[House Report 118-641]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


118th Congress  }                                               {  Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session     }                                               { 118-641

======================================================================



 
PROTECT AMERICA'S INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC SECURITY FROM CCP ACT OF 2024

                                _______
                                

 August 30, 2024.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Jordan, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 1398]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 1398) to establish the CCP Initiative program, and 
for other purposes, having considered the same, reports 
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the 
bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     2
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     3
Hearings.........................................................     4
Committee Consideration..........................................     5
Committee Votes..................................................     5
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     7
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     7
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................     7
Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects..........................     8
Duplication of Federal Programs..................................     8
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     8
Advisory on Earmarks.............................................     8
Federal Mandates Statement.......................................     8
Advisory Committee Statement.....................................     8
Applicability to Legislative Branch..............................     8
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................     9
Dissenting Views.................................................     9
    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Protect America's Innovation and 
Economic Security from CCP Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. CCP INITIATIVE.

  (a) Establishment.--There is established in the National Security 
Division of the Department of Justice the CCP Initiative to--
          (1) counter nation-state threats to the United States;
          (2) curb spying by the Chinese Communist Party on United 
        States intellectual property and academic institutions in the 
        United States;
          (3) develop an enforcement strategy concerning nontraditional 
        collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and 
        the defense industrial base, that are being used to transfer 
        technology contrary to United States interests;
          (4) implement the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
        Modernization Act of 2018 (title XVII of division A of the John 
        S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
        2019 (Public Law 115-232; 132 Stat. 2173)) for the Department 
        of Justice, including by working with the Department of the 
        Treasury to develop regulations under that Act;
          (5) identify cases under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
        1977 (Public Law 95-213; 91 Stat. 1494) involving Chinese 
        companies that compete with United States businesses; and
          (6) prioritize--
                  (A) identifying and prosecuting those engaged in 
                trade secret theft, hacking, and economic espionage; 
                and
                  (B) protecting the critical infrastructure in the 
                United States against external threats through foreign 
                direct investment and supply chain compromises.
  (b) Consultation.--In executing the CCP Initiative's objectives as 
set forth in subsection (a), the Attorney General, acting through the 
Assistant Attorney General for National Security, shall consult with 
relevant components of the Department of Justice as necessary, and 
coordinate activities with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and any 
other Federal agency as necessary.
  (c) Requirement.--Under the CCP Initiative--
          (1) the Initiative shall be separate from and not under the 
        authority or discretion of any other Department of Justice 
        initiative dedicated to countering nation-state threats; and
          (2) all resources used for the CCP Initiative shall solely be 
        set aside for the CCP Initiative and shall not be combined to 
        support any other Department of Justice program, including 
        other programs and initiatives dedicated to countering nation-
        state threats.
  (d) Annual Report.--The Attorney General shall submit annually a 
written report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the 
Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on the Judiciary of 
the House of Representatives, on the progress and challenges of the CCP 
Initiative over the preceding year, including--
          (1) its progress in accomplishing the objectives set forth in 
        subsection (a);
          (2) the amount and sufficiency of resources provided to, and 
        expended by, the CCP Initiative;
          (3) the level and effectiveness of coordination with the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Federal agencies;
          (4) the status of efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to 
        engage in trade secret theft, hacking, and economic espionage; 
        and
          (5) the impact of the CCP Initiative on those efforts of the 
        Chinese Communist Party.
  (e) Sunset.--This Act shall take effect on the date of enactment of 
this Act and cease to be in effect on the date that is 6 years after 
that date.
  (f) Severability.--If any provision of this Act, or the application 
of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be 
unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, and the application of the 
provisions of such to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected 
thereby.

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 1398, the Protect America's Innovation and Economic 
Security from CCP Act of 2024, introduced by Representative 
Lance Gooden (R-TX), provides for the establishment of an 
initiative within the National Security Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to address espionage by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government on U.S. 
intellectual property (IP) and academic institutions. The 
initiative would focus on identifying and prosecuting 
individuals engaged in the theft of trade secrets, hacking, and 
economic espionage, and protecting critical U.S. infrastructure 
from being compromised based on foreign investment and supply 
chains.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    According to DOJ, approximately 80 percent of all economic 
espionage cases prosecuted by DOJ involve theft of trade 
secrets by the Chinese government or its instrumentalities or 
agents, and approximately 60 percent of all trade secret 
misappropriation cases brought in the United States have a 
nexus to the People's Republic of China (PRC).\1\ The Chinese 
government also makes extensive use of cyber-intrusions to 
steal American IP.\2\ The annual cost of the theft of 
intellectual property by the PRC from the United States has 
been estimated at as much as $500 billion.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\David H. Laufman et al., The Department of Justice's National 
Security Division Chief Addresses China's Campaign to Steal U.S. 
Intellectual Property, NAT'L L.R., Aug. 24, 2020, https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/department-justice-s-national-security-
division-chief-addresses-china-s-campaign-to; Information About 
Department of Justice's China Initiative and Compilation of China-
Related Prosecutions Since 2018, DEPT. OF JUST., (Nov. 19, 2021), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/nsd/information-about-department-
justice-s-china-initiative-and-
compilation-china-related (``China Initiative Overview'').
    \2\Off. Of U.S. Trade Rep., Findings Of The Investigation Into 
China's Acts, Policies, And Practices Related To Technology Transfer, 
Intellectual Property, And Innovation Under Section 301 Of The Trade 
Act Of 1974, at 153-171 (2018) (``USTR 2018 Sec. 301 Report''), https:/
/ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF.
    \3\Naveed Jamali and Tom O'Connor, U.S., China's Cold War Is Raging 
in Cyberspace, Where Intellectual Property is a Costly Front, NEWSWEEK, 
Sept. 16, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/us-chinas-cold-war-raging-
cyberspace-where-intellectual-property-costly-front-1532133.
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    In response to the theft of U.S. trade secrets orchestrated 
by the Chinese government, DOJ established its China Initiative 
in 2018.\4\ Dozens of cases were prosecuted under DOJ's China 
Initiative, primarily under the Trump Administration.\5\ Over 
160 individuals and entities were indicted under the China 
Initiative, at least 45 of which have since been convicted or 
pled guilty.\6\ Arguably, these cases brought under the China 
Initiative were just the tip of the iceberg. Despite the track 
record of PRC IP theft and the successes of the Initiative, the 
Biden-Harris Administration chose to end the China Initiative 
in February 2022, bowing to pressure from liberal commentators 
and activists alleging that the program stoked anti-Asian bias 
and dissuaded Chinese students and scholars from coming to the 
U.S.\7\ The number of new economic espionage cases filed 
following cancellation of the initiative declined 
significantly--for example, zero new economic espionage cases 
were opened in 2022.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\Information About Department of Justice's China Initiative and 
Compilation of China-Related Prosecutions Since 2018, DEPT. OF JUST., 
(Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov
/archives/nsd/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-
and-compilation-china-related (``China Initiative Overview'').
    \5\Id.
    \6\Christopher Pelham & Brian A. Sun, US DOJ formally ends the 
China Initiative, but leaves the underlying prosecution priorities 
intact (Mar. 2022), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/enus/knowledge/
publications/0712bf2d/us-doj-formally-ends-the-china-initiative.
    \7\Ronn Blitzer & Jake Gibson, Biden DOJ ending national security 
initiative aimed at countering China amid complaints about bias, FOX 
NEWS, Feb. 23, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/doj-ending-china-
initiative-national-security-program-bias.
    \8\Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Criminal Case Processing 
Statistics Data Tool,
U.S. Dep't of Just., https://fccps.bjs.ojp.gov/
home.html?dashboard=FJSP-Prosecution&tab= 
ProsecutionCourtsDefendantsChargedinCriminalCasesAdvanced (last visited 
May 1, 2024).
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    H.R. 1398 would reestablish an initiative at DOJ, the CCP 
Initiative, dedicated to protecting the United States from the 
threats previously addressed by the China Initiative, 
statutorily requiring that this important work resumes. In 
conducting the work of the CCP Initiative, H.R. 1398 would 
mandate that DOJ coordinate efforts with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), other elements of DOJ, and other federal 
agencies, as necessary. Further, to enable effective 
Congressional oversight and to ensure that DOJ adequately 
pursues the CCP Initiative's objectives, H.R. 1398 requires 
robust annual reporting to key committees in the House and 
Senate.

                                Hearings

    For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII, 
the following hearings were used to develop H.R. 1398: 
``Intellectual Property: Enforcement Activities by the 
Executive Branch,'' a hearing held on May 7, 2024, before the 
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet 
of the Committee on the Judiciary. The Subcommittee heard 
testimony from the following witnesses:
           Josh Goldfoot, Acting Deputy Assistant 
        Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal 
        Division.
           Michael Ball, Deputy Director, National 
        Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center; 
        Deputy Assistant Director, Homeland Security 
        Investigations Global Trade Division.
           Brandon Lord, Deputy Director, National 
        Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center; 
        Executive Director, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
        Trade Policy and Programs Directorate.
    The hearing examined enforcement of IP in the United 
States, with a focus on agencies and U.S. government entities 
charged with IP enforcement-related tasks. The hearing 
explored, among other topics, the lack of criminal IP 
enforcement matters brought by the U.S. Department of Justice 
following the Biden Administration's cancellation of the China 
Initiative, as well as the lack of adequate information 
regarding such prosecutions.
    The Committee held another hearing titled, ``Intellectual 
Property and Strategic Competition with China: Part 3--IP 
Theft, Cybersecurity, and AI,'' a hearing held on October 19, 
2023, before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, 
and the Internet of the Committee on the Judiciary. The 
Subcommittee heard testimony from the following witnesses:
           John Brennan, Ph.D., General Manager, Public 
        Sector, Scale AI.
           William Hannas, Ph.D., Lead Analyst, Center 
        for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown 
        University; former Senior Intelligence Service, Central 
        Intelligence Agency; former Assistant Professor of 
        Chinese, Georgetown University.
           Benjamin Jensen, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, 
        International Security Program at the Center for 
        Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Professor 
        of Strategic Studies, Marine Corps University School of 
        Advanced Warfighting; former Senior Research Director, 
        U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission.
           Robert Sheldon, Senior Director of Public 
        Policy and Strategy, CrowdStrike.
    The hearing explored the current capabilities and risks in 
the arms race between the United States and the PRC in the 
development of artificial intelligence (AI) as it relates to 
cybersecurity and IP theft. The hearing examined the 
cybersecurity implications of AI and the potential impacts on 
the protection of U.S. IP and technical resources, including 
data.
    The Committee held a further hearing titled, ``Intellectual 
Property and Strategic Competition with China: Part I,'' a 
hearing held on March 8, 2023, before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the 
Committee on the Judiciary. The Subcommittee heard testimony 
from the following witnesses:
           The Honorable William Evanina, Founder and 
        CEO, Evanina Goup, LLC.
           Mr. Jamieson Greer, Partner of International 
        Trade, King & Spalding.
           Mr. Mark Cohen, Distinguished Senior Fellow 
        and Director of Asia IP Project, Berkeley Center for 
        Law and Technology.
           Mr. Charles Duan, Policy Fellow and Adjunct 
        Professor, Program on Information Justice and 
        Intellectual Property, American University Washington 
        College of Law, and Member, Patent Public Advisory 
        Committee, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
    The hearing explored the role and importance of IP in the 
strategic competition between the United States and the PRC. 
The hearing examined the scope and extent of actions by the 
Chinese government to obtain U.S. IP and technology, the goals 
and plans of the Chinese government as it relates to U.S. IP 
and technology, the methods and instrumentalities employed by 
the Chinese government to accomplish those goals, steps taken 
by the United States to counter IP theft by the Chinese 
government or its instrumentalities or agents as well as areas 
in which more action is needed, and the impact of Chinese 
government actions in these areas on the United States.

                        Committee Consideration

    On May 22, 2024, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered the bill, H.R. 1398, favorably reported with an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of 
15 to 8, a quorum being present.

                            Committee Votes

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of House rule XIII, the 
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's 
consideration of H.R. 1398:
          1. Vote on favorably reporting H.R. 1398, as 
        amended--passed 15 ayes to 8 nays.
        
        
                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House rule XIII, the 
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the 
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) 
of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are 
incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives does not apply where a cost estimate and 
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974 has been timely submitted prior to filing of the report 
and is included in the report. Such a cost estimate is included 
in this report.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    With respect to the requirement of clause 3(c)(3) of rule 
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has 
received the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1398 from the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office:




    H.R. 1398 would require the Department of Justice (DOJ) to 
establish a program to counter espionage, theft of intellectual 
property and trade secrets, and threats to critical 
infrastructure posed by the Chinese government. The bill also 
would require DOJ to report to the Congress annually on the 
program's activities. The bill's requirements would expire six 
years after enactment.
    Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates 
that implementing H.R. 1398 would cost less than $500,000 over 
the 2024-2029 period, primarily to comply with the bill's 
reporting requirements. Any related spending would be subject 
to the availability of appropriated funds. Because DOJ already 
addresses threats posed by the Chinese government, CBO 
estimates that the cost of implementing those provisions would 
be insignificant.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jeremy Crimm. 
The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy 
Director of Budget Analysis.
                                         Phillip L. Swagel,
                             Director, Congressional Budget Office.

                Committee Estimate of Budgetary Effects

    With respect to the requirements of clause 3(d)(1) of rule 
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the 
Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.

                    Duplication of Federal Programs

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House rule XIII, no provision 
of H.R. 1398 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the 
federal government known to be duplicative of another federal 
program.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of 
House rule XIII, H.R. 1398 would provide for the establishment 
of an initiative within the National Security Division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to address espionage by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government on 
U.S. intellectual property (IP) and academic institutions.

                          Advisory on Earmarks

    In accordance with clause 9 of House rule XXI, H.R. 1398 
does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax 
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses 
9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of House rule XXI.

                       Federal Mandates Statement

    Pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act, the Committee has determined that the bill does not 
contain federal mandates on the private sector. The Committee 
has determined that the bill does not impose a federal 
intergovernmental mandate on state, local, or tribal 
governments.

                      Advisory Committee Statement

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                  Applicability to Legislative Branch

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to 
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of section 
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Pub. L. 104-
1).

                      Section-by-Section Analysis


Section. 1. Short title

    The ``Protect America's Innovation and Economic Security 
from CCP Act of 2024.''

Section. 2. CCP Initiative

    Establishes the ``CCP Initiative'' within DOJ's National 
Security Division to counter nation state threats to the United 
States and curb spying by the CCP on U.S. IP and academic 
institutions, including by non-traditional collectors being 
used to transfer technology contrary to U.S. interests. The Act 
directs the DOJ to leverage the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act of 2018 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
of 1977, and to prioritize identifying and prosecuting 
individuals engaged in the theft of trade secrets, hacking, and 
economic espionage, as well as protecting the critical 
infrastructure of the United States from foreign investment and 
supply chain compromises. The Act requires consultation and 
coordination with the FBI and other relevant elements of DOJ 
and federal agencies as necessary, and mandates that DOJ 
provide an annual report to Congress regarding the 
effectiveness and progress of the CCP Initiative and related 
information. The Act further requires the CCP Initiative be 
separate from and not under the authority of any other DOJ 
initiative designed to counter nation-state threats, and 
requires DOJ to use resources for the CCP Initiative only for 
activities of the CCP Initiative.

                            Dissenting Views

    H.R. 1398 would reestablish the failed China Initiative at 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) in everything but name. While 
there are legitimate national security and economic espionage 
concerns posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), this 
program did nothing to counter those threats. Instead of 
preventing intellectual property theft, the China Initiative 
encouraged unrelated, unsupportable cases against Chinese 
academics at the height of their careers and stoked tensions 
with a community already experiencing unprecedented levels of 
discrimination. For these reasons, elaborated below, I urge all 
Members to oppose this legislation.
    The China Initiative was born out of the understanding that 
a strategic priority of the United States is countering 
national security threats from China.\1\ But instead of 
furthering the United States' national security and other 
strategic priorities, the China Initiative became a vehicle to 
target immigrants and foreigners. Using this program, the Trump 
Administration invested significant resources into targeting 
individuals of Chinese descent working in the United States, 
diverting crucial funding and personnel that could have been 
used to combat economic espionage and trade secret theft across 
the board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Web Page, Information About the Department of Justice's China 
Initiative and a Compilation of China-Related Prosecutions Since 2018, 
Dep't of Justice Archives (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/
archives/nsd/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-
and-
compilation-china-related.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Civil rights groups and national security experts have 
criticized the China Initiative for targeting Chinese American 
academics for minor infractions, such as administrative errors, 
while failing to address any true threats to the United 
States.\2\ These concerns are augmented by the data available. 
Though the China Initiative's purported focus was countering 
economic espionage, only 25% of cases included charges of 
violating the Economic Espionage Act (EEA).\3\ Many cases also 
had little-to-no nexus to national security, resulting in 
racial profiling based on academics' race, ethnicity, and 
ancestry. While at least 150 individuals were ultimately 
charged, a significant number of these cases were dropped, 
dismissed, or ended in mistrial.\4\ Critics have also 
highlighted that the Department of Justice was inconsistent in 
its reporting on these cases, for example, by deleting cases 
from its website after they did not result in a conviction.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\Natasha Gilbert & Max Kozlov, The Controversial China Initiative 
Is Ending, and Researchers Are Relieved, Sci. Am. (Feb. 25, 2022), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-
controversial-china-initiative-is-ending-and-researchers-are-relieved/.
    \3\Eileen Guo, Jess Aloe, & Karen Hao, The US crackdown on Chinese 
economic espionage is a mess. We have the data to show it, MIT Tech. 
Review (Dec. 2, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/12/02/
1040656/china-initative-us-justice-department/.
    \4\Id.
    \5\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The China Initiative was ineffective. But it did not just 
waste valuable resources. Rather than keeping America safe, the 
China Initiative divided workplaces, ruined careers, and 
contributed to Anti-Asian hate at the height of the pandemic, 
when tensions were already high. Even after their cases were 
dropped, many academics faced long-term personal and 
professional damage and were unable to recover their former 
jobs at American universities.\6\ An investigation by MIT 
Technology Review found that some fired academics were even 
forced to take up positions at the laboratories to which they 
were previously accused of hiding their affiliations, without 
other avenues for conducting their research.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\Id.
    \7\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Scientists of Chinese descent also experienced a chilling 
effect on their research as a result of DOJ's prosecutions. A 
survey of nearly 2,000 scientists found that 51% of scientists 
of Chinese descent reported feeling ``considerable fear, 
anxiety, or both about being surveilled by the US government,'' 
while only 12% of non-Chinese scientists reported the same 
sentiment.\8\ Respondents also commented that fear of added 
scrutiny and discrimination caused them to pursue ``safer'' 
rather than ``cutting edge'' research.\9\ In another study of 
scientists of Chinese descent, 72% reported feeling unsafe in 
the US; 61% reported feeling pressure to move overseas; and 45% 
reported an intent to avoid federal grant applications. The 
scientists expressed disappointment with the government's 
actions, with 89% of respondents affirming that they still wish 
to contribute to US leadership in science and technology.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\Racial Profiling Among Scientists of Chinese Descent and 
Consequences for the US Scientific Community, The University of 
Arizona, https://www.committee100.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/C100-
Lee-Li-White-Paper-FINAL-FINAL-10.28.pdf.
    \9\Id.
    \10\Yu Xie, et al., Caught in the crossfire: Fears of Chinese-
American scientists, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
(June 27, 2023), https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2216248120.
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    These chilling effects have also extended to the US's 
attractiveness to international scientists more broadly, and to 
fields seeking to study US China relations. A 2021 survey of 
over 3,200 physicists found that 43% of early-career 
researchers believed the US to be ``unwelcoming for 
international students and scholars.''\11\ In a September 2022 
report by the Asian American Scholar's Forum, researchers found 
that between December 2021 and March 2022, 42 percent of the 
over 1,300 faculty members surveyed nationwide reported being 
fearful of conducting research in the U.S. A further 61 percent 
felt pressure to leave the U.S., and 45 percent intended to 
avoid federal grant applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\Research Security Policies & Their Impacts: Key Results of APS 
Member Survey, American Physical Society (October 2021), https://
www.aps.org/policy/analysis/upload/APS-Research-
Security-Survey-Key-Findings-2021.pdf.
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    Finally, innovation in the United States also suffered 
because of China Initiative policies. During its four-year 
tenure, the China Initiative stifled intellectual property 
growth by discouraging foreign talent from moving to American 
companies and prevented Chinese researchers from accepting 
positions at our institutions of higher learning. We cannot 
quantify those missed opportunities, there is no way to know 
what inventions never came to be, but we can realize when we 
made a mistake, and move on. This legislation would prevent us 
from doing so.
    For all of these reasons, I dissent, and I urge all of my 
colleagues to oppose this legislation.
                                            Jerrold Nadler,
                                                    Ranking Member.