[House Report 118-417]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


118th Congress }                                          { Report 
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session    }                                          { 118-417

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           PROTECTING AMERICANS FROM FOREIGN ADVERSARY 
                    CONTROLLED APPLICATIONS ACT

                                _______
                                

 March 11, 2024.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

Mrs. Rodgers of Washington, from the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 7521]

    The Committee on Energy and Commerce, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 7521) to protect the national security of the 
United States from the threat posed by foreign adversary 
controlled applications, such as TikTok and any successor 
application or service and any other application or service 
developed or provided by ByteDance Ltd. or an entity under the 
control of ByteDance Ltd., having considered the same, reports 
favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the 
bill do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     2
Background and Need for Legislation..............................     2
Committee Action.................................................    12
Committee Votes..................................................    12
Oversight Findings and Recommendations...........................    14
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures    14
Congressional Budget Office Estimate.............................    14
Federal Mandates Statement.......................................    14
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............    14
Duplication of Federal Programs..................................    14
Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings......................    14
Committee Cost Estimate..........................................    15
Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits.......    15
Advisory Committee Statement.....................................    15
Applicability to Legislative Branch..............................    15
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation...................    15
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    18

                          PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

    Communications applications that are owned and operated by 
companies controlled by foreign adversary countries present a 
clear threat to the national security of the United States. 
This is because such applications can be used by those 
countries to collect vast amounts of data on Americans, conduct 
espionage campaigns, and push misinformation, disinformation, 
and propaganda on the American public.
    The United States has, for more than 100 years, restricted 
foreign governments and persons from owning media outlets and 
holding broadcast licenses. However, current law does not 
address the situation where a foreign adversary country has 
significant control over a company that operates a technology 
application, even where such application poses a significant 
threat to national security.
    H.R. 7521, the ``Protecting Americans from Foreign 
Adversary Controlled Applications Act'' protects Americans from 
national security risks posed certain by applications 
controlled by a foreign adversary of the United States. If an 
application is determined to be a foreign adversary controlled 
application, such as TikTok's parent company ByteDance, the 
application must be divested so that is no longer in the 
foreign adversary's control. If the application is not divested 
within 180 days, entities in the United States would be 
prohibited from distributing the application through an 
application marketplace or store, and from providing web 
hosting services. The 180 days would begin upon enactment of 
the legislation for ByteDance, TikTok, and other subsidiaries; 
for other foreign adversary controlled applications, the 180 
days begins after a Presidential determination that the 
application poses a significant threat to national security. 
The legislation includes a requirement that foreign adversary 
controlled applications provide users, upon request, 
information related to the user's account, including photos, 
videos, and posts, in a machine-readable format. This Act 
addresses the immediate national security risks posed by TikTok 
and establishes a framework for the Executive Branch to protect 
Americans from future foreign adversary controlled 
applications.

                  BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

    Communications technologies and networks underpin the daily 
lives of the American public and economy. Foreign adversaries 
have used access to Americans' data, communications networks, 
devices, and applications as entry points to disrupt Americans' 
daily lives, conduct espionage activities, and push 
disinformation and propaganda campaigns in an attempt to 
undermine our democracy and gain worldwide influence and 
control. This is all a detriment to our national security 
interests.
    One such adversary that has aggressively pursued this 
strategy is the People's Republic of China (PRC). It has backed 
hackers to disrupt our communications networks\1\ and used 
``deceptive and coercive methods'' to shape global information. 
As described by the U.S. Department of State, its goals are to 
promote ``digital authoritarianism.''\2\ They have accomplished 
some of these goals through coercion of companies headquartered 
in the PRC. One way it does so is through its National 
Intelligence Law of 2017, which requires PRC individuals and 
entities to support PRC intelligence services, including by 
providing data without regard to where that data was collected 
and without any mechanism of due process.\3\
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    \1\https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-
038a.
    \2\https://www.state.gov/gec-special-report-how-the-peoples-
republic-of-china-seeks-to-reshape-the-global-information-environment/.
    \3\U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Strategy, Policy 
& Plans, Data Security Business Advisory: Risks and Considerations for 
Businesses Using Data Services and Equipment From Firms Linked to the 
People's Republic of China at 6 (December 22, 2020), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_1222_data-security-
business-advisory.pdf.
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    Beijing ByteDance Technology is a Chinese internet 
technology company headquartered in Beijing and operating in 
the United States through a holding company (``ByteDance 
Ltd.'') incorporated in the Cayman Islands.\4\ ByteDance Ltd., 
founded and headquartered in Beijing, was formed in 2012 and 
launched a number of applications and products which became 
extremely popular, including TikTok.\5\
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    \4\Beijing ByteDance Technology and its Cayman Island holding 
company, ByteDance Ltd., will interchangeably be referred to as 
``ByteDance.''
    \5\Joe Tidy and Sophia Smith Galer, TikTok: The story of a social 
media giant, BBC News (5 August 2020). https://www.bbc.com/news/
technology-53640724.
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    TikTok is now one of the most popular social media 
platforms in the world. It is available in over 150 countries 
and serves over 1 billion users.\6\ In the United States, 
TikTok has over 170 million users and is especially popular 
among teenagers and young adults who represent 35 percent of 
its American user base.\7\
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    \6\TikTok Statistics For 2024: Users, Demographics, Trend, What's 
The Big Data (Nov. 29, 2023), https://whatsthebigdata.com/tiktok-
statistics/.
    \7\Jamie Ding, Why TikTok is dangerously good at making you spend 
money, L.A. Times (Dec. 3, 2023), https://www.latimes.com/business/
story/2023-12-03/why-tiktok-is-dangerously-good-at-making-you-spend-
money.
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    Foreign adversary controlled applications present a clear 
threat to the national security of the United States. This 
includes TikTok due to ByteDance, Ltd.'s ownership of the 
application.\8\
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    \8\Judy Woodruff, CIA Director Bill Burns on War in Ukraine, 
Intelligence Challenges Posed by China, PBS (Dec. 16, 2022, 6:50 P.M.), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/cia-director-bill-burns-on-war-in-
ukraine-intelligence-challenges-posed-by-china.
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    Outside reporting has indicated the breadth of TikTok's 
reach, suggesting that its data collection practices extend to 
age, phone number, precise location, internet address, device 
used, phone contacts, social network connections, the content 
of private messages sent through the application, and videos 
watched.\9\ The risk posed by TikTok though is exacerbated by 
the difficulty in assessing precisely which categories of data 
it collects. For example, outside researchers have found 
embedded vulnerabilities that allow the company to collect more 
data than the app's privacy policy indicates.\10\
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    \9\Geoffrey A. Fowler, Is it time to delete TikTok? A guide to the 
rumors and the real privacy risks, Wash. Post (July 13, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/07/13/tiktok-privacy/. See also 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center, ``Operations Security (OPSEC) 
Advisory, TikTok Concerns and Vulnerabilities'' (Mar. 2023), https://
www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/nittf/OPSEC_Advisory_
TikTok_Concerns_and_Vulnerabilities.pdf.
    \10\Fowler, supra note 2.
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    Additionally, public reporting has repeatedly confirmed 
statements made by the Executive Branch regarding the tight 
interlinkages between ByteDance Ltd., TikTok, and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). For example, the Secretary of ByteDance 
Ltd.'s CCP committee, Zhang Fuping, also serves as ByteDance 
Ltd.'s Editor-in-Chief and Vice President and has vowed that 
the CCP committee would ``take the lead'' across ``all product 
lines and business lines,'' which includes TikTok.
    Moreover, pursuant to the PRC's laws, the PRC can require a 
company headquartered in the PRC to surrender all its data to 
the PRC, making companies headquartered there an espionage tool 
of the CCP:
           The National Intelligence Law, passed in 
        China in 2017, requires that ``any organization'' must 
        assist or cooperate with CCP intelligence work.\11\ 
        Such assistance or cooperation must also remain secret 
        at the PRC's request.\12\
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    \11\Joe McDonald & Zen Soo, Why Does US See Chinese-Owned TikTok as 
a Security Threat?, AP News (Mar. 24, 2023, 10:24 A.M.), https://
apnews.com/article/tiktok-bytedance-shou-zi-chew-
8d8a6a9694357040d484670b7f4833be.
    \12\U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Strategy, 
Policy & Plans, Data Security Business Advisory: Risks and 
Considerations for Businesses Using Data Services and Equipment From 
Firms Linked to the People's Republic of China at 6 (December 22, 
2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
20_1222_data-security-business-advisory.pdf/.
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           The PRC's 2014 Counter-Espionage Law 
        requires that ``relevant organizations . . . may not 
        refuse'' to collect evidence for an investigation.\13\
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    \13\McDonald & Soo, infra note 5.
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           The PRC's Data Security Law of 2021 
        establishes that the PRC has the power to access and 
        control private data.\14\
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    \14\Code Civil, Data Security Law of the People's Republic of 
China, 2021, art (China).
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           The PRC's Counter-Espionage Law grants PRC 
        security agencies nearly unfettered discretion, if 
        acting under an unrestricted understanding of national 
        security, to access data from companies.\15\
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    \15\Library of Congress, China: Counterespionage Law Revised, 
https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2023-09-21/china-
counterespionage-law-revised/.
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    As a result, the Department of Homeland Security has warned 
that ``[t]he PRC's data collection actions result innumerous 
risks to U.S. businesses and customers, including: the theft of 
trade secrets, of intellectual property, and of other 
confidential business information; violations of U.S. export 
control laws; violations of U.S. privacy laws; breaches of 
contractual provisions and terms of service; security and 
privacy risks to customers and employees; risk of PRC 
surveillance and tracking of regime critics; and reputational 
harm to U.S. businesses.''\16\ These risks are imminent, but 
other, unforeseen risks may also exist.
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    \16\Data Security Business Advisory, supra note 6.
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    Prior to 2022, several federal agencies, including the 
Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security, issued 
orders banning TikTok on devices for which those specific 
agencies are responsible.\17\ A majority of states in the 
United States have banned TikTok on state government devices 
due to the national security threat posed by the application 
under its current ownership.\18\
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    \17\See, e.g., Neil Vigdor, ``U.S. Military Branches Block Access 
to TikTok App Amid Pentagon Warning,'' N.Y. Times (Jan. 4, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/us/tiktok-pentagon-military-
ban.html.
    \18\Sawdah Bhainmiya, Here's a full list of the US states that have 
introduced full or partial TikTok bans on government devices over 
mounting security concerns, Business Insider (Jan. 15, 2023, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/tiktok-banned-us-government-state-
devices-2023-1.
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    As has been widely reported, TikTok. has proposed an 
alternative to a ban, a proposal referred to as ``Project 
Texas,'' which is an initiative to try and satisfy concerns 
relating to TikTok's handling of U.S. user data. This proposal 
was rolled out in July 2022. Under the proposal, U.S. user data 
would be stored in the United States, using the infrastructure 
of a trusted third party.\19\ However, under the initiative, 
the application algorithm, source code, and development 
activities would remain in China under ByteDance Ltd.'s control 
and subject to PRC laws, subject to proposed safeguards 
relating to cloud infrastructure and other data security 
concerns. Project Texas would also allow ByteDance Ltd. to 
continue to have a role in certain aspects of TikTok's U.S. 
operations.\20\
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    \19\TikTok Response to Sen Blackburn, June 30, 2022, https://
www.blackburn.senate.gov/services/files/A5027CD8-73DE-4571-95B0-
AA7064F707C1, p.2.
    \20\See, e.g., TikTok v. Trump, 490 F.Supp.3d 73 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 
2020); Marland v. Trump, 20-cv-04597 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2020).
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    Additionally, Project Texas would allow TikTok to continue 
to rely on the engineers and back-end support in China to 
update its algorithms and the source code needed to run the 
TikTok application in the U.S.\21\ But allowing code 
development in and access to U.S. user data from China 
potentially exposes U.S. users to malicious code, backdoor 
vulnerabilities, surreptitious surveillance, and other 
problematic activities tied to source code development. 
Furthermore, allowing back-end support, code development, and 
operational activities to remain in China would also require 
TikTok to continue to send U.S. user data to China to update 
the machine learning algorithms and source code for the 
application, and to conduct related back-end services, like 
managing users' accounts.\22\
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    \21\Id., p.3-5.
    \22\See, e.g., Emily Baker White, EXCLUSIVE: TikTok Spied On Forbes 
Journalists, Forbes (December 22, 2022), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
emilybaker-white/2022/12/22/tiktok-tracks-forbes-journalists-bytedance/
?sh=68c05b5d7da5.
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    As of March 2024, Project Texas has not been completed. 
Until Project Texas is complete, Beijing-based employees of 
TikTok can access U.S. user data.\23\
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    \23\Christianna Silva, What is Project Texas, TikTok's Best Chance 
to Avoid a Deal, Mashable (March 28, 2023), https://mashable.com/
article/project-texas-tiktok.
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    Finally, as TikTok's popularity continues to grow in the 
United States, so does the risk it poses. Attempted action by 
the Executive Branch to mitigate these risks has proven 
unsuccessful, and therefore Congress must act to provide 
congressional authority to protect U.S. national security.
    Congress has previously taken such action with respect to 
media companies in passing the Communications Act of 1934, 
which limits foreign investment in television and radio 
broadcast licenses.\24\ These foreign ownership restrictions 
were originally adopted to protect national security interests 
during wartime by preventing the airing of foreign propaganda 
on broadcast stations.\25\ Today, applications like TikTok 
operate in similar manner as other media companies in the 
United States, and therefore they should be subject to foreign 
ownership scrutiny too.
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    \24\47 U.S.C. 310(b).
    \25\In re Commission Policies and Procedures Under Section 
310(b)(4) of the Communications Act, Foreign Investment in Broadcast 
Licenses, 28 FCC Rcd 16244 (2013), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-
clarifies-policy-foreign-investment-broadcast-licensees-0.
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    Below is a list of public statements that have been made 
regarding the national security risks posed by ByteDance Ltd., 
TikTok, and the CCP as well as past and ongoing actions being 
taken to mitigate the national security risks associated with 
these entities and similarly situated companies:
           In May 2019, in connection with a review by 
        the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
        States (CFIUS), a company based in the PRC agreed to 
        divest its interest in a popular software application 
        reportedly due to concerns relating to potential access 
        by the PRC to American user data from the 
        application.\26\
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    \26\Zack Whittaker, Grindr sold by Chinese owner after US raised 
national security concerns, Tech Crunch. (March 6, 2020, 1:06 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/03/06/grindr-sold-china-national-security/.
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           On May 15, 2019, the President of the United 
        States (President) issued an Executive Order on 
        Securing the Information and Communications Technology 
        and Services Supply Chain, which stated that 
        ``unrestricted acquisition or use in the United States 
        of information and communications technology or 
        services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied 
        by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the 
        jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries . . . 
        constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
        national security, foreign policy, and economy of the 
        United States.''\27\
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    \27\Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 FR 22689 (May 15, 2019), https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/05/17/2019-10538/securing-the-
information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain.
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           On August 2, 2020, then-Secretary of State 
        Mike Pompeo stated that PRC-based companies ``are 
        feeding data directly to the Chinese Communist Party, 
        their national security apparatus.''\28\
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    \28\Ronn Blitzer, Pompeo Warns TikTok Users' Personal Info Could Be 
Going `Directly to the Chinese Communist Party, Fox News (Aug. 2, 2020, 
12:39 P.M.), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/pompeo-warns-tiktok-
users-data-including-facial-pattern-residence-phone-number-could-be-
going-directly-to-the-chinese-communist-party.
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           On August 6, 2020, the President concluded 
        that TikTok ``automatically captures vast swaths of 
        information from its users'' and that TikTok's 
        ownership by ByteDance Ltd. enables the PRC and CCP to 
        gain access to ``Americans' personal and proprietary 
        information,'' potentially allowing the CCP ``to track 
        the locations of Federal employees and contractors, 
        build dossiers of personal information for blackmail, 
        and conduct corporate espionage.''\29\
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    \29\Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 6, 2020), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/11/2020-17699/
addressing-the-threat-posed-by-tiktok-and-taking-additional-steps-to-
address-the-national-emergency (revoked by Exec. Order No. 14,034 (June 
9, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/06/11/2021-
12506/protecting-americans-sensitive-data-from-foreign-adversaries).
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           On August 6, 2020, the President issued an 
        Executive Order (E.O. 13942) that directed the 
        Secretary of Commerce to take actions that would have 
        prohibited certain transactions related to TikTok in 45 
        days if ByteDance failed to divest its ownership of 
        TikTok.\30\ The companies and content creators using 
        the TikTok mobile application filed lawsuits 
        challenging those prohibitions, as a result of which 
        two district courts issued preliminary injunctions 
        enjoining the prohibitions.\31\
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    \30\Exec. Order No. 13942, 85 Fed. Reg. 51297 (Aug. 6, 2020).
    \31\See, e.g., TikTok v. Trump, 490 F.Supp.3d 73 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 
2020); Marland v. Trump, 20-cv-04597 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2020).
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           On August 14, 2020, the President found 
        ``there is credible evidence . . . that ByteDance Ltd. 
        . . . might take action that threatens to impair the 
        national security of the United States.''\32\
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    \32\Order of August 14, 2020, 85 Fed. Reg. 51,297 (Aug. 19, 2020), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-08-19/pdf/2020-18360.pdf.
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           On August 14, 2020, the President issued an 
        Executive Order directing ByteDance Ltd. to divest any 
        assets or property used to enable or support ByteDance 
        Ltd.'s operation of the TikTok application in the 
        United States and any data obtained or derived from 
        TikTok application or musical.ly application users in 
        the United States.\33\ The Order, however, remains the 
        subject of litigation.
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    \33\Order of Aug. 14, 2020, ``Regarding the Acquisition of 
Musical.ly By Bytedance Ltd.'' 85 Fed. Reg. 51297 (Aug. 19, 2020).
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           On September 17, 2020, the Department of 
        Commerce concluded that the PRC, to advance ``its 
        intelligence-gathering and to understand more about who 
        to target for espionage, whether electronically or via 
        human recruitment,'' is constructing ``massive 
        databases of Americans' personal information'' and that 
        ByteDance Ltd. has close ties to the CCP, including a 
        cooperation agreement with a security agency and over 
        130 CCP members in management positions.\34\
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    \34\TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73, 78 (D.D.C. 2020) 
(mem.). [BETTER CITATION: U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Mem. for the Sec'y, 
Proposed Prohibited Transactions Related to TikTok Pursuant to 
Executive Order 13942 (Sept. 17, 2020), ECF No. 22-1]
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           Following the multiple judicial rulings that 
        enjoined the Executive Branch from enforcing the 
        regulations contemplated in E.O. 13942, on June 9, 
        2021, the President issued a new Executive Order that 
        rescinded E.O. 13942 and directed the Secretary of 
        Commerce to assess and take action, where possible, 
        against connected software applications that pose a 
        threat to national security more broadly.\35\
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    \35\Exec. Order No. 14034, 86 Fed. Reg. 31423 (June 9, 2021).
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           On June 9, 2021, the President issued an 
        Executive Order on Protecting Americans' Sensitive Data 
        from Foreign Adversaries, which stated that ``[f]oreign 
        adversary access to large repositories of United States 
        persons' data also presents a significant risk.''\36\ 
        The EO stated that ``the United States must act to 
        protect against the risks associated with connected 
        software applications that are designed, developed, 
        manufactured, or supplied by persons owned or 
        controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or 
        direction of, a foreign adversary.''\37\
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    \36\Exec. Order No. 14,034, 86 FR 31423 (Jun 9, 2021), https://
www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2021/06/11/2021-12506/protecting-americans-sensitive-data-
from-foreign-adversaries.
    \37\Id.
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           On October 26, 2021, lawmakers expressed 
        concerns that TikTok's audio and user location data 
        could be used by the CCP during the testimony of 
        Michael Beckerman, TikTok head of public policy for the 
        Americas and registered lobbyist for ByteDance Ltd., 
        before a Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Consumer 
        Protection hearing.\38\
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    \38\Diane Bartz & Sheila Dang, TikTok Tells U.S. Lawmakers It Does 
Not Give Information to China's Government, Reuters (Oct. 26, 2021, 
4:53 P.M.), https://www.reuters.com/technology/tiktok-tells-us-
lawmakers-it-does-not-give-information-chinas-government-2021-10-26/.
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           On June 17, 2022, public reporting revealed 
        that leaked audio from more than 80 internal TikTok 
        meetings, China-based employees of ByteDance Ltd. 
        repeatedly accessed nonpublic data about U.S. TikTok 
        users, including the physical locations of specific 
        U.S. citizens.\39\
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    \39\Emily Baket-White, Leaked Audio From 80 Internal TikTok 
Meetings Shows That US User Data Has Been Repeatedly Accessed From 
China, Buzzfeed. (June, 17, 2022), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/emilybakerwhite/tiktok-tapes-us-user-data-china-bytedance-
access.
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           On September 14, 2022, lawmakers expressed 
        concerns over TikTok's algorithm and content 
        recommendations posing a national security threat 
        during a hearing before the Senate Committee on 
        Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs with Vanessa 
        Pappas, Chief Operating Officer of TikTok.\40\
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    \40\Vanessa Pappas, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/
Testimony-Pappas-2022-09-14-REVISED.pdf.
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           On November 15, 2022, Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray testified 
        before the House Committee on Homeland Security that 
        TikTok's national security concerns ``include the 
        possibility that the [CCP] could use it to control data 
        collection on millions of users or control the 
        recommendation algorithm, which could be used for 
        influence operations if they so choose, or to control 
        software on millions of devices, which gives it an 
        opportunity to potentially technically compromise 
        personal devices.''\41\
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    \41\Ariana Figueroa, Members of Congress Sign Up for TikTok, 
Despite Security Concerns, Idaho Cap. Sun (Jan. 19, 2023, 12:26 P.M.), 
https://idahocapitalsun.com/2023/01/19/members-of-congress-sign-up-for-
tiktok-despite-security-concerns/.
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           On December 2, 2022, FBI Director Wray 
        stated that TikTok's data repositories on Americans 
        ``are in the hands of a government that doesn't share 
        our values and that has a mission that's very much at 
        odds with what's in the best interests of the United 
        States. . . . The [CCP] has shown a willingness to 
        steal Americans data on a scale that dwarfs any 
        other.''\42\
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    \42\Anisha Kohli, Why the FBI Is Concerned About TikTok, Time Mag. 
(Dec. 3, 2022, 3:42 P.M.), https://time.com/6238540/tiktok-fbi-
security-concerns/.
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           On December 5, 2022, Director of National 
        Intelligence Avril Haines stated, when asked about 
        TikTok and PRC ownership, ``It is extraordinary the 
        degree to which [the PRC] . . . [is] developing [] 
        frameworks for collecting foreign data and pulling it 
        in, and their capacity to then turn that around and use 
        it to target audiences for information campaigns and 
        other things, but also to have it for the future so 
        that they can use it for a variety of means.''\43\
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    \43\Transcript, Avril Haines, Dir. of Nat'l Intel., Fireside Chat 
with DNI Haines at the Reagan National Defense Forum (Dec. 3, 2022), 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/news-articles/news-articles-
2022/3660-fireside-chat-with-dni-haines-at-the-reagan-national-defense-
forum.
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           On December 16, 2022, Central Intelligence 
        Agency Director William Burns explained that ``because 
        the parent company of TikTok is a [PRC] company, the 
        [CCP] is able to insist upon extracting the private 
        data of a lot of TikTok users in this country, and also 
        to shape the content of what goes on to TikTok as well 
        to suit the interests of the Chinese leadership.''\44\
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    \44\Judy Woodruff, CIA Director Bill Burns on War in Ukraine, 
Intelligence Challenges Posed by China, PBS (Dec. 16, 2022, 6:50 P.M.), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/cia-director-bill-burns-on-war-in-
ukraine-intelligence-challenges-posed-by-china.
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           On December 22, 2022, public reporting 
        revealed that ByteDance Ltd. employees accessed TikTok 
        user data and IP addresses to monitor the physical 
        locations of specific U.S. citizens.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\Emily Baker White, EXCLUSIVE: TikTok Spied On Forbes 
Journalists, Forbes (December 22, 2022), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
emilybaker-white/2022/12/22/tiktok-tracks-forbes-
journalists-bytedance/?sh=68c05b5d7da5.
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           On December 29, 2022, following its adoption 
        by Congress, the President signed into law a bill 
        banning the use of TikTok on government devices due to 
        the national security threat posed by the application 
        under its current ownership.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\David Ingram, Biden Signs TikTok Ban for Government Devices, 
Setting Up a Chaotic 2023 for the App, NBC News (Dec. 30, 2022, 4:24 
P.M.), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/tiktok-ban-biden-
government-college-state-federal-security-privacy-rcna63724.
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           On January 20, 2023, public reporting 
        revealed that TikTok and ByteDance Ltd. employees 
        regularly engage in practice called ``heating,'' which 
        is a manual push to ensure specific videos ``achieve a 
        certain number of video views.''\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\Emily Baker-White, TikTokt's Secret `Heating' Button Can Make 
Anyone Go Viral, Forbes (Jan 20, 2023), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
emilybaker-white/2023/01/20/tiktoks-secret-heating-button-can-make-
anyone-go-viral/?sh=62d61d006bfd.
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                   In a court filing in June 2023, 
                a former employee of ByteDance Ltd. alleged 
                that the CCP spied on pro-democracy protestors 
                in Hong Kong in 2018 by using backdoor access 
                to TikTok to identify and monitor activists' 
                locations and communications.\48\
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    \48\Brian Fung, Analysis: There is now some public evidence that 
China viewed TikTok data, CNN (June 8, 2023, 10:28 A.M.), https://
www.cnn.com/2023/06/08/tech/tiktok-data-china/index.html.
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                   On November 1, 2023, public 
                reporting revealed that TikTok's internal 
                platform, which houses its most sensitive 
                information, was inspected in person by CCP 
                cybersecurity agents in the lead-up to the 
                CCP's 20th National Congress.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\Emily Baker-White, A Platform Storing TikTok Corporate Secrets 
Was Inspected By The Chinese Government, Forbes (Nov. 1, 2023, 6:30 
A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilybaker-white/2023/11/01/a-
platform-storing-tiktok-corporate-secrets-was-inspected-by-the-chinese-
government/?sh=193ba64e23b2.
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           In February 2023, Deputy Attorney General 
        Lisa Monaco stated, ``Our intelligence community has 
        been very clear about [the CCP's] efforts and intention 
        to mold the use of [TikTok] using data in a worldview 
        that is completely inconsistent with our own.''\50\ 
        Deputy AG Monaco also stated, ``I don't use TikTok and 
        I would not advise anybody to do so because of 
        [national security] concerns.''\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\John D. McKinnon, U.S. Threatens Ban if TikTok's Chinese Owners 
Don't Sell Stakes, Wall St. J. (Mar. 15, 2023, 6:45 P.M.), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-threatens-to-ban-tiktok-if-
chinese-founder-doesnt-sell-ownership-stake-36d7295c.
    \51\Lauren Feiner, High-Ranking DOJ Official Says She `Would Not 
Advise' Consumers to Use TikTok, Citing Security Concerns, CNBC (Feb. 
16, 2023, 4:55 P.M), https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/16/dojs-lisa-monaco-
warns-against-tiktok-use-citing-security-concerns.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           On February 28, 2023, former Deputy National 
        Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger emphasized that it 
        has already been confirmed that TikTok's parent company 
        ByteDance has used the app to surveil U.S. journalist 
        as a means to identify and retaliate against potential 
        sources. The PRC has also shown a willingness to harass 
        individuals abroad who take stances that contradict the 
        Communist Party lines.\52\ The app can further be 
        employed to help manipulate social discourse and 
        amplify false information to tens of millions of 
        Americans.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\On Hong Kong Authorities' Transnational Repression, Press 
Statement, Athony J. Blinken, Secretary of State (Dec. 15, 2023), 
https://www.state.gov/on-hong-kong-authorities-transnational-
repression/; Transnational Repression, Freedom House, https://
freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression; The PRC has also 
shown itself willing to harass Americans on U.S. soil. See, e.g., Josh 
Rogin, Chinese police stations in NYC are part of a vast influence 
operation, The Washington Post (Apr. 19, 2023), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/04/19/chinese-police-new-york-
city-foreign-influence/.
    \53\Matthew Pottinger, Testimony Before the U.S. House Select 
Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, https://
selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/
selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2.28.2023-
hearing-transcript.pdf.
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           On March 8, 2023, FBI Director Christopher 
        Wray testified before the Senate Permanent Select 
        Committee on Intelligence that the CCP, through its 
        ownership of ByteDance, could use TikTok to collect and 
        control users' data and drive divisive narratives 
        internationally.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\FBI Chief Says TikTok `Screams' of US National Security 
Concerns, Reuters (Mar. 9, 2023, 4:43 P.M.), https://www.reuters.com/
technology/fbi-chief-says-tiktok-screams-us-national-security-concerns-
2023-03-08/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           On March 22, 2023, elements of the 
        intelligence community provided a classified briefing 
        on the threat to members of the U.S. House of 
        Representatives Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence and leadership of the Committee on Energy 
        and Commerce.
           On March 23, 2023, Secretary of State Antony 
        Blinken testified before the House Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs that TikTok is a threat to national security 
        that should be ``ended one way or another.''\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\Houston Keene, Blinken Suggests TikTok `Should Be Ended One Way 
or Another', FOX NEWS (Mar. 23, 2023, 6:11 P.M.), https://
www.foxnews.com/politics/blinken-tiktok-should-be-ended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           On March 23, 2023, during the testimony of 
        TikTok CEO Shou Chew before the House Committee on 
        Energy and Commerce, lawmakers expressed concerns about 
        the safety and security of the app, including TikTok's 
        relationship with the CCP.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\Dara Kerr, Lawmakers Grilled TikTok CEO Chew for 5 Hours in a 
High-Stakes Hearing About the App, NPR (Mar. 23, 2023, 5:34 P.M.), 
https://www.npr.org/2023/03/23/1165579717/tiktok-congress-hearing-shou-
zi-chew-project-texas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           On March 23, 2023, Nury Turkel, the Chair of 
        the United States Commission on International Religious 
        Freedom, raised the alarm that TikTok's parent company, 
        ByteDance Ltd., has a strategic partnership with 
        China's Ministry of Public Security, and China's 
        domestic version of the app, Douyin, has been used to 
        collect sensitive information from Uyghurs and other 
        oppressed ethnic minority groups.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\Nury Turkel, Testimony Before the U.S. House Select Committee 
on the Chinese Communist Party, https://
selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/
selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/3.23.23-
hearing-transcript.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           On April 26, 2023, the Executive Branch 
        provided a classified briefing to members of the United 
        States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
        Transportation and the Senate Select Committee on 
        Intelligence on the threat.
           On May 30, 2023, public reporting revealed 
        that TikTok has stored sensitive financial information, 
        including the Social Security numbers and tax 
        identifications of TikTok influencers and United States 
        small businesses, on servers in China accessible by 
        ByteDance Ltd. employees.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\Alexandra S. Levine, TikTok Creators' Financial Info, Social 
Security Numbers Have Been Stored In China, Forbes (May 30, 2023, 6:30 
A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandralevine/2023/05/30/tiktok-
creators-data-security-china/?sh=1af8f2657048.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           On June 5, 2023, the Executive Branch 
        provided a classified briefing to staff of the United 
        States Senate Committee on Banking and the U.S. House 
        of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce on 
        the threat.
           In June 2023, at the request of the House 
        Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
        intelligence community provided a classified threat 
        briefing open to all members in the U.S. House of 
        Representatives.
           On July 26, 2023, William Evanina, the 
        former director of the National Counterintelligence and 
        Security Center, pointed to TikTok as just one of many 
        areas of concern regarding the CCP's capabilities and 
        intent as an adversarial, malign competitor.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\William Evanina, Testimony Before the U.S. House Select 
Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the 
Chinese Communist Party, https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/
sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-
document/7.26.23-hearing-transcript.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           On September 28, 2023, the U.S. Department 
        of State's Global Engagement Center issued a report 
        that found that ``TikTok [c]reates [o]pportunities for 
        PRC [g]lobal [c]ensorship. The report stated that U.S. 
        Government information as of late 2020 showed that 
        ``ByteDance maintained a regularly updated internal 
        list identifying people who were likely blocked or 
        restricted from all ByteDance platforms, including 
        TikTok, for reasons such as advocating for Uyghur 
        independence.''
           On November 15, 2023, elements of the 
        intelligence community provided a classified briefing 
        to the United States Senate Select Committee on 
        Intelligence and the Committee on Commerce, Science, 
        and Transportation on the PRC's conduct of global 
        foreign malign influence operations, including through 
        platforms such as TikTok.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\Reuters, U.S. to Brief Senators on Foreign Online Influence 
Focused on Israel, Ukraine (November 15, 2023), https://
www.reuters.com/world/us/us-senators-get-classified-briefing-foreign-
online-influence-2023-11-15/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           On November 30, 2023, John Garnaut of the 
        Australian Strategic Policy Institute remarked that 
        TikTok has sophisticated capabilities that create the 
        risk that TikTok can clandestinely shape narratives and 
        elevate favorable opinions while suppressing statements 
        and news that the PRC deems negative.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\John Garnaut, Testimony Before the U.S. House Select Committee 
on the Chinese Communist Party, https://
selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/
selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/11.30.23-
hearing-transcript.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           On January 18, 2024, the U.S. House of 
        Representatives Select Committee on Strategic 
        Competition between the United States and the Chinese 
        Communist Party was briefed by a set of senior 
        interagency officials to discuss these matters.
           On January 31, 2024, FBI Director Wray 
        testified before the Select Committee on Strategic 
        Competition between the United States and the Chinese 
        Communist Party that TikTok gives the PRC ``the ability 
        to control data collection on millions of users, which 
        can be used for all sorts of intelligence operations or 
        influence operations,'' and ``the ability, should they 
        so choose, to control the software on millions of 
        devices, which means the opportunity to technically 
        compromise millions of devices.''\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\The CCP Cyber Threat to the American Homeland and National 
Security, Hearing, The Select Committee on the CCP (March. 1, 2024), 
https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/
hearing-notice-ccp-cyber-threat-american-homeland-and-national-
security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           On February 29, 2024, the U.S. House of 
        Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce was 
        briefed by a set of senior interagency officials to 
        discuss these matters.

                            COMMITTEE ACTION

    On March 23, 2023, the Committee on Energy and Commerce 
held a full committee hearing. The title of the hearing was 
``TikTok: How Congress Can Safeguard American Data Privacy and 
Protect Children from Online Harms.'' The Committee received 
testimony from:
           Shou Chew, CEO, TikTok Inc.
    On March 7, 2024, the Committee on Energy and Commerce held 
a full committee hearing to review H.R. 7521. The title of the 
hearing was ``Legislation to Protect Americans from the 
National Security Threats Posed by Foreign Adversary Controlled 
Applications.'' The Committee met in executive session pursuant 
to a motion by Chair Rodgers, which was adopted by a record 
vote of 43 yeas and 0 nays.
    On March 7, 2024, the full Committee on Energy and Commerce 
met in open markup session and ordered H.R. 7521 favorably 
reported, without amendment, to the House by a record vote of 
50 yeas and 0 nays.

                            COMMITTEE VOTES

    Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the 
record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments 
thereto. The following reflects the record votes taken during 
the Committee consideration:


                 OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    Pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of 
rule XIII, the Committee held hearings and made findings that 
are reflected in this report.

   NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII, the Committee 
finds that H.R. 7521 would result in no new or increased budget 
authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or 
revenues.

                  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII, at the time this 
report was filed, the cost estimate prepared by the Director of 
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not available.

                       FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

    The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal 
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act.

         STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general 
performance goal or objective of this legislation is to force a 
divesture or prohibit the distribution, maintenance, or 
updating of foreign adversary controlled applications.

                    DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no provision of 
H.R. 7521 is known to be duplicative of another Federal 
program, including any program that was included in a report to 
Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139 or the 
most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.

              RELATED COMMITTEE AND SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following 
hearings were used to develop or consider H.R. 7521:
           On March 23, 2023, the Committee on Energy 
        and Commerce held a full committee hearing. The title 
        of the hearing was ``TikTok: How Congress Can Safeguard 
        American Data Privacy and Protect Children from Online 
        Harms.'' The Committee received testimony from:
                 Shou Chew, CEO, TikTok Inc.
           On March 7, 2024, the Committee on Energy 
        and Commerce held a full committee hearing to review 
        H.R. 7521. The title of the hearing was ``Legislation 
        to Protect Americans from the National Security Threats 
        Posed by Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications.'' 
        The Committee met in executive session pursuant to a 
        motion by Chair Rodgers, which was adopted by a record 
        vote of 43 yeas and 0 nays.

                        COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee 
adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of 
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974. At the time this report was 
filed, the estimate was not available.

       EARMARK, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED TARIFF BENEFITS

    Pursuant to clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI, the 
Committee finds that H.R. 7521 contains no earmarks, limited 
tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits.

                      ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                  APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to 
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of section 
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.

             SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short title

    This Section provides that the Act may be cited as the 
``Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled 
Applications Act''.

Section 2. Prohibition of Foreign-Adversary Controlled Applications

    Subsection (a)(1) makes it unlawful for an entity to 
distribute, maintain, update, or enable the distribution, 
maintenance, or updating of a foreign adversary controlled 
application in the United States.
    Subsection (a)(2) provides the applicable dates of 
prohibitions in subsection (a)(1), which is 180 days after 
enactment for the foreign adversary controlled applications in 
(g)(3)(A), and beginning 180 days after the relevant 
determination in (g)(3)(B) that such application poses an 
unacceptable risk to national security.
    Subsection (b) requires a foreign adversary controlled 
application to provide any U.S. user with all available data 
related to their account provided by that application, upon 
request by the user, in a machine readable format, including 
any data maintained by the application regarding the user's 
account, such as the user's content and all other account 
information.
    Subsection (c) provides the exemptions for the prohibition 
in subsection (a). It provides that the prohibition in 
subsection (a) does not apply to a foreign adversary controlled 
application regarding which a qualified divestiture is executed 
and shall cease to apply if a qualified divestment is executed 
after the effective date. This subsection also states that 
subsection (a) also does not apply to services provided with 
respect to a foreign adversary controlled application that are 
necessary for an entity to attain compliance with this Act.
    Subsection (d) outlines the civil penalties for an entity 
found violating subsection (a) or subsection (b). An entity 
found violating subsection (a) shall be subject an amount not 
to exceed the amount that results from multiplying $5,000 by 
the number of U.S. users determined to have accessed, 
maintained, or updated an application. An entity found 
violating subsection (b) shall be subject to a civil penalty in 
an amount not to exceed $500 per U.S. user with an account 
provided by that application. This subsection also directs the 
Attorney General to conduct investigations related to potential 
violations of this Act and pursue enforcement if a violation 
has occurred.
    Subsection (e) is a severability provision. If any 
provision of this section or the application of this section to 
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity 
shall not affect the other provisions or applications of this 
section that can be given effect without the invalid provision 
or application. This subsection also clarifies that any 
invalidity of subsection (g)(3)(A) shall not affect or preclude 
the application from a determination as a foreign adversary 
controlled application under subsection (g)(3)(B).
    Subsection (f) is a rule of construction stating that 
nothing in this Act may be construed to authorize the Attorney 
General to pursue enforcement other than what is specifically 
stated in this Act. It does not authorize the Attorney General 
to pursue enforcement against any individual user of the 
foreign adversary controlled application, nor does it alter or 
affect any other authority provided by or established under 
another provision of Federal law.
    Subsection (g) defines key terms used throughout Section 2, 
including:
    (1) The term ``Controlled by a Foreign Adversary'' means 
(A) a foreign person that is domiciled in, headquartered in, 
has its principal place of business in, or is organized under 
the laws of a foreign adversary country; (B) an entity in which 
an entity or combination of entities identified in subparagraph 
(A), directly or indirectly owns a twenty percent stake or 
greater; or (C) an entity subject to the direction, or control, 
or of an entity identified in subparagraph (A) or (B).
    (2) The term ``Covered Company'' means an entity that 
operates, directly or indirectly, including through its parent 
company, subsidiaries, or affiliates, a website, desktop 
application, mobile application, or augmented or immersive 
technology application that permits a user to create an account 
or profile to generate, share, and view text, images, videos, 
real-time communications, or similar content; has more than 
1,000,000 monthly active users for a majority of months during 
the preceding 3 months the Presidential determination; enables 
one or more users to generate or distribute content that can be 
viewed by other users of the website, desktop application, 
mobile application, or augmented or immersive technology; and 
enables one or more users to view content generated by other 
users of the website, desktop application, mobile application, 
or augmented or immersive technology.
    (3) The term does not include any website, desktop 
application, or mobile application in the United States whose 
primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews, 
business reviews, or travel information and reviews.
    (4) The term ``Foreign Adversary Controlled Application'' 
means a website, desktop application, mobile application, or 
augmented or immersive technology application is that is 
operated, directly or indirectly, including through its parent 
company, subsidiaries, or affiliates by:
          (A) any of (i) ByteDance, Ltd.; (ii) TikTok; (iii) a 
        subsidiary of or a successor to ByteDance, Ltd. or 
        TikTok that is controlled by a foreign adversary; or 
        (iv) a company owned or controlled directly or 
        indirectly by such an entity; or
          (B) a covered company that is controlled by a foreign 
        adversary; and that is determined by the President to 
        present a significant threat to the national security 
        of the United States following the issuance of a public 
        notice of the proposed presidential determination, a 
        public report to Congress, to be submitted not less 
        than 30 days prior to the presidential determination, 
        describing the specific national security concern, 
        which shall contain a classified annex, and describing 
        what assets would need to be divested to be a qualified 
        divestiture.
    (5) The term ``Foreign Adversary Country'' means the 
countries identified pursuant to section 4872(d)(2) of title 
10, United States Code (North Korea, People Republic of China, 
Russia, Iran).
    (6) The term ``Internet Hosting Service'' means a service 
through which storage and computing resources are provided to 
an individual or organization for the accommodation and 
maintenance of one or more websites or online services, and 
which may include file hosting, domain name server hosting, 
cloud hosting, and virtual private server hosting.
    (7) The term ``Qualified Divestiture'' means a divestiture 
or similar transaction that the President, through an 
interagency process, determines results in the foreign 
adversary controlled application no longer being controlled by 
a foreign adversary; and the President determines, through an 
interagency process, precludes the establishment or maintenance 
of any operational relationship between the foreign adversary 
controlled application's United States operations after the 
date of the transaction and any formerly affiliated entities 
that are controlled by a foreign adversary, including, but not 
limited to, any cooperation with respect to the operation of a 
content recommendation algorithm or agreement with respect to 
data sharing.
    (8) The term ``Source Code'' means the combination of text 
and other characters comprising the content, both viewable and 
nonviewable, of a software application, including any 
publishing language, programming language, protocol, or 
functional content, as well as any successor languages or 
protocols.
    (9) The term ``United States'' means the ``United States'' 
including the territories of the United States.

Section 3. Judicial review

    This section requires any review challenging this Act to be 
filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit. Subsection (b) provides that the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any challenge to 
this Act, or any action, finding, or determination under this 
Act. Subsection (c) places, upon enactment, a 165-day statute 
of limitation on any challenge to this Act. This subsection 
also places a 90-day statute of limitations on any challenges 
to an action, finding, or determination under this Act.

         CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

    This legislation does not amend any existing Federal 
statute.

                                  [all]