[House Report 119-244]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
119th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { 119-244
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FDIC BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
_______
September 8, 2025.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Hill of Arkansas, from the Committee on Financial Services,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 3446]
The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 3446) to amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
to revise the membership requirements for the Board of
Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and for
other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably
thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 2
Committee Consideration.......................................... 2
Related Hearings................................................. 3
Committee Votes.................................................. 3
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 5
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 5
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 5
New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate....................... 5
Unfunded Mandates Statement...................................... 5
Earmark Statement................................................ 6
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 6
Applicability to the Legislative Branch.......................... 6
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 6
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 6
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 6
Minority Views................................................... 10
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 3446, the FDIC Board Accountability Act, was
introduced on May 15, 2025, by Republican Representative Bill
Huizenga (MI-04). H.R. 3446 amends the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act to strengthen the professional qualifications and
governance of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
Board of Directors. Specifically, it requires that at least one
of the presidentially appointed board members have state bank
supervisory experience, and separately, that one have
demonstrated primary experience working in or supervising
depository institutions with less than $10 billion in assets.
The bill preserves the position of the Comptroller of the
Currency as a voting Board member and converts the Director of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) from a voting
Board member into a non-voting observer. Additionally, it
limits board service to no more than two terms and a maximum of
12 years total, ensuring regular infusion of fresh perspectives
and reducing potential for entrenched partisanship.
Background and Need for Legislation
The FDIC plays a critical role in ensuring the safety and
soundness of the U.S. banking system. However, recent events
revealed vulnerabilities in FDIC Board governance and
politicization of agency functions. Most notably, in 2020, the
CFPB Director and other Democratic members of the FDIC Board
bypassed the Chair to pursue a partisan regulatory agenda,
raising concerns about internal board conflict and diminished
institutional independence.\1\ These actions risked
destabilizing the agency's neutral supervisory role and
injected uncertainty into financial markets at a time when
stability was paramount.
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\1\Emily Flitter, How Bank Regulators are Trying to Oust a Trump
Holdover, N.Y. Times (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/
10/business/jelena-mcwilliams-fdic-bank-regulation-trump.html.
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H.R. 3446 enhances accountability by requiring specific
expertise among Board members and setting term limits to
prevent entrenchment. By ensuring the Board includes members
with relevant experience at smaller banks and state supervisory
agencies, the bill promotes balanced, informed decision-making
that reflects the diversity of the banking sector. The bill
also restores balance by removing the CFPB Director's voting
authority, enabling the CFPB to focus exclusively on consumer
protection without overstepping into prudential regulation.
This governance structure promotes a more stable and
independent FDIC, better equipped to respond effectively to
systemic risks and supervisory challenges in a nonpartisan,
professional manner.
Committee Consideration
119TH CONGRESS
On May 15, 2025, Representative Huizenga introduced H.R.
3446, the FDIC Board Accountability Act, with Representatives
Andy Barr (R-KY), Daniel Meuser (R-PA), and John Rose (R-TN) as
original cosponsors. The bill was referred solely to the
Committee on Financial Services.
This bill was attached to the April 29, 2025 hearing titled
``Regulatory Overreach: The Price Tag on American Prosperity''
and the July 15, 2025 hearing titled, ``Dodd-Frank Turns 15:
Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead.''
On June 10, 2025, the Committee on Financial Services met
in open session to consider, among others, H.R. 3446. The
Committee ordered H.R. 3446 to be favorably reported to the
House of Representatives.
118TH CONGRESS
On March 7, 2023, Representative Blaine Luetkemeyer (R-MO)
introduced H.R. 1409, the FDIC Board Accountability Act, with
Representative Mark Alford (R-MO) as original cosponsor. This
bill is an earlier iteration of H.R. 3446. The bill was
referred solely to the Committee on Financial Services. There
was no further action on the bill in the 118th Congress.
Related Hearings
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the following hearings were used to
develop H.R. 3446:
The Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Committee
on Financial Services held an April 29, 2025, hearing titled
``Regulatory Overreach: The Price Tag on American Prosperity.''
A discussion draft version of the bill was attached to the
hearing. The following witnesses testified: Ms. Sarah Christine
Flowers, Senior Vice President, Senior Associate General
Counsel, Bank Policy Institute; Mr. Michael Radcliffe, Chairman
& Chief Executive Officer, Community Financial Services Bank;
Mrs. Margaret E. Tahyar, Partner, Head of Financial
Institutions Group, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP; and The
Honorable Graham Steele, Academic Fellow, Rock Center for
Corporate Governance, Stanford Law School.
The Committee on Financial Services held a July 15, 2025,
hearing titled ``Dodd-Frank Turns 15: Lessons Learned and the
Road Ahead.'' H.R. 3666 was attached to the hearing. The
following witnesses testified: The Honorable Ken Bentsen,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association; Mrs. Lindsey Johnson, President
and Chief Executive Officer, Consumer Bankers Association; Mr.
Tom Quaadman, Chief of Government Affairs and Public Policy,
Investment Company Institute; Dr. Paul Kupiec, Senior Fellow,
American Enterprise Institute; and Mr. Dennis Kelleher, Co-
Founder, President, and Chief Executive Officer, Better
Markets.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee Report to include record
votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments
thereto.
On July 23, 2025, the Committee ordered H.R. 3446 to be
reported favorably to the House by a recorded vote of 26 yeas
and 23 nays. (Record Vote No. FC-189).
Committee Oversight Findings
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of
the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives
are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
Performance Goals and Objectives
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the goal of H.R. 3446 is to
strengthen the professional qualifications and governance of
the FDIC Board of Directors by requiring that at least one of
the presidentially appointed board members have state bank
supervisory experience, and separately, that one have
demonstrated primary experience working in or supervising
depository institutions with less than $10 billion in assets.
to strengthen the professional qualifications and governance of
the FDIC Board of Directors by requiring that at least one of
the presidentially appointed board members have state bank
supervisory experience, and separately, that one have
demonstrated primary experience working in or supervising
depository institutions with less than $10 billion in assets.
Committee Cost Estimate
Clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison of the
costs that would be incurred in carrying out H.R. 3446. The
Committee has requested but not received a cost estimate from
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. However,
pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee will adopt as its own
the cost estimate by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office once it has been prepared.
New Budget Authority and CBO Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect
to requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives and section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee will adopt as
its own the cost estimate for the bill prepared by the Director
of the Congressional Budget Office. However, a cost estimate
was not made available to the Committee in time for the filing
of this report. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause such
estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon its
receipt by the Committee.
Unfunded Mandates Statement
The Committee has requested but not received from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office an estimate of the
Federal mandates pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act. The Chairman of the Committee shall cause
such estimate to be printed in the Congressional Record upon
its receipt by the Committee.
Earmark Statement
In compliance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of rule XXI.
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to the Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Duplication of Federal Programs
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee states that no
provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of
the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another
Federal program, including any program that was included in a
report to Congress pursuant to section 21 of the Public Law
111-139 or the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
Section 1 provides the short title is the ``FDIC Board
Accountability Act.''
Section 2. FDIC Board of Directors
This section amends Section 2 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act to require 4 members of the FDIC Board be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, one of
whom shall have State bank supervisory experience, and
separately one of whom shall demonstrate primary experience
working in or supervising depository institutions with less
than $10 billion in total assets.
This section designates the Director of the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection as a non-voting observer to the
FDIC Board.
This Section places a maximum length of service limit of 12
years for a member to serve on the FDIC Board.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE ACT
* * * * * * *
SEC. 2. MANAGEMENT.
(a) Board of Directors.--
(1) In general.--The management of the Corporation
shall be vested in a Board of Directors consisting of 5
members--
(A) 1 of whom shall be the Comptroller of the
Currency; and
[(B) 1 of whom shall be the Director of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; and
[(C) 3 of whom shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, from among individuals who are
citizens of the United States, 1 of whom shall
have State bank supervisory experience.]
(B) 4 of whom shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, from among individuals who are
citizens of the United States, 1 of whom shall
have State bank supervisory experience, and
separately 1 of whom shall have demonstrated
primary experience working in or supervising
depository institutions having less than
$10,000,000,000 in total assets.
(2) Political affiliation.--After February 28, 1993,
not more than 3 of the members of the Board of
Directors may be members of the same political party.
(3) Non-voting status of the director of the bureau
of consumer financial protection.--The Director of the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection shall serve as
a non-voting observer to the Board of Directors of the
Corporation.
(b) Chairperson and Vice Chairperson.--
(1) Chairperson.--1 of the appointed members shall be
designated by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to serve as Chairperson of the
Board of Directors for a term of 5 years.
(2) Vice chairperson.--1 of the appointed members
shall be designated by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to serve as Vice
Chairperson of the Board of Directors.
(3) Acting chairperson.--In the event of a vacancy in
the position of Chairperson of the Board of Directors
or during the absence or disability of the Chairperson,
the Vice Chairperson shall act as Chairperson.
(c) Terms.--
(1) Appointed members.--Each appointed member shall
be appointed for a term of 6 years. No individual may
be appointed as a member for more than two terms.
(2) Interim appointments.--Any member appointed to
fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of the
term for which such member's predecessor was appointed
shall be appointed only for the remainder of such term.
(3) Continuation of service.--The Chairperson, Vice
Chairperson, and each appointed member may continue to
serve after the expiration of the term of office to
which such member was appointed until a successor has
been appointed and qualified.
(4) Maximum length of service.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, no person shall serve as a
member for more than twelve years in total.
(d) Vacancy.--
(1) In general.--Any vacancy on the Board of
Directors shall be filled in the manner in which the
original appointment was made.
(2) Acting officials may serve.--In the event of a
vacancy in the office of the Comptroller of the
Currency or the office of Director of the [Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau] Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection and pending the appointment of a
successor, or during the absence or disability of the
Comptroller of the Currency or the Director of the
[Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection, the acting Comptroller
of the Currency or the acting Director of the [Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau] Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection, as the case may be, shall be a
member or observer, as the case may be, of the Board of
Directors in the place of the Comptroller or Director.
(e) Ineligibility for Other Offices.--
(1) Postservice restriction.--
(A) In general.--No member of the Board of
Directors may hold any office, position, or
employment in any insured depository
institution or any depository institution
holding company during--
(i) the time such member is in
office; and
(ii) the 2-year period beginning on
the date such member ceases to serve on
the Board of Directors.
(B) Exception for members who serve full
term.--The limitation contained in subparagraph
(A)(ii) shall not apply to any member who has
ceased to serve on the Board of Directors after
serving the full term for which such member was
appointed.
(2) Restriction during service.--No member of the
Board of Directors may--
(A) be an officer or director of any insured
depository institution, depository institution
holding company, Federal Reserve bank, or
Federal home loan bank; or
(B) hold stock in any insured depository
institution or depository institution holding
company.
(3) Certification.--Upon taking office, each member
of the Board of Directors shall certify under oath that
such member has complied with this subsection and such
certification shall be filed with the secretary of the
Board of Directors.
(f) Status of Employees.--
(1) In general.--A director, member, officer, or
employee of the Corporation has no liability under the
Securities Act of 1933 with respect to any claim
arising out of or resulting from any act or omission by
such person within the scope of such person's
employment in connection with any transaction involving
the disposition of assets (or any interests in any
assets or any obligations backed by any assets) by the
Corporation. This subsection shall not be construed to
limit personal liability for criminal acts or
omissions, willful or malicious misconduct, acts or
omissions for private gain, or any other acts or
omissions outside the scope of such person's
employment.
(2) Definition.--For purposes of this subsection, the
term ``employee of the Corporation'' includes any
employee of the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency [or of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau] who serves as a deputy or assistant to a member
of the Board of Directors of the Corporation in
connection with activities of the Corporation.
(3) Effect on other law.--This subsection does not
affect--
(A) any other immunities and protections that
may be available to such person under
applicable law with respect to such
transactions, or
(B) any other right or remedy against the
Corporation, against the United States under
applicable law, or against any person other
than a person described in paragraph (1)
participating in such transactions.
This subsection shall not be construed to limit or
alter in any way the immunities that are available
under applicable law for Federal officials and
employees not described in this subsection.
* * * * * * *
MINORITY VIEWS
H.R. 3446 would remove the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) Director as a voting member of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) board, mandate the
appointment of a member with experience in small depository
institutions, and limit board members' terms to twelve years.
One reason Congress put CFPB's Director on the FDIC board in
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
was because the FDIC has a joint prudential and consumer
protection mandate, including examining most of its banks that
have less than $10 billion in assets for consumer compliance.
Furthermore, this bill does nothing to prevent or stop
President Trump's recent attacks on the independence of the
FDIC and other financial regulators.
The FDIC Is the primary federal regulator of state banks
that are not members of the Federal Reserve System and state-
chartered thrift institutions. They examine those banks for
safety and soundness, and, for most of their banks that have
less than $10 billion in assets, they also examine them for
consumer protection. (The CFPB examines banks with more than
$10 billion in assets, in addition to certain non-depository
institutions, for consumer compliance). The FDIC also manages
the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) and is tasked with resolving
banks that fail, as well as large non-bank financial
institutions that need to be resolved through the Orderly
Liquidation Authority (OLA), which was created by Dodd-Frank to
avoid having another disorderly bankruptcy, like Lehman
Brothers which fueled the 2008 financial crisis.\1\
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\1\CRS, Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of the U.S. Financial
Regulatory Framework (Oct. 13, 2023).
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The FDIC is led by a five-member Board of Directors, which
consists of a Chairman, a Vice Chairman, and a third appointed
director. The two other members are the Comptroller of the
Currency and the CFPB Director. No more than three Directors
may be of the same political party (which typically means the
Vice Chairman and third-appointed Director are from the
opposite party of the President). Chairs and Vice Chairs have
five-year terms, and Directors have six-year terms. There is no
limit on how many terms these officials may serve. Dodd-Frank
placed the CFPB Director on the FDIC Board given some of the
shared responsibilities, for example, how FDIC examines small
banks with less than $10 billion for compliance with Federal
consumer laws for which the CFPB writes the implementing rules.
CFPB is also required to consult with the FDIC and other bank
regulators when issuing its rules.
H.R. 3446 is a partisan bill first introduced several years
ago by House Republicans as a political attack against then-
CFPB Director Rohit Chopra and then-FDIC Director Marty
Gruenberg, when they served on the FDIC Board along with former
FDIC Chairwoman Jelena McWilliams. House Republicans claimed
Chopra and Gruenberg exceeded their authority by seeking to
advance a proposal to request public comment on how the FDIC
could strengthen their bank merger review policies over
Chairwoman McWilliams' objections.\2\ The Department of
Justice, however, wrote a legal opinion making clear that
Chopra and Gruenberg acted appropriately, and that an FDIC
Chair lacks authority to block a proposal supported by the
majority of the FDIC Board.\3\ Chair McWilliams resigned
shortly thereafter, and House Republicans introduced this bill
to ``ensure the FDIC remains an independent agency removed from
the political whims of partisan ideologues like we saw on
December 9th.''\4\
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\2\FSC, Luetkemeyer, McHenry, Emmer Demand Answers on CFPB Attempt
to Usurp FDIC Authority (Mar. 7, 2022).
\3\DOJ. Authority of a Majority of the FDIC Board to Present Items
for Vote and Decision (Jul. 29, 2022). Also see FSC, Waters Blasts FDIC
Chairman McWilliams `Attempt to Block Bank Merger Protections for
Working Families (Dec. 16, 2021); and FSC, Waters Requests FDIC
Chairman Provide Legal Basis for Impeding Board Majority's Request for
Public Input on Merger Reviews (Dec. 21, 2021).
\4\FSC, Luetkemeyer, McHenry, Emmer Demand Answers on CFPB Attempt
to Usurp FDIC Authority (Mar. 7, 2022).
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Notably, President Trump has arguably taken significant
actions to undermine the independence of Federal agencies that
this bill does not address. For example, Trump has tried to
fire a number of Democratic commissioners from various
independent agencies, like the NCUA and FTC. Trump also took
the unprecedented step to seize significant control over
independent regulators like the Fed by requiring White House
review and approval of all rules as well as agency budgets.\5\
Despite their earlier concerns about political independence at
the FDIC, Republicans have done nothing to rein in these
actions nor does this bill otherwise strengthen the actual
independence of agencies like the FDIC. In fact, this bill
would remove the only voting person on the FDIC Board that is
effectively a consumer financial protection expert, with their
primary job being a CFPB Director.\6\ This bill is opposed by
the Americans for Financial Reform and Public Citizen.
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\5\White House, Executive Order 14215, Ensuring Accountability for
All Agencies (Feb. 18, 2025). Also see White House, OMB Interim
Guidance Implementing Section 3 of EO 14215 (Apr. 17, 2025).
\6\Testimony of Graham Steele before FSC hearing, Regulatory
Overreach: The Price Tag on American Prosperity (Apr. 29, 2025).
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For all of these reasons, we oppose H.R. 3446.
Sincerely,
Maxine Waters,
Ranking Member.
Nydia M. Velazquez,
Brad Sherman,
David Scott,
Stephen F. Lynch,
Al Green,
Emanuel Cleaver, II,
Bill Foster,
Joyce Beatty,
Juan Vargas,
Sean Casten,
Ayanna Pressley,
Rashida Tlaib,
Sylvia R. Garcia,
Nikema Williams,
Cleo Fields,
Members of Congress.
[all]