[House Report 119-87]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
119th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { 119-87
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DHS RESTRICTIONS ON CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES AND
CHINESE ENTITIES OF CONCERN ACT
_______
May 5, 2025.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Green of Tennessee, from the Committee on Homeland
Security, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 881]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 881) to establish Department of Homeland
Security funding restrictions on institutions of higher
education that have a relationship with Confucius Institutes,
and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 3
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 3
Hearings......................................................... 5
Committee Consideration.......................................... 6
Committee Votes.................................................. 6
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 6
C.B.O. Estimate, New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and
Tax Expenditures............................................... 6
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 7
Duplicative Federal Programs..................................... 7
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 7
Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff
Benefits....................................................... 7
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 7
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 7
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 8
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius
Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act''.
SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS ON CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES' HOST SCHOOLS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Chinese entity of concern.--The term ``Chinese entity of
concern'' means any university or college in the People's
Republic of China that--
(A) is involved in the implementation of military-
civil fusion;
(B) participates in the Chinese defense industrial
base;
(C) is affiliated with the Chinese State
Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for
the National Defense;
(D) receives funding from any organization
subordinate to the Central Military Commission of the
Chinese Communist Party;
(E) provides support to any security, defense,
police, or intelligence organization of the Government
of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese
Communist Party;
(F) purposefully undermines the United States'
relationship with Taiwan;
(G) aids, abets, or enables the detention,
imprisonment, persecution, or forced labor of Uyghur
Muslims in the People's Republic of China;
(H) willfully and knowingly engages in malicious
activities, including online disinformation campaigns
and propaganda, for the purpose of interfering with
United States Federal, State, or local elections; or
(I) is affiliated with the Chinese Academy of
Sciences.
(2) Confucius institute.--The term ``Confucius Institute''
means a cultural institute funded by the Government of the
People's Republic of China.
(3) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution
of higher education'' has the meaning given such term in
section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1002).
(4) Relationship.--The term ``relationship'' means, with
respect to an institution of higher education, any contract
awarded, or agreement entered into, as well as any in-kind
donation or gift, received from a Confucius Institute or
Chinese entity of concern.
(5) Thousand talents program.--The term ``Thousand Talents
Program'' means any technological or educational program funded
or administered by the Chinese Communist Party's Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology.
(b) Restrictions on Institutions of Higher Education.--Beginning with
the first fiscal year that begins after the date that is 12 months
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall ensure that an institution of higher education (referred
to in this subsection as an ``institution'') which has a relationship
with a Confucius Institute, Thousand Talents Program, or Chinese entity
of concern is ineligible to receive any funds from the Department of
Homeland Security, unless the institution terminates the relationship
between the institution and such Confucius Institute, Thousand Talents
Program, or Chinese entity of concern, as the case may be. Upon
termination of such a relationship, the institution at issue shall be
eligible to receive funds from the Department of Homeland Security.
(c) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may,
after consultation with the Director of National Intelligence,
on a case-by-case basis and for a period not to exceed one
year, waive the application of subsection (b) with respect to
an institution of higher education if the Secretary determines
the institution at issue maintains robust safeguards and
enforcement protocols to monitor the relationship at issue,
including active measures to detect and deter attempts by
Chinese nationals affiliated with a Confucius Institute,
Thousand Talents Program, or Chinese entity of concern that is
the subject of such relationship to gain unauthorized access to
sensitive research, data, or federally funded development
activities conducted at or on the premises of, or by, such
institution, and either of the following conditions is
satisfied:
(A) The relationship at issue is in the national
security interests of the United States.
(B) The relationship at issue does not present a
direct or indirect national security risk to the United
States or its allies.
(2) Renewal.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may, after
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence,
annually renew a waiver issued pursuant to paragraph (1) if the
Secretary determines all of the conditions described in such
paragraph continue to be satisfied.
(3) Effective dates.--A waiver issued or renewed pursuant to
paragraph (1) or (2), respectively, takes effect and applies
beginning on the date that is 30 days after such issuance or
renewal, as the case may be.
(4) Notification.--If the Secretary of Homeland Security,
after consultation with the Director of National Intelligence,
issues or renews a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2),
respectively, not later than 30 days before such issuance or
renewal, as the case may be, takes effect, the Secretary shall
submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate written notification
regarding such issuance or renewal, including a justification
relating thereto.
(d) Assistance.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide
outreach and, upon request, technical assistance to institutions of
higher education relating to compliance with this Act.
(e) Reports.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report regarding implementation of
this section during the immediately preceding 12 month period. Each
such report shall include information relating to the following:
(1) Any institution of higher education that has a
relationship with a Confucius Institute, Thousand Talents
Program, or Chinese entity of concern and receives funds from
the Department of Homeland Security.
(2) The implementation of subsections (b), (c), and (d).
PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
H.R. 881, the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes
and Chinese Entities of Concern Act,'' prohibits the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) from providing any funds to any
United States institution of higher education that has a
relationship with a Confucius Institute (CI) funded by the
Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). H.R. 881
also bars such funds to any institution of higher education
with a ``Thousand Talents Program'' or ``Chinese Entity of
Concern'' that has a relationship with the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), supports China's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF)
programs, the PRC's Ministry of State Security, or the PRC's
Ministry of Science and Technology. If an institution of higher
education completely terminates the relationship with the CI or
Chinese entity of concern, the institution will be eligible to
receive funds from DHS. The Secretary may waive a restriction
on funding in limited circumstances where the institution
maintains robust safeguards and enforcement protocols and has
measures to detect or deter any efforts by the PRC to gain
access to sensitive research, and the relationship at issue
does not present a national security risk to the U.S. or its
allies or is in the national security interest of the U.S.
BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION
For years, the CCP, working through the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), has executed sophisticated propaganda and espionage
campaigns across the globe. Of particular concern, is the CCP's
practice of exploiting the open and collaborative nature of
American academia, to conduct widespread industrial and
military espionage inside the United States.
Confucius Institutes were first established in America in
2004.\1\ These initiatives were marketed by the CCP as a
mechanism to promote Chinese language and culture, support
local Chinese teaching internationally, and facilitate cultural
exchanges.\2\ However, it quickly became apparent that CIs were
an extension of the CCP's global influence apparatus, allowing
it to impact the decisions of academic institutions, conduct
espionage inside the homeland, and promote MCF programs.\3\\4\
MCF is the CCP's aggressive national strategy to help the PRC
develop the most technologically advanced military in the world
by the year 2049, often through the theft of American
intellectual property and trade secrets.\5\ The Federal Bureau
of Investigation determined that the U.S. economy loses between
$225 and $600 billion annually to the PRC due to counterfeit
goods, pirated software, and the theft of trade secrets.\6\
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\1\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-19-278, China: Agreements
Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities Are Similar, but
Institute Operations Vary (2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-
278.pdf.
\2\Congressional Research Service, Confucius Institutes in the
United States: Selected Issues (2023) https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/IF/IF11180.
\3\U.S. State Department, ``Confucius Institutes U.S. Center''
Designation as a Foreign Mission, https://2017-2021.state.gov/
confucius-institute-u-s-center-designation-as-a-foreign-mission/.
\4\U.S. Department of Justice, Texas Professor and NASA Researcher
Arrested on Charges Related to China's Talent Program, https://
www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/texas-professor-and-nasa-researcher-
arrested-charges-related-china-s-talents-program (2020).
\5\U.S. State Department, Military-Civil Fusion of the People's
Republic of China, 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
05/What-is-MCF-One-Pager.pdf.
\6\Fed. Bureau of Investigations, China: the Risk to Academia,
https://www.fbi.gov/file-
repository/counterintelligence/china-risk-to-academia-2019.pdf/view.
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Although there are less than five active CIs left in
existence in the United States, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has found that 43 out of the 74 schools surveyed
still maintain a relationship with an entity that supported
their previous CI.\7\ Congress has not been able to keep up in
combatting these new entities because of the rapidly evolving
nature of these threats. There is little to no transparency
from institutions of higher learning in what type of assistance
they receive from the PRC. Data collected by the Department of
Education from June 22, 2020, to April 6, 2023, shows that
universities in the United States have collected over $3
billion from entities connected to the PRC and the CCP.\8\
Further complicating matters is the PRC's 2017 National
Intelligence Law, which obligates individuals, organizations,
and institutions to assist the PRC security and intelligence
services in advancing a wide variety of intelligence work.\9\
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\7\U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``China: With Nearly All
U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative
Language Support'' Report Number GAO-24-105981, October 30, 2023,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf.
\8\U.S. Department of Education, College and Foreign Gift Report,
https://sites.ed.gov/foreigngifts/.
\9\U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Data Security Business
Advisory: Risks and Considerations for Businesses Using Data Services
and Equipment From Firms Linked to the People's Republic of China,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_1222_data-
security-business-advisory.pdf.
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The United States Government has taken some successful
action against this encroachment in the last several years.
Congress has already passed two statutes limiting the
Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to fund U.S. universities
that host a CI.\10\ For example, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included provisions
barring DOD from obligating or expending funds for Chinese
language instruction provided by a CI.\11\ It also restricted
DOD's ability to use funds to support Chinese language programs
at U.S. universities that host a CI.\12\ Subsequently, the FY
2021 NDAA prohibited the DOD from providing any funding to
institutions of higher education that host CIs.\13\
Importantly, while both acts allow for waivers of the
limitations if certain elements are met, no waivers have been
granted altogether since May of 2023, according to the GAO.\14\
The waiver and assistance language included in this measure may
be used by the Secretary of Homeland Security to help American
institutions of higher education avoid unintended outcomes,
such as a U.S. university's exchange program with a Chinese
university on a topic wholly unrelated to national security
resulting in denial of Federal Emergency Management Agency
assistance following a natural disaster because the Chinese
university met the bill's broad definition of ``Chinese entity
of concern'' unbeknownst to the U.S. university.
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\10\U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``China: With Nearly All
U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative
Language Support'' Report Number GAO-24-105981, October 30, 2023,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf.
\11\Id. at 6.
\12\Id.
\13\United States Congress, Section 1062 of the H.R. 6395 William
M. (MAC) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021, https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf.
\14\U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``China: With Nearly All
U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative
Language Support'' Report Number GAO-24-105981, October 30, 2023,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf.
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H.R. 881, the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes
and Chinese Entities of Concern Act,'' ensures that
universities and other institutions of higher education
prioritize the security of their scientific research and
technological development efforts above a relationship or
funding from entities affiliated with the CCP or PLA.
Specifically, this legislation restricts DHS funding from going
to universities who maintain relationships with entities
connected to the CCP or support the PRC's MCF programs. This
bill helps ensure taxpayer dollars are appropriately used and
encourages universities to end relationships with partners who
do not have America's best interests in mind. More importantly,
this bill helps to free U.S. institutions from the PRC's
foreign influence and ensure safety from the theft of their
critical research and development work.
HEARINGS
The Committee held the following hearing in the 119th
Congress that informed H.R. 881:
On March 5, 2025, the Full Committee held a hearing
entitled ``Countering Threats Posed by the Chinese Communist
Party to U.S. National Security.'' The Committee received
testimony from Dr. Michael Pillsbury, Senior Fellow for China
Strategy, the Heritage Foundation; the Honorable William R.
Evanina, founder and CEO, the Eviana Group; Craig Singleton,
China Program Senior Director and Senior Fellow, Foundation for
Defense of Democracies; and Dr. Rush Doshi, Assistant Professor
of Security Studies, Georgetown University Walsh School of
Foreign Service and C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia Studies
and Director of the China Strategy Initiative, Council on
Foreign Relations.
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION
The Committee met on April 9, 2025, a quorum being present,
to consider H.R. 881 and ordered the measure to be favorably
reported, as amended, to the House by voice vote.
COMMITTEE VOTES
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the
recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and
amendments thereto.
No recorded votes were requested during consideration of
H.R. 881.
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this
report.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE, NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY,
ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of
rule XIII and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of any new
budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an
increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures contained
in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
H.R. 881 would prohibit the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) from providing funds to any higher education institution
that hosts Confucius Institutes, which are nonprofit cultural
and educational centers funded by the Chinese government. That
prohibition also would apply to institutions that have
financial relationships with Chinese universities or colleges
that meet other criteria such as receiving funding from or
providing support to elements of the Chinese Communist Party.
H.R. 881 also would require DHS to report to the Congress on
the number of education institutions that maintain
relationships with Chinese entities of concern and receive
funds from the department.
The requirements of H.R. 881 would not change the total
amount of funding DHS provides to higher education
institutions. CBO expects that the department would update its
contracting and federal assistance procedures to ensure that it
complies with H.R. 881. CBO estimates that those administrative
and reporting efforts would cost less than $500,000. Any
spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated
funds.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Aldo Prosperi.
The estimate was reviewed by Christina Hawley Anthony, Deputy
Director of Budget Analysis.
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director, Congressional Budget Office.
FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995.
DUPLICATIVE FEDERAL PROGRAMS
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds
that H.R. 881 does not contain any provision that establishes
or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another
Federal program.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the objective of
H.R. 881 is to establish Department of Homeland Security
funding restrictions on institutions of higher education that
have a relationship with Confucius Institutes.
CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED
TARIFF BENEFITS
In compliance with rule XXI, this bill, as reported,
contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or
limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or
9(f) of rule XXI.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
APPLICABILITY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The Committee finds that H.R. 881 does not relate to the
terms and conditions of employment or access to public services
or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of
the Congressional Accountability Act.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
Section 1. Short title
This section states that the Act may be cited as the ``DHS
Restrictions on Confucius Institutes Act and Chinese Entities
of Concern Act''.
Section 2. Limitations on Confucius Institutes' host schools
Subsection (a) paragraph (1) defines the term ``Chinese
Entity of Concern'' as a university or college located in the
PRC that is involved with the implementation of MCF programs;
supports the PRC's defense industrial base; is affiliated with
the Chinese State Administration for Science, Technology, and
Industry for the National Defense; receives any funding from
any organization that is subordinate to the Central Military
Commission of the CCP; provides support to any security,
defense, police, or intelligence organization of the Government
of the PRC or CCP; purposefully undermines the United States'
relationship with Taiwan; aids, abets or enables the detention,
imprisonment, persecution, or forced labor of Uyghur Muslims in
the PRC; willfully and knowingly engages in malicious
activities, including online disinformation campaigns and
propaganda, for the purpose of interfering with the United
States Federal, State, or local elections; or, is affiliated
with the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Subsection (a) paragraph (2) defines the term ``Confucius
Institute'' as any cultural institute that is funded by the
Government of the PRC.
Subsection (a) paragraph (3) defines the term ``institution
of higher education'' as the meaning given in section 102 of
the 20 U.S.C. 1002.
Subsection (a) paragraph (4) defines the term
``relationship'' as any in-kind donation or gift, contract
awarded, or agreement entered into by an institution of higher
education within the United States and any CI or Chinese entity
of concern.
Subsection (a) paragraph (5) defines the term ``Thousand
Talents Program'' as any technological or educational program
funded or administered by the Chinese Communist Party's
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.
Subsection (b) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security
to ensure that any institution of higher education within the
United States which has a relationship with a Confucius
Institute, Thousand Talents Program, or Chinese entity of
concern is ineligible to receive any funds from the Department
of Homeland Security within one year of enactment of this
legislation. If an institution of higher education completely
terminates the relationship with the Confucius Institute,
Thousand Talents Program, or Chinese entity of concern, the
institution will be eligible to receive funds from the
Department of Homeland Security.
Subsection (c) paragraph (1) allows the Secretary of
Homeland Security to, after consultation with the Director of
National Intelligence, waive the application of subsection (b)
on a case-by-case basis and for a period not to exceed one year
to institutions of higher education. The Secretary may issue
such a waiver if the Secretary determines that the institution
at issue maintains robust safeguards and enforcement protocols
to monitor the relationship at issue, including active measures
to detect and deter attempts by Chinese nationals affiliated
with a Confucius Institute, Thousand Talents Program, or
Chinese entity of concern that is the subject to such
relationship to gain unauthorized access to sensitive research,
data, or federally funded development activities conducted at
or on the premises of, or by, such institution. In addition,
the relationship at issue must be either in the national
security interests of the United States or not present a direct
or indirect national security risk to the United States or its
allies.
Subsection (c) paragraph (2) allows the Secretary to, after
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence,
annually renew a waiver issued pursuant to paragraph (1) if the
Secretary determines all of the conditions described in such
paragraph continue to be satisfied.
Subsection (c) paragraph (3) clarifies that a waiver issued
or renewed pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) takes effect and
applies beginning on the date that is 30 days after such
issuance or renewal.
Subsection (c) paragraph (4) requires the Secretary of
Homeland Security, if the Secretary of Homeland Security after
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence issues
or renews a waiver pursuant to paragraphs (1) or (2), to submit
to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate written notification
regarding such issuance or renewal, including a justification
relating thereto, not later than 30 days before such issuance
or renewal.
Subsection (d) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security
to provide outreach to and, upon request, technical to
institutions of higher education relating to compliance of the
Act.
Subsection (e) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security
to submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report containing
information on higher education institution that has a
relationship with a Confucius Institute, Thousand Talents
Program, or Chinese entity of concern and receives funds from
the Department of Homeland Security.
[all]