[Senate Report 117-1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
117th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 117-1
_______________________________________________________________________
ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
and its
SUBCOMMITTEES
for the
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
March 1, 2021.--Ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
19-010 WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSOFF, Georgia RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
Pamela Thiessen, Minority Staff Director
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DURING THE
116TH CONGRESS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RAND PAUL, Kentucky THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
RICK SCOTT, Florida KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
------
SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE 116TH CONGRESS
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio, Chairman
RAND PAUL, Kentucky THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
------
FEDERAL SPENDING OVERSIGHT AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
RAND PAUL, Kentucky, Chairman
RICK SCOTT, Florida MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
REGULATORY AFFAIRS AND FEDERAL MANAGEMENT
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma, Chairman
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
MITT ROMNEY, Utah THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
CONTENTS
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Page
I. Highlights of Activities.........................................1
A. Border and Immigration Security....................... 2
B. Cybersecurity......................................... 5
C. Critical Infrastructure............................... 7
D. Terrorism............................................. 11
E. DHS Reforms and COVID-19 Response..................... 13
F. Oversight of Federal Agencies & Government Programs... 17
G. Reducing Waste, Fraud and Abuse....................... 22
II. Committee Jurisdiction..........................................25
III. Bills and Resolutions Referred and Considered...................28
IV. Hearings........................................................28
V. Reports, Prints, and GAO Reports................................43
VI. Official Communications.........................................60
VII. Legislative Actions.............................................60
Measures Enacted Into Law................................ 61
Postal Naming Bills...................................... 65
VIII.Activities of the Subcommittees.................................70
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI)
I. Historical Background...........................................70
A. Subcommittee Jurisdiction............................. 70
B. Subcommittee Investigations........................... 72
II. Subcommittee Hearings during the 116th Congress.................78
III. Legislation Activities during the 116th Congress................80
IV. Reports, Prints, and Studies....................................82
V. GAO Reports....................................................121
Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management (FSO)
I. Authority......................................................123
II. Activity.......................................................123
III. Legislation....................................................129
IV. GAO Reports....................................................132
Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management (RAFM)
I. Authority......................................................135
II. Activity.......................................................135
III. Legislation....................................................138
IV. GAO Reports....................................................141
117th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 117-1
======================================================================
ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND
SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
DURING THE 116TH CONGRESS
_______
March 1, 2021--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. PETERS, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, submitted the following
REPORT
This report reviews the legislative and oversight
activities of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and its Subcommittees during the 116th
Congress. These activities were conducted pursuant to the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended; by Rule
XXV(k) of the Standing Rules of the Senate; and by additional
authorizing resolutions of the Senate. See Section II,
``Committee Jurisdiction,'' for details.
Senator Ron Johnson was Chairman of the Committee during
the 116th Congress; Senator Gary C. Peters was the Ranking
Member.
Major activities of the Committee during the 116th Congress
included oversight and legislation involving border and
immigration security; cybersecurity; protecting critical
infrastructure; combatting terrorism; efficient functioning of
the Department of Homeland Security, including oversight of
COVID-19 pandemic preparedness and response; the Committee's
oversight of Federal programs; regulatory reform; and reducing
waste, fraud and abuse in Federal spending. Discussion of these
major activities appears in Section I below; additional
information on these and other measures appears in Section VII,
``Legislative Actions.''
Extensive information about the Committee's history,
hearings, legislation, documents, Subcommittees, and other
matters is available at the Web site, http://hsgac.senate.gov/.
I. HIGHLIGHTS OF ACTIVITIES
In the 116th Congress, the Committee carried out its
mission statement ``to enhance the economic and national
security of America and promote more efficient, effective, and
accountable government.'' The Committee approved 104 bills, not
including bills to name United States Post Offices, 51 of which
were passed by the United States Senate, and 37 of which were
ultimately signed into law. The Committee also held 50 hearings
and roundtables and confirmed 30 nominees. Priority areas for
the Committee's work are discussed below.
A. BORDER AND IMMIGRATION SECURITY
Legal loopholes continue to create an incentive for people
to make the dangerous journey to the United States. This
Congress, the Committee continued to lay out the reality of the
challenges the nation faces securing the southwest border, and
worked with Members of the Committee and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS, or the Department) to find bipartisan
solutions to address the humanitarian crisis occurring along
the southwest border. Continuing the Committee's emphasis on
border security, the Committee held more than 35 bipartisan
staff briefings; took staff delegation trips to various
locations across the southwest border, Mexico, El Salvador, and
Guatemala; convened seven hearings focused on border security;
and used what we learned to inform proposals to improve border
security including Operation Safe Return. Below are highlights
from some of the hearings.
At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: By
the Numbers, the Committee heard directly from border security
experts.\1\ The hearing highlighted the border security and
humanitarian crisis at the southwest border. Witnesses spoke
about the changing trends in illegal border crossings and how
the exploitation of legal loopholes overwhelmed the personnel
and resources at the border.
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\1\Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: By the
Numbers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
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At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border:
Perspectives from the Frontline, Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Drug
Enforcement Agency, and Health and Human Services (HHS)
frontline employees told the Committee about the migration
crisis at the southwest border and compared apprehension data
to prior trends.\2\ CBP and ICE employees testified about the
components' need for additional resources to keep up with the
surge in unaccompanied alien children and family unit
apprehensions.
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\2\Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border:
Perspectives from the Frontline: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
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At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The
Exploitation of Migrants through Smuggling, Trafficking, and
Involuntary Servitude, the Committee heard testimony from ICE,
U.S. Border Patrol, and Office of Field Operations about the
different aspects and phases of exploitation, including the
current trends, and costs associated with human smuggling and
trafficking across the southwest border. The Committee heard
directly from the agencies that encountered cases of smuggling,
trafficking, and involuntary servitude, including the case of a
three-year-old boy who was abandoned in a cornfield between
Mexico and Texas, with just his name and phone number written
on his shoes.\3\ The hearing highlighted how illegal
immigrants, including MS13 gang members, fraudulently use
unrelated children to gain entry into the United States.
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\3\Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The
Exploitation of Migrants through Smuggling, Trafficking, and
Involuntary Servitude: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs,116th Cong. (2019).
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On July 17, 2019, the Committee held a roundtable titled,
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Bipartisan
Policy Recommendations from the Homeland Security Advisory
Council. The roundtable was an important discussion about the
Homeland Security Advisory Council's bipartisan assessment of
the migration crisis and policy recommendations for mitigating
the flow and preventing similar crises in the future.\4\
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\4\Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Bipartisan
Policy Recommendations from the Homeland Security Advisory Council:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
116th Cong. (2019).
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At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border:
What is required to Improve Conditions, Acting Commissioner
Mark Morgan explained the need for additional aid for
transportation, temporary facilities, and additional beds to
address the border crisis. Then-DHS Acting Inspector General
Jennifer Costello explained the findings of a Management Alert
issued on July 2, 2019.\5\ The Committee discussed how CBP was
forced to hold crowds of migrants in temporary facilities while
migrants waited to be transferred to a more long-term ICE
facility, resulting in prolonged wait times and overcrowding.
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\5\Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: What Is
Required to Improve Conditions?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
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At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The
Year in Review, the Committee highlighted the shift in migrant
demographics from single males from Mexico to families and
children from Central America. Witnesses provided testimony on
the Trump administration's actions over the past year to curb
illegal immigration, including the Migrant Protection Protocol,
the Flores Settlement Agreement Rule, the Third Country Asylum
Rule, regional cooperation from Mexico, and Agreements with
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. The hearing noted how in
Fiscal Year 2019, 977,509 individuals were apprehended or found
to be inadmissible by CBP at the southwest border.\6\
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\6\Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The Year in
Review: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
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At CBP Oversight: Examining the Evolving Challenges Facing
the Agency, Acting Commissioner Mark Morgan testified about how
CBP is using the Title 42 public health authorities to prohibit
the entry of migrants crossing the border in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. The hearing examined how CBP has adjusted
its processes and enforcement actions while continuing to
enable lawful trade, travel, and migration. The Acting
Commissioner indicated that the tactics of illegal crossing has
changed and smugglers are now using concealment techniques,
such as dangerously confining migrants in tractor-trailers, to
enter illegally through ports of entry.\7\
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\7\CBP Oversight: Examining the Evolving Challenges Facing the
Agency: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
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Chairman Johnson released a majority staff report, titled
Judicial Rulings Ending the Obama Administration's Family
Detention Policy: Implications for Illegal Immigration and
Border Security. The report highlighted the staggering increase
of family unit illegal border crossings since the 2015 court
reinterpretation of the Flores Settlement Agreement and how the
ruling entices migrant families to make the dangerous journey
to the United States because they know they will be released.
The report noted how the Flores reinterpretation, combined with
limited detention facilities, has forced ICE to release
families. In fiscal year 2015, when the courts reinterpreted
the Flores Settlement Agreement, CBP apprehended 39,838 family
units. At the end of fiscal year 2018, CBP apprehended a total
of 107,212 family units.\8\
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\8\Majority Staff Rpt., S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, Judicial Rulings Ending the Obama Admin.'s Family Det. Policy:
Implications for Illegal Immigration and Border Security, 116th Cong.
(2019).
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The Chairman released a majority staff report, titled How
the U.S. Immigration System Encourages Child Marriages.
Chairman Johnson drew attention to loopholes in Federal
immigration law that can be used to force children to marry for
the purpose of receiving an immigration benefit. The report
presented findings from a yearlong bipartisan inquiry with
then- Ranking Member Claire McCaskill. The report noted that
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
approved immigration petitions for 8,686 spouses and fiances in
marriages involving minors from FY2007 to FY2017.\9\ In 95
percent of the cases, the younger person was a girl.\10\
Additionally, the report highlighted that USCIS approved 149
petitions involving a minor with an adult spouse or fiance who
was more than 40 years old.\11\
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\9\Majority Staff Rpt., S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, How the U.S. Immigration Sys. Encourages Child Marriages,
116th Cong., (2019).
\10\Id.
\11\Id.
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The Committee approved eight bills related to securing our
borders. Those bills included the Securing America's Ports of
Entry Act of 2019, requiring CBP to hire 600 additional Office
of Field Operations officers per year until CBP's staffing
needs are met. To ensure the borders are secure between the
ports, the Committee also approved the Securing America's
Borders Act of 2019, to require CBP to hire at least 600 Border
Patrol agents above attrition levels each year. Two other bills
approved by the Committee strengthen CBP strategy and policies
regarding opioid exposure and detection at Ports of Entry.\12\
The Committee considered and approved two additional bipartisan
bills that would encourage technological advancements and
planning, including by requiring DHS to perform a thorough
analysis of border security gaps and needs along the southwest
border.\13\
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\12\DHS Opioid Detection Resilience Act, H.R. 4761, 116th Cong.
(2019); Synthetic Opioid Exposure Prevention and Training Act, H.R.
4739, 116th Cong. (2019).
\13\Securing America's Ports Act, H.R. 5273, 116th Cong. (2019);
Southwest Border Security Technology Improvement Act, S. 4224, 116th
Cong. (2020).
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During the height of the crisis at the southwest border,
Chairman Johnson worked with executive agencies to develop a
streamlined process aimed at quickly and fairly processing
family units with asylum claims. Chairman Johnson and
colleagues detailed this process in a letter sent to President
Trump requesting the implementation of their Operation Safe
Return proposal as a pilot program.\14\ Operation Safe Return
became the basis for two expedited processing programs, Prompt
Asylum Claim Review (known as PACR) and Humanitarian Asylum
Review Process (known as HARP). CBP Acting Commissioner Mark
Morgan testified before the Committee that these programs bring
a ``whole-of-Government approach to the border'' and allow
processing to be more effective and efficient.\15\
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\14\Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, to President Donald J. Trump (July 17, 2019) (on
file with author).
\15\CBP Oversight: Examining the Evolving Challenges Facing the
Agency: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
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B. CYBERSECURITY
The United States continues to face an evolving cyber
threat landscape. According to IBM Security, the average total
cost of a data breach in the United States, which has the
current highest country average, is $8.64 million.\16\ DHS,
notably the newly established Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA), provides capabilities and resources to
support and secure Federal civilian government networks and
critical networks within the private sector.\17\
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\16\IBM Security, 2020 Cost of a Data Breach Report, https://
www.ibm.com/security/digital-assets/cost-data-breach-report/#/.
\17\Dep't of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, Cybersecurity Division Mission and Vision, https://
www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-division.
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Last Congress, the Committee moved legislation to establish
CISA through restructuring and renaming the Department's former
National Protection and Programs Directorate.\18\ The Committee
continued its oversight of CISA during the 116th Congress,
sending a bipartisan request to the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to review and ensure CISA's
organizational structure can effectively carry out its
statutory responsibilities.\19\ In addition, Committee staff
received multiple bipartisan briefings from CISA on its
reorganization efforts.\20\
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\18\Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-278 (115th Cong.).
\19\Letter from S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs to
U.S. Government Accountability Office (May 29, 2019) (CISA Review) (on
file with Comm. staff).
\20\See, e.g., Comm. Majority and Minority Staff Briefing (CISA
Reorg) (Sept. 3, 2019); Comm. Majority and Minority Staff Briefing
(CISA 2020) (Dec. 12, 2019); Comm. Majority and Minority Staff Briefing
(CISA Central) (June 10, 2020).
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The Committee held a number of cybersecurity roundtables
and hearings. On May 15, 2019, the Committee held a member
meeting with private sector critical infrastructure providers
and cybersecurity companies to explore Federal agency
challenges in providing effective support and resources to the
private sector.\21\ The Committee learned that to effectively
assist the private sector, the Federal Government needs to find
new methods of imposing cost to deter adversaries from using
cyber means to achieve their goals.\22\
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\21\HSGAC Member Meeting, Cybersecurity Roles and Responsibilities:
Private Sector Perspectives (May 15, 2019).
\22\Id.
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On October 31, 2019, the Committee held a hearing, Supply
Chain Security, Global Competitiveness, and 5G, to examine the
national security and economic challenges in competing with
Chinese-supported telecommunications companies in the race
towards 5G (5th generation) wireless networks in the U.S. and
globally.\23\ According to Committee testimony, Chinese
companies own 36 percent of all 5G wireless standard-essential
patents, compared to only 14 percent held in the United
States.\24\ Additionally, the U.S. has no domestic manufacturer
of key 5G equipment.\25\ Candid testimony from four Federal
agencies raised concerns about the nation's ability to compete
with China on the deployment of 5G and in global Information
Communications Technology marketplaces.\26\
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\23\Supply Chain Security, Global Competitiveness, and 5G: Hearing
before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
116th Cong. (2019), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/supply-chain-security-
global-competitiveness-and-5g.
\24\Id. (Testimony of Jessica Rosenworcel).
\25\Id.
\26\Supply Chain Security, Global Competitiveness, and 5G: Hearing
before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
116th Cong. (2019), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/supply-chain-security-
global-competitiveness-and-5g.
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On February 11, 2020, the Committee held a hearing, What
States, Locals, and the Business Community Should Know and Do:
A Roadmap for EffectiveCybersecurity.\27\ The purpose of this
hearing was to examine how state, local, tribal, and
territorial (SLTT) governments and critical infrastructure
owners and operators can mitigate and protect against
persistent cybersecurity threats.\28\ This hearing also
examined the current threat environment, including
ransomware.\29\ During the hearing, CISA's then-director,
Christopher Krebs, discussed the voluntary services provided to
SLTTs, such as vulnerability scanning, malware analysis, and
technical expertise.\30\ He also discussed the rise in
ransomware attacks, which in 2019, ``impacted at least 966
government agencies, educational establishments and healthcare
providers at a potential cost of $7.5 billion.''\31\ State
officials from Texas and Michigan also discussed responding to
cyber events, including ransomware attacks, and how CISA can
better collaborate and assist SLTT governments.\32\
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\27\What States, Locals, and the Business Community Should Know and
Do: A Roadmap for Effective Cybersecurity, Hearing Before the S. Comm.
On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
\28\Id.
\29\Id.
\30\Id. Testimony of Christopher Krebs.
\31\Id. Testimony of Christopher Krebs.
\32\What States, Locals, and the Business Community Should Know and
Do: A Roadmap for Effective Cybersecurity, Hearing Before the S. Comm.
On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020) (testimony
of Amanda Crawford, Executive Director, Department of Information
Resources, State of Texas); see also Testimony of Christopher DeRusha,
Chief Security Officer, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection
Office, State of Michigan.
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On May 13, 2020, the Committee held another hearing,
Evolving the U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy and Posture: Reviewing
the Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report.\33\ The purpose of
this hearing was to discuss the findings and recommendations of
the Commission's report, and build consensus around a possible
path forward to enact its key recommendations.\34\ One chief
finding reviewed by the Committee was that the Federal
Government has a unique understanding of threat actors and
vulnerabilities in the nation's critical infrastructure, but
there are limits to systemically identify, warn, and assist
those that are vulnerable.\35\ As a result, the Commission
recommended granting CISA the authority to issue administrative
subpoenas to support threat and vulnerability mitigation
activities.\36\
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\33\Evolving the U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy and Posture: Reviewing
the Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/evolving-the-us-cybersecurity-strategy-and-
posture-reviewing-the-cyberspace-solarium-commission-report.
\34\Id.
\35\U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report, 100 (March 2020),
https://www.solarium.gov/report.
\36\Id.
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Throughout the Congress, the Committee worked to understand
legal constraints around information sharing and the
dissemination of information technology vulnerabilities to at
risk entities. CISA briefed the Committee on the need to
identify and warn the nation's critical infrastructure owners
and operators of potentially vulnerable technologies.\37\ The
Committee then worked with stakeholders to find consensus, and
approved legislation authorizing CISA to issue administrative
subpoenas to alert U.S. critical infrastructure owners and
operators about potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities
identified by the agency.\38\ The legislation was enacted in
the FY2021 NDAA.\39\
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\37\Comm. Majority and Minority Classified Staff Briefing (CISA
Legislative Proposal) (June 13, 2019).
\38\S. 3045, Cybersecurity Vulnerability Identification and
Notification Act of 2020 (116th. Cong).
\39\FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 116-283
(116th Cong.) (2021).
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The Committee considered and passed approximately 15
additional cybersecurity bills during the 116th Congress. The
Committee views these pieces of legislation as important
efforts to generate efficient use of Federal resources to
improve the security of Federal and non-Federal networks. This
includes legislation to better coordinate Federal resources and
information to assist State and local cybersecurity
efforts;\40\ legislation to establish a Cybersecurity Advisory
Committee within CISA;\41\ legislation to facilitate use of the
.gov domain by State and local governments;\42\ legislation to
authorize DHS' hunt and incident response teams;\43\ and
legislation to create a security acquisitions cycle for
Internet of Things devices procured by Federal agencies.\44\
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\40\S. 3207, Cybersecurity State Coordinator Act of 2020 (116th
Cong). See also S.1846, State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act of
2019 (116th Cong.).
\41\S. 4024, Cybersecurity Advisory Committee Authorization Act of
2020 (116th Cong.).
\42\S. 2749, DOTGOV Act of 2019 (116th Cong.) (enacted in larger
legislation in January 2021).
\43\S. 315, DHS Cyber Hunt and Incident Response Teams Act of 2019
(116th Cong.).
\44\S. 734, Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of
2019 (116th Cong.) (enacted in larger legislation in January 2021).
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C. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Our nation's critical infrastructure has been deemed ``so
vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of those matters.''\45\ These vital
sectors are primarily owned and operated by the private
sector.\46\ CISA assists a variety of stakeholders, including
Federal departments and agencies, businesses, and State, local,
tribal and territorial governments, in strengthening the
nation's critical infrastructure against cyber and physical
threats.\47\
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\45\Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Presidential Policy Directive--Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013), available at https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-
policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil.
\46\Dep't of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnerships. https://
www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sector-partnerships.
\47\Dep't of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, Infrastructure Security. https://www.cisa.gov/
infrastructure-security.
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Electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) and geomagnetic disturbances
(GMDs) are both classified as low probability/high impact
events.\48\ If an EMP or substantial GMD were to occur, they
could inflict significant damage on the nation's critical
infrastructure. Through the Committee's oversight last
Congress, the Committee found that Federal mitigation efforts
to address these threats has been inadequate. As a result, one
of the first hearings the Committee held during the 116th
Congress, Perspectives on Protecting the Electric Grid from an
Electromagnetic Pulse or Geomagnetic Disturbance, examined
different viewpoints from eleven representatives from the
public, private, and nonprofit sectors on potential EMP and GMD
mitigation solutions to protect the U.S. electric grid.\49\
During the hearing, witnesses were asked about actionable and
achievable goals to mitigate against EMPs and GMDs.\50\
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\48\Comm. staff briefing by the U.S. Dep't of Energy (Feb. 7,
2019).
\49\Roundtable: Perspectives on Protecting the Electric Grid from
an Electromagnetic Pulse or Geomagnetic Disturbance: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-protecting-the-
electric-grid-from-an-electromagnetic-pulse-or-geomagnetic-disturbance.
\50\Id.
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On March 26, 2019, the Trump Administration took effective
action to start moving the Federal Government toward EMP and
GMD mitigation efforts through issuing Executive Order 13865,
Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses.\51\
Through recommendations from the Committee's hearing, and
working with witnesses on potential action items, Chairman
Johnson determined that Congress should codify portions of the
Executive Order to ensure agencies comply with its requirements
and provide congressional stakeholders valuable information to
oversee and support the development of appropriate mitigation
solutions.
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\51\Exec. Order No. 13865, 84 Fed. Reg. 12041 (March 26, 2019).
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Toward that end, he sponsored a bipartisan amendment to the
FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act that was adopted by
unanimous consent in the Senate-passed bill\52\ and ultimately
enacted.\53\ The language requires the administration to
coordinate and evaluate relevant vulnerabilities; assess
mitigation solutions and harden approaches; and develop, update
and implement specific benchmarks and plans.\54\ Codifying
these requirements will not only help protect our nation's
critical infrastructure from the potentially catastrophic
effects of EMPs and GMDs, but also from other national security
threats, such as cyberattacks and natural disasters.
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\52\S. 1790, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2020, Section 6006 (116th Congress).
\53\Id. at Section 1740 (116th Congress) (Pub. Law 116-92).
\54\Id.
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The Committee continued its oversight of the Department's
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007
authorized DHS to regulate high-risk chemical facilities to
prevent terrorists from acquiring or utilizing certain
chemicals for an attack.\55\ DHS manages the CFATS program
under CISA's Infrastructure Security Division.\56\ Through
CFATS, DHS sets standards and regulates security for
approximately 3,299 chemical facilities nationwide.\57\
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\55\Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
109-295, 550, 120 Stat. 1355, 1388-1389 (2006). See also Frank
Gottron, Cong. Research Serv., IF10853, Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards (2020), available at http://www.crs.gov/Reports/
IF10853.
\56\CISA Chemical Security, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Cybersecurity &
Infrastructure Security Agency, https://www.cisa.gov/cisa-chemical-
security (last visited Dec. 3, 2020).
\57\CFATS Monthly Statistics, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Cybersecurity
& Infrastructure Security Agency, https://www.cisa.gov/cfats-monthly-
statistics (last visited Dec. 3, 2020).
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CISA focuses ``around raising awareness among the broader
community on the need for critical infrastructure security and
resilience and enhancing their current efforts. Public-private
partnerships are vital to this effort as everyone has a role in
securing the nation's critical infrastructure.''\58\ These
types of public-private partnerships are naturally intended to
be non-regulatory.\59\ However, the CFATS program is one of
three regulatory programs at DHS and the only one under
CISA.\60\ The Committee examined a number of regulatory reforms
to evolve the CFATS program, including opportunities to
streamline and harmonize the program's regulatory
requirements\61\ and determine whether CFATS effectively
reduces risk.\62\
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\58\Dep't of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, Infrastructure Security. https://www.cisa.gov/
infrastructure-security.
\59\U.S. Congressional Research Service. Critical Infrastructure:
Emerging Trends and Policy Considerations for Congress (R45809; July 8,
2019).
\60\Id. (``The Homeland Security Act created an organization--DHS--
with wide-ranging responsibilities, but relatively narrow regulatory
mandates. The Transportation Security Administration has (but does not
exercise) regulatory oversight over oil and gas pipeline security. The
Coast Guard regulates certain aspects of port security--a mission that
long predates the transfer of the service to DHS under the Homeland
Security Act. Finally, CISA directly regulates certain chemical
facilities under the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards
program to prevent terrorist exploitation of the chemical industry.'')
\61\See, e.g., Roundtable: Sensibly Reforming the Chemical Facility
Anti-Terrorism Standards Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019); Letter from
Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Sen. Mike Enzi to Sec'y Kirstjen Nielsen
(Mar. 29, 2019) (CFATS overlap with ATF regulations) (on file with
HSGAC staff); Letter from Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Sen. Mike Enzi
to Thomas Brandon, Dir., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (Mar. 29, 2019) (CFATS overlap with ATF regulations) (on
file with HSGAC staff); Letter from Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and
Ranking Member Sen. Gary Peters to Sec'y Kirstjen Nielsen (Mar. 22,
2019) (Status of DHS's CFATS program audit) (on file with HSGAC staff).
\62\Roundtable: Sensibly Reforming the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affairs (statement of Nathan Anderson, Acting
Director, Homeland Sec. & Justice Team, U.S. Gov't Accountability
Office), 116th Cong. (2019). See also U.S. Gov't Accountability Office,
GAO-18-538, Critical Infrastructure Protection (2018), available at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/693817.pdf.
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Chairman Johnson and Senator Mike Enzi sent letters to DHS
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF) requesting information regarding the CFATS program's
regulation of explosive materials.\63\ DHS documents confirmed
that ATF was opposed to the inclusion of 18 U.S.C Chapter 40
regulated explosives being included in the CFATS program.\64\
Moreover, GAO is in the final stages of a report started at the
request of the Committee to examine potential fragmentation,
overlap and duplication with CFATS and other regulatory
regimes.\65\ Although the report is not yet complete, GAO has
confirmed during staff briefings that there is duplication
between regulations and elements of the CFATS program and other
Federal regulatory regimes, including ATF.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\Letter from Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Sen. Mike Enzi to
Sec'y Kirstjen Nielsen (Mar. 29, 2019) (on file with HSGAC staff). See
also Letter from Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Sen. Mike Enzi to Thomas
Brandon, Dir., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(Mar. 29, 2019) (on file with HSGAC staff).
\64\Id.
\65\Letter from S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs to
U.S. Government Accountability Office (Aug. 20, 2019) (on file with
Comm. staff).
\66\Comm. staff briefing U.S. Gov't Accountability Office (Sept. 3,
2020).
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On June 4, 2019, the Committee held a roundtable, Sensibly
Reforming the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
Program, to examine the effectiveness of the CFATS program and
identify areas for improvement.\67\ A number of industry
witnesses discussed the challenges of being regulated by
multiple Federal and state agencies, and explained how their
regulatory regimes overlap with CFATS in various
capacities.\68\ In addition, GAO testified that the CFATS
program still does not evaluate or measure vulnerability
reduction.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\Roundtable: Sensibly Reforming the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/sensibly-reforming-the-chemical-facility-anti-
terrorism-standards-program.
\68\Id.
\69\Id. (Statement of Nathan Anderson, Acting Director, Homeland
Sec. & Justice Team, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office).
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On March 5, 2020, Chairman Johnson introduced S.3416,
Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist
Attacks Act of 2020.\70\ This legislation had a number of
proposed reforms to provide regulatory relief to industry,
including exempting duplicative explosive materials regulated
by ATF, and additional metrics to help the program evaluate and
measure risk reduction.\71\ However, the Committee could not
reach bipartisan consensus to reform CFATS. As a result, the
CFATS program was reauthorized without changes for three years
and is set to expire on July 27, 2023.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\S. 3416, Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from
Terrorist Attacks Act of 2020 (116th Cong.).
\71\Id.
\72\S. 4148, A bill to extend the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards Program of the Department of Homeland Security, and for other
purposes, Pub. L. No. 116-150 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee also conducted oversight of the Department's
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center's
(NISAC) COVID-19 response. The NISAC is housed in CISA's
National Risk Management Center, and responsible for conducting
simulation, modeling, and analysis of cyber and physical risks
to the nation's sixteen critical infrastructure sectors.\73\
This includes a number of pandemic analyses, such as the 2007
H5N1 bird flu, 2009 H1N1 influenza, 2014 Ebola virus disease,
and 2016 Zika virus disease.\74\ In March 2020, news reports
circulated that the NISAC ceased its pandemic work in 2017.\75\
This was confirmed during a bipartisan Committee staff phone
call with department officials on April 15, 2020.\76\ As a
result, Department officials had issues locating these prior
pandemic analyses at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.\77\ If
readily available when needed, the past pandemic modeling,
simulation, and analyses conducted by the NISAC could have
assisted the Federal Government's response. To that end,
Chairman Johnson introduced S. 4157, National Infrastructure
Simulation and Analysis Center Pandemic Modeling Act of 2020,
to clarify the NISAC's authority and capabilities, and ensure
the proper entities receive information on current projects and
priorities, prior work, and specific pandemic information.\78\
The legislation was cosponsored by Ranking Member Peters and
Senator Margaret Wood Hassan, and was reported favorably by the
Committee at the July 22, 2020 business meeting.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\James Platt, U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency, National Risk Management Center (June 2019), https://
www.gps.gov/governance/advisory/meetings/2019-06/platt.pdf (referring
to NISAC slide). See also About the National Infrastructure Simulation
and Analysis Center, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, https://
www.dhs.gov/about-national-infrastructure-simulation-and-analysis-
center (last published June 27, 2016).
\74\Call from Majority and Minority Staff, U.S. Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, to Bob Kolasky, Director,
National Risk Management Center, and supporting staff, National Risk
Management Center and National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center (April 15, 2020, 11:00 AM) (notes on file with Committee
Majority staff).
\75\Daniel Lippman, DHS Wound Down Pandemic Models Before
Coronavirus Struck, POLITICO (Mar. 24, 2020, 8:47 PM), https://
www.politico.com/news/2020/03/24/dhs-pandemic-coronavirus-146884; see
also Kayla Epstein, A Bureaucratic Fight Halted a Vital Department of
Homeland Security Program that Helped Model Pandemics in 2017, Bus.
Insider (Mar. 25, 2020, 11:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
coronavirus-dhs-reportedly-shut-down-pandemic-modeling-program-in-2017-
2020-3.
\76\Call from Majority and Minority Staff, U.S. Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, to Bob Kolasky, Director,
National Risk Management Center, and supporting staff, National Risk
Management Center and National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center (April 15, 2020, 11:00 AM) (notes on file with Committee
Majority staff).
\77\Daniel Lippman, DHS Wound Down Pandemic Models Before
Coronavirus Struck, POLITICO (Mar. 24, 2020, 8:47 PM), https://
www.politico.com/news/2020/03/24/dhs-pandemic-coronavirus-146884; see
also Kayla Epstein, A Bureaucratic Fight Halted a Vital Department of
Homeland Security Program that Helped Model Pandemics in 2017, Bus.
Insider (Mar. 25, 2020, 11:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
coronavirus-dhs-reportedly-shut-down-pandemic-modeling-program-in-2017-
2020-3.
\78\S. 4157, National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center
Pandemic Modeling Act of 2020 (116th Cong.).
\79\Id.
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Finally, throughout the 116th Congress, the Committee
conducted oversight of CISA's efforts to provide voluntary
election security assistance to State and local government
officials. This includes more than 50 staff and member
meetings, briefings, and document reviews on various election
security topics.\80\ The Committee also held a February 2020
hearing, What States, Locals and the Business Community Should
Know and Do: A Roadmap for Effective Cybersecurity, in which
election security was discussed.\81\ Christopher Krebs, then-
Director of CISA, discussed how the agency assists State and
local governments to address concerns and resources provided to
protect election infrastructure in preparation for the 2020
election.\82\ Director Krebs also discussed the current risks
in elections, including vulnerabilities within voter files and
voter registration databases.\83\
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\80\Summary of election meetings attended by Chairman Ron Johnson,
116th Congress. On file with Committee Majority staff.
\81\What States, Locals and the Business Community Should Know and
Do: A Roadmap for Effective Cybersecurity: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/what-states-locals-and-the-business-community-
should-know-and-do-a-roadmap-for-effective-cybersecurity.
\82\Id. Statement of Christopher Krebs, Director, Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
\83\Id.
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D. TERRORISM
In recent years, the United States has seen a shifting
terrorist threat landscape. Although the threat of
international terrorism and homegrown violent extremism
continues, there has been a rise in domestic terrorism. To
combat the threats facing the United States, the Federal
Government has had to adapt its counterterrorism efforts to
address emerging and evolving trends. It has been increasingly
evident that the counterterrorism practices of years' past may
not address the full scope of threats facing the United States.
The threat of domestic terrorism requires dedicated attention
and proper resource allocation. In recognition of this, the
Committee engaged in bipartisan oversight aimed at evaluating
how the Federal Government addresses, prioritizes and allocates
for the full spectrum of terrorist threats. Specifically, the
Committee examined the Federal Government's efforts to counter
domestic terrorism while balancing the broad range of threats
to the homeland.
On May 8, 2019, Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Peters
sent letters to DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting documents and
information on their respective efforts.\84\ The Committee
found that there was no consistent or unified system for
understanding, tracking, and reporting on domestic terrorism
across agencies. The Committee also found that the agencies
have been engaged in interagency communication and conduct
ongoing outreach to SLTT law enforcement agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\Letter from Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman of Homeland Sec. and
Governmental Affairs Senate Comm. and Senator Gary C. Peters, Ranking
Member of Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs Senate Comm., to Hon.
William Barr, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (May 8, 2019) (on
file with author).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee held three hearings and one roundtable to
examine the shifting terrorist threat landscape and heard
testimony from both terrorism subject matter experts from
various research institutions and Federal Government officials
from DHS, the FBI, and the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC).\85\ The Committee's first hearing on terrorism threats
in the 116th Congress was the first hearing in the Committee's
history to focus solely on domestic terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\Countering Domestic Terrorism: Examining the Evolving Threat:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs,
116th Cong. (2019), Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019),
Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
and Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the findings of the May 8, 2019 letter and the
multiple hearings, Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Peters
introduced the Terrorism Reporting and Classifying Act of 2019
(TRAC Act), which would establish a unified database and
reporting requirements for DHS, the FBI, and NCTC to better
track and understand domestic terrorism in the broader
terrorism threat landscape.\86\ Chairman Johnson and Ranking
Member Peters were successful in getting much of the language
from the TRAC Act into the 2019 National Defense Authorization
Act, enacted in December 2019. The law now requires DHS, the
FBI and NCTC to establish joint definitions and interpretations
of terrorism-related terminology, establish unified tracking
systems for incidents of domestic terrorism, submit joint,
annual reports to Congress, and make the reports public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\S. 3118, (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foreign fighters continue to pose a threat to the homeland,
as they travel overseas to train and participate in terrorist
activities. In 2019, the Committee approved and Congress
enacted the Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Exercise Act
of 2019.\87\ The Act requires DHS to conduct exercises to
improve detection of terrorist and foreign fighter travel. By
building on DHS' national exercise framework, this legislation
will improve collaboration among key partners and stakeholders
in counterterrorism and travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\H.R. 1590 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee approved six other bills to help the U.S.
improve its ability to counter terrorist attacks and harden
soft targets. Those bills include the DHS Intelligence
Rotational Assignment Program Act of 2019, to codify the DHS
Office of Intelligence and Analysis' intelligence rotational
assignment program which improves coordination and
communication with intra-agency partners;\88\ the Luke and Alex
School Safety Act of 2019, to establish a Federal Clearinghouse
on School Safety Best Practices for use by State and local
educational and law enforcement agencies, institutions of
higher education, health professionals, and the public;\89\ the
Protecting Faith-Based and Nonprofit Organizations From
Terrorism Act of 2019, which requires the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) to extend its Nonprofit Grant Program
to eligible nonprofits at risk of terrorist attacks to improve
target hardening and other security measures;\90\ the Counter
Threats Advisory Board Act of 2019, which authorizes DHS to
establish an advisory board tasked with evaluating the current
threat environment and DHS' ability to counter such
threats;\91\ the DHS Overseas Personnel Enhancement Act of
2019, which requires DHS to annually brief congressional
homeland security committees on the work of DHS personnel
serving overseas, including challenges to counterterrorism
missions;\92\ and the Reporting Efficiently to Proper Officials
in Response to Terrorism Act of 2019, which requires Federal
agencies to submit a report to Congress in the year following
an investigation of an act of terrorism.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\H.R. 2066 (116th Cong.).
\89\S. 2779 (116th Cong.).
\90\H.R. 1539 (116th Cong.).
\91\S. 411 (116th Cong.).
\92\H.R. 2590 (116th Cong.).
\93\S. 2513 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. DHS REFORMS AND COVID-19 RESPONSE
The Committee has primary responsibility for overseeing and
authorizing DHS. This Congress, the Committee built on the
significant actions it took in the 115th Congress to improve
the Department's management and operations. Specifically, the
Committee exercised its oversight authority through hearings,
legislation, and briefings in an effort to improve the
execution of DHS's management functions and operational
capabilities. Since its establishment more than 17 years ago,
DHS faced arguably some of its greatest challenges in 2020 with
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the rise of civil unrest
throughout the United States.
1. COVID-19 OVERSIGHT
On December 31, 2019, the World Health Organization was
informed that there was a cluster of atypical pneumonia cases
in Wuhan, China.\94\ This abnormal activity was later
determined to be the spread of a novel coronavirus known as
SARS-CoV-2, the severe acute respiratory syndrome that causes
the COVID-19 disease. By January 21, 2020, the first-known case
of COVID-19 in the United States was confirmed in Seattle,
Washington. As the worldwide transmission of the virus
accelerated, the Secretary of HHS, Alex Azar, declared a Public
Health Emergency.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\1AWorld Health Organization, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19)
outbreak, https://www.who.int/westernpacific/emergencies/novel-
coronavirus.
\95\Secretary Azar Declares Public Health Emergency for United
States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020) https://www.hhs.gov/
about/news/2020/01/31/secretary-azar-declares-public-health-emergency-
us-2019-novel-coronavirus.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 12, 2020, the Committee held a roundtable to
discuss our nation's state of preparedness for a global
pandemic.\96\ One of the participants, Dr. Scott Gottlieb,
discussed the insecurity of the U.S. medical supply chain and
how the overreliance on a foreign nation, such as China, can
leave our nation in a vulnerable position while trying to
acquire critical drugs and personal protective equipment (PPE)
during a global health crisis.\97\ This was particularly
concerning to the Committee given previous studies indicating
that 72 percent of the U.S. active pharmaceutical ingredient
supply that is necessary to finish critical drugs was
manufactured outside of the U.S., with China accounting for 13
percent of that capacity.\98\ Following the roundtable, the
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee requested that the
Secretaries of DHS and HHS inform the American public about our
existing vulnerabilities, actions that have been taken to
address the potential shortages, and how DHS and FEMA are
protecting their workforce and the American people should
COVID-19 become a health crisis in the U.S.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\Are We Prepared? Protecting the U.S. from Global Pandemics,
Roundtable Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
116th Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/are-we-prepared-
protecting-the-us-from-global-pandemics.
\97\Id. (statement of Dr. Scott Gottlieb).
\98\Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director--Center for Drug Evaluations and
Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Testimony before the U.S.
House of Representatives, Committee Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee
on Health (October 30, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/
congressional-testimony/safeguarding-pharmaceutical-supply-chains-
global-economy-10302019
\99\S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Letter to HHS
& DHS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
200228--Letter--HHS--DHS--Coronavirus.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee held a hearing with the HHS Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and the Senior
Official Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary at DHS.\100\
In that hearing, the HHS ASPR told the Committee that the
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), the Federal resource to
``supplement State and local supplies during public health
emergencies'', held 35 million N95 respirators.\101\ Given the
concerns that a pandemic was materializing, these levels seemed
insufficient to address a nationwide public health emergency,
with one Committee member stating, ``[i]t strikes me that we
should have substantially more.''\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\The Federal Interagency Response to the Coronavirus and
Preparing for Future Global Pandemics, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/the-federal-interagency-response-to-the-
coronavirus-and-preparing-for-future-global-pandemics.
\101\Strategic National Stockpile, Off. of the Assistant Secretary
for Preparedness & Response, https://www.phe.gov/about/sns/Pages/
default.aspx (last updated Jan. 7, 2021); The Federal Interagency
Response to the Coronavirus and Preparing for Future Global Pandemics,
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
116th Cong. (2020) (Statement of Dr. Robert Kadlec), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/the-federal-interagency-response-to-the-
coronavirus-and-preparing-for-future-global-pandemics.
\102\Id. (Statement of Sen. Mitt Romney).
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On March 13, 2020, President Trump invoked section 501(b)
of the Stafford Act to extend Federal assistance to all States,
tribes, territories, and the District of Columbia.\103\ Given
the anticipation of a shortage of critical drugs and PPE, the
Committee focused on examining the Federal Government's
procurement and distribution strategies to understand what
authorities and practices they were exercising to meet the
demand of States across the country.\104\ During this hearing,
FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor and Rear Admiral John Polowczyk
described the Federal Government's ingenuities, such as Project
Airbridge, which expedited the shipping of critical supplies to
our nation's ``hotspot'' areas to address supply
shortages.\105\ Members of the Committee recommended the
Senate, ``reexamine what our domestic manufacturing (is) for
those supplies that we were in such a desperate moment that we
had to be able to move via an air bridge from Asia? Why aren't
we producing those domestically and what can we do to create
more domestic supply?''\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\Federal Emergency Management Agency, COVID-19 Emergency
Declaration, Mar. 13, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/press-release/
20210121/covid-19-emergency-declaration.
\104\Evaluating the Federal Government's Procurement and
Distribution Strategies in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th
Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/evaluating-the-federal-
governments-procurement-and-distribution-strategies-in-response-to-the-
covid-19-pandemic.
\105\Id. (Statement of Peter T. Gaynor and John Polowcyzk).
\106\Id. (Statement of Sen. James Lankford).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To understand the concern of domestic manufacturing and
supply, but also examine what the Federal Government could
improve upon, the Committee held a hearing on the SNS.\107\
During the hearing, Chairman Ron Johnson asserted that supply
and demand challenges precipitated from ``a lack of clarity and
understanding of exactly what the SNS's role is, and what it
should be.''\108\ The Chairman further stated that, ``[w]e are
paying the price for this lack of articulation and clarity
during the current pandemic.''\109\ To address these
challenges, the Chairman introduced S. 4204, the Federal
Emergency Pandemic Response Act (FEPRA), and S. 4210, the
Securing Healthcare and Response Equipment (SHARE) Act. FEPRA
requires the Office of Management and Budget to convene an
interagency task force to evaluate the components of the SNS.
As part of that evaluation, it requires the interagency
taskforce to identify the current inventory levels of the SNS,
what the levels should be so they are sufficient to address the
needs of a pandemic, where the stockpiles should be located,
and whether or not the current SNS name aligns with the mission
determined by the task force. SHARE gives DHS the authority to
share critical supplies with HHS to distribute out of the SNS
if the Secretary of DHS has determined that their supplies
exceed what is necessary to protect their own workforce. The
Committee considered FEPRA and SHARE during their July 22, 2020
business meeting and reported the bills out of Committee
favorably.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\The Role of the Strategic National Stockpile in Pandemic
Response, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/the-role-of-
the-strategic-national-stockpile-in-pandemic-response.
\108\Id. (Statement of Chairman Ron Johnson).
\109\Id.
\110\Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong.(2020) https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
07/15/2020/business-meeting-.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To better prepare DHS for any future pandemic, the
Committee passed the National Response Framework Improvement
Act of 2020.\111\ This legislation would require the
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
to assess the effectiveness of the National Response Framework
during the COVID-19 pandemic and develop a report that includes
its findings and recommendations for improvement.\112\
Incorporating the recommendations into the National Response
Framework could bring much needed reforms to the way DHS and
its partner agencies respond to pandemics going forward.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\S. 4153 (116th Cong.).
\112\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 28, 2020, at the Oversight of COVID-19 Financial
Relief Packages hearing, several private sector witnesses
testified about how the various financial relief packages
enacted by Congress had been used. The witnesses also discussed
reforms and oversight still needed, as well as unintended
consequences from certain provisions in the enacted financial
relief packages.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\Oversight of COVID-19 Financial Relief Packages: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th
Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/oversight-of-covid-19-
financial-relief-packages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to concerns from medical doctors throughout the
country treating COVID-19 patients, Chairman Johnson also
focused attention on the unfortunate lack of Federal efforts to
develop early treatment options for COVID-19, and social
media's actions to keep information about potential early
treatments from the public. On August 18, 2020, Senators
Johnson, Lee and Cruz sent a letter to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) requesting information regarding the FDA's
Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) decisions. The letter
stressed the importance of allowing physicians to ``make the
best medical and treatment decisions for their patients, use
their ``off-label' prescription rights, and have full access to
FDA approved drugs.''\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\Letter from Sens. Johnson, Lee, Cruz to Stephen Hahn, FDA
Commissioner (Aug. 18, 2020), available at https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/johnson-lee-cruz-call-for-
explanation-into-fdas-emergency-use-authorization-decisions-.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On November 19 and December 8, 2020, the Committee held a
two-part hearing on these concerns, titled Early Outpatient
Treatment--An Essential Part of a COVID-19 Solution. These
hearings asked medical practitioners to address how they
provided early outpatient treatment for COVID-19 patients in
the absence of guidance from the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and treatment protocols they had developed. The
physicians discussed their experiences using widely available,
low-cost drugs to prevent disease progression and
hospitalization.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\Early Outpatient Treatment--An Essential Part of a COVID-19
Solution, Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
hearings/early-outpatient-treatment-an-essential-part-of-a-covid-19-
solution; Early Outpatient Treatment--An Essential Part of a COVID-19
Solution, Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
early-outpatient-treatment-an-essential-part-of-a-covid-19-solution-
part-ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On November 23, 2020, Senators Johnson, Lee and Cruz sent a
follow up letter to the FDA to reiterate the requests in the
August 18, 2020 letter that had gone unanswered and to stress
the importance of early outpatient treatment for COVID-19.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\Letter from Sens. Johnson, Lee, Cruz to Stephen Hahn, FDA
Commissioner (Nov. 23, 2020) (on file with Comm. staff).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the December 8th hearing, Senators Johnson and
Paul sent a letter to the National Institute of Health (NIH)
highlighting a promising early treatment--ivermectin--that was
discussed in the hearing. The letter asked NIH to examine
recent studies of ivermectin and provide an update on early
outpatient treatments that are currently under NIH review.\117\
On February 11, 2021, the NIH updated its COVID-19 Treatment
Guidelines to a neutral position while further studies gather
additional data on its effectiveness as a treatment for COVID-
19.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\Letter from Sens. Johnson, Paul to Francis S. Collins, NIH
Director (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
40-317--Comm.%20Homeland%20Security%20%20Gov.%20Affairs%2012-10-
2020.pdf.
\118\NIH, COVID-19 Treatment Guidelines, Ivermectin, https://
www.covid19treatmentguidelines.nih.gov/antiviral-therapy/ivermectin/
(last updated Feb. 11, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. OTHER DHS OVERSIGHT
To enhance and reform DHS's relationship with its SLTT
partners, the Committee passed legislation providing DHS with
the authority to collaborate and share information. The DHS
Field Engagement Accountability Act, approved by the Committee
and enacted in 2020, enables DHS' Office of Intelligence and
Analysis to work with fusion centers, which play an important
role in counterintelligence and counterterrorism efforts.\119\
This legislation refines DHS's information sharing apparatus
and improves its ability to mitigate and prevent threats to the
homeland.\120\ Additionally, the Committee held a hearing on
August 6, 2020, to examine DHS' efforts to protect Federal
property and personnel during protests across the country, and
particularly in Portland, Oregon.\121\ Acting Secretary Wolf
testified and described the events surrounding the deployment
of DHS law enforcement and personnel as well as the authorities
DHS used to carry out its protective mission and coordinate
with state and local officials in these efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\Pub. L. No. 116-116 (116th Cong.).
\120\Id.
\121\Oversight of DHS Personnel Deployments to Recent Protests:
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
116th Cong. (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In July 2020, the Committee passed The Department of
Homeland Security Mentor-Protege Program Act of 2019.\122\ This
legislation provides statutory authority to the DHS Mentor-
Protege program, which has been in place since2003.\123\ The
program allows small businesses (referred to as ``protege''
firms) to seek guidance from large businesses (referred to as
``mentor'' firms) who traditional obtain contracts from the
Department on best to compete for prime contracts with DHS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\H.R. 4727 (116th. Cong.).
\123\Page 24, Small Business Mentor-Protege Programs, CRS Report,
available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41722.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, during this Congress, HSGAC worked tirelessly to
ensure DHS obtained adequate funding to continue to carry out
its mission. The Committee held hearings entitled Resources and
Authorities Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland
\124\ in March 2020, and Resources Needed to Protect and
Secure the Homeland\125\ in May 2019 to examine the needs of
the DHS workforce and affirm Chairman Johnson's continued
support of providing DHS with the resources and authorities
required to protect the homeland. On September 9, 2019, the
Committee held a field hearing at the National September 11
Memorial & Museum in New York City. The hearing, titled 18
Years Later: The State of Homeland Security after 9/11, brought
together three former Secretaries of Homeland Security for a
wide-ranging discussion of the Departments history, current and
future challenges, and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\Resources and Authorities Needed to Protect and Secure the
Homeland: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
\125\Resources Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland: Hearing
before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th
Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The Committee is also responsible for investigating ``the
efficiency and economy of operations of all branches of the
Government[.]''\126\ In the 116th Congress, the Committee
continued to carry out its oversight responsibilities over the
Federal bureaucracy to help foster a professional, nonpartisan,
and accountable government. The Committee's oversight
jurisdiction stretches across all facets of the executive
branch. Pursuant to this expansive authority, the Committee
conducted oversight of numerous Federal departments and
agencies, ranging from DHS, the FBI, and the Department of
State. The Committee maintains a whistleblower hotline for
Federal employees to disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and
misconduct. This section includes a summary of some of the most
consequential oversight projects this Congress, but is not a
complete list of all the work conducted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\S. Res. 70, Sec. 12(e)(1)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In March 2019, the Committee learned that an employee at a
West Virginia facility of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives Agency (ATF) stole firearms and
firearm parts that were slated for destruction, including
service weapons for Federal agents. The Committee also learned
that these stolen firearms were not only sold illegally, but
also that at least one of those firearms was found at a crime
scene. The Committee pursued this issue as the responsible
individuals were prosecuted and as ATF began take corrective
action to prevent similar misconduct from occurring in the
future.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, to Thomas Brandon, Deputy Dir., Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (Mar. 12, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee also continued oversight of the consequences
of different immigration policies. In May 2019, Chairman
Johnson wrote to the DHS, the Attorney General of Maryland, and
the Executive for Prince George's County, about the decision to
instruct local law enforcement not to comply with detainer
requests by ICE agents for illegal aliens who were arrested.
Earlier that month, local authorities in Prince George's county
ignored an ICE detainer request and released two MS-13 gang
members, who soon after brutally murdered a 14-year old
girl.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, to Brian Frosh, Attorney General, State of
Maryland (May 28, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Secretary,
Dep't of Homeland Security (May 28, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2020, Chairman Johnson, joined by 14 other
senators, wrote to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) about an
inspector general report that taxpayers improperly claimed $72
million in tax credits for electric vehicles.\129\ The report
also found that the IRS did not have an effective process to
identify and prevent these erroneous claims. Notably, the
inspector general first identified this issue in 2011--and $33
million in improperly claimed credits--yet the problem only
worsened. The Committee highlighted this information as
Congress was considering a potential $16 billion expansion to
this tax credit program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, et al., to Charles P. Rettig, Commissioner,
Internal Revenue Service (Jan. 27, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee continued to conduct oversight of the FBI and
reports that senior FBI officials exhibited political bias
while assigned to high-profile, politically-oriented cases.
Together with Chairman Chuck Grassley of the Finance Committee,
Chairman Johnson sent numerous requests for information to the
FBI, the DOJ, the Department of State, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency, among
others, as part of their continued oversight of the FBI's
investigation of alleged collusion between the Trump campaign
and Russia.\130\ On December 18, 2019, the committee convened a
hearing, titled DOJ OIG FISA Report: Methodology, Scope, and
Findings, during which the DOJ Inspector General presented the
findings from his review of the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane
investigation of Trump campaign officials. At that hearing, the
Inspector General testified that he identified evidence of
political bias by certain FBI officials and that he could not
find a satisfactory explanation for 17 significant errors and
omissions by the FBI officials conducting the
investigation.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\E.g., Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (April
25, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Finance, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (May 6, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State, Dep't of State (May
9, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation
(May 9, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to Steve Linick, Inspector General, Dep't of State (Sept. 12,
2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 17,
2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security
& Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (Oct. 2, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal
Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 16, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, &
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Atkinson,
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (Oct. 23, 2019); Ron
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William
Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Oct. 29, 2019); Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to
David S. Ferriero, Archivist, National Archives and Records Admin.
(Oct. 31, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, &
Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Dec. 13,
2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Jan. 28,
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to Richard Grenell, Acting Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence (Apr. 2,
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Apr. 16, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to Richard Grenell, Acting Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence &
William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (May 12, 2020); Ron
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William
Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (May 18, 2020); Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, &
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Richard Grenell,
Acting Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence (May 19, 2020); Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, &
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Richard Grenell,
Acting Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence (May 22, 2020); Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, &
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Pompeo,
Secretary, Dep't of State (June 11, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Steve Mnuchin, Secretary, Dep't of
Treasury (June 11, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep't of State (July 2,
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep't of State (July 7, 2020);
Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Gina
Haspel, Dir., Central Intelligence Agency (July 28, 2020); Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, &
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to John Ratcliffe,
Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence (Jul. 28, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't
of Justice, & Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Jul. 28, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep't of State (Jul. 28, 2020);
Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to
Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Aug. 21,
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of
Investigation (Sept. 9, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to Michael Horowitz,
Inspector General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 11, 2020); Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, &
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to John Ratcliffe,
Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence (Sept.. 11, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal
Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 2, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Gina Haspel, Dir., Central
Intelligence Agency (Oct. 7, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman,
S. Comm. on Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of
Investigation (Oct. 12, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman,
S. Comm. on Finance, to Mark Esper, Secretary, Dep't of Defense (Oct.
14, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to John Ratcliffe, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, & Christopher
Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 14, 2020); Ron
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William
Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, & Christopher Wray, Dir.,
Federal Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 30, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman,
S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to William Barr,
Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Nov. 2, 2020).
\131\DOJ OIG FISA Report: Methodology, Scope, and Findings, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (Dec. 18, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2020, Chairman Johnson received and publicly released
declassified records related to the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane
investigation, including intelligence reporting the FBI
received that certain parts of the Steele dossier were the
product of a Russian disinformation campaign.\132\ On June 4,
2020, the Committee authorized Chairman Johnson to issue
several subpoenas for records and testimony related to this
investigation; Chairman Johnson issued a subpoena for records
to the FBI, and subpoenas for records and testimony to former
State Department official Jonathan Winer and Stefan Halper. On
October 23, 2020, along with the Finance Committee, Chairman
Johnson issued a majority staff report, titled Don't Brief the
Trump Team: How the GSA and the FBI Secretly Shared Trump
Transition Team Records, which described how the GSA violated
the terms of its memorandum of understanding with the Trump
transition team to secretly preserve and share transition
records with the FBI and Office of the Special Counsel.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\Letter from Richard Grenell, Acting Dir. of Nat'l
Intelligence, to Ron Johnson, Chairman (Apr. 15, 2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/ig-footnotes-serious-
problems-with-dossier-sources-didnt-stop-fbis-page-surveillance; Letter
from Richard Grenell, Acting Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, to Ron
Johnson, Chairman (May 13, 2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/2020-05-13%20ODNI%20to%20CEG%20RHJ%20(Unmasking).pdf; Press
Release, Johnson, Grassley release FBI, DOJ, State Department records
related to the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/johnson-grassley-
release-fbi-doj-state-department-records-related-to-the-fbis-crossfire-
hurricane-investigation
\133\Don't Brief the Trump Team: How the GSA and FBI Secretly
Shared Trump Transition Team Records, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and S. Comm. on Finance (Oct. 23, 2020), https://
www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-10-
23%20Committee%20Report%20-%20GSA%20&%20Trump%20Transition.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 3, 2020, Chairman Johnson held a capstone
hearing, titled Congressional Oversight in the Face of
Executive Branch and Media Suppression: The Case Study of
Crossfire Hurricane.\134\ The hearing focused largely on the
misconduct of the FBI during its investigation of the Trump
campaign and it addressed the difficulty Chairman Johnson
experienced throughout his tenure attempting to receive
meaningful compliance from executive agencies and former
government officials. Chairman Johnson released two timelines
in conjunction with this hearing highlighting key events during
the Crossfire Hurricane investigation and relevant findings
from the Chairman's oversight work.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\Congressional Oversight in the Face of Executive Branch and
Media Suppression: The Case Study of Crossfire Hurricane, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (Dec. 3, 2020).
\135\Timeline: Congressional Oversight in the Face of Executive
Branch and Media Suppression: The Case Study of Crossfire Hurricane, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Dec. 3, 2020);
Timeline of Key Events Related to Crossfire Hurricane Investigation, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and S. Comm. on
Finance (Dec. 3, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In November 2019, the Committee initiated a joint
investigation with the Finance Committee into actual or
apparent conflicts of interest between then-Vice President
Biden and U.S. foreign policy toward Ukraine in light of Hunter
Biden's position on the board of directors of a Ukrainian
natural gas firm that was under investigation for corruption.
This conduct was placed at issue during the 2019 impeachment
proceedings in the House against President Trump. As part of
the investigation, Chairman Johnson sent numerous requests for
information to the Department of State and the National
Archives, among other agencies,\136\ and conducted several
transcribed interviews of relevant witnesses.\137\ Chairman
Johnson also served a subpoena for records on Blue Star
Strategies, a consulting firm representing Burisma, which the
Committee authorized. On September 23, 2020, the majority
issued a staff report, titled Hunter Biden, Burisma, and
Corruption: The Impact on U.S. Government Policy and Related
Concerns, summarizing its findings.\138\ On November 18, 2020,
the majority issued a supplemental report based on additional
information that came to light on this topic.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\E.g., Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 27,
2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (Sept. 30, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, & Mike Lee, U.S. Senator, to Michael
Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (Oct. 2,
2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security
& Governmental Affairs, Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, & Mike Lee, U.S. Senator, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community (Oct. 16, 2019); Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, &
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Pompeo,
Secretary, Dep't of State (Nov. 6, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to David S. Ferriero, Archivist,
National Archives and Records Administration (Nov. 21, 2019); Ron
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William
Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice & Christopher Wray, Dir.,
Federal Bureau of Investigation (Nov. 22, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman,
S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles
Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Karen Tramontano, CEO, Blue
Star Strategies (Dec. 3, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman,
S. Comm. on Finance, to James M. Murray, Dir., U.S. Secret Service
(Feb. 5, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep't of State (Apr. 30, 2020);
Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to
Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 15,
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to Peter Kadzik, Vedable (Oct. 17, 2020); Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to
Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 17,
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to James M. Murray, Dir., U.S. Secret Service (Oct. 20, 2020);
Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Tony
Bobulinski (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Finance, to James Gilliar (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to James Biden (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Benjamin
Klubs, et al, (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman,
S. Comm. on Finance, to Rob Walker (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, &
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Horowitz,
Inspector General, Dep't of Justice (Oct. 21, 2020).
\137\See Interview transcripts, available at https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/hunter-biden-burisma-and-corruption-the-
impact-on-us-government-policy-and-related-
concerns?peek=H8DPK9jMv5%2FLz%2F2Jz1eN6dDBxADb117R%2Fnn5y%2B5qKcnHqg29.
\138\Hunter Biden, Burisma, and Corruption: The Impact on U.S.
Government Policy and Related Concerns, S. Comm. on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, and S. Comm. on Finance (Sept. 23, 2020),
HTTPS://WWW.HSGAC.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HSGAC--Finance--Report--
FINAL.pdf.
\139\Majority Staff Report Supplemental, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, and S. Comm. on Finance (Nov. 18,
2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-11-
18%20HSGAC%20-%20Finance%20Joint%20Report%20Supplemental.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 16, 2020, Chairman Johnson initiated an
investigation of the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis
(I&A). Specifically, this inquiry focused on I&A's overt human
intelligence collection program and its counter-intelligence
program. On August 6, 2020, the Committee held an oversight
hearing, titled Oversight of DHS Personnel Deployments at
Recent Protests, which included the deployment of I&A
personnel.
Chairman Johnson also continued his oversight of the Trump
Administration's tariffs, which created financial burdens for
many businesses across the country. Chairman Johnson requested
updated information and data from the Commerce Department about
the effects of tariffs on U.S. businesses.\140\ Chairman
Johnson also sought to understand how the Commerce Department
determined which applicants qualified for exclusions from the
tariffs. In addition, Chairman Johnson requested material from
major domestic steel and aluminum producers to better
understand how the tariffs were affecting producers and
consumers.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill, Ranking
Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to Wilbur
R. Ross, Secretary, Dep't of Commerce (Aug. 30, 2018).
\141\Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill, Ranking
Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affs., to Roger
Newport, Chief Executive Officer, AK Steel Holding Corp. (Aug. 27,
2018); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill, Ranking
Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affs., to Michael
Bless, President, Chief Executive Officer, and Director, Century
Aluminum Co. (Aug. 27, 2018); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, &
Claire McCaskill, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, to John Ferriola, Chairman, Chief Executive
Officer, and President, Nucor Corp. (Aug. 27, 2018); Letter from Ron
Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to David Burritt, President
and Chief Executive Officer, United States Steel Corp. (Aug. 27, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Johnson also examined allegations of
irregularities in the 2020 election, including holding a
hearing on December 16, 2020, in an effort to ``restore
confidence in the integrity of our voting system'' and
``resolve suspicions with full transparency and public
awareness.''\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election, S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs (Dec. 16, 2020) (statement of
Chairman Johnson).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. REDUCING WASTE, FRAUD AND ABUSE
The Committee passed nearly 50 pieces of legislation that
aim to reduce waste, fraud and abuse in the Federal Government.
The following is a brief summary of some of those highlights.
The 116th Congress saw unprecedented packages of Federal
spending in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the
associated stay-at-home orders and business closings. The $2
trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(CARES Act) contained a provision negotiated by Chairman
Johnson and Ranking Member Peters to provide oversight of this
massive influx of Federal spending.\143\ The CARES Act
established the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
(PRAC) within the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency in order to provide needed oversight to the
pandemic spending programs to ensure tax dollars are not
wasted.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\Pub. L. No. 116-136 (116th Cong.).
\144\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The COVID-19 pandemic also presented unique challenges and
opportunities for the Unites States Postal Service (USPS). In
the initial weeks of the pandemic, USPS saw drastic reductions
in mail volume and revenue.\145\ Based on these weeks of
crisis, USPS projected it would run out of liquidity in just a
few months.\146\ In response to the initial USPS projections,
the Committee negotiated another provision in the CARES Act--
one that would allow USPS to borrow up to $10 billion from the
U.S. Treasury to cover COVID-19 related costs.\147\ However,
USPS's financial situation improved quickly thereafter due to
an unprecedented increase in package volume.\148\ While USPS
did have some increased costs due to overtime, sick leave, and
transportation costs, its overall revenue was $4.4 billion
higher from March 2020 through December 2020 compared to the
same weeks in 2019.\149\ As such, USPS did not access the loan
during the 116th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\Letter from Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman of Homeland Sec. and
Governmental Affairs Senate Comm., Congressman Jim Jordan, Ranking
Member of Oversight House Comm., and Congressman Jody Hice, Ranking
member of Government Operations, House Comm., to the Honorable Megan
Brennan, Postmaster General., U.S. Postal Service (June 8, 2020).
\146\Id.
\147\Pub. L. No. 116-136 (116th Cong.).
\148\ Letter from Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman of Homeland Sec.
and Governmental Affairs Senate Comm., Congressman Jim Jordan, Ranking
Member of Oversight House Comm., and Congressman Jody Hice, Ranking
member of Government Operations, House Comm., to the Honorable Megan
Brennan, Postmaster General., U.S. Postal Service (June 8, 2020).
\149\Data from USPS on file with the Comm. staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee held a hearing on USPS' finances and
operations during the COVID-19 pandemic and the then-upcoming
2020 elections.\150\ The hearing addressed the better-than-
expected financial condition of USPS and examined changes made
by the Postmaster General shortly after he was sworn in.\151\
The hearing debunked conspiracy theories regarding the removal
of blue drop boxes and the removal of sorting equipment at some
postal facilities.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\Examining the Finances and Operations of the United States
Postal Service During COVID-19 and Upcoming Elections: Hearing before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong.
(2020).
\151\Id.
\152\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee also worked in the 116th Congress to address
the growth in annual improper payments--sums paid out by the
Federal Government to the wrong person, in the wrong amount,
for the wrong reason, or without sufficient documentation. From
2017 to 2019, the annual improper payment total increased from
$141 billion to $175 billion.\153\ The Committee passed and the
President signed the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019,
which reorganizes and streamlines Federal improper payments
laws, improving transparency and agency compliance.\154\ It
takes several improper payments laws from the last decade and
consolidates them into one section of the U.S. Code and
clarifies inconsistencies within those laws.\155\ The Committee
also approved legislation requiring Federal agencies to make
budget justification material readily available to the public,
improving Federal transparency.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-18-377, Improper Payments:
Actions and Guidance Could Help Address Issues and Inconsistencies in
Estimation Processes (May 31, 2018); Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-
20-344, Payment Integrity: Federal Agencies' Estimates of FY 2019
Improper Payments (Mar. 2, 2020).
\154\Pub. L. No. 116-117 (116th Cong.).
\155\Id.
\156\S. 2560 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first hearing the Committee held in the 116th Congress
was a field hearing at St. Thomas More Catholic School, to
examine the success of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship
program, the only federally-funded school voucher program.\157\
Witnesses included the Hon. Tim Scott, Senator from North
Carolina, school administrators, and a recent alumnus of the
program.\158\ The Committee also secured a reauthorization of
the program through 2023 and extended the requirement that
schools become accredited, due to complications arising from
the closure of schools due to the COVID-19 pandemic.\159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\Opportunity to SOAR: 15 years of School Choice in D.C.:
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
116th Cong. (2020).
\158\Id.
\159\Pub. L. No. 116-94 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee also passed the Fair Chance to Compete for
Jobs Act for the third time. The legislation requires that
Federal agencies and contractors wait until making a
conditional offer to a potential employee before asking them
about their criminal history. The legislation was included as a
part of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, signed
into law by the President.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\Pub. L. No. 116-283 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the potential for a Presidential transition in 2021,
the Committee reviewed the 2016 Presidential transition and
found that there were certain issues related to the roles and
responsibilities of the General Services Administration (GSA)
and presidential transition teams.\161\ The Committee passed,
and the President signed, the Presidential Transition
Enhancement Act, which clarified these roles and
responsibilities.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\S. Rept. 116-13.
\162\Pub. L. No. 116-121 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also of note, the Committee spent considerable time and
bipartisan effort on two major pieces of legislation that,
although approved by HSGAC with overwhelming support, were not
enacted this Congress. The first, S. 1877, the Prevent
Government Shutdowns Act of 2019, seeks to end costly and
disruptive government shutdowns during a lapse in
appropriations by providing for an automatic appropriation at
current levels and incentives for Congress to pass regular
appropriations while automatic appropriations are in place. The
legislation limits official travel of Members of Congress and
senior Executive Branch officials and holds Members' pay in
escrow during a period of automatic appropriations. It also
requires daily quorum calls and prohibits business from being
in order on the Senate and House floor other than
appropriations bills.\163\ The bill was approved by the
Committee on June 19, 2019 by a vote of 10-2\164\, and later
modified slightly in the form of a new bipartisan bill placed
on the Senate Legislative Calendar in August 2020.\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\S. 1877, Prevent Government Shutdowns Act of 2019 (116th
Cong.); S. Rept. 116-158 (116th Cong.).
\164\S. Rept. 116-158.
\165\S. 4461, Prevent Government Shutdowns Act of 2020 (116th
Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second, S. 764, ARTICLE ONE Act, seeks to reclaim
certain emergency authorities that Congress has ceded to the
President over time. The bill would invert the process for
congressional review of a national emergency declared by the
President, with the exception of emergencies declared pursuant
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to ensure
that Congress approves of the emergency if a President wants it
to continue for more than 30 days.\166\ The bill was approved
by the Committee on July 24, 2019, by voice vote.\167\ The
Chairman hopes that work on both of these important pieces of
legislation will continue in the next Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\S. 764, ARTICLE ONE Act (116th Cong.); S. Rept. 116-159 (116th
Cong.).
\167\S. Rept. 116-159.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. COMMITTEE JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Committee (which was renamed the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs when
the 109th Congress convened) derives from the Rules of the
Senate and Senate Resolutions:
RULE XXV
* * * * * * * *
(k)(1) Committee on Governmental Affairs, to which
committee shall be referred all proposed legislation, messages,
petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the
following subjects:
1. Archives of the United States.
2. Budget and accounting measures, other than
appropriations, except as provided in the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974.
3. Census and collection of statistics, including economic
and social statistics.
4. Congressional organization, except for any part of the
matter that amends the rules or orders of the Senate.
5. Federal Civil Service.
6. Government information.
7. Intergovernmental relations.
8. Municipal affairs of the District of Columbia, except
appropriations therefor.
9. Organization and management of United States nuclear
export policy.
10. Organization and reorganization of the executive branch
of the Government.
11. Postal Service.
12. Status of officers and employees of the United States,
including their classification, compensation, and benefits.
(2) Such committee shall have the duty of----
(A) receiving and examining reports of the Comptroller
General of the United States and of submitting such
recommendations to the Senate as it deems necessary or
desirable in connection with the subject matter of such
reports;
(B) studying the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of
all agencies and departments of the Government;
(C) evaluating the effects of laws enacted to reorganize
the legislative and executive branches of the Government; and
(D) studying the intergovernmental relationships between
the United States and the States and municipalities, and
between the United States and international organizations of
which the United States is a member.
SENATE RESOLUTION 70, 116TH CONGRESS
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS.
Sec. 12. (a) * * *
* * * * * * * *
(d) INVESTIGATIONS----
(1) IN GENERAL--The committee, or any duly authorized
subcommittee of the committee, is authorized to study or
investigate----
(A) the efficiency and economy of operations of all
branches of the Government including the possible existence of
fraud, misfeasance, malfeasance, collusion, mismanagement,
incompetence, corruption, or unethical practices, waste,
extravagance, conflicts of interest, and the improper
expenditure of Government funds in transactions, contracts,
and, activities of the Government or of Government officials
and employees and any and all such improper practices between
Government personnel and corporations, individuals, companies,
or persons affiliated therewith, doing business with the
Government; and the compliance or noncompliance of such
corporations, companies, or individuals or other entities with
the rules, regulations, and laws governing the various
governmental agencies and its relationships with the public;
(B) the extent to which criminal or other improper
practices or activities are, or have been, engaged in the field
of labor-management relations or in groups or organizations of
employees or employers, to the detriment of interests of the
public, employers, or employees, and to determine whether any
changes are required in the laws of the United States in order
to protect such interests against the occurrence of such
practices or activities;
(C) organized criminal activity which may operate in or
otherwise utilize the facilities of interstate or international
commerce in furtherance of any transactions and the manner and
extent to which, and the identity of the persons, firms, or
corporations, or other entities by whom such utilization is
being made, and further, to study and investigate the manner in
which and the extent to which persons engaged in organized
criminal activity have infiltrated lawful business enterprise,
and to study the adequacy of Federal laws to prevent the
operations of organized crime in interstate or international
commerce; and to determine whether any changes are required in
the laws of the United States in order to protect the public
against such practices or activities;
(D) all other aspects of crime and lawlessness within the
United States which have an impact upon or affect the national
health, welfare, and safety; including but not limited to
investment fraud schemes, commodity and security fraud,
computer fraud, and the use of offshore banking and corporate
facilities to carry out criminal objectives;
(E) the efficiency and economy of operations of all
branches and functions of the government with particular
reference to----
(i) the effectiveness of present national security methods,
staffing, and processes as tested against the requirements
imposed by the rapidly mounting complexity of national security
problems;
(ii) the capacity of present national security staffing,
methods, and processes to make full use of the Nation's
resources of knowledge and talents;
(iii) the adequacy of present intergovernmental relations
between the United States and international organizations
principally concerned with national security of which the
United States is a member; and
(iv) legislative and other proposals to improve these
methods, processes, and relationships;
(F) the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all
agencies and departments of the government involved in the
control and management of energy shortages including, but not
limited to, their performance with respect to----
(i) the collection and dissemination of accurate statistics
on fuel demand and supply;
(ii) the implementation of effective energy conservation
measures;
(iii) the pricing of energy in all forms;
(iv) coordination of energy programs with State and local
government;
(v) control of exports of scarce fuels;
(vi) the management of tax, import, pricing, and other
policies affecting energy supplies;
(vii) maintenance of the independent sector of the
petroleum industry as a strong competitive force;
(viii) the allocation of fuels in short supply by public
and private entities;
(ix) the management of energy supplies owned or controlled
by the Government;
(x) relations with other oil producing and consuming
countries;
(xi) the monitoring of compliance by governments,
corporations, or individuals with the laws and regulations
governing the allocation, conservation, or pricing of energy
supplies; and
(xii) research into the discovery and development of
alternative energy supplies; and
(G) the efficiency and economy of all branches and
functions of government with particular references to the
operations and management of Federal regulatory policies and
programs.
(2) EXTENT OF INQUIRIES.--In carrying out the duties
provided in paragraph (1), the inquiries of this committee or
any subcommittee of the committee shall not be construed to be
limited to the records, functions, and operations of any
particular branch of the Government and may extend to the
records and activities of any persons, corporation, or other
entity.
(3) SPECIAL COMMITTEE AUTHORITY.--For the purposes of this
subsection, the committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee
of the committee, or its chairman, or any other member of the
committee or subcommittee designated by the chairman is
authorized, in its, his or her, or their discretion----
(A) to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of
witnesses and production of correspondence, books, papers, and
documents;
(B) to hold hearings;
(C) to sit and act at any time or place during the
sessions, recess, and adjournment periods of the Senate;
(D) to administer oaths; and
(E) to take testimony, either orally or by sworn Statement,
or, in the case of staff members of the Committee and the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, by deposition in
accordance with the Committee Rules of Procedure.
(4) AUTHORITY OF OTHER COMMITTEES.--Nothing contained in
this subsection shall affect or impair the exercise of any
other standing committee of the Senate of any power, or the
discharge by such committee of any duty, conferred or imposed
upon it by the Standing Rules of the Senate or by the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.
(5) SUBPOENA AUTHORITY.--All subpoenas and related legal
processes of the committee and its subcommittee authorized
under S. Res. 62, agreed to February 28, 2017 (115th Congress)
are authorized to continue.
III. BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS REFERRED AND CONSIDERED
During the 116th Congress, 409 Senate bills and 136 House
bills were referred to the Committee for consideration. In
addition, 10 Senate Resolutions and 2 Senate Concurrent
Resolutions were referred to the Committee.
The Committee reported 138 bills; an additional 44 measures
were discharged.
Of the legislation received by the Committee, 79 measures
became public laws, including 64 postal naming bills.
IV. HEARINGS
During the 116th Congress, the Committee held 50 hearings
on legislation, oversight issues, and nominations. Hearing
titles and dates follow.
The Committee also held 16 scheduled business meetings.
Lists of hearings with copies of Statements by Members and
witnesses, with archives going back to 1997, are online at the
Committee's Website, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/.
The Opportunity to SOAR: 15 Years of School Choice in D.C. February 26,
2019. (S. Hearing. 116-27)
The purpose of this two-panel field hearing was to mark the
15th year anniversary of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship
Program and discuss its future with the SOAR Reauthorization
Act of 2019. The witnesses addressed how the D.C. Opportunity
Scholarship Program benefits students and parents
educationally, financially, and socially as it prepared them
for the future. The witnesses also addressed past obstacles the
program had to overcome, highlighting times administrators,
parents, and advocates of the program supported the students'
education.
Witnesses: Hon. Tim Scott, U.S. Senate; K. Marguerite
Conley, Former Executive Director, Consortium of Catholic
Academies; Yisehak Abraham, Alumnus, D.C. Opportunity
Scholarship Program; Gerald Smith, Principal, St. Thomas More
Catholic School.
Perspectives on Protecting the Electric Grid from an Electromagnetic
Pulse or Geomagnetic Disturbance. February 27, 2019. (S.
Hearing. 116-78)
The purpose of this roundtable is to hear differing
perspectives from key stakeholders on electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) and geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) risks and mitigation
solutions. The witnesses discussed current activities to
predict and prepare for the consequences of an EMP or GMD and
how the United States can improve its efforts. Witnesses also
discussed the Department of Homeland Security's EMP strategy
that was submitted to Congress last year, and how government
agencies and private sector organizations are working together
to secure our nation's electrical grid from an EMP or GMD.
Finally, the witnesses discussed the potential costs associated
with hardening the nation's electrical grid and possible
technical solutions, and recommendations on authorities needed
to prepare and protect the United States for an EMP or GMD
event.
Witnesses: Hon. Karen Evans, Assistant Secretary for
Cybersecurity, Energy Security, & Emergency Response, U.S.
Department of Energy; Brian Harrell, Assistant Director,
Infrastructure Security Division, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Nathan Anderson, Acting Director, Homeland Security &
Justice Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Joseph
McClelland, Director, Office of Energy Infrastructure Security,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; Scott Aaronson, Vice
President for Security and Preparedness, Edison Electric
Institute; Randy Horton, PH.D., Senior Program Manager, Grid
Operations and Planning, Electric Power, Research Institute;
David Roop, Director, Electric, Transmission Operations &
Reliability, Dominion Energy; James Vespalec, Director, Asset
Planning and Engineering, American Transmission Company; George
Baker, PH.D., Professor Emeritus, James Madison University;
Justin Kasper, PH.D., Associate Professor of Space Science and
Engineering, University of Michigan; Caitlin Durkovich,
Director, Toffler Associates
Nomination of Joseph V. Cuffari to be Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security. March 5, 2019. (S. Hearing
116-28)
This one-panel hearing considered the nomination of Joseph
V. Cuffari, to be Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security. Mr. Cuffari was introduced by Senator Martha
McSally.
High Risk List 2019: Recommendations to Reduce Risk of Waste, Fraud,
and Mismanagement in Federal Programs. March 6, 2019. (S.
Hearing 116-43)
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the Government
Accountability Office's 2019 update of the High Risk List. The
witness discussed agencies that required significant
congressional attention, particularly in the legislative
jurisdiction of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee.
Witnesses: Hon. Eugene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of
the United States, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
accompanied by Cathleen Berrick, Managing Director, Defense
Capabilities and Management Team, U.S. Government
Accountability Office; Nikki Clowers, Managing Director, Health
Care Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Elizabeth
Curda, Director, Education, Workforce, & Income Security Team,
U.S. Government Accountability Office; Mark Gaffigan, Managing
Director, Natural Resources and Environment Team, U.S.
Government Accountability Office; Nick Marinos, Director,
Information Technology and Cybersecurity Team, U.S. Government
Accountability Office; Chris Mihm, Managing Director, Strategic
Issues Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office.
A Path to Sustainability: Recommendations From The President's Task
Force on the United States Postal Service. March 12, 2019. (S.
Hearing 116-97)
The purpose of this hearing was to address the
unsustainable financial path of the Postal Service and to
provide recommendations to promote the Nation's commerce and
communication without shifting additional cost to taxpayers.
The witnesses addressed the findings of the President's Task
Force and summarized recommendations to improve the
relationship between the Postal Service and the Federal
Government, the Postal Service's Universal Service Obligation,
its obligations to employees and retirees, and the workforce
needs of the Postal Service.
Witnesses: Gary Grippo, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Public Finance, U.S. Department of the Treasury; Hon. Robert G.
Taub, Chairman, Postal Regulatory Commission; Hon. David C.
Williams, Vice Chairman, Board of Governors, U.S. Postal
Service; Hon. Margaret Weichert, Deputy Director for
Management, Office of Management and Budget, Acting Director,
Office of Personnel Management.
Nominations of Ron A. Bloom and Roman Martinez IV to be Governors, U.S.
Postal Service, James A. Crowell IV and Jason Park to be
Associate Judges, Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
April 2, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-60)
This one-panel hearing considered the nominations of Ron A.
Bloom and Roman Martinez IV to be Governors, U.S. Postal
Service & James A. Crowell IV and Jason Park to be Associate
Judges, Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: By The Numbers.
April 4, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine U.S. southern
border migration, apprehension, and drug flow data, and to
compare recent data to historical trends. The witnesses
discussed their experiences and expertise in immigration,
migration, and border security policy. The witnesses also
addressed challenges facing the Southern Border, Mexico, and
the Northern Triangle and suggested potential solutions to fix
our broken immigration system.
Witnesses: Mark Morgan, Former Chief of the U.S. Border
Patrol (2016-2017), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; John Daniel Davidson, Senior
Correspondent, The Federalist; Andrew Selee, Ph.D., President,
Migration Policy Institute.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Perspectives from
the Frontline. April 9, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine U.S. southern
border migration, apprehension, and drug flow data, and to
compare recent data to historical trends. The witnesses
discussed their frontline experiences serving in U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, Homeland Security Investigations, Health
and Human Services, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. Witnesses
addressed the changing nature of migration, the flow of drugs,
and human smuggling and trafficking operations across the
southwest border.
Witnesses: Rodolfo Karisch, Rio Grande Valley Sector Chief
Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Randy Howe,
Executive Director for Operations, Office of Field Operations,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Timothy Tubbs, Deputy Special Agent in Charge-
Laredo, Texas, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Greg Cherundolo, Chief of Operations, Drug
Enforcement Agency, U.S. Department of Justice; and Commander
Jonathan White, Ph.D., USPHS, Senior Advisor, Office of
Emergency Management and Medical Operations, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services.
Nominations of Hon. Dale Cabaniss to be Director, Office of Personal
Management, and Michael E. Wooten, ED.D., to be Administrator,
Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Office of Management and
Budget. May 7, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-61)
This one-panel hearing considered the nominations of Hon.
Dale Cabaniss to be Director, Office of Personal Management;
and Michael E. Wooten, Ed.D., to be Administrator, Office of
Federal Procurement Policy, Office of Management and Budget.
Ms. Cabaniss was introduced by Senator John Boozman. Dr. Wooten
was introduced by former Representative Tom Davis.
Resources Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland. May 23, 2019. (S.
Hearing 116-189)
The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the Department
of Homeland Security's budget request and legislative
priorities for Fiscal Year 2020. The witness addressed the need
for additional resources and authorities to secure and protect
the homeland, and also how the Department's budget request
meets the current and future homeland security needs of the
nation.
Witness: Hon. Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.
Sensibly Reforming the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
Program. June 4, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-79)
The purpose of this hearing was to examine potential
reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program as
the Committee worked toward a reauthorization. The witnesses
discussed their experiences with the program, including
recommendations for overall program improvement, maturation of
the program, and opportunities to streamline and harmonize
CFATS program regulatory requirements.
Witnesses: Brian Harrell, Assistant Director for
Infrastructure Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Nathan
Anderson, Acting Director, Homeland Security & Justice Team,
U.S. Government Accountability Office; Matthew Fridley, Safety,
Regulatory and Security Manager, Brenntag North America,
Timothy O'Brien, President, Detotec North America; William
Erny, Senior Director, American Chemistry Council; Andrew
Wright, Vice President, Legislative Affairs, International
Liquid Terminals Association; John Morawetz, Health and Safety
Representative, International Chemical Workers Union Council,
United Food & Commercial Workers International Union.
Nominations of Chad F. Wolf to be Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy,
and Plans, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Jeffrey C.
Byard to be Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Troy D. Edgar to be Chief
Financial Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; John
M. Barger to be a Governor, U.S. Postal Service; and B. Chad
Bungard to be a Member, Merit Systems Protection Board. June
12, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-63)
This one-panel hearing considered the nominations of Chad
F. Wolf to be Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Jeffrey C. Byard to be
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Byard was introduced by
Senator Richard C. Shelby; Troy D. Edgar to be Chief Financial
Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; John M. Barger
to be a Governor, U.S. Postal Service; and B. Chad Bungard to
be a Member, Merit Systems Protection Board.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The Exploitation
of Migrants through Smuggling, Trafficking, and Involuntary
Servitude. June 26, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing, the third in a series
addressing the ongoing humanitarian and national security
crisis at the U.S. southern border, was to examine different
ways in which individuals or organizations seek to exploit
migrants attempting to enter the United States. The witnesses
discussed different aspects and phases of this exploitation,
including the current trends, tactics, and costs associated
with human smuggling and trafficking across the southwest
border. Witnesses also discussed how human smuggling can become
human trafficking or involuntary servitude when migrants are
forced to pay off debts related to their unlawful entry into
the U.S and explained concrete examples of these different
forms of exploitation. Including how this exploitation benefits
transnational criminal organizations, human trafficking and
human smuggling operations, and their work to thwart them.
Witnesses: Brian S. Hastings, Chief, Law Enforcement
Operations Directorate, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Randy
Howe, Executive Director for Operations, Office of Field
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; Gregory Nevano, Assistant Director for
Investigative Programs, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.
Nominations of Ann C. Fisher and Ashley E. Poling to be Commissioners,
Postal Regulatory Commission; Catherine Bird to be General
Counsel, Federal Labor Relations Authority; and Rainey R.
Brandt and Shana Frost Matini to be Associate Judges, Superior
Court of the District of Columbia. July 16, 2019. (S. Hearing
116-69)
The purpose of this hearing considered the nominations of
Ann C. Fisher and Ashley E. Poling to be Commissioners, Postal
Regulatory Commission; Catherine Bird to be General Counsel,
Federal Labor Relations Authority; and Rainey R. Brandt and
Shana Frost Matini to be Associate Judges, Superior Court of
the District of Columbia.
2020 Census: Conducting a Secure and Accurate Count. July 16, 2019. (S.
Hearing 116-136)
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the U.S. Census
Bureau's work towards the 2020 Census. The witnesses discussed
how the Bureau is working to mitigate key risks to the 2020
Census, upholding strong privacy protections for individual
responses, and deploying strong cybersecurity measures for the
unprecedented digital census environment.
Witnesses: Hon. Steven Dillingham, PH.D., Director, U.S.
Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce; Robert Goldenkoff,
Director of Strategic Issues, U.S. Government Accountability
Office; Nicholas Marinos, Director of Information Technology &
Cybersecurity, U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Bipartisan Policy
Recommendations from the Homeland Security Advisory Council.
July 17, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the current
migration crisis at the southern border and recommendations by
the Homeland Security Advisory Council to address it. The
witnesses discussed the Emergency Interim Report the Council
issued on April 16, 2019.
Witnesses: Hon. Karen Tandy, Chair, Customs and Border
Protection Families and Children Care Panel, Homeland Security
Advisory Council; Jayson Ahern, Vice Chair, Customs and Border
Protection Families and Children Care Panel, Homeland Security
Advisory Council; Sharon W. Cooper, MD FAAP, Member, Customs
and Border Protection Families and Children Care Panel,
Homeland Security Advisory Council; Leon Fresco, Member,
Customs and Border Protection Families and Children Care Panel,
Homeland Security Advisory Council.
Examining State and Federal Recommendations for Enhancing School Safety
Against Targeted Violence. July 24, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-117)
The purpose of this hearing was to provide the public with
an understanding of the current state of school security,
mitigation, and prevention best practices, as well as state and
Federal recommendations. The witnesses discussed their advocacy
on behalf of school hardening and research on school safety
measures and school-based prevention. The witnesses also
suggested ways to effect non-political, efficacious, and proven
measures for enhancing safe environments at American schools.
Witnesses: Max Schachter, Founder & Chief Executive
Officer, Safe Schools for Alex; Tom Hoyer, Treasurer, Stand
with Parkland--The National Association of Families for Safe
Schools; Hon. Bob Gualtieri, Chair, Marjory Stoneman Douglas
High School Public Safety Commission and Sheriff of Pinellas
County, Florida; Deborah Temkin, Ph.D., Senior Program Area
Director, Education Child Trends.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: What Is Required
to Improve Conditions? July 30, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the conditions
at Customs and Border Protection detention centers along the
southern border, CBP's efforts to ensure the safety and care of
all individuals in its custody, and what actions Congress and
the Executive Branch needed to take to help address the
unprecedented flow of families and unaccompanied alien children
that have led to overcrowding at CBP facilities. The witnesses
discussed the findings following the Department of Homeland
Security Office of the Inspector General's visits to CBP
detention centers and the provided recommendations to address
the various challenges.
Witnesses: Mark Morgan, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
Jennifer L. Costello, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security.
18 Years Later: The State of Homeland Security after 9/11. September 9,
2019. (S. Hearing 116-397)
The purpose of this field hearing, held at the National
September 11th Memorial & Museum in New York City, New York,
was to evaluate how the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
has evolved to address an ever-changing threat landscape in the
years since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The
witnesses provided frank assessments of the greatest threats to
our homeland security, how well they believe the Department is
handling these challenges, and recommendations for how DHS can
improve. The witnesses' recommendations included both how DHS
can better leverage its existing relationships with public and
private sector partners to anticipate, adapt, and respond to
persistent and emerging threats, and how Congress can better
position the Department to address these threats.
Witnesses: Hon. Michael Chertoff, Former Secretary (2005-
2009), U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Hon. Janet A.
Napolitano, Former Secretary (2009-2013), U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Hon. Jeh C. Johnson, Former Secretary (2013-
2017), U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Countering Domestic Terrorism: Examining the Evolving Threat. September
25, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-154)
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the evolving
threat posed by domestic terrorism and how the Federal
Government is combatting that threat. The hearing addressed
current trends across the domestic terrorism threat landscape,
the available data used to make threat assessments and resource
allocation decisions, the posture of the relevant government
agencies for addressing the threat, and the identification of
possible challenges the government faces. The witness discussed
their various experiences assessing domestic terrorism threats,
the status of data collection and threat tracking, and
evaluated the ability and efforts of the Federal Government to
combat domestic terrorism.
Witnesses: William Braniff, Director, National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism and
Professor of the Practice, University of Maryland; Clinton
Watts, Distinguished Research Fellow, Foreign Policy Research
Institute; Robert M. Chesney, James A. Baker III Chair in the
Rule of Law and World Affairs and Director, Robert Strauss
Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas
Law School; George Selim, Senior Vice President for National
Programs, Anti-Defamation League.
Nominations of Joshua A. Deahl to be an Associate Judge, District of
Columbia Court of Appeals; Deborah J. Israel to be an Associate
Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia; Andrea L.
Hertzfeld to be an Associate Judge, Superior Court of the
District of Columbia; and Robert A. Dixon to be United States
Marshal for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
October 22, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-156)
The purpose of this hearing considered the nominations of
Joshua A. Deahl to be an Associate Judge, District of Columbia
Court of Appeals; Deborah J. Israel to be an Associate Judge,
Superior Court of the District of Columbia; Andrea L. Hertzfeld
to be an Associate Judge, Superior Court of the District of
Columbia; and Robert A. Dixon to be United States Marshal for
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Supply Chain Security, Global Competitiveness, and 5G. October 31,
2019. (S. Hearing 116185)
The purpose of this hearing was to better understand the
Administration's ongoing work managing risks and threats to the
nation's information telecommunications technology (ICT) supply
chain as the nation transitions to the 5th generation mobile
network (5G). The witnesses highlighted the nature and severity
of the threats posed by foreign-owned and operated ICT across
the nation's 5G infrastructure, as well as the importance of 5G
to U.S. innovation and global economic competitiveness.
Additionally, witnesses described the structure of the
interagency group working on 5G issues, including who is in
charge of the interagency effort.
Witnesses: Hon. Christopher C. Krebs, Director,
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Diane Rinaldo, Acting
Assistant Secretary, National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce; Robert
L. Strayer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cyber and
International Communications and Information Policy, U.S.
Department of State; Hon. Jessica Rosenworcel, Commissioner,
Federal Communications Commission.
Threats to the Homeland. November 5, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing was to update the public
understanding of prevailing threats to the security of the
United States of America. Witnesses highlighted the most
pressing domestic and foreign threats faced by the United
States determined by their respective organizations, and also
discussed what efforts they are taking to counter these major
threats to the homeland.
Witnesses: Hon. David J. Glawe, Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Russell Travers, Acting Director, National
Counterterrorism Center.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The Year in
Review. November 13, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the
unprecedented migration flow at our southern border during
fiscal year 2019. Witnesses discussed the administrations
efforts to curb the unprecedented number of individuals
attempting to illegally enter the country. The discussion
highlighted data regarding migration patterns, apprehensions,
asylum claims, detention facilities, and drug flows in an
attempt to find potential solutions to fix our broken
immigration system.
Witnesses: Mark A. Morgan, Acting Commissioner, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, Acting Director, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Derek N. Benner, Acting Deputy Director,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, James McHenry, Director, Executive Office
for Immigration Review, U.S. Department of Justice.
Nomination of Hon. Peter T. Gaynor to be Administrator, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security. November 14, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-188)
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nomination
of Hon. Peter T. Gaynor to be Administrator, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The
nominee was introduced by Senator Jack Reed.
Nomination of Paul J. Ray to be Administrator, Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.
December 4, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-187)
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nomination
of Paul J. Ray to be Administrator, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget. The
nominee was introduced by Senator Marsha Blackburn.
DOJ OIG FISA Report: Methodology, Scope, and Findings. December 18,
2019. (S. Hearing 116396)
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the Department
of Justice Office of the Inspector General's report titled,
``Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the
FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation,'' released on December
9, 2019. The witness explained the contours of his work, the
findings regarding the FBI's basis for seeking warrants, and
other relevant examinations conducted during the investigation.
Witness: Hon. Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Justice.
Examining the Root Causes of America's Unsustainable Fiscal Path.
January 28, 2020. (S. Hearing 116-186)
The purpose of this hearing was to lay out the reality of
America's long-term financial situation, including the root
causes of the current fiscal challenges of Federal trust funds.
Witnesses discussed these long-term issues related to
government spending including Senator Mitt Romney's bill, S.
2733, The TRUST Act.
Witnesses: Douglas Holtz-Eakin, PH.D., President, American
Action Form; Charles P. Blahous III, PH.D., J. Fish and Lillian
F. Smith Chair and Senior Research Strategist, Mercatus Center,
George Mason University; Brian Riedl, Senior Fellow, Manhattan
Institute for Policy Research; Henry J. Aaron, PH.D., Bruce and
Virginia MacLaury Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution.
What States, Locals and the Business Community Should Know and Do: A
Roadmap for Effective Cybersecurity. February 11, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine how State,
local, tribal, and territorial governments and critical
infrastructure owners/operators can mitigate and protect
against persistent cybersecurity threats. This hearing also
examined the current threat environment, including ransomware
attacks, and threats from state actors like Iran, China, and
Russia. In addition, the witnesses addressed Federal and State
responses, and recommendations for improvement.
Witnesses: Hon. Christopher C. Krebs, Director,
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Amanda Crawford, Executive
Director, Department of Information Resources, State of Texas;
Christopher DeRusha, Chief Security Officer, Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Protection Office, State of Michigan.
Are We Prepared? Protecting the U.S. from Global Pandemics. February
12, 2020.
The purpose of this roundtable hearing, the first in a
series of committee hearings on the Coronavirus, was to examine
the nation's level of preparedness against pandemic threats,
particularly in the context of the Coronavirus outbreak that
originated in Wuhan, China. Witnesses discussed their views on
the actions taken by the U.S. government to combat the spread
of the Coronavirus, and if additional resources were needed.
Witnesses also discussed how the U.S. government coordinates
with both relevant Federal agencies and State, local, and
tribal entities to prepare for, respond to, and limit the
spread of infectious diseases.
Witnesses: Nikki Clowers, Managing Director, Health Care
Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Julie L.
Gerberding, MD, Former Director (2002-2009) of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention at the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services; Hon. Scott Gottlieb, MD, Former
Commissioner (2017-2019) of the Food and Drug Administration at
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Luciana
Borio, MDFormer Director for Medical and Biodefense
Preparedness (2017-2019) at the National Security Council; Asha
M. George, Dr.PH, Executive Director, Bipartisan Commission on
Biodefense.
Resources and Authorities Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland.
March 4, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the Department
of Homeland Security's budget request and legislative
priorities for Fiscal Year 2021. The witness addressed the need
for additional resources and authorities to protect and secure
the homeland, and also how the Department's budget request
meets the current and future homeland security needs for the
nation.
Witness: Hon. Chad F. Wolf, Acting Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.
The Federal Interagency Response to the Coronavirus and Preparing for
Future Global Pandemics. March 5, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the interagency
response to global pandemic outbreaks, such as the Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19), that posed public health threats to
the U.S. homeland. Witnesses provided updates on the COVID-19
outbreak, and the actions taken by their departments to combat
the spread of the virus. The witnesses also discussed
coordination efforts with other relevant Federal agencies and
relevant international partners to detect, contain, and
mitigate the spread of pandemic diseases. Finally, witnesses
discussed lessons learned from previous infectious disease
outbreaks, such as the 2014 West African Ebola outbreak and
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2003, and
included new structures put in place to respond to pandemics
affecting the nation.
Witnesses: Hon. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, Senior Official
Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; The Honorable Robert Kadlec, M.D.,
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services.
Roundtable--COVID-19: How New Information Should Drive Policy. May 6,
2020.
The purpose of this remote roundtable was to examine new
data pertaining to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic of 2020.
The witnesses discussed the development of testing methods and
treatment for coronavirus cases, the effectiveness of current
precautions such as state lockdowns and social distancing, how
to mitigate the spread of and hospitalizations due to the
coronavirus, and plans to reopen the American economy.
Witnesses: Scott W. Atlas, M.D., David and Joan Traitel
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; David
L. Katz, M.D., M.P.H., President, True Health Initiative;
Pierre Kory, M.D., M.P.A., Critical Care Service Chief,
Associate Professor of Medicine, University of Wisconsin School
of Medicine and Public Health; John P.A. Ioannidis, M.D., C.F.
Rehnborg Professor in Disease Prevention, School of Medicine,
Stanford University; Avik Roy, President, Foundation for
Research on Equal Opportunity; Tom Inglesby, M.D., Director,
Center for Health Security, Bloomberg School of Public Health,
John Hopkins University.
Evolving the U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy and Posture: Reviewing the
Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report. May 13, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to discuss and evaluate the
findings and recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium
Commission's March 2020 report. The witnesses highlighted the
Commission's recommendations aimed at improving the resilience
of the homeland from cybersecurity threats, particularly those
recommendations that strengthen the Department of Homeland
Security's ability to mitigate such threats. Additionally, the
witnesses described the details of the need for government
reforms, namely the need to improve the role of Sector Specific
Agencies and to establish the Office of the National Cyber
Director.
Witnesses: Hon. Angus S. King, JR., Co-Chair, Cyberspace
Solarium Commission; Hon. Mike Gallagher, Co-Chair, Cyberspace
Solarium Commission; Hon. Suzanne E. Spaulding, Commissioner,
Cyberspace Solarium Commission; Thomas A. Fanning,
Commissioner, Cyberspace Solarium Commission.
Nominations of Hon. Russell Vought to be Director, Office of Management
and Budget, and Craig E. Leen to be Inspector General, Office
of Personnel Management. June 2, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nominations
of Hon. Russell Vought to be Director, Office of Management and
Budget, and Craig E. Leen to be Inspector General, Office of
Personnel Management.
Nominations of Donald L. Moak and William Zollars to be Governors,
United States Postal Service, and The Honorable Mark A.
Robbins, Carl E. Ross, and Elizabeth J. Shapiro to be Associate
Judges, Superior Court of the District of Columbia. June 3,
2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nominations
of Donald L. Moak and William Zollars to be Governors, United
States Postal Service, and The Honorable Mark A. Robbins, Carl
E. Ross, and Elizabeth J. Shapiro to be Associate Judges,
Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Evaluating the Federal Government's Procurement and Distribution
Strategies in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic. June 9, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine how the Federal
Government developed and executed procurement and distribution
strategies in order to provide our nation the requisite
diagnostic testing, personal protective equipment (PPE), drug
supplies, other medically-necessary equipment, and resources in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The witnesses addressed
their agency's roles in the evaluation of the nation's need for
and current supply of diagnostics testing, PPE, and other
medically-necessary equipment and how that data informs their
distribution strategies. The witnesses also discussed data and
analyses used to determine the current and future need for
these critical resources, activities established to expedite
procurement, and distribution of these resources to state,
local, tribal, and territorial governments in response to the
pandemic.
Witnesses: Hon. Peter T. Gaynor, Administrator, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, Vice Director of
Logistics, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense;
Hon. Brett Giroir, M.D., Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services.
The Role of the Strategic National Stockpile in Pandemic Response. June
24, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the mission of
the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and the role it played
in the Federal Government's response to the coronavirus
pandemic. Witnesses discussed how the Federal Government makes
decisions affecting the SNS's inventory, and the challenges of
balancing its multiple preparedness missions with available
resources. Witnesses also discussed how the Federal Government
could improve its approach to restocking the SNS following
disasters and crises. Finally, witnesses addressed the role
state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments play
in responding to pandemics, and provided recommendations for
how the Federal and SLTT governments can better enhance their
stockpiling capabilities in response to future pandemics.
Witnesses: Julie L. Gerberding, M.D., Former Director
(2002-2009) of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Daniel M.
Gerstein, PH.D., Senior Policy Researcher, RAND Corporation; W.
Gregory Burel, Former Director (2007-2020) of the Strategic
National Stockpile at the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Andrew Phelps, Director, Oregon Office of Emergency
Management on behalf of the National Emergency Management
Association.
CBP Oversight: Examining the Evolving Challenges Facing the Agency.
June 25, 2020.
This hearing highlighted the top concerns and challenges
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) faces during a public
health emergency, as well as the adaptations it has made to
safeguard the nation while enabling lawful and essential trade,
travel, and migration. The witness discussed the effectiveness
of the specific actions CBP has taken to confront COVID-19,
including CBP's mass migration strategies and the effects on
CBP's front-line workforce. The witness also addressed specific
programs including processing under Title 42 health
authorities; the Migrant Protection Protocols; Prompt Asylum
Claim Review; Humanitarian Asylum Review Process; Asylum
Cooperative Agreements; and Electronic Nationality
Verification.
Witness: Mark Morgan, Chief Operating Officer and Senior
Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security
Nomination of Hon. Derek T. Kan to be Deputy Director, Office of
Management and Budget. June 30, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nomination
of Hon. Derek T. Kan to be Deputy Director, Office of
Management and Budget.
Oversight of COVID-19 Financial Relief Packages. July 28, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the COVID-19
financial relief packages. The witnesses provided evaluations
on the effectiveness of the packages programs and highlighted
any programs that required additional oversight. The witnesses
also addressed oversight and other controls they believed
Congress should consider as it debated the authorization of
additional programs and the appropriation of additional
funding.
Witnesses: Hon. Phil Gramm, Former Senator from the State
of Texas, and Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute;
Danielle Brian, Executive Director, Project on Government
Oversight; Maya MacGuineas, President, Committee for a
Responsible Federal Budget; Veronique De Rugy, Ph.D., Senior
Research Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason University; Hon.
Neil Barofsky, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP, Former Special
Inspector General (2008-2011) Troubled Asset Relief Program.
Oversight of DHS Personnel Deployments to Recent Protests. August 6,
2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) actions to protect Federal
property and personnel during the protests in cities across the
country, and in particular in Portland, Oregon. The witness
described the events leading to the Department's deployment of
law enforcement officers, the number and component agencies
from which these officers were deployed, the authorities that
DHS relied on to conduct its operations, coordination with
state and local officials, and any relevant data the Department
collected during the protests. Additionally, the witness
discussed the role DHS's law enforcement officers will play in
Operation Legend, announced by the President on July 8, 2020.
Witness: Hon. Chad F. Wolf, Acting Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.
Examining the Finances and Operations of the United States
Postal Service During COVID-19 and Upcoming Elections. August
21, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the finances and
operations of the United States Postal Service (USPS),
particularly in light of the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic;
recent operational changes at USPS; and the upcoming elections.
Witness: Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States
Postal Service.
Nominations of John Gibbs to be Director, Office of Personnel
Management, and Hon. John M. Barger, Hon. Christopher B.
Burnham, and Frank Dunlevy to be Members, Federal Retirement
Thrift Investment Board. September 9, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nominations
of John Gibbs to be Director, Office of Personnel Management,
and Hon. John M. Barger, Hon. Christopher B. Burnham, and Frank
Dunlevy to be Members, Federal Retirement Thrift Investment
Board.
Nomination of Hon. Chad F. Wolf to be Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security. September 23, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nomination
of Hon. Chad F. Wolf to be Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.
Threats to the Homeland. September 24, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to update the public
understanding of prevailing threats to the security of the
United States of America. The witnesses discussed the most
pressing domestic and foreign threats faced by the United
States and what efforts were taken to counter them.
Witnesses: Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice; Hon.
Christopher Miller, Director, National Counterterrorism Center,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Kenneth
Cuccinelli, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Early Outpatient Treatment: An Essential Part of a COVID-19
Solution. November 19, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to assess the current state
of the COVID-19 pandemic and examine efforts to develop early
therapeutic treatments for COVID-19 outpatients. The witnesses
discussed the research and development of early outpatient
medical treatments for COVID-19, as well as the review and
approval of such treatments by the Food and Drug Administration
under its Emergency Use Authorization program. Witnesses also
provided recommendations on what is most effective in treating
COVID-19 outpatients.
Witnesses: Peter A. McCullough, M.D., M.P.H., Vice Chief of
Internal Medicine, Baylor University Medical Center; Harvey
Risch, M.D., PH.D., Professor of Epidemiology, Yale School of
Medicine; George C. Fareed, M.D., Medical Director and Family
Medicine Specialist, Pioneers Medical Center; Ashish K. Jha,
M.D., M.P.H., Dean of the School of Public Health, Brown
University.
Congressional Oversight in the Face of Executive Branch and Media
Suppression: The Case Study of Crossfire Hurricane. December
3rd, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine misconduct by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI), Department of
Justice, and other Federal agencies; the executive branch's
responsiveness to congressional oversight of that misconduct;
and the media's coverage of that misconduct, with a particular
focus on the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation. The
witnesses offered any unique insight into those matters based
on their previous work.
Witnesses: Sharyl Attkisson, Investigative Journalist;
Kevin R. Brock, Former Assistant Director for Intelligence,
Federal Bureau of Investigation; Lee Smith, Investigative
Journalist & Author.
Early Outpatient Treatment: An Essential Part of a COVID-19
Solution, Part II. December 8, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to assess the state of the
COVID-19 pandemic and efforts to develop early therapeutic
treatments for COVID-19 patients for whom hospitalization is
not required. The witnesses discussed the research and
development of early outpatient medical treatments for COVID-
19, as well as the review and approval of such treatments by
the Food and Drug Administration under its Emergency Use
Authorization program. Witnesses shared lessons learned and
provided recommendations for how to provide more effective
outpatient treatment to COVID-19 patients.
Witnesses: Ramin Oskoui, M.D., Vice President of Medical
Staff, Sibley Memorial Hospital and Chief Executive Officer,
Foxhall Cardiology; Jean-Jacques Rajter, M.D., Pulmonologist,
Broward Health Medical Center; Pierre Kory, M.D., Associate
Professor of Medicine, St. Luke's Aurora Medical Center; Armand
Balboni, M.D., PH.D., Chief Executive Director, Appili
Therapeutics Inc.; Jane M. Orient, M.D., Executive Director,
Association of American Physicians and Surgeons; Jayanta
Bhattacharya, M.D., PH.D., Professor of Medicine, Stanford
University, and Senior Fellow Stanford Institute for Economic
Policy Research, Stanford University.
Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election. December 16, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine perceived
irregularities in the 2020 election. The witnesses shared their
insight on the 2020 Presidential Election, and its outcome.
Witnesses: Hon. Kenneth W. Starr, Testifying in Personal
Capacity; Hon. Donald Palmer, Commissioner, U.S. Election
Assistance Commission; James R. Troupis, Attorney, Troupis Law
Firm; Hon. Francis X. Ryan, State Representative, Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania; Jesse R. Binnall, Partner, Harvey & Binnall,
PLLC; Hon. Christopher C. Krebs, Former Director (2018-2020)
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.
V. REPORTS, PRINTS, AND GAO REPORTS
During the 116th Congress, the Committee prepared and
issued 103 reports and 2 Committee Prints on the following
topics. Reports issued by Subcommittees are listed in their
respective sections of this document.
COMMITTEE REPORTS
Activities of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and its Subcommittees for the One Hundred
Sixteenth Congress.
To authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to work
with Cybersecurity Consortia for training, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116-5, re. S. 333.
To increase access to agency guidance documents. S. 116-12,
re. S. 380.
To amend the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 to improve
the orderly transfer of the executive power during presidential
transitions. S. Rept. 116-13, re. S. 394.
To require each agency, in providing notice of a rule
making, to include a link to a 100 word plain language summary
of the proposed rule. S. Rept. 116 14, re. S. 395
To establish a Federal rotational cyber workforce program
for the Federal cyber workforce. S. Rept. 116-15, re. S. 406
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require the
Department of Homeland Security to develop an engagement
strategy with fusion centers, and for other purposes. S. Rept.
116-16, re. H.R. 504.
Activities of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs. Report of the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate and its
Subcommittees for the One Hundred and Fifteenth Congress. S.
Rept. 116-17.
To authorize Cyber Hunt and incident response teams at the
Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116-27, re. S. 315.
To require the Director of the Government Publishing Office
to establish and maintain a website accessible to the public
that allows the public to obtain electronic copies of all
congressionally mandated reports in one place, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116-31, re. S. 195.
To save taxpayer money and improve the efficiency and speed
of intragovernmental correspondence, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116-32, re. S. 196.
To prohibit Federal agencies and Federal contractors from
requesting that an applicant for employment disclose criminal
history record information before the applicant has received a
conditional offer, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-33, re.
S. 387.
To improve efforts to identify and reduce government-wide
improper payments, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-35, re.
S. 375.
To accompany S. Con. Res. 15. S. Rept. 116-43, re. S. Con.
Res. 15.
To require an exercise related to terrorist and foreign
fighter travel, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-44, re.
H.R. 1590.
To require the collection of voluntary feedback on services
provided by agencies, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-46,
re.
S. 1275.
To amend the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery
Improvement Act of 2012, including making changes to the Do Not
Pay Initiative, for improved detection, prevention, and
recovery of improper payments to deceased individuals, and for
other purposes. S. Rept. 116-49, re. S. 1333.
To require the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget to issue guidance on electronic consent forms, and for
other purposes. S. Rept. 116-50, re. H.R. 1079.
To amend the Act of August 25, 1958, commonly known as the
``Former Presidents Act of 1958,'' with respect to the monetary
allowance payable to a former President, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116-53, re. S. 580.
To amend Title 5, United States code, to improve the
effectiveness of major rules accomplishing their regulatory
objectives by promoting retrospective review, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116-55, re. S. 1420.
To amend Title 5, United States code, to prevent fraud by
representative payees. S. Rept. 116-56, re. S. 1430.
To amend Title 44, United States code, to modernize the
Federal Register, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-57, re.
H.R. 1654.
To establish a counterterrorism advisory board, and for
other purposes. S. Rept. 116-59, re. S. 411.
To amend Section 327 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to clarify that national
urban search and rescue response system task forces may include
Federal employees. S. Rept. 116-60, re. S. 1521.
To amend the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
of 2006 to incorporate the recommendations made by the
Government Accountability Office relating to advance contracts,
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-84, re. S. 979.
To prohibit contracting with persons that have business
operations with the Maduro regime and other purposes. S. Rept.
116-85, re. S. 1151.
To repeal the Multi-State Plan Program. S. Rept. 116-86,
re. S. 1378.
To manage supply chain risk through counterintelligence
training, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-87, re. S. 1388.
To require agencies to publish an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking for major rules. S. Rept. 116-88, re. S.
1419.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide
funding to secure nonprofit facilities from terrorist attacks,
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-89, re. S. 1539.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide for
engagements with state, local, tribal, and territorial
governments, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-90, re. S.
1846.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish in
the Department of Homeland Security an unmanned aircraft
systems coordinator, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-91,
re. S. 1867.
To require the disclosure of ownership of high-security
space leased to accommodate a Federal agency, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116-92, re. S. 1869.
To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to publish an
annual report on the use of deepfake technology, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116-93, re. S. 2065.
To increase the number of Customs and Border Protection
agriculture specialists and support staff in the Office of
Field Operations of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and for
other purposes. S. Rept. 116-94, re. S. 2107.
To require the Administrator of General Services to issue
guidance to clarify that Federal agencies may pay by charge
card for the charging of Federal electric motor vehicles, and
for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-95, re. S. 2193.
To modernize Federal grant reporting, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116-96, re. H.R. 150.
To require a Department of Homeland Security Overseas
Personnel Enhancement Plan, and for other purposes. S. Rept.
116-97, re. H.R. 2590.
To amend the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010 to
authorize certain polygraph waiver authority, and for other
purposes.
S. Rept. 116-99, re. S. 731.
To prohibit the use of reverse auctions for design and
construction services procurements, and for other purposes. S.
Rept
116-100, re. S. 1434.
To leverage Federal Government procurement power to
encourage increased cybersecurity for internet of things
devices, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-112, re. S. 734.
To require the Comptroller General of the United States to
analyze certain legislation in order to prevent duplication of
an overlap with existing Federal programs, and initiatives. S.
Rept. 116-113, re. S. 2183.
To amend Section 3116 of Title 5 United States Code, to
clarify the applicability of the appointment limitations for
students appointed under the expedited hiring authority for
post-secondary students. S. Rept. 116-129, re. S. 2169.
To amend Title 5, United States Code, to appropriately
limit the authority to award bonuses to Federal employees. S.
Rept.116-152, re. S. 2119.
To allow members of Congress to opt out of the Federal
Employees Retirement System, and allow members who opt out of
the Federal Employees Retirement System to continue to
participate in the Thrift Savings Plan. S. Rept. 116-153, re.
S. 439.
To provide taxpayers with an improved understanding of
government programs through the disclosure of cost,
performance, and areas of duplication among them, leverage
existing data to achieve a functional Federal program
inventory, and for other purposes.
S. Rept. 116-154, re. S. 2177.
To amend Title 40, United States Code, to require the
Administrator of General Services to procure the most life-
cycle cost effective and energy efficient lighting products and
to issue guidance on the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy
of those products, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-157,
re. S. 1874.
To establish procedures ad consequences in the event of a
failure to complete regular appropriations. S. Rept. 116-158,
re. S. 1877.
To provide for congressional approval of national emergency
declarations, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-159, re. S.
764.
To provide for joint reports by relevant Federal agencies
to Congress regarding incidents of terrorism, and for other
purposes.
S. Rept. 116-175, re. S. 2513.
To amend the Notification and Federal Employee
Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 to strengthen
Federal antidiscrimination laws enforced by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and expand accountability
within the Federal Government, and for other purposes. S. Rept.
116-176, re. H.R. 135.
To provide requirements for the .gov domain, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116-192, re. S. 2749.
To establish the Federal clearinghouse on school safety
best practices and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-193, re. S.
2779.
To direct the Administrator of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency to develop guidance for firefighters and
other emergency response personnel on best practices to protect
them from exposure to PFAS and to limit and prevent the release
of PFAS into the environment, and for other purposes. S. Rept.
116-211, re.
S. 2353.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to authorize the
Operation Stonegarden Grant Program, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116-212, re. S. 2750.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require an
annual report on the Office for State and Local Law
Enforcement.
S. Rept. 116-213, re. H.R. 495.
To require the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget to submit to Congress an annual report on projects that
are over budget and behind schedule, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116-220, re. S. 565.
To amend the Federal Funding Accountability and
Transparency Act of 2006, to require the budget justifications
and appropriation requests of agencies be made publicly
available. S. Rept. 116-221, re. S. 2560.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear intelligence
and information sharing functions of the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security and to
require dissemination of information analyzed by the Department
to entities with responsibilities relating to Homeland
Security, and for other purposes.
S. 116-222, re. H.R. 1589.
To authorize an Artificial Intelligence Center of
Excellence within the General Services Administration, and for
other purposes.
S. Rept. 116-225, re. S. 1363.
To eliminate or modify certain Federal agency reporting
requirements, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-226, re. S.
2769.
To require the Director of the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency to establish a cybersecurity
state coordinator in each state, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116-227, re. S. 3207.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish the
Intelligence Rotational Assignment Program in the Department of
Homeland Security, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-228,
re. H.R. 2066.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to protect U.S.
Customs and Border Protection officers, agents, and other
personnel, and canines against potential synthetic opioid
exposure, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-229, re. H.R.
4739.
To strengthen employee cost savings suggestions programs
within the Federal Government. S. Rept. 116-231, re. S. 2618.
To require a review of Department of Homeland Security
Trusted Traveler Programs, and for other purposes. S. Rept.
116-237, re. H.R. 3675.
To amend the Fast Act to improve the Federal permitting
process, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-241, re. S. 1976.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2012 to protect
United States critical infrastructure by ensuring that the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has the legal
tools it needs to notify private and public sector entities put
at risk by cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the networks and
systems that control critical assets of the United States. S.
Rept. 116-242, re. S. 3045.
To amend Title 5, United States code, to provide for the
halt in pension payments for members of Congress sentenced for
certain offenses and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-243, re.
S. 3332.
To ensure U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers,
agents, and other personnel have adequate synthetic opioid
detection equipment, that the Department of Homeland Security
has a process to update synthetic opioid detection capability,
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-244, re. H.R. 4761.
To amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act to allow the Administrator of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide capitalization
grants to states to establish revolving funds to provide hazard
mitigation assistance to reduce risks from disasters and
natural hazards, and other related environmental harm. S. Rept.
116-249, re. S. 3418.
To prohibit certain individuals from downloading or using
Tiktok on any device issued by the United States or a
government corporation. S. Rept. 116-250, re. S. 3455.
To increase the number of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Office of Field Operations officers and support
staff and to require reports that identify staffing,
infrastructure, and equipment needed to enhance security at
ports of entry. S. Rept. 116-264, re. S. 1004.
To establish in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security a
cybersecurity advisory committee. S. Rept. 116-265, re. S.
4024.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to expand the
authority of the National Infrastructure Simulation and
Analysis Center, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-266, re.
S. 4157.
To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a
plan to increase to 100 percent the rates of scanning of
commercial and passenger vehicles entering the United States at
land ports of entry along the border using large-scale non-
intrusive inspection systems to enhance border security, and
for other purposes.
S. Rept. 116-267, re. H.R. 5273.
To ban the Federal procurement of certain drones and other
unmanned aircraft systems, and for other purposes. S. Rept.
116-268, re. S. 2502.
To amend Title 5, United States code, to make permanent the
authority of the United States Patent and Trademark Office to
conduct a Telework Travel Expenses Program. S. Rept. 116-276,
re. S. 4138.
To establish a program to facilitate the adoption of modern
technology by executive agencies, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116-277, re. S. 4200.
To modify the government wide Financial Management Plan,
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-278, S. 3287.
To establish an interagency task force to analyze
preparedness for national pandemics, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116-279, re. S. 4204.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to make certain
improvements in the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
of the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes.
S. Rept. 116-280, re. H.R. 4713.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish
National Urban Security Technology, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116-285, re. H.R. 542.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish a
Homeland Intelligence Doctrine for the Department of Homeland
Security, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-286, re. H.R.
2589.
To amend he Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish a
mentor-protege program, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-
287, re. H.R. 4727.
To require a guidance clarity statement on certain agency
guidance, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-297, re. S.
3412.
To amend Chapter 8 of Title 5 United States code, to
require Federal agencies to submit to the Comptroller General
of the United States a report on rules that are revoked,
suspended, replaced, amended, or otherwise made ineffective. S.
Rept. 116-298, re. S. 4222.
To amend Title 5, United States code, to require the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management to establish and
maintain a public directory of the individuals occupying
government policy and supporting positions, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116-302, re. S. 3896.
To modernize the Real ID Act of 2005, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116-303, re. S. 4133.
To amend Chapter 8 of Title 5, United States code, to
provide that major rules of the executive branch shall have no
force or effect unless a joint resolution of approval is
enacted into law.
S. Rept. 116-311, re. S. 92.
To require the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection to annually hire at least 600 new Border Patrol
agents, to report quarterly to Congress on the status of the
Border Patrol workforce, and to conduct a comprehensive
staffing analysis. S. Rept. 116-312, re. S. 2162.
To prohibit agencies from using Federal funds for publicity
or propaganda purposes, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-
313, re. S. 2722.
To establish the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
of the United States to facilitate the fullest cooperation,
coordination, and mutual accountability among all levels of
government, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-314, re. S.
2967.
To promote innovative acquisition techniques and
procurement strategies, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-
315, re. S. 3038.
To establish an Office of Equal Rights and Community
Inclusion at the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and for
other purposes. S. Rept. 116-316, re. S. 3658.
To strengthen the security and integrity of the United
States scientific and research enterprise. S. Rept. 116-317,
re. S. 3997.
To require the Federal Emergency Management Agency to
evaluate the national response framework based on lessons
learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116-318, re. S. 4153.
To examine the extent of the reliance of the United States
on foreign producers for personal protective equipment during
the COVID-19 pandemic and produce recommendations to secure the
supply chain of personal protective equipment. S. Rept. 116-
319, re. S. 4158.
To repeal Section 692 of the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2020. S. Rept. 116-320, re. S. 4165.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to authorize the
transfer of certain equipment during a public health emergency,
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-321, re. S. 4210.
To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to assess
technology needs along the southern border and develop a
strategy for bridging such gaps. S. Rept. 116-322, re. S. 4224.
To amend the implementing recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 to clarify certain allowable uses of
funds for public transportation security assistance grants and
establish periods of performance for such grants, and other
purposes. S. Rept. 116-323, re. H.R. 1313.
To waive the imposition of a civil fine for certain first-
time paperwork violations by small business concerns. S. Rept.
116-326, re. S. 2757.
To amend the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, to
provide for regulatory impact analyses for certain rules, and
for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-333, re. S. 4077.
COMMITTEE PRINTS
The Committee issued the following Committee Prints during
the 116th Congress:
Rules of Procedure. Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs. (Printed. 40 pp. S. Prt. 116-10)
Rules of Procedure. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
(Printed. 23 pp. S. Prt. 116-11)
GAO REPORTS
Also during the 116th Congress, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) issued 205 reports at the request
of the Committee. GAO reports requested by the Subcommittees
appear in their respective sections. Reports are listed here by
title, GAO number, and release date.
Federal Protective Service: DHS Should Take Additional
Steps To Evaluate Organizational Placement. GAO-19-122. January
8, 2019.
Aviation Security: TSA Improved Covert Testing But Needs To
Conduct More Risk-Informed Tests And Address Vulnerabilities.
GAO-19-154C. January 10, 2019.
Improper Payments: Selected Agencies Need Improvements In
Their Assessments To Better Determine And Document Risk
Susceptibility. GAO-19-112. January 10, 2019.
K-12 Education: Challenges To Assessing Program Performance
And Recent Efforts To Address Them. GAO-19-266R. January 31,
2019.
U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Status Of FEMA Public
Assistance Funding And Implementation. GAO-19-253. February 25,
2019.
Department Of Energy: Performance Evaluations Could Better
Assess Management And Operating Contractor Costs. GAO-19-5.
February 26, 2019.
Oral Presentation On Electromagnetic Events. February 27,
2019. High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed To Achieve
Greater Progress On High-Risk Areas. GAO-19-393T. March 6,
2019.
Department Of Energy Contracting: Actions Needed To
Strengthen Subcontract Oversight. GAO-19-107. March 12, 2019.
Foot-And-Mouth Disease: USDA's Efforts To Prepare For A
Potential Outbreak Could Be Strengthened. GAO-19-103. March 12,
2019.
Cybersecurity Workforce: Agencies Need To Accurately
Categorize Positions To Effectively Identify Critical Staffing
Needs. GAO-19-144. March 12, 2019.
Federal Ethics Programs: Government-Wide Political
Appointee Data And Some Ethics Oversight Procedures At Interior
And SBA Could Be Improved. GAO-19-249. March 14, 2019.
Grants Management: Agency Action Required To Ensure
Grantees Identify Federal Contribution Amounts. GAO-19-282.
March 14, 2019.
U.S. Ports Of Entry: Update On CBP Public-Private
Partnership Programs. GAO-19-263R. March 14, 2019.
Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status Of FEMA Funding, Oversight,
And Recovery Challenges. GAO-19-256. March 14, 2019.
Huracanes De Puerto Rico: Estado De Financiamiento De Fema,
Supervision Y Desafios De Recuperacion (Spanish Highlights).
GAO-19-331. March 14, 2019.
Border Security: DHS Should Improve The Quality Of Unlawful
Border Entry Information And Other Metric Reporting.
GAO-19-305. March 21, 2019
Data Act: OMB Needs To Formalize Data Governance For
Reporting Federal Spending. GAO-19-284. March 22, 2019.
Disaster Recovery: Better Monitoring Of Block Grant Funds
Is Needed. GAO-19-232. March 25, 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls.
GAO-19-301RSU. March 26, 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls. GAO-19-302R.
March 26, 2019.
Management Report: Areas For Improvement In The Federal
Reserve Banks' Information System Controls. GAO-19-303RSU.
March 26, 2019.
Management Report: Areas For Improvement In The Federal
Reserve Banks' Information System Controls. GAO-19-304R. March
26, 2019.
Federal Workforce: Key Talent Management Strategies For
Agencies To Better Meet Their Missions. GAO-19-181. March 28,
2019.
Northern Border Security: CBP Identified Resource
Challenges But Needs Performance Measures To Assess Security
Between Ports Of Entry. GAO-19-194SU. March 28, 2019.
Department Of Defense Consolidated Financial Statements FY
2018 Audit Oversight. March 28, 2019.
Financial Audit: Fiscal Years 2018 And 2017 Consolidated
Financial Statements Of The U.S. Government. GAO-19-294R. March
28, 2019.
Financial Audit: Processes Used To Prepare The U.S.
Government's FY 2018 Financial Statements. March 28, 2019.
Financial Audit: 2018 Statement Of Long-Term Fiscal
Projections Audit. March 28, 2019.
Financial Audit: Fiscal Year 2018 Statements Of Social
Insurance For The Consolidated Financial Statements Audit.
March 28, 2019.
2018 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations On Lobbyists'
Compliance With Disclosure Requirements. GAO-19-357. March 29,
2019.
Aviation Security: TSA Improved Covert Testing But Needs To
Conduct More Risk-Informed Tests And Address Vulnerabilities.
GAO-19-374. April 4, 2019.
Data Center Optimization: Additional Agency Actions Needed
To Meet OMB Goals. GAO-19-241. April 11, 2019.
2017 Hurricane Season: Federal Support For Electricity Grid
Restoration In The U.S. Virgin Islands And Puerto Rico.
GAO-19-296. April 18, 2019.
2017 Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed To Improve The
Use Of Post-Disaster Contracts To Support Response And
Recovery. GAO-19-281. April 24, 2019.
Data Act: Pilot Effectively Tested Approaches For Reducing
Reporting Burden For Grants But Not For Contracts. GAO-19-299.
April 30, 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The
Internal Revenue Service's Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting. GAO-19-412R. May 9, 2019.
Combating Nuclear Terrorism: DHS Should Address Limitations
To Its Program To Secure Key Cities. GAO-19-327. May 13, 2019.
Disaster Assistance: FEMA Action Needed To Better Support
Individuals Who Are Older Or Have Disabilities. GAO-19-318. May
14, 2019.
Financial Audit: Bureau Of The Fiscal Service's Fiscal Year
2018 Schedules Of The General Fund. GAO-19-185. May 15, 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls Related To The
Schedules Of The General Fund. GAO-19-463RSU. May 15, 2019.
2019 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities To Reduce
Fragmentation, Overlap, And Duplication And Achieve Billions In
Financial Benefits. GAO-19-285SP. May 21, 2019.
Congressional Award Foundation: Review Of The Audit Of The
Financial Statements For Fiscal Year 2018. GAO-19-472R. May 21,
2019.
U. S. Secret Service: Further Actions Needed To Fully
Address Protective Mission Panel Recommendations. GAO-19-415.
May 22, 2019.
Federal Real Property: GSA Needs To Strengthen Oversight Of
Its Delegated Leasing Program. GAO-19-405. June 3, 2019.
Oral Presentation On Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards Program. June 4, 2019.
Land Ports Of Entry: CBP Should Update Policies And Enhance
Analysis Of Inspections. GAO-19-400SU. June 13, 2019.
Committee On Foreign Investment In The United States:
Selected Transactions Involving Real Estate May Share Certain
National Security Risks, But Dispositions Can Vary Due To Case-
Specific Factors. GAO-19-417C. June 14, 2019.
Northern Border Security: CBP Identified Resource
Challenges But Needs Performance Measures To Assess Security
Between Ports Of Entry. GAO-19-470. June 26, 2019.
2017 Disaster Relief Oversight: Strategy Needed To Ensure
Agencies' Internal Control Plans Provide Sufficient
Information. GAO-19-479. June 28, 2019.
2020 Census: Actions Needed To Address Key Risks To A
Successful Enumeration. GAO-19-588T. July 16, 2019.
Data Act: Customer Agencies' Experiences Working With
Shared Service Providers For Data Submissions. GAO-19-537. July
18, 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The
Internal Revenue Service's Information System Security
Controls. GAO-19-473RSU. July 18, 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The
Internal Revenue Service's Information System Security
Controls. GAO-19-474R. July 18, 2019.
Cybersecurity: Agencies Need To Fully Establish Risk
Management Programs And Address Challenges. GAO-19-384. July
25, 2019.
Federal Vehicle Fleets: Agencies Have Continued To
Incorporate Alternative Fuel Vehicles Into Fleets, But
Challenges Remain. GAO-19-397. July 26, 2019.
Federal Information Security: Agencies And OMB Need To
Strengthen Policies And Practices. GAO-19-545. July 26, 2019.
Land Ports Of Entry: CBP Should Update Policies And Enhance
Analysis Of Inspections. GAO-19-658. August 6, 2019.
Substantial Progress In Federal Financial Management Has
Been Made; Significant Challenges Remain. August 15 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In Controls Over The
Processes Used To Prepare The U.S. Consolidated Financial
Statements. GAO-19-624. September 4, 2019.
U.S. Assistance To Mexico: State And USAID Allocated Over
$700 Million To Support Criminal Justice, Border Security, And
Related Efforts From Fiscal Year 2014 Through 2018.
GAO-19-647. September 10, 2019.
Disaster Response: Federal Assistance And Selected States
And Territory Efforts To Identify Deaths From 2017 Hurricanes.
GAO-19-486. September 13, 2019.
Disaster Response: FEMA And The American Red Cross Need To
Ensure Key Mass Care Organizations Are Included In Coordination
And Planning. GAO-19-526. September 19, 2019.
Respuesta A Desastres: Fema Y La Cruz Roja Americana
Necesitan Asegurar Que Las Organizaciones Claves Del Cuidado En
Masa Sean Incluidas En La Coordinacion Y El Planeamiento. GAO-
19-708. September 19, 2019.
Disaster Response: HHS Should Address Deficiencies
Highlighted By Recent Hurricanes In The U.S. Virgin Islands And
Puerto Rico. GAO-19-592. September 20, 2019.
U.S. Secret Service: Investigative Operations Confer
Benefits, But Additional Actions Are Needed To Prioritize
Resources.
GAO-19-560SU. September 26, 2019.
Federal Contracting: Information On Federal Agencies' Use
Of The Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Process. GAO-19-691.
September 26, 2019.
International Aviation Security: TSA Should Improve
Industry Coordination And Its Security Directive And Emergency
Amendment Review Process. GAO-20-7. October 3, 2019.
Puerto Rico Electricity Grid Recovery: Better Information
And Enhanced Coordination Is Needed To Address Challenges.
GAO-20-14. October 8, 2019.
Recuperacion De La Red Electrica En Puerto Rico: Se
Necesita Mejor Informacion Y Coordinacion Para Enfrentar
Desafios.
GAO-20-143. October 8, 2019.
Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take Additional Actions To
Address Unique Response And Recovery Challenges. GAO-20-5.
October 9, 2019.
Highway Emergency Relief: Federal Highway Administration
Should Enhance Accountability Over Project Decisions.
GAO-20-32. October 17, 2019.
2020 Census: Status Update On Early Operations.
GAO-20-111R. October 31, 2019.
Government Watchlists. GAO-20-247C. November 7, 2019.
Agreed-Upon Procedures: FY 2019 Excise Tax Distributions To
The Airport And Airway And Highway Trust Funds.
GAO-20-138R. November 7, 2019.
Financial Audit: Bureau Of The Fiscal Service's FY 2019 And
FY 2018 Schedules Of Federal Debt. GAO-20-117. November 8,
2019.
Financial Audit: IRS's FY 2019 And FY 2018 Financial
Statements. GAO-20-159. November 8, 2019.
Data Act: Quality Of Data Submissions Has Improved But
Further Action Is Needed To Disclose Known Data Limitations.
GAO-20-75. November 8, 2019.
Emergency Transportation Relief: Federal Transit
Administration And Fema Took Actions To Coordinate, But Steps
Are Needed To Address Risk Of Duplicate Funding. GAO-20-85.
November 13, 2019.
Financial Audit: Securities And Exchange Commission's FY
2019 And FY 2018 Financial Statements. GAO-20-204R. November
15, 2019.
U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions Could
Strengthen FEMA's Key Disaster Recovery Efforts. GAO-20-54.
November 19, 2019.
Transportation Security: DHS Should Communicate The
National Strategy's Alignment With Related Strategies To Guide
Federal Efforts. GAO-20-88. November 19, 2019.
Surface Transportation: TSA Should Improve Coordination
Procedures For Its Security Training Program. GAO-20-185.
November 20, 2019.
Aviation Security: TSA Coordinates With Stakeholders On
Changes To Screening Rules But Could Clarify Its Review
Processes And Better Measure Effectiveness. GAO-20-72. November
20, 2019.
Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces'
Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency And Reduce Potential
Overlap Or Gaps In Capabilities. GAO-20-33. November 21, 2019.
Aviation Security: TSA Should Ensure Screening Technologies
Continue To Meet Detection Requirements After Deployment. GAO-
20-56. December 5, 2019.
Cloud Computing Security: Agencies Increased Their Use Of
The Federal Authorization Program, But Improved Oversight And
Implementation Are Needed. GAO-20-126. December 12, 2019.
Technology Modernization Fund: OMB And GSA Need To Improve
Fee Collection And Clarify Cost Estimating Guidance For Awarded
Projects. GAO-20-3. December 12, 2019.
Improving Program Management: Key Actions Taken, But
Further Efforts Needed To Strengthen Standards, Expand Reviews,
And Address High-Risk Areas. GAO-20-44. December 13, 2019.
U.S. Postal Service: Offering Nonpostal Services Through
Its Delivery Network Would Likely Present Benefits And
Limitations. GAO-20-190. December 17, 2019.
Drug Control: The Office Of National Drug Control Policy
Should Develop Key Planning Elements To Meet Statutory
Requirements. GAO-20-124. December 18, 2019.
International Mail: Progress Made In Using Electronic Data
To Detect Illegal Opioid Shipments, But Additional Steps
Remain. GAO-20-231RSU. December 18, 2019.
International Mail: Progress Made In Using Electronic Data
To Detect Illegal Opioid Shipments, But Additional Steps
Remain. GAO-20-229R. December 18, 2019.
Wildland Fire: Federal Agencies' Efforts To Reduce Wildland
Fuels And Lower Risk To Communities And Ecosystems.
GAO-20-52. December 19, 2019.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: Outcomes Have Improved But
Actions Needed To Enhance Oversight Of Schedule Goals.
GAO-20-170SP. December 19, 2019.
Federal Property: GSA Guidance Needed To Help Agencies
Identify Unneeded Property In Warehouses. GAO-20-228. December
20, 2019.
2020 Census: Changes Planned To Improve Data Quality.
GAO-20-282. December 20, 2019.
U.S. Postal Service: Additional Guidance Needed To Assess
Effect Of Changes To Employee Compensation. GAO-20-140. January
17, 2020.
U.S. Secret Service: Investigative Operations Confer
Benefits, But Additional Actions Are Needed To Prioritize
Resources.
GAO-20-239. January 22, 2020.
State Department: Additional Steps Are Needed To Identify
Potential Barriers To Diversity. GAO-20-237. January 27, 2020.
U.S. Ports Of Entry: Update On CBP Public-Private
Partnership Programs. GAO-20-255R. January 30, 2020.
DOD Financial Management: Impact Of Financial Audit
Deficiencies On DOD's Mission Critical Assets. February 4,
2020.
Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery: FEMA Actions Needed To
Strengthen Project Cost Estimation And Awareness Of Program
Guidance. GAO-20-221. February 5, 2020.
Briefing On Civilian Agency Suggestions For Changes In
Statutes To Reduce Facility Energy Costs And Use. February 5,
2020.
Recuperacion De Desastres En Puerto Rico: Acciones De Fema
Son Necesarias Para Fortalecer La Calculacion De Costos De
Proyectos Y El Conocimiento De Las Directrices Del Programa.
GAO-20-381. February 5, 2020.
Emergency Alerting: Agencies Need To Address Pending
Applications And Monitor Industry Progress On System
Improvements. GAO-20-294. February 6, 2020.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Has Taken
Steps To Address Workforce Issues, But Additional Actions
Needed. GAO-20-125. February 12, 2020.
2020 Census: Initial Enumeration Underway But Readiness For
Upcoming Operations Is Mixed. GAO-20-368R. February 12, 2020.
Aviation Security: TSA Updated Screener Training To Address
Risks, But Should Enhance Processes To Monitor Compliance. GAO-
20-219. February 13, 2020.
Southwest Border: Actions Needed To Improve DHS Processing
Of Families And Coordination Between DHS And HHS. GAO-20-245.
February 19, 2020.
National Biodefense Strategy: Additional Efforts Would
Enhance Likelihood Of Effective Implementation. GAO-20-273.
February 19, 2020.
Immigration: Actions Needed To Strengthen USCIS's Oversight
And Data Quality Of Credible And Reasonable Fear Screenings.
GAO-20-250. February 19, 2020.
Southwest Border: Actions Needed To Address Fragmentation
In DHS's Processes For Apprehended Family Members. GAO-20-274.
February 19, 2020.
Preliminary Observations On DHS CFATS And ATF Similarities
And Differences. February 24, 2020.
Department Of Defense FY 2019 Audit Summary Memo. February
27, 2020.
International Mail: Stakeholders' Views On Possible Changes
To Inbound Mail Regarding Customs Fees And Opioid Detection
Efforts. GAO-20-340R. February 27, 2020.
Financial Audit: FY 2019 Statements Of Social Insurance For
The Consolidated Financial Statements Audit. February 27, 2020.
Financial Audit: FY 2019 Statement Of Long-Term Fiscal
Projections Audit. February 27, 2020.
Financial Audit: FY 2019 And FY 2018 Consolidated Financial
Statements Of The U.S. Government. GAO-20-315R. February 27,
2020.
Financial Audit: Processes Used To Prepare The U.S.
Government's FY 2019 Financial Statements. February 27 2020.
Data Center Optimization: Agencies Report Progress, But
Oversight And Cybersecurity Risks Need To Be Addressed.
GAO-20-279. March 5, 2020.
U.S. Postal Service: Expanding Non-postal Products And
Services At Retail Facilities Could Result In Benefits But May
Have Limited Viability. GAO-20-354. March 10, 2020.
2020 Census: Bureau Generally Followed Its Plan For In-
Field Address Canvassing. GAO-20-415. March 12, 2020.
2019 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations On Lobbyists'
Compliance With Disclosure Requirements. GAO-20-449. March 31,
2020.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls Related To The
Schedules Of The General Fund. GAO-20-398rsu. March 31, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls Related To The
Schedules Of The General Fund. GAO-20-399r. March 31, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls Related To The
Schedule Of Federal Debt. GAO-20-375rsu. March 31, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls Related To The
Schedule Of Federal Debt. GAO-20-376r. March 31, 2020.
Payment Integrity: Selected Agencies Should Improve Efforts
To Evaluate Effectiveness Of Corrective Actions To Reduce
Improper Payments. GAO-20-336. April 1, 2020.
Passenger Rail Security: TSA Engages With Stakeholders But
Could Better Identify And Share Standards And Key Practices.
GAO-20-404. April 3, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The
Internal Revenue Service's Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting. GAO-20-480r. May 1, 2020.
FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed To Address
Deployment And Staff Development Challenges. GAO-20-360. May 4,
2020.
National Preparedness: Additional Actions Needed To Address
Gaps In The Nation's Emergency Management Capabilities.
GAO-20-297. May 4, 2020.
National Flood Insurance Program: FEMA Can Improve
Community Oversight And Data Sharing. GAO-20-396. May 5, 2020.
U.S. Postal Service: Congressional Action Is Essential To
Enable A Sustainable Business Model. GAO-20-385. May 7, 2020.
DHS Service Contracts: Increased Oversight Needed To Reduce
The Risk Associated With Contractors Performing Certain
Functions. GAO-20-417, May 7, 2020.
U.S. Assistance To Mexico: State Department Could Improve
Its Monitoring Of Merida Initiative Projects. GAO-20-388. May
12, 2020.
2020 Census: Update On The Census Bureau's Implementation
Of Partnership And Outreach Activities. GAO-20-496. May 13,
2020.
Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The
Internal Revenue Service's Information System Security
Controls. GAO-20-410RSU. May 13, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The
Internal Revenue Service's Information System Security
Controls. GAO-20-411R. May 13, 2020.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Actions Needed To
Enhance DHS Oversight Of Cybersecurity At High-Risk Chemical
Facilities. GAO-20-453. May 14, 2020.
2020 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities To Reduce
Fragmentation, Overlap, And Duplication And Achieve Billions In
Financial Benefits. GAO-20-440SP. May 19, 2020.
Congressional Award Foundation: Review Of The Audit Of The
Financial Statements For Fiscal Year 2019. GAO-20-539R. May 21,
2020.
Cybersecurity: Selected Federal Agencies Need To Coordinate
On Requirements And Assessments Of States. GAO-20-123. May 27,
2020.
Department Of Homeland Security: Assessment Of Air And
Marine Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs
Across All DHS Marine Operations. GAO-20-420SU. May 27, 2020.
Whistleblowers: Office Of Special Counsel Should Require
Information On The Probationary Status Of Whistleblowers. GAO-
20-436. May 28, 2020.
2020 Census: COVID-19 Presents Delays And Risks To Census
Count. GAO-20-551R. June 9, 2020.
June 2020--2020 Census Briefing. June 10, 2020.
Air Force: Enhanced Enterprise Risk Management And Internal
Control Assessments Could Improve Accountability Over Mission-
Critical Assets. GAO-20-332. June 18, 2020.
USAID: Mixed Progress In Increasing Diversity, And Actions
Needed To Consistently Meet EEO Requirements. GAO-20-477. June
23, 2020.
COVID-19: Opportunities To Improve Federal Response And
Recovery Efforts. GAO-20-625. June 25, 2020.
COVID-19: Opportunities To Improve Federal Response And
Recovery Efforts. GAO-20-659T. June 26, 2020.
DATA ACT: OIGs Reported That Quality Of Agency-Submitted
Data Varied, And Most Recommended Improvements. GAO-20-540.
July 9, 2020
National Bio And Agro-Defense Facility: DHS And USDA Are
Working To Transfer Ownership And Prepare For Operations, But
Critical Steps Remain. GAO-20-331. July 10, 2020.
Medicaid: Primer On Financing Arrangements. GAO-20-571R.
July 14, 2020.
Surface Transportation Security: TSA Has Taken Steps To
Improve Its Surface Inspector Program, But Lacks Performance
Targets. GAO-20-558. July 27, 2020.
COVID-19 Contracting: Observations On Federal Contracting
In Response To The Pandemic. GAO-20-632. July 29, 2020.
COVID-19: Data Quality And Considerations For Modeling And
Analysis. GAO-20-635SP. July 30, 2020.
Federal Financial Management: Substantial Progress Made
Since Enactment Of The 1990 CFO Act; Refinements Would Yield
Added Benefits. GAO-20-566. August 6, 2020.
Cybersecurity: DHS And Selected Agencies Need To Address
Shortcomings In Implementation Of Network Monitoring Program.
GAO-20-598. August 18, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In Controls Over The
Processes Used To Prepare The U.S. Consolidated Financial
Statements. GAO-20-586. August 25, 2020.
2020 Census: Recent Decision To Compress Census Timeframes
Poses Additional Risks To An Accurate Count. GAO-20-671R.
August 27, 2020.
Time And Attendance: Agencies Generally Compiled Data On
Misconduct, And Reported Using Various Internal Controls For
Monitoring. GAO-20-640. August 31, 2020.
COVID-19: Brief Update On Initial Federal Response To The
Pandemic. GAO-20-708. August 31, 2020.
Facial Recognition: CBP And TSA Are Taking Steps To
Implement Programs, But CBP Should Address Privacy And System
Performance Issues. GAO-20-568. September 2, 2020.
COVID-19 Contracting: Observations On Contractor Paid Leave
Reimbursement Guidance And Use. GAO-20-662. September 3, 2020.
VA Police: Actions Needed To Improve Data Completeness And
Accuracy On Use Of Force Incidents At Medical Centers. GAO-20-
599. September 8, 2020.
Defense Real Property: DOD-Wide Strategy Needed To Address
Control Issues And Improve Reliability Of Records. GAO-20-615.
September 9, 2020.
Natural Disasters: Economic Effects Of Hurricanes Katrina,
Sandy, Harvey, And Irma. GAO-20-633r. September 10, 2020.
Senior Executive Service: Opportunities For Selected
Agencies To Improve Their Career Reassignment Processes. GAO-
20-559. September 16, 2020.
Agriculture Spending: Opportunities Exist For USDA To
Identify Successes And Challenges Of The Farmers To Families
Food Box Program To Inform Future Efforts. GAO-20-711r.
September 16, 2020.
Critical Infrastructure Prioritization During COVID-19.
September 17, 2020.
COVID-19: Federal Efforts Could Be Strengthened By Timely
And Concerted Actions. GAO-20-701. September 21, 2020.
Cybersecurity: Clarity Of Leadership Urgently Needed To
Fully Implement The National Strategy. GAO-20-629. September
22, 2020.
Department Of Homeland Security: Assessment Of Air And
Marine Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs
Across All DHS Marine Operations. GAO-20-663. September 24,
2020.
Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take Additional Actions To
Strengthen Fraud Risk Management For Public Assistance
Emergency Work Grants. GAO-20-604. September 29, 2020.
Disaster Assistance: Additional Actions Needed To
Strengthen FEMA'S Individuals And Households Program. GAO-20-
503. September 30, 2020.
Supplemental Material For GAO-20-503: FEMA Individuals And
Households Program Applicant Data 2016-2018. GAO-20-675sp.
September 30, 2020.
Supplemental Material For GAO-20-503: Select Disaster
Profiles For FEMA's Individuals And Households Program 2016-
2018. GAO-20-674sp. September 30, 2020.
Open Data: Agencies Need Guidance To Establish
Comprehensive Data Inventories; Information On Their Progress
Is Limited. GAO-21-29. October 8, 2020.
DOD Financial Management: Continued Efforts Needed To
Correct Material Weaknesses Identified In Financial Statement
Audits. GAO-21-157. October 13, 2020.
Information And Communications Technology: Federal Agencies
Need To Take Urgent Action To Manage Supply Chain Risks (Louo).
GAO-21-164su. October 27, 2020.
Ongoing Cybersecurity Risks To The 2020 Census (No Slides).
October 29, 2020.
TSA Acquisitions: TSA Needs To Establish Metrics And
Evaluate Third Party Testing Outcomes For Screening
Technologies. GAO-21-50. October 29, 2020.
FY 2020 Excise Tax: Agreed-Upon Procedures Related To
Distributions To Trust Funds. GAO-21-163R. November 6, 2020.
Financial Audit: Bureau Of The Fiscal Service's FY 2020 And
FY 2019 Schedules Of Federal Debt. GAO-21-124. November 9,
2020.
Financial Audit: IRS's FY 2020 And FY 2019 Financial
Statements. GAO-21-162. November 10, 2020.
Financial Audit: Securities And Exchange Commission's FY
2020 And FY6 2019 Financial Statements. GAO-21-192R. November
16, 2020.
U.S. Assistance To Mexico: State And USAID Should
Strengthen Risk Management For Programs Under The Merida
Initiative. GAO-21-112SU. November 17, 2020.
Puerto Rico Electricity: FEMA And HUD Have Not Approved
Long-Term Projects And Need To Implement Recommendations To
Address Uncertainties And Enhance Resilience. GAO-21-54.
November 17, 2020.
COVID-19: Federal Efforts Accelerate Vaccine And
Therapeutic Development, But More Transparency Needed On
Emergency Use Authorizations. GAO-21-207. November 17, 2020.
Distance Learning: Challenges Providing Services To K-12
English Learners And Students With Disabilities During COVID-
19. GAO-21-43. November 19, 2020.
Defense Production Act: Opportunities Exist To Increase
Transparency And Identify Future Actions To Mitigate Medical
Supply Chain Issues. GAO-21-108. November 19, 2020.
Disaster Response: Agencies Should Assess Contracting
Workforce Needs And Purchase Card Fraud Risk. GAO-21-42.
November 24, 2020.
Federal Buying Power: OMB Can Further Advance Category
Management Initiative By Focusing On Requirements, Data, And
Training. GAO-21-40. November 30, 2020.
COVID-19: Urgent Actions Needed To Better Ensure An
Effective Federal Response. GAO-21-191. November 30, 2020.
Medicaid: CMS Needs More Information On States' Financing
And Payment Arrangements To Improve Oversight. GAO-21-98.
December 7, 2020.
2020 Census: The Bureau Concluded Field Work But
Uncertainty About Data Quality, Accuracy, And Protection
Remains. GAO-21-206R. December 9, 2020.
Financial Assistance: Lessons Learned From Cares Act Loan
Program For Aviation And Other Eligible Businesses. GAO-21-198.
December 10, 2020.
Ongoing Monitoring Of It Systems Implementation For The
2020 Census (No Slides). December 14, 2020.
Disaster Housing: Improved Cost Data And Guidance Would Aid
FEMA Activation Decisions. GAO-21-116. December 15, 2020.
Information Technology: Federal Agencies Need To Take
Urgent Action To Manage Supply Chain Risks (Public). GAO-21-
171. December 15, 2020.
Data Governance: Agencies Made Progress In Establishing
Governance, But Need To Address Key Milestones. GAO-21-152.
December 16, 2020.
Rural Hospital Closures: Affected Residents Had Reduced
Access To Health Care Services. GAO-21-93. December 22, 2020.
VI. OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS
During the 116th Congress, 774 official communications were
referred to the Committee. Of these, 760 were Executive
Communications, and 14 were Petitions or Memorials. Of the
official communications, 316 dealt with the District of
Columbia.
VII. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS
During the 116th Congress, the Committee reported
significant legislation that was approved by Congress and
signed by the President.
The following are brief legislative histories of measures
to the Committee and, in some cases, drafted by the Committee,
which (1) became public law or (2) were favorable reported from
the Committee and passed by the Senate, but did not become law.
In addition to the measures listed below, the Committee
received during the 116th Congress numerous legislative
proposals that were not considered or reported, or that were
reported but not passed by the Senate. Additional information
on these measures appears in the Committee's Legislative
Calendar for the 116th Congress.
A. MEASURES ENACTED INTO LAW
The following measures considered by the Committee were
enacted into Public Law. The descriptions following the signing
date of each measure note selected provisions of the text, and
are not intended to serve as section-by-section summaries.
H.R. 639.--To amend section 327 of the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to clarify that
National Urban Search and Rescue Response System task forces
may include Federal employees. (Public Law 116-48). August 22,
2019.
This bill amends the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act to specify that National Urban Search
and Rescue Response System task forces may include Federal
employees.
H.R.1079.--Creating Advanced Streamlined Electronic
Services for Constituents Act of 2019. (Public Law 116-50).
August 22, 2019.
This bill directs the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
to require each Federal agency to accept electronic identity
proofing and authentication processes that allow an individual,
under the Privacy Act, to access the individual's records or to
provide prior written consent for the disclosure of the
individual's records. The OMB must (1) create a template for
electronic consent and access forms, and (2) require each
agency to accept such forms from any individual properly
identity proofed and authenticated.
H.R.1590.--Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Exercise
Act of 2019. (Public Law 116-64). October 9, 2019.
This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security to
develop and conduct an exercise related to the detection and
prevention of terrorist and foreign fighter travel. The bill
requires the national exercise program (a program to test and
evaluate the national preparedness goal, National Incident
Management System, National Response Plan, and other related
plans and strategies) to include emerging threats.
H.R.150.--Grant Reporting Efficiency and Agreements
Transparency Act of 2019. (Public Law 116-103). December 30
2019.
This bill requires the establishment and use of data
standards for information reported by recipients of Federal
grants. The bill requires the Office of Management and Budget,
jointly with the executive department that issues the most
Federal grant awards, to (1) establish government-wide data
standards for information reported by grant recipients, (2)
issue guidance directing Federal agencies to apply those
standards, and (3) require the publication of recipient-
reported data collected from all agencies on a single public
website. Each agency shall ensure its awards use the data
standards for future information collection requests.
H.R.2476.--Securing American Nonprofit Organizations
Against Terrorism Act of 2019. (Public Law 116-108). January
24, 2020.
This bill establishes in the Department of Homeland
Security a Nonprofit Security Grant Program, under which the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shall make grants to
eligible nonprofit organizations (tax-exempt organizations and
those determined to be at risk of a terrorist attack) for
target hardening and other security enhancements to protect
against terrorist attacks.
H.R.504.--DHS Field Engagement Accountability Act. (Public
Law 116-116). March 2, 2020.
This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to develop and update at least once every five years a
strategy for DHS engagement with fusion centers. The term
``fusion center'' means a collaborative effort of two or more
government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or
information to maximize the ability of such agencies to detect,
prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or
terrorist activity. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of
DHS shall provide personnel and support to fusion centers,
publish performance metrics for DHS field personnel assigned to
fusion centers, and develop and implement training for fusion
center personnel. DHS intelligence and information components
shall develop policies and metrics to ensure effective use of
the unclassified Homeland Security Information Sharing Network
and shall assess and implement enhancements to improve such
network.
S.375.--Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019. (Public
Law 116-117). March 2, 2020.
This bill reorganizes and revises several existing improper
payments statutes, which establish requirements for Federal
agencies to cut down on improper payments made by the Federal
Government. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) may
establish one or more pilot programs to test potential
accountability mechanisms for compliance with requirements
regarding improper payments and the elimination of improper
payments. The bill requires the OMB to update its plan for
improving the death data maintained by the Social Security
Administration and improving Federal agency use of death data.
The bill establishes an interagency working group on payment
integrity.
S.394.--Presidential Transition Enhancement Act of 2019.
(Public Law 116-121). March 3, 2020.
This bill makes changes intended to smooth the transfer of
executive power during presidential transitions. The bill
provides for the detailing of legislative branch employees on a
reimbursable basis to office staffs designated by the
President-elect or Vice President-elect with the consent of the
supervising Member of Congress. The bill extends support
provided by the General Services Administration (GSA) to the
President- and Vice President-elect for up to 60 days after the
inauguration. By September 1 of a year during which a
presidential election occurs, the GSA shall enter into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with each eligible candidate,
which shall include the conditions for administrative support
services and facilities. To the maximum extent practicable, an
MOU shall be based on MOUs relating to previous presidential
transitions. Each MOU shall include an agreement that the
eligible candidate will implement and enforce an ethics plan to
guide the conduct of the transition beginning on the date on
which such candidate becomes President-elect. The plan shall be
published on the GSA website. By September 15 of a year during
which a presidential election occurs, each agency shall ensure
that a succession plan is in place for each senior non-career
position in the agency.
S.2107.--Protecting America's Food and Agriculture Act of
2019. (Public Law 116-122). March 3, 2020.
This bill authorizes U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), every fiscal year, to hire, train, and assign 240 new
agricultural specialists until the total number of specialists
equals and sustains the requirements identified each year in
the Agriculture Resource Allocation Model. The CBP may also
hire, train, and assign support staff to assist the specialists
and specified levels of agricultural canine teams. In
calculating the number of specialists needed at each port of
entry through the Agriculture Resource Allocation Model, the
Office of Field Operations of the CBP must (1) rely on data
collected regarding the inspections and other activities
conducted at each such port of entry; and (2) consider volume
from seasonal surges, other projected changes in commercial and
passenger volumes, the most current commercial forecasts, and
other relevant information. The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) must conduct a review of the efforts of the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Agriculture,
and other Federal agencies to address risks to the agricultural
supply. The GAO must analyze (1) interagency coordination and
the distribution of responsibilities among Federal agencies
with respect to the inspection of agricultural commodities
entering the United States; (2) the effectiveness of such
inspection responsibilities among Federal agencies; and (3) the
training provided to, and working conditions of, CBP
Agriculture Specialists.
S. 2193.--CHARGE Act. (Public Law 116-160). October 1,
2020.
This bill requires the General Services Administration to
issue (1) guidance to clarify that Federal agencies may use a
charge card to pay to charge Federal electric motor vehicles at
commercial charging stations, and (2) a charge card for such
payments to each agency for each of the agency's electric motor
vehicles.
H.R.4761.--DHS Opioid Detection Resilience Act of 2019.
(Public Law 116-254). December 23, 2020.
This bill establishes new requirements related to the
detection of illicit narcotics at ports of entry. Specifically,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) must implement a
strategy to ensure chemical screening devices are able to
identify narcotics at purity levels equal to or less than 10
percent, or provide an alternate method for identifying
narcotics at lower purity levels. The CBP must also test new
chemical screening devices at various purity levels before it
commits to their acquisition. Additionally, the Department of
Homeland Security must implement a plan for the long-term
development of a centralized spectral database for chemical
screening devices.
S. 979.--Federal Advance Contracts Enhancement Act (FACE)
Act. (Public Law 116-272). December 31, 2020.
This bill directs the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) to report to Congress on advance contracts. Advance
contracts are established prior to disasters to provide life-
sustaining goods and services in the immediate aftermath of a
disaster. The report must include (1) information required in
the initial report on recurring disaster response requirements;
and (2) an updated strategy that defines the objectives of
advance contracts, how such contracts contribute to FEMA
disaster response operations, how to maximize the award of
advance contracts to small business concerns, and whether and
how such contracts should be prioritized in relation to new
post-disaster contract awards. The bill sets forth additional
duties of FEMA with respect to advance contracts, including
requiring FEMA to (1) update and implement guidance for its
program office and acquisition personnel to identify
acquisition planning time frames and considerations across the
entire acquisition planning process, and (2) communicate the
purpose and use of a master acquisition planning schedule.
S.1869.--Secure Federal Leases from Espionage and
Suspicious Entanglements (LEASEs) Act. (Public Law 116-276).
December 31, 2020
(Sec. 3) This bill instructs the General Services
Administration (GSA), the Architect of the Capitol, or any
Federal agency (other than the Department of Defense and the
intelligence community) that has independent statutory leasing
authority (Federal lessee), before entering into a lease
agreement or approving a novation agreement with an entity
involving a change of ownership under a lease that will be used
for high-security leased space, to require the entity to
identify the immediate or highest-level owner of the space and
disclose whether that owner is a foreign person or entity,
including the country associated with the ownership entity. A
Federal lessee shall require the entity to (1) provide such
identification and disclosure when first submitting a proposal
in response to a solicitation for offers issued by the Federal
lessee; and (2) update such information annually, including the
list of the immediate or highest-level owners of that entity or
the information required to be provided related to each such
owner. (Sec. 4) The GSA shall develop a government-wide plan
for identifying all immediate, highest-level, or beneficial
owners of high-security leased spaces before entering into a
lease agreement to accommodate a Federal tenant. (Sec. 5) The
bill provides a rule for language in a lease agreement
(concerning restriction of access to high-security space)
between a Federal lessee and an entity to accommodate an agency
in a building or improvement used for high-security leased
space.
S.3418.--Safeguarding Tomorrow through Ongoing Risk
Mitigation (STORM) Act. (Public Law 116-284). January 1, 2021.
This bill authorizes the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) to enter into agreements with any state or Indian
tribal government to make capitalization grants for the
establishment of hazard mitigation revolving loan funds. Such
funds shall provide funding assistance to local governments to
carry out projects to reduce disaster risk in order to decrease
the loss of life and property, the cost of insurance claims,
and Federal disaster payments. FEMA shall not be liable for any
claim based on the exercise or performance of, or the failure
to exercise or perform, a discretionary function or duty by
FEMA or by a FEMA employee in carrying out this bill.
H.R.5273.--Securing America's Ports Act. (Public Law 116-
299). January 5, 2021.
This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to report to Congress a plan to expeditiously scan all
commercial and passenger vehicles entering the United States at
a land port of entry using large-scale non-intrusive inspection
systems, such as X-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems, or
similar technology. The plan shall include elements such as (1)
an inventory of such systems currently in use, (2) the
estimated costs of achieving a 100 percent scanning rate, and
(3) the anticipated impact that increasing the scanning rate
will have on wait times at land ports of entry. DHS shall
periodically report to Congress on the progress in implementing
the plan. DHS shall also research and develop technology
enhancements to inspection areas at land ports of entry.
B. POSTAL NAMING BILLS
H.R. 540--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 770 Ayrault Road in Fairport, New
York, as the ``Louise and Bob Slaughter Post Office''. (Public
Law 116-42). August 21, 2019.
H.R. 828--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 25 Route 111 in Smithtown, New York,
as the ``Congressman Bill Carney Post Office''. (Public Law
116-43). August 21 2019.
H.R. 829--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 1450 Montauk Highway in Mastic, New
York, as the ``Army Specialist Thomas J. Wilwerth Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-44). August 21, 2019.
H.R. 1198--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 404 South Boulder Highway in
Henderson, Nevada, as the ``Henderson Veterans Memorial Post
Office Building''. (Public Law 116-45). August 21, 2019.
H.R. 1449--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 3033 203rd Street in Olympia Fields,
Illinois, as the ``Captain Robert L. Martin Post Office''.
(Public Law 116-46). August 21, 2019.
H.R. 3305--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 2509 George Mason Drive in Virginia
Beach, Virginia, as the ``Ryan Keith Cox Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-47). August 21, 2019.
H.R. 1250--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 11158 Highway 146 North in Hardin,
Texas, as the ``Lucas Lowe Memorial Post Office''. (Public Law
116-55). August 23, 2019.
S. 1196--A bill to designate the facility of the United
States Postal Service located at 1715 Linnerud Drive in Sun
Prairie, Wisconsin, as the ``Fire Captain Cory Barr Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-66). October 31, 2019.
H.R. 887--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 877 East 1200 South in Orem, Utah, as
the ``Jerry C. Washburn Post Office Building''. (Public Law
116-79). December 12, 2019.
H.R. 1252--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 6531 Van Nuys Boulevard in Van Nuys,
California, as the ``Marilyn Monroe Post Office''. (Public Law
116-80). December 12, 2019.
H.R. 1253--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 13507 Van Nuys Boulevard in Pacoima,
California, as the ``Ritchie Valens Post Office Building''.
(Public Law 116-81). December 12, 2019.
H.R. 1526--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 200 Israel Road Southeast in
Tumwater, Washington, as the ``Eva G. Hewitt Post Office''.
(Public Law 116-82). December 12, 2019.
H.R. 1844--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 66 Grove Court in Elgin, Illinois, as
the ``Corporal Alex Martinez Memorial Post Office Building''.
(Public Law 116-83). December 12, 2019.
H.R. 1972--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 1100 West Kent Avenue in Missoula,
Montana, as the ``Jeannette Rankin Post Office Building''.
(Public Law 116-84). December 13, 2019.
H.R. 2151--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 7722 South Main Street in Pine
Plains, New York, as the ``Senior Chief Petty Officer Shannon
M. Kent Post Office''. (Public Law 116-85). December 13, 2019.
H.R. 2325--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 100 Calle Alondra in San Juan, Puerto
Rico, as the ``65th Infantry Regiment Post Office Building''.
(Public Law 116-86). December 13, 2019.
H.R. 3144--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 8520 Michigan Avenue in Whittier,
California, as the ``Jose Ramos Post Office Building''. (Public
Law 116-89). December 13, 2019.
H.R. 3314--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 1750 McCulloch Boulevard North in
Lake Havasu City, Arizona, as the ``Lake Havasu City Combat
Veterans Memorial Post Office Building''. (Public Law 116-90).
December 13, 2019.
H.R. 1833--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 35 Tulip Avenue in Floral Park, New
York, as the ``Lieutenant Michael R. Davidson Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-196). December 3, 2020.
H.R. 3207--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 114 Mill Street in Hookstown,
Pennsylvania, as the ``Staff Sergeant Dylan Elchin Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-197). December 3, 2020.
H.R. 3317--To permit the Scipio A. Jones Post Office in
Little Rock, Arkansas, to accept and display a portrait of
Scipio A. Jones, and for other purposes. (Public Law 116-198).
December 3, 2020.
H.R. 3329--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 5186 Benito Street in Montclair,
California, as the ``Paul Eaton Post Office Building''. (Public
Law 116-199). December 3, 2020.
H.R. 4794--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 8320 13th Avenue in Brooklyn, New
York, as the ``Mother Frances Xavier Cabrini Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-201). December 3, 2020.
H.R. 4981--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 2505 Derita Avenue in Charlotte,
North Carolina, as the ``Julius L. Chambers Civil Rights
Memorial Post Office''. (Public Law 116-202). December 3, 2020.
H.R. 5037--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 3703 North Main Street in Farmville,
North Carolina, as the ``Walter B. Jones, Jr. Post Office''.
(Public Law 116-203). December 3, 2020.
H.R. 4975--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 1201 Sycamore Square Drive in
Midlothian, Virginia, as the ``Dorothy Braden Bruce Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-218). December 17, 2020.
H.R. 5062--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 9930 Conroy Windermere Road in
Windermere, Florida, as the ``Officer Robert German Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-219). December 17, 2020.
H.R. 5307--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 115 Nicol Avenue in Thomasville,
Alabama, as the ``Postmaster Robert Ingram Post Office''.
(Public Law 116-220). December 17, 2020.
H.R. 2246--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 201 West Cherokee Street in
Brookhaven, Mississippi, as the ``Deputy Donald William Durr,
Corporal Zach Moak, and Patrolman James White Memorial Post
Office Building''. (Public Law 116-227). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 2454--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 123 East Sharpfish Street in Rosebud,
South Dakota, as the ``Ben Reifel Post Office Building''.
(Public Law 116-228). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 2969--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 1401 1st Street North in Winter
Haven, Florida, as the ``Althea Margaret Daily Mills Post
Office Building''. (Public Law 116-229). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 3005--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 13308 Midland Road in Poway,
California, as the ``Ray Chavez Post Office Building''. (Public
Law 116-230). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 3275--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 340 Wetmore Avenue in Grand River,
Ohio, as the ``Lance Corporal Andy 'Ace' Nowacki Post Office''.
(Public Law 116-231). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 3680--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 415 North Main Street in Henning,
Tennessee, as the ``Paula Croom Robinson and Judy Spray
Memorial Post Office Building''. (Public Law 116-232) December
21, 2020.
H.R. 3847--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 117 West Poythress Street in
Hopewell, Virginia, as the ``Reverend Curtis West Harris Post
Office Building''. (Public Law 116-233). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 3870--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 511 West 165th Street in New York,
New York, as the ``Normandia Maldonado Post Office Building''.
(Public Law 116-234). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 4034--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 602 Pacific Avenue in Bremerton,
Washington, as the ``John Henry Turpin Post Office Building''.
(Public Law 116-235). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 4200--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 321 South 1st Street in Montrose,
Colorado, as the ``Sergeant David Kinterknecht Post Office''.
(Public Law 116-236). December 21 2020.
H.R. 4279--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 445 Main Street in Laceyville,
Pennsylvania, as the ``Melinda Gene Piccotti Post Office''.
(Public Law 116-237). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 4672--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 21701 Stevens Creek Boulevard in
Cupertino, California, as the ``Petty Officer 2nd Class (SEAL)
Matthew G. Axelson Post Office Building''. (Public Law 116-
238). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 4725--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 8585 Criterion Drive in Colorado
Springs, Colorado, as the ``Chaplain (Capt.) Dale Goetz
Memorial Post Office Building''. (Public Law 116-239). December
21, 2020.
H.R. 4785--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 1305 U.S. Highway 90 West in
Castroville, Texas, as the ``Lance Corporal Rhonald Dain
Rairdan Post Office''. (Public Law 116-240). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 4875--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 2201 E. Maple Street in North Canton,
Ohio, as the ``Lance Cpl. Stacy 'Annie' Dryden Post Office''.
(Public Law 116-241). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 4971--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 15 East Market Street in Leesburg,
Virginia, as the ``Norman Duncan Post Office Building''.
(Public Law 116-242). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 5317--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 315 Addicks Howell Road in Houston,
Texas, as the ``Deputy Sandeep Singh Dhaliwal Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-243). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 5954--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 108 West Maple Street in Holly,
Michigan, as the ``Holly Veterans Memorial Post Office''.
(Public Law 116-244). December 21, 2020.
S. 3257--A bill to designate the facility of the United
States Postal Service located at 311 West Wisconsin Avenue in
Tomahawk, Wisconsin, as the ``Einar 'Sarge' H. Ingman, Jr. Post
Office Building''. (Public Law 116-264). December 30, 2020.
S. 3461--A bill to designate the facility of the United
States Postal Service located at 2600 Wesley Street in
Greenville, Texas, as the ``Audie Murphy Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-265). December 30, 2020.
S. 3462--A bill to designate the facility of the United
States Postal Service located at 909 West Holiday Drive in
Fate, Texas, as the ``Ralph Hall Post Office''. (Public Law
116-266). December 30, 2020.
S. 4126--A bill to designate the facility of the United
States Postal Service located at 104 East Main Street in Port
Washington, Wisconsin, as the ``Joseph G. Demler Post Office''.
(Public Law 116-267). December 30, 2020.
S. 4684--A bill to designate the facility of the United
States Postal Service located at 440 Arapahoe Street in
Thermopolis, Wyoming, as the ``Robert L. Brown Post Office''.
(Public Law 116-268). December 30, 2020.
H.R. 3976--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 12711 East Jefferson Avenue in
Detroit, Michigan, as the ``Aretha Franklin Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-293). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 4988--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 14 Walnut Street in Bordentown, New
Jersey, as the ``Clara Barton Post Office Building''. (Public
Law 116-296). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 5123--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 476 East Main Street in Galesburg,
Illinois, as the ``Senior Airman Daniel Miller Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-298). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 5451--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 599 East Genesse Street in
Fayetteville, New York, as the ``George H. Bacel Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-300). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 5597--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 305 Northwest 5th Street in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, as the ``Clara Luper Post Office Building''.
(Public Law 116-303). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 5972--Mary Ann Shadd Cary Post Office Dedication Act.
(Public Law 116-306). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 5983--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 4150 Chicago Avenue in Riverside,
California, as the ``Woodie Rucker-Hughes Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-307). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 6161--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 1585 Yanceyville Street, Greensboro,
North Carolina, as the ``J. Howard Coble Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-310). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 6418--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 509 Fairhope Avenue in Fairhope,
Alabama, as the ``William 'Jack' Jackson Edwards III Post
Office Building''. (Public Law 116-312). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 7088--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 111 James Street in Reidsville,
Georgia, as the ``Senator Jack Hill Post Office Building''.
(Public Law 116-314). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 7502--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 101 South 16th Street in Clarinda,
Iowa, as the ``Jessie Field Shambaugh Post Office Building''.
(Public Law 116-319). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 7810--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 3519 East Walnut Street in Pearland,
Texas, as the ``Tom Reid Post Office Building''. (Public Law
116-320). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 8611--To designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 4755 Southeast Dixie Highway in Port
Salerno, Florida, as the ``Joseph Bullock Post Office
Building''. (Public Law 116-322). January 5, 2021.
VIII. ACTIVITIES OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
Chairman: Robert Portman
Ranking Minority Member: Thomas R. Carper
The following is the Activities Report of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations for the 116th Congress.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Subcommittee Jurisdiction
The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations was originally
authorized by Senate Resolution 189 on January 28, 1948. At its
creation in 1948, the Subcommittee was part of the Committee on
Expenditures in the Executive Departments. The Subcommittee's
records and broad investigative jurisdiction over government
operations and national security issues, however, actually
antedate its creation, since it was given custody of the
jurisdiction of the former Special Committee to Investigate the
National Defense Program (the so-called ``War Investigating
Committee'' or ``Truman Committee''), chaired by Senator Harry
S. Truman during the Second World War and charged with exposing
waste, fraud, and abuse in the war effort and war profiteering.
Today, the Subcommittee is part of the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs.\1\
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\1\In 1952, the parent committee's name was changed to the
Committee on Government Operations. It was changed again in early 1977,
to the Committee on Governmental Affairs, and again in 2005, to the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, its present
title.
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The Subcommittee has had eleven chairmen: Senators Homer
Ferguson of Michigan (1948), Clyde R. Hoey of North Carolina
(1949-1952), Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin (1953-1954), John
L. McClellan of Arkansas (1955-1972), Henry M. Jackson of
Washington (1973-1978), Sam Nunn of Georgia (1979-1980
and 1987-1994), William V. Roth of Delaware (1981-1986 and
1995-1996), Susan M. Collins of Maine (1997-2001); Norman B.
Coleman of Minnesota (2003-2007); Carl Levin of Michigan (2001-
2002 and 2007-2014); and Robert J. Portman of Ohio (2015-
present).
Until 1957, the Subcommittee's jurisdiction focused
principally on waste, inefficiency, impropriety, and illegality
in government operations. Its jurisdiction then expanded over
time, today encompassing investigations within the broad ambit
of the parent committee's responsibility for matters relating
to the efficiency and economy of operations of all branches of
the government, including matters related to: (a) waste, fraud,
abuse, malfeasance, and unethical practices in government
contracting and operations; (b) organized criminal activities
affecting interstate or international commerce; (c) criminal
activity affecting the national health, welfare, or safety,
including investment fraud, commodity and securities fraud,
computer fraud, and offshore abuses; (d) criminality or
improper practices in labor-management relations; (e) the
effectiveness of present national security methods, staffing
and procedures, and U.S. relationships with international
organizations concerned with national security; (f) energy
shortages, energy pricing, management of government-owned or
controlled energy supplies; and relationships with oil
producing and consuming countries; and (g) the operations and
management of Federal regulatory policies and programs. While
retaining the status of a subcommittee of a standing committee,
the Subcommittee has long exercised its authority on an
independent basis, selecting its own staff, issuing its own
subpoenas, and determining its own investigatory agenda.
The Subcommittee acquired its sweeping jurisdiction in
several successive stages. In 1957--based on information
developed by the Subcommittee--the Senate passed a Resolution
establishing a Select Committee on Improper Activities in the
Labor or Management Field. Chaired by Senator McClellan, who
also chaired the Subcommittee at that time, the Select
Committee was composed of eight Senators--four of whom were
drawn from the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and
four from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. The Select
Committee operated for 3 years, sharing office space,
personnel, and other facilities with the Permanent
Subcommittee. Upon its expiration in early 1960, the Select
Committee's jurisdiction and files were transferred to the
Permanent Subcommittee, greatly enlarging the latter body's
investigative authority in the labor-management area.
The Subcommittee's jurisdiction expanded further during the
1960s and 1970s. In 1961, for example, it received authority to
make inquiries into matters pertaining to organized crime and,
in 1963, held the famous Valachi hearings examining the inner
workings of the Italian Mafia. In 1967, following a summer of
riots and other civil disturbances, the Senate approved a
Resolution directing the Subcommittee to investigate the causes
of this disorder and to recommend corrective action. In January
1973, the Subcommittee acquired its national security mandate
when it merged with the National Security Subcommittee. With
this merger, the Subcommittee's jurisdiction was broadened to
include inquiries concerning the adequacy of national security
staffing and procedures, relations with international
organizations, technology transfer issues, and related matters.
In 1974, in reaction to the gasoline shortages precipitated by
the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, the Subcommittee acquired
jurisdiction to investigate the control and management of
energy resources and supplies as well as energy pricing issues.
In 1997, the full Committee on Governmental Affairs was
charged by the Senate to conduct a special examination into
illegal or improper activities in connection with Federal
election campaigns during the 1996 election cycle. The
Permanent Subcommittee provided substantial resources and
assistance to this investigation, contributing to a greater
public understanding of what happened, to subsequent criminal
and civil legal actions taken against wrongdoers, and to
enactment of campaign finance reforms in 2001.
In 1998, the Subcommittee marked the fiftieth anniversary
of the Truman Committee's conversion into a permanent
subcommittee of the U.S. Senate.\2\ Since then, the
Subcommittee has developed particular expertise in complex
financial matters, examining the collapse of Enron Corporation
in 2001, the key causes of the 2008 financial crisis,
structured finance abuses, financial fraud, unfair credit
practices, money laundering, commodity speculation, and a wide
range of offshore and tax haven abuses. It has also focused on
issues involving health care fraud, foreign corruption, and
waste, fraud and abuse in government programs. In the half-
century of its existence, the Subcommittee's many successful
investigations have made clear to the Senate the importance of
retaining a standing investigatory body devoted to keeping
government not only efficient and effective, but also honest
and accountable.
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\2\This anniversary also marked the first date upon which internal
Subcommittee records generally began to become available to the public.
Unlike most standing committees of the Senate whose previously
unpublished records open after a period of 20 years has elapsed, the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, as an investigatory body, may
close its records for 50 years to protect personal privacy and the
integrity of the investigatory process. With this 50th anniversary, the
Subcommittee's earliest records, housed in the Center for Legislative
Archives at the National Archives and Records Administration, began to
open seriatim. The records of the predecessor committee--the Truman
Committee--were opened by Senator Nunn in 1980.
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B. Subcommittee Investigations
Armed with its broad jurisdictional mandate, the
Subcommittee has conducted investigations into a wide variety
of topics of public concern, ranging from financial misconduct,
to commodities speculation, predatory lending, and tax evasion.
Over the years, the Subcommittee has also conducted
investigations into criminal wrongdoing, including money
laundering, the narcotics trade, child pornography, labor
racketeering, human trafficking, the opioid crisis, and
organized crime activities. In addition, the Subcommittee has
investigated a wide range of allegations of waste, fraud, and
abuse in government programs and consumer protection issues,
addressing problems ranging from unfair credit card practices
to health care fraud. In the 116th Congress, the Subcommittee
held seven hearings and issued eleven reports on a wide range
of issues.
(1) Historical Highlights
The Subcommittee's investigatory record as a permanent
Senate body began under the Chairmanship of Republican Senator
Homer Ferguson and his Chief Counsel (and future Attorney
General and Secretary of State) William P. Rogers, as the
Subcommittee inherited the Truman Committee's role in
investigating fraud and waste in U.S. Government operations.
This investigative work became particularly colorful under the
chairmanship of Senator Clyde Hoey, a North Carolina Democrat
who took the chair from Senator Ferguson after the 1948
elections. Under Senator Hoey's leadership, the Subcommittee
won national attention for its investigation of the so-called
``five percenters,'' notorious Washington lobbyists who charged
their clients five percent of the profits from any Federal
contracts they obtained on the client's behalf. Given the
Subcommittee's jurisdictional inheritance from the Truman
Committee, it is perhaps ironic that the ``five percenters''
investigation raised allegations of bribery and influence-
peddling that reached right into the White House and implicated
members of President Truman's staff. In any event, the
fledgling Subcommittee was off to a rapid start.
What began as colorful soon became contentious. When
Republicans returned to the Majority in the Senate in 1953,
Wisconsin's junior Senator, Joseph R. McCarthy, became the
Subcommittee's Chairman. Two years earlier, as Ranking Minority
Member, Senator McCarthy had arranged for another Republican
Senator, Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, to be removed from the
Subcommittee. Senator Smith's offense, in Senator McCarthy's
eyes, was her issuance of a ``Declaration of Conscience''
repudiating those who made unfounded charges and used character
assassination against their political opponents. Although
Senator Smith had carefully declined to name any specific
offender, her remarks were universally recognized as criticism
of Senator McCarthy's accusations that communists had
infiltrated the State Department and other government agencies.
Senator McCarthy retaliated by engineering Senator Smith's
removal, replacing her with the newly-elected Senator from
California, Richard Nixon.
Upon becoming Subcommittee Chairman, Senator McCarthy
staged a series of highly publicized anti-Communist
investigations, culminating in an inquiry into Communism within
the U.S. Army, which became known as the Army-McCarthy
hearings. During the latter portion of those hearings, in which
the parent Committee examined the Wisconsin Senator's attacks
on the Army, Senator McCarthy recused himself, leaving South
Dakota Senator Karl Mundt to serve as Acting Chairman of the
Subcommittee. Gavel-to-gavel television coverage of the
hearings helped turn the tide against Senator McCarthy by
raising public concern about his treatment of witnesses and
cavalier use of evidence. In December 1954, the Senate censured
Senator McCarthy for unbecoming conduct. In the following year,
the Subcommittee adopted new rules of procedure that better
protected the rights of witnesses. The Subcommittee also
strengthened the rules ensuring the right of both parties on
the Subcommittee to appoint staff, initiate and approve
investigations, and review all information in the
Subcommittee's possession.
In 1955, Senator John McClellan of Arkansas began 18 years
of service as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations. Senator McClellan appointed a young Robert F.
Kennedy as the Subcommittee's Chief Counsel. That same year,
Members of the Subcommittee were joined by Members of the
Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee on a special
committee to investigate labor racketeering. Chaired by Senator
McClellan and staffed by Robert Kennedy and other Subcommittee
staff members, this special committee directed much of its
attention to criminal influence over the Teamsters Union, most
famously calling Teamsters' leaders Dave Beck and Jimmy Hoffa
to testify. The televised hearings of the special committee
also introduced Senators Barry Goldwater and John F. Kennedy to
the nation, as well as led to passage of the Landrum-Griffin
Labor Act.
After the special committee completed its work, the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations continued to
investigate organized crime. In 1962, the Subcommittee held
hearings during which Joseph Valachi outlined the activities of
La Cosa Nostra, or the Mafia. Former Subcommittee staffer
Robert Kennedy--who
had by then become Attorney General in his brother's
Administration--used this information to prosecute prominent
mob leaders and their accomplices. The Subcommittee's
investigations also led to passage of major legislation against
organized crime, most notably the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) provisions of the Crime Control
Act of 1970. Under Chairman McClellan, the Subcommittee also
investigated fraud in the purchase of military uniforms,
corruption in the Department of Agriculture's grain storage
program, securities fraud, and civil disorders and acts of
terrorism. In addition, from 1962 to 1970, the Subcommittee
conducted an extensive probe of political interference in the
awarding of government contracts for the Pentagon's ill-fated
TFX (``tactical fighter, experimental'') aircraft. In 1968, the
Subcommittee also examined charges of corruption in U.S.
servicemen's clubs in Vietnam and elsewhere around the world.
In 1973, Senator Henry ``Scoop'' Jackson, a Democrat from
Washington, replaced Senator McClellan as the Subcommittee's
Chairman. During his tenure, recalled Chief Clerk Ruth Young
Watt--who served in this position from the Subcommittee's
founding until her retirement in 1979--Ranking Minority Member
Charles Percy, an Illinois Republican, became more active on
the Subcommittee than Chairman Jackson, who was often
distracted by his Chairmanship of the Interior Committee and
his active role on the Armed Services Committee.\3\ Senator
Percy also worked closely with Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn, a
Subcommittee member who subsequently succeeded Senator Jackson
as Subcommittee Chairman in 1979. As Chairman, Senator Nunn
continued the Subcommittee's investigations into the role of
organized crime in labor-management relations and also
investigated pension fraud.
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\3\It had not been uncommon in the Subcommittee's history for the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member to work together closely despite
partisan differences, but Senator Percy was unusually active while in
the Minority--a role that included his chairing an investigation of the
hearing aid industry.
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Regular reversals of political fortunes in the Senate
during the 1980s and 1990s saw Senator Nunn trade the
chairmanship three times with Delaware Republican William Roth.
Senator Nunn served from 1979 to 1980 and again from 1987 to
1995, while Senator Roth served from 1981 to 1986, and again
from 1995 to 1996. These 15 years saw a strengthening of the
Subcommittee's bipartisan tradition in which investigations
were initiated by either the Majority or Minority and fully
supported by the entire Subcommittee. For his part, Senator
Roth led a wide range of investigations into commodity
investment fraud, offshore banking schemes, money laundering,
and child pornography. Senator Nunn led inquiries into Federal
drug policy, the global spread of chemical and biological
weapons, abuses in Federal student aid programs, computer
security, airline safety, and health care fraud. Senator Nunn
also appointed the Subcommittee's first female counsel,
Eleanore Hill, who served as Chief Counsel to the Minority from
1982 to 1986 and then as Chief Counsel from 1987 to 1995.
Strong bipartisan traditions continued in the 105th
Congress when, in January 1997, Republican Senator Susan
Collins of Maine became the first woman to chair the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations. Senator John Glenn of Ohio
became the Ranking Minority Member, while also serving as
Ranking Minority Member of the full Committee. Two years later,
in the 106th Congress, after Senator Glenn's retirement,
Michigan Democrat Carl Levin succeeded him as the
Subcommittee's Ranking Minority Member. During Senator Collins'
chairmanship, the Subcommittee conducted investigations into
issues affecting Americans in their day-to-day lives, including
mortgage fraud, deceptive mailings and sweepstakes promotions,
phony credentials obtained through the Internet, day trading of
securities, and securities fraud on the Internet. Senator Levin
initiated an investigation into money laundering. At his
request, in 1999, the Subcommittee held hearings on money
laundering issues affecting private banking services provided
to wealthy individuals, and, in 2001, on how major U.S. banks
providing correspondent accounts to offshore banks were being
used to advance money laundering and other criminal schemes.
During the 107th Congress, both Senator Collins and Senator
Levin chaired the Subcommittee. Senator Collins served as
chairman until June 2001, when the Senate Majority changed
hands; at that point, Senator Levin assumed the chairmanship
and Senator Collins, in turn, became the Ranking Minority
Member. In her first six months chairing the Subcommittee at
the start of the 107th Congress, Senator Collins held hearings
examining issues related to cross border fraud, the improper
operation of tissue banks, and Federal programs designed to
fight diabetes. When Senator Levin assumed the chairmanship, as
his first major effort, the Subcommittee initiated an 18-month
bipartisan investigation into the Enron Corporation, which had
collapsed into bankruptcy. As part of that investigation, the
Subcommittee reviewed over 2 million pages of documents,
conducted more than 100 interviews, held four hearings, and
issued three bipartisan reports focusing on the role played by
Enron's Board of Directors, Enron's use of tax shelters and
structured financial instruments, and how major U.S. financial
institutions contributed to Enron's accounting deceptions,
corporate abuses, and ultimate collapse. The Subcommittee's
investigative work contributed to passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act which enacted accounting and corporate reforms in July
2002. In addition, Senator Levin continued the money laundering
investigation initiated while he was the Ranking Minority
Member, and the Subcommittee's work contributed to enactment of
major reforms strengthening U.S. anti-money laundering laws in
the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act). Also during the 107th
Congress, the Subcommittee opened new investigations into
offshore tax abuses, border security, and abusive practices
related to the pricing of gasoline and other fuels.
In January 2003, at the start of the 108th Congress, after
the Senate Majority party again changed hands, Senator Collins
was elevated to Chairman of the full Committee on Governmental
Affairs, and Republican Senator Norman Coleman of Minnesota
became Chairman of the Subcommittee. Over the next two years,
Senator Coleman held hearings on topics of national and global
concern including illegal file sharing on peer-to-peer
networks, abusive practices in the credit counseling industry,
the dangers of purchasing pharmaceuticals over the Internet,
SARS preparedness, border security, and how former Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein had abused the United Nations Oil-for-
Food Program. At the request of Senator Levin, then Ranking
Minority Member, the Subcommittee examined how some U.S.
accounting firms, banks, investment firms, and tax lawyers were
designing, promoting, and implementing abusive tax shelters
across the country. Also at Senator Levin's request, the
Subcommittee investigated how some U.S. financial institutions
were failing to comply with anti-money laundering controls
mandated by the Patriot Act, using as a case history Riggs Bank
accounts involving Augusto Pinochet, the former President of
Chile, and Equatorial Guinea, an oil-rich country in Africa.
During the 109th Congress, Senator Coleman held additional
hearings on abuses associated with the United Nation's Oil-for-
Food Program, and initiated a series of hearings on Federal
contractors who were paid with taxpayer dollars but failed to
meet their own tax obligations, resulting in billions of
dollars in unpaid taxes. He also held hearings on border
security issues, securing the global supply chain, Federal
travel abuses, abusive tax refund loans, and unfair energy
pricing. At Senator Levin's request, the Subcommittee held
hearings on offshore tax abuses responsible for $100 billion in
unpaid taxes each year, and on U.S. vulnerabilities caused by
States forming 2 million companies each year with hidden
owners.
During the 110th Congress, in January 2007, after the
Senate majority shifted, Senator Levin once again became
Subcommittee Chairman, while Senator Coleman became the Ranking
Minority Member. Senator Levin chaired the Subcommittee for the
next seven years. He focused the Subcommittee on investigations
into complex financial and tax matters, including unfair credit
card practices, executive stock option abuses, excessive
speculation in the natural gas and crude oil markets, and
offshore tax abuses involving tax haven banks and non-U.S.
persons dodging payment of U.S. taxes on U.S. stock dividends.
The Subcommittee's work contributed to enactment of two
landmark bills, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility
and Disclosure Act (Credit CARD Act), which reformed credit
card practices, and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA), which tackled the problem of hidden offshore bank
accounts used by U.S. persons to dodge U.S. taxes. At the
request of Senator Coleman, the Subcommittee also conducted
bipartisan investigations into Medicare and Medicaid health
care providers who cheat on their taxes, fraudulent Medicare
claims involving deceased doctors or inappropriate diagnosis
codes, U.S. dirty bomb vulnerabilities, Federal payroll tax
abuses, abusive practices involving transit benefits, and
problems involving the United Nations Development Program.
During the 111th Congress, Senator Levin continued as
Subcommittee Chairman, while Senator Tom Coburn joined the
Subcommittee as its Ranking Minority Member. Under their
leadership, the Subcommittee dedicated much of its resources to
a bipartisan investigation into key causes of the 2008
financial crisis, looking in particular at the role of high-
risk home loans, regulatory failures, inflated credit ratings,
and high-risk, conflicts-ridden financial products designed and
sold by investment banks. The Subcommittee held four hearings
and released thousands of documents. The Subcommittee's work
contributed to passage of another landmark financial reform
bill, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010. In addition, the Subcommittee held hearings on
excessive speculation in the wheat market, tax haven banks that
helped U.S. clients evade U.S. taxes, how to keep foreign
corruption out of the United States, and Social Security
disability fraud.
During the 112th Congress, Senator Levin and Senator Coburn
continued in their respective roles as Chairman and Ranking
Minority Member of the Subcommittee. In a series of bipartisan
investigations, the Subcommittee examined how a global banking
giant, HSBC, exposed the U.S. financial system to an array of
money laundering, drug trafficking, and terrorist financing
risks due to poor anti-money laundering controls; how two U.S.
multinational corporations, Microsoft and Hewlett Packard
engaged in offshore tax abuses; and how excessive commodity
speculation by mutual funds and others were taking place
without Dodd-Frank safeguards such as position limits being put
into effect. At the request of Senator Coburn, the Subcommittee
also conducted bipartisan investigations into problems with
Social Security disability determinations that, due to poor
procedures, perfunctory hearings, and poor quality decisions,
resulted in over one in five disability cases containing errors
or inadequate justifications; how Department of Homeland
Security State and local intelligence fusion centers failed to
yield significant, useful information to support Federal
counterterrorism efforts; and how certain Federal contractors
that received taxpayer dollars through stimulus funding failed
to pay their Federal taxes.
During the 113th Congress, Senator Levin continued as
Chairman, while Senator John McCain joined the Subcommittee as
its Ranking Minority Member. They continued to strengthen the
Subcommittee's strong bipartisan traditions, conducting all
investigations in a bipartisan manner. During the 113th
Congress, the Subcommittee held eight hearings and released ten
reports on a variety of investigations. The investigations
examined high risk credit derivatives trades at JPMorgan;
hidden offshore accounts opened for U.S. clients by Credit
Suisse in Switzerland; corporate tax avoidance in case studies
involving Apple, Caterpillar, and a structured financial
product known as basket options; online advertising abuses;
conflicts of interest affecting the stock market and high speed
trading; IRS processing of 501(c)(4) applications; defense
acquisition reforms; and bank involvement with physical
commodities. At the end of the 113th Congress, Senator Levin
retired from the Senate.
(2) More Recent Investigations
During the 114th Congress, Senator Rob Portman became
Subcommittee Chairman with Senator Claire McCaskill serving as
Ranking Minority Member. Under the Chairman and Ranking
Member's leadership, the Subcommittee held six hearings and
issued eight reports addressing range of public policy
concerns. Investigations examined the impact of the U.S.
corporate tax code on cross-border mergers acquisitions; online
sex trafficking; the Federal Government's efforts to protect
unaccompanied migrant children from human trafficking; consumer
protection in the cable and satellite television industry;
terrorist networks' use of the Internet and social media to
radicalize and recruit; the U.S. State Department's oversight
of a grantee involved in political activities in Israel; and
efforts by Medicare and private health insurance systems to
combat the opioid epidemic. The Subcommittee also initiated the
first successful civil contempt proceedings to enforce a Senate
subpoena in twenty years. The Subcommittee's long-term
investigation of online sex trafficking culminated in a final
report and hearing on January 10, 2017, at the start of the
115th Congress.
During the 115th Congress Senator Portman continued as
Chairman while Senator Tom Carper became the Subcommittee's
Ranking Minority Member. Under the Chairman and Ranking
Member's leadership, the Subcommittee held six hearings and
issued six reports. The Subcommittee examined the opioid
crisis, including the price increase of an opioid overdose
reversal drug and the cost to Federal healthcare programs and
Chinese online drug sellers shipping illicit opioids to the
United States through international mail; the Federal
Government's efforts to protect unaccompanied alien children;
Federal agency compliance with the Digital Accountability and
Transparency Act; Federal infrastructure permitting; and
Backpage.com's knowing facilitation of online sex trafficking.
II. SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS DURING THE 116TH CONGRESS
During the 116th Congress, Senator Rob Portman remained
Subcommittee Chairman with Senator Tom Carper serving as
Ranking Minority Member.
China's Impact on the U.S. Education System. February 28, 2019. (S.
Hrg. 116-30)
The Subcommittee's first hearing and report of the 116th
Congress was held in conjunction with the release of the
Subcommittee's report titled ``China's Impact on the U.S.
Education System.'' The hearing examined the findings and
recommendations in the Subcommittee's report.
The hearing featured one panels of witnesses including
Jason Bair, Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade,
U.S. Government Accountability Office; Walter Douglas, Deputy
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
U.S. Department of State; Hon. Jennifer Zimdahl Galt, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Cultural and Educational
Affairs, U.S. Department of State; and Hon. Mitchell M. Zais,
Ph.D., Deputy Secretary of Education, U.S. Department of
Education.
Examining Private Sector Data Breaches. March 7, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116-
40)
The Subcommittee's second hearing was held in conjunction
with the release of the Subcommittee's report titled ``How
Equifax Neglected Cybersecurity and Suffered a Devastating Data
Breach'' and examined the findings and recommendations of the
report. The Subcommittee also received testimony regarding a
data breach announced by Marriott in November 2018 that exposed
more than 380 million guest records, including passport and
credit card numbers.
The hearing featured testimony from two panels of
witnesses. The first panel included Mark W. Begor, Chief
Executive Officer, Equifax, Inc.; and Arne M. Sorenson,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Marriott International,
Inc. The second panel was comprised of: Alicia Puente Cackley,
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, U.S.
Government Accountability Office; Andrew Smith, Director,
Bureau of Consumer Protection, U.S. Federal Trade Commission;
and John M. Gilligan, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Center for Internet Security.
Oversight of Federal Infrastructure Permitting and FAST-41. May 2,
2019. (S. Hrg. 116-44)
The Subcommittee's third hearing reviewed activities of the
Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council, which was
established to improve coordination between Federal permitting
agencies and help large projects navigate the permitting
process.
The Subcommittee heard from one panel of witnesses. The
panel included Alexander Herrgott, Executive Director, Federal
Permitting Improvement Steering Council; Laura Abram, Director,
Project Execution and Public Affairs, First Solar; Michael
Knisley, Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Ohio State Building and
Construction Trades Council; Joseph M. Johnson, Ph.D.,
Executive Director, Federal Regulatory Process Review and
Analysis, Environment, Technology, and Regulatory Affairs, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce; and Raul E. Garcia, Senior Legislative
Counsel, Policy and Legislation Department, Earthjustice.
Joint Hearing with the Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal
Management: Review of E-Rulemaking Comment Systems. October 24,
2019. (S. Hrg. 116-114)
The Subcommittee held a joint hearing with the Subcommittee
on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management after reviewing
Federal agency systems for receiving, reviewing, and
publicizing comments on proposed regulations and found the
systems were abused, creating some public distrust in the
rulewriting process, as well as additional work for Federal
employees. The Subcommittee also released a report in
conjunction with the hearing titled ``Abuses of the Federal
Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Process.''
The Subcommittee heard from one panel of witnesses
comprised of Elizabeth Angerman, Principal Deputy Associate
Administrator, Office of Government-Wide Policy, U.S. General
Services Administration; Dominic Mancini, Acting Director,
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget; Ashley Boizelle, Deputy General Counsel,
Federal Communications Commission; and Seto J. Bagdoyan,
Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, U.S.
Government Accountability Office.
Securing the U.S. Research Enterprise from China's Talent Recruitment
Plans. November 19, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116-286)
The Subcommittee's fifth hearing was held in conjunction
with the release of the Subcommittee's report titled ``Threats
to the U.S Research Enterprise: China's Talent Recruitment
Plans.'' The hearing examined the report's findings and
recommendations.
One panel of witnesses testified at the hearing including
John Brown, Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice;
Rebecca L. Keiser, Ph.D., Office Head, Office of International
Science and Engineering, National Science Foundation; Michael
S. Lauer, MD, Deputy Director for Extramural Research, National
Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services; The Honorable Christopher Fall, Ph.D., Director,
Office of Science, U.S. Department of Energy; and Edward J.
Ramotowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services,
Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
Continuity of Senate Operations and Remote Voting in Times of Crisis.
April 30, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116-297)
The roundtable considered the Subcommittee's memorandum on
the continuity of Senate operations and remove voting in times
of crisis.
At the roundtable, the Subcommittee heard from one panel of
participants including Martin B. Gold, Partner, Capitol
Counsel, LLC; Lorelei Kelly, Director of Congressional
Modernization, Beeck Center for Social Impact and Innovation,
Georgetown University; and Joshua C. Huder, Ph.D., Senior
Fellow, the Government Affairs Institute, Georgetown
University.
Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Oversight of the Implementation of the
STOP Act. December 10, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116-)
The Subcommittee's seventh hearing examined the
implementation of the Synthetics Trafficking & Overdose
Prevention (STOP) Act, which became law in 2018. The STOP Act
requires advance electronic data on all inbound international
packages, including packages coming from China. Starting
January 1, 2021, the STOP Act requires the Postal Service to
refuse any inbound international packages without advance
electronic data. The deadline was later pushed until March 15,
2021.
One panel of witnesses testified at the hearing including
Eric F. Green, Director of Specialized and Technical Agencies,
Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, U.S. Department
of State; Robert Cintron, Vice President, Logistics, United
States Postal Service; and Thomas F. Overacker, Executive
Director, Cargo and Conveyance Security, Office of Field
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security.
III. LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES DURING THE 116th CONGRESS
The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations does not have
legislative authority, but because its investigations play an
important role in bringing issues to the attention of Congress
and the public, the Subcommittee's work contributes to the
development of legislative initiatives. The Subcommittee's
activity during the 116th Congress was no exception, with
Subcommittee hearings and Members playing prominent roles in
several legislative initiatives.
A. Safeguarding American Innovation Act (S. 3997)
Senators Portman and Carper introduced the Safeguarding
American Innovation Act (SAIA) on June 18, 2020. The
legislation was based on two Subcommittee reports: (1) China's
Impact on the U.S. Education System and (2) Threats to the U.S.
Research Enterprise: China's Talent Recruitment Plans. The
legislation included provisions that would:
Amend Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
212(3)A to provide State Department the authority to deny
visas to certain foreign nationals seeking access to sensitive
technologies when providing them a visa is not in the national
interest.
Revise 22 USC 2452 to require certain visa
sponsors to disclose to the State Department what sensitive
technologies foreign researchers will access and what
appropriate safeguards they have to prevent foreign nationals'
unauthorized access to sensitive technologies.
Require Federal grant-making agencies to share
information about grantees under investigation; create a U.S.
government wide database of Federal grantees; and standardize
the grant application process.
Revise Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of
1965 to require universities to report any foreign gift of
$50,000 or more and allow the Department of Education to fine
universities that repeatedly fail to disclose these gifts.
Make grant application fraud a crime under 18
USC.
SAIA was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs. The Committee considered SAIA on July 22,
2020 and reported out favorably by unanimous consent. SAIA was
also sponsored by Sens. Barrasso, Blackburn, Braun, Coons,
Cortex Masto, Hassan, Hawley, Manchin, Risch, Rubio, R. Scott,
Shaheen, Tillis, Grassley, Johnson, McSally, Lankford, and
Romney.
B. To amend the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, Fiscal Year 1979,
relating to the conduct of knowledge diplomacy (S. 3996)
This legislation was introduced by Senators Portman and
Carper on June 18, 2020 based on the Subcommittee's report
titled ``Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China's
Talent Recruitment Plans'' The legislation would authorize
State Department to negotiate and manage U.S. scientific
partnerships that are in the U.S. national interest, assist
allies in securing their research enterprises from hostile
governments, and report these efforts to Congress.
The legislation was referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations and also cosponsored by Sens. Barrasso, Blackburn,
Braun, Coons, Cortez Masto, Hassan, Hawley, Manchin, Risch,
Rubio, R. Scott, Shaheen, and Tillis.
IV. REPORTS, PRINTS, AND STUDIES
In connection with its investigations, the Subcommittee
often issues lengthy and detailed reports. During the 116th
Congress, the Subcommittee released eleven such reports, listed
below.
A. China's Impact on the U.S. Education System, February 27, 2019
(Report Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staff of the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and released in
conjunction with the Subcommittee's hearing on February 28,
2019)
At the start of the 116th Congress, Subcommittee staff
released a 93-page bipartisan report culminating its
investigation into Confucius Institutes on American colleges
and universities. The Subcommittee staff report found that
Confucius Institutes are controlled, funded, and often staffed
by the Chinese government. The report also detailed China's
one-sided treatment of U.S. schools and key State Department
programs in China, and documents the lack of oversight by the
Departments of State and Education of U.S. Confucius
Institutes. Below is a summary of the findings of the staff
report.
When China sought to market itself to students around the
world, it looked to its past. Confucius, the ancient Chinese
philosopher, is synonymous with morality, justice, and honesty.
The Chinese government capitalized on this rich legacy and
began establishing Confucius Institutes on college campuses
around the world in 2004, including the first in the United
States at the University of Maryland. Today, there are more
than 100 Confucius Institutes in the United States, the most of
any country.
The Chinese government funds Confucius Institutes and
provides Chinese teachers to teach language classes to students
and non-student community members. In addition to Chinese
language classes, Confucius Institutes host cultural events,
including Chinese New Year celebrations, cooking classes,
speakers, and dance and music performances. These selective
events depict China as approachable and compassionate; rarely
are events critical or controversial. The Chinese government
also funds and provides language instructors for Confucius
Classrooms, which offer classes for kindergarten through 12th
grade students. Confucius Classrooms are currently in 519
elementary, middle, and high schools in the United States.
Continued expansion of the program is a priority for China.
Confucius Institute funding comes with strings that can
compromise academic freedom. The Chinese government approves
all teachers, events, and speakers. Some U.S. schools
contractually agree that both Chinese and U.S. laws will apply.
The Chinese teachers sign contracts with the Chinese government
pledging they will not damage the national interests of China.
Such limitations attempt to export China's censorship of
political debate and prevent discussion of potentially
politically sensitive topics. Indeed, U.S. school officials
told the Subcommittee that Confucius Institutes were not the
place to discuss controversial topics like the independence of
Taiwan or the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. As one U.S.
school administrator explained to the Subcommittee, when
something is ``funded by the Chinese government, you know what
you're getting.''
Confucius Institutes exist as one part of China's broader,
long-term strategy. Through Confucius Institutes, the Chinese
government is attempting to change the impression in the United
States and around the world that China is an economic and
security threat. Confucius Institutes' soft power encourages
complacency towards China's pervasive, long-term initiatives
against both government critics at home and businesses and
academic institutions abroad. Those long-term initiatives
include it's Made in China 2025 plan, a push to lead the world
in certain advanced technology manufacturing. The Thousand
Talents program is another state-run initiative designed to
recruit Chinese researchers in the United States to return to
China for significant financial gain--bringing with them the
knowledge gained at U.S. universities and companies.
Contracting with the Chinese Government. The Chinese
government runs the Confucius Institute program out of the
Ministry of Education's Office of Chinese Language Council
International, known as ``Hanban.'' Each U.S. school signs a
contract with Hanban establishing the terms of hosting a
Confucius Institute. Contracts reviewed by the Subcommittee
generally contain provisions that state both Chinese and U.S.
laws apply; limit public disclosure of the contract; and
terminate the contract if the U.S. school take actions that
``severely harm the image or reputation'' of the Confucius
Institute.
The Chinese director and teachers at each Confucius
Institute also sign contracts with Hanban. The contract with
Hanban makes clear a Chinese director or teacher will be
terminated if they ``violate Chinese laws;'' ``engage in
activities detrimental to national interests;'' or
``participate in illegal organizations.'' In fact, the contract
states the Chinese director and teachers must ``conscientiously
safeguard national interests'' and report to the Chinese
Embassy within one month of arrival in the United States.
Resources Provided by Hanban. U.S. schools that contract
with Hanban receive substantial funding and resources to
establish the Confucius Institute on campus. At the outset,
Hanban typically provides a U.S. school between $100,000 and
$200,000 in start-up costs, around 3,000 books, and other
materials. Hanban also selects and provides a Chinese director
and teachers at no cost to the U.S. school. While school
officials have the opportunity to interview candidates for
these positions, there is little-to-no transparency into how
the Chinese government selects the individuals that schools
must choose from. Nor did U.S. school officials interviewed by
the Subcommittee know if candidates would meet the school's
hiring standards. Hanban requires director and teacher
candidates to pass English proficiency tests and undergo a
psychological exam to determine adaptability to living and
teaching in the United States. Beyond that, U.S. schools'
understanding of the selection process was limited, at best.
Expansion to Kindergarten through 12th Grade. China did not
stop at expanding at university and college campuses. The next
phase of Confucius Institutes involved funding teachers for
Confucius Classrooms in K-12 grade school. There are currently
519 Confucius Classrooms operating in the United States with
expansion of this program a top priority for China. In the
United States, a Confucius Institute receives funding and
instructors directly from Hanban and passes it to the K-12
grade school to support affiliated Confucius Classrooms.
The Cost of Confucius Institutes. The investment by China
in U.S. Confucius Institutes is substantial. Since 2006, the
Subcommittee determined China directly provided over $158
million in funding to U.S. schools for Confucius Institutes. A
number of U.S. schools, however, failed to properly report this
funding as required by law. The Department of Education
requires all postsecondary schools to report 3 foreign gifts of
$250,000 or more from a single source within a calendar year of
receiving them. Despite that legal requirement, nearly 70
percent of U.S. schools that received more than $250,000 from
Hanban failed to properly report that amount to the Department
of Education.
The Department of Education last issued guidance to U.S.
schools on foreign gift reporting requirements in 2004, the
same year the first Confucius Institute opened in the United
States. As China opened over 100 additional Confucius
Institutes in the United States over the last 15 years, the
Department of Education remained silent.
Visa Failures. The State Department is responsible for
issuing visas to any Chinese director or teacher entering the
United States to work at a Confucius Institute. Some U.S.
schools have struggled to comply with the requirements of the
Exchange Visitor Visa (or ``J-1''). In 2018, the State
Department revoked 32 J-1 Professor and Research Scholar visas
for Confucius Institute teachers who were not conducting
research, but instead were teaching at K-12 schools. The State
Department also found evidence that one Confucius Institute
Chinese director improperly coached the teachers to discuss
their research during interviews with State Department
investigators.
China's Lack of Reciprocity. In response to the growing
popularity of Confucius Institutes in the United States, the
State Department initiated a public diplomacy program in China.
Between 2010 and the issuance of the Subcommittee's report, the
State Department had provided $5.1 million in grant funding for
29 ``American Cultural Centers'' or ACCs in China. Through the
ACC program, a U.S. school partners with a Chinese school, much
like a Confucius Institute. The U.S. school then uses the grant
funds to create a space on the campus of the Chinese partner
school to ``enable Chinese audiences to better understand the
United States, its culture, society, government, language, law,
economic center, and values.'' ACCs are notably different from
Confucius Institutes, however, as the State Department does not
pay or vet instructors or directors; provide books or
materials; or veto proposed events. Even so, the Chinese
government stifled the establishment of the ACC program from
the start.
In all, the State Department provided 29 U.S. schools with
grant funds to establish ACCs with a partner Chinese schools.
For some U.S schools, roadblocks to opening their ACCs appeared
immediately. For example, after extensive negotiations, one
Chinese school refused to open a proposed ACC, stating it
didn't see a need to move forward. An official from the U.S.
school seeking to open the ACC, however, believed China's
Ministry of Education told the partner school not to proceed
with the contract. This official wrote in an email to his
colleagues, ``This is a typical Chinese political euphemism.
Obviously, [the Chinese University] was instructed by [the
Ministry of Education] not to proceed with our proposal.'' The
U.S. school returned the grant funds to the State Department.
The ACCs that did open found they needed permission from
their Chinese host schools to hold most cultural events. One
Chinese host school refused to allow its ACC to host a play
about the life of Muhammad Ali. Another denied approval for a
lecture series on policy issues facing Americans. One U.S.
school official who staffed an ACC told the Subcommittee that
members of the local Communist Party often participated in the
approval process. Another U.S. school official left the ACC
after two sessions of extensive questioning by Chinese police
officers regarding her involvement with the ACC and the State
Department. When the U.S. school official returned to the
United States, a colleague told her that Chinese police
interrogation of school officials was common and that she was
now just ``part of the club.''
In all, the State Department documented over 80 instances
in the past four years where the Chinese government directly
interfered with U.S. diplomacy efforts in China. Interference
with State Department officials or events took a number of
forms. One example involved a Chinese official telling a U.S.
official an ACC no longer existed; the U.S. official easily
confirmed the continued existence of the ACC through its U.S.
partner school. One U.S. official was told she applied too late
to attend the opening of an ACC after submitting the request a
month before. In other instances, the Chinese school canceled
approved events, sometimes as late as the night before.
In December 2017, the State Department Inspector General
found the ACC mission was largely ineffective. In October 2018,
the State Department ended all ACC program grant funding in
order to conduct an internal assessment of the program. At the
time of the issuance of the Subcommittee's report, the
Department indicated that it had no plans for future ACC
grants.
The Need for Transparency and Reciprocity. Schools in the
United States--from kindergarten to college--have provided a
level of access to the Chinese government that the Chinese
government has refused to provide to the United States. That
level of access can stifle academic freedom and provide
students and others exposed to Confucius Institute programming
with an incomplete picture of Chinese government actions and
policies that run counter to U.S. interests at home and abroad.
Absent full transparency regarding how Confucius Institutes
operate and full reciprocity for U.S. cultural outreach efforts
on college campuses in China, Confucius Institutes should not
continue in the United States.
Findings and recommendations from this investigation were
incorporated into S. 3997, Safeguarding American Innovation
Act.
B. How Equifax Neglected Cybersecurity and Suffered A Devastated Data
Breach, March 6, 2019 (Report Prepared by the Majority and
Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
and released in conjunction with the Subcommittee's hearing on
March 7, 2019)
In March 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 67-page
bipartisan report detailing the repeated failures over years on
the part of Equifax, one of the nation's largest consumer
reporting agencies, that led to a devastating data breach in
2017. As a result of poor cybersecurity practices, Equifax
failed to adequately protect the sensitive information of more
than 145 million Americans, including Social Security numbers
and driver's license and passport information. A summary of the
staff report is found below.
The effects of data breaches are often long-lasting and
challenging to reverse. Victims who have had their sensitive
personal or financial information stolen by hackers can be left
with years of expense and hassle. No type of entity or sector
of the economy has been immune to data breaches. In 2018 alone,
Google+, Facebook, Ticketfly, T-Mobile, Orbitz, Saks, Lord &
Taylor, and Marriott all announced significant breaches. The
importance of protecting personally identifiable information
(``PII'') grows with every successive data breach.
Consumers and businesses are well aware of the need to
safeguard items like driver's licenses, credit cards, and
financial records that criminals can use to their advantage.
Consumers also understand the need to protect information like
online passwords, pin numbers, and Social Security numbers. But
a consumer taking appropriate care of this information may not
be enough to keep PII out of the hands of criminal hackers. In
the modern world, businesses collect and compile data about
their customers and potential customers. Without proper
precautions, this information can be stored or transmitted in
ways that leave it vulnerable to theft.
The information collected by consumer reporting agencies
(``CRAs'') to compile credit reports is one example of PII that
must be protected. This information includes a consumer's name,
nicknames, date of birth, Social Security number, telephone
numbers, and current and former addresses. Credit reports also
typically include a list of all open and closed credit
accounts, account balances, account payment histories, and the
names of creditors. The information tells the story of a
consumer's financial life and can determine whether they can
rent an apartment, buy a car, or qualify for a home loan. If
stolen, criminals can use it to do significant financial harm.
The steps CRAs take to safeguard consumers' credit histories
are extremely important. If that information is compromised,
consumers should know to be on heightened alert to monitor
their finances and mitigate any potential damage.
In 2017, one of the largest CRAs, Equifax Inc.
(``Equifax'') announced that it had suffered a data breach that
involved the PII of over 145 million Americans. The
Subcommittee investigated the causes of this breach to identify
ways to prevent future incidents of this scope. The
Subcommittee also reviewed the efforts of Equifax's two largest
competitors, Experian plc (``Experian'') and TransUnion LLC
(``TransUnion''), in responding to the vulnerability that
ultimately led to the Equifax data breach. Highlights of the
Subcommittee's investigative results, including findings and
recommendations, are provided below.
Equifax Failed to Prioritize Cybersecurity. Equifax had no
standalone written corporate policy governing the patching of
known cyber vulnerabilities until 2015. After implementing this
policy, Equifax conducted an audit of its patch management
efforts, which identified a backlog of over 8,500 known
vulnerabilities that had not been patched. This included more
than 1,000 vulnerabilities the auditors deemed critical, high,
or medium risks that were found on systems that could be
accessed by individuals from outside of Equifax's information
technology (``IT'') networks. The audit report concluded, among
other things, that Equifax did not abide by the schedule for
addressing vulnerabilities mandated by its own patching policy.
It also found that the company had a reactive approach to
installing patches and used what the auditors called an ``honor
system'' for patching that failed to ensure that patches were
installed. The audit report also noted that Equifax lacked a
comprehensive IT asset inventory, meaning it lacked a complete
understanding of the assets it owned. This made it difficult,
if not impossible, for Equifax to know if vulnerabilities
existed on its networks. If a vulnerability cannot be found, it
cannot be patched.
Equifax never conducted another audit after the 2015 audit
and left several of the issues identified in the 2015 audit
report unaddressed in the months leading up to the 2017 data
breach.
Equifax Could Not Follow Its Own Policies in Patching the
Vulnerability That Ultimately Caused the Breach. Equifax's
patching policy required the company's IT department to patch
critical vulnerabilities within 48 hours. The company's
security staff learned of a critical vulnerability in certain
versions of Apache Struts--a widely-used piece of web
application software--on March 8, 2017, from the U.S. Computer
Emergency Readiness Team at the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
gave the vulnerability the highest criticality score possible;
it was widely known that the vulnerability was easy to exploit.
Equifax employees circulated news of the vulnerability through
an internal alert the next day that went to a list of more than
400 company employees.
Equifax held monthly meetings to discuss cyber threats and
vulnerabilities, but senior managers did not routinely attend
these meetings and follow-up was limited. The Apache Struts
vulnerability was discussed during the March 2017 and April
2017 meetings, but not discussed at any subsequent monthly
meetings. The Subcommittee interviewed the leadership of the
Equifax IT and security staffs and learned that none of them
regularly attended these monthly meetings or specifically
recalled attending the March 2017 meeting. In addition, the
Chief Information Officer (``CIO''), who oversaw the IT
department during 2017, referred to patching as a ``lower level
responsibility that was six levels down'' from him.
Equifax Failed to Locate and Patch Apache Struts. The
Equifax developer who was aware of Equifax's use of Apache
Struts software was not included in the 400-person email
distribution list used to circulate information on the
vulnerability. The developer's manager, however, was on the
distribution list and received the alert, but failed to forward
it to the developer or anyone on the developer's team. As a
result, the key developer never received the alert. Equifax
added application owners to the list after the breach.
The Subcommittee also learned that Equifax developers were
individually responsible for subscribing to push notifications
from software vendors about security vulnerabilities. The
developer who knew of the company's use of Apache Struts
software was not subscribed to notifications from Apache and
did not receive any alerts about the vulnerability.
On March 14, 2017--nearly a week after the Apache Struts
vulnerability was disclosed--Equifax added new rules to the
company's intrusion prevention system intended to help it
thwart efforts to exploit the vulnerability. With these new
protections in place, Equifax believed it had the ability to
identify and block exploit attempts and did block several
attempts the same day the rules were installed.
None of Equifax's subsequent scans identified the
vulnerable version of Apache Struts running on Equifax's
network. And since Equifax lacked a comprehensive inventory of
its IT assets, it did not know that the vulnerable version of
Apache Struts remained on its system.
Equifax Left Itself Open to Attack Due to Poor
Cybersecurity Practices. Equifax was unable to detect attackers
entering its networks because it failed to take the steps
necessary to see incoming malicious traffic online.
Website owners install Secure Sockets Layer (``SSL'')
certificates to protect and encrypt online interactions with
their servers. If an SSL certificate expires, transactions are
no longer protected. As part of an IT management effort
unrelated to the Apache Struts vulnerability, Equifax installed
dozens of new SSL certificates on the night of July 29, 2017,
to replace certificates that had expired. This included a new
certificate for the expired SSL certificate for its online
dispute portal. The SSL certificate needed to be up-to-date to
properly monitor the online dispute portal, but had expired
eight months earlier in November 2016. Almost immediately after
updating the SSL certificate, company employees observed
suspicious internet traffic from its online dispute portal that
they were able to trace to an IP address in China, a country
where Equifax does not operate. After blocking the IP address,
Equifax observed similar traffic the following day to another
IP address that appeared to be connected to a Chinese entity
and decided to take the online dispute portal offline. Equifax
later determined that the hackers first gained access to
Equifax's system through the online dispute portal on May 13,
2017, meaning the hackers had 78 days to maneuver undetected.
Equifax confirmed to the Subcommittee that the Apache
Struts vulnerability facilitated the data breach that began in
May 2017.
The Damage Done by the Hackers Could Have Been Minimized.
Once inside Equifax's online dispute portal, the hackers also
accessed other Equifax databases as they searched for other
systems containing PII. They eventually found a data repository
that also contained unencrypted usernames and passwords that
allowed the hackers to access additional Equifax databases. The
information accessed primarily included names, Social Security
numbers, birth dates, addresses, and, in some instances,
driver's license and credit card numbers.
The usernames and passwords the hackers found were saved on
a file share by Equifax employees. Equifax told the
Subcommittee that it decided to structure its networks this way
in an effort to support efficient business operations.
In addition, Equifax did not have basic tools in place to
detect and identify changes to files, a protection which would
have generated real-time alerts and detected the unauthorized
changes the hackers were making.
Equifax Waited Six Weeks Before Notifying the Public It Was
Breached. Equifax employees discovered the suspicious activity
that was later determined to be a data breach on July 29, 2017.
Equifax's then-Chief Executive Officer, Richard Smith, learned
of the breach on July 31 and that consumer PII maintained by
Equifax had likely been stolen on August 15, 2017. Mr. Smith
waited until August 22 to begin notifying members of Equifax's
Board of Directors. Equifax publicly announced the data breach
on September 7, six weeks after learning of it and nearly four
months after the hackers entered Equifax's networks. Because
Equifax was unaware of all the assets it owned, unable to patch
the Apache Struts vulnerability, and unable to detect attacks
on key portions of its network, for months consumers were
unaware that criminals had obtained their most sensitive
personal and financial information and that they should take
steps to protect themselves from fraud. Equifax officials say
the company chose to notify the public only after determining
every single individual impacted by the breach.
There is no national uniform standard requiring a private
entity to notify affected individuals in the event of a data
breach. Instead, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and
several U.S. territories have enacted their own legislation
requiring public disclosure of security breaches of PII. Some
states require notification after any breach of non-encrypted
personal information, while others require notification only if
the breach is likely to cause ``substantial harm'' to
individuals. Some states require companies to notify affected
individuals within a set number of days, while others simply
require private entities to provide notice ``without
unreasonable delay.'' This creates a patchwork of uncertainty
for companies and consumers responding to data breaches. For
example, Target, one of the largest retail chains in the United
States, notified the public seven days after learning that it
suffered a data breach. By contrast, Yahoo! suffered data
breaches in 2013 and 2014, but did not disclose them until 2016
and 2017, respectively.
Equifax Executives Believe They Did All They Could to
Prevent the Breach. The Subcommittee interviewed current and
former Equifax employees from the information security and IT
departments. Their responses varied, but most said they believe
that the security team's actions were an appropriate response
to the Apache Struts vulnerability. The Director of Global
Threats and Vulnerability Management from 2014 to 2017 said
``security wasn't first'' at Equifax before the data breach,
but that the data breach ``made everyone focus on it more.''
The former Countermeasures Manager in place from 2016 to 2017
said he believes the response to the vulnerability was ``not
only defensible, but justifiable.'' The CIO at Equifax from
2010 to 2017 oversaw the company employees responsible for
installing patches but said he was never made aware of the
Apache Struts vulnerability and does not understand why the
vulnerability ``was not caught.'' He does not think Equifax
could have done anything differently.
TransUnion and Experian Avoided a Breach. TransUnion and
Experian received the same information as the public and
Equifax regarding the Apache Struts vulnerability, but the
approach that each company took to cybersecurity was different
from Equifax's. Both companies had deployed software to verify
the installation of security patches, ran scans more
frequently, and maintained an IT asset inventory. In response
to the Apache Struts vulnerability, TransUnion began patching
vulnerable versions of the software within days. Experian
retained a software security firm in March 2017 to conduct
targeted vulnerability scans of Apache Struts vulnerabilities.
After finding an Experian server was running a vulnerable
version, Experian took the server offline and began patching
it. There is no indication that TransUnion or Experian were
attacked by hackers seeking to exploit the Apache Struts
vulnerability.
Equifax Failed to Preserve Key Internal Chat Records.
Equifax was unable to produce potentially responsive documents
related to the data breach because the company failed to take
steps to preserve records created on an internal chat platform.
Equifax's document retention policy requires the company to
preserve several types of documents for different periods of
time. In general, Equifax employees are required to preserve
all business records, unless they are considered ``disposable''
under the policy. The policy also gives the Equifax legal
department the authority to halt the disposal of any records
that are subject to a legal hold due to litigation or a
government investigation.
During its investigation, the Subcommittee learned that
Equifax employees conducted substantive discussions of the
discovery and mitigation of the data breach using Microsoft
Lync, an instant messaging product. Equifax's policy was that
records of these chats were disposable. As such, Equifax
maintained the default setting on the chat platform not to
archive chats. After discovering the data breach on July 29,
2017, Equifax did not issue a legal hold for related documents
until August 22, 2017. Despite the legal hold, Equifax did not
change the default setting on the Lync platform and begin
archiving chats until September 15, 2017. As a result, the
Subcommittee does not have a complete record of documents
concerning the breach.
C. Federal Cybersecurity: America's Data at Risk, June 25, 2019 (Report
Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations)
In June 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 95-page
bipartisan report reviewing Federal Government agencies'
compliance with basic cybersecurity standards found in the
Federal Information Security Management Act. A summary of the
staff report is found below.
Federal Government agencies are the frequent target of
cybersecurity attacks. From 2006 to 2015, the number of cyber
incidents reported by Federal agencies increased by more than
1,300 percent. In 2017 alone, Federal agencies reported 35,277
cyber incidents. The Government Accountability Office (``GAO'')
has included cybersecurity on its ``high risk'' list every year
since 1997.
No agency is immune to attack and the list of Federal
agencies compromised by hackers continues to grow. In the past
five years, agencies reporting data breaches include the United
States Postal Service, the Internal Revenue Service, and even
the White House. One of the largest breaches of government
information occurred in 2015 when a hacker ex-filtrated over 22
million security clearance files from the Office of Personnel
Management (``OPM''). Those files contained extensive personal
and potentially comprising information. We may never know the
full impact on our national security of the OPM breach.
The number of data breaches agencies have reported in
recent years is not surprising given the current cybersecurity
posture of the Federal Government. A recent report by the
Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') made clear that
agencies ``do not understand and do not have the resources to
combat the current threat environment.'' This is especially
concerning given the information agencies must collect and
hold. This report documents the extent to which the Federal
Government is the target of cybersecurity attacks, how key
Federal agencies have failed to address vulnerabilities in
their IT infrastructure, and how these failures have left
America's sensitive personal information unsafe and vulnerable
to theft.
Federal agencies hold sensitive information. The Federal
Government holds extensive amounts of highly personal
information on most Americans. For example, the Department of
Education collects financial data on students and parents
applying for college loans. Disabled Americans prove they are
entitled to disability benefits from the Social Security
Administration by providing years of health records documenting
medical issues. Prospective homeowners provide payroll and
savings information to the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to qualify for home loans. The Department of
Homeland Security maintains travel records on citizens
traveling abroad and returning to the United States.
Federal agencies also hold information pertaining to
national security and other vital government functions, some of
which could be dangerous in the wrong hands. The Department of
State holds and vets visa information for foreign nationals
applying to come to the United States. The Department of
Transportation certifies aircraft through the review of
aircraft design, flight test information, and maintenance and
operational suitability. The Department of Agriculture
maintains information on hazardous pathogens and toxins that
could threaten animals or plants.
Protecting this information from cybersecurity attacks
could not be more important.
Congress required OMB and agencies to secure Federal
networks. In 2002, Congress recognized the importance of
protecting information held by the government by passing the
Federal Information Security Management Act. That law put OMB
in charge of Federal cybersecurity, required agencies to
provide cybersecurity training for employees, and mandated
agencies develop procedures for identifying, reporting, and
responding to cyber incidents. Twelve years later, in 2014,
Congress updated the law through the Federal Information
SecurityModernization Act (``FISMA''). The new law reaffirmed
OMB's ultimate authority over Federal cybersecurity and its
responsibility for guiding and overseeing agencies' individual
cybersecurity efforts. It also directed the Department of
Homeland Security (``DHS'') to ``administer the implementation
of agency [cyber] security policies and practices.'' This
includes activities related to monitoring Federal networks and
detecting and preventing attacks aimed at Federal agencies. DHS
also develops directives implementing OMB cybersecurity
policies. These directives mandate that Federal agencies take
certain actions to protect information and systems from
emerging cybersecurity threats. In doing so, DHS consults with
the National Institute of Science and Technology's (``NIST'')
to ensure its directives are consistent with NIST's
cybersecurity framework. That framework ``is a risk-based
approach to managing cybersecurity risk'' with five core
functions essential to an effective approach to cybersecurity:
(1) Identify (develop the organizational understanding to
manage cybersecurity);
(2) Protect (develop and implement the appropriate
cybersecurity safeguards);
(3) Detect (develop and implement the appropriate
activities to identify a cybersecurity event);
(4) Respond (develop and implement the appropriate
activities to take action in response to the detection of a
cybersecurity event); and
(5) Recover (develop and implement the appropriate
activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore any
capabilities impaired due to a cybersecurity event).
Congress also tasked each agency's Inspector General
(``IG'') to annually audit compliance with basic cybersecurity
standards based on the NIST cybersecurity framework. The
Subcommittee reviewed the past ten years of audits for DHS and
seven other agencies: (1) the Department of State (``State'');
(2) the Department of Transportation (``DOT''); (3) the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (``HUD''); (4) the
Department of Agriculture (``USDA''); (5) the Department of
Health and Human Services (``HHS''); (6) the Department of
Education (``Education''); and (7) the Social Security
Administration (``SSA''). These seven agencies were cited by
OMB as having the lowest ratings with regard to cybersecurity
practices based on NIST's cybersecurity framework in fiscal
year 2017.
Agencies currently fail to comply with basic cybersecurity
standards. During the Subcommittee's review, a number of
concerning trends emerged regarding the eight agencies' failure
to comply with basic NIST cybersecurity standards. In the most
recent audits at the time, the IGs found that seven of the
eight agencies reviewed by the Subcommittee failed to properly
protect personally identifiable information (``PII''). Five of
the eight agencies did not maintain a comprehensive and
accurate list of information technology (``IT'') assets.
Without a list of the agency's IT assets, the agency does not
know all of the applications operating on its network. If the
agency does not know the application is on its network, it
cannot secure the application. Six of the eight agencies failed
to install security patches. Vendors issue security patches to
secure vulnerabilities. Hackers exploit these vulnerabilities
during data breaches. Depending on the vulnerability and
abilities of the hacker, the vulnerability may allow access to
the agency's network. Multiple agencies, across multiple years,
failed to ensure systems had valid authorities to operate. An
authority to operate certifies that the system is in proper
working order, including an analysis and acceptance of any risk
the system may contain. All of the agencies used legacy systems
that were costly and difficult to secure. Legacy systems are
systems a vendor no longer supports or issues updates to patch
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
The IG audits identified several highly concerning issues
at certain agencies. For example, the Education IG found that
since 2011, the agency was unable to prevent unauthorized
outside devices from easily connecting to the agency's network.
In its 2018 audit, the IG found the agency had managed to
restrict unauthorized access to 90 seconds, but explained that
this was enough time for a malicious actor to ``launch an
attack or gain intermittent access to internal network
resources that could lead to'' exposing the agency's data. This
is concerning because that agency holds PII on millions of
Americans.
Agencies historically failed to comply with cybersecurity
standards. The failures cited above are not new. Inspectors
General have cited many of these same vulnerabilities for the
past decade. The IGs identified several common historical
failures at the eight agencies reviewed by the Subcommittee:
Protection of PII. Several agencies failed to properly
protect the PII entrusted to their care. These agencies
included State, DOT, HUD, Education, and SSA. The HUD IG has
noted this issue in nine of the last eleven audits.
Comprehensive list of IT assets. The IGs identified a
persistent issue with agencies failing to maintain an accurate
and comprehensive inventory of its IT assets. In the last
decade, IGs identified this as a recurrent problem for State,
DOT, HUD, HHS, and SSA.
Remediation of cyber vulnerabilities. Over the past decade,
IGs for all eight agencies reviewed by the Subcommittee found
each agency failed to timely remediate cyber vulnerabilities
and apply security patches. For example, the HUD and State IGs
identified the failure to patch security vulnerabilities seven
of the last ten annual audits. HHS and Education cybersecurity
audits highlighted failures to apply security patches eight out
of ten years. For the last nine years, USDA failed to timely
apply patches. Both DHS and DOT failed to properly apply
security patches for the last ten consecutive years.
Authority to operate. The IGs identified multiple agencies
that failed to ensure systems had valid authorities to operate.
These included DHS, DOT, HUD, USDA, HHS, and Education. For
example, HHS systems lacked valid authorities to operate for
the last nine consecutive audits. Additionally, the DHS IG
determined that DHS operated systems without valid authorities
in seven of the last ten audits. As stated, DHS is the agency
in charge of securing the networks of all other government
agencies.
Overreliance on legacy systems. The extensive use of legacy
systems was also a common issue identified by IGs. All eight
agencies examined by the Subcommittee relied on legacy systems.
For example, the DHS IG noted the use of unsupported operating
systems for at least the last four years, including Windows XP
and Windows 2003.
The President's 2019 budget request addressed the risks
associated with agencies' reliance on:
[A]ging legacy systems, [which] pose efficiency,
cybersecurity, and mission risk issues, such as ever-rising
costs to maintain them and an inability to meet current or
expected mission requirements. Legacy systems may also operate
with known security vulnerabilities that are either technically
difficult or prohibitively expensive to address and thus may
hinder agencies' ability to comply with critical cybersecurity
statutory and policy requirements.
OMB also recently confirmed the risks legacy systems pose.
In May 2018, OMB published the Federal Cybersecurity Risk
Determination Report and Action Plan. OMB explained that the
two most substantial issues contributing to agency risk were
the ``abundance of legacy information technology, which is
difficult and expensive to protect, as well as shortages of
experienced and capable cybersecurity personnel.'' That report
found that 71 of 96 agencies surveyed (or 74 percent) had
cybersecurity programs at risk. Twelve of those 71 agencies had
programs at high risk.
Chief Information Officer. In an effort to prioritize
agency cybersecurity, Congress established the position of
Chief Information Officer (``CIO'') in 1996. Since then,
Congress has increased the responsibilities of agency CIOs
several times. The most recent attempts were included in FISMA
and the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act,
which gave CIOs plenary governance over an agency's IT budget
and priorities. Despite these authorities, agencies still
struggle with empowering the CIO. In August 2018, GAO found
that none of the 24 major agencies--including the eight
examined by the Subcommittee--properly addressed the role of
CIO as Congress directed. These 24 agencies included the eight
agencies reviewed by the Subcommittee in this report.
Given the sustained vulnerabilities identified by numerous
Inspectors General, the Subcommittee finds that the Federal
Government has not fully achieved its legislative mandate under
FISMA and is failing to implement basic cybersecurity standards
necessary to protect America's sensitive data.
D. The True Cost of Government Shutdowns, September 17, 2019 (Report
Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations)
On September 17, 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 180-
page bipartisan report regarding the cost to American taxpayers
of the last three government shutdowns and the resulting
impacts on the economy and core government functions. A summary
of the findings of the staff report is found below.
The Constitution grants Congress the power of the purse.
Specifically, Congress has the sole responsibility to raise
revenue and appropriate money to fund the Federal Government.
When Congress and the President fail to reach agreement on
legislation to appropriate funds, affected Federal agencies
shut down and suspend most activities. During this time,
Federal law prevents most Federal employees from working and
most are sent home without pay. In recent shutdowns, however,
the spending legislation ultimately agreed upon by Congress and
the President provided back pay for Federal employees. As such,
the American taxpayer funded furloughed Federal employees'
salaries for the duration of each shutdown, even when employees
were not permitted to go to work.
This report documents the cost to the American taxpayer of
the last three government shutdowns. Federal workers were
furloughed and unable to work for 54 days during those three
government shutdowns. The Subcommittee surveyed 26 Federal
agencies and found the last three government shutdowns cost
taxpayers nearly $4 billion--at least $3.7 billion in back pay
to furloughed Federal workers, and at least $338 million in
other costs associated with the shutdowns, including extra
administrative work, lost revenue, and late fees on interest
payments. Agencies reported to the Subcommittee that the
combined total of furlough days during all three shutdowns was
about 14,859,144, representing an estimated 56,938 years of
lost productivity for those agency employees. These figures,
however, do not include data from some of the largest
government agencies, which were unable to provide complete
shutdown cost estimates to the Subcommittee, including the
Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Justice, and Commerce and
the Environmental Protection Agency.
This report also documents the impacts that shutdowns have
on important core government functions.
Congress created a process to pass appropriations to fund
the Federal Government. Under the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the budget process begins the
first Monday in February with the President sending the House
of Representatives and Senate Budget Committees a proposed
budget. This proposed budget is the President's recommendation
for funding the government the following fiscal year, which
begins October 1. The Budget Committees consider that request
and develop their own budget proposal. The full House and
Senate are then required to pass a formal budget resolution
outlining topline spending levels by April 15. The House and
Senate Appropriations Committees then pass and send
appropriations bills to the full House and Senate for
consideration; the process divides funding for the entire
government into 12 separate bills. Each of the 12 regular
appropriations bills must pass both chambers, and the two
chambers work out any differences in the bills in conference.
Once the House and Senate pass the same versions of an
appropriations bill, Congress sends the bill to the President
for signature.
Congress designed this process to orderly fund the Federal
Government as it determines what programs to fund and the
funding allocated to each program. This process also allows the
President to make recommendations for program funding levels
and permits agencies to plan for the year ahead. Today, that
orderly process is rarely followed.
The Federal Government routinely operates on temporary
continuing resolutions. Ideally, Congress and the President
complete the budget process before the end of the fiscal year
and enact all 12 appropriations bills before October 1. Since
1997, however, some or all of the executive branch has operated
under a continuing resolution or ``CR.'' A CR provides
temporary funding when Congress is unable to pass a
comprehensive budget. Since 1997, Congress has passed 117 CRs
to temporarily fund the government--often passing multiple CRs
each fiscal year. The CRs have ranged in duration from one day
to the entire fiscal year.
When Congress cannot pass the 12 appropriations bills or a
CR, the portion of the government without appropriated funding
shuts down. In the last five years, this has occurred three
times resulting in three government shutdowns: 16 days in
October 2013; 3 days in January 2018; and most recently, 35
days from December 2018 to January 2019.
Rather than saving taxpayer money, shutdowns produce
significant costs to the American taxpayer. While Federal
workers are not paid during a shutdown, Congress routinely
provides full back pay to those workers when it ultimately
passes appropriations. The government pays Federal workers for
the time they were furloughed and unable to work due to the
shutdown. However, the American taxpayer incurs significant
lost productivity costs due to the furlough. Federal agencies
reported they were unable to perform important functions during
the shutdowns, including:
Investigations of bad actors who were potentially breaking
Federal laws were suspended, including investigations by the
Departments of Justice and Treasury, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission.
Investigators were unable to pursue leads, develop evidence of
crimes, or bring enforcement actions against individuals and
corporate entities for bad acts.
The Department of Justice canceled approximately
60,000 immigration hearings for non-detained aliens scheduled
to take place during the FY 2019 shutdown. This delay likely
extended the current two-year wait time for individuals waiting
for a hearing to determine their immigration status.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (``CPSC'')
tabled any outstanding decisions regarding the recall of
potentially dangerous consumer products, leaving potentially
dangerous products on the market and available to consumers. No
recalls were posted on the CPSC website during the FY 2019
shutdown. A recall notice posted on February 5, 2019 after the
shutdown noted that a drill posing a shock hazard to consumers
was ``previously announced independently on January 10, 2019 by
the firm due to the government furlough.''
National Parks, including Yellowstone National
Park and Grand Canyon National Park, were either closed or
unattended. Park visitors either had no access to parks or
encountered unattended parks with overflowing trashcans. The
lack of park attendants and rangers left sensitive habitats
vulnerable to damage. Nor were park rangers on site to help
lost or injured park visitors.
The Smithsonian Institution closed museums during
certain shutdowns. Tourists could not see any of the world-
renowned paintings in the National Gallery of Art in
Washington, D.C. Nor were they able to access other popular
destinations like the National Museum of American History and
the National Air and Space Museum. With its museums closed, the
Smithsonian also lost significant revenue from its on-site
shops, theaters, and dining facilities.
Some agencies could not determine the cost of the shutdown.
The Subcommittee based its cost estimate of nearly $4 billion
on the information provided by 26 Federal agencies. Some
agencies, however, were unable to provide one or more
categories of the requested financial information. For example,
the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Justice, Commerce, and
the Environmental Protection Agency did not know the amount
paid to employees in back pay following certain shutdowns.
Other agencies were unable to provide information about other
costs associated with shutdown impacts such as extra
administrative work, lost revenue, project delays, and late
payment fees. Therefore, certain shutdown costs from those
agencies are not included in the Subcommittee's estimate.
The cost of a shutdown to the national economy. Shutting
down the government also affects the national economy. The
Congressional Budget Office (``CBO'') determined the most
recent partial shutdown ``delayed approximately $18 billion in
Federal discretionary spending for compensation and purchases
of goods and services and suspended some Federal services.'' As
a result of this reduced spending, the Congressional Budget
Office estimated that the shutdown reduced real GDP in the
fourth quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019 to what it
would have been otherwise by $3 billion and $8 billion,
respectively. CBO explained that real GDP should have grown at
a significantly faster rate if the shutdown had been averted.
Specifically, CBO quantified the effect of the partial shutdown
on the rate of annualized real GDP growth at 0.4 percent in the
first quarter of 2019, finding that quarterly real GDP growth
would have been 3.5 percent instead of the 3.1 percent that
actually occurred.
E. Abuses of the Federal Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Process, October
24, 2019 (Report Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs
of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and released in
conjunction with the Subcommittee's hearing on October 24,
2019)
In October 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 33-page
bipartisan report examining that documents abuses of the
Federal Government's online regulatory comment systems and the
government's lack of sufficient response to those abuses. A
summary of the findings of the report is found below.
Federal agencies depend on relevant, substantive
information from a wide variety of parties to assist them in
developing and updating Federal regulations. This information
includes comments submitted by members of the public,
businesses, non-profit organizations, and academics. This
process, known as ``notice-and-comment rulemaking,''
transitioned from paper to the internet in the early 2000s. As
a result, the public has more opportunity than ever to engage
in the Federal rulemaking process by reviewing electronic
regulatory dockets and submitting comments through portals like
Regulations.gov and the Federal Communications Commission's
(``FCC'') Electronic Comment Filing System (``ECFS'').
Like many popular news and social media websites, the
Federal Government's commenting systems have at times become
fora for profane, threatening, and abusive commentary. Recent
high-profile agency dockets have hosted profanity and threats
directed at agency officials and comments submitted falsely
under another person's identity. They have even been disrupted
by commenters submitting voluminous materials with the seeming
intention of overloading the system and disrupting the comment
period. The Federal agencies that host these platforms have not
yet found ways to cope with these abuses, which reduces the
effectiveness of the notice-and-comment process; costs taxpayer
funds to mitigate; allows identity theft-related crimes to go
unaddressed; and leaves the rulemaking process vulnerable to
disruptive activity.
After the FCC received nearly 24 million comments in the
course of just one rulemaking proceeding in 2017 and its
website crashed due to the volume of comments submitted
simultaneously, the Subcommittee initiated a review of Federal
commenting systems to understand their flaws and develop
recommendations to improve them.
In February 2021, the General Services Administration (GSA)
announced that it plans to adopt many of the recommendations
made in the report. For example, the staff report found that
Federal agencies did not have a means to prevent people from
using false identities to post comments or using bots to
facilitate abusive mass comment campaigns to overwhelm comment
systems or generate the appearance of a grassroots response to
a proposed regulation. The report recommended implementing
CAPTCHA-like technologies on regulatory comment systems and
developing ways to prevent people from submitting comments
under false identities. GSA announced it is implementing
reCAPTCHA and an Application Programming Interface to increase
security around large comment campaigns.
F. Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China's Talent Recruitment
Plans, November 18, 2019 (Report Prepared by the Majority and
Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
and released in conjunction with the Subcommittee's hearing on
November 19, 2019)
In November 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 105-page
bipartisan report documenting how American taxpayers have been
unwittingly funding the rise of China's economy and military
over the last two decades while Federal agencies have done
little to stop it. A summary of the report's findings is found
below.
American taxpayers contribute over $150 billion each year
to scientific research in the United States. Through entities
like the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes
of Health and the Department of Energy's National Labs,
taxpayers fund innovations that contribute to our national
security and profoundly change the way we live. America built
this successful research enterprise on certain values:
reciprocity, integrity, merit-based competition, and
transparency. These values foster a free exchange of ideas,
encourage the most rigorous research results to flourish, and
ensure that researchers receive the benefit of their
intellectual capital. The open nature of research in America is
manifest; we encourage our researchers and scientists to
``stand on the shoulders of giants.'' In turn, America attracts
the best and brightest. Foreign researchers and scholars travel
to the United States just to participate in the advancement of
science and technology.
Some countries, however, seek to exploit America's openness
to advance their own national interests. The most aggressive of
them has been China. China primarily does this through its more
than 200 talent recruitment plans--the most prominent of which
is the Thousand Talents Plan. Launched in 2008, the Thousand
Talents Plan incentivizes individuals engaged in research and
development in the United States to transmit the knowledge and
research they gain here to China in exchange for salaries,
research funding, lab space, and other incentives. China
unfairly uses the American research and expertise it obtains
for its own economic and military gain. In recent years,
Federal agencies have discovered talent recruitment plan
members who downloaded sensitive electronic research files
before leaving to return to China, submitted false information
when applying for grant funds, and willfully failed to disclose
receiving money from the Chinese government on U.S. grant
applications.
This report exposed how American taxpayer funded research
has contributed to China's global rise over the last 20 years.
During that time, China openly recruited U.S.-based
researchers, scientists, and experts in the public and private
sector to provide China with knowledge and intellectual capital
in exchange for monetary gain and other benefits. At the same
time, the Federal Government's grant-making agencies did little
to prevent this from happening, nor did the FBI and other
Federal agencies develop a coordinated response to mitigate the
threat.These failures continue to undermine the integrity of
the American research enterprise and endanger our national
security.
China aims to be the world's leader in science and
technology (``S&T'') by 2050. To achieve its S&T goals, China
has implemented a whole-of-government campaign to recruit
talent and foreign experts from around the world. China's
campaign is well financed. According to an analysis by the FBI,
China has pledged to spend 15 percent of its gross domestic
product on improving human resources from 2008 to 2020. That
amounts to an investment of more than $2 trillion. For the
Chinese government, international scientific collaboration is
not about advancing science, it is to advance China's national
security interests.
China's Talent Recruitment Plans. Foreign trained
scientists and experts provide China access to know-how,
expertise, and foreign technology--all necessary for China's
economic development and military modernization. While China
has created and manages more than 200 talent recruitment plans,
this report focuses on the Thousand Talents Plan. China
designed the Thousand Talents Plan to recruit 2,000 high-
quality overseas talents, including scientists, engineers,
entrepreneurs, and finance experts. The plan provides salaries,
research funding, lab space, and other incentives to lure
experts into researching for China. According to one report, by
2017, China dramatically exceeded its recruitment goal, having
recruited more than 7,000 ``high-end professionals,'' including
several Nobel laureates.
The Chinese Communist Party (the ``Party'') plays a lead
role in administering the Thousand Talents Plan. The Party
recognized the need to control overseas talent recruitment
efforts to ensure the program served its priorities. The Party
created a ``complex system of administration and oversight to
coordinate its recruitment efforts.'' The Party is able to
``exert exceptional'' levels of control over the Thousand
Talents Plan and other talent recruitment plans. To ensure
control, Thousand Talents Plan members sign legally binding
contracts.
Contracting with the Chinese Government. Thousand Talent
Plan members sign legally binding contracts with Chinese
institutions, like universities and research institutions. The
contracts can incentivize members to lie on grant applications
to U.S. grant-making agencies, set up ``shadow labs'' in China
working on research identical to their U.S. research, and, in
some cases, transfer U.S. scientists' hard-earned intellectual
capital. Some of the contracts also contain nondisclosure
provisions and require the Chinese government's permission to
terminate the agreement, giving the Chinese government
significant leverage over talent recruitment plan members.
These provisions are in stark contrast to the U.S. research
community's basic norms, values, and principles. Annexed to
this report are Chinese talent recruitment plan contracts that
illustrate exactly what talent recruitment plan members agree
to when they become members.
Case Examples. This report included selected examples from
U.S. grantmaking agencies involving Chinese talent recruitment
plan members. For example, talent recruitment plan members
removed 30,000 electronic files before leaving for China,
submitted false information when applying for grant funds,
filed a patent based on U.S. government-funded research, and
hired other Chinese talent recruitment plan members to work on
U.S. national security topics. One Chinese talent recruitment
plan member stole proprietary defense information related
toU.S. military jet engines, and others have contractually
agreed to give Chinese institutions intellectual property
rights that overlapped with research conducted at U.S.
institutions. Case examples provided by several Federal
agencies were included with the report.
Talent Plans Go Underground. Following public testimony and
U.S. government scrutiny, the Chinese government started
deleting online references to the Thousand Talents Plan in
October 2018. For example, China deleted news articles
featuring Thousand Talents Plan members, Chinese universities
stopped promoting the program on their websites, and the
official Thousand Talent Plan site deleted the names of
scientists participating in the program. The Chinese government
has also instructed talent recruitment organizations that ``the
phrase `Thousand Talents Plan' should not appear in written
circulars/notices.'' Despite this censorship, China's talent
recruitment plans continue.
The Subcommittee reviewed seven Federal agencies' efforts
to mitigate the threat that Chinese talent recruitment plans
pose to the U.S. research enterprise, including U.S.-funded
research. While China has a strategic plan to acquire knowledge
and intellectual property from researchers, scientists, and the
U.S. private sector, the U.S. government does not have a
comprehensive strategy to combat this threat.
The National Science Foundation (``NSF'') funds
approximately 27 percent of all federally funded basic research
at U.S. colleges and universities, leading to 12,000 annual
awards to more than 40,000 recipients. In light of Chinese
talent recruitment plan members' misappropriation of NSF
funding, NSF has taken several steps--albeit insufficient
ones--to mitigate this risk. As of July 2019, NSF policy
prohibits Federal employees from participating in foreign
talent recruitment plans, but the policy does not apply to NSF-
funded researchers. These NSF-funded researchers are the
individuals mostly likely to be members of foreign talent
recruitment plans. The NSF also does not vet grantees before
awarding them funding. Instead, NSF relies on sponsoring
institutions to vet and conduct due diligence on potential
grantees. NSF has no dedicated staff to ensure compliance with
NSF grant terms.
The National Institutes of Health (``NIH'') invests over
$31 billion annually in medical research through 50,000
competitive grants to more than 300,000 researchers. NIH has
recently found instances of talent recruitment plan members
committing grant fraud and transferring intellectual capital
and property. It also found possible malign foreign influence
in its peer review process. NIH has attempted to address these
issues, but significant gaps in NIH's grant integrity process
remain. Much like the NSF, NIH relies on institutions to
solicit and review disclosures of financial conflicts by its
employees participating in NIH-funded research. Unlike the NSF,
the NIH has a Division of Grants Compliance and Oversight that
conducts site visits at institutions to advance compliance and
provide oversight. The number of oversight visits to
institutions has fallen from 28 in 2012 to only three last
year. NIH officials remain concerned that China's talent
recruitment plans are more pervasive than what they have
uncovered to date.
The Department of Energy (``Energy'') is the largest
Federal sponsor of basic research in the physical sciences.
Energy awards $6.6 billion in grants and contracts annually
that support over 25,000 researchers at over 300 institutions
and National Labs. Energy's research funding and prominent role
in advanced research and development make it particularly
attractive to the Chinese government. Energy has recently
identified Thousand Talent Plan members working on sensitive
research at National Labs and Thousand Talent Plan members with
security clearances. Energy has been slow to address
vulnerabilities surrounding the openness of its National Labs
and its scientific collaboration with the 35,000 foreign
nationals who conduct research at the National Labs each year.
For example, in December 2018, Energy began requiring all
foreign nationals' curricula vitae be included in Foreign
Visits and Assignments requests to Energy facilities as well as
in the Foreign Access Central Tracking System database. Despite
30-year old Federal regulations prohibiting U.S. government
employees from receiving foreign compensation, Energy clarified
only this year that employees and contractors are prohibited
from participating in foreign talent recruitment plans.
The State Department (``State'') issues nonimmigrant visas
(``NIV'') to foreign nationals seeking to visit the United
States to study, work, or conduct research. It is on the front
line in the U.S. government efforts to protect against
intellectual property theft and illicit technology transfers.
While State has a process to review NIV applicants attempting
to violate export control laws, State's authority to deny visas
is limited. State's review process leads to less than five
percent of reviewed applicants being denied a visa. Nor does
State systematically track visa applicants linked to China's
talent recruitment plans, even though some applicants linked to
Chinese talent recruitment plans have engaged in intellectual
property theft.
The Department of Commerce's (``Commerce'') Bureau of
Industry and Security conducts assessments of defense-related
technologies and ``administers export controls of dual-use
items which have both military and commercial applications.''
Commerce is also responsible for issuing deemed export licenses
to firms that employ or host foreign nationals seeking to work
on controlled technology projects. The Subcommittee found that
Commerce rarely denies an application for a deemed export
license. Commerce's denial rate in 2018 for deemed export
licenses was only 1.1 percent. Commerce officials told the
Subcommittee that it has not revoked a deemed export license in
the past five years, despite the recent listing of new entities
on Commerce's Entity List that require additional scrutiny.
Commerce issued deemed export licenses to Chinese nationals who
participated in talent recruitment plans, had ties to Huawei,
and were affiliated with other concerning entities.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (``FBI'') protects the
United States from foreign intelligence operations and
espionage. The FBI, however, has recognized that it was ``was
slow to recognize the threat of the Chinese Talent Plans.'' It
was not until mid-2018, however, that FBI headquarters in
Washington, D.C. took control of the FBI's response to the
threat. Moreover, after collecting information on suspected
talent plan participants, the FBI waited nearly two years to
coordinate and provide those details to Federal grant-making
agencies. This delay likely prevented the Federal Government
from identifying talent recruitment plan members who engaged in
illegal or unethical grant practices or the unauthorized
transfer of technology. The FBI has yet to develop an
effective, nationwide strategy to warn universities, government
laboratories, and the broader public of the risks of foreign
talent recruitment plans.
The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(``OSTP'') has formal authority to convene all research funding
agencies on matters of policy through the National Science and
Technology Council. OSTP formally established a joint committee
in May 2019 to begin a policy review to coordinate efforts to
adopt best practices across the Federal Government to mitigate
foreign exploitation of the U.S. open innovation system. This
review is intended to develop a longer-term strategy for
balancing engagement and risk without stifling innovation. The
U.S. government's vast and varied array of grant-making
agencies complicates this policy review.
As American policy makers navigate an increasingly
complicated relationship with China, it is not in our national
security interest to fund China's economic and military
development with taxpayer dollars. China's talent recruitment
plans, including the Thousand Talents Plan, undermine the
integrity of our research enterprise and harm our economic and
national security interests.
U.S. universities and U.S.-based researchers must take
responsibility in addressing this threat. If U.S. universities
can vet employees for scientific rigor or allegations of
plagiarism, they also can vet for financial conflicts of
interests and foreign sources of funding. If U.S. researchers
can assess potential collaborators' research aptitude and their
past publications, they should know their collaborators'
affiliations and their research intentions.
The U.S. academic community is in the crosshairs of not
only foreign competitors contending for the best and brightest,
but also of foreign nation states that seek to transfer
valuable intellectual capital and steal intellectual property.
As the academic community looks to the Federal Government for
guidance and direction on mitigating threats, the U.S.
government must provide effective, useful, timely, and specific
threat information and tools to counter the threats. Based on
this investigation, the Subcommittee finds that the Federal
Government has failed to stop China from acquiring knowledge
and intellectual property from U.S. taxpayer funded researchers
and scientists. Nor do Federal agencies have a comprehensive
strategy to combat this threat.
Findings and recommendations associated with this staff
report led to the Safeguarding American Innovation Act.
G. Continuity of Senate Operations and Remote Voting in Times of
Crisis, April 29, 2020 (Report Prepared by the Majority and
Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
released in conjunction with the Subcommittee's roundtable on
April 30, 2020)
In April 2020, as the country dealt with the COVID-19
pandemic, the Subcommittee released a 29-page joint memorandum
examines the possibility of amending the Standing Rules of the
Senate to allow senators to participate and vote remotely
during a national crisis. A summary of the bipartisan
memorandum is found below.
The COVID-19 virus has shut down major sectors of our
society, including many functions of Congress. By rule and
custom, the two chambers of Congress have always met in person
to conduct business, including committee hearings, floor
deliberation, and voting. Neither chamber has contingency plans
that allow those functions to proceed remotely, but this crisis
highlights the need to consider means for Congress to do its
job at times when it may not be safe for members and staff to
gather in person.
Some experts have expressed concerns about Congress
operating remotely, particularly citing the importance of
physically meeting together to facilitate the deliberative
process and ensure broad participation in negotiations. Those
concerns are valid: face-to-face communications and in-person
meetings are the most effective way for Congress to conduct its
business on a regular basis. Remote participation should never
take the place of in-person participation except in the most
limited circumstances--crises, affecting the entire country,
that would otherwise hobble Congress's ability to act without
this authority. The current nationwide pandemic requires
Congress to consider how best to continue its operations,
communicate, and pass necessary legislation safely.
This memorandum provided: (1) a brief overview of
congressional continuity efforts to date; (2) a description of
Senate proposals to allow senators to participate and vote
remotely; (3) a legal analysis of remote congressional
proceedings; (4) a discussion of other jurisdictions that have
implemented remote legislative procedures; and (5) a discussion
of the technological security specifications the Senate should
consider if it adopts a remote participation and voting system.
H. Threats to U.S. Networks: Oversight of Chinese Government-Owned
Carriers, June 9, 2020 (Report Prepared by the Majority and
Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations)
In June 2020, Subcommittee staff released a 104-page
bipartisan report detailing how the Federal Government provided
little-to-no oversight of Chinese state-owned
telecommunications carriers operating in the United States for
nearly twenty years. As demonstrated in prior PSI
investigations, China routinely exploits the American education
and scientific research sectors to further its national
interest and engages in cyber-attacks against U.S. companies,
like Equifax and Marriott. This report revealed how the
telecommunications industry has been similarly targeted. A
summary of the report's findings is found below.
Information and telecommunications technologies bring the
world closer together, allowing individuals and businesses
nearly everywhere in the world to communicate with each other.
The expansion of global telecommunications networks, in
particular, acts as a driving force of economic development by
affording individuals unprecedented access to information and
opportunities. Understanding the increasing interconnectedness
of society, the Federal Communications Commission (``FCC'')--
the Federal agency tasked with regulating the U.S.
telecommunications industry--strives to open U.S. markets to
foreign telecommunications carriers, where doing so is in the
country's public interest. As a result, foreign-owned carriers
have established operations within the United States.
Not all international expansion of telecommunications
carriers, however, is in the United States' national security
interests. Some foreign governments seek to exploit the
openness of America's telecommunications market to advance
their own national interests. One such country is China. The
Chinese government views telecommunications as a ``strategic''
industry. It has expended significant resources to create and
promote new business opportunities for its state-owned carriers
and has established barriers to market entry for foreign
carriers seeking to operate in China. Today, three state-owned
carriers dominate the Chinese telecommunications market: China
Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom, commonly referred to
as the `Big Three.'' In addition to shoring up a stable
domestic market for these carriers, the Chinese government has
encouraged its carriers to expand into global markets,
including the United States. This expansion, however, raises
national security concerns. U.S. government officials have
warned that Chinese state-owned carriers are ``subject to
exploitation, influence, and control by the Chinese
government'' and can be used in the Chinese government's cyber
and economic espionage efforts targeted at the United States.
The operation of Chinese state-owned telecommunications
carriers in the United States garnered public attention in May
2019 after the FCC denied China Mobile International (USA) Inc.
(``China Mobile USA'') the authority to provide international
telecommunications services between the United States and
foreign locations. The FCC premised its denial on national
security concerns. This marked the first instance in which the
FCC denied an application on national security grounds.
Following that denial, the Subcommittee launched an
investigation into how the U.S. Federal Government guards
against risks posed by Chinese state-owned carriers already
authorized to provide international telecommunications services
between the United States and other points.
This report detailed how the U.S. Federal Government--
particularly the FCC, Department of Justice (``DOJ''), and
Department of Homeland Security (``DHS'')--historically
exercised minimal oversight to safeguard U.S.
telecommunications networks against risks posed by Chinese
state-owned carriers. Three Chinese state-owned carriers have
been operating in the United States since the early 2000s, but
only in recent years have the FCC, DOJ, and DHS focused on
potential risks associated with these carriers. DOJ and DHS did
enter into security agreements with two of the Chinese state-
owned carriers prior to 2010, but they conducted only two site
visits to each carrier since that time (or four total). Three
of those visits occurred between 2017 and 2018. This lack of
oversight undermined the safety of American communications and
endangered our national security.
Since the Subcommittee launched its investigation, the
agencies have increased their oversight of the Chinese state-
owned carriers. The administration also issued an executive
order establishing a formal committee to review the national
security and law enforcement risks posed by foreign carriers
operating in the United States. Still, the new committee's
authorities remain limited, and as a result, our country, our
privacy, and our information remain at risk.
The Chinese government exerts control over China's domestic
telecommunications industry and state-owned carriers. China
aims to be a world leader in technology by 2050, including in
the telecommunications sector. To achieve this goal, China
controls who can provide domestic services by maintaining one
of the most restrictive foreign investment regimes in the
world. Although the Chinese government may publicly state that
it is opening the telecommunications market, foreign companies
are subject to burdensome regulatory requirements; required to
enter into joint ventures majority owned by Chinese parties;
and often forced to transfer both technology and know-how to
Chinese counterparts. State-owned carriers are equally
controlled, as the Chinese government selects their management,
sets target returns and growth rates, and compels companies to
put state interests ahead of the carriers' market interests.
The Chinese government has encouraged state-owned
telecommunications carriers to expand internationally. In 1999,
the Chinese government issued a ``Go Out'' policy, through
which it pledged financial support to entities to expand into
global markets. Telecommunications carriers took advantage of
this, with major state-owned carriers establishing operations
across the world, including in the United States.
The Chinese government targets the United States through
cyber and economic espionage activities and enlists state-owned
entities in these efforts. Many U.S. government officials have
highlighted the ``persistent'' threat posed by China. As
Assistant Attorney General of DOJ's National Security Division
John Demers stated, China's ``overall economic policy [is to]
develop[ ] China at American expense.'' U.S. government
officials have also warned that China will use its state-owned
carriers to further its national interests. At least one
Chinese carrier is publicly alleged to have hijacked and
rerouted communications data through China. This allows Chinese
actors to access sensitive communications, regardless of
whether the data is encrypted.
The Subcommittee reviewed the Federal agencies responsible
for regulating and monitoring foreign telecommunications
carriers operating in the United States. Although foreign
carriers have operated in the United States for decades, the
U.S. government had no statutory authorities to monitor the
risks associated with these carriers. This is especially
evident when reviewing the agencies' oversight of Chinese
state-owned carriers.
The FCC regulates the U.S. telecommunications market.
Carriers seeking to provide international telecommunications
services between the United States and foreign points must
apply for and obtain authorization from the FCC. The FCC's
process is aimed at protecting the U.S. market from anti-
competitive behavior in foreign markets. Thus, in evaluating
applications, the FCC considers whether the foreign carrier's
proposed services are in the public interest. Once
authorization is granted, the Subcommittee found that it
effectively exists in perpetuity; the FCC does not periodically
review existing authorizations.
The FCC historically relied on ``Team Telecom'' to assess
national security and law enforcement risks associated with a
foreign carrier's provision of international telecommunications
services. The FCC's public interest calculation involves
weighing the national security, law enforcement, trade, and
foreign policy implications associated with a foreign carrier's
proposed services. The FCC has recognized, however, that it
lacks the subject-matter expertise to evaluate these topics,
and thus, it relies on certain Executive Branch agencies for
guidance. For years, three agencies--DOJ, DHS, and the
Department of Defense (``DOD''), which until recently were
collectively referred to as ``Team Telecom''--were tasked with
evaluating national security and law enforcement concerns.
Where Team Telecom believed that risks may exist, it attempted
to mitigate those risks through a security agreement with the
foreign carrier. These agreements provided Team Telecom with
oversight capabilities, including the right to visit the
carrier's U.S.-based facilities. If Team Telecom opted not to
enter into a security agreement with a foreign carrier, it had
no insight into the carrier's operations.
These measures were ineffective as Team Telecom lacked
formal statutory authority, leaving its operations unstructured
and ad hoc. Because of the lack of statutory authority, Team
Telecom had no formal, written processes for reviewing
applications or monitoring compliance with security agreements.
The informality also resulted in protracted review periods and
a process FCC commissioners described as ``broken'' and an
``inextricable black hole'' that provided ``no clarity for
[the] future.'' For example, Team Telecom's review of China
Mobile USA's application lasted seven years. Further, the
agencies did not dedicate sufficient resources to ensure Team
Telecom conducted oversight in an efficient and effective
manner. The components of DHS and DOJ responsible for Team
Telecom together historically tasked three employees with
reviewing applications and monitoring compliance with security
agreements.
In April 2020, as the Subcommittee was nearing the end of
its investigation, the President issued Executive Order 13913,
replacing the informal Team Telecom with the Committee for the
Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States
Telecommunications Services (``EO Telecom Committee''). The
Executive Order seeks to address many of the shortcomings
identified by the Subcommittee's investigation. The Executive
Order requires members of the EO Telecom Committee to enter
into a memorandum of understanding by July 3, 2020. Therefore,
this report continues to refer to Team Telecom, even in
relation to actions taken after April 4, 2020.
Beginning in 2018, Team Telecom and the FCC publicly
highlighted the national security concerns associated with
Chinese state-owned carriers operating in the United States.
China Mobile USA's application marked the first instance in
which Team Telecom recommended that the FCC deny a foreign
carrier authorization to provide international
telecommunications services on national security grounds. In
its denial, the FCC relied on Team Telecom's conclusion that
China Mobile USA is ``subject to exploitation, influence, and
control by the Chinese government.'' Such government control,
Team Telecom warned, could advance the Chinese government's
cyber and economic espionage activities targeted at the United
States. Team Telecom specifically cautioned that China Mobile
USA would build relationships with major U.S. carriers, through
which it could gain access to U.S. networks and the sensitive
public and private data transferred across those networks.
At least three other Chinese state-owned carriers have been
operating in the United States for decades. The U.S.
subsidiaries of the two other Big Three carriers--China Telecom
and China Unicom--along with a smaller state-affiliated
provider ComNet (USA) LLC (``ComNet'') each received
authorization to provide international telecommunications
services in or prior to 2002 and have been operating ever
since. During this time, these Chinese carriers have built
relationships with major U.S. carriers and established points
of presence across the United States. Further, China Telecom's
U.S. subsidiary, China Telecom Americas, provides services to
Chinese government facilities in the United States.
Until recently, Team Telecom conducted limited oversight of
these Chinese state-owned carriers. Team Telecom entered into
security agreements with China Telecom Americas (2007) and
ComNet (2009), but it exercised minimal oversight over those
entities until recently. During the more-than-ten year period
in which these security agreements have been in effect, Team
Telecom conducted just two site visits to each company--or four
in total, three of which occurred within the past three years.
At no point did Team Telecom enter into a security agreement
with China Unicom Americas, meaning Team Telecom has no
oversight authority to assess the company's operations in the
United States.
The national security concerns Team Telecom and the FCC
outlined in relation to China Mobile USA are applicable to the
Chinese state-owned carriers currently operating in the United
States. In advocating that the FCC deny China Mobile USA's
application, Team Telecom raised a number of national security
concerns related to China Mobile USA's Chinese government
ownership. As Team Telecom officials acknowledged to the
Subcommittee, those concerns also apply to China Telecom
Americas, China Unicom Americas, and ComNet. The carriers are
ultimately owned by the Chinese government; are required to
comply with Chinese national security laws to support the
Chinese government's intelligence work; and have established
relationships with U.S. carriers, giving them access to
critical infrastructure that the Chinese government could
exploit in its economic and cyber espionage efforts. Team
Telecom recognized these issues in its recent recommendation
that the FCC to revoke China Telecom Americas' authorizations.
The FCC also indicated its awareness of these concerns, when it
recently called for all the carriers to demonstrate why their
authorizations should not be revoked.
It must be noted that state-ownership does not presume a
national security risk. Indeed, many foreign telecommunications
companies around the world are state-owned. There are also
compelling commercial interests dependent on facilitating the
flow of data between the United States and China, which are
among each other's top trading partners. The vast global
telecommunications and technology infrastructure that
facilitates commerce and economic development include undersea,
terrestrial, wireless, and space-based networks jointly owned
or operated by Chinese and Western companies.
Commercial interests, however, must be balanced against
national security interests. Striking an appropriate balance
between these interests requires the Executive Branch to
exercise greater oversight and regularly evaluate the risks
posed by foreign-owned companies, especially considering that
national security concerns evolve over time. Currently, Chinese
state-owned carriers are providing international
telecommunications services based on FCC authorizations granted
more than a decade ago, in some cases nearly two decades. The
carriers have provided services during this time, with minimal
oversight from Team Telecom.
Following several Subcommittee briefings with the
Department of Justice, on April 4, 2020, the administration
released Executive Order 13913, ``Establishing the Committee
for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United
States Telecommunications Services Sector.'' The Department of
Justice summarized the Executive Order in the following way:
This Executive Order formalizes and improves the
interagency committee, formerly known as Team Telecom, that
advises the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on national
security and law enforcement concerns associated with
applications for telecommunications licenses meeting certain
thresholds of foreign ownership or control. The Executive Order
creates a formal process to review applications referred by the
FCC to the Committee that raise the concerns mentioned above
within an established timeframe. In addition, the Executive
Order allows the Committee to assess whether new national
security or law enforcement concerns exist with respect to
existing FCC licenses previously reviewed by interested
Executive Branch agencies.
I. IRS Oversight of the Free File Program (Staff Memorandum by the
Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations)
In June 2020, Subcommittee staff released a bipartisan
memorandum that found there has been little IRS oversight of
the Free File program, which provides free online tax
preparation and filing services to U.S. taxpayers. As a result,
American taxpayers, who are eligible for free tax filing
through the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), may not be aware of
the program or taking advantage of it. This could result in
eligible taxpayers paying fees to file their taxes.
Over the course of a year-long investigation, the
Subcommittee examined the history of the IRS Free File program,
the coordination between the Free File Alliance (FFA) and its
membership of tax preparation software companies, oversight of
the Free File program by IRS, and reporting in 2019 that
certain FFA members used coding to hide their Free File
websites from online search engines. The key findings of the
memorandum included:
Until recently, the IRS conducted little
oversight of the Free File program.
Three different independent entities have
reviewed the Free File program since 2018 and provided
recommendations for improvement, but the program continues to
struggle to serve eligible taxpayers.
For the first 15 years of the Free File program,
the IRS declined to take a position on whether FFA companies
should index Free File websites to appear in online search
engines, nor did FFA companies seek guidance from the IRS on
whether their indexing practices complied with the MOU. As a
result, participating FFA companies took different approaches
in deciding whether to code their Free File program websites to
appear in organic search engine results, or to have users
access the Free File program only through the IRS website. Five
companies (H&R Block, Intuit, TaxHawk, Drake, and TaxSlayer)
coded their Free File websites in a way that prevented a search
engine from including the websites in organic search results
(or ``non-indexed''). In doing so, all five companies believed
they were complying with the MOU that governs the Free File
program. The IRS and FFA companies executed an addendum to the
MOU in December 2019 that clarified Free File websites should
be indexed.
Three companies (TaxHawk, Drake, and TaxSlayer)
non-indexed their Free File websites from the start of their
participation in the Free File program. H&R Block non-indexed
its Free File website in 2018 in response to a technical issue
after determining the MOU did not require the website be
indexed. In 2018, Intuit changed the name of its Free File
program in an attempt to avoid consumer confusion and non-
indexed the landing page of its renamed Free File offering.
According to an analysis performed by MITRE,
approximately 85 percent of the visits made to FFA member web
sites and IRS.gov from Google, the most popular online search
engine, were made through links included in advertisements
placed by FFA members to promote commercial products that may
charge fees. Only a fraction of total visits--approximately
56,000 out of 12 million--went directly from Google to the
website for an FFA member's Free File product.
A lack of investment in marketing by the IRS
likely led to a lack of consumer awareness that hampered
participation in the Free File program.
J. The Art Industry and U.S. Policies that Undermine Sanctions, July
29, 2020 (Report Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs
of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations)
In July 2020, Subcommittee staff released a 150-page
bipartisan report regarding how Russian oligarchs have used the
secrecy of the art industry to evade U.S. sanctions. Following
a two-year investigation, which included the major auction
houses, private New York art dealers, and seven financial
institutions, the report showed how a lack of regulation allows
the art industry to avoid the same anti-money laundering
requirements that apply to financial institutions. The
Subcommittee found that the art industry's secretive nature
allowed art intermediaries to purchase more than $18 million in
high-value art in the United States through shell companies
linked to Russian oligarchs after they were sanctioned by the
United States in March 2014. The Subcommittee also found the
shell companies linked to the Russian oligarchs were not
limited to just art and engaged in a total of $91 million in
post-sanctions transactions. A summary of the report's findings
is found below.
The United States government imposes economic sanctions on
foreign adversaries in attempt to change their behavior. In
theory, sanctions are simple. U.S. persons and companies are
prohibited from doing business with sanctioned persons and
entities. This prohibition should bar access to the world's
largest economy. The United States imposes sanctions for a wide
range of reasons. For example, the United States has imposed
sanctions on Russia for election interference, human rights
abuses, providing support to Venezuela and Syria, but mainly in
response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
This report focused, in particular, on a case study
documenting how certain Russian oligarchs appear to have used
transactions involving high-value art to evade sanctions
imposed on them by the United States on March 20, 2014 in
response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and annexation of
Crimea. Specifically, the Subcommittee traced purchases of
high-value art back to anonymous shell companies linked to
sanctioned individuals Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, two Russian
oligarchs, and Arkady's son, Igor. It appears the Rotenbergs
continued actively participating in the U.S. art market by
purchasing over $18 million in art in the months following the
imposition of sanctions on March 20, 2014. Shell companies
linked to the Rotenbergs also transferred over $120 million to
Russia during a four-day window between President Obama's March
16, 2014 executive order stating that the U.S. would be
sanctioning certain Russian individuals and the Treasury
Department specifically naming the Rotenbergs as sanctioned on
March 20, 2014. In addition, certain Rotenberg-linked shell
companies continued transacting in the U.S. financial system
long after Arkady and Boris Rotenberg were sanctioned. The
Subcommittee determined these Rotenberg-linked shell companies
engaged in over $91 million in transactions post-sanctions.
While Russia-related sanctions, including those against the
Rotenbergs, were set to expire in March 2020, President Trump
extended them for another year. The effectiveness of these
sanctions, however, is in question. To date, Russia has not
withdrawn from Crimea and has even expanded its military
operations in surrounding waters. The Subcommittee sought to
understand why the sanctions have not been more effective and,
after reviewing a number of suspect transactions, launched a
narrow investigation into high-value art. If wealthy Russian
oligarchs can purchase millions in art for personal investment
or enjoyment while under sanction, it follows that their
businesses or hidden resources could also continue accessing
the U.S. financial system.
The Subcommittee's investigation uncovered a complex set of
facts involving shell companies with hidden owners,
intermediaries who mask purchasers and sellers, and lax money
laundering safeguards in the U.S. art industry.
The art industry is largely unregulated. The art industry
is considered the largest, legal unregulated industry in the
United States. Unlike financial institutions, the art industry
is not subject to Bank Secrecy Act's (``BSA'') requirements,
which mandate detailed procedures to prevent money laundering
and to verify a customer's identity. While the BSA does not
apply to art transactions by art dealers and auction houses,
sanctions do. No U.S. person or entity is allowed to do
business with a sanctioned individual or entity.
The art industry has been enjoying a boom. According to the
2019 Art Basel and UBS Global Art Market Report, world-wide art
sales hit $64.1 billion in 2019. That report found the United
States was the world's largest art market comprising 44 percent
of global sales, or around $28.3 billion. The art industry is
generally divided into sales at public auctions and by private
dealers. In 2019, sales at auction houses made up 42 percent of
total art sales, while the remaining 58 percent of sales were
through private dealers. The four biggest auction houses--
Sotheby's, Christie's, Phillips, and Bonhams--are selling art
for sizeable amounts. In November 2017, Leonardo da Vinci's
Salvator Mundi sold at auction at Christie's in New York for
over $450 million. In May 2019, Christie's New York sold Jeff
Koon's Rabbit for over $91 million, the highest price ever paid
for a piece by a living artist. Even during the COVID-19
pandemic, an online auction at Sotheby's brought in $234.9
million in total sales, including $84.55 million for Triptych
Inspired by the Oresteia of Aeschylus by Francis Bacon. In
turn, the auction houses report large annual sale numbers.
Sotheby's reported $4.8 billion in sales for 2019, while
Christie's reported $2.8 billion in sales for just the first
six months of 2019.
Investors have taken notice. Deloitte's 2019 Art and
Finance Report noted that ``artnet's Index for Top 100 Artists
produced an 8 percent Compound Annual Growth Rate between 2000
and 2018, compared with 3 percent for the S&P 500.'' For
example, Banksy's Devolved Parliament sold at Sotheby's in
London on October 3, 2019 for around $12.2 million; the
artist's previous record for a painting sold at auction was
$1.87 million for Keep It Spotless in 2008.
Secrecy is pervasive in the art industry. While the art
market is not regulated by the BSA, it is governed by unwritten
rules. A large number of art sales happen through
intermediaries referred to as ``art advisors'' who can
represent both purchasers and sellers. In a typical
transaction, a purchaser may not ask who owns the piece of art
they are purchasing; the seller may not ask for whom it is
being purchased or the origin of the money. And in general an
art advisor would be reluctant to reveal the identity of their
client for fear of being cut out of the deal and losing the
business.
Auction houses have voluntary AML polices. Because the art
industry is not subject to BSA requirements, when a piece of
art is sold, there is no legal requirement for the selling
party to confirm the identity of the buyer or that the buyer is
not laundering money through the purchase. While the four
biggest auction houses have voluntary anti-money laundering
(``AML'') programs, the employees who facilitated art purchases
in the Subcommittee's case study said they never asked the art
advisor the identity of his client. Instead, the auction houses
considered the art advisor the principal purchaser and
performed any due diligence on the art advisor, even when it
was well-known that the ultimate owner was someone else. With
regard to the funds used to purchase art, the auction houses
told the Subcommittee they rely on financial institutions to
ensure the integrity of the funds, even though the auction
houses interact directly with the buyer. But these voluntary
AML policies are just for sales through the auction houses. As
stated above, the majority of art sales are private
transactions. A private dealer interviewed by the Subcommittee
stated she had no written AML policies, tries to work with
people she knows and trusts, looks for red flags, and relies on
her gut. She also explained that her practices have
significantly changed over the years and that she also relies
on advice from AML lawyers.
Tracing the ownership of anonymous shell companies,
including those involved in high-value art transactions, is
difficult. That difficulty continues even though corporate
secrecy suffered a blow in the spring of 2016 when the
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
(``ICIJ'') shocked the world by releasing information on
214,488 offshore entities from the Panamanian law firm Mossack
Fonseca (the ``Panama Papers''). One email chain included among
the Panama Papers and made public described links between nine
offshore companies to the Rotenbergs. The email chain listed
Boris Rotenberg as the ultimate beneficial owner (``UBO'') of
Highland Ventures Group Limited (``Highland Ventures'') and
Arkady Rotenberg's son Igor as the UBO of Highland Business
Group Limited (``Highland Business''). The email copied London-
based attorney Mark Omelnitski, who used his firm the Markom
Group to establish and maintain shell companies for the
Rotenberg family.
The true ownership of the listed shell companies was not,
however, as straightforward as the Panama Papers email chain
suggested. For example, based on financial information reviewed
by the Subcommittee during its investigation, Arkady Rotenberg
appeared to be the UBO of Highland Ventures, not his brother
Boris. That information included non-public wire transfers
showing multi-million dollar transfers from a company owned by
Arkady Rotenberg to Highland Ventures. In 2012 and 2013, that
company--Milasi Engineering--transferred over $124 million
marked as annual dividends to Highland Ventures. The December
31, 2014 Financial Report for Milasi Engineering listed Arkady
Rotenberg as its UBO, making it clear that Highland Ventures
received its funding from a company owned by an individual the
U.S. would later sanction. Milasi Engineering also held shares
in Stroygazmontazh, a gas pipeline company sanctioned in April
2014 by the United States due to its ownership by Arkady
Rotenberg.
Arkady Rotenberg transferred his business interests to his
son, Igor. In July 2014, four months after the United States
sanctioned Arkady, Mr. Omelnitski's firm, the Markom Group,
executed paperwork that appeared to transfer Arkady's interest
in Milasi Engineering to his son, Igor, who was not sanctioned
at the time. Milasi Engineering was owned by two other holding
companies. The Markom Group transferred the ownership of those
two companies to Highland Ventures, which it asserted had
always been owned by Igor. Therefore, from July 2014 to April
2018, when Igor was finally sanctioned by the United States,
Milasi Engineering was owned on paper by an unsanctioned
individual. A report by a bank investigator produced to the
Subcommittee determined the transfer of Milasi Engineering from
Arkady to Igor was done solely to evade sanctions, and the
Markom Group ``intentionally structured [the ownership of these
shell companies] to be opaque in order to hide the identities
of true beneficiaries.'' In response, the bank closed all
accounts associated with the Markom Group. This included
closing accounts held by art advisor Gregory Baltser.
Art advisor Gregory Baltser facilitated purchases for the
Rotenbergs. Intermediaries played a central role in the
Rotenbergs' art purchases in the United States. As previously
explained, Mr. Omelnitski and his company, the Markom Group,
established and maintained shell companies for the Rotenbergs
to mask their identities. The Rotenbergs also employed art
advisor Gregory Baltser, who facilitated the purchase and sale
of high-value art both before and after sanctions without
disclosing the names of his clients.
Mr. Baltser is a U.S. citizen, who must comply with U.S.
sanctions laws, but his business is based in Moscow. Prior to
sanctions, funds Mr. Baltser used to purchase art linked to the
Rotenbergs followed a unique and recognizable financial path:
Mr. Baltser bid on specific artworks at auction, purchased the
art, and then assigned the title to the art to a Belize company
named Steamort Limited (``Steamort''). Steamort paid for the
art using funds the Subcommittee traced back to Highland
Business.
Mr. Baltser, however, was not the owner of Steamort; he had
a contract with Steamort to serve as a consultant to purchase
art on behalf of the company. A copy of that contract was
produced to the Subcommittee by Christie's. Both the contract
and financial records showed that Steamort paid Mr. Baltser
$9,500 a month for his services. In total, between March 2010
and October 2018, financial records show Mr. Baltser received
$1,116,000 in fees for his consulting services under the
Steamort Agreement.
Company documents obtained by the Subcommittee listed
Steamort's only director and shareholder as Jason Hughes.
According to a report by ICIJ, Mr. Hughes was associated with
over 200 other companies as a nominee director--an individual
who masks the true UBO of a shell company.
The owner of Steamort remains unknown. In 2012, Christie's
questioned Mr. Baltser about who owned Steamort, and asserted
that Mr. Baltser could no longer bid at auctions until he
provided Steamort's UBO. Initially, Mr. Baltser responded that
he did not know who owned Steamort. When pressed and threatened
with missing the opportunity to bid at an upcoming auction, Mr.
Baltser verbally told Christie's that Steamort was owned by
``Luisa Brown.'' Christie's accepted this verbal assertion,
conducted AML checks on Ms. Brown, found no derogatory
information, and cleared Mr. Baltser to continue bidding at
auctions. Mr. Baltser never provided any documentary evidence
of Steamort's ownership by Ms. Brown. The Subcommittee was
unable to confirm if an individual named Luisa Brown was the
UBO for Steamort, or if she even existed at all.
Mr. Baltser opened an auction agency and club in Moscow. In
late 2012, Mr. Baltser announced he was planning to open
BALTZER Auction Agency and Club. The agency would be located in
Moscow and its members would be ``the leading Moscow and
Russian collectors--the active participants of auction biddings
at many world marketplaces.'' Mr. Baltser proposed to partner
with both Christie's and Sotheby's. As part of the proposed
agreement, Mr. Baltser stated that he would bid at auctions on
behalf of his clients under an account in the name of BALTZER.
This allowed Mr. Baltser to guarantee on his website that ``we
can give you complete anonymity.'' Under the proposed
agreement, Mr. Baltser pledged to conduct all AML and sanctions
checks on his clients and provide an annual certification to
the auction houses that no member of BALTZER was engaged in
money laundering. Mr. Omelnitski served as BALTZER's chief AML
officer and represented Mr. Baltser in contract negotiations
with the two auction houses. To be clear, Mr. Baltser put the
same attorney who established and maintained shell companies to
mask the Rotenbergs' ownership in charge of his new venture's
AML compliance.
Christie's partnered with BALTZER. Christie's accepted Mr.
Baltser's proposal and signed the agreement with BALTZER on
February 4, 2014. At the end of 2014, Mr. Omelnitski certified
to Christie's that ``despite BALTZER having a significant
number of Russian clients there were no transactions, which
fall under recent sanctions against Russia.'' Mr. Omelnitski
failed to provide another such certification for the next three
years, despite repeated requests from Christie's to provide the
annual certificate promised in the agreement. In 2018,
Christie's renegotiated its agreement with BALTZER to require
client due diligence documents after each purchase.
A Sotheby's employee identified Arkady and Boris Rotenberg
as Mr. Baltser's clients. Sotheby's also considered Mr.
Baltser's business proposal, but ultimately declined. During
negotiations, a Sotheby's employee represented to Sotheby's
management that Mr. Baltser had told her that his clients
included Russian oligarchs. In fact, she told Sotheby's
management that Mr. Baltser had identified Arkady and Boris
Rotenberg as two of his clients (five months prior to U.S.
sanctions). During her Subcommittee interview, however, the
same Sotheby's employee said Mr. Baltser had never told her
that Arkady and Boris Rotenberg were his clients. Instead, she
asserted she fabricated this information in an effort to
convince Sotheby's to accept BALTZER's proposal. Despite
declining the proposal, Sotheby's continued to conduct business
as usual with Mr. Baltser and his new company, BALTZER, and
never questioned whether Arkady and Boris Rotenberg were his
clients. The Subcommittee independently traced post-sanction
purchases by BALTZER to shell companies linked to the
Rotenbergs, suggesting theSotheby's employee was not truthful
in her Subcommittee interview.
Mr. Baltser continued to purchase art with funds linked to
the Rotenbergs even after March 2014 sanctions. Following the
imposition of sanctions by the United States on Arkady and
Boris Rotenberg in March 2014, the funds Mr. Baltser used to
purchase works of art at auction houses continued to follow the
same general financial path as before sanctions. By this time,
BALTZER provided another layer of anonymity for the funds used
to purchase art. After Mr. Baltser successfully bid at auction,
funds were wired from Highland Ventures to Steamort, just as
they had arrived from Highland Business before sanctions.
Steamort then wired funds to BALTZER, which paid the auction
house and took title of the purchase. All four auction houses
considered Mr. Baltser the principal purchaser, rather than an
agent for a buyer, and never asked for whom he was purchasing
the art. Any client due diligence was performed only on Mr.
Baltser and not his undisclosed clients, satisfying the
voluntary AML policies at the auction houses.
Highland Ventures purchased a painting through a private
art dealer. The funds used to purchase Rene Magritte's La
Poitrine for $7.5 million in May 2014 through a private art
dealer followed a different path. In this transaction, Highland
Ventures took title to the painting and was listed on the
invoice as the buyer. Anna Wilkes, an employee of Mr.
Omelnitski's Markom Group, signed on behalf of Highland
Ventures as its Director. The funds used to pay for the
painting were wired to the private dealer from a company named
Advantage Alliance. The Subcommittee traced those funds to a
company called Senton Holdings. An investigation by a financial
institution--produced to the Subcommittee--determined Senton
Holdings was owned by Arkady Rotenberg, linking him through the
chain of wire transfers to the purchase of the painting.
Art was shipped to Germany for storage. La Poitrine, like
much of the art traced to companies linked to the Rotenbergs,
was shipped to a storage facility in Germany called Hasenkamp.
The Subcommittee contacted Hasenkamp and was told the art was
originally stored there under the name Highland Business; no
individual was named. Later, a company named Taide Connoisseur
Selection took over the contract to store the art at Hasenkamp.
The only individual named on Taide Connoisseur Selection's
website was Mr. Omelnitski.
In August 2019, during the course of the Subcommittee's
investigation, the Taide Connoisseur Selection account at
Hasenkamp was closed and all art stored under the account was
shipped to Moscow.
Art purchases linked to the Rotenberg shell companies
totaled millions of dollars. In total, the Subcommittee traced
funds for over $18 million in art purchased in the United
States from March 2014 to November 2014, both at auction houses
and through private sales back to shell companies that appeared
to be funded or owned by the Rotenbergs.
Sotheby's agreed to sell Brucke II for Mr. Baltser during
the Subcommittee's investigation. Mr. Baltser also sold
paintings owned by his clients. In late 2018, he attempted to
sell Lyonel Feininger's Brucke II. Brucke II was originally
purchased through Mr. Baltser on February 4, 2014 at an auction
at Christie's in London. The painting later appeared on a list
of 31 paintings sent to Christie's by a BALTZER employee, who
stated that the list represented the collection of one of Mr.
Baltser's clients. The Subcommittee traced 16 paintings on the
list purchased in the United States back to suspected Rotenberg
shell companies. This suggests that all 31 paintings were owned
by the Rotenbergs.
When Mr. Baltser attempted to sell Brucke II in late 2018,
both Christie's and Sotheby's expressed interest in having the
painting at their auctions. Ultimately, Mr. Baltser's client
chose Sotheby's to sell Brucke II at auction in February 2019.
At the time, the Subcommittee was actively investigating the
auction house and Mr. Baltser. Sotheby's requested Mr. Baltser
provide the name of the UBO of the painting, including whether
that individual was currently sanctioned. Mr. Baltser said
Brucke II had been resold since it was purchased at Christie's
in February 2014 and now belonged to a company incorporated in
the Marshall Islands and provided a Russian passport for the
company's UBO. The Subcommittee asked Sotheby's to request the
name of the February 2014 purchaser of the painting; Mr.
Baltser declined to disclose the name of that purchaser due to
a non-disclosure agreement. Sotheby's ultimately pulled the
painting from the 2019 auction due to a lack of interest.
The Subcommittee asked to interview Mr. Baltser, but
through his attorney, he declined the request and stated he was
in Moscow and had no plans to return to the United States.
Through his attorney, Mr. Baltser stated that: he has never
represented or transacted with Arkady or Boris Rotenberg;
Highland Business and Highland Ventures were not listed as
sanctioned by the Treasury Department; and he did not have
access to the Panama Papers.
A delay between the 2014 announcement and imposition of
sanctions created a window to send U.S. dollars to Russia. On
March 16, 2014, President Obama signed an executive order
authorizing the Treasury Department to impose sanctions on
individuals for Russia's annexation of Crimea. But the Treasury
Department did not name the specific individuals sanctioned
under the executive order until March 20, 2014. During this
four-day window, Rotenberg-linked shell companies transferred
over $120 million through the United States to Russia. On March
18, 2014, Highland Ventures transferred over $39.5 million from
its account at The Pictet Group in Switzerland through the U.S.
financial system to its account at Gazprombank in Moscow. That
same day, Culloden Properties transferred over $82 million from
its Pictet Group account in Switzerland through the U.S.
financial system to its account in Moscow at the Gazprombank.
Both the Panama Papers and documents produced to a financial
institution by the Markom Group--and subsequently provided to
the Subcommittee--identify Boris Rotenberg as the owner of
Culloden Properties.
Rotenberg-linked shell companies transacted in U.S. dollars
post-sanctions. Shell companies linked to the Rotenbergs
continued conducting transactions through the U.S. financial
system even after the imposition of sanctions in March 2014.
For example, including its art purchases, Highland Ventures was
involved in transactions worth over $16 million. Advantage
Alliance was involved in transactions worth over $29 million.
And while the UBO of Steamort remains hidden, the company
served as an intermediary between Rotenberg-linked shell
companies and BALTZER in the purchase of art. Following the
imposition of sanctions in March 2014, Steamort was a part of
transactions totaling over $22 million. In total, the
Subcommittee identified over $91 million in transactions by
Rotenberg-linked shell companies after sanctions were imposed
on the Rotenberg in March 2014.
In response to the report, on October 30, 2020, the
Treasury Department issued an ``Advisory and Guidance on
Potential Sanctions Risks Arising from Dealings in High-Value
Artwork,'' citing the Subcommittee's report in explaining the
sanctions risks in the high-value art market. The Advisory
adopted a key recommendation of the Subcommittee's report
making clear that what is commonly referred to as the ``Berman
Amendment'' to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
and the Trading with the Enemy Act does not categorically
exempt all dealings in artwork from Treasury's regulation and
enforcement.
K. Oversight of HHS Shelter Grants for UACs December 8, 2020 (Report
Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations)
In December 2020, Subcommittee staff released a bipartisan
report identifying failures in the Department of Health and
Human Services' (HHS) shelter grant processes to ensure the
safety of unaccompanied alien children (UACs) and safeguard
over $32 million in taxpayers funds. The report confirmed that
HHS awarded Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) shelter grants
to two companies with a documented history of failing to
provide adequate care of children--VisionQuest National, Ltd.
and New Horizon Group Home, LLC. As a result of their previous
failures in caring for children and other regulatory issues,
VisionQuest and New Horizon struggled to acquire zoning and
licensing approval to open shelters across the country, meaning
that taxpayers paid for facilities that will never open.
A review of several prior funding opportunity announcements
and interviews with HHS officials demonstrated that, prior to
fall 2019, HHS did not require grant applicants to disclose
prior adverse actions their respective State and local
governments had taken against them. The Department conducted no
independent research into the disciplinary history of either
VisionQuest or New Horizon. These oversight failures could have
endangered unaccompanied children trusted to the care of these
companies. Additionally, until November 2019, HHS also had no
policy to restrict funding for grantees that did not have a
license to operate. HHS's policy of awarding grants to
applicants, including VisionQuest and New Horizon, prior to the
applicants securing zoning and licensing approval led to issues
that could cost tens of millions of taxpayer dollars. At the
time of the report's release, HHS was attempting to recoup
funds disbursed for facilities that failed to open.
A summary of the report's findings is found below.
Since 2015, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
has conducted oversight of Federal Government programs designed
to protect and care for children who enter the United States
without a parent or legal guardian. Federal agencies, including
the Department of Homeland Security (``DHS''), the Department
of Justice (``DOJ''), and the Department of Health and Human
Services (``HHS'') play key roles in the care of these
unaccompanied alien children (``UACs''). Deficiencies at these
agencies have continued across two presidential
administrations, as discussed in two previous Subcommittee
reports. In addition to the issues identified in those reports,
since 2018, the Subcommittee has examined whether HHS has
placed UACs in safe settings and made efficient use of taxpayer
dollars when establishing residential shelters for some UACs.
This report describes failures in HHS's processes to ensure the
safety of children in the care of the Federal Government and
safeguard $32,125,779 in taxpayer funds.
Pursuant to the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (`TVPRA'') and the 1997 consent
decree known as the Flores Settlement Agreement, HHS uses
shelter facilities in cities and states across the United
States to house certain UACs. Although HHS, through the Office
of Refugee Resettlement (`ORR''), works to place UACs with an
adult sponsor, in some instances ORR cannot place a child with
a sponsor. In these instances, ORR places UACs in shelter
facilities, which differ markedly from detention facilities for
adults and provide resources tailored to children that are not
available in temporary influx shelters. In most shelter
facilities, for example, children do not live in a restricted
setting, and they receive classroom education, health care
services, recreation, and case management. As noted in a report
the Subcommittee released in 2018, staff secure and secure
facilities are also available for children who require
placement in a more restricted setting because they pose a
danger to themselves or the community, or present a flight
risk.
HHS, through the Administration for Children and Families
(``ACF'') and ORR, offers grants to care providers to operate
these state-licensed shelter facilities. Traditionally,
community-based non-profit organizations operated most shelter
facilities. A surge of UAC arrivals in recent years, however,
has led larger, for-profit companies to apply for ORR funding
opportunities. As of September 23, 2020, 120 shelter facilities
in the United States house 1,478 UACs, with an average length
of stay of 60 days.
The Subcommittee sought to understand the processes HHS
uses to fund and open shelter facilities for UACs. The
Subcommittee identified key gaps in the shelter grant process
that affected HHS's ability to place UACs in safe settings and
ensure efficient use of taxpayer funds. A review of several
prior funding opportunity announcements and interviews with HHS
officials demonstrated that, prior to fall 2019, the Department
did not require a company seeking a grant to provide shelter
services for UACs to disclose prior adverse regulatory actions
from state and local governments related to the care of
children. For example, an applicant for a shelter facility that
previously operated a facility for children and had its license
revoked by a state regulatory agency had no obligation to
disclose this information to HHS. Additionally, HHS did not
conduct independent research on applicants and instead confined
its review to the contents of the grant applications. HHS also
relied entirely on grantees to obtain necessary zoning approval
and state licensure for a shelter facility. Furthermore, the
Department did not have a policy in place to restrict funding
for grantees without a license to operate until November 2019.
As a result of these gaps in the shelter grant process, the
Subcommittee confirmed that HHS awarded grants to two companies
with histories of questionable practices in caring for
children--VisionQuest National, Ltd. (``VisionQuest'') and New
Horizon Group Home, LLC (``New Horizon''). In 2016, the
Philadelphia Department of Human Services (``Philadelphia
DHS'') contracted with VisionQuest for the provision of
residential services. VisionQuest began operating four programs
at three residential facilities for young adults and children
in the juvenile justice system in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
All three facilities faced troubling allegations that local
authorities in Philadelphia later substantiated. Confirmed
incidents included residents escaping from a facility, numerous
fights among residents resulting in serious injuries, and
facility staff organizing further fights among residents. By
February 2018, Philadelphia authorities transferred all
children out of the three facilities, and VisionQuest
voluntarily closed the program.
In February 2018, New Horizon began operating a residential
facility in North Carolina for male children ages 9 to 17 who
required full-time mental health services. Less than a month
later, state officials conducted an inspection and identified
more than a dozen violations of state law. The violations
included New Horizon's failure to hire necessary medical
personnel, failure to protect two of its five residents from
serious harm, and the use of an unauthorized time-out room for
residents. State officials ultimately revoked New Horizon's
operating license. On appeal, an administrative law judge
upheld the license revocation and noted that the facility
presented ``an imminent danger to the health, safety, and
welfare of the clients.''
In 2019, HHS awarded grants to VisionQuest and New Horizon
for UAC shelter facilities. VisionQuest received five grants
totaling over $50 million for seven facilities, including one
of the same facilities in Philadelphia that local authorities
deemed unsafe for children in 2018. New Horizon received a
grant award for approximately $8 million for a UAC shelter
facility in North Carolina. HHS did not require either company
to disclose prior adverse actions their respective State and
local governments had taken against them, and the Department
did not research the disciplinary history of either company.
These oversights could have endangered UACs trusted to the care
of these companies.
Furthermore, both because of their previous failures in
caring for children and other regulatory issues, VisionQuest
and New Horizon have struggled to acquire zoning and licensing
approval to open shelters across the country. This means that
taxpayers have paid for facilities that will never open. HHS's
policy of awarding grants to applicants, including VisionQuest
and New Horizon, prior to the applicants securing zoning and
licensing approval led to issues that could waste tens of
millions of taxpayer dollars. VisionQuest, for example, faced
immediate challenges in opening the shelter facility under its
HHS grant after Philadelphia officials determined that the
zoning variance for a previous facility was invalid for a
facility housing migrant children. This dispute resulted in
litigation prior to the parties entering into a settlement
agreement in October 2020. VisionQuest also failed to obtain
the necessary zoning approval for proposed facilities in
California and Texas after facing local political opposition.
Ultimately, HHS disbursed over $28 million to VisionQuest for
five facilities that will not open.
Similarly, North Carolina's revocation of New Horizon's
operating license for one of its existing residential
facilities meant that New Horizon could not open its proposed
UAC shelter facility. Under North Carolina state law, a license
revocation makes a facility operator ineligible for any new
licenses for a five-year period. (New Horizon executives told
the Subcommittee that they were confident that they would
succeed in their appeal of the license revocation and had
alternate plans to use a separate existing facility license.)
HHS was initially unaware of these licensing issues and only
learned of them in August 2019--14 months after the license
revocation--from a congressional inquiry that cited a local
media report. HHS disbursed nearly $4 million in funding to New
Horizon for a facility in North Carolina that will not open.
HHS has since discontinued all five grants to VisionQuest
and the grant to New Horizon. The Department also requested
financial documentation from both companies for expenditures
made with grant funds. This process is ongoing for both
companies, but it is further along with New Horizon. On June 8,
2020, HHS transmitted a final disallowance letter to New
Horizon requesting the repayment of $3,119,453.69 (out of
$3,984,803). On July 7, 2020, New Horizon appealed the decision
to the HHS Departmental Appeals Board, which has the authority
to either uphold the decision or reduce the amount of the
disallowance and reverse the discontinuation of the grant
award. HHS officials stated that they would comply with the
decisions of the Departmental Appeals Board.
HHS has also implemented changes to its shelter grant
process. For example, the Department now restricts funds for
grantees that are eligible for funding but do not yet have an
operating license. In a briefing with Subcommittee staff,
however, HHS officials defended their previous policy, which
was in effect as recently as November 2019 and made funds
available to unlicensed grantees.
In late 2019, HHS also began requiring applicants to
disclose prior documented licensing allegations or concerns.
However, HHS did not specify a time period for the issues
applicants needed to disclose. In funding announcements from
June and July 2020, HHS further required applicants to be
licensed at the time of application and to disclose any
allegations or concerns of abuse or neglect, as well as any
prior denial, suspension, or revocation of their license. As of
the date of this report, however, HHS officials expressed
uncertainty regarding whether HHS will include the licensing
requirement in future announcements.
V. GAO REPORTS
During the 116th Congress, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) issued 23 reports at the request of the
Subcommittee. Reports are listed here by title, GAO number, and
release date.
China: Agreements Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S.
Universities are Similar, But Institute Operations Vary.
GAO-19-278. February 13, 2019.
China: Observations on Confucius Institutes in the United
States and U.S. Universities in China. GAO-19-401T. February
28, 2019.
Internet Privacy and Data Security: Additional Federal
Authority Could Enhance Consumer Protections and Provide
Flexibility. GAO-19-427T. March 7, 2019.
Federal Ethics Programs: Government-Wide Political
Appointee Data and Some Ethics Oversight Procedures at Interior
and SBA Could Be Improved. GAO-19-249. March 14, 2019.
U.S. Postal Service: Addressing Policy Gaps Could Improve
Pilot Design and Evaluation for Postal Innovations. GAO-19-293.
March 14, 2019.
Employment and Training Programs: Department of Labor
Should Assess Efforts to Coordinate Services Across Programs.
GAO-19-200. March 28, 2019.
Management Report: CMS Needs to Address Gaps in Federal
Oversight of Nursing Home Abuse Investigations that Persisted
in Oregon for at Least 15 Years. GAO-19-313R. April 15, 2019.
Nursing Homes: Improved Oversight Needed to Better Protect
Residents from Abuse. GAO-19-433. June 13, 2019.
Federal Rulemaking: Selected Agencies Should Clearly
Communicate Practices Associated with Identity Information in
the Public Comment Process. GAO-19-483. June 26, 2019.
U.S. Assistance to Central America: Department of State
Should Establish A Comprehensive Plan to Assess Progress Toward
Prosperity, Governance, and Security. GAO-19-590. September 26,
2019.
U.S. Assistance to Central America: Department of State
Should Establish A Comprehensive Plan to Assess Progress Toward
Prosperity, Governance, and Security. GAO-19-709. September 26,
2019.
Federal Rulemaking: Selected Agencies Should Clearly
Communicate Public Comment Posting Practices Associated with
Identity Information. GAO-20-105T. October 24, 2019.
Evidence-Based Policymaking: Selected Agencies Coordinate
Activities, But Could Enhance Collaboration. GAO-20-119.
December 4, 2019.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: Outcomes Have Improved But
Actions Needed to Enhance Oversight of Schedule Goals.
GAO-20-170SP. December 19, 2019.
Information Management: Selected Agencies Need to Fully
Address Federal Electronic Recordkeeping Requirements.
GAO-20-50. February 27, 2020.
U.S. Assistance to Central America: Status of Funding.
GAO-20-163R. March 4, 2020.
Federal Rulemaking: Information on Selected Agencies'
Management of Public Comments. GAO-20-383R. April 16, 2020.
Federal Management: Selected Reforms Could Be Strengthened
by Following Additional Planning, Communication, and Leadership
Practices. GAO-20-322.
DATA Act: OIGs Reported that Quality of Agency-Submitted
Data Varied, and Most Recommended Improvements. GAO-20-540.
July 9, 2020.
Federal Advisory Committees: Actions needed to Enhance
Decision-Making Transparency and Cost Data Accuracy. GAO-20-
575. September 10, 2020.
Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: Commerce Should Improve Its
Exclusion Request Process and Economic Impact Review.
GAO-20-517. September 15, 2020.
Critical Infrastructure Prioritization During COVID-19.
September 17, 2020.
Federal Buying Power: OMB Can Further Advance Category
Management Initiative by Focusing on Requirements, Data, and
Training. GAO-21-40. November 30, 2020.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL SPENDING OVERSIGHT AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Chairman: Rand Paul (R-KY)
Ranking Member: Maggie Hassan (D-NH)
I. AUTHORITY
The Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and
Emergency Management focuses on the effectiveness and
efficiency of Federal financial management; agency policies to
promote program integrity and the prevention of waste, fraud,
and abuse; policies and procedures related to Federal
contracting and procurement, including Federal Acquisition
Regulation; and the acquisition functions of the General
Services Administration (GSA) and the Office of the Federal
Procurement Policy. The Subcommittee also examines the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Federal Government's
efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural
and man-made disasters, including State and local grant
programs; activities under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act; and activities related to
the National Capital Region; the relationship between the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and States and
localities, including in preparing for, responding to, and
recovering from natural and man-made disasters; and activities
relating to the Office of the Private Sector and the
integration of the private sector into the Nation's emergency
preparedness, resilience, and response matters.
II. ACTIVITY
During the 116th Congress, the Subcommittee on Federal
Spending Oversight and Emergency Management held seven
hearings; released six reports cataloging hundreds of examples
of wasteful federal spending practices, highlighting more than
$104 billion in wasted taxpayer money; produced and introduced
a budget resolution; and introduced eight pieces of legislation
that were referred to the Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, three of which were reported out of
committee; as well as others that pertain to the work of the
committee.
A. Hearings
Direct and Indirect Costs to the Federal Government from Management of
Federal Lands. April 25, 2019. Field Hearing in Stearns, KY.
The Federal Government owns approximately 640 million acres
of land in the United States, roughly 28 percent of all the
land in the United States. Recently there has been much debate
about appropriateness of the federal government holding so much
land and questions have been asked if the Federal Government
has more land than it has capacity to manage. The Park Service
alone has an $11.6 billion maintenance backlog despite its
budget growing 10.8 percent in real dollars since 2010. And
yet, the trend is toward expanding federal ownership of lands.
Not only does the Federal Government incur cost associated
with maintaining Federal land and property, but it may also be
the case that Federal land holding create secondary costs to
the Federal government in the form of depressed economies in
areas of significant Federal holding. Local populations are
thus, then more likely to qualify and utilize a variety of
Federal assistance programs, with little hope or opportunity to
transition off of them.
While much of the focus of this debate has been in the
west, this problem is not isolated to western States. Nearly 2/
3rds of McCreary County, KY is owned and managed by the Federal
Government, between the Daniel Boone National Forest and the
Big South Fork National River and Recreation Area. Local
communities rely on federally managed Cumberland Lake for water
and power. Meanwhile the median household income in McCreary
County is about 3.1 times below the national average and 42.5
percent of the population lives below the poverty line.
To that end, this hearing aimed to explore what the cost
and benefits of the Federal Government of managing Federal
lands, if States and local communities could be better
positioned to steward these lands, and what impediments Federal
ownership/management pose to local economies.
Witnesses: Jimmie Greene, McCreary County Judge Executive;
Nathan Nevels, McCreary County Deputy Judge Executive; Randy
Maxwell, McCreary County Magistrate; Stephen Whitaker,
Supervisor, McCreary County Water Department; Randy Kidd,
Chairman, McCreary County Industrial Authority Board; Jerry
Stephens, Owner, Stephens Hardwoods and Barrel Stave Mill;
Robert A. Vogel, Regional Director, Southeast Region, National
Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior; and Ken Arney,
Regional Forester for the Southern Region, Forest Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture.
Review of GAO's Annual Duplication Report. May 21, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116-
58)
This was a review of GAO's annual duplication report. The
report identified 17 new areas of duplication, fragmentation,
or overlap that are identified in the report. There were also
11 other areas GAO has identified as potential sources of cost
savings or revenue enhancement. Further, GAO made 33 new
recommended corrective actions that apply to areas identified
in prior reports.
With regard to corrective actions taken, GAO notes that 53
percent of actions directed toward Congress have either not
been addressed or are only partially addressed. With regard to
the executive branch that number is better, but still 35
percent of corrective actions are not fully addressed.
Witnesses: Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the
United States, U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Federally Incurred Cost of Regulatory Changes and How Such Changes are
Made. July 17, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116-62)
The power of the purse theoretically rests with Congress;
Section 9 (7) of the Constitution reads, ``No Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law.'' However, it has been generally accepted that
mandatory spending, or ``permanent appropriations'' meet this
test--Congress appropriates, ``such sums as are necessary'' to
provide a certain benefit to a certain population.
One of the problems this hearing investigated was
regulatory changes that affect spending; changes through
regulation to mandatory entitlement programs that alter the
benefit or the recipient population, and thus affect spending.
For example, the Department of Agriculture has latitude to
broaden or contract eligibility for disaster aid, the VA can
alter what constitutes a service related disability, and Social
Security Administration has made obesity and illiteracy
(including only speaking Spanish in Puerto Rico) qualifying
disabilities.
Such changes cause fluctuations in Federal spending (called
budgetary regulations) without the express consent of Congress
as manifest in an appropriation; but also without the implied
consent contained in the authorizing legislation, as these
changes are made well beyond what was envisioned when these
programs were created decades earlier.
Moreover, research from the Pacific Legal Foundation has
shown that just at FDA, more than 3/4th of new regulations
promulgated over the last 20 years have gotten final sign off
from a career employee, not a Senate confirmed principal
officer. In other words, Congress's ability to hold decision
makers accountable and provide oversight of such spending is
impaired when career employees (with civil service protections)
are responsible for these regulations.
Witnesses: James Broughel, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow,
The Mercatus Center, George Mason University; Thomas A. Berry,
Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation; and Richard W. Parker,
Policy Director, Center for Energy and Environmental Law,
University of Connecticut School of Law.
Squeezed at Both Ends: Federal Spending Resulting from Restrictive
Logging Access and Timber Tariffs. October 7, 2019. Field
Hearing in Morehead, KY.
This hearing examined the cross-sectional impact of forest
policy and tariffs. Over the past three decades the Federal
Government has increasingly restricted access to Federal
forests for logging. This has depressed economic activity and
contracted tax bases in areas where logging is a major
industry. This manifests in direct costs to the Federal
Government in the form of mitigation type payments such as
Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) and Secure Rural School
payments. Moreover, because local economies are depressed,
local populations are more likely to depend on direct federal
aid.
Compounding and exacerbating this problem are recent and
proposed tariffs which impede access to markets for timber that
can be harvested in these communities. These trade actions have
the potential to further depress already vulnerable communities
resulting in fewer tax receipts to the Federal Government and
local communities and pushing more people onto Government aid
programs.
Witnesses: Joseph L. Barloon, General Counsel, Office of
the United States Trade Representative; Cameron Bishop, Deputy
Assistant United States Trade Representative for Congressional
Affairs, Office of the United States Trade Representative;
Jeffrey W. Stringer, Ph.D., Chairman, Department of Forestry
and Natural Resources, University of Kentucky; Stephen M.
Vacik, Ed.D., President and Chief Executive Officer, Maysville
Community and Technical College; Ray White, Chief Executive
Officer, Harold White Lumber, Inc.; Bob Helton, Executive
Director, Morehead Rowan County Economic Development Council;
Hon. Harry Clark, Judge/Executive, Rowan County Kentucky; Hon.
Laura White-Brown, Mayor, City of Morehead Kentucky; Hon. Rick
Stiltner, Judge/Executive, Menifee County Kentucky; and Hon.
Bobby C. Rogers, Judge/Executive, Bath County Kentucky.
Rise of the Zombies: The Unauthorized and Unaccountable Government You
Pay For. October 30, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116-132)
This hearing looked at unauthorized programs. Discretionary
programs are created through authorizing legislation--laws that
establish the programs and parameters under which they are to
be carried out. Authorizations also lay out funding parameters
and timelines for the program's existence. After such time
programs are supposed to be evaluated and reformed through a
reauthorization.
However, though authorizations are laws, so too are
appropriations bills. Thus, often appropriators regularly
override authorizations by providing funds to programs
inconsistent with the underlying authorization. Such was the
case a number of years ago when the NDAA eliminated a missile
program, but the appropriations that year funded the program
anyway.
Another, and more pervasive, problem occurs when a
program's authorization expires, but the appropriators fund it
anyway. This is a very prevalent practice, accounting for more
than 1000 programs and $300 billion in spending.
Since appropriator override invalidates authorizing
committees, once a program is initially created authorizers
have little incentive to reassess programs for performance and
need. Meaning many programs have not been scrutinized for
decades. For example, the Inter-American Foundation (which has
paid for clown college in Argentina) was last authorized (or
scrutinized) in 1987, but has continued to be funded every year
since.
There is little capacity for senators to prevent this
practice. For that reason, Chairman Paul has previously
introduced the Legislative Performance Review Act, which would
limit all authorizations to 4 years, wind programs down over
two years after their authorizations have expired, and most
importantly create a surgical point of order against
appropriations for unauthorized programs. Rep. McMorris Rodgers
has her own bill aimed at addressing this problem in the House.
Witnesses: Panel I--Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, U.S. House
of Representatives
Panel II--Kevin R. Kosar, Vice President of Policy, R
Street Institute; Jonathan Bydlak, President, Institute for
Spending Reform; and James A. Thurber, Distinguished Professor
of Government, American University.
The Afghanistan Papers: Costs and Benefits of America's Longest War.
February 11, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116-203)
At the time of the hearing, the war in Afghanistan has now
gone on for more than 18 years, making it the longest military
conflict in U.S. history. By some estimates, this has cost the
U.S. taxpayer more than $1 trillion.
Prior to this hearing, The Washington Post published The
Afghanistan Papers, which chronicle that from the very
beginning, the Afghanistan conflict has been rudderless, with
success largely undefined and unachievable. Despite clear and
obvious problems with the war, military and other officials
systematically mislead Congress and the American people about
conditions in Afghanistan.
Spending seems to have played a critical role in the
effectiveness of efforts in Afghanistan and as a justification
for ongoing U.S. engagement. One the one hand, the Afghan
conflict has become a long term justification for increases in
appropriations; whereas on the other hand, so much money has
been thrown at the conflict in the name of rebuilding, that it
has diminished the effectiveness of such efforts.
Witnesses: Panel I--John F. Sopko, Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Panel II--Hon. Douglas E. Lute, Former United States
Permanent Representative to NATO and Senior Fellow, Project on
Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.
Panel III--Hon. Richard A. Boucher, Former United States
Ambassador to Cyprus and Senior Fellow, The Watson Institute
for International and Public Affairs, Brown University; Lt.
Col. Daniel L. Davis, USA, Ret., Senior Fellow and Military
Expert, Defense Priorities.
State and Local Cybersecurity: Defending Our Communities from Cyber
Threats amid COVID-19. December 2, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116-)
In recent years, State and local governments and entities
have found themselves increasingly at risk from sophisticated
cybersecurity threats from a diverse set of actors. In 2020,
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for millions of
Americans to convert their daily activities and routines to an
internet-based regimen has amplified the cybersecurity threats
to State and local governments and entities.
This hearing served as a follow-up to the February 2020
HSGAC hearing on state and local cyber security and examined in
particular how State and local governments, schools, and
hospitals are responding to cyber threats amid the response to
COVID-19 and how the Federal Government can provide support to
improve their response, including through a standalone state
and local cybersecurity grant program and improved information
sharing between the Federal Government and schools and
hospitals.
Witnesses: Panel I--Brandon Wales, Acting Director,
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.
Panel II--Denis Goulet, Commissioner, New Hampshire
Department of Information Technology; Leslie Torres-Rodriguez,
Ed.D., Superintendent of Schools, Hartford Public Schools; John
Riggi, Senior Advisor for Cybersecurity and Risk, American
Hospital Association; and Bill Siegel, Chief Executive Officer
and Founder, Coveware, Inc.
B. Reports
In his capacity of Chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal
Spending Oversight and Emergency Management, Senator Paul
released six compilation reports, detailing various wasteful
programs, grants, and practices that have cost taxpayers
billions.
``The Waste Report: Swipe Left on Waste'' February 14, 2019
This report detailed an effort by private researchers,
using funds totaling $1,200,000 from the National Institute of
Child and Human Development and the National Science Foundation
to study the habits of dating app users.
``The Waste Report Spring 2019: Waste in Full Bloom'' April 2019
This report cataloged 10 examples of the Federal Government
spending more than $42 million on wasteful projects. The report
included examples of waste such as:
Sending international students to American
colleges for free;
Documented abuse of the DOD's 1033 program;
Studied the habits of online dating app users;
Funded a week of summer school for grad students;
and
Improved the quality of TV in Moldova.
``The Summer 2019 Waste Report!'' August 2019
This report cataloged 10 examples of the Federal Government
spending more than $50 billion on wasteful projects. The report
included examples of waste such as:
Funding ``green growth'' in Peru;
Medicare's paying of improper payments;
Studying whether the Panamanian Tungara frog's
mating calls sound different in the forest or the city;
Spending money to teach English and information
technology skills to students at Iraqi madrasas; and
The attempt to convert an abandoned mental
hospital into the headquarters of the Department of Homeland
Security.
``The Waste Report: Fall 2019'' November 2019
This report catalogued 8 examples of the Federal Government
spending more than $230 million on wasteful projects. The
report included examples of waste such as:
The Federal subsidy of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority;
Funding debate and model United Nations
competitions in Afghanistan;
Purchasing a statute made by the musical artist
Bob Dylan for the U.S. Embassy in Mozambique;
Studying the connection between drinking alcohol
and winding up in the emergency room; and
Paying to bring Serbian cheese up to
international standards.
``The Festivus Report 2019'' December 2019
This is Chairman Paul's annual compilation report of
wasteful government spending. This edition of the Festivus
Report cataloged over $50 billion in wasteful spending
including:
The U.S. Agency for International Development
funding the acquisition of textbooks for students in
Afghanistan that were unusable and unused;
The Department of State funding efforts to
improve the capacity of the Pakistani film industry;
FEMA paying for vehicles the New York City
government falsely claimed were damaged by Superstorm Sandy;
and
The NSF paying to teach social scientists how to
apply for grants.
``The Festivus Report 2020'' December 2020
This is Chairman Paul's annual compilation report of
wasteful government spending. This edition of the Festivus
Report catalogued 57 examples of government waste across five
categories: Energy, Environment, and Science; Foreign Aid;
Military; Health Care; and Miscellaneous. The 57 items totaled
over $54 billion in wasteful spending, including:
The Fish and Wildlife Service subsidizing
investments to facilitate yachting;
The Federal Aviation Administration using funds
appropriated as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act to renovate a taxiway at an airport on
Nantucket island most often used by private jets;
The National Institutes of Health paid
researchers to interview San Franciscans about their edible
cannabis use; and
The National Institutes of Health paying to find
out if hot tubbing can lower stress.
III. LEGISLATION
Since the Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and
Emergency Management's hearings play an important role in
bringing issues to the attention of Congress and the public,
its work frequently contributes to the development of
legislative initiatives. During the 116th Congress, Chairman
Paul introduced the following legislative proposals in his
capacity as a Senator:
1. S. 2618--Bonuses for Cost-Cutters Act--Expands existing
agency Inspector General programs that pursue waste, fraud, and
abuse to also include surplus funds that are not needed to
accomplish an Executive agency's duties and responsibilities.
Under this program, Executive Branch employees could propose
savings and, if confirmed by their agency's Inspector General
and Chief Financial Officer, extra funds may be returned to the
Treasury at the end of the year. Consistent with the existing
Inspector General authority, if such savings are realized, the
employee that made the suggestion would also be eligible for a
performance bonus of one percent of the amount saved, capped at
$10,000.
2. S.1740--Default Prevention Act--This bill requires the
following obligations to be granted priority over all other
U.S. obligations if the public debt reaches the statutory
limit:
Principal and interest on debt held by the
public;
Compensations, allowances, and benefits for
members of the Armed Forces on active duty;
Social Security benefits;
Medicare benefits; and
Obligations under any program administered by the
Department of Veterans Affairs.
If Congress is notified, the Department of the Treasury may
issue additional debt for the priority obligations in excess of
the debt limit. Treasury may issue the additional debt during
the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the United
States is unable to use revenues or extraordinary measures to
fully pay the priority obligations at the time they are due.
(The term ``extraordinary measures'' refers to a series of
actions that the Department of Treasury may implement to allow
the United States to borrow additional funds without exceeding
the debt limit. The measures generally include suspensions or
delays of debt sales and suspensions or redemptions of
investments in certain government funds.)
3. S. 5014--Shutdown Prevention Act--This bill provides
specified continuing appropriations to prevent a government
shutdown if any appropriations measure for a fiscal year has
not been enacted or a joint resolution making continuing
appropriations is not in effect after the fiscal year begins.
The appropriations are provided to continue to fund programs,
projects, and activities for which funds were provided in the
preceding fiscal year.
4. S. 4979--A bill to terminate the Department of
Education--This bill would terminate the Department of
Education, effective December 31, 2020. This bill reflects the
belief that the Federal Government need not impose itself on
the education system by empowering unelected bureaucrats over
our children's education. Local school systems, teachers, and
parents, not the Federal Government, are in the best position
to determine how to educate our children and eliminating the
Department of Education is the best way to ensure that parents
and local school boards are truly in control of their child's
education.
5. S. 2183--Duplication Scoring Act of 2019--This bill
would require the Government Accountability Office to analyze
legislation reported by a congressional committee in order to
prevent duplication of and overlap with existing federal
programs, offices, and initiatives.
6. S. 4104--Stopping Improper Payments to Deceased People
Act--This bill expands and otherwise modifies the sharing of
death data, particularly with regard to the recovery of
improper payments to deceased individuals. It would require the
Social Security Administration to pay to States their
reasonable costs for compiling and sharing death records with
the SSA. In addition, the bill permits the SSA to share, if
certain conditions are met, the death data with Federal and
State agencies for purposes of, among other things, ensuring
proper payments and tax administration duties related to
issuing Economic Impact Payments related to the COVID-19
pandemic.
7. S. 4878--Stopping Improper Payments to Foreigners Act--
This bill would ensure proper Economic Impact Payments paid out
with Americans' tax dollars would not be sent abroad to those
with tenuous or no ties to the United States.
8. S. Con. Res. 11--Penny Plan Balanced Budget--Establishes
the congressional budget for the Federal Government for FY2021
and sets forth budgetary levels for FY2021-FY2029. This budget
balances in 5 years by implementing a one percent year over
year cut for the first 5 years and then grows at one percent
thereafter.
Recommends levels and amounts for FY2021-FY2029 in both
houses of Congress for:
Federal revenues,
New budget authority,
Budget outlays,
Deficits,
Public debt,
Debt held by the public, and
The major functional categories of spending.
Recommends levels and amounts for FY2021-FY2029 in the
Senate for Social Security and Postal Service discretionary
administrative expenses.
Includes reconciliation instructions directing: (1) several
Senate authorizing committees to report and submit to the
Senate Budget Committee legislation to reduce the deficit, and
(2) the Senate Finance Committee to report and submit to the
Senate Budget Committee legislation to reduce the deficit and
legislation to reduce revenues.
(Under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, reconciliation
bills are considered by Congress using expedited legislative
procedures that prevent a filibuster and restrict amendments in
the Senate.)
Establishes reserve funds that provide flexibility in
applying budget enforcement rules to legislation relating to
efficiencies, consolidations, and other savings; or health
savings accounts.
Sets forth budget enforcement procedures for legislation
considered in the Senate.
9. S. 2798--Whistleblower Protection Act of 2019--This bill
would retroactively prohibit a Federal contractor from taking a
personnel action against an employee who has lawfully disclosed
information the employee reasonably believes shows 1) a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or 2) cooperation
with or disclosure of information to the agency's inspector
general or special counsel; or 3) refusal to obey an order that
would require the individual to violate a law, rule, or
regulation. This bill also prohibits a Federal agency from
pressuring a Federal contractor to take any personnel action
against an employee based on such disclosures or actions by the
employee.
10. S. 3904--Write the Laws Act--This bill would prohibit
an act of Congress from containing any delegation of
legislative powers, whether to any component within the
legislative branch, the President or any other member of the
executive branch, the judicial branch, any agency or quasi-
public agency, any state or state instrumentality, or any other
organization or individual. It would also require the GAO to
identify to Congress all statutes enacted before 90 days after
this bill's enactment that contain any delegation of
legislative power.
11. S. 92--Regulations from the Executive In Need of
Scrutiny Act of 2019--This bill establishes a congressional
approval process for a major rule. A major rule may only take
effect if Congress approves the rule. A major rule is a rule
that results in 1) an annual effect on the economy of $100
million or more, 2) a major increase in costs or prices for
consumers, individual industries, government agencies, or
geographic regions, 3) significant adverse effects on
competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation,
or the ability of U.S.-based enterprises to compete with
foreign-based enterprises. The bill also establishes a
congressional disapproval process for a nonmajor rule,
providing that a nonmajor rule may only take effect if Congress
does not disapprove of the rule.
IV. GAO REPORTS
During the 116th Congress, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) issued 32 reports at the request of the
Subcommittee. Reports are listed here by title, GAO number, and
release date.
U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Status of FEMA Public
Assistance Funding and Implementation. GAO-19-253. February 25,
2019.
Grants Management: Agency Action Required to Ensure
Grantees Identify Federal Contribution Amounts. GAO-19-282.
March 14, 2019.
Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status of FEMA Funding, Oversight,
and Recovery Challenges. GAO-19-256. March 14, 2019.
Huracanes de Puerto Rico: Estado de Financiamiento de FEMA,
Suervision y Desafios de Recuperacion (Spanish Highlights).
GAO-19-331. March 14, 2019.
Disaster Recovery: Better Monitoring of Block Grants Funds
is Needed. GAO-19-232. March 25, 2019.
2017 Hurricane Season: Federal Support for Electricity Grid
Restoration in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. GAO-19-
296. April 18, 2019.
2017 Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed to Improve the
Use of Post-Disaster Contracts to Support Response and
Recovery. GAO-19-281. April 24, 2019.
Disaster Assistance: FEMA Action Needed to Better Support
Individuals Who Are Older or Have Disabilities. GAO-19-318. May
14, 2019.
Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Opportunities to
Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve
Billions in Financial Benefits. GAO-19-536T. May 21, 2019.
2017 Disaster Relief Oversight: Strategy Needed to Ensure
Agencies' Internal Control Plans Provide Sufficient
Information. GAO-19-479. June 28, 2019.
Disaster Response: FEMA and the American Red Cross Need to
Ensure Key Mass Care Organizations are Included in Coordination
and Planning. GAO-19-526. September 19, 2019.
Respuesta a Desastres: FEMA y La Cruz Roja Americana
Necesitan Asegurar que las Organizaciones Claves del Cuidado en
Masa Sean Incluidas en la Coordinacion y el Planeamiento. GAO-
19-708. September 19, 2019.
Disaster Response: HHS Should Address Deficiencies
Highlighted by Recent Hurricanes in the U.S. Virgin Islands and
Puerto Rico. GAO-19-592. September 20, 2019.
Puerto Rico Electricity Grid Recovery: Better Information
and Enhanced Coordination is Needed to Address Challenges. GAO-
20-141. October 8, 2019.
Recuperacion de la Red Electrica en Puerto Rico: Se
Necesita Mejor Informacion y Coordinacion para Enfrentar
Desafios. GAO-20-143. October 8, 2019.
Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take Additional Actions to
Address Unique Response and Recovery Challenges. GAO-20-5.
October 9, 2019.
Highway Emergency Relief: Federal Highway Administration
Should Enhance Accountability Over Project Decisions. GAO-20-
32. October 17, 2019.
Emergency Transportation Relief: Federal Transit
Administration and FEMA Took Actions to Coordinate, But Steps
are Needed to Address Risk of Duplicate Funding. GAO-20-85.
November 13, 2019.
U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions Could
Strengthen FEMA's Key Disaster Recovery Efforts. GAO-20-54.
November 19, 2019.
Wildland Fire: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Reduce Wildland
Fuels and Lower Risk to Communities and Ecosystems. GAO-20-52.
December 19, 2019.
Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery: FEMA Actions Needed to
Strengthen Project Cost Estimation and Awareness of Program
Guidance. GAO-20-221. February 5, 2020.
Recuperacion de Desastres en Puerto Rico: Acciones de FEMA
son Necesarias para Fortalecer la Calculacion de Costos de
Proyectos y el Conocimento de las Directrices del Programa.
GAO-20-381. February 5, 2020.
Emergency Alerting: Agencies Need to Address Pending
Applications and Monitor Industry Progress on System
Improvements. GAO-20-294. February 6, 2020.
FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Address
Deployment and Staff Development Challenges. GAO-20-360. May 4,
2020.
National Preparedness: Additional Actions Needed to Address
Gaps in the Nation's Emergency Management Capabilities. GAO-20-
297. May 4, 2020.
National Flood Insurance Program: FEMA Can Improve
Community Oversight and Data Sharing. GAO-20-396. May 5, 2020.
Critical Infrastructure Prioritization During COVID-19.
September 17, 2020.
Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take Additional Actions to
Strengthen Fraud Risk Management for Public Assistance
Emergency Work Grants. GAO-20-604. September 29, 2020.
Disaster Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to
Strengthen FEMA's Individuals and Households Program. GAO-20-
503. September 20, 2020.
Supplemental Material for GAO-20-503: FEMA Individuals and
Households Program Applicant Data 2016-2018. GAO 20-675SP.
September 30, 2020.
Supplemental Material for GAO-20-503: Select Disaster
Profiles for FEMA's Individuals and Households Program 2016-
2018. GAO-20-674SP. September 30, 2020.
Puerto Rico Electricity: FEMA and HUD Have Not Approved
Long-Term Projects and Need to Implement Recommendations to
Address Uncertainties and Enhance Resilience. GAO-21-54.
November 17, 2020.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY AFFAIRS AND
FEDERAL MANAGEMENT
CHAIRMAN: James Lankford (R-OK)
RANKING MEMBER: Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ)
I. AUTHORITY
The Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal
Management oversees the management, efficiency, effectiveness,
and economy of all government agencies, departments, and
programs. The Subcommittee has broad oversight over the Federal
regulatory regime, including the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). In addition, the Subcommittee is
responsible for exploring policies that promote a skilled,
efficient, and effective Federal workforce that will work to
ensure efficient and effective management of Federal programs.
II. ACTIVITY
During the 116th Congress, the Subcommittee on Regulatory
Affairs and Federal Management held 7 hearings.
A. Hearings
From Beginning to End: An Examination of Agencies' Early Public
Engagement and Retrospective Review. May 7, 2019.
(S. Hrg. 116-37)
At the beginning of a rulemaking, agencies are encouraged
to consult with stakeholders, consider multiple approaches to
regulation, and directed to provide opportunity for public
comment. In the years following the promulgation of a rule,
agencies are expected to periodically review regulations to
ensure their effectiveness and continued necessity. However,
there is no overarching legal requirements governing initial
public outreach and review of existing rules.
This hearing considered how the regulatory process could be
improved by legislation requiring advanced notices of proposed
rulemaking and the creation of retrospective review frameworks
during the promulgation of `major' rules.
Witnesses: Hon. Susan E. Dudley, Former Administrator
(2007-2009), of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, at the Office of Management and Budget; Hon. Sally
Katzen, Former Administrator (1993-1998), of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, at the Office of Management
and Budget
Reauthorization of the SBA Office of Advocacy. May 22, 2019
(S. Hrg. 116-86)
The 1980 passage of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
greatly expanded the Small Business Administration's (SBA's)
Office of Advocacy's role. The RFA requires agencies to
consider the effects of their regulatory actions on small
entities, mitigate effects when possible, and fill out initial
and final regulatory analyses. The RFA also charges the Chief
Counsel with monitoring agencies' compliance with the Act and
submitting an annual report to Congress. In 1996, the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) required
the EPA and OSHA to hold panels with Advocacy, OIRA, and small
entity representatives when developing a rule that requires an
initial regulatory flexibility analysis. The 2010 Dodd-Frank
added the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to the
list of agencies required to convene ``SBREFA'' panels.
Executive Order 13272 in 2002 required all Federal agencies to
establish procedures and policies to promote compliance with
the RFA, which was later codified in the Small Business Jobs
Act of 2010.
This hearing, held jointly with the Senate Committee on
Small Business and Entrepreneurship, discussed the work at the
office of Advocacy, ways to enhance the Office's mission to
serve as a voice for small businesses within the Federal
Government, and figure out the best ways to draft a
reauthorization of the portions of the Small Business Act and
other laws that enable Advocacy.
Witnesses: Major Clark, III, Acting Chief Counsel, Office
of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration; Winslow
Sargeant, Senior Vice President for Partnerships, International
Council for Small Business; John Arensmeyer, CEO and Founder,
Small Business Majority; Jeanette Hernandez Prenger, Founder,
President, and CEO, ECCO Select; Rick Baumann, Owner, Murrells
Inlet Seafood.
Solutions to Improve Federal Hiring. July 30, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116-98)
This hearing provided an opportunity to discuss specific
ways to modernize the hiring process to attract and retain
highly qualified civil servants. Federal agencies continue to
face a prolonged hiring crisis. The average time to hire is 106
days, well above the Office of Personnel Management's goal of
80 days. This renders the Federal Government unable to compete
with the private sector for top talent. The Federal workforce
is also aging. With 32 percent of employees eligible to retire
by 2022, there is a significant risk of having a wide knowledge
gap amongst Federal workers in years to come. It is therefore
vital that the Federal hiring process be improved so that
agencies can strategically fill critical needs in a timely
manner. This hearing examined the challenges to implementing a
competitive hiring process in the Federal Government and
explored strategic measures to address these challenges.
Witnesses: Yvonne D. Jones, Director, Strategic Issues
Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Angela Bailey,
Chief Human Capital Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; and Daniel R. Sitterly, Assistant Secretary for Human
Resources and Administration, U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs.
Review of E-Rulemaking Comment Systems. October 24, 2019.
(S. Hrg. 116-114).
This hearing, held jointly with the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, reviewed federal agency systems for
receiving reviewing, and publicizing comments on proposed
regulations and found the systems were abused, creating some
public distrust in the rule writing process, as well as
additional work for federal employees. The Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations also released a report in
conjunction with the hearing titled ``Abuses of the Federal
Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Process.''
Witnesses: Elizabeth Angerman, Principal Deputy
Administrator, Office of Government-Wide Policy, U.S. General
Services Administration; Dominic Mancini, Acting Director,
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget; Ashley Boizelle, Deputy General Counsel,
Federal Communications Commission; Seto J. Bagdoyan, Director,
Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, U.S. Government
Accountability Office.
Improving Public Service: A Review of Recommendations Made by the
National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service.
June 23, 2020 (S. Hrg. 116-268)
As the National Commission observed in its final report
issued on March 25th, ``Public servants perform a critical role
in the functioning of American democracy,'' but ``significant
barriers to entering public service exist due to lack of
awareness, aspiration, and access--especially among younger
workers, who are underrepresented in Federal civilian
employment.'' The National Commission went on to make specific
recommendations, including legislative proposals for improving
the functioning of the Federal workforce. This hearing focused
on those recommendations with a particular emphasis on hiring
reform.
Witnesses: Hon. Joseph Heck, D.O, Chairman, National
Commission on Military, National, and Public Service; Shawn
Skelly, Commissioner, National Commission on Military,
National, and Public Service.
Modernizing Telework: Review of Private Sector Telework Policies during
the COVID-19 Pandemic. July 28, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116-283)
COVID-19 has forced both the Federal Government and private
sector to conduct much of their normal operations remotely.
This enhanced reliance on telework provides an opportunity to
learn what policies put in place before the pandemic lead to
successful remote work environments and what improvements are
needed. Given the agility of the private sector, the hearing
invited representatives from private sector companies to
discuss their approach to telework before the pandemic and how,
if at all, that approach changed since the pandemic and how it
will continue to change moving forward.
This hearing focused on what lessons the Federal Government
could learn from the private sector regarding the future of
telework. This will include what infrastructure is available to
support telework practices, how to ensure employee productivity
goals are met, what technologies are available to optimize
remote collaboration and improve data security, potential cost
saving from having a full or part-time remote workforce, as
well as any other proposals the private sector has found useful
in establishing and improving teleworking policies.
Witnesses: Sean D. Morris, Principal, Deloitte Consulting
LLP; T. Lane Wilson, Senior Vice President and General Counsel,
The Williams Companies, Inc.; Michael Ly, Chief Executive
Officer, Reconciled; John Zanni, Chief Executive Officer,
Acronis SCS.
Modernizing Federal Telework: Moving forward using the Lessons Learned
during the COVID-19 Pandemic. November 18, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116-
402).
COVID-19 has required the Federal Government to conduct
most of its normal operations remotely. The need for maximal
telework during this period has provided an opportunity to
identify what existing telework policies and procedures have
been successful and areas for improvement. This hearing invited
Federal agency representatives to discuss their approach to
telework before the pandemic, what lessons they have learned
during the pandemic, and how these lessons might shape the
future of telework.
Witnesses: Michelle Rosenberg, Acting Director, Strategic
Issues Team, Government Accountability Office; Keith
Washington, Deputy Secretary for Administration, U.S.
Department of Transportation; Ms. Sydney T. Rose, Chief Human
Capital Officer, Office of Human Resources, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management, U.S.
Department of Labor; Jim Borland, Assistant Deputy Commissioner
for Systems and Deputy Chief Information Officer for IT
Operations, Social Security Administration.
III. LEGISLATION
Since the Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal
Management's hearings play an important role in bringing issues
to the attention of Congress and the public, its work
frequently contributes to the development of legislative
initiatives. During the 116th Congress, Chairman Lankford
introduced the following legislative proposals in his capacity
as a Senator:
1. S. 395--Providing Accountability Through Transparency--
This bill requires the notice of a proposed rule by a Federal
agency to include the Internet address of a summary of the
rule. The summary must be 100 words or fewer, written in plain
language, and posted on regulations.gov.
2. S. 1120--Small Business Regulatory Flexibility
Improvements Act--Updates the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
Requires agencies to analyze the total impact of a proposed
regulation on small businesses during the rulemaking process.
It also closes loopholes used by agencies to avoid compliance
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996.
3. S. 1419--Early Participation in Regulations Act--This
bill directs agencies to publish advance notice of a proposed
rulemaking at least 90 days before publishing a notice of
proposed rulemaking for a major rule that the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) determines is likely
to impose (1) an annual effect on the economy of $100 million
or more; (2) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers,
individual industries, government agencies, or geographic
regions; or (3) significant adverse effects on competition,
employment, investment, productivity, innovation, health,
safety, the environment, or the ability of U.S. enterprises to
compete with foreign-based enterprises.
The advance notice must:
include, among other information, a written a description
of the rule and the legal authority under which it is proposed;
and
solicit and provide a period of at least 60 days for
submission of written data, views, and argument from interested
persons.
Any difference between such advance notice and the notice
of proposed rulemaking may not be considered arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
Advance notice is not required if the proposing agency is
not required to publish notice of proposed rulemaking or OIRA
finds that such advance notice is not in the public interest or
duplicative of another statutory requirement. Such a
determination made by OIRA is not subject to judicial review.
4. S. 1430--Representative Payee Fraud Prevention Act--This
bill prohibits a representative payee (i.e., a person
designated to receive payments on behalf of a minor, a mentally
incompetent individual, or an individual under other legal
disability) from embezzling or converting the amounts received
from certain retirement funds.
If the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) determines that
a representative payee has embezzled or converted payments from
the Civil Service Retirement System or the Federal Employees
Retirement System for a use other than the benefit of the
individual on whose behalf such payments were received, OPM
shall (1) revoke the certification for payment of benefits to
the representative payee, and (2) certify payment to another
representative payee or to the individual.
5. S. 2169--A bill to amend section 3116 of title 5, United
States Code, to clarify the applicability of the appointment
limitations for students appointed under the expedited hiring
authority for post-secondary students.This bill revises a
provision that limits the authority of an agency to appoint,
through expedited hiring authority, post-secondary students to
an agency position at the GS-11 level. Further, the bill
authorizes an agency to grant paid leave for up to (1) 20 days
of rest and recuperation to a civilian employee serving in a
combat zone or other high risk, high threat post; and (2) 5
days to a civilian employee serving in a foreign area for local
holidays observed in such area.
6. S. 2757--Harmless Error Lesser Penalty for Small
Business Act--This bill prohibits an agency from imposing a
civil fine on a small business for a first-time paperwork
violation, with the exceptions that the agency may levy a fine
for a violation that (1) interferes with the detection of
criminal activity; (2) contravenes an internal revenue law; or
(3) endangers public health, safety, or the environment.
However, an agency must track each first-time violation and
report each waiver or reduction of a civil penalty for the
violation.
7. S. 3412--Guidance Clarity Act--This bill requires
Federal agencies to state on the first page of guidance
documents that such guidance (1) does not have the force and
effect of law, and (2) is intended only to provide clarity to
the public about existing legal requirements or agency
policies. Excluded from this requirement is guidance directed
to the issuing agency or other agency that is not intended to
have a substantial effect on the behavior of regulated parties,
as well as internal executive branch legal advice or opinions
addressed to executive branch officials.
8. S. 4138--Telework for U.S. Innovation Act--This bill
makes permanent the Telework Enhancement Act Pilot Program in
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The program
allows USPTO employees to telework from locations across the
United States; USPTO may cover any necessary travel expenses to
and from an agency worksite. The program is set to expire on
December 31, 2020.
9. S. 4691--Safeguarding Awards for Victims and Enforcement
Settlements Act--Previous administrations have directed DOJ
settlement money be issued to third parties with no direct
interest in or claim to the settlement, subverting Congress's
spending and oversight authority. SAVES Act resolves this issue
by preventing third party payments except in limited
circumstances where a third party is necessary for a fair
result. Specifically, it prohibits the government from entering
into or enforcing an enforcement settlement agreement on behalf
of the US that directs or provides for a payment or loan to any
person or entity other than the US except to: directly remedy
actual harm (including to the environment) caused by the party
making the payment or loan, pay for services rendered in
connection with the case, or pay for court ordered restitution
to victims in certain criminal cases or other persons in plea
agreements.
10. S. 4693--Better Evaluation of Science and Technology
Act--This bill requires Federal agencies to use the best
available scientific information during rulemaking and publish
specified documentation of the rulemaking process.
Specifically, the bill requires a Federal agency, to the
extent it is making a decision based on science when issuing a
rule, to use scientific information, technical procedures,
methods, protocols, methodologies, or models in a manner that
is consistent with the best available science and the intended
use of the information, based on the weight of the scientific
evidence.
Each Federal agency shall make available to the public (1)
all of its notices, determinations, findings, rules, consent
agreements, and orders in connection with a rule; (2) a
nontechnical summary of each risk evaluation conducted in
connection with a rule; and (3) a list of the studies
considered by the agency in carrying out each evaluation, along
with the results of those studies.
11. S. 4708--Pandemic Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
Act--This bill establishes in the legislative branch the
Pandemic Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Commission to
make recommendations and propose legislation for modification,
consolidation, harmonization, or repeal of regulations to
reduce compliance costs, encourage growth and innovation,
improve competitiveness, and protect public safety.
The commission must give priority to regulations (1) the
repeal or modification of which may assist recovery or response
to the COVID-19 (i.e., coronavirus disease 2019) pandemic and
future pandemics, (2) that impose disproportionately high costs
on a small entity, (3) that create substantial recurring
paperwork burdens or transaction costs, or (4) that could be
made more effective while reducing regulatory costs.
The bill sets forth reporting requirements for the
commission and procedures for congressional consideration of
commission reports, recommendations, and proposed legislation.
12. S. 4977--Retirement Annuity Supplement Clarity Act--
Clarifies that OPM has the flexibility to follow a court order,
if that order specifically divides the annuity supplement,
rather than the blanket approach applied now. Repays annuitants
who were retired on or before June 30, 2016, and entitled to an
annuity supplement that was subject to a court order that was
silent on division of the supplement, or expressly excluded the
supplement from division; and whose annuity supplement was
recomputed retroactively. Clarifies that any collection of
overpayments to former spouses due to this recalculation shall
be waived.
IV. GAO REPORTS
During the 116th Congress, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) issued 8 reports at the request of the
Subcommittee. Reports are listed here by title, GAO number, and
release date.
1. Grants Management: Agency Action Required to Ensure
Grantees Identify Federal Contribution Amounts. GAO-19-282.
March 14, 2018.
2. Federal Workforce: Key Talent Management Strategies for
Agencies to Better Meet their Missions. GAO-19-181. March 28,
2019.
3. Federal Rulemaking: Selected Agencies Should Clearly
Communicate Practices Associated with Identity Information in
the Public Comment Process. GAO-19-483. June 26, 2019.
4. Federal Vehicle Fleets: Agencies have continued to
Incorporate Alternative Fuel Vehicles into Fleets, but
Challenges Remain. GAO-19-397. July 26, 2019.
5. Human Capital: Improving Federal Recruiting and Hiring
Efforts. GAO-19-696T. July 30, 2019.
6. Federal Rulemaking: Selected Agencies Should Clearly
Communicate Public Comment Posting Practices Associated with
Identity Information. GAO-20-105T. October 24, 2019.
7. Federal Rulemaking: Information on Selected Agencies'
Management of Public Comments. GAO-20-383R. April 16, 2020.
8. Federal Telework: Key Practices that can help ensure the
Success of Telework Programs. GAO-21-238T. November 18, 2020.
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