[House Report 117-66]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
117th Congress } { Rept. 117-66
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { Part 1
======================================================================
IG INDEPENDENCE AND EMPOWERMENT ACT
_______
June 17, 2021.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mrs. Carolyn B. Maloney of New York, from the Committee on Oversight
and Reform, submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2662]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Oversight and Reform, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 2662) to amend the Inspector General Act of
1978, and for other purposes, having considered the same,
reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that
the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Purpose of Legislation............................... 11
Background and Need for legislation.............................. 11
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 24
Legislative History.............................................. 31
Committee Consideration.......................................... 35
Roll Call Votes.................................................. 36
Explanation of Amendments........................................ 40
List of Related Committee Hearings............................... 40
Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the
Committee...................................................... 40
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 40
Application of Law to the Legislative Branch..................... 41
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 41
Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings.............................. 41
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement......................... 41
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement........................... 41
Earmark Identification........................................... 41
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 41
New Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost
Estimate....................................................... 42
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 43
Correspondence................................................... 82
Minority Views................................................... 84
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``IG Independence and
Empowerment Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE
Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Amendment.
TITLE II--CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL
Sec. 201. Short title.
Sec. 202. Change in status of Inspector General offices.
Sec. 203. Presidential explanation of failure to nominate an Inspector
General.
TITLE III--VACANCY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL POSITIONS
Sec. 301. Vacancy of Inspector General positions.
TITLE IV--COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY
TRANSPARENCY
Sec. 401. Short title.
Sec. 402. Additional information to be included in requests and reports
to Congress.
Sec. 403. Availability of information to members of Congress regarding
certain allegations of wrongdoing closed without referral.
Sec. 404. Semiannual report.
Sec. 405. Additional reports; rules of construction.
Sec. 406. Membership of Integrity Committee.
Sec. 407. Requirement to refer allegations of wrongdoing against
Inspector General to Integrity Committee.
Sec. 408. Requirement to report final disposition to Congress.
TITLE V--ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY PROVISIONS FOR INSPECTORS GENERAL
Sec. 501. Short title.
Sec. 502. Additional authority provisions for Inspectors General.
TITLE VI--INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERSONNEL
Sec. 601. Short title.
Sec. 602. Investigations of Department of Justice personnel.
TITLE VII--OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS
Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Office of Inspector General whistleblower complaints.
TITLE VIII--NOTICE OF ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE IN
STATUS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Sec. 801. Notice of ongoing investigations when there is a change in
status of Inspector General.
TITLE IX--COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY
APPROPRIATION
Sec. 901. CIGIE appropriation.
TITLE X--NOTICE OF REFUSAL TO PROVIDE INSPECTORS GENERAL ACCESS
Sec. 1001. Notice of refusal to provide information or assistance to
Inspectors General.
TITLE XI--ENHANCEMENTS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL TRAINING
Sec. 1101. Short title.
Sec. 1102. Enhancements to Inspector General Training.
TITLE XII--BUDGETARY EFFECTS
Sec. 1201. Determination of budgetary effects.
TITLE XIII--SEVERABILITY
Sec. 1301. Severability.
TITLE I--INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Inspector General Independence
Act''.
SEC. 102. AMENDMENT.
The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(1) in section 3(b)--
(A) by striking ``An Inspector General'' and
inserting:
``(1) An Inspector General'';
(B) by inserting after ``by the President'' the
following: ``in accordance with paragraph (2)''; and
(C) by inserting at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(2) The President may remove an Inspector General only for
any of the following grounds (and the documentation of any such
ground shall be included in the communication required pursuant
to paragraph (1)):
``(A) Documented permanent incapacity.
``(B) Documented neglect of duty.
``(C) Documented malfeasance.
``(D) Documented conviction of a felony or conduct involving
moral turpitude.
``(E) Documented knowing violation of a law or regulation.
``(F) Documented gross mismanagement.
``(G) Documented gross waste of funds.
``(H) Documented abuse of authority.
``(I) Documented inefficiency.''; and
(2) in section 8G(e)(2), by adding at the end the following:
``An Inspector General may be removed only for any of the
following grounds (and the documentation of any such ground
shall be included in the communication required pursuant to
this paragraph):
``(A) Documented permanent incapacity.
``(B) Documented neglect of duty.
``(C) Documented malfeasance.
``(D) Documented conviction of a felony or conduct
involving moral turpitude.
``(E) Documented knowing violation of a law or
regulation.
``(F) Documented gross mismanagement.
``(G) Documented gross waste of funds.
``(H) Documented abuse of authority.
``(I) Documented inefficiency.''.
TITLE II--CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL
SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Inspector General Protection Act''.
SEC. 202. CHANGE IN STATUS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OFFICES.
(a) Change in Status of Inspector General of Offices.--Paragraph (1)
of section 3(b) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``, is placed on paid or unpaid non-duty
status,'' after ``is removed from office'';
(2) by inserting ``, change in status,'' after ``any such
removal''; and
(3) by inserting ``, change in status,'' after ``before the
removal''.
(b) Change in Status of Inspector General of Designated Federal
Entities.--Section 8G(e)(2) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5
U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``, is placed on paid or unpaid non-duty
status,'' after ``office'';
(2) by inserting ``, change in status,'' after ``any such
removal''; and
(3) by inserting ``, change in status,'' after ``before the
removal''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take
effect 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 203. PRESIDENTIAL EXPLANATION OF FAILURE TO NOMINATE AN INSPECTOR
GENERAL.
(a) In General.--Subchapter III of chapter 33 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by inserting after section 3349d the following
new section:
``Sec. 3349e. Presidential explanation of failure to nominate an
Inspector General
``If the President fails to make a formal nomination for a vacant
Inspector General position that requires a formal nomination by the
President to be filled within the period beginning on the date on which
the vacancy occurred and ending on the day that is 210 days after that
date, the President shall communicate, within 30 days after the end of
such period, to Congress in writing--
``(1) the reasons why the President has not yet made a formal
nomination; and
``(2) a target date for making a formal nomination.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 33 of
title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 3349d the following new item:
``3349e. Presidential explanation of failure to nominate an Inspector
General.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any
vacancy first occurring on or after that date.
TITLE III--VACANCY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL POSITIONS
SEC. 301. VACANCY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL POSITIONS.
(a) In General.--Section 3345 of title 5, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(d)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if an Inspector General
position that requires appointment by the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate to be filled is vacant, the first
assistant of such position shall perform the functions and duties of
the Inspector General temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the
time limitations of section 3346.
``(2) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if for purposes of carrying out
paragraph (1) of this subsection, by reason of absence, disability, or
vacancy, the first assistant to the position of Inspector General is
not available to perform the functions and duties of the Inspector
General, an acting Inspector General shall be appointed by the
President from among individuals serving in an office of any Inspector
General, provided that--
``(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of death,
resignation, or beginning of inability to serve of the
applicable Inspector General, the individual served in a
position in an office of any Inspector General for not less
than 90 days; and
``(B) the rate of pay for the position of such individual is
equal to or greater than the minimum rate of pay payable for a
position at GS-15 of the General Schedule.''.
(b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to
any vacancy first occurring with respect to an Inspector General
position on or after the date of enactment of this Act.
TITLE IV--COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY
TRANSPARENCY
SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Integrity Committee Transparency Act
of 2021''.
SEC. 402. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN REQUESTS AND REPORTS
TO CONGRESS.
Section 11(d) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (5)(B)(ii), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ``, the length of time the Integrity
Committee has been evaluating the allegation of wrongdoing, and
a description of any previous written notice provided under
this clause with respect to the allegation of wrongdoing,
including the description provided for why additional time was
needed.''; and
(2) in paragraph (8)(A)(ii), by inserting ``or corrective
action'' after ``disciplinary action''.
SEC. 403. AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS REGARDING
CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING CLOSED WITHOUT
REFERRAL.
Section 11(d)(5)(B) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(iii) Availability of information to
members of congress.--
``(I) In general.--With respect to an
allegation of wrongdoing made by a
member of Congress that is closed by
the Integrity Committee without
referral to the Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee to initiate an
investigation, the Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee shall, not later
than 60 days after closing such
allegation, provide a written
description of the nature of the
allegation of wrongdoing and how the
Integrity Committee evaluated the
allegation of wrongdoing to--
``(aa) the Chair and Ranking
Member of the Committee on
Oversight and Reform of the
House of Representatives;
``(bb) the Chair and Ranking
Member of the Committee on
Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the
Senate;
``(cc) a member of the House
of Representatives who has the
support of any seven members of
the Committee on Oversight and
Reform of the House of
Representatives; or
``(dd) a member of the Senate
who has the support of any five
members of the Committee on
Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the
Senate.
``(II) Requirement to forward.--The
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee
shall forward any written description
or update provided under this clause to
the members of the Integrity Committee
and to the Chairperson of the
Council.''.
SEC. 404. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.
Section 11(d)(9) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.)
is amended to read as follows:
``(9) Semiannual report.--On or before May 31, 2022, and
every six months thereafter, the Council shall submit to
Congress and the President a report on the activities of the
Integrity Committee during the immediately preceding six-month
periods ending March 31 and September 30, which shall include
the following with respect to allegations of wrongdoing that
are made against Inspectors General and staff members of the
various Offices of Inspector General described under paragraph
(4)(C):
``(A) An overview and analysis of the allegations of
wrongdoing disposed of by the Integrity Committee,
including--
``(i) analysis of the positions held by
individuals against whom allegations were made,
including the duties affiliated with such
positions;
``(ii) analysis of the categories or types of
the allegations of wrongdoing; and
``(iii) a summary of disposition of all the
allegations.
``(B) The number of allegations referred to the
Department of Justice or the Office of Special Counsel,
including the number of allegations referred for
criminal investigation.
``(C) The number of allegations referred to the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee for
investigation, a general description of the status of
such investigations, and a summary of the findings of
investigations completed.
``(D) An overview and analysis of allegations of
wrongdoing received by the Integrity Committee during
any previous reporting period, but remained pending
during some part of the six months covered by the
report, including--
``(i) analysis of the positions held by
individuals against whom allegations were made,
including the duties affiliated with such
positions;
``(ii) analysis of the categories or types of
the allegations of wrongdoing; and
``(iii) a summary of disposition of all the
allegations.
``(E) The number and category or type of pending
investigations.
``(F) For each allegation received--
``(i) the date on which the investigation was
opened;
``(ii) the date on which the allegation was
disposed of, as applicable; and
``(iii) the case number associated with the
allegation.
``(G) The nature and number of allegations to the
Integrity Committee closed without referral, including
the justification for why each allegation was closed
without referral.
``(H) A brief description of any difficulty
encountered by the Integrity Committee when receiving,
evaluating, investigating, or referring for
investigation an allegation received by the Integrity
Committee, including a brief description of--
``(i) any attempt to prevent or hinder an
investigation; or
``(ii) concerns about the integrity or
operations at an Office of Inspector
General.''.
SEC. 405. ADDITIONAL REPORTS; RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
Section 11(d) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(14) Additional reports.--
``(A) Report to inspector general.--The Chairperson
of the Integrity Committee shall submit a report
immediately whenever the Chairperson of the Integrity
Committee becomes aware of particularly serious or
flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to
the administration of programs and operations of an
Office of Inspector General. The report shall be sent
to the Inspector General who leads the Office of
Inspector General at which the serious or flagrant
problems, abuses, or deficiencies were alleged.
``(B) Report to congress.--The Inspector General of
the Office identified by the Integrity Committee shall
submit any such report to the House Committee on
Oversight and Reform and the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs within seven
calendar days from the time the Inspector General
receives the report together with a report by the
Inspector General at the Office identified by the
Integrity Committee containing any comments such
Inspector General deems appropriate.
``(15) Rule of construction.--
``(A) Public disclosure of information.--Except as
provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this
subsection shall be construed to authorize the public
disclosure of information which is--
``(i) prohibited from disclosure by any other
provision of law;
``(ii) required by Executive order to be
protected from disclosure in the interest of
national defense or national security or in the
conduct of foreign affairs; or
``(iii) a part of an ongoing criminal
investigation.
``(B) Provision of report to requesting members of
congress.--Subject to any other provision of law that
would otherwise prohibit disclosure of such
information, the information described in subparagraph
(A) may be provided to any Member of Congress upon
request of the Member.
``(16) Prohibited disclosures.--The Integrity Committee may
not provide or otherwise disclose to Congress or the public any
information that reveals the personally identifiable
information of an individual who alleges wrongdoing to the
Integrity Committee under this subsection unless the Integrity
Committee first obtains the consent of the individual.''.
SEC. 406. MEMBERSHIP OF INTEGRITY COMMITTEE.
Section 11(d)(2) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.)
is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by adding at the end the following:
``(iv) The individual appointed under
subparagraph (C).''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(C) Appointment of former inspector general to
committee.--
``(i) Appointment.--The Chairperson of the
Council shall appoint an individual who prior
to the date of such appointment served as an
Inspector General (as that position is
described in section 3(a) and section
8G(a)(6)), and who has upheld the highest
standards of integrity and professionalism
while serving and since leaving service as an
Inspector General, as determined by the
Chairperson, to serve as a member of the
Committee unless no such individual is
available or willing to serve as a member of
the Committee at the time of the appointment.
``(ii) Initial term.--The individual
appointed under clause (i) shall serve at the
pleasure of the Chairperson of the Council for
a 2-year term.
``(iii) Additional term.--The Chairperson of
the Council may reappoint the individual
appointed under clause (i) to serve at the
pleasure of the Chairperson of the Council for
an additional term not to exceed 2 years.
``(iv) Compensation.--
``(I) Special government employee
designation.--The individual appointed
under clause (i) shall be considered a
special government employee pursuant to
section 202(a) of title 18, United
States Code.
``(II) Compensation and travel
expenses.--An individual appointed
under clause (i) may not receive
compensation at a rate in excess of the
rate of basic pay for level IV of the
executive schedule under section 5315
of title 5, United States Code, and any
such individual, while engaged in the
performance of their duties away from
their homes or regular places of
business, may be allowed travel
expenses, including per diem in lieu of
subsistence, as authorized by section
5703 of such title for persons employed
intermittently in the Government
service.
``(III) Acceptance of volunteer
services.--The Chairperson of the
Council may accept volunteer services
from the individual appointed under
this subparagraph without regard to
section 1342 of title 31, United States
Code.
``(IV) Provisions relating to
reemployment.--
``(aa) The Chairperson of the
Council may reemploy
annuitants.
``(bb) The employment of
annuitants under this paragraph
shall be subject to the
provisions of section 9902(g)
of title 5, United States Code,
as if the Council was the
Department of Defense.''.
SEC. 407. REQUIREMENT TO REFER ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING AGAINST
INSPECTOR GENERAL TO INTEGRITY COMMITTEE.
(a) Requirement.--Section 11(d)(4) of the Inspector General Act of
1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), in the heading, by striking
``Requirement'' and inserting ``Allegations against staff
members'';
(2) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) and (C) as
subparagraphs (C) and (D), respectively; and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following:
``(B) Allegations against inspectors general.--An
Inspector General shall refer to the Integrity
Committee any allegation of wrongdoing against that
Inspector General.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 11(d)(1) of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking
``(4)(C)'' and inserting ``(4)(D)''.
SEC. 408. REQUIREMENT TO REPORT FINAL DISPOSITION TO CONGRESS.
Section 11(d)(8) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.)
is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by inserting
``contemporaneously with the submission of the report under
clause (ii),'' before ``submit''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the
Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of
Representatives, and other congressional committees of
jurisdiction,'' after ``Integrity Committee''.
TITLE V--ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY PROVISIONS FOR INSPECTORS GENERAL
SEC. 501. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``IG Subpoena Authority Act''.
SEC. 502. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY PROVISIONS FOR INSPECTORS GENERAL.
The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(1) by inserting after section 6 the following new section:
``SEC. 6A. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.
``(a) Testimonial Subpoena Authority.--In addition to the authority
otherwise provided by this Act and in accordance with the requirements
of this section, each Inspector General, in carrying out the provisions
of this Act (or in the case of an Inspector General or Special
Inspector General not established under this Act, the provisions of the
authorizing statute), is authorized to require by subpoena the
attendance and testimony of witnesses as necessary in the performance
of the functions assigned to the Inspector General by this Act (or in
the case of an Inspector General or Special Inspector General not
established under this Act, the functions assigned by the authorizing
statute), which in the case of contumacy or refusal to obey, such
subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate United States
district court. An Inspector General may not require by subpoena the
attendance and testimony of any Federal employee or employee of a
designated Federal entity, but may use other authorized procedures.
``(b) Limitation of Delegation.--The authority to issue a subpoena
under subsection (a) may only be delegated to an official performing
the functions and duties of the Inspector General when an Inspector
General position is vacant or when the Inspector General is unable to
perform the functions and duties of the Office.
``(c) Panel Review Before Issuance.--
``(1) Approval required.--
``(A) Request for approval by subpoena panel.--Before
the issuance of a subpoena described in subsection (a),
an Inspector General shall submit a request for
approval to issue a subpoena to a panel (in this
section, referred to as the `Subpoena Panel'), which
shall be comprised of three Inspectors General of the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency, who shall be designated by the Inspector
General serving as Chairperson of the Council.
``(B) Protection from disclosure.--The information
contained in the request submitted by an Inspector
General under subparagraph (A) and the identification
of a witness shall be protected from disclosure to the
extent permitted by law. Any request for disclosure of
such information shall be submitted to the Inspector
General requesting the subpoena.
``(2) Time to respond.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph
(B), the Subpoena Panel shall approve or deny a request
for approval to issue a subpoena not later than 10
calendar days after the submission of such request.
``(B) Additional information for panel.--If the
Subpoena Panel determines that additional information
is necessary to approve or deny a request submitted by
an Inspector General under paragraph (1)(A), the
Subpoena Panel shall request such information from the
Inspector General and shall approve or deny the request
submitted by the Inspector General under paragraph
(1)(A) not later than 20 calendar days after the
submission of the request under such paragraph.
``(3) Denial by panel.--If a majority of the Subpoena Panel
denies the approval of a subpoena, that subpoena may not be
issued.
``(d) Notice to Attorney General.--
``(1) In general.--If the Subpoena Panel approves a subpoena
under subsection (c), the Inspector General shall notify the
Attorney General that the Inspector General intends to issue
the subpoena.
``(2) Denial for interference with an ongoing
investigation.--Not later than 10 calendar days after the date
on which the Attorney General is notified pursuant to paragraph
(1), the Attorney General may object to the issuance of the
subpoena because the subpoena will interfere with an ongoing
investigation and the subpoena may not be issued.
``(3) Issuance of subpoena approved.--If the Attorney General
declines to object or fails to object to the issuance of the
subpoena during the 10-day period described in paragraph (2),
the Inspector General may issue the subpoena.
``(e) Guidelines.--The Chairperson of the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency, in consultation with the Attorney
General, shall prescribe guidelines to carry out this section.
``(f) Inspector General Defined.--For purposes of this section, the
term `Inspector General' includes each Inspector General established
under this Act and each Inspector General or Special Inspector General
not established under this Act.
``(g) Applicability.--The provisions of this section shall not affect
the exercise of authority by an Inspector General of testimonial
subpoena authority established under another provision of law.'';
(2) in section 5(a)--
(A) in paragraph (21)(B), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (22), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by inserting at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(23) a description of the use of subpoenas for the
attendance and testimony of witnesses authorized under section
6A.''; and
(3) in section 8G(g)(1), by inserting ``6A,'' before ``and
7''.
TITLE VI--INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERSONNEL
SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Inspector General Access Act''.
SEC. 602. INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERSONNEL.
Section 8E of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and paragraph
(3)'';
(B) by striking paragraph (3);
(C) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as
paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively; and
(D) in paragraph (4), as redesignated, by striking
``paragraph (4)'' and inserting ``paragraph (3)''; and
(2) in subsection (d), by striking ``, except with respect to
allegations described in subsection (b)(3),''.
TITLE VII--OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS
SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Enhanced Whistleblower Engagement
Act''.
SEC. 702. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS.
(a) Whistleblower Protection Coordinator.--Section 3(d)(1)(C) of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(1) in clause (i), in the matter preceding subclause (I), by
inserting ``, including employees of that Office of Inspector
General'' after ``employees''; and
(2) in clause (iii), by inserting ``(including the Integrity
Committee of that Council)'' after ``and Efficiency''.
(b) Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.--
Section 11(c)(5)(B) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.) is amended by striking ``, allegations of reprisal,'' and
inserting the following: ``and allegations of reprisal (including the
timely and appropriate handling and consideration of protected
disclosures and allegations of reprisal that are internal to an Office
of Inspector General)''.
TITLE VIII--NOTICE OF ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE IN
STATUS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
SEC. 801. NOTICE OF ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE IN
STATUS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL.
(a) Change in Status of Inspector General of Establishment.--Section
3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by
inserting at the end the following:
``(h) Not later than 15 days after an Inspector General is removed,
placed on paid or unpaid non-duty status, or transferred to another
position or location within an establishment, the acting Inspector
General shall submit to the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a list of all audits and
investigations being conducted, supervised, coordinated by the Office
at the time the Inspector General was removed, placed on paid or unpaid
non-duty status, or transferred.''.
(b) Change in Status of Inspector General of Designated Federal
Entity.--Section 8G(e) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.) is amended by inserting at the end the following:
``(3) Not later than 15 days after an Inspector General is removed,
placed on paid or unpaid non-duty status, or transferred to another
position or location within an designated Federal entity, the acting
Inspector General shall submit to the Committee on Oversight and Reform
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a list of all audits and
investigations being conducted, supervised, coordinated by the Office
at the time the Inspector General was removed, placed on paid or unpaid
non-duty status, or transferred.''.
TITLE IX--COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY
APPROPRIATION
SEC. 901. CIGIE APPROPRIATION.
(a) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Section 11(c)(3) of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``(D) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition
to any funds available in the Inspectors General
Council Fund established under subparagraph (B), there
are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary, to remain available until expended, to carry
out the functions and duties of the Council under this
subsection.''.
(b) Removing Council Funding From Individual Inspector General Budget
Requests.--Section 6(g) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``, and any resources
necessary to support the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency. Resources necessary to support the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
shall be specifically identified and justified in the budget
request''; and
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) in subparagraph (B), by adding ``and'' after the
semicolon;
(B) by striking subparagraph (C); and
(C) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph
(C).
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (b) shall take
effect on the date that is 30 days after the date of receipt by the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency of an
appropriation for the Council to carry out the functions and duties of
the Council under section 11 of the Inspector General Act (5 U.S.C.
App. 11), as amended under this section.
TITLE X--NOTICE OF REFUSAL TO PROVIDE INSPECTORS GENERAL ACCESS
SEC. 1001. NOTICE OF REFUSAL TO PROVIDE INFORMATION OR ASSISTANCE TO
INSPECTORS GENERAL.
Section 6(c) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(3) If the information or assistance that is the subject of a
report under paragraph (2) is not provided to the Inspector General by
the date that is 30 days after the report is made, the Inspector
General shall submit a notice that the information or assistance
requested is being unreasonably refused or not provided by the head of
the establishment involved or the head of the Federal agency involved,
as applicable, to--
``(A) the Committee in the House of Representatives and the
Committee in the Senate that has jurisdiction over the
establishment involved or the Federal agency involved, as
applicable;
``(B) the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of
Representatives; and
``(C) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate.''.
TITLE XI--ENHANCEMENTS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL TRAINING
SEC. 1101. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Inspector General Training
Enhancement Act''.
SEC. 1102. ENHANCEMENTS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL TRAINING.
Section 11(c)(1)(E) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.) is amended by inserting ``and establish minimum standards and
best practices for training to ensure all Inspectors General receive
training to carry out the duties, responsibilities, and authorities
under this Act and on emerging areas of the law of relevance to
Inspectors General and the work of their offices as identified by the
Council'' after ``Inspector General''.
TITLE XII--BUDGETARY EFFECTS
SEC. 1201. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.
The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with
the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall be determined by
reference to the latest statement titled ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO
Legislation'' for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional
Record by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, provided that
such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.
TITLE XIII--SEVERABILITY
SEC. 1301. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act (or the application of that provision to
particular persons or circumstances) is held invalid or found to be
unconstitutional the remainder of this Act (or the application of that
provision to other persons or circumstances) shall not be affected.
Summary and Purpose of Legislation
The IG Independence and Empowerment Act would amend the
Inspector General Act of 1978 to require that an inspector
general (IG) is removed only for cause, require Congress to be
notified before an IG is placed on non-duty status, require
that an acting IG in the event of an IG vacancy be the first
assistant in the same office or other senior official within
the IG community, and increase accountability and transparency
for the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIE) Integrity Committee.
The bill would also grant IGs the authority to subpoena
witnesses for testimony who are not currently federal
employees; provide the Department of Justice (DOJ) IG the
authority to initiate investigations into wrongdoing by DOJ
attorneys; expand whistleblower trainings for Office of
Inspector General (OIG) employees, require notification to
Congress of an IG's ongoing work when an IG is removed,
transferred, or placed on non-duty status; provide a single
appropriation for CIGIE; require IGs to notify Congress if
agencies deny access to requested information; and require
CIGIE to establish minimum standards and best practice for IG
training.
Background and Need for Legislation
Since enactment of the Inspector General Act of 1978, IGs
have provided oversight of the executive branch. IGs play a
critical role in independently and objectively working to help
recover overpayments by government agencies; identify risks and
program improvement areas; and root out fraud, waste, abuse,
and gross mismanagement.\1\ The work of IGs helps make the
entire government more effective and efficient, and continues
to yield a remarkable return on investment for American
taxpayers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Pub. L. No. 95-452 (1978), as amended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During a hearing before the Committee's Subcommittee on
Government Operations on April 20, 2021, the Committee
considered H.R. 2662 and heard testimony from multiple IGs on
issues facing the broader IG community, as well as areas for
legislative reform. In her written testimony for this hearing,
National Science Foundation IG Allison C. Lerner, CIGIE Chair,
summarized the work of IGs over the previous year:
The work of OIG investigators and investigative
attorneys led to more than 4,000 indictments and
informations and almost 1,300 successful civil actions.
In response to our recommendations, agencies made more
than 4,000 suspensions and debarments and took more
than 3,500 personnel actions. Altogether, our work
resulted in significant improvements to the economy and
efficiency of programs governmentwide, with potential
savings totaling approximately $53 billion--a $17
return on every dollar invested in the OIGs.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Government
Operations, Testimony of Inspector General Allison C. Lerner, Chair,
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, Hearing
on Restoring Independence: Rebuilding the Federal Offices of Inspectors
General (Apr. 20, 2021) (emphasis added) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
Lerner%20Testimony.pdf).
Several of the reforms included in H.R. 2662 have been
requested by IGs for over a decade and have been favorably
reported by the Committee and passed the House on previous
occasions. Several of these reforms were identified by CIGIE as
priorities this year in a January 28, 2021, legislative
priorities letter from Peace Corps IG Kathy A. Buller, Chair of
the CIGIE Legislation Committee.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\Letter from Inspector General Kathy A. Buller, Legislation
Committee Chair, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency, to Lesley A. Field, Acting Executive Chairperson, Council
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (Jan. 27, 2021)
(online at www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/untracked/
CIGIE_Legislative_Priorities_117th_Congress.pdf). The CIGIE Legislation
Committee ``provides timely information to the IG community about
congressional initiatives; solicits the technical advice of the IG
community in response to congressional initiatives; and presents views
and recommendations to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget
on legislative matters.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
REMOVAL PROTECTIONS FOR INSPECTORS GENERAL
Title I of H.R. 2662 would allow an IG to be removed only
for the following causes: permanent incapacity, neglect of
duty, malfeasance, conviction of a felony or conduct involving
moral turpitude, knowing violation of a law or regulation,
gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority,
or inefficiency. Title I would require documentation of the
cause for removal to be reported directly to Congress.
The need for greater protections for IGs was highlighted
when, in 2020, then-President Trump removed multiple IGs in
what appeared to be retaliation for investigating misconduct of
his own Administration:
Intelligence Community IG Michael Atkinson
was targeted after he sent a letter to notify Congress
that a whistleblower raised concerns about the
President's conduct on a call with officials from
Ukraine. The whistleblower's allegations ultimately led
the House to impeach President Trump.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Trump Says He Will Fire Intelligence Watchdog at Center of
Ukraine Allegations That Led to Impeachment, Washington Post (Apr. 3,
2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-says-
he-will-fire-intelligence-watchdog-at-center-of-ukraine-allegations-
that-led-to-impeachment/2020/04/03/d0b873d4-761c-11ea-87da-
77a8136c1a6d_story.html); Timeline: The Trump Whistleblower Complaint,
The Hill (Sept. 21, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/policy/
national-security/462464-timeline-the-trump-whistleblower-complaint).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Trump fired State Department IG
Steve Linick, reportedly at the request of Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo.\5\ At the time, Mr. Linick was
investigating allegations of misconduct by Secretary
Pompeo related to the misuse of government resources
and the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia without
congressional approval.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\Fired State Department Watchdog Who Was Investigating Pompeo
Appears Before Congress, Washington Post (June 3, 2020) (online at
www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/fired-state-department-
watchdog-who-was-probing-pompeo-to-appear-before-congress/2020/06/02/
bc51e098-a4f6-11ea-8681-7d471bf20207_story.html).
\6\Trump Ousts State Department Watchdog, Politico (May 15, 2020)
(online at www.politico.com/news/2020/05/15/state-department-inspector-
general-fired-261536).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bipartisan Members of Congress raised serious concerns
about these firings. Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT) stated: ``The
firings of multiple Inspectors General is unprecedented; doing
so without good cause chills the independence essential to
their purpose. It is a threat to accountable democracy and a
fissure in the constitutional balance of power.''\7\ Senator
Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) stated in response to the State
Department IG firing, ``I'm concerned that our inspectors
general be allowed to do the job that they have been hired to
do, whether it's Mr. Linick or others.''\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\Senator Mitt Romney (@senatorromney), Twitter (May 16, 2020)
(online at https://twitter.com/senatorromney/status/
1261799211760222210).
\8\Senate Republicans Demand Answers from Trump on IG Firing, The
Hill (May 18, 2020) (online at https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/
498425-senate-republicans-demand-answers-from-trump-on-ig-firing).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As described in an April 2021 Congressional Research
Service (CRS) report, Congress and the Supreme Court have both
recognized the importance of IG ``independence, autonomy,
impartiality, and objectivity to effective oversight of agency
programs.''\9\ The Supreme Court has recognized that the
autonomy of IGs is ``vital to effectuating Congress'' intent
and maintaining an opportunity for objective inquiries into
bureaucratic waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.''\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\Congressional Research Service, Congress's Authority to Limit
the Removal of Inspectors General (Apr. 16, 2021) (online at https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46762).
\10\NASA v. Fed. Labor Rels. Auth., 527 U.S. 229, 240 (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the Senate Report accompanying the original Inspector
General Act of 1978 explained:
Above all, the Inspector and Auditors General created
in this legislation would have the requisite
independence to do an effective job. There is a natural
tendency for an agency administrator to be protective
of the programs that he administers. In some cases,
frank recognition of waste, mismanagement or wrongdoing
reflects on him personally. Even if he is not
personally implicated, revelations of wrongdoing or
waste may reflect adversely on his programs and
undercut public and congressional support for them.
Under these circumstances, it is a fact of life that
agency managers and supervisors in the executive branch
do not always identify or come forward with evidence of
failings in the programs they administer. For that
reason, the audit and investigative functions should be
assigned to an individual whose independence is clear
and whose responsibility runs directly to the agency
head and ultimately to the Congress. . . .
With rare exceptions, the agencies have not
adequately policed their own operations and programs.
The committee wants Inspector and Auditors General of
high ability, stature and an unusual degree of
independence--outsiders, at least to the extent that
they will have no vested interest in the programs and
policies whose economy, efficiency and effectiveness
they are evaluating.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Report to Accompany
H.R. 8588, 95th Cong. (1978) (S. Rept. 95-1071).
In June 2020, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
issued a report addressing the impact of political retaliation
on IGs and considerations for IG independence, which concluded
that ``[e]nsuring the independence of IGs is critical to OIGs''
credibility and effectiveness.''\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\Government Accountability Office, Inspectors General:
Independence Principles and Considerations for Reform (June 8, 2020)
(GAO-20-639R) (online at www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20 639r.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protecting IGs from political retaliation has previously
received bipartisan support from Congress. During the 110th
Congress, the House passed a bill with similar provisions to
this title by a vote of 404 to 11.\13\ Representative Tom Davis
(R-VA) endorsed that legislation limiting the President's
authority to remove IGs in the Committee report on the bill:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\H.R. 928, 110th Congress (2007).
We all agree IGs should operate independently, free
from political interference. After all, both agency
heads and Congress often rely on IG reports to provide
frank assessments of the effectiveness of Federal
Programs.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Report on the
Improving Government Accountability Act (2007) (H. Rept. 110-354)
(online at www.congress.gov/congressional-report/110th-congress/house-
report/354).
Numerous IGs have also endorsed for-cause removal
protections. In a May 2020 letter to congressional leaders,
nine former IGs urged Congress to ``codify for-cause removal
protections for IGs.''\15\ They noted that there are
appropriate checks for this protection:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\Project on Government Oversight, Former Inspectors General Call
on Congress to Pass Overdue Reforms to IG System (May 5, 2020) (online
at www.pogo.org/letter/2020/05/former-inspectors-general-call-on-
congress-to-pass-overdue-reforms-to-ig-system/).
[F]or-cause removal protections do not make
underperforming IGs untouchable. If structured
properly, these protections always reserve the right of
any sitting president to remove an IG when they are
ineffective or unwilling to conduct the rigorous
oversight required of their office. Under such
circumstances, IGs should be removed to make way for
individuals willing and able to uphold the important
mandate of the office.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\Id.
CRS recently evaluated congressional authority to limit the
removal of IGs and concluded that for-cause removal
restrictions ``appear to be a constitutionally permissible
means of encouraging independence for most IGs.''\17\ Federal
law already extends for-cause protections to the Postal Service
IG, who shall ``at any time be removed upon the written
concurrence of at least 7 Governors, but only for cause.''\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\Congressional Research Service, Congress's Authority to Limit
the Removal of Inspectors General (Apr. 16, 2021) (online at https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46762).
\18\39 U.S.C. Sec. 202(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the April 2021 Government Operations Subcommittee
hearing, Liz Hempowicz, Director of Public Policy at Project on
Government Oversight (POGO), testified in support of these
removal protections:
Last year, after President Trump removed four
Inspectors General in quick succession, POGO
immediately began hearing from those in the IG
community. What we heard was that they were afraid that
doing their jobs and going after the facts, wherever
they may lead, without regard for how it would reflect
on the President or others in political leadership,
would cost--would be the end of their careers.
This is not an environment conducive to rigorous and
effective oversight. That is why I strongly urge
Congress to enact legislation that would require the
President to have just cause to fire an Inspector
General and to communicate the specific causes
underlying that impending removal to Congress.
Granting Inspectors General for-cause removal
protections will make it less dangerous to exercise the
independence required of them to fulfill their
missions.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Government
Operations, Hearing on Restoring Independence: Rebuilding the Federal
Offices of Inspectors General (Apr. 20, 2021) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/restoring-independence-
rebuilding-the-federal-offices-of-inspectors-general).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION FOR IG CHANGE IN STATUS AND LONG-STANDING
VACANCIES
Title II of H.R. 2662 would require the President to notify
Congress 30 days before placing an IG on non-duty status and
explain the failure to fill long-standing IG vacancies.
Current law requires a President to provide Congress with
an explanation for removing an IG at least 30 days before the
removal takes effect.\20\ When President Trump removed the
State Department IG in May 2020, he circumvented the intent of
this requirement by immediately placing the IG on
administrative leave and immediately appointing a replacement
acting IG. President Trump took similar action upon his
notification of intent to remove the Intelligence Community IG,
making both these terminations essentially effective
immediately upon notice.\21\ In another example, when President
Obama removed Gerald Walpin, the IG for the Corporation for
National and Community Service, IG Walpin was ``suspended, with
pay, pending his removal.''\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 3(b).
\21\Trump Is Gutting Our Democracy While We're Dealing with
Coronavirus, New York Times (Apr. 6, 2020 (online at www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/06/opinion/atkinson-inspector-general-ukraine-fired.html);
Ousted State Department Watchdog Tells Lawmakers He's Unaware if Pompeo
Probes Were Stopped, Politico (June 10, 2020) (online at
www.politico.com/news/2020/06/10/steve-linick-mike-pompeo-probes-
310568).
\22\Letter from Gregory B. Craig, Counsel to the President, to
Senator Charles E. Grassley (June 11, 2009) (online at https://
a.abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/Craig_letter_to_Grassley.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.R. 2662 would also require that, when an IG vacancy has
lasted for more than 210 days without the President nominating
a replacement, the President provide to Congress an explanation
for the failure to submit a nomination and a target date for
making a nomination.
Currently, 13 IG offices with presidentially-appointed IGs
are without a confirmed IG and, in some cases, have been for
years.\23\ Among these, the Export-Import Bank, Central
Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and the Office of
Personnel Management have not had a permanent IG for more than
five years.\24\ Several of these positions have gone without
nominees for years at a time as well, and this legislation
would require clear and transparent justifications when there
is no nominee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Inspector General Vacancies (online at www.oversight.gov/ig-vacancies)
(accessed on June 16, 2021).
\24\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the May 2021 hearing before the Subcommittee on
Government Operations, IG Lerner testified:
One of the greatest challenges facing the IG
community is the extensive list of vacant IG positions.
As this Committee has long recognized, prolonged
vacancies within OIGs undermine the critical oversight
work being done within those offices. During the period
of such vacancies, acting Inspectors General and career
staff carry on the work of their offices, and they do
it with the utmost professionalism. Nevertheless, a
sustained loss of permanent leadership is not healthy
for any office, particularly one entrusted with the
important and challenging mission of an OIG. For this
reason, ensuring that vacant IG positions are filled
with exemplary individuals capable of helping their
offices accomplish their vital missions through good
times and bad is always one of CIGIE's highest
priorities.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Government
Operations, Testimony of Inspector General Allison C. Lerner, Chair,
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, Hearing
on Restoring Independence: Rebuilding the Federal Offices of Inspectors
General (Apr. 20, 2021) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Lerner%20Testimony.pdf).
When the House passed the language in title II as a
standalone bill in 2019, Rep. Fred Keller (R-PA) summarized the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
importance of the bill during remarks on the House floor:
Inspectors general play an important role in
improving the operations of the Federal Government.
They help combat fraud, waste, and abuse throughout
executive branch departments and agencies and promote a
resourceful and effective Federal Government.
They have assisted us with discharging one of our
most important responsibilities, shining the light on
areas of the government that need improved efficiency
and economy.
However, throughout both Republican and Democratic
administrations, there have been numerous vacant
inspector general positions. Certain agencies have
experienced prolonged periods of absent inspector
general leadership.
For example, the Department of the Interior has been
without a permanent inspector general since 2009.
Likewise, there are approximately 13 vacant inspector
general positions for agencies covered by the Inspector
General Act.
This bill would require the President to timely
notify Congress of a failure to nominate an inspector
general for a given agency. The President would also be
required to explain why a nomination has not yet been
made and provide a target date for that nomination. The
bill also calls for increased transparency by requiring
the President to notify Congress if an inspector
general is placed on leave or changes status.
Inspectors general are an indispensable tool to
Congress. By ensuring the Federal Government is
adequately staffed with inspectors general, we are
reaffirming our commitment to rooting out government
fraud, waste, and abuse.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\U.S. House of Representatives, Debate on H.R. 1847 (July 17,
2019) (online at www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2019/07/17/
house-section/article/H5950 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTING IGS
Title III of H.R. 2662 addresses who can serve as an acting
IG in the event of a vacancy due to an absence of a Senate-
confirmed individual. The Federal Vacancies Reform Act
currently allows the President to designate any Senate-
confirmed political appointee, or a senior employee from the
agency overseen by the OIG, to serve as an acting IG. Title III
would require that the first assistant in an OIG, generally the
Principal Deputy or Deputy IG, serve as the acting IG in the
event of a vacancy. If the first assistant position is also
vacant, then title III would allow the President to designate a
senior official at any OIG to serve as acting IG.
This reform would prevent ``dual-hatting'' arrangements
where a political official from within an agency is overseeing
that agency as the acting IG. This occurred twice in 2020, when
President Trump named an Acting Department of Transportation IG
from within the Department of Transportation and an Acting
State Department IG from within the State Department. These
decisions prompted this Committee and others to conduct
oversight over both OIGs to ensure that the offices' work
proceeded unimpeded and officials with conflicts of interest
recused themselves.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Press Release: Chairs
Release Letter from Acting State Department IG Regarding His Ongoing
Conflicts of Interest (June 5, 2020) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairs-release-letter-from-
acting-state-department-ig-regarding-his-ongoing); Democrats Open
Investigation into Trump's Replacement of Acting Transportation
Department Inspector General, Washington Post (May 19, 2020) (online at
www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/democrats-open-
investigation-into-replacement-of-acting-transportation-department-
inspector-general/2020/05/19/e8e62b52-99f5-11ea-89fd-
28fb313d1886_story.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In CIGIE's legislative priorities letter, IG Buller
explained how an agency official serving as acting IG could
compromise the OIG's work:
However, the Vacancies Act allows the President to
direct a Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed
(PAS) appointee or a senior management employee in the
agency overseen by the OIG to temporarily serve as
acting IG. Doing so risks both actual and apparent
conflicts that affect the acting IG's ability to
maintain independence, including the independence
required by Generally Accepted Government Auditing
Standards and other professional standards that IGs
must follow. Further, it may erode whistleblowers'
trust that their identities will be protected.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\Letter from Inspector General Kathy A. Buller, Legislation
Committee Chair, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency, to Lesley A. Field, Acting Executive Chairperson, Council
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (Jan. 27, 2021)
(online at www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/untracked/
CIGIE_Legislative_Priorities_117th_Congress.pdf).
Ms. Hempowicz from POGO elaborated on this whistleblower
issue, in written testimony for the Subcommittee on Government
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations hearing:
The implications of a political appointee
simultaneously running an agency office and serving as
the inspector general in charge of investigating
whistleblower complaints into that office present an
obvious and inherent conflict. Such a situation would
surely chill any agency employees from making
whistleblower disclosures to that acting inspector
general. Yet there's nothing to prevent this from
occurring at any inspector general office at any time.
This could result in whistleblowers across government
choosing not to disclose waste, fraud, or abuse to
their inspector general offices to avoid the increased
risk that political leadership may find out who they
are.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Government
Operations, Testimony of Liz Hempowicz, Director of Public Policy,
Project on Government Oversight, Hearing on Restoring Independence:
Rebuilding the Federal Offices of Inspectors General (Apr. 20, 2021)
(online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Hempowicz%20Testimony.pdf).
At a Committee hearing on May 3, 2021, Rudy Mehrbani,
Senior Advisor from the Democracy Fund, testified that this
reform would ``provide democratic accountability in the
future.'' He also said that ``reforms to ensure that a
President can't install inspectors general, even in an acting
capacity, that have perceived or real conflicts of interest is
critically important.''\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Improving
Government Accountability and Transparency (May 3, 2021) (online at
https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/improving-government-
accountability-and-transparency).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIGIE INTEGRITY COMMITTEE TRANSPARENCY
Title IV of H.R. 2662 would increase the transparency in
reporting by CIGIE's Integrity Committee for investigations
involving allegations of wrongdoing within OIGs.
Because IGs evaluate the integrity of agency operations,
the conduct of IGs themselves must be above reproach. CIGIE's
Integrity Committee serves as the independent and objective
oversight organization that investigates and reports on
allegations of wrongdoing by IGs and the senior staff within
their offices.\31\ Currently, the Integrity Committee reports
annually to Congress on various aspects of its operations,
including the number of allegations of wrongdoing received,
referred to other agencies, or closed without referral. The
Integrity Committee also reports dates of receipt and
disposition of allegations, as well as the status and findings
of its investigations.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\Congressional Research Service, Oversight of the Inspector
General Community: The IG Council's Integrity Committee (Sept. 21,
2015) (online at www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44198.html).
\32\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This title would make the Integrity Committee's periodic
reporting to Congress a semi-annual requirement. The Integrity
Committee chairperson would also be required to report
immediately to an IG if the Integrity Committee becomes aware
of any particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies at the IG's office. The IG would have to transmit
this report to Congress within seven days.
This title would also add requirements for the Integrity
Committee to communicate the length of time spent evaluating
investigations for which it requests extensions, information
regarding how it evaluates allegations made by a Member of
Congress if the review is closed without referral, and analysis
of allegations filed. Finally, this title would expand the
membership of the Integrity Committee to include a former IG.
At the May 3, 2021, Committee hearing, Ms. Hempowicz from
POGO said these reforms ``would greatly increase transparency
with how both CIGIE and the Integrity Committee operate and
oversee inspectors general.''\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Improving
Government Accountability and Transparency (May 3, 2021) (online at
https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/improving-government-
accountability-and-transparency).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IG TESTIMONIAL SUBPOENA AUTHORITY
H.R. 2662 would also provide additional authority to IGs by
including a longstanding priority of CIGIE, testimonial
subpoena authority.
Under existing law, IGs cannot compel testimony from
individuals who do not work for the government, including
former government employees, hampering the IGs' ability to
construct a complete case and hold individuals accountable for
wrongdoing. This issue was highlighted recently before the
Committee when DOJ IG Michael E. Horowitz testified that,
without this authority, his office was unable to interview
former Attorney General Jeff Sessions during an investigation
of the Trump Administration's child separation policy.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on
Accountability and Lessons Learned from the Trump Administration's
Child Separation Policy (Feb. 4, 2021) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/accountability-and-lessons-
learned-from-the-trump-administration-s-child).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In multiple other instances, IGs have been unable to obtain
testimony from individuals outside the federal government. For
example, the DOJ OIG was unable to obtain cooperation from non-
government witnesses in its review of the Carter Page FISA
applications and in the Fast and Furious investigation, and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development OIG was unable to
interview a former official in a review of disaster recovery
funds appropriated to Puerto Rico following Hurricanes Irma and
Maria.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review
of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's Crossfire
Hurricane Investigation (Dec. 2019) (online at www.justice.gov/storage/
120919-examination.pdf); Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector
General, A Review of ATF's Operation Fast and Furious and Related
Matters (Nov. 2012) (online at https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2012/
s1209.pdf); Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Office of Inspector General, Review of HUD's Disbursement
of Grant Funds
Appropriated for Disaster Recovery and Mitigation Activities in Puerto
Rico (Apr. 20, 2021)
(online at https://hudoig.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/
HUD%20OIG%20Final%20Report _2019SU008945I.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress, for many years and on a bipartisan basis, has
attempted to provide the IG community with this authority.\36\
In 2014, then-Committee Chairman Darrell Issa (R-CA) stated
after the Committee reported favorably a bill with language
similar to this title on a voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\H.R. 4917, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. 2395, 114th Cong. (2015);
H.R. 5492, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. 5815, 111th Cong. (2009).
With Inspectors General facing obstruction by
agencies, this legislation provides much-needed tools
to our independent watchdogs as they work to reduce
agency waste and mismanagement. The provision of
testimonial subpoena authority will enhance the ability
of Inspectors General to conduct thorough audits and
investigations. This reform sends a message of
congressional support for full and timely compliance
with the important work of Inspectors General, and I
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
thank my colleagues for their support.\37\
\37\House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Press
Release: Oversight Committee Approves Bipartisan Inspector General
Empowerment Legislation (Sept. 17, 2014) (online at https://
republicans-oversight.house.gov/release/oversight-committee-approves-
bipartisan-inspector-general-empowerment-legislation/).
In 2016, Representative Mark Meadows (R-NC), supported a
similar provision during floor debate on broad IG legislation
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that the House passed by voice vote:
The bill we are considering today will make the IGs
even more effective by allowing them to follow the
facts where they lead. For years, the IGs have asked us
to extend to them the authority to issue subpoenas to
get answers from government contractors and former
Federal employees.
Independent sources, including the DOJ's National
Procurement Task Force and the Project on Government
Oversight, have also urged Congress to expand the
testimonial subpoena authority.
This bill provides the expanded authority that the
IGs have asked for, but with safeguards in place to
make sure that they protect against the possibility
that an IG's investigation would interfere with an
ongoing criminal investigation, or do other harm.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\U.S. House of Representatives, Debate on H.R. 2395 (June 21,
2016) (online at www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2016/06/21/
house-section/article/H4002-1).
In 2018, Representative Steve Russell (R-OK), the lead
sponsor of a bill with substantially similar language in H.R.
2662 that the House passed by voice vote, spoke in favor of his
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
bill on the floor prior to passage:
To effectively identify waste, fraud, and abuse, IGs
should be able to conduct a thorough and complete
investigation. To conduct a thorough and complete
investigation, however, IGs need to be able to talk to
the people involved.
Unfortunately, inspectors general haven't always been
able to obtain testimony from those key individuals.
They collect testimony from Federal employees, but
sometimes the employees resign or retire before the
inspectors general can review them. In fact, the IG
community has informed us of many cases that went cold
when witnesses left the agencies or refused to testify
voluntarily.
This bill seeks to address these gaps in the
evidentiary record by permitting IGs to subpoena the
testimony of witnesses during the course of an audit or
investigation. The bill establishes procedures to
ensure the authority is not abused.\39\
\39\U.S. House of Representatives, Debate on H.R. 4917 (Sept. 26,
2018) (online at www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2018/09/26/
house-section/article/H9070-1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In her letter setting forth CIGIE legislative priorities,
IG Buller explained the need for testimonial subpoena
authority:
OIG oversight can be substantially hampered by the
inability to compel the testimony of witnesses who have
information that cannot be obtained by other means.
Congress could address this concern by providing IGs
with the authority to subpoena the testimony of certain
witnesses as necessary in the performance of OIG
oversight. For example, this authority is especially
important in cases where a Federal employee resigns.
Without testimonial subpoena authority, that employee's
resignation can limit an IG audit, investigation, or
other review into matters pertaining to that
individual's former responsibilities. IGs also face
difficulty accessing key information during an inquiry
into other individuals or entities with whom the
Federal government does business. Examples include
subcontractors or subgrantees that have no direct
contractual relationship with the Federal government
but are suspected of defrauding a federally funded
program; in these cases, IGs have limited recourse if
employees of contractors refuse to provide information
to the IG during an audit or investigation.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\Letter from Inspector General Kathy A. Buller, Legislation
Committee Chair, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency, to Lesley A. Field, Acting Executive Chairperson, Council
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (Jan. 27, 2021)
(online at www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/untracked/
CIGIE_Legislative_Priorities_117th_Congress.pdf).
At the Committee's hearing on May 3, 2021, Ms. Hempowicz
testified that the inability of IGs to compel testimony
``completely undermines their ability to conduct fulsome
investigations.''\41\ In addition, in a May 2021 letter to the
Committee, DOJ IG Horowitz strongly endorsed this reform,
stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Improving
Government Accountability and Transparency (May 3, 2021) (online at
https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/improving-government-
accountability-and-transparency).
As I have noted on multiple occasions in testimony
before this Committee, both in my past role as Chair of
the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIE) and as the DOJ IG, I strongly
support granting IGs testimonial subpoena authority
because the absence of such authority hinders the
ability of OIGs to conduct complete oversight. Without
this authority, OIGs are unable to obtain potentially
critical evidence from former federal employees,
employees of federal contractors and grant recipients,
and other non-government witnesses unless they
voluntarily agree to be interviewed. For example, a
federal employee's resignation or retirement enables
the former employee to avoid being interviewed by an
OIG about serious misconduct the former employee
allegedly engaged in while working for the federal
government. Similarly, an OIG's inability to compel
testimony from federal contractors and grant recipients
can result in the OIG being unable to gather sufficient
evidence to hold the contractor or grant recipient
accountable for waste, fraud, and abuse in connection
with the use of federal funds, and therefore affects
our ability to recover misused federal funds.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\Letter from Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz, Department
of Justice, to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney and Ranking Member James
Comer, Committee on Oversight and Reform (May 24, 2021) (online at
https://oversight.house.gov /sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov /
files/DOJ%20OIG%20 to%20COR%20IG%20 legislation %2005.24.21.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUTHORITY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IG TO INITIATE ATTORNEY
MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS
Title VI of H.R. 2662 would provide the DOJ IG with the
authority to investigate misconduct by DOJ attorneys.
Currently, the DOJ OIG must refer allegations of misconduct by
DOJ attorneys to the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR), rather than initiate an investigation itself. The title
addresses this issue by amending the Inspector General Act to
repeal the provision requiring this referral.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 8E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Having a statutorily independent entity investigate
attorney misconduct would ensure independent oversight,
transparency, and accountability. The DOJ OIG--like all federal
OIGs--maintains a level of independence from the management of
the agency it oversees. OPR does not have the same statutory
requirement for independence and is within DOJ's chain of
command.
According to a May 2021 letter to the Committee from DOJ IG
Horowitz, the DOJ OIG has the capacity and experience to review
professional misconduct cases and would use the same standards
currently used by the DOJ OPR. The DOJ OIG employs dozens of
attorneys whose backgrounds and experiences are similar to OPR,
including former prosecutors and DOJ attorneys specializing in
attorney ethics, who would handle professional misconduct
allegations. These OIG attorneys are from the same divisions
that have long conducted sensitive and complex
investigations.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\Letter from Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz, Department
of Justice, to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney and Ranking Member James
Comer, Committee on Oversight and Reform (May 24, 2021) (online at
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
DOJ%20OIG%20to%20COR%20IG%20legislation%2005.24.21.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IG Horowitz also noted that under current practice, DOJ OIG
may only initiate investigations of attorney professional
misconduct with the approval of the Deputy Attorney General. IG
Horowitz stated, however, that DOJ has denied every one of
OIG's requests to investigate serious allegations, including
the circumstances under which Jeffrey Epstein received a non-
prosecution agreement from the Southern District of
Florida.\45\ IG Horowitz noted other instances of potential
misconduct his office could not investigate under current law,
including potential abuses related to use of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act warrants and interference in the
2020 presidential election.\46\ IG Horowitz summarized the
issue as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\Project on Government Oversight, Acosta-Epstein Deal Sparks
Calls for Independent DOJ Misconduct Investigations (Jan. 10, 2019)
(online at www.pogo.org/analysis/2019/01/acosta-epstein-deal-sparks-
calls-for-independent-doj-misconduct-investigations/).
\46\See Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General,
Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's
Crossfire Hurricane Investigation (December 2019) (online at
www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf); The Justice Dept.'s
Inspector General Opens an Investigation into Any Efforts to Overturn
the Election, New York Times (Jan. 25, 2021) (online at
www.nytimes.com/2021/01/25/us/politics/justice-dept-investigation-
election-trump.html).
Requiring the OIG to request permission from
Department leadership to handle a matter, and
empowering the Deputy Attorney General to ``block'' OIG
oversight of a serious misconduct allegation,
undermines IG independence and is inconsistent with the
Inspector General Act.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\Letter from Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz, Department
of Justice, to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney and Ranking Member James
Comer, Committee on Oversight and Reform (May 24, 2021) (online at
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
DOJ%20OIG%20to%20COR%20IG%20legislation%2005.24.21.pdf).
In concluding his letter, IG Horowitz expressed strong
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
support for closing this loophole:
The DOJ OIG is the only Inspector General in the
federal government that does not have the authority to
investigate alleged misconduct, including professional
misconduct, by attorneys who work in the agency it
oversees. As I have stated many times in past
Congressional testimony, there is no principled basis
for authorizing OIG oversight of DOJ law enforcement
personnel, such as FBI agents, while excluding DOJ
lawyers from that same OIG oversight. Providing the DOJ
OIG with the authority to exercise jurisdiction in
attorney professional misconduct cases would enhance
the public's confidence in the outcomes of these
investigations and provide the OIG with the same
authority as every other IG.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\Id.
Similarly, Representative James Comer (R-KY), Ranking
Member of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, said on the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
House floor on November 29, 2018:
It is important to note that this division of
authority is a unique situation in the Federal IG
community. For instance, the Securities and Exchange
Commission Office of Inspector General is responsible
for handling misconduct allegations against SEC
lawyers, including those with prosecuting
authority.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\U.S. House of Representatives, Debate on H.R. 3154 (Nov. 29,
2018) (online at www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2018/11/29/
house-section/article/H9717-1).
Rep. Comer stressed the ``importance of eliminating this
discrepancy,'' and urged his colleagues to support this
provision. He said: ``The need for this legislation has also
been discussed in multiple hearings before our committee and in
reports by watchdog groups.''\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seventeen organizations that represent diverse viewpoints--
including, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union,
Americans for Prosperity, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU
School of Law, Government Accountability Project, and R Street
Institute--also support this provision, stating in a March 2021
letter:
Given that DOJ attorneys are among the most powerful
federal employees--with the ability to make life-and-
death decisions--it is imperative that their
professionalism and official actions be beyond
reproach. It is therefore critical for an independent
watchdog, such as an inspector general, to have the
statutory authority to investigate any allegation that
may call into question the actions and conduct of DOJ
attorneys.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\Project on Government Oversight, Cross-Partisan Coalition Calls
on Senate to Enact DOJ Accountability Bill (Mar. 26, 2021) (online at
www.pogo.org/letter/2021/03/cross-partisan-coalition-calls-on-senate-
to-enact-doj-accountability-bill/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional reforms
H.R. 2662 would make several additional reforms, including
enhanced whistleblower training for OIG employees, disclosure
to Congress of ongoing OIG audits and investigations when the
President removes an IG, authorization of a single
appropriation for CIGIE, notification to Congress when an
agency unreasonably refuses to provide information or
assistance to IGs, and trainings for IGs in their duties and
responsibilities.
CIGIE requested the reforms authorizing a single CIGIE
appropriation and notifying Congress when an agency refuses
information or assistance to IGs. IG Buller described the need
for a single appropriation in the CIGIE legislative priorities
letter:
Acting as the collective body of IGs, CIGIE fulfills
its twin mission to (1) address integrity, economy, and
effectiveness issues that transcend individual
Government agencies and (2) increase the
professionalism and effectiveness of IG community
employees. While CIGIE has steadily increased the
amount and scope of its work over its 10 years of
existence, this independent agency is still primarily
funded through an inefficient and complicated process
of interagency collections individually deposited into
a revolving fund. OIGs make these individual deposits
without clear congressional direction regarding how
much funding CIGIE should receive or how much any
individual OIG should provide. In contrast, CIGIE has
leveraged to great effect limited, one-time
appropriations for enhancements to Oversight.gov. In
addition, Congress recently authorized a partial
appropriation for CIGIE. A direct, annual appropriation
will streamline and make more transparent the process
by which CIGIE is funded. Moreover, with a direct,
annual appropriation, Congress and the President can
better align funding with CIGIE's responsibilities and
the work congressional stakeholders frequently ask of
it.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\Letter from Inspector General Kathy A. Buller, Legislation
Committee Chair, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency, to Lesley A. Field, Acting Executive Chairperson, Council
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (Jan. 27, 2021)
(online at www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/untracked/
CIGIE_Legislative_Priorities_117th_Congress.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section-by-Section Analysis
Sec. 1. Short title
The short title is the ``IG Independence and Empowerment
Act.''
TITLE I--INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE
Sec. 101. Short title
The short title is the ``Inspector General Independence
Act.''
Sec. 102. Amendment
Paragraph (1) amends subsection (b) of section 3 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to add a
provision requiring that a President may only remove an IG with
documentation transmitted to Congress of the following causes:
permanent incapacity, neglect of duty, malfeasance, conviction
of a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude, knowing
violation of a law or regulation, gross mismanagement, gross
waste of funds, abuse of authority, or inefficiency.
Paragraph (2) amends subsection (e) of section 8G of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to add a
provision requiring that an IG at a designated Federal entity
only be removed with documentation transmitted to Congress of
the following causes: permanent incapacity, neglect of duty,
malfeasance, conviction of a felony or conduct involving moral
turpitude, knowing violation of a law or regulation, gross
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or
inefficiency.
TITLE II--CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL
Sec. 201. Short title
The short title is the ``Inspector General Protection
Act.''
Sec. 202. Change in status of Inspector General offices
Subsection (a)--Change in Status of Inspector General of
Offices
Subsection (a) amends subsection (b) of section 3 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require the
President to notify Congress when placing an IG of a federal
agency on non-duty status, at least 30 days before that change
in status takes effect.
Subsection (b)--Change in Status of Inspector General of
Designated Federal Entities
Subsection (b) amends subsection (e) of section 8G of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require the
head of a designated Federal entity to notify Congress when
placing an IG on non-duty status, at least 30 days before that
change in status takes effect.
Subsection (c)--Effective Date
Subsection (c) makes this section effective 30 days after
the date of enactment of the Act.
Sec. 203. Presidential explanation of failure to nominate an Inspector
General
Subsection (a)--In General
Subsection (a) amends subchapter III of chapter 33 of title
5, United States Code, by adding a new section 3349e to
require, if the President fails to make a formal nomination to
fill a vacant IG position within 210 days after the vacancy
occurred, that the President communicate to Congress within 30
days after the end of that 210 day-period the reasons why the
President has not yet made a formal nomination and a target
date for making a formal nomination.
Subsection (b)--Clerical Amendment
Subsection (b) renumbers relevant sections of the United
States Code to conform to the amendment made by subsection (a).
Subsection (c)--Effective Date
Subsection (c) makes this section effective as of the date
of enactment of the Act and only apply to vacancies occurring
after that date.
TITLE III--VACANCY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL POSITIONS
Sec. 301. Vacancy of Inspector General positions
Subsection (a)--In General
Subsection (a) amends section 3345 of title 5, United
States Code, to require that, in the event of a vacancy of an
IG position that requires Senate confirmation, the first
assistant in the same OIG shall serve as the acting IG. In the
event that the first assistant position in that office is also
vacant, the President may appoint any individual currently
serving in an OIG, as long as that individual has served in a
position in an OIG for at least 90 days in the year prior to
the IG vacancy occurring, and that individual was paid at a GS
15 rate or higher.
Subsection (b)--Application
Subsection (b) makes this section apply only to IG
vacancies occurring on or after the date of enactment of the
Act.
TITLE IV--COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY
TRANSPARENCY
Sec. 401. Short title
The short title is the ``Integrity Committee Transparency
Act of 2021.''
Sec. 402. Additional information to be included in requests and reports
to Congress
Paragraph (1) amends subsection (d) of section 11 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) to require that
the CIGIE Integrity Committee provide additional information to
Congress when requiring an extension to evaluate an allegation
of wrongdoing for referral to the Integrity Committee Chair for
investigation. Specifically, the Integrity Committee's written
notice to applicable Congressional Committees must include
descriptions of how long it had been evaluating the allegation
of wrongdoing and any previous extension requests related to
the allegation, including why the extension was needed.
Paragraph (2) amends further amends subsection (d) of
section 11 to require that the Integrity Committee include
recommendations for corrective action in its reports of
investigations into alleged wrongdoing.
Sec. 403. Availability of information to Members of Congress regarding
certain allegations of wrongdoing closed without referral
This section amends subsection (d) of section 11 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) by adding a new
subparagraph requiring the Integrity Committee to provide a
written report to Members of Congress who have made allegations
of wrongdoing that were not referred to the Integrity Committee
Chair to investigate. The Integrity Committee is required to
provide the written report no later than 60 days after the
allegation was closed to the Chairs and Ranking Members of the
House Committee on Oversight and Reform (COR), Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC), a member
of the House of Representatives who has the support of seven
members of COR, and a member of the Senate who has the support
of five members of HSGAC. This report shall include a
description of the allegation and the Integrity Committee's
evaluation of the allegation. The Integrity Committee Chair is
further required to forward any written descriptions or updates
to the members of the Integrity Committee and CIGIE Chair.
Sec. 404. Semiannual report
This section amends subsection (d) of section 11 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to increase the
Integrity Committee's regular reporting to Congress on its
activities, making this a semi-annual requirement.
This section further amends section 11 to include more
detailed requirements for the content of the Integrity
Committee's semiannual reports. Specifically, the Integrity
Committee is required to include an overview and analysis of
allegations received during the reporting period and those
still pending from previous reporting periods, including
positions and duties of the individuals against whom misconduct
was alleged; the categories and types of allegations; and
summary of the disposition of the allegations. This section
also requires these reports to include a status of
investigations, a summary of findings for completed
investigations, and descriptions of any difficulties
encountered by the Integrity Committee during investigations,
including attempts to prevent or hinder the investigation or
concerns about integrity or operations at the office of the IG
under investigation.
Sec. 405. Additional reports; Rules of construction
This section amends subsection (d) of section 11 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require the
Integrity Committee Chair to report immediately to an IG if the
Integrity Committee becomes aware of any particularly serious
or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies at the IG's
office. The IG would have to transmit this report to COR and
HSGAC within seven days of receiving the report.
This section also adds rules of construction to specify
that subsection (d) of section 11 does not authorize the public
disclosure of information when it is otherwise prohibited by
law, protected from disclosure in the interest of national
security or in the conduct of foreign affairs, or is part of an
ongoing criminal investigation. In addition, the information
may be provided to any Member of Congress upon request of the
Member, subject to any other provision of law that would
prohibit disclosure. Finally, this section adds an additional
rule of construction stating that the Integrity Committee may
not disclose any information that includes personally
identifiable information without consent of the individual.
Sec. 406. Membership of Integrity Committee
Paragraph (1) amends subsection (d) of section 11 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to expand the
membership of the Integrity Committee as described in paragraph
(2) of this section.
Paragraph (2) further amends subsection (d) of section 11
to require that the CIGIE chair appoint a former IG to the
Integrity Committee, subject to the willingness and
availability of a qualified candidate, as determined by the
Chair. The individual appointed would serve a two-year term at
the pleasure of the CIGIE Chair that could be extended for an
additional term not to exceed two years. This paragraph also
provides for various compensation and reimbursements for the
former IG appointed to the Integrity Committee and allows the
individual to serve as a volunteer.
Sec. 407. Requirement to refer allegations of wrongdoing against
Inspector General to Integrity Committee
Subsection (a)--Requirement
Subsection (a) makes technical changes to subsection (d) of
section 11 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.)
and adds a new subparagraph to require an IG refer allegations
of wrongdoing against themselves to the Integrity Committee.
Subsection (b)--Technical and Conforming Amendment
Subsection (b) makes further technical changes to section
11 to reflect the amendment in subsection (a).
Sec. 408. Requirement to report final disposition to Congress
Paragraph (1) amends subsection (d) of section 11 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to ensure that
Congress receives final reports of Integrity Committee
investigations into alleged wrongdoing at the same time CIGIE's
Executive Chair and applicable appointing authority for the
inspector general under investigation receives such reports.
Paragraph (2) further amends subsection (d) of section 11
to specify that HSGAC, COR, and other congressional committees
of jurisdiction should also receive reports from the CIGIE
Executive Chair on the final disposition of the report.
TITLE V--ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY PROVISIONS FOR INSPECTORS GENERAL
Sec. 501. Short title
The short title is the ``IG Subpoena Authority Act.''
Sec. 502. Additional authority provisions for Inspectors General
Paragraph 1 amends the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5
U.S.C. App.) by adding a new section 6A to authorize IGs to
subpoena the attendance and testimony of individuals, other
than current federal employees or current employees of a
designated Federal entity, as necessary in carrying out the
provisions of the Inspector General Act. This authority may
only be delegated to an official performing the functions and
duties of the IG in the event of an IG vacancy or the inability
of an IG to perform the functions and duties of the Office.
This section creates a panel of three IGs selected by CIGIE
to review and approve any proposed subpoena within a specified
timeframe. Following approval from the panel, the issuing IG
must notify the Attorney General of the subpoena. The Attorney
General may object within a specified timeframe to a subpoena
because the subpoena will interfere with an ongoing
investigation. In addition, this section defines ``Inspector
General'' for the purposes of this section as any IG
established under the Inspector General Act or any other law.
This section also directs the Chairperson of CIGIE to issue
guidelines to carry out this section.
Paragraph 2 amends subsection (a) of section 5 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require that a
description of the use of witness testimony subpoenas
authorized by this Act are reported in IG semiannual reports.
Paragraph 3 amends subsection (g) of section 8A of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to specify that
the authority to subpoena witness testimony authorized by this
section applies to IGs at designated Federal entities.
TITLE VI--INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERSONNEL
Sec. 601. Short title
The short title is the ``Inspector General Access Act.''
Sec. 602. Investigations of Department of Justice personnel
This section amends section 8E of the Inspector General Act
of 1978 (Appendix to title 5, United States Code) to repeal a
provision requiring the DOJ IG to refer allegations of
misconduct involving Department attorneys to the OPR if the
allegations relate to the exercise of the authority of an
attorney to investigate, litigate, or provide legal advice.
This section also makes technical changes to the surrounding
paragraphs to reflect the repeal.
TITLE VII--OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS
Sec. 701. Short title
The short title is the ``Enhanced Whistleblower Protection
Act.''
Sec. 702. Office of Inspector General whistleblower complaints
Subsection (a)--Whistleblower Protection Coordinator.
Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) amends subsection (d) of
section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5. U.S.C. App.)
to require that OIG Whistleblower Protection Coordinators
educate OIG employees in whistleblower retaliation prohibitions
and whistleblower rights, which is already required under
current law of OIG Whistleblower Protection Coordinators for
agency employees.
Paragraph (2) of subsection (a) further amends section 3 to
require that OIG Whistleblower Protection Coordinators assist
IGs in coordinating with the CIGIE Integrity Committee, in
addition to existing requirements to coordinate among other
entities including the Office of Special Counsel, CIGIE, the
agency, and Congress.
Subsection (b)--Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency
Subsection (b) amends subsection (c) of section 11 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require that
CIGIE develop best practices for handling whistleblower
reprisal allegations arising from matters internal to an OIG,
in addition to existing requirements for developing such best
practices for handling general whistleblower disclosures and
allegations of reprisal.
TITLE VIII--NOTICE OF ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE IN
STATUS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Sec. 801. Notice of ongoing investigations when there is a change in
status of Inspector General
Subsection (a)--Change in Status of Inspector General of
Establishment.
Subsection (a) amends subsection (b) of section 3 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require,
within 15 days of an IG of a federal agency being removed,
placed on non-duty status, or transferred, that the acting IG
of that agency submit to the House Committee on Oversight and
Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs a list of all audits and investigations in
process at that OIG at the time of removal, placement on non-
duty status, or transfer.
Subsection (b)--Change in Status of Inspector General of
Designated Federal Entities
Subsection (b) amends subsection (e) of section 8G of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require,
within 15 days of an IG of a designated Federal entity being
removed, placed on non-duty status, or transferred, that the
acting IG of that entity submit to the House Committee on
Oversight and Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs a list of all audits and
investigations in process at that OIG at the time of removal,
placement on non-duty status, or transfer.
TITLE IX--COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY
APPROPRIATION
Sec. 901. CIGIE appropriation
Subsection (a)--Availability of Appropriated Funds
Subsection (a) amends subsection (c) of section 11 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to authorize an
appropriation for CIGIE of such sums as may be necessary to
carry out the functions and duties of CIGIE.
Subsection (b)--Removing Council Funding from Individual
Inspector General Budget Requests
Subsection (b) amends subsection (g) of section 6 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to repeal
language requiring that IGs include funding requests for CIGIE
in annual budget requests. This subsection also makes technical
changes to the surrounding paragraphs to reflect the repeal.
Subsection (c)--Effective Date
Subsection (c) makes subsection (b) effective 30 days after
the first receipt by CIGIE of an appropriation authorized under
subsection (a).
TITLE X--NOTICE OF REFUSAL TO PROVIDE INSPECTORS GENERAL ACCESS
Sec. 1001. Notice of refusal to provide information or assistance to
Inspectors General
This section amends subsection (c) of section 6 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require that
an IG report to congressional committees of jurisdiction,
within 30 days of making a similar report to the establishment
or agency head as required under existing law, when an
establishment or agency unreasonably refuses an IG request or
otherwise does not provide information or assistance to an IG
when requested.
TITLE XI--ENHANCEMENTS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL TRAINING
Sec. 1101. Short title
The short title is the ``Inspector General Training
Enhancement Act.''
Sec. 1102. Enhancements to Inspector General training
This section amends subsection (c) of section 11 of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require that
CIGIE establish minimum standards and best practices for
training IGs in the duties, responsibilities, and authorities
established by the Inspector General Act, as well as areas of
relevant law as identified by CIGIE.
TITLE XII--BUDGETARY EFFECTS
Sec. 1201. Determination of budgetary effects
This section states that the budgetary effects of this Act,
for the purposes of the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010,
are determined in a separate statement submitted to the
Congressional Record by the Chair of the House Budget Committee
prior to the House voting on the Act.
TITLE XIII--SEVERABILITY
Sec. 1301. Severability
This section states that if a provision of this Act is
determined to be invalid or unconstitutional, it does not make
the entire Act invalid or unconstitutional.
Legislative History
FULL IG INDEPENDENCE AND EMPOWERMENT ACT
During the 117th Congress, on April 19, 2021,
Representatives Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY), Chairwoman of the
Committee, Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Majority Leader of the House,
Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA), Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Government Operations, Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA), Chairman of the
Subcommittee on National Security, Jimmy Gomez (D-CA), Katie
Porter (D-CA), and Ted Lieu (D-CA) introduced H.R. 2662, the IG
Independence and Empowerment Act, which includes several
provisions from other bills. H.R. 2662 was referred to the
Committee on Oversight and Reform and the Committee on the
Budget. On May 25, 2021, the Oversight Committee considered
H.R. 2662 at a business meeting with a quorum present. The
Committee ordered the bill reported favorably, as amended, by a
record vote of 22 18. In a May 28, 2021, letter (attached to
this report), the Committee on Budget waived formal
consideration of the bill.
On April 20, 2021, the Subcommittee on Government
Operations, Committee on Oversight and Reform, held a hearing
to consider proposed reforms included in H.R. 2662. The
Subcommittee heard testimony from Allison C. Lerner, National
Science Foundation IG and Chair of CIGIE; Kathy A. Buller,
Peace Corps IG and Legislation Committee Chair of CIGIE; Clark
Ervin, former IG of the Departments of Homeland Security and
State; Liz Hempowicz, Director of Public Policy of the Project
on Government Oversight (POGO); and Mia M. Forgy, Deputy IG of
the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
On May 3, 2021, the Committee held a hearing to consider
proposals in H.R. 2662. The Committee heard testimony from
James-Christian Blockwood, Executive Vice President of the
Partnership for Public Service; Liz Hempowicz, Director of
Public Policy of POGO; Rudy Mehrbani, Senior Advisor of the
Democracy Fund; and Zack Smith, Legal Fellow of the Heritage
Foundation.
On May 25, 2021, the Committee considered H.R. 2662 at a
business meeting with a quorum present. The Committee ordered
the bill reported favorably, as amended, by a recorded vote of
22 to 18.
RELATED PROPOSALS FOR REFORMS
H.R. 2662 Title I--Inspector General Independence Act
During the 116th Congress, on May 22, 2020, Representative
Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY), Chairwoman of the Committee,
introduced H.R. 6984, the Inspector General Independence Act,
with Representative Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Majority Leader of
the House, Representative Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA), Chairman
of the Subcommittee on Government Operations, and
Representative Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA), Chairman of the
Subcommittee on National Security. H.R. 6984 had 16 additional
cosponsors. H.R. 6984 was referred to the Committee. The
Inspector General Independence Act comprises title I of H.R.
2662.
On May 12, 2020, Representative Nita M. Lowey (D-NY),
introduced H.R. 6800, the Heroes Act, with Chairwoman Maloney
and ten other committee chairs. H.R. 6800 was referred to the
Committees on Appropriations, Budget, and Ways and Means. On
May 15, 2020, H.R. 6800 was passed by the House of
Representatives by a vote of 208 199. Sections 70102, 70103,
70104 of H.R. 6800, are the same text as title I (the Inspector
General Independence Act) and title II (the Inspector General
Protection Act) of H.R. 2662.
During the 110th Congress, on February 8, 2007,
Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN) introduced H.R. 928, Inspector
General Reform Act. Cosponsors of the bill included
Representatives Henry A. Waxman, then-Chairman of the
Committee, Edolphus Towns, (D-NY), then-Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and
Procurement, Christopher Shays (R-CT), then-Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Bart
Gordon (D-TN), Michael N. Castle (R-DE), Dennis Moore, (D-KS),
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (D-GA). The text of H.R. 928 is similar
to title I of H.R. 2662.
The Committee held a markup to consider H.R. 928 on August
2, 2007, and ordered the bill to be reported, as amended, by
voice vote. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 928 on
October 3, 2007, by a recorded vote of 404 to 11.
H.R. 2662 Title II--Inspector General Protection Act
During the 117th Congress, on January 4, 2021,
Representatives Ted Lieu (D-CA) and Jody B. Hice (R-GA),
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Government Operations,
introduced H.R. 23, the Inspector General Protection Act. On
January 5, 2021, H.R. 23 was passed by the House of
Representatives by voice vote. H.R. 23 comprises title II of
H.R. 2662.
During the 116th Congress, on March 21, 2019,
Representatives Ted Lieu (D-CA) and Jody B. Hice (R-GA),
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Government Operations,
introduced H.R. 1847, the Inspector General Protection Act,
with substantially the same text as the version in the 117th
Congress. On March 26, 2019, H.R. 1847 was ordered to be
reported favorably by the Committee by a voice vote. On July
17, 2019, H.R. 1847 was passed by the House of Representatives
by a voice vote.
H.R. 2662 Title III--Inspector General Vacancies
During the 117th Congress, on May 4, 2021, Representative
Katie Porter (D-CA), along with Representatives Carolyn B.
Maloney (D-NY), Chairwoman of the Committee, Gerald E. Connolly
(D-VA), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Operations,
Bennie Thompson (D-MS), Adam Smith (D-WA), Jerrold Nadler (D-
NY), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Raul Grijalva (D-AZ), and Mark Takano
(D-CA), introduced H.R. 2994, the Accountability for Acting
Officials Act. The bill was referred to the Committee for
consideration. Subsection (d) of section 2 of H.R. 2994
comprises title III of H.R. 2662.
During the 116th Congress, the language in title III of
H.R. 2662 passed the House on July 21, 2020, as part of H.R.
6395, section 1115, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021, but was not included in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 that was signed into
law. Prior to passage, this same language was included in H.R.
6689, the Accountability for Acting Officials Act, introduced
on May 1, 2020, by Rep. Porter and the same cosponsors as the
version of the bill introduced in the 117th Congress.
H.R. 2662 Title IV--Integrity Committee Transparency Act
During the 117th Congress, on April 20, 2021,
Representative Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA), Subcommittee on
Government Operations Chairman, along with Representatives Jody
B. Hice (R-GA), Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Carolyn B.
Maloney (D-NY), Chairwoman of the Committee, Danny K. Davis (D-
IL), Katie Porter (D-CA), Jamie Raskin (D-MD), Brenda Lawrence
(D-MI), Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA), Ro Khanna (D-CA), John
Sarbanes (D-MD), and Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) introduced
H.R. 2681, the Integrity Committee Transparency Act. The
Committee reported H.R. 2681 favorably by voice vote at the
Committee business meeting on May 13, 2021. H.R. 2681 comprises
title IV of H.R. 2662.
During the 116th Congress, on September 18, 2019,
Representative Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA), Chair of the
Subcommittee on Government Operations, along with
Representatives Elijah E. Cummings (D-MD), then-Chairman of the
Committee, Mark Meadows (R-NC), and Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA)
introduced H.R. 4382, the Integrity Committee Transparency Act
of 2019, with similar text to the version in H.R. 2662, as
amended. On September 16, 2020, H.R. 4382, as amended, was
reported favorably by the Committee by a voice vote.
H.R. 2662 Title V--IG Subpoena Authority Act
During the 117th Congress, on March 19, 2021,
Representative Jimmy Gomez (D-CA), along with Representatives
Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY) and Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA), and
Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) introduced H.R. 2089, the
IG Subpoena Authority Act, which would provide IGs with the
authority to subpoena witness testimony from non-federal
employees. H.R. 2089 was referred to the Committee for
consideration. H.R. 2089 comprises title V of H.R. 2662.
During the 116th Congress, on February 2, 2018,
Representative Steve Russell (R-OK), along with Representative
Matt Cartwright (D-PA) introduced H.R. 4917, the IG Subpoena
Authority Act. The bill was referred to the Committee for
consideration. On June 29, 2018, the Committee ordered H.R.
4917 favorably reported by voice vote, and on September 26,
2018, the House passed the bill by voice vote.
In the 114th Congress, on May 18, 2015, then-Chairman Jason
Chaffetz (R-UT) introduced H.R. 2395, the Inspector General
Empowerment Act of 2016, with Representative Mark Meadows (R-
NC) and Ranking Minority Member Elijah E. Cummings (D-MD). The
bill was referred to the Committee for consideration. H.R. 2395
contained a similar provision to future versions of IG
testimonial subpoena authority language. On May 19, 2015, the
Committee ordered H.R. 2395 favorably reported by voice vote
and on June 21, 2016, the House passed the bill, as amended, by
voice vote.
H.R. 2662 Title VI--Inspector General Access Act
During the 117th Congress, on May 7, 2021, Representative
Deborah Ross (D-NC), along with Representatives Jamie Raskin
(D-MD), Darrell Issa (R-CA), Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY),
Chairwoman of the Committee, Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA),
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Operations, Jody B.
Hice (R-GA), Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Government
Operations, and Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) introduced H.R.
3064, the Inspector General Access Act, which would provide the
DOJ IG with the authority to investigate misconduct by DOJ
attorneys. The bill was referred to the Committee for
consideration. H.R. 3064 comprises title VI of H.R. 2662, the
IG Independence and Empowerment Act.
During the 116th Congress, on January 3, 2019,
Representative Cedric Richmond (D-LA), along with
Representatives Elijah E. Cummings (D-MD), then-Chairman of the
Committee, Jody B. Hice (R-GA), and Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA),
introduced H.R. 202, the Inspector General Access Act of 2019,
with the same text as H.R. 3064. The bill was referred to the
Committee for consideration. A companion bill, S. 685,
Inspector General Access Act of 2019, was introduced by Senator
Mike Lee (R-UT), along with Senators Chuck Grassley (R-IA),
Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), and Marco Rubio (R-FL) on March 6, 2019.
H.R. 202 passed the House on January 15, 2019 by voice vote.
During the 115th Congress, on June 29, 2017, Representative
Cedric Richmond (D-LA), along with Representatives Jody B. Hice
(R-GA), John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), and Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA),
introduced H.R. 3154, the Inspector General Access Act of 2017,
with the same text as later versions of the bill. The bill was
referred to the Committee for consideration. The Committee
considered H.R. 3154 at a business meeting on September 27,
2018, and ordered the bill favorably reported by unanimous
consent. A companion bill, S. 3003, the Inspector General
Access Act of 2018, was introduced by Senator Mike Lee (R-UT),
along with Senators Chuck Grassley (R-IA) and Lisa Murkowski
(R-AK) on June 6, 2018. H.R. 3154 passed the House on November
29, 2018 by voice vote.
During the 114th Congress, on May 5, 2015, Representative
Cedric Richmond (D-LA), along with Representatives John
Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), Jody B. Hice (R-GA), and Ral R. Labrador
(R-ID), introduced H.R. 2240, the Inspector General Access Act
of 2015, with the same text as later versions of the bill. The
bill was referred to the Committee for consideration. A
companion bill, S. 618, Inspector General Access Act of 2015,
was introduced by Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), along with Senators
Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), and Jon Tester
(D-MT) on March 2, 2015.
H.R. 2662 Title VII--Enhanced Whistleblower Protection Act
During the 117th Congress, On May 19, 2021, Representative
Gerald E. Connolly, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Government
Operations, introduced H.R. 3338, the Enhanced Whistleblower
Engagement Act, with Representatives Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY),
Chairwoman of the Committee, Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA), Danny K.
Davis (D-IL), Jamie Raskin (D-MD), Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-
DC), Ro Khanna (D-CA), and Katie Porter (D-CA). The bill was
referred to the Committee for consideration. H.R. 3338
comprises title VII of H.R. 2662, the IG Independence and
Empowerment Act and section 4 of S. 587, the Securing Inspector
General Independence Act of 2021.
Committee Consideration
On May 25, 2021, the Committee considered H.R. 2662 at a
business meeting. Chairwoman Maloney offered an amendment in
the nature of a substitute (ANS).
Representative Andy Biggs (R-AZ) offered an amendment to
the ANS that would strike title I, title III, and title V from
the bill. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 15-20.
Representative Fred Keller (R-PA) offered an amendment to
the ANS that would strike title I and title II from the bill,
and make changes to title V. The amendment failed by a recorded
vote of 18-21.
The ANS was adopted by a voice vote, and the Committee
ordered the bill reported favorably, as amended, by a recorded
vote of 22-18.
Roll Call Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's
consideration of H.R. 2662:
Explanation of Amendments
During Committee consideration of the bill, Representative
Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY), Chairwoman of the Committee, offered
an amendment in the nature of a substitute that modified the
bill to make technical changes to multiple titles of the bill,
including title V and title X, as well as changes to title IV
to conform to language in a separate bill the Committee
reported favorably on May 13, 2021, H.R. 2681, the Integrity
Committee Transparency Act, introduced by Representative Gerald
E. Connolly (D-VA). The Committee adopted the Maloney amendment
by a voice vote.
Representative Andy Biggs (R-AZ) offered an amendment that
would have stricken title I, the for-cause removal protections
for IGs, title III, requirements for who can serve as an acting
IG in the event of a vacancy, and title V, testimonial subpoena
authority for IGs. The amendment was not adopted.
Representative Fred Keller (R-PA) offered an amendment that
would have stricken title I, the for-cause removal protections
for IGs, and title III, requirements for who can serve as an
acting IG in the event of a vacancy. The amendment would also
have modified title V, testimonial subpoena authority for IGs,
to forbid subpoenas of former federal employees who were not
employed with the federal government on the date of enactment
of the Act, and to require an IG to pay for the legal
representation of any witness whose testimony the IG is seeking
to compel under subpoena. The amendment was not adopted.
List of Related Committee Hearings
In accordance with section 103(i) of H. Res. 6, the
Committee held hearings to consider the proposals set forth in
the IG Independence and Empowerment Act, on April 20, 2021,
before the Subcommittee on Government Operations as part of a
hearing to consider legislative proposals related to IGs, and
on May 3, 2021, before the full Committee, as part of a hearing
to consider various government accountability and transparency
legislative proposals.
Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the Committee
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII and clause
(2)(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, the Committee finds that greater independence,
authority, and transparency of inspectors general is necessary
to effectively and efficiently uncover waste, fraud, and abuse
and investigate allegations of misconduct in the federal
government, such that the Committee recommends the adoption of
this bill (H.R. 2662) to ensure that IGs can continue serving a
critical oversight function within the federal government and
report findings to Congress and the American people.
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives
In accordance with clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee's performance
goal or objective of this bill is to amend the Inspector
General Act of 1978 to require that an Inspector General is
removed only for cause, expand authorities and transparency
requirements relating to federal inspectors general, and for
other purposes.
Application of Law to the Legislative Branch
Section 102(b)(3) of Public Law 104-1 requires a
description of the application of this bill to the legislative
branch where the bill relates to the terms and conditions of
employment or access to public services and accommodations.
This bill amends the Inspector General Act of 1978 to require
that an Inspector General is removed only for cause, expand
authorities and transparency requirements relating to federal
inspectors general, and for other purposes. As such, this bill
does not relate to terms and conditions of employment or access
to public services or accommodations.
Duplication of Federal Programs
In accordance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no
provision of this bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of
the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another
Federal program, a program that was included in any report from
the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to
section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a
program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance.
Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings
This bill does not direct the completion of any specific
rule makings within the meaning of section 551 of title 5,
United States Code.
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement
The legislation does not establish or authorize the
establishment of an advisory committee within the definition of
section 5(b) of the appendix to title 5, United States Code.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement
Pursuant to section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, the Committee has included a letter received from the
Congressional Budget Office below.
Earmark Identification
This bill does not include any congressional earmarks,
limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in
clause 9 of rule XXI of the House of Representatives.
Committee Cost Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(2)(B) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee includes below a
cost estimate of the bill prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
New Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the House of
Representatives, the cost estimate prepared by the
Congressional Budget Office and submitted pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is as follows:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, June 16, 2021.
Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney,
Chairwoman, Committee on Oversight and Reform,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Madam Chairwoman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2662, the IG
Independence and Empowerment Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew
Pickford.
Sincerely,
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 2662 would amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 and
would require the President and inspectors general (IGs) to
report to the Congress on certain activities. The bill also
would require that the Integrity Committee of the Council of
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) have one
member who is a former IG, would direct the council to
establish minimum training standards and best practices for
IGs, and would authorize the appropriation of whatever amounts
are necessary for the council.
In 2020, IGs working in more than 70 federal agencies spent
$3.1 billion to detect and deter fraud, waste, and abuse and
produced more than 3,000 audit, investigation, and evaluation
reports.
Under current law, each federal agency with an IG provides
funds annually to operate CIGIE; those funds total about $10
million a year. H.R. 2662 would authorize appropriations for
the CIGIE. Based on information from selected IGs and the CIGIE
regarding their current operations and the new reporting and
staffing requirements, and accounting for anticipated
inflation, CBO estimates that implementing this provision would
cost $52 million over the 2022-2026 period, assuming
appropriation of the necessary amounts.
CBO assumes the bill will be enacted near the end of fiscal
year 2021. The costs of the legislation, detailed in Table 1,
fall within budget function 800 (general government).
TABLE 1.--ESTIMATED INCREASES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION UNDER H.R. 2662
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, millions of dollars--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2021-2026
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated Authorization............ 0 10 10 11 11 11 53
Estimated Outlays.................. 0 9 10 11 11 11 52
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Matthew
Pickford. The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss,
Deputy Director of Budget Analysis.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
* * * * * * *
appointment and removal of officers
Sec. 3. (a) There shall be at the head of each Office an
Inspector General who shall be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, without regard
to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity
and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial
analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or
investigations. Each Inspector General shall report to and be
under the general supervision of the head of the establishment
involved or, to the extent such authority is delegated, the
officer next in rank below such head, but shall not report to,
or be subject to supervision by, any other officer of such
establishment. Neither the head of the establishment nor the
officer next in rank below such head shall prevent or prohibit
the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or
completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any
subpoena during the course of any audit or investigation.
(b) [An Inspector General]
(1) An Inspector General may be removed from office
by the President in accordance with paragraph (2). If
an Inspector General is removed from office, is placed
on paid or unpaid non-duty status, or is transferred to
another position or location within an establishment,
the President shall communicate in writing the reasons
for any such removal, change in status, or transfer to
both Houses of Congress, not later than 30 days before
the removal, change in status, or transfer. Nothing in
this subsection shall prohibit a personnel action
otherwise authorized by law, other than transfer or
removal.
(2) The President may remove an Inspector General
only for any of the following grounds (and the
documentation of any such ground shall be included in
the communication required pursuant to paragraph (1)):
(A) Documented permanent incapacity.
(B) Documented neglect of duty.
(C) Documented malfeasance.
(D) Documented conviction of a felony or conduct
involving moral turpitude.
(E) Documented knowing violation of a law or
regulation.
(F) Documented gross mismanagement.
(G) Documented gross waste of funds.
(H) Documented abuse of authority.
(I) Documented inefficiency.
(c) For the purposes of section 7324 of title 5, United
States Code, no Inspector General shall be considered to be an
employee who determines policies to be pursued by the United
States in the nationwide administration of Federal laws.
(d)(1) Each Inspector General shall, in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations governing the civil service--
(A) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for
Auditing who shall have the responsibility for
supervising the performance of auditing activities
relating to programs and operations of the
establishment;
(B) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations who shall have the responsibility for
supervising the performance of investigative activities
relating to such programs and operations; and
(C) designate a Whistleblower Protection Coordinator
whoshall--
(i) educate agency employees, including
employees of that Office of Inspector General--
(I) about prohibitions against
retaliation for protected disclosures;
and
(II) who have made or are
contemplating making a protected
disclosure about the rights and
remedies against retaliation for
protected disclosures, including--
(aa) the means by which
employees may seek review of
any allegation of reprisal,
including the roles of the
Office of the Inspector
General, the Office of Special
Counsel, the Merit Systems
Protection Board, and any other
relevant entities; and
(bb) general information
about the timeliness of such
cases, the availability of any
alternative dispute mechanisms,
and avenues for potential
relief.
(ii) assist the Inspector General in
promoting the timely and appropriate handling
and consideration of protected disclosures and
allegations of reprisal, to the extent
practicable, by the Inspector General; and
(iii) assist the Inspector General in
facilitating communication and coordination
with the Special Counsel, the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
(including the Integrity Committee of that
Council), the establishment, Congress, and any
other relevant entity regarding the timely and
appropriate handling and consideration of
protected disclosures, allegations of reprisal,
and general matters regarding the
implementation and administration of
whistleblower protection laws, rules, and
regulations.
(2) The Whistleblower Protection Coordinator shall not act as
a legal representative, agent, or advocate of the employee or
former employee.
(3) The Whistleblower Protection Coordinator shall
have direct access to the Inspector General as needed
to accomplish the requirements of this subsection.
(4) For the purposes of this section, the requirement of the
designation of a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman under
paragraph (1)(C) shall not apply to--
(A) any agency that is an element of the intelligence
community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))); or
(B) as determined by the President, any executive
agency or unit thereof the principal function of which
is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counter
intelligence activities.
(e) The annual rate of basic pay for an Inspector General (as
defined under section 12(3)) shall be the rate payable for
level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title
5, United States Code, plus 3 percent.
(f) An Inspector General (as defined under section 8G(a)(6)
or 12(3)) may not receive any cash award or cash bonus,
including any cash award under chapter 45 of title 5, United
States Code.
(g) Each Inspector General shall, in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations governing the civil service,
obtain legal advice from a counsel either reporting directly to
the Inspector General or another Inspector General.
(h) Not later than 15 days after an Inspector General is
removed, placed on paid or unpaid non-duty status, or
transferred to another position or location within an
establishment, the acting Inspector General shall submit to the
Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a list of all audits and
investigations being conducted, supervised, coordinated by the
Office at the time the Inspector General was removed, placed on
paid or unpaid non-duty status, or transferred.
* * * * * * *
reports
Sec. 5. (a) Each Inspector General shall, not later than
April 30 and October 31 of each year, prepare semiannual
reports summarizing the activities of the Office during the
immediately preceding six-month periods ending March 31 and
September 30. Such reports shall include, but need not be
limited to--
(1) a description of significant problems, abuses,
and deficiencies relating to the administration of
programs and operations of such establishment disclosed
by such activities during the reporting period;
(2) a description of the recommendations for
corrective action made by the Office during the
reporting period with respect to significant problems,
abuses, or deficiencies identified pursuant to
paragraph (1);
(3) an identification of each significant
recommendation described in previous semiannual reports
on which corrective action has not been completed;
(4) a summary of matters referred to prosecutive
authorities and the prosecutions and convictions which
have resulted;
(5) a summary of each report made to the head of the
establishment under section 6(c)(2) during the
reporting period;
(6) a listing, subdivided according to subject
matter, of each audit report, inspection reports, and
evaluation reports issued by the Office during the
reporting period and for each report, where applicable,
the total dollar value of questioned costs (including a
separate category for the dollar value of unsupported
costs) and the dollar value of recommendations that
funds be put to better use;
(7) a summary of each particularly significant
report;
(8) statistical tables showing the total number of
audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation
reports and the total dollar value of questioned costs
(including a separate category for the dollar value of
unsupported costs), for reports--
(A) for which no management decision had been
made by the commencement of the reporting
period;
(B) which were issued during the reporting
period;
(C) for which a management decision was made
during the reporting period, including--
(i) the dollar value of disallowed
costs; and
(ii) the dollar value of costs not
disallowed; and
(D) for which no management decision has been
made by the end of the reporting period;
(9) statistical tables showing the total number of
audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation
reports and the dollar value of recommendations that
funds be put to better use by management, for reports--
(A) for which no management decision had been
made by the commencement of the reporting
period;
(B) which were issued during the reporting
period;
(C) for which a management decision was made
during the reporting period, including--
(i) the dollar value of
recommendations that were agreed to by
management; and
(ii) the dollar value of
recommendations that were not agreed to
by management; and
(D) for which no management decision has been
made by the end of the reporting period;
(10) a summary of each audit report, inspection
reports, and evaluation reports issued before the
commencement of the reporting period--
(A) for which no management decision has been
made by the end of the reporting period
(including the date and title of each such
report), an explanation of the reasons such
management decision has not been made, and a
statement concerning the desired timetable for
achieving a management decision on each such
report;
(B) for which no establishment comment was
returned within 60 days of providing the report
to the establishment; and
(C) for which there are any outstanding
unimplemented recommendations, including the
aggregate potential cost savings of those
recommendations.
(11) a description and explanation of the reasons for
any significant revised management decision made during
the reporting period;
(12) information concerning any significant
management decision with which the Inspector General is
in disagreement;
(13) the information described under section 804(b)
of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of
1996;
(14)(A) an appendix containing the results of any
peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector
General during the reporting period; or
(B) if no peer review was conducted within that
reporting period, a statement identifying the date of
the last peer review conducted by another Office of
Inspector General;
(15) a list of any outstanding recommendations from
any peer review conducted by another Office of
Inspector General that have not been fully implemented,
including a statement describing the status of the
implementation and why implementation is not complete;
(16) a list of any peer reviews conducted by the
Inspector General of another Office of the Inspector
General during the reporting period, including a list
of any outstanding recommendations made from any
previous peer review (including any peer review
conducted before the reporting period) that remain
outstanding or have not been fully implemented;
(17) statistical tables showing--
(A) the total number of investigative reports
issued during the reporting period;
(B) the total number of persons referred to
the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution during the reporting period;
(C) the total number of persons referred to
State and local prosecuting authorities for
criminal prosecution during the reporting
period; and
(D) the total number of indictments and
criminal informations during the reporting
period that resulted from any prior referral to
prosecuting authorities;
(18) a description of the metrics used for developing
the data for the statistical tables under paragraph
(17);
(19) a report on each investigation conducted by the
Office involving a senior Government employee where
allegations of misconduct were substantiated, including
the name of the senior government official (as defined
by the department or agency) if already made public by
the Office, and a detailed description of--
(A) the facts and circumstances of the
investigation; and
(B) the status and disposition of the matter,
including--
(i) if the matter was referred to the
Department of Justice, the date of the
referral; and
(ii) if the Department of Justice
declined the referral, the date of the
declination;
(20)(A) a detailed description of any instance of
whistleblower retaliation, including information about
the official found to have engaged in retaliation; and
(B) what, if any, consequences the establishment
actually imposed to hold the official described in
subparagraph (A) accountable;
(21) a detailed description of any attempt by the
establishment to interfere with the independence of the
Office, including--
(A) with budget constraints designed to limit
the capabilities of the Office; and
(B) incidents where the establishment has
resisted or objected to oversight activities of
the Office or restricted or significantly
delayed access to information, including the
justification of the establishment for such
action[; and];
(22) detailed descriptions of the particular
circumstances of each--
(A) inspection, evaluation, and audit
conducted by the Office that is closed and was
not disclosed to the public; and
(B) investigation conducted by the Office
involving a senior Government employee that is
closed and was not disclosed to the public[.];
and
(23) a description of the use of subpoenas for the
attendance and testimony of witnesses authorized under
section 6A.
(b) Semiannual reports of each Inspector General shall be
furnished to the head of the establishment involved not later
than April 30 and October 31 of each year and shall be
transmitted by such head to the appropriate committees or
subcommittees of the Congress within thirty days after receipt
of the report, together with a report by the head of the
establishment containing--
(1) any comments such head determines appropriate;
(2) statistical tables showing the total number of
audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation
reports and the dollar value of disallowed costs, for
reports--
(A) for which final action had not been taken
by the commencement of the reporting period;
(B) on which management decisions were made
during the reporting period;
(C) for which final action was taken during
the reporting period, including--
(i) the dollar value of disallowed
costs that were recovered by management
through collection, offset, property in
lieu of cash, or otherwise; and
(ii) the dollar value of disallowed
costs that were written off by
management; and
(D) for which no final action has been taken
by the end of the reporting period;
(3) statistical tables showing the total number of
audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation
reports and the dollar value of recommendations that
funds be put to better use by management agreed to in a
management decision, for reports--
(A) for which final action had not been taken
by the commencement of the reporting period;
(B) on which management decisions were made
during the reporting period;
(C) for which final action was taken during
the reporting period, including--
(i) the dollar value of
recommendations that were actually
completed; and
(ii) the dollar value of
recommendations that management has
subsequently concluded should not or
could not be implemented or completed;
and
(D) for which no final action has been taken
by the end of the reporting period;
(4) whether the establishment entered into a
settlement agreement with the official described in
subsection (a)(20)(A), which shall be reported
regardless of any confidentiality agreement relating to
the settlement agreement; and
(5) a statement with respect to audit reports on
which management decisions have been made but final
action has not been taken, other than audit reports on
which a management decision was made within the
preceding year, containing--
(A) a list of such audit reports and the date
each such report was issued;
(B) the dollar value of disallowed costs for
each report;
(C) the dollar value of recommendations that
funds be put to better use agreed to by
management for each report; and
(D) an explanation of the reasons final
action has not been taken with respect to each
such audit report,
except that such statement may exclude such audit
reports that are under formal administrative or
judicial appeal or upon which management of an
establishment has agreed to pursue a legislative
solution, but shall identify the number of reports in
each category so excluded.
(c) Within sixty days of the transmission of the semiannual
reports of each Inspector General to the Congress, the head of
each establishment shall make copies of such report available
to the public upon request and at a reasonable cost. Within 60
days after the transmission of the semiannual reports of each
establishment head to the Congress, the head of each
establishment shall make copies of such report available to the
public upon request and at a reasonable cost.
(d) Each Inspector General shall report immediately to the
head of the establishment involved whenever the Inspector
General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant
problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the
administration of programs and operations of such
establishment. The head of the establishment shall transmit any
such report to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of
Congress within seven calendar days, together with a report by
the head of the establishment containing any comments such head
deems appropriate.
(e)(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
authorize the public disclosure of information which is--
(A) specifically prohibited from disclosure by any
other provision of law;
(B) specifically required by Executive order to be
protected from disclosure in the interest of national
defense or national security or in the conduct of
foreign affairs; or
(C) a part of an ongoing criminal investigation.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(C), any report under this
section may be disclosed to the public in a form which includes
information with respect to a part of an ongoing criminal
investigation if such information has been included in a public
record.
(3) Except to the extent and in the manner provided under
section 6103(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, nothing
in this section or in any other provision of this Act shall be
construed to authorize or permit the withholding of information
from the Congress, or from any committee or subcommittee
thereof.
(4) Subject to any other provision of law that would
otherwise prohibit disclosure of such information, the
information described in paragraph (1) may be provided to any
Member of Congress upon request.
(5) An Office may not provide to Congress or the public any
information that reveals the personally identifiable
information of a whistleblower under this section unless the
Office first obtains the consent of the whistleblower.
(f) As used in this section--
(1) the term ``questioned cost'' means a cost that is
questioned by the Office because of--
(A) an alleged violation of a provision of a
law, regulation, contract, grant, cooperative
agreement, or other agreement or document
governing the expenditure of funds;
(B) a finding that, at the time of the audit,
such cost is not supported by adequate
documentation; or
(C) a finding that the expenditure of funds
for the intended purpose is unnecessary or
unreasonable;
(2) the term ``unsupported cost'' means a cost that
is questioned by the Office because the Office found
that, at the time of the audit, such cost is not
supported by adequate documentation;
(3) the term ``disallowed cost'' means a questioned
cost that management, in a management decision, has
sustained or agreed should not be charged to the
Government;
(4) the term ``recommendation that funds be put to
better use'' means a recommendation by the Office that
funds could be used more efficiently if management of
an establishment took actions to implement and complete
the recommendation, including--
(A) reductions in outlays;
(B) deobligation of funds from programs or
operations;
(C) withdrawal of interest subsidy costs on
loans or loan guarantees, insurance, or bonds;
(D) costs not incurred by implementing
recommended improvements related to the
operations of the establishment, a contractor
or grantee;
(E) avoidance of unnecessary expenditures
noted in preaward reviews of contract or grant
agreements; or
(F) any other savings which are specifically
identified;
(5) the term ``management decision'' means the
evaluation by the management of an establishment of the
findings and recommendations included in an audit
report and the issuance of a final decision by
management concerning its response to such findings and
recommendations, including actions concluded to be
necessary;
(6) the term ``final action'' means--
(A) the completion of all actions that the
management of an establishment has concluded,
in its management decision, are necessary with
respect to the findings and recommendations
included in an audit report; and
(B) in the event that the management of an
establishment concludes no action is necessary,
final action occurs when a management decision
has been made; and
(7) the term ``senior Government employee'' means--
(A) an officer or employee in the executive
branch (including a special Government employee
as defined in section 202 of title 18, United
States Code) who occupies a position classified
at or above GS-15 of the General Schedule or,
in the case of positions not under the General
Schedule, for which the rate of basic pay is
equal to or greater than 120 percent of the
minimum rate of basic pay payable for GS-15 of
the General Schedule; and
(B) any commissioned officer in the Armed
Forces in pay grades O-6 and above.
authority; administration provisions
Sec. 6. (a) In addition to the authority otherwise provided
by this Act, each Inspector General, in carrying out the
provisions of this Act, is authorized--
(1)(A) to have timely access to all records, reports,
audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or
other materials available to the applicable
establishment which relate to the programs and
operations with respect to which that Inspector General
has responsibilities under this Act;
(B) to have access under subparagraph (A)
notwithstanding any other provision of law, except
pursuant to any provision of law enacted by Congress
that expressly--
(i) refers to the Inspector General; and
(ii) limits the right of access of the
Inspector General; and
(C) except as provided in subsection (i), with regard
to Federal grand jury materials protected from
disclosure pursuant to rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, to have timely access to such
information if the Attorney General grants the request
in accordance with subsection (h);
(2) to make such investigations and reports relating
to the administration of the programs and operations of
the applicable establishment as are, in the judgment of
the Inspector General, necessary or desirable;
(3) to request such information or assistance as may
be necessary for carrying out the duties and
responsibilities provided by this Act from any Federal,
State, or local governmental agency or unit thereof;
(4) to require by subpoena the production of all
information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data in any medium
(including electronically stored information), as well
as any tangible thing and documentary evidence
necessary in the performance of the functions assigned
by this Act, which subpena, in the case of contumacy or
refusal to obey, shall be enforceable by order of any
appropriate United States district court: Provided,
That procedures other than subpoenas shall be used by
the Inspector General to obtain documents and
information from Federal agencies;
(5) to administer to or take from any person an oath,
affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the
performance of the functions assigned by this Act,
which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered
or taken by or before an employee of an Office of
Inspector General designated by the Inspector General
shall have the same force and effect as if administered
or taken by or before an officer having a seal;
(6) to have direct and prompt access to the head of
the establishment involved when necessary for any
purpose pertaining to the performance of functions and
responsibilities under this Act;
(7) to select, appoint, and employ such officers and
employees as may be necessary for carrying out the
functions, powers, and duties of the Office subject to
the provisions of title 5, United States Code,
governing appointments in the competitive service, and
the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of
chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and
General Schedule pay rates;
(8) to obtain services as authorized by section 3109
of title 5, United States Code, at daily rates not to
exceed the equivalent rate prescribed for grade GS-18
of the General Schedule by section 5332 of title 5,
United States Code; and
(9) to the extent and in such amounts as may be
provided in advance by appropriations Acts, to enter
into contracts and other arrangements for audits,
studies, analyses, and other services with public
agencies and with private persons, and to make such
payments as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing
an Inspector General to publicly disclose information otherwise
prohibited from disclosure by law.
(c)(1) Upon request of an Inspector General for information
or assistance under subsection (a)(3), the head of any Federal
agency involved shall, insofar as is practicable and not in
contravention of any existing statutory restriction or
regulation of the Federal agency from which the information is
requested, furnish to such Inspector General, or to an
authorized designee, such information or assistance.
(2) Whenever information or assistance requested under
subsection (a)(1) or (a)(3) is, in the judgment of an Inspector
General, unreasonably refused or not provided, the Inspector
General shall report the circumstances to the head of the
establishment involved without delay.
(3) If the information or assistance that is the subject of a
report under paragraph (2) is not provided to the Inspector
General by the date that is 30 days after the report is made,
the Inspector General shall submit a notice that the
information or assistance requested is being unreasonably
refused or not provided by the head of the establishment
involved or the head of the Federal agency involved, as
applicable, to--
(A) the Committee in the House of Representatives and
the Committee in the Senate that has jurisdiction over
the establishment involved or the Federal agency
involved, as applicable;
(B) the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the
House of Representatives; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(d) Each head of an establishment shall provide the Office
within such establishment with appropriate and adequate office
space at central and field office locations of such
establishment, together with such equipment, office supplies,
and communications facilities and services as may be necessary
for the operation of such offices, and shall provide necessary
maintenance services for such offices and the equipment and
facilities located therein.
(e)(1)(A) For purposes of applying the provisions of law
identified in subparagraph (B)--
(i) each Office of Inspector General shall be
considered to be a separate agency; and
(ii) the Inspector General who is the head of an
office referred to in clause (i) shall, with respect to
such office, have the functions, powers, and duties of
an agency head or appointing authority under such
provisions.
(B) This paragraph applies with respect to the following
provisions of title 5, United States Code:
(i) Subchapter II of chapter 35.
(ii) Sections 8335(b), 8336, 8344, 8414, 8468, and
8425(b).
(iii) All provisions relating to the Senior Executive
Service (as determined by the Office of Personnel
Management), subject to paragraph (2).
(2) For purposes of applying section 4507(b) of title 5,
United States Code, paragraph (1)(A)(ii) shall be applied by
substituting ``the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency (established by section 11 of the
Inspector General Act) shall'' for ``the Inspector General who
is the head of an office referred to in clause (i) shall, with
respect to such office,''.
(f)(1) In addition to the authority otherwise provided by
this Act, each Inspector General, any Assistant Inspector
General for Investigations under such an Inspector General, and
any special agent supervised by such an Assistant Inspector
General may be authorized by the Attorney General to--
(A) carry a firearm while engaged in official duties
as authorized under this Act or other statute, or as
expressly authorized by the Attorney General;
(B) make an arrest without a warrant while engaged in
official duties as authorized under this Act or other
statute, or as expressly authorized by the Attorney
General, for any offense against the United States
committed in the presence of such Inspector General,
Assistant Inspector General, or agent, or for any
felony cognizable under the laws of the United States
if such Inspector General, Assistant Inspector General,
or agent has reasonable grounds to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed or is committing
such felony; and
(C) seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of a
premises, or seizure of evidence issued under the
authority of the United States upon probable cause to
believe that a violation has been committed.
(2) The Attorney General may authorize exercise of the powers
under this subsection only upon an initial determination that--
(A) the affected Office of Inspector General is
significantly hampered in the performance of
responsibilities established by this Act as a result of
the lack of such powers;
(B) available assistance from other law enforcement
agencies is insufficient to meet the need for such
powers; and
(C) adequate internal safeguards and management
procedures exist to ensure proper exercise of such
powers.
(3) The Inspector General offices of the Department of
Commerce, Department of Education, Department of Energy,
Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland
Security, Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Department of the Interior, Department of Justice, Department
of Labor, Department of State, Department of Transportation,
Department of the Treasury, Department of Veterans Affairs,
Agency for International Development, Environmental Protection
Agency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, General Services Administration,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management, Railroad
Retirement Board, Small Business Administration, Social
Security Administration, and the Tennessee Valley Authority are
exempt from the requirement of paragraph (2) of an initial
determination of eligibility by the Attorney General.
(4) The Attorney General shall promulgate, and revise as
appropriate, guidelines which shall govern the exercise of the
law enforcement powers established under paragraph (1).
(5)(A) Powers authorized for an Office of Inspector General
under paragraph (1) may be rescinded or suspended upon a
determination by the Attorney General that any of the
requirements under paragraph (2) is no longer satisfied or that
the exercise of authorized powers by that Office of Inspector
General has not complied with the guidelines promulgated by the
Attorney General under paragraph (4).
(B) Powers authorized to be exercised by any individual under
paragraph (1) may be rescinded or suspended with respect to
that individual upon a determination by the Attorney General
that such individual has not complied with guidelines
promulgated by the Attorney General under paragraph (4).
(6) A determination by the Attorney General under paragraph
(2) or (5) shall not be reviewable in or by any court.
(7) To ensure the proper exercise of the law enforcement
powers authorized by this subsection, the Offices of Inspector
General described under paragraph (3) shall, not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of this subsection,
collectively enter into a memorandum of understanding to
establish an external review process for ensuring that adequate
internal safeguards and management procedures continue to exist
within each Office and within any Office that later receives an
authorization under paragraph (2). The review process shall be
established in consultation with the Attorney General, who
shall be provided with a copy of the memorandum of
understanding that establishes the review process. Under the
review process, the exercise of the law enforcement powers by
each Office of Inspector General shall be reviewed periodically
by another Office of Inspector General or by a committee of
Inspectors General. The results of each review shall be
communicated in writing to the applicable Inspector General and
to the Attorney General.
(8) No provision of this subsection shall limit the exercise
of law enforcement powers established under any other statutory
authority, including United States Marshals Service special
deputation.
(9) In this subsection, the term ``Inspector General'' means
an Inspector General appointed under section 3 or an Inspector
General appointed under section 8G.
(g)(1) For each fiscal year, an Inspector General shall
transmit a budget estimate and request to the head of the
establishment or designated Federal entity to which the
Inspector General reports. The budget request shall specify the
aggregate amount of funds requested for such fiscal year for
the operations of that Inspector General and shall specify the
amount requested for all training needs, including a
certification from the Inspector General that the amount
requested satisfies all training requirements for the Inspector
General's office for that fiscal year[, and any resources
necessary to support the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency. Resources necessary to support the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
shall be specifically identified and justified in the budget
request].
(2) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for
approval, the head of each establishment or designated Federal
entity shall include--
(A) an aggregate request for the Inspector General;
(B) amounts for Inspector General training; and
[(C) amounts for support of the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and]
[(D)] (C) any comments of the affected Inspector
General with respect to the proposal.
(3) The President shall include in each budget of the United
States Government submitted to Congress--
(A) a separate statement of the budget estimate
prepared in accordance with paragraph (1);
(B) the amount requested by the President for each
Inspector General;
(C) the amount requested by the President for
training of Inspectors General;
(D) the amount requested by the President for support
for the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency; and
(E) any comments of the affected Inspector General
with respect to the proposal if the Inspector General
concludes that the budget submitted by the President
would substantially inhibit the Inspector General from
performing the duties of the office.
(h)(1) If the Inspector General of an establishment submits a
request to the head of the establishment for Federal grand jury
materials pursuant to subsection (a)(1), the head of the
establishment shall immediately notify the Attorney General of
such request.
(2) Not later than 15 days after the date on which a request
is submitted to the Attorney General under paragraph (1), the
Attorney General shall determine whether to grant or deny the
request for Federal grand jury materials and shall immediately
notify the head of the establishment of such determination. The
Attorney General shall grant the request unless the Attorney
General determines that granting access to the Federal grand
jury materials would be likely to--
(A) interfere with an ongoing criminal investigation
or prosecution;
(B) interfere with an undercover operation;
(C) result in disclosure of the identity of a
confidential source, including a protected witness;
(D) pose a serious threat to national security; or
(E) result in significant impairment of the trade or
economic interests of the United States.
(3)(A) The head of the establishment shall inform the
Inspector General of the establishment of the determination
made by the Attorney General with respect to the request for
Federal grand jury materials.
(B) The Inspector General of the establishment described
under subparagraph (A) may submit comments on the determination
submitted pursuant to such subparagraph to the committees
listed under paragraph (4) that the Inspector General considers
appropriate.
(4) Not later than 30 days after notifying the head of an
establishment of a denial pursuant to paragraph (2), the
Attorney General shall submit a statement that the request for
Federal grand jury materials by the Inspector General was
denied and the reason for the denial to each of the following:
(A) The Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary,
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(B) The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(C) Other appropriate committees and subcommittees of
Congress.
(i) Subsections (a)(1)(C) and (h) shall not apply to requests
from the Inspector General of the Department of Justice.
(j)(1) In this subsection, the terms ``agency'', ``matching
program'', ``record'', and ``system of records'' have the
meanings given those terms in section 552a(a) of title 5,
United States Code.
(2) For purposes of section 552a of title 5, United States
Code, or any other provision of law, a computerized comparison
of two or more automated Federal systems of records, or a
computerized comparison of a Federal system of records with
other records or non-Federal records, performed by an Inspector
General or by an agency in coordination with an Inspector
General in conducting an audit, investigation, inspection,
evaluation, or other review authorized under this Act shall not
be considered a matching program.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impede
the exercise by an Inspector General of any matching program
authority established under any other provision of law.
(k) Subchapter I of chapter 35 of title 44, United States
Code, shall not apply to the collection of information during
the conduct of an audit, investigation, inspection, evaluation,
or other review conducted by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency or any Office of Inspector
General, including any Office of Special Inspector General.
SEC. 6A. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.
(a) Testimonial Subpoena Authority.--In addition to the
authority otherwise provided by this Act and in accordance with
the requirements of this section, each Inspector General, in
carrying out the provisions of this Act (or in the case of an
Inspector General or Special Inspector General not established
under this Act, the provisions of the authorizing statute), is
authorized to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony
of witnesses as necessary in the performance of the functions
assigned to the Inspector General by this Act (or in the case
of an Inspector General or Special Inspector General not
established under this Act, the functions assigned by the
authorizing statute), which in the case of contumacy or refusal
to obey, such subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any
appropriate United States district court. An Inspector General
may not require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of any
Federal employee or employee of a designated Federal entity,
but may use other authorized procedures.
(b) Limitation of Delegation.--The authority to issue a
subpoena under subsection (a) may only be delegated to an
official performing the functions and duties of the Inspector
General when an Inspector General position is vacant or when
the Inspector General is unable to perform the functions and
duties of the Office.
(c) Panel Review Before Issuance.--
(1) Approval required.--
(A) Request for approval by subpoena panel.--
Before the issuance of a subpoena described in
subsection (a), an Inspector General shall
submit a request for approval to issue a
subpoena to a panel (in this section, referred
to as the ``Subpoena Panel''), which shall be
comprised of three Inspectors General of the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency, who shall be designated by the
Inspector General serving as Chairperson of the
Council.
(B) Protection from disclosure.--The
information contained in the request submitted
by an Inspector General under subparagraph (A)
and the identification of a witness shall be
protected from disclosure to the extent
permitted by law. Any request for disclosure of
such information shall be submitted to the
Inspector General requesting the subpoena.
(2) Time to respond.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), the Subpoena Panel shall
approve or deny a request for approval to issue
a subpoena not later than 10 calendar days
after the submission of such request.
(B) Additional information for panel.--If the
Subpoena Panel determines that additional
information is necessary to approve or deny a
request submitted by an Inspector General under
paragraph (1)(A), the Subpoena Panel shall
request such information from the Inspector
General and shall approve or deny the request
submitted by the Inspector General under
paragraph (1)(A) not later than 20 calendar
days after the submission of the request under
such paragraph.
(3) Denial by panel.--If a majority of the Subpoena
Panel denies the approval of a subpoena, that subpoena
may not be issued.
(d) Notice to Attorney General.--
(1) In general.--If the Subpoena Panel approves a
subpoena under subsection (c), the Inspector General
shall notify the Attorney General that the Inspector
General intends to issue the subpoena.
(2) Denial for interference with an ongoing
investigation.--Not later than 10 calendar days after
the date on which the Attorney General is notified
pursuant to paragraph (1), the Attorney General may
object to the issuance of the subpoena because the
subpoena will interfere with an ongoing investigation
and the subpoena may not be issued.
(3) Issuance of subpoena approved.--If the Attorney
General declines to object or fails to object to the
issuance of the subpoena during the 10-day period
described in paragraph (2), the Inspector General may
issue the subpoena.
(e) Guidelines.--The Chairperson of the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, in consultation
with the Attorney General, shall prescribe guidelines to carry
out this section.
(f) Inspector General Defined.--For purposes of this section,
the term ``Inspector General'' includes each Inspector General
established under this Act and each Inspector General or
Special Inspector General not established under this Act.
(g) Applicability.--The provisions of this section shall not
affect the exercise of authority by an Inspector General of
testimonial subpoena authority established under another
provision of law.
* * * * * * *
special provisions concerning the department of justice
Sec. 8E. (a)(1) Notwithstanding the last two sentences of
section 3(a), the Inspector General shall be under the
authority, direction, and control of the Attorney General with
respect to audits or investigations, or the issuance of
subpoenas, which require access to sensitive information
concerning--
(A) ongoing civil or criminal investigations or
proceedings;
(B) undercover operations;
(C) the identity of confidential sources, including
protected witnesses;
(D) intelligence or counterintelligence matters; or
(E) other matters the disclosure of which would
constitute a serious threat to national security.
(2) With respect to the information described under paragraph
(1), the Attorney General may prohibit the Inspector General
from carrying out or completing any audit or investigation,
from accessing information described in paragraph (1), or from
issuing any subpoena, after such Inspector General has decided
to initiate, carry out, or complete such audit or
investigation, access such information, or to issue such
subpoena, if the Attorney General determines that such
prohibition is necessary to prevent the disclosure of any
information described under paragraph (1) or to prevent the
significant impairment to the national interests of the United
States.
(3) If the Attorney General exercises any power under
paragraph (1) or (2), the Attorney General shall notify the
Inspector General in writing stating the reasons for such
exercise. Within 30 days after receipt of any such notice, the
Inspector General shall transmit a copy of such notice to the
Committees on Governmental Affairs and Judiciary of the Senate
and the Committees on Government Operations and Judiciary of
the House of Representatives, and to other appropriate
committees or subcommittees of the Congress.
(b) In carrying out the duties and responsibilities specified
in this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of
Justice--
(1) may initiate, conduct and supervise such audits
and investigations in the Department of Justice as the
Inspector General considers appropriate;
(2) except as specified in subsection (a) [and
paragraph (3)], may investigate allegations of criminal
wrongdoing or administrative misconduct by an employee
of the Department of Justice, or may, in the discretion
of the Inspector General, refer such allegations to the
Office of Professional Responsibility or the internal
affairs office of the appropriate component of the
Department of Justice;
[(3) shall refer to the Counsel, Office of
Professional Responsibility of the Department of
Justice, allegations of misconduct involving Department
attorneys, investigators, or law enforcement personnel,
where the allegations relate to the exercise of the
authority of an attorney to investigate, litigate, or
provide legal advice, except that no such referral
shall be made if the attorney is employed in the Office
of Professional Responsibility;]
[(4)] (3) may investigate allegations of criminal
wrongdoing or administrative misconduct by a person who
is the head of any agency or component of the
Department of Justice; and
[(5)] (4) shall forward the results of any
investigation conducted under [paragraph (4)] paragraph
(3), along with any appropriate recommendation for
disciplinary action, to the Attorney General.
(c) Any report required to be transmitted by the Attorney
General to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of the
Congress under section 5(d) shall also be transmitted, within
the seven-day period specified under such section, to the
Committees on the Judiciary and Governmental Affairs of the
Senate and the Committees on the Judiciary and Government
Operations of the House of Representatives.
(d) The Attorney General shall ensure by regulation that any
component of the Department of Justice receiving a nonfrivolous
allegation of criminal wrongdoing or administrative misconduct
by an employee of the Department of Justice[, except with
respect to allegations described in subsection (b)(3),] shall
report that information to the Inspector General.
* * * * * * *
requirements for federal entities and designated federal entities
Sec. 8G. (a) Notwithstanding section 12 of this Act, as used
in this section--
(1) the term ``Federal entity'' means any Government
corporation (within the meaning of section 103(1) of
title 5, United States Code), any Government controlled
corporation (within the meaning of section 103(2) of
such title), or any other entity in the Executive
branch of the Government, or any independent regulatory
agency, but does not include--
(A) an establishment (as defined under
section 12(2) of this Act) or part of an
establishment;
(B) a designated Federal entity (as defined
under paragraph (2) of this subsection) or part
of a designated Federal entity;
(C) the Executive Office of the President;
(D) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(E) the General Accounting Office; or
(F) any entity in the judicial or legislative
branches of the Government, including the
Administrative Office of the United States
Courts and the Architect of the Capitol and any
activities under the direction of the Architect
of the Capitol;
(2) the term ``designated Federal entity'' means
Amtrak, the Appalachian Regional Commission, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the Board for
International Broadcasting, the Committee for Purchase
From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Farm
Credit Administration, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Election Commission, the
Election Assistance Commission, the Federal Housing
Finance Board, the Federal Labor Relations Authority,
the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Legal Services Corporation, the
National Archives and Records Administration, the
National Credit Union Administration, the National
Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment for the
Humanities, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, the National Labor Relations Board, the
National Science Foundation, the Panama Canal
Commission, the Peace Corps, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Smithsonian Institution, the United
States International Development Finance Corporation,
the United States International Trade Commission, the
Postal Regulatory Commission, and the United States
Postal Service;
(3) the term ``head of the Federal entity'' means any
person or persons designated by statute as the head of
a Federal entity, and if no such designation exists,
the chief policymaking officer or board of a Federal
entity as identified in the list published pursuant to
subsection (h)(1) of this section;
(4) the term ``head of the designated Federal
entity'' means the board or commission of the
designated Federal entity, or in the event the
designated Federal entity does not have a board or
commission, any person or persons designated by statute
as the head of a designated Federal entity and if no
such designation exists, the chief policymaking officer
or board of a designated Federal entity as identified
in the list published pursuant to subsection (h)(1) of
this section, except that--
(A) with respect to the National Science
Foundation, such term means the National
Science Board;
(B) with respect to the United States Postal
Service, such term means the Governors (within
the meaning of section 102(3) of title 39,
United States Code);
(C) with respect to the Federal Labor
Relations Authority, such term means the
members of the Authority (described under
section 7104 of title 5, United States Code);
(D) with respect to the Committee for
Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely
Disabled, such term means the Chairman of the
Committee for Purchase From People Who Are
Blind or Severely Disabled;
(E) with respect to the National Archives and
Records Administration, such term means the
Archivist of the United States;
(F) with respect to the National Credit Union
Administration, such term means the National
Credit Union Administration Board (described
under section 102 of the Federal Credit Union
Act (12 U.S.C. 1752a);
(G) with respect to the National Endowment of
the Arts, such term means the National Council
on the Arts;
(H) with respect to the National Endowment
for the Humanities, such term means the
National Council on the Humanities;
(I) with respect to the Peace Corps, such
term means the Director of the Peace Corps; and
(J) with respect to the United States
International Development Finance Corporation,
such term means the Board of Directors of the
United States International Development Finance
Corporation;
(5) the term ``Office of Inspector General'' means an
Office of Inspector General of a designated Federal
entity; and
(6) the term ``Inspector General'' means an Inspector
General of a designated Federal entity.
(b) No later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this section, there shall be established and maintained in each
designated Federal entity an Office of Inspector General. The
head of the designated Federal entity shall transfer to such
office the offices, units, or other components, and the
functions, powers, or duties thereof, that such head determines
are properly related to the functions of the Office of
Inspector General and would, if so transferred, further the
purposes of this section. There shall not be transferred to
such office any program operating responsibilities.
(c) Except as provided under subsection (f) of this section,
the Inspector General shall be appointed by the head of the
designated Federal entity in accordance with the applicable
laws and regulations governing appointments within the
designated Federal entity. Each Inspector General shall be
appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on
the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting,
auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or investigations. For purposes of implementing
this section, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System shall appoint the Inspector General of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. The Inspector General
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection shall have all of the
authorities and responsibilities provided by this Act with
respect to the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, as if
the Bureau were part of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
(d)(1) Each Inspector General shall report to and be under
the general supervision of the head of the designated Federal
entity, but shall not report to, or be subject to supervision
by, any other officer or employee of such designated Federal
entity. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the head of the
designated Federal entity shall not prevent or prohibit the
Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing
any audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoena during
the course of any audit or investigation.
(2)(A) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Director of National Intelligence, may prohibit the inspector
general of an element of the intelligence community specified
in subparagraph (D) from initiating, carrying out, or
completing any audit or investigation, or from accessing
information available to an element of the intelligence
community specified in subparagraph (D),, or from accessing
information available to an element of the intelligence
community specified in subparagraph (D), if the Secretary
determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital
national security interests of the United States.
(B) If the Secretary exercises the authority under
subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall submit to the committees
of Congress specified in subparagraph (E) an appropriately
classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such
authority not later than 7 days after the exercise of such
authority.
(C) At the same time the Secretary submits under subparagraph
(B) a statement on the exercise of the authority in
subparagraph (A) to the committees of Congress specified in
subparagraph (E), the Secretary shall notify the inspector
general of such element of the submittal of such statement and,
to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods, provide such inspector general with a copy
of such statement. Such inspector general may submit to such
committees of Congress any comments on a notice or statement
received by the inspector general under this subparagraph that
the inspector general considers appropriate.
(D) The elements of the intelligence community specified in
this subparagraph are as follows:
(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(ii) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(iii) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(iv) The National Security Agency.
(E) The committees of Congress specified in this subparagraph
are--
(i) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
(e)(1) In the case of a designated Federal entity for which a
board, chairman of a committee, or commission is the head of
the designated Federal entity, a removal under this subsection
may only be made upon the written concurrence of a \2/3\
majority of the board, committee, or commission.
(2) If an Inspector General is removed from office, is placed
on paid or unpaid non-duty status, or is transferred to another
position or location within a designated Federal entity, the
head of the designated Federal entity shall communicate in
writing the reasons for any such removal, change in status, or
transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than 30 days
before the removal, change in status, or transfer. Nothing in
this subsection shall prohibit a personnel action otherwise
authorized by law, other than transfer or removal. An Inspector
General may be removed only for any of the following grounds
(and the documentation of any such ground shall be included in
the communication required pursuant to this paragraph):
(A) Documented permanent incapacity.
(B) Documented neglect of duty.
(C) Documented malfeasance.
(D) Documented conviction of a felony or conduct
involving moral turpitude.
(E) Documented knowing violation of a law or
regulation.
(F) Documented gross mismanagement.
(G) Documented gross waste of funds.
(H) Documented abuse of authority.
(I) Documented inefficiency.
(3) Not later than 15 days after an Inspector General is
removed, placed on paid or unpaid non-duty status, or
transferred to another position or location within an
designated Federal entity, the acting Inspector General shall
submit to the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a list of all audits and
investigations being conducted, supervised, coordinated by the
Office at the time the Inspector General was removed, placed on
paid or unpaid non-duty status, or transferred.
(f)(1) For purposes of carrying out subsection (c) with
respect to the United States Postal Service, the appointment
provisions of section 202(e) of title 39, United States Code,
shall be applied.
(2) In carrying out the duties and responsibilities specified
in this Act, the Inspector General of the United States Postal
Service (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the
``Inspector General'') shall have oversight responsibility for
all activities of the Postal Inspection Service, including any
internal investigation performed by the Postal Inspection
Service. The Chief Postal Inspector shall promptly report the
significant activities being carried out by the Postal
Inspection Service to such Inspector General.
(3)(A)(i) Notwithstanding subsection (d), the Inspector
General shall be under the authority, direction, and control of
the Governors with respect to audits or investigations, or the
issuance of subpoenas, which require access to sensitive
information concerning--
(I) ongoing civil or criminal investigations or
proceedings;
(II) undercover operations;
(III) the identity of confidential sources, including
protected witnesses;
(IV) intelligence or counterintelligence matters; or
(V) other matters the disclosure of which would
constitute a serious threat to national security.
(ii) With respect to the information described under clause
(i), the Governors may prohibit the Inspector General from
carrying out or completing any audit or investigation, or from
issuing any subpoena, after such Inspector General has decided
to initiate, carry out, or complete such audit or investigation
or to issue such subpoena, if the Governors determine that such
prohibition is necessary to prevent the disclosure of any
information described under clause (i) or to prevent the
significant impairment to the national interests of the United
States.
(iii) If the Governors exercise any power under clause (i) or
(ii), the Governors shall notify the Inspector General in
writing stating the reasons for such exercise. Within 30 days
after receipt of any such notice, the Inspector General shall
transmit a copy of such notice to the Committee on Governmental
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight of the House of Representatives, and to other
appropriate committees or subcommittees of the Congress.
(B) In carrying out the duties and responsibilities specified
in this Act, the Inspector General--
(i) may initiate, conduct and supervise such audits
and investigations in the United States Postal Service
as the Inspector General considers appropriate; and
(ii) shall give particular regard to the activities
of the Postal Inspection Service with a view toward
avoiding duplication and insuring effective
coordination and cooperation.
(C) Any report required to be transmitted by the Governors to
the appropriate committees or subcommittees of the Congress
under section 5(d) shall also be transmitted, within the seven-
day period specified under such section, to the Committee on
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight of the House of
Representatives.
(4) Nothing in this Act shall restrict, eliminate, or
otherwise adversely affect any of the rights, privileges, or
benefits of either employees of the United States Postal
Service, or labor organizations representing employees of the
United States Postal Service, under chapter 12 of title 39,
United States Code, the National Labor Relations Act, any
handbook or manual affecting employee labor relations with the
United States Postal Service, or any collective bargaining
agreement.
(5) As used in this subsection, the term ``Governors'' has
the meaning given such term by section 102(3) of title 39,
United States Code.
(6) There are authorized to be appropriated, out of
the Postal Service Fund, such sums as may be necessary
for the Office of Inspector General of the United
States Postal Service.
(g)(1) Sections 4, 5, 6 (other than subsections (a)(7) and
(a)(8) thereof), 6A, and 7 of this Act shall apply to each
Inspector General and Office of Inspector General of a
designated Federal entity and such sections shall be applied to
each designated Federal entity and head of the designated
Federal entity (as defined under subsection (a)) by
substituting--
(A) ``designated Federal entity'' for
``establishment''; and
(B) ``head of the designated Federal entity'' for
``head of the establishment''.
(2) In addition to the other authorities specified in this
Act, an Inspector General is authorized to select, appoint, and
employ such officers and employees as may be necessary for
carrying out the functions, powers, and duties of the Office of
Inspector General and to obtain the temporary or intermittent
services of experts or consultants or an organization thereof,
subject to the applicable laws and regulations that govern such
selections, appointments, and employment, and the obtaining of
such services, within the designated Federal entity.
(3) Notwithstanding the last sentence of subsection (d) of
this section, the provisions of subsection (a) of section 8D
(other than the provisions of subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and
(E) of subsection (a)(1)) shall apply to the Inspector General
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in the same
manner as such provisions apply to the Inspector General of the
Department of the Treasury and the Secretary of the Treasury,
respectively.
(4) Each Inspector General shall--
(A) in accordance with applicable laws and regulations
governing appointments within the designated Federal entity,
appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who shall report to
the Inspector General;
(B) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and
directly reporting to another Inspector General on a
reimbursable basis; or
(C) obtain the services of appropriate staff of the Council
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on a
reimbursable basis.
(h)(1) No later than April 30, 1989, and annually thereafter,
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, after
consultation with the Comptroller General of the United States,
shall publish in the Federal Register a list of the Federal
entities and designated Federal entities and if the designated
Federal entity is not a board or commission, include the head
of each such entity (as defined under subsection (a) of this
section).
(2) Beginning on October 31, 1989, and on October 31 of each
succeeding calendar year, the head of each Federal entity (as
defined under subsection (a) of this section) shall prepare and
transmit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
and to each House of the Congress a report which--
(A) states whether there has been established in the
Federal entity an office that meets the requirements of
this section;
(B) specifies the actions taken by the Federal entity
otherwise to ensure that audits are conducted of its
programs and operations in accordance with the
standards for audit of governmental organizations,
programs, activities, and functions issued by the
Comptroller General of the United States, and includes
a list of each audit report completed by a Federal or
non-Federal auditor during the reporting period and a
summary of any particularly significant findings; and
(C) summarizes any matters relating to the personnel,
programs, and operations of the Federal entity referred
to prosecutive authorities, including a summary
description of any preliminary investigation conducted
by or at the request of the Federal entity concerning
these matters, and the prosecutions and convictions
which have resulted.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 11. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON
INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY.
(a) Establishment and Mission.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established as an
independent entity within the executive branch the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (in this section referred to as the
``Council'').
(2) Mission.--The mission of the Council shall be
to--
(A) address integrity, economy, and
effectiveness issues that transcend individual
Government agencies; and
(B) increase the professionalism and
effectiveness of personnel by developing
policies, standards, and approaches to aid in
the establishment of a well-trained and highly
skilled workforce in the offices of the
Inspectors General.
(b) Membership.--
(1) In general.--The Council shall consist of the
following members:
(A) All Inspectors General whose offices are
established under--
(i) section 2; or
(ii) section 8G.
(B) The Inspectors General of the
Intelligence Community and the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(C) The Controller of the Office of Federal
Financial Management.
(D) A senior level official of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation designated by the
Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(E) The Director of the Office of Government
Ethics.
(F) The Special Counsel of the Office of
Special Counsel.
(G) The Deputy Director of the Office of
Personnel Management.
(H) The Deputy Director for Management of the
Office of Management and Budget.
(I) The Inspectors General of the Library of
Congress, Capitol Police, Government Printing
Office, Government Accountability Office, and
the Architect of the Capitol.
(2) Chairperson and executive chairperson.--
(A) Executive chairperson.--The Deputy
Director for Management of the Office of
Management and Budget shall be the Executive
Chairperson of the Council.
(B) Chairperson.--The Council shall elect 1
of the Inspectors General referred to in
paragraph (1)(A) or (B) to act as Chairperson
of the Council. The term of office of the
Chairperson shall be 2 years.
(3) Functions of chairperson and executive
chairperson.--
(A) Executive chairperson.--The Executive
Chairperson shall--
(i) preside over meetings of the
Council;
(ii) provide to the heads of agencies
and entities represented on the Council
summary reports of the activities of
the Council; and
(iii) provide to the Council such
information relating to the agencies
and entities represented on the Council
as assists the Council in performing
its functions.
(B) Chairperson.--The Chairperson shall--
(i) convene meetings of the Council--
(I) at least 6 times each
year;
(II) monthly to the extent
possible; and
(III) more frequently at the
discretion of the Chairperson;
(ii) carry out the functions and
duties of the Council under subsection
(c);
(iii) appoint a Vice Chairperson to
assist in carrying out the functions of
the Council and act in the absence of
the Chairperson, from a category of
Inspectors General described in
subparagraph (A)(i), (A)(ii), or (B) of
paragraph (1), other than the category
from which the Chairperson was elected;
(iv) make such payments from funds
otherwise available to the Council as
may be necessary to carry out the
functions of the Council;
(v) select, appoint, and employ
personnel as needed to carry out the
functions of the Council subject to the
provisions of title 5, United States
Code, governing appointments in the
competitive service, and the provisions
of chapter 51 and subchapter III of
chapter 53 of such title, relating to
classification and General Schedule pay
rates;
(vi) to the extent and in such
amounts as may be provided in advance
by appropriations Acts, made available
from the revolving fund established
under subsection (c)(3)(B), or as
otherwise provided by law, enter into
contracts and other arrangements with
public agencies and private persons to
carry out the functions and duties of
the Council;
(vii) establish, in consultation with
the members of the Council, such
committees as determined by the
Chairperson to be necessary and
appropriate for the efficient conduct
of Council functions; and
(viii) prepare and transmit an annual
report on behalf of the Council on the
activities of the Council to--
(I) the President;
(II) the appropriate
committees of jurisdiction of
the Senate and the House of
Representatives;
(III) the Committee on
Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the
Senate; and
(IV) the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform
of the House of
Representatives.
(c) Functions and Duties of Council.--
(1) In general.--The Council shall--
(A) continually identify, review, and discuss
areas of weakness and vulnerability in Federal
programs and operations with respect to fraud,
waste, and abuse;
(B) develop plans for coordinated,
Governmentwide activities that address these
problems and promote economy and efficiency in
Federal programs and operations, including
interagency and interentity audit,
investigation, inspection, and evaluation
programs and projects to deal efficiently and
effectively with those problems concerning
fraud and waste that exceed the capability or
jurisdiction of an individual agency or entity;
(C) develop policies that will aid in the
maintenance of a corps of well-trained and
highly skilled Office of Inspector General
personnel;
(D) maintain an Internet website and other
electronic systems for the benefit of all
Inspectors General, as the Council determines
are necessary or desirable;
(E) maintain 1 or more academies as the
Council considers desirable for the
professional training of auditors,
investigators, inspectors, evaluators, and
other personnel of the various offices of
Inspector General and establish minimum
standards and best practices for training to
ensure all Inspectors General receive training
to carry out the duties, responsibilities, and
authorities under this Act and on emerging
areas of the law of relevance to Inspectors
General and the work of their offices as
identified by the Council;
(F) submit recommendations of individuals to
the appropriate appointing authority for any
appointment to an office of Inspector General
described under subsection (b)(1)(A) or (B);
(G) make such reports to Congress as the
Chairperson determines are necessary or
appropriate;
(H) except for matters coordinated among
Inspectors General under section 3033 of title
50, United States Code, receive, review, and
mediate any disputes submitted in writing to
the Council by an Office of Inspector General
regarding an audit, investigation, inspection,
evaluation, or project that involves the
jurisdiction of more than one Office of
Inspector General; and
(I) perform other duties within the authority
and jurisdiction of the Council, as
appropriate.
(2) Adherence and participation by members.--To the
extent permitted under law, and to the extent not
inconsistent with standards established by the
Comptroller General of the United States for audits of
Federal establishments, organizations, programs,
activities, and functions, each member of the Council,
as appropriate, shall--
(A) adhere to professional standards
developed by the Council; and
(B) participate in the plans, programs, and
projects of the Council, except that in the
case of a member described under subsection
(b)(1)(I), the member shall participate only to
the extent requested by the member and approved
by the Executive Chairperson and Chairperson.
(3) Additional administrative authorities.--
(A) Interagency funding.--Notwithstanding
section 1532 of title 31, United States Code,
or any other provision of law prohibiting the
interagency funding of activities described
under subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause
(i), in the performance of the
responsibilities, authorities, and duties of
the Council--
(i) the Executive Chairperson may
authorize the use of interagency
funding for--
(I) Governmentwide training
of employees of the Offices of
the Inspectors General;
(II) the functions of the
Integrity Committee of the
Council; and
(III) any other authorized
purpose determined by the
Council; and
(ii) upon the authorization of the
Executive Chairperson, any Federal
agency or designated Federal entity (as
defined in section 8G(a)) which has a
member on the Council shall fund or
participate in the funding of such
activities.
(B) Revolving fund.--
(i) In general.--The Council may--
(I) establish in the Treasury
of the United States a
revolving fund to be called the
Inspectors General Council
Fund; or
(II) enter into an
arrangement with a department
or agency to use an existing
revolving fund.
(ii) Amounts in revolving fund.--
(I) In general.--Amounts
transferred to the Council
under this subsection shall be
deposited in the revolving fund
described under clause (i)(I)
or (II).
(II) Training.--Any remaining
unexpended balances
appropriated for or otherwise
available to the Inspectors
General Criminal Investigator
Academy and the Inspectors
General Auditor Training
Institute shall be transferred
to the revolving fund described
under clause (i)(I) or (II).
(iii) Use of revolving fund.--
(I) In general.--Except as
provided under subclause (II),
amounts in the revolving fund
described under clause (i)(I)
or (II) may be used to carry
out the functions and duties of
the Council under this
subsection.
(II) Training.--Amounts
transferred into the revolving
fund described under clause
(i)(I) or (II) may be used for
the purpose of maintaining any
training academy as determined
by the Council.
(iv) Availability of funds.--Amounts
in the revolving fund described under
clause (i)(I) or (II) shall remain
available to the Council without fiscal
year limitation.
(C) Superseding provisions.--No provision of
law enacted after the date of enactment of this
subsection shall be construed to limit or
supersede any authority under subparagraph (A)
or (B), unless such provision makes specific
reference to the authority in that paragraph.
(D) Authorization of appropriations.--In
addition to any funds available in the
Inspectors General Council Fund established
under subparagraph (B), there are authorized to
be appropriated such sums as may be necessary,
to remain available until expended, to carry
out the functions and duties of the Council
under this subsection.
(4) Existing authorities and responsibilities.--The
establishment and operation of the Council shall not
affect--
(A) the role of the Department of Justice in
law enforcement and litigation;
(B) the authority or responsibilities of any
Government agency or entity; and
(C) the authority or responsibilities of
individual members of the Council.
(5) Additional responsibilities relating to
whistleblower protection.--The Council shall--
(A) facilitate the work of the Whistleblower
Protection Coordinators designated under
section 3(d)(C); and
(B) in consultation with the Office of
Special Counsel and Whistleblower Protection
Coordinators from the member offices of the
Inspector General, develop best practices for
coordination and communication in promoting the
timely and appropriate handling and
consideration of protected disclosures[,
allegations of reprisal,] and allegations of
reprisal (including the timely and appropriate
handling and consideration of protected
disclosures and allegations of reprisal that
are internal to an Office of Inspector General)
and general matters regarding the
implementation and administration of
whistleblower protection laws, in accordance
with Federal law.
(d) Integrity Committee.--
(1) Establishment.--The Council shall have an
Integrity Committee, which shall receive, review, and
refer for investigation allegations of wrongdoing that
are made against Inspectors General and staff members
of the various Offices of Inspector General described
under paragraph [(4)(C)] (4)(D).
(2) Membership.--
(A) In general.--The Integrity Committee
shall consist of the following members:
(i) The official of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation serving on the
Council.
(ii) Four Inspectors General
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
subsection (b)(1) appointed by the
Chairperson of the Council,
representing both establishments and
designated Federal entities (as that
term is defined in section 8G(a)).
(iii) The Director of the Office of
Government Ethics or the designee of
the Director.
(iv) The individual appointed under
subparagraph (C).
(B) Chairperson.--
(i) In general.--The Integrity
Committee shall elect one of the
Inspectors General referred to in
subparagraph (A)(ii) to act as
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee.
(ii) Term.--The term of office of the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee
shall be 2 years.
(C) Appointment of former inspector general
to committee.--
(i) Appointment.--The Chairperson of
the Council shall appoint an individual
who prior to the date of such
appointment served as an Inspector
General (as that position is described
in section 3(a) and section 8G(a)(6)),
and who has upheld the highest
standards of integrity and
professionalism while serving and since
leaving service as an Inspector
General, as determined by the
Chairperson, to serve as a member of
the Committee unless no such individual
is available or willing to serve as a
member of the Committee at the time of
the appointment.
(ii) Initial term.--The individual
appointed under clause (i) shall serve
at the pleasure of the Chairperson of
the Council for a 2-year term.
(iii) Additional term.--The
Chairperson of the Council may
reappoint the individual appointed
under clause (i) to serve at the
pleasure of the Chairperson of the
Council for an additional term not to
exceed 2 years.
(iv) Compensation.--
(I) Special government
employee designation.--The
individual appointed under
clause (i) shall be considered
a special government employee
pursuant to section 202(a) of
title 18, United States Code.
(II) Compensation and travel
expenses.--An individual
appointed under clause (i) may
not receive compensation at a
rate in excess of the rate of
basic pay for level IV of the
executive schedule under
section 5315 of title 5, United
States Code, and any such
individual, while engaged in
the performance of their duties
away from their homes or
regular places of business, may
be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of
subsistence, as authorized by
section 5703 of such title for
persons employed intermittently
in the Government service.
(III) Acceptance of volunteer
services.--The Chairperson of
the Council may accept
volunteer services from the
individual appointed under this
subparagraph without regard to
section 1342 of title 31,
United States Code.
(IV) Provisions relating to
reemployment.--
(aa) The Chairperson
of the Council may
reemploy annuitants.
(bb) The employment
of annuitants under
this paragraph shall be
subject to the
provisions of section
9902(g) of title 5,
United States Code, as
if the Council was the
Department of Defense.
(3) Legal advisor.--The Chief of the Public Integrity
Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice, or his designee, shall serve as a legal
advisor to the Integrity Committee.
(4) Referral of allegations.--
(A) [Requirement] Allegations against staff
members.--An Inspector General shall refer to
the Integrity Committee any allegation of
wrongdoing against a staff member of the office
of that Inspector General, if--
(i) review of the substance of the
allegation cannot be assigned to an
agency of the executive branch with
appropriate jurisdiction over the
matter; and
(ii) the Inspector General determines
that--
(I) an objective internal
investigation of the allegation
is not feasible; or
(II) an internal
investigation of the allegation
may appear not to be objective.
(B) Allegations against inspectors general.--
An Inspector General shall refer to the
Integrity Committee any allegation of
wrongdoing against that Inspector General.
[(B)] (C) Definition.--In this paragraph the
term ``staff member'' means any employee of an
Office of Inspector General who--
(i) reports directly to an Inspector
General; or
(ii) is designated by an Inspector
General under subparagraph (C).
[(C)] (D) Designation of staff members.--Each
Inspector General shall annually submit to the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee a
designation of positions whose holders are
staff members for purposes of subparagraph (B).
(5) Review of allegations.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 7 days after
the date on which the Integrity Committee
receives an allegation of wrongdoing against an
Inspector General or against a staff member of
an Office of Inspector General described under
paragraph (4)(C), the allegation of wrongdoing
shall be reviewed and referred to the
Department of Justice or the Office of Special
Counsel for investigation, or to the Integrity
Committee for review, as appropriate, by--
(i) a representative of the
Department of Justice, as designated by
the Attorney General;
(ii) a representative of the Office
of Special Counsel, as designated by
the Special Counsel; and
(iii) a representative of the
Integrity Committee, as designated by
the Chairperson of the Integrity
Committee.
(B) Referral to the chairperson.--
(i) In general.--Except as provided
in clause (ii), not later than 30 days
after the date on which an allegation
of wrongdoing is referred to the
Integrity Committee under subparagraph
(A), the Integrity Committee shall
determine whether to refer the
allegation of wrongdoing to the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee
to initiate an investigation.
(ii) Extension.--The 30-day period
described in clause (i) may be extended
for an additional period of 30 days if
the Integrity Committee provides
written notice to the congressional
committees described in paragraph
(8)(A)(iii) that includes a detailed,
case-specific description of why the
additional time is needed to evaluate
the allegation of wrongdoing[.], the
length of time the Integrity Committee
has been evaluating the allegation of
wrongdoing, and a description of any
previous written notice provided under
this clause with respect to the
allegation of wrongdoing, including the
description provided for why additional
time was needed.
(iii) Availability of information to
members of congress.--
(I) In general.--With respect
to an allegation of wrongdoing
made by a member of Congress
that is closed by the Integrity
Committee without referral to
the Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee to initiate
an investigation, the
Chairperson of the Integrity
Committee shall, not later than
60 days after closing such
allegation, provide a written
description of the nature of
the allegation of wrongdoing
and how the Integrity Committee
evaluated the allegation of
wrongdoing to--
(aa) the Chair and
Ranking Member of the
Committee on Oversight
and Reform of the House
of Representatives;
(bb) the Chair and
Ranking Member of the
Committee on Homeland
Security and
Governmental Affairs of
the Senate;
(cc) a member of the
House of
Representatives who has
the support of any
seven members of the
Committee on Oversight
and Reform of the House
of Representatives; or
(dd) a member of the
Senate who has the
support of any five
members of the
Committee on Homeland
Security and
Governmental Affairs of
the Senate.
(II) Requirement to
forward.--The Chairperson of
the Integrity Committee shall
forward any written description
or update provided under this
clause to the members of the
Integrity Committee and to the
Chairperson of the Council.
(6) Authority to investigate allegations.--
(A) Requirement.--The Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee shall cause a thorough and
timely investigation of each allegation
referred under paragraph (5)(B) to be conducted
in accordance with this paragraph.
(B) Resources.--At the request of the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee, the
head of each agency or entity represented on
the Council--
(i) shall provide assistance
necessary to the Integrity Committee;
and
(ii) may detail employees from that
agency or entity to the Integrity
Committee, subject to the control and
direction of the Chairperson, to
conduct an investigation under this
subsection.
(7) Procedures for investigations.--
(A) Standards applicable.--Investigations
initiated under this subsection shall be
conducted in accordance with the most current
Quality Standards for Investigations issued by
the Council or by its predecessors (the
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency
and the Executive Council on Integrity and
Efficiency).
(B) Additional policies and procedures.--
(i) Establishment.--The Integrity
Committee, in conjunction with the
Chairperson of the Council, shall
establish additional policies and
procedures necessary to ensure fairness
and consistency in--
(I) determining whether to
initiate an investigation;
(II) conducting
investigations;
(III) reporting the results
of an investigation;
(IV) providing the person who
is the subject of an
investigation with an
opportunity to respond to any
Integrity Committee report;
(V) except as provided in
clause (ii), ensuring, to the
extent possible, that
investigations are conducted by
Offices of Inspector General of
similar size;
(VI) creating a process for
rotation of Inspectors General
assigned to investigate
allegations through the
Integrity Committee; and
(VII) creating procedures to
avoid conflicts of interest for
Integrity Committee
investigations.
(ii) Exception.--The requirement
under clause (i)(V) shall not apply to
any Office of Inspector General with
less than 50 employees who are
authorized to conduct audits or
investigations.
(iii) Submission to congress.--The
Council shall submit a copy of the
policies and procedures established
under clause (i) to the congressional
committees of jurisdiction.
(C) Completion of investigation.--If an
allegation of wrongdoing is referred to the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee under
paragraph (5)(B), the Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee--
(i) shall complete the investigation
not later than 150 days after the date
on which the Integrity Committee made
the referral; and
(ii) if the investigation cannot be
completed within the 150-day period
described in clause (i), shall--
(I) promptly notify the
congressional committees
described in paragraph
(8)(A)(iii); and
(II) brief the congressional
committees described in
paragraph (8)(A)(iii) every 30
days regarding the status of
the investigation and the
general reasons for delay until
the investigation is complete.
(D) Concurrent investigation.--If an
allegation of wrongdoing against an Inspector
General or a staff member of an Office of
Inspector General described under paragraph
(4)(C) is referred to the Department of Justice
or the Office of Special Counsel under
paragraph (5)(A), the Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee may conduct any related
investigation referred to the Chairperson under
paragraph (5)(B) concurrently with the
Department of Justice or the Office of Special
Counsel, as applicable.
(E) Reports.--
(i) Integrity committee
investigations.--For each investigation
of an allegation of wrongdoing referred
to the Chairperson of the Integrity
Committee under paragraph (5)(B), the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee
shall submit to members of the
Integrity Committee and to the
Chairperson of the Council a report
containing the results of the
investigation.
(ii) Other investigations.--For each
allegation of wrongdoing referred to
the Department of Justice or the Office
of Special Counsel under paragraph
(5)(A), the Attorney General or the
Special Counsel, as applicable, shall
submit to the Integrity Committee a
report containing the results of the
investigation.
(iii) Availability to congress.--
(I) In general.--The
congressional committees
described in paragraph
(8)(A)(iii) shall have access
to any report authored by the
Integrity Committee.
(II) Members of congress.--
Subject to any other provision
of law that would otherwise
prohibit disclosure of such
information, the Integrity
Committee may provide any
report authored by the
Integrity Committee to any
Member of Congress.
(8) Assessment and final disposition.--
(A) In general.--With respect to any report
received under paragraph (7)(E), the Integrity
Committee shall--
(i) assess the report;
(ii) forward the report, with the
recommendations of the Integrity
Committee, including those on
disciplinary action or corrective
action, within 30 days (to the maximum
extent practicable) after the
completion of the investigation, to the
Executive Chairperson of the Council
and to the President (in the case of a
report relating to an Inspector General
of an establishment or any employee of
that Inspector General) or the head of
a designated Federal entity (in the
case of a report relating to an
Inspector General of such an entity or
any employee of that Inspector General)
for resolution; and
(iii) contemporaneously with the
submission of the report under clause
(ii), submit the report, with the
recommendations of the Integrity
Committee, to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate, the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform of the House of
Representatives, and other
congressional committees of
jurisdiction; and
(iv) following the submission of the
report under clause (iii) and upon
request by any Member of Congress,
submit the report, with the
recommendations of the Integrity
Committee, to that Member.
(B) Disposition.--The Executive Chairperson
of the Council shall report to the Integrity
Committee, the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the
Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House
of Representatives, and other congressional
committees of jurisdiction, the final
disposition of the matter, including what
action was taken by the President or agency
head.
[(9) Annual report.--The Council shall submit to
Congress and the President by December 31 of each year
a report on the activities of the Integrity Committee
during the preceding fiscal year, which shall include
the following:
[(A) The number of allegations received.
[(B) The number of allegations referred to
the Department of Justice or the Office of
Special Counsel, including the number of
allegations referred for criminal
investigation.
[(C) The number of allegations referred to
the Chairperson of the Integrity Committee for
investigation.
[(D) The number of allegations closed without
referral.
[(E) The date each allegation was received
and the date each allegation was finally
disposed of.
[(F) In the case of allegations referred to
the Chairperson of the Integrity Committee, a
summary of the status of the investigation of
the allegations and, in the case of
investigations completed during the preceding
fiscal year, a summary of the findings of the
investigations.
[(G) Other matters that the Council considers
appropriate.]
(9) Semiannual report.--On or before May 31, 2022,
and every six months thereafter, the Council shall
submit to Congress and the President a report on the
activities of the Integrity Committee during the
immediately preceding six-month periods ending March 31
and September 30, which shall include the following
with respect to allegations of wrongdoing that are made
against Inspectors General and staff members of the
various Offices of Inspector General described under
paragraph (4)(C):
(A) An overview and analysis of the
allegations of wrongdoing disposed of by the
Integrity Committee, including--
(i) analysis of the positions held by
individuals against whom allegations
were made, including the duties
affiliated with such positions;
(ii) analysis of the categories or
types of the allegations of wrongdoing;
and
(iii) a summary of disposition of all
the allegations.
(B) The number of allegations referred to the
Department of Justice or the Office of Special
Counsel, including the number of allegations
referred for criminal investigation.
(C) The number of allegations referred to the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee for
investigation, a general description of the
status of such investigations, and a summary of
the findings of investigations completed.
(D) An overview and analysis of allegations
of wrongdoing received by the Integrity
Committee during any previous reporting period,
but remained pending during some part of the
six months covered by the report, including--
(i) analysis of the positions held by
individuals against whom allegations
were made, including the duties
affiliated with such positions;
(ii) analysis of the categories or
types of the allegations of wrongdoing;
and
(iii) a summary of disposition of all
the allegations.
(E) The number and category or type of
pending investigations.
(F) For each allegation received--
(i) the date on which the
investigation was opened;
(ii) the date on which the allegation
was disposed of, as applicable;
(iii) the case number associated with
the allegation.
(G) The nature and number of allegations to
the Integrity Committee closed without
referral, including the justification for why
each allegation was closed without referral.
(H) A brief description of any difficulty
encountered by the Integrity Committee when
receiving, evaluating, investigating, or
referring for investigation an allegation
received by the Integrity Committee, including
a brief description of--
(i) any attempt to prevent or hinder
an investigation; or
(ii) concerns about the integrity or
operations at an Office of Inspector
General.
(10) Requests for more information.--With respect to
paragraphs (8) and (9), the Council shall provide more
detailed information about specific allegations upon
request from any Member of Congress.
(11) No right or benefit.--This subsection is not
intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by a person against the
United States, its agencies, its officers, or any
person.
(12) Allegations of wrongdoing against special
counsel or deputy special counsel.--
(A) Special counsel defined.--In this
paragraph, the term ``Special Counsel'' means
the Special Counsel appointed under section
1211(b) of title 5, United States Code.
(B) Authority of integrity committee.--
(i) In general.--An allegation of
wrongdoing against the Special Counsel
or the Deputy Special Counsel may be
received, reviewed, and referred for
investigation to the same extent and in
the same manner as in the case of an
allegation against an Inspector General
or against a staff member of an Office
of Inspector General described under
paragraph (4)(C), subject to the
requirement that the representative
designated by the Special Counsel under
paragraph (5)(A)(ii) shall recuse
himself or herself from the
consideration of any allegation brought
under this paragraph.
(ii) Coordination with existing
provisions of law.--This paragraph
shall not eliminate access to the Merit
Systems Protection Board for review
under section 7701 of title 5, United
States Code. To the extent that an
allegation brought under this paragraph
involves section 2302(b)(8) of such
title, a failure to obtain corrective
action within 120 days after the date
on which the allegation is received by
the Integrity Committee shall, for
purposes of section 1221 of such title,
be considered to satisfy section
1214(a)(3)(B) of such title.
(C) Regulations.--The Integrity Committee may
prescribe any rules or regulations necessary to
carry out this paragraph, subject to such
consultation or other requirements as may
otherwise apply.
(13) Committee records.--The Chairperson of the
Council shall maintain the records of the Integrity
Committee.
(14) Additional reports.--
(A) Report to inspector general.--The
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee shall
submit a report immediately whenever the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee becomes
aware of particularly serious or flagrant
problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to
the administration of programs and operations
of an Office of Inspector General. The report
shall be sent to the Inspector General who
leads the Office of Inspector General at which
the serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies were alleged.
(B) Report to congress.--The Inspector
General of the Office identified by the
Integrity Committee shall submit any such
report to the House Committee on Oversight and
Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs within seven
calendar days from the time the Inspector
General receives the report together with a
report by the Inspector General at the Office
identified by the Integrity Committee
containing any comments such Inspector General
deems appropriate.
(15) Rule of construction.--
(A) Public disclosure of information.--Except
as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in
this subsection shall be construed to authorize
the public disclosure of information which is--
(i) prohibited from disclosure by any
other provision of law;
(ii) required by Executive order to
be protected from disclosure in the
interest of national defense or
national security or in the conduct of
foreign affairs; or
(iii) a part of an ongoing criminal
investigation.
(B) Provision of report to requesting members
of congress.--Subject to any other provision of
law that would otherwise prohibit disclosure of
such information, the information described in
subparagraph (A) may be provided to any Member
of Congress upon request of the Member.
(16) Prohibited disclosures.--The Integrity Committee
may not provide or otherwise disclose to Congress or
the public any information that reveals the personally
identifiable information of an individual who alleges
wrongdoing to the Integrity Committee under this
subsection unless the Integrity Committee first obtains
the consent of the individual.
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART III--EMPLOYEES
* * * * * * *
SUBPART B--EMPLOYMENT AND RETENTION
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 33--EXAMINATION, SELECTION, AND PLACEMENT
SUBCHAPTER I--EXAMINATION, CERTIFICATION, AND APPOINTMENT
Sec.
3301. Civil service; generally.
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--DETAILS, VACANCIES, AND APPOINTMENTS
* * * * * * *
3349e. Presidential explanation of failure to nominate an Inspector
General.
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--DETAILS, VACANCIES, AND APPOINTMENTS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3345. Acting officer
(a) If an officer of an Executive agency (including the
Executive Office of the President, and other than the
Government Accountability Office) whose appointment to office
is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is otherwise
unable to perform the functions and duties of the office--
(1) the first assistant to the office of such officer
shall perform the functions and duties of the office
temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time
limitations of section 3346;
(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and
only the President) may direct a person who serves in
an office for which appointment is required to be made
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to perform the functions and duties of the
vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity subject
to the time limitations of section 3346; or
(3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and
only the President) may direct an officer or employee
of such Executive agency to perform the functions and
duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting
capacity, subject to the time limitations of section
3346, if--
(A) during the 365-day period preceding the
date of death, resignation, or beginning of
inability to serve of the applicable officer,
the officer or employee served in a position in
such agency for not less than 90 days; and
(B) the rate of pay for the position
described under subparagraph (A) is equal to or
greater than the minimum rate of pay payable
for a position at GS-15 of the General
Schedule.
(b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), a person may not
serve as an acting officer for an office under this section,
if--
(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of
the death, resignation, or beginning of inability to
serve, such person--
(i) did not serve in the position of first
assistant to the office of such officer; or
(ii) served in the position of first
assistant to the office of such officer for
less than 90 days; and
(B) the President submits a nomination of such person
to the Senate for appointment to such office.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any person if--
(A) such person is serving as the first assistant to
the office of an officer described under subsection
(a);
(B) the office of such first assistant is an office
for which appointment is required to be made by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate; and
(C) the Senate has approved the appointment of such
person to such office.
(c)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), the President (and
only the President) may direct an officer who is nominated by
the President for reappointment for an additional term to the
same office in an Executive department without a break in
service, to continue to serve in that office subject to the
time limitations in section 3346, until such time as the Senate
has acted to confirm or reject the nomination, notwithstanding
adjournment sine die.
(2) For purposes of this section and sections 3346, 3347,
3348, 3349, 3349a, and 3349d, the expiration of a term of
office is an inability to perform the functions and duties of
such office.
(d)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if an Inspector
General position that requires appointment by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate to be filled is
vacant, the first assistant of such position shall perform the
functions and duties of the Inspector General temporarily in an
acting capacity subject to the time limitations of section
3346.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if for purposes of
carrying out paragraph (1) of this subsection, by reason of
absence, disability, or vacancy, the first assistant to the
position of Inspector General is not available to perform the
functions and duties of the Inspector General, an acting
Inspector General shall be appointed by the President from
among individuals serving in an office of any Inspector
General, provided that--
(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of
death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve
of the applicable Inspector General, the individual
served in a position in an office of any Inspector
General for not less than 90 days; and
(B) the rate of pay for the position of such
individual is equal to or greater than the minimum rate
of pay payable for a position at GS-15 of the General
Schedule.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3349e. Presidential explanation of failure to nominate an
Inspector General
If the President fails to make a formal nomination for a
vacant Inspector General position that requires a formal
nomination by the President to be filled within the period
beginning on the date on which the vacancy occurred and ending
on the day that is 210 days after that date, the President
shall communicate, within 30 days after the end of such period,
to Congress in writing--
(1) the reasons why the President has not yet made a
formal nomination; and
(2) a target date for making a formal nomination.
* * * * * * *
MINORITY VIEWS
Committee Republicans oppose certain titles and support or
are neutral on the other titles of H.R. 2662, the Inspector
General Independence and Empowerment Act.
I. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE AND EMPOWERMENT ACT RESTRICTS THE
PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO TERMINATE IGS BY IMPOSING SUBSTANTIAL LIMITS
UPON THE EXERCISE OF THAT POWER.
Title I alters the current system by which the President
may terminate IGs with minimal notice to Congress.\1\ Under the
proposed legislation, the President may only terminate or
reassign an IG for one of nine documented reasons explicitly
defined in the provision and to also provide documentation to
Congress.\2\ While the President should not be able to remove
an IG without a valid reason, so dramatically limiting the
authority of a President to remove an IG will result in a
President being unable to remove an IG acting with partisan
intent to undermine the administration of a duly elected
President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452 Sec. 1, 92
Stat. 1101 (1978).
\2\H.R. 2662, Sec. 102(2)(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title III would put further restrictions on the President's
ability to fill an Inspector General vacancy, by requiring the
replacement be either the ``first assistant'' to the prior IG
unless that individual is absent or disabled or there is no
``first assistant.''\3\ Limiting who may become an acting IG to
only the ``first assistant'' fails to take into account that
the ``first assistant'' could be implicated in the same poor
conduct as the IG which was removed and/or be under
investigation for other wrongdoing themselves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\H.R. 2662, Sec. 301(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, Titles I and III of the IG Independence and
Empowerment Act would impose substantial limits on the
President's authority under the Inspector General Act of 1978
to freely terminate IGs. A duly elected President should have a
wide prerogative to remove or relocate ineffective Inspectors
General. The proper balance of oversight of Executive Branch
agencies while maintaining the President's role as the head of
the Executive Branch is to keep the current system that
preserves the President's freedom to terminate IGs while
expanding and strengthening the Congressional notice
requirement.
The bill sponsor and other House Democrats have previously
attempted to include these titles in either standalone
legislation\4\ or within the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense
Authorization Act. We opposed both previous attempts, a stance
which has not changed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\H.R. 6984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE AND EMPOWERMENT ACT SEEKS TO
PROVIDE CLARITY WITH RESPECT TO IG STATUS, APPROPRIATION, DOJ
INVESTIGATIVE INDEPENDENCE, AND VARIOUS MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURES.
Title II requires the President to notify Congress each
time the President places an Inspector General on nonduty
status.\5\ If the President fails, within 210 days, to make a
formal nomination for a vacant IG position that requires a
formal nomination by the President to be filled, the President
shall communicate to Congress within 30 days with the reasons
why, and a target date for a nomination.\6\ This bill ensures
the President keep Congress informed of changes to an IG's
status or, in the event of a vacancy, an impetus to fill the
job. These are not prohibitive restrictions on the Executive
Branch, and they align with the very purpose of an Inspector
General to ensure robust oversight. Title II is identical to
the H.R. 23, the Inspector General Protection Act, which has
bipartisan support in the Committee and passed the House under
suspension of the rules by voice vote on January 5th, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\H.R. 2662, Sec. 203(a).
\6\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title IV expands the membership of the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's (CIGIE)
Integrity Committee (IC) to include a former inspector
general.\7\ This legislation will provide some necessary
sunshine into the process by enabling members of Congress, when
supported by their peers on the House and Senate Committees of
jurisdiction, to receive information when their allegation of
wrongdoing against an Inspector General is not referred by the
Integrity Committee for further investigation. This provision
mirrors the bipartisan H.R. 2681, the Integrity Committee
Transparency Act, which passed the House Committee on Oversight
and Reform by voice vote on May 13th, 2021.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\H.R. 2662, Sec. 406(a).
\8\Business Meeting on H.R. 2681, H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform,
117th Cong. (May 13, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title VI harmonizes the Department of Justice Office of
Inspector General's (DOJ IG) authority to investigate all
allegations of misconduct at the Department of Justice.\9\ The
bill repeals a provision requiring the IG to refer certain
allegations of misconduct involving DOJ attorneys to the Office
of Professional Responsibility (OPR).\10\ To ensure
independence, transparency, and accountability within the
Department of Justice, all allegations of misconduct should be
consolidated under the OIG for investigation. This provision is
identical to H.R. 3064, the Inspector General Access Act, which
has bipartisan support in the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\H.R. 2662, Sec. 602.
\10\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title VII expands whistleblower training to require staff
in an IGs office to undergo whistleblower training.\11\
Additionally, this would expand CIGIE's duty to provide best
practices for the confidential handling of allegations of
reprisal against an IG or member of the IGs staff.\12\ This
does not adequately address many of the larger issues
surrounding whistleblower protection, including the significant
delays caused by IGs who fail to quickly investigate many
whistleblower complaints. Nonetheless, it would clarify the
procedures for confidentially review allegations of reprisal
within Inspectors General offices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\H.R. 2662, Sec. 702.
\12\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title VIII requires Congressional notification within 15
days of an IG being removed, placed on leave, or some other
non-duty status.\13\ The notice would require a list of all
audits and investigations being conducted by the IG at the time
of his or her removal.\14\ It is vital that Congress know all
on-going IG investigations at the time of removal to ensure
that any IG's removal is not made with the intent to stop an
ongoing investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\H.R. 2662, Sec. 801.
\14\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title IX simplifies CIGIE appropriations by consolidating
funds that are appropriated to individual IG offices and
thereafter sent to CIGIE for its use, into one
appropriation.\15\ The piecemeal approach to CIGIE
appropriations has made conducting oversight of CIGIE more
difficult because it is unclear exactly how much money CIGIE
receives and how those funds are being used. Furthermore,
consolidating appropriations will enable future cooperation
within the IG community to utilize data to investigate waste,
fraud, abuse, and misconduct.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\H.R. 2662, Sec. 901.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title X requires any IG to notify the House Oversight and
Reform Committee, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Government Affairs, and the IGs committee of jurisdiction, when
an agency refuses to provide information or assistance
requested to conduct an investigation.\16\ This provision would
not prevent the agency from protecting its own equities but
instead enable Congress to review the allegations being
investigated and determine if it should exert political
pressure on the agency to provide the necessary information or
assistance. Additionally, this may result in Congress opening
an investigation of its own to get the information if it feels
that is the appropriate action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\H.R. 2662, Sec. 1001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, most of the titles of H.R. 2662 would warrant
support from Committee Republicans as standalone bills or
combined into other legislative packages.
III. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE AND EMPOWERMENT ACT FAILS TO
INCLUDE ROBUST PROTECTIONS AGAINST IG ABUSES.
Title V authorizes Inspectors General to issue testimonial
subpoenas for contractors, grant recipients, and former federal
employees, as necessary to investigate waste, fraud, and
abuse.\17\ While, Republicans have supported testimonial
subpoena authority for IGs going back to 2010, recent IG abuses
and overtly partisan investigations have underscored the need
to include robust protections in any testimonial subpoena
authority legislation. Recent examples include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\H.R. 2662, Sec. 502.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. The Intelligence Community IG Michael Atkinson
circumvented the Director of National Intelligence to
provide the Ukraine Whistleblower complaint directly to
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Democrats.
b. The Acting IG for the Department of Health and
Human Services Christi Grimm released an outdated,
misleading, and likely politically motivated report on
shortages of medical supplies at hospitals.
c. The Department of Justice IG Michael Horowitz has
stated on that he would use testimonial subpoena
authority to subpoena former Attorney General Jeff
Sessions regarding policy decisions related to child
separation.
Due to these abuses, Rep. Fred Keller (R-PA) offered an
amendment at the Committee's markup of H.R. 2662 to, in part,
prevent the use of testimonial subpoenas on any federal
employee not employed at the time of enactment of this bill and
to require the IG office to cover the legal fees for any
subpoenaed individuals.\18\ This amendment would have ensured
that all former employees have access to legal counsel and that
no former political appointees who did not know that they may
be subject to a subpoena are at risk.\19\ Committee Democrats
refused to consider protections to guard against IGs misusing
this authority and unanimously opposed the amendment which
failed 21 to 18 in a recorded vote.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\Business Meeting on H.R. 2662, H. Comm. on Oversight and
Reform, 117th Cong. (May 25, 2021).
\19\Id.
\20\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. CONCLUSION
Certain aspects of Chairwoman Maloney's proposed
legislation would resolve ambiguities regarding IGs. However,
Titles I and III appear to be politically motivated
overreactions to the Trump administration and Title V presents
dangers for future political abuse of former federal officials.
During the Committee's Markup, Republican members offered two
amendments to strip out these three problematic Titles in order
to be able to support the bill in Committee. Rep. Andy Biggs
(R-AZ) offered an amendment that simply struck Titles I, III,
and V, but Committee Democrats unanimously rejected the
amendment which failed 20 to 15 in a recorded vote.\21\ And as
mentioned previously, Rep. Fred Keller offered a similar
amendment which both removed Titles I and III while amending
Title V in manner described earlier that would garner Committee
Republican support. This second good-faith amendment attempt
also failed. As demonstrated by the myriad of bipartisan
provisions contained within the H.R. 2662 legislative package,
Committee Republicans have worked with House Democrats to
advance necessary reforms to the IG community.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\Id.
James Comer,
Ranking Member.