[Senate Report 117-37]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                     Calendar No. 116
117th Congress       }                          {            Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session         }                          {            117-37

======================================================================


 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                _______
                                

                August 10, 2021.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

        Mr. Warner, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 2610]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 2610) to authorize appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 2022 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community 
Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement 
and Disability System, and for other purposes, reports 
favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

                Classified Annex to the Committee Report

    Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on May 28, 2021, 
that the request for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) 
for Fiscal Year 2022 was $62.3 billion. Other than for limited 
unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence 
Community Management Account, the classified nature of United 
States intelligence activities precludes any further 
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its 
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has 
prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a 
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule 
of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act and has the legal status of 
public law. The classified annex is made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for 
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of 
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2022 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for Fiscal Year 2022.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2022 are 
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that 
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal Year 
2022.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA 
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2022.

                TITLE III-- GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

               Subtitle A--Intelligence Community Matters


Section 301. Increasing agricultural and commercial intelligence 
        measures

    Section 301 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) to submit to designated congressional committees a report 
detailing the options for the Intelligence Community (IC) to 
improve intelligence support to the Department of Agriculture 
and the Department of Commerce.

Section 302. Plan for allowing contracts with providers of services 
        relating to sensitive compartmented information facilities

    Section 302 requires the DNI to submit a plan for allowing 
IC elements to contract with providers of services related to 
sensitive compartmented information facilities for use of those 
facilities by businesses and organizations at multiple security 
levels.

Section 303. Plan to establish commercial geospatial intelligence data 
        and services program office

    Section 303 requires the Directors of the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) to develop and submit to 
designated congressional committees a plan to establish a co-
located joint commercial geospatial intelligence data and 
services program office. Section 303 further requires that the 
plan include milestones, an updated acquisition strategy, and a 
plan for the establishment of a commercial geospatial 
intelligence data innovation fund.

Section 304. Investment strategy for commercial geospatial intelligence 
        services acquisition

    Section 304 requires the Director of NGA, in consultation 
with the DNI and the Secretary of Defense, to submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees an investment strategy for 
NGA to acquire commercial geospatial intelligence data services 
and analytics. Section 304 further requires that the strategy 
include a plan to increase purchases of unclassified geospatial 
intelligence data services and analytics, and to articulate any 
challenges to procuring geospatial intelligence data and 
services.

Section 305. Central Intelligence Agency Acquisition Innovation Center 
        report, strategy, and plan

    Section 305 requires the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on the CIA's Acquisition 
Innovation Center and an implementation plan. The plan shall 
address how the Director will ensure that personnel have access 
to the technical expertise required to inform acquisitions 
specifically in technical industries, and include projections 
for resources to support the Acquisition Innovation Center.

Section 306. Improving authorities relating to national 
        counterintelligence and security

    Section 306 clarifies the authorities and responsibilities 
of the Office of the DNI's National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center (NCSC). Section 306 clarifies NCSC's role in 
coordinating strategic counterintelligence matters through 
outreach efforts to the IC and non-Title 50 federal agencies, 
as well as conducting risk assessments associated with 
counterintelligence threats. Section 306 also expands NCSC's 
role in coordinating and overseeing the development of budgets 
and resource allocation plans for counterintelligence programs. 
Finally, section 306 amends NCSC's public facing outreach 
authorities to include state, local and tribal authorities, 
foreign governments, and U.S. academic institutions.

Section 307. Removal of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
        Community from level IV of the Executive Schedule

    Section 307 removes the Chief Information Officer of the 
Intelligence Community from Title 5, section 5315, given the 
position no longer requires Presidential nomination and Senate 
confirmation.

Section 308. Requirements relating to construction of facilities to be 
        used primarily by intelligence community

    Section 308 amends Title 50, section 3304 to increase the 
congressional notification threshold from $5,000,000 to 
$6,000,000 when the IC engages in certain facilities 
improvement or repair projects.

Section 309. Director of National Intelligence support for intelligence 
        community diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility 
        activities

    Section 309 provides the DNI flexibility to expend funds in 
support of IC-wide workforce activities related to recruitment, 
retention, diversity, equity, inclusion, or accessibility, 
provided that they are of benefit to the whole IC.

Section 310. Establishment of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Officer 
        of the intelligence community

    Section 310 requires the DNI to appoint a Diversity, 
Equity, and Inclusion Officer to serve as the IC's principal 
advisor on diversity, equity, and inclusion. Section 310 
further requires the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Officer 
to submit a report, at least once a year, to the congressional 
intelligence committees on strategies and initiatives developed 
to advance diversity, equity, and inclusion in the IC.

Section 311. Clarification of authority of National Reconnaissance 
        Office

    Section 311 prohibits any element of NRO from being 
transferred to the U.S. Space Force.

Section 312. Director of National Intelligence declassification review 
        of information relating to terrorist attacks of September 11, 
        2001

    Section 312 requires the DNI, in coordination with other 
appropriate government entities, to conduct a declassification 
review of information relating to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Section 312 further requires the review be 
completed and a report on the findings of the review be 
submitted to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 313. Establishment of Chaplain Corps of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 313 requires the CIA to establish a Chaplain Corps 
for the provision of spiritual or religious pastoral services.

Section 314. Pilot program on recruitment and retention in Office of 
        Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury

    Section 314 establishes a pilot program during a four-year 
period in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the 
Department of the Treasury to assess the feasibility and 
advisability of using adjustments of rates of pay to recruit 
and retain staff for financial and cyber intelligence analyst 
positions. Section 314 further requires the Assistant Secretary 
of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis to provide the 
congressional intelligence committees and the DNI with a 
briefing on the pilot program, and to submit a report to the 
appropriate congressional committees and the DNI on the 
effectiveness of the pilot program and recommendations as to 
whether the program should be modified.

Section 315. Pilot program on student loan repayment at Office of 
        Intelligence and Analysis of Department of the Treasury

    Section 315 establishes a pilot program during a three-year 
period in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the 
Department of the Treasury to assess the feasibility and 
advisability of using repayment of student loans as a 
recruitment incentive for employment at the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis of China specialists, data 
scientists, cyber specialist, and others with any other 
analytic or technical capabilities that are in high demand. 
Section 315 further requires the Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis to submit a preliminary 
report, and an annual report on the pilot program. In addition, 
Section 315 requires the DNI to submit any recommendations to 
expand or modify the pilot program to the congressional 
intelligence committees within two years after the program's 
commencement.

Section 316. Prohibition on collection and analysis of United States 
        persons' information by intelligence community based on First 
        Amendment-protected activities

    Section 316 reaffirms that no element of the IC may collect 
or analyze a United States person's information based on 
activity protected under the First Amendment of the 
Constitution.

Section 317. Sense of the Senate on the use of intelligence community 
        resources for collection, assessment, and analysis of 
        information pertaining exclusively to United States persons 
        absent a foreign nexus

    Section 317 expresses the Sense of the Senate that National 
Intelligence Program funds should be expended only in support 
of intelligence activities with a foreign nexus, and that the 
IC should not engage in the collection, assessment, or analysis 
of information that pertains exclusively to United States 
persons, absent a foreign nexus.

      Subtitle B--Inspector General of the Intelligence Community


Section 321. Submittal of complaints and information by whistleblowers 
        in the intelligence community to Congress

    Section 321 establishes security officers and protocols to 
facilitate IC employees' and contractors' submission of 
complaints and information to Congress. Section 321 further 
clarifies the requirements for submitting whistleblower 
complaints and information and ensures bipartisan notification 
of such materials.

Section 322. Definitions and authorities regarding whistleblower 
        complaints and information of urgent concern received by 
        Inspectors General of the intelligence community

    Section 322 clarifies the definition of ``urgent concern'' 
regarding whistleblower complaints and ensures that the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) has 
authority over determining whether a matter falls within the 
``urgent concern'' definition.

Section 323. Harmonization of whistleblower protections

    Section 323 establishes uniformity among IC whistleblower 
statutes to ensure consistency with respect to treatment of IC 
agency employees and contractors, and regarding protected 
disclosures related to security clearances and personnel 
actions. Section 323 further establishes parity in the legal 
standards applied to IC whistleblower matters by requiring an 
agency, in justifying an adverse security clearance or access 
determination against a whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear 
and convincing evidence that the agency would have made the 
same security clearance or access determination in the absence 
of the whistleblower's disclosure.

Section 324. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity 
        as reprisal against whistleblower disclosure by employees and 
        contractors in intelligence community

    Section 324 adds to prohibited personnel practices a 
knowing or willful disclosure that reveals an IC 
whistleblower's identifying information without consent, except 
as necessary during the course of an investigation. Section 324 
further provides an IC whistleblower with a private right of 
action if such disclosure is taken as a reprisal against the IC 
whistleblower for bringing a complaint.

  Subtitle C--Reports and Assessments Pertaining to the Intelligence 
                               Community


Section 331. Report on efforts to build an integrated hybrid space 
        architecture

    Section 331 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and 
the Director of the NRO, to submit a report on the IC's efforts 
to build an integrated hybrid space architecture that combines 
national and commercial capabilities, and large and small 
satellites.

Section 332. Report on Project Maven transition

    Section 332 requires the Director of the NGA, in 
consultation with other appropriate government entities, to 
submit a report on the transition of Project Maven to 
operational mission support, including a detailed plan of 
action and milestones identifying (1) points leading to the 
transition of Project Maven-developed geospatial intelligence 
capabilities to the NGA, and (2) metrics of success regarding 
the transition and mission support provided to the NGA.

Section 333. Assessment of intelligence community counternarcotics 
        capabilities

    Section 333 requires the DNI, in consultation with other 
appropriate federal government entities, to submit an 
assessment on the status of the IC's counternarcotics 
capabilities and resourcing, operational support to foreign 
liaison partners, and operational capacity to support the 
government's counternarcotics mission.

Section 334. Assessment of intelligence community's intelligence-
        sharing relationships with Latin American partners in 
        counternarcotics

    Section 334 requires the DNI, in consultation with other 
appropriate federal government entities, to submit an 
assessment on the IC's intelligence sharing relationships with 
foreign partners in Latin America on counternarcotics matters.

Section 335. Report on United States Southern Command intelligence 
        capabilities

    Section 335 requires the Director of the DIA, in 
consultation with other relevant federal government entities, 
to submit a report detailing the status of United States 
Southern Command's intelligence collection, analysis, and 
operational capabilities to support missions in Latin America.

Section 336. Director of National Intelligence report on trends in 
        technologies of strategic importance to United States

    Section 336 requires the DNI to submit to Congress, at 
least every two years, a report assessing foreign trends in 
technologies that the DNI considers of strategic importance to 
the United States, including the top technology focus areas. 
Section 336 further requires the report to include the top 
technology focus areas of our foreign adversaries.

Section 337. Report on Nord Stream II companies and intelligence ties

    Section 337 requires the DNI, in consultation with other 
appropriate government entities, to submit a report on Nord 
Stream II efforts, including an unclassified list of companies 
supporting the project and an updated assessment of the current 
or former ties between Nord Stream's Chief Executive Officer 
and Russian, East German, or other hostile intelligence 
agencies.

Section 338. Assessment of Organization of Defensive Innovation and 
        Research activities

    Section 338 requires the DNI, in consultation with other 
appropriate government entities, to submit an assessment of the 
activities and objectives of Iran's Organization of Defense 
Innovation and Research (SPND), including the organization's 
composition, relationships to research on weapons of mass 
destruction, and sources of financial and material support that 
SPND receives (including from the Government of Iran).

Section 339. Report on intelligence community support to Visas Mantis 
        program

    Section 339 requires the DNI, in consultation with any 
other appropriate government entity, to submit a report on 
intelligence matters relating to the Visas Mantis program, 
including the IC's efforts to provide and plan for intelligence 
support to this program, and hostile intelligence service 
efforts to exploit this program or any program by which United 
States visas are issued.

Section 340. Plan for artificial intelligence digital ecosystem

    Section 340 requires the DNI, within one year of enactment 
of this Act, to develop and submit a plan for developing and 
resourcing a modern digital ecosystem to enable continuous 
updates of artificial intelligence-powered applications.

Section 341. Study on utility of expanded personnel management 
        authority

    Section 341 requires the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence and Security and the DNI to submit a study on the 
utility of providing Department of Defense IC elements (other 
than the NGA) with personnel management authority to attract 
science and engineering experts.

Section 342. Assessment of role of foreign groups in domestic violent 
        extremism

    Section 342 requires the DNI to submit an assessment 
identifying the role of foreign groups (including entities, 
adversaries, governments, or other groups) in domestic violent 
extremist activities in the United States.

Section 343. Report on the assessment of all source cyber intelligence 
        information, with an emphasis on supply chain risks

    Section 343 requires the DNI to submit a report to the 
congressional intelligence committees on strengthening all-
source intelligence integration relating to foreign cyber 
threats, with an emphasis on cyber supply chain risks.

Section 344. Review of National Security Agency and United States Cyber 
        Command

    Section 344 requires the Inspectors General of the IC and 
the Department of Defense to complete a review of the National 
Security Agency and United States Cyber Command to assess the 
current resource-sharing arrangement, and to determine whether 
there are issues with directing intelligence collection in 
support of United States Cyber Command rather than foreign 
intelligence collection. Section 344 further requires the 
Inspectors General to submit a report to the appropriate 
congressional committees on their findings.

Section 345. Support for and oversight of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena 
        Task Force

    Section 345 directs the DNI and the Secretary of Defense to 
require each IC element and the Department of Defense to make 
data relating to unidentified aerial phenomena available 
immediately to the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force and 
to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center. Section 345 
further requires the Unidentified Aerial Task Force to submit 
quarterly reports to Congress on its findings.

Section 346. Publication of unclassified appendices from reports on 
        intelligence community participation in vulnerabilities 
        equities process

    Section 346 directs the DNI to make public the unclassified 
report required pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 3316a(c).

Section 347. Report on future structure and responsibilities of Foreign 
        Malign Influence Center

    Section 347 requires the DNI to conduct an assessment of 
the structure and responsibilities of the Foreign Malign 
Influence Center and submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report on its findings.

                 Subtitle D--People's Republic of China


Section 351. Assessment of posture and capabilities of intelligence 
        community with respect to actions of the People's Republic of 
        China targeting Taiwan

    Section 351 requires the DNI and the Director of the CIA to 
submit an assessment to determine whether the IC is capable of 
providing sufficient warnings regarding the People's Republic 
of China's (PRC's) actions towards Taiwan.

Section 352. Plan to cooperate with intelligence agencies of key 
        democratic countries regarding technological competition with 
        People's Republic of China

    Section 352 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a plan to increase cooperation with key 
democratic countries, partners, and allies of the United States 
to track and analyze technology capabilities, efforts by the 
PRC to invest in specific technologies, technology development 
in key sectors, the efforts of the PRC relating to standard 
setting forums, and supply chain vulnerabilities for key 
sectors.

Section 353. Assessment of People's Republic of China genomic 
        collection

    Section 353 requires the DNI, in consultation with other 
appropriate agencies, to submit to the designated congressional 
committees an assessment of the PRC's plans, intentions, 
capabilities, and resources devoted to biotechnology. Section 
353 further requires that the assessment include an analysis of 
the PRC's efforts to acquire foreign-origin biotechnology, 
research and development, and genetic information; identify 
PRC-based organizations involved in these efforts; and include 
an analysis of IC resourced devoted to biotechnology.

Section 354. Updates to annual reports on influence operations and 
        campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party

    Section 354 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3237(b)) to require that the annual report that NCSC 
submits to designated congressional committees include a 
listing of all known Chinese talent recruitment programs 
operating in the United States.

Section 355. Report on influence of People's Republic of China through 
        Belt and Road Initiative projects with other countries

    Section 355 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on recent projects negotiated 
by the PRC as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, to include 
information about the types of such projects, costs, and 
potential national security implications.

Section 356. Study on the creation of an official digital currency by 
        the People's Republic of China

    Section 356 directs the President to submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the national 
security risks associated with the PRC's creation and use of an 
official digital currency.

Section 357. Report on efforts of Chinese Communist Party to erode 
        freedom and autonomy in Hong Kong

    Section 357 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on the Chinese Communist 
Party's efforts to stifle political freedoms, influence or 
manipulate the judiciary, destroy freedom of the press and 
speech, and take actions to otherwise undermine the democratic 
processes of Hong Kong.

Section 358. Report on targeting renewable sectors by China

    Section 358 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report assessing the PRC's efforts 
and advancements in certain renewable energy sectors, to 
include an assessment of the PRC's pursuit of rare earth 
minerals and the use of forced labor.

                  TITLE IV--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS

Section 401. Definition of anomalous health incident

    Section 401 provides the definition for anomalous health 
incidents used throughout this Title.

Section 402. Assessment and report on interagency communication 
        relating to efforts to address anomalous health incidents

    Section 402 requires the DNI to conduct (1) an assessment 
of how the various IC elements are coordinating or 
collaborating with each other and with non-IC elements of the 
Federal Government in their efforts to address AHI; and (2) 
submit a report on the findings of the DNI.

Section 403. Advisory panel on the Office of Medical Services of the 
        Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 403 requires the DNI establish an advisory panel 
sponsored by the National Institutes of Health to assess the 
capabilities, expertise, and qualifications of the CIA's Office 
of Medical Services (OMS) related to the care and health 
management of IC personnel reporting symptoms of AHI. Section 
403 further requires the advisory panel to (1) review the 
performance of OMS for the treatment of IC personnel reporting 
symptoms, consistent with those AHI experienced between January 
1, 2016 and December 31, 2021; (2) assess the policies and 
procedures that guided external treatment referral practices 
during that period; (3) develop recommendations regarding 
capabilities, processes, and policies to improve patient 
treatment; and (4) prepare and submit a report within 1 year of 
the date on which the panel is established on its activities.

Section 404. Joint task force to investigate anomalous health incidents

    Section 404 requires the establishment of a joint task 
force by the DNI and Director of the FBI to investigate AHI, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense. Section 404 also 
requires the task force to complete the investigation and 
submit a written report on its findings.

Section 405. Reporting on occurrence of anomalous health incidents

    Section 405 requires the head of an IC element to issue a 
report to the congressional intelligence committees of any 
reported incident involving an AHI occurring among its 
employees or contractors.

Section 406. Access to certain facilities of United States Government 
        for assessment of anomalous health conditions

    Section 406 requires the DNI to ensure that IC elements 
provide to IC employees and their family members experiencing 
symptoms of AHI timely access for medical assessment to 
facilities in the U.S. with expertise in traumatic brain 
injury. Section 406 further requires the DNI coordinate with 
the Secretary of Defense and the heads of any other appropriate 
Federal agency to ensure there is a process to provide 
employees and their family members with timely access to the 
National Intrepid Center of Excellence at Walter Reed National 
Military Medical Center for assessment and, if necessary, 
treatment no later than 60 days following enactment of this 
Act.

           TITLE V--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE

Section 501. Exclusivity, consistency, and transparency in security 
        clearance procedures, and right to appeal

    Section 501 requires the Executive Branch to publish 
adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility to access 
classified information and makes these guidelines the exclusive 
basis for granting, denying, and revoking clearances in order 
to increase transparency and accountability, and ensure due 
process. Section 501 further codifies the right of government 
employees to appeal unfavorable eligibility determinations to 
an agency-level panel. Section 501 also creates a higher level 
review by a government-wide appeals panel, chaired by the DNI 
as the government's Security Executive Agent, to review certain 
agency-level panel determinations involving allegations of 
constitutional violations or discrimination. This DNI-led panel 
can remand decisions to the employing agency for reevaluation 
if the panel finds valid cause.

Section 502. Federal policy on sharing of derogatory information 
        pertaining to contractor employees in the trusted workforce

    Section 502 requires the DNI to issue a policy that 
facilitates sharing of information that is relevant to a 
security clearance adjudication (known colloquially as 
``derogatory information'') the government obtains on cleared 
contractors (along with any mitigation measures put in place) 
with Federal contractor employers' chief security officers, to 
help companies maintain robust insider threat programs. The 
policy must comport with privacy rights, allow individuals to 
verify the information, and stipulate that such sharing is only 
for purposes of security risk mitigation. Such sharing should 
be consistent with Section 2, 1-202, of the National Industrial 
Security Program Operational Manual Conforming Change 2 of 2016 
and the Industrial Security Letter issued by the Defense 
Security Service in 2017 (now known as the Defense 
Counterintelligence and Security Agency).

Section 503. Performance measures regarding timeliness for personnel 
        mobility

    Section 503 requires the DNI to issue a policy for 
measuring the total time it takes to transfer personnel with 
security clearances and eligibility for access to information 
from one Federal agency to another, or from one contract to 
another. Section 503 further requires the DNI to submit an 
annual report following policy issuance and once each year for 
the following three years after the date of such issuance on 
the implementation of such policy.

Section 504. Governance of Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative

    Section 504 requires the DNI and the Director of the Office 
Personnel Management, in coordination with the Deputy Director 
for Management in the Office of Management and Budget and the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security to (1) 
jointly publish in the Federal Register a policy with 
guidelines and standards for Federal Government agencies and 
industry partners to implement the Trusted Workforce 2.0 
initiative; (2) periodically submit to Congress a report on the 
timing, delivery, and adoption of Federal Government agencies' 
policies, products, and services to implement Trusted Workforce 
2.0; and (3) submit to Congress performance management metrics 
for its implementation. Section 504 requires an independent 
study be conducted, via the DNI, by an entity that is not part 
of the Federal Government on the effectiveness of the 
initiatives known as Trusted Workforce 1.25, 1.5, and 2.0.

                  TITLE VI--OTHER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Section 601. National technology strategy

    Section 601 requires the President submit to Congress an 
annual report on the United States' technology strategy.

Section 602. Improvements relating to continuity of Privacy and Civil 
        Liberties Oversight Board membership

    Section 602 permits (1) the reappointment of a member of 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) for 
additional terms; (2) filling a vacancy in the same manner in 
which the original appointment was made; and (3) the continued 
service of a member following the expiration of their term.

Section 603. Air America

    Section 603 establishes as a qualifying service for 
purposes of the Civil Service Retirement System the past 
service of United States citizens who were employed by Air 
America, a government-owned airline that provided air transport 
for operations in Southeast Asia.

Section 604. Access by Comptroller General of the United States to 
        certain cybersecurity records

    Section 604 permits access by the Comptroller General of 
the United States to any records it may require for preparing 
an annual report on cybersecurity and surveillance threats to 
Congress.

Section 605. Reports on intelligence support for and capacity of the 
        Sergeants at Arms of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives and the United States Capitol Police

    Section 605 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Director of FBI and Secretary of DHS, to submit a report on 
intelligence support provided to the Sergeant at Arms and the 
United States Capitol Police. Section 605 also requires a 
report to be filed by the Government Accountability Office on 
the capacity of the Sergeants at Arms and the United States 
Capitol Police to assess and use intelligence and threat 
information relevant to the physical and cyber security of 
Congress.

Section 606. Study on vulnerability of Global Positioning System to 
        hostile actions

    Section 606 requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce, to conduct 
a study on the vulnerability of the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) to hostile actions, as well as any actions that the 
Federal Government is taking to mitigate any risks from the 
potential unavailability of the GPS system.

Section 607. Authority for transportation of federally owned canines 
        associated with force protection duties of intelligence 
        community

    Section 607 authorizes IC personnel to use federal funds to 
transport federally-owned canines associated with force 
protection duties.

                           Committee Comments


Countering China

    The People's Republic of China (PRC) poses the most 
significant strategic challenge to the United States as the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) actively works to systematically 
undermine the U.S. economically, politically, and militarily 
while expanding the PRC's influence globally. The threat 
requires a whole-of-government response to counter the CCP's 
ambitions and malign activities globally. The CCP is actively 
working to control strategic technology sectors, remake 
international institutions to align with CCP objectives, weaken 
U.S. alliances, modernize its military, and increase its trade 
relationships through aggressive and predatory economic 
behavior, while supplanting the United States' global 
leadership.
    The CCP, through its theft of intellectual property, brutal 
authoritarianism, and economic might, seeks to strengthen its 
position abroad and enrich the Party. The world is witnessing 
the CCP's ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity against 
Uyghurs and other Muslim groups in Xinjiang, its crushing of 
Hong Kong's freedom and autonomy in direct violation of its 
treaty commitments, and its widespread use of surveillance 
equipment and facial recognition to control the Chinese people. 
The CCP actively seeks to export its authoritarian model 
abroad, with accompanying technology, to provide other 
authoritarian regimes with sophisticated tools of repression.
    The Intelligence Community must reorient to engage in a 
strategic competition with the PRC while countering China's 
malign activities globally. To do so, it must continue to build 
open source intelligence capabilities and augment capacity; 
enhance sharing of intelligence capabilities; and strengthen 
the analytical and collection capabilities relating to non-
military threats including technology competition.

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence & Analysis' 
        role in domestic activities

    The Committee is concerned about the Department of Homeland 
Security, Office of Intelligence & Analysis' (I&A's) use of 
Title 50 authorities and National Intelligence Program funds 
for programs and operations focused entirely on the domestic 
activities of U.S. persons without a foreign nexus. In 
particular, a number of I&A activities, including, but not 
limited to, the use of I&A resources to protect monuments, 
memorials, and statues, appear to be focused on individuals or 
groups that have no link to foreign governments, foreign 
organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist 
activities. In addition, despite documented problems related to 
I&A's collection and dissemination of open source information 
collected on United States persons during protests in Portland, 
Oregon, I&A continues to issue open source collection 
requirements that are both overly broad in scope and 
disconnected from national intelligence missions and 
priorities.
    Moreover, the Committee is concerned about the misuse of 
Title 50 authorities and intelligence funding against domestic 
threats, including I&A's open source collection activities 
related to U.S. persons. When an IC element conducts activities 
that involve the domestic activities of U.S. persons, it can 
create a perception, if not reality, that the authorities 
granted to the IC to combat foreign threats are being used 
against U.S. persons. The failure of I&A to break down its 
budget request by mission center or function, such as open 
source collection, makes it difficult for the Committee to 
assess the extent to which I&A is using intelligence funding to 
gather information about the domestic activities of U.S. 
persons.
    Therefore, the Committee directs I&A, in coordination with 
FBI and ODNI, to provide a report, within 180 days following 
enactment of this Act. The report should include:
          1. The feasibility and advisability of eliminating or 
        transitioning I&A activities directed at the domestic 
        activities of U.S. persons with no foreign nexus to 
        non-IC components of the Department of Homeland 
        Security, subject to all relevant privacy and civil 
        liberty protections afforded to a U.S. person;
          2. The feasibility and advisability of eliminating or 
        transitioning I&A programs directed at the domestic 
        activities of U.S. persons with no foreign nexus to the 
        FBI, or other law enforcement entities, subject to all 
        relevant privacy and civil liberty protections afforded 
        to a U.S. person; and
          3. An analysis of I&A's legal authorities that permit 
        or restrict activities that are solely focused on the 
        domestic activities of U.S. persons absent a foreign 
        nexus.

National Background Investigation Service (NBIS)

    The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security 
(USD/I&S) oversees the Defense Counterintelligence and Security 
Agency (DCSA), which includes the National Background 
Investigation Service (NBIS). Pursuant to Executive Order 13869 
(April 24, 2019), NBIS will provide the information technology 
backbone for government-wide background investigations to 
support security clearances and determinations of trust for 
suitability and credentialing. The Committee recognizes that 
NBIS is the critical path to successfully implementing the 
Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative that the Performance 
Accountability Council, led by the Office of Management and 
Budget, have been leading the last three years. A key feature 
to NBIS's success is its cybersecurity policies practices, 
particularly after the data breach of the Office of Personnel 
Management's personally identifiable information (PII) 
repository in 2015. The Committee believes additional 
explanation of NBIS's cybersecurity protocols is appropriate. 
The Committee equally believes that NBIS's success relies upon 
the scope and rate of agencies' adoption of NBIS products and 
services.
    Therefore, the Committee directs USD/I&S to provide the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees, within 90 
days of enactment of this Act, with a report that describes 
NBIS's cybersecurity protocols to protect PII; how these 
protocols compare to leading industry and government best 
practices; how NBIS is factoring in resilience into its 
architecture to recover from network attacks; and how NBIS is 
being governed to ensure stakeholder perspectives are properly 
accommodated.
    Furthermore, the Committee directs NBIS to provide the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees with 
quarterly updates on the extent to which agencies are using 
NBIS products and services.

Report on engagement of National Reconnaissance Office with university 
        community

    The Committee recognizes that the survivability and 
resiliency of United States satellites is critically important 
to the United States intelligence and defense communities. 
Combatting current threats to US satellites requires new 
technologies using autonomous systems and artificial 
intelligence. While the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
engages with the university community in support of basic 
research and developing an education workforce pipeline to help 
advance new technologies and produce skilled professionals, it 
can do more in this regard to focus on space survivability.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the NRO's Survivability 
Assurance Office to report, within 180 days of enactment of 
this Act, on NRO's current efforts and future strategies to 
partner with a university or universities that are 
strategically located, host secure information facilities, and 
offer a strong engineering curriculum, with a particular focus 
on space survivability, artificial intelligence, AI test beds, 
and resiliency. This report should include a summary of NRO's 
planned university engagement and levels of funding.

Implementing NGA IG acquisition report recommendations

    In November 2019, the NGA Office of Inspector General 
issued a report on NGA's acquisition policies and processes. 
The Committee fully supports the recommendations of the report, 
and highlights agency progress in acquisitions management 
process, but remains concerned that key recommendations were 
not fully implemented. For example, the OIG recommended that 
NGA's Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) not be encumbered 
by duties other than acquisition and that all acquisition 
activities should fall under the CAE. The NGA has dual-hatted 
the deputy director as the CAE, which does not meet the OIG 
report's recommendation. The Committee believes that the CAE 
function should be a full-time position reporting to the 
Director of the agency.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the NGA to report, within 
90 days of enactment of this Act, on its compliance with the 
OIG report recommendations, including a report outlining the 
reasons for any outstanding recommendations. The report should 
also include outcomes of the 90-day study on program 
traceability.

Utilizing AI/ML in Joint Task Force investigation into anomalous health 
        incidents

    The Committee is committed to protecting and supporting 
Intelligence Community and other federal government personnel 
who have experienced debilitating, unexplained attacks, or 
anomalous health incidents, while serving their country. The 
Committee is also focused on identifying and holding 
accountable those responsible for inflicting these injuries on 
U.S. personnel, and recognizes that artificial intelligence and 
machine learning tools can play an important role in 
identifying the actors, weapons, and patterns of these attacks.
    Therefore, the Committee encourages the Joint Task Force 
required by Section 404 to investigate anomalous health 
incidents. In carrying out its investigation, the Committee 
urges the Joint Task Force to utilize commercially available 
technological tools, including but not limited to off-the-shelf 
automated machine learning tools, to gain insights from open 
source and commercially available data.

NRO acquisition of imagery from companies with foreign ownership

    The Committee supports the NRO's intent to strengthen and 
expand investment in the U.S. commercial imagery industry and 
supports the concept that the NRO should build only those 
capabilities that it cannot acquire from the commercial market. 
However, the Committee is concerned about the NRO's recent 
commercial imagery acquisition guidance. When it comes to 
defining the boundaries of the U.S. commercial imagery market, 
there is considerable precedent for the Department of Defense 
and the Intelligence Community to contract with companies with 
a Special Security Agreement (SSA), Foreign Ownership, Control, 
or Influence (FOCI) mitigation and some foreign ownership. NRO 
efforts to restrict the ability of U.S. companies with foreign 
ownership equities to compete could unnecessarily limit user 
access to some of the most innovative commercial imagery 
capabilities the market can deliver. Therefore, within 120 days 
of enactment of this Act, the Committee directs the NRO to 
provide the Committee a plan to establish a repeatable process 
for acquiring commercial imagery that would manage acceptable 
risks associated with foreign ownership. The plan should also 
clearly articulate specific risks that the NRO has determined 
would exclude from competition U.S. companies with foreign 
ownership equities that have an SSA and FOCI mitigation in 
place.

Enhancing financial intelligence capability

    Sections 314 and 315 authorize pilot programs at the Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of the Treasury 
to enhance recruitment and retention of financial intelligence 
professionals. The Committee believes a robust financial 
intelligence capability is critical to meeting 21st century 
threats and ensuring U.S. economic security. The Committee is 
concerned that the Intelligence Community has not adequately 
resourced well-identified demands for financial intelligence 
capability. Therefore, the Committee urges the Intelligence 
Community to take additional steps to realign collection and 
analysis to match growing demand for financial intelligence.

Reporting foreign employment by former intelligence community personnel

    The Committee continues to have significant concerns about 
former Intelligence Community personnel providing support to 
foreign governments, particularly where it involves abuses of 
human rights, violations of U.S. laws, or infringements on 
United States persons' privacy rights. Section 5703 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 
directed the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to conduct 
a study on former intelligence personnel who have directly or 
indirectly provided assistance to a foreign government in a 
capacity that benefits the intelligence, military, or law 
enforcement activities of the foreign country.
    As a follow-on to this study, the Committee directs the DNI 
to provide to the congressional intelligence committees and 
both the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs and the House Homeland Security Committee, within 120 
days of enactment of the Act, a proposal to improve reporting 
and tracking of employment of former IC personnel, to include 
mechanisms to enforce or incentivize reporting of their 
employment with foreign governments.

Explicit grant, cooperative agreement, and other transaction authority

    ODNI communicated to the Committee its request to 
explicitly set forth its acquisition and assistance tools 
available for executing its R&D mission in legislation, and for 
those tools to be available across the IC for all such 
activities. The Committee understands that, while ODNI has 
relied on its acquisition authorities to maintain and expand 
acquisition and promotion of R&D services from outside 
entities, including academic institutions and small businesses, 
these authorities lack specific statements regarding the 
particular acquisition or assistance instruments available to 
the DNI. Providing explicit authorities would address questions 
ODNI receives concerning the availability of grants, 
cooperative agreements, and other transactions.
    The Committee recognizes the importance of R&D activities 
to ODNI's mission, and the mission of the IC writ large. 
However, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 3024(n), the Committee believes 
ODNI already has the authorities necessary to engage with non-
governmental entities on R&D activities. ODNI, for its part, 
believes it has the authority to enter into these kinds of 
agreements, but it has not executed one of those agreements to 
date. Rather than provide additional authorities in this bill, 
the Committee requests that ODNI work with the Committee by 
providing notification when it uses existing authorities to 
enter into grants, cooperative agreements, and other 
transactions. In this way, the Committee will gain a more 
practical understanding about these arrangements, the frequency 
with which they are utilized, and what any associated funding 
is used to do. The Committee will in turn use this information 
to determine whether additional authorities are needed.

Assessment of critical supply chains

    As demonstrated in The Supply Chain Assessment and 
Vulnerability Act of 2021, S. 849, introduced by Senators 
Cornyn and King, the Committee seeks to identify supply chains 
that are critical to the national security, economic security, 
or public health or safety of the United States. Furthermore, 
the Committee seeks to identify important vulnerabilities in 
such supply chains and recommendations for legislative or 
administrative actions to secure them. The DNI, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, and 
other government entities as appropriate, should lead this 
effort to ensure our supply chains remain robust, resilient, 
and capable of withstanding attacks or disruptions perpetrated 
by our adversaries or other man-made or naturally-occurring 
events. Moreover, the Committee seeks to identify those supply 
chains which are critical to our foreign adversaries' national 
security and defense.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, and 
other government entities as appropriate, to provide an 
assessment to the congressional intelligence and armed services 
committees, within 120 days of the date of enactment of this 
Act, that: (1) identifies those supply chains which are 
critical to the national security, economic security, or public 
health of the United States; (2) identifies those supply chains 
which are critical to our foreign adversaries' national 
security and defense; (3) provides recommendations for 
legislative or administrative actions to secure supply chains 
described in section (1); and (4) analyzes the adversary supply 
chain vulnerabilities that can be exploited in the event of 
conflict, or as necessary and appropriate. This assessment 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
classified annex.

Unidentified Aerial Phenomena

    The Committee acknowledges the recent Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) report of the 
Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) Task Force and the need for 
increased collection and data to better understand the 
potential national security threats that UAPs pose to our 
nation.
    The Committee remains concerned, however, that while the 
U.S. Navy and the U.S. Navy-led UAP Task Force have made 
efforts to standardize and destigmatize UAP reporting, the ODNI 
report confirmed that the scope of UAP activity expands 
significantly beyond the U.S. Navy's equities. Subsequently, 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed the Undersecretary 
of Defense for Intelligence and Security to provide a plan to 
formalize the mission currently performed by the UAP Task 
Force. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 345 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (S. 2610), the Committee 
has directed classified quarterly reporting on UAP-related 
events.
    Therefore, given the Department of Defense's mandate to the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, and 
the additional reporting mandates, the Committee continues to 
support increased funding for UAP Task Force-related 
operations.

                            Committee Action

    On July 28, 2021, a quorum being present, the Committee met 
to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the 
following actions:

Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex

    By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for 
Fiscal Year 2022, the base text for purposes of amendment.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-four 
amendments to the bill, as follows: (1) an amendment by Senator 
King to require an assessment of all source cyber intelligence 
information, with an emphasis on supply chain risks; (2) an 
amendment by Senator Risch to improve Section 337; (3) an 
amendment by Senator Risch to improve Section 353; (4) an 
amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to prohibit the collection and 
analysis of United States persons' information by the 
Intelligence Community based on First Amendment-protected 
activities; (5) an amendment by Chairman Warner to establish a 
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Officer of the Intelligence 
Community; (6) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored 
by Vice Chairman Rubio, to improve Section 351 and Section 404; 
(7) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice 
Chairman Rubio, to require a report on the influence of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) through Belt and Road 
Initiative projects; (8) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and 
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to establish a Chaplain 
Corps at the CIA; (9) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and 
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to require a plan to 
increase cooperation with intelligence agencies of key 
democratic countries to track and analyze certain matters 
relating to the technological competition with the PRC; (10) an 
amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman 
Rubio, to require a study on the PRC's creation of an official 
digital currency; (11) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and 
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to require a report on the 
efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to erode freedom and 
autonomy in Hong Kong; (12) an amendment by Chairman Warner, 
and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to improve Section 306; 
(13) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice 
Chairman Rubio, to provide legal authority for the 
transportation of federally-owned canines associated with the 
force protection duties of the Intelligence Community; (14) an 
amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman 
Rubio, to establish a pilot program on recruiting and retaining 
high demand positions in the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis at the Department of Treasury; (15) an amendment by 
Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to 
require a report on the PRC's targeting of renewable sectors; 
(16) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice 
Chairman Rubio, to require a review of the National Security 
Agency and United States Cyber Command; (17) an amendment by 
Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to 
require a plan for allowing contracts with providers of 
services relating to SCIFs for use of those facilities by 
businesses and organizations on contracts at multiple security 
levels; (18) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored 
by Vice Chairman Rubio, to establish a pilot program on student 
loan repayment to enhance recruitment of intelligence personnel 
in high-demand disciplines at the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis at the Department of Treasury; (19) an amendment by 
Chairman Warner and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and 
Senators Feinstein, Heinrich, and Blunt, to require support for 
and oversight of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force; 
(20) an amendment by Senator Wyden to improve Section 604; (21) 
an amendment by Senator Wyden to improve Section 340; (22) an 
amendment by Senator Wyden to require the publication of the 
unclassified appendices from reports on the Vulnerabilities 
Equities Process; (23) an amendment by Senator Cotton to 
express the sense of the Senate on the use of Intelligence 
Community resources for collection, assessment, and analysis of 
information pertaining exclusively to United States persons 
absent a foreign nexus; and (24) an amendment from Senator Burr 
to require a report on the future structure and 
responsibilities of the Foreign Malign Influence Center.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-eight 
amendments to the classified annex.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by 
Senator Sasse to strike from the bill a provision to make 
improvements to the Steering Committee on Emerging Technology 
and National Security Threats, as established by section 236 of 
the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283).

Votes to report the committee bill

    On July 28, 2021, the Committee voted to report the bill, 
as amended, by a vote of 16 ayes and zero nayes. The votes in 
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye; 
Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--
aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator 
Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator 
Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator 
Sasse--aye.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to 
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and 
classified annex.

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

    Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires 
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed 
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff 
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report 
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the 
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the 
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of 
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of 
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited 
tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On August 4, 
2021, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional 
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred 
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

    The Fiscal Year 2022 Intelligence Authorization Act 
includes numerous provisions and amendments I put forward to 
protect Intelligence Community whistleblowers, defend the 
physical and cyber security of the U.S. Congress, and ensure 
greater oversight, transparency and civil liberties.
    The bill includes four amendments to protect 
whistleblowers. The first creates a mechanism for 
whistleblowers to go straight to Congress without going through 
agency heads. The second addresses the previous 
administration's misreading of existing law by confirming that 
the inspectors general have the authority to determine which 
whistleblower complaints are ``urgent concerns'' that must be 
transmitted to Congress. The third prohibits the public 
disclosure of a whistleblower's identity as a reprisal. The 
final provision fixes the existing whistleblower statutes, 
which are confusing and contradictory, harmonizing them to 
strengthen whistleblower protections and provide necessary 
clarity to whistleblowers and inspectors general.
    As the January 6, 2021, insurrection highlighted, the 
defense of American democracy must include the protection of 
the U.S. Congress. That is why I am pleased that the bill 
includes my provision requiring the DNI, in coordination with 
the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
to report on intelligence support to the Senate and House 
Sergeants at Arms and the U.S. Capitol police. The provision, 
which covers both the physical and cyber security of the 
Congress, also directs the GAO to report on the capabilities of 
the Sergeants at Arms and U.S. Capitol police to use this 
intelligence support. A separate provision ensures that the 
GAO, in conducting an annual review of cyber and surveillance 
threats against Congress required by the Fiscal Years 2018, 
2019 and 2020 Act, has the accesses it needs. These reviews are 
critically important to the task of protecting Congress from 
serious hacking and surveillance threats, including from 
sophisticated foreign adversaries.
    In recent years, critical investigations and reports of the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board have been disrupted 
due to the lack of a quorum. The bill addresses this problem by 
allowing members to serve until their replacements are 
confirmed. Another provision ensures that certain data related 
to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process will be made public. 
Yet another provision requires that the DNI's plans related to 
artificial intelligence include recommendations to protect 
Americans' privacy.
    Finally, I remain deeply concerned about the failures of 
the Federal Government's obsolete declassification system, a 
problem described at length during the Committee's September 9, 
2020, open hearing. I am therefore pleased that the classified 
annex to the bill includes several amendments I offered to 
advance efforts to accelerate declassification and promote 
declassification reform.

                                                         Ron Wyden.

            ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WYDEN AND HEINRICH

    As in previous years, our votes in favor of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act should not be read as an 
endorsement of all Intelligence Community programs and 
activities. We are particularly concerned about a CIA program 
described in a report by the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board (PCLOB), which we have requested be 
declassified.
                                   Ron Wyden.
                                   Martin Heinrich.

  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN RUBIO, AND SENATORS BURR, RISCH, 
                    BLUNT, COTTON, CORNYN, AND SASSE

    In the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress 
rightly passed legislation to improve information sharing and 
collaboration within the Intelligence Community--and also with 
federal and state and local law enforcement--to make it more 
likely that the Intelligence Community ``connects the dots'' of 
international terror plotting in order to safeguard against 
future attacks.
    We note with concern, however, the growing number of 
Intelligence Community activities focused on U.S. persons where 
there is no foreign nexus, which law enforcement is poised to 
address. Any American who commits a crime by planning, 
plotting, or carrying out acts of violence in the United States 
should be arrested by law enforcement and prosecuted by state 
or federal prosecutors to the fullest extent of the law. 
Diverting the unique capabilities of the Intelligence Community 
toward domestic activities under the guise of analyzing 
domestic terrorism or domestic violent extremism, however, is a 
poor use of the IC's capabilities, is duplicative of the 
resources and responsibilities of state and federal law 
enforcement, and erodes public trust and confidence in the 
Intelligence Community.
    The reasons are twofold.
    We must be careful not to repeat darker periods of our 
history when the federal government abused its power by spying 
on Americans for political purposes. This Committee was 
created, in part, as a result of these abuses, and since that 
time we have gone to great lengths to ensure the public that 
the Intelligence Community does not and will not infringe on 
the rights of Americans. The Intelligence Community can only 
perform its formidable work if it has the trust and confidence 
of the public at large. Intelligence Community involvement in 
the collection, analysis, and assessment of intelligence 
targeting Americans at home where no foreign nexus is present 
would erode that confidence. We were pleased to hear the 
President's nominee for the number two position in the 
Intelligence Community agree in her confirmation hearing that 
there must be a foreign nexus before the collection and 
analysis capabilities of the IC are brought to bear against a 
U.S. person.
    Equally important, the Intelligence Community needs all the 
resources it can muster to address the threats to this country 
emanating from foreign sources, be they foreign adversaries 
such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, or international 
terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State. 
Resources expended by the Intelligence Community for law 
enforcement activities are resources not devoted to 
intelligence activities related to those threats.
    We will continue to work to address this complex issue in a 
way that protects the First Amendment rights of the American 
people, preserves the Intelligence Community's ability to 
connect the dots to prevent transnational threats of terrorism 
at home and abroad, while also ensuring that those who plan, 
plot, or carry out acts of violence within the United States 
are prevented from doing so by law enforcement and held 
accountable to the fullest extent of the law.
                                   Marco Rubio.
                                   Richard Burr.
                                   James E. Risch.
                                   Roy Blunt.
                                   Tom Cotton.
                                   John Cornyn.
                                   Ben Sasse.
                        Changes to Existing Law


    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that is 
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to 
expedite the business of the Senate.

                                  
                                  
                                  

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