[Senate Report 118-181]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 412
118th Congress} { Report
SENATE
2d Session } { 118-181
======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2025
_______
June 12, 2024.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Warner, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. 4443]
The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an
original bill (S. 4443) to authorize appropriations for Fiscal
Year 2025 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community
Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.
Classified Annex to the Committee Report
Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on March 12,
2024, that the request for the National Intelligence Program
for Fiscal Year 2025 was $73.4 billion. Other than for limited
unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence
Community Management Account, the classified nature of United
States intelligence activities precludes any further
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has
prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule
of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 and has the
legal status of public law. The classified annex is made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
the House of Representatives and to the President. It is also
available for review by any Member of the Senate subject to the
provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress
(1976).
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) for Fiscal Year
2025.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2025 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI) for Fiscal Year 2025.
Section 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 104 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2025.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Section 301. Improvements relating to conflicts of interest in the
Intelligence Innovation Board
Section 301 amends Section 7506 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, which established the
Intelligence Innovation Board, in order to improve the process
for vetting potential conflicts of interest.
Section 302. National Threat Identification and Prioritization
Assessment and National Counterintelligence Strategy
Section 302 amends Section 904 of the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002 to update the process for submittal to
Congress of the National Threat Identification and
Prioritization Assessment and the National Counterintelligence
Strategy.
Section 303. Open Source Intelligence Division of Office of
Intelligence and Analysis personnel
Section 303 prohibits funds made available for Fiscal Year
2025 for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security from being obligated or
expended to increase the number of personnel assigned to the
Open Source Intelligence Division who work exclusively or
predominantly on domestic terrorism issues.
Section 304. Appointment of Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence
Section 304 requires that the Director of the Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of
Energy be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, for a six-year term.
Section 305. Improvements to advisory board of National Reconnaissance
Office
Section 305 amends the composition of the Advisory Board of
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) by permitting the
Director of the NRO to independently appoint up to eight
members to the Board. Section 305 also requires the Director to
establish a charter for the Board and extends the Board until
August 31, 2027.
Section 306. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants
Section 306 authorizes the National Intelligence University
to accept qualifying research grants.
Section 307. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and
assets from unmanned aircraft
Section 307 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 to allow authorized CIA personnel to better detect and
respond to threats posed to CIA facilities and assets by
unmanned aircraft.
Section 308. Limitation on availability of funds for new controlled
access programs
Section 308 prohibits funds made available for fiscal year
2025 for the National Intelligence Program from being obligated
or expended for any controlled access program, until the head
of the element of the IC responsible for the program submits
the notification required by section 501A(b) of the National
Security Act of 1947.
Section 309. Limitation on transfers from controlled access programs
Section 309 amends Section 501A(b) of the National Security
Act of 1947 to prohibit the head of an element of the IC from
transferring a capability from a controlled access program,
until the head submits to the appropriate congressional
committees and congressional leadership notice of the intent of
the head to make such transfer.
Section 310. Expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and
counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard
Section 310 authorizes the Commandant of the Coast Guard to
use up to 1% of the amounts made available for the National
Intelligence Program for each fiscal year for intelligence and
counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard relating to
objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature,
which may be accounted for solely on the certification of the
Commandant.
Section 311. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property
Section 311 establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized
access to IC property.
Section 312. Strengthening of Office of Intelligence and Analysis
Section 312 amends Section 311 of Title 31 to establish
within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of
the Department of Treasury, the Office of Economic Intelligence
and Security, which replaces the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis.
Section 313. Report on sensitive commercially available information
Section 313 requires each element of the IC to submit to
the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on
the access to, collection, processing, and use of sensitive
commercially available information by such element. Section 313
further requires the DNI to make available to the public, once
every 2 years, a report on the policies and procedures of the
IC with respect to sensitive commercially available
information.
Section 314. Policy on collection of United States location information
Section 314 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Attorney General, to issue a policy on the collection of United
States location information by the IC.
Section 315. Display of flags, seals, and emblems other than the United
States flag
Section 315 provides that any flag, seal, or emblem that is
not the United States flag that is displayed at an official
location of an element of the IC shall be smaller than the
official United States flag and may not be displayed above the
United States flag. Section 315 further provides that none of
the funds made available by the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2025 for the National Intelligence Program may
be obligated or expended to fly or display a flag over a
facility of an element of the IC other than the United States
flag or another authorized flag.
TITLE IV--COUNTERING FOREIGN THREATS
Subtitle A--People's Republic of China
Section 401. Strategy and outreach on risks posed by People's Republic
of China smartport technology
Section 401 requires the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) to engage with
United States industry partners on the risks of smartport
technology--including shipping and logistics infrastructure and
software--of the People's Republic of China to United States
supply chains and commercial activity.
Section 402. Assessment of current status of biotechnology of People's
Republic of China
Section 402 requires the DNI, in consultation with the
Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity
Center (NCBC), to assess the current status of the
biotechnology sector of the People's Republic of China. Within
30 days after the completion of the assessment, the DNI is
required to submit a report on the findings to the
congressional intelligence committees.
Section 403. Intelligence sharing with law enforcement agencies on
synthetic opioid precursor chemicals originating in People's
Republic of China
Section 403 requires the DNI, in consultation with the head
of the Office of National Security Intelligence of the Drug
Enforcement Administration and the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis, to develop a strategy
to ensure robust intelligence sharing relating to the illicit
trafficking of synthetic opioid precursor chemicals from the
People's Republic of China and other source countries. The DNI
is further required to develop a mechanism for collaboration
between the IC and other Federal Government agencies.
Section 404. Report on efforts of the People's Republic of China to
evade United States transparency and national security
regulations
Section 404 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an unclassified report on the efforts
of the People's Republic of China to evade specified national
security restrictions and limitations.
Section 405. Plan for recruitment of Mandarin speakers
Section 405 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a comprehensive plan to prioritize the
recruitment and training of individuals who speak Mandarin
Chinese for each element of the IC.
Subtitle B--The Russian Federation
Section 411. Assessment of Russian Federation sponsorship of acts of
international terrorism
Section 411 requires the DNI to conduct and submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an assessment on the
extent to which the Russian Federation provides support for
international acts of terrorism and cooperates with the
antiterrorism efforts of the United States.
Section 412. Assessment of likely course of war in Ukraine
Section 412 requires the DNI, in collaboration with the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of
the CIA, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees
an assessment of the likely course of the war in Ukraine
through December 31, 2025.
Subtitle C--International Terrorism
Section 421. Inclusion of Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS
officials and members among aliens engaged in terrorist
activity
Section 421 amends Section 212 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act to specify that any person who is a
spokesperson, or member of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, or any
successor or affiliate group, or who endorses or espouses
terrorist activities conducted by any of the aforementioned
groups, is considered to be engaged in terrorist activities.
Section 422. Assessment and report on the threat of ISIS-Khorasan to
the United States
Section 422 requires the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center to conduct an assessment of the threats
to the United States and United States citizens posed by ISIS-
Khorasan.
Section 423. Terrorist financing prevention
Section 423 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to
submit to the President a report identifying any foreign
financial institution or foreign digital asset transaction
facilitator that has knowingly facilitated a significant
financial transaction with a terrorist organization. Section
423 further requires the President to impose sanctions on such
foreign financial institutions and foreign digital asset
transaction facilitators.
Subtitle D--Other Foreign Threats
Section 431. Assessment of visa-free travel to and within Western
Hemisphere by nationals of countries of concern
Section 431 requires the DNI to conduct and submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a written assessment of
the impacts to national security caused by travel without a
visa to and within countries in the Western Hemisphere by
nationals of countries of concern.
Section 432. Study on threat posed by foreign investment in United
States agricultural land
Section 432 requires the DNI to conduct a study and provide
a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress on the
threats posed to the United States by foreign investment in
agricultural land in the United States.
Section 433. Assessment of threat posed by citizenship-by-investment
programs
Section 433 requires the DNI and the Assistant Secretary
for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury
to complete an assessment on the threat posed to the United
States by citizenship-by-investment programs. The DNI and the
Assistant Secretary are further directed to submit a report to
the appropriate congressional committees on the findings of the
assessment and provide a briefing to such committees on the
report.
Section 434. Mitigating the use of United States components and
technology in hostile activities by foreign adversaries
Section 434 requires the DNI within 180 days of enactment
to develop and commence implementation of a Supply Chain Risk
Mitigation Strategy to mitigate or disrupt the acquisition and
use of United States components in the conduct of activities
harmful to national security. The DNI is further required to
submit to Congress annually thereafter for three years a report
on the status and effect of the strategy.
Section 435. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence review of
visitors and assignees
Section 435 requires the Director of the Department of
Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence to
establish procedures by which visitors and assignees are
assessed for counterintelligence risks to research or
activities undertaken at National Laboratories. It further
requires the Director to advise a National Laboratory on
visitors or assignees when the Director has reason to believe a
visitor or assignee is a non-traditional collector, or when the
Director has information indicating that the visitor or
assignee constitutes a counterintelligence risk to a lab.
Section 435 requires the Director to report quarterly to the
appropriate congressional committees metrics regarding
assignees and visitors admitted to the National Laboratories.
Section 436. Prohibition on National Laboratories admitting certain
foreign nationals
Section 436 limits entry into Department of Energy National
Laboratories by foreign nationals from China, Russia, Iran,
North Korea, and Cuba, with an exception for legal permanent
residents. Section 436 permits the Secretary of Energy, in
consultation with the Director of the Office of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy and certain
senior counterintelligence officials at the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), to waive the prohibition for nationals
from these countries if the Secretary certifies that the
benefits to the United States of access outweigh the national
security and economic risks to the United States. Section 436
requires the Secretary to submit notifications to congressional
committees of each waiver issued.
Section 437. Quarterly report on certain foreign nationals encountered
at the United States border
Section 437 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the DNI, to publish a quarterly report
identifying the aggregate number of special interest aliens who
have been encountered at or near the United States border and
have been released, are under supervision, are being detained,
or have been removed from the United States.
Section 438. Assessment of the lessons learned by the intelligence
community with respect to the Israel-Hamas war
Section 438 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress an assessment of the lessons learned
from the Israel-Hamas war.
Section 439. Central Intelligence Agency intelligence assessment on
Tren de Aragua
Section 439 requires the Director of the CIA to submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment on the
gang known as ``Tren de Aragua.''
Section 440. Assessment of Maduro regime's economic and security
relationships with state sponsors of terrorism and foreign
terrorist organizations
Section 440 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an assessment of the economic and
security relationships of the regime of Nicolas Maduro of
Venezuela with specified state sponsors of terrorism and
foreign terrorist organizations.
Section 441. Continued congressional oversight of Iranian expenditures
supporting foreign military and terrorist activities
Section 441 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report describing the current
occurrences, circumstances, and expenditures by Iran on
military and terrorist activities outside the country.
TITLE V--EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Section 501. Strategy to counter foreign adversary efforts to utilize
biotechnologies in ways that threaten United States national
security
Section 501 requires the DNI, acting through NCBC, to
develop and submit to the congressional intelligence committees
a whole-of-government strategy to address concerns relating to
biotechnologies.
Section 502. Improvements to the roles, missions, and objectives of the
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center
Section 502 expands NCBC's authorities, to include
overseeing and coordinating the analysis of intelligence on
biotechnologies.
Section 503. Enhancing capabilities to detect foreign adversary threats
relating to biological data
Section 503 requires the DNI to take steps to standardize
and enhance the capabilities of the IC to detect foreign
adversary threats relating to biological data.
Section 504. National security procedures to address certain risks and
threats relating to artificial intelligence
Section 504 requires the President to develop and implement
procedures to facilitate information sharing on national
security threats emanating from, or directed at, artificial
intelligence systems.
Section 505. Establishment of Artificial Intelligence Security Center
Section 505 establishes an Artificial Intelligence Security
Center within the National Security Agency, with functions that
include making available a research test-bed to facilitate
security research on artificial intelligence systems by private
sector and academic researchers in a secure environment.
Section 506. Sense of Congress encouraging intelligence community to
increase private sector capital partnerships and partnership
with Office of Strategic Capital of Department of Defense to
secure enduring technological advantages
Section 506 provides that it is the Sense of Congress that
the IC should further explore the strategic use of private
capital partnerships to secure enduring technological
advantages for the IC and undertake regular consultation with
Federal partners on best practices and lessons learned.
Section 507. Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Fund
Section 507 creates a fund to assist in transitioning IC
products from the research and development phase to the
contracting and production phase, with priority given to small
business concerns and nontraditional defense contractors.
Section 508. Enhancement of authority for intelligence community
public-private talent exchanges
Section 508 amends Section 5306 of the Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3334) to
enhance the authority for exchanges between the private sector
and the IC, with a focus on finance, acquisition, technology,
innovation, and research.
Section 509. Enhancing intelligence community ability to acquire
emerging technology that fulfills intelligence community needs
Section 509 enables the IC to use a streamlined acquisition
process to acquire property, products, or services from
companies that have completed an In-Q Tel work program in which
the company furnished property, products, or services to
address government technology needs or requirements.
Section 510. Management of artificial intelligence security risks
Section 510 requires the Director of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) to ensure that the National
Vulnerability Database of the Institute incorporates artificial
intelligence security vulnerabilities and addresses those
vulnerabilities. It also directs NIST, in coordination with the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), to
establish a database by which vendors can voluntarily disclose
artificial intelligence security and safety incidents. Finally,
it directs the Director of CISA to ensure that the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures Program encompasses artificial
intelligence security vulnerabilities.
Section 511. Protection of technological measures designed to verify
authenticity or provenance of machine-manipulated media
Section 511 prohibits the concealment, subversion,
fraudulent distribution, and circumvention of technological
measures designed to verify the authenticity, modifications, or
conveyance of machine-manipulated media or characteristics of
the provenance of such media. Section 511 also establishes
civil penalties, enforceable by the Attorney General, for
violations of the prohibitions.
Section 512. Sense of Congress on hostile foreign cyber actors
Section 512 provides that it is the sense of Congress that
foreign ransomware organizations constitute hostile foreign
cyber actors, that covered nations abet and benefit from the
activities of these actors, and that such actors should be
treated as hostile foreign cyber actors by the United States.
Section 513. Designation of state sponsors of ransomware and reporting
requirements
Section 513 requires the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the DNI, to annually designate as a state
sponsor of ransomware any country the government of which the
Secretary has determined provides support for ransomware demand
schemes. Section 513 further requires the President to impose
the sanctions and penalties imposed with respect to a state
sponsor of terrorism on each country designated by the
Secretary as a state sponsor of ransomware. Section 513
requires the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a report on
the number and geographic locations of individuals, groups, and
entities subject to sanctions imposed by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control who were subsequently determined to have been
involved in a ransomware demand scheme. Section 513 also
requires the Secretary of State to submit a report on the
number and geographic locations of individuals, groups, and
entities that identifies the country of origin of foreign-based
ransomware attacks. Section 513 further requires the
Comptroller General to issue a report on the authorities
available to respond to foreign-based ransomware attacks.
Section 514. Deeming ransomware threats to critical infrastructure a
national intelligence priority
Section 514 requires the DNI to deem ransomware threats to
critical infrastructure a national intelligence priority
component to the National Intelligence Priorities Framework.
Section 514 further requires the DNI, in consultation with the
Director of the FBI, to submit a report on the implications of
the ransomware threat to United States national security.
TITLE VI--CLASSIFICATION REFORM
Section 601. Governance of classification and declassification system
Section 601 requires the President to designate an official
as Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification to
identify and promote technological solutions to support
efficient and effective systems for classification and
declassification to be implemented on an interoperable and
federated basis across the Federal Government. Section 601 also
requires the President to designate an official to establish
policies and guidance relating to classification and
declassification and controlled unclassified information and to
oversee the implementation of such policies and guidance.
Finally, Section 601 requires the President to establish an
Executive Committee on Classification and Declassification
Programs and Technology to provide direction, advice, and
guidance to the Executive Agent.
Section 602. Classification and declassification of information
Section 602 authorizes the President to establish a system
for the classification and declassification of information,
subject to certain minimum requirements including the scope of
information that may be classified, the duration of
classification, and the processes for reviewing classified
records and materials.
Section 603. Minimum standards for Executive agency insider threat
programs
Section 603 requires each agency with access to classified
information to establish an insider threat program that meets
certain minimum standards, including establishing a capability
to monitor user activity on all classified networks.
TITLE VII--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE
IMPROVEMENTS
Section 701. Security clearances held by certain former employees of
intelligence community
Section 701 amends Section 803 of the National Security Act
of 1947 to require the Security Executive Agent to issue
guidelines and instructions to the heads of Federal agencies to
ensure that any individual who was appointed by the President
to a position in an element of the IC, but is no longer
employed by the Federal Government, maintains a security
clearance only in accordance with Executive Order 12968, or
successor order. Section 701 also requires submission of the
guidelines and instructions to Congress, as well as a report on
former Presidential appointees who hold security clearances.
Section 702. Policy for authorizing intelligence community program of
contractor-owned and contractor-operated sensitive
compartmented information facilities
Section 702 requires the DNI to establish a standardized
policy for the IC that authorizes a program of contractor-owned
and contractor-operated sensitive compartmented information
facilities as a service to the national security and
intelligence enterprises.
Section 703. Enabling intelligence community integration
Section 703 authorizes the head of an element of the IC to
provide goods or services to another element of the IC without
reimbursement or transfer of funds for hoteling initiatives for
IC employees and affiliates to enable those employees and
affiliates to work from secure facilities maintained by other
elements of the IC across a wide geographic area.
Section 704. Appointment of spouses of certain Federal employees
Section 704 amends Section 3330d of Title 5 to extend to
spouses of an employee of the Department of State or an element
of the IC the same options for federal employment as currently
enjoyed by spouses of employees of the Department of Defense
(DOD).
Section 705. Plan for staffing the intelligence collection positions of
the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 705 requires the Director of the CIA to submit a
plan for ensuring the Directorate of Operations has staffed
every civilian full-time equivalent position authorized for
that Directorate under the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024.
Section 706. Intelligence community workplace protections
Section 706 allows for IC incumbent personnel whose
positions are converted involuntarily to the excepted service,
or from one excepted service schedule to another, to retain
their adverse action protections. Section 706 further requires
congressional notification and explanation when heads of
agencies terminate personnel in contravention of existing
protections. Section 706 also prohibits the Director of the CIA
from terminating an officer or employee except in accordance
with guidelines and regulations submitted to the congressional
intelligence committees, unless the Director determines that
such compliance poses a threat to U.S. national security and
provides an explanation for such determination to the
committees.
Section 707. Sense of Congress on Government personnel support for
foreign terrorist organizations
Section 707 establishes a Sense of Congress that for the
purposes of adjudicating the eligibility of an individual for
access to classified information, renewal of a prior
determination of eligibility, or continuous vetting of an
individual for eligibility, certain enumerated actions shall be
considered acts advocating an act of terrorism.
TITLE VIII--WHISTLEBLOWERS
Section 801. Improvements regarding urgent concerns submitted to
Inspectors General of the intelligence community
Section 801 permits urgent concerns submitted by
whistleblowers to the inspectors general of the IC to be
provided directly to Congress rather than going through the
heads of agencies when an inspector general determines that
transmittal to the head of agency could compromise the
anonymity of the employee or result in the complaint being
transmitted to the subject of the complaint. Section 801
requires that submissions be made in writing and provides that
the statutory review period for such submissions begins on the
date the submitter confirms their written submission is
complete, while requiring the inspectors general to facilitate
a writing of a submission or treat a written record of a verbal
complaint as a submission. Finally, Section 801 clarifies that
individuals formerly affiliated with an element of the IC may
submit matters of urgent concern that arose during and related
to the time of their prior employment with the element.
Section 802. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity
as act of reprisal
Section 802 prohibits knowing or willful disclosures that
reveal an IC employee's or IC contractor employee's identifying
information without consent, so as to identify such employee or
contractor employee as a whistleblower, except as necessary
during the course of an investigation. Section 802 further
establishes a private right of action for an IC whistleblower
if such disclosure is taken as a reprisal against the
whistleblower for bringing a complaint.
Section 803. Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures
to Inspectors General of elements of the intelligence community
Section 803 clarifies that a disclosure of classified
information to an Inspector General of an element of the IC
that is made by a whistleblower who held a security clearance
during the whistleblower's IC employment, but who, at the time
of the disclosure, does not hold the appropriate clearance or
authority to access such classified information, and that is
otherwise made in accordance with such security standards and
procedures, shall be treated as an authorized disclosure.
Section 804. Clarification of authority of certain Inspectors General
to receive protected disclosures
Section 804 makes a technical correction to Section 1104 of
the National Security Act of 1947 to clarify that the
inspectors general of defense intelligence elements are
authorized recipients of whistleblower protected disclosures.
Section 805. Whistleblower protections relating to psychiatric testing
or examination
Section 805 amends Section 1104 of the National Security
Act of 1947 to establish that a decision to order psychiatric
testing or examination is a prohibited personnel practice when
taken or threatened as a reprisal for a protected disclosure.
Section 806. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance
and access determinations
Section 806 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse
security clearance or access determination against a
whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that the agency would have made the same security clearance or
access determination in the absence of the whistleblower's
disclosure. Section 806 further establishes parity in the legal
standards applied to IC whistleblower matters.
Section 807. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory
revocation of security clearances and access determinations
Section 807 removes the cap on compensatory damages for an
employee or former employee who was subjected to a reprisal
with respect to the employee's or former employee's security
clearance or access determination.
TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS
Section 901. Additional discretion for Director of Central Intelligence
Agency in paying costs of treating qualifying injuries and
making payments for qualifying injuries to the brain
Section 901 authorizes the Director of the CIA to pay or
reimburse the costs relating to diagnosing or treating a
qualifying injury that is not otherwise covered under existing
law, under circumstances the Director determines to be
extraordinary.
Section 902. Additional discretion for Secretary of State and heads of
other Federal agencies in paying costs of treating qualifying
injuries and making payments for qualifying injuries to the
brain
Section 902 authorizes the Secretary of State or the head
of any other Federal agency to pay or reimburse the costs
relating to diagnosing or treating a qualifying injury that is
not otherwise covered under existing law, under circumstances
the Secretary (or relevant head of another Federal agency)
determines to be extraordinary.
Section 903. Improved funding flexibility for payments made by
Department of State for qualifying injuries to the brain
Section 903 improves funding flexibility for payments made
by the Department of State for qualifying injuries to the
brain.
TITLE X--UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA
Section 1001. Comptroller General of the United States review of All-
domain Anomaly Resolution Office
Section 1001 requires the Comptroller General to conduct
and submit a review of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office
regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena reporting and
Federal agency coordination.
Section 1002. Sunset of requirements relating to audits of unidentified
anomalous phenomena historical record report
Section 1002 terminates certain audit requirements of the
unidentified anomalous phenomena historical record report.
Section 1003. Funding limitations relating to unidentified anomalous
phenomena
Section 1003 maintains certain limitations on funding
absent congressional oversight for Fiscal Year 2025.
TITLE XI--AIR AMERICA
Section 1101. Short title
Section 1101 provides that the title may be cited as the
``Air America Act of 2024.''
Section 1102. Findings
Section 1102 sets forth Congress's findings that Air
America and its affiliated companies, in coordination with the
CIA, supported the United States Government from 1950 to 1976,
with service and sacrifice of its employees.
Section 1103. Definitions
Section 1103 sets forth the definitions of Air America
affiliates, covered decedents, qualifying service, and other
terminology.
Section 1104. Award authorized to eligible persons
Section 1104 authorizes the Director of the CIA to award
payments to certain qualifying Air America employees and
survivors, and sets forth eligibility requirements for award
payments.
Section 1105. Funding limitation
Section 1105 sets a $60 million funding limitation, with
the ability for the Director of the CIA to request additional
funds to fulfill eligible award payments.
Section 1106. Time limitation
Section 1106 establishes a two-year time period within
which claimants must file their award claims. The two-year
period starts upon the date of Director of the CIA's
application regulations, and upon receiving a claim, the
Director has 90 days within which to make an eligibility
determination.
Section 1107. Application procedures
Section 1107 requires the Director of the CIA to prescribe
procedures for claimants to apply for award payments.
Section 1108. Rule of construction
Section 1108 clarifies that nothing in this subtitle shall
entitle any person to Federal benefits under Title 5, chapters
81, 83, or 84.
Section 1109. Attorneys' and agents' fees
Section 1109 makes it unlawful for more than 25 percent of
an award payment to be paid to, or received by, any agent or
attorney for services rendered in connection with an award
payment.
Section 1110. No judicial review
Section 1110 establishes that the Director of the CIA's
determinations under this subtitle are not subject to judicial
review.
Section 1111. Reports to Congress
Section 1111 requires the Director of the CIA to submit
semiannual reports on the award payments made and denied (and,
if a denial, the rationale therefor).
TITLE XII--OTHER MATTERS
Section 1201. Enhanced authorities for amicus curiae under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
Section 1201 enhances the authorities of court-appointed
amici and establishes new requirements to appoint amici in a
broader array of cases.
Section 1202. Limitation on directives under Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 relating to certain electronic
communication service providers
Section 1202 provides that a directive may not be issued
pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act to a covered electronic communication service
provider, unless the covered provider is a provider of the type
of service at issue in the opinions of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review authorized for public release on August 23,
2023. Section 1202 also requires notification and reporting of
information concerning such directives.
Section 1203. Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect
for Elections through Independent Testing Act of 2024
Section 1203 directs the Election Assistance Commission
(EAC) to require that voting systems undergo penetration
testing as part of the standard certification process for such
systems. Section 1203 also directs the NIST to accredit
entities that can perform such testing and directs the EAC to
create a voluntary vulnerability disclosure program for
election systems.
Section 1204. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
qualifications
Section 1204 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000ee(h)(2)) to ensure
that experience in positions requiring a security clearance and
relevant national security experience are among the
qualifications that may be considered when appointing members
of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Section
1204 retains authority to consider expertise in civil liberties
and privacy when appointing members to the Board.
Section 1205. Parity in pay for staff of the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board and the intelligence community
Section 1205 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000ee(j)(1)) to ensure
that staff of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
may be paid a rate of pay comparable to employees of the IC.
Section 1206. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements
Section 1206 modifies and repeals certain prior
congressional intelligence committee reporting requirements
that, for certain reasons, are no longer relevant or necessary
to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 1207. Technical amendments
Section 1207 makes certain technical amendments relating to
IC facility construction and copyright permissions for works by
the United States Government.
Committee Comments and Direction
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Oversight
The Committee is encouraged that DOD concurred with the
recommendations outlined by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) in its October 2023 assessment of matters related
to DOD's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
processing, exploiting, and disseminating (PED) capabilities
(GAO-24-106088C), and is interested in the prompt
implementation of these recommendations. The Committee notes
that the ODNI did not respond to GAO's report, but recognizes
the important coordination role that it should play in these
matters. Consequently, the Committee directs the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and ODNI to provide a briefing, 180 days
after passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2025, to the congressional defense and intelligence
committees, on the DOD implementation of recommendations made
by the above-noted GAO report, and ODNI's support to these
efforts. The briefing should include a discussion of the
progress made by DOD, in coordination with ODNI, in
implementing the recommendations in the GAO report, including
any actions they have taken, challenges they face, and
timelines for implementation. The briefing should also include
a discussion of any proposals to the Congress that would
streamline or otherwise improve efforts to address the
recommendations.
Plan for Increased Security at United States Installations Used by
Intelligence Community
At present, no unified plan across the IC exists for
restricting access to transportation security companies
accessing U.S. government facilities that house IC entities.
While U.S. government installations generally have access
requirements, including DOD, as described in 346(d) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (10
U.S.C. Sec. 2661 note prec.), the IC has yet to clarify a
congruent policy for all U.S. government installations that
house IC components. The Committee remains concerned at
potential counterintelligence gaps in access to U.S.
installations that house IC entities and subsidiaries.
Therefore, the Committee directs that not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the DNI shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a plan to
increase security at each installation under the control of the
United States that is used by one or more elements of the IC,
including by controlling access to such installations by any
employee or contractor of a transportation company.
Establishing a National Intelligence Manager for Counternarcotics
In September 2023, the ODNI convened a 90-day Sprint Cell
hosted by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to
``identify opportunities to strengthen the IC integration of
intelligence and support to policymakers and operators in
disrupting the illicit fentanyl supply chain.'' On April 2,
2024, the NCTC presented to Committee staff its report, which
found that coordination between the IC and Federal Law
Enforcement can be improved to enhance government-wide efforts
to counter illicit fentanyl production and distribution.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to establish, within
90 days of enactment of this act, a National Intelligence
Manager for Counternarcotics to focus exclusively on the
counternarcotics mission.
China's attempts to exploit knowledge of proprietary U.S. tactics,
techniques, and procedures
The Committee is concerned that our adversaries are
targeting U.S. and allied servicemembers, and have successfully
recruited former servicemembers, for employment in positions
that allow adversaries to harvest knowledge and receive
training on U.S., NATO, and allied military tactics, techniques
and procedures (TTPs). These proprietary TTPs are a critical
element of combat effectiveness that underpins our national
security.
Therefore, to improve awareness of the threat and to
develop mitigation strategies, the committee directs the DNI,
working in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and Security, to undertake a review and report to
the Committee, no later than 60 days after enactment, on (1)
China's collection efforts and intended use of the information;
(2) an assessment of the threat profile and related trends; and
(3) recommended mitigating actions that can be taken across the
targeted population including to protect U.S. servicemembers
during and after their service, including veterans who operate
commercial tactical training services. To contribute to public
awareness, the report shall be unclassified to the maximum
extent practicable, with a classified annex if needed.
Evolving Tactics of Transnational Criminal Organizations
Our national security is enhanced by continuing to
strengthen border security in response to evolving threats. In
recent years, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs),
including those operating in Latin America and the border
region, have leveraged technological developments and
demonstrated an evolution in tactics in furtherance of
narcotics trafficking and other activities that threaten
national security. These have included the use of digital
platforms, cryptocurrency and encrypted communication systems
for a variety of activities, and testing the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles to move drugs across the U.S. border and
maritime transit routes.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to brief the
Committee, no later than 60 days after enactment, on (1) new
tactics being utilized by TCOs, including leveraging digital
technologies to include social media, cryptocurrency, and
encrypted communications for recruitment and financial flows,
and the use of unmanned underwater and aerial vehicles to
facilitate surveillance and movement of materiel across
maritime and land borders; (2) an assessment of the risk posed
by these emergent capabilities; and (3) an assessment of
resources necessary to support IC elements in addressing these
developments.
Comptroller Review of Reporting and Response Procedures for Anomalous
Health Incidents
The Committee is committed to ensuring continued
investigation and research into anomalous health incidents
(AHIs), and to the provision of appropriate medical care and
compensation for individuals affected by such incidents. To
achieve these aims, the U.S. government must have effective,
standardized, and enforceable policies and procedures for
reporting and responding to AHIs. However, the Committee is
concerned that existing policies and procedures lack clarity
and may be inconsistently applied across agencies and
locations, potentially resulting in premature dismissals of
AHIs without adequate diligence or process.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to conduct a review of the policies and
procedures surrounding AHIs at U.S. government agencies,
including but not limited to the IC, DOD, and Department of
State. This review should evaluate:
1. The extent to which federal agencies have
established and are following processes and procedures
for consistent AHI reporting, evaluation, and response,
consistent with section 6603 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022.
2. The adequacy and consistency of agency and/or
site-specific procedures and criteria at overseas and
domestic locations for responding to, investigating,
and evaluating the credibility of potential AHIs,
including assessing disparities across agencies,
location, and individual types (e.g. overseas vs.
domestic, military vs. civilian employee, vs.
contractor vs. dependent) and any mechanisms for
appealing credibility determinations.
3. The extent to which each agency is collecting,
storing, and sharing data regarding AHIs as outlined in
current legislation, and the adequacy of the mechanisms
to do so, including the government-wide database
maintained by the NCSC.
4. How the data in the NCSC database are managed,
shared across government, and used to support research,
investigations, intelligence collection, and/or for
other purposes.
5. Recommendations for improvements to existing
policies, initiatives, and/or mechanisms to ensure
efficient and consistent interagency coordination as it
relates to the U.S. government's investigation of and
response to AHIs.
6. Any other aspect relating to U.S. government's
response to or treatment of AHIs that the Comptroller
General deems appropriate.
The Committee further directs the Comptroller General to
brief the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Armed
Services Committee, House Armed Services Committee, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Relations
Committee on preliminary observations not later than 90 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, and to provide a final
report at such time as is mutually agreed upon by the
committees and the Comptroller General.
Annual Comptroller General Report on Cybersecurity and Surveillance
Threats to Congress
Section 5710 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018,
2019, and 2020 (P.L. 116-92), codified at 2 U.S.C. Sec. 4111,
requires the Comptroller General of the United States to submit
to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report
on cybersecurity and surveillance threats to Congress. For the
next annual report conducted pursuant to this provision on
cybersecurity and surveillance threats to the Senate, the
Committee requests the Comptroller General to assess the
following:
1. The extent to which the cryptography used in
Senate collaboration platforms is consistent with
leading cybersecurity practices, including those
relating to end-to-end encryption.
2. Challenges that prevent offices or committees from
implementing strong cryptography--such as end-to-end
encryption--on Senate collaboration platforms.
3. Efforts taken by the Senate Sergeant at Arms (SAA)
to safeguard the personal accounts, devices, and
information of Senators, their staffs, and immediate
families, and how those efforts compare to efforts
taken by certain executive and judicial branch entities
with statutory authority to safeguard the personal
accounts, devices or information of employees.
4. The techniques, means, and methods used by the
Senate SAA to detect surveillance against, hacks of,
and the deployment of spyware by foreign governments,
on mobile devices subject to Senate SAA cybersecurity
safeguards, and how those techniques, means, and
methods compare to those used by executive branch
agencies to detect and protect against such
cybersecurity and surveillance threats to mobile
devices managed by those agencies.
As part of the report, the Comptroller General shall
include any resulting recommendations to improve Senate
policies and programs to meaningfully address related
cybersecurity and surveillance threats and to protect Senate
information.
In conducting the above assessments, the Committee suggests
the Comptroller General consult with the Attorney General; the
DNI, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts; the Director of the National Security Agency;
the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and State; the
Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper of the Senate and any other
agencies the Comptroller General determines to have information
necessary for conducting comprehensive assessments. The
Committee expects these officials to fully cooperate with the
Comptroller General and provide any information the Comptroller
General determines is necessary to complete this work.
Intelligence Community Directive Oversight
Four years ago, ODNI updated the Technical Specifications
for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facilities (SCIFs) issued pursuant to Intelligence
Community Directive 705. The Committee supports ODNI's efforts
to ensure the Technical Specifications are regularly updated to
account for changing and emerging technology. However,
compliance with updated Technical Specifications also imposes
costs on departments and agencies, as well as private industry,
responsible for implementing the updated standards. These costs
include those associated with displacing personnel and/or
equipment from SCIF space in order to implement necessary
physical upgrades.
Therefore, the Committee directs that not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of this Act, the DNI, in
coordination with the Under Secretary for Defense for
Intelligence and Security, submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives, a 5-year plan to communicate and implement the
updated Technical Specifications. The briefing should include a
threat background brief, and cost estimates for departments and
agencies within the IC, and a plan to mitigate any loss of use
of SCIF space resulting from renovations necessary to implement
appropriate upgrades.
Committee Support for Ongoing Intelligence Community Collection,
Analysis, and Research into Anomalous Health Incidents
As noted previously by the Committee's September 2022
organizational assessment of the National Counterintelligence
and Security Center, the Committee is concerned about the
emerging foreign intelligence threat landscape facing the IC.
One of the key novel threats facing the IC workforce is AHIs.
Many years after the first incidents were publicly reported,
AHIs continue to be a vexing issue, as case definitions have
proven elusive, and controversy has shrouded the results of
analytical and research efforts to-date.
While most IC agencies assessed in March 2023 that AHIs
reported by U.S. personnel to date were probably the result of
factors that did not involve a foreign adversary--such as
preexisting conditions, conventional illness, and environmental
factors--the assessment acknowledged intelligence gaps and the
existence of cases that could not be explained. The September
2022 IC Experts Panel also identified various research gaps and
made a range of recommendations to help the U.S. government
better understand, prevent, and manage AHIs, including calling
for coordinated intelligence collection, data analysis, and
research efforts across the U.S. government.
The Committee believes a whole-of-government approach is
necessary to identify and mitigate novel personnel threats,
including AHIs. To that end, the Committee, in the classified
annex, directs the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center to develop a strategy for next generation force
protection; directs the CIA to redouble analytic efforts on
emerging threats, including AHIs; and bolsters the budgets of
several intelligence collection and research efforts focused on
directed energy technology and next generation sensors.
The Committee also expresses support for ongoing Department
of Defense initiatives related to AHIs, including establishing
a registry of AHI reporters' medical data collected from the
military health system and planning for acute stage,
retrospective, and longitudinal studies of AHI reporters'
medical conditions. The Committee directs IC agencies to
provide robust support to these efforts as necessary and in
accordance with the detailed direction in our classified annex.
Committee Action
On May 22, 2024, a quorum being present, the Committee met
to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The
Committee took the following actions:
Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex
By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman's and
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for
Fiscal Year 2025, the base text for purposes of amendment.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-two
amendments to the bill as follows: (1) an amendment by Chairman
Warner, and cosponsored by Senators Collins and Cotton, to take
actions against foreign ransomware actors and designate state
sponsors of ransomware; (2) an amendment by Chairman Warner,
and cosponsored by Senator Rounds, to prevent foreign terrorist
financing regimes; (3) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to make certain revisions
to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding NCBC; (4)
an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice
Chairman Rubio, to make certain revisions to the Chairman's and
Vice Chairman's bill regarding genomic data and biosurveillance
capabilities; (5) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and Senator Casey, to
strengthen the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; (6) an
amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to impose limitations on
National Laboratories from admitting certain foreign nationals;
(7) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio expressing the Sense of
Congress on government personnel support for Foreign Terrorist
Organizations; (8) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to
include Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS officials and
members among aliens engaged in terrorist activity; (9) an
amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to require a report on the
threat of ISIS Khorasan to the United States; (10) an amendment
by Vice Chairman Rubio limiting the display of flags, seals,
and emblems other than the United States flag at IC facilities;
(11) an amendment by Senator Wyden to require a report on
sensitive commercially available information; (12) an amendment
by Senator Wyden to require a policy on collection of United
States location information; (13) an amendment by Senator
Heinrich, and cosponsored by Senator Ossoff, regarding Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act directives relating to certain
electronic communication service providers; (14) an amendment
by Senator Cotton to require continued oversight of Iranian
expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist
activities; (15) an amendment by Senator Cotton to require a
plan for staffing the CIA's intelligence collection positions;
(16) an amendment by Senator Cornyn, and cosponsored by
Chairman Warner and Senator Kelly, to make certain revisions to
the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding emerging
technologies; (17) an amendment by Senator Moran regarding the
Coast Guard's expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and
counterintelligence activities; (18) an amendment by Senator
Lankford to require reporting on certain foreign nationals
encountered at the United States border; (19) an amendment by
Senator Gillibrand to extend certain funding limitations
relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena; (20) an amendment
by Senator Ossoff, and cosponsored by Senators Wyden and
Heinrich, to make certain technical revisions to the Chairman's
and Vice Chairman's bill regarding Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board members' qualifications; (21) an amendment by
Senator Ossoff to make certain technical revisions to the
Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding an assessment of
the likely course of war in Ukraine; and (22) an amendment by
Senator Rounds, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and
Senators Risch, Moran, Cornyn, and Cotton, to prevent
unauthorized access to IC property.
By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a
second-degree amendment by Senator Warner to his own amendment
to protect technological measures designed to verify
authenticity or provenance of machine-manipulated media. By
voice vote, the Committee adopted Chairman Warner's amendment,
as amended.
By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a
second-degree amendment by Senator Wyden to his own amendment
providing certain protections, imposing reporting requirements
on the IC regarding termination authorities, and prohibiting
the Director of the CIA from terminating an officer or employee
except in accordance with guidelines and regulations submitted
to the congressional intelligence committees, unless the
Director determines that such compliance poses a threat to U.S.
national security and provides an explanation for such
determination to the committees. By a vote of 10 ayes and 7
noes, the Committee adopted Senator Wyden's amendment, as
amended. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows:
Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--
aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator
Kelly--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator
Collins--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator
Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no.
By voice vote, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by
Senator Wyden to revise the definition of electronic
communication service provider, as amended by the Reforming
Intelligence and Securing America Act, with Senator Wyden
recorded as an aye.
Senator Cornyn offered an amendment to strike the provision
in the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill to revise the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act's amicus curiae
authorities, and withdrew it pending future consideration.
By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted an
amendment by Senator Ossoff to establish pay parity for Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board staff with IC employees.
The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman
Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator
King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator
Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye; Vice
Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no;
Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no;
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no.
Votes to report the committee bill
On May 22, 2024, the Committee voted to report the bill, as
amended, by a vote of 17 ayes and zero noes. The votes in
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye;
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye;
Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator Gillibrand--
aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye; Vice Chairman
Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator
Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator
Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye.
By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and
classified annex.
Compliance With Rule XLIV
Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited
tariff benefits.
Estimate of Costs
Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On May 23,
2024, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.
Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing
the provisions of this legislation.
Changes to Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to
expedite the business of the Senate.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN RUBIO,
SENATOR RISCH, AND SENATOR ROUNDS
During the markup of the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence
Authorization Act (IAA), the Committee adopted an amendment
that purported to provide Intelligence Community (IC) employees
with new employment protections, but in reality it will
increase risks to America's national security and hinder the
ability of Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed IC
officials to make personnel decisions to meet mission needs. We
believe this provision--if enacted--will thwart the IC's
effectiveness and upend decades of Congress's efforts to
recognize the unique mission of the IC. Notably, the IC and
Department of Defense (DOD) strongly oppose this amendment.
This amendment dictates to the heads of IC elements,
specifically the Director of National Intelligence and the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the
Secretary of Defense, how to manage personnel decisions at
their own agencies. The amendment restricts the ability of
heads of IC elements from converting the employment status of
their own personnel and mandates that IC employees in converted
positions retain their competitive service rights under Title 5
even if the employee's position falls under the excepted
service. The amendment further inhibits the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency from exercising termination
authorities under Title 50 by imposing burdensome requirements
to notify Congress about internal agency guidelines and
regulations--which Congress intentionally declined to codify
given the IC's unique national security mission and
responsibilities.
Rather than protecting IC and certain DOD employees from
adverse actions, the amendment micromanages the Senate-
confirmed Directors' and Secretary's fundamental authorities
and responsibilities to maintain their workforce in the
interest of national security. The amendment requires
congressional notifications upon conversion of competitive
service positions to excepted service positions, or when the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Secretary of
Defense make certain termination decisions, which becomes a
slippery slope toward unraveling the very specific and critical
IC employment protections that Congress has legislated over the
decades.
Congress recognized the Central Intelligence Agency's
unique employment requirements by specifically exempting the
Central Intelligence Agency from Title 5's requirements in 5
U.S.C. Sec. 7511(b)(7). Congress further gave the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency full discretion to manage
termination protocols, see 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3036, and followed
suit as to the Director of National Intelligence, see 50 U.S.C.
Sec. 3024. It was a long-debated, thoughtful process
culminating in gradual codifications to ensure that America has
the most efficient, effective, and capable men and women
protecting us from terrorism, counterintelligence threats,
weapons of mass destruction, and many other national security
perils that go unseen by the public.
The IC and DOD leadership, entrusted by the President of
the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, must be
able to ensure the best and most capable personnel are in
operational positions. They must be able to determine the right
course of action when an employee's actions harm their
employing agency, the workforce, or our national security. As
to the DOD, the amendment would impose dual-track employment
requirements, ultimately meaning that two respective employees
serving in the same positions would be paid and treated
differently.
Given all of the above, this amendment appears to be an
attempt to impede future administrations' abilities to build a
workforce that meets current critical national security
challenges. There is no valid problem that this amendment is
attempting to solve.
Marco Rubio.
James E. Risch.
M. Michael Rounds.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
includes critical protections for Intelligence Community
personnel against political firings and whistleblower
reprisals.
My amendment to the bill ensures that personnel who are
involuntarily moved from one employment status to another can
retain their protections from firing. The amendment also
ensures that if an Intelligence Community employee is fired
without any due process, as is currently authorized, the agency
must explain its reasons to Congress. This oversight is
critical to protecting against politically motivated firings
and preserving the independence and professionalism of the
Intelligence Community.
The bill includes a number of provisions I submitted
protecting Intelligence Community whistleblowers. One provision
allows classified whistleblower complaints to be provided
directly to Congress if the Inspector General determines that
sending the complaint to the whistleblower's agency, as the
statute currently requires, could compromise the anonymity of
the whistleblower or result in the complaint being delivered to
the subject of that complaint. Other provisions ensure that
whistleblowers can't have their security clearances revoked on
a pretext; allow for former Intelligence Community employees to
submit whistleblower complaints; remove the cap on damages for
retaliatory revocation of whistleblowers' clearances; and
prohibit, as acts of reprisal, public disclosures of
whistleblowers' identities as well as orders to undertake
psychological examinations.
The bill includes two of my amendments that increase
oversight of and public reporting on the Intelligence
Community's collection of Americans' private data. Since the
beginning of this administration, I have pressed the
Intelligence Community to be transparent about its purchases of
sensitive data on Americans. On May 8, 2024, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence released the Intelligence
Community Policy Framework for Commercially Available
Information. While I was disappointed that the Framework did
not prohibit the Intelligence Community from purchasing any
particular type of information, it did require IC elements to
report to the ODNI on its purchases of sensitive information on
Americans, while directing IC elements to employ privacy-
protecting safeguards. My amendment requires an annual report
to Congress on the Intelligence Community's access to and
collection, purchase and use of commercial datasets that
contain sensitive data on Americans, as well as its
implementation of the safeguards. The amendment also codifies
the Framework's requirement of a public report every two years.
In the years since the 2018 U.S. Supreme Court case of
Carpenter v. United States, the Intelligence Community's
policies with regard to the warrantless collection of U.S.
location data have been both inconsistent and opaque. My
amendment to the bill brings clarity to this long-standing
problem by requiring the Intelligence Community to issue a
public policy on its collection of U.S. location information.
For years, I have worked to reform the country's broken
classification and declassification system. In particular, I
have joined with Senator Jerry Moran to ensure that there be an
Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification to lead
a fully integrated, U.S. government-wide reform effort. My
provision directs the President to designate an Executive Agent
and provide a clear funding plan for governing the reform
process, including money for the perpetually under-resourced
Public Interest Declassification Board.
The bill modifies the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) in several ways. In April 2024, as the Senate considered
the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA), I
sought to strike from the bill a sweeping new definition of
electronic communications service provider that would authorize
the government to force almost any American with access to a
server, a wire, a cable box or wifi to participate in
warrantless surveillance under Section 702 of FISA. At the
time, the Department of Justice stated that it would only apply
the new authorities to the type of service provider at issue in
a 2023 FISA Court case. However, no such limitation was in the
statute.
The Intelligence Authorization Act represents a significant
improvement, codifying that limitation and adding provisions
allowing for FISA Court review and congressional oversight of
the new authorities. However, the actual boundaries of what is
legal under the new authorities remain hidden from the public.
It is a fundamental democratic principle that an American
citizen should be able to read the law and have some inkling
about what the government is and is not permitted to do,
particularly when it comes to warrantless surveillance.
For this reason, I offered an amendment to replace the new
authorities with a clear articulation of which providers are
now subject to Section 702. This amendment would have allowed
the public to understand the intent and effect of the new
surveillance authorities, while permitting an informed, open
debate in Congress when these authorities sunset in 2026. The
defeat of my amendment unfortunately perpetuates secret law, a
problem that undermines trust in government and the Congress.
Voters have a need and a right to understand the limits of what
is and is not permitted under the law, so that they can ratify
or reject decisions that elected officials make on their
behalf.
The bill includes a provision strengthening the role of the
amicus curiae in the FISA Court. Many of these reforms
originated in the USA RIGHTS Act, which I introduced in 2017
with a bipartisan, bicameral coalition. In 2020, they passed
the Senate by a 77-19 vote thanks to the leadership of Senators
Lee and Leahy, although they were not passed into law at that
time. I commend Chairman Warner and Vice Chairman Rubio for
continuing to push for these important reforms and for
including them in this bill.
Finally, the bill includes a provision granting the
Attorney General new powers to police the labeling of AI-
generated media. This provision is modeled on the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act's anti-circumvention provisions, which
are extremely controversial and have chilled legitimate
cybersecurity research. The use of this problematic legislative
framework to address the cutting-edge issue of AI-generated
media raises numerous First Amendment and other questions that
need to be considered and debated in public. I am also
concerned about a blanket exemption for intelligence agencies
as well as law enforcement, state actors and contractors at all
levels to use unlabeled deepfake material.
Ron Wyden.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR HEINRICH
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
that the Senate Intelligence Committee reported out on May 22,
2024, includes a provision I drafted that would limit the new
definition of Electronic Communication Service Provider (ECSP)
in the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA)
to providers of the type of service at issue in the 2023 FISA
Court and FISA Court of Review opinions. The language was part
of a managers' amendment that was accepted with bipartisan
support.
My provision is intended to be consistent with the
statement in the Assistant Attorney General letter of April 17,
2024, that: ``The Department commits to applying this
definition of ECSP exclusively to cover the type of service
provider at issue in the litigation before the FISC [Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court].'' The letter went further to
explain that ``[t]he number of technology companies providing
this service is extremely small.''
My provision is also intended to be consistent with the
clarification in the Explanatory Statement to accompany RISAA
that ``Congress intends that the amended ECSP definition will
be used exclusively to cover the type of service provider at
issue in the litigation before the FISC.''
I also supported an amendment to the Intelligence
Authorization Act that would prohibit the intentional,
deceptive removal of content provenance information, such as a
watermark, label, or metadata attached to an image that
demonstrates where it came from. As the quality and
availability of AI-powered digital content generation tools
increases, content provenance information will be an
increasingly important basis of trust in the online information
ecosystem.
The amendment takes an enforcement approach based on civil
actions against end users that deceptively remove content
provenance information (or providers of software that help
enable this removal). In order to truly address the problem of
online disinformation at scale, however, I believe the bulk of
the responsibility lies with online content distributors and
social media platforms to ensure that content provenance
information is available and transmitted faithfully, rather
than with end users.
Martin Heinrich.
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