[House Report 118-633]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


118th Congress }                                             { Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session    }                                             { 118-633

======================================================================



 
               DECOUPLING FROM FOREIGN ADVERSARIAL BATTERY  
                             DEPENDENCE ACT

                                _______
                                

August 23, 2024.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

        Mr. Green of Tennessee, from the Committee on Homeland 
                    Security, submitted the following 

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 8631]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 8631) to prohibit the Secretary of Homeland 
Security from procuring certain foreign-made batteries, and for 
other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably 
thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as 
amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     3
Background and Need for Legislation..............................     3
Hearings.........................................................     5
Committee Consideration..........................................     6
Committee Votes..................................................     6
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     6
C.B.O. Estimate, New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and 
  Tax Expenditures...............................................     6
Federal Mandates Statement.......................................    11
Duplicative Federal Programs.....................................    11
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............    11
Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff 
  Benefits.......................................................    11
Advisory Committee Statement.....................................    11
Applicability to Legislative Branch..............................    11
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation...................    11

    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial 
Battery Dependence Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PROCUREMENT OF CERTAIN 
          BATTERIES.

  (a) In General.--Beginning on October 1, 2027, none of the funds 
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for the 
Department of Homeland Security may be obligated to procure a battery 
produced by an entity specified in subsection (b).
  (b) Entities Specified.--The entities specified in this subsection 
are the following:
          (1) Contemporary Amperex Technology Company, Limited (also 
        known as ``CATL'').
          (2) BYD Company, Limited.
          (3) Envision Energy, Limited.
          (4) EVE Energy Company, Limited.
          (5) Gotion High tech Company, Limited.
          (6) Hithium Energy Storage Technology company, Limited.
          (7) Any entity on any list required under clauses (i), (ii), 
        (iv), or (v) of section 2(d)(2)(B) of Public Law 117-78 
        (commonly referred to as the ``Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention 
        Act'').
          (8) Any entity identified by the Secretary of Defense as a 
        Chinese military company pursuant to section 1260H of the 
        William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note).
          (9) Any entity included in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of 
        title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor 
        regulation.
          (10) Any subsidiary or successor to an entity specified in 
        paragraphs (1) through (9).
  (c) Treatment of Production.--For purposes of this section, a battery 
shall be treated as produced by an entity specified in subsection (b) 
if such entity--
          (1) assembles or manufactures the final product that uses 
        such battery; or
          (2) creates or otherwise provides a majority of the 
        components used in such battery.
  (d) Waivers.--
          (1) Relating to assessment.--The Secretary of Homeland 
        Security may waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the 
        Secretary assesses in the affirmative all of the following:
                  (A) The batteries to be procured do not pose a 
                national security, data, or infrastructure risk to the 
                United States.
                  (B) There is no available alternative to procure 
                batteries that are--
                          (i) of similar or better cost and quality; 
                        and
                          (ii) produced by an entity not specified in 
                        subsection (b).
          (2) Relating to research.--The Secretary of Homeland Security 
        may waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the Secretary 
        determines that the batteries to be procured are for the sole 
        purpose of research, evaluation, training, testing, or analysis
          (3) Congressional notification.--Not later than 15 days after 
        granting a waiver under this subsection, the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland 
        Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
        Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a 
        notification relating thereto.
  (e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the 
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a 
report on the anticipated impacts on mission and costs on the 
Department of Homeland Security associated with carrying out this 
section, including with respect to following components of the 
Department:
          (1) U.S. Customs and Border Protection, including the U.S. 
        Border Patrol.
          (2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, including 
        Homeland Security Investigations.
          (3) The United States Secret Service.
          (4) The Transportation Security Administration.
          (5) The United States Coast Guard.
          (6) The Federal Protective Service.
          (7) The Federal Emergency Management Agency.
          (8) The Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers.
          (9) The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

                          PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

    H.R. 8631, the Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery 
Dependency Act, prohibits the use of Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) funds for purchasing battery technology produced 
by the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP)-aligned Chinese 
companies as well as companies that violate the Uyghur Forced 
Labor Protection Act and those that have engaged in activities 
contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. 
H.R. 8631 furthers efforts to decouple the U.S. government's 
supply chain from its geopolitical foreign adversary, while 
proactively addressing national security risks to U.S. critical 
infrastructure and data security.

                  BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

    H.R. 8631, aligns with Section 154 of the Fiscal Year 2024 
National Defense Authorization Act, legislation signed into 
law, which prohibited the Department of Defense from procuring 
batteries from six companies that are closely aligned with the 
CCP and the CCP-led All-China Federation of Industry and 
Commerce. These key companies are: Contemporary Amperex 
Technology Company, Ltd. (CATL); BYD Company, Ltd; Envision 
Energy, Ltd; EVE Energy Company, Ltd; Hithium Energy Storage 
Technology company, Ltd; and Gotion High-Tech Company, Ltd. 
Additionally, the bill would ban batteries produced by entities 
that appear on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act list 
maintained by the Department of Commerce, any entity identified 
by the Secretary of Defense as a ``Chinese military company'', 
and any entity included in further lists of companies involved 
in activities that go against U.S. national security or foreign 
policy interests maintained by the Departments of Homeland 
Security, Defense, and Commerce.
    Last year, Duke Energy, a U.S. power company decommissioned 
CATL storage batteries from one of the largest U.S. Marine 
Corps bases in the country, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.\1\ 
According to the Department of Navy, the action was taken as a 
```proactive approach' to procure American or allied-supplied 
batteries for its installations.''\2\ According to Duke Energy, 
``In partnership with policymakers and the Department of the 
Navy, we [Duke Energy] have made the decision to decommission 
the CATL battery energy storage system at Camp Lejeune and 
replace it with a domestic or allied nation supplier.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Drew Lawrence, China-Made Batteries Eliminated from Navy, Marine 
Corps Infrastructure After Camp Lejeune Incident, Military (Apr. 11, 
2024, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/04/11/navy-says-no-more-
chinese-batteries-after-lawmakers-raise-concerns-about-camp-lejeune-
power-system.html.
    \2\Id.
    \3\Michael Martina, Exclusive: Duke Energy to remove Chinese 
battery giant CATL from Marine Corps Base, Reuters (Feb. 9, 2024), 
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/duke-energy-remove-chinese-
battery-giant-catl-marine-corps-base-2024-02-09/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By expanding U.S. procurement prohibitions to DHS, this 
legislation would prevent the CCP from exploiting economic and 
security vulnerabilities that U.S. reliance on these Chinese-
origin batteries causes. In particular, CATL and associated 
Chinese-companies could install malware on electric vehicles 
and use it to collect sensitive information or shut down 
charging networks or disable vehicles through hardware 
infiltration, presenting security vulnerabilities.\4\ Moreover, 
there are national security risks associated with malware on 
battery energy storage systems, a device that charges or 
collects energy from the grid or a power plant and then 
discharges that energy at a subsequent period to provide 
electricity for various services, as well as the building of 
battery production and other facilities in the United 
States.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\Craig Singleton, Beijing's Power Play, Safeguarding U.S. 
National Security in the Electric Vehicle and Battery Industries, FDD 
(Oct. 23, 2023), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/10/23/
beijings-power-play/.
    \5\Id., see also, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Grid-Scale 
Battery Storage: Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy19osti/74426.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additionally, under the People's Republic of China's 
National Intelligence Law, as amended in 2018, all PRC firms, 
entities, organizations and citizens are required to support, 
assist, and cooperate with the PRC's intelligence work.\6\ 
Under Article 7 of this law, it states ``any organization or 
citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the state 
intelligence work in accordance with the [National 
Intelligence] Law, and keep the secrets of the national 
intelligence work from becoming known to the public.''\7\ This 
raises serious U.S. national security risks associated with 
Chinese companies that are controlled, operated, or aligned 
with the PRC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\PRC National Intelligence Law (as amended in 2018), China Law 
Translate, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/national-intelligence-
law-of-the-p-r-c-2017/ (last visited June 22, 2024).
    \7\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, this legislation is also partly a result of the 
Committee's and Select Committee on the Chinese Communist 
Party's oversight work of some of these companies' apparent 
ties to forced labor practices. In particular, publicly 
available corporate information reveals that CATL and Gotion 
High Tech, two of the six companies, are affiliated with 
Xinjiang Production and Construction (XPCC), a paramilitary and 
state-owned system and the only entity named in the Uyghur 
Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFPLA) Entity List,\8\ due to its 
egregious forced labor practices.\9\ As the U.S. Departments of 
State, Treasury, and Commerce have jointly stated, 
``[B]usinesses and individuals that do not exit supply chains, 
ventures, and/or investments connected to Xinjiang could run a 
high risk of violating U.S. law.''\10\ These apparent 
affiliations are present in a tier-1 supplier relations, 
raising serious concerns. On June 5, 2024, Members of the 
Committee on Homeland Security and the Select Committee on the 
Chinese Communist Party, sent a 15-page letter to DHS 
illustrating that CATL and Gotion High Tech's supply chains are 
compromised by links to entities whose goods, wares, articles, 
or merchandise is mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in 
part in Xinjiang, China.\11\ As a result, Members requested 
they be added to the UFLPA Entity List and its shipments 
prohibited from entry to the United States.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\UFLPA Entity List, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://
www.dhs.gov/uflpa-entity-list (last updated May 14, 2024).
    \9\XPCC is connected to ``serious human rights abuse against ethnic 
minorities in Xinjiang, which reportedly include mass arbitrary 
detention and severe physical abuse, among other serious abuses 
targeting Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim population indigenous to Xinjiang, 
and other ethnic minorities in the region.'' See, Press Release, U.S. 
Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials 
Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Executive Order (July 31, 
2020), www.home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1073.
    \10\Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE 
(Sept. 26, 2023), www.state.gov/xinjiang-supply-chainbusiness-
advisory/.
    \11\Letter from Hon. Mark Green, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec., Hon. John Moolenaar, Chairman, Select Comm. on the Chinese 
Communist Party., et al. to Rob Slivers, Under Sec'y of Strategy, 
Policy, and Plans, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., (June 5, 2024) (on file 
with Committee).
    \12\Pursuant to section 2(d)(2)(B) of the UFLPA, DHS on behalf of 
the FLETF is required to develop and maintain the UFLPA Entity List. 
CATL's supply chain connections to products mined, produced, or 
manufactured in the Xinjiang as well as its direct connections to XPCC 
``subsidiaries'' and ``affiliates'' warrant its inclusion on the UFLPA 
Entity List per the requirements outlined in 2(d)(2)(B)(i); 
2(d)(2)(B)(iv); and 2(d)(2)(B)(v).
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                                HEARINGS

    The Committee held the following hearings in the 118th 
Congress that informed H.R. 8631:
    On March 9, 2023, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law 
Enforcement, and Intelligence held a hearing entitled, 
``Confronting Threats Posed by the Chinese Communist Party to 
the U.S. Homeland.'' Members heard testimony from the following 
witnesses: the Honorable William R. Evanina, former Director of 
the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center; 
Lieutenant General Joseph T. Guastella Jr., Senior Fellow, at 
the Mitchell Institute; the Honorable Kari Bingen, former 
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, 
at the Department of Defense; and Dr. Tyler Jost, Assistant 
Professor of Political Science and International and Public 
Affairs, at Brown University.
    On May 23, 2023, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law 
Enforcement, and Intelligence held a hearing entitled, ``A 
Security Sprint: Assessing U.S. Homeland Vulnerabilities to 
Chinese Communist Party Aggression.'' Members heard testimony 
from the following witnesses: Iranga Kahangama, Assistant 
Secretary for Cyber, Infrastructure, Risk and Resilience, 
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, at DHS; Tyrone Durham, 
Acting Director, Nation State Threats Center, Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, at DHS; and Jill M. Murphy, Deputy 
Assistant Director of Counterintelligence, at the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.
    On October 19, 2023, the Subcommittee on Oversight, 
Investigations, and Accountability held a hearing entitled, 
``Exploitation and Enforcement: Evaluating the Department of 
Homeland Security's Efforts to Counter Uyghur Forced Labor.'' 
Members heard testimony from the following witnesses: Ms. 
Kimberly Glas, President and CEO, National Council of Textile 
Organizations; Mr. Peter Mattis, private citizen; Ms. Louisa 
Greve, Director of Global Advocacy, Uyghur Human Rights 
Project; and Mr. Michael Stumo, CEO, Coalition for a Prosperous 
America.
    On January 11, 2024, the Subcommittee on Oversight, 
Investigations, and Accountability held a hearing entitled, 
``Exploitation and Enforcement Part II: Improving Enforcement 
in Countering Uyghur Forced Labor.'' Members heard testimony 
from the following witnesses: Ms. Christa Brzozowski, Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Trade and Economic Security Policy, 
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security; Ms. Thea Lee, Deputy Undersecretary for 
International Affairs, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 
U.S. Department of Labor; and Mr. Eric Choy, Executive 
Director, Trade Remedy Law Enforcement Directorate, Office of 
Trade, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

                        COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

    The Committee met on June 12, 2024, a quorum being present, 
to consider H.R. 8631 and ordered the measure to be favorably 
reported to the House, as amended, by voice vote.

                            COMMITTEE VOTES

    Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the 
recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and 
amendments thereto.
    No recorded votes were requested during consideration of 
H.R. 8631.

                      COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the 
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the 
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) 
of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this 
report.

    CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE, NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, 
           ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES 

    With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule 
XIII and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974, and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of 
rule XIII and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of any new 
budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an 
increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures contained 
in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 


    Legislation summary: On June 12, 2024, the House Committee 
on Homeland Security ordered 13 bills to be reported. This 
document provides estimates for 12 of those bills.
    The legislation would:
           Require the Department of Homeland Security 
        (DHS) to conduct a public information campaign on the 
        dangers of traveling to the United States through 
        Mexico from Central and South America;
           Codify the Special Event Assessment Rating 
        (SEAR) program within DHS;
           Authorize U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
        (CBP) to conduct its own maintenance at ports of entry 
        for projects that cost less than $300,000;
           Prohibit DHS from purchasing batteries or 
        products that use batteries made by certain Chinese 
        entities;
           Impose various reporting requirements on the 
        Transportation Security Administration (TSA), DHS, and 
        the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
           Require DHS to conduct research and 
        development on equipment used by law enforcement 
        agencies to detect illicit drugs; and
           Expand the employee rotational program 
        within DHS to include intelligence analyst positions.
    Estimated Federal cost: The estimated costs of the 
legislation fall within budget functions 400 (transportation) 
and 750 (administration of justice).
    Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the 
legislation will be enacted near the end of fiscal year 2024. 
The estimated costs do not include any interaction effects 
among the pieces of legislation. If all 12 bills were combined 
and enacted as a single piece of legislation, the estimated 
costs could be different than the sum of the separate 
estimates, although CBO expects that any difference would be 
small.
    H.R. 4574, Cooperation on Combatting Human Smuggling and 
Trafficking Act: H.R. 4574 would require DHS to conduct public 
information campaigns about the dangers for migrants traveling 
across Mexico to the United States. H.R. 4574 also would 
require DHS to expand partnerships with law enforcement 
entities in Central and South America to combat human smuggling 
and trafficking.
    Using information from DHS about the costs of similar 
public awareness campaigns, such as ``If You See Something, Say 
Something'' and the Blue Campaign, CBO estimates that it would 
cost $5 million annually to implement the public information 
campaigns. Those costs would include hiring and training staff, 
engaging private contractors, and advertising. CBO estimates 
that it would cost DHS less than $500,000 to comply with the 
bill's other provisions because the agency already conducts 
those activities. In total, CBO estimates that implementing 
H.R. 4574 would cost $26 million over the 2024-2029 period, 
assuming appropriation of the estimated amounts.
    H.R. 6229, DHS Special Events Program and Support Act: H.R. 
6229 would codify the Special Event Assessment Rating program 
that DHS currently administers. Under that program, state and 
local governments submit events to an inter-agency working 
group that assesses each event for potential security risks, 
such as terrorist attacks and other hazards. Depending on the 
level of risk determined by the group, DHS and other federal 
agencies may provide support to the state or local government 
in managing security operations for the event.
    H.R. 6229 also would require DHS to engage in research and 
development of emerging technologies that would enhance the 
department's efforts to support federal, state, local, tribal, 
and territorial agencies with respect to mass gatherings. 
Lastly, the bill would require DHS to report to the Congress 
annually on the program's activities and once every five years 
on the program's effectiveness.
    Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates 
implementing H.R. 6229 would cost less than $500,000 over the 
2024-2029 period, primarily to comply with the bill's reporting 
requirements. Any related spending would be subject to the 
availability of appropriated funds. Under current law, DHS 
already can conduct research and development on emerging 
technologies. On that basis, CBO estimates that the cost of 
implementing that provision and codifying the existing SEAR 
program would be insignificant.
    H.R. 8150, REVAMP Act: H.R. 8150 would require U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) to establish procedures to allow 
the agency to carry out maintenance and repair projects that 
cost less than $300,000 at federally owned ports of entry 
without the direct involvement of the General Services 
Administration (GSA). Under the bill, that amount would be 
adjusted annually for inflation. The bill also would require 
CBP to consult with GSA before creating those procedures and 
report annually to the Congress on the projects it completed 
and their costs.
    Using information from CBP, CBO estimates that implementing 
H.R. 8150 would cost $1 million in administrative and personnel 
costs over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be 
subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
    H.R. 8631, Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery 
Dependence Act: H.R. 8631 would, starting in fiscal year 2028, 
prohibit DHS from using appropriated funds to purchase a 
battery or a product that uses a battery made by certain 
Chinese entities. The bill would allow DHS to waive the 
prohibition under some circumstances, including if it 
determines that the battery would not pose a threat to national 
security. H.R. 8631 also would require DHS to report to the 
Congress within 180 days of enactment on the effect the 
prohibition would have on costs and operations.
    Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates 
that implementing H.R. 8631 would cost less than $500,000. Any 
related spending would be subject to the availability of 
appropriated funds.
    H.R. 8654, Streamlining Law Enforcement Information Sharing 
Act: H.R. 8654 would require the GAO to report to the Congress 
within one year of enactment on the Homeland Security 
Information Network. DHS uses that network to share information 
and intelligence with other law enforcement agencies, 
coordinate security for planned events, and respond to 
emergencies. Based on the costs of similar reports, CBO 
estimates that implementing H.R. 8654 would cost less than 
$500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would 
be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
    H.R. 8655, Federal Air Marshal Enhancing Airport Security 
Act of 2024: H.R. 8655 would require TSA to develop a plan for 
the role of federal air marshals at certain airports and brief 
the Congress on that plan. Based on the costs of similar 
activities, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost 
less than $500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related 
spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated 
funds.
    H.R. 8658, Emerging Digital Identity Ecosystem Report Act 
of 2024: H.R. 8658 would require TSA to report to the Congress 
on digital identity systems that allow credentials and other 
information to be verified in a secure and efficient manner. 
Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates that 
implementing the bill would cost less than $500,000 over the 
2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be subject to the 
availability of appropriated funds.
    H.R. 8662, TSA Commuting Fairness Act: H.R. 8662 would 
require TSA to report to the Congress on the feasibility of 
treating the time that its employees spend commuting from 
airport parking lots to their workstations as on-duty hours. 
Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO estimates that 
implementing the bill would cost less than $500,000 over the 
2024-2029 period. Any related spending would be subject to the 
availability of appropriated funds.
    H.R. 8663, DETECT Fentanyl and Xylazine Act of 2024: H.R. 
8663 would require DHS to engage in research and development of 
technologies and equipment that would help federal, state, 
local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies detect 
and disrupt illicit drug trafficking. Under current law, DHS 
already conducts research on equipment and technologies to 
detect and intercept illegal drugs. On that basis, CBO 
estimates that implementing H.R. 8663 would cost less than 
$500,000. Any related spending would be subject to the 
availability of appropriated funds.
    H.R. 8664, DHS Intelligence and Analysis Oversight and 
Transparency Act: H.R. 8664 would require DHS to annually audit 
its use of information systems and bulk data and report the 
results to the Congress. Based on the costs of similar 
activities, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 8664 would 
cost less than $500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related 
spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated 
funds.
    H.R. 8671, DHS Intelligence Rotational Assignment Program 
and Law Enforcement Support Act: H.R. 8671 would allow 
intelligence analysts to participate in DHS's in-house employee 
rotation program, which allows personnel to work temporarily in 
different component units. CBO expects that DHS would need to 
update policies and procedures to expand the current rotation 
program. Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO 
estimates that implementing H.R. 8671 would cost less than 
$500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would 
be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
    H.R. 8675, Repair the National Law Enforcement 
Telecommunications Systems Act of 2024: H.R. 8675 would require 
TSA to report to the Congress on how the agency collects 
digital data about law enforcement officers who are armed when 
they fly. Based on the costs of similar activities, CBO 
estimates that implementing the bill would cost less than 
$500,000 over the 2024-2029 period. Any related spending would 
be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
    Pay-As-You-Go considerations: Enacting any of the 12 bills 
in this estimate would not affect direct spending or revenues; 
therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
    Increase in long-term net direct spending and deficits: CBO 
estimates that enacting any of the 12 bills in this estimate 
would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits in 
any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2035.
    Mandates: None of the bills contain intergovernmental or 
private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act.
    Previous CBO estimate: On April 10, 2023, CBO transmitted a 
cost estimate for S. 243, a bill to require the Commissioner of 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection to establish procedures for 
conducting maintenance projects at ports of entry at which the 
Office of Field Operations conducts certain enforcement and 
facilitation activities, as ordered reported by the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on 
March 29, 2023. S. 243 is similar to H.R. 8150, and CBO's 
estimate of the costs are the same for both bills.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Jeremy Crimm 
(Department of Homeland Security); Aaron Krupkin 
(Transportation Security Administration). Mandates: Rachel 
Austin, Brandon Lever.
    Estimate reviewed by: Justin Humphrey, Chief, Finance, 
Housing, and Education Cost Estimates Unit; Robert Reese, 
Chief, Natural and Physical Resources Cost Estimates Unit; 
Kathleen FitzGerald, Chief, Public and Private Mandates Unit; 
H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Director of Budget Analysis.
    Estimate approved by: Phillip L. Swagel, Director, 
Congressional Budget Office.

                       FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

    The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal 
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act of 1995.

                      DUPLICATIVE FEDERAL PROGRAMS

    Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds 
that H.R. 8631 does not contain any provision that establishes 
or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another 
Federal program.

         STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the objective of 
H.R. 8631 is to prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security 
from procuring certain foreign-made batteries, and for other 
purposes.

      CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED 
                          TARIFF BENEFITS

    In compliance with rule XXI, this bill, as reported, 
contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or 
limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 
9(f) of rule XXI.

                      ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                APPLICABILITY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

    The Committee finds that H.R. 8631 does not relate to the 
terms and conditions of employment or access to public services 
or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of 
the Congressional Accountability Act.

             SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short title

    This section provides the Act's short title, the 
``Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependency Act of 
2024''.

Section 2. Prohibition on availability of funds for procurement of 
        certain batteries

    Subsection 2(a) prohibits funds authorized to be 
appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of 
Homeland Security to procure a battery produced by certain 
specified foreign entities beginning on October 1, 2027.
    Subsection 2(b) outlines the specific entities, which are 
the following: (1) Contemporary Amperex Technology Company, 
Limited (also known as ``CATL''); (2) BYD Company, Limited; (3) 
Envision Energy, Limited; (4) EVE Energy Company, Limited; (5) 
Gotion High tech Company, Limited; (6) Hithium Energy Storage 
Technology company, Limited; and (7) Any successor to an entity 
specified in paragraphs (1) through (6). Additionally, the bill 
would ban batteries produced by entities that appear on the 
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act list maintained by the 
Department of Commerce, any entity identified by the Secretary 
of Defense as a ``Chinese military company'', and any entity 
included in further lists of companies involved in activities 
that go against U.S. national security or foreign policy 
interests maintained by the Departments of Homeland Security, 
Defense, and Commerce.
    Subsection 2(c) details that a battery shall be treated as 
produced by an entity specific in subsection (b), if such 
entity (1) assembles or manufactures the final product that 
uses such battery; or (2) creates or otherwise provides a 
majority of the components used in such battery.
    Subsection 2(d) paragraph (1) authorizes the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to waive the limitation under subsection (a) 
if the Secretary assesses in the affirmative all of the 
following: that the batteries to be procured do not pose a 
national security, data, or infrastructure risk to the U.S.; 
that there is no available alternative to procure batteries 
that are of similar or better cost and quality; and there is no 
available alternative produced by an entity not specified in 
subsection (b).
    Subsection 2(d) paragraph (2) authorizes the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to waive the limitation under subsection (a) 
if the Secretary determines that the batteries to be procured 
are for the sole purpose of research, evaluation, training, 
testing or analysis.
    Subsection 2(d) paragraph (3) requires a Congressional 
notification that not later than 15 days after granting a 
waiver under this subsection, to the House Committee on 
Homeland Security and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs.
    Subsection 2(e) requires a report by the Secretary of 
Homeland on the anticipated impacts on mission and costs on the 
Department of Homeland Security associated with carrying out 
the prohibition on Chinese batteries, particularly with respect 
to Department components.

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