[House Report 119-302]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
119th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { 119-302
=======================================================================
RELIABLE POWER ACT
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September 17, 2025.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
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Mr. Guthrie, from the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 3616]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Energy and Commerce, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 3616) to require the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission to review regulations that may affect the reliable
operation of the bulk-power system, having considered the same,
reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that
the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 3
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 3
Committee Action................................................. 7
Committee Votes.................................................. 7
Oversight Findings and Recommendations........................... 10
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures 10
Congressional Budget Office Estimate............................. 10
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 11
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 11
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 11
Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings...................... 12
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 13
Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits....... 13
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 13
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 13
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 13
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 15
Minority, Additional, or Dissenting Views........................ 22
The amendment is as follows:
Striking all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Reliable Power Act''.
SEC. 2. COMMISSION REVIEW AND COMMENT FOR COVERED AGENCY ACTIONS.
Section 215 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824o) is amended--
(1) in subsection (g)--
(A) by striking ``The ERO'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--The ERO''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Annual long-term assessment.--The assessments under
paragraph (1) shall include an annual long-term assessment,
which shall include--
``(A) an analysis of the ability of the bulk-power
system to supply sufficient electric energy necessary
to maintain an adequate level of reliability, taking
into account generation resource mix, transmission
development, and electric energy demand trends;
``(B) an analysis of the risk of future electric
energy supply shortfalls under normal and extreme
weather conditions, and the risk of any such shortfalls
within each region of the bulk-power system; and
``(C) a determination of whether additional
generation resources are necessary to supply sufficient
electric energy to maintain an adequate level of
reliability during the assessment period.
``(3) Notice of generation inadequacy.--In conducting a long-
term assessment under paragraph (2), if the ERO finds that the
bulk-power system is at risk of not having adequate generation
resources to supply sufficient electric energy to maintain an
adequate level of reliability, the ERO shall publicly notify
the Commission that the bulk-power system is in a state of
generation inadequacy.
``(4) Data collection.--To conduct a long-term assessment
under paragraph (2), the ERO may collect information and data
from users, owners, and operators of the bulk-power system.'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (h) through (k) as
subsections (i) through (l), respectively; and
(3) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
``(h) Commission Review and Comment for Covered Agency Actions.--
``(1) Notice to federal agencies.--If the ERO notifies the
Commission under subsection (g)(3) that the bulk-power system
is in a state of generation inadequacy, the Commission shall
promptly notify the Department of Energy, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and any other Federal agency the Commission
determines appropriate of such state of generation inadequacy.
``(2) Submission.--Upon receiving notice under paragraph (1),
the head of each Federal agency that received such notice shall
provide to the Commission for review and comment any covered
agency action by the Federal agency--
``(A) on the first date on which such covered agency
action is provided to the Office of Management and
Budget or any other Federal agency for review and
comment; or
``(B) if such covered agency action is not provided
to the Office of Management and Budget or any other
Federal agency for review and comment, not later than
90 days before the date on which the covered agency
action is published in the Federal Register or is
otherwise made available for public inspection or
comment.
``(3) Commission comments.--The Commission, in consultation
with the ERO and transmission organizations, shall, by order,
provide to the agency head that provided to the Commission a
covered agency action under paragraph (2)--
``(A) comments on such covered agency action, which
such comments may include an assessment of the effect
of the covered agency action on rates, terms, and
conditions for services pursuant to the authority of
the Commission under sections 201 and 206; and
``(B) if applicable, recommendations for
modifications to the covered agency action to prevent a
significant negative impact on the ability of the bulk-
power system to supply sufficient electric energy
necessary to maintain an adequate level of reliability.
``(4) Agency response.--The head of a Federal agency may not
finalize a covered agency action that is provided to the
Commission under paragraph (2) until--
``(A) the agency head responds in writing to the
Commission with an explanation of how the agency head
modified, or why the agency head determined not to
modify, such covered agency action in response to any
comments and recommendations provided by the Commission
under paragraph (3); and
``(B) the Commission finds that the covered agency
action will not be likely to have a significant
negative impact on the ability of the bulk-power system
to supply sufficient electric energy necessary to
maintain an adequate level of reliability.
``(5) Public availability of comments and responses.--An
agency head shall include any comments, recommendations, and
responses for the covered agency action when--
``(A) submitting the covered agency action to the
Federal Register for publication; or
``(B) otherwise making the covered agency action
available for public inspection or comment.
``(6) Definitions.--In this subsection:
``(A) Covered agency action.--The term `covered
agency action' means a regulation that--
``(i) relates to, or otherwise directly
affects, any generation resource in the bulk-
power system; and
``(ii) is under development to be proposed or
otherwise under consideration in a rulemaking
prior to finalization on the date on which the
Federal agency receives notice from the
Commission under paragraph (1).
``(B) Federal agency.--The term `Federal agency'
means an Executive department (as that term is defined
in section 101 of title 5, United States Code) or any
other Executive agency that is in the President's
cabinet.''.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 3616, the Reliable Power Act, would amend the Federal
Power Act to provide for the Federal Regulatory Commission
(FERC) review of certain federal regulations that may affect
the reliable operation of the bulk-power system.
The legislation would require the electric reliability
organization (ERO) to conduct annual long-term reliability
assessments of the bulk-power system. In the event the ERO
determines during such assessments that the bulk-power system
does not have sufficient electric generation to maintain
reliability, FERC would review, provide comment, and as
necessary recommend changes to modify federal regulations
proposed or under development that affect generation resources
in the bulk-power system. No regulation affecting such
resources would be allowed to be finalized if FERC finds it
would have a significant negative impact on the reliability of
the bulk-power system.
Background and Need for Legislation
Reliable delivery of electric power is essential for all
aspects of modern life, and especially, public health and
welfare. The nation's electric power grid is comprised of vast
networks of high voltage transmission lines, generating
resources, local distribution lines, and other critical
infrastructure to ensure the delivery of adequate and reliable
supplies of electricity. The backbone of the electric grid is
the bulk-power system. This system includes the facilities and
control systems necessary for operating the interconnected
transmission network and the electric energy generation
resources needed to maintain transmission system
reliability.\1\
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\1\The bulk-power system does not include the local distribution of
electric power.
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FERC and the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), each have important statutory roles in
monitoring and assuring reliability across the bulk power
system.FERC oversees and regulates the interstate transmission
of natural gas, oil, and electricity through its authority
under the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power Act. Under
section 215 of the Federal Power Act, NERC is the ERO certified
to establish and enforce reliability standards for the bulk-
power system, or BPS, subject to FERC review and approval.
The need for strengthened oversight of policies by FERC and
NERC that impact reliability is increasing. The electric power
system is undergoing an unprecedented period of transformation
and uncertainty. This is driven by an accelerated rate of pre-
mature retirements of traditional, baseload and dispatchable
electric generation resources, without adequate replacement
resources, coupled with substantial increases in the demand for
more electric power. This demand is driven by rapid growth of
data centers, artificial intelligence, domestic manufacturing,
and general electrification. Absent sufficient new generation
resources, the new demand is exacerbating existing and growing
risks to the reliable delivery of power in large regions of the
nation.
For the past decade, accelerated retirement of dispatchable
generation resources, chiefly coal, natural gas, and nuclear,
has been driven by state and federal policies that limit
production from or increase environmental compliance costs of
these traditional generation resources and, particularly in
deregulated wholesale electricity markets, favor investment in
intermittent solar and wind resources over traditional fossil
generation resources.
The consequences of premature retirements have been
magnified by the operating limitations of replacement
generation--chiefly intermittent wind and solar--that do not
have the same attributes or provide the same level of
reliability as dispatchable resources. Existing state and
federal policies continue to produce powerful economic
incentives for retirements of baseload and dispatchable power
and the related services to balance and maintain electric grid
reliability.
``Accelerated retirements of the existing coal, natural
gas, and nuclear generators can have a profound and negative
effect on the resource adequacy and reliability of the BPS in
the next 10 years,'' according to the NERC's December 2024
Long-Term Reliability Assessment.\2\ The report states further:
``Environmental regulations and energy policies have the
potential to influence generators to seek deactivation during
the 10-year assessment period. . . . The lack of dispatchable
resources and diverse generator fuel types in the
interconnection processes makes the future resource mix look
alarmingly unreliable. The potential for capacity and energy
shortfalls and a higher-risk resource mix is heightened by
economic and policy factors that place pressure on existing
thermal generators.''\3\
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\2\North American Reliability Corp. (NERC), 2024 Long-Term
Reliability Assessment (Dec. 2024, updated Jul. 15, 2025), https://
www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20
Assessments%20DL/NERC_Long%20Term%20Reliability%20Assessment_2024.pdf.
\3\Id.
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Analysis by the Department of Energy found that increased
demand combined with retirements of dispatchable generation
would increase the risk of power outages 100-fold by 2030. Even
assuming no retirements, the increased risk of power outages in
2030 increased by a factor of 34 over current risks,
underscoring the current reliability crisis.\4\
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\4\U.S. Dep't of Energy, Evaluating the Reliability and Security of
the United States Electric Grid (Resource Adequacy Report), at 1 (Jul.
2025), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/
DOE%20Final%20EO%20Report%20%28FINAL%20JULY%207%29_.0.pdf.
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The Committee held multiple hearings during the 118th and
119th Congress on electric reliability and, through these
hearings and testimony, the Committee has heard from utilities,
states, grid operators, and FERC Commissioners that there is an
increasing threat to grid reliability that could lead to
extensive, system-wide outages.
Increasingly, grid operators have warned of the potential
for electricity disruptions and asked their customers to
conserve power.\5\ PJM, the nation's largest grid operator, has
warned that it could see a capacity shortage as early as 2026/
2027 and identified public policies, permitting constraints,
and supply chain challenges as key trends that are tightening
supply-demand balance within the system.\6\ PJM CEO, Manu
Asthana also stated, ``PJM needs to slow down the pace of
generation retirements to avoid reliability problems by the end
of the decade.''\7\ In Committee hearings during the 119th
Congress, grid operators continued to identify premature
retirements of generation resources as a risk to reliability.
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\5\News Release, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc.
(ERCOT), ERCOT Has Initiated Energy Emergency Alert Level 2 (EEA 2),
Conservation is Critical (Sept. 6, 2023), https://www.ercot.com/news/
release/2023-09-06-ercot-has-initiated.
\6\Letter from Mark Takahashi, Chair, Board of Managers, PJM
Interconnection to PJM Stakeholders (Dec. 9, 2024), https://
www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/about-pjm/who-we-are/public-disclosures/
2024/20241209-board-letter-outlining-action-on-capacity-market-
adjustments-rri-and-sis.pdf.
\7\Rich Heidorn, Jr., PJM Chief: Retirements Need to Slow Down, RTO
INSIDER, (Mar. 27, 2023), https://www.rtoinsider.com/31899-pjm-chief-
retirements-need-to-slow-down/.
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Over the past decade, federal regulatory initiatives,
particularly by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), have
contributed to or threatened to contribute to the premature
retirement of baseload and dispatchable generation resources.
In large part, these regulatory initiatives reflected policies
to transition the nation's electric system away from fossil
based electric generation.
The most notable example of these regulatory initiatives is
the EPA's promulgation during the Biden Administration of
greenhouse gas standards for fossil-fuel fired power plants.\8\
Twenty-seven states filed legal challenges to the rule in the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in September 2024.\9\ An amicus
brief filed by four grid operators requested the court remand
the final rule back to EPA ``with instructions for it to
adequately consider the . . . grid adequacy issues [grid
operators] previously raised,'' noting the rules would trigger
an acceleration in the pace of premature retirements of
resources ``that can have significant, negative consequences on
reliability.''\10\
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\8\U.S. Env't. Prot. Agency (EPA) Final Rule, New Source
Performance Standards from Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified,
and Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units, etc., 89
Fed. Reg. 39798 (May 9, 2024) (where EPA's greenhouse gas rules were
part of a larger, comprehensive suite of regulatory actions for power
plants. EPA Administrator Regan announced this suite of actions, known
as the EGU (for ``electric generating unit'') strategy, to address
climate, health, and environmental burdens from power plants; and where
these regulatory actions include the Interstate Transport Rule,
Regional Haze, Risk and Technology Review for the Mercury Air Toxics
Rule, effluent limitations, and a legacy coal combustion residue rule;
and where these rules are impacting operations of existing baseload
generation in the bulk power system, compelling, in many instances,
retirements of generating sources earlier than had been planned).
\9\State of West Virginia, et al. v. EPA, No. 24-1120, (D.C. Cir.
2024).
\10\Brief of Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., PJM
Interconnection L.L.C., Southwest Power Pool, Inc., and Electric
Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, State of West Virginia, et al. v. EPA, No. 24-1120, (D.C.
Cir. 2024).
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Although Congress, under the Federal Power Act, provided
FERC responsibility for assuring reliability of the bulk-power
system, EPA was under no legal obligation to address adequately
the electric reliability risk created by its rules. This
legislation establishes a statutory mechanism to provide
accountability for and to align federal agency actions with the
surpassing importance of ensuring electric power reliability.
The legislation builds upon existing authorities, which
provide FERC and NERC responsibility to examine reliability of
the bulk-power system and to identify actions that ensure
reliable operation of the grid. It requires a long-term
reliability assessment of the bulk power system by NERC, which
is the ERO, and to include in that assessment determination
whether more generation resources are necessary to maintain an
adequate level of reliability. The assessment requirements
reflect the existing objective criteria used by NERC to ensure
there is sufficient energy to maintain an adequate level of
reliability under a range of circumstances. It directs NERC to
take into account transmission development, the mix of
generation resources, and energy demand trends.
If NERC finds the bulk power system is at risk of not
having adequate generation resources to supply sufficient
energy to maintain an adequate level of reliability during the
assessment period, it must notify FERC that the system is in a
state of generation inadequacy. Upon such notification, FERC
notifies DOE and EPA and any agency it determines appropriate
of the state of generation inadequacy. Upon such notice, the
notified agency sends any rules under development that impact
generation resources to FERC for review and comment, and any
recommendations necessary to prevent significant impacts on the
ability of the grid to supply sufficient energy to maintain an
adequate level of reliability.
Given the engineering and analytical capacity necessary to
assess reliability adequately, the Committee expects that FERC
will consult with grid operators and NERC and its subsidiaries,
which have expertise, information, and modeling tools to assist
with assessments. The Committee also expects that FERC will
also consider impacts of proposed rules on rates, terms, and
conditions of service, pursuant to its authority under the
Federal Power Act, in its assessments under this legislation.
To ensure rules are crafted to avoid significant
reliability impacts, the legislation provides that no rule that
affects generation resources can be finalized if FERC
determines the rule would have a significant negative impact on
the ability of the grid to supply sufficient energy to maintain
an adequate level of reliability. It is expected this will
provide for future regulatory actions that balance the needs
for regulatory action with the public interest needs for
affordable, reliable delivery of electric power.
The Committee finds this legislation is necessary to
provide accountability for federal rules that affect generation
resources, and to provide a mechanism for adjusting any such
rules to ensure they do not significantly impact electric power
reliability.
Committee Action
On April 30, 2025, the Subcommittee on Energy held a
legislative hearing on 14 pieces of legislative, including H.R.
3616. The Subcommittee received testimony from:
Mike Goff, Acting Undersecretary of Energy,
U.S. Department of Energy;
David L. Morenoff, Acting General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;
Terry Turpin, Director, Office of Energy
Projects, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;
Jim Matheson, Chief Executive Officer,
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association;
Amy Andryszak, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Interstate Natural Gas Association of America;
Todd A. Snitchler, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Electric Power Supply Association
and;
Kim Smaczniak, Partner, Roselle LLP.
On June 5, 2025, the Subcommittee on Energy met in open
markup session and forwarded H.R. 3616, as amended, to the full
Committee by a record vote of 16 yeas and 14 nays. On June 25,
2025 the full Committee on Energy and Commerce met in open
markup session and ordered H.R. 3616, without amendment,
favorably reported to the House by a record vote of 28 yeas and
23 nays.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the
record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments
thereto. The following reflects the record votes taken during
the Committee consideration:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Oversight Findings and Recommendations
Pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of
rule XIII, the Committee held hearings and made findings that
are reflected in this report.
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority,
and Tax Expenditures
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII, the Committee
finds that H.R. 3616 would result in no new or increased budget
authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or
revenues.
Congressional Budget Office Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII, the following is
the cost estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office
pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
H.R. 3616 would require the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), in consultation with the Electric
Reliability Organization (ERO), to review regulations proposed
by other federal agencies that could affect the reliability of
the bulk-power system, under conditions specified in the bill.
Agencies could not finalize those actions until they respond to
any concerns raised by FERC as part of that review.
Using information from FERC, CBO expects that the agency
would need additional staff and would need to acquire new data
to fulfill the bill's requirements. CBO estimates that
implementing those requirements would cost FERC less than $10
million each year. However, because FERC is authorized to
recover 100 percent of its costs through user fees, any change
in agency costs (which are controlled through annual
appropriation acts) would be offset by an equal change in fees
that the commission charges. Accordingly, CBO estimates that
implementing those provisions would result in no net change in
discretionary spending for FERC.
CBO further estimates that the costs for other agencies
(primarily the Department of Energy) to coordinate with FERC on
those reviews would total $1 million over the 2025-2030 period;
that spending would be subject to the availability of
appropriated funds.
Finally, enacting H.R. 3616 would increase direct spending
and revenues because spending by the ERO is recorded on the
budget as direct spending, and the organization assesses fees,
which are recorded as revenues, to cover its costs. CBO
estimates that consulting with FERC would increase costs for
the ERO by less than $500,000 over the 2025-2035 period.
Because any amounts collected would be spent soon thereafter,
CBO estimates that the net effect on the deficit would be
negligible.
Implementing the bill could result in some regulations
being delayed because of the procedures specified in the bill.
Those delays could result in budgetary effects; however, CBO
has no basis to estimate which regulations could be affected,
nor the direction or magnitude of any such effects.
If FERC and the ERO increase their fees to offset the costs
of implementing the bill, H.R. 3616 would increase the cost of
an existing mandate on public and private entities, such as
electric utilities, that are required to pay those fees. CBO
estimates that the incremental cost of the mandates would be
small and fall well below the annual threshold established in
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act for intergovernmental and
private-sector mandates ($103 million and $206 million in 2025,
respectively, adjusted annually for inflation).
The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Aaron Krupkin
(for federal costs) and Brandon Lever (for mandates). The
estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Director
of Budget Analysis.
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director, Congressional Budget Office.
Federal Mandates Statement
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act.
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general
performance goal or objective of this legislation is to provide
accountability for federal rules that affect generation
resources, and to provide a mechanism for adjusting any such
rules to ensure they do not significantly impact electric power
reliability.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no provision of
H.R. 3616 is known to be duplicative of another Federal
program, including any program that was included in a report to
Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139 or the
most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.
Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings
On February 5, 2025, the Subcommittee on Energy held a
hearing that covered issues related to HR 3616. The title of
the hearing was ``Powering America's Future: Unleashing
American Energy.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from:
Amanda Eversole, Executive Vice President
and Chief Advocacy Officer, American Petroleum
Institute;
Brigham McCown, Senior Fellow and Director,
Initiative on American Energy Security, The Hudson
Institute;
Gary Arnold, Business Manager, Denver
Pipefitters Local 208 and;
Tyler O'Connor, Partner, Crowell & Moring
LLP.
On March 5, 2025, the Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing
that covered issues relating to HR 3616. The title of the
hearing was ``Scaling for Growth: Meeting the Demand for
Reliable, Affordable Electricity.'' The Subcommittee received
testimony from:
Todd Brickhouse, CEO and General Manager,
Basin Electric Power Cooperative;
Asim Haque, Senior Vice President for
Governmental and Member Services, PJM;
Noel W. Black, Senior VP of Regulatory
Affairs, Southern Company and;
Tyler H. Norris, James B. Duke Fellow, Duke
University.
On March 25, 2025, the Subcommittee on Energy held a
hearing that covered issues relating to HR 3616. The title of
the hearing was ``Keeping the Lights On: Examining the State of
Regional Grid Reliability.'' The Subcommittee received
testimony from:
Gordon van Welie, President and Chief
Executive Officer, ISO New England;
Richard J. Dewey, President and Chief
Executive Officer, New York Independent System
Operator;
Manu Asthana, President and Chief Executive
Officer, PJM Interconnection LLC;
Jennifer Curran, Senior Vice President for
Planning and Operations, Midcontinent ISO;
Lanny Nickell, Chief Operating Officer,
Southwest Power Pool;
Elliot Mainzer, President and Chief
Executive Officer, California Independent System
Operator and;
Pablo Vegas, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc.
On April 9, 2025, the Committee on Energy and Commerce held
a full committee hearing that covered issues relating to HR
3616. The title of the hearing was ``The Energy Needs for
Advancing American Technological Leadership.'' The Committee
received testimony from:
Eric Schmidt, Chair, Special Competitive
Studies Project;
Manish Bhatia, Executive Vice President of
Global Operations, Micron Technology;
Alexander Wang, Founder and Chief Executive
Officer, Scale AI, and;
David Turk, Distinguished Visiting Fellow,
Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University.
On April 30, 2025, the Subcommittee on Energy held a
legislative hearing on H.R. 3616. The title of the hearing was
``Assuring Abundant, Reliable American Energy to Power
Innovation.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from:
Mike Goff, Acting Undersecretary of Energy,
U.S. Department of Energy;
David L. Morenoff, Acting General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;
Terry Turpin, Director, Office of Energy
Projects, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;
Jim Matheson, Chief Executive Officer,
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association;
Amy Andryszak, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Interstate Natural Gas Association of America;
Todd A. Snitchler, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Electric Power Supply Association
and;
Kim Smaczniak, Partner, Roselle LLP.
Committee Cost Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee
adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits
Pursuant to clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI, the
Committee finds that H.R. 3616 contains no earmarks, limited
tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
Section 1 provides that the Act may be cited as the
``Reliable Power Act''.
Section 2. Commission review and comment for covered agency actions
Paragraph (1) of Section 2 amends subsection (g) of Section
215 of the Federal Power Act to require under a new subsection
(g) (2) an annual long-term assessment of the reliability and
adequacy of the bulk-power system by the Energy Reliability
Organization (ERO). The paragraph provides for what analyses
the assessment must include, considering generation resource
mix, transmission development, and electric energy demand
trends, to assess the risk of future electric energy supply
shortfalls. It requires the ERO to make a determination whether
additional generation resources are necessary to supply
sufficient energy to maintain an adequate level of reliability
during the assessment period.
The new subsection (g) (3) requests that, if the ERO finds
the bulk-power system is at risk of not having adequate
generation, it shall notify the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (Commission) that the bulk-power system is in a
state of generation inadequacy.
The new subsection (g) (4) provides that the ERO may
collect information from users, owners, and operators of the
bulk-power system to conduct its long-term assessments.
Paragraph (2) of Section 2 redesignates subsections (h)
through (k) of the Federal Power Act as subsections (i) through
(l) respectively.
Paragraph (3) of Section 2 inserts a new subsection (h)
Commission Review and Comment for Covered Agency Actions. The
new subsection (h) (1) provides that, if the ERO notifies the
Commission that the bulk-power system is in a state of
generation inadequacy, the Commission shall promptly notify the
Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
any other Federal agency the Commission determines appropriate
of the state of generation inadequacy.
The new subsection (h) (2) provides that the head of each
Federal agency so notified shall provide for Commission review
and comment any Covered Agency Action by the Federal agency not
later than 90 days before the covered action is made available
for public inspection.
The new subsection (h) (3) provides that the Commission, in
consultation with the ERO and transmission organizations,
shall, by order, provide to the Federal agency comments on the
Covered Agency Action, and, if applicable, recommendations for
modification to the Covered Agency Action to prevent a
significant negative impact on the ability of the bulk-power
system to supply sufficient energy to maintain reliability. The
Commission response may include assessment of the effects of
the Covered Agency Action on rates, terms, and conditions for
services, pursuant to Commission authority.
The new subsection (h) (4) provides that the head of a
Federal agency may not finalize a Covered Agency Action
provided to the Commission under (h) (2) until the agency head
responds in writing to the Commission how the agency head
modified the action in response to Commission comments and
recommendations and the Commission finds that the Covered
Agency Action will not be likely to have a significant negative
impact on the reliability of the bulk-power system.
The new subsection (h) (5) provides for the Federal agency
head to make public Commission comments, recommendations, and
related responses for the Covered Agency Action.
The new subsection (h) (6) provides definitions, including
that a Covered Agency Action is a regulation that relates to or
otherwise directly affects any generation resources in the
bulk-power system and is under development or consideration by
a federal agency.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
FEDERAL POWER ACT
* * * * * * *
PART II--REGULATION OF ELECTRIC UTILITY COMPANIES
ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
* * * * * * *
SEC. 215. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY.
(a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) The term ``bulk-power system'' means--
(A) facilities and control systems necessary
for operating an interconnected electric energy
transmission network (or any portion thereof);
and
(B) electric energy from generation
facilities needed to maintain transmission
system reliability.
The term does not include facilities used in the local
distribution of electric energy.
(2) The terms ``Electric Reliability Organization''
and ``ERO'' mean the organization certified by the
Commission under subsection (c) the purpose of which is
to establish and enforce reliability standards for the
bulk-power system, subject to Commission review.
(3) The term ``reliability standard'' means a
requirement, approved by the Commission under this
section, to provide for reliable operation of the bulk-
power system. The term includes requirements for the
operation of existing bulk-power system facilities,
including cybersecurity protection, and the design of
planned additions or modifications to such facilities
to the extent necessary to provide for reliable
operation of the bulk-power system, but the term does
not include any requirement to enlarge such facilities
or to construct new transmission capacity or generation
capacity.
(4) The term ``reliable operation'' means operating
the elements of the bulk-power system within equipment
and electric system thermal, voltage, and stability
limits so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or
cascading failures of such system will not occur as a
result of a sudden disturbance, including a
cybersecurity incident, or unanticipated failure of
system elements.
(5) The term ``Interconnection'' means a geographic
area in which the operation of bulk-power system
components is synchronized such that the failure of one
or more of such components may adversely affect the
ability of the operators of other components within the
system to maintain reliable operation of the facilities
within their control.
(6) The term ``transmission organization'' means a
Regional Transmission Organization, Independent System
Operator, independent transmission provider, or other
transmission organization finally approved by the
Commission for the operation of transmission
facilities.
(7) The term ``regional entity'' means an entity
having enforcement authority pursuant to subsection
(e)(4).
(8) The term ``cybersecurity incident'' means a
malicious act or suspicious event that disrupts, or was
an attempt to disrupt, the operation of those
programmable electronic devices and communication
networks including hardware, software and data that are
essential to the reliable operation of the bulk power
system.
(b) Jurisdiction and Applicability.--(1) The Commission shall
have jurisdiction, within the United States, over the ERO
certified by the Commission under subsection (c), any regional
entities, and all users, owners and operators of the bulk-power
system, including but not limited to the entities described in
section 201(f), for purposes of approving reliability standards
established under this section and enforcing compliance with
this section. All users, owners and operators of the bulk-power
system shall comply with reliability standards that take effect
under this section.
(2) The Commission shall issue a final rule to implement the
requirements of this section not later than 180 days after the
date of enactment of this section.
(c) Certification.--Following the issuance of a Commission
rule under subsection (b)(2), any person may submit an
application to the Commission for certification as the Electric
Reliability Organization. The Commission may certify one such
ERO if the Commission determines that such ERO--
(1) has the ability to develop and enforce, subject
to subsection (e)(2), reliability standards that
provide for an adequate level of reliability of the
bulk-power system; and
(2) has established rules that--
(A) assure its independence of the users and
owners and operators of the bulk-power system,
while assuring fair stakeholder representation
in the selection of its directors and balanced
decisionmaking in any ERO committee or
subordinate organizational structure;
(B) allocate equitably reasonable dues, fees,
and other charges among end users for all
activities under this section;
(C) provide fair and impartial procedures for
enforcement of reliability standards through
the imposition of penalties in accordance with
subsection (e) (including limitations on
activities, functions, or operations, or other
appropriate sanctions);
(D) provide for reasonable notice and
opportunity for public comment, due process,
openness, and balance of interests in
developing reliability standards and otherwise
exercising its duties; and
(E) provide for taking, after certification,
appropriate steps to gain recognition in Canada
and Mexico.
(d) Reliability Standards.--(1) The Electric Reliability
Organization shall file each reliability standard or
modification to a reliability standard that it proposes to be
made effective under this section with the Commission.
(2) The Commission may approve, by rule or order, a proposed
reliability standard or modification to a reliability standard
if it determines that the standard is just, reasonable, not
unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public
interest. The Commission shall give due weight to the technical
expertise of the Electric Reliability Organization with respect
to the content of a proposed standard or modification to a
reliability standard and to the technical expertise of a
regional entity organized on an Interconnection-wide basis with
respect to a reliability standard to be applicable within that
Interconnection, but shall not defer with respect to the effect
of a standard on competition. A proposed standard or
modification shall take effect upon approval by the Commission.
(3) The Electric Reliability Organization shall rebuttably
presume that a proposal from a regional entity organized on an
Interconnection-wide basis for a reliability standard or
modification to a reliability standard to be applicable on an
Interconnection-wide basis is just, reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest.
(4) The Commission shall remand to the Electric Reliability
Organization for further consideration a proposed reliability
standard or a modification to a reliability standard that the
Commission disapproves in whole or in part.
(5) The Commission, upon its own motion or upon complaint,
may order the Electric Reliability Organization to submit to
the Commission a proposed reliability standard or a
modification to a reliability standard that addresses a
specific matter if the Commission considers such a new or
modified reliability standard appropriate to carry out this
section.
(6) The final rule adopted under subsection (b)(2) shall
include fair processes for the identification and timely
resolution of any conflict between a reliability standard and
any function, rule, order, tariff, rate schedule, or agreement
accepted, approved, or ordered by the Commission applicable to
a transmission organization. Such transmission organization
shall continue to comply with such function, rule, order,
tariff, rate schedule or agreement accepted, approved, or
ordered by the Commission until--
(A) the Commission finds a conflict exists between a
reliability standard and any such provision;
(B) the Commission orders a change to such provision
pursuant to section 206 of this part; and
(C) the ordered change becomes effective under this
part.
If the Commission determines that a reliability standard needs
to be changed as a result of such a conflict, it shall order
the ERO to develop and file with the Commission a modified
reliability standard under paragraph (4) or (5) of this
subsection.
(e) Enforcement.--(1) The ERO may impose, subject to
paragraph (2), a penalty on a user or owner or operator of the
bulk-power system for a violation of a reliability standard
approved by the Commission under subsection (d) if the ERO,
after notice and an opportunity for a hearing--
(A) finds that the user or owner or operator has
violated a reliability standard approved by the
Commission under subsection (d); and
(B) files notice and the record of the proceeding
with the Commission.
(2) A penalty imposed under paragraph (1) may take effect not
earlier than the 31st day after the ERO files with the
Commission notice of the penalty and the record of proceedings.
Such penalty shall be subject to review by the Commission, on
its own motion or upon application by the user, owner or
operator that is the subject of the penalty filed within 30
days after the date such notice is filed with the Commission.
Application to the Commission for review, or the initiation of
review by the Commission on its own motion, shall not operate
as a stay of such penalty unless the Commission otherwise
orders upon its own motion or upon application by the user,
owner or operator that is the subject of such penalty. In any
proceeding to review a penalty imposed under paragraph (1), the
Commission, after notice and opportunity for hearing (which
hearing may consist solely of the record before the ERO and
opportunity for the presentation of supporting reasons to
affirm, modify, or set aside the penalty), shall by order
affirm, set aside, reinstate, or modify the penalty, and, if
appropriate, remand to the ERO for further proceedings. The
Commission shall implement expedited procedures for such
hearings.
(3) On its own motion or upon complaint, the Commission may
order compliance with a reliability standard and may impose a
penalty against a user or owner or operator of the bulk-power
system if the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity
for a hearing, that the user or owner or operator of the bulk-
power system has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or
practices that constitute or will constitute a violation of a
reliability standard.
(4) The Commission shall issue regulations authorizing the
ERO to enter into an agreement to delegate authority to a
regional entity for the purpose of proposing reliability
standards to the ERO and enforcing reliability standards under
paragraph (1) if--
(A) the regional entity is governed by--
(i) an independent board;
(ii) a balanced stakeholder board; or
(iii) a combination independent and balanced
stakeholder board.
(B) the regional entity otherwise satisfies the
provisions of subsection (c)(1) and (2); and
(C) the agreement promotes effective and efficient
administration of bulk-power system reliability.
The Commission may modify such delegation. The ERO and the
Commission shall rebuttably presume that a proposal for
delegation to a regional entity organized on an
Interconnection-wide basis promotes effective and efficient
administration of bulk-power system reliability and should be
approved. Such regulation may provide that the Commission may
assign the ERO's authority to enforce reliability standards
under paragraph (1) directly to a regional entity consistent
with the requirements of this paragraph.
(5) The Commission may take such action as is necessary or
appropriate against the ERO or a regional entity to ensure
compliance with a reliability standard or any Commission order
affecting the ERO or a regional entity.
(6) Any penalty imposed under this section shall bear a
reasonable relation to the seriousness of the violation and
shall take into consideration the efforts of such user, owner,
or operator to remedy the violation in a timely manner.
(f) Changes in Electric Reliability Organization Rules.--The
Electric Reliability Organization shall file with the
Commission for approval any proposed rule or proposed rule
change, accompanied by an explanation of its basis and purpose.
The Commission, upon its own motion or complaint, may propose a
change to the rules of the ERO. A proposed rule or proposed
rule change shall take effect upon a finding by the Commission,
after notice and opportunity for comment, that the change is
just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, is
in the public interest, and satisfies the requirements of
subsection (c).
(g) Reliability Reports.--[The ERO]
(1) In general._The ERO shall conduct periodic
assessments of the reliability and adequacy of the
bulk-power system in North America.
(2) Annual long-term assessment.--The assessments
under paragraph (1) shall include an annual long-term
assessment, which shall include--
(A) an analysis of the ability of the bulk-
power system to supply sufficient electric
energy necessary to maintain an adequate level
of reliability, taking into account generation
resource mix, transmission development, and
electric energy demand trends;
(B) an analysis of the risk of future
electric energy supply shortfalls under normal
and extreme weather conditions, and the risk of
any such shortfalls within each region of the
bulk-power system; and
(C) a determination of whether additional
generation resources are necessary to supply
sufficient electric energy to maintain an
adequate level of reliability during the
assessment period.
(3) Notice of generation inadequacy.--In conducting a
long-term assessment under paragraph (2), if the ERO
finds that the bulk-power system is at risk of not
having adequate generation resources to supply
sufficient electric energy to maintain an adequate
level of reliability, the ERO shall publicly notify the
Commission that the bulk-power system is in a state of
generation inadequacy.
(4) Data collection.--To conduct a long-term
assessment under paragraph (2), the ERO may collect
information and data from users, owners, and operators
of the bulk-power system.
(h) Commission Review and Comment for Covered Agency
Actions.--
(1) Notice to federal agencies.--If the ERO notifies
the Commission under subsection (g)(3) that the bulk-
power system is in a state of generation inadequacy,
the Commission shall promptly notify the Department of
Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and any
other Federal agency the Commission determines
appropriate of such state of generation inadequacy.
(2) Submission.--Upon receiving notice under
paragraph (1), the head of each Federal agency that
received such notice shall provide to the Commission
for review and comment any covered agency action by the
Federal agency--
(A) on the first date on which such covered
agency action is provided to the Office of
Management and Budget or any other Federal
agency for review and comment; or
(B) if such covered agency action is not
provided to the Office of Management and Budget
or any other Federal agency for review and
comment, not later than 90 days before the date
on which the covered agency action is published
in the Federal Register or is otherwise made
available for public inspection or comment.
(3) Commission comments.--The Commission, in
consultation with the ERO and transmission
organizations, shall, by order, provide to the agency
head that provided to the Commission a covered agency
action under paragraph (2)--
(A) comments on such covered agency action,
which such comments may include an assessment
of the effect of the covered agency action on
rates, terms, and conditions for services
pursuant to the authority of the Commission
under sections 201 and 206; and
(B) if applicable, recommendations for
modifications to the covered agency action to
prevent a significant negative impact on the
ability of the bulk-power system to supply
sufficient electric energy necessary to
maintain an adequate level of reliability.
(4) Agency response.--The head of a Federal agency
may not finalize a covered agency action that is
provided to the Commission under paragraph (2) until--
(A) the agency head responds in writing to
the Commission with an explanation of how the
agency head modified, or why the agency head
determined not to modify, such covered agency
action in response to any comments and
recommendations provided by the Commission
under paragraph (3); and
(B) the Commission finds that the covered
agency action will not be likely to have a
significant negative impact on the ability of
the bulk-power system to supply sufficient
electric energy necessary to maintain an
adequate level of reliability.
(5) Public availability of comments and responses.--
An agency head shall include any comments,
recommendations, and responses for the covered agency
action when--
(A) submitting the covered agency action to
the Federal Register for publication; or
(B) otherwise making the covered agency
action available for public inspection or
comment.
(6) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) Covered agency action.--The term
``covered agency action'' means a regulation
that--
(i) relates to, or otherwise directly
affects, any generation resource in the
bulk-power system; and
(ii) is under development to be
proposed or otherwise under
consideration in a rulemaking prior to
finalization on the date on which the
Federal agency receives notice from the
Commission under paragraph (1).
(B) Federal agency.--The term ``Federal
agency'' means an Executive department (as that
term is defined in section 101 of title 5,
United States Code) or any other Executive
agency that is in the President's cabinet.
[(h)] (i) Coordination With Canada and Mexico.--The President
is urged to negotiate international agreements with the
governments of Canada and Mexico to provide for effective
compliance with reliability standards and the effectiveness of
the ERO in the United States and Canada or Mexico.
[(i)] (j) Savings Provisions.--(1) The ERO shall have
authority to develop and enforce compliance with reliability
standards for only the bulk-power system.
(2) This section does not authorize the ERO or the Commission
to order the construction of additional generation or
transmission capacity or to set and enforce compliance with
standards for adequacy or safety of electric facilities or
services.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt any
authority of any State to take action to ensure the safety,
adequacy, and reliability of electric service within that
State, as long as such action is not inconsistent with any
reliability standard, except that the State of New York may
establish rules that result in greater reliability within that
State, as long as such action does not result in lesser
reliability outside the State than that provided by the
reliability standards.
(4) Within 90 days of the application of the Electric
Reliability Organization or other affected party, and after
notice and opportunity for comment, the Commission shall issue
a final order determining whether a State action is
inconsistent with a reliability standard, taking into
consideration any recommendation of the ERO.
(5) The Commission, after consultation with the ERO and the
State taking action, may stay the effectiveness of any State
action, pending the Commission's issuance of a final order.
[(j)] (k) Regional Advisory Bodies.--The Commission shall
establish a regional advisory body on the petition of at least
two-thirds of the States within a region that have more than
one-half of their electric load served within the region. A
regional advisory body shall be composed of one member from
each participating State in the region, appointed by the
Governor of each State, and may include representatives of
agencies, States, and provinces outside the United States. A
regional advisory body may provide advice to the Electric
Reliability Organization, a regional entity, or the Commission
regarding the governance of an existing or proposed regional
entity within the same region, whether a standard proposed to
apply within the region is just, reasonable, not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest,
whether fees proposed to be assessed within the region are
just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential,
and in the public interest and any other responsibilities
requested by the Commission. The Commission may give deference
to the advice of any such regional advisory body if that body
is organized on an Interconnection-wide basis.
[(k)] (l) Alaska and Hawaii.--The provisions of this section
do not apply to Alaska or Hawaii.
* * * * * * *
MINORITY VIEWS
H.R. 3616, the Reliable Power Act H.R. 3616, the Reliable
Power Act, would restructure section 215 of the Federal Power
Act to grant the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
veto authority over other agencies' regulations in certain
circumstances. It would effectively elevate FERC's authority
over all other agencies' statutory responsibilities. The bill
would grant FERC an unprecedented veto over other agency
actions while FERC's status as an independent regulator is in
serious jeopardy.
The bill grants FERC power over other agency regulations if
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
notifies FERC that the bulk-power system is in a ``state of
generation inadequacy.''\1\ This would transform NERC from a
neutral arbiter of the electric sector's reliability into a
political actor, deciding when to grant FERC additional powers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\H.R. 3616.
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NERC's annual long-term reliability assessments would
become politicized, and Congress would delegate a decision
about what powers FERC should have to an industry body.
Furthermore, while NERC and its staff do an admirable job
with relatively few resources, their judgment is only as good
as the data inputs they receive. This recently became an issue
when NERC announced that it was reclassifying the footprint of
the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) from a
state of high risk to a state of elevated risk later this
decade, because MISO had mismatched data submitted to NERC.\2\
This episode highlights the sheer complexity of NERC's
reliability assessments, and, while useful, they are uncertain
enough that they should not be used to trigger additional FERC
authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Statement on
NERC's 2024 Long-Term Assessment (June 17, 2025) (https://www.nerc.com/
news/Pages/Statement-on-NERC%E2%80%99s-2024-Long-Term-Reliability-
Assessment.aspx).
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The majority's report singles out the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) 2024 rule on New Source Performance
Standards for new, modified, and reconstructed power plants.
However, the majority can hardly argue that EPA lacked
information on potential reliability impacts when crafting the
rule. In April 2023, a year before the rule was finalized, FERC
staff from the Office of Electric Reliability met with EPA
staff regarding the rule.\3\ In November 2023, FERC held a
technical conference that featured EPA's then-Principal Deputy
Assistant Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation,
Joseph Goffman, as a witness and included an additional two
panels from electric industry stakeholders discussing the
rule.\4\ Following the technical conference, EPA noticed a
supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, specifically
soliciting comments on how the proposed rule related to
electric reliability, and received over one hundred
comments.\5\ Finally, then-FERC Commissioner James Danly
himself submitted two comments on the rule to EPA.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Response from Dr. David
Ortiz, Director, Office of Electric Reliability, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, to a Question for the Record from Chair Jeff
Duncan, Subcommittee on Climate and Grid Security, Hearing on Keeping
the Lights on: Enhancing Reliability and Efficiency to Power American
Homes, 118th Cong. (Sept. 13, 2023).
\4\Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Second Supplemental Notice
of Technical Conference, Reliability Technical Conference, Docket No.
AD23-9 (Oct. 30, 2023).
\5\Environmental Protection Agency, New Source Performance
Standards for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units, 88 Fed. Reg.
80682. (Nov. 20, 2023) (proposed rule).
\6\Commissioner James Danly, Comment to Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-
0072 (Aug. 8, 2023); Commissioner James Danly, Comment to Docket No.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0072 (Dec. 20, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The majority may dislike the conclusions EPA came to, but
the agency's process was undeniably thorough. EPA considered a
number of factors, including electric reliability, and came to
a conclusion of what was required of it under the Clean Air
Act. Here, the majority seeks to upset the law without actually
doing the hard work of amending agency authorizing statutes,
instead simply giving the final call to FERC--an independent
commission that ``has no business promoting the policies of any
one party or presidential administration.''\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Building for the Future
Through Electric Regional Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation,
Order No. 1920, 187 FERC 61,068 (May 13, 2024) (Christie,
Commissioner, dissenting at PP 4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Giving FERC the final call on regulations is even more
concerning now than it was in prior administrations due to an
exodus of staff over the previous nine months. The agency has
lost 11 percent of its workforce since the Trump Administration
took office, meaning that it will struggle to carry out its
basic activities regulating the energy sector, let alone
policing other agencies' regulations.\8\ This amplifies fears
that even at pre-Trump Administration staffing levels, FERC
lacked the capacity to implement the bill, as the Committee
heard from Dr. David Ortiz, then-Director of FERC's Office of
Electric Reliability in 2023 and FERC's Acting General Counsel
David L. Morenoff earlier this year.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\`Brain Drain' at FERC Hits Legal and Policy Staff, E&E News
(Sep. 5, 2025).
\9\House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Testimony of Dr. David
Ortiz, Director, Office of Electric Reliability, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Hearing on Keeping the Lights on: Enhancing
Reliability and Efficiency to Power American Homes, 118th Cong. (Sept.
13, 2023); House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Testimony of David
L. Morenoff, Acting General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Hearing on Assuring Abundant, Reliable American Energy to
Power Innovation, 119th Cong. (Apr. 30, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the Energy Subcommittee Markup, Rep. Diana DeGette (D-
CO) offered an amendment that would have fixed this portion of
the bill by preventing it from taking effect until FERC
certified that it had sufficient staffing capacity to analyze
all covered agency actions.\10\ That amendment failed on a
party-line vote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy,
Markup of 13 Bills, 119th Cong. (June 5, 2025).
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For the reasons stated above, I oppose this legislation.
Frank Pallone, Jr.,
Ranking Member.
[all]