[Senate Report 117-1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


117th Congress         } 		           {    	Report
                      		 SENATE                          
 1st Session           }                           {             117-1
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     




                     ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON

                         HOMELAND SECURITY AND

                          GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS


                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                                and its

                             SUBCOMMITTEES

                                for the

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS


		[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
		


                 March 1, 2021.--Ordered to be printed
        
        			__________
        
        
		     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

19-010 			    WASHINGTON : 2021        
        
        
        
        
        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire         RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California             MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSOFF, Georgia                   RICK SCOTT, Florida
                                     JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

                   David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
                Pamela Thiessen, Minority Staff Director
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                                 ------                                

  COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DURING THE 
                             116TH CONGRESS

                    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah                    KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming             JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

                                 ------                                

                  SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE 116TH CONGRESS
                PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

                      ROB PORTMAN, Ohio, Chairman
RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah                    KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
                                 ------                                

          FEDERAL SPENDING OVERSIGHT AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

                     RAND PAUL, Kentucky, Chairman
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming             KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
               REGULATORY AFFAIRS AND FEDERAL MANAGEMENT

                   JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma, Chairman
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
MITT ROMNEY, Utah                    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

                                CONTENTS

                                 ------                                
                                                                   Page
  I. Highlights of Activities.........................................1

        A. Border and Immigration Security.......................     2
        B. Cybersecurity.........................................     5
        C. Critical Infrastructure...............................     7
        D. Terrorism.............................................    11
        E. DHS Reforms and COVID-19 Response.....................    13
        F. Oversight of Federal Agencies & Government Programs...    17
        G. Reducing Waste, Fraud and Abuse.......................    22

 II. Committee Jurisdiction..........................................25
III. Bills and Resolutions Referred and Considered...................28
 IV. Hearings........................................................28
  V. Reports, Prints, and GAO Reports................................43
 VI. Official Communications.........................................60
VII. Legislative Actions.............................................60
        Measures Enacted Into Law................................    61
        Postal Naming Bills......................................    65
VIII.Activities of the Subcommittees.................................70


             Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI)

  I. Historical Background...........................................70

        A. Subcommittee Jurisdiction.............................    70

        B. Subcommittee Investigations...........................    72

 II. Subcommittee Hearings during the 116th Congress.................78

III. Legislation Activities during the 116th Congress................80

 IV. Reports, Prints, and Studies....................................82

  V. GAO Reports....................................................121

       Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management (FSO)

  I. Authority......................................................123

 II. Activity.......................................................123

III. Legislation....................................................129

 IV. GAO Reports....................................................132

            Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management (RAFM)

  I. Authority......................................................135

 II. Activity.......................................................135

III. Legislation....................................................138

 IV. GAO Reports....................................................141






117th Congress         } 		           {    	Report
                      		 SENATE                          
 1st Session           }                           {             117-1

======================================================================



 
                ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND



                   SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS



                       DURING THE 116TH CONGRESS

                                _______
                                

                  March 1, 2021--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. PETERS, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
                    Affairs, submitted the following

                                 REPORT

    This report reviews the legislative and oversight 
activities of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs and its Subcommittees during the 116th 
Congress. These activities were conducted pursuant to the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended; by Rule 
XXV(k) of the Standing Rules of the Senate; and by additional 
authorizing resolutions of the Senate. See Section II, 
``Committee Jurisdiction,'' for details.
    Senator Ron Johnson was Chairman of the Committee during 
the 116th Congress; Senator Gary C. Peters was the Ranking 
Member.
    Major activities of the Committee during the 116th Congress 
included oversight and legislation involving border and 
immigration security; cybersecurity; protecting critical 
infrastructure; combatting terrorism; efficient functioning of 
the Department of Homeland Security, including oversight of 
COVID-19 pandemic preparedness and response; the Committee's 
oversight of Federal programs; regulatory reform; and reducing 
waste, fraud and abuse in Federal spending. Discussion of these 
major activities appears in Section I below; additional 
information on these and other measures appears in Section VII, 
``Legislative Actions.''
    Extensive information about the Committee's history, 
hearings, legislation, documents, Subcommittees, and other 
matters is available at the Web site, http://hsgac.senate.gov/.

                      I. HIGHLIGHTS OF ACTIVITIES

    In the 116th Congress, the Committee carried out its 
mission statement ``to enhance the economic and national 
security of America and promote more efficient, effective, and 
accountable government.'' The Committee approved 104 bills, not 
including bills to name United States Post Offices, 51 of which 
were passed by the United States Senate, and 37 of which were 
ultimately signed into law. The Committee also held 50 hearings 
and roundtables and confirmed 30 nominees. Priority areas for 
the Committee's work are discussed below.

                   A. BORDER AND IMMIGRATION SECURITY

    Legal loopholes continue to create an incentive for people 
to make the dangerous journey to the United States. This 
Congress, the Committee continued to lay out the reality of the 
challenges the nation faces securing the southwest border, and 
worked with Members of the Committee and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS, or the Department) to find bipartisan 
solutions to address the humanitarian crisis occurring along 
the southwest border. Continuing the Committee's emphasis on 
border security, the Committee held more than 35 bipartisan 
staff briefings; took staff delegation trips to various 
locations across the southwest border, Mexico, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala; convened seven hearings focused on border security; 
and used what we learned to inform proposals to improve border 
security including Operation Safe Return. Below are highlights 
from some of the hearings.
    At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: By 
the Numbers, the Committee heard directly from border security 
experts.\1\ The hearing highlighted the border security and 
humanitarian crisis at the southwest border. Witnesses spoke 
about the changing trends in illegal border crossings and how 
the exploitation of legal loopholes overwhelmed the personnel 
and resources at the border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: By the 
Numbers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: 
Perspectives from the Frontline, Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Drug 
Enforcement Agency, and Health and Human Services (HHS) 
frontline employees told the Committee about the migration 
crisis at the southwest border and compared apprehension data 
to prior trends.\2\ CBP and ICE employees testified about the 
components' need for additional resources to keep up with the 
surge in unaccompanied alien children and family unit 
apprehensions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: 
Perspectives from the Frontline: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The 
Exploitation of Migrants through Smuggling, Trafficking, and 
Involuntary Servitude, the Committee heard testimony from ICE, 
U.S. Border Patrol, and Office of Field Operations about the 
different aspects and phases of exploitation, including the 
current trends, and costs associated with human smuggling and 
trafficking across the southwest border. The Committee heard 
directly from the agencies that encountered cases of smuggling, 
trafficking, and involuntary servitude, including the case of a 
three-year-old boy who was abandoned in a cornfield between 
Mexico and Texas, with just his name and phone number written 
on his shoes.\3\ The hearing highlighted how illegal 
immigrants, including MS13 gang members, fraudulently use 
unrelated children to gain entry into the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The 
Exploitation of Migrants through Smuggling, Trafficking, and 
Involuntary Servitude: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs,116th Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 17, 2019, the Committee held a roundtable titled, 
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Bipartisan 
Policy Recommendations from the Homeland Security Advisory 
Council. The roundtable was an important discussion about the 
Homeland Security Advisory Council's bipartisan assessment of 
the migration crisis and policy recommendations for mitigating 
the flow and preventing similar crises in the future.\4\
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    \4\Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Bipartisan 
Policy Recommendations from the Homeland Security Advisory Council: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 
116th Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: 
What is required to Improve Conditions, Acting Commissioner 
Mark Morgan explained the need for additional aid for 
transportation, temporary facilities, and additional beds to 
address the border crisis. Then-DHS Acting Inspector General 
Jennifer Costello explained the findings of a Management Alert 
issued on July 2, 2019.\5\ The Committee discussed how CBP was 
forced to hold crowds of migrants in temporary facilities while 
migrants waited to be transferred to a more long-term ICE 
facility, resulting in prolonged wait times and overcrowding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: What Is 
Required to Improve Conditions?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The 
Year in Review, the Committee highlighted the shift in migrant 
demographics from single males from Mexico to families and 
children from Central America. Witnesses provided testimony on 
the Trump administration's actions over the past year to curb 
illegal immigration, including the Migrant Protection Protocol, 
the Flores Settlement Agreement Rule, the Third Country Asylum 
Rule, regional cooperation from Mexico, and Agreements with 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. The hearing noted how in 
Fiscal Year 2019, 977,509 individuals were apprehended or found 
to be inadmissible by CBP at the southwest border.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The Year in 
Review: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At CBP Oversight: Examining the Evolving Challenges Facing 
the Agency, Acting Commissioner Mark Morgan testified about how 
CBP is using the Title 42 public health authorities to prohibit 
the entry of migrants crossing the border in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The hearing examined how CBP has adjusted 
its processes and enforcement actions while continuing to 
enable lawful trade, travel, and migration. The Acting 
Commissioner indicated that the tactics of illegal crossing has 
changed and smugglers are now using concealment techniques, 
such as dangerously confining migrants in tractor-trailers, to 
enter illegally through ports of entry.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\CBP Oversight: Examining the Evolving Challenges Facing the 
Agency: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Johnson released a majority staff report, titled 
Judicial Rulings Ending the Obama Administration's Family 
Detention Policy: Implications for Illegal Immigration and 
Border Security. The report highlighted the staggering increase 
of family unit illegal border crossings since the 2015 court 
reinterpretation of the Flores Settlement Agreement and how the 
ruling entices migrant families to make the dangerous journey 
to the United States because they know they will be released. 
The report noted how the Flores reinterpretation, combined with 
limited detention facilities, has forced ICE to release 
families. In fiscal year 2015, when the courts reinterpreted 
the Flores Settlement Agreement, CBP apprehended 39,838 family 
units. At the end of fiscal year 2018, CBP apprehended a total 
of 107,212 family units.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\Majority Staff Rpt., S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs, Judicial Rulings Ending the Obama Admin.'s Family Det. Policy: 
Implications for Illegal Immigration and Border Security, 116th Cong. 
(2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Chairman released a majority staff report, titled How 
the U.S. Immigration System Encourages Child Marriages. 
Chairman Johnson drew attention to loopholes in Federal 
immigration law that can be used to force children to marry for 
the purpose of receiving an immigration benefit. The report 
presented findings from a yearlong bipartisan inquiry with 
then- Ranking Member Claire McCaskill. The report noted that 
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
approved immigration petitions for 8,686 spouses and fiances in 
marriages involving minors from FY2007 to FY2017.\9\ In 95 
percent of the cases, the younger person was a girl.\10\ 
Additionally, the report highlighted that USCIS approved 149 
petitions involving a minor with an adult spouse or fiance who 
was more than 40 years old.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\Majority Staff Rpt., S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs, How the U.S. Immigration Sys. Encourages Child Marriages, 
116th Cong., (2019).
    \10\Id.
    \11\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee approved eight bills related to securing our 
borders. Those bills included the Securing America's Ports of 
Entry Act of 2019, requiring CBP to hire 600 additional Office 
of Field Operations officers per year until CBP's staffing 
needs are met. To ensure the borders are secure between the 
ports, the Committee also approved the Securing America's 
Borders Act of 2019, to require CBP to hire at least 600 Border 
Patrol agents above attrition levels each year. Two other bills 
approved by the Committee strengthen CBP strategy and policies 
regarding opioid exposure and detection at Ports of Entry.\12\ 
The Committee considered and approved two additional bipartisan 
bills that would encourage technological advancements and 
planning, including by requiring DHS to perform a thorough 
analysis of border security gaps and needs along the southwest 
border.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\DHS Opioid Detection Resilience Act, H.R. 4761, 116th Cong. 
(2019); Synthetic Opioid Exposure Prevention and Training Act, H.R. 
4739, 116th Cong. (2019).
    \13\Securing America's Ports Act, H.R. 5273, 116th Cong. (2019); 
Southwest Border Security Technology Improvement Act, S. 4224, 116th 
Cong. (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the height of the crisis at the southwest border, 
Chairman Johnson worked with executive agencies to develop a 
streamlined process aimed at quickly and fairly processing 
family units with asylum claims. Chairman Johnson and 
colleagues detailed this process in a letter sent to President 
Trump requesting the implementation of their Operation Safe 
Return proposal as a pilot program.\14\ Operation Safe Return 
became the basis for two expedited processing programs, Prompt 
Asylum Claim Review (known as PACR) and Humanitarian Asylum 
Review Process (known as HARP). CBP Acting Commissioner Mark 
Morgan testified before the Committee that these programs bring 
a ``whole-of-Government approach to the border'' and allow 
processing to be more effective and efficient.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs, to President Donald J. Trump (July 17, 2019) (on 
file with author).
    \15\CBP Oversight: Examining the Evolving Challenges Facing the 
Agency: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
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                            B. CYBERSECURITY

    The United States continues to face an evolving cyber 
threat landscape. According to IBM Security, the average total 
cost of a data breach in the United States, which has the 
current highest country average, is $8.64 million.\16\ DHS, 
notably the newly established Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency (CISA), provides capabilities and resources to 
support and secure Federal civilian government networks and 
critical networks within the private sector.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\IBM Security, 2020 Cost of a Data Breach Report, https://
www.ibm.com/security/digital-assets/cost-data-breach-report/#/.
    \17\Dep't of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency, Cybersecurity Division Mission and Vision, https://
www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-division.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Last Congress, the Committee moved legislation to establish 
CISA through restructuring and renaming the Department's former 
National Protection and Programs Directorate.\18\ The Committee 
continued its oversight of CISA during the 116th Congress, 
sending a bipartisan request to the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to review and ensure CISA's 
organizational structure can effectively carry out its 
statutory responsibilities.\19\ In addition, Committee staff 
received multiple bipartisan briefings from CISA on its 
reorganization efforts.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018, 
Pub. L. No. 115-278 (115th Cong.).
    \19\Letter from S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs to 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (May 29, 2019) (CISA Review) (on 
file with Comm. staff).
    \20\See, e.g., Comm. Majority and Minority Staff Briefing (CISA 
Reorg) (Sept. 3, 2019); Comm. Majority and Minority Staff Briefing 
(CISA 2020) (Dec. 12, 2019); Comm. Majority and Minority Staff Briefing 
(CISA Central) (June 10, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee held a number of cybersecurity roundtables 
and hearings. On May 15, 2019, the Committee held a member 
meeting with private sector critical infrastructure providers 
and cybersecurity companies to explore Federal agency 
challenges in providing effective support and resources to the 
private sector.\21\ The Committee learned that to effectively 
assist the private sector, the Federal Government needs to find 
new methods of imposing cost to deter adversaries from using 
cyber means to achieve their goals.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\HSGAC Member Meeting, Cybersecurity Roles and Responsibilities: 
Private Sector Perspectives (May 15, 2019).
    \22\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On October 31, 2019, the Committee held a hearing, Supply 
Chain Security, Global Competitiveness, and 5G, to examine the 
national security and economic challenges in competing with 
Chinese-supported telecommunications companies in the race 
towards 5G (5th generation) wireless networks in the U.S. and 
globally.\23\ According to Committee testimony, Chinese 
companies own 36 percent of all 5G wireless standard-essential 
patents, compared to only 14 percent held in the United 
States.\24\ Additionally, the U.S. has no domestic manufacturer 
of key 5G equipment.\25\ Candid testimony from four Federal 
agencies raised concerns about the nation's ability to compete 
with China on the deployment of 5G and in global Information 
Communications Technology marketplaces.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\Supply Chain Security, Global Competitiveness, and 5G: Hearing 
before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
116th Cong. (2019), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/supply-chain-security-
global-competitiveness-and-5g.
    \24\Id. (Testimony of Jessica Rosenworcel).
    \25\Id.
    \26\Supply Chain Security, Global Competitiveness, and 5G: Hearing 
before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
116th Cong. (2019), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/supply-chain-security-
global-competitiveness-and-5g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On February 11, 2020, the Committee held a hearing, What 
States, Locals, and the Business Community Should Know and Do: 
A Roadmap for EffectiveCybersecurity.\27\ The purpose of this 
hearing was to examine how state, local, tribal, and 
territorial (SLTT) governments and critical infrastructure 
owners and operators can mitigate and protect against 
persistent cybersecurity threats.\28\ This hearing also 
examined the current threat environment, including 
ransomware.\29\ During the hearing, CISA's then-director, 
Christopher Krebs, discussed the voluntary services provided to 
SLTTs, such as vulnerability scanning, malware analysis, and 
technical expertise.\30\ He also discussed the rise in 
ransomware attacks, which in 2019, ``impacted at least 966 
government agencies, educational establishments and healthcare 
providers at a potential cost of $7.5 billion.''\31\ State 
officials from Texas and Michigan also discussed responding to 
cyber events, including ransomware attacks, and how CISA can 
better collaborate and assist SLTT governments.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\What States, Locals, and the Business Community Should Know and 
Do: A Roadmap for Effective Cybersecurity, Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
    \28\Id.
    \29\Id.
    \30\Id. Testimony of Christopher Krebs.
    \31\Id. Testimony of Christopher Krebs.
    \32\What States, Locals, and the Business Community Should Know and 
Do: A Roadmap for Effective Cybersecurity, Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020) (testimony 
of Amanda Crawford, Executive Director, Department of Information 
Resources, State of Texas); see also Testimony of Christopher DeRusha, 
Chief Security Officer, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection 
Office, State of Michigan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On May 13, 2020, the Committee held another hearing, 
Evolving the U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy and Posture: Reviewing 
the Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report.\33\ The purpose of 
this hearing was to discuss the findings and recommendations of 
the Commission's report, and build consensus around a possible 
path forward to enact its key recommendations.\34\ One chief 
finding reviewed by the Committee was that the Federal 
Government has a unique understanding of threat actors and 
vulnerabilities in the nation's critical infrastructure, but 
there are limits to systemically identify, warn, and assist 
those that are vulnerable.\35\ As a result, the Commission 
recommended granting CISA the authority to issue administrative 
subpoenas to support threat and vulnerability mitigation 
activities.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\Evolving the U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy and Posture: Reviewing 
the Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/evolving-the-us-cybersecurity-strategy-and-
posture-reviewing-the-cyberspace-solarium-commission-report.
    \34\Id.
    \35\U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report, 100 (March 2020), 
https://www.solarium.gov/report.
    \36\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Throughout the Congress, the Committee worked to understand 
legal constraints around information sharing and the 
dissemination of information technology vulnerabilities to at 
risk entities. CISA briefed the Committee on the need to 
identify and warn the nation's critical infrastructure owners 
and operators of potentially vulnerable technologies.\37\ The 
Committee then worked with stakeholders to find consensus, and 
approved legislation authorizing CISA to issue administrative 
subpoenas to alert U.S. critical infrastructure owners and 
operators about potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
identified by the agency.\38\ The legislation was enacted in 
the FY2021 NDAA.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\Comm. Majority and Minority Classified Staff Briefing (CISA 
Legislative Proposal) (June 13, 2019).
    \38\S. 3045, Cybersecurity Vulnerability Identification and 
Notification Act of 2020 (116th. Cong).
    \39\FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 116-283 
(116th Cong.) (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee considered and passed approximately 15 
additional cybersecurity bills during the 116th Congress. The 
Committee views these pieces of legislation as important 
efforts to generate efficient use of Federal resources to 
improve the security of Federal and non-Federal networks. This 
includes legislation to better coordinate Federal resources and 
information to assist State and local cybersecurity 
efforts;\40\ legislation to establish a Cybersecurity Advisory 
Committee within CISA;\41\ legislation to facilitate use of the 
.gov domain by State and local governments;\42\ legislation to 
authorize DHS' hunt and incident response teams;\43\ and 
legislation to create a security acquisitions cycle for 
Internet of Things devices procured by Federal agencies.\44\
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    \40\S. 3207, Cybersecurity State Coordinator Act of 2020 (116th 
Cong). See also S.1846, State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act of 
2019 (116th Cong.).
    \41\S. 4024, Cybersecurity Advisory Committee Authorization Act of 
2020 (116th Cong.).
    \42\S. 2749, DOTGOV Act of 2019 (116th Cong.) (enacted in larger 
legislation in January 2021).
    \43\S. 315, DHS Cyber Hunt and Incident Response Teams Act of 2019 
(116th Cong.).
    \44\S. 734, Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 
2019 (116th Cong.) (enacted in larger legislation in January 2021).
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                       C. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

    Our nation's critical infrastructure has been deemed ``so 
vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction 
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters.''\45\ These vital 
sectors are primarily owned and operated by the private 
sector.\46\ CISA assists a variety of stakeholders, including 
Federal departments and agencies, businesses, and State, local, 
tribal and territorial governments, in strengthening the 
nation's critical infrastructure against cyber and physical 
threats.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Presidential Policy Directive--Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013), available at https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-
policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil.
    \46\Dep't of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency, Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnerships. https://
www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sector-partnerships.
    \47\Dep't of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency, Infrastructure Security. https://www.cisa.gov/
infrastructure-security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) and geomagnetic disturbances 
(GMDs) are both classified as low probability/high impact 
events.\48\ If an EMP or substantial GMD were to occur, they 
could inflict significant damage on the nation's critical 
infrastructure. Through the Committee's oversight last 
Congress, the Committee found that Federal mitigation efforts 
to address these threats has been inadequate. As a result, one 
of the first hearings the Committee held during the 116th 
Congress, Perspectives on Protecting the Electric Grid from an 
Electromagnetic Pulse or Geomagnetic Disturbance, examined 
different viewpoints from eleven representatives from the 
public, private, and nonprofit sectors on potential EMP and GMD 
mitigation solutions to protect the U.S. electric grid.\49\ 
During the hearing, witnesses were asked about actionable and 
achievable goals to mitigate against EMPs and GMDs.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\Comm. staff briefing by the U.S. Dep't of Energy (Feb. 7, 
2019).
    \49\Roundtable: Perspectives on Protecting the Electric Grid from 
an Electromagnetic Pulse or Geomagnetic Disturbance: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019), 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-protecting-the-
electric-grid-from-an-electromagnetic-pulse-or-geomagnetic-disturbance.
    \50\Id.
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    On March 26, 2019, the Trump Administration took effective 
action to start moving the Federal Government toward EMP and 
GMD mitigation efforts through issuing Executive Order 13865, 
Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses.\51\ 
Through recommendations from the Committee's hearing, and 
working with witnesses on potential action items, Chairman 
Johnson determined that Congress should codify portions of the 
Executive Order to ensure agencies comply with its requirements 
and provide congressional stakeholders valuable information to 
oversee and support the development of appropriate mitigation 
solutions.
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    \51\Exec. Order No. 13865, 84 Fed. Reg. 12041 (March 26, 2019).
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    Toward that end, he sponsored a bipartisan amendment to the 
FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act that was adopted by 
unanimous consent in the Senate-passed bill\52\ and ultimately 
enacted.\53\ The language requires the administration to 
coordinate and evaluate relevant vulnerabilities; assess 
mitigation solutions and harden approaches; and develop, update 
and implement specific benchmarks and plans.\54\ Codifying 
these requirements will not only help protect our nation's 
critical infrastructure from the potentially catastrophic 
effects of EMPs and GMDs, but also from other national security 
threats, such as cyberattacks and natural disasters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\S. 1790, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2020, Section 6006 (116th Congress).
    \53\Id. at Section 1740 (116th Congress) (Pub. Law 116-92).
    \54\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee continued its oversight of the Department's 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The 
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 
authorized DHS to regulate high-risk chemical facilities to 
prevent terrorists from acquiring or utilizing certain 
chemicals for an attack.\55\ DHS manages the CFATS program 
under CISA's Infrastructure Security Division.\56\ Through 
CFATS, DHS sets standards and regulates security for 
approximately 3,299 chemical facilities nationwide.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
109-295,  550, 120 Stat. 1355, 1388-1389 (2006). See also Frank 
Gottron, Cong. Research Serv., IF10853, Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards (2020), available at http://www.crs.gov/Reports/
IF10853.
    \56\CISA Chemical Security, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Cybersecurity & 
Infrastructure Security Agency, https://www.cisa.gov/cisa-chemical-
security (last visited Dec. 3, 2020).
    \57\CFATS Monthly Statistics, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Cybersecurity 
& Infrastructure Security Agency, https://www.cisa.gov/cfats-monthly-
statistics (last visited Dec. 3, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CISA focuses ``around raising awareness among the broader 
community on the need for critical infrastructure security and 
resilience and enhancing their current efforts. Public-private 
partnerships are vital to this effort as everyone has a role in 
securing the nation's critical infrastructure.''\58\ These 
types of public-private partnerships are naturally intended to 
be non-regulatory.\59\ However, the CFATS program is one of 
three regulatory programs at DHS and the only one under 
CISA.\60\ The Committee examined a number of regulatory reforms 
to evolve the CFATS program, including opportunities to 
streamline and harmonize the program's regulatory 
requirements\61\ and determine whether CFATS effectively 
reduces risk.\62\
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    \58\Dep't of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency, Infrastructure Security. https://www.cisa.gov/
infrastructure-security.
    \59\U.S. Congressional Research Service. Critical Infrastructure: 
Emerging Trends and Policy Considerations for Congress (R45809; July 8, 
2019).
    \60\Id. (``The Homeland Security Act created an organization--DHS--
with wide-ranging responsibilities, but relatively narrow regulatory 
mandates. The Transportation Security Administration has (but does not 
exercise) regulatory oversight over oil and gas pipeline security. The 
Coast Guard regulates certain aspects of port security--a mission that 
long predates the transfer of the service to DHS under the Homeland 
Security Act. Finally, CISA directly regulates certain chemical 
facilities under the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards 
program to prevent terrorist exploitation of the chemical industry.'')
    \61\See, e.g., Roundtable: Sensibly Reforming the Chemical Facility 
Anti-Terrorism Standards Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019); Letter from 
Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Sen. Mike Enzi to Sec'y Kirstjen Nielsen 
(Mar. 29, 2019) (CFATS overlap with ATF regulations) (on file with 
HSGAC staff); Letter from Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Sen. Mike Enzi 
to Thomas Brandon, Dir., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives (Mar. 29, 2019) (CFATS overlap with ATF regulations) (on 
file with HSGAC staff); Letter from Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and 
Ranking Member Sen. Gary Peters to Sec'y Kirstjen Nielsen (Mar. 22, 
2019) (Status of DHS's CFATS program audit) (on file with HSGAC staff).
    \62\Roundtable: Sensibly Reforming the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec. & Governmental Affairs (statement of Nathan Anderson, Acting 
Director, Homeland Sec. & Justice Team, U.S. Gov't Accountability 
Office), 116th Cong. (2019). See also U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, 
GAO-18-538, Critical Infrastructure Protection (2018), available at 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/693817.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Johnson and Senator Mike Enzi sent letters to DHS 
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
(ATF) requesting information regarding the CFATS program's 
regulation of explosive materials.\63\ DHS documents confirmed 
that ATF was opposed to the inclusion of 18 U.S.C Chapter 40 
regulated explosives being included in the CFATS program.\64\ 
Moreover, GAO is in the final stages of a report started at the 
request of the Committee to examine potential fragmentation, 
overlap and duplication with CFATS and other regulatory 
regimes.\65\ Although the report is not yet complete, GAO has 
confirmed during staff briefings that there is duplication 
between regulations and elements of the CFATS program and other 
Federal regulatory regimes, including ATF.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\Letter from Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Sen. Mike Enzi to 
Sec'y Kirstjen Nielsen (Mar. 29, 2019) (on file with HSGAC staff). See 
also Letter from Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Sen. Mike Enzi to Thomas 
Brandon, Dir., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
(Mar. 29, 2019) (on file with HSGAC staff).
    \64\Id.
    \65\Letter from S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs to 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (Aug. 20, 2019) (on file with 
Comm. staff).
    \66\Comm. staff briefing U.S. Gov't Accountability Office (Sept. 3, 
2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On June 4, 2019, the Committee held a roundtable, Sensibly 
Reforming the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 
Program, to examine the effectiveness of the CFATS program and 
identify areas for improvement.\67\ A number of industry 
witnesses discussed the challenges of being regulated by 
multiple Federal and state agencies, and explained how their 
regulatory regimes overlap with CFATS in various 
capacities.\68\ In addition, GAO testified that the CFATS 
program still does not evaluate or measure vulnerability 
reduction.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\Roundtable: Sensibly Reforming the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/sensibly-reforming-the-chemical-facility-anti-
terrorism-standards-program.
    \68\Id.
    \69\Id. (Statement of Nathan Anderson, Acting Director, Homeland 
Sec. & Justice Team, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On March 5, 2020, Chairman Johnson introduced S.3416, 
Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist 
Attacks Act of 2020.\70\ This legislation had a number of 
proposed reforms to provide regulatory relief to industry, 
including exempting duplicative explosive materials regulated 
by ATF, and additional metrics to help the program evaluate and 
measure risk reduction.\71\ However, the Committee could not 
reach bipartisan consensus to reform CFATS. As a result, the 
CFATS program was reauthorized without changes for three years 
and is set to expire on July 27, 2023.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\S. 3416, Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from 
Terrorist Attacks Act of 2020 (116th Cong.).
    \71\Id.
    \72\S. 4148, A bill to extend the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Standards Program of the Department of Homeland Security, and for other 
purposes, Pub. L. No. 116-150 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee also conducted oversight of the Department's 
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center's 
(NISAC) COVID-19 response. The NISAC is housed in CISA's 
National Risk Management Center, and responsible for conducting 
simulation, modeling, and analysis of cyber and physical risks 
to the nation's sixteen critical infrastructure sectors.\73\ 
This includes a number of pandemic analyses, such as the 2007 
H5N1 bird flu, 2009 H1N1 influenza, 2014 Ebola virus disease, 
and 2016 Zika virus disease.\74\ In March 2020, news reports 
circulated that the NISAC ceased its pandemic work in 2017.\75\ 
This was confirmed during a bipartisan Committee staff phone 
call with department officials on April 15, 2020.\76\ As a 
result, Department officials had issues locating these prior 
pandemic analyses at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.\77\ If 
readily available when needed, the past pandemic modeling, 
simulation, and analyses conducted by the NISAC could have 
assisted the Federal Government's response. To that end, 
Chairman Johnson introduced S. 4157, National Infrastructure 
Simulation and Analysis Center Pandemic Modeling Act of 2020, 
to clarify the NISAC's authority and capabilities, and ensure 
the proper entities receive information on current projects and 
priorities, prior work, and specific pandemic information.\78\ 
The legislation was cosponsored by Ranking Member Peters and 
Senator Margaret Wood Hassan, and was reported favorably by the 
Committee at the July 22, 2020 business meeting.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\James Platt, U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency, National Risk Management Center (June 2019), https://
www.gps.gov/governance/advisory/meetings/2019-06/platt.pdf (referring 
to NISAC slide). See also About the National Infrastructure Simulation 
and Analysis Center, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, https://
www.dhs.gov/about-national-infrastructure-simulation-and-analysis-
center (last published June 27, 2016).
    \74\Call from Majority and Minority Staff, U.S. Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, to Bob Kolasky, Director, 
National Risk Management Center, and supporting staff, National Risk 
Management Center and National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis 
Center (April 15, 2020, 11:00 AM) (notes on file with Committee 
Majority staff).
    \75\Daniel Lippman, DHS Wound Down Pandemic Models Before 
Coronavirus Struck, POLITICO (Mar. 24, 2020, 8:47 PM), https://
www.politico.com/news/2020/03/24/dhs-pandemic-coronavirus-146884; see 
also Kayla Epstein, A Bureaucratic Fight Halted a Vital Department of 
Homeland Security Program that Helped Model Pandemics in 2017, Bus. 
Insider (Mar. 25, 2020, 11:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
coronavirus-dhs-reportedly-shut-down-pandemic-modeling-program-in-2017-
2020-3.
    \76\Call from Majority and Minority Staff, U.S. Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, to Bob Kolasky, Director, 
National Risk Management Center, and supporting staff, National Risk 
Management Center and National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis 
Center (April 15, 2020, 11:00 AM) (notes on file with Committee 
Majority staff).
    \77\Daniel Lippman, DHS Wound Down Pandemic Models Before 
Coronavirus Struck, POLITICO (Mar. 24, 2020, 8:47 PM), https://
www.politico.com/news/2020/03/24/dhs-pandemic-coronavirus-146884; see 
also Kayla Epstein, A Bureaucratic Fight Halted a Vital Department of 
Homeland Security Program that Helped Model Pandemics in 2017, Bus. 
Insider (Mar. 25, 2020, 11:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
coronavirus-dhs-reportedly-shut-down-pandemic-modeling-program-in-2017-
2020-3.
    \78\S. 4157, National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 
Pandemic Modeling Act of 2020 (116th Cong.).
    \79\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, throughout the 116th Congress, the Committee 
conducted oversight of CISA's efforts to provide voluntary 
election security assistance to State and local government 
officials. This includes more than 50 staff and member 
meetings, briefings, and document reviews on various election 
security topics.\80\ The Committee also held a February 2020 
hearing, What States, Locals and the Business Community Should 
Know and Do: A Roadmap for Effective Cybersecurity, in which 
election security was discussed.\81\ Christopher Krebs, then-
Director of CISA, discussed how the agency assists State and 
local governments to address concerns and resources provided to 
protect election infrastructure in preparation for the 2020 
election.\82\ Director Krebs also discussed the current risks 
in elections, including vulnerabilities within voter files and 
voter registration databases.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\Summary of election meetings attended by Chairman Ron Johnson, 
116th Congress. On file with Committee Majority staff.
    \81\What States, Locals and the Business Community Should Know and 
Do: A Roadmap for Effective Cybersecurity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/what-states-locals-and-the-business-community-
should-know-and-do-a-roadmap-for-effective-cybersecurity.
    \82\Id. Statement of Christopher Krebs, Director, Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
    \83\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              D. TERRORISM

    In recent years, the United States has seen a shifting 
terrorist threat landscape. Although the threat of 
international terrorism and homegrown violent extremism 
continues, there has been a rise in domestic terrorism. To 
combat the threats facing the United States, the Federal 
Government has had to adapt its counterterrorism efforts to 
address emerging and evolving trends. It has been increasingly 
evident that the counterterrorism practices of years' past may 
not address the full scope of threats facing the United States. 
The threat of domestic terrorism requires dedicated attention 
and proper resource allocation. In recognition of this, the 
Committee engaged in bipartisan oversight aimed at evaluating 
how the Federal Government addresses, prioritizes and allocates 
for the full spectrum of terrorist threats. Specifically, the 
Committee examined the Federal Government's efforts to counter 
domestic terrorism while balancing the broad range of threats 
to the homeland.
    On May 8, 2019, Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Peters 
sent letters to DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting documents and 
information on their respective efforts.\84\ The Committee 
found that there was no consistent or unified system for 
understanding, tracking, and reporting on domestic terrorism 
across agencies. The Committee also found that the agencies 
have been engaged in interagency communication and conduct 
ongoing outreach to SLTT law enforcement agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\Letter from Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman of Homeland Sec. and 
Governmental Affairs Senate Comm. and Senator Gary C. Peters, Ranking 
Member of Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs Senate Comm., to Hon. 
William Barr, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (May 8, 2019) (on 
file with author).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee held three hearings and one roundtable to 
examine the shifting terrorist threat landscape and heard 
testimony from both terrorism subject matter experts from 
various research institutions and Federal Government officials 
from DHS, the FBI, and the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC).\85\ The Committee's first hearing on terrorism threats 
in the 116th Congress was the first hearing in the Committee's 
history to focus solely on domestic terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\Countering Domestic Terrorism: Examining the Evolving Threat: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 
116th Cong. (2019), Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019), 
Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. 
and Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Based on the findings of the May 8, 2019 letter and the 
multiple hearings, Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Peters 
introduced the Terrorism Reporting and Classifying Act of 2019 
(TRAC Act), which would establish a unified database and 
reporting requirements for DHS, the FBI, and NCTC to better 
track and understand domestic terrorism in the broader 
terrorism threat landscape.\86\ Chairman Johnson and Ranking 
Member Peters were successful in getting much of the language 
from the TRAC Act into the 2019 National Defense Authorization 
Act, enacted in December 2019. The law now requires DHS, the 
FBI and NCTC to establish joint definitions and interpretations 
of terrorism-related terminology, establish unified tracking 
systems for incidents of domestic terrorism, submit joint, 
annual reports to Congress, and make the reports public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\S. 3118, (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Foreign fighters continue to pose a threat to the homeland, 
as they travel overseas to train and participate in terrorist 
activities. In 2019, the Committee approved and Congress 
enacted the Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Exercise Act 
of 2019.\87\ The Act requires DHS to conduct exercises to 
improve detection of terrorist and foreign fighter travel. By 
building on DHS' national exercise framework, this legislation 
will improve collaboration among key partners and stakeholders 
in counterterrorism and travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\H.R. 1590 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee approved six other bills to help the U.S. 
improve its ability to counter terrorist attacks and harden 
soft targets. Those bills include the DHS Intelligence 
Rotational Assignment Program Act of 2019, to codify the DHS 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis' intelligence rotational 
assignment program which improves coordination and 
communication with intra-agency partners;\88\ the Luke and Alex 
School Safety Act of 2019, to establish a Federal Clearinghouse 
on School Safety Best Practices for use by State and local 
educational and law enforcement agencies, institutions of 
higher education, health professionals, and the public;\89\ the 
Protecting Faith-Based and Nonprofit Organizations From 
Terrorism Act of 2019, which requires the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) to extend its Nonprofit Grant Program 
to eligible nonprofits at risk of terrorist attacks to improve 
target hardening and other security measures;\90\ the Counter 
Threats Advisory Board Act of 2019, which authorizes DHS to 
establish an advisory board tasked with evaluating the current 
threat environment and DHS' ability to counter such 
threats;\91\ the DHS Overseas Personnel Enhancement Act of 
2019, which requires DHS to annually brief congressional 
homeland security committees on the work of DHS personnel 
serving overseas, including challenges to counterterrorism 
missions;\92\ and the Reporting Efficiently to Proper Officials 
in Response to Terrorism Act of 2019, which requires Federal 
agencies to submit a report to Congress in the year following 
an investigation of an act of terrorism.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\H.R. 2066 (116th Cong.).
    \89\S. 2779 (116th Cong.).
    \90\H.R. 1539 (116th Cong.).
    \91\S. 411 (116th Cong.).
    \92\H.R. 2590 (116th Cong.).
    \93\S. 2513 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  E. DHS REFORMS AND COVID-19 RESPONSE

    The Committee has primary responsibility for overseeing and 
authorizing DHS. This Congress, the Committee built on the 
significant actions it took in the 115th Congress to improve 
the Department's management and operations. Specifically, the 
Committee exercised its oversight authority through hearings, 
legislation, and briefings in an effort to improve the 
execution of DHS's management functions and operational 
capabilities. Since its establishment more than 17 years ago, 
DHS faced arguably some of its greatest challenges in 2020 with 
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the rise of civil unrest 
throughout the United States.

                         1. COVID-19 OVERSIGHT

    On December 31, 2019, the World Health Organization was 
informed that there was a cluster of atypical pneumonia cases 
in Wuhan, China.\94\ This abnormal activity was later 
determined to be the spread of a novel coronavirus known as 
SARS-CoV-2, the severe acute respiratory syndrome that causes 
the COVID-19 disease. By January 21, 2020, the first-known case 
of COVID-19 in the United States was confirmed in Seattle, 
Washington. As the worldwide transmission of the virus 
accelerated, the Secretary of HHS, Alex Azar, declared a Public 
Health Emergency.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\1AWorld Health Organization, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) 
outbreak, https://www.who.int/westernpacific/emergencies/novel-
coronavirus.
    \95\Secretary Azar Declares Public Health Emergency for United 
States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020) https://www.hhs.gov/
about/news/2020/01/31/secretary-azar-declares-public-health-emergency-
us-2019-novel-coronavirus.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On February 12, 2020, the Committee held a roundtable to 
discuss our nation's state of preparedness for a global 
pandemic.\96\ One of the participants, Dr. Scott Gottlieb, 
discussed the insecurity of the U.S. medical supply chain and 
how the overreliance on a foreign nation, such as China, can 
leave our nation in a vulnerable position while trying to 
acquire critical drugs and personal protective equipment (PPE) 
during a global health crisis.\97\ This was particularly 
concerning to the Committee given previous studies indicating 
that 72 percent of the U.S. active pharmaceutical ingredient 
supply that is necessary to finish critical drugs was 
manufactured outside of the U.S., with China accounting for 13 
percent of that capacity.\98\ Following the roundtable, the 
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee requested that the 
Secretaries of DHS and HHS inform the American public about our 
existing vulnerabilities, actions that have been taken to 
address the potential shortages, and how DHS and FEMA are 
protecting their workforce and the American people should 
COVID-19 become a health crisis in the U.S.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\Are We Prepared? Protecting the U.S. from Global Pandemics, 
Roundtable Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 
116th Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/are-we-prepared-
protecting-the-us-from-global-pandemics.
    \97\Id. (statement of Dr. Scott Gottlieb).
    \98\Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director--Center for Drug Evaluations and 
Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Testimony before the U.S. 
House of Representatives, Committee Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee 
on Health (October 30, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/
congressional-testimony/safeguarding-pharmaceutical-supply-chains-
global-economy-10302019
    \99\S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Letter to HHS 
& DHS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
200228--Letter--HHS--DHS--Coronavirus.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee held a hearing with the HHS Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and the Senior 
Official Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary at DHS.\100\ 
In that hearing, the HHS ASPR told the Committee that the 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), the Federal resource to 
``supplement State and local supplies during public health 
emergencies'', held 35 million N95 respirators.\101\ Given the 
concerns that a pandemic was materializing, these levels seemed 
insufficient to address a nationwide public health emergency, 
with one Committee member stating, ``[i]t strikes me that we 
should have substantially more.''\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\The Federal Interagency Response to the Coronavirus and 
Preparing for Future Global Pandemics, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/the-federal-interagency-response-to-the-
coronavirus-and-preparing-for-future-global-pandemics.
    \101\Strategic National Stockpile, Off. of the Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness & Response, https://www.phe.gov/about/sns/Pages/
default.aspx (last updated Jan. 7, 2021); The Federal Interagency 
Response to the Coronavirus and Preparing for Future Global Pandemics, 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 
116th Cong. (2020) (Statement of Dr. Robert Kadlec), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/the-federal-interagency-response-to-the-
coronavirus-and-preparing-for-future-global-pandemics.
    \102\Id. (Statement of Sen. Mitt Romney).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On March 13, 2020, President Trump invoked section 501(b) 
of the Stafford Act to extend Federal assistance to all States, 
tribes, territories, and the District of Columbia.\103\ Given 
the anticipation of a shortage of critical drugs and PPE, the 
Committee focused on examining the Federal Government's 
procurement and distribution strategies to understand what 
authorities and practices they were exercising to meet the 
demand of States across the country.\104\ During this hearing, 
FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor and Rear Admiral John Polowczyk 
described the Federal Government's ingenuities, such as Project 
Airbridge, which expedited the shipping of critical supplies to 
our nation's ``hotspot'' areas to address supply 
shortages.\105\ Members of the Committee recommended the 
Senate, ``reexamine what our domestic manufacturing (is) for 
those supplies that we were in such a desperate moment that we 
had to be able to move via an air bridge from Asia? Why aren't 
we producing those domestically and what can we do to create 
more domestic supply?''\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\Federal Emergency Management Agency, COVID-19 Emergency 
Declaration, Mar. 13, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/press-release/
20210121/covid-19-emergency-declaration.
    \104\Evaluating the Federal Government's Procurement and 
Distribution Strategies in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th 
Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/evaluating-the-federal-
governments-procurement-and-distribution-strategies-in-response-to-the-
covid-19-pandemic.
    \105\Id. (Statement of Peter T. Gaynor and John Polowcyzk).
    \106\Id. (Statement of Sen. James Lankford).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To understand the concern of domestic manufacturing and 
supply, but also examine what the Federal Government could 
improve upon, the Committee held a hearing on the SNS.\107\ 
During the hearing, Chairman Ron Johnson asserted that supply 
and demand challenges precipitated from ``a lack of clarity and 
understanding of exactly what the SNS's role is, and what it 
should be.''\108\ The Chairman further stated that, ``[w]e are 
paying the price for this lack of articulation and clarity 
during the current pandemic.''\109\ To address these 
challenges, the Chairman introduced S. 4204, the Federal 
Emergency Pandemic Response Act (FEPRA), and S. 4210, the 
Securing Healthcare and Response Equipment (SHARE) Act. FEPRA 
requires the Office of Management and Budget to convene an 
interagency task force to evaluate the components of the SNS. 
As part of that evaluation, it requires the interagency 
taskforce to identify the current inventory levels of the SNS, 
what the levels should be so they are sufficient to address the 
needs of a pandemic, where the stockpiles should be located, 
and whether or not the current SNS name aligns with the mission 
determined by the task force. SHARE gives DHS the authority to 
share critical supplies with HHS to distribute out of the SNS 
if the Secretary of DHS has determined that their supplies 
exceed what is necessary to protect their own workforce. The 
Committee considered FEPRA and SHARE during their July 22, 2020 
business meeting and reported the bills out of Committee 
favorably.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \107\The Role of the Strategic National Stockpile in Pandemic 
Response, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/the-role-of-
the-strategic-national-stockpile-in-pandemic-response.
    \108\Id. (Statement of Chairman Ron Johnson).
    \109\Id.
    \110\Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong.(2020) https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
07/15/2020/business-meeting-.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To better prepare DHS for any future pandemic, the 
Committee passed the National Response Framework Improvement 
Act of 2020.\111\ This legislation would require the 
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
to assess the effectiveness of the National Response Framework 
during the COVID-19 pandemic and develop a report that includes 
its findings and recommendations for improvement.\112\ 
Incorporating the recommendations into the National Response 
Framework could bring much needed reforms to the way DHS and 
its partner agencies respond to pandemics going forward.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \111\S. 4153 (116th Cong.).
    \112\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 28, 2020, at the Oversight of COVID-19 Financial 
Relief Packages hearing, several private sector witnesses 
testified about how the various financial relief packages 
enacted by Congress had been used. The witnesses also discussed 
reforms and oversight still needed, as well as unintended 
consequences from certain provisions in the enacted financial 
relief packages.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \113\Oversight of COVID-19 Financial Relief Packages: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th 
Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/oversight-of-covid-19-
financial-relief-packages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to concerns from medical doctors throughout the 
country treating COVID-19 patients, Chairman Johnson also 
focused attention on the unfortunate lack of Federal efforts to 
develop early treatment options for COVID-19, and social 
media's actions to keep information about potential early 
treatments from the public. On August 18, 2020, Senators 
Johnson, Lee and Cruz sent a letter to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) requesting information regarding the FDA's 
Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) decisions. The letter 
stressed the importance of allowing physicians to ``make the 
best medical and treatment decisions for their patients, use 
their ``off-label' prescription rights, and have full access to 
FDA approved drugs.''\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \114\Letter from Sens. Johnson, Lee, Cruz to Stephen Hahn, FDA 
Commissioner (Aug. 18, 2020), available at https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/johnson-lee-cruz-call-for-
explanation-into-fdas-emergency-use-authorization-decisions-.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On November 19 and December 8, 2020, the Committee held a 
two-part hearing on these concerns, titled Early Outpatient 
Treatment--An Essential Part of a COVID-19 Solution. These 
hearings asked medical practitioners to address how they 
provided early outpatient treatment for COVID-19 patients in 
the absence of guidance from the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and treatment protocols they had developed. The 
physicians discussed their experiences using widely available, 
low-cost drugs to prevent disease progression and 
hospitalization.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\Early Outpatient Treatment--An Essential Part of a COVID-19 
Solution, Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
hearings/early-outpatient-treatment-an-essential-part-of-a-covid-19-
solution; Early Outpatient Treatment--An Essential Part of a COVID-19 
Solution, Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
early-outpatient-treatment-an-essential-part-of-a-covid-19-solution-
part-ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On November 23, 2020, Senators Johnson, Lee and Cruz sent a 
follow up letter to the FDA to reiterate the requests in the 
August 18, 2020 letter that had gone unanswered and to stress 
the importance of early outpatient treatment for COVID-19.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \116\Letter from Sens. Johnson, Lee, Cruz to Stephen Hahn, FDA 
Commissioner (Nov. 23, 2020) (on file with Comm. staff).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Following the December 8th hearing, Senators Johnson and 
Paul sent a letter to the National Institute of Health (NIH) 
highlighting a promising early treatment--ivermectin--that was 
discussed in the hearing. The letter asked NIH to examine 
recent studies of ivermectin and provide an update on early 
outpatient treatments that are currently under NIH review.\117\ 
On February 11, 2021, the NIH updated its COVID-19 Treatment 
Guidelines to a neutral position while further studies gather 
additional data on its effectiveness as a treatment for COVID-
19.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\Letter from Sens. Johnson, Paul to Francis S. Collins, NIH 
Director (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
40-317--Comm.%20Homeland%20Security%20%20Gov.%20Affairs%2012-10-
2020.pdf.
    \118\NIH, COVID-19 Treatment Guidelines, Ivermectin,  https://
www.covid19treatmentguidelines.nih.gov/antiviral-therapy/ivermectin/ 
(last updated Feb. 11, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         2. OTHER DHS OVERSIGHT

    To enhance and reform DHS's relationship with its SLTT 
partners, the Committee passed legislation providing DHS with 
the authority to collaborate and share information. The DHS 
Field Engagement Accountability Act, approved by the Committee 
and enacted in 2020, enables DHS' Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis to work with fusion centers, which play an important 
role in counterintelligence and counterterrorism efforts.\119\ 
This legislation refines DHS's information sharing apparatus 
and improves its ability to mitigate and prevent threats to the 
homeland.\120\ Additionally, the Committee held a hearing on 
August 6, 2020, to examine DHS' efforts to protect Federal 
property and personnel during protests across the country, and 
particularly in Portland, Oregon.\121\ Acting Secretary Wolf 
testified and described the events surrounding the deployment 
of DHS law enforcement and personnel as well as the authorities 
DHS used to carry out its protective mission and coordinate 
with state and local officials in these efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \119\Pub. L. No. 116-116 (116th Cong.).
    \120\Id.
    \121\Oversight of DHS Personnel Deployments to Recent Protests: 
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 
116th Cong. (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In July 2020, the Committee passed The Department of 
Homeland Security Mentor-Protege Program Act of 2019.\122\ This 
legislation provides statutory authority to the DHS Mentor-
Protege program, which has been in place since2003.\123\ The 
program allows small businesses (referred to as ``protege'' 
firms) to seek guidance from large businesses (referred to as 
``mentor'' firms) who traditional obtain contracts from the 
Department on best to compete for prime contracts with DHS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \122\H.R. 4727 (116th. Cong.).
    \123\Page 24, Small Business Mentor-Protege Programs, CRS Report, 
available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41722.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, during this Congress, HSGAC worked tirelessly to 
ensure DHS obtained adequate funding to continue to carry out 
its mission. The Committee held hearings entitled Resources and 
Authorities Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland
    \124\ in March 2020, and Resources Needed to Protect and 
Secure the Homeland\125\ in May 2019 to examine the needs of 
the DHS workforce and affirm Chairman Johnson's continued 
support of providing DHS with the resources and authorities 
required to protect the homeland. On September 9, 2019, the 
Committee held a field hearing at the National September 11 
Memorial & Museum in New York City. The hearing, titled 18 
Years Later: The State of Homeland Security after 9/11, brought 
together three former Secretaries of Homeland Security for a 
wide-ranging discussion of the Departments history, current and 
future challenges, and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \124\Resources and Authorities Needed to Protect and Secure the 
Homeland: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
    \125\Resources Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland: Hearing 
before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th 
Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 F. OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

    The Committee is also responsible for investigating ``the 
efficiency and economy of operations of all branches of the 
Government[.]''\126\ In the 116th Congress, the Committee 
continued to carry out its oversight responsibilities over the 
Federal bureaucracy to help foster a professional, nonpartisan, 
and accountable government. The Committee's oversight 
jurisdiction stretches across all facets of the executive 
branch. Pursuant to this expansive authority, the Committee 
conducted oversight of numerous Federal departments and 
agencies, ranging from DHS, the FBI, and the Department of 
State. The Committee maintains a whistleblower hotline for 
Federal employees to disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and 
misconduct. This section includes a summary of some of the most 
consequential oversight projects this Congress, but is not a 
complete list of all the work conducted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \126\S. Res. 70, Sec. 12(e)(1)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In March 2019, the Committee learned that an employee at a 
West Virginia facility of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives Agency (ATF) stole firearms and 
firearm parts that were slated for destruction, including 
service weapons for Federal agents. The Committee also learned 
that these stolen firearms were not only sold illegally, but 
also that at least one of those firearms was found at a crime 
scene. The Committee pursued this issue as the responsible 
individuals were prosecuted and as ATF began take corrective 
action to prevent similar misconduct from occurring in the 
future.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \127\Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, to Thomas Brandon, Deputy Dir., Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (Mar. 12, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee also continued oversight of the consequences 
of different immigration policies. In May 2019, Chairman 
Johnson wrote to the DHS, the Attorney General of Maryland, and 
the Executive for Prince George's County, about the decision to 
instruct local law enforcement not to comply with detainer 
requests by ICE agents for illegal aliens who were arrested. 
Earlier that month, local authorities in Prince George's county 
ignored an ICE detainer request and released two MS-13 gang 
members, who soon after brutally murdered a 14-year old 
girl.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \128\Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, to Brian Frosh, Attorney General, State of 
Maryland (May 28, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland 
Security & Governmental Affairs, to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Secretary, 
Dep't of Homeland Security (May 28, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In January 2020, Chairman Johnson, joined by 14 other 
senators, wrote to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) about an 
inspector general report that taxpayers improperly claimed $72 
million in tax credits for electric vehicles.\129\ The report 
also found that the IRS did not have an effective process to 
identify and prevent these erroneous claims. Notably, the 
inspector general first identified this issue in 2011--and $33 
million in improperly claimed credits--yet the problem only 
worsened. The Committee highlighted this information as 
Congress was considering a potential $16 billion expansion to 
this tax credit program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \129\Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, et al., to Charles P. Rettig, Commissioner, 
Internal Revenue Service (Jan. 27, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee continued to conduct oversight of the FBI and 
reports that senior FBI officials exhibited political bias 
while assigned to high-profile, politically-oriented cases. 
Together with Chairman Chuck Grassley of the Finance Committee, 
Chairman Johnson sent numerous requests for information to the 
FBI, the DOJ, the Department of State, the Director of National 
Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency, among 
others, as part of their continued oversight of the FBI's 
investigation of alleged collusion between the Trump campaign 
and Russia.\130\ On December 18, 2019, the committee convened a 
hearing, titled DOJ OIG FISA Report: Methodology, Scope, and 
Findings, during which the DOJ Inspector General presented the 
findings from his review of the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane 
investigation of Trump campaign officials. At that hearing, the 
Inspector General testified that he identified evidence of 
political bias by certain FBI officials and that he could not 
find a satisfactory explanation for 17 significant errors and 
omissions by the FBI officials conducting the 
investigation.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \130\E.g., Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland 
Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. 
on Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (April 
25, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland 
Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. 
on Finance, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community (May 6, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland 
Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. 
on Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State, Dep't of State (May 
9, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(May 9, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to Steve Linick, Inspector General, Dep't of State (Sept. 12, 
2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 17, 
2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security 
& Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community (Oct. 2, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. 
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 16, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & 
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Atkinson, 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (Oct. 23, 2019); Ron 
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental 
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William 
Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Oct. 29, 2019); Ron Johnson, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to 
David S. Ferriero, Archivist, National Archives and Records Admin. 
(Oct. 31, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, & 
Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Dec. 13, 
2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Jan. 28, 
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to Richard Grenell, Acting Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence (Apr. 2, 
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(Apr. 16, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to Richard Grenell, Acting Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence & 
William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (May 12, 2020); Ron 
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental 
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William 
Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (May 18, 2020); Ron Johnson, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & 
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Richard Grenell, 
Acting Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence (May 19, 2020); Ron Johnson, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & 
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Richard Grenell, 
Acting Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence (May 22, 2020); Ron Johnson, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & 
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Pompeo, 
Secretary, Dep't of State (June 11, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Steve Mnuchin, Secretary, Dep't of 
Treasury (June 11, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland 
Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. 
on Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep't of State (July 2, 
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep't of State (July 7, 2020); 
Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental 
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Gina 
Haspel, Dir., Central Intelligence Agency (July 28, 2020); Ron Johnson, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & 
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to John Ratcliffe, 
Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence (Jul. 28, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't 
of Justice, & Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(Jul. 28, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep't of State (Jul. 28, 2020); 
Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental 
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to 
Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Aug. 21, 
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (Sept. 9, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to Michael Horowitz, 
Inspector General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 11, 2020); Ron Johnson, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & 
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to John Ratcliffe, 
Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence (Sept.. 11, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 2, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. 
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Gina Haspel, Dir., Central 
Intelligence Agency (Oct. 7, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, 
S. Comm. on Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (Oct. 12, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, 
S. Comm. on Finance, to Mark Esper, Secretary, Dep't of Defense (Oct. 
14, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to John Ratcliffe, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, & Christopher 
Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 14, 2020); Ron 
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental 
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William 
Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, & Christopher Wray, Dir., 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 30, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, 
S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to William Barr, 
Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Nov. 2, 2020).
    \131\DOJ OIG FISA Report: Methodology, Scope, and Findings, S. 
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (Dec. 18, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2020, Chairman Johnson received and publicly released 
declassified records related to the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane 
investigation, including intelligence reporting the FBI 
received that certain parts of the Steele dossier were the 
product of a Russian disinformation campaign.\132\ On June 4, 
2020, the Committee authorized Chairman Johnson to issue 
several subpoenas for records and testimony related to this 
investigation; Chairman Johnson issued a subpoena for records 
to the FBI, and subpoenas for records and testimony to former 
State Department official Jonathan Winer and Stefan Halper. On 
October 23, 2020, along with the Finance Committee, Chairman 
Johnson issued a majority staff report, titled Don't Brief the 
Trump Team: How the GSA and the FBI Secretly Shared Trump 
Transition Team Records, which described how the GSA violated 
the terms of its memorandum of understanding with the Trump 
transition team to secretly preserve and share transition 
records with the FBI and Office of the Special Counsel.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \132\Letter from Richard Grenell, Acting Dir. of Nat'l 
Intelligence, to Ron Johnson, Chairman (Apr. 15, 2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/ig-footnotes-serious-
problems-with-dossier-sources-didnt-stop-fbis-page-surveillance; Letter 
from Richard Grenell, Acting Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, to Ron 
Johnson, Chairman (May 13, 2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/2020-05-13%20ODNI%20to%20CEG%20RHJ%20(Unmasking).pdf; Press 
Release, Johnson, Grassley release FBI, DOJ, State Department records 
related to the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation (Dec. 3, 2020), 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/johnson-grassley-
release-fbi-doj-state-department-records-related-to-the-fbis-crossfire-
hurricane-investigation
    \133\Don't Brief the Trump Team: How the GSA and FBI Secretly 
Shared Trump Transition Team Records, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, and S. Comm. on Finance (Oct. 23, 2020), https://
www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-10-
23%20Committee%20Report%20-%20GSA%20&%20Trump%20Transition.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 3, 2020, Chairman Johnson held a capstone 
hearing, titled Congressional Oversight in the Face of 
Executive Branch and Media Suppression: The Case Study of 
Crossfire Hurricane.\134\ The hearing focused largely on the 
misconduct of the FBI during its investigation of the Trump 
campaign and it addressed the difficulty Chairman Johnson 
experienced throughout his tenure attempting to receive 
meaningful compliance from executive agencies and former 
government officials. Chairman Johnson released two timelines 
in conjunction with this hearing highlighting key events during 
the Crossfire Hurricane investigation and relevant findings 
from the Chairman's oversight work.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \134\Congressional Oversight in the Face of Executive Branch and 
Media Suppression: The Case Study of Crossfire Hurricane, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (Dec. 3, 2020).
    \135\Timeline: Congressional Oversight in the Face of Executive 
Branch and Media Suppression: The Case Study of Crossfire Hurricane, S. 
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Dec. 3, 2020); 
Timeline of Key Events Related to Crossfire Hurricane Investigation, S. 
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and S. Comm. on 
Finance (Dec. 3, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In November 2019, the Committee initiated a joint 
investigation with the Finance Committee into actual or 
apparent conflicts of interest between then-Vice President 
Biden and U.S. foreign policy toward Ukraine in light of Hunter 
Biden's position on the board of directors of a Ukrainian 
natural gas firm that was under investigation for corruption. 
This conduct was placed at issue during the 2019 impeachment 
proceedings in the House against President Trump. As part of 
the investigation, Chairman Johnson sent numerous requests for 
information to the Department of State and the National 
Archives, among other agencies,\136\ and conducted several 
transcribed interviews of relevant witnesses.\137\ Chairman 
Johnson also served a subpoena for records on Blue Star 
Strategies, a consulting firm representing Burisma, which the 
Committee authorized. On September 23, 2020, the majority 
issued a staff report, titled Hunter Biden, Burisma, and 
Corruption: The Impact on U.S. Government Policy and Related 
Concerns, summarizing its findings.\138\ On November 18, 2020, 
the majority issued a supplemental report based on additional 
information that came to light on this topic.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \136\E.g., Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice (Sept. 27, 
2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community (Sept. 30, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. 
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Charles Grassley, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, & Mike Lee, U.S. Senator, to Michael 
Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (Oct. 2, 
2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security 
& Governmental Affairs, Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, & Mike Lee, U.S. Senator, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community (Oct. 16, 2019); Ron Johnson, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & 
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Pompeo, 
Secretary, Dep't of State (Nov. 6, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to David S. Ferriero, Archivist, 
National Archives and Records Administration (Nov. 21, 2019); Ron 
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental 
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William 
Barr, Attorney General, Dep't of Justice & Christopher Wray, Dir., 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (Nov. 22, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, 
S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles 
Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Karen Tramontano, CEO, Blue 
Star Strategies (Dec. 3, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, 
S. Comm. on Finance, to James M. Murray, Dir., U.S. Secret Service 
(Feb. 5, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep't of State (Apr. 30, 2020); 
Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental 
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to 
Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 15, 
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to Peter Kadzik, Vedable (Oct. 17, 2020); Ron Johnson, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to 
Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 17, 
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Finance, to James M. Murray, Dir., U.S. Secret Service (Oct. 20, 2020); 
Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental 
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Tony 
Bobulinski (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland 
Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. 
on Finance, to James Gilliar (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to James Biden (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron 
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental 
Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Benjamin 
Klubs, et al, (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, 
S. Comm. on Finance, to Rob Walker (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & 
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Horowitz, 
Inspector General, Dep't of Justice (Oct. 21, 2020).
    \137\See Interview transcripts, available at https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/hunter-biden-burisma-and-corruption-the-
impact-on-us-government-policy-and-related-
concerns?peek=H8DPK9jMv5%2FLz%2F2Jz1eN6dDBxADb117R%2Fnn5y%2B5qKcnHqg29.
    \138\Hunter Biden, Burisma, and Corruption: The Impact on U.S. 
Government Policy and Related Concerns, S. Comm. on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, and S. Comm. on Finance (Sept. 23, 2020), 
HTTPS://WWW.HSGAC.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HSGAC--Finance--Report--
FINAL.pdf.
    \139\Majority Staff Report Supplemental, S. Comm. on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, and S. Comm. on Finance (Nov. 18, 
2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-11-
18%20HSGAC%20-%20Finance%20Joint%20Report%20Supplemental.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On April 16, 2020, Chairman Johnson initiated an 
investigation of the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
(I&A). Specifically, this inquiry focused on I&A's overt human 
intelligence collection program and its counter-intelligence 
program. On August 6, 2020, the Committee held an oversight 
hearing, titled Oversight of DHS Personnel Deployments at 
Recent Protests, which included the deployment of I&A 
personnel.
    Chairman Johnson also continued his oversight of the Trump 
Administration's tariffs, which created financial burdens for 
many businesses across the country. Chairman Johnson requested 
updated information and data from the Commerce Department about 
the effects of tariffs on U.S. businesses.\140\ Chairman 
Johnson also sought to understand how the Commerce Department 
determined which applicants qualified for exclusions from the 
tariffs. In addition, Chairman Johnson requested material from 
major domestic steel and aluminum producers to better 
understand how the tariffs were affecting producers and 
consumers.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \140\Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill, Ranking 
Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to Wilbur 
R. Ross, Secretary, Dep't of Commerce (Aug. 30, 2018).
    \141\Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill, Ranking 
Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affs., to Roger 
Newport, Chief Executive Officer, AK Steel Holding Corp. (Aug. 27, 
2018); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill, Ranking 
Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affs., to Michael 
Bless, President, Chief Executive Officer, and Director, Century 
Aluminum Co. (Aug. 27, 2018); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, & 
Claire McCaskill, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, to John Ferriola, Chairman, Chief Executive 
Officer, and President, Nucor Corp. (Aug. 27, 2018); Letter from Ron 
Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to David Burritt, President 
and Chief Executive Officer, United States Steel Corp. (Aug. 27, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Johnson also examined allegations of 
irregularities in the 2020 election, including holding a 
hearing on December 16, 2020, in an effort to ``restore 
confidence in the integrity of our voting system'' and 
``resolve suspicions with full transparency and public 
awareness.''\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \142\Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs (Dec. 16, 2020) (statement of 
Chairman Johnson).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   G. REDUCING WASTE, FRAUD AND ABUSE

    The Committee passed nearly 50 pieces of legislation that 
aim to reduce waste, fraud and abuse in the Federal Government. 
The following is a brief summary of some of those highlights.
    The 116th Congress saw unprecedented packages of Federal 
spending in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
associated stay-at-home orders and business closings. The $2 
trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 
(CARES Act) contained a provision negotiated by Chairman 
Johnson and Ranking Member Peters to provide oversight of this 
massive influx of Federal spending.\143\ The CARES Act 
established the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 
(PRAC) within the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity 
and Efficiency in order to provide needed oversight to the 
pandemic spending programs to ensure tax dollars are not 
wasted.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \143\Pub. L. No. 116-136 (116th Cong.).
    \144\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The COVID-19 pandemic also presented unique challenges and 
opportunities for the Unites States Postal Service (USPS). In 
the initial weeks of the pandemic, USPS saw drastic reductions 
in mail volume and revenue.\145\ Based on these weeks of 
crisis, USPS projected it would run out of liquidity in just a 
few months.\146\ In response to the initial USPS projections, 
the Committee negotiated another provision in the CARES Act--
one that would allow USPS to borrow up to $10 billion from the 
U.S. Treasury to cover COVID-19 related costs.\147\ However, 
USPS's financial situation improved quickly thereafter due to 
an unprecedented increase in package volume.\148\ While USPS 
did have some increased costs due to overtime, sick leave, and 
transportation costs, its overall revenue was $4.4 billion 
higher from March 2020 through December 2020 compared to the 
same weeks in 2019.\149\ As such, USPS did not access the loan 
during the 116th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \145\Letter from Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman of Homeland Sec. and 
Governmental Affairs Senate Comm., Congressman Jim Jordan, Ranking 
Member of Oversight House Comm., and Congressman Jody Hice, Ranking 
member of Government Operations, House Comm., to the Honorable Megan 
Brennan, Postmaster General., U.S. Postal Service (June 8, 2020).
    \146\Id.
    \147\Pub. L. No. 116-136 (116th Cong.).
    \148\ Letter from Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman of Homeland Sec. 
and Governmental Affairs Senate Comm., Congressman Jim Jordan, Ranking 
Member of Oversight House Comm., and Congressman Jody Hice, Ranking 
member of Government Operations, House Comm., to the Honorable Megan 
Brennan, Postmaster General., U.S. Postal Service (June 8, 2020).
    \149\Data from USPS on file with the Comm. staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee held a hearing on USPS' finances and 
operations during the COVID-19 pandemic and the then-upcoming 
2020 elections.\150\ The hearing addressed the better-than-
expected financial condition of USPS and examined changes made 
by the Postmaster General shortly after he was sworn in.\151\ 
The hearing debunked conspiracy theories regarding the removal 
of blue drop boxes and the removal of sorting equipment at some 
postal facilities.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \150\Examining the Finances and Operations of the United States 
Postal Service During COVID-19 and Upcoming Elections: Hearing before 
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. 
(2020).
    \151\Id.
    \152\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee also worked in the 116th Congress to address 
the growth in annual improper payments--sums paid out by the 
Federal Government to the wrong person, in the wrong amount, 
for the wrong reason, or without sufficient documentation. From 
2017 to 2019, the annual improper payment total increased from 
$141 billion to $175 billion.\153\ The Committee passed and the 
President signed the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019, 
which reorganizes and streamlines Federal improper payments 
laws, improving transparency and agency compliance.\154\ It 
takes several improper payments laws from the last decade and 
consolidates them into one section of the U.S. Code and 
clarifies inconsistencies within those laws.\155\ The Committee 
also approved legislation requiring Federal agencies to make 
budget justification material readily available to the public, 
improving Federal transparency.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \153\Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-18-377, Improper Payments: 
Actions and Guidance Could Help Address Issues and Inconsistencies in 
Estimation Processes (May 31, 2018); Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-
20-344, Payment Integrity: Federal Agencies' Estimates of FY 2019 
Improper Payments (Mar. 2, 2020).
    \154\Pub. L. No. 116-117 (116th Cong.).
    \155\Id.
    \156\S. 2560 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The first hearing the Committee held in the 116th Congress 
was a field hearing at St. Thomas More Catholic School, to 
examine the success of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship 
program, the only federally-funded school voucher program.\157\ 
Witnesses included the Hon. Tim Scott, Senator from North 
Carolina, school administrators, and a recent alumnus of the 
program.\158\ The Committee also secured a reauthorization of 
the program through 2023 and extended the requirement that 
schools become accredited, due to complications arising from 
the closure of schools due to the COVID-19 pandemic.\159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \157\Opportunity to SOAR: 15 years of School Choice in D.C.: 
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 
116th Cong. (2020).
    \158\Id.
    \159\Pub. L. No. 116-94 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee also passed the Fair Chance to Compete for 
Jobs Act for the third time. The legislation requires that 
Federal agencies and contractors wait until making a 
conditional offer to a potential employee before asking them 
about their criminal history. The legislation was included as a 
part of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, signed 
into law by the President.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \160\Pub. L. No. 116-283 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With the potential for a Presidential transition in 2021, 
the Committee reviewed the 2016 Presidential transition and 
found that there were certain issues related to the roles and 
responsibilities of the General Services Administration (GSA) 
and presidential transition teams.\161\ The Committee passed, 
and the President signed, the Presidential Transition 
Enhancement Act, which clarified these roles and 
responsibilities.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \161\S. Rept. 116-13.
    \162\Pub. L. No. 116-121 (116th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Also of note, the Committee spent considerable time and 
bipartisan effort on two major pieces of legislation that, 
although approved by HSGAC with overwhelming support, were not 
enacted this Congress. The first, S. 1877, the Prevent 
Government Shutdowns Act of 2019, seeks to end costly and 
disruptive government shutdowns during a lapse in 
appropriations by providing for an automatic appropriation at 
current levels and incentives for Congress to pass regular 
appropriations while automatic appropriations are in place. The 
legislation limits official travel of Members of Congress and 
senior Executive Branch officials and holds Members' pay in 
escrow during a period of automatic appropriations. It also 
requires daily quorum calls and prohibits business from being 
in order on the Senate and House floor other than 
appropriations bills.\163\ The bill was approved by the 
Committee on June 19, 2019 by a vote of 10-2\164\, and later 
modified slightly in the form of a new bipartisan bill placed 
on the Senate Legislative Calendar in August 2020.\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \163\S. 1877, Prevent Government Shutdowns Act of 2019 (116th 
Cong.); S. Rept. 116-158 (116th Cong.).
    \164\S. Rept. 116-158.
    \165\S. 4461, Prevent Government Shutdowns Act of 2020 (116th 
Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second, S. 764, ARTICLE ONE Act, seeks to reclaim 
certain emergency authorities that Congress has ceded to the 
President over time. The bill would invert the process for 
congressional review of a national emergency declared by the 
President, with the exception of emergencies declared pursuant 
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to ensure 
that Congress approves of the emergency if a President wants it 
to continue for more than 30 days.\166\ The bill was approved 
by the Committee on July 24, 2019, by voice vote.\167\ The 
Chairman hopes that work on both of these important pieces of 
legislation will continue in the next Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \166\S. 764, ARTICLE ONE Act (116th Cong.); S. Rept. 116-159 (116th 
Cong.).
    \167\S. Rept. 116-159.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       II. COMMITTEE JURISDICTION

    The jurisdiction of the Committee (which was renamed the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs when 
the 109th Congress convened) derives from the Rules of the 
Senate and Senate Resolutions:

                                RULE XXV

                            * * * * * * * *

    (k)(1) Committee on Governmental Affairs, to which 
committee shall be referred all proposed legislation, messages, 
petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the 
following subjects:

     1. Archives of the United States.
     2. Budget and accounting measures, other than 
appropriations, except as provided in the Congressional Budget 
Act of 1974.
     3. Census and collection of statistics, including economic 
and social statistics.
     4. Congressional organization, except for any part of the 
matter that amends the rules or orders of the Senate.
     5. Federal Civil Service.
     6. Government information.
     7. Intergovernmental relations.
     8. Municipal affairs of the District of Columbia, except 
appropriations therefor.
     9. Organization and management of United States nuclear 
export policy.
    10. Organization and reorganization of the executive branch 
of the Government.
    11. Postal Service.
    12. Status of officers and employees of the United States, 
including their classification, compensation, and benefits.
    (2) Such committee shall have the duty of----
    (A) receiving and examining reports of the Comptroller 
General of the United States and of submitting such 
recommendations to the Senate as it deems necessary or 
desirable in connection with the subject matter of such 
reports;
    (B) studying the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of 
all agencies and departments of the Government;
    (C) evaluating the effects of laws enacted to reorganize 
the legislative and executive branches of the Government; and
    (D) studying the intergovernmental relationships between 
the United States and the States and municipalities, and 
between the United States and international organizations of 
which the United States is a member.

                  SENATE RESOLUTION 70, 116TH CONGRESS

        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS.

    Sec. 12. (a) * * *

                            * * * * * * * *

    (d) INVESTIGATIONS----
    (1) IN GENERAL--The committee, or any duly authorized 
subcommittee of the committee, is authorized to study or 
investigate----
    (A) the efficiency and economy of operations of all 
branches of the Government including the possible existence of 
fraud, misfeasance, malfeasance, collusion, mismanagement, 
incompetence, corruption, or unethical practices, waste, 
extravagance, conflicts of interest, and the improper 
expenditure of Government funds in transactions, contracts, 
and, activities of the Government or of Government officials 
and employees and any and all such improper practices between 
Government personnel and corporations, individuals, companies, 
or persons affiliated therewith, doing business with the 
Government; and the compliance or noncompliance of such 
corporations, companies, or individuals or other entities with 
the rules, regulations, and laws governing the various 
governmental agencies and its relationships with the public;
    (B) the extent to which criminal or other improper 
practices or activities are, or have been, engaged in the field 
of labor-management relations or in groups or organizations of 
employees or employers, to the detriment of interests of the 
public, employers, or employees, and to determine whether any 
changes are required in the laws of the United States in order 
to protect such interests against the occurrence of such 
practices or activities;
    (C) organized criminal activity which may operate in or 
otherwise utilize the facilities of interstate or international 
commerce in furtherance of any transactions and the manner and 
extent to which, and the identity of the persons, firms, or 
corporations, or other entities by whom such utilization is 
being made, and further, to study and investigate the manner in 
which and the extent to which persons engaged in organized 
criminal activity have infiltrated lawful business enterprise, 
and to study the adequacy of Federal laws to prevent the 
operations of organized crime in interstate or international 
commerce; and to determine whether any changes are required in 
the laws of the United States in order to protect the public 
against such practices or activities;
    (D) all other aspects of crime and lawlessness within the 
United States which have an impact upon or affect the national 
health, welfare, and safety; including but not limited to 
investment fraud schemes, commodity and security fraud, 
computer fraud, and the use of offshore banking and corporate 
facilities to carry out criminal objectives;
    (E) the efficiency and economy of operations of all 
branches and functions of the government with particular 
reference to----
    (i) the effectiveness of present national security methods, 
staffing, and processes as tested against the requirements 
imposed by the rapidly mounting complexity of national security 
problems;
    (ii) the capacity of present national security staffing, 
methods, and processes to make full use of the Nation's 
resources of knowledge and talents;
    (iii) the adequacy of present intergovernmental relations 
between the United States and international organizations 
principally concerned with national security of which the 
United States is a member; and
    (iv) legislative and other proposals to improve these 
methods, processes, and relationships;
    (F) the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all 
agencies and departments of the government involved in the 
control and management of energy shortages including, but not 
limited to, their performance with respect to----
    (i) the collection and dissemination of accurate statistics 
on fuel demand and supply;
    (ii) the implementation of effective energy conservation 
measures;
    (iii) the pricing of energy in all forms;
    (iv) coordination of energy programs with State and local 
government;
    (v) control of exports of scarce fuels;
    (vi) the management of tax, import, pricing, and other 
policies affecting energy supplies;
    (vii) maintenance of the independent sector of the 
petroleum industry as a strong competitive force;
    (viii) the allocation of fuels in short supply by public 
and private entities;
    (ix) the management of energy supplies owned or controlled 
by the Government;
    (x) relations with other oil producing and consuming 
countries;
    (xi) the monitoring of compliance by governments, 
corporations, or individuals with the laws and regulations 
governing the allocation, conservation, or pricing of energy 
supplies; and
    (xii) research into the discovery and development of 
alternative energy supplies; and
    (G) the efficiency and economy of all branches and 
functions of government with particular references to the 
operations and management of Federal regulatory policies and 
programs.
    (2) EXTENT OF INQUIRIES.--In carrying out the duties 
provided in paragraph (1), the inquiries of this committee or 
any subcommittee of the committee shall not be construed to be 
limited to the records, functions, and operations of any 
particular branch of the Government and may extend to the 
records and activities of any persons, corporation, or other 
entity.
    (3) SPECIAL COMMITTEE AUTHORITY.--For the purposes of this 
subsection, the committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee 
of the committee, or its chairman, or any other member of the 
committee or subcommittee designated by the chairman is 
authorized, in its, his or her, or their discretion----
    (A) to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of 
witnesses and production of correspondence, books, papers, and 
documents;
    (B) to hold hearings;
    (C) to sit and act at any time or place during the 
sessions, recess, and adjournment periods of the Senate;
    (D) to administer oaths; and
    (E) to take testimony, either orally or by sworn Statement, 
or, in the case of staff members of the Committee and the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, by deposition in 
accordance with the Committee Rules of Procedure.
    (4) AUTHORITY OF OTHER COMMITTEES.--Nothing contained in 
this subsection shall affect or impair the exercise of any 
other standing committee of the Senate of any power, or the 
discharge by such committee of any duty, conferred or imposed 
upon it by the Standing Rules of the Senate or by the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.
    (5) SUBPOENA AUTHORITY.--All subpoenas and related legal 
processes of the committee and its subcommittee authorized 
under S. Res. 62, agreed to February 28, 2017 (115th Congress) 
are authorized to continue.

           III. BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS REFERRED AND CONSIDERED

    During the 116th Congress, 409 Senate bills and 136 House 
bills were referred to the Committee for consideration. In 
addition, 10 Senate Resolutions and 2 Senate Concurrent 
Resolutions were referred to the Committee.
    The Committee reported 138 bills; an additional 44 measures 
were discharged.
    Of the legislation received by the Committee, 79 measures 
became public laws, including 64 postal naming bills.

                              IV. HEARINGS

    During the 116th Congress, the Committee held 50 hearings 
on legislation, oversight issues, and nominations. Hearing 
titles and dates follow.
    The Committee also held 16 scheduled business meetings.
    Lists of hearings with copies of Statements by Members and 
witnesses, with archives going back to 1997, are online at the 
Committee's Website, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/.
The Opportunity to SOAR: 15 Years of School Choice in D.C. February 26, 
        2019. (S. Hearing. 116-27)
    The purpose of this two-panel field hearing was to mark the 
15th year anniversary of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship 
Program and discuss its future with the SOAR Reauthorization 
Act of 2019. The witnesses addressed how the D.C. Opportunity 
Scholarship Program benefits students and parents 
educationally, financially, and socially as it prepared them 
for the future. The witnesses also addressed past obstacles the 
program had to overcome, highlighting times administrators, 
parents, and advocates of the program supported the students' 
education.
    Witnesses: Hon. Tim Scott, U.S. Senate; K. Marguerite 
Conley, Former Executive Director, Consortium of Catholic 
Academies; Yisehak Abraham, Alumnus, D.C. Opportunity 
Scholarship Program; Gerald Smith, Principal, St. Thomas More 
Catholic School.
Perspectives on Protecting the Electric Grid from an Electromagnetic 
        Pulse or Geomagnetic Disturbance. February 27, 2019. (S. 
        Hearing. 116-78)
    The purpose of this roundtable is to hear differing 
perspectives from key stakeholders on electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP) and geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) risks and mitigation 
solutions. The witnesses discussed current activities to 
predict and prepare for the consequences of an EMP or GMD and 
how the United States can improve its efforts. Witnesses also 
discussed the Department of Homeland Security's EMP strategy 
that was submitted to Congress last year, and how government 
agencies and private sector organizations are working together 
to secure our nation's electrical grid from an EMP or GMD. 
Finally, the witnesses discussed the potential costs associated 
with hardening the nation's electrical grid and possible 
technical solutions, and recommendations on authorities needed 
to prepare and protect the United States for an EMP or GMD 
event.
    Witnesses: Hon. Karen Evans, Assistant Secretary for 
Cybersecurity, Energy Security, & Emergency Response, U.S. 
Department of Energy; Brian Harrell, Assistant Director, 
Infrastructure Security Division, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security; Nathan Anderson, Acting Director, Homeland Security & 
Justice Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Joseph 
McClelland, Director, Office of Energy Infrastructure Security, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; Scott Aaronson, Vice 
President for Security and Preparedness, Edison Electric 
Institute; Randy Horton, PH.D., Senior Program Manager, Grid 
Operations and Planning, Electric Power, Research Institute; 
David Roop, Director, Electric, Transmission Operations & 
Reliability, Dominion Energy; James Vespalec, Director, Asset 
Planning and Engineering, American Transmission Company; George 
Baker, PH.D., Professor Emeritus, James Madison University; 
Justin Kasper, PH.D., Associate Professor of Space Science and 
Engineering, University of Michigan; Caitlin Durkovich, 
Director, Toffler Associates
Nomination of Joseph V. Cuffari to be Inspector General, U.S. 
        Department of Homeland Security. March 5, 2019. (S. Hearing 
        116-28)
    This one-panel hearing considered the nomination of Joseph 
V. Cuffari, to be Inspector General, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security. Mr. Cuffari was introduced by Senator Martha 
McSally.
High Risk List 2019: Recommendations to Reduce Risk of Waste, Fraud, 
        and Mismanagement in Federal Programs. March 6, 2019. (S. 
        Hearing 116-43)
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine the Government 
Accountability Office's 2019 update of the High Risk List. The 
witness discussed agencies that required significant 
congressional attention, particularly in the legislative 
jurisdiction of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee.
    Witnesses: Hon. Eugene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of 
the United States, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
accompanied by Cathleen Berrick, Managing Director, Defense 
Capabilities and Management Team, U.S. Government 
Accountability Office; Nikki Clowers, Managing Director, Health 
Care Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Elizabeth 
Curda, Director, Education, Workforce, & Income Security Team, 
U.S. Government Accountability Office; Mark Gaffigan, Managing 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment Team, U.S. 
Government Accountability Office; Nick Marinos, Director, 
Information Technology and Cybersecurity Team, U.S. Government 
Accountability Office; Chris Mihm, Managing Director, Strategic 
Issues Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office.
A Path to Sustainability: Recommendations From The President's Task 
        Force on the United States Postal Service. March 12, 2019. (S. 
        Hearing 116-97)
    The purpose of this hearing was to address the 
unsustainable financial path of the Postal Service and to 
provide recommendations to promote the Nation's commerce and 
communication without shifting additional cost to taxpayers. 
The witnesses addressed the findings of the President's Task 
Force and summarized recommendations to improve the 
relationship between the Postal Service and the Federal 
Government, the Postal Service's Universal Service Obligation, 
its obligations to employees and retirees, and the workforce 
needs of the Postal Service.
    Witnesses: Gary Grippo, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Public Finance, U.S. Department of the Treasury; Hon. Robert G. 
Taub, Chairman, Postal Regulatory Commission; Hon. David C. 
Williams, Vice Chairman, Board of Governors, U.S. Postal 
Service; Hon. Margaret Weichert, Deputy Director for 
Management, Office of Management and Budget, Acting Director, 
Office of Personnel Management.
Nominations of Ron A. Bloom and Roman Martinez IV to be Governors, U.S. 
        Postal Service, James A. Crowell IV and Jason Park to be 
        Associate Judges, Superior Court of the District of Columbia. 
        April 2, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-60)
    This one-panel hearing considered the nominations of Ron A. 
Bloom and Roman Martinez IV to be Governors, U.S. Postal 
Service & James A. Crowell IV and Jason Park to be Associate 
Judges, Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: By The Numbers. 
        April 4, 2019.
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine U.S. southern 
border migration, apprehension, and drug flow data, and to 
compare recent data to historical trends. The witnesses 
discussed their experiences and expertise in immigration, 
migration, and border security policy. The witnesses also 
addressed challenges facing the Southern Border, Mexico, and 
the Northern Triangle and suggested potential solutions to fix 
our broken immigration system.
    Witnesses: Mark Morgan, Former Chief of the U.S. Border 
Patrol (2016-2017), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security; John Daniel Davidson, Senior 
Correspondent, The Federalist; Andrew Selee, Ph.D., President, 
Migration Policy Institute.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Perspectives from 
        the Frontline. April 9, 2019.
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine U.S. southern 
border migration, apprehension, and drug flow data, and to 
compare recent data to historical trends. The witnesses 
discussed their frontline experiences serving in U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, Homeland Security Investigations, Health 
and Human Services, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. Witnesses 
addressed the changing nature of migration, the flow of drugs, 
and human smuggling and trafficking operations across the 
southwest border.
    Witnesses: Rodolfo Karisch, Rio Grande Valley Sector Chief 
Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Randy Howe, 
Executive Director for Operations, Office of Field Operations, 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security; Timothy Tubbs, Deputy Special Agent in Charge- 
Laredo, Texas, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security; Greg Cherundolo, Chief of Operations, Drug 
Enforcement Agency, U.S. Department of Justice; and Commander 
Jonathan White, Ph.D., USPHS, Senior Advisor, Office of 
Emergency Management and Medical Operations, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.
Nominations of Hon. Dale Cabaniss to be Director, Office of Personal 
        Management, and Michael E. Wooten, ED.D., to be Administrator, 
        Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Office of Management and 
        Budget. May 7, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-61)
    This one-panel hearing considered the nominations of Hon. 
Dale Cabaniss to be Director, Office of Personal Management; 
and Michael E. Wooten, Ed.D., to be Administrator, Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy, Office of Management and Budget. 
Ms. Cabaniss was introduced by Senator John Boozman. Dr. Wooten 
was introduced by former Representative Tom Davis.
Resources Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland. May 23, 2019. (S. 
        Hearing 116-189)
    The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the Department 
of Homeland Security's budget request and legislative 
priorities for Fiscal Year 2020. The witness addressed the need 
for additional resources and authorities to secure and protect 
the homeland, and also how the Department's budget request 
meets the current and future homeland security needs of the 
nation.
    Witness: Hon. Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Secretary, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.
Sensibly Reforming the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 
        Program. June 4, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-79)
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine potential 
reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program as 
the Committee worked toward a reauthorization. The witnesses 
discussed their experiences with the program, including 
recommendations for overall program improvement, maturation of 
the program, and opportunities to streamline and harmonize 
CFATS program regulatory requirements.
    Witnesses: Brian Harrell, Assistant Director for 
Infrastructure Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Nathan 
Anderson, Acting Director, Homeland Security & Justice Team, 
U.S. Government Accountability Office; Matthew Fridley, Safety, 
Regulatory and Security Manager, Brenntag North America, 
Timothy O'Brien, President, Detotec North America; William 
Erny, Senior Director, American Chemistry Council; Andrew 
Wright, Vice President, Legislative Affairs, International 
Liquid Terminals Association; John Morawetz, Health and Safety 
Representative, International Chemical Workers Union Council, 
United Food & Commercial Workers International Union.
Nominations of Chad F. Wolf to be Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, 
        and Plans, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Jeffrey C. 
        Byard to be Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
        U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Troy D. Edgar to be Chief 
        Financial Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; John 
        M. Barger to be a Governor, U.S. Postal Service; and B. Chad 
        Bungard to be a Member, Merit Systems Protection Board. June 
        12, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-63)
    This one-panel hearing considered the nominations of Chad 
F. Wolf to be Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Jeffrey C. Byard to be 
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Byard was introduced by 
Senator Richard C. Shelby; Troy D. Edgar to be Chief Financial 
Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; John M. Barger 
to be a Governor, U.S. Postal Service; and B. Chad Bungard to 
be a Member, Merit Systems Protection Board.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The Exploitation 
        of Migrants through Smuggling, Trafficking, and Involuntary 
        Servitude. June 26, 2019.
    The purpose of this hearing, the third in a series 
addressing the ongoing humanitarian and national security 
crisis at the U.S. southern border, was to examine different 
ways in which individuals or organizations seek to exploit 
migrants attempting to enter the United States. The witnesses 
discussed different aspects and phases of this exploitation, 
including the current trends, tactics, and costs associated 
with human smuggling and trafficking across the southwest 
border. Witnesses also discussed how human smuggling can become 
human trafficking or involuntary servitude when migrants are 
forced to pay off debts related to their unlawful entry into 
the U.S and explained concrete examples of these different 
forms of exploitation. Including how this exploitation benefits 
transnational criminal organizations, human trafficking and 
human smuggling operations, and their work to thwart them.
    Witnesses: Brian S. Hastings, Chief, Law Enforcement 
Operations Directorate, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Randy 
Howe, Executive Director for Operations, Office of Field 
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security; Gregory Nevano, Assistant Director for 
Investigative Programs, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security.
Nominations of Ann C. Fisher and Ashley E. Poling to be Commissioners, 
        Postal Regulatory Commission; Catherine Bird to be General 
        Counsel, Federal Labor Relations Authority; and Rainey R. 
        Brandt and Shana Frost Matini to be Associate Judges, Superior 
        Court of the District of Columbia. July 16, 2019. (S. Hearing 
        116-69)
    The purpose of this hearing considered the nominations of 
Ann C. Fisher and Ashley E. Poling to be Commissioners, Postal 
Regulatory Commission; Catherine Bird to be General Counsel, 
Federal Labor Relations Authority; and Rainey R. Brandt and 
Shana Frost Matini to be Associate Judges, Superior Court of 
the District of Columbia.
2020 Census: Conducting a Secure and Accurate Count. July 16, 2019. (S. 
        Hearing 116-136)
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine the U.S. Census 
Bureau's work towards the 2020 Census. The witnesses discussed 
how the Bureau is working to mitigate key risks to the 2020 
Census, upholding strong privacy protections for individual 
responses, and deploying strong cybersecurity measures for the 
unprecedented digital census environment.
    Witnesses: Hon. Steven Dillingham, PH.D., Director, U.S. 
Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce; Robert Goldenkoff, 
Director of Strategic Issues, U.S. Government Accountability 
Office; Nicholas Marinos, Director of Information Technology & 
Cybersecurity, U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Bipartisan Policy 
        Recommendations from the Homeland Security Advisory Council. 
        July 17, 2019.
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine the current 
migration crisis at the southern border and recommendations by 
the Homeland Security Advisory Council to address it. The 
witnesses discussed the Emergency Interim Report the Council 
issued on April 16, 2019.
    Witnesses: Hon. Karen Tandy, Chair, Customs and Border 
Protection Families and Children Care Panel, Homeland Security 
Advisory Council; Jayson Ahern, Vice Chair, Customs and Border 
Protection Families and Children Care Panel, Homeland Security 
Advisory Council; Sharon W. Cooper, MD FAAP, Member, Customs 
and Border Protection Families and Children Care Panel, 
Homeland Security Advisory Council; Leon Fresco, Member, 
Customs and Border Protection Families and Children Care Panel, 
Homeland Security Advisory Council.
Examining State and Federal Recommendations for Enhancing School Safety 
        Against Targeted Violence. July 24, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-117)
    The purpose of this hearing was to provide the public with 
an understanding of the current state of school security, 
mitigation, and prevention best practices, as well as state and 
Federal recommendations. The witnesses discussed their advocacy 
on behalf of school hardening and research on school safety 
measures and school-based prevention. The witnesses also 
suggested ways to effect non-political, efficacious, and proven 
measures for enhancing safe environments at American schools.
    Witnesses: Max Schachter, Founder & Chief Executive 
Officer, Safe Schools for Alex; Tom Hoyer, Treasurer, Stand 
with Parkland--The National Association of Families for Safe 
Schools; Hon. Bob Gualtieri, Chair, Marjory Stoneman Douglas 
High School Public Safety Commission and Sheriff of Pinellas 
County, Florida; Deborah Temkin, Ph.D., Senior Program Area 
Director, Education Child Trends.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: What Is Required 
        to Improve Conditions? July 30, 2019.
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine the conditions 
at Customs and Border Protection detention centers along the 
southern border, CBP's efforts to ensure the safety and care of 
all individuals in its custody, and what actions Congress and 
the Executive Branch needed to take to help address the 
unprecedented flow of families and unaccompanied alien children 
that have led to overcrowding at CBP facilities. The witnesses 
discussed the findings following the Department of Homeland 
Security Office of the Inspector General's visits to CBP 
detention centers and the provided recommendations to address 
the various challenges.
    Witnesses: Mark Morgan, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 
Jennifer L. Costello, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security.
18 Years Later: The State of Homeland Security after 9/11. September 9, 
        2019. (S. Hearing 116-397)
    The purpose of this field hearing, held at the National 
September 11th Memorial & Museum in New York City, New York, 
was to evaluate how the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
has evolved to address an ever-changing threat landscape in the 
years since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The 
witnesses provided frank assessments of the greatest threats to 
our homeland security, how well they believe the Department is 
handling these challenges, and recommendations for how DHS can 
improve. The witnesses' recommendations included both how DHS 
can better leverage its existing relationships with public and 
private sector partners to anticipate, adapt, and respond to 
persistent and emerging threats, and how Congress can better 
position the Department to address these threats.
    Witnesses: Hon. Michael Chertoff, Former Secretary (2005-
2009), U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Hon. Janet A. 
Napolitano, Former Secretary (2009-2013), U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security; Hon. Jeh C. Johnson, Former Secretary (2013-
2017), U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Countering Domestic Terrorism: Examining the Evolving Threat. September 
        25, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-154)
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine the evolving 
threat posed by domestic terrorism and how the Federal 
Government is combatting that threat. The hearing addressed 
current trends across the domestic terrorism threat landscape, 
the available data used to make threat assessments and resource 
allocation decisions, the posture of the relevant government 
agencies for addressing the threat, and the identification of 
possible challenges the government faces. The witness discussed 
their various experiences assessing domestic terrorism threats, 
the status of data collection and threat tracking, and 
evaluated the ability and efforts of the Federal Government to 
combat domestic terrorism.
    Witnesses: William Braniff, Director, National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism and 
Professor of the Practice, University of Maryland; Clinton 
Watts, Distinguished Research Fellow, Foreign Policy Research 
Institute; Robert M. Chesney, James A. Baker III Chair in the 
Rule of Law and World Affairs and Director, Robert Strauss 
Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas 
Law School; George Selim, Senior Vice President for National 
Programs, Anti-Defamation League.
Nominations of Joshua A. Deahl to be an Associate Judge, District of 
        Columbia Court of Appeals; Deborah J. Israel to be an Associate 
        Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia; Andrea L. 
        Hertzfeld to be an Associate Judge, Superior Court of the 
        District of Columbia; and Robert A. Dixon to be United States 
        Marshal for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. 
        October 22, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-156)
    The purpose of this hearing considered the nominations of 
Joshua A. Deahl to be an Associate Judge, District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals; Deborah J. Israel to be an Associate Judge, 
Superior Court of the District of Columbia; Andrea L. Hertzfeld 
to be an Associate Judge, Superior Court of the District of 
Columbia; and Robert A. Dixon to be United States Marshal for 
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Supply Chain Security, Global Competitiveness, and 5G. October 31, 
        2019. (S. Hearing 116185)
    The purpose of this hearing was to better understand the 
Administration's ongoing work managing risks and threats to the 
nation's information telecommunications technology (ICT) supply 
chain as the nation transitions to the 5th generation mobile 
network (5G). The witnesses highlighted the nature and severity 
of the threats posed by foreign-owned and operated ICT across 
the nation's 5G infrastructure, as well as the importance of 5G 
to U.S. innovation and global economic competitiveness. 
Additionally, witnesses described the structure of the 
interagency group working on 5G issues, including who is in 
charge of the interagency effort.
    Witnesses: Hon. Christopher C. Krebs, Director, 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security; Diane Rinaldo, Acting 
Assistant Secretary, National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce; Robert 
L. Strayer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cyber and 
International Communications and Information Policy, U.S. 
Department of State; Hon. Jessica Rosenworcel, Commissioner, 
Federal Communications Commission.
Threats to the Homeland.  November 5, 2019.
    The purpose of this hearing was to update the public 
understanding of prevailing threats to the security of the 
United States of America. Witnesses highlighted the most 
pressing domestic and foreign threats faced by the United 
States determined by their respective organizations, and also 
discussed what efforts they are taking to counter these major 
threats to the homeland.
    Witnesses: Hon. David J. Glawe, Under Secretary for 
Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security; Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; Russell Travers, Acting Director, National 
Counterterrorism Center.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The Year in 
        Review. November 13, 2019.
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine the 
unprecedented migration flow at our southern border during 
fiscal year 2019. Witnesses discussed the administrations 
efforts to curb the unprecedented number of individuals 
attempting to illegally enter the country. The discussion 
highlighted data regarding migration patterns, apprehensions, 
asylum claims, detention facilities, and drug flows in an 
attempt to find potential solutions to fix our broken 
immigration system.
    Witnesses: Mark A. Morgan, Acting Commissioner, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security; Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, Acting Director, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security; Derek N. Benner, Acting Deputy Director, 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, James McHenry, Director, Executive Office 
for Immigration Review, U.S. Department of Justice.
Nomination of Hon. Peter T. Gaynor to be Administrator, Federal 
        Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland 
        Security. November 14, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-188)
    The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nomination 
of Hon. Peter T. Gaynor to be Administrator, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The 
nominee was introduced by Senator Jack Reed.
Nomination of Paul J. Ray to be Administrator, Office of Information 
        and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget. 
        December 4, 2019. (S. Hearing 116-187)
    The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nomination 
of Paul J. Ray to be Administrator, Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget. The 
nominee was introduced by Senator Marsha Blackburn.
DOJ OIG FISA Report: Methodology, Scope, and Findings. December 18, 
        2019. (S. Hearing 116396)
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine the Department 
of Justice Office of the Inspector General's report titled, 
``Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the 
FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation,'' released on December 
9, 2019. The witness explained the contours of his work, the 
findings regarding the FBI's basis for seeking warrants, and 
other relevant examinations conducted during the investigation.
    Witness: Hon. Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, U.S. 
Department of Justice.
Examining the Root Causes of America's Unsustainable Fiscal Path. 
        January 28, 2020. (S. Hearing 116-186)
    The purpose of this hearing was to lay out the reality of 
America's long-term financial situation, including the root 
causes of the current fiscal challenges of Federal trust funds. 
Witnesses discussed these long-term issues related to 
government spending including Senator Mitt Romney's bill, S. 
2733, The TRUST Act.
    Witnesses: Douglas Holtz-Eakin, PH.D., President, American 
Action Form; Charles P. Blahous III, PH.D., J. Fish and Lillian 
F. Smith Chair and Senior Research Strategist, Mercatus Center, 
George Mason University; Brian Riedl, Senior Fellow, Manhattan 
Institute for Policy Research; Henry J. Aaron, PH.D., Bruce and 
Virginia MacLaury Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution.
What States, Locals and the Business Community Should Know and Do: A 
        Roadmap for Effective Cybersecurity. February 11, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine how State, 
local, tribal, and territorial governments and critical 
infrastructure owners/operators can mitigate and protect 
against persistent cybersecurity threats. This hearing also 
examined the current threat environment, including ransomware 
attacks, and threats from state actors like Iran, China, and 
Russia. In addition, the witnesses addressed Federal and State 
responses, and recommendations for improvement.
    Witnesses: Hon. Christopher C. Krebs, Director, 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security; Amanda Crawford, Executive 
Director, Department of Information Resources, State of Texas; 
Christopher DeRusha, Chief Security Officer, Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Protection Office, State of Michigan.
Are We Prepared? Protecting the U.S. from Global Pandemics. February 
        12, 2020.
    The purpose of this roundtable hearing, the first in a 
series of committee hearings on the Coronavirus, was to examine 
the nation's level of preparedness against pandemic threats, 
particularly in the context of the Coronavirus outbreak that 
originated in Wuhan, China. Witnesses discussed their views on 
the actions taken by the U.S. government to combat the spread 
of the Coronavirus, and if additional resources were needed. 
Witnesses also discussed how the U.S. government coordinates 
with both relevant Federal agencies and State, local, and 
tribal entities to prepare for, respond to, and limit the 
spread of infectious diseases.
    Witnesses: Nikki Clowers, Managing Director, Health Care 
Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Julie L. 
Gerberding, MD, Former Director (2002-2009) of the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention at the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services; Hon. Scott Gottlieb, MD, Former 
Commissioner (2017-2019) of the Food and Drug Administration at 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Luciana 
Borio, MDFormer Director for Medical and Biodefense 
Preparedness (2017-2019) at the National Security Council; Asha 
M. George, Dr.PH, Executive Director, Bipartisan Commission on 
Biodefense.
Resources and Authorities Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland. 
        March 4, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the Department 
of Homeland Security's budget request and legislative 
priorities for Fiscal Year 2021. The witness addressed the need 
for additional resources and authorities to protect and secure 
the homeland, and also how the Department's budget request 
meets the current and future homeland security needs for the 
nation.
    Witness: Hon. Chad F. Wolf, Acting Secretary, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.
The Federal Interagency Response to the Coronavirus and Preparing for 
        Future Global Pandemics. March 5, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine the interagency 
response to global pandemic outbreaks, such as the Coronavirus 
Disease 2019 (COVID-19), that posed public health threats to 
the U.S. homeland. Witnesses provided updates on the COVID-19 
outbreak, and the actions taken by their departments to combat 
the spread of the virus. The witnesses also discussed 
coordination efforts with other relevant Federal agencies and 
relevant international partners to detect, contain, and 
mitigate the spread of pandemic diseases. Finally, witnesses 
discussed lessons learned from previous infectious disease 
outbreaks, such as the 2014 West African Ebola outbreak and 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2003, and 
included new structures put in place to respond to pandemics 
affecting the nation.
    Witnesses: Hon. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, Senior Official 
Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security; The Honorable Robert Kadlec, M.D., 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.
Roundtable--COVID-19: How New Information Should Drive Policy. May 6, 
        2020.
    The purpose of this remote roundtable was to examine new 
data pertaining to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic of 2020. 
The witnesses discussed the development of testing methods and 
treatment for coronavirus cases, the effectiveness of current 
precautions such as state lockdowns and social distancing, how 
to mitigate the spread of and hospitalizations due to the 
coronavirus, and plans to reopen the American economy.
    Witnesses: Scott W. Atlas, M.D., David and Joan Traitel 
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; David 
L. Katz, M.D., M.P.H., President, True Health Initiative; 
Pierre Kory, M.D., M.P.A., Critical Care Service Chief, 
Associate Professor of Medicine, University of Wisconsin School 
of Medicine and Public Health; John P.A. Ioannidis, M.D., C.F. 
Rehnborg Professor in Disease Prevention, School of Medicine, 
Stanford University; Avik Roy, President, Foundation for 
Research on Equal Opportunity; Tom Inglesby, M.D., Director, 
Center for Health Security, Bloomberg School of Public Health, 
John Hopkins University.
Evolving the U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy and Posture: Reviewing the 
        Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report. May 13, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to discuss and evaluate the 
findings and recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium 
Commission's March 2020 report. The witnesses highlighted the 
Commission's recommendations aimed at improving the resilience 
of the homeland from cybersecurity threats, particularly those 
recommendations that strengthen the Department of Homeland 
Security's ability to mitigate such threats. Additionally, the 
witnesses described the details of the need for government 
reforms, namely the need to improve the role of Sector Specific 
Agencies and to establish the Office of the National Cyber 
Director.
    Witnesses: Hon. Angus S. King, JR., Co-Chair, Cyberspace 
Solarium Commission; Hon. Mike Gallagher, Co-Chair, Cyberspace 
Solarium Commission; Hon. Suzanne E. Spaulding, Commissioner, 
Cyberspace Solarium Commission; Thomas A. Fanning, 
Commissioner, Cyberspace Solarium Commission.
Nominations of Hon. Russell Vought to be Director, Office of Management 
        and Budget, and Craig E. Leen to be Inspector General, Office 
        of Personnel Management. June 2, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nominations 
of Hon. Russell Vought to be Director, Office of Management and 
Budget, and Craig E. Leen to be Inspector General, Office of 
Personnel Management.
Nominations of Donald L. Moak and William Zollars to be Governors, 
        United States Postal Service, and The Honorable Mark A. 
        Robbins, Carl E. Ross, and Elizabeth J. Shapiro to be Associate 
        Judges, Superior Court of the District of Columbia. June 3, 
        2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nominations 
of Donald L. Moak and William Zollars to be Governors, United 
States Postal Service, and The Honorable Mark A. Robbins, Carl 
E. Ross, and Elizabeth J. Shapiro to be Associate Judges, 
Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Evaluating the Federal Government's Procurement and Distribution 
        Strategies in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic. June 9, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine how the Federal 
Government developed and executed procurement and distribution 
strategies in order to provide our nation the requisite 
diagnostic testing, personal protective equipment (PPE), drug 
supplies, other medically-necessary equipment, and resources in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The witnesses addressed 
their agency's roles in the evaluation of the nation's need for 
and current supply of diagnostics testing, PPE, and other 
medically-necessary equipment and how that data informs their 
distribution strategies. The witnesses also discussed data and 
analyses used to determine the current and future need for 
these critical resources, activities established to expedite 
procurement, and distribution of these resources to state, 
local, tribal, and territorial governments in response to the 
pandemic.
    Witnesses: Hon. Peter T. Gaynor, Administrator, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security; Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, Vice Director of 
Logistics, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense; 
Hon. Brett Giroir, M.D., Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.
The Role of the Strategic National Stockpile in Pandemic Response. June 
        24, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the mission of 
the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and the role it played 
in the Federal Government's response to the coronavirus 
pandemic. Witnesses discussed how the Federal Government makes 
decisions affecting the SNS's inventory, and the challenges of 
balancing its multiple preparedness missions with available 
resources. Witnesses also discussed how the Federal Government 
could improve its approach to restocking the SNS following 
disasters and crises. Finally, witnesses addressed the role 
state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments play 
in responding to pandemics, and provided recommendations for 
how the Federal and SLTT governments can better enhance their 
stockpiling capabilities in response to future pandemics.
    Witnesses: Julie L. Gerberding, M.D., Former Director 
(2002-2009) of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Daniel M. 
Gerstein, PH.D., Senior Policy Researcher, RAND Corporation; W. 
Gregory Burel, Former Director (2007-2020) of the Strategic 
National Stockpile at the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Andrew Phelps, Director, Oregon Office of Emergency 
Management on behalf of the National Emergency Management 
Association.
CBP Oversight: Examining the Evolving Challenges Facing the Agency. 
        June 25, 2020.
    This hearing highlighted the top concerns and challenges 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) faces during a public 
health emergency, as well as the adaptations it has made to 
safeguard the nation while enabling lawful and essential trade, 
travel, and migration. The witness discussed the effectiveness 
of the specific actions CBP has taken to confront COVID-19, 
including CBP's mass migration strategies and the effects on 
CBP's front-line workforce. The witness also addressed specific 
programs including processing under Title 42 health 
authorities; the Migrant Protection Protocols; Prompt Asylum 
Claim Review; Humanitarian Asylum Review Process; Asylum 
Cooperative Agreements; and Electronic Nationality 
Verification.
    Witness: Mark Morgan, Chief Operating Officer and Senior 
Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security
Nomination of Hon. Derek T. Kan to be Deputy Director, Office of 
        Management and Budget. June 30, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nomination 
of Hon. Derek T. Kan to be Deputy Director, Office of 
Management and Budget.
Oversight of COVID-19 Financial Relief Packages. July 28, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the COVID-19 
financial relief packages. The witnesses provided evaluations 
on the effectiveness of the packages programs and highlighted 
any programs that required additional oversight. The witnesses 
also addressed oversight and other controls they believed 
Congress should consider as it debated the authorization of 
additional programs and the appropriation of additional 
funding.
    Witnesses: Hon. Phil Gramm, Former Senator from the State 
of Texas, and Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; 
Danielle Brian, Executive Director, Project on Government 
Oversight; Maya MacGuineas, President, Committee for a 
Responsible Federal Budget; Veronique De Rugy, Ph.D., Senior 
Research Fellow, Mercatus Center, George Mason University; Hon. 
Neil Barofsky, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP, Former Special 
Inspector General (2008-2011) Troubled Asset Relief Program.
Oversight of DHS Personnel Deployments to Recent Protests. August 6, 
        2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine the Department 
of Homeland Security's (DHS) actions to protect Federal 
property and personnel during the protests in cities across the 
country, and in particular in Portland, Oregon. The witness 
described the events leading to the Department's deployment of 
law enforcement officers, the number and component agencies 
from which these officers were deployed, the authorities that 
DHS relied on to conduct its operations, coordination with 
state and local officials, and any relevant data the Department 
collected during the protests. Additionally, the witness 
discussed the role DHS's law enforcement officers will play in 
Operation Legend, announced by the President on July 8, 2020.
    Witness: Hon. Chad F. Wolf, Acting Secretary, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.
    Examining the Finances and Operations of the United States 
Postal Service During COVID-19 and Upcoming Elections. August 
21, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine the finances and 
operations of the United States Postal Service (USPS), 
particularly in light of the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic; 
recent operational changes at USPS; and the upcoming elections.
    Witness: Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States 
Postal Service.
Nominations of John Gibbs to be Director, Office of Personnel 
        Management, and Hon. John M. Barger, Hon. Christopher B. 
        Burnham, and Frank Dunlevy to be Members, Federal Retirement 
        Thrift Investment Board. September 9, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nominations 
of John Gibbs to be Director, Office of Personnel Management, 
and Hon. John M. Barger, Hon. Christopher B. Burnham, and Frank 
Dunlevy to be Members, Federal Retirement Thrift Investment 
Board.
Nomination of Hon. Chad F. Wolf to be Secretary, U.S. Department of 
        Homeland Security. September 23, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nomination 
of Hon. Chad F. Wolf to be Secretary, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security.
Threats to the Homeland. September 24, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to update the public 
understanding of prevailing threats to the security of the 
United States of America. The witnesses discussed the most 
pressing domestic and foreign threats faced by the United 
States and what efforts were taken to counter them.
    Witnesses: Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice; Hon. 
Christopher Miller, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Kenneth 
Cuccinelli, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy 
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Early Outpatient Treatment: An Essential Part of a COVID-19 
        Solution. November 19, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to assess the current state 
of the COVID-19 pandemic and examine efforts to develop early 
therapeutic treatments for COVID-19 outpatients. The witnesses 
discussed the research and development of early outpatient 
medical treatments for COVID-19, as well as the review and 
approval of such treatments by the Food and Drug Administration 
under its Emergency Use Authorization program. Witnesses also 
provided recommendations on what is most effective in treating 
COVID-19 outpatients.
    Witnesses: Peter A. McCullough, M.D., M.P.H., Vice Chief of 
Internal Medicine, Baylor University Medical Center; Harvey 
Risch, M.D., PH.D., Professor of Epidemiology, Yale School of 
Medicine; George C. Fareed, M.D., Medical Director and Family 
Medicine Specialist, Pioneers Medical Center; Ashish K. Jha, 
M.D., M.P.H., Dean of the School of Public Health, Brown 
University.
Congressional Oversight in the Face of Executive Branch and Media 
        Suppression: The Case Study of Crossfire Hurricane. December 
        3rd, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine misconduct by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI), Department of 
Justice, and other Federal agencies; the executive branch's 
responsiveness to congressional oversight of that misconduct; 
and the media's coverage of that misconduct, with a particular 
focus on the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation. The 
witnesses offered any unique insight into those matters based 
on their previous work.
    Witnesses: Sharyl Attkisson, Investigative Journalist; 
Kevin R. Brock, Former Assistant Director for Intelligence, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation; Lee Smith, Investigative 
Journalist & Author.
Early Outpatient Treatment: An Essential Part of a COVID-19 
        Solution, Part II. December 8, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to assess the state of the 
COVID-19 pandemic and efforts to develop early therapeutic 
treatments for COVID-19 patients for whom hospitalization is 
not required. The witnesses discussed the research and 
development of early outpatient medical treatments for COVID-
19, as well as the review and approval of such treatments by 
the Food and Drug Administration under its Emergency Use 
Authorization program. Witnesses shared lessons learned and 
provided recommendations for how to provide more effective 
outpatient treatment to COVID-19 patients.
    Witnesses: Ramin Oskoui, M.D., Vice President of Medical 
Staff, Sibley Memorial Hospital and Chief Executive Officer, 
Foxhall Cardiology; Jean-Jacques Rajter, M.D., Pulmonologist, 
Broward Health Medical Center; Pierre Kory, M.D., Associate 
Professor of Medicine, St. Luke's Aurora Medical Center; Armand 
Balboni, M.D., PH.D., Chief Executive Director, Appili 
Therapeutics Inc.; Jane M. Orient, M.D., Executive Director, 
Association of American Physicians and Surgeons; Jayanta 
Bhattacharya, M.D., PH.D., Professor of Medicine, Stanford 
University, and Senior Fellow Stanford Institute for Economic 
Policy Research, Stanford University.
Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election. December 16, 2020.
    The purpose of this hearing was to examine perceived 
irregularities in the 2020 election. The witnesses shared their 
insight on the 2020 Presidential Election, and its outcome.
    Witnesses: Hon. Kenneth W. Starr, Testifying in Personal 
Capacity; Hon. Donald Palmer, Commissioner, U.S. Election 
Assistance Commission; James R. Troupis, Attorney, Troupis Law 
Firm; Hon. Francis X. Ryan, State Representative, Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania; Jesse R. Binnall, Partner, Harvey & Binnall, 
PLLC; Hon. Christopher C. Krebs, Former Director (2018-2020) 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.

                  V. REPORTS, PRINTS, AND GAO REPORTS

    During the 116th Congress, the Committee prepared and 
issued 103 reports and 2 Committee Prints on the following 
topics. Reports issued by Subcommittees are listed in their 
respective sections of this document.

                           COMMITTEE REPORTS

    Activities of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs and its Subcommittees for the One Hundred 
Sixteenth Congress.
    To authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to work 
with Cybersecurity Consortia for training, and for other 
purposes. S. Rept. 116-5, re. S. 333.
    To increase access to agency guidance documents. S. 116-12, 
re. S. 380.
    To amend the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 to improve 
the orderly transfer of the executive power during presidential 
transitions. S. Rept. 116-13, re. S. 394.
    To require each agency, in providing notice of a rule 
making, to include a link to a 100 word plain language summary 
of the proposed rule. S. Rept. 116 14, re. S. 395
    To establish a Federal rotational cyber workforce program 
for the Federal cyber workforce. S. Rept. 116-15, re. S. 406
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require the 
Department of Homeland Security to develop an engagement 
strategy with fusion centers, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 
116-16, re. H.R. 504.
    Activities of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs. Report of the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate and its 
Subcommittees for the One Hundred and Fifteenth Congress. S. 
Rept. 116-17.
    To authorize Cyber Hunt and incident response teams at the 
Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes. S. 
Rept. 116-27, re. S. 315.
    To require the Director of the Government Publishing Office 
to establish and maintain a website accessible to the public 
that allows the public to obtain electronic copies of all 
congressionally mandated reports in one place, and for other 
purposes. S. Rept. 116-31, re. S. 195.
    To save taxpayer money and improve the efficiency and speed 
of intragovernmental correspondence, and for other purposes. S. 
Rept. 116-32, re. S. 196.
    To prohibit Federal agencies and Federal contractors from 
requesting that an applicant for employment disclose criminal 
history record information before the applicant has received a 
conditional offer, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-33, re. 
S. 387.
    To improve efforts to identify and reduce government-wide 
improper payments, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-35, re. 

S. 375.
    To accompany S. Con. Res. 15. S. Rept. 116-43, re. S. Con. 
Res. 15.
    To require an exercise related to terrorist and foreign 
fighter travel, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-44, re. 
H.R. 1590.
    To require the collection of voluntary feedback on services 
provided by agencies, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-46, 
re. 
S. 1275.
    To amend the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery 
Improvement Act of 2012, including making changes to the Do Not 
Pay Initiative, for improved detection, prevention, and 
recovery of improper payments to deceased individuals, and for 
other purposes. S. Rept. 116-49, re. S. 1333.
    To require the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget to issue guidance on electronic consent forms, and for 
other purposes. S. Rept. 116-50, re. H.R. 1079.
    To amend the Act of August 25, 1958, commonly known as the 
``Former Presidents Act of 1958,'' with respect to the monetary 
allowance payable to a former President, and for other 
purposes. S. Rept. 116-53, re. S. 580.
    To amend Title 5, United States code, to improve the 
effectiveness of major rules accomplishing their regulatory 
objectives by promoting retrospective review, and for other 
purposes. S. Rept. 116-55, re. S. 1420.
    To amend Title 5, United States code, to prevent fraud by 
representative payees. S. Rept. 116-56, re. S. 1430.
    To amend Title 44, United States code, to modernize the 
Federal Register, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-57, re. 
H.R. 1654.
    To establish a counterterrorism advisory board, and for 
other purposes. S. Rept. 116-59, re. S. 411.
    To amend Section 327 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to clarify that national 
urban search and rescue response system task forces may include 
Federal employees. S. Rept. 116-60, re. S. 1521.
    To amend the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
of 2006 to incorporate the recommendations made by the 
Government Accountability Office relating to advance contracts, 
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-84, re. S. 979.
    To prohibit contracting with persons that have business 
operations with the Maduro regime and other purposes. S. Rept. 
116-85, re. S. 1151.
    To repeal the Multi-State Plan Program. S. Rept. 116-86, 
re. S. 1378.
    To manage supply chain risk through counterintelligence 
training, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-87, re. S. 1388.
    To require agencies to publish an advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking for major rules. S. Rept. 116-88, re. S. 
1419.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide 
funding to secure nonprofit facilities from terrorist attacks, 
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-89, re. S. 1539.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide for 
engagements with state, local, tribal, and territorial 
governments, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-90, re. S. 
1846.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish in 
the Department of Homeland Security an unmanned aircraft 
systems coordinator, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-91, 
re. S. 1867.
    To require the disclosure of ownership of high-security 
space leased to accommodate a Federal agency, and for other 
purposes. S. Rept. 116-92, re. S. 1869.
    To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to publish an 
annual report on the use of deepfake technology, and for other 
purposes. S. Rept. 116-93, re. S. 2065.
    To increase the number of Customs and Border Protection 
agriculture specialists and support staff in the Office of 
Field Operations of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and for 
other purposes. S. Rept. 116-94, re. S. 2107.
    To require the Administrator of General Services to issue 
guidance to clarify that Federal agencies may pay by charge 
card for the charging of Federal electric motor vehicles, and 
for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-95, re. S. 2193.
    To modernize Federal grant reporting, and for other 
purposes. S. Rept. 116-96, re. H.R. 150.
    To require a Department of Homeland Security Overseas 
Personnel Enhancement Plan, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 
116-97, re. H.R. 2590.
    To amend the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010 to 
authorize certain polygraph waiver authority, and for other 
purposes. 
S. Rept. 116-99, re. S. 731.
    To prohibit the use of reverse auctions for design and 
construction services procurements, and for other purposes. S. 
Rept 
116-100, re. S. 1434.
    To leverage Federal Government procurement power to 
encourage increased cybersecurity for internet of things 
devices, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-112, re. S. 734.
    To require the Comptroller General of the United States to 
analyze certain legislation in order to prevent duplication of 
an overlap with existing Federal programs, and initiatives. S. 
Rept. 116-113, re. S. 2183.
    To amend Section 3116 of Title 5 United States Code, to 
clarify the applicability of the appointment limitations for 
students appointed under the expedited hiring authority for 
post-secondary students. S. Rept. 116-129, re. S. 2169.
    To amend Title 5, United States Code, to appropriately 
limit the authority to award bonuses to Federal employees. S. 
Rept.116-152, re. S. 2119.
    To allow members of Congress to opt out of the Federal 
Employees Retirement System, and allow members who opt out of 
the Federal Employees Retirement System to continue to 
participate in the Thrift Savings Plan. S. Rept. 116-153, re. 
S. 439.
    To provide taxpayers with an improved understanding of 
government programs through the disclosure of cost, 
performance, and areas of duplication among them, leverage 
existing data to achieve a functional Federal program 
inventory, and for other purposes. 
S. Rept. 116-154, re. S. 2177.
    To amend Title 40, United States Code, to require the 
Administrator of General Services to procure the most life-
cycle cost effective and energy efficient lighting products and 
to issue guidance on the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy 
of those products, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-157, 
re. S. 1874.
    To establish procedures ad consequences in the event of a 
failure to complete regular appropriations. S. Rept. 116-158, 
re. S. 1877.
    To provide for congressional approval of national emergency 
declarations, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-159, re. S. 
764.
    To provide for joint reports by relevant Federal agencies 
to Congress regarding incidents of terrorism, and for other 
purposes. 
S. Rept. 116-175, re. S. 2513.
    To amend the Notification and Federal Employee 
Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 to strengthen 
Federal antidiscrimination laws enforced by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and expand accountability 
within the Federal Government, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 
116-176, re. H.R. 135.
    To provide requirements for the .gov domain, and for other 
purposes. S. Rept. 116-192, re. S. 2749.
    To establish the Federal clearinghouse on school safety 
best practices and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-193, re. S. 
2779.
    To direct the Administrator of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency to develop guidance for firefighters and 
other emergency response personnel on best practices to protect 
them from exposure to PFAS and to limit and prevent the release 
of PFAS into the environment, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 
116-211, re. 
S. 2353.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to authorize the 
Operation Stonegarden Grant Program, and for other purposes. S. 
Rept. 116-212, re. S. 2750.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require an 
annual report on the Office for State and Local Law 
Enforcement. 
S. Rept. 116-213, re. H.R. 495.
    To require the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget to submit to Congress an annual report on projects that 
are over budget and behind schedule, and for other purposes. S. 
Rept. 116-220, re. S. 565.
    To amend the Federal Funding Accountability and 
Transparency Act of 2006, to require the budget justifications 
and appropriation requests of agencies be made publicly 
available. S. Rept. 116-221, re. S. 2560.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear intelligence 
and information sharing functions of the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security and to 
require dissemination of information analyzed by the Department 
to entities with responsibilities relating to Homeland 
Security, and for other purposes. 
S. 116-222, re. H.R. 1589.
    To authorize an Artificial Intelligence Center of 
Excellence within the General Services Administration, and for 
other purposes. 
S. Rept. 116-225, re. S. 1363.
    To eliminate or modify certain Federal agency reporting 
requirements, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-226, re. S. 
2769.
    To require the Director of the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency to establish a cybersecurity 
state coordinator in each state, and for other purposes. S. 
Rept. 116-227, re. S. 3207.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish the 
Intelligence Rotational Assignment Program in the Department of 
Homeland Security, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-228, 
re. H.R. 2066.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to protect U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection officers, agents, and other 
personnel, and canines against potential synthetic opioid 
exposure, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-229, re. H.R. 
4739.
    To strengthen employee cost savings suggestions programs 
within the Federal Government. S. Rept. 116-231, re. S. 2618.
    To require a review of Department of Homeland Security 
Trusted Traveler Programs, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 
116-237, re. H.R. 3675.
    To amend the Fast Act to improve the Federal permitting 
process, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-241, re. S. 1976.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2012 to protect 
United States critical infrastructure by ensuring that the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has the legal 
tools it needs to notify private and public sector entities put 
at risk by cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the networks and 
systems that control critical assets of the United States. S. 
Rept. 116-242, re. S. 3045.
    To amend Title 5, United States code, to provide for the 
halt in pension payments for members of Congress sentenced for 
certain offenses and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-243, re. 
S. 3332.
    To ensure U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers, 
agents, and other personnel have adequate synthetic opioid 
detection equipment, that the Department of Homeland Security 
has a process to update synthetic opioid detection capability, 
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-244, re. H.R. 4761.
    To amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act to allow the Administrator of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide capitalization 
grants to states to establish revolving funds to provide hazard 
mitigation assistance to reduce risks from disasters and 
natural hazards, and other related environmental harm. S. Rept. 
116-249, re. S. 3418.
    To prohibit certain individuals from downloading or using 
Tiktok on any device issued by the United States or a 
government corporation. S. Rept. 116-250, re. S. 3455.
    To increase the number of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Office of Field Operations officers and support 
staff and to require reports that identify staffing, 
infrastructure, and equipment needed to enhance security at 
ports of entry. S. Rept. 116-264, re. S. 1004.
    To establish in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security a 
cybersecurity advisory committee. S. Rept. 116-265, re. S. 
4024.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to expand the 
authority of the National Infrastructure Simulation and 
Analysis Center, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-266, re. 
S. 4157.
    To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a 
plan to increase to 100 percent the rates of scanning of 
commercial and passenger vehicles entering the United States at 
land ports of entry along the border using large-scale non-
intrusive inspection systems to enhance border security, and 
for other purposes. 
S. Rept. 116-267, re. H.R. 5273.
    To ban the Federal procurement of certain drones and other 
unmanned aircraft systems, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 
116-268, re. S. 2502.
    To amend Title 5, United States code, to make permanent the 
authority of the United States Patent and Trademark Office to 
conduct a Telework Travel Expenses Program. S. Rept. 116-276, 
re. S. 4138.
    To establish a program to facilitate the adoption of modern 
technology by executive agencies, and for other purposes. S. 
Rept. 116-277, re. S. 4200.
    To modify the government wide Financial Management Plan, 
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-278, S. 3287.
    To establish an interagency task force to analyze 
preparedness for national pandemics, and for other purposes. S. 
Rept. 116-279, re. S. 4204.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to make certain 
improvements in the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
of the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes. 

S. Rept. 116-280, re. H.R. 4713.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish 
National Urban Security Technology, and for other purposes. S. 
Rept. 116-285, re. H.R. 542.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish a 
Homeland Intelligence Doctrine for the Department of Homeland 
Security, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-286, re. H.R. 
2589.
    To amend he Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish a 
mentor-protege program, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-
287, re. H.R. 4727.
    To require a guidance clarity statement on certain agency 
guidance, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-297, re. S. 
3412.
    To amend Chapter 8 of Title 5 United States code, to 
require Federal agencies to submit to the Comptroller General 
of the United States a report on rules that are revoked, 
suspended, replaced, amended, or otherwise made ineffective. S. 
Rept. 116-298, re. S. 4222.
    To amend Title 5, United States code, to require the 
Director of the Office of Personnel Management to establish and 
maintain a public directory of the individuals occupying 
government policy and supporting positions, and for other 
purposes. S. Rept. 116-302, re. S. 3896.
    To modernize the Real ID Act of 2005, and for other 
purposes. S. Rept. 116-303, re. S. 4133.
    To amend Chapter 8 of Title 5, United States code, to 
provide that major rules of the executive branch shall have no 
force or effect unless a joint resolution of approval is 
enacted into law. 
S. Rept. 116-311, re. S. 92.
    To require the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection to annually hire at least 600 new Border Patrol 
agents, to report quarterly to Congress on the status of the 
Border Patrol workforce, and to conduct a comprehensive 
staffing analysis. S. Rept. 116-312, re. S. 2162.
    To prohibit agencies from using Federal funds for publicity 
or propaganda purposes, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-
313, re. S. 2722.
    To establish the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
of the United States to facilitate the fullest cooperation, 
coordination, and mutual accountability among all levels of 
government, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-314, re. S. 
2967.
    To promote innovative acquisition techniques and 
procurement strategies, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-
315, re. S. 3038.
    To establish an Office of Equal Rights and Community 
Inclusion at the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and for 
other purposes. S. Rept. 116-316, re. S. 3658.
    To strengthen the security and integrity of the United 
States scientific and research enterprise. S. Rept. 116-317, 
re. S. 3997.
    To require the Federal Emergency Management Agency to 
evaluate the national response framework based on lessons 
learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, and for other purposes. S. 
Rept. 116-318, re. S. 4153.
    To examine the extent of the reliance of the United States 
on foreign producers for personal protective equipment during 
the COVID-19 pandemic and produce recommendations to secure the 
supply chain of personal protective equipment. S. Rept. 116-
319, re. S. 4158.
    To repeal Section 692 of the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2020. S. Rept. 116-320, re. S. 4165.
    To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to authorize the 
transfer of certain equipment during a public health emergency, 
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-321, re. S. 4210.
    To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to assess 
technology needs along the southern border and develop a 
strategy for bridging such gaps. S. Rept. 116-322, re. S. 4224.
    To amend the implementing recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007 to clarify certain allowable uses of 
funds for public transportation security assistance grants and 
establish periods of performance for such grants, and other 
purposes. S. Rept. 116-323, re. H.R. 1313.
    To waive the imposition of a civil fine for certain first-
time paperwork violations by small business concerns. S. Rept. 
116-326, re. S. 2757.
    To amend the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, to 
provide for regulatory impact analyses for certain rules, and 
for other purposes. S. Rept. 116-333, re. S. 4077.

                            COMMITTEE PRINTS

    The Committee issued the following Committee Prints during 
the 116th Congress:
    Rules of Procedure. Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs. (Printed. 40 pp. S. Prt. 116-10)
    Rules of Procedure. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 
(Printed. 23 pp. S. Prt. 116-11)

                              GAO REPORTS

    Also during the 116th Congress, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) issued 205 reports at the request 
of the Committee. GAO reports requested by the Subcommittees 
appear in their respective sections. Reports are listed here by 
title, GAO number, and release date.
    Federal Protective Service: DHS Should Take Additional 
Steps To Evaluate Organizational Placement. GAO-19-122. January 
8, 2019.
    Aviation Security: TSA Improved Covert Testing But Needs To 
Conduct More Risk-Informed Tests And Address Vulnerabilities. 
GAO-19-154C. January 10, 2019.
    Improper Payments: Selected Agencies Need Improvements In 
Their Assessments To Better Determine And Document Risk 
Susceptibility. GAO-19-112. January 10, 2019.
    K-12 Education: Challenges To Assessing Program Performance 
And Recent Efforts To Address Them. GAO-19-266R. January 31, 
2019.
    U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Status Of FEMA Public 
Assistance Funding And Implementation. GAO-19-253. February 25, 
2019.
    Department Of Energy: Performance Evaluations Could Better 
Assess Management And Operating Contractor Costs. GAO-19-5. 
February 26, 2019.
    Oral Presentation On Electromagnetic Events. February 27, 
2019. High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed To Achieve 
Greater Progress On High-Risk Areas. GAO-19-393T. March 6, 
2019.
    Department Of Energy Contracting: Actions Needed To 
Strengthen Subcontract Oversight. GAO-19-107. March 12, 2019.
    Foot-And-Mouth Disease: USDA's Efforts To Prepare For A 
Potential Outbreak Could Be Strengthened. GAO-19-103. March 12, 
2019.
    Cybersecurity Workforce: Agencies Need To Accurately 
Categorize Positions To Effectively Identify Critical Staffing 
Needs. GAO-19-144. March 12, 2019.
    Federal Ethics Programs: Government-Wide Political 
Appointee Data And Some Ethics Oversight Procedures At Interior 
And SBA Could Be Improved. GAO-19-249. March 14, 2019.
    Grants Management: Agency Action Required To Ensure 
Grantees Identify Federal Contribution Amounts. GAO-19-282. 
March 14, 2019.
    U.S. Ports Of Entry: Update On CBP Public-Private 
Partnership Programs. GAO-19-263R. March 14, 2019.
    Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status Of FEMA Funding, Oversight, 
And Recovery Challenges. GAO-19-256. March 14, 2019.
    Huracanes De Puerto Rico: Estado De Financiamiento De Fema, 
Supervision Y Desafios De Recuperacion (Spanish Highlights). 
GAO-19-331. March 14, 2019.
    Border Security: DHS Should Improve The Quality Of Unlawful 
Border Entry Information And Other Metric Reporting. 
GAO-19-305. March 21, 2019
    Data Act: OMB Needs To Formalize Data Governance For 
Reporting Federal Spending. GAO-19-284. March 22, 2019.
    Disaster Recovery: Better Monitoring Of Block Grant Funds 
Is Needed. GAO-19-232. March 25, 2019.
    Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The 
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls. 
GAO-19-301RSU. March 26, 2019.
    Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The 
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls. GAO-19-302R. 
March 26, 2019.
    Management Report: Areas For Improvement In The Federal 
Reserve Banks' Information System Controls. GAO-19-303RSU. 
March 26, 2019.
    Management Report: Areas For Improvement In The Federal 
Reserve Banks' Information System Controls. GAO-19-304R. March 
26, 2019.
    Federal Workforce: Key Talent Management Strategies For 
Agencies To Better Meet Their Missions. GAO-19-181. March 28, 
2019.
    Northern Border Security: CBP Identified Resource 
Challenges But Needs Performance Measures To Assess Security 
Between Ports Of Entry. GAO-19-194SU. March 28, 2019.
    Department Of Defense Consolidated Financial Statements FY 
2018 Audit Oversight. March 28, 2019.
    Financial Audit: Fiscal Years 2018 And 2017 Consolidated 
Financial Statements Of The U.S. Government. GAO-19-294R. March 
28, 2019.
    Financial Audit: Processes Used To Prepare The U.S. 
Government's FY 2018 Financial Statements. March 28, 2019.
    Financial Audit: 2018 Statement Of Long-Term Fiscal 
Projections Audit. March 28, 2019.
    Financial Audit: Fiscal Year 2018 Statements Of Social 
Insurance For The Consolidated Financial Statements Audit. 
March 28, 2019.
    2018 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations On Lobbyists' 
Compliance With Disclosure Requirements. GAO-19-357. March 29, 
2019.
    Aviation Security: TSA Improved Covert Testing But Needs To 
Conduct More Risk-Informed Tests And Address Vulnerabilities. 
GAO-19-374. April 4, 2019.
    Data Center Optimization: Additional Agency Actions Needed 
To Meet OMB Goals. GAO-19-241. April 11, 2019.
    2017 Hurricane Season: Federal Support For Electricity Grid 
Restoration In The U.S. Virgin Islands And Puerto Rico. 
GAO-19-296. April 18, 2019.
    2017 Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed To Improve The 
Use Of Post-Disaster Contracts To Support Response And 
Recovery. GAO-19-281. April 24, 2019.
    Data Act: Pilot Effectively Tested Approaches For Reducing 
Reporting Burden For Grants But Not For Contracts. GAO-19-299. 
April 30, 2019.
    Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The 
Internal Revenue Service's Internal Control Over Financial 
Reporting. GAO-19-412R. May 9, 2019.
    Combating Nuclear Terrorism: DHS Should Address Limitations 
To Its Program To Secure Key Cities. GAO-19-327. May 13, 2019.
    Disaster Assistance: FEMA Action Needed To Better Support 
Individuals Who Are Older Or Have Disabilities. GAO-19-318. May 
14, 2019.
    Financial Audit: Bureau Of The Fiscal Service's Fiscal Year 
2018 Schedules Of The General Fund. GAO-19-185. May 15, 2019.
    Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The 
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls Related To The 
Schedules Of The General Fund. GAO-19-463RSU. May 15, 2019.
    2019 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities To Reduce 
Fragmentation, Overlap, And Duplication And Achieve Billions In 
Financial Benefits. GAO-19-285SP. May 21, 2019.
    Congressional Award Foundation: Review Of The Audit Of The 
Financial Statements For Fiscal Year 2018. GAO-19-472R. May 21, 
2019.
    U. S. Secret Service: Further Actions Needed To Fully 
Address Protective Mission Panel Recommendations. GAO-19-415. 
May 22, 2019.
    Federal Real Property: GSA Needs To Strengthen Oversight Of 
Its Delegated Leasing Program. GAO-19-405. June 3, 2019.
    Oral Presentation On Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Standards Program. June 4, 2019.
    Land Ports Of Entry: CBP Should Update Policies And Enhance 
Analysis Of Inspections. GAO-19-400SU. June 13, 2019.
    Committee On Foreign Investment In The United States: 
Selected Transactions Involving Real Estate May Share Certain 
National Security Risks, But Dispositions Can Vary Due To Case-
Specific Factors. GAO-19-417C. June 14, 2019.
    Northern Border Security: CBP Identified Resource 
Challenges But Needs Performance Measures To Assess Security 
Between Ports Of Entry. GAO-19-470. June 26, 2019.
    2017 Disaster Relief Oversight: Strategy Needed To Ensure 
Agencies' Internal Control Plans Provide Sufficient 
Information. GAO-19-479. June 28, 2019.
    2020 Census: Actions Needed To Address Key Risks To A 
Successful Enumeration. GAO-19-588T. July 16, 2019.
    Data Act: Customer Agencies' Experiences Working With 
Shared Service Providers For Data Submissions. GAO-19-537. July 
18, 2019.
    Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The 
Internal Revenue Service's Information System Security 
Controls. GAO-19-473RSU. July 18, 2019.
    Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The 
Internal Revenue Service's Information System Security 
Controls. GAO-19-474R. July 18, 2019.
    Cybersecurity: Agencies Need To Fully Establish Risk 
Management Programs And Address Challenges. GAO-19-384. July 
25, 2019.
    Federal Vehicle Fleets: Agencies Have Continued To 
Incorporate Alternative Fuel Vehicles Into Fleets, But 
Challenges Remain. GAO-19-397. July 26, 2019.
    Federal Information Security: Agencies And OMB Need To 
Strengthen Policies And Practices. GAO-19-545. July 26, 2019.
    Land Ports Of Entry: CBP Should Update Policies And Enhance 
Analysis Of Inspections. GAO-19-658. August 6, 2019.
    Substantial Progress In Federal Financial Management Has 
Been Made; Significant Challenges Remain. August 15 2019.
    Management Report: Improvements Needed In Controls Over The 
Processes Used To Prepare The U.S. Consolidated Financial 
Statements. GAO-19-624. September 4, 2019.
    U.S. Assistance To Mexico: State And USAID Allocated Over 
$700 Million To Support Criminal Justice, Border Security, And 
Related Efforts From Fiscal Year 2014 Through 2018. 
GAO-19-647. September 10, 2019.
    Disaster Response: Federal Assistance And Selected States 
And Territory Efforts To Identify Deaths From 2017 Hurricanes. 
GAO-19-486. September 13, 2019.
    Disaster Response: FEMA And The American Red Cross Need To 
Ensure Key Mass Care Organizations Are Included In Coordination 
And Planning. GAO-19-526. September 19, 2019.
    Respuesta A Desastres: Fema Y La Cruz Roja Americana 
Necesitan Asegurar Que Las Organizaciones Claves Del Cuidado En 
Masa Sean Incluidas En La Coordinacion Y El Planeamiento. GAO-
19-708. September 19, 2019.
    Disaster Response: HHS Should Address Deficiencies 
Highlighted By Recent Hurricanes In The U.S. Virgin Islands And 
Puerto Rico. GAO-19-592. September 20, 2019.
    U.S. Secret Service: Investigative Operations Confer 
Benefits, But Additional Actions Are Needed To Prioritize 
Resources. 
GAO-19-560SU. September 26, 2019.
    Federal Contracting: Information On Federal Agencies' Use 
Of The Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Process. GAO-19-691. 
September 26, 2019.
    International Aviation Security: TSA Should Improve 
Industry Coordination And Its Security Directive And Emergency 
Amendment Review Process. GAO-20-7. October 3, 2019.
    Puerto Rico Electricity Grid Recovery: Better Information 
And Enhanced Coordination Is Needed To Address Challenges. 
GAO-20-14. October 8, 2019.
    Recuperacion De La Red Electrica En Puerto Rico: Se 
Necesita Mejor Informacion Y Coordinacion Para Enfrentar 
Desafios. 
GAO-20-143. October 8, 2019.
    Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take Additional Actions To 
Address Unique Response And Recovery Challenges. GAO-20-5. 
October 9, 2019.
    Highway Emergency Relief: Federal Highway Administration 
Should Enhance Accountability Over Project Decisions. 
GAO-20-32. October 17, 2019.
    2020 Census: Status Update On Early Operations. 
GAO-20-111R. October 31, 2019.
    Government Watchlists. GAO-20-247C. November 7, 2019.
    Agreed-Upon Procedures: FY 2019 Excise Tax Distributions To 
The Airport And Airway And Highway Trust Funds. 
GAO-20-138R. November 7, 2019.
    Financial Audit: Bureau Of The Fiscal Service's FY 2019 And 
FY 2018 Schedules Of Federal Debt. GAO-20-117. November 8, 
2019.
    Financial Audit: IRS's FY 2019 And FY 2018 Financial 
Statements. GAO-20-159. November 8, 2019.
    Data Act: Quality Of Data Submissions Has Improved But 
Further Action Is Needed To Disclose Known Data Limitations. 
GAO-20-75. November 8, 2019.
    Emergency Transportation Relief: Federal Transit 
Administration And Fema Took Actions To Coordinate, But Steps 
Are Needed To Address Risk Of Duplicate Funding. GAO-20-85. 
November 13, 2019.
    Financial Audit: Securities And Exchange Commission's FY 
2019 And FY 2018 Financial Statements. GAO-20-204R. November 
15, 2019.
    U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions Could 
Strengthen FEMA's Key Disaster Recovery Efforts. GAO-20-54. 
November 19, 2019.
    Transportation Security: DHS Should Communicate The 
National Strategy's Alignment With Related Strategies To Guide 
Federal Efforts. GAO-20-88. November 19, 2019.
    Surface Transportation: TSA Should Improve Coordination 
Procedures For Its Security Training Program. GAO-20-185. 
November 20, 2019.
    Aviation Security: TSA Coordinates With Stakeholders On 
Changes To Screening Rules But Could Clarify Its Review 
Processes And Better Measure Effectiveness. GAO-20-72. November 
20, 2019.
    Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' 
Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency And Reduce Potential 
Overlap Or Gaps In Capabilities. GAO-20-33. November 21, 2019.
    Aviation Security: TSA Should Ensure Screening Technologies 
Continue To Meet Detection Requirements After Deployment. GAO-
20-56. December 5, 2019.
    Cloud Computing Security: Agencies Increased Their Use Of 
The Federal Authorization Program, But Improved Oversight And 
Implementation Are Needed. GAO-20-126. December 12, 2019.
    Technology Modernization Fund: OMB And GSA Need To Improve 
Fee Collection And Clarify Cost Estimating Guidance For Awarded 
Projects. GAO-20-3. December 12, 2019.
    Improving Program Management: Key Actions Taken, But 
Further Efforts Needed To Strengthen Standards, Expand Reviews, 
And Address High-Risk Areas. GAO-20-44. December 13, 2019.
    U.S. Postal Service: Offering Nonpostal Services Through 
Its Delivery Network Would Likely Present Benefits And 
Limitations. GAO-20-190. December 17, 2019.
    Drug Control: The Office Of National Drug Control Policy 
Should Develop Key Planning Elements To Meet Statutory 
Requirements. GAO-20-124. December 18, 2019.
    International Mail: Progress Made In Using Electronic Data 
To Detect Illegal Opioid Shipments, But Additional Steps 
Remain. GAO-20-231RSU. December 18, 2019.
    International Mail: Progress Made In Using Electronic Data 
To Detect Illegal Opioid Shipments, But Additional Steps 
Remain. GAO-20-229R. December 18, 2019.
    Wildland Fire: Federal Agencies' Efforts To Reduce Wildland 
Fuels And Lower Risk To Communities And Ecosystems. 
GAO-20-52. December 19, 2019.
    Homeland Security Acquisitions: Outcomes Have Improved But 
Actions Needed To Enhance Oversight Of Schedule Goals. 
GAO-20-170SP. December 19, 2019.
    Federal Property: GSA Guidance Needed To Help Agencies 
Identify Unneeded Property In Warehouses. GAO-20-228. December 
20, 2019.
    2020 Census: Changes Planned To Improve Data Quality. 
GAO-20-282. December 20, 2019.
    U.S. Postal Service: Additional Guidance Needed To Assess 
Effect Of Changes To Employee Compensation. GAO-20-140. January 
17, 2020.
    U.S. Secret Service: Investigative Operations Confer 
Benefits, But Additional Actions Are Needed To Prioritize 
Resources. 
GAO-20-239. January 22, 2020.
    State Department: Additional Steps Are Needed To Identify 
Potential Barriers To Diversity. GAO-20-237. January 27, 2020.
    U.S. Ports Of Entry: Update On CBP Public-Private 
Partnership Programs. GAO-20-255R. January 30, 2020.
    DOD Financial Management: Impact Of Financial Audit 
Deficiencies On DOD's Mission Critical Assets. February 4, 
2020.
    Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery: FEMA Actions Needed To 
Strengthen Project Cost Estimation And Awareness Of Program 
Guidance. GAO-20-221. February 5, 2020.
    Briefing On Civilian Agency Suggestions For Changes In 
Statutes To Reduce Facility Energy Costs And Use. February 5, 
2020.
    Recuperacion De Desastres En Puerto Rico: Acciones De Fema 
Son Necesarias Para Fortalecer La Calculacion De Costos De 
Proyectos Y El Conocimiento De Las Directrices Del Programa. 
GAO-20-381. February 5, 2020.
    Emergency Alerting: Agencies Need To Address Pending 
Applications And Monitor Industry Progress On System 
Improvements. GAO-20-294. February 6, 2020.
    Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Has Taken 
Steps To Address Workforce Issues, But Additional Actions 
Needed. GAO-20-125. February 12, 2020.
    2020 Census: Initial Enumeration Underway But Readiness For 
Upcoming Operations Is Mixed. GAO-20-368R. February 12, 2020.
    Aviation Security: TSA Updated Screener Training To Address 
Risks, But Should Enhance Processes To Monitor Compliance. GAO-
20-219. February 13, 2020.
    Southwest Border: Actions Needed To Improve DHS Processing 
Of Families And Coordination Between DHS And HHS. GAO-20-245. 
February 19, 2020.
    National Biodefense Strategy: Additional Efforts Would 
Enhance Likelihood Of Effective Implementation. GAO-20-273. 
February 19, 2020.
    Immigration: Actions Needed To Strengthen USCIS's Oversight 
And Data Quality Of Credible And Reasonable Fear Screenings. 
GAO-20-250. February 19, 2020.
    Southwest Border: Actions Needed To Address Fragmentation 
In DHS's Processes For Apprehended Family Members. GAO-20-274. 
February 19, 2020.
    Preliminary Observations On DHS CFATS And ATF Similarities 
And Differences. February 24, 2020.
    Department Of Defense FY 2019 Audit Summary Memo. February 
27, 2020.
    International Mail: Stakeholders' Views On Possible Changes 
To Inbound Mail Regarding Customs Fees And Opioid Detection 
Efforts. GAO-20-340R. February 27, 2020.
    Financial Audit: FY 2019 Statements Of Social Insurance For 
The Consolidated Financial Statements Audit. February 27, 2020.
    Financial Audit: FY 2019 Statement Of Long-Term Fiscal 
Projections Audit. February 27, 2020.
    Financial Audit: FY 2019 And FY 2018 Consolidated Financial 
Statements Of The U.S. Government. GAO-20-315R. February 27, 
2020.
    Financial Audit: Processes Used To Prepare The U.S. 
Government's FY 2019 Financial Statements. February 27 2020.
    Data Center Optimization: Agencies Report Progress, But 
Oversight And Cybersecurity Risks Need To Be Addressed. 
GAO-20-279. March 5, 2020.
    U.S. Postal Service: Expanding Non-postal Products And 
Services At Retail Facilities Could Result In Benefits But May 
Have Limited Viability. GAO-20-354. March 10, 2020.
    2020 Census: Bureau Generally Followed Its Plan For In-
Field Address Canvassing. GAO-20-415. March 12, 2020.
    2019 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations On Lobbyists' 
Compliance With Disclosure Requirements. GAO-20-449. March 31, 
2020.
    Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The 
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls Related To The 
Schedules Of The General Fund. GAO-20-398rsu. March 31, 2020.
    Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The 
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls Related To The 
Schedules Of The General Fund. GAO-20-399r. March 31, 2020.
    Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The 
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls Related To The 
Schedule Of Federal Debt. GAO-20-375rsu. March 31, 2020.
    Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of The 
Fiscal Service's Information System Controls Related To The 
Schedule Of Federal Debt. GAO-20-376r. March 31, 2020.
    Payment Integrity: Selected Agencies Should Improve Efforts 
To Evaluate Effectiveness Of Corrective Actions To Reduce 
Improper Payments. GAO-20-336. April 1, 2020.
    Passenger Rail Security: TSA Engages With Stakeholders But 
Could Better Identify And Share Standards And Key Practices. 
GAO-20-404. April 3, 2020.
    Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The 
Internal Revenue Service's Internal Control Over Financial 
Reporting. GAO-20-480r. May 1, 2020.
    FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed To Address 
Deployment And Staff Development Challenges. GAO-20-360. May 4, 
2020.
    National Preparedness: Additional Actions Needed To Address 
Gaps In The Nation's Emergency Management Capabilities. 
GAO-20-297. May 4, 2020.
    National Flood Insurance Program: FEMA Can Improve 
Community Oversight And Data Sharing. GAO-20-396. May 5, 2020.
    U.S. Postal Service: Congressional Action Is Essential To 
Enable A Sustainable Business Model. GAO-20-385. May 7, 2020.
    DHS Service Contracts: Increased Oversight Needed To Reduce 
The Risk Associated With Contractors Performing Certain 
Functions. GAO-20-417, May 7, 2020.
    U.S. Assistance To Mexico: State Department Could Improve 
Its Monitoring Of Merida Initiative Projects. GAO-20-388. May 
12, 2020.
    2020 Census: Update On The Census Bureau's Implementation 
Of Partnership And Outreach Activities. GAO-20-496. May 13, 
2020.
    Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The 
Internal Revenue Service's Information System Security 
Controls. GAO-20-410RSU. May 13, 2020.
    Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The 
Internal Revenue Service's Information System Security 
Controls. GAO-20-411R. May 13, 2020.
    Critical Infrastructure Protection: Actions Needed To 
Enhance DHS Oversight Of Cybersecurity At High-Risk Chemical 
Facilities. GAO-20-453. May 14, 2020.
    2020 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities To Reduce 
Fragmentation, Overlap, And Duplication And Achieve Billions In 
Financial Benefits. GAO-20-440SP. May 19, 2020.
    Congressional Award Foundation: Review Of The Audit Of The 
Financial Statements For Fiscal Year 2019. GAO-20-539R. May 21, 
2020.
    Cybersecurity: Selected Federal Agencies Need To Coordinate 
On Requirements And Assessments Of States. GAO-20-123. May 27, 
2020.
    Department Of Homeland Security: Assessment Of Air And 
Marine Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs 
Across All DHS Marine Operations. GAO-20-420SU. May 27, 2020.
    Whistleblowers: Office Of Special Counsel Should Require 
Information On The Probationary Status Of Whistleblowers. GAO-
20-436. May 28, 2020.
    2020 Census: COVID-19 Presents Delays And Risks To Census 
Count. GAO-20-551R. June 9, 2020.
    June 2020--2020 Census Briefing. June 10, 2020.
    Air Force: Enhanced Enterprise Risk Management And Internal 
Control Assessments Could Improve Accountability Over Mission-
Critical Assets. GAO-20-332. June 18, 2020.
    USAID: Mixed Progress In Increasing Diversity, And Actions 
Needed To Consistently Meet EEO Requirements. GAO-20-477. June 
23, 2020.
    COVID-19: Opportunities To Improve Federal Response And 
Recovery Efforts. GAO-20-625. June 25, 2020.
    COVID-19: Opportunities To Improve Federal Response And 
Recovery Efforts. GAO-20-659T. June 26, 2020.
    DATA ACT: OIGs Reported That Quality Of Agency-Submitted 
Data Varied, And Most Recommended Improvements. GAO-20-540. 
July 9, 2020
    National Bio And Agro-Defense Facility: DHS And USDA Are 
Working To Transfer Ownership And Prepare For Operations, But 
Critical Steps Remain. GAO-20-331. July 10, 2020.
    Medicaid: Primer On Financing Arrangements. GAO-20-571R. 
July 14, 2020.
    Surface Transportation Security: TSA Has Taken Steps To 
Improve Its Surface Inspector Program, But Lacks Performance 
Targets. GAO-20-558. July 27, 2020.
    COVID-19 Contracting: Observations On Federal Contracting 
In Response To The Pandemic. GAO-20-632. July 29, 2020.
    COVID-19: Data Quality And Considerations For Modeling And 
Analysis. GAO-20-635SP. July 30, 2020.
    Federal Financial Management: Substantial Progress Made 
Since Enactment Of The 1990 CFO Act; Refinements Would Yield 
Added Benefits. GAO-20-566. August 6, 2020.
    Cybersecurity: DHS And Selected Agencies Need To Address 
Shortcomings In Implementation Of Network Monitoring Program. 
GAO-20-598. August 18, 2020.
    Management Report: Improvements Needed In Controls Over The 
Processes Used To Prepare The U.S. Consolidated Financial 
Statements. GAO-20-586. August 25, 2020.
    2020 Census: Recent Decision To Compress Census Timeframes 
Poses Additional Risks To An Accurate Count. GAO-20-671R. 
August 27, 2020.
    Time And Attendance: Agencies Generally Compiled Data On 
Misconduct, And Reported Using Various Internal Controls For 
Monitoring. GAO-20-640. August 31, 2020.
    COVID-19: Brief Update On Initial Federal Response To The 
Pandemic. GAO-20-708. August 31, 2020.
    Facial Recognition: CBP And TSA Are Taking Steps To 
Implement Programs, But CBP Should Address Privacy And System 
Performance Issues. GAO-20-568. September 2, 2020.
    COVID-19 Contracting: Observations On Contractor Paid Leave 
Reimbursement Guidance And Use. GAO-20-662. September 3, 2020.
    VA Police: Actions Needed To Improve Data Completeness And 
Accuracy On Use Of Force Incidents At Medical Centers. GAO-20-
599. September 8, 2020.
    Defense Real Property: DOD-Wide Strategy Needed To Address 
Control Issues And Improve Reliability Of Records. GAO-20-615. 
September 9, 2020.
    Natural Disasters: Economic Effects Of Hurricanes Katrina, 
Sandy, Harvey, And Irma. GAO-20-633r. September 10, 2020.
    Senior Executive Service: Opportunities For Selected 
Agencies To Improve Their Career Reassignment Processes. GAO-
20-559. September 16, 2020.
    Agriculture Spending: Opportunities Exist For USDA To 
Identify Successes And Challenges Of The Farmers To Families 
Food Box Program To Inform Future Efforts. GAO-20-711r. 
September 16, 2020.
    Critical Infrastructure Prioritization During COVID-19. 
September 17, 2020.
    COVID-19: Federal Efforts Could Be Strengthened By Timely 
And Concerted Actions. GAO-20-701. September 21, 2020.
    Cybersecurity: Clarity Of Leadership Urgently Needed To 
Fully Implement The National Strategy. GAO-20-629. September 
22, 2020.
    Department Of Homeland Security: Assessment Of Air And 
Marine Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs 
Across All DHS Marine Operations. GAO-20-663. September 24, 
2020.
    Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take Additional Actions To 
Strengthen Fraud Risk Management For Public Assistance 
Emergency Work Grants. GAO-20-604. September 29, 2020.
    Disaster Assistance: Additional Actions Needed To 
Strengthen FEMA'S Individuals And Households Program. GAO-20-
503. September 30, 2020.
    Supplemental Material For GAO-20-503: FEMA Individuals And 
Households Program Applicant Data 2016-2018. GAO-20-675sp. 
September 30, 2020.
    Supplemental Material For GAO-20-503: Select Disaster 
Profiles For FEMA's Individuals And Households Program 2016-
2018. GAO-20-674sp. September 30, 2020.
    Open Data: Agencies Need Guidance To Establish 
Comprehensive Data Inventories; Information On Their Progress 
Is Limited. GAO-21-29. October 8, 2020.
    DOD Financial Management: Continued Efforts Needed To 
Correct Material Weaknesses Identified In Financial Statement 
Audits. GAO-21-157. October 13, 2020.
    Information And Communications Technology: Federal Agencies 
Need To Take Urgent Action To Manage Supply Chain Risks (Louo). 
GAO-21-164su. October 27, 2020.
    Ongoing Cybersecurity Risks To The 2020 Census (No Slides). 
October 29, 2020.
    TSA Acquisitions: TSA Needs To Establish Metrics And 
Evaluate Third Party Testing Outcomes For Screening 
Technologies. GAO-21-50. October 29, 2020.
    FY 2020 Excise Tax: Agreed-Upon Procedures Related To 
Distributions To Trust Funds. GAO-21-163R. November 6, 2020.
    Financial Audit: Bureau Of The Fiscal Service's FY 2020 And 
FY 2019 Schedules Of Federal Debt. GAO-21-124. November 9, 
2020.
    Financial Audit: IRS's FY 2020 And FY 2019 Financial 
Statements. GAO-21-162. November 10, 2020.
    Financial Audit: Securities And Exchange Commission's FY 
2020 And FY6 2019 Financial Statements. GAO-21-192R. November 
16, 2020.
    U.S. Assistance To Mexico: State And USAID Should 
Strengthen Risk Management For Programs Under The Merida 
Initiative. GAO-21-112SU. November 17, 2020.
    Puerto Rico Electricity: FEMA And HUD Have Not Approved 
Long-Term Projects And Need To Implement Recommendations To 
Address Uncertainties And Enhance Resilience. GAO-21-54. 
November 17, 2020.
    COVID-19: Federal Efforts Accelerate Vaccine And 
Therapeutic Development, But More Transparency Needed On 
Emergency Use Authorizations. GAO-21-207. November 17, 2020.
    Distance Learning: Challenges Providing Services To K-12 
English Learners And Students With Disabilities During COVID-
19. GAO-21-43. November 19, 2020.
    Defense Production Act: Opportunities Exist To Increase 
Transparency And Identify Future Actions To Mitigate Medical 
Supply Chain Issues. GAO-21-108. November 19, 2020.
    Disaster Response: Agencies Should Assess Contracting 
Workforce Needs And Purchase Card Fraud Risk. GAO-21-42. 
November 24, 2020.
    Federal Buying Power: OMB Can Further Advance Category 
Management Initiative By Focusing On Requirements, Data, And 
Training. GAO-21-40. November 30, 2020.
    COVID-19: Urgent Actions Needed To Better Ensure An 
Effective Federal Response. GAO-21-191. November 30, 2020.
    Medicaid: CMS Needs More Information On States' Financing 
And Payment Arrangements To Improve Oversight. GAO-21-98. 
December 7, 2020.
    2020 Census: The Bureau Concluded Field Work But 
Uncertainty About Data Quality, Accuracy, And Protection 
Remains. GAO-21-206R. December 9, 2020.
    Financial Assistance: Lessons Learned From Cares Act Loan 
Program For Aviation And Other Eligible Businesses. GAO-21-198. 
December 10, 2020.
    Ongoing Monitoring Of It Systems Implementation For The 
2020 Census (No Slides). December 14, 2020.
    Disaster Housing: Improved Cost Data And Guidance Would Aid 
FEMA Activation Decisions. GAO-21-116. December 15, 2020.
    Information Technology: Federal Agencies Need To Take 
Urgent Action To Manage Supply Chain Risks (Public). GAO-21-
171. December 15, 2020.
    Data Governance: Agencies Made Progress In Establishing 
Governance, But Need To Address Key Milestones. GAO-21-152. 
December 16, 2020.
    Rural Hospital Closures: Affected Residents Had Reduced 
Access To Health Care Services. GAO-21-93. December 22, 2020.

                      VI. OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS

    During the 116th Congress, 774 official communications were 
referred to the Committee. Of these, 760 were Executive 
Communications, and 14 were Petitions or Memorials. Of the 
official communications, 316 dealt with the District of 
Columbia.

                        VII. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS

    During the 116th Congress, the Committee reported 
significant legislation that was approved by Congress and 
signed by the President.
    The following are brief legislative histories of measures 
to the Committee and, in some cases, drafted by the Committee, 
which (1) became public law or (2) were favorable reported from 
the Committee and passed by the Senate, but did not become law. 
In addition to the measures listed below, the Committee 
received during the 116th Congress numerous legislative 
proposals that were not considered or reported, or that were 
reported but not passed by the Senate. Additional information 
on these measures appears in the Committee's Legislative 
Calendar for the 116th Congress.

                      A. MEASURES ENACTED INTO LAW

    The following measures considered by the Committee were 
enacted into Public Law. The descriptions following the signing 
date of each measure note selected provisions of the text, and 
are not intended to serve as section-by-section summaries.
    H.R. 639.--To amend section 327 of the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to clarify that 
National Urban Search and Rescue Response System task forces 
may include Federal employees. (Public Law 116-48). August 22, 
2019.
    This bill amends the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act to specify that National Urban Search 
and Rescue Response System task forces may include Federal 
employees.
    H.R.1079.--Creating Advanced Streamlined Electronic 
Services for Constituents Act of 2019. (Public Law 116-50). 
August 22, 2019.
    This bill directs the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
to require each Federal agency to accept electronic identity 
proofing and authentication processes that allow an individual, 
under the Privacy Act, to access the individual's records or to 
provide prior written consent for the disclosure of the 
individual's records. The OMB must (1) create a template for 
electronic consent and access forms, and (2) require each 
agency to accept such forms from any individual properly 
identity proofed and authenticated.
    H.R.1590.--Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Exercise 
Act of 2019. (Public Law 116-64). October 9, 2019.
    This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security to 
develop and conduct an exercise related to the detection and 
prevention of terrorist and foreign fighter travel. The bill 
requires the national exercise program (a program to test and 
evaluate the national preparedness goal, National Incident 
Management System, National Response Plan, and other related 
plans and strategies) to include emerging threats.
    H.R.150.--Grant Reporting Efficiency and Agreements 
Transparency Act of 2019. (Public Law 116-103). December 30 
2019.
    This bill requires the establishment and use of data 
standards for information reported by recipients of Federal 
grants. The bill requires the Office of Management and Budget, 
jointly with the executive department that issues the most 
Federal grant awards, to (1) establish government-wide data 
standards for information reported by grant recipients, (2) 
issue guidance directing Federal agencies to apply those 
standards, and (3) require the publication of recipient-
reported data collected from all agencies on a single public 
website. Each agency shall ensure its awards use the data 
standards for future information collection requests.
    H.R.2476.--Securing American Nonprofit Organizations 
Against Terrorism Act of 2019. (Public Law 116-108). January 
24, 2020.
    This bill establishes in the Department of Homeland 
Security a Nonprofit Security Grant Program, under which the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shall make grants to 
eligible nonprofit organizations (tax-exempt organizations and 
those determined to be at risk of a terrorist attack) for 
target hardening and other security enhancements to protect 
against terrorist attacks.
    H.R.504.--DHS Field Engagement Accountability Act. (Public 
Law 116-116). March 2, 2020.
    This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) to develop and update at least once every five years a 
strategy for DHS engagement with fusion centers. The term 
``fusion center'' means a collaborative effort of two or more 
government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or 
information to maximize the ability of such agencies to detect, 
prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or 
terrorist activity. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of 
DHS shall provide personnel and support to fusion centers, 
publish performance metrics for DHS field personnel assigned to 
fusion centers, and develop and implement training for fusion 
center personnel. DHS intelligence and information components 
shall develop policies and metrics to ensure effective use of 
the unclassified Homeland Security Information Sharing Network 
and shall assess and implement enhancements to improve such 
network.
    S.375.--Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019. (Public 
Law 116-117). March 2, 2020.
    This bill reorganizes and revises several existing improper 
payments statutes, which establish requirements for Federal 
agencies to cut down on improper payments made by the Federal 
Government. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) may 
establish one or more pilot programs to test potential 
accountability mechanisms for compliance with requirements 
regarding improper payments and the elimination of improper 
payments. The bill requires the OMB to update its plan for 
improving the death data maintained by the Social Security 
Administration and improving Federal agency use of death data. 
The bill establishes an interagency working group on payment 
integrity.
    S.394.--Presidential Transition Enhancement Act of 2019. 
(Public Law 116-121). March 3, 2020.
    This bill makes changes intended to smooth the transfer of 
executive power during presidential transitions. The bill 
provides for the detailing of legislative branch employees on a 
reimbursable basis to office staffs designated by the 
President-elect or Vice President-elect with the consent of the 
supervising Member of Congress. The bill extends support 
provided by the General Services Administration (GSA) to the 
President- and Vice President-elect for up to 60 days after the 
inauguration. By September 1 of a year during which a 
presidential election occurs, the GSA shall enter into a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with each eligible candidate, 
which shall include the conditions for administrative support 
services and facilities. To the maximum extent practicable, an 
MOU shall be based on MOUs relating to previous presidential 
transitions. Each MOU shall include an agreement that the 
eligible candidate will implement and enforce an ethics plan to 
guide the conduct of the transition beginning on the date on 
which such candidate becomes President-elect. The plan shall be 
published on the GSA website. By September 15 of a year during 
which a presidential election occurs, each agency shall ensure 
that a succession plan is in place for each senior non-career 
position in the agency.
    S.2107.--Protecting America's Food and Agriculture Act of 
2019. (Public Law 116-122). March 3, 2020.
    This bill authorizes U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), every fiscal year, to hire, train, and assign 240 new 
agricultural specialists until the total number of specialists 
equals and sustains the requirements identified each year in 
the Agriculture Resource Allocation Model. The CBP may also 
hire, train, and assign support staff to assist the specialists 
and specified levels of agricultural canine teams. In 
calculating the number of specialists needed at each port of 
entry through the Agriculture Resource Allocation Model, the 
Office of Field Operations of the CBP must (1) rely on data 
collected regarding the inspections and other activities 
conducted at each such port of entry; and (2) consider volume 
from seasonal surges, other projected changes in commercial and 
passenger volumes, the most current commercial forecasts, and 
other relevant information. The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) must conduct a review of the efforts of the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Agriculture, 
and other Federal agencies to address risks to the agricultural 
supply. The GAO must analyze (1) interagency coordination and 
the distribution of responsibilities among Federal agencies 
with respect to the inspection of agricultural commodities 
entering the United States; (2) the effectiveness of such 
inspection responsibilities among Federal agencies; and (3) the 
training provided to, and working conditions of, CBP 
Agriculture Specialists.
    S. 2193.--CHARGE Act. (Public Law 116-160). October 1, 
2020.
    This bill requires the General Services Administration to 
issue (1) guidance to clarify that Federal agencies may use a 
charge card to pay to charge Federal electric motor vehicles at 
commercial charging stations, and (2) a charge card for such 
payments to each agency for each of the agency's electric motor 
vehicles.
    H.R.4761.--DHS Opioid Detection Resilience Act of 2019. 
(Public Law 116-254). December 23, 2020.
    This bill establishes new requirements related to the 
detection of illicit narcotics at ports of entry. Specifically, 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) must implement a 
strategy to ensure chemical screening devices are able to 
identify narcotics at purity levels equal to or less than 10 
percent, or provide an alternate method for identifying 
narcotics at lower purity levels. The CBP must also test new 
chemical screening devices at various purity levels before it 
commits to their acquisition. Additionally, the Department of 
Homeland Security must implement a plan for the long-term 
development of a centralized spectral database for chemical 
screening devices.
    S. 979.--Federal Advance Contracts Enhancement Act (FACE) 
Act. (Public Law 116-272). December 31, 2020.
    This bill directs the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) to report to Congress on advance contracts. Advance 
contracts are established prior to disasters to provide life-
sustaining goods and services in the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster. The report must include (1) information required in 
the initial report on recurring disaster response requirements; 
and (2) an updated strategy that defines the objectives of 
advance contracts, how such contracts contribute to FEMA 
disaster response operations, how to maximize the award of 
advance contracts to small business concerns, and whether and 
how such contracts should be prioritized in relation to new 
post-disaster contract awards. The bill sets forth additional 
duties of FEMA with respect to advance contracts, including 
requiring FEMA to (1) update and implement guidance for its 
program office and acquisition personnel to identify 
acquisition planning time frames and considerations across the 
entire acquisition planning process, and (2) communicate the 
purpose and use of a master acquisition planning schedule.
    S.1869.--Secure Federal Leases from Espionage and 
Suspicious Entanglements (LEASEs) Act. (Public Law 116-276). 
December 31, 2020
    (Sec. 3) This bill instructs the General Services 
Administration (GSA), the Architect of the Capitol, or any 
Federal agency (other than the Department of Defense and the 
intelligence community) that has independent statutory leasing 
authority (Federal lessee), before entering into a lease 
agreement or approving a novation agreement with an entity 
involving a change of ownership under a lease that will be used 
for high-security leased space, to require the entity to 
identify the immediate or highest-level owner of the space and 
disclose whether that owner is a foreign person or entity, 
including the country associated with the ownership entity. A 
Federal lessee shall require the entity to (1) provide such 
identification and disclosure when first submitting a proposal 
in response to a solicitation for offers issued by the Federal 
lessee; and (2) update such information annually, including the 
list of the immediate or highest-level owners of that entity or 
the information required to be provided related to each such 
owner. (Sec. 4) The GSA shall develop a government-wide plan 
for identifying all immediate, highest-level, or beneficial 
owners of high-security leased spaces before entering into a 
lease agreement to accommodate a Federal tenant. (Sec. 5) The 
bill provides a rule for language in a lease agreement 
(concerning restriction of access to high-security space) 
between a Federal lessee and an entity to accommodate an agency 
in a building or improvement used for high-security leased 
space.
    S.3418.--Safeguarding Tomorrow through Ongoing Risk 
Mitigation (STORM) Act. (Public Law 116-284). January 1, 2021.
    This bill authorizes the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) to enter into agreements with any state or Indian 
tribal government to make capitalization grants for the 
establishment of hazard mitigation revolving loan funds. Such 
funds shall provide funding assistance to local governments to 
carry out projects to reduce disaster risk in order to decrease 
the loss of life and property, the cost of insurance claims, 
and Federal disaster payments. FEMA shall not be liable for any 
claim based on the exercise or performance of, or the failure 
to exercise or perform, a discretionary function or duty by 
FEMA or by a FEMA employee in carrying out this bill.
    H.R.5273.--Securing America's Ports Act. (Public Law 116-
299). January 5, 2021.
    This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) to report to Congress a plan to expeditiously scan all 
commercial and passenger vehicles entering the United States at 
a land port of entry using large-scale non-intrusive inspection 
systems, such as X-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems, or 
similar technology. The plan shall include elements such as (1) 
an inventory of such systems currently in use, (2) the 
estimated costs of achieving a 100 percent scanning rate, and 
(3) the anticipated impact that increasing the scanning rate 
will have on wait times at land ports of entry. DHS shall 
periodically report to Congress on the progress in implementing 
the plan. DHS shall also research and develop technology 
enhancements to inspection areas at land ports of entry.

                         B. POSTAL NAMING BILLS

    H.R. 540--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 770 Ayrault Road in Fairport, New 
York, as the ``Louise and Bob Slaughter Post Office''. (Public 
Law 116-42). August 21, 2019.
    H.R. 828--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 25 Route 111 in Smithtown, New York, 
as the ``Congressman Bill Carney Post Office''. (Public Law 
116-43). August 21 2019.
    H.R. 829--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 1450 Montauk Highway in Mastic, New 
York, as the ``Army Specialist Thomas J. Wilwerth Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-44). August 21, 2019.
    H.R. 1198--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 404 South Boulder Highway in 
Henderson, Nevada, as the ``Henderson Veterans Memorial Post 
Office Building''. (Public Law 116-45). August 21, 2019.
    H.R. 1449--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 3033 203rd Street in Olympia Fields, 
Illinois, as the ``Captain Robert L. Martin Post Office''. 
(Public Law 116-46). August 21, 2019.
    H.R. 3305--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 2509 George Mason Drive in Virginia 
Beach, Virginia, as the ``Ryan Keith Cox Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-47). August 21, 2019.
    H.R. 1250--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 11158 Highway 146 North in Hardin, 
Texas, as the ``Lucas Lowe Memorial Post Office''. (Public Law 
116-55). August 23, 2019.
    S. 1196--A bill to designate the facility of the United 
States Postal Service located at 1715 Linnerud Drive in Sun 
Prairie, Wisconsin, as the ``Fire Captain Cory Barr Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-66). October 31, 2019.
    H.R. 887--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 877 East 1200 South in Orem, Utah, as 
the ``Jerry C. Washburn Post Office Building''. (Public Law 
116-79). December 12, 2019.
    H.R. 1252--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 6531 Van Nuys Boulevard in Van Nuys, 
California, as the ``Marilyn Monroe Post Office''. (Public Law 
116-80). December 12, 2019.
    H.R. 1253--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 13507 Van Nuys Boulevard in Pacoima, 
California, as the ``Ritchie Valens Post Office Building''. 
(Public Law 116-81). December 12, 2019.
    H.R. 1526--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 200 Israel Road Southeast in 
Tumwater, Washington, as the ``Eva G. Hewitt Post Office''. 
(Public Law 116-82). December 12, 2019.
    H.R. 1844--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 66 Grove Court in Elgin, Illinois, as 
the ``Corporal Alex Martinez Memorial Post Office Building''. 
(Public Law 116-83). December 12, 2019.
    H.R. 1972--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 1100 West Kent Avenue in Missoula, 
Montana, as the ``Jeannette Rankin Post Office Building''. 
(Public Law 116-84). December 13, 2019.
    H.R. 2151--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 7722 South Main Street in Pine 
Plains, New York, as the ``Senior Chief Petty Officer Shannon 
M. Kent Post Office''. (Public Law 116-85). December 13, 2019.
    H.R. 2325--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 100 Calle Alondra in San Juan, Puerto 
Rico, as the ``65th Infantry Regiment Post Office Building''. 
(Public Law 116-86). December 13, 2019.
    H.R. 3144--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 8520 Michigan Avenue in Whittier, 
California, as the ``Jose Ramos Post Office Building''. (Public 
Law 116-89). December 13, 2019.
    H.R. 3314--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 1750 McCulloch Boulevard North in 
Lake Havasu City, Arizona, as the ``Lake Havasu City Combat 
Veterans Memorial Post Office Building''. (Public Law 116-90). 
December 13, 2019.
    H.R. 1833--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 35 Tulip Avenue in Floral Park, New 
York, as the ``Lieutenant Michael R. Davidson Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-196). December 3, 2020.
    H.R. 3207--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 114 Mill Street in Hookstown, 
Pennsylvania, as the ``Staff Sergeant Dylan Elchin Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-197). December 3, 2020.
    H.R. 3317--To permit the Scipio A. Jones Post Office in 
Little Rock, Arkansas, to accept and display a portrait of 
Scipio A. Jones, and for other purposes. (Public Law 116-198). 
December 3, 2020.
    H.R. 3329--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 5186 Benito Street in Montclair, 
California, as the ``Paul Eaton Post Office Building''. (Public 
Law 116-199). December 3, 2020.
    H.R. 4794--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 8320 13th Avenue in Brooklyn, New 
York, as the ``Mother Frances Xavier Cabrini Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-201). December 3, 2020.
    H.R. 4981--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 2505 Derita Avenue in Charlotte, 
North Carolina, as the ``Julius L. Chambers Civil Rights 
Memorial Post Office''. (Public Law 116-202). December 3, 2020.
    H.R. 5037--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 3703 North Main Street in Farmville, 
North Carolina, as the ``Walter B. Jones, Jr. Post Office''. 
(Public Law 116-203). December 3, 2020.
    H.R. 4975--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 1201 Sycamore Square Drive in 
Midlothian, Virginia, as the ``Dorothy Braden Bruce Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-218). December 17, 2020.
    H.R. 5062--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 9930 Conroy Windermere Road in 
Windermere, Florida, as the ``Officer Robert German Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-219). December 17, 2020.
    H.R. 5307--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 115 Nicol Avenue in Thomasville, 
Alabama, as the ``Postmaster Robert Ingram Post Office''. 
(Public Law 116-220). December 17, 2020.
    H.R. 2246--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 201 West Cherokee Street in 
Brookhaven, Mississippi, as the ``Deputy Donald William Durr, 
Corporal Zach Moak, and Patrolman James White Memorial Post 
Office Building''. (Public Law 116-227). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 2454--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 123 East Sharpfish Street in Rosebud, 
South Dakota, as the ``Ben Reifel Post Office Building''. 
(Public Law 116-228). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 2969--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 1401 1st Street North in Winter 
Haven, Florida, as the ``Althea Margaret Daily Mills Post 
Office Building''. (Public Law 116-229). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 3005--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 13308 Midland Road in Poway, 
California, as the ``Ray Chavez Post Office Building''. (Public 
Law 116-230). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 3275--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 340 Wetmore Avenue in Grand River, 
Ohio, as the ``Lance Corporal Andy 'Ace' Nowacki Post Office''. 
(Public Law 116-231). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 3680--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 415 North Main Street in Henning, 
Tennessee, as the ``Paula Croom Robinson and Judy Spray 
Memorial Post Office Building''. (Public Law 116-232) December 
21, 2020.
    H.R. 3847--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 117 West Poythress Street in 
Hopewell, Virginia, as the ``Reverend Curtis West Harris Post 
Office Building''. (Public Law 116-233). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 3870--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 511 West 165th Street in New York, 
New York, as the ``Normandia Maldonado Post Office Building''. 
(Public Law 116-234). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 4034--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 602 Pacific Avenue in Bremerton, 
Washington, as the ``John Henry Turpin Post Office Building''. 
(Public Law 116-235). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 4200--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 321 South 1st Street in Montrose, 
Colorado, as the ``Sergeant David Kinterknecht Post Office''. 
(Public Law 116-236). December 21 2020.
    H.R. 4279--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 445 Main Street in Laceyville, 
Pennsylvania, as the ``Melinda Gene Piccotti Post Office''. 
(Public Law 116-237). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 4672--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 21701 Stevens Creek Boulevard in 
Cupertino, California, as the ``Petty Officer 2nd Class (SEAL) 
Matthew G. Axelson Post Office Building''. (Public Law 116-
238). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 4725--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 8585 Criterion Drive in Colorado 
Springs, Colorado, as the ``Chaplain (Capt.) Dale Goetz 
Memorial Post Office Building''. (Public Law 116-239). December 
21, 2020.
    H.R. 4785--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 1305 U.S. Highway 90 West in 
Castroville, Texas, as the ``Lance Corporal Rhonald Dain 
Rairdan Post Office''. (Public Law 116-240). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 4875--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 2201 E. Maple Street in North Canton, 
Ohio, as the ``Lance Cpl. Stacy 'Annie' Dryden Post Office''. 
(Public Law 116-241). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 4971--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 15 East Market Street in Leesburg, 
Virginia, as the ``Norman Duncan Post Office Building''. 
(Public Law 116-242). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 5317--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 315 Addicks Howell Road in Houston, 
Texas, as the ``Deputy Sandeep Singh Dhaliwal Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-243). December 21, 2020.
    H.R. 5954--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 108 West Maple Street in Holly, 
Michigan, as the ``Holly Veterans Memorial Post Office''. 
(Public Law 116-244). December 21, 2020.
    S. 3257--A bill to designate the facility of the United 
States Postal Service located at 311 West Wisconsin Avenue in 
Tomahawk, Wisconsin, as the ``Einar 'Sarge' H. Ingman, Jr. Post 
Office Building''. (Public Law 116-264). December 30, 2020.
    S. 3461--A bill to designate the facility of the United 
States Postal Service located at 2600 Wesley Street in 
Greenville, Texas, as the ``Audie Murphy Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-265). December 30, 2020.
    S. 3462--A bill to designate the facility of the United 
States Postal Service located at 909 West Holiday Drive in 
Fate, Texas, as the ``Ralph Hall Post Office''. (Public Law 
116-266). December 30, 2020.
    S. 4126--A bill to designate the facility of the United 
States Postal Service located at 104 East Main Street in Port 
Washington, Wisconsin, as the ``Joseph G. Demler Post Office''. 
(Public Law 116-267). December 30, 2020.
    S. 4684--A bill to designate the facility of the United 
States Postal Service located at 440 Arapahoe Street in 
Thermopolis, Wyoming, as the ``Robert L. Brown Post Office''. 
(Public Law 116-268). December 30, 2020.
    H.R. 3976--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 12711 East Jefferson Avenue in 
Detroit, Michigan, as the ``Aretha Franklin Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-293). January 5, 2021.
    H.R. 4988--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 14 Walnut Street in Bordentown, New 
Jersey, as the ``Clara Barton Post Office Building''. (Public 
Law 116-296). January 5, 2021.
    H.R. 5123--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 476 East Main Street in Galesburg, 
Illinois, as the ``Senior Airman Daniel Miller Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-298). January 5, 2021.
    H.R. 5451--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 599 East Genesse Street in 
Fayetteville, New York, as the ``George H. Bacel Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-300). January 5, 2021.
    H.R. 5597--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 305 Northwest 5th Street in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, as the ``Clara Luper Post Office Building''. 
(Public Law 116-303). January 5, 2021.
    H.R. 5972--Mary Ann Shadd Cary Post Office Dedication Act. 
(Public Law 116-306). January 5, 2021.
    H.R. 5983--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 4150 Chicago Avenue in Riverside, 
California, as the ``Woodie Rucker-Hughes Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-307). January 5, 2021.
    H.R. 6161--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 1585 Yanceyville Street, Greensboro, 
North Carolina, as the ``J. Howard Coble Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-310). January 5, 2021.
    H.R. 6418--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 509 Fairhope Avenue in Fairhope, 
Alabama, as the ``William 'Jack' Jackson Edwards III Post 
Office Building''. (Public Law 116-312). January 5, 2021.
    H.R. 7088--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 111 James Street in Reidsville, 
Georgia, as the ``Senator Jack Hill Post Office Building''. 
(Public Law 116-314). January 5, 2021.
    H.R. 7502--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 101 South 16th Street in Clarinda, 
Iowa, as the ``Jessie Field Shambaugh Post Office Building''. 
(Public Law 116-319). January 5, 2021.
    H.R. 7810--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 3519 East Walnut Street in Pearland, 
Texas, as the ``Tom Reid Post Office Building''. (Public Law 
116-320). January 5, 2021.
    H.R. 8611--To designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 4755 Southeast Dixie Highway in Port 
Salerno, Florida, as the ``Joseph Bullock Post Office 
Building''. (Public Law 116-322). January 5, 2021.
                 VIII. ACTIVITIES OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES


                PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS


                        Chairman: Robert Portman


               Ranking Minority Member: Thomas R. Carper

    The following is the Activities Report of the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations for the 116th Congress.

                        I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND


                      A. Subcommittee Jurisdiction

    The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations was originally 
authorized by Senate Resolution 189 on January 28, 1948. At its 
creation in 1948, the Subcommittee was part of the Committee on 
Expenditures in the Executive Departments. The Subcommittee's 
records and broad investigative jurisdiction over government 
operations and national security issues, however, actually 
antedate its creation, since it was given custody of the 
jurisdiction of the former Special Committee to Investigate the 
National Defense Program (the so-called ``War Investigating 
Committee'' or ``Truman Committee''), chaired by Senator Harry 
S. Truman during the Second World War and charged with exposing 
waste, fraud, and abuse in the war effort and war profiteering. 
Today, the Subcommittee is part of the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\In 1952, the parent committee's name was changed to the 
Committee on Government Operations. It was changed again in early 1977, 
to the Committee on Governmental Affairs, and again in 2005, to the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, its present 
title.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Subcommittee has had eleven chairmen: Senators Homer 
Ferguson of Michigan (1948), Clyde R. Hoey of North Carolina 
(1949-1952), Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin (1953-1954), John 
L. McClellan of Arkansas (1955-1972), Henry M. Jackson of 
Washington (1973-1978), Sam Nunn of Georgia (1979-1980 
and 1987-1994), William V. Roth of Delaware (1981-1986 and 
1995-1996), Susan M. Collins of Maine (1997-2001); Norman B. 
Coleman of Minnesota (2003-2007); Carl Levin of Michigan (2001-
2002 and 2007-2014); and Robert J. Portman of Ohio (2015-
present).
    Until 1957, the Subcommittee's jurisdiction focused 
principally on waste, inefficiency, impropriety, and illegality 
in government operations. Its jurisdiction then expanded over 
time, today encompassing investigations within the broad ambit 
of the parent committee's responsibility for matters relating 
to the efficiency and economy of operations of all branches of 
the government, including matters related to: (a) waste, fraud, 
abuse, malfeasance, and unethical practices in government 
contracting and operations; (b) organized criminal activities 
affecting interstate or international commerce; (c) criminal 
activity affecting the national health, welfare, or safety, 
including investment fraud, commodity and securities fraud, 
computer fraud, and offshore abuses; (d) criminality or 
improper practices in labor-management relations; (e) the 
effectiveness of present national security methods, staffing 
and procedures, and U.S. relationships with international 
organizations concerned with national security; (f) energy 
shortages, energy pricing, management of government-owned or 
controlled energy supplies; and relationships with oil 
producing and consuming countries; and (g) the operations and 
management of Federal regulatory policies and programs. While 
retaining the status of a subcommittee of a standing committee, 
the Subcommittee has long exercised its authority on an 
independent basis, selecting its own staff, issuing its own 
subpoenas, and determining its own investigatory agenda.
    The Subcommittee acquired its sweeping jurisdiction in 
several successive stages. In 1957--based on information 
developed by the Subcommittee--the Senate passed a Resolution 
establishing a Select Committee on Improper Activities in the 
Labor or Management Field. Chaired by Senator McClellan, who 
also chaired the Subcommittee at that time, the Select 
Committee was composed of eight Senators--four of whom were 
drawn from the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and 
four from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. The Select 
Committee operated for 3 years, sharing office space, 
personnel, and other facilities with the Permanent 
Subcommittee. Upon its expiration in early 1960, the Select 
Committee's jurisdiction and files were transferred to the 
Permanent Subcommittee, greatly enlarging the latter body's 
investigative authority in the labor-management area.
    The Subcommittee's jurisdiction expanded further during the 
1960s and 1970s. In 1961, for example, it received authority to 
make inquiries into matters pertaining to organized crime and, 
in 1963, held the famous Valachi hearings examining the inner 
workings of the Italian Mafia. In 1967, following a summer of 
riots and other civil disturbances, the Senate approved a 
Resolution directing the Subcommittee to investigate the causes 
of this disorder and to recommend corrective action. In January 
1973, the Subcommittee acquired its national security mandate 
when it merged with the National Security Subcommittee. With 
this merger, the Subcommittee's jurisdiction was broadened to 
include inquiries concerning the adequacy of national security 
staffing and procedures, relations with international 
organizations, technology transfer issues, and related matters. 
In 1974, in reaction to the gasoline shortages precipitated by 
the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, the Subcommittee acquired 
jurisdiction to investigate the control and management of 
energy resources and supplies as well as energy pricing issues.
    In 1997, the full Committee on Governmental Affairs was 
charged by the Senate to conduct a special examination into 
illegal or improper activities in connection with Federal 
election campaigns during the 1996 election cycle. The 
Permanent Subcommittee provided substantial resources and 
assistance to this investigation, contributing to a greater 
public understanding of what happened, to subsequent criminal 
and civil legal actions taken against wrongdoers, and to 
enactment of campaign finance reforms in 2001.
    In 1998, the Subcommittee marked the fiftieth anniversary 
of the Truman Committee's conversion into a permanent 
subcommittee of the U.S. Senate.\2\ Since then, the 
Subcommittee has developed particular expertise in complex 
financial matters, examining the collapse of Enron Corporation 
in 2001, the key causes of the 2008 financial crisis, 
structured finance abuses, financial fraud, unfair credit 
practices, money laundering, commodity speculation, and a wide 
range of offshore and tax haven abuses. It has also focused on 
issues involving health care fraud, foreign corruption, and 
waste, fraud and abuse in government programs. In the half-
century of its existence, the Subcommittee's many successful 
investigations have made clear to the Senate the importance of 
retaining a standing investigatory body devoted to keeping 
government not only efficient and effective, but also honest 
and accountable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\This anniversary also marked the first date upon which internal 
Subcommittee records generally began to become available to the public. 
Unlike most standing committees of the Senate whose previously 
unpublished records open after a period of 20 years has elapsed, the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, as an investigatory body, may 
close its records for 50 years to protect personal privacy and the 
integrity of the investigatory process. With this 50th anniversary, the 
Subcommittee's earliest records, housed in the Center for Legislative 
Archives at the National Archives and Records Administration, began to 
open seriatim. The records of the predecessor committee--the Truman 
Committee--were opened by Senator Nunn in 1980.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     B. Subcommittee Investigations

    Armed with its broad jurisdictional mandate, the 
Subcommittee has conducted investigations into a wide variety 
of topics of public concern, ranging from financial misconduct, 
to commodities speculation, predatory lending, and tax evasion. 
Over the years, the Subcommittee has also conducted 
investigations into criminal wrongdoing, including money 
laundering, the narcotics trade, child pornography, labor 
racketeering, human trafficking, the opioid crisis, and 
organized crime activities. In addition, the Subcommittee has 
investigated a wide range of allegations of waste, fraud, and 
abuse in government programs and consumer protection issues, 
addressing problems ranging from unfair credit card practices 
to health care fraud. In the 116th Congress, the Subcommittee 
held seven hearings and issued eleven reports on a wide range 
of issues.

(1) Historical Highlights

    The Subcommittee's investigatory record as a permanent 
Senate body began under the Chairmanship of Republican Senator 
Homer Ferguson and his Chief Counsel (and future Attorney 
General and Secretary of State) William P. Rogers, as the 
Subcommittee inherited the Truman Committee's role in 
investigating fraud and waste in U.S. Government operations. 
This investigative work became particularly colorful under the 
chairmanship of Senator Clyde Hoey, a North Carolina Democrat 
who took the chair from Senator Ferguson after the 1948 
elections. Under Senator Hoey's leadership, the Subcommittee 
won national attention for its investigation of the so-called 
``five percenters,'' notorious Washington lobbyists who charged 
their clients five percent of the profits from any Federal 
contracts they obtained on the client's behalf. Given the 
Subcommittee's jurisdictional inheritance from the Truman 
Committee, it is perhaps ironic that the ``five percenters'' 
investigation raised allegations of bribery and influence-
peddling that reached right into the White House and implicated 
members of President Truman's staff. In any event, the 
fledgling Subcommittee was off to a rapid start.
    What began as colorful soon became contentious. When 
Republicans returned to the Majority in the Senate in 1953, 
Wisconsin's junior Senator, Joseph R. McCarthy, became the 
Subcommittee's Chairman. Two years earlier, as Ranking Minority 
Member, Senator McCarthy had arranged for another Republican 
Senator, Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, to be removed from the 
Subcommittee. Senator Smith's offense, in Senator McCarthy's 
eyes, was her issuance of a ``Declaration of Conscience'' 
repudiating those who made unfounded charges and used character 
assassination against their political opponents. Although 
Senator Smith had carefully declined to name any specific 
offender, her remarks were universally recognized as criticism 
of Senator McCarthy's accusations that communists had 
infiltrated the State Department and other government agencies. 
Senator McCarthy retaliated by engineering Senator Smith's 
removal, replacing her with the newly-elected Senator from 
California, Richard Nixon.
    Upon becoming Subcommittee Chairman, Senator McCarthy 
staged a series of highly publicized anti-Communist 
investigations, culminating in an inquiry into Communism within 
the U.S. Army, which became known as the Army-McCarthy 
hearings. During the latter portion of those hearings, in which 
the parent Committee examined the Wisconsin Senator's attacks 
on the Army, Senator McCarthy recused himself, leaving South 
Dakota Senator Karl Mundt to serve as Acting Chairman of the 
Subcommittee. Gavel-to-gavel television coverage of the 
hearings helped turn the tide against Senator McCarthy by 
raising public concern about his treatment of witnesses and 
cavalier use of evidence. In December 1954, the Senate censured 
Senator McCarthy for unbecoming conduct. In the following year, 
the Subcommittee adopted new rules of procedure that better 
protected the rights of witnesses. The Subcommittee also 
strengthened the rules ensuring the right of both parties on 
the Subcommittee to appoint staff, initiate and approve 
investigations, and review all information in the 
Subcommittee's possession.
    In 1955, Senator John McClellan of Arkansas began 18 years 
of service as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations. Senator McClellan appointed a young Robert F. 
Kennedy as the Subcommittee's Chief Counsel. That same year, 
Members of the Subcommittee were joined by Members of the 
Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee on a special 
committee to investigate labor racketeering. Chaired by Senator 
McClellan and staffed by Robert Kennedy and other Subcommittee 
staff members, this special committee directed much of its 
attention to criminal influence over the Teamsters Union, most 
famously calling Teamsters' leaders Dave Beck and Jimmy Hoffa 
to testify. The televised hearings of the special committee 
also introduced Senators Barry Goldwater and John F. Kennedy to 
the nation, as well as led to passage of the Landrum-Griffin 
Labor Act.
    After the special committee completed its work, the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations continued to 
investigate organized crime. In 1962, the Subcommittee held 
hearings during which Joseph Valachi outlined the activities of 
La Cosa Nostra, or the Mafia. Former Subcommittee staffer 
Robert Kennedy--who 
had by then become Attorney General in his brother's 
Administration--used this information to prosecute prominent 
mob leaders and their accomplices. The Subcommittee's 
investigations also led to passage of major legislation against 
organized crime, most notably the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) provisions of the Crime Control 
Act of 1970. Under Chairman McClellan, the Subcommittee also 
investigated fraud in the purchase of military uniforms, 
corruption in the Department of Agriculture's grain storage 
program, securities fraud, and civil disorders and acts of 
terrorism. In addition, from 1962 to 1970, the Subcommittee 
conducted an extensive probe of political interference in the 
awarding of government contracts for the Pentagon's ill-fated 
TFX (``tactical fighter, experimental'') aircraft. In 1968, the 
Subcommittee also examined charges of corruption in U.S. 
servicemen's clubs in Vietnam and elsewhere around the world.
    In 1973, Senator Henry ``Scoop'' Jackson, a Democrat from 
Washington, replaced Senator McClellan as the Subcommittee's 
Chairman. During his tenure, recalled Chief Clerk Ruth Young 
Watt--who served in this position from the Subcommittee's 
founding until her retirement in 1979--Ranking Minority Member 
Charles Percy, an Illinois Republican, became more active on 
the Subcommittee than Chairman Jackson, who was often 
distracted by his Chairmanship of the Interior Committee and 
his active role on the Armed Services Committee.\3\ Senator 
Percy also worked closely with Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn, a 
Subcommittee member who subsequently succeeded Senator Jackson 
as Subcommittee Chairman in 1979. As Chairman, Senator Nunn 
continued the Subcommittee's investigations into the role of 
organized crime in labor-management relations and also 
investigated pension fraud.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\It had not been uncommon in the Subcommittee's history for the 
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member to work together closely despite 
partisan differences, but Senator Percy was unusually active while in 
the Minority--a role that included his chairing an investigation of the 
hearing aid industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regular reversals of political fortunes in the Senate 
during the 1980s and 1990s saw Senator Nunn trade the 
chairmanship three times with Delaware Republican William Roth. 
Senator Nunn served from 1979 to 1980 and again from 1987 to 
1995, while Senator Roth served from 1981 to 1986, and again 
from 1995 to 1996. These 15 years saw a strengthening of the 
Subcommittee's bipartisan tradition in which investigations 
were initiated by either the Majority or Minority and fully 
supported by the entire Subcommittee. For his part, Senator 
Roth led a wide range of investigations into commodity 
investment fraud, offshore banking schemes, money laundering, 
and child pornography. Senator Nunn led inquiries into Federal 
drug policy, the global spread of chemical and biological 
weapons, abuses in Federal student aid programs, computer 
security, airline safety, and health care fraud. Senator Nunn 
also appointed the Subcommittee's first female counsel, 
Eleanore Hill, who served as Chief Counsel to the Minority from 
1982 to 1986 and then as Chief Counsel from 1987 to 1995.
    Strong bipartisan traditions continued in the 105th 
Congress when, in January 1997, Republican Senator Susan 
Collins of Maine became the first woman to chair the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations. Senator John Glenn of Ohio 
became the Ranking Minority Member, while also serving as 
Ranking Minority Member of the full Committee. Two years later, 
in the 106th Congress, after Senator Glenn's retirement, 
Michigan Democrat Carl Levin succeeded him as the 
Subcommittee's Ranking Minority Member. During Senator Collins' 
chairmanship, the Subcommittee conducted investigations into 
issues affecting Americans in their day-to-day lives, including 
mortgage fraud, deceptive mailings and sweepstakes promotions, 
phony credentials obtained through the Internet, day trading of 
securities, and securities fraud on the Internet. Senator Levin 
initiated an investigation into money laundering. At his 
request, in 1999, the Subcommittee held hearings on money 
laundering issues affecting private banking services provided 
to wealthy individuals, and, in 2001, on how major U.S. banks 
providing correspondent accounts to offshore banks were being 
used to advance money laundering and other criminal schemes.
    During the 107th Congress, both Senator Collins and Senator 
Levin chaired the Subcommittee. Senator Collins served as 
chairman until June 2001, when the Senate Majority changed 
hands; at that point, Senator Levin assumed the chairmanship 
and Senator Collins, in turn, became the Ranking Minority 
Member. In her first six months chairing the Subcommittee at 
the start of the 107th Congress, Senator Collins held hearings 
examining issues related to cross border fraud, the improper 
operation of tissue banks, and Federal programs designed to 
fight diabetes. When Senator Levin assumed the chairmanship, as 
his first major effort, the Subcommittee initiated an 18-month 
bipartisan investigation into the Enron Corporation, which had 
collapsed into bankruptcy. As part of that investigation, the 
Subcommittee reviewed over 2 million pages of documents, 
conducted more than 100 interviews, held four hearings, and 
issued three bipartisan reports focusing on the role played by 
Enron's Board of Directors, Enron's use of tax shelters and 
structured financial instruments, and how major U.S. financial 
institutions contributed to Enron's accounting deceptions, 
corporate abuses, and ultimate collapse. The Subcommittee's 
investigative work contributed to passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act which enacted accounting and corporate reforms in July 
2002. In addition, Senator Levin continued the money laundering 
investigation initiated while he was the Ranking Minority 
Member, and the Subcommittee's work contributed to enactment of 
major reforms strengthening U.S. anti-money laundering laws in 
the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act). Also during the 107th 
Congress, the Subcommittee opened new investigations into 
offshore tax abuses, border security, and abusive practices 
related to the pricing of gasoline and other fuels.
    In January 2003, at the start of the 108th Congress, after 
the Senate Majority party again changed hands, Senator Collins 
was elevated to Chairman of the full Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, and Republican Senator Norman Coleman of Minnesota 
became Chairman of the Subcommittee. Over the next two years, 
Senator Coleman held hearings on topics of national and global 
concern including illegal file sharing on peer-to-peer 
networks, abusive practices in the credit counseling industry, 
the dangers of purchasing pharmaceuticals over the Internet, 
SARS preparedness, border security, and how former Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein had abused the United Nations Oil-for-
Food Program. At the request of Senator Levin, then Ranking 
Minority Member, the Subcommittee examined how some U.S. 
accounting firms, banks, investment firms, and tax lawyers were 
designing, promoting, and implementing abusive tax shelters 
across the country. Also at Senator Levin's request, the 
Subcommittee investigated how some U.S. financial institutions 
were failing to comply with anti-money laundering controls 
mandated by the Patriot Act, using as a case history Riggs Bank 
accounts involving Augusto Pinochet, the former President of 
Chile, and Equatorial Guinea, an oil-rich country in Africa.
    During the 109th Congress, Senator Coleman held additional 
hearings on abuses associated with the United Nation's Oil-for-
Food Program, and initiated a series of hearings on Federal 
contractors who were paid with taxpayer dollars but failed to 
meet their own tax obligations, resulting in billions of 
dollars in unpaid taxes. He also held hearings on border 
security issues, securing the global supply chain, Federal 
travel abuses, abusive tax refund loans, and unfair energy 
pricing. At Senator Levin's request, the Subcommittee held 
hearings on offshore tax abuses responsible for $100 billion in 
unpaid taxes each year, and on U.S. vulnerabilities caused by 
States forming 2 million companies each year with hidden 
owners.
    During the 110th Congress, in January 2007, after the 
Senate majority shifted, Senator Levin once again became 
Subcommittee Chairman, while Senator Coleman became the Ranking 
Minority Member. Senator Levin chaired the Subcommittee for the 
next seven years. He focused the Subcommittee on investigations 
into complex financial and tax matters, including unfair credit 
card practices, executive stock option abuses, excessive 
speculation in the natural gas and crude oil markets, and 
offshore tax abuses involving tax haven banks and non-U.S. 
persons dodging payment of U.S. taxes on U.S. stock dividends. 
The Subcommittee's work contributed to enactment of two 
landmark bills, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility 
and Disclosure Act (Credit CARD Act), which reformed credit 
card practices, and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA), which tackled the problem of hidden offshore bank 
accounts used by U.S. persons to dodge U.S. taxes. At the 
request of Senator Coleman, the Subcommittee also conducted 
bipartisan investigations into Medicare and Medicaid health 
care providers who cheat on their taxes, fraudulent Medicare 
claims involving deceased doctors or inappropriate diagnosis 
codes, U.S. dirty bomb vulnerabilities, Federal payroll tax 
abuses, abusive practices involving transit benefits, and 
problems involving the United Nations Development Program.
    During the 111th Congress, Senator Levin continued as 
Subcommittee Chairman, while Senator Tom Coburn joined the 
Subcommittee as its Ranking Minority Member. Under their 
leadership, the Subcommittee dedicated much of its resources to 
a bipartisan investigation into key causes of the 2008 
financial crisis, looking in particular at the role of high-
risk home loans, regulatory failures, inflated credit ratings, 
and high-risk, conflicts-ridden financial products designed and 
sold by investment banks. The Subcommittee held four hearings 
and released thousands of documents. The Subcommittee's work 
contributed to passage of another landmark financial reform 
bill, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010. In addition, the Subcommittee held hearings on 
excessive speculation in the wheat market, tax haven banks that 
helped U.S. clients evade U.S. taxes, how to keep foreign 
corruption out of the United States, and Social Security 
disability fraud.
    During the 112th Congress, Senator Levin and Senator Coburn 
continued in their respective roles as Chairman and Ranking 
Minority Member of the Subcommittee. In a series of bipartisan 
investigations, the Subcommittee examined how a global banking 
giant, HSBC, exposed the U.S. financial system to an array of 
money laundering, drug trafficking, and terrorist financing 
risks due to poor anti-money laundering controls; how two U.S. 
multinational corporations, Microsoft and Hewlett Packard 
engaged in offshore tax abuses; and how excessive commodity 
speculation by mutual funds and others were taking place 
without Dodd-Frank safeguards such as position limits being put 
into effect. At the request of Senator Coburn, the Subcommittee 
also conducted bipartisan investigations into problems with 
Social Security disability determinations that, due to poor 
procedures, perfunctory hearings, and poor quality decisions, 
resulted in over one in five disability cases containing errors 
or inadequate justifications; how Department of Homeland 
Security State and local intelligence fusion centers failed to 
yield significant, useful information to support Federal 
counterterrorism efforts; and how certain Federal contractors 
that received taxpayer dollars through stimulus funding failed 
to pay their Federal taxes.
    During the 113th Congress, Senator Levin continued as 
Chairman, while Senator John McCain joined the Subcommittee as 
its Ranking Minority Member. They continued to strengthen the 
Subcommittee's strong bipartisan traditions, conducting all 
investigations in a bipartisan manner. During the 113th 
Congress, the Subcommittee held eight hearings and released ten 
reports on a variety of investigations. The investigations 
examined high risk credit derivatives trades at JPMorgan; 
hidden offshore accounts opened for U.S. clients by Credit 
Suisse in Switzerland; corporate tax avoidance in case studies 
involving Apple, Caterpillar, and a structured financial 
product known as basket options; online advertising abuses; 
conflicts of interest affecting the stock market and high speed 
trading; IRS processing of 501(c)(4) applications; defense 
acquisition reforms; and bank involvement with physical 
commodities. At the end of the 113th Congress, Senator Levin 
retired from the Senate.

(2) More Recent Investigations

    During the 114th Congress, Senator Rob Portman became 
Subcommittee Chairman with Senator Claire McCaskill serving as 
Ranking Minority Member. Under the Chairman and Ranking 
Member's leadership, the Subcommittee held six hearings and 
issued eight reports addressing range of public policy 
concerns. Investigations examined the impact of the U.S. 
corporate tax code on cross-border mergers acquisitions; online 
sex trafficking; the Federal Government's efforts to protect 
unaccompanied migrant children from human trafficking; consumer 
protection in the cable and satellite television industry; 
terrorist networks' use of the Internet and social media to 
radicalize and recruit; the U.S. State Department's oversight 
of a grantee involved in political activities in Israel; and 
efforts by Medicare and private health insurance systems to 
combat the opioid epidemic. The Subcommittee also initiated the 
first successful civil contempt proceedings to enforce a Senate 
subpoena in twenty years. The Subcommittee's long-term 
investigation of online sex trafficking culminated in a final 
report and hearing on January 10, 2017, at the start of the 
115th Congress.
    During the 115th Congress Senator Portman continued as 
Chairman while Senator Tom Carper became the Subcommittee's 
Ranking Minority Member. Under the Chairman and Ranking 
Member's leadership, the Subcommittee held six hearings and 
issued six reports. The Subcommittee examined the opioid 
crisis, including the price increase of an opioid overdose 
reversal drug and the cost to Federal healthcare programs and 
Chinese online drug sellers shipping illicit opioids to the 
United States through international mail; the Federal 
Government's efforts to protect unaccompanied alien children; 
Federal agency compliance with the Digital Accountability and 
Transparency Act; Federal infrastructure permitting; and 
Backpage.com's knowing facilitation of online sex trafficking.

          II. SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS DURING THE 116TH CONGRESS

    During the 116th Congress, Senator Rob Portman remained 
Subcommittee Chairman with Senator Tom Carper serving as 
Ranking Minority Member.

China's Impact on the U.S. Education System.  February 28, 2019. (S. 
        Hrg. 116-30)

    The Subcommittee's first hearing and report of the 116th 
Congress was held in conjunction with the release of the 
Subcommittee's report titled ``China's Impact on the U.S. 
Education System.'' The hearing examined the findings and 
recommendations in the Subcommittee's report.
    The hearing featured one panels of witnesses including 
Jason Bair, Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade, 
U.S. Government Accountability Office; Walter Douglas, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
U.S. Department of State; Hon. Jennifer Zimdahl Galt, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Cultural and Educational 
Affairs, U.S. Department of State; and Hon. Mitchell M. Zais, 
Ph.D., Deputy Secretary of Education, U.S. Department of 
Education.

Examining Private Sector Data Breaches.  March 7, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116-
        40)

    The Subcommittee's second hearing was held in conjunction 
with the release of the Subcommittee's report titled ``How 
Equifax Neglected Cybersecurity and Suffered a Devastating Data 
Breach'' and examined the findings and recommendations of the 
report. The Subcommittee also received testimony regarding a 
data breach announced by Marriott in November 2018 that exposed 
more than 380 million guest records, including passport and 
credit card numbers.
    The hearing featured testimony from two panels of 
witnesses. The first panel included Mark W. Begor, Chief 
Executive Officer, Equifax, Inc.; and Arne M. Sorenson, 
President and Chief Executive Officer, Marriott International, 
Inc. The second panel was comprised of: Alicia Puente Cackley, 
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, U.S. 
Government Accountability Office; Andrew Smith, Director, 
Bureau of Consumer Protection, U.S. Federal Trade Commission; 
and John M. Gilligan, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Center for Internet Security.

Oversight of Federal Infrastructure Permitting and FAST-41. May 2, 
        2019. (S. Hrg. 116-44)

    The Subcommittee's third hearing reviewed activities of the 
Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council, which was 
established to improve coordination between Federal permitting 
agencies and help large projects navigate the permitting 
process.
    The Subcommittee heard from one panel of witnesses. The 
panel included Alexander Herrgott, Executive Director, Federal 
Permitting Improvement Steering Council; Laura Abram, Director, 
Project Execution and Public Affairs, First Solar; Michael 
Knisley, Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Ohio State Building and 
Construction Trades Council; Joseph M. Johnson, Ph.D., 
Executive Director, Federal Regulatory Process Review and 
Analysis, Environment, Technology, and Regulatory Affairs, U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce; and Raul E. Garcia, Senior Legislative 
Counsel, Policy and Legislation Department, Earthjustice.

Joint Hearing with the Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal 
        Management: Review of E-Rulemaking Comment Systems. October 24, 
        2019. (S. Hrg. 116-114)

    The Subcommittee held a joint hearing with the Subcommittee 
on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management after reviewing 
Federal agency systems for receiving, reviewing, and 
publicizing comments on proposed regulations and found the 
systems were abused, creating some public distrust in the 
rulewriting process, as well as additional work for Federal 
employees. The Subcommittee also released a report in 
conjunction with the hearing titled ``Abuses of the Federal 
Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Process.''
    The Subcommittee heard from one panel of witnesses 
comprised of Elizabeth Angerman, Principal Deputy Associate 
Administrator, Office of Government-Wide Policy, U.S. General 
Services Administration; Dominic Mancini, Acting Director, 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of 
Management and Budget; Ashley Boizelle, Deputy General Counsel, 
Federal Communications Commission; and Seto J. Bagdoyan, 
Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, U.S. 
Government Accountability Office.

Securing the U.S. Research Enterprise from China's Talent Recruitment 
        Plans. November 19, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116-286)

    The Subcommittee's fifth hearing was held in conjunction 
with the release of the Subcommittee's report titled ``Threats 
to the U.S Research Enterprise: China's Talent Recruitment 
Plans.'' The hearing examined the report's findings and 
recommendations.
    One panel of witnesses testified at the hearing including 
John Brown, Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Division, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice; 
Rebecca L. Keiser, Ph.D., Office Head, Office of International 
Science and Engineering, National Science Foundation; Michael 
S. Lauer, MD, Deputy Director for Extramural Research, National 
Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services; The Honorable Christopher Fall, Ph.D., Director, 
Office of Science, U.S. Department of Energy; and Edward J. 
Ramotowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services, 
Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

Continuity of Senate Operations and Remote Voting in Times of Crisis. 
        April 30, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116-297)

    The roundtable considered the Subcommittee's memorandum on 
the continuity of Senate operations and remove voting in times 
of crisis.
    At the roundtable, the Subcommittee heard from one panel of 
participants including Martin B. Gold, Partner, Capitol 
Counsel, LLC; Lorelei Kelly, Director of Congressional 
Modernization, Beeck Center for Social Impact and Innovation, 
Georgetown University; and Joshua C. Huder, Ph.D., Senior 
Fellow, the Government Affairs Institute, Georgetown 
University.

Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Oversight of the Implementation of the 
        STOP Act. December 10, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116-)

    The Subcommittee's seventh hearing examined the 
implementation of the Synthetics Trafficking & Overdose 
Prevention (STOP) Act, which became law in 2018. The STOP Act 
requires advance electronic data on all inbound international 
packages, including packages coming from China. Starting 
January 1, 2021, the STOP Act requires the Postal Service to 
refuse any inbound international packages without advance 
electronic data. The deadline was later pushed until March 15, 
2021.
    One panel of witnesses testified at the hearing including 
Eric F. Green, Director of Specialized and Technical Agencies, 
Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, U.S. Department 
of State; Robert Cintron, Vice President, Logistics, United 
States Postal Service; and Thomas F. Overacker, Executive 
Director, Cargo and Conveyance Security, Office of Field 
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security.

         III. LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES DURING THE 116th CONGRESS

    The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations does not have 
legislative authority, but because its investigations play an 
important role in bringing issues to the attention of Congress 
and the public, the Subcommittee's work contributes to the 
development of legislative initiatives. The Subcommittee's 
activity during the 116th Congress was no exception, with 
Subcommittee hearings and Members playing prominent roles in 
several legislative initiatives.

A. Safeguarding American Innovation Act (S. 3997)

    Senators Portman and Carper introduced the Safeguarding 
American Innovation Act (SAIA) on June 18, 2020. The 
legislation was based on two Subcommittee reports: (1) China's 
Impact on the U.S. Education System and (2) Threats to the U.S. 
Research Enterprise: China's Talent Recruitment Plans. The 
legislation included provisions that would:

      Amend Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
212(3)A to provide State Department the authority to deny 
visas to certain foreign nationals seeking access to sensitive 
technologies when providing them a visa is not in the national 
interest.
      Revise 22 USC 2452 to require certain visa 
sponsors to disclose to the State Department what sensitive 
technologies foreign researchers will access and what 
appropriate safeguards they have to prevent foreign nationals' 
unauthorized access to sensitive technologies.
      Require Federal grant-making agencies to share 
information about grantees under investigation; create a U.S. 
government wide database of Federal grantees; and standardize 
the grant application process.
      Revise Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 
1965 to require universities to report any foreign gift of 
$50,000 or more and allow the Department of Education to fine 
universities that repeatedly fail to disclose these gifts.
      Make grant application fraud a crime under 18 
USC.

    SAIA was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs. The Committee considered SAIA on July 22, 
2020 and reported out favorably by unanimous consent. SAIA was 
also sponsored by Sens. Barrasso, Blackburn, Braun, Coons, 
Cortex Masto, Hassan, Hawley, Manchin, Risch, Rubio, R. Scott, 
Shaheen, Tillis, Grassley, Johnson, McSally, Lankford, and 
Romney.

B. To amend the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, Fiscal Year 1979, 
        relating to the conduct of knowledge diplomacy (S. 3996)

    This legislation was introduced by Senators Portman and 
Carper on June 18, 2020 based on the Subcommittee's report 
titled ``Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China's 
Talent Recruitment Plans'' The legislation would authorize 
State Department to negotiate and manage U.S. scientific 
partnerships that are in the U.S. national interest, assist 
allies in securing their research enterprises from hostile 
governments, and report these efforts to Congress.
    The legislation was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations and also cosponsored by Sens. Barrasso, Blackburn, 
Braun, Coons, Cortez Masto, Hassan, Hawley, Manchin, Risch, 
Rubio, R. Scott, Shaheen, and Tillis.

                    IV. REPORTS, PRINTS, AND STUDIES

    In connection with its investigations, the Subcommittee 
often issues lengthy and detailed reports. During the 116th 
Congress, the Subcommittee released eleven such reports, listed 
below.

A. China's Impact on the U.S. Education System, February 27, 2019 
        (Report Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staff of the 
        Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and released in 
        conjunction with the Subcommittee's hearing on February 28, 
        2019)

    At the start of the 116th Congress, Subcommittee staff 
released a 93-page bipartisan report culminating its 
investigation into Confucius Institutes on American colleges 
and universities. The Subcommittee staff report found that 
Confucius Institutes are controlled, funded, and often staffed 
by the Chinese government. The report also detailed China's 
one-sided treatment of U.S. schools and key State Department 
programs in China, and documents the lack of oversight by the 
Departments of State and Education of U.S. Confucius 
Institutes. Below is a summary of the findings of the staff 
report.
    When China sought to market itself to students around the 
world, it looked to its past. Confucius, the ancient Chinese 
philosopher, is synonymous with morality, justice, and honesty. 
The Chinese government capitalized on this rich legacy and 
began establishing Confucius Institutes on college campuses 
around the world in 2004, including the first in the United 
States at the University of Maryland. Today, there are more 
than 100 Confucius Institutes in the United States, the most of 
any country.
    The Chinese government funds Confucius Institutes and 
provides Chinese teachers to teach language classes to students 
and non-student community members. In addition to Chinese 
language classes, Confucius Institutes host cultural events, 
including Chinese New Year celebrations, cooking classes, 
speakers, and dance and music performances. These selective 
events depict China as approachable and compassionate; rarely 
are events critical or controversial. The Chinese government 
also funds and provides language instructors for Confucius 
Classrooms, which offer classes for kindergarten through 12th 
grade students. Confucius Classrooms are currently in 519 
elementary, middle, and high schools in the United States. 
Continued expansion of the program is a priority for China.
    Confucius Institute funding comes with strings that can 
compromise academic freedom. The Chinese government approves 
all teachers, events, and speakers. Some U.S. schools 
contractually agree that both Chinese and U.S. laws will apply. 
The Chinese teachers sign contracts with the Chinese government 
pledging they will not damage the national interests of China. 
Such limitations attempt to export China's censorship of 
political debate and prevent discussion of potentially 
politically sensitive topics. Indeed, U.S. school officials 
told the Subcommittee that Confucius Institutes were not the 
place to discuss controversial topics like the independence of 
Taiwan or the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. As one U.S. 
school administrator explained to the Subcommittee, when 
something is ``funded by the Chinese government, you know what 
you're getting.''
    Confucius Institutes exist as one part of China's broader, 
long-term strategy. Through Confucius Institutes, the Chinese 
government is attempting to change the impression in the United 
States and around the world that China is an economic and 
security threat. Confucius Institutes' soft power encourages 
complacency towards China's pervasive, long-term initiatives 
against both government critics at home and businesses and 
academic institutions abroad. Those long-term initiatives 
include it's Made in China 2025 plan, a push to lead the world 
in certain advanced technology manufacturing. The Thousand 
Talents program is another state-run initiative designed to 
recruit Chinese researchers in the United States to return to 
China for significant financial gain--bringing with them the 
knowledge gained at U.S. universities and companies.
    Contracting with the Chinese Government. The Chinese 
government runs the Confucius Institute program out of the 
Ministry of Education's Office of Chinese Language Council 
International, known as ``Hanban.'' Each U.S. school signs a 
contract with Hanban establishing the terms of hosting a 
Confucius Institute. Contracts reviewed by the Subcommittee 
generally contain provisions that state both Chinese and U.S. 
laws apply; limit public disclosure of the contract; and 
terminate the contract if the U.S. school take actions that 
``severely harm the image or reputation'' of the Confucius 
Institute.
    The Chinese director and teachers at each Confucius 
Institute also sign contracts with Hanban. The contract with 
Hanban makes clear a Chinese director or teacher will be 
terminated if they ``violate Chinese laws;'' ``engage in 
activities detrimental to national interests;'' or 
``participate in illegal organizations.'' In fact, the contract 
states the Chinese director and teachers must ``conscientiously 
safeguard national interests'' and report to the Chinese 
Embassy within one month of arrival in the United States.
    Resources Provided by Hanban. U.S. schools that contract 
with Hanban receive substantial funding and resources to 
establish the Confucius Institute on campus. At the outset, 
Hanban typically provides a U.S. school between $100,000 and 
$200,000 in start-up costs, around 3,000 books, and other 
materials. Hanban also selects and provides a Chinese director 
and teachers at no cost to the U.S. school. While school 
officials have the opportunity to interview candidates for 
these positions, there is little-to-no transparency into how 
the Chinese government selects the individuals that schools 
must choose from. Nor did U.S. school officials interviewed by 
the Subcommittee know if candidates would meet the school's 
hiring standards. Hanban requires director and teacher 
candidates to pass English proficiency tests and undergo a 
psychological exam to determine adaptability to living and 
teaching in the United States. Beyond that, U.S. schools' 
understanding of the selection process was limited, at best.
    Expansion to Kindergarten through 12th Grade. China did not 
stop at expanding at university and college campuses. The next 
phase of Confucius Institutes involved funding teachers for 
Confucius Classrooms in K-12 grade school. There are currently 
519 Confucius Classrooms operating in the United States with 
expansion of this program a top priority for China. In the 
United States, a Confucius Institute receives funding and 
instructors directly from Hanban and passes it to the K-12 
grade school to support affiliated Confucius Classrooms.
    The Cost of Confucius Institutes. The investment by China 
in U.S. Confucius Institutes is substantial. Since 2006, the 
Subcommittee determined China directly provided over $158 
million in funding to U.S. schools for Confucius Institutes. A 
number of U.S. schools, however, failed to properly report this 
funding as required by law. The Department of Education 
requires all postsecondary schools to report 3 foreign gifts of 
$250,000 or more from a single source within a calendar year of 
receiving them. Despite that legal requirement, nearly 70 
percent of U.S. schools that received more than $250,000 from 
Hanban failed to properly report that amount to the Department 
of Education.
    The Department of Education last issued guidance to U.S. 
schools on foreign gift reporting requirements in 2004, the 
same year the first Confucius Institute opened in the United 
States. As China opened over 100 additional Confucius 
Institutes in the United States over the last 15 years, the 
Department of Education remained silent.
    Visa Failures. The State Department is responsible for 
issuing visas to any Chinese director or teacher entering the 
United States to work at a Confucius Institute. Some U.S. 
schools have struggled to comply with the requirements of the 
Exchange Visitor Visa (or ``J-1''). In 2018, the State 
Department revoked 32 J-1 Professor and Research Scholar visas 
for Confucius Institute teachers who were not conducting 
research, but instead were teaching at K-12 schools. The State 
Department also found evidence that one Confucius Institute 
Chinese director improperly coached the teachers to discuss 
their research during interviews with State Department 
investigators.
    China's Lack of Reciprocity. In response to the growing 
popularity of Confucius Institutes in the United States, the 
State Department initiated a public diplomacy program in China. 
Between 2010 and the issuance of the Subcommittee's report, the 
State Department had provided $5.1 million in grant funding for 
29 ``American Cultural Centers'' or ACCs in China. Through the 
ACC program, a U.S. school partners with a Chinese school, much 
like a Confucius Institute. The U.S. school then uses the grant 
funds to create a space on the campus of the Chinese partner 
school to ``enable Chinese audiences to better understand the 
United States, its culture, society, government, language, law, 
economic center, and values.'' ACCs are notably different from 
Confucius Institutes, however, as the State Department does not 
pay or vet instructors or directors; provide books or 
materials; or veto proposed events. Even so, the Chinese 
government stifled the establishment of the ACC program from 
the start.
    In all, the State Department provided 29 U.S. schools with 
grant funds to establish ACCs with a partner Chinese schools. 
For some U.S schools, roadblocks to opening their ACCs appeared 
immediately. For example, after extensive negotiations, one 
Chinese school refused to open a proposed ACC, stating it 
didn't see a need to move forward. An official from the U.S. 
school seeking to open the ACC, however, believed China's 
Ministry of Education told the partner school not to proceed 
with the contract. This official wrote in an email to his 
colleagues, ``This is a typical Chinese political euphemism. 
Obviously, [the Chinese University] was instructed by [the 
Ministry of Education] not to proceed with our proposal.'' The 
U.S. school returned the grant funds to the State Department.
    The ACCs that did open found they needed permission from 
their Chinese host schools to hold most cultural events. One 
Chinese host school refused to allow its ACC to host a play 
about the life of Muhammad Ali. Another denied approval for a 
lecture series on policy issues facing Americans. One U.S. 
school official who staffed an ACC told the Subcommittee that 
members of the local Communist Party often participated in the 
approval process. Another U.S. school official left the ACC 
after two sessions of extensive questioning by Chinese police 
officers regarding her involvement with the ACC and the State 
Department. When the U.S. school official returned to the 
United States, a colleague told her that Chinese police 
interrogation of school officials was common and that she was 
now just ``part of the club.''
    In all, the State Department documented over 80 instances 
in the past four years where the Chinese government directly 
interfered with U.S. diplomacy efforts in China. Interference 
with State Department officials or events took a number of 
forms. One example involved a Chinese official telling a U.S. 
official an ACC no longer existed; the U.S. official easily 
confirmed the continued existence of the ACC through its U.S. 
partner school. One U.S. official was told she applied too late 
to attend the opening of an ACC after submitting the request a 
month before. In other instances, the Chinese school canceled 
approved events, sometimes as late as the night before.
    In December 2017, the State Department Inspector General 
found the ACC mission was largely ineffective. In October 2018, 
the State Department ended all ACC program grant funding in 
order to conduct an internal assessment of the program. At the 
time of the issuance of the Subcommittee's report, the 
Department indicated that it had no plans for future ACC 
grants.
    The Need for Transparency and Reciprocity. Schools in the 
United States--from kindergarten to college--have provided a 
level of access to the Chinese government that the Chinese 
government has refused to provide to the United States. That 
level of access can stifle academic freedom and provide 
students and others exposed to Confucius Institute programming 
with an incomplete picture of Chinese government actions and 
policies that run counter to U.S. interests at home and abroad. 
Absent full transparency regarding how Confucius Institutes 
operate and full reciprocity for U.S. cultural outreach efforts 
on college campuses in China, Confucius Institutes should not 
continue in the United States.
    Findings and recommendations from this investigation were 
incorporated into S. 3997, Safeguarding American Innovation 
Act.

B. How Equifax Neglected Cybersecurity and Suffered A Devastated Data 
        Breach, March 6, 2019 (Report Prepared by the Majority and 
        Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
        and released in conjunction with the Subcommittee's hearing on 
        March 7, 2019)

    In March 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 67-page 
bipartisan report detailing the repeated failures over years on 
the part of Equifax, one of the nation's largest consumer 
reporting agencies, that led to a devastating data breach in 
2017. As a result of poor cybersecurity practices, Equifax 
failed to adequately protect the sensitive information of more 
than 145 million Americans, including Social Security numbers 
and driver's license and passport information. A summary of the 
staff report is found below.
    The effects of data breaches are often long-lasting and 
challenging to reverse. Victims who have had their sensitive 
personal or financial information stolen by hackers can be left 
with years of expense and hassle. No type of entity or sector 
of the economy has been immune to data breaches. In 2018 alone, 
Google+, Facebook, Ticketfly, T-Mobile, Orbitz, Saks, Lord & 
Taylor, and Marriott all announced significant breaches. The 
importance of protecting personally identifiable information 
(``PII'') grows with every successive data breach.
    Consumers and businesses are well aware of the need to 
safeguard items like driver's licenses, credit cards, and 
financial records that criminals can use to their advantage. 
Consumers also understand the need to protect information like 
online passwords, pin numbers, and Social Security numbers. But 
a consumer taking appropriate care of this information may not 
be enough to keep PII out of the hands of criminal hackers. In 
the modern world, businesses collect and compile data about 
their customers and potential customers. Without proper 
precautions, this information can be stored or transmitted in 
ways that leave it vulnerable to theft.
    The information collected by consumer reporting agencies 
(``CRAs'') to compile credit reports is one example of PII that 
must be protected. This information includes a consumer's name, 
nicknames, date of birth, Social Security number, telephone 
numbers, and current and former addresses. Credit reports also 
typically include a list of all open and closed credit 
accounts, account balances, account payment histories, and the 
names of creditors. The information tells the story of a 
consumer's financial life and can determine whether they can 
rent an apartment, buy a car, or qualify for a home loan. If 
stolen, criminals can use it to do significant financial harm. 
The steps CRAs take to safeguard consumers' credit histories 
are extremely important. If that information is compromised, 
consumers should know to be on heightened alert to monitor 
their finances and mitigate any potential damage.
    In 2017, one of the largest CRAs, Equifax Inc. 
(``Equifax'') announced that it had suffered a data breach that 
involved the PII of over 145 million Americans. The 
Subcommittee investigated the causes of this breach to identify 
ways to prevent future incidents of this scope. The 
Subcommittee also reviewed the efforts of Equifax's two largest 
competitors, Experian plc (``Experian'') and TransUnion LLC 
(``TransUnion''), in responding to the vulnerability that 
ultimately led to the Equifax data breach. Highlights of the 
Subcommittee's investigative results, including findings and 
recommendations, are provided below.
    Equifax Failed to Prioritize Cybersecurity. Equifax had no 
standalone written corporate policy governing the patching of 
known cyber vulnerabilities until 2015. After implementing this 
policy, Equifax conducted an audit of its patch management 
efforts, which identified a backlog of over 8,500 known 
vulnerabilities that had not been patched. This included more 
than 1,000 vulnerabilities the auditors deemed critical, high, 
or medium risks that were found on systems that could be 
accessed by individuals from outside of Equifax's information 
technology (``IT'') networks. The audit report concluded, among 
other things, that Equifax did not abide by the schedule for 
addressing vulnerabilities mandated by its own patching policy. 
It also found that the company had a reactive approach to 
installing patches and used what the auditors called an ``honor 
system'' for patching that failed to ensure that patches were 
installed. The audit report also noted that Equifax lacked a 
comprehensive IT asset inventory, meaning it lacked a complete 
understanding of the assets it owned. This made it difficult, 
if not impossible, for Equifax to know if vulnerabilities 
existed on its networks. If a vulnerability cannot be found, it 
cannot be patched.
    Equifax never conducted another audit after the 2015 audit 
and left several of the issues identified in the 2015 audit 
report unaddressed in the months leading up to the 2017 data 
breach.
    Equifax Could Not Follow Its Own Policies in Patching the 
Vulnerability That Ultimately Caused the Breach. Equifax's 
patching policy required the company's IT department to patch 
critical vulnerabilities within 48 hours. The company's 
security staff learned of a critical vulnerability in certain 
versions of Apache Struts--a widely-used piece of web 
application software--on March 8, 2017, from the U.S. Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team at the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security. The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
gave the vulnerability the highest criticality score possible; 
it was widely known that the vulnerability was easy to exploit. 
Equifax employees circulated news of the vulnerability through 
an internal alert the next day that went to a list of more than 
400 company employees.
    Equifax held monthly meetings to discuss cyber threats and 
vulnerabilities, but senior managers did not routinely attend 
these meetings and follow-up was limited. The Apache Struts 
vulnerability was discussed during the March 2017 and April 
2017 meetings, but not discussed at any subsequent monthly 
meetings. The Subcommittee interviewed the leadership of the 
Equifax IT and security staffs and learned that none of them 
regularly attended these monthly meetings or specifically 
recalled attending the March 2017 meeting. In addition, the 
Chief Information Officer (``CIO''), who oversaw the IT 
department during 2017, referred to patching as a ``lower level 
responsibility that was six levels down'' from him.
    Equifax Failed to Locate and Patch Apache Struts. The 
Equifax developer who was aware of Equifax's use of Apache 
Struts software was not included in the 400-person email 
distribution list used to circulate information on the 
vulnerability. The developer's manager, however, was on the 
distribution list and received the alert, but failed to forward 
it to the developer or anyone on the developer's team. As a 
result, the key developer never received the alert. Equifax 
added application owners to the list after the breach.
    The Subcommittee also learned that Equifax developers were 
individually responsible for subscribing to push notifications 
from software vendors about security vulnerabilities. The 
developer who knew of the company's use of Apache Struts 
software was not subscribed to notifications from Apache and 
did not receive any alerts about the vulnerability.
    On March 14, 2017--nearly a week after the Apache Struts 
vulnerability was disclosed--Equifax added new rules to the 
company's intrusion prevention system intended to help it 
thwart efforts to exploit the vulnerability. With these new 
protections in place, Equifax believed it had the ability to 
identify and block exploit attempts and did block several 
attempts the same day the rules were installed.
    None of Equifax's subsequent scans identified the 
vulnerable version of Apache Struts running on Equifax's 
network. And since Equifax lacked a comprehensive inventory of 
its IT assets, it did not know that the vulnerable version of 
Apache Struts remained on its system.
    Equifax Left Itself Open to Attack Due to Poor 
Cybersecurity Practices. Equifax was unable to detect attackers 
entering its networks because it failed to take the steps 
necessary to see incoming malicious traffic online.
    Website owners install Secure Sockets Layer (``SSL'') 
certificates to protect and encrypt online interactions with 
their servers. If an SSL certificate expires, transactions are 
no longer protected. As part of an IT management effort 
unrelated to the Apache Struts vulnerability, Equifax installed 
dozens of new SSL certificates on the night of July 29, 2017, 
to replace certificates that had expired. This included a new 
certificate for the expired SSL certificate for its online 
dispute portal. The SSL certificate needed to be up-to-date to 
properly monitor the online dispute portal, but had expired 
eight months earlier in November 2016. Almost immediately after 
updating the SSL certificate, company employees observed 
suspicious internet traffic from its online dispute portal that 
they were able to trace to an IP address in China, a country 
where Equifax does not operate. After blocking the IP address, 
Equifax observed similar traffic the following day to another 
IP address that appeared to be connected to a Chinese entity 
and decided to take the online dispute portal offline. Equifax 
later determined that the hackers first gained access to 
Equifax's system through the online dispute portal on May 13, 
2017, meaning the hackers had 78 days to maneuver undetected.
    Equifax confirmed to the Subcommittee that the Apache 
Struts vulnerability facilitated the data breach that began in 
May 2017.
    The Damage Done by the Hackers Could Have Been Minimized. 
Once inside Equifax's online dispute portal, the hackers also 
accessed other Equifax databases as they searched for other 
systems containing PII. They eventually found a data repository 
that also contained unencrypted usernames and passwords that 
allowed the hackers to access additional Equifax databases. The 
information accessed primarily included names, Social Security 
numbers, birth dates, addresses, and, in some instances, 
driver's license and credit card numbers.
    The usernames and passwords the hackers found were saved on 
a file share by Equifax employees. Equifax told the 
Subcommittee that it decided to structure its networks this way 
in an effort to support efficient business operations.
    In addition, Equifax did not have basic tools in place to 
detect and identify changes to files, a protection which would 
have generated real-time alerts and detected the unauthorized 
changes the hackers were making.
    Equifax Waited Six Weeks Before Notifying the Public It Was 
Breached. Equifax employees discovered the suspicious activity 
that was later determined to be a data breach on July 29, 2017. 
Equifax's then-Chief Executive Officer, Richard Smith, learned 
of the breach on July 31 and that consumer PII maintained by 
Equifax had likely been stolen on August 15, 2017. Mr. Smith 
waited until August 22 to begin notifying members of Equifax's 
Board of Directors. Equifax publicly announced the data breach 
on September 7, six weeks after learning of it and nearly four 
months after the hackers entered Equifax's networks. Because 
Equifax was unaware of all the assets it owned, unable to patch 
the Apache Struts vulnerability, and unable to detect attacks 
on key portions of its network, for months consumers were 
unaware that criminals had obtained their most sensitive 
personal and financial information and that they should take 
steps to protect themselves from fraud. Equifax officials say 
the company chose to notify the public only after determining 
every single individual impacted by the breach.
    There is no national uniform standard requiring a private 
entity to notify affected individuals in the event of a data 
breach. Instead, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 
several U.S. territories have enacted their own legislation 
requiring public disclosure of security breaches of PII. Some 
states require notification after any breach of non-encrypted 
personal information, while others require notification only if 
the breach is likely to cause ``substantial harm'' to 
individuals. Some states require companies to notify affected 
individuals within a set number of days, while others simply 
require private entities to provide notice ``without 
unreasonable delay.'' This creates a patchwork of uncertainty 
for companies and consumers responding to data breaches. For 
example, Target, one of the largest retail chains in the United 
States, notified the public seven days after learning that it 
suffered a data breach. By contrast, Yahoo! suffered data 
breaches in 2013 and 2014, but did not disclose them until 2016 
and 2017, respectively.
    Equifax Executives Believe They Did All They Could to 
Prevent the Breach. The Subcommittee interviewed current and 
former Equifax employees from the information security and IT 
departments. Their responses varied, but most said they believe 
that the security team's actions were an appropriate response 
to the Apache Struts vulnerability. The Director of Global 
Threats and Vulnerability Management from 2014 to 2017 said 
``security wasn't first'' at Equifax before the data breach, 
but that the data breach ``made everyone focus on it more.'' 
The former Countermeasures Manager in place from 2016 to 2017 
said he believes the response to the vulnerability was ``not 
only defensible, but justifiable.'' The CIO at Equifax from 
2010 to 2017 oversaw the company employees responsible for 
installing patches but said he was never made aware of the 
Apache Struts vulnerability and does not understand why the 
vulnerability ``was not caught.'' He does not think Equifax 
could have done anything differently.
    TransUnion and Experian Avoided a Breach. TransUnion and 
Experian received the same information as the public and 
Equifax regarding the Apache Struts vulnerability, but the 
approach that each company took to cybersecurity was different 
from Equifax's. Both companies had deployed software to verify 
the installation of security patches, ran scans more 
frequently, and maintained an IT asset inventory. In response 
to the Apache Struts vulnerability, TransUnion began patching 
vulnerable versions of the software within days. Experian 
retained a software security firm in March 2017 to conduct 
targeted vulnerability scans of Apache Struts vulnerabilities. 
After finding an Experian server was running a vulnerable 
version, Experian took the server offline and began patching 
it. There is no indication that TransUnion or Experian were 
attacked by hackers seeking to exploit the Apache Struts 
vulnerability.
    Equifax Failed to Preserve Key Internal Chat Records. 
Equifax was unable to produce potentially responsive documents 
related to the data breach because the company failed to take 
steps to preserve records created on an internal chat platform. 
Equifax's document retention policy requires the company to 
preserve several types of documents for different periods of 
time. In general, Equifax employees are required to preserve 
all business records, unless they are considered ``disposable'' 
under the policy. The policy also gives the Equifax legal 
department the authority to halt the disposal of any records 
that are subject to a legal hold due to litigation or a 
government investigation.
    During its investigation, the Subcommittee learned that 
Equifax employees conducted substantive discussions of the 
discovery and mitigation of the data breach using Microsoft 
Lync, an instant messaging product. Equifax's policy was that 
records of these chats were disposable. As such, Equifax 
maintained the default setting on the chat platform not to 
archive chats. After discovering the data breach on July 29, 
2017, Equifax did not issue a legal hold for related documents 
until August 22, 2017. Despite the legal hold, Equifax did not 
change the default setting on the Lync platform and begin 
archiving chats until September 15, 2017. As a result, the 
Subcommittee does not have a complete record of documents 
concerning the breach.

C. Federal Cybersecurity: America's Data at Risk, June 25, 2019 (Report 
        Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent 
        Subcommittee on Investigations)

    In June 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 95-page 
bipartisan report reviewing Federal Government agencies' 
compliance with basic cybersecurity standards found in the 
Federal Information Security Management Act. A summary of the 
staff report is found below.
    Federal Government agencies are the frequent target of 
cybersecurity attacks. From 2006 to 2015, the number of cyber 
incidents reported by Federal agencies increased by more than 
1,300 percent. In 2017 alone, Federal agencies reported 35,277 
cyber incidents. The Government Accountability Office (``GAO'') 
has included cybersecurity on its ``high risk'' list every year 
since 1997.
    No agency is immune to attack and the list of Federal 
agencies compromised by hackers continues to grow. In the past 
five years, agencies reporting data breaches include the United 
States Postal Service, the Internal Revenue Service, and even 
the White House. One of the largest breaches of government 
information occurred in 2015 when a hacker ex-filtrated over 22 
million security clearance files from the Office of Personnel 
Management (``OPM''). Those files contained extensive personal 
and potentially comprising information. We may never know the 
full impact on our national security of the OPM breach.
    The number of data breaches agencies have reported in 
recent years is not surprising given the current cybersecurity 
posture of the Federal Government. A recent report by the 
Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') made clear that 
agencies ``do not understand and do not have the resources to 
combat the current threat environment.'' This is especially 
concerning given the information agencies must collect and 
hold. This report documents the extent to which the Federal 
Government is the target of cybersecurity attacks, how key 
Federal agencies have failed to address vulnerabilities in 
their IT infrastructure, and how these failures have left 
America's sensitive personal information unsafe and vulnerable 
to theft.
    Federal agencies hold sensitive information. The Federal 
Government holds extensive amounts of highly personal 
information on most Americans. For example, the Department of 
Education collects financial data on students and parents 
applying for college loans. Disabled Americans prove they are 
entitled to disability benefits from the Social Security 
Administration by providing years of health records documenting 
medical issues. Prospective homeowners provide payroll and 
savings information to the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development to qualify for home loans. The Department of 
Homeland Security maintains travel records on citizens 
traveling abroad and returning to the United States.
    Federal agencies also hold information pertaining to 
national security and other vital government functions, some of 
which could be dangerous in the wrong hands. The Department of 
State holds and vets visa information for foreign nationals 
applying to come to the United States. The Department of 
Transportation certifies aircraft through the review of 
aircraft design, flight test information, and maintenance and 
operational suitability. The Department of Agriculture 
maintains information on hazardous pathogens and toxins that 
could threaten animals or plants.
    Protecting this information from cybersecurity attacks 
could not be more important.
    Congress required OMB and agencies to secure Federal 
networks. In 2002, Congress recognized the importance of 
protecting information held by the government by passing the 
Federal Information Security Management Act. That law put OMB 
in charge of Federal cybersecurity, required agencies to 
provide cybersecurity training for employees, and mandated 
agencies develop procedures for identifying, reporting, and 
responding to cyber incidents. Twelve years later, in 2014, 
Congress updated the law through the Federal Information 
SecurityModernization Act (``FISMA''). The new law reaffirmed 
OMB's ultimate authority over Federal cybersecurity and its 
responsibility for guiding and overseeing agencies' individual 
cybersecurity efforts. It also directed the Department of 
Homeland Security (``DHS'') to ``administer the implementation 
of agency [cyber] security policies and practices.'' This 
includes activities related to monitoring Federal networks and 
detecting and preventing attacks aimed at Federal agencies. DHS 
also develops directives implementing OMB cybersecurity 
policies. These directives mandate that Federal agencies take 
certain actions to protect information and systems from 
emerging cybersecurity threats. In doing so, DHS consults with 
the National Institute of Science and Technology's (``NIST'') 
to ensure its directives are consistent with NIST's 
cybersecurity framework. That framework ``is a risk-based 
approach to managing cybersecurity risk'' with five core 
functions essential to an effective approach to cybersecurity:

     (1) Identify (develop the organizational understanding to 
manage cybersecurity);
     (2) Protect (develop and implement the appropriate 
cybersecurity safeguards);
     (3) Detect (develop and implement the appropriate 
activities to identify a cybersecurity event);
     (4) Respond (develop and implement the appropriate 
activities to take action in response to the detection of a 
cybersecurity event); and
     (5) Recover (develop and implement the appropriate 
activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore any 
capabilities impaired due to a cybersecurity event).

    Congress also tasked each agency's Inspector General 
(``IG'') to annually audit compliance with basic cybersecurity 
standards based on the NIST cybersecurity framework. The 
Subcommittee reviewed the past ten years of audits for DHS and 
seven other agencies: (1) the Department of State (``State''); 
(2) the Department of Transportation (``DOT''); (3) the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (``HUD''); (4) the 
Department of Agriculture (``USDA''); (5) the Department of 
Health and Human Services (``HHS''); (6) the Department of 
Education (``Education''); and (7) the Social Security 
Administration (``SSA''). These seven agencies were cited by 
OMB as having the lowest ratings with regard to cybersecurity 
practices based on NIST's cybersecurity framework in fiscal 
year 2017.
    Agencies currently fail to comply with basic cybersecurity 
standards. During the Subcommittee's review, a number of 
concerning trends emerged regarding the eight agencies' failure 
to comply with basic NIST cybersecurity standards. In the most 
recent audits at the time, the IGs found that seven of the 
eight agencies reviewed by the Subcommittee failed to properly 
protect personally identifiable information (``PII''). Five of 
the eight agencies did not maintain a comprehensive and 
accurate list of information technology (``IT'') assets. 
Without a list of the agency's IT assets, the agency does not 
know all of the applications operating on its network. If the 
agency does not know the application is on its network, it 
cannot secure the application. Six of the eight agencies failed 
to install security patches. Vendors issue security patches to 
secure vulnerabilities. Hackers exploit these vulnerabilities 
during data breaches. Depending on the vulnerability and 
abilities of the hacker, the vulnerability may allow access to 
the agency's network. Multiple agencies, across multiple years, 
failed to ensure systems had valid authorities to operate. An 
authority to operate certifies that the system is in proper 
working order, including an analysis and acceptance of any risk 
the system may contain. All of the agencies used legacy systems 
that were costly and difficult to secure. Legacy systems are 
systems a vendor no longer supports or issues updates to patch 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
    The IG audits identified several highly concerning issues 
at certain agencies. For example, the Education IG found that 
since 2011, the agency was unable to prevent unauthorized 
outside devices from easily connecting to the agency's network. 
In its 2018 audit, the IG found the agency had managed to 
restrict unauthorized access to 90 seconds, but explained that 
this was enough time for a malicious actor to ``launch an 
attack or gain intermittent access to internal network 
resources that could lead to'' exposing the agency's data. This 
is concerning because that agency holds PII on millions of 
Americans.
    Agencies historically failed to comply with cybersecurity 
standards. The failures cited above are not new. Inspectors 
General have cited many of these same vulnerabilities for the 
past decade. The IGs identified several common historical 
failures at the eight agencies reviewed by the Subcommittee:
    Protection of PII. Several agencies failed to properly 
protect the PII entrusted to their care. These agencies 
included State, DOT, HUD, Education, and SSA. The HUD IG has 
noted this issue in nine of the last eleven audits.
    Comprehensive list of IT assets. The IGs identified a 
persistent issue with agencies failing to maintain an accurate 
and comprehensive inventory of its IT assets. In the last 
decade, IGs identified this as a recurrent problem for State, 
DOT, HUD, HHS, and SSA.
    Remediation of cyber vulnerabilities. Over the past decade, 
IGs for all eight agencies reviewed by the Subcommittee found 
each agency failed to timely remediate cyber vulnerabilities 
and apply security patches. For example, the HUD and State IGs 
identified the failure to patch security vulnerabilities seven 
of the last ten annual audits. HHS and Education cybersecurity 
audits highlighted failures to apply security patches eight out 
of ten years. For the last nine years, USDA failed to timely 
apply patches. Both DHS and DOT failed to properly apply 
security patches for the last ten consecutive years.
    Authority to operate. The IGs identified multiple agencies 
that failed to ensure systems had valid authorities to operate. 
These included DHS, DOT, HUD, USDA, HHS, and Education. For 
example, HHS systems lacked valid authorities to operate for 
the last nine consecutive audits. Additionally, the DHS IG 
determined that DHS operated systems without valid authorities 
in seven of the last ten audits. As stated, DHS is the agency 
in charge of securing the networks of all other government 
agencies.
    Overreliance on legacy systems. The extensive use of legacy 
systems was also a common issue identified by IGs. All eight 
agencies examined by the Subcommittee relied on legacy systems. 
For example, the DHS IG noted the use of unsupported operating 
systems for at least the last four years, including Windows XP 
and Windows 2003.
    The President's 2019 budget request addressed the risks 
associated with agencies' reliance on:

    [A]ging legacy systems, [which] pose efficiency, 
cybersecurity, and mission risk issues, such as ever-rising 
costs to maintain them and an inability to meet current or 
expected mission requirements. Legacy systems may also operate 
with known security vulnerabilities that are either technically 
difficult or prohibitively expensive to address and thus may 
hinder agencies' ability to comply with critical cybersecurity 
statutory and policy requirements.

    OMB also recently confirmed the risks legacy systems pose. 
In May 2018, OMB published the Federal Cybersecurity Risk 
Determination Report and Action Plan. OMB explained that the 
two most substantial issues contributing to agency risk were 
the ``abundance of legacy information technology, which is 
difficult and expensive to protect, as well as shortages of 
experienced and capable cybersecurity personnel.'' That report 
found that 71 of 96 agencies surveyed (or 74 percent) had 
cybersecurity programs at risk. Twelve of those 71 agencies had 
programs at high risk.
    Chief Information Officer. In an effort to prioritize 
agency cybersecurity, Congress established the position of 
Chief Information Officer (``CIO'') in 1996. Since then, 
Congress has increased the responsibilities of agency CIOs 
several times. The most recent attempts were included in FISMA 
and the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act, 
which gave CIOs plenary governance over an agency's IT budget 
and priorities. Despite these authorities, agencies still 
struggle with empowering the CIO. In August 2018, GAO found 
that none of the 24 major agencies--including the eight 
examined by the Subcommittee--properly addressed the role of 
CIO as Congress directed. These 24 agencies included the eight 
agencies reviewed by the Subcommittee in this report.
    Given the sustained vulnerabilities identified by numerous 
Inspectors General, the Subcommittee finds that the Federal 
Government has not fully achieved its legislative mandate under 
FISMA and is failing to implement basic cybersecurity standards 
necessary to protect America's sensitive data.

D. The True Cost of Government Shutdowns, September 17, 2019 (Report 
        Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent 
        Subcommittee on Investigations)

    On September 17, 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 180-
page bipartisan report regarding the cost to American taxpayers 
of the last three government shutdowns and the resulting 
impacts on the economy and core government functions. A summary 
of the findings of the staff report is found below.
    The Constitution grants Congress the power of the purse. 
Specifically, Congress has the sole responsibility to raise 
revenue and appropriate money to fund the Federal Government. 
When Congress and the President fail to reach agreement on 
legislation to appropriate funds, affected Federal agencies 
shut down and suspend most activities. During this time, 
Federal law prevents most Federal employees from working and 
most are sent home without pay. In recent shutdowns, however, 
the spending legislation ultimately agreed upon by Congress and 
the President provided back pay for Federal employees. As such, 
the American taxpayer funded furloughed Federal employees' 
salaries for the duration of each shutdown, even when employees 
were not permitted to go to work.
    This report documents the cost to the American taxpayer of 
the last three government shutdowns. Federal workers were 
furloughed and unable to work for 54 days during those three 
government shutdowns. The Subcommittee surveyed 26 Federal 
agencies and found the last three government shutdowns cost 
taxpayers nearly $4 billion--at least $3.7 billion in back pay 
to furloughed Federal workers, and at least $338 million in 
other costs associated with the shutdowns, including extra 
administrative work, lost revenue, and late fees on interest 
payments. Agencies reported to the Subcommittee that the 
combined total of furlough days during all three shutdowns was 
about 14,859,144, representing an estimated 56,938 years of 
lost productivity for those agency employees. These figures, 
however, do not include data from some of the largest 
government agencies, which were unable to provide complete 
shutdown cost estimates to the Subcommittee, including the 
Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Justice, and Commerce and 
the Environmental Protection Agency.
    This report also documents the impacts that shutdowns have 
on important core government functions.
    Congress created a process to pass appropriations to fund 
the Federal Government. Under the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the budget process begins the 
first Monday in February with the President sending the House 
of Representatives and Senate Budget Committees a proposed 
budget. This proposed budget is the President's recommendation 
for funding the government the following fiscal year, which 
begins October 1. The Budget Committees consider that request 
and develop their own budget proposal. The full House and 
Senate are then required to pass a formal budget resolution 
outlining topline spending levels by April 15. The House and 
Senate Appropriations Committees then pass and send 
appropriations bills to the full House and Senate for 
consideration; the process divides funding for the entire 
government into 12 separate bills. Each of the 12 regular 
appropriations bills must pass both chambers, and the two 
chambers work out any differences in the bills in conference. 
Once the House and Senate pass the same versions of an 
appropriations bill, Congress sends the bill to the President 
for signature.
    Congress designed this process to orderly fund the Federal 
Government as it determines what programs to fund and the 
funding allocated to each program. This process also allows the 
President to make recommendations for program funding levels 
and permits agencies to plan for the year ahead. Today, that 
orderly process is rarely followed.
    The Federal Government routinely operates on temporary 
continuing resolutions. Ideally, Congress and the President 
complete the budget process before the end of the fiscal year 
and enact all 12 appropriations bills before October 1. Since 
1997, however, some or all of the executive branch has operated 
under a continuing resolution or ``CR.'' A CR provides 
temporary funding when Congress is unable to pass a 
comprehensive budget. Since 1997, Congress has passed 117 CRs 
to temporarily fund the government--often passing multiple CRs 
each fiscal year. The CRs have ranged in duration from one day 
to the entire fiscal year.
    When Congress cannot pass the 12 appropriations bills or a 
CR, the portion of the government without appropriated funding 
shuts down. In the last five years, this has occurred three 
times resulting in three government shutdowns: 16 days in 
October 2013; 3 days in January 2018; and most recently, 35 
days from December 2018 to January 2019.
    Rather than saving taxpayer money, shutdowns produce 
significant costs to the American taxpayer. While Federal 
workers are not paid during a shutdown, Congress routinely 
provides full back pay to those workers when it ultimately 
passes appropriations. The government pays Federal workers for 
the time they were furloughed and unable to work due to the 
shutdown. However, the American taxpayer incurs significant 
lost productivity costs due to the furlough. Federal agencies 
reported they were unable to perform important functions during 
the shutdowns, including:
    Investigations of bad actors who were potentially breaking 
Federal laws were suspended, including investigations by the 
Departments of Justice and Treasury, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. 
Investigators were unable to pursue leads, develop evidence of 
crimes, or bring enforcement actions against individuals and 
corporate entities for bad acts.

      The Department of Justice canceled approximately 
60,000 immigration hearings for non-detained aliens scheduled 
to take place during the FY 2019 shutdown. This delay likely 
extended the current two-year wait time for individuals waiting 
for a hearing to determine their immigration status.
      The Consumer Product Safety Commission (``CPSC'') 
tabled any outstanding decisions regarding the recall of 
potentially dangerous consumer products, leaving potentially 
dangerous products on the market and available to consumers. No 
recalls were posted on the CPSC website during the FY 2019 
shutdown. A recall notice posted on February 5, 2019 after the 
shutdown noted that a drill posing a shock hazard to consumers 
was ``previously announced independently on January 10, 2019 by 
the firm due to the government furlough.''
      National Parks, including Yellowstone National 
Park and Grand Canyon National Park, were either closed or 
unattended. Park visitors either had no access to parks or 
encountered unattended parks with overflowing trashcans. The 
lack of park attendants and rangers left sensitive habitats 
vulnerable to damage. Nor were park rangers on site to help 
lost or injured park visitors.
      The Smithsonian Institution closed museums during 
certain shutdowns. Tourists could not see any of the world-
renowned paintings in the National Gallery of Art in 
Washington, D.C. Nor were they able to access other popular 
destinations like the National Museum of American History and 
the National Air and Space Museum. With its museums closed, the 
Smithsonian also lost significant revenue from its on-site 
shops, theaters, and dining facilities.

    Some agencies could not determine the cost of the shutdown. 
The Subcommittee based its cost estimate of nearly $4 billion 
on the information provided by 26 Federal agencies. Some 
agencies, however, were unable to provide one or more 
categories of the requested financial information. For example, 
the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Justice, Commerce, and 
the Environmental Protection Agency did not know the amount 
paid to employees in back pay following certain shutdowns. 
Other agencies were unable to provide information about other 
costs associated with shutdown impacts such as extra 
administrative work, lost revenue, project delays, and late 
payment fees. Therefore, certain shutdown costs from those 
agencies are not included in the Subcommittee's estimate.
    The cost of a shutdown to the national economy. Shutting 
down the government also affects the national economy. The 
Congressional Budget Office (``CBO'') determined the most 
recent partial shutdown ``delayed approximately $18 billion in 
Federal discretionary spending for compensation and purchases 
of goods and services and suspended some Federal services.'' As 
a result of this reduced spending, the Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that the shutdown reduced real GDP in the 
fourth quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019 to what it 
would have been otherwise by $3 billion and $8 billion, 
respectively. CBO explained that real GDP should have grown at 
a significantly faster rate if the shutdown had been averted. 
Specifically, CBO quantified the effect of the partial shutdown 
on the rate of annualized real GDP growth at 0.4 percent in the 
first quarter of 2019, finding that quarterly real GDP growth 
would have been 3.5 percent instead of the 3.1 percent that 
actually occurred.

E. Abuses of the Federal Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Process, October 
        24, 2019 (Report Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs 
        of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and released in 
        conjunction with the Subcommittee's hearing on October 24, 
        2019)

    In October 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 33-page 
bipartisan report examining that documents abuses of the 
Federal Government's online regulatory comment systems and the 
government's lack of sufficient response to those abuses. A 
summary of the findings of the report is found below.
    Federal agencies depend on relevant, substantive 
information from a wide variety of parties to assist them in 
developing and updating Federal regulations. This information 
includes comments submitted by members of the public, 
businesses, non-profit organizations, and academics. This 
process, known as ``notice-and-comment rulemaking,'' 
transitioned from paper to the internet in the early 2000s. As 
a result, the public has more opportunity than ever to engage 
in the Federal rulemaking process by reviewing electronic 
regulatory dockets and submitting comments through portals like 
Regulations.gov and the Federal Communications Commission's 
(``FCC'') Electronic Comment Filing System (``ECFS'').
    Like many popular news and social media websites, the 
Federal Government's commenting systems have at times become 
fora for profane, threatening, and abusive commentary. Recent 
high-profile agency dockets have hosted profanity and threats 
directed at agency officials and comments submitted falsely 
under another person's identity. They have even been disrupted 
by commenters submitting voluminous materials with the seeming 
intention of overloading the system and disrupting the comment 
period. The Federal agencies that host these platforms have not 
yet found ways to cope with these abuses, which reduces the 
effectiveness of the notice-and-comment process; costs taxpayer 
funds to mitigate; allows identity theft-related crimes to go 
unaddressed; and leaves the rulemaking process vulnerable to 
disruptive activity.
    After the FCC received nearly 24 million comments in the 
course of just one rulemaking proceeding in 2017 and its 
website crashed due to the volume of comments submitted 
simultaneously, the Subcommittee initiated a review of Federal 
commenting systems to understand their flaws and develop 
recommendations to improve them.
    In February 2021, the General Services Administration (GSA) 
announced that it plans to adopt many of the recommendations 
made in the report. For example, the staff report found that 
Federal agencies did not have a means to prevent people from 
using false identities to post comments or using bots to 
facilitate abusive mass comment campaigns to overwhelm comment 
systems or generate the appearance of a grassroots response to 
a proposed regulation. The report recommended implementing 
CAPTCHA-like technologies on regulatory comment systems and 
developing ways to prevent people from submitting comments 
under false identities. GSA announced it is implementing 
reCAPTCHA and an Application Programming Interface to increase 
security around large comment campaigns.

F. Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China's Talent Recruitment 
        Plans, November 18, 2019 (Report Prepared by the Majority and 
        Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
        and released in conjunction with the Subcommittee's hearing on 
        November 19, 2019)

    In November 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 105-page 
bipartisan report documenting how American taxpayers have been 
unwittingly funding the rise of China's economy and military 
over the last two decades while Federal agencies have done 
little to stop it. A summary of the report's findings is found 
below.
    American taxpayers contribute over $150 billion each year 
to scientific research in the United States. Through entities 
like the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes 
of Health and the Department of Energy's National Labs, 
taxpayers fund innovations that contribute to our national 
security and profoundly change the way we live. America built 
this successful research enterprise on certain values: 
reciprocity, integrity, merit-based competition, and 
transparency. These values foster a free exchange of ideas, 
encourage the most rigorous research results to flourish, and 
ensure that researchers receive the benefit of their 
intellectual capital. The open nature of research in America is 
manifest; we encourage our researchers and scientists to 
``stand on the shoulders of giants.'' In turn, America attracts 
the best and brightest. Foreign researchers and scholars travel 
to the United States just to participate in the advancement of 
science and technology.
    Some countries, however, seek to exploit America's openness 
to advance their own national interests. The most aggressive of 
them has been China. China primarily does this through its more 
than 200 talent recruitment plans--the most prominent of which 
is the Thousand Talents Plan. Launched in 2008, the Thousand 
Talents Plan incentivizes individuals engaged in research and 
development in the United States to transmit the knowledge and 
research they gain here to China in exchange for salaries, 
research funding, lab space, and other incentives. China 
unfairly uses the American research and expertise it obtains 
for its own economic and military gain. In recent years, 
Federal agencies have discovered talent recruitment plan 
members who downloaded sensitive electronic research files 
before leaving to return to China, submitted false information 
when applying for grant funds, and willfully failed to disclose 
receiving money from the Chinese government on U.S. grant 
applications.
    This report exposed how American taxpayer funded research 
has contributed to China's global rise over the last 20 years. 
During that time, China openly recruited U.S.-based 
researchers, scientists, and experts in the public and private 
sector to provide China with knowledge and intellectual capital 
in exchange for monetary gain and other benefits. At the same 
time, the Federal Government's grant-making agencies did little 
to prevent this from happening, nor did the FBI and other 
Federal agencies develop a coordinated response to mitigate the 
threat.These failures continue to undermine the integrity of 
the American research enterprise and endanger our national 
security.
    China aims to be the world's leader in science and 
technology (``S&T'') by 2050. To achieve its S&T goals, China 
has implemented a whole-of-government campaign to recruit 
talent and foreign experts from around the world. China's 
campaign is well financed. According to an analysis by the FBI, 
China has pledged to spend 15 percent of its gross domestic 
product on improving human resources from 2008 to 2020. That 
amounts to an investment of more than $2 trillion. For the 
Chinese government, international scientific collaboration is 
not about advancing science, it is to advance China's national 
security interests.
    China's Talent Recruitment Plans. Foreign trained 
scientists and experts provide China access to know-how, 
expertise, and foreign technology--all necessary for China's 
economic development and military modernization. While China 
has created and manages more than 200 talent recruitment plans, 
this report focuses on the Thousand Talents Plan. China 
designed the Thousand Talents Plan to recruit 2,000 high-
quality overseas talents, including scientists, engineers, 
entrepreneurs, and finance experts. The plan provides salaries, 
research funding, lab space, and other incentives to lure 
experts into researching for China. According to one report, by 
2017, China dramatically exceeded its recruitment goal, having 
recruited more than 7,000 ``high-end professionals,'' including 
several Nobel laureates.
    The Chinese Communist Party (the ``Party'') plays a lead 
role in administering the Thousand Talents Plan. The Party 
recognized the need to control overseas talent recruitment 
efforts to ensure the program served its priorities. The Party 
created a ``complex system of administration and oversight to 
coordinate its recruitment efforts.'' The Party is able to 
``exert exceptional'' levels of control over the Thousand 
Talents Plan and other talent recruitment plans. To ensure 
control, Thousand Talents Plan members sign legally binding 
contracts.
    Contracting with the Chinese Government. Thousand Talent 
Plan members sign legally binding contracts with Chinese 
institutions, like universities and research institutions. The 
contracts can incentivize members to lie on grant applications 
to U.S. grant-making agencies, set up ``shadow labs'' in China 
working on research identical to their U.S. research, and, in 
some cases, transfer U.S. scientists' hard-earned intellectual 
capital. Some of the contracts also contain nondisclosure 
provisions and require the Chinese government's permission to 
terminate the agreement, giving the Chinese government 
significant leverage over talent recruitment plan members. 
These provisions are in stark contrast to the U.S. research 
community's basic norms, values, and principles. Annexed to 
this report are Chinese talent recruitment plan contracts that 
illustrate exactly what talent recruitment plan members agree 
to when they become members.
    Case Examples. This report included selected examples from 
U.S. grantmaking agencies involving Chinese talent recruitment 
plan members. For example, talent recruitment plan members 
removed 30,000 electronic files before leaving for China, 
submitted false information when applying for grant funds, 
filed a patent based on U.S. government-funded research, and 
hired other Chinese talent recruitment plan members to work on 
U.S. national security topics. One Chinese talent recruitment 
plan member stole proprietary defense information related 
toU.S. military jet engines, and others have contractually 
agreed to give Chinese institutions intellectual property 
rights that overlapped with research conducted at U.S. 
institutions. Case examples provided by several Federal 
agencies were included with the report.
    Talent Plans Go Underground. Following public testimony and 
U.S. government scrutiny, the Chinese government started 
deleting online references to the Thousand Talents Plan in 
October 2018. For example, China deleted news articles 
featuring Thousand Talents Plan members, Chinese universities 
stopped promoting the program on their websites, and the 
official Thousand Talent Plan site deleted the names of 
scientists participating in the program. The Chinese government 
has also instructed talent recruitment organizations that ``the 
phrase `Thousand Talents Plan' should not appear in written 
circulars/notices.'' Despite this censorship, China's talent 
recruitment plans continue.
    The Subcommittee reviewed seven Federal agencies' efforts 
to mitigate the threat that Chinese talent recruitment plans 
pose to the U.S. research enterprise, including U.S.-funded 
research. While China has a strategic plan to acquire knowledge 
and intellectual property from researchers, scientists, and the 
U.S. private sector, the U.S. government does not have a 
comprehensive strategy to combat this threat.
    The National Science Foundation (``NSF'') funds 
approximately 27 percent of all federally funded basic research 
at U.S. colleges and universities, leading to 12,000 annual 
awards to more than 40,000 recipients. In light of Chinese 
talent recruitment plan members' misappropriation of NSF 
funding, NSF has taken several steps--albeit insufficient 
ones--to mitigate this risk. As of July 2019, NSF policy 
prohibits Federal employees from participating in foreign 
talent recruitment plans, but the policy does not apply to NSF-
funded researchers. These NSF-funded researchers are the 
individuals mostly likely to be members of foreign talent 
recruitment plans. The NSF also does not vet grantees before 
awarding them funding. Instead, NSF relies on sponsoring 
institutions to vet and conduct due diligence on potential 
grantees. NSF has no dedicated staff to ensure compliance with 
NSF grant terms.
    The National Institutes of Health (``NIH'') invests over 
$31 billion annually in medical research through 50,000 
competitive grants to more than 300,000 researchers. NIH has 
recently found instances of talent recruitment plan members 
committing grant fraud and transferring intellectual capital 
and property. It also found possible malign foreign influence 
in its peer review process. NIH has attempted to address these 
issues, but significant gaps in NIH's grant integrity process 
remain. Much like the NSF, NIH relies on institutions to 
solicit and review disclosures of financial conflicts by its 
employees participating in NIH-funded research. Unlike the NSF, 
the NIH has a Division of Grants Compliance and Oversight that 
conducts site visits at institutions to advance compliance and 
provide oversight. The number of oversight visits to 
institutions has fallen from 28 in 2012 to only three last 
year. NIH officials remain concerned that China's talent 
recruitment plans are more pervasive than what they have 
uncovered to date.
    The Department of Energy (``Energy'') is the largest 
Federal sponsor of basic research in the physical sciences. 
Energy awards $6.6 billion in grants and contracts annually 
that support over 25,000 researchers at over 300 institutions 
and National Labs. Energy's research funding and prominent role 
in advanced research and development make it particularly 
attractive to the Chinese government. Energy has recently 
identified Thousand Talent Plan members working on sensitive 
research at National Labs and Thousand Talent Plan members with 
security clearances. Energy has been slow to address 
vulnerabilities surrounding the openness of its National Labs 
and its scientific collaboration with the 35,000 foreign 
nationals who conduct research at the National Labs each year. 
For example, in December 2018, Energy began requiring all 
foreign nationals' curricula vitae be included in Foreign 
Visits and Assignments requests to Energy facilities as well as 
in the Foreign Access Central Tracking System database. Despite 
30-year old Federal regulations prohibiting U.S. government 
employees from receiving foreign compensation, Energy clarified 
only this year that employees and contractors are prohibited 
from participating in foreign talent recruitment plans.
    The State Department (``State'') issues nonimmigrant visas 
(``NIV'') to foreign nationals seeking to visit the United 
States to study, work, or conduct research. It is on the front 
line in the U.S. government efforts to protect against 
intellectual property theft and illicit technology transfers. 
While State has a process to review NIV applicants attempting 
to violate export control laws, State's authority to deny visas 
is limited. State's review process leads to less than five 
percent of reviewed applicants being denied a visa. Nor does 
State systematically track visa applicants linked to China's 
talent recruitment plans, even though some applicants linked to 
Chinese talent recruitment plans have engaged in intellectual 
property theft.
    The Department of Commerce's (``Commerce'') Bureau of 
Industry and Security conducts assessments of defense-related 
technologies and ``administers export controls of dual-use 
items which have both military and commercial applications.'' 
Commerce is also responsible for issuing deemed export licenses 
to firms that employ or host foreign nationals seeking to work 
on controlled technology projects. The Subcommittee found that 
Commerce rarely denies an application for a deemed export 
license. Commerce's denial rate in 2018 for deemed export 
licenses was only 1.1 percent. Commerce officials told the 
Subcommittee that it has not revoked a deemed export license in 
the past five years, despite the recent listing of new entities 
on Commerce's Entity List that require additional scrutiny. 
Commerce issued deemed export licenses to Chinese nationals who 
participated in talent recruitment plans, had ties to Huawei, 
and were affiliated with other concerning entities.
    The Federal Bureau of Investigation (``FBI'') protects the 
United States from foreign intelligence operations and 
espionage. The FBI, however, has recognized that it was ``was 
slow to recognize the threat of the Chinese Talent Plans.'' It 
was not until mid-2018, however, that FBI headquarters in 
Washington, D.C. took control of the FBI's response to the 
threat. Moreover, after collecting information on suspected 
talent plan participants, the FBI waited nearly two years to 
coordinate and provide those details to Federal grant-making 
agencies. This delay likely prevented the Federal Government 
from identifying talent recruitment plan members who engaged in 
illegal or unethical grant practices or the unauthorized 
transfer of technology. The FBI has yet to develop an 
effective, nationwide strategy to warn universities, government 
laboratories, and the broader public of the risks of foreign 
talent recruitment plans.
    The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 
(``OSTP'') has formal authority to convene all research funding 
agencies on matters of policy through the National Science and 
Technology Council. OSTP formally established a joint committee 
in May 2019 to begin a policy review to coordinate efforts to 
adopt best practices across the Federal Government to mitigate 
foreign exploitation of the U.S. open innovation system. This 
review is intended to develop a longer-term strategy for 
balancing engagement and risk without stifling innovation. The 
U.S. government's vast and varied array of grant-making 
agencies complicates this policy review.
    As American policy makers navigate an increasingly 
complicated relationship with China, it is not in our national 
security interest to fund China's economic and military 
development with taxpayer dollars. China's talent recruitment 
plans, including the Thousand Talents Plan, undermine the 
integrity of our research enterprise and harm our economic and 
national security interests.
    U.S. universities and U.S.-based researchers must take 
responsibility in addressing this threat. If U.S. universities 
can vet employees for scientific rigor or allegations of 
plagiarism, they also can vet for financial conflicts of 
interests and foreign sources of funding. If U.S. researchers 
can assess potential collaborators' research aptitude and their 
past publications, they should know their collaborators' 
affiliations and their research intentions.
    The U.S. academic community is in the crosshairs of not 
only foreign competitors contending for the best and brightest, 
but also of foreign nation states that seek to transfer 
valuable intellectual capital and steal intellectual property. 
As the academic community looks to the Federal Government for 
guidance and direction on mitigating threats, the U.S. 
government must provide effective, useful, timely, and specific 
threat information and tools to counter the threats. Based on 
this investigation, the Subcommittee finds that the Federal 
Government has failed to stop China from acquiring knowledge 
and intellectual property from U.S. taxpayer funded researchers 
and scientists. Nor do Federal agencies have a comprehensive 
strategy to combat this threat.
    Findings and recommendations associated with this staff 
report led to the Safeguarding American Innovation Act.

G. Continuity of Senate Operations and Remote Voting in Times of 
        Crisis, April 29, 2020 (Report Prepared by the Majority and 
        Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
        released in conjunction with the Subcommittee's roundtable on 
        April 30, 2020)

    In April 2020, as the country dealt with the COVID-19 
pandemic, the Subcommittee released a 29-page joint memorandum 
examines the possibility of amending the Standing Rules of the 
Senate to allow senators to participate and vote remotely 
during a national crisis. A summary of the bipartisan 
memorandum is found below.
    The COVID-19 virus has shut down major sectors of our 
society, including many functions of Congress. By rule and 
custom, the two chambers of Congress have always met in person 
to conduct business, including committee hearings, floor 
deliberation, and voting. Neither chamber has contingency plans 
that allow those functions to proceed remotely, but this crisis 
highlights the need to consider means for Congress to do its 
job at times when it may not be safe for members and staff to 
gather in person.
    Some experts have expressed concerns about Congress 
operating remotely, particularly citing the importance of 
physically meeting together to facilitate the deliberative 
process and ensure broad participation in negotiations. Those 
concerns are valid: face-to-face communications and in-person 
meetings are the most effective way for Congress to conduct its 
business on a regular basis. Remote participation should never 
take the place of in-person participation except in the most 
limited circumstances--crises, affecting the entire country, 
that would otherwise hobble Congress's ability to act without 
this authority. The current nationwide pandemic requires 
Congress to consider how best to continue its operations, 
communicate, and pass necessary legislation safely.
    This memorandum provided: (1) a brief overview of 
congressional continuity efforts to date; (2) a description of 
Senate proposals to allow senators to participate and vote 
remotely; (3) a legal analysis of remote congressional 
proceedings; (4) a discussion of other jurisdictions that have 
implemented remote legislative procedures; and (5) a discussion 
of the technological security specifications the Senate should 
consider if it adopts a remote participation and voting system.

H. Threats to U.S. Networks: Oversight of Chinese Government-Owned 
        Carriers, June 9, 2020 (Report Prepared by the Majority and 
        Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on 
        Investigations)

    In June 2020, Subcommittee staff released a 104-page 
bipartisan report detailing how the Federal Government provided 
little-to-no oversight of Chinese state-owned 
telecommunications carriers operating in the United States for 
nearly twenty years. As demonstrated in prior PSI 
investigations, China routinely exploits the American education 
and scientific research sectors to further its national 
interest and engages in cyber-attacks against U.S. companies, 
like Equifax and Marriott. This report revealed how the 
telecommunications industry has been similarly targeted. A 
summary of the report's findings is found below.
    Information and telecommunications technologies bring the 
world closer together, allowing individuals and businesses 
nearly everywhere in the world to communicate with each other. 
The expansion of global telecommunications networks, in 
particular, acts as a driving force of economic development by 
affording individuals unprecedented access to information and 
opportunities. Understanding the increasing interconnectedness 
of society, the Federal Communications Commission (``FCC'')--
the Federal agency tasked with regulating the U.S. 
telecommunications industry--strives to open U.S. markets to 
foreign telecommunications carriers, where doing so is in the 
country's public interest. As a result, foreign-owned carriers 
have established operations within the United States.
    Not all international expansion of telecommunications 
carriers, however, is in the United States' national security 
interests. Some foreign governments seek to exploit the 
openness of America's telecommunications market to advance 
their own national interests. One such country is China. The 
Chinese government views telecommunications as a ``strategic'' 
industry. It has expended significant resources to create and 
promote new business opportunities for its state-owned carriers 
and has established barriers to market entry for foreign 
carriers seeking to operate in China. Today, three state-owned 
carriers dominate the Chinese telecommunications market: China 
Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom, commonly referred to 
as the `Big Three.'' In addition to shoring up a stable 
domestic market for these carriers, the Chinese government has 
encouraged its carriers to expand into global markets, 
including the United States. This expansion, however, raises 
national security concerns. U.S. government officials have 
warned that Chinese state-owned carriers are ``subject to 
exploitation, influence, and control by the Chinese 
government'' and can be used in the Chinese government's cyber 
and economic espionage efforts targeted at the United States.
    The operation of Chinese state-owned telecommunications 
carriers in the United States garnered public attention in May 
2019 after the FCC denied China Mobile International (USA) Inc. 
(``China Mobile USA'') the authority to provide international 
telecommunications services between the United States and 
foreign locations. The FCC premised its denial on national 
security concerns. This marked the first instance in which the 
FCC denied an application on national security grounds. 
Following that denial, the Subcommittee launched an 
investigation into how the U.S. Federal Government guards 
against risks posed by Chinese state-owned carriers already 
authorized to provide international telecommunications services 
between the United States and other points.
    This report detailed how the U.S. Federal Government--
particularly the FCC, Department of Justice (``DOJ''), and 
Department of Homeland Security (``DHS'')--historically 
exercised minimal oversight to safeguard U.S. 
telecommunications networks against risks posed by Chinese 
state-owned carriers. Three Chinese state-owned carriers have 
been operating in the United States since the early 2000s, but 
only in recent years have the FCC, DOJ, and DHS focused on 
potential risks associated with these carriers. DOJ and DHS did 
enter into security agreements with two of the Chinese state-
owned carriers prior to 2010, but they conducted only two site 
visits to each carrier since that time (or four total). Three 
of those visits occurred between 2017 and 2018. This lack of 
oversight undermined the safety of American communications and 
endangered our national security.
    Since the Subcommittee launched its investigation, the 
agencies have increased their oversight of the Chinese state-
owned carriers. The administration also issued an executive 
order establishing a formal committee to review the national 
security and law enforcement risks posed by foreign carriers 
operating in the United States. Still, the new committee's 
authorities remain limited, and as a result, our country, our 
privacy, and our information remain at risk.
    The Chinese government exerts control over China's domestic 
telecommunications industry and state-owned carriers. China 
aims to be a world leader in technology by 2050, including in 
the telecommunications sector. To achieve this goal, China 
controls who can provide domestic services by maintaining one 
of the most restrictive foreign investment regimes in the 
world. Although the Chinese government may publicly state that 
it is opening the telecommunications market, foreign companies 
are subject to burdensome regulatory requirements; required to 
enter into joint ventures majority owned by Chinese parties; 
and often forced to transfer both technology and know-how to 
Chinese counterparts. State-owned carriers are equally 
controlled, as the Chinese government selects their management, 
sets target returns and growth rates, and compels companies to 
put state interests ahead of the carriers' market interests.
    The Chinese government has encouraged state-owned 
telecommunications carriers to expand internationally. In 1999, 
the Chinese government issued a ``Go Out'' policy, through 
which it pledged financial support to entities to expand into 
global markets. Telecommunications carriers took advantage of 
this, with major state-owned carriers establishing operations 
across the world, including in the United States.
    The Chinese government targets the United States through 
cyber and economic espionage activities and enlists state-owned 
entities in these efforts. Many U.S. government officials have 
highlighted the ``persistent'' threat posed by China. As 
Assistant Attorney General of DOJ's National Security Division 
John Demers stated, China's ``overall economic policy [is to] 
develop[ ] China at American expense.'' U.S. government 
officials have also warned that China will use its state-owned 
carriers to further its national interests. At least one 
Chinese carrier is publicly alleged to have hijacked and 
rerouted communications data through China. This allows Chinese 
actors to access sensitive communications, regardless of 
whether the data is encrypted.
    The Subcommittee reviewed the Federal agencies responsible 
for regulating and monitoring foreign telecommunications 
carriers operating in the United States. Although foreign 
carriers have operated in the United States for decades, the 
U.S. government had no statutory authorities to monitor the 
risks associated with these carriers. This is especially 
evident when reviewing the agencies' oversight of Chinese 
state-owned carriers.
    The FCC regulates the U.S. telecommunications market. 
Carriers seeking to provide international telecommunications 
services between the United States and foreign points must 
apply for and obtain authorization from the FCC. The FCC's 
process is aimed at protecting the U.S. market from anti-
competitive behavior in foreign markets. Thus, in evaluating 
applications, the FCC considers whether the foreign carrier's 
proposed services are in the public interest. Once 
authorization is granted, the Subcommittee found that it 
effectively exists in perpetuity; the FCC does not periodically 
review existing authorizations.
    The FCC historically relied on ``Team Telecom'' to assess 
national security and law enforcement risks associated with a 
foreign carrier's provision of international telecommunications 
services. The FCC's public interest calculation involves 
weighing the national security, law enforcement, trade, and 
foreign policy implications associated with a foreign carrier's 
proposed services. The FCC has recognized, however, that it 
lacks the subject-matter expertise to evaluate these topics, 
and thus, it relies on certain Executive Branch agencies for 
guidance. For years, three agencies--DOJ, DHS, and the 
Department of Defense (``DOD''), which until recently were 
collectively referred to as ``Team Telecom''--were tasked with 
evaluating national security and law enforcement concerns. 
Where Team Telecom believed that risks may exist, it attempted 
to mitigate those risks through a security agreement with the 
foreign carrier. These agreements provided Team Telecom with 
oversight capabilities, including the right to visit the 
carrier's U.S.-based facilities. If Team Telecom opted not to 
enter into a security agreement with a foreign carrier, it had 
no insight into the carrier's operations.
    These measures were ineffective as Team Telecom lacked 
formal statutory authority, leaving its operations unstructured 
and ad hoc. Because of the lack of statutory authority, Team 
Telecom had no formal, written processes for reviewing 
applications or monitoring compliance with security agreements. 
The informality also resulted in protracted review periods and 
a process FCC commissioners described as ``broken'' and an 
``inextricable black hole'' that provided ``no clarity for 
[the] future.'' For example, Team Telecom's review of China 
Mobile USA's application lasted seven years. Further, the 
agencies did not dedicate sufficient resources to ensure Team 
Telecom conducted oversight in an efficient and effective 
manner. The components of DHS and DOJ responsible for Team 
Telecom together historically tasked three employees with 
reviewing applications and monitoring compliance with security 
agreements.
    In April 2020, as the Subcommittee was nearing the end of 
its investigation, the President issued Executive Order 13913, 
replacing the informal Team Telecom with the Committee for the 
Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States 
Telecommunications Services (``EO Telecom Committee''). The 
Executive Order seeks to address many of the shortcomings 
identified by the Subcommittee's investigation. The Executive 
Order requires members of the EO Telecom Committee to enter 
into a memorandum of understanding by July 3, 2020. Therefore, 
this report continues to refer to Team Telecom, even in 
relation to actions taken after April 4, 2020.
    Beginning in 2018, Team Telecom and the FCC publicly 
highlighted the national security concerns associated with 
Chinese state-owned carriers operating in the United States. 
China Mobile USA's application marked the first instance in 
which Team Telecom recommended that the FCC deny a foreign 
carrier authorization to provide international 
telecommunications services on national security grounds. In 
its denial, the FCC relied on Team Telecom's conclusion that 
China Mobile USA is ``subject to exploitation, influence, and 
control by the Chinese government.'' Such government control, 
Team Telecom warned, could advance the Chinese government's 
cyber and economic espionage activities targeted at the United 
States. Team Telecom specifically cautioned that China Mobile 
USA would build relationships with major U.S. carriers, through 
which it could gain access to U.S. networks and the sensitive 
public and private data transferred across those networks.
    At least three other Chinese state-owned carriers have been 
operating in the United States for decades. The U.S. 
subsidiaries of the two other Big Three carriers--China Telecom 
and China Unicom--along with a smaller state-affiliated 
provider ComNet (USA) LLC (``ComNet'') each received 
authorization to provide international telecommunications 
services in or prior to 2002 and have been operating ever 
since. During this time, these Chinese carriers have built 
relationships with major U.S. carriers and established points 
of presence across the United States. Further, China Telecom's 
U.S. subsidiary, China Telecom Americas, provides services to 
Chinese government facilities in the United States.
    Until recently, Team Telecom conducted limited oversight of 
these Chinese state-owned carriers. Team Telecom entered into 
security agreements with China Telecom Americas (2007) and 
ComNet (2009), but it exercised minimal oversight over those 
entities until recently. During the more-than-ten year period 
in which these security agreements have been in effect, Team 
Telecom conducted just two site visits to each company--or four 
in total, three of which occurred within the past three years. 
At no point did Team Telecom enter into a security agreement 
with China Unicom Americas, meaning Team Telecom has no 
oversight authority to assess the company's operations in the 
United States.
    The national security concerns Team Telecom and the FCC 
outlined in relation to China Mobile USA are applicable to the 
Chinese state-owned carriers currently operating in the United 
States. In advocating that the FCC deny China Mobile USA's 
application, Team Telecom raised a number of national security 
concerns related to China Mobile USA's Chinese government 
ownership. As Team Telecom officials acknowledged to the 
Subcommittee, those concerns also apply to China Telecom 
Americas, China Unicom Americas, and ComNet. The carriers are 
ultimately owned by the Chinese government; are required to 
comply with Chinese national security laws to support the 
Chinese government's intelligence work; and have established 
relationships with U.S. carriers, giving them access to 
critical infrastructure that the Chinese government could 
exploit in its economic and cyber espionage efforts. Team 
Telecom recognized these issues in its recent recommendation 
that the FCC to revoke China Telecom Americas' authorizations. 
The FCC also indicated its awareness of these concerns, when it 
recently called for all the carriers to demonstrate why their 
authorizations should not be revoked.
    It must be noted that state-ownership does not presume a 
national security risk. Indeed, many foreign telecommunications 
companies around the world are state-owned. There are also 
compelling commercial interests dependent on facilitating the 
flow of data between the United States and China, which are 
among each other's top trading partners. The vast global 
telecommunications and technology infrastructure that 
facilitates commerce and economic development include undersea, 
terrestrial, wireless, and space-based networks jointly owned 
or operated by Chinese and Western companies.
    Commercial interests, however, must be balanced against 
national security interests. Striking an appropriate balance 
between these interests requires the Executive Branch to 
exercise greater oversight and regularly evaluate the risks 
posed by foreign-owned companies, especially considering that 
national security concerns evolve over time. Currently, Chinese 
state-owned carriers are providing international 
telecommunications services based on FCC authorizations granted 
more than a decade ago, in some cases nearly two decades. The 
carriers have provided services during this time, with minimal 
oversight from Team Telecom.
    Following several Subcommittee briefings with the 
Department of Justice, on April 4, 2020, the administration 
released Executive Order 13913, ``Establishing the Committee 
for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United 
States Telecommunications Services Sector.'' The Department of 
Justice summarized the Executive Order in the following way:

        This Executive Order formalizes and improves the 
interagency committee, formerly known as Team Telecom, that 
advises the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on national 
security and law enforcement concerns associated with 
applications for telecommunications licenses meeting certain 
thresholds of foreign ownership or control. The Executive Order 
creates a formal process to review applications referred by the 
FCC to the Committee that raise the concerns mentioned above 
within an established timeframe. In addition, the Executive 
Order allows the Committee to assess whether new national 
security or law enforcement concerns exist with respect to 
existing FCC licenses previously reviewed by interested 
Executive Branch agencies.

I. IRS Oversight of the Free File Program (Staff Memorandum by the 
        Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on 
        Investigations)

    In June 2020, Subcommittee staff released a bipartisan 
memorandum that found there has been little IRS oversight of 
the Free File program, which provides free online tax 
preparation and filing services to U.S. taxpayers. As a result, 
American taxpayers, who are eligible for free tax filing 
through the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), may not be aware of 
the program or taking advantage of it. This could result in 
eligible taxpayers paying fees to file their taxes.
    Over the course of a year-long investigation, the 
Subcommittee examined the history of the IRS Free File program, 
the coordination between the Free File Alliance (FFA) and its 
membership of tax preparation software companies, oversight of 
the Free File program by IRS, and reporting in 2019 that 
certain FFA members used coding to hide their Free File 
websites from online search engines. The key findings of the 
memorandum included:

      Until recently, the IRS conducted little 
oversight of the Free File program.
      Three different independent entities have 
reviewed the Free File program since 2018 and provided 
recommendations for improvement, but the program continues to 
struggle to serve eligible taxpayers.
      For the first 15 years of the Free File program, 
the IRS declined to take a position on whether FFA companies 
should index Free File websites to appear in online search 
engines, nor did FFA companies seek guidance from the IRS on 
whether their indexing practices complied with the MOU. As a 
result, participating FFA companies took different approaches 
in deciding whether to code their Free File program websites to 
appear in organic search engine results, or to have users 
access the Free File program only through the IRS website. Five 
companies (H&R Block, Intuit, TaxHawk, Drake, and TaxSlayer) 
coded their Free File websites in a way that prevented a search 
engine from including the websites in organic search results 
(or ``non-indexed''). In doing so, all five companies believed 
they were complying with the MOU that governs the Free File 
program. The IRS and FFA companies executed an addendum to the 
MOU in December 2019 that clarified Free File websites should 
be indexed.
      Three companies (TaxHawk, Drake, and TaxSlayer) 
non-indexed their Free File websites from the start of their 
participation in the Free File program. H&R Block non-indexed 
its Free File website in 2018 in response to a technical issue 
after determining the MOU did not require the website be 
indexed. In 2018, Intuit changed the name of its Free File 
program in an attempt to avoid consumer confusion and non-
indexed the landing page of its renamed Free File offering.
      According to an analysis performed by MITRE, 
approximately 85 percent of the visits made to FFA member web 
sites and IRS.gov from Google, the most popular online search 
engine, were made through links included in advertisements 
placed by FFA members to promote commercial products that may 
charge fees. Only a fraction of total visits--approximately 
56,000 out of 12 million--went directly from Google to the 
website for an FFA member's Free File product.
      A lack of investment in marketing by the IRS 
likely led to a lack of consumer awareness that hampered 
participation in the Free File program.

J. The Art Industry and U.S. Policies that Undermine Sanctions, July 
        29, 2020 (Report Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs 
        of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations)

    In July 2020, Subcommittee staff released a 150-page 
bipartisan report regarding how Russian oligarchs have used the 
secrecy of the art industry to evade U.S. sanctions. Following 
a two-year investigation, which included the major auction 
houses, private New York art dealers, and seven financial 
institutions, the report showed how a lack of regulation allows 
the art industry to avoid the same anti-money laundering 
requirements that apply to financial institutions. The 
Subcommittee found that the art industry's secretive nature 
allowed art intermediaries to purchase more than $18 million in 
high-value art in the United States through shell companies 
linked to Russian oligarchs after they were sanctioned by the 
United States in March 2014. The Subcommittee also found the 
shell companies linked to the Russian oligarchs were not 
limited to just art and engaged in a total of $91 million in 
post-sanctions transactions. A summary of the report's findings 
is found below.
    The United States government imposes economic sanctions on 
foreign adversaries in attempt to change their behavior. In 
theory, sanctions are simple. U.S. persons and companies are 
prohibited from doing business with sanctioned persons and 
entities. This prohibition should bar access to the world's 
largest economy. The United States imposes sanctions for a wide 
range of reasons. For example, the United States has imposed 
sanctions on Russia for election interference, human rights 
abuses, providing support to Venezuela and Syria, but mainly in 
response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
    This report focused, in particular, on a case study 
documenting how certain Russian oligarchs appear to have used 
transactions involving high-value art to evade sanctions 
imposed on them by the United States on March 20, 2014 in 
response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and annexation of 
Crimea. Specifically, the Subcommittee traced purchases of 
high-value art back to anonymous shell companies linked to 
sanctioned individuals Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, two Russian 
oligarchs, and Arkady's son, Igor. It appears the Rotenbergs 
continued actively participating in the U.S. art market by 
purchasing over $18 million in art in the months following the 
imposition of sanctions on March 20, 2014. Shell companies 
linked to the Rotenbergs also transferred over $120 million to 
Russia during a four-day window between President Obama's March 
16, 2014 executive order stating that the U.S. would be 
sanctioning certain Russian individuals and the Treasury 
Department specifically naming the Rotenbergs as sanctioned on 
March 20, 2014. In addition, certain Rotenberg-linked shell 
companies continued transacting in the U.S. financial system 
long after Arkady and Boris Rotenberg were sanctioned. The 
Subcommittee determined these Rotenberg-linked shell companies 
engaged in over $91 million in transactions post-sanctions.
    While Russia-related sanctions, including those against the 
Rotenbergs, were set to expire in March 2020, President Trump 
extended them for another year. The effectiveness of these 
sanctions, however, is in question. To date, Russia has not 
withdrawn from Crimea and has even expanded its military 
operations in surrounding waters. The Subcommittee sought to 
understand why the sanctions have not been more effective and, 
after reviewing a number of suspect transactions, launched a 
narrow investigation into high-value art. If wealthy Russian 
oligarchs can purchase millions in art for personal investment 
or enjoyment while under sanction, it follows that their 
businesses or hidden resources could also continue accessing 
the U.S. financial system.
    The Subcommittee's investigation uncovered a complex set of 
facts involving shell companies with hidden owners, 
intermediaries who mask purchasers and sellers, and lax money 
laundering safeguards in the U.S. art industry.
    The art industry is largely unregulated. The art industry 
is considered the largest, legal unregulated industry in the 
United States. Unlike financial institutions, the art industry 
is not subject to Bank Secrecy Act's (``BSA'') requirements, 
which mandate detailed procedures to prevent money laundering 
and to verify a customer's identity. While the BSA does not 
apply to art transactions by art dealers and auction houses, 
sanctions do. No U.S. person or entity is allowed to do 
business with a sanctioned individual or entity.
    The art industry has been enjoying a boom. According to the 
2019 Art Basel and UBS Global Art Market Report, world-wide art 
sales hit $64.1 billion in 2019. That report found the United 
States was the world's largest art market comprising 44 percent 
of global sales, or around $28.3 billion. The art industry is 
generally divided into sales at public auctions and by private 
dealers. In 2019, sales at auction houses made up 42 percent of 
total art sales, while the remaining 58 percent of sales were 
through private dealers. The four biggest auction houses--
Sotheby's, Christie's, Phillips, and Bonhams--are selling art 
for sizeable amounts. In November 2017, Leonardo da Vinci's 
Salvator Mundi sold at auction at Christie's in New York for 
over $450 million. In May 2019, Christie's New York sold Jeff 
Koon's Rabbit for over $91 million, the highest price ever paid 
for a piece by a living artist. Even during the COVID-19 
pandemic, an online auction at Sotheby's brought in $234.9 
million in total sales, including $84.55 million for Triptych 
Inspired by the Oresteia of Aeschylus by Francis Bacon. In 
turn, the auction houses report large annual sale numbers. 
Sotheby's reported $4.8 billion in sales for 2019, while 
Christie's reported $2.8 billion in sales for just the first 
six months of 2019.
    Investors have taken notice. Deloitte's 2019 Art and 
Finance Report noted that ``artnet's Index for Top 100 Artists 
produced an 8 percent Compound Annual Growth Rate between 2000 
and 2018, compared with 3 percent for the S&P 500.'' For 
example, Banksy's Devolved Parliament sold at Sotheby's in 
London on October 3, 2019 for around $12.2 million; the 
artist's previous record for a painting sold at auction was 
$1.87 million for Keep It Spotless in 2008.
    Secrecy is pervasive in the art industry. While the art 
market is not regulated by the BSA, it is governed by unwritten 
rules. A large number of art sales happen through 
intermediaries referred to as ``art advisors'' who can 
represent both purchasers and sellers. In a typical 
transaction, a purchaser may not ask who owns the piece of art 
they are purchasing; the seller may not ask for whom it is 
being purchased or the origin of the money. And in general an 
art advisor would be reluctant to reveal the identity of their 
client for fear of being cut out of the deal and losing the 
business.
    Auction houses have voluntary AML polices. Because the art 
industry is not subject to BSA requirements, when a piece of 
art is sold, there is no legal requirement for the selling 
party to confirm the identity of the buyer or that the buyer is 
not laundering money through the purchase. While the four 
biggest auction houses have voluntary anti-money laundering 
(``AML'') programs, the employees who facilitated art purchases 
in the Subcommittee's case study said they never asked the art 
advisor the identity of his client. Instead, the auction houses 
considered the art advisor the principal purchaser and 
performed any due diligence on the art advisor, even when it 
was well-known that the ultimate owner was someone else. With 
regard to the funds used to purchase art, the auction houses 
told the Subcommittee they rely on financial institutions to 
ensure the integrity of the funds, even though the auction 
houses interact directly with the buyer. But these voluntary 
AML policies are just for sales through the auction houses. As 
stated above, the majority of art sales are private 
transactions. A private dealer interviewed by the Subcommittee 
stated she had no written AML policies, tries to work with 
people she knows and trusts, looks for red flags, and relies on 
her gut. She also explained that her practices have 
significantly changed over the years and that she also relies 
on advice from AML lawyers.
    Tracing the ownership of anonymous shell companies, 
including those involved in high-value art transactions, is 
difficult. That difficulty continues even though corporate 
secrecy suffered a blow in the spring of 2016 when the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
(``ICIJ'') shocked the world by releasing information on 
214,488 offshore entities from the Panamanian law firm Mossack 
Fonseca (the ``Panama Papers''). One email chain included among 
the Panama Papers and made public described links between nine 
offshore companies to the Rotenbergs. The email chain listed 
Boris Rotenberg as the ultimate beneficial owner (``UBO'') of 
Highland Ventures Group Limited (``Highland Ventures'') and 
Arkady Rotenberg's son Igor as the UBO of Highland Business 
Group Limited (``Highland Business''). The email copied London-
based attorney Mark Omelnitski, who used his firm the Markom 
Group to establish and maintain shell companies for the 
Rotenberg family.
    The true ownership of the listed shell companies was not, 
however, as straightforward as the Panama Papers email chain 
suggested. For example, based on financial information reviewed 
by the Subcommittee during its investigation, Arkady Rotenberg 
appeared to be the UBO of Highland Ventures, not his brother 
Boris. That information included non-public wire transfers 
showing multi-million dollar transfers from a company owned by 
Arkady Rotenberg to Highland Ventures. In 2012 and 2013, that 
company--Milasi Engineering--transferred over $124 million 
marked as annual dividends to Highland Ventures. The December 
31, 2014 Financial Report for Milasi Engineering listed Arkady 
Rotenberg as its UBO, making it clear that Highland Ventures 
received its funding from a company owned by an individual the 
U.S. would later sanction. Milasi Engineering also held shares 
in Stroygazmontazh, a gas pipeline company sanctioned in April 
2014 by the United States due to its ownership by Arkady 
Rotenberg.
    Arkady Rotenberg transferred his business interests to his 
son, Igor. In July 2014, four months after the United States 
sanctioned Arkady, Mr. Omelnitski's firm, the Markom Group, 
executed paperwork that appeared to transfer Arkady's interest 
in Milasi Engineering to his son, Igor, who was not sanctioned 
at the time. Milasi Engineering was owned by two other holding 
companies. The Markom Group transferred the ownership of those 
two companies to Highland Ventures, which it asserted had 
always been owned by Igor. Therefore, from July 2014 to April 
2018, when Igor was finally sanctioned by the United States, 
Milasi Engineering was owned on paper by an unsanctioned 
individual. A report by a bank investigator produced to the 
Subcommittee determined the transfer of Milasi Engineering from 
Arkady to Igor was done solely to evade sanctions, and the 
Markom Group ``intentionally structured [the ownership of these 
shell companies] to be opaque in order to hide the identities 
of true beneficiaries.'' In response, the bank closed all 
accounts associated with the Markom Group. This included 
closing accounts held by art advisor Gregory Baltser.
    Art advisor Gregory Baltser facilitated purchases for the 
Rotenbergs. Intermediaries played a central role in the 
Rotenbergs' art purchases in the United States. As previously 
explained, Mr. Omelnitski and his company, the Markom Group, 
established and maintained shell companies for the Rotenbergs 
to mask their identities. The Rotenbergs also employed art 
advisor Gregory Baltser, who facilitated the purchase and sale 
of high-value art both before and after sanctions without 
disclosing the names of his clients.
    Mr. Baltser is a U.S. citizen, who must comply with U.S. 
sanctions laws, but his business is based in Moscow. Prior to 
sanctions, funds Mr. Baltser used to purchase art linked to the 
Rotenbergs followed a unique and recognizable financial path: 
Mr. Baltser bid on specific artworks at auction, purchased the 
art, and then assigned the title to the art to a Belize company 
named Steamort Limited (``Steamort''). Steamort paid for the 
art using funds the Subcommittee traced back to Highland 
Business.
    Mr. Baltser, however, was not the owner of Steamort; he had 
a contract with Steamort to serve as a consultant to purchase 
art on behalf of the company. A copy of that contract was 
produced to the Subcommittee by Christie's. Both the contract 
and financial records showed that Steamort paid Mr. Baltser 
$9,500 a month for his services. In total, between March 2010 
and October 2018, financial records show Mr. Baltser received 
$1,116,000 in fees for his consulting services under the 
Steamort Agreement.
    Company documents obtained by the Subcommittee listed 
Steamort's only director and shareholder as Jason Hughes. 
According to a report by ICIJ, Mr. Hughes was associated with 
over 200 other companies as a nominee director--an individual 
who masks the true UBO of a shell company.
    The owner of Steamort remains unknown. In 2012, Christie's 
questioned Mr. Baltser about who owned Steamort, and asserted 
that Mr. Baltser could no longer bid at auctions until he 
provided Steamort's UBO. Initially, Mr. Baltser responded that 
he did not know who owned Steamort. When pressed and threatened 
with missing the opportunity to bid at an upcoming auction, Mr. 
Baltser verbally told Christie's that Steamort was owned by 
``Luisa Brown.'' Christie's accepted this verbal assertion, 
conducted AML checks on Ms. Brown, found no derogatory 
information, and cleared Mr. Baltser to continue bidding at 
auctions. Mr. Baltser never provided any documentary evidence 
of Steamort's ownership by Ms. Brown. The Subcommittee was 
unable to confirm if an individual named Luisa Brown was the 
UBO for Steamort, or if she even existed at all.
    Mr. Baltser opened an auction agency and club in Moscow. In 
late 2012, Mr. Baltser announced he was planning to open 
BALTZER Auction Agency and Club. The agency would be located in 
Moscow and its members would be ``the leading Moscow and 
Russian collectors--the active participants of auction biddings 
at many world marketplaces.'' Mr. Baltser proposed to partner 
with both Christie's and Sotheby's. As part of the proposed 
agreement, Mr. Baltser stated that he would bid at auctions on 
behalf of his clients under an account in the name of BALTZER. 
This allowed Mr. Baltser to guarantee on his website that ``we 
can give you complete anonymity.'' Under the proposed 
agreement, Mr. Baltser pledged to conduct all AML and sanctions 
checks on his clients and provide an annual certification to 
the auction houses that no member of BALTZER was engaged in 
money laundering. Mr. Omelnitski served as BALTZER's chief AML 
officer and represented Mr. Baltser in contract negotiations 
with the two auction houses. To be clear, Mr. Baltser put the 
same attorney who established and maintained shell companies to 
mask the Rotenbergs' ownership in charge of his new venture's 
AML compliance.
    Christie's partnered with BALTZER. Christie's accepted Mr. 
Baltser's proposal and signed the agreement with BALTZER on 
February 4, 2014. At the end of 2014, Mr. Omelnitski certified 
to Christie's that ``despite BALTZER having a significant 
number of Russian clients there were no transactions, which 
fall under recent sanctions against Russia.'' Mr. Omelnitski 
failed to provide another such certification for the next three 
years, despite repeated requests from Christie's to provide the 
annual certificate promised in the agreement. In 2018, 
Christie's renegotiated its agreement with BALTZER to require 
client due diligence documents after each purchase.
    A Sotheby's employee identified Arkady and Boris Rotenberg 
as Mr. Baltser's clients. Sotheby's also considered Mr. 
Baltser's business proposal, but ultimately declined. During 
negotiations, a Sotheby's employee represented to Sotheby's 
management that Mr. Baltser had told her that his clients 
included Russian oligarchs. In fact, she told Sotheby's 
management that Mr. Baltser had identified Arkady and Boris 
Rotenberg as two of his clients (five months prior to U.S. 
sanctions). During her Subcommittee interview, however, the 
same Sotheby's employee said Mr. Baltser had never told her 
that Arkady and Boris Rotenberg were his clients. Instead, she 
asserted she fabricated this information in an effort to 
convince Sotheby's to accept BALTZER's proposal. Despite 
declining the proposal, Sotheby's continued to conduct business 
as usual with Mr. Baltser and his new company, BALTZER, and 
never questioned whether Arkady and Boris Rotenberg were his 
clients. The Subcommittee independently traced post-sanction 
purchases by BALTZER to shell companies linked to the 
Rotenbergs, suggesting theSotheby's employee was not truthful 
in her Subcommittee interview.
    Mr. Baltser continued to purchase art with funds linked to 
the Rotenbergs even after March 2014 sanctions. Following the 
imposition of sanctions by the United States on Arkady and 
Boris Rotenberg in March 2014, the funds Mr. Baltser used to 
purchase works of art at auction houses continued to follow the 
same general financial path as before sanctions. By this time, 
BALTZER provided another layer of anonymity for the funds used 
to purchase art. After Mr. Baltser successfully bid at auction, 
funds were wired from Highland Ventures to Steamort, just as 
they had arrived from Highland Business before sanctions. 
Steamort then wired funds to BALTZER, which paid the auction 
house and took title of the purchase. All four auction houses 
considered Mr. Baltser the principal purchaser, rather than an 
agent for a buyer, and never asked for whom he was purchasing 
the art. Any client due diligence was performed only on Mr. 
Baltser and not his undisclosed clients, satisfying the 
voluntary AML policies at the auction houses.
    Highland Ventures purchased a painting through a private 
art dealer. The funds used to purchase Rene Magritte's La 
Poitrine for $7.5 million in May 2014 through a private art 
dealer followed a different path. In this transaction, Highland 
Ventures took title to the painting and was listed on the 
invoice as the buyer. Anna Wilkes, an employee of Mr. 
Omelnitski's Markom Group, signed on behalf of Highland 
Ventures as its Director. The funds used to pay for the 
painting were wired to the private dealer from a company named 
Advantage Alliance. The Subcommittee traced those funds to a 
company called Senton Holdings. An investigation by a financial 
institution--produced to the Subcommittee--determined Senton 
Holdings was owned by Arkady Rotenberg, linking him through the 
chain of wire transfers to the purchase of the painting.
    Art was shipped to Germany for storage. La Poitrine, like 
much of the art traced to companies linked to the Rotenbergs, 
was shipped to a storage facility in Germany called Hasenkamp. 
The Subcommittee contacted Hasenkamp and was told the art was 
originally stored there under the name Highland Business; no 
individual was named. Later, a company named Taide Connoisseur 
Selection took over the contract to store the art at Hasenkamp. 
The only individual named on Taide Connoisseur Selection's 
website was Mr. Omelnitski.
    In August 2019, during the course of the Subcommittee's 
investigation, the Taide Connoisseur Selection account at 
Hasenkamp was closed and all art stored under the account was 
shipped to Moscow.
    Art purchases linked to the Rotenberg shell companies 
totaled millions of dollars. In total, the Subcommittee traced 
funds for over $18 million in art purchased in the United 
States from March 2014 to November 2014, both at auction houses 
and through private sales back to shell companies that appeared 
to be funded or owned by the Rotenbergs.
    Sotheby's agreed to sell Brucke II for Mr. Baltser during 
the Subcommittee's investigation. Mr. Baltser also sold 
paintings owned by his clients. In late 2018, he attempted to 
sell Lyonel Feininger's Brucke II. Brucke II was originally 
purchased through Mr. Baltser on February 4, 2014 at an auction 
at Christie's in London. The painting later appeared on a list 
of 31 paintings sent to Christie's by a BALTZER employee, who 
stated that the list represented the collection of one of Mr. 
Baltser's clients. The Subcommittee traced 16 paintings on the 
list purchased in the United States back to suspected Rotenberg 
shell companies. This suggests that all 31 paintings were owned 
by the Rotenbergs.
    When Mr. Baltser attempted to sell Brucke II in late 2018, 
both Christie's and Sotheby's expressed interest in having the 
painting at their auctions. Ultimately, Mr. Baltser's client 
chose Sotheby's to sell Brucke II at auction in February 2019. 
At the time, the Subcommittee was actively investigating the 
auction house and Mr. Baltser. Sotheby's requested Mr. Baltser 
provide the name of the UBO of the painting, including whether 
that individual was currently sanctioned. Mr. Baltser said 
Brucke II had been resold since it was purchased at Christie's 
in February 2014 and now belonged to a company incorporated in 
the Marshall Islands and provided a Russian passport for the 
company's UBO. The Subcommittee asked Sotheby's to request the 
name of the February 2014 purchaser of the painting; Mr. 
Baltser declined to disclose the name of that purchaser due to 
a non-disclosure agreement. Sotheby's ultimately pulled the 
painting from the 2019 auction due to a lack of interest.
    The Subcommittee asked to interview Mr. Baltser, but 
through his attorney, he declined the request and stated he was 
in Moscow and had no plans to return to the United States. 
Through his attorney, Mr. Baltser stated that: he has never 
represented or transacted with Arkady or Boris Rotenberg; 
Highland Business and Highland Ventures were not listed as 
sanctioned by the Treasury Department; and he did not have 
access to the Panama Papers.
    A delay between the 2014 announcement and imposition of 
sanctions created a window to send U.S. dollars to Russia. On 
March 16, 2014, President Obama signed an executive order 
authorizing the Treasury Department to impose sanctions on 
individuals for Russia's annexation of Crimea. But the Treasury 
Department did not name the specific individuals sanctioned 
under the executive order until March 20, 2014. During this 
four-day window, Rotenberg-linked shell companies transferred 
over $120 million through the United States to Russia. On March 
18, 2014, Highland Ventures transferred over $39.5 million from 
its account at The Pictet Group in Switzerland through the U.S. 
financial system to its account at Gazprombank in Moscow. That 
same day, Culloden Properties transferred over $82 million from 
its Pictet Group account in Switzerland through the U.S. 
financial system to its account in Moscow at the Gazprombank. 
Both the Panama Papers and documents produced to a financial 
institution by the Markom Group--and subsequently provided to 
the Subcommittee--identify Boris Rotenberg as the owner of 
Culloden Properties.
    Rotenberg-linked shell companies transacted in U.S. dollars 
post-sanctions. Shell companies linked to the Rotenbergs 
continued conducting transactions through the U.S. financial 
system even after the imposition of sanctions in March 2014. 
For example, including its art purchases, Highland Ventures was 
involved in transactions worth over $16 million. Advantage 
Alliance was involved in transactions worth over $29 million. 
And while the UBO of Steamort remains hidden, the company 
served as an intermediary between Rotenberg-linked shell 
companies and BALTZER in the purchase of art. Following the 
imposition of sanctions in March 2014, Steamort was a part of 
transactions totaling over $22 million. In total, the 
Subcommittee identified over $91 million in transactions by 
Rotenberg-linked shell companies after sanctions were imposed 
on the Rotenberg in March 2014.
    In response to the report, on October 30, 2020, the 
Treasury Department issued an ``Advisory and Guidance on 
Potential Sanctions Risks Arising from Dealings in High-Value 
Artwork,'' citing the Subcommittee's report in explaining the 
sanctions risks in the high-value art market. The Advisory 
adopted a key recommendation of the Subcommittee's report 
making clear that what is commonly referred to as the ``Berman 
Amendment'' to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
and the Trading with the Enemy Act does not categorically 
exempt all dealings in artwork from Treasury's regulation and 
enforcement.

K. Oversight of HHS Shelter Grants for UACs December 8, 2020 (Report 
        Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent 
        Subcommittee on Investigations)

    In December 2020, Subcommittee staff released a bipartisan 
report identifying failures in the Department of Health and 
Human Services' (HHS) shelter grant processes to ensure the 
safety of unaccompanied alien children (UACs) and safeguard 
over $32 million in taxpayers funds. The report confirmed that 
HHS awarded Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) shelter grants 
to two companies with a documented history of failing to 
provide adequate care of children--VisionQuest National, Ltd. 
and New Horizon Group Home, LLC. As a result of their previous 
failures in caring for children and other regulatory issues, 
VisionQuest and New Horizon struggled to acquire zoning and 
licensing approval to open shelters across the country, meaning 
that taxpayers paid for facilities that will never open.
    A review of several prior funding opportunity announcements 
and interviews with HHS officials demonstrated that, prior to 
fall 2019, HHS did not require grant applicants to disclose 
prior adverse actions their respective State and local 
governments had taken against them. The Department conducted no 
independent research into the disciplinary history of either 
VisionQuest or New Horizon. These oversight failures could have 
endangered unaccompanied children trusted to the care of these 
companies. Additionally, until November 2019, HHS also had no 
policy to restrict funding for grantees that did not have a 
license to operate. HHS's policy of awarding grants to 
applicants, including VisionQuest and New Horizon, prior to the 
applicants securing zoning and licensing approval led to issues 
that could cost tens of millions of taxpayer dollars. At the 
time of the report's release, HHS was attempting to recoup 
funds disbursed for facilities that failed to open.
    A summary of the report's findings is found below.
    Since 2015, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
has conducted oversight of Federal Government programs designed 
to protect and care for children who enter the United States 
without a parent or legal guardian. Federal agencies, including 
the Department of Homeland Security (``DHS''), the Department 
of Justice (``DOJ''), and the Department of Health and Human 
Services (``HHS'') play key roles in the care of these 
unaccompanied alien children (``UACs''). Deficiencies at these 
agencies have continued across two presidential 
administrations, as discussed in two previous Subcommittee 
reports. In addition to the issues identified in those reports, 
since 2018, the Subcommittee has examined whether HHS has 
placed UACs in safe settings and made efficient use of taxpayer 
dollars when establishing residential shelters for some UACs. 
This report describes failures in HHS's processes to ensure the 
safety of children in the care of the Federal Government and 
safeguard $32,125,779 in taxpayer funds.
    Pursuant to the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act (`TVPRA'') and the 1997 consent 
decree known as the Flores Settlement Agreement, HHS uses 
shelter facilities in cities and states across the United 
States to house certain UACs. Although HHS, through the Office 
of Refugee Resettlement (`ORR''), works to place UACs with an 
adult sponsor, in some instances ORR cannot place a child with 
a sponsor. In these instances, ORR places UACs in shelter 
facilities, which differ markedly from detention facilities for 
adults and provide resources tailored to children that are not 
available in temporary influx shelters. In most shelter 
facilities, for example, children do not live in a restricted 
setting, and they receive classroom education, health care 
services, recreation, and case management. As noted in a report 
the Subcommittee released in 2018, staff secure and secure 
facilities are also available for children who require 
placement in a more restricted setting because they pose a 
danger to themselves or the community, or present a flight 
risk.
    HHS, through the Administration for Children and Families 
(``ACF'') and ORR, offers grants to care providers to operate 
these state-licensed shelter facilities. Traditionally, 
community-based non-profit organizations operated most shelter 
facilities. A surge of UAC arrivals in recent years, however, 
has led larger, for-profit companies to apply for ORR funding 
opportunities. As of September 23, 2020, 120 shelter facilities 
in the United States house 1,478 UACs, with an average length 
of stay of 60 days.
    The Subcommittee sought to understand the processes HHS 
uses to fund and open shelter facilities for UACs. The 
Subcommittee identified key gaps in the shelter grant process 
that affected HHS's ability to place UACs in safe settings and 
ensure efficient use of taxpayer funds. A review of several 
prior funding opportunity announcements and interviews with HHS 
officials demonstrated that, prior to fall 2019, the Department 
did not require a company seeking a grant to provide shelter 
services for UACs to disclose prior adverse regulatory actions 
from state and local governments related to the care of 
children. For example, an applicant for a shelter facility that 
previously operated a facility for children and had its license 
revoked by a state regulatory agency had no obligation to 
disclose this information to HHS. Additionally, HHS did not 
conduct independent research on applicants and instead confined 
its review to the contents of the grant applications. HHS also 
relied entirely on grantees to obtain necessary zoning approval 
and state licensure for a shelter facility. Furthermore, the 
Department did not have a policy in place to restrict funding 
for grantees without a license to operate until November 2019.
    As a result of these gaps in the shelter grant process, the 
Subcommittee confirmed that HHS awarded grants to two companies 
with histories of questionable practices in caring for 
children--VisionQuest National, Ltd. (``VisionQuest'') and New 
Horizon Group Home, LLC (``New Horizon''). In 2016, the 
Philadelphia Department of Human Services (``Philadelphia 
DHS'') contracted with VisionQuest for the provision of 
residential services. VisionQuest began operating four programs 
at three residential facilities for young adults and children 
in the juvenile justice system in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
All three facilities faced troubling allegations that local 
authorities in Philadelphia later substantiated. Confirmed 
incidents included residents escaping from a facility, numerous 
fights among residents resulting in serious injuries, and 
facility staff organizing further fights among residents. By 
February 2018, Philadelphia authorities transferred all 
children out of the three facilities, and VisionQuest 
voluntarily closed the program.
    In February 2018, New Horizon began operating a residential 
facility in North Carolina for male children ages 9 to 17 who 
required full-time mental health services. Less than a month 
later, state officials conducted an inspection and identified 
more than a dozen violations of state law. The violations 
included New Horizon's failure to hire necessary medical 
personnel, failure to protect two of its five residents from 
serious harm, and the use of an unauthorized time-out room for 
residents. State officials ultimately revoked New Horizon's 
operating license. On appeal, an administrative law judge 
upheld the license revocation and noted that the facility 
presented ``an imminent danger to the health, safety, and 
welfare of the clients.''
    In 2019, HHS awarded grants to VisionQuest and New Horizon 
for UAC shelter facilities. VisionQuest received five grants 
totaling over $50 million for seven facilities, including one 
of the same facilities in Philadelphia that local authorities 
deemed unsafe for children in 2018. New Horizon received a 
grant award for approximately $8 million for a UAC shelter 
facility in North Carolina. HHS did not require either company 
to disclose prior adverse actions their respective State and 
local governments had taken against them, and the Department 
did not research the disciplinary history of either company. 
These oversights could have endangered UACs trusted to the care 
of these companies.
    Furthermore, both because of their previous failures in 
caring for children and other regulatory issues, VisionQuest 
and New Horizon have struggled to acquire zoning and licensing 
approval to open shelters across the country. This means that 
taxpayers have paid for facilities that will never open. HHS's 
policy of awarding grants to applicants, including VisionQuest 
and New Horizon, prior to the applicants securing zoning and 
licensing approval led to issues that could waste tens of 
millions of taxpayer dollars. VisionQuest, for example, faced 
immediate challenges in opening the shelter facility under its 
HHS grant after Philadelphia officials determined that the 
zoning variance for a previous facility was invalid for a 
facility housing migrant children. This dispute resulted in 
litigation prior to the parties entering into a settlement 
agreement in October 2020. VisionQuest also failed to obtain 
the necessary zoning approval for proposed facilities in 
California and Texas after facing local political opposition. 
Ultimately, HHS disbursed over $28 million to VisionQuest for 
five facilities that will not open.
    Similarly, North Carolina's revocation of New Horizon's 
operating license for one of its existing residential 
facilities meant that New Horizon could not open its proposed 
UAC shelter facility. Under North Carolina state law, a license 
revocation makes a facility operator ineligible for any new 
licenses for a five-year period. (New Horizon executives told 
the Subcommittee that they were confident that they would 
succeed in their appeal of the license revocation and had 
alternate plans to use a separate existing facility license.) 
HHS was initially unaware of these licensing issues and only 
learned of them in August 2019--14 months after the license 
revocation--from a congressional inquiry that cited a local 
media report. HHS disbursed nearly $4 million in funding to New 
Horizon for a facility in North Carolina that will not open.
    HHS has since discontinued all five grants to VisionQuest 
and the grant to New Horizon. The Department also requested 
financial documentation from both companies for expenditures 
made with grant funds. This process is ongoing for both 
companies, but it is further along with New Horizon. On June 8, 
2020, HHS transmitted a final disallowance letter to New 
Horizon requesting the repayment of $3,119,453.69 (out of 
$3,984,803). On July 7, 2020, New Horizon appealed the decision 
to the HHS Departmental Appeals Board, which has the authority 
to either uphold the decision or reduce the amount of the 
disallowance and reverse the discontinuation of the grant 
award. HHS officials stated that they would comply with the 
decisions of the Departmental Appeals Board.
    HHS has also implemented changes to its shelter grant 
process. For example, the Department now restricts funds for 
grantees that are eligible for funding but do not yet have an 
operating license. In a briefing with Subcommittee staff, 
however, HHS officials defended their previous policy, which 
was in effect as recently as November 2019 and made funds 
available to unlicensed grantees.
    In late 2019, HHS also began requiring applicants to 
disclose prior documented licensing allegations or concerns. 
However, HHS did not specify a time period for the issues 
applicants needed to disclose. In funding announcements from 
June and July 2020, HHS further required applicants to be 
licensed at the time of application and to disclose any 
allegations or concerns of abuse or neglect, as well as any 
prior denial, suspension, or revocation of their license. As of 
the date of this report, however, HHS officials expressed 
uncertainty regarding whether HHS will include the licensing 
requirement in future announcements.

                             V. GAO REPORTS

    During the 116th Congress, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) issued 23 reports at the request of the 
Subcommittee. Reports are listed here by title, GAO number, and 
release date.
    China: Agreements Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. 
Universities are Similar, But Institute Operations Vary. 
GAO-19-278. February 13, 2019.
    China: Observations on Confucius Institutes in the United 
States and U.S. Universities in China. GAO-19-401T. February 
28, 2019.
    Internet Privacy and Data Security: Additional Federal 
Authority Could Enhance Consumer Protections and Provide 
Flexibility. GAO-19-427T. March 7, 2019.
    Federal Ethics Programs: Government-Wide Political 
Appointee Data and Some Ethics Oversight Procedures at Interior 
and SBA Could Be Improved. GAO-19-249. March 14, 2019.
    U.S. Postal Service: Addressing Policy Gaps Could Improve 
Pilot Design and Evaluation for Postal Innovations. GAO-19-293. 
March 14, 2019.
    Employment and Training Programs: Department of Labor 
Should Assess Efforts to Coordinate Services Across Programs. 
GAO-19-200. March 28, 2019.
    Management Report: CMS Needs to Address Gaps in Federal 
Oversight of Nursing Home Abuse Investigations that Persisted 
in Oregon for at Least 15 Years. GAO-19-313R. April 15, 2019.
    Nursing Homes: Improved Oversight Needed to Better Protect 
Residents from Abuse. GAO-19-433. June 13, 2019.
    Federal Rulemaking: Selected Agencies Should Clearly 
Communicate Practices Associated with Identity Information in 
the Public Comment Process. GAO-19-483. June 26, 2019.
    U.S. Assistance to Central America: Department of State 
Should Establish A Comprehensive Plan to Assess Progress Toward 
Prosperity, Governance, and Security. GAO-19-590. September 26, 
2019.
    U.S. Assistance to Central America: Department of State 
Should Establish A Comprehensive Plan to Assess Progress Toward 
Prosperity, Governance, and Security. GAO-19-709. September 26, 
2019.
    Federal Rulemaking: Selected Agencies Should Clearly 
Communicate Public Comment Posting Practices Associated with 
Identity Information. GAO-20-105T. October 24, 2019.
    Evidence-Based Policymaking: Selected Agencies Coordinate 
Activities, But Could Enhance Collaboration. GAO-20-119. 
December 4, 2019.
    Homeland Security Acquisitions: Outcomes Have Improved But 
Actions Needed to Enhance Oversight of Schedule Goals. 
GAO-20-170SP. December 19, 2019.
    Information Management: Selected Agencies Need to Fully 
Address Federal Electronic Recordkeeping Requirements. 
GAO-20-50. February 27, 2020.
    U.S. Assistance to Central America: Status of Funding. 
GAO-20-163R. March 4, 2020.
    Federal Rulemaking: Information on Selected Agencies' 
Management of Public Comments. GAO-20-383R. April 16, 2020.
    Federal Management: Selected Reforms Could Be Strengthened 
by Following Additional Planning, Communication, and Leadership 
Practices. GAO-20-322.
    DATA Act: OIGs Reported that Quality of Agency-Submitted 
Data Varied, and Most Recommended Improvements. GAO-20-540. 
July 9, 2020.
    Federal Advisory Committees: Actions needed to Enhance 
Decision-Making Transparency and Cost Data Accuracy. GAO-20-
575. September 10, 2020.
    Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: Commerce Should Improve Its 
Exclusion Request Process and Economic Impact Review. 
GAO-20-517. September 15, 2020.
    Critical Infrastructure Prioritization During COVID-19. 
September 17, 2020.
    Federal Buying Power: OMB Can Further Advance Category 
Management Initiative by Focusing on Requirements, Data, and 
Training. GAO-21-40. November 30, 2020.
  SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL SPENDING OVERSIGHT AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT


                       Chairman: Rand Paul (R-KY)


                  Ranking Member: Maggie Hassan (D-NH)


                              I. AUTHORITY

    The Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and 
Emergency Management focuses on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of Federal financial management; agency policies to 
promote program integrity and the prevention of waste, fraud, 
and abuse; policies and procedures related to Federal 
contracting and procurement, including Federal Acquisition 
Regulation; and the acquisition functions of the General 
Services Administration (GSA) and the Office of the Federal 
Procurement Policy. The Subcommittee also examines the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Federal Government's 
efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural 
and man-made disasters, including State and local grant 
programs; activities under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act; and activities related to 
the National Capital Region; the relationship between the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and States and 
localities, including in preparing for, responding to, and 
recovering from natural and man-made disasters; and activities 
relating to the Office of the Private Sector and the 
integration of the private sector into the Nation's emergency 
preparedness, resilience, and response matters.

                              II. ACTIVITY

    During the 116th Congress, the Subcommittee on Federal 
Spending Oversight and Emergency Management held seven 
hearings; released six reports cataloging hundreds of examples 
of wasteful federal spending practices, highlighting more than 
$104 billion in wasted taxpayer money; produced and introduced 
a budget resolution; and introduced eight pieces of legislation 
that were referred to the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee, three of which were reported out of 
committee; as well as others that pertain to the work of the 
committee.

                              A. Hearings


Direct and Indirect Costs to the Federal Government from Management of 
        Federal Lands. April 25, 2019. Field Hearing in Stearns, KY.

    The Federal Government owns approximately 640 million acres 
of land in the United States, roughly 28 percent of all the 
land in the United States. Recently there has been much debate 
about appropriateness of the federal government holding so much 
land and questions have been asked if the Federal Government 
has more land than it has capacity to manage. The Park Service 
alone has an $11.6 billion maintenance backlog despite its 
budget growing 10.8 percent in real dollars since 2010. And 
yet, the trend is toward expanding federal ownership of lands.
    Not only does the Federal Government incur cost associated 
with maintaining Federal land and property, but it may also be 
the case that Federal land holding create secondary costs to 
the Federal government in the form of depressed economies in 
areas of significant Federal holding. Local populations are 
thus, then more likely to qualify and utilize a variety of 
Federal assistance programs, with little hope or opportunity to 
transition off of them.
    While much of the focus of this debate has been in the 
west, this problem is not isolated to western States. Nearly 2/
3rds of McCreary County, KY is owned and managed by the Federal 
Government, between the Daniel Boone National Forest and the 
Big South Fork National River and Recreation Area. Local 
communities rely on federally managed Cumberland Lake for water 
and power. Meanwhile the median household income in McCreary 
County is about 3.1 times below the national average and 42.5 
percent of the population lives below the poverty line.
    To that end, this hearing aimed to explore what the cost 
and benefits of the Federal Government of managing Federal 
lands, if States and local communities could be better 
positioned to steward these lands, and what impediments Federal 
ownership/management pose to local economies.
    Witnesses: Jimmie Greene, McCreary County Judge Executive; 
Nathan Nevels, McCreary County Deputy Judge Executive; Randy 
Maxwell, McCreary County Magistrate; Stephen Whitaker, 
Supervisor, McCreary County Water Department; Randy Kidd, 
Chairman, McCreary County Industrial Authority Board; Jerry 
Stephens, Owner, Stephens Hardwoods and Barrel Stave Mill; 
Robert A. Vogel, Regional Director, Southeast Region, National 
Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior; and Ken Arney, 
Regional Forester for the Southern Region, Forest Service, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.

Review of GAO's Annual Duplication Report. May 21, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116-
        58)

    This was a review of GAO's annual duplication report. The 
report identified 17 new areas of duplication, fragmentation, 
or overlap that are identified in the report. There were also 
11 other areas GAO has identified as potential sources of cost 
savings or revenue enhancement. Further, GAO made 33 new 
recommended corrective actions that apply to areas identified 
in prior reports.
    With regard to corrective actions taken, GAO notes that 53 
percent of actions directed toward Congress have either not 
been addressed or are only partially addressed. With regard to 
the executive branch that number is better, but still 35 
percent of corrective actions are not fully addressed.
    Witnesses: Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the 
United States, U.S. Government Accountability Office.

Federally Incurred Cost of Regulatory Changes and How Such Changes are 
        Made. July 17, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116-62)

    The power of the purse theoretically rests with Congress; 
Section 9 (7) of the Constitution reads, ``No Money shall be 
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations 
made by Law.'' However, it has been generally accepted that 
mandatory spending, or ``permanent appropriations'' meet this 
test--Congress appropriates, ``such sums as are necessary'' to 
provide a certain benefit to a certain population.
    One of the problems this hearing investigated was 
regulatory changes that affect spending; changes through 
regulation to mandatory entitlement programs that alter the 
benefit or the recipient population, and thus affect spending. 
For example, the Department of Agriculture has latitude to 
broaden or contract eligibility for disaster aid, the VA can 
alter what constitutes a service related disability, and Social 
Security Administration has made obesity and illiteracy 
(including only speaking Spanish in Puerto Rico) qualifying 
disabilities.
    Such changes cause fluctuations in Federal spending (called 
budgetary regulations) without the express consent of Congress 
as manifest in an appropriation; but also without the implied 
consent contained in the authorizing legislation, as these 
changes are made well beyond what was envisioned when these 
programs were created decades earlier.
    Moreover, research from the Pacific Legal Foundation has 
shown that just at FDA, more than 3/4th of new regulations 
promulgated over the last 20 years have gotten final sign off 
from a career employee, not a Senate confirmed principal 
officer. In other words, Congress's ability to hold decision 
makers accountable and provide oversight of such spending is 
impaired when career employees (with civil service protections) 
are responsible for these regulations.
    Witnesses: James Broughel, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, 
The Mercatus Center, George Mason University; Thomas A. Berry, 
Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation; and Richard W. Parker, 
Policy Director, Center for Energy and Environmental Law, 
University of Connecticut School of Law.

Squeezed at Both Ends: Federal Spending Resulting from Restrictive 
        Logging Access and Timber Tariffs. October 7, 2019. Field 
        Hearing in Morehead, KY.

    This hearing examined the cross-sectional impact of forest 
policy and tariffs. Over the past three decades the Federal 
Government has increasingly restricted access to Federal 
forests for logging. This has depressed economic activity and 
contracted tax bases in areas where logging is a major 
industry. This manifests in direct costs to the Federal 
Government in the form of mitigation type payments such as 
Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) and Secure Rural School 
payments. Moreover, because local economies are depressed, 
local populations are more likely to depend on direct federal 
aid.
    Compounding and exacerbating this problem are recent and 
proposed tariffs which impede access to markets for timber that 
can be harvested in these communities. These trade actions have 
the potential to further depress already vulnerable communities 
resulting in fewer tax receipts to the Federal Government and 
local communities and pushing more people onto Government aid 
programs.
    Witnesses: Joseph L. Barloon, General Counsel, Office of 
the United States Trade Representative; Cameron Bishop, Deputy 
Assistant United States Trade Representative for Congressional 
Affairs, Office of the United States Trade Representative; 
Jeffrey W. Stringer, Ph.D., Chairman, Department of Forestry 
and Natural Resources, University of Kentucky; Stephen M. 
Vacik, Ed.D., President and Chief Executive Officer, Maysville 
Community and Technical College; Ray White, Chief Executive 
Officer, Harold White Lumber, Inc.; Bob Helton, Executive 
Director, Morehead Rowan County Economic Development Council; 
Hon. Harry Clark, Judge/Executive, Rowan County Kentucky; Hon. 
Laura White-Brown, Mayor, City of Morehead Kentucky; Hon. Rick 
Stiltner, Judge/Executive, Menifee County Kentucky; and Hon. 
Bobby C. Rogers, Judge/Executive, Bath County Kentucky.

Rise of the Zombies: The Unauthorized and Unaccountable Government You 
        Pay For. October 30, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116-132)

    This hearing looked at unauthorized programs. Discretionary 
programs are created through authorizing legislation--laws that 
establish the programs and parameters under which they are to 
be carried out. Authorizations also lay out funding parameters 
and timelines for the program's existence. After such time 
programs are supposed to be evaluated and reformed through a 
reauthorization.
    However, though authorizations are laws, so too are 
appropriations bills. Thus, often appropriators regularly 
override authorizations by providing funds to programs 
inconsistent with the underlying authorization. Such was the 
case a number of years ago when the NDAA eliminated a missile 
program, but the appropriations that year funded the program 
anyway.
    Another, and more pervasive, problem occurs when a 
program's authorization expires, but the appropriators fund it 
anyway. This is a very prevalent practice, accounting for more 
than 1000 programs and $300 billion in spending.
    Since appropriator override invalidates authorizing 
committees, once a program is initially created authorizers 
have little incentive to reassess programs for performance and 
need. Meaning many programs have not been scrutinized for 
decades. For example, the Inter-American Foundation (which has 
paid for clown college in Argentina) was last authorized (or 
scrutinized) in 1987, but has continued to be funded every year 
since.
    There is little capacity for senators to prevent this 
practice. For that reason, Chairman Paul has previously 
introduced the Legislative Performance Review Act, which would 
limit all authorizations to 4 years, wind programs down over 
two years after their authorizations have expired, and most 
importantly create a surgical point of order against 
appropriations for unauthorized programs. Rep. McMorris Rodgers 
has her own bill aimed at addressing this problem in the House.
    Witnesses: Panel I--Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, U.S. House 
of Representatives
    Panel II--Kevin R. Kosar, Vice President of Policy, R 
Street Institute; Jonathan Bydlak, President, Institute for 
Spending Reform; and James A. Thurber, Distinguished Professor 
of Government, American University.

The Afghanistan Papers: Costs and Benefits of America's Longest War. 
        February 11, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116-203)

    At the time of the hearing, the war in Afghanistan has now 
gone on for more than 18 years, making it the longest military 
conflict in U.S. history. By some estimates, this has cost the 
U.S. taxpayer more than $1 trillion.
    Prior to this hearing, The Washington Post published The 
Afghanistan Papers, which chronicle that from the very 
beginning, the Afghanistan conflict has been rudderless, with 
success largely undefined and unachievable. Despite clear and 
obvious problems with the war, military and other officials 
systematically mislead Congress and the American people about 
conditions in Afghanistan.
    Spending seems to have played a critical role in the 
effectiveness of efforts in Afghanistan and as a justification 
for ongoing U.S. engagement. One the one hand, the Afghan 
conflict has become a long term justification for increases in 
appropriations; whereas on the other hand, so much money has 
been thrown at the conflict in the name of rebuilding, that it 
has diminished the effectiveness of such efforts.
    Witnesses: Panel I--John F. Sopko, Special Inspector 
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
    Panel II--Hon. Douglas E. Lute, Former United States 
Permanent Representative to NATO and Senior Fellow, Project on 
Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.
    Panel III--Hon. Richard A. Boucher, Former United States 
Ambassador to Cyprus and Senior Fellow, The Watson Institute 
for International and Public Affairs, Brown University; Lt. 
Col. Daniel L. Davis, USA, Ret., Senior Fellow and Military 
Expert, Defense Priorities.

 State and Local Cybersecurity: Defending Our Communities from Cyber 
        Threats amid COVID-19. December 2, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116-)

    In recent years, State and local governments and entities 
have found themselves increasingly at risk from sophisticated 
cybersecurity threats from a diverse set of actors. In 2020, 
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for millions of 
Americans to convert their daily activities and routines to an 
internet-based regimen has amplified the cybersecurity threats 
to State and local governments and entities.
    This hearing served as a follow-up to the February 2020 
HSGAC hearing on state and local cyber security and examined in 
particular how State and local governments, schools, and 
hospitals are responding to cyber threats amid the response to 
COVID-19 and how the Federal Government can provide support to 
improve their response, including through a standalone state 
and local cybersecurity grant program and improved information 
sharing between the Federal Government and schools and 
hospitals.
    Witnesses: Panel I--Brandon Wales, Acting Director, 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.
    Panel II--Denis Goulet, Commissioner, New Hampshire 
Department of Information Technology; Leslie Torres-Rodriguez, 
Ed.D., Superintendent of Schools, Hartford Public Schools; John 
Riggi, Senior Advisor for Cybersecurity and Risk, American 
Hospital Association; and Bill Siegel, Chief Executive Officer 
and Founder, Coveware, Inc.

                               B. Reports

    In his capacity of Chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal 
Spending Oversight and Emergency Management, Senator Paul 
released six compilation reports, detailing various wasteful 
programs, grants, and practices that have cost taxpayers 
billions.

``The Waste Report: Swipe Left on Waste'' February 14, 2019

    This report detailed an effort by private researchers, 
using funds totaling $1,200,000 from the National Institute of 
Child and Human Development and the National Science Foundation 
to study the habits of dating app users.

``The Waste Report Spring 2019: Waste in Full Bloom'' April 2019

    This report cataloged 10 examples of the Federal Government 
spending more than $42 million on wasteful projects. The report 
included examples of waste such as:

      Sending international students to American 
colleges for free;
      Documented abuse of the DOD's 1033 program;
      Studied the habits of online dating app users;
      Funded a week of summer school for grad students; 
and
      Improved the quality of TV in Moldova.

``The Summer 2019 Waste Report!'' August 2019

    This report cataloged 10 examples of the Federal Government 
spending more than $50 billion on wasteful projects. The report 
included examples of waste such as:

      Funding ``green growth'' in Peru;
      Medicare's paying of improper payments;
      Studying whether the Panamanian Tungara frog's 
mating calls sound different in the forest or the city;
      Spending money to teach English and information 
technology skills to students at Iraqi madrasas; and
      The attempt to convert an abandoned mental 
hospital into the headquarters of the Department of Homeland 
Security.

``The Waste Report: Fall 2019'' November 2019

    This report catalogued 8 examples of the Federal Government 
spending more than $230 million on wasteful projects. The 
report included examples of waste such as:

      The Federal subsidy of the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority;
      Funding debate and model United Nations 
competitions in Afghanistan;
      Purchasing a statute made by the musical artist 
Bob Dylan for the U.S. Embassy in Mozambique;
      Studying the connection between drinking alcohol 
and winding up in the emergency room; and
      Paying to bring Serbian cheese up to 
international standards.

``The Festivus Report 2019'' December 2019

    This is Chairman Paul's annual compilation report of 
wasteful government spending. This edition of the Festivus 
Report cataloged over $50 billion in wasteful spending 
including:

      The U.S. Agency for International Development 
funding the acquisition of textbooks for students in 
Afghanistan that were unusable and unused;
      The Department of State funding efforts to 
improve the capacity of the Pakistani film industry;
      FEMA paying for vehicles the New York City 
government falsely claimed were damaged by Superstorm Sandy; 
and
      The NSF paying to teach social scientists how to 
apply for grants.

``The Festivus Report 2020'' December 2020

    This is Chairman Paul's annual compilation report of 
wasteful government spending. This edition of the Festivus 
Report catalogued 57 examples of government waste across five 
categories: Energy, Environment, and Science; Foreign Aid; 
Military; Health Care; and Miscellaneous. The 57 items totaled 
over $54 billion in wasteful spending, including:

      The Fish and Wildlife Service subsidizing 
investments to facilitate yachting;
      The Federal Aviation Administration using funds 
appropriated as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security Act to renovate a taxiway at an airport on 
Nantucket island most often used by private jets;
      The National Institutes of Health paid 
researchers to interview San Franciscans about their edible 
cannabis use; and
      The National Institutes of Health paying to find 
out if hot tubbing can lower stress.

                            III. LEGISLATION

    Since the Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and 
Emergency Management's hearings play an important role in 
bringing issues to the attention of Congress and the public, 
its work frequently contributes to the development of 
legislative initiatives. During the 116th Congress, Chairman 
Paul introduced the following legislative proposals in his 
capacity as a Senator:
    1. S. 2618--Bonuses for Cost-Cutters Act--Expands existing 
agency Inspector General programs that pursue waste, fraud, and 
abuse to also include surplus funds that are not needed to 
accomplish an Executive agency's duties and responsibilities. 
Under this program, Executive Branch employees could propose 
savings and, if confirmed by their agency's Inspector General 
and Chief Financial Officer, extra funds may be returned to the 
Treasury at the end of the year. Consistent with the existing 
Inspector General authority, if such savings are realized, the 
employee that made the suggestion would also be eligible for a 
performance bonus of one percent of the amount saved, capped at 
$10,000.
    2. S.1740--Default Prevention Act--This bill requires the 
following obligations to be granted priority over all other 
U.S. obligations if the public debt reaches the statutory 
limit:

      Principal and interest on debt held by the 
public;
      Compensations, allowances, and benefits for 
members of the Armed Forces on active duty;
      Social Security benefits;
      Medicare benefits; and
      Obligations under any program administered by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs.

    If Congress is notified, the Department of the Treasury may 
issue additional debt for the priority obligations in excess of 
the debt limit. Treasury may issue the additional debt during 
the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the United 
States is unable to use revenues or extraordinary measures to 
fully pay the priority obligations at the time they are due.
    (The term ``extraordinary measures'' refers to a series of 
actions that the Department of Treasury may implement to allow 
the United States to borrow additional funds without exceeding 
the debt limit. The measures generally include suspensions or 
delays of debt sales and suspensions or redemptions of 
investments in certain government funds.)
    3. S. 5014--Shutdown Prevention Act--This bill provides 
specified continuing appropriations to prevent a government 
shutdown if any appropriations measure for a fiscal year has 
not been enacted or a joint resolution making continuing 
appropriations is not in effect after the fiscal year begins. 
The appropriations are provided to continue to fund programs, 
projects, and activities for which funds were provided in the 
preceding fiscal year.
    4. S. 4979--A bill to terminate the Department of 
Education--This bill would terminate the Department of 
Education, effective December 31, 2020. This bill reflects the 
belief that the Federal Government need not impose itself on 
the education system by empowering unelected bureaucrats over 
our children's education. Local school systems, teachers, and 
parents, not the Federal Government, are in the best position 
to determine how to educate our children and eliminating the 
Department of Education is the best way to ensure that parents 
and local school boards are truly in control of their child's 
education.
    5. S. 2183--Duplication Scoring Act of 2019--This bill 
would require the Government Accountability Office to analyze 
legislation reported by a congressional committee in order to 
prevent duplication of and overlap with existing federal 
programs, offices, and initiatives.
    6. S. 4104--Stopping Improper Payments to Deceased People 
Act--This bill expands and otherwise modifies the sharing of 
death data, particularly with regard to the recovery of 
improper payments to deceased individuals. It would require the 
Social Security Administration to pay to States their 
reasonable costs for compiling and sharing death records with 
the SSA. In addition, the bill permits the SSA to share, if 
certain conditions are met, the death data with Federal and 
State agencies for purposes of, among other things, ensuring 
proper payments and tax administration duties related to 
issuing Economic Impact Payments related to the COVID-19 
pandemic.
    7. S. 4878--Stopping Improper Payments to Foreigners Act--
This bill would ensure proper Economic Impact Payments paid out 
with Americans' tax dollars would not be sent abroad to those 
with tenuous or no ties to the United States.
    8. S. Con. Res. 11--Penny Plan Balanced Budget--Establishes 
the congressional budget for the Federal Government for FY2021 
and sets forth budgetary levels for FY2021-FY2029. This budget 
balances in 5 years by implementing a one percent year over 
year cut for the first 5 years and then grows at one percent 
thereafter.
    Recommends levels and amounts for FY2021-FY2029 in both 
houses of Congress for:

      Federal revenues,
      New budget authority,
      Budget outlays,
      Deficits,
      Public debt,
      Debt held by the public, and
      The major functional categories of spending.

    Recommends levels and amounts for FY2021-FY2029 in the 
Senate for Social Security and Postal Service discretionary 
administrative expenses.
    Includes reconciliation instructions directing: (1) several 
Senate authorizing committees to report and submit to the 
Senate Budget Committee legislation to reduce the deficit, and 
(2) the Senate Finance Committee to report and submit to the 
Senate Budget Committee legislation to reduce the deficit and 
legislation to reduce revenues.
    (Under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, reconciliation 
bills are considered by Congress using expedited legislative 
procedures that prevent a filibuster and restrict amendments in 
the Senate.)
    Establishes reserve funds that provide flexibility in 
applying budget enforcement rules to legislation relating to 
efficiencies, consolidations, and other savings; or health 
savings accounts.
    Sets forth budget enforcement procedures for legislation 
considered in the Senate.
    9. S. 2798--Whistleblower Protection Act of 2019--This bill 
would retroactively prohibit a Federal contractor from taking a 
personnel action against an employee who has lawfully disclosed 
information the employee reasonably believes shows 1) a 
violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or 2) cooperation 
with or disclosure of information to the agency's inspector 
general or special counsel; or 3) refusal to obey an order that 
would require the individual to violate a law, rule, or 
regulation. This bill also prohibits a Federal agency from 
pressuring a Federal contractor to take any personnel action 
against an employee based on such disclosures or actions by the 
employee.
    10. S. 3904--Write the Laws Act--This bill would prohibit 
an act of Congress from containing any delegation of 
legislative powers, whether to any component within the 
legislative branch, the President or any other member of the 
executive branch, the judicial branch, any agency or quasi-
public agency, any state or state instrumentality, or any other 
organization or individual. It would also require the GAO to 
identify to Congress all statutes enacted before 90 days after 
this bill's enactment that contain any delegation of 
legislative power.
    11. S. 92--Regulations from the Executive In Need of 
Scrutiny Act of 2019--This bill establishes a congressional 
approval process for a major rule. A major rule may only take 
effect if Congress approves the rule. A major rule is a rule 
that results in 1) an annual effect on the economy of $100 
million or more, 2) a major increase in costs or prices for 
consumers, individual industries, government agencies, or 
geographic regions, 3) significant adverse effects on 
competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, 
or the ability of U.S.-based enterprises to compete with 
foreign-based enterprises. The bill also establishes a 
congressional disapproval process for a nonmajor rule, 
providing that a nonmajor rule may only take effect if Congress 
does not disapprove of the rule.

                            IV. GAO REPORTS

    During the 116th Congress, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) issued 32 reports at the request of the 
Subcommittee. Reports are listed here by title, GAO number, and 
release date.
    U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Status of FEMA Public 
Assistance Funding and Implementation. GAO-19-253. February 25, 
2019.
    Grants Management: Agency Action Required to Ensure 
Grantees Identify Federal Contribution Amounts. GAO-19-282. 
March 14, 2019.
    Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status of FEMA Funding, Oversight, 
and Recovery Challenges. GAO-19-256. March 14, 2019.
    Huracanes de Puerto Rico: Estado de Financiamiento de FEMA, 
Suervision y Desafios de Recuperacion (Spanish Highlights). 
GAO-19-331. March 14, 2019.
    Disaster Recovery: Better Monitoring of Block Grants Funds 
is Needed. GAO-19-232. March 25, 2019.
    2017 Hurricane Season: Federal Support for Electricity Grid 
Restoration in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. GAO-19-
296. April 18, 2019.
    2017 Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed to Improve the 
Use of Post-Disaster Contracts to Support Response and 
Recovery. GAO-19-281. April 24, 2019.
    Disaster Assistance: FEMA Action Needed to Better Support 
Individuals Who Are Older or Have Disabilities. GAO-19-318. May 
14, 2019.
    Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Opportunities to 
Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve 
Billions in Financial Benefits. GAO-19-536T. May 21, 2019.
    2017 Disaster Relief Oversight: Strategy Needed to Ensure 
Agencies' Internal Control Plans Provide Sufficient 
Information. GAO-19-479. June 28, 2019.
    Disaster Response: FEMA and the American Red Cross Need to 
Ensure Key Mass Care Organizations are Included in Coordination 
and Planning. GAO-19-526. September 19, 2019.
    Respuesta a Desastres: FEMA y La Cruz Roja Americana 
Necesitan Asegurar que las Organizaciones Claves del Cuidado en 
Masa Sean Incluidas en la Coordinacion y el Planeamiento. GAO-
19-708. September 19, 2019.
    Disaster Response: HHS Should Address Deficiencies 
Highlighted by Recent Hurricanes in the U.S. Virgin Islands and 
Puerto Rico. GAO-19-592. September 20, 2019.
    Puerto Rico Electricity Grid Recovery: Better Information 
and Enhanced Coordination is Needed to Address Challenges. GAO-
20-141. October 8, 2019.
    Recuperacion de la Red Electrica en Puerto Rico: Se 
Necesita Mejor Informacion y Coordinacion para Enfrentar 
Desafios. GAO-20-143. October 8, 2019.
    Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take Additional Actions to 
Address Unique Response and Recovery Challenges. GAO-20-5. 
October 9, 2019.
    Highway Emergency Relief: Federal Highway Administration 
Should Enhance Accountability Over Project Decisions. GAO-20-
32. October 17, 2019.
    Emergency Transportation Relief: Federal Transit 
Administration and FEMA Took Actions to Coordinate, But Steps 
are Needed to Address Risk of Duplicate Funding. GAO-20-85. 
November 13, 2019.
    U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions Could 
Strengthen FEMA's Key Disaster Recovery Efforts. GAO-20-54. 
November 19, 2019.
    Wildland Fire: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Reduce Wildland 
Fuels and Lower Risk to Communities and Ecosystems. GAO-20-52. 
December 19, 2019.
    Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery: FEMA Actions Needed to 
Strengthen Project Cost Estimation and Awareness of Program 
Guidance. GAO-20-221. February 5, 2020.
    Recuperacion de Desastres en Puerto Rico: Acciones de FEMA 
son Necesarias para Fortalecer la Calculacion de Costos de 
Proyectos y el Conocimento de las Directrices del Programa. 
GAO-20-381. February 5, 2020.
    Emergency Alerting: Agencies Need to Address Pending 
Applications and Monitor Industry Progress on System 
Improvements. GAO-20-294. February 6, 2020.
    FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Address 
Deployment and Staff Development Challenges. GAO-20-360. May 4, 
2020.
    National Preparedness: Additional Actions Needed to Address 
Gaps in the Nation's Emergency Management Capabilities. GAO-20-
297. May 4, 2020.
    National Flood Insurance Program: FEMA Can Improve 
Community Oversight and Data Sharing. GAO-20-396. May 5, 2020.
    Critical Infrastructure Prioritization During COVID-19. 
September 17, 2020.
    Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take Additional Actions to 
Strengthen Fraud Risk Management for Public Assistance 
Emergency Work Grants. GAO-20-604. September 29, 2020.
    Disaster Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to 
Strengthen FEMA's Individuals and Households Program. GAO-20-
503. September 20, 2020.
    Supplemental Material for GAO-20-503: FEMA Individuals and 
Households Program Applicant Data 2016-2018. GAO 20-675SP. 
September 30, 2020.
    Supplemental Material for GAO-20-503: Select Disaster 
Profiles for FEMA's Individuals and Households Program 2016-
2018. GAO-20-674SP. September 30, 2020.
    Puerto Rico Electricity: FEMA and HUD Have Not Approved 
Long-Term Projects and Need to Implement Recommendations to 
Address Uncertainties and Enhance Resilience. GAO-21-54. 
November 17, 2020.
                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY AFFAIRS AND


                           FEDERAL MANAGEMENT


                    CHAIRMAN: James Lankford (R-OK)


                 RANKING MEMBER: Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ)


                              I. AUTHORITY

    The Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal 
Management oversees the management, efficiency, effectiveness, 
and economy of all government agencies, departments, and 
programs. The Subcommittee has broad oversight over the Federal 
regulatory regime, including the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). In addition, the Subcommittee is 
responsible for exploring policies that promote a skilled, 
efficient, and effective Federal workforce that will work to 
ensure efficient and effective management of Federal programs.

                              II. ACTIVITY

    During the 116th Congress, the Subcommittee on Regulatory 
Affairs and Federal Management held 7 hearings.

                              A. Hearings


From Beginning to End: An Examination of Agencies' Early Public 
        Engagement and Retrospective Review. May 7, 2019. 
        (S. Hrg. 116-37)

    At the beginning of a rulemaking, agencies are encouraged 
to consult with stakeholders, consider multiple approaches to 
regulation, and directed to provide opportunity for public 
comment. In the years following the promulgation of a rule, 
agencies are expected to periodically review regulations to 
ensure their effectiveness and continued necessity. However, 
there is no overarching legal requirements governing initial 
public outreach and review of existing rules.
    This hearing considered how the regulatory process could be 
improved by legislation requiring advanced notices of proposed 
rulemaking and the creation of retrospective review frameworks 
during the promulgation of `major' rules.
    Witnesses: Hon. Susan E. Dudley, Former Administrator 
(2007-2009), of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs, at the Office of Management and Budget; Hon. Sally 
Katzen, Former Administrator (1993-1998), of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, at the Office of Management 
and Budget

Reauthorization of the SBA Office of Advocacy. May 22, 2019 
        (S. Hrg. 116-86)

    The 1980 passage of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) 
greatly expanded the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) 
Office of Advocacy's role. The RFA requires agencies to 
consider the effects of their regulatory actions on small 
entities, mitigate effects when possible, and fill out initial 
and final regulatory analyses. The RFA also charges the Chief 
Counsel with monitoring agencies' compliance with the Act and 
submitting an annual report to Congress. In 1996, the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) required 
the EPA and OSHA to hold panels with Advocacy, OIRA, and small 
entity representatives when developing a rule that requires an 
initial regulatory flexibility analysis. The 2010 Dodd-Frank 
added the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to the 
list of agencies required to convene ``SBREFA'' panels. 
Executive Order 13272 in 2002 required all Federal agencies to 
establish procedures and policies to promote compliance with 
the RFA, which was later codified in the Small Business Jobs 
Act of 2010.
    This hearing, held jointly with the Senate Committee on 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship, discussed the work at the 
office of Advocacy, ways to enhance the Office's mission to 
serve as a voice for small businesses within the Federal 
Government, and figure out the best ways to draft a 
reauthorization of the portions of the Small Business Act and 
other laws that enable Advocacy.
    Witnesses: Major Clark, III, Acting Chief Counsel, Office 
of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration; Winslow 
Sargeant, Senior Vice President for Partnerships, International 
Council for Small Business; John Arensmeyer, CEO and Founder, 
Small Business Majority; Jeanette Hernandez Prenger, Founder, 
President, and CEO, ECCO Select; Rick Baumann, Owner, Murrells 
Inlet Seafood.

Solutions to Improve Federal Hiring. July 30, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116-98)

    This hearing provided an opportunity to discuss specific 
ways to modernize the hiring process to attract and retain 
highly qualified civil servants. Federal agencies continue to 
face a prolonged hiring crisis. The average time to hire is 106 
days, well above the Office of Personnel Management's goal of 
80 days. This renders the Federal Government unable to compete 
with the private sector for top talent. The Federal workforce 
is also aging. With 32 percent of employees eligible to retire 
by 2022, there is a significant risk of having a wide knowledge 
gap amongst Federal workers in years to come. It is therefore 
vital that the Federal hiring process be improved so that 
agencies can strategically fill critical needs in a timely 
manner. This hearing examined the challenges to implementing a 
competitive hiring process in the Federal Government and 
explored strategic measures to address these challenges.
    Witnesses: Yvonne D. Jones, Director, Strategic Issues 
Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Angela Bailey, 
Chief Human Capital Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security; and Daniel R. Sitterly, Assistant Secretary for Human 
Resources and Administration, U.S. Department of Veterans 
Affairs.

Review of E-Rulemaking Comment Systems. October 24, 2019. 
        (S. Hrg. 116-114).

    This hearing, held jointly with the Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations, reviewed federal agency systems for 
receiving reviewing, and publicizing comments on proposed 
regulations and found the systems were abused, creating some 
public distrust in the rule writing process, as well as 
additional work for federal employees. The Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations also released a report in 
conjunction with the hearing titled ``Abuses of the Federal 
Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Process.''
    Witnesses: Elizabeth Angerman, Principal Deputy 
Administrator, Office of Government-Wide Policy, U.S. General 
Services Administration; Dominic Mancini, Acting Director, 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of 
Management and Budget; Ashley Boizelle, Deputy General Counsel, 
Federal Communications Commission; Seto J. Bagdoyan, Director, 
Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, U.S. Government 
Accountability Office.

Improving Public Service: A Review of Recommendations Made by the 
        National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service. 
        June 23, 2020 (S. Hrg. 116-268)

    As the National Commission observed in its final report 
issued on March 25th, ``Public servants perform a critical role 
in the functioning of American democracy,'' but ``significant 
barriers to entering public service exist due to lack of 
awareness, aspiration, and access--especially among younger 
workers, who are underrepresented in Federal civilian 
employment.'' The National Commission went on to make specific 
recommendations, including legislative proposals for improving 
the functioning of the Federal workforce. This hearing focused 
on those recommendations with a particular emphasis on hiring 
reform.
    Witnesses: Hon. Joseph Heck, D.O, Chairman, National 
Commission on Military, National, and Public Service; Shawn 
Skelly, Commissioner, National Commission on Military, 
National, and Public Service.

Modernizing Telework: Review of Private Sector Telework Policies during 
        the COVID-19 Pandemic. July 28, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116-283)

    COVID-19 has forced both the Federal Government and private 
sector to conduct much of their normal operations remotely. 
This enhanced reliance on telework provides an opportunity to 
learn what policies put in place before the pandemic lead to 
successful remote work environments and what improvements are 
needed. Given the agility of the private sector, the hearing 
invited representatives from private sector companies to 
discuss their approach to telework before the pandemic and how, 
if at all, that approach changed since the pandemic and how it 
will continue to change moving forward.
    This hearing focused on what lessons the Federal Government 
could learn from the private sector regarding the future of 
telework. This will include what infrastructure is available to 
support telework practices, how to ensure employee productivity 
goals are met, what technologies are available to optimize 
remote collaboration and improve data security, potential cost 
saving from having a full or part-time remote workforce, as 
well as any other proposals the private sector has found useful 
in establishing and improving teleworking policies.
    Witnesses: Sean D. Morris, Principal, Deloitte Consulting 
LLP; T. Lane Wilson, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, 
The Williams Companies, Inc.; Michael Ly, Chief Executive 
Officer, Reconciled; John Zanni, Chief Executive Officer, 
Acronis SCS.

Modernizing Federal Telework: Moving forward using the Lessons Learned 
        during the COVID-19 Pandemic. November 18, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116-
        402).

    COVID-19 has required the Federal Government to conduct 
most of its normal operations remotely. The need for maximal 
telework during this period has provided an opportunity to 
identify what existing telework policies and procedures have 
been successful and areas for improvement. This hearing invited 
Federal agency representatives to discuss their approach to 
telework before the pandemic, what lessons they have learned 
during the pandemic, and how these lessons might shape the 
future of telework.
    Witnesses: Michelle Rosenberg, Acting Director, Strategic 
Issues Team, Government Accountability Office; Keith 
Washington, Deputy Secretary for Administration, U.S. 
Department of Transportation; Ms. Sydney T. Rose, Chief Human 
Capital Officer, Office of Human Resources, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management, U.S. 
Department of Labor; Jim Borland, Assistant Deputy Commissioner 
for Systems and Deputy Chief Information Officer for IT 
Operations, Social Security Administration.

                            III. LEGISLATION

    Since the Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal 
Management's hearings play an important role in bringing issues 
to the attention of Congress and the public, its work 
frequently contributes to the development of legislative 
initiatives. During the 116th Congress, Chairman Lankford 
introduced the following legislative proposals in his capacity 
as a Senator:
    1. S. 395--Providing Accountability Through Transparency--
This bill requires the notice of a proposed rule by a Federal 
agency to include the Internet address of a summary of the 
rule. The summary must be 100 words or fewer, written in plain 
language, and posted on regulations.gov.
    2. S. 1120--Small Business Regulatory Flexibility 
Improvements Act--Updates the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 
Requires agencies to analyze the total impact of a proposed 
regulation on small businesses during the rulemaking process. 
It also closes loopholes used by agencies to avoid compliance 
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996.
    3. S. 1419--Early Participation in Regulations Act--This 
bill directs agencies to publish advance notice of a proposed 
rulemaking at least 90 days before publishing a notice of 
proposed rulemaking for a major rule that the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) determines is likely 
to impose (1) an annual effect on the economy of $100 million 
or more; (2) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, 
individual industries, government agencies, or geographic 
regions; or (3) significant adverse effects on competition, 
employment, investment, productivity, innovation, health, 
safety, the environment, or the ability of U.S. enterprises to 
compete with foreign-based enterprises.
    The advance notice must:
     include, among other information, a written a description 
of the rule and the legal authority under which it is proposed; 
and
     solicit and provide a period of at least 60 days for 
submission of written data, views, and argument from interested 
persons.
    Any difference between such advance notice and the notice 
of proposed rulemaking may not be considered arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
    Advance notice is not required if the proposing agency is 
not required to publish notice of proposed rulemaking or OIRA 
finds that such advance notice is not in the public interest or 
duplicative of another statutory requirement. Such a 
determination made by OIRA is not subject to judicial review.
    4. S. 1430--Representative Payee Fraud Prevention Act--This 
bill prohibits a representative payee (i.e., a person 
designated to receive payments on behalf of a minor, a mentally 
incompetent individual, or an individual under other legal 
disability) from embezzling or converting the amounts received 
from certain retirement funds.
    If the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) determines that 
a representative payee has embezzled or converted payments from 
the Civil Service Retirement System or the Federal Employees 
Retirement System for a use other than the benefit of the 
individual on whose behalf such payments were received, OPM 
shall (1) revoke the certification for payment of benefits to 
the representative payee, and (2) certify payment to another 
representative payee or to the individual.
    5. S. 2169--A bill to amend section 3116 of title 5, United 
States Code, to clarify the applicability of the appointment 
limitations for students appointed under the expedited hiring 
authority for post-secondary students.This bill revises a 
provision that limits the authority of an agency to appoint, 
through expedited hiring authority, post-secondary students to 
an agency position at the GS-11 level. Further, the bill 
authorizes an agency to grant paid leave for up to (1) 20 days 
of rest and recuperation to a civilian employee serving in a 
combat zone or other high risk, high threat post; and (2) 5 
days to a civilian employee serving in a foreign area for local 
holidays observed in such area.
    6. S. 2757--Harmless Error Lesser Penalty for Small 
Business Act--This bill prohibits an agency from imposing a 
civil fine on a small business for a first-time paperwork 
violation, with the exceptions that the agency may levy a fine 
for a violation that (1) interferes with the detection of 
criminal activity; (2) contravenes an internal revenue law; or 
(3) endangers public health, safety, or the environment. 
However, an agency must track each first-time violation and 
report each waiver or reduction of a civil penalty for the 
violation.
    7. S. 3412--Guidance Clarity Act--This bill requires 
Federal agencies to state on the first page of guidance 
documents that such guidance (1) does not have the force and 
effect of law, and (2) is intended only to provide clarity to 
the public about existing legal requirements or agency 
policies. Excluded from this requirement is guidance directed 
to the issuing agency or other agency that is not intended to 
have a substantial effect on the behavior of regulated parties, 
as well as internal executive branch legal advice or opinions 
addressed to executive branch officials.
    8. S. 4138--Telework for U.S. Innovation Act--This bill 
makes permanent the Telework Enhancement Act Pilot Program in 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The program 
allows USPTO employees to telework from locations across the 
United States; USPTO may cover any necessary travel expenses to 
and from an agency worksite. The program is set to expire on 
December 31, 2020.
    9. S. 4691--Safeguarding Awards for Victims and Enforcement 
Settlements Act--Previous administrations have directed DOJ 
settlement money be issued to third parties with no direct 
interest in or claim to the settlement, subverting Congress's 
spending and oversight authority. SAVES Act resolves this issue 
by preventing third party payments except in limited 
circumstances where a third party is necessary for a fair 
result. Specifically, it prohibits the government from entering 
into or enforcing an enforcement settlement agreement on behalf 
of the US that directs or provides for a payment or loan to any 
person or entity other than the US except to: directly remedy 
actual harm (including to the environment) caused by the party 
making the payment or loan, pay for services rendered in 
connection with the case, or pay for court ordered restitution 
to victims in certain criminal cases or other persons in plea 
agreements.
    10. S. 4693--Better Evaluation of Science and Technology 
Act--This bill requires Federal agencies to use the best 
available scientific information during rulemaking and publish 
specified documentation of the rulemaking process.
    Specifically, the bill requires a Federal agency, to the 
extent it is making a decision based on science when issuing a 
rule, to use scientific information, technical procedures, 
methods, protocols, methodologies, or models in a manner that 
is consistent with the best available science and the intended 
use of the information, based on the weight of the scientific 
evidence.
    Each Federal agency shall make available to the public (1) 
all of its notices, determinations, findings, rules, consent 
agreements, and orders in connection with a rule; (2) a 
nontechnical summary of each risk evaluation conducted in 
connection with a rule; and (3) a list of the studies 
considered by the agency in carrying out each evaluation, along 
with the results of those studies.
    11. S. 4708--Pandemic Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 
Act--This bill establishes in the legislative branch the 
Pandemic Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Commission to 
make recommendations and propose legislation for modification, 
consolidation, harmonization, or repeal of regulations to 
reduce compliance costs, encourage growth and innovation, 
improve competitiveness, and protect public safety.
    The commission must give priority to regulations (1) the 
repeal or modification of which may assist recovery or response 
to the COVID-19 (i.e., coronavirus disease 2019) pandemic and 
future pandemics, (2) that impose disproportionately high costs 
on a small entity, (3) that create substantial recurring 
paperwork burdens or transaction costs, or (4) that could be 
made more effective while reducing regulatory costs.
    The bill sets forth reporting requirements for the 
commission and procedures for congressional consideration of 
commission reports, recommendations, and proposed legislation.
    12. S. 4977--Retirement Annuity Supplement Clarity Act--
Clarifies that OPM has the flexibility to follow a court order, 
if that order specifically divides the annuity supplement, 
rather than the blanket approach applied now. Repays annuitants 
who were retired on or before June 30, 2016, and entitled to an 
annuity supplement that was subject to a court order that was 
silent on division of the supplement, or expressly excluded the 
supplement from division; and whose annuity supplement was 
recomputed retroactively. Clarifies that any collection of 
overpayments to former spouses due to this recalculation shall 
be waived.

                            IV. GAO REPORTS

    During the 116th Congress, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) issued 8 reports at the request of the 
Subcommittee. Reports are listed here by title, GAO number, and 
release date.
    1. Grants Management: Agency Action Required to Ensure 
Grantees Identify Federal Contribution Amounts. GAO-19-282. 
March 14, 2018.
    2. Federal Workforce: Key Talent Management Strategies for 
Agencies to Better Meet their Missions. GAO-19-181. March 28, 
2019.
    3. Federal Rulemaking: Selected Agencies Should Clearly 
Communicate Practices Associated with Identity Information in 
the Public Comment Process. GAO-19-483. June 26, 2019.
    4. Federal Vehicle Fleets: Agencies have continued to 
Incorporate Alternative Fuel Vehicles into Fleets, but 
Challenges Remain. GAO-19-397. July 26, 2019.
    5. Human Capital: Improving Federal Recruiting and Hiring 
Efforts. GAO-19-696T. July 30, 2019.
    6. Federal Rulemaking: Selected Agencies Should Clearly 
Communicate Public Comment Posting Practices Associated with 
Identity Information. GAO-20-105T. October 24, 2019.
    7. Federal Rulemaking: Information on Selected Agencies' 
Management of Public Comments. GAO-20-383R. April 16, 2020.
    8. Federal Telework: Key Practices that can help ensure the 
Success of Telework Programs. GAO-21-238T. November 18, 2020.

                                 
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