[House Report 118-319]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


118th Congress }                                          { REPORT 
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session   }                                          { 118-319

======================================================================
 
   DHS RESTRICTIONS ON CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES AND CHINESE ENTITIES OF 
                              CONCERN ACT

                                _______
                                

   December 19, 2023.--Reported with an amendment, committed to the 
 Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to 
                               be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Green of Tennessee, from the Committee on Homeland Security, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 1516]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 1516) to establish Department of Homeland 
Security funding restrictions on institutions of higher 
education that have a relationship with Confucius Institutes, 
and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports 
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the 
bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     3
Background and Need for Legislation..............................     3
Hearings.........................................................     5
Committee Consideration..........................................     5
Committee Votes..................................................     5
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     7
C.B.O. Estimate, New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and 
  Tax Expenditures...............................................     7
Federal Mandates Statement.......................................     8
Duplicative Federal Programs.....................................     8
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............     8
Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff 
  Benefits.......................................................     8
Advisory Committee Statement.....................................     8
Applicability to Legislative Branch..............................     8
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation...................     9
Minority Views...................................................    10

    The amendment is as follows:
    Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius 
Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act''.

SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS ON CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES' HOST SCHOOLS.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Chinese entity of concern.--The term ``Chinese entity of 
        concern'' means any university or college in the People's 
        Republic of China that--
                  (A) is involved in the implementation of military-
                civil fusion;
                  (B) participates in the Chinese defense industrial 
                base;
                  (C) is affiliated with the Chinese State 
                Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for 
                the National Defense;
                  (D) receives funding from any organization 
                subordinate to the Central Military Commission of the 
                Chinese Communist Party; or
                  (E) provides support to any security, defense, 
                police, or intelligence organization of the Government 
                of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese 
                Communist Party.
          (2) Confucius institute.--The term ``Confucius Institute'' 
        means a cultural institute funded by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China.
          (3) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution 
        of higher education'' has the meaning given such term in 
        section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
        1002).
          (4) Relationship.--The term ``relationship'' means, with 
        respect to an institution of higher education, any contract 
        awarded, or agreement entered into, as well as any in-kind 
        donation or gift, received from a Confucius Institute or 
        Chinese entity of concern.
  (b) Restrictions on Institutions of Higher Education.--Beginning with 
the first fiscal year that begins after the date that is 12 months 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security shall ensure that an institution of higher education (referred 
to in this section as an ``institution'') which has a relationship with 
a Confucius Institute is ineligible to receive any Science and 
Technology or Research and Development funds from the Department of 
Homeland Security, unless the institution terminates the relationship 
between the institution and such Confucius Institute. Upon the 
termination of such a relationship, the institution at issue shall be 
eligible to receive Science and Technology or Research and Development 
funds from the Department of Homeland Security.
  (c) Chinese Entities of Concern Relationship Disclosures.--Beginning 
on the date that is 12 months after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall require each institution 
which has a relationship with a Chinese entity of concern that is 
seeking or receives Science and Technology or Research and Development 
funds from the Department of Homeland Security to notify the Secretary 
of such relationship. Such notification shall include the following 
with respect to such relationship:
          (1) An identification of the Chinese entity of concern.
          (2) Information relating to the length of such relationship.
          (3) A description of the nature of such institution's 
        relationship with such Chinese entity of concern, including the 
        monetary value of any contract awarded, or agreement entered 
        into, as well as any in-kind donation or gift, from such 
        Chinese entity of concern.
  (d) Assistance.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide 
outreach and, upon request, technical assistance to institutions 
relating to compliance with this Act. In carrying out this subsection, 
the Secretary shall provide particular attention to institutions 
assisting historically Black colleges and universities (as such term is 
defined in part B of section 322(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
(22 U.S.C. 1061(2)), Hispanic serving institutions (as such term is 
defined in section 502 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1101a)), Tribal colleges and universities (as such term is defined in 
section 316(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1059c(b)), and other minority serving institutions (as such defined in 
section 371(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1067q(a))).
  (e) Waiver.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may 
        waive, on a case-by-case basis, and for a period of not more 
        than one year, the application of subsection (b) to an 
        institution if the Secretary determines such is in the national 
        security interests of the United States.
          (2) Renewal.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may annually 
        renew a waiver issued pursuant to paragraph (1) if the 
        Secretary determines such is in the national security interests 
        of the United States.
          (3) Notification.--If the Secretary of Homeland Security 
        issues or renews a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2), 
        respectively, not later than 30 days after such issuance or 
        renewal, as the case may be, the Secretary shall provide 
        written notification to the Committee on Homeland Security of 
        the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland 
        Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate regarding such 
        issuance or renewal, including a justification relating 
        thereto.
  (f) Reports.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security shall report to the Committee on Homeland Security of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate regarding implementation of this Act 
during the immediately preceding 12 month period. Each such report 
shall include information relating to--
          (1) the implementation of subsections (b) and (c), including 
        the information disclosed pursuant to such subsection (c); and
          (2) outreach and the provision of technical assistance 
        pursuant to subsection (d).

                          PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

    H.R. 1516, the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes 
and Chinese Entities of Concern Act'', prohibits the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) from providing any funds to any 
United States institution of higher education that has a 
relationship with a Confucius Institute funded by the 
Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). H.R. 1516 
also bars such funds to any ``Chinese Entity of Concern'' that 
has a relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
supports China's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) programs, the 
PRC's Ministry of State Security, or the PRC's Ministry of 
Science and Technology. If an institution of higher education 
completely terminates the relationship with the CI or Chinese 
entity of concern, the institution will be eligible to receive 
funds from DHS.

                  BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

    For years, the CCP, working through the People's Liberation 
Army (PLA), has executed sophisticated propaganda and espionage 
campaigns across the globe. Of particular concern, is the CCP's 
practice of exploiting the open and collaborative nature of 
American academia, to conduct widespread industrial and 
military espionage inside the United States.
    Confucius Institutes (CIs) were first established in 
America in 2004.\1\ These initiatives were marketed by the CCP 
as a mechanism to promote Chinese language and culture, support 
local Chinese teaching internationally, and facilitate cultural 
exchanges.\2\ However, it quickly became apparent that CIs were 
an extension of the CCPs global influence apparatus, allowing 
it to impact the decisions of academic institutions, conduct 
espionage inside the homeland, and promote MCF 
programs.\3\}\4\ MCF is the CCP's aggressive 
national strategy to help the PRC develop the most 
technologically advanced military in the world by the year 
2049, often through the theft of American intellectual property 
and trade secrets.\5\ The Federal Bureau of Investigation cited 
that the U.S. economy loses between $225 and $600 billion 
annually to the PRC due to counterfeit goods, pirated software, 
and the theft of trade secrets.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-19-278, Agreements 
Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities Are Similar, but 
Institute Operations Vary (2019).
    \2\https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11180.
    \3\U.S. State Department, Confucius Institutes U.S. Center'' 
Designation as a Foreign Mission, https://2017-2021.state.gov/
confucius-institute-u-s-center-designation-as-a-foreign-
mission/(2020).
    \4\U.S. Department of Justice, Texas Professor and NASA Researcher 
Arrested on Charges Related to China's Talent Program, https://
www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/texas-professor-and-nasa-researcher-
arrested-charges-related-china-s-talents-
program (2020).
    \5\U.S. State Department, Military-Civil Fusion of the People's 
Republic of China, 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
05/What-is-MCF-One-Pager.pdf.
    \6\Fed. Bureau of Investigations, China: the Risk to Academia, 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/china-risk-to-academia-2019.pdf/
view.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although there are less than five active CIs left in 
existence in the United States, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) has found that 43 out of the 74 schools surveyed 
still maintain a relationship with an entity that supported 
their previous CI.\7\ Congress has not been able to keep up in 
combatting these new entities because of the rapidly evolving 
nature of these threats. There is little to no transparency 
from institutions of higher learning in what type of assistance 
they receive from the PRC. Data collected by the Department of 
Education from June 22, 2020, to April 6, 2023, shows that 
universities in the United States have collected over $3 
billion from entities connected to the PRC and the CCP.\8\ 
Further complicating matters is the PRC's 2017 National 
Intelligence Law, which obligates individuals, organizations, 
and institutions to assist the PRC security and intelligence 
services in advancing a wide variety of intelligence work.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``China: With Nearly All 
U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative 
Language Support'' Report Number GAO-24-105981, October 30, 2023, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf.
    \8\U.S. Department of Education, College and Foreign Gift Report, 
https://sites.ed.gov/foreigngifts/.
    \9\U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Data Security Business 
Advisory: Risks and Considerations for Businesses Using Data Services 
and Equipment From Firms Linked to the People's Republic of China, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_1222_data-
security-business-advisory.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States Government has taken some successful 
action against this encroachment in the last several years. 
Congress has already passed two statutes limiting the 
Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to fund U.S. universities 
that host a CI.\10\ For example, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included provisions 
barring DOD from obligating or expending funds for Chinese 
language instruction provided by a CI.\11\ It also restricted 
DOD's ability to use funds to support Chinese language programs 
at U.S. universities that host a CI.\12\ Subsequently, the FY 
2021 NDAA prohibited the DOD from providing any funding to 
institutions of higher education that host CIs.\13\ 
Importantly, while both acts allow for waivers of the 
limitations if certain elements are met, no waivers have been 
granted altogether since May of 2023, according to the GAO.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``China: With Nearly All 
U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative 
Language Support'' Report Number GAO-24-105981, October 30, 2023, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf.
    \11\Id. at 6.
    \12\Id.
    \13\United States Congress, Section 1062 of the H.R. 6395 William 
M. (MAC) Thornberry National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2021, https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf.
    \14\U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``China: With Nearly All 
U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative 
Language Support'' Report Number GAO-24-105981, October 30, 2023, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 1516, the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes 
Act,'' ensures that universities and other institutions of 
higher education prioritize the security of their scientific 
research and technological development efforts above a paycheck 
from the CCP or entities affiliated with the CCP or PLA. 
Specifically, this legislation restricts DHS funding from going 
to universities who maintain relationships with entities 
connected to the CCP or support the PRC's MCF programs. This 
bill ensures taxpayer dollars are appropriately used and 
encourages universities to end relationships with partners who 
do not have America's best interest in mind. More importantly, 
this bill ensures U.S. institutions are free of the PRC's 
foreign influence and safe from the theft of their critical 
research and development work.

                                HEARINGS

    The Committee held the following hearing in the 118th 
Congress that informed H.R. 1516:
    On March 9, 2023, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law 
Enforcement, and Intelligence held a hearing entitled 
``Confronting Threats Posed by the Chinese Communist Party to 
the U.S. Homeland.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from 
the Honorable William R. Evanina, former Director of the 
National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence; Lieutenant General Joseph 
Guastella Jr., (Ret.), Senior Fellow, Mitchell Institute; the 
Honorable Kari A. Bingen, former Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Department of Defense; 
and Dr. Tyler Jost, Assistant Professor of Political Science 
and International and Public Affairs, Brown University.
    On May 23, 2023, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law 
Enforcement, and Intelligence held a hearing entitled ``A 
Security Sprint: Assessing the U.S. Homeland's Vulnerabilities 
to Chinese Communist Party Aggression.'' The Subcommittee 
received testimony from Jill M. Murphy, Deputy Assistant 
Director of Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; Iranga Kahangama, Assistant Secretary for Cyber, 
Infrastructure, Risk, and Resilience, Department of Homeland 
Security; and Tyrone Durham, Acting Director of the Nation 
State Threats Center, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 
Department of Homeland Security.

                        COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

    The Committee met on November 8, 2023, a quorum being 
present, to consider H.R. 1516 and ordered the measure to be 
favorably reported to the House, as amended, by a recorded vote 
of 16 yeas to 12 nays.

                            COMMITTEE VOTES

    An Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr. 
Pfluger was agreed to by voice vote.
    An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute 
offered by Mr. Thompson (014); to replace the text of the 
Pfluger Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute with the text 
of H.R. 7779, the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes 
and Chinese Entities of Concern Act,'' as reported by the 
Committee on Homeland Security in the 117th Congress; was not 
agreed to by a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 17 nays (Roll Call 
No. 23).

                                                    VOTE: 023
                               On: Thompson amendment 014 to the ANS to H.R. 1516
                                                  Yea 12 Nay 17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Member                          Vote                     Member                    Vote
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Green of TN................................          Nay   Mr. Thompson of MS.................          Yea
Mr. McCaul.....................................          Nay   Ms. Jackson Lee....................  ............
Mr. Higgins of LA..............................          Nay   Mr. Payne..........................          Yea
Mr. Guest......................................          Nay   Mr. Swalwell.......................  ............
Mr. Bishop of NC...............................          Nay   Mr. Correa.........................          Yea
Mr. Gimenez....................................          Nay   Mr. Carter of LA...................          Yea
Mr. Pfluger....................................          Nay   Mr. Thanedar.......................          Yea
Mr. Garbarino..................................          Nay   Mr. Magaziner......................          Yea
Ms. Greene of GA...............................          Nay   Mr. Ivey...........................          Yea
Mr. Tony Gonzales of TX........................          Nay   Ms. Goldman of NY..................          Yea
Mr. LaLota.....................................          Nay   Mr. Robert Garcia of CA............          Yea
Mr. Ezell......................................          Nay   Mrs. Ramirez.......................  ............
Mr. D'Esposito.................................          Nay   Mr. Menendez.......................          Yea
Ms. Lee of FL..................................          Nay   Ms. Clarke of NY...................          Yea
Mr. Luttrell...................................          Nay   Ms. Titus..........................          Yea
Mr. Strong.....................................          Nay
Mr. Brecheen...................................  ............
Mr. Crane......................................          Nay
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A motion by Mr. Green to report H.R. 1516, as amended, to 
the House with a favorable recommendation was agreed to by a 
recorded vote of 16 yeas and 12 nays (Roll Call No. 24).

                                                    Vote: 024
                                    On: Final Passage, H.R. 1516, as amended
                                                  Yea 16 Nay 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Member                          Vote                     Member                    Vote
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Green of TN................................          Yea   Mr. Thompson of MS.................          Nay
Mr. McCaul.....................................          Yea   Ms. Jackson Lee....................  ............
Mr. Higgins of LA..............................          Yea   Mr. Payne..........................          Nay
Mr. Guest......................................          Yea   Mr. Swalwell.......................  ............
Mr. Bishop of NC...............................          Yea   Mr. Correa.........................          Nay
Mr. Gimenez....................................          Yea   Mr. Carter of LA...................          Nay
Mr. Pfluger....................................          Yea   Mr. Thanedar.......................          Nay
Mr. Garbarino..................................          Yea   Mr. Magaziner......................          Nay
Ms. Greene of GA...............................          Yea   Mr. Ivey...........................          Nay
Mr. Tony Gonzales of TX........................          Yea   Ms. Goldman of NY..................          Nay
Mr. LaLota.....................................          Yea   Mr. Robert Garcia of CA............          Nay
Mr. Ezell......................................          Yea   Mrs. Ramirez.......................  ............
Mr. D'Esposito.................................          Yea   Mr. Menendez.......................          Nay
Ms. Lee of FL..................................          Yea   Ms. Clarke of NY...................          Nay
Mr. Luttrell...................................  ............  Ms. Titus..........................          Nay
Mr. Strong.....................................          Yea
Mr. Brecheen...................................  ............
Mr. Crane......................................          Yea
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the 
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the 
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) 
of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this 
report.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE, NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT 
                    AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES

    With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule 
XIII and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974, and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of 
rule XIII and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of any new 
budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an 
increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures contained 
in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office.



    H.R. 1516 would prohibit the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) from providing funds to any higher education 
institution that hosts Confucius Institutes, which are 
nonprofit cultural and educational centers funded by the 
Chinese government. That prohibition also would apply to 
institutions that have financial relationships with Chinese 
universities or colleges that meet other criteria such as 
receiving funding from or providing support to elements of the 
Chinese Communist Party.
    The requirements of H.R. 1516 would not change the total 
amount of funding DHS provides to higher education 
institutions. CBO expects that the department would update its 
contracting and federal assistance procedures to ensure that it 
complies with H.R. 1516. CBO estimates that those 
administrative efforts would cost less than $500,000. Any 
spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated 
funds.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Aldo Prosperi. 
The estimate was reviewed by Christina Hawley Anthony, Deputy 
Director of Budget Analysis.
                                         Phillip L. Swagel,
                             Director, Congressional Budget Office.

                       FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

    The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal 
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act of 1995.

                      DUPLICATIVE FEDERAL PROGRAMS

    Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds 
that H.R. 1516 does not contain any provision that establishes 
or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another 
Federal program.

         STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the objective of 
H.R. 1516 is to establish Department of Homeland Security 
funding restrictions on institutions of higher education that 
have a relationship with Confucius Institutes.

   CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED TARIFF 
                                BENEFITS

    In compliance with rule XXI, this bill, as reported, 
contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or 
limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 
9(f) of rule XXI.

                      ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                APPLICABILITY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

    The Committee finds that H.R. 1516 does not relate to the 
terms and conditions of employment or access to public services 
or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of 
the Congressional Accountability Act.

             SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short title

    This section states that the Act may be cited as the ``DHS 
Restrictions on Confucius Institutes Act''.

Section 2. Limitations on Confucius Institutes' host schools

    Subsection (a) paragraph (1) defines the term ``Chinese 
Entity of Concern'' as a university or college located in the 
PRC that is involved with the implementation of MCF programs; 
supports the PRC's defense industrial base; receives any 
funding from any organization that is subordinate to the 
Central Military Commission of the CCP; or provides support to 
any security, defense, police, or intelligence organization of 
the Government of the PRC.
    Subsection (a) paragraph (2) defines the term ``Confucius 
Institute'' as any cultural institute that is funded by the 
Government of the PRC.
    Subsection (a) paragraph (3) defines the term ``institution 
of higher education'' as the meaning given in section 102 of 
the 20 U.S.C. 1002.
    Subsection (a) paragraph (4) defines the term 
``relationship'' as any in-kind donation or gift, contract 
awarded, or agreement entered into by an institution of higher 
education within the United States and any CI or Chinese entity 
of concern.
    Subsection (b) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to ensure that any institution of higher education within the 
United States which has a CI or a connection to a Chinese 
entity of concern is ineligible to receive any funds from the 
Department of Homeland Security within one year of enactment of 
this legislation. If an institution of higher education 
completely terminates the relationship with the CI or Chinese 
entity of concern, the institution will be eligible to receive 
funds from the Department of Homeland Security.

                             MINORITY VIEWS

    While Committee Democrats support efforts to prevent the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) from exerting undue influence 
on U.S. universities by funding Confucius Institutes, we do not 
support the vague and overbroad language Committee Republicans 
advanced in H.R. 1516. As reported out of Committee, this 
legislation rejects the bipartisan language unanimously 
reported out of Committee in the 117th Congress in favor of an 
absolute prohibition on Department of Homeland Security funding 
for any U.S. university that has a relationship with an ill-
defined ``Chinese entity of concern.'' The host of absurd 
outcomes that could result from this measure includes colleges 
and universities losing out on disaster relief funding because 
of a research partnership.
    Committee Democrats recognize the threat of investments by 
the PRC at U.S. universities. Since 2013, the PRC has poured 
hundreds of millions of dollars into U.S. universities through 
Confucius Institutes and other means.\1\ We agree that such 
foreign investments by PRC affiliates must not go unchecked, 
but H.R. 1516, as reported, is no solution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Will Ford, How Far Does China's Influence at U.S. Universities 
Go? One Student Tried to Find Out., Politico, Apr. 24, 2022, https://
www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/24/
confucius-institutes-china-new-mexico-00027287.
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    Confucius Institutes purport to promote Chinese language 
and culture in schools around the world. In the United States, 
they were established beginning in 2004 and spread to around 
118 educational institutions by 2017.\2\ To establish a 
Confucius Institute in the United States, educational 
institutions generally sign an agreement with a PRC-affiliated 
entity, which helps oversee and fund, in whole or in part, the 
Institute.\3\ According to the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, U.S. universities report that Confucius Institutes have 
provided U.S. students with beneficial resources for China-
related cultural, educational, and academic programming.\4\ 
Although foreign investments in U.S. educational institutions 
may provide benefits for students and campus communities, 
Confucius Institutes' ties to the PRC government make them 
susceptible to PRC influence, may undermine academic freedom, 
and pose a security and espionage risk to U.S. research and 
intellectual property.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\Thomas Lum & Hannah Fischer, Cong. Research Serv., IF11180, 
Confucius Institutes in the United States: Selected Issues 1 (2023), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11180.
    \3\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-24-105981, With Nearly All 
U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative 
Language Support 4, (2023), https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf.
    \4\Id.
    \5\See Benefits and Risks of Foreign-Funded Language and Cultural 
Institutes, in Foreign-Funded Language and Culture Institutes at U.S. 
Institutions of Higher Education: Practices to Assess and Mitigate Risk 
(Philip J. Hanlon, et al., eds., 2023), https://
nap.nationalacademies.org/read/27065/chapter/5.
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    To prevent such risks, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 and FY 
2021 National Defense Authorization Acts restricted Department 
of Defense funding from going to United States institutions of 
higher education that host Confucius Institutes and provided 
the Secretary of Defense discretionary authority to, as 
appropriate, waive such restrictions.\6\ Following enactment of 
this legislation, Confucius Institutes began to shutter across 
America. There were around 100 Confucius Institutes active in 
the United States in 2019, and fewer than five remained active 
in October 2023.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232 Sec. 1091, 132 Stat. 1997; Mac 
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, 
Pub. L. No. 116-283 Sec. 1062, 134 Stat. 3859.
    \7\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, supra note 3, at 1.
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    Committee Democrats laud the closure of Confucius 
Institutes, and we recognize that the PRC may seek alternative 
means of exerting influence on U.S. universities at the expense 
of U.S. security. We agree with our Republican colleagues that 
the PRC should not be allowed to use money as leverage to gain 
access to U.S. universities for nefarious purposes. But the 
solution proposed by H.R. 1516 is deeply flawed, and our 
Republican colleagues rejected Democratic efforts to strengthen 
the bill.
    The operative language in H.R. 1516 deems any institution 
of higher education in the United States ``which has a 
relationship with a Confucius Institute or Chinese entity of 
concern . . . ineligible to receive any funds from the 
Department of Homeland Security, unless the institution 
terminates the relationship between the institution and such 
Confucius Institute or Chinese entity of concern.''\8\
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    \8\DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of 
Concern Act, H.R. 1516, 118th Cong. (2023).
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THE FUNDING PROHIBITION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND 
                     RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDS

    H.R. 1516 prohibits a U.S. institution of higher education 
from receiving ``any funds from the Department of Homeland 
Security'' if it has a relationship with a Confucius Institute 
or ``Chinese entity of concern.'' The bill's use of the term 
``any funds'' would apply to any contract related to a covered 
institution of higher education. That means DHS would be 
prohibited from entering into a contract with an institute of 
higher education even for the purpose of hosting a recruitment 
or educational event at that location, for example. This 
legislation's reach should be limited to Science & Technology 
and Research & Development funding, which is how previous 
versions of the bill were scoped. H.R. 1516's overbroad 
prohibition on ``any funds'' is unfocused on the problem at 
hand and threatens homeland security, including our educational 
institutions and the students they serve. For example, under 
H.R. 1516's overbroad prohibition on reception of ``any 
funds,'' a U.S. institution of higher education that has a 
relationship with a Confucius Institute or ``Chinese entity of 
concern'' would be ineligible for DHS funding for terrorism 
prevention, public safety, and disaster relief--all of which 
are unrelated to the Committee's concerns with PRC activities 
at U.S. universities.
    To prevent the unintended consequences of barring covered 
universities from receiving ``any funds from the Department of 
Homeland Security'' based on their relationship with a 
Confucius Institute or ``Chinese entity of concern,'' Ranking 
Member Bennie G. Thompson offered an amendment limiting the 
prohibition to DHS Science & Technology and Research & 
Development funds. Committee Republicans rejected the Thompson 
amendment.

          ``CHINESE ENTITY OF CONCERN'' IS VAGUE AND OVERBROAD

    Whereas Confucius Institutes are commonly identifiable, a 
``Chinese entity of concern'' is not. As a result, H.R. 1516 
includes a three-part test: To qualify as a Chinese entity of 
concern, an entity must be (1) ``a university or college'' that 
is (2) located ``in the People's Republic of China'' and (3) is 
involved in the ``implementation of military-civil fusion,'' 
``participates in the Chinese defense industrial base,'' ``is 
affiliated with the Chinese State Administration for Science, 
Technology, and Industry for the National Defense,'' ``receives 
funding from any organization subordinate to the Central 
Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party,'' or 
``provides support to any security, defense, police, or 
intelligence organization of the Government of the People's 
Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party.''\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\Id. at Sec. 2(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The third prong of H.R. 1516's ``Chinese entity of 
concern'' test is at once vague and overbroad. Committee 
Democrats are concerned such language would require 
considerable insight into internal Chinese government 
functions, which would be a burdensome exercise for all 
educational institutions but especially for those that are 
under-resourced.
    Determining whether a university located in China 
``provides any support to . . . police . . . of the Government 
of the People's Republic of China,'' which would deem that 
university a ``Chinese entity of concern'' under H.R. 1516, 
would require DHS and educational institutions to have insight 
into police investigations and public safety policies at 
China's more than 3,000 universities. For example, this 
legislation would be triggered by any support to Chinese 
government police, even support for a criminal investigation 
such as a crime of violence against a U.S. study-abroad 
student. That absurd result was recognized by H.R. 1516's 
author, Representative August Pfluger, who claimed during the 
Committee's November 8, 2023, markup that the legislation's use 
of ``support'' somehow means ``monetary relationship,'' a term 
that neither appears in the bill nor was offered by 
Representative Pfluger as an amendment.
    Moreover, whether a university located in China ``is 
involved in the implementation of military-civil fusion'' or 
``participates in the Chinese defense industrial base'' also 
requires considerable insight into internal Chinese government 
functions. In fact, a rigorous study into relationships between 
Chinese universities and the Chinese defense industrial base 
conducted by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at 
Georgetown University concluded that ``it appears that the vast 
majority of civilian universities in China maintain at least 
some connection to the country's defense industry.''\10\ The 
vague three-part test in H.R. 1516, therefore, would appear to 
deem every university in China an ``entity of concern.'' If 
that is the legislation's intent, H.R. 1516 should say as much 
and not leave DHS and universities that seek DHS funds guessing 
at the bill's intent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\Ryan Fedasiuk & Emily S. Weinstein, Universities and the 
Chinese Defense Technology Workforce 4 (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To aid U.S. institutions and DHS in identifying 
relationships with a ``Chinese entity of concern,'' Ranking 
Member Thompson offered an amendment that would limit H.R. 
1516's funding prohibition to U.S. institutions that have a 
relationship with a Confucius Institute, which is commonly 
identifiable, and establishes a reporting requirement for 
institutions that have relationships with a ``Chinese entity of 
concern,'' as the term is vague and overbroad. In addition to 
the reporting requirement, the Thompson amendment required DHS 
to provide technical assistance to colleges and universities in 
carrying out this requirement with particular attention to 
historically Black colleges and universities and other 
minority-serving institutions. Committee Republicans rejected 
the Thompson amendment.

            THE LACK OF DISCRETION FOR A WAVIER IS DAMAGING

    Unlike language adopted in the FY 2019 and 2021 NDAAs 
directed at the Secretary of Defense, H.R. 1516 does not 
provide the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to issue a 
waiver from funding restrictions, should the Secretary deem it 
is in the interest of America's national security. The failure 
to provide such waiver authority would prevent the Secretary 
from issuing a waiver even in furtherance of a 
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, or counterespionage 
mission. As a result, H.R. 1516 undermines DHS's 
counterterrorism and economic security missions under the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended.
    To prevent H.R. 1516 from undermining homeland security and 
DHS's mission, Ranking Member Thompson offered an amendment 
providing the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to waive 
the funding prohibition on a case-by-case basis and for not 
longer than one year. Committee Republicans rejected the 
Thompson amendment.
    H.R. 1516 has a commendable goal to prevent the People's 
Republic of China from investing in U.S. institutions of higher 
education in hopes of gaining a return on its investment 
through undue influence, undermining of academic freedom, or 
theft of research or intellectual property. This Committee is 
capable of bipartisan consensus in furtherance of securing the 
homeland from foreign influence, as we did in the 117th 
Congress by unanimously reporting out of Committee H.R. 7779, 
as amended. Unfortunately, with this legislation, 
Representative Pfluger and Committee Republicans rejected this 
Committee's past bipartisan work in favor of a vague and 
overbroad H.R. 1516 that would not only burden U.S. 
institutions of higher education but also make the homeland 
less secure.
                                                Bennie G. Thompson.

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