[House Report 118-151]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


118th Congress }                                          { Report 
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session   }                                          { 118-151

======================================================================
 
                      UNMANNED AERIAL SECURITY ACT

                                _______
                                

 July 19, 2023.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Green of Tennessee, from the Committee on Homeland Security, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 1501]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 1501) to prohibit the Secretary of Homeland 
Security from operating or procuring certain foreign-made 
unmanned aircraft systems, and for other purposes, having 
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     3
Background and Need for Legislation..............................     3
Hearings.........................................................     5
Committee Consideration..........................................     6
Committee Votes..................................................     6
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     6
C.B.O. Estimate, New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and 
  Tax Expenditures...............................................     6
Federal Mandates Statement.......................................     7
Duplicative Federal Programs.....................................     7
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............     7
Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff 
  Benefits.......................................................     7
Advisory Committee Statement.....................................     7
Applicability to Legislative Branch..............................     8
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation...................     8

    The amendment is as follows:
    Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Unmanned Aerial Security Act'' or the 
``UAS Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON OPERATION OR PROCUREMENT OF CERTAIN FOREIGN-MADE 
                    UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.

  (a) Prohibition on Agency Operation or Procurement.--Except as 
provided in subsection (b) and subsection (c)(3), the Secretary of 
Homeland Security may not operate, provide financial assistance for, or 
enter into or renew a contract for the procurement of--
          (1) an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) that--
                  (A) is manufactured in a covered foreign country or 
                by a business entity domiciled in a covered foreign 
                country;
                  (B) uses flight controllers, radios, data 
                transmission devices, cameras, or gimbals manufactured 
                in a covered foreign country or by a business entity 
                domiciled in a covered foreign country;
                  (C) uses a ground control system or operating 
                software developed in a covered foreign country or by a 
                business entity domiciled in a covered foreign country; 
                or
                  (D) uses network connectivity or data storage located 
                in a covered foreign country or administered by a 
                business entity domiciled in a covered foreign country;
          (2) a software operating system associated with a UAS that 
        uses network connectivity or data storage located in a covered 
        foreign country or administered by a business entity domiciled 
        in a covered foreign country; or
          (3) a system for the detection or identification of a UAS, 
        which system is manufactured in a covered foreign country or by 
        a business entity domiciled in a covered foreign country.
  (b) Waiyer.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security is 
        authorized to waive the prohibition under subsection (a) if the 
        Secretary certifies in writing to the Committee on Homeland 
        Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
        Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate that a 
        UAS, a software operating system associated with a UAS, or a 
        system for the detection or identification of a UAS described 
        in any of paragraphs (1) through (3) of such subsection that is 
        the subject of such a waiver is required--
                  (A) in the national interest of the United States;
                  (B) for counter-DAS surrogate research, testing, 
                development, evaluation, or training; or
                  (C) for intelligence, electronic warfare, or 
                information warfare operations, testing, analysis, and 
                or training.
          (2) Notice.--The certification described in paragraph (1) 
        shall be submitted to the Committees specified in such 
        paragraph by not later than the date that is 14 days after the 
        date on which a waiver is issued under such paragraph.
  (c) Effective Dates.--
          (1) In general.--This Act shall take effect on the date that 
        is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
          (2) Waiyer process.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
        shall establish a process by which the head of an office or 
        component of the Department of Homeland Security may request a 
        waiver under subsection (b).
          (3) Exception.--Notwithstanding the prohibition under 
        subsection (a), the head of an office or component of the 
        Department of Homeland Security may continue to operate a UAS, 
        a software operating system associated with a UAS, or a system 
        for the detection or identification of a UAS described in any 
        of paragraphs (1) through (3) of such subsection that was in 
        the inventory of such office or component on the day before the 
        effective date of this Act until--
                  (A) such time as the Secretary of Homeland Security 
                has--
                          (i) granted a waiver relating thereto under 
                        subsection (b); or
                          (ii) declined to grant such a waiver; or
                  (B) one year after the date of the enactment of this 
                Act, whichever is later.
  (d) Drone Origin Security Report to Congress.--Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate a terrorism threat assessment and 
report that contains information relating to the following:
          (1) The extent to which the Department of Homeland Security 
        has previously analyzed the threat that a UAS, a software 
        operating system associated with a UAS, or a system for the 
        detection or identification of a UAS described in any of 
        paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a) operating in the 
        United States poses, and the results of such analysis.
          (2) The number of UAS, software operating systems associated 
        with a UAS, or systems for the detection or identification of a 
        UAS described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3) of 
        subsection (a) in operation by the Department, including an 
        identification of the component or office of the Department at 
        issue, as of such date.
          (3) The extent to which information gathered by a UAS, a 
        software operating system associated with a UAS, or a system 
        for the detection or identification of a UAS described in any 
        of paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a) could be 
        employed to harm the national or economic security of the 
        United States.
  (e) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Business entity.--The term ``business entity'' has the 
        meaning given such term in section 334 of the Graham-Leach-
        Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6764).
          (2) Covered foreign country.--The term ``covered foreign 
        country'' means a country that--
                  (A) the intelligence community has identified as a 
                foreign adversary in its most recent Annual Threat 
                Assessment; or
                  (B) the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
                coordination with the Director of National 
                Intelligence, has identified as a foreign adversary 
                that is not included in such Annual Threat Assessment.
          (3) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of 
        the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
          (4) Unmanned aircraft system; uas.--The terms ``unmanned 
        aircraft system'' and ``UAS'' have the meaning given the term 
        ``unmanned aircraft system'' in section 44801 of title 49, 
        United States Code.

                          PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

    H.R. 1501, the ``Unmanned Aerial Security Act,'' prohibits 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from operating, 
providing financial assistance for, entering into, or renewing 
a contract for any unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), known as 
drones, that are manufactured in certain adversarial foreign 
countries, or by a business entity domiciled in such foreign 
countries. Adversarial foreign countries include those that are 
identified in the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence's February 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the 
U.S. Intelligence Community (which includes the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Iran, and North Korea)\1\ and 
other countries designated by DHS. H.R. 1501 also includes a 
waiver on the prohibition on using or purchasing UAS from 
covered foreign countries after certifying in writing to 
Congress that the UAS, is in the national interest of the 
United States, is needed for counter-UAS research and training, 
or is for intelligence and warfare information testing and 
analysis. Finally, an office or component of DHS may continue 
to use a UAS or system in its supply that would otherwise be 
barred until DHS grants or denies a waiver or until one year 
after this legislation is enacted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat 
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Committee (Feb. 6, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

    The need for this legislation is critical so that DHS may 
protect the United States against potential threats to U.S. 
counterintelligence efforts and critical infrastructure posed 
by UAS that is manufactured in foreign adversarial countries, 
which includes the PRC, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.\2\ The 
PRC poses a particularly acute threat in this space given its 
domination of the global UAS market.\3\ The PRC, led by the 
Chinese Communist Party, aggressively seeks to undermine the 
global rules-based order as well as U.S. interests through 
economic, political, and military power.\4\ This legislation 
aims to safeguard the sensitive data collected by UAS for 
homeland security purposes and combat the PRC's aggressions 
towards the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\Brian Harrell and Travis Moran, The pressing threat of Chinese-
made drones flying above U.S. critical infrastructure, Cyberscoop 
(March 23, 2023) https://cyberscoop.com/chinese-drone-threat-dji-
regulation-critical-infrastructure/.
    \3\Nessa Anwar, World's largest drone maker is unfazed--even if 
it's blacklisted by the U.S. CNBC (Feb. 7, 2023) https://www.cnbc.com/
2023/02/08/worlds-largest-drone-maker-dji-is-unfazed-by-challenges-
like-us-blacklist.html.
    \4\White House, United States Strategic Approach to the People's 
Republic of China (2020) https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-
Republic-of-China-Report-5.24v1.pdf.
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    DHS uses UAS for a number of important functions, including 
but not limited to, enhancing situational awareness at the 
Southwest border,\5\ conducting counter-UAS efforts in the U.S. 
homeland,\6\ and meeting the U.S. Coast Guard National Security 
Cutter's operational need for a persistent airborne 
surveillance capability.\7\ Unfortunately, numerous U.S. 
federal agencies rely on foreign-made UAS, particularly those 
made in the PRC.\8\ A single Chinese UAS manufacturer, DJI 
Technology Co., owns over 70 percent of the global market 
share.\9\ In June 2020, the former Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency Director wrote of DJI Technology 
Co. saying that ``any information collected by a drone from 
this particular manufacturer should be considered at risk and 
protected from inadvertent disclosure.''\10\ As a result of 
this threat, several other Departments, such as Commerce and 
the Interior, have taken actions to ground their drone fleets 
until the threat to United States government data can be 
determined.\11\ DHS has also issued warnings in recent years 
about Chinese-made drones, specifically citing concerns that 
they may be sending sensitive data to their manufacturers in 
China, where it can then be accessed by the Chinese 
government.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\John Davis, Small but Mighty: Border Patrol's use of small 
drones is a game changer in border security, US CBP (last accessed May 
31, 2023) https://www.cbp.gov/frontline/cbp-small-drones-program.
    \6\U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(C-UAS) (last accessed May 31, 2023) https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-
technology/counter-unmanned-aircraft-systems-c-uas.
    \7\U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. USCG, Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(last accessed May 31, 2023) https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-
Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Air-
Programs/UAS/.
    \8\Annie I. Anton, Olivia C. Mauger, U.S. Reliance on Chinese 
Drones: A Sector for the Next CHIPS Act? (May 25, 2023) https://
www.lawfareblog.com/us-reliance-chinese-drones-sector-next-chips-act.
    \9\Nessa Anwar, World's largest drone maker is unfazed--even if 
it's blacklisted by the U.S. CNBC (Feb. 7, 2023) https://www.cnbc.com/
2023/02/08/worlds-largest-drone-maker-dji-is-unfazed-by-challenges-
like-us-blacklist.html.
    \10\Letter from Christopher Krebs, Former Director, CISA, to Jerry 
Nadler, Former Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (June 23, 2020), 
available at https://www.scribd.com/document/466960345/DHS-warns-about-
China-made-DJI-drones?irclickid=1s4WxhQbmxyNR9L2odz- 
41r2UkASfeUSXC5Ug0&irpid=10078&utm_source=impact&utm_medium=cpc&utm 
_campaign=affiliate_pdm_acquisition 
_Skimbit20%Ltd.&sharedid=nypost.com&irgwc=1.
    \11\Brian Harrell and Travis Moran, The pressing threat of Chinese-
made drones flying above U.S. critical infrastructure, Cyberscoop 
(March 23, 2023) https://cyberscoop.com/chinese-drone-threat-dji-
regulation-critical-infrastructure/.
    \12\David Shortell, DHS warns of `strong concerns' that Chinese-
made drones are stealing data (May 20, 2019) https://www.cnn.com/2019/
05/20/politics/dhs-chinese-drone-warning/index.html.
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    Additionally, under the PRC's National Intelligence Law, as 
amended in 2018, all organizations and citizens are required to 
support, assist, and cooperate with the PRC's intelligence 
work.\13\ Under this law, all Chinese organizations and 
citizens, to include DJI Technology Co., as well as U.S. and 
other foreign organizations and citizens doing business or 
otherwise operating in the PRC would be required to share all 
information in their possession with the CCP.\14\ It is 
imperative that DHS be prohibited from purchasing and operating 
foreign-made UAS, particularly Chinese-made UAS, given the 
technology's significant capacity to collect sensitive 
information as well as the legal requirement for UAS crafted in 
the PRC to share such information with the CCP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\PRC National Intelligence Law (as amended in 2018), China Law 
Translate, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/national-intelligence-
law-of-the-p-r-c-2017/ (last visited May 31, 2023).
    \14\Murray Scot Tanner, Beijing's New National Intelligence Law: 
From Defense to Offense, Lawfare (July 20, 2017) https://
www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-national-intelligence-law-defense-
offense.
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    The Committee's intent is to safeguard sensitive 
information that may be collected by UAS deployed by DHS for 
the purpose of completing its various mission sets. 
Furthermore, the Committee's intent is to mitigate covered 
foreign countries, especially the PRC, from leveraging UAS to 
commit espionage or create risks to U.S. homeland security. It 
is also the Committee's intent to ensure that foreign 
adversarial countries are unable to compromise the work of the 
United States government through foreign-made UAS as well as 
domestic-made UAS that is implicated under the PRC's National 
Intelligence Law, as amended in 2018.
    In the 117th Congress, on September 29, 2021, this 
unamended version of this bill passed the House of 
Representatives on suspension by voice vote. In the 118th 
Congress, this legislation was reintroduced. H.R. 1501 has 
bipartisan support and was reported favorably out of the 
Committee on Homeland Security by voice vote.

                                HEARINGS

    The Committee held the following hearing in the 118th 
Congress that informed H.R. 1501:
    On March 9, 2023, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law 
Enforcement, and Intelligence held a hearing entitled 
``Confronting Threats Posed by the Chinese Communist Party to 
the U.S. Homeland.'' The Subcommittee received testimony from 
the Honorable William R. Evanina, former Director of the 
National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, Lieutenant General Joseph 
Guastella Jr., (Ret.), Senior Fellow, Mitchell Institute, the 
Honorable Kari A. Bingen, former Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Department of Defense, 
and Dr. Tyler Jost, Assistant Professor of Political Science 
and International and Public Affairs, Brown University.
    On May 23, 2023, the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law 
Enforcement, and Intelligence held a hearing entitled ``A 
Security Sprint: Assessing the U.S. Homeland's Vulnerabilities 
to Chinese Communist Party Aggression.'' The Subcommittee 
received testimony from Jill M. Murphy, Deputy Assistant 
Director of Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Iranga Kahangama, Assistant Secretary for Cyber, 
Infrastructure, Risk, and Resilience, Department of Homeland 
Security, and Tyrone Durham, Acting Director of the Nation 
State Threats Center, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 
Department of Homeland Security.

                        COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

    The Committee met on May 17, 2023, a quorum being present, 
to consider H.R. 1501 and ordered the measure to be favorably 
reported to the House, as amended, by a voice vote.\15\
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    \15\H.R.1501--UAS Act, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
118th-congress/house-bill/1501/all-actions (last visited May 31, 2023).
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                            COMMITTEE VOTES

    Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the 
recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and 
amendments thereto.
    No recorded votes were requested during consideration of 
H.R. 1501.

                      COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the 
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the 
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) 
of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this 
report.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE, NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT 
                    AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES

    With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c) of rule 
XIII and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974, and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of 
rule XIII and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of any new 
budget authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an 
increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures contained 
in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office.




    H.R. 1501 would prevent the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) from operating or procuring an unmanned aircraft system 
(UAS) that is manufactured in or by a business entity 
headquartered in a foreign country that poses a threat to 
national security. The prohibition would also apply to software 
systems associated with UAS that store data or use a network 
located in such a country. The bill would allow DHS to waive 
the prohibition on a case-by-case basis upon notification to 
the Congress. H.R. 1501 also would require DHS to report to the 
Congress on the number of UAS subject to the prohibition 
currently operated by DHS and the threats they pose to national 
security.
    DHS's current operations and policy are largely consistent 
with the bill's requirements and CBO estimates that any changes 
required under the bill would not require substantial action by 
the department. On that basis and the cost of similar reporting 
requirements, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 1501 would 
cost less than $500,000 over the 2024 2028 period. Any spending 
would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jeremy Crimm. 
The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy 
Director of Budget Analysis.

                                         Phillip L. Swagel,
                             Director, Congressional Budget Office.

                       FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

    The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal 
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act of 1995.

                      DUPLICATIVE FEDERAL PROGRAMS

    Pursuant to clause 3(c) of rule XIII, the Committee finds 
that H.R. 1501 does not contain any provision that establishes 
or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative of another 
Federal program.

         STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the objective of 
H.R. 1501 is to prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security 
from operating or procuring certain foreign-made unmanned 
aircraft systems, and for other purposes.

   CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED TARIFF 
                                BENEFITS

    In compliance with rule XXI, this bill, as reported, 
contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or 
limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 
9(f) of rule XXI.

                      ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. Sec. 1004) were 
created by this legislation.

                APPLICABILITY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

    The Committee finds that H.R. 1501 does not relate to the 
terms and conditions of employment or access to public services 
or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of 
the Congressional Accountability Act.

             SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short title

    This section states that the Act may be cited as the 
``Unmanned Aerial Security Act'' or the ``UAS Act''.

Section 2. Prohibition on operation or procurement of certain foreign-
        made unmanned air craft systems

    Subsection (a) paragraph (1) prohibits the Secretary of 
Homeland Security from operating, providing financial 
assistance for, or entering into or renewing a contract for the 
procurement of an unmanned aircraft system or drones that is 
manufactured in a covered foreign country or by a business 
entity domiciled in such foreign country; uses flight 
controllers, radios, data transmission devices, cameras, or 
gimbals manufactured in a covered foreign country or by a 
business entity domiciled in a covered foreign country; uses 
ground control system or operating software developed in a 
covered foreign country or by a business entity domiciled in a 
covered foreign country; or uses network connectivity or data 
storage located in a covered foreign country or administered by 
a business entity domiciled in a covered foreign country.
    Subsection (a) paragraph (2) prohibits the Secretary of 
Homeland Security from operating, providing financial 
assistance for, entering into, or renewing a contract for the 
procurement of a software operating system associated with a 
UAS that uses network connectivity or data storage located in a 
covered foreign country or administered by a business entity 
domiciled in a covered foreign country.
    Subsection (a) paragraph (3) prohibits the Secretary of 
Homeland Security from operating, providing financial 
assistance for, entering into, or renewing a contract for the 
procurement of a system for the detection or identification of 
a UAS, which system is manufactured in a covered foreign 
country or by a business entity domiciled in a covered foreign 
country.
    Subsection (b) authorizes the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to waive the prohibition under subsection (a) if the 
Secretary certifies in writing to the Committee on Homeland 
Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate that a 
UAS, a software operating system associated with a UAS, or a 
system for the detection or identification of a UAS described 
in any of paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a) is 
required in the national interest of the United States; 
required for counter-UAS surrogate research, testing, 
development, evaluation, or training; or required for 
intelligence, electronic warfare, or information warfare 
operations, testing, analysis, and or training. The waiver must 
be submitted to the Committees specified no later than the date 
that is 14 days after the date on which a waiver is issued.
    Subsection (c) details that the Act shall take effect 120 
days after the date of enactment. Subsection (c) also details 
that no later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary shall establish a process by which the head 
of an office or component of DHS may request a waiver under 
subsection (b).
    Subsection (d) directs the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs of the United States Senate a terrorism 
threat assessment and report on information relating to DHS's 
analysis of the threats posed by UAS operating in the United 
States, the number of UAS and related technologies in operation 
by DHS, including identifying the specific component or office 
of DHS, and information on how UAS and related technologies 
could be used to harm the national or economic security of the 
United States.
    Subsection (e) defines the terms of a covered foreign 
country, the intelligence community, and an unmanned aircraft 
system. The term covered foreign country means a country that 
the intelligence community has identified as a foreign 
adversary in its annual Threat Assessment or the Secretary of 
Homeland Security in coordination with the Director of National 
Intelligence has identified as a foreign adversary. The terms 
intelligence community and an unmanned aircraft system have the 
same meaning of title 50 section 3003(4) and title 49 section 
44801, respectively. Additionally, the term business entity in 
this bill has the meaning given in 15 U.S.C. 6764.

                                  [all]