[Senate Report 118-52]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 124
118th Congress} { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 118-52
======================================================================
NUCLEAR FUEL SECURITY ACT
_______
July 11, 2023.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Manchin, from the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 452]
The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, to which was
referred the bill (S. 452), to require the Secretary of Energy
to establish a Nuclear Fuel Security Program, expand the
American Assured Fuel Supply Program, and submit a report on a
civil nuclear credit program, and for other purposes, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill, as amended, do pass.
AMENDMENT
SEC. 4. AMENDMENTS TO THE USEC PRIVATIZATION ACT.
(a) Prohibition on Imports.--Section 3112A of the USEC
Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10a) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``(d) Prohibition on Imports of Low-enriched Uranium.--
``(1) Prohibition.--Beginning on the date that is 90
days after the date of the enactment of this
subsection, and subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), no
unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is produced in
the Russian Federation, or by a Russian entity, or
swapped with such unirradiated low-enriched uranium,
may be imported into the United States:
``(A) Unirradiated low-enriched uranium that
is produced in the Russian Federation or by a
Russian entity.
``(B) Unirradiated low-enriched uranium that
is determined to have been exchanged with,
swapped for, or otherwise obtained in lieu of
unirradiated low-enriched uranium described in
subparagraph (A) in a manner designed to
circumvent the restrictions under this section.
``(2) Waiver.--
``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraphs
(B) and (C), the Secretary of Energy, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Commerce, may waive the
application of paragraph (1) to authorize the
importation of low-enriched uranium described
in that paragraph if the Secretary of Energy
determines that--
``(i) no alternative viable source of
low-enriched uranium is available to
sustain the continued operation of a
nuclear reactor or a United States
nuclear energy company; or
``(ii) importation of low-enriched
uranium that is produced in the Russian
Federation or by a Russian entity is in
the national interest.
``(B) Limitation on amounts of imports of
low-enriched uranium.--
``(i) In general.--The importation
into the United States of low-enriched
uranium, including low-enriched uranium
obtained under contracts for separative
work units, that is produced in the
Russian Federation or by a Russian
entity, whether or not such low-
enriched uranium is derived from highly
enriched uranium of weapons origin, may
not exceed--
``(I) in calendar year 2023,
578,877 kilograms;
``(II) in calendar year 2024,
476,536 kilograms;
``(III) in calendar year
2025, 470,376 kilograms;
``(IV) in calendar year 2026,
464,183 kilograms; and
``(V) in calendar year 2027,
459,083 kilograms.
``(ii) Administration.--The Secretary
of Commerce shall--
``(I) administer the import
limitations described in clause
(i) in accordance with the
provisions of the Suspension
Agreement, including the
provisions described in
subsection (c)(2)(B)(i);
``(II) be responsible for
enforcing the import
limitations described in clause
(i); and
``(III) enforce the import
limitations described in clause
(i) in a manner that imposes a
minimal burden on the
commercial nuclear industry.
``(C) Termination.--Any waiver issued under
subparagraph (A) shall terminate not later than
January 1, 2028.
``(D) Notification to Congress.--
``(i) In general.--Upon issuing a
waiver under subparagraph (A), the
Secretary of Energy shall submit to the
committees specified in clause (ii) a
notification that a waiver has been
issued, which shall include
identification of the recipient of the
waiver.
``(ii) Committees specified.--The
committees specified in this clause
are--
``(I) the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources and the
Committee on Finance of the
Senate; and
``(II) the Committee on
Energy and Commerce and the
Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives.
``(3) Applicability.--This subsection does not apply
to imports--
``(A) by or under contract to the Department
of Energy for national security or
nonproliferation purposes; or
``(B) of non-uranium isotopes.
``(4) Termination.--The provisions of this subsection
shall terminate on December 31, 2040.
``(5) Russian entity defined.--In this subsection,
the term `Russian entity' means an entity organized
under the laws of or otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the Government of the Russian
Federation.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) In general.--Section 3112A(c) of the USEC
Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10a(c)) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraph (A)--
(I) in clause (viii), by
inserting ``and'' after the
semicolon at the end;
(II) in clause (ix), by
striking the semicolon and
inserting a period; and
(III) by striking clauses (x)
through (xxvii); and
(ii) in subparagraph (C)(i), by
striking ``paragraph (10)'' and
inserting ``paragraph (9)'';
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``United
States'' and all that follows through ``for
processing'' and inserting ``United States for
processing'';
(C) by striking paragraph (5);
(D) by redesignating paragraphs (6) through
(12) as paragraphs (5) through (11),
respectively;
(E) in paragraph (5), as redesignated by
subparagraph (D), by striking ``In addition to
the adjustment under paragraph (5)(A), the''
and inserting ``The'';
(F) in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (7), as
so redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (10)''
and inserting ``paragraph (9)'';
(G) in paragraph (8), as so redesignated, by
striking ``December 31, 2040'' and inserting
``the date described in subsection (d)(1)'';
and
(H) in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (9), as
so redesignated, by striking ``paragraphs
(2)(C) and (8)'' and inserting ``paragraphs
(2)(C) and (7)''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendment to section
3112A(c)(2)(A)(x) of the USEC Privatization Act (42
U.S.C. 2297h-10a(c)(2)(A)(x)) made by paragraph (1)(A)
of this subsection shall take effect on the date that
is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SECTION 5. SUPPLY CHAIN INFRASTRUCTURE AND WORKFORCE CAPACITY BUILDING.
(a) Section 10781 of the Chips and Science Act (42 U.S.C.
19351) is amended in subsection (b)(1) by striking ``and
demonstration of advanced nuclear reactors'' and inserting
``demonstration, and deployment of advanced nuclear reactors
and associated supply chain infrastructure.''
(b) Section 954(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42
U.S.C. 16274(b)) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking
``Graduate'';
(2) by striking ``graduate'' each place it appears;
(3) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting ``community
colleges, trade schools, registered apprenticeship
programs, pre-apprenticeship programs,'' after
``universities,'';
(4) in paragraph (3), by striking ``2021 through
2025'' and inserting ``2023 through 2027'';
(5) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4);
and
(6) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Focus areas.--In carrying out the subprogram
under this subsection, the Secretary may implement
traineeships in focus areas that, in the determination
of the Secretary, are necessary to support the nuclear
energy sector in the United States, including--
``(A) research and development;
``(B) construction and operation;
``(C) associated supply chains; and
``(D) workforce training and retraining to
support transitioning workforces.''.
Purpose
The purposes of S. 452, as ordered reported, are to
establish a Nuclear Fuel Security Program, expand the American
Assured Fuel Supply Program, establish a HALEU (high-assay,
low-enriched uranium) for Advanced Nuclear Reactor
Demonstration Projects Program, require the Secretary of Energy
to submit a report on a civil nuclear credit program, prohibit
importation of low-enriched uranium from Russia, expand the
Advanced Nuclear Technologies Program to include supply chains
associated with advanced nuclear reactors, strengthen nuclear
energy workforce training programs.
Background and Need
The United States currently requires a domestic nuclear
fuel supply chain sufficient to meet the needs of existing and
advanced reactors. In 2021, Russia accounted for 28 percent of
the enriched uranium used in U.S. reactors. The world
collectively relies on Russia for one-third of its uranium
conversion and half of its enrichment needs. As a result of
Russia's efforts to flood the market and undermine Western
nuclear fuel suppliers, domestic uranium production services
are at their lowest levels in decades. America's only uranium
conversion facility is currently shut down. The only domestic
enrichment facility is operating at reduced capacity. Russia is
the only commercial supplier of HALEU for advanced reactors.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has heightened the need for an
alternative to Russian uranium supply. While Russian uranium
imports into the United States have yet to be banned, America's
advanced reactor developers have committed not to use Russian-
produced HALEU. Unless the Department of Energy supplies
advanced reactor demonstration projects with HALEU before
domestically enriched HALEU is available, several demonstration
projects may be delayed. Additionally, the Department must
partner with domestic nuclear fuel suppliers to expand low-
enriched uranium (LEU) production capacity to avoid a supply
disruption to existing nuclear reactors when Russian uranium
imports are terminated.
S. 452 would establish a nuclear fuel program to increase
domestic production of LEU and HALEU to ensure that a
disruption in Russian uranium supply would not negatively
impact the operation of existing nuclear reactors or advanced
reactor demonstrations. S. 452 would also provide domestic
nuclear fuel suppliers with the market certainty they need to
justify investments in expanded capacity by prohibiting Russian
uranium imports into the United States. The Department would be
authorized to issue waivers to this prohibition if no viable
alternative source of uranium is available or in the interest
of national security or national interest, through the calendar
year 2027. S. 452 would also strengthen the nuclear supply
chain infrastructure and workforce capacity building.
Legislative History
S. 452 was introduced by Senators Manchin, Barrasso, Risch,
on February 15, 2023. Senators Warner and Coons were
subsequently added as cosponsors.
On May 17, 2023, the Committee ordered S. 452 favorably
reported with an amendment containing text similar to S. 763,
the Reduce Russian Uranium Imports Act. S. 763 was introduced
by Senators Barrasso, Manchin, Risch, Heinrich, Lummis, Coons,
and Marshall, on March 9, 2023.
The Committee and the Senate considered legislation similar
to S. 452, as introduced, and S. 763 during the 117th Congress.
Legislation similar to S. 452, as introduced, was proposed as
Senate Amendment 6627, an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to S. 3428, the Fission for the Future Act, in the
117th Congress by Senator Schumer for Senator Manchin (for
himself and Senators Barrasso and Risch) on December 22, 2022.
S. 3428, a bill to establish a financial assistance program for
advanced nuclear reactors and their associated supply chains,
was introduced by Senators Manchin and Barrasso on December 16,
2021. The Committee held a hearing on S. 3428 on March 1, 2022.
The contents of this bill were included in H.R. 4346, the CHIPS
and Science Act, as enacted on August 9, 2022. The Committee
was discharged from further consideration of S. 3428, Amendment
6627 was agreed to, and S. 3428, as amended, was passed by
voice vote, by the Senate, on December 22, 2022. The House took
no action on S. 3428.
Earlier in the 117th Congress, legislation similar to
Amendment 6627 was included as section 8103 of Amendment 5499,
an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 7900, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. The
provision was not included in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 as enacted. In addition,
S. 4066, the Fueling Our Nuclear Future Act of 2022, also
contained legislation similar to Amendment 6627. S. 4066 was
introduced by Senator Barrasso on April 7, 2022. The Committee
held a hearing on S. 4066 on July 28, 2022, but took no further
action on the bill.
Legislation similar to S. 763, the Reduce Russian Uranium
Imports Act, was also considered during the 117th Congress. S.
3856, a bill to prohibit the importation of uranium from the
Russian Federation, was introduced in the 117th Congress by
Senators Barrasso, Lummis, Marshall, and Cramer. The Committee
held a hearing on S. 3856 on July 28, 2022, but took no further
action on the bill.
In addition, section 5(b), proposed to be added to S. 452
by the Committee amendment, to enhance nuclear energy workforce
training, is similar to section 3 of S. 3428, as introduced in
the 117th Congress, by Senators Manchin and Barrasso on
December 16, 2021.
Committee Recommendation
The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, in an
open business session on May 17, 2023, by a voice vote of a
quorum present, recommends that the Senate pass S. 452, if
amended as described herein.
Committee Amendment
During the consideration of S. 452, the Committee adopted
an amendment to add sections 4 and 5 to the bill. Section 4
amends section 3112 of the USEC Privatization Act to prohibit
the importation into the U.S. of unirradiated LEU that is
produced in the Russian Federation or by a Russian entity, and
allows for a waiver if no viable alternative supply of LEU is
available or if a waiver is in the national interest. Section
5(a) amends the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 to expand the
Department of Energy's authority to provide technical
assistance for nuclear supply chain infrastructure. Section
5(b) amends section 954(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to
improve the Department of Energy's nuclear traineeship program
to strengthen workforce capacity building and retraining.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short title
Provides the short title of the bill, the ``Nuclear Fuel
Security Act of 2023.''
Section 2. U.S. Nuclear Fuel Security initiative
Subsection (a) provides a sense of Congress that the
Department of Energy should prioritize activities to increase
domestic production of LEU and accelerate efforts to establish
a domestic high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU) enrichment
capability. It further states that if a domestic HALEU
enrichment capability will not be available in time to meet the
needs of advanced nuclear reactor demonstration projects, the
Department of Energy shall consider and implement, as
necessary, all viable options to make HALEU available from
inventories owned by the Department, until such time as
commercial enrichment is available.
Subsection (b) provides the objectives of this section,
including: to increase domestic production of LEU for existing
reactors and HALEU for advanced reactors; to ensure the
availability of domestically produced uranium sufficient to
address a supply disruption; to address gaps and deficiencies
in the domestic uranium supply chain; to ensure a backup supply
of uranium to support nonproliferation and civil nuclear
objectives of the Department; to support uranium supply chain
technology deployed in the U.S.; and to ensure the Department
considers and implements all viable options necessary to ensure
HALEU availability until such time as the needs and schedules
of advanced nuclear reactor developers can be met with
commercially produced HALEU.
Subsection (c) provides the definitions used in this
section.
Subsection (d) directs the Secretary of Energy (Secretary)
to establish a Nuclear Fuel Security program to increase
domestic production of LEU and HALEU. It directs the Secretary
to expand the American Assured Fuel Supply program to ensure
the availability of uranium in the event of a supply
disruption. The subsection also directs the Secretary to
establish a HALEU for Advanced Nuclear Reactor Demonstration
Projects program to ensure HALEU availability, from inventories
owned by the Department, until such time as the needs and
schedules of advanced nuclear reactor developers can be met
with commercially produced HALEU.
Subsection (e) directs the Secretary to enter into 2 or
more contracts each to begin acquiring not less than 100 metric
tons per year of LEU by December 31, 2026 and not less than 20
metric tons per year of HALEU by December 31, 2027, utilizing
domestic supply chains to the maximum extent practicable. The
subsection limits the Secretary's ability to make commitments
to acquire LEU or HALEU unless funds are available for those
purposes. It further directs the Secretary to consider and
implement options to ensure the quickest availability of
commercially enriched HALEU and options to replenish Department
stockpiles of uranium used as part of the HALEU for Advanced
Nuclear Reactor Demonstration Projects program. The subsection
directs the Secretary to avoid market disruptions or completion
with U.S. nuclear energy companies in carrying out the Nuclear
Fuel Security program.
Subsection (f) directs the Secretary, in consultation with
U.S. nuclear energy companies, to expand the American Assured
Fuel Supply program by merging it with the operations of the
Department's Uranium Reserve program and maintaining,
replenishing, diversifying, and increasing the quantity of
uranium made available by the program, utilizing domestically
produced, converted, enriched, deconverted, and reduced uranium
to the maximum extent practicable. It requires the Secretary to
maintain a reserve in the event of a supply disruption.
Subsection (g) directs the Secretary to accelerate, and as
necessary initiate, activities to make available HALEU from
inventories owned by the Department for use in advanced
reactors that cannot operate on uranium with lower enrichment
levels or alternate fuels. It gives priority to the Advanced
Reactor Demonstration Projects, with additional HALEU to be
made available to other advanced reactor developers as the
Secretary determines to be appropriate. The subsection provides
the quantities and dates for which the Secretary shall make
HALEU available and lists the factors the Secretary shall
consider in carrying out this program. The subsection prohibits
uranium bartering as a method to pay for the Department's
radioactive waste disposition and environmental cleanup
activities. The subsection limits the Secretary's ability to
make commitments to acquire LEU or HALEU unless funds are
available for those purposes. The HALEU for Advanced Reactor
Demonstrations Projects program sunsets when the needs of
advanced reactor developers can be fully met by domestic
commercial HALEU suppliers.
Subsection (h) directs the Secretary to execute the
programs authorized in this section in a manner that promotes
domestic manufacturing and maximizes utilization of domestic
resources.
Subsection (i) directs the Secretary to ensure that any LEU
or HALEU made available as a result of the programs authorized
in this section are subject to reasonable compensation, taking
into account fair market value and the purposes of this
section. It also creates a revolving fund to minimize the need
for additional appropriations.
Subsection (j) directs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
prioritize and expedite consideration of any action related to
the programs authorized in this section.
Subsection (k) provides that section 3112(d)(2) of the USEC
Privatization Act does not apply to the programs authorized in
this section.
Subsection (1) prohibits the use of uranium deemed
necessary for national security applications as part of the
programs authorized by this section.
Subsection (m) requires that this section be carried out in
a manner consistent with the obligations of the U.S. under
international agreements.
Subsection (n) authorizes $3,500,000,000 for fiscal year
2023 to carry out this section, to remain available until
September 30, 2032, of which the Secretary may use up to
$1,000,000,000 by September 30, 2028, to carry out the HALEU
for Advanced Nuclear Reactor Demonstration Projects program.
Section 3. Report on civil nuclear credit program
This section requires the Secretary of Energy to submit a
report to Congress on anticipated funding requirements for the
civil nuclear credit program described in section 40323 of the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (42 U.S.C. 18753).
Section 4. Amendments to the USEC Privatization Act
This section prohibits the importation of Russian uranium
into the United States 90 days after enactment, prevents
circumvention of the prohibition through uranium swaps, and
allows waivers in the event of fuel unavailability or national
security concerns.
Section 5. Supply chain infrastructure and workforce capacity building
Subsection (a) amends section 10781 of the CHIPS and
Science Act of 2022 to expand the Department of Energy's
authority to provide technical assistance to state, local
communities and other eligible entities for advanced nuclear
reactors to include associated nuclear supply chain
infrastructure.
Subsection (b) amends section 954(b) of the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 to improve Department's nuclear traineeship program
to enhance workforce capacity building and retraining and
extends authorization of appropriations through 2027.
Cost and Budgetary Considerations
The Committee has requested, but has not yet received, the
Congressional Budget Office's estimate of the cost of S. 452,
as ordered reported. When the Congressional Budget Office
completes its cost estimate, it will be posted on the Internet
at www.cbo.gov.
Regulatory Impact Evaluation
In compliance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee makes the following
evaluation of the regulatory impact which would be incurred in
carrying out S. 452. The bill is not a regulatory measure in
the sense of imposing Government-established standards or
significant economic responsibilities on private individuals
and businesses. No personal information would be collected in
administering the program. Therefore, there would be no impact
on personal privacy. Little, if any, additional paperwork would
result from the enactment of S. 452, as ordered reported.
Congressionally Directed Spending
S. 452, as ordered reported, does not contain any
congressionally directed spending items, limited tax benefits,
or limited tariff benefits as defined in rule XLIV of the
Standing Rules of the Senate.
Executive Communications
The testimony provided by the Department of Energy at the
March 9, 2023, Committee hearing to examine the nuclear fuel
cycle follows:
Testimony of Dr. Kathryn Huff, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy,
U.S. Department of Energy
The Russian Federation's brutal invasion of Ukraine has
demonstrated the grave threat to global energy security posed
by dependence on Russian-supplied fuels. This is also the case
in the nuclear area. Russia, the largest global enricher of
uranium, currently supplies a significant portion of the
nuclear fuel supply chain to the United States and our
international allies and partners. In particular, conversion
and enrichment services from trusted sources are insufficient
to replace current U.S. imports from Russia. Without expansion
of the domestic and international allies' and partners' fuel
cycle capacity, the United States cannot reliably make
sufficient low enriched uranium (LEU) or high-assay LEU (HALEU)
available to support the needs of today's power reactor fleet,
advanced reactors, research reactors, and medical isotope
production facilities. This strategic vulnerability is
unsustainable.
In addition, Russia's military attacks on and subsequent
seizure of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)
and the associated heightened risks of a nuclear incident
underscore the nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation
concerns of doing business with Russia in the nuclear energy
area.
The Department is working to address these energy security
challenges in the face of ongoing global events. As noted, the
United States currently purchases a significant amount of
enriched uranium from Russia. We cannot continue to infuse the
Russian state with this source of income and must begin to
reduce and ultimately eliminate U.S. reliance on Russia in the
nuclear energy area, especially as it irresponsibly engages in
strikes that disregard nuclear safety and security and a
nuclear incident in Ukraine.
I want to thank this Committee for its leadership in the
development of proposed legislation aimed at tackling this
critically important issue facing our nation and the world. As
you know, there is no quick, easy path to reduce our dependence
on Russian-supplied fuels. Expanding our domestic fuel capacity
will require strategic investments coupled with import
restrictions that protect those investments well into the
future. We must act swiftly to support domestic enrichment
capabilities and prepare our industry for this transition. The
Department welcomes the opportunity to work with Congress to
address this national security vulnerability.
The testimony provided by the Department of Energy at the
July 28, 2022, Committee hearing on S. 3856 and S. 4066
follows:
Testimony of Dr. Kathryn Huff, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy,
U.S. Department of Energy
s. 3856--a bill to prohibit the importation of uranium from the russian
federation (barrasso et al.)
S. 3856, a bill to prohibit the importation of uranium from
the Russian Federation, bans the import of uranium from the
Russian Federation.
American dependence on Russian uranium threatens our energy
security. Energy security is national security and
untrustworthy state-sponsored programs have no place in our
energy policy. However, any uranium ban from the Russian
Federation must be accompanied by strategic investments that
strengthen our domestic nuclear fuel supply chain.
While a ban coupled with long-term assurances would provide
long-term predictability that would de-risk investments in the
domestic nuclear fuel supply chain, our nation's current
nuclear power operators will need some time to wean themselves
off this Russian supply. In the Presidential Proclamation that
prohibits Russian-affiliated vessels from entering into U.S.
ports, the Department was provided a method to exempt Russian-
affiliated vessels transporting source, special nuclear, and
by-product material, for such time, as the Secretary of Energy,
in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Commerce, determines that no viable source of supply is
available that would not require transport on Russian-
affiliated vessels. A similar exception to a ban on uranium and
fuel services from the Russian Federation would be needed while
new capacity is developed to ensure our nuclear power plants
continue to generate carbon-free electricity.
s. 4066--fueling our nuclear future act of 2022 (barrasso haleu bill)
S. 4066, the Fueling our Nuclear Future Act, would direct
the Department of Energy to establish a program to accelerate
the availability of commercially produced HALEU in the United
States. It would also direct DOE to make HALEU available from
our inventories for advanced reactors until U.S. commercial
enrichment is available.
DOE is supporting the development of two advanced reactor
demonstrations that will require HALEU fuel. These Advanced
Reactor Demonstration Program awardees have aggressive
timelines for deployment. At DOE, we are working diligently to
meet awardees' HALEU needs, which may be as early as 2025 for
reactors that may go online as early as 2028.
The Department shares the Committee's concern about HALEU
availability, and it is a topic that DOE's Office of Nuclear
Energy (NE) is actively addressing, in coordination with the
Environmental Management program and the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA), given the importance to our
domestic industry and national security.
Prior to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine, the
Department was already working to address HALEU needs for
commercial deployment and uranium needs for its other missions.
However, given global events, a new and more urgent path is
needed. The Department recently issued a request for proposal
for a competitively awarded cost share procurement to complete
construction and operate the centrifuge cascade at Piketon,
Ohio, with options to continue to operate the cascade subject
to appropriations.
The President's Fiscal Year 2023 budget request proposes to
make available small quantities of HALEU from limited DOE
inventories and support the private sector in establishing a
limited U.S. commercial HALEU production and supply chain
capability. The Department's highest priority for its enriched
uranium inventories has been and will remain NNSA's national
security missions. The Department will ensure that any material
provided will not impinge on those missions.
This includes the recovery and down-blending of material
stored at Y-12 and Savannah River in a cost share program
between NE and NNSA and producing HALEU material in the 2025-
2026 timeframe. It would also support completing construction
of the enrichment demonstration facility in Piketon, Ohio, and
continued operation of the centrifuge cascade at Piketon, Ohio,
to produce 900kg HALEU per year, enriched to a nominal 19.75%
U-235.
The Department is concerned that the bill would eliminate
consideration of potential harm to the natural or cultural
resources of Tribal communities or sovereign Native Nations. I
look forward to working together with you toward investments
that secure our supplies of low enriched uranium (LEU),
including HALEU, in a just and equitable manner.
The testimony provided by the Department of Energy at the
March 1, 2022, Committee hearing on S. 3428 follows:
Testimony of Dr. Geraldine Richmond, Under Secretary for Science and
Innovation, U.S. Department of Energy
s. 3428
Bill number S. 3428, to be referred to as the Fission for
the Future Act of 2022, supports the deployment of next
generation advanced nuclear energy technologies by establishing
a program at DOE that would provide additional Federal
assistance for such efforts. Specifically, the bill prioritizes
helping communities with retired or retiring fossil fuel
generation facilities transition to a clean energy future using
nuclear energy technology. This future includes non-electric
applications for nuclear energy such as heating, hydrogen
production, industrial processes, desalination, and isotope
production. Furthermore, the support for fossil communities,
Tribes, and institutions of higher education and workforce
development in this bill is consistent with the Department's
equity and justice considerations.
DOE currently supports efforts to deploy next generation
advanced nuclear energy technology by leveraging retiring
energy generation assets. For example, TerraPower recently
announced siting of a Natrium reactor at a retiring coal plant
in Wyoming. TerraPower has a cooperative agreement with DOE--
specifically in the Office of Nuclear Energy's (NE) Advanced
Reactor Demonstration Program--to advance this project. The
partnership includes private sector companies, universities,
and National Laboratories. This project is a great example of
what successful public-private partnerships can achieve in
advancing energy solutions.
Changes in Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by
the bill S. 452, as ordered reported, are shown as follows
(existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black
brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in
which no change is proposed is shown in roman):
USEC PRIVATIZATION ACT
Public Law 104-134
AN ACT Making appropriations for fiscal year 1996 to make a further
downpayment toward a balanced budget, and for other purposes.
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--RESCISSIONS AND OFFSETS
CHAPTER 1--ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT
Subchapter A--United States Enrichment Corporation Privatization
* * * * * * *
SEC. 3112A. INCENTIVES FOR ADDITIONAL DOWNBLENDING OF HIGHLY ENRICHED
URANIUM BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
* * * * * * *
(c) Promotion of Downblending of Russian Highly Enriched
Uranium.--
* * * * * * *
(2) Incentives to continue downblending russian
highly enriched uranium after the completion of the
russian heu agreement.--
(A) In general.--After the completion of the
Russian HEU Agreement, the importation into the
United States of low-enriched uranium,
including low-enriched uranium obtained under
contracts for separative work units, that is
produced in the Russian Federation, whether or
not such low-enriched uranium is derived from
highly enriched uranium of weapons origin, may
not exceed--
(i) in calendar year 2014, 485,279
kilograms;
(ii) in calendar year 2015, 455,142
kilograms;
(iii) in calendar year 2016, 480,146
kilograms;
(iv) in calendar year 2017, 490,710
kilograms;
(v) in calendar year 2018, 492,731
kilograms;
(vi) in calendar year 2019, 509,058
kilograms;
(vii) in calendar year 2020, 514,754
kilograms;
(viii) in calendar year 2021, 596,682
kilograms; and
(ix) in calendar year 2022, 489,617
kilograms[;] .
[(x) in calendar year 2023, 578,877
kilograms;
(xi) in calendar year 2024, 476,536
kilograms;
(xii) in calendar year 2025, 470,376
kilograms;
(xiii) in calendar year 2026, 464,183
kilograms;
(xiv) in calendar year 2027, 459,083
kilograms;
(xv) in calendar year 2028, 344,312
kilograms;
(xvi) in calendar year 2029, 340,114
kilograms;
(xvii) in calendar year 2030, 332,141
kilograms;
(xviii) in calendar year 2031,
328,862 kilograms;
(xix) in calendar year 2032, 322,255
kilograms;
(xx) in calendar year 2033, 317,536
kilograms;
(xxi) in calendar year 2034, 298,088
kilograms;
(xxii) in calendar year 2035, 294,511
kilograms;
(xxiii) in calendar year 2036,
286,066 kilograms;
(xxiv) in calendar year 2037, 281,272
kilograms;
(xxv) in calendar year 2038, 277,124
kilograms;
(xxvi) in calendar year 2039, 277,124
kilograms; and
(xxvii) in calendar year 2040,
267,685 kilograms.]
* * * * * * *
(C) Additional imports in exchange for a
commitment to downblend an additional 300
metric tons of highly enriched uranium.--
(i) In general.--In addition to the
amount authorized to be imported under
subparagraph (A) and except as provided
in clause (ii), if the Russian
Federation enters into a bilateral
agreement with the United States under
which the Russian Federation agrees to
downblend an additional 300 metric tons
of highly enriched uranium after the
completion of the Russian HEU
Agreement, 4 kilograms of low-enriched
uranium, whether or not such low-
enriched uranium is derived from highly
enriched uranium of weapons origin and
including low-enriched uranium obtained
under contracts for separative work
units, may be imported in a calendar
year for every 1 kilogram of Russian
highly enriched uranium of weapons
origin that was downblended in the
preceding calendar year, subject to the
verification of the Secretary of Energy
under [paragraph (10)] paragraph (9).
* * * * * * *
(3) Exceptions.--The import limitations described in
paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to low-enriched
uranium produced in the Russian Federation that is
imported into the [United States--
(A) for use in the initial core of a new
nuclear reactor; or
(B) for processing] United States for
processing and to be certified for
reexportation and not for consumption in the
United States.
* * * * * * *
[(5) Adjustments to import limitations.--
[(A) In general.--The import limitations
described in paragraph (2)(A) are based on the
lower scenario data in the report of the World
Nuclear Association entitled ``The Nuclear Fuel
Report: Global Scenarios for Demand and Supply
Availability 2019-2040''. In each of calendar
years 2023, 2029, and 2035, the Secretary of
Commerce shall review the projected demand for
uranium for nuclear reactors in the United
States and adjust the import limitations
described in paragraph (2)(A) to account for
changes in such demand in years after the year
in which that report or a subsequent report is
published.
[(B) Report required.--Not later than one
year after December 27, 2020, and every 3 years
thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to
Congress a report that includes--
[(i) a recommendation on the use of
all publicly available data to ensure
accurate forecasting by scenario data
to comport to actual demand for low-
enriched uranium for nuclear reactors
in the United States; and
(ii) an identification of the steps
to be taken to adjust the import
limitations described in paragraph
(2)(A) based on the most accurate
scenario data.
[(C) Incentive adjustment.--Beginning in the
second calendar year after the calendar year of
the completion of the Russian HEU Agreement,
the Secretary of Energy shall increase or
decrease the amount of low-enriched uranium
that may be imported in a calendar year under
paragraph (2)(C) (including the amount of low-
enriched uranium that may be imported for each
kilogram of highly enriched uranium downblended
under paragraph (2)(C)(i)) by a percentage
equal to the percentage increase or decrease,
as the case may be, in the average amount of
uranium loaded into nuclear power reactors in
the United States in the most recent 3-
calendar-year period for which data are
available, as reported by the Energy
Information Administration of the Department of
Energy, compared to the average amount of
uranium loaded into such reactors during the 3-
calendar-year period beginning on January 1,
2011, as reported by the Energy Information
Administration.
[(D) Publication of adjustments.--As soon as
practicable, but not later than July 31 of each
calendar year, the Secretary of Energy shall
publish in the Federal Register the amount of
low-enriched uranium that may be imported in
the current calendar year after the adjustments
under subparagraph (C).]
[(6)] (5) Authority for additional
adjustment.--[In addition to the
adjustment under paragraph (5)(A), the]
The Secretary of Commerce may adjust
the import limitations under paragraph
(2)(A) for a calendar year if the
Secretary--
(A) in consultation with the Secretary of
Energy, determines that the available supply of
low-enriched uranium and the available
stockpiles of uranium of the Department of
Energy are insufficient to meet demand in the
United States in the following calendar year;
and
(B) notifies Congress of the adjustment not
less than 45 days before making the adjustment.
[(7)] (6) Equivalent quantities of
low-enriched uranium imports.--
(A) In general.--The import limitations
described in paragraphs (1) and (2) are
expressed in terms of uranium containing 4.4
percent uranium-235 and a tails assay of 0.3
percent.
(B) Adjustment for other uranium.--Imports of
low-enriched uranium under paragraphs (1) and
(2), including low-enriched uranium obtained
under contracts for separative work units,
shall count against the import limitations
described in such paragraphs in amounts
calculated as the quantity of low-enriched
uranium containing 4.4 percent uranium-235
necessary to equal the total amount of uranium-
235 contained in such imports.
[(8)] (7) Downblending of other
highly enriched uranium.--
(A) In general.--The downblending of highly
enriched uranium not of weapons origin may be
counted for purposes of paragraph (2)(C),
subject to verification under [paragraph (10)]
paragraph 9, if the Secretary of Energy
determines that the highly enriched uranium to
be downblended poses a risk to the national
security of the United States.
(B) Equivalent quantities of highly enriched
uranium.--For purposes of determining the
additional low-enriched uranium imports allowed
under paragraph (2)(C), highly enriched uranium
not of weapons origin downblended pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall count as downblended
highly enriched uranium of weapons origin in
amounts calculated as the quantity of highly
enriched uranium containing 90 percent uranium-
235 necessary to equal the total amount of
uranium-235 contained in the highly enriched
uranium not of weapons origin downblended
pursuant to subparagraph (A).
[(9)] (8) Termination of import restrictions.--The
provisions of this subsection shall terminate on
[December 31, 2040] the date described in subsection
(d)(1).
[(10)] (9) Technical verifications by secretary of
energy.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of Energy
shall verify the origin, quantity, and uranium-
235 content of the highly enriched uranium
downblended for purposes of [paragraphs (2)(C)
and (8)] paragraphs (2)(C) and (7).
(B) Methods of verification.--In conducting
the verification required under subparagraph
(A), the Secretary of Energy shall employ the
transparency measures and access provisions
agreed to under the Russian HEU Agreement for
monitoring the downblending of Russian highly
enriched uranium of weapons origin and such
other methods as the Secretary determines
appropriate.
[(11)] (10) Enforcement of import limitations.--The
Secretary of Commerce shall be responsible for
enforcing the import limitations imposed under this
subsection and shall enforce such import limitations in
a manner that imposes a minimal burden on the
commercial nuclear industry.
[(12)] (11) Ffect on other agreements.--
(A) Russian heu agreement.--Nothing in this
section shall be construed to modify the terms
of the Russian HEU Agreement, including the
provisions of the Agreement relating to the
amount of low-enriched uranium that may be
imported into the United States.
(B) Other agreements.--If a provision of any
agreement between the United States and the
Russian Federation, other than the Russian HEU
Agreement or the Suspension Agreement, relating
to the importation of low-enriched uranium,
including low-enriched uranium obtained under
contracts for separative work units, into the
United States conflicts with a provision of
this section, the provision of this section
shall supersede the provision of the agreement
to the extent of the conflict.
(d) Prohibition on Imports of Low Enriched Uranium.--
(1) Prohibition.--Beginning on the date that is 90
days after the date of the enactment of this
subsection, and subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the
following may be imported into the United States:
(A) Unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is
produced in the Russian Federation or by a
Russian entity.
(B) Unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is
determined to have been exchanged with swapped
for, or otherwise obtained in lieu or
unirradiated low-enriched uranium described in
subparagraph (A) in a manner designed to
circumvent the restrictions under this section.
(2) Waiver.--
(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraphs (B)
and (C), the Secretary of Energy, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Commerce, may waive the
application of paragraph (1) to authorize the
importation of low-enriched uranium described
in that paragraph if the Secretary of Energy
determines that--
(i) no alternative viable source of
low-enriched uranium is available to
sustain the continued operation of a
nuclear reactor or a United States
nuclear energy company; or
(ii) importation of low-enriched
uranium that is produced in the Russian
Federation or by a Russian entity is in
the national interest.
(B) Limitation on amounts of imports of low
enriched uranium.--
(i) In general.--The importation into
the United States of low-enriched
uranium, including low-enriched uranium
obtained under contracts for separative
work units, that is produced in the
Russian Federation or by a Russian
entity, whether or not such low-
enriched uranium is derived from highly
enriched uranium of weapons origin, may
not exceed--
(I) in calendar year 2023,
578,877 kilograms;
(II) in calendar year 2024,
476,536 kilograms;
(III) in calendar year 2025,
470,376 kilograms;
(IV) in calendar year 2026,
464,183 kilograms; and
(V) in calendar year 2027,
459,083 kilograms.
(ii) Administration.--The Secretary
of Commerce shall--
(I) administer the import
limitations described in clause
(i) in accordance with the
provisions of the Suspension
Agreement, including the
provisions described in
subsection (c)(2)(B)(i);
(II) be responsible for
enforcing the import
limitations described in clause
(i); and
(III) enforce the import
limitations described in clause
(i) in a manner that imposes a
minimal burden on the
commercial nuclear industry.
(C) Termination.--Any waiver issued under
subparagraph (A) shall terminate not later than
January 1, 2028.
(D) Notification to congress.--
(i) In general.--Upon issuing a
waiver under subparagraph (A), the
Secretary of Energy shall submit to the
committees specified in clause (ii) a
notification that a waiver has been
issued, which shall include
identification of the recipient of the
waiver.
(ii) Committees specified.--The
committees specified in this clause
are--
(I) the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources and the
Committee on Finance of the
Senate; and
(II) the Committee on Energy
and Commerce and the Committee
on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives.
(3) Applicability.--This subsection does not apply to
imports--
(A) by or under contract to the Department of
Energy for national security or
nonproliferation purposes; or
(B) of non-uranium isotopes.
(4) Termi(nation.--The provisions of this subsection
shall terminate on December 31, 2040.
(5) Russian entity defined.--In this subsection, the
term `Russian entity' means an entity organized under
the laws of or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of
the Government of the Russian Federation.
* * * * * * *
CHIPS AND SCIENCE ACT OF 2022
Public Law 117-167
AN ACT Making appropriations for Legislative Branch for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2022, and for other purposes.
* * * * * * *
DIVISION B--RESEARCH AND INNOVATION
* * * * * * *
TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle P--Fission for the Future
SEC. 10781. ADVANCED NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES FEDERAL RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM.
* * * * * * *
(b) Establishment of Program.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall establish a
program to provide Federal financial assistance to
eligible entities to support the research, development,
[and demonstration of advanced nuclear reactors]
demonstration, and deployment of advanced nuclear
reactors and associated supply chain infrastructure.
* * * * * * *
ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005
Public Law 109-58
AN ACT To ensure jobs for our future with secure, affordable, and
reliable energy.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 954. NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING SUPPORT.
* * * * * * *
(b) Nuclear Energy [Graduate] Traineeship Subprogram.--
(1) Establishment.--In carrying out the program under
subsection (a), the Secretary shall establish a nuclear
energy [graduate] traineeship subprogram under which
the Secretary shall competitively award [graduate]
traineeships in coordination with universities to
provide focused, advanced training to meet critical
mission needs of the Department, including in
industries that are represented by skilled labor
unions.
(2) Requirements.--In carrying out the subprogram
under this subsection, the Secretary shall--
(A) encourage appropriate partnerships among
National Laboratories, affected universities,
community colleges, trade schools, registered
apprenticeship programs, pre-apprenticeship
programs, and industry; and
(B) on an annual basis, evaluate the needs of
the nuclear energy community to implement
[graduate] traineeships for focused topical
areas addressing mission-specific workforce
needs.
(3) Focus areas.--In carrying out the subprogram
under this subsection, the Secretary may implement
traineeships in focus areas that, in the determination
of the Secretary, are necessary to support the nuclear
energy sector in the United States, including--
(A) research and development;
(B) construction and operation;
(C) associated supply chains; and
(D) workforce training and retraining to
support transitioning workforces.
[(3)] (4) Authorization of appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry
out the subprogram under this subsection $5,000,000 for
each of fiscal years [2021 through 2025] 2023 through
2027.
* * * * * * *
[all]