[House Report 118-319]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
118th Congress } { REPORT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { 118-319
======================================================================
DHS RESTRICTIONS ON CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES AND CHINESE ENTITIES OF
CONCERN ACT
_______
December 19, 2023.--Reported with an amendment, committed to the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to
be printed
_______
Mr. Green of Tennessee, from the Committee on Homeland Security,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 1516]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 1516) to establish Department of Homeland
Security funding restrictions on institutions of higher
education that have a relationship with Confucius Institutes,
and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 3
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 3
Hearings......................................................... 5
Committee Consideration.......................................... 5
Committee Votes.................................................. 5
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 7
C.B.O. Estimate, New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and
Tax Expenditures............................................... 7
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 8
Duplicative Federal Programs..................................... 8
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 8
Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff
Benefits....................................................... 8
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 8
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 8
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 9
Minority Views................................................... 10
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius
Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act''.
SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS ON CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES' HOST SCHOOLS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Chinese entity of concern.--The term ``Chinese entity of
concern'' means any university or college in the People's
Republic of China that--
(A) is involved in the implementation of military-
civil fusion;
(B) participates in the Chinese defense industrial
base;
(C) is affiliated with the Chinese State
Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for
the National Defense;
(D) receives funding from any organization
subordinate to the Central Military Commission of the
Chinese Communist Party; or
(E) provides support to any security, defense,
police, or intelligence organization of the Government
of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese
Communist Party.
(2) Confucius institute.--The term ``Confucius Institute''
means a cultural institute funded by the Government of the
People's Republic of China.
(3) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution
of higher education'' has the meaning given such term in
section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1002).
(4) Relationship.--The term ``relationship'' means, with
respect to an institution of higher education, any contract
awarded, or agreement entered into, as well as any in-kind
donation or gift, received from a Confucius Institute or
Chinese entity of concern.
(b) Restrictions on Institutions of Higher Education.--Beginning with
the first fiscal year that begins after the date that is 12 months
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall ensure that an institution of higher education (referred
to in this section as an ``institution'') which has a relationship with
a Confucius Institute is ineligible to receive any Science and
Technology or Research and Development funds from the Department of
Homeland Security, unless the institution terminates the relationship
between the institution and such Confucius Institute. Upon the
termination of such a relationship, the institution at issue shall be
eligible to receive Science and Technology or Research and Development
funds from the Department of Homeland Security.
(c) Chinese Entities of Concern Relationship Disclosures.--Beginning
on the date that is 12 months after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall require each institution
which has a relationship with a Chinese entity of concern that is
seeking or receives Science and Technology or Research and Development
funds from the Department of Homeland Security to notify the Secretary
of such relationship. Such notification shall include the following
with respect to such relationship:
(1) An identification of the Chinese entity of concern.
(2) Information relating to the length of such relationship.
(3) A description of the nature of such institution's
relationship with such Chinese entity of concern, including the
monetary value of any contract awarded, or agreement entered
into, as well as any in-kind donation or gift, from such
Chinese entity of concern.
(d) Assistance.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide
outreach and, upon request, technical assistance to institutions
relating to compliance with this Act. In carrying out this subsection,
the Secretary shall provide particular attention to institutions
assisting historically Black colleges and universities (as such term is
defined in part B of section 322(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(22 U.S.C. 1061(2)), Hispanic serving institutions (as such term is
defined in section 502 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1101a)), Tribal colleges and universities (as such term is defined in
section 316(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1059c(b)), and other minority serving institutions (as such defined in
section 371(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1067q(a))).
(e) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may
waive, on a case-by-case basis, and for a period of not more
than one year, the application of subsection (b) to an
institution if the Secretary determines such is in the national
security interests of the United States.
(2) Renewal.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may annually
renew a waiver issued pursuant to paragraph (1) if the
Secretary determines such is in the national security interests
of the United States.
(3) Notification.--If the Secretary of Homeland Security
issues or renews a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2),
respectively, not later than 30 days after such issuance or
renewal, as the case may be, the Secretary shall provide
written notification to the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate regarding such
issuance or renewal, including a justification relating
thereto.
(f) Reports.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall report to the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate regarding implementation of this Act
during the immediately preceding 12 month period. Each such report
shall include information relating to--
(1) the implementation of subsections (b) and (c), including
the information disclosed pursuant to such subsection (c); and
(2) outreach and the provision of technical assistance
pursuant to subsection (d).
PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
H.R. 1516, the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes
and Chinese Entities of Concern Act'', prohibits the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) from providing any funds to any
United States institution of higher education that has a
relationship with a Confucius Institute funded by the
Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). H.R. 1516
also bars such funds to any ``Chinese Entity of Concern'' that
has a relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
supports China's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) programs, the
PRC's Ministry of State Security, or the PRC's Ministry of
Science and Technology. If an institution of higher education
completely terminates the relationship with the CI or Chinese
entity of concern, the institution will be eligible to receive
funds from DHS.
BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION
For years, the CCP, working through the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), has executed sophisticated propaganda and espionage
campaigns across the globe. Of particular concern, is the CCP's
practice of exploiting the open and collaborative nature of
American academia, to conduct widespread industrial and
military espionage inside the United States.
Confucius Institutes (CIs) were first established in
America in 2004.\1\ These initiatives were marketed by the CCP
as a mechanism to promote Chinese language and culture, support
local Chinese teaching internationally, and facilitate cultural
exchanges.\2\ However, it quickly became apparent that CIs were
an extension of the CCPs global influence apparatus, allowing
it to impact the decisions of academic institutions, conduct
espionage inside the homeland, and promote MCF
programs.\3\}\4\ MCF is the CCP's aggressive
national strategy to help the PRC develop the most
technologically advanced military in the world by the year
2049, often through the theft of American intellectual property
and trade secrets.\5\ The Federal Bureau of Investigation cited
that the U.S. economy loses between $225 and $600 billion
annually to the PRC due to counterfeit goods, pirated software,
and the theft of trade secrets.\6\
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\1\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-19-278, Agreements
Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities Are Similar, but
Institute Operations Vary (2019).
\2\https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11180.
\3\U.S. State Department, Confucius Institutes U.S. Center''
Designation as a Foreign Mission, https://2017-2021.state.gov/
confucius-institute-u-s-center-designation-as-a-foreign-
mission/(2020).
\4\U.S. Department of Justice, Texas Professor and NASA Researcher
Arrested on Charges Related to China's Talent Program, https://
www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/texas-professor-and-nasa-researcher-
arrested-charges-related-china-s-talents-
program (2020).
\5\U.S. State Department, Military-Civil Fusion of the People's
Republic of China, 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
05/What-is-MCF-One-Pager.pdf.
\6\Fed. Bureau of Investigations, China: the Risk to Academia,
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/china-risk-to-academia-2019.pdf/
view.
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Although there are less than five active CIs left in
existence in the United States, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has found that 43 out of the 74 schools surveyed
still maintain a relationship with an entity that supported
their previous CI.\7\ Congress has not been able to keep up in
combatting these new entities because of the rapidly evolving
nature of these threats. There is little to no transparency
from institutions of higher learning in what type of assistance
they receive from the PRC. Data collected by the Department of
Education from June 22, 2020, to April 6, 2023, shows that
universities in the United States have collected over $3
billion from entities connected to the PRC and the CCP.\8\
Further complicating matters is the PRC's 2017 National
Intelligence Law, which obligates individuals, organizations,
and institutions to assist the PRC security and intelligence
services in advancing a wide variety of intelligence work.\9\
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\7\U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``China: With Nearly All
U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative
Language Support'' Report Number GAO-24-105981, October 30, 2023,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf.
\8\U.S. Department of Education, College and Foreign Gift Report,
https://sites.ed.gov/foreigngifts/.
\9\U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Data Security Business
Advisory: Risks and Considerations for Businesses Using Data Services
and Equipment From Firms Linked to the People's Republic of China,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_1222_data-
security-business-advisory.pdf.
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The United States Government has taken some successful
action against this encroachment in the last several years.
Congress has already passed two statutes limiting the
Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to fund U.S. universities
that host a CI.\10\ For example, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included provisions
barring DOD from obligating or expending funds for Chinese
language instruction provided by a CI.\11\ It also restricted
DOD's ability to use funds to support Chinese language programs
at U.S. universities that host a CI.\12\ Subsequently, the FY
2021 NDAA prohibited the DOD from providing any funding to
institutions of higher education that host CIs.\13\
Importantly, while both acts allow for waivers of the
limitations if certain elements are met, no waivers have been
granted altogether since May of 2023, according to the GAO.\14\
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\10\U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``China: With Nearly All
U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative
Language Support'' Report Number GAO-24-105981, October 30, 2023,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf.
\11\Id. at 6.
\12\Id.
\13\United States Congress, Section 1062 of the H.R. 6395 William
M. (MAC) Thornberry National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021, https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf.
\14\U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``China: With Nearly All
U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative
Language Support'' Report Number GAO-24-105981, October 30, 2023,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf.
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H.R. 1516, the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes
Act,'' ensures that universities and other institutions of
higher education prioritize the security of their scientific
research and technological development efforts above a paycheck
from the CCP or entities affiliated with the CCP or PLA.
Specifically, this legislation restricts DHS funding from going
to universities who maintain relationships with entities
connected to the CCP or support the PRC's MCF programs. This
bill ensures taxpayer dollars are appropriately used and
encourages universities to end relationships with partners who
do not have America's best interest in mind. More importantly,
this bill ensures U.S. institutions are free of the PRC's
foreign influence and safe from the theft of their critical
research and development work.
HEARINGS
The Committee held the following hearing in the 118th
Congress that informed H.R. 1516:
On March 9, 2023, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law
Enforcement, and Intelligence held a hearing entitled
``Confronting Threats Posed by the Chinese Communist Party to
the U.S. Homeland.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from
the Honorable William R. Evanina, former Director of the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence; Lieutenant General Joseph
Guastella Jr., (Ret.), Senior Fellow, Mitchell Institute; the
Honorable Kari A. Bingen, former Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Department of Defense;
and Dr. Tyler Jost, Assistant Professor of Political Science
and International and Public Affairs, Brown University.
On May 23, 2023, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law
Enforcement, and Intelligence held a hearing entitled ``A
Security Sprint: Assessing the U.S. Homeland's Vulnerabilities
to Chinese Communist Party Aggression.'' The Subcommittee
received testimony from Jill M. Murphy, Deputy Assistant
Director of Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Iranga Kahangama, Assistant Secretary for Cyber,
Infrastructure, Risk, and Resilience, Department of Homeland
Security; and Tyrone Durham, Acting Director of the Nation
State Threats Center, Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
Department of Homeland Security.
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION
The Committee met on November 8, 2023, a quorum being
present, to consider H.R. 1516 and ordered the measure to be
favorably reported to the House, as amended, by a recorded vote
of 16 yeas to 12 nays.
COMMITTEE VOTES
An Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by Mr.
Pfluger was agreed to by voice vote.
An amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute
offered by Mr. Thompson (014); to replace the text of the
Pfluger Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute with the text
of H.R. 7779, the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes
and Chinese Entities of Concern Act,'' as reported by the
Committee on Homeland Security in the 117th Congress; was not
agreed to by a recorded vote of 12 yeas and 17 nays (Roll Call
No. 23).
VOTE: 023
On: Thompson amendment 014 to the ANS to H.R. 1516
Yea 12 Nay 17
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Member Vote Member Vote
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Green of TN................................ Nay Mr. Thompson of MS................. Yea
Mr. McCaul..................................... Nay Ms. Jackson Lee.................... ............
Mr. Higgins of LA.............................. Nay Mr. Payne.......................... Yea
Mr. Guest...................................... Nay Mr. Swalwell....................... ............
Mr. Bishop of NC............................... Nay Mr. Correa......................... Yea
Mr. Gimenez.................................... Nay Mr. Carter of LA................... Yea
Mr. Pfluger.................................... Nay Mr. Thanedar....................... Yea
Mr. Garbarino.................................. Nay Mr. Magaziner...................... Yea
Ms. Greene of GA............................... Nay Mr. Ivey........................... Yea
Mr. Tony Gonzales of TX........................ Nay Ms. Goldman of NY.................. Yea
Mr. LaLota..................................... Nay Mr. Robert Garcia of CA............ Yea
Mr. Ezell...................................... Nay Mrs. Ramirez....................... ............
Mr. D'Esposito................................. Nay Mr. Menendez....................... Yea
Ms. Lee of FL.................................. Nay Ms. Clarke of NY................... Yea
Mr. Luttrell................................... Nay Ms. Titus.......................... Yea
Mr. Strong..................................... Nay
Mr. Brecheen................................... ............
Mr. Crane...................................... Nay
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A motion by Mr. Green to report H.R. 1516, as amended, to
the House with a favorable recommendation was agreed to by a
recorded vote of 16 yeas and 12 nays (Roll Call No. 24).
Vote: 024
On: Final Passage, H.R. 1516, as amended
Yea 16 Nay 12
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Member Vote Member Vote
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Green of TN................................ Yea Mr. Thompson of MS................. Nay
Mr. McCaul..................................... Yea Ms. Jackson Lee.................... ............
Mr. Higgins of LA.............................. Yea Mr. Payne.......................... Nay
Mr. Guest...................................... Yea Mr. Swalwell....................... ............
Mr. Bishop of NC............................... Yea Mr. Correa......................... Nay
Mr. Gimenez.................................... Yea Mr. Carter of LA................... Nay
Mr. Pfluger.................................... Yea Mr. Thanedar....................... Nay
Mr. Garbarino.................................. Yea Mr. Magaziner...................... Nay
Ms. Greene of GA............................... Yea Mr. Ivey........................... Nay
Mr. Tony Gonzales of TX........................ Yea Ms. Goldman of NY.................. Nay
Mr. LaLota..................................... Yea Mr. Robert Garcia of CA............ Nay
Mr. Ezell...................................... Yea Mrs. Ramirez....................... ............
Mr. D'Esposito................................. Yea Mr. Menendez....................... Nay
Ms. Lee of FL.................................. Yea Ms. Clarke of NY................... Nay
Mr. Luttrell................................... ............ Ms. Titus.......................... Nay
Mr. Strong..................................... Yea
Mr. Brecheen................................... ............
Mr. Crane...................................... Yea
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this
report.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE, NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT
AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of
rule XIII and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of any new
budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an
increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures contained
in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office.
H.R. 1516 would prohibit the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) from providing funds to any higher education
institution that hosts Confucius Institutes, which are
nonprofit cultural and educational centers funded by the
Chinese government. That prohibition also would apply to
institutions that have financial relationships with Chinese
universities or colleges that meet other criteria such as
receiving funding from or providing support to elements of the
Chinese Communist Party.
The requirements of H.R. 1516 would not change the total
amount of funding DHS provides to higher education
institutions. CBO expects that the department would update its
contracting and federal assistance procedures to ensure that it
complies with H.R. 1516. CBO estimates that those
administrative efforts would cost less than $500,000. Any
spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated
funds.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Aldo Prosperi.
The estimate was reviewed by Christina Hawley Anthony, Deputy
Director of Budget Analysis.
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director, Congressional Budget Office.
FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995.
DUPLICATIVE FEDERAL PROGRAMS
Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds
that H.R. 1516 does not contain any provision that establishes
or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another
Federal program.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the objective of
H.R. 1516 is to establish Department of Homeland Security
funding restrictions on institutions of higher education that
have a relationship with Confucius Institutes.
CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED TARIFF
BENEFITS
In compliance with rule XXI, this bill, as reported,
contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or
limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or
9(f) of rule XXI.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
APPLICABILITY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The Committee finds that H.R. 1516 does not relate to the
terms and conditions of employment or access to public services
or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of
the Congressional Accountability Act.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
Section 1. Short title
This section states that the Act may be cited as the ``DHS
Restrictions on Confucius Institutes Act''.
Section 2. Limitations on Confucius Institutes' host schools
Subsection (a) paragraph (1) defines the term ``Chinese
Entity of Concern'' as a university or college located in the
PRC that is involved with the implementation of MCF programs;
supports the PRC's defense industrial base; receives any
funding from any organization that is subordinate to the
Central Military Commission of the CCP; or provides support to
any security, defense, police, or intelligence organization of
the Government of the PRC.
Subsection (a) paragraph (2) defines the term ``Confucius
Institute'' as any cultural institute that is funded by the
Government of the PRC.
Subsection (a) paragraph (3) defines the term ``institution
of higher education'' as the meaning given in section 102 of
the 20 U.S.C. 1002.
Subsection (a) paragraph (4) defines the term
``relationship'' as any in-kind donation or gift, contract
awarded, or agreement entered into by an institution of higher
education within the United States and any CI or Chinese entity
of concern.
Subsection (b) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security
to ensure that any institution of higher education within the
United States which has a CI or a connection to a Chinese
entity of concern is ineligible to receive any funds from the
Department of Homeland Security within one year of enactment of
this legislation. If an institution of higher education
completely terminates the relationship with the CI or Chinese
entity of concern, the institution will be eligible to receive
funds from the Department of Homeland Security.
MINORITY VIEWS
While Committee Democrats support efforts to prevent the
People's Republic of China (PRC) from exerting undue influence
on U.S. universities by funding Confucius Institutes, we do not
support the vague and overbroad language Committee Republicans
advanced in H.R. 1516. As reported out of Committee, this
legislation rejects the bipartisan language unanimously
reported out of Committee in the 117th Congress in favor of an
absolute prohibition on Department of Homeland Security funding
for any U.S. university that has a relationship with an ill-
defined ``Chinese entity of concern.'' The host of absurd
outcomes that could result from this measure includes colleges
and universities losing out on disaster relief funding because
of a research partnership.
Committee Democrats recognize the threat of investments by
the PRC at U.S. universities. Since 2013, the PRC has poured
hundreds of millions of dollars into U.S. universities through
Confucius Institutes and other means.\1\ We agree that such
foreign investments by PRC affiliates must not go unchecked,
but H.R. 1516, as reported, is no solution.
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\1\ Will Ford, How Far Does China's Influence at U.S. Universities
Go? One Student Tried to Find Out., Politico, Apr. 24, 2022, https://
www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/24/
confucius-institutes-china-new-mexico-00027287.
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Confucius Institutes purport to promote Chinese language
and culture in schools around the world. In the United States,
they were established beginning in 2004 and spread to around
118 educational institutions by 2017.\2\ To establish a
Confucius Institute in the United States, educational
institutions generally sign an agreement with a PRC-affiliated
entity, which helps oversee and fund, in whole or in part, the
Institute.\3\ According to the U.S. Government Accountability
Office, U.S. universities report that Confucius Institutes have
provided U.S. students with beneficial resources for China-
related cultural, educational, and academic programming.\4\
Although foreign investments in U.S. educational institutions
may provide benefits for students and campus communities,
Confucius Institutes' ties to the PRC government make them
susceptible to PRC influence, may undermine academic freedom,
and pose a security and espionage risk to U.S. research and
intellectual property.\5\
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\2\Thomas Lum & Hannah Fischer, Cong. Research Serv., IF11180,
Confucius Institutes in the United States: Selected Issues 1 (2023),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11180.
\3\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-24-105981, With Nearly All
U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative
Language Support 4, (2023), https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105981.pdf.
\4\Id.
\5\See Benefits and Risks of Foreign-Funded Language and Cultural
Institutes, in Foreign-Funded Language and Culture Institutes at U.S.
Institutions of Higher Education: Practices to Assess and Mitigate Risk
(Philip J. Hanlon, et al., eds., 2023), https://
nap.nationalacademies.org/read/27065/chapter/5.
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To prevent such risks, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 and FY
2021 National Defense Authorization Acts restricted Department
of Defense funding from going to United States institutions of
higher education that host Confucius Institutes and provided
the Secretary of Defense discretionary authority to, as
appropriate, waive such restrictions.\6\ Following enactment of
this legislation, Confucius Institutes began to shutter across
America. There were around 100 Confucius Institutes active in
the United States in 2019, and fewer than five remained active
in October 2023.\7\
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\6\See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232 Sec. 1091, 132 Stat. 1997; Mac
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021,
Pub. L. No. 116-283 Sec. 1062, 134 Stat. 3859.
\7\U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, supra note 3, at 1.
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Committee Democrats laud the closure of Confucius
Institutes, and we recognize that the PRC may seek alternative
means of exerting influence on U.S. universities at the expense
of U.S. security. We agree with our Republican colleagues that
the PRC should not be allowed to use money as leverage to gain
access to U.S. universities for nefarious purposes. But the
solution proposed by H.R. 1516 is deeply flawed, and our
Republican colleagues rejected Democratic efforts to strengthen
the bill.
The operative language in H.R. 1516 deems any institution
of higher education in the United States ``which has a
relationship with a Confucius Institute or Chinese entity of
concern . . . ineligible to receive any funds from the
Department of Homeland Security, unless the institution
terminates the relationship between the institution and such
Confucius Institute or Chinese entity of concern.''\8\
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\8\DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of
Concern Act, H.R. 1516, 118th Cong. (2023).
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THE FUNDING PROHIBITION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDS
H.R. 1516 prohibits a U.S. institution of higher education
from receiving ``any funds from the Department of Homeland
Security'' if it has a relationship with a Confucius Institute
or ``Chinese entity of concern.'' The bill's use of the term
``any funds'' would apply to any contract related to a covered
institution of higher education. That means DHS would be
prohibited from entering into a contract with an institute of
higher education even for the purpose of hosting a recruitment
or educational event at that location, for example. This
legislation's reach should be limited to Science & Technology
and Research & Development funding, which is how previous
versions of the bill were scoped. H.R. 1516's overbroad
prohibition on ``any funds'' is unfocused on the problem at
hand and threatens homeland security, including our educational
institutions and the students they serve. For example, under
H.R. 1516's overbroad prohibition on reception of ``any
funds,'' a U.S. institution of higher education that has a
relationship with a Confucius Institute or ``Chinese entity of
concern'' would be ineligible for DHS funding for terrorism
prevention, public safety, and disaster relief--all of which
are unrelated to the Committee's concerns with PRC activities
at U.S. universities.
To prevent the unintended consequences of barring covered
universities from receiving ``any funds from the Department of
Homeland Security'' based on their relationship with a
Confucius Institute or ``Chinese entity of concern,'' Ranking
Member Bennie G. Thompson offered an amendment limiting the
prohibition to DHS Science & Technology and Research &
Development funds. Committee Republicans rejected the Thompson
amendment.
``CHINESE ENTITY OF CONCERN'' IS VAGUE AND OVERBROAD
Whereas Confucius Institutes are commonly identifiable, a
``Chinese entity of concern'' is not. As a result, H.R. 1516
includes a three-part test: To qualify as a Chinese entity of
concern, an entity must be (1) ``a university or college'' that
is (2) located ``in the People's Republic of China'' and (3) is
involved in the ``implementation of military-civil fusion,''
``participates in the Chinese defense industrial base,'' ``is
affiliated with the Chinese State Administration for Science,
Technology, and Industry for the National Defense,'' ``receives
funding from any organization subordinate to the Central
Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party,'' or
``provides support to any security, defense, police, or
intelligence organization of the Government of the People's
Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party.''\9\
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\9\Id. at Sec. 2(a)(1).
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The third prong of H.R. 1516's ``Chinese entity of
concern'' test is at once vague and overbroad. Committee
Democrats are concerned such language would require
considerable insight into internal Chinese government
functions, which would be a burdensome exercise for all
educational institutions but especially for those that are
under-resourced.
Determining whether a university located in China
``provides any support to . . . police . . . of the Government
of the People's Republic of China,'' which would deem that
university a ``Chinese entity of concern'' under H.R. 1516,
would require DHS and educational institutions to have insight
into police investigations and public safety policies at
China's more than 3,000 universities. For example, this
legislation would be triggered by any support to Chinese
government police, even support for a criminal investigation
such as a crime of violence against a U.S. study-abroad
student. That absurd result was recognized by H.R. 1516's
author, Representative August Pfluger, who claimed during the
Committee's November 8, 2023, markup that the legislation's use
of ``support'' somehow means ``monetary relationship,'' a term
that neither appears in the bill nor was offered by
Representative Pfluger as an amendment.
Moreover, whether a university located in China ``is
involved in the implementation of military-civil fusion'' or
``participates in the Chinese defense industrial base'' also
requires considerable insight into internal Chinese government
functions. In fact, a rigorous study into relationships between
Chinese universities and the Chinese defense industrial base
conducted by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at
Georgetown University concluded that ``it appears that the vast
majority of civilian universities in China maintain at least
some connection to the country's defense industry.''\10\ The
vague three-part test in H.R. 1516, therefore, would appear to
deem every university in China an ``entity of concern.'' If
that is the legislation's intent, H.R. 1516 should say as much
and not leave DHS and universities that seek DHS funds guessing
at the bill's intent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\Ryan Fedasiuk & Emily S. Weinstein, Universities and the
Chinese Defense Technology Workforce 4 (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To aid U.S. institutions and DHS in identifying
relationships with a ``Chinese entity of concern,'' Ranking
Member Thompson offered an amendment that would limit H.R.
1516's funding prohibition to U.S. institutions that have a
relationship with a Confucius Institute, which is commonly
identifiable, and establishes a reporting requirement for
institutions that have relationships with a ``Chinese entity of
concern,'' as the term is vague and overbroad. In addition to
the reporting requirement, the Thompson amendment required DHS
to provide technical assistance to colleges and universities in
carrying out this requirement with particular attention to
historically Black colleges and universities and other
minority-serving institutions. Committee Republicans rejected
the Thompson amendment.
THE LACK OF DISCRETION FOR A WAVIER IS DAMAGING
Unlike language adopted in the FY 2019 and 2021 NDAAs
directed at the Secretary of Defense, H.R. 1516 does not
provide the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to issue a
waiver from funding restrictions, should the Secretary deem it
is in the interest of America's national security. The failure
to provide such waiver authority would prevent the Secretary
from issuing a waiver even in furtherance of a
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, or counterespionage
mission. As a result, H.R. 1516 undermines DHS's
counterterrorism and economic security missions under the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended.
To prevent H.R. 1516 from undermining homeland security and
DHS's mission, Ranking Member Thompson offered an amendment
providing the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to waive
the funding prohibition on a case-by-case basis and for not
longer than one year. Committee Republicans rejected the
Thompson amendment.
H.R. 1516 has a commendable goal to prevent the People's
Republic of China from investing in U.S. institutions of higher
education in hopes of gaining a return on its investment
through undue influence, undermining of academic freedom, or
theft of research or intellectual property. This Committee is
capable of bipartisan consensus in furtherance of securing the
homeland from foreign influence, as we did in the 117th
Congress by unanimously reporting out of Committee H.R. 7779,
as amended. Unfortunately, with this legislation,
Representative Pfluger and Committee Republicans rejected this
Committee's past bipartisan work in favor of a vague and
overbroad H.R. 1516 that would not only burden U.S.
institutions of higher education but also make the homeland
less secure.
Bennie G. Thompson.
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