

AIRSPACE LOCATION AND ENHANCED RISK
TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2026

APRIL 9, 2026.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of
the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. GRAVES, from the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, submitted the following

R E P O R T

[To accompany H.R. 7613]

The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, to whom
was referred the bill (H.R. 7613) to require certain aircraft to be
equipped with collision mitigation technology, to improve helicopter
route safety and separation around airports, to update air traffic
control processes and procedures, to address national airspace sys-
tem safety in Department of Defense activities, and for other pur-
poses, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with
amendments and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

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The amendments are as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This Act may be cited as the “Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency Act of 2026” or the “ALERT Act”.

(b) **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
 Sec. 2. Definitions.
 Sec. 3. Findings; sense of Congress.

TITLE I—CIVIL AVIATION MATTERS

Sec. 101. Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa inhibit altitude.
 Sec. 102. Airborne Collision Avoidance System upgrades.
 Sec. 103. Airborne collision avoidance systems for rotorcraft.
 Sec. 104. Collision prevention systems.
 Sec. 105. Prohibition on certain use of ADS-B data.
 Sec. 106. Rulemaking accountability.
 Sec. 107. Time-on-position limits.
 Sec. 108. Controller threat and error management training.
 Sec. 109. Controller visual separation training.
 Sec. 110. Safety risk assessment tool.
 Sec. 111. Operational rates at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
 Sec. 112. Time-based flow management.
 Sec. 113. Air traffic control facility levels.
 Sec. 114. Working group to evaluate shared frequency around Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
 Sec. 115. Anti-blocking technology.
 Sec. 116. Task force to identify improvements to air traffic controller conflict alert system.
 Sec. 117. Postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing.
 Sec. 118. Further modifications to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport area helicopter routes.
 Sec. 119. Requiring vertical separation near airports during critical phases of flight.
 Sec. 120. Helicopter Route Chart annual review.
 Sec. 121. Visual charts.
 Sec. 122. Close proximity encounters.
 Sec. 123. Notification of close proximity encounters and analysis of data.
 Sec. 124. Safety culture and safety management review.
 Sec. 125. Documentation of control position combinations.
 Sec. 126. Review of miles-in-trail procedures or agreements.
 Sec. 127. Closure of Helicopter Route 4.

TITLE II—[PLACEHOLDER]**SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

In this Act:

(1) **ADS-B IN.**—The term “ADS-B In” means technology that receives and processes Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast transmissions that are broadcast in accordance with part 91.225 and 91.227 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, and other aviation advisory information from ground stations, including traffic information service-broadcast (TIS-B) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast (ADS-R).

(2) **ADMINISTRATOR.**—The term “Administrator” means the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.

(3) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.**—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

(4) **COLLISION PREVENTION TECHNOLOGY.**—The term “collision prevention technology” means equipment, or a combination of equipment, that—

- (A) has ADS-B In;
- (B) uses ADS-B data to provide the pilot and flight crew with situational awareness of surrounding traffic and traffic advisories; and
- (C) provides, and is configured to provide, alerting that is audible to the pilot and flight crew.

(5) **FAA.**—The term “FAA” means the Federal Aviation Administration.

(6) **SECRETARY.**—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Transportation.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(a) **FINDINGS.**—Congress finds the following:

(1) On January 29, 2025, about 8:48 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, a Sikorsky UH-60L operated by the United States Army under the callsign PAT25 (Priority Air Transport 25) and an MHI RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CRJ700 operated by PSA Airlines as American Airlines flight 5342, collided in flight about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, D.C.

(2) The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers onboard the airplane and 3 crewmembers onboard the helicopter died.

(3) This tragedy represents the deadliest aviation disaster in the United States since the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 in 2001 and the first fatal major commercial passenger flight accident in the United States since Colgan Air Flight 3407 in 2009.

(4) Passengers aboard Flight 5342 included American citizens from across the country and international travelers, among them championship figure skaters and coaches returning from competition, military servicemembers, and families traveling for personal and professional reasons, each of whom is mourned by loved ones.

(5) Crewmembers aboard Flight 5342 served their passengers with professionalism and dedication and the three United States Army soldiers aboard Priority Air Transport 25 gave their lives in service to this Nation.

(6) Emergency responders from Alexandria City Fire Department, Alexandria Police Department, Ann Arundel Fire Department, Arlington County Fire & Rescue, Arlington County Office of Emergency Management, Arlington Police Department, Baltimore City Fire Department, Baltimore Police, Charles County Fire and Rescue, DC Fire Department & EMS, DC Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax City Fire & Rescue, Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Department, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Maryland Natural Resources Police, Maryland State Police, Metropolitan Police Department, Montgomery County Fire and Rescue, Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) Fire & Rescue, MWAA Police, NCR-Incident Management Team, Office of Chief Medical Examiner of the District of Columbia, Prince George's County Fire & Rescue, Prince William Fire & Rescue, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving, Virginia Department of Emergency Management, Virginia State Police, and other local, state, and Federal agencies conducted heroic rescue and recovery operations in frigid, dangerous conditions—including near-freezing water temperatures and strong winds—working tirelessly to recover all 67 victims and reunite them with their loved ones.

(7) The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) immediately launched a full investigation and, on March 7, 2025, issued urgent safety recommendations to prohibit operations on Helicopter Route 4 during simultaneous runway operations, which the Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration promptly implemented.

(8) The NTSB held a public meeting on January 27, 2026, where the NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near DCA; as well as the air traffic system's overreliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept.

(9) The NTSB determined that the lack of effective pilot-applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, the tower team's loss of situation awareness and degraded performance due to the high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real-time operational risk factors, and the Army's failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of error tolerances on barometric altimeters in their helicopters, were also causal to the collision.

(10) The NTSB further determined that contributing factors included the limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crews; an unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix, and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strained the DCA air traffic control tower workforce and degraded safety over time; the Army's lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, DC, helicopter routes; the FAA's failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast In, and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational changes based on previously identified risks that were known to management; and the absence of effective data sharing and analysis among the FAA, aircraft operators, and other relevant organizations.

(11) The NTSB on January 27, 2026, adopted 74 findings and issued 50 safety recommendations to the Department of Transportation, the FAA, the United States Army, the Department of Defense Policy Board on Federal Aviation, the inspector general of the Department of Transportation, and RTCA Program Management Committee to prevent similar accidents in the future.

(12) The families of the victims have demonstrated extraordinary courage and dignity in their grief, and have called for accountability and systemic reform so that no other family will endure such loss.

- (13) Congress remains committed to ensuring that the aviation system of the United States achieves the highest possible standard of safety, and that the lessons of this tragedy are fully learned and acted upon.
- (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
- (1) Congress mourns the loss of all 67 lives taken in the midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport on January 29, 2025, and extends its deepest condolences to the families, friends, and communities of all those who perished;
 - (2) Congress honors the four crew members of American Airlines Flight 5342 who served their passengers with professionalism and dedication;
 - (3) Congress honors the three United States Army soldiers aboard Priority Air Transport 25, who gave their lives in service to this nation;
 - (4) Congress honors the passengers of Flight 5342, including the figure skaters and coaches of the United States figure skating community and all other individuals whose lives, achievements, and contributions to their families and communities are irreplaceable;
 - (5) Congress commends the first responders who worked with valor and dedication under dangerous conditions to conduct rescue and recovery operations in the Potomac River;
 - (6) Congress affirms its full support for the National Transportation Safety Board, its mission of independent accident investigation, and the integrity of its investigative process, and herein the ALERT Act responds to all of the 50 recommendations to prevent a similar tragedy from reoccurring;
 - (7) Congress further commits to conducting rigorous oversight to ensure accountability for implementing these safety recommendations and ensuring the systemic failures that contributed to this disaster are fully addressed; and
 - (8) Congress pledges, on behalf of the American people, that the 67 lives lost on January 29, 2025, will not be forgotten, and that their memory will be honored by this Nation's commitment to an aviation system that is worthy of the trust placed in it by every passenger who boards an aircraft in the United States.

TITLE I—CIVIL AVIATION MATTERS

SEC. 101. AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM XA INHIBIT ALTITUDE.

- (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall complete an evaluation of the hazards and safety benefits of decreasing the traffic advisory and resolution advisory inhibit altitudes in Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa (hereinafter referred to as “ACAS Xa”) to enable improved alerting throughout more of the flight maneuvering envelope of an aircraft than is required under the RTCA minimum operational performance standards for the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (DO-385A, issued June 22, 2023).
- (b) CONSULTATION.—In conducting the evaluation under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with representatives of the following:
- (1) Air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, including regional air carriers and air carriers with a low-cost or ultra-low-cost business model.
 - (2) Air carriers operating under part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
 - (3) Air carriers operating under part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
 - (4) Cargo air carriers.
 - (5) Transport category aircraft manufacturers.
 - (6) General aviation aircraft manufacturers.
 - (7) Avionics manufacturers.
 - (8) Exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code.
 - (9) Organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots.
 - (10) The certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the Federal Aviation Administration.
 - (11) Aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of human factors or human factors experts with specific knowledge of aviation safety.
 - (12) Research institutions with relevant aviation safety or human factors subject matter expertise.
 - (13) The National Transportation Safety Board.
 - (14) Any other stakeholders the Administrator determines appropriate.

(c) CONSIDERATIONS.—In conducting the evaluation under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider, at a minimum—

- (1) safety benefits to the public, including reductions in the probability of mid-air and near-midair collisions;
- (2) the benefits and risks to the ability of pilots and air traffic controllers to ensure operational safety;
- (3) false, misleading, or potentially overlapping alerts or resolution advisories;
- (4) technological advances in software logic to limit nuisance or false alerts;
- (5) air traffic control procedures and the impact of such procedures on pilots and air traffic controllers during critical phases of flight;
- (6) training requirements for pilots and air traffic controllers;
- (7) to the greatest extent practicable, human factors, including products by working groups related to human factors in aviation safety;
- (8) research and simulations of reduced resolution advisory inhibit altitudes conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board pursuant to Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 adopted on January 27, 2026; and
- (9) any other considerations the Administrator determines appropriate.

SEC. 102. AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM UPGRADES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall establish an aviation rulemaking committee (in this section referred to as the “Committee”) to review and develop findings and recommendations to require selected aircraft to be equipped and operating with ACAS Xa that is—

- (1) integrated and uses both ADS-B In and transponder interrogations, as required under the RTCA minimum operational performance standards for the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (DO-385A, issued June 22, 2023); and
- (2) is configured to provide visual and audible alerting to the pilot and flight crew.

(b) COMPOSITION.—The Committee shall consist of members appointed by the Administrator, including representatives of—

- (1) air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, including regional air carriers and air carriers with a low-cost or ultra-low-cost business model;
- (2) air carriers operating under part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;
- (3) air carriers operating under subpart K of part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;
- (4) business aviation operators;
- (5) cargo air carriers;
- (6) air ambulance operators;
- (7) transport category aircraft manufacturers;
- (8) general aviation aircraft manufacturers;
- (9) avionics manufacturers;
- (10) supplemental type certificate holders;
- (11) modification service providers;
- (12) exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;
- (13) the certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the Federal Aviation Administration;
- (14) organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots;
- (15) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of human factors or human factors experts with specific knowledge of aviation safety;
- (16) research institutions with relevant aviation safety or human factors subject matter expertise;
- (17) a representative from the National Transportation Safety Board with subject matter expertise as an observer; and
- (18) any other stakeholders the Administrator determines appropriate.

(c) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the findings and recommendations under subsection (a), the Committee shall consider—

- (1) the anticipated certification timeline for ACAS Xa equipment given the technical complexity and requisite procedures for approval;
- (2) the feasibility of using the Line Replaceable Units of existing collision avoidance systems in such aircraft;
- (3) the feasibility of using existing antennas of existing collision avoidance systems in such aircraft;
- (4) the commercial availability of all necessary components associated with integrated ACAS Xa;

(5) actions the Administrator can take to prioritize the certification and installation of integrated ACAS Xa;

(6) related changes that may be required for the operating rules and training necessary for air traffic controllers, pilots, and others;

(7) harmonization of global standards associated with collision avoidance systems; and

(8) any other considerations the Committee or the Administrator determines appropriate.

(d) **REPORT.**—Not later than 1 year after the date of establishment of the Committee, the Committee shall submit to the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing the findings and recommendations of the Committee.

(e) **RULEMAKING.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 18 months after the submission of the report under subsection (d) or 32 months after the date of enactment of this Act (whichever is earlier), the Administrator shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to prohibit persons from operating selected aircraft unless such aircraft are equipped and operating with ACAS Xa that—

(A) is integrated and uses both ADS-B In and transponder interrogations, as required under the RTCA minimum operational performance standards for the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (DO-385A, issued June 22, 2023); and

(B) provides visual and audible alerting to the pilot and flight crew.

(2) **CONTENTS.**—The notice of proposed rulemaking described in paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum—

(A) appropriate guidance for certification of ACAS Xa;

(B) a deadline, not to exceed December 31, 2031, for any newly manufactured selected aircraft to be equipped with ACAS Xa that reflects various aircraft types, appropriate maintenance cycles, and required updates to appropriate guidance after certification of ACAS Xa;

(C) a deadline, not to exceed December 31, 2031, for existing selected aircraft to be retrofit with ACAS Xa that reflects various aircraft types, appropriate maintenance cycles, and required updates to appropriate guidance after certification of ACAS Xa;

(D) if the new minimal operating performance standards promulgated under subsection (f) require an upgrade of software, an upgrade of hardware, or additional training, a deadline for selected aircraft to be upgraded, not to exceed December 31, 2033; and

(E) a process by which the Administrator may extend the deadlines specified in subparagraphs (B) and (C), not to exceed a period of 2 years, provided that the Administrator provides a report to the appropriate committees of Congress within 14 days of taking such action, with the reasons justifying such action and an assurance that safety will not be compromised by the delay.

(3) **FINAL RULE.**—Not later than 1 year after the issuance of the notice of proposed rulemaking required under paragraph (1)(A), the Administrator shall issue a final rule to carry out the requirements of this section.

(f) **MODIFICATION OF MINIMAL OPERATING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS.**—Not later than 30 days after the issuance of a final rule under subsection (e), the Administrator shall work with the appropriate standards-setting organization to update the minimal operation standards for ACAS Xa to—

(1) if the evaluation conducted pursuant to section 101 determines that inhibit altitudes can be safely decreased, safely decrease the inhibit altitude in accordance with the results of such evaluation;

(2) update traffic advisory aural alert standards to include clock position, relative altitude, range, and vertical tendency; and

(3) integrate directional traffic symbols into visual displays.

(g) **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.**—The Administrator shall provide technical assistance for facilitating equipage across the entire fleet of affected aircraft, including, as appropriate, guidance under part 26 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, to provide support for affected aircraft operators in complying with the requirements of this section.

(h) **SELECTED AIRCRAFT DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “selected aircraft” means aircraft that are required to be equipped with traffic alert and collision avoidance systems as required in sections 121.356, 135.180, and 91.1045 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

SEC. 103. AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS FOR ROTORCRAFT.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than December 31, 2026, the Administrator shall take necessary action with the appropriate standards-setting organization to finalize and publish minimum operational performance standards for the collision avoidance system known as “Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xr” (in this section referred to as “ACAS Xr”) that uses both ADS-B In and a second independent source of target aircraft data, such as transponder interrogations.

(b) **ACAS Xr AVIATION RULEMAKING COMMITTEE.**—

(1) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the appropriate standards-setting organization publishes minimal operational performance standards for ACAS Xr under subsection (a), or January 31, 2027, (whichever is earlier), the Administrator shall establish an aviation rulemaking committee (in this section referred to as the “Committee”) to review and develop findings and recommendations to require selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft be equipped and operating with ACAS Xr that has ADS-B In and is configured to provide visual and audible alerting to the pilot and flight crew.

(2) **COMPOSITION.**—The Committee shall consist of members appointed by the Administrator, including representatives of—

(A) rotorcraft operating under part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(B) rotorcraft operating under part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(C) rotorcraft manufacturers;

(D) an organization representing rotorcraft operators and pilots;

(E) an organization representing rotorcraft air medical services;

(F) general aviation aircraft manufacturers;

(G) powered-lift aircraft operators and manufacturers;

(H) avionics manufacturers;

(I) supplemental type certificate holders;

(J) modification service providers;

(K) exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(L) the certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA;

(M) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of human factors or human factors experts with specific knowledge of aviation safety;

(N) a career representative from the National Transportation Safety Board with subject matter expertise as an observer; and

(O) any other stakeholders the Administrator determines appropriate.

(3) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In developing the findings and recommendations required under paragraph (1), the Committee shall consider—

(A) any anticipated modifications to the minimum operational performance standards of ACAS Xr that are required by subsection (c)(1)(B);

(B) the anticipated certification timeline for ACAS Xr equipment given the technical complexity and requisite procedures for approval;

(C) a projected deadline for equipping newly manufactured selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft with ACAS Xr that considers—

(i) the safety benefits of ACAS Xr;

(ii) the anticipated timeline needed for the FAA to approve the installation of ACAS Xr on various rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft or for various operations;

(iii) the commercial availability of the necessary components associated with ACAS Xr; and

(iv) the operational and technical considerations associated with installing ACAS Xr on newly manufactured selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft;

(D) a projected deadline to retrofit selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft with ACAS Xr that considers—

(i) the safety benefits of ACAS Xr;

(ii) the feasibility of using existing antennas of existing collision prevention systems equipped in selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft;

(iii) the feasibility and cost associated with retrofitting selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft not equipped with existing collision avoidance systems;

(iv) the commercial availability of the necessary components associated with ACAS Xr; and

- (v) the operational and technical considerations associated with retrofitting selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft;
 - (E) actions that the Administrator can take to prioritize the certification and installation of ACAS Xr;
 - (F) the interaction of ACAS Xr with existing collision prevention technologies;
 - (G) the efficacy of ACAS Xr in low-altitude and high-density airspace environments;
 - (H) any available safety data assessing the effectiveness of ACAS Xr in reducing midair collision risk;
 - (I) related training for air traffic controllers, pilots, and others;
 - (J) National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 adopted on January 27, 2026; and
 - (K) any other considerations the Committee determines appropriate.
- (4) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the establishment of the Committee, the Committee shall submit to the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings and the recommendations developed by the Committee under this subsection.
- (c) RULEMAKING AND MODIFICATION OF MINIMAL OPERATING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS.—
- (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months after the submission of the report required under subsection (b)(4), or 24 months after the date of enactment of this Act (whichever is earlier), the Administrator shall—
- (A) issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to prohibit persons from operating selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft unless such rotorcraft or powered-lift aircraft are equipped and operating with ACAS Xr that uses both ADS-B In and transponder interrogations, as required under the minimum operational performance standards as required under subsection (a); and
 - (B) take necessary actions with the appropriate standards-setting organization to modify the minimal operational performance standards for ACAS Xr to—
 - (i) update traffic advisory aural alert standards to include clock position, relative altitude, range and vertical tendency; and
 - (ii) integrate directional traffic symbols into visual displays.
- (2) CONTENTS.—The notice of proposed rulemaking required under paragraph (1)(A) shall include, at a minimum—
- (A) appropriate guidance for the certification of ACAS Xr systems;
 - (B) defined standards for the modifications to such systems described in paragraph (1)(B);
 - (C) a deadline for any newly manufactured selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft to be equipped with ACAS Xr, considering the findings and recommendations developed pursuant to subsection (b);
 - (D) a deadline for selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft to be retrofit with ACAS Xr, considering the findings and recommendations developed pursuant to subsection (b); and
 - (E) a deadline for selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft to be equipped with collision prevention technology pursuant to section 104, not to exceed December 31, 2031.
- (3) FINAL RULE.—Not later than 18 months after the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking under paragraph (1)(A), the Administrator shall issue a final rule associated with such proposed rulemaking.
- (d) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—The Administrator shall provide technical assistance to facilitating equipage across the entire fleet of affected aircraft to provide support for selected rotorcraft operators and selected powered-lift aircraft operators in complying with the requirements of this section.
- (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
- (1) SELECTED ROTORCRAFT.—The term “selected rotorcraft” means a non-military rotorcraft operating in Class B airspace.
 - (2) POWERED-LIFT AIRCRAFT.—The term “powered-lift aircraft” has the meaning given the term “powered-lift” in section 1.1 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
 - (3) SELECTED POWERED-LIFT AIRCRAFT.—The term “selected powered-lift aircraft” means a non-military powered-lift aircraft operating in Class B airspace.
- SEC. 104. COLLISION PREVENTION SYSTEMS.**
- (a) FINAL RULE.—Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall issue a final rule with an effective date not later than De-

cember 31, 2031, to require covered aircraft to be equipped and operating with collision prevention technology.

(b) CONSULTATION.—In developing the final rule under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with the following:

- (1) Air carriers operating under part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
- (2) Air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
- (3) Air carriers operating under part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
- (4) Organizations representing helicopter aviation operators and pilots.
- (5) Organizations representing the general aviation community.
- (6) Organizations representing business aviation operators.
- (7) Organizations representing experimental aircraft operators.
- (8) Transport category aircraft manufacturers.
- (9) General aviation aircraft manufactures.
- (10) Rotorcraft manufacturers.
- (11) Avionics manufacturers.
- (12) Powered-lifted aircraft manufacturers.
- (13) Supplemental type certificate holders.
- (14) Aircraft modification service providers.
- (15) Exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code.
- (16) Certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA.
- (17) Not fewer than 3 organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
- (18) Aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of human factors or human factors experts with specific knowledge of aviation safety.
- (19) The National Transportation Safety Board.
- (20) Any other representative the Administrator determines appropriate.

(c) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the final rule under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider—

- (1) the safety benefits of collision prevention technologies;
- (2) relevant regulations, guidance, and policies for traffic awareness and traffic advisory technology that uses ADS-B In;
- (3) ways in which ADS-B In software applications can be used as of the date of enactment of this Act;
- (4) software in existence on the date of enactment of this Act, and reasonably projected thereafter, that can predict aircraft movements, display surrounding traffic, and provide visual and audible traffic advisories;
- (5) the margin of error and accuracy of software described in paragraph (4);
- (6) the safety benefits of software described in paragraph (4) in preventing conflicts with both aircraft and ground vehicles on airport surfaces;
- (7) the safety benefits of software described in paragraph (4) in informing pilots or flight crews of operational risks, including encounters with forecasted severe weather using flight information services broadcast (FIS-B);
- (8) the effort of the Administrator to modernize the air traffic control system, including timelines, technologies being incorporated, changes to operational rules, and training requirements;
- (9) the role of air traffic controllers in ensuring aircraft separation, including the need for additional training to air traffic controllers given the requirements of this section;
- (10) the necessity of certification for implementing collision prevention technology based on type of aircraft and operation;
- (11) the capacity of the aerospace supply chain to manufacture necessary equipment;
- (12) the use of existing air traffic control deviation authorization tools to implement the requirement in subsection (g)(2);
- (13) the requirements for the final rule as specified in subsection (d);
- (14) if available at the time of consideration, the results of the studies on ADS-B Out equipage and development of low-cost voluntary ADS-B as required by sections 808 and 810 of FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (Public Law 118–63); and
- (15) any other considerations the Administrator determines appropriate.

(d) REQUIREMENTS FOR FINAL RULE.—In issuing the final rule required under subsection (a), the Administrator shall—

- (1) establish performance requirements for equipping collision prevention technology that, as determined by the Administrator, are appropriate for the covered aircraft and the operations, including the operating environment;
 - (2) in establishing the performance requirements described in paragraph (1)—
 - (A) require such technology be configured to provide visual and audible alerting to the pilot and flight crew;
 - (B) consider the field of view of the pilots, human factors, and, if applicable, mounting method of such technology, to ensure that such technology can be readily utilized and has minimal risk of unexpected detachment;
 - (C) consider the reliability and resiliency of alerts in environments where inputs or signals, including GPS, can be jammed or spoofed; and
 - (D) consider the utilization of existing antenna locations or the placement of new antenna used to receive and, if applicable, transmit, data used in collision prevention technology;
 - (3) identify existing or issue additional relevant guidance or technical standard orders to carry out the requirements of this section; and
 - (4) establish an effective date not later than December 31, 2031, for equipping the covered aircraft with technology described in subsection (a) that reflects various aircraft types, appropriate maintenance cycles, and required updates to appropriate guidance for such technology after certification of such technologies.
- (e) **EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF SAFETY.**—In issuing the final rule required under this section, the Administrator shall allow for the use of any collision prevention technology (including technology that uses portable ADS-B In receivers or other equipment that displays on an existing or future portable device, electronic flight bag, or panel mounted display) available for use at the time of the effective date established in subsection (d)(4), if the Administrator determines it provides an equivalent level of safety as the requirements of the final rule issued pursuant to subsection (a).
- (f) **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.**—The Administrator shall provide technical assistance to facilitating equipage across the entire fleet of affected aircraft to provide support for affected aircraft operators in complying with the requirements of this section.
- (g) **COVERED AIRCRAFT DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “covered aircraft”—
- (1) means any non-military aircraft, except a selected aircraft as defined in section 102, that is required to be equipped with ADS-B Out under section 91.225 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations; and
 - (2) excludes aircraft that have a limited category special airworthiness certificate or an experimental airworthiness certificate, provided the pilot of such aircraft is authorized to deviate from the requirements of this section by air traffic control in the same manner ADS-B Out deviations are approved under section 91.225(g) of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

SEC. 105. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN USE OF ADS-B DATA.

- (a) **IN GENERAL.**—
 - (1) **LIMITATION ON USE OF DATA.**—Data from Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast may not be used by any person, governmental agency, or other entity to identify aircraft for the purpose of obtaining revenue from the owner or operator of such aircraft, without the consent of such owner or operator.
 - (2) **USE OF DATA BY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER.**—Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast data may be used to assist air traffic controllers in tracking aircraft and improving air traffic safety and efficiency.
- (b) **LIMIT ON USE OF ADS-B DATA.**—Section 46101(c)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by striking “the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may not” and inserting “neither the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration nor any other Federal, State, local, territorial, or Tribal official may”.

SEC. 106. RULEMAKING ACCOUNTABILITY.

- (a) **PUBLIC DASHBOARD.**—The Secretary shall establish, maintain, and make available, on a publicly available website of the Department of Transportation, a dashboard that displays, for the rulemakings required in sections 102, 103, and 104—
 - (1) dates of publication and links to the minimum operating performance standards referenced by and developed pursuant to such sections;
 - (2) the date of establishment, membership roster, and tasking memoranda (or similar document) for rulemaking committees established pursuant to such sections;
 - (3) deadlines and actual dates for the submission for all required rulemaking committee reports to the Administrator or Congress;
 - (4) publication dates of and a link to any—
 - (A) advanced notice of proposed rulemakings published pursuant to such sections;

- (B) notice of proposed rulemakings published pursuant to such sections; and
 - (C) revised notice of proposed rulemakings published pursuant to rulemakings described in subparagraphs (A) and (B);
 - (5) the opening and closing of public comment periods and a link to public comments;
 - (6) the publication of and a link to any final rule issued pursuant to such sections;
 - (7) all associated official correspondence with the National Transportation Safety Board regarding related safety recommendations; and
 - (8) any additional information the Secretary determines will increase transparency without delaying the publication of a final rule.
- (b) CONGRESSIONAL AND FAMILY BRIEFING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the final rules required pursuant to sections 102, 103, and 104 are issued, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress and the families of the victims of the midair collision referenced in National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 adopted on January 27, 2026 on the progress in issuing such final rules.
- (c) CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT IN CASE OF FAILURE TO MEET DEADLINES.—
- (1) IN GENERAL.—If the Administrator fails to meet any rulemaking deadline established in sections 102, 103, and 104, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress in person not later than 4 weeks after the date on which such deadline is not met.
 - (2) DEADLINE FOR INITIAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION.—Not later than 4 days after the date described in paragraph (1), the Administrator shall begin initial outreach to and coordination with the appropriate committees of Congress to arrange and organize logistics of the briefing required under paragraph (1).
 - (3) FORMAT AND TIME OF BRIEFING.—The briefing required under paragraph (1) shall be in a format and at a time to be determined by the appropriate committees of Congress.

SEC. 107. TIME-ON-POSITION LIMITS.

- (a) TIME-ON-POSITION LIMITS.—
- (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in coordination with organizations representing air traffic controller managers and supervisors, shall establish time-on-position limits for operations supervisory personnel.
 - (2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the limits described in paragraph (1), the Administrator shall—
 - (A) evaluate appropriate time-on-position limits for operations supervisory personnel, prioritizing the evaluation of such limits at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and other air traffic facilities with high volumes of mixed rotorcraft and airplane traffic;
 - (B) establish such limits for Air Traffic Organization operations supervisory personnel at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and other air traffic facilities with high volumes of mixed helicopter and airplane traffic;
 - (C) develop guidance for district and facility-level management to adapt such limits to account for their own staffing and local standard operating procedures;
 - (D) consider the operational needs and staffing levels of the air traffic facilities described in the previous subparagraphs to ensure effective oversight and monitoring of safety critical operations;
 - (E) consider air traffic control specialists performing watch supervision in the controller-in-charge position;
 - (F) consider requirements of FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration”, issued on February 20, 2025, or any successor document, and FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled “Air Traffic Control”, issued on February 20, 2025, or any successor document;
 - (G) consider data, reports, and best practices pertaining to human factors; and
 - (H) consider any other items determined appropriate by the Administrator.
 - (3) CONSULTATION.—The Administrator may consult with the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code.

(b) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere with any agreement between a governmental agency and the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, section 7106(a) of title 5, United States Code, or section 40122 of title 49, United States Code.

(c) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **CONTROLLER-IN-CHARGE.**—The term “controller-in-charge” means the bargaining unit air traffic control specialist responsible for providing watch supervision for the continuous operation of an air traffic control facility or area in any case in which operations supervisory personnel are not available.

(2) **OPERATIONAL OVERSIGHT.**—The term “operational oversight” means the duty of the individual in charge of the operation to effectively lead and manage the delivery of air traffic services by maintaining intentional engagement, situational awareness, and accountability within the area of supervision.

(3) **OPERATIONS SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL.**—The term “operations supervisory personnel” means managerial personnel responsible for the direct supervision of air traffic control operational personnel.

SEC. 108. CONTROLLER THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT TRAINING.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall, in coordination with the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, develop and implement initial, recurrent, and refresher training for air traffic controllers on threat and error management that is instructor-led and scenario-based.

(b) **CONSULTATION.**—In developing the training under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with representatives of—

(1) organizations representing air traffic control managers and operations supervisors;

(2) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of—

(A) human factors and human decision making in realistic operational settings; and

(B) threat and error management best practices and policies; and

(3) a career representative from the National Transportation Safety Board with subject matter expertise as an observer.

(c) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In developing the training described in subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider, at a minimum—

(1) the findings and recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board, including as contained in the final aviation investigation report, AIR-26-02, adopted on January 27, 2026, such as—

(A) training controllers to continuously monitor their environment to more quickly and accurately identify threats;

(B) promoting team communication to ensure that communications are clear, timely, and assertive;

(C) emphasizing effective scanning habits;

(D) recognizing patterns in the development of adverse events; and

(E) enhanced decision making under stress by developing habits that balance procedural compliance with problem-solving;

(2) the requirements of—

(A) FAA Order JO 3120.4S, titled “Air Traffic Technical Training”, issued on August 28, 2024;

(B) FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration”, issued on February 20, 2025;

(C) FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled “Air Traffic Control”, issued on February 20, 2025; and

(D) other relevant air traffic control standards, guidance, and policies;

(3) the frequency of the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection (a) and whether frequency should be increased for air traffic controllers in facilities managing high-complexity or high-volume airspace;

(4) data, reports, and peer-reviewed studies on human factors and threat and error management best practices;

(5) the appropriate use of tower simulator systems and other advanced training technologies to supplement the recurrent training described in subsection (a), including the use of data analytics from such systems and technologies to individualize instruction;

(6) the use of data analytics to identify systemic gaps in the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection (a) and to dynamically enhance training curriculum and techniques;

(7) data gathered from aviation safety reporting programs; and

(8) any other item determined appropriate by the Administrator.

(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the development of the training under subsection (a), the Administrator shall revise the orders of the FAA described in subsection (c)(2), or any successor documents, and any corresponding policy or guidance materials, to reflect the requirements of this section.

(e) BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after the training requirements under this section and section 109 are established, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of such training and any potential recommendations for improvements.

(f) THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT DEFINED.—In this section, the term “threat and error management” has the meaning described in chapter 6 of the Risk Management Handbook (FAA H–8083–2A) or any successor document.

SEC. 109. CONTROLLER VISUAL SEPARATION TRAINING.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall, in coordination with the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, develop and implement initial, recurrent, and refresher training for air traffic controllers on tower-applied and pilot-applied visual separation procedures that is instructor-led and scenario-based.

(b) CONSULTATION.—In developing and implementing the training required under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with representatives of—

- (1) the certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA;
- (2) organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots;
- (3) organizations representing air traffic control managers and supervisors;
- (4) organizations representing general aviation pilots; and
- (5) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of—
 - (A) human factors and human decision making in realistic operational settings; and
 - (B) tower-applied and pilot-applied visual separation procedures and regulations.

(c) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the training under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider, at a minimum—

- (1) the findings and recommendations made by the National Transportation Safety Board, including as contained in the final aviation investigation report, AIR–26–02, adopted on January 27, 2026;
- (2) the requirements of—
 - (A) FAA Order JO 3120.4S, titled “Air Traffic Technical Training”, issued on August 28, 2024;
 - (B) FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration”, issued on February 20, 2025;
 - (C) FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled “Air Traffic Control”, issued on February 20, 2025; and
 - (D) other relevant air traffic control standards, guidance, and policies;
- (3) the frequency of the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection (a), including—
 - (A) whether such frequency should be increased for air traffic controllers in facilities managing high-complexity or high-volume airspace; and
 - (B) the need for advance training and guidance ahead of any changes to FAA visual separation policies;
- (4) the appropriate use of tower simulator systems and other advanced training technologies to supplement the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection (a), including the use of data analytics from such systems and technologies to individualize instruction;
- (5) the use of data analytics to identify systemic gaps in the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection (a) and to dynamically enhance training curriculum and techniques;
- (6) data gathered from aviation safety reporting programs; and
- (7) any other item determined appropriate by the Administrator.

(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the development of the training under subsection (a), the Administrator shall revise the orders of the FAA described in subparagraph (c)(2), or any successor documents, and any corresponding policy or guidance materials, to reflect the requirements of this section.

SEC. 110. SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall develop a safety risk assessment tool for use by air traffic

controllers, including by supervisory air traffic control personnel, to assist in airspace risk identification, mitigation, and operational decision making.

(b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider, at a minimum—

(1) the development of a safety risk assessment tool capable of supporting air traffic controllers in—

- (A) identifying safety risks;
 - (B) analyzing the impact of and prioritizing such risks; and
 - (C) developing strategies to reduce or eliminate such risks in real time;
- (2) data, reports, studies, and best practices on threat and error management;
- (3) findings and recommendations of the—

(A) National Transportation Safety Board, including as contained in the final aviation investigation report, AIR-26-02, adopted on January 27, 2026;

(B) National Airspace System Safety Review Team as contained in the final report titled “Discussion and Recommendations to Address Risk in the National Airspace System”, issued on November 15, 2023; and

(C) frontline manager workload study authorized under section 412 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (Public Law 118-63);

- (4) air traffic facility type and staffing level;
- (5) risk assessment guidance, policies, and regulations of the Administration in place prior to the date of enactment of this Act;
- (6) data gathered from aviation safety reporting programs;
- (7) best practices or similar relevant risk assessment tools and methods used by foreign civil aviation authorities;
- (8) the feasibility of leveraging commercially available products or technologies that may be utilized to develop such tool;
- (9) benefits of incorporating such tool into a Common Automation Platform; and

(10) any other factors determined relevant by the Administrator.

(c) COORDINATION.—In developing the safety risk assessment tool under subsection (a), the Administrator shall coordinate with—

- (1) organizations representing air traffic control supervisors and managers;
- (2) the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;
- (3) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of threat and error management;
- (4) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge of human factors and human decision making in realistic operational settings;
- (5) organizations representing operators of Federal contract towers pursuant to section 47124 of title 49, United States Code; and
- (6) any other stakeholders determined relevant by the Administrator.

(d) BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on—

- (1) the development of the safety risk assessment tool required under this section and recommendations for implementation;
- (2) the progress of implementation described in subsection (e); and
- (3) any recommendations to improve the deployment of the safety risk assessment tool.

(e) IMPLEMENTATION.—The Administrator shall deploy the safety risk assessment tool developed under this section at—

- (1) the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport air traffic control tower, not later than 1 year after the development of the safety risk assessment tool;
- (2) air traffic control facilities with high volumes of mixed rotorcraft and airplane traffic not later than 18 months after the development of the safety risk assessment tool; and
- (3) any remaining air traffic control facilities not later than 2 years after the development of the safety risk assessment tool.

(f) THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT DEFINED.—In this section, the term “threat and error management” has the meaning described in chapter 6 of the Risk Management Handbook (FAA H-8083-2A) or any successor document.

SEC. 111. OPERATIONAL RATES AT RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall initiate an assessment of the aircraft arrival rate at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.

(b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In conducting the assessment described in subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider—

- (1) airspace complexity;
 - (2) airfield limitations;
 - (3) mixed-fleet operations;
 - (4) traffic volume;
 - (5) air carrier scheduling practices;
 - (6) the operational capacity of such airport;
 - (7) the current hourly instrument flight rules allocation practice at such airport;
 - (8) expertise provided by the Air Traffic Organization; and
 - (9) any other considerations the Administrator determines appropriate.
- (c) **COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT.**—Not later than 180 days after the Administrator initiates the assessment under subsection (a), the Administrator shall complete and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress such assessment, including any related findings and recommendations.
- (d) **RULEMAKING.**—Not later than 30 days after completing the assessment pursuant to subsection (c), and taking such assessment into account, the Administrator shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding to update subpart K of part 93 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, to require allocated instrument flight rules operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport to be prescribed in periods not greater than 30 minutes to ensure such airport does not exceed safe capacity.
- (e) **CONSULTATION.**—In conducting the rulemaking required under subsection (d), the Administrator shall consult with the following:
- (1) Any air carrier operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, with scheduled operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, including regional air carriers and low-cost and ultra-low-cost air carriers.
 - (2) Air carriers operating under parts 91, including subpart K, and 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, authorized to conduct non-scheduled operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
 - (3) The exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code.
 - (4) The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority.
 - (5) Any other stakeholders the Administrator determines appropriate.

SEC. 112. TIME-BASED FLOW MANAGEMENT.

Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall implement operational use of the time-based flow management system at Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control and associated air traffic control towers.

SEC. 113. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITY LEVELS.

(a) REVIEW OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITY LEVEL CRITERIA.—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Administrator and the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, (in this section referred to as the “Parties”) may, at their joint election, review and advise, as agreed to, the criteria and procedures used to assess, determine, and validate the facility pay levels of air traffic control facilities.

(2) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In conducting a review under paragraph (1), the Parties may consider—

- (A) the many variables that may affect the difficulty and complexity of air traffic control work, including technological advancements, aviation industry trends, and the modification or extension of air traffic control services;
- (B) weights and add-ons used to calculate the traffic count index and other related formulas for air traffic control facilities; and
- (C) whether new weights and add-ons should be incorporated into such formulas to more accurately reflect the air traffic density and complexity of the facility operations.

(b) REASSESSMENT OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITY LEVELS.—

(1) **LIMITATION.**—No changes to facility pay levels due to data source changes may be implemented until negotiations pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement of the Parties and title 49, United States Code, have been completed.

(2) **APPLICATION OF STANDARD.**—Upon completion of a review conducted under subsection (a) and related negotiations pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement of the Parties and title 49, United States Code, the Parties shall apply the standard in accordance with any agreements made pursuant to this section at—

- (A) the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport; and
- (B) all other air traffic control facilities, prioritizing facilities with high volumes of mixed rotorcraft and airplane traffic.

(c) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this section may be construed to interfere with any agreement between a governmental agency and the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code, or section 40122 of title 49, United States Code.

SEC. 114. WORKING GROUP TO EVALUATE SHARED FREQUENCY AROUND RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall convene a working group (in this section referred to as the “Working Group”) to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the safety benefits and risks of requiring all aircraft to use the same communications frequency during any period in which helicopter and local air traffic control positions are combined in the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport air traffic control tower.

(b) **MEMBERS.**—The Working Group convened under subsection (a) shall be comprised of representatives of—

(1) the exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(2) the organization representing air traffic control operational supervisors and managers;

(3) not fewer than 3 separate organizations representing the certified collective bargaining representatives of pilots operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

(4) air medical services;

(5) an organization representing helicopter aviation operators and pilots;

(6) an organization representing business aviation operators and pilots;

(7) air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, United States Code;

(8) an individual that has expertise in an operational or academic discipline that is relevant to the analysis of human factors in aviation, which may include air carrier operations, line pilot expertise, air traffic control, linguistics, human-machine integration, general aviation operations, and organizational behavior and culture;

(9) the FAA, provided the representative has expertise on flight operations in the area described in subsection (a);

(10) the Department of Defense, provided the representative has expertise on Department of Defense flight operations in the area described in subsection (a);

(11) the Coast Guard, provided the representative has expertise on Coast Guard flight operations in the area described in subsection (a);

(12) the National Transportation Safety Board; and

(13) other organizations or agencies as determined necessary by the Administrator.

(c) **LOCAL OPERATOR PREFERENCE.**—The members described in paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of subsection (b) shall be, or represent, individuals who operate in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area, as defined in subpart V of part 93 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

(d) **GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES.**—The members described in paragraphs (11), (12), (13), (14), and, in the case of a representative chosen by the Administrator that is from a governmental agency, (15) of subsection (b)—

(1) may not be political appointees; and

(2) shall be nonvoting members of the Working Group.

(e) **DURATION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Members of the Working Group shall be appointed for the duration of the Working Group.

(2) **LENGTH OF EXISTENCE.**—

(A) **IN GENERAL.**—The Working Group shall have an initial duration of 1 year.

(B) **OPTIONAL EXTENSION.**—The Administrator may extend the duration of the Working Group for an additional period of up to 1 year.

(f) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In conducting the comprehensive evaluation under subsection (a), the Working Group shall, at minimum, consider—

(1) the benefits or detriments to pilot and air traffic controller situation awareness;

(2) to the greatest extent possible, the human factors that would impact pilot and air traffic controller situation awareness;

(3) to the greatest extent possible, the human factors that would impact pilot and air traffic controllers during critical phases of flight;

(4) existing products by other working groups related to human factors in aviation safety;

(5) pilot training requirements;

(6) air traffic controller training requirements;

(7) if any, technological limitations or challenges that would impede aircraft from using the same communications frequency;

(8) the potential for overlapping, conflicting, and simultaneous communication transmissions, prior to and after any improvements made as a result of the assessment conducted pursuant to section 115;

(9) the potential for misdirected, missed, or stepped on communications if requiring all aircraft to use the same communication frequency;

(10) National Transportation Safety Board recommendations pertaining to miscommunications on crowded frequencies, including relevant recommendations included in the National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 adopted on January 27, 2026; and

(11) solicited feedback from air carriers operating under part 121 and part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, and general aviation operators under part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

(g) **REPORT.**—Not later than 6 months after the conclusion of the Working Group, the Working Group shall submit to the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings and recommendations resulting from the activities carried out under this section.

(h) **IMPLEMENTATION.**—Not later than 6 months after receiving recommendations outlined in the report under subsection (g), the Administrator shall operationally validate such recommendations and may take such action, as appropriate, to implement such recommendations.

SEC. 115. ANTI-BLOCKING TECHNOLOGY.

(a) **ASSESSMENT.**—Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall initiate an assessment on the feasibility, maturity, hazards, and safety benefits of technology that serves to alert air traffic controllers or flight crews to instances of potentially blocked transmissions when simultaneous broadcasting occurs.

(b) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In conducting the assessment under subsection (a), the Administrator shall, at minimum, consider—

(1) technologies currently in use domestically and internationally that alert an air traffic controller or flight crew to instances in which radio transmissions may have been blocked;

(2) the technical standards written for, and associated with, the use of such technologies identified under paragraph (1);

(3) existing and proposed technologies not in use that could alert an air traffic controller or flight crew to instances in which radio transmissions may have been blocked;

(4) the technical standards that would be needed to implement the technologies identified under paragraph (3);

(5) the potential benefits and enhanced awareness that the adoption of such technologies would provide;

(6) the technological limitations associated with such technologies;

(7) air traffic controller training requirements;

(8) the effort of the FAA to modernize the air traffic control system, including timelines, the incorporation of new technologies, and planned training; and

(9) any benefits and detriments to air traffic controller situational awareness, including availability of information, nuisance alerts, and human factors.

(c) **CONSULTATION.**—In conducting the assessment under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with stakeholders or standards organizations, including—

(1) the exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(2) the organization representing air traffic control operational supervisors and managers;

(3) the certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA;

(4) an organization representing manufacturers of air traffic management systems, equipment and technologies;

(5) an organization representing helicopter aviation operators and pilots;

(6) an organization representing general aviation operators and pilots; and

(7) any other organization or agency the Administrator determines appropriate.

(d) **REPORT.**—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the results of the assessment under subsection (a) that includes—

(1) a list of technologies identified by the Administrator serving the purpose described in subsection (a);

- (2) a list of technologies the Administrator proposes that could serve the purpose described in subsection (a);
- (3) results of simulations and testing; and
- (4) a plan to implement the technologies listed under paragraphs (1) and (2) if the assessment under subsection (a) finds such technology can be safely implemented, including—
 - (A) the scope of potential upgrades;
 - (B) predicted costs;
 - (C) a projected timeline; and
 - (D) how the potential upgrades to facilities and equipment within the scope of subparagraph (A) would be prioritized.

SEC. 116. TASK FORCE TO IDENTIFY IMPROVEMENTS TO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER CONFLICT ALERT SYSTEM.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall convene a task force (in this section referred to as the “Task Force”) to develop a framework detailing the priorities, goals, timeline, and recommendations to implement improvements to the conflict alert system to provide more salient and meaningful alerts to air traffic controllers based on the severity of the conflict triggering the alert.

(b) **MEMBERS.**—The Task Force convened under subsection (a) shall be comprised of representatives of—

- (1) the exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;
- (2) the organization representing air traffic control operational supervisors and managers;
- (3) the organization representing operators under the Contract Tower Program established under section 47124 of title 49, United States Code;
- (4) the certified bargaining representative of aviation safety inspectors and engineers for the FAA;
- (5) individuals with expertise in the human factors of alert design and related impacts on human performance;
- (6) individuals with expertise in an operational or academic discipline that is relevant to the analysis of human factors in aviation, which may include air carrier operations, line pilot expertise, air traffic control, linguistics, human-machine integration, general aviation operations, and organizational behavior and culture;
- (7) the FAA, including the Air Traffic Organization and the Office of Finance and Management, provided such representative has expertise on equipment procurement; and
- (8) other organizations or agencies as determined necessary by the Administrator.

(c) **VOTING.**—The members described in paragraphs (3), (6), and, in the case of a representative chosen by the Administrator that is from a governmental agency, (7) of subsection (b) shall be nonvoting members of the Task Force.

(d) **DURATION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Members of the Task Force shall be appointed for the duration of the Task Force.

(2) **LENGTH OF EXISTENCE.**—

(A) **IN GENERAL.**—The Task Force shall have an initial duration of 1 year.

(B) **OPTIONAL EXTENSION.**—The Administrator may extend the duration of the Task Force for an additional period of up to 6 months.

(e) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In developing the framework under subsection (a), the Task Force shall, at minimum, consider—

- (1) the benefits and detriments to air traffic controller situational awareness, including availability of information, nuisance and false alerts, and human factors;
- (2) opportunities and challenges of consolidating numerous systems and underlying data sources into a single display, including through the deployment of the Enterprise-Information Display System;
- (3) existing products by other working groups related to human factors in aviation safety;
- (4) air traffic controller training requirements;
- (5) advances in available technology not being utilized as of the date on which the Task Force is convened;
- (6) technological limitations;
- (7) National Transportation Safety Board recommendations pertaining to air traffic controller alerts, distractions, and loss of focus;
- (8) the effort of the FAA to modernize the air traffic control system, including timelines, new technologies being incorporated, and planned training; and

(9) solicited feedback from equipment manufacturers and entities involved with the air traffic control modernization effort of the Administrator.

(f) REPORT.—Not later than 4 months after the conclusion of the Task Force, the Task Force shall submit to the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a report that includes the framework developed as a result of the activities carried out under subsection (a).

(g) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 8 months after receiving the framework outlined in the report under subsection (f), the Administrator shall finalize and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a plan (in this section referred to as the “Plan”) to implement such framework.

(2) CONTENTS.—Such Plan shall include, as appropriate—

(A) specific training requirements for air traffic controllers, as detailed in—

(i) FAA Order JO 3120.4S, titled “Air Traffic Technical Training”, issued on August 28, 2024;

(ii) FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration”, issued on February 20, 2025; and

(iii) any successor or other relevant documents or guidance; and

(B) a publicly available prioritized list of airports enumerating the order in which they will receive such upgrades.

(3) TIME LIMIT.—The Plan may not contain a timeline of implementation that exceeds 2 years.

(h) IMPLEMENTATION.—The Administrator shall immediately begin implementing the Plan upon the submission of such Plan under subsection (g)(1) to the appropriate committees of Congress.

(i) BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 6 months after the submission of the Plan to the appropriate committees of Congress under subsection (g)(1), and every 6 months thereafter until the full implementation of the Plan, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the progress of implementation.

SEC. 117. POSTACCIDENT AND POSTINCIDENT DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—The Administrator shall abide by DOT Order 3910.1D, titled “Drug and Alcohol-Free Departmental Workplace Program” (or any successor document) to ensure appropriate postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing.

(b) REVISION OF PROCEDURES.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall revise procedures of the Air Traffic Organization to ensure an appropriate on-site supervisor makes each postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing determination in a timely manner based on an assessment of such supervisor of whether the event meets testing criteria and which controllers had duties pertaining to the involved aircraft without need to wait for investigation or approval.

(c) TRAINING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall incorporate training on the revised postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing determination procedure described in subsection (b) for all staff of the Air Traffic Organization who have responsibilities under such procedure.

(2) REQUIREMENTS.—The training described under this subsection shall, at a minimum—

(A) be administered during initial training, and annually thereafter; and

(B) include a postlearning knowledge assessment.

(d) REVIEW.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall conduct a review of the ability of each FAA-operated air traffic control facility to routinely accomplish the required postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing within the Secretary’s specified timeframes of within 2 hours for alcohol testing and within 4 hours for drug testing.

(2) REQUIREMENTS.—The review described under this subsection shall, at a minimum, require each FAA-operated air traffic control facility to conduct a demonstration to establish the time that would be required for urine and breath evidence collection to begin if testing were unexpectedly needed during a time with the lowest routinely anticipated level of resource availability for testing.

(3) REMEDIATION.—After each review under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall work with the Secretary to mitigate identified barriers to timely postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing, and to remediate the

performance of each facility for which the demonstration under paragraph (2) indicated inability to meet required timeframes for postaccident drug or alcohol testing.

(4) **REPORT.**—Not later than 3 months after each review under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing the results of the review, including facilities in need of remediation, progress at facilities previously identified for remediation, and planned approaches to remediation.

SEC. 118. FURTHER MODIFICATIONS TO RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT AREA HELICOPTER ROUTES.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall evaluate, via the safety risk management process in accordance with FAA Order JO 8040.4C, titled “Safety Risk Management Policy” (or any successor document), charted helicopter routes in the vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.

(b) **REVISIONS TO DECONFLICT TRAFFIC.**—Upon the completion of each route evaluation under subsection (a), the Administrator shall immediately, as necessary, revise such route to ensure that the route and routes utilized by fixed-wing aircraft—

(1) are safely deconflicted physically at all times; or

(2) have operating procedures that require positive control from the controller to ensure safe deconfliction during operations.

(c) **SAFETY REVIEW REQUIREMENTS.**—In carrying out the route revisions required under subsection (b), the Administrator shall conduct a safety risk management review, as necessary, for any helicopter route changes, in accordance with FAA Order 8040.4C, titled “Safety Risk Management Policy” (or any successor document).

(d) **REPORT.**—Not later than 120 days after the Administrator completes all the evaluations and subsequent route revisions required under this section, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing—

(1) the results of the evaluations required under subsection (a);

(2) the route revisions required under subsection (b), including an explanation for such revisions; and

(3) the safety risk management review documentation developed as a result of the review conducted under subsection (c).

SEC. 119. REQUIRING VERTICAL SEPARATION NEAR AIRPORTS DURING CRITICAL PHASES OF FLIGHT.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in subsection (b), the Administrator shall ensure that each segment of a helicopter route contains, in the appropriate helicopter route chart, recommended flight altitudes, including altitude ceilings and floors, in a manner consistent with FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration” (or any successor document).

(b) **CONSIDERATION OF VERTICAL SEPARATION IN ROUTE CRITERIA.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall amend FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration” (or any successor document), to add minimum vertical separation requirements to the criteria for the helicopter route chart program.

(c) **CHARTING MINIMUM SEPARATION NEAR AIRPORTS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Administrator shall ensure that any helicopter chart that represents an area near an airport clearly conveys to an operator the segments of such helicopter routes in the vicinity of such airport.

(2) **CONTENT REQUIREMENTS.**—At minimum, each such chart shall clearly convey for each of the segments, the recommended flight altitudes, including altitude ceilings and floors, and any necessary instructions, to convey minimum separation, in accordance with FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled “Air Traffic Control” (or any successor document), between—

(A) a helicopter or powered-lift aircraft utilizing such segment; and

(B) a fixed-wing aircraft operating at or near such airport during critical phases of flight.

(d) **UPDATE POLICY.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall update FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration” (or any successor document), to account for any additional changes made by this section.

(e) **ANNUAL REVIEW.**—The Administrator shall ensure that any changes made to Helicopter Route Charts as a result of this section are assessed on an annual basis as part of the annual review described in section 120.

SEC. 120. HELICOPTER ROUTE CHART ANNUAL REVIEW.

(a) **CRITERIA REVIEW.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Administrator shall initiate a review of the criteria for annual reviews of helicopter routes as required pursuant to FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration” (or any successor document).

(2) **UPDATE OF CRITERIA.**—After each annual criteria review under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall update the criteria based on such review and publish the updated criteria on a publicly available website of the FAA.

(3) **CHANGES TO ROUTE REVIEWS.**—After any change is made to FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration” (or any successor document) pursuant to section 119(d), the Administrator shall update the criteria for annual reviews of helicopter routes to reflect such change.

(b) **PUBLICATION.**—The Administrator shall publish, on a publicly available website of the FAA, the date on which the annual review for each Helicopter Route Chart has been most recently completed, as required pursuant to FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration” (or any successor document).

(c) **REPORT.**—Not later than December 31, 2026, and December 31 of each year thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing, at a minimum, the following information:

(1) A summary of changes, if applicable, made to each Helicopter Route Chart, including—

(A) changes, additions, or deletions to designated helicopter routes;

(B) changes in instrument flight rules routes;

(C) additions or deletions of visual checkpoints; and

(D) rationale or safety data to justify any changes described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).

(2) The safety risk management documentation completed in accordance with FAA Order JO 8040.4C, titled “Safety Risk Management Policy” (or any successor document).

(3) A summary of any advanced consultation between the Administrator and impacted helicopter and fixed-wing operators in planning the safety risk management process.

(4) A certification that the designated recommended route altitudes and flight ceilings and floors ensure helicopters maintain minimum separation, in accordance with FAA Order 7110.65BB, titled “Air Traffic Control” (or any successor document), with fixed-wing aircraft operating along airport approach and departure paths.

(d) **FAILURE TO SUBMIT.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—If the Administrator fails to submit an annual report required under subsection (b) on or before the date on which such report is required to be submitted, the Chief Operating Officer of the Air Traffic Organization shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress in person not later than 4 weeks after such date.

(2) **DEADLINE FOR INITIAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION.**—Not later than 4 days after such date, the FAA shall begin initial outreach to and coordination with the appropriate committees of Congress to arrange and organize logistics of the briefing required under paragraph (1).

(3) **FORMAT AND TIME OF BRIEFING.**—The briefing required under paragraph (1) shall be in a format and at a time to be determined by such committees.

SEC. 121. VISUAL CHARTS.

(a) **STUDY.**—Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall initiate a study on incorporating the lateral location and published altitudes of helicopter routes into all instrument and visual approach and departure procedures for airports to provide situation awareness to fixed-wing operators of the risk of helicopter traffic operating in the vicinity of such operators.

(b) **CONSULTATION.**—In carrying out subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with relevant stakeholders, including—

(1) air carriers;

(2) an organization representing helicopter operators and pilots;

(3) an organization representing general aviation operators and pilots;

(4) an organization representing business aviation operators and pilots;

(5) an organization representing emergency air medical services;

(6) representatives of the Department of Defense and United States Coast Guard who are not political appointees;

(7) not fewer than 3 separate organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;

- (8) the certified exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code; and
 - (9) an individual that has expertise in an operational or academic discipline that is relevant to the analysis of human factors in aviation, including air carrier operations, line pilot expertise, air traffic control, linguistics, human-machine integration, general aviation operations, and organizational behavior and culture.
- (c) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Administrator shall consider the—
- (1) spacing and legibility of information on charts;
 - (2) workload of flight crews at lower altitudes and during critical phases of flight;
 - (3) feasibility and decipherability of layered information on digital charts;
 - (4) current best practices for pilots when landing at or departing from airports with high volume helicopter traffic but that do not have charted helicopter routes; and
 - (5) human factors involved with approach and departure procedures.
- (d) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 1 year after initiating the study under subsection (a), the Administrator shall make any revisions necessary to—
- (1) Terminal Procedures Publications to include charted helicopter routes to provide appropriate situational awareness to fixed-wing operators; and
 - (2) Helicopter Route Charts to include airport approach and departure paths to provide appropriate situational awareness to helicopter operators.
- (e) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—If the Administrator makes revisions under subsection (d), the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on such revisions not later than 60 days after making such revisions.

SEC. 122. CLOSE PROXIMITY ENCOUNTERS.

- (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall establish a working group to make recommendations on—
- (1) an objective definition of close proximity encounters;
 - (2) associated parameters that can be used to monitor the prevalence of such encounters and identify areas of potential traffic conflict for safety assurance and safety risk management for such encounters; and
 - (3) making publicly available aggregated information about all such encounters, including date and location.
- (b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out subsection (a), the working group shall consider—
- (1) existing airborne separation rules and required loss of airborne separation reporting requirements;
 - (2) the development of a definition of, and associated parameters for, close proximity encounter events;
 - (3) data gathered from aviation safety reporting systems and reports, including the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing Program, the Aviation Safety Action Program, the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System, the Aviation Risk Identification and Assessment (“ARIA”) system, preliminary ARIA reports, the Air Traffic Safety Action Program, the Aviation Safety Reporting System, the Near Midair Collision System, mandatory occurrence reports, and other relevant systems and reports;
 - (4) National Transportation Safety Board aviation investigation report AIR-26-02, adopted on January 27, 2026;
 - (5) FAA risk assessment guidance, policies, and regulations in place prior to the date of enactment of this Act;
 - (6) best practices or similar relevant risk assessment tools and methods used by foreign civil aviation authorities; and
 - (7) any other factors determined relevant by the working group.
- (c) MEMBERSHIP.—The working group shall consist of the following:
- (1) APPOINTED MEMBERS.—The following members appointed by the Administrator:
 - (A) 2 representatives of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration with expertise in safety data.
 - (B) 5 appropriately qualified representatives of aviation labor organizations (designated by the applicable represented organization), including—
 - (i) organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots;
 - (ii) the exclusive bargaining representatives of FAA air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;
 - (iii) organizations representing helicopter operators and pilots, including law enforcement and air ambulance operators; and

- (iv) organizations representing general aviation operators and pilots.
- (C) Not fewer than 5 independent subject matter experts in safety management systems and safety data who—
 - (i) have not served as a political appointee in the Administration; and
 - (ii) have a minimum of 10 years of relevant applied experience.
- (D) 2 air carrier employees whose job responsibilities include administration of a safety management system.
- (E) 2 individuals representing holders of a certificate issued under part 21 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, whose job responsibilities include administration of a safety management system.
- (F) 2 other representatives from the aerospace industry that do not meet the criteria described in subparagraph (D) or (E) and who have expertise in safety assurance or safety risk or whose job responsibilities include administration of a safety management system.
- (G) A career representative from the National Transportation Safety Board with subject matter expertise, as a nonvoting member.
- (2) ADVISORY MEMBERS.—In addition to the appointed members described in paragraph (1), the working group shall be advised by up to 5 employees of the Administration, at least 3 of whom shall be subject matter experts in implementing safety assurance and safety risk management.
- (d) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 30 days after the working group develops recommendations under subsection (a), the Administrator shall make publicly available a report containing the recommendations and describing how the Administrator will implement such recommendations.

SEC. 123. NOTIFICATION OF CLOSE PROXIMITY ENCOUNTERS AND ANALYSIS OF DATA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in accordance with the mandatory occurrence reporting requirements in FAA Order JO 7210.632A, titled “Air Traffic Organization Occurrence Reporting” (or any successor document), FAA Order 8020.11D, titled “Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting” (or any successor document), and FAA Advisory Circular AC 90–120, titled “Operational Use of Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems” (or any successor document), shall establish a process to—

- (1) notify, with respect to each event, parties involved with—
 - (A) a near midair collision event;
 - (B) a traffic collision avoidance system resolution advisory event;
 - (C) a close proximity encounter, as defined pursuant to section 122; and
 - (D) any other events, as determined by the Administrator; and
- (2) provide deidentified event data to the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing program.
- (b) REQUIREMENTS.—In establishing the process under subsection (a), the Administrator shall—
 - (1) establish a database that tracks the details of events described in subsection (a)(1);
 - (2) continuously monitor and review such database to identify areas of potential traffic conflict for safety assurance and safety risk management;
 - (3) ensure timeliness of notifications to the parties described in subsection (a)(1) so that relevant data remains available before meaningful safety analysis, reporting, or corrective action is no longer practicable;
 - (4) consider informing, with deidentified or aggregated data, other frequent operators of events described in subsection (a)(1); and
 - (5) consider the practicality and usefulness of notification requirements for—
 - (A) airport surface loss of separation;
 - (B) loss of separation with terrain or obstacles;
 - (C) airborne loss of separation; and
 - (D) any other close proximity encounters as determined by the Administrator.
- (c) CONSULTATION.—In establishing the process under subsection (a), the Administrator shall consult with—
 - (1) air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;
 - (2) air carriers operating under part 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;
 - (3) air carriers operating under part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;
 - (4) organizations representing helicopter aviation operators and pilots;
 - (5) organizations representing the general aviation community;
 - (6) organizations representing business aviation operators;

- (7) organizations representing experimental aircraft operators;
 - (8) organizations representing powered-lift operators;
 - (9) organizations representing certified collective bargaining representatives of airline pilots;
 - (10) the certified exclusive bargaining representatives of air traffic controllers of the Administration certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;
 - (11) FAA subject matter experts, including aviation safety inspectors; and
 - (12) other aviation safety experts determined appropriate by the Administrator.
- (d) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days after establishing the process required under subsection (a), the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of this section.
- (e) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after establishing the process required under subsection (a), and annually thereafter, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing—
- (1) data on number and location of—
 - (A) near midair collision events;
 - (B) traffic collision avoidance system resolution advisory events; and
 - (C) close proximity encounters, as defined pursuant to section 122;
 - (2) the average time of notification to parties involved in such events;
 - (3) identified locations of concern or other trends; and
 - (4) actions taken to mitigate identified risks and reduce such events.
- (f) PROTECTION OF DATA.—
- (1) IN GENERAL.—Data collected in response to subsection (a) shall be used solely for safety assurance and safety risk management.
 - (2) CONSISTENCY WITH EXISTING SAFETY PROGRAMS.—The Administrator shall ensure consistency with existing voluntary safety programs, including the Aviation Safety Action Program, the Aviation Safety Reporting System, the Air Traffic Safety Action Plan, and flight operational quality assurance programs.

SEC. 124. SAFETY CULTURE AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT REVIEW.

- (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the inspector general of the Department of Transportation shall initiate an audit of the safety culture and the safety management system of the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization.
- (b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In conducting the audit under subsection (a), the inspector general shall, at a minimum, evaluate—
- (1) the safety management system of the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization, including the functions and data sharing activities of such system at all air traffic control facilities;
 - (2) whether such system effectively coordinates safety assurance and safety risk management activities with external stakeholders consistent with FAA requirements for operators under section 5.57 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations;
 - (3) which data analysis, safety assurance, and risk assessment processes failed to identify and mitigate the risk of potential midair collisions near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport before January 29, 2025;
 - (4) the failure of the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization to recognize external compliance verification results as indicators of systemic traffic management, volume, and flow issues at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport for which air traffic controllers were required to compensate to mitigate such issues;
 - (5) the failure of the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization to conduct annual reviews of helicopter route charts as required by FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration”;
 - (6) the failure of the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization to understand and implement post-accident and post-incident drug and alcohol testing as required by Department of Transportation Order 3910.1D, titled “Drug and Alcohol-Free Departmental Workplace Program”;
 - (7) whether there are fears of retaliation against persons identifying or reporting risks in accordance with the safety management system; and
 - (8) how the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization have addressed the findings and utilized the Safety Risk Management process in accordance with FAA Order 8040.4C, titled “Safety Risk Management Policy” (or any successor document) in the National Airspace System Helicopter Operations Helicopter Route Analysis of the FAA issued in April 2025.

(c) REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the inspector general shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the audit conducted under subsection (a).

(2) RECOMMENDATIONS.—The inspector general shall include in the report submitted under paragraph (1)—

(A) recommendations for actions the Secretary should take with respect to the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization to—

(i) strengthen and adhere to the tenets of the safety management system;

(ii) increase transparency in the safety management system process, including by adopting policies that provide assurances to FAA employees that the Air Traffic Organization is addressing any identified safety issues;

(iii) increase data sharing and collaboration with external stakeholders;

(iv) protect against retaliation;

(v) encourage open, nonpunitive communication; and

(vi) foster a just culture across the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety Management Organization;

(B) recommendations for actions the Secretary may take to ensure adequate oversight over the safety management system of the Air Traffic Organization; and

(C) any other recommendations the inspector general determines appropriate.

(d) RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS.—Not later than 120 days after submission of the report required under subsection (c)—

(1) the Secretary shall respond to any recommendations in such report that are directed at the Department of Transportation or FAA, respectively; and

(2) the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report describing how the Secretary intends to implement such recommendations.

SEC. 125. DOCUMENTATION OF CONTROL POSITION COMBINATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall review and revise, as appropriate, procedures regarding the documentation of the combination of air traffic control position responsibilities, including each occurrence in which any air traffic control position is combined with any other position, including a local control position, operations supervisor, or controller-in-charge.

(b) REQUIREMENTS.—In reviewing and revising the procedures described in subsection (a), the Administrator shall—

(1) evaluate procedures and guidance regarding the combination of controller position responsibilities described in subsection (a) that are in effect prior to the date of enactment of this Act;

(2) examine the feasibility of digitizing, or providing an electronic means of, the documentation described in subsection (a);

(3) require the operations supervisor to periodically review documentation of occurrences of combined control position responsibilities described in subsection (a) and report on deviations from the standard operating procedures to the facility air traffic manager;

(4) consider air traffic facility type and staffing level; and

(5) consult with representatives of—

(A) the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(B) organizations representing air traffic control managers and operational supervisors; and

(C) aviation safety experts with specific knowledge in information technology.

(c) BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after the completion of the review required under subsection (a), the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on implementation of this section.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section may be construed to interfere with any agreement between a governmental agency and the exclusive bargaining representative of air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code or section 7106(a) of title 5, United States Code.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) **CONTROLLER-IN-CHARGE.**—The term “controller-in-charge” means an air traffic control specialist performing duties of a shift supervisor in accordance with—

(A) FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled “Facility Operation and Administration”, issued on February 20, 2025; and

(B) FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled “Air Traffic Control”, issued on February 20, 2025.

(2) **OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR.**—The term “operations supervisor” means managerial personnel responsible for the direct supervision of air traffic control operational personnel.

SEC. 126. REVIEW OF MILES-IN-TRAIL PROCEDURES OR AGREEMENTS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall complete a review of the miles-in-trail standards and procedures to determine if such standards provide for a separation of traffic that is appropriate for operational safety.

(b) **CONSIDERATIONS.**—In conducting the review under subsection (a), the Administrator may consider—

(1) the accuracy of the criteria used to determine the miles-in-trail procedures for air traffic control facilities;

(2) whether additional criteria should be incorporated to more appropriately reflect the traffic volume and operational complexity of air traffic control facilities; and

(3) the findings and recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board.

(c) **STANDARDS UPDATE.**—Upon completion of the review conducted under subsection (a), the Administrator shall update the miles-in-trail standards and procedures to ensure such standards and procedures are appropriate for operational safety.

(d) **REVIEW OF CERTAIN FACILITIES.**—Not later than 90 days after the completion of the review under subsection (a), the Administrator shall initiate a review of the miles-in-trail procedures or agreements at all air traffic control facilities located within Class B or Class C airspace to ensure such procedures or agreements provide for a separation of traffic that is appropriate for operational safety.

(e) **CONSULTATION.**—In carrying out the review under subsection (d), the Administrator shall consult with, at minimum—

(1) the exclusive bargaining representatives of the air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code;

(2) organizations representing air traffic control managers and operations supervisors;

(3) sponsors and operators of airports with air traffic control facilities described in subsection (d);

(4) organizations representing the certified collective bargaining representatives of pilots operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations; and

(5) air carriers, business aviation, and general aviation operators with operations at airports with air traffic control facilities described in subsection (d).

(f) **REPORT.**—Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that includes—

(1) a list of air traffic control facilities identified under subsection (d) as having miles-in-trail procedures or agreements that did not provide for a separation of aircraft traffic appropriate for operational safety; and

(2) steps that the Administrator has taken, or plans to take, to modify the miles-in-trail procedures or agreements at each facility listed under paragraph (1) to ensure such procedures or agreements provide for a separation of traffic that is appropriate for operational safety.

SEC. 127. CLOSURE OF HELICOPTER ROUTE 4.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Operations on Helicopter Route 4, as such Route existed on January 29, 2025, on the segment located between Hains Point and the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge in the District of Columbia shall be prohibited.

(b) **SEGMENT ELIMINATION.**—The segment of Helicopter Route 4 described in subsection (a) shall remain eliminated from helicopter charts.

TITLE II—[PLACEHOLDER]

Amend the title so as to read:

A bill to require certain aircraft to be equipped and operating with collision prevention technology, to improve helicopter route safety and separation around airports, to update air traffic control processes and procedures, to address national airspace system safety in Department of Defense activities, and for other purposes.

PURPOSE OF LEGISLATION

The purpose of H.R. 7613, as amended, is to require certain aircraft to be equipped and operating with collision prevention technology, to improve helicopter route safety and separation around airports, to update air traffic control processes and procedures, to address national airspace system safety in Department of Defense activities, and for other purposes.

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

On January 29, 2025, American Airlines Flight 5342 departed from Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (ICT) in Wichita, Kansas to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). Air traffic controllers at DCA instructed American Airlines Flight 5342 to land on runway 33. While on final approach, an Army UH–60 “Black Hawk” helicopter collided with American Airlines Flight 5342 resulting in both aircraft impacting the Potomac River. The two pilots, two flight attendants, the 60 passengers onboard the airplane, and three crew members on the helicopter—67 people—tragically died. This mid-air collision was the deadliest aviation accident in the United States since 2001. Immediately following the collision, Federal authorities, alongside state and local first responders from Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, D.C., launched an aggressive search and rescue mission on the Potomac River. Furthermore, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) launched an immediate investigation into the collision to determine the probable cause, contributing factors and findings, and issue recommendations to the appropriate Federal agencies.

On March 7, 2025, the NTSB issued an urgent recommendation report containing two urgent recommendations on mitigating the risk of mid-air collisions at DCA.¹ The NTSB’s urgent safety recommendations cautioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to prohibit operations on helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge while Runways 15/33 were being used at DCA.² The NTSB successfully closed this urgent recommendation, determining the FAA’s response “exceeded recommendation action” on May 2, 2025.³ Additionally, the NTSB cautioned the FAA to designate an alternative helicopter route that could be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of helicopter Route 4 was closed.⁴ To date, the NTSB classifies this urgent safety recommendation as “open-ac-

¹ NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, DECONFLICT AIRPLANE AND HELICOPTER TRAFFIC IN THE VICINITY OF RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT (2025), *available at* <https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AIR2501.pdf>. [hereinafter Urgent Safety Recommendations].

² *Id.*

³ NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, *Safety Recommendation A–25–001* (last updated May 2, 2025), *available at* <https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/A-25-001>.

⁴ *Urgent Safety Recommendations*, *supra* note 1.

ceptable response.”⁵ Following the NTSB’s urgent safety recommendations, the FAA took immediate action to improve safety around DCA, including by: (1) permanently restricting non-essential helicopter operations around DCA and eliminating helicopter and fixed-wing mixed traffic, (2) permanently closing helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge and evaluated alternative helicopter routes, (3) keeping traffic at specific distances from fixed-wing aircraft in the event a helicopter needed to transit through the airspace on an urgent mission (e.g., lifesaving medical evacuations, priority law enforcement missions, or Presidential transport), (4) prohibiting the simultaneous use of Runways 15/33 and 4/22 when helicopters are conducting those urgent missions around DCA airspace, and (5) limiting the use of visual separation to certain Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Park Police helicopter operations outside of the restricted airspace.⁶ Additionally, the FAA conducted a deeper analysis of other airports in the National Airspace System (NAS) with high volumes of mixed traffic operations, utilizing machine learning and language modeling.⁷

During the NTSB’s Board meeting on January 27, 2026, the Board adopted a final report, which was subsequently published on February 17, 2026, that contained the probable cause of the collision, findings, and 50 new safety recommendations.⁸ Of the 50 safety recommendations: 33 recommendations were directed to the FAA, eight recommendations were directed to the United States Army, five recommendations were directed to the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) Policy Board on Federal Aviation, two recommendations were directed to the Department of Transportation (DOT), one recommendation was directed to the DOT Office of Inspector General, and one recommendation was directed to the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Program Management Committee.⁹

In the final report, the NTSB determined that the probable cause of the collision was primarily the FAA’s placement of helicopter Route 4 near the runway approach path, the FAA’s failure to regularly review helicopter routes and available data, and the overreliance on visual separation. Causal factors were determined to be ineffective application of the see-and-avoid concept within visual separation procedures, air traffic controllers’ loss of situational awareness and high workload, lack of alerts to both flight crews, and the helicopter crew’s lack of awareness of their altimeter tolerances.¹⁰ Additionally, the Board identified contributing factors which included: (1) the limitations of traffic awareness, collision avoidance technology, and alerts, (2) an unsustainable aircraft arrival rate at DCA, (3) the Army’s inadequate safety management system (SMS), (4) the FAA’s failure to fully integrate SMS, and (5) the absence of effective data sharing among the FAA, aircraft operators, and

⁵ NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, *Safety Recommendation A-25-002* (last updated March 11, 2025), available at <https://data.nts.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/A-25-002>.

⁶ Press Release, FAA, *FAA Statement on NTSB Recommendations for DCA* (March 14, 2025), available at <https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faq-statement-nts-recommendations-dca>.

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, MIDAIR COLLISION OVER THE POTOMAC RIVER PSA AIRLINES FLIGHT 5342, MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES (MHI) RJ AVIATION CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), AND U.S. ARMY PRIORITY AIR TRANSPORT FLIGHT 25, SIKORSKY UH-60L (2026), available at <https://www.nts.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AIR2602.pdf>. [hereinafter Final Report].

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Id.*

others.¹¹ The culmination of the NTSB’s year-long investigation revealed the need for systemic reform across several areas of aviation safety, including: enhancing situational awareness for flight crews and air traffic controllers, improving helicopter route safety and separation around airports, improving air traffic control processes and procedures, addressing the shortcomings in the FAA’s and Army’s safety culture and data sharing mechanisms, reducing conflict in and around the airspace of DCA, and overhauling cooperation between the military and the FAA.

To advance adoption of NTSB’s safety recommendations, on February 20, 2026, the leaders of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and House Committee on Armed Services introduced the *Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency Act of 2026 (ALERT Act)*.¹² The *ALERT Act*, as amended, is a comprehensive package that addresses all 50 safety recommendations issued by the NTSB in its final report.¹³ Specifically, the *ALERT Act* takes important steps to improve safety throughout the NAS by ensuring civil aircraft are equipped and operating with technology to enhance flight crew alerting and controller situational awareness, requiring updates to helicopter route safety and separation requirements, requiring updates to air traffic control processes and procedures to promote safety, investigating the shortcomings in safety culture and data sharing at the FAA and the DoD, strengthening safety standards for military aircraft and enhancing cooperation between the FAA and the DoD, enhancing the requirements and guidance for collision avoidance technology for military aircraft operating in the NAS, and requiring flight data sharing between the FAA and the DoD.¹⁴

On March 26, 2026, the Transportation and Infrastructure and Armed Services Committees of the House of Representatives marked up their respective titles of the *ALERT Act*. Title I of the *ALERT Act* pertains to civil aviation matters, and is within the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s jurisdiction, while Title II pertains to DoD matters, which is under the Armed Services Committee’s jurisdiction. Both Committees ordered their respective Titles to be reported to the House with a favorable recommendation, with amendment, by unanimous recorded vote. The House Armed Services Committee will file a separate Bill Report for Title II of the *ALERT Act*. This Bill Report covers Title I.

HEARINGS

For the purposes of rule XIII, clause 3(c)(6)(A) of the 119th Congress—

The following hearing was used to develop or consider H.R. 7613: On Tuesday, December 16, 2025, the Subcommittee on Aviation held a hearing entitled, “*The State of American Aviation*.” At the hearing, Members received testimony from the Honorable Bryan Bedford, Administrator, FAA. The hearing examined the general

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *ALERT Act*, H.R. 7613, 119th Cong. (2026). [hereinafter *ALERT*].

¹³ NTSB Safety Analysis, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, Analysis of H.R. 7613 *ALERT Act*, Titles I & II: A Side-by-Side Review of Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS) to H.R. 7613 (*ALERT Act*), as posted Mar. 24, 2026, compared with NTSB Safety Recommendations from NTSB Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 on the DCA Midair Collision (Mar. 24, 2026) (on file with Comm.).

¹⁴ *ALERT*, *supra* note 12.

state of aviation in America and Members had the opportunity to discuss recent regulatory actions taken by the FAA, including changes to the Washington, DC airspace in response to the January 29, 2025 crash, air traffic control modernization, air traffic controller hiring and training, the continued implementation of the *FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024* (P.L. 118–63), and other current issues in aviation.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONSIDERATION

H.R. 7613, the “*ALERT Act*,” was introduced in the United States House of Representatives on February 20, 2026, by Representative Sam Graves (R–MO), with Representatives Rick Larsen (D–WA), Mike Rogers (R–AL), and Adam Smith (D–WA) along with 44 other members as original cosponsors and was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Committee on Armed Services. Within the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, H.R. 7613 was referred to the Subcommittee on Aviation. The Subcommittee on Aviation was discharged from further consideration of H.R. 7613 on March 26, 2026.

The Committee considered H.R. 7613 on March 26, 2026, and ordered the measure to be reported to the House with a favorable recommendation, with amendment, by a recorded vote of 62 yeas to 0 nays.

The following amendments were offered:

An Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 7613, offered by Chairman Graves of Missouri; was AGREED TO, as amended, by voice vote.

A Manager’s Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 7613, offered by Chairman Graves of Missouri (Graves MGRS 01): Page 6, line 6, strike “March 11” and insert “March 7”. Page 20, line 16, insert “a second independent source of target aircraft data, such as” after “and”. Page 27, line 21, strike “civil” and insert “non-military”. Page 28, line 4, strike “civil” and insert “non-military”. Page 28, after line 17, insert the following (and redesignate the subsequent paragraphs accordingly): “(2) Air carriers operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.” Page 34, line 6, strike “civil” and insert “non-military”. Page 47, strike lines 6 through 10 and insert the following: “(3) the frequency of the recurrent and refresher training described in subsection (a), including—(A) whether such frequency should be increased for air traffic controllers in facilities managing high-complexity or high-volume airspace; and (B) the need for advance training and guidance ahead of any changes to FAA visual separation policies;”. Page 50, line 17, strike “and”. Page 50, after line 17, insert the following (and redesignate the subsequent paragraph accordingly): “(5) organizations representing operators of Federal contract towers pursuant to section 47124 of title 49, United States Code; and”. Page 53, after line 21, insert the following (and redesignate the subsequent paragraphs accordingly): “(2) Air carriers operating under parts 91, including subpart K, and 135 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, authorized to conduct non-scheduled operations at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.” Page 90, line 13, insert “the Air Traffic Safety Action Plan,” after “Reporting System,”. Page 90, line 21, insert “and the Aviation Safety Manage-

ment Organization” after “Air Traffic Organization”. Page 91, line 2, insert “and the Aviation Safety Management Organization” after “Traffic Organization”. Page 91, line 15, insert “and the Aviation Safety Management Organization” after “Air Traffic Organization”. Page 91, line 21, insert “and the Aviation Safety Management Organization” after “Air Traffic Organization”. Page 92, line 1, insert “and the Aviation Safety Management Organization” after “Air Traffic Organization”. Page 92, line 10, insert “and the Aviation Safety Management Organization” after “Air Traffic Organization”. Page 93, line 3, insert “and the Aviation Safety Management Organization” after “Organization”. Page 93, line 18, insert “and the Aviation Safety Management Organization” after “Air Traffic Organization”. Page 93, line 22, insert “and the Aviation Safety Management Organization” after “Traffic Organization”. Page 94, beginning on line 16, strike “regulations and standard operating”. Page 94, line 24, strike “regulations” and insert “procedures”. Page 95, line 1, strike “standard operating procedures,” and insert “procedures and”. Page 95, line 2, strike “, and regulations”. Page 95, beginning on line 12, strike “submit a rationale for atypical occurrences” and insert “report on deviations from the standard operating procedures”. Page 97, beginning on line 5, strike “in FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled ‘Facility Operation and Administration’ (or any successor document)” and insert “and procedures”. Page 97, beginning on line 23, strike “in FAA Order JO 7210.3EE, titled ‘Facility Operation and Administration’ (or any successor document)” and insert “and procedures”. Page 97, line 25, insert “and procedures” after “such standards”. Page 99, after line 15, insert the following: “SEC. 127. CLOSURE OF HELICOPTER ROUTE 4. (a) IN GENERAL.—Operations on Helicopter Route 4, as such Route existed on January 29, 2025, on the segment located between Hains Point and the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge in the District of Columbia shall be prohibited. (b) SEGMENT ELIMINATION.—The segment of Helicopter Route 4 described in subsection (a) shall remain eliminated from helicopter charts.; was AGREED TO by voice vote.

An Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 7613, offered by Mr. Carbajal of California (Carbajal 061): Strike section 105 (and redesignate subsequent sections accordingly). Page 44, line 23, strike “109” and insert “108”. Page 60, line 12, strike “115” and insert “114”. Page 76, line 4, strike “120” and insert “119”. Page 76, line 22, strike “119(d)” and insert “118(d)”. Page 86, line 24, strike “122” and insert “121”. Page 89, line 22, strike “122” and insert “121”.; was NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 27 Yeas and 36 Nays (RC#71).

An Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 7613, offered by Ms. Hoyle of Oregon (Hoyle 042): At the end of title I of the bill, insert the following: SEC. 127. ENHANCED NOTIFICATION AND ALERTING FOR SLACKLINES. Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall implement enhanced notification and alerting requirements for slacklines and similar temporary aerial hazards that—(1) exceed existing regulatory notice requirements; and (2) provides pilots with a warning, similar to a temporary flight restriction, that is—(A) not limited to an airport-specific notice

(NOTAM); and (B) displayed on pilot-facing tools for aircraft operating in the vicinity of the affected airspace.; was WITHDRAWN.

An Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 7613, offered by Ms. Friedman of California (Friedman 035): Page 34, strike line 22 through line 3 on page 35 (and redesignate the subsequent paragraph accordingly).; was NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 27 Yeas and 36 Nays (RC#72).

An Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 7613, offered by Ms. Hoyle of Oregon (Hoyle 043): Page 2, strike lines 3 through 11 and insert the following paragraphs (and redesignate subsequent paragraphs accordingly): TITLE I—REQUIREMENTS AS TO COMMERCIAL DRIVERS' LICENSES Add, at the end of the bill, the following: TITLE II—VERIFICATION ENHANCEMENT AND RELIABILITY FOR IMMIGRATION FIDELITY SEC. 101. SAVE PROGRAM MODERNIZATION. (a) GENERAL REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, shall modernize the SAVE program to ensure accurate, timely, and reliable verification response, including by—(1) upgrading query processing infrastructure to reduce response latency; (2) implementing automated data reconciliation with source systems; (3) expanding API access for authorized querying agencies; and (4) establishing a user feedback mechanism for agencies to report suspected data errors. (b) TIMELINESS OF UPDATES.—To the maximum extent practicable and consistent with applicable law, the Secretary shall ensure that changes to an individual's immigration status, including grants, extensions, expirations, revocations, or terminations of lawful status or parole, are reflected in the SAVE program not later than 24 hours after such changes are recorded in the originating system. (c) INTEROPERABILITY AND DATA SHARING.—The Secretary, consistent with the Privacy Act of 1974, the E Government Act of 2002, the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, and other applicable Federal law, shall—(1) integrate the SAVE program into relevant Department of Homeland Security systems, including arrival and departure information systems; (2) establish or update memoranda of understanding with the Social Security Administration and other Federal agencies, as appropriate, to improve verification accuracy using data-sharing arrangements authorized under applicable Federal law, including section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, and memoranda of understanding in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act; and (3) encourage voluntary data-sharing agreements with State vital records agencies for verification of birth and death information, where legally permissible. (d) POST-VERIFICATION STATUS CHANGE ALERTS.—The SAVE program shall notify querying agencies when an individual's immigration status materially changes after a prior verification, when such notification is relevant to continued eligibility. Notifications shall comply with applicable Federal privacy laws, including the Privacy Act of 1974, and with additional administrative safeguards established by the Secretary and include only information necessary for eligibility determinations. (e) DATA SCOPE LIMITATIONS.—Information used or displayed through the SAVE program shall be limited to data necessary for eligibility verification purposes. Nothing in this Act may

be construed to authorize—(1) the expansion of the SAVE program to include non-immigration criminal history databases; and (2) the use of the SAVE program for general law enforcement or surveillance purposes. (f) USE OF AUTOMATED TOOLS.—The Secretary may use automated or algorithmic tools within the SAVE program solely for data reconciliation, error reduction, and identity matching, provided that—(1) no adverse eligibility determination is made solely on the basis of automated processing; (2) human review is required for contested or negative determinations; and (3) the Secretary implements regular testing for accuracy and bias and submits summary results annually to Congress. SEC. 102. PROHIBITION ON USER ACCESS AND FEES. No fee may be charged to a Federal, State, local, or Tribal government agency for submitting a verification query through the SAVE program. SEC. 103. IMPLEMENTATION AND OVERSIGHT. (a) MODERNIZATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a SAVE modernization plan that includes—(1) a description of technological upgrades to the SAVE program; (2) user training improvements; and (3) performance metrics related to accuracy and response time, including error rates and average query completion time benchmarks. (b) INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDITS.—The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security shall conduct annual audits of the SAVE program’s accuracy, timeliness, and compliance with this Act, and submit reports to Congress. (c) CORRECTIVE ACTION.—If the Inspector General identifies material non-compliance, the Secretary shall submit a corrective action plan to Congress within 90 days. Continued non-compliance may be addressed through limitations on the use of funds for non-SAVE discretionary activities, as determined by Congress, and may trigger suspension of SAVE queries until compliance is restored. SEC. 104. DEFINITION. For purposes of this title, the term “SAVE program” means the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program, established pursuant to section 121 of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. SEC. 105. EFFECTIVE DATE. This title shall take effect one year after the date of enactment, except that planning and reporting requirements under section 103 shall take effect immediately upon enactment. SEC. 106. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this title, or the application thereof, is held invalid, the remainder of this title shall not be affected.; was WITHDRAWN.

An Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 7613, offered by Mr. Figures of Alabama (Figures 052): Page 34, line 24, insert “(except a State or local government for the assessment of taxes and preventing tax evasion)” after “governmental agency”. Page 35, line 14, strike “State, local,”. Page 35, line 15, insert “, and no State or local official may, except for the assessment of taxes or preventing tax evasion,”. After “may”.; was NOT AGREED TO by a recorded vote of 25 Yeas and 38 Nays (RC#73).

COMMITTEE VOTES

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires each committee report to include the total number of votes cast for and against on each record vote on a motion to report

and on any amendment offered to the measure or matter, and the names of those members voting for and against.

Vote: 74.

Measure: H.R. 7613.

On: final passage, as amended.

Yea 62; Nay 0.

Present 0; Not Voting 4.

Member	Vote	Member	Vote
Mr. Graves of MO	Y	Mr. Larsen of WA	Y
Mr. Crawford	Y	<i>Ms. Norton</i>	Y
Mr. Webster of FL	Y	Mr. Nadler	
Mr. Massie	Y	Mr. Garamendi	Y
Mr. Perry		Mr. Johnson of GA	Y
Mr. Babin	Y	Mr. Carson	Y
Mr. Rouzer	Y	Ms. Titus	Y
Mr. Bost	Y	Mr. Huffman	Y
Mr. Westerman	Y	Ms. Brownley	Y
Mr. Mast	Y	Ms. Wilson of FL	Y
Mr. Stauber		Mr. DeSaulnier	Y
Mr. Burchett	Y	Mr. Carbajal	Y
Mr. Johnson of SD	Y	Mr. Stanton	Y
Mr. Van Drew	Y	Ms. Davids of KS	Y
Mr. Nehls	Y	Mr. Garcia of IL	Y
Mr. Mann	Y	Mr. Pappas	Y
Mr. Owens	Y	Mr. Moulton	
Mr. Burlison	Y	Ms. Strickland	Y
Mr. Collins	Y	Mr. Ryan	Y
Mr. Ezell	Y	Ms. Hoyle of OR	Y
Mr. Yakym	Y	Mrs. Sykes	Y
Mr. Fong	Y	Ms. Scholten	Y
Mr. Wied	Y	Mrs. Foushee	Y
Mr. Barrett	Y	Mr. Deluzio	Y
Mr. Begich	Y	Mr. Garcia of CA	Y
Mr. Bresnahan	Y	Ms. Pou	Y
Mr. Hurd	Y	Ms. McDonald Rivet	Y
Mr. Shreve	Y	Ms. Friedman	Y
Mr. McDowell	Y	Ms. Gillen	Y
Mr. Taylor	Y	Mr. Figures	Y
Mr. Knott	Y	Mr. Frost	Y
<i>Ms. King-Hinds</i>	Y		
Mr. Kennedy	Y		
Mr. Onder	Y		
Mr. Patronis	Y		

Vote: 71.

Measure: H.R. 7613.

On: No. 061, amdt to ANS offered by Mr. Carbajal.

Yea 27; Nay 36.

Present 0; Not Voting 3.

Member	Vote	Member	Vote
Mr. Graves of MO	N	Mr. Larsen of WA	N
Mr. Crawford	N	<i>Ms. Norton</i>	Y
Mr. Webster of FL	N	Mr. Nadler	
Mr. Massie	N	Mr. Garamendi	Y
Mr. Perry	N	Mr. Johnson of GA	Y
Mr. Babin	N	Mr. Carson	N
Mr. Rouzer	N	Ms. Titus	Y
Mr. Bost	N	Mr. Huffman	Y
Mr. Westerman	N	Ms. Brownley	Y
Mr. Mast	N	Ms. Wilson of FL	Y
Mr. Stauber		Mr. DeSaulnier	Y
Mr. Burchett	N	Mr. Carbajal	Y
Mr. Johnson of SD	N	Mr. Stanton	Y

Member	Vote	Member	Vote
Mr. Van Drew	N	Ms. Davids of KS	Y
Mr. Nehls	N	Mr. Garcia of IL	Y
Mr. Mann	N	Mr. Pappas	Y
Mr. Owens	N	Mr. Moulton	
Mr. Burlison	N	Ms. Strickland	Y
Mr. Collins	N	Mr. Ryan	Y
Mr. Ezell	N	Ms. Hoyle of OR	Y
Mr. Yakym	N	Mrs. Sykes	Y
Mr. Fong	N	Ms. Scholten	Y
Mr. Wied	N	Mrs. Foushee	Y
Mr. Barrett	N	Mr. Deluzio	Y
Mr. Begich	N	Mr. Garcia of CA	Y
Mr. Bresnahan	N	Ms. Pou	Y
Mr. Hurd	N	Ms. McDonald Rivet	Y
Mr. Shreve	N	Ms. Friedman	Y
Mr. McDowell	N	Ms. Gillen	Y
Mr. Taylor	N	Mr. Figures	Y
Mr. Knott	N	Mr. Frost	Y
<i>Ms. King-Hinds</i>	N		
Mr. Kennedy	N		
Mr. Onder	N		
Mr. Patronis	N		

Vote: 72.

Measure: H.R. 7613.

On: No. 035, an amdt to the ANS offered by Mr. Friedman.

Yea 27; Nay 36.

Present 0; Not Voting 3.

Member	Vote	Member	Vote
Mr. Graves of MO	N	Mr. Larsen of WA	N
Mr. Crawford	N	<i>Ms. Norton</i>	Y
Mr. Webster of FL	N	Mr. Nadler	
Mr. Massie	N	Mr. Garamendi	Y
Mr. Perry	N	Mr. Johnson of GA	Y
Mr. Babin	N	Mr. Carson	N
Mr. Rouzer	N	Ms. Titus	Y
Mr. Bost	N	Mr. Huffman	Y
Mr. Westerman	N	Ms. Brownley	Y
Mr. Mast	N	Ms. Wilson of FL	Y
Mr. Stauber		Mr. DeSaulnier	Y
Mr. Burchett	N	Mr. Carbajal	Y
Mr. Johnson of SD	N	Mr. Stanton	Y
Mr. Van Drew	N	Ms. Davids of KS	Y
Mr. Nehls	N	Mr. Garcia of IL	Y
Mr. Mann	N	Mr. Pappas	Y
Mr. Owens	N	Mr. Moulton	
Mr. Burlison	N	Ms. Strickland	Y
Mr. Collins	N	Mr. Ryan	Y
Mr. Ezell	N	Ms. Hoyle of OR	Y
Mr. Yakym	N	Mrs. Sykes	Y
Mr. Fong	N	Ms. Scholten	Y
Mr. Wied	N	Mrs. Foushee	Y
Mr. Barrett	N	Mr. Deluzio	Y
Mr. Begich	N	Mr. Garcia of CA	Y
Mr. Bresnahan	N	Ms. Pou	Y
Mr. Hurd	N	Ms. McDonald Rivet	Y
Mr. Shreve	N	Ms. Friedman	Y
Mr. McDowell	N	Ms. Gillen	Y
Mr. Taylor	N	Mr. Figures	Y
Mr. Knott	N	Mr. Frost	Y
<i>Ms. King-Hinds</i>	N		
Mr. Kennedy	N		
Mr. Onder	N		
Mr. Patronis	N		

Vote: 73.

Measure: H.R. 7613.

On: 052, an amdt to the ANS offered by Mr. Figures.

Yea 25; Nay 38.

Present 0; Not Voting 3.

Member	Vote	Member	Vote
Mr. Graves of MO	N	Mr. Larsen of WA	N
Mr. Crawford	N	Ms. Norton	Y
Mr. Webster of FL	N	Mr. Nadler	Y
Mr. Massie	N	Mr. Garamendi	Y
Mr. Perry	N	Mr. Johnson of GA	Y
Mr. Babin	N	Mr. Carson	N
Mr. Rouzer	N	Ms. Titus	Y
Mr. Bost	N	Mr. Huffman	Y
Mr. Westerman	N	Ms. Brownley	Y
Mr. Mast	N	Ms. Wilson of FL	Y
Mr. Stauber	N	Mr. DeSaulnier	N
Mr. Burchett	N	Mr. Carbajal	Y
Mr. Johnson of SD	N	Mr. Stanton	Y
Mr. Van Drew	N	Ms. Davids of KS	Y
Mr. Nehls	N	Mr. Garcia of IL	Y
Mr. Mann	N	Mr. Pappas	N
Mr. Owens	N	Mr. Moulton	Y
Mr. Burlison	N	Ms. Strickland	Y
Mr. Collins	N	Mr. Ryan	Y
Mr. Ezell	N	Ms. Hoyle of OR	Y
Mr. Yakym	N	Mrs. Sykes	Y
Mr. Fong	N	Ms. Scholten	Y
Mr. Wied	N	Mrs. Foushee	Y
Mr. Barrett	N	Mr. Deluzio	Y
Mr. Begich	N	Mr. Garcia of CA	Y
Mr. Bresnahan	N	Ms. Pou	Y
Mr. Hurd	N	Ms. McDonald Rivet	Y
Mr. Shreve	N	Ms. Friedman	Y
Mr. McDowell	N	Ms. Gillen	Y
Mr. Taylor	N	Mr. Figures	Y
Mr. Knott	N	Mr. Frost	Y
Ms. King-Hinds	N		
Mr. Kennedy	N		
Mr. Onder	N		
Mr. Patronis	N		

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee's oversight findings and recommendations are reflected in this report.

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES

With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the *Congressional Budget Act of 1974* and with respect to requirements of clause (3)(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the *Congressional Budget Act of 1974*, the Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate for this bill from the Director of Congressional Budget Office. The Committee has requested but not received from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office a statement as to whether this bill contains any new budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate and

statement to be printed in the *Congressional Record* upon its receipt by the Committee.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, a cost estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the *Congressional Budget Act of 1974* was not made available to the Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the *Congressional Record* upon its receipt by the Committee.

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the performance goal and objective of this legislation is to require certain aircraft to be equipped with collision prevention technology, to improve helicopter route safety and separation around airports, to update air traffic control processes and procedures, to address national airspace system safety in Department of Defense activities, and for other purposes.

DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee finds that no provision of H.R. 7613 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111–139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.

CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED TARIFF BENEFITS

In compliance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of the rule XXI.

FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the *Unfunded Mandates Reform Act* (Public Law 104–4).

PREEMPTION CLARIFICATION

Section 423 of the *Congressional Budget Act of 1974* requires the report of any Committee on a bill or joint resolution to include a statement on the extent to which the bill or joint resolution is intended to preempt state, local, or tribal law. The Committee finds that H.R. 7613 may preempt state, local, or tribal laws. Consistent with section 105 of this bill, which restricts certain use of ADS–B data, state legislatures are increasingly considering proposals to

prohibit public and private entities from utilizing ADS-B data for calculating or collecting fees from aircraft owners or operators. Montana was the first state to enact such a law on May 13, 2025.¹⁵ However, absent Federal action, other states or localities could consider authorizing or mandating the use of ADS-B data for revenue generating purposes. This bill would establish a clear, nationwide standard, preempting any future state, local, or tribal law, ensuring that ADS-B is solely used for its intended safety purpose.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

No advisory committees within the definition of Section 5(b) of the appendix to Title 5, United States Code, are created by this legislation.

APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the *Congressional Accountability Act* (Public Law 104-1).

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short title; Table of Contents

This section states that the bill may be cited as the *Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency of 2026 or ALERT Act* and provides for the table of contents.

Section 2. Definitions

This section provides global definitions for the terms “Administrator,” “Appropriate Committees of Congress,” “FAA,” and “Secretary,” “ADS-B In,” and “Collision Prevention Technology.” These definitions apply throughout the legislation.

Section 3. Findings; Sense of Congress

This section states that it is the Sense of Congress that: (1) Congress mourns the lives of the 67 souls taken in the midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport on January 29, 2025, and extends its deepest condolences to the families, friends, and communities of the who perished; (2) Congress honors the lives of the four crew members of American Airlines Flight 5342; (3) Congress honors the lives of the three United States Army soldiers aboard Priority Air Transport 25 (PAT25); (4) Congress honors the passengers of Flight 5342; (5) Congress commends the first responders who worked with valor and dedication; (6) Congress affirms its support for the NTSB and in this act responds to all 50 recommendations; (7) Congress commits to conducting rigorous oversight to ensure accountability; and (8) Congress pledges that the lives lost on January 29, 2025, will not be forgotten; their memory will be honored by this Nation’s commitment to aviation safety.

¹⁵ Act of May 13, 2025, ch. 494, 2025 Mont. Laws (H.B. 571).

TITLE I—CIVIL AVIATION MATTERS

Section 101. Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa inhibit altitude

This section requires the Administrator to complete, within 180 days, an evaluation of the hazards and safety benefits of changing the traffic advisory (TA) and resolution advisory (RA) inhibit altitudes in the Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa (ACAS Xa) to improve alerting throughout the flight maneuvering envelope of an aircraft. In conducting the evaluation, the Administrator shall consider (1) public safety benefits; (2) benefits and risk to the ability of pilots and air traffic controllers to ensure operational safety; (3) false, misleading, or potential overlapping alerts or resolution advisories; (4) advances in software logic to minimize nuisance and false alerts; (5) air traffic control procedures and the impacts to pilots and air traffic controllers during critical phases of flight; (6) pilot and air traffic controller training requirements; (7) human factors; and (8) research and simulations of reduced RA inhibit altitudes conducted by the NTSB.

Section 102. Airborne Collision Avoidance System upgrades

This section requires the Administrator to issue a final rule to require selected aircraft that are currently required to be equipped with traffic alert and collision avoidance systems (TCAS) under part 121.356, part 135.180, and part 91.1045 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, respectively, to be upgraded to and operating with Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xa (ACAS Xa). Moreover, the system must be integrated and use both ADS-B In and transponder interrogations. Additionally, ACAS Xa must be configured to provide visual and audible alerting to the pilot and flight crew.

To fulfill this requirement, the Administrator must establish an aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) within 45 days of enactment to review and develop findings and recommendations. The ARC shall consider: (1) the anticipated certification timeline of ACAS Xa given the technical complexity and requisite procedures for approval; (2) the feasibility of using the Line Replaceable Units of existing collision avoidance systems in such aircraft; (3) the feasibility of using existing antennas of existing collision avoidance systems in such aircraft; (4) the commercial availability of all necessary components associated with integrated ACAS Xa; (5) actions the Administrator can take to prioritize the certification and installment of integrated ACAS Xa; (6) related changes that may be required for the operating rules and training necessary for air traffic control, pilots and others; and (7) harmonization of global standards associated with collision avoidance systems. The ARC is directed to complete its work within a year of its formation and submit to the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings and recommendations developed by the ARC.

To ensure continued movement, the Administrator shall, within 18 months of receiving the report or 32 months after the date of enactment, whichever is sooner, issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to prohibit persons from operating selected aircraft unless such aircraft are equipped and operating with ACAS

Xa in accordance with the above requirements. The NPRM shall include appropriate guidance for the certification of ACAS Xa and deadlines, not to exceed December 31, 2031, for newly manufactured and existing selected aircraft to be equipped and operating with ACAS Xa. While the Administrator may extend the deadlines specified for no longer than two years, if the Administrator exercises such extension authority, then they must provide Congress a report with the justification for the extension and assurances that safety will not be compromised by the extension. Separately but concurrently, if the new minimum operating performance standards require an upgrade of software, hardware, or additional training, the Administrator must establish a separate deadline for selected aircraft to be upgraded that shall not exceed December 31, 2033. Furthermore, not later than 30 days after issuing a final rule, the Administrator shall work with the appropriate standards setting organization to update the minimum operational standards for ACAS Xa to: (1) safely decrease the inhibit altitude if the evaluation conducted pursuant to section 101 determines it can be done safely; (2) update traffic advisory aural alert standards to include clock position, relative altitude, range and vertical tendency; and (3) integrate directional traffic symbols into visual displays.

Lastly, the Administrator shall provide technical assistance facilitating equipment across the entire fleet of affected aircraft to provide support for affected aircraft operators in complying with the requirements of this section.

In the amended text, the interim equipment requirement for commercial passenger aircraft subject to ACAS Xa under section 102 has been removed. To avoid unnecessary delays, these aircraft must proceed directly to next-generation, ADS-B In-enabled collision avoidance technology—ACAS Xa. This mandate is distinct from the broader collision prevention technology requirement in section 104.

Section 103. Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems for rotorcraft

This section requires the Administrator to issue a final rule to require selected rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft (non-military rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft operating in Class B airspace) be equipped and operating with the collision avoidance system known as “Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xr” (ACAS Xr) that uses both ADS-B In and transponder interrogations.

To do so, the Administrator is required, by December 31, 2026, to take necessary action to work with the appropriate standards setting organization to finalize and publish minimum operational performance standards for ACAS Xr.

Then, not later than 30 days after the minimum operational performance standards are published, or not later than January 31, 2027, whichever occurs earlier, the Administrator is required to establish an ARC to review the minimum operational performance standards and develop findings and recommendations to require selected rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft (non-military rotorcraft and powered-lift operating in Class B airspace) be equipped and operating with ACAS-Xr. As part of its work, the ARC is directed to consider: (1) any modifications that may need to be made to the minimum operational performance standards to carry out the requirements of this section; (2) an anticipated certification timeline

for ACAS Xr; (3) a projected deadline for equipping newly manufactured selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft with ACAS Xr, that considers the safety benefits, anticipated timeline for FAA to approve installations, and commercial availability of components; (4) a projected deadline to retrofit selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft with ACAS Xr; (5) actions that the Administrator can take to prioritize the certification and installation of ACAS Xr; (6) the interaction of ACAS Xr with existing collision prevention technologies; (7) the efficacy of ACAS Xr in low-altitude and high-density airspace; (8) any available data assessing the effectiveness of ACAS Xr in reducing midair collision risk; (9) related training for air traffic controllers, pilots, and others; and (10) NTSB report AIR-26-02. Furthermore, the ARC is directed to complete its work within a year of its formation and submit to the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings and recommendations developed by the ARC.

To ensure continued movement, within 18 months of receiving the report, or 24 months after enactment, whichever is sooner, the Administrator shall: (1) issue an NPRM to prohibit persons from operating selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft, unless such rotorcraft or powered-lift aircraft are equipped and operating with ACAS Xr; and (2) take the necessary actions with the appropriate standards setting organization to modify the minimum operational performance standards for ACAS Xr to update traffic advisory aural alert standards (including clock position, relative altitude, range, and vertical tendency) and integrate directional traffic symbols into visual displays. The NPRM shall include (1) appropriate guidance for the certification of ACAS Xr systems; (2) defined standards for the modification of ACAS Xr to support the modifications listed above; (3) a deadline for any newly manufactured selected rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft to be equipped with ACAS Xr; (4) a deadline for selected rotorcraft and powered-lift aircraft to be retrofitted with ACAS Xr; and (5) a deadline for selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft to be equipped with collision prevention technology pursuant to section 104, not to exceed December 31, 2031.

Finally, this section directs the Administrator to issue a final rule carrying out the requirements of this section no later than 18 months after the issuance of the NPRM.

In executing these requirements, the Administrator shall provide technical assistance to facilitate equipage across the entire fleet of selected rotorcraft and selected powered-lift aircraft and to provide support for such aircraft operators in complying with the requirements of this section.

Section 104. Collision prevention systems

This section requires the Administrator issue a final rule within two years of enactment, with an effective date not later than December 31, 2031, to require covered aircraft be equipped and operating with “collision prevention technology.” In this bill, “collision prevention technology” is equipment, or a combination of equipment that has ADS-B In; uses ADS-B In to provide the pilot with situational awareness of the location of other aircraft and traffic advisories; and provides, and is configured to provide, alerting that is audible to the pilot and flight crew. “Covered aircraft,” are de-

defined as any non-military aircraft that is required to have ADS-B out (pursuant to section 91.225 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations), with an exception for aircraft that have a limited category special airworthiness or an experimental airworthiness certificate. It also excludes selected aircraft described in section 102, since such aircraft are already covered under the ACAS Xa and ADS-B In equipage requirement promulgated under that section.

In developing the final rule, the Administrator shall consider (1) the safety benefits of collision prevention technologies; (2) relevant regulations, guidance, and policies for traffic awareness and traffic advisory technology that utilizes ADS-B In; (3) ways in which ADS-B In software applications can be used as of the date of enactment of this Act; (4) available and projected software that can predict aircraft movements, display surrounding traffic, and provide visual and audible traffic advisories; (5) the margin of error and accuracy of such technologies; (6) the safety benefits of software in preventing conflicts with both aircraft and ground vehicles on airport surfaces; (7) the safety benefits of the software in informing pilots or flight crews to operational risks, such as encounters with forecasted severe weather, using flight information services-broadcast (FIS-B); (8) the Administrator's efforts to modernize the air traffic control system, including timelines, technologies being incorporated, changes to operational rules, and training requirements; (9) the role of air traffic controllers in ensuring aircraft separation including the need for additional training to air traffic controllers; (10) the necessity of certification for implementing collision prevention technology based on type of aircraft and operation; (11) the capacity of the aerospace supply chain to manufacture necessary equipment; (12) the use of existing air traffic control deviation authorization tools; (13) the minimum requirements for this final rule, as enumerated by Congress; and (14) the results, if available at the time of consideration, of the studies on ADS-B Out equipage and development of low-cost voluntary ADS-B as required by sections 808 and 810 of the *FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024* (P.L. 118-63).

The final rule, at minimum, shall: (1) establish performance requirements for equipping collision prevention technology appropriate for the covered aircraft and the operations; (2) have performance requirements that require the technology to be configured to provide visual and audible alerting to the pilot and flight crew, consider the field of view of the pilots to ensure the technology can be readily utilized and has minimal risk of unexpected detachment, consider the reliability and resiliency of alerts in environments where inputs or signals can be jammed or spoofed, and consider the utilization of existing antenna locations or the placement of a new antenna used to receive and transmit data; (3) identify existing or issue additional relevant guidance or technical standards orders to carry out the requirements of this section; and (4) establish an effective date of no later than December 31, 2031, that reflects various aircraft types, appropriate maintenance cycles, and required updates to appropriate guidance for such technology after certification. In issuing the final rule, the Administrator shall allow for the use of any collision prevention technology (including technology that uses portable ADS-B In receivers or other equipment that displays on an existing or future portable device, electronic flight bag,

or panel mounted display) available for use at the time of the effective date (established in this section) if the Administrator determines it provides an equivalent level of safety.

Furthermore, the Administrator shall provide technical assistance to facilitate equipage in complying with the requirements of this section.

Section 105. Prohibition on certain use of ADS-B data

This section prohibits the use of ADS-B data to identify an aircraft for the purpose of obtaining revenue from the aircraft owner or operator without prior consent. This section affirms air traffic controllers may use ADS-B data for the purposes of tracking aircraft, improving safety, and efficiency.

Further, this section extends to other Federal, state, local, territorial, or Tribal official the existing prohibition on the FAA from initiating investigations (excluding criminal investigations) based exclusively on ADS-B data.

Section 106. Rulemaking accountability

This section requires the Secretary to establish, on a publicly available website, a dashboard that displays the progress of the rulemakings required by sections 102, 103, and 104.

Further, this section requires the FAA to brief Congress and families of the victims of the January 29, 2025, midair collision near Washington Ronald Reagan National Airport every 180 days until final rules are published pursuant to sections 102, 103, and 104. For any rulemaking deadlines established in sections 102, 103, and 104 missed by the FAA, the Administrator shall brief Congress in-person within four weeks.

Section 107. Time-on-position limits

This section directs the Administrator, no later than one year after enactment, in coordination with organizations representing air traffic controller managers and supervisors, to establish time-on-position limits for air traffic control (ATC) operations supervisory personnel. In establishing such limits, the Administrator shall (1) evaluate the time-on-position limits for operations supervisory personnel, prioritizing the evaluation of such limits at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and other air traffic facilities with high volumes of mixed rotorcraft and airplane traffic; (2) establish such limits for Air Traffic Organization operations supervisory personnel at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and other air traffic facilities with high volumes of mixed helicopter and airplane traffic; (3) develop guidance for district and facility level management to adapt such limitations to account for their own staffing and local standard operating procedures; (4) consider the operational needs and staffing levels of the air traffic facilities described in the previous subparagraphs to ensure effective oversight and monitoring of safety critical operations; (5) consider air traffic control specialists performing watch supervision in the controller-in-charge position; (6) consider existing relevant FAA orders; (7) consider data, reports, and best practices pertaining to human factors; and (8) any other factor determined appropriate by the Administrator. To establish the time-on-position limits, the Administrator may consult with the air traffic controllers' union. Last-

ly, it clarifies that nothing in the section may be construed to interfere with any agreement between a governmental agency and the air traffic controllers' union.

Section 108. Controller threat and error management training

This section requires the Administrator, no later than nine months after enactment, in coordination with the air traffic controllers' union, to develop and implement initial, recurrent, and refresher training for air traffic controllers on threat and error management that is instructor-led and scenario-based. The Administrator shall consult with air traffic controllers, managers, and operations supervisors; aviation safety experts with knowledge of human factors; and a non-political representative from the NTSB with subject matter expertise will serve as an observer.

This section requires the Administrator to consider: (1) the findings and recommendations of the NTSB; (2) existing relevant FAA orders; (3) whether the frequency of training should be increased for air traffic controllers in high-volume or high-complexity air traffic control facilities; (4) data and reports on human factors and threat and error management best practices; (5) the appropriate use of tower simulator systems and other advanced training technologies to supplement recurrent controller training; (6) the use of data analytics to identify systemic gaps in controller training; (7) data gathered from aviation safety reporting programs; and (8) any other factor determined appropriate by the Administrator.

No later than 90 days after development of the training program, the FAA shall revise associated orders, policies, and guidance documents and brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of such training requirements and potential recommendations for improvements.

Section 109. Controller visual separation training

This section requires the Administrator, no later than 270 days after enactment, in coordination with the air traffic controllers' union, to develop and implement initial, recurrent, and refresher training for air traffic controllers on tower-applied and pilot-applied visual separation procedures that is instructor-led and scenario-based. The Administrator shall consult with representatives of air traffic controllers, managers, and operations supervisors; general aviation and commercial airline pilots; and aviation safety experts with knowledge of human factors and visual separation procedures.

In developing and implementing the training, the Administrator shall consider (1) the findings and recommendations of the NTSB; (2) existing relevant FAA orders; (3) whether the frequency of training should be increased for air traffic controllers in high-volume or high-complexity air traffic control facilities and the need for advance training and guidance before any changes to visual separation policies; (4) the appropriate use of tower simulator systems and other advanced training technologies to supplement the recurrent and refresher training; (5) the use of data analytics to identify systemic gaps in controller training; (6) data gathered from aviation safety reporting programs; and (7) any other factor determined appropriate by the Administrator.

No later than 90 days after development of the training program, the Administrator shall revise associated orders, policies, and guidance documents to reflect the requirements of this section.

Section 110. Safety risk assessment tool

This section requires the Administrator, no later than 180 days after enactment, to develop a safety risk assessment tool to assist air traffic controllers and supervisors in airspace risk identification, mitigation, and operational decision-making. In developing the safety risk assessment tool, the Administrator shall consider, at a minimum, (1) developing a tool that can support air traffic controllers in identifying safety risks, analyzing the impact of and prioritizing such risks, and developing strategies to reduce or eliminate such risks in real time; (2) data, reports, studies, and best practices on threat and error management; (3) the findings and recommendations of the NTSB, National Airspace System Safety Review Team, and a frontline manager workload study required by the *FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024*; (4) air traffic control facility type and staffing level; (5) current FAA risk assessment guidance, policies, and regulations; (6) data gathered from aviation safety reporting programs; (7) best practices or similar relevant risk assessment tools and methods used by foreign civil aviation authorities; (8) the feasibility of leveraging commercially available products or technologies that may be utilized; (9) benefits of incorporating this tool into a Common Automation Platform; and (10) any other relevant factors determined by the Administrator.

Additionally, the section requires the Administrator to coordinate with representatives of air traffic controllers; air traffic control operations supervisors; aviation safety experts with knowledge of threat and error management and human factors; organizations representing operators of Federal contract towers; and any other relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, this section requires the Administrator to brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the development of the safety risk assessment tool, progress of implementation, and recommendations to improve deployment of the tool. Lastly, the section requires implementation of the tool, prioritizing Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport within one year of development of the tool, air traffic control facilities with high volumes of mixed rotorcraft and airplane traffic no later than 18 months, and any remaining air traffic control facilities no later than 24 months.

Section 111. Operational rates at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport

This section requires the Administrator to initiate an assessment of the aircraft arrival rate at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). In conducting the assessment, the Administrator shall consider (1) the airspace complexity; (2) the airfield's limitations; (3) mixed-fleet operations; (4) traffic volume; (5) air carrier scheduling practices; (6) operation capacity of the airport; (7) current hourly instrument flight rules allocation practices at the airport; and (8) expertise provided by the FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO). Following completion of the assessment, the Administrator shall submit the assessment to the appropriate committees of Congress, including any related findings and recommendations.

Furthermore, this section requires the Administrator to initiate rulemaking proceedings to update the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) to require allocated instrument flight rules operations at DCA to be prescribed in periods not greater than 30 minutes to ensure the airport does not exceed safe capacity.

Section 112. Time-based flow management

This section requires the Administrator, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, to implement the operational use of the time-based flow management (TBFM) system at the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and associated air traffic control towers.

Section 113. Air traffic control facility levels

This section allows the air traffic controllers' union and the Administrator (jointly referred to as "the Parties"), at their joint election, to review the criteria and procedures used to assess, determine, and validate the facility pay levels of air traffic control (ATC) facilities. To conduct this review, the Parties may consider (1) the many variables that may affect the difficulty and complexity of ATC work, including technological advancements, aviation industry trends, and the modification or extension of air traffic control services; (2) the weights and add-ons used to calculate the formulas used to determine ATC facility levels; and (3) whether new relevant weights and add-ons should be incorporated into such formulas to more accurately reflect the density and complexity of facility operations.

The section also allows the reassessment of ATC facility pay levels by the Parties, upon completion of this review, prioritizing the ATC facility level of Washington National Airport (DCA) followed by all other ATC facilities with high volumes of mixed helicopter and airplane traffic.

Lastly, it clarifies that nothing in the section may be construed to interfere with any agreement between a governmental agency and the air traffic controllers' union.

Section 114. Working group to evaluate shared frequency around Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport

This section directs the Administrator to convene a working group to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the safety benefits and risks of requiring all aircraft to use the same communications frequency during any period in which helicopter and local air traffic control positions are combined at DCA. Members of this working group will include air traffic controllers; air traffic control operational supervisors and managers; aircraft pilots; helicopter pilots and operators; air carriers; business aviation operators and pilots; air medical operators; human factors experts; the FAA; the DoD; the United States Coast Guard; the NTSB; and other relevant stakeholders. Government representatives are nonvoting members of the working group and may not be political appointees.

The working group is authorized to be in effect for one year, with an option for a one-year extension if the Administrator deems it necessary. To conduct the required comprehensive evaluation, the working group must consider the (1) benefits or detriments to pilot and air traffic controller situational awareness; (2) human factors

that would impact pilot and air traffic controllers focus during critical phases of flight; (3) pilot training requirements; (4) air traffic controller training requirements; (5) technological limitations or challenges that would impeded aircraft from using the same communications frequency; (6) potential for overlapping, conflicting, and simultaneous communication transmissions; (7) potential for misdirected, missed, or stepped on communications on crowded frequencies; (8) relevant NTSB recommendations; and (9) feedback from air carriers and general aviation operators.

Additionally, this section requires the working group to submit a report to the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress detailing their findings and recommendations. No later than six months after the submission of this report, the Administrator shall operationally validate such recommendations and take action, as appropriate, to implement the recommendations.

Section 115. Anti-blocking technology

This section requires the Administrator to initiate an assessment into the feasibility, maturity, hazards, and safety benefits of technology that serves to alert an air traffic controller or flight crew to instances of potentially blocked transmissions when simultaneous broadcasting occurs.

Additionally, this section requires the Administrator to submit to Congress a report on the results of the assessment that includes: (1) a list of technologies identified by the Administrator as serving to alert air traffic controllers or flight crews to instances of blocked transmissions; (2) a list of the technologies that the Administrator proposes could alert air traffic controllers or flight crews to instances of blocked transmissions; (3) results of simulations and testing; and (4) the Administrator's plan to implement anti-blocking technology if the assessment finds the technology can be safely implemented, including the projected costs, a projected timeline for implementation, and how the upgrades to facilities and equipment would be prioritized.

Section 116. Task force to identify improvements to air traffic controller conflict alert systems

This section requires the Administrator to convene a task force to develop a framework detailing the priorities, goals, timeline, and recommendations to implement improvements to the conflict alert system to provide more salient and meaningful alerts to air traffic controllers. The task force will consist of air traffic controllers; operators of Federal Contract Towers; air traffic control operational supervisors and managers; human factors experts; employees from the FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and Office of Finance and Management (AFN) with expertise in equipment procurement; and other relevant stakeholders.

The task force is authorized to be in effect for one year, with an option for a six-month extension if the Administrator determines it is necessary. To develop the required framework, the task force must, at minimum, consider the (1) benefits and detriments to air traffic controller situational awareness, including availability of information, nuisance and false alerts, and human factors; (2) opportunities and challenges of consolidating numerous systems and underlying data sources into a single display; (3) products by other

working groups related to human factors in aviation safety; (4) air traffic controller training requirements; (5) advances in available technology currently not being utilized; (6) technological limitations; (7) relevant NTSB recommendations; (8) ATC modernization efforts by the FAA; and (9) feedback from manufacturers and entities involved in the FAA's ATC modernization initiative.

This section also requires the task force to submit a report to the Administrator and the appropriate committees of Congress detailing the framework. No later than eight months after the submission of this report, the Administrator must submit to the appropriate committees of Congress, and immediately begin implementing, a two-year implementation plan. This plan must include specific training requirements for air traffic controllers and a publicly available list of prioritized airports to receive upgrades to the conflict alert system. Lastly, this section requires briefings every six months until full implementation of the plan to the appropriate committees of Congress on progress of the implementation.

Section 117. Postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing

This section states it is the Sense of Congress that the Administrator shall abide by Department of Transportation order (DOT Order 3910.1D) requiring postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing.

This section requires the Administrator to revise procedures of the FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO) to ensure that an appropriate on-site supervisor makes each postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing determination based on their assessment of whether the event meets testing criteria and which controllers had duties pertaining to the involved aircraft without need to wait for investigation or approval.

This section also requires the Administrator to incorporate into annual training the revised postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing determination procedure for all ATO staff who have such responsibilities. The training standards shall include a post-learning knowledge assessment.

Additionally, this section requires the Administrator to conduct an annual review of the ability of each air traffic control facility to routinely accomplish the required postaccident and postincident testing within the specified timeframes, within two hours for alcohol testing and within four hours for drug testing, including conducting a demonstration. Following the review, the Administrator shall work with the Secretary to mitigate identified barriers to timely postaccident and postincident drug and alcohol testing, and to remediate the performance of each facility that failed the demonstration. Lastly, not later than three months after each annual review, the Secretary is required to submit a report to Congress detailing the results of the reviews, any facilities needing remediation, progress at facilities previously identified for remediation, and planned approaches to remediation.

Section 118. Further modifications to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport area helicopter routes

This section requires the Administrator, via the safety risk management process, to evaluate all charted helicopter routes in the vicinity of DCA to ensure that helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft

routes are safely always deconflicted physically or have operating procedures that require positive control from the controller to ensure safe deconfliction during operations. In carrying out the route revisions under this section, the Administrator shall conduct a safety risk management review for any helicopter route changes. Lastly, the Administrator is required to report the results of the evaluation to Congress and provide safety risk assessment documentation.

Section 119. Requiring vertical separation near airports during critical phases of flight

This section requires the Administrator to ensure that each segment of a helicopter route contains, in the appropriate helicopter route chart, recommended flight altitudes (ceilings and floors) consistent with FAA Order JO 7210.3EE. Additionally, this section requires the Administrator to amend FAA Order JO 7210.3EE to add minimum vertical separation requirements to the criteria for the helicopter route chart program. In making these revisions, the Administrator shall ensure that any helicopter route chart that represents an area near an airport clearly conveys to an operator the segments of the route in the vicinity of an airport. Further, this section requires the changes to be incorporated into the annual review of helicopter charts.

Section 120. Helicopter route chart annual review

This section requires the Administrator to initiate, annually, a review of the criteria for annual reviews of helicopter routes required by FAA Order JO 7210.3EE. After each annual review of the criteria, the Administrator shall update the criteria based on the review and publish the updated criteria on a publicly available website of the FAA. The Administrator shall publish on a FAA website the date on which the annual review for each Helicopter Route Chart has been most recently completed.

Furthermore, this section requires the Administrator to report annually to Congress a summary of changes to the charted helicopter routes, the rationale or safety data justifying the changes, a summary of any consultation with helicopter and fixed-wing operators, and the associated safety risk management process documents. If the Administrator fails to submit an annual report, the chief operation officer of the FAA's ATO is required to brief Congress in-person within four weeks.

Section 121. Visual charts

This section requires the Administrator to initiate a study on incorporating the lateral location and published altitudes of helicopter routes into all instrument and visual approach and departure procedures for airports to provide situational awareness to fixed-wing operators of the risk of helicopter traffic operating in their vicinity. The Administrator shall consider: (1) the spacing and legibility of information on the charts; (2) the workload of flight crews at lower altitudes during critical phases of flight; (3) the feasibility and decipherability of layered information on digital charts; (4) current best practices for pilots when landing at or departing from airports with high volumes of helicopter traffic that do not

have charted helicopter routes; and (5) the human factors involved with approach and departure procedures.

Additionally, after completion of the study, this section requires the Administrator to make any necessary revisions to (1) Terminal Procedures Publications to include charted helicopter routes providing appropriate situational awareness to fixed-wing operators and (2) Helicopter Route Charts to include airport approach and departure paths to provide appropriate situational awareness to helicopter operators. If the Administrator revises any of the publications or charts, the appropriate committees of Congress must be briefed on the revisions.

Section 122. Close proximity encounters

This section requires the Administrator to establish a working group to make recommendations on an objective definition of “close proximity encounters”, as well as the associated parameters that can be used to monitor the prevalence of such encounters and identify areas of potential traffic conflict. This section also requires the working group to make publicly available aggregated information about all encounters, including the date and location.

The working group shall consider (1) existing airborne separation rules and required loss of airborne separation reporting requirements; (2) development of a definition of, and associated parameters for, close proximity encounters; (3) data gathered from aviation safety reporting systems; (4) NTSB aviation investigation report AIR-26-02; (5) FAA risk assessment guidance, policies, and regulations; (6) best practices or similar risk assessment tools used by foreign civil aviation authorities; and (7) any other relevant factors determined by the working group.

The working group’s membership will include representatives from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); aviation labor organizations; subject matter experts in safety management systems and safety data; air carriers; helicopter pilots and operators, including law enforcement and air ambulance operators; general aviation operators and pilots; and a non-political representative from the NTSB with subject matter expertise, who will be a non-voting member. Furthermore, after the working group develops recommendations, the Administrator is required to make publicly available a report containing the working group’s recommendations and how the Administrator will implement such recommendations.

Section 123. Notification of close proximity encounters and analysis of data

This section requires the Administrator to establish a process to notify parties involved in: (1) a near midair collision, (2) a traffic collision avoidance system resolution advisory (TCAS RA) event, (3) a close proximity encounter event (as defined by section 122), or (4) any other event determined by the Administrator and provide deidentified event data to the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) program. The Administrator shall also establish and continuously monitor a database of events listed above to identify trends, ensure timely notification to involved parties to prevent the loss of data, consider informing frequent operators of such events, and account for other close proximity encounters. Additionally, the Administrator is required to brief Congress on the

implementation of this section not later than 30 days after establishing the notification process mandated in this section.

Furthermore, the Administrator shall annually submit to Congress a report containing data on the number of instances and locations of near midair collision events, TCAS RA events, close proximity events, identified locations of concern, and action taken to mitigate identified risks and reduce the occurrence of such events. Lastly, this section ensures that the data collected under this section shall only be used for safety assurance and safety risk management.

Section 124. Safety culture and safety management review

This section requires the Department of Transportation Inspector General to initiate a comprehensive audit of the FAA's ATO and Aviation Safety Management Organization safety culture and Safety Management System, including its risk identification, data sharing, compliance with existing safety directives, and mitigation of collision risks within the National Airspace System.

Furthermore, the Inspector General must submit a report to Congress that includes recommendations to strengthen adherence to safety management principles, enhance transparency, protect against retaliation, and foster a just culture. The section further requires the Secretary of Transportation to respond to those recommendations and submit an implementation plan to Congress within 120 days of the report's submission, ensuring timely oversight and corrective action.

Section 125. Documentation of control position combinations

This section requires the Administrator, not later than one year after enactment, to review and revise, as appropriate, the regulations and standard operating procedures governing the documentation of combining air traffic control position responsibilities.

In carrying out this section, the Administrator shall: (1) consider the current standard operating procedures and guidance on the combination of air traffic control position responsibilities; (2) examine the feasibility of digitizing the documentation required under this section; (3) require the Operations Supervisor (OS) to periodically review the documentation of combined controller position occurrences and report on deviations from standard operating procedures; (4) consider air traffic facility type and staffing level; and (5) consult with the air traffic controllers' union, organization representing ATC managers and supervisors, and aviation safety experts with knowledge in information technology.

Additionally, the Administrator shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of this section no later than one year after completion of the review required under subsection (a). Lastly, it clarifies that nothing in the section may be construed to interfere with any agreement between a governmental agency and the air traffic controllers' union.

Section 126. Review of miles-in-trail procedures or agreements

This section requires the Administrator to complete a review, within 60 days of enactment, of the miles-in-trail (MIT) standards and procedures to determine if they provide for a separation of aircraft traffic that is appropriate for operational safety. In conducting

the review, the Administrator may consider the: (1) accuracy of the criteria used to determine MIT procedures for air traffic control (ATC) facilities; (2) whether additional criteria should be incorporated to more appropriately reflect the traffic volume and operational complexity of ATC facilities; and (3) the findings and recommendations of the NTSB. The Administrator is required to update the standards and procedures to ensure the standards provide for a separation of traffic that is appropriate for operational safety. In carrying out the review, the Administrator must consult with the air traffic controllers' union; ATC managers and supervisors; airport sponsors and operators located within Class B or Class C airspace; commercial airline pilots; and air carriers, general aviation and business aviation operators.

After completing the review of the MIT standards and procedures, the Administrator will initiate an additional review of the MIT procedures or agreements at all ATC facilities located within Class B and Class C airspace to ensure the procedures provide for a separation of traffic that is appropriate for operational safety.

Finally, no later than 18 months after enactment, the Administrator is required to submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that includes: (1) a list of ATC facilities identified during the Administrator's review that did not have MIT procedures or agreements that allowed for the separation of traffic appropriate for operational safety and (2) steps that the Administrator has taken, or plans to take, to modify the MIT procedures or agreements at each facility to ensure they provide for a separation of traffic appropriate for operational safety.

Section 127. Closure of Helicopter Route 4

This section states that operations on Helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge in the District of Columbia, as such Route existed on January 29, 2025, shall be prohibited and shall remain eliminated from helicopter charts.

TITLE II—[PLACEHOLDER]

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by title I of the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE

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SUBTITLE VII—AVIATION PROGRAMS

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PART A—AIR COMMERCE AND SAFETY

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SUBPART iv—ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES

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CHAPTER 461—INVESTIGATIONS AND PROCEEDINGS

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§ 46101. Complaints and investigations

(a) GENERAL.—(1) A person may file a complaint in writing with the Secretary of Transportation (or the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration with respect to security duties and powers designated to be carried out by the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration with respect to aviation safety duties and powers designated to be carried out by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration) about a person violating this part or a requirement prescribed under this part. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the Secretary, Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, or Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall investigate the complaint if a reasonable ground appears to the Secretary, Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, or Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration for the investigation.

(2) On the initiative of the Secretary, Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, or Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, as appropriate, the Secretary, Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, or Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may conduct an investigation, if a reasonable ground appears to the Secretary, Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, or Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration for the investigation, about—

(A) a person violating this part or a requirement prescribed under this part; or

(B) any question that may arise under this part.

(3) The Secretary of Transportation, Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, or Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may dismiss a complaint without a hearing when the Secretary, Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, or Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration is of the opinion that the complaint does not state facts that warrant an investigation or action.

(4) After notice and an opportunity for a hearing and subject to section 40105(b) of this title, the Secretary of Transportation, Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, or Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall issue an

order to compel compliance with this part if the Secretary, Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, or Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration finds in an investigation under this subsection that a person is violating this part.

(b) COMPLAINTS AGAINST MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES.—The Secretary of Transportation, Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, or Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall refer a complaint against a member of the armed forces of the United States performing official duties to the Secretary of the department concerned for action. Not later than 90 days after receiving the complaint, the Secretary of that department shall inform the Secretary of Transportation, Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, or Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration of the action taken on the complaint, including any corrective or disciplinary action taken.

(c) PROHIBITION ON USING ADS-B OUT DATA TO INITIATE AN INVESTIGATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, [the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may not] *neither the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration nor any other Federal, State, local, territorial, or Tribal official may* initiate an investigation (excluding a criminal investigation) of a person based exclusively on automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast data.

(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the use of automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast data in an investigation that was initiated for any reason other than the review of automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast data, including if such investigation was initiated as a result of a report or complaint submitted to the Administrator.

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