[Senate Report 118-5]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


118th Congress}                                           { Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session  }                                           { 118-5

======================================================================
                              R E P O R T

                                 OF THE

                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                          COVERING THE PERIOD

                            JANUARY 3, 2021

                                   TO

                            JANUARY 3, 2023

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                 March 28, 2023.--Ordered to be printed
                 
                            __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
                            WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                      
                 
                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                   MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
                  MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RON WYDEN, Oregon                    SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico          TOM COTTON, Arkansas
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine            JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado          JERRY MORAN, Kansas
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      M. MICHAEL ROUNDS, South Dakota
JON OSSOFF, Georgia

              Charles Schumer, New York, Ex Officio Member
              Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
               Jack Reed, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
            Roger F. Wicker, Mississippi, Ex Officio Member
                     Michael Casey, Staff Director
                Brian W. Walsh, Minority Staff Director
                     Kelsey S. Bailey, Chief Clerk

During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence was as follows:

                   MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
                  MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon                    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico          SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine            ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado          TOM COTTON, Arkansas
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      BEN SASSE, Nebraska
              Charles Schumer, New York, Ex Officio Member
              Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
               Jack Reed, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
               James Inhofe, Oklahoma, Ex Officio Member
                     Michael Casey, Staff Director
                Brian W. Walsh, Minority Staff Director
                     Kelsey S. Bailey, Chief Clerk
                                PREFACE

    The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate 
this report on its activities from January 3, 2021, to January 
3, 2023. This report also includes references to activities 
underway at the conclusion of the 117th Congress that the 
Committee expects to continue into the future.
    Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th 
Congress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of 
carrying out oversight of the programs and activities of the 
Intelligence Community (IC) of the United States. Most of the 
Committee's oversight work is conducted in secret and cannot be 
discussed publicly to protect sensitive IC sources and methods. 
Nevertheless, the Select Committee on Intelligence has 
submitted activities reports on a biennial basis since 1977 to 
provide the American public with information about its 
intelligence oversight activities. We submit this report to the 
Senate, in observance of this practice.
    We also take this opportunity to thank all of the members 
of the Committee in the 117th Congress. In particular, we take 
special note of colleagues who completed their service on the 
Committee. Senator Burr served on the Committee from the 110th 
Congress until he retired from the U.S. Senate on January 3, 
2023. Senator Blunt served on the Committee from the 112th 
Congress until he retired from the Senate on January 3, 2023. 
Senator Sasse served on the Committee from the 116th Congress 
until he retired from the Senate on January 3, 2023. Their 
commitment to the important work of the Committee has helped to 
ensure a strong IC and a secure nation. We are grateful for 
their contributions.
    We also express our deep gratitude for the work of all 
Committee staff during the 117th Congress. Their vigilance, 
professionalism, and perseverance in the face of unprecedented 
public health challenges were essential to the Committee's 
fulfillment of its oversight obligations.

                                   Mark R. Warner,
                                           Chairman.
                                   Marco Rubio,
                                           Vice Chairman.
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Preface..........................................................   III
  I. Introduction.....................................................1
 II. Legislation......................................................2
      A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022.....     2
      B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023.....     3
III. Oversight Activities.............................................5
      A. Worldwide Threats Hearing...............................     5
      B. China...................................................     5
      C. Russia..................................................     6
      D. Afghanistan.............................................     7
      E. Iran....................................................     7
      F. North Korea.............................................     7
      G. Western Hemisphere/Latin America........................     8
      H. Africa..................................................     8
      I. Middle East.............................................     8
      J. Covert Action...........................................     9
      K. Counterterrorism........................................     9
      L. Counterintelligence.....................................    10
      M. Cyber...................................................    10
      N. Telecommunications......................................    11
      O. Emerging Technologies...................................    11
      P. Artificial Intelligence.................................    12
      Q. Anomalous Health Incidents..............................    12
      R. Personnel Vetting Reform................................    12
      S. Government Security Policy..............................    13
      T. Foreign Malign Influence................................    13
      U. Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena........................    13
      V. Space...................................................    14
      W. Audits and Projects.....................................    15
      X. Whistleblowers and Other Complainants...................    16
      Y. Inspectors General......................................    16
      Z. Review of Analytic Ombudsman Report on Allegations of 
        Politicization...........................................    16
 IV. Nominations.....................................................16
      A. Avril Haines............................................    18
      B. William Burns...........................................    18
      C. Christopher C. Fonzone..................................    18
      D. Brett M. Holmgren.......................................    18
      E. Christine Abizaid.......................................    18
      F. Robin Ashton............................................    18
      G. Thomas A. Monheim.......................................    18
      H. Stacey A. Dixon.........................................    18
      I. Matthew G. Olsen........................................    18
      J. Shannon Corless.........................................    18
      K. Kenneth Wainstein.......................................    19
      L. Kate Heinzelman.........................................    19
      M. Terrence Edwards........................................    19
  V. Support to the Senate...........................................19
 VI. Summary of Committee Actions....................................19
      A. Number of meetings......................................    19
      B. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee.......    20
      C. Bills referred to the Committee.........................    20
      D. Committee publications..................................    20
      
                                            
118th Congress}                                           { Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session  }                                           { 118-5

======================================================================
 
                          COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

                                _______
                                

                 March 28, 2023.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Warner, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                            I. INTRODUCTION

    The activities of the Committee during the 117th Congress 
included passage of critical enabling legislation, confirmation 
of appointees to key IC leadership posts, and inquiries on the 
performance and activities of the IC.
    As detailed in Part II of this report, the Committee's 
paramount legislative priority and achievement in the 117th 
Congress was the successful enactment of Intelligence 
Authorization Acts for both Fiscal Year 2022 and Fiscal Year 
2023.
    Throughout the 117th Congress, the Committee's oversight 
activities focused on the national security threats posed by 
The People's Republic of China (PRC or China) and the Russian 
Federation (Russia), including China's military, economic, and 
political activities around the world, and Russia's unjustified 
and illegal invasion of Ukraine. In addition, the Committee 
devoted considerable attention to events leading up to and 
following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. The 
Committee maintained continued focus on the malign activities 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), as well as 
strategically significant political, military, and economic 
developments in Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South 
America. The Committee also conducted vigorous oversight of 
covert action, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence 
programs carried out by the IC during the 117th Congress. 
Finally, the Committee sustained its emphasis on overseeing the 
national security implications of certain technological 
advancements, including in telecommunications, as well as 
emerging technologies, such as next-generation energy storage, 
generation, and distribution.

                            II. LEGISLATION


         A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022

    In the 117th Congress, the Committee focused its efforts on 
enacting annual intelligence authorization acts as its primary 
means of carrying out its oversight responsibility. In early 
2021, the Committee began consideration of the President's 
request for funding levels and legislative authority for Fiscal 
Year 2022. The Committee's budget monitors and counsel 
evaluated the funding and legislative requests submitted by the 
Executive Branch. The Committee conducted numerous topical and 
regional briefings and hearings, including classified budget 
hearings.
    The Committee reported the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2022 (S. 2610) on August 4, 2021, and 
subsequently filed an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 117-37) on 
August 10, 2021.
    The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed 
its version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2022 (H.R. 5412) on September 30, 2021, and then reported 
the bill to the full House and filed an accompanying report (H. 
Rpt. 117-156) on October 28, 2021. The Committee proceeded to 
work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
and other congressional committees on a final version of the 
legislation.
    The product of the committees' efforts, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, was incorporated as 
Division X of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal 
Year 2022 (P.L. 117-103). The Consolidated Appropriations Act 
for Fiscal Year 2022 passed the House on March 9, 2022, in two 
separate measures by votes of 361-69 and 260-171, and passed 
the Senate on March 10, 2022, as a consolidated measure by a 
vote of 68-31. The President signed the consolidated bill into 
law on March 15, 2022.
    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 
authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities across the U.S. Government and was accompanied by a 
classified schedule of authorizations and a classified annex. 
The Act, as incorporated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act 
for Fiscal Year 2022, ensures accountability and integrity from 
IC agencies, which undertake the Nation's most sensitive 
intelligence programs and activities, and included significant 
legislative provisions to strengthen national security by:
           Increasing oversight and investments to 
        address the growing national security threats posed by 
        China, including its technology advancements, military 
        base and infrastructure expansion, influence 
        operations, global investments, and digital currencies;
           Improving the IC's response to anomalous 
        health incidents, also known as ``Havana Syndrome,'' by 
        establishing an independent medical advisory board at 
        the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ensuring 
        benefits, eligibility, and access to expert medical 
        advice and facilities, and requiring protocols on 
        testing, information safeguards, and reporting 
        mechanisms;
           Improving the IC's ability to adopt and 
        integrate artificial intelligence tools and other 
        emerging technologies;
           Bolstering investments in commercial imagery 
        and analytic services to provide more unclassified 
        collection and analysis to policymakers and warfighters 
        in a timely manner;
           Continuing the Committee's commitment to 
        reform and improve the security clearance process, 
        including mandating a performance management framework 
        to assess the adoption and effectiveness of the 
        Executive Branch's ``Trusted Workforce 2.0'' 
        initiative, more accurately measuring how long it takes 
        to transfer clearances between Federal agencies so 
        timelines can be shortened, and creating IC-wide 
        policies to share information on cleared contractors to 
        enhance the effectiveness of insider threat programs;
           Ensuring strong congressional oversight of 
        and protections for IC whistleblowers who come forward 
        to report waste, fraud, or abuse;
           Addressing intelligence requirements in key 
        locations worldwide, including in Latin America, 
        Africa, and Afghanistan, to confront foreign 
        adversaries' efforts to undermine the U.S. abroad;
           Strengthening the IC's ability to conduct 
        financial intelligence activities; and
           Supporting the IC's efforts to assess 
        unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP), further 
        building upon the work of the UAP Task Force.

         B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023

    In early 2022, the Committee began consideration of the 
President's request for funding levels and legislative 
authority for Fiscal Year 2023. The Committee's budget monitors 
and counsel evaluated the funding and legislative requests 
submitted by the Executive Branch. The Committee conducted 
numerous topical and regional briefings and hearings, including 
classified budget hearings.
    The Committee reported the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2023 (S. 4503) on July 12, 2022, and 
subsequently filed an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 117-132) on 
July 20, 2022.
    The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed 
its version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2023 (H.R. 8367) on July 20, 2022, and then reported the 
bill to the full House and issued an accompanying report (H. 
Rpt. 117-546) on October 31, 2022. The Committee proceeded to 
work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
and other congressional committees on a final version of the 
legislation.
    The product of the committees' efforts, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, was incorporated as 
Division F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263). The National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2023 passed the House on December 8, 2022, 
by a vote of 350-80, and passed the Senate on December 15, 
2022, by a vote of 83-11. The President signed the consolidated 
bill into law on December 23, 2022.
    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 
authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities across the U.S. Government and was accompanied by a 
classified schedule of authorizations and a classified annex. 
The Act, as incorporated in the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2023, ensures accountability and integrity 
from IC agencies and contained a number of legislative 
provisions, including:
           Confronting the growing national security 
        threat posed by the PRC by increasing hard target 
        intelligence collection and analysis, as well as by 
        identifying and exposing the PRC's leadership 
        corruption, forced labor camps, and malign economic 
        investments, including in telecommunications, emerging 
        technologies, and semiconductors;
           Bolstering intelligence support for Ukraine 
        as it fights to defend its territorial integrity and 
        sovereignty since Russia's second unprovoked invasion, 
        including by assessing the effects of sanctions on 
        Russia and its allies and opportunities to mitigate 
        threats to food security at home and abroad;
           Driving improvements to the IC's hiring and 
        security clearance processes by holding the IC 
        accountable for improving the timeliness of bringing 
        cleared personnel on-board, ensuring that key 
        management and contract oversight personnel in industry 
        can obtain clearances, and establishing personnel 
        vetting performance measures;
           Establishing counterintelligence protections 
        for IC grant funding against foreign-based risks of 
        misappropriation, theft, and other threats to U.S. 
        innovation;
           Accelerating and improving procurement, 
        adoption, and integration of emerging technologies 
        across the IC;
           Establishing measures to mitigate 
        counterintelligence threats from foreign commercial 
        spyware;
           Strengthening oversight of national security 
        threats associated with the regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, 
        and Venezuela;
           Ensuring continued support to the victims of 
        anomalous health incidents and maintaining continued 
        oversight over the IC's investigations into the causes 
        of such incidents;
           Promoting cybersecurity enhancements and 
        establishing cybersecurity minimum standards across the 
        IC, including for classified systems;
           Enhancing oversight of IC and Department of 
        Defense collection and reporting on UAP;
           Establishing IC coordinators to account for 
        Russian atrocities and for countering proliferation of 
        Iran-origin unmanned aircraft systems;
           Promoting establishment of an Office of 
        Global Competition Analysis to conduct analysis 
        relevant to U.S. leadership in science, technology, and 
        innovation sectors critical to national security and 
        economic prosperity;
           Enhancing intelligence support to export 
        controls and investment screening and emphasizing the 
        importance of open source intelligence capabilities in 
        the IC; and
           Continuing the Committee's efforts to 
        modernize the Government's declassification system by 
        directing the Director of National Intelligence and the 
        Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and 
        Security to report on declassification policies, 
        proposals to promote best practices across the federal 
        government, and spend plans for technological reforms.

                       III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES


                     A. Worldwide Threats Hearings

    Since 1994, the Committee has held annual open hearings to 
review the IC's assessment of the current and projected 
national security threats to the United States. There have only 
been two years (1999 and 2019) when the Committee did not hold 
a ``Worldwide Threats'' hearing. It is one of the few open 
hearings that the Committee has regularly conducted to share 
the work of the IC with the public. These Worldwide Threats 
hearings cover national security assessments pertaining to all 
geographic regions, as well as transnational threats such as 
terrorism and the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction.
    On April 14, 2021 and March 10, 2022, the Committee held 
open Worldwide Threats hearings on the current and projected 
threats to the United States. The lead witness before the 
Committee at both hearings was Director of National 
Intelligence Avril Haines. She was joined at the witness table 
during both hearings by the Honorable William J. Burns, 
Director of the CIA; the Honorable Christopher Wray, Director 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); General Paul 
Nakasone, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA); and 
Lieutenant General Scott Berrier, Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA). Both hearings were followed by 
closed, classified sessions. Video recordings of the open 
hearings are available on the Committee's website, along with 
Director Haines's unclassified statements for the record.

                                B. China

    The Committee prioritized the PRC as the top national and 
economic security threat throughout the 117th Congress. The 
Committee dedicated a significant number of classified hearings 
and briefings to China and Taiwan. In addition, the Committee 
held two open hearings on the PRC in order to raise greater 
public awareness on the threats to our national and economic 
security posed by the PRC.
    Through briefings and hearings, the Committee continued to 
evaluate the IC's budget and programs to ensure its 
capabilities, collection posture, and analysis relating to the 
PRC were sufficient to defend our national security, economic 
prosperity, and values. In addition, the Committee paid close 
attention to the PRC's military, economic, and political 
activities around the world, including its illicit tactics to 
obtain technology, economic coercion, military plans and 
modernization, malign influence efforts in the United States 
and abroad, cyber operations, and intelligence efforts.
    Staff and Members of the Committee traveled to the Indo-
Pacific region, as well as to other regions--including Latin 
America, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe--to better 
understand the threats posed by the PRC's malign activities and 
the U.S. efforts to counter those threats. The Committee also 
received numerous briefings regarding the PRC, including from 
the IC, other departments and agencies, and outside experts.
    The Committee convened a series of engagements between the 
IC and private sector entities, academics, and local 
governments in order to raise awareness of strategic economic 
and technological threats emanating from China.

                               C. Russia

    During the 117th Congress, the Committee focused 
extensively on the threat to U.S. national security from 
Russia, including during the run-up to, and start of, Russia's 
unjustified and illegal invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 
2022. The Committee conducted at least 16 formal hearings and 
briefings on issues relating to the threat from Russia, 
including its war against Ukraine.
    Prior to Russia's invasion, the IC issued warnings about 
Russia's buildup of military forces on Ukraine's borders, and 
accurately predicted that Putin was preparing to invade. The 
Committee was briefed on these developments and oversaw the 
operations of U.S. intelligence agencies prior to, and during, 
the invasion. Prior to the invasion, on February 9, 2022, all 
16 Members of the Committee, on a bipartisan basis, wrote to 
the President, urging him to ensure that the United States was 
sharing as much intelligence as possible with Ukraine, noting 
that ``Russia's threats to Ukraine are a threat to democracies 
around the world, and we urge you to do as much as possible to 
support Ukraine at this critical moment.''
    In addition to the Committee's focus on the threat from 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it also examined the threat posed 
by Russia's other malign activities around the world. These 
include Russia's traditional and cyber espionage, including the 
2020 SolarWinds cyber intrusion perpetrated by the Russian 
external intelligence agency, the SVR, which resulted in the 
compromise of hundreds of federal agencies and private 
companies, and the May 2021 ransomware attack by a Russian 
cybercrime group on the Colonial Pipeline, which halted 
pipeline operations temporarily and resulted in fuel shortages 
along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States.
    The Committee took a strong stand on ensuring U.S. 
diplomats at our Embassy in Moscow be afforded the same 
privileges, including comparable numbers of visas, as Russia's 
diplomats in the United States. All 16 Members, as well as 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez, sent 
a letter to the President on October 4, 2021, expressing 
concern about ongoing actions inhibiting the work of U.S. 
diplomats in Moscow that resulted in disproportionately more 
Russian diplomats in the U.S. than vice versa, and undermining 
the ability of the Embassy to function in a safe and secure 
manner. The Committee urged the President to expel Russian 
diplomats if Russia was unwilling to provide the number of 
visas necessary to ensure parity between the two sides.
    The Committee further held hearings and briefings on 
Russia's continued reliance on misinformation and 
disinformation to target global audiences and interfere with 
elections and democratic processes in the United States and 
around the world; the buildup of its conventional, strategic, 
and asymmetric arsenals; its increasingly assertive military 
deployments on its periphery and to wider regions, including 
the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America; its use of 
mercenary groups and private military and security corporations 
such as the Vagner Group; its support of like-minded 
authoritarian regimes; and its use of corruption and criminal 
networks to further its strategic goals. The Committee's 
activities regarding these issues were designed to provide 
oversight and assess the IC's capabilities to collect against, 
analyze, provide warning, and counter these and other malign 
activities of Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.

                             D. Afghanistan

    The Committee's efforts in the 117th Congress regarding 
Afghanistan largely focused on the collapse of the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), with the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Prior to the 
complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, the 
Committee held multiple hearings and weekly briefings with the 
IC to monitor intelligence operations, as well as implications 
for long-term U.S. policy goals following the U.S. decision to 
fully withdraw from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021.
    Following the collapse of GIROA, and the complete 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, the 
Committee held multiple hearings to better understand IC 
methodology in determining the strength of Taliban forces, the 
forces of the GIROA, and the impact of the U.S. withdrawal. 
Committee staff reviewed intelligence products from the signing 
of the Doha Agreement in 2020 through the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces in 2021 in order to provide Committee Members with an 
accurate picture of IC work during and leading up to the 
withdrawal.
    The Committee continues the important work of oversight 
through hearings, briefings, roundtables, and congressional 
delegations to the region to review the role of the IC in 
supporting and implementing U.S. policy in Afghanistan from 
outside of the country.

                                E. Iran

    The Committee conducted travel, and held hearings, 
briefings, and roundtables focused on Iranian malign influence, 
support to proxies in regional conflict zones, Iran's nuclear 
program, and, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 
Iranian support to Russian forces. Through travel to the 
region, staff obtained valuable insight on Iranian threats and 
efforts to mitigate them, the alignment of Gulf Arab states 
following the end of the rift with Qatar, the alignment of Gulf 
Arab states with Israel after the signing of the Abraham 
Accords, and energy and security dynamics. The Committee 
conducted hearings and briefings on U.S. intelligence 
activities and partnerships related to Iranian plans, 
intentions, and capabilities.

                             F. North Korea

    During the 117th Congress, the Committee held two hearings 
and conducted multiple engagements with the IC on North Korea. 
In particular, the Committee's efforts focused on political, 
military, and technical issues related to weapons programs that 
could threaten the United States and its allies. Staff traveled 
to the region to conduct oversight and also received IC 
briefings and reports on counterintelligence issues, North 
Korea's illicit cyber activity, and sanctions violations.

                  G. Western Hemisphere/Latin America

    The Committee focused its efforts, through travel, 
briefings, and hearings, on monitoring key elections across the 
region in Colombia, Peru, Chile, Brazil, Honduras, and Ecuador, 
as well as tracking developments in the authoritarian regimes 
in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Members and staff, during 
travel and other engagements, also met with allies in the 
region to deepen bilateral engagement.
    The Committee continued to monitor the supply chain, 
production, and trafficking of illicit narcotics, with 
increased focus on synthetic opioids; the threat posed by 
violent transnational criminal organizations to the United 
States and the stability of the region; and the military and 
intelligence activities of U.S. adversaries in Latin America, 
including escalation in PRC and Russian activity.

                               H. Africa

    During the 117th Congress, the Committee renewed focus on 
North Africa, the Sahel, and the Sub-Saharan region. Committee 
staff conducted oversight through a series of briefings, 
hearings, and foreign visits, ensuring that authorized and 
appropriated programs coalesced with realities on the ground 
and U.S. diplomatic and intelligence interests on the 
continent. The increased presence and investments by the PRC 
and Russia in the region represent an elevated threat to the 
security of the U.S. and our allies and partners.
    Throughout the Sahel, Russia and its military and political 
proxy, private military company Vagner, continue to parlay 
Russian influence in the fragile post-coup landscape--more 
often than not granting Russia access to politically vulnerable 
juntas under the auspices of counterterrorism assistance. 
Russia has intensified its disinformation efforts on the 
continent, in particular to secure support for its barbaric war 
in Ukraine and turn African nations against the west.
    The PRC continues to leverage its economic footholds in the 
region to exploit and influence African nations. The Committee 
focused in particular on the PRC's exploitative attempts to 
control precious metals, minerals, and rare-earth metals on the 
continent, as part of the PRC's ongoing effort to dominate 
supply chains for emerging energy technologies critical to U.S. 
national security. The Committee remains focused on countering 
these PRC and Russian threats in the region, and continuing to 
strengthen U.S.-African relations.
    During the 117th Congress, parties advanced peace talks in 
the conflict between Ethiopia and Tigray--a conflict with far-
reaching implications throughout the Horn of Africa and North 
Africa. Terrorism remains a pointed threat, especially as 
emanating from al Qa'eda affiliate al Shabaab in East Africa--
to that end, Committee staff remained focused U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts in the region, and on the return of 
U.S. forces to Somalia and the implications thereof to the IC.

                             I. Middle East

    The Committee conducted briefings, roundtables, and 
extensive overseas travel to the Middle East to conduct 
oversight and gain a better understanding of the changing 
dynamics of a strategically important region. With changing 
dynamics following the signing of the Abraham Accords, 
increased strategic competition with China and Russia, the 
ongoing war in Syria, the ever present threat of terrorism, and 
the continued realignment of the U.S. security posture in the 
region with resulting fear of U.S. disengagement, staff travel 
was essential to providing Committee members with key insights 
and observations only evident through site visits and direct 
engagement with U.S. officials and foreign partners. Additional 
important themes explored include the impact of the war in 
Yemen on the security and intelligence arrangements with key 
U.S. partners such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates, the continued importance of counterterrorism and 
intelligence relationships with our partners in the region, the 
essential role diplomacy plays in furthering U.S. intelligence 
and security partnerships, and the ongoing threat posed to 
regional stability by Iranian malign influence. Finally, 
oversight focused on ensuring the U.S. intelligence footprint 
in the region was commensurate to U.S. national security 
priorities.

                            J. Covert Action

    The Committee conducted vigorous oversight of covert action 
programs throughout the 117th Congress. The Committee's rules 
require the Committee's Staff Director to ``ensure that covert 
action programs of the United States government receive 
appropriate consideration once a quarter.'' In accordance with 
this rule, the Committee receives a written report every 
quarter on each covert action program that is being carried out 
under a presidential finding. Committee staff review these 
reports and meet with IC personnel to discuss their substance 
and pose additional questions. The Committee also holds 
periodic hearings and briefings on covert action programs, and 
receives written reviews of covert actions from the CIA 
Inspector General, which are often the basis for additional 
staff inquiries.
    Further, under section 503 of the National Security Act, 
the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all 
departments, agencies, and entities of the United States 
Government involved in a covert action are required to keep the 
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently 
informed of all covert actions that are the responsibility of, 
are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of any 
department or agency of the United States. Upon receiving such 
notifications, the Committee reviews the details of each and 
receives briefings to fully understand the issues.
    The Committee seeks to ensure that covert action programs 
are consistent with United States foreign policy goals, and are 
conducted in accordance with all applicable U.S. laws.

                          K. Counterterrorism

    In the 117th Congress, the Committee conducted oversight of 
the IC's counterterrorism programs and activities, through 
hearings, briefings, roundtables, and overseas travel. The 
Committee reviewed the IC's response to the threat posed to the 
United States from foreign terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda 
and the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, and its activities 
related to domestic violent extremism. Specifically, the 
Committee focused on examining the role of the IC in combatting 
domestic violent extremism, ensuring the proper use of 
intelligence resources and protection of Americans' civil 
liberties, and clarifying the respective responsibilities of 
the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of 
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and 
the FBI. Committee staff traveled overseas, reviewing on-the-
ground IC counterterrorism activities, as well as liaison 
relationships with foreign partners.

                         L. Counterintelligence

    During the 117th Congress, the Committee emphasized the 
important role of counterintelligence as a functional specialty 
in confronting U.S. adversaries, including the PRC. To that 
end, the Committee held an open hearing on ``Beijing's Long 
Arm: Threats to U.S. National Security'' to explore the risks 
posed by PRC intelligence collection to the United States. The 
Committee's non-partisan Audits and Projects team undertook a 
comprehensive 18-month study on the role of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), a mission 
center of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI), and its integration into the greater 
counterintelligence enterprise. The team's work resulted in a 
publicly-available report that included recommendations to 
improve NCSC and strengthen integration. Following publication, 
the Committee hosted an open hearing to discuss the issues 
raised with three of the investigation's key participants. 
Further, staff held recurring interagency meetings with NCSC, 
ODNI, and the FBI to ensure development of coordinated 
legislative measures aimed at optimizing FBI-NCSC integration 
and collaboration.

                                M. Cyber

    During the 117th Congress, Committee staff continued to 
monitor the IC's efforts to identify and track foreign cyber 
actors that pose significant threats to the United States and 
its allies. The Committee's public hearing on the cyber 
intrusion into SolarWinds and the subsequent intrusions into 
downstream customers led to the creation and passage of the 
Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 
2022. The Committee also continued to perform oversight of the 
Cybersecurity Directorate within the National Security Agency.
    Leading up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 
2022, the Committee conducted vigorous oversight of the IC's 
collection and analysis of Russian cyber capabilities. The 
Committee also continued to engage with private sector entities 
offering cyber defense support to Ukraine. The Committee 
believes increased scrutiny should be placed on how cyber 
capabilities will be used in advance of and during periods of 
hostilities between nations.
    The Committee also conducted oversight of the IC's 
activities to identify and track foreign cyber actors. However, 
the Committee continues to be hampered in conducting effective 
oversight of joint cyber activities involving U.S. Cyber 
Command and the IC.

                         N. Telecommunications

    The Committee continued with efforts initiated in the 116th 
Congress to investigate and respond to the national security 
implications posed by 5G telecommunications technology. The 
Committee engaged closely with the Senate and House Committees 
on Appropriations to ensure that authorizations previously 
contained in the Committee-reported Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2021--and ultimately enacted through the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021--
received full appropriations. This effort ultimately culminated 
in the provision of $1.5 billion towards the Public Wireless 
Supply Chain Innovation Fund, as well as $500 towards the 
Multilateral Telecommunications Security fund (administered 
through a new International Technology Security Innovation 
Fund).
    As part of these continuing efforts, the Committee also 
convened a number of federal agencies--spanning the IC, 
domestic regulatory agencies, and foreign development 
agencies--for an update on efforts by the federal government to 
promote secure and trusted digital infrastructure, including 
through the promotion of trusted technical standards. Committee 
staff supplemented these efforts in the Committee's overseas 
travel, engaging both foreign allies and State Department 
personnel on the status of efforts to promote adoption of 
secure and trusted digital infrastructure.

                        O. Emerging Technologies

    During the 117th Congress, the Committee expanded its 
oversight of foundational and emerging technologies that have 
significant implications for national security and national 
competitiveness. The Committee met with a range of private 
sector technology experts, as well as IC personnel (to include 
both leadership and subject-matter experts), to identify a 
series of priority emerging and disruptive technologies. 
Committee staff worked to determine the set of federal agencies 
responsible for monitoring and countering efforts related to 
those technologies, and formulate strategies to promote U.S. 
and allied alternatives to counter adversary efforts.
    The Committee focused on identifying technologies that may 
confer military, political, and economic leverage for foreign 
adversaries, including enhancing the ability of foreign 
adversaries to shape wider technology ecosystems for strategic 
objectives and geopolitical influence. Based on these efforts, 
the Committee identified and is focused on three critical 
technologies: semiconductors, biotechnology, and next-
generation energy storage, generation, and distribution.
    The Committee engaged closely with private sector experts, 
the IC, and other departments and agencies to understand the 
unique needs of national security customers with respect to 
these technologies, as well as critical supply chain 
dependencies and other impacts of global, strategic 
competition, that could have implications for U.S. national 
security.
    The Committee intends to continue these efforts into the 
118th Congress.

                       P. Artificial Intelligence

    The Committee continued its efforts to conduct oversight on 
the national security implications of artificial intelligence. 
Committee staff engaged closely with private sector and 
academic experts to understand research development and 
commercial trends, as well as examine opportunities for 
adversarial use of artificial intelligence and machine 
learning-based technologies. The Committee also passed a series 
of enhancements to the authorities and governance of the IC 
with respect to emerging technology, and in particular, 
artificial intelligence, as part of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. The Committee provided 
the Director of National Intelligence the ability to enter into 
other transactions to increase the speed and agility with which 
the IC can acquire emerging technologies. The Committee also 
directed the IC to reduce the barriers to entry for adopting 
new technologies and harmonize the authorizations to operate 
for information technology systems between the Department of 
Defense and IC.

                     Q. Anamolous Health Incidents

    The Committee conducted oversight of the CIA's use of 
authorities provided by Section 6412 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 and initiated a review, 
by the Audits and Projects team, of CIA's response to anomalous 
health incidents, with a focus on the medical care, 
compensation, and other workplace provisions provided to CIA 
affiliates affected by these incidents. The Committee also 
continued to oversee a range of investigations into the causes 
of anomalous health incidents experienced by U.S. Government 
personnel in Havana, Cuba, and elsewhere. Members of the 
Committee remain committed to supporting the victims of these 
health incidents and overseeing the IC's investigations into 
their causes.

                      R. Personnel Vetting Reform

    During the 117th Congress, the Committee continued its 
rigorous oversight of the Executive Branch's efforts to reform 
a personnel vetting model that has remained largely unchanged 
for more than 70 years. Since 2016, Committee staff have 
sponsored quarterly briefings from the Performance 
Accountability Council, led by the Office of Management and 
Budget, to keep all congressional committees in the House and 
Senate apprised of reforms to address problems surfaced by the 
Navy Yard shooting in 2013, the government's public admission 
in 2015 of China's breach of personnel data held by the Office 
of Personnel Management, and the introduction of the new 
Trusted Workforce 2.0 paradigm. The Director of National 
Intelligence bears particular responsibility in leading these 
reforms as the government's statutory Security Executive Agent. 
The Committee has taken specific interest in efforts to vet 
government and contract personnel employed in the IC. Following 
a longstanding tradition of legislating in this area, both the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 and the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 contained 
multiple provisions on personnel vetting. These Acts 
established governance and performance management frameworks 
for personnel vetting, and required analyses on the efficient 
administration of polygraphs, among other things. The 
Committee's sustained, bipartisan pressure has yielded results: 
the elimination of a backlog in background investigations that 
once topped 725,000, a return of timelines for adjudications of 
clearances to levels established in the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and the Executive Branch's 
adoption of Trusted Workforce 2.0.

                     S. Government Security Policy

    The Committee continued its focus on security policies and 
practices through regular meetings with the ODNI, the National 
Archives and Records Administration's Information Security 
Oversight Office, and public advocates. The Committee sought to 
ensure proper use of classification and handling markings to 
safeguard America's security, while ensuring appropriate 
sharing with allies, partners, and the public. In addition, the 
Committee sought greater flexibility in the use of sensitive 
compartmented information facilities by multiple agencies and 
companies. The Committee also held briefings on modernizing the 
national industrial security policy to address growing 
challenges from China and others and protect the range of 
technologies critical to America's long-term success.

                      T. Foreign Malign Influence

    During the 117th Congress, the Committee built on its 
efforts in the 116th Congress to evaluate the IC's response to 
foreign malign influence activity. In 2022, the Committee 
authorized initial funding through the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 to enable the formation 
of the Foreign Malign Influence Center, first established in 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. In 
an effort to ensure the Center does not undertake efforts that 
are duplicative of those already being executed by other IC 
elements, the Committee also required the Director of National 
Intelligence to provide a report explaining the structure, 
responsibilities, and organizational placement of the Center, 
as well as assessing the efficacy of alternative organizational 
structures. The Director of National Intelligence provided the 
Committee with a response in September 2022, outlining the 
assessed needs and functions of the Center and expressing 
support for the Center's current organizational structure.
    The Committee also continued its practice of conducting 
oversight on the posture of the IC to identify, disrupt, and 
counter foreign malign influence activity directed at U.S. 
elections. As the Committee had in the lead-up to the 2018 and 
2020 elections, the Committee held briefings with IC agencies 
leading those efforts, including a post-election briefing to 
evaluate the IC's effectiveness and the role of the Foreign 
Malign Influence Center in coordinating those efforts for the 
first time. Committee staff also conducted weekly briefings 
with IC ahead of the election to monitor analytical and 
operational activity.

                  U. Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena

    During the 117th Congress, the Committee continued its 
oversight of the UAP issue, specifically working to ensure that 
the Department of Defense's efforts to report and respond to 
UAP are coordinated with those of the IC. In 2021, members on 
the armed services and intelligence committees spearheaded 
legislation standing up an office to replace the U.S. Navy-led 
UAP Task Force and broadening its efforts to improve data-
sharing between agencies on UAP sightings and address national 
security concerns. In 2022, the Committee directed further 
changes to the office in the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2023, establishing the All-Domain Anomaly 
Resolution Office (AARO) under the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
and the Principle Deputy Director for National Intelligence to 
provide comprehensive management of the UAP issue across the 
Department of Defense and the IC. Importantly, associated 
legislation mandates a secure authorized disclosure reporting 
process allowing witnesses to report to AARO any relevant 
information at any security level. Finally, the legislation 
directs the AARO to conduct a historical study going back to 
1945 to document U.S. historical efforts to address UAP.
    The Committee also focused efforts on gaining additional 
insights into the increasing numbers of UAP sightings over or 
near U.S. national security assets. At a time when near-peer 
adversaries are fielding advanced all-domain technologies at a 
rapid pace, the Committee worked to ensure the IC allocates 
sufficient resources and attention on UAP to avoid technology 
surprise from a potential adversary.

                                V. Space

    During the 117th Congress, the Committee continued its 
oversight of the IC's role in the space domain, which is 
evolving in light of adversary advances in counterspace 
capabilities intended to target U.S. and allied satellites. The 
Committee continued its efforts to ensure the IC has reliable 
and resilient access to, and operation in, space to provide 
intelligence support. In 2021, the National Reconnaissance 
Office's (NRO) focus on, and investments in, resiliency were 
formalized through the Protect and Defend Strategic Framework, 
signed by the NRO, U.S. Space Force, and the U.S. Space 
Command, which helped define and deconflict roles and sharpen 
the Committee's oversight efforts.
    The Committee continues to advocate for effective 
collaboration and unity of effort between NRO and the range of 
stakeholders in the Department of Defense, which is critical to 
improve speed and quality of data delivered to the warfighter 
and other government customers.
    The Committee held hearings and briefings on NRO's evolving 
approach to a ``hybrid'' space architecture, the expanding role 
of commercial space within the IC, and adversary threats to 
U.S. space capabilities. The Committee also examined key budget 
and cross-cutting technology issues, such as artificial 
intelligence and cloud computing, and continued to encourage 
the NRO and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) 
to capitalize on the ongoing revolution in the commercial space 
sector, which has yielded reductions in the cost of launch, new 
sensor technologies, smaller satellites, and sophisticated data 
analytics and services. Importantly, the committee recognizes 
the critical symbiotic contribution of the ground architecture 
to space and continues to provide focused oversight on this 
architecture.
    In addition to hearings, since February 2022, the Committee 
has been particularly active in ensuring NRO and NGA have 
worked to expedite the flow of geospatial intelligence and data 
to the Ukrainian government and to our North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization allies in the context of the Ukraine-Russia 
crisis. The Committee and its staff also engaged frequently on 
overhead architecture topics with the NRO, NGA, ODNI, and other 
IC and government officials, and conducted site visits to 
government facilities and commercial companies to meet with 
government officials and industry leaders. The Committee also 
continued to monitor the establishment of the U.S. Space Force 
as the 18th and newest element of the IC to ensure it meets the 
standards set for all IC elements.

                         W. Audits and Projects

    The Committee's rules stipulate that within its staff there 
``shall be an element with the capability to perform audits of 
programs and activities undertaken by departments and agencies 
with intelligence functions. Such element shall be comprised of 
persons qualified by training and/or experience to carry out 
such functions in accordance with accepted auditing 
standards.'' This capability resides within the Committee's 
``Audits and Projects Team.'' The Committee charges the Audits 
and Projects Team to conduct in-depth reviews of IC-related 
matters and assist the Committee with its oversight 
obligations. The Committee has also assigned the Audits and 
Projects Team responsibility for managing the Committee's 
relationship with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
to include overseeing the development and execution of reviews 
that the Committee assigns to GAO, and for managing the 
Committee relationship with IC inspectors general. In addition, 
the Audits and Projects Team tracks IC compliance with 
direction contained in the annual Intelligence Authorization 
Acts and manages the complainant and whistleblower intake and 
review process.
    The Audits and Projects Team completed three Committee-
authorized projects during the 117th Congress. The first 
project was a lessons-learned review of a compartmented IC 
acquisition program culminating in a classified report that 
offered 18 recommendations to improve IC acquisition and 
contracting processes.
    The second project was an organizational assessment of the 
NCSC within the context of a changing threat landscape. The 
review culminated in a classified report that offered 17 
recommendations to address challenges facing the 
counterintelligence enterprise in general and the NCSC in 
particular; an unclassified (redacted) version of the report 
that is available on the Committee website; and an open hearing 
on how the IC, industry, and academia are postured against 
foreign adversary threats to American innovation identified in 
the report.
    The third project examined how commercial satellite imagery 
was or could be used to support certain national security 
missions. This project culminated in a final classified report 
that offered three recommendations, and which will inform the 
Committee's continued oversight of the IC's efforts to 
integrate commercial satellite imagery into intelligence 
collection and analysis efforts.
    Finally, at the conclusion of the 117th Congress, the 
Audits and Projects Team initiated a review of the CIA's 
response to anomalous health incidents, with a focus on the 
medical care, compensation, and other workplace provisions 
provided to CIA affiliates affected by these incidents. This 
work will inform the Committee's broader and continued 
oversight of this important topic. This work is continuing into 
the 118th Congress.

                X. Whistleblowers and Other Complainants

    The Committee annually receives hundreds of phone calls, 
facsimiles, mail, and email communications from self-identified 
whistleblowers and other complainants on matters they believe 
constitute a violation of law, rule, or regulation; gross 
mismanagement; waste of resources; abuse of authority; or a 
substantial danger to public health and safety. Committee staff 
reviewed and, where warranted, investigated those complaints, 
often working closely with the inspectors general of agencies 
in the IC.

                         Y. Inspectors General

    The Committee continued its strong relationship with, and 
oversight of, the inspectors general of agencies in the IC. 
Regular oversight consisted of reviews of agency semiannual 
reports and annual work plans, as well as specific audits and 
reviews. On November 21, 2021, the Committee also held a closed 
roundtable with the four Senate-confirmed inspectors general 
within the IC--the IC Inspector General, the CIA Inspector 
General, the NSA Inspector General, and the NRO Inspector 
General--as well as a representative of the GAO.

Z. Review of Analytc Ombudsman Report on Allegations of Poliiticization

    Committee staff conducted a year-long review of ODNI's 
election security analysis that was prompted by an unclassified 
report published on January 6, 2021, by the ODNI's Analytic 
Ombudsman concerning allegations of politicization. Staff 
produced a classified report that contained eight 
recommendations for improvements in election security analysis.

                            IV. NOMINATIONS

    During the 117th Congress, the Committee received 13 
nominations from President Joe Biden.
    Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of the 94th Congress (as amended) 
and a 2009 unanimous consent agreement govern referrals of 
nominations to the Committee. S. Res. 445, which amended S. 
Res. 400 in 2004, required all nominations to positions in the 
IC requiring the Senate's advice and consent be reported by the 
Select Committee on Intelligence, even when they are positions 
within departments that are primarily under the jurisdiction of 
other Senate committees, though the committee overseeing the 
given department or agency may hold hearings and interviews on 
the nomination. Notwithstanding that general guidance, the 
resolution directed the Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security be reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, but 
referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence. In the wake 
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, 
which made the directors and inspectors general of the NRO and 
the NSA Senate-confirmed positions, the Senate adopted S. Res. 
470 on July 7, 2014. This resolution directed that if the 
nominee were a civilian, the Select Committee on Intelligence 
would report the nomination and refer it to the Committee on 
Armed Services, and if the nominee were a member of the Armed 
Forces on active duty, the reverse.
    A unanimous consent agreement of January 7, 2009, refers 
all nominations for inspectors general to the committees of 
primary jurisdiction and then sequentially to the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Under 
this consent agreement, the nominations for the NRO and NSA 
Inspectors General are also referred to the Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Committee. The exception to this 
consent agreement is the Inspector General for the CIA, which 
is considered exclusively by the Select Committee on 
Intelligence.
    During the 117th Congress, the Committee neither received 
nor considered a nomination for the Director of NCSC. The 
Committee has been disheartened by this lack of a nomination, 
particularly in light of its critical organizational assessment 
of NCSC, a redacted version of which was publicly released in 
September 2022, and the importance of the executive branch's 
Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative to transform the government's 
personnel vetting model.
    The following nominations were referred to the Committee 
during the 117th Congress:

           A. Avril Haines, Director of National Intelligence

    On November 23, 2020, President-elect Biden announced his 
intent to nominate Avril Haines to be the Director of National 
Intelligence. The Committee held a hearing on January 19, 2021, 
and President Biden formally nominated her on January 20, 2021. 
The Committee reported the nomination favorably on January 20, 
2021, and the Senate confirmed Director Haines by a vote of 84-
10 on the same day. Director Haines is the first woman to serve 
as the Director of National Intelligence.

     B. William Burns, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

    On January 11, 2021, President-elect Biden announced his 
intent to nominate William Burns to be the Director of the CIA. 
President Biden formally nominated him on February 3, 2021. The 
Committee held a hearing on February 24, 2021, and reported the 
nomination favorably on March 2, 2021. The Senate confirmed 
Director Burns by voice vote on March 18, 2021.

                       C. Christopher C. Fonzone

    On March 16, 2021, President Biden nominated Christopher 
Fonzone to be General Counsel of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence. The Committee held a hearing on May 18, 
2021, and reported the nomination favorably on May 26, 2021. 
The Senate confirmed Mr. Fonzone by a vote of 55-45 on June 22, 
2021.

                          D. Brett M. Holmgren

    On April 12, 2021, President Biden nominated Brett Holmgren 
to be Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
Research. The Committee held a hearing on May 18, 2021, and 
reported the nomination favorably on May 26, 2021. The Senate 
confirmed Assistant Secretary Holmgren by voice vote on 
September 13, 2021.

                          E. Christine Abizaid

    On April 15, 2021, President Biden nominated Christine 
Abizaid to be the Director of National Counterterrorism Center. 
The Committee held a hearing on June 9, 2021, and reported the 
nomination favorably on June 22, 2021. The Senate confirmed 
Director Abizaid by voice vote on June 24, 2021.

                            F. Robin Ashton

    On April 19, 2021, President Biden nominated Robin Ashton 
to be Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. The 
Committee held a hearing on June 9, 2021, and reported the 
nomination favorably on June 16, 2021. The Senate confirmed Ms. 
Ashton by voice vote on June 24, 2021.

                          G. Thomas A. Monheim

    On May 10, 2021, President Biden nominated Thomas Monheim 
to be Inspector General of the IC. Upon primary referral, the 
Committee held a hearing on July 20, 2021, and reported the 
nomination favorably on July 28, 2021. The nomination was 
sequentially referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs the same day. Upon sequential 
referral to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs for 20 calendar days pursuant to an order 
of January 7, 2009 (S05120), the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs discharged the nomination on 
September 20, 2021. The Senate confirmed Mr. Monheim by voice 
vote on September 30, 2021.

                           H. Stacey A. Dixon

    On April 27, 2021, President Biden nominated Stacey Dixon 
to be the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. 
The Committee held a hearing on July 20, 2021, and reported the 
nomination favorably on July 28, 2021. The Senate confirmed Ms. 
Dixon by voice vote on August 3, 2021.

                          I. Matthew G. Olsen

    On May 27, 2021, President Biden nominated Matthew Olsen to 
be Assistant Attorney General for National Security. Upon 
sequential referral to the Committee following primary referral 
to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee held a 
hearing on July 20, 2021, and reported the nomination favorably 
on August 10, 2021. The Senate confirmed Mr. Olsen by a vote of 
53-45.

                           J. Shannon Corless

    On September 27, 2021, President Biden nominated Shannon 
Corless to be Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 
at the Department of the Treasury. The Committee held a hearing 
on November 30, 2021, and reported the nomination favorably on 
December 15, 2021. The Senate confirmed Ms. Corless by voice 
vote on December 16, 2021.

                          K. Kenneth Wainstein

    On November 17, 2021, President Biden nominated Kenneth 
Wainstein to be Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 
at the Department of Homeland Security. The Committee held a 
hearing on January 12, 2022, and reported the nomination 
favorably on March 8, 2022. The Senate confirmed Mr. Wainstein 
by a vote of 63-35 on June 7, 2022.

                           L. Kate Heinzelman

    On March 8, 2022, President Biden nominated Kate Heinzelman 
to be General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. The 
Committee held a hearing on April 6, 2022, and reported the 
nomination favorably on May 10, 2022. The Senate confirmed Ms. 
Heinzelman by a vote of 50-41 on July 14, 2022.

                          M. Terrence Edwards

    On June 7, 2021, President Biden nominated Terrence Edwards 
to be Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance Office. 
Upon primary referral to the Committee, the Committee held a 
hearing on August 2, 2022 and reported the nomination favorably 
on September 14, 2022. The nomination was sequentially referred 
to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, which discharged the 
nominee on November 28, 2022. The nomination was sequentially 
referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, which discharged the nominee on December 
18, 2022. The Senate confirmed Mr. Edwards by unanimous consent 
on December 22, 2022.

                          V. SUPPORT TO SENATE

    Under Senate Resolution 400, which established the 
Committee in 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence has an 
important role in assuring that the IC provides ``informed and 
timely intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative 
branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and 
vital interests of the Nation.'' The Committee fulfills this 
responsibility by providing access to IC information and 
officials to the U.S. Senate.
    The Committee facilitated access to IC information for 
members and staff outside the Committee by inviting them to 
participate in briefings and hearings on issues of shared 
jurisdiction or interest. The Committee also provided 
intelligence briefings by its professional staff to Members 
outside the Committee and assisted Members in resolving issues 
with intelligence agencies.

                    VI. SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIONS


                         A. Number of Meetings

    During the 117th Congress, the Committee held a total of 
132 on-the-record interviews, meetings, briefings, and 
hearings, as well as numerous off-the-record briefings. There 
were 39 oversight hearings, including 13 hearings on the IC 
budget. Of these 39 hearings, 14 were open to the public, 
including open confirmation hearings for 13 administration 
nominees, while the remainder were closed to protect classified 
information pursuant to Senate rules. The Committee also held 
10 business meetings including mark-ups of legislation.

          B. Bills and Resolutions Originated by the Committee

    S. Res. 53--An original resolution authorizing expenditures 
by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
    S. 2610--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2022.
    S. 4503--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2023.

                   C. Bills Referred to the Committee

    S. 849--Supply Chain Vulnerability Assessment Act of 2021.
    S. 1348--COVID-19 Origin Act of 2021.
    S. 2345--Preventing Terrorism from Hitting America's 
Streets Act.
    S. 2590--Directed Energy Threat Emergency Response Act.
    S. 2654--September 11 Transparency Act of 2021.
    S. 3657--A bill to require the Director of National 
Intelligence to provide notification to Congress of abandoned 
United States military equipment used in terrorist attacks.
    S. 3759--Afghanistan Vetting and Accountability Act of 
2022.
    S. 4456--A bill to prohibit certain former employees of the 
Intelligence Community from providing certain services to 
governments of countries that are state sponsors of terrorism, 
the People's Republic of Chain, and the Russian Federation, and 
for other purposes.
    S. 5250--A bill to modify requirements for certain 
employment activities by former intelligence officers and 
employees of the Intelligence Community, and of other purposes.

                       D. Committee Publications

    Report 117-2--Report of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence covering the period January 4, 2019-January 3, 
2021.
    Report 117-37--Report to accompany the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022.
    Report 117-132--Report to accompany the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023.

                                  [all]