[Senate Report 117-132]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                      Calendar No. 438
117th Congress     }                                    {       Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session        }                                    {      117-132

======================================================================



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                _______
                                

                 July 20, 2022.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

        Mr. Warner, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 4503]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 4503) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
year 2023 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community 
Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement 
and Disability System, and for other purposes, reports 
favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

                Classified Annex to the Committee Report

    Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on March 28, 
2022, that the request for the National Intelligence Program 
for Fiscal Year 2022 was $67.1 billion. Other than for limited 
unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence 
Community Management Account, the classified nature of United 
States intelligence activities precludes any further 
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its 
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has 
prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a 
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule 
of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act and has the legal status of 
public law. The classified annex is made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for 
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of 
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2023 (the ``Act'') reported by the Committee.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 specifies that the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the Intelligence Community for Fiscal Year 2023.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2023 are 
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that 
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) for Fiscal Year 2023.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA 
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2023.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Plan for assessing counterintelligence programs

    Section 301 requires the National Counterintelligence and 
Security Center to submit a plan for assessing the 
effectiveness of the counterintelligence programs of the 
Federal Government.

Section 302. Modification of advisory board in National Reconnaissance 
        Office

    Section 302 modifies the appointment mechanism and duration 
of the advisory board in the National Reconnaissance Office.

Section 303. Prohibition on employment with governments of certain 
        countries

    Section 303 establishes a prohibition on former 
Intelligence Community employees providing certain services to 
foreign state sponsors of terror and other foreign countries 
determined to be a significant threat to the national security 
interests of the United States, and establishes penalties for 
former employees who knowingly and willfully violate that 
prohibition.

Section 304. Counterintelligence and national security protections for 
        intelligence community grant funding

    Section 304 establishes counterintelligence protections for 
Intelligence Community grant funding to protect against risks 
of misappropriation, theft, and other threats to U.S. national 
security, including by the People's Republic of China, the 
Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Republic of 
Cuba.

Section 305. Extension of Central Intelligence Agency law enforcement 
        jurisdiction to facilities of Office of Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Section 305 enhances the CIA's authority to exercise law 
enforcement authority in order to protect ODNI facilities.

Section 306. Clarification regarding protection of Central Intelligence 
        Agency functions

    Section 306 clarifies protections for certain information 
regarding the functions of the CIA.

Section 307. Establishment of advisory board for National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 307 establishes an advisory board in the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) to study, advise on, and 
report about matters relating to the agency's mission.

Section 308. Annual Reports on status of recommendations of Comptroller 
        General of the United States for the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Section 308 directs the Comptroller General to submit an 
annual report listing all open recommendations made to the DNI. 
Section 308 further directs the DNI to provide a status update 
on each recommendation listed in the report.

Section 309. Timely submission of budget documents from intelligence 
        community

    Section 309 requires the DNI to deliver budget 
justification materials for elements of the Intelligence 
Community to Congress no later than 14 days after the President 
submits the budget request to Congress.

Section 310. Copyright protection for civilian faculty of the National 
        Intelligence University

    Section 310 allows faculty at the National Intelligence 
University to have limited copyright protection, consistent 
with protection afforded to faculty at educational institutions 
at the Department of Defense (DoD).

Section 311. Expansion of reporting requirements relating to authority 
        to pay personnel of Central Intelligence Agency for certain 
        injuries to the brain

    Section 311 extends for five years a one-time reporting 
requirement in the Helping American Victims Afflicted by 
Neurological Attacks Act (P.L. 117-46), requires the CIA to 
provide additional details in the contents of the report 
submitted, and requires the National Intelligence Council to 
coordinate an updated analytic assessment regarding the cause 
and attribution of anomalous health incidents, along with any 
dissenting views from the Intelligence Community.

Section 312. Modifications to Foreign Malign Influence Response Center

    Section 312 renames the Center established by Section 119C 
of the National Security Act of 1947 the ``Foreign Malign 
Influence Center,'' requires a report assessing the Center's 
need for continued operation, and sunsets the Center's 
authorities and requirements on December 31, 2027.

Section 313. Requirement to offer cyber protection support for 
        personnel of intelligence community in positions highly 
        vulnerable to cyber attack

    Section 313 amends Section 6308(b) of the Damon Paul Nelson 
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (P.L. 116-92) to clarify that 
the DNI shall offer protection support for Intelligence 
Community personnel in positions highly vulnerable to cyber 
attacks, including by providing such support to any such 
personnel who request protection. Section 313 further requires 
the DNI to submit a plan for the training and resources 
required for such support.

Section 314. Minimum cybersecurity standards for national security 
        systems of intelligence community

    Section 314 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
National Manager for National Security Systems, to establish 
minimum cybersecurity requirements across the Intelligence 
Community, and requires agencies to meet the deadlines 
established under those requirements and to update their plans 
to resource the full implementation of those standards.

Section 315. Review and report on intelligence community activities 
        under Executive Order 12333

    Section 315 requires the DNI to conduct an assessment on 
the feasibility and advisability of making public certain 
information relating to activities under Executive Order 12333, 
and to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
report on that assessment, including descriptions of incidents 
in which the Intelligence Community violated Executive Order 
12333 or other guidelines and procedures, and a recommendation 
on whether such incidents can be disaggregated for public 
release.

Section 316. Elevation of the commercial and business operations office 
        of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

    Section 316 directs the head of the commercial and business 
operations office of the NGA to report directly to the Director 
of the NGA.

Section 317. Assessing intelligence community open-source support for 
        export controls and foreign investment screening

    Section 317 requires the DNI to carry out a pilot program 
to assess the feasibility and advisability of providing certain 
open source-derived intelligence to the Department of Commerce 
to support the Department's efforts related to export controls 
and investment screening functions. Section 317 further 
requires the DNI to submit a plan to carry out the pilot 
program and a report on the findings of the DNI with respect to 
the program.

Section 318. Annual training requirement and report regarding analytic 
        standards

    Section 318 requires the DNI to issue a policy requiring 
the head of each element of the Intelligence Community to 
create an annual training program on Intelligence Community 
Directive (ICD) 203, Analytic Standards, and provide a report 
to the congressional intelligence committees on compliance 
incidents reported to Intelligence Community analytic 
ombudspersons related to the standards set forth in ICD 203. 
Section 318 further includes a five-year sunset provision.

Section 319. Historical Advisory Panel of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency

    Section 319 establishes a Historical Advisory Panel in the 
CIA to determine topics for research, publication, and 
declassification, and identify technological tools to modernize 
classification and declassification processes. Section 319 
further requires the Panel to submit an annual report on its 
activities to the Director of the CIA and to the congressional 
intelligence committees. Section 319 also includes a seven-year 
sunset provision.

  TITLE IV--INTELLIGENCE MATTERS RELATED TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
                                 CHINA

Section 401. Update to annual reports on influence operations and 
        campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party

    Section 401 updates the reporting requirement in Section 
1107(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 to require 
assessments on the Chinese Communist Party's online influence 
operations and propaganda campaigns, including through the use 
of social media and news outlets, and opportunities to expose 
and counter such activities.

Section 402. Report on wealth and corrupt activities of the leadership 
        of the Chinese Community Party

    Section 402 requires reporting on the wealth and corrupt 
activities of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Section 403. Identification and threat assessment of companies with 
        investments by the People's Republic of China

    Section 403 requires the Intelligence Community to report 
on the risk to national security posed by telecommunication, 
hospitality, and conveyance companies in which the People's 
Republic of China has substantially invested.

Section 404. Intelligence community working group for monitoring the 
        economic and technological capabilities of the People's 
        Republic of China

    Section 404 establishes a cross-Intelligence Community 
working group to assess and report on the economic and 
technological capabilities of the People's Republic of China to 
become the dominant military, technological, and economic 
power, and to undermine the rules-based world order, including 
providing unclassified lists of the top institutions, 
businesses, and projects facilitating the Chinese Communist 
Party's technology, military, and other objectives.

Section 405. Annual report on concentrated reeducation camps in the 
        Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region of the People's Republic of 
        China

    Section 405 requires public reporting on the detention and 
forced labor camps in the People's Republic of China's Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region, including victims, personnel, 
funding, and participating Chinese companies.

Section 406. Assessments of production of semiconductors by the 
        People's Republic of China

    Section 406 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees an assessment of the People's Republic 
of China in global competitiveness in the production of 
semiconductors by Chinese firms.

           TITLE V--PERSONNEL AND SECURITY CLEARANCE MATTERS

Section 501. Improving onboarding of personnel in intelligence 
        community

    Section 501 requires the DNI to establish a methodology for 
measuring the time it takes elements of the Intelligence 
Community to onboard personnel, to submit a report on the time 
it takes to onboard personnel in the Intelligence Community, 
and to submit a plan to reduce that time for elements that have 
median onboarding times that exceed 180 days.

Section 502. Improving onboarding at the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 502 requires the Director of the CIA to take 
actions necessary to ensure that, by December 31, 2023, the 
CIA's onboarding process has a median duration of 180 days or 
less.

Section 503. Report on legislative action required to implement Trusted 
        Workforce 2.0 initiative

    Section 503 requires the Office of Management and Budget to 
submit a report on the legislative action required to implement 
the Trusted Workforce (TW) 2.0 initiative, including any 
statutory provisions requiring amendment.

Section 504. Comptroller General of the United States assessment of 
        administration of polygraphs in intelligence community

    Section 504 requires the Comptroller General to conduct an 
assessment, provide a briefing, and submit a report on the 
administration of polygraph evaluations that are needed in the 
Intelligence Community to meet current mission demand.

Section 505. Timeliness in the administration of polygraphs

    Section 505 requires the DNI, in the DNI's capacity as the 
Security Executive Agent, to issue standards for timeliness for 
Federal agencies to administer polygraphs conducted for 
purposes of adjudicating eligibility for access to classified 
information and granting clearance reciprocity.

Section 506. Policy on submittal of applications for access to 
        classified information for certain personnel

    Section 506 requires the DNI, in the DNI's capacity as the 
Security Executive Agent, to issue a policy that allows 
companies to submit applications for security clearances, on a 
nonreimbursable basis, for personnel who perform key management 
and oversight functions who may not merit an application due to 
their work under any one contract.

Section 507. Prohibition on denial of eligibility for access to 
        classified information solely because of preemployment use of 
        cannabis

    Section 507 prohibits the head of an element of the 
Intelligence Community from denying an individual's security 
clearance based solely on the individual's preemployment use of 
cannabis.

Section 508. Technical correction regarding Federal policy on sharing 
        of covered insider threat information

    Section 508 makes a technical correction to Section 806 of 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 
117-103), which requires the DNI to issue a policy for the 
Federal Government on sharing covered insider threat 
information pertaining to contractor employees.

Section 509. Establishing process parity for security clearance and 
        access determinations

    Section 509 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse 
security clearance or access determination against a 
whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 
that the agency would have made the same security clearance or 
access determination in the absence of the whistleblower's 
disclosure. Section 509 further establishes parity in the legal 
standards applied to Intelligence Community whistleblower 
matters.

Section 510. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory 
        revocation of security clearances and access determinations

    Section 510 removes the cap on compensatory damages for an 
employee or former employee who was subjected to a reprisal 
with respect to the employee's or former employee's security 
clearance or access determination.

Section 511. Comptroller General of the United States report on use of 
        Government and industry space certified as secure compartmented 
        information facilities

    Section 511 requires the Comptroller General to submit a 
report on the average annual utilization of Federal Government 
and industry space certified as secure compartmented 
information facilities under Intelligence Community or DoD 
policy.

       TITLE VI--INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Section 601. Submittal of complaints and information by whistleblowers 
        in the intelligence community to Congress

    Section 601 establishes security officers and protocols to 
facilitate Intelligence Community employees' and contractors' 
submissions of complaints and information to Congress. Section 
601 further clarifies the requirements for submitting 
whistleblower complaints and information, and ensures 
bipartisan notification of such materials.

Section 602. Modification of whistleblower protections for contractor 
        employees in intelligence community

    Section 602 ensures that Intelligence Community 
whistleblowers can provide disclosures to supervisors who have 
responsibility for the subject matter of the disclosure.

Section 603. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity 
        as reprisal against whistleblower disclosure by employees and 
        contractors in intelligence community

    Section 603 adds a prohibition on knowing or willful 
disclosures that reveal an Intelligence Community 
whistleblower's identifying information without consent, except 
as necessary during the course of an investigation. Section 603 
further establishes a private right of action for an 
Intelligence Community whistleblower if such disclosure is 
taken as a reprisal against the whistleblower for bringing a 
complaint.

Section 604. Definitions regarding whistleblower complaints and 
        information of urgent concern received by inspectors general of 
        the intelligence community

    Section 604 clarifies the definition of ``urgent concern'' 
regarding whistleblower complaints and ensures that the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community has authority 
over ``urgent concern'' determinations that are matters of 
national security and not public policy matters.

                        TITLE VII--OTHER MATTERS

Section 701. Improvements relating to continuity of Privacy and Civil 
        Liberties Oversight Board membership

    Section 701 permits (1) the reappointment of a member of 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board for additional 
terms; (2) filling a vacancy in the same manner in which the 
original appointment was made; and (3) the continued service of 
a member following the expiration of their term.

Section 702. Report by Public Interest Declassification Board

    Section 702 requires the Public Interest Declassification 
Board to submit a report on recommendations to improve the 
Information Security Oversight Office and Executive Order 
13526, as well as other matters.

Section 703. Modification of requirement for office to address 
        unidentified aerospace-undersea phenomena

    Section 703 renames the Office established to carry out the 
duties of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, and 
clarifies the Office's legal authorities, duties, and 
leadership to incorporate Intelligence Community equities that 
are integral to ensuring full oversight of unidentified 
aerospace-undersea phenomena subject matters.

Section 704. Unidentified aerospace-undersea phenomena reporting 
        procedures

    Section 704 ensures the Intelligence Community and DoD have 
sufficient procedures in place to receive all relevant 
reporting and disclosures regarding unidentified aerospace-
undersea phenomena.

Sections 705. Comptroller General of the United States compilation of 
        unidentified aerospace-undersea phenomena records

    Section 705 requires the Comptroller General to undertake 
an independent review and compilation of unidentified 
aerospace-undersea phenomena-related historical documents and 
submit a corresponding report. Section 705 further requires the 
relevant agencies to provide the Comptroller General with 
necessary materials and access to such records.

Section 706. Office of Global Competition Analysis

    Section 706 requires the President to establish an office 
on analysis of global competition regarding United States 
leadership in technology and innovation sectors critical to 
national security and economic prosperity, and to support 
related policy development and decision making in related 
matters. Section 706 authorizes $20 million for fiscal year 
2023 to carry out this requirement.

Section 707. Report on tracking and collecting precursor chemicals used 
        in the production of synthetic opioids

    Section 707 requires the Director of the CIA to submit a 
report on intelligence gaps related to tracking and collecting 
licit precursor chemicals bound for illicit use in opioid 
production.

Section 708. Assessment and report on mass migration in the Western 
        Hemisphere

    Section 708 requires the DNI to submit a report on the 
national security threats posed by mass migration within the 
Western Hemisphere, including the risks associated with the 
regime in Cuba and the illegitimate Nicolas Maduro regime in 
Venezuela.

Section 709. Notifications regarding transfers of detainees at United 
        States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

    Section 709 requires the Secretary of Defense to notify 
appropriate Members of Congress when a final determination is 
made that the continued law of war detention of an individual 
detained at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay is unwarranted. 
Section 709 further requires the Secretary of State to notify 
appropriate Members of Congress prior to a detainee's transfer 
outside of Guantanamo Bay, including specific information about 
the detainee and the transfer.

Section 710. Report on international norms, rules, and principles 
        applicable in space

    Section 710 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, and heads of other agencies as the DNI 
determines to be necessary, to submit a report on international 
norms, rules, and principles applicable in space, including how 
threats to the United States may be mitigated through the 
development of international norms, as well as opportunities 
for the United States to influence those norms.

Section 711. Assessments of the effects of sanctions imposed with 
        respect to the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine

    Section 711 requires the DNI to submit an assessment of the 
cumulative and material effects of sanctions imposed by the 
United States, European countries, and the international 
community on the Russian Federation in response to Russia's 
invasion of Ukraine, including efforts by Russia to evade 
sanctions through direct or indirect assistance from other 
countries and by using digital assets; the effect of the 
sanctions on Russia's relationship with certain regimes, 
countries, and senior leadership; the effect of the sanctions 
on other countries' development of alternative payment systems; 
and the impact of any general licenses issued in relation to 
the sanctions.

Section 712. Assessment and briefing on implications of food insecurity 
        resulting from the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine

    Section 712 requires the DNI to conduct an assessment of 
the implications of food insecurity that may result from the 
Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine.

Section 713. Pilot program for Director of Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation to undertake an effort to identify International 
        Mobile Subscriber Identity-catchers and develop countermeasures

    Section 713 amends Section 5725 of the Damon Paul Nelson 
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (P.L. 116-92) authorizing the 
DNI to undertake an effort to identify International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity-catchers in the United States and, when 
appropriate, develop countermeasures, by transferring the 
authority to the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). Section 713 further directs the Director 
of the FBI to exercise those authorities through a pilot 
program within the National Capital Region, and limits the 
pilot program to two years.

Section 714. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
        assessment of anomalous health incidents

    Section 714 requires the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research to submit a report on its assessment 
of the findings of the events that have been collectively 
labeled as ``anomalous health incidents.''

Section 715. Clarification of process for protecting classified 
        information using the Classified Information Procedures Act

    Section 715 clarifies that a motion under Section 4 of the 
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) may be supported 
by a declaration executed by any official possessing original 
classification authority, who shall not be required to be the 
head of the relevant agency.

                    Committee Comments and Direction


Protecting classified information using the Classified Information 
        Procedures Act

    In United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2008), the 
Second Circuit held that the state secrets privilege applies to 
criminal proceedings involving protection of classified 
information under CIPA, and that the government must satisfy 
the procedural requirements of the privilege when seeking the 
protections of CIPA. These requirements include personal 
invocation of the privilege by the head of the department which 
has control over the matter, after actual personal 
consideration by that officer. The Second Circuit holding is at 
odds with the views of most other appellate courts, and the 
Committee is concerned that it imposes substantial burdens in 
addressing routine classified information issues in cases 
within the Second Circuit. Accordingly, Section 715 clarifies 
that the head of the department is not required to provide the 
necessary declaration; instead, any official possessing 
original classification authority may do so.

People's Republic of China Presence and Intentions in the Caribbean

    The Committee commends the Intelligence Community's 
recognition of--and increased commitment of resources to--the 
threat posed by the People's Republic of China's long-term 
goals and intentions related to United States interests 
worldwide. The Committee remains concerned, among other areas, 
about the People's Republic of China's intentions and influence 
in the Caribbean, including in Suriname and Guyana. Therefore, 
within 90 days following enactment of this Act, the Committee 
directs the Director of the CIA to submit a report to the 
congressional intelligence committees regarding the threats and 
risks presented to United States national security and economic 
interests by People's Republic of China investments in critical 
infrastructure, including energy and telecommunications 
infrastructure, in the Caribbean.

Trusted Workforce 2.0

    The Committee continues to exercise close oversight of the 
executive branch's personnel vetting reform effort, TW 2.0. The 
executive agents for security (the DNI) and suitability and 
credentialing (the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management) have issued a number of policy documents to 
modernize a vetting model that has largely remained unchanged 
for more than 70 years. The Committee is closely watching how 
the Intelligence Community can capitalize on reforms being 
adopted in TW 2.0 to ensure personnel can maintain their 
mobility across their career. The DNI has specific 
responsibilities to lead this effort, which the Committee 
endorses to drive much needed change for the Federal government 
and its industry partners. DoD is responsible for the 
information technology backbone for this effort, known as the 
National Background Investigation Services (NBIS). The 
Committee looks forward to NBIS's capabilities maturing to 
support five core human resource scenarios--establishing, 
continuing, upgrading, transferring, and reestablishing trust. 
The Committee recognizes that modernizing the government's 
personnel vetting paradigm is a long-term project that requires 
sustained oversight attention.

Modification of Requirement for Office to Address Unidentified 
        Aerospace-Undersea Phenomena

    At a time when cross-domain transmedium threats to United 
States national security are expanding exponentially, the 
Committee is disappointed with the slow pace of DoD-led efforts 
to establish the office to address those threats and to replace 
the former Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force as required 
in Section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2022. The Committee was hopeful that the new office 
would address many of the structural issues hindering progress. 
To accelerate progress, the Committee has, pursuant to Section 
703, renamed the organization formerly known as the 
Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force and the Aerial Object 
Identification and Management Synchronization Management Group 
to be the Unidentified Aerospace-Undersea Phenomena Joint 
Program Office. That change reflects the broader scope of the 
effort directed by the Congress. Identification, 
classification, and scientific study of unidentified aerospace-
undersea phenomena is an inherently challenging cross-agency, 
cross-domain problem requiring an integrated or joint 
Intelligence Community and DoD approach. The new Office will 
continue to be led by DoD, with a Deputy Director named by the 
Intelligence Community. The formal DoD and Intelligence 
Community definition of the terms used by the Office shall be 
updated to include space and undersea, and the scope of the 
Office shall be inclusive of those additional domains with 
focus on addressing technology surprise and ``unknown 
unknowns.'' Temporary nonattributed objects, or those that are 
positively identified as man-made after analysis, will be 
passed to appropriate offices and should not be considered 
under the definition as unidentified aerospace-undersea 
phenomena.

Annual Reports on status of recommendations of Comptroller General of 
        the United States for the Director of National Intelligence

    As noted in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying 
the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020, the 
congressional intelligence committees believe the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) adds significant value to their 
oversight efforts. GAO has provided numerous recommendations to 
improve the functioning and efficiency of the Intelligence 
Community. However, these improvements can only be achieved 
through timely and deliberate action taken in response. The 
committees do not always have sufficient information to 
understand the status of ODNI actions taken in response to open 
GAO recommendations, or where, if applicable, ODNI does not 
plan to take action in response to GAO recommendations. 
Accordingly, Section 308 directs the Comptroller General to 
submit an annual report listing all open recommendations made 
to the DNI. Section 308 further directs the DNI to provide a 
status update on each recommendation listed in the report.

Minimum Cybersecurity Standards for National Security Systems of 
        Intelligence Community

    Section 314 in this bill requires the DNI, in coordination 
with the National Manager for National Security Systems, to 
establish Intelligence Community-wide minimum cybersecurity 
standards for national security systems. The Committee welcomes 
the publication of the National Security Memorandum on 
Improving the Cybersecurity of National Security, DoD, and 
Intelligence Community Systems (NSM-8). This section codifies 
the establishment of, and adherence to, minimum cybersecurity 
standards for the national security systems of the Intelligence 
Community, as provided for in NSM-08 or any successor policy 
guidance. The provision further requires elements of the 
Intelligence Community to meet the deadlines established for 
implementation of the standards, and requires elements of the 
Intelligence Community to update their plans to resource the 
full implementation of those standards.

Report on the establishment of a cadre of professors to support the 
        Intelligence Community

    The Committee continues to endorse exploring mechanisms by 
which the Intelligence Community can better utilize expertise 
outside of the government in its operations, such as the 
public-private talent exchange program. The Committee 
encourages the Intelligence Community to ensure that academics, 
from a variety of fields, at universities, research 
organizations, and elsewhere, can play a robust role in 
contribution to the U.S. intelligence enterprise. The Committee 
therefore directs ODNI to provide the congressional 
intelligence committees, within 180 days after enactment of 
this Act, with a plan for creating a reserve cadre of academics 
who can perform specific assignments for the Intelligence 
Community. That plan should include an assessment of and 
solutions for any barriers to creating this cadre, such as 
issues with contracting vehicles, a plan for expediting 
granting of academics' security clearances, and protocols for 
disclosure and accountability with the academics' host 
institutions.

Response to report required by Section 6715 of the Fiscal Year 2018, 
        2019, and 2020 Intelligence Authorization Act

    The Committee seeks a substantive response to a report 
required by Section 6715 of the Fiscal Year 2018, 2019, and 
2020 Intelligence Authorization Act, which was enacted on 
December 20, 2019 (P.L. 116-92).The report required by that 
provision included ``any attempts known to the intelligence 
community by foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in United States telecommunications networks 
(including Signaling System No. 7) to target for surveillance 
United States persons, including employees of the Federal 
Government,'' and ``any actions taken by the intelligence 
community to protect agencies and personnel of the United 
States Government from surveillance conducted by foreign 
governments.'' The document that the ODNI identified as a 
response provided to the Committee on November 23, 2021, made 
no reference to Signaling System No. 7. The Committee has 
further addressed this concern in the classified annex.

Review of declassification practices and policies across Executive 
        agencies, funding for such activities, and investments in 
        technological modernization

    The Committee remains concerned about the Government's 
obsolete classification system whose deficiencies ``undermine 
our national security, as well as critical democratic 
objectives,'' according to the DNI. The Committee further notes 
the DNI's acknowledgment that ``[t]he current prioritization 
given to remediating these issues and the resources dedicated 
to making tangible progress are simply not sufficient.'' The 
Committee therefore directs the DNI, jointly with the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), 
to conduct a review of declassification practices and policies 
across Executive agencies, funding for such activities, and 
investments in technological modernization. The Committee 
further directs the DNI, jointly with the USD(I&S), to provide 
a report to the congressional intelligence and defense 
committees to include: (1) a description of declassification 
practices and policies across Executive agencies, funding for 
such activities, and investments in technological 
modernization; (2) proposals for the promotion of best 
practices that could be applied across relevant Executive 
agencies and/or as part of a federated system, and cost 
estimates associated with such proposals; and (3) a spend plan 
for the research, development, and promotion of technological 
solutions to, and other modernizations efforts for, 
declassification.

Historical Advisory Panel of the Central Intelligence Agency

    The Committee appreciates the steps CIA has recently taken 
to consult scholarly experts on declassification. The CIA's 
Historical Advisory Panel has demonstrated that it can be an 
important tool in identifying topics for research, publication, 
and discretionary declassification. Accordingly, Section 319 
codifies the Panel to ensure that CIA sustains the Historical 
Advisory Panel and that the Panel's work receives the attention 
it deserves. The Committee expects the Director of the CIA to 
meet with the Historical Advisory Panel at regular intervals 
and take full heed of the panel's recommendations.

                            Committee Action

    On June 22, 2022, a quorum being present, the Committee met 
to consider the bill, classified annex, and amendments. The 
Committee took the following actions:

Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex

    By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex for 
Fiscal Year 2023, the base text for purposes of amendment.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc twenty-six 
amendments to the bill, as follows: (1) an amendment by Senator 
Blunt, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to establish an 
NGA Advisory Board; (2) an amendment by Senator Blunt, and 
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and Senators Gillibrand and 
Heinrich, to rename and modify the Unidentified Aerospace-
Undersea Phenomena Joint Program Office; (3) an amendment by 
Vice Chairman Rubio to require notifications of Guantanamo Bay 
transfers; (4) an amendment by Senator Collins to require 
reports on Comptroller General recommendations; (5) an 
amendment by Senator Bennet, and cosponsored by Senator 
Feinstein, to require a report on international space norms; 
(6) an amendment by Senator Collins, and cosponsored by 
Chairman Warner, to require timely submission of certain 
budgetary documents; (7) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and 
cosponsored by Senators Sasse and Gillibrand, to establish 
copyright protection for National Intelligence University 
civilian faculty; (8) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and 
cosponsored by Senator Cornyn, to require assessments of the 
People's Republic of China's semiconductor production; (9) an 
amendment by Senator Collins, and cosponsored by Senators 
Gillibrand and Cotton, to expand reporting on CIA's payment 
authorities for certain injuries; (10) an amendment by Chairman 
Warner, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to extend the 
CIA's law enforcement jurisdiction to certain ODNI facilities; 
(11) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Vice 
Chairman Rubio, to require assessments of the effects of 
sanctions imposed regarding the Russian Federation's Ukraine 
invasion; (12) an amendment by Senator Bennet, and cosponsored 
by Senator Sasse and Chairman Warner, to establish an Office of 
Global Competition Analysis; (13) an amendment by Senator 
Blunt, and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio and Senators 
Gillibrand and Heinrich, to require Comptroller General 
historical compilations of Unidentified Aerospace-Undersea 
Phenomena records; (14) an amendment by Chairman Warner, and 
cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to modify and sunset the 
Foreign Malign Influence Response Center; (15) an amendment by 
Senator Wyden to require certain cyber protection support for 
Intelligence Community personnel; (16) an amendment by Senator 
Wyden, and cosponsored by Senator Heinrich, to require a pilot 
program for the FBI to identify International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity-catchers and develop countermeasures; (17) an 
amendment by Senator Gillibrand, and cosponsored by Senator 
Cotton, to require an assessment of anomalous health incidents 
by the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research; 
(18) an amendment by Senator Collins, and cosponsored by 
Senator Wyden and Chairman Warner, to require minimum 
cybersecurity standards for the Intelligence Community's 
National Security Systems; (19) an amendment by Senator Wyden, 
and cosponsored by Senator Heinrich, to require a review and 
report on Intelligence Community activities pursuant to 
Executive Order 12333; (20) an amendment by Chairman Warner, 
and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Rubio, to elevate the NGA's 
Commercial and Business Operations Office; (21) an amendment by 
Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senator Cornyn, to clarify 
the Classified Information Protection Act; (22) an amendment by 
Senator Casey, and cosponsored by Chairman Warner and Senator 
Bennet, to require assessments on food security implications 
from the Russian Federation's Ukraine invasion; (23) an 
amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senator Casey, 
to assess Intelligence Community open source support for export 
controls and foreign investment screening; (24) an amendment by 
Senator King to require training and reporting on analytic 
standards; (25) an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio, and 
cosponsored by Senator Sasse, to improve personnel onboarding 
at the CIA; and (26) an amendment by Senator Sasse, and 
cosponsored by Chairman Warner, to establish a Historical 
Advisory Panel at the CIA.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc thirty-seven 
amendments to the classified annex.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted a second-degree 
amendment by Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senator 
Bennet, to an amendment by Senator Wyden, and cosponsored by 
Senators Heinrich and Gillibrand. Senator Wyden's amendment, as 
cosponsored by Senators Heinrich and Gillibrand, prohibited any 
Federal agency from denying or revoking an individual's 
eligibility for access to classified information solely because 
of past or present use of cannabis. Chairman Warner's second-
degree amendment, as cosponsored by Senator Bennet, limited the 
prohibition to Intelligence Community agencies, struck the 
revocation prohibition, and replaced the ``past or present'' 
application with a ``pre-employment'' application. By a vote of 
11 ayes and 5 noes, the Committee adopted the amendment by 
Senator Wyden, and cosponsored by Senators Heinrich and 
Gillibrand, as modified by Chairman Warner's second-degree 
amendment (cosponsored by Senator Bennet). The votes in person 
or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye; Senator 
Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; 
Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--aye; 
Senator Gillibrand--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--no; Senator 
Burr--aye; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--aye; Senator 
Blunt--no; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator 
Sasse--aye.
    By a vote of 5 ayes and 11 noes, the Committee did not 
adopt an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to prohibit funds 
authorized by this Act within the Intelligence Community 
Management Account from being obligated or expended to provide 
financial or in-kind support to certain tax-exempt 
organizations that receive financial or in-kind support from 
foreign governments outside of the Five Eyes alliance. The 
votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--
no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator 
Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator 
Casey--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; 
Senator Burr--no; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--no; 
Senator Blunt--no; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; 
Senator Sasse--aye.
    By a vote of 8 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee did not adopt 
an amendment by Vice Chairman Rubio to prohibit funds 
authorized by this Act from being obligated or expended by or 
for the currently-paused Department of Homeland Security's 
Disinformation Governance Board or successor organization. The 
votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--
no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator 
Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator 
Casey--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; 
Senator Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; 
Senator Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; 
Senator Sasse--aye.
    Senator Cornyn offered and withdrew an amendment to limit 
the availability of funds authorized by this Act to change the 
section of the Questionnaire for National Security Positions 
that pertains to association record.
    By a vote of 8 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee did not adopt 
an amendment by Senator Cotton to the classified annex. The 
votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--
no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator 
Heinrich--no; Senator King--no; Senator Bennet--no; Senator 
Casey--no; Senator Gillibrand--no; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; 
Senator Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; 
Senator Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; 
Senator Sasse--aye.
    By a vote of 9 ayes and 7 noes, the Committee adopted an 
amendment by Senator Cotton to the classified annex. The votes 
in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--no; 
Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--no; 
Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--no; Senator Casey--no; 
Senator Gillibrand--no; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator 
Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator 
Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator 
Sasse--aye.

Votes to report the committee bill

    On June 22, 2022, the Committee voted to report the bill, 
as amended, by a vote of 16 ayes and zero noes. The votes in 
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Warner--aye; 
Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Bennet--aye; Senator Casey--
aye; Senator Gillibrand--aye; Vice Chairman Rubio--aye; Senator 
Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator 
Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Senator 
Sasse--aye.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to 
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and 
classified annex.

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

    Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires 
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed 
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff 
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report 
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the 
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the 
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of 
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of 
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited 
tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On July 12, 
2022, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional 
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred 
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN RUBIO

    Keeping politics out of our intelligence apparatus is 
essential for its success. The Intelligence Authorization Act 
for fiscal year 2023 represents a broad, bipartisan consensus 
regarding the critical work performed by the men and women of 
our Intelligence Community.
    This year's bill includes bipartisan language contained in 
the Annex to accompany the bill that prohibits the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) from performing intelligence 
analysis that lacks a foreign nexus. When NCTC was created, it 
was the drafters' intent that it bridge the divide between 
intelligence and law enforcement to ``connect the dots'' 
regarding transnational terrorism--a critical capability absent 
prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. This constructive 
relationship has helped to ensure that the Intelligence 
Community is working with law enforcement when there is a link 
to a foreign entity.
    Over the past several years, NCTC has produced analysis on 
events that pertain exclusively to domestic cases, even when it 
is clear that there is no foreign nexus. This concerning 
development disregards the clear intent for this Center and 
risks threatening the integrity of the Intelligence Community 
and the critical work of NCTC. Unless an act of terrorism 
within the homeland has a known or suspected foreign nexus, 
NCTC should not commit any of its limited analytic resources to 
the response. I appreciate the bipartisan consensus directing 
NCTC to focus its analytic resources on the threat of 
transnational terrorism consistent with its authorizing 
statute.
    Similarly, I remain concerned by the use of National 
Intelligence Program funds to support the Department of 
Homeland Security's Disinformation Governance Board. Although 
the Committee did not adopt an amendment I offered--and all 
Minority members supported--that would prohibit Intelligence 
Community support to the Disinformation Governance Board, I 
will continue my efforts to ensure National Intelligence 
Program funds are not used to regulate Americans' free speech.
    Secretary Mayorkas signed the Board's Charter on February 
24, 2022 and, given the administration's characterization that 
the Board was on ``pause'' as of May 18, I presume the intent 
remains to continue with the Board's activities. The Charter 
stated that the Department's Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis, one of 18 Intelligence Community elements whose funds 
this Committee authorizes, was one of the ``Standing Board 
members'' from inception. Whatever one thinks of a government-
sponsored, domestic-facing ``board'' designed to identify what 
elements of free speech the government deems to be 
disinformation, we should all be able to agree that our 
Intelligence Community should have no part in it.
    I intend to continue to work in a bipartisan manner to 
ensure the Intelligence Community is focused on protecting 
Americans from threats to the homeland and on countering 
authoritarian regimes like Russia and China and not on lawful, 
protected activities of U.S. persons.
                                                       Marco Rubio.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

    I am pleased that the Fiscal Year 2023 Intelligence 
Authorization Act (IAA) includes numerous provisions and 
amendments I put forward to increase transparency, advance 
declassification reform, strengthen cybersecurity, protect 
Intelligence Community whistleblowers, and improve the 
Intelligence Community's recruiting.
    One provision, co-sponsored by Senator Heinrich, directs 
the DNI to report on the feasibility of greater transparency 
with regard to the Intelligence Community's activities governed 
by Executive Order 12333. In recent years, the Intelligence 
Community has made significant, if incomplete, progress in 
informing the public about surveillance conducted pursuant to 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. By contrast, the 
Intelligence Community releases almost no information on the 
impact of Executive Order 12333 activities on U.S. persons or 
on violations of the Executive Order.
    The bill promotes declassification reform by directing the 
Public Interest Declassification Board to report on recommended 
modifications to Executive Order 13526, which governs 
classification and declassification, a provision I put forward 
with Chairman Warner. As detailed above, the DNI is also 
directed to report on progress in implementing declassification 
reform. The critical importance of this direction was recently 
underscored by the DNI's acknowledgment that deficiencies in 
the current system undermine national security and that reform 
efforts have received insufficient resources and 
prioritization.
    The bill includes a number of important cybersecurity and 
counter-surveillance provisions. While the Fiscal Year 2020 
National Defense Authorization Act granted the DNI the 
authority to take actions to detect the use of international 
mobile subscriber identity catchers (surveillance devices that 
impersonate a phone company's cell towers in order to track, 
intercept and hack cell phones) and deploy countermeasures 
against them, that authority has not been exercised. The Fiscal 
Year 2023 IAA therefore includes a provision, co-sponsored by 
Senator Heinrich, mandating that the FBI Director conduct a 
two-year effort within the National Capital Region. Similarly, 
the Intelligence Community has not implemented a provision I 
included in the Fiscal Year 2018, 2019 and 2020 IAA authorizing 
the DNI to provide voluntary cybersecurity assistance for the 
personal devices and accounts of Intelligence Community 
personnel whom the DNI determines are vulnerable to foreign 
surveillance. The Fiscal Year 2023 bill therefore requires the 
DNI to offer that assistance and provide it if requested.
    As described above, the bill ensures that the government 
provide a report, required by a provision I included in the 
Fiscal Year 2018, 2019, and 2020 IAA, on any attempts by 
foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities in 
U.S. telecommunications networks, including Signaling System 
No. 7. Finally, I was pleased to work with Senator Collins on 
an amendment mandating minimum cyber security standards for 
national security systems and requiring reports to Congress on 
any waivers of those standards.
    The bill includes numerous provisions I included in the 
Fiscal Year 2022 bill that have not yet been passed into law. 
Most of those provisions protect Intelligence Community 
whistleblowers, by ensuring that their security clearances 
cannot be revoked based on a pretext, by removing the damages 
cap for reprisals, by ensuring that whistleblowers can come 
directly to Congress, and, by clarifying which whistleblower 
complaints must be submitted to Congress, a provision 
necessitated by the previous Administration's misinterpretation 
of the law. The bill also includes a provision from last year's 
bill ensuring continuity of the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board.
    During the Committee's mark-up, I offered, with Senators 
Gillibrand and Heinrich, an amendment prohibiting the denial or 
revocation of a security clearance solely based on past or 
ongoing use of cannabis. This reform, which reflects widespread 
legalization around the country, is necessary if the U.S. 
Government is going to compete with the private sector and 
recruit and retain the talent it needs to defend the country. 
The modified version of the amendment, which applies to pre-
employment use and to elements of the Intelligence Community, 
is a significant step in this direction.

                                                         Ron Wyden.
                        Changes to Existing Law

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is 
necessary to dispense with the requipment of paragraph 12 to 
expedite the business of the Senate.

                                  [all]