[Senate Report 117-2]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


117th Congress     }                                   {        Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session       }                                   {         117-2
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

                                                                       

                              R E P O R T


                                 of the


                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE


                          UNITED STATES SENATE


                          covering the period


                            JANUARY 4, 2019

                                   to

                            JANUARY 3, 2021














[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]












                 March 23, 2021.--Ordered to be printed 
                 
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                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                 
19-010                   WASHINGTON : 2021
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                   MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
                  MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon                    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico          SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine            ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado             TOM COTTON, Arkansas
ROBERT P. CASEY, Pennsylvania        JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York         BEN SASSE, Nebraska

            Charles E. Schumer, New York, Ex Officio Member
              Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
               Jack Reed, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
               James Inhofe, Oklahoma, Ex Officio Member
                     Michael Casey, Staff Director
             Christopher A. Joyner, Minority Staff Director
                   Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk

During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence was as follows:

                 RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
                 MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Acting Chairman
                MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              RON WYDEN, Oregon
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   KAMALA HARRIS, California
BEN SASSE, Nebraska                  MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado
              Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
            Charles E. Schumer, New York, Ex Officio Member
               James Inhofe, Oklahoma, Ex Officio Member
               Jack Reed, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
                 Christopher A. Joyner, Staff Director
                 Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
                   Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                                PREFACE

    The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate 
this report on its activities from January 4, 2019, to January 
3, 2021. This report also includes references to activities 
underway at the conclusion of the 116th Congress that the 
Committee expects to continue into the future.
    Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th 
Congress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of 
carrying out oversight of the programs and activities of the 
Intelligence Community (IC) of the United States. Most of the 
Committee's oversight work is conducted in secret and cannot be 
discussed publicly to protect sensitive IC sources and methods. 
Nevertheless, the Select Committee on Intelligence has 
submitted activities reports on a biennial basis since 1977 to 
provide the American public with information about its 
intelligence oversight activities. We submit this report to the 
Senate, in observance of this practice.
    We also take this opportunity to thank all of the members 
of the Committee in the 116th Congress. In particular, we take 
special note of a colleague who completed her service on the 
Committee. Senator Harris served on the Committee from the 
115th Congress until she retired from the U.S. Senate on 
January 18, 2021, in order to assume the office of Vice 
President of the United States. Her commitment to the important 
work of the Committee has helped to ensure a strong IC and a 
secure nation. We are grateful for her contributions.
    We also express our deep gratitude for the work of all 
members of the Committee's staff during the 116th Congress. 
Their vigilance, professionalism, and perseverance in the face 
of unprecedented public health challenges were essential to the 
Committee's fulfillment of its oversight obligations.

                                   Mark R. Warner,
                                           Chairman.
                                   Marco Rubio,
                                           Vice Chairman. 
                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                                           
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Preface..........................................................   III
  I. Introduction.....................................................1
 II. Legislation......................................................2
      A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 
        2019, and 2020...........................................     2
      B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.....     4
III. Oversight Activities.............................................5
      A. Hearings................................................     5
        1. Worldwide Threats Hearing.............................     5
        2. Russia................................................     6
        3. Afghanistan...........................................     7
        4. Western Hemisphere/Latin America......................     7
        5. Iran..................................................     7
        6. Asia-Pacific Region...................................     7
        7. Middle East and North Africa..........................     8
      B. Investigations and Reviews..............................     9
        1. Investigation of Russian Active Measures Campaigns and 
          Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election.................     9
      C. Intelligence Community Issues...........................    10
        1. Defense Intelligence Enterprise.......................    10
        2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
          Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017.................    10
        3. USA FREEDOM Act.......................................    10
        4. IC Intelligence Analysis..............................    11
        5. Fifth-Generation Telecommunications Technology (5G)...    12
        6. Counterterrorism......................................    13
        7. Cyber Domain..........................................    13
        8. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)    14
        9. Covert Action.........................................    14
        10. Space................................................    15
      D. Other Matters...........................................    15
        1. Classification and Declassification...................    15
        2. Whistleblowers and Matters of Urgent Concern..........    16
        3. Inspectors General....................................    16
        4. Committee Audits and Projects Team....................    16
        5. Personnel Vetting Reform..............................    17
        6. Technical Advisory Group (TAG)........................    18
        7. IC Response to COVID-19...............................    18
 IV. Nominations.....................................................19
      A. William R. Evanina......................................    19
      B. Christopher Scolese.....................................    20
      C. John L. Ratcliffe.......................................    20
      D. Peter Michael Thomson...................................    20
      E. Christopher C. Miller...................................    20
      F. Patrick Hovakimian......................................    21
      G. Allen Robert Souza......................................    21
  V. Support to the Senate...........................................21
 VI. Appendix........................................................21
      A. Summary of Committee Actions............................    21
        1. Number of meetings....................................    21
        2. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee.....    22
        3. Bills referred to the Committee.......................    22
        4. Committee publications................................    22





















117th Congress     }                                   {        Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session       }                                   {         117-2

======================================================================



 
                          COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

                                _______
                                

                 March 23, 2021.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

            Mr. Warner, from the Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                            I. INTRODUCTION

    The activities of the Committee during the 116th Congress 
included passage of critical enabling legislation, confirmation 
of appointees to key intelligence leadership posts, inquiries 
on the performance and activities of the Intelligence Community 
(IC), and completion of the Committee's investigation of 
Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
    As detailed in Part II of this report, the Committee's 
paramount legislative priority in the 116th Congress was 
enactment of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Years (FY) 
2018, 2019, and 2020, and the IAA for FY 2021.
    The Committee also dedicated considerable effort to 
completing and publishing a comprehensive, five-volume report 
on Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election. The 
investigation underlying this report comprised witness 
interviews, hearings, staff briefings, site visits, and 
frequent interactions with IC leadership and personnel from 
across the counterintelligence enterprise.
    Notably, the COVID-19 global pandemic had a direct impact 
on the Committee during the second session of the 116th 
Congress. The Committee adapted to the coronavirus during 2020, 
prioritizing protection of public health, while continuing to 
perform its critical oversight mission. While most Senate 
offices shifted to mostly or fully remote operations, the 
Committee did not have that option because of the requirements 
for physical access to classified spaces and communications 
networks to perform its oversight of sensitive intelligence 
activities.
    Despite the challenges that the pandemic posed, the 
Committee committed to a schedule that physically separated 
staff while continuing to meet its oversight obligations--
passing authorizing legislation, conducting regular hearings, 
processing presidential nominations, and meeting routinely with 
representatives of the IC to conduct oversight. Member events 
complied with Office of the Attending Physician guidelines. 
Staff were provided greater information technology tools to 
enhance their ability to work remotely. Staff were also given 
additional access to secure Senate office space to conduct 
their work.

                            II. LEGISLATION


      A. Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020

    In the 116th Congress, the Committee emphasized the 
continued enactment of annual intelligence authorization acts 
as a primary means of its oversight. During the prior term, the 
individual Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 
2018 and 2019 were not enacted. The Committee re-introduced the 
Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 (S. 245) on 
January 28, 2019. (Messrs. Nelson and Pollard were staff 
members of the House and Senate intelligence committees, 
respectively, who had recently passed away.) The Senate did not 
act on that bill. Therefore, at the start of the 116th 
Congress, the Committee continued to work with the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and pursue passage 
of an Intelligence Authorization Act that covered Fiscal Years 
2018, 2019, and 2020.
    The intelligence entities covered by the annual budget 
reviews included: the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency 
(NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the intelligence 
capabilities of the military services and the U.S. Coast Guard; 
and, the intelligence-related components of the Federal Bureau 
of Intelligence (FBI), as well as the Departments of State, 
Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security, and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration.
    As part of its budget review, the Committee received 
testimony from senior IC officials in closed hearings. 
Committee budget monitors evaluated classified budget 
justifications submitted by the Executive Branch. Based on 
those reviews, the Committee prepared a classified annex to its 
annual authorization bill and report. This annex contained a 
classified schedule of authorizations and classified direction 
to IC elements.
    The Committee also reviewed the Administration's 
legislative proposals for the bill, which included new or 
amended legislative authority requested by the IC.
    The Committee passed the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew 
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
2018, 2019, and 2020, reported the bill (S.1589) on May 22, 
2019, and subsequently issued an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 
116-47) on June 11, 2019. The full Senate passed the Damon Paul 
Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 as Divisions F and G of 
the Senate-passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2020 on June 27, 2019 (S.1790), by a vote of 86-8.
    The House of Representatives passed the Damon Paul Nelson 
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (H.R. 3494) on July 17, 2019, 
by a vote of 397-31. The Committee proceeded to work with the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and other 
congressional committees on a final version of the legislation.
    Subsequently, the Senate and House intelligence committees 
included the joint Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 
2020 as Division E of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2020 (S. 1790). The House passed S. 1790 on 
December 11, 2019, by a vote of 377-48. The Senate passed S. 
1790 on December 17, 2019, by a vote of 86-8. The President 
signed S. 1790 into law on December 20, 2019 (Public Law 116-
92).
    As enacted, the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 
2020 authorizes fiscal year 2020 funding for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities across the U.S. Government and 
includes a classified schedule of authorizations and a 
classified annex.\1\ It also retroactively authorized funding 
for fiscal years 2018 and 2019. The Act contained a number of 
legislative provisions, including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\The Act deemed as authorized the funds already appropriated for 
fiscal years 2019 and 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           A provision that seeks to deter foreign 
        influence in U.S. elections and counter aggression from 
        Russia and other foreign actors by increasing 
        capabilities to detect Russian activities, including 
        active measures campaigns and illicit financial 
        transactions;
           A provision requiring assessments of Russian 
        cyber threats and influence campaigns, and facilitating 
        information sharing among state, local, and Federal 
        officials;
           A provision creating an independent Social 
        Media Data and Threat Analysis Center to support the 
        IC's role in countering Russian propaganda;
           A requirement for the DNI to designate a 
        national counterintelligence (CI) officer within the 
        National Counterintelligence Security Center (NCSC) to 
        lead election security-related CI matters;
           A provision requiring ongoing notifications 
        of travel by certain Russian Federation personnel in 
        the U.S. and any potential active measures campaigns 
        conducted by those individuals;
           A provision requiring reporting on Chinese 
        influence campaigns directed at Taiwan, including 
        United States actions to disrupt such operations, as 
        well as reporting on surveillance technologies;
           A provision requiring a plan for reducing 
        the security clearance background investigation 
        backlog;
           A requirement for a DNI-led task force to 
        protect IC supply chains from foreign CI risks from 
        Russia, China, and other adversaries;
           A provision requiring the IC to account for 
        foreign threats to our infrastructure before entering 
        into foreign intelligence sharing agreements;
           A provision increasing pay scales for IC 
        employees with science, technology, engineering, and 
        mathematics (STEM) expertise in cyber missions;
           A provision intended to improve retention 
        and recruiting for underrepresented populations;
           A requirement for the DNI to establish an 
        advisory council to incorporate climate security 
        analysis across IC components, and to facilitate 
        coordination with non-IC agencies;
           A provision establishing a pilot program 
        with the National Labs and energy sector to partner 
        with covered entities and protect against security 
        vulnerabilities;
           A provision establishing requirements to 
        strengthen the oversight function performed by the IC 
        Inspector General and promote consistency in IC 
        whistleblower processes and procedures; and
           A requirement for ODNI, FBI, and DHS to 
        conduct a strategic intelligence assessment of domestic 
        terrorism, consistent with U.S. Person protections.

         B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021

    In early 2020, the Committee began consideration of the 
President's request for funding levels and legislative 
authority for fiscal year 2021. The Committee's budget monitors 
evaluated the requests submitted by the Executive Branch. 
Committee staff received a number of briefings, and the 
Committee conducted classified budget hearings.
    The Committee reported the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2021 (S. 3905) on June 8, 2020, and 
subsequently reported an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 116-233) 
on June 17, 2020. The Committee subsequently incorporated its 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 as Division 
F of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2021 (S. 4049), which passed the Senate on July 23, 2020, by a 
vote of 86-14.
    The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed 
its version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2021 (H.R. 7856) on July 31, 2020, and then reported the 
bill to the full House and issued an accompanying report (H. 
Rpt. 116-595) on October 30, 2020. The Committee proceeded to 
work with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
and other congressional committees on a final version of the 
legislation.
    The product of the two committees' efforts, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, was 
incorporated as Division W of the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-260). The Consolidated 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2021 passed the House on 
December 21, 2020, in two separate measures by votes of 359-53 
and 327-85, and passed the Senate that same day as a 
consolidated measure by a vote of 92-6. The President signed 
the consolidated bill into law on December 27, 2020.
    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 
authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities across the U.S. Government and included a classified 
schedule of authorizations and a classified annex. The Act as 
incorporated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal 
Year 2021 ensures accountability and integrity from our IC 
agencies, which undertake our most sensitive intelligence 
programs and activities, and contained a number of legislative 
provisions, including:
           A provision requiring assessments on risks 
        to national security from consumer genetic testing, and 
        mitigation efforts being taken in response by the IC 
        and DoD;
           A provision requiring complex, extensive 
        assessments of current U.S. critical technologies and 
        their requisite supply chains;
           A provision intended to afford IC agencies 
        the tools and resources their respective workforce 
        hiring and retention objectives require;
           A provision requiring reporting on 
        intelligence sharing with ``Five Eyes'' foreign 
        partners that have or intend to use adversary 
        telecommunications or cybersecurity equipment;
           A provision requiring reporting on foreign 
        governments' use of commercially-available cyber 
        intrusion and surveillance technology;
           Provisions requiring reporting on Chinese 
        Community Party (CCP) corruption, CCP influence 
        operations against technology sectors, and potential 
        CCP information suppression and/or exploitation 
        relative to COVID-19;
           A provision requiring reporting on Russian 
        and Eastern European oligarchs' corruption and illegal 
        activities; and
           Provisions intended to strengthen open 
        source information capabilities across the IC, in part 
        by requiring IC strategies for coordinated collection 
        and analysis of open source information.

                       III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES


                              A. Hearings


1. Worldwide Threats Hearing

    Since 1994, the Committee has held annual open hearings to 
review the Intelligence Community's assessment of the current 
and projected national security threats to the United States. 
There was only one year (1999) when the Committee did not hold 
a Worldwide Threats hearing. It is one of the few open hearings 
that the Committee has regularly conducted to share the work of 
the IC with the public. These ``Worldwide Threats'' hearings 
cover national security concerns in all geographic regions, as 
well as transnational threats such as terrorism and the 
proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
    On January 29, 2019, the Committee held an open Worldwide 
Threats hearing on the current and projected threats to the 
United States. The lead witness before the Committee was DNI 
Daniel R. Coats. He was joined at the witness table by the 
Honorable Gina Haspel, Director of the CIA; the Honorable 
Christopher Wray, Director of the FBI; General Paul Nakasone, 
Director of the NSA; Lieutenant General Robert Ashley, Director 
of the DIA; and Mr. Robert Cardillo, Director of the NGA. The 
open hearing was followed by a closedhearing session with the 
Committee. Director Coats' unclassified prepared statement for the 
record is available in the Hearings section of the Committee's website 
and the record of the open hearing is printed as S. Hrg. 116-75. A 
video recording of the full hearing can also be found on the 
Committee's website.
    At the hearing, Director Coats identified election security 
as a top priority for the IC, adding the IC's assessment that 
``foreign actors will view the 2020 U.S. elections as an 
opportunity to advance their interests.'' He also noted the 
IC's expectation that foreign actors would ``refine their 
capabilities and add new tactics as they learn from each 
other's experiences and efforts in previous elections.''
    Director Coats also explained the principal ``state actor'' 
threats facing the United States in terms of a ``big four,'' 
comprising China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Director Coats 
highlighted China's exercise of its intelligence and influence 
apparatus to shape international views and gain advantages, in 
furtherance of Beijing's intent to ``diminish U.S. influence 
and extend its own economic, political, and military reach.'' 
On the subject of Russia, Director Coats indicated that Moscow 
was escalating its campaign to ``divide Western political and 
security institutions and undermine the post-World War II 
international order,'' in part, by waging an ``information war 
against democracies, and [using] social media to attempt to 
divide our societies.'' Regarding North Korea, Director Coats 
noted that the regime had ``halted its provocative behavior 
related to its WMD program,'' however tempering the observation 
with the assessment that Pyongyang ``will seek to retain its 
WMD capabilities and is unlikely to completely give up its 
nuclear weapons and production capabilities because its leaders 
ultimately view nuclear weapons as critical to regime 
survival.'' Director Haspel later added that the North Korean 
regime ``is committed to developing a long-range nuclear armed 
missile that would pose a direct threat to the United States.''
    While the Committee repeatedly engaged with the IC to 
arrange for a Worldwide Threats Hearing to be held in the 
second session of the 116th Congress, scheduling conflicts, 
sustained assertions of witness unavailability, and an apparent 
general reluctance by Administration officials to appear before 
the Committee to discuss publicly intelligence threat 
assessments prevented the Committee from holding a Worldwide 
Threats Hearing in 2020.

2. Russia

    During the 116th Congress, the Committee focused 
extensively on the Russian threat to U.S. national security. In 
addition to its report on Russian active measures campaigns and 
interference in the 2016 U.S. election, the Committee continued 
robust oversight of intelligence relating to the threat posed 
by Russia's other malign activities around the world. These 
threats include Russia's traditional and cyber espionage; its 
continued reliance on misinformation and disinformation to 
target global audiences and interfere with elections and 
democratic processes in the United States and around the world; 
the buildup of its conventional, strategic, and asymmetric 
arsenals; its increasingly assertive military deployments on 
its periphery and to wider regions, including the Middle East, 
Africa, and Latin America; its use of mercenary groups and 
private military and security corporations such as the Vagner 
Group; its support of like-minded authoritarian regimes; and 
its use of corruption and criminal networks to further its 
strategic goals. The Committee held a number of closed hearings 
on these and other issues to assess the IC's posture to warn 
of, analyze, understand, expose, and counter the Russian 
threat.

3. Afghanistan

    The IC's contribution to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan has 
been a constant focus of the Committee since 2001. As the U.S. 
neared the 20-year mark of its latest involvement in 
Afghanistan, the Committee continued its oversight--through 
hearings, briefings, roundtables, and pre-pandemic staff travel 
to the region--on the IC's operations and analysis in support 
of U.S. policy. Following the signing of the February 29, 2020, 
U.S.-Taliban agreement, the Committee focused on the IC's 
collection on Taliban adherence to its stated commitments, as 
well as the IC's coordination with DOD and State Department 
plans for an eventual drawdown of the U.S. presence.

4. Western Hemisphere/Latin America

    The Committee focused its efforts on monitoring the ongoing 
crisis in Venezuela, travelling to meet with allies in the 
region to deepen bilateral engagement, and maintaining an 
awareness of elections in several key Latin American countries. 
The Committee continued to monitor illicit trafficking; 
narcotics production; the threat posed by violent transnational 
criminal organizations to the United States and the stability 
of the region; the military and intelligence activities of U.S. 
adversaries in Latin America, including an increase in Chinese 
and Russian engagements; and the mystery illnesses (including 
brain injuries) contracted by U.S. Government personnel in 
Havana, Cuba, and elsewhere, which are likely the result of a 
directed energy attack by a foreign adversary. Oversight 
activities included numerous staff and Member briefings, 
additional hearings, and visits to the region.

5. Iran

    The Committee held a number of hearings on Iran with the 
purpose of overseeing the IC's ability to collect intelligence 
and provide assessments to policymakers on Iran's intentions 
and evolving capabilities in areas such as its nuclear program, 
role in the Middle East, and support to terrorist groups. In 
addition to hearings, the Committee consistently held briefings 
related to Iran's nuclear program and its destabilizing 
activities in the region and beyond. Over the course of 
significant developments related to Iran, the Committee 
examined U.S. security and that of U.S. allies and partners in 
the region, monitored reporting on evolving threats, and probed 
the adequacy of the IC's posture to defend against those 
threats. Committee members and staff also engaged officials 
from partner countries on dynamics related to Iran.

6. Asia-Pacific Region

    The Asia-Pacific region was the focus of considerable 
Committee time and attention throughout the 116th Congress. 
Intended to facilitate a continual evaluation of the IC's 
collection posture and analytic capabilities relative to the 
national security threats emanating from the region, the 
Committee traveled to the region, held numerous Member and 
staff briefings, and dedicated nine Committee hearings to 
China, North Korea, regional geopolitical dynamics, and 
counterintelligence related topics. The Committee also received 
briefings and reports on the region from the National 
Intelligence Council, CIA, the Defense Department, the State 
Department, and nongovernmental organizations.
    These activities were central to the Committee fulfilling 
its oversight mandate to ensure the IC duly informs the 
national-level policymaking process. In particular, the 
Committee's efforts on North Korea focused on political-
military issues related to WMD programs and denuclearization. 
On China, the Committee spent considerable time reviewing 
Beijing's increasingly globalized activities, relentless 
pursuit of illicit technology transfer, targeted human rights 
abuses and repression, and lack of transparency on the initial 
outbreak and response to the COVID 19 outbreak.
    The Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Members of the Committee 
also provided over a dozen classified and unclassified 
briefings--in partnership with the DNI, Principal Deputy DNI 
and top counterintelligence leaders at the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center, FBI, and DHS--to the 
private sector on strategic economic and technological threats 
stemming from Beijing. Committee staff also convened meetings 
between the IC elements' top privacy and civil liberties 
officers, human resource leaders, securityofficials, and 
representatives of ethnic heritage groups to address allegations of 
bias and profiling in security and law enforcement practices that may 
have occurred as an inadvertent result of efforts to counter China's 
aggression.

7. Middle East and North Africa

    The Committee continued to focus on developments in the 
Middle East during the 116th Congress. The Committee held 
multiple hearings, hosted many briefings, and monitored events 
that bore on the security of the United States, our allies, and 
our partners. The Committee also analyzed the resources the IC 
devoted to understanding those developments and delivering 
advantage to U.S. decision-makers. In Syria and Iraq, Iran's 
paramilitary activity, Russia and Turkey's military 
deployments, Assad's war crimes, and recidivism among Islamic 
Statefighters risk extending and deepening the conflict. Yemen 
remains at risk of humanitarian catastrophe, and conflict 
involving Iranian supported Houthi forces, Yemeni government 
forces, and the Saudi-led military intervention is exacerbating 
the country's instability. Iran also directed or supported 
attacks against its neighbors, and proliferated advanced 
weapons throughout the region, undermining the stability and 
security of other nations. Committee Members and staff traveled 
throughout the region and met with U.S. partners to better 
understand and consider options related to many of these 
challenges.
    Committee Members and staff also monitored events in North 
Africa with implications for U.S. security and that of our 
allies and partners in the region and adjacent regions through 
a series of hearings, briefings, and travel. The war in Libya 
remains a stalemate threatening the health and livelihoods of 
the Libyan people as well as the security of Libya's 
neighbors--risks that are elevated by the presence and 
involvement of Russian military and contract security elements. 
The political situation in several other North African 
countries is also an area of focus for the Committee, as 
governments continue to evolve following the Arab Spring, and 
foreign governments seek to undermine these countries' 
sovereignty.

                     B. Investigations and Reviews


1. Investigation of Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference 
        in the 2016 U.S. Election

    On January 24, 2017, the Committee began a bipartisan 
investigation into Russian interference in the U.S. elections. 
Unlike previous Committee investigations, there was no separate 
vote to initiate it; the investigation was considered a part of 
the Committee's regular oversight responsibilities. During the 
following 43 months, the Committee interviewed over 200 
witnesses, reviewed over a million pages of documents, and held 
open and closed hearings on: election security; social media 
and disinformation; a review of the January 2017 Intelligence 
Community Assessment covering Russian activities; and the U.S. 
Government's response to Russia's efforts to interfere in the 
2016 U.S. elections. The Committee's efforts were distinctive 
for their investigative scope, authority, breadth, and depth, 
particularly in contrast to two other related investigations 
occurring in parallel. One was begun by the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence in January 2017 to investigate 
Russian interference in the 2016 elections, an effort that 
concluded in March 2018.
    The other began on May 17, 2017, when the Department of 
Justice appointed former FBI Director Robert Mueller as a 
Special Counsel to investigate potential criminal activity 
surrounding Russian interference in the 2016 elections. The 
overlap among these reviews led to the Department of Justice 
resisting some Committee investigative activity and led to 
complications for witnesses to comply with the Committee 
inquiry.
    The Committee interviewed then-Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions, former FBI Director James B. Comey, several high-
ranking Obama administration cabinet officials, as well as 
members of President Trump's family, campaign, and business 
enterprise in order to ascertain the nature and extent of 
Russian influence activity in the 2016 U.S. elections. The 
Committee's investigation involved several novel legal and 
constitutional issues, including the first successful use of a 
congressional subpoena to obtain non-content subscriber 
information from telecommunications and social media companies. 
While the Committee was successful in obtaining voluntary 
testimony and document production from a vast majority of its 
witnesses, the Committee was required to issue multiple 
subpoenas to compel certain witnesses' testimony. The 
Committee's commitment to bipartisanship throughout the course 
of its investigation was integral to obtaining witness 
cooperation and access to documents held by the Executive 
Branch.
    Given the large and complex nature of the investigation, 
the Committee adopted and released its Report, Russian Active 
Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election 
(S. Rep. 116-290), in five volumes, the last of which was 
issued in August 2020. These volumes covered Russian efforts 
against election infrastructure (Volume 1), Russia's use of 
social media (Volume 2), the U.S. Government's response to the 
Russian efforts (Volume 3), a review of the Intelligence 
Community Assessment covering the Russian activities (Volume 
4), and counterintelligence threats and vulnerabilities related 
to Russia (Volume 5). The Committee adopted each volume of its 
Report with broad bipartisan support and simultaneously adopted 
publicly releasable versions of each volume, posted on the 
Committee website. The Committee's final unclassified Report 
totals 1,346 pages, and stands to date as the most complete 
account of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.

                    C. Intelligence Community Issues


1. Defense Intelligence Enterprise

    The Committee's oversight of the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise (DIE) included travel to embassies and military 
bases, meetings with defense attaches, and numerous staff 
briefings. The Committee also held six hearings related to the 
DIE, its support to ballistic missile defense, and its view of 
global threats. DIE experts also provided critical analytic 
threat updates at numerous hearing.
    In particular, the Committee's oversight efforts focused 
on: DIA's development of the Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-
Repository System, a major system acquisition project; the 
DIE's integration of machine learning and artificial 
intelligence; refreshing the IT technology platform known as 
the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) 
modernization; the transition from an IT concept of operation 
from network protection to data protection; reviewing defense 
intelligence support to federal law enforcement for First 
Amendment activities; DIE capabilities against hard target 
threats; defense and military counterintelligence reform 
efforts; reviewing the DIE's open source intelligence strategy 
and investments profile; and COVID-19 response and workforce 
reconstitution plans.

2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments 
        Reauthorization Act of 2017

    The Committee continued to monitor implementation of the 
FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 (S. 139, P.L. 115-
118), as enacted on January 19, 2018, particularly the critical 
intelligence authorities against foreign targets, as set forth 
in Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
2008 (most notably against foreigners located abroad under 
Section 702). The Committee sought to ensure enhanced 
transparency and privacy protections for Americans and 
individuals in the United States.

3. USA FREEDOM Act

    The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 included four foreign 
intelligence legal authorities that were set to expire on 
December 15, 2019. Those authorities included: (1) business 
records collection; (2) call detail records collection; (3) 
lone wolf targeting; and (4) roving wiretap surveillance. On 
November 21, 2019, Congress extended these authorities to March 
15, 2020, as part of the Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2020, and Further Health Extenders Act of 2019(H.R. 3055, P.L, 
116 69). Also on November21, 2019, then-Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman 
Warner introduced the Protecting Against International Terrorism Act of 
2019 (S.2939), which extended all aforementioned authorities for eight 
years, with the exception of call detail records. (The Senate did not 
act on S. 2939.)
    On March 11, 2020, the House of Representatives passed the 
USA FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020 (H.R. 6172) by a vote 
of 278-136. The bill extended the business records, lone wolf, 
and roving authorities through December 1, 2023, while 
repealing the call detail records collection authority. The 
bill also required FISA application accuracy reviews, expanded 
notifications of the use of business records in legal 
proceedings, limited business records retention periods (with 
certain exceptions), included penalties for FISA abuse, 
expanded amicus curiae participation in certain Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court matters, and required 
additional compliance and oversight.
    On March 16, 2020, the Senate passed a bill to provide a 
77-day extension of certain authorities for foreign 
intelligence and international terrorism investigations (S. 
3501), which extended the business records, lone wolf, and 
roving authorities through May 30, 2020 (retroactive to March 
14, 2020). (The House of Representatives did not act on this 
bill.)
    On May 13, 2020, the Senate proceeded to consider H.R. 
6172. Pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement requiring a 60-
vote threshold, the Senate voted on three amendments: (1)an 
amendment cosponsored by Senators Lee and Leahy to expand the 
amici's authorities and access (agreed to by a vote of 77-19); 
(2) an amendment cosponsored by Senators Daines and Wyden to 
preclude the use of business records authorities to obtain 
Internet web browsing and search history information (not 
agreed to by a vote of 59-37); and (3) an amendment sponsored 
by Senator Paul that precluded targeting United States persons 
via FISA's electronic surveillance, physical searches, business 
records collections, and other foreign intelligence tools (not 
agreed to by a vote of 11-85). On May 14, 2020, the Senate 
passed H.R. 6172, as amended, by a vote of 80-16.
    On May 28, 2020, by a vote of 284-122, the House of 
Representatives passed a motion to disagree with the Senate 
amendments and request a conference. Neither chamber has taken 
further action on the USA FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020.

4. IC Intelligence Analysis

    The Committee conducted oversight of the IC's analytic 
enterprise during the 116th Congress, with an emphasis on 
analytic objectivity and duplication. Committee staff engaged 
with ODNI, CIA, and other agencies responsible for analytic 
production to ensure that IC analysis was meeting customer 
demands, devoid of politicization and compliant with standards 
for objectivity, and properly resourced. Committee staff held 
many engagements with the IC to better understand and reduce 
analytic duplication, while recognizing the virtue in analytic 
redundancy to promote diversity of perspective. The Committee 
also engaged with the IC on hiring and retention for hard-to-
fill analytic positions. These topics were interwoven through 
multiple hearings during the 116th Congress. The most prominent 
hearing showcasing IC analysis, the annual Worldwide Threats 
Hearing, occurred in 2019, but not in 2020, due to the ODNI's 
reluctance to engage publicly with Congress on IC threat 
assessments, as discussed in Section III.A.1. of this Report.

5. Fifth-Generation Telecommunications Technology (5G)

    The Committee investigated the significant national 
security implications posed by 5G telecommunications 
technology. Part of the challenge is the paucity of 5G 
equipment vendors, especially those that do not have a nexus 
with the Chinese Communist Party. The Committee convened 
several meetings with the leadership of several executive 
branch agencies and telecommunications companies to discuss the 
United States' strategy for 5G and opportunities to mitigate 
the related national security vulnerabilities.
    The Committee also engaged with Five Eyes nations and other 
allies to develop and examine multi-national efforts to 
mitigate potential national security vulnerabilities. 
Recognizing that the United States must provide secure, 
competitive alternatives to Huawei's and ZTE's 5G technology, 
on June 8, 2020, the Committee included a provision in its 
Committee-reported Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2021 (IAA), S. 3905, to establish:
           A Communications Technology Security and 
        Innovation Fund to support the development and 
        deployment of open standards-based compatible, 
        interoperable equipment for fifth-generation wireless 
        networks to create a more secure and diverse 
        telecommunications vendor market; and
           A Multilateral Telecommunications Security 
        Fund to support the adoption of secure and trusted 
        communications technologies in key markets globally.
    The Committee subsequently introduced an amendment to the 
Senate National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 
(NDAA) (S.4049) that established:
           A Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation 
        Fund for the NTIA Administrator (in consultation with 
        other relevant agencies) to make grants that will 
        support 5G research and its commercial application; and
           A Multilateral Telecommunications Security 
        Fund for the Secretary of State (in consultation with 
        other relevant agencies) to deploy funds, contingent on 
        foreign government partners' agreement to participate 
        in development and adoption of secure 5G technologies.
    The Committee's amendment was incorporated into an NDAA 
Manager's Amendment, and passed as part of the Senate NDAA on 
July 23, 2020.
    The provision was considered in the NDAA conference with 
other relevant Senate and House committees of jurisdiction. The 
NDAA conference report included a 5G provision that established 
the Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund and the 
Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund, both of which 
the Committee will work to fund from future congressional 
appropriations. The provision further requires multiple reports 
to Congress for each respective fund.
    The NDAA conference report passed the House and the Senate 
on December 8, 2020, and December 11, 2020 (H.R. 6395). The 
President vetoed the NDAA on December 23, 2020. On December 28, 
2020, the House passed the NDAA over the President's veto by a 
vote of 322-87. On January 1, 2020, the Senate passed the NDAA 
over the President's veto by a vote of 81-13. The NDAA, with 
the aforementioned 5G provision, was enacted as Public Law 
Number 116-283.

6. Counterterrorism

    During the 116th Congress, the Committee continued its 
oversight of the IC's counterterrorism efforts. This was done 
through a range of activities, including Committee hearings and 
roundtables, as well as staff-level briefings and engagement 
with the IC. In 2019, the Committee traveled overseas and 
visited multiple facilities to see firsthand the IC's 
counterterrorism efforts and evaluate plans, resources, and 
authorities.
    SSCI authorized counterterrorism budgets and legal 
authorities accordingly based on this oversight. As the 
counterterrorism threat continued to evolve--both domestically 
and abroad--the Committee conducted multiple oversight meetings 
to ensure that the IC's authorities and resources align with 
this threat. This includes tracking transnational threats like 
racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist groups, as 
well as al-Qa'ida, ISIS core, and their global affiliates.

7. Cyber Domain

    During the 116th Congress, Committee staff continued to 
monitor the IC's efforts to identify and track foreign cyber 
actors that pose threats to the United States and its allies. 
The establishment of the Cybersecurity Directorate at the 
National Security Agency aligns intelligence and information 
security resources under the Deputy National Manager for 
National Security Systems. The Committee conducted vigorous 
oversight of the establishment of this new organization to 
ensure its mission and resources are appropriate to advance the 
cybersecurity of the nation, without compromising NSA's 
commitment to its intelligence mission.
    The Office of the Director of National Intelligence also 
created the Cyber Executive, a new position that consolidates 
the National Intelligence Manager for Cyber, the Cyber Threat 
Intelligence Integration Center, and the Intelligence 
Community's Security Center under a single responsible 
official. The Committee anticipates ongoing engagement with 
this new executive to bolster the cyber threat intelligence 
mission.
    The Cyberspace Solarium Commission, established by section 
1652 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232), delivered its final report 
on March 11, 2020, which contained a series of findings and 
recommendations to bolster the nation's cyber posture. The 
commission's report provided a series of legislative proposals 
that the Committee used as a basis to enhance the nation's 
cyber posture. One such proposal was the establishment of a 
National Cyber Director within the Executive Office of the 
President to coordinate the government's cyber activities, with 
the caveat that the National Cyber Director may not direct 
intelligence activities or resources and cannot modify 
classification of intelligence information.
    The Committee also conducted oversight of the IC's 
activities to identify and track foreign cyber actors. However, 
the Committee faced difficulties in conducting effective 
oversight of joint cyber activities involving U.S. Cyber 
Command and the Intelligence Community.

8. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

    The Committee staff conducted close oversight of ODNI as it 
underwent a number of personnel, organizational, and policy 
changes during the 116th Congress. A number of forced 
resignations (of DNI Dan Coats, Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI) 
Sue Gordon, Acting DNI and Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Joe Maguire, Intelligence 
Community Inspector General Michael Atkinson, and Chief 
Operating Officer Deirdre Walsh), along with use of a novel 
position of ``Principal Executive'' to perform the duties of 
the PDDNI, created instability and leadership gaps that 
demanded close attention to ensure the DNI's statutory 
functions could still be performed. The DNI's unwillingness to 
testify at the Committee's annual worldwide threats hearing was 
emblematic of the turbulence. At the close of the 116th 
Congress, four of the six ODNI positions subject to Senate 
confirmation--PDDNI, General Counsel, IC Inspector General, and 
Director of NCTC--were being fulfilled by ``acting'' officials 
or personnel ``performing the duties of'' that position, which 
required specific attention to ensure those offices' missions 
were being fulfilled.
    Committee staff held several briefings on organizational 
changes adopted by Acting DNI Ric Grenell and DNI John 
Ratcliffe, to include moving from four deputy DNIs to two; 
creating a new Director's Adviser for Military Affairs; 
establishing ``executives''' for space, cyber, election 
threats, and economic security and financial intelligence; and 
altering the grade structure of the ODNI. Committee staff also 
scrutinized the impact of two Executive Orders--13950 on 
combating race and sex stereotyping, and 13957 regarding a new 
Schedule F in the excepted civil service--to ensure the ODNI 
could maintain a workforce ethos of inclusiveness and a 
commitment to objectivity.
    Finally, the Committee closely reviewed a number of ODNI 
policy and programmatic initiatives. Staff closely monitored 
workforce initiatives to recruit, hire, develop, and retain a 
quality, diverse, and trusted workforce. Staff studied ODNI's 
use of the Staff Reserve program to make temporary hires to 
ensure this program complied with, and did not circumvent, 
Office of Personnel Management guidelines. Staff continued 
quarterly briefings on the IC Information Technology 
Enterprise. Lastly, staff ensured ODNI was appropriately 
supporting the Biden-Harris transition once the General 
Services Administration ascertained the 2020 presidential 
election.

9. Covert Action

    The Committee conducted vigorous oversight of covert action 
programs throughout the 116th Congress. The Committee's rules 
require the Committee's Staff Director to ``ensure that covert 
action programs of the United States government receive 
appropriate consideration once a quarter.'' In accordance with 
this rule, the Committee receives a written report every 
quarter on each covert action that is being carried out under a 
presidential finding. Committee staff reviews these reports and 
meets with IC personnel to discuss their substance and pose 
additional questions. The Committee also holds periodic 
hearings and briefings on covert action programs, and receives 
written reviews of covert actions from the CIA Inspector 
General, which are often the basis for additional staff 
inquiries.
    Further, under section 3093 of the National Security Act, 
the DNI and the heads of all departments, agencies, and 
entities of the United States Government involved in a covert 
action are required to keep the congressional intelligence 
committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions 
that are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are 
carried out for or on behalf of any department or agency of the 
United States. Upon receiving such notifications, the Committee 
reviews the details of each and receives briefings to fully 
understand the issues.
    The Committee seeks to ensure that covert action programs 
are consistent with United States foreign policy goals, and are 
conducted in accordance with all applicable U.S. laws.

10. Space

    During the 116th Congress, the Committee continued its 
oversight of the IC's role in the space domain. The Committee's 
ongoing efforts to ensure reliable and resilient access to, and 
operation in, space to provide intelligence support took on 
greater urgency in light of an increasingly hostile space 
environment. Committee oversight has been key in tracking 
growing requirements to improve the speed and quality of data 
delivered to the warfighter and other government customers, 
which is resulting in shifting roles and responsibilities among 
IC elements.
    As Congress drafted legislation to establish the U.S. Space 
Force, the Committee supported preserving the NRO as a separate 
entity in the DoD, recognizing its key role in the national 
intelligence enterprise beyond its contributions to the DoD 
mission. The Committee continues to advocate for effective 
collaboration between NRO and the range of stakeholders in DoD.
    The Committee held hearings and briefings on space launch 
capabilities, NRO's evolving approach to a ``hybrid'' space 
architecture, and adversary threats in space. The Committee 
also examined key budget and cross-cutting technology issues, 
such as artificial intelligence and cloud computing, and 
continued to encourage the NRO to capitalize on the ongoing 
revolution in the space sector, which has yielded reductions in 
the cost of launch, new kinds of sensors, smaller satellites, 
and more sophisticated data analytics and services.
    In addition to hearings, the Committee and its staff 
engaged frequently on overhead architecture topics with the 
NRO, NGA, ODNI, and other IC and government officials, and 
conducted site visits to government facilities and commercial 
companies to meet with government officials and industry 
leaders. The Committee also closely monitored the establishment 
of the U.S. Space Force as the 18th and newest element of the 
IC to ensure it meets the standards set for all IC elements.

                            D. Other Matters


1. Classification and Declassification

    The Committee continued its oversight of the government's 
classification and declassification systems to ensure that 
classified information is handled appropriately and that it is 
released to the public when the requirements for classification 
are no longer met. The Committee has exclusive oversight of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which has 
statutory responsibilities for protecting sources and methods, 
as well as for developing, implementing, and overseeing 
security clearance policies and procedures as the federal 
government's Security Executive Agent. The staff met a number 
of times with the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) 
at the National Archives and Records Administration, which 
serves as the policy oversight mechanism for Executive Order 
13526, ``Classified National Security Information,'' and 
Executive Order 12829, ``National Industrial Security 
Program.'' It also met with classification offices across the 
IC.
    The Committee also met several times with the Public 
Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) to discuss the Board's 
recommendations related to the modernizing technology to make 
classification and declassification system more effective and 
efficient and creating a government-wide executive agent 
(specifically the Director of National Intelligence) for 
declassification. The Committee held a public hearing on 
declassification reform on September 9, 2020, with witnesses 
from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and a 
member of the PIDB. The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young 
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 
2019, and 2020 permanently reauthorized the PIDB, first 
authorized in the IAA for Fiscal Year 2000.

2. Whistleblowers and Matters of Urgent Concern

    The Committee annually receives hundreds of phone calls, 
facsimiles, mail, and email communications from self-identified 
whistleblowers on matters they believe to be of urgent concern. 
Committee staff reviewed and, where warranted, investigated 
those complaints. The Committee also receives formal 
whistleblower complaints from IC inspectors general deemed to 
be of urgent concern. Among these matters was a complaint 
concerning a phone call between former President Trump and the 
President of Ukraine, which ultimately became the basis of a 
presidential impeachment trial. The Committee held a hearing 
and conducted witness interviews of the IC IG and other IC 
officials in furtherance of its review of the IC's handling of 
the complaint.

3. Inspectors General

    The Committee continued its strong relationship with, and 
oversight of, the Inspectors General of agencies in the IC. 
Regular oversight consisted of reviews of agency Semiannual 
Reports and Annual Work Plans, as well as specific audits and 
reviews.

4. Committee Audits and Projects Team

    The Committee's rules stipulate that within its staff there 
``shall be an element with the capability to perform audits of 
programs and activities undertaken by departments and agencies 
with intelligence functions. Such element shall be comprised of 
persons qualified by training and/or experience to carry out 
such functions in accordance with accepted auditing 
standards.'' This function was distributed to Committee 
professional staff during the 113th Congress. During the 116th 
Congress, the Committee reconstituted this effort under its 
``Audits and Projects Team.'' The Committee charges the Audits 
and Projects Team to conduct in-depth reviews of IC-related 
matters and assist the Committee with its oversight 
obligations.
    In order to institutionalize its work, the Audits and 
Projects Team designed a robust and standardized process for 
selecting and conducting its studies, audits, reviews, and 
investigations. The Committee also assigned the Audits and 
Projects Team the responsibility for managing the relationship 
with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), to include 
overseeing the development and execution of reviews that the 
Committee assigns to GAO.
    The Audits and Projects Team began two on-going, Committee-
authorized projects during the 116th Congress. The first is a 
lessons-learned review of a compartmented IC acquisition 
program. The final report will offer recommendations to improve 
acquisition and contracting processes to ensure acquisitions 
meet expectations for costs, schedule, and performance. The 
second is an organizational assessment of a component within 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The final 
report will make recommendations regarding this component's 
resources, organizational structure, and authorities.

5. Personnel Vetting Reform

    The Committee continued its close oversight of reform to 
the government's personnel vetting enterprise, consistent with 
its inclusion as part of the President's Management Agenda and 
the Government Accountability Office's identification of the 
security clearance process as ``high risk.'' The personnel 
vetting framework has remained largely unchanged since 1947, 
and signs of its ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and fragility 
have grown. Insider threats such as Edward Snowden, timelines 
for granting clearances exceeding in some cases two years, and 
the inability to capitalize on modern technology to access 
publicly available information have demanded action.
    Toward this end, the Committee held a closed hearing on 
this topic in January 2020 with the principal members of the 
interagency Performance Accountability Council (PAC) who lead 
the executive branch reform effort. Committee staff continued 
holding quarterly briefings for the eight House and Senate 
committees of jurisdiction with these PAC members, as well as 
separate briefings with individual agencies. Such oversight led 
to significant progress in reducing the backlog in background 
investigation to a ``healthy'' steady state of roughly 220,000 
(from a peak of 725,000), and returning to timelines for 
processing SECRET and TOP SECRET clearances nearly to the 
standards established in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004. Committee staff have engaged closely 
with the cleared industry community as well, to include 
presentations at conferences. The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew 
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
2018, 2019, and 2020 contained an entire title comprised of a 
dozen provisions to support and enable this success. The 
Committee worked closely with the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence as the government's statutory Security 
Executive Agent and the Office of Personnel Management as the 
government's Suitability, Fitness, and Credentialing Executive 
Agent in their development of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 
initiative to modernize personnel. The Committee supported 
issuance of policies that enabled agility in personnel vetting 
practices during the COVID-19 global pandemic.
    The Committee looks forward to overseeing executive branch 
plans for a singular framework for determining trust for 
security, suitability, fitness, and credentialing to enable 
workforce mobility; a reduced number of tiers in this framework 
to simplify the system's complexity; use of a behavioral model 
for personnel trustworthiness that reflects today's threats and 
workforce patterns of life; and use of continuous vetting model 
for identifying personnel risk over time, rather than time-
based periodic reinvestigations.

6. Technical Advisory Group (TAG)

    During the 116th Congress, the Committee maintained its 
relationship with the TAG, an external group of experts that 
the Committee consults for substantive technical advice. Most 
notably, the TAG's researchers and experts in social network 
analysis, social media political content and hate speech, 
disinformation, and algorithms were instrumental to the 
Committee's understanding of Russia's 2016 use of social media 
to conduct an information warfare campaign designed to spread 
disinformation and societal division in the United States. The 
efforts of these TAG researchers led to the release of two 
public reports on this information warfare campaign, furnishing 
the Committee, social media companies, U.S. law enforcement, 
international partners, fellow researchers and academics, and 
the American public with an enhanced understanding of how 
Russia-based actors, at the direction of the Russian 
government, carried out a sustained campaign of information 
warfare aimed at influencing how the United States' citizens 
think about themselves, their government, and their fellow 
Americans. The TAG's findings were foundational to the 
Committee's investigation of Russia's activities and feature 
prominently in Volume 2: Russia's Use of Social Media.

7. IC Response to COVID-19

    The Committee exercised close oversight of the IC's 
adaptation to the coronavirus pandemic to ensure public health 
while continuing to perform its important national security 
mission. The Committee closely monitored IC agencies' 
implementation of public health measures, as well as their 
rates of infections, to ensure the safety of the workforce. It 
also encouraged maximal application of the flexibility for 
remote work allowed by the Office of Personnel Management and 
Office of Management and Budget, consistent with the needs for 
security. The Committee encouraged use of this public health 
crisis as a moment to reconsider what Intelligence Community 
work could be performed in spaces that might not be deemed a 
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), on 
unclassified networks, and even by personnel not all fully 
cleared to the TOP SECRET/SCI level. Such new thinking could 
revolutionize where work could be done across the United 
States; it could also significantly expand the population of 
personnel talent the IC could draw on and enable operation 
beyond the Washington Metropolitan area, which is of particular 
interest in areas of rapidly evolving technology such as 
cybersecurity.
    The Committee also closely monitored the impact of COVID on 
the industrial base that supports the IC. It worked closely 
with other committees on the development, passage, and 
enactment of Section 3610 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security Act, which allowed IC industrial partners to 
seek reimbursement under their contracts for activities that 
allowed them to remain in a ``ready state.'' The Committee 
supported the two extensions of this authority that occurred 
during the 116th Congress.

                            IV. NOMINATIONS

    During the 116th Congress, the Committee received seven 
nominations from President Donald J. Trump.
    Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of the 94th Congress (as amended) 
and a 2009 unanimous consent agreement govern referrals of 
nominations to the Committee. S. Res. 445, which amended 
S.Res.400 in 2004, required all nominations to positions in the 
IC requiring the Senate's advice and consent be reported by the 
Select Committee on Intelligence, even when they are positions 
within departments that are primarily under the jurisdiction of 
other Senate committees, though the committee overseeing the 
given department or agency may hold hearings and interviews on 
the nomination. Notwithstanding that general guidance, the 
resolution directed the Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security be reported by the Judiciary Committee, but referred 
to the Select Intelligence Committee. In the wake of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, which made 
the directors and inspectors general of the NRO and the NSA 
Senate-confirmed positions, the Senate adopted S. Res. 470, 
July 7, 2014. This resolution directed that if the nominee were 
a civilian, the Select Intelligence Committee would report the 
nomination and refer it to the Armed Services Committee, and if 
the nominee were a member of the Armed Forces on active duty, 
the reverse.
    A unanimous consent agreement of January 7, 2009, refers 
all nominations for inspectors general to the committees of 
primary jurisdiction and then sequentially to the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Under 
this consent agreement, the nominations for the NRO and NSA 
Inspectors General are also referred to the Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Committee. The exception to this 
consent agreement is the Inspector General for the CIA, which 
is considered exclusively by the Select Intelligence Committee.
    The following nominations were referred to the Committee 
during the 116th Congress:

A. William R. Evanina, Director of the National Counterintelligence and 
 Security Center at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    On January 16, 2019, President Trump nominated William R. 
Evanina to be the Director of the National Counterintelligence 
and Security Center. At that time, Mr. Evanina was serving in 
that same position. (President Trump previously nominated Mr. 
Evanina to this position on February 5, 2018. The full Senate 
did not act on that nomination.)
    The Committee reported the nomination favorably on February 
28, 2019. The Senate invoked cloture on the nomination on May 
6, 2020 by a vote of 83-7. The Senate approved the nomination 
on May 6, 2020 by a vote of 84-7.

B. Dr. Christopher J. Scolese, Director of the National Reconnaissance 
                                 Office

    On February 12, 2019, President Trump nominated Dr. 
Christopher J. Scolese to be the Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office. At that time, Dr. Scolese was serving as 
Director of the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center.
    Upon primary referral, the Committee held a hearing on May 
1, 2019, and reported the nomination favorably on May 9, 2019. 
Upon sequential referral, Senate Committee on Armed Service 
held a nomination hearing on June 4, 2019. Following the 
hearing, the Senate Committee on Armed Services reported the 
nomination favorably on June 10, 2019. The Senate approved the 
nomination by voice vote on June 27, 2019.

        C. John L. Ratcliffe, Director of National Intelligence

    On March 2, 2020, President Trump nominated John L. 
Ratcliffe be the Director of National Intelligence. At that 
time, Mr. Ratcliffe was serving as a United States 
Representative from Texas.
    The Committee held a nomination hearing on May 5, 2020. 
Following the hearing, the Committee reported the nomination 
favorably on May 19, 2020. Pursuant to the Senate's unanimous 
consent agreement on May 20, 2020, the Senate debated and 
approved the nomination on May 21, 2020 by a vote of 49-44.

D. Peter Michael Thomson, Inspector General of the Central Intelligence 
                                 Agency

    On April 6, 2020, President Trump nominated Peter Michael 
Thomson to be the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence 
Agency. At that time, Mr.Thomson was a partner at the law firm 
of Stone Pigman Walther Wittmann LLP.
    The Committee held a nomination hearing on June 24, 2020. 
Following the hearing, the Committee reported the nomination 
favorably on July 1, 2020.

  E. Christopher C. Miller, Director of the National Counterterrorism 
        Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    On May 4, 2020, President Trump nominated Christopher C. 
Miller to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center. At that time, Mr. Miller was the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense forSpecial Operations and Combatting 
Terrorism at the Defense Department.
    The Committee held a nomination hearing on July 22, 2020. 
Following the hearing, the Committee reported the nomination 
favorably on July 29, 2020. The Senate approved the nomination 
by voice vote on August 6, 2020.

F. Patrick Hovakimian, General Counsel of the Office of the Director of 
                         National Intelligence

    On May 21, 2020, President Trump nominated Patrick 
Hovakimian to be the General Counsel of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence. At that time, Mr. Hovakimian 
was serving as an Associate Deputy Attorney General at the 
Department of Justice. The Committee held a nomination hearing 
on July 22, 2020.

G. Allen Robert Souza, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 
         at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    On September 23, 2020, President Trump nominated Allen 
Robert Souza to be the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community. At that time, Mr. Souza was serving as the Principal 
Deputy Senior Director for Intelligence Programs at the 
National Security Council.

                          V. SUPPORT TO SENATE

    Under Senate Resolution 400, which established the 
Committee in 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence has an 
important role in assuring that the IC provides ``informed and 
timely intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative 
branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and 
vital interests of the Nation.'' The Committee fulfills this 
responsibility by providing access to IC information and 
officials to the U.S. Senate.
    The Committee facilitated access to IC information for 
members and staff outside the Committee by inviting them to 
participate in briefings and hearings on issues of shared 
jurisdiction or interest. The Committee also provided 
intelligence briefings by its professional staff to Members 
outside the Committee and assisted Members in resolving issues 
with intelligence agencies.

                              VI. APPENDIX


                    A. Summary of Committee Actions


1. Number of meetings

    During the 116th Congress, the Committee held a total of 
102 on-the-record interviews, meetings, briefings, and 
hearings, and numerous off-the-record briefings. These included 
multiple witness interviews, staff briefings to Committee 
members, hearings, and business meetings in furtherance of the 
Committee's investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 
presidential election. There were 86 oversight hearings, 
including nine hearings on the IC budget and six on election 
security, and open confirmation hearings for four 
administration nominees. Of these 86 hearings, 5 were open to 
the public and 81 were closed to protect classified information 
pursuant to Senate rules. The Committee also held 13 business 
meetings including mark-ups of legislation. Additionally, the 
Committee staff conducted multiple on-the-record briefings and 
interviews and numerous off-the-record briefings.

2. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee

    S. 245--Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.
    S. Res. 51--An original resolution authorizing expenditures 
by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
    S. 1589--Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 
2020.
    S. 3905--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2021.

3. Bills referred to the Committee

    S. 314--Modernizing the Trusted Workforce for the 21st 
Century Act of 2019.
    S. 544--A bill to require the Director of National 
Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on the death of 
Jamal Khashoggi, and for other purposes.
    H.R. 1404--Vladimir Putin Transparency Act.
    S. 838--A bill to protect integrity, fairness, and 
objectivity in decisions regarding access to classified 
information, and for other purposes.
    H.R. 3494--Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 
2020.
    S. 2316--Manufacturing, Investment, and Controls Review for 
Computer Hardware, Intellectual Property, and Supply Act of 
2019.
    S. 2493--Combatting Foreign Influence Act of 2019.
    S. 2528--A bill to require the Director of National 
Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on the purpose, 
scope, and means of expanded Chinese influence in international 
organizations, and for other purposes.
    S. 3142--Increasing Efficiency of All United States-Based 
Terrorism Information Sharing Act of 2019.
    S. 3153--A bill to prohibit the sharing of United States 
intelligence with countries that permit the operation of Huawei 
fifth generation telecommunications technology within their 
borders.
    S. Res. 666--A resolution honoring the faithful and 
unwavering service of Civil Air Transport and Air America to 
the United States.

4. Committee publications

    Report 116-20--Report of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence covering the period January 3, 2017-January 3, 
2019.
    Report 116-47--Report to accompany the Damon Paul Nelson 
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 together with Additional 
Views (S. 1589).
    Report 116-233--Report to accompany the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 together with Minority 
Views (S. 3905).
    Report 116-290--Report of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and 
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election together with Additional 
Views--November 10, 2020.

                                  [all]