[Senate Report 118-59]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                   Calendar No. 106

118th Congress}                                            { Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session  }                                            { 118-59

======================================================================
 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

                                _______
                                

                 July 13, 2023.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

        Mr. Warner, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 2103]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 2103) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
year 2024 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

                Classified Annex to the Committee Report

    Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on March 14, 
2023, that the request for the National Intelligence Program 
for Fiscal Year 2024 was $72.4 billion. Other than for limited 
unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence 
Community Management Account, the classified nature of United 
States intelligence activities precludes any further 
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its 
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has 
prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a 
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule 
of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act and has the legal status of 
public law. The classified annex is made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for 
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of 
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2024 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the Intelligence Community for Fiscal Year 2024.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2024 are 
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that 
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) for Fiscal Year 2024.

Section 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 104 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM


Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA 
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2024.

               TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS


           Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters


Section 301. Post-graduate employment of Department of Defense Cyber 
        and Digital Service Academy scholarship recipients in 
        intelligence community

    Section 301 enables recipients of a Cyber and Digital 
Services Academy Scholarship to fulfill their post-award 
employment obligations through service in Intelligence 
Community agencies.

Section 302. Plan to recruit, train, and retain personnel with 
        experience in financial intelligence and emerging technologies

    Section 302 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
heads of human capital of the CIA, the National Security 
Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees a plan for the 
Intelligence Community to recruit, train, and retain personnel 
who have expertise and experience in financial intelligence and 
emerging technologies in order to improve analytic tradecraft.

Section 303. Policy and performance framework for mobility of 
        intelligence community workforce

    Section 303 requires the DNI to develop and implement a 
policy and performance framework to ensure the timely and 
effective mobility of employees and contractors of the Federal 
Government who are transferring employment between elements of 
the Intelligence Community.

Section 304. In-State tuition rates for active duty members of the 
        intelligence community

    Section 304 allows officers employed in the Intelligence 
Community to obtain in-state tuition benefits, consistent with 
members of armed forces and the Foreign Service.

Section 305. Standards, criteria, and guidance for counterintelligence 
        vulnerability assessments and surveys

    Section 305 amends the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act 
of 2002 to require the National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center (NCSC) to develop standards, criteria, and 
guidance that U.S. Government and private sector entities could 
use to conduct their own vulnerability surveys.

Section 306. Improving administration of certain post-employment 
        restrictions for intelligence community

    Section 306 provides the Intelligence Community with the 
authorities necessary to effectively administer the post-
employment restriction requirements in the National Security 
Act of 1947.

Section 307. Mission of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
        Center

    Section 307 amends the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act 
of 2002 to establish the NCSC's mission to include organizing 
and leading strategic planning for counterintelligence 
activities of the U.S. Government.

Section 308. Prohibition relating to transport of individuals detained 
        at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

    Section 308 prohibits any IC element from chartering 
private or commercial aircraft to transport any individual who 
is or was detained at Guantanamo Bay.

Section 309. Department of Energy review of certain foreign visitors 
        and assignees to National Laboratories

    Section 309 requires the Director of the Office of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of 
Energy to vet foreign national visitors or assignees to 
National Labs from sensitive countries for counterintelligence 
risks, notify a National Lab of its determination of whether a 
visitor or assignee poses a counterintelligence risk, and make 
a recommendation to the National Lab whether to grant or deny 
access. Section 309 further requires quarterly reporting of 
each instance where a National Lab granted access and the 
respective recommendation.

Section 310. Congressional oversight of intelligence community risk 
        assessments

    Section 310 requires the DNI, within 30 days of commencing 
a risk assessment arising from the mishandling or improper 
disclosure ofclassified information, to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees copies of such documents and 
materials within the committees' jurisdiction and provide a briefing.

Section 311. Inspector General review of dissemination by Federal 
        Bureau of Investigation Richmond, Virginia, field office of 
        certain document

    Section 311 requires the Inspector General of the 
Department of Justice to conduct a review of the actions and 
events, including any underlying policy direction, that served 
as a basis for the FBI Richmond Field Office's January 23, 2023 
dissemination of the document titled ``Interest of Racially or 
Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in Radical-
Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New 
Mitigation Opportunities.''

Section 312. Office of Intelligence and Analysis

    Section 312 prohibits employees of the Department of 
Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
(I&A) from engaging in the collection of information or 
intelligence targeting U.S. persons, except when carried out by 
I&A officials responsible for collecting information or 
intelligence from state, local, or Tribal territory governments 
or a private employer.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency


Section 321. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and 
        assets from unmanned aircraft

    Section 321 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 to allow authorized CIA personnel to better detect and 
respond to threats posed to CIA facilities and assets by 
unmanned aircraft.

Section 322. Change to penalties and increased availability of mental 
        health treatment for unlawful conduct on Central Intelligence 
        Agency installations

    Section 322 allows the U.S. Government to seek penalties 
for violations of CIA regulations prohibiting certain conduct 
on CIA installations, such as driving under the influence and 
trespass, that are consistent with other federal and state 
jurisdictions.

Section 323. Modifications to procurement authorities of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 323 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 to ensure that the CIA's advance payment delegation 
authorities conform to those of other U.S. government agencies.

Section 324. Establishment of Central Intelligence Agency standard 
        workplace sexual misconduct complaint investigation procedure

    Section 324 requires the Director of the CIA to establish 
and implement a standard workplace sexual misconduct complaint 
investigation procedure and provide annual reports to the 
congressional intelligence committees regarding the number and 
disposition of workplace sexual misconduct complaints brought 
to each individual or office of the CIA.

Section 325. Pay cap for diversity, equity, and inclusion staff and 
        contract employees of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 325 requires the Director of the CIA to establish a 
pay cap on the salaries of CIA Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion 
staff and contract employees at the same level as an officer of 
the Directorate of Operations in the Clandestine Services 
Trainee program.

             TITLE IV--MATTERS CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES


                 Subtitle A--People's Republic of China


Section 401. Intelligence community coordinator for accountability of 
        atrocities of the People's Republic of China

    Section 401 requires the DNI to designate an Intelligence 
Community coordinator for accountability of atrocities of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC).

Section 402. Interagency working group and report on the malign efforts 
        of the People's Republic of China in Africa

    Section 402 requires the DNI to establish an interagency 
working group within the Intelligence Community to analyze the 
PRC's tactics and capabilities in Africa.

Section 403. Amendment to requirement for annual assessment by 
        intelligence community working group for monitoring the 
        economic and technological capabilities of the People's 
        Republic of China

    Section 403 amends section 6503 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 to ensure the DNI 
provides a comprehensive unclassified list of PRC businesses, 
academic and research institutions and other entities that 
support the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese military, and 
other Chinese government entities.

Section 404. Assessments of reciprocity in the relationship between the 
        United States and the People's Republic of China

    Section 404 requires the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research, together with the DNI and other 
appropriate Intelligence Community leaders, to submit an 
assessment of critical areas in which the United States does 
not maintain a reciprocal relationship with the PRC, and how 
any lack of reciprocity provides advantages to the PRC.

Section 405. Annual briefing on intelligence community efforts to 
        identify and mitigate Chinese Communist Party political 
        influence operations and information warfare against the United 
        States

    Section 405 requires the Director of the Foreign Malign 
Influence Center to provide the congressional intelligence 
committees with a briefing on the ways in which relevant 
Intelligence Community elements are working to identify and 
mitigate actions of Chinese entities engaged in political 
influence operations and information warfare against the United 
States (including U.S. persons).

Section 406. Assessment of threat posed to United States ports by 
        cranes manufactured by countries of concern

    Section 406 requires the DNI to coordinate with the 
Secretary of Defense and other heads of the Intelligence 
Community as appropriate to conduct an assessment and submit a 
report on the threat posed to the United States by cranes 
manufactured by countries of concern and commercial entities of 
those countries, including the Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy 
Industries Co.

                     Subtitle B--Russian Federation


Section 411. Assessment of lessons learned by intelligence community 
        with respect to conflict in Ukraine

    Section 411 requires the DNI to submit an assessment of the 
lessons learned by the Intelligence Community with respect to 
the war in Ukraine, including the quality and timeliness of the 
United States' intelligence support.

Section 412. National intelligence estimate on long-term confrontation 
        with Russia

    Section 412 requires the DNI to submit a national 
intelligence estimate on the implications of the Ukraine war 
with respect to a long-term United States and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization confrontation with Russia.

                  Subtitle C--Other Foreign Countries


Section 421. Report on efforts to capture and detain United States 
        citizens as hostages

    Section 421 requires the DNI to submit a report on the 
efforts of the Maduro regime in Venezuela to arrest, capture, 
detain, and/or imprison United States citizens and lawful 
permanent residents.

Section 422. Sense of Congress on priority of fentanyl in National 
        Intelligence Priorities Framework

    Section 422 provides a sense of Congress that the 
trafficking of illicit fentanyl from the PRC and Mexico should 
be among the highest priorities in the National Intelligence 
Priorities Framework.

  TITLE V--MATTERS PERTAINING TO UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND EMERGING 
         TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION WITH UNITED STATES ADVERSARIES


                      Subtitle A--General Matters


Section 501. Office of Global Competition Analysis

    Section 501 requires the President to establish an office 
for analysis of global competition regarding United States 
leadership in science, technology, and innovation sectors 
critical to national security and economic prosperity and to 
support related intelligence, policy development, and decision 
making across the federal government.

Section 502. Assignment of detailees from intelligence community to 
        Department of Commerce

    Section 502 provides the DNI with discretionary authority 
to assign members of the Intelligence Community to be detailees 
to the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of 
Commerce.

Section 503. Threats posed by information and communications technology 
        and services transactions and other activities

    Section 503 requires the DNI to carry out threat 
assessments of significant information and communications 
technology and services transactions.

Section 504. Revision of regulations defining sensitive national 
        security property for Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
        United States reviews

    Section 504 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to 
revise regulations for the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States in order to treat facilities and property of 
elements of the Intelligence Community and National 
Laboratories comparably to military installations.

Section 505. Support of intelligence community for export controls and 
        other missions of the Department of Commerce

    Section 505 codifies authority for the DNI to collect, 
analyze, and share information necessary to support the 
missions of the Department of Commerce, including with respect 
to the administration of export controls. Section 505 further 
ensures that classified and sensitive information shared by the 
Intelligence Community is protected in the course of civil 
litigation challenging an action or finding of the Secretary of 
Commerce.

Section 506. Review regarding information collection and analysis with 
        respect to economic competition

    Section 506 requires the DNI to review open-source 
commercial databases utilized by the Intelligence Community to 
identify threats and gaps regarding economic competition with 
foreign countries, including the PRC.

   Subtitle B--Next Generation Energy, Biotechnology, and Artificial 
                              Intelligence


Section 511. Expanded annual assessment of economic and technological 
        capabilities of the People's Republic of China

    Section 511 amends Section 6503(c)(3) of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 to expand the scope of 
annual assessments of the economic and technological strategy, 
efforts, and progress of the PRC to include next-generation 
energy, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence.

Section 512. Procurement of public utility contracts

    Section 512 extends the period of time to establish a 
contract for public utility services to 30 years for any 
executive agency that is, or has a component that is, an 
element of the Intelligence Community.

Section 513. Assessment of using civil nuclear energy for intelligence 
        community capabilities

    Section 513 requires the DNI to conduct an assessment of 
Intelligence Community facilities that have unique energy needs 
to ascertain the feasibility and advisability of using civil 
nuclear reactors to meet such needs.

Section 514. Policies established by Director of National Intelligence 
        for artificial intelligence capabilities

    Section 514 amends Section 6702 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 to require the DNI to 
establish policies for the acquisition, adoption, development, 
use, coordination, and maintenance of artificial intelligence 
capabilities.

Section 515. Strategy for submittal of notice by private persons to 
        Federal agencies regarding certain risks and threats relating 
        to artificial intelligence

    Section 515 directs the President to develop a strategy to 
more effectively enable private sector actors, commercial 
users, and independent researchers to notify relevant U.S. 
Government agencies of information security risks from 
artificial intelligence systems.

                    TITLE VI--WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS


Section 601. Submittal to Congress of complaints and information by 
        whistleblowers in the intelligence community

    Section 601 establishes security officers and protocols to 
facilitate Intelligence Community employees' and contractors' 
submissions of complaints and information to Congress. Section 
601 further clarifies the requirements for submitting 
whistleblower complaints and information, and ensures 
bipartisan notification of such materials.

Section 602. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity 
        as reprisal against whistleblower disclosure by employees and 
        contractors in intelligence community

    Section 602 adds a prohibition on knowing or willful 
disclosures that reveal an Intelligence Community employee's or 
contractor employee's identifying information without consent, 
so as to identify such employee or contractor employee as a 
whistleblower, except as necessary during the course of an 
investigation. Section 602 further establishes a private right 
of action for an Intelligence Community whistleblower if such 
disclosure is taken as a reprisal against the whistleblower for 
bringing a complaint.

Section 603. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance 
        and access determinations

    Section 603 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse 
security clearance or access determination against a 
whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 
that the agency would have made the same security clearance or 
access determination in the absence of the whistleblower's 
disclosure. Section 603 further establishes parity in the legal 
standards applied to Intelligence Community whistleblower 
matters.

Section 604. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory 
        revocation of security clearances and access determinations

    Section 604 removes the cap on compensatory damages for an 
employee or former employee who was subjected to a reprisal 
with respect to the employee's or former employee's security 
clearance or access determination.

Section 605. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements

    Section 605 enhances the efficiency of whistleblower 
notifications to the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community.

                    TITLE VII--CLASSIFICATION REFORM


             Subtitle A--Classification Reform Act of 2023


                  CHAPTER 1--SHORT TITLE; DEFINITIONS

Section 701. Short title

    Section 701 contains the short title for this subtitle.

Section 702. Definitions

    Section 702 contains the definitions for this subtitle.

  CHAPTER 2--GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR REFORM OF THE SECURITY 
                         CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

Section 711. Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification

    Section 711 designates the DNI as Executive Agent for 
Classification and Declassification with responsibility to lead 
whole-of-government technological modernization of the 
classification and declassification system.

Section 712. Executive Committee on Classification and Declassification 
        Programs and Technology

    Section 712 establishes an interagency committee to provide 
direction, advice, and guidance to the Executive Agent for 
Classification and Declassification on matters relating to 
classification and declassification programs and technology.

Section 713. Advisory bodies for Executive Agent for Classification and 
        Declassification

    Section 713 designates several existing bodies, including 
the Public Interest Declassification Board, as advisory bodies 
to the Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification.

Section 714. Information Security Oversight Office

    Section 714 codifies establishment of an Information 
Security Oversight Office within the Executive Branch.

                 CHAPTER 3--REDUCING OVERCLASSIFICATION

Section 721. Classification and declassification of information

    Section 721 authorizes the President to establish a system 
for the classification and declassification of information, 
subject to certain minimum requirements including with regard 
to the scope of information that may be classified, the 
duration of classification, and the processes for reviewing 
classified records and materials. Among other things, it 
provides that information may only be classified, or remain 
classified, where the harm to national security reasonably 
expected from disclosure outweighs the public interest.It also 
sets the maximum period for classification at 25 years, grants 
agency heads the authority to extend that period to 50 years, 
and grants the President the authority to extend beyond 50 
years in 10 year increments.

Section 722. Declassification working capital funds

    Section 722 establishes working capital funds that are 
funded relative to how many classified records an agency 
generates. The proceeds of these funds may be used with the 
concurrence of the Executive Agent for Classification and 
Declassification to promote and implement interoperable 
technological and automated solutions for automatic 
declassification.

Section 723. Transparency officers

    Section 723 codifies a requirement for privacy and civil 
liberties officers to also serve as transparency officers to 
assist agencies in identifying records of significant public 
interest and prioritizing review of such records for public 
release.

      CHAPTER 4--PREVENTING MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Section 731. Security review of certain records of the President and 
        Vice President

    Section 731 establishes a process for security review of 
certain President and Vice-Presidential records to ensure that 
records bearing classification markings are not improperly 
categorized as personal records and removed from secure 
facilities.

Section 732. Mandatory counterintelligence risk assessments

    Section 732 requires NCSC to prepare a written risk 
assessment following any mishandling or unauthorized disclosure 
of classified information by certain senior government 
officials.

Section 733. Minimum standards for Executive agency insider threat 
        programs

    Section 733 requires each agency with access to classified 
information to establish an insider threat program that meets 
certain minimum standards, including establishing a capability 
to monitor user activity on all classified networks.

                        CHAPTER 5--OTHER MATTERS

Section 741. Prohibitions

    Section 741 establishes certain prohibitions applicable to 
this subtitle, including with respect to withholding 
information from Congress and judicial review.

Section 742. Conforming amendment

    Section 742 contains a conforming amendment to the National 
Security Act of 1947.

Section 743. Clerical amendment

    Section 743 contains a clerical amendment to the National 
Security Act of 1947.

            Subtitle B--Sensible Classification Act of 2023


Section 751. Short title

    Section 751 contains the short title for this subtitle.

Section 752. Definitions

    Section 752 contains the definitions for this subtitle.

Section 753. Findings and sense of the Senate

    Section 753 contains findings and a Sense of the Senate 
that the classification system is in urgent need of reform, and 
classification should be limited to the minimum necessary to 
protect national security while balancing the public's interest 
in disclosure.

Section 754. Classification authority

    Section 754 codifies the exercise of classification 
authority by the President, Vice President, and other 
officials. Section 754 also specifies how the authority is 
delegated and the training required to receive delegated 
classification authority.

Section 755. Promoting efficient declassification review

    Section 755 requires agencies that identify records more 
than 25 years old while processing requests pursuant to the 
Freedom of Information Act or mandatory declassification review 
procedures to review and process such records for release by 
the National Declassification Center.

Section 756. Training to promote sensible classification

    Section 756 requires the head of each agency with 
classification authority to conduct training to discourage 
over-classification and promote sensible classification.

Section 757. Improvements to Public Interest Declassification Board

    Section 757 allows members of the Public Interest 
Declassification Board whose term has expired to continue to 
serve until a successor is appointed and sworn in. Section 757 
also authorized the Board to hire up to 12 staff members.

Section 758. Implementation of technology for classification and 
        declassification

    Section 758 directs the Administrator of the Office of 
Electronic Government to research and submit recommendations to 
the President and Congress concerning technology-based 
solutions to support classification and declassification that 
are interoperable across the government.

Section 759. Studies and recommendations on necessity of security 
        clearances

    Section 759 directs the head of each agency that grants 
security clearances to conduct a study on the number and types 
of security clearances and their justification. Section 759 
also provides for independent review of each study.

          TITLE VIII--SECURITY CLEARANCE AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE


Section 801. Review of shared information technology services for 
        personnel vetting

    Section 801 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a review of the extent to which the 
Intelligence Community can use information technology services 
shared among the Intelligence Community for purposes of 
personnel vetting.

Section 802. Timeliness standard for rendering determinations of trust 
        for personnel vetting

    Section 802 requires the President, acting through the 
Security Executive Agent and Suitability and Credentialing 
Executive Agent, to establish and publish in the Federal 
Register new timeliness performance standards for processing 
personnel vetting trust determinations in accordance with the 
Federal personnel vetting performance management standards.

Section 803. Annual report on personnel vetting trust determinations

    Section 803 requires the DNI, acting as the Security 
Executive Agent, and the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management, acting as the Suitability and Credentialing 
Executive Agent, in coordination with the Security, 
Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability 
Council, to jointly make available to the public an annual 
report on specific types of personnel vetting trust 
determinations.

Section 804. Survey to assess strengths and weaknesses of Trusted 
        Workforce 2.0

    Section 804 requires the Comptroller General of the United 
States to administer a survey to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 
initiative.

Section 805. Prohibition on denial of eligibility for access to 
        classified information solely because of past use of cannabis

    Section 805 prohibits the head of an element of the 
Intelligence Community from denying eligibility for access to 
classified information to an individual solely on the use of 
cannabis by that individual prior to the submission of an 
application for a security clearance.

                  TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS


Section 901. Improved funding flexibility for payments made by the 
        Central Intelligence Agency for qualifying injuries to the 
        brain

    Section 901 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 to allow flexibility of funding, if necessary, to pay 
qualified individuals who apply for payments for certain 
injuries.

Section 902. Clarification of requirements to seek certain benefits 
        relating to injuries to the brain

    Section 902 clarifies that covered dependents, covered 
employees, or covered individuals shall not be required to seek 
any other benefit furnished by the U.S. Government to be 
eligible for a payment for a qualifying injury to the brain 
authorized under the Helping American Victims Afflicted by 
Neurological Attacks Act of 2021 (HAVANA Act) (Public Law 117-
46).

Section 903. Intelligence community implementation of HAVANA Act of 
        2021 authorities

    Section 903 requires each head of an element of the 
Intelligence Community that has not already done so to issue 
regulations and procedures to implement the authorities 
provided by the HAVANA Act (Public Law 117-46).

Section 904. Report and briefing on Central Intelligence Agency 
        handling of anomalous health incidents

    Section 904 requires the Director of the CIA to submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
handling of anomalous health incidents by the Agency.

                       TITLE X--ELECTION SECURITY


Section 1001. Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect 
        for Elections through Independent Testing Act of 2023

    Section 1001 directs the Election Assistance Commission 
(EAC) to require that voting systems undergo penetration 
testing as part of the standard certification process for such 
systems. Section 1001 also directs the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology to accredit entities that can perform 
such testing and would direct the EAC to create a voluntary 
vulnerability disclosure program for election systems.

Section 1002. Protecting Ballot Measures from Foreign Influence Act of 
        2023

    Section 1002 makes it unlawful for a foreign national to 
contribute money, either directly or indirectly, to a State or 
local ballot initiative or ballot referendum.

                        TITLE XI--OTHER MATTERS


Section 1101. Modification of reporting requirement for All-domain 
        Anomaly Resolution Office

    Section 1101 amends section 1683(k)(1) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (as amended by 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023) to 
ensure the Director of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office 
(AARO) prepares the relevant reporting.

Section 1102. Modifications to notification on the provision of defense 
        sensitive support

    Section 1102 permits the Secretary of Defense to notify the 
congressional defense committees and, when appropriate, the 
congressional intelligence committees after providing support 
requiring time-sensitive support and extraordinary security 
protections.

Section 1103. Modification of congressional oversight of special access 
        programs

    Section 1103 amends Title 50 to ensure that annual reports 
on Special Access Programs currently provided to the 
congressional defense committees are also provided to the 
congressional intelligence committees.

Section 1104. Funding limitations relating to unidentified anomalous 
        phenomena

    Section 1104 prohibits funds authorized by this Act from 
being used for activities involving unidentified anomalous 
phenomena protected under any form of special access or 
restricted access limitations that have not been briefed to 
appropriate congressional committees, congressional leadership, 
and the Director of AARO. Section 1104 also requires any person 
currently or formerly under contract with the Federal 
Government that has material or information relating to 
unidentified anomalous phenomena protected by any form of 
special access or restricted access to make the material or 
information available to the Director of AARO.

                    Committee Comments and Direction


Civil Nuclear Technologies

    Our national security depends on ensuring we innovate and 
deploy civil nuclear power ahead of our adversaries. The 
Committee is concerned that the Administration has not 
appointed a Civil Nuclear Coordinator to develop and implement 
a cohesive policy for building, operating, and deploying civil 
nuclear power at home and abroad. The last two Administrations 
both had such positions. Appointing a Civil Nuclear Coordinator 
is especially critical now, as our adversaries invest heavily 
and attempt to market competing civil nuclear reactors in 
regions of substantial geopolitical and economic importance. A 
Civil Nuclear Coordinator would ensure that necessary framework 
agreements and controls relating to civil nuclear materials and 
technologies are in place for competitive domestic and 
international licensing and deployment, and coordinate with 
U.S. industry and allies abroad to ensure that the United 
States remains competitive in the development, deployment, and 
export of civil nuclear technologies as compared to our 
adversaries.

CIA Policies and Processes for Managing and Evaluating the Performance 
        of Agency Personnel

    The Committee is concerned that the policies and processes 
used by the CIA for managing and evaluating the performance of 
CIA personnel are not being implemented in a manner that 
provides minimum safeguards consistent with CIA regulations. In 
addition, the Committee is concerned that these processes yield 
inconsistent results, which for any given matter may either be 
too harsh or too lenient. Therefore, the Committee directs 
CIA's Office of Inspector General to examine whether CIA's 
policies and processes for managing and evaluating the 
performance of Agency personnel are effective and applied 
consistently throughout the Agency, and whether there may be 
systemic problems or deficiencies in those areas for which 
corrective action may be appropriate.

Strategic Counterintelligence and Offensive Counterintelligence

    The Committee is concerned that the U.S. 
counterintelligence enterprise is not currently postured to 
confront the whole-of-society foreign intelligence threat 
landscape facing the country today. In particular, the 
Committee is concerned that the Intelligence Community has not 
taken steps to address ambiguity around the meaning of 
fundamental terms, including ``offensive counterintelligence'' 
and ``strategic counterintelligence.''
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in coordination 
with other elements of the Intelligence Community as 
appropriate, to adopt definitions for ``offensive 
counterintelligence'' and ``strategic counterintelligence.'' 
The Committee directs the DNI to provide the congressional 
intelligence committees, not later than 120 days following 
enactment of this Act, with notification of definitions adopted 
for the terms ``offensive counterintelligence'' and ``strategic 
counterintelligence.''
    In addition, the Committee further recommends that the DNI 
adopt the following language in defining roles and 
responsibilities for the government-wide counterintelligence 
mission:
          ``For purposes of carrying out the 
        counterintelligence activities of the United States 
        Government, the term `offensive counterintelligence' 
        means clandestine counterintelligence activity 
        conducted for national security, strategic, and 
        counterintelligence purposes against a target having 
        suspected or known affiliation with a foreign 
        intelligence entity to counter clandestine activities 
        that threaten the United States or the national 
        interests of the United States.''
          ``For purposes of organizing and leading strategic 
        planning for counterintelligence activities of the 
        United States Government, the term `strategic 
        counterintelligence' means the process and product of 
        developing the context, tradecraft, capabilities, 
        knowledge, and understanding of the strategic 
        environment, including the intentions and capabilities 
        of foreign adversaries and the national resources 
        necessary to engage in counterintelligence activities, 
        to support United States national security interests, 
        policy development, and planning processes.''

Improving the Quality, Transparency, Impartiality, and Consistency in 
        the Clearance Appeals Process

    The Committee continues to be concerned with the quality, 
transparency, impartiality, and consistency in government 
processes that allow civilian, military, and contractor 
personnel to appeal decisions to deny or revoke access to 
classified national security information. Personnel, regardless 
of status or agency, deserve an appeals process that exhibits 
these characteristics. Recent memos by the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence & Security) indicate 
internal debates over how best to achieve these goals at the 
Department of Defense, the single largest granter of security 
clearances.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, as the 
government's Security Executive Agent, in coordination with the 
interagency Performance Accountability Council, chaired by the 
Office of Management and Budget, to provide Congress with a 
report, within 180 days after enactment of this Act, on the 
number of appeals filed in the previous year, the reasons 
appeals were filed, and the rates by which decisions to deny or 
revoke a clearance was made. Further, the Committee directs the 
DNI, in this report, to identify best practices for departments 
and agencies in considering appeals to deny or revoke accesses 
to classified national security information.

Intelligence Community Employment Protections

    The Committee supports Intelligence Community employment 
policies that bolster the professionalism and independence of 
the workforce. This support is complicated, however, by the 
lack of transparency with regard to the protections currently 
granted employees by different Intelligence Community entities. 
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, working with the 
heads of each of the Intelligence Community entities, to 
provide the Committee a report within 90 days of the reporting 
of this bill. The report should describe: (1) the statutory 
basis for the rules governing employment protections for each 
Intelligence Community entity; (2) how each of the Intelligence 
Community entities categorizes its employees according to the 
competitive and excepted service and schedules associated with 
the excepted service; (3) how each of the Intelligence 
Community entities applies employment protections to personnel 
in each of those categories; and (4) what limits, if any, exist 
within each of the Intelligence Community entities to the 
involuntary transfer of employees from one category to another 
so as to diminish those protections.

                            Committee Action

    On June 14, 2023 a quorum being present, the Committee met 
to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The 
Committee took the following actions:

Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex

    By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for 
Fiscal Year 2024, the base text for purposes of amendment.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc fifteen 
amendments to the bill, as follows: (1) an amendment by Vice 
Chairman Rubio, to require the DNI, within 30 days of 
commencing a risk assessment arising from the mishandling or 
improper disclosure of classified information, to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees copies of such documents 
and materials within the committees' jurisdiction and provide a 
briefing; (2) an amendment by Senator Collins, and cosponsored 
by Chairman Warner, to improve the security of voting and 
election systems; (3) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to 
prohibit any Intelligence Community element from chartering 
private or commercial aircraft to transport any individual who 
is or was detained at Guantanamo Bay; (4) an amendment by Vice 
Chairman Rubio to ensure that annual reports on Special Access 
Programs currently provided to the congressional defense 
committees are also provided to the congressional intelligence 
committees; (5) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio, and 
cosponsored by Chairman Warner, to prohibit contributions and 
donations by foreign nationals in connection with State or 
local ballot initiatives and referenda; (6) an amendment by 
Senator Gillibrand, and cosponsored by Senators Cornyn, Rubio, 
and Rounds, to prohibit funds from being used for activities 
involving unidentified anomalous phenomena protected under any 
form of special access or restricted access limitations that 
have not been briefed to appropriate congressional committees, 
congressional leadership, and the Director of AARO; (7) an 
amendment by Senator Cornyn, and cosponsored by Chairman Warner 
and Senators Moran, Wyden, Collins, King, Rounds, Heinrich, 
Lankford, and Casey, to reform the classification system; (8) 
an amendment by Senator Bennet to require the Secretary of the 
Treasury to revise regulations for the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States in order to treat facilities 
and property of elements of the Intelligence Community and 
National Laboratories comparably to military installations; (9) 
an amendment by Senator Bennet to codify authority for the DNI 
to collect, analyze, and share information necessary to support 
the missions of the Department of Commerce, including with 
respect to the administration of export controls; (10) an 
amendment by Senator Casey to require the DNI to review open-
source commercial databases utilized by the Intelligence 
Community to identify threats and gaps regarding economic 
competition with foreign countries, including the PRC; (11) an 
amendment by Senator Bennet to modify Section 401, regarding 
designation of an Intelligence Community coordinator for 
accountability of atrocities of the PRC; (12) an amendment by 
Senator Wyden to modify Section 306 to retain the current law's 
application to contractors and the requirement of a written 
agreement requiring reporting on post-service employment with 
foreign governments; (13) an amendment by Senator Lankford to 
require Inspector General review of the dissemination of a 
certain document by the FBI's Richmond field office; (14) an 
amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio, and cosponsored by Senators 
Cotton and Lankford, to require the Director of the Office of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of 
Energy to vet certain foreign national visitors or assignees to 
National Labs; and (15) an amendment by Senator Warner, and 
cosponsored by Senator Heinrich, to require a strategy to 
enable private sector actors, commercial users, and independent 
researchers to notify relevant U.S. Government agencies of 
information security risks from artificial intelligence 
systems.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc nine 
amendments to the classified annex.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by 
Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senators Wyden, King, 
Heinrich, Cornyn, Bennet, Casey, Moran, and Rounds to implement 
classification and declassification reforms, with Vice Chairman 
Rubio and Senator Cotton recorded as noes.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to vote on a 
second-degree amendment by Senator Ossoff to an amendment by 
Vice Chairman Rubio, and to vote on Vice Chairman Rubio's 
original amendment as filed and cosponsored by Senators Risch 
and Lankford. Senator Ossoff's second-degree amendment required 
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community to 
undertake a review of DHS I&A. Vice Chairman Rubio's amendment 
prohibited I&A from engaging in the collection of information 
or intelligence targeting U.S. persons, except when carried out 
by I&A officials responsible for collecting information or 
intelligence from state, local, or Tribal territory governments 
or a private employer. By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the 
Committee did not adopt Senator Ossoff's second-degree 
amendment. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: 
Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--
aye; Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--
aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator 
Ossoff--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--no; 
Senator Collins--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; 
Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no. By 
a vote of 10 ayes and 7 noes, the Committee adopted Vice 
Chairman Rubio's amendment. The votes in person or by proxy 
were as follows: Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--no; 
Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--no; 
Senator Bennet--no; Senator Casey--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; 
Senator Ossoff--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--
aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator 
Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator 
Rounds--aye.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to vote on a 
second-degree amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio, which 
substituted for his original-filed amendment and permitted 
Intelligence Community employees to opt out of the ``gender 
identity and inclusiveness''' initiatives put forth in 
Intelligence Community Directive 125. The second-degree 
amendment substitute did the same and added a clause to ensure 
current legal protections remained intact. Senator Lankford 
offered a separate second-degree amendment to require sex-
segregated restrooms and locker rooms in Intelligence Community 
agencies, and withdrew it pending future Committee 
consideration. By a vote of 8 ayes and 9 noes, the Committee 
did not adopt Vice Chairman Rubio's second-degree amendment 
substitute. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: 
Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no; 
Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; 
Senator Casey--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; Senator Ossoff--no; 
Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--
aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--
aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye.
    Senator Wyden offered an amendment that prohibited the head 
of any U.S. Government agency from denying an individual's 
eligibility for access to classified information based solely 
on the individual's cannabis use prior to submitting a security 
clearance application, and withdrew it pending future Committee 
consideration.
    By a vote of 10 ayes and 7 noes, the Committee adopted an 
amendment by Senator Wyden that prohibited the head of any 
Intelligence Community agency from denying an individual's 
eligibility for access to classified information based solely 
on the individual's cannabis use prior to submitting a security 
clearance application. The votes in person or by proxy were as 
follows: Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator 
Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator 
Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; 
Senator Ossoff--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--
no; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--
no; Senator Moran--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--
no.
    Senator Cotton offered an amendment that prohibited 
additional hiring by the CIA's Directorate of Analysis until 
CIA staffed each of the Directorate of Operations' authorized 
full-time equivalent positions, and withdrew it pending future 
Committee consideration.
    By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted an 
amendment by Senator Cotton to establish a pay cap on the 
salaries of CIA Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion staff and 
contract employees at the same level as an officer of the 
Directorate of Operations in the Clandestine Services Trainee 
program. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: 
Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no; 
Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--no; 
Senator Casey--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; Senator Ossoff--no; 
Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--
aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--
aye; Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye.
    Senator Lankford offered an amendment to limit the 
availability of funds authorized by this Act to change the 
section of the Questionnaire for National Security Positions 
that pertains to association record, and withdrew it pending 
future Committee consideration.
    By voice vote, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by 
Senator Wyden to the classified annex, with Senator Wyden 
recorded as an aye.

Votes to report the committee bill

    On June 14, 2023, the Committee voted to report the bill, 
as amended, by a vote of 17 ayes and zero noes. The votes in 
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye; 
Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--
aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Vice 
Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; 
Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; 
Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to 
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and 
classified annex.

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

    Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires 
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed 
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff 
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report 
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the 
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the 
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of 
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of 
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited 
tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On June 22, 
2023, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional 
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred 
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                        Changes to Existing Law

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is 
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to 
expedite the business of the Senate.

                  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN WARNER

    I am pleased that the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence has again reported an Intelligence Authorization 
Act by a unanimous vote. The Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2024 reflects the Senate Intelligence Committee's 
continued, bipartisan commitment to ensuring America's 
intelligence agencies have the resources they need to protect 
our country. In addition, the bill addresses many of my 
oversight priorities, including technological and economic 
competition with China, reform of the classification and 
declassification system, election security, and security 
clearance reform.
    Notwithstanding my strong support for the bill, I write 
separately in order to express my opposition to two provisions 
of the bill that were added as amendments during the 
Committee's markup. First, by a vote of 9-8 the Committee 
adopted an amendment that would cap the pay for any staff 
employee or contractor of the CIA whose duties include certain 
diversity-related functions at that of the most junior officers 
in the Clandestine Service. This amendment will handicap the 
efforts of the CIA to build a diverse workforce that reflects 
the Nation the agency serves. In 2015, a CIA-commissioned study 
found that the Agency lagged behind other employers in 
maintaining a diverse workforce, especially at the senior 
leadership ranks. In the wake of that study, the CIA, with the 
support of this Committee, instituted numerous reforms, which 
have benefited the Agency's mission by enabling it to draw upon 
the wide range of talent, abilities, and backgrounds unique to 
this country. This amendment imperils that progress. Moreover, 
while I oppose the intent of the amendment, its drafting is 
cause for addition concern. By its terms the amendment would 
cap the pay of every CIA employee whose duties include 
``developing, refining, and implementing diversity, equity, and 
inclusion policy,'' which certainly includes the senior 
leadership of the Agency, up to and including the Director, if 
not a significant portion of Agency workforce.
    Second, by a vote of 10-7 the Committee adopted an 
amendment that would prohibit DHS I&A from engaging in the 
collection of information or intelligence targeting U.S. 
persons, except when carried out by I&A officials responsible 
for collecting information or intelligence from state, local, 
or Tribal territory governments or a private employer. I share 
the concerns of many of my colleagues regarding the activities 
of DHS I&A, particularly as they relate to the challenges the 
Office appears to face in consistently producing intelligence 
reports that meet analytic standards. Nonetheless, this 
amendment is not the solution. The amendment will fundamentally 
alter the mission of DHS I&A in ways the Committee has not 
taken adequate time to understand. Moreover, the Committee is 
hastily imposing these changes before the Committee has had an 
opportunity to fully explore the causes of DHS I&A's 
difficulties or whether the Office's current leadership is 
succeeding in instituting needed reforms. The Committee will 
continue to vigorously oversee DHS I&A and hold the Office 
accountable for its actions, but this amendment needlessly 
limits the authorities of an important component of the 
Intelligence Community, with concerning implications.
                                                    Mark R. Warner.

                ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN RUBIO

    During the markup of the fiscal year 2024 Intelligence 
Authorization Act (IAA), the Committee voted on an amendment to 
prohibit the Department of Homeland Security's Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) from collecting, overtly or 
through publicly available means, information and intelligence 
on U.S. persons. The amendment was adopted by a bipartisan vote 
of 10 to 7 and is Section 312 of our IAA.
    Congress created I&A as a part of the Department of 
Homeland Security in 2002 and it is charged with numerous 
responsibilities geared toward bridging the gap between the 
federal government and the Intelligence Community (IC) on one 
hand, and state and local governments and the private sector on 
the other, in order to detect, identify, understand, and 
prevent another act of terror on the U.S. homeland. This 
remains a critical government function. The problem, however, 
is that I&A uses its authorities to collect--overtly or through 
publicly available means--information and intelligence on U.S. 
persons who have no affiliation with foreign intelligence or 
foreign adversaries. This has resulted in potential abuses of 
I&A's authorities.
    For example, I&A collected U.S. journalists' social media 
posts reporting on civil unrest in Portland, Oregon, during the 
summer of 2020. Analysts used that collection to craft 
intelligence reports on these journalists and circulated them 
internally. One of these journalists filed a lawsuit against 
the federal government which is still in litigation. Most 
recently, a news story from March 2023 exposed a troubling I&A 
practice of conducting custodial debriefings of individuals--
including American citizens--without those individuals having 
any representative counsel present. Lastly, I&A regularly 
publishes unclassified assessments of domestic violent 
extremists who have no foreign affiliations looking to engage 
in potentially criminal behavior in the name of a political 
ideology, and often I&A will cite these domestic extremists' 
use of online platforms in those products.
    These are issues for law enforcement, not the IC. We 
strongly support federal, state, and local law enforcement 
investigating domestic violent extremism in its many 
manifestations. When there are threats of violence, or 
incitement to violence, the perpetrators should be prosecuted 
to the fullest extent of the law. The FBI already has the 
authorities, operational tools, and resources to undertake such 
collection, and I&A should not be devoting intelligence 
resources to collect information on Americans with no 
connection to foreign intelligence or adversaries. Domestic law 
enforcement is not a job for the IC.
    Section 312 prohibits I&A from collecting, overtly or 
through publicly available means, information or intelligence 
on any U.S. person. In addition, the provision excepts from 
this prohibition the collection of information from state and 
local governments and the private sector, preserving I&A's core 
function of ensuring that critical information about potential 
threats to our homeland is shared between the federal 
government and state and local governments and the private 
sector. We were pleased the amendment was approved in a 
bipartisan fashion and voted out unanimously as part of our 
Committee-reported IAA.
                                   Marco Rubio.
                                   James E. Risch.
                                   Susan M. Collins.
                                   Tom Cotton.
                                   John Cornyn.
                                   Jerry Moran.
                                   James Lankford.
                                   M. Michael Rounds.

              ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WYDEN AND MORAN

    The Fiscal Year 2024 Intelligence Authorization Act 
includes historic legislation addressing the chronic and long-
standing problem of overclassification while reforming the 
Federal Government's broken classification and declassification 
system. Among the provisions of this legislation is a reform 
that we put forward in 2020--the designation of the Director of 
National Intelligence as the Executive Agent for Classification 
and Declassification.
    There is unanimous agreement that the current system is 
obsolete and in need of technical modernization. As has been 
documented in numerous reports by the Information Security 
Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Public Interest 
Declassification Board (PIDB), as well as by the DNI herself, 
the onslaught of new classified digital records has overwhelmed 
an archaic declassification system, the result being that an 
ever-increasing number of records that should be declassified 
are never actually released to the public. Fortunately, there 
are technical solutions to this problem; they just require 
someone to promote and guide strategic investments in 
modernization technology across the Federal Government.
    The DNI is uniquely situated to carry out this role. She 
already has a statutory responsibility to develop information 
technology systems while protecting sources and methods. The 
DNI is also tasked with providing guidance on budget priorities 
across agencies.
    Technical solutions must be inter-operable and must be 
implemented across the Federal Government if they are going to 
work at all. Systems that are stovepiped among different 
agencies impede efforts to locate records and prevent 
coordination on their declassification. The DNI already serves 
as the Security Executive Agent, a role in which she develops 
policies related to security clearances that apply to the whole 
of Government and not just the Intelligence Community. This 
experience is directly relevant to the role of Executive Agent 
for Classification and Declassification.
    Government-wide solutions are necessary not only to fix a 
broken declassification system but also to protect the 
information that remains classified. Records originating in 
dozens of agencies, departments and offices traverse the 
Federal Government at the speed of light. A modernized system 
that tracks these records is necessary both to ensure eventual 
declassification and to identify and resolve weaknesses in how 
currently classified records are protected.

                                   Ron Wyden.
                                   Jerry Moran.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

    The Fiscal Year 2024 Intelligence Authorization Act 
includes a number of provisions that strengthen national 
security while promoting democratic oversight. First among 
these provisions is historic declassification reform 
legislation which I have addressed in separate Additional Views 
with Senator Moran.
    As was the case last year, the Committee passed my 
amendment prohibiting the denial of security clearances based 
solely on the past use of cannabis. As more states legalize 
cannabis, it becomes less and less tenable to deny security 
clearances to those who have used it. The amendment, which was 
co-sponsored by Senators Heinrich and Bennet, will help the 
Intelligence Community recruit the qualified personnel needed 
to protect the country.
    The bill also includes whistleblower provisions I have 
secured in previous years, including provisions that ensure 
that whistleblowers' security clearances cannot be revoked as a 
pretext, remove the damages cap for reprisals, ensure that 
whistleblowers can come straight to Congress, and prohibit 
public disclosure of a whistleblower's identity as a reprisal.
    Finally, I am pleased that the Committee agreed to include 
in its public report direction to the Director of National 
Intelligence to report on how Intelligence Community personnel 
are or are not protected by virtue of their employment status. 
The American people expect the employees of the Intelligence 
Community to speak truth to power, to dissent when appropriate, 
and to be fully candid with Congress, all without fear of 
retaliation. Any current or future employment policies that 
would permit arbitrary or politically motivated firings risk 
placing that professionalism and independence in jeopardy. It 
is imperative that Congress act to address any vulnerabilities 
that might allow for such a contingency.

                                                         Ron Wyden.

                                  [all]