[House Report 118-296]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


118th Congress    }                                      {      Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session      }                                      {     118-296

======================================================================



 
                PROHIBITING RUSSIAN URANIUM IMPORTS ACT

                                _______
                                

December 1, 2023.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

Mrs. Rodgers of Washington, from the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 1042]

    The Committee on Energy and Commerce, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 1042) to prohibit the importation into the 
United States of unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is 
produced in the Russian Federation, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     3
Background and Need for Legislation..............................     4
Committee Action.................................................     7
Committee Votes..................................................     8
Oversight Findings and Recommendations...........................    11
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures    11
Congressional Budget Office Estimate.............................    11
Federal Mandates Statement.......................................    11
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............    11
Duplication of Federal Programs..................................    11
Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings......................    11
Committee Cost Estimate..........................................    12
Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits.......    12
Advisory Committee Statement.....................................    13
Applicability to Legislative Branch..............................    13
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation...................    13
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    13
Minority Views...................................................    22

    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports 
Act''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE USEC PRIVATIZATION ACT.

  (a) Prohibition on Imports.--Section 3112A of the USEC Privatization 
Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10a) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
  ``(d) Prohibition on Imports of Low-Enriched Uranium.--
          ``(1) Prohibition.--Beginning on the date that is 90 days 
        after the date of enactment of this subsection, and subject to 
        paragraphs (2) and (3), no unirradiated low-enriched uranium 
        that is produced in the Russian Federation may be imported into 
        the United States.
          ``(2) Waiver.--
                  ``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the 
                Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary 
                of State and the Secretary of Commerce, may waive 
                application of paragraph (1) to authorize the 
                importation of unirradiated low-enriched uranium that 
                is produced in the Russian Federation if the Secretary 
                of Energy determines that--
                          ``(i) no alternative viable source of low-
                        enriched uranium is available to sustain the 
                        continued operation of a nuclear reactor or a 
                        United States nuclear energy company; or
                          ``(ii) importation of low-enriched uranium 
                        that is produced in the Russian Federation is 
                        in the national interest.
                  ``(B) Limitation on amounts of imports of low-
                enriched uranium.--
                          ``(i) In general.--The importation into the 
                        United States of low-enriched uranium, 
                        including low-enriched uranium obtained under 
                        contracts for separative work units, that is 
                        produced in the Russian Federation, whether or 
                        not such low-enriched uranium is derived from 
                        highly enriched uranium of weapons origin, may 
                        not exceed--
                                  ``(I) in calendar year 2023, 578,877 
                                kilograms;
                                  ``(II) in calendar year 2024, 476,536 
                                kilograms;
                                  ``(III) in calendar year 2025, 
                                470,376 kilograms;
                                  ``(IV) in calendar year 2026, 464,183 
                                kilograms; and
                                  ``(V) in calendar year 2027, 459,083 
                                kilograms.
                          ``(ii) Termination.--Any waiver issued under 
                        this subsection shall terminate not later than 
                        January 1, 2028.
                  ``(C) Administration.--The Secretary of Commerce 
                shall--
                          ``(i) administer the import limitations 
                        described in subparagraph (B) in accordance 
                        with the provisions of the Suspension 
                        Agreement, including the provisions described 
                        in subsection (c)(2)(B)(i);
                          ``(ii) be responsible for enforcing the 
                        import limitations described in subparagraph 
                        (B); and
                          ``(iii) enforce the import limitations 
                        described in subparagraph (B) in a manner that 
                        imposes a minimal burden on the commercial 
                        nuclear industry.
                  ``(D) Notification to congress.--Upon issuing a 
                waiver under subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Energy 
                shall submit to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of 
                the House of Representatives, the Committee on Ways and 
                Means of the House of Representatives, the Committee on 
                Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Energy and 
                Natural Resources of the Senate a notification that a 
                waiver has been issued, which shall include 
                identification of the recipient of the waiver.
          ``(3) Applicability.--This subsection does not apply to 
        imports--
                  ``(A) by or under contract to the Department of 
                Energy for national security or nonproliferation 
                purposes, as determined by the Secretary of Energy; or
                  ``(B) of non-uranium isotopes.
          ``(4) Termination.--The provisions of this subsection shall 
        terminate on December 31, 2040.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendments.--
          (1) In general.--Section 3112A(c) of the USEC Privatization 
        Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10a(c)) is amended--
                  (A) in paragraph (2)--
                          (i) in subparagraph (A)--
                                  (I) in clause (viii), by inserting 
                                ``and'' after the semicolon at the end;
                                  (II) in clause (ix), by striking the 
                                semicolon and inserting a period; and
                                  (III) by striking clauses (x) through 
                                (xxvii); and
                          (ii) in subparagraph (C)(i), by striking 
                        ``paragraph (10)'' and inserting ``paragraph 
                        (9)'';
                  (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``United States'' 
                and all that follows through ``for processing'' and 
                inserting ``United States for processing'';
                  (C) by striking paragraph (5);
                  (D) by redesignating paragraphs (6) through (12) as 
                paragraphs (5) through (11), respectively;
                  (E) in paragraph (5), as redesignated by subparagraph 
                (D), by striking ``In addition to the adjustment under 
                paragraph (5)(A), the'' and inserting ``The'';
                  (F) in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (7), as so 
                redesignated, by striking ``paragraph (10)'' and 
                inserting ``paragraph (9)'';
                  (G) in paragraph (8), as so redesignated, by striking 
                ``December 31, 2040'' and inserting ``the date 
                described in subsection (d)(1)''; and
                  (H) in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (9), as so 
                redesignated, by striking ``paragraphs (2)(C) and (8)'' 
                and inserting ``paragraphs (2)(C) and (7)''.
          (2) Effective date.--The amendment to section 
        3112A(c)(2)(A)(x) of the USEC Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 
        2297h-10a(c)(2)(A)(x)) made by paragraph (1)(A) of this 
        subsection shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after 
        the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3. MARKET EVALUATION AND SUPPORT.

  Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Energy shall submit to the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce of the House of Representatives, the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources of the Senate a report that includes--
          (1) an evaluation, with respect to the 5-year period that 
        begins on the date of enactment of this Act, of the anticipated 
        supply of low-enriched uranium (as defined in section 3112A(a) 
        of the USEC Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h-10a(a))) 
        available to replace imports of low-enriched uranium produced 
        in the Russian Federation, taking into account--
                  (A) waivers authorized to be issued under section 
                3112A(d) of the USEC Privatization Act (as added by 
                section 2 of this Act);
                  (B) private and government inventories of low-
                enriched uranium;
                  (C) market demand for low-enriched uranium products; 
                and
                  (D) current orders and announced plans for expansion 
                of low-enriched uranium production capacity, including 
                domestic production capacity; and
          (2) a description of proposed Department of Energy 
        assistance, if the Secretary determines such assistance is 
        needed based on the evaluation under paragraph (1), to support 
        the expansion of domestic low-enriched uranium production 
        capacity sufficient to meet domestic market demand for low-
        enriched uranium, taking into consideration--
                  (A) market competition for low-enriched uranium 
                production services;
                  (B) low-enriched uranium supply diversity; and
                  (C) the long-term uranium fuel supply needs of the 
                United States.

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 1042 would amend the USEC Privatization Act to 
prohibit the importation into the United States of 
unirradiated, low-enriched uranium that is produced in the 
Russian Federation.
    H.R. 1042 would provide a date certain, after which no 
Russian-sourced unirradiated, low-enriched uranium\1\ will be 
available for U.S. nuclear reactors through at least 2040. This 
would create the market conditions for the long-term commercial 
contracts that domestic fuel producers need to invest in new 
U.S. supply capacity, including uranium conversion and 
enrichment capacity, which has atrophied substantially over the 
past decade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Unirradiated, or fresh, fuel has not yet been used in a reactor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To reduce supply disruption risks and to allow time for new 
production capacity to come on-line, H.R. 1042 would provide 
the Secretary of Energy waiver authority through 2027 to 
authorize certain imports of such low-enriched uranium, subject 
to specific limits, if no alternative source of the uranium is 
available to sustain U.S. nuclear operations or if such imports 
are in the public interest. (The prohibition on imports would 
not apply to imports for national security purposes.) In 
addition, H.R. 1042 would require the Secretary to conduct a 
thorough market evaluation of the anticipated supply of low-
enriched uranium, to determine what, if any, U.S. federal 
assistance may be needed to support expansion of production 
capacity sufficient to replace Russian supplies.

                  Background and Need for Legislation

    Russia's invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the looming 
threat to global energy security created by dependence on 
Russian-supplied fuels. The threat extends beyond oil and gas 
to include reliance on Russian-sourced enriched uranium for the 
U.S. nuclear fuel market.
    With production capacity that far outstrips its own 
domestic requirements and a vertically integrated, state-owned 
system that excludes external competition, Russia maintains an 
influential position in global nuclear fuel supply chains, 
particularly in uranium conversion and enrichment--two 
essential processing steps in the production of nuclear fuels 
for reactors. It is the largest enricher, with about 46 percent 
of global capacity. It maintains roughly 20 percent of global 
uranium conversion capacity and has been supplying some 40 
percent of conversion services, including to the United 
States.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\For general data on global capacities see World Nuclear 
Association at https://world-
nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.K. and European Union's enrichment capacity is also 
substantially larger than European domestic requirements and 
provides a large portion of conversion and enrichment services 
to the U.S. market.\3\ By contrast, while the United States 
maintains the largest market globally for nuclear fuels, its 
current domestic enrichment capacity can supply just 30 percent 
of domestic fuel requirements at present. Its one conversion 
facility is restarting and will be able to supply the 
equivalent of about 40 percent of U.S. market demand in the 
near term.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\A Canadian supplier also provides substantial conversion 
services.
    \4\Honeywell's ConverDyn Metropolis Works facility, the only U.S. 
uranium conversion facility, had shuttered in 2017 due to a collapse in 
market prices, but has restarted in 2023 to previous production levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The size of Russian state-owned enrichment capacity, along 
with its large enriched-uranium inventories, enables it to 
export enriched uranium products at prices that would undercut 
allied and domestic producers, to the detriment of domestic 
supply chains, as U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) 
investigations have repeatedly found over the past 30 years.\5\ 
In point of fact, this past March 2023, the ITC's five year 
review of uranium from Russia found that, absent current import 
limits, Russian suppliers would likely undersell domestic 
supplies and depress prices, to the detriment of U.S. supply 
chains.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\See Uranium from Russia: Investigation No. 731-TA-539-C (Fifth 
Review), U.S. International Trade Administration, March 2023 Publican 
5416.
    \6\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given Russia's long-standing ability to flood markets and 
undercut prices--and indications it would do so if provided the 
opportunity--the United States has established import limits on 
Russian-sourced uranium fuels.\7\ Yet under these limits, the 
United States continues to import more than 20 percent of 
enriched uranium from Russia's state-owned nuclear power 
company, Rosatom and its subsidiary Tenex.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\The limits were established in the so-called Russian Suspension 
agreement, first established in 1992, the continuance of which was 
signed in October 2020. See https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/FR-2020-10-09/pdf/2020-22431.pdf. In addition, Congress has 
enacted the import limits into law, in the USEC Privatization Act, 
updating the October limits in the Energy Act of 2020. H.R. 1042 is 
amending these statutory limits.
    \8\Under the Russian Suspension Agreement, Russia is scheduled to 
export to U.S. utilities and fuel brokers the equivalent of 24% of U.S. 
domestic supply in 2023. This limit declines to 20% of the market in 
2024 and down to 15% of the market in 2028 through 2040.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Meanwhile, for a variety of reasons, the U.S. domestic 
nuclear fuel supply chain atrophied over the past decade. 
Nuclear fuel market disruptions in the wake of Japanese and 
German nuclear reactor shutdowns following the Fukushima 
accident in 2011, as well as U.S. reactor shutdowns over the 
past decade, depressed global nuclear fuel demand and 
undermined domestic uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment 
services as market prices for uranium product collapsed. This 
eroded U.S. domestic nuclear fuel infrastructure--and created a 
vulnerability to supply disruptions and dependence on cheap 
Russian fuels.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\USEC (now Centrus Energy) ceased enrichment operations in 2013; 
The French nuclear fuel cycle company AREVA (now Orano) canceled plans 
to build an enrichment facility in the United States, and GLE, or 
Global Laser Enrichment, had slowed efforts to commercialize new 
enrichment technology in the United States due to market conditions, 
ITC's Fifth Review reports. Op. Cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Russian invasion of Ukraine raises concerns that access 
to Russian supplies may cease without adequate new capacity to 
fill the gap.\10\ The impacts of Russian cut-off would not be 
immediate, given the long lead times of nuclear refueling, 
current utility and U.S. government stocks, and Western 
movement to take actions to wean off of Russian supplies have 
been mitigating supply risks.\11\ Nevertheless, more capacity 
from U.S. and Western producers is necessary before the end of 
the decade to eliminate vulnerabilities, and to meet increasing 
demand, including for advanced reactors. As the Department of 
Energy's (DOE's) top nuclear energy official stated in 
testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\Continuing reliance on Russian fuels also raises concerns about 
U.S. industry revenues supporting Rosatom, which helps finance the 
Ukraine War and China's nuclear weapons breakout. See Catherine Belton, 
``Russia's state nuclear company aids war effort, leading to calls for 
sanctions,'' The Washington Post, January 20, 2023, and March 16, 2023, 
letter to the Honorable Jake Sullivan, Assistant to the President for 
National Security, from House Armed Services Committee Chair Mike D. 
Rogers, Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Michael McCaul, and Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligency Chair Michael R. Turner.
    \11\U.S. reactors typically maintain working inventories of fuel to 
cover a refuel every 18 to 24 months. There are additional liquid 
inventories that could also cover short-term domestic gaps from loss of 
Russian imports, including U.S. utility surplus inventories, American 
Assured Fuel Supply, MOX backup, Asian inventories, contract 
restructuring, and enrichment optimization (reversal of underfeeding), 
according to public information compiled by Urenco USA. Meantime, DOE 
reported to Congress that ``ConverDyn could increase capacity from 7 
million kgU to 13 million kgU by late 2024 eliminating shortfalls [from 
Russian cut off] after 2024.''

          Conversion and enrichment services from trusted 
        sources are insufficient to replace current U.S. 
        imports from Russia. Without expansion of the domestic 
        and international allies' and partners' fuel cycle 
        capacity, the United States cannot reliably make 
        sufficient low enriched uranium (LEU) or high-assay LEU 
        (HALEU) available to support the needs of today's power 
        reactor fleet, advanced reactors, research reactors, 
        and medical isotope production facilities. This 
        strategic vulnerability is unsustainable.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\Testimony of Dr. Kathryn Huff, Assistant Secretary of Nuclear 
Energy, Department of Energy, before the Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources, March 9, 2023.

    Restoration of America's domestic nuclear fuel supply chain 
is a national and energy security imperative. A robust nuclear 
sector is essential for the nation's defense and nuclear 
industrial base, for energy security, and the long-term health 
of the domestic nuclear industry. It is key to strengthening 
the geostrategic relationships necessary to compete with Russia 
and China.
    Restoration of America's domestic nuclear fuel supply chain 
requires ending Russia's supply of cheap fuels to the domestic 
market for the long-term, without the prospect of Russia 
reentering the market after the Ukraine war, for example. For 
capacity to be built, ``U.S. suppliers need certainty that 
investments will not be undercut by policy reversal,'' DOE 
states in its Uranium Strategy, presented to Congress. What is 
necessary, DOE states, is ``long term stability in import 
policy.''\13\ This means long-term certainty that, should 
Russia be excluded from U.S. markets, suppliers know there is 
no chance Russia will be back in the market for a long time. 
That certainty would create the market conditions for the long-
term commercial contracts that producers need to invest in 
expanded capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\U.S. DOE Uranium Strategy, presented to congressional 
authorizing and appropriations committees, August, 2022. (Official Use 
Only.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Restoration also takes time for new capacity to be built. 
Investment decisions must be made well in advance of needed 
capacity. Fortunately, provided adequate contracts and demand 
signals, current conversion and enrichment suppliers in the 
United States have the requisite licensing to build out 
capacity to fill the Russian-supply gap.\14\ Other companies 
are expected to join the competition for supplying U.S. nuclear 
demand, provided appropriate market certainty.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\For example, Honeywell's ConverDyn uranium conversion facility, 
Centrus Energy's enrichment facility, and Urenco USA's enrichment 
facility all have Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses that allow 
expansion to capacity to meet U.S. needs.
    \15\Global Laser Enrichment, already under the contract with the 
Department of Energy to produce fuel from depleted uranium, has signed 
engagement letters with three major American utilities in support of 
its emerging technology and diversity of domestic enrichment supplies. 
See https://www.gle-us.com/news/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee recognizes that, for advanced nuclear fuels--
the so-called high assay, low enriched uranium or HALEU fuels--
there is a federal role to assist with buildout. Because there 
is no domestic HALEU infrastructure, and the future market 
demand is uncertain, the Committee developed legislation 
authorizing the Department of Energy to stand up a program to 
support building capacity for these fuels, in coordination with 
the private sector. The 116th Congress enacted this 
legislation, the Advanced Nuclear Fuel Availability program, in 
the Energy Act of 2020. Although the program has been plagued 
by delay, it provides an essential framework upon which DOE, 
and Congress, may continue to assist developing an advanced 
fuel infrastructure.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\Current legislative proposals in the House and Senate 
concerning nuclear fuel security provide direction to DOE consistent 
with this framework. Notably, Centrus Energy, with DOE support under 
the program, expects to be producing HALEU in 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The role for federal support for conventional low-enriched 
uranium (LEU) used to supply the existing fleet of U.S. 
reactors requires closer scrutiny. The existing, multi-billion-
dollar market for LEU is well-developed. It would not need the 
type of taxpayer support that HALEU infrastructure may require, 
because there already is a mature market and identifiable 
demand.
    The DOE's proposal to purchase LEU for existing reactors 
and then resell it to utilities\17\ risks distorting pricing 
and the orderly signals of mature supply and demand. While this 
may be a workable approach for incentivizing HALEU for advanced 
reactors, for the existing fleet it creates a dynamic where 
utilities will be bidding against DOE for limited supply of 
fuel, which will drive up costs and increase scarcity of an 
already challenged fuel supply. ``Simply creating demand-side 
pressure is not constructive in an already constrained 
market,'' one industry official explained to the Committee in 
testimony.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\Uranium Strategy, op cit.
    \18\June 6, 2023, Response to questions for the record by Regis 
Repko, Senior Vice President, Generation and Transmission Strategy, 
Duke Energy, for hearing entitled: ``American Nuclear Energy Expansion: 
Powering a Clean and Secure Future,'' Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, 
and Grid Security, April 19, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee finds that, while targeted DOE support may be 
necessary, the most important action to address the urgency of 
Russian threats and the imperative to build out capacity is to 
establish that, after a date certain, Russian sourced LEU will 
not be allowed into U.S. markets. The U.S. industry generally 
relies on long-term contracting, and operates with long-term 
horizons, which means market signals and forecasts become 
increasingly important as the market rebalances away from 
Russian sources.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\See International Trade Commission, Post-Preliminary Analysis 
Memorandum in the 2017-2108 Administrative Review of the Agreement 
Suspending the Antidumping Investigation of Uranium from the Russian 
Federation, June 17, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To protect taxpayers and ensure the benefits of efficient 
market response to supply constraints, the appropriate sequence 
of Congressional action is first to create the long-term 
certainty that Russian fuels will not enter the U.S. market. 
This allows accurate evaluation of the market response, and 
other priorities for nuclear infrastructure, to identify what, 
if any, additional federal support is necessary to assist 
diverse and adequate capacity expansion.
    H.R. 1042, as amended and reported by the Committee, would 
take this approach. It would provide the appropriate market 
signal, waivers to allow time to transition to U.S. and Western 
supplies, and a timely evaluation to identify where, if 
necessary, federal and taxpayer assistance is needed. It would 
provide the information for targeted, appropriate assistance. 
The Committee disagrees with the view that infrastructure must 
be constructed before a ban can be put in place. This gets the 
sequencing backwards and risks market distortions and taxpayer 
waste.
    H.R. 1042 would establish the market conditions that would 
responsibly secure our supply chains, protect taxpayers, and 
ensure a robust nuclear future.

                            Committee Action

    On February 7, 2023, the Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, 
and Grid Security and the Subcommittee on Environment, 
Manufacturing, and Critical Materials held a joint hearing on 
17 pieces of legislation, including a discussion draft that 
would become H.R. 1042. The title of the hearing was 
``Unleashing American Energy, Lowering Energy Costs, and 
Strengthening Supply Chains.'' The Subcommittees received 
testimony from:
           The Honorable Mark Menezes, Former United 
        States Deputy Secretary of Energy, Department of 
        Energy;
           The Honorable Bernard McNamee, Former 
        Commissioner, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;
           Jeffrey Eshelman, II, President and Chief 
        Executive Officer, Independent Petroleum Association of 
        America;
           Katie Sweeney, Executive Vice President and 
        Chief Operating Officer, National Mining Association;
           Raul Garcia, Legislative Director for 
        Healthy Communities, Earthjustice; and
           Tyson Slocum, Director of the Energy 
        Program, Public Citizen.
    H.R. 1042, Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, was 
introduced by Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA) and Rep. 
Robert E. Latta (R-Ohio) on February 14, 2023.
    On May 16, 2023, the Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and 
Grid Security met in open markup session and forwarded H.R. 
1042, with amendment, to the full Committee by a record vote of 
18 yeas and 12 nays.
    On May 24, 2023, the full Committee on Energy and Commerce 
met in open markup session and ordered H.R. 1042 favorably 
reported, as amended, to the House by a record vote of 29 yeas 
and 21 nays.

                            Committee Votes

    Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the 
record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments 
thereto. The following reflects the record votes taken during 
the Committee consideration:

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                 Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    Pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of 
rule XIII, the Committee held hearings and made findings that 
are reflected in this report.

   New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII, the Committee 
finds that H.R. 1042 would result in no new or increased budget 
authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or 
revenues.

                  Congressional Budget Office Estimate

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII, at the time this 
report was filed, the cost estimate prepared by the Director of 
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not available.

                       Federal Mandates Statement

    The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal 
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act.

         Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general 
performance goal or objective of this legislation is to ensure 
there is an adequate and reliable supply of critical energy 
resources that are essential to the energy security of the 
United States.

                    Duplication of Federal Programs

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no provision of 
H.R. 1042 is known to be duplicative of another Federal 
program, including any program that was included in a report to 
Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139 or the 
most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.

              Related Committee and Subcommittee Hearings

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII, the following 
related hearings were used to develop or consider H.R. 1042:
           On January 31, 2023, the Committee on Energy 
        and Commerce held an oversight hearing entitled, 
        ``American Energy Expansion: Strengthening Economic, 
        Environmental, and National Security.'' The Committee 
        received testimony from:
                   The Honorable Paul Dabbar, 
                Former Under Secretary of Energy, Department of 
                Energy;
                   Robert McNalley, President, 
                Rapidan Energy Group, LLC;
                   Donna Jackson, Director of 
                Membership Development--National Center for 
                Public Policy Research, Project 21; and
                   Ana Unruh Cohen, Former Majority 
                Staff Director, U.S. House Select Committee on 
                the Climate Crisis.
           On February 7, 2023, the Subcommittee on 
        Energy, Climate, and Grid Security and the Subcommittee 
        on Environment, Manufacturing, and Critical Materials 
        held a joint legislative hearing entitled, ``Unleashing 
        American Energy, Lowering Energy Costs, and 
        Strengthening Supply Chains,'' on 17 pieces of 
        legislation, including a discussion draft that would 
        become H.R. 1042. The Subcommittees received testimony 
        from:
                   The Honorable Mark Menezes, 
                Former United States Deputy Secretary of 
                Energy, Department of Energy;
                   The Honorable Bernard McNamee, 
                Former Commissioner, Federal Energy Regulatory 
                Commission;
                   Jeffrey Eshelman, II, President 
                and Chief Executive Officer, Independent 
                Petroleum Association of America;
                   Katie Sweeney, Executive Vice 
                President and Chief Operating Officer, National 
                Mining Association;
                   Raul Garcia, Legislative 
                Director for Healthy Communities, Earthjustice; 
                and
                   Tyson Slocum, Director of the 
                Energy Program, Public Citizen.
           On April 18, 2023, the Subcommittee on 
        Energy, Climate, and Grid Security held an oversight 
        hearing entitled, ``American Nuclear Energy Expansion: 
        Powering a Clean and Secure Future.'' The Subcommittee 
        received testimony from:
                   Jess C. Gehin, Ph.D., Associate 
                Laboratory Director, Nuclear Science and 
                Technology, Idaho National Laboratory;
                   Regis Repko, Senior Vice 
                President, Generation and Transmission, Duke 
                Energy;
                   Jeremy Harrell, Board of 
                Directors Chair, U.S. Nuclear Industry Council 
                and Chief Strategy Officer, ClearPath; and
                   Armond Cohen, Executive 
                Director, Clean Air Task Force.
           On May 11, 2023, the Subcommittee on Energy, 
        Climate, and Grid Security held an oversight hearing 
        entitled, ``The Fiscal Year 2024 Department of Energy 
        Budget.'' The Committee received testimony from:
                   The Honorable Jennifer Granholm, 
                Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy.

                        Committee Cost Estimate

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee 
adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by the Director of 
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974. At the time this report was 
filed, the estimate was not available.

       Earmark, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits

    Pursuant to clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI, the 
Committee finds that H.R. 1042 contains no earmarks, limited 
tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits.

                      Advisory Committee Statement

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                  Applicability to Legislative Branch

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to 
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of section 
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.

             Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation


Section 1. Short title

    Section 1 provides that the Act may be cites as the 
``Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act.''

Section 2. Amendments to the USEC Privatization Act

    Section 2 amends the USEC Privatization Act to prohibit the 
importation of unirradiated, low-enriched uranium that is 
produced in the Russian Federation. The prohibition begins 90 
days after enactment of the Act. The provision provides waiver 
authority until January 2028 to the Secretary of Energy to 
authorize the importation of such uranium, subject to certain 
limits specified in the text, if no alternative, viable source 
of low-enriched uranium is available to sustain U.S. nuclear 
reactor or U.S. nuclear company operations or is determined to 
be in the national interest. This prohibition would not apply 
to imports of non-uranium isotopes or certain imports for 
national security or nonproliferation purposes. The prohibition 
terminates on December 31, 2040.

Section 3. Market evaluation and support

    Section 3 directs the Secretary of Energy to submit to 
Congress an evaluation of anticipated low-enriched uranium 
supplies to replace Russian supplies and proposed Department of 
Energy assistance, if determined necessary, to support 
expansion of domestic low-enriched uranium production capacity 
sufficient to meet domestic demand, accounting for market 
competition, supply diversity, and long-term fuel supply needs 
of the United States.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no 
change is proposed is shown in roman):

                         USEC PRIVATIZATION ACT




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
                   TITLE III--RESCISSIONS AND OFFSETS


                CHAPTER 1--ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT


Subchapter A--United States Enrichment Corporation Privatization

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 3112A. INCENTIVES FOR ADDITIONAL DOWNBLENDING OF HIGHLY ENRICHED 
                    URANIUM BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Completion of the russian heu agreement.--The 
        term ``completion of the Russian HEU Agreement'' means 
        the importation into the United States from the Russian 
        Federation pursuant to the Russian HEU Agreement of 
        uranium derived from the downblending of not less than 
        500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium of weapons 
        origin.
          (2) Downblending.--The term ``downblending'' means 
        processing highly enriched uranium into a uranium 
        product in any form in which the uranium contains less 
        than 20 percent uranium-235.
          (3) Highly enriched uranium.--The term ``highly 
        enriched uranium'' has the meaning given that term in 
        section 3102(4).
          (4) Highly enriched uranium of weapons origin.--The 
        term ``highly enriched uranium of weapons origin'' 
        means highly enriched uranium that--
                  (A) contains 90 percent or more uranium-235; 
                and
                  (B) is verified by the Secretary of Energy to 
                be of weapons origin.
          (5) Low-enriched uranium.--The term ``low-enriched 
        uranium'' means a uranium product in any form, 
        including uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and 
        uranium oxide (UO2), in which the uranium 
        contains less than 20 percent uranium-235, including 
        natural uranium, without regard to whether the uranium 
        is incorporated into fuel rods or complete fuel 
        assemblies.
          (6) Russian heu agreement.--The term ``Russian HEU 
        Agreement'' has the meaning given that term in section 
        3102(11).
          (7) Suspension agreement.--The term ``Suspension 
        Agreement'' has the meaning given that term in section 
        3102(13).
          (8) Uranium-235.--The term ``uranium-235'' means the 
        isotope U.
  (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
States--
          (1) to support the continued downblending of highly 
        enriched uranium of weapons origin in the Russian 
        Federation in order to protect the essential security 
        interests of the United States with respect to the 
        nonproliferation of nuclear weapons;
          (2) to reduce reliance on uranium imports in order to 
        protect essential national security interests;
          (3) to revive and strengthen the supply chain for 
        nuclear fuel produced and used in the United States; 
        and
          (4) to expand production of nuclear fuel in the 
        United States.
  (c) Promotion of Downblending of Russian Highly Enriched 
Uranium.--
          (1) Completion of the russian heu agreement.--Prior 
        to the completion of the Russian HEU Agreement, the 
        importation into the United States of low-enriched 
        uranium, including low-enriched uranium obtained under 
        contracts for separative work units, that is produced 
        in the Russian Federation and is not imported pursuant 
        to the Russian HEU Agreement, may not exceed the 
        following amounts:
                  (A) In the 4-year period beginning with 
                calendar year 2008, 16,559 kilograms.
                  (B) In calendar year 2012, 24,839 kilograms.
                  (C) In calendar year 2013 and each calendar 
                year thereafter through the calendar year of 
                the completion of the Russian HEU Agreement, 
                41,398 kilograms.
          (2) Incentives to continue downblending russian 
        highly enriched uranium after the completion of the 
        russian heu agreement.--
                  (A) In general.--After the completion of the 
                Russian HEU Agreement, the importation into the 
                United States of low-enriched uranium, 
                including low-enriched uranium obtained under 
                contracts for separative work units, that is 
                produced in the Russian Federation, whether or 
                not such low-enriched uranium is derived from 
                highly enriched uranium of weapons origin, may 
                not exceed--
                          (i) in calendar year 2014, 485,279 
                        kilograms;
                          (ii) in calendar year 2015, 455,142 
                        kilograms;
                          (iii) in calendar year 2016, 480,146 
                        kilograms;
                          (iv) in calendar year 2017, 490,710 
                        kilograms;
                          (v) in calendar year 2018, 492,731 
                        kilograms;
                          (vi) in calendar year 2019, 509,058 
                        kilograms;
                          (vii) in calendar year 2020, 514,754 
                        kilograms;
                          (viii) in calendar year 2021, 596,682 
                        kilograms; and
                          (ix) in calendar year 2022, 489,617 
                        kilograms[;].
                          [(x) in calendar year 2023, 578,877 
                        kilograms;
                          [(xi) in calendar year 2024, 476,536 
                        kilograms;
                          [(xii) in calendar year 2025, 470,376 
                        kilograms;
                          [(xiii) in calendar year 2026, 
                        464,183 kilograms;
                          [(xiv) in calendar year 2027, 459,083 
                        kilograms;
                          [(xv) in calendar year 2028, 344,312 
                        kilograms;
                          [(xvi) in calendar year 2029, 340,114 
                        kilograms;
                          [(xvii) in calendar year 2030, 
                        332,141 kilograms;
                          [(xviii) in calendar year 2031, 
                        328,862 kilograms;
                          [(xix) in calendar year 2032, 322,255 
                        kilograms;
                          [(xx) in calendar year 2033, 317,536 
                        kilograms;
                          [(xxi) in calendar year 2034, 298,088 
                        kilograms;
                          [(xxii) in calendar year 2035, 
                        294,511 kilograms;
                          [(xxiii) in calendar year 2036, 
                        286,066 kilograms;
                          [(xxiv) in calendar year 2037, 
                        281,272 kilograms;
                          [(xxv) in calendar year 2038, 277,124 
                        kilograms;
                          [(xxvi) in calendar year 2039, 
                        277,124 kilograms; and
                          [(xxvii) in calendar year 2040, 
                        267,685 kilograms.]
                  (B) Administration.--
                          (i) In general.--The Secretary of 
                        Commerce shall administer the import 
                        limitations described in subparagraph 
                        (A) in accordance with the provisions 
                        of the Suspension Agreement, 
                        including--
                                  (I) the limitations on sales 
                                of enriched uranium product and 
                                separative work units plus 
                                conversion, in amounts 
                                determined in accordance with 
                                Section IV.B.1 of the 
                                Suspension Agreement (as 
                                amended by the amendment 
                                published in the Federal 
                                Register on October 9, 2020 (85 
                                Fed. Reg. 64112));
                                  (II) the export limit 
                                allocations set forth in 
                                Appendix 5 of the Suspension 
                                Agreement (as so amended);
                                  (III) the requirements for 
                                natural uranium returned feed 
                                associated with imports of low-
                                enriched uranium, including 
                                pursuant to sales of 
                                enrichment, with or without 
                                conversion, from the Russian 
                                Federation, as set forth in 
                                Section IV.B.1 of the 
                                Suspension Agreement (as so 
                                amended);
                                  (IV) any other provisions of 
                                the Suspension Agreement (as so 
                                amended); and
                                  (V) any related 
                                administrative guidance issued 
                                by the Department of Commerce.
                          (ii) Effect of termination of 
                        suspension agreement.--Clause (i) shall 
                        remain in effect if the Suspension 
                        Agreement is terminated.
                  (C) Additional imports in exchange for a 
                commitment to downblend an additional 300 
                metric tons of highly enriched uranium.--
                          (i) In general.--In addition to the 
                        amount authorized to be imported under 
                        subparagraph (A) and except as provided 
                        in clause (ii), if the Russian 
                        Federation enters into a bilateral 
                        agreement with the United States under 
                        which the Russian Federation agrees to 
                        downblend an additional 300 metric tons 
                        of highly enriched uranium after the 
                        completion of the Russian HEU 
                        Agreement, 4 kilograms of low-enriched 
                        uranium, whether or not such low-
                        enriched uranium is derived from highly 
                        enriched uranium of weapons origin and 
                        including low-enriched uranium obtained 
                        under contracts for separative work 
                        units, may be imported in a calendar 
                        year for every 1 kilogram of Russian 
                        highly enriched uranium of weapons 
                        origin that was downblended in the 
                        preceding calendar year, subject to the 
                        verification of the Secretary of Energy 
                        under [paragraph (10)] paragraph (9).
                          (ii) Maximum annual imports.--Not 
                        more than 120,000 kilograms of low-
                        enriched uranium may be imported in a 
                        calendar year under clause (i).
          (3) Exceptions.--The import limitations described in 
        paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply to low-enriched 
        uranium produced in the Russian Federation that is 
        imported into the United States--
                  (A) for use in the initial core of a new 
                nuclear reactor; or
                  (B) for processing and to be certified for 
                reexportation and not for consumption in the 
                United States.
          (4) Limited waiver authority.--
                  (A) In general.--Notwithstanding paragraph 
                (1)(C), if the completion of the Russian HEU 
                Agreement does not occur before December 31, 
                2013, the import limitations under paragraph 
                (1)(C) shall be waived, and low-enriched 
                uranium may be imported into the United States 
                in the quantities specified in paragraph (2) in 
                a calendar year after 2013, if--
                          (i) the Secretary of Energy and the 
                        Secretary of State jointly determine 
                        that--
                                  (I) the failure of the 
                                completion of the Russian HEU 
                                Agreement arises from causes 
                                beyond the control and without 
                                the fault or negligence of the 
                                Government of the Russian 
                                Federation; and
                                  (II) the Government of the 
                                Russian Federation has made 
                                reasonable efforts to avoid and 
                                mitigate the effects of the 
                                failure of the completion of 
                                the Russian HEU Agreement; and
                          (ii) the Secretary of Energy and the 
                        Secretary of State jointly notify 
                        Congress of, and publish in the Federal 
                        Register, the determination under 
                        clause (i) and the reasons for the 
                        determination.
                  (B) Notice and wait.--A waiver under 
                subparagraph (A) may not take effect until the 
                date that is 180 days after the date on which 
                Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of State 
                notify Congress under subparagraph (A)(ii).
                  (C) Termination.--A waiver under subparagraph 
                (A) shall terminate on December 31 of the 
                calendar year with respect to which the 
                Secretary makes the determination under 
                subparagraph (A)(i).
          [(5) Adjustments to import limitations.--
                  [(A) In general.--The import limitations 
                described in paragraph (2)(A) are based on the 
                lower scenario data in the report of the World 
                Nuclear Association entitled ``The Nuclear Fuel 
                Report: Global Scenarios for Demand and Supply 
                Availability 2019-2040''. In each of calendar 
                years 2023, 2029, and 2035, the Secretary of 
                Commerce shall review the projected demand for 
                uranium for nuclear reactors in the United 
                States and adjust the import limitations 
                described in paragraph (2)(A) to account for 
                changes in such demand in years after the year 
                in which that report or a subsequent report is 
                published.
                  [(B) Report required.--Not later than one 
                year after the date of the enactment of the 
                Energy Act of 2020, and every 3 years 
                thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to 
                Congress a report that includes--
                          [(i) a recommendation on the use of 
                        all publicly available data to ensure 
                        accurate forecasting by scenario data 
                        to comport to actual demand for low-
                        enriched uranium for nuclear reactors 
                        in the United States; and
                          [(ii) an identification of the steps 
                        to be taken to adjust the import 
                        limitations described in paragraph 
                        (2)(A) based on the most accurate 
                        scenario data.
                  [(C) Incentive adjustment.--Beginning in the 
                second calendar year after the calendar year of 
                the completion of the Russian HEU Agreement, 
                the Secretary of Energy shall increase or 
                decrease the amount of low-enriched uranium 
                that may be imported in a calendar year under 
                paragraph (2)(C) (including the amount of low-
                enriched uranium that may be imported for each 
                kilogram of highly enriched uranium downblended 
                under paragraph (2)(B)(i)) by a percentage 
                equal to the percentage increase or decrease, 
                as the case may be, in the average amount of 
                uranium loaded into nuclear power reactors in 
                the United States in the most recent 3-
                calendar-year period for which data are 
                available, as reported by the Energy 
                Information Administration of the Department of 
                Energy, compared to the average amount of 
                uranium loaded into such reactors during the 3-
                calendar-year period beginning on January 1, 
                2011, as reported by the Energy Information 
                Administration.
                  [(D) Publication of adjustments.--As soon as 
                practicable, but not later than July 31 of each 
                calendar year, the Secretary of Energy shall 
                publish in the Federal Register the amount of 
                low-enriched uranium that may be imported in 
                the current calendar year after the adjustments 
                under subparagraph (C).]
          [(6)] (5) Authority for additional adjustment.--[In 
        addition to the adjustment under paragraph (5)(A), the] 
        The Secretary of Commerce may adjust the import 
        limitations under paragraph (2)(A) for a calendar year 
        if the Secretary--
                  (A) in consultation with the Secretary of 
                Energy, determines that the available supply of 
                low-enriched uranium and the available 
                stockpiles of uranium of the Department of 
                Energy are insufficient to meet demand in the 
                United States in the following calendar year; 
                and
                  (B) notifies Congress of the adjustment not 
                less than 45 days before making the adjustment.
          [(7)] (6) Equivalent quantities of low-enriched 
        uranium imports.--
                  (A) In general.--The import limitations 
                described in paragraphs (1) and (2) are 
                expressed in terms of uranium containing 4.4 
                percent uranium-235 and a tails assay of 0.3 
                percent.
                  (B) Adjustment for other uranium.--Imports of 
                low-enriched uranium under paragraphs (1) and 
                (2), including low-enriched uranium obtained 
                under contracts for separative work units, 
                shall count against the import limitations 
                described in such paragraphs in amounts 
                calculated as the quantity of low-enriched 
                uranium containing 4.4 percent uranium-235 
                necessary to equal the total amount of uranium-
                235 contained in such imports.
          [(8)] (7) Downblending of other highly enriched 
        uranium.--
                  (A) In general.--The downblending of highly 
                enriched uranium not of weapons origin may be 
                counted for purposes of paragraph (2)(C, 
                subject to verification under [paragraph (10)] 
                paragraph (9), if the Secretary of Energy 
                determines that the highly enriched uranium to 
                be downblended poses a risk to the national 
                security of the United States.
                  (B) Equivalent quantities of highly enriched 
                uranium.--For purposes of determining the 
                additional low-enriched uranium imports allowed 
                under paragraph (2)(C), highly enriched uranium 
                not of weapons origin downblended pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A) shall count as downblended 
                highly enriched uranium of weapons origin in 
                amounts calculated as the quantity of highly 
                enriched uranium containing 90 percent uranium-
                235 necessary to equal the total amount of 
                uranium-235 contained in the highly enriched 
                uranium not of weapons origin downblended 
                pursuant to subparagraph (A).
          [(9)] (8) Termination of import restrictions.--The 
        provisions of this subsection shall terminate on 
        [December 31, 2040] the date described in subsection 
        (d)(1).
          [(10)] (9) Technical verifications by secretary of 
        energy.--
                  (A) In general.--The Secretary of Energy 
                shall verify the origin, quantity, and uranium-
                235 content of the highly enriched uranium 
                downblended for purposes of [paragraphs (2)(C) 
                and (8)] paragraphs (2)(C) and (7).
                  (B) Methods of verification.--In conducting 
                the verification required under subparagraph 
                (A), the Secretary of Energy shall employ the 
                transparency measures and access provisions 
                agreed to under the Russian HEU Agreement for 
                monitoring the downblending of Russian highly 
                enriched uranium of weapons origin and such 
                other methods as the Secretary determines 
                appropriate.
          [(11)] (10) Enforcement of import limitations.--The 
        Secretary of Commerce shall be responsible for 
        enforcing the import limitations imposed under this 
        subsection and shall enforce such import limitations in 
        a manner that imposes a minimal burden on the 
        commercial nuclear industry.
          [(12)] (11) Effect on other agreements.--
                  (A) Russian heu agreement.--Nothing in this 
                section shall be construed to modify the terms 
                of the Russian HEU Agreement, including the 
                provisions of the Agreement relating to the 
                amount of low-enriched uranium that may be 
                imported into the United States.
                  (B) Other agreements.--If a provision of any 
                agreement between the United States and the 
                Russian Federation, other than the Russian HEU 
                Agreement or the Suspension Agreement, relating 
                to the importation of low-enriched uranium, 
                including low-enriched uranium obtained under 
                contracts for separative work units, into the 
                United States conflicts with a provision of 
                this section, the provision of this section 
                shall supersede the provision of the agreement 
                to the extent of the conflict.
  (d) Prohibition on Imports of Low-Enriched Uranium.--
          (1) Prohibition.--Beginning on the date that is 90 
        days after the date of enactment of this subsection, 
        and subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), no unirradiated 
        low-enriched uranium that is produced in the Russian 
        Federation may be imported into the United States.
          (2) Waiver.--
                  (A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), 
                the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with 
                the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
                Commerce, may waive application of paragraph 
                (1) to authorize the importation of 
                unirradiated low-enriched uranium that is 
                produced in the Russian Federation if the 
                Secretary of Energy determines that--
                          (i) no alternative viable source of 
                        low-enriched uranium is available to 
                        sustain the continued operation of a 
                        nuclear reactor or a United States 
                        nuclear energy company; or
                          (ii) importation of low-enriched 
                        uranium that is produced in the Russian 
                        Federation is in the national interest.
                  (B) Limitation on amounts of imports of low-
                enriched uranium.--
                          (i) In general.--The importation into 
                        the United States of low-enriched 
                        uranium, including low-enriched uranium 
                        obtained under contracts for separative 
                        work units, that is produced in the 
                        Russian Federation, whether or not such 
                        low-enriched uranium is derived from 
                        highly enriched uranium of weapons 
                        origin, may not exceed--
                                  (I) in calendar year 2023, 
                                578,877 kilograms;
                                  (II) in calendar year 2024, 
                                476,536 kilograms;
                                  (III) in calendar year 2025, 
                                470,376 kilograms;
                                  (IV) in calendar year 2026, 
                                464,183 kilograms; and
                                  (V) in calendar year 2027, 
                                459,083 kilograms.
                          (ii) Termination.--Any waiver issued 
                        under this subsection shall terminate 
                        not later than January 1, 2028.
                  (C) Administration.--The Secretary of 
                Commerce shall--
                          (i) administer the import limitations 
                        described in subparagraph (B) in 
                        accordance with the provisions of the 
                        Suspension Agreement, including the 
                        provisions described in subsection 
                        (c)(2)(B)(i);
                          (ii) be responsible for enforcing the 
                        import limitations described in 
                        subparagraph (B); and
                          (iii) enforce the import limitations 
                        described in subparagraph (B) in a 
                        manner that imposes a minimal burden on 
                        the commercial nuclear industry.
                  (D) Notification to congress.--Upon issuing a 
                waiver under subparagraph (A), the Secretary of 
                Energy shall submit to the Committee on Energy 
                and Commerce of the House of Representatives, 
                the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
                Representatives, the Committee on Finance of 
                the Senate, and the Committee on Energy and 
                Natural Resources of the Senate a notification 
                that a waiver has been issued, which shall 
                include identification of the recipient of the 
                waiver.
          (3) Applicability.--This subsection does not apply to 
        imports--
                  (A) by or under contract to the Department of 
                Energy for national security or 
                nonproliferation purposes, as determined by the 
                Secretary of Energy; or
                  (B) of non-uranium isotopes.
          (4) Termination.--The provisions of this subsection 
        shall terminate on December 31, 2040.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                             MINORITY VIEWS

    We support restrictions on the importation of uranium from 
Russia. However, we need to partner any effort to lessen our 
dependence on Russian uranium with efforts to boost the 
domestic uranium fuel cycle supply chain. Otherwise, we risk 
swapping our dependence on one country for dependence on 
another. Right now, the United States has only one enrichment 
facility that produces roughly one-third of the enriched 
uranium that our domestic nuclear power fleet consumes.
    In testimony before the Energy Subcommittee, Secretary of 
Energy Jennifer Granholm indicated that she would consider a 
ban on Russian uranium if the United States developed its own 
domestic supply of enriched uranium.\1\ The Administration 
underscored the importance of this issue when it included in a 
recent supplemental funding request $2.16 billion to secure the 
nuclear fuel supply chain by supporting the expansion of 
domestic uranium enrichment services. The request states that 
``expanding domestic fuel capacity would require both funding 
and a long-term ban on enriched uranium product imports from 
the Russian Federation into the United States.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\House Committee on Energy & Commerce, Hearing on Fiscal Year 
2024 Department of Energy Budget Request, 118th Cong. (May 11, 2023).
    \2\The White House, Funding Request to Meet Critical Needs, (Oct. 
2023) (www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Funding-Request-
to-Meet-Critical-Needs.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For these reasons, we believe it is critical to pair a ban 
on Russian uranium with support for expanding domestic nuclear 
fuel cycle capabilities.
                                         Frank Pallone Jr.,
                  Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce.

                                  [all]