[Senate Report 118-181]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                   Calendar No. 412

118th Congress}                                           { Report
                                 SENATE
   2d Session }                                           { 118-181

======================================================================
 
                  INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR 
                            FISCAL YEAR 2025

                                _______
                                

                 June 12, 2024.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

        Mr. Warner, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 4443]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 4443) to authorize appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 2025 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community 
Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

                Classified Annex to the Committee Report

    Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on March 12, 
2024, that the request for the National Intelligence Program 
for Fiscal Year 2025 was $73.4 billion. Other than for limited 
unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence 
Community Management Account, the classified nature of United 
States intelligence activities precludes any further 
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its 
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has 
prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a 
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule 
of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 and has the 
legal status of public law. The classified annex is made 
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
the House of Representatives and to the President. It is also 
available for review by any Member of the Senate subject to the 
provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress 
(1976).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2025 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the Intelligence Community (IC) for Fiscal Year 
2025.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2025 are 
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that 
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) for Fiscal Year 2025.

Section 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 104 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM


Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA 
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2025.

               TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS


Section 301. Improvements relating to conflicts of interest in the 
        Intelligence Innovation Board

    Section 301 amends Section 7506 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, which established the 
Intelligence Innovation Board, in order to improve the process 
for vetting potential conflicts of interest.

Section 302. National Threat Identification and Prioritization 
        Assessment and National Counterintelligence Strategy

    Section 302 amends Section 904 of the Counterintelligence 
Enhancement Act of 2002 to update the process for submittal to 
Congress of the National Threat Identification and 
Prioritization Assessment and the National Counterintelligence 
Strategy.

Section 303. Open Source Intelligence Division of Office of 
        Intelligence and Analysis personnel

    Section 303 prohibits funds made available for Fiscal Year 
2025 for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the 
Department of Homeland Security from being obligated or 
expended to increase the number of personnel assigned to the 
Open Source Intelligence Division who work exclusively or 
predominantly on domestic terrorism issues.

Section 304. Appointment of Director of the Office of Intelligence and 
        Counterintelligence

    Section 304 requires that the Director of the Office of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of 
Energy be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, for a six-year term.

Section 305. Improvements to advisory board of National Reconnaissance 
        Office

    Section 305 amends the composition of the Advisory Board of 
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) by permitting the 
Director of the NRO to independently appoint up to eight 
members to the Board. Section 305 also requires the Director to 
establish a charter for the Board and extends the Board until 
August 31, 2027.

Section 306. National Intelligence University acceptance of grants

    Section 306 authorizes the National Intelligence University 
to accept qualifying research grants.

Section 307. Protection of Central Intelligence Agency facilities and 
        assets from unmanned aircraft

    Section 307 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 to allow authorized CIA personnel to better detect and 
respond to threats posed to CIA facilities and assets by 
unmanned aircraft.

Section 308. Limitation on availability of funds for new controlled 
        access programs

    Section 308 prohibits funds made available for fiscal year 
2025 for the National Intelligence Program from being obligated 
or expended for any controlled access program, until the head 
of the element of the IC responsible for the program submits 
the notification required by section 501A(b) of the National 
Security Act of 1947.

Section 309. Limitation on transfers from controlled access programs

    Section 309 amends Section 501A(b) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 to prohibit the head of an element of the IC from 
transferring a capability from a controlled access program, 
until the head submits to the appropriate congressional 
committees and congressional leadership notice of the intent of 
the head to make such transfer.

Section 310. Expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and 
        counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard

    Section 310 authorizes the Commandant of the Coast Guard to 
use up to 1% of the amounts made available for the National 
Intelligence Program for each fiscal year for intelligence and 
counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard relating to 
objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, 
which may be accounted for solely on the certification of the 
Commandant.

Section 311. Unauthorized access to intelligence community property

    Section 311 establishes criminal penalties for unauthorized 
access to IC property.

Section 312. Strengthening of Office of Intelligence and Analysis

    Section 312 amends Section 311 of Title 31 to establish 
within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of 
the Department of Treasury, the Office of Economic Intelligence 
and Security, which replaces the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis.

Section 313. Report on sensitive commercially available information

    Section 313 requires each element of the IC to submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on 
the access to, collection, processing, and use of sensitive 
commercially available information by such element. Section 313 
further requires the DNI to make available to the public, once 
every 2 years, a report on the policies and procedures of the 
IC with respect to sensitive commercially available 
information.

Section 314. Policy on collection of United States location information

    Section 314 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Attorney General, to issue a policy on the collection of United 
States location information by the IC.

Section 315. Display of flags, seals, and emblems other than the United 
        States flag

    Section 315 provides that any flag, seal, or emblem that is 
not the United States flag that is displayed at an official 
location of an element of the IC shall be smaller than the 
official United States flag and may not be displayed above the 
United States flag. Section 315 further provides that none of 
the funds made available by the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2025 for the National Intelligence Program may 
be obligated or expended to fly or display a flag over a 
facility of an element of the IC other than the United States 
flag or another authorized flag.

                  TITLE IV--COUNTERING FOREIGN THREATS


                 Subtitle A--People's Republic of China


Section 401. Strategy and outreach on risks posed by People's Republic 
        of China smartport technology

    Section 401 requires the Director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) to engage with 
United States industry partners on the risks of smartport 
technology--including shipping and logistics infrastructure and 
software--of the People's Republic of China to United States 
supply chains and commercial activity.

Section 402. Assessment of current status of biotechnology of People's 
        Republic of China

    Section 402 requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity 
Center (NCBC), to assess the current status of the 
biotechnology sector of the People's Republic of China. Within 
30 days after the completion of the assessment, the DNI is 
required to submit a report on the findings to the 
congressional intelligence committees.

Section 403. Intelligence sharing with law enforcement agencies on 
        synthetic opioid precursor chemicals originating in People's 
        Republic of China

    Section 403 requires the DNI, in consultation with the head 
of the Office of National Security Intelligence of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration and the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for Intelligence and Analysis, to develop a strategy 
to ensure robust intelligence sharing relating to the illicit 
trafficking of synthetic opioid precursor chemicals from the 
People's Republic of China and other source countries. The DNI 
is further required to develop a mechanism for collaboration 
between the IC and other Federal Government agencies.

Section 404. Report on efforts of the People's Republic of China to 
        evade United States transparency and national security 
        regulations

    Section 404 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees an unclassified report on the efforts 
of the People's Republic of China to evade specified national 
security restrictions and limitations.

Section 405. Plan for recruitment of Mandarin speakers

    Section 405 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a comprehensive plan to prioritize the 
recruitment and training of individuals who speak Mandarin 
Chinese for each element of the IC.

                   Subtitle B--The Russian Federation


Section 411. Assessment of Russian Federation sponsorship of acts of 
        international terrorism

    Section 411 requires the DNI to conduct and submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees an assessment on the 
extent to which the Russian Federation provides support for 
international acts of terrorism and cooperates with the 
antiterrorism efforts of the United States.

Section 412. Assessment of likely course of war in Ukraine

    Section 412 requires the DNI, in collaboration with the 
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of 
the CIA, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
an assessment of the likely course of the war in Ukraine 
through December 31, 2025.

                  Subtitle C--International Terrorism


Section 421. Inclusion of Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS 
        officials and members among aliens engaged in terrorist 
        activity

    Section 421 amends Section 212 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act to specify that any person who is a 
spokesperson, or member of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, or any 
successor or affiliate group, or who endorses or espouses 
terrorist activities conducted by any of the aforementioned 
groups, is considered to be engaged in terrorist activities.

Section 422. Assessment and report on the threat of ISIS-Khorasan to 
        the United States

    Section 422 requires the Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center to conduct an assessment of the threats 
to the United States and United States citizens posed by ISIS-
Khorasan.

Section 423. Terrorist financing prevention

    Section 423 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to 
submit to the President a report identifying any foreign 
financial institution or foreign digital asset transaction 
facilitator that has knowingly facilitated a significant 
financial transaction with a terrorist organization. Section 
423 further requires the President to impose sanctions on such 
foreign financial institutions and foreign digital asset 
transaction facilitators.

                   Subtitle D--Other Foreign Threats


Section 431. Assessment of visa-free travel to and within Western 
        Hemisphere by nationals of countries of concern

    Section 431 requires the DNI to conduct and submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a written assessment of 
the impacts to national security caused by travel without a 
visa to and within countries in the Western Hemisphere by 
nationals of countries of concern.

Section 432. Study on threat posed by foreign investment in United 
        States agricultural land

    Section 432 requires the DNI to conduct a study and provide 
a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress on the 
threats posed to the United States by foreign investment in 
agricultural land in the United States.

Section 433. Assessment of threat posed by citizenship-by-investment 
        programs

    Section 433 requires the DNI and the Assistant Secretary 
for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury 
to complete an assessment on the threat posed to the United 
States by citizenship-by-investment programs. The DNI and the 
Assistant Secretary are further directed to submit a report to 
the appropriate congressional committees on the findings of the 
assessment and provide a briefing to such committees on the 
report.

Section 434. Mitigating the use of United States components and 
        technology in hostile activities by foreign adversaries

    Section 434 requires the DNI within 180 days of enactment 
to develop and commence implementation of a Supply Chain Risk 
Mitigation Strategy to mitigate or disrupt the acquisition and 
use of United States components in the conduct of activities 
harmful to national security. The DNI is further required to 
submit to Congress annually thereafter for three years a report 
on the status and effect of the strategy.

Section 435. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence review of 
        visitors and assignees

    Section 435 requires the Director of the Department of 
Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence to 
establish procedures by which visitors and assignees are 
assessed for counterintelligence risks to research or 
activities undertaken at National Laboratories. It further 
requires the Director to advise a National Laboratory on 
visitors or assignees when the Director has reason to believe a 
visitor or assignee is a non-traditional collector, or when the 
Director has information indicating that the visitor or 
assignee constitutes a counterintelligence risk to a lab. 
Section 435 requires the Director to report quarterly to the 
appropriate congressional committees metrics regarding 
assignees and visitors admitted to the National Laboratories.

Section 436. Prohibition on National Laboratories admitting certain 
        foreign nationals

    Section 436 limits entry into Department of Energy National 
Laboratories by foreign nationals from China, Russia, Iran, 
North Korea, and Cuba, with an exception for legal permanent 
residents. Section 436 permits the Secretary of Energy, in 
consultation with the Director of the Office of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy and certain 
senior counterintelligence officials at the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), to waive the prohibition for nationals 
from these countries if the Secretary certifies that the 
benefits to the United States of access outweigh the national 
security and economic risks to the United States. Section 436 
requires the Secretary to submit notifications to congressional 
committees of each waiver issued.

Section 437. Quarterly report on certain foreign nationals encountered 
        at the United States border

    Section 437 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
coordination with the DNI, to publish a quarterly report 
identifying the aggregate number of special interest aliens who 
have been encountered at or near the United States border and 
have been released, are under supervision, are being detained, 
or have been removed from the United States.

Section 438. Assessment of the lessons learned by the intelligence 
        community with respect to the Israel-Hamas war

    Section 438 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress an assessment of the lessons learned 
from the Israel-Hamas war.

Section 439. Central Intelligence Agency intelligence assessment on 
        Tren de Aragua

    Section 439 requires the Director of the CIA to submit to 
the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment on the 
gang known as ``Tren de Aragua.''

Section 440. Assessment of Maduro regime's economic and security 
        relationships with state sponsors of terrorism and foreign 
        terrorist organizations

    Section 440 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees an assessment of the economic and 
security relationships of the regime of Nicolas Maduro of 
Venezuela with specified state sponsors of terrorism and 
foreign terrorist organizations.

Section 441. Continued congressional oversight of Iranian expenditures 
        supporting foreign military and terrorist activities

    Section 441 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report describing the current 
occurrences, circumstances, and expenditures by Iran on 
military and terrorist activities outside the country.

                     TITLE V--EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES


Section 501. Strategy to counter foreign adversary efforts to utilize 
        biotechnologies in ways that threaten United States national 
        security

    Section 501 requires the DNI, acting through NCBC, to 
develop and submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
a whole-of-government strategy to address concerns relating to 
biotechnologies.

Section 502. Improvements to the roles, missions, and objectives of the 
        National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center

    Section 502 expands NCBC's authorities, to include 
overseeing and coordinating the analysis of intelligence on 
biotechnologies.

Section 503. Enhancing capabilities to detect foreign adversary threats 
        relating to biological data

    Section 503 requires the DNI to take steps to standardize 
and enhance the capabilities of the IC to detect foreign 
adversary threats relating to biological data.

Section 504. National security procedures to address certain risks and 
        threats relating to artificial intelligence

    Section 504 requires the President to develop and implement 
procedures to facilitate information sharing on national 
security threats emanating from, or directed at, artificial 
intelligence systems.

Section 505. Establishment of Artificial Intelligence Security Center

    Section 505 establishes an Artificial Intelligence Security 
Center within the National Security Agency, with functions that 
include making available a research test-bed to facilitate 
security research on artificial intelligence systems by private 
sector and academic researchers in a secure environment.

Section 506. Sense of Congress encouraging intelligence community to 
        increase private sector capital partnerships and partnership 
        with Office of Strategic Capital of Department of Defense to 
        secure enduring technological advantages

    Section 506 provides that it is the Sense of Congress that 
the IC should further explore the strategic use of private 
capital partnerships to secure enduring technological 
advantages for the IC and undertake regular consultation with 
Federal partners on best practices and lessons learned.

Section 507. Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Fund

    Section 507 creates a fund to assist in transitioning IC 
products from the research and development phase to the 
contracting and production phase, with priority given to small 
business concerns and nontraditional defense contractors.

Section 508. Enhancement of authority for intelligence community 
        public-private talent exchanges

    Section 508 amends Section 5306 of the Damon Paul Nelson 
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3334) to 
enhance the authority for exchanges between the private sector 
and the IC, with a focus on finance, acquisition, technology, 
innovation, and research.

Section 509. Enhancing intelligence community ability to acquire 
        emerging technology that fulfills intelligence community needs

    Section 509 enables the IC to use a streamlined acquisition 
process to acquire property, products, or services from 
companies that have completed an In-Q Tel work program in which 
the company furnished property, products, or services to 
address government technology needs or requirements.

Section 510. Management of artificial intelligence security risks

    Section 510 requires the Director of the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) to ensure that the National 
Vulnerability Database of the Institute incorporates artificial 
intelligence security vulnerabilities and addresses those 
vulnerabilities. It also directs NIST, in coordination with the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), to 
establish a database by which vendors can voluntarily disclose 
artificial intelligence security and safety incidents. Finally, 
it directs the Director of CISA to ensure that the Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures Program encompasses artificial 
intelligence security vulnerabilities.

Section 511. Protection of technological measures designed to verify 
        authenticity or provenance of machine-manipulated media

    Section 511 prohibits the concealment, subversion, 
fraudulent distribution, and circumvention of technological 
measures designed to verify the authenticity, modifications, or 
conveyance of machine-manipulated media or characteristics of 
the provenance of such media. Section 511 also establishes 
civil penalties, enforceable by the Attorney General, for 
violations of the prohibitions.

Section 512. Sense of Congress on hostile foreign cyber actors

    Section 512 provides that it is the sense of Congress that 
foreign ransomware organizations constitute hostile foreign 
cyber actors, that covered nations abet and benefit from the 
activities of these actors, and that such actors should be 
treated as hostile foreign cyber actors by the United States.

Section 513. Designation of state sponsors of ransomware and reporting 
        requirements

    Section 513 requires the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the DNI, to annually designate as a state 
sponsor of ransomware any country the government of which the 
Secretary has determined provides support for ransomware demand 
schemes. Section 513 further requires the President to impose 
the sanctions and penalties imposed with respect to a state 
sponsor of terrorism on each country designated by the 
Secretary as a state sponsor of ransomware. Section 513 
requires the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a report on 
the number and geographic locations of individuals, groups, and 
entities subject to sanctions imposed by the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control who were subsequently determined to have been 
involved in a ransomware demand scheme. Section 513 also 
requires the Secretary of State to submit a report on the 
number and geographic locations of individuals, groups, and 
entities that identifies the country of origin of foreign-based 
ransomware attacks. Section 513 further requires the 
Comptroller General to issue a report on the authorities 
available to respond to foreign-based ransomware attacks.

Section 514. Deeming ransomware threats to critical infrastructure a 
        national intelligence priority

    Section 514 requires the DNI to deem ransomware threats to 
critical infrastructure a national intelligence priority 
component to the National Intelligence Priorities Framework. 
Section 514 further requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
Director of the FBI, to submit a report on the implications of 
the ransomware threat to United States national security.

                    TITLE VI--CLASSIFICATION REFORM


Section 601. Governance of classification and declassification system

    Section 601 requires the President to designate an official 
as Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification to 
identify and promote technological solutions to support 
efficient and effective systems for classification and 
declassification to be implemented on an interoperable and 
federated basis across the Federal Government. Section 601 also 
requires the President to designate an official to establish 
policies and guidance relating to classification and 
declassification and controlled unclassified information and to 
oversee the implementation of such policies and guidance. 
Finally, Section 601 requires the President to establish an 
Executive Committee on Classification and Declassification 
Programs and Technology to provide direction, advice, and 
guidance to the Executive Agent.

Section 602. Classification and declassification of information

    Section 602 authorizes the President to establish a system 
for the classification and declassification of information, 
subject to certain minimum requirements including the scope of 
information that may be classified, the duration of 
classification, and the processes for reviewing classified 
records and materials.

Section 603. Minimum standards for Executive agency insider threat 
        programs

    Section 603 requires each agency with access to classified 
information to establish an insider threat program that meets 
certain minimum standards, including establishing a capability 
to monitor user activity on all classified networks.

  TITLE VII--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE 
                              IMPROVEMENTS


Section 701. Security clearances held by certain former employees of 
        intelligence community

    Section 701 amends Section 803 of the National Security Act 
of 1947 to require the Security Executive Agent to issue 
guidelines and instructions to the heads of Federal agencies to 
ensure that any individual who was appointed by the President 
to a position in an element of the IC, but is no longer 
employed by the Federal Government, maintains a security 
clearance only in accordance with Executive Order 12968, or 
successor order. Section 701 also requires submission of the 
guidelines and instructions to Congress, as well as a report on 
former Presidential appointees who hold security clearances.

Section 702. Policy for authorizing intelligence community program of 
        contractor-owned and contractor-operated sensitive 
        compartmented information facilities

    Section 702 requires the DNI to establish a standardized 
policy for the IC that authorizes a program of contractor-owned 
and contractor-operated sensitive compartmented information 
facilities as a service to the national security and 
intelligence enterprises.

Section 703. Enabling intelligence community integration

    Section 703 authorizes the head of an element of the IC to 
provide goods or services to another element of the IC without 
reimbursement or transfer of funds for hoteling initiatives for 
IC employees and affiliates to enable those employees and 
affiliates to work from secure facilities maintained by other 
elements of the IC across a wide geographic area.

Section 704. Appointment of spouses of certain Federal employees

    Section 704 amends Section 3330d of Title 5 to extend to 
spouses of an employee of the Department of State or an element 
of the IC the same options for federal employment as currently 
enjoyed by spouses of employees of the Department of Defense 
(DOD).

Section 705. Plan for staffing the intelligence collection positions of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 705 requires the Director of the CIA to submit a 
plan for ensuring the Directorate of Operations has staffed 
every civilian full-time equivalent position authorized for 
that Directorate under the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2024.

Section 706. Intelligence community workplace protections

    Section 706 allows for IC incumbent personnel whose 
positions are converted involuntarily to the excepted service, 
or from one excepted service schedule to another, to retain 
their adverse action protections. Section 706 further requires 
congressional notification and explanation when heads of 
agencies terminate personnel in contravention of existing 
protections. Section 706 also prohibits the Director of the CIA 
from terminating an officer or employee except in accordance 
with guidelines and regulations submitted to the congressional 
intelligence committees, unless the Director determines that 
such compliance poses a threat to U.S. national security and 
provides an explanation for such determination to the 
committees.

Section 707. Sense of Congress on Government personnel support for 
        foreign terrorist organizations

    Section 707 establishes a Sense of Congress that for the 
purposes of adjudicating the eligibility of an individual for 
access to classified information, renewal of a prior 
determination of eligibility, or continuous vetting of an 
individual for eligibility, certain enumerated actions shall be 
considered acts advocating an act of terrorism.

                       TITLE VIII--WHISTLEBLOWERS


Section 801. Improvements regarding urgent concerns submitted to 
        Inspectors General of the intelligence community

    Section 801 permits urgent concerns submitted by 
whistleblowers to the inspectors general of the IC to be 
provided directly to Congress rather than going through the 
heads of agencies when an inspector general determines that 
transmittal to the head of agency could compromise the 
anonymity of the employee or result in the complaint being 
transmitted to the subject of the complaint. Section 801 
requires that submissions be made in writing and provides that 
the statutory review period for such submissions begins on the 
date the submitter confirms their written submission is 
complete, while requiring the inspectors general to facilitate 
a writing of a submission or treat a written record of a verbal 
complaint as a submission. Finally, Section 801 clarifies that 
individuals formerly affiliated with an element of the IC may 
submit matters of urgent concern that arose during and related 
to the time of their prior employment with the element.

Section 802. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity 
        as act of reprisal

    Section 802 prohibits knowing or willful disclosures that 
reveal an IC employee's or IC contractor employee's identifying 
information without consent, so as to identify such employee or 
contractor employee as a whistleblower, except as necessary 
during the course of an investigation. Section 802 further 
establishes a private right of action for an IC whistleblower 
if such disclosure is taken as a reprisal against the 
whistleblower for bringing a complaint.

Section 803. Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures 
        to Inspectors General of elements of the intelligence community

    Section 803 clarifies that a disclosure of classified 
information to an Inspector General of an element of the IC 
that is made by a whistleblower who held a security clearance 
during the whistleblower's IC employment, but who, at the time 
of the disclosure, does not hold the appropriate clearance or 
authority to access such classified information, and that is 
otherwise made in accordance with such security standards and 
procedures, shall be treated as an authorized disclosure.

Section 804. Clarification of authority of certain Inspectors General 
        to receive protected disclosures

    Section 804 makes a technical correction to Section 1104 of 
the National Security Act of 1947 to clarify that the 
inspectors general of defense intelligence elements are 
authorized recipients of whistleblower protected disclosures.

Section 805. Whistleblower protections relating to psychiatric testing 
        or examination

    Section 805 amends Section 1104 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 to establish that a decision to order psychiatric 
testing or examination is a prohibited personnel practice when 
taken or threatened as a reprisal for a protected disclosure.

Section 806. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance 
        and access determinations

    Section 806 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse 
security clearance or access determination against a 
whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 
that the agency would have made the same security clearance or 
access determination in the absence of the whistleblower's 
disclosure. Section 806 further establishes parity in the legal 
standards applied to IC whistleblower matters.

Section 807. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory 
        revocation of security clearances and access determinations

    Section 807 removes the cap on compensatory damages for an 
employee or former employee who was subjected to a reprisal 
with respect to the employee's or former employee's security 
clearance or access determination.

                  TITLE IX--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS


Section 901. Additional discretion for Director of Central Intelligence 
        Agency in paying costs of treating qualifying injuries and 
        making payments for qualifying injuries to the brain

    Section 901 authorizes the Director of the CIA to pay or 
reimburse the costs relating to diagnosing or treating a 
qualifying injury that is not otherwise covered under existing 
law, under circumstances the Director determines to be 
extraordinary.

Section 902. Additional discretion for Secretary of State and heads of 
        other Federal agencies in paying costs of treating qualifying 
        injuries and making payments for qualifying injuries to the 
        brain

    Section 902 authorizes the Secretary of State or the head 
of any other Federal agency to pay or reimburse the costs 
relating to diagnosing or treating a qualifying injury that is 
not otherwise covered under existing law, under circumstances 
the Secretary (or relevant head of another Federal agency) 
determines to be extraordinary.

Section 903. Improved funding flexibility for payments made by 
        Department of State for qualifying injuries to the brain

    Section 903 improves funding flexibility for payments made 
by the Department of State for qualifying injuries to the 
brain.

               TITLE X--UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA


Section 1001. Comptroller General of the United States review of All-
        domain Anomaly Resolution Office

    Section 1001 requires the Comptroller General to conduct 
and submit a review of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office 
regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena reporting and 
Federal agency coordination.

Section 1002. Sunset of requirements relating to audits of unidentified 
        anomalous phenomena historical record report

    Section 1002 terminates certain audit requirements of the 
unidentified anomalous phenomena historical record report.

Section 1003. Funding limitations relating to unidentified anomalous 
        phenomena

    Section 1003 maintains certain limitations on funding 
absent congressional oversight for Fiscal Year 2025.

                         TITLE XI--AIR AMERICA


Section 1101. Short title

    Section 1101 provides that the title may be cited as the 
``Air America Act of 2024.''

Section 1102. Findings

    Section 1102 sets forth Congress's findings that Air 
America and its affiliated companies, in coordination with the 
CIA, supported the United States Government from 1950 to 1976, 
with service and sacrifice of its employees.

Section 1103. Definitions

    Section 1103 sets forth the definitions of Air America 
affiliates, covered decedents, qualifying service, and other 
terminology.

Section 1104. Award authorized to eligible persons

    Section 1104 authorizes the Director of the CIA to award 
payments to certain qualifying Air America employees and 
survivors, and sets forth eligibility requirements for award 
payments.

Section 1105. Funding limitation

    Section 1105 sets a $60 million funding limitation, with 
the ability for the Director of the CIA to request additional 
funds to fulfill eligible award payments.

Section 1106. Time limitation

    Section 1106 establishes a two-year time period within 
which claimants must file their award claims. The two-year 
period starts upon the date of Director of the CIA's 
application regulations, and upon receiving a claim, the 
Director has 90 days within which to make an eligibility 
determination.

Section 1107. Application procedures

    Section 1107 requires the Director of the CIA to prescribe 
procedures for claimants to apply for award payments.

Section 1108. Rule of construction

    Section 1108 clarifies that nothing in this subtitle shall 
entitle any person to Federal benefits under Title 5, chapters 
81, 83, or 84.

Section 1109. Attorneys' and agents' fees

    Section 1109 makes it unlawful for more than 25 percent of 
an award payment to be paid to, or received by, any agent or 
attorney for services rendered in connection with an award 
payment.

Section 1110. No judicial review

    Section 1110 establishes that the Director of the CIA's 
determinations under this subtitle are not subject to judicial 
review.

Section 1111. Reports to Congress

    Section 1111 requires the Director of the CIA to submit 
semiannual reports on the award payments made and denied (and, 
if a denial, the rationale therefor).

                        TITLE XII--OTHER MATTERS


Section 1201. Enhanced authorities for amicus curiae under the Foreign 
        Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978

    Section 1201 enhances the authorities of court-appointed 
amici and establishes new requirements to appoint amici in a 
broader array of cases.

Section 1202. Limitation on directives under Foreign Intelligence 
        Surveillance Act of 1978 relating to certain electronic 
        communication service providers

    Section 1202 provides that a directive may not be issued 
pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act to a covered electronic communication service 
provider, unless the covered provider is a provider of the type 
of service at issue in the opinions of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review authorized for public release on August 23, 
2023. Section 1202 also requires notification and reporting of 
information concerning such directives.

Section 1203. Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect 
        for Elections through Independent Testing Act of 2024

    Section 1203 directs the Election Assistance Commission 
(EAC) to require that voting systems undergo penetration 
testing as part of the standard certification process for such 
systems. Section 1203 also directs the NIST to accredit 
entities that can perform such testing and directs the EAC to 
create a voluntary vulnerability disclosure program for 
election systems.

Section 1204. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
        qualifications

    Section 1204 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000ee(h)(2)) to ensure 
that experience in positions requiring a security clearance and 
relevant national security experience are among the 
qualifications that may be considered when appointing members 
of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Section 
1204 retains authority to consider expertise in civil liberties 
and privacy when appointing members to the Board.

Section 1205. Parity in pay for staff of the Privacy and Civil 
        Liberties Oversight Board and the intelligence community

    Section 1205 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000ee(j)(1)) to ensure 
that staff of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
may be paid a rate of pay comparable to employees of the IC.

Section 1206. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements

    Section 1206 modifies and repeals certain prior 
congressional intelligence committee reporting requirements 
that, for certain reasons, are no longer relevant or necessary 
to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 1207. Technical amendments

    Section 1207 makes certain technical amendments relating to 
IC facility construction and copyright permissions for works by 
the United States Government.

                    Committee Comments and Direction


Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Oversight

    The Committee is encouraged that DOD concurred with the 
recommendations outlined by the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) in its October 2023 assessment of matters related 
to DOD's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
processing, exploiting, and disseminating (PED) capabilities 
(GAO-24-106088C), and is interested in the prompt 
implementation of these recommendations. The Committee notes 
that the ODNI did not respond to GAO's report, but recognizes 
the important coordination role that it should play in these 
matters. Consequently, the Committee directs the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and ODNI to provide a briefing, 180 days 
after passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2025, to the congressional defense and intelligence 
committees, on the DOD implementation of recommendations made 
by the above-noted GAO report, and ODNI's support to these 
efforts. The briefing should include a discussion of the 
progress made by DOD, in coordination with ODNI, in 
implementing the recommendations in the GAO report, including 
any actions they have taken, challenges they face, and 
timelines for implementation. The briefing should also include 
a discussion of any proposals to the Congress that would 
streamline or otherwise improve efforts to address the 
recommendations.

Plan for Increased Security at United States Installations Used by 
        Intelligence Community

    At present, no unified plan across the IC exists for 
restricting access to transportation security companies 
accessing U.S. government facilities that house IC entities. 
While U.S. government installations generally have access 
requirements, including DOD, as described in 346(d) of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (10 
U.S.C. Sec. 2661 note prec.), the IC has yet to clarify a 
congruent policy for all U.S. government installations that 
house IC components. The Committee remains concerned at 
potential counterintelligence gaps in access to U.S. 
installations that house IC entities and subsidiaries.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the DNI shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a plan to 
increase security at each installation under the control of the 
United States that is used by one or more elements of the IC, 
including by controlling access to such installations by any 
employee or contractor of a transportation company.

Establishing a National Intelligence Manager for Counternarcotics

    In September 2023, the ODNI convened a 90-day Sprint Cell 
hosted by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to 
``identify opportunities to strengthen the IC integration of 
intelligence and support to policymakers and operators in 
disrupting the illicit fentanyl supply chain.'' On April 2, 
2024, the NCTC presented to Committee staff its report, which 
found that coordination between the IC and Federal Law 
Enforcement can be improved to enhance government-wide efforts 
to counter illicit fentanyl production and distribution. 
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to establish, within 
90 days of enactment of this act, a National Intelligence 
Manager for Counternarcotics to focus exclusively on the 
counternarcotics mission.

China's attempts to exploit knowledge of proprietary U.S. tactics, 
        techniques, and procedures

    The Committee is concerned that our adversaries are 
targeting U.S. and allied servicemembers, and have successfully 
recruited former servicemembers, for employment in positions 
that allow adversaries to harvest knowledge and receive 
training on U.S., NATO, and allied military tactics, techniques 
and procedures (TTPs). These proprietary TTPs are a critical 
element of combat effectiveness that underpins our national 
security.
    Therefore, to improve awareness of the threat and to 
develop mitigation strategies, the committee directs the DNI, 
working in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence and Security, to undertake a review and report to 
the Committee, no later than 60 days after enactment, on (1) 
China's collection efforts and intended use of the information; 
(2) an assessment of the threat profile and related trends; and 
(3) recommended mitigating actions that can be taken across the 
targeted population including to protect U.S. servicemembers 
during and after their service, including veterans who operate 
commercial tactical training services. To contribute to public 
awareness, the report shall be unclassified to the maximum 
extent practicable, with a classified annex if needed.

Evolving Tactics of Transnational Criminal Organizations

    Our national security is enhanced by continuing to 
strengthen border security in response to evolving threats. In 
recent years, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), 
including those operating in Latin America and the border 
region, have leveraged technological developments and 
demonstrated an evolution in tactics in furtherance of 
narcotics trafficking and other activities that threaten 
national security. These have included the use of digital 
platforms, cryptocurrency and encrypted communication systems 
for a variety of activities, and testing the use of unmanned 
aerial vehicles to move drugs across the U.S. border and 
maritime transit routes.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to brief the 
Committee, no later than 60 days after enactment, on (1) new 
tactics being utilized by TCOs, including leveraging digital 
technologies to include social media, cryptocurrency, and 
encrypted communications for recruitment and financial flows, 
and the use of unmanned underwater and aerial vehicles to 
facilitate surveillance and movement of materiel across 
maritime and land borders; (2) an assessment of the risk posed 
by these emergent capabilities; and (3) an assessment of 
resources necessary to support IC elements in addressing these 
developments.

Comptroller Review of Reporting and Response Procedures for Anomalous 
        Health Incidents

    The Committee is committed to ensuring continued 
investigation and research into anomalous health incidents 
(AHIs), and to the provision of appropriate medical care and 
compensation for individuals affected by such incidents. To 
achieve these aims, the U.S. government must have effective, 
standardized, and enforceable policies and procedures for 
reporting and responding to AHIs. However, the Committee is 
concerned that existing policies and procedures lack clarity 
and may be inconsistently applied across agencies and 
locations, potentially resulting in premature dismissals of 
AHIs without adequate diligence or process.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Comptroller General of 
the United States to conduct a review of the policies and 
procedures surrounding AHIs at U.S. government agencies, 
including but not limited to the IC, DOD, and Department of 
State. This review should evaluate:
          1. The extent to which federal agencies have 
        established and are following processes and procedures 
        for consistent AHI reporting, evaluation, and response, 
        consistent with section 6603 of the National Defense 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022.
          2. The adequacy and consistency of agency and/or 
        site-specific procedures and criteria at overseas and 
        domestic locations for responding to, investigating, 
        and evaluating the credibility of potential AHIs, 
        including assessing disparities across agencies, 
        location, and individual types (e.g. overseas vs. 
        domestic, military vs. civilian employee, vs. 
        contractor vs. dependent) and any mechanisms for 
        appealing credibility determinations.
          3. The extent to which each agency is collecting, 
        storing, and sharing data regarding AHIs as outlined in 
        current legislation, and the adequacy of the mechanisms 
        to do so, including the government-wide database 
        maintained by the NCSC.
          4. How the data in the NCSC database are managed, 
        shared across government, and used to support research, 
        investigations, intelligence collection, and/or for 
        other purposes.
          5. Recommendations for improvements to existing 
        policies, initiatives, and/or mechanisms to ensure 
        efficient and consistent interagency coordination as it 
        relates to the U.S. government's investigation of and 
        response to AHIs.
          6. Any other aspect relating to U.S. government's 
        response to or treatment of AHIs that the Comptroller 
        General deems appropriate.
    The Committee further directs the Comptroller General to 
brief the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Armed 
Services Committee, House Armed Services Committee, Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Relations 
Committee on preliminary observations not later than 90 days 
after the date of enactment of this Act, and to provide a final 
report at such time as is mutually agreed upon by the 
committees and the Comptroller General.

Annual Comptroller General Report on Cybersecurity and Surveillance 
        Threats to Congress

    Section 5710 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young 
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 
2019, and 2020 (P.L. 116-92), codified at 2 U.S.C. Sec. 4111, 
requires the Comptroller General of the United States to submit 
to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report 
on cybersecurity and surveillance threats to Congress. For the 
next annual report conducted pursuant to this provision on 
cybersecurity and surveillance threats to the Senate, the 
Committee requests the Comptroller General to assess the 
following:
          1. The extent to which the cryptography used in 
        Senate collaboration platforms is consistent with 
        leading cybersecurity practices, including those 
        relating to end-to-end encryption.
          2. Challenges that prevent offices or committees from 
        implementing strong cryptography--such as end-to-end 
        encryption--on Senate collaboration platforms.
          3. Efforts taken by the Senate Sergeant at Arms (SAA) 
        to safeguard the personal accounts, devices, and 
        information of Senators, their staffs, and immediate 
        families, and how those efforts compare to efforts 
        taken by certain executive and judicial branch entities 
        with statutory authority to safeguard the personal 
        accounts, devices or information of employees.
          4. The techniques, means, and methods used by the 
        Senate SAA to detect surveillance against, hacks of, 
        and the deployment of spyware by foreign governments, 
        on mobile devices subject to Senate SAA cybersecurity 
        safeguards, and how those techniques, means, and 
        methods compare to those used by executive branch 
        agencies to detect and protect against such 
        cybersecurity and surveillance threats to mobile 
        devices managed by those agencies.
    As part of the report, the Comptroller General shall 
include any resulting recommendations to improve Senate 
policies and programs to meaningfully address related 
cybersecurity and surveillance threats and to protect Senate 
information.
    In conducting the above assessments, the Committee suggests 
the Comptroller General consult with the Attorney General; the 
DNI, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts; the Director of the National Security Agency; 
the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and State; the 
Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper of the Senate and any other 
agencies the Comptroller General determines to have information 
necessary for conducting comprehensive assessments. The 
Committee expects these officials to fully cooperate with the 
Comptroller General and provide any information the Comptroller 
General determines is necessary to complete this work.

Intelligence Community Directive Oversight

    Four years ago, ODNI updated the Technical Specifications 
for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented 
Information Facilities (SCIFs) issued pursuant to Intelligence 
Community Directive 705. The Committee supports ODNI's efforts 
to ensure the Technical Specifications are regularly updated to 
account for changing and emerging technology. However, 
compliance with updated Technical Specifications also imposes 
costs on departments and agencies, as well as private industry, 
responsible for implementing the updated standards. These costs 
include those associated with displacing personnel and/or 
equipment from SCIF space in order to implement necessary 
physical upgrades.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that not later than 180 
days after the date of enactment of this Act, the DNI, in 
coordination with the Under Secretary for Defense for 
Intelligence and Security, submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the 
Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives, a 5-year plan to communicate and implement the 
updated Technical Specifications. The briefing should include a 
threat background brief, and cost estimates for departments and 
agencies within the IC, and a plan to mitigate any loss of use 
of SCIF space resulting from renovations necessary to implement 
appropriate upgrades.

Committee Support for Ongoing Intelligence Community Collection, 
        Analysis, and Research into Anomalous Health Incidents

    As noted previously by the Committee's September 2022 
organizational assessment of the National Counterintelligence 
and Security Center, the Committee is concerned about the 
emerging foreign intelligence threat landscape facing the IC. 
One of the key novel threats facing the IC workforce is AHIs. 
Many years after the first incidents were publicly reported, 
AHIs continue to be a vexing issue, as case definitions have 
proven elusive, and controversy has shrouded the results of 
analytical and research efforts to-date.
    While most IC agencies assessed in March 2023 that AHIs 
reported by U.S. personnel to date were probably the result of 
factors that did not involve a foreign adversary--such as 
preexisting conditions, conventional illness, and environmental 
factors--the assessment acknowledged intelligence gaps and the 
existence of cases that could not be explained. The September 
2022 IC Experts Panel also identified various research gaps and 
made a range of recommendations to help the U.S. government 
better understand, prevent, and manage AHIs, including calling 
for coordinated intelligence collection, data analysis, and 
research efforts across the U.S. government.
    The Committee believes a whole-of-government approach is 
necessary to identify and mitigate novel personnel threats, 
including AHIs. To that end, the Committee, in the classified 
annex, directs the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center to develop a strategy for next generation force 
protection; directs the CIA to redouble analytic efforts on 
emerging threats, including AHIs; and bolsters the budgets of 
several intelligence collection and research efforts focused on 
directed energy technology and next generation sensors.
    The Committee also expresses support for ongoing Department 
of Defense initiatives related to AHIs, including establishing 
a registry of AHI reporters' medical data collected from the 
military health system and planning for acute stage, 
retrospective, and longitudinal studies of AHI reporters' 
medical conditions. The Committee directs IC agencies to 
provide robust support to these efforts as necessary and in 
accordance with the detailed direction in our classified annex.

                            Committee Action

    On May 22, 2024, a quorum being present, the Committee met 
to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The 
Committee took the following actions:

Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex

    By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman's and 
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for 
Fiscal Year 2025, the base text for purposes of amendment.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-two 
amendments to the bill as follows: (1) an amendment by Chairman 
Warner, and cosponsored by Senators Collins and Cotton, to take 
actions against foreign ransomware actors and designate state 
sponsors of ransomware; (2) an amendment by Chairman Warner, 
and cosponsored by Senator Rounds, to prevent foreign terrorist 
financing regimes; (3) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and 
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to make certain revisions 
to the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding NCBC; (4) 
an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice 
Chairman Rubio, to make certain revisions to the Chairman's and 
Vice Chairman's bill regarding genomic data and biosurveillance 
capabilities; (5) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and 
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and Senator Casey, to 
strengthen the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; (6) an 
amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to impose limitations on 
National Laboratories from admitting certain foreign nationals; 
(7) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio expressing the Sense of 
Congress on government personnel support for Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations; (8) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to 
include Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS officials and 
members among aliens engaged in terrorist activity; (9) an 
amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to require a report on the 
threat of ISIS Khorasan to the United States; (10) an amendment 
by Vice Chairman Rubio limiting the display of flags, seals, 
and emblems other than the United States flag at IC facilities; 
(11) an amendment by Senator Wyden to require a report on 
sensitive commercially available information; (12) an amendment 
by Senator Wyden to require a policy on collection of United 
States location information; (13) an amendment by Senator 
Heinrich, and cosponsored by Senator Ossoff, regarding Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act directives relating to certain 
electronic communication service providers; (14) an amendment 
by Senator Cotton to require continued oversight of Iranian 
expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist 
activities; (15) an amendment by Senator Cotton to require a 
plan for staffing the CIA's intelligence collection positions; 
(16) an amendment by Senator Cornyn, and cosponsored by 
Chairman Warner and Senator Kelly, to make certain revisions to 
the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding emerging 
technologies; (17) an amendment by Senator Moran regarding the 
Coast Guard's expenditure of funds for certain intelligence and 
counterintelligence activities; (18) an amendment by Senator 
Lankford to require reporting on certain foreign nationals 
encountered at the United States border; (19) an amendment by 
Senator Gillibrand to extend certain funding limitations 
relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena; (20) an amendment 
by Senator Ossoff, and cosponsored by Senators Wyden and 
Heinrich, to make certain technical revisions to the Chairman's 
and Vice Chairman's bill regarding Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board members' qualifications; (21) an amendment by 
Senator Ossoff to make certain technical revisions to the 
Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill regarding an assessment of 
the likely course of war in Ukraine; and (22) an amendment by 
Senator Rounds, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and 
Senators Risch, Moran, Cornyn, and Cotton, to prevent 
unauthorized access to IC property.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a 
second-degree amendment by Senator Warner to his own amendment 
to protect technological measures designed to verify 
authenticity or provenance of machine-manipulated media. By 
voice vote, the Committee adopted Chairman Warner's amendment, 
as amended.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to adopt a 
second-degree amendment by Senator Wyden to his own amendment 
providing certain protections, imposing reporting requirements 
on the IC regarding termination authorities, and prohibiting 
the Director of the CIA from terminating an officer or employee 
except in accordance with guidelines and regulations submitted 
to the congressional intelligence committees, unless the 
Director determines that such compliance poses a threat to U.S. 
national security and provides an explanation for such 
determination to the committees. By a vote of 10 ayes and 7 
noes, the Committee adopted Senator Wyden's amendment, as 
amended. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: 
Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--
aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator 
Kelly--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator 
Collins--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator 
Moran--aye; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no.
    By voice vote, the Committee did not adopt an amendment by 
Senator Wyden to revise the definition of electronic 
communication service provider, as amended by the Reforming 
Intelligence and Securing America Act, with Senator Wyden 
recorded as an aye.
    Senator Cornyn offered an amendment to strike the provision 
in the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's bill to revise the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act's amicus curiae 
authorities, and withdrew it pending future consideration.
    By a vote of 9 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee adopted an 
amendment by Senator Ossoff to establish pay parity for Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board staff with IC employees. 
The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman 
Warner--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator 
King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator 
Gillibrand--aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye; Vice 
Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; 
Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Moran--no; 
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Rounds--no.

Votes to report the committee bill

    On May 22, 2024, the Committee voted to report the bill, as 
amended, by a vote of 17 ayes and zero noes. The votes in 
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye; 
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; 
Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; Senator Gillibrand--
aye; Senator Ossoff--aye; Senator Kelly--aye; Vice Chairman 
Rubio--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator 
Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator Moran--aye; Senator 
Lankford--aye; Senator Rounds--aye.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to 
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and 
classified annex.

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

    Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires 
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed 
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff 
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report 
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the 
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the 
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of 
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of 
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited 
tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On May 23, 
2024, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional 
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred 
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                        Changes to Existing Law

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is 
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to 
expedite the business of the Senate.

               ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN RUBIO, 
                   SENATOR RISCH, AND SENATOR ROUNDS

    During the markup of the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence 
Authorization Act (IAA), the Committee adopted an amendment 
that purported to provide Intelligence Community (IC) employees 
with new employment protections, but in reality it will 
increase risks to America's national security and hinder the 
ability of Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed IC 
officials to make personnel decisions to meet mission needs. We 
believe this provision--if enacted--will thwart the IC's 
effectiveness and upend decades of Congress's efforts to 
recognize the unique mission of the IC. Notably, the IC and 
Department of Defense (DOD) strongly oppose this amendment.
    This amendment dictates to the heads of IC elements, 
specifically the Director of National Intelligence and the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the 
Secretary of Defense, how to manage personnel decisions at 
their own agencies. The amendment restricts the ability of 
heads of IC elements from converting the employment status of 
their own personnel and mandates that IC employees in converted 
positions retain their competitive service rights under Title 5 
even if the employee's position falls under the excepted 
service. The amendment further inhibits the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency from exercising termination 
authorities under Title 50 by imposing burdensome requirements 
to notify Congress about internal agency guidelines and 
regulations--which Congress intentionally declined to codify 
given the IC's unique national security mission and 
responsibilities.
    Rather than protecting IC and certain DOD employees from 
adverse actions, the amendment micromanages the Senate-
confirmed Directors' and Secretary's fundamental authorities 
and responsibilities to maintain their workforce in the 
interest of national security. The amendment requires 
congressional notifications upon conversion of competitive 
service positions to excepted service positions, or when the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Secretary of 
Defense make certain termination decisions, which becomes a 
slippery slope toward unraveling the very specific and critical 
IC employment protections that Congress has legislated over the 
decades.
    Congress recognized the Central Intelligence Agency's 
unique employment requirements by specifically exempting the 
Central Intelligence Agency from Title 5's requirements in 5 
U.S.C. Sec. 7511(b)(7). Congress further gave the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency full discretion to manage 
termination protocols, see 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3036, and followed 
suit as to the Director of National Intelligence, see 50 U.S.C. 
Sec. 3024. It was a long-debated, thoughtful process 
culminating in gradual codifications to ensure that America has 
the most efficient, effective, and capable men and women 
protecting us from terrorism, counterintelligence threats, 
weapons of mass destruction, and many other national security 
perils that go unseen by the public.
    The IC and DOD leadership, entrusted by the President of 
the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, must be 
able to ensure the best and most capable personnel are in 
operational positions. They must be able to determine the right 
course of action when an employee's actions harm their 
employing agency, the workforce, or our national security. As 
to the DOD, the amendment would impose dual-track employment 
requirements, ultimately meaning that two respective employees 
serving in the same positions would be paid and treated 
differently.
    Given all of the above, this amendment appears to be an 
attempt to impede future administrations' abilities to build a 
workforce that meets current critical national security 
challenges. There is no valid problem that this amendment is 
attempting to solve.

                                   Marco Rubio.
                                   James E. Risch.
                                   M. Michael Rounds.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 
includes critical protections for Intelligence Community 
personnel against political firings and whistleblower 
reprisals.
    My amendment to the bill ensures that personnel who are 
involuntarily moved from one employment status to another can 
retain their protections from firing. The amendment also 
ensures that if an Intelligence Community employee is fired 
without any due process, as is currently authorized, the agency 
must explain its reasons to Congress. This oversight is 
critical to protecting against politically motivated firings 
and preserving the independence and professionalism of the 
Intelligence Community.
    The bill includes a number of provisions I submitted 
protecting Intelligence Community whistleblowers. One provision 
allows classified whistleblower complaints to be provided 
directly to Congress if the Inspector General determines that 
sending the complaint to the whistleblower's agency, as the 
statute currently requires, could compromise the anonymity of 
the whistleblower or result in the complaint being delivered to 
the subject of that complaint. Other provisions ensure that 
whistleblowers can't have their security clearances revoked on 
a pretext; allow for former Intelligence Community employees to 
submit whistleblower complaints; remove the cap on damages for 
retaliatory revocation of whistleblowers' clearances; and 
prohibit, as acts of reprisal, public disclosures of 
whistleblowers' identities as well as orders to undertake 
psychological examinations.
    The bill includes two of my amendments that increase 
oversight of and public reporting on the Intelligence 
Community's collection of Americans' private data. Since the 
beginning of this administration, I have pressed the 
Intelligence Community to be transparent about its purchases of 
sensitive data on Americans. On May 8, 2024, the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence released the Intelligence 
Community Policy Framework for Commercially Available 
Information. While I was disappointed that the Framework did 
not prohibit the Intelligence Community from purchasing any 
particular type of information, it did require IC elements to 
report to the ODNI on its purchases of sensitive information on 
Americans, while directing IC elements to employ privacy-
protecting safeguards. My amendment requires an annual report 
to Congress on the Intelligence Community's access to and 
collection, purchase and use of commercial datasets that 
contain sensitive data on Americans, as well as its 
implementation of the safeguards. The amendment also codifies 
the Framework's requirement of a public report every two years.
    In the years since the 2018 U.S. Supreme Court case of 
Carpenter v. United States, the Intelligence Community's 
policies with regard to the warrantless collection of U.S. 
location data have been both inconsistent and opaque. My 
amendment to the bill brings clarity to this long-standing 
problem by requiring the Intelligence Community to issue a 
public policy on its collection of U.S. location information.
    For years, I have worked to reform the country's broken 
classification and declassification system. In particular, I 
have joined with Senator Jerry Moran to ensure that there be an 
Executive Agent for Classification and Declassification to lead 
a fully integrated, U.S. government-wide reform effort. My 
provision directs the President to designate an Executive Agent 
and provide a clear funding plan for governing the reform 
process, including money for the perpetually under-resourced 
Public Interest Declassification Board.
    The bill modifies the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) in several ways. In April 2024, as the Senate considered 
the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA), I 
sought to strike from the bill a sweeping new definition of 
electronic communications service provider that would authorize 
the government to force almost any American with access to a 
server, a wire, a cable box or wifi to participate in 
warrantless surveillance under Section 702 of FISA. At the 
time, the Department of Justice stated that it would only apply 
the new authorities to the type of service provider at issue in 
a 2023 FISA Court case. However, no such limitation was in the 
statute.
    The Intelligence Authorization Act represents a significant 
improvement, codifying that limitation and adding provisions 
allowing for FISA Court review and congressional oversight of 
the new authorities. However, the actual boundaries of what is 
legal under the new authorities remain hidden from the public. 
It is a fundamental democratic principle that an American 
citizen should be able to read the law and have some inkling 
about what the government is and is not permitted to do, 
particularly when it comes to warrantless surveillance.
    For this reason, I offered an amendment to replace the new 
authorities with a clear articulation of which providers are 
now subject to Section 702. This amendment would have allowed 
the public to understand the intent and effect of the new 
surveillance authorities, while permitting an informed, open 
debate in Congress when these authorities sunset in 2026. The 
defeat of my amendment unfortunately perpetuates secret law, a 
problem that undermines trust in government and the Congress. 
Voters have a need and a right to understand the limits of what 
is and is not permitted under the law, so that they can ratify 
or reject decisions that elected officials make on their 
behalf.
    The bill includes a provision strengthening the role of the 
amicus curiae in the FISA Court. Many of these reforms 
originated in the USA RIGHTS Act, which I introduced in 2017 
with a bipartisan, bicameral coalition. In 2020, they passed 
the Senate by a 77-19 vote thanks to the leadership of Senators 
Lee and Leahy, although they were not passed into law at that 
time. I commend Chairman Warner and Vice Chairman Rubio for 
continuing to push for these important reforms and for 
including them in this bill.
    Finally, the bill includes a provision granting the 
Attorney General new powers to police the labeling of AI-
generated media. This provision is modeled on the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act's anti-circumvention provisions, which 
are extremely controversial and have chilled legitimate 
cybersecurity research. The use of this problematic legislative 
framework to address the cutting-edge issue of AI-generated 
media raises numerous First Amendment and other questions that 
need to be considered and debated in public. I am also 
concerned about a blanket exemption for intelligence agencies 
as well as law enforcement, state actors and contractors at all 
levels to use unlabeled deepfake material.

                                                         Ron Wyden.

                  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR HEINRICH

    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 
that the Senate Intelligence Committee reported out on May 22, 
2024, includes a provision I drafted that would limit the new 
definition of Electronic Communication Service Provider (ECSP) 
in the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA) 
to providers of the type of service at issue in the 2023 FISA 
Court and FISA Court of Review opinions. The language was part 
of a managers' amendment that was accepted with bipartisan 
support.
    My provision is intended to be consistent with the 
statement in the Assistant Attorney General letter of April 17, 
2024, that: ``The Department commits to applying this 
definition of ECSP exclusively to cover the type of service 
provider at issue in the litigation before the FISC [Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court].'' The letter went further to 
explain that ``[t]he number of technology companies providing 
this service is extremely small.''
    My provision is also intended to be consistent with the 
clarification in the Explanatory Statement to accompany RISAA 
that ``Congress intends that the amended ECSP definition will 
be used exclusively to cover the type of service provider at 
issue in the litigation before the FISC.''
    I also supported an amendment to the Intelligence 
Authorization Act that would prohibit the intentional, 
deceptive removal of content provenance information, such as a 
watermark, label, or metadata attached to an image that 
demonstrates where it came from. As the quality and 
availability of AI-powered digital content generation tools 
increases, content provenance information will be an 
increasingly important basis of trust in the online information 
ecosystem.
    The amendment takes an enforcement approach based on civil 
actions against end users that deceptively remove content 
provenance information (or providers of software that help 
enable this removal). In order to truly address the problem of 
online disinformation at scale, however, I believe the bulk of 
the responsibility lies with online content distributors and 
social media platforms to ensure that content provenance 
information is available and transmitted faithfully, rather 
than with end users.

                                                   Martin Heinrich.

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