base.

Sec. 842--Assessing and addressing risk related to adversarial capital

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to designate, not later than March 1,
2027, within the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial
Base Policy, an office with primary responsibility for
identifying, assessing, monitoring, and mitigating risks
related to adversarial capital in the defense industrial base.

Sec. 843--Modifications to requirement for public reporting of Chinese
military companies operating in the United States

Sec. 844--Amendments to requirements pertaining to printed circuit
boards

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 4873 of title 10, United States Code, to include copper
clad laminate, copper foil, or glass as additional
restrictions.

Sec. 845--Report on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a
strategic partnership on defense industrial priorities between
the United States and Israel

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to submit a report with a plan, not later
than March 30, 2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives for the establishment
of a partnership between the Department of Defense and the
appropriate counterparts of the Government of Israel in order
to enhance market opportunities for United States-based and
Israel-based defense technology companies, among other
purposes.

Sec. 846--Prohibition on the use of Chinese-manufactured optical fiber
by the Department of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the Department of Defense from procuring, obtaining, or using
optical fiber and optical fiber cable that are produced,
manufactured, or assembled by the People's Republic of China.

Sec. 847--Promoting the United States drone industrial base

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 848(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92), to expand the components
that are limited from manufacture by covered foreign countries
or entities domiciled in a covered foreign country.

Sec. 848--Pilot program for domestic antimony and copper production for
defense applications

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to establish a pilot program to support
the recovery of antimony and copper as byproducts of mineral
production in the United States.

Sec. 849--Full accountability for Chinese military companies

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-
283) to: (1) Remove the requirement for a Chinese military
company to be located in the United States; (2) Extends the
sunset to 2035; (3) Requires rulemaking to implement; and (4)
Clarifies and expands certain definitions.

Subtitle D--Small Business Matters

Sec. 861--Department of Defense Mentor-Protege Program

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 4902 of title 10, United States Code, to make technical
corrections to the Department of Defense Mentor-Protege
Program.

Sec. 862--APEX Accelerator funding

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 4955(a) of title 10, United States Code, to increase
the funding caps for APEX Accelerators.

Sec. 863--Test program for negotiation of comprehensive small business
subcontracting plans

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 834(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189) by extending
the program to December 31, 2037.

Sec. 864--Application of the bona fide place of business to certain
contracts

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize,
for the purposes of a construction contract awarded by the
Department of Defense under section 8(a)(11) of section
637(a)(11) of title 15, United States Code, the geographic
requirement be deemed satisfied if the program participant
establishes a staffed, physical office in the geographic area
required not later than 60 days after the date of the contract
award.

Subtitle E--Other Matters

Sec. 871--Technical corrections related to National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 provisions

The committee recommends a provision that would make
technical corrections to various provisions of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-
60).

Sec. 872--Limitation on availability of funds pending implementation of
certain requirements relating to munitions

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
obligation or expenditure of not more than 90 percent of
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide, funds authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2027
for travel expenses for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional
defense committees the report required under section 364 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public
Law 119-60) and certifies that the requirement under paragraph
(9) of section 222c of title 10, United States Code, as added
by section 361 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026, has been met.

Sec. 873--Repeal of amendments providing for submission by subcontract
offeror of recent price history in satisfaction of cost or
pricing data requirements

The committee recommends a provision that would repeal the
amendment to section 3702(a)(3) of title 10, United States
Code, created by section 815 of the Servicemember Quality of
Life and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2025 (Public Law 118-159).

Sec. 874--Competitive procedures for certain pharmaceutical contracts

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that any contract awarded for
the purpose of pharmaceutical drug, active pharmaceutical
ingredients, or other pharmaceutical materials stockpiling,
manufacturing, onshoring, or supply chain expansion, is awarded
using competitive sourcing procedures.
The committee recognizes the importance of pharmaceutical
supply chain security and encourages the Department of Defense
to avoid single points of failure in the pharmaceutical supply
chains and to ensure market competition so servicemembers and
their families can be treated with high quality products.

Sec. 875--Enhancement of defense supply chain resilience and secondary
source qualification

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 865(f) of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement
and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
(Public Law 118-159) to create a process for an expedited
qualification panel and contractor incentives to provide rights
in technical data.

Sec. 876--Limitation pending Army conformance with portfolio
acquisition executive requirements

The committee recommends a provision that would limit
funding for the travel of the Office of the Secretary of the
Army to not more than 75 percent of the funds authorized by
this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2027 until
the Secretary of the Army certifies that all portfolio
acquisition executives of the Army are certified acquisition
officials.

Sec. 877--Procurement of medical countermeasures for overseas personnel
of the Department of Defense for acute radiation syndrome and
thermal burns

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the procurement of medical countermeasures to diagnose,
prevent, and treat acute radiation syndrome, cutaneous
radiation injury, and thermal burns. The use of a nuclear
device in an overseas conflict can cause acute radiation burns.
Medical technology is available to triage such injuries for
evacuation and further treatment and should be utilized to the
greatest extent possible.

Sec. 878--Procurements on behalf of the Department of Defense by the
Department of Veterans Affairs for planning, design, and
construction projects

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 801(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) by no longer requiring a
certificate of compliance for the planning, design, and
construction of projects in the case of the procurement of
property or services on behalf of the Department of Defense by
the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Sec. 879--Leasing of vessels, aircraft, and combat vehicles

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 3671(b)(1) of title 10, United States Code, to add an
accelerated delivery schedule as a valid rationale for
certifying a lease greater than 5 years.

Sec. 880--Prohibition on modems or routers acquisitions involving
entities owned or controlled by China

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the Department of Defense from acquiring any modem or router
manufactured or offered by China.

Sec. 881--Prohibition on television acquisitions involving entities
owned or controlled by China

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the Department of Defense from acquiring televisions
manufactured or offered by China.

Sec. 882--Prohibition for defense contractors providing sensitive
information related to synthetic biology to foreign entities of
concern

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit a
covered entity from providing a digital sequence of synthetic
DNA or RNA or other synthetic protein designed by humans or
artificial intelligence systems to a foreign entity of concern.

Sec. 883--Reporting on contractor operations related to China

The committee recommends a provision that would require
contractors performing on Major Defense Acquisition Programs to
disclose the entity's operations related to China.

Sec. 884--Ensuring Department of Defense contractor compliance with
disability hiring goals

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to conduct an audit of the compliance of
defense contractors with the 7 percent utilization goal for
employment of qualified individuals with disabilities
established by section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(29 U.S.C. 793).

Items of Special Interest

Accelerate report on perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substance-free
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protective
garments

The committee understands that perfluoroalkyl and
polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS)-free textile technologies can
provide new performance capabilities for individual Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) protective
equipment. Individual CBRN protection is a key part of
strategic deterrence against our adversaries. The committee is
concerned that the Department of Defense may not be able to
provide the servicemembers with advanced individual CBRN
protection equipment unless it accelerates efforts to acquire
and field PFAS-free textile technologies. In the Senate report
accompanying S. 2296 (S. Rept. 119-39) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, the committee requested
a briefing on ongoing efforts and a strategy to acquire PFAS-
free textile technologies for individual CBRN protective
equipment but has yet to receive the required briefing.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees,
not later than February 1, 2027, on the Department's assessment
to acquire PFAS-free textile technologies for individual CBRN
protective equipment as soon as feasible. The briefing should
include:
(1) Current efforts to secure the industrial base for
PFAS-free textile technologies for individual CBRN
protective equipment;
(2) A description of how advanced performance may
enable new CBRN doctrines that enhance survivability
and lethality in contested environments; and
(3) Any resources or legislative authorities
necessary or beneficial to ensure these new
technologies can be fielded by fiscal year 2028.

Acceleration of small attritable ground robotics capabilities

The committee is aware of strategic adversaries' rapid
adoption of scalable ground autonomous systems and the
operational challenges this presents to U.S. forces. Existing
investments and resources supporting ground autonomy
initiatives present opportunities to accelerate the deployment
of small autonomous ground vehicle (AGV) systems. The committee
encourages the Army to prioritize existing resources and
modernization investments to enable rapid acquisition pathways.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a briefing, not later than February 26, 2027, to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the Army's efforts to accelerate adoption of
ground autonomous capabilities. The briefing shall include:
(1) A capability investment strategy and
modernization roadmap to scale AGV and swarming
autonomy and transition emerging AGV technologies into
programs of record;
(2) An evaluation framework for attritable ground
systems, including small, medium, and large
classification standards modeled on unmanned aircraft
system standards, and metrics for operational
effectiveness and scalability;
(3) Plans to optimize portfolio resources to support
rapid experimentation, verification, and validation
aligned with combatant command priorities; and
(4) Efforts to leverage private capital and
nontraditional contractors, with priority for U.S.
manufacturers, to rapidly field capabilities.

Acquisition workforce metrics

The committee believes that strengthening accountability
for the Department of Defense acquisition workforce, including
program managers and contracting officers, is essential to
improving acquisition program performance, ensuring timely
deliveries, and safeguarding taxpayer resources. The committee
notes that an empowered acquisition workforce is necessary to
fully utilize the many acquisition authorities the Department
has been provided, and that high performing acquisition
professionals should be rewarded professionally.
However, the committee notes that oversight failures have
contributed to delays in sustainment, maintenance, and
modernization programs that directly affect operational
readiness. Audit findings frequently occur years after
oversight deficiencies take place, at which point responsible
personnel may have rotated to new assignments or separated from
service, limiting meaningful accountability.
The committee believes that as the Secretary of Defense
implements key performance objectives established under section
826 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2026 (Public Law 60-119) for the acquisition workforce, the
Department of Defense should create and maintain a formal
process for tracking the performance of individuals within the
acquisition workforce and assessing their performance against
the key performance objectives.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a
briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on
the implementation of section 826 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 including the
development of a performance tracking system for members of the
acquisition workforce. This briefing should also include an
update on implementing relevant findings and recommendations
from the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the
Government Accountability Office, and contract administration
and audit agencies. If the Portfolio Acquisition Executive
validates any deficiencies identified through oversight or
audit activities, the deficiencies should be documented and
reflected in the performance evaluations of the individuals
concerned.
The committee expects the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment to include a description of the
implementation of this tracking and accountability process in
the required semiannual reports to the congressional defense
committees.

Artificial intelligence-enabled biological threat detection

The committee recognizes the growing role of artificial
intelligence and advanced computational methods in changing the
landscape of biological threats and in strengthening defensive
capabilities for biological threat detection, characterization,
and mitigation, including through medical countermeasures. The
committee notes that research efforts supported by the
Department of Defense, including those undertaken by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, have advanced
artificial intelligence-enabled biological sequence analysis
capabilities with potential operational applications across
these mission areas.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees,
not later than March 31, 2027, on: (1) How advancements in
artificial intelligence and biotechnology are changing the
landscape and complexity of biological threats; (2) Practical
integration of artificial intelligence-enabled biological
threat detection and characterization tools into Department
biosurveillance, early warning, and operational decision-
support programs; (3) Barriers to the transition of such
capabilities from research and development efforts into
operational deployment; and (4) Acquisition or pilot pathways
available to accelerate the evaluation and the potential
deployment of such tools.

Biochemical sensing technologies for warfighter readiness and threat
detection

The committee recognizes that the ability to detect
physiological stress, injury, and exposure, as well as external
chemical and biological threats, in real time is increasingly
critical to warfighter readiness, operational safety, and
mission effectiveness. The committee is aware of ongoing
research and development efforts by the U.S. Army Combat
Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM), including DEVCOM
Army Research Laboratory and DEVCOM Chemical and Biological
Center, to develop real-time biochemical sensing technologies.
The committee further notes that expanding biochemical
sensing beyond currently fielded or studied indicators to
include additional biomarkers could significantly enhance the
Department of Defense's ability to assess warfighter readiness,
cognitive and physical performance, brain health, and exposure
to toxic industrial chemicals or chemical agents.
The committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy
and Programs to brief the congressional defense committees, not
later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's efforts to
develop, evaluate, and transition biochemical sensing
technologies for the detection of physiological biomarkers and
external environmental threats. The briefing shall include: (1)
An overview of Department of Defense research, development,
test, and evaluation activities related to robust and scalable
real-time biochemical sensing technologies; (2) A description
of ongoing and planned efforts to expand physiological
biomarker detection at the edge beyond current indicators; (3)
An assessment of how biochemical sensing technologies are being
developed or evaluated to detect external chemical and
biological threats; (4) A discussion of how the Department
envisions integrating internal biomarker sensing and external
threat detection data to support early warning, medical
response, force protection, and operational decision-making;
(5) An identification of the offices, laboratories, and program
elements responsible for advancing biochemical sensing research
and engineering; (6) A description of supply chain and
manufacturing considerations relevant to biochemical sensing
technologies; and (7) Planned investments and milestones to
mature, prototype, test, and transition biochemical sensing
technologies for both physiological monitoring and external
threat detection in operationally relevant conditions.

Bolstering critical minerals workforce with separating servicemembers

The committee is concerned that shortages in the domestic
workforce for mineral processing and critical minerals
separations continue to constrain U.S. production of materials
essential to defense systems. The Department of Defense has
made and is continuing to explore investments in critical
minerals mining, processing, refining, and recycling
capabilities. The committee is concerned that these efforts may
be limited by insufficient trained personnel in these advanced
fields. The separating members of the Armed Forces possess
technical experience highly relevant to mineral processing and
represent a potential underutilized workforce source for
domestic critical minerals opportunities.
The committee is aware of several ongoing workforce
development initiatives within the Office of Industrial Base
Policy. Accordingly, to encourage the advancement of a
servicemember transition pathway into the critical minerals
field, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Industrial Base Policy, in consultation with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, to
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than May 1,
2027, that includes, at a minimum:
(1) Potential opportunities for partnerships with
mining companies, mineral processing operators, mineral
recyclers, and academic institutions to recover or
conduct research into defense-relevant critical
minerals;
(2) Projected workforce needs for domestic recovery
and processing of defense-prioritized critical minerals
over the next 10 years;
(3) The feasibility of a transitioning servicemember-
focused workforce initiative for critical minerals
entities, including estimated costs and participant
throughput; and
(4) Potential opportunities for coordination with the
SkillBridge program, the Industrial Base Analysis and
Sustainment program, and the Manufacturing Technology
program.

Carbon black

The committee understands that carbon black is an essential
industrial input used in defense platforms, military vehicles,
aircraft tires, seals, hoses, coatings, plastics, and other
defense critical applications. Global carbon black supply
chains are concentrated in foreign countries, including
countries of concern, and domestic production of carbon black
is limited and has not significantly expanded in more than 5
decades. Given this, the committee is concerned that
disruptions in the supply of carbon black would pose a
significant risk to the defense industrial base.
Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Industrial Base Policy to provide a briefing to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, assessing
vulnerabilities in the domestic and global supply chains for
carbon black that are relevant to the defense industrial base.
The briefing shall include but not be limited to: (1) A
comprehensive assessment of current and projected defense
demand for carbon black across defense platforms, systems, and
sustainment activities; (2) An analysis of the risks associated
with reliance on foreign sources of carbon black, including
sources located in countries of concern; (3) An analysis of the
risks associated with supply disruptions, aging production
facilities, or limited domestic production capacity of carbon
black; and (4) Recommendations to strengthen domestic
production capacity and supply chain resilience for carbon
black.

Comptroller General review of commercial technology to support
contested logistics

The committee commends the Department of Defense for its
investments in commercial technology and in its efforts to
advance capabilities to support operating in a contested
logistics environment. The Department and the military services
have made significant investments aimed at retiring technical
debt and transitioning to modern, commercial-based finance,
logistics, and other business systems. The committee believes
that continuing these efforts is critical to improving the
Department's ability to operate in contested logistics
environments.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to submit a report to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than February 2, 2027, that analyzes:
(1) The Department's use of commercial technology,
business systems, and business practices to operate in
contested logistics environments;
(2) The extent to which the Department considers the
use of resilient logistics technology and business
systems to support contested logistics capability
instead of acquiring bespoke solutions;
(3) Opportunities to engage original equipment and
software manufacturers to maximize the investment of
the Department and military services in commercial
technology and business systems; and
(4) Options to hold prime contractors accountable to
maximize the use of commercial original equipment and
software business system manufactures.

Defense Civilian Training Corps

The committee continues to support the Defense Civilian
Training Corps (DCTC) as a talent development program that
aligns with the Department's acquisition transformation agenda
and provides an important pathway to attract top talent to the
Department of Defense (DOD). The committee appreciates the
effort by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)) and the Acquisition
Innovation Research Center (AIRC) to experiment, adapt, and
iterate over the past 3 years to build a DCTC talent
development prototype that can be scaled.
The committee notes a key lesson learned during the DCTC
prototyping phase. The universities that produce talent operate
largely independently from the DOD organizations that recruit,
hire, and employ talent, with different cycle times, resources,
and incentives. This disconnect reveals a talent valley of
death, which requires sponsorship between promising talent on
the one side and the integration and application of that
talent, at scale, to implement DOD priorities.
The committee intends for the DCTC to bridge this talent
gap, by extending talent development into post-secondary
education to meet specific Department needs and connecting that
talent with those in the DOD that need it. The OUSD(A&S) alone
cannot scale a talent development pipeline into the robust
factory needed to continuously produce new talent through
experiential and project-based learning. Pursuant to the
authority in section 2200g of title 10, United States Code, the
committee intends for the services to identify specific
universities as talent partners and for the AIRC to provide the
necessary talent development needed by specific DOD
organizations. Pursuant to the amendments made by section 823
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026
(Public Law 119-60), the services have the hiring authority
needed to bring on students as term employees during the
development phase and transition to full-time employees upon
graduation, if they meet expectations. The committee encourages
full use of this authority in partnership with the services to
develop new talent with critical thinking, digital fluency, and
a transformational mindset and to smoothly transition that
talent into the civilian workforce of the Department.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of the AIRC to provide a briefing to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
not later than March 1, 2027, on efforts by the OUSD(A&S), the
AIRC, and the services to bridge the talent valley of death
using the DCTC. The briefings shall include: (1) An explanation
of how the services use DCTC authority; (2) How the OUSD(A&S)
measures success; and (3) The annual Defense Acquisition
Workforce Development Account funding needed for the services
to conduct strategic planning and expansion of the DCTC talent
development program.

Design for manufacturing for munitions and energetics

The committee is pleased to note the Department of
Defense's (DOD) increased focus on munitions and energetics
production. However, the committee believes that as the
Department of Defense takes steps to increase munitions and
energetics production, the DOD should focus on incorporating
modern manufacturing processes to speed production and reduce
waste. This is particularly important as the Department of the
Army continues to modernize and expand the usage of the
arsenals, ammunition plants, and depots in the organic
industrial base. Modern manufacturing processes--such as design
simplification to minimize part counts and reduce reliance on
bespoke tooling, testing components at the lowest value state
to minimize scrap rates, prioritizing automation from the
beginning of the manufacturing design process, focusing on
building production lines that can be scaled to meet demand,
developing testing points along the manufacturing process to
prevent revisions, and others--have the potential to
significantly reduce both the cost and schedule of producing
munitions and energetic materials.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments
and the Joint Energetics Transition Office, to provide a
briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than March 31, 2027, on
the automation and efficiency of munitions production,
including:
(1) An assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness
of current munitions and energetics manufacturing
processes, with a focus on enumerating the manual
processes that exist and the justification for why
automation is not technically or economically feasible.
This assessment should delineate any roadblocks to
expanding the production lines if required;
(2) Recommendations to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of current munitions and energetics
manufacturing processes;
(3) An assessment of how automation and streamlined
processes are being incorporated into the Army's
organic industrial base;
(4) An update on the Joint Energetics Transition
Office's efforts to identify raw material waste during
the explosives manufacturing process and opportunities
for implementation; and
(5) Any other areas the Secretary identifies to
improve efficiency or capacity in munitions and
energetics production.

Digital modernization of the organic industrial base

The committee commends the military departments for ongoing
efforts to modernize the organic industrial base in
collaboration with the Nation's digital manufacturing
institute. The committee believes that sustained progress
toward a digitally enabled organic industrial base is essential
to improving readiness, expediting production and maintenance
timelines, and ensuring the Department of Defense's ability to
meet wartime munition demands.
The committee encourages the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the military departments to continue working with
the Nation's digital manufacturing institute to pilot scalable
approaches that improve supply chain awareness and support the
transition from peacetime operations to sustained wartime
production.

Enhancing military intelligence regarding biological threats

The committee recognizes the importance of developing and
accessing the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) related to
the threat that manmade and naturally occurring biological
agents pose to Department of Defense personnel and operations.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security to take steps necessary
to ensure that the biological weapons threat receives
appropriate prioritization within the defense intelligence
organizations by: (1) Directing that the next Defense
Intelligence Strategy specifically addresses the biological
threat; (2) Providing formal input during the development of
the National Intelligence Priorities Framework regarding
biological intelligence needs and information gaps; (3)
Ensuring that the threat of biological weapons is specifically
addressed by Military Intelligence Program planning,
programming, and budgeting activities; and (4) Identifying
areas where biological threat intelligence collection and
analysis activities should be adjusted to better align with
military intelligence priorities. Further, the committee
directs the Under Secretary to provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees regarding the implementation
of these actions, not later than March 31, 2027.

Ensuring preparedness for biological threats to servicemembers

The committee is concerned about emerging biological
threats, including anthrax, which remains the leading
biological agent threat posed by malign actors to
servicemembers stationed abroad and at home. The committee
recognizes the need for a robust and secure stockpile of
medical countermeasures to use in countering the effects of
anthrax, including both an antitoxin and a prophylactic and is
concerned that the Department of Defense and interagency
partners are not fully meeting requirements for this threat.
Investing in the sustainable stockpiling and forward-deployment
of anthrax countermeasures, including antitoxins, ensures the
health and safety of the warfighter and civilians and provides
deterrence value.
Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological
Defense, Policy and Programs to provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, on any strategic implementation plans enacted to ensure
adequate stockpiling, sustainability, and forward-deployment of
anthrax countermeasures by the Department and interagency
partners, including replenishment of current stocks consistent
with required levels.

Heavy press aluminum extrusions in national defense industrial base

The committee commends the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
for its execution of the Aluminum Wargame, the third wargame
conducted under the DLA Industrial Base Campaign of Learning
series, and the first wargame to focus on a critical mineral.
The committee notes that aluminum was appropriately selected
given its essential role across U.S. military platforms and
systems, as well as national security concerns regarding the
resilience and long-term stability of the domestic aluminum
industrial base.
Building on the insights generated through this wargame,
the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Industrial Base Policy, to submit an unclassified report to the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 1, 2027,
assessing the role of large-scale aluminum extrusion
capabilities in supporting current and projected national
defense requirements.
The report shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of the potential benefits to the
Department of Defense and the defense industrial base
of establishing a hard alloy aluminum extrusion press
within the United States, including implications for
defense-unique manufacturing, supply chain resilience,
surge capacity, and long-term sustainment of critical
weapons systems;
(2) An evaluation of the current domestic aluminum
production and extrusion landscape relevant to defense
applications, including geographic dispersion, regional
concentrations, identified gaps, and potential single-
point-of-failure risks;
(3) A comparative assessment of U.S. aluminum
extrusion press capabilities relative to those of
allied and competitor nations, including: the number,
size, and technical sophistication of large-scale
extrusion presses operated domestically versus abroad;
the extent to which foreign extrusion capacity supports
defense or dual-use applications; and risks to U.S.
defense supply chains associated with reliance on non-
U.S. extrusion capabilities;
(4) An assessment of workforce, permitting,
infrastructure, and energy considerations associated
with sustaining or expanding large-scale aluminum
extrusion press capabilities in the United States; and
(5) Identification of policy, acquisition, or
investment options the Department is undertaking or
considering to mitigate identified risks or gaps in
domestic aluminum extrusion capacity, including
potential public-private partnerships or other
industrial base support mechanisms, as appropriate.
The committee further directs that the report includes any
recommendations the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate
to ensure the United States maintains sufficient aluminum
extrusion press capacity to meet current and projected national
security requirements.

Implementation of Shared Classified Commercial Infrastructure Pilot
Program

The committee notes that section 874 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-
31) directed the establishment of a Shared Classified
Commercial Infrastructure Pilot Program to expand access to
classified facilities and networks for the defense industrial
base, academia, and non-traditional contractors. The committee
is concerned that the Department of Defense has not moved with
sufficient alacrity to implement this authority and has not
established the policies, timelines, organizational capacity,
or network access frameworks necessary to enable rapid
provisioning of classified connectivity at commercial
facilities. In particular, the committee is concerned that
delays in classified network delivery, limited use of
commercial transport, and the absence of standardized risk
management and reciprocity policies continue to constrain
participation by small businesses and emerging technology
firms.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Chief Information Officer of
the Department of Defense and the Director of the Defense
Information Systems Agency, to submit a report to the Senate
Armed Services Committee, not later than December 1, 2026,
detailing progress and remaining barriers to implementation.
The report shall include the following:
(1) A plan to accelerate classified network
provisioning processes, including streamlined
procedures for delivering classified connectivity to
Shared Classified Commercial Infrastructure locations
using commercial transport;
(2) Department-wide timeline targets and
accountability metrics for classified network delivery,
including maximum deployment timelines and reporting on
delays exceeding 30, 60, and 90 days;
(3) Pilot and scaling activities validating the
operational effectiveness, cybersecurity posture, and
cost efficiency of commercial transport paired with
Type 1 encryption;
(4) A plan to modernize classified transport
delivery, including the development and fielding of
software-defined network architectures;
(5) A unified risk management and reciprocity
framework for commercial-circuit-based classified
transport that reduces duplicative security
assessments;
(6) Policies governing access to classified
commercial cloud environments, including publication of
average account provisioning timelines; and
(7) Identification of an individual designated as
responsible for authorizing classified networks that
extend across the boundaries of multiple security
regions.

Legacy semiconductor industrial base

The committee continues to be concerned that a lack of
support for legacy semiconductors in the Department of Defense
(DOD) presents major supply chain challenges due to
obsolescence, limited manufacturing capacity, and national
security risks. Many chips in military systems were designed
decades ago and are no longer produced by original
manufacturers. As the semiconductor industry shifts to advanced
nodes, fewer foundries maintain the older process technologies
needed for defense applications, making sourcing legacy
semiconductors difficult and expensive. When chips become
unavailable, costly alternatives must be explored, requiring
significant time and resources.
To mitigate these risks, the Department is investing in
stockpiling critical components, expanding trusted foundry
partnerships, and developing reverse-engineered replacements.
However, sustaining military readiness in an era of shrinking
legacy chip availability will require long-term policy and
funding commitments to ensure secure and reliable semiconductor
access.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide a briefing
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on DOD
efforts to support the defense industrial base in sourcing
legacy semiconductors to support the readiness and sustainment
of military capabilities. This briefing shall include: (1)
Ongoing efforts by the Defense Microelectronics Activity to
reverse engineer and develop technical data packages for legacy
semiconductors no longer in production; (2) Efforts by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy to
find new potential suppliers of legacy semiconductors,
including when furnished with technical data by the Department;
(3) The potential for the DOD to stockpile critical
semiconductors; and (4) The potential for the use of the
Defense Production Act and Industrial Base Analysis and
Sustainment program to support investment into the defense
industrial base to support the production of legacy
semiconductors to meet DOD demand.

Manufacturing USA network

The committee appreciates the importance of the Department
of Defense (DOD) Manufacturing Technology Office, the
Manufacturing Innovation Institutes, and the broader
Manufacturing USA network for revitalizing the domestic defense
industrial base through supporting manufacturing ecosystems,
workforce development, and manufacturing technology development
and implementation.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
March 1, 2027, detailing the work of the DOD Manufacturing
Technology Office, the Manufacturing Innovation Institutes, and
the broader Manufacturing USA network in supporting the U.S.
defense industrial base. The briefing shall: (1) Describe the
relevant metrics and milestones by which the Department of
Defense measures their impact; (2) Lay out any barriers they
have confronted in achieving their mission; and (3) Note ways
in which the Congress can help support their work in
strengthening American manufacturing.

Materials workforce for munitions

The committee recognizes the indispensable role of advanced
materials, including composites, in munitions programs and is
concerned that current workforce pipelines are not producing
enough candidates with the requisite technical skills and
experience to satisfy munitions production staffing
requirements for modern composite fabrication. As munitions
demand continues to increase for long range precision fires,
counter unmanned aircraft systems, missile defense, and other
applications, shortfalls in a skilled workforce could hinder
production of these urgently required systems.
Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide a briefing
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on programs
to support the development, training, and retention of the
munitions industrial base workforce to support increased
production demand. This briefing shall include the Department's
use of existing authorities, such as those within the
Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Support program, to
close composite materials skills gaps and maintain a sufficient
pipeline of qualified technicians to meet modern composite
fabrication requirements for the munitions industrial base.

Medium caliber munitions industrial base

The committee recognizes that allowing new entrants into
the medium caliber portfolio could foster increased competition
and improve the long-term resilience of the industrial base.
Accordingly, the committee expects the Army to implement
the Medium Caliber Family Buy 4 (MCFB4) acquisition strategy in
a manner that enables new contractors to participate across the
full medium caliber portfolio, rather than through segmented
competition that limits scale and investment. The committee
emphasizes that MCFB4 should be executed in a way that
preserves the viability of new entrants, incentivizes private
capital investment, increases competition, reduces supply chain
risks, and strengthens surge readiness.

Pharmaceutical supply chains of Department of Defense

The committee remains concerned about the strength and
security of the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chains for
pharmaceutical materials based on findings from the report
required by section 860(a) of the James M. Inhofe National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-
263). Additionally, a DOD Inspector General report (Report No.
DODIG-2021-126) evaluated the Department's mitigation of
foreign suppliers in the pharmaceutical supply chain. The
Inspector General report concluded that:
(1) The Department did not mitigate the risks of
disruptions to its pharmaceutical supply chain, which
is reliant upon foreign suppliers;
(2) The Department did not have implementing guidance
on supply chain risk management for Department
material; and
(3) The Department's reliance on foreign suppliers
for pharmaceuticals is a public health, readiness, and
national security risk.
The resiliency of the pharmaceutical supply chain is
imperative for the health, well-being, and operational
advantage of the warfighter.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, to
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March
1, 2027, on the Department's implementation of the findings
described in the report published pursuant to section 860(a).
Specifically, the briefing shall include:
(1) Short-term risk mitigation efforts for
pharmaceuticals whose active pharmaceutical ingredients
are sourced from foreign entities of concern or have
been subject to supply chain disruptions;
(2) Ongoing Department efforts to work with relevant
stakeholders to encourage investment in domestic,
allied, and partner research and manufacturing in the
pharmaceutical space; and
(3) Department plans to partner with other federal
stakeholders on leveraging existing medical
countermeasure stockpiling to alleviate potential
supply chain disruptions and encourage investment in
domestic, allied, and partner manufacturing
capabilities.

Portfolio Acquisition Executive scorecards

The committee notes that the effectiveness of the
Department of Defense's acquisition enterprise depends on the
performance and accountability of its Program Acquisition
Executives (PAEs). The committee notes the Department's
utilization of performance scorecards as a tool to assess these
executive-level roles and the programs they oversee.
The committee is interested in how these scorecards provide
visibility into the defense acquisition lifecycle and ensure
rigorous oversight. Specifically, the committee emphasizes that
these evaluations should maintain a standardized focus on the
number and quality of technology transitions and insertions,
measurable improvements in user outcomes, and the timely
divestment of resources from non-performing efforts.
Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to provide an annual
report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, and
continuing through March 1, 2030, on the results of these
scorecards. Each report shall include, at a minimum:
(1) Aggregated data on the number and quality of
successful technology transitions and insertions
achieved;
(2) Metrics detailing measurable improvements in user
outcomes, including warfighter feedback, capability
effectiveness, and mission performance enhancements,
directly attributable to PAE-managed programs;
(3) Data on the identification, assessment, and
divestment of non-performing efforts, including
resources reallocated as a result of such divestments
and the resulting improvements in portfolio efficiency;
and
(4) Recommended improvements to the scorecard process
to better capture technology transition performance,
user outcome results, and divestment effectiveness
while enhancing data accuracy and executive
accountability.

Requirements for concurrent and rapid detection of biological and
chemical agents

The threat of aerosolized biological and chemical attacks
on our military's operational readiness and continuity of
operations is increasing. Aerosol biological and chemical
agents are both easy and inexpensive to produce and provide
adversaries with new ways to target critical U.S.
infrastructure. China continues to engage in biological and
chemical activities, and Russia continues to research and
deploy biological and chemical weapons capabilities--as seen in
Ukraine--in violation of the Biological and Chemical Weapons
Conventions. Renewed attention to this threat is vital,
especially for combatant commands.
Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological
Defense, Policy and Programs to brief the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the current and
future requirements for the procurement, deployment, and
maintenance of sensors capable of detecting biological and
chemical agents in operational environments rapidly and
concurrently.

Technologies for modernization of logistic yard operations

The committee recognizes the importance of improving the
efficiency, throughput, and resiliency of Department of Defense
logistics yard operations. Recent advances in artificial
intelligence, computer vision, sensor integration, and data
analytics have enabled commercial solutions capable of
providing real-time visibility of vehicles, equipment, cargo,
and material flow across complex logistics environments.
The committee notes that commercial technologies have
demonstrated the potential to improve asset utilization, reduce
congestion and delays, enhance safety, and support more
efficient logistics operations while minimizing infrastructure
requirements and implementation timelines.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Department of
Defense, including the Defense Logistics Agency and military
departments, to evaluate commercially available smart
technologies and identify opportunities to improve logistics
yard operations through the adoption of artificial
intelligence-enabled, software-defined capabilities.
The committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment, in coordination with the Director
of the Defense Logistics Agency and the Secretaries of the
military departments, to provide a briefing to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on the
Department's efforts to evaluate and deploy commercial smart
technologies to enhance and modernize logistics yard
operations. The briefing shall include an assessment of
operational benefits, implementation challenges,
interoperability considerations, potential applications across
defense logistics installations, and recommendations for
broader adoption where appropriate.

Uncrewed Aerial System acoustic detection

The committee is concerned that traditional radar and radio
frequency-based sensors generate excessive false positives in
urban environments and remain blind to certain autonomous
threats. The committee recognizes the success of agile rapid
prototyping, which has generated significant detection accuracy
improvements at operationally relevant ranges within a single
sprint effort.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a
briefing, not later than March 1, 2027, to the congressional
defense committees on the integration of Tactical Assault Kit
integrated acoustic sensors to improve detection and reduce
coverage costs per square kilometer.

TITLE IX--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

Subtitle A--Office of the Secretary of Defense and Related Matters

Sec. 901--Economic Defense Unit

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 4 of title 10, United States Code, to establish the
Department of Defense Economic Defense Unit.

Sec. 902--Extension of pilot program on capital assistance of Office of
Strategic Capital

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 149(e)(9) of title 10, United States Code, to extend
the pilot program on capital assistance to 2038.

Sec. 903--Requirement for professional code of conduct for certain
Department of Defense positions

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to develop, not later than August 1, 2027,
a professional code of conduct for individuals serving in
certain specified positions in the Department of Defense, or
adopt or modify an existing code of conduct to apply to those
positions, to ensure that individuals in those positions have
clear guidance on the ethics and standards governing their
professional behavior.
The committee is concerned that the use of new tools, such
as loans, loan guarantees, or equity stakes, may be leaving
some ambiguity in the application of conflict of interest rules
to the behavior of employees. The committee believes that a
code of conduct can help employees avoid any appearance of
impropriety or conflict of interest. With the high possibility
for distorting markets or corruption, the committee believes
that employees in these sectors need to be above reproach and
should go above and beyond when it comes to professional and
ethical standards of behavior. The committee is aware that in
the financial community there are professional codes of conduct
that financial advisors adhere to and that infractions can
result in legal ramifications as well as the loss of
professional certifications and standing. The committee
believes that the adoption of similar practices could be
beneficial for this nascent community of practice in the
Department.

Sec. 904--Redesignation of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness; reorganization of Assistant Secretaries of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 136 of title 10, United States Code, to redesignate the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Health Affairs.

Sec. 905--Responsibility for cyber matters in Office of Secretary of
Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would establish a
new Under Secretary of Defense for Cyber, Information, and
Networks, to be effective on January 20, 2029.

Subtitle B--Combatant Commands

Sec. 911--Unified combatant command for Africa

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a
unified combatant command for Africa.

Sec. 912--Unified combatant command for the Middle East and Central
Asia

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a
unified combatant command for the Middle East and Central Asia.

Sec. 913--Unified combatant command for Europe

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a
unified combatant command for Europe.

Sec. 914--Unified combatant command for North America

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a
unified combatant command for North America.

Sec. 915--Unified combatant command for Central America, South America,
and the Caribbean

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a
unified combatant command for Central America, South America,
and the Caribbean.

Sec. 916--Unified combatant command for the Indo-Pacific region

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, to establish a
unified combatant command for the Indo-Pacific region.

Sec. 917--Establishment of United States Robotic and Autonomous Systems
Command

The committee recommends a provision that would permit the
President, through the Secretary of Defense, to establish a
Robotics and Autonomous Systems Combatant Command.

Subtitle C--Other Department of Defense Organization and Management
Matters

Sec. 921--Organization of responsibilities relating to unmanned systems

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Navy to submit a plan, not later than 180 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, to consolidate
responsibilities for generating, organizing, training, and
equipping unmanned systems in the Department of the Navy--other
than Group 4 and Group 5 unmanned aerial systems--under a
single accountable official. The provision would also require
the Chief of Naval Operations to submit a plan for the
reorganization of the office, including an assessment
establishing a dedicated resource sponsor for robotic
autonomous systems. It also would require the Secretary of the
Air Force to submit a plan, not later than 180 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, to consolidate responsibilities
for Group 1 through Group 3 unmanned aerial systems under a
single accountable official. It would further direct the
Requirements and Resourcing Alignment Board to include a joint
working group on robotic autonomous systems responsible for
integrating investment strategies and identifying cross-service
efficiencies.
The committee notes the role of the Defense Autonomous
Working Group in providing leadership in fielding unmanned
systems. While the Defense Autonomous Working Group is a
helpful step toward aligning the military service efforts, it
does not replace the long-term need for the services to
organize themselves to prioritize the requirements, resourcing,
acquisition, force generation, and sustainment of unmanned
systems. Responsibilities for unmanned systems are dispersed
across the Navy's resource sponsors and type commands,
providing it a low priority in the budget, little opportunity
for rationalizing programs, and few opportunities as a career
path for sailors.

Sec. 922--Composition of cross-functional team for emerging threat
relating to anomalous health incidents; reports

The committee recommends a provision that would specify the
composition of the Department of Defense cross-functional team
established in section 910 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81) to
address national security challenges posed by anomalous health
incidents and would require quarterly reports on the activities
of the cross-functional team.

Sec. 923--Comptroller General review of Anomalous Health Incidents
Cross-Functional Team

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a review of
the Department of Defense Anomalous Health Incidents Cross
Functional Team.

Sec. 924--Establishment of Center for the Study of the National Guard

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 1 of title 32, United States Code, to establish a
Center for the Study of the National Guard. The committee notes
that research into the National Guard has historically been
difficult, requiring visits to over 58 separate archives,
museums, and military headquarters. Moreover, traditional Army
and Air Force research centers are not mandated to collect and
preserve non-federalized operations--such as title 32 and state
active-duty roles. These non-federalized roles, however, are
vital to domestic response efforts, like disaster relief and
civil unrest management. This effort would address significant
gaps in historical research while supporting the Department of
Defense's strategic planning and analysis of National Guard
missions.

Sec. 925--Civil-Military Coordination Center

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of Defense to maintain and continue operating the
Civil-Military Coordination Center until December 31, 2027.

Sec. 926--Modifications to unmanned aircraft system definitions for
Joint Interagency Task Force 401

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 199(h) of title 10, United States Code, to modify the
definition of unmanned aircraft systems.

Sec. 927--Maximizing funding efficiency for Homeland Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 199 of title 10, United States Code, to identify
interagency initiatives in Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems programs and align them with the Joint Interagency Task
Force 401 efforts.

Sec. 928--Prohibition on the reduction of funding for foreign language
training for members of the Armed Forces

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the reduction of funding for foreign language training for
members of the Armed Forces.

Sec. 929--Records retention requirement

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that all records related to U.S.
strikes in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific are retained in
accordance with existing records retention laws and policies
and may be transferred to the National Archives and Records
Administration under those policies.

Items of Special Interest

Feasibility study on alternate transportation methods for Crane Army
Ammunition Activity

The committee notes that the Department of Defense should
continue to look at more effective methods to transport
munitions.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Army to
provide a report, not later than April 16, 2027, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, on the feasibility and advisability of
developing alternative transportation methods for munitions
supplied by Crane Army Ammunition Activity. The report should
include:
(1) Current transportation methods used to support
the movement of munitions, materiel, and related items
to and from Crane Army Ammunition Activity;
(2) Existing transportation constraints,
vulnerabilities, and infrastructure deficiencies
affecting the efficiency of the transportation of
munitions, materiel, and related items to and from
Crane Army Ammunition Activity;
(3) The feasibility of alternative transportation
methods, including the improvement of existing airfield
infrastructure at Jefferson Proving Ground, the use of
military aircraft to transport munitions from Crane
Army Ammunition Activity, and any other transportation
method the Secretary determines appropriate;
(4) The costs and benefits associated with each
alternative transportation method identified under
paragraph three, including maintenance costs,
operational benefits, scalability, resilience, and
impacts on readiness;
(5) Any effects of such alternative transportation
methods on ammunition transport safety, explosive
safety requirements, security, and environmental
compliance;
(6) The extent to which such alternative
transportation methods could reduce delivery time for
munitions being transported from Crane Army Ammunition
Activity and could enhance the ability of the Crane
Army Ammunition Activity to meet current and projected
mission requirements;
(7) Any infrastructure investments, Federal or state
approvals, or intergovernmental agreements that may be
necessary to implement such alternative transportation
methods; and
(8) Any legislative, regulatory, or budgetary
barriers to the implementation of such alternative
transportation methods.

High-power microwave technologies for airfield and installation defense

The committee recognizes the growing threat posed by
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), including coordinated drone
attacks against military installations and airfields with
concentrated aircraft assets. The committee believes that high-
power microwave (HPM) technologies offer significant potential
to provide non-kinetic, scalable, and cost-effective protection
against massed UAS threats while reducing reliance on expensive
interceptor-based defenses.
The committee remains concerned that the Army has not
transitioned promising HPM capabilities into operational use
despite continued congressional support and the demonstrated
need to protect critical facilities and high-value aircraft
from emerging aerial threats. The committee further believes
that installations with dense concentrations of fixed-wing,
rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft represent attractive targets
for adversaries and require layered counter-UAS defenses that
include directed energy capabilities.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army,
in coordination with the Joint Interagency Task Force 401, to
provide a briefing, not later than April 5, 2027, to the
congressional defense committees on the feasibility and
operational utility of employing high-power microwave
technologies to defend airfields and other facilities with high
concentrations of aircraft. The briefing shall include at a
minimum:
(1) An assessment of current and projected UAS
threats to aviation facilities and other high-value
installations;
(2) The potential role of HPM systems within layered
air and missile defense architectures;
(3) Any operational lessons learned from
demonstrations, exercises, or experimentation involving
HPM technologies; and
(4) Planned investments, resourcing requirements, and
acquisition timelines for fielding HPM capabilities to
protect critical installations.

Plan for identification and adoption of cutting-edge global
technologies

The committee is encouraged by the efforts undertaken by
the Department of Defense to foster the growth of the defense
industrial base and to leverage the U.S. technology industry
for real-world battlefield advantage. Given the pace of global
innovation in dual-use and defense technologies, especially
related to ongoing global conflicts, there exists an
opportunity to strengthen the Department's capabilities by
identifying and leveraging technological innovations developed
by early-stage technology companies around the world while also
preventing such innovations and related intellectual property
from being co-opted by adversary nations. The committee
acknowledges that the Department has several different offices
and authorities that could be leveraged for partnership,
investment, and adoption of novel technologies and capabilities
with allies and partners. However, this approach does not
appear to be sufficiently coordinated nor aligned with other
activities of the Department and the broader interagency.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to brief the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on: (1) The
Department's existing authorities, activities, and offices
engaged in monitoring developments and making investments or
partnerships in early-stage technology companies, including
participation in any international organizations with allies
and partners; (2) Assessment for how the Department could
utilize the Office of Strategic Capital's authorities to
identify and leverage global technologies; (3) Any details on
existing efforts and plans to partner with private sector and
nonprofit investors to advance the Department's objectives and
prevent adversary access to global technologies; and (4) Any
recommended authorities, resources, and organizational
structure changes required to fully execute this mission.

Subsea and seabed warfare

The committee recognizes the importance of subsea and
seabed warfare capabilities as well as the necessity to
integrate those capabilities across the Joint Force.
Therefore, the committee directs the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Navy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict, and the combatant commanders to
submit to the congressional defense committees a report, not
later than March 31, 2027, on the current state of the subsea
and seabed warfare enterprise and the strategy for integrating
subsea and seabed warfare capabilities across the Joint Force
and interagency. At a minimum, the report shall include the
following:
(1) A description and assessment of current and
planned efforts to address the cross-functional nature
of the subsea and seabed warfare domain, including an
evaluation of how the Joint Staff is mitigating
challenges related to global demand for subsea and
seabed warfare-capable platforms and related
capabilities;
(2) A description of how current subsea and seabed
warfare mission development efforts and investments are
being prioritized to support National Defense Strategy
objectives on a global scale;
(3) An evaluation of the feasibility and advisability
of establishing a dedicated coordinating body or Joint
Task Force to oversee prioritization, investment,
campaigning, and execution of subsea and seabed warfare
operations;
(4) A summary of findings and lessons learned from
recent subsea and seabed warfare tabletop exercises and
planning, specifically addressing the coordination gaps
identified in these events; and
(5) Any other matters deemed relevant by the
Chairman.

TITLE X--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subtitle A--Financial Matters

Sec. 1001--General transfer authority
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $6.0 billion of
fiscal year 2027 funds authorized in division A of this Act to
unforeseen higher-priority needs in accordance with normal
reprogramming procedures. Transfers of funds between military
personnel authorizations would not be counted toward the dollar
limitation in this provision.
Sec. 1002--Department of Defense financial statement audit readiness,
reporting relief, and related reforms
The committee notes that Article I, section 9 of the
Constitution of the United States requires a regular statement
and account of the receipts and expenditures of public funds.
In addition, section 3515(a) of title 31, United States Code,
requires Federal agencies to prepare auditable annual financial
statements, while the Federal Financial Management Improvement
Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-208) requires Federal financial
systems to provide reliable information necessary to manage and
control Government costs. Despite these longstanding
requirements, the Department of Defense (DOD) has yet to
achieve an unmodified audit opinion on its consolidated
financial statements and continues to face significant
weaknesses in financial management, internal controls, and
business systems integration. However, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31)
requires the DOD to achieve an unmodified opinion by December
31, 2028.
The committee further notes that the Government
Accountability Office has continued to designate DOD financial
management as a ``high-risk'' area due to persistent challenges
in accountability, financial reporting, and cost control.
Although the DOD has made incremental progress since initiating
Department-wide financial statement audits in fiscal year 2018,
substantial deficiencies remain.
Accordingly, the committee recommends a provision that
would suspend certain recurring reporting requirements upon the
Department achieving an unmodified audit opinion on its
consolidated financial statements, while reinstating certain
reporting requirements should the Department subsequently fail
to maintain such an opinion. The provision would establish
enhanced qualification requirements for senior financial
management officials if the Department fails to achieve an
unmodified audit opinion by December 31, 2028. The committee
believes that requiring professional accounting credentials or
demonstrated experience overseeing organizations that achieved
unmodified audit opinions will strengthen financial leadership,
improve accountability, and accelerate remediation efforts.
In addition, the committee supports investments to improve
financial statement accuracy, strengthen auditability, and
reduce reliance on manual processes that contribute to audit
deficiencies. Therefore, the committee authorizes $250.0
million in Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide, and $250.0
million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation,
Defense-wide, for automation and artificial intelligence
initiatives intended to accelerate remediation efforts and
modernize financial management systems supporting the audit of
DOD financial statements.
The provision also would establish the position of a Deputy
Inspector General for Financial Statement Audits within the DOD
Office of Inspector General to strengthen the oversight of
independent financial statement audits and improve
accountability across the Department.
Sec. 1003--Expansion of requirements for submittal to Congress of
reports and justification books
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that unfunded priority lists are
provided to the congressional defense committees not later than
7 days after any ``covered document'' is delivered to the
Congress. The provision would define ``covered document'' to
include the military personnel (M-1), operation and maintenance
(O-1), revolving and management fund (RF-1), procurement (P-1
and P-1R), research, development, test, and evaluation (R-1),
and military construction (C-1) budget exhibits, as well as any
successor documents. The provision would also require the
Secretary of Defense to transmit the corresponding
justification books to the Congress not later than 7 days after
the submission of such covered documents.
Sec. 1004--Financial statements: opening balances for audit purposes
The committee recommends a provision that would establish
beginning balances for specific Department of Defense (DOD)
financial accounts. The committee believes this will better
position the DOD to pass an audit for accounts where historical
documentation is unavailable or insufficient.
Sec. 1005--Prohibition on provision of support to Department of
Homeland Security
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the obligation or expenditure of funds authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of
Defense for fiscal year 2027 for support to the Department of
Homeland Security until the Secretary of Defense certifies that
the Department of Defense has been reimbursed for support
provided to the Department of Homeland Security since October
1, 2025.

Subtitle B--Naval Vessels

Sec. 1011--Design and construction of new Global-class auxiliary
general oceanographic research ships
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Navy to submit to the congressional defense
committees, within 90 days of the date of the enactment of this
Act, a strategy for the design and construction of new Global-
class auxiliary general oceanographic research (AGOR) ships to
replace the AGOR 23-25 ships, including a cost estimate and
delivery timeline, with a report on the plan to follow 90 days
later.
Sec. 1012--Limitation on use of funds in the National Defense Sealift
Fund to purchase certain used foreign constructed vessels
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2218 of title 10, United States Code, to require the
Secretary of Defense to procure one new domestic sealift vessel
for the Ready Reserve Force for every used foreign constructed
vessel procured above the limitation of 12 foreign-constructed
vessels.
Sec. 1013--Modifications to vessel construction managers for the
construction of certain Navy vessels
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 129 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) to make the following
changes to vessel construction manager (VCM) authorities: (1)
Increase the number of vessels required under the Landing Ship
Medium program; (2) Direct the use of a VCM only if the
Secretary of the Navy decides to proceed with the light
replenishment oiler program; and (3) Expand the VCM authority
to include unmanned vessels and other vessels not included in
the battle force.
Sec. 1014--Development of industrial base for distributed submarine and
surface vessel shipbuilding
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional
defense committees, not later than October 1, 2027, on a plan
to expand cooperation and information sharing with state
university systems, community college systems, technical
college systems, and state educational agencies to scale
workforce development for distributed submarine and surface
vessel shipbuilding. It would also require the Secretary to
develop a strategy, not later than October 1, 2027, to
modernize the maritime industrial base supply chain by
optimizing its geographic reach to incorporate capable
suppliers and manufacturers beyond traditional centers in the
United States, as well as to develop a consolidated online
portal for suppliers.
Sec. 1015--Report and briefing on submarine tender requirements and
capacity
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of the Navy to submit a report, not later than March
1, 2027, and provide a briefing, not later than April 1, 2027,
to the congressional defense committees on the required number
of submarine tenders to support the current and planned force
structure of attack submarines, guided-missile submarines, and
ballistic missile submarines, particularly in the U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command area of responsibility.
Sec. 1016--Increase in minimum number of amphibious warfare ships
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 8062(b) of title 10, United States Code, to increase
the minimum number of amphibious warfare ships from 31 to 33
and require a report, not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, on plans of the Department of the Navy
to meet the goal of increased forward presence of amphibious
readiness groups.
Sec. 1017--Prohibition on retiring and decommissioning oceanographic
research vessels of the Navy
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
fiscal year 2027 funding from being used to retire or
decommission oceanographic research vessels.
Sec. 1018--Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 8039 of title 10, United States Code, related to the
Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair.
Sec. 1019--Construction of vessels in foreign shipyards
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 8679 of title 10, United States Code, to remove the
presidential waiver on the prohibition on the construction of
vessels in foreign shipyards. The provision would also provide
the authority to construct not more than two vessels of a bulk
fuel vessel class and a strategic sealift class of vessels,
provided that the construction ensures concurrent direct
capital investments in the United States maritime industrial
base resulting in subsequent ships being built in the United
States.
Sec. 1020--Limitation on authority of the Secretary of the Navy to
change vessel names
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 8662 of title 10, United States Code, to require that
only Senate-confirmed Secretaries of the Navy may rename a
vessel and only if justified with a notification to the
Congress 30 days before such a vessel is renamed.

Subtitle C--Counterterrorism

Sec. 1021--Extension of prohibition on use of funds for transfer or
release of individuals detained at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1033 of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232), as
most recently amended by section 1032 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60), to
extend through December 31, 2027, the prohibition on the use of
funds provided to the Department of Defense to transfer or
release individuals detained at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States.
Sec. 1022--Extension of prohibition on use of funds to construct or
modify facilities in the United States to house detainees
transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1034(a) of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232), as
most recently amended by section 1033 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60), to
extend through December 31, 2027, the prohibition on the use of
funds provided to the Department of Defense to construct or
modify facilities in the United States to house detainees
transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.
Sec. 1023--Extension of prohibition on use of funds for transfer or
release of individuals detained at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to certain countries
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1035 of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232), as
most recently amended by section 1034 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60), to
extend through December 31, 2027, the prohibition on the use of
funds provided to the Department of Defense to transfer or
release individuals detained at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to certain countries.
Sec. 1024--Extension of prohibition on use of funds to close or
relinquish control of United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1036 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91), as most recently amended
by section 1035 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60), to extend through the end
of fiscal year 2027 the prohibition on the use of funds
provided to the Department of Defense to: (1) Close or abandon
United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; (2)
Relinquish control of Guantanamo Bay to the Republic of Cuba;
or (3) Implement a material modification to the Treaty between
the United States and Cuba, signed in Washington, D.C., on May
29, 1934, which modification would constructively close United
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Subtitle D--Miscellaneous Authorities and Limitations

Sec. 1031--Prohibition on use of funds to support entertainment
projects with ties to the Government of the People's Republic
of China
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act to be made
available for providing active and direct support to any film,
television, or other entertainment project if the Secretary of
Defense has demonstrable evidence that the project has
complied, or is likely to comply, with a demand from the
government of China or the Chinese Communist Party to censor
content of the project in a material manner to advance the
national interest of China.
Sec. 1032--Waiver authority for limitation on live fire trauma training
The committee recommends a provision that would modify
section 1050 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) to provide a waiver
authority in specified circumstances, with associated reporting
requirements.
Sec. 1033--Prohibition on availability of funds for removal of Army
prepositioned stocks from Europe
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
any funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or
otherwise made available to be used to transport Army
Prepositioned Stock-2 (APS-2) equipment, so assigned as of
March 1, 2026, outside of the European area of operations for
the purposes of maintenance or divestment.
The committee is concerned by the lack of priority placed
on the build out and refurbishment of APS-2 to meet U.S.
deterrence and defense requirements in the European theater. We
strongly encourage the Army to invest adequate funds in such
efforts as expeditiously as possible.
Sec. 1034--Implementation of National Transportation Safety Board
recommendations for Department of Defense
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to implement Department of Defense-related
recommendations included in the National Transportation Safety
Board report dated January 27, 2026, and entitled, ``Midair
Collision over the Potomac River PSA Airlines Flight 5342,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) RJ Aviation CL-600-2C10
(CRJ700) and US Army Priority Air Transport Flight 25, Sikorsky
UH-60L'' (Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02), as the
Secretary of Defense determines appropriate and practicable.
Sec. 1035--Modification of support of special operations for irregular
warfare
The committee recommends a provision that would modify
section 127d of title 10, United States Code, to increase the
level of authorized support and to make changes to the
notification requirements. The provision also includes a
technical amendment to section 130g of title 10, United States
Code.
Sec. 1036--Designation of southwest land border activities, support,
and operations as named operation
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to designate activities, support, and
operations conducted by the Department of Defense in support of
civil authorities at the southwest land border as a named
operation.

Subtitle E--Studies and Reports

Sec. 1041--Threat assessment regarding unmanned aircraft systems at or
near the international borders of the United States
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Commander, U.S. Northern Command: (1) To conduct a threat
assessment on: (a) the occurrence of unmanned aircraft systems
operated at or near an international boundary of the United
States by a malign actor; and (b) the adequacy of Federal
agencies to identify, assess, and mitigate those threats in
coordination with relevant agencies; and (2) To produce a
report for the congressional defense committees on the findings
of that assessment with any recommendations for clarifying the
authorities and responsibilities of Federal agencies and any
resource needs.
Sec. 1042--Extension of Afghanistan War Commission
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1094(e)(2)(A)(ii)(I) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81) to
grant the Afghanistan War Commission an additional year to
complete its report.
Sec. 1043--Extension of briefing requirement regarding civil
authorities at the Southwest border
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1070 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) by
extending the briefing requirement regarding civil authorities
at the southwest border through December 31, 2028, and
expanding the requirement to include a report on the costs
associated with the assistance provided by the Department of
Defense to the Department of Homeland Security every 90 days
and annually.
Sec. 1044--Drone posture review
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to conduct a drone posture review for
uncrewed aerial, ground, surface, and undersea vehicles and
their enabling systems in order to identify capability gaps and
vulnerabilities, and submit a report to the congressional
defense committees not later than March 1, 2027.
Sec. 1045--Quarterly reports on unmanned aerial system incursions over
military installations, sensitive sites, and the southern
border
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Americas Security Affairs to submit quarterly reports to the
congressional defense committees on unmanned aerial system
incursions over military installations, sensitive sites, and
the southern border until December 31, 2031.
Sec. 1046--Report on progress on implementation of Department of
Defense instruction on civilian harm mitigation and response
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, not later than March 15, 2027, to provide
a report to the congressional defense committees on the
progress made to fulfill the requirements under section 1082 of
the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) and Department of Defense
(DOD) Instruction 3000.17 relating to civilian harm mitigation
and response.
The committee recognizes that the U.S. military goes to
great lengths to prevent and mitigate civilian harm in U.S.
military operations. DOD Instruction 3000.17 directed a number
of actions to support the Department's ongoing work to prevent
and address civilian harm. The committee is concerned that
recent efforts to reorganize and reallocate resources within
the Department have impacted the Department's ability to meet
the requirements of section 184 of title 10, United States
Code, to operate a Civilian Protection Center of Excellence and
to implement DOD Instruction 3000.17.
Sec. 1047--Report on transfer of property by Department of Defense
The committee recommends a provision that would require a
report to the congressional defense committees every 180 days
regarding the transfer of any controlled or non-controlled
property by the Department of Defense pursuant to section 2576a
of title 10, United States Code.
Sec. 1048--Oversight of Department of Defense rules of engagement
The committee recommends a provision that would require an
annual report on the rules of engagement authorized by the
Department of Defense.
Sec. 1049--Strategy to address intelligence-gathering shortcomings in
area of responsibility of United States Africa command
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Commander, U.S. Africa Command, in consultation with the head
of any other relevant Federal agency, as appropriate, to submit
to the congressional defense committees a strategy, not later
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to
address intelligence gathering shortcomings in the area of
responsibility of the U.S. Africa Command.

Subtitle F--Equity Investments and Related Matters

Sec. 1051--Authority for equity investments by Office of Strategic
Capital
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 149 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the
authority for equity investments under the Office of Strategic
Capital.
Sec. 1052--Ownership review for equity investments
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 149 of title 10, United States Code, by adding a new
section which would require the Secretary of Defense to conduct
a review of the ownership structure of an entity, including any
potential conflicts of interest with U.S. Government officials,
and provide this review to the congressional defense committees
before obligating or disbursing any funds for an equity
investment.
Sec. 1053--Notifications with respect to debt and equity investments
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 149 of title 10, United States Code, to insert a new
section requiring notifications with respect to debt and equity
investments.
The committee notes the importance of robust and clear
communication between the Department of Defense and the
Congress on investments the Department is making in the defense
industrial base, especially when such investment could distort
markets or have potentially harmful long-term consequences.
However, the Department has not been forthcoming on providing
information to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and the House of Representatives on equity investments made by
the Department in the defense industrial base in a timely
manner. Without this information, the committees are unable to
assess the merits of individual deals or the use of equity as a
tool for supporting the industrial base. The committee expects
the Department to be forthcoming and timely in responding to
congressional requests for additional information regarding
these investments.
Sec. 1054--Modifications to authorities of Industrial Base Fund
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 4817 of title 10, United States Code, to clarify
authorities of the Industrial Base Fund.
Sec. 1055--Briefings on Economic Defense Unit; limitation on use of
funds
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide quarterly briefings to
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, starting not later than January 31, 2027, on
the activities of the Economic Defense Unit. The provision
would also limit the use of funds appropriated by this Act, any
previous Act, or otherwise made available to the Department of
Defense for the Economic Defense Unit or any activities of the
Economic Defense Unit until the Deputy Secretary of Defense
provides the first briefing required by this section, the
Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense
committees an ownership review of all companies in which the
Department of Defense holds equity, and the Secretary of
Defense certifies to the congressional defense committees that
the Department of Defense does not hold, and does not have the
option to hold, any seat on the board of directors or any other
form of voting representation or control in any entity in which
the Department holds equity.
Sec. 1056--Approval authority for expenditures from Industrial Base
Fund
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 4817 of title 10, United States Code, to require that
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
be the authority to review and approve all expenditures from
the fund of less than $75.0 million.
Sec. 1057--Quarterly briefings on Business Operators for National
Defense (BOND) Program
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to provide to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than January 31, 2027, and every 90 days thereafter until
January 31, 2029, a briefing on the activities of the Business
Operators for National Defense Program. The provision would
also limit the use of funds obligated or expended by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense for the Program until the first
briefing has been provided.

Subtitle G--Other Matters

Sec. 1061--Extension of admission to Guam, Wake Island, and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for certain H-2B
nonimmigrants
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 6(b)(1)(B) of the Joint Resolution titled, ``A Joint
Resolution to approve the `Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the
United States of America', and for other purposes'' (48 U.S.C.
1806(b)(1)(B)), approved March 24, 1976, by extending the
deadline for certain nonimmigrant H 2B workers to 2031.
The committee notes that this provision would support the
realignment of U.S. forces to Guam by addressing limited
workforce availability in Guam. The committee understands that
current labor market conditions are constrained by recovery
from Typhoon Mawar and that, without this provision,
construction costs for the Department of Defense will increase
due to labor shortages as well as degraded readiness, since
construction would also be delayed. Finally, the committee
understands that lead times are crucial to planning and cost
estimates for contractors. Should an additional extension be
necessary, the committee strongly encourages the Department of
Defense to begin engagements with the Congress, specifically
the committees of jurisdiction, not less than 3 years before
the authority expires.
Sec. 1062--Notification to congressional defense committees of combat
wounded in action
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary concerned to provide the congressional defense
committees notification of any member of the Armed Forces
wounded in action in a theater of combat within 24 hours, along
with a brief description of the incident without personally
identifiable information.
Additionally, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than April 1, 2027, identifying any lessons learned from
previous wounded in action notification processes, including
any potential improvements to notification procedures during
combat operations during Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring
Freedom, and Freedom Sentinel.
Sec. 1063--Americas Defense Initiative
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to establish an Americas Defense
Initiative, not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, to carry out prioritized activities to
enhance the defense and security of the United States, counter
transnational criminal organizations and malign foreign actors,
and strengthen the capacity of partner nations in the Western
Hemisphere. The provision would also require that, not later
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
annually thereafter, the Secretary, in consultation with the
Commander, U.S. Southern Command, submit to the congressional
defense committees a report on future-year activities and
resources of the Initiative and include a detailed budget
display for the Initiative in the Department of Defense budget
materials submitted to the Congress. Additionally, the
provision would require the Secretary, not later than March 1,
2027, and annually thereafter, to provide to the congressional
defense committees a briefing on the budget proposal for and
programs of the Initiative, including the budget display
information for the applicable fiscal year.
Sec. 1064--Briefings on homeland defense
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in
coordination with the U.S. Northern Command and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to jointly brief the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
every quarter on the status of Department of Defense planning
for, and implementation of, core Homeland defense priorities,
including plans for responding to a major attack on the
Homeland in the context of military operations in other areas
of responsibility.
Sec. 1065--Independence of Stars and Stripes
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to ensure the independence of the Stars
and Stripes publication.
Sec. 1066--Identification, assessment, and mitigation of critical
defense sites
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, to designate an existing or new
office or official within the Department of Defense to lead the
identification, assessment, prioritization, and mitigation of
risks to critical defense sites in the defense industrial base,
including privately owned or commercially operated facilities.
The provision would further require that, not later than 180
days after such designation, the responsible office compile and
maintain a classified list of such sites and rank them by the
potential impact on national security if disrupted. Not later
than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary would be required to submit to the congressional
defense committees a report that includes the list and
prioritization of sites, an unclassified definition of ``single
point of failure,'' an assessment of current protection levels
and gaps, a description of associated national security risks,
and a path forward with options, costs, recommended
authorities, and implementation timelines, with annual updates
for 5 years.
The committee recognizes that the defense industrial base
relies on privately owned facilities and capabilities that are
essential to military production, sustainment, and readiness
and is concerned that certain sites may constitute single
points of failure whose disruption--whether by physical attack,
unmanned aircraft systems incursions, sabotage, or other
threats--could have catastrophic consequences with no readily
available substitutes. The committee is further concerned that
the Department of Defense has not clearly assigned
responsibility for addressing these risks and that existing
efforts do not comprehensively extend to privately owned
defense industrial base sites. Accordingly, the committee
believes a comprehensive approach is required to define,
identify, prioritize, and mitigate these vulnerabilities and
improve the resilience and security of critical defense sites.
Sec. 1067--Administrative support for commissions
The committee recommends a provision that would include
technical fixes to congressionally authorized commissions to
permit the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate
to provide resources to those commissions.
Sec. 1068--Requirement to assign conventional names to critical
munitions
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
service chiefs to identify critical munitions under their
management and, not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, to assign each a clear, conventional
English-language name in place of acronyms or alphanumeric
designations. Further, the committee directs the Chief of Staff
of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff
of the Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the
Chief of Space Operations to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
for 2 years, detailing the munitions reviewed, the names
assigned, the rationale for each name, the associated costs,
and the incorporation of operational feedback.
The committee intends these names to be easily understood
and suitable for operational use and training. The provision
would require coordination across the Department of Defense to
ensure consistency and avoid conflicts, with the Deputy
Secretary of Defense resolving any disputes over management
responsibility.
Sec. 1069--Technical corrections to National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2026
The committee recommends a provision that would make
technical corrections to three provisions in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-
60).
Sec. 1070--Development of cognitive warfare strategy
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to develop and submit to the congressional
defense committees, not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, a comprehensive strategy for
cognitive warfare for the Department of Defense.
Sec. 1071--Notification requirements for sensitive military operations
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 130f(a) of title 10, United States Code, to require the
Secretary of Defense to submit a written notification to the
congressional defense committees not later than 7 days
following a sensitive military operation. The provision would
also make other clarifying changes to the existing notification
requirements.

Sec. 1071A--Declassification guidance for Department of Defense
original classification authorities

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, to issue written guidance for the ad
hoc declassification of Department of Defense information by
Department of Defense original classification authorities.

Sec. 1072--Post-government employment restrictions applicable to
certain senior military officers and senior civilian employees
of the Department of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91) to synchronize the post-
government restrictions included in this section with the
existing criminal post-government employment statutes while
maintaining the extended post-government employment ``cooling
off period'' restriction for the Department of Defense's most
senior personnel.

Sec. 1073--Repeals of existing reporting requirements

The committee recommends a provision that would repeal
certain required briefings and reports.

Sec. 1074--Report and briefing on Worldwide Expeditionary Multiple
Award Contract Territorial Integrity of the United States
contract

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to submit a report and briefing on the use
of the Department of Defense's Worldwide Expeditionary Multiple
Award Contract Territorial Integrity of the United States
contract designed to expedite the award process for
construction and operation of detention facilities.

Sec. 1075--Documentation of verbal approval of requests for assistance

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1707 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92) to expand the reporting
requirement to apply to Requests for Assistance from all
Federal agencies, and to require that all approvals of Requests
for Assistance are documented in writing and transmitted to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.

Sec. 1076--Increase of the Working Capital Fund, Capital Investment
Program threshold

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2208(k)(2) of title 10, United States Code, by
increasing the Capital Investment Program threshold from
$250,000 to $500,000.

Sec. 1077--National Guard Rural Revival and Modernization Plan

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Army to develop a comprehensive strategy, not
later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, to
optimize Army National Guard readiness, force posture, and
infrastructure in remote or isolated areas to include the
Arctic.

Sec. 1078--Redesignation of the Department of Defense as the Department
of War

The committee recommends a provision that would amend the
name ``Department of Defense'' to ``Department of War''
wherever it occurs in titles 10, 32, and 37 of the United
States Code.

Sec. 1079--Service-wide enterprise strategy for human performance

The committee recommends a provision that would require
each Secretary of a military department to establish, not later
than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, a
service-wide human performance strategy to identify
requirements and policies for the acquisition and use of human
performance technologies and services.

Sec. 1080--Records preservation processes for certain at-risk Afghan
allies

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to establish a process by which an
individual may apply to the Secretary of Defense for
classification as an Afghan ally.

Sec. 1081--Prohibition on covered transactions involving prediction
market contracts

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
members of the Armed Forces, civilian employees of the
Department of Defense, and employees of entities that contract
with the Department of Defense from using material non-public
information derived from their position as a means for making a
profit on a prediction market contract. The provision also
requires a report by the designated agency ethics official to
the Secretary of Defense on any transactions covered by this
prohibition.

Sec. 1082--Prohibition on use of prediction markets by personnel of the
Department of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to issue regulations prohibiting members
of the Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department of
Defense (DOD) from entering into transactions on prediction
markets that relate to various matters associated with the
activities of DOD and its subordinate components. The
regulations would also create similar prohibitions to be
included in contracts governed by the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement.

Sec. 1083--Ban on bets on military operations

The committee recommends a provision that would make it
unlawful for any person to place, accept, or facilitate the
placement or acceptance of a wager regarding a military
operation. The provision would also amend sections 1952 and
1955 of title 18, United States Code, section 5362 of title 31,
United States Code, and section 5c of the Commodity Exchange
Act (7 U.S.C. 7a-2) to make it unlawful for any commodity
exchange market to facilitate exchanges based on U.S. Armed
Forces military operations.

Sec. 1084--Universal guidance on remote and isolated installation
designations

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, not later than 12 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act, to issue guidance applicable to
all military departments establishing a standardized definition
and tiered classification system for determining the remote and
isolated designation status of military installations for the
purposes of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation and resale;
workforce shortages; providing critical services to members and
families; and infrastructure.

Sec. 1085--Declassification of information concerning United States
personnel classified as prisoner of war or missing in action
during certain conflicts

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to declassify or make such information
available for family members to review any record, live-
sighting report, or other information in the custody of the
Department of Defense that relates to the location, treatment,
or condition of any personnel classified as prisoner of war or
missing in action from World War II, the Korean War, or the
Vietnam War.

Sec. 1086--Requirement for markings on lethal military platforms

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the Secretary of Defense from employing a manned platform with
offensive lethal weapons capabilities to conduct an attack if
such platform does not include markings to signify its
affiliation with the U.S. Armed Forces, and to distinguish
itself from the civilian population, equipment, or platforms
when conducting an attack. The provision includes a rule of
construction that specifies that this prohibition shall not
apply to the employment of a manned platform with integrated
weapons capabilities of a purely defensive character.

Sec. 1087--Extension of National Defense Strategy Commission

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize a
1-year extension of the National Defense Strategy Commission
established in section 1095(e) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60).

Sec. 1088--Prohibition on use of funds for transfer of individuals
located at Camp As Sayliyah

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the funds that are authorized to be appropriated for the
Department of Defense to be used to transfer Afghan nationals
housed at Camp As Sayliyah to Afghanistan. The provision
includes a waiver for individuals for whom there is pre-
existing derogatory information that would preclude that
individual from settling in the United States or Qatar.

Sec. 1089--Analysis of force requirements for alternative warfighting
scenarios

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Program Evaluation Competitive Analysis Cell and the Director
of the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to provide a
briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than 270 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, on force structure
requirements for alternative warfighting scenarios to include
protracted and simultaneous conflicts in not fewer than two
geographic combatant commands.

Sec. 1090--Guidance on the treatment of claims under the HAVANA Act

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, to issue guidance on the treatment
of claims under the HAVANA Act (Public Law 117-46) with respect
to the inclusion of current and former members of the U.S.
Armed Forces.

Sec. 1091--Assessment of Department of Defense phosphate supply chain
vulnerabilities; related land exchange authorization

The committee recommends a provision that would: (1)
Require the Secretary of Defense to complete a comprehensive
assessment of the vulnerabilities in the Department of Defense
phosphate supply chain; (2) Authorize the use of certain non-
Federal land in Salt Lake City, Utah, for valid public purposes
and requirements; (3) Require the Secretary of the Interior,
subject to the availability of appropriations, to complete the
Continental Divide National Scenic Trail as a continuous route;
and (4) Authorize a withdrawal of certain Bureau of Land
Management land in New Mexico.

Sec. 1092--Plan for domain awareness at the southern land border

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to develop and submit to the congressional
defense committees a plan for the Department of Defense to
contribute to a common operating picture to improve domain
awareness on the southern land border.

Sec. 1093--Prohibition on implementation of any policy that alters the
requirements for chaplains to display visible officer rank on
military uniforms

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the implementation of any policy of the Department of Defense
that would alter the requirements for chaplains to display
visible officer rank on military uniforms.

Items of Special Interest

Base defense modernization

The committee recognizes the critical and growing need for
the protection of military installations from full-spectrum,
all-domain threats. The committee notes that the proliferation
of low-altitude, small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) presents
an immediate, asymmetric risk to defense critical
infrastructure. Industrial base installations present a unique
security challenge: they possess vast physical footprints that
are highly vulnerable to intrusion, infiltration, and aerial
surveillance, yet they are typically secured by relatively
small, manned security forces. To mitigate these
vulnerabilities, the Department of Defense should transition
from a reliance on outdated surveillance systems toward
integrated security architectures.
The committee notes that recent advancements in commercial
technology have demonstrated the immediate availability and
efficacy of various platforms and enhanced capabilities such as
leveraging existing infrastructure to integrate wide-area
surveillance tools, including radar, Light Detection and
Ranging, unattended ground sensors, and non-lethal deterrents.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Army to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services
of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
April 1, 2027, on the Army's plans to address the full spectrum
of all-domain threats to its military installations. The
briefing shall include:
(1) An operational assessment and after action review
of the Lake City Army Ammunition Plant pilot program
conducted in April 2026;
(2) A prioritized list of high-value Army
installations, ammunition plants, and depots designated
where this capability could be fielded; and
(3) A technical evaluation of incorporating
prioritized follow-on capability updates, including
acoustic UAS detection, open-source intelligence feed
integration, and advanced seismic sensors.

Comptroller General assessment of antisemitism training within
Department of Defense

The committee notes that a professional military workplace
free from antisemitism strengthens trust, morale, and mission
effectiveness, and that antisemitism threatens unit cohesion,
undermines command authority, and erodes military readiness.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to conduct a review of the Department of
Defense's antisemitism training applicable to members of the
Armed Forces and civilian employees of the Department. The
review should assesses the status and efficiency of
antisemitism training within the Department, including:
(1) An identification of actions taken by the
Department to create an environment free of
antisemitism;
(2) An accounting of any antisemitism training in the
previous 5 years that has been provided to members of
the Armed Forces and civilian employees of the
Department; and
(3) Any other items the Comptroller General deems
appropriate.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
provide a report on their findings to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than March 1, 2027.

Comptroller General review of security clearance due process and
transparency

The committee believes that a robust and efficient security
clearance process is vital to maintaining a high-quality
national security workforce and enabling the mobility of that
workforce across the defense and intelligence enterprises.
However, the committee is concerned about impediments to that
mobility. In particular, the committee is concerned about the
transparency and consistency of due process protections,
including rights to an appeal following clearance revocation or
suspension, in the security clearance process, particularly for
government personnel with eligibility to access Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI) within the intelligence
community (IC).
The committee is also concerned by descriptions of
instances in which outstanding adjudicative issues are not
resolved and the related effects they can have on the careers
of government personnel attempting to transfer between or
within the IC and the Department of Defense (DOD), particularly
for personnel with eligibility to access SCI. The committee
further notes inconsistencies in the due process protections
and rights to an appeal following clearance revocation or
suspension available to government personnel at some agencies
compared to contractor and other personnel at the Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals, as well as a lack of
transparency regarding when personnel are informed of
outstanding adjudicative issues with their clearances.
Finally, the committee would like to better understand the
due process protections for government personnel who receive an
adverse determination with respect to their eligibility to
access SCI.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to conduct an assessment of the processes,
policies, and transparency of SCI determinations within the DOD
and the IC. The assessment should include: (1) An evaluation of
the effect of unresolved adjudicative issues on personnel
mobility; (2) The consistency of due process protections for
personnel who experience unresolved adjudications or clearance
revocations or suspensions across the government; (3) The
timelines for resolving issues; and (4) Any additional matters
the Comptroller General deems relevant.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
provide a briefing, not later than March 31, 2027, to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the congressional intelligence committees,
with the results of the review to follow in a mutually agreed
upon format and timeframe.

Comptroller General review of sensitive activities coordination and
integration

The committee notes that U.S. Special Operations Forces
play a key role in establishing access in sensitive areas to
support critical military objectives. Coordinating and
synchronizing policies and oversight mechanisms for these
efforts across the national security enterprise is a
challenging task. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has
taken steps to develop a coordinated approach between the
Department of Defense (DOD) and the Intelligence Community
(IC), yet challenges to coordinating and synchronizing policies
and oversight mechanisms for these efforts remain. The Congress
has directed further action to institutionalize these
coordination and oversight efforts.
The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United
States to assess the DOD's efforts to synchronize special
operations forces and other DOD components with the IC on
sensitive activities and the implementation of efforts to
organize, empower, and resource the Special Reconnaissance and
Enabling Command (SREC) to meet current and future needs. This
review should assess, at a minimum, whether:
(1) DOD components and the IC adequately coordinate
and synchronize sensitive activities policies and
oversight mechanisms;
(2) DOD has processes for globally synchronizing and
coordinating activities with the IC;
(3) Requirements are being effectively generated,
staffed, and planned between the DOD and the IC;
(4) DOD is effectively implementing congressional
direction related to the conduct of sensitive
activities, including:
(a) the Joint Explanatory Statement to
Accompany the Servicemember Quality of Life
Improvement and National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Committee Print 119
2), which directed the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict and the Commander, SOCOM to
submit to the congressional defense committees
a plan to establish and maintain the SREC;
(b) section 1621 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public
Law 119-60), which directed the Secretary of
Defense to establish, maintain, continuously
update, and use a secure, centralized technical
capability to facilitate oversight,
deconfliction, and risk assessments of all
commercial vendor support to the DOD for
clandestine activities; and
(c) section 1622 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, which
directed the Secretary of Defense to keep the
congressional defense committees fully and
currently informed of DOD sensitive activities;
and
(5) Any other matters determined relevant by the
Comptroller General.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than April
1, 2027, with the results of the review to follow in a mutually
agreed upon format and timeframe.

Comptroller General review of whistleblower protections

The committee reiterates the importance of whistleblowers
in detecting violations of law, gross management, waste, abuse,
and threats to safety. Given the need to ensure that
whistleblowers within the Department of Defense (DOD) are given
adequate protections to come forward to report such abuses and
violations and that DOD inspectors general and investigating
officers have the fulsome knowledge and training to be able to
investigate cases of reprisal, restriction, or retaliation, the
committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States
to conduct a study that covers the following:
(1) The adequacy of training, including recurring
training, for DOD Inspector General (IG) investigators,
the DOD IG-delegated service-level investigators,
service-level IG investigators, and command-level IG
investigators appointed, designated, or designed to
conduct whistleblower reprisal investigations in
support of potential administrative punishments and
non-judicial punishment within the Department of
Defense;
(2) The performance of the DOD IG in fulfilling
timeliness and quality goals for handling whistleblower
reprisal complaints;
(3) The performance of the DOD IG in fulfilling
efforts to protect the confidentiality of whistleblower
reprisal complainants;
(4) Trends tracked by the DOD in the types of
whistleblower complaints investigated, including if
there are concentrations of complaints in certain
Services, installations, or other characteristics;
(5) Barriers for whistleblowers coming forward to
report protected communications under section
1034(c)(2) of title 10, United States Code;
(6) The standards of evidence and burdens of proof
under military, civilian, contractor, and intelligence
community statutory whistleblower statutes, including
an analysis of the adequacy of such standards of
evidence and burdens of proof in the life of the
populations protected; and
(7) Any recommendations for improving protections for
whistleblowers and training for investigations into
complaints of reprisal, restrictions, or retaliation
prohibited under section 1034 of title 10, United
States Code.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, not later than April 2, 2027, with
the results of the review to follow in a mutually agreed upon
format and timeframe.

Department of Defense audit capabilities using advanced software and
artificial intelligence

The committee recognizes the Department of Defense's
growing adoption of advanced software and artificial
intelligence (AI) capabilities across various operational and
administrative functions. The committee notes that the
Department of the Navy, in particular, has demonstrated
successful implementation of digital tools for program
management.
The committee believes these technological capabilities
present a significant opportunity to transform the Department's
financial management and auditability. The Department has yet
to achieve an unmodified audit opinion but continues to work
toward achieving one by December 31, 2028, as required by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public
Law 118-31).
The committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to expand
existing software and AI applications within the Department to
further modernize and improve accountability. Specifically, the
committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to:
(1) Assess current software and AI platforms within
the Department that could be expanded or adapted to
provide continuous financial monitoring and audit
capabilities across all military services and Defense
Agencies;
(2) Identify integration requirements to connect
disparate financial systems across the Department into
unified platforms capable of providing enterprise-wide
financial visibility; and
(3) Evaluate how real-time audit capabilities could
support the annual audit process, along with improved
financial decision-making, fraud detection, and
resource allocation.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a
briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on
the Department's plans to expand the use of advanced software
and artificial intelligence technologies and its evaluation of
real-time audit capabilities.

Dismantlement and disposal of nuclear-powered submarines

The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide
a briefing, not later than March 1, 2027, on plans for the
dismantlement and disposal of nuclear-powered submarines. The
briefing should include, but will not be limited to, the
following: (1) A summary of activities required for
dismantlement and disposal; (2) The regulatory requirements
related to managing radioactive materials; (3) The cost and
schedule baseline for such activities to occur at naval
shipyards; and (4) An assessment of the estimated cost and
schedule for such activities to be performed by one or more
commercial entities.

Distributed shipbuilding

The committee notes that, as the United States seeks to
revitalize the American shipbuilding industry and increase
naval production rates, distributed shipbuilding has emerged as
an essential component of this revitalization strategy.
Realizing the benefits, however, may require clear definitions
and structured, scalable frameworks that distinguish true
distributed production from routine subcontracting. In this
way, distributed shipbuilding functions not as supply chain
management but as a production system that, if governed
effectively, can reduce bottleneck critical shipyard
constraints.
The committee is interested in whether a clear, outcome-
based definition could help ensure federal investment is
directed toward distributed shipbuilding models that produce
installation-ready modules rather than being applied broadly to
component outsourcing, labor pass-through arrangements, or
training activities.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Navy to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services
of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, on the advisability of formulating and
codifying a standard statutory definition of ``distributed
shipbuilding'' for use across naval vessel construction
programs. In preparing the briefing, the Secretary shall
consult with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, the
Administrator of the Maritime Administration, and the
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, as appropriate, to incorporate applicable
lessons learned from other Federal vessel programs. The
briefing shall address the following elements:
(1) Whether the definition should require the
execution at a facility operationally distinct from the
final assembly shipyard;
(2) Whether the producing entity must execute the
work under its own independent planning, material
management, or quality control systems;
(3) Whether the work must be delivered as inspection-
ready, configuration-controlled, and install-ready
product;
(4) Whether the activity must demonstrably reduce the
planning, integration, or production management burden
of the final assembly shipyard during vessel
construction;
(5) Whether the definition should expressly exclude
activities that do not transfer integrated production
responsibility from the final assembly shipyard,
including:
(a) component-level outsourcing that delivers
individual parts requiring receiving inspection
and installation sequencing at the final
assembly shipyard;
(b) labor pass-through arrangements in which
workers are supplied without production
responsibility for an integrated, install-ready
outcome; and
(c) fabrication of unoutfitted structural
elements without trade integration,
preservation, or configuration control; and
(6) Any additional statutory, regulatory,
contracting, or resource considerations that would
affect the advisability and feasibility of adopting
such a definition.

Enterprise resource management systems for requirements traceability

The committee notes the significant efforts of the
Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
(PPBE) Reform, established by section 1004 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-
81). In its final report, the commission highlighted the need
to improve and consolidate the Department of Defense's resource
management systems and to create a common analytics platform to
support more effective, data-driven decision-making across the
PPBE process.
The committee believes that end-to-end requirements
traceability and enhanced resource visibility are critical to
addressing longstanding challenges in the PPBE process, to
improving agility, and to ensuring resources are aligned with
strategic priorities and warfighter needs.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to deliver a briefing
to the congressional defense committees, not later than March
1, 2027. The briefing shall include a plan for implementing
common standards for commercially available tools across the
Department that:
(1) Enable end-to-end integration of programmatic,
operational, and financial data across components and
mission areas;
(2) Interoperate with existing enterprise platforms,
including Advana, the Defense Enterprise Accounting and
Management System, the General Fund Enterprise Business
System, and Navy Enterprise Resource Planning tools;
(3) Support predictive obligation tracking and
execution forecasting; and
(4) Provide real-time decision support at the program
and portfolio level without necessitating the
decommissioning of existing functional systems.

Improvements to aviation safety

The committee is dedicated to improving aviation safety,
especially the interactions between military and civilian
aircraft in light of the crash involving American Airlines
flight 5342 and a Blackhawk helicopter in January of 2025. The
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released its
analysis into causal factors of the crash in January 2026,
including specific recommendations for the Department of
Defense and the Department of the Army.
The committee believes it is necessary for the safety of
all passengers in American airspace that the Department of
Defense implement these recommendations to the broadest extent
possible. For any recommendation that the Department believes
it cannot implement as written, it must brief the committee
about all implementation challenges and develop solutions to
address the risks identified in that recommendation.
Recognizing that this effort may take significant resources,
but cognizant of the gravity of ensuring the American airspace
is safe for commercial and military aircraft, the committee
requests close collaboration with the Department throughout
this process.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing, not later than January 15, 2027, and
every 90 days thereafter, to the Committees on Armed Services
of the Senate and the House of Representatives on the
implementation of the recommendations from the NTSB Aviation
Investigation Report AIR-26-02, including:
(1) Progress on implementation of each recommendation
directed to the Department of Defense;
(2) Progress on implementation of each recommendation
directed to the Department of the Army and
implementation of those recommendations by the
Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air
Force;
(3) Description of barriers to any recommendation by
the Department of Defense or any military department;
(4) Proposed solutions to any identified barriers
that address the risk identified in the NTSB
recommendations;
(5) Any other relevant information as determined by
the Secretary.

Improvements to aviation safety briefing

Increasing shipbuilding and repair capacity

The committee recognizes the strategic importance of a
robust domestic maritime industrial base to the national
security and economic resilience of the United States. The
committee is concerned that existing domestic shipbuilding,
ship repair, dry dock availability, and associated waterfront
infrastructure is at times inaccessible to the full range of
military, government-owned, and U.S.-flag commercial vessels
and therefore poses a risk to strategic sealift readiness,
force projection capabilities, and sustainment operations.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of
Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation
and the Maritime Administration, to identify opportunities to
strengthen domestic shipbuilding and repair capacity through
investments in infrastructure, industrial modernization, and
workforce development. Such efforts may include the expansion
or rehabilitation of dry docks; modernization of ship repair
facilities and waterfront infrastructure; upgrades to heavy-
lift and crane capacity; dredging and navigation improvements
necessary to accommodate larger vessels and increased
throughput; and other capital improvements that enhance the
ability of the United States to construct, maintain, and repair
military and commercially useful sealift vessels. The committee
further encourages the Department of Defense to prioritize
projects that demonstrate a clear nexus to national defense
objectives, including support for surge sealift readiness,
contested logistics operations, distributed maritime
operations, maintenance and sustainment of Navy and Military
Sealift Command vessels, strategic commercial shipping
capacity, and the operational readiness of the U.S.-flag fleet.
The committee also encourages consultation with private
industry, public shipyards, commercial repair facilities, and
relevant Federal agencies to ensure a comprehensive approach to
strengthening the Nation's maritime industrial base.

Joint Integration Coordination Cell resourcing

The committee recognizes that the ongoing war in Ukraine
has generated significant operational lessons regarding the
employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and counter-UAS
(cUAS), lessons that are directly relevant to current and
future theaters of operation. The committee notes testimony
from the Commander, U.S. European Command, which confirmed the
importance of partnering closely with Ukraine to ensure we are
rapidly capturing and implementing these lessons across the
Joint Force and also highlighted the value of additional
funding. The committee further notes that timely resourcing is
necessary to translate battlefield observations into deployable
capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Therefore, the committee supports full funding for the
Joint Integration Coordination Cell and the Special Operations
Command Europe theater innovation laboratory, including their
work to accelerate the collection, analysis, and transfer of
UAS and cUAS lessons learned from the European theater to
operational forces worldwide.

Navy shipbuilding software and artificial intelligence applications for
surface combatants

The committee recognizes the Navy's successful deployment
of advanced software and artificial intelligence (AI)
capabilities in submarine construction and commends these
efforts to modernize shipbuilding processes. The integration of
digital tools, including AI-enabled design optimization,
production planning systems, and quality assurance platforms,
has demonstrated meaningful improvements in construction
efficiency, cost management, and schedule adherence in the
submarine industrial base. The committee believes these
technological advances should not remain limited to submarine
programs. The same software and AI capabilities that have
proven effective for submarine construction hold significant
potential to enhance productivity and reduce costs across the
Navy's entire shipbuilding portfolio, including surface
combatants, amphibious vessels, auxiliary ships, and unmanned
platforms.
The committee notes that modern commercial shipbuilding
operations worldwide increasingly rely on integrated software
systems to manage complex construction workflows, optimize
material logistics, and ensure quality control. The Navy's
surface ship and auxiliary vessel construction programs would
benefit from similar technological modernization. Therefore,
the committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to expand
the application of software and artificial intelligence tools
beyond submarine programs to all classes of naval vessels. This
expansion should include:
(1) Assessment of current software and AI
applications in submarine construction that could be
adapted for surface ship and auxiliary vessel programs;
(2) Development of a comprehensive plan to integrate
advanced digital tools across all surface combatant
shipbuilding programs, including specific timelines and
expected performance improvements;
(3) Identification of any regulatory, contractual, or
cultural barriers within the shipbuilding industrial
base that may impede adoption of these technologies;
and
(4) Coordination with public and private shipyards to
ensure shipbuilding software and AI capabilities are
implemented in a manner that enhances workforce
productivity rather than displacing skilled labor.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide
a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027,
on efforts to expand shipbuilding software and AI applications
across all vessel classes.

Office of Net Assessment

The committee commends the contributions of the Office of
Net Assessment (ONA) and reaffirms the value of its
longstanding partnership with the Congress. The ONA provides
long-term, strategic, and independent analysis in service of
the national defense, and when properly resourced and supported
by leadership, it has made significant contributions to the
strategic direction and understanding for senior Department of
Defense decision-makers.
The committee believes that ONA's work is crucial and of
significant interest to a broad range of policymakers and
senior leaders striving for deeper, strategic understanding of
the future problems facing the Department. The committee
expects the Department to preserve and reinforce the office's
analytical independence, institutional standing, and sufficient
funding level. The committee further encourages the Department
to provide the ONA with the resources, access, and authorities
necessary to fulfill its mission, particularly as it produces
assessments on the character of future warfare, geo-economic
competition, and the long-term balance of military power
between the United States and its adversaries.

Potable water purification systems for new surface combatants

The committee remains concerned that, despite over a decade
of repeated congressional direction and dedicated funding,
hazardous bromine cartridge systems continue to be used for
potable water disinfection on certain Navy surface combatants.
These systems unnecessarily expose sailors to health hazards
and impose significant recurring costs related to the handling
and disposal of hazardous materials.
The committee notes that reliance on ``inherited'' baseline
designs--rather than deliberate, forward-looking requirements
decisions--has resulted in these outdated systems being
incorporated by default into new ship classes. This lack of
modernization at the design phase risks locking obsolete and
hazardous technology into platforms that will remain in the
fleet for decades, ultimately requiring far more expensive
post-award retrofits or modernization efforts.
Mixed-oxidant electrolytic disinfectant generator systems
have been successfully deployed on Navy aircraft carriers and
amphibious ships for more than 20 years, and more recently on
the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDG-51) and littoral combat
ship platforms. These systems generate a disinfectant solution
on demand using only common salt and electricity, effectively
eliminating the need for bromine cartridges. The failure to
transition smaller surface combatants to this safer technology
appears to be driven by acquisition sequencing rather than
technical limitations.
The committee expects potable water disinfection to be
treated as a class-specific design requirement for every new
platform.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Navy to ensure that modern, non-hazardous potable water
purification systems are evaluated, selected, and integrated
during the initial design phases of new classes of surface
combatants. These systems must be incorporated into the
baseline design and not deferred to post-award retrofit or
modernization. The committee expects potable water disinfection
to be treated as a class-specific design requirement for each
platform.

Report on feasibility and advisability of Arctic operational and surge
floor

The committee remains concerned by the increasingly complex
security environment in the Arctic, marked by growing strategic
competition and expanding military activity by near-peer
adversaries. The committee recognizes that protecting U.S.
national security interests and strengthening integrated
deterrence across the areas of responsibility of U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), and
U.S. European Command (EUCOM) will require a sustained and
adaptable military presence capable of operating in the Arctic
environment.
The committee also recognizes that force posture decisions
in the Arctic present unique operational, logistical, and
infrastructure challenges. While permanent stationing or
homeporting of forces may provide certain advantages, a
flexible mix of forward presence, rotational deployments, and
surge capacity may offer greater responsiveness to evolving
threats and operational requirements. Accordingly, the
committee believes it is important for the Department of
Defense to assess the appropriate balance between enduring
Arctic capabilities and the ability to rapidly reinforce the
region when necessary.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Secretaries of the military
departments and the Commander, NORTHCOM, the Commander, EUCOM,
and the Commander, INDOPACOM to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees, not later than June 1, 2027,
assessing the feasibility and advisability of maintaining a
persistent and scalable Department of Defense presence in the
Arctic.
The report shall include:
(1) An assessment of the operational feasibility and
strategic value of maintaining a baseline level of
Arctic-capable assets across the maritime, aviation,
ground, and multi-domain environments;
(2) An identification of the capabilities, capacity,
and force structure required to sustain domain
awareness, deterrence, and rapid response capabilities
across the Arctic regions relevant to NORTHCOM,
INDOPACOM, and EUCOM.
(3) An evaluation of options for maintaining a
scalable surge capability, including the personnel,
platforms, logistics infrastructure, and mobility
requirements necessary to reinforce the region during
periods of increased tension or conflict;
(4) A description of any capability gaps, force
structure limitations, or infrastructure shortfalls
that could affect the Department's ability to sustain
operations in the Arctic; and
(5) An analysis comparing the costs, benefits,
readiness implications, and risks associated with
alternative force posture models, including permanent
stationing, homeporting, rotational deployments, and
other approaches for maintaining Arctic presence and
responsiveness.

Report on Navy's use of synthetic oil

The committee notes that the Navy is working to meet major
increases in mission demand, operating tempo, and service life
for its limited number of ships. Measures need to be taken to
extend existing fleets' operating capability, decrease
operational failures and maintenance costs, improve safety, and
widen performance boundaries. One cost-effective way to extend
operating capability and service life is to use synthetic oil
to replace the Navy's existing petroleum-based oil. Synthetic
technology improves systems performance at low temperatures,
enables ship commanders to confidently press performance limits
in high tempo environments, and improves overall motion
control, propulsion, weapons, and acoustic performance.
Synthetic oils reduce onboard fire hazards, maintain stability
over large temperature ranges, and resist seawater
contamination, oxidation, and corrosion. Tests have shown that
synthetic lubricants significantly extend the duration between
oil changes by at least a factor of two and result in less
corrective operations and maintenance associated with carbon
and varnish build-up on critical components. Synthetic
lubricants can also greatly reduce signature levels, mitigating
noise and improving stealth and precision benefits and
survivability of the platforms they support.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Navy to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027,
on the Navy's assessment of increased usage of synthetic
lubricants. The briefing shall include any current plans by the
Navy to increase the use of synthetic lubricants, an outline of
its current use, costs and benefits of increased usage,
conversion costs, and any additional funding required to
realize the benefits of increased lifecycle savings and reduced
corrective downtime.

Support for military aviation demonstration teams

The committee recognizes the important role that military
aviation demonstration teams play in supporting recruiting,
retention, and public outreach efforts across the Armed Forces.
The committee specifically acknowledges the contributions of
the United States Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron (Blue
Angels) and the United States Air Force Air Demonstration
Squadron (Thunderbirds), whose performances showcase the skill,
professionalism, and capabilities of the men and women of the
Armed Forces while strengthening ties between the military and
the communities they serve. The committee encourages the
continued support of military aviation demonstration teams and
related outreach activities, recognizing that air shows,
aviation demonstrations, and similar events promote public
understanding of military service, inspire future generations
of servicemembers, and serve as valuable tools for recruiting
and community engagement.

United States Africa Command advise and assist

The committee is aware that U.S. Special Operations Forces
have been assisting the Somali Armed Forces in countering al-
Shabaab in Somalia, but desires more information on constraints
limiting their effectiveness.
Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy and the Commander, U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM) to provide a briefing, not later than February 1,
2027, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives on the advise and assist mission in
Somalia against al-Shabaab and other violent extremist
organizations. At a minimum, the briefing should detail
strategic objectives, an assessment of the current operating
environment, an identification of any limitations, to include,
but not be limited to, rules of engagement, authorities,
permissions, current lines of operation and lines of effort,
and both policy and resourcing limitations that challenge the
AFRICOM mission to counter al-Shabaab and other violent
extremist organizations in Somalia.

Zumwalt-class destroyer homeporting

The Navy has just notified the committee of a change of
home port for the USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) from Pascagoula,
Mississippi, to San Diego, California. The ship has been
undergoing upgrades at a shipyard in Mississippi. The Navy had
originally planned to change the home port for the ship to
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. To support that decision, the Navy had
requested funding for upgrades to facilities in Pearl Harbor in
fiscal year 2026. Congress appropriated $83.0 million in fiscal
year 2026 for ``DDG-1000 Ship Support Infrastructure Upgrades''
under the Continuing Appropriations, Agriculture, Legislative
Branch, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and
Extensions Act, 2026 (Public Law 119-37) based on that Navy
request.
The committee understands that the Navy may also be
planning to change homeports from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to San
Diego, California, for the other two Zumwalt-class destroyers,
the USS Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001) and the USS Lyndon B.
Johnson (DDG-1002). The Navy has not briefed the plan to change
home ports for the Zumwalt-class destroyers or the rationale
for doing so. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of
the Navy to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than October 1, 2026, on the home porting
decision for the USS Zumwalt and the potential follow-on
homeporting decisions for the remainder of the Zumwalt-class
destroyers. The briefing shall include:
(1) The Navy's justification for changing the home
port of the USS Zumwalt from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to
San Diego, California, from an operational,
administrative, and financial standpoint;
(2) The Navy's future plans for home porting the
remainder of the Zumwalt-class of destroyers, the USS
Michael Monsoor and the USS Lyndon B. Johnson;
(3) The status of the Navy's plan to repair and
upgrade the piers at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam,
Hawaii, to receive all Zumwalt-class destroyers;
(4) An assessment of how a decision to relocate the
home port of the USS Zumwalt, and potentially the USS
Michael Monsoor and the USS Lyndon B. Johnson, from
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to San Diego, California, would
affect the private ship repair maintenance workload in
Hawaii and California;
(5) Any Navy plans to potentially homeport additional
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers at Joint Base Pearl
Harbor-Hickam.
(6) Any other matters the Secretary deems relevant to
the home porting decisions for the USS Zumwalt, the USS
Michael Monsoor, the USS Lyndon B. Johnson, and other
warships at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii.

TITLE XI--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MATTERS

Sec. 1101--Prevailing rate determinations for defense industrial base
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 81 of title 10, United States Code, to allow the
Secretary of Defense to establish the pay of wage-grade
employees located at any defense industrial base facility, in
order to make rates of pay comparable to the private sector and
surrounding areas.
Sec. 1102--Job grading system for prevailing rate employees at defense
industrial base facilities
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 81 of title 10, United States Code, to direct the
Secretary of Defense to establish and maintain a job grading
system for wage-grade employees who are located at any defense
industrial base facility, in order to establish pay that is
competitive with the private sector.
Sec. 1103--Probationary period for civilian personnel of the United
States Cyber Command
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1599f(i) of title 10, United States Code, to change the
length of the probationary period for Cyber Excepted Service
employees to 2 years.
Sec. 1104--Enhanced authority for transfers between cyber excepted
service and competitive service
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1643(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, to enhance
authority for transfers between the Cyber Excepted Service and
the competitive service.
Sec. 1105--Removal of Direct Support Activities from personnel
limitation on the Office of the Secretary of Defense
The committee recommends a provision that would remove
direct support positions of the Washington Headquarters
Services, supporting the staff of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, from a personnel limitation that applies to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Sec. 1106--Prohibition on the use of funds for carrying out a hiring
freeze, reduction in force, or hiring delay without cause at a
public shipyard
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
funds authorized by this Act from being used to carry out a
hiring freeze or a reduction in force, or to delay filling a
vacant Federal civilian position at public shipyards.
Sec. 1107--Prohibition on the use of funds for carrying out certain
hiring freezes, reductions in force, and hiring delays
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
funds authorized by this Act from being used to carry out a
hiring freeze or a reduction in force, or to delay filling a
vacant Federal civilian position within the workforce funded by
a working capital fund.
Sec. 1108--Disclosure of telework, remote work, and exemptions for
return-to-in-person-work requirements in Department of Defense
vacancy announcements
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military
departments, not later than June 1, 2027, to ensure that the
disclosure of telework and remote work eligibility, as well as
exemptions for return-to-in-person-work requirements, is
considered for all announcements of vacant positions in the
Department of Defense to encourage all agencies of the
Department to utilize these flexibilities to support the
employment of military spouses.
Sec. 1109--Pilot program to retain high-performing supervisors and
managers within the Department of Defense
The committee recommends a provision to authorize the
Secretary of Defense to establish a pilot program to reward
high-performing supervisors and managers with incentive pay.
Sec. 1110--Congressional notification of certain changes to civilian
workforce of Department of Defense
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1597 of title 10, United States Code, to require the
Secretary of Defense to notify the congressional defense
committees of any changes to civilian personnel in the
Department of Defense that would result in a reduction in force
of 50 or more personnel.

Items of Special Interest

DOD contracting with industrial base facilities that offer competency
based-apprenticeships
The committee greatly values the United States' defense
industrial base workforce and notes the importance of training
the next generation of defense industrial base contractors and
employees to lead future defense production. The committee is
aware that some defense industrial base facilities offer
competency-based registered apprenticeship programs, which are
established to train workers efficiently. These programs can
result in faster production of key products in the industrial
base, such as munitions, airplanes, boats, submarines,
spacecraft, and unmanned aircraft systems.
Therefore, the committee encourages the Department of
Defense to assess its contracting with industrial base
producers that have competency-based registered apprenticeship
programs and to continue to contract with these facilities
wherever practicable.
Japan pilot health insurance enhancement briefing
The committee recognizes the challenges faced by Department
of Defense (DOD) civilian employees serving in Japan in
accessing health care consistent with American standards of
care and notes the Department's ongoing Pilot Health Insurance
Enhancement program as a meaningful but incomplete response to
those challenges.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives a briefing, not later than
February 1, 2027, assessing the following: (1) Outcomes and
utilization of the Pilot Health Insurance Enhancement program
for DOD Civilian Employees in Japan through its current period
of performance; (2) Identified gaps in program coverage,
including dependent eligibility and specialty care access; (3)
Options for a durable funding mechanism to continue or expand
the program, including an assessment of appropriate
departmental jurisdiction between the DOD and the Office of
Personnel Management; and (4) The feasibility of applying a
similar model to DOD civilian employees serving in other
overseas locations.
Study on improving civilian employee performance management
The committee is grateful for the hard work and dedication
of the career civil servants who serve in the Department of
Defense. In particular, civil servants in managerial or
supervisory roles are vital to carrying out the Department's
many critical national security missions, serving as an anchor
for productivity, high standards, and a positive work
environment. In any enterprise, supervisors and managers are
critical for ensuring a well-trained and functioning workforce.
The committee notes that in order to continue to grow a
strong, more competitive, and efficient workforce, empowering
supervisors to have a greater say in shaping the force that
they manage could lead to better hiring decisions, stronger
teams, and a more productive work environment. In recent years,
the Department has carried out attempts to shape the workforce
through Department-wide policies that sometimes lead to a one-
size-fits-all approach, which fails to provide the nuanced
approach to employee performance management that supervisors
and managers are otherwise able to provide.
In 2017, the Institute for Defense Analysis published a
study titled, ``Civilian Personnel Reform at the Department of
Defense: Lessons from the Failure of the National Security
Personnel System.'' Among other things, the study recommended
amending the 2-year probationary period to require performance
manager review before an employee's tenure became fixed. The
committee notes that civil servants in supervisory roles are
already in an ideal position to conduct such a performance
review.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to conduct a study on improving supervisor oversight, employee
performance, and the efficiency of the Department's performance
evaluation system, including recommendations for authorities or
reforms that could be implemented at the supervisory level to
achieve improved employee performance and management. The study
shall include a report on the advisability and feasibility of
implementing supervisory review and concurrence upon the
expiration of an employee's 2-year probationary period.
The committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to
provide an initial briefing on the progress of this study to
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than April 16, 2027, with follow-on
briefings to occur at a mutually agreed upon time.

TITLE XII--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

Subtitle A--Assistance and Training

Sec. 1201--Authority to provide assistance to military forces of Jordan
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the provision of assistance to the military forces associated
with the Jordanian government.
Sec. 1202--Modification of authority to provide defense institution
capacity building for friendly foreign countries
The committee recommends a provision that would modify
section 332 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize legal
defense institution capacity building.
Sec. 1203--Modification of authority to build capacity
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 333(a) of title 10, United States Code, to add disaster
risk reduction or response operations, space domain awareness
and space operations, and foreign internal defense operations
to the authorized capability areas.
Sec. 1204--Abraham Accords Defense Cooperation Initiative
The committee recommends a provision that directs the
Secretary of Defense to establish an initiative to bolster
defense cooperation among the United States and signatories of
the Abraham Accords, as well as any regional, Arab, or Muslim-
majority country that has sought to normalize relations with
the State of Israel since 2020.
Sec. 1205--Redesignation of Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical
Training School as Special Boat Training Command
The committee recommends a provision that would modify
section 352 of title 10, United States Code, to redesignate the
Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School as
the Special Boat Training Command.
Sec. 1206--Extension of Defense Operational Resilience International
Cooperation Pilot Program
The committee recommends a provision that would extend the
Defense Operational Resilience International Cooperation pilot
program authorized by section 1212 of the James M. Inhofe
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public
Law 117-263) through December 31, 2032.
Sec. 1207--Feasibility report on multinational jungle warfare exercises
in area of responsibility of United States Southern Command
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Commander, U.S. Southern Command, to conduct a study to
determine the feasibility and advisability of establishing a
program of recurring multinational jungle warfare exercises
with partner countries in South America and provide a report on
the study to the congressional defense committees not later
than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act.
Sec. 1208--Redesignation of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies as
the James M. Inhofe Center for Africa Security Studies
The committee recommends a provision that would modify
section 342 of title 10, United States Code, to redesignate the
Africa Center for Strategic Studies as the James M. Inhofe
Center for Africa Security Studies.
Sec. 1209--Notification of intent to decrease United States Armed
Forces presence in North Atlantic Treaty Organization member
country
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, not less than 120 days before decreasing
permanent or rotational troops in a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) country, to submit an assessment of the
impact of such reductions on the ability of NATO to meet its
deterrence and defense requirements.

Subtitle B--Matters Relating to the Middle East

Sec. 1211--Assistance to Lebanese Armed Forces for countering Hezbollah
and other terrorist groups
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
$36.0 million for the Lebanese Armed Forces to counter
Hezbollah, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al-Qaeda, the
Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and all
United States-designated terrorist organizations in Lebanon.
The provision would condition this support on the Lebanese
Armed Forces' willingness to confront and disarm Hezbollah.
Sec. 1212--Extension of authority for reimbursement of certain
coalition nations for support provided to United States
military operations
The committee recommends a provision that would extend
section 1233 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), which provides for the
reimbursement of certain coalition nations for support provided
to U.S. military operations.
Sec. 1213--Extension and modification of authority to provide
assistance to vetted Syrian groups and individuals
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1209 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public
Law 113-291) to extend and modify the authority to provide
assistance to vetted Syrian groups and individuals.
Sec. 1214--Extension and modification of authority to provide
assistance to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1236 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public
Law 113-291) to extend and modify the authority to provide
assistance to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
Sec. 1215--Modification of United States-Israel subterranean operations
cooperation
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1279 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92) to broaden cooperation
between the United States and Israel on subterranean
operations.
Sec. 1216--Modification of United States-Israel cooperation to counter
unmanned systems in all warfighting domains
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1278(b)(4) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92) to increase, by $30.0
million, funding for United States-Israel cooperation for
countering unmanned aerial systems.
Sec. 1217--United States-Israel Framework for Upgraded Technologies,
Unified Research, and Enhanced Security (FUTURES) Act of 2026
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Minister of
Defense of Israel, to establish a cooperative initiative to be
known as the ``United States-Israel Defense Technology
Cooperation Initiative,'' to expand and accelerate bilateral
defense technology research, development, testing, evaluation,
coordination, and industrial cooperation between the United
States and Israel.

Subtitle C--Matters Relating to Europe and the Russian Federation

Sec. 1221--Extension of prohibition on availability of funds relating
to sovereignty of the Russian Federation over internationally
recognized territory of Ukraine
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1245(a) of the James M. Inhofe National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-236) to
extend the prohibition of funds authorized to be appropriated
by this Act for fiscal year 2027 from being obligated or
expended to implement any activity that recognizes the
sovereignty of Russia over the internationally recognized
territory of Ukraine.
Sec. 1222--Oversight of United States military posture in Europe
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the obligation or expenditure of funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available to reduce
the total number of members of the Armed Forces permanently
stationed in or deployed to the U.S. European Command (EUCOM)
area of responsibility below 76,000, to divest of property, to
remove or redeploy major equipment, or to relinquish command of
the position of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe until 90
days after the Secretary of Defense submits an assessment and
certification to the appropriate committees of the Congress
regarding such action.
The committee remains deeply concerned about Russian
aggression in the EUCOM area of responsibility. North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) members have seen a sharp increase
in threats from Russia including manned and unmanned air
incursions, sabotage activities, and malign influence
campaigns. The committee directs the Department to maintain
robust U.S. troop presence in Europe, including along NATO's
eastern flank, to sustain the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces
to provide forward defense of the United States and contribute
to NATO's defense and deterrence posture.
Sec. 1223--Intelligence support for Ukraine
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to provide intelligence support to the
Ukrainian government for the purpose of supporting military
operations to defend or take back the internationally
recognized territory of Ukraine.
Sec. 1224--United States-Ukraine Strategic Defense Innovation Working
Group
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, to engage with the Government of
Ukraine to establish a defense innovation working group.
The committee notes that Ukraine is best positioned to
provide up-to-date, validated, and battle-tested expertise on
low-cost scaled production of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and
counter-UAS technology and employment. The U.S. Department of
Defense should make every effort to learn Ukraine's hard-earned
best practices in preparation for current and future worldwide
military engagements.
Sec. 1225--Notification of gray zone activities by the Russian
Federation against North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to notify appropriate committees of the
Congress not later than 7 days after the Department of Defense
is made aware of any gray-zone activities on a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization ally known or reasonably suspected to be
carried out by Russia.
Sec. 1226--Extension and modification of Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92) to extend the Ukraine
Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) through December 31,
2030, and authorize $750,000,000 for fiscal year 2027. The
provision would also clarify the conditions under which foreign
contributions may be used to replace weapons or articles
provided to Ukraine under this authority via contributions from
the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List.
Sec. 1227--Synchronization of defense readiness with North Atlantic
Treaty Organization allies
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
on the defense readiness of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and every 180 days thereafter through
2034.
Sec. 1228--Co-development and co-production program with Germany for
certain munitions
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, not later than
March 1, 2027, to seek to engage with appropriate officials of
Germany in a joint program for the purpose of enabling the
fielding of air defense and air-to-air munitions, including co-
development and co-production of such capabilities, for the
Armed Forces of the United States and the Bundeswehr of
Germany, consistent with applicable United States law and
existing bilateral defense cooperation agreements.
Sec. 1229--Report and assessment relating to United States force
posture adjustments in Europe
The committee recommends a provision that would require
U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to submit an updated risk
assessment addressing its ability to execute its theater
campaign plan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) plans,
and NATO defense and deterrence requirements following recent
force posture reductions in the EUCOM area of responsibility.
The provision would also require an independent Government
Accountability Office assessment of the sufficiency of the
process and analysis used to inform such reductions.

Subtitle D--Matters Relating to the Indo-Pacific Region

Sec. 1231--Extension and modification of designation of senior official
for Department of Defense activities relating to, and
implementation plan for, the AUKUS partnership

The committee recommends a provision that would designate
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Armaments
Cooperation as the senior civilian official of the Department
of Defense (DOD) responsible for overseeing DOD activities
relating to the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States
(AUKUS) partnership. The provision would also modify and extend
reporting requirements related to DOD activities to implement
the AUKUS partnership.

Sec. 1232--Extension and modification of Pacific Deterrence Initiative

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1251 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-
283) to extend the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) through
fiscal year 2027. The provision would also require that the
requirements of the subordinate unified commands of United
States Indo-Pacific Command, including United States Forces
Korea and United States Forces Japan, are included in the PDI.

Sec. 1233--Extension, modification, and redesignation of Taiwan
Security Cooperation Initiative

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1323 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement
and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
(Public Law 118-159). The amendment redesignates the Taiwan
Security Cooperation Initiative as the First Island Chain
Security Cooperation Initiative and authorizes assistance for
the national security forces of the Government of the
Philippines.

Sec. 1234--Updates to National Industrial Security Program Operating
Manual regarding AUKUS

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, acting through the Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency, to submit to the
congressional defense committees a plan to identify, mitigate,
and remove, as appropriate, procedures and regulations
contained in the National Industrial Security Program Operating
Manual that unnecessarily constrain or impede government and
industry from meeting the objectives of the partnership among
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (commonly
known as ``AUKUS'').

Sec. 1235--Oversight of United States military posture on the Korean
Peninsula

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the obligation or expenditure of funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act to reduce the total number of members
of the Armed Forces permanently stationed in or deployed to the
Republic of Korea below 28,500 or to complete the transition of
wartime operational control of the United States-Republic of
Korea Combined Forces Command from United States-led command to
Republic of Korea-led command until 90 days after the Secretary
of Defense submits an assessment and certification to the
appropriate committees of the Congress regarding such action.

Sec. 1236--Indo-Pacific Regional Sustainment Framework

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to establish and maintain a regional
sustainment framework in the area of responsibility of the U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command, to be known as the ``Indo-Pacific
Regional Sustainment Framework,'' to foster co-sustainment
efforts focused on providing the logistics support, sustainment
activities, and personnel services necessary to maintain
defense platforms, systems, subsystems, and components.

Sec. 1237--Extension of annual report on military power of the People's
Republic of China

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) by extending the China
Military Power Report to January 31, 2032.

Sec. 1238--Strategy for crisis management in South China Sea

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the head of any
other appropriate Federal department or agency, to develop, not
later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act,
a strategy for crisis management in the South China Sea.

Sec. 1239--Master plan for facility requirements to support rotational
force presence in the Philippines

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, to submit, not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to the
congressional defense committees a master plan outlining
facility requirements to support a rotational presence of the
U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines.

Sec. 1240--Master plan for infrastructure requirements to support
rotational force presence in Australia

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, to submit, not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to the
congressional defense committees a master plan outlining
infrastructure requirements to support a rotational presence of
the U.S. Armed Forces in Australia.

Sec. 1241--Extension of pilot program to develop young civilian defense
leaders in the Indo-Pacific region

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1261(e) of the James M. Inhofe National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) to
extend the pilot program authorized by that Act to develop
young civilian defense leaders in the Indo-Pacific region
through December 31, 2031.

Sec. 1242--Extension of pilot program to improve cyber cooperation with
covered foreign military partners in Southeast Asia

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1256(e) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-
283) by extending the pilot program to improve cyber
cooperation with covered foreign military partners in Southeast
Asia through December 31, 2030.

Sec. 1243--Extension of authority to transfer funds for Bien Hoa dioxin
cleanup

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1253(b) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-
283) to extend the authority of the Secretary of Defense to
transfer funds to the Secretary of State for the Bien Hoa
dioxin cleanup in Vietnam through fiscal year 2027.

Sec. 1244--Limitation on availability of funds for travel expenses of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the obligation or expenditure of 25 percent of the funding
authorized or otherwise made available for the travel expenses
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense until various overdue
reports and other documents relating to the Indo-Pacific region
are submitted to the congressional defense committees.

Sec. 1245--Report on Japanese counterstrike capabilities

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to provide the congressional defense
committees with a report, not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, outlining Department of
Defense efforts to support Japan in the fielding of an
operational counterstrike capability.

Sec. 1246--Strategy for cyber cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a strategy to enhance and
institutionalize cyber cooperation between the Department of
Defense and allies and partners of the Indo-Pacific region.
The committee believes cyber cooperation with allies and
partners is foundational to broader efforts to achieve a free
and open Indo-Pacific region. As part of these efforts, the
committee believes cyber cooperation with the Pacific Island
countries (PICs) should be increased as these countries
continue to expand their digital connectivity and face new and
emerging cybersecurity concerns. The committee recognizes that
Department of Defense cooperation with the PICs can be made
complex by their unique size, distributed geography, limited
resources, and other challenges. However, the criticality of
this region for the security of the Indo-Pacific, including to
U.S. military activities, means that cyber security efforts
must be prioritized.

Sec. 1247--Extension and modification of Indo-Pacific Maritime Security
Initiative

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92) to extend the Indo-Pacific
Maritime Security Initiative through calendar year 2031. The
provision would also expand the types of assistance provided
under this authority to allow for the operational test,
evaluation, and demonstration of uncrewed systems and
asymmetric autonomous concepts.

Sec. 1248--Annual assessment of contribution of certain artificial
intelligence chips to military capabilities of the People's
Republic of China

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration to
submit annual reports on the contribution of covered artificial
intelligence chips to the military capabilities of China.

Sec. 1249--Modification of authorization of sales to Australia of in-
service Virginia class submarines to provide for sale of
additional in-service submarine in lieu of new construction
submarine

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
subsection (a) of section 1352 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31) to
modify the authorization of sales to Australia of Virginia-
class submarines to allow for the sale of an additional in-
service submarine in lieu of a new construction submarine.

Sec. 1250--War Reserve Stock Program for Taiwan

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the establishment of a war reserve stock program for Taiwan.

Sec. 1251--Sense of Congress on defense alliances and partnerships in
the Indo-Pacific region

The committee recommends a provision that would express the
sense of the Congress on the importance of defense alliances
and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.

Subtitle E--Other Matters

Sec. 1261--Western Hemisphere strategy

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, to develop and
submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a
comprehensive strategy for advancing U.S. interests in the
Western Hemisphere.

Sec. 1262--Enhanced cooperation in North Atlantic and Arctic regions

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to invite the Kingdom of Denmark to assign
a permanent liaison officer to the U.S. Northern Command.

Sec. 1263--Report on capabilities and illicit activities of cartels

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney
General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to submit to
the congressional defense committees a report on the
capabilities and illicit activities of certain cartels.

Sec. 1264--Report on threats to United States interests in Africa

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to submit to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, a report on threats to U.S. interests in
the AFRICOM area of responsibility and an assessment of the
resources needed to address them.

Sec. 1265--Reports on Arctic and High North defense integration

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to submit reports on defense integration
in the Arctic and High North to the congressional defense
committees, not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.

Sec. 1266--Briefing on military and intelligence presence of Cuba in
the Western Hemisphere

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and the Director of National Intelligence, to submit to
the congressional defense committees, not later than 180 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, a report on the
military and intelligence activities of Cuba in the Western
Hemisphere.

Sec. 1267--Continuation of Joint Interagency Task Force--Counter Cartel

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to support and carry out, through December
31, 2030, the activities and functions of the Joint Interagency
Task Force--Counter Cartel, in coordination with appropriate
Federal departments and agencies, consistent with applicable
law, and to transmit an annual report on the progress of the
Joint Interagency Task Force--Counter Cartel to the
congressional defense committees.

Sec. 1268--Plan to enhance defense cooperation with Morocco

The committee recommends a provision that would direct, not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional
defense committees a plan to enhance United States defense
cooperation with Morocco. The provision would also require the
submission of the United States-Morocco Defense Cooperation
Roadmap signed April 2026 to the Congress.

Sec. 1269--Extension of Public Law 115-68 and related security
cooperation programs

The committee recommends a provision that would modify
section 1210E of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-
283) to extend the underlying authority through 2029. The
provision would also amend section 1208 of the James M. Inhofe
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public
Law 117-263) by extending the underlying authority through
2029.

Sec. 1270--Modification of requirements for Department of Defense
Regional Centers for Security Studies

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 342(b)(1)(B) of title 10, United States Code, to
include operational simulation and analysis.

Items of Special Interest

Appreciation for Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish Partners in Countering
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

The committee commends the deep partnership of the Kurdish
Peshmerga forces and Syrian Democratic forces with the United
States in degrading and defeating the threat from the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
The committee is deeply concerned that there is significant
risk in pivoting away from the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic
Forces, which served as the primary United States partner in
defeating the ISIS caliphate in Syria, and relying instead on
the Syrian government to counter ISIS and other terrorist
groups that could pose a threat to the United States Homeland.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing, not later than October 1, 2026, on the
performance of the Syrian government in countering terrorist
groups and actors within Syria, including foreign terrorists.
Furthermore, the committee has concerns that the Department
of Defense did not request funding to train and equip the
Kurdish Peshmerga forces in its 2027 budget request for the
Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund.
Therefore, the committee further directs the Secretary of
Defense to provide a briefing, not later than October 1, 2026,
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House
of Representatives on: (1) The Department's plans for the
Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund; (2) The rationale for not
including such funds in the budget request; and (3) Plans to
improve the ability of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces to support
counterterrorism operations with the Iraqi Security Forces and
the United States.

Assessment of Chinese Communist Party malign influence within the
Republic of Korea

The committee notes that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
continues to use hybrid tactics to project its influence
outside of China's borders and to undermine the interests of
the United States and its allies in the region and globally. Of
particular concern are China's malign influence efforts in the
Republic of Korea.
Therefore, the Secretary of Defense shall, not later than
May 1, 2027, provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, detailing malign influence by the Chinese Communist
Party within the Republic of Korea and its implications for the
national security and commercial interests of the United
States. At a minimum, the required briefing shall include an
assessment of the extent to which China's malign influence:
(1) Creates human intelligence and national security
risks to United States Forces stationed in the Republic
of Korea; and
(2) Negatively impacts the availability of dual-use
commercial goods that are essential to security
cooperation between the United States and the Republic
of Korea, including with respect to defense industrial
base cooperation.

Assessment of Hezbollah

To better understand the security environment in southern
Lebanon, where Hezbollah's de facto control has been virtually
uncontested by the legitimate Lebanese government for
approximately 2 decades, the committee directs the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide a briefing to the
Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than January 1,
2027, assessing changes in the security environment in southern
Lebanon from October 8, 2023, to the present day, including:
(1) An assessment of the damage to Hezbollah infrastructure,
capabilities, and personnel due to Israeli operations; (2) The
extent to which the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed to southern
Lebanon consistent with the November 2024 ceasefire and January
2025 ceasefire extension; (3) The extent to which the Lebanese
Armed Forces has been willing to counter, and/or has been
effective in countering, Hezbollah at any point since 2006,
whether within southern Lebanon, northern Lebanon, or Beirut;
(4) An assessment of Hezbollah's strength over the same period,
including its remaining power projection capabilities into
Israel; (5) An assessment of the means and financial networks
used and relied upon by Hezbollah to fund its reconstitution;
(6) An evaluation of efforts being made by the Lebanese Armed
Forces to plan for further disarmament of Hezbollah throughout
other parts of Lebanon, including in South Beirut and the Bekaa
Valley; (7) An assessment of actions taken by the Government of
Lebanon to demonstrate its willingness to exert authority over
Lebanon, including through political steps and military steps
to disarm Hezbollah and counter the abilities of Hezbollah to
reconstitute; and (8) An assessment of the steps that can be
taken to undermine Hezbollah's control in southern Lebanon,
south Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley.

Assessment of Taiwan's liquefied natural gas supply chains

The committee notes that Taiwan imports the overwhelming
majority of its energy and is heavily dependent on liquefied
natural gas (LNG) for electricity generation. The committee is
concerned that a disruption of such supplies through blockade
or other means could negatively impact Taiwan's ability to
effectively defend itself in a contingency.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with the heads of other departments and
agencies, as appropriate, to provide a classified briefing to
the congressional defense committees, the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives, not later than October 1, 2026, regarding:
(1) The current state of Taiwan's LNG supply chain and
potential vulnerabilities; (2) The potential impact of a
disruption of LNG supplies through blockade or other means that
could negatively impact Taiwan's ability to effectively defend
itself in a contingency; and (3) Potential opportunities to
mitigate the risk posed by a disruption of LNG imports to
Taiwan.

Assessment of United States-Republic of Korea integration and
operational use of emerging technologies

The committee strongly supports efforts to build the
combined capabilities of the United States and Republic of
Korea militaries and believes that the integration and
operational use of emerging technologies, including artificial
intelligence, cyber tools, and unmanned systems, within
combined military operations enhance interoperability and
mission effectiveness.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
not later than January 15, 2027, to provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees on efforts to enhance combined
United States-Republic of Korea operational capabilities and
interoperability using emerging technologies, including
recommendations, if any, for legislative or resource changes to
accelerate such efforts.

Briefing on industrial base cooperation between United States and India

The committee recognizes the strong bond between the United
States and India and the growing importance of the defense
industrial relationship within the broader bilateral
relationship. The committee notes the progress of the India-
United States Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X), which
is intended to facilitate partnerships among defense companies,
investors, universities, and accelerators in both countries, as
well as the conclusion of a Security of Supply Arrangement
between the Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defense
of India in 2024.
The committee believes the Department should seek to
identify steps to further expand co-development, co-production,
and reciprocal sourcing with India in areas of mutual strategic
interest. The committee further believes that legal,
regulatory, acquisition, and export-control barriers to deeper
industrial cooperation should be identified and, where
appropriate, addressed.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in coordination with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,
the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and
the Secretary of State, to provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees, not later than December 1,
2026, that:
(1) Identifies priority sectors for expanded United
States-India co-production and co-sustainment;
(2) Assesses barriers to greater participation by
Indian firms in Department of Defense supply chains and
by United States firms in defense manufacturing
partnerships in India;
(3) Evaluates the implementation status and practical
utility of the Security of Supply Arrangement;
(4) Describes steps taken under INDUS-X to move from
pilot projects and start-up engagement toward fielded
capability and programmatic acquisition outcomes; and
(5) Provides recommendations, including any
legislative recommendations, regarding authorities,
pilot programs, procurement flexibilities, and export-
control reforms needed to strengthen United States-
India defense industrial integration.

Briefing on space cooperation between United States and India

The committee believes that the maturation of the military
space programs of our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific
region, specifically India, is in our national security
interest given the growing space threat posed by China.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Space Policy and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs to brief the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, on efforts to expand and deepen bilateral military
exercises with India in the space domain. This would include
the potential integration of Indian commercial space entities
that could help mature the Indian military's space program
while enabling the U.S. Space Force's multi-domain operations
with ally and partner nations. The exercises considered in this
matter include but are not limited to Cope India, Yudh Abhyas,
and Tiger Triumph.

Comptroller General review of impact of delays in foreign military
sales to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Philippines

The committee remains concerned about delays in the
delivery of military capabilities to allies and partners in the
Indo-Pacific region via the foreign military sales process and
the impact of such delays on the ability of the Department of
Defense to establish and maintain deterrence against Chinese
military aggression in the First Island Chain.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General
of the United States to conduct a review and submit to the
congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives a report on the manner in which
delays in United States weapons sales to Japan, Taiwan, South
Korea, and the Philippines through the foreign military sales
process affect the ability of the Department of Defense to
build, posture, and sustain a strong denial defense in the
First Island Chain. At a minimum, the required report shall
include the following:
(1) A description of the benefits to United States
national security of United States arms deliveries to
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and
the importance of interoperability in the event of a
contingency across the Taiwan Strait;
(2) A description of:
(a) the current status of major defense
equipment sales to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea,
and the Philippines that have been approved but
have not been completed; and
(b) relevant metrics for identifying delays
in the timelines for delivery on such major
defense equipment sales, including such delays
attributable to:
(i) Department of Defense review,
procurement, and administration
processes for the foreign military
sales mechanism;
(ii) production constraints on the
United States defense industrial base
with respect to materiel currently
under contract with Japan, Taiwan,
South Korea, and the Philippines; or
(iii) Department of Defense
prioritization of arms deliveries to
allies and partners in the midst of
conflict, such as allies in the Middle
East region;
(3) An assessment of possible impacts of such delays
on the ability of the Department of Defense to build,
posture, and sustain a strong denial defense in the
First Island Chain, including by enabling
interoperability with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and
the Philippines; and
(4) An evaluation, as applicable, of the impact any
other relevant authority for arms sales or transfers to
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines may
have on the ability of the Department of Defense to
build, posture, and sustain a strong denial defense in
the First Island Chain.
Not later than July 7, 2027, the Comptroller General shall
brief the congressional defense committees, the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives on the review, with
final results provided in a mutually agreed upon format and
timeframe. To the maximum extent practicable, the required
report shall be submitted in unclassified form without any
designation relating to dissemination control and shall contain
a classified annex.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide
the Comptroller General with timely access to any appropriate
information, data, and analyses requested by the Comptroller
General necessary to develop, in a timely, thorough, and
independent manner, the required report.

Expediting the refueling of Israeli aircraft

The committee affirms that the U.S. Government's commitment
to providing Israel with the means and resources to defend
itself by itself must remain enduring and ironclad. The people
of the United States and the people of Israel are bound closely
by civilizational values and mutual interests. They face common
threats in the Middle East, and these threats are constantly
evolving in scope, scale, and lethality. The committee
appreciates the new opportunities to deepen operational
collaboration between the Israel Defense Forces and United
States Armed Forces that the assumption by U.S. Central Command
of combatant command responsibility for U.S. forces in the
State of Israel in 2021 enabled.
The committee notes that the Twelve-Day War in June 2025
reaffirmed Israel's central role in advancing the United
States' national security interests in the Middle East by
severely degrading Iran's nuclear and long-range missile
programs. Such operations were impressive despite Israel's use
of 50- to 60-year-old ``Ram'' refueling aircraft. To modernize
their tanker forces, Israel has signed multiple contracts with
the U.S. Government to purchase six Boeing KC-46 refueling
aircraft for the Israeli Air Force, the first two of which are
scheduled to be delivered in 2026. The presence of these
aircraft should strengthen deterrence against Iran and its
proxies. The committee encourages the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to
provide any appropriate assistance the Israelis may request in
enhancing aerial refueling capabilities.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide,
not later than September 30, 2026, to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a
briefing that includes an assessment of the aerial refueling
operational requirements for the Israeli government during the
12-Day War against Iran in 2025, including: (1) An assessment
of the tempo of the Israeli Air Force's Ram tanker fleet during
those 12 days, versus an estimate of what the refueling tempo
might have been with two or four KC-46s as part of their tanker
fleet; (2) The extent to which any assistance was provided by
United States Air Force aerial refueling tankers to support
Israeli Air Force operations; (3) The estimated date of
delivery to Israel of the remainder of the KC-46 aircraft
procured by the Government of Israel to date; and (4) A
detailed description of any actions the U.S. Government is
taking to expedite the delivery to Israel of KC-46 aircraft
procured by the Israeli government, while minimizing adverse
impacts to United States defense readiness, including strategic
forces readiness and any additional actions the U.S. Government
could take to expedite such delivery.

Report on addressing Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor
production and shipments to Ukraine

The committee remains concerned about Ukraine's continuing
requirements for integrated air and missile defense
capabilities to defend civilian populations, critical
infrastructure, and military assets against ongoing Russian
ballistic missile and unmanned aerial system attacks. The
committee recognizes the importance of Patriot air defense
systems and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors
in supporting Ukraine's self-defense and notes continued
concerns regarding interceptor availability, production
capacity, and the impact of transfers on United States military
readiness.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment, to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees, not later than October 1,
2026, assessing the feasibility of increasing deliveries of
PAC-3 interceptors to Ukraine. The report shall include:
(1) An assessment of current and projected Ukrainian
requirements for PAC-3 interceptors over the next 12
months;
(2) An assessment of the availability of PAC-3
interceptors from existing Department of Defense
inventories for transfer to Ukraine and the impact of
such transfers on United States military readiness and
operational plans;
(3) An evaluation of options to accelerate production
of PAC-3 interceptors, including through multiyear
procurement authorities, advance procurement, expanded
supplier capacity, and other industrial-base
investments;
(4) An assessment of the feasibility of increasing
annual PAC-3 interceptor production and the anticipated
timeline for achieving such increases;
(5) An identification of any statutory, regulatory,
contractual, or supply-chain barriers to increasing
interceptor deliveries to Ukraine;
(6) An assessment of opportunities for allied and
partner nations operating Patriot systems to contribute
additional PAC-3 interceptors to Ukraine, including
options for United States backfill arrangements; and
(7) Recommendations for legislative or administrative
actions that would enable increased interceptor
deliveries to Ukraine while maintaining acceptable
levels of United States military readiness.
The committee further directs the Secretary to provide a
briefing to the congressional defense committees on the
findings of the report, not later than 15 days after its
submission.

Report on personnel and capability transfers from United States Indo-
Pacific Command

The committee strongly agrees with the National Security
Strategy and the National Defense Strategy that it is critical
for the United States to maintain a balance of power in the
Indo-Pacific favorable to our interests.
Therefore, the committee directs the Commander, U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) to provide a report to the
congressional defense committees, not later than October 1,
2026, on transfers of personnel, platforms, equipment,
munitions, and other capabilities previously allocated or
assigned to INDOPACOM to other combatant commands since May 1,
2025. At a minimum, the report shall include:
(1) A detailed accounting of personnel, platforms,
equipment, munitions, and other capabilities previously
allocated or assigned to INDOPACOM;
(2) The current status of personnel, platforms,
equipment, munitions, and other capabilities identified
under (1);
(3) A plan and expected timeline for returning or
replacing capabilities identified under (1);
(4) A description of efforts to mitigate any
capability or readiness shortfalls;
(5) The independent assessment of the Commander with
respect to global munitions inventories, including
those designated on the critical munitions list of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, relative to
deterrence and warfighting requirements in the
INDOPACOM area of responsibility; and
(6) Any other matters deemed relevant by the
Commander.

Report on United States and South Korean cooperation on nuclear powered
submarines

The committee notes the release of the Joint Fact Sheet
describing President Donald J. Trump's meeting with South
Korean President Lee Jae Myung on November 13, 2025. The fact
sheet expresses support for South Korea's effort to build
nuclear powered attack submarines and commits the United States
to work to support requirements for this shipbuilding project,
including by sourcing nuclear fuel. The committee supports
bilateral cooperation on submarine manufacturing with South
Korea and acknowledges the potential positive implications for
stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide the
Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations with a report, not later than February 1,
2027, that:
(1) Defines the scope of bilateral cooperation in
developing a nuclear powered, conventionally armed
submarine for South Korea;
(2) Describes all bilateral working groups and lines
of effort supporting the development and fielding of a
South Korean nuclear-powered, conventionally armed
submarine;
(3) Assesses the impact on regional stability and
security in the Indo-Pacific of South Korea's
acquisition of a nuclear powered, conventionally armed
submarine;
(4) Evaluates the cost to South Korea of fielding a
fleet of nuclear powered, conventionally armed
submarines and the corresponding impact of this cost on
efforts to achieve the conditions-based transition of
wartime operational control of the South Korean
military to South Korea; and
(5) Evaluates the proliferation risks associated with
South Korea acquiring a nuclear powered, conventionally
armed submarine.

Resilient command, control, and communications for Taiwan

The committee recognizes that resilient communications
between the United States and Taiwan are essential to support
effective coordination during both steady-state operations and
crisis scenarios. The committee is concerned that disruption or
degradation of communications infrastructure in a contested
environment could significantly limit Taiwan's ability to
communicate with United States forces and partners. The
committee believes it is necessary to assess current
capabilities and address gaps now to ensure continuity of
communications under stressed conditions.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees,
not later than March 1, 2027, assessing the extent to which
mobile ad hoc networking and commercially derived
communications systems in Taiwan support United States
operational requirements in contested or degraded environments.
The briefing shall include:
(1) Key Taiwan communications networks across civil
and military organizations necessary to support United
States and coalition operations;
(2) Connectivity and integration of Department of
Defense systems with such networks;
(3) Gaps in Taiwan's ability to communicate with
United States forces under contested conditions;
(4) Network architectures enabling resilient,
infrastructure-independent communications, including
secure, segmented data transmission;
(5) Opportunities to rapidly field and scale
solutions, including through the use of existing
equipment;
(6) Cybersecurity and supply chain risks affecting
such communications; and
(7) Prioritized potential actions to improve
resilient and interoperable communications, including
continued progress on coalition information.

United States national security interests related to the war in Sudan

The committee remains deeply concerned by the ongoing
conflict in Sudan, the resulting mass displacement and
atrocities, the destabilizing effects of that conflict on the
Horn of Africa and Red Sea region, and the role of external
actors in fueling the war.
The committee is concerned that the conflict in Sudan has
implications not only for regional humanitarian conditions but
also for U.S. national security interests related to Red Sea
maritime security, strategic competition, illicit trafficking,
regional partner stability, and the potential expansion of
malign foreign influence.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the heads of relevant U.S.
Government departments and agencies, to submit to the
congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027,
a report on Sudan and the Red Sea corridor.
The report shall include:
(1) An assessment of United States national security
interests affected by the conflict in Sudan, including
implications for Red Sea maritime security, regional
force posture, access, overflight, logistics, and
partner engagement in the Horn of Africa and adjoining
theaters;
(2) An assessment of the roles of foreign state and
non-state actors in supporting, enabling, financing,
arming, equipping, training, or otherwise sustaining
parties to the conflict in Sudan;
(3) An assessment of the implications of the Sudan
conflict for strategic competition, including Russian
efforts to expand military access or basing along the
Red Sea and Iranian efforts to expand regional
influence or materiel support networks;
(4) An assessment of illicit trafficking and other
transnational threats associated with the conflict,
including arms flows, drone proliferation, sanctions
evasion, gold or other resource smuggling, and the
movement of foreign fighters or mercenary personnel;
(5) A description of current and planned Department
of Defense activities, including intelligence support,
security cooperation, regional coordination, maritime
domain awareness, and efforts to support interagency
objectives related to conflict mitigation, atrocity
prevention, and the protection of civilians;
(6) An assessment of the extent to which existing
authorities, resources, posture, and coordination
mechanisms are sufficient to protect United States
interests related to Sudan and the Red Sea corridor;
(7) Recommendations for any additional legislative
authorities, interagency mechanisms, partner-capacity
initiatives, or oversight measures needed to address
the threats posed by the conflict; and
(8) A description of how the Department will
coordinate with allies and partners to monitor and
respond to developments arising from the conflict in
Sudan that affect the Red Sea and surrounding region.

Vietnam Wartime Accounting Initiative

The committee notes that section 1245 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-
81) authorized the establishment of a cooperative program with
the Ministry of Defense of Vietnam and other entities of the
Vietnamese government to assist in accounting for Vietnamese
personnel missing in action. The committee recognizes and
appreciates the decades of assistance from the government and
people of Vietnam in locating the remains of hundreds of
missing United States servicemembers and believes the
cooperative program authorized by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 makes an important
contribution to the overall United States-Vietnam bilateral
relationship. The committee also notes that there remain
significant numbers of Vietnamese categorized as missing in
action and recommends that the Department of Defense continue
funding the Vietnam Wartime Accounting Initiative.

TITLE XIII--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

Sec. 1301--Cooperative Threat Reduction Funds
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
$221.3 million for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program, define the funds as authorized to be appropriated in
section 301 of this Act, and authorize CTR funds to be
available for obligation for fiscal years 2027, 2028, and 2029.

Items of Special Interest

Waste water surveillance
The committee notes waste water surveillance is an
important tool for pathogen outbreak and monitoring. The
Cooperative Threat Reduction program has a long and successful
history in tracking and securing weapons of mass destruction,
which includes dangerous pathogens, especially associated with
laboratories securing and handling these materials.
Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Policy and Programs to provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, on the feasibility and advisability of developing
partnering efforts to strengthen waste water and other
potential environmental and clinical sampling as a means to
track the spread of such pathogens as part of an overall effort
to secure these biological materials. Such a cooperative effort
will also serve as a deterrence function to the potential use
of biological agents.

TITLE XIV--OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

Subtitle A--Military Programs

Sec. 1401--Working capital funds
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for the defense working capital funds at the
levels identified in section 4501 of division D of this Act.
Sec. 1402--Chemical agents and munitions destruction, defense
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction,
Defense, at the levels identified in section 4501 of division D
of this Act.
Sec. 1403--Drug interdiction and counter-drug activities, defense-wide
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug
Activities, Defense-wide, at the levels identified in section
4501 of division D of this Act.
Sec. 1404--Defense Inspector General
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for the Office of the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense at the levels identified in section 4501
of division D of this Act.
Sec. 1405--Defense Health Program
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for Defense Health Program activities at the
levels identified in section 4501 of division D of this Act.

Subtitle B--National Defense Stockpile

Sec. 1411--Amendments to Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling
Act
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 98 of title 50, United States Code, to make technical
and conforming amendments.
Sec. 1412--Pilot program on public-private partnerships for recycling
strategic and critical materials
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, acting through the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Industrial Base Policy, to establish a public-
private partnership program on recycling strategic and critical
materials, not later than May 1, 2027.
The committee strongly encourages the Department of Defense
to accelerate domestic commercial-scale recycling of strategic
and critical materials and to retain value from Department of
Defense scrap assets within the United States.
Sec. 1413--Inclusion of recovery and recycling of strategic and
critical materials in national emergency planning assumptions
for National Defense Stockpile
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 98h-5(b) of title 50, United States Code, to include
the extent to which expanded processing, recovery, or recycling
capacity in the commercial critical materials markets can
assist with meeting defense needs, to include e-waste.

Subtitle C--Other Matters

Sec. 1431--Extension of Authority for Joint Department of Defense-
Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Facility Demonstration
Fund
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1704(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84) to extend the Joint
Department of Defense-Department of Veterans Affairs Medical
Facility Demonstration Fund from September 30, 2027, to
September 30, 2028.
Sec. 1432--Extension of Department of Defense-Department of Veterans
Affairs Health Care Sharing Incentive Fund
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 8111(d)(3) of title 38, United States Code, to extend
the Department of Defense-Department of Veterans Affairs Health
Care Sharing Incentive Fund by 1 year to September 30, 2027.

Sec. 1433--Modifications to Advisory Council

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1516 of the Armed Forces Retirement Home Act of 1991
(Public Law 101-510) to make modifications to the Advisory
Council.

Items of Special Interest

Domestic antimony and copper recovery for defense applications

The committee remains concerned about the continued
reliance of the United States on foreign sources of antimony
and copper, both critical minerals essential to the defense
industrial base. The committee notes the potential opportunity
to recover antimony and copper as byproducts of domestic
mineral production and the possible benefits such recovery
could provide for supply chain resilience and national
security.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Defense Logistics
Agency, to conduct a feasibility and advisability study
regarding the establishment of a pilot program to support the
recovery of antimony and copper as byproducts of mineral
production in the United States. The study should assess: (1)
The technical feasibility of recovering antimony and copper
from domestic mineral production streams using multiple
recovery processes and techniques; (2) The potential for
developing process design plans necessary to scale such
recovery activities to demonstration-level production; (3) The
feasibility of generating representative sample materials for
independent testing and validation of suitability for defense
applications; (4) The ability of domestic producers to
manufacture antimony materials that meet Defense Logistics
Agency specifications; (5) The estimated costs, schedule, and
resource requirements associated with establishing and
executing such a pilot program; (6) The expected benefits to
domestic supply chain resilience and reductions in dependence
on foreign sources of antimony and copper; and (7) Any
legislative or administrative actions needed to support the
establishment of such a pilot program. The committee further
directs the Secretary to submit the feasibility and
advisability study to the Senate Armed Services Committee, not
later than March 31, 2027.

Recovery of critical minerals from lithium-ion battery waste

The committee finds that the secure domestic recovery of
critical minerals is a matter of significant national security.
When properly recycled, lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) yield
several of the most strategically important minerals in the
U.S. supply chain, including those essential for national
defense such as graphite, manganese, nickel, cobalt, and
lithium. As the volume of LIB scrap continues to escalate, the
Department of Defense should view its own waste streams as a
strategic source for these materials rather than a disposal
liability.
The committee notes that the Defense Logistics Agency
Hazardous Waste Disposition Services does not currently recycle
LIBs internally. Instead, it classifies them as hazardous or
universal waste, consolidates them at Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) sites, and ships them under contract to certified
recyclers or treatment facilities--with some of those materials
eventually being exported to geopolitical rivals for further
recovery. As the demand for U.S.-sourced critical minerals and
other metals increases, recycling can prove a viable option
based on changes in recovery technology and methods and changes
in the market. The committee is concerned about the limited
information regarding the composition of the waste stream
generated by DLA, making it difficult to ensure these strategic
minerals are being recovered.
Therefore, the committee directs the Director of the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to provide a briefing to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, on how the DLA
tracks, characterizes, and reports the composition of critical
minerals present in DLA-managed LIB waste streams. The briefing
shall include the following: (1) An assessment of current LIB
data collection practices, including any existing tracking of
mineral content and a plan to improve systematic tracking of
materials contained in LIB waste streams; (2) Opportunities to
integrate advanced sorting, sensing, or analytical technologies
to improve the characterization of waste streams; (3)
Identification of required changes to the DLA's logistics,
contracting, or hazardous waste management systems to enable
accurate, material-level tracking; (4) An evaluation of the
statutory authorities and specialized capabilities required to
implement a recovery program, including the ability of the
domestic industrial base to provide these services; (5) An
assessment of the costs to capture critical minerals and
materials through these processes; (6) Which material streams
may ultimately be exported; and (7) Any additional matters the
agency wishes to consider.

Report on domestic tungsten supply chain

The committee notes that the Department of Defense is
currently developing strategic plans to strengthen domestic
supply chains for critical materials, including tungsten, which
is essential for a wide range of industrial and defense
applications. Tungsten is a strategically important material,
and the United States has the potential to establish a robust
domestic supply chain capable of reducing reliance on foreign
sources and supporting both commercial and defense needs.
The committee is concerned about the current reliance on
foreign sources of tungsten and the associated risks to
national security, supply chain resilience, and defense
readiness. The lack of a fully developed domestic tungsten
supply chain presents challenges in ensuring consistent access
to materials necessary for critical defense systems and
industrial applications. The absence of a domestic tungsten
scrap utilization and recycling process constitutes a policy
failure, one made more acute by adversaries who have moved to
capitalize on what the United States has left unrealized.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March
1, 2027, on the Department's plan to establish a domestic
tungsten supply chain in the United States. The report shall
include the following elements: (1) An assessment of existing
domestic tungsten production capacity, including mining,
processing, refining, and recycling capabilities, and
recommendations for increasing domestic supply; (2) Strategies
to establish a resilient supply chain through investment in
integrated U.S.-based tungsten mining, processing, refining,
and recycling infrastructure; (3) Identification of
opportunities to support research, development, and testing
capabilities necessary to ensure tungsten meets defense-grade
performance requirements; and (4) Recommendations for aligning
procurement policies to prioritize and support the domestic
mining, production, and recycling of tungsten.

TITLE XV--SPACE ACTIVITIES, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, AND INTELLIGENCE
MATTERS

Subtitle A--Space Activities

Sec. 1501--Modification of acquisition and operation of space systems
for space warfighting and control
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2275d of title 10, United States Code, to ensure that
the Secretary of Defense shall acquire, hold title to, and
operate space systems to be used primarily for warfighting in
and from space to meet the requirements specified by one or
more combatant commanders in carrying out the responsibilities
set forth in section 164 of title 10, United States Code, to
ensure an Armed Force owns and operates a space warfighting
weapon system.
Sec. 1502--Modification of special authority for provision of space
launch support services to increase space launch capacity
The committee recommends a provision that would amend 2276a
of title 10, United State Code, by narrowing the scope of the
overhead structure to Air Force properties which the Space
Force utilizes for launch operations.
Section 1602 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) created an overhead
structure for the use of launch facilities by private rocket
companies on major launch ranges. These ranges are Cape
Canaveral Space Force Station and Vandenberg Space Force
Station. The original provision as written applies to the
entire Department of Defense, creating potential conflicts with
private ranges on non-Department-owned land when the airspace
must be closed for a launch.
Sec. 1503--Extension of indirect cost limitations and reporting
requirements for space launch activities on a military
installation
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2276a(e) of title 10, United States Code, to preserve,
through fiscal year 2031, predictable range costs while the
Department of Defense establishes a uniform, transparent, and
auditable methodology for indirect cost recovery.
The committee supports extending the temporary cap on
reimbursable indirect costs. In the absence of a standardized
Department-wide approach, the committee is concerned that
inconsistent overhead charges could create uncertainty for
operators and complicate planning for government and commercial
missions.
Continuation of the current cap, which is the lesser of 30
percent of reimbursable direct costs or $5.0 million (in fiscal
year 2024 constant dollars) per year, provides appropriate
transitional guardrails, reduces administrative burden, and
enables range personnel to prioritize readiness and mission
support. The committee further notes that predictable range
economics sustain a competitive commercial launch base and
enhance capacity, flexibility, and resilience for national
security missions.
Sec. 1504--Replacement of Space Launch Complex 46 at Cape Canaveral
Space Force Station
The committee recommends a provision, incorporating by
reference the Memorandum of Understanding between the Navy and
the Space Force, dated April 2, 2026, ``Memorandum of Agreement
Between Director Strategic Systems Programs and the United
States Space Force for the Development and Acceptance of
Replacement Facilities for Space Launch Complex 46 (SLC-46),''
that would ensure that the Navy will not be forced to move from
Space Launch Complex (SLC) 46 until such time as SLC-51 is
built and fully satisfies the capability for Navy's fleet
ballistic missile test program and other activities performed
by the Navy Strategic Systems Program at SLC-46.
The Cape Canaveral Space Force Station is experiencing
rapid growth. The number of launches increased by 354% since
2019, with 109 launches in 2025. Of particular concern is the
requirement for super heavy vehicle launch sites capable of
lifting more than 110,000 pounds to low earth orbit. These
vehicles, which use liquid methane-oxygen fuel, have very large
blast radiuses. As a result, an effort is underway to move the
Navy Strategic Systems Program Naval Ordnance Test Unit from
SLC-46 further south on the Cape, to a new site called SLC-51,
which has yet to be built but which will be paid for by the
private entity that takes possession of SLC-46 for super heavy
launch operations either at SLC-46 or adjacent to it at other
launch sites. Since the 1980s, SLC-46 has been the principal
launch pad to test the Trident D-5 Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missile (SLBM) as part of our Nation's nuclear deterrent. It is
planned to test the Trident D5-LE2 SLBM for the Columbia
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). The Columbia-class SSBN
will carry upward of 66% of our Nation's nuclear deterrent and
is the guaranteed response capability of our nuclear triad.
This report language should not be interpreted to change
the content or intent of the Memorandum of Agreement of this
provision.
Sec. 1505--Integration of space weather into space domain awareness and
operations
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that space weather is
incorporated as a core component of space domain awareness
within the U.S. Space Force by integrating space weather data,
modeling, and forecasting into operational systems and
processes, updating doctrine and requirements to reflect its
operational relevance, and incorporating space weather
considerations into the design, acquisition, and sustainment of
space domain awareness capabilities, while leveraging, to the
maximum extent practicable, existing Federal capabilities and
commercial data. The provision would further require the
Secretary to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 31, 2027, detailing
implementation status, planned investments, capability gaps,
interagency coordination, and any recommended legislative
actions.
Sec. 1506--Delivery of Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack
Characterization System
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to ensure delivery of the Perimeter
Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System, not later
than December 31, 2028. It also directs the Secretary to
submit, within 30 days of the date of the enactment of this
Act, an acquisition strategy to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
outlining how the Department of Defense will meet this delivery
deadline.
Sec. 1507--Acquisition of space-based tactical data capability
The committee recommends a provision that directs the head
of an agency that is contracting for space-based functional
data capability, to the maximum extent practicable, to ensure
that space acquisitions maximize competition and comply with
interfaces and standards that maximize resilience and
interoperability within the Department of Defense.
Sec. 1508--Space Launch Enterprise billet sufficiency review and
alignment plan
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Chief of
Space Operations, the Commander of Space Systems Command, the
Commander of Space Launch Delta 45, and the Commander of Space
Launch Delta 30, to conduct a comprehensive billet sufficiency
review of the Space Launch Enterprise to determine whether
military end strength authorizations are sufficient to support
current and projected launch operations through fiscal year
2032, and then to submit a plan based on the review to the
congressional defense committees, not later than September 30,
2027.
Sec. 1509--Flexibility for Department of Air Force to implement
acquisition structure for optimal support of new portfolio
acquisition executive system within Space Force
The committee recommends a provision that would repeal
statutory requirements relating to the Space Development Agency
(SDA) and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO), thereby
providing the Secretary of the Air Force greater flexibility to
determine the optimal organizational structure for the Space
Force acquisition enterprise, including potential alignment
under a unified acquisition framework. The provision would also
transfer certain personnel management authorities and
acquisition authorities currently vested in the SDA and Space
RCO to the Secretary of the Air Force for application across
the Space Force, increasing flexibility to recruit and allocate
acquisition, science, and engineering talent throughout the
enterprise.
Sec. 1510--Arctic connectivity and downlink resiliency initiative
The committee recommends a provision that would require,
not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chief
of Space Operations and the Commander, U.S. Northern Command,
to submit to the congressional defense committees a strategy to
secure, high-speed downlink capability and persistent
connectivity in high-longitudinal and polar regions.

Subtitle B--Nuclear Forces

Sec. 1511--Prohibition on reduction of intercontinental ballistic
missiles of the United States
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2027 funds to
reduce deployed U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles'
(ICBM) responsiveness, alert level, or quantity to fewer than
that specified by section 9062(n) of title 10, United States
Code. The provision would provide an exception to this
prohibition for activities related to maintenance, sustainment,
and replacement or activities to ensure safety, security, or
reliability.
The committee notes that the modernization of the ground-
based leg of the nuclear triad of the United States is vital to
the security of the Homeland and a core component of the
Homeland defense mission and that extending the life cycle of
the current Minuteman III system is both costly and an
unsustainable long-term option for maintaining a ready and
capable ground-based leg of the nuclear triad. The committee
also recognizes that the breach of chapter 325 of title 10,
United States Code, by the Sentinel ICBM program to modernize
the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad should be addressed
in a way that balances the national security need with fiscally
responsible modifications to the program that prevent future
unanticipated cost overruns, but this does not alter the
fundamental national security imperative for the modernization
program, which should remain robustly funded and active.
Sec. 1512--Exception for below-threshold modifications of nuclear
missiles to limitation on modification of major items of
equipment scheduled for retirement or disposal
The committee recommends a provision that would create an
exception to section 2244a(b) of title 10, United States Code,
for below-threshold nuclear missile modifications of less than
$500,000 in base year 2027 dollars.
Sec. 1513--Procurement authority for certain parts of intercontinental
ballistic missiles, reentry vehicles, and associated equipment
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of the Air Force and the Direct Reporting Program
Manager for Critical Major Weapon Systems to enter into
contracts for the life-of-type procurement of covered parts of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, reentry vehicles, and
associated equipment, valued at up to $115.0 million for fiscal
year 2027.
Sec. 1514--Limitation on availability of funds pending submission of
the strategy to sustain the Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missile and maximize end of life margin
The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2027 Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force travel funds to no more than 85
percent until the Secretary submits to the congressional
defense committees the strategy required by section 1641 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public
Law 119-60).
Sec. 1515--Integration of ICBM maintenance equipment into the LGM-30G
weapon system designation
The committee recommends a provision that includes unique
maintenance equipment as part of the LGM-30G weapon system and
requires the System Program Office to develop preventative
maintenance and/or replacement schedules for such equipment to
increase overall weapon system readiness.
The LGM-30G Minuteman III weapon system has been in
continuous service since 1970. In the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise
Review, the weapon system boundary was expanded beyond the
actual missile and launch control center but did not include
the unique maintenance equipment that Air Force personnel use
to maintain the system. As a result, many of these maintenance
items are essentially orphaned and maintained in an ad-hoc
fashion at wing-level repair facilities.
Sec. 1516--Contract authority for intercontinental ballistic missiles,
replacement equipment, and reentry vehicle test equipment and
components
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of the Air Force and the Direct Reporting Program
Manager for Critical Major Weapon Systems to enter into one or
more contracts for the procurement of not more than 125 arming
and fuzing assemblies, 48 nuclear certified tractors and
trailers, 116 arm/disarm switch replacements, and 13 test
support equipment systems. The provision would also authorize
the use of contracts for advance procurement and material and
equipment in economic order quantities associated with the
procurement of such items.
Sec. 1517--Modification to strategy to sustain Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missile and maximize end-of-life
margin
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1641 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) to modify the officials
responsible for establishing and executing the strategy to
sustain the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile
and maximize end-of-life margin.
Sec. 1518--Modifications to portfolio management framework for nuclear
forces
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 499c of title 10, United States Code, to change the
definition of ``nuclear forces'' to include ``military,
civilian, and contractor workforces,'' add the nuclear-armed
sea-launched cruise missile to the list of capabilities that
must reach initial operational capability prior to the
termination of the requirements of this section, and establish
January 1, 2027, as the required date for the Secretary of
Defense to implement a revised portfolio management framework
for the nuclear forces of the United States.
Sec. 1519--Modifications to reports on nuclear force reductions
The committee recommends a provision that would integrate
portions the legislative language of section 495 of title 10,
United States Code, into section 494 of title 10, United States
Code; make technical corrections to the consolidated language
of section 494 of title 10, United States Code; and repeal
section 495 of title 10, United States Code.
Sec. 1520--Modifications to biennial report on the plan for the nuclear
weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, nuclear weapons
delivery systems, and nuclear weapons command and control
system
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 492a of title 10, United States Code, by extending the
reporting period of this section through 2033, simplifying the
directive text, and establishing the future years defense
program and the future years nuclear security program following
the date of the report as the period of assessment for this
section.
Sec. 1521--Multipolar nuclear deterrence strategy and theater-range
nuclear capabilities
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize,
consistent with section 6120 of title 10, United States Code,
the establishment of up to two new or modified nuclear weapons
and associated delivery systems, provided one such capability
is primarily intended to be surface-launched and one such
capability is primarily intended to be air-launched. The
provision would also require the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to submit a report, not
later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, on a revised strategy of the Department of Defense for
deterring multiple nuclear-armed adversaries. The provision
would also establish a requirement that the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff annually brief the congressional defense
committees on their joint efforts to implement the conclusions
and recommendations of the strategy.
The committee recognizes that the United States is entering
a fundamentally new strategic era characterized by the
concurrent presence of two nuclear peer competitors, China and
Russia, each possessing expanding, diversifying, and
increasingly sophisticated nuclear arsenals. This emerging
multipolar nuclear environment represents the most significant
shift in the global strategic balance since the end of the Cold
War and poses unprecedented challenges for U.S. deterrence
strategy and force planning. China is engaged in a rapid and
opaque expansion of its nuclear forces, including the large-
scale construction of intercontinental ballistic missile silos,
the development of advanced delivery systems, and the fielding
of theater-range nuclear capabilities designed to coerce the
United States and its allies. Russia continues to expand and
modernize its nuclear arsenal, including a substantial
inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons and novel systems
intended to exploit perceived gaps in United States and allied
deterrence posture. These challenges are further exacerbated by
North Korea's continued expansion and diversification of its
nuclear arsenal, which poses unique threats to the United
States, its allies, and interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
The committee believes the scale, pace, and diversity of
these developments increasingly strain the assumptions
underpinning a U.S. nuclear posture designed for a bipolar
strategic environment. The committees also believes that the
most recent National Defense Strategy fails to adequately
recognize, characterize, or operationalize the requirements of
deterring two nuclear peer adversaries simultaneously and that
it lacks the specificity necessary to guide force structure,
posture, and capability development decisions. In particular,
the National Defense Strategy does not provide sufficient
detail regarding how the Department of Defense will ensure the
ability to hold at risk a sufficient number and diversity of
targets across multiple nuclear-armed adversaries to maintain a
counterforce strategy consistent with the Law of War, nor does
it identify the force structure implications of such
requirements. The absence of clear guidance in the National
Defense Strategy risks delaying necessary investments,
obscuring critical capability gaps, and undermining the
credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments.
The committee strongly believes that the modernization of
the U.S. nuclear triad, including the Columbia-class ballistic
missile submarine, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic
missile, the B-21 bomber, the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon, and
the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, remains essential and
should be fielded on expedited timelines. The committee also
believes that additional theater-range nuclear capabilities
will likely be required to ensure the United States can
credibly deter limited nuclear use and manage escalation across
multiple theaters simultaneously. The committee considers the
recapitalization of the nuclear security enterprise by the
National Nuclear Security Administration to be indispensable to
sustaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S.
nuclear deterrent and believes these efforts should be
accelerated wherever possible, using all available policy,
regulatory, and statutory tools at the administration's
disposal. In parallel, the committee urges the Administrator
for Nuclear Security to accelerate efforts to modernize
production capabilities and strengthen the workforce of the
Nuclear Security Enterprise.
The committee also recognizes that military capabilities
are only part of the solution to the deterrence of nuclear
threats and that the Department of Defense has not provided
sufficient clarity or analytical rigor in the National Defense
Strategy regarding the implications of a multipolar nuclear
environment for U.S. strategy, force structure, and operational
planning. The committee strongly believes the Department should
promptly revise and supplement its strategic guidance to
explicitly address the requirements of deterring and, if
necessary, responding to nuclear coercion or employment by
multiple peer adversaries. This requires the United States to
urgently adapt its nuclear posture to ensure the capability to
hold at risk a sufficient number, variety, and geographic
distribution of targets across more than one nuclear-armed
adversary simultaneously, while preserving a targeting strategy
that relies on holding militarily-significant locations and
capabilities at risk. In doing so, the committee believes the
Department should assess, develop, and, as appropriate, deploy
additional theater-range nuclear capabilities to address
identified deterrence gaps and provide the President with
credible, flexible response options, as a failure to clearly
define and resource a strategy for multipolar nuclear
deterrence risks eroding strategic stability, weakening allied
confidence, and inviting adversary miscalculation.

Subtitle C--Missile Defense

Sec. 1531--Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system and Israeli
cooperative missile defense program co-development and co-
production
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
funding for the procurement of the Iron Dome short-range rocket
defense system, David's Sling Weapon System, and Arrow 3 Upper
Tier Interceptor Program as outlined under the Memorandum of
Agreement between the United States and the government of
Israel for cooperative missile defense programs.
Sec. 1532--Enduring operational capability for the Guam Defense System
Command and Control Facility
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, as
the Senior Official Responsible for the Missile Defense of
Guam, pursuant to section 1660(b)(1) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263), to
certify to the congressional defense committees that, before
the Guam command and control facility is declared operational,
there is a continuity of operations plan and that there are
facilities that can assume the functions of the command and
control facility if it were to become non-operational.
The Guam Missile Defense System comprises a large array of
sensors and integrated air and missile defense interceptors
deployed across the island. These sensors and interceptors are
integrated into a command-and-control architecture. The Guam
Missile Defense Command and Control facility located on the
island will orchestrate the battle management command and
control of this architecture. Given the singular importance of
the facility, it is apparent to the committee that there must
be a continuity of operations plan and appropriate facilities
if the command-and-control facility were to become non-
operational.
The committee further requires that when such certification
is made the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment and the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command brief
the congressional defense committees on the continuity plan and
facilities within 45 days.
Sec. 1533--Further limitation on availability of funds pending
independent analysis of space-based missile defense capability
The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
obligation or expenditure of 25 percent of the funds authorized
to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for
fiscal year 2027 for Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide,
and available to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering for travel purposes, until the
date on which the Secretary of Defense submits the report
required by section 1671(d) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31).
Sec. 1534--Modification of Golden Dome missile defense system annual
reporting
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1652 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) to modify the official
responsible for preparing and submitting, to the congressional
defense committees, annual reports on the Golden Dome missile
defense system from the Secretary of Defense to the Direct
Reporting Program Manager for Golden Dome for America.
Sec. 1535--Limitation on availability of funds pending submission of
the briefing on sea-based launch platforms for ballistic
missile defense targets
The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
obligation or expenditure of 10 percent of fiscal year 2027
Office of the Secretary of the Navy travel funds until the
Secretary provides the briefing required on page 278 of Senate
Report 119-39, accompanying S. 2296.
Sec. 1536--Comprehensive integrated air and missile defense sensor
coverage of Guam
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense, acting through the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Director of the
Missile Defense Agency, and in coordination with the Commander,
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Army Portfolio Acquisition
Executive--Fires, to take such actions as are required to
ensure full operational capability for the Aegis Guam System,
including emplacement of no fewer than two AN/TPY-6 radars, by
not later than September 30, 2030.
Sec. 1537--Repeal of requirement for Government Accountability Office
to review and assess missile defense acquisition programs
The committee recommends a provision that would repeal
section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), as most recently amended
by section 1664 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31).
Sec. 1538--Improvements to air and missile defense acquisition
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, to complete an assessment of U.S. Armed Forces and
foreign specified partner air and missile defense systems and
interceptors in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility
and submit a report on the findings to the congressional
defense committees.

Subtitle D--Other Matters

Sec. 1541--Sense of the Senate, Inspector General review, and
restoration and remediation plans for United States Army,
Kwajalein Atoll, and the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test
Range
The committee recommends a provision that would express the
Sense of the Senate that the condition of U.S. facilities
located on the Kwajalein Atoll represents an abject failure of
U.S. Army leadership and that the persistent lack of progress
in rectifying such conditions amounts to an abdication of the
Army's responsibility to maintain the capabilities of the
Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range, sustain the
associated infrastructure for U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll, and
adequately provide for the health and welfare of the full
complement of military, civilian, and contractor personnel
assigned to the installation. The provision would also: (1)
Require the Inspector General of the Department of Defense
(DOD), within 150 days of the date of the enactment of this
Act, to conduct a review of the condition of DOD infrastructure
on Kwajalein Atoll and evaluate the circumstances that led to
the current state of the facilities; (2) Require the Deputy
Secretary of Defense to develop an initial plan for restoring
DOD test and evaluation capabilities and remediating
infrastructure on the atoll and submit said plan to the
congressional defense committees; (3) Require the Secretary of
the Army to annually update said plan and provide a cost
estimate for implementing said plan; and (4) Require the
Comptroller General of the United States to conduct an annual
review of DOD facilities located on the atoll, submit a report
on findings, and brief the congressional defense committees.
The committee is profoundly concerned that the Army's
inability to maintain these capabilities has jeopardized
billions of dollars in critical investments to modernize U.S.
munitions stockpiles, develop a national integrated air and
missile defense architecture through the Golden Dome for
America initiative, and recapitalize the Nation's nuclear
deterrent forces. The committee expects the Secretary of the
Army to immediately prioritize efforts to restore U.S.
facilities on the Kwajalein Atoll to a state of full mission
capability and to establish clear standards of performance for
the future to ensure that the Army does not repeat the actions
that led to the current state of affairs.
Sec. 1542--Limitation on the reallocation of funds for the Ronald
Reagan Space and Missile Test Range and United States Army
Garrison Kwajalein Atoll
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the reallocation of any appropriated funds or funds otherwise
made available for the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test
Range or United States Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll and
require such funds be obligated or expended only for the
purposes for which funds are authorized and appropriated or
otherwise made available.
Sec. 1543--Notifications with respect to relocating Department of
Defense systems out of certain spectrum frequencies
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Department of Defense (DOD) Chief Information Officer (CIO) to
notify the congressional defense committees within 30 days of
initiating any study to relocate DOD systems out of spectrum
frequencies assigned to non-Federal entities. Following
notification, the CIO must complete a cost and operational
readiness assessment and provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees within 60 days, and then the
CIO must submit a written report within 90 days. This provision
also prohibits the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year
2027 funds for any such relocation until both the briefing and
report requirements have been fulfilled.
Sec. 1544--Annual briefing on Department of Defense activities
associated with participation in the International
Telecommunication Union World Radio Conference
The committee recommends a provision requiring annual
briefings, starting on March 31, 2027, and continuing each
calendar year through 2031, on activities by the Department of
Defense with respect to participation in events leading up to
and in the International Telecommunication Union World Radio
Conference (WRC), which is held every 3 to 4 years. The
committee must understand the cost and readiness impacts of any
proposal for studies and especially the adoption of any WRC
studies on the Department.
The briefing shall be delivered by the Department of
Defense Chief Information Officer and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, with delegation as necessary. In developing
the briefing, the Chairman shall take into account the views of
the Chiefs of each of the Armed Forces to represent the
readiness of the Department as a whole.
Sec. 1545--Report on efforts to counter foreign espionage and
intellectual property theft targeting defense assets
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of such
other Federal agencies as the Secretary considers appropriate,
to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, on efforts of the Department of Defense (DOD) to counter
espionage and intellectual property theft by China targeting
DOD installations, research institutions, and the defense
industrial base.
Sec. 1546--Department of the Air Force electronic warfare roadmap
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
chapter 25 of title 10, United States Code, by requiring the
Secretary of the Air Force to develop an integrated air and
space capabilities electronic warfare roadmap, not later than
March 31, 2027.
Currently, the utilization of electronic warfare
capabilities resides in each Armed Service within the
Department of the Air Force with little apparent integration
between them. The purpose of this roadmap is to integrate the
two Services' capabilities in presentation of electronic
warfare effects to a combatant command and to minimize any
duplication.
This roadmap shall be updated every odd year based upon a
rolling 10-year threat assessment. The committee expects the
roadmap to represent an integrated capabilities framework
between air and space systems. Examples include the use of
space data layer networks as a means to rapidly update air
frame electronic attack and defensive systems. Since this
roadmap is the first of its kind, the committee requires an
assessment by the Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Executive
Committee (EW EXCOM) as defined in chapter 25 of title 10,
United States Code. If successful, the committee's expectation
is that other Armed Forces will develop a similar roadmap to be
reviewed by the EW EXCOM for a Joint Force presentation of
effects to the combatant commands. Finally, the congressional
defense committees shall be briefed on the roadmap produced
every odd year in consultation with the EW EXCOM.
Sec. 1547--Using operational electronic intelligence assets to engage
high-value targets
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that the National Security
Agency approves, directs, and enables the direct and immediate
dissemination of all operational electronic intelligence data
collected on high-value targets to military command nodes in
the U.S. Indo-Pacific and European Command areas of
responsibility.

Items of Special Interest

Affordable dual-capable air-launched strike capabilities
The committee is concerned that the evolving security
environment increasingly requires the United States to deter
and, if necessary, prevail in simultaneous or overlapping
crises across multiple theaters. The committee notes that
potential adversaries continue to expand and diversify their
inventories of long-range conventional and nuclear-capable
strike systems, including cruise missiles, ballistic missiles,
and hypersonic weapons designed to hold United States forces,
allies, and partners at risk.
The committee further recognizes that current and planned
United States air-launched strike capabilities often involve
highly specialized systems optimized for either conventional or
nuclear missions, are procured in relatively limited
quantities, or may not be affordable to produce at the scale
required for sustained operations in a protracted conflict. As
a result, the committee believes the Department of the Air
Force should evaluate opportunities to leverage common
technologies, production infrastructure, and modular designs to
develop more affordable and scalable air-launched weapons
capable of supporting both conventional and strategic
deterrence requirements.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering, to conduct an assessment of options for
developing a family of affordable, dual-capable air-launched
cruise missiles, air-launched ballistic missiles, and air-
launched hypersonic glide vehicles to include a conventional
variant of the Long Range Stand-Off Weapon that could be
produced at scale and employed by both fighter and bomber
aircraft.
The assessment shall examine:
(1) Operational requirements for dual-capable air-
launched weapons across the Indo-Pacific, European, and
other geographic combatant command theaters;
(2) Opportunities to employ common airframes,
propulsion systems, guidance packages, launch
interfaces, and other subsystems across conventional
and nuclear mission sets;
(3) Options for integrating such weapons onto current
and planned Air Force fighter and bomber aircraft;
(4) Anticipated acquisition, procurement,
sustainment, and lifecycle costs associated with
alternative concepts;
(5) Production capacity, supply chain considerations,
and opportunities to maximize surge manufacturing
capability during crisis or conflict;
(6) The extent to which commercially derived
technologies, digital engineering approaches, open-
system architectures, and nontraditional defense
contractors could reduce development timelines and
program costs;
(7) The relative advantages, limitations, and
operational risks associated with cruise missile,
ballistic missile, and hypersonic glide vehicle
approaches;
(8) Opportunities to increase magazine depth and
provide commanders with a broader range of survivable
strike options at short-, medium-, and long-range
distances; and
(9) Any legislative, budgetary, policy, or
infrastructure-related considerations relevant to the
development, deployment, and sustainment of such
capabilities.
Not later than April 1, 2027, the Secretary of the Air
Force shall brief the congressional defense committees on the
results of the assessment, including recommendations for
potential prototype efforts, technology demonstrations,
acquisition strategies, and investments necessary to support
the development of affordable, scalable dual-capable air-
launched strike systems.
Assessing Department of Defense and National Nuclear Security
Administration compliance with congressional direction on the
nuclear sea-launched cruise missile
The committee is deeply concerned by the Department of
Defense's (DOD) and the National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) apparent reticence in expediting the
development and fielding of the nuclear-armed, sea-launched
cruise missile (SLCM-N) program, despite clear statutory
direction to do so and public endorsements on the urgent need
for this capability by our Nation's highest ranking military
officers--including successive Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and Chiefs of Naval Operations. Despite repeated
assurances by DOD and NNSA personnel of their commitment to the
program, it is difficult for this committee to interpret the
failure to request fiscal year 2027 funding in support of this
obligation, even as the Department submitted an unprecedented
$1.5 trillion budget, as anything but an absolutely unnecessary
programmatic risk given the potential for successive continuing
resolutions and a clear disregard of explicit congressional
intent.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Navy, the Administrator for Nuclear Security, the Director of
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Policy and Programs, without delegation and
not later than August 1, 2026, to brief the Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces on: (1) The status of the SLCM-N program; (2)
DOD actions to enable the program to achieve the statutorily
directed fielding dates; and (3) The policies and procedures to
be implemented to ensure the Department will consistently and
adequately resource the SLCM-N program to fully comply with
statutory obligations specifically and congressional intent
generally.
Assessment of orbital data center services
The committee recognizes the increasing volume of data
generated by national security space systems and the potential
operational benefits of emerging commercial capabilities that
enable data processing, storage, and analytics in space. The
committee notes that orbital data center services and space-
based cloud computing capabilities may offer advantages in
reducing latency, improving resilience, and enhancing mission
effectiveness in contested environments.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense
Innovation Unit, to conduct an assessment of the viability and
military utility of commercially available orbital data center
services and space-based cloud computing capabilities for
national security space and joint mission requirements. The
assessment should evaluate potential operational use cases,
integration with existing and planned Department of Defense
architectures, resilience and mission assurance benefits, and
any challenges associated with adoption or transition to
operational use and should be conducted not later than December
31, 2027.
The committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to
provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not
later than March 1, 2028, on the results of the assessment,
including mission applications evaluated, key findings, lessons
learned, and recommendations regarding future acquisition
strategies or operational employment of orbital data center
services.
Autonomous Electromagnetic Spectrum Dominance and Edge Resilience
The committee recognizes that the 2026 National Defense
Strategy identifies electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) superiority
as a prerequisite for maintaining U.S. military advantage and
deterring adversaries in increasingly contested operational
environments. The committee acknowledges that the Army Research
Laboratory's collaborative research efforts through Project
Autonomous EMS Dominance and Edge Resilience (AEDER) to develop
leap-ahead capabilities in communications, sensing, data
processing, and electronic warfare. By integrating artificial
intelligence and machine learning with cyber and
electromagnetic operations, Project AEDER seeks to accelerate
the development of autonomous capabilities capable of
detecting, identifying, and responding to adversary actions at
machine speed while protecting friendly systems from
interference and attack.
The committee is particularly encouraged by research
efforts focused on resilient communications and adaptive
antenna technologies, autonomous swarm and counter-swarm
operations, advanced multi-modal sensing and positioning
capabilities, and AI-driven tactical edge computing. These
technologies have the potential to enhance situational
awareness, strengthen resilient communications in contested
environments, improve protection against electronic attack, and
accelerate decision-making at the tactical edge.
Accordingly, the committee emphasizes that sustained
funding for Project AEDER is critical to maturing these
technologies, accelerating their transition to the warfighter,
and achieving and maintaining dominance across the
electromagnetic spectrum.
Briefing on a unified intercontinental ballistic missile depot
The committee appreciates the efforts of the Direct
Reporting Program Manager for Critical Major Weapon Systems
(DRPM (CMWS)) to improve integration across the Air Force
intercontinental ballistic missile mission space, especially
the enhanced focus on managing the sustainment of the LGM-30G
Minuteman III (MMIII) system until it can be fully replaced by
the LGM-35A Sentinel. However, the committee remains concerned
that the extended transition period between these two weapon
systems will simultaneously present a unique sustainment
challenge at both the field and depot levels, and the Air Force
will be hard-pressed to manage this effort without identifying
opportunities to streamline maintenance support in a way that
allows for common equipment usage across both weapons systems.
Accordingly, the committee directs the DRPM (CMWS), in
coordination with the Commander, Air Force Global Strike
Command and the Commander, Air Force Materiel Command, to brief
the Senate Armed Services Committee on the feasibility of
establishing a unified intercontinental ballistic missile depot
approach to concurrently support the continued operational
fielding of the MMIII and the transition from MMIII to
Sentinel, while maximizing commonality across support
equipment, tooling, and maintenance personnel training. The
DRPM (CMWS) should provide this briefing not later than
February 1, 2027.

Briefing on acquisition of Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space
Sensor

The committee recognizes the critical importance of Golden
Dome for America and advancing our missile defense capabilities
to counter emerging and evolving threats posed by both
ballistic and maneuverable hypersonic missiles. The successful
deployment of advanced missile defense systems is paramount in
maintaining national security and ensuring the defense of the
Homeland. In this regard, the committee strongly emphasizes the
significance of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space
Sensor (HBTSS) capability, which underwent exhaustive
competition and deployment of a successful prototype under the
Missile Defense Agency. The HBTSS provides real-time tracking
and early detection of hypersonic and ballistic missiles over
an operationally relevant range of threat trajectories,
enabling timely and effective interception. The space-based
sensor network is essential for providing continuous global
coverage, high-resolution tracking, and improved discrimination
of complex threat environments.
To this end, in the spirit of the Acquisition
Transformation Strategy's focus on delivering capability and
speed and scale, embracing proven capabilities that are ready-
now, the committee directs the U.S. Space Force to prioritize
acquisition and operational deployment of a full constellation
of at least 45 space vehicles equipped with proven HBTSS
payloads within the anticipated Missile Defense Tranche 3
(MDT3) program. In consideration of the urgent need for this
capability, the committee recommends that the U.S. Space Force
expedite the MDT3 program by utilizing the flexibility of other
transaction authorities (OTA) to move already competed,
successful prototype demonstrations into production to
streamline the acquisition process. This approach will
facilitate rapid development and deployment while maintaining
rigorous oversight and accountability.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration and the
Director of the Missile Defense Agency to provide a detailed
briefing to the committee, not later than March 1, 2027,
outlining the comprehensive acquisition plan for the MDT3 HBTSS
constellation, including timelines, cost estimates, and the
intended use of sole source contracts and OTAs. The briefing
shall also address risk mitigation strategies and coordination
efforts with other relevant defense programs to ensure seamless
integration and functionality of the HBTSS.

Briefing on Air Force implementation of section 1634 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-
60)

The committee directs the Direct Reporting Program Manager
for Critical Major Weapon Systems, in coordination with the
Secretary of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Policy and Programs, to brief the congressional defense
committees, not later than October 1, 2026, on the progress of
the B-21 Raider program office specifically, and the Air Force
generally, in implementing the requirements of section 1634 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026
(Public Law 119-60), including: (1) A description of system
development and testing objectives and nuclear certification
processes and milestones required to fulfill section 1634
statutory requirements; (2) Program resourcing adjustments in
the current year of execution and across the current future
years defense program that the Air Force has taken to enable
the fulfillment of section 1634; and (3) Any other related
matters the directed officials believe relevant.

Briefing on continuity of operations for Space Development Agency
ground infrastructure

The committee recognizes the critical importance of
resilient ground infrastructure to support space-enabled
command and control, including space domain awareness, custody,
and fire control integration functions associated with
proliferated space architectures. The committee further notes
that future contested and degraded operational environments
will require the ability to maintain uninterrupted ground
operations and mission management functions supporting space-
based capabilities.
The committee is interested in ensuring that the Department
of Defense maintains continuity of operations for mission-
critical ground systems supporting space warfighting
capabilities, including geographically distributed resilience
and the ability to operate through disruption or attack.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Director of the Space
Development Agency, to provide a briefing to the congressional
defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the
Department's plan to ensure continuity of operations for ground
infrastructure supporting space domain awareness, custody, and
fire control missions associated with proliferated space
architectures. The briefing shall include: (1) The Department's
approach to establishing geographically distributed continuity
of operations capabilities to ensure resilient and
uninterrupted ground operations under degraded or contested
conditions; (2) How existing Space Operations Center
infrastructure is being leveraged or adapted to support
continuity of operations requirements; (3) The integration of
mission management functions within the broader ground
infrastructure supporting space-enabled command and control;
(4) The resources, infrastructure, and personnel required to
achieve and sustain continuous 24-hour, 7-day-per-week
operational capability; and (5) Key milestones, implementation
timelines, and risks associated with achieving full operational
capability for distributed continuity of operations functions.

Briefing on execution and results of allied and theater missile defense
review

The committee notes that the President's Executive Order
(14186) on Iron Dome for America, dated January 27, 2025, which
established the Golden Dome for America integrated air and
missile defense initiative, also directed the Secretary of
Defense to conduct ``. . . a review of theater missile defense
posture and initiatives to identify ways in which the United
States and its allies and partners can: (a) Increase bilateral
and multilateral cooperation on missile defense technology
development, capabilities, and operations; (b) Improve theater
missile defenses of forward-deployed United States troops and
allied territories, troops, and populations; and (c) Increase
and accelerate the provision of United States missile defense
capabilities to allies and partners.''
However, despite repeated inquiries with the Department of
Defense, the committee has been unable to ascertain the status
of this review, despite its apparent priority as a directive
from the President and the potential value of these activities
to the long-term success of the Golden Dome for America
initiative.
The committee recognizes the value of allied contributions
and cooperative development activities on missile defense
operations and technologies, appreciates the focus on these
efforts within the President's Executive Order, and strongly
believes there exists significant potential for expanding the
scale and scope of these efforts to address rapidly growing air
and missile threats.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than
December 1, 2026, on the status of the theater air and missile
defense review directed by the President's Executive Order on
Iron Dome for America, including any follow-on actions
resulting from said review, as appropriate.

Briefing on expanded use of medium-range air defenses for Homeland
defense

The committee recognizes that medium-range air defense
systems have protected the National Capital Region continuously
since 2005, are currently being acquired to support operations
of U.S. forces overseas, and serve allied and partner nations.
Recent combat operations in Ukraine have demonstrated
effectiveness rates exceeding 90 percent in engagements against
cruise missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and air-breathing
threats in all weather conditions with significantly low
downtime. These medium-range systems feature substantial U.S.
manufacturing content, utilize interceptor missiles already in
Department of Defense inventory, and have procurement timelines
within 24 months from contract award to fielding.
The committee is concerned that existing production
capacity constraints and current backlogs for interceptor
systems may limit near-term availability for Homeland defense
missions. The committee believes that diversifying interceptor
options, rather than further stressing existing production
bottlenecks, will enhance overall air and missile defense
capacity while supporting the defense industrial base goals
established in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60).
Therefore, the committee directs the Direct Reporting
Program Manager for Golden Dome for America to brief the
congressional defense committees, not later than December 1,
2026, on opportunities to expand the use of medium-range air
defense systems in the U.S. Homeland defense strategy and
architecture. The briefing shall include, at a minimum: (1) A
description and depiction of the current and objective Homeland
air defense posture and laydown; (2) Currently deployed defense
systems to counter cruise missile, unmanned aerial systems, and
air-breathing threats; (3) An assessment of the current posture
against these medium-range threats and an identification of
gaps or vulnerabilities against these threats; (4) An
assessment of available and feasible options to enhance medium-
range air defense capabilities, including those systems and
interceptors with production capacity available within 24
months that do not exacerbate current munitions backlogs or
create further supply chain risk; (5) The schedule and cost
projections for fielding and deploying the identified medium-
range air defense systems; and (6) An addressing of current and
projected defense industrial base demand when assessing the
availability and feasibility of the air defense system and
interceptor options.

Briefing on feasibility of designating Air Force Global Strike Command
as the National Center for Conventional-Nuclear Integration

The committee notes that section 9068 of title 10, United
States Code, establishes Air Force Global Strike Command and
provides that its Commander is the single accountable officer
responsible for carrying out all aspects of Air Force nuclear
and long-range strike missions in support of U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM), including nuclear command, control, and
communications systems and the development of employment
strategies, concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures for
strategic deterrence, nuclear deterrence operations, and long-
range strike operations.
Consistent with this designation, the committee directs the
Secretary of the Air Force to brief the congressional defense
committees, not later than April 15, 2027, on the feasibility
and advisability of establishing Air Force Global Strike
Command as the Department of the Air Force's ``National Center
for Conventional-Nuclear Integration,'' (CNI) consistent with
the roles, responsibilities, and functions of Air Force Global
Strike Command and its Commander under section 9068 of title
10, United States Code. At a minimum, the briefing should
include an assessment of the following responsibilities for
inclusion in the designation described above: (1) Develops and
maintains Air Force-wide CNI operational concepts, standards,
and implementation guidance to integrate conventional and
nuclear planning, command and control, and execution in support
of STRATCOM-assigned missions; (2) Establishes a governance and
coordination framework to synchronize CNI efforts across
relevant Air Force major commands, field commands, and centers,
and to align Air Force CNI implementation with STRATCOM's
operational requirements; (3) Identifies required training,
education, and exercise objectives to institutionalize CNI
proficiency across the force, including incorporation into
appropriate operational plans and readiness constructs; and (4)
Identifies CNI-related capability gaps and resourcing
priorities, including doctrine, interoperability, decision
support, and command and control enablers.
The briefing shall also address: (1) The organizational
approach and resourcing strategy for the National Center for
CNI, should such a designation be implemented; (2) Notional
objectives and milestones for institutionalizing CNI across
doctrine, training, exercises, and operational employment; and
(3) An assessment of the extent to which the designation
advances the statutory responsibilities of Air Force Global
Strike Command under section 9068 of title 10, United States
Code, in support of STRATCOM's nuclear and long-range strike
missions.

Briefing on feasibility of designating Joint Global Strike Operations
Center as an alternate command post to United States Strategic
Command Global Operations Center

The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in
coordination with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) and the Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command,
to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than
June 1, 2027, on the feasibility, military utility, risks, and
resource requirements of designating the Joint Global Strike
Operations Center (J-GSOC) at Barksdale Air Force Base as an
alternate command post to STRATCOM Global Operations Center. At
a minimum, the briefing shall address: (1) A proposed concept
of operations describing how the J-GSOC would assume and
sustain alternate command post responsibilities to support
STRATCOM-assigned nuclear and long-range strike missions across
steady-state operations, crisis response, and major conflict;
(2) The proposed command relationships, authorities, and
supported/supporting arrangements for the alternate command
post, including required coordination with STRATCOM, Air Force
Global Strike Command, Eighth Air Force, and associated
operational command and control nodes; (3) An assessment of
required communications and interoperability capabilities
(including redundancy, resiliency, and survivability) necessary
to perform alternate command post functions, including
interfaces with nuclear command, control, and communications
systems supporting STRATCOM-assigned missions; (4)
Identification of required facilities, infrastructure, and
military construction improvements, with cost estimates and a
notional execution timeline; (5) Identification of required
manpower to sustain continuous operations at the readiness
level required, including any specialized requirements
necessary to support nuclear and long-range strike command and
control; and (6) Identification of required funding resources
across the future years defense program to establish, operate,
and sustain the alternate command post, including near-term
resourcing actions and any legislative authorities the
Secretary determines necessary.

Briefing on in-space mobility, logistics, and sustainment capabilities

The committee recognizes that future space operations will
require the ability to maneuver, sustain, and reconstitute
space systems in orbit in order to support credible deterrence,
resilience, and sustained operations in a contested space
domain. The committee further notes that U.S. Space Command has
identified space mobility, logistics, and sustainment as a
critical capability gap, particularly with respect to on-orbit
maneuver, transportation, refueling, servicing, resupply, and
reconstitution of space assets across multiple orbital regimes.
The committee believes that establishing clear operational
requirements and an acquisition plan for in-space logistics and
sustainment is necessary to address this gap, enable more
resilient space architectures, and support sustained deterrence
and warfighting effectiveness. The committee further notes that
development of these capabilities would help strengthen the
domestic space industrial base by creating sustained demand for
emerging on-orbit service technologies.
Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space
Operations, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Space
Command, to provide a report and briefing to the congressional
defense committees on space mobility, logistics, and
sustainment requirements and capabilities, not later than June
1, 2027. The report and briefings shall include: (1) The
process and timeline for developing operational requirements
and an acquisition plan for space mobility, logistics, and
sustainment capabilities; (2) The defined requirements to
enable on-orbit maneuver, transportation, refueling, servicing,
resupply, and reconstitution of space assets across orbital
regimes; (3) How these capabilities will be integrated into
joint and combined operational concepts, planning, and
deterrence strategies; (4) An assessment of how space mobility,
logistics, and sustainment capabilities will support
resilience, crisis response, and sustained operations in a
contested environment; (5) Implications for force development,
including organizational constructs, roles, and
responsibilities needed to operationalize these capabilities;
and (6) An assessment of how these capabilities may support and
accelerate the growth of a domestic industrial base for on-
orbit servicing and logistics technologies.

Briefing on Lower Tier Air Missile Defense System Sensor sparing and
sustainment plan

The committee notes that the Lower Tier Air and Missile
Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) is the Army's primary radar for the
Integrated Air and Missile Defense used by the United States
and its allies and partners. Additionally, the committee notes
that the Army has been designated the lead to integrate the
LTAMDS into the existing Phased Array Tracking Radar to
Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) weapon system architecture for
the United States and its 19 PATRIOT partner nations across the
globe.
The committee understands that global missile defense
posture will rely heavily on LTAMDS capabilities to meet
growing demand for defense against advancing tactical ballistic
missile and air breathing threats and to withstand increased
requirements for radiation or ``burn time'' necessary to
prevent threat leaks through the layered defense architecture.
However, the committee is concerned that the Army has not
adequately defined the sparing package required for each LTAMDS
radar to ensure the system stays fully mission capable to meet
demanding unified combatant commands' commander requirements
for air defense of forward-deployed forces. The lack of a
dedicated sparing risks undermining billions of dollars in
LTAMDS procurement over the Department of Defense's future
years defense programming as the warfighter will not have on
hand the necessary spares required to keep the radar
operational. This lack of adequate sustainment planning is seen
in the extreme case of the Army's current usage of a second
LTAMDS radar in Guam solely for cannibalization of parts for
the other radar in testing.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Army
to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than
March 1, 2027, on the sustainment and sparing plan for LTAMDS.
The briefing shall address, at a minimum:
(1) A system sustainment strategy overview and
support concept that details the sustainment needs of
the LTAMDS radar for warfighter requirements;
(2) A maintenance planning framework that ensures
long-term readiness of deployed systems;
(3) A supply support-approach that supports initial
and recurring spares and repairs;
(4) A plan for sustaining engineering services;
(5) Identification of near-term mission support gaps
and mitigation recommendations related to currently
deployed systems; and
(6) Any additional considerations the Secretary deems
necessary.

Briefing on options for development of low-cost space-based
interceptors in support of Golden Dome for America

The committee is concerned about emerging threats to the
Homeland as near-peer adversaries build and diversify their
missile inventories. The drastic increase in the volume and
capability of cruise, ballistic, hypersonic, and space-based
missile threats over the last several years requires a
transformational response. The air and missile defense system
proposed by Executive Order 14186, commonly known as Golden
Dome for America, may provide the architecture necessary to
provide a lasting, modern defense against these emerging
threats. The architecture's effectiveness is reliant on the
successful development and deployment of a proliferated space-
based interceptor (SBI) network of constellations to defeat
incoming threats. In addition to a proliferated SBI network,
the Department of Defense must deploy an all-inclusive mesh
command and control solution that connects all capabilities
into a single domain to provide theater-level insights for all
potential threats.
The committee is aware of commercially available terminals
able to combine electronic warfare for terrestrial and space
domain awareness, artificial intelligence for electronic
warfare and sensor fusion applications, and secure tactical
communications with a software-defined radio and on-orbit
software programmable crypto developed specifically to address
these challenges. Commercially available space terminal
providers offer qualified low earth orbit (LEO) space payloads
and relevant application experience to meet Golden Dome and
Space Force needs and may aid in driving down costs for an SBI
constellation.
The committee encourages the U.S. Space Force to procure,
test, and evaluate commercial terminals launched and qualified
in LEO for integration into the future Golden Dome architecture
that can demonstrate electronic warfare for terrestrial and
space domain awareness, artificial intelligence for sensor
fusion applications, and secure tactical communications with
software-defined radio and programmable crypto. The terminals
evaluated should, at a minimum, provide target detection,
identification, geolocation, sensor fusion, and target tracking
to meet the relevant LEO space platform mission requirements.
The committee both acknowledges the need for an SBI
capability and recognizes the potentially high cost associated
with the development, procurement, and sustainment of even a
deployed interceptor capacity. Therefore, the committee
encourages the Department of Defense to prioritize affordable,
scalable, mass-producible SBI capabilities to ensure
effectiveness while reducing the cost per successful intercept.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in consultation with the Under Secretary of
Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Research
and Engineering, and the Chief of Space Operations, to brief
the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, on the development, procurement, and operational
deployment strategies for the SBI program. The briefing shall
cover, at a minimum: (1) Projected costs to achieve the minimum
capacity of the Department's operational deployment strategy of
SBIs, including the projected cost of development, procurement
of interceptor rounds, launch, and fleet replenishment; (2) An
initial assessment of industry options that meet defined
criteria for affordability and scalability, including
technological readiness, integration potential with current
systems, and how these options align with the overall strategic
objectives of the SBI program; and (3) Analyses regarding the
effect private capital investments have on the speed to ramp
production and affordability.

Briefing on plan for defending Golden Dome assets from autonomous and
remotely piloted aircraft

The committee notes that the growing proliferation of
autonomous and remotely piloted aircraft represents a growing
threat to U.S. installations, facilities, and equipment
worldwide. In light of this risk, the committee is concerned
about the vulnerability of critical ground assets to autonomous
and remotely piloted threats to the Golden Dome for America
(GDA) architecture. To ensure the survivability of radars,
satellite communication nodes, and interceptor sites, the
committee believes that the Department of Defense should
develop a tailored approach to defending these assets and
prioritize counter-unmanned aircraft systems (cUAS) investments
appropriately.
Accordingly the committee directs the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Direct Reporting Program
Manager for Golden Dome for America, to brief the congressional
defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027, on the
Department's assessment of:
(1) The vulnerability of critical GDA assets to
autonomous and remotely piloted aircraft threats;
(2) Non-kinetic solutions uniquely suited for the
defense of critical assets in the Homeland, including
high power microwave systems;
(3) Plans to accelerate the deployment of non-kinetic
point defense solutions, including associated
resourcing requirements;
(4) Any policy and regulatory barriers to the
effective employment of non-kinetic cUAS initiatives
under the GDA and the current pathway for system
approval by interagency stakeholders as required; and
(5) Ongoing efforts to test and evaluate commercially
available technologies for critical point defense
against UAS threats in the Homeland.

Briefing on progress of reconversion of Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarine missile tubes

The committee notes that as part of the United States'
efforts to comply with the provisions of the now-expired treaty
between the United States and Russia on Measures for the
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
or New START, a number of Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarine missile launch tubes underwent a conversion process
to remove the capability of these tubes to carry or launch
ballistic missiles. Public Law 119-21 contained a provision for
the enhancement of resources for nuclear forces, providing
$62.0 million to reconvert these tubes and make them once again
operationally available to the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command as a means of offsetting the rapid growth and
diversification of China's and Russia's nuclear arsenals.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Navy, in coordination with the Direct Reporting Program
Managers for Submarines and the Director of Navy Strategic
Systems Programs, to brief the congressional defense
committees, not later than January 15, 2027, on the Navy's
progress toward executing the funding for missile tube
reconversion, as well as any such related actions, including
the procurement of additional Trident II ballistic missiles,
necessary to fully reactivate these missile tubes.

Briefing on proliferated space architectures

The committee notes the importance of proliferated space
architectures for enabling resilience and mission assurance for
national security needs derived from space-based capabilities.
The committee observes that proliferated space architectures in
low earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) for
communications, missile warning, and other space control
missions disproportionately benefit from the resilience
provided by proliferation.
The committee further notes that proliferated architectures
for these mission areas provide an asymmetric advantage to the
U.S. national security community and deny first-mover advantage
to adversaries targeting space-based capabilities. Furthermore,
the committee expresses interest in the potential for the
Department of the Air Force to leverage ``productized,''
domestically produced commercial satellite buses to accelerate
the deployment of these constellations while reducing non-
recurring engineering costs.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the benefits of
transitioning core mission areas of the U.S. Space Force to
proliferated space architectures in LEO and GEO. The briefing
should include the following: (1) An assessment of how the core
functions of the U.S. Space Force would benefit from more
proliferated space architectures across all mission areas and
orbital regimes; (2) An assessment of the benefits of
proliferated space architectures in ensuring persistent mission
availability that denies adversaries first-mover advantage in
times of conflict; (3) An evaluation of the cost, schedule, and
performance implications of transitioning to proliferated space
architectures while leveraging commoditized, domestically
produced buses, including production metrics such as yearly
production rates of a single design that measure the ability to
deliver buses at scale and on rapid timelines; (4) An
assessment of how such scalability and production capacity
contribute to survivability and continuity of operations; and
(5) An identification of the challenges of transitioning to
such an architecture within the next 24 months and a mitigation
plan to address those challenges.

Briefing on radiation source testing capacity

The committee is concerned that existing radiation source
testing capacity is insufficient to meet the current and future
demands of simultaneously modernizing Department of Defense
nuclear, missile defense, and space capabilities.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the
Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, the
Direct Reporting Program Manager for Critical Major Weapon
Systems, and the Direct Reporting Program Manager for Golden
Dome for America, to brief the congressional committees, not
later than March 31, 2027, on anticipated gaps in strategic
radiation testing capabilities needed for nuclear weapon system
modernization and missile defense, including Fast Burst Reactor
availability.

Briefing on reactivation of Grand Forks Air Force Base nuclear
facilities

The committee notes that Grand Forks Air Force Base once
housed two legs of the nuclear triad and all the support
facilities that went along with that task. The B-52 nuclear
mission was housed there from 1963 to 1994, and the base's
intercontinental ballistic missile mission lasted from 1966 to
1998. In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, the
Department of Defense reduced its nuclear force capacity and
closed or developed alternative missions for numerous
facilities. However, as a new era of expanded nuclear
competition with Russia and China has dawned, the committee
believes it is prudent to reexamine the current limited nuclear
footprint and begin assessing options for increased dispersal,
resilience, and increased operational flexibility.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy
and Programs, to brief the congressional defense committees,
not later than March 31, 2027, detailing: (1) The condition of
the nuclear storage facilities on Grand Forks Air Force Base;
and (2) The feasibility of refurbishing and certifying such
facilities to handle and store nuclear weapons again.

Briefing on resource sufficiency for National Strategic Research
Institute

The committee recognizes that, in 2012, the Department of
Defense (DOD) established a university-affiliated research
center (UARC) at the University of Nebraska, sponsored by the
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). As the only DOD UARC aligned
to a combatant command, the National Strategic Research
Institute (NSRI) is uniquely positioned to be responsive to
warfighter perspectives in ways that other UARCs are not
institutionally capable.
The committee recognizes that this arrangement, lacking the
traditional military service sponsor, has constrained budgetary
resources to support vital research for STRATCOM and the DOD on
the policy and technical dimensions of strategic deterrence and
escalation dynamics, multi-actor deterrence, peer-to-peer
multi-domain strategic competition, extended deterrence with
partners and allies, nuclear command and control modernization,
and electromagnetic spectrum warfare, control, and management.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Commander, STRATCOM,
in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, to brief
the congressional defense committees, not later than October 1,
2026, on options to enhance enduring resources to support NSRI
research activities, including an assessment of the
advisability of transferring sponsorship of the NSRI from
STRATCOM to the United States Air Force account, consistent
with other UARCs.

Briefing on space and nuclear risk reduction measures among the United
States, Russia, and China

The committee recognizes that intensifying strategic
competition among the United States, Russia, and China is
occurring alongside increasing reliance on space-based
capabilities and the continued salience of nuclear deterrence.
The committee notes that the absence of sufficient
transparency, predictability, and risk reduction mechanisms in
both the nuclear and space domains increases the potential for
miscalculation, escalation, and unintended conflict. In the
absence of treaty-based mechanisms, measures for consistent
analytical reporting and transparency between the executive
branch and Congress remain important for informed oversight of
United States nuclear policy, force posture decisions,
strategic stability, and risk reduction among the United
States, Russia, and China.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological
Defense, Policy and Programs, in coordination with the
Administrator for Nuclear Security, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy, and the Director of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, to brief the congressional defense
committees, not later than April 15, 2027, on existing and
potential nuclear and space risk reduction measures. At a
minimum, the briefing shall include:
(1) A detailed description and assessment of existing
bilateral and multilateral defense mechanisms,
agreements, and informal arrangements involving the
United States, Russia, and China that are intended to
reduce the risks of nuclear conflict and escalation, as
well as miscalculation in the space domain;
(2) An evaluation of potential options for further
actions the Department of Defense, in coordination with
interagency and allied partners, could pursue to
strengthen space security and reduce space-related
nuclear risks, including:
(a) measures to mitigate and respond to the
creation and proliferation of orbital debris,
including debris resulting from anti-satellite
weapons testing or use;
(b) initiatives to promote responsible
behavior in space, including norms, rules, and
transparency measures;
(c) approaches to improve the resilience and
protection of critical space-based systems that
support nuclear command, control, and
communications and other strategic missions;
and
(d) opportunities for bilateral or
multilateral engagement with strategic
competitors aimed at reducing the risks of
misinterpretation or escalation stemming from
activities in space;
(3) An evaluation of the feasibility, risks, and
limitations associated with integrating additional
verification and transparency measures into current or
future nuclear systems, postures, and operations,
including:
(a) the potential benefits and drawbacks of
increased transparency for strategic stability;
(b) technical and operational challenges
associated with implementing such measures;
(c) risks to the survivability, security, and
effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces and
supporting systems; and
(d) potential vulnerabilities arising from
adversary exploitation of transparency or
verification mechanisms, including risks to
sensitive information, operational security,
and deterrence credibility; and
(4) An assessment of how proposed or existing risk
reduction measures in the nuclear and space domains
affect U.S. allies and partners, including implications
for extended deterrence, assurance, and allied space
capabilities, as well as any recommendations for
additional initiatives that may increase stability.

Briefing on space debris reduction through transient materials

The committee is aware of the growing accumulation of man-
made debris in low Earth orbit and the risks such debris poses
to national security space systems, commercial satellites, and
civil space activities. The committee notes that emerging
technologies, including transient and degradable materials, may
offer innovative approaches to mitigating long-term orbital
debris while preserving mission effectiveness.
The committee believes the Department of Defense should
further explore the feasibility and operational utility of such
technologies, including through collaboration with institutions
of higher education, federally funded research and development
centers, and commercial partners with expertise in advanced
materials and space systems.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Chief of Space Operations, to provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, on the feasibility, operational effectiveness, and
potential implementation pathways of transient-material
technologies for space debris reduction.
The briefing shall include: (1) An assessment of material
degradation timelines, performance characteristics, and
compatibility with existing and planned space systems,
including implications for mission assurance; (2) An evaluation
of operational, environmental, and safety considerations; (3)
Identification of opportunities for collaboration with
academic, commercial, and federally funded partners; and (4)
Preliminary recommendations for future research, development,
testing, and evaluation efforts, including pilot programs or
demonstrations.

Briefing on space-based solar power and commercial solar technologies
for proliferated architectures

The committee supports the Department of Defense's focus on
rapidly delivering capability to the warfighter, strengthening
the domestic defense industrial base, and leveraging commercial
innovation and non-traditional suppliers to maintain advantage
in a contested space domain. The committee further recognizes
that the growth of proliferated space architectures and layered
missile defense systems will require a significant increase in
space-based systems, which in turn depends on a resilient and
scalable domestic industrial base capable of producing space-
qualified power components at volume.
The committee is interested in understanding how the United
States Space Force plans to leverage commercially available,
domestically manufactured silicon-based photovoltaic
technologies to support rapid deployment of space systems,
including technologies capable of high-volume production and
modular integration to support proliferated architectures.
Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space
Operations to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the Space Force's
plans to incorporate commercially scalable solar power
technologies into future space architectures. The briefing
shall include:
(1) Space capabilities and programs under
consideration for transition to a more proliferated and
distributed architecture;
(2) An assessment of the ability of commercially
available silicon photovoltaic technologies, including
advanced and modular solar cell designs, to meet the
power requirements of those capabilities and programs;
(3) A comparison of relevant solar power approaches,
including advanced multi-junction technologies and
commercially produced silicon-based solutions, in
supporting emerging mission needs; and
(4) An assessment of how increased use of
commercially produced solar technologies could improve
mission assurance, supply chain resilience, and
operational flexibility for space-based systems.

Briefing on strategic radioisotope supply chains

The committee believes that securing supply chains for
radioisotopes is a top national defense priority across the
Department of Defense. The committee notes that radioisotopes
are a key material component for several critical national
security technologies, including power systems, radiation
detection equipment, and non-destructive material analysis.
The committee further notes that the supply chains to
produce, recover, process, or otherwise make available
strategic radioisotopes domestically, or acquire strategic
radioisotopes from ally countries, remain vulnerable and
subject to disruption. The committee recognizes that foreign
adversaries are using strategic radioisotopes to develop
advanced military technology and that the United States cannot
lag behind in developing competing and superior radioisotope-
based technologies. Therefore, the Department of Defense should
prioritize efforts to bolster strategic radioisotope supply
chains as part of the larger national effort to reinvigorate
the national defense industrial base.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, in coordination with the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the
Secretary of the Air Force, and the Secretary of the Navy, to
brief the congressional defense committees, not later than
March 31, 2027, on:
(1) The status of current strategic radioisotope
supply chains, including domestic production and
availability across the full life cycle from feedstock
access (including government-owned materials) through
recovery, purification, processing, and preparation of
radioisotopes into forms usable for defense
manufacturing and integration, and known
vulnerabilities in these chains;
(2) Projected Department of Defense demand for
strategic radioisotopes necessary to sustain existing
capabilities and to enable advanced energy and power
technologies to support operations in austere
environments, including commercial radioisotope power
systems for subsea and space applications, with
specific consideration of strontium-90 and americium-
241 over the coming future years defense program;
(3) Opportunities to better secure existing
radioisotope supply chains through expanded use of
Department of Defense support programs, such as the
Industrial Base Fund established under section 4817 of
title 10, United States Code; and
(4) Recommendations to strengthen domestic strategic
radioisotope supply chains, including statutory
adjustments, investments, or policy actions to improve
access to feedstock, processing capacity, and
manufacturing ready material.

Briefing on strategy and funding for Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services
program

The committee is highly interested in ensuring continued
and stable funding for the Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services
(EMSS) program, including the EMSS Gateway located in Wahiawa,
Hawaii, and the associated remote feeder link at Tobyhanna Army
Depot, Pennsylvania. The committee views the EMSS program and
its supporting infrastructure as a critical national security
capability that provides assured global connectivity for the
Joint Force, interagency partners, allies, and coalition
partners.
The committee is concerned that the EMSS program and
Gateway are not currently resourced with sufficient stability
and predictability to sustain operational requirements,
including cybersecurity, life cycle sustainment, and end-of-
life replenishment. The committee further notes the importance
of ensuring that the EMSS program evolves to meet emerging
mission needs, including through research and development, the
expansion of operational capabilities, and enhanced
functionality for users.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees,
not later than January 1, 2027, on the status of the EMSS
program. The briefing shall include an assessment of the
Department's plan to ensure stable and predictable funding for
the program, including: (1) Consideration of centralized
funding mechanisms; (2) The approach to sustaining and
modernizing the EMSS Gateway and associated infrastructure; and
(3) How the Department will ensure the program meets current
and future mission requirements, including research and
development, capability expansion, and improved user
functionality.

Briefing on Transportable Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal
Increment 1

The committee notes that an important element of nuclear
command, control, and communications is the ability for the
reconstitution of forces after or during deployment. This
aspect is addressed through the Transportable Global Aircrew
Strategic Network Terminal Increment 1 kits. Thus far, the
committee has been unable to determine the number of such kits
that will be required.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, not later than March 31, 2027, to brief the
congressional defense committees on: (1) The number of such
kits required and their respective functional users; (2) Where
the kits will be stored; (3) How they will be maintained and
through what Air Force depot; and (4) The expected unit cost
per kit.

Briefing on very low earth orbit

The committee recognizes the benefits of very low earth
orbit (VLEO) to national security, including increased
communications, improved Earth imaging, and a self-cleaning
orbital environment. Further, the committee recognizes that
resilient VLEO operations, enabled by advances in propulsion,
materials, autonomous orbital management, and power systems can
provide enhanced responsiveness, higher-resolution sensing,
orbital diversity, and deterrence against debris-generating and
nuclear radiation threats through inherent survivability and
rapid reconstitution, improving continuity of operations under
contested conditions.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 31, 2027, to identify
opportunities and gaps in research, development, test, and
evaluation that require further exploration and testing by the
Department of Defense. The briefing should include how those
opportunities and gaps can be addressed by funding research at
institutions of higher education, what resources would be
required by the Department to fund this research, and how the
capabilities of non-profits and academic institutions bring
expertise in real-time modeling and in-space measurement that
complements commercial and government capabilities.

Cislunar space situational awareness mission and support

The committee notes the cislunar region, a vast and
strategically important orbit, lacks adequate U.S. space domain
awareness, creating a vulnerability to adversarial activities.
Expanding programs to include distributed sensing, autonomous
command and control frameworks, communication, and deep-space
positioning and navigation systems will enhance U.S.
capabilities in this critical, contested region. Developing
capabilities and operating within cislunar space is imperative
for the Nation to ensure national security, science and
technology, and economic advantages. The committee believes the
Secretary of the Air Force should prioritize and expand space
situational awareness, command and control, communication and
positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities using an
evolutionary acquisition approach for additional space vehicles
and expanded experimentation in cislunar space.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to brief the congressional defense committees, not later
than March 31, 2027, on actions taken to assess the value of
cislunar space to the Department of Defense.

Commercial satellite communications integrator innovative acquisition

The committee recognizes the increasing strategic,
operational, and tactical importance of resilient satellite
communications (SATCOM) for command and control and situational
awareness across all domains to enable successful U.S.
warfighting and lethality.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to brief the congressional defense committees, not later
than May 1, 2027, assessing acquisition approaches for
commercial SATCOM that maximize resilience, interoperability,
and cost-effectiveness. The briefing shall: (1) Assess the
operational benefits of communications path diversity using
multi-vendor capable commercial integrators that combine multi-
orbit, multi-bandwidth SATCOM services with available
terrestrial-based networks and private network gateways; (2)
Describe the potential costs savings of using multi-vendor
capable integrators as opposed to singular contractual vehicles
for specific frequency bands or vendors that provide a single
SATCOM pathway; and (3) Investigate the need for a hardware and
software full stack solution that allows for field-replaceable,
software-defined upgrades.

Comptroller General assessment of airborne moving target indicator
capabilities

The committee notes that the Department of Defense has
begun to invest in space-based airborne moving target indicator
(AMTI) capabilities while planning to divest of multi-role
airborne platforms such as the E-3 Sentry and to limit
recapitalization of such platforms. While the committee
supports the acquisition of space-based AMTI and other related
capabilities, the committee is concerned about how the
Department plans to coordinate future space-based systems,
operate these systems, and organize, train, and equip future
battle managers. Synchronizing these functions, currently
conducted, in many cases, within a single aircraft, is critical
to enabling the future fight.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General
of the United States to conduct a review of: (1) How the
department plans to coordinate taskings, collections, and
operations of space-based AMTI systems across users and
providers to meet combatant command and service needs; (2) The
extent to which the Department is prepared to operate AMTI
systems to provide intelligence within operationally relevant
timelines, including plans to organize, train, and equip battle
managers for these systems; and (3) Other matters deemed
necessary during the conducting of this review.
The Comptroller General shall provide an initial briefing
to the congressional defense committees, not later than March
31, 2027, with a report due at a time mutually agreeable
between the Comptroller General and the congressional defense
committees.

Comptroller General assessment of Department of Defense missile defense
systems acceleration efforts

The committee notes that the Department of Defense (DOD) is
placing increased emphasis on the acceleration of missile
defense systems and at theater and regional levels. This places
large challenges on the acquisition and production capability
of the existing production base to meet these acquisition
demands.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to review the:
(1) DOD activities related to increasing production
of theater and regional missile defense interceptors
and related missile defense systems, including but not
limited to radars and other sensors that the
Comptroller General deems appropriate;
(2) Efforts to increase production capacity,
throughput, and inventory levels of the same;
(3) Details on the levels of government investment
into new or enhanced facilities, authorities for
advanced procurement, expanding the industrial base to
new vendors, and other related efforts;
(4) Whether the efforts undertaken are likely to
result in timely increased production at the levels
needed to meet demand for the national missile defense
systems;
(5) U.S. military demands for theater and regional
systems to be mobile or emplaced outside the U.S.;
(6) Demand from allies and other international
customers; and
(7) The expected increase in production rate by year
and how that aligns with demand.
Not later than May 1, 2027, the Comptroller General shall
brief the congressional defense committees on the assessment
regarding the DOD's effort to increase production and inventory
levels of missile defense interceptors and related missile
defense systems, any risks or challenges associated with these
efforts, including issues related to available suppliers and
production capacity, and cost and schedules associated with
these efforts.

Comptroller General assessment of Golden Dome for America missile
defense system

The committee acknowledges that, over the past 20 years,
the Government Accountability Office has provided important
support to the Congress and the congressional defense
committees by annually reviewing the missile defense activities
of the Missile Defense Agency. That effort has now greatly
expanded with the initiation of the Golden Dome for America
missile defense system.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to review the Department of Defense
activities related to integrated missile defense acquisition
efforts intended for Homeland defense currently being pursued
under the Golden Dome for America missile defense initiative.
In particular, this review shall: (1) Identify the plans and
status of efforts to develop, integrate, and field a national
missile defense architecture; (2) Any cost, schedule, or
technical risks and Department of Defense efforts to address
these risks; (3) Plans to develop timely and cost-effective
sustainment of these systems; and (4) Any other topic that the
Comptroller General deems appropriate in consultation with the
congressional defense committees.
The committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to
ensure the Comptroller General has necessary access to
information at appropriate classification and facilities to
carry out such an assessment.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the
congressional defense committees, not later than May 1, 2027,
and annually thereafter through 2031, of the results of this
assessment and determine a mutually agreeable framework for a
report to the congressional defense committees on the
assessment.

Comptroller General assessment of operational fielding of directed
energy systems

The committee notes that directed energy technologies have
been the subject of long-term research and development across
the Department of Defense (DOD). As witnessed in Ukraine and
the Middle East, the modern evolving battlefield has
increasingly featured uses of drones and other previously novel
modes of attack. Traditional technologies, such as
interceptors, have been used to defend against these attacks
but are only available in limited quantities, and the cost of
developing and fielding those interceptors and related systems
is high. In some cases, reports identify that interceptors,
costing in some cases millions of dollars, are being used to
shoot down drones or other unmanned systems that cost one
thousand dollars or less.
In recent years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
has reported on directed energy systems, such as lasers and
high-powered microwaves, for defense against drones, unmanned
aircraft, and other attacks. The GAO has reported that the
advantages of these systems include low cost per shot and
potentially unlimited magazines available for defense.
In order to assist the committee as it considers options to
protect facilities, platforms such as ships, fielded troops and
for other purposes, the committee directs the Comptroller
General of the United States to provide a review of current DOD
plans for developing and fielding directed energy weapons. This
review shall: (1) Identify what systems are being developed;
(2) The planned and actual schedule for developing and fielding
these systems; (3) The expected and actual cost of these
programs; (4) What technical or other challenges these programs
are witnessing; and (5) Other matters deemed important by the
Comptroller General.
The committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to
ensure that the Comptroller General has necessary access to
information at appropriate classification and facilities to
carry out such an assessment.
Not later than May 1, 2027, the Comptroller General shall
brief the congressional defense committees and determine
whether to provide a report to the congressional defense
committees on the assessment.

Comptroller General assessment of reentry vehicles

The committee notes that, over the next decade, the
Department of the Air Force will continue to design, develop,
and field the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) system to replace the fielded Minuteman III ICBM.
Regular and sustained reviews by the Government Accountability
Office, as established by the Senate report accompanying S.
2943 (S. Rept. 114-255) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328), have been
essential to the congressional defense committees' oversight of
this program.
An important aspect of this oversight is the research,
development, acquisition and industrial based efforts related
to these future ICBM capabilities, particularly the next-
generation reentry vehicles intended to ensure the continued
capability of the ground leg of the nuclear triad.
To ensure that this review process continues, the committee
directs the Comptroller General of the United States to
continue these reviews through 2031 and to brief the
congressional defense committees on a periodic basis mutually
agreeable to both parties.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to
ensure that the Comptroller General has appropriate access to
classified information and facilities to continue this
oversight function.

Digital backbone of United States Space Force

The committee recognizes that the current Department of the
Air Force human resources information technology architecture
consists of numerous legacy and fragmented systems that may not
adequately support the operational, workforce management,
auditability, and readiness requirements associated with
implementation of the Personnel Management Act. Space Force has
identified the need for a unified and scalable human resources
management capability capable of integrating personnel data,
automating workflows, improving workforce analytics, and
supporting force readiness requirements across sustained-duty
and non-sustained-duty Guardian populations. The committee
believes that the modernization of Space Force personnel
systems is important to supporting operational agility, talent
management, readiness visibility, and enterprise data
management in support of the service's evolving warfighting
mission. The committee further recognizes that modern
enterprise systems may improve accountability, transparency,
and interoperability in support of the Department of Defense's
objective of achieving a clean audit by 2028.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations, to
provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not
later than March 1, 2027, on the status of Space Force human
resources information technology modernization efforts. The
briefing shall include:
(1) An assessment of projected cost savings and
operational efficiencies associated with modernization
efforts;
(2) An explanation of how modernization efforts will
support audit readiness and enterprise data management
objectives;
(3) A description of commercial technologies, cloud-
based architectures, automation capabilities, and data
integration tools being evaluated or implemented; and
(4) Any additional resources, authorities, or
legislative actions required to achieve full
operational capability by fiscal year 2028.

Electromagnetic pulse capabilities of China

The committee remains concerned that advances in China's
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) research, development, and
acquisition activities could pose a significant threat to
Taiwan. Given Taiwan's threat environment and geographic
positioning, a successful EMP or high-altitude electromagnetic
pulse (HEMP) strike could rapidly degrade the island's ability
to sustain its civilian population and mount an effective
defense. Given Taiwan's unique vulnerabilities, the committee
is concerned that China may view such an attack as an
attractive first strike in a conflict with the island because
the effects can be catastrophic while remaining below the
threshold of conventional armed attack.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Director of
National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Energy, to brief
the congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, on the following:
(1) The operational, research, and development
capabilities of China with respect to EMP and HEMP
weapons, including delivery systems and deployment
strategies;
(2) An assessment of Taiwan's current vulnerabilities
across civilian and defense-critical infrastructure,
including power generation and distribution, financial
systems, communications, transportation, and water and
healthcare systems;
(3) An assessment of existing United States-Taiwan
cooperation on EMP and HEMP resilience, including any
bilateral programs, security assistance efforts, or
information-sharing arrangements, and the current
status and progress of such efforts; and
(4) Recommendations for how the United States can
support Taiwan in strengthening its infrastructure
survivability against EMP and HEMP threats, including
through technical assistance, joint exercises, and
security cooperation.

Electronic warfare workforce at Fort Huachuca Electronic Proving Ground

The committee notes that the workforce for electronic
warfare and testing is a small and highly skilled workforce
sometimes taking decades to train and typically having an
outsized impact on Department of Defense electronic warfare
programs. The committee is concerned about staffing at the
Electronic Proving Ground (EPG), given recent actions on force
reduction in the Department.
Therefore, not later than March 1, 2027, and annually
thereafter through March 1, 2030, the Secretary of the Army
shall brief the congressional defense committees on staffing
levels at the EPG. The briefing shall include: (1) The number
of full-time employees as of the end of the preceding fiscal
year; (2) Efforts to ensure the EPG staffing is capable of
performing its necessary testing mission; and (3) A description
of any actions and the reason for force reductions of such
skilled staff at the EPG.

Enhancing adversarial testing for United States space assets

The committee notes that space systems, supporting
terrestrial infrastructure, and commercial space services
integrated into Department of Defense (DOD) operations face
sophisticated, evolving cyber threats, and that emerging
acquisition requirements for annual government-led adversarial
cybersecurity testing require a scalable execution model. The
committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, acting
through the Chief of Space Operations and in coordination with
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Space Acquisition and Integration, to assess and brief the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, on the development of a repeatable framework for
government-led adversarial cybersecurity testing of DOD space
Programs of Record, associated ground segments, supporting
commercial space services, and relevant launch infrastructure.
This briefing shall address: (1) A framework description:
governance, roles, authorities, and a methodology for
persistent adversarial engagement; (2) A method to emulate
nation-state tactics, techniques, and procedures and produce
mission impact findings assessing operational consequences; (3)
The ability to conduct testing on not fewer than two major
space programs, including ground infrastructure, with
prioritized remediation actions and assigned timelines; and (4)
The capability to extend testing to ground stations, launch
infrastructure, critical supporting utilities, and commercial
space services upon which DOD operations depend.

Expanding electronic warfare and counter-electronic warfare integration
and testing facilities

The committee notes that the Department of Defense (DOD)
must prioritize developing and implementing robust, integrated
counter-electronic warfare (EW) systems and hardware quickly
and at scale across all components. Counter-EW capabilities are
a critical gap for the DOD, and recent battlefield experiences
in Ukraine, Gaza, and other conflict zones demonstrate the
vulnerability of unmanned systems and munitions to EW attack
and interference. If DOD unmanned systems and munitions lack
counter-EW systems and hardware, they will be ineffective at
deterring peer competitors or prevailing in peer-to-peer
conflict. Most current and future DOD unmanned systems and
munitions should include integrated counter-EW systems that
harden them against EW attack and interference, including
communications, signal, multi-spectrum, and global positioning
system jamming and spoofing.
The committee believes that this hardware should be
integrated, because without an integrated counter-EW hardware,
unmanned systems are functionally ineffective under real-world
contested conditions. Accordingly, the DOD will accelerate
development, procurement, adoption, and implementation of
robust counter-EW systems and hardware, prioritizing
capabilities that protect command and control and the
precision, navigation, and timing of any unmanned systems and
munitions. This hardware must be integrated into new contracts,
systems, and munitions and must also be integrated into
existing contracts, systems, and munitions.

Facility damage at Space Force launch ranges due to launch

The committee notes that recent launch and landing
activities at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station and Vandenberg
Space Force Base involving heavy and potentially super-heavy
rockets have caused damage to government facilities. This
damage is primarily attributed to shock waves generated during
reentry, commonly referred to as ``sonic booms''. These
operations are conducted by participants in the National
Security Space Launch program, who effectively lease launch and
landing sites from the Air Force. Reported impacts include
shattered windows and, in some cases, damage to structural
elements of facilities.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to brief the congressional defense committees, not later
than March 31, 2027, on procedures for restitution of the
government facilities damaged from the shock waves caused by
launch and landing, how long this restitution can take, and
potential legislation, if any, that can expedite restitution or
other such preventive actions, if so required.

Feasibility and advisability of expanding Operation Olympic Defender

The committee recognizes that Multinational Force Operation
Olympic Defender (MNF-OOD), which reached initial operating
capability in April 2025 with seven allied nations and has
already demonstrated successful on-orbit operations and
interoperability, is a key framework for strengthening
deterrence, resilience, and responsible behavior in space.
Expanding participation to additional Indo-Pacific allies,
including Japan and the Republic of Korea, would further
reinforce burden sharing and enhance collective space domain
awareness in a strategically contested region.
Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space
Operations to submit to the congressional defense committees a
report, not later than March 31, 2027, on the feasibility and
advisability of expanding the MNF-OOD to include additional
allies in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan and the
Republic of Korea. The Chief of Space Operations shall also
provide a briefing on the findings of such report, on the same
date, to the congressional defense committees.
The report shall include:
(1) A description of current activities and
initiatives to support potential expansion of the MNF-
OOD to allied countries in the Indo-Pacific region,
including Japan and the Republic of Korea;
(2) An identification of any policy changes required
by the Government of Japan, the Government of the
Republic of Korea, or other identified allied
governments to enable a formal invitation to join the
MNF-OOD;
(3) An identification of any funding or policy
changes required by the U.S. Government to support the
accession of Japan, the Republic of Korea, or other
identified allied countries; and
(4) An assessment of:
(a) the implications of such accession for
U.S. national security interests;
(b) the feasibility of accession for Japan
and the Republic of Korea and whether such
accession would be in the national interest of
the United States; and
(c) any additional resources or authorities
required to execute such expansion.

Feasibility of establishing Joint Commercial Operations cells in the
Indo-Pacific region

The committee notes that the development of joint partner
nations' commercial space operations is an important mechanism
for sharing space domain awareness information and expanding
the capability for beyond-line-of-sight communications. In
particular, given the large area encompassing the Indo-Pacific
region, there are advantages to developing such joint
commercial space operations cells with regard to Department of
Defense operations.
Therefore, not later than May 1, 2027, the Commander, U.S.
Space Command, shall brief the congressional defense committees
on the feasibility and advisability of establishing additional
Joint Commercial Operations cells in the Indo-Pacific region to
complement existing such joint commercial cells in Australia
and New Zealand.
The briefing shall include the following: (1) An assessment
of the feasibility and advisability of establishing Joint
Commercial Operations cells in Japan, the Republic of Korea,
India, and any other jurisdiction in the Indo-Pacific region
the Commander considers appropriate; and (2) An identification
of any funding or policy change necessary to feasibly establish
Joint Commercial Operations cells in Japan, the Republic of
Korea, India, and any other jurisdiction in the Indo-Pacific
region the Commander considers appropriate.

Fort Huachuca electronic proving ground assessment

The committee recognizes the critical role of the
Electronic Proving Ground (EPG) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in
supporting testing and evaluation of electronic warfare,
communications, and spectrum-dependent capabilities across the
Department of Defense. The committee also recognizes that the
EPG operates the only National Security Agency-certified
TEMPEST facility in the United States, and their personnel are
level II certified. The committee further recognizes the
increasing importance of these capabilities to the missions of
the Space Force, particularly in contested electromagnetic
environments.
Therefore, given these unique attributes, the committee
directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with
the Chief of Space Operations and the Secretary of the Army, to
conduct a feasibility assessment of the utility of using Space
Force systems at the EPG. This assessment should also include
using Space Force Operational Test and Training Infrastructure
at the EPG, which is isolated from spectrum interference and
from light pollution--essential for optical systems.
Not later than May 1, 2027, the Secretary of the Air Force
shall brief the congressional defense committees detailing the
findings of the assessment, along with any recommendations for
legislative or administrative action.

Future space launch capacity

The committee remains concerned about the Nation's ability
to maintain sufficient, resilient, and geographically diverse
launch capacity to meet current and projected national security
space requirements and has consistently emphasized the
importance of assured access to space, launch infrastructure
resilience, and the availability of multiple launch providers
capable of supporting Department of Defense missions. The
committee is aware of the recent New Glenn launch vehicle
anomaly at Space Launch Complex 36 at Cape Canaveral Space
Force Station. Given the importance of resilient launch
infrastructure and sufficient launch capacity to support
national security space requirements, the committee directs the
Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report and provide a
briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later
than December 1, 2026.
The report shall include:
(1) A summary of the known facts regarding the
anomaly and the status of any ongoing investigations;
(2) An assessment of the impact of the anomaly and
any resulting infrastructure damage on the availability
of launch capacity and launch infrastructure supporting
national security space missions;
(3) An assessment of any resulting impacts to
National Security Space Launch program requirements,
mission assurance, launch resiliency, and assured
access to space objectives;
(4) An evaluation of the extent to which the anomaly
affects the assumptions, findings, conclusions, and
recommendations developed pursuant to section 1608 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2026 (Public Law 119-60), titled, ``Spaceport of the
Future Initiative and Study on Future Space Launch
Capacity'';
(5) An assessment of the risks associated with the
loss, degradation, or temporary unavailability of a
major launch vehicle or launch site, including the
risks to future launch capacity projections, surge
capability, and launch infrastructure resilience; and
(6) Any recommendations for modifications to the
Spaceport of the Future Initiative, future launch
infrastructure investments, launch capacity planning
assumptions, resiliency requirements, or acquisition
strategies based on lessons learned from the anomaly.
The report shall also identify any additional actions the
Department considers necessary to ensure adequate launch
capacity and resilient launch infrastructure to meet projected
national security space requirements.

Golden Dome modeling, simulation analysis, and reporting

The committee notes that the Golden Dome for America (GDA)
initiative, established by Executive Order 14186 on January 27,
2025, represents the most ambitious Homeland air and missile
defense effort in a generation. The committee further notes
that the GDA architecture is a ``system of systems'' comprising
space-,
air-, ground-, and sea-based sensors, kinetic and non-kinetic
interceptors, and an integrated battle management, command, and
control system intended to operate at machine speed. The
verification and validation of such an architecture against the
full spectrum of mixed-raid threats, including coordinated
ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile attacks combined with
low-cost unmanned aerial systems, requires modeling,
simulation, and analysis (MS&A) capabilities of a fidelity,
scale, and speed that exceed those of legacy Department of
Defense MS&A infrastructure originally fielded to support
discrete weapon systems rather than continental-scale, multi-
domain defense architectures.
In addition, the committee recognizes that the broader
commercial economy, including the autonomous vehicle, physical
artificial intelligence, electronic design automation, and
industrial digital twin sectors, has developed simulation,
digital engineering, and physical artificial intelligence
capabilities of a sophistication and scale that, in important
respects, surpass MS&A capabilities developed exclusively for
defense applications. Non-traditional defense contractors and
their underlying commercial products represent a significant
resource for the Department of Defense in scaling MS&A capacity
to meet the GDA mission.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Director of Golden Dome for
America, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation,
and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, to
submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than
March 1, 2027, a report on the use, integration, and
effectiveness of commercial and defense-adjacent modeling,
simulation and analysis (MS&A) capabilities in support of
Golden Dome for America.
At a minimum, the report should include the following:
(1) An inventory of commercial, defense-adjacent, and
Government-developed MS&A tools, digital proving ground
capabilities, and supporting high-performance computing
resources currently in use, planned for acquisition, or
under evaluation in support of GDA, including for each
the originating vendor or laboratory, the security
accreditation status, the verification, validation, and
accreditation status, and the Government data rights
position;
(2) A description of the open, modular, government-
owned reference architecture established for GDA MS&A,
including measures taken to prevent vendor lock-in, the
role of common authoritative threat models and
scenarios, and the mechanisms by which GDA performers
and prime contractors are required to interoperate with
the reference architecture;
(3) An identification of capability gaps in current
commercial, defense-adjacent, and Government MS&A
offerings--including with respect to threat
phenomenology, sensor modeling, command and control
representation, electronic warfare and cyber effects,
and human-in-the-loop integration--and a plan, with
associated funding requirements by fiscal year, to
close such gaps;
(4) A description of how MS&A capabilities developed
or procured under this direction are being made
available as shared services to the Missile Defense
Agency, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Space Command, U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command, the military departments, the
National Guard Bureau, and other appropriate entities,
including any limitations on such availability and any
associated cost-sharing arrangements; and
(5) Any legislative, regulatory, or policy
recommendations the Deputy Secretary of Defense
considers necessary or appropriate to accelerate the
adoption, accreditation, and integration of commercial
and defense-adjacent MS&A capabilities in support of
GDA.
The report should be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex. The committee further directs
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, or a designee, to provide a
briefing to the congressional defense committees on the
contents of each report, not later than 30 days after
submission, and to be available to respond to questions of the
committees.

In-space mobility industrial base and supply chain risk

The committee recognizes that in-space mobility is a
critical enabler for national security space missions,
permitting maneuver, survivability, orbital logistics, and
freedom of sustained action in contested environments where the
adversary is already perfecting orbital warfare techniques. The
committee is concerned that key components underpinning in-
space mobility, particularly propulsion, including thrusters,
valves, and related subsystems, are sourced from a fragile and
highly constrained industrial base, creating potential single-
point failures and strategic vulnerabilities. These industrial
vulnerabilities inhibit the Department of Defense's ability to
generate, sustain, and reconstitute space combat power,
therefore requiring a resilient and scalable industrial base to
achieve and maintain space superiority in support of Joint
Force operations across all domains.
The committee notes that many propulsion and fluid-control
components essential to in-space mobility are produced by a
limited number of domestic suppliers, rely on foreign sources
or foreign sub-tier dependencies, or lack sufficient surge
capacity to support rapid scaling in anticipation of sustained
conflict. The committee further notes that these
vulnerabilities could constrain the Department of Defense's
ability to field and operate space systems capable of
maneuvering, repositioning, refueling, servicing, or rapid
reconstitution.
Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in coordination with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition
and Integration, to brief the congressional defense committees,
not later than March 1, 2027, on supply chain risks associated
with in-space mobility capabilities.
The briefing shall include: (1) An assessment of the
current domestic and allied industrial base for propulsion
components and other critical components required for in-space
mobility; (2) Identification of supply chain vulnerabilities;
(3) An evaluation of how these vulnerabilities impact the
Department of Defense's ability to field resilient,
maneuverable, and sustainable space architectures; (4) An
assessment of ongoing Department of Defense efforts to mitigate
these risks; and (5) Recommendations for acquisition,
industrial base, and policy actions, within existing
authorities, to strengthen domestic production, reduce foreign
dependence, and ensure assured access to critical in-space
mobility components.

Incorporating lessons learned from allies and enabling international
cooperation related to Golden Dome for America

The committee acknowledges and appreciates the value of
allied experience in missile defense development and production
programs, as well as with real-world missile defense operations
and believes that it is vitally important to utilize these
lessons learned to inform ongoing efforts for the Golden Dome
initiative. The committee also strongly encourages the
Department of Defense to fully implement section 4 of Executive
Order 14186, or ``Iron Dome for America,'' and substantially
increase cooperation on missile defense efforts with allied and
partner nations. The committee believes it is imperative to
consider lessons learned from Israeli missile defense programs
such as Iron Dome; David's Sling; Arrow I, II, and III; and
Iron Beam.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to brief the congressional defense committees, not later than
March 1, 2027, on:
(1) How lessons learned from Israeli integrated air
and missile defense operations, particularly since
October 7, 2023, are being incorporated into doctrinal
development central to Golden Dome, ensuring concepts
reflect continuous, real-world air defense operations;
and
(2) An assessment of how the Department of Defense
plans to increase bilateral and multilateral
cooperation on missile defense technology development,
capabilities, and operations with trusted allies under
current defense agreements and arrangements, including:
(a) How pre-existing allied integrated air
and missile defense capabilities, including
U.S.-Israel Cooperative Missile Defense
Programs and programs under the Trilateral
Security Cooperation Framework among the United
States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, can
support next-generation integrated air and
missile defense architecture;
(b) Consistent with section 1214 of the
Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159), whether
utilizing Israeli air defense systems at scale
within the Golden Dome architecture could
expand interceptor capacity and coverage at
comparable cost to United States-only force
designs for theater-level defense capabilities;
(c) Recommendations on how to create
standard, shared network protocols to assist
integration with trusted allies under current
defense agreements and arrangements within
next-generation integrated air and missile
defense architecture;
(d) Recommendations to streamline or waive
export control and related technology transfer
authorities to enable precleared, but closely
monitored, development that also protects
security and intellectual property of all
involved parties;
(e) The extent to which Israel's inclusion in
next-generation integrated air and missile
defense architecture could serve as a model for
a global defense framework with other allies
and partners and increase partner burden-
sharing and supply chain resiliency; and
(f) Any other matters the Secretary considers
relevant to further increase bilateral and
multilateral cooperation with trusted allies
under current defense agreements and
arrangements.

Infrastructure requirements for National Security Space Launch
operations at Kodiak

The committee recognizes the growing importance of
responsive and resilient access to space for national security
missions and the strategic value of the Pacific Spaceport
Complex Alaska as a launch location capable of supporting polar
and high-inclination missions. The committee understands that
additional infrastructure investments may be required to
support current and future national security space launch
requirements at Kodiak.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a report and associated briefing on the report
to the congressional defense committees, not later than April
1, 2027, assessing the infrastructure, capability, funding, and
authority requirements necessary to support current and future
national security space launch operations at Kodiak.
The report should identify the modifications, upgrades, and
investments and feasibility thereof required to enable future
and expanded Space Force and national security launch
activities; provide estimated costs associated with such
investments; and identify any statutory, regulatory, funding,
organizational, or authorities-related gaps that could impede
development of these capabilities.
The report should also include an assessment of
requirements for:
(1) Permanent classified mission support
infrastructure, including Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facilities, SIPRNET connectivity, JWICS
connectivity, and other secure communications
capabilities;
(2) Climate-controlled vehicle integration
facilities, payload processing facilities, cleanrooms,
and other weather-resilient infrastructure necessary to
support launch vehicle assembly, payload integration,
spacecraft processing, and mission assurance activities
in Arctic operating conditions;
(3) Modular and vehicle-agnostic launch pad
infrastructure capable of supporting multiple
commercial and government launch providers;
(4) Range safety, radar, telemetry, tracking, and
command-and-control systems necessary to support
increased launch cadence and complex national security
launch trajectories;
(5) Fuel and propellant storage, transportation, and
handling infrastructure necessary to support responsive
launch operations;
(6) Resilient energy and power generation
capabilities, including microgrids and backup power
systems; and
(7) Housing, transportation, port, road, and
logistics infrastructure required to support military
personnel, contractors, and sustained launch
operations.
The committee further directs the Secretary to identify
opportunities for public-private partnerships and commercial
investment that could accelerate infrastructure development at
Kodiak and provide recommendations regarding how such
investments could be leveraged to support future Department of
Defense missions, including investments supporting launch
vehicle integration, payload processing, and responsive space
operations.

Initial Operational Capability of space control weapon systems

The committee notes that a key acquisition feature of
Department of Defense weapon systems is to spiral the
acquisition development so that the warfighter is given not a
perfect solution but one that works initially and is refined
thereafter. The concept of a weapon system for the U.S. Space
Force and, in particular, a space control weapon system is
relatively new given the U.S. Space Force itself is 6 years
old. Issues such as test and training are essentially new
concepts for space warfighting systems. Yet in the other title
10 Services, spiral development and test and training are
longstanding objectives. Space Force Instruction 13-604,
``System Acceptance,'' is the first integrated approach to
fielding space weapons systems. The first step, however, is
entry into the system acceptance process. The normal
nomenclature would be Initial Operational Capability, which in
effect drives down into the acquisition process a date by which
system development should be pressurized to achieve. It is not
a complete solution, but it does get the weapon system into the
warfighter's use for additional test and training in order to
give feedback for material improvement.
This iterative process, starting with an Initial
Operational Capability, is found in a Chief of Space Operations
note to Guardians, C-Note #38, April 24, 2026, ``Space
Acquisitions--A Warfighting Imperative.'' It states, ``An 80
percent solution in the warfighters' hands today is infinitely
more valuable than a 100 percent solution that arrives late.
Well-intentioned setbacks are not failures, but rather a means
to learn and improve. In fact, taking more calculated risk in
capability delivery can decrease operational risk in the end.''
Therefore, the committee directs the Chief of Space
Operations to review all ongoing Space Control Weapons System
acquisition programs to determine if these programs are set
with an Initial Operational Capability date to pressurize the
acquisition program development not for a 100 percent solution
but one that is 80 percent. The Chief of Space Operations shall
brief the congressional defense committees on his findings,
with recommendations, not later than March 1, 2027.

Integration of space domain awareness in joint exercises and training

The committee recognizes that space domain awareness (SDA)
is a foundational capability for the Joint Force. It underpins
the ability to detect, track, characterize, and respond to
threats in an increasingly congested and contested space
environment. Peer and near-peer adversaries are expanding their
on-orbit and counterspace capabilities. Persistent and
resilient space domain awareness is therefore essential to
protecting United States and allied space assets and to
maintaining freedom of operation in the Indo-Pacific region.
The committee further recognizes that joint and combined
exercises with allies and partners are a critical venue for
testing and maturing expeditionary and deployed SDA
capabilities. Commercial providers are key contributors to
these emerging capabilities. The committee believes structured
pathways are needed to transition technologies demonstrated in
exercises into programs of record and other acquisition
vehicles. The committee also values interoperability with
allies and partners, and it is concerned that classification
barriers and data-sharing constraints may limit allied
participation in SDA exercise scenarios.
Therefore, the committee directs the Commander, U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command, in coordination with the Chief of Space
Operations and the Commander, U.S. Space Command, to brief the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, on the integration of SDA capabilities into joint and
combined military exercises with allies and partners in the
Indo-Pacific region. The briefing shall include the following:
(1) An identification and description of each joint
and combined exercise conducted or planned in the area
of responsibility of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command that
incorporates or is planned to incorporate expeditionary
or deployed space domain awareness capabilities,
including the scope of allied and partner participation
in each such exercise;
(2) An assessment of current capability gaps in space
domain awareness for Joint Force exercises in the Indo-
Pacific region;
(3) A description of how commercial and emerging
space domain awareness technologies, including
artificial intelligence and machine learning-enabled
analytics, advanced sensing systems, and outputs from
applied research and rapid prototyping programs, are
tested, evaluated, or demonstrated in operationally
relevant exercise environments;
(4) An assessment of the role of small business and
early-stage dual-use technology companies in developing
and providing space domain awareness capabilities
tested or demonstrated during such exercises;
(5) An identification of structured pathways for
transitioning space domain awareness technologies
demonstrated in exercises, including technologies that
have been transitioned or are in the process of
transitioning because of demonstrations during
exercises, into programs of record or other acquisition
vehicles, and a description of any barriers to such
transition, including funding gaps, classification
constraints, and acquisition process timelines, and
recommendations for legislative or administrative
actions to accelerate SDA technology transition from
exercise demonstration to operational fielding; and
(6) An assessment of ally and partner
interoperability with respect to space domain awareness
in exercises.

Investigation of Global Positioning System Next Generation Operational
Control System

The committee notes that in 2010, the Air Force initiated
the Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX) for the
Global Positioning System (GPS) Satellite System III. This
control system was to take full advantage of military grade
encryption as well as cyber hardness. The contract for
production was awarded to Raytheon at roughly $3.7 billion with
work to be performed at its Aurora, Colorado, facility and
completed by 2016. A key tenet of the acquisition acceleration
was for the Government to accept the product under a Department
of Defense Form 250 (DD250) before final operational
acceptance. Normally, a DD250 acceptance is not obtained until
all defects or liens under the contract are resolved. Due to
poor performance with the Development, Security, and Operations
software production framework to incorporate cyber security,
the program was forced to undergo a critical Nunn-McCurdy
breach (section 4375 of title 10, United States Code) as per
section 1610 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328). The program was to be
subsequently re-baselined with a service cost position of $8.3
billion and was ready to transition to operations (RTO) in the
3rd quarter of fiscal year 2022. An independent cost position
was $8.5 billion with an RTO date of the 1st quarter of fiscal
year 2023. Due to ongoing delays and cost-overruns, the OCX was
not transferred to the Department until the summer of 2025.
On April 17, 2026, the congressional defense committees
were informed that the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment cancelled the program, stating
that, ``The OCX program has long been plagued by technical
challenges, inadequate systems engineering processes, and
vendor underperformance that has resulted in numerous schedule
slips and associated cost growth.'' Further, the statement said
that the existing GPS control system built by Lockheed Martin
would be modified to meet cyber security requirements in order
to control the GPS III and IIIF constellation.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to conduct an Acquisition Incident Review (AIR) of the
OCX program and to brief the congressional defense committees,
not later than January 31, 2027. Sixty days after receipt of
the AIR, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the
United States to independently review the AIR and brief its
findings to the congressional defense committees.
The committee and the Comptroller General have closely
followed the OCX program since its inception, pointing out
problematic decisions by both the Air Force and the prime
contractor Raytheon. It is important to perform an examination
of the failed effort to understand the root causes and avoid
repeating them in the future.

Launch ranges for medium and small lift capacity

The committee notes that the Public Law 119-21 provided
significant mandatory funding for National Security Space
Launch (NSSL) infrastructure to support assured access to
space, launch resiliency, and increased launch capacity in
response to growing NSSL demand. While the two existing Space
Force ranges, the Eastern Range and the Western Range, are
capable of heavy and super heavy launch capacity, a wide range
of non-Space Force ranges exist capable of NSSL medium and
small lift capacity. They can take the increasing launch rate
burden from the two major Space Force ranges. This is important
given that the blast radius of heavy and super-heavy launch
pads is so large that adjacent launch operations cannot proceed
for long periods of time, affecting other launch providers,
including those that provide medium and small lift capacity.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to brief the congressional defense committees, not later
than March 31, 2027, on efforts to utilize these non-Space
Force launch ranges as a means to ease the launch burden on the
Eastern Range and the Western Range, and to list support given
to these ranges for their use.

Prioritization of commercial off-the-shelf tools at National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

The committee recognizes the growing importance of
multimodal artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities across the
defense intelligence enterprise, particularly semantic search
functionality applied to geospatial datasets. The committee
encourages the Department of Defense (DOD) and the defense
intelligence enterprise, especially the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), to prioritize investigation and
adoption of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions where
appropriate, rather than defaulting to custom-built tools that
may duplicate existing commercial capabilities. The committee
appreciates the value of domain-specific development for
certain mission-unique requirements but believes that broader
adoption of COTS AI and semantic search platforms would allow
the DOD and the NGA to better focus their skilled workforces
toward tradecraft and tools that are unique to their mission
sets.
The committee believes that the NGA and the broader defense
intelligence enterprise should take a more deliberate approach
to evaluating COTS solutions as part of their AI investment
strategy, including for multimodal and semantic search
applications. Therefore, the committee directs the Director of
the NGA to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services
Committee, not later than June 1, 2027, addressing the
following: (1) The NGA's approach to semantic search; (2) The
NGA's overall AI investment strategy; and (3) An assessment of
tools broken out comparing COTS AI tools versus government-
developed AI solutions.

Proliferated space architectures

The committee notes the importance of proliferated space
architectures for enabling resilience and mission assurance for
national security needs derived from space-based capabilities.
Proliferated space architectures in low earth orbit (LEO) and
geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) for fire control,
communications, missile warning, and other space control
missions disproportionately benefit from the resilience
provided by proliferation. Proliferated architectures for these
missions' areas provide asymmetric advantage to the U.S.
national security community and deny first-mover advantage to
adversaries targeting space-based capabilities.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on how the core
mission areas of the Space Force would benefit from
transitioning to proliferated space architectures in LEO and
GEO through the acquisition of productized, domestically
produced commercial satellite buses. The briefing shall
include: (1) An assessment of how the core functions of the
Space Force would benefit from more proliferated space
architectures across all mission areas and orbital regimes; (2)
An assessment of the benefits of proliferated space
architectures in ensuring persistent mission availability that
denies adversaries first-mover advantage in times of conflict;
(3) The cost, schedule, and performance implications of
transitioning to proliferated space architectures while
leveraging commoditized domestically produced buses; and (4)
The challenges of transitioning to such an architecture within
the next 2 years and a mitigation plan to address those
challenges.

Rapid rocket resupply for contested logistics

The committee recognizes that future conflicts may involve
contested environments in which traditional airlift, sealift,
and fixed logistics infrastructure are degraded or denied
during the opening phase of operations. The committee believes
that space-enabled contested logistics initiatives, including
globally deployed, cost-effective, mass-producible terrestrial
suborbital delivery concepts and related rapid-response launch
capabilities, may provide a globally available tactical
resupply capability to support the delivery of high-priority
supplies into denied terrestrial environments when conventional
pathways are disrupted.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, acting through the Chief of Space Operations, to assess
the ongoing and planned rapid rocket resupply initiatives for
contested logistics within space access, mobility, and
logistics efforts. The assessment shall include: (1)
Operational use cases; (2) Integration with joint logistics
planning processes; (3) Technical and regulatory barriers to
fielding; and (4) Pathways to accelerate operational
demonstration.
The Secretary shall brief the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on findings and any
recommended policy or legislative changes necessary to advance
space-enabled contested logistics capabilities.

Report on acceleration of commercial dynamic space operations
capabilities

The committee recognizes that domestic commercial space
companies have made significant investments in innovative
spacecraft, services, and technologies relevant to Dynamic
Space Operations (DSO), including in-space mobility, servicing,
logistics, and autonomous operations. The committee believes
that integrating mature commercial capabilities can accelerate
deployment timelines, reduce costs, and enhance operational
flexibility to meet national security objectives. Accordingly,
the committee encourages the Department of the Air Force and
the U.S. Space Force to prioritize the rapid adoption and
fielding of commercial DSO capabilities.
The committee further supports the establishment of an
integrated acquisition approach for DSO capabilities within the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space
Acquisition and Integration to serve as the lead for acquiring
and integrating operational DSO systems and services. The
committee expects such an effort to improve cross-mission
integration, align requirements with operational needs, and
enable the transition of demonstrated capabilities into
operational use on an accelerated timeline.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Chief of Space
Operations, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, and in
consultation with the Commander, U.S. Space Command and the
head of Space Systems Command, to provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees, not later than June 1, 2027,
and to submit a report on the same date, on efforts to
accelerate the development, integration, and fielding of DSO
capabilities.
The briefing and report shall include: (1) An inventory of
current and planned investments in DSO capabilities across the
future years defense program, including associated program
elements, schedules, and identified capability gaps; (2)
Opportunities for enhanced collaboration with the domestic
commercial space industry, including the use of rapid
acquisition authorities, commercial item procedures, and
service-based acquisition approaches; (3) A roadmap to field
additional DSO capabilities outside existing programs of record
within 18 months, including technology transition pathways,
milestones, decision points, and risk management
considerations; (4) A funding profile by fiscal year required
to execute such a roadmap; (5) A plan to define necessary
government interfaces to ensure appropriate operational
authority and control while minimizing government ownership;
and (6) Identification of statutory, regulatory, or policy
barriers to accelerated fielding, along with recommendations to
address such barriers.
The committee expects the briefing and report to prioritize
the adoption of mature commercial capabilities and to describe
how DSO capabilities will be integrated into joint operational
concepts and tasking. The report shall be submitted in
unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

Report on dynamic spectrum sharing and strategic spectrum capabilities

The committee recognizes the increasing demand for
electromagnetic spectrum and the necessity of advancing
national security requirements with commercial innovation
simultaneously. The committee notes the Department of Defense's
ongoing efforts to implement section 9203 of the William M.
(Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283) and the potential for Advanced
Dynamic Spectrum Sharing (ADSS) to optimize this finite
resource.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not
later than March 31, 2027, on the Department's progress in
developing dynamic spectrum sharing technologies and its
progress in fulfilling the requirements of section 9203 of the
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2021. The report should include: (1) A summary
of the findings from the 2025 ADSS demonstration including
technical feasibility impacts on incumbent military radar
systems; (2) An evaluation of the technological maturity of
interferences-mitigation features necessary to protect critical
mission functions during shared use; (3) An assessment of the
Department's current ability to dynamically share spectrum with
non-Federal entities; (4) A roadmap to full capability
maturation; and (5) Recommendations for real-world deployments.

Report on Guam Defense System programmatic performance

The committee directs the Secretary of the Army, in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, on:
(1) A life cycle cost estimate of the fully
integrated Guam Defense System, including total phased
costs in then-year dollars, the estimate's underlying
ground rules and assumptions, and any additional
analyses to validate the estimate's costs or range of
costs, such as risk and uncertainty analyses. At a
minimum, the report shall address the costs to:
(a) procure missile defense hardware,
including:
(i) sensors and radars;
(ii) missiles and launchers;
(ii) command and control systems; and
(iv) network and communication
systems;
(b) transport and field missile defense
hardware;
(c) research, develop, test, and evaluate
hardware specifically for Guam Defense System
activities, including activities of the fully
integrated system;
(d) software development, specifically the
Joint Integrated Battle Manager;
(e) military construction;
(f) operations and sustainment, including
advanced planning and infrastructure
sustainment, renovation, and maintenance funds;
(g) munitions; and
(h) civilian and military personnel,
including quality of life supporting functions;
(2) The integrated master schedule for the Guam
Defense System, including an update on the status to
meet and achieve key acquisition milestones and a
summary of risks to the program schedule, including:
(a) program milestones based on current
scheduled activities;
(b) logical sequencing;
(c) resource loading;
(d) a schedule basis document to define the
organization of the integrated master schedule,
schedule fields, and other key schedule
characteristics; and
(e) a schedule risk assessment;
(3) An independent technical risk assessment for the
Guam Defense System, including:
(a) critical technologies and their
technology readiness levels;
(b) the status of software development
efforts;
(c) the technology and engineering risks to
integrate the system;
(d) the status and risks of system
development and mission capability progress;
and
(e) the mitigation or maturation plan for
technologies that do not meet requirements; and
(4) Other such matters as the secretaries consider
appropriate.

Report on risk reduction measures for Next Generation Interceptor

The committee directs the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency, not later than February 1, 2027, to submit to the
congressional defense committees a report on the costs and
benefits of implementing risk mitigation measures for the
development and production of the Next Generation Interceptor
solid rocket motors, including at a minimum:
(1) A systematic, quantitative, cost-benefit analysis
of identified risk mitigation measures for the Next
Generation Interceptor solid rocket motor development
and production, such as:
(a) conducting a non-intercept boost vehicle
flight test prior to conducting the first all-
up round intercept flight test;
(b) using a launch pad to conduct a boost
vehicle flight test and/or the first all-up
round intercept flight test;
(c) increasing opportunities for competition
by maintaining two contractors for the first
stage solid rocket motor through:
(i) an all-up round production
readiness review;
(ii) a boost vehicle flight test and/
or the first all-up round intercept
flight test;
(iii) completion of all-up round
interceptor qualification; and
(iv) production of the first 20 all-
up round tactical interceptors;
(d) increasing opportunities for competition
by maintaining two contractors for the second
stage solid rocket motor; and
(e) any other measures identified by the
Director; and
(2) A description of the costs and benefits
associated with each risk reduction measure assessed as
they relate to program cost, schedule, resources, risk,
and any other metric the Director deems relevant; and
(3) An explanation of the methodology employed to
perform the assessment, including any caveats,
assumptions, or limitations.

Report on space-based environmental monitoring governance and program
structure

The committee recognizes that accurate and timely
environmental monitoring and weather forecasting are
foundational to military success across space, air, missile
warning, ground, naval, and global strike missions. The
committee notes with concern that legacy space-based
environmental monitoring systems, including the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program, are projected to cease
operations in the near term, while replacement capabilities
such as the Weather System Follow-on-Microwave are not yet
fully operational or accessible. The committee is concerned
that this transition period may create gaps in environmental
awareness that could adversely impact operational
effectiveness.
The committee further notes longstanding ambiguity
regarding responsibility within the Department of the Air Force
for space-based environmental monitoring capabilities,
including the acquisition and integration of commercial weather
data. While the Space Force has been identified as the
responsible Service, the committee is concerned that existing
efforts have not been formalized with the requirements,
acquisition structure, and lifecycle resourcing typically
associated with a program of record. The committee believes
that clear governance, ownership, and resourcing are necessary
to ensure continuity of capability, provide a sustained demand
signal to the commercial industrial base, and enable effective
congressional oversight.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations and
other appropriate officials, to provide a report and briefing
to the congressional defense committees, not later than March
31, 2027, on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a
dedicated program of record and associated organizational
construct within the Space Force for space-based environmental
monitoring, including the acquisition and integration of
commercial capabilities. The report and briefing shall include:
(1) An assessment of current and projected capability
gaps and operational risks associated with the
degradation or loss of legacy space-based environmental
monitoring systems;
(2) An evaluation of the feasibility and advisability
of establishing a formal program of record within the
Space Force, including the benefits and risks of such
an approach compared to alternative governance and
acquisition models;
(3) Options for assigning clear responsibility and
organizational ownership within the Department of the
Air Force, including consideration of whether a
dedicated office or program executive structure is
required to manage space-based environmental monitoring
capabilities;
(4) An analysis of requirements, acquisition
authorities, and planning, programming, and budgeting
processes necessary to support a sustained capability,
including options to provide a consistent demand signal
to the commercial industrial base;
(5) An assessment of approaches for acquiring,
integrating, processing, and disseminating commercial
environmental monitoring data to operational users,
including measures to ensure resilience and avoid
single points of failure;
(6) A plan to ensure continuity of environmental
monitoring capabilities during the transition from
legacy systems to future architectures, including
timelines and key milestones;
(7) Projected funding requirements across the future
years defense program and options for presenting such
funding to provide transparency and oversight; and
(8) Any recommendations for legislative or
administrative actions needed to implement the
preferred approach.

Responsive Electro-Optical Follow On

The committee notes that the Responsive Electro-Optical
Follow On (REFO) program is an established effort to provide
responsive electro-optical space and ground capabilities in
support of time-sensitive targeting and related indications and
warning missions. The committee believes REFO is a key
contributor to left of launch monitoring and to enhancing
decision time and battlespace awareness for combatant
commanders.
The committee directs the Undersecretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security, not later than March 31, 2027, to
provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees on:
(1) The REFO funding profile and capability delivery plan
across the future years defense program; (2) The strategy and
timelines for integrating dual-use commercial capabilities into
REFO; and (3) How REFO will be employed, in coordination with
other space-based and terrestrial sensors, to support left of
launch monitoring and next generation missile defense.

Review of National Security Space Launch Phase 3 acquisition strategy

The committee notes that the National Security Space Launch
(NSSL) Phase 3 construct is intended to ensure assured access
to space for the integrated space architecture at affordable
prices through a dual-lane approach, with Lane 1 designed to
expand competition and enable higher-risk missions and Lane 2
structured as a block buy to provide stability, cadence
assurance, and high mission assurance for critical national
security payloads. While this framework was intended to balance
innovation, resilience, competition, and predictability, the
committee observes that rapid advancements in commercial launch
capabilities and evolving mission requirements raise questions
regarding whether both lanes are achieving their intended
outcomes in practice.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations and
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition
and Integration, to provide a briefing to the congressional
defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, on the
performance and structure of NSSL Phase 3 across both Lane 1
and Lane 2.
The briefing shall include: (1) An assessment of cost,
schedule, performance, mission assurance, and competition
outcomes for both lanes; (2) An evaluation of the extent to
which Lane 1 has achieved its objectives of expanding
competition, enabling new entrants, and driving affordability;
(3) An assessment of whether the Lane 2 block buy construct
continues to deliver intended benefits in cost predictability,
cadence stability, industrial base sustainment, and mission
assurance; (4) An analysis of how task order development,
requirements formulation, and contracting structures across
both lanes affect competition, pricing, and innovation; and (5)
An examination of whether the current dual-lane construct
remains optimally aligned with evolving commercial launch
capabilities and mission needs, and what alternative structures
or adjustments may better achieve program objectives of
affordability, resilience, and assured access to space.

Solar Observing Optical Network

The committee recognizes the importance of the Solar
Observing Optical Network (SOON) to provide critical solar
observations through monitoring sunspots to predict the
occurrence of a flare or coronal mass ejection. Along with
other systems, SOON notifies the military of solar events,
enabling them to protect assets and personnel. However, the
committee remains concerned about progress transitioning from
SOON to the Next-Generation Global Oscillations Network Group--
Operational (ngGONG-O) which is set to replace it and will be
shared between the Space Force, the National Solar Observatory
(NSO), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). The committee expects to be kept apprised of Space
Force negotiations with NSO and NOAA to set forth a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) detailing an acquisition strategy, a cost-
sharing agreement, and a sustainment strategy for the future
ngGONG-O system.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Space Force to
work expeditiously to complete the MOA with NSO and NOAA.
Furthermore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations, to
provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not
later than February 1, 2027, which should include: (1) A
detailed update on the Space Force's discussions with NSO and
NOAA regarding the MOA; (2) A list of outstanding issues
regarding cost, acquisition, and utilization/sustainment; and
(3) Any congressional assistance that may be needed to finalize
an agreement and mitigate risk for military systems and
personnel.

Space Based Infrared System security, reliability, and maintainability

The committee is concerned that the U.S. Space Force has
not been able to prioritize the reliability and maintainability
of the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) constellation during
the integration and eventual transition to the Next Generation
Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) Constellation, leaving
Defensive Cyber Operations-Space with insufficient resources to
modernize, refresh, and update critical hardware and software,
harden SBIRS systems against attack, or deploy enterprise
SBIRS/OPIR cyber defenses as scheduled. This exposes the SBIRS,
a high value target, to an unacceptable risk of adversary
exploitation. As such, the committee recognizes the importance
of updating SBIRS for security, reliability, and
maintainability.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to brief the congressional defense committees, not later
than March 31, 2027, on the status of Defensive Cyber
Operations-Space actions to harden the SBIRS against a
cyberattack.

Space data network strategy and ground architecture

The committee is concerned by the absence of a clearly
articulated, Department of the Air Force-wide strategy for
integrating space-based transport layers with terrestrial
ground networks to deliver data to tactical users. The
committee notes the potential for overlapping efforts across
the Department of the Air Force and multiple ground
architectures being developed in parallel. Without a coherent
approach, these efforts risk fragmentation, unnecessary
duplication, and misalignment with user terminal fielding.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, in coordination with the Chief of Space Operations, the
Director of the Space Development Agency, and the Commander,
U.S. Space Command, to provide a report and briefing to the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, on the Department's strategy for space and terrestrial
ground networks and the delivery of space-based data to
tactical users. The report shall include:
(1) A description of the Department's concept for
connecting data from low earth orbit, mid earth orbit,
and geosynchronous orbit constellations to tactical
users in 2027, 2030, and 2035, including backhaul,
front haul, laser communication common standards, and
network orchestration functions;
(2) An overview of current and planned terrestrial
ground networks supporting the delivery of space-based
data, including the Space Data Network, the
Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture ground
segment, and other Government-owned or contractor-
operated networks used to ingest, route, or distribute
data from military and commercial space systems;
(3) A description of the roles and responsibilities
of relevant program offices and agencies, including
plans to deconflict capabilities, avoid unnecessary
duplication, and identify areas in which duplication is
maintained for resiliency;
(4) A description of the strategy for delivering
legacy tactical data links, including Link 16, and
broadcast services, including the Integrated Broadcast
Service, through current and planned satellite
constellations and ground architectures, and an
assessment of whether new communication standards or
waveforms are required;
(5) If new standards or waveforms are required, an
assessment of associated user terminal programs,
including fielding timelines, required quantities
across the Joint Force, and any capability gaps between
the fielding of space and ground architectures and user
terminals;
(6) A description of any planned consolidation or
restructuring of ground network infrastructure or
operations centers, and the relationship between the
Space Data Network and the Proliferated Warfighter
Space Architecture across current and planned tranches;
(7) An assessment of workforce and basing
implications for Space Force and Space Development
Agency locations with ground network infrastructure;
and
(8) The estimated cost of the Space Data Network
through full operational capability and the planned
acquisition strategy.
The committee further directs the Secretary to provide a
briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later
than December 15, 2026, on the Department's preliminary
approach to these matters, including any near-term decisions
regarding architecture, governance, and acquisition.

Space domain awareness

The committee notes that the U.S. Space Force's space
domain awareness (SDA) mission is a critical part of military
operations. It allows the U.S. Space Force and other space
organizations to understand and monitor the space domain,
ensure the safety of U.S. space assets, and respond to
potential threats. In recent years, numerous space companies
and organizations have increased the number of satellites they
operate in low earth orbit, increasing the total number of
space objects that the U.S. Space Force needs to include in SDA
efforts. In addition, adversary nations have demonstrated
increased capability to threaten U.S. space assets in recent
years. Taken together, there is increased need for specialized
SDA systems to monitor these threats. The U.S. Space Force uses
a variety of space and ground-based systems to monitor,
characterize, and track objects in space for the benefit of
military, civil, and commercial space organizations. Some of
these systems are operational, and the Space Force is
developing a variety of others to contribute to this mission.
Additionally, SDA may be important to support missile defense
capabilities.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to conduct a review examining: (1) How the
U.S. Space Force is assessing its needs for future SDA systems
at a portfolio level to enable comprehensive identification,
characterization, and tracking of all relevant space objects;
(2) What systems the Department of Defense is using and/or
developing to meet its SDA needs, including existing
capabilities, new acquisitions, commercial solutions, enhanced
data processing, and other methods; (3) The extent to which
existing and developing systems will meet the needs identified
by U.S. Space Force assessments and any challenges to meeting
those needs; (4) Use of SDA tools for battle damage assessment
of objects in space; (5) How, if at all, the U.S. Space Force
is coordinating with other defense and civil users on
determining and meeting SDA needs; and (6) Other matters deemed
relevant by the Comptroller General.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the
congressional defense committees, not later than May 1, 2027,
on the review and to determine a mutually agreeable time to
provide a report on the assessment.

Space modeling, simulation, and analysis hub

The committee strongly encourages the use of modeling,
simulation, and analysis (MS&A) at the Air Force Research
Laboratory's Space Vehicles Directorate's Analysis and
Simulation Branch, the MS&A hub, at Kirtland Air Force Base.
The rigorous environment of the MS&A hub facilitates space
superiority by informing force structure decisions, satellite
design, and space operations and conducting training,
wargaming, and the development of tactics. The MS&A hub
directly supports rapid acquisition efforts that seek to
deliver first-of-their-kind operational space capabilities by
affording an environment to assess and validate assumptions in
threat-informed scenarios for existing and future programs of
record.

Space Training and Readiness Command Guardian workforce development and
long-term training infrastructure

The committee recognizes that the Space Force depends on a
highly trained Guardian workforce to operate, defend, and
reconstitute space capabilities across all mission areas,
including missile warning; space domain awareness; satellite
communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; and space
control, in an increasingly contested and congested
environment. The Space Training and Readiness Command (commonly
known as ``STARCOM''), headquartered at Patrick Space Force
Base, Florida, is the primary organization of the Space Force
responsible for developing doctrine, conducting training, and
producing operationally ready Guardians across the full
spectrum of space missions, yet it receives a
disproportionately small share of investment relative to the
acquisition of the space systems it supports. STARCOM's unique
co-location at Patrick Space Force Base with Space Launch Delta
45, the Air Force Technical Applications Center, and one of the
Nation's most active space launch ranges creates an unmatched
environment for training Guardians in direct proximity to
operational space systems, live launch activities, and real-
time space domain awareness missions, an advantage that no
purpose-built training facility could replicate at comparable
cost.
The committee believes that sustained investment in
Guardian training infrastructure, simulation capabilities,
doctrine development, and professional military education at
STARCOM is essential to ensuring that space systems procured at
great expense to the taxpayer are operated by personnel with
the depth of expertise required to employ those systems
effectively in competition and conflict. Congress has a long-
term interest in establishing STARCOM as a permanent center of
excellence for space warfighter development, ensuring that
future generations of Guardians are trained to the highest
standard regardless of which space systems, missions, or
adversary threats define the strategic environment at the time
of their service.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to submit a report to the congressional defense
committees, not later than April 1, 2027, on the long-term
training infrastructure, doctrine development capacity, and
Guardian workforce requirements of STARCOM at Patrick Space
Force Base, together with a plan for sustained investment in
such capabilities over the future years defense program. The
report shall include:
(1) An assessment of STARCOM's current training
capacity, including available simulation systems, live
training ranges, classroom and laboratory facilities,
and embedded operational training opportunities
afforded by co-location with active space launch and
operations units;
(2) A gap analysis identifying shortfalls in Guardian
training throughput, doctrine development personnel,
advanced simulation infrastructure, and professional
military education pathways, with estimated costs to
address each identified shortfall over a 5-year period;
(3) A plan for achieving STARCOM full operational
capability for space warfighter development, including
recommended milestones, resource requirements, and
metrics for evaluating the readiness of graduating
Guardians to operate space systems in contested
environments;
(4) Recommendations for legislative or programmatic
action to ensure that STARCOM training and doctrine
development capacity scales proportionally with planned
growth in Space Force end strength and the number of
space systems entering operational service; and
(5) Any administrative, budgetary, or organizational
barriers that impede STARCOM from fully executing its
training and doctrine development mission, together
with recommendations to address such barriers.
The committee also directs the Chief of Space Operations,
in close coordination with the Commander, STARCOM to, not later
than April 1, 2027, submit to the Secretary of the Air Force a
comprehensive Guardian workforce development strategy covering
a 10-year planning horizon. Such a strategy shall address
training pipeline capacity, advanced warfighter education,
tactics and doctrine development, simulation and synthetic
training environment investment, and the integration of
emerging mission areas into STARCOM's curriculum. The
Commander, STARCOM, shall leverage the unique operational
training environment at Patrick Space Force Base, including
proximity to active launch operations and space domain
awareness activities, in developing such strategy.
The committee directs an associated briefing on both the
report and the workforce strategy to be presented to the
congressional defense committees, not later than April 1, 2027.

Space Training and Readiness Command resourcing and other training
capabilities

The committee recognizes the critical role of the Space
Force's Space Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM) in
training Guardians, developing space warfighting doctrine;
developing its tactics, techniques, and procedures; and testing
and evaluating Space Force capabilities. The committee further
recognizes the increasing importance of realistic, on-orbit
training environments to prepare Guardians to recognize,
characterize, and respond to increasingly complex and
aggressive behaviors by near-peer competitors in the space
domain.
The committee notes that commercially operated on-orbit
systems now provide mature capabilities that may support
operational test, training, and exercise activities in ways
that are not fully achievable through ground-based or purely
simulated systems. These capabilities include, but are not
limited to, rendezvous and proximity operations, inspection,
maneuver characterization, space domain awareness, and other
mission-relevant activities associated with contested space
operations. The committee encourages the Department of the Air
Force to leverage such commercial capabilities to the maximum
extent practicable in support of STARCOM-led training and the
Space Systems Command Operational Test and Training
Infrastructure (OTTI) construct.
Therefore, the committee directs the Commander of STARCOM,
in coordination with the Commander of Space Systems Command, to
provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not
later than March 31, 2027, on STARCOM resourcing and the
integration of commercial on-orbit capabilities into Space
Force training and test activities.
The briefing shall include:
(1) An assessment of how STARCOM is currently
resourced to execute its mission set, including the
training of Guardians, the development of doctrine and
tactics, and the test and evaluation of Space Force
capabilities;
(2) A plan to integrate commercially available on-
orbit capabilities into OTTI-supported training, test,
and exercise activities;
(3) The funding strategy and contracting mechanisms
to be used to procure and sustain such commercial
capabilities, including the use of Other Transaction
Authority, Commercial Solutions Opening, Broad Agency
Announcement, and reimbursable agreements;
(4) A proposed timeline for initial operational use
of commercial on-orbit assets, including a goal of
incorporating such capabilities into guardian training
events before the end of 2028;
(5) An assessment of any policy, classification,
acquisition, or statutory barriers that may inhibit the
use of commercial systems for training and test
purposes; and
(6) An evaluation of how integration of commercial
on-orbit capabilities will enhance training realism,
improve space warfighting readiness, and support
operations in a contested space domain.

Space-based systems to support long-range targeting and engagement

The committee notes the ability to remotely target and
employ long-range weapons to engage adversaries is critical for
a variety of military actions and plans across warfighting
domains. The space domain is poised to support long-range
targeting of adversary locations and assets through planned
space-based sensing and data transmission capabilities. Space
domain systems for sensing, processing, and disseminating
sensor data; command and control; communications; and battle
management all support long-range targeting and the use of
long-range weapons, particularly those needed by the U.S. Air
Force and the U.S. Navy. However, the Department of Defense
(DOD) faces challenges maturing technologies as well as
acquiring and integrating needed systems at a relevant scale.
Further, the DOD's emerging Golden Dome for America plans may
levy additional requirements on such systems.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to conduct a review of space domain
acquisitions the DOD plans or has underway to support targeting
and the use of long-range weapons to assess: (1) The extent to
which the DOD is using space-based capabilities to enable long-
range targeting and use of weapons; (2) The extent to which the
DOD is communicating to necessary stakeholders the space-based
capabilities, systems, and processes required to enable long-
range targeting and weapons employment; (3) The extent to which
the systems critical to enabling long-range targeting and
weapons employment can support the DOD's planned increases in
munitions procurement quantities; (4) What challenges, if any,
the DOD faces in coordinating capabilities to support long-
range targeting and weapons employment across geographic or
mission areas; and (5) Other matters deemed relevant by the
Comptroller General.
The Secretary of the Air Force shall ensure that the
Comptroller General has the necessary access to information at
appropriate classification and facilities to carry out such an
assessment.
Not later than May 1, 2027, the Comptroller General shall
brief congressional defense committees and discuss whether to
provide a report on the assessment or if further briefings are
warranted.

Suitability of the Enterprise Logistics Management System for lifecycle
management of vehicles used in missile field operations by Air
Force Global Strike Command

The committee notes that vehicles used by the Air Force
Global Strike Command for missile field operations and
maintenance routinely exceed 200,000 miles. However, these
vehicles are not replaced in a timely fashion and in turn
become increasingly harder to maintain, affecting missile field
wing readiness. For example, 2014 F350 pickup trucks can exceed
200,000 miles, 2006 F650 box trucks can exceed 140,000 miles,
and 2010 F350 cargo trucks can exceed 150,000 miles. The
property accountability system used to assess vehicle
replacement versus continued maintenance is referred to as the
Enterprise Logistics Management System (ELMS). The committee
notes that ELMS is designed for Department of Defense vehicles
that do not receive such high mileage and wear as found in the
geographically large intercontinental ballistic missile fields,
often under harsh weather. As a result, mission capable rates
may be skewed for vehicles not physically possessed by Missile
Wing's Logistics Readiness Squadron for repair. Additionally,
ELMS may not capture other key metrics that would provide a
more complete picture of the health of the vehicle fleet used
to support missile field operations.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to review: (1) If ELMS over-reports the
mission capability rate of vehicles based on how it calculates
possession of the vehicle; (2) Whether ELMS adequately captures
break rates for vehicles; and (3) Whether there are additional
metrics that should be assessed to provide a more complete
picture of the health of the vehicle fleet used to support
missile field operations.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
assess the capability of the ELMS to adequately determine when
vehicles used in these large and remote missile field locations
should be replaced versus undergoing continued, time-consuming
maintenance at high mileage and wear rates.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to provide
initial observations to the congressional defense committee,
not later than March 31, 2027, with a report to be provided
based upon a mutually agreed upon date.

Support for United States-Mexico intelligence sharing

The committee recognizes the persistent and evolving threat
posed by transnational criminal organizations, including drug
cartels operating in Mexico, which continue to undermine
regional stability and threaten the security of the United
States. The committee notes that these organizations are
responsible for significant volumes of illicit narcotics
trafficking, violence, and other nefarious activity that impact
communities on both sides of the United States-Mexico border.
The committee supports continued and enhanced security
cooperation between the Armed Forces of the United States and
the Mexican government, particularly efforts focused on
identifying high-value cartel leaders and weakening cartel
networks. The committee believes that bilateral cooperation--
including intelligence sharing and capacity building--remains
essential to disrupting cartel command structures and degrading
operational capabilities.
The committee encourages the Department of Defense, in
consultation with the Department of State, the intelligence
community, and other relevant agencies, to expand collaboration
with vetted Mexican security forces to support efforts to
combat cartels.
The committee further encourages the Department of Defense
to assess opportunities to improve real-time intelligence
sharing and communications synchronization with Mexican
counterparts to increase the effectiveness of joint efforts
targeting cartel leadership networks.

United States critical infrastructure resilience against
electromagnetic pulse weapons

The committee remains concerned about the growing strategic
threat posed by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and high-altitude
electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons to the United States. The
United States' ability to defend its critical infrastructure
against such attacks is critical, as a successful strike would
deny civilian populations access to life-critical services--
including clean water, healthcare, communications, and
transportation--creating mass panic and disruption. The
committee recognizes that these weapons could provide
adversaries with an asymmetric means of coercion that may be
more attractive than conventional military force in a conflict
with the United States.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, on the following:
(1) An assessment of current U.S. vulnerabilities
across military and civilian critical infrastructure,
including energy, water, healthcare, communications,
and transportation systems;
(2) The status and adequacy of hardening, mitigation,
and recovery efforts across Department of Defense
systems and platforms; and
(3) Recommendations to strengthen U.S. resilience
against EMP and HEMP threats.

United States Telecommunications Training Institute

The committee notes the importance of the United States
Telecommunications Training Institute (USTTI) to help the
Department of Defense work with allies and partners as they
develop high-risk communications infrastructure around the
world. This is particularly important in developing nations, in
order to counter China's aggressive strategy with respect to
proposals at the World Radio Conference. The training courses
the USTTI provides, many times with the participation of the
Department, forge long-term relationships with the host nation,
ensuring their future strategies also align with United States
national defense strategies, especially with respect to
spectrum allocations through the International
Telecommunications Union.

Vandenberg public-private partnership

The committee is encouraged by the launch of Space
Vandenberg as a new public-private partnership to support the
Western Range. Innovative public-private partnerships can play
an important role in accelerating spaceport development,
leveraging state, local, and private capital to advance
infrastructure priorities, and maximizing the innovation
potential of the ranges through university partnerships and the
creation of mission development zones for researchers and
entrepreneurs to innovate new space technologies. We encourage
the U.S. Space Force to continue these innovative
collaborations to advance the Spaceport of the Future
initiative and national space priorities.

Weather satellites

The U.S. Air Force and Navy have previously testified that
over 90 percent of their weather forecasting data comes from
satellites, emphasizing the need for continued, secure, and
modernized weather data.
Yet, weather satellite funding is virtually non-existent in
the annual U.S. Space Force budget request. While
demonstrations and prototypes have been funded, nothing yet has
transitioned into a significant program of record, continuing
the Space Force's reliance on the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration for critical weather data. This lack
of U.S. warfighter capability includes potential threats to
military readiness, as well as weakens support for new
initiatives such as Golden Dome, which relies on accurate
weather and atmospheric models to counter hypersonic, missile,
and space-borne threats.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Department of the
Air Force to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services
Committee, not later than March 1, 2027. This briefing should
include steps the Space Force will take to ensure the Space
Force is not relying solely on non-military entities for future
military weather requirements. It will also assess the
potential for the Space Force to leverage the Golden Dome
initiative and military modernizations for the purposes of
reinvigorating Department of Defense space-based weather
programs and capabilities.

Wireless intrusion detection

The committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security to provide a briefing to the
congressional defense committees, not later than February 1,
2027, providing a detailed assessment of Wireless Intrusion
Detection Systems requirements across the military services,
the combatant commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
and the defense agencies to enhance the security of Secure
Compartmented Information Facilities and Special Access Program
Facilities. The briefing shall, at a minimum, provide an
implementation plan and associated resource requirement to
integrate Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems across the
Department of Defense security facility enterprise.

TITLE XVI--CYBERSPACE RELATED MATTERS

Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Cyber Operations and Cyber Forces

Sec. 1601--Independent study on the authorities and organizational
structure of the principal cyber advisors
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to enter into an agreement with a
federally funded research and development center or independent
entity, not later than March 1, 2027, to conduct a study on the
roles, responsibilities, authorities, and resourcing of the
Principal Cyber Advisors (PCA) of the military departments. The
study shall assess whether current authorities under section
392a(c) of title 10, United States Code, are sufficient to
enable PCAs to execute their statutory responsibilities and
examine the organizational relationships between PCAs and other
senior cyber and information technology officials within each
military department. The conducting entity shall submit a
report to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional
defense committees, not later than January 1, 2028. The
Secretary of Defense shall provide a briefing on the findings
to the congressional defense committees, not later than January
15, 2028.
The committee notes that the PCA role has existed for over
6 years. Over that period, resourcing for PCA offices has
evolved, and the approach to organizing and employing the PCA
varies considerably across the military departments. The
committee believes this variation makes it an appropriate time
to assess whether the PCA construct has the authorities,
organizational placement, and resourcing necessary to provide
effective civilian oversight and advocacy for service cyber
forces. The committee further notes that as the Department of
Defense invests in the implementation of the Department of
Defense Revised Cyber Force Generation Model, known more
commonly as CYBERCOM 2.0, ensuring that the PCA offices are
well-positioned to support the Department's evolving cyber
workforce needs is an important consideration.
Sec. 1602--Funding for reserve component support to cyber-peculiar
operations
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to obligate or
expend up to $5.0 million for fiscal year 2027 in operation and
maintenance funds to support reserve component participation in
cyber-peculiar operations. The provision requires CYBERCOM to
notify the congressional defense committees within 15 days each
time cumulative obligations exceed $500,000 increments and to
submit an annual report, not later than December 31, 2027,
detailing activities conducted, reserve participation, and
standards applied to determine cyber-peculiar requirements.
The committee believes that reserve component cyber
personnel offer unique and specialized skills that are a
valuable asset to the cyberspace mission. The committee
recognizes that many of these personnel maintain strong ties to
the private sector, providing unique access to industry best
practices and technical expertise. The committee notes that
under current authority in section 167b of title 10, United
States Code, CYBERCOM does not have independent authority to
fund the ordering of reserve component members to duty on its
own. Instead, the command must coordinate through the military
services for such funding. The committee understands that
CYBERCOM has at times faced challenges securing sufficient
access to these forces when needed, as demand for this funding
is high across the services. This limited-duration authority
serves as a targeted solution to provide CYBERCOM a more direct
mechanism to order reserve component forces to duty for cyber-
peculiar requirements, while generating data to assess whether
a longer-term legislative solution is warranted.
Sec. 1603--Amendment of annual reporting requirements on support for
United States Cyber Command
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 391a of title 10, United States Code, to revise the
annual reporting requirements on military department support
for U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). The provision requires the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy to submit an
annual report to the congressional defense committees, not
later than March 1, 2027, and annually thereafter, on the
readiness, capability gaps, and mitigation plans across the
military departments in support of operational cyber
requirements.
The committee acknowledges the measurable improvements the
military departments and CYBERCOM have made in overall cyber
readiness. The committee also recognizes the Department of
Defense's ongoing work to develop and implement the Revised
Cyber Force Generation Model, commonly referred to as CYBERCOM
2.0, which sets a more ambitious and comprehensive standard for
force readiness and capability. The committee believes success
in meeting those standards will require a sustained, whole-of-
department commitment to the investments and obligations
outlined in the CYBERCOM 2.0 implementation plan. To support
this effort, the committee believes reorienting existing
reporting structures toward this initiative is beneficial and,
therefore, directs that the annual readiness reporting required
under this provision be refocused to track military department
support for CYBERCOM 2.0.
Sec. 1604--Scaling cyberspace access generation and maintenance
capabilities
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize a
pilot program to contract with private sector entities to
conduct limited contractor-owned, contractor-operated cyber
operations for access generation and maintenance, under the
operational authority of the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, and
subject to direct oversight by cleared Department of Defense
civilian employees or military members. The Secretary of
Defense shall submit a report to the congressional defense
committees, not later than 90 days after the termination of the
pilot program.
Sec. 1605--Cyber operational readiness assessments of the Department of
Defense information network
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Department of Defense (DOD) Cyber Defense Command (DCDC) to
submit annual reports to the congressional defense committees
on the implementation and findings of the Cyber Operational
Readiness Assessment program, beginning March 1, 2027, and
annually thereafter through December 31, 2030.
The committee commends the transition from static,
compliance-based inspections toward a proactive, risk-based
model that emphasizes operational readiness, threat
intelligence, and continuous assessment of the DOD Information
Network. The committee views this transition as an important
step in ensuring that DOD networks are evaluated against real-
world threats rather than point-in-time compliance checklists.
The committee also supports the investments DCDC is making in
tools to support network defense and operational technology
visibility and expects future reporting to address the pace of
adoption, operational utility, and whether those tools are
delivering the intended outcomes across the enterprise. The
committee will continue working with the Department to ensure
it has the resources and authorities necessary to succeed.
Sec. 1606--Independent study on United States Cyber Command
organization and resourcing
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to enter into an agreement with a
federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) or
other independent entity, not later than March 1, 2027, to
conduct an independent study on the organizational constructs
and resourcing of the U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and develop
not fewer than two alternative models for the organization and
resourcing of the CYBERCOM headquarters. The FFRDC or
independent entity shall deliver a presentation on the study to
the Secretary of Defense, not later than December 31, 2027. Not
later than April 30, 2028, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the congressional defense committees an
implementation plan for the preferred model presented by the
FFRDC or independent entity.
The committee commends CYBERCOM for its accomplishments in
assuming enhanced budget authority and control over its
resources, as well as the significant work undertaken to
establish a Program Executive Office in preparation for the
transition of the Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture to the
command in 2027. The committee believes that the Department of
Defense is at a natural inflection point to assess whether the
command's current resources and organizational structure allow
for the Department to fully realize the potential of these
expanded authorities and responsibilities, without requiring
the command to accept trade-offs between service-like
responsibilities and the operational demands of a combatant
command. While the committee acknowledges the remarkable
progress CYBERCOM has achieved under this construct, it is
concerned that over the long-term, these trade-offs will
increasingly limit the command's ability to build and advance
cyber capabilities at the pace and scale the nation requires.
The committee encourages the entity conducting this
assessment to explore alternative models, such as those within
U.S. Special Operations Command, which operates under a dual-
track staff in which one element is aligned to service-like
responsibilities, and a separate element is aligned to
combatant command responsibilities.
Sec. 1607--Modification to quarterly reporting for cyber operations
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 484 of title 10, United States Code, to modify that
section's reporting requirements for cyber operations.

Sec. 1608--Repeal of authority to use operations and maintenance funds
for cyber-peculiar development

The committee recommends a provision that would repeal
section 1640 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92).

Sec. 1609--Strategy for integration of National Guard physical range
capabilities into cyber testing activities

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy for integrating
National Guard physical ranges with cyber-peculiar capabilities
or cyber-peculiar test and evaluation requirements, and submit
a report to the congressional defense committees on this
strategy not later than January 15, 2028. The Secretary of
Defense must also evaluate the adequacy of current funding
models under the Department of Defense Financial Management
Regulation for funding National Guard cyber ranges, and submit
a report to the congressional defense committees on this
evaluation not later than January 15, 2028.

Sec. 1610--Updated cyber readiness reporting methodology

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, in coordination with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy and the
Principal Cyber Advisors of the military departments, to
develop and implement an updated methodology for reporting
cyber force readiness, not later than January 1, 2028.

Sec. 1611--Expansion of entities included in coordination between
United States Cyber Command and private sector

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1508 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81) to expand the authority to
engage with entities beyond information technology and
cybersecurity, and to extend the annual reporting requirement
to 2031.

Subtitle B--Matters Relating to Department of Defense Cybersecurity and
Information Technology

Sec. 1621--Improving reserve component network account continuity

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (CIO), in
coordination with the CIOs of the military departments, to
establish minimum standards for reserve component personnel
accounts on unclassified and classified networks, not later
than March 1, 2027. The provision also directs the Department
of Defense Inspector General to conduct an audit of
implementation and provide findings to the congressional
defense committees, not later than October 1, 2028.
The committee is aware that members of the reserve
components frequently encounter avoidable network access issues
when transitioning between duty statuses, including repeated
account reactivation or credential resets. This persists
despite policies intended to maintain access for longer periods
in recognition of the intermittent nature of reserve service,
creating unnecessary administrative burden and detracting from
readiness.

Sec. 1622--Reducing administrative burden in the Department of Defense
risk management framework implementation

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Department of Defense (DOD) Chief Information Officer (CIO) to
reduce administrative burden in the implementation of the Risk
Management Framework (RMF) across the Department. The provision
requires the DOD CIO to issue standardized RMF policy guidance,
not later than October 1, 2027; directs each military
department's CIO to publish consistent implementing guidance,
not later than December 1, 2027; and requires modernization of
the enterprise platform supporting RMF approvals and
documentation, not later than October 1, 2028. Not later than
April 1, 2027, and annually thereafter through April 1, 2032,
the DOD CIO shall provide a briefing to the congressional
defense committees on the status of the new policy guidance and
implementation.
The committee recognizes that repeated congressional and
DOD efforts to address burdensome and inconsistent RMF
implementation have yielded mixed results. The committee is
concerned that the accelerating pace of software delivery makes
the cost of the current process increasingly acute, creating
compounding risk to warfighter capability and security.
The committee believes that many of the root causes of
these challenges were surfaced in industry responses to the
DOD's Software Fast Track Initiative. This provision reflects
the continuation of that effort by directing the establishment
of a standardized, consistent process across all DOD services
and components, addressing the friction that has prevented
prior reciprocity provisions from being fully realized, and
correcting the inconsistent application of control inheritance
that has been a key barrier to progress. The committee further
directs modernization of the current platform to enable the
ingestion of machine-readable security data and real-time
monitoring.

Sec. 1623--Science, Technology, and Innovation Board study on software-
as-a-service in classified networks

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to task the Science, Technology, and
Innovation Board (STIB), not later than February 1, 2027, to
study the enablement of commercial software-as-a-service (SaaS)
offerings on classified networks of the Department of Defense
(DOD). The STIB would deliver an interim briefing to the
congressional defense committees, not later than August 1,
2027; a final report, not later than January 15, 2028; and a
briefing on the findings of such study, not later than January
31, 2028.
The committee recognizes that commercial SaaS offerings
could deliver significant operational and innovation benefits
to the DOD on classified networks, but that no clear or
transparent pathway currently exists for vendors to bring such
offerings to scale. The committee is aware that while some
vendors have obtained authorizations and sponsorship, the
process spanning technical, security, and contractual
requirements lacks consistency and transparency, and the
investments required are substantial, particularly for small
businesses and nontraditional defense contractors. The
committee believes this study would provide industry a defined
path toward certification, authorization, and contract
eligibility. The committee believes that without such clarity,
the DOD risks forgoing the innovation benefits a competitive
classified SaaS marketplace could provide.

Sec. 1624--Streamlining Department of Defense governance process for
cross-domain solution approvals

The committee recommends a provision directing the
Department of Defense (DOD) Chief Information Officer (CIO) to
streamline cross-domain solution (CDS) approval governance by
eliminating unnecessary procedural steps and governance body
involvement that does not contribute a meaningful security
benefit. Not later than December 15, 2027, the DOD CIO shall
submit a report to the congressional defense committees
assessing current processes and a plan to establish a risk-
tiered review framework. Additionally, the DOD CIO shall
provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not
later than March 1, 2028, on the implementation status of the
findings of the report.
The committee recognizes that robust protections are
essential when moving data across classification boundaries,
but finds that the current CDS approval process has grown
unnecessarily bureaucratic, introducing latency into a domain
where the balance of speed and security is paramount.
Consensus-based decision requirements, full board reviews
regardless of risk level, and limited use of reciprocity
authorities risk imposing real operational costs on
warfighters, who require timely access to information across
domains. The committee believes that rigorous process review
and the integration of automation can meaningfully reduce
procedural steps that add no genuine security value.

Sec. 1625--Data center infrastructure strategy and roadmap for military
installations

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, acting through the Department of Defense
Chief Information Officer and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment, to develop
and submit to the congressional defense committees a data
center infrastructure strategy and roadmap for the build-out of
private data centers on military installations, not later than
January 15, 2028.
The provision requires the Secretary to designate a senior
lead official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
oversee and coordinate all related activities, including
negotiations with external vendors. The strategy and roadmap
must include a capacity and requirements analysis, an
installation infrastructure study, and a governance structure
for negotiating land use rights with external vendors.

Sec. 1626--Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification assessment grants
for small businesses and new entrants

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to establish the Cybersecurity Maturity
Model Certification (CMMC) Assessment Grant Program, not later
than July 1, 2027, to award one-time grants of up to $100,000
to eligible small businesses and nontraditional defense
contractors seeking CMMC Level 2 certification, with total
grant funding not to exceed $50.0 million. The provision also
directs the Secretary of Defense to submit annual reports to
the congressional defense committees beginning July 1, 2028,
through December 31, 2031.

Sec. 1627--Harmonization of Department of Defense security boundaries
to enable reciprocity

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to standardize security boundaries across
the Department of Defense (DOD) to maximize security control
inheritance and reduce duplicative security assessments. The
provision requires the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) to
update all applicable policy and guidance, not later than
October 1, 2027, and military department CIOs to publish
implementing guidance, not later than December 1, 2027. All
programs and systems must be brought into compliance not later
than October 1, 2030, and annual briefings to the congressional
defense committees are required, not later than April 1, 2027,
and continuing through April 1, 2031.
The committee is concerned that inconsistent security
boundary definitions have been a persistent barrier to
effective reciprocity. The committee notes that when
authorizing officials attempt to apply the DOD reciprocity
handbook, inconsistent boundary constructs force them to
decipher which documents apply to which portions of their
review. This introduces ambiguity that often undermines prior
authorization work and negates the intent of existing
reciprocity policy. The committee views boundary
standardization as foundational to realizing the full potential
of reciprocity and as an essential complement to broader Risk
Management Framework reform efforts currently underway.

Sec. 1628--Expansion of cyber scholarship program to include
operational technology

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2200(a) of title 10, United States Code, and add
operational technology as a key educational area for the
Department of Defense cyber scholarship program.

Sec. 1629--Limitation on availability of funds for Alpha-1 Development
Activities

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
amount of funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for obligation or expenditure for the War Data
Platform in Program Element 0604133D8Z until the Department of
Defense Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer
provides a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee that
includes a comprehensive application strategy for the War Data
Platform, including a plan for competing out aspects of the
program.

Sec. 1630--Limitation on the use of funds for information systems
development

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
amount of funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) Information Technology Development Initiative (PE
0605027D8Z) until the Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the Director of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service
and the program managers for the Armed Forces pay and personnel
systems, provides to the congressional defense committees the
briefing related to the modernization of pay systems across the
Department of Defense, including the impacts on military
service integrated pay and personnel systems.

Sec. 1631--Post-quantum cryptography adoption

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to set specific adoption timelines for the
cryptographic solutions of the Department of Defense.

Sec. 1632--Improvements to high-performance computing roadmap

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1532(c) of the Servicemember Quality of Life
Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025 (Public Law 119-60) by including additional elements
to the reporting requirement.

Sec. 1633--Pilot program on Department of Defense partnerships with
institutions of higher education recognized in the National
Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity program for
Cyber Research

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to establish a pilot program to assess the
feasibility of partnering advanced cyberspace operations and
information aggressor units of the Department of Defense with
institutions of higher education recognized in the National
Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity program for
Cyber Research, Cyber Defense, or Cyber Operations by the
National Security Agency.

Sec. 1634--Insider threat reporting and voluntary guidance for large
artificial intelligence contractors

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to issue regulations, not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of this Act, regarding insider
threat reporting requirements for artificial intelligence
contractors.

Sec. 1635--Requirement for memoranda of agreement regarding
vulnerability disclosure and prohibition on procurement from IT
providers who share cyber vulnerabilities with countries of
concern

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to include a memorandum of agreement on
any contract for commercial information technology systems to
ensure an entity discloses vulnerabilities impacting department
systems prior to disclosure to any other entity including
trusted partners.

Sec. 1636--Strategy for artificial intelligence-accelerated
vulnerability discovery and remediation

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy, not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of this Act, to assess risks
and opportunities arising from the use of advanced artificial
intelligence capabilities to discover, validate, exploit,
remediate, or reverse engineer vulnerabilities in software,
weapons systems, and information systems.

Sec. 1637--Ensuring competition in artificial intelligence procurement

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to require a competitive process for each
procurement of advanced computing systems and artificial
intelligence applications.

Sec. 1638--Phishing resistant authentication for defense

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that only phishing-resistant
authentication is used by all Department of Defense personnel,
not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this
Act.

Subtitle C--Data and Artificial Intelligence

Sec. 1641--Establishing an ecosystem for use of artificial intelligence
agents at scale and speed

The committee recommends a provision directing the
Secretary of Defense, acting through the Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO), to establish a
Department of Defense (DOD)-wide ecosystem for the deployment
and enterprise use of agentic artificial intelligence (AI)
systems at scale and speed. The Secretary must submit an
implementation roadmap and briefing to the congressional
defense committees, not later than January 15, 2028.
The committee commends the Department for its investment in
agentic AI, particularly through the seven pace-setting
projects. However, the committee is concerned that the DOD is
overlooking the importance of translating the lessons from
these projects into a broader ecosystem that supports the speed
and scale of development and adoption and is, instead, treating
it as an afterthought to individual program success.
Effective commercial agentic ecosystems include governance,
best practice forums, agent discovery applications, and
deployment platforms. They are also designed for both technical
developers and non-technical end users, who have proven equally
capable of leveraging agents for daily tasks.
Without such an ecosystem, the Department risks not being
able to consistently replicate the success of the pace-setting
projects at speed and scale. Rather, each fast follow-on
project and those after will be forced to rebuild and relearn
from scratch rather than drawing on shared infrastructure,
common standards, and reusable agents.

Sec. 1642--Security standards and framework for Department of Defense
agents

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to develop and issue authoritative
security standards and guidance for artificial intelligence
(AI) agents across the Department of Defense (DOD), not later
than December 15, 2027.
As the DOD continues to expand its use of AI agents, the
committee believes appropriate security policies are essential.
The committee cautions the Department, however, against
creating a compliance-focused process versus a security-
focused, risk-informed one. The former approach risks slowing
adoption and technological advancement rather than securing
those activities.

Sec. 1643--Assessment of generative artificial intelligence platform
impact on workforce acumen

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to provide annual briefings to the
congressional defense committees on the utilization of the
Department of Defense (DOD) generative artificial intelligence
platform, commonly referred to as GenAI.mil, and on what that
utilization reflects about the state of artificial intelligence
adoption and acumen in the DOD general workforce.

Sec. 1644--Demand forecast model for artificial intelligence

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, acting through the Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officer, to develop a unified,
Department of Defense-wide demand forecast model for artificial
intelligence (AI) and establish an automated data collection
process providing the Director of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation direct access to all AI demand data.

Sec. 1645--Strategy and governance for adversarial artificial
intelligence

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment of
the effects of the adoption of artificial intelligence systems
by personnel of the Department of Defense on the maintenance
and retention of essential warfighter skills, and require the
Secretary to designate a senior official to be responsible for
overseeing such efforts.

Sec. 1646--Inclusion of alternative models in Department of Defense
generative artificial intelligence platform

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, acting through the Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officer, to expand the number and
diversity of models and applications on the Department of
Defense enterprise generative artificial intelligence platform,
GenAI.mil, including capabilities for language translation,
coding assistance, and data analysis, with particular attention
to removing barriers to participation by small business
concerns. The provision would require a 4-year expansion
strategy submitted to the congressional defense committees, as
well as an annual roadmap briefing.

Sec. 1647--Policy and guidance related to autonomous weapon systems and
artificial intelligence capabilities acquisition

The committee recommends a provision that would create a
new section in title 10, United States Code, to codify policies
related to the acquisition of autonomous weapon systems and
artificial intelligence capabilities. Elements of this policy,
based on the Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, would do
the following: (1) Codify in statute the review process for
autonomous weapon systems and artificial intelligence
capabilities in development and before fielding; (2) Specify in
more detail the definition for appropriate levels of human
judgment for such systems; (3) Provide direction on validation,
verification, and test and evaluation for such systems; (4)
Provide exceptions to the policy, as well as proscribe certain
prohibitions for the use of such systems; (5) Require the
establishment of a working group to support Departmental
decisions for these systems; and (6) Require the establishment
of a centralized repository for reporting, collecting, and
analyzing incidents involving autonomous weapon systems used by
the Department of Defense.

Sec. 1648--Update to the Department of Defense data strategy and
implementation plan

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, acting through the Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officer as the Chief Data Officer of
the Department of Defense (DOD), to update the 2020 DOD Data
Strategy, not later than September 15, 2027, to serve as the
authoritative guiding document for how the DOD hosts, manages,
and makes discoverable Department data in support of data
sharing and artificial intelligence readiness. The Secretary
shall also submit to the congressional defense committees an
implementation plan for the strategy across the future years
defense program.

Sec. 1649--Assessment of artificial intelligence effects on warfighter
skill retention and operational readiness

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment of
the effects of the adoption of artificial intelligence systems
by personnel of the Department of Defense on the maintenance
and retention of essential warfighter skills, and the Secretary
shall designate a senior official to be responsible for
overseeing such efforts.

Sec. 1650--Derived sourcing requirements for artificial intelligence
outputs

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to require that any vendor providing
artificial intelligence capabilities to the Department of
Defense implement a sourcing mechanism that affixes cited
sources to generated content.

Sec. 1651--Improvements regarding guidance and prohibition on use of
certain artificial intelligence

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 1532 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) by expanding the list of
Chinese artificial intelligence companies covered by the
restriction, and making some additional technical
clarifications.

Sec. 1652--Artificial intelligence functional bill of materials

The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit
the Department of Defense from entering into, renewing, or
extending a contract for the procurement of goods or services
that utilize artificial intelligence, unless the contractor
submits and maintains a functional bill of materials, which
would include hardware, software, and data bills of material
incorporated into such good or service.

Sec. 1653--Requirements for human oversight of use of force by the
Department of Defense

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to issue regulations that the use of force
remains subject to an identifiable human in the chain of
command and control, and to develop a joint doctrine for
autonomous warfare.

Sec. 1654--Biosecurity procurement requirements for covered artificial
intelligence models

The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense to develop a framework for biosecurity
evaluation of artificial intelligence models to mitigate risks
to the Department of Defense from malicious use of such models.

Sec. 1655--Prototyping secure artificial intelligence data centers

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in
consultation with the Director of the National Security Agency
and the Head of the Center for Artificial Intelligence
Standards and Innovation, to carry out a test and evaluation
program for unique security requirements for artificial
intelligence data centers.

Items of Special Interest

Access to Department of Defense-unique data for commercial development

The committee commends the Department of Defense (DOD) for
its efforts to reduce barriers to fielding commercial solutions
but believes acquisition reform alone is insufficient. For
commercial solutions to effectively support the warfighter,
commercial companies, particularly small businesses and
nontraditional defense contractors, need access to DOD data, or
appropriately representative data, to develop and validate
their solutions. Currently, obtaining such access places a
significant burden of time and financial investment on the
commercial entity, slowing the pathway from solution
development to deployed capability.
The committee notes that early access to relevant data can
more quickly demonstrate the value of a commercial solution
and, if performant, can accelerate integration into deployed
capabilities for the warfighter. Much of the DOD's data is
unique to military operations and has no commercial equivalent,
and the committee believes the Department should develop an
open-source and unclassified data platform, to include
synthetic data representative of classified datasets, organized
around specific mission problem sets for which the Department
seeks commercial solutions.
Therefore, the committee directs the Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO), in coordination with
the service and Joint Staff Chief Data Officers (CDOs), to
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January
15, 2027, on a roadmap for such a platform. This briefing
should address the following: (1) Prioritization of mission
problem sets for which open or synthetic data should be
developed; (2) A governance model defining the roles of the
CDAO, the service CDOs, and the Joint Staff CDO; and (3) An
assessment of investments required to build and sustain the
platform.

Army investment in operationalizing data through teams and operations
centers

The committee commends the Army for its investment in and
integration of data products at the tactical level through the
establishment of Operational Data Teams (ODTs) and the Army
Data Operations Center (ADOC). As the Army progresses in its
modernization initiatives and develops low-code/no-code
platforms for agile software development in support of rapidly
evolving battlefield requirements, these teams and this
capability will become increasingly critical to operational
effectiveness.
The committee advocates for the continued growth and
resourcing of this effort and strongly encourages the other
military departments to evaluate a similar concept at
appropriate echelons for the establishment of comparable
functions. The committee further advocates for the Chief
Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office, in its capacity as
the Chief Data Officer (CDO) of the Department of Defense
(DOD), to consider both the ODT concept and the ADOC model in
any forthcoming rewrite of the DOD Data Strategy. The committee
intends to continue monitoring the progress of this initiative
and seeks to better understand its concept of operations.
Therefore, the committee directs the CDO of the Department
of the Army to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than March 15, 2027. The briefing shall address the
following: (1) An update on the status and development of
Operational Data Teams and the Army Data Operations Center; (2)
The development of the concept of operations; (3) Integration
with Army software development capabilities, including low-
code/no-code platforms; (4) Experimentation and integration
with the Next Generation Command and Control platform; and (5)
Any challenges or barriers to implementation.
The committee further directs the CDO of the Department of
the Navy and the CDO of the Department of the Air Force to each
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March
15, 2027, on their evaluation of a concept similar to the
Army's ODTs and ADOC. The briefings shall address the
following: (1) The various organizational and functional models
considered during the evaluation; (2) The justification for the
final determination reached by each military department; and
(3) Any planned next steps or barriers to implementation.

Army network edge security and remote access modernization

The committee supports the U.S. Army's efforts to modernize
security for off-base and remote users. The committee remains
concerned that the Army's legacy, perimeter-based network
architecture is not positioned to meet security requirements
for off-base network access from which a significant and
growing portion of the total force operates. The current
hardware-heavy model creates latency and security gaps for
users accessing the network outside of military installations.
The committee encourages the Secretary of the Army to
prioritize the assessment and acquisition of commercially
available, software-defined, cloud-delivered solutions that
deliver secure access service edge capabilities, including an
integrated, agentless browser workspace to enforce security
controls directly within the browsing environment and to
provide low-latency, high-performance connectivity for
geographically dispersed components.
Therefore, the committee directs the Army Chief Information
Officer to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Army's
approach to modernizing its edge security and remote access
approach. The briefing should include: (1) A description of any
additional resources needed to ensure a consistent security
posture for remote network users; (2) Projected cost savings
from the reduction of on-premises hardware; and (3) Plans to
integrate security orchestration and automation capabilities
into the Army Unified Network Plan 2.0 to improve threat
detection and response.

Artificial intelligence decision support system adoption

The committee notes that the Department of Defense (DOD)
announced in March 2026 that it is transitioning Maven Smart
Systems (MSS) to become a formal Program of Record (POR) within
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering and under the Chief Digital and Artificial
Intelligence Office to accelerate artificial intelligence (AI)-
enabled decision making for the Joint Force. The committee
remains cautiously optimistic, but like other recent moves to
institutionalize rapid capability development efforts into
PORs, the committee remains vigilant to ensure that proper
planning and due diligence is also being exercised. The
committee also believes that documentation of lessons learned
will be an important mechanism for identifying best practices
and necessary policy changes across DOD components and other
military services for future POR transitions of joint
warfighting capabilities.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Chief Digital and Artificial
Intelligence Office MSS Program Office, the National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation, to conduct an independent review to
document lessons learned from MSS and deliver a report to the
Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than December 15,
2027. The review should assess the state of MSS prior to its
program of record designation and track operational momentum
for 12 months post-POR designation, and cover the following:
(1) Pre- and post-POR designation user adoption rates; (2)
Time-from-requirement-to-deployment; (3) Noteworthy
innovations; (4) Notable incidents; (5) Challenges in managing
and modifying doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy; and (6)
Standardized servicemember and user feedback across combatant
commands and networks.
The committee notes that such review should expand on how
the POR transition will advance a framework to guide
investments, measure progress, and ensure oversight and
accountability for the adoption of AI solutions, especially for
the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control initiative
required in section 1509 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60). The committee
notes the importance of transparency and oversight during
transitions to a formal POR.

Artificial intelligence shared services cost recovery model study

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense (DOD)
has made initial progress toward centralizing artificial
intelligence (AI) capabilities through platforms such as
GenAI.mil, operated by the Chief Digital and Artificial
Intelligence Office (CDAO). As the DOD continues to expand its
enterprise-wide AI infrastructure, including large language
models, applications, application programming interfaces, and
AI agents, the committee believes it is important to assess
whether a shared services cost recovery model could improve
security, accountability, and buying power across the AI
enterprise. However, the committee is uncertain whether
existing financial mechanisms, such as a Working Capital Fund
(WCF), are sufficient to enable DOD components to access and
pay for centrally hosted AI capabilities across both the Non-
Classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) and the
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet).
Therefore, the committee directs the CDAO, in coordination
with the DOD Chief Information Officer, to conduct a study on
the feasibility and advisability of establishing a shared
services cost recovery model to centrally host and manage
enterprise-wide AI capabilities available to DOD components and
other authorized entities and to provide a briefing to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than December 15, 2026. The study
shall evaluate: (1) The feasibility of a centralized AI hosting
architecture accessible across NIPRNet and SIPRNet; (2) The
advisability of a shared services cost recovery model,
including whether a WCF or other existing financial mechanisms
could support such a program; (3) The security, efficiency, and
cost benefits of centralization, including consolidation of
security authorization and enterprise licensing; and (4)
Whether existing DOD mechanisms already provide similar
functionality and are sufficient to meet enterprise needs.

Collaborative planning and briefing platforms

The committee notes that there is an increasing number of
collaborative planning and briefing tools available that can
help automate Department of Defense staff functions that are
typically manual and time consuming. These platforms can
support real-time, multi-user military staff workflow planning
and are increasingly used by the Joint Staff, combatant
commands, military departments, and National Guard components
across multiple command echelons and coalition partner networks
to develop and execute operational plans, facilitate
coordination, and improve the speed, quality, continuity, and
auditability of commander decision-making.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a
briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027,
on the Department's use of collaborative planning and briefing
platforms. The briefing shall include the following: (1) An
assessment of the tools available and currently being used
within the Department; (2) Approaches for evaluating such tools
in ongoing exercises, including the identification of possible
exercise venues for demonstration; (3) Processes for managing
access to such tools at an enterprise level to ensure
availability across Department of Defense users; (4) Notional
timelines and resource needs for the expansion of the
availability of such platforms; and (5) Metrics to be used to
assess the efficacy of such capabilities.

Commercial cyber threat intelligence

The committee understands the critical importance of
developing and integrating cyber threat intelligence to support
and inform cyber operations. The committee also recognizes that
commercial cyber threat intelligence can provide a valuable
source of information to layer on to traditional intelligence
produced by the defense intelligence enterprise. In addition to
being based on deep technical understanding of software code
and vulnerabilities, such commercial products have an
additional benefit of often being unclassified and thus easily
sharable across Department of Defense (DOD) components,
industry, and allied partners.
The committee is also aware that the way the DOD procures
commercial cyber threat intelligence can often be fragmented.
The committee enacted section 1521 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81) to
provide an enterprise solution to accessing such commercial
cyber data products. However, the Department still has not
adequately addressed the concerns from the committee on the use
of that authority.
Therefore, the committee directs the DOD Chief Information
Officer (CIO), in coordination with the CIOs of the military
departments, to provide a strategy for increasing access to the
number of providers and diversity in sources for commercial
cyber threat intelligence products. The committee directs the
CIO to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services
of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
March 30, 2027, on this strategy. The briefing shall include:
(1) A summary of Department entities utilizing the cyber threat
intelligence products and their utilization rates, including
through the use of the authority in section 1521 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022; (2) An
overall assessment of the impact of this utilization on the
Department's cybersecurity posture; (3) An identification of
technical, policy, or resource-based limitations that restrict
the ability of Department entities to access and effectively
utilize the cyber threat intelligence; and (4) A summary of
enterprise-wide program procurement cost savings versus
individual procurement expenditures on cyber threat
intelligence services.

Comptroller General review of reforms to processes for authority to
operate on Department of Defense networks

The committee recognizes that through legislative direction
and Department actions, the Department of Defense continues to
make progress in identifying and addressing procedural and
other challenges that impede effective and efficient Assessment
and Authorization (A&A) processes for information systems to
operate on the Department of Defense Information Network.
Recent legislation has required the Department to seek
additional efficiencies to achieve the security goals of the
Risk Management Framework (RMF) in a manner that reduces the
time and effort required for Authorizing Officials to provide
the required Authority to Operate (ATO). The Department has
also publicly announced plans under the Software Fast Track
initiative to substantially streamline and modify its
implementation of the RMF process. The committee is still
concerned that challenges remain in terms of measurable
objectives, the structure of the processes, and the resources
to execute them.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to assess the Department's progress in the
implementation of improvements to the RMF and A&A process,
including: (1) Implementing reciprocity in the ATO process; (2)
Updating the Enterprise Mission Assurance Support Service to
handle digital data; (3) Assessing and addressing any
challenges related to the personnel and capacity of Authorizing
Officials; and (4) Any other matter the Comptroller General
deems relevant.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, with
results to follow in a format and timeframe mutually agreed
upon.

Comptroller General review of role of Chief Data Officers in Department
of Defense

The committee recognizes that artificial intelligence (AI)
represents a transformative technology with the potential to
fundamentally revolutionize the battlespace and sustain U.S.
decision advantage over adversaries. However, the committee is
concerned that the broad focus on AI development and adoption
has had the unintended consequence of deprioritizing
investments and governance associated with the data upon which
AI depends. The committee acknowledges the ongoing efforts of
the Department of Defense (DOD) to consolidate data catalogs as
a meaningful step forward but believes substantially more
sustained work is required to achieve true data centricity
across the enterprise.
Central to this concern is the committee's uncertainty
regarding the current state of the Chief Data Officer (CDO)
function across the DOD. The committee is not confident that
CDOs possess the organizational prominence, authorities, or
resources necessary to drive the cultural and structural
changes required to make data a true warfighting asset.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the
CDO function across the DOD enterprise, including: (1) The
organizational placement of each CDO and the degree to which
that placement enables or inhibits their ability to influence
enterprise data policy and practice; (2) The level of authority
each CDO possesses to direct his or her respective organization
to implement data governance guidance, and the degree to which
that authority is actually exercised; (3) The degree to which
each CDO's perceived responsibilities align with statutory
requirements, including any authorities or responsibilities not
currently being executed; (4) Each CDO's approach to advancing
data centricity, including efforts to make data discoverable,
accessible, and interoperable across his or her organization;
(5) The effectiveness of existing forums and mechanisms for
coordination and information sharing among CDOs across the
enterprise; (6) The adequacy of CDO office resourcing in terms
of personnel, funding, and tools; (7) The maturity and
enforcement of data governance frameworks, policies, and
standards within each CDO's organization; (8) The sufficiency
of enterprise data management practices--including data
labeling, lineage, and quality assurance--to support AI and
machine learning adoption at speed and scale; (9) The degree to
which CDOs are influencing requirements, acquisition, and
programming processes to ensure data considerations are
embedded from the outset; and (10) Recommendations for
improving the prominence, authority, resourcing, and
coordination of the CDO function across the DOD enterprise,
including any legislative changes the Comptroller General deems
appropriate.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027, with a
report to follow in a format and timeframe mutually agreed
upon.

Comptroller General review of software factories

The committee notes that over the past decade, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has made significant investments in
software factories to develop and field software capabilities
at the speed and agility demanded by the modern battlefield.
Under the DOD Software Modernization Implementation Plan,
software factories and their broader ecosystem serve critical
functions in scaling software delivery. The rapid emergence of
artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities that can write code
and build applications at scale presents new opportunities to
accelerate software development across the force. These
developments also demand a hard look at whether the policies
and directives governing software factories are being followed
and how these should be updated to seize the opportunity this
technology presents. The committee is concerned by the lack of
clarity, standardization, and data around the Department's use
of software factories. The committee believes that without a
clear governance framework and standard that all software
factories consistently follow, the ecosystem will fail at the
tasks of scaling those solutions that provide benefit and
discarding those that are either duplicative or do not deliver
value.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to conduct a comprehensive review of the
Department's and the military services' use of software
factories, to include: (1) An assessment of existing policy and
guidance governing software factories, the degree to which such
guidance is being followed across the Department, and whether
such guidance remains adequate and appropriate in an AI-enabled
environment; (2) An analysis of current operating practices
across the software factory ecosystem to identify areas of
compliance and non-compliance with existing guidance; and (3)
An analysis of the cumulative costs and work product of the
Department's software factory ecosystem to identify
redundancies and assess overall return on investment.
Furthermore, the committee directs the Comptroller General
to complete the review and provide a briefing on its findings
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, not later than February 15, 2027, with a
final report to be delivered at a mutually agreed time. The
committee also directs that such report be provided to the
Science, Technology and Innovation Board in support of a review
they are tasked to conduct under section 907 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-
60).

Comptroller General review of status of Zero Trust implementation
efforts

The committee is concerned with the Department of Defense's
efforts to implement a Zero Trust cybersecurity framework in
response to continued and increasing cybersecurity threats. In
fiscal year 2022, the committee directed the Department to
enact a Zero Trust strategy and related implementation plans.
In these plans, the Department established a goal of fiscal
year 2027 for a baseline Zero Trust capability. However, both
the Department's Inspector General and the Government
Accountability Office have identified deficiencies in the
Department's policies, plans, and progress for this effort, and
the committee remains concerned with the Department's ability
to meet the 2027 deadline.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to review the status and implementation of
the Department's Zero Trust efforts, the challenges the
Department faces meeting its stated goals, and the steps it is
taking to address these challenges.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives on the results of its review, not
later than April 15, 2027, with the final report on the results
of the review to follow in a mutually agreed upon format and
timeframe.

Containerized commercial artificial intelligence

The committee is encouraged by the progress the Department
of Defense (DOD) has made in advancing enterprise artificial
intelligence (AI) capabilities but believes it is important not
to lose sight of AI at the tactical edge. Operations in air-
gapped, disconnected, or contested environments preclude
reliance on cloud-based infrastructure and demand advanced on-
premise compute and containerized AI models. The committee
notes that a number of commercial vendors have developed such
capabilities for both commercial and defense-specific use cases
and that the DOD should be better leveraging these solutions.
The committee is further concerned that commercial AI software
acquired by the Department may carry inherent dependencies on
cloud-based application programming interfaces for core
functionality, creating unacceptable operational risk in denied
or degraded network environments.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the DOD Chief Information Officer, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and
the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer, to
submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027, a
strategy and implementation plan for accelerating the adoption
of containerized commercial AI capabilities for local, on-
premise execution in air-gapped or disconnected operational
environments. The strategy and implementation plan shall
include: (1) A plan to transition mission-critical AI
applications to containerized architectures capable of local
execution across tactical-edge infrastructure; (2) A framework
for the secure transfer, validation, and updating of
containerized models in air-gapped environments; (3) An
evaluation of current inventory and future requirements for
ruggedized, on-premise compute hardware capable of hosting
large-scale AI models at the tactical edge; (4) A review to
ensure commercial AI software acquired by the DOD is not
inherently dependent on cloud-based application programming
interfaces for core functionality; and (5) Identification of
acquisition pathways, including commercial solutions openings
and the Software Acquisition Pathway, that enable the DOD to
maintain competition and procurement flexibility across both
traditional and nontraditional vendors.

Coordination of Open Centralized Unit Distributed Unit Ecosystem

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense
(DOD), in partnership with industry and academia, has made
progress in advancing open architecture wireless infrastructure
through the Future G Office. The committee is also aware that
partnership with stakeholders, such as the Open Centralized
Unit Distributed Unit (OCUDU) Ecosystem Foundation, is critical
to bringing next-generation wireless technology to the
Department. The intent of OCUDU is to develop open-source
software for the centralized unit and distributed unit
components of next-generation wireless networks, which
represent a critical layer of secure, resilient, tactical, and
strategic telecommunications architecture.
Open source development provides significant operational
advantages for 5G, emerging 6G, and future iterations of
advanced wireless infrastructure at the tactical edge. By
establishing a shared community-governed software foundation,
the OCUDU Ecosystem enables faster innovation, greater joint
force interoperability, and reduced duplication of effort
across both government and industry. Transparent and neutral
governance ensures that no single vendor controls critical
national security network infrastructure while broad
participation strengthens supply chain diversity and resilience
against peer adversaries.
The committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering and the DOD Chief Information Officer
to provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than May
1, 2027, on the progress of the OCUDU Ecosystem. The briefing
shall include the following: (1) A description of technical
progress, including the development of centralized unit and
distributed unit software capabilities, including for tactical
and enterprise operations; (2) An assessment of industry and
academic participation, including contributions from non-
traditional entities with a specific emphasis on U.S.-owned
businesses and domestic manufacturing partners; (3) A
description of deployment activities and the transition of
capabilities into operational environments; (4) An evaluation
of the impact of the OCUDU ecosystem on interoperability
security and supply chain resilience; (5) A description of
coordination with other federal initiatives related to wireless
communications and advanced network technologies; and (6) Any
recommendations for further actions to support continued
adoption and scaling, particularly across the military
departments and combatant commands.

Cyber warfare engineering officer reserve component career field

The committee recognizes the significant progress the
Department of the Navy has made in developing skilled cyber
professionals, particularly within the Cyber Warfare
Engineering (CWE) officer community. CWE officers possess
highly specialized technical skills in areas that have proven
invaluable to cyber operations and are in exceptional demand
across both government and industry. The committee recognizes
that retention of cyber professionals is a broader challenge
facing the Department of Defense and notes that efforts are
underway to address it across the cyber workforce.
Nevertheless, the committee believes it is critical that CWE
officers who transition out of active duty have the option to
continue serving in a reserve capacity should they choose to do
so.
Currently, the Navy does not maintain a CWE career field
within its reserve component, limiting the ability of
separating active duty CWE officers to continue contributing
their unique skills in a part-time uniformed capacity. The
committee acknowledges the resources required to establish and
sustain career fields in the reserve component but believes the
operational and strategic benefits of retaining access to this
specialized talent pool justify the investment.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy,
in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Cyber Policy, and the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, to conduct
a feasibility and advisability study on establishing a CWE
career field in the Navy Reserve. The study shall assess, at a
minimum, the following: (1) The requirements necessary to
support a CWE career field in the Navy Reserve, including
personnel, training, and infrastructure needs; (2)
Opportunities to share resources with the active component,
including matrixed options for career field management; (3) The
operational benefits of establishing such a career field; (4)
The risks associated with not establishing such a career field;
and (5) How the Navy would structure reserve billets at
sufficient grades to enable meaningful career progression for
CWE officers within the reserve component, including pathways
for advancement in rank.
The Secretary of the Navy shall provide a briefing on the
findings of this study, along with recommendations and proposed
next steps, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, not later than March 15,
2027.

Cybersecurity at Defense Health Agency

The committee remains concerned about the increasing
frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks targeting the
healthcare sector, including entities that provide medical
services, systems, and devices in support of the Department of
Defense (DOD). Recent cyber incidents involving defense
contractors underscore the potential risk to military medical
readiness, the security of sensitive health data, and the
integrity of network-connected medical devices used by the
Armed Forces. The committee notes that many defense contractors
and suppliers supporting military medical operations, including
those providing network-enabled medical devices, may be subject
to varying cybersecurity standards, creating potential
vulnerabilities within the broader defense health ecosystem.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Director of the Defense Health Agency
and other relevant Department of Defense medical components, to
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than
February 1, 2027, that assesses the cybersecurity posture of
defense-associated health systems and medical device providers
that support the Department. This briefing shall include: (1)
An evaluation of current cybersecurity standards and
requirements applicable to contractors providing medical
services, systems, or devices to the Department; (2)
Identification of gaps between existing requirements and
current cybersecurity best practices, particularly with respect
to advanced persistent threats; (3) An analysis of risks posed
by network-connected medical devices used in military treatment
facilities and operational environments; (4) Recommendations to
improve cybersecurity training, compliance, and oversight for
contractors and suppliers supporting military health
operations; and (5) Options to modernize Department policies
and acquisition requirements to ensure that all entities
supporting the Defense Health System implement robust and up-
to-date cybersecurity measures.

Data readiness and analytical modernization across Joint Force

The committee recognizes that common operating picture
applications, while critical for operational planning,
represent only a fraction of the analytical work combatant
commands perform. Theater cooperation, assessments, policy
development, and interagency coordination generate substantial
data demands that existing tools currently available to the
combatant commands do not address. Many commercial solutions
are capable, however, of filling these gaps if procured, while
also complementing operational applications.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide a briefing to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than February 1, 2027, on how the
Joint Staff is consolidating and building requirements for the
combatant commands to support the full range of data and
analytical needs. The briefing shall address: (1) The
feasibility and advisability of establishing a unified,
accredited repository for publicly available information and
information environment operations; (2) The feasibility and
advisability of developing a minimum fieldable artificial
intelligence trust package inclusive of data provenance
standards, attribute-based access control, and continuous
monitoring; (3) How automated workflows can reduce the burden
of manual database searches and accelerate actionable
intelligence production; and (4) Current efforts to enable
small businesses and non-traditional providers to contribute to
Department of Defense analytical missions.

Defense of critical infrastructure

The committee is concerned that adversary cyber campaigns
against U.S. critical infrastructure could impede or delay
military mobilization, force flow, logistics, and sustainment
in a crisis or conflict. The committee notes that the
Department of Defense (DOD) depends heavily on civilian-owned
and civilian-operated infrastructure to move personnel,
equipment, fuel, munitions, and information within the homeland
and to ports of embarkation. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) has
publicly warned that China has established persistent access in
U.S. critical infrastructure for possible use in a contingency
or crisis and has emphasized the importance of defending
adjacent government, partner, and critical infrastructure
networks that underpin military operations. Public reporting
and outside analysis have likewise highlighted the
vulnerability of the air, rail, maritime, communications, and
energy systems that support military mobility and mobilization.
Accordingly, in parallel to the force mobilization exercise
in section 283 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60), the committee directs the
Commander, CYBERCOM, in coordination with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy; the Commander, U.S.
Northern Command; the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command;
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in
consultation with other relevant Federal departments and
agencies as the Commander considers appropriate, to provide a
briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later
than January 15, 2027, on the Command's assessment of cyber
risks to military mobilization and force projection in the
event of a crisis or conflict.
The briefing shall include: (1) An identification of the
critical infrastructure sectors, systems, and key nodes within
the United States whose cyber disruption would most
significantly impair military mobilization, deployment,
distribution, sustainment, or command and control; (2) An
assessment of the roles and responsibilities of the DOD,
including CYBERCOM, in preparing for, mitigating, and
responding to cyber threats against such infrastructure during
competition, crisis, and armed conflict; (3) An assessment of
gaps in current authorities, operational constructs,
information-sharing arrangements, planning, defense support for
civil authorities, exercises, and public-private coordination
mechanisms relevant to securing the cyber aspects of
mobilization; (4) Options for legislative, policy,
organizational, or operational changes to improve the security
and resilience of infrastructure supporting military
mobilization; (5) The role that the National Guard and private
cybersecurity companies can and should play in supporting this
mission; and (6) Any recommendations for additional authorities
or resources needed for the Department to better support the
defense of critical infrastructure essential to mobilization.
The committee further directs the Secretary of Defense to
submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than
90 days after the briefing, a report setting forth a plan of
action to address identified gaps, including proposed
timelines, lead organizations, estimated resource requirements,
and, as appropriate, legislative proposals.

Department of Defense lead for remediating threat of locational
services to overseas military installations

The committee finds that foreign adversaries are actively
exploiting commercially available data, including publicly
available information and commercially available information,
to identify, track, and characterize U.S. Armed Forces
personnel, installations, and operational activity. In times of
conflict, competition, and crisis, this capability can be used
to target personnel, anticipate operational movements, and
undermine U.S. strategic advantage.
The committee finds that the Department of Defense (DOD)
lacks a designated lead and consistent department-wide strategy
to assess and mitigate this exposure and finds that current
efforts are fragmented and episodic. Certain policy-based
remediation measures, particularly restrictions on location-
enabled devices in hostile threat environments, can and should
be implemented immediately. The committee recognizes, however,
that durable solutions will also require dedicated
technological investment.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to designate a primary integrator for digital force protection
and signature management for overseas military installations of
high threats, who shall coordinate with the DOD Chief
Information Officer, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Enterprise Installations and Environment, and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, to develop
a mitigation strategy for locational data threats from personal
and official devices on overseas military installations in
hostile threat environments.
This lead shall develop and provide a briefing to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than January 15, 2027, on a strategy
to remediate such risks to high threat overseas military
installations. The briefing shall address: (1) Current policy
and technological gaps with respect to locational data
exposure; (2) Near-term policy actions and longer-term
technological solutions; and (3) A plan for establishing
persistent, Department-wide capability to assess and reduce the
digital exposure of U.S. forces and installations.

Documenting lessons learned and doctrine related to integration of
cyber forces

The committee recognizes the exceptional performance of
cyber forces across the Department of Defense (DOD) since June
of 2025. Recent world events have demonstrated the maturation
of cyber forces and, more critically, the pivotal progress
achieved in integrating cyber capabilities into Joint Force
operations. The timing, tempo, and close coordination exhibited
by these forces reflect a significant evolution in how cyber
effects are delivered and synchronized within the Joint Force.
The committee believes it is essential that the lessons
learned from these operations, and their doctrinal
implications, be formally documented. The committee
acknowledges, however, that the nature of the cyber domain
presents unique challenges to conventional lessons learned and
doctrine development processes. Threats, techniques, and
operational contexts in the cyber domain evolve in weeks and
months, while updates to doctrine and lessons learned documents
are often measured in years. The committee believes there
remains enduring value in deliberate, thorough, and validated
lessons learned processes that support longer-term doctrinal
development and directs U.S. Cyber Command, the service cyber
components, and the Joint Staff to update current doctrine and
lessons learned documents to ensure that recent operational
insights are captured and not lost.
At the same time, the committee encourages these same
organizations to explore supplemental mechanisms and venues to
capture and share lessons learned at a pace commensurate with
the speed of change in the cyber domain, so that operationally
relevant insights are made available to practitioners in a
timely manner.
Therefore, the committee directs the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Cyber
Command and the service cyber components, to provide a briefing
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, not later than January 15, 2027, on the
Joint Staff's doctrine update process for incorporating cyber
operations across all joint publications. The briefing shall
include: (1) A description of the current process and timeline
for updating joint doctrine publications to reflect lessons
learned from cyber operations; (2) Identified gaps or
impediments in the existing doctrine development process that
prevent timely incorporation of cyber lessons learned; and (3)
Proposed or existing mechanisms to accelerate the sharing of
operationally relevant cyber lessons learned outside of formal
doctrine update processes.

Election security

The committee strongly agrees with General Joshua Rudd,
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, and his statement during
testimony before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence that ``the electoral process is fundamental to our
democratic values'' and ``[a]ny foreign threat to the electoral
process should be viewed as a national security concern.''
Adversary information operations and cyber operations are real
threats that the federal government must be prepared to defend
against.
However, the committee is concerned that it did not receive
a post-election report from U.S. Cyber Command after the 2024
election cycle. The committee therefore reiterates its request
in the Senate report (S. Rept. 117-130) of the James M. Inhofe
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 for a
pre-election briefing and a post-election unclassified report
with a classified annex for each Federal election through the
2032 election cycle.

Evaluation of virtual cyber training environments for operator
development

The committee is aware that U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)
has undertaken efforts to develop and field virtual persistent
cyber training environments across the military services to
develop advanced-proficiency cyber operators and analysts. The
committee recognizes the importance of scalable and
operationally realistic training infrastructure to support the
objectives of CYBERCOM's Campaign Plan 2.0, which demands a
highly proficient cyber workforce capable of executing the full
spectrum of offensive and defensive cyber operations.
The committee is encouraged by the progress made in
developing these environments and believes that continued
investment in platform capacity, responsiveness, and
operationally realistic scenarios across all proficiency levels
will be essential to fully realizing their potential. The
committee further believes that consistent integration of
readiness data generated through training activities with
existing readiness tracking systems will enable commanders to
make more informed assessments of operator proficiency and
support the long-term development of the cyber workforce.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to conduct an assessment, through a federally funded research
and development center (FFRDC), on the capacity and suitability
of current virtual persistent cyber training environments,
disaggregated by each of the military services. In the course
of this study, the selected FFRDC shall consult with the
principal cyber advisor of each military department and the
cyber component commander of each Armed Force.
The study shall assess the following: (1) The capacity of
each environment to support concurrent users and training
activities at scale; (2) Platform responsiveness, including
time required to access, authenticate, and load training
content; (3) The availability and operational realism of
training scenarios across foundational, journeyman, and
advanced operator and analyst proficiency levels; (4) The
extent to which each environment supports training for
offensive and defensive cyber operations across the full
spectrum of cyber missions; (5) The degree to which each
environment is integrated with readiness tracking systems and
whether readiness data must be captured or reported manually;
and (6) Categories of training or training tasks that cannot be
conducted on each environment and the technical, programmatic,
or resource constraints that preclude such training.
Not later than November 1, 2027, the FFRDC shall submit to
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy and the
congressional defense committees a report on the findings of
the study, including recommendations for improvements to each
environment disaggregated by the military services and any
cross-cutting findings applicable across the Armed Forces.

Funding software activities

The committee is aware of persistent challenges in matching
funding from different appropriations types to software
acquisition activities within the Department of Defense. The
committee has heard from program managers, contracting
officials, and financial managers that the iterative nature of
modern software development does not align clearly to
traditional appropriations categories and that, despite various
efforts to address this tension, issues remain. In practice,
the manner in which a software activity is executed or the way
a vendor delivers a solution can necessitate a change in the
programmed appropriations type, triggering funds transfers,
reprogrammings, or technical corrections that delay delivery
and consume management resources. The committee is sympathetic
but notes that the instances relayed to the committee to date
are largely anecdotal and that data on the frequency,
magnitude, root causes, and operational impact of such events
is needed before the most appropriate solution can be
identified. The committee further notes that these challenges
are not confined to secretariat-level decisions and that any
meaningful assessment must capture experiences across all
levels of the acquisition and contract management enterprise.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to conduct a study on the extent to which
existing appropriations authorities and Financial Management
Regulation (FMR) guidance adequately address the realities of
modern software acquisition and delivery. The study shall
include: (1) The frequency and aggregate dollar value of funds
transfers, reprogrammings, and technical corrections
attributable to appropriations type misalignments for software
activities, disaggregated by account type and military
department or defense agency; (2) An identification of the
specific activity types, vendor delivery models, and FMR
provisions most frequently associated with such misalignments;
(3) An assessment of the extent to which more deliberate budget
planning practices and expanded use of Budget Activity 08 could
reduce the frequency of such misalignments, and the
circumstances under which such approaches might not be
sufficient to resolve the underlying challenge; (4) An
assessment of resulting delays and impacts to warfighter
capability and readiness; and (5) Recommendations for
statutory, regulatory, or policy changes to better align
existing appropriations authorities and financial management
guidance to the modern software development and delivery cycle.
The Comptroller General shall brief the results of such
study to the congressional defense committees, not later than
December 15, 2026, with a report to be provided at a mutually
agreed date.

Golden Dome command and control cybersecurity plan

The committee remains concerned that the Golden Dome for
America program lacks a defined cybersecurity strategy for its
command and control (C2) architecture. Converging enterprise
information technology and operational technology across C2
nodes expands attack surfaces that traditional tools cannot
adequately protect.
Therefore, the committee directs the Direct Reporting
Program Manager (DRPM) for Golden Dome to develop a
comprehensive cyber defense plan for Golden Dome C2
infrastructure. Not later than March 1, 2027, the DRPM shall
brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives on a plan that addresses: (1) How each
C2 component will be secured, including sensors, data links,
and processing nodes; (2) The implementation of Zero Trust
principles across C2 networks and the tactical edge; (3) The
use of artificial intelligence-driven capabilities for real-
time threat detection and automated cyber defense; and (4)
Methods to ensure data integrity and chain-of-custody
protections for sensor feeds entering and transiting the C2
architecture.

Information repository and joint communications marketplace

The committee is aware that the military services are
evaluating new communications technologies. The Department of
Defense (DOD) Information Repository (IR) and Joint
Communications Marketplace (JCM) have traditionally aided
commercial and defense vendors in conducting waveform
development through the DOD IR Waveform Catalog, providing
global interoperability across line-of-sight, beyond-line-of-
sight, and networked communications modes.
The committee recognizes the importance of a well-
maintained IR and the enforcement of software standards that
ensure software distribution, interoperability, and security
are prioritized and that provide a basis for vendors to develop
collaboratively and enhance existing modes. The committee
believes there is significant strategic advantage in preserving
and broadening this model, especially as communications
technologies continue to advance and become increasingly
integrated.
Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in consultation with
the DOD Chief Information Officer, to provide a briefing to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than December 1, 2026, detailing the
military services' current plans for the JCM and the IR,
including: (1) A comprehensive accounting of the current
waveform inventory, including waveforms in use with partners
and allies; (2) How the services plan to validate
interoperability across joint, coalition, and multi-vendor
environments; (3) Cybersecurity protocols and software
assurance frameworks applied to waveforms distributed through
the IR, including known vulnerabilities and planned
remediation; (4) Mechanisms in place to protect vendor
intellectual property within the IR and the JCM; (5) Known or
assessed electronic warfare vulnerabilities associated with
cataloged waveforms and processes for identifying and
mitigating them; and (6) The degree to which waveforms in the
IR are portable across vendor platforms and hardware
architectures and plans to address any identified gaps.

Interoperable multi-cloud architecture

The committee remains concerned that the current approach
of the Department of Defense (DOD) to cloud infrastructure has
resulted in a proliferation of stove-piped systems that are not
interoperable, do not promote data portability, and inhibit
adaptation to changing requirements and technological advances.
Despite the direction to address this challenge in section 1514
of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-
159), the DOD has not shown any indication that it recognizes
or is attempting to address the problem. The committee believes
the Department's mission is best served by an interoperable
multi-cloud environment that provides flexibility, security,
redundancy, and resiliency by promoting competition and
incentivizing innovation.
Therefore, the committee directs the DOD Chief Information
Officer to provide a briefing to the congressional defense
committees, not later than March 1, 2027, on the Department's
plans for ensuring an interoperable, multi-cloud architecture.
The briefing shall include the following: (1) An inventory of
existing cloud contracts and associated licenses; (2) A summary
of security challenges regarding multi-cloud implementation,
including issues related to reciprocity and the harmonization
of authority to operate; (3) A description of current technical
standards and a recommendation for new standards to be used in
the multi-cloud architecture; and (4) A description of the
technical, process, procurement, and policy changes necessary
to transition to a vendor agnostic, multi-cloud architecture.

Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture

As the Department of Defense continues to mature its cyber
operational capabilities, the committee reiterates the
importance of ensuring that defense investments result in
operationally relevant capabilities that enable offensive cyber
operations at speed and scale. The committee notes actions
taken by U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to refactor the Joint
Cyber Warfighting Architecture pursuant to section 1545 of the
Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159).
The committee further notes the importance of continued
progress in this effort in light of the evolving cyber threat
environment and the Department's requirement to effectively
integrate relevant advanced technologies such as artificial
intelligence (AI). The committee is aware of CYBERCOM's use of
AI-enabled programs, such as the PATHFINDER platform, that
leverage commercial technologies and capabilities to increase
targeting and access.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Commander, CYBERCOM
to submit a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March
1, 2027, detailing the use of commercially developed AI
platforms to support targeting and access development, such as
the PATHFINDER program, as well as planned resourcing across
the future years defense program.

Joint Force common operating picture scaling and federated ontology
strategy

The committee recognizes that warfighters across multiple
domains require a common operating picture capable of rapidly
ingesting and connecting data to support time-sensitive
targeting, intelligence fusion, and operational data
integration. Platforms such as the Maven Smart System have
demonstrated that a shared, artificial intelligence (AI)-backed
data ontology can satisfy this requirement and deliver
meaningful decision advantage. Having validated this approach,
the committee believes the Department of Defense (DOD) should
evaluate whether and how scaling this capability across the
Joint Force would further satisfy warfighter requirements by
ensuring that all service components operating within and
supporting combatant commands share a common understanding of
the battlespace regardless of service or component.
Additionally, the committee recognizes that deployed
platforms are generating a valuable data ontology. This
ontology includes the structured, semantic relationships
between entities, events, and data across DOD operations, which
represent a growing institutional asset. Realizing its full
value requires that DOD tools, applications, and data sources,
including intelligence community holdings, interagency
partners, and allied and coalition partners, be able to both
contribute to, and benefit from, these semantic relationships.
Without a strategy to federate this data into a shared
ontological framework, critical data sources will remain
semantically isolated, limiting the common operating picture
and constraining the broader DOD AI ecosystem.
Therefore, the committee directs the Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officer, in his or her capacity as
Chief Data Officer of the DOD and program manager for joint AI-
enabled operational platforms, to develop a strategy for
scaling common operating picture capabilities across the Joint
Force and federating their underlying data ontologies and to
provide a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January
15, 2027.
The strategy shall include the following: (1) An evaluation
of the feasibility and advisability of expanding this
capability to all service components within the combatant
commands, including an assessment of the degree to which
scaling would further satisfy warfighter requirements for a
common operating and intelligence picture; (2) A governance
framework for managing the Department's operational data
ontology as a DOD enterprise asset extendable across the
broader DOD AI ecosystem; (3) Technical approaches for enabling
data and applications residing outside of existing platforms to
integrate with and contribute to these ontological
relationships, including through open, vendor-neutral standards
and federation mechanisms that do not require physical data
ingestion into any single platform; and (4) An assessment of
opportunities to extend ontology-based data sharing to the
intelligence community, interagency partners, and allied and
coalition partners, and recommendations for addressing any
legislative, policy, contractual, or resource barriers to
implementation.

Modernization plan for commercial solutions for classified program

The committee notes that the Commercial Solutions for
Classified (CSfC) program at the National Security Agency (NSA)
has been an important tool to find industry solutions to
Department of Defense (DOD) needs for classified systems,
especially tactical systems. However, the committee believes
that the program would benefit from a comprehensive review of
its processes to determine if the changing state of technology
and policy would offer an opportunity for modernization.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in coordination with the Director of the NSA, to submit a
report to the congressional defense and intelligence
committees, not later than August 1, 2027, on a comprehensive
roadmap that details the modernization of the CSfC program, as
well as a plan to modernize the DOD and the NSA's policies and
procedures associated with CSfC.
The roadmap shall include the following: (1) An assessment
of structural and operational limitations within the current
CSfC framework, including the responsiveness of Capability
Packages and Protection Profiles to evolving warfighter needs,
cyber threats, and technological advances; the impact of
certification and validation processes on fielding secure
commercial technologies; and the extent to which prescriptive
architecture standards and barriers to vendor participation
limit adoption, competition, innovation, and cost efficiency;
(2) An actionable plan to modernize CSfC governance,
certification, and compliance mechanisms, including a
transition from static Protection Profiles and Capability
Packages to modular, risk-based, and continuously updated
guidance; (3) An evaluation of mission areas across the DOD
where CSfC implementation would enable commander's intent,
improve system performance, and reduce system cost without
compromise to mission assurance; (4) An evaluation of
coordination mechanisms to ensure the synchronization of CSfC
policy to warfighter needs, joint and coalition
interoperability requirements, and DOD initiatives aimed at the
acceleration of systems acquisition and fielding and weapon
systems modernization; and (5) A detailed timeline with key
milestones, including programmatic decision points, required
policy, regulatory, and standards updates; resourcing,
acquisition, and workforce needs; and risk assessments and
mitigation strategies.

Reciprocity by exception for artificial intelligence platforms

The committee recognizes that maintaining technological
superiority over near-peer adversaries requires the Department
of Defense (DOD) to field advanced artificial intelligence (AI)
systems at nearly the pace they are developed commercially.
Frontier AI developers release updated models on a cadence of
weeks, yet the current security authorization framework has not
kept pace with that cycle. The committee believes a targeted
review is warranted to ensure processes reflect genuine
security requirements and that our warfighters have access to
the best available technology.
Inherited controls and reciprocity are foundational to
efficient risk management. When an AI model is hosted on a
cloud platform that has already been granted an Authority to
Operate through a centralized DOD mechanism, such as GenAI.mil
or a Defense Information Systems Agency-managed offering,
subsequent model updates should be evaluated against a clear,
consistent standard for what constitutes a security-relevant
change. While prudent as a general matter, the committee
questions whether, in the specific context of model updates on
already accredited cloud platforms, this revalidation
meaningfully improves security posture or has become a process
burden without commensurate security return.
The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program has
recently established criteria distinguishing genuine security
changes from routine updates. The committee encourages the
Department to evaluate this approach and, if appropriate, adopt
comparable standards. The committee acknowledges that the DOD
reciprocity handbook requires authorizing officials to
independently locate and revalidate documentation of controls
already assessed at the Department level.
The committee therefore directs the DOD Chief Information
Officer (CIO) to evaluate: (1) Whether current guidance and
reciprocity handbooks appropriately distinguish security-
relevant AI model changes from routine updates for models
hosted on centrally accredited cloud platforms; (2) Whether
authorizing official revalidation of inherited controls in this
context provides security benefit beyond existing centralized
review; and (3) What risks, if any, would result from directing
full reciprocity for model updates already approved through
centralized platforms, removing that revalidation burden from
service-level authorizing officials.
The DOD CIO shall brief the Committees on Armed Services of
the Senate and the House of Representatives on the results of
this evaluation, not later than April 1, 2027.

Recommendation to transition Workforce Transformation Cyber Initiative
pilot to program of record

The committee supports the continuation of the Workforce
Transformation Cyber Initiative pilot program at the National
Security Agency (NSA), which offers certificate-based courses
through a Center of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity. The
committee supports the intentions of the Department of Defense
(DOD) to codify the pilot program as a permanent program of
record. The committee encourages prioritization of funding to
the successful ``train the trainers'' curriculum, which
provides scholarships to military veterans, first responders,
and minority-serving institutions to access certificate-based
courses that address secure coding, artificial intelligence,
quantum, and cybersecurity, which are all critical national
needs in responding to cyber threats.
The committee supports the inclusion of new capabilities in
the program and recommends the DOD transition the NSA's
Workforce Transformation Cyber Initiative into a program of
record and identify an academic institution to serve as a
management center to synchronize, coordinate, and direct the
activities of participating programs to dynamically align with
DOD priorities and workforce requirements. This central
management institution should be a designated research
university that has participated in the pilot program since its
inception and has experience with developing cybersecurity
curriculum in collaboration with a variety of academic
partners.

Report on agile telecommunications technologies

Near-peer adversaries continue to advance signals
intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities designed to
intercept and disrupt Joint Force communications. The committee
notes that while the Department of Defense (DOD) has integrated
commercial 4G and 5G waveforms into tactical settings, these
systems often rely on static frequencies that can be vulnerable
to detection in contested environments.
The committee is aware of existing research and development
efforts into emerging technology that enable operators to apply
anti-jam capabilities such as frequency-hop communications
through randomized, alternative frequencies in contested and
congested multidomain environments, similar to other tactical
communications systems.
The committee directs the Director of the DOD 5G Cross-
Functional Team and the Director of the FutureG Office to
provide a briefing on frequency and modality agile technologies
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, not later than April 1, 2027. The report
shall include: (1) An assessment of how frequency- and
modality-agile emergent technologies could enable more secure
and resilient communications in contested, congested, and
constrained electromagnetic spectrum environments; (2) An
analysis of commercially available frequency- and modality-
agile technologies; (3) A description of how such technologies
could operate within the existing Joint All-Domain Command and
Control architecture; (4) A strategy for working with
commercial providers, including Open Radio Access Network
companies, on integrating such technologies into their
solutions for warfighting systems; and (5) A plan to integrate
frequency- and modality-agile technologies into the theater
plans for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

Review of Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification program approach
following release of cyber-focused generative artificial
intelligence models

The committee recognizes that point-in-time security and
compliance frameworks present an inherent and growing
vulnerability as the interval between assessments increases.
The recent emergence of sophisticated cyber-focused generative
artificial intelligence (AI) models has materially accelerated
this risk by providing adversaries with powerful new
capabilities to identify and exploit security gaps within the
defense industrial base (DIB). The committee believes this
development warrants a critical examination of whether the
Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) program, as
currently structured, remains sufficient to protect DIB
contractors and subcontractors against this evolving threat
environment.
The committee acknowledges the considerable financial and
administrative investment that CMMC certification imposes on
DIB vendors and does not take lightly the burden that any
programmatic evolution may present. Nevertheless, the committee
believes the security of the DIB must remain paramount and that
the maturation of cyber-focused generative AI necessitates a
serious evaluation of whether a transition from periodic,
point-in-time assessments to a model of continuous evaluation
is both necessary and achievable within the existing CMMC
framework.
Therefore, the committee directs the Department of Defense
(DOD) Chief Information Officer (CIO) to conduct a
comprehensive evaluation of the CMMC program and provide a
briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than March 15, 2027, on
the outcomes of that evaluation.
The evaluation and briefing shall address the following:
(1) An assessment of the ability of the current CMMC framework
to protect the DIB against threats enabled by cyber-focused
generative AI, including the identification of any programmatic
gaps or vulnerabilities; (2) A determination of the CMMC
certification level or levels at which a transition to
continuous evaluation would be necessary to adequately mitigate
the identified threat; (3) A proposed timeline and
implementation plan for transitioning from point-in-time
assessments to continuous evaluation, including any required
regulatory, contractual, or programmatic changes; (4) An
assessment of the impact such a transition would have on the
Third Party Assessment Organization (3PAO) evaluation model,
including any changes to 3PAO roles, responsibilities,
accreditation standards, or capacity; and (5) An assessment of
how cyber-focused generative AI technologies could themselves
be leveraged by the DOD or authorized assessment bodies to
strengthen continuous monitoring of DIB contractor
cybersecurity posture and CMMC compliance.

Risk mitigation and acceleration of Zero Trust implementation for
operational technology

The committee welcomes recent updates to the Department of
Defense's (DOD) Zero Trust Strategy 2.0 but remains concerned
with the strategy's ability to scale across the full DOD
enterprise and maintain continuous monitoring across all threat
vectors, including operational technology (OT), in the face of
rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled threats.
Fragmented point solutions and manual processes continue to
impede progress toward Target Level Zero Trust maturity,
leaving Defense Critical Infrastructure and mission-critical OT
environments at unacceptable risk. The committee is concerned
that, as a result of these shortfalls, the DOD does not expect
to achieve Target Level Zero Trust for OT systems until the end
of fiscal year 2030.
To address these concerns, the committee believes that the
DOD should accelerate the adoption of platform-centric
architectures that unify data models, enable AI-driven security
operations, and enforce Zero Trust controls continuously across
the enterprise, including within disconnected, intermittent,
and low bandwidth and browser environments. The committee
believes this approach will reduce latency, ease network
defender workload, and ensure security policies adapt
dynamically to emerging threats.
To this end, the committee directs the DOD Chief
Information Officer to provide a briefing to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
not later than March 1, 2027, on how the Zero Trust Strategy
2.0 will scale across the full DOD enterprise, including OT
environments, and address the architectural, funding, and
acquisition challenges necessary to ensure continuous
protection against AI-enabled threats. The briefing shall
specifically address: (1) A roadmap to achieve 100 percent
visibility into all OT systems; (2) The feasibility of
accelerating Target Level OT outcomes for all Tier 1 Mission
Assurance installations to fiscal year 2028, and not later than
fiscal year 2029 for the broader enterprise; (3) An assessment
of funding required to achieve these goals; (4) How acquisition
efforts align with AI-driven security operations; and (5)
Estimated cost savings and operational efficiencies achieved
through capability consolidation and automation.

Security and risk management for commercial artificial intelligence

The committee recognizes that the Department of Defense
(DOD) is expanding its integration of commercial frontier
artificial intelligence (AI) models to support critical mission
functions and that the security of these models presents an
evolving and multi-dimensional challenge. Recent incidents,
including the reported theft of model weights from leading AI
developers, underscore that adversaries are actively targeting
the foundational assets of commercial AI systems. The committee
believes that the United States' competitive advantage in AI is
inseparable from its ability to protect the technology and that
a collaborative security posture with industry is essential to
sustaining that advantage.
The committee is concerned that the DOD has not yet
developed a comprehensive, standardized approach to applying
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF) to
its engagements with commercial frontier AI model providers.
Threat vectors--including data poisoning, model weight
exfiltration, backdoor insertion, supply-chain compromise, and
insider threats--are evolving rapidly and require an adaptive,
cooperative strategy.
Therefore, the committee directs the DOD Chief Information
Officer (CIO), in coordination with the Chief Digital and
Artificial Intelligence Officer and the Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency, to develop a
comprehensive strategy for managing AI security risks in DOD
partnerships with commercial frontier AI model providers. The
strategy shall include the following: (1) A plan for applying
the NIST AI RMF to DOD contracts with commercial frontier AI
providers, including minimum standards for model integrity,
training data integrity, and infrastructure protection; (2) An
approach for collaboratively assessing and mitigating insider
threat risks with commercial AI partners, recognizing that
effective mitigation requires trust, information sharing, and
joint investment in security practices; (3) A framework for
incident notification requiring timely reporting to the
Department of any theft or unauthorized access of model
weights, corruption or unauthorized alteration of training
data, discovery of a material vulnerability permitting
unauthorized model modification or misuse, or concerning model
behavior affecting DOD mission integrity; and (4) A roadmap for
evolving this strategy as AI capabilities and threat vectors
develop, including mechanisms for sustained engagement with
industry partners. The CIO shall provide a briefing on the
strategy to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than July 15, 2027.

Space domain awareness software

The committee is aware that the space domain is becoming
increasingly congested and contested, with rapid growth in
resident space objects, more frequent deployment events, and
adversary behaviors designed to exploit ambiguity below the
threshold of armed conflict.
The committee further notes that adversaries are employing
Camouflage, Concealment, Deception, and Maneuver (CCDM)
tactics, including the introduction of unexpected objects,
novel configurations, and atypical behaviors that challenge
existing space domain awareness (SDA) processes.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services
Committee, not later than June 1, 2027, on how the Space Force
and Air Force plan to operationalize machine learning-enabled
object classification and anomaly detection tools that identify
suspected CCDM, flag unexpected object behaviors during
deployment events, and integrate with existing SDA
architectures. The briefing shall include: (1) The plan to
transition this capability from prototype to operational
deployment; (2) Integration pathways with existing Space Force
command and control systems; (3) Performance metrics for
anomaly detection, classification accuracy, and analyst
workload reduction; and (4) Plans to potentially extend this
capability to support cislunar space domain awareness.

Strategy for leveraging artificial intelligence tools for medical
countermeasures development

The committee notes that significant progress is being made
in the capabilities for advanced artificial intelligence (AI)
systems, and their application for a broad range of uses in the
Department of Defense continues to expand. The committee is
aware that the use of such systems with domain specific data is
for focused technical needs. While the Department has invested
in generalized large language models for broad application, the
committee believes the Department needs to emphasize additional
attention on these domain specific needs.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to develop a strategy for leveraging AI tools for medical
countermeasures development and deliver a report to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than December 1, 2027. The strategy
shall include: (1) An assessment of the current and projected
threat landscape for biological and chemical threats against
which the Department requires medical countermeasures; (2) A
prioritized list of near-term and long-term medical
countermeasures platforms needed by the Department; (3)
Proposals to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate relevant
Department components to most effectively leverage AI tools for
medical countermeasures development; (4) Identification of any
issues, problems, or roadblocks that would impede progress; (5)
Opportunities to leverage support from non-Departmental
entities; (6) Resources required, including personnel,
facilities, and funding; (7) Implementation timeline over the
next 5 years, including budget estimates and key milestones;
(8) Recommendations for improving or formalizing interagency
coordination and support mechanisms; and (9) Any required
policy or legislative changes that would enable implementation
of the strategy.

Study on use of software agents in cyber operations

The committee recognizes that the Department of Defense
(DOD) is increasingly exploring the application of autonomous
capabilities across all warfighting domains, including the use
of software agents in cyberspace. However, the committee is not
aware of a comprehensive, Department-wide assessment of how
such software agents are being developed, resourced, and
operationalized within the cyber domain, including offensive
and defensive cyber operations, network operations, and
Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) operations.
Therefore, the committee directs the Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation to conduct a comprehensive
study on the use of software agents in the cyber domain and
provide a report on the findings and recommendations of that
study to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, not later than November 1, 2027.
The study must be coordinated with the Commander, U.S.
Cyber Command; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber
Policy; the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It
should include: (1) A review of all current DOD investments,
programs, and resources dedicated to the development and
employment of software agents in cyberspace, including
offensive cyber operations, defensive cyber operations, network
operations, and DODIN operations; (2) An assessment of existing
policies, doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities frameworks
as they pertain to the employment of software agents in the
cyber domain; (3) A review of relevant operational plans,
strategies, and concepts of operations that contemplate or
direct the use of software agents in cyberspace; (4) An
assessment of how software agents in the cyber domain can
support and enhance Joint Force operations, including the
integration of autonomous cyber tools into joint operational
planning, the potential to enable or accelerate effects across
other warfighting domains, and the role of software agents in
supporting combatant command requirements and theater campaign
objectives; (5) An assessment of technology readiness levels
and current operational capabilities, including autonomous
agents, machine learning systems, and emerging science and
technology concepts such as self-recursive training and related
techniques; (6) An identification of barriers to the adoption
and deployment of software agents, including cybersecurity
requirements, security policies, legal and policy constraints,
and authorities; and (7) An assessment of future plans and
recommended strategies necessary to responsibly develop, field,
and sustain software agents in the cyber domain.

Third-party hardware evaluation and independent analysis program

The committee is aware that the Department of Defense (DOD)
has conducted pilot tests using novel commercial technology to
directly interrogate electronic equipment, identify individual
components, and compare their behavior against libraries of
known characteristics. Testing at a large defense agency,
aboard operational Navy vessels, and at a developmental 5G
network installation revealed that a meaningful percentage of
devices exhibited supply chain anomalies warranting further
investigation. The committee is concerned that such anomalies
may reflect systemic vulnerabilities across the DOD's
commercial supply chains and believes a structured, Department-
wide assessment is essential to determine the full scope of the
problem.
The committee directs the Chief Information Officer (CIO),
in cooperation with the DOD Inspector General, to conduct a
feasibility assessment, not later than January 15, 2027, of
establishing a program to do third-party hardware evaluation
and independent analysis. The objective of this program would
be to assess the scope of DOD supply chain security problems
across a representative sample of vendors and DOD components.
Not later than February 15, 2027, the CIO shall brief the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the following: (1) The results of the
feasibility study, including the analytic framework by which
the study was conducted; (2) A proposed structure, resourcing,
and implementation timeline for a program to do third-party
hardware evaluation and independent analysis, if recommended;
(3) Proposed remediation efforts and investments required to
address identified supply chain vulnerabilities at scale; and
(4) Findings and anomalies identified during prior pilot
assessments and their implications for broader DOD supply chain
integrity.
Further, the committee encourages the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security, through the Directors of
the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency and the
National Security Agency, to engage commercial information
technology vendors to understand how unauthorized components
enter their supply chains and to develop remediation plans and
investment strategies necessary to prevent such occurrences at
scale.

U.S. Cyber Command science and technology investment strategy

The committee recognizes the significant progress U.S.
Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) has made in advancing its science and
technology (S&T) investments and programs and commends the
processes established in response to the Senate report
accompanying S. 4543 (S. Rept. 117-130) of the James M. Inhofe
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. With
the continued maturation of CYBERCOM under CYBERCOM 2.0, the
advancement of its workforce, and the establishment of the
Cyber Warfare Innovation Center, the committee believes this
moment presents a natural opportunity to build on those
successes, candidly assess what is working well, and position
the command for continued growth in its approach to S&T
investment.
To that end, the committee believes it is timely to conduct
a thorough examination of the current S&T process, including:
(1) How CYBERCOM collects operational requirements and
capability gaps and transmits them to appropriate development
partners; (2) How the command selects among the military
services, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO), the Defense
Innovation Unit (DIU), and other organizations to best address
a given requirement; (3) How S&T projects are consolidated,
tracked, and transitioned to operational use to maximize their
impact; (4) How the relative distribution of S&T investments
across those organizations aligns with CYBERCOM's evolving
needs; and (5) How investments are categorized as S&T versus
capabilities appropriate for direct development and fielding by
the command, in light of the command's increasing maturity and
the advancing technological readiness of emerging capabilities.
Beyond an assessment of the mechanics of the current
process, the committee believes the evaluation should also: (1)
Examine whether the overall S&T investment approach is
achieving its intended outcomes; (2) Identify opportunities for
improvement; (3) Determine whether any new or revised
authorities are needed to better enable the command to meet its
S&T objectives; and (4) Assess whether the current limitations
on budget authority for S&T investment remain appropriate given
the command's continued evolution.
Therefore, the committee directs the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Cyber Policy, the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command,
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, in coordination with the Principal Cyber Advisors
of the military departments, the Director of DARPA, the
Director of the SCO, and the Director of the DIU, to conduct a
comprehensive evaluation of the matters described above and
provide a briefing on the results to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not
later than March 15, 2027.

DIVISION B--MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATIONS

Summary and explanation of funding tables
Division B of this Act authorizes funding for military
construction projects of the Department of Defense (DOD). It
includes funding authorizations for the construction and
operation of military family housing as well as military
construction for the reserve components, the Defense Agencies
and Field Activities, and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Security Investment Program. It also provides
authorization for the base closure accounts that fund military
construction, environmental cleanup, and other activities
required to implement the decisions made in prior base
realignment and closure rounds.
The tables contained in this Act provide the project-level
authorizations for the military construction funding authorized
in division B of this Act and summarize that funding by
account.
The fiscal year 2027 budget request included $38.0 billion
for military construction and housing programs. Of this amount,
$36.9 billion was requested for military construction, $119.2
million for the construction and operation of family housing,
$372.3 million for base closure activities, and $604.4 million
for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment
Program.
The committee recommends the authorization of
appropriations for military construction, housing programs,
facilities sustainment, and base closure activities totaling
$38.0 billion. The total amount authorized for appropriations
reflects the committee's continued commitment to investing in
the recapitalization of DOD facilities and infrastructure.
Sec. 2001--Short title
The committee recommends a provision that would designate
division B of this Act as the ``Military Construction
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027.''
Sec. 2002--Expiration of authorizations and amounts required to be
specified by law
The committee recommends a provision that would establish
the expiration date for authorizations in this Act for military
construction projects, land acquisition, family housing
projects and facilities, and contributions to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program as
October 1, 2029, or the date of the enactment of an Act
authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year
2030, whichever is later.
Sec. 2003--Effective date
The committee recommends a provision that would provide an
effective date for titles XXI through XXVII of October 1, 2026,
or the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later.

TITLE XXI--ARMY MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Summary
The budget request included an authorization of
appropriations of $1.6 billion for military construction and
$95.1 million for family housing for the Army for fiscal year
2027.
The committee recommends an authorization of appropriations
of $2.2 billion for military construction for the Army and
$95.1 million for family housing for the Army for fiscal year
2027.
Further details on projects authorized can be found in
section 4601 of this Act.
Sec. 2101--Authorized Army construction and land acquisition projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
Army military construction projects for fiscal year 2027. The
authorized amount is listed on an installation-by-installation
basis.
Sec. 2102--Family housing
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
new construction, planning, and design for Army family housing
units for fiscal year 2027. This provision would also authorize
funds for facilities that support family housing, including
housing management offices, housing maintenance, and storage
facilities.
Sec. 2103--Authorization of appropriations, Army
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for the active component military construction
and family housing projects of the Army authorized for
construction for fiscal year 2027. This provision would also
provide an overall limit on the amount authorized for military
construction and family housing projects for the active
component of the Army. The state list contained in this report
is the binding list of the specific projects authorized at each
location.
Sec. 2104--Extension of authority to carry out fiscal year 2021 project
at Fort Gillem, Georgia
The committee recommends a provision that would extend the
authorization contained in section 2101 of the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021 (Public Law 116-283) until October 1, 2027, or the date of
the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military
construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.
Sec. 2105--Extension and modification of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2022 projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend
certain authorizations contained in section 2101 of the
Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022
(Public Law 117-81) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the
enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction
for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.
The provision would also modify an authorization contained
in the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022 to construct 193,347 square feet of barracks.
Sec. 2106--Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2023
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend the
authorization contained in section 2101 of the Military
Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 of the
James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) until October 1, 2027, or the
date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military
construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.
Sec. 2107--Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2024
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend the
authorization contained in section 2101 of the Military
Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public
Law 118-31) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment
of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for
fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.
Sec. 2108--Modification of authority to carry out fiscal year 2025
project at Grafenwoehr, Germany
The committee recommends a provision that would modify an
authorization contained in the Military Construction
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 of the Servicemember
Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159) to construct an
Operational Readiness Training Complex underground electric
line.
Sec. 2109--Modification of authority to carry out fiscal year 2026
project at Joint Region Marianas, Guam
The committee recommends a provision that would modify an
authorization contained in the Military Construction
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) to
construct a 2,496 square foot pump house and a 648,000 gallon
non-portable water storage tank.

TITLE XXII--NAVY MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Summary
The budget request included an authorization of
appropriations of $19.2 billion for military construction for
the Navy for fiscal year 2027.
The committee recommends an authorization of appropriations
of $20.3 billion for military construction for the Navy for
fiscal year 2027.
Further details on projects authorized can be found in
section 4601 of this Act.
Sec. 2201--Authorized Navy construction and land acquisition projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
Navy and Marine Corps military construction projects for fiscal
year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an
installation-by-installation basis.
Sec. 2202--Family housing
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
new construction, planning, and design for Navy family housing
units for fiscal year 2027. This provision would also authorize
funds for facilities that support family housing, including
housing management offices, housing maintenance, and storage
facilities.
Sec. 2203--Authorization of appropriations, Navy
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for the active component military construction
and family housing projects of the Department of the Navy
authorized for construction for fiscal year 2027. This
provision would also provide an overall limit on the amount
authorized for military construction and family housing
projects for the active components of the Navy and the Marine
Corps. The state list contained in this report is the binding
list of the specific projects authorized at each location.
Sec. 2204--Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2023
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend the
authorization contained in section 2201 of the Military
Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 of the
James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) until October 1, 2027, or the
date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military
construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.
Sec. 2205--Extension and modification of authority to carry out certain
fiscal year 2024 projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend the
authorization contained in section 2201 of the Military
Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public
Law 118-31) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment
of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for
fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

Sec. 2206--Modification of authority to carry out fiscal year 2026
project at Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii

The committee recommends a provision that would modify an
authorization contained in the Military Construction
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) to
expand airfield pavement areas to 280,000 square meters.

TITLE XXIII--AIR FORCE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Summary
The budget request included an authorization of
appropriations of $9.7 billion for military construction and
$24.1 million for family housing for the Air Force in fiscal
year 2027.
The committee recommends an authorization of appropriations
of $10.4 billion for military construction and $24.1 million
for family housing for the Air Force for fiscal year 2027.
Further details on projects authorized can be found in
section 4601 of this Act.
Sec. 2301--Authorized Air Force construction and land acquisition
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
Air Force military construction projects for fiscal year 2027.
The authorized amounts are listed on an installation-by-
installation basis.
Sec. 2302--Family housing
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
improvements to existing housing, planning, and design for Air
Force family housing units for fiscal year 2027. This provision
would also authorize funds for facilities that support family
housing, including housing management offices, housing
maintenance, and storage facilities.
Sec. 2303--Authorization of appropriations, Air Force
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for military construction and family housing
projects of the Department of the Air Force authorized for
construction for fiscal year 2027. This provision would also
provide an overall limit on the amount authorized for military
construction and family housing projects for the active
component of the Air Force and the Space Force. The state list
contained in this report is the binding list of the specific
projects authorized at each location.
Sec. 2304--Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2019
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend the
authorization of certain projects contained in section 2903 of
the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232) until October 1,
2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds
for military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is
later.
Sec. 2305--Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2020
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend
certain authorizations contained in sections 2301(a) and
2912(a) of the Military Construction Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 117-81) until October 1, 2027, or
the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for
military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.
Sec. 2306--Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2023
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend
certain authorizations contained in section 2301 of the
Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 of
the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263) until October 1, 2027, or
the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for
military construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.
Sec. 2307--Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2024
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend the
authorization contained in sections 2301 and 2302 of the
Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024
(Public Law 118-31) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the
enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction
for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.
Sec. 2308--Authority to carry out family housing improvement projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of the Air Force to carry out family housing
improvement projects to restructure agreements under the
Military Housing Privatization Initiative under subchapter IV
of chapter 169 of title 10, United States Code. The authorized
amounts are listed on an installation-by-installation basis.
Sec. 2309--Authority to carry out project at Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of the Air Force to carry out a military
construction project to construct a 6,934 square meter Joint
All-Domain Command and Control and Air Battle Management
Systems Test Facility at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, in the
amount of $87.8 million.

TITLE XXIV--DEFENSE AGENCIES MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Summary
The budget request included an authorization of
appropriations of $5.9 billion for military construction for
the Defense Agencies for fiscal year 2027.
The committee recommends an authorization of appropriations
of $5.9 billion for military construction for the Defense
Agencies for fiscal year 2027.
Further details on projects authorized can be found in
section 4601 of this Act.
Sec. 2401--Authorized Defense agencies construction and land
acquisition projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
military construction projects for the Defense Agencies for
fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an
installation-by-installation basis.
Sec. 2402--Authorized Energy Resilience and Conservation Investment
Program projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of Defense to carry out Energy Resilience and
Conservation Investment Program projects for fiscal year 2027.
The authorized amounts are listed on an installation-by-
installation basis.
Sec. 2403--Authorization of appropriations, Defense Agencies
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for the military construction and family housing
projects of the Defense Agencies authorized for construction
for fiscal year 2027. This provision would also provide an
overall limit on the amount authorized for military
construction and family housing projects for the Defense
Agencies. The state list contained in this report is the
binding list of the specific projects authorized at each
location.
Sec. 2404--Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2023
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend
certain authorizations contained in sections 2401(a) and
2402(a) of the Military Construction Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263)
until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act
authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year
2028, whichever is later.
Sec. 2405--Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2024
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend the
authorization contained in sections 2401 and 2402 in the
Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024
(Public Law 118-31) until October 1, 2027, or the date of the
enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction
for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.

TITLE XXV--INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS

Summary
The budget request included an authorization of
appropriations of $604.3 million for military construction of
fiscal year 2027 for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Security Investment Program.
The committee recommends an authorization of appropriations
of $654.3 million for military construction of fiscal year 2027
for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment
Program.

Subtitle A--North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment
Program

Sec. 2501--Authorized NATO construction and land acquisition projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of Defense to make contributions to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program in an
amount equal to the sum of the amount specifically authorized
in section 4601 of this title and the amount of recoupment due
to the United States for construction previously financed by
the United States.
Sec. 2502--Authorization of appropriations, NATO
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations of $654.3 million for the U.S. contribution to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment
Program for fiscal year 2027.

Subtitle B--Host Country in-Kind Contributions

Sec. 2511--Republic of Korea funded construction projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of Defense to accept seven military construction
projects totaling $416.5 million from the Republic of Korea as
in-kind contributions.
Sec. 2512--Republic of Poland funded construction projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of Defense to accept two military construction
projects totaling $134.0 million from the Republic of Poland as
in-kind contributions.

TITLE XXVI--GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES FACILITIES

Summary
The budget request included an authorization of
appropriations of $611.0 million for military construction in
fiscal year 2027 for facilities for the National Guard and
reserve components.
The committee recommends an authorization of appropriations
of $946.5 million for military construction for the National
Guard and reserve components. The detailed funding
recommendations are contained in the state list table included
in this report.
Further details on projects authorized can be found in the
tables in this title and section 4601 of this Act.
Sec. 2601--Authorized Army National Guard construction and land
acquisition projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
military construction projects for the Army National Guard for
fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an
installation-by-installation basis.
Sec. 2602--Authorized Army Reserve construction and land acquisition
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
military construction projects for the Army Reserve for fiscal
year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an
installation-by-installation basis.
Sec. 2603--Authorized Navy Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve
construction and land acquisition projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
military construction projects for the Navy Reserve and Marine
Corps Reserve for fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are
listed on an installation-by-installation basis.
Sec. 2604--Authorized Air National Guard construction and land
acquisition projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
military construction projects for the Air National Guard for
fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an
installation-by-installation basis.
Sec. 2605--Authorized Air Force Reserve construction and land
acquisition projects
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
military construction projects for the Air Force Reserve for
fiscal year 2027. The authorized amounts are listed on an
installation-by-installation basis.
Sec. 2606--Authorization of appropriations, National Guard and Reserve
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for the reserve component military construction
projects authorized for construction for fiscal year 2027 in
this Act. This provision would also provide an overall limit on
the amount authorized for military construction projects for
each of the reserve components of the military departments. The
state list contained in this report is the binding list of the
specific projects authorized at each location.
Sec. 2607--Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2023
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend
certain authorizations contained in sections 2601, 2602, 2603,
and 2604 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263)
until October 1, 2027, or the date of the enactment of an Act
authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year
2028, whichever is later.
Sec. 2608--Extension of authority to carry out certain fiscal year 2024
projects
The committee recommends a provision that would extend the
authorization contained in sections 2601, 2602, 2604, and 2605
of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2024 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2024 (Public Law 118-31) until October 1, 2027, or the date of
the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military
construction for fiscal year 2028, whichever is later.
Sec. 2609--Modification of authority to carry out fiscal year 2026
project at Colonie, New York
The committee recommends a provision that would modify the
authorization contained in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60) for Colonie, New
York.

TITLE XXVII--BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 2701--Authorization of appropriations for base realignment and
closure activities funded through Department of Defense Base
Closure Account
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for ongoing activities that
are required to implement the decisions of the 1988, 1991,
1993, 1995, and 2005 base realignment and closure rounds.

TITLE XXVIII--MILITARY CONSTRUCTION GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subtitle A--Military Construction Program

Sec. 2801--Modification of master plans for major military
installations
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2864 of title 10, United States Code, to align major
military installation master plans to the new definition for
military installation resilience requested last year by the
Department of Defense and adopted in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (Public Law 119-60).
Sec. 2802--Prohibition on use of repair projects to expand footprint of
existing facilities or infrastructure
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2811 of title 10, United States Code, to clarify that
the expansion of the footprint of existing facilities or
infrastructure is not allowed outside of very limited criteria.
Sec. 2803--Increase of authority for Indo-Pacific posture unspecified
military construction projects
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2810(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31) by increasing the minor
military construction threshold from $30.0 million to $35.0
million.
Sec. 2804--Use of certain amounts for electrical or infrastructure
upgrades on Barbers Point, Hawaii
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
2814(i)(1) of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the
Secretary of Defense to use existing funding in the Ford Island
Improvement Account to make electrical upgrades on Barbers
Point, Hawaii.
Sec. 2805--Temporary adjustment of unspecified minor military
construction requirements
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2805 of title 10, United States Code, to increase the
unspecified minor military construction threshold from $9.0
million to $15.0 million and relieve area cost factor
adjustments for Alaska, Hawaii, and other islands in the Indo-
Pacific for a period of 5 years. The provision would also make
additional conforming and clarifying changes to the underlying
statute to improve understanding within the Department of
Defense.
Sec. 2806--Modification of authority for transactions other than
contracts and grants for purposes of facility construction or
repair
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2808a of title 10, United States Code, with a technical
correction.

Subtitle B--Military Housing

Sec. 2821--Exclusion of window opening control devices from requirement
for window fall prevention devices in military family housing
units
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2857(a)(3) of title 10, United States Code, to clarify
that a window fall prevention device in military family housing
units does not include a device that is solely a window opening
control device.
Sec. 2822--Health and safety requirements for military housing
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that all housing project
agreements and renewals for privatized military housing are
compliant with the appropriate environmental health and safety
standards and that all maintenance personnel, contracted mold
assessors, indoor environmental professionals, and mold
remediators responsible for assessing or remediating mold and
water damage in covered housing shall possess and maintain
current certifications issued by a nationally recognized,
third-party, nonprofit certifying body.
Sec. 2823--Expansion of protection from reprisal or retaliation against
tenants of privatized military housing units who report
housing-related issues
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2890(e) of title 10, United States Code, to expand
protected communications of tenants of privatized military
housing who report housing-related issues relative to the
privatized housing.
Sec. 2824--Transparency and strategic planning for housing
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to ensure that any enhanced-use lease
executed, extended, or renewed under section 2662 or 2667 of
title 10, United States Code, consider a range of more
transparent and strategic planning considerations with respect
to military housing.
Sec. 2825--Development and implementation of minimum health and safety
standards for military family housing
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to mandate specific standards for housing
and environmental health and safety protections for members of
the Armed Forces and their families residing in military family
housing.
Sec. 2826--Treatment of nondisclosure agreements with respect to
privatized military housing
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2890(f) of title 10, United States Code, to prohibit a
landlord from requesting that a tenant or prospective tenant of
a privatized housing unit sign a nondisclosure agreement.
Sec. 2827--Improvement of privatized military housing complaint
database
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2894a of title 10, United States Code, to improve the
complaint database for privatized military housing.
Sec. 2828--Requirement relating to any reprogramming request relating
to funding for housing or facilities of Department of Defense
The committee recommends a provision that would, in the
event the Department of Defense (DOD) requests approval to
reprogram funding for military housing or any other facility,
require the DOD to provide: an assessment of the condition of
the facility from which funding is requested to be
reprogrammed, any accompanying documentation, any outstanding
maintenance requests at such facility, the number of
servicemembers at such facility, any anticipated impacts to
readiness, and an analysis by the DOD on why the request was
made.

Subtitle C--Land Conveyances

Sec. 2841--Land conveyance, Milan Army Ammunition Plant, Tennessee
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of the Army to convey approximately 5,000 acres
currently located at the former Milan Army Ammunition Plant to
the University of Tennessee, for the purposes of expanding the
University of Tennessee Research and Education Center at Milan.
Sec. 2842--Land conveyance, Army Reserve Center, Opelika, Alabama
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Secretary of the Army to convey land that contains an Army
Reserve Center and 4.5 acres to the City of Opelika, Alabama,
for the purpose of meeting increased healthcare demands from
the center.
Sec. 2843--Report on land withdrawal at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Army to submit a report to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, on all land withdrawal actions that are necessary to
support training at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona.
Sec. 2844--Report on necessary modifications to military land
withdrawal of Fallon Range Training Complex, Nevada
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Navy to submit a report, not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of this Act, on any necessary
modifications to the military land withdrawal of Fallon Range
Training Complex, Nevada, under subtitle G of the Military Land
Withdrawals Act of 2013 (title XXIX of Public Law 113-66), as
added by section 2901 of the Military Construction
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (division B of Public
Law 117-263), regarding the management of withdrawn and
reserved land, road reconstruction and treatment of existing
roads and rights-of-way, reconstruction and relocation
requirements, and treatment of livestock grazing permits.
Sec. 2845--Land exchange, Camp Pike and Camp Joseph T. Robinson,
Arkansas
The committee recommends a provision that would grant
permissive authority to the Secretary of the Army to convey a
certain parcel of real property located at Camp Pike, North
Little Rock, Arkansas, in exchange for property located at Camp
Joseph T. Robinson, North Little Rock, Arkansas.
Sec. 2846--Removal of conditions on use of certain land conveyed to the
State of Indiana
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2858 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996 (division B of Public Law 104-106), as amended
by section 2838 of the Military Construction Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1998 (division B of Public Law 105-85) and
section 2843(i) of the Military Construction Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1999 (division B of Public Law 105-261) by
striking subsection (d) and inserting new conditions on the
release of covenants.
Sec. 2847--Review and report on conveyance of Lambert St. Louis
International Airport
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive review of the
feasibility and advisability of conveying to the City of St.
Louis, Missouri, certain lands to the Lambert St. Louis
International Airport.
Sec. 2848--Review and report on conveyance of Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson, Anchorage, Alaska
The committee recommends a provision that would require a
review and report on a potential conveyance specific to Joint
Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska.

Subtitle D--Other Matters

Sec. 2861--Authority of combatant commands to recover and reinvest
operational energy cost savings
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2912 of title 10, United States Code, to include
combatant commands as eligible entities to recover and reinvest
operational energy cost savings.
Sec. 2862--Energy control requirements for electrical infrastructure
upgrades
The committee recommends a provision that would ensure that
electrical systems within facilities of the Department of
Defense are capable of operating in islanded mode during grid
outages, thereby enhancing energy resilience, security, and
operational continuity.
Sec. 2863--Modification of calculation of minimum capital investment
for facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2680 of title 10, United States Code, to include
operation and maintenance resources obligated under eligible
performance-based contracts to count toward the minimum capital
investment for facilities sustainment, restoration, and
modernization.
Sec. 2864--Requirements relating to leasing of land in Hawaii
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of the Army to seek from the State of Hawaii on terms
acceptable to both the Army and the State, a renewal of
expiring leases, pursuant to section 2667 of title 10, United
States Code. The provision would also direct the Secretary of
the Army to resubmit an environmental impact statement for
additional review that responds to and addresses any
deficiencies.
Sec. 2865--Department of Defense Laboratory Facility Investment Program
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
subchapter I of chapter 169 of title 10, United States Code, to
establish the Department of Defense Laboratory Facility
Investment Program to fund military construction projects that
improve, modernize, or recapitalize the physical infrastructure
of defense laboratories critical to national security.
Sec. 2866--Consideration of modular construction methods for military
construction projects with protective design elements
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of Defense to consider the use of modular
construction when determining the most effective method for a
military construction project, and to provide a report to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, not later than 180 days after the enactment of
this Act.
Sec. 2867--Standardized methodology for basing decisions for the Air
Force
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that all future basing
decisions utilize specific methodology to increase transparency
and take into account lifecycle costs.
The committee notes that the Department of the Air Force is
expected to make critical basing decisions within the next 24
months for both F-35 and KC-46A aircraft. The committee
supports the methodology used in recent basing decisions,
including consideration of cost, infrastructure, readiness, and
mission requirements, as a fair and transparent approach to
strategic basing. The committee does believe, however, that
additional data would assist the Air Force in considering life
cycle costs over a longer time period.
Sec. 2868--Pilot program on replacement of substandard chillers or
facilities that support subsistence resiliency
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize a
pilot program to replace a chiller or chiller-related
facilities that support subsistence resiliency within the U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command at locations that have been deemed remote
and isolated.
Sec. 2869--Department of Defense pilot program for development and use
of online real estate inventory tool
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2866 of the Military Construction Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021 (division B of Public Law 116-283) to expand
the pilot program for the online real estate inventory tool for
the entire Department of Defense.
Sec. 2870--Transfer of amounts for development of Ford Island, Hawaii,
and electrical upgrades and Barbers Point, Hawaii
The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Secretary of the Navy to transfer all amounts in the account
associated with the Ford Island Master Development Agreement to
the Ford Island Improvement Account.
Sec. 2871--Expansion of defense community infrastructure pilot program
to include installations of the Coast Guard
The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 2391 of title 10, United States Code, to allow the U.S.
Coast Guard to compete for funding available through the
Defense Community Infrastructure Program.
Sec. 2872--Plan on remediation of certain equipment and computational
facilities owned or controlled by a foreign adversary
The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Commander, U.S.
Northern Command, and the Secretaries of the military
departments, and in consultation with the Secretary of Energy,
to submit to the congressional defense committees, not later
than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, a plan
to identify, prioritize, and remediate the presence of
equipment and computational facilities owned or controlled by a
foreign adversary in the electric grid of the United States.

Items of Special Interest

Accounting for force protection and weather concerns for B-21 Bomber
shelter budgeting
The committee continues to support the Air Force's efforts
to defend air bases and recognizes that technology and tactics
for unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and first person view (FPV)
drones, demonstrated in Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb and
Israel's Operation Roaring Lion, challenge the suitability of
open-sided environmental protection shelters (EPS) in
comparison to traditional hangars for B-21 bomber aircraft,
especially for priority alert missions. Furthermore, the matter
of operational security and information control relating to
strategic nuclear and stealth assets has been underappreciated
in discussions that originally focused on weather conditions,
which, prior to the rapid emergence of UAS and FPV threats,
determined that the current EPS design is inadequate for
blizzard conditions often experienced at the future Main
Operating Base for the B-21.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Department of the
Air Force to take these issues under consideration when
programming for aircraft sustainment as well as military
construction and to coordinate with both force protection and
construction agents when planning for design allocation funding
over the future years defense program.
Adoption and integration of additive construction technologies
The committee supports efforts by the Department of Defense
and the military services to accelerate the adoption of
additive construction technology for construction projects. The
committee notes additive construction's potential to reduce the
time and cost of projects compared to traditional construction.
The committee supports Department initiatives to pursue
additive construction technology demonstration projects for
rapid construction in contingency environments as well as
organic additive construction capabilities within garrison
engineering units such as the ongoing demonstrations at
Ellsworth Air Force Base and the U.S. Air Force Academy. The
committee further notes that recent updates to the Unified
Facilities Criteria (UFC), UFC 3-301-01, specifically address
additively constructed concrete (ACC) structures to allow for
broader adoption and further innovation. However, the committee
is concerned that some limitations in current regulations, such
as limiting ACC buildings to a height of no more than two
stories, will hinder broader adoption and thus require further
research, demonstration, and refinement of UFC and other
Department regulations or policies.
Accordingly, the committee strongly encourages the
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the military
services, to pursue further research and demonstration of
multi-story ACC structures, including required seismic
certification and compliance with other safety requirements.
The committee believes this research should inform and enable
revisions to current Department regulations and policies to
permit future additive construction of larger projects such as
barracks, schools, and office space, as well as garrison and
expeditionary structures to harden and defend high-value
defense assets such as aircraft hangers that will house the B-
21 strategic bomber and other exquisite platforms.
Additionally, the committee directs the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the military services, to provide
a briefing to the congressional defense committees, not later
than January 31, 2027, on the status of Department research and
demonstration of multi-story ACC structures. The briefing shall
include: (1) An overview of Department efforts to demonstrate
and certify the use of ACC for multi-story structures; (2) An
explanation of any barriers to revision of Department
regulations or policies enabling the use of ACC for multi-story
structures; (3) A review of the benefits of broader adoption of
organic additive manufacturing capabilities within garrison
engineering units; and (4) An assessment of the use of additive
construction for structures to harden aircraft hangers and
other structures that defend high value assets against drones,
unmanned aerial vehicles, and other threats.
Air Force cyber facilities
The committee recognizes the acute deficiencies in the
facilities of the 16th Air Force and applauds efforts to build
a new consolidated campus for the unit and its associated
missions and partner agencies across the Cyber Mission Force.
The committee supports the Air Force exploring efforts to
construct new facilities in a manner that can deliver a new
facility more expeditiously and cost-effectively than the
traditional military construction process.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of the
Air Force to work with entities proposing to build such
facilities and directs the Secretary to brief the Senate Armed
Services Committee on the status of the discussions, not later
than January 15, 2027.
Army National Guard training center range improvement
The committee recognizes the Army National Guard's critical
role as part of the Army's Operational Reserve and its
contributions to the Joint Force. Army National Guard training
sites across the country, including Camp Navajo, Florence
Military Reservation, and the Buckeye Training Site (in
partnership with the U.S. Army Reserve), provide diverse and
complementary training environments that are well-suited for
realistic and effective readiness training across a range of
missions, terrain, and operating conditions and are essential
to sustaining the readiness of units that must be prepared to
respond to both federal and domestic missions.
Nationwide, Army National Guard training sites support Army
National Guard soldiers and enable joint and allied training,
underscoring their broader value to the Joint Force. Continued
modernization of these ranges would further enhance proficiency
in core warfighting tasks--including squad defense, fire and
movement, and convoy defense. The committee notes that Army
National Guard training sites must have the infrastructure and
facilities necessary to support local training with modern
weapon systems, strengthen lethality and maneuver competencies,
and prepare units for National Training Center rotations,
deployment mobilizations, and Multi-Domain Operations as part
of the Joint Force.
Accordingly, the committee urges the Secretary of the Army,
in coordination with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to
fund efforts to modernize and expand training infrastructure at
Army National Guard training sites nationwide, including those
at Camp Navajo, Florence Military Reservation, and the Buckeye
Training Site. The committee further encourages the Secretary
to identify and prioritize Army National Guard training
infrastructure requirements that address capability gaps,
increase training efficacy, improve access to realistic
training environments, and ensure range and facility
modernization remains aligned with broader Army modernization
objectives. The committee notes that such investments will
strengthen readiness, improve interoperability, and ensure Army
National Guard soldiers are prepared to deploy as capable and
effective warfighters.
Army Reserve component facilities joint use with Army National Guard
The committee notes with concern the fiscal and operational
challenges facing the Army's reserve components regarding
facility sustainment. The Army National Guard's (ARNG) 2,200
Readiness Centers have an average age of 48 years, with an
estimated $60.0 billion required to remedy a 40 percent total
space deficit. The committee is aware that despite the ARNG
managing a significant portion of the Army's facility
inventory, its share of military construction funding has been
disproportionately low, leading to a projected 130-year
modernization timeline that is unsustainable and degrades
readiness.
The committee believes the current model of operating
separate, single-component facilities for the U.S. Army Reserve
(USAR) and the ARNG may be inefficient and fail to maximize the
use of taxpayer dollars. This model of facility management can
lead to costly redundancies and the deterioration of valuable
federal assets when units are realigned. The committee believes
that the Army's Total Force Policy, which seeks to integrate
the active and reserve components into a unified operational
force, should be reflected in how the Army manages its real
property.
Accordingly, the committee encourages the Secretary of the
Army to assess the feasibility and benefits of transferring
sustainment responsibility of USAR facilities to the ARNG. The
committee notes that USAR and ARNG are already planning such
facility transfers in Texas and Connecticut and commends those
efforts.
The committee directs the Secretary of the Army to provide
a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, not later than 1 year following
the date of the enactment of this Act, on the feasibility of
such a transfer program. This report shall include: (1) A
detailed analysis of any cost savings realized by leveraging
the ARNG's federal-state cost-sharing model and state
contracting mechanisms; (2) An assessment of the operational
benefits, including efficiencies in maintenance and repair; (3)
An evaluation of how this model can support force structure
changes resulting from the Army Transformation Initiative; and
(4) Recommendations on the feasibility of expanding this
program and any legislative or regulatory changes needed to
facilitate the conversion of single-component facilities to
joint-use facilities.
Cargo pier at United States Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll
The committee recognizes the enduring strategic value of
Kwajalein Atoll to the Department of Defense. As the location
of the Ronald Reagan Space and Missile Test Range, Kwajalein
provides irreplaceable capabilities for ballistic missile
defense developmental and operational testing, long-range
missile flight testing, space domain awareness, and space
object tracking. Its position in the central Pacific has taken
on heightened importance as the Department reorients toward
strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, and the United
States' access to the atoll represents a significant national
security interest. The committee believes that sustained
investment in the installation's enabling infrastructure is
essential to preserving these capabilities over the long term.
The committee is concerned, however, that the extreme
remoteness of Kwajalein Atoll and its near-total dependence on
maritime resupply place a premium on resilient and sufficient
cargo-handling infrastructure that current port facilities may
not provide. The committee understands that the atoll's
existing pier infrastructure is aging and constrains cargo
throughput and that these limitations may complicate the timely
delivery of sustainment cargo, military construction materiel,
and mission-critical equipment. The committee is particularly
concerned that existing facilities lack roll-on/roll-off
capability, requiring that wheeled and tracked vehicles,
rolling stock, and outsized equipment be handled by lift-on/
lift-off methods that are slower, more labor- and equipment-
intensive, and ill-suited to the efficient movement of
vehicular cargo. The committee is further concerned that the
lack of redundant pier capacity creates a potential single
point of failure that could jeopardize installation readiness,
particularly in the event of damage to existing facilities or a
contingency requiring surge logistics support.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Army to provide a briefing to the Senate Armed Services
Committee, not later than February 1, 2027, on the feasibility
and estimated cost of constructing a new cargo pier at U.S.
Army Garrison Kwajalein Atoll. The briefing shall include, at a
minimum: (1) An assessment of current cargo handling capacity
and identified deficiencies, including the absence of roll-on/
roll-off capability; (2) The projected cargo throughput and
resilience requirements needed to support current and
anticipated missions; (3) An evaluation of options for new or
expanded pier construction, including roll-on/roll-off
capability, with a rough order of magnitude cost estimate and
notional construction schedule for each; (4) An assessment of
associated dredging, landside, staging, and supporting
infrastructure requirements and costs; and (5) A discussion of
relevant environmental, regulatory, and host-nation
considerations under applicable agreements with the Republic of
the Marshall Islands.
Comptroller General review of military installations
The committee recognizes the growing risk of increasingly
frequent and extreme heat events and remains concerned by data
indicating that heat illness was among the top five most
reported medical events among U.S. active-duty servicemembers
in 2024. The committee encourages the Department of Defense to
prioritize the development of policies to identify
opportunities to better prepare for extreme heat events to
ensure military readiness and operational efficiency on
military installations.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General
of the United States to review the Department's and Services'
policies and procedures for data gathering, assessment,
mitigation, and response of military installations to extreme
heat events by assessing: (1) Safety mechanisms and procedures
for outdoor training events that take place during extreme heat
events; (2) Whether and how the Services track and treat
military personnel with heat-related illnesses; (3) What
extreme heat-related infrastructure vulnerabilities exist, if
any, at military installations and what mitigation measures can
be used to enhance their resiliency; (4) Considerations for the
use of decision support tools, such as heat risk management
applications, on at-risk military installations; and (5)
Recommendations to improve the Department's implementation of
existing extreme heat preparedness and response efforts.
The Comptroller General should brief the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives
on this review, not later than March 1, 2027.
Ensuring department budgets for plant replacement value investment
requirement
The committee notes that section 2841 of the Servicemember
Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159) established a
binding statutory requirement that the Secretaries of the
military departments invest in the budget for facilities
sustainment, restoration, and modernization (FSRM) an amount
equal to no less than 4 percent of the total plant replacement
value (PRV) of all their respective department facilities by
fiscal year 2030 and sustain that level in each subsequent
fiscal year. The law further establishes a structured schedule
of interim statutory investment obligations: 1.75 percent of
total PRV in fiscal year 2027; 2.5 percent in fiscal year 2028;
3.25 percent in fiscal year 2029; and 4.0 percent in fiscal
year 2030 and each fiscal year thereafter.
The committee notes that the Department of Defense reported
an FSRM investment rate of 1.75 percent of total PRV in fiscal
year 2027, nominally satisfying the first statutory milestone
established under Section 2841 of the Servicemember Quality of
Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025. However, the committee finds that this result
was achieved only through the application of funds provided
under the Public Law 119-21, a reconciliation measure
constituting mandatory spending. The committee notes that while
satisfaction with the section 2841 statutory milestone through
one-time mandatory spending does comply with the intent of the
law, it does not demonstrate the Department's resolve in
fulfilling the statutory requirement by allocating appropriate
resources in its discretionary budget. The committee notes that
reconciliation is a non-recurring budgetary mechanism and
cannot serve as the programmatic foundation for a sustained,
multi-year infrastructure investment obligation.
The committee also believes it is important to note that
the Department requested a repeal of section 2841 even though
the military departments are supportive of the original
measure. The committee is unambiguous in its direction: the
Department must program and budget for FSRM investments at the
levels required by Section 2841 of the Servicemember Quality of
Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025--92.5 percent of total PRV in fiscal year
2028, 3.25 percent in fiscal year 2029, and 4.0 percent in
fiscal year 2030--through the base discretionary budget,
reflected fully across the future years defense program.
Accordingly, beginning no later than the President's budget
submission for fiscal year 2028, the committee expects each
military department's budget justification materials to
demonstrate compliance with the applicable PRV milestone
through programmed Operation and Maintenance funds, without
reliance on supplemental, emergency, or mandatory spending.
Gila Bend Air Force Auxiliary Field North Turnaround
The committee recognizes the critical role of Gila Bend Air
Force Auxiliary Field (GBAFAF) in supporting pilot training and
combat readiness for aircraft operating from Luke Air Force
Base and throughout the Barry M. Goldwater Range complex. As a
key training and emergency divert airfield, GBAFAF supports
high-tempo flight operations for Air Force, Air National Guard,
and partner nation aircraft.
The committee notes that the existing north turnaround does
not meet current Unified Facilities Criteria requirements and
operates under a waiver, creating operational and safety
challenges. The committee understands that replacing and
expanding the north turnaround would provide immediate
compliance with applicable standards, improve aircraft
maneuverability and safety, and enable parking for additional
aircraft. The committee further notes that the project would
enhance airfield capacity and support continued operations for
current and future aircraft missions.
The committee is concerned that failure to modernize this
infrastructure could increase operational risk, constrain
airfield operations, and degrade the airfield's ability to
support readiness requirements and training activities.
Therefore, the committee urges the Secretary of the Air Force
to prioritize funding for the north turnaround replacement and
expansion project at GBAFAF in fiscal year 2028.
Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning replacement at Luke Air
Force Base
The committee remains concerned by the condition of aging
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems
across Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, and notes that funding for
necessary replacements was not included in the fiscal year 2027
budget request. The committee understands that HVAC systems,
including the main cooling tower, at Luke Air Force Base have
exceeded their expected service lives, resulting in increased
maintenance requirements, reduced reliability, and higher
operating costs.
The committee further notes that Luke Air Force Base is
located in one of the hottest regions of the United States,
where summer temperatures routinely approach 120 degrees
Fahrenheit. Reliable climate control is essential to
maintaining safe working conditions for airmen and civilian
personnel, protecting mission-critical equipment, and
sustaining installation readiness. HVAC failures during periods
of extreme heat can adversely affect personnel health and
productivity while disrupting mission operations.
The committee emphasizes that continued reliance on aging
HVAC infrastructure is both a readiness concern and a fiscal
inefficiency. Accordingly, the committee strongly urges the
Secretary of the Air Force to prioritize funding for HVAC
replacement projects at Luke Air Force Base and to ensure that
future budget requests adequately address facility sustainment
requirements at installations operating in extreme climate
conditions.
Marine Corps Air Station Yuma airfield security
The committee recognizes the critical national security
mission performed by Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma,
Arizona, the busiest air station in the Marine Corps and home
to the F-35B Lightning II aircraft. MCAS Yuma also hosts the
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One Weapons and
Tactics Instructor course twice annually, providing advanced
training essential to the readiness of Marine aviation forces.
The committee is aware that MCAS Yuma operates a shared use
airfield with Yuma International Airport, creating unique
security challenges and increasing the importance of robust
installation and airfield security measures.
The committee is aware of vulnerabilities along the
installation perimeter and the need for enhanced airfield
security systems. The committee understands that the Marine
Corps has identified a requirement to replace aging and end-of-
life portable security monitoring systems with fixed-base
perimeter security infrastructure, including security cameras
and associated monitoring capabilities at multiple locations
along the installation perimeter.
Therefore, the committee urges the Secretary of the Navy,
acting through the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to
prioritize funding for airfield security camera and perimeter
security fence upgrades at MCAS Yuma in fiscal year 2028. The
committee notes that these improvements would provide
continuous and sustainable electronic monitoring of perimeter
fence areas, improve early detection of unauthorized access to
the airfield and critical infrastructure, and enable more rapid
security force response to potential threats. The committee
directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a briefing to the
Senate Armed Services Committee, not later than February 1,
2027, on the status of airfield security upgrades at MCAS Yuma.
Public Schools on Military Installations program
The committee remains concerned about the physical
condition and capacity of public schools located on military
installations, which play a vital role in supporting the morale
and readiness of military families. The committee notes that
several facilities located outside the contiguous United States
require significant modernization, construction, or repair to
meet adequate educational and safety standards.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense
to submit a briefing to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than March
1, 2027, on the costs associated with constructing, renovating,
and repairing public schools located on military installations
in states eligible for public schools serving military
installations located outside the contiguous United States or
in a non-contiguous state or territory and that are currently
included on the Deputy Secretary of Defense's Public Schools on
Military Installations (PSMI) Priority List.
The briefing should include:
(1) A comparison of the estimated costs to renovate
each school on the priority list against the estimated
costs to completely replace each such school through
new construction;
(2) An assessment of and specific recommendation on
which schools should be targeted for replacement versus
those suited for renovation;
(3) For each school where renovation is recommended,
an assessment of whether the proposed renovation would
successfully extend the facility's useful life by at
least 30 years;
(4) A recommended federal and state cost share ratio
for funding schools; and
(5) Any other issues the Secretary of Defense, or his
or her designee, deems relevant to the PSMI program.
Report on military construction in Freely Associated States
The military services are making large infrastructure
investments in the Freely Associated States (FAS) for the first
time in generations, and local on-the-ground engagement with
the national and local governments in these countries will
greatly reduce risks of construction delay and cost increases.
To better understand what actions can be taken in the FAS
to address these risks, the committee directs the Indo-Pacific
Command's Joint Task Force-Micronesia, in consultation with the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy, and
Environment; Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy,
Installations, and Environment; and Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Energy, Installations, and Environment to provide
a report, not later than February 1, 2027, summarizing:
(1) Action taken to date to improve the civilian-
military relationship for major planned military
construction; and
(2) Potential options for and advisability of
building an enduring capability, to include permanent
government civilian or military personnel stationed in
the FAS, to improve coordination to address local
workforce, environmental approvals, and community
relations issues.
Requirement for Camp Navajo entry bridge replacement
In the event of a conflict, it is critical to have reliable
access to munitions in storage and the ability to expediently
ship munitions. The committee acknowledges that the transport
of munitions often relies on rail transportation to
expeditiously move munitions from the interior of the United
States to munition ports to be shipped outside the contiguous
United States to the theater of operations.
The committee acknowledges that properly maintaining the
infrastructure, such as bridges and overpasses, at military
installations operating munitions storage missions along the
Strategic Rail Corridor Network, including Camp Navajo in
Bellemont, Arizona, is important for our national security.
However, the condition and size of the current bridge limits
the portion of the strategic national rail line underneath the
overpass to one lane of travel, creating a limiting factor to
support contingencies, logistics, and resupply in the Indo-
Pacific area of operations.
Therefore, the committee directs the Army and the Army
National Guard to provide a briefing to the committee, not
later than March 1, 2027, on efforts to replace the overpass
bridge at Camp Navajo, an exploration of public-private
partnership funding to do so, and a budget estimate for the
replacement.
Waterfront production facility
The committee notes that waterfront production facilities
are critical elements of the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program (SIOP) which seeks to more efficiently
collocate shops, engineering, and project teams closer to dry
docks for increased productivity and ultimately lower costs
over time.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the
Navy to brief the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, not later than March 1, 2027,
regarding the Navy's plan to construct a waterfront production
facility at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii. The
briefing shall include: (1) The total cost of the proposed
waterfront production facility or facilities; (2) The scope of
the proposed waterfront production facility or facilities,
including whether the Secretary intends to build one large
facility or multiple smaller facilities, and if the latter, how
many buildings are planned and their respective sizes; (3) The
intended location or locations of the waterfront production
facility or facilities on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam; and
(4) The timing of the planned construction, including planning
and design efforts, and proposed military construction start
and end dates for the facility or facilities.
Lastly, if the Secretary intends to build the waterfront
production facility or facilities at a location other than the
previously planned site on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam,
former dry dock 3, the briefing shall include an assessment of
how the Secretary intends to achieve similar optimization and
workflow efficiency goals contemplated by the SIOP, including:
(1) A comparison of the expected level of optimization,
workflow efficiency, and maintenance throughput envisioned for
the previously planned facility at the site of former dry dock
3 and the expected level of optimization, workflow efficiency,
and maintenance throughput envisioned at the new location or
locations of the waterfront production facility or facilities;
and (2) A comparison of the expected level of occupational
safety and health, including workforce welfare initiatives,
protection, and conveniences envisioned for the previously
planned facility at the site of former dry dock 3 and the
expected level of occupational safety and health, including
workforce welfare initiatives, protection, and conveniences
envisioned at the new location or locations of the facility or
facilities.

DIVISION C--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND
OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE XXXI--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

Subtitle A--National Security Programs and Authorizations

Sec. 3101--National Nuclear Security Administration
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the appropriation of funds for the activities of the National
Nuclear Security Administration and authorize one new plant
project.
Sec. 3102--Defense environmental cleanup
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the appropriation of funds for the Department of Energy's
defense environmental cleanup activities.
Sec. 3103--Other defense activities
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the appropriation of funds for the Department of Energy's other
defense activities.
Sec. 3104--Nuclear energy
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the appropriation of funds for the Department of Energy's
nuclear energy activities.

Subtitle B--Program Authorizations, Restrictions, and Limitations

Sec. 3111--Delegation of authorities to Administrator for Nuclear
Security

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
delegation of approval authority for National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) capital projects to the Administrator for
Nuclear Security.
The committee appreciates the efforts of the NNSA
leadership to reexamine entrenched policies and procedures and
explore innovative solutions to expedite the recapitalization
of the U.S. nuclear enterprise. The committee believes that
decision-making authority should be decentralized to as low a
level as prudently possible to maximize the agility and
adaptability of the NNSA.

Sec. 3112--Protection of Office of Secure Transportation vehicles and
equipment from unmanned aircraft

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 6227 of title 10, United States Code, to clarify that
National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Secure
Transport equipment and special nuclear material transport
activities are included in the authorization for counter-
unmanned aerial system defense measures.
The proliferation of autonomous and remotely piloted
aircraft has reshaped modern battlefields and presents a
rapidly growing threat to mobile assets as well as fixed sites
around the world. It is incumbent upon the Department of Energy
to ensure special nuclear material, whether secured in a fixed
location or in transit, remains protected from all types of
threats.

Sec. 3113--Authorization to establish public-private partnerships for
nuclear effects testing

The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the Administrator for Nuclear Security, in coordination with
the Secretary of Defense, to establish one or more public-
private partnerships to provide nuclear effects testing
capabilities in support of the mission requirements of the
National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of
Defense. The provision would also require the Administrator to
submit a report to the congressional defense committees
outlining the specifics of the partnerships within 180 days of
the establishment of such a partnership.

Sec. 3114--Limitation on availability of funds pending submission of
report on restoration of a domestic uranium enrichment
capability

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2027 travel funding
for the Administrator for Nuclear Security to no more than 80
percent until the Administrator submits the report required by
section 3123 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement
and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
(Public Law 118-159).
The committee appreciates the efforts of the Department of
Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
to promote the development and deployment of nuclear
technologies, including the reestablishment of a complete
domestic nuclear fuel cycle. However, accomplishment of this
goal necessitates the restoration of a comprehensive enrichment
capability for unencumbered uranium. The committee recognizes
this and directed the NNSA, in the Servicemember Quality of
Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025, to evaluate at least two geographically
disparate possible locations in the United States that would by
2035 be best suited to host a modular, scalable facility for
the domestic enrichment of unencumbered uranium, including
highly enriched uranium suitable for defense applications.
However, the NNSA has yet to provide the required report.

Sec. 3115--Briefing on activities by the Director for Cost Estimating
and Program Evaluation

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 3221 of the National Nuclear Security Administration
Act, division C, title XXXII of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) to
require annual briefings by the Director of the Cost Estimating
and Program Evaluation (CEPE) Office of the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) through fiscal year 2031.
Until fiscal year 2018, under section 2411(g) of title 50,
United States Code, the Director of CEPE of the NNSA was
required to report on activities conducted during the prior
fiscal year. Given the importance of ongoing nuclear
modernization activities at the NNSA, the committee recommends
amending section 3221(g) of the National Nuclear Security
Administration Act, division C, title 32 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, to require a
briefing by the Director of CEPE to the congressional defense
committees on activities conducted in the prior fiscal year as
well as assessments of major atomic energy defense acquisition
programs, per section 2411(i) of title 50, United States Code.
This briefing is to occur at or about the same time as the
submission of the President's budget request, per section
1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.
While the NNSA has now established a rigorous process for
the modernization of nuclear weapons, the committee believes it
is important to understand major construction programs under
review by the Director of CEPE.

Sec. 3116--Modification to selected acquisition reports requirement

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 6125(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, to modify
the submission deadline to the Congress for annual Selected
Acquisition Reports on each new nuclear weapon system program,
including those undergoing life extension or major alteration,
to within 30 days of the date on which the President transmits
the budget to the Congress for the following fiscal year.

Sec. 3117--Modification to the program for acceleration of replacement
of cesium blood irradiation sources

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 6156(b)(2) of title 10, United States Code, to allow
for payment of the full per-device cost of replacing blood
irradiation devices.

Sec. 3118--Briefings on nuclear-related autonomous or remotely-piloted
aircraft incursions

The committee recommends a provision that would require the
Administrator for Nuclear Security, in coordination with the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical and
Biological Defense Policy and Programs, to brief the
congressional defense committees quarterly on all instances
occurring over the previous calendar year of remotely-piloted
or autonomous system incursions into secured areas or airspace
in or around nuclear-weapons related areas. The provision would
allow briefings conducted pursuant to section 130i of title 10,
United States Code, to partially fulfill this requirement and
would terminate the requirement entirely on August 31, 2031.

Sec. 3119--Conceptual and construction design

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 6277(b) of title 10, United States Code, by striking
``$5,000,000'' each time it appears and inserting ``$10,000,000
in fiscal year 2026 dollars.''

Sec. 3120--Annual public workshops and nuclear science advisory
committee reviews

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 3173(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112 239) by striking paragraph
(4).

Sec. 3121--Limitation on use of funds until certain criteria are met

The committee recommends a provision that would limit the
obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2027 funds for Federal
Salaries and Expenses and available to the Office of the
Administrator for Nuclear Security for travel purposes to:
(1) Not more than 50 percent until the date on which
the Administrator notifies the congressional defense
committees that site selection has been completed and
construction has commenced for projects 21-D-510 High
Explosives Synthesis Formulation and Production
Facility, Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas, and 18-D-650
Tritium Finishing Facility, Savannah River Site, Aiken,
South Carolina;
(2) Not more than 80 percent until the date on which
the Administrator notifies the congressional defense
committees that initial long-lead component, equipment,
and commodity requirements have been identified for
projects 21-D-510 High Explosives Synthesis Formulation
and Production Facility, Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas,
and 18-D-650 Tritium Finishing Facility, Savannah River
Site, Aiken, South Carolina; and
(3) Not more than 90 percent until the date on which
the Administrator notifies the congressional defense
committees that 25 percent of the value of the
identified initial long-lead component, equipment, and
commodity requirements have been submitted to vendors
for projects 21-D-510 High Explosives Synthesis
Formulation and Production Facility, Pantex Plant,
Amarillo, Texas, and 18-D-650 Tritium Finishing
Facility, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

Sec. 3122--Continuation of National Nuclear Security Administration pay
and performance system

The committee recommends a provision that would amend
section 3116(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91) by striking ``,
until'' and all that follows through ``this Act.''

Subtitle C--Other Matters

Items of Special Interest

Briefing on National Nuclear Security Administration plans for
recapitalizing Pantex Plant infrastructure and facilities

The committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear
Security to provide a detailed briefing, not later than
December 1, 2026, on long-term recapitalization plans for the
Pantex Plant, including critical high explosives facilities and
the materials staging capability. The briefing shall include a
10-year outlook focused on the necessary assets and resources,
including special tooling development and supply chain
requirements, as well as actions required, to modernize the
critical capabilities needed to deliver warheads on schedule.
The committee believes that a focused 10-year strategy with
steady state funding may yield cost savings while advancing the
mission.

Briefing on plutonium pit production and reuse planning

The committee notes that the expansion of plutonium pit
production capabilities and the revitalization of associated
facilities and infrastructure are critical in facilitating the
modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The
committee further notes that consistent communication between
the National Nuclear Security Administration and the
congressional defense committees is necessary to ensure that
emerging execution challenges are identified and addressed in a
timely manner.
Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator for
Nuclear Security to brief the congressional defense committees,
not later than December 1, 2026, on: (1) The progress of Los
Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) plutonium pit production
capability expansion to enable the production of at least 100
pits by the end of calendar year 2028; (2) Opportunities for
the Savannah River Site to facilitate expanded plutonium pit
production at LANL; (3) Progress on establishing a
complementary production capability at the Savannah River
Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF); and (4) Options where
the reuse of existing plutonium pits may support a bridging
strategy for meeting Department of Defense stockpile
requirements until pit production targets are met at LANL and
SRPPF.

Briefing on procurement of United States-origin unobligated enriched
uranium

The committee is concerned about the adequacy of current
and future capacity to supply U.S.-origin, unobligated uranium,
including the mining and conversion needed to replenish defense
inventories on an enduring basis.The National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) made an initial round of purchases of
natural uranium from U.S. mining companies in 2022 to begin
filling the strategic uranium reserve managed by the NNSA.
These purchases illustrate that the necessary infrastructure,
permits, and licenses to transport and store the uranium in the
reserve are in place. However, longer-term contracts with
uranium producers, refiners, converts, and enrichers are
necessary to provide the price and supply certainty needed to
support the operation of uranium mines and conversion
facilities.
Further, the committee is concerned over the lack of
domestic enrichment capacity that meets international
unobligated uranium requirements, including the apparent lack
of progress in reestablishing enrichment capabilities pursuant
to section 3123 of the Servicemember Quality of Life
Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159). These requirements require that
not only natural uranium inputs be domestically procured but
that the enrichment technology used must be of U.S. origin.
Current U.S. enrichment capacities do not meet these
requirements.
The committee directs the NNSA to examine and identify gaps
in the existing supply chain for mining, conversion, and
enrichment capable of supplying U.S.-origin, unobligated
uranium for defense purposes, including small modular reactors
(SMR), microreactors, the nuclear Navy, and other advanced
nuclear requirements under development.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Administrator for
Nuclear Security to brief the congressional defense committees,
not later than December 1, 2026. The briefing shall include:
(1) An analysis of current and projected defense
needs, including SMR and microreactor requirements
under development;
(2) How projected increases in U.S. and global
commercial demand for mined uranium, conversion
services, and enrichment will impact the availability
of U.S.-origin, unobligated uranium for defense needs;
(3) Estimates of the cost of replenishing uranium
inventories for defense needs, including for mined
uranium, conversion services, and enrichment;
(4) Options and recommendations for the procurement
of U.S.-origin, unobligated uranium, conversion, and
enrichment; and
(5) How the NNSA is accounting for the concerns
outlined above in its efforts to comply with section
3123 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement
and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2025, which directed the evaluation of at least two
geographically disparate possible locations in the
United States that would, by 2035, be best suited to
host a modular, scalable facility for the domestic
enrichment of unencumbered uranium, including highly-
enriched uranium suitable for defense applications.
Further, the committee directs the Administrator for
Nuclear Security to brief the congressional defense committees,
not later than March 31, 2027, on a strategy for the United
States to ensure continuity for the supply of unobligated
uranium, including conversion and enrichment capabilities.

Briefing on recycling spent fuel into long-duration radioisotope power
systems

The committee is concerned about the indefinite storage of
spent nuclear fuel in ``temporary'' storage pools and casks.
The National Nuclear Security Administration estimates that
current stockpiles of unobligated uranium and nuclear fuel will
run out by 2040.
Therefore, the committee directs the Administrator for
Nuclear Security, in coordination with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering and the Assistant
Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management, to brief the
congressional defense committees, not later than April 15,
2027, on the feasibility of establishing a pilot-scale
demonstration of proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel recycling
technologies to address the concerns established above. The
briefing should address, at a minimum:
(1) Identification of defense applications for long-
duration radioisotope power systems derived from
recycled materials, particularly for distributed
logistics, space, maritime, and autonomous systems;
(2) A description of operational requirements for
long-duration power systems;
(3) Potential applications of such technologies in
fission generation technologies including small modular
reactors and microreactors for defense purposes;
(4) Any other potential applications of nuclear fuel
recycling technologies for national security purposes;
(5) Notional experimentation and validation
milestones;
(6) Acquisition and commercial buying pathways,
including an assessment of options for risk-sharing and
cost recovery structures consistent with private-
capital-led deployment;
(7) An examination of interagency and regulatory
relationships and frameworks necessary to carry out
such a demonstration; and
(8) Any statutory adjustment necessary to improve the
efficiency or cost effectiveness of such a
demonstration.

Briefing on use of artificial intelligence to support weapons design
and stockpile stewardship

The committee directs the Administrator for Nuclear
Security to brief the congressional defense committees, not
later than March 1, 2027, on ongoing activities related to the
use of artificial intelligence (AI) to support the nuclear
security mission of the administration and efforts to
characterize, assess, and reduce the risk of and potential
impact from AI-related nuclear incidents, including the
generation of weapons-relevant technical information, risks to
nuclear command and control, and exploitation by foreign
adversary technologies.

Briefings on nuclear explosive test readiness

The committee notes that the United States last conducted a
nuclear explosive test in 1992. Since 2000, the three National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) laboratory directors
have affirmed that there are no known technical issues in the
stockpile that would necessitate a return to testing. Last
year, the National Ignition Facility conducted fusion yield
producing experiments with plutonium, achieving a stockpile
assessment goal set in 1992 after the investment of
approximately $10.0 billion. Likewise, the U1A underground site
at the Nevada National Security Site is conducting experiments
with bulk quantities of plutonium 1,000 feet underground. Above
ground, Los Alamos National Laboratory conducts bulk plutonium
experiments under explosive compression with the Dual Axis
Radiographic Hydrodynamic Facility.
Section 6114(5) of title 10, United States Code, requires
that part of the biannual nuclear weapons stockpile
stewardship, management, and responsiveness plan address
nuclear test readiness as a capability.
Therefore, the committee directs that the Administrator for
Nuclear Security brief the congressional defense committees,
not later than February 1, 2027, on the NNSA's efforts to
maintain the readiness of U.S. capabilities to conduct nuclear
explosive testing if required. The committee directs the
Comptroller General of the United States to assess the extent
to which the NNSA has addressed section 6114(5) of title 10,
United States Code, and to brief the congressional defense
committees on these findings, not later than March 31, 2027.

Comptroller General review of management and operating contractor
construction burden

The committee notes that the Government Accountability
Office reported in a February 2026 report, ``Nuclear Security
Enterprise: Assessments of National Nuclear Security
Administration Major Projects,'' (GAO-26-107777), that the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and its
management and operating (M&O) contractors are carrying out
nearly 30 major construction projects estimated to cost a total
of more than $30.0 billion. In addition, M&O contractors carry
out hundreds of smaller projects, which collectively add
billions of dollars in investment to the agency's overall
construction portfolio.
Under M&O contracts, the contractor is responsible for
nearly all aspects of site operation, security, maintenance,
and construction, as well as mission-related work, including
research and weapons production. M&O contract terms are
generally long, and new or large-scale construction efforts may
not have been contemplated at the time of the NNSA's initial
awarding of the M&O contract. The Department of Energy has used
M&O contracts since the Manhattan Project and remains the
primary user of these unique contracts to this day.
A feature of M&O contracts is that the contractor is
responsible for managing construction acquisition processes and
applies its overhead rates to these services. Especially for
the major projects, these costs can be considerable. Given M&O
contractors' poor records of performance in delivering projects
on budget and on schedule, the committee is seeking to
understand whether alternative management approaches could
reduce cost and improve project delivery.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to assess: (1) The benefits, costs, and
challenges associated with using M&O contractors to manage
construction projects at their sites; and (2) The extent to
which the NNSA has used or considered alternatives to M&O
contracts to manage construction projects and the benefits,
costs, and challenges of these alternatives.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General to
provide a one-time, preliminary briefing on the results of its
assessment to the congressional defense committees at a
mutually agreed upon date, not later than March 31, 2027, with
final results to follow in a mutually agreed upon format and
timeframe.

Comptroller General review of National Nuclear Security Administration
approaches to incentivizing contractors' performance

The committee notes that since its establishment in 2000,
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has changed
its performance evaluation approach for management and
operating (M&O) contractors several times, and there has been
frequent discussion of the benefits of different contract
incentive structures to incentivize desired performance
outcomes. In the 2000s, the NNSA used detailed performance
criteria specific to each contract to make decisions on
awarding incentives. Since 2013, the NNSA has used broad, more
subjective NNSA-wide performance criteria to make award fee
decisions. In a 2019 report, the Government Accountability
Office found that the NNSA generally awarded M&O contractors
high ratings and most available performance incentives, except
in cases of significant safety or security incidents. This
pattern has seemed to hold since then.
Throughout this period, while the NNSA's modernization
efforts and program of record have changed and expanded
significantly, cost and schedule performance have continued to
raise concerns, particularly in areas such as large
construction projects and infrastructure recapitalization.
Further, challenges in recruitment and retention of
contractors' workforces are essential to address in order to
achieve modernization objectives. Several external reviews,
such as the Augustine-Mies report and the NNSA's own Enhanced
Mission Delivery Initiative, have called for the NNSA to move
away from award fees to fixed fees as it is unclear that award
fees have been meaningful for performance. Further, as the NNSA
seeks to speed up its efforts and reduce project costs while
also evaluating how regulation can be streamlined, getting its
contract incentives right is essential.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation discusses various types
of potential contract incentives that establish realistic and
achievable targets that are clearly communicated to the
contractor, that include appropriate incentive arrangements
designed to motivate contractor efforts that might not
otherwise be emphasized, and that discourage contractor
inefficiency and waste. Different incentives may be appropriate
depending on the nature of the work. NNSA sites conduct a
variety of work, including research, production, construction,
maintenance, and site operations, but generally only use award
fees and fixed fees as incentives.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to assess: (1) The extent to which current
incentives align with the scope of the work the NNSA seeks to
incentivize; (2) Opportunities that alternative incentive
structures could provide to improve contractor motivation and
performance; and (3) The views of stakeholders and experts
regarding what incentives drive and reward contractors to
exceptional performance and hold them accountable when
performance is lacking.
The Comptroller General shall brief the congressional
defense committees, not later than March 31, 2027, and meet
with the congressional defense committees to determine a
mutually agreeable time for a final report.

Comptroller General review of National Nuclear Security Administration
efforts to sustain science, technology, and engineering
facilities

The committee realizes that the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) relies on unique science, technology, and
engineering (ST&E) facilities across the U.S. nuclear security
enterprise to assess and certify weapon performance and to
research and develop new materials, designs, technologies, and
production processes for modernizing the nuclear deterrent. The
NNSA has reported that ongoing stockpile stewardship and
modernizations are placing greater demand on these facilities
than at any time in the past 30 years. Many of these facilities
and supporting infrastructure are relatively new and well-
maintained compared to the production infrastructure in the
nuclear security enterprise. However, these facilities are
still decades old and in need of substantial sustainment and,
in some cases, recapitalization to ensure that they continue to
support stockpile stewardship and modernization, even as the
NNSA plans replacement capabilities in the future for some
facilities. The NNSA funds its ST&E facility sustainment
activities through multiple programs' operations budgets,
rather than as line-item projects, limiting visibility into the
full scope and estimated cost of these efforts, particularly in
the agency's budget materials.
Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to assess: (1) The NNSA's ongoing and planned
inventory of ST&E sustainment efforts and any risk assessments
of these facilities; (2) The costs and schedules for the
sustainment efforts and the program budgets through which these
efforts are carried out; and (3) Any opportunities to improve
the visibility of these efforts in the NNSA's budget materials
to ensure budgetary needs can be fully considered.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, and meet with the congressional defense committees to
determine a mutually agreeable time for a final report.

Comptroller General review of National Nuclear Security Administration
use of digital engineering

The committee recognizes that the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) has recently announced a Digital
Transformation Initiative, which aims to fully digitize aspects
of the nuclear security enterprise, including its supply chain,
product flow, inventory, and legacy data in the coming years.
This initiative, which is being led jointly by the NNSA and
Sandia National Laboratories, will establish the use of
``digital threads'' and ``digital twins'' to reduce the time
involved in the design and qualification of weapon components
and systems. A digital thread refers to a common source of
information connecting stakeholders with real-time data across
the product life cycle to inform product decisions. A digital
twin (of a component or system) is used during design modeling
and simulation to connect to a physical component or system
through sensors or by collecting enough data to build the twin
digitally. A digital twin can ensure that manufacturing
outcomes match design intent by simulating the production
process before physical manufacturing begins. The NNSA aims to
use some of these digital tools for the W93 program.
To better understand the NNSA's plans for its Digital
Transformation Initiative, the committee directs the
Comptroller General of the United States to assess: (1) The
tools and resources (such as networks and data centers) that
the NNSA plans to acquire as part of this initiative; and (2)
The benefits and challenges of applying these tools to the W93
program and future nuclear weapon acquisition programs.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, and meet with the congressional defense committees to
determine a mutually agreeable time for a final report.

Comptroller General review of Office of Environmental Management
economic opportunities

The committee recognizes that the Department of Energy's
(DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible
for substantial tracts of land that were either never
contaminated or have been successfully remediated. Meanwhile,
many industries, such as electricity generators developing
small modular reactors and artificial intelligence data
centers, are looking for sites ready for development. In
addition, the Office of EM possesses various materials,
including cesium and strontium capsules, that may be
commercially viable and could be of use for industrial or other
beneficial purposes.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General
of the United States to assess the Office of EM's economic
opportunities, including: (1) What portions of DOE-owned land
are currently clean enough for industrial use; (2) The steps
involved in the DOE's land-transfer policies and processes; (3)
The potential economic benefits of land transfers for the DOE
and surrounding communities; (4) What materials the Office of
EM possesses that could be sold to private companies, including
the potential economic value of those materials; and (5) Any
barriers the Office of EM faces in realizing such benefits.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the
congressional defense committees on the status of its review,
not later than March 1, 2027, with a report to follow at a time
mutually agreed upon with the congressional defense committees.

Comptroller General review of Office of Environmental Management
research and development efforts

The committee recognizes that research and development
(R&D) has played a critical role in the Department of Energy's
Office of Environmental Management's (EM) efforts to clean up
radioactive and hazardous contamination from decades of nuclear
weapons production and energy research. To fulfill its
responsibility for cleaning up contaminated sites, the Office
of EM relies on capital asset projects, which can be
technically complex and, in some cases, can rely on first-of-a-
kind technology. In October 2021, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reported that the Office of EM's collaboration
across its 15 sites and 11 national laboratories on R&D was
strong, but the GAO found areas for improvement, including that
the Office of EM did not take a comprehensive approach to
prioritizing R&D.
The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United
States to review the steps the Office of EM has taken to
integrate its R&D program into the cleanup mission.
Specifically, the Comptroller General shall review: (1) Steps
the Office of EM has taken to encourage or invest in innovative
technologies; (2) How the Office of EM incorporates innovative
technologies from other industries or countries; (3) How, if at
all, the Office of EM incentivizes its contractors to pursue
and incorporate technological innovations into its cleanup
efforts; and (4) The barriers, if any, that prevent the Office
of EM from incorporating innovative technologies into its
cleanup efforts.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the
congressional defense committees on the status of this review,
not later than March 1, 2027, with a report to follow at a time
mutually agreed upon with the congressional defense committees.

Comptroller General review of Office of Environmental Management site-
specific cleanup activities

The committee notes that the Department of Energy's Office
of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for cleaning up
15 remaining sites contaminated by decades of nuclear weapons
production and nuclear energy research. These sites manage a
range of cleanup activities, including remediating contaminated
soil and groundwater; deactivating and decommissioning
contaminated buildings; and designing, constructing, and
operating facilities to treat millions of gallons of
radioactive waste stored in underground tanks. The committee
recognizes that it may benefit from periodic briefings on site-
specific issues that arise over the course of the National
Defense Authorization Act consideration cycle. In particular,
the committee is interested in topics such as: (1) The
acceleration of site closure at the Portsmouth and Paducah
sites; (2) Technology readiness and throughput of the Direct-
Feed Low-Activity Waste facility at the Hanford Site; (3) The
Office of EM's future plans for operation of H-Canyon at the
Savannah River Site; (4) The status of the Office of EM's plans
for the dilute and dispose strategy for surplus plutonium; and
(5) Opportunities for the Office of EM to increase coordination
with the National Nuclear Security Administration to address
newly generated waste such as by leveraging existing cleanup
capabilities.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General
of the United States to brief the congressional defense
committees on the status of this review, not later than March
1, 2027, with a report to follow at a time mutually agreed upon
with the congressional defense committees.

Comptroller General review of Office of Environmental Management use of
contracting for cleanup activities

The committee notes that the Department of Energy's Office
of Environmental Management (EM) spent about 90 percent of its
$8.0 billion fiscal year 2025 annual cleanup budget on
contracts. The Office of EM's reliance on contractors, contract
management, and effective performance evaluation is critical to
the office's ability to reduce the federal government's
environmental liability and receive the highest return on
federal investment. The committee directs the Comptroller
General of the United States to assess the Office of EM's use
of contractually related mechanisms--such as contract types,
terms, evaluation, fees, and extensions--to hold contractors
accountable and to incentivize performance. Further, the
committee directs the Comptroller General to assess and report
on any aspects of the Office of EM's contracting approach that
may provide perverse incentives that hinder cleanup progress.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the
congressional defense committees on the status of its review,
not later than March 1, 2027, with a report to follow at a time
mutually agreed upon with the congressional defense committees.

Comptroller General review of opportunities to accelerate Office of
Environmental Management cleanup missions

The committee notes that the Department of Energy's Office
of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for cleaning up
15 remaining sites contaminated by decades of nuclear weapons
production and nuclear energy research. Office of EM documents
indicate that these cleanup efforts could cost over a half
trillion dollars in life cycle costs and could continue into
the 2090s. The Government Accountability Office and other
independent organizations have recommended that the Office of
EM take a more risk-informed approach to cleanup, including by
targeting EM resources to more quickly reduce risks to human
health and the environment and reduce the overall costs of the
Office of EM's cleanup mission.
The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United
States to review the extent to which the Office of EM has
assessed and implemented options for accelerating cleanup
across the EM complex to reduce its mission duration, what
sites or cleanup projects, if any, could be accelerated, and
the potential effect on the Office of EM's environmental
liabilities by taking an accelerated approach to cleanup.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the
congressional defense committees on the status of its review,
not later than March 1, 2027, with a report to follow at a time
mutually agreed upon with the congressional defense committees.

Comptroller General review of the W93 modernization program

The committee recognizes that the W93 modernization program
was established to augment Navy forces with a survivable weapon
deployable on the Ohio-class and Columbia-class submarines
starting in the mid-2030s. The National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) has reported that the warhead will be
anchored on previously tested nuclear components and will
incorporate modern technologies that improve safety and
security and ease of manufacturing, maintenance, and
certification. Further, the W93 program is managed jointly with
the Navy to develop a new reentry body for the warhead, known
as the Mk7. In December 2024, the Government Accountability
Office reported that the program faces risks in areas such as
maturing technologies, manufacturing components, and flight
testing that could impact the program's overall schedule. As of
March 2025, the program proceeded into the design definition
and cost study phase, during which the NNSA will refine the
warhead's design, qualification plans, production requirements,
program schedule, and life cycle cost estimates.
To better understand the progress, challenges, and
potential costs to the W93 program, the committee directs the
Comptroller General of the United States to assess the NNSA's
efforts to manage the technical, programmatic, and other risks
and challenges facing the program and the key cost drivers of
the program.
The committee directs the Comptroller General to brief the
congressional defense committees, not later than March 31,
2027, and to meet with the congressional defense committees to
determine a mutually agreeable time for a final report.

Genesis Mission

The committee commends the Department of Energy for its
strategic vision in the initiation of the Genesis Mission. An
integrated platform connecting cutting-edge, high-performance
computing, experimental facilities, artificial intelligence
systems, and unique datasets across every major scientific
domain will have a significant impact on scientific discovery
and should provide significant value to national security. The
National Nuclear Security Administration should capitalize on
the successful model from the Exascale Computing Initiative to
bring together industry, academia, and government in
partnership to drive the Genesis Mission and accelerate
security improvements and the effectiveness of U.S. strategic
assets.

TITLE XXXII--DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

Sec. 3201--Authorization
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize
the appropriation of funds for the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board.

DIVISION D--FUNDING TABLES

Sec. 4001--Authorization of amounts in funding tables
The committee recommends a provision that would provide for
the allocation of funds among programs, projects, and
activities in accordance with the tables in division D of this
Act, subject to reprogramming in accordance with established
procedures.
Consistent with the previously expressed views of the
committee, the provision would also require that decisions by
an agency head to commit, obligate, or expend funds to a
specific entity on the basis of such funding tables be based on
authorized, transparent, and statutory criteria or merit-based
selection procedures in accordance with the requirements of
sections 2304(k) and 2374 of title 10, United States Code, and
other applicable provisions of law.

TITLE XLI--PROCUREMENT

Sec. 4101--Procurement

TITLE XLII--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

Sec. 4201--Research, development, test, and evaluation

TITLE XLIII--OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

Sec. 4301--Operation and maintenance

TITLE XLIV--MILITARY PERSONNEL

Sec. 4401--Military personnel

TITLE XLV--OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

Sec. 4501--Other authorizations

TITLE XLVI--MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Sec. 4601--Military construction

TITLE XLVII--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

Sec. 4701--Department of Energy national security programs

SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027
(In Thousands of Dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2027 Request Senate Change Senate Authorized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

NATIONAL DEFENSE BASE BUDGET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (BUDGET SUB-FUNCTION 051)

DIVISION A: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE I--PROCUREMENT
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, ARMY............................ 1,933,769 -127,217 1,806,552
MISSILE PROCUREMENT, ARMY............................. 12,130,430 -173,738 11,956,692
PROCUREMENT OF W&TCV, ARMY............................ 3,728,159 0 3,728,159
PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, ARMY....................... 5,469,588 252,000 5,721,588
OTHER PROCUREMENT, ARMY............................... 12,667,053 168,490 12,835,543
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, NAVY............................ 26,947,023 -79,629 26,867,394
WEAPONS PROCUREMENT, NAVY............................. 11,769,111 -275,194 11,493,917
PROCUREMENT OF AMMO, NAVY & MC........................ 1,958,597 50,000 2,008,597
SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION, NAVY..................... 60,176,117 -3,060,664 57,115,453
OTHER PROCUREMENT, NAVY............................... 18,866,679 950,000 19,816,679
PROCUREMENT, MARINE CORPS............................. 6,288,905 0 6,288,905
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE....................... 26,985,236 405,109 27,390,345
MISSILE PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE........................ 6,811,174 845,000 7,656,174
PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, AIR FORCE.................. 910,116 0 910,116
PROCUREMENT, SPACE FORCE.............................. 9,645,353 12,816 9,658,169
OTHER PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE.......................... 39,199,963 15,000 39,214,963
PROCUREMENT, DEFENSE-WIDE............................. 10,354,868 649,056 11,003,924
DEFENSE STRATEGIC CAPITAL CREDIT PROGRAM.............. 216,000 0 216,000
SUBTOTAL, TITLE I--PROCUREMENT........................ 256,058,141 -368,971 255,689,170

TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, ARMY.............. 18,708,826 995,227 19,704,053
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, NAVY.............. 32,386,619 549,260 32,935,879
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, AF................ 73,075,614 1,578,423 74,654,037
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, SF................ 38,373,489 -1,113,439 37,260,050
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVAL, DW................ 55,736,724 -953,051 54,783,673
GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA FUND.......................... 397,971 0 397,971
OPERATIONAL TEST & EVAL, DEFENSE...................... 112,365 70,000 182,365
SUBTOTAL, TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND 218,791,608 1,126,420 219,918,028
EVALUATION...........................................

TITLE III--OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY......................... 64,114,683 -5,812,897 58,301,786
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY RES..................... 3,112,634 -421,315 2,691,319
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARNG......................... 8,703,824 -1,312,062 7,391,762
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY......................... 82,568,546 -5,009,071 77,559,475
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS................. 15,988,817 -3,702,133 12,286,684
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY RES..................... 1,477,216 -79,149 1,398,067
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, MC RESERVE................... 404,680 -112,976 291,704
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE.................... 74,039,636 -6,854,829 67,184,807
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, SPACE FORCE.................. 9,265,917 -1,625,523 7,640,394
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AF RESERVE................... 4,748,987 -411,913 4,337,074
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ANG.......................... 8,130,689 -537,102 7,593,587
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, DEFENSE-WIDE............... 64,251,581 1,638,960 65,890,541
MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.......................... 21,698 0 21,698
MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.......................... 78,187 30,000 108,187
MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.......................... 221,332 0 221,332
MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.......................... 37,478 0 37,478
MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.......................... 282,444 0 282,444
MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.......................... 305,246 0 305,246
MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.......................... 320,060 0 320,060
MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.......................... 8,957 0 8,957
MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.......................... 238,927 0 238,927
SUBTOTAL, TITLE III--OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE........ 338,321,539 -24,210,010 314,111,529

TITLE IV--MILITARY PERSONNEL
MILITARY PERSONNEL.................................... 190,771,931 -2,119,526 188,652,405
MEDICARE-ELIGIBLE RETIREE HEALTH FUND CONTRIBUTIONS... 14,349,269 0 14,349,269
SUBTOTAL, TITLE IV--MILITARY PERSONNEL................ 205,121,200 -2,119,526 203,001,674

TITLE XIV--OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS
WORKING CAPITAL FUND.................................. 7,507,993 10,000 7,517,993
CHEM AGENTS & MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION................... 55,972 0 55,972
DRUG INTERDICTION & CTR-DRUG ACTIVITIES, DEF.......... 918,002 133,352 1,051,354
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL....................... 506,343 27,000 533,343
DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM................................ 42,517,115 1,780,000 44,297,115
COUNTER ISIS TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF).............. 303,099 0 303,099
SUBTOTAL, TITLE XIV--OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS............. 51,808,524 1,950,352 53,758,876

TOTAL, DIVISION A: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 1,070,101,012 -23,621,735 1,046,479,277
AUTHORIZATIONS.......................................

DIVISION B: MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATIONS

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
ARMY.................................................. 1,931,638 5,825,514 7,757,152
NAVY & MARINE CORPS................................... 8,266,703 7,427,116 15,693,819
AIR FORCE............................................. 10,688,980 6,894,341 17,583,321
DEFENSE-WIDE.......................................... 3,375,211 561,310 3,936,521
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD................................... 358,909 1,333,184 1,692,093
ARMY RESERVE.......................................... 209,913 431,093 641,006
NAVY RESERVE & MARINE CORPS RESERVE................... 132,272 180,095 312,367
AIR NATIONAL GUARD.................................... 525,221 762,891 1,288,112
AIR FORCE RESERVE..................................... 22,172 211,022 233,194
NATO SECURITY INVESTMENT PROGRAM...................... 604,270 50,000 654,270
INDOPACIFIC COMBATANT COMMAND......................... 27,740 184,169 211,909
SUBTOTAL, MILITARY CONSTRUCTION....................... 26,143,029 23,860,735 50,003,764

FAMILY HOUSING
CONSTRUCTION, ARMY.................................... 240,495 0 240,495
O&M, ARMY............................................. 468,407 0 468,407
CONSTRUCTION, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS................... 361,870 0 361,870
O&M, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS............................ 385,609 0 385,609
CONSTRUCTION, AIR FORCE............................... 243,022 0 243,022
O&M, AIR FORCE........................................ 366,756 0 366,756
O&M, DEFENSE-WIDE..................................... 63,064 0 63,064
IMPROVEMENT FUND...................................... 8,412 0 8,412
UNACCMP HSG IMPRV FUND................................ 501 0 501
SUBTOTAL, FAMILY HOUSING.............................. 2,138,136 0 2,138,136

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE
ARMY BRAC............................................. 151,293 0 151,293
NAVY BRAC............................................. 108,325 0 108,325
AIR FORCE BRAC........................................ 111,381 0 111,381
DEFENSE-WIDE BRAC..................................... 1,318 0 1,318
SUBTOTAL, BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE................ 372,317 0 372,317

TOTAL, DIVISION B: MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 28,653,482 23,860,735 52,514,217
AUTHORIZATIONS.......................................

TOTAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (BUDGET SUB- 1,098,754,494 239,000 1,098,993,494
FUNCTION 051)........................................

ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES (BUDGET SUB-FUNCTION 053)

DIVISION C: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCY AUTHORIZATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AUTHORIZATIONS

ENERGY PROGRAMS
NUCLEAR ENERGY........................................ 160,000 0 160,000
SUBTOTAL, ENERGY PROGRAMS............................. 160,000 0 160,000

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
FEDERAL SALARIES AND EXPENSES......................... 577,097 0 577,097
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES.................................... 26,941,950 74,000 27,015,950
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION...................... 2,389,595 0 2,389,595
NAVAL REACTORS........................................ 2,393,692 -65,000 2,328,692
SUBTOTAL, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.... 32,302,334 9,000 32,311,334

ENVIRONMENTAL AND OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP......................... 6,983,318 5,000 6,988,318
OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES.............................. 1,184,721 0 1,184,721
SUBTOTAL, ENVIRONMENTAL & OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES.... 8,168,039 5,000 8,173,039

DEFENSE URANIUM ENRICHMENT D&D........................ 253,000 -253,000 0

SUBTOTAL, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AUTHORIZATIONS......... 41,382,582 -239,000 41,143,582

INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCY AUTHORIZATION
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD............... 45,000 0 45,000
SUBTOTAL, INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCY AUTHORIZATION.... 45,000 0 45,000

TOTAL, DIVISION C: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL 41,427,582 -239,000 41,188,582
SECURITY AND INDEPENDENT FEDERAL AGENCY
AUTHORIZATIONS.......................................

ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES (BUDGET SUB-FUNCTION 41,427,582 -239,000 41,188,582
053).................................................

TOTAL, NATIONAL DEFENSE (BUDGET FUNCTION 050)......... 1,140,182,076 0 1,140,182,076

MEMORANDUM: NON-DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS
TITLE XIV--ARMED FORCES RETIREMENT HOME (FUNCTION 600) 77,000 0 77,000

MEMORANDUM: TRANSFER AUTHORITIES (NON-ADDS)
TITLE X--GENERAL TRANSFER AUTHORITY................... 10,000,000 6,000,000

SUMMARY DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

NATIONAL DEFENSE (050)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (051).................. 1,098,754,494 239,000 1,098,993,494
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES (053)................ 41,382,582 -239,000 41,143,582
TOTAL, NATIONAL DEFENSE (050)......................... 1,140,137,076 0 1,140,137,076

TRANSFER OF AUTHORIZED AMOUNTS TO NON-DEFENSE FUNCTIONS

TRANSFER FROM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (051)
CAPTAIN JAMES A. LOVELL FEDERAL HEALTH CARE CENTER.... -174,000 0 -174,000
BIEN HOA DIOXIN CLEANUP............................... 0 -15,000 -15,000
SUBTOTAL, TRANSFER FROM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY -174000 -15,000 -189,000
(051)................................................

OTHER DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS--PROGRAMS OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE OR
ALREADY AUTHORIZED
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (051)
DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT PURCHASES...................... 477,287 0 477,287
INDEFINITE ACCOUNT: DISPOSAL OF DOD REAL PROPERTY..... 7,799 0 7,799
INDEFINITE ACCOUNT: LEASE OF DOD REAL PROPERTY........ 37,220 0 37,220
SUBTOTAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (051)........ 522,306 0 522,306

DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES (054)
OTHER DISCRETIONARY PROGRAMS
SUBTOTAL, DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES (054)............ 11,916,000 0 11,916,000

TOTAL, OTHER DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS 12,438,306 0 12,438,306
(050)................................................

DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY IMPLICATIONS (050)

NATIONAL DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIZATIONS (050)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-MILITARY (051).................. 1,099,276,800 239,000 1,099,515,800
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES (053)................ 41,427,582 -239,000 41,188,582
DEFENSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES (054)...................... 11,916,000 0 11,916,000
TOTAL, DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY IMPLICATION, 1,152,620,382 0 1,152,620,382
(050)................................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TITLE XLI--PROCUREMENT

SEC. 4101. PROCUREMENT.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 4101. PROCUREMENT (In Thousands of Dollars)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2027 Request Senate Change Senate Authorized
Line Item -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qty Cost Qty Cost Qty Cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIRCRAFT
PROCUREMENT, ARMY
FIXED WING
1 MQ-1 UAV.......... 0 0 0 0
2 FUTURE UAS FAMILY. 0 0 0 0
3 SMALL UNMANNED 0 291,472 0 291,472
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.
4 UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 0 52,398 0 52,398
SYSTEMS (UAS)....
5 HADES PLATFORM, 0 227,569 0 227,569
PAYLOADS/PED, AND
INTEGRATION......
ROTARY
6 UH-72 LAKOTA LIGHT 0 0 0 0
UTILITY
HELICOPTER.......
7 AH-64 APACHE BLOCK 0 1,552 0 1,552
IIIA REMAN.......
9 FUTURE VERTICAL 0 127,217 0 -127,217 0 0
LIFT FAMILY OF
SYSTEMS..........
Realignment to [0] [-127,217]
Research,
Development,
Test, and
Evaluation for
operational test
aircraft.........
10 UH-60 BLACKHAWK M 1 39,257 1 39,257
MODEL (MYP)......
11 UH-60 BLACKHAWK M 0 0 0 0
MODEL (MYP)......
12 CH-47 HELICOPTER.. 5 210,645 5 210,645
13 CH-47 HELICOPTER.. 0 0 0 0
MODIFICATION OF
AIRCRAFT
15 MQ-1 PAYLOAD...... 0 53,190 0 53,190
16 GRAY EAGLE MODS2.. 0 2,556 0 2,556
17 AH-64 MODS........ 0 251,645 0 251,645
18 SCALABLE CONTROL 0 2,061 0 2,061
INTERFACE (SCI)..
19 CH-47 CARGO 0 108,408 0 108,408
HELICOPTER MODS
(MYP)............
20 UTILITY HELICOPTER 0 120,013 0 120,013
MODS.............
21 NETWORK AND 0 29,235 0 29,235
MISSION PLAN.....
22 COMMS, NAV 0 14,384 0 14,384
SURVEILLANCE.....
23 DEGRADED VISUAL 0 0 0 0
ENVIRONMENT......
24 AVIATION ASSURED 0 55,055 0 55,055
PNT..............
25 GATM ROLLUP....... 0 0 0 0
GROUND SUPPORT
AVIONICS
27 AIRCRAFT 0 125,050 0 125,050
SURVIVABILITY
EQUIPMENT........
28 CMWS.............. 0 21,511 0 21,511
29 COMMON INFRARED 36 140,636 36 140,636
COUNTERMEASURES
(CIRCM)..........
OTHER SUPPORT
30 COMMON GROUND 0 29,778 0 29,778
EQUIPMENT........
31 AIRCREW INTEGRATED 0 15,229 0 15,229
SYSTEMS..........
32 AIR TRAFFIC 0 11,044 0 11,044
CONTROL..........
33 LAUNCHER, 2.75 0 3,864 0 3,864
ROCKET...........
TOTAL AIRCRAFT 42 1,933,769 0 -127,217 42 1,806,552
PROCUREMENT, ARMY

MISSILE
PROCUREMENT, ARMY
SURFACE-TO-AIR
MISSILE SYSTEM
1 LOWER TIER AIR AND 0 2,036,358 0 2,036,358
MISSILE DEFENSE
(AMD) SEN........
2 TERMINAL HIGH 27 907,162 0 -173,738 27 733,424
ALTITUDE AREA
DEFENSE (THAAD)..
Realignment to [0] [-173,738]
Operation and
Maintenance......
3 M-SHORAD-- 14 712,690 14 712,690
PROCUREMENT......
4 MSE MISSILE....... 244 1,297,528 244 1,297,528
5 PRECISION STRIKE 680 1,226,526 680 1,226,526
MISSILE (PRSM)...
6 INDIRECT FIRE 0 1,626,004 0 1,626,004
PROTECTION
CAPABILITY INC 2-
I................
7 MID-RANGE 0 370,351 0 370,351
CAPABILITY (MRC).
AIR-TO-SURFACE
MISSILE SYSTEM
9 JOINT AIR-TO- 269 104,059 269 104,059
GROUND MSLS
(JAGM)...........
11 LONG-RANGE 0 301,777 0 301,777
HYPERSONIC WEAPON
ANTI-TANK/ASSAULT
MISSILE SYS
12 JAVELIN (AAWS-M) 1,316 417,031 1,316 417,031
SYSTEM SUMMARY...
13 TOW 2 SYSTEM 0 0 0 0
SUMMARY..........
14 GUIDED MLRS ROCKET 0 1,014,937 0 1,014,937
(GMLRS)..........
15 GUIDED MLRS ROCKET 0 49,106 0 49,106
(GMLRS)..........
16 MLRS REDUCED RANGE 600 7,412 600 7,412
PRACTICE ROCKETS
(RRPR)...........
17 HIGH MOBILITY 96 745,682 96 745,682
ARTILLERY ROCKET
SYSTEM (HIMARS...
20 FAMILY OF LOW 0 139,191 0 139,191
ALTITUDE UNMANNED
SYSTEMS..........
MODIFICATIONS
21 PATRIOT MODS...... 0 796,837 0 796,837
22 STINGER MODS...... 0 10,786 0 10,786
23 AVENGER MODS...... 0 6,823 0 6,823
24 MLRS MODS......... 0 289,496 0 289,496
25 HIMARS 0 54,363 0 54,363
MODIFICATIONS....
SPARES AND REPAIR
PARTS
26 SPARES AND REPAIR 0 6,698 0 6,698
PARTS............
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
& FACILITIES
27 AIR DEFENSE 0 9,613 0 9,613
TARGETS..........
TOTAL MISSILE 3,246 12,130,430 0 -173,738 3,246 11,956,692
PROCUREMENT, ARMY

PROCUREMENT OF
W&TCV, ARMY
TRACKED COMBAT
VEHICLES
1 ARMORED MULTI 196 1,150,759 196 1,150,759
PURPOSE VEHICLE
(AMPV)...........
3 ASSAULT BREACHER 0 17,807 0 17,807
VEHICLE (ABV)....
4 M10 BOOKER........ 0 0 0 0
5 XM30 MECHANIZED 19 546,990 19 546,990
INFANTRY COMBAT
VEHICLE (MICV....
MODIFICATION OF
TRACKED COMBAT
VEHICLES
7 STRYKER UPGRADE... 0 45,725 0 45,725
8 BRADLEY FIRE 0 4,863 0 4,863
SUPPORT TEAM
(BFIST) VEHICLE..
9 BRADLEY PROGRAM 0 161,979 0 161,979
(MOD)............
10 M109 FOV 0 74,070 0 74,070
MODIFICATIONS....
11 PALADIN INTEGRATED 0 84,193 0 84,193
MANAGEMENT (PIM).
12 IMPROVED RECOVERY 10 106,036 10 106,036
VEHICLE (M88
HERCULES)........
13 JOINT ASSAULT 18 163,354 18 163,354
BRIDGE...........
14 ABRAMS UPGRADE 22 654,969 22 654,969
PROGRAM..........
15 VEHICLE PROTECTION 0 16,134 0 16,134
SYSTEMS (VPS)....
WEAPONS & OTHER
COMBAT VEHICLES
16 PERSONAL DEFENSE 0 0 0 0
WEAPON (ROLL)....
17 M240 MEDIUM 0 0 0 0
MACHINE GUN
(7.62MM).........
18 MACHINE GUN, CAL 0 0 0 0
.50 M2 ROLL......
19 MORTAR SYSTEMS.... 0 3,575 0 3,575
20 LOCATION & AZIMUTH 0 10,420 0 10,420
DETERMINATION
SYSTEM (LADS.....
21 XM320 GRENADE 0 0 0 0
LAUNCHER MODULE
(GLM)............
22 PRECISION SNIPER 0 0 0 0
RIFLE............
24 NEXT GENERATION 0 372,641 0 372,641
SQUAD WEAPON.....
25 COMMON REMOTELY 0 0 0 0
OPERATED WEAPONS
STATION..........
26 HANDGUN........... 0 0 0 0
MOD OF WEAPONS AND
OTHER COMBAT VEH
28 M777 MODS......... 0 1,569 0 1,569
29 SNIPER RIFLES 0 0 0 0
MODIFICATIONS....
30 M119 MODIFICATIONS 0 4,453 0 4,453
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
& FACILITIES
31 ITEMS LESS THAN 0 512 0 512
$5.0M (WOCV-WTCV)
32 PRODUCTION BASE 0 308,110 0 308,110
SUPPORT (WOCV-
WTCV)............
TOTAL PROCUREMENT 265 3,728,159 0 0 265 3,728,159
OF W&TCV, ARMY...

PROCUREMENT OF
AMMUNITION, ARMY
SMALL/MEDIUM CAL
AMMUNITION
1 CTG, 5.56MM, ALL 0 114,418 0 20,000 0 134,418
TYPES............
5.56 Munition [0] [20,000]
Procurement......
2 CTG, 7.62MM, ALL 0 41,356 0 50,000 0 91,356
TYPES............
7.62 Munition [0] [50,000]
Procurement......
3 NEXT GENERATION 0 536,695 0 536,695
SQUAD WEAPON
AMMUNITION.......
4 CTG, HANDGUN, ALL 0 6,719 0 2,000 0 8,719
TYPES............
9mm Munition [0] [2,000]
Procurement......
5 CTG, .50 CAL, ALL 0 50,861 0 20,000 0 70,861
TYPES............
.50 cal Munition [0] [20,000]
Procurement......
6 CTG, 20MM, ALL 0 9,427 0 9,427
TYPES............
7 CTG, 25MM, ALL 0 34,038 0 34,038
TYPES............
8 CTG, 30MM, ALL 0 164,116 0 164,116
TYPES............
9 CTG, 40MM, ALL 0 146,105 0 146,105
TYPES............
10 CTG, 50MM, ALL 0 58,221 0 58,221
TYPES............
MORTAR AMMUNITION
11 60MM MORTAR, ALL 0 67,727 0 67,727
TYPES............
12 81MM MORTAR, ALL 0 123,745 0 123,745
TYPES............
13 120MM MORTAR, ALL 0 192,826 0 192,826
TYPES............
TANK AMMUNITION
14 CARTRIDGES, TANK, 0 421,735 0 421,735
105MM AND 120MM,
ALL TYPES........
ARTILLERY
AMMUNITION
15 ARTILLERY 0 48,841 0 48,841
CARTRIDGES, 75MM
& 105MM, ALL
TYPES............
16 ARTILLERY 0 120,703 0 85,000 0 205,703
PROJECTILE,
155MM, ALL TYPES.
155mm Projectile [0] [50,000]
Procurement......
Advanced [0] [35,000]
manufacturing
propulsion
facility.........
17 PRECISION 0 0 0 0
ARTILLERY
MUNITIONS........
18 ARTILLERY 0 431,328 0 431,328
PROPELLANTS,
FUZES AND
PRIMERS, ALL.....
MINES
19 MINES & CLEARING 0 47,012 0 47,012
CHARGES, ALL
TYPES............
20 CLOSE TERRAIN 0 0 0 0
SHAPING OBSTACLE.
21 MINE, AT, VOLCANO, 0 4,026 0 4,026
ALL TYPES........
ROCKETS
22 SHOULDER LAUNCHED 0 50,235 0 50,235
MUNITIONS, ALL
TYPES............
23 ROCKET, HYDRA 70, 0 92,772 0 92,772
ALL TYPES........
OTHER AMMUNITION
24 CAD/PAD, ALL TYPES 0 11,615 0 11,615
25 DEMOLITION 0 21,691 0 21,691
MUNITIONS, ALL
TYPES............
26 GRENADES, ALL 0 66,845 0 66,845
TYPES............
27 SIGNALS, ALL TYPES 0 44,927 0 44,927
28 SIMULATORS, ALL 0 11,508 0 11,508
TYPES............
MISCELLANEOUS
30 AMMO COMPONENTS, 0 4,109 0 4,109
ALL TYPES........
31 ITEMS LESS THAN $5 0 16,290 0 16,290
MILLION (AMMO)...
32 AMMUNITION 0 14,007 0 14,007
PECULIAR
EQUIPMENT........
33 FIRST DESTINATION 0 18,712 0 18,712
TRANSPORTATION
(AMMO)...........
34 CLOSEOUT 0 101 0 101
LIABILITIES......
PRODUCTION BASE
SUPPORT
35 INDUSTRIAL 0 2,331,763 0 75,000 0 2,406,763
FACILITIES.......
Industrial [0] [75,000]
Facilities
Modernization....
36 CONVENTIONAL 0 161,179 0 161,179
MUNITIONS
DEMILITARIZATION.
37 ARMS INITIATIVE... 0 3,935 0 3,935
TOTAL PROCUREMENT 0 5,469,588 0 252,000 0 5,721,588
OF AMMUNITION,
ARMY.............

OTHER PROCUREMENT,
ARMY
TACTICAL VEHICLES
1 FAMILY OF 0 129,602 0 129,602
SEMITRAILERS.....
2 HI MOB MULTI-PURP 0 0 0 60,000 0 60,000
WHLD VEH (HMMWV).
Modernization over [0] [60,000]
350 HMMWVs for
the Army Reserves
3 GROUND MOBILITY 0 526,796 0 526,796
VEHICLES (GMV)...
4 ARNG HMMWV 0 0 0 140,000 0 140,000
MODERNIZATION
PROGRAM..........
Modernization over [0] [140,000]
750 HMMWVs for
the Army National
Guard............
5 JOINT LIGHT 0 0 0 0
TACTICAL VEHICLE
FAMILY OF VEHICL.
6 TRUCK, DUMP, 20T 0 17,030 0 35,000 0 52,030
(CCE)............
M917A3 Heavy Dump [0] [35,000]
Truck procurement
7 FAMILY OF MEDIUM 0 283,344 0 283,344
TACTICAL VEH
(FMTV)...........
8 FAMILY OF COLD 0 38,294 0 38,294
WEATHER ALL-
TERRAIN VEHICLE
(C...............
9 FIRETRUCKS & 0 40,203 0 40,203
ASSOCIATED
FIREFIGHTING
EQUIP............
10 FAMILY OF HEAVY 0 169,404 0 169,404
TACTICAL VEHICLES
(FHTV)...........
11 FAMILY OF COMMON 0 80,187 0 80,187
TACTICAL TRUCKS..
12 TACTICAL WHEELED 0 0 0 0
VEHICLE
PROTECTION KITS..
13 MODIFICATION OF IN 0 28,583 0 28,583
SVC EQUIP........
NON-TACTICAL
VEHICLES
14 NONTACTICAL 0 12,029 0 12,029
VEHICLES, OTHER..
COMM--JOINT
COMMUNICATIONS
15 TACTICAL NETWORK 0 0 0 0
COMMUNICATION....
16 C2 INFRASTRUCTURE. 0 1,293,203 0 1,293,203
17 C2 TRANSPORT...... 0 1,581,863 0 1,581,863
18 JCSE EQUIPMENT 0 39 0 39
(USRDECOM).......
COMM--SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS
19 SATELLITE 0 0 0 0
COMMUNICATIONS...
21 DEFENSE ENTERPRISE 0 73,959 0 73,959
WIDEBAND SATCOM
SYSTEMS..........
22 ASSURED 0 243,303 0 243,303
POSITIONING,
NAVIGATION AND
TIMING...........
COMM--COMBAT
COMMUNICATIONS
25 HANDHELD MANPACK 0 516,045 0 516,045
SMALL FORM FIT
(HMS)............
26 ARMY LINK 16 0 33,711 0 33,711
SYSTEMS..........
27 UNIFIED COMMAND 0 20,187 0 20,187
SUITE............
28 COTS 0 5,188 0 5,188
COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT........
30 ARMY 0 54,428 0 54,428
COMMUNICATIONS &
ELECTRONICS......
COMM--INTELLIGENCE
COMM
31 CI AUTOMATION 0 16,382 0 16,382
ARCHITECTURE-
INTEL............
32 MULTI-DOMAIN 0 243,732 0 243,732
INTELLIGENCE.....
INFORMATION
SECURITY
33 INFORMATION SYSTEM 0 853 0 853
SECURITY PROGRAM-
ISSP.............
34 COMMUNICATIONS 0 145,507 0 145,507
SECURITY (COMSEC)
35 BIOMETRIC ENABLING 0 65 0 65
CAPABILITY (BEC).
COMM--BASE
COMMUNICATIONS
36 INFORMATION 0 133,046 0 133,046
SYSTEMS..........
37 BASE EMERGENCY 0 50,644 0 50,644
COMMUNICATION....
38 INSTALLATION INFO 0 335,050 0 335,050
INFRASTRUCTURE
MOD PROGRAM......
ELECT EQUIP--TACT
INT REL ACT
(TIARA)
42 TITAN............. 0 368,672 0 -81,510 0 287,162
Realignment to [0] [-81,510]
Research,
Development,
Test, and
Evaluation.......
43 TERRESTRIAL LAYER 0 172,558 0 172,558
SYSTEMS (TLS)....
44 COLLECTION 0 5,914 0 5,914
CAPABILITY.......
46 DCGS-A-INTEL...... 0 1,075 0 1,075
47 TROJAN............ 0 48,885 0 48,885
48 MOD OF IN-SVC 0 12,441 0 12,441
EQUIP (INTEL SPT)
ELECT EQUIP--
ELECTRONIC
WARFARE (EW)
50 AIR VIGILANCE (AV) 0 106,497 0 106,497
52 ELECTRONIC WARFARE 0 46,570 0 46,570
PLANNING & MGMT
TOOLS (EWP.......
53 FAMILY OF 0 163 0 163
PERSISTENT
SURVEILLANCE CAP.
54 COUNTERINTELLIGENC 0 8,427 0 8,427
E/SECURITY
COUNTERMEASURES..
ELECT EQUIP--
TACTICAL SURV.
(TAC SURV)
56 SENTINEL MODS..... 0 485,840 0 485,840
57 NIGHT VISION 0 0 0 0
DEVICES..........
58 SMALL TACTICAL 0 0 0 0
OPTICAL RIFLE
MOUNTED MLRF.....
59 BASE EXPEDITIARY 0 1,818 0 1,818
TARGETING AND
SURV SYS.........
60 INDIRECT FIRE 0 18,000 0 18,000
PROTECTION FAMILY
OF SYSTEMS.......
61 FAMILY OF WEAPON 0 15,340 0 15,340
SIGHTS (FWS).....
62 ENHANCED PORTABLE 0 13,228 0 13,228
INDUCTIVE
ARTILLERY FUZE SE
63 SURVEILLANCE 0 9,848 0 9,848
SYSTEMS..........
64 FORWARD LOOKING 0 84,134 0 84,134
INFRARED (IFLIR).
65 COUNTER SMALL 0 994,127 0 994,127
UNMANNED AERIAL
SYSTEM (C-SUAS)..
66 JOINT BATTLE 0 0 0 0
COMMAND--PLATFORM
(JBC-P)..........
67 JOINT EFFECTS 0 7,663 0 7,663
TARGETING SYSTEM
(JETS)...........
68 COMPUTER 0 6,382 0 6,382
BALLISTICS: LHMBC
XM32.............
69 MORTAR FIRE 0 2,391 0 2,391
CONTROL SYSTEM...
70 MORTAR FIRE 0 7,139 0 7,139
CONTROL SYSTEMS
MODIFICATIONS....
71 COUNTERFIRE RADARS 0 196,522 0 196,522
72 ADVANCED 0 397,286 0 397,286
SITUATIONAL
AWARENESS SYSTEMS
ELECT EQUIP--
TACTICAL C2
SYSTEMS
73 ARMY COMMAND POST 0 0 0 0
INTEGRATED
INFRASTRUCTURE (.
74 FIRE SUPPORT C2 0 3,559 0 3,559
FAMILY...........
75 AIR & MSL DEFENSE 0 61,127 0 61,127
PLANNING &
CONTROL SYS......
76 IAMD BATTLE 0 1,052,868 0 1,052,868
COMMAND SYSTEM...
77 AIAMD FAMILY OF 0 16,446 0 16,446
SYSTEMS (FOS)
COMPONENTS.......
78 LIFE CYCLE 0 5,265 0 5,265
SOFTWARE SUPPORT
(LCSS)...........
79 NETWORK MANAGEMENT 0 0 0 0
INITIALIZATION
AND SERVICE......
82 MOD OF IN-SVC 0 16,673 0 16,673
EQUIPMENT
(ENFIRE).........
ELECT EQUIP--
AUTOMATION
83 ARMY TRAINING 0 4,303 0 4,303
MODERNIZATION....
84 AUTOMATED DATA 0 99,039 0 99,039
PROCESSING EQUIP.
86 HIGH PERF 0 75,004 0 75,004
COMPUTING MOD PGM
(HPCMP)..........
87 CONTRACT WRITING 0 0 0 0
SYSTEM...........
CLASSIFIED
PROGRAMS
9999 CLASSIFIED 0 1,577 0 1,577
PROGRAMS.........
CHEMICAL DEFENSIVE
EQUIPMENT
88 BASE DEFENSE 0 143 0 143
SYSTEMS (BDS)....
89 CBRN DEFENSE...... 0 65,020 0 65,020
BRIDGING EQUIPMENT
90 TACTICAL BRIDGE, 0 35,806 0 35,806
FLOAT-RIBBON.....
ENGINEER (NON-
CONSTRUCTION)
EQUIPMENT
92 ROBOTICS AND 0 84,303 0 84,303
APPLIQUE SYSTEMS.
93 RENDER SAFE SETS 0 12,461 0 12,461
KITS OUTFITS.....
94 FAMILY OF BOATS 0 8,028 0 8,028
AND MOTORS.......
COMBAT SERVICE
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
95 HEATERS AND ECU'S. 0 15,021 0 15,021
97 GROUND SOLDIER 0 193,491 0 193,491
SYSTEM...........
98 MOBILE SOLDIER 0 0 0 0
POWER............
99 FORCE PROVIDER.... 0 0 0 0
100 FIELD FEEDING 0 0 0 0
EQUIPMENT........
101 CARGO AERIAL DEL & 0 39,505 0 39,505
PERSONNEL
PARACHUTE SYSTEM.
103 ITEMS LESS THAN 0 4,129 0 4,129
$5M (ENG SPT)....
PETROLEUM
EQUIPMENT
104 DISTRIBUTION 0 133,881 0 133,881
SYSTEMS,
PETROLEUM & WATER
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
105 COMBAT SUPPORT 0 93,705 0 93,705
MEDICAL..........
MAINTENANCE
EQUIPMENT
106 MOBILE MAINTENANCE 0 58,997 0 58,997
EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS
CONSTRUCTION
EQUIPMENT
107 CONSTRUCTION 0 72,582 0 72,582
EQUIPMENT........
RAIL FLOAT
CONTAINERIZATION
EQUIPMENT
108 ARMY WATERCRAFT 0 75,717 0 75,717
ESP..............
109 MANEUVER SUPPORT 0 104,705 0 104,705
VESSEL (MSV).....
110 ITEMS LESS THAN 0 22,021 0 22,021
$5.0M (FLOAT/
RAIL)............
GENERATORS
111 GENERATORS AND 0 79,456 0 79,456
ASSOCIATED EQUIP.
MATERIAL HANDLING
EQUIPMENT
112 FAMILY OF 0 6,238 0 15,000 0 21,238
FORKLIFTS........
Crane procurement. [0] [15,000]
TRAINING EQUIPMENT
113 COMBAT TRAINING 0 141,848 0 141,848
CENTERS SUPPORT..
114 TRAINING DEVICES, 0 140,860 0 140,860
NONSYSTEM........
115 SYNTHETIC TRAINING 0 115,535 0 115,535
ENVIRONMENT (STE)
116 GAMING TECHNOLOGY 0 4,180 0 4,180
IN SUPPORT OF
ARMY TRAINING....
TEST MEASURE AND
DIG EQUIPMENT
(TMD)
117 INTEGRATED FAMILY 0 18,570 0 18,570
OF TEST EQUIPMENT
(IFTE)...........
118 TEST EQUIPMENT 0 53,597 0 53,597
MODERNIZATION
(TEMOD)..........
OTHER SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT
119 PHYSICAL SECURITY 0 137,271 0 137,271
SYSTEMS (OPA3)...
120 BASE LEVEL COMMON 0 19,889 0 19,889
EQUIPMENT........
121 MODIFICATION OF IN- 0 41,358 0 41,358
SVC EQUIPMENT
(OPA-3)..........
122 PRODUCTION BASE 0 362,356 0 362,356
SUPPORT (OTH)....
123 BUILDING, PRE-FAB, 0 10,878 0 10,878
RELOCATABLE......
124 SPECIAL EQUIPMENT 0 88,721 0 88,721
FOR TEST AND
EVALUATION.......
OPA2
126 INITIAL SPARES-- 0 7,323 0 7,323
C&E..............
TOTAL OTHER 0 12,667,053 0 168,490 0 12,835,543
PROCUREMENT, ARMY

AIRCRAFT
PROCUREMENT, NAVY
COMBAT AIRCRAFT
1 F/A-18E/F 0 49,088 0 48,000 0 97,088
(FIGHTER) HORNET.
F/A-18 IRST [0] [48,000]
capability.......
2 JOINT STRIKE 8 995,707 8 995,707
FIGHTER CV.......
3 JOINT STRIKE 0 651,081 0 651,081
FIGHTER CV.......
4 JSF STOVL......... 0 62,363 0 62,363
5 JSF STOVL......... 0 77,963 0 77,963
6 CH-53K (HEAVY 22 3,044,450 22 3,044,450
LIFT)............
7 CH-53K (HEAVY 0 429,295 0 429,295
LIFT)............
8 V-22 (MEDIUM LIFT) 0 0 0 0
9 H-1 UPGRADES (UH- 0 5,974 0 5,974
1Y/AH-1Z)........
10 P-8A POSEIDON..... 12 4,227,350 0 -127,629 12 4,099,721
Early to need..... [0] [-127,629]
11 E-2D ADV HAWKEYE.. 6 2,075,025 6 2,075,025
12 E-2D ADV HAWKEYE.. 0 550,000 0 550,000
OTHER AIRCRAFT
15 KC-130J........... 11 1,601,906 11 1,601,906
16 MQ-4 TRITON....... 0 104,326 0 104,326
17 MQ-25............. 3 771,177 3 771,177
18 MQ-25............. 0 80,965 0 80,965
19 MARINE GROUP 5 UAS 5 118,600 5 118,600
20 OTHER SUPPORT 10 204,476 10 204,476
AIRCRAFT.........
MODIFICATION OF
AIRCRAFT
21 F-18 A-D UNIQUE... 0 36,951 0 36,951
22 F-18E/F AND EA-18G 0 563,832 0 563,832
MODERNIZATION AND
SUSTAINM.........
23 MARINE GROUP 5 UAS 0 179,603 0 179,603
SERIES...........
24 AEA SYSTEMS....... 0 37,125 0 37,125
26 INFRARED SEARCH 0 171,345 0 171,345
AND TRACK (IRST).
27 ADVERSARY......... 0 24,732 0 24,732
28 F-18 SERIES....... 0 858,716 0 858,716
29 H-53 SERIES....... 0 91,903 0 91,903
30 MH-60 SERIES...... 0 236,555 0 236,555
31 H-1 SERIES........ 0 304,267 0 304,267
32 E-2 SERIES........ 0 96,428 0 96,428
33 TRAINER A/C SERIES 0 12,359 0 12,359
34 C-130 SERIES...... 0 185,266 0 185,266
35 FEWSG............. 0 0 0 0
36 CARGO/TRANSPORT A/ 0 20,100 0 20,100
C SERIES.........
37 E-6 SERIES........ 0 270,832 0 270,832
38 EXECUTIVE 0 57,319 0 57,319
HELICOPTERS
SERIES...........
39 T-45 SERIES....... 0 191,139 0 191,139
40 POWER PLANT 0 23,765 0 23,765
CHANGES..........
41 JPATS SERIES...... 0 28,059 0 28,059
43 COMMON ECM 0 365,990 0 365,990
EQUIPMENT........
44 COMMON AVIONICS 0 246,728 0 246,728
CHANGES..........
45 COMMON DEFENSIVE 0 11,028 0 11,028
WEAPON SYSTEM....
46 ID SYSTEMS........ 0 3,199 0 3,199
47 P-8 SERIES........ 0 381,014 0 381,014
48 MAGTF EW FOR 0 20,686 0 20,686
AVIATION.........
49 V-22 (TILT/ROTOR 0 641,715 0 641,715
ACFT) OSPREY.....
50 NEXT GENERATION 0 458,658 0 458,658
JAMMER (NGJ).....
51 F-35 STOVL SERIES. 0 428,881 0 428,881
52 F-35 CV SERIES.... 0 135,612 0 135,612
53 QRC............... 0 27,686 0 27,686
54 MQ-4 SERIES....... 0 157,849 0 157,849
AIRCRAFT SPARES
AND REPAIR PARTS
58 SPARES AND REPAIR 0 4,511,417 0 4,511,417
PARTS............
AIRCRAFT SUPPORT
EQUIP &
FACILITIES
59 COMMON GROUND 0 666,140 0 666,140
EQUIPMENT........
60 AIRCRAFT 0 113,513 0 113,513
INDUSTRIAL
FACILITIES.......
61 WAR CONSUMABLES... 0 56,577 0 56,577
62 OTHER PRODUCTION 0 61,970 0 61,970
CHARGES..........
63 SPECIAL SUPPORT 0 218,318 0 218,318
EQUIPMENT........
TOTAL AIRCRAFT 77 26,947,023 0 -79,629 77 26,867,394
PROCUREMENT, NAVY

WEAPONS
PROCUREMENT, NAVY
BALLISTIC MISSILES
MODIFICATION OF
MISSILES
1 CONVENTIONAL 12 750,387 -6 -375,194 6 375,193
PROMPT STRIKE....
CPS six missiles.. [-6] [-375,194]
2 TRIDENT II MODS... 0 3,912,267 0 3,912,267
STRATEGIC MISSILES
4 TOMAHAWK.......... 58 1,015,106 58 1,015,106
TACTICAL MISSILES
5 AMRAAM............ 106 167,439 106 167,439
6 SIDEWINDER........ 306 174,750 306 174,750
7 JOINT ADVANCE 0 557,806 0 557,806
TACTICAL MISSILE
(JATM)...........
8 STANDARD MISSILE.. 106 733,159 0 100,000 106 833,159
SM-6 solid rocket [0] [100,000]
motor second
sourcing.........
10 SMALL DIAMETER 512 166,688 512 166,688
BOMB II..........
11 RAM............... 116 119,166 116 119,166
12 MSE MISSILE....... 23 97,835 23 97,835
13 JOINT AIR GROUND 282 73,226 282 73,226
MISSILE (JAGM)...
15 AERIAL TARGETS.... 0 179,931 0 179,931
16 OTHER MISSILE 0 3,877 0 3,877
SUPPORT..........
17 LRASM............. 129 670,456 129 670,456
18 NAVAL STRIKE 32 75,972 32 75,972
MISSILE (NSM)....
19 NAVAL STRIKE 0 2,103 0 2,103
MISSILE (NSM)....
21 PRECISION ATTACK 4 4,019 4 4,019
STRIKE MUNITION
(PASM)...........
MODIFICATION OF
MISSILES
22 TOMAHAWK MODS..... 0 799,139 0 799,139
23 ESSM.............. 290 521,006 290 521,006
24 AARGM-ER.......... 0 20 0 20
25 AARGM-ER.......... 0 5,210 0 5,210
26 STANDARD MISSILES 0 69,579 0 69,579
MODS.............
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
& FACILITIES
27 WEAPONS INDUSTRIAL 0 62,403 0 62,403
FACILITIES.......
28 INDUSTRIAL 0 640 0 640
PREPAREDNESS.....
ORDNANCE SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT
29 ORDNANCE SUPPORT 0 43,261 0 43,261
EQUIPMENT........
TORPEDOES AND
RELATED EQUIP
30 SSTD.............. 0 3,969 0 3,969
31 MK-48 TORPEDO..... 141 571,274 141 571,274
32 ASW TARGETS....... 0 47,277 0 47,277
MOD OF TORPEDOES
AND RELATED EQUIP
33 MK-54 TORPEDO MODS 0 112,126 0 112,126
34 MK-48 TORPEDO 0 67,279 0 67,279
ADCAP MODS.......
35 MARITIME MINES.... 0 251,724 0 251,724
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
36 TORPEDO SUPPORT 0 160,445 0 160,445
EQUIPMENT........
37 ASW RANGE SUPPORT. 0 4,438 0 4,438
DESTINATION
TRANSPORTATION
38 FIRST DESTINATION 0 6,011 0 6,011
TRANSPORTATION...
GUNS AND GUN
MOUNTS
39 SMALL ARMS AND 0 13,946 0 13,946
WEAPONS..........
MODIFICATION OF
GUNS AND GUN
MOUNTS
40 CIWS MODS......... 0 7,939 0 7,939
41 COAST GUARD 0 49,537 0 49,537
WEAPONS..........
42 GUN MOUNT MODS.... 0 84,004 0 84,004
43 LCS MODULE WEAPONS 10 2,190 10 2,190
44 AIRBORNE MINE 0 14,265 0 14,265
NEUTRALIZATION
SYSTEMS..........
SPARES AND REPAIR
PARTS
46 SPARES AND REPAIR 0 167,242 0 167,242
PARTS............
TOTAL WEAPONS 2,127 11,769,111 -6 -275,194 2,121 11,493,917
PROCUREMENT, NAVY

PROCUREMENT OF
AMMO, NAVY & MC
NAVY AMMUNITION
1 GENERAL PURPOSE 0 45,607 0 45,607
BOMBS............
2 JDAM.............. 1,292 96,935 1,292 96,935
3 AIRBORNE ROCKETS, 0 92,145 0 92,145
ALL TYPES........
4 MACHINE GUN 0 14,832 0 14,832
AMMUNITION.......
5 PRACTICE BOMBS.... 0 46,782 0 46,782
6 CARTRIDGES & CART 0 63,064 0 63,064
ACTUATED DEVICES.
7 AIR EXPENDABLE 0 121,059 0 121,059
COUNTERMEASURES..
8 JATOS............. 0 8,179 0 8,179
9 5 INCH/54 GUN 0 44,136 0 44,136
AMMUNITION.......
10 INTERMEDIATE 0 40,095 0 40,095
CALIBER GUN
AMMUNITION.......
11 OTHER SHIP GUN 0 43,106 0 43,106
AMMUNITION.......
12 SMALL ARMS & 0 48,801 0 48,801
LANDING PARTY
AMMO.............
13 PYROTECHNIC AND 0 9,510 0 9,510
DEMOLITION.......
15 AMMUNITION LESS 0 1,692 0 1,692
THAN $5 MILLION..
16 EXPEDITIONARY 0 165,662 0 50,000 0 215,662
LOITERING
MUNITIONS........
Increase [0] [50,000]
expeditionary
loitering
munitions........
MARINE CORPS
AMMUNITION
17 MORTARS........... 0 181,464 0 181,464
18 DIRECT SUPPORT 0 29,715 0 29,715
MUNITIONS........
19 INFANTRY WEAPONS 0 142,179 0 142,179
AMMUNITION.......
20 COMBAT SUPPORT 0 12,510 0 12,510
MUNITIONS........
21 AMMO MODERNIZATION 0 19,009 0 19,009
22 ARTILLERY 0 723,278 0 723,278
MUNITIONS........
23 ITEMS LESS THAN $5 0 8,837 0 8,837
MILLION..........
TOTAL PROCUREMENT 1,292 1,958,597 0 50,000 1,292 2,008,597
OF AMMO, NAVY &
MC...............

SHIPBUILDING AND
CONVERSION, NAVY
FLEET BALLISTIC
MISSILE SHIPS
1 COLUMBIA CLASS 0 3,329,047 0 3,329,047
SUBMARINE........
1 COLUMBIA CLASS 1 6,904,785 1 6,904,785
SUBMARINE........
2 COLUMBIA CLASS 0 4,763,342 0 4,763,342
SUBMARINE........
OTHER WARSHIPS
3 CARRIER 0 641,907 0 641,907
REPLACEMENT
PROGRAM..........
4 CARRIER 0 1,940,566 0 1,940,566
REPLACEMENT
PROGRAM..........
5 CVN-81............ 0 1,447,882 0 1,447,882
6 VIRGINIA CLASS 2 8,402,316 2 8,402,316
SUBMARINE........
7 VIRGINIA CLASS 0 4,143,618 0 4,143,618
SUBMARINE........
8 SURFACE SHIP 0 0 0 550,000 0 550,000
INDUSTRIAL BASE..
DDG-51 wage [0] [100,000]
commitment.......
Surface combatant [0] [450,000]
shipyard
infrastructure
and strategic
sourcing.........
9 BBG(X)............ 0 1,000,000 0 -1,000,000 0 0
Advance [0] [-1,000,000]
procurement early
to need..........
10 CVN REFUELING 0 4,418,902 0 -2,400,000 0 2,018,902
OVERHAULS........
Incremental [0] [-2,400,000]
funding extended.
11 CVN REFUELING 0 53,070 0 53,070
OVERHAULS........
12 DDG 1000.......... 0 66,516 0 66,516
13 DDG-51............ 1 2,954,238 1 2,500,000 2 5,454,238
Second DDG-51 ship [1] [2,500,000]
for FY27.........
14 DDG-51............ 0 0 0 0
16 FFG-FRIGATE....... 0 0 0 0
17 FF(X)............. 1 1,429,000 1 1,429,000
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
18 LPD FLIGHT II..... 1 2,188,700 1 2,188,700
19 LPD FLIGHT II..... 0 355,950 0 355,950
21 LHA REPLACEMENT... 1 3,850,319 1 3,850,319
24 MEDIUM LANDING 0 0 0 0
SHIP.............
AUXILIARIES, CRAFT
AND PRIOR YR
PROGRAM COST
26 AS SUBMARINE 2 4,444,000 -1 -2,100,000 1 2,344,000
TENDER...........
Second ship early [-1] [-2,100,000]
to need,
unjustified
savings..........
28 TAO FLEET OILER... 2 1,946,063 2 1,946,063
31 TAGOS SURTASS 1 610,664 -1 -610,664 0 0
SHIPS............
Third ship early [-1] [-610,664]
to need..........
32 TOWING, SALVAGE, 0 0 0 0
AND RESCUE SHIP
(ATS)............
35 STRATEGIC SEALIFT. 1 450,000 1 450,000
36 OUTFITTING........ 0 741,270 0 741,270
37 SHIP TO SHORE 4 733,895 4 733,895
CONNECTOR........
38 SERVICE CRAFT..... 0 177,079 0 177,079
39 AUXILIARY 0 83,000 0 83,000
PERSONNEL LIGHTER
40 BULK FUEL VESSEL.. 1 450,000 1 450,000
43 LCAC SLEP......... 2 37,998 2 37,998
44 AUXILIARY VESSELS 0 0 0 0
(USED SEALIFT)...
45 COMPLETION OF PY 0 2,611,990 0 2,611,990
SHIPBUILDING
PROGRAMS.........
TOTAL SHIPBUILDING 20 60,176,117 -1 -3,060,664 19 57,115,453
AND CONVERSION,
NAVY.............

OTHER PROCUREMENT,
NAVY
SHIP PROPULSION
EQUIPMENT
1 SURFACE POWER 0 22,668 0 22,668
EQUIPMENT........
GENERATORS
2 SURFACE COMBATANT 0 103,871 0 103,871
HM&E.............
NAVIGATION
EQUIPMENT
3 OTHER NAVIGATION 0 83,510 0 83,510
EQUIPMENT........
OTHER SHIPBOARD
EQUIPMENT
4 SUB PERISCOPE, 0 344,885 0 344,885
IMAGING AND SUPT
EQUIP PROG.......
5 DDG MOD........... 0 1,000,278 0 1,000,278
6 FIREFIGHTING 0 177,708 0 177,708
EQUIPMENT........
7 COMMAND AND 0 2,259 0 2,259
CONTROL
SWITCHBOARD......
8 LHA/LHD MIDLIFE... 0 131,315 0 131,315
9 LCC 19/20 EXTENDED 0 766 0 766
SERVICE LIFE
PROGRAM..........
10 POLLUTION CONTROL 0 22,506 0 22,506
EQUIPMENT........
11 SUBMARINE SUPPORT 0 330,951 0 330,951
EQUIPMENT........
12 VIRGINIA CLASS 0 83,297 0 83,297
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
13 LCS CLASS SUPPORT 0 15,815 0 15,815
EQUIPMENT........
14 SUBMARINE 0 26,211 0 26,211
BATTERIES........
15 LPD CLASS SUPPORT 0 213,723 0 213,723
EQUIPMENT........
16 DDG 1000 CLASS 0 58,284 0 58,284
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
17 STRATEGIC PLATFORM 0 72,163 0 72,163
SUPPORT EQUIP....
18 DSSP EQUIPMENT.... 0 7,440 0 7,440
19 SMALL UNMANNED 0 585 0 100,000 0 100,585
SURFACE VEHICLES.
Increase small [0] [100,000]
unmanned surface
vessels..........
20 LCAC.............. 0 22,515 0 22,515
21 UNDERWATER EOD 0 20,575 0 20,575
EQUIPMENT........
22 ITEMS LESS THAN $5 0 69,425 0 69,425
MILLION..........
23 CHEMICAL WARFARE 0 2,425 0 2,425
DETECTORS........
REACTOR PLANT
EQUIPMENT
24 SHIP MAINTENANCE, 0 2,737,140 0 2,737,140
REPAIR AND
MODERNIZATION....
25 REACTOR COMPONENTS 0 519,821 0 519,821
OCEAN ENGINEERING
26 DIVING AND SALVAGE 0 33,013 0 33,013
EQUIPMENT........
SMALL BOATS
27 MEDIUM UNMANNED 0 121,130 0 121,130
SURFACE VEHICLE
(MUSVS)..........
28 STANDARD BOATS.... 0 97,746 0 97,746
PRODUCTION
FACILITIES
EQUIPMENT
29 OPERATING FORCES 0 492,100 0 492,100
IPE..............
OTHER SHIP SUPPORT
30 LCS COMMON MISSION 0 30,565 0 30,565
MODULES EQUIPMENT
31 LCS MCM MISSION 0 65,113 0 65,113
MODULES..........
32 LCS SUW MISSION 0 1,719 0 1,719
MODULES..........
33 LCS IN-SERVICE 0 315,272 0 315,272
MODERNIZATION....
34 SMALL & MEDIUM UUV 0 110,955 0 110,955
35 LARGE UUV......... 0 222,998 0 222,998
36 EXTRA LARGE UUV... 0 135,802 0 135,802
LOGISTIC SUPPORT
37 LSD MIDLIFE & 0 240 0 240
MODERNIZATION....
SHIP SONARS
39 AN/SQQ-89 SURF ASW 0 142,355 0 142,355
COMBAT SYSTEM....
40 SSN ACOUSTIC 0 454,161 0 454,161
EQUIPMENT........
ASW ELECTRONIC
EQUIPMENT
42 SUBMARINE ACOUSTIC 0 68,881 0 68,881
WARFARE SYSTEM...
43 SSTD.............. 0 14,857 0 14,857
44 FIXED SURVEILLANCE 0 490,548 0 490,548
SYSTEM...........
45 SURTASS........... 0 72,190 0 72,190
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
EQUIPMENT
46 AN/SLQ-32......... 0 653,483 0 653,483
RECONNAISSANCE
EQUIPMENT
47 SHIPBOARD IW 0 701,667 0 701,667
EXPLOIT..........
48 MARITIME 0 8,652 0 8,652
BATTLESPACE
AWARENESS........
OTHER SHIP
ELECTRONIC
EQUIPMENT
49 COOPERATIVE 0 33,932 0 33,932
ENGAGEMENT
CAPABILITY.......
50 NAVAL TACTICAL 0 10,108 0 10,108
COMMAND SUPPORT
SYSTEM (NTCSS)...
51 ATDLS............. 0 52,758 0 52,758
52 NAVY COMMAND AND 0 16,167 0 16,167
CONTROL SYSTEM
(NCCS)...........
53 MINESWEEPING 0 14,879 0 14,879
SYSTEM
REPLACEMENT......
54 NAVSTAR GPS 0 43,097 0 43,097
RECEIVERS (SPACE)
55 AMERICAN FORCES 0 289 0 289
RADIO AND TV
SERVICE..........
AVIATION
ELECTRONIC
EQUIPMENT
56 ASHORE ATC 0 83,057 0 83,057
EQUIPMENT........
57 AFLOAT ATC 0 62,581 0 62,581
EQUIPMENT........
58 ID SYSTEMS........ 0 35,620 0 35,620
59 JOINT PRECISION 0 2,976 0 2,976
APPROACH AND
LANDING SYSTEM (.
60 NAVAL MISSION 0 54,487 0 54,487
PLANNING SYSTEMS.
OTHER SHORE
ELECTRONIC
EQUIPMENT
62 TACTICAL/MOBILE 0 48,262 0 48,262
C4I SYSTEMS......
63 INTELLIGENCE 0 11,824 0 11,824
SURVEILLANCE AND
RECONNAISSANCE
(ISR)............
64 CANES............. 0 493,046 0 493,046
65 RADIAC............ 0 38,000 0 38,000
66 CANES-INTELL...... 0 43,028 0 43,028
67 GPETE............. 0 31,462 0 31,462
68 MASF.............. 0 5,822 0 5,822
69 INTEG COMBAT 0 6,454 0 6,454
SYSTEM TEST
FACILITY.........
70 EMI CONTROL 0 3,435 0 3,435
INSTRUMENTATION..
71 IN-SERVICE RADARS 0 338,946 0 338,946
AND SENSORS......
SHIPBOARD
COMMUNICATIONS
72 BATTLE FORCE 0 125,661 0 125,661
TACTICAL NETWORK.
73 SHIPBOARD TACTICAL 0 50,350 0 50,350
COMMUNICATIONS...
74 SHIP 0 156,605 0 156,605
COMMUNICATIONS
AUTOMATION.......
75 COMMUNICATIONS 0 15,097 0 15,097
ITEMS UNDER $5M..
SUBMARINE
COMMUNICATIONS
76 SUBMARINE 0 173,069 0 173,069
BROADCAST SUPPORT
77 SUBMARINE 0 88,071 0 88,071
COMMUNICATION
EQUIPMENT........
SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS
78 SATELLITE 0 57,961 0 57,961
COMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEMS..........
79 NAVY MULTIBAND 0 57,768 0 57,768
TERMINAL (NMT)...
80 MOBILE ADVANCED 0 202,305 0 202,305
EHF TERMINAL
(MAT)............
SHORE
COMMUNICATIONS
81 JOINT 0 0 0 0
COMMUNICATIONS
SUPPORT ELEMENT
(JCSE)...........
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
EQUIPMENT
82 INFO SYSTEMS 0 349,099 0 349,099
SECURITY PROGRAM
(ISSP)...........
83 MIO INTEL 0 1,063 0 1,063
EXPLOITATION TEAM
CRYPTOLOGIC
EQUIPMENT
84 CRYPTOLOGIC 0 7,419 0 7,419
COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIP............
OTHER ELECTRONIC
SUPPORT
91 COAST GUARD 0 67,106 0 67,106
EQUIPMENT........
DRUG INTERDICTION
SUPPORT
92 OTHER DRUG 0 57,568 0 57,568
INTERDICTION
SUPPORT..........
SONOBUOYS
93 SONOBUOYS--ALL 0 300,151 0 100,000 0 400,151
TYPES............
Sonobuoys--All [0] [100,000]
Types Increase...
AIRCRAFT SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT
94 MINOTAUR.......... 0 4,831 0 4,831
95 WEAPONS RANGE 0 119,900 0 119,900
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
96 AIRCRAFT SUPPORT 0 69,065 0 69,065
EQUIPMENT........
97 ADVANCED ARRESTING 0 23,551 0 23,551
GEAR (AAG).......
98 ELECTROMAGNETIC 0 36,908 0 36,908
AIRCRAFT LAUNCH
SYSTEM (EMALS....
99 METEOROLOGICAL 0 7,477 0 7,477
EQUIPMENT........
100 AIRBORNE MCM...... 0 9,507 0 9,507
101 AVIATION SUPPORT 0 116,873 0 116,873
EQUIPMENT........
102 UMCS-UNMAN CARRIER 0 211,216 0 211,216
AVIATION(UCA)MISS
ION CNTRL........
SHIP GUN SYSTEM
EQUIPMENT
103 SHIP GUN SYSTEMS 0 6,962 0 6,962
EQUIPMENT........
SHIP MISSILE
SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT
104 HARPOON SUPPORT 0 195 0 195
EQUIPMENT........
105 SHIP MISSILE 0 431,069 0 431,069
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
106 TOMAHAWK SUPPORT 0 116,208 0 116,208
EQUIPMENT........
FBM SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT
107 CPS SUPPORT 0 188,430 0 188,430
EQUIPMENT........
108 STRATEGIC MISSILE 0 327,941 0 327,941
SYSTEMS EQUIP....
ASW SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT
109 SSN COMBAT CONTROL 0 165,416 0 165,416
SYSTEMS..........
110 ASW SUPPORT 0 25,105 0 25,105
EQUIPMENT........
OTHER ORDNANCE
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
111 EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE 0 48,252 0 48,252
DISPOSAL EQUIP...
112 DIRECTED ENERGY 0 0 0 0
SYSTEMS..........
113 ITEMS LESS THAN $5 0 2,592 0 2,592
MILLION..........
OTHER EXPENDABLE
ORDNANCE
114 ANTI-SHIP MISSILE 0 606,241 0 606,241
DECOY SYSTEM.....
115 SUBMARINE TRAINING 0 73,681 0 73,681
DEVICE MODS......
116 SURFACE TRAINING 0 218,181 0 218,181
EQUIPMENT........
CIVIL ENGINEERING
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
117 PASSENGER CARRYING 0 3,567 0 3,567
VEHICLES.........
118 GENERAL PURPOSE 0 4,801 0 4,801
TRUCKS...........
120 CONSTRUCTION & 0 91,269 0 91,269
MAINTENANCE EQUIP
121 FIRE FIGHTING 0 17,107 0 17,107
EQUIPMENT........
122 TACTICAL VEHICLES. 0 46,796 0 46,796
123 AMPHIBIOUS 0 53,916 0 53,916
EQUIPMENT........
124 POLLUTION CONTROL 0 3,586 0 3,586
EQUIPMENT........
125 ITEMS LESS THAN $5 0 131,449 0 131,449
MILLION..........
126 PHYSICAL SECURITY 0 998 0 998
VEHICLES.........
SUPPLY SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT
127 SUPPLY EQUIPMENT.. 0 67,828 0 67,828
128 FIRST DESTINATION 0 4,732 0 4,732
TRANSPORTATION...
129 SPECIAL PURPOSE 0 323,644 0 323,644
SUPPLY SYSTEMS...
TRAINING DEVICES
130 TRAINING SUPPORT 0 10,608 0 10,608
EQUIPMENT........
131 TRAINING AND 0 331,016 0 331,016
EDUCATION
EQUIPMENT........
COMMAND SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT
132 COMMAND SUPPORT 0 55,202 0 55,202
EQUIPMENT........
133 MEDICAL SUPPORT 0 54,862 0 54,862
EQUIPMENT........
135 NAVAL MIP SUPPORT 0 5,213 0 5,213
EQUIPMENT........
136 OPERATING FORCES 0 15,107 0 15,107
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
137 C4ISR EQUIPMENT... 0 33,975 0 33,975
138 ENVIRONMENTAL 0 60,467 0 60,467
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
139 PHYSICAL SECURITY 0 218,037 0 218,037
EQUIPMENT........
140 ENTERPRISE 0 40,490 0 40,490
INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY.......
OTHER
142 NEXT GENERATION 0 223,647 0 223,647
ENTERPRISE
SERVICE..........
143 CYBERSPACE 0 7,131 0 7,131
ACTIVITIES.......
CLASSIFIED
PROGRAMS
9999 CLASSIFIED 0 42,813 0 42,813
PROGRAMS.........
SPARES AND REPAIR
PARTS
144 SPARES AND REPAIR 0 765,711 0 750,000 0 1,515,711
PARTS............
Increase for ship [0] [750,000]
spares and
repairs..........
TOTAL OTHER 0 18,866,679 0 950,000 0 19,816,679
PROCUREMENT, NAVY

PROCUREMENT,
MARINE CORPS
TRACKED COMBAT
VEHICLES
1 AAV7A1 PIP........ 0 0 0 0
2 AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT 0 237,336 0 237,336
VEHICLE FAMILY OF
VEHICLES.........
3 LAV PIP........... 0 68,825 0 68,825
ARTILLERY AND
OTHER WEAPONS
4 155MM LIGHTWEIGHT 0 5,709 0 5,709
TOWED HOWITZER...
5 ARTILLERY WEAPONS 0 341,085 0 341,085
SYSTEM...........
6 WEAPONS AND COMBAT 0 50,299 0 50,299
VEHICLES UNDER $5
MILLION..........
GUIDED MISSILES
8 NAVAL STRIKE 103 204,639 103 204,639
MISSILE (NSM)....
9 NAVAL STRIKE 0 14,391 0 14,391
MISSILE (NSM)....
10 GROUND BASED AIR 0 1,274,446 0 1,274,446
DEFENSE..........
11 ANTI-ARMOR MISSILE- 193 63,020 193 63,020
JAVELIN..........
12 FAMILY ANTI-ARMOR 0 808 0 808
WEAPON SYSTEMS
(FOAAWS).........
13 ANTI-ARMOR MISSILE- 0 1,265 0 1,265
TOW..............
14 GUIDED MLRS ROCKET 0 61,355 0 61,355
(GMLRS)..........
COMMAND AND
CONTROL SYSTEMS
15 COMMON AVIATION 0 0 0 0
COMMAND AND
CONTROL SYSTEM (C
REPAIR AND TEST
EQUIPMENT
16 REPAIR AND TEST 0 65,665 0 65,665
EQUIPMENT........
OTHER SUPPORT
(TEL)
17 MODIFICATION KITS. 0 1,047 0 1,047
COMMAND AND
CONTROL SYSTEM
(NON-TEL)
18 ITEMS UNDER $5 0 140,929 0 140,929
MILLION (COMM &
ELEC)............
19 AIR OPERATIONS C2 0 0 0 0
SYSTEMS..........
RADAR + EQUIPMENT
(NON-TEL)
20 GROUND/AIR TASK 0 55,622 0 55,622
ORIENTED RADAR (G/
ATOR)............
INTELL/COMM
EQUIPMENT (NON-
TEL)
21 ELECTRO MAGNETIC 0 79,269 0 79,269
SPECTRUM
OPERATIONS (EMSO)
22 GCSS-MC........... 0 3,435 0 3,435
23 FIRE SUPPORT 0 136,070 0 136,070
SYSTEM...........
24 INTELLIGENCE 0 395,854 0 395,854
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
26 UNMANNED AIR 0 262,815 0 262,815
SYSTEMS (INTEL)..
27 DCGS-MC........... 0 0 0 0
28 UAS PAYLOADS...... 0 14,834 0 14,834
OTHER SUPPORT (NON-
TEL)
29 MARINE CORPS 0 190,282 0 190,282
ENTERPRISE
NETWORK (MCEN)...
30 COMMON COMPUTER 0 15,950 0 15,950
RESOURCES........
31 COMMAND POST 0 442,308 0 442,308
SYSTEMS..........
32 RADIO SYSTEMS..... 0 764,001 0 764,001
33 COMM SWITCHING & 0 0 0 0
CONTROL SYSTEMS..
34 COMM & ELEC 0 37,640 0 37,640
INFRASTRUCTURE
SUPPORT..........
35 CYBERSPACE 0 19,854 0 19,854
ACTIVITIES.......
36 UNMANNED 0 1,001 0 1,001
EXPEDITIONARY
SYSTEMS..........
CLASSIFIED
PROGRAMS
9999 CLASSIFIED 0 2,029 0 2,029
PROGRAMS.........
ADMINISTRATIVE
VEHICLES
40 COMMERCIAL CARGO 0 27,582 0 27,582
VEHICLES.........
TACTICAL VEHICLES
41 MOTOR TRANSPORT 0 22,460 0 22,460
MODIFICATIONS....
42 JOINT LIGHT 341 244,941 341 244,941
TACTICAL VEHICLE.
43 TRAILERS.......... 0 136,438 0 136,438
ENGINEER AND OTHER
EQUIPMENT
44 TACTICAL FUEL 0 112,197 0 112,197
SYSTEMS..........
45 POWER EQUIPMENT 0 34,219 0 34,219
ASSORTED.........
46 AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT 0 29,042 0 29,042
EQUIPMENT........
47 EOD SYSTEMS....... 0 24,297 0 24,297
MATERIALS HANDLING
EQUIPMENT
48 PHYSICAL SECURITY 0 151,740 0 151,740
EQUIPMENT........
GENERAL PROPERTY
49 FIELD MEDICAL 0 227,761 0 227,761
EQUIPMENT........
50 TRAINING DEVICES.. 0 136,639 0 136,639
51 FAMILY OF 0 115,681 0 115,681
CONSTRUCTION
EQUIPMENT........
52 ULTRA-LIGHT 0 972 0 972
TACTICAL VEHICLE
(ULTV)...........
OTHER SUPPORT
53 ITEMS LESS THAN $5 0 54,228 0 54,228
MILLION..........
SPARES AND REPAIR
PARTS
54 SPARES AND REPAIR 0 18,925 0 18,925
PARTS............
TOTAL PROCUREMENT, 637 6,288,905 0 0 637 6,288,905
MARINE CORPS.....

AIRCRAFT
PROCUREMENT, AIR
FORCE
STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE
1 B-21 RAIDER....... 0 2,230,615 0 2,230,615
2 B-21 RAIDER....... 0 1,005,667 0 1,005,667
TACTICAL FORCES
3 F-35.............. 24 2,393,723 0 232,480 24 2,626,203
Program increase.. [0] [232,480]
4 F-35.............. 0 738,103 0 738,103
5 COLLABORATIVE 0 996,528 0 996,528
COMBAT AIRCRAFT..
6 COLLABORATIVE 0 150,500 0 150,500
COMBAT AIRCRAFT..
7 F-15EX............ 24 2,656,716 24 2,656,716
9 JOINT SIMULATION 0 52,695 0 52,695
ENVIRONMENT......
TACTICAL AIRLIFT
10 KC-46A MDAP....... 15 3,520,530 15 3,520,530
OTHER AIRLIFT
11 C-130J............ 0 636,680 0 636,680
UPT TRAINERS
12 ADVANCED PILOT 23 529,464 23 529,464
TRAINING T-7A....
13 ADVANCED PILOT 0 69,690 0 69,690
TRAINING T-7A....
HELICOPTERS
14 MH-139A........... 4 252,949 0 127,629 4 380,578
Procure 8 MH-139A [0] [127,629]
aircraft.........
15 COMBAT RESCUE 0 69,395 0 35,000 0 104,395
HELICOPTER.......
Realignment from [0] [35,000]
HH60W
Modifications....
MISSION SUPPORT
AIRCRAFT
16 C-37A............. 1 208,000 1 208,000
17 C-40 FLEET 0 0 0 0
EXPANSION........
18 CIVIL AIR PATROL A/ 0 3,219 0 3,219
C................
OTHER AIRCRAFT
20 TARGET DRONES..... 10 31,912 10 31,912
21 COMPASS CALL...... 3 660,000 3 660,000
22 E-7............... 0 0 0 0
24 RQ-20B PUMA....... 6 15,513 6 15,513
STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT
25 B-2A.............. 0 178,668 0 178,668
26 B-1B.............. 0 146,862 0 146,862
27 B-52.............. 0 422,399 0 45,000 0 467,399
Procurement of 10 [0] [45,000]
F130 engines for
B-52 CERP........
28 LARGE AIRCRAFT 0 66,638 0 66,638
INFRARED
COUNTERMEASURES..
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
29 COLLABORATIVE 0 822 0 822
COMBAT AIRCRAFT
MODS.............
30 E-11 BACN/HAG..... 0 0 0 0
31 F-15.............. 0 140,204 0 140,204
32 F-15EX............ 0 214,176 0 214,176
33 F-16 MODIFICATIONS 0 946,747 0 946,747
34 F-22A............. 0 1,052,088 0 1,052,088
35 F-35 MODIFICATIONS 0 335,973 0 335,973
36 F-15 EPAW......... 0 141,233 0 141,233
37 KC-46A MDAP....... 0 85,515 0 85,515
AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT
38 C-5............... 0 10,308 0 10,308
39 C-17A............. 0 59,867 0 59,867
42 OSA-EA 0 136,786 0 136,786
MODIFICATIONS....
TRAINER AIRCRAFT
43 GLIDER MODS....... 0 164 0 164
44 T-6............... 0 131,747 0 131,747
45 T-1............... 0 0 0 0
46 T-38.............. 0 84,452 0 84,452
OTHER AIRCRAFT
47 U-2 MODS.......... 0 297 0 297
50 C-130............. 0 23,546 0 23,546
51 C-130J MODS....... 0 315,308 0 315,308
52 C-135............. 0 158,715 0 158,715
53 COMPASS CALL...... 0 506,265 0 506,265
54 CVR (CONNON ULF 0 18 0 18
RECEIVER) INC 2..
55 RC-135............ 0 252,846 0 252,846
56 E-3............... 0 841 0 841
57 E-4............... 0 30,779 0 30,779
58 H-1............... 0 17,872 0 17,872
59 MH-139A MOD....... 0 5,021 0 5,021
60 H-60.............. 0 0 0 0
61 HH60W 0 46,662 0 -42,000 0 4,662
MODIFICATIONS....
Realignment to [0] [-35,000]
Combat Rescue
Helicopter.......
Realignment to [0] [-7,000]
Initial Spares/
Repair Parts.....
62 HC/MC-130 0 257,742 0 257,742
MODIFICATIONS....
63 OTHER AIRCRAFT.... 0 102,052 0 102,052
64 MQ-9 MODS......... 0 105,966 0 105,966
65 SOFTWARE DEFINED 0 25,847 0 25,847
USER EQUIPMENT...
66 SENIOR LEADER C3 0 32,654 0 32,654
SYSTEM--AIRCRAFT.
67 CV-22 MODS........ 0 168,042 0 168,042
AIRCRAFT SPARES
AND REPAIR PARTS
68 INITIAL SPARES/ 0 1,441,052 0 7,000 0 1,448,052
REPAIR PARTS.....
Realignment from [0] [7,000]
HH60W
Modifications....
COMMON SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT
71 AIRCRAFT 0 252,808 0 252,808
REPLACEMENT
SUPPORT EQUIP....
POST PRODUCTION
SUPPORT
73 B-2B.............. 0 95,457 0 95,457
74 B-52.............. 0 114 0 114
75 C-17A............. 0 3,027 0 3,027
76 CV-22 POST 0 5,088 0 5,088
PRODUCTION
SUPPORT..........
78 F-15.............. 0 0 0 0
79 F-15EX............ 0 16,930 0 16,930
80 F-16 POST 0 57,781 0 57,781
PRODUCTION
SUPPORT..........
81 HC/MC-130 POST 0 20,415 0 20,415
PROD.............
82 JOINT SIMULATION 0 0 0 0
ENVIRONMENT POST
PRODUCTION
SUPPORT..........
83 MQ-9 POST PROD.... 0 15,365 0 15,365
INDUSTRIAL
PREPAREDNESS
84 INDUSTRIAL 0 20,590 0 20,590
RESPONSIVENESS...
WAR CONSUMABLES
85 WAR CONSUMABLES... 0 85,387 0 85,387
OTHER PRODUCTION
CHARGES
86 OTHER PRODUCTION 0 2,528,401 0 2,528,401
CHARGES..........
CLASSIFIED
PROGRAMS
9999 CLASSIFIED 0 15,800 0 15,800
PROGRAMS.........
TOTAL AIRCRAFT 110 26,985,236 0 405,109 110 27,390,345
PROCUREMENT, AIR
FORCE............

MISSILE
PROCUREMENT, AIR
FORCE
MISSILE
REPLACEMENT
EQUIPMENT--BALLIS
TIC
1 MISSILE 0 27,006 0 27,006
REPLACEMENT EQ-
BALLISTIC........
2 MISSILE 0 0 0 0
REPLACEMENT EQ-
BALLISTIC........
BALLISTIC MISSILES
3 GROUND BASED 0 107,602 0 107,602
STRATEGIC
DETERRENT........
STRATEGIC
TACTICAL
5 LONG RANGE STAND- 0 506,047 0 506,047
OFF WEAPON.......
6 LONG RANGE STAND- 0 456,810 0 456,810
OFF WEAPON.......
7 REPLAC EQUIP & WAR 0 23,575 0 23,575
CONSUMABLES......
8 ADVANCED PRECISION 0 0 0 0
KILL WEAPON
SYSTEM (APKWS)
MISSILE..........
9 AGM-183A AIR- 0 452,035 0 452,035
LAUNCHED RAPID
RESPONSE WEAPON..
10 FAMILY OF 0 55,000 3,000 845,000 3,000 900,000
AFFORDABLE MASS
MISSILE (FAMM)...
3,000 Family of [3,000] [845,000]
Affordable Mass
Missile (FAMM)...
11 HYPERSONIC ATTACK 0 403,974 0 403,974
CRUISE MISSILE...
12 JOINT AIR-SURFACE 491 967,866 491 967,866
STANDOFF MISSILE.
13 JOINT ADVANCED 0 608,743 0 608,743
TACTICAL MISSILE.
14 JOINT STRIKE 100 384,607 100 384,607
MISSILE..........
15 LRASM0............ 111 500,916 111 500,916
16 SIDEWINDER (AIM- 648 419,238 648 419,238
9X)..............
17 AMRAAM............ 38 115,856 38 115,856
19 SMALL DIAMETER 220 44,596 220 44,596
BOMB.............
20 SMALL DIAMETER 373 194,509 373 194,509
BOMB II..........
21 STAND-IN ATTACK 155 401,607 155 401,607
WEAPON (SIAW)....
INDUSTRIAL
FACILITIES
22 INDUSTRIAL 0 931 0 931
PREPAREDNESS/POL
PREVENTION.......
CLASS IV
23 ICBM FUZE MOD..... 0 169,747 0 169,747
25 MM III 0 9,865 0 9,865
MODIFICATIONS....
26 AIR LAUNCH CRUISE 0 30,407 0 30,407
MISSILE (ALCM)...
MISSILE SPARES AND
REPAIR PARTS
27 MSL SPRS/REPAIR 0 15,621 0 15,621
PARTS (INITIAL)..
28 MSL SPRS/REPAIR 0 123,224 0 123,224
PARTS (REPLEN)...
SPECIAL PROGRAMS
30 SPECIAL UPDATE 0 168,578 0 168,578
PROGRAMS.........
CLASSIFIED
PROGRAMS
9999 CLASSIFIED 0 622,814 0 622,814
PROGRAMS.........
TOTAL MISSILE 2,136 6,811,174 3,000 845,000 5,136 7,656,174
PROCUREMENT, AIR
FORCE............

PROCUREMENT OF
AMMUNITION, AIR
FORCE
ROCKETS
1 ROCKETS........... 0 102,059 0 102,059
CARTRIDGES
2 CARTRIDGES........ 0 157,508 0 157,508
BOMBS
3 GENERAL PURPOSE 0 168,469 0 168,469
BOMBS............
4 MASSIVE ORDNANCE 0 755 0 755
PENETRATOR (MOP).
5 JOINT DIRECT 1,150 129,568 1,150 129,568
ATTACK MUNITION..
6 B61-12 TRAINER.... 0 24,226 0 24,226
OTHER ITEMS
7 CAD/PAD........... 0 45,448 0 45,448
8 EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE 0 7,168 0 7,168
DISPOSAL (EOD)...
9 SPARES AND REPAIR 0 626 0 626
PARTS............
10 FIRST DESTINATION 0 2,873 0 2,873
TRANSPORTATION...
11 ITEMS LESS THAN 0 5,468 0 5,468
$5,000,000.......
FLARES
13 EXPENDABLE 0 99,180 0 99,180
COUNTERMEASURES..
FUZES
14 FUZES............. 0 141,149 0 141,149
SMALL ARMS
15 SMALL ARMS........ 0 25,619 0 25,619
TOTAL PROCUREMENT 1,150 910,116 0 0 1,150 910,116
OF AMMUNITION,
AIR FORCE........

PROCUREMENT, SPACE
FORCE
SPACE PROCUREMENT,
SF
1 AF SATELLITE COMM 0 54,391 0 10,000 0 64,391
SYSTEM...........
Bigelow [0] [10,000]
restoration and
tri-band antenna
construction.....
3 AUXILIARY PAYLOADS 0 241,076 0 241,076
5 COUNTERSPACE 0 459,466 0 -80,000 0 379,466
SYSTEMS..........
Realignment to [0] [-80,000]
Research,
Development,
Test, and
Evaluation for
PDM..............
7 EVOLVED STRATEGIC 0 139,700 0 139,700
SATCOM (ESS).....
8 FAMILY OF BEYOND 0 0 0 0
LINE-OF-SIGHT
TERMINALS........
11 GROUND MOVING 0 1,016,612 0 -213,184 0 803,428
TARGET INDICATOR
(GMTI)...........
Realignment to [0] [-120,000]
advance
procurement......
Realignment to [0] [-46,592]
Research,
Development,
Test, and
Evaluation.......
Realignment to [0] [-46,592]
Research,
Development,
Test, and
Evaluation for
Space-Based
Moving Target
Indicator........
12 GROUND MOVING 0 0 0 120,000 0 120,000
TARGET INDICATOR
(GMTI)...........
Realignment for [0] [120,000]
advance
procurement......
13 GENERAL 0 14,895 0 14,895
INFORMATION TECH--
SPACE............
14 GPSIII FOLLOW ON.. 2 680,875 2 680,875
15 GPS III SPACE 0 0 0 0
SEGMENT..........
16 GLOBAL POSTIONING 0 0 0 0
(SPACE)..........
17 SPACEBORNE EQUIP 0 95,061 0 95,061
(COMSEC).........
18 MILSATCOM......... 0 38,067 0 38,067
20 SPECIAL SPACE 0 2,021,299 0 2,021,299
ACTIVITIES.......
21 MOBILE USER 0 50,640 0 50,640
OBJECTIVE SYSTEM.
22 NATIONAL SECURITY 13 3,370,958 13 3,370,958
SPACE LAUNCH.....
24 PTES HUB.......... 0 12,046 0 12,046
25 SPACE DEVELOPMENT 9 835,197 9 835,197
AGENCY LAUNCH....
26 SPACE DIGITAL 0 5,119 0 5,119
INTEGRATED
NETWORK (SDIN)...
27 SPACE MODS........ 0 448,674 0 176,000 0 624,674
Realignment from [0] [78,000]
Operation and
Maintenance for
AEP fielded GPS
ground system....
Realignment from [0] [98,000]
Research,
Development,
Test, and
Evaluation for
AEP technical
refresh..........
28 SPACELIFT RANGE 0 64,885 0 64,885
SYSTEM SPACE.....
29 WIDEBAND SATCOM 0 81,483 0 81,483
OPERATIONAL
MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS..........
SPARES
30 SPARES AND REPAIR 0 971 0 971
PARTS............
NON-TACTICAL
VEHICLES
31 USSF VEHICLES..... 0 6,032 0 6,032
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
33 POWER CONDITIONING 0 7,906 0 7,906
EQUIPMENT........
TOTAL PROCUREMENT, 24 9,645,353 0 12,816 24 9,658,169
SPACE FORCE......

OTHER PROCUREMENT,
AIR FORCE
PASSENGER CARRYING
VEHICLES
1 PASSENGER CARRYING 0 0 0 0
VEHICLES.........
CARGO AND UTILITY
VEHICLES
2 MEDIUM TACTICAL 0 0 0 0
VEHICLE..........
3 CAP VEHICLES...... 0 0 0 0
4 CARGO AND UTILITY 0 0 0 0
VEHICLES.........
SPECIAL PURPOSE
VEHICLES
5 JOINT LIGHT 0 103,304 0 103,304
TACTICAL VEHICLE.
6 SECURITY AND 0 0 0 0
TACTICAL VEHICLES
7 SPECIAL PURPOSE 0 0 0 0
VEHICLES.........
FIRE FIGHTING
EQUIPMENT
8 FIRE FIGHTING/ 0 0 0 0
CRASH RESCUE
VEHICLES.........
MATERIALS HANDLING
EQUIPMENT
9 MATERIALS HANDLING 0 2,132 0 -2,132 0 0
VEHICLES.........
Realignment to [0] [-2,132]
Mission Support
Vehicles.........
BASE MAINTENANCE
SUPPORT
10 RUNWAY SNOW REMOV 0 0 0 0
AND CLEANING EQU.
11 BASE MAINTENANCE 0 0 0 25,000 0 25,000
SUPPORT VEHICLES.
ICBM base [0] [25,000]
maintenance
support vehicle
replacement
procurement......
MISSION SUPPORT
VEHICLES
12 MISSION SUPPORT 0 439,892 0 2,132 0 442,024
VEHICLES.........
Realignment from [0] [2,132]
Materials
Handling Vehicles
COMM SECURITY
EQUIPMENT(COMSEC)
14 COMSEC EQUIPMENT.. 0 374,613 0 374,613
INTELLIGENCE
PROGRAMS
16 INTERNATIONAL 0 19,060 0 19,060
INTEL TECH &
ARCHITECTURES....
17 INTELLIGENCE 0 5,531 0 5,531
TRAINING
EQUIPMENT........
18 INTELLIGENCE COMM 0 37,717 0 37,717
EQUIPMENT........
ELECTRONICS
PROGRAMS
19 AIR TRAFFIC 0 58,313 0 58,313
CONTROL & LANDING
SYS..............
20 NATIONAL AIRSPACE 0 0 0 0
SYSTEM...........
21 BATTLE CONTROL 0 3,391 0 3,391
SYSTEM--FIXED....
22 THEATER AIR 0 11,640 0 11,640
CONTROL SYS
IMPROVEMEN.......
23 3D EXPEDITIONARY 0 430,607 0 430,607
LONG-RANGE RADAR.
24 WEATHER 0 33,111 0 33,111
OBSERVATION
FORECAST.........
25 STRATEGIC COMMAND 0 89,931 0 89,931
AND CONTROL......
26 CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN 0 7,434 0 7,434
COMPLEX..........
27 MISSION PLANNING 0 23,927 0 23,927
SYSTEMS..........
28 STRATEGIC MISSION 0 9,435 0 9,435
PLANNING &
EXECUTION SYSTEM.
SPCL COMM-
ELECTRONICS
PROJECTS
29 GENERAL 0 234,417 0 234,417
INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY.......
30 AF GLOBAL COMMAND 0 0 0 0
& CONTROL SYS....
32 MOBILITY COMMAND 0 0 0 0
AND CONTROL......
33 AIR FORCE PHYSICAL 0 1,770,698 0 1,770,698
SECURITY SYSTEM..
34 SAMTEC 0 17,641 0 17,641
COMMUNICATIONS...
35 COMBAT TRAINING 0 94,378 0 94,378
RANGES...........
36 MINIMUM ESSENTIAL 0 279,516 0 279,516
EMERGENCY COMM N.
37 WIDE AREA 0 17,000 0 17,000
SURVEILLANCE
(WAS)............
38 C3 COUNTERMEASURES 0 163,127 0 163,127
39 DEFENSE ENTERPRISE 0 0 0 0
ACCOUNTING & MGT
SYS..............
40 THEATER BATTLE MGT 0 460 0 460
C2 SYSTEM........
41 AIR & SPACE 0 23,778 0 23,778
OPERATIONS CENTER
(AOC)............
AIR FORCE
COMMUNICATIONS
42 BASE INFORMATION 0 125,702 0 125,702
TRANSPT INFRAST
(BITI) WIRED.....
43 AFNET............. 0 325,839 0 325,839
44 JOINT 0 16,267 0 16,267
COMMUNICATIONS
SUPPORT ELEMENT
(JCSE)...........
45 USCENTCOM......... 0 15,328 0 15,328
46 USSTRATCOM........ 0 5,013 0 5,013
47 USSPACECOM........ 0 195,370 0 195,370
ORGANIZATION AND
BASE
48 TACTICAL C-E 0 162,835 0 162,835
EQUIPMENT........
49 NEXT GENERATION 0 80,321 0 80,321
SURVIVAL RADIO
(NGSR)...........
51 RADIO EQUIPMENT... 0 36,874 0 36,874
52 BASE COMM 0 158,113 0 158,113
INFRASTRUCTURE...
MODIFICATIONS
53 COMM ELECT MODS... 0 220,855 0 -10,000 0 210,855
Realignment to [0] [-10,000]
RDT&E for Over-
the-Horizon
Backscatter Radar
PERSONAL SAFETY &
RESCUE EQUIP
54 PERSONAL SAFETY 0 87,994 0 87,994
AND RESCUE
EQUIPMENT........
DEPOT PLANT+MTRLS
HANDLING EQ
55 POWER CONDITIONING 0 14,444 0 14,444
EQUIPMENT........
56 MECHANIZED 0 24,594 0 24,594
MATERIAL HANDLING
EQUIP............
BASE SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT
57 BASE PROCURED 0 81,686 0 81,686
EQUIPMENT........
58 ENGINEERING AND 0 247,989 0 247,989
EOD EQUIPMENT....
59 MOBILITY EQUIPMENT 0 288,930 0 288,930
60 FUELS SUPPORT 0 81,066 0 81,066
EQUIPMENT (FSE)..
61 BASE MAINTENANCE 0 68,127 0 68,127
AND SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT........
SPECIAL SUPPORT
PROJECTS
63 DARP RC135........ 0 31,496 0 31,496
64 DCGS-AF........... 0 316,157 0 316,157
66 SPECIAL UPDATE 0 5,099,420 0 5,099,420
PROGRAM..........
CLASSIFIED
PROGRAMS
9999 CLASSIFIED 0 27,241,704 0 27,241,704
PROGRAMS.........
SPARES AND REPAIR
PARTS
67 SPARES AND REPAIR 0 8,657 0 8,657
PARTS (CYBER)....
68 SPARES AND REPAIR 0 14,129 0 14,129
PARTS............
TOTAL OTHER 0 39,199,963 0 15,000 0 39,214,963
PROCUREMENT, AIR
FORCE............

PROCUREMENT,
DEFENSE-WIDE
MAJOR EQUIPMENT,
DCSA
23 MAJOR EQUIPMENT... 0 0 0 0
MAJOR EQUIPMENT,
DHRA
37 PERSONNEL 0 82,438 0 82,438
ADMINISTRATION...
MAJOR EQUIPMENT,
DISA
7 INFORMATION 0 27,652 0 27,652
SYSTEMS SECURITY.
8 TELEPORT PROGRAM.. 0 93,512 0 93,512
9 ITEMS LESS THAN $5 0 24,013 0 24,013
MILLION..........
10 DEFENSE 0 392,650 0 392,650
INFORMATION
SYSTEM NETWORK...
12 WHITE HOUSE 0 611,216 0 -100,000 0 511,216
COMMUNICATION
AGENCY...........
Unjustified growth [0] [-100,000]
13 SENIOR LEADERSHIP 0 81,584 0 81,584
ENTERPRISE.......
14 JOINT REGIONAL 0 0 0 0
SECURITY STACKS
(JRSS)...........
15 JOINT SERVICE 0 53,596 0 53,596
PROVIDER.........
16 FOURTH ESTATE 0 60,808 0 60,808
NETWORK
OPTIMIZATION
(4ENO)...........
MAJOR EQUIPMENT,
DLA
22 MAJOR EQUIPMENT... 0 19,707 0 19,707
MAJOR EQUIPMENT,
DMACT
44 MAJOR EQUIPMENT... 0 6,854 0 6,854
MAJOR EQUIPMENT,
DPAA
1 MAJOR EQUIPMENT, 0 0 0 0
DPAA.............
MAJOR EQUIPMENT,
DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY
40 VEHICLES.......... 0 99 0 99
41 OTHER MAJOR 0 8,963 0 8,963
EQUIPMENT........
42 DTRA CYBER 0 900 0 900
ACTIVITIES.......
MAJOR EQUIPMENT,
MISSILE DEFENSE
AGENCY
26 THAAD............. 0 0 0 0
28 AEGIS BMD......... 0 0 0 0
29 BMDS AN/TPY-2 0 17,840 0 17,840
RADARS...........
30 SM-3 IIAS......... 22 778,964 22 778,964
31 ARROW 3 UPPER TIER 1 150,000 1 150,000
SYSTEMS..........
32 SHORT RANGE 1 30,000 1 30,000
BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE (SRBMD)..
33 DEFENSE OF GUAM 0 0 0 0
PROCUREMENT......
35 IRON DOME......... 1 20,000 1 20,000
36 AEGIS BMD HARDWARE 0 39,256 0 39,256
AND SOFTWARE.....
MAJOR EQUIPMENT,
OSD
2 MAJOR EQUIPMENT, 0 213,031 0 213,031
OSD..............
MAJOR EQUIPMENT,
TJS
24 MAJOR EQUIPMENT, 0 11,689 0 11,689
TJS..............
25 COUNTER-SMALL 0 800,000 0 800,000
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS..........
MAJOR EQUIPMENT,
WHS
6 MAJOR EQUIPMENT, 0 453 0 453
WHS..............
MAJOR EQUIPMENT,
USCYBERCOM
45 CYBERSPACE 0 103,855 0 20,000 0 123,855
OPERATIONS.......
Hunt kits for [0] [20,000]
reserve component
CLASSIFIED
PROGRAMS
9999 CLASSIFIED 0 3,587,405 0 3,587,405
PROGRAMS.........
AVIATION PROGRAMS
46 ARMED OVERWATCH/ 0 0 0 0
TARGETING........
50 ROTARY WING 0 185,930 0 72,000 0 257,930
UPGRADES AND
SUSTAINMENT......
SOCOM UPL--SOF [0] [72,000]
Mobility combat
loss.............
51 SKYRAIDER II...... 2 59,894 -2 -59,894 0 0
Realignment to [-2] [-59,894]
SOCOM UPL........
52 UNMANNED ISR...... 0 0 0 0
53 NON-STANDARD 0 72,650 0 37,600 0 110,250
AVIATION.........
SOCOM UPL--Non- [0] [37,600]
standard aviation
54 U-28.............. 0 0 0 0
55 MH-47 CHINOOK..... 0 168,411 0 168,411
56 CV-22 MODIFICATION 0 9,479 0 9,479
57 MQ-9 UNMANNED 0 75,841 0 5,400 0 81,241
AERIAL VEHICLE...
SOCOM UPL-- [0] [5,400]
Adaptive Airborne
Enterprise Group
3 sUAS...........
58 PRECISION STRIKE 0 0 0 0
PACKAGE..........
59 AC/MC-130J........ 0 366,857 0 55,750 0 422,607
SOCOM UPL- SOF [0] [55,750]
Mobility combat
loss.............
SHIPBUILDING
60 UNDERWATER SYSTEMS 0 76,879 0 13,400 0 90,279
SOCOM UPL--Mission [0] [13,400]
critical Dry
Combat
Submersible
battery upgrade..
AMMUNITION
PROGRAMS
61 ORDNANCE ITEMS 0 237,153 0 148,200 0 385,353
<$5M.............
SOCOM UPL--Ground [0] [25,500]
organic precision
strike systems...
SOCOM UPL-- [0] [118,000]
Munitions War
Reserve..........
SOCOM UPL--Small [0] [4,700]
cruise missile
development......
OTHER PROCUREMENT
PROGRAMS
62 INTELLIGENCE 0 319,241 0 319,241
SYSTEMS..........
63 DISTRIBUTED COMMON 0 0 0 0
GROUND/SURFACE
SYSTEMS..........
64 OTHER ITEMS <$5M.. 0 119,047 0 119,047
65 COMBATANT CRAFT 0 33,858 0 9,100 0 42,958
SYSTEMS..........
Special Operations [0] [9,100]
Craft--Riverine..
66 SPECIAL PROGRAMS.. 0 130,462 0 130,462
67 TACTICAL VEHICLES. 0 36,983 0 36,983
68 WARRIOR SYSTEMS 0 511,016 0 190,300 0 701,316
<$5M.............
SOCOM UPL-- [0] [79,900]
Electromagnetic
warfare family of
systems..........
SOCOM UPL--Ground [0] [39,200]
infiltration
protection system
SOCOM UPL--SOF-P [0] [71,200]
pre-positioned
stocks...........
69 COMBAT MISSION 0 4,988 0 4,988
REQUIREMENTS.....
70 OPERATIONAL 0 28,074 0 28,074
ENHANCEMENTS
INTELLIGENCE.....
71 OPERATIONAL 0 360,595 0 257,200 0 617,795
ENHANCEMENTS.....
SOCOM UPL-- [0] [36,600]
Accelerated
fielding of Group
3 UAS............
SOCOM UPL--Armored [0] [48,000]
ground mobility
system...........
SOCOM UPL--Ground [0] [12,000]
infiltration
protection system
SOCOM UPL-- [0] [160,600]
Operational
capacity
enhancement......
CBDP
72 CHEMICAL 0 223,166 0 223,166
BIOLOGICAL
SITUATIONAL
AWARENESS........
73 CB PROTECTION & 0 117,859 0 117,859
HAZARD MITIGATION
TOTAL PROCUREMENT, 27 10,354,868 -2 649,056 25 11,003,924
DEFENSE-WIDE.....

DEFENSE STRATEGIC
CAPITAL CREDIT
PROGRAM
DEFENSE STRATEGIC
CAPITAL CREDIT
PROGRAM
1 OFFICE OF 0 216,000 0 216,000
STRATEGIC CAPITAL
LOAN PROGRAM.....
TOTAL DEFENSE 0 216,000 0 0 0 216,000
STRATEGIC CAPITAL
CREDIT PROGRAM...

TOTAL PROCUREMENT. 11,153 256,058,141 2,991 -368,971 14,144 255,689,170
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TITLE XLII--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND
EVALUATION

SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 4201. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION (In Thousands of Dollars)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senate
Line Program Element Item FY 2027 Request Senate Change Authorized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
..................... RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,
TEST & EVAL, ARMY
..................... BASIC RESEARCH
1 0601102A DEFENSE RESEARCH SCIENCES 215,322 85,000 300,322
..................... Increase for basic [75,000]
research activities.
..................... Innovative Energetic [10,000]
Materials.
2 0601103A UNIVERSITY RESEARCH 63,102 63,102
INITIATIVES.
3 0601104A UNIVERSITY AND INDUSTRY 53,598 25,000 78,598
RESEARCH CENTERS.
..................... Increase for basic [25,000]
research activities.
4 0601121A CYBER COLLABORATIVE 0
RESEARCH ALLIANCE.
5 0601275A ELECTRONIC WARFARE BASIC 64,031 64,031
RESEARCH.
6 0601601A ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 0
AND MACHINE LEARNING
BASIC RESEARCH.
..................... SUBTOTAL BASIC RESEARCH.. 396,053 110,000 506,053
.....................
..................... APPLIED RESEARCH
7 0602002A ARMY AGILE INNOVATION AND 0
DEVELOPMENT-APPLIED
RESEARCH.
8 0602134A COUNTER IMPROVISED-THREAT 0
ADVANCED STUDIES.
9 0602135A COUNTER SMALL UNMANNED 26,523 4,000 30,523
AERIAL SYSTEMS (C-SUAS)
APPLIED RESEARCH.
..................... C-UAS Detect, track and [4,000]
defeat.
10 0602141A LETHALITY TECHNOLOGY..... 232,046 232,046
11 0602143A SOLDIER LETHALITY 68,018 18,000 86,018
TECHNOLOGY.
..................... Army Pathfinder Airborne. [5,000]
..................... Domestic Silicon [5,000]
Production Initiative.
..................... Pathfinder Air Assault... [8,000]
12 0602144A GROUND TECHNOLOGY........ 44,146 30,000 74,146
..................... Isostatic High-Pressure [10,000]
Advanced Armor
Production.
..................... Large Area Additive [10,000]
Deposition.
..................... Polar Proving Ground..... [5,000]
..................... Roadway Repair Materials [5,000]
Development.
13 0602145A NEXT GENERATION COMBAT 70,540 14,000 84,540
VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY.
..................... Advancing Autonomous [5,000]
Ground Vehicle Research.
..................... Ground Vehicle Research [9,000]
Center Lightweight
Prototype.
14 0602146A NETWORK C3I TECHNOLOGY... 53,373 53,373
15 0602147A LONG RANGE PRECISION 24,086 24,086
FIRES TECHNOLOGY.
16 0602148A FUTURE VERTICLE LIFT 17,727 17,727
TECHNOLOGY.
17 0602150A AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE 36,113 5,000 41,113
TECHNOLOGY.
..................... Counter-UAS Testing and [5,000]
Research Center.
18 0602180A ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 0
AND MACHINE LEARNING
TECHNOLOGIES.
20 0602182A C3I APPLIED RESEARCH..... 0
21 0602183A AIR PLATFORM APPLIED 43,700 10,000 53,700
RESEARCH.
..................... On-the-Edge Modeling for [10,000]
Next-Gen Passive Sensors.
22 0602184A SOLDIER APPLIED RESEARCH. 2,429 2,429
23 0602213A C3I APPLIED CYBER........ 63 63
24 0602275A ELECTRONIC WARFARE 51,184 51,184
APPLIED RESEARCH.
25 0602276A ELECTRONIC WARFARE CYBER 9,857 9,857
APPLIED RESEARCH.
26 0602345A UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 22,871 22,871
LAUNCHED EFFECTS APPLIED
RESEARCH.
27 0602386A BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR 14,979 14,979
MATERIALS--APPLIED
RESEARCH.
29 0602785A MANPOWER/PERSONNEL/ 14,275 3,000 17,275
TRAINING TECHNOLOGY.
..................... Musculoskeletal Health [3,000]
Technologies.
30 0602787A MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY....... 149,221 149,221
9999 9999999999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS...... 32,883 32,883
..................... SUBTOTAL APPLIED RESEARCH 914,034 84,000 998,034
.....................
..................... ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
31 0603002A MEDICAL ADVANCED 17,876 10,000 27,876
TECHNOLOGY.
..................... Drug Development for [10,000]
traumatic brian injury.
32 0603007A MANPOWER, PERSONNEL AND 11,113 11,113
TRAINING ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY.
33 0603025A ARMY AGILE INNOVATION AND 3,325 3,325
DEMONSTRATION.
34 0603040A ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 0 8,000 8,000
AND MACHINE LEARNING
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES.
..................... Preserving AI performance [8,000]
over time.
35 0603041A ALL DOMAIN CONVERGENCE 3,575 3,575
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.
36 0603042A C3I ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.. 1,211 1,211
37 0603043A AIR PLATFORM ADVANCED 23,471 23,471
TECHNOLOGY.
38 0603044A SOLDIER ADVANCED 3,951 3,951
TECHNOLOGY.
39 0603116A LETHALITY ADVANCED 31,812 10,000 41,812
TECHNOLOGY.
..................... SLING BLADE Mid-Range [10,000]
Kinetic Counter-UAS
Capability.
40 0603118A SOLDIER LETHALITY 125,121 125,121
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.
41 0603119A GROUND ADVANCED 25,043 22,000 47,043
TECHNOLOGY.
..................... Autonomous Tip-Extending [5,000]
Robots for the
Transparent Battlefield
Collaboration.
..................... Cold Regions Advanced [10,000]
Materials and
Manufacturing.
..................... Fuel Cell Multi-Modular [5,000]
Use.
..................... Robotics Autonomous [2,000]
Floating Transit System
(RAFTS).
42 0603134A COUNTER IMPROVISED-THREAT 0
SIMULATION.
43 0603135A COUNTER SMALL UNMANNED 156,520 156,520
AERIAL SYSTEMS (C-SUAS)
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.
44 0603275A ELECTRONIC WARFARE 156,326 156,326
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.
45 0603276A ELECTRONIC WARFARE CYBER 15,278 15,278
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.
46 0603345A UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 33,129 33,129
LAUNCHED EFFECTS
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT.
47 0603386A BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR 22,402 22,402
MATERIALS--ADVANCED
RESEARCH.
48 0603457A C3I CYBER ADVANCED 8,509 8,509
DEVELOPMENT.
49 0603461A HIGH PERFORMANCE 215,090 10,000 225,090
COMPUTING MODERNIZATION
PROGRAM.
..................... High performance [10,000]
computing modernization
program.
50 0603462A NEXT GENERATION COMBAT 118,207 14,000 132,207
VEHICLE ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY.
..................... Electronic Signature [4,000]
Management Coatings.
..................... Next Generation Vehicle [10,000]
Automated Testing
Infrastructure.
51 0603463A NETWORK C3I ADVANCED 48,490 48,490
TECHNOLOGY.
52 0603464A LONG RANGE PRECISION 422,590 7,500 430,090
FIRES ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY.
..................... Missile Delivered [7,500]
Launched Effects -
Virtual Test Range.
53 0603465A FUTURE VERTICAL LIFT 14,984 14,984
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.
54 0603466A AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE 63,924 11,000 74,924
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.
..................... C-UAS Detect, track and [11,000]
defeat.
56 0603920A HUMANITARIAN DEMINING.... 7,619 5,000 12,619
..................... Humanitarian Demining.... [5,000]
9999 9999999999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS...... 80,717 80,717
..................... SUBTOTAL ADVANCED 1,610,283 97,500 1,707,783
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
.....................
..................... ADVANCED COMPONENT
DEVELOPMENT AND
PROTOTYPES
58 0603305A ARMY MISSLE DEFENSE 8,367 8,367
SYSTEMS INTEGRATION.
59 0603308A ARMY SPACE SYSTEMS 59,573 59,573
INTEGRATION.
60 0603327A AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE 0
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING.
61 0603619A LANDMINE WARFARE AND 31,374 31,374
BARRIER--ADV DEV.
62 0603627A SMOKE, OBSCURANT AND 5,596 5,596
TARGET DEFEATING SYS-ADV
DEV.
63 0603639A TANK AND MEDIUM CALIBER 277,248 5,000 282,248
AMMUNITION.
..................... Large caliber automated [5,000]
ammunition resupply.
64 0603645A ARMORED SYSTEM 23,594 23,594
MODERNIZATION--ADV DEV.
65 0603747A SOLDIER SUPPORT AND 4,109 4,109
SURVIVABILITY.
66 0603766A TACTICAL ELECTRONIC 98,331 98,331
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM--ADV
DEV.
67 0603774A NIGHT VISION SYSTEMS 5,310 5,310
ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT.
68 0603779A ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 19,499 19,499
TECHNOLOGY--DEM/VAL.
69 0603790A NATO RESEARCH AND 5,145 5,145
DEVELOPMENT.
71 0603804A LOGISTICS AND ENGINEER 12,822 12,822
EQUIPMENT--ADV DEV.
72 0603807A MEDICAL SYSTEMS--ADV DEV. 1,017 1,017
73 0603827A SOLDIER SYSTEMS--ADVANCED 56,122 56,122
DEVELOPMENT.
74 0604017A ROBOTICS DEVELOPMENT..... 20,290 20,290
75 0604019A EXPANDED MISSION AREA 235,593 235,593
MISSILE (EMAM).
77 0604035A LOW EARTH ORBIT (LEO) 319 319
SATELLITE CAPABILITY.
78 0604036A MULTI-DOMAIN SENSING 99,471 99,471
SYSTEM (MDSS) ADV DEV.
79 0604037A TACTICAL INTEL TARGETING 4,123 4,123
ACCESS NODE (TITAN) ADV
DEV.
80 0604100A ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES. 10,077 10,077
84 0604114A LOWER TIER AIR MISSILE 162,074 162,074
DEFENSE (LTAMD) SENSOR.
85 0604115A TECHNOLOGY MATURATION 314,671 100,000 414,671
INITIATIVES.
..................... SRM second sourcing and [100,000]
qualification.
86 0604117A MANEUVER--SHORT RANGE AIR 460,980 460,980
DEFENSE (M-SHORAD).
87 0604120A ASSURED POSITIONING, 18,993 18,993
NAVIGATION AND TIMING
(PNT).
88 0604121A SYNTHETIC TRAINING 219,137 219,137
ENVIRONMENT REFINEMENT &
PROTOTYPING.
89 0604129A ADVANCED POWER 48,000 48,000
APPLICATIONS.
90 0604134A COUNTER IMPROVISED-THREAT 0
DEMONSTRATION, PROTOTYPE
DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING.
91 0604135A STRATEGIC MID-RANGE FIRES 211,848 211,848
92 0604182A HYPERSONICS.............. 82,939 82,939
96 0604531A COUNTER--SMALL UNMANNED 0
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT.
98 0604541A UNIFIED NETWORK TRANSPORT 0
99 0305251A CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 22,889 22,889
FORCES AND FORCE SUPPORT.
9999 9999999999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS...... 261,466 261,466
..................... SUBTOTAL ADVANCED 2,780,977 105,000 2,885,977
COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT
AND PROTOTYPES.
.....................
..................... SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION
100 0604201A AIRCRAFT AVIONICS........ 30,658 30,658
101 0604270A ELECTRONIC WARFARE 2,807 5,000 7,807
DEVELOPMENT.
..................... Electronic Warfare [5,000]
Development increase.
102 0604601A INFANTRY SUPPORT WEAPONS. 55,296 55,296
103 0604604A MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLES. 23,763 23,763
104 0604611A JAVELIN.................. 10,217 10,217
105 0604622A FAMILY OF HEAVY TACTICAL 43,003 10,000 53,003
VEHICLES.
..................... Data Integration for [10,000]
Ground Systems.
108 0604642A LIGHT TACTICAL WHEELED 6,142 6,142
VEHICLES.
110 0604710A NIGHT VISION SYSTEMS--ENG 418,427 418,427
DEV.
111 0604713A COMBAT FEEDING, CLOTHING, 6,701 6,701
AND EQUIPMENT.
112 0604715A NON-SYSTEM TRAINING 29,685 29,685
DEVICES--ENG DEV.
113 0604741A AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, 14,276 14,276
CONTROL AND
INTELLIGENCE--ENG DEV.
114 0604742A CONSTRUCTIVE SIMULATION 5,618 5,618
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT.
115 0604746A AUTOMATIC TEST EQUIPMENT 9,625 9,625
DEVELOPMENT.
116 0604760A DISTRIBUTIVE INTERACTIVE 7,883 7,883
SIMULATIONS (DIS)--ENG
DEV.
117 0604798A BRIGADE ANALYSIS, 26,602 26,602
INTEGRATION AND
EVALUATION.
118 0604802A WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS-- 124,881 124,881
ENG DEV.
119 0604804A LOGISTICS AND ENGINEER 65,238 65,238
EQUIPMENT--ENG DEV.
120 0604805A COMMAND, CONTROL, 5,541 5,541
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS--
ENG DEV.
121 0604807A MEDICAL MATERIEL/MEDICAL 9,744 9,744
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
EQUIPMENT--ENG DEV.
122 0604808A LANDMINE WARFARE/BARRIER-- 17,586 17,586
ENG DEV.
123 0604818A ARMY TACTICAL COMMAND & 42,584 42,584
CONTROL HARDWARE &
SOFTWARE.
124 0604820A RADAR DEVELOPMENT........ 58,260 58,260
126 0604827A SOLDIER SYSTEMS--WARRIOR 5,663 5,663
DEM/VAL.
127 0604852A SUITE OF SURVIVABILITY 78,331 78,331
ENHANCEMENT SYSTEMS--EMD.
128 0604854A ARTILLERY SYSTEMS--EMD... 709,192 709,192
129 0605013A INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 121,525 121,525
DEVELOPMENT.
130 0605018A INTEGRATED PERSONNEL AND 102,694 102,694
PAY SYSTEM-ARMY (IPPS-A).
131 0605030A JOINT TACTICAL NETWORK 21,561 21,561
CENTER (JTNC).
132 0605031A JOINT TACTICAL NETWORK 50,390 50,390
(JTN).
133 0605035A COMMON INFRARED 11,573 11,573
COUNTERMEASURES (CIRCM).
134 0605036A COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS 5,605 5,605
DESTRUCTION (CWMD).
135 0605037A EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND 5,513 5,513
DETAINEE PROCESSING.
136 0605038A NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL 13,864 13,864
CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE
VEHICLE (NBCRV) SENSOR
SUITE.
137 0605041A DEFENSIVE CYBER TOOL 3,519 3,519
DEVELOPMENT.
138 0605042A TACTICAL NETWORK RADIO 3,804 3,804
SYSTEMS (LOW-TIER).
139 0605047A CONTRACT WRITING SYSTEM.. 4,777 4,777
140 0605049A MISSILE WARNING SYSTEM 0
MODERNIZATION (MWSM).
141 0605051A AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY 106,621 106,621
DEVELOPMENT.
142 0605052A INDIRECT FIRE PROTECTION 175,352 175,352
CAPABILITY INC 2--BLOCK
1.
143 0605053A GROUND ROBOTICS.......... 192,185 192,185
144 0605054A EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 147,881 147,881
INITIATIVES.
145 0605058A TERMINAL HIGH ALTITUDE 1,053,983 1,053,983
AREA DEFENSE (THAAD)
RDTE.
146 0605144A NEXT GENERATION LOAD 2,380 2,380
DEVICE--MEDIUM.
147 0605148A TACTICAL INTEL TARGETING 35,769 81,510 117,279
ACCESS NODE (TITAN) EMD.
..................... Realignment from [81,510]
procurement.
151 0605224A MULTI-DOMAIN INTELLIGENCE 49,594 49,594
152 0605231A PRECISION STRIKE MISSILE 288,304 288,304
(PRSM).
153 0605232A HYPERSONICS EMD.......... 446,616 5,000 451,616
..................... Low Cost Hypersonic Test [5,000]
Bed.
154 0605233A ACCESSIONS INFORMATION 33,770 33,770
ENVIRONMENT (AIE).
155 0605235A STRATEGIC MID-RANGE 82,550 82,550
CAPABILITY.
156 0605236A INTEGRATED TACTICAL 0
COMMUNICATIONS.
157 0605241A FUTURE LONG RANGE ASSAULT 2,140,569 127,217 2,267,786
AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT.
..................... Realignment from [127,217]
procurement for
operational test
aircraft.
159 0605244A JOINT REDUCED RANGE 16,014 15,000 31,014
ROCKET (JR3).
..................... Programmatic increase to [15,000]
support HIMARS platforms.
161 0605275A ELECTRONIC WARFARE 99,691 99,691
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT.
162 0605330A C2 TRANSPORT............. 45,370 45,370
163 0605331A C2 APPLICATIONS.......... 488,401 488,401
164 0605332A C2 DATA.................. 306,019 306,019
165 0605333A C2 INFRASTRUCTURE........ 64,849 64,849
166 0605345A UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 816,433 816,433
LAUNCHED EFFECTS SYSTEMS
DEVELOPMENT.
167 0605347A COUNTER UNMANNED AERIAL 359,182 359,182
SYSTEMS (UAS)
DEVELOPMENT.
169 0605457A ARMY INTEGRATED AIR AND 126,623 126,623
MISSILE DEFENSE (AIAMD).
170 0605531A COUNTER--SMALL UNMANNED 695 695
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS SYS DEV
& DEMONSTRATION.
172 0605625A MANNED GROUND VEHICLE.... 290,069 20,000 310,069
..................... Unmanned Ground Vehicles [20,000]
Development.
173 0605766A NATIONAL CAPABILITIES 17,211 17,211
INTEGRATION (MIP).
174 0605812A JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL 2,749 2,749
VEHICLE (JLTV)
ENGINEERING AND
MANUFACTURING
DEVELOPMENT PHASE (EMD).
175 0605830A AVIATION GROUND SUPPORT 951 951
EQUIPMENT.
176 0303032A TROJAN--RH12............. 3,946 3,946
178 0304270A ELECTRONIC WARFARE 125,301 125,301
DEVELOPMENT.
9999 9999999999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS...... 89,121 89,121
..................... SUBTOTAL SYSTEM 9,760,747 263,727 10,024,474
DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION.
.....................
..................... MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
179 0604256A THREAT SIMULATOR 60,233 60,233
DEVELOPMENT.
180 0604258A TARGET SYSTEMS 16,488 16,488
DEVELOPMENT.
181 0604759A MAJOR T&E INVESTMENT..... 106,140 20,000 126,140
..................... Ground Based Radar-- [20,000]
Kwajalein radome and
digital modernization.
182 0605103A RAND ARROYO CENTER....... 10,737 10,737
183 0605301A ARMY KWAJALEIN ATOLL..... 7,051 140,000 147,051
..................... Deferred maintenance [140,000]
backlog reduction.
184 0605326A CONCEPTS EXPERIMENTATION 55,596 55,596
PROGRAM.
186 0605601A ARMY TEST RANGES AND 469,723 469,723
FACILITIES.
187 0605602A ARMY TECHNICAL TEST 62,303 62,303
INSTRUMENTATION AND
TARGETS.
188 0605604A SURVIVABILITY/LETHALITY 31,283 31,283
ANALYSIS.
189 0605606A AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION... 1,983 1,983
190 0605706A MATERIEL SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 19,013 19,013
191 0605709A EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN 10,481 10,481
ITEMS.
192 0605712A SUPPORT OF OPERATIONAL 60,733 60,733
TESTING.
193 0605716A ARMY EVALUATION CENTER... 65,565 65,565
194 0605718A ARMY MODELING & SIM X-CMD 15,608 15,608
COLLABORATION & INTEG.
195 0605801A PROGRAMWIDE ACTIVITIES... 52,978 52,978
196 0605803A TECHNICAL INFORMATION 27,004 27,004
ACTIVITIES.
197 0605805A MUNITIONS 44,851 44,851
STANDARDIZATION,
EFFECTIVENESS AND SAFETY.
198 0605857A ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 3,256 3,256
TECHNOLOGY MGMT SUPPORT.
199 0605898A ARMY DIRECT REPORT 54,276 54,276
HEADQUARTERS--R&D - MHA.
200 0606002A RONALD REAGAN BALLISTIC 118,585 90,000 208,585
MISSILE DEFENSE TEST
SITE.
..................... Deferred maintenance [90,000]
backlog reduction.
201 0606003A COUNTERINTEL AND HUMAN 5,802 5,802
INTEL MODERNIZATION.
202 0606118A AIAMD SOFTWARE 653,653 653,653
DEVELOPMENT &
INTEGRATION.
203 0606942A ASSESSMENTS AND 6,468 6,468
EVALUATIONS CYBER
VULNERABILITIES.
..................... SUBTOTAL MANAGEMENT 1,959,810 250,000 2,209,810
SUPPORT.
.....................
..................... OPERATIONAL SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT
205 0603778A MLRS PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT 17,780 20,000 37,780
PROGRAM.
..................... GLSDB integration on [20,000]
HIMARS.
206 0605024A ANTI-TAMPER TECHNOLOGY 6,613 6,613
SUPPORT.
207 0607101A COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS 488 488
DESTRUCTION (CWMD)
PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT.
208 0607131A WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS 21,553 10,000 31,553
PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT
PROGRAMS.
..................... Weapons and Munitions [10,000]
Product Improvement
Programs.
209 0607136A BLACKHAWK PRODUCT 35,147 35,147
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.
210 0607137A CHINOOK PRODUCT 7,277 7,277
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.
211 0607139A IMPROVED TURBINE ENGINE 0
PROGRAM.
213 0607145A APACHE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 30,759 30,000 60,759
..................... Apache Modernization..... [30,000]
214 0607148A AN/TPQ-53 COUNTERFIRE 90,981 90,981
TARGET ACQUISITION RADAR
SYSTEM.
215 0607150A INTEL CYBER DEVELOPMENT.. 13,694 13,694
216 0607212A TENCAP ENHANCEMENTS...... 20,982 20,982
219 0607665A FAMILY OF BIOMETRICS..... 1,640 1,640
220 0607865A PATRIOT PRODUCT 219,046 219,046
IMPROVEMENT.
221 0203728A JOINT AUTOMATED DEEP 11,255 11,255
OPERATION COORDINATION
SYSTEM (JADOCS).
222 0203735A COMBAT VEHICLE 492,364 492,364
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS.
223 0203743A 155MM SELF-PROPELLED 0
HOWITZER IMPROVEMENTS.
224 0203752A AIRCRAFT ENGINE COMPONENT 239 239
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.
225 0203758A DIGITIZATION............. 1,615 1,615
226 0203801A MISSILE/AIR DEFENSE 2,054 2,054
PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT
PROGRAM.
229 0205778A GUIDED MULTIPLE-LAUNCH 73,639 73,639
ROCKET SYSTEM (GMLRS).
232 0303140A INFORMATION SYSTEMS 15,932 15,932
SECURITY PROGRAM.
234 0303142A SATCOM GROUND ENVIRONMENT 4,870 4,870
(SPACE).
237 0305179A INTEGRATED BROADCAST 6,870 6,870
SERVICE (IBS).
238 0305219A MQ-1 GRAY EAGLE UAV...... 2,590 2,590
239 0708045A END ITEM INDUSTRIAL 68,097 25,000 93,097
PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES.
..................... Letterkenney Directed [25,000]
Energy Research.
9999 9999999999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS...... 47,342 47,342
..................... SUBTOTAL OPERATIONAL 1,192,827 85,000 1,277,827
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT.
.....................
..................... SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL
TECHNOLOGY PILOT
PROGRAMS
240 0608041A DEFENSIVE CYBER--SOFTWARE 94,095 94,095
PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT.
..................... SUBTOTAL SOFTWARE AND 94,095 0 94,095
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY PILOT
PROGRAMS.
.....................
..................... TOTAL RESEARCH, 18,708,826 995,227 19,704,053
DEVELOPMENT, TEST &
EVAL, ARMY.
.....................
..................... RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,
TEST & EVAL, NAVY
..................... BASIC RESEARCH
1 0601103N UNIVERSITY RESEARCH 0 75,000 75,000
INITIATIVES.
..................... Increase for basic [75,000]
research activities.
2 0601153N DEFENSE RESEARCH SCIENCES 525,399 15,100 540,499
..................... Precision interferometer [10,100]
at Lowell Observatory.
..................... Quantum algorithms for [5,000]
chemistry and
computational fluid
dynamics.
..................... SUBTOTAL BASIC RESEARCH.. 525,399 90,100 615,499
.....................
..................... APPLIED RESEARCH
3 0602114N POWER PROJECTION APPLIED 38,838 38,838
RESEARCH.
4 0602123N FORCE PROTECTION APPLIED 137,779 137,779
RESEARCH.
5 0602131M MARINE CORPS LANDING 57,567 57,567
FORCE TECHNOLOGY.
6 0602235N COMMON PICTURE APPLIED 40,433 40,433
RESEARCH.
7 0602236N WARFIGHTER SUSTAINMENT 60,350 5,000 65,350
APPLIED RESEARCH.
..................... Slip Resistance Testing [5,000]
for corrosion resistant
marine decking testing.
8 0602271N ELECTROMAGNETIC SYSTEMS 74,603 74,603
APPLIED RESEARCH.
9 0602435N OCEAN WARFIGHTING 64,693 30,000 94,693
ENVIRONMENT APPLIED
RESEARCH.
..................... Autonomous Sense-Making [12,000]
of the Undersea
Battlespace.
..................... Ocean Warfighting [3,000]
Environment Applied
Research.
..................... Resilient Autonomous [15,000]
Sensing in the Arctic
(VIPER).
10 0602651M JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 4,105 4,105
APPLIED RESEARCH.
11 0602747N UNDERSEA WARFARE APPLIED 52,515 52,515
RESEARCH.
12 0602750N FUTURE NAVAL CAPABILITIES 305,357 305,357
APPLIED RESEARCH.
13 0602782N MINE AND EXPEDITIONARY 24,634 24,634
WARFARE APPLIED RESEARCH.
15 0602861N SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 74,378 74,378
MANAGEMENT--ONR FIELD
ACITIVITIES.
..................... SUBTOTAL APPLIED RESEARCH 935,252 35,000 970,252
.....................
..................... ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
16 0603123N FORCE PROTECTION ADVANCED 50,869 7,000 57,869
TECHNOLOGY.
..................... Secure power data [7,000]
analytics and AI.
17 0603271N ELECTROMAGNETIC SYSTEMS 8,635 8,635
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.
18 0603273N SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY FOR 114,767 114,767
NUCLEAR RE-ENTRY SYSTEMS.
19 0603640M USMC ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 287,897 40,000 327,897
DEMONSTRATION (ATD).
..................... Bullseye Missile [40,000]
Integration and
Demonstration.
20 0603651M JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 8,727 8,727
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
21 0603673N FUTURE NAVAL CAPABILITIES 445,977 445,977
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT.
22 0603680N MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 79,132 79,132
PROGRAM.
23 0603729N WARFIGHTER PROTECTION 0
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY.
24 0603758N NAVY WARFIGHTING 66,395 7,500 73,895
EXPERIMENTS AND
DEMONSTRATIONS.
..................... Remote and Resilient Edge [7,500]
Computing.
25 0603782N MINE AND EXPEDITIONARY 0
WARFARE ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY.
..................... SUBTOTAL ADVANCED 1,062,399 54,500 1,116,899
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
.....................
..................... ADVANCED COMPONENT
DEVELOPMENT AND
PROTOTYPES
27 0603128N UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM... 35,706 35,706
29 0603207N AIR/OCEAN TACTICAL 76,141 19,000 95,141
APPLICATIONS.
..................... Dual-Modality Large [19,000]
Displacement UUV.
30 0603216N AVIATION SURVIVABILITY... 20,010 20,010
31 0603239N NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES 7,726 7,726
32 0603254N ASW SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT.. 20,070 20,070
33 0603261N TACTICAL AIRBORNE 3,239 3,239
RECONNAISSANCE.
34 0603382N ADVANCED COMBAT SYSTEMS 32,263 32,263
TECHNOLOGY.
35 0603502N SURFACE AND SHALLOW WATER 32,451 32,451
MINE COUNTERMEASURES.
36 0603506N SURFACE SHIP TORPEDO 9,920 9,920
DEFENSE.
37 0603512N CARRIER SYSTEMS 8,806 8,806
DEVELOPMENT.
38 0603525N PILOT FISH............... 1,339,052 1,339,052
39 0603536N RETRACT JUNIPER.......... 275,300 275,300
40 0603542N RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL..... 704 704
42 0603561N UNDERSEA WARFARE SYSTEM 132,885 15,000 147,885
DEVELOPMENT.
..................... 21st Century Polymers for [15,000]
Submarines.
44 0603563N SHIP CONCEPT ADVANCED 353,893 -177,000 176,893
DESIGN.
..................... ARSV unjustified request. [-177,000]
45 0603564N SHIP PRELIMINARY DESIGN & 666,640 666,640
FEASIBILITY STUDIES.
46 0603570N ADVANCED NUCLEAR POWER 392,426 392,426
SYSTEMS.
47 0603573N ADVANCED SURFACE 269,961 269,961
MACHINERY SYSTEMS.
48 0603576N CHALK EAGLE.............. 149,351 149,351
49 0603581N LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP 12,576 22,576 35,152
(LCS).
..................... FREEDOM-Class LCS Supply [22,576]
Chain Risk Analysis and
Radar Remediation
Demonstration.
50 0603582N COMBAT SYSTEM INTEGRATION 18,819 18,819
51 0603595N OHIO REPLACEMENT......... 331,577 331,577
52 0603596N LCS MISSION MODULES...... 46,239 46,239
53 0603597N AUTOMATED TEST AND RE- 18,070 18,070
TEST (ATRT).
54 0603598N ATRT ENTERPRISE RAPID 87,585 87,585
CAPABILITY.
55 0603599N FRIGATE DEVELOPMENT...... 212,041 212,041
56 0603609N CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS... 10,216 10,216
57 0603635M MARINE CORPS GROUND 521,995 521,995
COMBAT/SUPPORT SYSTEM.
58 0603654N JOINT SERVICE EXPLOSIVE 43,568 43,568
ORDNANCE DEVELOPMENT.
59 0603713N OCEAN ENGINEERING 15,903 15,903
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
60 0603721N ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. 19,347 19,347
61 0603724N NAVY ENERGY PROGRAM...... 59,591 30,800 90,391
..................... Battery develop safety-- [8,300]
accelerate MBSE, field
DIU standard batteries,
sUAS safety certs.
..................... High value target [17,500]
protection program.
..................... Power and energy supply [5,000]
chain.
62 0603725N FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT... 13,738 13,738
63 0603734N CHALK CORAL.............. 995,658 995,658
64 0603739N NAVY LOGISTIC 929 929
PRODUCTIVITY.
65 0603746N RETRACT MAPLE............ 655,551 655,551
66 0603748N LINK PLUMERIA............ 498,853 498,853
67 0603751N RETRACT ELM.............. 87,999 87,999
68 0603764M LINK EVERGREEN........... 593,835 593,835
69 0603790N NATO RESEARCH AND 5,513 5,513
DEVELOPMENT.
70 0603795N LAND ATTACK TECHNOLOGY... 985 985
71 0603851M JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 14,152 14,152
TESTING.
72 0603860N JOINT PRECISION APPROACH 73,813 73,813
AND LANDING SYSTEMS--DEM/
VAL.
73 0603889N COUNTERDRUG RDT&E 6,500 6,500
PROJECTS.
74 0603925N DIRECTED ENERGY AND 94,825 9,000 103,825
ELECTRIC WEAPON SYSTEMS.
..................... Ship-board high powered [9,000]
microwave counter-UAS
development.
76 0604027N DIGITAL WARFARE OFFICE... 182,205 182,205
77 0604028N SMALL AND MEDIUM UNMANNED 24,598 100,000 124,598
UNDERSEA VEHICLES.
..................... Increase low cost [100,000]
undersea effector.
78 0604029N UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE 62,460 25,000 87,460
CORE TECHNOLOGIES.
..................... Liberty Cage--Refuel [5,000]
stations for UUVs (N97).
..................... Ocean Explorer (OEX) [20,000]
commercial battery for
XXL UUV (N97).
80 0604031N LARGE UNMANNED UNDERSEA 0 120,000 120,000
VEHICLES.
..................... Increase Liberator and [120,000]
RAPTOR.
81 0604112N GERALD R. FORD CLASS 111,241 111,241
NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIER
(CVN 78--80).
82 0604127N SURFACE MINE 17,762 17,762
COUNTERMEASURES.
83 0604272N TACTICAL AIR DIRECTIONAL 14,974 14,974
INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES
(TADIRCM).
84 0604286N NAVY ADVANCED 10,016 5,000 15,016
MANUFACTURING.
..................... Advanced Naval Casting [5,000]
for Hardware and
Operational Repairs
(ANCHOR).
85 0604289M NEXT GENERATION LOGISTICS 24 24
86 0604292N FUTURE VERTICAL LIFT 5,314 5,314
(MARITIME STRIKE).
87 0604295M MARINE AVIATION 47,152 60,000 107,152
DEMONSTRATION/VALIDATION.
..................... USMC unmanned vertical [60,000]
take off/landing aerial
vehicle.
88 0604320M RAPID TECHNOLOGY 125,999 125,999
CAPABILITY PROTOTYPE.
89 0604454N LX (R)................... 18,574 18,574
90 0604536N ADVANCED UNDERSEA 164,512 50,000 214,512
PROTOTYPING.
..................... Advanced sea mines [50,000]
project scylla.
92 0604636N COUNTER UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 20,833 20,833
SYSTEMS (C-UAS).
93 0604659N PRECISION STRIKE WEAPONS 206,873 206,873
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.
94 0604707N SPACE AND ELECTRONIC 8,657 8,657
WARFARE (SEW)
ARCHITECTURE/ENGINEERING
SUPPORT.
95 0604786N OFFENSIVE ANTI-SURFACE 104,527 104,527
WARFARE WEAPON
DEVELOPMENT.
97 0605513N UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLE 255,135 377,000 632,135
ENABLING CAPABILITIES.
..................... Containerized payloads [325,000]
for MUSV.
..................... Increase USV enabling [52,000]
capabilities.
98 0605514M GROUND BASED ANTI-SHIP 16,307 16,307
MISSILE.
100 0605518N CONVENTIONAL PROMPT 1,341,416 -541,416 800,000
STRIKE (CPS).
..................... CPS unjustified increase. [-541,416]
101 0105519N NUCLEAR-ARMED SEA- 0 250,000 250,000
LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE
(SLCM-N) SUPPORT.
..................... Restoration of [250,000]
statutorily-directed
funding.
102 0207147M COLLABORATIVE COMBAT 213,934 213,934
AIRCRAFT.
103 0303260N DEFENSE MILITARY 0
DECEPTION INITIATIVE.
104 0303354N ASW SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT-- 3,206 3,206
MIP.
105 0304240M ADVANCED TACTICAL 1,979 1,979
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM.
106 0304270N ELECTRONIC WARFARE 0
DEVELOPMENT--MIP.
107 0304797N UNDERSEA ARTIFICIAL 13,563 13,563
INTELLIGENCE / MACHINE
LEARNING (AI/ML).
..................... SUBTOTAL ADVANCED 11,237,683 364,960 11,602,643
COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT
AND PROTOTYPES.
.....................
..................... SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION
108 0603208N TRAINING SYSTEM AIRCRAFT. 80,617 80,617
109 0604038N MARITIME TARGETING CELL.. 216,514 216,514
110 0604212N OTHER HELO DEVELOPMENT... 976 976
112 0604215N STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT.... 4,399 4,399
113 0604216N MULTI-MISSION HELICOPTER 88,855 88,855
UPGRADE DEVELOPMENT.
114 0604230N WARFARE SUPPORT SYSTEM... 73,080 73,080
115 0604231N COMMAND AND CONTROL 73,534 73,534
SYSTEMS.
116 0604234N ADVANCED HAWKEYE......... 390,260 390,260
117 0604245M H-1 UPGRADES............. 66,446 66,446
118 0604261N ACOUSTIC SEARCH SENSORS.. 48,875 48,875
119 0604262N V-22..................... 252,335 252,335
120 0604264N AIR CREW SYSTEMS 21,582 21,582
DEVELOPMENT.
121 0604269N EA-18.................... 131,683 131,683
122 0604270N ELECTRONIC WARFARE 168,985 168,985
DEVELOPMENT.
123 0604273M EXECUTIVE HELO 69,438 69,438
DEVELOPMENT.
124 0604274N NEXT GENERATION JAMMER 50,332 50,332
(NGJ).
125 0604280N JOINT TACTICAL RADIO 409,318 409,318
SYSTEM--NAVY (JTRS-NAVY).
126 0604282N NEXT GENERATION JAMMER 497,011 497,011
(NGJ) INCREMENT II.
127 0604307N SURFACE COMBATANT COMBAT 425,060 425,060
SYSTEM ENGINEERING.
128 0604329N SMALL DIAMETER BOMB (SDB) 64,428 64,428
129 0604366N STANDARD MISSILE 539,279 539,279
IMPROVEMENTS.
130 0604373N AIRBORNE MCM............. 8,567 8,567
131 0604378N NAVAL INTEGRATED FIRE 42,177 42,177
CONTROL--COUNTER AIR
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING.
132 0604501N ADVANCED ABOVE WATER 67,900 67,900
SENSORS.
133 0604503N SUBMARINE SWFTS 195,361 195,361
MODERNIZATION.
134 0604504N AIR CONTROL.............. 41,610 41,610
135 0604512N SHIPBOARD AVIATION 30,970 30,970
SYSTEMS.
136 0604516N SHIP SURVIVABILITY....... 7,861 7,861
138 0604522N AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE 96,642 96,642
RADAR (AMDR) SYSTEM.
139 0604530N ADVANCED ARRESTING GEAR 60,518 60,518
(AAG).
140 0604558N NEW DESIGN SSN........... 237,103 237,103
142 0604567N SHIP CONTRACT DESIGN/ 19,429 19,429
LIVE FIRE T&E.
143 0604574N NAVY TACTICAL COMPUTER 3,415 3,415
RESOURCES.
144 0604601N MINE DEVELOPMENT......... 158,666 158,666
145 0604610N LIGHTWEIGHT TORPEDO 102,159 102,159
DEVELOPMENT.
146 0604654N JOINT SERVICE EXPLOSIVE 8,509 8,509
ORDNANCE DEVELOPMENT.
147 0604657M USMC GROUND COMBAT/ 69,478 69,478
SUPPORTING ARMS SYSTEMS--
ENG DEV.
148 0604703N PERSONNEL, TRAINING, 8,316 8,316
SIMULATION, AND HUMAN
FACTORS.
149 0604727N JOINT STANDOFF WEAPON 1,447 1,447
SYSTEMS.
150 0604755N SHIP SELF DEFENSE (DETECT 156,167 156,167
& CONTROL).
151 0604756N SHIP SELF DEFENSE 296,261 296,261
(ENGAGE: HARD KILL).
152 0604757N SHIP SELF DEFENSE 196,761 196,761
(ENGAGE: SOFT KILL/EW).
153 0604761N INTELLIGENCE ENGINEERING. 6,426 6,426
154 0604771N MEDICAL DEVELOPMENT...... 6,900 6,900
155 0604777N NAVIGATION/ID SYSTEM..... 3,388 3,388
156 0604850N SSN(X)................... 315,914 315,914
157 0605013M INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 14,380 14,380
DEVELOPMENT.
158 0605013N INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 149,089 149,089
DEVELOPMENT.
159 0605024N ANTI-TAMPER TECHNOLOGY 3,459 3,459
SUPPORT.
160 0605180N TACAMO MODERNIZATION..... 1,662,723 1,662,723
161 0605212M CH-53K RDTE.............. 139,273 139,273
162 0605215N MISSION PLANNING......... 82,618 82,618
163 0605217N COMMON AVIONICS.......... 133,855 133,855
164 0605220N SHIP TO SHORE CONNECTOR 4,519 4,519
(SSC).
165 0605285N NEXT GENERATION FIGHTER.. 68,498 68,498
166 0605414N UNMANNED CARRIER AVIATION 0
(UCA).
167 0605450M JOINT AIR-TO-GROUND 189,866 189,866
MISSILE (JAGM).
168 0605500N MULTI-MISSION MARITIME 87,173 87,173
AIRCRAFT (MMA).
169 0605504N MULTI-MISSION MARITIME 52,951 52,951
(MMA) INCREMENT III.
170 0605516N LONG RANGE FIRES......... 186,735 186,735
171 0605611M MARINE CORPS ASSAULT 12,461 12,461
VEHICLES SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT &
DEMONSTRATION.
172 0605813M JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL 2,413 2,413
VEHICLE (JLTV) SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT &
DEMONSTRATION.
173 0204202N DESTROYERS GUIDED MISSILE 50,166 50,166
(DDG-1000).
174 0301377N COUNTERING ADVANCED 15,563 15,563
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
(CACW).
175 0302315N NON-KINETIC 23,146 23,146
COUNTERMEASURE SUPPORT.
181 0304785N ISR & INFO OPERATIONS.... 274,478 274,478
183 0306250M CYBER OPERATIONS 8,962 8,962
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
..................... SUBTOTAL SYSTEM 8,977,280 0 8,977,280
DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION.
.....................
..................... MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
184 0604256N THREAT SIMULATOR 16,453 16,453
DEVELOPMENT.
185 0604258N TARGET SYSTEMS 22,653 22,653
DEVELOPMENT.
186 0604759N MAJOR T&E INVESTMENT..... 112,458 112,458
187 0605152N STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 4,336 4,336
SUPPORT--NAVY.
188 0605154N CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES 28,310 28,310
191 0605853N MANAGEMENT, TECHNICAL & 124,898 124,898
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.
192 0605856N STRATEGIC TECHNICAL 4,260 4,260
SUPPORT.
193 0605863N RDT&E SHIP AND AIRCRAFT 170,699 170,699
SUPPORT.
194 0605864N TEST AND EVALUATION 470,492 470,492
SUPPORT.
195 0605865N OPERATIONAL TEST AND 31,902 31,902
EVALUATION CAPABILITY.
196 0605866N NAVY SPACE AND ELECTRONIC 21,498 21,498
WARFARE (SEW) SUPPORT.
197 0605867N SEW SURVEILLANCE/ 25,144 25,144
RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT.
198 0605873M MARINE CORPS PROGRAM WIDE 70,013 70,013
SUPPORT.
199 0605898N MANAGEMENT HQ--R&D....... 33,533 33,533
200 0606295M MARINE AVIATION 19,165 19,165
DEVELOPMENTAL MANAGEMENT
AND SUPPORT.
201 0606355N WARFARE INNOVATION 35,931 35,931
MANAGEMENT.
202 0606942N ASSESSMENTS AND 11,282 11,282
EVALUATIONS CYBER
VULNERABILITIES.
203 0305327N INSIDER THREAT........... 2,214 2,214
204 0902498N MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS 2,054 2,054
(DEPARTMENTAL SUPPORT
ACTIVITIES).
..................... SUBTOTAL MANAGEMENT 1,207,295 0 1,207,295
SUPPORT.
.....................
..................... OPERATIONAL SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT
208 0604840M F-35 C2D2................ 469,779 469,779
209 0604840N F-35 C2D2................ 428,545 428,545
210 0605520M MARINE CORPS AIR DEFENSE 133,041 133,041
WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
211 0607658N COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT 120,782 120,782
CAPABILITY (CEC).
212 0101221N STRATEGIC SUB & WEAPONS 1,051,736 1,051,736
SYSTEM SUPPORT.
213 0101224N SSBN SECURITY TECHNOLOGY 65,856 65,856
PROGRAM.
214 0101226N SUBMARINE ACOUSTIC 114,279 114,279
WARFARE DEVELOPMENT.
215 0101402N NAVY STRATEGIC 88,572 88,572
COMMUNICATIONS.
216 0204136N F/A-18 SQUADRONS......... 271,429 271,429
218 0204229N TOMAHAWK AND TOMAHAWK 76,653 76,653
MISSION PLANNING CENTER
(TMPC).
219 0204311N INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE 71,901 71,901
SYSTEM.
220 0204313N SHIP-TOWED ARRAY 954 954
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS.
221 0204413N AMPHIBIOUS TACTICAL 1,526 1,526
SUPPORT UNITS
(DISPLACEMENT CRAFT).
222 0204460M GROUND/AIR TASK ORIENTED 66,255 66,255
RADAR (G/ATOR).
223 0204571N CONSOLIDATED TRAINING 115,839 115,839
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT.
224 0204575N ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) 198,560 198,560
READINESS SUPPORT.
225 0205601N ANTI-RADIATION MISSILE 80,491 80,491
IMPROVEMENT.
227 0205632N MK-48 ADCAP.............. 123,011 123,011
228 0205633N AVIATION IMPROVEMENTS.... 108,505 108,505
229 0205675N OPERATIONAL NUCLEAR POWER 252,893 252,893
SYSTEMS.
230 0206313M MARINE CORPS 268,983 4,700 273,683
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.
..................... Dismounted microturbine [4,700]
power generation (USMC
E2O) supports EABO.
231 0206335M COMMON AVIATION COMMAND 0
AND CONTROL SYSTEM
(CAC2S).
232 0206623M MARINE CORPS GROUND 79,031 79,031
COMBAT/SUPPORTING ARMS
SYSTEMS.
233 0206624M MARINE CORPS COMBAT 19,915 19,915
SERVICES SUPPORT.
234 0206625M USMC INTELLIGENCE/ 149,055 149,055
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
SYSTEMS.
235 0207161N TACTICAL AIM MISSILES.... 122,518 122,518
236 0207163N ADVANCED MEDIUM RANGE AIR- 24,675 24,675
TO-AIR MISSILE (AMRAAM).
237 0207255N MQ-25 STINGRAY........... 513,308 513,308
238 0208043N PLANNING AND DECISION AID 3,491 3,491
SYSTEM (PDAS).
242 0303138N AFLOAT NETWORKS.......... 68,369 68,369
243 0303140N INFORMATION SYSTEMS 79,128 79,128
SECURITY PROGRAM.
244 0305192N MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 5,187 5,187
PROGRAM (MIP) ACTIVITIES.
245 0305205N UAS INTEGRATION AND 0
INTEROPERABILITY.
246 0305208M DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND/ 0
SURFACE SYSTEMS.
247 0305220N MQ-4C TRITON............. 10,515 10,515
248 0305232M RQ-11 UAV................ 19,842 19,842
249 0305241N MULTI-INTELLIGENCE SENSOR 49,898 49,898
DEVELOPMENT.
250 0305242M UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 20,750 20,750
(UAS) PAYLOADS (MIP).
251 0305421N MQ-4C TRITON 344,890 344,890
MODERNIZATION.
252 0307577N INTELLIGENCE MISSION DATA 787 787
(IMD).
253 0308601N MODELING AND SIMULATION 16,401 16,401
SUPPORT.
254 0702207N DEPOT MAINTENANCE (NON- 8,097 8,097
IF).
255 0708730N MARITIME TECHNOLOGY 1,710 1,710
(MARITECH).
9999 9999999999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS...... 2,755,838 2,755,838
..................... SUBTOTAL OPERATIONAL 8,402,995 4,700 8,407,695
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT.
.....................
..................... SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL
TECHNOLOGY PILOT
PROGRAMS
256 0608013N RISK MANAGEMENT 13,017 13,017
INFORMATION--SOFTWARE
PILOT PROGRAM.
257 0608231N MARITIME TACTICAL COMMAND 25,299 25,299
AND CONTROL (MTC2)--
SOFTWARE PILOT PROGRAM.
..................... SUBTOTAL SOFTWARE AND 38,316 0 38,316
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY PILOT
PROGRAMS.
.....................
..................... TOTAL RESEARCH, 32,386,619 549,260 32,935,879
DEVELOPMENT, TEST &
EVAL, NAVY.
.....................
..................... RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,
TEST & EVAL, AF
..................... BASIC RESEARCH
1 0601102F DEFENSE RESEARCH SCIENCES 296,535 25,000 321,535
..................... Increase for basic [25,000]
research activities.
2 0601103F UNIVERSITY RESEARCH 91,394 30,000 121,394
INITIATIVES.
..................... Increase for basic [30,000]
research activities.
..................... SUBTOTAL BASIC RESEARCH.. 387,929 55,000 442,929
.....................
..................... APPLIED RESEARCH
3 0602020F FUTURE AF CAPABILITIES 44,029 44,029
APPLIED RESEARCH.
4 0602022F UNIVERSITY AFFILIATED 0
RESEARCH CENTER (UARC)--
TACTICAL AUTONOMY.
5 0602102F MATERIALS................ 139,872 10,000 149,872
..................... High Energy Synchrotron X- [10,000]
Ray Research.
7 0602202F HUMAN EFFECTIVENESS 103,170 2,000 105,170
APPLIED RESEARCH.
..................... Ceramic Oxygen Generation [2,000]
System for Aircrew Life
Support.
8 0602203F AEROSPACE SYSTEMS 397,809 20,000 417,809
TECHNOLOGIES.
..................... Extreme Environment Power- [10,000]
to-AI Systems for Air
and Space Operations.
..................... Scaling Autonomous Cruise [10,000]
Missile Defense.
9 0602204F AEROSPACE SENSORS........ 164,962 164,962
11 0602298F SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 10,285 10,285
MANAGEMENT--MAJOR
HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITIES.
12 0602336F NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS 27,031 27,031
TECH EXPLORATION.
13 0602602F CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS... 130,146 130,146
14 0602605F DIRECTED ENERGY 91,798 91,798
TECHNOLOGY.
15 0602788F DOMINANT INFORMATION 149,174 35,000 184,174
SCIENCES AND METHODS.
..................... Future Flag Operational [10,000]
Experimentation Testbed.
..................... Quantum Technology [15,000]
Innovation Center.
..................... UAS Airspace Integration [10,000]
and Air Domain Awareness
for Airspace Safety,
Management, and Counter-
UAS Operations.
..................... SUBTOTAL APPLIED RESEARCH 1,258,276 67,000 1,325,276
.....................
..................... ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
16 0603032F FUTURE AF INTEGRATED 282,004 282,004
TECHNOLOGY DEMOS.
17 0603112F ADVANCED MATERIALS FOR 32,808 10,000 42,808
WEAPON SYSTEMS.
..................... Metals Affordability [10,000]
Initiative.
18 0603199F SUSTAINMENT SCIENCE AND 13,277 13,277
TECHNOLOGY (S&T).
19 0603203F ADVANCED AEROSPACE 72,149 3,000 75,149
SENSORS.
..................... Aerospace Thermoplastic [3,000]
Composites.
20 0603211F AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY DEV/ 260,212 10,000 270,212
DEMO.
..................... Collaborative Combat [10,000]
Aircraft Propulsion
Technology Integration.
22 0603273F SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY FOR 165,949 165,949
NUCLEAR RE-ENTRY SYSTEMS.
23 0603456F HUMAN EFFECTIVENESS 20,338 20,338
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT.
24 0603601F CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 131,397 131,397
TECHNOLOGY.
25 0603605F ADVANCED WEAPONS 13,744 13,744
TECHNOLOGY.
26 0603680F MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 99,908 99,908
PROGRAM.
27 0603788F BATTLESPACE KNOWLEDGE 31,938 31,938
DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION.
28 0604776F DEPLOYMENT & DISTRIBUTION 29,109 29,109
ENTERPRISE R&D.
..................... SUBTOTAL ADVANCED 1,152,833 23,000 1,175,833
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
.....................
..................... ADVANCED COMPONENT
DEVELOPMENT AND
PROTOTYPES
30 0603036F MODULAR ADVANCED MISSILE. 15,099 15,099
31 0603260F INTELLIGENCE ADVANCED 4,012 4,012
DEVELOPMENT.
32 0603677F IN-TRANSIT VISIBILITY 0
(ITV) MODERNIZATION.
33 0603742F COMBAT IDENTIFICATION 25,888 25,888
TECHNOLOGY.
34 0603790F NATO RESEARCH AND 2,320 2,320
DEVELOPMENT.
35 0603851F INTERCONTINENTAL 72,112 72,112
BALLISTIC MISSILE--DEM/
VAL.
36 0604001F NC3 ADVANCED CONCEPTS.... 14,394 14,394
37 0604003F ADVANCED BATTLE 1,040,945 1,040,945
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (ABMS).
38 0604004F ADVANCED ENGINE 0
DEVELOPMENT.
39 0604005F NC3 COMMERCIAL 61,355 61,355
DEVELOPMENT &
PROTOTYPING.
40 0604007F E-7...................... 0 1,500,000 1,500,000
..................... Restore full funding for [1,500,000]
E-7.
41 0604009F AFWERX................... 3,589 3,589
42 0604010F NEXT GENERATION ADAPTIVE 513,681 513,681
PROPULSION.
43 0604015F LONG RANGE STRIKE--BOMBER 2,862,677 2,862,677
46 0604033F HYPERSONICS PROTOTYPING.. 345,769 345,769
47 0604041F FAMILY OF AFFORDABLE MASS 525,223 525,223
MISSILES (FAMM).
48 0604060F NORAD & USNORTHCOM (N&NC) 39,257 39,257
EXPERIMENTATION.
49 0604183F HYPERSONICS PROTOTYPING-- 806,142 806,142
HYPERSONIC ATTACK CRUISE
MISSILE (HACM).
50 0604257F ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND 38,756 38,756
SENSORS.
52 0604317F TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER...... 2,196 2,196
53 0604327F HARD AND DEEPLY BURIED 186,385 186,385
TARGET DEFEAT SYSTEM
(HDBTDS) PROGRAM.
54 0604336F NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS 91,550 91,550
PROTOTYPING.
55 0604343F ADVANCED TANKER SYSTEMS.. 13,036 13,036
56 0604414F CYBER RESILIENCY OF 44,377 44,377
WEAPON SYSTEMS-ACS.
57 0604609F REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS & 57,575 57,575
CONCEPT MATURATION.
58 0604668F JOINT TRANSPORTATION 57,802 57,802
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (JTMS).
59 0604776F DEPLOYMENT & DISTRIBUTION 5,136 5,136
ENTERPRISE R&D.
60 0604858F TECH TRANSITION PROGRAM.. 166,061 166,061
61 0604860F OPERATIONAL ENERGY AND 61,000 61,000 122,000
INSTALLATION RESILIENCE.
..................... Operational energy and [61,000]
installation resilience
increase.
62 0605057F NEXT GENERATION AIR- 0
REFUELING SYSTEM.
64 0606004F NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE 1,105 1,105
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT.
65 0606005F DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION 183,398 183,398
OFFICE.
67 0207147F COLLABORATIVE COMBAT 1,373,740 1,373,740
AIRCRAFT.
68 0207179F AUTONOMOUS COLLABORATIVE 57,217 57,217
PLATFORMS.
69 0207420F COMBAT IDENTIFICATION.... 1,692 1,692
71 0207455F THREE DIMENSIONAL LONG- 22,335 22,335
RANGE RADAR (3DELRR).
72 0207522F AIRBASE AIR DEFENSE 85,305 85,305
SYSTEMS (ABADS).
73 0207606F JOINT SIMULATION 302,801 302,801
ENVIRONMENT (JSE).
74 0208030F WAR RESERVE MATERIEL-- 14,663 14,663
AMMUNITION.
75 0302060F LOOKING GLASS NEXT....... 65,277 65,277
76 0303010F AF ISR DIGITAL 24,455 24,455
INFRASTRUCTURE.
77 0305236F COMMON DATA LINK 26,401 26,401
EXECUTIVE AGENT (CDL EA).
78 0305601F MISSION PARTNER 0
ENVIRONMENTS.
79 0305913F PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE.. 29,325 29,325
80 0701200F ENTERPRISE SELECT CLASS 949 949
II.
81 0708051F RAPID SUSTAINMENT 27,475 27,475
MODERNIZATION (RSM).
82 0808736F SPECIAL VICTIM 1,652 1,652
ACCOUNTABILITY AND
INVESTIGATION.
83 0808737F INTEGRATED PRIMARY 4,271 4,271
PREVENTION.
84 0901410F CONTRACTING INFORMATION 25,815 25,815
TECHNOLOGY SYSTEM.
85 1206415F U.S. SPACE COMMAND 34,719 34,719
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SUPPORT.
..................... SUBTOTAL ADVANCED 9,338,932 1,561,000 10,899,932
COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT
AND PROTOTYPES.
.....................
..................... SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION
86 0604200F FUTURE ADVANCED WEAPON 35,142 35,142
ANALYSIS & PROGRAMS.
87 0604201F PNT RESILIENCY, MODS, AND 710,780 710,780
IMPROVEMENTS.
88 0604222F NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUPPORT.. 86,921 86,921
89 0604270F ELECTRONIC WARFARE 260,233 260,233
DEVELOPMENT.
90 0604281F TACTICAL DATA NETWORKS 110,151 110,151
ENTERPRISE.
91 0604287F PHYSICAL SECURITY 8,743 8,743
EQUIPMENT.
92 0604288F SURVIVABLE AIRBORNE 2,218,921 2,218,921
OPERATIONS CENTER (SAOC).
93 0604602F ARMAMENT/ORDNANCE 96,762 96,762
DEVELOPMENT.
94 0604604F SUBMUNITIONS............. 3,599 3,599
95 0604617F AGILE COMBAT SUPPORT..... 19,348 19,348
96 0604706F LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS..... 21,328 21,328
97 0604735F COMBAT TRAINING RANGES... 132,783 10,000 142,783
..................... Overland electronic [10,000]
warfare test and
training range
feasibility study.
98 0604932F LONG RANGE STANDOFF 565,679 565,679
WEAPON.
99 0604933F ICBM FUZE MODERNIZATION.. 0
100 0605056F OPEN ARCHITECTURE 43,482 43,482
MANAGEMENT.
101 0605223F ADVANCED PILOT TRAINING.. 72,174 72,174
102 0605238F GROUND BASED STRATEGIC 4,521,370 4,521,370
DETERRENT EMD.
103 0605296F MICROELECTRONICS SECURE 224,664 -150,000 74,664
ENCLAVE.
..................... Unjustified growth....... [-150,000]
104 0101125F NUCLEAR WEAPONS 23,066 23,066
MODERNIZATION.
105 0102417F OVER-THE-HORIZON 173,975 19,200 193,175
BACKSCATTER RADAR.
..................... Realignment from [19,200]
Operation and
Maintenance and
Procurement.
106 0207039F COGNITIVE ELECTROMAGNETIC 50,496 50,496
WARFARE.
107 0207110F F-47..................... 5,037,904 5,037,904
108 0207279F ISOLATED PERSONNEL 16,001 16,001
SURVIVABILITY AND
RECOVERY.
109 0207328F STAND IN ATTACK WEAPON... 115,882 115,882
110 0207407F ELECTROMAGNETIC BATTLE 45,322 45,322
MANAGEMENT (EMBM).
111 0207701F FULL COMBAT MISSION 6,501 6,501
TRAINING.
112 0303008F SATURN................... 4,771 4,771
115 0305155F THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPON 0
STORAGE & SECURITY
SYSTEM.
116 0305282F JOINT FIRES NETWORK (JFN) 313,982 313,982
117 0401221F KC-46A TANKER SQUADRONS.. 543,788 543,788
118 0401319F VC-25B................... 555,195 555,195
119 0401334F LARGE AIRCRAFT 17,996 17,996
SURVIVABILITY SYSTEMS
(LASS).
120 0701212F AUTOMATED TEST SYSTEMS... 15,900 15,900
121 0804772F TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS.... 4,947 4,947
..................... SUBTOTAL SYSTEM 16,057,806 -120,800 15,937,006
DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION.
.....................
..................... MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
123 0604256F THREAT SIMULATOR 44,526 44,526
DEVELOPMENT.
124 0604759F MAJOR T&E INVESTMENT..... 235,405 235,405
125 0605101F RAND PROJECT AIR FORCE... 13,312 13,312
127 0605712F INITIAL OPERATIONAL TEST 13,562 13,562
& EVALUATION.
128 0605807F TEST AND EVALUATION 1,802,502 1,802,502
SUPPORT.
131 0605829F ACQ WORKFORCE--CYBER, 439,592 439,592
NETWORK, & BUS SYS.
132 0605831F ACQ WORKFORCE--CAPABILITY 1,206,669 1,206,669
INTEGRATION.
134 0605833F ACQ WORKFORCE--NUCLEAR 342,650 342,650
SYSTEMS.
135 0605898F MANAGEMENT HQ--R&D....... 6,209 6,209
136 0605976F FACILITIES RESTORATION 367,369 367,369
AND MODERNIZATION--TEST
AND EVALUATION SUPPORT.
137 0605978F FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT-- 298,924 298,924
TEST AND EVALUATION
SUPPORT.
138 0606017F REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS AND 21,678 21,678
MATURATION.
139 0606398F MANAGEMENT HQ--T&E....... 7,507 7,507
140 0208201F OFFENSIVE SMALL UNMANNED 30,187 30,187
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (SUAS).
141 0303255F COMMAND, CONTROL, 18,068 27,000 45,068
COMMUNICATION, AND
COMPUTERS (C4)--STRATCOM.
..................... Enhanced National [5,000]
Strategic Research
Institute research scope.
..................... Evaluation of [2,000]
electromagnetic warfare
and dynamic spectrum
sharing technologies.
..................... NC3 network sensor [10,000]
demonstration.
..................... Rapid Engineering [10,000]
Architecture
Collaboration Hub--NC3
architecture.
142 0308602F ENTEPRISE INFORMATION 80,342 80,342
SERVICES (EIS).
143 0702806F ACQUISITION AND 12,132 12,132
MANAGEMENT SUPPORT.
144 0804776F ADVANCED DISTRIBUTED 238 238
LEARNING.
145 0901215F PRODUCTIVITY INVESTMENTS. 4,017 4,017
147 1001004F INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES. 4,514 4,514
..................... SUBTOTAL MANAGEMENT 4,949,403 27,000 4,976,403
SUPPORT.
.....................
..................... OPERATIONAL SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT
148 0604222F NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUPPORT.. 10,029 10,029
149 0604233F SPECIALIZED UNDERGRADUATE 22,071 22,071
FLIGHT TRAINING.
150 0604283F BATTLE MGMT COM & CTRL 44,187 44,187
SENSOR DEVELOPMENT.
152 0604840F F-35 C2D2................ 1,128,748 1,128,748
153 0605018F AF INTEGRATED PERSONNEL 31,777 -31,777
AND PAY SYSTEM (AF-IPPS).
..................... Realignment to Service- [-31,777]
Wide Support.
154 0605024F ANTI-TAMPER TECHNOLOGY 130,610 130,610
EXECUTIVE AGENCY.
155 0605117F FOREIGN MATERIEL 4,676 4,676
ACQUISITION AND
EXPLOITATION.
156 0605229F HH-60W................... 87,881 87,881
157 0605278F HC/MC-130 RECAP RDT&E.... 34,932 25,000 59,932
..................... Nonrecurring engineering [25,000]
for the LC-130J program.
158 0606018F NC3 INTEGRATION.......... 36,521 36,521
159 0101113F B-52 SQUADRONS........... 1,478,648 1,478,648
160 0101122F AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE 570 570
MISSILE (ALCM).
161 0101126F B-1B SQUADRONS........... 273,552 273,552
162 0101127F B-2 SQUADRONS............ 418,178 418,178
163 0101213F MINUTEMAN SQUADRONS...... 79,313 79,313
164 0101316F WORLDWIDE JOINT STRATEGIC 44,424 44,424
COMMUNICATIONS.
165 0101318F SERVICE SUPPORT TO 56,203 56,203
STRATCOM--GLOBAL STRIKE.
166 0101328F ICBM REENTRY VEHICLES.... 733,182 733,182
168 0102110F MH-139A.................. 7,046 7,046
169 0102326F REGION/SECTOR OPERATION 709 709
CONTROL CENTER
MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.
170 0102417F OVER-THE-HORIZON 0
BACKSCATTER RADAR.
171 0202834F AVIATION SUPPORT 1,028 1,028
EQUIPMENT--GENERAL.
172 0203345F OPERATIONS SECURITY 45,000 45,000
(OPSEC).
173 0205219F MQ-9 UAV................. 16,723 16,723
174 0205671F JOINT COUNTER RCIED 2,816 2,816
ELECTRONIC WARFARE.
175 0207040F MULTI-PLATFORM ELECTRONIC 0
WARFARE EQUIPMENT.
176 0207133F F-16 SQUADRONS........... 527,739 527,739
177 0207134F F-15E SQUADRONS.......... 322,889 48,000 370,889
..................... F-15 IRST capability..... [48,000]
178 0207136F MANNED DESTRUCTIVE 8,128 8,128
SUPPRESSION.
179 0207138F F-22A SQUADRONS.......... 950,375 -96,000 854,375
..................... Decrement F-22 sensor [-96,000]
enhancments.
180 0207142F F-35 SQUADRONS........... 47,388 47,388
181 0207146F F-15EX................... 133,274 133,274
182 0207161F TACTICAL AIM MISSILES.... 98,861 98,861
183 0207163F ADVANCED MEDIUM RANGE AIR- 53,277 53,277
TO-AIR MISSILE (AMRAAM).
184 0207172F JOINT ADVANCED TACTICAL 500,422 500,422
MISSILE (JATM).
186 0207238F E-11A.................... 0
187 0207242F SPECIAL PROGRAM 35,149 35,149
APPLICATIONS.
188 0207247F AF TENCAP................ 50,913 50,913
189 0207249F PRECISION ATTACK SYSTEMS 14,602 14,602
PROCUREMENT.
190 0207253F COMPASS CALL............. 66,514 66,514
191 0207268F AIRCRAFT ENGINE COMPONENT 205,938 205,938
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.
192 0207325F JOINT AIR-TO-SURFACE 133,092 133,092
STANDOFF MISSILE (JASSM).
193 0207327F SMALL DIAMETER BOMB (SDB) 25,497 25,497
194 0207410F AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS 158,871 158,871
CENTER (AOC).
195 0207412F CONTROL AND REPORTING 18,137 18,137
CENTER (CRC).
196 0207418F AFSPECWAR--TACP.......... 5,206 5,206
198 0207431F COMBAT AIR INTELLIGENCE 33,700 33,700
SYSTEM ACTIVITIES.
199 0207438F THEATER BATTLE MANAGEMENT 7,014 7,014
(TBM) C4I.
200 0207439F ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE 73,523 73,523
INT REPROG (EWIR).
202 0207452F DCAPES................... 5,254 5,254
203 0207457F AIR FORCE SPECIAL WARFARE 24,423 24,423
(SPECWAR).
204 0207461F FLIGHT OPERATIONS SYSTEMS 15,978 15,978
205 0207521F AIR FORCE CALIBRATION 2,220 2,220
PROGRAMS.
207 0207590F SEEK EAGLE............... 36,710 36,710
208 0207611F READINESS DECISION 6,823 6,823
SUPPORT ENTERPRISE.
209 0207697F DISTRIBUTED TRAINING AND 83,659 83,659
EXERCISES.
210 0207701F FULL COMBAT MISSION 6,644 6,644
TRAINING.
211 0208006F MISSION PLANNING SYSTEMS. 122,175 122,175
212 0208007F TACTICAL DECEPTION....... 48,857 48,857
213 0208087F DISTRIBUTED CYBER WARFARE 71,868 71,868
OPERATIONS.
214 0208088F AF DEFENSIVE CYBERSPACE 76,758 76,758
OPERATIONS.
218 0208288F INTEL DATA APPLICATIONS.. 7,511 7,511
219 0301025F GEOBASE.................. 403 403
220 0301113F CYBER SECURITY 0
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT.
226 0301377F COUNTERING ADVANCED 1,343 1,343
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
(CACW).
228 0301401F AF MULTI-DOMAIN NON- 2,754 2,754
TRADITIONAL ISR
BATTLESPACE AWARENESS.
229 0302015F E-4B NATIONAL AIRBORNE 50,873 50,873
OPERATIONS CENTER (NAOC).
230 0302315F NON-KINETIC 4,024 4,024
COUNTERMEASURE SUPPORT.
232 0303089F CYBERSPACE AND DODIN 0
OPERATIONS.
233 0303131F MINIMUM ESSENTIAL 254,837 254,837
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS
NETWORK (MEECN).
234 0303133F HIGH FREQUENCY RADIO 33,215 33,215
SYSTEMS.
235 0303140F INFORMATION SYSTEMS 117,658 117,658
SECURITY PROGRAM.
236 0303248F ALL DOMAIN COMMON 71,312 71,312
PLATFORM.
237 0303260F JOINT MILITARY DECEPTION 0
INITIATIVE.
238 0304100F STRATEGIC MISSION 89,663 89,663
PLANNING & EXECUTION
SYSTEM (SMPES).
239 0304109F THRESHER................. 109 109
242 0304260F AIRBORNE SIGINT 98,319 98,319
ENTERPRISE.
243 0304310F COMMERCIAL ECONOMIC 1,713 1,713
ANALYSIS.
246 0304784F LONG ENDURANCE--AIRBORNE 16,570 16,570
ISR.
248 0305020F CCMD INTELLIGENCE 0
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.
249 0305022F ISR MODERNIZATION & 16,188 16,188
AUTOMATION DVMT (IMAD).
250 0305099F GLOBAL AIR TRAFFIC 4,210 4,210
MANAGEMENT (GATM).
251 0305103F CYBER SECURITY INITIATIVE 318 318
252 0305111F WEATHER SERVICE.......... 29,331 29,331
253 0305114F AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, 61,895 61,895
APPROACH, AND LANDING
SYSTEM (ATCALS).
254 0305116F AERIAL TARGETS........... 1,704 1,704
257 0305128F SECURITY AND 9,642 9,642
INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES.
258 0305146F DEFENSE JOINT 2,469 2,469
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES.
259 0305155F THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPON 24,364 24,364
STORAGE & SECURITY
SYSTEM.
260 0305158F TACTICAL TERMINAL........ 0
261 0305179F INTEGRATED BROADCAST 18,266 18,266
SERVICE (IBS).
262 0305206F AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE 34,273 34,273
SYSTEMS.
263 0305207F MANNED RECONNAISSANCE 17,114 17,114
SYSTEMS.
264 0305208F DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND/ 85,365 85,365
SURFACE SYSTEMS.
266 0305221F NETWORK-CENTRIC 9,146 9,146
COLLABORATIVE TARGETING.
267 0305238F NATO AGS................. 0
268 0305240F ISR TRANSPORT AND 312,037 312,037
PROCESSING.
269 0305249F AF JWICS ENTERPRISE...... 19,324 19,324
270 0305600F INTERNATIONAL 62,000 62,000
INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY
AND ARCHITECTURES.
271 0305836F C2IMERA.................. 11,393 11,393
272 0305903F COCOM MOBILE COMMAND AND 2,013 2,013
CONTROL CENTERS (MCCCS).
273 0305984F PERSONNEL RECOVERY 1,783 1,783
COMMAND & CTRL (PRC2).
274 0307577F INTELLIGENCE MISSION DATA 3,151 3,151
(IMD).
275 0401119F C-5 AIRLIFT SQUADRONS 76,233 76,233
(IF).
276 0401130F C-17 AIRCRAFT (IF)....... 178,130 7,000 185,130
..................... C-17 data bus recording [7,000]
upgrade.
277 0401132F C-130J PROGRAM........... 16,628 7,000 23,628
..................... C-130 advanced [7,000]
maintenance analytics
data kits.
278 0401134F LARGE AIRCRAFT IR 12,323 12,323
COUNTERMEASURES (LAIRCM).
279 0401218F KC-135S.................. 121,742 7,000 128,742
..................... KC-135 vertical wipers... [7,000]
280 0401318F CV-22.................... 45,699 45,699
281 0401334F LARGE AIRCRAFT 50,111 50,111
SURVIVABILITY SYSTEMS
(LASS).
282 0408011F SPECIAL TACTICS / COMBAT 0
CONTROL.
283 0708610F LOGISTICS INFORMATION 21,518 21,518
TECHNOLOGY (LOGIT).
284 0801380F AF LVC OPERATIONAL 23,472 23,472
TRAINING (LVC-OT).
285 0804743F OTHER FLIGHT TRAINING.... 1,950 1,950
286 0901202F JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY 2,035 2,035
AGENCY.
287 0901218F CIVILIAN COMPENSATION 4,248 4,248
PROGRAM.
288 0901220F PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION. 2,678 2,678
289 0901226F AIR FORCE STUDIES AND 81,252 81,252
ANALYSIS AGENCY.
291 0901538F FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 3,316 3,316
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
DEVELOPMENT.
292 0901554F DEFENSE ENTERPRISE ACNTNG 38,301 38,301
AND MGT SYS (DEAMS).
293 1201921F SERVICE SUPPORT TO 700 700
STRATCOM--SPACE
ACTIVITIES.
9999 9999999999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS...... 29,113,107 29,113,107
..................... SUBTOTAL OPERATIONAL 39,930,435 -33,777 39,896,658
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT.
.....................
..................... TOTAL RESEARCH, 73,075,614 1,578,423 74,654,037
DEVELOPMENT, TEST &
EVAL, AF.
.....................
..................... RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,
TEST & EVAL, SF
..................... BASIC RESEARCH
1 0601102SF DEFENSE RESEARCH SCIENCES 20,833 20,833
2 0601103SF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH 14,426 14,426
INITIATIVES.
..................... SUBTOTAL BASIC RESEARCH.. 35,259 0 35,259
.....................
..................... APPLIED RESEARCH
4 1206601SF SPACE TECHNOLOGY......... 234,190 10,000 244,190
..................... Establishment of [10,000]
Modeling, Simulation,
and Analysis Hub.
..................... SUBTOTAL APPLIED RESEARCH 234,190 10,000 244,190
.....................
..................... ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
5 1206310SF SPACE SCIENCE AND 313,738 313,738
TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT.
6 1206616SF SPACE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 126,427 126,427
DEVELOPMENT/DEMO.
..................... SUBTOTAL ADVANCED 440,165 0 440,165
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
.....................
..................... ADVANCED COMPONENT
DEVELOPMENT AND
PROTOTYPES
7 0604002SF SPACE FORCE WEATHER 3,581 3,581
SERVICES RESEARCH.
8 1203010SF SPACE FORCE IT, DATA 45,971 45,971
ANALYTICS, DIGITAL
SOLUTIONS.
9 1203164SF NAVSTAR GLOBAL 0
POSITIONING SYSTEM (USER
EQUIPMENT) (SPACE).
10 1203622SF SPACE WARFIGHTING 128,546 128,546
ANALYSIS.
11 1203710SF EO/IR WEATHER SYSTEMS.... 144,434 144,434
12 1203955SF SPACE ACCESS, MOBILITY & 9,724 9,724
LOGISTICS (SAML).
13 1206410SF SPACE TECHNOLOGY 1,246,316 1,246,316
DEVELOPMENT AND
PROTOTYPING.
14 1206427SF SPACE SYSTEMS PROTOTYPE 87,730 87,730
TRANSITIONS (SSPT).
15 1206438SF SPACE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY. 62,031 62,031
16 1206458SF TECH TRANSITION (SPACE).. 241,056 241,056
17 1206617SF OPERATIONAL TEST & 265,215 265,215
TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE.
18 1206730SF SPACE SECURITY AND 102,140 102,140
DEFENSE PROGRAM.
19 1206760SF PROTECTED TACTICAL 155,885 155,885
ENTERPRISE SERVICE
(PTES).
20 1206761SF PROTECTED TACTICAL 449,434 449,434
SERVICE (PTS).
21 1206855SF EVOLVED STRATEGIC SATCOM 0
(ESS).
22 1206857SF SPACE RAPID CAPABILITIES 9,950 9,950
OFFICE.
23 1206862SF TACTICALLY RESPONSIVE 86,306 10,000 96,306
SPACE.
..................... Orbital Pre-Positioned [10,000]
Tactically Responsive
Space capability
enhancement.
..................... SUBTOTAL ADVANCED 3,038,319 10,000 3,048,319
COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT
AND PROTOTYPES.
.....................
..................... SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION
24 1203269SF GPS III FOLLOW-ON (GPS 123,793 123,793
IIIF).
25 1206421SF COUNTERSPACE SYSTEMS..... 43,702 80,000 123,702
..................... Realignment from [80,000]
procurement for PDM.
26 1206422SF WEATHER SYSTEM FOLLOW-ON. 34,756 34,756
27 1206425SF SPACE SITUATION AWARENESS 1,317,841 1,317,841
SYSTEMS.
28 1206431SF ADVANCED EHF MILSATCOM 10,157 10,157
(SPACE).
29 1206433SF WIDEBAND GLOBAL SATCOM 0
(SPACE).
30 1206440SF NEXT-GEN OPIR--GROUND.... 761,425 761,425
31 1206442SF NEXT GENERATION OPIR..... 209,851 209,851
32 1206443SF NEXT-GEN OPIR--GEO....... 485,703 485,703
33 1206444SF NEXT-GEN OPIR--POLAR..... 0 500,000 500,000
..................... Restore funding to Next [500,000]
Generation Polar.
34 1206445SF COMMERCIAL SATCOM 68,554 68,554
(COMSATCOM) INTEGRATION.
35 1206446SF RESILIENT MISSILE WARNING 3,564,176 3,564,176
MISSILE TRACKING--LOW
EARTH ORBIT (LEO).
36 1206447SF RESILIENT MISSILE WARNING 1,413,662 1,413,662
MISSILE TRACKING--MEDIUM
EARTH ORBIT (MEO).
37 1206771SF COMMERCIAL SERVICES...... 23,752 23,752
38 1206853SF NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE 2,748 2,748
LAUNCH PROGRAM (SPACE)--
EMD.
39 1206855SF EVOLVED STRATEGIC SATCOM 1,838,718 1,838,718
(ESS).
..................... SUBTOTAL SYSTEM 9,898,838 580,000 10,478,838
DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION.
.....................
..................... MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
42 1206392SF ACQ WORKFORCE--SPACE & 260,731 260,731
MISSILE SYSTEMS.
43 1206398SF SPACE & MISSILE SYSTEMS 13,717 13,717
CENTER--MHA.
44 1206399SF SSC ENTERPRISE 230,848 230,848
ENGINEERING &
INTEGRATION.
45 1206759SF MAJOR T&E INVESTMENT-- 65,731 65,731
SPACE.
46 1206860SF ROCKET SYSTEMS LAUNCH 19,965 19,965
PROGRAM (SPACE).
47 1206864SF SPACE TEST PROGRAM (STP). 29,598 29,598
..................... SUBTOTAL MANAGEMENT 620,590 0 620,590
SUPPORT.
.....................
..................... OPERATIONAL SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT
49 1201212SF SERVICE-WIDE SUPPORT (NOT 28,425 41,377 69,802
OTHERWISE ACCOUNTED FOR).
..................... Realignment from AF [31,777]
Integrated Personnel and
Pay System.
..................... Realignment from [9,600]
Operation and
Maintenance for HR IT
automation.
50 1203001SF FAMILY OF ADVANCED BLOS 0
TERMINALS (FAB-T).
51 1203040SF DCO-SPACE................ 481,251 481,251
52 1203109SF NARROWBAND SATELLITE 855,860 855,860
COMMUNICATIONS.
53 1203110SF SATELLITE CONTROL NETWORK 92,537 92,537
(SPACE).
54 1203154SF LONG RANGE KILL CHAINS... 1,392,025 1,392,025
55 1203155SF SPACE-BASED MOVING TARGET 253,355 83,134 336,489
INDICATOR.
..................... Realignment for execution [-10,050]
..................... Realignment from [46,592]
procurement.
..................... Realignment from [46,592]
procurement for Space-
Based Moving Target
Indicator.
56 1203156SF DATA TRANSPORT AND 164,974 164,974
NETWORKING.
57 1203165SF NAVSTAR GLOBAL 115,000 115,000
POSITIONING SYSTEM
(SPACE AND CONTROL
SEGMENTS).
58 1203173SF SPACE AND MISSILE TEST 22,487 22,487
AND EVALUATION CENTER.
59 1203174SF SPACE INNOVATION, 10,538 10,538
INTEGRATION AND RAPID
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
60 1203182SF SPACELIFT RANGE SYSTEM 56,781 56,781
(SPACE).
61 1203330SF SPACE SUPERIORITY ISR.... 64,290 64,290
62 1203636SF SPACE DATA NETWORK....... 0
63 1203873SF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 0
RADARS.
64 1203906SF NCMC--ITW/AA SYSTEM...... 25,092 25,092
65 1203909SF BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY 128,630 128,630
WARNING SYSTEM (BMEWS).
66 1203913SF NUDET DETECTION SYSTEM 114,004 114,004
(SPACE).
67 1203940SF SPACE SITUATION AWARENESS 294,902 294,902
OPERATIONS.
68 1206423SF GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM 332,313 -98,000 234,313
III--OPERATIONAL CONTROL
SEGMENT.
..................... Realignment to [-98,000]
procurement for AEP
technical refresh.
72 1206772SF RAPID RESILIENT COMMAND 109,190 109,190
AND CONTROL (R2C2).
73 1207440SF AUTOMATE SAT C2.......... 1,524,300 -1,500,000 24,300
..................... Unjustified growth....... [-1,500,000]
74 1208053SF JOINT TACTICAL GROUND 92,731 92,731
SYSTEM.
9999 9999999999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS...... 17,330,381 -239,950 17,090,431
..................... Program realignment from [10,050]
SB-MTI.
..................... Unjustified growth....... [-250,000]
..................... SUBTOTAL OPERATIONAL 23,489,066 -1,713,439 21,775,627
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT.
.....................
..................... SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL
TECHNOLOGY PILOT
PROGRAMS
75 1208248SF SPACE DOMAIN AWARENESS/ 617,062 617,062
PLANNING/TASKING SW.
..................... SUBTOTAL SOFTWARE AND 617,062 0 617,062
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY PILOT
PROGRAMS.
.....................
..................... TOTAL RESEARCH, 38,373,489 -1,113,439 37,260,050
DEVELOPMENT, TEST &
EVAL, SF.
.....................
..................... RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,
TEST & EVAL, DW
..................... BASIC RESEARCH
1 0601000BR DTRA BASIC RESEARCH...... 15,070 15,070
3 0601108D8Z HIGH ENERGY LASER 17,667 17,667
RESEARCH INITIATIVES.
4 0601110D8Z BASIC RESEARCH 87,091 95,000 182,091
INITIATIVES.
..................... Defense Established [40,000]
Program to Stimulate
Competitive Research.
..................... Increase for Minerva [15,000]
program.
..................... Increase for Vanevar Bush [40,000]
fellowships.
6 0601120D8Z NATIONAL DEFENSE 165,488 165,488
EDUCATION PROGRAM.
7 0601122E EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES... 387,633 387,633
8 0601228D8Z HISTORICALLY BLACK 99,706 20,000 119,706
COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES/MINORITY
INSTITUTIONS.
..................... Historically Black [20,000]
Colleges and
Universities/Minority
Institutions.
9 0601384BP CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 27,425 27,425
DEFENSE PROGRAM.
..................... SUBTOTAL BASIC RESEARCH.. 800,080 115,000 915,080
.....................
..................... APPLIED RESEARCH
11 0602000D8Z JOINT MUNITIONS 32,145 32,145
TECHNOLOGY.
12 0602023E ACCESS AND AWARENESS..... 110,096 110,096
13 0602024E WARFIGHTING PERFORMANCE.. 364,141 364,141
14 0602025E MAKING, MAINTAINING, 1,624,523 1,624,523
SUPPLY CHAIN AND
LOGISTICS.
15 0602026E EFFECTS.................. 0
17 0602128D8Z PROMOTION AND PROTECTION 4,260 4,260
STRATEGIES.
18 0602230D8Z DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY 43,405 43,405
INNOVATION.
19 0602234D8Z LINCOLN LABORATORY 10,045 10,045
RESEARCH PROGRAM.
20 0602251D8Z APPLIED RESEARCH FOR THE 59,560 59,560
ADVANCEMENT OF S&T
PRIORITIES.
22 0602384BP CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 207,186 207,186
DEFENSE PROGRAM.
23 0602668D8Z CYBER SECURITY RESEARCH.. 18,575 35,000 53,575
..................... Pacific Intelligence and [5,000]
Innovation Initiative.
..................... University Consortium for [30,000]
Cybersecurity.
24 0602669D8Z MICROELECTRONICS COMMONS-- 0 50,000 50,000
APPLIED RESEARCH.
..................... Program increase......... [50,000]
29 0602718BR COUNTER WEAPONS OF MASS 157,287 157,287
DESTRUCTION APPLIED
RESEARCH.
30 0602751D8Z SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 7,069 7,069
INSTITUTE (SEI) APPLIED
RESEARCH.
31 0602890D8Z HIGH ENERGY LASER 50,408 50,408
RESEARCH.
32 0602891D8Z FSRM MODELLING........... 6,635 6,635
33 1160401BB SOF TECHNOLOGY 50,856 10,000 60,856
DEVELOPMENT.
..................... Cognitive Warfare and [10,000]
Narrative Intelligence.
..................... SUBTOTAL APPLIED RESEARCH 2,746,191 95,000 2,841,191
.....................
..................... ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
34 0603000D8Z JOINT MUNITIONS ADVANCED 64,251 64,251
TECHNOLOGY.
36 0603055D8Z OPERATIONAL ENERGY 165,060 165,060
CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENT.
38 0603122D8Z COMBATING TERRORISM 73,618 200,000 273,618
TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT.
..................... U.S.-Israel Cooperation [100,000]
to Counter Unmanned
Aerial Systems.
..................... U.S.-Israel Subterranean [100,000]
Operations Cooperation.
39 0603133D8Z FOREIGN COMPARATIVE 24,950 24,950
TESTING.
40 0603142D8Z MISSION ENGINEERING & 144,454 144,454
INTEGRATION (ME&I).
41 0603160BR COUNTER WEAPONS OF MASS 509,160 509,160
DESTRUCTION ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
42 0603176C ADVANCED CONCEPTS AND 0
PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT.
43 0603180C ADVANCED RESEARCH........ 482,573 25,000 507,573
..................... Advanced Research for [10,000]
Blood Platelet
Treatments.
..................... Autonomous Surface Vessel [15,000]
Support.
44 0603183D8Z JOINT HYPERSONIC 424,422 15,000 439,422
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
&TRANSITION.
..................... Hypersonic Ground Test [15,000]
Infrastructure.
45 0603225D8Z JOINT DOD-DOE MUNITIONS 45,375 45,375
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
48 0603288D8Z ANALYTIC ASSESSMENTS..... 36,917 36,917
49 0603289D8Z ADVANCED INNOVATIVE 51,960 51,960
ANALYSIS AND CONCEPTS.
50 0603330D8Z QUANTUM APPLICATION...... 60,333 60,333
51 0603331D8Z FUTURE GENERATION 5,000 5,000
WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES.
52 0603342D8Z DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT 522,559 5,000 527,559
(DIU).
..................... Defense Innovation Unit [5,000]
OnRamp Hub Expansion.
53 0603375D8Z TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION.... 982,694 -350,000 632,694
..................... Unjustified growth....... [-350,000]
54 0603379D8Z ADVANCED TECHNICAL 79,268 79,268
INTEGRATION.
55 0603384BP CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 310,308 310,308
DEFENSE PROGRAM--
ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT.
56 0603467E DARPA ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 1,568,124 -93,000 1,475,124
DEVELOPMENT.
..................... Cut to Perfect Victory [-93,000]
and HATS.
57 0603468E ADVANCED COMPLEX SYSTEMS. 540,362 540,362
58 0603469E ADVANCED ENABLING 331,007 331,007
TECHNOLOGIES.
59 0603618D8Z JOINT ELECTRONIC ADVANCED 49,083 49,083
TECHNOLOGY.
60 0603662D8Z NETWORKED COMMUNICATIONS 696,297 696,297
CAPABILITIES.
62 0603680D8Z DEFENSE-WIDE 581,847 20,000 601,847
MANUFACTURING SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM.
..................... Hypersonic Advanced [8,000]
Materials.
..................... Manufacturing Advancement [12,000]
for Novel Technology
Innovation and
Sustainment (F-47).
63 0603680S MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 49,787 49,787
PROGRAM.
64 0603712S GENERIC LOGISTICS R&D 18,791 18,791
TECHNOLOGY
DEMONSTRATIONS.
65 0603716D8Z STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL 60,774 60,774
RESEARCH PROGRAM.
66 0603720S MICROELECTRONICS 139,923 139,923
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
AND SUPPORT.
67 0603727D8Z JOINT WARFIGHTING PROGRAM 0
72 0603781D8Z SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 10,227 10,227
INSTITUTE.
73 0603834D8Z BIOSURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 9,800 9,800
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT.
74 0603838D8Z DEFENSE INNOVATION 310,977 310,977
ACCELERATION (DIA).
75 0603924D8Z HIGH ENERGY LASER 201,125 5,000 206,125
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
PROGRAM.
..................... Ultra-Short Pulsed Laser [5,000]
Weapons.
76 0603941D8Z TEST & EVALUATION SCIENCE 3,834,080 -1,455,706 2,378,374
& TECHNOLOGY.
..................... MACH-XL program increase. [200,000]
..................... Unjustified growth....... [-1,655,706]
77 0603945D8Z INTERNATIONAL INNOVATION 158,345 158,345
INITIATIVES.
79 0604055D8Z OPERATIONAL ENERGY 0 55,000 55,000
CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENT.
..................... Energy mission planning-- [50,000]
program increase.
..................... Innovative high energy [5,000]
density sodium battery.
80 1160402BB SOF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 126,085 126,085
DEVELOPMENT.
..................... SUBTOTAL ADVANCED 12,669,536 -1,573,706 11,095,830
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
.....................
..................... ADVANCED COMPONENT
DEVELOPMENT AND
PROTOTYPES
81 0603161D8Z NUCLEAR MATTERS, ADVANCED 44,685 15,000 59,685
COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT &
PROTOTYPES.
..................... Advanced prototyping [15,000]
acceleration.
82 0603600D8Z WALKOFF.................. 227,158 227,158
83 0603851D8Z ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 125,066 3,000 128,066
TECHNICAL CERTIFICATION
PROGRAM.
..................... STED program increase-- [3,000]
accelerate SOF
warfighter technologies.
84 0603881C BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 0
TERMINAL DEFENSE SEGMENT.
85 0603882C BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 1,360,611 -75,000 1,285,611
MIDCOURSE DEFENSE
SEGMENT.
..................... Unjustified growth....... [-75,000]
86 0603884BP CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 391,307 391,307
DEFENSE PROGRAM--DEM/VAL.
87 0603884C BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 865,420 865,420
SENSORS.
88 0603890C BMD ENABLING PROGRAMS.... 1,457,437 -15,000 1,442,437
..................... DEEP SENTRY tool [5,000]
development.
..................... Program decrease......... [-20,000]
89 0603891C SPECIAL PROGRAMS--MDA.... 1,742,778 -100,000 1,642,778
..................... Unjustified growth....... [-100,000]
90 0603892C AEGIS BMD................ 927,870 927,870
91 0603896C BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 939,987 939,987
COMMAND AND CONTROL,
BATTLE MANAGEMENT AND
COMMUNICATIONS (C2BMC).
92 0603898C BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 50,430 50,430
JOINT WARFIGHTER SUPPORT.
93 0603904C MISSILE DEFENSE 57,892 57,892
INTEGRATION & OPERATIONS
CENTER (MDIOC).
94 0603906C REGARDING TRENCH......... 29,807 29,807
95 0603907C SEA BASED X-BAND RADAR 274,204 274,204
(SBX).
96 0603913C ISRAELI COOPERATIVE 300,000 300,000
PROGRAMS.
97 0603914C BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 1,065,474 1,065,474
TEST.
98 0603915C BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 518,506 27,000 545,506
TARGETS.
..................... Advanced Target Front End [7,000]
(ATFE) Configuration 3
(C3) Risk Reduction.
..................... Development of full- [10,000]
scale, low-cost
hypersonic vehicle
target.
..................... Expanded operational [10,000]
testing.
99 0603923D8Z COALITION WARFARE........ 10,082 10,082
100 0604011D8Z NEXT GENERATION 0
INFORMATION
COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY (5G).
101 0604016D8Z DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 2,675 2,675
CORROSION PROGRAM.
102 0604023D8Z JOINT MUNITIONS COMPONENT 7,893 7,893
PROTOTYPING.
103 0604102C GUAM DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT. 212,413 100,000 312,413
..................... Program increase......... [100,000]
104 0604115C TECHNOLOGY MATURATION 59,700 59,700
INITIATIVES.
106 0604125D8Z ADVANCED MANUFACTURING 52,122 10,000 62,122
COMPONENTS AND
PROTOTYPES.
..................... Advanced Manufacturing [10,000]
Pilot Research Facility
for Large Scale, Large
Volume, Agile, Additive
and Hybrid Manufacturing.
107 0604162D8Z CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 945 945
WEAPONS ELIMINATION
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.
108 0604181C HYPERSONIC DEFENSE....... 213,783 213,783
109 0604250D8Z ADVANCED INNOVATIVE 2,626,130 150,000 2,776,130
TECHNOLOGIES.
..................... HGWS/MDACS integration [150,000]
and test.
110 0604294D8Z TRUSTED & ASSURED 156,743 350,000 506,743
MICROELECTRONICS.
..................... Restore funding for [350,000]
microelectronics
activities.
111 0604331D8Z RAPID PROTOTYPING PROGRAM 238,800 140,000 378,800
..................... Covert Acoustic [5,000]
Communications.
..................... HALE/HAPS................ [5,000]
..................... Rapidly Scalable [100,000]
Affordable Mass Group 2/
3 UAS.
..................... Unmanned Fleet Expansion. [30,000]
113 0604341D8Z DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT 0 330,000 330,000
(DIU) PROTOTYPING.
..................... Alternative low-cost [75,000]
exoatmospheric
interceptor.
..................... Alternative low-cost [25,000]
ground-launched extended-
range munition.
..................... Alternative low-cost [35,000]
medium air-to-air
missile.
..................... Alternative low-cost [40,000]
medium-range integrated
air and missile defense
interceptor.
..................... Alternative low-cost [35,000]
short-range integrated
air and missile defense
interceptor.
..................... Alternative low-cost [20,000]
shoulder launched
missile.
..................... Ramjet munition from a [100,000]
responsive strike
aircraft.
114 0604400D8Z DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 2,024 2,024
(DOD) UNMANNED SYSTEM
COMMON DEVELOPMENT.
115 0604539D8Z DEFENSE AUTONOMOUS 1,000,000 1,000,000
WARFARE GROUP.
116 0604551BR CATAPULT INFORMATION 7,500 7,500
SYSTEM.
117 0604555D8Z OPERATIONAL ENERGY 53,505 40,000 93,505
PROTOTYPING--NON S&T.
..................... Operational energy [40,000]
prototyping.
119 0604679D8Z OFFICE OF STRATEGIC 18,955 231,045 250,000
CAPITAL (OSC).
..................... Establish OSC equity [250,000]
account.
..................... Reduction for program no [-18,955]
longer executed by OSC.
120 0604682D8Z SUPPORT FOR STRATEGIC 2,802 2,802
ANALYSIS.
122 0604791D8Z MULTI-DOMAIN JOINT 32,001 32,001
OPERATIONS (MDJO).
123 0604797D8Z JOINT ENERGETIC 6,278 6,278
TRANSITION OFFICE.
124 0604826J JOINT C5 CAPABILITY 28,314 28,314
DEVELOPMENT, INTEGRATION
AND INTEROPERABILITY
ASSESSMENTS.
125 0604834D8Z BIOSURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 7,000 7,000
DEVELOPMENT &
PROTOTYPING.
126 0604873C LONG RANGE DISCRIMINATION 125,074 125,074
RADAR (LRDR).
127 0604874C IMPROVED HOMELAND DEFENSE 1,344,824 1,344,824
INTERCEPTORS.
128 0604876C BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 0
TERMINAL DEFENSE SEGMENT
TEST.
129 0604878C AEGIS BMD TEST........... 61,969 61,969
130 0604879C BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 52,919 52,919
SENSOR TEST.
131 0604880C LAND-BASED SM-3 (LBSM3).. 25,102 25,102
132 0604887C BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 53,761 53,761
MIDCOURSE SEGMENT TEST.
133 0604924D8Z HIGH ENERGY LASER 44,485 44,485
ADVANCED COMPONENT
DEVELOPMENT & PROTOTYPE.
134 0202057C SAFETY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 2,146 2,146
135 0208059JCY CYBERCOM ACTIVITIES...... 31,735 31,735
137 0208086JCY CYBER TRAINING 120,814 120,814
ENVIRONMENT (CTE).
139 0305103C CYBER SECURITY INITIATIVE 2,160 2,160
140 0305245D8Z INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES 15,047 5,000 20,047
AND INNOVATION
INVESTMENTS.
..................... Geospatial Workforce [5,000]
Development Program.
142 1206895C BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 95,819 95,819
SYSTEM SPACE PROGRAMS.
..................... SUBTOTAL ADVANCED 17,094,152 1,211,045 18,305,197
COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT
AND PROTOTYPES.
.....................
..................... SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION
144 0604123D8Z CHIEF DIGITAL AND 11,197 11,197
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER (CDAO)--DEM/VAL
ACTIVITIES.
145 0604133D8Z ALPHA-1 DEVELOPMENT 969,825 -250,000 719,825
ACTIVITIES.
..................... Unjustified growth for [-250,000]
Alpha-1 activities.
146 0604161D8Z NUCLEAR MATTERS, SYSTEM 14,919 14,919
DEVELOPMENT &
DEMONSTRATION.
147 0604384BP CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 261,947 261,947
DEFENSE PROGRAM--EMD.
148 0604771D8Z JOINT TACTICAL 10,200 10,200
INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM (JTIDS).
149 0605000BR COUNTER WEAPONS OF MASS 16,713 16,713
DESTRUCTION SYSTEMS
DEVELOPMENT.
150 0605013BL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 13,620 13,620
DEVELOPMENT.
151 0605021SE HOMELAND PERSONNEL 9,334 9,334
SECURITY INITIATIVE.
152 0605022D8Z DEFENSE EXPORTABILITY 5,943 50,000 55,943
PROGRAM.
..................... Increase for Defense [50,000]
Exportability Features
program.
153 0605027D8Z OUSD(C) IT DEVELOPMENT 273,253 -50,000 223,253
INITIATIVES.
..................... Unjustified growth for [-50,000]
OUSD(C) IT development.
154 0605080S DEFENSE AGENCY 51,265 51,265
INITIATIVES (DAI)--
FINANCIAL SYSTEM.
155 0605141BR MISSION ASSURANCE RISK 0
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
(MARMS).
156 0605210D8Z DEFENSE-WIDE ELECTRONIC 7,918 7,918
PROCUREMENT CAPABILITIES.
157 0605294D8Z TRUSTED & ASSURED 51,202 100,000 151,202
MICROELECTRONICS.
..................... Restore funding for [100,000]
microelectronics
activities.
158 0605310D8Z MILITARY AVIATION AND 4,072 4,072
INSTALLATION ASSURANCE
SITING CLEARINGHOUSE.
159 0605649D8Z ACQUISITION INTEGRATION 92,689 92,689
AND INTEROPERABILITY
(AI2).
160 0605755D8Z RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR 3,090 3,090
DEFENSE MODERNIZATION
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION.
161 0605772D8Z NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, 2,985 2,985
& COMMUNICATIONS.
162 0205401JCA COUNTER--SMALL UNMANNED 580,348 580,348
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (JIATF-
401).
163 0305282D8Z JOINT FIRES NETWORK (JFN) 0
164 0305282K JOINT FIRES NETWORK (JFN) 35,000 35,000
165 0305304D8Z REAL PROPERTY ANALYTICS.. 2,573 2,573
166 0305310D8Z COUNTERPROLIFERATION 12,751 12,751
ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT.
..................... SUBTOTAL SYSTEM 2,430,844 -150,000 2,280,844
DEVELOPMENT AND
DEMONSTRATION.
.....................
..................... MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
168 0603829J JOINT CAPABILITY 12,332 12,332
EXPERIMENTATION.
169 0604122D8Z JADC2 DEVELOPMENT AND 2,109,895 -650,000 1,459,895
EXPERIMENTATION
ACTIVITIES.
..................... Unjustified growth for [-650,000]
JADC2.
171 0604774D8Z DEFENSE READINESS 8,921 8,921
REPORTING SYSTEM (DRRS).
172 0604875D8Z JOINT SYSTEMS 11,094 11,094
ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT.
173 0604940D8Z CENTRAL TEST AND 1,153,754 1,153,754
EVALUATION INVESTMENT
DEVELOPMENT (CTEIP).
174 0604942D8Z ASSESSMENTS AND 0
EVALUATIONS.
175 0605001E MISSION SUPPORT.......... 108,101 108,101
176 0605100D8Z JOINT MISSION ENVIRONMENT 234,700 234,700
TEST CAPABILITY (JMETC).
177 0605126J JOINT INTEGRATED AIR AND 69,820 69,820
MISSILE DEFENSE
ORGANIZATION (JIAMDO).
178 0605128D8Z CLASSIFIED PROGRAM USD(P) 0
179 0605131D8Z LIVE FIRE TESTING........ 9,020 9,020
180 0605142D8Z SYSTEMS ENGINEERING...... 21,992 21,992
181 0605151D8Z STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 5,255 5,255
SUPPORT--OSD.
182 0605161D8Z NUCLEAR MATTERS 21,862 21,862
MANAGEMENT SUPPORT.
183 0605170D8Z SUPPORT TO NETWORKS AND 26,878 3,000 29,878
INFORMATION INTEGRATION.
..................... Third-Party hardware [3,000]
evaluation and
independent analysis.
184 0605200D8Z GENERAL SUPPORT TO 10,695 10,695
OUSD(INTELLIGENCE AND
SECURITY).
185 0605384BP CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 89,467 89,467
DEFENSE PROGRAM.
192 0605711D8Z CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY 10,913 10,913
ANALYSIS.
193 0605790D8Z SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION 8,435 8,435
RESEARCH (SBIR)/ SMALL
BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER (STTR)
ADMINISTRATION.
194 0605797D8Z MAINTAINING TECHNOLOGY 35,512 35,512
ADVANTAGE.
195 0605798D8Z DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY 165,450 165,450
ANALYSIS.
196 0605801KA DEFENSE TECHNICAL 57,576 57,576
INFORMATION CENTER
(DTIC).
197 0605803SE R&D IN SUPPORT OF DOD 34,359 34,359
ENLISTMENT, TESTING AND
EVALUATION.
198 0605804D8Z DEVELOPMENT TEST AND 35,106 35,106
EVALUATION.
199 0605898E MANAGEMENT HQ--R&D....... 5,383 5,383
200 0605998KA MANAGEMENT HQ--DEFENSE 3,489 3,489
TECHNICAL INFORMATION
CENTER (DTIC).
201 0606005D8Z SPECIAL ACTIVITIES....... 19,260 19,260
202 0606100D8Z BUDGET AND PROGRAM 10,678 10,678
ASSESSMENTS.
203 0606114D8Z ANALYSIS WORKING GROUP 11,668 11,668
(AWG) SUPPORT.
205 0606220D8Z OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 75,000 75,000
OF WAR ENTERPRISE
TRANSFORMATION AND
MODERNIZATION.
206 0606225D8Z ODNA TECHNOLOGY AND 3,264 3,264
RESOURCE ANALYSIS.
207 0606300D8Z DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD.... 6,307 6,307
208 0606301D8Z AVIATION SAFETY 986 986
TECHNOLOGIES.
209 0606771D8Z CYBER RESILIENCY AND 30,746 30,746
CYBERSECURITY POLICY.
210 0606774D8Z DEFENSE CIVILIAN TRAINING 0 20,000 20,000
CORPS.
..................... Defense civilian training [20,000]
corps increase.
211 0606775D8Z JOINT PRODUCTION 6,215 6,215
ACCELERATOR CELL (JPAC).
212 0606829D8Z SUSTAINMENT TRANSITION 29,408 29,408
CAPABILITIES.
213 0606853BR MANAGEMENT, TECHNICAL & 0
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.
214 0203345D8Z DEFENSE OPERATIONS 0
SECURITY INITIATIVE
(DOSI).
215 0204571J JOINT STAFF ANALYTICAL 5,088 5,088
SUPPORT.
216 0207834D8Z BIOSURVEILLANCE PROGRAM.. 7,000 7,000
217 0208045K C4I INTEROPERABILITY..... 72,581 72,581
218 0303169D8Z INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 6,416 6,416
RAPID ACQUISITION.
219 0305172K COMBINED ADVANCED 5,566 5,566
APPLICATIONS.
221 0305208K DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND/ 2,951 2,951
SURFACE SYSTEMS.
222 0305248J JOINT STAFF OFFICE OF THE 67,007 67,007
CHIEF DATA OFFICER
(OCDO) ACTIVITIES.
223 0804768J COCOM EXERCISE ENGAGEMENT 90,424 90,424
AND TRAINING
TRANSFORMATION (CE2T2)--
NON-MHA.
224 0808709SE DEFENSE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 0
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE
(DEOMI).
225 0808737SE INTEGRATED PRIMARY 5,768 5,768
PREVENTION.
226 0901598C MANAGEMENT HQ--MDA....... 31,863 31,863
227 0903235K JOINT SERVICE PROVIDER 0
(JSP).
9999 9999999999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS...... 36,977 36,977
..................... SUBTOTAL MANAGEMENT 4,775,182 -627,000 4,148,182
SUPPORT.
.....................
..................... OPERATIONAL SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT
229 0604011D8Z NEXT GENERATION 5,893 5,893
INFORMATION
COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY (5G).
231 0604538D8Z ECONOMIC DEFENSE UNIT 403,903 -350,000 53,903
(EDU).
..................... Transfer to OSC.......... [-250,000]
..................... Unjustified growth for [-100,000]
Economic Defense Unit.
232 0607162D8Z CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 2,931 2,931
WEAPONS ELIMINATION
TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENT.
233 0607210D8Z INDUSTRIAL BASE ANALYSIS 1,177,356 97,000 1,274,356
AND SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT.
..................... Automated textile [50,000]
manufacturing program.
..................... Fan-Out Water-Level [10,000]
Packaging.
..................... MUDCAT: Secure [22,000]
Manufacturing and
Integration Capability.
..................... Multi Domain Operations [10,000]
(MDO) and
Electromagnetic Spectrum
Operations (EMSO) Range.
..................... Stem+M Shipbuilding [5,000]
Workforce Education
Program.
234 0607310D8Z COUNTERPROLIFERATION 11,304 11,304
MODERNIZATION.
235 0607327T GLOBAL THEATER SECURITY 6,010 6,010
COOPERATION MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION SYSTEMS (G-
TSCMIS).
236 0607384BP CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 82,695 82,695
DEFENSE (OPERATIONAL
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT).
237 0607385BR COUNTER WEAPONS OF MASS 4,108 4,108
DESTRUCTION OPERATIONAL
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT.
238 0607757D8Z RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR 2,794 2,794
DEFENSE MODERNIZATION
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM
DEVELOPMENT.
239 0208085JCY ROBUST INFRASTRUCTURE AND 155,613 155,613
ACCESS.
240 0208097JCY CYBER COMMAND AND CONTROL 85,958 85,958
(CYBER C2).
241 0208099JCY DATA AND UNIFIED PLATFORM 84,687 84,687
(D&UP).
245 0302019K DEFENSE INFO 13,312 13,312
INFRASTRUCTURE
ENGINEERING AND
INTEGRATION.
246 0302609V COUNTERING THREATS 11,710 11,710
AUTOMATED PLATFORM.
247 0303126K LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS-- 10,508 10,508
DCS.
248 0303131K MINIMUM ESSENTIAL 10,307 10,307
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS
NETWORK (MEECN).
250 0303140D8Z INFORMATION SYSTEMS 35,214 35,214
SECURITY PROGRAM.
252 0303140K INFORMATION SYSTEMS 33,502 33,502
SECURITY PROGRAM.
253 0303153K DEFENSE SPECTRUM 49,466 49,466
ORGANIZATION.
254 0303171K JOINT PLANNING AND 10,615 10,615
EXECUTION SERVICES.
257 0303430V FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE 50,900 50,900
SERVICES INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY.
265 0305104D8Z DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE 17,077 17,077
(DIB) CYBER SECURITY
INITIATIVE.
269 0305146V DEFENSE JOINT 6,751 6,751
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES.
270 0305172D8Z COMBINED ADVANCED 18,912 18,912
APPLICATIONS.
272 0305186D8Z POLICY R&D PROGRAMS...... 11,740 11,740
275 0305199D8Z NET CENTRICITY........... 55,673 55,673
277 0305208BB DISTRIBUTED COMMON GROUND/ 0
SURFACE SYSTEMS.
282 0305387D8Z HOMELAND DEFENSE 1,730 1,730
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
PROGRAM.
283 0305601K MISSION PARTNER 15,464 15,464
ENVIRONMENTS.
293 0306250JCY CYBER OPERATIONS 1,303,094 115,000 1,418,094
TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT.
..................... Artificial Intelligence [30,000]
for cyberspace
operations.
..................... CYBERCOM 2.0............. [35,000]
..................... Extending technical [50,000]
service support.
294 0307609V NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL 19,840 19,840
SECURITY SYSTEMS (NISS).
297 0708012K LOGISTICS SUPPORT 2,051 2,051
ACTIVITIES.
298 0708012S PACIFIC DISASTER CENTERS. 0 9,500 9,500
..................... Pacific Disaster Centers. [9,500]
299 0708047S DEFENSE PROPERTY 2,829 2,829
ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM.
302 1160403BB AVIATION SYSTEMS......... 216,781 6,510 223,291
..................... SOCOM UPL--Adaptive [6,510]
Airborne Enterprise
Group 3 sUAS.
303 1160405BB INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS 109,227 10,000 119,227
DEVELOPMENT.
..................... Ultra-light Group 1 sUAS. [10,000]
304 1160408BB OPERATIONAL ENHANCEMENTS. 279,478 33,200 312,678
..................... SOCOM UPL--Ground [25,700]
infiltration protection
system.
..................... SOCOM UPL--Operational [7,500]
capacity enhancements.
305 1160431BB WARRIOR SYSTEMS.......... 435,074 43,100 478,174
..................... SOCOM UPL-- [3,500]
Electromagnetic warfare
family of systems.
..................... SOCOM UPL--Ground [4,000]
infiltration protection
system.
..................... SOCOM UPL--Ground organic [5,000]
precision strike systems.
..................... SOCOM UPL--Munitions War [8,500]
Reserve.
..................... SOCOM UPL--Small cruise [22,100]
missile development.
306 1160432BB SPECIAL PROGRAMS......... 25,761 25,761
307 1160434BB UNMANNED ISR............. 0
308 1160480BB SOF TACTICAL VEHICLES.... 0
309 1160483BB MARITIME SYSTEMS......... 351,721 12,300 364,021
..................... Open-architecture [10,000]
unmanned surface vessel
experimentation.
..................... SOCOM UPL--Mission [2,300]
critical Dry Combat
Submersible battery
upgrade.
310 1160490BB OPERATIONAL ENHANCEMENTS 25,747 25,747
INTELLIGENCE.
311 1203610K TELEPORT PROGRAM......... 22,244 22,244
9999 9999999999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS...... 8,923,353 8,923,353
..................... SUBTOTAL OPERATIONAL 14,093,333 -23,390 14,069,943
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT.
.....................
..................... SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL
TECHNOLOGY PILOT
PROGRAMS
312 0608140D8Z ENTERPRISE PLATFORMS AND 481,775 481,775
CAPABILITIES--SOFTWARE
PILOT PROGRAM.
313 0608500D8Z WEAPONEERING CODE 23,071 23,071
SUSTAINMENT.
314 0608648D8Z ACQUISITION VISIBILITY-- 64,364 64,364
SOFTWARE PILOT PROGRAM.
315 0608775D8Z ACCELERATE THE 0
PROCUREMENT AND FIELDING
OF INNOVATIVE
TECHNOLOGIES (APFIT).
316 0608776D8Z DEFENSE INNOVATION UNIT 433,867 433,867
FIELDING.
317 0303150K GLOBAL COMMAND AND 124,329 124,329
CONTROL SYSTEM.
..................... SUBTOTAL SOFTWARE AND 1,127,406 0 1,127,406
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY PILOT
PROGRAMS.
.....................
..................... TOTAL RESEARCH, 55,736,724 -953,051 54,783,673
DEVELOPMENT, TEST &
EVAL, DW.
.....................
..................... GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA
FUND
..................... RESEARCH, DEV, TEST &
EVAL
9 0604139D8Z GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA-- 367,000 367,000
MDA.
15 0901159D8Z GOLDEN DOME FOR AMERICA.. 30,971 30,971
..................... SUBTOTAL RESEARCH, DEV, 397,971 0 397,971
TEST & EVAL.
.....................
..................... TOTAL GOLDEN DOME FOR 397,971 397,971
AMERICA FUND.
.....................
..................... OPERATIONAL TEST & EVAL,
DEFENSE
..................... MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
1 0605118OTE OPERATIONAL TEST AND 101,365 70,000 171,365
EVALUATION.
..................... Additional support for [50,000]
data analysis activities
and testing for AI
systems.
..................... Cyber assessments........ [20,000]
2 0605131OTE LIVE FIRE TEST AND 11,000 11,000
EVALUATION.
3 0605814OTE OPERATIONAL TEST 0
ACTIVITIES AND ANALYSES.
..................... SUBTOTAL MANAGEMENT 112,365 70,000 182,365
SUPPORT.
.....................
..................... TOTAL OPERATIONAL TEST & 112,365 70,000 182,365
EVAL, DEFENSE.
.....................
..................... TOTAL RDT&E.............. 218,791,608 1,126,420 219,918,028
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TITLE XLIII--OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE (In Thousands of Dollars)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2027 Senate
Line Item Request Senate Change Authorized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY
OPERATING FORCES
010 MANEUVER UNITS...................................... 5,309,790 43,205 5,352,995
Winter equipment.................................... [43,205]
020 MODULAR SUPPORT BRIGADES............................ 375,682 375,682
030 ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE.............................. 1,193,028 173,738 1,366,766
Realignment from procurement for THAAD battery [173,738]
support............................................
040 THEATER LEVEL ASSETS................................ 2,395,049 2,395,049
050 LAND FORCES OPERATIONS SUPPORT...................... 1,273,674 1,273,674
060 AVIATION ASSETS..................................... 1,930,557 1,930,557
070 FORCE READINESS OPERATIONS SUPPORT.................. 7,186,195 7,186,195
080 LAND FORCES SYSTEMS READINESS....................... 888,277 888,277
090 LAND FORCES DEPOT MAINTENANCE....................... 2,022,115 120,000 2,142,115
Depot Equipment Maintenance......................... [120,000]
100 MEDICAL READINESS................................... 786,815 786,815
110 BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT............................. 10,390,174 12,656 10,402,830
Increase Child and Youth Program Funding............ [12,656]
120 FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION. 5,435,364 -5,435,364
Transfer to Division B.............................. [-5,435,364]
130 MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS............. 287,812 287,812
140 ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES............................... 383,610 383,610
150 RESET............................................... 117,880 117,880
160 US AFRICA COMMAND................................... 693,812 693,812
170 US EUROPEAN COMMAND................................. 510,862 15,000 525,862
EUCOM -Joint Intelligence Coordination Center....... [15,000]
180 US SOUTHERN COMMAND................................. 464,769 464,769
190 US FORCES KOREA..................................... 77,775 77,775
200 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES--CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS........ 366,311 366,311
210 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES--CYBERSECURITY................ 579,954 579,954
SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES........................... 42,669,505 -5,070,765 37,598,740

MOBILIZATION
220 STRATEGIC MOBILITY.................................. 53,602 53,602
230 ARMY PREPOSITIONED STOCKS........................... 1,125,709 1,125,709
240 INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS............................. 3,172 3,172
SUBTOTAL MOBILIZATION............................... 1,182,483 0 1,182,483

TRAINING AND RECRUITING
250 OFFICER ACQUISITION................................. 193,530 193,530
260 RECRUIT TRAINING.................................... 70,431 70,431
270 ONE STATION UNIT TRAINING........................... 96,115 96,115
280 SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS.............. 503,896 503,896
290 SPECIALIZED SKILL TRAINING.......................... 1,204,230 1,204,230
300 FLIGHT TRAINING..................................... 1,381,437 1,381,437
310 PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION.................. 201,481 201,481
320 TRAINING SUPPORT.................................... 609,925 609,925
330 RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING.......................... 712,092 712,092
340 EXAMINING........................................... 0
350 OFF-DUTY AND VOLUNTARY EDUCATION.................... 216,256 4,224 220,480
Increase Tuition/Credentialing Assistance........... [4,224]
360 CIVILIAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING..................... 218,683 218,683
370 JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS............... 218,598 218,598
SUBTOTAL TRAINING AND RECRUITING.................... 5,626,674 4,224 5,630,898

ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES
390 SERVICEWIDE TRANSPORTATION.......................... 1,483,938 1,483,938
400 CENTRAL SUPPLY ACTIVITIES........................... 703,829 703,829
410 LOGISTIC SUPPORT ACTIVITIES......................... 634,879 634,879
420 AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT............................... 525,732 525,732
430 ADMINISTRATION...................................... 402,276 402,276
440 SERVICEWIDE COMMUNICATIONS.......................... 2,252,914 2,252,914
450 MANPOWER MANAGEMENT................................. 324,069 324,069
460 OTHER PERSONNEL SUPPORT............................. 961,851 961,851
470 OTHER SERVICE SUPPORT............................... 2,179,562 65,979 2,245,541
Increase to Civilian Personnel Compensation......... [65,979]
480 ARMY CLAIMS ACTIVITIES.............................. 139,480 139,480
490 REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT.............................. 308,271 308,271
500 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND AUDIT READINESS............ 434,778 434,778
510 DEF ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNT....... 37,654 37,654
520 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS................. 760,520 760,520
530 MISC. SUPPORT OF OTHER NATIONS...................... 28,681 28,681
9999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS................................. 3,457,587 3,457,587
SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES................... 14,636,021 65,979 14,702,000

UNDISTRIBUTED
600 UNDISTRIBUTED....................................... 0 -812,335
Unobligated balances................................ [-812,335]
SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED.............................. 0 -812,335

TOTAL OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY............... 64,114,683 -5,812,897 58,301,786

OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY RES
OPERATING FORCES
010 MODULAR SUPPORT BRIGADES............................ 15,213 15,213
020 ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE.............................. 674,766 674,766
030 THEATER LEVEL ASSETS................................ 121,223 121,223
040 LAND FORCES OPERATIONS SUPPORT...................... 664,612 664,612
050 AVIATION ASSETS..................................... 37,490 37,490
060 FORCE READINESS OPERATIONS SUPPORT.................. 380,473 380,473
070 LAND FORCES SYSTEMS READINESS....................... 41,301 41,301
080 LAND FORCES DEPOT MAINTENANCE....................... 37,429 37,429
090 BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT............................. 577,337 577,337
100 FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION. 411,093 -411,093
Transfer to Division B.............................. [-411,093]
110 MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS............. 27,810 27,810
120 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES--CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS........ 2,725 2,725
130 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES--CYBERSECURITY................ 19,422 19,422
SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES........................... 3,010,894 -411,093 2,599,801

ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES
140 SERVICEWIDE TRANSPORTATION.......................... 15,237 15,237
150 ADMINISTRATION...................................... 11,708 11,708
160 SERVICEWIDE COMMUNICATIONS.......................... 4,165 4,165
170 MANPOWER MANAGEMENT................................. 7,300 7,300
180 OTHER PERSONNEL SUPPORT............................. 63,330 63,330
SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES................... 101,740 0 101,740

UNDISTRIBUTED
220 UNDISTRIBUTED....................................... 0 -10,222
Unobligated balances................................ [-10,222]
SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED.............................. 0 -10,222

TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY RES............. 3,112,634 -421,315 2,691,319

OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARNG
OPERATING FORCES
010 MANEUVER UNITS...................................... 807,777 807,777
020 MODULAR SUPPORT BRIGADES............................ 233,114 233,114
030 ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE.............................. 1,143,423 1,143,423
040 THEATER LEVEL ASSETS................................ 84,598 84,598
050 LAND FORCES OPERATIONS SUPPORT...................... 344,161 344,161
060 AVIATION ASSETS..................................... 1,096,948 1,096,948
070 FORCE READINESS OPERATIONS SUPPORT.................. 864,172 864,172
080 LAND FORCES SYSTEMS READINESS....................... 93,367 93,367
090 LAND FORCES DEPOT MAINTENANCE....................... 171,055 171,055
100 BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT............................. 1,326,854 1,326,854
110 FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION. 1,065,363 -1,065,363
Transfer to Division B.............................. [-1,065,363]
120 MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS............. 1,116,559 1,116,559
130 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES--CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS........ 6,831 6,831
140 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES--CYBERSECURITY................ 24,785 24,785
SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES........................... 8,379,007 -1,065,363 7,313,644

ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES
150 SERVICEWIDE TRANSPORTATION.......................... 6,604 6,604
160 ADMINISTRATION...................................... 50,221 50,221
170 SERVICEWIDE COMMUNICATIONS.......................... 24,846 24,846
180 OTHER PERSONNEL SUPPORT............................. 239,142 239,142
190 REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT.............................. 4,004 4,004
SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES................... 324,817 0 324,817

UNDISTRIBUTED
220 UNDISTRIBUTED....................................... 0 -246,699
Unobligated balances................................ [-246,699]
SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED.............................. 0 -246,699

TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARNG................. 8,703,824 -1,312,062 7,391,762

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY
OPERATING FORCES
010 MISSION AND OTHER FLIGHT OPERATIONS................. 8,324,572 8,324,572
020 FLEET AIR TRAINING.................................. 3,128,764 3,128,764
030 AIR SYSTEMS SUPPORT................................. 1,469,165 1,469,165
040 AIRCRAFT DEPOT MAINTENANCE.......................... 2,219,583 2,219,583
050 AVIATION LOGISTICS.................................. 2,664,360 2,664,360
060 MISSION AND OTHER SHIP OPERATIONS................... 7,424,752 230,000 7,654,752
Maritime unmanned operating forces.................. [225,000]
Sailor Quality of Life Survey....................... [5,000]
070 SHIP OPERATIONS SUPPORT & TRAINING.................. 1,713,065 1,713,065
080 SHIP DEPOT MAINTENANCE.............................. 14,292,873 14,292,873
090 SHIP DEPOT OPERATIONS SUPPORT....................... 2,597,722 2,597,722
100 COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE........ 1,821,744 1,821,744
110 MEDICAL READINESS................................... 661,800 661,800
120 SPACE SYSTEMS AND SURVEILLANCE...................... 572,000 572,000
130 WARFARE TACTICS..................................... 1,038,456 1,038,456
140 OPERATIONAL METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY............ 496,272 496,272
150 COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES............................... 2,476,987 700 2,477,687
Special Boat Training Command operations and [700]
maintenance enhancement............................
160 EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE AND DEPOT OPERATIONS SUPPORT.. 62,570 62,570
170 COMBATANT COMMANDERS CORE OPERATIONS................ 105,379 5,000 110,379
INDOPACOM community engagement for Red Hill and [5,000]
training land lease negotiations...................
180 COMBATANT COMMANDERS DIRECT MISSION SUPPORT......... 1,994,139 50,000 2,044,139
Contracted Seaplane capacity--INDOPACOM............. [50,000]
190 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES............................... 662,040 662,040
200 STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL STRIKE DETERRENCE............ 2,220,083 2,220,083
210 WEAPONS MAINTENANCE................................. 1,833,006 22,400 1,855,406
Mobile utilities support equipment employment....... [22,400]
220 OTHER WEAPON SYSTEMS SUPPORT........................ 834,752 834,752
230 ENTERPRISE INFORMATION.............................. 2,196,932 2,196,932
240 SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION AND MODERNIZATION.......... 4,891,828 -4,891,828
Expeditionary unmanned infrastructure............... [65,000]
Transfer to Division B.............................. [-4,956,828]
250 BASE OPERATING SUPPORT.............................. 6,069,456 19,891 6,089,347
Increase Child and Youth Program Funding............ [9,891]
Red Hill long-term monitoring, research, and [10,000]
remediation........................................
SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES........................... 71,772,300 -4,563,837 67,208,463

MOBILIZATION
260 SHIP PREPOSITIONING AND SURGE....................... 378,073 378,073
270 READY RESERVE FORCE................................. 881,029 881,029
280 SHIP ACTIVATIONS/INACTIVATIONS...................... 831,641 831,641
300 COAST GUARD SUPPORT................................. 27,729 27,729
SUBTOTAL MOBILIZATION............................... 2,118,472 0 2,118,472

TRAINING AND RECRUITING
310 OFFICER ACQUISITION................................. 198,743 198,743
320 RECRUIT TRAINING.................................... 17,813 17,813
330 RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS..................... 193,797 193,797
340 SPECIALIZED SKILL TRAINING.......................... 1,163,755 1,163,755
350 PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION.................. 280,521 280,521
360 TRAINING SUPPORT.................................... 504,282 504,282
370 RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING.......................... 261,140 261,140
380 OFF-DUTY AND VOLUNTARY EDUCATION.................... 75,600 18,800 94,400
Increase Tuition/Credentialing Assistance........... [18,800]
390 CIVILIAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING..................... 60,191 60,191
400 JUNIOR ROTC......................................... 60,219 60,219
SUBTOTAL TRAINING AND RECRUITING.................... 2,816,061 18,800 2,834,861

ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES
410 ADMINISTRATION...................................... 1,396,823 76,387 1,473,210
Increase to Civilian Personnel Compensation......... [76,387]
430 CIVILIAN MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.......... 244,308 244,308
450 MILITARY MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.......... 642,260 642,260
470 FOREIGN CURRENCY FLUCTUATION........................ 5,517 5,517
480 DEF ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNT....... 60,440 60,440
490 SERVICEWIDE TRANSPORTATION.......................... 279,134 279,134
510 PLANNING, ENGINEERING, AND PROGRAM SUPPORT.......... 605,530 605,530
520 ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND OVERSIGHT............... 822,580 822,580
530 INVESTIGATIVE AND SECURITY SERVICES................. 1,076,664 1,076,664
9999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS................................. 728,457 728,457
SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES................... 5,861,713 76,387 5,938,100

UNDISTRIBUTED
770 UNDISTRIBUTED....................................... 0 -540,421
Unobligated balances................................ [-540,421]
SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED.............................. 0 -540,421

TOTAL OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY............... 82,568,546 -5,009,071 77,559,475

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS
OPERATING FORCES
010 OPERATIONAL FORCES.................................. 3,113,102 3,113,102
020 FIELD LOGISTICS..................................... 2,807,429 2,807,429
030 DEPOT MAINTENANCE................................... 344,750 344,750
040 MARITIME PREPOSITIONING............................. 280,543 280,543
050 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES............................... 351,199 351,199
060 SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION............ 3,629,008 -3,629,008
Transfer to Division B.............................. [-3,629,008]
070 BASE OPERATING SUPPORT.............................. 3,175,027 3,223 3,178,250
Increase Child and Youth Program Funding............ [3,223]
SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES........................... 13,701,058 -3,625,785 10,075,273

TRAINING AND RECRUITING
080 RECRUIT TRAINING.................................... 45,521 45,521
090 OFFICER ACQUISITION................................. 1,346 1,346
100 SPECIALIZED SKILL TRAINING.......................... 242,438 242,438
110 PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION.................. 64,994 64,994
120 TRAINING SUPPORT.................................... 838,526 838,526
130 RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING.......................... 363,287 363,287
140 OFF-DUTY AND VOLUNTARY EDUCATION.................... 47,840 957 48,797
Increase Tuition/Credentialing Assistance........... [957]
150 JUNIOR ROTC......................................... 33,292 33,292
SUBTOTAL TRAINING AND RECRUITING.................... 1,637,244 957 1,638,201

ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES
180 SERVICEWIDE TRANSPORTATION.......................... 154,026 154,026
190 ADMINISTRATION...................................... 416,349 11,970 428,319
Increase to Civilian Personnel Compensation......... [11,970]
9999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS................................. 80,140 80,140
SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES................... 650,515 11,970 662,485

UNDISTRIBUTED
310 UNDISTRIBUTED....................................... 0 -89,275
Unobligated balances................................ [-89,275]
SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED.............................. 0 -89,275

TOTAL OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS....... 15,988,817 -3,702,133 12,286,684

OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY RES
OPERATING FORCES
010 MISSION AND OTHER FLIGHT OPERATIONS................. 787,622 787,622
020 AIR SYSTEMS SUPPORT................................. 9,733 9,733
030 AIRCRAFT DEPOT MAINTENANCE.......................... 215,547 215,547
040 AVIATION LOGISTICS.................................. 27,703 27,703
050 COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS............................... 19,652 19,652
060 COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES............................... 196,376 196,376
070 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES............................... 288 288
080 ENTERPRISE INFORMATION.............................. 30,811 30,811
090 SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION AND MODERNIZATION.......... 59,386 -59,386
Transfer to Division B.............................. [-59,386]
100 BASE OPERATING SUPPORT.............................. 111,177 111,177
SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES........................... 1,458,295 -59,386 1,398,909

ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES
110 ADMINISTRATION...................................... 2,747 2,747
120 MILITARY MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.......... 14,944 14,944
130 ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.................. 1,230 1,230
SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES................... 18,921 0 18,921

UNDISTRIBUTED
170 UNDISTRIBUTED....................................... 0 -19,763
Unobligated balances................................ [-19,763]
SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED.............................. 0 -19,763

TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY RES............. 1,477,216 -79,149 1,398,067

OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, MC RESERVE
OPERATING FORCES
010 OPERATING FORCES.................................... 142,416 142,416
020 DEPOT MAINTENANCE................................... 23,213 23,213
030 SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION AND MODERNIZATION.......... 100,709 -100,709
Transfer to Division B.............................. [-100,709]
040 BASE OPERATING SUPPORT.............................. 128,902 128,902
SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES........................... 395,240 -100,709 294,531

ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES
050 ADMINISTRATION...................................... 9,440 9,440
SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES................... 9,440 0 9,440

UNDISTRIBUTED
060 UNDISTRIBUTED....................................... 0 -12,267
Unobligated balances................................ [-12,267]
SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED.............................. 0 -12,267

TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, MC RESERVE........... 404,680 -112,976 291,704

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE
OPERATING FORCES
010 PRIMARY COMBAT FORCES............................... 1,798,263 150,000 1,948,263
A-10 service life extension......................... [150,000]
020 COMBAT ENHANCEMENT FORCES........................... 3,117,205 3,117,205
030 AIR OPERATIONS TRAINING (OJT, MAINTAIN SKILLS)...... 2,770,832 2,770,832
040 DEPOT PURCHASE EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE................ 6,092,998 6,092,998
050 FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION. 6,100,395 -6,100,395
Transfer to Division B.............................. [-6,100,395]
060 CYBERSPACE SUSTAINMENT.............................. 320,297 320,297
070 CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND SYSTEM SUPPORT..... 11,647,415 11,647,415
080 FLYING HOUR PROGRAM................................. 7,265,480 7,265,480
090 BASE SUPPORT........................................ 11,318,037 27,933 11,345,970
AFSAS, MFOQA, Space Safety Support, RPA, BASH....... [18,000]
Increase Child and Youth Program Funding............ [9,933]
100 GLOBAL C3I AND EARLY WARNING........................ 1,214,408 -9,200 1,205,208
Realignment to RDT&E for Over-the-Horizon [-9,200]
Backscatter Radar..................................
110 OTHER COMBAT OPS SPT PROGRAMS....................... 2,146,977 2,146,977
120 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES............................... 1,155,815 1,155,815
130 TACTICAL INTEL AND OTHER SPECIAL ACTIVITIES......... 1,992,280 1,992,280
140 MEDICAL READINESS................................... 561,626 561,626
150 US NORTHCOM/NORAD................................... 746,165 20,000 766,165
Military Infrastructure and Supply Chain Hardening [20,000]
Program............................................
160 US STRATCOM......................................... 656,448 656,448
170 US CENTCOM.......................................... 405,438 405,438
180 US SOCOM............................................ 42,261 42,261
190 US TRANSCOM......................................... 694 694
200 CENTCOM CYBERSPACE SUSTAINMENT...................... 0 1,000
Cyber cooperation with the Kingdom of Jordan........ [1,000]
210 USSPACECOM.......................................... 555,147 555,147
9999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS................................. 81,694 81,694
SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES........................... 59,989,875 -5,910,662 54,078,213

MOBILIZATION
220 AIRLIFT OPERATIONS.................................. 3,782,668 3,782,668
230 MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS........................... 321,889 321,889
SUBTOTAL MOBILIZATION............................... 4,104,557 0 4,104,557

TRAINING AND RECRUITING
240 OFFICER ACQUISITION................................. 267,971 267,971
250 RECRUIT TRAINING.................................... 70,462 70,462
260 RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS (ROTC).............. 143,686 143,686
270 SPECIALIZED SKILL TRAINING.......................... 589,549 589,549
280 FLIGHT TRAINING..................................... 1,122,297 1,122,297
290 PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION.................. 280,908 280,908
300 TRAINING SUPPORT.................................... 192,608 192,608
310 RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING.......................... 254,720 254,720
320 EXAMINING........................................... 7,261 7,261
330 OFF-DUTY AND VOLUNTARY EDUCATION.................... 232,768 4,245 237,013
Increase Tuition/Credentialing Assistance........... [4,245]
340 CIVILIAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING..................... 354,678 354,678
350 JUNIOR ROTC......................................... 114,790 114,790
SUBTOTAL TRAINING AND RECRUITING.................... 3,631,698 4,245 3,635,943

ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES
360 LOGISTICS OPERATIONS................................ 1,124,763 1,124,763
370 TECHNICAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES........................ 159,721 159,721
380 ADMINISTRATION...................................... 1,292,758 49,277 1,342,035
Increase to Civilian Personnel Compensation......... [58,877]
Realignment to Research, Development, Test, and [-9,600]
Evaluation for HR IT automation....................
390 SERVICEWIDE COMMUNICATIONS.......................... 43,892 43,892
410 OTHER SERVICEWIDE ACTIVITIES........................ 1,666,547 22,500 1,689,047
MEEP to AFGSC, engine sustainment, training support. [22,500]
420 CIVIL AIR PATROL.................................... 32,984 32,984
430 DEF ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNT....... 58,936 58,936
440 SECURITY PROGRAMS................................... 202,400 202,400
450 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT............................... 77,853 77,853
9999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS................................. 1,653,652 1,653,652
SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES................... 6,313,506 71,777 6,385,283

UNDISTRIBUTED
460 UNDISTRIBUTED....................................... 0 -1,020,189
Unobligated balances................................ [-1,020,189]
SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED.............................. 0 -1,020,189

TOTAL OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE.......... 74,039,636 -6,854,829 67,184,807

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, SPACE FORCE
OPERATING FORCES
010 GLOBAL C3I & EARLY WARNING.......................... 1,056,824 1,056,824
020 SPACE LAUNCH OPERATIONS............................. 415,322 50,000 465,322
Launch Capacity..................................... [50,000]
030 SPACE OPERATIONS.................................... 1,266,939 -78,000 1,188,939
Realignment to procurement for AEP fielded GPS [-78,000]
ground system......................................
040 EDUCATION & TRAINING................................ 783,168 783,168
050 SPECIAL PROGRAMS.................................... 733,761 733,761
060 DEPOT MAINTENANCE................................... 83,803 83,803
070 FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION. 1,384,326 -1,384,326
Transfer to Division B.............................. [-1,384,326]
080 CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS AND SYSTEM SUPPORT............. 2,096,381 2,096,381
090 SPACE OPERATIONS -BOS............................... 551,196 551,196
100 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES............................... 289,958 289,958
9999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS................................. 118,478 118,478
SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES........................... 8,780,156 -1,412,326 7,367,830

ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES
110 LOGISTICS OPERATIONS................................ 36,164 36,164
120 ADMINISTRATION...................................... 449,597 4,880 454,477
Increase to Civilian Personnel Compensation......... [4,880]
SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES................... 485,761 4,880 490,641

UNDISTRIBUTED
140 UNDISTRIBUTED....................................... 0 -218,077
Unobligated balances................................ [-218,077]
SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED.............................. 0 -218,077

TOTAL OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, SPACE FORCE........ 9,265,917 -1,625,523 7,640,394

OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AF RESERVE
OPERATING FORCES
010 PRIMARY COMBAT FORCES............................... 2,138,964 2,138,964
020 MISSION SUPPORT OPERATIONS.......................... 217,542 217,542
030 DEPOT PURCHASE EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE................ 787,861 787,861
040 FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION. 187,022 -187,022
Transfer to Division B.............................. [-187,022]
050 CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND SYSTEM SUPPORT..... 654,233 654,233
060 BASE SUPPORT........................................ 632,638 632,638
070 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES............................... 1,655 1,655
SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES........................... 4,619,915 -187,022 4,432,893

ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES
080 ADMINISTRATION...................................... 100,998 100,998
090 RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING.......................... 11,620 11,620
100 MILITARY MANPOWER AND PERS MGMT (ARPC).............. 15,893 15,893
110 AUDIOVISUAL......................................... 561 561
SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES................... 129,072 0 129,072

UNDISTRIBUTED
130 UNDISTRIBUTED....................................... 0 -224,891
Unobligated balances................................ [-224,891]
SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED.............................. 0 -224,891

TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AF RESERVE........... 4,748,987 -411,913 4,337,074

OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ANG
OPERATING FORCES
010 AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS................................. 2,744,277 2,744,277
020 MISSION SUPPORT OPERATIONS.......................... 663,367 663,367
030 DEPOT PURCHASE EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE................ 1,210,460 1,210,460
040 FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION & MODERNIZATION. 531,241 -531,241
Transfer to Division B.............................. [-531,241]
050 CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND SYSTEM SUPPORT..... 1,632,461 1,632,461
060 BASE SUPPORT........................................ 1,128,729 1,128,729
070 CYBERSPACE SUSTAINMENT.............................. 26,354 26,354
080 CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES............................... 81,720 81,720
SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES........................... 8,018,609 -531,241 7,487,368

ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES
090 ADMINISTRATION...................................... 64,249 64,249
100 RECRUITING AND ADVERTISING.......................... 47,831 47,831
SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES................... 112,080 0 112,080

UNDISTRIBUTED
110 UNDISTRIBUTED....................................... 0 -5,861
Unobligated balances................................ [-5,861]
SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED.............................. 0 -5,861

TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ANG.................. 8,130,689 -537,102 7,593,587

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, DEFENSE-WIDE
OPERATING FORCES
010 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF............................... 534,218 534,218
020 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF--JTEEP........................ 1,393,798 1,393,798
030 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF--CYBER........................ 9,103 9,103
040 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE--PSYOP........... 325,609 325,609
050 SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND COMBAT DEVELOPMENT 2,589,383 433,600 3,022,983
ACTIVITIES.........................................
SOCOM UPL--Accelerated fielding of Group 3 UAS...... [3,600]
SOCOM UPL--Operational capacity enhancements........ [325,000]
SOCOM UPL--Strategic airlift........................ [105,000]
060 SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND MAINTENANCE.............. 1,388,865 46,200 1,435,065
SOCOM UPL--Electromagnetic warfare family of systems [1,300]
SOCOM UPL--Ground infiltration protection system.... [15,300]
SOCOM UPL--Ground organic precision strike family of [3,600]
systems............................................
SOCOM UPL--Munitions War Reserve.................... [2,900]
SOCOM UPL--Non-standard aviation.................... [15,600]
SOCOM UPL--SOF-P pre-positioned stocks.............. [7,500]
070 SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND MANAGEMENT/OPERATIONAL 180,691 180,691
HEADQUARTERS.......................................
080 SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND THEATER FORCES........... 3,695,859 3,695,859
090 SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES.... 78,512 78,512
100 SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND INTELLIGENCE............. 1,130,849 8,000 1,138,849
SOCOM UPL--Identity and Signature Management [8,000]
Modernization......................................
110 SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT...... 1,796,851 11,100 1,807,951
SOCOM UPL--Identity and Signature Management [11,100]
Modernization......................................
120 CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS............................... 1,880,381 130,000 2,010,381
Combat ready Department of Defense Information [60,000]
Network (DoDIN)....................................
Extending technical service support................. [70,000]
130 USCYBERCOM HEADQUARTERS............................. 303,726 8,000 311,726
Facilities--Pentagon presence....................... [8,000]
SUBTOTAL OPERATING FORCES........................... 15,307,845 636,900 15,944,745

TRAINING AND RECRUITING
140 DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY...................... 193,017 193,017
150 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF............................... 173,748 173,748
160 SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND/PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 30,040 30,040
EDUCATION..........................................
SUBTOTAL TRAINING AND RECRUITING.................... 396,805 0 396,805

ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES
170 CIVIL MILITARY PROGRAMS............................. 118,488 118,488
180 DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY--CYBER................ 3,825 3,825
190 DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY....................... 611,600 611,600
200 DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY.................. 1,462,988 1,462,988
210 DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY--CYBER........... 42,367 42,367
220 DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCY..... 1,035,974 1,035,974
240 DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCY-- 16,885 16,885
CYBER..............................................
250 DEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCES ACTIVITY--CYBER............. 49,611 49,611
260 DEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCES ACTIVITY.................... 1,505,352 70,967 1,576,319
Defense Suicide Prevention Office (DSPO)............ [10,000]
Increase Child and Youth Program Funding............ [3,075]
Increase to Civilian Personnel Compensation......... [32,892]
Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM)..... [20,000]
New Authorization: Guardianship Transfer Fees....... [5,000]
290 DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY.................. 3,873,222 3,873,222
300 DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY--CYBER........... 602,017 602,017
310 DEFENSE LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY....................... 147,620 147,620
320 DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY............................ 585,610 585,610
330 DEFENSE MEDIA ACTIVITY.............................. 207,551 207,551
340 DEFENSE POW/MIA OFFICE.............................. 160,358 55,000 215,358
Defense POW/MIA Office.............................. [40,000]
Defense POW/MIA Office records scanning and [15,000]
digitization efforts for declassification..........
350 DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY................. 3,780,757 1,506,000 5,286,757
First Island Chain Security Cooperation Initiative [500,000]
(formerly TSCI)....................................
Innovative International Security Cooperation [250,000]
Programs...........................................
Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence.............. [6,000]
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.............. [750,000]
360 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.......... 47,101 47,101
370 DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY..................... 637,514 637,514
390 DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY--CYBER.............. 73,477 73,477
400 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EDUCATION ACTIVITY............ 3,493,232 80,000 3,573,232
Impact Aid.......................................... [50,000]
Impact Aid for children with severe disabilities.... [30,000]
410 MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY.............................. 487,235 487,235
420 OFFICE OF THE LOCAL DEFENSE COMMUNITY COOPERATION... 142,597 142,597
430 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF--JIATF........................ 431,652 431,652
470 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE--CYBER........... 81,163 58,945 140,108
Cyber Service Academies............................. [50,000]
Grow ASD Cyber Policy and civilian oversight of [8,945]
cyber..............................................
480 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.................. 3,832,831 131,148 3,963,979
Afghanistan War Commission.......................... [11,400]
Anomalous Health Incidents Attribution Research..... [10,000]
AUKUS Pillar 2 Signature Project.................... [15,000]
Bien Hoa Dioxin Cleanup............................. [15,000]
China Strategic Initiative.......................... [3,000]
CMMC small business grants.......................... [50,000]
Commission on the National Defense Strategy......... [5,000]
Establish a deterrence based track 1.5 with the [2,500]
Philippines........................................
Legacy Resource Management Program.................. [13,348]
National Commission on the Future of the Navy....... [5,000]
Reduction for the Business Operatives for National [-25,100]
Defense (BOND) program.............................
Regional Sustainment Framework for the Indo-Pacific. [5,000]
REPI................................................ [20,000]
Support for USTTI training.......................... [1,000]
490 HOMELAND DEFENSE INITIATIVES........................ 0
500 TAIWAN PRESIDENTIAL DRAWDOWN REPLACEMENT FUND....... 0
510 WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES.................... 536,546 536,546
9999 CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS................................. 24,579,358 24,579,358
SUBTOTAL ADMIN & SRVWD ACTIVITIES................... 48,546,931 1,902,060 50,448,991

UNDISTRIBUTED
540 UNDISTRIBUTED....................................... 0 -900,000 -900,000
Unobligated balances................................ [-900,000]
SUBTOTAL UNDISTRIBUTED.............................. 0 -900,000 -900,000

TOTAL OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, DEFENSE-WIDE....... 64,251,581 1,638,960 65,890,541

MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES
010 US COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, DEFENSE... 21,698 21,698
SUBTOTAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 21,698 0 21,698
ARMED FORCES.......................................

TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.................. 21,698 0 21,698

MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS
OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN, DISASTER, AND CIVIC AID
010 OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN, DISASTER AND CIVIC AID....... 78,187 30,000 108,187
OHDACA--Humanitarian Assistance..................... [20,000]
OHDACA--Humanitarian Mine Action.................... [10,000]
SUBTOTAL OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN, DISASTER, AND CIVIC 78,187 30,000 108,187
AID................................................

TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.................. 78,187 30,000 108,187

MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION ACCOUNT
010 COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION........................ 221,332 221,332
SUBTOTAL COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION ACCOUNT....... 221,332 0 221,332

TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.................. 221,332 0 221,332

MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS
ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
010 ACQ WORKFORCE DEV FD................................ 37,478 37,478
SUBTOTAL ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT.......... 37,478 0 37,478

TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.................. 37,478 0 37,478

MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, ARMY
050 ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, ARMY..................... 282,444 282,444
SUBTOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, ARMY............ 282,444 0 282,444

TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.................. 282,444 0 282,444

MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, NAVY
060 ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, NAVY..................... 305,246 305,246
SUBTOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, NAVY............ 305,246 0 305,246

TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.................. 305,246 0 305,246

MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, AIR FORCE
070 ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, AIR FORCE................ 320,060 320,060
SUBTOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, AIR FORCE....... 320,060 0 320,060

TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.................. 320,060 0 320,060

MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, DEFENSE
080 ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, DEFENSE.................. 8,957 8,957
SUBTOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, DEFENSE......... 8,957 0 8,957

TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.................. 8,957 0 8,957

MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, FORMERLY USED DEFENSE
SITES
090 ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION FORMERLY USED SITES....... 238,927 238,927
SUBTOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, FORMERLY USED 238,927 0 238,927
DEFENSE SITES......................................

TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS APPROPRIATIONS.................. 238,927 0 238,927

TOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE....................... 338,321,539 -24,210,010 314,111,529
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TITLE XLIV--MILITARY PERSONNEL

SEC. 4401. MILITARY PERSONNEL.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 4401. MILITARY PERSONNEL (In Thousands of Dollars)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Item FY 2027 Request Senate Change Senate Authorized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MILITARY PERSONNEL
MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS
MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS................... 190,771,931 -2,119,526 188,652,405
Increase Air Force Incentive Pays (Enlisted)........ 1,114
Increase Air Force Incentive Pays (Officers)........ 8,793
Increase Air Force Special Pays (Enlisted).......... 11,748
Increase Air Force Special Pays (Officers).......... 10,912
Increase Army Incentive Pays (Enlisted)............. 1,646
Increase Army Incentive Pays (Officers)............. 1,703
Increase Army Special Pays (Enlisted)............... 20,388
Increase Army Special Pays (Officers)............... 9,789
Increase Marine Corps Incentive Pays (Enlisted)..... 178
Increase Marine Corps Incentive Pays (Officers)..... 1,111
Increase Marine Corps Special Pays (Enlisted)....... 6,627
Increase Marine Corps Special Pays (Officers)....... 504
Increase Navy Incentive Pays (Enlisted)............. 2,388
Increase Navy Incentive Pays (Officers)............. 4,118
Increase Navy Special Pays (Enlisted)............... 33,100
Increase Navy Special Pays (Officers)............... 11,595
Increase Space Force Incentive Pays (Enlisted)...... 1
Increase Space Force Incentive Pays (Officers)...... 2
Increase Space Force Special Pays (Enlisted)........ 1,089
Increase Space Force Special Pays (Officers)........ 125
Redistribute basic pay increase..................... [-2,300,000]
Redistribution of 449 AGR positions to National 65,829
Guard Personnel, Air Force Administration and
Support............................................
Redistribution of 449 DSG positions from National [-12,286]
Guard Personnel, Air Force Pay Group A.............
SUBTOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS.......... 190,771,931 -2,119,526 188,652,405

MEDICARE-ELIGIBLE RETIREE HEALTH CARE FUND
CONTRIBUTIONS
MEDICARE-ELIGIBLE RETIREE HEALTH CARE FUND 14,349,269 14,349,269
CONTRIBUTIONS......................................
SUBTOTAL MEDICARE-ELIGIBLE RETIREE HEALTH CARE FUND 14,349,269 0 14,349,269
CONTRIBUTIONS......................................

TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL............................ 205,121,200 -2,119,526 203,001,674
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TITLE XLV--OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS

SEC. 4501. OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 4501. OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS (In Thousands of Dollars)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2027 Senate
Line Item Request Senate Change Authorized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WORKING CAPITAL FUND
WORKING CAPITAL FUND, ARMY
010 INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS........................... 20,563 20,563
SUBTOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND, ARMY............. 20,563 0 20,563

WORKING CAPITAL FUND, NAVY
010 NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTERS................... 266,212 266,212
SUBTOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND, NAVY............. 266,212 0 266,212

WORKING CAPITAL FUND, AIR FORCE
010 TRANSPORTATION.................................. 0
020 CRITICAL SPARES................................. 4,245,563 4,245,563
030 SUPPLIES AND MATERIALS.......................... 194,851 194,851
SUBTOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND, AIR FORCE........ 4,440,414 0 4,440,414

NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE TRANSACTION FUND
010 DEFENSE STOCKPILE............................... 5,700 5,700
SUBTOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE TRANSACTION 5,700 0 5,700
FUND...........................................

WORKING CAPITAL FUND, DEFENSE-WIDE
010 DEFENSE FINANCE OPERATIONS--DIRECT.............. 273,760 273,760
020 ENERGY MANAGEMENT--DEF.......................... 0
030 SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT--DEFENSE................ 0
040 UNDISTRIBUTED................................... 1,000,000 1,000,000
SUBTOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND, DEFENSE-WIDE..... 1,273,760 0 1,273,760

WORKING CAPITAL FUND, DECA
010 WORKING CAPITAL FUND, DECA...................... 1,501,344 10,000 1,511,344
Commissary Operations........................... [10,000]
SUBTOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND, DECA............. 1,501,344 10,000 1,511,344

TOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND...................... 7,507,993 10,000 7,517,993

CHEM AGENTS & MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE
1 CHEM DEMILITARIZATION--O&M...................... 0
SUBTOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE................ 0 0 0

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
2 CHEM DEMILITARIZATION--RDT&E.................... 55,972 55,972
SUBTOTAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND 55,972 0 55,972
EVALUATION.....................................

TOTAL CHEM AGENTS & MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION....... 55,972 0 55,972

DRUG INTERDICTION & CTR-DRUG ACTIVITIES, DEF
DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER DRUG ACTIVITIES
010 COUNTER-NARCOTICS SUPPORT....................... 658,191 658,191
SUBTOTAL DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER DRUG 658,191 0 658,191
ACTIVITIES.....................................

DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAM
020 DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAM................... 135,745 135,745
SUBTOTAL DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION PROGRAM.......... 135,745 0 135,745

NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG PROGRAM
030 NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG PROGRAM............. 117,418 100,000 217,418
Increase to National Guard Counter-Drug Program. [100,000]
SUBTOTAL NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG PROGRAM.... 117,418 100,000 217,418

NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG SCHOOLS
040 NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG SCHOOLS............. 6,648 33,352 40,000
Increase to National Guard Counter-Drug Schools. [33,352]
SUBTOTAL NATIONAL GUARD COUNTER-DRUG SCHOOLS.... 6,648 33,352 40,000

TOTAL DRUG INTERDICTION & CTR-DRUG ACTIVITIES, 918,002 133,352 1,051,354
DEF............................................

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
010 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE....................... 501,371 27,000 528,371
Restore funding for DOD Office of the Inspector [27,000]
General........................................
020 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE....................... 2,073 2,073
030 RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION..... 1,506 1,506
040 PROCUREMENT..................................... 1,393 1,393
SUBTOTAL OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL........ 506,343 27,000 533,343

TOTAL OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL........... 506,343 27,000 533,343

DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE
010 IN-HOUSE CARE................................... 10,863,317 1,000,000 11,863,317
Military Treatment Facility Operations and [1,000,000]
Support........................................
030 CONSOLIDATED HEALTH SUPPORT..................... 2,375,175 280,000 2,655,175
Combat Support Agency........................... [280,000]
040 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT.......................... 2,600,177 2,600,177
050 MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES........................... 304,382 304,382
060 EDUCATION AND TRAINING.......................... 349,460 40,000 389,460
Graduate Medical Education, Undergraduate [40,000]
Medical Education and Force Health Protection..
070 BASE OPERATIONS/COMMUNICATIONS.................. 2,463,042 350,000 2,813,042
Facilities Restoration and Modernization........ [350,000]
SUBTOTAL OPERATION & MAINTENANCE................ 18,955,553 1,670,000 20,625,553

RDT&E
080 R&D RESEARCH.................................... 41,924 41,924
090 R&D EXPLORATRY DEVELOPMENT...................... 185,153 10,000 195,153
Biological Stress, Recovery, and Resilience for [10,000]
Military Readiness.............................
100 R&D ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT........................ 361,241 361,241
110 R&D DEMONSTRATION/VALIDATION.................... 186,018 186,018
120 R&D ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT..................... 124,662 124,662
130 R&D MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT...................... 100,912 100,912
140 R&D CAPABILITIES ENHANCEMENT.................... 19,452 19,452
SUBTOTAL RDT&E.................................. 1,019,362 10,000 1,029,362

PROCUREMENT
150 PROC INITIAL OUTFITTING......................... 25,555 25,555
160 PROC REPLACEMENT & MODERNIZATION................ 231,382 231,382
170 PROC JOINT OPERATIONAL MEDICINE INFORMATION 31,203 31,203
SYSTEM.........................................
180 PROC MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM--DESKTOP TO 78,588 78,588
DATACENTER.....................................
SUBTOTAL PROCUREMENT............................ 366,728 0 366,728

PRIVATE SECTOR CARE PROGRAM
010 PRIVATE SECTOR CARE............................. 22,175,472 100,000 22,275,472
Access to care and network adequacy............. [100,000]
SUBTOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR CARE PROGRAM............ 22,175,472 100,000 22,275,472

TOTAL DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM.................... 42,517,115 1,780,000 44,297,115

COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA TRAIN
AND EQUIP
COUNTER-ISIL TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF)
010 IRAQ............................................ 118,899 118,899
020 SYRIA........................................... 130,000 130,000
030 LEBANON......................................... 36,000 36,000
040 JORDAN.......................................... 18,200 18,200
SUBTOTAL COUNTER-ISIL TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND 303,099 0 303,099
(CTEF).........................................

TOTAL COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA 303,099 0 303,099
TRAIN AND EQUIP................................

TOTAL OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS...................... 51,808,524 1,950,352 53,758,876
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TITLE XLVI--MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 4601. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (In Thousands of Dollars)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2027 Senate
Account State/ Country Installation Project Title Request Senate Change Authorized
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARMY
Army Alabama Anniston Army Depot COST TO COMPLETE: ACCESS CONTROL 0 53,000 53,000
POINT
Army Alaska Fort Wainwright BARRACKS (INC 2) 24,000 0 24,000
Army Alaska Fort Wainwright DINNING FACILITY 0 147,000 147,000
Army Arizona Fort Huachuca LIBBY ARMY AIRFIELD FLIGHT CONTROL 0 4,000 4,000
TOWER (DESIGN)
Army Arizona Yuma Proving Ground POLE LINE ROAD--REPLACE (DESIGN) 0 2,000 2,000
Army Florida Naval Air Station COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITY (INC 2) 160,000 -150,000 10,000
Key West
Army Georgia Fort Gordon CYBER FACULTY OPERATIONS AND 0 14,700 14,700
AUDITORIUM FACILITY (DESIGN)
Army Georgia Fort Stewart ENLISTED UNACCOMPANIED PERSONNEL 0 12,000 12,000
BARRACKS (DESIGN)
Army Germany Grafenwoehr UNDERGROUND ELECTRIC LINES 12,800 0 12,800
Army Guam Joint Region PDI: GUAM DEF SYS, EIAMD, PHASE 2 190,000 -50,000 140,000
Marianas (INC 2)
Army Guam Joint Region PDI: GUAM DEF SYS, EIAMD, PHASE 3 155,000 -95,000 60,000
Marianas
Army Guam Joint Region PDI: LAND ACQUISITION 29,000 0 29,000
Marianas
Army Hawaii Fort Shafter COST TO COMPLETE: CLEARWELL AND 71,000 0 71,000
BOOSTER PUMP
Army Hawaii Helemano COST TO COMPLETE: WELLS AND STORAGE 72,000 0 72,000
TANKS
Army Hawaii Schofield Barracks COST TO COMPLETE: ELEVATED TANK AND 26,000 0 26,000
DISTRIBUTION LINES
Army Hawaii Schofield Barracks COST TO COMPLETE: WATER STORAGE TANK 21,000 0 21,000
Army Hawaii Schofield Barracks FIRE STATION 30,000 0 30,000
Army Hawaii Wheeler Army Air AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR (INC 1) 90,000 -40,000 50,000
Field
Army Hawaii Wheeler Army AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER 0 79,000 79,000
Airfield
Army Hawaii Wheeler Army AIRCRAFT CLEAR WATER RINSE FACILITY 0 3,300 3,300
Airfield (DESIGN)
Army Honduras Soto Cano Air Base VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP 0 17,000 17,000
Army Illinois Rock Island Arsenal CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER (DESIGN) 0 5,000 5,000
Army Indiana Crane Army AMMUNITION STORAGE 0 27,000 27,000
Ammunition
Activity
Army Italy Caserma Renato Del ACCESS CONTROL POINT 17,000 0 17,000
Din
Army Japan Kadena Air Base COST TO COMPLETE: VEHICLE 69,000 0 69,000
MAINTENANCE SHOP
Army Louisiana Fort Polk JRTC ROTATIONAL UNIT BILLETING AREA, 0 157,000 157,000
INC #3
Army Maine Lola-Dana Training AUTOMATED QUALIFICATIONS TRAINING 0 4,700 4,700
Site RANGE (DESIGN)
Army Maryland Aberdeen Proving REPAIR EDGEWOOD WATER DISTRIBUTION 0 4,100 4,100
Ground-South (DESIGN)
Army Michigan Camp Grayling COMPANY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING, 0 4,400 4,400
COLLECTIVE TRAINING (DESIGN)
Army Missouri Fort Leonard Wood CENTRAL ISSUING FACILITY (DESIGN) 0 12,000 12,000
Army New York Fort Drum AIRFIELD FIRE AND RESCUE STATION 0 4,600 4,600
(DESIGN)
Army New York Fort Drum AUTOMATED RECORD FIRE PLUS RANGE 25,000 0 25,000
Army New York Fort Drum SIMULATOR BUILDING (DESIGN) 0 2,400 2,400
Army New York Watervliet CHROME PLATING FACILITY (DESIGN) 0 11,100 11,100
Army New York Watervliet WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT (DESIGN) 0 2,850 2,850
Army North Carolina Fort Bragg COST TO COMPLETE: AIRCRAFT 31,000 0 31,000
MAINTENANCE HANGAR
Army North Carolina Fort Bragg JOINT DEPLOYMENT WARFIGHTING COMPLEX 0 54,000 54,000
(DESIGN)
Army Oklahoma Fort Sill AUTOMATION AIDED INSTRUCTION BLDG 0 93,000 93,000
Army Texas Fort Bliss SHIPPING AND RECEIVING BUILDING 35,000 0 35,000
Army Texas Fort Hood VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP (MP #72) 0 81,000 81,000
Army Texas Joint Base San ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING 303,000 -200,000 103,000
Antonio BARRACKS-METC (INC)
Army Utah Dugway Proving TWO-COMPANY SATELLITE FIRE STATION / 0 3,300 3,300
Ground THREE-COMPANY HQ FIRE STATION
(DESIGN)
Army Washington Joint Base Lewis- AIRFIELD FIRE AND RESCUE STATION 89,000 0 89,000
McChord
Army Wisconsin Fort McCoy FITNESS CENTER (DESIGN) 0 1,700 1,700
Army Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN 173,421 0 173,421
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Army Worldwide Unspecified FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION 0 5,435,364 5,435,364
Unspecified Worldwide & MODERNIZATION (TRANSFERRED FROM
Locations O&M)
Army Worldwide Unspecified HOST NATION SUPPORT 53,521 0 53,521
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Army Worldwide Unspecified PDI: MINOR CONSTRUCTION 76,270 25,000 101,270
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Army Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION 178,626 100,000 278,626
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Military Construction, Army 1,931,638 5,825,514 7,757,152
................... ................... ....................................
NAVY & MARINE CORPS
Navy & Marine Corps Australia Royal Australian PDI: AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR 46,958 0 46,958
Air Force Base (INC)
Darwin
Navy & Marine Corps Australia Royal Australian PDI: MAINTENANCE SUPPORT FACS (INC) 33,955 0 33,955
Air Force Base
Darwin
Navy & Marine Corps California Camp Pendleton FIRE/EMERGENCY RESPONSE STATION (53 43,000 0 43,000
AREA) REPLACE
Navy & Marine Corps California Camp Pendleton LANDFILL LINER, PHASE 3 AND 4 53,150 0 53,150
Navy & Marine Corps California Naval Air Station STRIKE FIGHTER CENTER OF EXCELLENCE 155,939 -130,000 25,939
Lemoore PACIFIC (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps California Naval Base Coronado FORD CLASS CVN INFRASTRUCTURE 33,000 0 33,000
UPGRADE (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps California Naval Base San RECONFIGURABLE CYBER LABORATORY 0 68,000 68,000
Diego
Navy & Marine Corps California Naval Base Ventura COMMUNITY & AIRFIELD AREA FLOOD 164,000 -129,000 35,000
County Point Mugu PROTECTION
Navy & Marine Corps California Naval Support NAVAL INNOVATION CENTER (INC) 50,000 0 50,000
Activity Monterey
Navy & Marine Corps Connecticut Naval Submarine SUBMARINE PIER 8 REPLACEMENT (INC) 142,124 -122,000 20,124
Base New London
Navy & Marine Corps Connecticut Naval Submarine SUBMARINE SUPPORT STORAGE 0 50,000 50,000
Base New London MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS FACILITY
Navy & Marine Corps Connecticut Naval Submarine WEAPONS MAGAZINE & ORDNANCE 79,600 0 79,600
Base New London OPERATIONS FACILITY (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps District of Naval Research BIOMOLECULAR SCIENCE & SYNTHETIC 157,000 -80,000 77,000
Columbia Laboratory BIOLOGY LAB
Navy & Marine Corps Federated States of Palau PDI: PALAU PORT AND HARBOR 384,560 0 384,560
Micronesia IMPROVEMENTS (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Federated States of Yap PDI: YAP PORT AND HARBOR 142,235 0 142,235
Micronesia IMPROVEMENTS (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Florida Cape Canaveral CAPE CANAVERAL RAILHEAD & TRANSFER 60,990 0 60,990
Space Force FACILITIES
Station
Navy & Marine Corps Florida Marine Corps COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE (INC) 46,075 0 46,075
Support Facility
Blount Island
Navy & Marine Corps Georgia Naval Air Station CONSOLIDATED COMMUNICATION FACILITY 86,350 0 86,350
Albany
Navy & Marine Corps Georgia Naval Submarine TRANSIT PROTECTION PROGRAM FACILITY 100,000 0 100,000
Base Kings Bay (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Georgia Naval Submarine TRIDENT REFIT FACILITY EXPANSION-- 30,000 0 30,000
Base Kings Bay COLUMBIA SUB (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Guam Andersen Air Force PDI: JOINT CONSOLIDATED 132,416 0 132,416
Base COMMUNICATIONS CENTER (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Guam Apra Heights PDI: INNER APRA HARBOR RESILIENCY 13,400 0 13,400
(INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Guam Joint Region PDI: JOINT COMMUNICATION UPGRADE 60,000 0 60,000
Marianas (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Guam Joint Region PDI: POLARIS POINT ELECTRICAL 122,000 -110,000 12,000
Marianas CAPACITY UPGRADE
Navy & Marine Corps Guam Joint Region PDI: POLARIS POINT SUBMARINE PIER 171,800 -90,000 81,800
Marianas (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Hawaii Ford Island PACIFIC WARFIGHTING CENTER EXPANSION 183,760 -133,760 50,000
Navy & Marine Corps Hawaii Joint Base Pearl DRY DOCK 3 REPLACEMENT (INC) 507,453 0 507,453
Harbor-Hickam
Navy & Marine Corps Hawaii Joint Base Pearl WATER TREATMENT PLANT (INC) 248,170 0 248,170
Harbor-Hickam
Navy & Marine Corps Hawaii Marine Corps Base 3D MLR ARMORY EXPANSION 76,550 0 76,550
Kaneohe Bay
Navy & Marine Corps Hawaii Marine Corps Base ATC CO M COMPOUND 134,090 -111,800 22,290
Kaneohe Bay
Navy & Marine Corps Hawaii Marine Corps Base ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION AND 0 25,000 25,000
Kaneohe Bay MODERNIZATION
Navy & Marine Corps Hawaii Marine Corps Base MAIN GATE ENTRY CONTROL POINT 49,260 0 49,260
Kaneohe Bay
Navy & Marine Corps Hawaii Pacific Missile PDI: AIRFIELD PAVEMENT UPGRADES 142,470 0 142,470
Range Facility (INC)
Barking Sands
Navy & Marine Corps Illinois Naval Station Great FIREFIGHTING, TRAINING AND DAMAGE 0 25,000 25,000
Lakes CONTROL WET TRAINER FACILITY
Navy & Marine Corps Indiana Naval Weapons HIGH ENERGY TEST & ABUSE FACILITY 0 25,000 25,000
Station Crane
Navy & Marine Corps Japan Kadena Air Base AIRCRAFT INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE 31,780 0 31,780
FACILITY
Navy & Marine Corps Maine NCTAMS LANT Det UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING (DESIGN) 0 2,000 2,000
Cutler
Navy & Marine Corps Maine Portsmouth Naval CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER (DESIGN) 0 2,500 2,500
Shipyard
Navy & Marine Corps Maine Portsmouth Naval MULTI-MISSION DRYDOCK #1 EXTENSION 50,755 0 50,755
Shipyard (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Maine Portsmouth Naval POWER RELIABILITY & WATER RESILIENCE 138,875 0 138,875
Shipyard UPGRADE (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Maine Portsmouth Naval UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING (DESIGN) 0 25,000 25,000
Shipyard
Navy & Marine Corps Maryland Naval Air Station TC-7 REPLACEMENT (DESIGN) 0 1,100 1,100
Patuxent River
Navy & Marine Corps Maryland United States Naval STORM WATER MANAGEMENT FACILITIES 0 86,000 86,000
Academy
Navy & Marine Corps Mississippi Naval Construction BATTALION MAINTENANCE FACILITIES 0 2,000 2,000
Battalion Center (DESIGN)
Gulfport
Navy & Marine Corps Nevada Naval Air Station RANGE TRAINING COMPLEX IMPROVEMENTS 387,570 0 387,570
Fallon
Navy & Marine Corps New Hampshire Portsmouth Naval SAILOR CAMPUS (DESIGN) 0 1,000 1,000
Shipyard
Navy & Marine Corps North Carolina Camp Lejeune 10TH MARINES OPERATIONAL COMPLEX 77,520 0 77,520
(INC)
Navy & Marine Corps North Carolina Camp Lejeune AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINT UPGRADE 15,451 0 15,451
PHASE II (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps North Carolina Camp Lejeune COMBAT WATER SURVIVAL TRAINING 141,880 -111,880 30,000
FACILITY
Navy & Marine Corps North Carolina Marine Corps Air 2D LAAD MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS 0 11,500 11,500
Station Cherry FACILITIES (DESIGN)
Point
Navy & Marine Corps North Carolina Marine Corps Air COST TO COMPLETE: CH-53K GEARBOX 17,941 0 17,941
Station Cherry REPAIR AND TEST FACILITY
Point
Navy & Marine Corps North Carolina Marine Corps Air COST TO COMPLETE: AIRCRAFT 47,560 0 47,560
Station Cherry MAINTENANCE HANGAR
Point
Navy & Marine Corps North Carolina Marine Corps Air F-35 AIRCRAFT SUSTAINMENT CTR (INC) 89,181 0 89,181
Station Cherry
Point
Navy & Marine Corps North Carolina Marine Corps Air MAINTENANCE FACILITY & MARINE AIR 62,575 0 62,575
Station Cherry GROUP HQS (INC)
Point
Navy & Marine Corps Pennsylvania Naval Support MACHINERY CONTROL DEVELOPMENT CENTER 79,140 0 79,140
Activity (INC)
Mechanicsburg
Navy & Marine Corps Rhode Island Naval Station CONSOLIDATED RDT&E INTEGRATION 40,000 0 40,000
Newport LABORATORY
Navy & Marine Corps Rhode Island Naval Station NEXT GENERATION SUBMARINE PLATFORM 73,000 0 73,000
Newport FACILITY
Navy & Marine Corps Rhode Island Naval Station SUBMARINE PAYLOAD INTEGRATION 40,000 0 40,000
Newport LABORATORY
Navy & Marine Corps South Carolina Charleston Air NUCLEAR POWER TRAINING FAC 161,700 -80,000 81,700
Force Base SIMULATION EXPANSION (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Spain Naval Station Rota UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING FOR PERMANENT 64,080 0 64,080
PARTY
Navy & Marine Corps Virginia Joint Expeditionary CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER 65,640 0 65,640
Base Little Creek-
Fort Story
Navy & Marine Corps Virginia Naval Air Station CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER 104,340 -94,340 10,000
Oceana
Navy & Marine Corps Virginia Naval Station CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER 93,040 -83,040 10,000
Norfolk
Navy & Marine Corps Virginia Naval Station CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER 84,940 0 84,940
Norfolk
Navy & Marine Corps Virginia Naval Station ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 124,965 0 124,965
Norfolk UPGRADES (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Virginia Naval Station MQ-25 AIRCRAFT LAYDOWN FACILITIES 54,622 0 54,622
Norfolk (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Virginia Naval Weapons COST TO COMPLETE: CONTAINERIZED LONG 16,170 0 16,170
Station Yorktown WEAPONS STORAGE MAGAZINE
Navy & Marine Corps Virginia Naval Weapons COST TO COMPLETE: CONVENTIONAL 13,710 0 13,710
Station Yorktown PROMPT STRIKE TEST FACILITY
Navy & Marine Corps Virginia Naval Weapons WEAPONS MAGAZINES (INC) 100,782 -80,000 20,782
Station Yorktown
Navy & Marine Corps Virginia Norfolk Naval DRY DOCK 3 MODERNIZATION (INC) 189,353 0 189,353
Shipyard
Navy & Marine Corps Washington Naval Air Station EA-18G AIRCRAFT REGIONAL SERVICE 202,000 -180,000 22,000
Whidbey Island FACILITY
Navy & Marine Corps Washington Naval Air Station NAVAL OCEAN PROCESSING FACILITY 0 15,000 15,000
Whidbey Island EXPANSION
Navy & Marine Corps Washington Naval Air Station P-8A AIRCRAFT RESERVE HANGAR 0 108,000 108,000
Whidbey Island
Navy & Marine Corps Washington Naval Base Kitsap- COLUMBIA SUBMARINE REPAIR FACILITY 64,000 0 64,000
Bangor EXPANSION (INC)
Navy & Marine Corps Washington Naval Base Kitsap- COLUMBIA SUBMARINE TRAINING FACILITY 90,900 -67,000 23,900
Bangor EXPANSION
Navy & Marine Corps Washington Naval Base Kitsap- REGIONAL OPTICS REPAIR CENTER 0 35,000 35,000
Bangor
Navy & Marine Corps Washington Naval Base Kitsap- MISSILE ASSEMBLY BUILDING 195,227 -163,000 32,227
Bremerton REPLACEMENT
Navy & Marine Corps Washington Puget Sound Naval MULTI-MISSION DRY DOCK (INC) 245,000 0 245,000
Shipyard
Navy & Marine Corps Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN 1,163,477 0 1,163,477
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Navy & Marine Corps Worldwide Unspecified FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION 0 4,956,828 4,956,828
Unspecified Worldwide & MODERNIZATION (NAVY) (TRANSFERRED
Locations FROM O&M)
Navy & Marine Corps Worldwide Unspecified FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION 0 3,629,008 3,629,008
Unspecified Worldwide & MODERNIZATION (MARINE CORPS)
Locations (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M)
Navy & Marine Corps Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION 289,224 125,000 414,224
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Military Construction, Navy & Marine Corps 8,266,703 7,427,116 15,693,819
................... ................... ....................................
AIR FORCE
Air Force Alabama Redstone Arsenal SPACE FORCE OPERATIONAL FACILITY 250,000 -150,000 100,000
Air Force Alabama Redstone Arsenal USSPACECOM HQ 450,000 -320,000 130,000
Air Force Alaska Eielson Air Force JPARC RANGE OPERATIONS CENTER 91,000 -50,000 41,000
Base
Air Force Alaska Joint Base FTR: ADAL FIELD TRAINING DETACHMENT 56,000 0 56,000
Elmendorf- (FTD)
Richardson
Air Force Alaska Joint Base FTR: CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS COMPLEX 132,300 0 132,300
Elmendorf-
Richardson
Air Force Alaska Joint Base FTR: DORMITORY 451,500 0 451,500
Elmendorf-
Richardson
Air Force Alaska Joint Base FTR: FLIGHT SIMULATOR 93,800 0 93,800
Elmendorf-
Richardson
Air Force Alaska Joint Base FTR: FUEL CELL MAINTENANCE 31,250 0 31,250
Elmendorf-
Richardson
Air Force Alaska Joint Base FTR: INFRASTRUCTURE & UTILITIES 422,100 0 422,100
Elmendorf-
Richardson
Air Force Alaska Joint Base FTR: LOW OBSERVABLE AIRCRAFT 63,250 0 63,250
Elmendorf- STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE
Richardson
Air Force Alaska Joint Base FTR: OPERATIONS AND GENERATION 127,500 0 127,500
Elmendorf- HANGAR
Richardson
Air Force Alaska Joint Base FTR: PGM RELOCATION 359,100 0 359,100
Elmendorf-
Richardson
Air Force Alaska Joint Base FTR: PUBLIC TRAFFIC ROUTE 50,000 0 50,000
Elmendorf- REALIGNMENT
Richardson
Air Force Alaska Joint Base FTR: SQUADRON 1-1 AIRFIELD PAVEMENTS 125,250 0 125,250
Elmendorf-
Richardson
Air Force Alaska Joint Base FTR: SQUADRON 1-1 FLOWTHROUGH 154,000 0 154,000
Elmendorf- HANGARS
Richardson
Air Force Alaska Joint Base JOINT INTEGRATED TEST AND TRAINING 42,000 0 42,000
Elmendorf- CENTER (INC)
Richardson
Air Force Arizona Davis-Monthan Air ADAL CORROSION CONTROL FACILITY 0 8,250 8,250
Force Base (DESIGN)
Air Force Arizona Davis-Monthan Air COMPASS CALL TASK FORCE HQ (DESIGN) 0 11,400 11,400
Force Base
Air Force Arizona Davis-Monthan Air CONSOLIDATED CHILD DEVELOPMENT 0 8,000 8,000
Force Base CENTER (DESIGN)
Air Force Arizona Davis-Monthan Air DORMITORY (DESIGN) 0 10,200 10,200
Force Base
Air Force Arizona Davis-Monthan Air HANGAR/AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE UNIT 15,000 0 15,000
Force Base
Air Force Arkansas Ebbing Air National F-35 GROUP OPS FACILITY 0 18,000 18,000
Guard Base
Air Force Arkansas Little Rock Air CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER 27,000 0 27,000
Force Base
Air Force California Beale Air Force MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS COMPLEX 126,000 0 126,000
Base
Air Force Colorado Schriever Space SPACE FORCE OPERATIONAL FACILITY 250,000 -150,000 100,000
Force Base
Air Force Commonwealth of the Tinian COST TO COMPLETE: FUEL TANKS WITH 0 26,300 26,300
Northern Mariana RECEIPT PIPELINE & HYDRANT SYSTEM
Islands
Air Force Djibouti Chabelley Airfield CHABELLEY POWER PLANT AND PRIMARY 27,000 0 27,000
DIST
Air Force Federated States of Yap PDI: RUNWAY EXTENSION, INC 27,000 0 27,000
Micronesia
Air Force Florida Cape Canaveral BASE SUPPORT WAREHOUSE 64,000 0 64,000
Space Force
Station
Air Force Florida Cape Canaveral COMMAND FACILITY 85,000 0 85,000
Space Force
Station
Air Force Florida Cape Canaveral COMMUNICATIONS PLANT WAREHOUSE 48,400 0 48,400
Space Force
Station
Air Force Florida Cape Canaveral LAUNCH SUPPORT FACILITY 84,000 0 84,000
Space Force
Station
Air Force Florida Cape Canaveral LRS VEHICLE MAINTENANCE FACILITY 80,400 0 80,400
Space Force
Station
Air Force Florida Cape Canaveral SECURITY FORCES OPERATIONS FACILITY 48,000 0 48,000
Space Force
Station
Air Force Florida Eglin Air Force JADC2 AND ABM TEST FACILITY 87,800 0 87,800
Base
Air Force Florida Eglin Air Force KING HANGAR BUILDING 130 (DESIGN) 0 7,000 7,000
Base
Air Force Florida Eglin Air Force PHYSICAL FITNESS COMPLEX (DESIGN) 0 4,200 4,200
Base
Air Force Florida Tyndall Air Force AFCEC RDT&E FACILITIES AND GATE 160,000 -90,000 70,000
Base
Air Force Florida Tyndall Air Force FIRE/CRASH RESCUE STATION 0 48,000 48,000
Base
Air Force Georgia Moody Air Force MILITARY WORKING DOG KENNEL 0 15,870 15,870
Base
Air Force Georgia Robins Air Force CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER 0 52,000 52,000
Base
Air Force Hawaii Maui Optical and SECURE INTEGRATION SUPPORT LAB W/ 3,600 0 3,600
Supercomputing LAND ACQ
Site
Air Force Illinois Scott Air Force AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR 0 79,000 79,000
Base
Air Force Indiana Grissom Air Reserve AIRCREW READINESS FACILITY (DESIGN) 0 2,600 2,600
Base
Air Force Japan Kadena Air Base THEATER STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS HUB 99,000 -45,000 54,000
Air Force Japan Misawa Air Base F-35 FIGHTER JET FLIGHT SIMULATOR 0 89,000 89,000
Air Force Mississippi Columbus Air Force T-7A ALLIED SUPPORT 11,800 0 11,800
Base
Air Force Missouri Whiteman Air Force B-21 ADAL FIELD TRAINING DETACHMENT, 89,000 0 89,000
Base B152
Air Force Missouri Whiteman Air Force B-21 WEAPONS LOADER TRAINER 80,000 0 80,000
Base
Air Force Montana Malmstrom Air Force SENTINEL LAND ACQUISITION (INC) 43,500 0 43,500
Base
Air Force Montana Malmstrom Air Force SENTINEL OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE 95,000 -40,000 55,000
Base COMPLEX, INC
Air Force Nebraska Offutt Air Force REPLACE VEHICLE SEARCH AREA, 0 1,500 1,500
Base STRATCOM GATE, B511 (DESIGN)
Air Force Nebraska Offutt Air Force SAOC SUPPLY STORAGE FACILITY 0 15,000 15,000
Base (DESIGN)
Air Force Nebraska Offutt Air Force STRATCOM BASE AND OPERATIONS 0 11,200 11,200
Base MOBILITY CENTER (DESIGN)
Air Force Nevada Creech Air Force MISSION SUPPORT FACILITY 0 55,000 55,000
Base
Air Force Nevada Creech Air Force WARRIOR FITNESS TRAINING FACILITY 0 104,000 104,000
Base
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 2-BAY FUEL CELL (F-35) 52,000 0 52,000
Base
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 AGE WASHRACK 500 0 500
Base
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 AIRCRAFT WASHRACK & SUPPORT 4,000 0 4,000
Base FACILITY
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 APRON COMPLEX 192,500 0 192,500
Base
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 COMBINED OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE 177,800 0 177,800
Base HANGAR (COMH)
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 CONSOLIDATED MAINTENANCE 32,000 0 32,000
Base FACILITY
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 FUEL CELL 28,000 0 28,000
Base
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 FUEL STATION 10,000 0 10,000
Base
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 LOW OBSERVABLE CORROSION REPAIR 38,700 0 38,700
Base FACILITY
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 MAINTENANCE TRAINING FACILITY 29,000 0 29,000
Base
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 R-11 EAST SIDE SHADE STRUCTURE 1,800 0 1,800
Base
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 REPAIR MUNITIONS ADMIN FACILITY 4,600 0 4,600
Base
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 RE-PROGRAMMING LAB 61,000 0 61,000
Base
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 SIMULATOR FACILITY 62,000 0 62,000
Base
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 WEAPONS LOAD TRAINING FACILITY 34,000 0 34,000
Base
Air Force Nevada Nellis Air Force F-47 WEAPONS STORAGE FACILITY 2,800 0 2,800
Base
Air Force New Jersey Joint Base McGuire- CYBER OPERATIONS FACILITY (DESIGN) 0 4,000 4,000
Dix-Lakehurst
Air Force New Mexico Cannon Air Force DORMITORY 10,000 0 10,000
Base
Air Force New Mexico Holloman Air Force HIGH SPEED TEST TRACK 0 72,750 72,750
Base
Air Force New Mexico Kirtland Air Force EOD Facility (INC) 0 7,750 7,750
Base
Air Force New Mexico Kirtland Air Force SPACE FORCE OPERATIONAL FACILITY 250,000 -150,000 100,000
Base
Air Force North Carolina Seymour Johnson Air AIRCREW READINESS FACILITY 0 13,000 13,000
Force Base
Air Force North Dakota Grand Forks PAVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE FACILITY 0 71,000 71,000
Air Force North Dakota Grand Forks Air SPACE FORCE OPERATIONAL FACILITY 250,000 -150,000 100,000
Force Base
Air Force North Dakota Minot Air Force SENTINEL CONSOLIDATED VEHICLE 124,000 -75,000 49,000
Base MAINTENANCE COMPLEX
Air Force North Dakota Minot Air Force SENTINEL SECURITY FORCES OPERATIONS 108,000 0 108,000
Base COMPLEX
Air Force Ohio Wright-Patterson AI SUPERCOMPUTING RESOURCE CENTER 0 46,000 46,000
Air Force Base (DESIGN)
Air Force Oklahoma Tinker Air Force BOMBER AGILE COMMON HANGAR (INC) 112,000 -105,000 7,000
Base
Air Force Oregon Mountain Home Air HOMELAND DEFENSE OVER-THE-HORIZON 33,650 0 33,650
Force Base RADAR (INC)
Air Force Spain Moron Air Base PARKING APRON 75,500 0 75,500
Air Force Tennessee Arnold Air Force INSTALLATION ACP GATE 2 UPGRADE 0 17,600 17,600
Base
Air Force Tennessee Arnold Air Force COOLING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE FOR 0 5,500 5,500
Base DEFENSE GROUND TEST FACILITIES
(DESIGN)
Air Force Texas Dyess Air Force B-21 FLIGHT SIMULATOR FACILITY 63,000 0 63,000
Base
Air Force Texas Dyess Air Force B-21 LOW OBSERVABLE CORROSION 74,000 0 74,000
Base CONTROL FAC
Air Force Texas Dyess Air Force B-21 UTILITIES SITE IMPROVEMENTS 23,000 0 23,000
Base ELECTRIC
Air Force Texas Dyess Air Force B-21 FIELD TRAINING DETACHMENT 0 84,000 84,000
Base FACILITY
Air Force Texas Fort Sam Houston METC--BARRACKS/SHIPS/DORMS #1 (INC) 308,000 0 308,000
Air Force Texas Goodfellow Air PIPELINE STUDENT DORMITORY 12,000 0 12,000
Force Base
Air Force Texas Joint Base San MILITARY WORKING DOGS LARGE CAPACITY 180,000 -100,000 80,000
Antonio KENNEL
Air Force Texas Lackland Air Force 91 CYBER OPERATIONS CENTER 96,000 -60,000 36,000
Base
Air Force Utah Hill Air Force Base F-35 MAINTENANCE FACILITY, PHASE 1 100,000 0 100,000
(INC)
Air Force Utah Hill Air Force Base T-7A DEPOT MAINTENANCE COMPLEX, INC 72,000 0 72,000
Air Force Virginia Joint Base Langley- FUEL SYSTEM MAINTENANCE DOCK 49,000 0 49,000
Eustis
Air Force Wake Island Wake Island PDI: AIRCRAFT PARKING APRON, PHASE 1 129,000 0 129,000
(INC)
Air Force Washington Fairchild Air Force KC-135 ADAL PARTS WAREHOUSE (DESIGN) 0 2,500 2,500
Base
Air Force Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN 2,490,612 0 2,490,612
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Air Force Worldwide Unspecified FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION 0 6,100,395 6,100,395
Unspecified Worldwide & MODERNIZATION (AIR FORCE)
Locations (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M)
Air Force Worldwide Unspecified FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION 0 1,384,326 1,384,326
Unspecified Worldwide & MODERNIZATION (SPACE FORCE)
Locations (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M)
Air Force Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION 315,810 145,000 460,810
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Air Force Wyoming F.E. Warren Air GBSD OPERATIONS GROUP FACILITY 171,000 -141,000 30,000
Force Base
Air Force Wyoming F.E. Warren Air GBSD UTILITY CORRIDOR (INC) 461,158 0 461,158
Force Base
Subtotal Military Construction, Air Force 10,688,980 6,894,341 17,583,321
................... ................... ....................................
DEFENSE-WIDE
Defense-Wide Alabama Maxwell Air Force MAXWELL ELEMENTARY/MIDDLE SCHOOL 44,000 0 44,000
Base ADDITION
Defense-Wide Alabama Redstone Arsenal POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID 0 90,000 90,000
Defense-Wide Bahrain Naval Support POWER GENERATION 0 5,900 5,900
Activity Bahrain
Defense-Wide Belgium Sterrebeek Annex BRUSSELS UNIT SCHOOL ANNEX 33,000 0 33,000
Defense-Wide California Camp Edwards POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID 0 79,000 79,000
Defense-Wide California Naval Base Coronado MULTI-MISSION DRY SUBMERSIBLE CAMPUS 0 35,000 35,000
(DESIGN)
Defense-Wide Colorado Defense GENERAL PURPOSE WAREHOUSE 85,000 0 85,000
Reutilization and
Marketing Office
(DRMO)--Colorado
Springs
Defense-Wide Florida Eglin Air Force POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID 0 43,000 43,000
Base
Defense-Wide Florida Homestead Air SOF CLIMATE CONTROLLED TACTICAL 33,000 0 33,000
Reserve Base STORAGE WAREHOUSE
Defense-Wide Florida Naval Air Station AMBULATORY CARE CENTER SUBSTANCE 40,000 0 40,000
Jacksonville ABUSE REHABILITATION PROGRAM (SARP)
REPLACEMENT
Defense-Wide Germany Ramstein Air Base VEHICLE FUELING FACILITY 20,500 0 20,500
Defense-Wide Germany Rhine Ordnance MEDICAL CENTER REPLACEMENT (INC 13) 95,002 0 95,002
Barracks
Defense-Wide Germany U.S. Army Garrison POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID 0 72,000 72,000
Ansbach
Defense-Wide Germany U.S. Army Garrison BAUMHOLDER MIDDLE/HIGH SCHOOL 140,000 0 140,000
Rheinland-Pfalz
Defense-Wide Guam Joint Region PDI: GDS, COMMAND CENTER (INC) 99,700 0 99,700
Marianas
Defense-Wide Guam Joint Region PDI: GDS, EIAMD, PHASE 1 (INC) 75,113 0 75,113
Marianas
Defense-Wide Guam Joint Region PDI: GDS, EIAMD, PHASE 3 179,446 0 179,446
Marianas
Defense-Wide Japan Camp Butler PDI: TRUCK OFFLOAD FACILITIES 37,900 0 37,900
Defense-Wide Japan Yokota Air Base PDI: BULK STORAGE TANKS PHASE 2 88,200 0 88,200
Defense-Wide Kentucky Fort Knox SCOTT MIDDLE SCHOOL 117,000 -85,000 32,000
Defense-Wide Korea Kunsan Air Base AMBULATORY CARE CENTER REPLACEMENT 65,000 0 65,000
Defense-Wide Maryland Bethesda Naval MEDCEN ADDITION/ALTERATION (INC 10) 87,275 0 87,275
Hospital
Defense-Wide Maryland Bethesda Naval SUPPORT FACILITIES REPLACEMENT (INC) 55,000 0 55,000
Hospital
Defense-Wide Maryland Fort Meade CYBER NATIONAL MISSION FORCE MISSION 98,411 0 98,411
OPERATIONS FACILITY (INC)
Defense-Wide Maryland Fort Meade NSAW EAST CAMPUS BUILDING #5 (INC 2) 180,000 0 180,000
Defense-Wide Maryland Fort Meade NSAW EAST CAMPUS SITE INFRASTRUCTURE 52,000 0 52,000
Defense-Wide Nebraska Offutt Air Force DPAA LABORATORY 0 69,000 69,000
Base
Defense-Wide Nevada Creech Air Force AMBULATORY CARE CENTER ADDITION/ 25,381 0 25,381
Base ALTERATION
Defense-Wide North Carolina Camp Lejeune SOF MARINE RAIDER BATTALION 80,000 0 80,000
OPERATIONS FACILITY
Defense-Wide North Carolina Camp Lejeune SOF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FACILITY 72,000 0 72,000
Defense-Wide North Carolina Fort Bragg SOF OPERATIONAL TRAINING FACILITY 50,000 0 50,000
Defense-Wide Pennsylvania Defense MICROGRID 0 58,000 58,000
Distribution
Center,
Susquehanna
Defense-Wide Puerto Rico Fort Buchanan EMERGENCY WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM 0 33,500 33,500
Defense-Wide Texas Brooks Army Medical POWER GENERATION AND ENERGY UPGRADES 0 55,500 55,500
Center
Defense-Wide United Kingdom Menwith Hill FIRE STATION REPLACEMENT 35,000 0 35,000
Station
Defense-Wide United Kingdom Royal Air Force HOSPITAL REPLACEMENT, PHASE 2 (INC) 78,000 0 78,000
Lakenheath
Defense-Wide Utah Camp Williams NSAU CONSOLIDATION--MISSION FACILITY 50,000 0 50,000
(INC)
Defense-Wide Virginia Joint Expeditionary SOF LAUNCH & RECOVERY FACILITY 36,000 0 36,000
Base Little Creek-
Fort Story
Defense-Wide Wake Island Defense Fuel PDI: FUELING FACILITIES 100,000 0 100,000
Support Point
Defense-Wide Washington Joint Base Lewis- SOF TACTICAL EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE 35,000 0 35,000
McChord FACILITY
Defense-Wide Washington Naval Base Kitsap POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID 0 65,000 65,000
Defense-Wide Washington Yakima Training POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID 0 73,000 73,000
Center
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified CHILLERS AND SUBSISTENCE RESILIENCY 0 150,000 150,000
Unspecified Worldwide PILOT
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified DEFENSE LABORATORY FACILITY 0 250,000 250,000
Unspecified Worldwide INVESTMENT PROGRAM
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN--JOINT ANALYSIS CENTER OF 5,000 0 5,000
Unspecified Worldwide EXCELLENCE
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN (DEFENSE-WIDE) 16,783 0 16,783
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN (DHA) 45,813 0 45,813
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN (DLA) 100,511 0 100,511
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN (DODEA) 26,625 0 26,625
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN (MDA) 42,846 0 42,846
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN (NSA) 33,700 0 33,700
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN (SOCOM) 81,628 0 81,628
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified ENERGY RESILIENCE AND CONSERV. 694,307 -694,307 0
Unspecified Worldwide INVEST. PROG.
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified ERCIP DESIGN 39,346 0 39,346
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified EXERCISE RELATED MINOR CONSTRUCTION 13,328 50,000 63,328
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified PAX SYSTEM SUPPORT 13,000 0 13,000
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified UFC SYSTEM SUPPORT 12,000 0 12,000
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION 3,000 50,000 53,000
Unspecified Worldwide (DEFENSE-WIDE)
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION (DLA) 14,237 20,000 34,237
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION 10,000 20,000 30,000
Unspecified Worldwide (DODEA)
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION (MDA) 2,659 25,000 27,659
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION (NSA) 9,000 20,000 29,000
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION 24,500 25,000 49,500
Unspecified Worldwide (SOCOM)
Locations
Defense-Wide Wyoming F.E. Warren Air POWER GENERATION AND MICROGRID WITH 0 51,717 51,717
Force Base GEOTHERMAL HEATING AND COOLING
Subtotal Military Construction, Defense-Wide 3,375,211 561,310 3,936,521
................... ................... ....................................
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
Army National Guard Alabama Fort McClellan REGIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTE (DESIGN) 0 2,250 2,250
Training Center
and Clarke Range
Army National Guard District of Armed Forces ACCESS CONTROL POINT 0 2,000 2,000
Columbia Retirement Home
Army National Guard District of Armed Forces COLLECTIVE TRAINING UNACCOMPANIED 0 10,000 10,000
Columbia Retirement Home HOUSING
Army National Guard District of Armed Forces COLLECTIVE TRAINING UNACCOMPANIED 0 10,000 10,000
Columbia Retirement Home HOUSING
Army National Guard District of Armed Forces COLLECTIVE TRAINING UNACCOMPANIED 0 10,000 10,000
Columbia Retirement Home HOUSING
Army National Guard District of Armed Forces COLLECTIVE TRAINING UNACCOMPANIED 0 10,000 10,000
Columbia Retirement Home HOUSING
Army National Guard District of Armed Forces MESS HALL (HISTORIC REBUILD) 0 6,000 6,000
Columbia Retirement Home
Army National Guard District of Armed Forces NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER- 0 21,700 21,700
Columbia Retirement Home GRANT BLDG
Army National Guard District of Armed Forces NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER- 0 16,000 16,000
Columbia Retirement Home LAGARDE
Army National Guard District of Armed Forces VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP 0 1,300 1,300
Columbia Retirement Home
Army National Guard District of Hill East RFK Area CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM READY BUILDING 0 3,000 3,000
Columbia 02
Army National Guard Florida Camp Blanding AUTOMATED MULTI PURPOSE TRAINING 28,000 0 28,000
RANGE
Army National Guard Idaho Orchard Training MISSION TRAINING COMPLEX (SMALL) 27,000 0 27,000
Area
Army National Guard Illinois Forest Park NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER 0 4,300 4,300
(DESIGN)
Army National Guard Illinois Peoria NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER 0 8,000 8,000
Army National Guard Kentucky Jackson Field VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP 0 18,500 18,500
CONSTRUCTION
Army National Guard Louisiana Abbeville Readiness NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER 23,000 0 23,000
Center
Army National Guard Maine Camp Keyes Training COMBINED SUPPORT MAINTENANCE SHOP 0 7,700 7,700
Site (DESIGN)
Army National Guard Maine Saco SOUTHERN MAINE READINESS CENTER 0 7,900 7,900
(DESIGN)
Army National Guard Massachusetts Camp Edwards NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER 43,000 0 43,000
Army National Guard Minnesota Anoka NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER 0 4,000 4,000
(DESIGN)
Army National Guard Minnesota Camp Ripley ACCESS CONTROL POINT 0 17,000 17,000
Army National Guard Mississippi Camp Shelby BOBBY CHAIN ARMY AVIATION SUPPORT 0 12,000 12,000
FACILITY AND READINESS CENTER
(DESIGN)
Army National Guard Mississippi Camp Shelby SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION 0 5,000 5,000
FACILITY (SCIF) (DESIGN)
Army National Guard Nevada Henderson Army READINESS CENTER EXPANSION (DESIGN) 0 2,371 2,371
National Guard
Readiness Center
Army National Guard New Hampshire Pease Air National NEWINGTON READINESS CENTER (DESIGN) 0 4,000 4,000
Guard Base
Army National Guard New York Colonie Readiness NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER 90,000 0 90,000
Center
Army National Guard Oklahoma Tulsa Army Aviation AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE BAY 18,500 0 18,500
Support Facility
Army National Guard Oregon Raymond F. Rees FACILITY ADDITION (DESIGN) 0 1,000 1,000
Training Center
Army National Guard South Dakota Sturgis VEHICLE MAINTENANCE SHOP (DESIGN) 0 3,700 3,700
Army National Guard Tennessee Volunteer Training AASF ROTARY WING HANGARS (DESIGN) 0 15,000 15,000
Site--Smyrna
Army National Guard Utah Camp Williams UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING (DESIGN) 0 4,100 4,100
Army National Guard Virginia Sandston ARMY AVIATION SUPPORT FACILIITY 0 21,000 21,000
(DESIGN)
Army National Guard Washington Yakima Training DINING FACILITY 18,000 0 18,000
Center
Army National Guard West Virginia Martinsburg NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER ADD/ 20,000 0 20,000
Readiness Center ALT
Army National Guard Wisconsin Black River Falls NATIONAL GUARD READINESS CENTER 0 20,000 20,000
Army National Guard Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN 71,909 0 71,909
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Army National Guard Worldwide Unspecified FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION 0 1,065,363 1,065,363
Unspecified Worldwide & MODERNIZATION (TRANSFERRED FROM
Locations O&M)
Army National Guard Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION 19,500 20,000 39,500
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Military Construction, Army National Guard 358,909 1,333,184 1,692,093
................... ................... ....................................
ARMY RESERVE
Army Reserve Colorado Fort Carson EQUIPMENT CONCENTRATION SITE 92,000 0 92,000
Army Reserve Illinois Fort Sheridan AREA MAINTENANCE SUPPORT ACTIVITY 38,000 0 38,000
Army Reserve Virginia Richmond Reserve ARMY RESERVE CENTER 48,000 0 48,000
Center
Army Reserve Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN 10,413 0 10,413
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Army Reserve Worldwide Unspecified FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION 0 411,093 411,093
Unspecified Worldwide & MODERNIZATION (TRANSFERRED FROM
Locations O&M)
Army Reserve Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION 21,500 20,000 41,500
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Military Construction, Army Reserve 209,913 431,093 641,006
................... ................... ....................................
NAVY RESERVE & MARINE CORPS RESERVE
Navy Reserve & Marine Florida Naval Air Station RAMP EXPANSION & RTC 47,000 0 47,000
Corps Reserve Jacksonville
Navy Reserve & Marine Texas Fort Worth HANGAR 1050 MODERNIZATION (INC) 56,870 0 56,870
Corps Reserve
Navy Reserve & Marine Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN 6,578 0 6,578
Corps Reserve Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Navy Reserve & Marine Worldwide Unspecified FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION 0 100,709 100,709
Corps Reserve Unspecified Worldwide & MODERNIZATION (MARINE CORPS
Locations RESERVE) (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M)
Navy Reserve & Marine Worldwide Unspecified FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION 0 59,386 59,386
Corps Reserve Unspecified Worldwide & MODERNIZATION (NAVY RESERVE)
Locations (TRANSFERRED FROM O&M)
Navy Reserve & Marine Worldwide Unspecified MCNR UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION 2,522 20,000 22,522
Corps Reserve Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Navy Reserve & Marine Worldwide Unspecified USMCR DESIGN 19,302 0 19,302
Corps Reserve Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Military Construction, Navy Reserve & Marine Corps Reserve 132,272 180,095 312,367
................... ................... ....................................
AIR NATIONAL GUARD
Air National Guard Alabama Sumpter Smith Air ADAL AIRCRAFT PARKING APRON 0 33,000 33,000
National Guard
Base
Air National Guard Alabama Sumpter Smith Air SECURITY AND SERVICES BUILDING 0 1,500 1,500
National Guard (DESIGN)
Base
Air National Guard Colorado Buckley Space Force MUNITIONS COMPLEX (DESIGN) 0 17,500 17,500
Base
Air National Guard Delaware New Castle Air CONSOLIDATED MXS/LRS COMPLEX 0 7,700 7,700
National Guard (DESIGN)
Air National Guard Indiana Fort Wayne F16: MISSION TRAINING FACILITY 0 1,800 1,800
International (DESIGN)
Airport
Air National Guard Maine Bangor AIRFIELD PAVEMENTS REPAIR (DESIGN) 0 3,800 3,800
Air National Guard Michigan Selfridge Air F-15EX MAINTENANCE COMPLEX 0 81,000 81,000
National Guard
Base
Air National Guard Michigan Selfridge Air MITIGATE RUNWAY ENCROACHMENT 110,000 -100,000 10,000
National Guard
Base
Air National Guard Michigan Selfridge Air TAXIWAY ALPHA EXTENSION 28,000 -28,000 0
National Guard
Base
Air National Guard Michigan Selfridge Air TAXIWAY BRAVO EXTENSION 24,000 -24,000 0
National Guard
Base
Air National Guard Minnesota Minneapolis-St. FUEL CELL HANGAR (DESIGN) 0 5,200 5,200
Paul International
Airport
Air National Guard Mississippi Key Field Air FUEL HYDRANT SYSTEM (DESIGN) 0 9,000 9,000
National Guard
Base
Air National Guard Mississippi Key Field Air MAINTENANCE HANGAR (DESIGN) 0 7,000 7,000
National Guard
Base
Air National Guard Mississippi Key Field Air SIMULATOR FACILITY BUILDING ADDITION 0 1,000 1,000
National Guard (DESIGN)
Base
Air National Guard Missouri Rosecrans Memorial AIRCRAFT PARKING APRON 0 63,000 63,000
Airport
Air National Guard New York Eastern Air Defense AIR CONTROL AND WARNING OPERATIONS 0 10,000 10,000
Sector BUILDING (DESIGN)
Air National Guard New York Gabreski Air LOGISTICS READINESS COMPLEX (DESIGN) 0 2,900 2,900
National Guard
Base
Air National Guard Oregon Kingsley Air Force F-35 FTU ACADEMIC TRAINING CENTER 80,000 0 80,000
Base
Air National Guard Oregon Kingsley Field Air ACADEMIC TRAINING CENTER (DESIGN) 0 8,000 8,000
National Guard
Base
Air National Guard South Dakota Joe Foss Field AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR 0 40,000 40,000
Air National Guard Tennessee McGhee Tyson ROAD, BRIDGE, AND ECP 0 28,000 28,000
Airport
Air National Guard Tennessee Volunteer Training AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR (DESIGN) 0 4,000 4,000
Site--Smyrna
Air National Guard Tennessee Volunteer Training BERRY FIELD GATE REPLACEMENT 0 1,250 1,250
Site--Smyrna (DESIGN)
Air National Guard Texas Naval Air Station C-130J ADAL MAINTENANCE HANGAR B1676 27,000 0 27,000
Joint Reserve Base
Fort Worth
Air National Guard Utah Salt Lake City FUEL CELL AND CORROSION CONTROL 0 5,500 5,500
International HANGAR (DESIGN)
Airport
Air National Guard Virginia Joint Base Langley- CONSOLIDATED HEADQUARTERS FACILITY 0 3,200 3,200
Eustis (DESIGN)
Air National Guard West Virginia McLaughlin Air C-130J APRON EXPANSION (DESIGN) 0 5,000 5,000
National Guard
Base
Air National Guard West Virginia McLaughlin Air COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY (DESIGN) 0 3,000 3,000
National Guard
Base
Air National Guard West Virginia McLaughlin Air SQUADRON OPERATIONS FACILITY 0 3,300 3,300
National Guard (DESIGN)
Base
Air National Guard Wisconsin Volk Field Air ADAL ACS COMPLEX 0 18,000 18,000
National Guard
Base
Air National Guard Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN 247,221 0 247,221
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Air National Guard Worldwide Unspecified FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION 0 531,241 531,241
Unspecified Worldwide & MODERNIZATION (TRANSFERRED FROM
Locations O&M)
Air National Guard Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION 9,000 20,000 29,000
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Military Construction, Air National Guard 525,221 762,891 1,288,112
................... ................... ....................................
AIR FORCE RESERVE
Air Force Reserve Pennsylvania Pittsburgh Air COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY 19,500 0 19,500
Reserve Station
Air Force Reserve Nebraska Lincoln Air PARKING APRON (DESIGN) 0 4,000 4,000
National Guard
Base
Air Force Reserve Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN 1,347 0 1,347
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Air Force Reserve Worldwide Unspecified FACILITIES, SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION 0 187,022 187,022
Unspecified Worldwide & MODERNIZATION (TRANSFERRED FROM
Locations O&M)
Air Force Reserve Worldwide Unspecified UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION 1,325 20,000 21,325
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Military Construction, Air Force Reserve 22,172 211,022 233,194
................... ................... ....................................
NATO SECURITY INVESTMENT PROGRAM
NATO Worldwide NATO Security NATO SECURITY INVESTMENT PROGRAM 604,270 50,000 654,270
Unspecified Investment Program
Subtotal NATO Security Investment Program 604,270 50,000 654,270
................... ................... ....................................
INDOPACIFIC COMBATANT COMMAND
MILCON, INDOPACOM Worldwide Unspecified INDOPACOM MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 27,740 184,169 211,909
Unspecified Worldwide PILOT PROGRAM
Locations
Subtotal INDOPACOM MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PILOT PROGRAM 27,740 184,169 211,909
................... ................... ....................................
TOTAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 26,143,029 23,860,735 50,003,764
................... ................... ....................................
FAMILY HOUSING
FAMILY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, ARMY
Fam Hsg Con, Army Germany South Camp Vilseck FH REPLACEMENT CONSTRUCTION (44 95,060 0 95,060
UNITS)
Fam Hsg Con, Army Japan Camp Zama FH IMPROVEMENT CONSTRUCTION (68 106,356 0 106,356
UNITS)
Fam Hsg Con, Army Worldwide Unspecified FAMILY HOUSING DESIGN 39,079 0 39,079
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Family Housing Construction, Army 240,495 0 240,495
................... ................... ....................................
FAMILY HOUSING O&M, ARMY
Fam Hsg O&M, Army Worldwide Unspecified FURNISHINGS 18,177 0 18,177
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Army Worldwide Unspecified LEASED HOUSING 132,820 0 132,820
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Army Worldwide Unspecified MAINTENANCE OF REAL PROPERTY 172,866 0 172,866
Unspecified Worldwide FACILITIES
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Army Worldwide Unspecified MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT 42,802 0 42,802
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Army Worldwide Unspecified MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION 42,026 0 42,026
Unspecified Worldwide INITIATIVE
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Army Worldwide Unspecified MISCELLANEOUS 92 0 92
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Army Worldwide Unspecified SERVICES 10,130 0 10,130
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Army Worldwide Unspecified UTILITIES 49,494 0 49,494
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Family Housing Operation And Maintenance, Army 468,407 0 468,407
................... ................... ....................................
FAMILY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, NAVY & MARINE CORPS
Fam Hsg Con, Navy & District of Marine Barracks COST TO COMPLETE: W/H 1,532 0 1,532
Marine Corps Columbia Washington (8th REVITALIZATION, QUARTERS #1 (1
Street & I) UNITS)
Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Guam Joint Region COST TO COMPLETE: REPLACE ANDERSEN 25,876 0 25,876
Marine Corps Marianas HOUSING, PHASE V (74 UNITS)
Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Guam Joint Region COST TO COMPLETE: REPLACE ANDERSEN 44,920 0 44,920
Marine Corps Marianas HOUSING, PHASE VI (52 UNITS)
Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Guam Joint Region COST TO COMPLETE: REPLACE ANDERSEN 33,771 0 33,771
Marine Corps Marianas HOUSING PHASE 8 (62 UNITS)
Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Guam Joint Region REPLACE ANDERSEN HOUSING PHASE 9 144,495 0 144,495
Marine Corps Marianas (149 UNITS) (INC)
Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Japan Yokosuka Naval Base WHOLE HOUSE & UTILITY REVITALIZE, 44,128 0 44,128
Marine Corps IKEGO TH PHASE 6 (32 UNITS)
Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN 14,971 0 14,971
Marine Corps Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg Con, Navy & Worldwide Unspecified NAVY SOUTHEAST MHPI (2ND 52,177 0 52,177
Marine Corps Unspecified Worldwide RESTRUCTURE) (100 UNITS)
Locations
Subtotal Family Housing Construction, Navy & Marine Corps 361,870 0 361,870
................... ................... ....................................
FAMILY HOUSING O&M, NAVY & MARINE CORPS
Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Worldwide Unspecified FURNISHINGS 17,252 0 17,252
Marine Corps Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Worldwide Unspecified HOUSING PRIVATIZATION SUPPORT 60,997 0 60,997
Marine Corps Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Worldwide Unspecified LEASING 66,242 0 66,242
Marine Corps Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Worldwide Unspecified MAINTENANCE 119,152 0 119,152
Marine Corps Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Worldwide Unspecified MANAGEMENT 54,612 0 54,612
Marine Corps Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Worldwide Unspecified MISCELLANEOUS 445 0 445
Marine Corps Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Worldwide Unspecified SERVICES 14,394 0 14,394
Marine Corps Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Navy & Worldwide Unspecified UTILITIES 52,515 0 52,515
Marine Corps Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Family Housing Operation & Maintenance, Navy & Marine Corps 385,609 0 385,609
FAMILY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, AIR FORCE
Fam Hsg Con, Air Force Alaska Joint Base MHPI RESTRUCTURE--JBER, PHASE 2 156,964 0 156,964
Elmendorf- (1,194 UNITS)
Richardson
Fam Hsg Con, Air Force Japan Yokota Air Base YOKOTA PAIP 10 PHASE 1 (32 UNITS) 36,100 0 36,100
Fam Hsg Con, Air Force United Kingdom Royal Air Force CROUGHTON (REPLACEMENT) (12 UNITS) 24,104 0 24,104
Croughton
Fam Hsg Con, Air Force Worldwide Unspecified DESIGN 25,854 0 25,854
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Family Housing Construction, Air Force 243,022 0 243,022
................... ................... ....................................
FAMILY HOUSING O&M, AIR FORCE
Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force Worldwide Unspecified FURNISHINGS 28,691 0 28,691
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force Worldwide Unspecified HOUSING PRIVATIZATION SUPPORT 40,627 0 40,627
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force Worldwide Unspecified LEASING 5,523 0 5,523
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force Worldwide Unspecified MAINTENANCE 160,528 0 160,528
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force Worldwide Unspecified MANAGEMENT 64,841 0 64,841
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force Worldwide Unspecified MISCELLANEOUS 2,492 0 2,492
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force Worldwide Unspecified SERVICES 12,957 0 12,957
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Air Force Worldwide Unspecified UTILITIES 51,097 0 51,097
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Family Housing Operation And Maintenance, Air Force 366,756 0 366,756
................... ................... ....................................
FAMILY HOUSING O&M, DEFENSE-WIDE
Fam Hsg O&M, Defense- Worldwide Unspecified FURNISHINGS (DIA) 566 0 566
Wide Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Defense- Worldwide Unspecified FURNISHINGS (NSA) 93 0 93
Wide Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Defense- Worldwide Unspecified LEASING (DIA) 34,693 0 34,693
Wide Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Defense- Worldwide Unspecified LEASING (DSCA) 8,792 0 8,792
Wide Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Defense- Worldwide Unspecified LEASING (NSA) 14,320 0 14,320
Wide Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Defense- Worldwide Unspecified MAINTENANCE (NSA) 37 0 37
Wide Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Defense- Worldwide Unspecified UTILITIES (DIA) 4,548 0 4,548
Wide Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Fam Hsg O&M, Defense- Worldwide Unspecified UTILITIES (NSA) 15 0 15
Wide Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Family Housing Operation And Maintenance, Defense-Wide 63,064 0 63,064
................... ................... ....................................
FAMILY HOUSING IMPROVEMENT FUND
Family Housing Worldwide Unspecified ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES--FHIF 8,412 0 8,412
Improvement Fund Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Family Housing Improvement Fund 8,412 0 8,412
................... ................... ....................................
UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING IMPROVEMENT FUND
Unaccompanied Housing Worldwide Unspecified ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES--UHIF 501 0 501
Improvement Fund Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Unaccompanied Housing Improvement Fund 501 0 501
................... ................... ....................................
TOTAL FAMILY HOUSING 2,138,136 0 2,138,136
DEFENSE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE, ARMY
BRAC, Army Worldwide Base Realignment & BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE 151,293 0 151,293
Unspecified Closure, Army
Subtotal Base Realignment and Closure--Army 151,293 0 151,293
................... ................... ....................................
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE, NAVY
BRAC, Navy Worldwide Unspecified BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE 108,325 0 108,325
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Base Realignment and Closure--Navy 108,325 0 108,325
................... ................... ....................................
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE, AIR FORCE
BRAC, Air Force Worldwide Unspecified BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE 111,381 0 111,381
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Base Realignment and Closure--Air Force 111,381 0 111,381
................... ................... ....................................
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE, DEFENSE-WIDE
BRAC, Defense-Wide Worldwide Unspecified BASE REALIGNMENT & CLOSURE 1,318 0 1,318
Unspecified Worldwide
Locations
Subtotal Base Realignment and Closure--Defense-Wide 1,318 0 1,318
................... ................... ....................................
TOTAL DEFENSE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE 372,317 0 372,317
................... ................... ....................................
TOTAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, FAMILY HOUSING, AND BRAC 28,653,482 23,860,735 52,514,217
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TITLE XLVII--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL
SECURITY PROGRAMS

SEC. 4701. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 4701. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS (In Thousands of Dollars)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senate
Program FY 2027 Request Senate Change Authorized
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discretionary Summary by Appropriation
Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies
Appropriation Summary:
Energy Programs
Nuclear Energy...................................... 160,000 0 160,000

Atomic Energy Defense Activities
National Nuclear Security Administration:
Weapons Activities................................ 26,941,950 74,000 27,015,950
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.................. 2,389,595 0 2,389,595
Naval Reactors.................................... 2,393,692 -65,000 2,328,692
Federal Salaries and Expenses..................... 577,097 0 577,097
Total, National Nuclear Security Administration..... 32,302,334 9,000 32,311,334

Defense Environmental Cleanup....................... 6,983,318 5,000 6,988,318

Defense Uranium Enrichment D&D...................... 253,000 -253,000 0

Other Defense Activities............................ 1,184,721 0 1,184,721

Total, Atomic Energy Defense Activities............... 41,222,582 -239,000 40,983,582

Total, Discretionary Funding.............................. 41,382,582 -239,000 41,143,582

Nuclear Energy
Safeguards and security................................. 160,000 0 160,000
Total, Nuclear Energy..................................... 160,000 0 160,000

National Nuclear Security Administration

Weapons Activities
Stockpile management
Stockpile modernization
B61-12 LEP.......................................... 0 0 0
B61-13.............................................. 46,428 0 46,428
W88 ALT 370......................................... 0 150,000 150,000
Restoration of statutorily-directed funding....... (150,000)
W80-4 LEP........................................... 1,048,340 0 1,048,340
W80-5 Modification Program.......................... 0 0 0
W87-1 Modification Program.......................... 913,231 0 913,231
W93 Program......................................... 1,106,106 0 1,106,106
Future Programs..................................... 99,794 0 99,794
Subtotal, Stockpile modernization..................... 3,213,899 150,000 3,363,899
Stockpile Operation....................................... 1,885,290 0 1,885,290
Weapons dismantlement and disposition..................... 90,760 0 90,760
Production operations..................................... 1,146,586 0 1,146,586
Nuclear enterprise assurance.............................. 121,015 0 121,015
Realignment of improperly applied reconciliation 0 0 0
funds............................................
Total, Stockpile management............................. 6,457,550 150,000 6,607,550

Production Modernization
Primary Capability Modernization
Plutonium Modernization
Los Alamos Plutonium Modernization
Los Alamos Pit Production....................... 1,460,791 -30,000 1,430,791
Unjustified growth..................... (-30,000)
21-D-512 Plutonium Pit Production Project, LANL. 812,100 0 812,100
15-D-302 TA-55 Reinvestments Project, Phase 3, 0 0 0
LANL...........................................
07-D-220-04 Transuranic Liquid Waste Facility, 10,000 0 10,000
LANL...........................................
04-D-125 Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 110,000 0 110,000
Replacement Project, LANL......................
Subtotal, Los Alamos Plutonium Modernization...... 2,392,891 -30,000 2,362,891
Savannah River Plutonium Modernization
Savannah River Pit Production................... 302,000 0 302,000
21-D-511 Savannah River Plutonium Processing 1,946,523 0 1,946,523
Facility, SRS..................................
Subtotal, Savannah River Plutonium Modernization.. 2,248,523 0 2,248,523
Enterprise Pit Production Support..................... 270,897 0 270,897
Total, Plutonium Modernization.......................... 4,912,311 -30,000 4,882,311
High Explosives & Energetics
High Explosives & Energetics.................... 251,765 0 251,765
21-D-510 HE Synthesis, Formulation, and 0 0 0
Production, PX.................................
Project Continuation................... 0 42,000 42,000
Restoration of statutorily-directed funding (42,000)
15-D-301 HE Science & Engineering Facility, PX.. 0 0 0
Subtotal, High Explosives & Energetics............ 251,765 42,000 293,765
Total, Primary Capability Modernization................... 5,164,076 12,000 5,176,076
Secondary Capability Modernization
Secondary Capability Modernization...................... 1,728,546 0 1,728,546
18-D-690 Lithium Processing Facility, Y-12.............. 0 0 0
Project Continuation......................... 0 0 0
06-D-141 Uranium Processing Facility, Y-12.............. 290,000 0 290,000
Total, Secondary Capability Modernization................. 2,018,546 0 2,018,546
Tritium and Defense Fuels Program
Tritium and Defense Fuels Program....................... 880,781 0 880,781
18-D-650 Tritium Finishing Facility, SRS................ 0 50,000 50,000
Restoration of statutorily-directed funding.... (50,000)
Total, Tritium and Domestic Uranium Enrichment............ 880,781 50,000 930,781
Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization
Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization............. 258,008 0 258,008
26-D-511 MESA Photolithography Capability (MPC), 51,000 0 51,000
SNL..............................................
26-D-510 Product Realization Infrastructure for 0 0 0
Stockpile Modernization (PRISM), LLNL............
22-D-513 Power Sources Capability, SNL............... 140,000 0 140,000
Total, Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization............... 449,008 0 449,008
Capability Based Investments.............................. 203,163 0 203,163
Warhead Assembly Modernization................... 47,965 0 47,965
18-D-680 Material Staging Capability, PX......... 22,500 5,000 27,500
Expedited construction......................... (5,000)
Total, Warhead Assembly Modernization..................... 70,465 5,000 75,465
Total, Production Modernization......................... 8,786,039 67,000 8,853,039

Stockpile research, technology, and engineering
Assessment Science
Assessment Science.................................. 1,243,267 -29,000 1,214,267
Unjustified growth......................... 0 (-29,000)
26-D-512 LANSCE Modernization Project (LAMP), LANL.. 15,200 0 15,200
24-D-513 Z-pinch Experimental Underground System 91,700 0 91,700
(ZEUS) Test Bed Facilities Improvement (ZTBFI),
NNSS...............................................
17-D-640 U1a Complex Enhancements Project, NNSS..... 154,142 0 154,142
Total, Assessment Science............................. 1,504,309 -29,000 1,475,309
Engineering
Engineering......................................... 230,043 0 230,043
Establishment of Rapid Capabilities 0 0 0
Development Office.........................
26-D-513 Combined Radiation Environments for 105,000 0 105,000
Survivability Testing, SNL.........................
Total, Engineering.................................... 335,043 0 335,043
Rapid & Advance Capabilities.......................... 499,209 0 499,209
Inertial Confinement Fusion........................... 829,736 15,000 844,736
Enhanced sustainment for Omega Laser Facility....... 0 (15,000) 0
26-D-514 NIF Enhanced Fusion Yield Capability, LLNL. 84,000 0 84,000
Total, Inertial Confinement Fusion.................... 913,736 15,000 928,736
Advanced simulation and computing..................... 909,765 0 909,765
Weapons technology and manufacturing maturation....... 405,413 0 405,413
Academic programs..................................... 0 80,000 80,000
Program restoration................................. (80,000)
Total, Stockpile research, technology, and engineering.. 4,068,266 66,000 4,134,266

Infrastructure and operations
Operating
Operations of facilities............................ 1,752,310 0 1,752,310
Safety and Environmental Operations................. 217,902 -50,000 167,902
Unjustified growth......................... (-50,000)
Maintenance and Repair of Facilities................ 1,384,323 -90,000 1,294,323
Unjustified growth......................... (-90,000)
Recapitalization.................................... 1,203,127 0 1,203,127
Total, Operating...................................... 4,557,662 -140,000 4,417,662
Mission enabling construction
24-D-510 Analytic Gas Laboratory, PX................ 0 0 0
23-D-517 Electrical Power Capacity Upgrade, LANL.... 65,000 0 65,000
27-D-512 Plutonium Engineering Support Building, 88,700 0 88,700
LANL...............................................
25-D-510 Plutonium Mission Safety & Quality 0 0 0
Building, LANL.....................................
25-D-511 PULSE New Access, NNSS..................... 50,000 0 50,000
Total, Mission enabling construction.................. 203,700 0 203,700
Total, Infrastructure and operations.................... 4,761,362 -140,000 4,621,362

Secure transportation asset
Operations and equipment-STA.......................... 443,075 0 443,075
Program direction-STA................................. 143,996 0 143,996
Total, Secure transportation asset...................... 587,071 0 587,071

Defense nuclear security
Operations and maintenance--DNS....................... 1,305,793 0 1,305,793
Construction:
17-D-710 West End Protected Area Reduction Project, 0 0 0
Y-12...............................................
Subtotal, Construction................................ 0 0 0
Total, Defense nuclear security......................... 1,305,793 0 1,305,793

Information Technology and Cybersecurity................ 935,000 -69,000 866,000
Unjustified growth.................................... (-69,000)
Legacy Contractor Pensions and Settlement Payments...... 40,869 0 40,869
Subtotal, Weapons Activities.............................. 27,441,159 74,000 27,515,159
Total, Weapons Activities................................. 27,441,159 74,000 27,515,159

Adjustments
Use of prior year balances............................ 0 0 0
Total, Adjustments........................................ 0 0 0
Total, Weapons Activities................................. 26,941,950 74,000 27,015,950

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
Material Management and Minimization
Conversion............................................ 0 0 0
Reactor conversion and uranium supply................. 117,820 0 117,820
Nuclear material removal and elimination.............. 68,945 0 68,945
Material disposition.................................. 0 0 0
Plutonium Management.................................. 79,039 0 79,039
Total, Material Management and Minimization............. 265,804 0 265,804
Global Material Security
International nuclear security........................ 61,013 0 61,013
Radiological security................................. 193,104 0 193,104
Nuclear smuggling detection and deterrence............ 136,457 0 136,457
Total, Global Material Security......................... 390,574 0 390,574
Nonproliferation and Arms Control....................... 214,494 0 214,494
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D
Proliferation detection............................... 296,170 0 296,170
Nonproliferation stewardship program.................. 174,383 0 174,383
Nuclear detonation detection.......................... 318,447 0 318,447
Restoral of orbital sensors.................. 0 0 0
Forensics R&D......................................... 30,000 0 30,000
Nonproliferation fuels development.................... 0 0 0
Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D............. 819,000 0 819,000
Nonproliferation Construction:
U.S. Construction..................................... 0 0 0
18-D-150 Surplus Plutonium Disposition 0 0 0
Project, SRS.................................
Total, Nonproliferation Construction.................... 0 0 0
Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs..... 1,689,872 0 1,689,872

Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program
Emergency Management............................. 35,045 0 35,045
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation........ 650,550 0 650,550
Total, Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response 685,595 0 685,595
Program..................................................

NNSA Bioassurance Program............................... 0 0 0
Legacy contractor pensions.............................. 14,128 0 14,128
Subtotal, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation................ 2,389,595 0 2,389,595

Adjustments
Use of prior year balances............................ 0 0 0
Cancellation of Prior Year Balances................... 0 0 0
Total, Adjustments...................................... 0 0 0

Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation................... 2,389,595 0 2,389,595

Naval Reactors
Naval reactors development.............................. 876,824 0 876,824
Columbia-Class reactor systems development.............. 29,700 0 29,700
S8G Prototype refueling................................. 0 0 0
Naval reactors operations and infrastructure............ 645,050 0 645,050
Program direction....................................... 71,841 0 71,841
Construction:
14-D-901 Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project, 691,953 -65,000 626,953
NRF..................................................
Unjustified growth........................... (-65,000)
21-D-530 KL Steam and Condensate Upgrades............. 0 0 0
22-D-531 KL Chemistry & Radiological Health Building.. 0 0 0
22-D-532 KL Security Upgrades......................... 0 0 0
23-D-533 BL Component Test Complex.................... 0 0 0
24-D-530 NRF Medical Science Complex.................. 0 0 0
25-D-530 Naval Examination Acquisition Project........ 80,000 0 80,000
26-D-530 East Side Office Building.................... 0 0 0
Total, Naval Reactors Construction...................... 771,953 -65,000 706,953
Subtotal, Naval Reactor................................... 2,395,368 -65,000 2,330,368
Use of prior year balances.............................. -1,676 0 -1,676
Total, Naval Reactors..................................... 2,393,692 -65,000 2,328,692

Federal Salaries and Expenses
Program direction....................................... 577,097 0 577,097
Use of prior year balances.............................. 0 0 0
Total, Federal Salaries and Expenses...................... 577,097 0 577,097

TOTAL, National Nuclear Security Administration........... 32,302,334 9,000 32,311,334

Defense Environmental Cleanup
Closure sites administration.......................... 500 0 500
Richland
River corridor and other cleanup operations........... 69,000 0 69,000
Central plateau remediation........................... 795,124 0 795,124
Richland community and regulatory support............. 12,000 0 12,000
18-D-404 Modification of Waste Encapsulation and 0 0 0
Storage Facility.....................................
22-D-401 L-888 Eastern Plateau Fire Station........... 0 0 0
22-D-402 L-897 200 Area Water Treatment Facility...... 0 0 0
23-D-404 181D Export Water System Reconfiguration and 0 0 0
Upgrade..............................................
23-D-405 181B Export Water System Reconfiguration and 0 0 0
Upgrade..............................................
24-D-401 Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility 0 0 0
Supercell 11 Expans Proj.............................
Total, Richland......................................... 876,624 0 876,624

Office of River Protection:
Waste Treatment Immobilization Plant Commissioning.... 466,000 0 466,000
Rad Liquid Tank Waste Stabilization and Disposition... 984,000 0 984,000
Construction:
23-D-403 Hanford 200 West Area Tank Farms Risk 90,000 0 90,000
Management Project...............................
15-D-409 Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System... 75,000 0 75,000
18-D-16 Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant-- 0 0 0
LBL/Direct feed LAW..............................
01-D-416 Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, 0 0 0
RL...............................................
01-D-16D High-Level Waste Facility................ 330,000 0 330,000
Subtotal, Construction................................ 495,000 0 495,000
Total, Office of River Protection....................... 1,945,000 0 1,945,000

Idaho National Laboratory:
Idaho cleanup and waste disposition................... 472,726 0 472,726
Idaho community and regulatory support................ 3,295 0 3,295
Construction:
22-D-403 Idaho Spent Nuclear Fuel Staging Facility 2,000 0 2,000
22-D-404 Addl ICDF Landfill Disposal Cell and 0 0 0
Evaporation Ponds Project........................
22-D-402 Calcine Construction..................... 2,000 0 2,000
Subtotal, Construction................................ 4,000 0 4,000
Total, Idaho National Laboratory........................ 480,021 0 480,021

NNSA sites and Nevada off-sites
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................ 1,955 0 1,955
LLNL Excess Facilities D&D............................ 0 0 0
Separations Processing Research Unit.................. 950 0 950
Nevada................................................ 64,835 0 64,835
Sandia National Laboratory............................ 1,030 0 1,030
Los Alamos National Laboratory........................ 293,937 0 293,937
Los Alamos Excess Facilities D&D...................... 0 0 0
Total, NNSA sites and Nevada off-sites.................. 362,707 0 362,707

Oak Ridge Reservation:
OR Nuclear Facility D&D............................... 289,297 0 289,297
U233 Disposition Program.............................. 70,000 0 70,000
OR cleanup and waste disposition...................... 85,800 0 85,800
Construction:
14-D-403 Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment Facility... 0 0 0
17-D-401 On-site Waste Disposal Facility.......... 57,828 0 57,828
OR reservation community & regulatory support......... 5,100 0 5,100
OR technology development and deployment.............. 3,500 0 3,500
Total, Oak Ridge Reservation............................ 511,525 0 511,525

Savannah River Site:
Savannah River risk management operations............. 465,620 0 465,620
Savannah River legacy pensions........................ 0 0 0
Savannah River community and regulatory support....... 5,450 0 5,450
Payment in lieu of taxes..................... 0 5,000 5,000
Program restoration (5,000)
Savannah River National Laboratory O&M................ 90,719 0 90,719
Construction:
20-D-401 Saltstone Disposal Unit #10, 11, 12...... 82,500 0 82,500
19-D-701: SR Security Systems Replacement......... 0 0 0
18-D-401 Saltstone Disposal Unit #8, 9, SR (SR- 0 0 0
0014C)...........................................
18-D-402 Emergency Operations Center.............. 0 0 0
Subtotal, Construction................................ 82,500 0 82,500
Radioactive liquid tank waste stabilization and 1,066,000 0 1,066,000
disposition..........................................
Total, Savannah River Site.............................. 1,710,289 5,000 1,715,289

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant........................... 400,020 0 400,020
Construction:
15-D-411 Safety Significant Confinement 0 0 0
Ventilation System, WIPP.........................
15-D-412 Utility Shaft,........................... 0 0 0
21-D-401 Hoisting Capability Project.............. 72,000 0 72,000
Total, Construction................................... 72,000 0 72,000
Total, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant...................... 472,020 0 472,020

Program direction....................................... 297,318 0 297,318
Program support......................................... 20,320 0 20,320
Safeguards and Security--Defense Environmental Cleanup.. 291,482 0 291,482
Technology development and deployment................... 16,012 0 16,012

TOTAL, Defense Environmental Cleanup...................... 6,983,318 5,000 6,988,318

Defense Uranium Enrichment D&D............................ 253,000 -253,000 0
Improper allocation.............................. (-253,000)

Other Defense Activities
Environment, health, safety and security
Environment, health, safety and security mission 150,761 0 150,761
support..............................................
Program direction..................................... 81,179 0 81,179
Total, Environment, health, safety and security......... 231,940 0 231,940

Office of Enterprise Assessments
Enterprise assessments................................ 32,183 0 32,183
Program direction..................................... 56,632 0 56,632
Total, Office of Enterprise Assessments................. 88,815 0 88,815

Specialized security activities......................... 471,082 0 471,082

Legacy Management
Legacy Management Activities--Defense................. 177,716 0 177,716
Program Direction..................................... 22,670 0 22,670
Total, Legacy Management................................ 200,386 0 200,386

Defense-Related Administrative Support.................. 187,475 0 187,475

Office of Hearings and Appeals.......................... 5,023 0 5,023
Subtotal, Other Defense Activities...................... 1,184,721 0 1,184,721
Use of prior year balances.............................. 0 0 0
Total, Other Defense Activities........................... 1,184,721 0 1,184,721
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS

Committee Action

Senate Armed Services Committee

ROLL CALL VOTES DURING FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027

In compliance with Rule XXVI 7(3)(b) of the Standing Rules
of the Senate, listed below is a tabulation of the roll call
votes.
1. MOTION: To include a provision that would provide for
rights in technical data.
VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 27-0
In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, Moody, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono,
Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and
Slotkin
Opposed: None
2. MOTION: To include a provision that would modify the
treatment of nondisclosure agreements with respect to
privatized military housing.
VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 18-9
In favor: Senators Rounds, Sullivan, Cramer, Sheehy, Moody,
Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King,
Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Scott,
Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, and Banks
3. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit the provision
of support to the Department of Homeland Security.
VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 16-11
In favor: Senators Fischer, Ernst, Sullivan, Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Cotton, Rounds, Cramer, Scott,
Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Sheehy, and Moody
4. MOTION: To include a provision to rescind amounts made
available by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act for development of
space-based and boost phase intercept capabilities.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 8-19
In favor: Senators Blumenthal, Hirono, Warren, Peters,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, Moody, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Kaine, and King
5. MOTION: To include a provision to promote the use of
standardized testing at military service academies and DoDEA
schools.
VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 18-9
In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, Moody, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Kaine, and King
Opposed: Senators Reed, Blumenthal, Hirono, Warren, Peters,
Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin
6. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit funding for
National Guard seizures of certain election material.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
7. MOTION: To include a provision to require congressional
notification of National Guard troops sent to polling places,
and for other purposes.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
8. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit use of media
from dignified transfers for political fundraising or
promotional purposes.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
9. MOTION: To include a provision to provide for additional
athletic eligibility for service academy graduates enrolled in
graduate education programs.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 7-20
In favor: Senators Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd,
Schmitt, Moody, and King
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Banks, Sheehy, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and
Slotkin
10. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit use of funds
to limit collective bargaining.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
11. MOTION: To include a provision to provide for term
appointments for civilian faculty at the United States Military
Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and the United States
Air Force Academy.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
Opposed: Senators Ernst, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth,
Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin
12. MOTION: To include a provision to establish the Cyber
Force.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Ernst, Scott, Sheehy, Moody, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds,
Sullivan, Cramer, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, Reed,
Duckworth, Rosen, and Kelly
13. MOTION: To include a provision to provide for a
reduction in authorized national defense funding.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
14. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit the use of
funds for military operations and activities against Iran until
Congress authorizes the use of military force against Iran, and
to prohibit the use of operation and maintenance funds for the
Office of the Secretary of Defense's travel expenses until the
congressional defense committees receive a report on the manner
in which military operations and activities against Iran since
February 28, 2026 affect the readiness of U.S. armed forces.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
15. MOTION: To include a provision to provide for gender-
neutral standards in the Armed Forces.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
16. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit the
exclusion of members of the Armed Forces from assignments on
the basis of gender.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
17. MOTION: To include a provision to modify certain
provisions related to diversity, equity, and inclusion.
VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 14-13
In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
Opposed: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
18. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit any lease
agreements for commercial data centers on military
installations until the strategy and roadmap required under the
original provision is delivered.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
19. MOTION: To include a provision to establish sex-neutral
occupational performance standards.
VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 15-12
In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, Moody, Gillibrand, and Blumenthal
Opposed: Senators Cotton, Reed, Shaheen, Hirono, Kaine,
King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin
20. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit the Office
of Strategic Capital of the Department of Defense from making
equity investments in entities in which certain senior
government officials hold a significant interest.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
21. MOTION: To include a provision to eliminate the
submission of cost and pricing data after agreeing on the
contract price as a defense to contract price adjustments for
defective cost and pricing data.
VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 14-13
In favor: Senators Sheehy, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth,
Rosen, Kelly, and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks, and
Moody
22. MOTION: To include a provision to require a report on
domestic deployments.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
23. MOTION: To include a provision to strike language
regarding post-government employment restrictions applicable to
certain senior military officers and senior civilian employees
of the Department of Defense.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
24. MOTION: To include a provision to limit the authority
of the Secretary of the Navy to change vessel names.
VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 20-7
In favor: Senators Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan,
Cramer, Banks, Sheehy, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Cotton, Scott, Tuberville, Budd,
Schmitt, and Moody
25. MOTION: To include a provision to require congressional
notification of calling the National Guard into Federal
service.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
26. MOTION: To include a provision to provide fertility
treatment under the TRICARE Program.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
27. MOTION: To include a provision to provide for the
redesignation of the Department of Defense as the Department of
War.
VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 14-13
In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
Opposed: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
28. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit the use of
funds to assert control over any member country of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
29. MOTION: To include a provision to prohibit the use of
the WEXMAC vehicle for immigration enforcement.
VOTE: Failed by roll call vote 13-14
In favor: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly,
and Slotkin
Opposed: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, and Moody
30. MOTION: To favorably report to the Senate the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027.
VOTE: Passed by roll call vote 18-9
In favor: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Tuberville, Budd, Schmitt, Banks,
Sheehy, Moody, Reed, Shaheen, King, and Rosen
Opposed: Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, Warren,
Peters, Duckworth, Kelly, and Slotkin

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

It was not possible to include the Congressional Budget
Office cost estimate on this legislation because it was not
available at the time the report was filed. It will be included
in material presented during the Senate floor debate on the
legislation.

Regulatory Impact

Paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the
Senate requires that a report on the regulatory impact of the
bill be included in the report on the bill. The committee finds
that there is no regulatory impact in the case of the National
Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2027.

Changes in Existing Law

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of
the Standing Rules of the Senate, the changes in existing law
made by certain portions of the bill have not been shown in
this section of the report because, in the opinion of the
committee, it is necessary to dispense with showing such
changes in order to expedite the business of the Senate and
reduce the expenditure of funds.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

I've been a proud member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee for more than 13 years. My work on the Committee is
the highlight of my Senate service because of my deep
connection to Virginia's military families and my deep respect
for my colleagues.
The process that our Committee uses to carefully craft the
National Defense Authorization Act--months of hearings to
consider all dimensions of our nation's security challenges
followed by a markup in which all members have the opportunity
to shape the final product--is a model for how the Senate
should operate. The leadership of the Committee, Senators
Wicker and Reed, have ably carried out this long tradition
whereby SASC is the only committee to do an authorizing bill
every year and they do so in a way that guarantees significant
bipartisan approval.
I've always voted for the NDAA in Committee and on the
floor of the Senate. The bill is never perfect--often omitting
items I advocated or including items I opposed. But it is
usually so full of good provisions that a yes vote has always
been an easy call. This year, for the first time, I voted
against the NDAA. I did so with deep regret. I file this
dissenting perspective to explain why.
This NDAA is much like earlier versions in containing solid
policy, including many provisions I worked to include as the
lead Democrat on the Seapower Subcommittee. Just as in past
years, the Committee's leadership and dedicated staff put
together a process that maximized inclusion of content from all
members. In virtually every particular, this NDAA represents
``business as usual'' from a Committee for whom that phrase is
actually a high compliment rather than a casual throwaway line.
But an exemplary process cannot obscure the fact that the
times are anything but usual. Since last year's NDAA, our
situation has changed dramatically. The United States is in the
middle of an illegal and foolish war with Iran, initiated by
the President for spurious reasons, that is harming our troops
and causing massive damage to American families and the global
economy. The United States is bombing boats in the Caribbean
and Eastern Pacific and killing those aboard in a campaign
described as an ``international armed conflict'' against narco-
traffickers even though many of these fatal strikes are carried
out against boats containing no drugs. The United States
invaded Venezuela to topple the Maduro regime, but has left the
regime in place and thus far denied the legitimate political
opposition the opportunity to build a Venezuela for
Venezuelans. And the President has threatened military action
against other nations--Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, Denmark--with
more such threats likely to emerge at any given moment based on
his whims and personal grievances.
All these Presidential actions to initiate armed conflict
here, there, and everywhere have been unilateral decisions
taken without the consultation with Congress required by the
Constitution. The President has chosen to make Congress a
bystander in matters of war and, thus far, Congress has
passively accepted that evisceration of its most solemn
obligation.
This year's NDAA shows no self-awareness of this growing
power grab by the executive branch and, in my view, even paves
the way for more unilateral executive control over matters of
war. To begin, the Administration proposes a massive increase
in the Defense budget--growing the topline from $850 billion to
$1.14 trillion while additionally seeking $350 billion more via
reconciliation and hinting at a future supplemental request
likely to add an additional $200 billion to the defense budget.
This is a staggering increase of funding for Defense,
particularly when counterposed with the sizable cuts being made
to Medicaid, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance, and other
programs relied upon by everyday Americans--and the fact that
Social Security's trust fund is expected to be depleted by the
end of 2032.
Efforts to amend the bill to fence off funds for the Iran
war--at least until Congress authorizes it--failed, as did
efforts to simply get accurate information about the war's
costs. Efforts to provide protection against other threatened
abuses, such as the deployment of the military to polling
places during elections, failed. This NDAA would swell the
Defense budget at the very moment when Congress shows a
determined unwillingness to exercise any meaningful check on
how the President uses the nation's military might.
The most telling single item in this year's NDAA, even
beyond the dramatic increase in spending, is the provision
ordering that the Department of Defense be renamed the
``Department of War.'' The United States long had a Secretary
of War, but President Truman and Congress, reflecting on the
devastation of World War II, chose to embrace Defense rather
than War as the descriptor of our national security mission, a
change that closely matches the oaths still taken by all who
wear the uniform of this country. The United States shouldn't
prefer war. We must be committed to defense of our nation, our
people, our allies and our values and, if that requires war, we
must always be prepared and ready to succeed. But war is not
the goal and it never should be.
When the United States embraced the ``Department of
Defense'' nomenclature in 1947, we inspired other nations to do
the same. Allies like the United Kingdom and France, former
adversaries like Japan and Germany, current adversaries like
Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran--they now all have Defense
agencies rather than War agencies. The word ``war'' in the
title of a nation's defense ministry is essentially extinct in
the modern world. If the NDAA passes with this change intact,
the United States will stand alone as the sole nation
advertising War as the mission of its military. This unique
status will be a stain on our country's reputation and will
certainly be used by our adversaries in propaganda to isolate
us from other nations.
The proposed change embraced by SASC reveals something sad
about our nation's leadership at the current moment. A
President who promised to end wars has transformed into one
intoxicated by war. He is not the first leader to go down that
path and won't be the last. But that's why our forefathers
rejected tyranny 250 years ago to create a democracy whereby
the legislative branch could serve as a check against the
natural tendency of an executive to seize more and more power.
Because this year's NDAA doesn't recognize the gravest threat
facing our nation at this moment, I cannot support it.

Tim Kaine.

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