[House Report 117-66]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


117th Congress  }                                         {  Rept. 117-66
                         HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session    }                                         {     Part 1

======================================================================



 
                  IG INDEPENDENCE AND EMPOWERMENT ACT

                                _______
                                

 June 17, 2021.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mrs. Carolyn B. Maloney of New York, from the Committee on Oversight 
                  and Reform, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 2662]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Oversight and Reform, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 2662) to amend the Inspector General Act of 
1978, and for other purposes, having considered the same, 
reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that 
the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Summary and Purpose of Legislation...............................    11
Background and Need for legislation..............................    11
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................    24
Legislative History..............................................    31
Committee Consideration..........................................    35
Roll Call Votes..................................................    36
Explanation of Amendments........................................    40
List of Related Committee Hearings...............................    40
Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the 
  Committee......................................................    40
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............    40
Application of Law to the Legislative Branch.....................    41
Duplication of Federal Programs..................................    41
Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings..............................    41
Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement.........................    41
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement...........................    41
Earmark Identification...........................................    41
Committee Cost Estimate..........................................    41
New Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost 
  Estimate.......................................................    42
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    43
Correspondence...................................................    82
Minority Views...................................................    84

    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``IG Independence and 
Empowerment Act''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                TITLE I--INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE

Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Amendment.

 TITLE II--CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF INSPECTOR 
                                GENERAL

Sec. 201. Short title.
Sec. 202. Change in status of Inspector General offices.
Sec. 203. Presidential explanation of failure to nominate an Inspector 
General.

           TITLE III--VACANCY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL POSITIONS

Sec. 301. Vacancy of Inspector General positions.

  TITLE IV--COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 
                              TRANSPARENCY

Sec. 401. Short title.
Sec. 402. Additional information to be included in requests and reports 
to Congress.
Sec. 403. Availability of information to members of Congress regarding 
certain allegations of wrongdoing closed without referral.
Sec. 404. Semiannual report.
Sec. 405. Additional reports; rules of construction.
Sec. 406. Membership of Integrity Committee.
Sec. 407. Requirement to refer allegations of wrongdoing against 
Inspector General to Integrity Committee.
Sec. 408. Requirement to report final disposition to Congress.

    TITLE V--ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY PROVISIONS FOR INSPECTORS GENERAL

Sec. 501. Short title.
Sec. 502. Additional authority provisions for Inspectors General.

      TITLE VI--INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERSONNEL

Sec. 601. Short title.
Sec. 602. Investigations of Department of Justice personnel.

    TITLE VII--OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS

Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Office of Inspector General whistleblower complaints.

TITLE VIII--NOTICE OF ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE IN 
                      STATUS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Sec. 801. Notice of ongoing investigations when there is a change in 
status of Inspector General.

TITLE IX--COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 
                             APPROPRIATION

Sec. 901. CIGIE appropriation.

    TITLE X--NOTICE OF REFUSAL TO PROVIDE INSPECTORS GENERAL ACCESS

Sec. 1001. Notice of refusal to provide information or assistance to 
Inspectors General.

          TITLE XI--ENHANCEMENTS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL TRAINING

Sec. 1101. Short title.
Sec. 1102. Enhancements to Inspector General Training.

                      TITLE XII--BUDGETARY EFFECTS

Sec. 1201. Determination of budgetary effects.

                        TITLE XIII--SEVERABILITY

Sec. 1301. Severability.

                TITLE I--INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``Inspector General Independence 
Act''.

SEC. 102. AMENDMENT.

  The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
          (1) in section 3(b)--
                  (A) by striking ``An Inspector General'' and 
                inserting:
          ``(1) An Inspector General'';
                  (B) by inserting after ``by the President'' the 
                following: ``in accordance with paragraph (2)''; and
                  (C) by inserting at the end the following new 
                paragraph:
          ``(2) The President may remove an Inspector General only for 
        any of the following grounds (and the documentation of any such 
        ground shall be included in the communication required pursuant 
        to paragraph (1)):
          ``(A) Documented permanent incapacity.
          ``(B) Documented neglect of duty.
          ``(C) Documented malfeasance.
          ``(D) Documented conviction of a felony or conduct involving 
        moral turpitude.
          ``(E) Documented knowing violation of a law or regulation.
          ``(F) Documented gross mismanagement.
          ``(G) Documented gross waste of funds.
          ``(H) Documented abuse of authority.
          ``(I) Documented inefficiency.''; and
          (2) in section 8G(e)(2), by adding at the end the following: 
        ``An Inspector General may be removed only for any of the 
        following grounds (and the documentation of any such ground 
        shall be included in the communication required pursuant to 
        this paragraph):
                  ``(A) Documented permanent incapacity.
                  ``(B) Documented neglect of duty.
                  ``(C) Documented malfeasance.
                  ``(D) Documented conviction of a felony or conduct 
                involving moral turpitude.
                  ``(E) Documented knowing violation of a law or 
                regulation.
                  ``(F) Documented gross mismanagement.
                  ``(G) Documented gross waste of funds.
                  ``(H) Documented abuse of authority.
                  ``(I) Documented inefficiency.''.

 TITLE II--CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF INSPECTOR 
                                GENERAL

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

   This title may be cited as the ``Inspector General Protection Act''.

SEC. 202. CHANGE IN STATUS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OFFICES.

  (a) Change in Status of Inspector General of Offices.--Paragraph (1) 
of section 3(b) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is 
amended--
          (1) by inserting ``, is placed on paid or unpaid non-duty 
        status,'' after ``is removed from office'';
          (2) by inserting ``, change in status,'' after ``any such 
        removal''; and
          (3) by inserting ``, change in status,'' after ``before the 
        removal''.
  (b) Change in Status of Inspector General of Designated Federal 
Entities.--Section 8G(e)(2) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 
U.S.C. App.) is amended--
          (1) by inserting ``, is placed on paid or unpaid non-duty 
        status,'' after ``office'';
          (2) by inserting ``, change in status,'' after ``any such 
        removal''; and
          (3) by inserting ``, change in status,'' after ``before the 
        removal''.
  (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 203. PRESIDENTIAL EXPLANATION OF FAILURE TO NOMINATE AN INSPECTOR 
                    GENERAL.

  (a) In General.--Subchapter III of chapter 33 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by inserting after section 3349d the following 
new section:

``Sec. 3349e. Presidential explanation of failure to nominate an 
                    Inspector General

  ``If the President fails to make a formal nomination for a vacant 
Inspector General position that requires a formal nomination by the 
President to be filled within the period beginning on the date on which 
the vacancy occurred and ending on the day that is 210 days after that 
date, the President shall communicate, within 30 days after the end of 
such period, to Congress in writing--
          ``(1) the reasons why the President has not yet made a formal 
        nomination; and
          ``(2) a target date for making a formal nomination.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 33 of 
title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item 
relating to section 3349d the following new item:

``3349e. Presidential explanation of failure to nominate an Inspector 
General.''.

  (c) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take 
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any 
vacancy first occurring on or after that date.

           TITLE III--VACANCY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL POSITIONS

SEC. 301. VACANCY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL POSITIONS.

  (a) In General.--Section 3345 of title 5, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
  ``(d)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if an Inspector General 
position that requires appointment by the President by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate to be filled is vacant, the first 
assistant of such position shall perform the functions and duties of 
the Inspector General temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the 
time limitations of section 3346.
  ``(2) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if for purposes of carrying out 
paragraph (1) of this subsection, by reason of absence, disability, or 
vacancy, the first assistant to the position of Inspector General is 
not available to perform the functions and duties of the Inspector 
General, an acting Inspector General shall be appointed by the 
President from among individuals serving in an office of any Inspector 
General, provided that--
          ``(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of death, 
        resignation, or beginning of inability to serve of the 
        applicable Inspector General, the individual served in a 
        position in an office of any Inspector General for not less 
        than 90 days; and
          ``(B) the rate of pay for the position of such individual is 
        equal to or greater than the minimum rate of pay payable for a 
        position at GS-15 of the General Schedule.''.
  (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to 
any vacancy first occurring with respect to an Inspector General 
position on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

  TITLE IV--COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 
                              TRANSPARENCY

SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``Integrity Committee Transparency Act 
of 2021''.

SEC. 402. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN REQUESTS AND REPORTS 
                    TO CONGRESS.

  Section 11(d) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is 
amended--
          (1) in paragraph (5)(B)(ii), by striking the period at the 
        end and inserting ``, the length of time the Integrity 
        Committee has been evaluating the allegation of wrongdoing, and 
        a description of any previous written notice provided under 
        this clause with respect to the allegation of wrongdoing, 
        including the description provided for why additional time was 
        needed.''; and
          (2) in paragraph (8)(A)(ii), by inserting ``or corrective 
        action'' after ``disciplinary action''.

SEC. 403. AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS REGARDING 
                    CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING CLOSED WITHOUT 
                    REFERRAL.

  Section 11(d)(5)(B) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
App) is amended by adding at the end the following:
                          ``(iii) Availability of information to 
                        members of congress.--
                                  ``(I) In general.--With respect to an 
                                allegation of wrongdoing made by a 
                                member of Congress that is closed by 
                                the Integrity Committee without 
                                referral to the Chairperson of the 
                                Integrity Committee to initiate an 
                                investigation, the Chairperson of the 
                                Integrity Committee shall, not later 
                                than 60 days after closing such 
                                allegation, provide a written 
                                description of the nature of the 
                                allegation of wrongdoing and how the 
                                Integrity Committee evaluated the 
                                allegation of wrongdoing to--
                                          ``(aa) the Chair and Ranking 
                                        Member of the Committee on 
                                        Oversight and Reform of the 
                                        House of Representatives;
                                          ``(bb) the Chair and Ranking 
                                        Member of the Committee on 
                                        Homeland Security and 
                                        Governmental Affairs of the 
                                        Senate;
                                          ``(cc) a member of the House 
                                        of Representatives who has the 
                                        support of any seven members of 
                                        the Committee on Oversight and 
                                        Reform of the House of 
                                        Representatives; or
                                          ``(dd) a member of the Senate 
                                        who has the support of any five 
                                        members of the Committee on 
                                        Homeland Security and 
                                        Governmental Affairs of the 
                                        Senate.
                                  ``(II) Requirement to forward.--The 
                                Chairperson of the Integrity Committee 
                                shall forward any written description 
                                or update provided under this clause to 
                                the members of the Integrity Committee 
                                and to the Chairperson of the 
                                Council.''.

SEC. 404. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.

  Section 11(d)(9) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) 
is amended to read as follows:
          ``(9) Semiannual report.--On or before May 31, 2022, and 
        every six months thereafter, the Council shall submit to 
        Congress and the President a report on the activities of the 
        Integrity Committee during the immediately preceding six-month 
        periods ending March 31 and September 30, which shall include 
        the following with respect to allegations of wrongdoing that 
        are made against Inspectors General and staff members of the 
        various Offices of Inspector General described under paragraph 
        (4)(C):
                  ``(A) An overview and analysis of the allegations of 
                wrongdoing disposed of by the Integrity Committee, 
                including--
                          ``(i) analysis of the positions held by 
                        individuals against whom allegations were made, 
                        including the duties affiliated with such 
                        positions;
                          ``(ii) analysis of the categories or types of 
                        the allegations of wrongdoing; and
                          ``(iii) a summary of disposition of all the 
                        allegations.
                  ``(B) The number of allegations referred to the 
                Department of Justice or the Office of Special Counsel, 
                including the number of allegations referred for 
                criminal investigation.
                  ``(C) The number of allegations referred to the 
                Chairperson of the Integrity Committee for 
                investigation, a general description of the status of 
                such investigations, and a summary of the findings of 
                investigations completed.
                  ``(D) An overview and analysis of allegations of 
                wrongdoing received by the Integrity Committee during 
                any previous reporting period, but remained pending 
                during some part of the six months covered by the 
                report, including--
                          ``(i) analysis of the positions held by 
                        individuals against whom allegations were made, 
                        including the duties affiliated with such 
                        positions;
                          ``(ii) analysis of the categories or types of 
                        the allegations of wrongdoing; and
                          ``(iii) a summary of disposition of all the 
                        allegations.
                  ``(E) The number and category or type of pending 
                investigations.
                  ``(F) For each allegation received--
                          ``(i) the date on which the investigation was 
                        opened;
                          ``(ii) the date on which the allegation was 
                        disposed of, as applicable; and
                          ``(iii) the case number associated with the 
                        allegation.
                  ``(G) The nature and number of allegations to the 
                Integrity Committee closed without referral, including 
                the justification for why each allegation was closed 
                without referral.
                  ``(H) A brief description of any difficulty 
                encountered by the Integrity Committee when receiving, 
                evaluating, investigating, or referring for 
                investigation an allegation received by the Integrity 
                Committee, including a brief description of--
                          ``(i) any attempt to prevent or hinder an 
                        investigation; or
                          ``(ii) concerns about the integrity or 
                        operations at an Office of Inspector 
                        General.''.

SEC. 405. ADDITIONAL REPORTS; RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

  Section 11(d) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
          ``(14) Additional reports.--
                  ``(A) Report to inspector general.--The Chairperson 
                of the Integrity Committee shall submit a report 
                immediately whenever the Chairperson of the Integrity 
                Committee becomes aware of particularly serious or 
                flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to 
                the administration of programs and operations of an 
                Office of Inspector General. The report shall be sent 
                to the Inspector General who leads the Office of 
                Inspector General at which the serious or flagrant 
                problems, abuses, or deficiencies were alleged.
                  ``(B) Report to congress.--The Inspector General of 
                the Office identified by the Integrity Committee shall 
                submit any such report to the House Committee on 
                Oversight and Reform and the Senate Committee on 
                Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs within seven 
                calendar days from the time the Inspector General 
                receives the report together with a report by the 
                Inspector General at the Office identified by the 
                Integrity Committee containing any comments such 
                Inspector General deems appropriate.
          ``(15) Rule of construction.--
                  ``(A) Public disclosure of information.--Except as 
                provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this 
                subsection shall be construed to authorize the public 
                disclosure of information which is--
                          ``(i) prohibited from disclosure by any other 
                        provision of law;
                          ``(ii) required by Executive order to be 
                        protected from disclosure in the interest of 
                        national defense or national security or in the 
                        conduct of foreign affairs; or
                          ``(iii) a part of an ongoing criminal 
                        investigation.
                  ``(B) Provision of report to requesting members of 
                congress.--Subject to any other provision of law that 
                would otherwise prohibit disclosure of such 
                information, the information described in subparagraph 
                (A) may be provided to any Member of Congress upon 
                request of the Member.
          ``(16) Prohibited disclosures.--The Integrity Committee may 
        not provide or otherwise disclose to Congress or the public any 
        information that reveals the personally identifiable 
        information of an individual who alleges wrongdoing to the 
        Integrity Committee under this subsection unless the Integrity 
        Committee first obtains the consent of the individual.''.

SEC. 406. MEMBERSHIP OF INTEGRITY COMMITTEE.

  Section 11(d)(2) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) 
is amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (A), by adding at the end the following:
                          ``(iv) The individual appointed under 
                        subparagraph (C).''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following:
                  ``(C) Appointment of former inspector general to 
                committee.--
                          ``(i) Appointment.--The Chairperson of the 
                        Council shall appoint an individual who prior 
                        to the date of such appointment served as an 
                        Inspector General (as that position is 
                        described in section 3(a) and section 
                        8G(a)(6)), and who has upheld the highest 
                        standards of integrity and professionalism 
                        while serving and since leaving service as an 
                        Inspector General, as determined by the 
                        Chairperson, to serve as a member of the 
                        Committee unless no such individual is 
                        available or willing to serve as a member of 
                        the Committee at the time of the appointment.
                          ``(ii) Initial term.--The individual 
                        appointed under clause (i) shall serve at the 
                        pleasure of the Chairperson of the Council for 
                        a 2-year term.
                          ``(iii) Additional term.--The Chairperson of 
                        the Council may reappoint the individual 
                        appointed under clause (i) to serve at the 
                        pleasure of the Chairperson of the Council for 
                        an additional term not to exceed 2 years.
                          ``(iv) Compensation.--
                                  ``(I) Special government employee 
                                designation.--The individual appointed 
                                under clause (i) shall be considered a 
                                special government employee pursuant to 
                                section 202(a) of title 18, United 
                                States Code.
                                  ``(II) Compensation and travel 
                                expenses.--An individual appointed 
                                under clause (i) may not receive 
                                compensation at a rate in excess of the 
                                rate of basic pay for level IV of the 
                                executive schedule under section 5315 
                                of title 5, United States Code, and any 
                                such individual, while engaged in the 
                                performance of their duties away from 
                                their homes or regular places of 
                                business, may be allowed travel 
                                expenses, including per diem in lieu of 
                                subsistence, as authorized by section 
                                5703 of such title for persons employed 
                                intermittently in the Government 
                                service.
                                  ``(III) Acceptance of volunteer 
                                services.--The Chairperson of the 
                                Council may accept volunteer services 
                                from the individual appointed under 
                                this subparagraph without regard to 
                                section 1342 of title 31, United States 
                                Code.
                                  ``(IV) Provisions relating to 
                                reemployment.--
                                          ``(aa) The Chairperson of the 
                                        Council may reemploy 
                                        annuitants.
                                          ``(bb) The employment of 
                                        annuitants under this paragraph 
                                        shall be subject to the 
                                        provisions of section 9902(g) 
                                        of title 5, United States Code, 
                                        as if the Council was the 
                                        Department of Defense.''.

SEC. 407. REQUIREMENT TO REFER ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING AGAINST 
                    INSPECTOR GENERAL TO INTEGRITY COMMITTEE.

  (a) Requirement.--Section 11(d)(4) of the Inspector General Act of 
1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (A), in the heading, by striking 
        ``Requirement'' and inserting ``Allegations against staff 
        members'';
          (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) and (C) as 
        subparagraphs (C) and (D), respectively; and
          (3) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following:
                  ``(B) Allegations against inspectors general.--An 
                Inspector General shall refer to the Integrity 
                Committee any allegation of wrongdoing against that 
                Inspector General.''.
  (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 11(d)(1) of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking 
``(4)(C)'' and inserting ``(4)(D)''.

SEC. 408. REQUIREMENT TO REPORT FINAL DISPOSITION TO CONGRESS.

  Section 11(d)(8) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) 
is amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by inserting 
        ``contemporaneously with the submission of the report under 
        clause (ii),'' before ``submit''; and
          (2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, the Committee on 
        Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the 
        Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of 
        Representatives, and other congressional committees of 
        jurisdiction,'' after ``Integrity Committee''.

    TITLE V--ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY PROVISIONS FOR INSPECTORS GENERAL

SEC. 501. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``IG Subpoena Authority Act''.

SEC. 502. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY PROVISIONS FOR INSPECTORS GENERAL.

  The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
          (1) by inserting after section 6 the following new section:

``SEC. 6A. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.

  ``(a) Testimonial Subpoena Authority.--In addition to the authority 
otherwise provided by this Act and in accordance with the requirements 
of this section, each Inspector General, in carrying out the provisions 
of this Act (or in the case of an Inspector General or Special 
Inspector General not established under this Act, the provisions of the 
authorizing statute), is authorized to require by subpoena the 
attendance and testimony of witnesses as necessary in the performance 
of the functions assigned to the Inspector General by this Act (or in 
the case of an Inspector General or Special Inspector General not 
established under this Act, the functions assigned by the authorizing 
statute), which in the case of contumacy or refusal to obey, such 
subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate United States 
district court. An Inspector General may not require by subpoena the 
attendance and testimony of any Federal employee or employee of a 
designated Federal entity, but may use other authorized procedures.
  ``(b) Limitation of Delegation.--The authority to issue a subpoena 
under subsection (a) may only be delegated to an official performing 
the functions and duties of the Inspector General when an Inspector 
General position is vacant or when the Inspector General is unable to 
perform the functions and duties of the Office.
  ``(c) Panel Review Before Issuance.--
          ``(1) Approval required.--
                  ``(A) Request for approval by subpoena panel.--Before 
                the issuance of a subpoena described in subsection (a), 
                an Inspector General shall submit a request for 
                approval to issue a subpoena to a panel (in this 
                section, referred to as the `Subpoena Panel'), which 
                shall be comprised of three Inspectors General of the 
                Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
                Efficiency, who shall be designated by the Inspector 
                General serving as Chairperson of the Council.
                  ``(B) Protection from disclosure.--The information 
                contained in the request submitted by an Inspector 
                General under subparagraph (A) and the identification 
                of a witness shall be protected from disclosure to the 
                extent permitted by law. Any request for disclosure of 
                such information shall be submitted to the Inspector 
                General requesting the subpoena.
          ``(2) Time to respond.--
                  ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph 
                (B), the Subpoena Panel shall approve or deny a request 
                for approval to issue a subpoena not later than 10 
                calendar days after the submission of such request.
                  ``(B) Additional information for panel.--If the 
                Subpoena Panel determines that additional information 
                is necessary to approve or deny a request submitted by 
                an Inspector General under paragraph (1)(A), the 
                Subpoena Panel shall request such information from the 
                Inspector General and shall approve or deny the request 
                submitted by the Inspector General under paragraph 
                (1)(A) not later than 20 calendar days after the 
                submission of the request under such paragraph.
          ``(3) Denial by panel.--If a majority of the Subpoena Panel 
        denies the approval of a subpoena, that subpoena may not be 
        issued.
  ``(d) Notice to Attorney General.--
          ``(1) In general.--If the Subpoena Panel approves a subpoena 
        under subsection (c), the Inspector General shall notify the 
        Attorney General that the Inspector General intends to issue 
        the subpoena.
          ``(2) Denial for interference with an ongoing 
        investigation.--Not later than 10 calendar days after the date 
        on which the Attorney General is notified pursuant to paragraph 
        (1), the Attorney General may object to the issuance of the 
        subpoena because the subpoena will interfere with an ongoing 
        investigation and the subpoena may not be issued.
          ``(3) Issuance of subpoena approved.--If the Attorney General 
        declines to object or fails to object to the issuance of the 
        subpoena during the 10-day period described in paragraph (2), 
        the Inspector General may issue the subpoena.
  ``(e) Guidelines.--The Chairperson of the Council of the Inspectors 
General on Integrity and Efficiency, in consultation with the Attorney 
General, shall prescribe guidelines to carry out this section.
  ``(f) Inspector General Defined.--For purposes of this section, the 
term `Inspector General' includes each Inspector General established 
under this Act and each Inspector General or Special Inspector General 
not established under this Act.
  ``(g) Applicability.--The provisions of this section shall not affect 
the exercise of authority by an Inspector General of testimonial 
subpoena authority established under another provision of law.'';
          (2) in section 5(a)--
                  (A) in paragraph (21)(B), by striking ``; and'' and 
                inserting a semicolon;
                  (B) in paragraph (22), by striking the period at the 
                end and inserting ``; and''; and
                  (C) by inserting at the end the following new 
                paragraph:
          ``(23) a description of the use of subpoenas for the 
        attendance and testimony of witnesses authorized under section 
        6A.''; and
          (3) in section 8G(g)(1), by inserting ``6A,'' before ``and 
        7''.

      TITLE VI--INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERSONNEL

SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``Inspector General Access Act''.

SEC. 602. INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERSONNEL.

  Section 8E of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is 
amended--
          (1) in subsection (b)--
                  (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and paragraph 
                (3)'';
                  (B) by striking paragraph (3);
                  (C) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as 
                paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively; and
                  (D) in paragraph (4), as redesignated, by striking 
                ``paragraph (4)'' and inserting ``paragraph (3)''; and
          (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``, except with respect to 
        allegations described in subsection (b)(3),''.

    TITLE VII--OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS

SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``Enhanced Whistleblower Engagement 
Act''.

SEC. 702. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS.

  (a) Whistleblower Protection Coordinator.--Section 3(d)(1)(C) of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
          (1) in clause (i), in the matter preceding subclause (I), by 
        inserting ``, including employees of that Office of Inspector 
        General'' after ``employees''; and
          (2) in clause (iii), by inserting ``(including the Integrity 
        Committee of that Council)'' after ``and Efficiency''.
  (b) Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.--
Section 11(c)(5)(B) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
App.) is amended by striking ``, allegations of reprisal,'' and 
inserting the following: ``and allegations of reprisal (including the 
timely and appropriate handling and consideration of protected 
disclosures and allegations of reprisal that are internal to an Office 
of Inspector General)''.

TITLE VIII--NOTICE OF ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE IN 
                      STATUS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

SEC. 801. NOTICE OF ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE IN 
                    STATUS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL.

  (a) Change in Status of Inspector General of Establishment.--Section 
3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by 
inserting at the end the following:
  ``(h) Not later than 15 days after an Inspector General is removed, 
placed on paid or unpaid non-duty status, or transferred to another 
position or location within an establishment, the acting Inspector 
General shall submit to the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a list of all audits and 
investigations being conducted, supervised, coordinated by the Office 
at the time the Inspector General was removed, placed on paid or unpaid 
non-duty status, or transferred.''.
  (b) Change in Status of Inspector General of Designated Federal 
Entity.--Section 8G(e) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
App.) is amended by inserting at the end the following:
  ``(3) Not later than 15 days after an Inspector General is removed, 
placed on paid or unpaid non-duty status, or transferred to another 
position or location within an designated Federal entity, the acting 
Inspector General shall submit to the Committee on Oversight and Reform 
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a list of all audits and 
investigations being conducted, supervised, coordinated by the Office 
at the time the Inspector General was removed, placed on paid or unpaid 
non-duty status, or transferred.''.

TITLE IX--COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 
                             APPROPRIATION

SEC. 901. CIGIE APPROPRIATION.

  (a) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Section 11(c)(3) of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by adding at 
the end the following:
                  ``(D) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition 
                to any funds available in the Inspectors General 
                Council Fund established under subparagraph (B), there 
                are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
                necessary, to remain available until expended, to carry 
                out the functions and duties of the Council under this 
                subsection.''.
  (b) Removing Council Funding From Individual Inspector General Budget 
Requests.--Section 6(g) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 is 
amended--
          (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``, and any resources 
        necessary to support the Council of the Inspectors General on 
        Integrity and Efficiency. Resources necessary to support the 
        Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency 
        shall be specifically identified and justified in the budget 
        request''; and
          (2) in paragraph (2)--
                  (A) in subparagraph (B), by adding ``and'' after the 
                semicolon;
                  (B) by striking subparagraph (C); and
                  (C) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph 
                (C).
  (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (b) shall take 
effect on the date that is 30 days after the date of receipt by the 
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency of an 
appropriation for the Council to carry out the functions and duties of 
the Council under section 11 of the Inspector General Act (5 U.S.C. 
App. 11), as amended under this section.

    TITLE X--NOTICE OF REFUSAL TO PROVIDE INSPECTORS GENERAL ACCESS

SEC. 1001. NOTICE OF REFUSAL TO PROVIDE INFORMATION OR ASSISTANCE TO 
                    INSPECTORS GENERAL.

  Section 6(c) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
  ``(3) If the information or assistance that is the subject of a 
report under paragraph (2) is not provided to the Inspector General by 
the date that is 30 days after the report is made, the Inspector 
General shall submit a notice that the information or assistance 
requested is being unreasonably refused or not provided by the head of 
the establishment involved or the head of the Federal agency involved, 
as applicable, to--
          ``(A) the Committee in the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee in the Senate that has jurisdiction over the 
        establishment involved or the Federal agency involved, as 
        applicable;
          ``(B) the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of 
        Representatives; and
          ``(C) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
        Affairs of the Senate.''.

          TITLE XI--ENHANCEMENTS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL TRAINING

SEC. 1101. SHORT TITLE.

  This title may be cited as the ``Inspector General Training 
Enhancement Act''.

SEC. 1102. ENHANCEMENTS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL TRAINING.

   Section 11(c)(1)(E) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
App.) is amended by inserting ``and establish minimum standards and 
best practices for training to ensure all Inspectors General receive 
training to carry out the duties, responsibilities, and authorities 
under this Act and on emerging areas of the law of relevance to 
Inspectors General and the work of their offices as identified by the 
Council'' after ``Inspector General''.

                      TITLE XII--BUDGETARY EFFECTS

SEC. 1201. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.

  The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with 
the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall be determined by 
reference to the latest statement titled ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO 
Legislation'' for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional 
Record by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, provided that 
such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.

                        TITLE XIII--SEVERABILITY

SEC. 1301. SEVERABILITY.

  If any provision of this Act (or the application of that provision to 
particular persons or circumstances) is held invalid or found to be 
unconstitutional the remainder of this Act (or the application of that 
provision to other persons or circumstances) shall not be affected.

                   Summary and Purpose of Legislation

    The IG Independence and Empowerment Act would amend the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 to require that an inspector 
general (IG) is removed only for cause, require Congress to be 
notified before an IG is placed on non-duty status, require 
that an acting IG in the event of an IG vacancy be the first 
assistant in the same office or other senior official within 
the IG community, and increase accountability and transparency 
for the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency (CIGIE) Integrity Committee.
    The bill would also grant IGs the authority to subpoena 
witnesses for testimony who are not currently federal 
employees; provide the Department of Justice (DOJ) IG the 
authority to initiate investigations into wrongdoing by DOJ 
attorneys; expand whistleblower trainings for Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) employees, require notification to 
Congress of an IG's ongoing work when an IG is removed, 
transferred, or placed on non-duty status; provide a single 
appropriation for CIGIE; require IGs to notify Congress if 
agencies deny access to requested information; and require 
CIGIE to establish minimum standards and best practice for IG 
training.

                  Background and Need for Legislation

    Since enactment of the Inspector General Act of 1978, IGs 
have provided oversight of the executive branch. IGs play a 
critical role in independently and objectively working to help 
recover overpayments by government agencies; identify risks and 
program improvement areas; and root out fraud, waste, abuse, 
and gross mismanagement.\1\ The work of IGs helps make the 
entire government more effective and efficient, and continues 
to yield a remarkable return on investment for American 
taxpayers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Pub. L. No. 95-452 (1978), as amended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During a hearing before the Committee's Subcommittee on 
Government Operations on April 20, 2021, the Committee 
considered H.R. 2662 and heard testimony from multiple IGs on 
issues facing the broader IG community, as well as areas for 
legislative reform. In her written testimony for this hearing, 
National Science Foundation IG Allison C. Lerner, CIGIE Chair, 
summarized the work of IGs over the previous year:

          The work of OIG investigators and investigative 
        attorneys led to more than 4,000 indictments and 
        informations and almost 1,300 successful civil actions. 
        In response to our recommendations, agencies made more 
        than 4,000 suspensions and debarments and took more 
        than 3,500 personnel actions. Altogether, our work 
        resulted in significant improvements to the economy and 
        efficiency of programs governmentwide, with potential 
        savings totaling approximately $53 billion--a $17 
        return on every dollar invested in the OIGs.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Government 
Operations, Testimony of Inspector General Allison C. Lerner, Chair, 
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, Hearing 
on Restoring Independence: Rebuilding the Federal Offices of Inspectors 
General (Apr. 20, 2021) (emphasis added) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
Lerner%20Testimony.pdf).

    Several of the reforms included in H.R. 2662 have been 
requested by IGs for over a decade and have been favorably 
reported by the Committee and passed the House on previous 
occasions. Several of these reforms were identified by CIGIE as 
priorities this year in a January 28, 2021, legislative 
priorities letter from Peace Corps IG Kathy A. Buller, Chair of 
the CIGIE Legislation Committee.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\Letter from Inspector General Kathy A. Buller, Legislation 
Committee Chair, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency, to Lesley A. Field, Acting Executive Chairperson, Council 
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (Jan. 27, 2021) 
(online at www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/untracked/
CIGIE_Legislative_Priorities_117th_Congress.pdf). The CIGIE Legislation 
Committee ``provides timely information to the IG community about 
congressional initiatives; solicits the technical advice of the IG 
community in response to congressional initiatives; and presents views 
and recommendations to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget 
on legislative matters.'' Id.
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               REMOVAL PROTECTIONS FOR INSPECTORS GENERAL

    Title I of H.R. 2662 would allow an IG to be removed only 
for the following causes: permanent incapacity, neglect of 
duty, malfeasance, conviction of a felony or conduct involving 
moral turpitude, knowing violation of a law or regulation, 
gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, 
or inefficiency. Title I would require documentation of the 
cause for removal to be reported directly to Congress.
    The need for greater protections for IGs was highlighted 
when, in 2020, then-President Trump removed multiple IGs in 
what appeared to be retaliation for investigating misconduct of 
his own Administration:
           Intelligence Community IG Michael Atkinson 
        was targeted after he sent a letter to notify Congress 
        that a whistleblower raised concerns about the 
        President's conduct on a call with officials from 
        Ukraine. The whistleblower's allegations ultimately led 
        the House to impeach President Trump.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\Trump Says He Will Fire Intelligence Watchdog at Center of 
Ukraine Allegations That Led to Impeachment, Washington Post (Apr. 3, 
2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-says-
he-will-fire-intelligence-watchdog-at-center-of-ukraine-allegations-
that-led-to-impeachment/2020/04/03/d0b873d4-761c-11ea-87da-
77a8136c1a6d_story.html); Timeline: The Trump Whistleblower Complaint, 
The Hill (Sept. 21, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/policy/
national-security/462464-timeline-the-trump-whistleblower-complaint).
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           President Trump fired State Department IG 
        Steve Linick, reportedly at the request of Secretary of 
        State Mike Pompeo.\5\ At the time, Mr. Linick was 
        investigating allegations of misconduct by Secretary 
        Pompeo related to the misuse of government resources 
        and the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia without 
        congressional approval.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\Fired State Department Watchdog Who Was Investigating Pompeo 
Appears Before Congress, Washington Post (June 3, 2020) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/fired-state-department-
watchdog-who-was-probing-pompeo-to-appear-before-congress/2020/06/02/
bc51e098-a4f6-11ea-8681-7d471bf20207_story.html).
    \6\Trump Ousts State Department Watchdog, Politico (May 15, 2020) 
(online at www.politico.com/news/2020/05/15/state-department-inspector-
general-fired-261536).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Bipartisan Members of Congress raised serious concerns 
about these firings. Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT) stated: ``The 
firings of multiple Inspectors General is unprecedented; doing 
so without good cause chills the independence essential to 
their purpose. It is a threat to accountable democracy and a 
fissure in the constitutional balance of power.''\7\ Senator 
Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) stated in response to the State 
Department IG firing, ``I'm concerned that our inspectors 
general be allowed to do the job that they have been hired to 
do, whether it's Mr. Linick or others.''\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\Senator Mitt Romney (@senatorromney), Twitter (May 16, 2020) 
(online at https://twitter.com/senatorromney/status/
1261799211760222210).
    \8\Senate Republicans Demand Answers from Trump on IG Firing, The 
Hill (May 18, 2020) (online at https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/
498425-senate-republicans-demand-answers-from-trump-on-ig-firing).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As described in an April 2021 Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) report, Congress and the Supreme Court have both 
recognized the importance of IG ``independence, autonomy, 
impartiality, and objectivity to effective oversight of agency 
programs.''\9\ The Supreme Court has recognized that the 
autonomy of IGs is ``vital to effectuating Congress'' intent 
and maintaining an opportunity for objective inquiries into 
bureaucratic waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.''\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\Congressional Research Service, Congress's Authority to Limit 
the Removal of Inspectors General (Apr. 16, 2021) (online at https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46762).
    \10\NASA v. Fed. Labor Rels. Auth., 527 U.S. 229, 240 (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the Senate Report accompanying the original Inspector 
General Act of 1978 explained:

          Above all, the Inspector and Auditors General created 
        in this legislation would have the requisite 
        independence to do an effective job. There is a natural 
        tendency for an agency administrator to be protective 
        of the programs that he administers. In some cases, 
        frank recognition of waste, mismanagement or wrongdoing 
        reflects on him personally. Even if he is not 
        personally implicated, revelations of wrongdoing or 
        waste may reflect adversely on his programs and 
        undercut public and congressional support for them. 
        Under these circumstances, it is a fact of life that 
        agency managers and supervisors in the executive branch 
        do not always identify or come forward with evidence of 
        failings in the programs they administer. For that 
        reason, the audit and investigative functions should be 
        assigned to an individual whose independence is clear 
        and whose responsibility runs directly to the agency 
        head and ultimately to the Congress. . . .
          With rare exceptions, the agencies have not 
        adequately policed their own operations and programs. 
        The committee wants Inspector and Auditors General of 
        high ability, stature and an unusual degree of 
        independence--outsiders, at least to the extent that 
        they will have no vested interest in the programs and 
        policies whose economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
        they are evaluating.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Report to Accompany 
H.R. 8588, 95th Cong. (1978) (S. Rept. 95-1071).

    In June 2020, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
issued a report addressing the impact of political retaliation 
on IGs and considerations for IG independence, which concluded 
that ``[e]nsuring the independence of IGs is critical to OIGs'' 
credibility and effectiveness.''\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\Government Accountability Office, Inspectors General: 
Independence Principles and Considerations for Reform (June 8, 2020) 
(GAO-20-639R) (online at www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20 639r.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Protecting IGs from political retaliation has previously 
received bipartisan support from Congress. During the 110th 
Congress, the House passed a bill with similar provisions to 
this title by a vote of 404 to 11.\13\ Representative Tom Davis 
(R-VA) endorsed that legislation limiting the President's 
authority to remove IGs in the Committee report on the bill:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\H.R. 928, 110th Congress (2007).

          We all agree IGs should operate independently, free 
        from political interference. After all, both agency 
        heads and Congress often rely on IG reports to provide 
        frank assessments of the effectiveness of Federal 
        Programs.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Report on the 
Improving Government Accountability Act (2007) (H. Rept. 110-354) 
(online at www.congress.gov/congressional-report/110th-congress/house-
report/354).

    Numerous IGs have also endorsed for-cause removal 
protections. In a May 2020 letter to congressional leaders, 
nine former IGs urged Congress to ``codify for-cause removal 
protections for IGs.''\15\ They noted that there are 
appropriate checks for this protection:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\Project on Government Oversight, Former Inspectors General Call 
on Congress to Pass Overdue Reforms to IG System (May 5, 2020) (online 
at www.pogo.org/letter/2020/05/former-inspectors-general-call-on-
congress-to-pass-overdue-reforms-to-ig-system/).

          [F]or-cause removal protections do not make 
        underperforming IGs untouchable. If structured 
        properly, these protections always reserve the right of 
        any sitting president to remove an IG when they are 
        ineffective or unwilling to conduct the rigorous 
        oversight required of their office. Under such 
        circumstances, IGs should be removed to make way for 
        individuals willing and able to uphold the important 
        mandate of the office.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\Id.

    CRS recently evaluated congressional authority to limit the 
removal of IGs and concluded that for-cause removal 
restrictions ``appear to be a constitutionally permissible 
means of encouraging independence for most IGs.''\17\ Federal 
law already extends for-cause protections to the Postal Service 
IG, who shall ``at any time be removed upon the written 
concurrence of at least 7 Governors, but only for cause.''\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\Congressional Research Service, Congress's Authority to Limit 
the Removal of Inspectors General (Apr. 16, 2021) (online at https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46762).
    \18\39 U.S.C. Sec.  202(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the April 2021 Government Operations Subcommittee 
hearing, Liz Hempowicz, Director of Public Policy at Project on 
Government Oversight (POGO), testified in support of these 
removal protections:

          Last year, after President Trump removed four 
        Inspectors General in quick succession, POGO 
        immediately began hearing from those in the IG 
        community. What we heard was that they were afraid that 
        doing their jobs and going after the facts, wherever 
        they may lead, without regard for how it would reflect 
        on the President or others in political leadership, 
        would cost--would be the end of their careers.
          This is not an environment conducive to rigorous and 
        effective oversight. That is why I strongly urge 
        Congress to enact legislation that would require the 
        President to have just cause to fire an Inspector 
        General and to communicate the specific causes 
        underlying that impending removal to Congress.
          Granting Inspectors General for-cause removal 
        protections will make it less dangerous to exercise the 
        independence required of them to fulfill their 
        missions.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Government 
Operations, Hearing on Restoring Independence: Rebuilding the Federal 
Offices of Inspectors General (Apr. 20, 2021) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/restoring-independence-
rebuilding-the-federal-offices-of-inspectors-general).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION FOR IG CHANGE IN STATUS AND LONG-STANDING 
                               VACANCIES

    Title II of H.R. 2662 would require the President to notify 
Congress 30 days before placing an IG on non-duty status and 
explain the failure to fill long-standing IG vacancies.
    Current law requires a President to provide Congress with 
an explanation for removing an IG at least 30 days before the 
removal takes effect.\20\ When President Trump removed the 
State Department IG in May 2020, he circumvented the intent of 
this requirement by immediately placing the IG on 
administrative leave and immediately appointing a replacement 
acting IG. President Trump took similar action upon his 
notification of intent to remove the Intelligence Community IG, 
making both these terminations essentially effective 
immediately upon notice.\21\ In another example, when President 
Obama removed Gerald Walpin, the IG for the Corporation for 
National and Community Service, IG Walpin was ``suspended, with 
pay, pending his removal.''\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. App. Sec.  3(b).
    \21\Trump Is Gutting Our Democracy While We're Dealing with 
Coronavirus, New York Times (Apr. 6, 2020 (online at www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/06/opinion/atkinson-inspector-general-ukraine-fired.html); 
Ousted State Department Watchdog Tells Lawmakers He's Unaware if Pompeo 
Probes Were Stopped, Politico (June 10, 2020) (online at 
www.politico.com/news/2020/06/10/steve-linick-mike-pompeo-probes-
310568).
    \22\Letter from Gregory B. Craig, Counsel to the President, to 
Senator Charles E. Grassley (June 11, 2009) (online at https://
a.abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/Craig_letter_to_Grassley.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 2662 would also require that, when an IG vacancy has 
lasted for more than 210 days without the President nominating 
a replacement, the President provide to Congress an explanation 
for the failure to submit a nomination and a target date for 
making a nomination.
    Currently, 13 IG offices with presidentially-appointed IGs 
are without a confirmed IG and, in some cases, have been for 
years.\23\ Among these, the Export-Import Bank, Central 
Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and the Office of 
Personnel Management have not had a permanent IG for more than 
five years.\24\ Several of these positions have gone without 
nominees for years at a time as well, and this legislation 
would require clear and transparent justifications when there 
is no nominee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency 
Inspector General Vacancies (online at www.oversight.gov/ig-vacancies) 
(accessed on June 16, 2021).
    \24\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the May 2021 hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Government Operations, IG Lerner testified:

          One of the greatest challenges facing the IG 
        community is the extensive list of vacant IG positions. 
        As this Committee has long recognized, prolonged 
        vacancies within OIGs undermine the critical oversight 
        work being done within those offices. During the period 
        of such vacancies, acting Inspectors General and career 
        staff carry on the work of their offices, and they do 
        it with the utmost professionalism. Nevertheless, a 
        sustained loss of permanent leadership is not healthy 
        for any office, particularly one entrusted with the 
        important and challenging mission of an OIG. For this 
        reason, ensuring that vacant IG positions are filled 
        with exemplary individuals capable of helping their 
        offices accomplish their vital missions through good 
        times and bad is always one of CIGIE's highest 
        priorities.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Government 
Operations, Testimony of Inspector General Allison C. Lerner, Chair, 
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, Hearing 
on Restoring Independence: Rebuilding the Federal Offices of Inspectors 
General (Apr. 20, 2021) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Lerner%20Testimony.pdf).

    When the House passed the language in title II as a 
standalone bill in 2019, Rep. Fred Keller (R-PA) summarized the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
importance of the bill during remarks on the House floor:

          Inspectors general play an important role in 
        improving the operations of the Federal Government. 
        They help combat fraud, waste, and abuse throughout 
        executive branch departments and agencies and promote a 
        resourceful and effective Federal Government.
          They have assisted us with discharging one of our 
        most important responsibilities, shining the light on 
        areas of the government that need improved efficiency 
        and economy.
          However, throughout both Republican and Democratic 
        administrations, there have been numerous vacant 
        inspector general positions. Certain agencies have 
        experienced prolonged periods of absent inspector 
        general leadership.
          For example, the Department of the Interior has been 
        without a permanent inspector general since 2009. 
        Likewise, there are approximately 13 vacant inspector 
        general positions for agencies covered by the Inspector 
        General Act.
          This bill would require the President to timely 
        notify Congress of a failure to nominate an inspector 
        general for a given agency. The President would also be 
        required to explain why a nomination has not yet been 
        made and provide a target date for that nomination. The 
        bill also calls for increased transparency by requiring 
        the President to notify Congress if an inspector 
        general is placed on leave or changes status.
          Inspectors general are an indispensable tool to 
        Congress. By ensuring the Federal Government is 
        adequately staffed with inspectors general, we are 
        reaffirming our commitment to rooting out government 
        fraud, waste, and abuse.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\U.S. House of Representatives, Debate on H.R. 1847 (July 17, 
2019) (online at www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2019/07/17/
house-section/article/H5950 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTING IGS

    Title III of H.R. 2662 addresses who can serve as an acting 
IG in the event of a vacancy due to an absence of a Senate-
confirmed individual. The Federal Vacancies Reform Act 
currently allows the President to designate any Senate-
confirmed political appointee, or a senior employee from the 
agency overseen by the OIG, to serve as an acting IG. Title III 
would require that the first assistant in an OIG, generally the 
Principal Deputy or Deputy IG, serve as the acting IG in the 
event of a vacancy. If the first assistant position is also 
vacant, then title III would allow the President to designate a 
senior official at any OIG to serve as acting IG.
    This reform would prevent ``dual-hatting'' arrangements 
where a political official from within an agency is overseeing 
that agency as the acting IG. This occurred twice in 2020, when 
President Trump named an Acting Department of Transportation IG 
from within the Department of Transportation and an Acting 
State Department IG from within the State Department. These 
decisions prompted this Committee and others to conduct 
oversight over both OIGs to ensure that the offices' work 
proceeded unimpeded and officials with conflicts of interest 
recused themselves.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Press Release: Chairs 
Release Letter from Acting State Department IG Regarding His Ongoing 
Conflicts of Interest (June 5, 2020) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairs-release-letter-from-
acting-state-department-ig-regarding-his-ongoing); Democrats Open 
Investigation into Trump's Replacement of Acting Transportation 
Department Inspector General, Washington Post (May 19, 2020) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/democrats-open-
investigation-into-replacement-of-acting-transportation-department-
inspector-general/2020/05/19/e8e62b52-99f5-11ea-89fd-
28fb313d1886_story.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In CIGIE's legislative priorities letter, IG Buller 
explained how an agency official serving as acting IG could 
compromise the OIG's work:

          However, the Vacancies Act allows the President to 
        direct a Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed 
        (PAS) appointee or a senior management employee in the 
        agency overseen by the OIG to temporarily serve as 
        acting IG. Doing so risks both actual and apparent 
        conflicts that affect the acting IG's ability to 
        maintain independence, including the independence 
        required by Generally Accepted Government Auditing 
        Standards and other professional standards that IGs 
        must follow. Further, it may erode whistleblowers' 
        trust that their identities will be protected.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\Letter from Inspector General Kathy A. Buller, Legislation 
Committee Chair, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency, to Lesley A. Field, Acting Executive Chairperson, Council 
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (Jan. 27, 2021) 
(online at www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/untracked/
CIGIE_Legislative_Priorities_117th_Congress.pdf).

    Ms. Hempowicz from POGO elaborated on this whistleblower 
issue, in written testimony for the Subcommittee on Government 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations hearing:

          The implications of a political appointee 
        simultaneously running an agency office and serving as 
        the inspector general in charge of investigating 
        whistleblower complaints into that office present an 
        obvious and inherent conflict. Such a situation would 
        surely chill any agency employees from making 
        whistleblower disclosures to that acting inspector 
        general. Yet there's nothing to prevent this from 
        occurring at any inspector general office at any time. 
        This could result in whistleblowers across government 
        choosing not to disclose waste, fraud, or abuse to 
        their inspector general offices to avoid the increased 
        risk that political leadership may find out who they 
        are.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Government 
Operations, Testimony of Liz Hempowicz, Director of Public Policy, 
Project on Government Oversight, Hearing on Restoring Independence: 
Rebuilding the Federal Offices of Inspectors General (Apr. 20, 2021) 
(online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Hempowicz%20Testimony.pdf).

    At a Committee hearing on May 3, 2021, Rudy Mehrbani, 
Senior Advisor from the Democracy Fund, testified that this 
reform would ``provide democratic accountability in the 
future.'' He also said that ``reforms to ensure that a 
President can't install inspectors general, even in an acting 
capacity, that have perceived or real conflicts of interest is 
critically important.''\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Improving 
Government Accountability and Transparency (May 3, 2021) (online at 
https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/improving-government-
accountability-and-transparency).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 CIGIE INTEGRITY COMMITTEE TRANSPARENCY

    Title IV of H.R. 2662 would increase the transparency in 
reporting by CIGIE's Integrity Committee for investigations 
involving allegations of wrongdoing within OIGs.
    Because IGs evaluate the integrity of agency operations, 
the conduct of IGs themselves must be above reproach. CIGIE's 
Integrity Committee serves as the independent and objective 
oversight organization that investigates and reports on 
allegations of wrongdoing by IGs and the senior staff within 
their offices.\31\ Currently, the Integrity Committee reports 
annually to Congress on various aspects of its operations, 
including the number of allegations of wrongdoing received, 
referred to other agencies, or closed without referral. The 
Integrity Committee also reports dates of receipt and 
disposition of allegations, as well as the status and findings 
of its investigations.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\Congressional Research Service, Oversight of the Inspector 
General Community: The IG Council's Integrity Committee (Sept. 21, 
2015) (online at www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44198.html).
    \32\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This title would make the Integrity Committee's periodic 
reporting to Congress a semi-annual requirement. The Integrity 
Committee chairperson would also be required to report 
immediately to an IG if the Integrity Committee becomes aware 
of any particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or 
deficiencies at the IG's office. The IG would have to transmit 
this report to Congress within seven days.
    This title would also add requirements for the Integrity 
Committee to communicate the length of time spent evaluating 
investigations for which it requests extensions, information 
regarding how it evaluates allegations made by a Member of 
Congress if the review is closed without referral, and analysis 
of allegations filed. Finally, this title would expand the 
membership of the Integrity Committee to include a former IG.
    At the May 3, 2021, Committee hearing, Ms. Hempowicz from 
POGO said these reforms ``would greatly increase transparency 
with how both CIGIE and the Integrity Committee operate and 
oversee inspectors general.''\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Improving 
Government Accountability and Transparency (May 3, 2021) (online at 
https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/improving-government-
accountability-and-transparency).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   IG TESTIMONIAL SUBPOENA AUTHORITY

    H.R. 2662 would also provide additional authority to IGs by 
including a longstanding priority of CIGIE, testimonial 
subpoena authority.
    Under existing law, IGs cannot compel testimony from 
individuals who do not work for the government, including 
former government employees, hampering the IGs' ability to 
construct a complete case and hold individuals accountable for 
wrongdoing. This issue was highlighted recently before the 
Committee when DOJ IG Michael E. Horowitz testified that, 
without this authority, his office was unable to interview 
former Attorney General Jeff Sessions during an investigation 
of the Trump Administration's child separation policy.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on 
Accountability and Lessons Learned from the Trump Administration's 
Child Separation Policy (Feb. 4, 2021) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/accountability-and-lessons-
learned-from-the-trump-administration-s-child).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In multiple other instances, IGs have been unable to obtain 
testimony from individuals outside the federal government. For 
example, the DOJ OIG was unable to obtain cooperation from non-
government witnesses in its review of the Carter Page FISA 
applications and in the Fast and Furious investigation, and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development OIG was unable to 
interview a former official in a review of disaster recovery 
funds appropriated to Puerto Rico following Hurricanes Irma and 
Maria.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review 
of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's Crossfire 
Hurricane Investigation (Dec. 2019) (online at www.justice.gov/storage/
120919-examination.pdf); Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector 
General, A Review of ATF's Operation Fast and Furious and Related 
Matters (Nov. 2012) (online at https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2012/
s1209.pdf); Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Office of Inspector General, Review of HUD's Disbursement 
of Grant Funds
Appropriated for Disaster Recovery and Mitigation Activities in Puerto 
Rico (Apr. 20, 2021)
(online at https://hudoig.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/
HUD%20OIG%20Final%20Report _2019SU008945I.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress, for many years and on a bipartisan basis, has 
attempted to provide the IG community with this authority.\36\ 
In 2014, then-Committee Chairman Darrell Issa (R-CA) stated 
after the Committee reported favorably a bill with language 
similar to this title on a voice vote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\H.R. 4917, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. 2395, 114th Cong. (2015); 
H.R. 5492, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. 5815, 111th Cong. (2009).

          With Inspectors General facing obstruction by 
        agencies, this legislation provides much-needed tools 
        to our independent watchdogs as they work to reduce 
        agency waste and mismanagement. The provision of 
        testimonial subpoena authority will enhance the ability 
        of Inspectors General to conduct thorough audits and 
        investigations. This reform sends a message of 
        congressional support for full and timely compliance 
        with the important work of Inspectors General, and I 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        thank my colleagues for their support.\37\

    \37\House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Press 
Release: Oversight Committee Approves Bipartisan Inspector General 
Empowerment Legislation (Sept. 17, 2014) (online at https://
republicans-oversight.house.gov/release/oversight-committee-approves-
bipartisan-inspector-general-empowerment-legislation/).

    In 2016, Representative Mark Meadows (R-NC), supported a 
similar provision during floor debate on broad IG legislation 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that the House passed by voice vote:

          The bill we are considering today will make the IGs 
        even more effective by allowing them to follow the 
        facts where they lead. For years, the IGs have asked us 
        to extend to them the authority to issue subpoenas to 
        get answers from government contractors and former 
        Federal employees.
          Independent sources, including the DOJ's National 
        Procurement Task Force and the Project on Government 
        Oversight, have also urged Congress to expand the 
        testimonial subpoena authority.
          This bill provides the expanded authority that the 
        IGs have asked for, but with safeguards in place to 
        make sure that they protect against the possibility 
        that an IG's investigation would interfere with an 
        ongoing criminal investigation, or do other harm.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\U.S. House of Representatives, Debate on H.R. 2395 (June 21, 
2016) (online at www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2016/06/21/
house-section/article/H4002-1).

    In 2018, Representative Steve Russell (R-OK), the lead 
sponsor of a bill with substantially similar language in H.R. 
2662 that the House passed by voice vote, spoke in favor of his 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
bill on the floor prior to passage:

          To effectively identify waste, fraud, and abuse, IGs 
        should be able to conduct a thorough and complete 
        investigation. To conduct a thorough and complete 
        investigation, however, IGs need to be able to talk to 
        the people involved.
          Unfortunately, inspectors general haven't always been 
        able to obtain testimony from those key individuals. 
        They collect testimony from Federal employees, but 
        sometimes the employees resign or retire before the 
        inspectors general can review them. In fact, the IG 
        community has informed us of many cases that went cold 
        when witnesses left the agencies or refused to testify 
        voluntarily.
          This bill seeks to address these gaps in the 
        evidentiary record by permitting IGs to subpoena the 
        testimony of witnesses during the course of an audit or 
        investigation. The bill establishes procedures to 
        ensure the authority is not abused.\39\

    \39\U.S. House of Representatives, Debate on H.R. 4917 (Sept. 26, 
2018) (online at www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2018/09/26/
house-section/article/H9070-1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In her letter setting forth CIGIE legislative priorities, 
IG Buller explained the need for testimonial subpoena 
authority:

          OIG oversight can be substantially hampered by the 
        inability to compel the testimony of witnesses who have 
        information that cannot be obtained by other means. 
        Congress could address this concern by providing IGs 
        with the authority to subpoena the testimony of certain 
        witnesses as necessary in the performance of OIG 
        oversight. For example, this authority is especially 
        important in cases where a Federal employee resigns. 
        Without testimonial subpoena authority, that employee's 
        resignation can limit an IG audit, investigation, or 
        other review into matters pertaining to that 
        individual's former responsibilities. IGs also face 
        difficulty accessing key information during an inquiry 
        into other individuals or entities with whom the 
        Federal government does business. Examples include 
        subcontractors or subgrantees that have no direct 
        contractual relationship with the Federal government 
        but are suspected of defrauding a federally funded 
        program; in these cases, IGs have limited recourse if 
        employees of contractors refuse to provide information 
        to the IG during an audit or investigation.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\Letter from Inspector General Kathy A. Buller, Legislation 
Committee Chair, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency, to Lesley A. Field, Acting Executive Chairperson, Council 
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (Jan. 27, 2021) 
(online at www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/untracked/
CIGIE_Legislative_Priorities_117th_Congress.pdf).

    At the Committee's hearing on May 3, 2021, Ms. Hempowicz 
testified that the inability of IGs to compel testimony 
``completely undermines their ability to conduct fulsome 
investigations.''\41\ In addition, in a May 2021 letter to the 
Committee, DOJ IG Horowitz strongly endorsed this reform, 
stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Improving 
Government Accountability and Transparency (May 3, 2021) (online at 
https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/improving-government-
accountability-and-transparency).

          As I have noted on multiple occasions in testimony 
        before this Committee, both in my past role as Chair of 
        the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and 
        Efficiency (CIGIE) and as the DOJ IG, I strongly 
        support granting IGs testimonial subpoena authority 
        because the absence of such authority hinders the 
        ability of OIGs to conduct complete oversight. Without 
        this authority, OIGs are unable to obtain potentially 
        critical evidence from former federal employees, 
        employees of federal contractors and grant recipients, 
        and other non-government witnesses unless they 
        voluntarily agree to be interviewed. For example, a 
        federal employee's resignation or retirement enables 
        the former employee to avoid being interviewed by an 
        OIG about serious misconduct the former employee 
        allegedly engaged in while working for the federal 
        government. Similarly, an OIG's inability to compel 
        testimony from federal contractors and grant recipients 
        can result in the OIG being unable to gather sufficient 
        evidence to hold the contractor or grant recipient 
        accountable for waste, fraud, and abuse in connection 
        with the use of federal funds, and therefore affects 
        our ability to recover misused federal funds.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\Letter from Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz, Department 
of Justice, to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney and Ranking Member James 
Comer, Committee on Oversight and Reform (May 24, 2021) (online at 
https://oversight.house.gov /sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov /
files/DOJ%20OIG%20 to%20COR%20IG%20 legislation %2005.24.21.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AUTHORITY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IG TO INITIATE ATTORNEY 
                       MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS

    Title VI of H.R. 2662 would provide the DOJ IG with the 
authority to investigate misconduct by DOJ attorneys. 
Currently, the DOJ OIG must refer allegations of misconduct by 
DOJ attorneys to the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility 
(OPR), rather than initiate an investigation itself. The title 
addresses this issue by amending the Inspector General Act to 
repeal the provision requiring this referral.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. App. Sec.  8E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Having a statutorily independent entity investigate 
attorney misconduct would ensure independent oversight, 
transparency, and accountability. The DOJ OIG--like all federal 
OIGs--maintains a level of independence from the management of 
the agency it oversees. OPR does not have the same statutory 
requirement for independence and is within DOJ's chain of 
command.
    According to a May 2021 letter to the Committee from DOJ IG 
Horowitz, the DOJ OIG has the capacity and experience to review 
professional misconduct cases and would use the same standards 
currently used by the DOJ OPR. The DOJ OIG employs dozens of 
attorneys whose backgrounds and experiences are similar to OPR, 
including former prosecutors and DOJ attorneys specializing in 
attorney ethics, who would handle professional misconduct 
allegations. These OIG attorneys are from the same divisions 
that have long conducted sensitive and complex 
investigations.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\Letter from Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz, Department 
of Justice, to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney and Ranking Member James 
Comer, Committee on Oversight and Reform (May 24, 2021) (online at 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
DOJ%20OIG%20to%20COR%20IG%20legislation%2005.24.21.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    IG Horowitz also noted that under current practice, DOJ OIG 
may only initiate investigations of attorney professional 
misconduct with the approval of the Deputy Attorney General. IG 
Horowitz stated, however, that DOJ has denied every one of 
OIG's requests to investigate serious allegations, including 
the circumstances under which Jeffrey Epstein received a non-
prosecution agreement from the Southern District of 
Florida.\45\ IG Horowitz noted other instances of potential 
misconduct his office could not investigate under current law, 
including potential abuses related to use of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act warrants and interference in the 
2020 presidential election.\46\ IG Horowitz summarized the 
issue as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\Project on Government Oversight, Acosta-Epstein Deal Sparks 
Calls for Independent DOJ Misconduct Investigations (Jan. 10, 2019) 
(online at www.pogo.org/analysis/2019/01/acosta-epstein-deal-sparks-
calls-for-independent-doj-misconduct-investigations/).
    \46\See Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 
Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's 
Crossfire Hurricane Investigation (December 2019) (online at 
www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf); The Justice Dept.'s 
Inspector General Opens an Investigation into Any Efforts to Overturn 
the Election, New York Times (Jan. 25, 2021) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2021/01/25/us/politics/justice-dept-investigation-
election-trump.html).

          Requiring the OIG to request permission from 
        Department leadership to handle a matter, and 
        empowering the Deputy Attorney General to ``block'' OIG 
        oversight of a serious misconduct allegation, 
        undermines IG independence and is inconsistent with the 
        Inspector General Act.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\Letter from Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz, Department 
of Justice, to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney and Ranking Member James 
Comer, Committee on Oversight and Reform (May 24, 2021) (online at 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
DOJ%20OIG%20to%20COR%20IG%20legislation%2005.24.21.pdf).

    In concluding his letter, IG Horowitz expressed strong 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
support for closing this loophole:

          The DOJ OIG is the only Inspector General in the 
        federal government that does not have the authority to 
        investigate alleged misconduct, including professional 
        misconduct, by attorneys who work in the agency it 
        oversees. As I have stated many times in past 
        Congressional testimony, there is no principled basis 
        for authorizing OIG oversight of DOJ law enforcement 
        personnel, such as FBI agents, while excluding DOJ 
        lawyers from that same OIG oversight. Providing the DOJ 
        OIG with the authority to exercise jurisdiction in 
        attorney professional misconduct cases would enhance 
        the public's confidence in the outcomes of these 
        investigations and provide the OIG with the same 
        authority as every other IG.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\Id.

    Similarly, Representative James Comer (R-KY), Ranking 
Member of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, said on the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
House floor on November 29, 2018:

          It is important to note that this division of 
        authority is a unique situation in the Federal IG 
        community. For instance, the Securities and Exchange 
        Commission Office of Inspector General is responsible 
        for handling misconduct allegations against SEC 
        lawyers, including those with prosecuting 
        authority.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\U.S. House of Representatives, Debate on H.R. 3154 (Nov. 29, 
2018) (online at www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2018/11/29/
house-section/article/H9717-1).

Rep. Comer stressed the ``importance of eliminating this 
discrepancy,'' and urged his colleagues to support this 
provision. He said: ``The need for this legislation has also 
been discussed in multiple hearings before our committee and in 
reports by watchdog groups.''\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Seventeen organizations that represent diverse viewpoints--
including, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
Americans for Prosperity, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU 
School of Law, Government Accountability Project, and R Street 
Institute--also support this provision, stating in a March 2021 
letter:

          Given that DOJ attorneys are among the most powerful 
        federal employees--with the ability to make life-and-
        death decisions--it is imperative that their 
        professionalism and official actions be beyond 
        reproach. It is therefore critical for an independent 
        watchdog, such as an inspector general, to have the 
        statutory authority to investigate any allegation that 
        may call into question the actions and conduct of DOJ 
        attorneys.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\Project on Government Oversight, Cross-Partisan Coalition Calls 
on Senate to Enact DOJ Accountability Bill (Mar. 26, 2021) (online at 
www.pogo.org/letter/2021/03/cross-partisan-coalition-calls-on-senate-
to-enact-doj-accountability-bill/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Additional reforms

    H.R. 2662 would make several additional reforms, including 
enhanced whistleblower training for OIG employees, disclosure 
to Congress of ongoing OIG audits and investigations when the 
President removes an IG, authorization of a single 
appropriation for CIGIE, notification to Congress when an 
agency unreasonably refuses to provide information or 
assistance to IGs, and trainings for IGs in their duties and 
responsibilities.
    CIGIE requested the reforms authorizing a single CIGIE 
appropriation and notifying Congress when an agency refuses 
information or assistance to IGs. IG Buller described the need 
for a single appropriation in the CIGIE legislative priorities 
letter:

          Acting as the collective body of IGs, CIGIE fulfills 
        its twin mission to (1) address integrity, economy, and 
        effectiveness issues that transcend individual 
        Government agencies and (2) increase the 
        professionalism and effectiveness of IG community 
        employees. While CIGIE has steadily increased the 
        amount and scope of its work over its 10 years of 
        existence, this independent agency is still primarily 
        funded through an inefficient and complicated process 
        of interagency collections individually deposited into 
        a revolving fund. OIGs make these individual deposits 
        without clear congressional direction regarding how 
        much funding CIGIE should receive or how much any 
        individual OIG should provide. In contrast, CIGIE has 
        leveraged to great effect limited, one-time 
        appropriations for enhancements to Oversight.gov. In 
        addition, Congress recently authorized a partial 
        appropriation for CIGIE. A direct, annual appropriation 
        will streamline and make more transparent the process 
        by which CIGIE is funded. Moreover, with a direct, 
        annual appropriation, Congress and the President can 
        better align funding with CIGIE's responsibilities and 
        the work congressional stakeholders frequently ask of 
        it.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\Letter from Inspector General Kathy A. Buller, Legislation 
Committee Chair, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency, to Lesley A. Field, Acting Executive Chairperson, Council 
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (Jan. 27, 2021) 
(online at www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/untracked/
CIGIE_Legislative_Priorities_117th_Congress.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Section-by-Section Analysis


Sec. 1. Short title

    The short title is the ``IG Independence and Empowerment 
Act.''

                TITLE I--INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE


Sec. 101. Short title

    The short title is the ``Inspector General Independence 
Act.''

Sec. 102. Amendment

    Paragraph (1) amends subsection (b) of section 3 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to add a 
provision requiring that a President may only remove an IG with 
documentation transmitted to Congress of the following causes: 
permanent incapacity, neglect of duty, malfeasance, conviction 
of a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude, knowing 
violation of a law or regulation, gross mismanagement, gross 
waste of funds, abuse of authority, or inefficiency.
    Paragraph (2) amends subsection (e) of section 8G of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to add a 
provision requiring that an IG at a designated Federal entity 
only be removed with documentation transmitted to Congress of 
the following causes: permanent incapacity, neglect of duty, 
malfeasance, conviction of a felony or conduct involving moral 
turpitude, knowing violation of a law or regulation, gross 
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or 
inefficiency.

 TITLE II--CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF INSPECTOR 
                                GENERAL


Sec. 201. Short title

    The short title is the ``Inspector General Protection 
Act.''

Sec. 202. Change in status of Inspector General offices

            Subsection (a)--Change in Status of Inspector General of 
                    Offices
    Subsection (a) amends subsection (b) of section 3 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require the 
President to notify Congress when placing an IG of a federal 
agency on non-duty status, at least 30 days before that change 
in status takes effect.
            Subsection (b)--Change in Status of Inspector General of 
                    Designated Federal Entities
    Subsection (b) amends subsection (e) of section 8G of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require the 
head of a designated Federal entity to notify Congress when 
placing an IG on non-duty status, at least 30 days before that 
change in status takes effect.
            Subsection (c)--Effective Date
    Subsection (c) makes this section effective 30 days after 
the date of enactment of the Act.

Sec. 203. Presidential explanation of failure to nominate an Inspector 
        General

            Subsection (a)--In General
    Subsection (a) amends subchapter III of chapter 33 of title 
5, United States Code, by adding a new section 3349e to 
require, if the President fails to make a formal nomination to 
fill a vacant IG position within 210 days after the vacancy 
occurred, that the President communicate to Congress within 30 
days after the end of that 210 day-period the reasons why the 
President has not yet made a formal nomination and a target 
date for making a formal nomination.
            Subsection (b)--Clerical Amendment
    Subsection (b) renumbers relevant sections of the United 
States Code to conform to the amendment made by subsection (a).
            Subsection (c)--Effective Date
    Subsection (c) makes this section effective as of the date 
of enactment of the Act and only apply to vacancies occurring 
after that date.

           TITLE III--VACANCY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL POSITIONS


Sec. 301. Vacancy of Inspector General positions

            Subsection (a)--In General
    Subsection (a) amends section 3345 of title 5, United 
States Code, to require that, in the event of a vacancy of an 
IG position that requires Senate confirmation, the first 
assistant in the same OIG shall serve as the acting IG. In the 
event that the first assistant position in that office is also 
vacant, the President may appoint any individual currently 
serving in an OIG, as long as that individual has served in a 
position in an OIG for at least 90 days in the year prior to 
the IG vacancy occurring, and that individual was paid at a GS 
15 rate or higher.
            Subsection (b)--Application
    Subsection (b) makes this section apply only to IG 
vacancies occurring on or after the date of enactment of the 
Act.

  TITLE IV--COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 
                              TRANSPARENCY


Sec. 401. Short title

    The short title is the ``Integrity Committee Transparency 
Act of 2021.''

Sec. 402. Additional information to be included in requests and reports 
        to Congress

    Paragraph (1) amends subsection (d) of section 11 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) to require that 
the CIGIE Integrity Committee provide additional information to 
Congress when requiring an extension to evaluate an allegation 
of wrongdoing for referral to the Integrity Committee Chair for 
investigation. Specifically, the Integrity Committee's written 
notice to applicable Congressional Committees must include 
descriptions of how long it had been evaluating the allegation 
of wrongdoing and any previous extension requests related to 
the allegation, including why the extension was needed.
    Paragraph (2) amends further amends subsection (d) of 
section 11 to require that the Integrity Committee include 
recommendations for corrective action in its reports of 
investigations into alleged wrongdoing.

Sec. 403. Availability of information to Members of Congress regarding 
        certain allegations of wrongdoing closed without referral

    This section amends subsection (d) of section 11 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) by adding a new 
subparagraph requiring the Integrity Committee to provide a 
written report to Members of Congress who have made allegations 
of wrongdoing that were not referred to the Integrity Committee 
Chair to investigate. The Integrity Committee is required to 
provide the written report no later than 60 days after the 
allegation was closed to the Chairs and Ranking Members of the 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform (COR), Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC), a member 
of the House of Representatives who has the support of seven 
members of COR, and a member of the Senate who has the support 
of five members of HSGAC. This report shall include a 
description of the allegation and the Integrity Committee's 
evaluation of the allegation. The Integrity Committee Chair is 
further required to forward any written descriptions or updates 
to the members of the Integrity Committee and CIGIE Chair.

Sec. 404. Semiannual report

    This section amends subsection (d) of section 11 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to increase the 
Integrity Committee's regular reporting to Congress on its 
activities, making this a semi-annual requirement.
    This section further amends section 11 to include more 
detailed requirements for the content of the Integrity 
Committee's semiannual reports. Specifically, the Integrity 
Committee is required to include an overview and analysis of 
allegations received during the reporting period and those 
still pending from previous reporting periods, including 
positions and duties of the individuals against whom misconduct 
was alleged; the categories and types of allegations; and 
summary of the disposition of the allegations. This section 
also requires these reports to include a status of 
investigations, a summary of findings for completed 
investigations, and descriptions of any difficulties 
encountered by the Integrity Committee during investigations, 
including attempts to prevent or hinder the investigation or 
concerns about integrity or operations at the office of the IG 
under investigation.

Sec. 405. Additional reports; Rules of construction

    This section amends subsection (d) of section 11 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require the 
Integrity Committee Chair to report immediately to an IG if the 
Integrity Committee becomes aware of any particularly serious 
or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies at the IG's 
office. The IG would have to transmit this report to COR and 
HSGAC within seven days of receiving the report.
    This section also adds rules of construction to specify 
that subsection (d) of section 11 does not authorize the public 
disclosure of information when it is otherwise prohibited by 
law, protected from disclosure in the interest of national 
security or in the conduct of foreign affairs, or is part of an 
ongoing criminal investigation. In addition, the information 
may be provided to any Member of Congress upon request of the 
Member, subject to any other provision of law that would 
prohibit disclosure. Finally, this section adds an additional 
rule of construction stating that the Integrity Committee may 
not disclose any information that includes personally 
identifiable information without consent of the individual.

Sec. 406. Membership of Integrity Committee

    Paragraph (1) amends subsection (d) of section 11 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to expand the 
membership of the Integrity Committee as described in paragraph 
(2) of this section.
    Paragraph (2) further amends subsection (d) of section 11 
to require that the CIGIE chair appoint a former IG to the 
Integrity Committee, subject to the willingness and 
availability of a qualified candidate, as determined by the 
Chair. The individual appointed would serve a two-year term at 
the pleasure of the CIGIE Chair that could be extended for an 
additional term not to exceed two years. This paragraph also 
provides for various compensation and reimbursements for the 
former IG appointed to the Integrity Committee and allows the 
individual to serve as a volunteer.

Sec. 407. Requirement to refer allegations of wrongdoing against 
        Inspector General to Integrity Committee

            Subsection (a)--Requirement
    Subsection (a) makes technical changes to subsection (d) of 
section 11 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) 
and adds a new subparagraph to require an IG refer allegations 
of wrongdoing against themselves to the Integrity Committee.
            Subsection (b)--Technical and Conforming Amendment
    Subsection (b) makes further technical changes to section 
11 to reflect the amendment in subsection (a).

Sec. 408. Requirement to report final disposition to Congress

    Paragraph (1) amends subsection (d) of section 11 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to ensure that 
Congress receives final reports of Integrity Committee 
investigations into alleged wrongdoing at the same time CIGIE's 
Executive Chair and applicable appointing authority for the 
inspector general under investigation receives such reports.
    Paragraph (2) further amends subsection (d) of section 11 
to specify that HSGAC, COR, and other congressional committees 
of jurisdiction should also receive reports from the CIGIE 
Executive Chair on the final disposition of the report.

    TITLE V--ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY PROVISIONS FOR INSPECTORS GENERAL


Sec. 501. Short title

    The short title is the ``IG Subpoena Authority Act.''

Sec. 502. Additional authority provisions for Inspectors General

    Paragraph 1 amends the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 
U.S.C. App.) by adding a new section 6A to authorize IGs to 
subpoena the attendance and testimony of individuals, other 
than current federal employees or current employees of a 
designated Federal entity, as necessary in carrying out the 
provisions of the Inspector General Act. This authority may 
only be delegated to an official performing the functions and 
duties of the IG in the event of an IG vacancy or the inability 
of an IG to perform the functions and duties of the Office.
    This section creates a panel of three IGs selected by CIGIE 
to review and approve any proposed subpoena within a specified 
timeframe. Following approval from the panel, the issuing IG 
must notify the Attorney General of the subpoena. The Attorney 
General may object within a specified timeframe to a subpoena 
because the subpoena will interfere with an ongoing 
investigation. In addition, this section defines ``Inspector 
General'' for the purposes of this section as any IG 
established under the Inspector General Act or any other law. 
This section also directs the Chairperson of CIGIE to issue 
guidelines to carry out this section.
    Paragraph 2 amends subsection (a) of section 5 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require that a 
description of the use of witness testimony subpoenas 
authorized by this Act are reported in IG semiannual reports.
    Paragraph 3 amends subsection (g) of section 8A of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to specify that 
the authority to subpoena witness testimony authorized by this 
section applies to IGs at designated Federal entities.

      TITLE VI--INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERSONNEL


Sec. 601. Short title

    The short title is the ``Inspector General Access Act.''

Sec. 602. Investigations of Department of Justice personnel

    This section amends section 8E of the Inspector General Act 
of 1978 (Appendix to title 5, United States Code) to repeal a 
provision requiring the DOJ IG to refer allegations of 
misconduct involving Department attorneys to the OPR if the 
allegations relate to the exercise of the authority of an 
attorney to investigate, litigate, or provide legal advice. 
This section also makes technical changes to the surrounding 
paragraphs to reflect the repeal.

    TITLE VII--OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS


Sec. 701. Short title

    The short title is the ``Enhanced Whistleblower Protection 
Act.''

Sec. 702. Office of Inspector General whistleblower complaints

            Subsection (a)--Whistleblower Protection Coordinator.
    Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) amends subsection (d) of 
section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5. U.S.C. App.) 
to require that OIG Whistleblower Protection Coordinators 
educate OIG employees in whistleblower retaliation prohibitions 
and whistleblower rights, which is already required under 
current law of OIG Whistleblower Protection Coordinators for 
agency employees.
    Paragraph (2) of subsection (a) further amends section 3 to 
require that OIG Whistleblower Protection Coordinators assist 
IGs in coordinating with the CIGIE Integrity Committee, in 
addition to existing requirements to coordinate among other 
entities including the Office of Special Counsel, CIGIE, the 
agency, and Congress.
            Subsection (b)--Council of the Inspectors General on 
                    Integrity and Efficiency
    Subsection (b) amends subsection (c) of section 11 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require that 
CIGIE develop best practices for handling whistleblower 
reprisal allegations arising from matters internal to an OIG, 
in addition to existing requirements for developing such best 
practices for handling general whistleblower disclosures and 
allegations of reprisal.

TITLE VIII--NOTICE OF ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS WHEN THERE IS A CHANGE IN 
                      STATUS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL


Sec. 801. Notice of ongoing investigations when there is a change in 
        status of Inspector General

            Subsection (a)--Change in Status of Inspector General of 
                    Establishment.
    Subsection (a) amends subsection (b) of section 3 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require, 
within 15 days of an IG of a federal agency being removed, 
placed on non-duty status, or transferred, that the acting IG 
of that agency submit to the House Committee on Oversight and 
Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs a list of all audits and investigations in 
process at that OIG at the time of removal, placement on non-
duty status, or transfer.
            Subsection (b)--Change in Status of Inspector General of 
                    Designated Federal Entities
    Subsection (b) amends subsection (e) of section 8G of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require, 
within 15 days of an IG of a designated Federal entity being 
removed, placed on non-duty status, or transferred, that the 
acting IG of that entity submit to the House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs a list of all audits and 
investigations in process at that OIG at the time of removal, 
placement on non-duty status, or transfer.

TITLE IX--COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 
                             APPROPRIATION


Sec. 901. CIGIE appropriation

            Subsection (a)--Availability of Appropriated Funds
    Subsection (a) amends subsection (c) of section 11 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to authorize an 
appropriation for CIGIE of such sums as may be necessary to 
carry out the functions and duties of CIGIE.
            Subsection (b)--Removing Council Funding from Individual 
                    Inspector General Budget Requests
    Subsection (b) amends subsection (g) of section 6 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to repeal 
language requiring that IGs include funding requests for CIGIE 
in annual budget requests. This subsection also makes technical 
changes to the surrounding paragraphs to reflect the repeal.
            Subsection (c)--Effective Date
    Subsection (c) makes subsection (b) effective 30 days after 
the first receipt by CIGIE of an appropriation authorized under 
subsection (a).

    TITLE X--NOTICE OF REFUSAL TO PROVIDE INSPECTORS GENERAL ACCESS


Sec. 1001. Notice of refusal to provide information or assistance to 
        Inspectors General

    This section amends subsection (c) of section 6 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require that 
an IG report to congressional committees of jurisdiction, 
within 30 days of making a similar report to the establishment 
or agency head as required under existing law, when an 
establishment or agency unreasonably refuses an IG request or 
otherwise does not provide information or assistance to an IG 
when requested.

          TITLE XI--ENHANCEMENTS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL TRAINING


Sec. 1101. Short title

    The short title is the ``Inspector General Training 
Enhancement Act.''

Sec. 1102. Enhancements to Inspector General training

    This section amends subsection (c) of section 11 of the 
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to require that 
CIGIE establish minimum standards and best practices for 
training IGs in the duties, responsibilities, and authorities 
established by the Inspector General Act, as well as areas of 
relevant law as identified by CIGIE.

                      TITLE XII--BUDGETARY EFFECTS


Sec. 1201. Determination of budgetary effects

    This section states that the budgetary effects of this Act, 
for the purposes of the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, 
are determined in a separate statement submitted to the 
Congressional Record by the Chair of the House Budget Committee 
prior to the House voting on the Act.

                        TITLE XIII--SEVERABILITY


Sec. 1301. Severability

    This section states that if a provision of this Act is 
determined to be invalid or unconstitutional, it does not make 
the entire Act invalid or unconstitutional.

                          Legislative History


                FULL IG INDEPENDENCE AND EMPOWERMENT ACT

    During the 117th Congress, on April 19, 2021, 
Representatives Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY), Chairwoman of the 
Committee, Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Majority Leader of the House, 
Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA), Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Government Operations, Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA), Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Jimmy Gomez (D-CA), Katie 
Porter (D-CA), and Ted Lieu (D-CA) introduced H.R. 2662, the IG 
Independence and Empowerment Act, which includes several 
provisions from other bills. H.R. 2662 was referred to the 
Committee on Oversight and Reform and the Committee on the 
Budget. On May 25, 2021, the Oversight Committee considered 
H.R. 2662 at a business meeting with a quorum present. The 
Committee ordered the bill reported favorably, as amended, by a 
record vote of 22 18. In a May 28, 2021, letter (attached to 
this report), the Committee on Budget waived formal 
consideration of the bill.
    On April 20, 2021, the Subcommittee on Government 
Operations, Committee on Oversight and Reform, held a hearing 
to consider proposed reforms included in H.R. 2662. The 
Subcommittee heard testimony from Allison C. Lerner, National 
Science Foundation IG and Chair of CIGIE; Kathy A. Buller, 
Peace Corps IG and Legislation Committee Chair of CIGIE; Clark 
Ervin, former IG of the Departments of Homeland Security and 
State; Liz Hempowicz, Director of Public Policy of the Project 
on Government Oversight (POGO); and Mia M. Forgy, Deputy IG of 
the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
    On May 3, 2021, the Committee held a hearing to consider 
proposals in H.R. 2662. The Committee heard testimony from 
James-Christian Blockwood, Executive Vice President of the 
Partnership for Public Service; Liz Hempowicz, Director of 
Public Policy of POGO; Rudy Mehrbani, Senior Advisor of the 
Democracy Fund; and Zack Smith, Legal Fellow of the Heritage 
Foundation.
    On May 25, 2021, the Committee considered H.R. 2662 at a 
business meeting with a quorum present. The Committee ordered 
the bill reported favorably, as amended, by a recorded vote of 
22 to 18.

                     RELATED PROPOSALS FOR REFORMS

H.R. 2662 Title I--Inspector General Independence Act

    During the 116th Congress, on May 22, 2020, Representative 
Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY), Chairwoman of the Committee, 
introduced H.R. 6984, the Inspector General Independence Act, 
with Representative Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD), Majority Leader of 
the House, Representative Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA), Chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Government Operations, and 
Representative Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA), Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on National Security. H.R. 6984 had 16 additional 
cosponsors. H.R. 6984 was referred to the Committee. The 
Inspector General Independence Act comprises title I of H.R. 
2662.
    On May 12, 2020, Representative Nita M. Lowey (D-NY), 
introduced H.R. 6800, the Heroes Act, with Chairwoman Maloney 
and ten other committee chairs. H.R. 6800 was referred to the 
Committees on Appropriations, Budget, and Ways and Means. On 
May 15, 2020, H.R. 6800 was passed by the House of 
Representatives by a vote of 208 199. Sections 70102, 70103, 
70104 of H.R. 6800, are the same text as title I (the Inspector 
General Independence Act) and title II (the Inspector General 
Protection Act) of H.R. 2662.
    During the 110th Congress, on February 8, 2007, 
Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN) introduced H.R. 928, Inspector 
General Reform Act. Cosponsors of the bill included 
Representatives Henry A. Waxman, then-Chairman of the 
Committee, Edolphus Towns, (D-NY), then-Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and 
Procurement, Christopher Shays (R-CT), then-Ranking Member of 
the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Bart 
Gordon (D-TN), Michael N. Castle (R-DE), Dennis Moore, (D-KS), 
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (D-GA). The text of H.R. 928 is similar 
to title I of H.R. 2662.
    The Committee held a markup to consider H.R. 928 on August 
2, 2007, and ordered the bill to be reported, as amended, by 
voice vote. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 928 on 
October 3, 2007, by a recorded vote of 404 to 11.

H.R. 2662 Title II--Inspector General Protection Act

    During the 117th Congress, on January 4, 2021, 
Representatives Ted Lieu (D-CA) and Jody B. Hice (R-GA), 
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Government Operations, 
introduced H.R. 23, the Inspector General Protection Act. On 
January 5, 2021, H.R. 23 was passed by the House of 
Representatives by voice vote. H.R. 23 comprises title II of 
H.R. 2662.
    During the 116th Congress, on March 21, 2019, 
Representatives Ted Lieu (D-CA) and Jody B. Hice (R-GA), 
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Government Operations, 
introduced H.R. 1847, the Inspector General Protection Act, 
with substantially the same text as the version in the 117th 
Congress. On March 26, 2019, H.R. 1847 was ordered to be 
reported favorably by the Committee by a voice vote. On July 
17, 2019, H.R. 1847 was passed by the House of Representatives 
by a voice vote.

H.R. 2662 Title III--Inspector General Vacancies

    During the 117th Congress, on May 4, 2021, Representative 
Katie Porter (D-CA), along with Representatives Carolyn B. 
Maloney (D-NY), Chairwoman of the Committee, Gerald E. Connolly 
(D-VA), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Operations, 
Bennie Thompson (D-MS), Adam Smith (D-WA), Jerrold Nadler (D-
NY), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Raul Grijalva (D-AZ), and Mark Takano 
(D-CA), introduced H.R. 2994, the Accountability for Acting 
Officials Act. The bill was referred to the Committee for 
consideration. Subsection (d) of section 2 of H.R. 2994 
comprises title III of H.R. 2662.
    During the 116th Congress, the language in title III of 
H.R. 2662 passed the House on July 21, 2020, as part of H.R. 
6395, section 1115, the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2021, but was not included in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 that was signed into 
law. Prior to passage, this same language was included in H.R. 
6689, the Accountability for Acting Officials Act, introduced 
on May 1, 2020, by Rep. Porter and the same cosponsors as the 
version of the bill introduced in the 117th Congress.

H.R. 2662 Title IV--Integrity Committee Transparency Act

    During the 117th Congress, on April 20, 2021, 
Representative Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA), Subcommittee on 
Government Operations Chairman, along with Representatives Jody 
B. Hice (R-GA), Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Carolyn B. 
Maloney (D-NY), Chairwoman of the Committee, Danny K. Davis (D-
IL), Katie Porter (D-CA), Jamie Raskin (D-MD), Brenda Lawrence 
(D-MI), Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA), Ro Khanna (D-CA), John 
Sarbanes (D-MD), and Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) introduced 
H.R. 2681, the Integrity Committee Transparency Act. The 
Committee reported H.R. 2681 favorably by voice vote at the 
Committee business meeting on May 13, 2021. H.R. 2681 comprises 
title IV of H.R. 2662.
    During the 116th Congress, on September 18, 2019, 
Representative Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA), Chair of the 
Subcommittee on Government Operations, along with 
Representatives Elijah E. Cummings (D-MD), then-Chairman of the 
Committee, Mark Meadows (R-NC), and Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA) 
introduced H.R. 4382, the Integrity Committee Transparency Act 
of 2019, with similar text to the version in H.R. 2662, as 
amended. On September 16, 2020, H.R. 4382, as amended, was 
reported favorably by the Committee by a voice vote.

H.R. 2662 Title V--IG Subpoena Authority Act

    During the 117th Congress, on March 19, 2021, 
Representative Jimmy Gomez (D-CA), along with Representatives 
Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY) and Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA), and 
Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) introduced H.R. 2089, the 
IG Subpoena Authority Act, which would provide IGs with the 
authority to subpoena witness testimony from non-federal 
employees. H.R. 2089 was referred to the Committee for 
consideration. H.R. 2089 comprises title V of H.R. 2662.
    During the 116th Congress, on February 2, 2018, 
Representative Steve Russell (R-OK), along with Representative 
Matt Cartwright (D-PA) introduced H.R. 4917, the IG Subpoena 
Authority Act. The bill was referred to the Committee for 
consideration. On June 29, 2018, the Committee ordered H.R. 
4917 favorably reported by voice vote, and on September 26, 
2018, the House passed the bill by voice vote.
    In the 114th Congress, on May 18, 2015, then-Chairman Jason 
Chaffetz (R-UT) introduced H.R. 2395, the Inspector General 
Empowerment Act of 2016, with Representative Mark Meadows (R-
NC) and Ranking Minority Member Elijah E. Cummings (D-MD). The 
bill was referred to the Committee for consideration. H.R. 2395 
contained a similar provision to future versions of IG 
testimonial subpoena authority language. On May 19, 2015, the 
Committee ordered H.R. 2395 favorably reported by voice vote 
and on June 21, 2016, the House passed the bill, as amended, by 
voice vote.

H.R. 2662 Title VI--Inspector General Access Act

    During the 117th Congress, on May 7, 2021, Representative 
Deborah Ross (D-NC), along with Representatives Jamie Raskin 
(D-MD), Darrell Issa (R-CA), Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY), 
Chairwoman of the Committee, Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA), 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Operations, Jody B. 
Hice (R-GA), Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Government 
Operations, and Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC) introduced H.R. 
3064, the Inspector General Access Act, which would provide the 
DOJ IG with the authority to investigate misconduct by DOJ 
attorneys. The bill was referred to the Committee for 
consideration. H.R. 3064 comprises title VI of H.R. 2662, the 
IG Independence and Empowerment Act.
    During the 116th Congress, on January 3, 2019, 
Representative Cedric Richmond (D-LA), along with 
Representatives Elijah E. Cummings (D-MD), then-Chairman of the 
Committee, Jody B. Hice (R-GA), and Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA), 
introduced H.R. 202, the Inspector General Access Act of 2019, 
with the same text as H.R. 3064. The bill was referred to the 
Committee for consideration. A companion bill, S. 685, 
Inspector General Access Act of 2019, was introduced by Senator 
Mike Lee (R-UT), along with Senators Chuck Grassley (R-IA), 
Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), and Marco Rubio (R-FL) on March 6, 2019. 
H.R. 202 passed the House on January 15, 2019 by voice vote.
    During the 115th Congress, on June 29, 2017, Representative 
Cedric Richmond (D-LA), along with Representatives Jody B. Hice 
(R-GA), John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), and Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA), 
introduced H.R. 3154, the Inspector General Access Act of 2017, 
with the same text as later versions of the bill. The bill was 
referred to the Committee for consideration. The Committee 
considered H.R. 3154 at a business meeting on September 27, 
2018, and ordered the bill favorably reported by unanimous 
consent. A companion bill, S. 3003, the Inspector General 
Access Act of 2018, was introduced by Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), 
along with Senators Chuck Grassley (R-IA) and Lisa Murkowski 
(R-AK) on June 6, 2018. H.R. 3154 passed the House on November 
29, 2018 by voice vote.
    During the 114th Congress, on May 5, 2015, Representative 
Cedric Richmond (D-LA), along with Representatives John 
Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), Jody B. Hice (R-GA), and Ral R. Labrador 
(R-ID), introduced H.R. 2240, the Inspector General Access Act 
of 2015, with the same text as later versions of the bill. The 
bill was referred to the Committee for consideration. A 
companion bill, S. 618, Inspector General Access Act of 2015, 
was introduced by Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), along with Senators 
Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), and Jon Tester 
(D-MT) on March 2, 2015.

H.R. 2662 Title VII--Enhanced Whistleblower Protection Act

    During the 117th Congress, On May 19, 2021, Representative 
Gerald E. Connolly, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Government 
Operations, introduced H.R. 3338, the Enhanced Whistleblower 
Engagement Act, with Representatives Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY), 
Chairwoman of the Committee, Stephen F. Lynch (D-MA), Danny K. 
Davis (D-IL), Jamie Raskin (D-MD), Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-
DC), Ro Khanna (D-CA), and Katie Porter (D-CA). The bill was 
referred to the Committee for consideration. H.R. 3338 
comprises title VII of H.R. 2662, the IG Independence and 
Empowerment Act and section 4 of S. 587, the Securing Inspector 
General Independence Act of 2021.

                        Committee Consideration

    On May 25, 2021, the Committee considered H.R. 2662 at a 
business meeting. Chairwoman Maloney offered an amendment in 
the nature of a substitute (ANS).
    Representative Andy Biggs (R-AZ) offered an amendment to 
the ANS that would strike title I, title III, and title V from 
the bill. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 15-20.
    Representative Fred Keller (R-PA) offered an amendment to 
the ANS that would strike title I and title II from the bill, 
and make changes to title V. The amendment failed by a recorded 
vote of 18-21.
    The ANS was adopted by a voice vote, and the Committee 
ordered the bill reported favorably, as amended, by a recorded 
vote of 22-18.

                            Roll Call Votes

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the 
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's 
consideration of H.R. 2662:


                       Explanation of Amendments

    During Committee consideration of the bill, Representative 
Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY), Chairwoman of the Committee, offered 
an amendment in the nature of a substitute that modified the 
bill to make technical changes to multiple titles of the bill, 
including title V and title X, as well as changes to title IV 
to conform to language in a separate bill the Committee 
reported favorably on May 13, 2021, H.R. 2681, the Integrity 
Committee Transparency Act, introduced by Representative Gerald 
E. Connolly (D-VA). The Committee adopted the Maloney amendment 
by a voice vote.
    Representative Andy Biggs (R-AZ) offered an amendment that 
would have stricken title I, the for-cause removal protections 
for IGs, title III, requirements for who can serve as an acting 
IG in the event of a vacancy, and title V, testimonial subpoena 
authority for IGs. The amendment was not adopted.
    Representative Fred Keller (R-PA) offered an amendment that 
would have stricken title I, the for-cause removal protections 
for IGs, and title III, requirements for who can serve as an 
acting IG in the event of a vacancy. The amendment would also 
have modified title V, testimonial subpoena authority for IGs, 
to forbid subpoenas of former federal employees who were not 
employed with the federal government on the date of enactment 
of the Act, and to require an IG to pay for the legal 
representation of any witness whose testimony the IG is seeking 
to compel under subpoena. The amendment was not adopted.

                   List of Related Committee Hearings

    In accordance with section 103(i) of H. Res. 6, the 
Committee held hearings to consider the proposals set forth in 
the IG Independence and Empowerment Act, on April 20, 2021, 
before the Subcommittee on Government Operations as part of a 
hearing to consider legislative proposals related to IGs, and 
on May 3, 2021, before the full Committee, as part of a hearing 
to consider various government accountability and transparency 
legislative proposals.

  Statement of Oversight Findings and Recommendations of the Committee

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII and clause 
(2)(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, the Committee finds that greater independence, 
authority, and transparency of inspectors general is necessary 
to effectively and efficiently uncover waste, fraud, and abuse 
and investigate allegations of misconduct in the federal 
government, such that the Committee recommends the adoption of 
this bill (H.R. 2662) to ensure that IGs can continue serving a 
critical oversight function within the federal government and 
report findings to Congress and the American people.

         Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives

    In accordance with clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee's performance 
goal or objective of this bill is to amend the Inspector 
General Act of 1978 to require that an Inspector General is 
removed only for cause, expand authorities and transparency 
requirements relating to federal inspectors general, and for 
other purposes.

              Application of Law to the Legislative Branch

    Section 102(b)(3) of Public Law 104-1 requires a 
description of the application of this bill to the legislative 
branch where the bill relates to the terms and conditions of 
employment or access to public services and accommodations. 
This bill amends the Inspector General Act of 1978 to require 
that an Inspector General is removed only for cause, expand 
authorities and transparency requirements relating to federal 
inspectors general, and for other purposes. As such, this bill 
does not relate to terms and conditions of employment or access 
to public services or accommodations.

                    Duplication of Federal Programs

    In accordance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, no 
provision of this bill establishes or reauthorizes a program of 
the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another 
Federal program, a program that was included in any report from 
the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to 
section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a 
program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal 
Domestic Assistance.

                  Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings

    This bill does not direct the completion of any specific 
rule makings within the meaning of section 551 of title 5, 
United States Code.

                Federal Advisory Committee Act Statement

    The legislation does not establish or authorize the 
establishment of an advisory committee within the definition of 
section 5(b) of the appendix to title 5, United States Code.

                 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Statement

    Pursuant to section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974, the Committee has included a letter received from the 
Congressional Budget Office below.

                         Earmark Identification

    This bill does not include any congressional earmarks, 
limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in 
clause 9 of rule XXI of the House of Representatives.

                        Committee Cost Estimate

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(2)(B) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee includes below a 
cost estimate of the bill prepared by the Director of the 
Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.

   New Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the House of 
Representatives, the cost estimate prepared by the 
Congressional Budget Office and submitted pursuant to section 
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is as follows:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, June 16, 2021.
Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney,
Chairwoman, Committee on Oversight and Reform,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Madam Chairwoman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2662, the IG 
Independence and Empowerment Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew 
Pickford.
            Sincerely,
                                         Phillip L. Swagel,
                                                          Director.
    Enclosure.

    
    

    H.R. 2662 would amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 and 
would require the President and inspectors general (IGs) to 
report to the Congress on certain activities. The bill also 
would require that the Integrity Committee of the Council of 
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) have one 
member who is a former IG, would direct the council to 
establish minimum training standards and best practices for 
IGs, and would authorize the appropriation of whatever amounts 
are necessary for the council.
    In 2020, IGs working in more than 70 federal agencies spent 
$3.1 billion to detect and deter fraud, waste, and abuse and 
produced more than 3,000 audit, investigation, and evaluation 
reports.
    Under current law, each federal agency with an IG provides 
funds annually to operate CIGIE; those funds total about $10 
million a year. H.R. 2662 would authorize appropriations for 
the CIGIE. Based on information from selected IGs and the CIGIE 
regarding their current operations and the new reporting and 
staffing requirements, and accounting for anticipated 
inflation, CBO estimates that implementing this provision would 
cost $52 million over the 2022-2026 period, assuming 
appropriation of the necessary amounts.
    CBO assumes the bill will be enacted near the end of fiscal 
year 2021. The costs of the legislation, detailed in Table 1, 
fall within budget function 800 (general government).

               TABLE 1.--ESTIMATED INCREASES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION UNDER H.R. 2662
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        By fiscal year, millions of dollars--
                                    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        2021       2022       2023       2024       2025       2026    2021-2026
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated Authorization............          0         10         10         11         11         11         53
Estimated Outlays..................          0          9         10         11         11         11         52
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Matthew 
Pickford. The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, 
Deputy Director of Budget Analysis.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no 
change is proposed is shown in roman):

                     INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
                  appointment and removal of officers

  Sec. 3. (a) There shall be at the head of each Office an 
Inspector General who shall be appointed by the President, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, without regard 
to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity 
and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial 
analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or 
investigations. Each Inspector General shall report to and be 
under the general supervision of the head of the establishment 
involved or, to the extent such authority is delegated, the 
officer next in rank below such head, but shall not report to, 
or be subject to supervision by, any other officer of such 
establishment. Neither the head of the establishment nor the 
officer next in rank below such head shall prevent or prohibit 
the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or 
completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any 
subpoena during the course of any audit or investigation.
  (b) [An Inspector General]
          (1) An Inspector General may be removed from office 
        by the President in accordance with paragraph (2). If 
        an Inspector General is removed from office, is placed 
        on paid or unpaid non-duty status, or is transferred to 
        another position or location within an establishment, 
        the President shall communicate in writing the reasons 
        for any such removal, change in status, or transfer to 
        both Houses of Congress, not later than 30 days before 
        the removal, change in status, or transfer. Nothing in 
        this subsection shall prohibit a personnel action 
        otherwise authorized by law, other than transfer or 
        removal.
          (2) The President may remove an Inspector General 
        only for any of the following grounds (and the 
        documentation of any such ground shall be included in 
        the communication required pursuant to paragraph (1)):
          (A) Documented permanent incapacity.
          (B) Documented neglect of duty.
          (C) Documented malfeasance.
          (D) Documented conviction of a felony or conduct 
        involving moral turpitude.
          (E) Documented knowing violation of a law or 
        regulation.
          (F) Documented gross mismanagement.
          (G) Documented gross waste of funds.
          (H) Documented abuse of authority.
          (I) Documented inefficiency.
  (c) For the purposes of section 7324 of title 5, United 
States Code, no Inspector General shall be considered to be an 
employee who determines policies to be pursued by the United 
States in the nationwide administration of Federal laws.
  (d)(1) Each Inspector General shall, in accordance with 
applicable laws and regulations governing the civil service--
          (A) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for 
        Auditing who shall have the responsibility for 
        supervising the performance of auditing activities 
        relating to programs and operations of the 
        establishment;
          (B) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for 
        Investigations who shall have the responsibility for 
        supervising the performance of investigative activities 
        relating to such programs and operations; and
          (C) designate a Whistleblower Protection Coordinator 
        whoshall--
                  (i) educate agency employees, including 
                employees of that Office of Inspector General--
                          (I) about prohibitions against 
                        retaliation for protected disclosures; 
                        and
                          (II) who have made or are 
                        contemplating making a protected 
                        disclosure about the rights and 
                        remedies against retaliation for 
                        protected disclosures, including--
                                  (aa) the means by which 
                                employees may seek review of 
                                any allegation of reprisal, 
                                including the roles of the 
                                Office of the Inspector 
                                General, the Office of Special 
                                Counsel, the Merit Systems 
                                Protection Board, and any other 
                                relevant entities; and
                                  (bb) general information 
                                about the timeliness of such 
                                cases, the availability of any 
                                alternative dispute mechanisms, 
                                and avenues for potential 
                                relief.
                  (ii) assist the Inspector General in 
                promoting the timely and appropriate handling 
                and consideration of protected disclosures and 
                allegations of reprisal, to the extent 
                practicable, by the Inspector General; and
                  (iii) assist the Inspector General in 
                facilitating communication and coordination 
                with the Special Counsel, the Council of the 
                Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency 
                (including the Integrity Committee of that 
                Council), the establishment, Congress, and any 
                other relevant entity regarding the timely and 
                appropriate handling and consideration of 
                protected disclosures, allegations of reprisal, 
                and general matters regarding the 
                implementation and administration of 
                whistleblower protection laws, rules, and 
                regulations.
  (2) The Whistleblower Protection Coordinator shall not act as 
a legal representative, agent, or advocate of the employee or 
former employee.
          (3) The Whistleblower Protection Coordinator shall 
        have direct access to the Inspector General as needed 
        to accomplish the requirements of this subsection.
  (4) For the purposes of this section, the requirement of the 
designation of a Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman under 
paragraph (1)(C) shall not apply to--
          (A) any agency that is an element of the intelligence 
        community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National 
        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))); or
          (B) as determined by the President, any executive 
        agency or unit thereof the principal function of which 
        is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counter 
        intelligence activities.
  (e) The annual rate of basic pay for an Inspector General (as 
defined under section 12(3)) shall be the rate payable for 
level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 
5, United States Code, plus 3 percent.
  (f) An Inspector General (as defined under section 8G(a)(6) 
or 12(3)) may not receive any cash award or cash bonus, 
including any cash award under chapter 45 of title 5, United 
States Code.
  (g) Each Inspector General shall, in accordance with 
applicable laws and regulations governing the civil service, 
obtain legal advice from a counsel either reporting directly to 
the Inspector General or another Inspector General.
  (h) Not later than 15 days after an Inspector General is 
removed, placed on paid or unpaid non-duty status, or 
transferred to another position or location within an 
establishment, the acting Inspector General shall submit to the 
Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a list of all audits and 
investigations being conducted, supervised, coordinated by the 
Office at the time the Inspector General was removed, placed on 
paid or unpaid non-duty status, or transferred.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                reports

  Sec. 5. (a) Each Inspector General shall, not later than 
April 30 and October 31 of each year, prepare semiannual 
reports summarizing the activities of the Office during the 
immediately preceding six-month periods ending March 31 and 
September 30. Such reports shall include, but need not be 
limited to--
          (1) a description of significant problems, abuses, 
        and deficiencies relating to the administration of 
        programs and operations of such establishment disclosed 
        by such activities during the reporting period;
          (2) a description of the recommendations for 
        corrective action made by the Office during the 
        reporting period with respect to significant problems, 
        abuses, or deficiencies identified pursuant to 
        paragraph (1);
          (3) an identification of each significant 
        recommendation described in previous semiannual reports 
        on which corrective action has not been completed;
          (4) a summary of matters referred to prosecutive 
        authorities and the prosecutions and convictions which 
        have resulted;
          (5) a summary of each report made to the head of the 
        establishment under section 6(c)(2) during the 
        reporting period;
          (6) a listing, subdivided according to subject 
        matter, of each audit report, inspection reports, and 
        evaluation reports issued by the Office during the 
        reporting period and for each report, where applicable, 
        the total dollar value of questioned costs (including a 
        separate category for the dollar value of unsupported 
        costs) and the dollar value of recommendations that 
        funds be put to better use;
          (7) a summary of each particularly significant 
        report;
          (8) statistical tables showing the total number of 
        audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation 
        reports and the total dollar value of questioned costs 
        (including a separate category for the dollar value of 
        unsupported costs), for reports--
                  (A) for which no management decision had been 
                made by the commencement of the reporting 
                period;
                  (B) which were issued during the reporting 
                period;
                  (C) for which a management decision was made 
                during the reporting period, including--
                          (i) the dollar value of disallowed 
                        costs; and
                          (ii) the dollar value of costs not 
                        disallowed; and
                  (D) for which no management decision has been 
                made by the end of the reporting period;
          (9) statistical tables showing the total number of 
        audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation 
        reports and the dollar value of recommendations that 
        funds be put to better use by management, for reports--
                  (A) for which no management decision had been 
                made by the commencement of the reporting 
                period;
                  (B) which were issued during the reporting 
                period;
                  (C) for which a management decision was made 
                during the reporting period, including--
                          (i) the dollar value of 
                        recommendations that were agreed to by 
                        management; and
                          (ii) the dollar value of 
                        recommendations that were not agreed to 
                        by management; and
                  (D) for which no management decision has been 
                made by the end of the reporting period;
          (10) a summary of each audit report, inspection 
        reports, and evaluation reports issued before the 
        commencement of the reporting period--
                  (A) for which no management decision has been 
                made by the end of the reporting period 
                (including the date and title of each such 
                report), an explanation of the reasons such 
                management decision has not been made, and a 
                statement concerning the desired timetable for 
                achieving a management decision on each such 
                report;
                  (B) for which no establishment comment was 
                returned within 60 days of providing the report 
                to the establishment; and
                  (C) for which there are any outstanding 
                unimplemented recommendations, including the 
                aggregate potential cost savings of those 
                recommendations.
          (11) a description and explanation of the reasons for 
        any significant revised management decision made during 
        the reporting period;
          (12) information concerning any significant 
        management decision with which the Inspector General is 
        in disagreement;
          (13) the information described under section 804(b) 
        of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 
        1996;
          (14)(A) an appendix containing the results of any 
        peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector 
        General during the reporting period; or
          (B) if no peer review was conducted within that 
        reporting period, a statement identifying the date of 
        the last peer review conducted by another Office of 
        Inspector General;
          (15) a list of any outstanding recommendations from 
        any peer review conducted by another Office of 
        Inspector General that have not been fully implemented, 
        including a statement describing the status of the 
        implementation and why implementation is not complete;
          (16) a list of any peer reviews conducted by the 
        Inspector General of another Office of the Inspector 
        General during the reporting period, including a list 
        of any outstanding recommendations made from any 
        previous peer review (including any peer review 
        conducted before the reporting period) that remain 
        outstanding or have not been fully implemented;
          (17) statistical tables showing--
                  (A) the total number of investigative reports 
                issued during the reporting period;
                  (B) the total number of persons referred to 
                the Department of Justice for criminal 
                prosecution during the reporting period;
                  (C) the total number of persons referred to 
                State and local prosecuting authorities for 
                criminal prosecution during the reporting 
                period; and
                  (D) the total number of indictments and 
                criminal informations during the reporting 
                period that resulted from any prior referral to 
                prosecuting authorities;
          (18) a description of the metrics used for developing 
        the data for the statistical tables under paragraph 
        (17);
          (19) a report on each investigation conducted by the 
        Office involving a senior Government employee where 
        allegations of misconduct were substantiated, including 
        the name of the senior government official (as defined 
        by the department or agency) if already made public by 
        the Office, and a detailed description of--
                  (A) the facts and circumstances of the 
                investigation; and
                  (B) the status and disposition of the matter, 
                including--
                          (i) if the matter was referred to the 
                        Department of Justice, the date of the 
                        referral; and
                          (ii) if the Department of Justice 
                        declined the referral, the date of the 
                        declination;
          (20)(A) a detailed description of any instance of 
        whistleblower retaliation, including information about 
        the official found to have engaged in retaliation; and
          (B) what, if any, consequences the establishment 
        actually imposed to hold the official described in 
        subparagraph (A) accountable;
          (21) a detailed description of any attempt by the 
        establishment to interfere with the independence of the 
        Office, including--
                  (A) with budget constraints designed to limit 
                the capabilities of the Office; and
                  (B) incidents where the establishment has 
                resisted or objected to oversight activities of 
                the Office or restricted or significantly 
                delayed access to information, including the 
                justification of the establishment for such 
                action[; and];
          (22) detailed descriptions of the particular 
        circumstances of each--
                  (A) inspection, evaluation, and audit 
                conducted by the Office that is closed and was 
                not disclosed to the public; and
                  (B) investigation conducted by the Office 
                involving a senior Government employee that is 
                closed and was not disclosed to the public[.]; 
                and
          (23) a description of the use of subpoenas for the 
        attendance and testimony of witnesses authorized under 
        section 6A.
  (b) Semiannual reports of each Inspector General shall be 
furnished to the head of the establishment involved not later 
than April 30 and October 31 of each year and shall be 
transmitted by such head to the appropriate committees or 
subcommittees of the Congress within thirty days after receipt 
of the report, together with a report by the head of the 
establishment containing--
          (1) any comments such head determines appropriate;
          (2) statistical tables showing the total number of 
        audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation 
        reports and the dollar value of disallowed costs, for 
        reports--
                  (A) for which final action had not been taken 
                by the commencement of the reporting period;
                  (B) on which management decisions were made 
                during the reporting period;
                  (C) for which final action was taken during 
                the reporting period, including--
                          (i) the dollar value of disallowed 
                        costs that were recovered by management 
                        through collection, offset, property in 
                        lieu of cash, or otherwise; and
                          (ii) the dollar value of disallowed 
                        costs that were written off by 
                        management; and
                  (D) for which no final action has been taken 
                by the end of the reporting period;
          (3) statistical tables showing the total number of 
        audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation 
        reports and the dollar value of recommendations that 
        funds be put to better use by management agreed to in a 
        management decision, for reports--
                  (A) for which final action had not been taken 
                by the commencement of the reporting period;
                  (B) on which management decisions were made 
                during the reporting period;
                  (C) for which final action was taken during 
                the reporting period, including--
                          (i) the dollar value of 
                        recommendations that were actually 
                        completed; and
                          (ii) the dollar value of 
                        recommendations that management has 
                        subsequently concluded should not or 
                        could not be implemented or completed; 
                        and
                  (D) for which no final action has been taken 
                by the end of the reporting period;
          (4) whether the establishment entered into a 
        settlement agreement with the official described in 
        subsection (a)(20)(A), which shall be reported 
        regardless of any confidentiality agreement relating to 
        the settlement agreement; and
          (5) a statement with respect to audit reports on 
        which management decisions have been made but final 
        action has not been taken, other than audit reports on 
        which a management decision was made within the 
        preceding year, containing--
                  (A) a list of such audit reports and the date 
                each such report was issued;
                  (B) the dollar value of disallowed costs for 
                each report;
                  (C) the dollar value of recommendations that 
                funds be put to better use agreed to by 
                management for each report; and
                  (D) an explanation of the reasons final 
                action has not been taken with respect to each 
                such audit report,
        except that such statement may exclude such audit 
        reports that are under formal administrative or 
        judicial appeal or upon which management of an 
        establishment has agreed to pursue a legislative 
        solution, but shall identify the number of reports in 
        each category so excluded.
  (c) Within sixty days of the transmission of the semiannual 
reports of each Inspector General to the Congress, the head of 
each establishment shall make copies of such report available 
to the public upon request and at a reasonable cost. Within 60 
days after the transmission of the semiannual reports of each 
establishment head to the Congress, the head of each 
establishment shall make copies of such report available to the 
public upon request and at a reasonable cost.
  (d) Each Inspector General shall report immediately to the 
head of the establishment involved whenever the Inspector 
General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant 
problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the 
administration of programs and operations of such 
establishment. The head of the establishment shall transmit any 
such report to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of 
Congress within seven calendar days, together with a report by 
the head of the establishment containing any comments such head 
deems appropriate.
  (e)(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
authorize the public disclosure of information which is--
          (A) specifically prohibited from disclosure by any 
        other provision of law;
          (B) specifically required by Executive order to be 
        protected from disclosure in the interest of national 
        defense or national security or in the conduct of 
        foreign affairs; or
          (C) a part of an ongoing criminal investigation.
  (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1)(C), any report under this 
section may be disclosed to the public in a form which includes 
information with respect to a part of an ongoing criminal 
investigation if such information has been included in a public 
record.
  (3) Except to the extent and in the manner provided under 
section 6103(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, nothing 
in this section or in any other provision of this Act shall be 
construed to authorize or permit the withholding of information 
from the Congress, or from any committee or subcommittee 
thereof.
  (4) Subject to any other provision of law that would 
otherwise prohibit disclosure of such information, the 
information described in paragraph (1) may be provided to any 
Member of Congress upon request.
  (5) An Office may not provide to Congress or the public any 
information that reveals the personally identifiable 
information of a whistleblower under this section unless the 
Office first obtains the consent of the whistleblower.
  (f) As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``questioned cost'' means a cost that is 
        questioned by the Office because of--
                  (A) an alleged violation of a provision of a 
                law, regulation, contract, grant, cooperative 
                agreement, or other agreement or document 
                governing the expenditure of funds;
                  (B) a finding that, at the time of the audit, 
                such cost is not supported by adequate 
                documentation; or
                  (C) a finding that the expenditure of funds 
                for the intended purpose is unnecessary or 
                unreasonable;
          (2) the term ``unsupported cost'' means a cost that 
        is questioned by the Office because the Office found 
        that, at the time of the audit, such cost is not 
        supported by adequate documentation;
          (3) the term ``disallowed cost'' means a questioned 
        cost that management, in a management decision, has 
        sustained or agreed should not be charged to the 
        Government;
          (4) the term ``recommendation that funds be put to 
        better use'' means a recommendation by the Office that 
        funds could be used more efficiently if management of 
        an establishment took actions to implement and complete 
        the recommendation, including--
                  (A) reductions in outlays;
                  (B) deobligation of funds from programs or 
                operations;
                  (C) withdrawal of interest subsidy costs on 
                loans or loan guarantees, insurance, or bonds;
                  (D) costs not incurred by implementing 
                recommended improvements related to the 
                operations of the establishment, a contractor 
                or grantee;
                  (E) avoidance of unnecessary expenditures 
                noted in preaward reviews of contract or grant 
                agreements; or
                  (F) any other savings which are specifically 
                identified;
          (5) the term ``management decision'' means the 
        evaluation by the management of an establishment of the 
        findings and recommendations included in an audit 
        report and the issuance of a final decision by 
        management concerning its response to such findings and 
        recommendations, including actions concluded to be 
        necessary;
          (6) the term ``final action'' means--
                  (A) the completion of all actions that the 
                management of an establishment has concluded, 
                in its management decision, are necessary with 
                respect to the findings and recommendations 
                included in an audit report; and
                  (B) in the event that the management of an 
                establishment concludes no action is necessary, 
                final action occurs when a management decision 
                has been made; and
          (7) the term ``senior Government employee'' means--
                  (A) an officer or employee in the executive 
                branch (including a special Government employee 
                as defined in section 202 of title 18, United 
                States Code) who occupies a position classified 
                at or above GS-15 of the General Schedule or, 
                in the case of positions not under the General 
                Schedule, for which the rate of basic pay is 
                equal to or greater than 120 percent of the 
                minimum rate of basic pay payable for GS-15 of 
                the General Schedule; and
                  (B) any commissioned officer in the Armed 
                Forces in pay grades O-6 and above.

                  authority; administration provisions

  Sec. 6. (a) In addition to the authority otherwise provided 
by this Act, each Inspector General, in carrying out the 
provisions of this Act, is authorized--
          (1)(A) to have timely access to all records, reports, 
        audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or 
        other materials available to the applicable 
        establishment which relate to the programs and 
        operations with respect to which that Inspector General 
        has responsibilities under this Act;
          (B) to have access under subparagraph (A) 
        notwithstanding any other provision of law, except 
        pursuant to any provision of law enacted by Congress 
        that expressly--
                  (i) refers to the Inspector General; and
                  (ii) limits the right of access of the 
                Inspector General; and
          (C) except as provided in subsection (i), with regard 
        to Federal grand jury materials protected from 
        disclosure pursuant to rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules 
        of Criminal Procedure, to have timely access to such 
        information if the Attorney General grants the request 
        in accordance with subsection (h);
          (2) to make such investigations and reports relating 
        to the administration of the programs and operations of 
        the applicable establishment as are, in the judgment of 
        the Inspector General, necessary or desirable;
          (3) to request such information or assistance as may 
        be necessary for carrying out the duties and 
        responsibilities provided by this Act from any Federal, 
        State, or local governmental agency or unit thereof;
          (4) to require by subpoena the production of all 
        information, documents, reports, answers, records, 
        accounts, papers, and other data in any medium 
        (including electronically stored information), as well 
        as any tangible thing and documentary evidence 
        necessary in the performance of the functions assigned 
        by this Act, which subpena, in the case of contumacy or 
        refusal to obey, shall be enforceable by order of any 
        appropriate United States district court: Provided, 
        That procedures other than subpoenas shall be used by 
        the Inspector General to obtain documents and 
        information from Federal agencies;
          (5) to administer to or take from any person an oath, 
        affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the 
        performance of the functions assigned by this Act, 
        which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered 
        or taken by or before an employee of an Office of 
        Inspector General designated by the Inspector General 
        shall have the same force and effect as if administered 
        or taken by or before an officer having a seal;
          (6) to have direct and prompt access to the head of 
        the establishment involved when necessary for any 
        purpose pertaining to the performance of functions and 
        responsibilities under this Act;
          (7) to select, appoint, and employ such officers and 
        employees as may be necessary for carrying out the 
        functions, powers, and duties of the Office subject to 
        the provisions of title 5, United States Code, 
        governing appointments in the competitive service, and 
        the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of 
        chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and 
        General Schedule pay rates;
          (8) to obtain services as authorized by section 3109 
        of title 5, United States Code, at daily rates not to 
        exceed the equivalent rate prescribed for grade GS-18 
        of the General Schedule by section 5332 of title 5, 
        United States Code; and
          (9) to the extent and in such amounts as may be 
        provided in advance by appropriations Acts, to enter 
        into contracts and other arrangements for audits, 
        studies, analyses, and other services with public 
        agencies and with private persons, and to make such 
        payments as may be necessary to carry out the 
        provisions of this Act.
  (b) Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing 
an Inspector General to publicly disclose information otherwise 
prohibited from disclosure by law.
  (c)(1) Upon request of an Inspector General for information 
or assistance under subsection (a)(3), the head of any Federal 
agency involved shall, insofar as is practicable and not in 
contravention of any existing statutory restriction or 
regulation of the Federal agency from which the information is 
requested, furnish to such Inspector General, or to an 
authorized designee, such information or assistance.
  (2) Whenever information or assistance requested under 
subsection (a)(1) or (a)(3) is, in the judgment of an Inspector 
General, unreasonably refused or not provided, the Inspector 
General shall report the circumstances to the head of the 
establishment involved without delay.
  (3) If the information or assistance that is the subject of a 
report under paragraph (2) is not provided to the Inspector 
General by the date that is 30 days after the report is made, 
the Inspector General shall submit a notice that the 
information or assistance requested is being unreasonably 
refused or not provided by the head of the establishment 
involved or the head of the Federal agency involved, as 
applicable, to--
          (A) the Committee in the House of Representatives and 
        the Committee in the Senate that has jurisdiction over 
        the establishment involved or the Federal agency 
        involved, as applicable;
          (B) the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the 
        House of Representatives; and
          (C) the Committee on Homeland Security and 
        Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
  (d) Each head of an establishment shall provide the Office 
within such establishment with appropriate and adequate office 
space at central and field office locations of such 
establishment, together with such equipment, office supplies, 
and communications facilities and services as may be necessary 
for the operation of such offices, and shall provide necessary 
maintenance services for such offices and the equipment and 
facilities located therein.
  (e)(1)(A) For purposes of applying the provisions of law 
identified in subparagraph (B)--
          (i) each Office of Inspector General shall be 
        considered to be a separate agency; and
          (ii) the Inspector General who is the head of an 
        office referred to in clause (i) shall, with respect to 
        such office, have the functions, powers, and duties of 
        an agency head or appointing authority under such 
        provisions.
  (B) This paragraph applies with respect to the following 
provisions of title 5, United States Code:
          (i) Subchapter II of chapter 35.
          (ii) Sections 8335(b), 8336, 8344, 8414, 8468, and 
        8425(b).
          (iii) All provisions relating to the Senior Executive 
        Service (as determined by the Office of Personnel 
        Management), subject to paragraph (2).
  (2) For purposes of applying section 4507(b) of title 5, 
United States Code, paragraph (1)(A)(ii) shall be applied by 
substituting ``the Council of the Inspectors General on 
Integrity and Efficiency (established by section 11 of the 
Inspector General Act) shall'' for ``the Inspector General who 
is the head of an office referred to in clause (i) shall, with 
respect to such office,''.
  (f)(1) In addition to the authority otherwise provided by 
this Act, each Inspector General, any Assistant Inspector 
General for Investigations under such an Inspector General, and 
any special agent supervised by such an Assistant Inspector 
General may be authorized by the Attorney General to--
          (A) carry a firearm while engaged in official duties 
        as authorized under this Act or other statute, or as 
        expressly authorized by the Attorney General;
          (B) make an arrest without a warrant while engaged in 
        official duties as authorized under this Act or other 
        statute, or as expressly authorized by the Attorney 
        General, for any offense against the United States 
        committed in the presence of such Inspector General, 
        Assistant Inspector General, or agent, or for any 
        felony cognizable under the laws of the United States 
        if such Inspector General, Assistant Inspector General, 
        or agent has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
        person to be arrested has committed or is committing 
        such felony; and
          (C) seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of a 
        premises, or seizure of evidence issued under the 
        authority of the United States upon probable cause to 
        believe that a violation has been committed.
  (2) The Attorney General may authorize exercise of the powers 
under this subsection only upon an initial determination that--
          (A) the affected Office of Inspector General is 
        significantly hampered in the performance of 
        responsibilities established by this Act as a result of 
        the lack of such powers;
          (B) available assistance from other law enforcement 
        agencies is insufficient to meet the need for such 
        powers; and
          (C) adequate internal safeguards and management 
        procedures exist to ensure proper exercise of such 
        powers.
  (3) The Inspector General offices of the Department of 
Commerce, Department of Education, Department of Energy, 
Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland 
Security, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
Department of the Interior, Department of Justice, Department 
of Labor, Department of State, Department of Transportation, 
Department of the Treasury, Department of Veterans Affairs, 
Agency for International Development, Environmental Protection 
Agency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, General Services Administration, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management, Railroad 
Retirement Board, Small Business Administration, Social 
Security Administration, and the Tennessee Valley Authority are 
exempt from the requirement of paragraph (2) of an initial 
determination of eligibility by the Attorney General.
  (4) The Attorney General shall promulgate, and revise as 
appropriate, guidelines which shall govern the exercise of the 
law enforcement powers established under paragraph (1).
  (5)(A) Powers authorized for an Office of Inspector General 
under paragraph (1) may be rescinded or suspended upon a 
determination by the Attorney General that any of the 
requirements under paragraph (2) is no longer satisfied or that 
the exercise of authorized powers by that Office of Inspector 
General has not complied with the guidelines promulgated by the 
Attorney General under paragraph (4).
  (B) Powers authorized to be exercised by any individual under 
paragraph (1) may be rescinded or suspended with respect to 
that individual upon a determination by the Attorney General 
that such individual has not complied with guidelines 
promulgated by the Attorney General under paragraph (4).
  (6) A determination by the Attorney General under paragraph 
(2) or (5) shall not be reviewable in or by any court.
  (7) To ensure the proper exercise of the law enforcement 
powers authorized by this subsection, the Offices of Inspector 
General described under paragraph (3) shall, not later than 180 
days after the date of enactment of this subsection, 
collectively enter into a memorandum of understanding to 
establish an external review process for ensuring that adequate 
internal safeguards and management procedures continue to exist 
within each Office and within any Office that later receives an 
authorization under paragraph (2). The review process shall be 
established in consultation with the Attorney General, who 
shall be provided with a copy of the memorandum of 
understanding that establishes the review process. Under the 
review process, the exercise of the law enforcement powers by 
each Office of Inspector General shall be reviewed periodically 
by another Office of Inspector General or by a committee of 
Inspectors General. The results of each review shall be 
communicated in writing to the applicable Inspector General and 
to the Attorney General.
  (8) No provision of this subsection shall limit the exercise 
of law enforcement powers established under any other statutory 
authority, including United States Marshals Service special 
deputation.
  (9) In this subsection, the term ``Inspector General'' means 
an Inspector General appointed under section 3 or an Inspector 
General appointed under section 8G.
  (g)(1) For each fiscal year, an Inspector General shall 
transmit a budget estimate and request to the head of the 
establishment or designated Federal entity to which the 
Inspector General reports. The budget request shall specify the 
aggregate amount of funds requested for such fiscal year for 
the operations of that Inspector General and shall specify the 
amount requested for all training needs, including a 
certification from the Inspector General that the amount 
requested satisfies all training requirements for the Inspector 
General's office for that fiscal year[, and any resources 
necessary to support the Council of the Inspectors General on 
Integrity and Efficiency. Resources necessary to support the 
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency 
shall be specifically identified and justified in the budget 
request].
  (2) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for 
approval, the head of each establishment or designated Federal 
entity shall include--
          (A) an aggregate request for the Inspector General;
          (B) amounts for Inspector General training; and
          [(C) amounts for support of the Council of the 
        Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and]
          [(D)] (C) any comments of the affected Inspector 
        General with respect to the proposal.
  (3) The President shall include in each budget of the United 
States Government submitted to Congress--
          (A) a separate statement of the budget estimate 
        prepared in accordance with paragraph (1);
          (B) the amount requested by the President for each 
        Inspector General;
          (C) the amount requested by the President for 
        training of Inspectors General;
          (D) the amount requested by the President for support 
        for the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity 
        and Efficiency; and
          (E) any comments of the affected Inspector General 
        with respect to the proposal if the Inspector General 
        concludes that the budget submitted by the President 
        would substantially inhibit the Inspector General from 
        performing the duties of the office.
  (h)(1) If the Inspector General of an establishment submits a 
request to the head of the establishment for Federal grand jury 
materials pursuant to subsection (a)(1), the head of the 
establishment shall immediately notify the Attorney General of 
such request.
  (2) Not later than 15 days after the date on which a request 
is submitted to the Attorney General under paragraph (1), the 
Attorney General shall determine whether to grant or deny the 
request for Federal grand jury materials and shall immediately 
notify the head of the establishment of such determination. The 
Attorney General shall grant the request unless the Attorney 
General determines that granting access to the Federal grand 
jury materials would be likely to--
          (A) interfere with an ongoing criminal investigation 
        or prosecution;
          (B) interfere with an undercover operation;
          (C) result in disclosure of the identity of a 
        confidential source, including a protected witness;
          (D) pose a serious threat to national security; or
          (E) result in significant impairment of the trade or 
        economic interests of the United States.
  (3)(A) The head of the establishment shall inform the 
Inspector General of the establishment of the determination 
made by the Attorney General with respect to the request for 
Federal grand jury materials.
  (B) The Inspector General of the establishment described 
under subparagraph (A) may submit comments on the determination 
submitted pursuant to such subparagraph to the committees 
listed under paragraph (4) that the Inspector General considers 
appropriate.
  (4) Not later than 30 days after notifying the head of an 
establishment of a denial pursuant to paragraph (2), the 
Attorney General shall submit a statement that the request for 
Federal grand jury materials by the Inspector General was 
denied and the reason for the denial to each of the following:
          (A) The Committee on Homeland Security and 
        Governmental Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, 
        and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
          (B) The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
        the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Permanent 
        Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
        Representatives.
          (C) Other appropriate committees and subcommittees of 
        Congress.
  (i) Subsections (a)(1)(C) and (h) shall not apply to requests 
from the Inspector General of the Department of Justice.
  (j)(1) In this subsection, the terms ``agency'', ``matching 
program'', ``record'', and ``system of records'' have the 
meanings given those terms in section 552a(a) of title 5, 
United States Code.
  (2) For purposes of section 552a of title 5, United States 
Code, or any other provision of law, a computerized comparison 
of two or more automated Federal systems of records, or a 
computerized comparison of a Federal system of records with 
other records or non-Federal records, performed by an Inspector 
General or by an agency in coordination with an Inspector 
General in conducting an audit, investigation, inspection, 
evaluation, or other review authorized under this Act shall not 
be considered a matching program.
  (3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impede 
the exercise by an Inspector General of any matching program 
authority established under any other provision of law.
  (k) Subchapter I of chapter 35 of title 44, United States 
Code, shall not apply to the collection of information during 
the conduct of an audit, investigation, inspection, evaluation, 
or other review conducted by the Council of the Inspectors 
General on Integrity and Efficiency or any Office of Inspector 
General, including any Office of Special Inspector General.

SEC. 6A. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.

  (a) Testimonial Subpoena Authority.--In addition to the 
authority otherwise provided by this Act and in accordance with 
the requirements of this section, each Inspector General, in 
carrying out the provisions of this Act (or in the case of an 
Inspector General or Special Inspector General not established 
under this Act, the provisions of the authorizing statute), is 
authorized to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony 
of witnesses as necessary in the performance of the functions 
assigned to the Inspector General by this Act (or in the case 
of an Inspector General or Special Inspector General not 
established under this Act, the functions assigned by the 
authorizing statute), which in the case of contumacy or refusal 
to obey, such subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any 
appropriate United States district court. An Inspector General 
may not require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of any 
Federal employee or employee of a designated Federal entity, 
but may use other authorized procedures.
  (b) Limitation of Delegation.--The authority to issue a 
subpoena under subsection (a) may only be delegated to an 
official performing the functions and duties of the Inspector 
General when an Inspector General position is vacant or when 
the Inspector General is unable to perform the functions and 
duties of the Office.
  (c) Panel Review Before Issuance.--
          (1) Approval required.--
                  (A) Request for approval by subpoena panel.--
                Before the issuance of a subpoena described in 
                subsection (a), an Inspector General shall 
                submit a request for approval to issue a 
                subpoena to a panel (in this section, referred 
                to as the ``Subpoena Panel''), which shall be 
                comprised of three Inspectors General of the 
                Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity 
                and Efficiency, who shall be designated by the 
                Inspector General serving as Chairperson of the 
                Council.
                  (B) Protection from disclosure.--The 
                information contained in the request submitted 
                by an Inspector General under subparagraph (A) 
                and the identification of a witness shall be 
                protected from disclosure to the extent 
                permitted by law. Any request for disclosure of 
                such information shall be submitted to the 
                Inspector General requesting the subpoena.
          (2) Time to respond.--
                  (A) In general.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), the Subpoena Panel shall 
                approve or deny a request for approval to issue 
                a subpoena not later than 10 calendar days 
                after the submission of such request.
                  (B) Additional information for panel.--If the 
                Subpoena Panel determines that additional 
                information is necessary to approve or deny a 
                request submitted by an Inspector General under 
                paragraph (1)(A), the Subpoena Panel shall 
                request such information from the Inspector 
                General and shall approve or deny the request 
                submitted by the Inspector General under 
                paragraph (1)(A) not later than 20 calendar 
                days after the submission of the request under 
                such paragraph.
          (3) Denial by panel.--If a majority of the Subpoena 
        Panel denies the approval of a subpoena, that subpoena 
        may not be issued.
  (d) Notice to Attorney General.--
          (1) In general.--If the Subpoena Panel approves a 
        subpoena under subsection (c), the Inspector General 
        shall notify the Attorney General that the Inspector 
        General intends to issue the subpoena.
          (2) Denial for interference with an ongoing 
        investigation.--Not later than 10 calendar days after 
        the date on which the Attorney General is notified 
        pursuant to paragraph (1), the Attorney General may 
        object to the issuance of the subpoena because the 
        subpoena will interfere with an ongoing investigation 
        and the subpoena may not be issued.
          (3) Issuance of subpoena approved.--If the Attorney 
        General declines to object or fails to object to the 
        issuance of the subpoena during the 10-day period 
        described in paragraph (2), the Inspector General may 
        issue the subpoena.
  (e) Guidelines.--The Chairperson of the Council of the 
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, in consultation 
with the Attorney General, shall prescribe guidelines to carry 
out this section.
  (f) Inspector General Defined.--For purposes of this section, 
the term ``Inspector General'' includes each Inspector General 
established under this Act and each Inspector General or 
Special Inspector General not established under this Act.
  (g) Applicability.--The provisions of this section shall not 
affect the exercise of authority by an Inspector General of 
testimonial subpoena authority established under another 
provision of law.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        special provisions concerning the department of justice

  Sec. 8E. (a)(1) Notwithstanding the last two sentences of 
section 3(a), the Inspector General shall be under the 
authority, direction, and control of the Attorney General with 
respect to audits or investigations, or the issuance of 
subpoenas, which require access to sensitive information 
concerning--
          (A) ongoing civil or criminal investigations or 
        proceedings;
          (B) undercover operations;
          (C) the identity of confidential sources, including 
        protected witnesses;
          (D) intelligence or counterintelligence matters; or
          (E) other matters the disclosure of which would 
        constitute a serious threat to national security.
  (2) With respect to the information described under paragraph 
(1), the Attorney General may prohibit the Inspector General 
from carrying out or completing any audit or investigation, 
from accessing information described in paragraph (1), or from 
issuing any subpoena, after such Inspector General has decided 
to initiate, carry out, or complete such audit or 
investigation, access such information, or to issue such 
subpoena, if the Attorney General determines that such 
prohibition is necessary to prevent the disclosure of any 
information described under paragraph (1) or to prevent the 
significant impairment to the national interests of the United 
States.
  (3) If the Attorney General exercises any power under 
paragraph (1) or (2), the Attorney General shall notify the 
Inspector General in writing stating the reasons for such 
exercise. Within 30 days after receipt of any such notice, the 
Inspector General shall transmit a copy of such notice to the 
Committees on Governmental Affairs and Judiciary of the Senate 
and the Committees on Government Operations and Judiciary of 
the House of Representatives, and to other appropriate 
committees or subcommittees of the Congress.
  (b) In carrying out the duties and responsibilities specified 
in this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of 
Justice--
          (1) may initiate, conduct and supervise such audits 
        and investigations in the Department of Justice as the 
        Inspector General considers appropriate;
          (2) except as specified in subsection (a) [and 
        paragraph (3)], may investigate allegations of criminal 
        wrongdoing or administrative misconduct by an employee 
        of the Department of Justice, or may, in the discretion 
        of the Inspector General, refer such allegations to the 
        Office of Professional Responsibility or the internal 
        affairs office of the appropriate component of the 
        Department of Justice;
          [(3) shall refer to the Counsel, Office of 
        Professional Responsibility of the Department of 
        Justice, allegations of misconduct involving Department 
        attorneys, investigators, or law enforcement personnel, 
        where the allegations relate to the exercise of the 
        authority of an attorney to investigate, litigate, or 
        provide legal advice, except that no such referral 
        shall be made if the attorney is employed in the Office 
        of Professional Responsibility;]
          [(4)] (3) may investigate allegations of criminal 
        wrongdoing or administrative misconduct by a person who 
        is the head of any agency or component of the 
        Department of Justice; and
          [(5)] (4) shall forward the results of any 
        investigation conducted under [paragraph (4)] paragraph 
        (3), along with any appropriate recommendation for 
        disciplinary action, to the Attorney General.
  (c) Any report required to be transmitted by the Attorney 
General to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of the 
Congress under section 5(d) shall also be transmitted, within 
the seven-day period specified under such section, to the 
Committees on the Judiciary and Governmental Affairs of the 
Senate and the Committees on the Judiciary and Government 
Operations of the House of Representatives.
  (d) The Attorney General shall ensure by regulation that any 
component of the Department of Justice receiving a nonfrivolous 
allegation of criminal wrongdoing or administrative misconduct 
by an employee of the Department of Justice[, except with 
respect to allegations described in subsection (b)(3),] shall 
report that information to the Inspector General.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   requirements for federal entities and designated federal entities

  Sec. 8G. (a) Notwithstanding section 12 of this Act, as used 
in this section--
          (1) the term ``Federal entity'' means any Government 
        corporation (within the meaning of section 103(1) of 
        title 5, United States Code), any Government controlled 
        corporation (within the meaning of section 103(2) of 
        such title), or any other entity in the Executive 
        branch of the Government, or any independent regulatory 
        agency, but does not include--
                  (A) an establishment (as defined under 
                section 12(2) of this Act) or part of an 
                establishment;
                  (B) a designated Federal entity (as defined 
                under paragraph (2) of this subsection) or part 
                of a designated Federal entity;
                  (C) the Executive Office of the President;
                  (D) the Central Intelligence Agency;
                  (E) the General Accounting Office; or
                  (F) any entity in the judicial or legislative 
                branches of the Government, including the 
                Administrative Office of the United States 
                Courts and the Architect of the Capitol and any 
                activities under the direction of the Architect 
                of the Capitol;
          (2) the term ``designated Federal entity'' means 
        Amtrak, the Appalachian Regional Commission, the Board 
        of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
        Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the Board for 
        International Broadcasting, the Committee for Purchase 
        From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled, the 
        Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Consumer 
        Product Safety Commission, the Corporation for Public 
        Broadcasting, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
        Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Farm 
        Credit Administration, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
        Corporation, the Federal Election Commission, the 
        Election Assistance Commission, the Federal Housing 
        Finance Board, the Federal Labor Relations Authority, 
        the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal Trade 
        Commission, the Legal Services Corporation, the 
        National Archives and Records Administration, the 
        National Credit Union Administration, the National 
        Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment for the 
        Humanities, the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
        Agency, the National Labor Relations Board, the 
        National Science Foundation, the Panama Canal 
        Commission, the Peace Corps, the Pension Benefit 
        Guaranty Corporation, the Securities and Exchange 
        Commission, the Smithsonian Institution, the United 
        States International Development Finance Corporation, 
        the United States International Trade Commission, the 
        Postal Regulatory Commission, and the United States 
        Postal Service;
          (3) the term ``head of the Federal entity'' means any 
        person or persons designated by statute as the head of 
        a Federal entity, and if no such designation exists, 
        the chief policymaking officer or board of a Federal 
        entity as identified in the list published pursuant to 
        subsection (h)(1) of this section;
          (4) the term ``head of the designated Federal 
        entity'' means the board or commission of the 
        designated Federal entity, or in the event the 
        designated Federal entity does not have a board or 
        commission, any person or persons designated by statute 
        as the head of a designated Federal entity and if no 
        such designation exists, the chief policymaking officer 
        or board of a designated Federal entity as identified 
        in the list published pursuant to subsection (h)(1) of 
        this section, except that--
                  (A) with respect to the National Science 
                Foundation, such term means the National 
                Science Board;
                  (B) with respect to the United States Postal 
                Service, such term means the Governors (within 
                the meaning of section 102(3) of title 39, 
                United States Code);
                  (C) with respect to the Federal Labor 
                Relations Authority, such term means the 
                members of the Authority (described under 
                section 7104 of title 5, United States Code);
                  (D) with respect to the Committee for 
                Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely 
                Disabled, such term means the Chairman of the 
                Committee for Purchase From People Who Are 
                Blind or Severely Disabled;
                  (E) with respect to the National Archives and 
                Records Administration, such term means the 
                Archivist of the United States;
                  (F) with respect to the National Credit Union 
                Administration, such term means the National 
                Credit Union Administration Board (described 
                under section 102 of the Federal Credit Union 
                Act (12 U.S.C. 1752a);
                  (G) with respect to the National Endowment of 
                the Arts, such term means the National Council 
                on the Arts;
                  (H) with respect to the National Endowment 
                for the Humanities, such term means the 
                National Council on the Humanities;
                  (I) with respect to the Peace Corps, such 
                term means the Director of the Peace Corps; and
                  (J) with respect to the United States 
                International Development Finance Corporation, 
                such term means the Board of Directors of the 
                United States International Development Finance 
                Corporation;
          (5) the term ``Office of Inspector General'' means an 
        Office of Inspector General of a designated Federal 
        entity; and
          (6) the term ``Inspector General'' means an Inspector 
        General of a designated Federal entity.
  (b) No later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this section, there shall be established and maintained in each 
designated Federal entity an Office of Inspector General. The 
head of the designated Federal entity shall transfer to such 
office the offices, units, or other components, and the 
functions, powers, or duties thereof, that such head determines 
are properly related to the functions of the Office of 
Inspector General and would, if so transferred, further the 
purposes of this section. There shall not be transferred to 
such office any program operating responsibilities.
  (c) Except as provided under subsection (f) of this section, 
the Inspector General shall be appointed by the head of the 
designated Federal entity in accordance with the applicable 
laws and regulations governing appointments within the 
designated Federal entity. Each Inspector General shall be 
appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on 
the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, 
auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public 
administration, or investigations. For purposes of implementing 
this section, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System shall appoint the Inspector General of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. The Inspector General 
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection shall have all of the 
authorities and responsibilities provided by this Act with 
respect to the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, as if 
the Bureau were part of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System.
  (d)(1) Each Inspector General shall report to and be under 
the general supervision of the head of the designated Federal 
entity, but shall not report to, or be subject to supervision 
by, any other officer or employee of such designated Federal 
entity. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the head of the 
designated Federal entity shall not prevent or prohibit the 
Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing 
any audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoena during 
the course of any audit or investigation.
  (2)(A) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Director of National Intelligence, may prohibit the inspector 
general of an element of the intelligence community specified 
in subparagraph (D) from initiating, carrying out, or 
completing any audit or investigation, or from accessing 
information available to an element of the intelligence 
community specified in subparagraph (D),, or from accessing 
information available to an element of the intelligence 
community specified in subparagraph (D), if the Secretary 
determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital 
national security interests of the United States.
  (B) If the Secretary exercises the authority under 
subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall submit to the committees 
of Congress specified in subparagraph (E) an appropriately 
classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such 
authority not later than 7 days after the exercise of such 
authority.
  (C) At the same time the Secretary submits under subparagraph 
(B) a statement on the exercise of the authority in 
subparagraph (A) to the committees of Congress specified in 
subparagraph (E), the Secretary shall notify the inspector 
general of such element of the submittal of such statement and, 
to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods, provide such inspector general with a copy 
of such statement. Such inspector general may submit to such 
committees of Congress any comments on a notice or statement 
received by the inspector general under this subparagraph that 
the inspector general considers appropriate.
  (D) The elements of the intelligence community specified in 
this subparagraph are as follows:
          (i) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (ii) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
          (iii) The National Reconnaissance Office.
          (iv) The National Security Agency.
  (E) The committees of Congress specified in this subparagraph 
are--
          (i) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
          (ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
        Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
        of Representatives.
  (e)(1) In the case of a designated Federal entity for which a 
board, chairman of a committee, or commission is the head of 
the designated Federal entity, a removal under this subsection 
may only be made upon the written concurrence of a \2/3\ 
majority of the board, committee, or commission.
  (2) If an Inspector General is removed from office, is placed 
on paid or unpaid non-duty status, or is transferred to another 
position or location within a designated Federal entity, the 
head of the designated Federal entity shall communicate in 
writing the reasons for any such removal, change in status, or 
transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than 30 days 
before the removal, change in status, or transfer. Nothing in 
this subsection shall prohibit a personnel action otherwise 
authorized by law, other than transfer or removal. An Inspector 
General may be removed only for any of the following grounds 
(and the documentation of any such ground shall be included in 
the communication required pursuant to this paragraph): 
          (A) Documented permanent incapacity. 
          (B) Documented neglect of duty. 
          (C) Documented malfeasance. 
          (D) Documented conviction of a felony or conduct 
        involving moral turpitude. 
          (E) Documented knowing violation of a law or 
        regulation. 
          (F) Documented gross mismanagement. 
          (G) Documented gross waste of funds. 
          (H) Documented abuse of authority. 
          (I) Documented inefficiency. 
  (3) Not later than 15 days after an Inspector General is 
removed, placed on paid or unpaid non-duty status, or 
transferred to another position or location within an 
designated Federal entity, the acting Inspector General shall 
submit to the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, a list of all audits and 
investigations being conducted, supervised, coordinated by the 
Office at the time the Inspector General was removed, placed on 
paid or unpaid non-duty status, or transferred.
  (f)(1) For purposes of carrying out subsection (c) with 
respect to the United States Postal Service, the appointment 
provisions of section 202(e) of title 39, United States Code, 
shall be applied.
  (2) In carrying out the duties and responsibilities specified 
in this Act, the Inspector General of the United States Postal 
Service (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the 
``Inspector General'') shall have oversight responsibility for 
all activities of the Postal Inspection Service, including any 
internal investigation performed by the Postal Inspection 
Service. The Chief Postal Inspector shall promptly report the 
significant activities being carried out by the Postal 
Inspection Service to such Inspector General.
  (3)(A)(i) Notwithstanding subsection (d), the Inspector 
General shall be under the authority, direction, and control of 
the Governors with respect to audits or investigations, or the 
issuance of subpoenas, which require access to sensitive 
information concerning--
          (I) ongoing civil or criminal investigations or 
        proceedings;
          (II) undercover operations;
          (III) the identity of confidential sources, including 
        protected witnesses;
          (IV) intelligence or counterintelligence matters; or
          (V) other matters the disclosure of which would 
        constitute a serious threat to national security.
  (ii) With respect to the information described under clause 
(i), the Governors may prohibit the Inspector General from 
carrying out or completing any audit or investigation, or from 
issuing any subpoena, after such Inspector General has decided 
to initiate, carry out, or complete such audit or investigation 
or to issue such subpoena, if the Governors determine that such 
prohibition is necessary to prevent the disclosure of any 
information described under clause (i) or to prevent the 
significant impairment to the national interests of the United 
States.
  (iii) If the Governors exercise any power under clause (i) or 
(ii), the Governors shall notify the Inspector General in 
writing stating the reasons for such exercise. Within 30 days 
after receipt of any such notice, the Inspector General shall 
transmit a copy of such notice to the Committee on Governmental 
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight of the House of Representatives, and to other 
appropriate committees or subcommittees of the Congress.
  (B) In carrying out the duties and responsibilities specified 
in this Act, the Inspector General--
          (i) may initiate, conduct and supervise such audits 
        and investigations in the United States Postal Service 
        as the Inspector General considers appropriate; and
          (ii) shall give particular regard to the activities 
        of the Postal Inspection Service with a view toward 
        avoiding duplication and insuring effective 
        coordination and cooperation.
  (C) Any report required to be transmitted by the Governors to 
the appropriate committees or subcommittees of the Congress 
under section 5(d) shall also be transmitted, within the seven-
day period specified under such section, to the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight of the House of 
Representatives.
  (4) Nothing in this Act shall restrict, eliminate, or 
otherwise adversely affect any of the rights, privileges, or 
benefits of either employees of the United States Postal 
Service, or labor organizations representing employees of the 
United States Postal Service, under chapter 12 of title 39, 
United States Code, the National Labor Relations Act, any 
handbook or manual affecting employee labor relations with the 
United States Postal Service, or any collective bargaining 
agreement.
  (5) As used in this subsection, the term ``Governors'' has 
the meaning given such term by section 102(3) of title 39, 
United States Code.
          (6) There are authorized to be appropriated, out of 
        the Postal Service Fund, such sums as may be necessary 
        for the Office of Inspector General of the United 
        States Postal Service.
  (g)(1) Sections 4, 5, 6 (other than subsections (a)(7) and 
(a)(8) thereof), 6A, and 7 of this Act shall apply to each 
Inspector General and Office of Inspector General of a 
designated Federal entity and such sections shall be applied to 
each designated Federal entity and head of the designated 
Federal entity (as defined under subsection (a)) by 
substituting--
          (A) ``designated Federal entity'' for 
        ``establishment''; and
          (B) ``head of the designated Federal entity'' for 
        ``head of the establishment''.
  (2) In addition to the other authorities specified in this 
Act, an Inspector General is authorized to select, appoint, and 
employ such officers and employees as may be necessary for 
carrying out the functions, powers, and duties of the Office of 
Inspector General and to obtain the temporary or intermittent 
services of experts or consultants or an organization thereof, 
subject to the applicable laws and regulations that govern such 
selections, appointments, and employment, and the obtaining of 
such services, within the designated Federal entity.
  (3) Notwithstanding the last sentence of subsection (d) of 
this section, the provisions of subsection (a) of section 8D 
(other than the provisions of subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and 
(E) of subsection (a)(1)) shall apply to the Inspector General 
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and the Chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in the same 
manner as such provisions apply to the Inspector General of the 
Department of the Treasury and the Secretary of the Treasury, 
respectively.
          (4) Each Inspector General shall--
  (A) in accordance with applicable laws and regulations 
governing appointments within the designated Federal entity, 
appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who shall report to 
the Inspector General;
  (B) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and 
directly reporting to another Inspector General on a 
reimbursable basis; or
  (C) obtain the services of appropriate staff of the Council 
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on a 
reimbursable basis.
  (h)(1) No later than April 30, 1989, and annually thereafter, 
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, after 
consultation with the Comptroller General of the United States, 
shall publish in the Federal Register a list of the Federal 
entities and designated Federal entities and if the designated 
Federal entity is not a board or commission, include the head 
of each such entity (as defined under subsection (a) of this 
section).
  (2) Beginning on October 31, 1989, and on October 31 of each 
succeeding calendar year, the head of each Federal entity (as 
defined under subsection (a) of this section) shall prepare and 
transmit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
and to each House of the Congress a report which--
          (A) states whether there has been established in the 
        Federal entity an office that meets the requirements of 
        this section;
          (B) specifies the actions taken by the Federal entity 
        otherwise to ensure that audits are conducted of its 
        programs and operations in accordance with the 
        standards for audit of governmental organizations, 
        programs, activities, and functions issued by the 
        Comptroller General of the United States, and includes 
        a list of each audit report completed by a Federal or 
        non-Federal auditor during the reporting period and a 
        summary of any particularly significant findings; and
          (C) summarizes any matters relating to the personnel, 
        programs, and operations of the Federal entity referred 
        to prosecutive authorities, including a summary 
        description of any preliminary investigation conducted 
        by or at the request of the Federal entity concerning 
        these matters, and the prosecutions and convictions 
        which have resulted.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 11. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON 
                    INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY.

  (a) Establishment and Mission.--
          (1) Establishment.--There is established as an 
        independent entity within the executive branch the 
        Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
        Efficiency (in this section referred to as the 
        ``Council'').
          (2) Mission.--The mission of the Council shall be 
        to--
                  (A) address integrity, economy, and 
                effectiveness issues that transcend individual 
                Government agencies; and
                  (B) increase the professionalism and 
                effectiveness of personnel by developing 
                policies, standards, and approaches to aid in 
                the establishment of a well-trained and highly 
                skilled workforce in the offices of the 
                Inspectors General.
  (b) Membership.--
          (1) In general.--The Council shall consist of the 
        following members:
                  (A) All Inspectors General whose offices are 
                established under--
                          (i) section 2; or
                          (ii) section 8G.
                  (B) The Inspectors General of the 
                Intelligence Community and the Central 
                Intelligence Agency.
                  (C) The Controller of the Office of Federal 
                Financial Management.
                  (D) A senior level official of the Federal 
                Bureau of Investigation designated by the 
                Director of the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation.
                  (E) The Director of the Office of Government 
                Ethics.
                  (F) The Special Counsel of the Office of 
                Special Counsel.
                  (G) The Deputy Director of the Office of 
                Personnel Management.
                  (H) The Deputy Director for Management of the 
                Office of Management and Budget.
                  (I) The Inspectors General of the Library of 
                Congress, Capitol Police, Government Printing 
                Office, Government Accountability Office, and 
                the Architect of the Capitol.
          (2) Chairperson and executive chairperson.--
                  (A) Executive chairperson.--The Deputy 
                Director for Management of the Office of 
                Management and Budget shall be the Executive 
                Chairperson of the Council.
                  (B) Chairperson.--The Council shall elect 1 
                of the Inspectors General referred to in 
                paragraph (1)(A) or (B) to act as Chairperson 
                of the Council. The term of office of the 
                Chairperson shall be 2 years.
          (3) Functions of chairperson and executive 
        chairperson.--
                  (A) Executive chairperson.--The Executive 
                Chairperson shall--
                          (i) preside over meetings of the 
                        Council;
                          (ii) provide to the heads of agencies 
                        and entities represented on the Council 
                        summary reports of the activities of 
                        the Council; and
                          (iii) provide to the Council such 
                        information relating to the agencies 
                        and entities represented on the Council 
                        as assists the Council in performing 
                        its functions.
                  (B) Chairperson.--The Chairperson shall--
                          (i) convene meetings of the Council--
                                  (I) at least 6 times each 
                                year;
                                  (II) monthly to the extent 
                                possible; and
                                  (III) more frequently at the 
                                discretion of the Chairperson;
                          (ii) carry out the functions and 
                        duties of the Council under subsection 
                        (c);
                          (iii) appoint a Vice Chairperson to 
                        assist in carrying out the functions of 
                        the Council and act in the absence of 
                        the Chairperson, from a category of 
                        Inspectors General described in 
                        subparagraph (A)(i), (A)(ii), or (B) of 
                        paragraph (1), other than the category 
                        from which the Chairperson was elected;
                          (iv) make such payments from funds 
                        otherwise available to the Council as 
                        may be necessary to carry out the 
                        functions of the Council;
                          (v) select, appoint, and employ 
                        personnel as needed to carry out the 
                        functions of the Council subject to the 
                        provisions of title 5, United States 
                        Code, governing appointments in the 
                        competitive service, and the provisions 
                        of chapter 51 and subchapter III of 
                        chapter 53 of such title, relating to 
                        classification and General Schedule pay 
                        rates;
                          (vi) to the extent and in such 
                        amounts as may be provided in advance 
                        by appropriations Acts, made available 
                        from the revolving fund established 
                        under subsection (c)(3)(B), or as 
                        otherwise provided by law, enter into 
                        contracts and other arrangements with 
                        public agencies and private persons to 
                        carry out the functions and duties of 
                        the Council;
                          (vii) establish, in consultation with 
                        the members of the Council, such 
                        committees as determined by the 
                        Chairperson to be necessary and 
                        appropriate for the efficient conduct 
                        of Council functions; and
                          (viii) prepare and transmit an annual 
                        report on behalf of the Council on the 
                        activities of the Council to--
                                  (I) the President;
                                  (II) the appropriate 
                                committees of jurisdiction of 
                                the Senate and the House of 
                                Representatives;
                                  (III) the Committee on 
                                Homeland Security and 
                                Governmental Affairs of the 
                                Senate; and
                                  (IV) the Committee on 
                                Oversight and Government Reform 
                                of the House of 
                                Representatives.
  (c) Functions and Duties of Council.--
          (1) In general.--The Council shall--
                  (A) continually identify, review, and discuss 
                areas of weakness and vulnerability in Federal 
                programs and operations with respect to fraud, 
                waste, and abuse;
                  (B) develop plans for coordinated, 
                Governmentwide activities that address these 
                problems and promote economy and efficiency in 
                Federal programs and operations, including 
                interagency and interentity audit, 
                investigation, inspection, and evaluation 
                programs and projects to deal efficiently and 
                effectively with those problems concerning 
                fraud and waste that exceed the capability or 
                jurisdiction of an individual agency or entity;
                  (C) develop policies that will aid in the 
                maintenance of a corps of well-trained and 
                highly skilled Office of Inspector General 
                personnel;
                  (D) maintain an Internet website and other 
                electronic systems for the benefit of all 
                Inspectors General, as the Council determines 
                are necessary or desirable;
                  (E) maintain 1 or more academies as the 
                Council considers desirable for the 
                professional training of auditors, 
                investigators, inspectors, evaluators, and 
                other personnel of the various offices of 
                Inspector General and establish minimum 
                standards and best practices for training to 
                ensure all Inspectors General receive training 
                to carry out the duties, responsibilities, and 
                authorities under this Act and on emerging 
                areas of the law of relevance to Inspectors 
                General and the work of their offices as 
                identified by the Council;
                  (F) submit recommendations of individuals to 
                the appropriate appointing authority for any 
                appointment to an office of Inspector General 
                described under subsection (b)(1)(A) or (B);
                  (G) make such reports to Congress as the 
                Chairperson determines are necessary or 
                appropriate;
                  (H) except for matters coordinated among 
                Inspectors General under section 3033 of title 
                50, United States Code, receive, review, and 
                mediate any disputes submitted in writing to 
                the Council by an Office of Inspector General 
                regarding an audit, investigation, inspection, 
                evaluation, or project that involves the 
                jurisdiction of more than one Office of 
                Inspector General; and
                  (I) perform other duties within the authority 
                and jurisdiction of the Council, as 
                appropriate.
          (2) Adherence and participation by members.--To the 
        extent permitted under law, and to the extent not 
        inconsistent with standards established by the 
        Comptroller General of the United States for audits of 
        Federal establishments, organizations, programs, 
        activities, and functions, each member of the Council, 
        as appropriate, shall--
                  (A) adhere to professional standards 
                developed by the Council; and
                  (B) participate in the plans, programs, and 
                projects of the Council, except that in the 
                case of a member described under subsection 
                (b)(1)(I), the member shall participate only to 
                the extent requested by the member and approved 
                by the Executive Chairperson and Chairperson.
          (3) Additional administrative authorities.--
                  (A) Interagency funding.--Notwithstanding 
                section 1532 of title 31, United States Code, 
                or any other provision of law prohibiting the 
                interagency funding of activities described 
                under subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause 
                (i), in the performance of the 
                responsibilities, authorities, and duties of 
                the Council--
                          (i) the Executive Chairperson may 
                        authorize the use of interagency 
                        funding for--
                                  (I) Governmentwide training 
                                of employees of the Offices of 
                                the Inspectors General;
                                  (II) the functions of the 
                                Integrity Committee of the 
                                Council; and
                                  (III) any other authorized 
                                purpose determined by the 
                                Council; and
                          (ii) upon the authorization of the 
                        Executive Chairperson, any Federal 
                        agency or designated Federal entity (as 
                        defined in section 8G(a)) which has a 
                        member on the Council shall fund or 
                        participate in the funding of such 
                        activities.
                  (B) Revolving fund.--
                          (i) In general.--The Council may--
                                  (I) establish in the Treasury 
                                of the United States a 
                                revolving fund to be called the 
                                Inspectors General Council 
                                Fund; or
                                  (II) enter into an 
                                arrangement with a department 
                                or agency to use an existing 
                                revolving fund.
                          (ii) Amounts in revolving fund.--
                                  (I) In general.--Amounts 
                                transferred to the Council 
                                under this subsection shall be 
                                deposited in the revolving fund 
                                described under clause (i)(I) 
                                or (II).
                                  (II) Training.--Any remaining 
                                unexpended balances 
                                appropriated for or otherwise 
                                available to the Inspectors 
                                General Criminal Investigator 
                                Academy and the Inspectors 
                                General Auditor Training 
                                Institute shall be transferred 
                                to the revolving fund described 
                                under clause (i)(I) or (II).
                          (iii) Use of revolving fund.--
                                  (I) In general.--Except as 
                                provided under subclause (II), 
                                amounts in the revolving fund 
                                described under clause (i)(I) 
                                or (II) may be used to carry 
                                out the functions and duties of 
                                the Council under this 
                                subsection.
                                  (II) Training.--Amounts 
                                transferred into the revolving 
                                fund described under clause 
                                (i)(I) or (II) may be used for 
                                the purpose of maintaining any 
                                training academy as determined 
                                by the Council.
                          (iv) Availability of funds.--Amounts 
                        in the revolving fund described under 
                        clause (i)(I) or (II) shall remain 
                        available to the Council without fiscal 
                        year limitation.
                  (C) Superseding provisions.--No provision of 
                law enacted after the date of enactment of this 
                subsection shall be construed to limit or 
                supersede any authority under subparagraph (A) 
                or (B), unless such provision makes specific 
                reference to the authority in that paragraph.
                  (D) Authorization of appropriations.--In 
                addition to any funds available in the 
                Inspectors General Council Fund established 
                under subparagraph (B), there are authorized to 
                be appropriated such sums as may be necessary, 
                to remain available until expended, to carry 
                out the functions and duties of the Council 
                under this subsection.
          (4) Existing authorities and responsibilities.--The 
        establishment and operation of the Council shall not 
        affect--
                  (A) the role of the Department of Justice in 
                law enforcement and litigation;
                  (B) the authority or responsibilities of any 
                Government agency or entity; and
                  (C) the authority or responsibilities of 
                individual members of the Council.
          (5) Additional responsibilities relating to 
        whistleblower protection.--The Council shall--
                  (A) facilitate the work of the Whistleblower 
                Protection Coordinators designated under 
                section 3(d)(C); and
                  (B) in consultation with the Office of 
                Special Counsel and Whistleblower Protection 
                Coordinators from the member offices of the 
                Inspector General, develop best practices for 
                coordination and communication in promoting the 
                timely and appropriate handling and 
                consideration of protected disclosures[, 
                allegations of reprisal,] and allegations of 
                reprisal (including the timely and appropriate 
                handling and consideration of protected 
                disclosures and allegations of reprisal that 
                are internal to an Office of Inspector General) 
                and general matters regarding the 
                implementation and administration of 
                whistleblower protection laws, in accordance 
                with Federal law.
  (d) Integrity Committee.--
          (1) Establishment.--The Council shall have an 
        Integrity Committee, which shall receive, review, and 
        refer for investigation allegations of wrongdoing that 
        are made against Inspectors General and staff members 
        of the various Offices of Inspector General described 
        under paragraph [(4)(C)] (4)(D).
          (2) Membership.--
                  (A) In general.--The Integrity Committee 
                shall consist of the following members:
                          (i) The official of the Federal 
                        Bureau of Investigation serving on the 
                        Council.
                          (ii) Four Inspectors General 
                        described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of 
                        subsection (b)(1) appointed by the 
                        Chairperson of the Council, 
                        representing both establishments and 
                        designated Federal entities (as that 
                        term is defined in section 8G(a)).
                          (iii) The Director of the Office of 
                        Government Ethics or the designee of 
                        the Director.
                          (iv) The individual appointed under 
                        subparagraph (C).
                  (B) Chairperson.--
                          (i) In general.--The Integrity 
                        Committee shall elect one of the 
                        Inspectors General referred to in 
                        subparagraph (A)(ii) to act as 
                        Chairperson of the Integrity Committee.
                          (ii) Term.--The term of office of the 
                        Chairperson of the Integrity Committee 
                        shall be 2 years.
                  (C) Appointment of former inspector general 
                to committee.--
                          (i) Appointment.--The Chairperson of 
                        the Council shall appoint an individual 
                        who prior to the date of such 
                        appointment served as an Inspector 
                        General (as that position is described 
                        in section 3(a) and section 8G(a)(6)), 
                        and who has upheld the highest 
                        standards of integrity and 
                        professionalism while serving and since 
                        leaving service as an Inspector 
                        General, as determined by the 
                        Chairperson, to serve as a member of 
                        the Committee unless no such individual 
                        is available or willing to serve as a 
                        member of the Committee at the time of 
                        the appointment.
                          (ii) Initial term.--The individual 
                        appointed under clause (i) shall serve 
                        at the pleasure of the Chairperson of 
                        the Council for a 2-year term.
                          (iii) Additional term.--The 
                        Chairperson of the Council may 
                        reappoint the individual appointed 
                        under clause (i) to serve at the 
                        pleasure of the Chairperson of the 
                        Council for an additional term not to 
                        exceed 2 years.
                          (iv) Compensation.--
                                  (I) Special government 
                                employee designation.--The 
                                individual appointed under 
                                clause (i) shall be considered 
                                a special government employee 
                                pursuant to section 202(a) of 
                                title 18, United States Code.
                                  (II) Compensation and travel 
                                expenses.--An individual 
                                appointed under clause (i) may 
                                not receive compensation at a 
                                rate in excess of the rate of 
                                basic pay for level IV of the 
                                executive schedule under 
                                section 5315 of title 5, United 
                                States Code, and any such 
                                individual, while engaged in 
                                the performance of their duties 
                                away from their homes or 
                                regular places of business, may 
                                be allowed travel expenses, 
                                including per diem in lieu of 
                                subsistence, as authorized by 
                                section 5703 of such title for 
                                persons employed intermittently 
                                in the Government service.
                                  (III) Acceptance of volunteer 
                                services.--The Chairperson of 
                                the Council may accept 
                                volunteer services from the 
                                individual appointed under this 
                                subparagraph without regard to 
                                section 1342 of title 31, 
                                United States Code.
                                  (IV) Provisions relating to 
                                reemployment.--
                                          (aa) The Chairperson 
                                        of the Council may 
                                        reemploy annuitants.
                                          (bb) The employment 
                                        of annuitants under 
                                        this paragraph shall be 
                                        subject to the 
                                        provisions of section 
                                        9902(g) of title 5, 
                                        United States Code, as 
                                        if the Council was the 
                                        Department of Defense.
          (3) Legal advisor.--The Chief of the Public Integrity 
        Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of 
        Justice, or his designee, shall serve as a legal 
        advisor to the Integrity Committee.
          (4) Referral of allegations.--
                  (A)  [Requirement] Allegations against staff 
                members.--An Inspector General shall refer to 
                the Integrity Committee any allegation of 
                wrongdoing against a staff member of the office 
                of that Inspector General, if--
                          (i) review of the substance of the 
                        allegation cannot be assigned to an 
                        agency of the executive branch with 
                        appropriate jurisdiction over the 
                        matter; and
                          (ii) the Inspector General determines 
                        that--
                                  (I) an objective internal 
                                investigation of the allegation 
                                is not feasible; or
                                  (II) an internal 
                                investigation of the allegation 
                                may appear not to be objective.
                  (B) Allegations against inspectors general.--
                An Inspector General shall refer to the 
                Integrity Committee any allegation of 
                wrongdoing against that Inspector General.
                  [(B)] (C) Definition.--In this paragraph the 
                term ``staff member'' means any employee of an 
                Office of Inspector General who--
                          (i) reports directly to an Inspector 
                        General; or
                          (ii) is designated by an Inspector 
                        General under subparagraph (C).
                  [(C)] (D) Designation of staff members.--Each 
                Inspector General shall annually submit to the 
                Chairperson of the Integrity Committee a 
                designation of positions whose holders are 
                staff members for purposes of subparagraph (B).
          (5) Review of allegations.--
                  (A) In general.--Not later than 7 days after 
                the date on which the Integrity Committee 
                receives an allegation of wrongdoing against an 
                Inspector General or against a staff member of 
                an Office of Inspector General described under 
                paragraph (4)(C), the allegation of wrongdoing 
                shall be reviewed and referred to the 
                Department of Justice or the Office of Special 
                Counsel for investigation, or to the Integrity 
                Committee for review, as appropriate, by--
                          (i) a representative of the 
                        Department of Justice, as designated by 
                        the Attorney General;
                          (ii) a representative of the Office 
                        of Special Counsel, as designated by 
                        the Special Counsel; and
                          (iii) a representative of the 
                        Integrity Committee, as designated by 
                        the Chairperson of the Integrity 
                        Committee.
                  (B) Referral to the chairperson.--
                          (i) In general.--Except as provided 
                        in clause (ii), not later than 30 days 
                        after the date on which an allegation 
                        of wrongdoing is referred to the 
                        Integrity Committee under subparagraph 
                        (A), the Integrity Committee shall 
                        determine whether to refer the 
                        allegation of wrongdoing to the 
                        Chairperson of the Integrity Committee 
                        to initiate an investigation.
                          (ii) Extension.--The 30-day period 
                        described in clause (i) may be extended 
                        for an additional period of 30 days if 
                        the Integrity Committee provides 
                        written notice to the congressional 
                        committees described in paragraph 
                        (8)(A)(iii) that includes a detailed, 
                        case-specific description of why the 
                        additional time is needed to evaluate 
                        the allegation of wrongdoing[.], the 
                        length of time the Integrity Committee 
                        has been evaluating the allegation of 
                        wrongdoing, and a description of any 
                        previous written notice provided under 
                        this clause with respect to the 
                        allegation of wrongdoing, including the 
                        description provided for why additional 
                        time was needed.
                          (iii) Availability of information to 
                        members of congress.--
                                  (I) In general.--With respect 
                                to an allegation of wrongdoing 
                                made by a member of Congress 
                                that is closed by the Integrity 
                                Committee without referral to 
                                the Chairperson of the 
                                Integrity Committee to initiate 
                                an investigation, the 
                                Chairperson of the Integrity 
                                Committee shall, not later than 
                                60 days after closing such 
                                allegation, provide a written 
                                description of the nature of 
                                the allegation of wrongdoing 
                                and how the Integrity Committee 
                                evaluated the allegation of 
                                wrongdoing to--
                                          (aa) the Chair and 
                                        Ranking Member of the 
                                        Committee on Oversight 
                                        and Reform of the House 
                                        of Representatives;
                                          (bb) the Chair and 
                                        Ranking Member of the 
                                        Committee on Homeland 
                                        Security and 
                                        Governmental Affairs of 
                                        the Senate;
                                          (cc) a member of the 
                                        House of 
                                        Representatives who has 
                                        the support of any 
                                        seven members of the 
                                        Committee on Oversight 
                                        and Reform of the House 
                                        of Representatives; or
                                          (dd) a member of the 
                                        Senate who has the 
                                        support of any five 
                                        members of the 
                                        Committee on Homeland 
                                        Security and 
                                        Governmental Affairs of 
                                        the Senate.
                                  (II) Requirement to 
                                forward.--The Chairperson of 
                                the Integrity Committee shall 
                                forward any written description 
                                or update provided under this 
                                clause to the members of the 
                                Integrity Committee and to the 
                                Chairperson of the Council.
          (6) Authority to investigate allegations.--
                  (A) Requirement.--The Chairperson of the 
                Integrity Committee shall cause a thorough and 
                timely investigation of each allegation 
                referred under paragraph (5)(B) to be conducted 
                in accordance with this paragraph.
                  (B) Resources.--At the request of the 
                Chairperson of the Integrity Committee, the 
                head of each agency or entity represented on 
                the Council--
                          (i) shall provide assistance 
                        necessary to the Integrity Committee; 
                        and
                          (ii) may detail employees from that 
                        agency or entity to the Integrity 
                        Committee, subject to the control and 
                        direction of the Chairperson, to 
                        conduct an investigation under this 
                        subsection.
          (7) Procedures for investigations.--
                  (A) Standards applicable.--Investigations 
                initiated under this subsection shall be 
                conducted in accordance with the most current 
                Quality Standards for Investigations issued by 
                the Council or by its predecessors (the 
                President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency 
                and the Executive Council on Integrity and 
                Efficiency).
                  (B) Additional policies and procedures.--
                          (i) Establishment.--The Integrity 
                        Committee, in conjunction with the 
                        Chairperson of the Council, shall 
                        establish additional policies and 
                        procedures necessary to ensure fairness 
                        and consistency in--
                                  (I) determining whether to 
                                initiate an investigation;
                                  (II) conducting 
                                investigations;
                                  (III) reporting the results 
                                of an investigation;
                                  (IV) providing the person who 
                                is the subject of an 
                                investigation with an 
                                opportunity to respond to any 
                                Integrity Committee report;
                                  (V) except as provided in 
                                clause (ii), ensuring, to the 
                                extent possible, that 
                                investigations are conducted by 
                                Offices of Inspector General of 
                                similar size;
                                  (VI) creating a process for 
                                rotation of Inspectors General 
                                assigned to investigate 
                                allegations through the 
                                Integrity Committee; and
                                  (VII) creating procedures to 
                                avoid conflicts of interest for 
                                Integrity Committee 
                                investigations.
                          (ii) Exception.--The requirement 
                        under clause (i)(V) shall not apply to 
                        any Office of Inspector General with 
                        less than 50 employees who are 
                        authorized to conduct audits or 
                        investigations.
                          (iii) Submission to congress.--The 
                        Council shall submit a copy of the 
                        policies and procedures established 
                        under clause (i) to the congressional 
                        committees of jurisdiction.
                  (C) Completion of investigation.--If an 
                allegation of wrongdoing is referred to the 
                Chairperson of the Integrity Committee under 
                paragraph (5)(B), the Chairperson of the 
                Integrity Committee--
                          (i) shall complete the investigation 
                        not later than 150 days after the date 
                        on which the Integrity Committee made 
                        the referral; and
                          (ii) if the investigation cannot be 
                        completed within the 150-day period 
                        described in clause (i), shall--
                                  (I) promptly notify the 
                                congressional committees 
                                described in paragraph 
                                (8)(A)(iii); and
                                  (II) brief the congressional 
                                committees described in 
                                paragraph (8)(A)(iii) every 30 
                                days regarding the status of 
                                the investigation and the 
                                general reasons for delay until 
                                the investigation is complete.
                  (D) Concurrent investigation.--If an 
                allegation of wrongdoing against an Inspector 
                General or a staff member of an Office of 
                Inspector General described under paragraph 
                (4)(C) is referred to the Department of Justice 
                or the Office of Special Counsel under 
                paragraph (5)(A), the Chairperson of the 
                Integrity Committee may conduct any related 
                investigation referred to the Chairperson under 
                paragraph (5)(B) concurrently with the 
                Department of Justice or the Office of Special 
                Counsel, as applicable.
                  (E) Reports.--
                          (i) Integrity committee 
                        investigations.--For each investigation 
                        of an allegation of wrongdoing referred 
                        to the Chairperson of the Integrity 
                        Committee under paragraph (5)(B), the 
                        Chairperson of the Integrity Committee 
                        shall submit to members of the 
                        Integrity Committee and to the 
                        Chairperson of the Council a report 
                        containing the results of the 
                        investigation.
                          (ii) Other investigations.--For each 
                        allegation of wrongdoing referred to 
                        the Department of Justice or the Office 
                        of Special Counsel under paragraph 
                        (5)(A), the Attorney General or the 
                        Special Counsel, as applicable, shall 
                        submit to the Integrity Committee a 
                        report containing the results of the 
                        investigation.
                          (iii) Availability to congress.--
                                  (I) In general.--The 
                                congressional committees 
                                described in paragraph 
                                (8)(A)(iii) shall have access 
                                to any report authored by the 
                                Integrity Committee.
                                  (II) Members of congress.--
                                Subject to any other provision 
                                of law that would otherwise 
                                prohibit disclosure of such 
                                information, the Integrity 
                                Committee may provide any 
                                report authored by the 
                                Integrity Committee to any 
                                Member of Congress.
          (8) Assessment and final disposition.--
                  (A) In general.--With respect to any report 
                received under paragraph (7)(E), the Integrity 
                Committee shall--
                          (i) assess the report;
                          (ii) forward the report, with the 
                        recommendations of the Integrity 
                        Committee, including those on 
                        disciplinary action or corrective 
                        action, within 30 days (to the maximum 
                        extent practicable) after the 
                        completion of the investigation, to the 
                        Executive Chairperson of the Council 
                        and to the President (in the case of a 
                        report relating to an Inspector General 
                        of an establishment or any employee of 
                        that Inspector General) or the head of 
                        a designated Federal entity (in the 
                        case of a report relating to an 
                        Inspector General of such an entity or 
                        any employee of that Inspector General) 
                        for resolution; and
                          (iii) contemporaneously with the 
                        submission of the report under clause 
                        (ii), submit the report, with the 
                        recommendations of the Integrity 
                        Committee, to the Committee on Homeland 
                        Security and Governmental Affairs of 
                        the Senate, the Committee on Oversight 
                        and Government Reform of the House of 
                        Representatives, and other 
                        congressional committees of 
                        jurisdiction; and
                          (iv) following the submission of the 
                        report under clause (iii) and upon 
                        request by any Member of Congress, 
                        submit the report, with the 
                        recommendations of the Integrity 
                        Committee, to that Member.
                  (B) Disposition.--The Executive Chairperson 
                of the Council shall report to the Integrity 
                Committee, the Committee on Homeland Security 
                and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the 
                Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House 
                of Representatives, and other congressional 
                committees of jurisdiction, the final 
                disposition of the matter, including what 
                action was taken by the President or agency 
                head.
          [(9) Annual report.--The Council shall submit to 
        Congress and the President by December 31 of each year 
        a report on the activities of the Integrity Committee 
        during the preceding fiscal year, which shall include 
        the following:
                  [(A) The number of allegations received.
                  [(B) The number of allegations referred to 
                the Department of Justice or the Office of 
                Special Counsel, including the number of 
                allegations referred for criminal 
                investigation.
                  [(C) The number of allegations referred to 
                the Chairperson of the Integrity Committee for 
                investigation.
                  [(D) The number of allegations closed without 
                referral.
                  [(E) The date each allegation was received 
                and the date each allegation was finally 
                disposed of.
                  [(F) In the case of allegations referred to 
                the Chairperson of the Integrity Committee, a 
                summary of the status of the investigation of 
                the allegations and, in the case of 
                investigations completed during the preceding 
                fiscal year, a summary of the findings of the 
                investigations.
                  [(G) Other matters that the Council considers 
                appropriate.]
          (9) Semiannual report.--On or before May 31, 2022, 
        and every six months thereafter, the Council shall 
        submit to Congress and the President a report on the 
        activities of the Integrity Committee during the 
        immediately preceding six-month periods ending March 31 
        and September 30, which shall include the following 
        with respect to allegations of wrongdoing that are made 
        against Inspectors General and staff members of the 
        various Offices of Inspector General described under 
        paragraph (4)(C):
                  (A) An overview and analysis of the 
                allegations of wrongdoing disposed of by the 
                Integrity Committee, including--
                          (i) analysis of the positions held by 
                        individuals against whom allegations 
                        were made, including the duties 
                        affiliated with such positions;
                          (ii) analysis of the categories or 
                        types of the allegations of wrongdoing; 
                        and
                          (iii) a summary of disposition of all 
                        the allegations.
                  (B) The number of allegations referred to the 
                Department of Justice or the Office of Special 
                Counsel, including the number of allegations 
                referred for criminal investigation.
                  (C) The number of allegations referred to the 
                Chairperson of the Integrity Committee for 
                investigation, a general description of the 
                status of such investigations, and a summary of 
                the findings of investigations completed.
                  (D) An overview and analysis of allegations 
                of wrongdoing received by the Integrity 
                Committee during any previous reporting period, 
                but remained pending during some part of the 
                six months covered by the report, including--
                          (i) analysis of the positions held by 
                        individuals against whom allegations 
                        were made, including the duties 
                        affiliated with such positions;
                          (ii) analysis of the categories or 
                        types of the allegations of wrongdoing; 
                        and
                          (iii) a summary of disposition of all 
                        the allegations.
                  (E) The number and category or type of 
                pending investigations.
                  (F) For each allegation received--
                          (i) the date on which the 
                        investigation was opened;
                          (ii) the date on which the allegation 
                        was disposed of, as applicable;
                          (iii) the case number associated with 
                        the allegation.
                  (G) The nature and number of allegations to 
                the Integrity Committee closed without 
                referral, including the justification for why 
                each allegation was closed without referral.
                  (H) A brief description of any difficulty 
                encountered by the Integrity Committee when 
                receiving, evaluating, investigating, or 
                referring for investigation an allegation 
                received by the Integrity Committee, including 
                a brief description of--
                          (i) any attempt to prevent or hinder 
                        an investigation; or
                          (ii) concerns about the integrity or 
                        operations at an Office of Inspector 
                        General.
          (10) Requests for more information.--With respect to 
        paragraphs (8) and (9), the Council shall provide more 
        detailed information about specific allegations upon 
        request from any Member of Congress.
          (11) No right or benefit.--This subsection is not 
        intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or 
        procedural, enforceable at law by a person against the 
        United States, its agencies, its officers, or any 
        person.
          (12) Allegations of wrongdoing against special 
        counsel or deputy special counsel.--
                  (A) Special counsel defined.--In this 
                paragraph, the term ``Special Counsel'' means 
                the Special Counsel appointed under section 
                1211(b) of title 5, United States Code.
                  (B) Authority of integrity committee.--
                          (i) In general.--An allegation of 
                        wrongdoing against the Special Counsel 
                        or the Deputy Special Counsel may be 
                        received, reviewed, and referred for 
                        investigation to the same extent and in 
                        the same manner as in the case of an 
                        allegation against an Inspector General 
                        or against a staff member of an Office 
                        of Inspector General described under 
                        paragraph (4)(C), subject to the 
                        requirement that the representative 
                        designated by the Special Counsel under 
                        paragraph (5)(A)(ii) shall recuse 
                        himself or herself from the 
                        consideration of any allegation brought 
                        under this paragraph.
                          (ii) Coordination with existing 
                        provisions of law.--This paragraph 
                        shall not eliminate access to the Merit 
                        Systems Protection Board for review 
                        under section 7701 of title 5, United 
                        States Code. To the extent that an 
                        allegation brought under this paragraph 
                        involves section 2302(b)(8) of such 
                        title, a failure to obtain corrective 
                        action within 120 days after the date 
                        on which the allegation is received by 
                        the Integrity Committee shall, for 
                        purposes of section 1221 of such title, 
                        be considered to satisfy section 
                        1214(a)(3)(B) of such title.
                  (C) Regulations.--The Integrity Committee may 
                prescribe any rules or regulations necessary to 
                carry out this paragraph, subject to such 
                consultation or other requirements as may 
                otherwise apply.
          (13) Committee records.--The Chairperson of the 
        Council shall maintain the records of the Integrity 
        Committee.
          (14) Additional reports.--
                  (A) Report to inspector general.--The 
                Chairperson of the Integrity Committee shall 
                submit a report immediately whenever the 
                Chairperson of the Integrity Committee becomes 
                aware of particularly serious or flagrant 
                problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to 
                the administration of programs and operations 
                of an Office of Inspector General. The report 
                shall be sent to the Inspector General who 
                leads the Office of Inspector General at which 
                the serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or 
                deficiencies were alleged.
                  (B) Report to congress.--The Inspector 
                General of the Office identified by the 
                Integrity Committee shall submit any such 
                report to the House Committee on Oversight and 
                Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland 
                Security and Governmental Affairs within seven 
                calendar days from the time the Inspector 
                General receives the report together with a 
                report by the Inspector General at the Office 
                identified by the Integrity Committee 
                containing any comments such Inspector General 
                deems appropriate.
          (15) Rule of construction.--
                  (A) Public disclosure of information.--Except 
                as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in 
                this subsection shall be construed to authorize 
                the public disclosure of information which is--
                          (i) prohibited from disclosure by any 
                        other provision of law;
                          (ii) required by Executive order to 
                        be protected from disclosure in the 
                        interest of national defense or 
                        national security or in the conduct of 
                        foreign affairs; or
                          (iii) a part of an ongoing criminal 
                        investigation.
                  (B) Provision of report to requesting members 
                of congress.--Subject to any other provision of 
                law that would otherwise prohibit disclosure of 
                such information, the information described in 
                subparagraph (A) may be provided to any Member 
                of Congress upon request of the Member.
          (16) Prohibited disclosures.--The Integrity Committee 
        may not provide or otherwise disclose to Congress or 
        the public any information that reveals the personally 
        identifiable information of an individual who alleges 
        wrongdoing to the Integrity Committee under this 
        subsection unless the Integrity Committee first obtains 
        the consent of the individual.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                      TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
PART III--EMPLOYEES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART B--EMPLOYMENT AND RETENTION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           CHAPTER 33--EXAMINATION, SELECTION, AND PLACEMENT


        SUBCHAPTER I--EXAMINATION, CERTIFICATION, AND APPOINTMENT

Sec.
3301. Civil service; generally.
     * * * * * * *

          SUBCHAPTER III--DETAILS, VACANCIES, AND APPOINTMENTS

     * * * * * * *
3349e. Presidential explanation of failure to nominate an Inspector 
          General.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER III--DETAILS, VACANCIES, AND APPOINTMENTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Sec. 3345. Acting officer

  (a) If an officer of an Executive agency (including the 
Executive Office of the President, and other than the 
Government Accountability Office) whose appointment to office 
is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is otherwise 
unable to perform the functions and duties of the office--
          (1) the first assistant to the office of such officer 
        shall perform the functions and duties of the office 
        temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time 
        limitations of section 3346;
          (2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and 
        only the President) may direct a person who serves in 
        an office for which appointment is required to be made 
        by the President, by and with the advice and consent of 
        the Senate, to perform the functions and duties of the 
        vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity subject 
        to the time limitations of section 3346; or
          (3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and 
        only the President) may direct an officer or employee 
        of such Executive agency to perform the functions and 
        duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting 
        capacity, subject to the time limitations of section 
        3346, if--
                  (A) during the 365-day period preceding the 
                date of death, resignation, or beginning of 
                inability to serve of the applicable officer, 
                the officer or employee served in a position in 
                such agency for not less than 90 days; and
                  (B) the rate of pay for the position 
                described under subparagraph (A) is equal to or 
                greater than the minimum rate of pay payable 
                for a position at GS-15 of the General 
                Schedule.
  (b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), a person may not 
serve as an acting officer for an office under this section, 
if--
          (A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of 
        the death, resignation, or beginning of inability to 
        serve, such person--
                  (i) did not serve in the position of first 
                assistant to the office of such officer; or
                  (ii) served in the position of first 
                assistant to the office of such officer for 
                less than 90 days; and
          (B) the President submits a nomination of such person 
        to the Senate for appointment to such office.
  (2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any person if--
          (A) such person is serving as the first assistant to 
        the office of an officer described under subsection 
        (a);
          (B) the office of such first assistant is an office 
        for which appointment is required to be made by the 
        President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
        Senate; and
          (C) the Senate has approved the appointment of such 
        person to such office.
  (c)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), the President (and 
only the President) may direct an officer who is nominated by 
the President for reappointment for an additional term to the 
same office in an Executive department without a break in 
service, to continue to serve in that office subject to the 
time limitations in section 3346, until such time as the Senate 
has acted to confirm or reject the nomination, notwithstanding 
adjournment sine die.
  (2) For purposes of this section and sections 3346, 3347, 
3348, 3349, 3349a, and 3349d, the expiration of a term of 
office is an inability to perform the functions and duties of 
such office.
  (d)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if an Inspector 
General position that requires appointment by the President by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate to be filled is 
vacant, the first assistant of such position shall perform the 
functions and duties of the Inspector General temporarily in an 
acting capacity subject to the time limitations of section 
3346.
  (2) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if for purposes of 
carrying out paragraph (1) of this subsection, by reason of 
absence, disability, or vacancy, the first assistant to the 
position of Inspector General is not available to perform the 
functions and duties of the Inspector General, an acting 
Inspector General shall be appointed by the President from 
among individuals serving in an office of any Inspector 
General, provided that--
          (A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of 
        death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve 
        of the applicable Inspector General, the individual 
        served in a position in an office of any Inspector 
        General for not less than 90 days; and
          (B) the rate of pay for the position of such 
        individual is equal to or greater than the minimum rate 
        of pay payable for a position at GS-15 of the General 
        Schedule.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 3349e. Presidential explanation of failure to nominate an 
                    Inspector General

  If the President fails to make a formal nomination for a 
vacant Inspector General position that requires a formal 
nomination by the President to be filled within the period 
beginning on the date on which the vacancy occurred and ending 
on the day that is 210 days after that date, the President 
shall communicate, within 30 days after the end of such period, 
to Congress in writing--
          (1) the reasons why the President has not yet made a 
        formal nomination; and
          (2) a target date for making a formal nomination.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *




                             MINORITY VIEWS

    Committee Republicans oppose certain titles and support or 
are neutral on the other titles of H.R. 2662, the Inspector 
General Independence and Empowerment Act.

I. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE AND EMPOWERMENT ACT RESTRICTS THE 
  PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO TERMINATE IGS BY IMPOSING SUBSTANTIAL LIMITS 
                    UPON THE EXERCISE OF THAT POWER.

    Title I alters the current system by which the President 
may terminate IGs with minimal notice to Congress.\1\ Under the 
proposed legislation, the President may only terminate or 
reassign an IG for one of nine documented reasons explicitly 
defined in the provision and to also provide documentation to 
Congress.\2\ While the President should not be able to remove 
an IG without a valid reason, so dramatically limiting the 
authority of a President to remove an IG will result in a 
President being unable to remove an IG acting with partisan 
intent to undermine the administration of a duly elected 
President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452 Sec. 1, 92 
Stat. 1101 (1978).
    \2\H.R. 2662, Sec. 102(2)(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Title III would put further restrictions on the President's 
ability to fill an Inspector General vacancy, by requiring the 
replacement be either the ``first assistant'' to the prior IG 
unless that individual is absent or disabled or there is no 
``first assistant.''\3\ Limiting who may become an acting IG to 
only the ``first assistant'' fails to take into account that 
the ``first assistant'' could be implicated in the same poor 
conduct as the IG which was removed and/or be under 
investigation for other wrongdoing themselves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\H.R. 2662, Sec. 301(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In short, Titles I and III of the IG Independence and 
Empowerment Act would impose substantial limits on the 
President's authority under the Inspector General Act of 1978 
to freely terminate IGs. A duly elected President should have a 
wide prerogative to remove or relocate ineffective Inspectors 
General. The proper balance of oversight of Executive Branch 
agencies while maintaining the President's role as the head of 
the Executive Branch is to keep the current system that 
preserves the President's freedom to terminate IGs while 
expanding and strengthening the Congressional notice 
requirement.
    The bill sponsor and other House Democrats have previously 
attempted to include these titles in either standalone 
legislation\4\ or within the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense 
Authorization Act. We opposed both previous attempts, a stance 
which has not changed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\H.R. 6984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  II. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE AND EMPOWERMENT ACT SEEKS TO 
     PROVIDE CLARITY WITH RESPECT TO IG STATUS, APPROPRIATION, DOJ 
   INVESTIGATIVE INDEPENDENCE, AND VARIOUS MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURES.

    Title II requires the President to notify Congress each 
time the President places an Inspector General on nonduty 
status.\5\ If the President fails, within 210 days, to make a 
formal nomination for a vacant IG position that requires a 
formal nomination by the President to be filled, the President 
shall communicate to Congress within 30 days with the reasons 
why, and a target date for a nomination.\6\ This bill ensures 
the President keep Congress informed of changes to an IG's 
status or, in the event of a vacancy, an impetus to fill the 
job. These are not prohibitive restrictions on the Executive 
Branch, and they align with the very purpose of an Inspector 
General to ensure robust oversight. Title II is identical to 
the H.R. 23, the Inspector General Protection Act, which has 
bipartisan support in the Committee and passed the House under 
suspension of the rules by voice vote on January 5th, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\H.R. 2662, Sec. 203(a).
    \6\Id. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Title IV expands the membership of the Council of the 
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's (CIGIE) 
Integrity Committee (IC) to include a former inspector 
general.\7\ This legislation will provide some necessary 
sunshine into the process by enabling members of Congress, when 
supported by their peers on the House and Senate Committees of 
jurisdiction, to receive information when their allegation of 
wrongdoing against an Inspector General is not referred by the 
Integrity Committee for further investigation. This provision 
mirrors the bipartisan H.R. 2681, the Integrity Committee 
Transparency Act, which passed the House Committee on Oversight 
and Reform by voice vote on May 13th, 2021.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\H.R. 2662, Sec. 406(a).
    \8\Business Meeting on H.R. 2681, H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 
117th Cong. (May 13, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Title VI harmonizes the Department of Justice Office of 
Inspector General's (DOJ IG) authority to investigate all 
allegations of misconduct at the Department of Justice.\9\ The 
bill repeals a provision requiring the IG to refer certain 
allegations of misconduct involving DOJ attorneys to the Office 
of Professional Responsibility (OPR).\10\ To ensure 
independence, transparency, and accountability within the 
Department of Justice, all allegations of misconduct should be 
consolidated under the OIG for investigation. This provision is 
identical to H.R. 3064, the Inspector General Access Act, which 
has bipartisan support in the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\H.R. 2662, Sec. 602.
    \10\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Title VII expands whistleblower training to require staff 
in an IGs office to undergo whistleblower training.\11\ 
Additionally, this would expand CIGIE's duty to provide best 
practices for the confidential handling of allegations of 
reprisal against an IG or member of the IGs staff.\12\ This 
does not adequately address many of the larger issues 
surrounding whistleblower protection, including the significant 
delays caused by IGs who fail to quickly investigate many 
whistleblower complaints. Nonetheless, it would clarify the 
procedures for confidentially review allegations of reprisal 
within Inspectors General offices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\H.R. 2662, Sec. 702.
    \12\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Title VIII requires Congressional notification within 15 
days of an IG being removed, placed on leave, or some other 
non-duty status.\13\ The notice would require a list of all 
audits and investigations being conducted by the IG at the time 
of his or her removal.\14\ It is vital that Congress know all 
on-going IG investigations at the time of removal to ensure 
that any IG's removal is not made with the intent to stop an 
ongoing investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\H.R. 2662, Sec. 801.
    \14\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Title IX simplifies CIGIE appropriations by consolidating 
funds that are appropriated to individual IG offices and 
thereafter sent to CIGIE for its use, into one 
appropriation.\15\ The piecemeal approach to CIGIE 
appropriations has made conducting oversight of CIGIE more 
difficult because it is unclear exactly how much money CIGIE 
receives and how those funds are being used. Furthermore, 
consolidating appropriations will enable future cooperation 
within the IG community to utilize data to investigate waste, 
fraud, abuse, and misconduct.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\H.R. 2662, Sec. 901.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Title X requires any IG to notify the House Oversight and 
Reform Committee, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs, and the IGs committee of jurisdiction, when 
an agency refuses to provide information or assistance 
requested to conduct an investigation.\16\ This provision would 
not prevent the agency from protecting its own equities but 
instead enable Congress to review the allegations being 
investigated and determine if it should exert political 
pressure on the agency to provide the necessary information or 
assistance. Additionally, this may result in Congress opening 
an investigation of its own to get the information if it feels 
that is the appropriate action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\H.R. 2662, Sec. 1001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In short, most of the titles of H.R. 2662 would warrant 
support from Committee Republicans as standalone bills or 
combined into other legislative packages.

 III. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL INDEPENDENCE AND EMPOWERMENT ACT FAILS TO 
             INCLUDE ROBUST PROTECTIONS AGAINST IG ABUSES.

    Title V authorizes Inspectors General to issue testimonial 
subpoenas for contractors, grant recipients, and former federal 
employees, as necessary to investigate waste, fraud, and 
abuse.\17\ While, Republicans have supported testimonial 
subpoena authority for IGs going back to 2010, recent IG abuses 
and overtly partisan investigations have underscored the need 
to include robust protections in any testimonial subpoena 
authority legislation. Recent examples include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\H.R. 2662, Sec. 502.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          a. The Intelligence Community IG Michael Atkinson 
        circumvented the Director of National Intelligence to 
        provide the Ukraine Whistleblower complaint directly to 
        the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
        Democrats.
          b. The Acting IG for the Department of Health and 
        Human Services Christi Grimm released an outdated, 
        misleading, and likely politically motivated report on 
        shortages of medical supplies at hospitals.
          c. The Department of Justice IG Michael Horowitz has 
        stated on that he would use testimonial subpoena 
        authority to subpoena former Attorney General Jeff 
        Sessions regarding policy decisions related to child 
        separation.
    Due to these abuses, Rep. Fred Keller (R-PA) offered an 
amendment at the Committee's markup of H.R. 2662 to, in part, 
prevent the use of testimonial subpoenas on any federal 
employee not employed at the time of enactment of this bill and 
to require the IG office to cover the legal fees for any 
subpoenaed individuals.\18\ This amendment would have ensured 
that all former employees have access to legal counsel and that 
no former political appointees who did not know that they may 
be subject to a subpoena are at risk.\19\ Committee Democrats 
refused to consider protections to guard against IGs misusing 
this authority and unanimously opposed the amendment which 
failed 21 to 18 in a recorded vote.\20\
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    \18\Business Meeting on H.R. 2662, H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Reform, 117th Cong. (May 25, 2021).
    \19\Id.
    \20\Id.
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                             IV. CONCLUSION

    Certain aspects of Chairwoman Maloney's proposed 
legislation would resolve ambiguities regarding IGs. However, 
Titles I and III appear to be politically motivated 
overreactions to the Trump administration and Title V presents 
dangers for future political abuse of former federal officials. 
During the Committee's Markup, Republican members offered two 
amendments to strip out these three problematic Titles in order 
to be able to support the bill in Committee. Rep. Andy Biggs 
(R-AZ) offered an amendment that simply struck Titles I, III, 
and V, but Committee Democrats unanimously rejected the 
amendment which failed 20 to 15 in a recorded vote.\21\ And as 
mentioned previously, Rep. Fred Keller offered a similar 
amendment which both removed Titles I and III while amending 
Title V in manner described earlier that would garner Committee 
Republican support. This second good-faith amendment attempt 
also failed. As demonstrated by the myriad of bipartisan 
provisions contained within the H.R. 2662 legislative package, 
Committee Republicans have worked with House Democrats to 
advance necessary reforms to the IG community.
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    \21\Id.

                                   James Comer,
                                           Ranking Member.