

RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY REQUESTING THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTING THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO TRANSMIT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ANY RECORD CREATED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 21, 2021, UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY, RESPECTIVELY, THAT REFERS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND INCLUDES CERTAIN TERMS AND PHRASES RELATING TO GENDER

DECEMBER 16, 2022.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

Mr. SMITH of Washington, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the following

ADVERSE REPORT

together with

DISSENTING VIEWS

[To accompany H. Res. 1475]

The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the resolution (H. Res. 1475) of inquiry requesting the President and directing the Secretary of Defense to transmit to the House of Representatives any record created on or after January 21, 2021, under the control of the President or the Secretary, respectively, that refers to the Department of Defense and includes certain terms and phrases relating to gender, having considered the same, reports unfavorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the resolution as amended not be agreed to.

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The amendment is as follows:

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

That President Joseph R. Biden is requested, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III is directed, to transmit, to the House of Representatives, not later than 30 days after the adoption of this resolution, in a complete and unredacted form, a copy of any document, book, map, photograph, sound or video recording, machine readable material, computerized, digitized, or electronic information created on or after January 21, 2021, under the control of the President or the Secretary, respectively, that pertains to the Department of Defense and contains any of the following terms or phrases:

- (1) Transgender.
- (2) Gender identity.
- (3) Gender transition.
- (4) Gender reassignment.
- (5) Gender affirming.
- (6) Gender neutral.
- (7) Gender dysphoria.
- (8) Nonbinary (or non-binary).
- (9) Gendered language.
- (10) Safe space.
- (11) Inclusive language.

PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

On November 16, 2022, Representative Andrew S. Clyde introduced H. Res. 1475, a resolution of inquiry requesting the President and directing the Secretary of Defense to transmit to the House of Representatives any record created on or after January 21, 2021, under the control of the President or the Secretary, respectively, that refers to the Department of Defense and includes certain terms and phrases relating to gender.

Clause 7 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides for a committee to report on a qualifying resolution of inquiry, such as H. Res. 1475, within 14 legislative days or a privileged motion to discharge the committee is in order. H. Res. 1475 was referred to the Committee on Armed Services on November 16, 2022.

Under the rules and precedents of the House, a resolution of inquiry is one of the methods that the House can use to obtain information from the executive branch. As stated in volume 7, chapter 24, section 8 of “Deschler’s Precedents,” a resolution of inquiry is a “simple resolution making a direct request or demand of the President or head of an executive department to furnish the House of Representatives with specific information in the possession of the executive branch.” In addition, the resolution must seek facts rather than opinions and may not require an investigation.

HEARINGS

For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6)(A) of House rule XIII, the Committee on Armed Services held no hearings on H. Res. 1475.

COMMITTEE POSITION

On December 13, 2022, the committee met in open session and ordered the resolution, H. Res. 1475, unfavorably reported to the House with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of 30 to 26, a quorum being present.

COMMITTEE VOTES

In accordance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, two recorded votes were taken with respect to the committee's consideration of H. Res. 1475. The record of these votes is contained in the following pages.

The committee ordered the resolution, H. Res. 1475, unfavorably reported to the House with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a roll call vote of 30 to 26, a quorum being present.

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

H. RES. 1475

ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 1

On agreeing to the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Smith.

Member	Aye	No	Present	Member	Aye	No	Present
Mr. Smith	X			Mr. Rogers	X		
Mr. Langevin	X			Mr. Wilson	X		
Mr. Larsen	X			Mr. Turner	X		
Mr. Cooper	X			Mr. Lamborn	X		
Mr. Courtney	X			Mr. Wittman	X		
Mr. Garamendi	X			Mrs. Hartzler	X		
Ms. Speier	X			Mr. Scott	X		
Mr. Norcross	X			Mr. Brooks			
Mr. Gallego	X			Mr. Graves	X		
Mr. Moulton	X			Ms. Stefanik	X		
Mr. Carbajal	X			Dr. DesJarlais	X		
Mr. Brown	X			Mr. Kelly	X		
Mr. Khanna	X			Mr. Gallagher	X		
Mr. Keating				Mr. Gaetz	X		
Mr. Kim	X			Mr. Bacon	X		
Ms. Houlihan	X			Mr. Banks	X		
Mr. Crow	X			Ms. Cheney			
Ms. Slotkin	X			Mr. Bergman	X		
Ms. Sherrill	X			Mr. Waltz	X		
Ms. Escobar	X			Mr. Johnson	X		
Mr. Golden	X			Mr. Green	X		
Mrs. Luria	X			Mrs. Bice	X		
Ms. Jacobs	X			Mr. Franklin	X		
Mr. Kahele	X			Mrs. McClain	X		
Ms. Strickland	X			Mr. Jackson	X		
Mr. Ryan				Mr. Carl	X		
Mr. Veasey				Mr. Moore	X		
Mr. Panetta	X			Mr. Fallon	X		
Ms. Murphy	X						
Mr. Horsford	X						
Ms. Garcia	X						
Roll Call Vote Total:	54	0	0				

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

H. RES. 1475

ROLL CALL VOTE NO. 2

On the motion to report H. Res. 1475 unfavorably to the House,
as amended.

Member	Aye	No	Present	Member	Aye	No	Present
Mr. Smith	X			Mr. Rogers		X	
Mr. Langevin	X			Mr. Wilson		X	
Mr. Larsen	X			Mr. Turner		X	
Mr. Cooper	X			Mr. Lamborn		X	
Mr. Courtney	X			Mr. Wittman		X	
Mr. Garamendi	X			Mr. Hartzler		X	
Ms. Speier	X			Mr. Scott		X	
Mr. Norcross	X			Mr. Brooks			
Mr. Gallego	X			Mr. Graves		X	
Mr. Moulton	X			Ms. Stefanik		X	
Mr. Carbajal	X			Dr. DesJarlais		X	
Mr. Brown	X			Mr. Kelly		X	
Mr. Khanna	X			Mr. Gallagher		X	
Mr. Keating				Mr. Gaetz		X	
Mr. Kim	X			Mr. Bacon		X	
Ms. Houlihan	X			Mr. Banks		X	
Mr. Crow	X			Ms. Cheney			
Ms. Slotkin	X			Mr. Bergman		X	
Ms. Sherrill	X			Mr. Waltz		X	
Mr. Escobar	X			Mr. Johnson		X	
Mr. Golden	X			Mr. Green		X	
Mrs. Luria	X			Mrs. Bice		X	
Ms. Jacobs	X			Mr. Franklin		X	
Mr. Kahele	X			Ms. McClain		X	
Ms. Strickland	X			Mr. Jackson		X	
Mr. Ryan	X			Mr. Carl		X	
Mr. Veasey	X			Mr. Moore		X	
Mr. Panetta	X			Mr. Fallon		X	
Ms. Murphy	X						
Mr. Horsford	X						
Ms. Garcia	X						
Roll Call Vote Total:	30	26	0				

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the committee has requested but not received a cost estimate for this legislation from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office.

COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE

The committee notes that clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives does not apply to committee reports on simple resolutions.

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES

In accordance with clause (3)(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this resolution does not provide any new budget authority, new spending authority, new credit authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures.

ADVISORY OF EARMARKS

The committee finds that H. Res. 1475, as reported, does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives.

OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the committee reports that the findings and recommendations of the committee are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.

GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the performance goals and objectives of H. Res. 1475 is to request the President and direct the Secretary of Defense to transmit to the House of Representatives any records that pertains to the Department of Defense and includes certain terms and phrases relating to gender.

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL MANDATES

Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104-4, this resolution contains no Federal mandates with respect to state, local, and tribal governments, nor with respect to the private sector. Similarly, the resolution provides no Federal intergovernmental mandates.

FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation.

APPLICABILITY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The committee finds that this legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or

accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act (Public Law 104–1).

DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

No provision of this resolution establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111–139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION

This resolution would request the President and the direct the Secretary of Defense to transmit to the House of Representatives any record created on or after January 21, 2021, that pertains to the Department of Defense and includes certain terms and phrases relating to gender (e.g., transgender).

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the committee advises that H. Res. 1475 would not make any changes to existing law.

DISSENTING VIEWS

There can be no doubt Department of Defense policy is to indoctrinate our fighting forces into a woke ideology. Let me be clear, this is not an indictment on the brave men and women who wear the uniform and selflessly serve to defend our way of life. Rather, this charge is directed at the besuited political appointees of the Biden Administration, starting with Secretary Lloyd Austin.

The Majority continues to ignore the reality of the situation, despite the overwhelming evidence, bending the knee to the Biden Administration. I offer the following documents as evidence in dissent to the Majority's decision to report H. Res. 1475 unfavorably.

MATT GAETZ.

**A REPORT ON THE FIGHTING CULTURE OF
THE UNITED STATES NAVY SURFACE FLEET**

Conducted at the Direction of
Senator Tom Cotton
Congressman Jim Banks
Congressman Dan Crenshaw
Congressman Mike Gallagher

**Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle, USMC, Ret.
&
Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, USN, Ret.**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This review was conducted at the direction of Senator Tom Cotton and Congressmen Mike Gallagher, Jim Banks, and Dan Crenshaw as a strictly nonpartisan exercise in Congressional oversight. The authors of this review conducted long-form interviews with numerous active-duty and recently retired or detached officers and enlisted personnel about their insights into the culture of the United States Navy following a series of high-profile and damaging operational failures in the Navy's Surface Warfare community. The discussion below is intended to inform Congress of the findings of these interviews, with an emphasis on subjects including funding, maintenance planning, administrative management, and operational employment.

The review did not focus on any single failure, each of which has been thoroughly investigated by the appropriate authorities, but rather examined the broader question of whether the episodes taken as a whole indicate any underlying systemic problems affecting the performance of the surface Navy. The incidents that formed the impetus for this review included the catastrophic fire on the USS Bonhomme Richard pier-side in San Diego, the collision of the USS McCain in the South China Sea, the collision of the USS Fitzgerald off the coast of Japan, and the surrender of two small U.S. Navy craft to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy in the Arabian Gulf. The direction from members of Congress was to establish if these incidents were part of a series of isolated, unit-level breakdowns, or if they instead indicate larger institutional issues that are degrading the performance of the entire naval surface force.

Interviews were conducted both by Congressional staff and outside experts. Interviewers were directed to apply an iterative long-form interview process to a wide variety of individuals and to present members of Congress with a compendium detailing their findings. The review team was directed to employ a high-touch, iterative approach that proceeded without reliance on an interview subject's chain of command in order to encourage nuance and candor on the part of interviewees—as opposed to wider-reach, lower-touch survey methods that are typically used in military climate assessments. 77 unique and formal interviews were conducted with Navy personnel via an extensive hour-long process to establish a common controlled approach to the questions at hand. The interviewees represented a cross-section of Navy personnel at varying ranks and in varying occupational specialties across a broad period of time—though interviewers did exercise a moderate prejudice for speaking to personnel with service in the surface Navy, to officers, and to those with significant time at sea.

By conducting lengthy conversations with knowledgeable subject matter experts and subjects with direct experience in or with the surface Navy, including with ship captains in command, deep and substantive common insights were captured that escape mathematical surveys. Moreover, by conducting the interviews from outside the chain of command via the exercise of the Congress's Title I oversight authority, and by pledging anonymity to participants, interviewers enjoyed a significant level of candor in these conversations. Ultimately the process was able to identify trends that, by the admission of those interviewed, would not normally be shared with their own chain of command.

The results of this project are unambiguous. There was a broad consensus across interviewees on numerous cultural and structural issues that impact the morale and readiness of the Navy's surface force. These include: an insufficient focus on warfighting skills, the perception of a zero-defect mentality accompanied by a culture of micromanagement, and over-sensitivity and responsiveness to modern media culture. Structural issues identified include lack of resources and consistency in surface warfare training programs, and the Navy's underwhelming commitment to surface ship maintenance—a problem that spans decades.

Concern within the Navy runs so high that, when asked whether incidents such as the two destroyer collisions in the Pacific, the surrender of a small craft to the IRGC in the Arabian Gulf, the burning of the Bonhomme Richard and other incidents were part of a broader cultural or leadership problem in the Navy, 94% of interviewees responded "yes," 3% said "no," and 3% said "unsure." And when asked if the incidents were directly connected, 55% said "yes," 16% said "no," and 29% said "unsure." This sentiment, that the Navy is dangerously off course, was overwhelming.

FIGURE 1: Do you believe these incidents are part of a broader problem in Navy culture or leadership?





FIGURE 2: Do you believe there is a direct connection between the incidents?



Specific Issues Raised

Insufficient leadership focus on warfighting. Perhaps the most concerning comment and consistent observation amongst interviewees was that the service does not promote or advance surface ship warfighting in a meaningful way. Finding and sinking enemy fleets should be the principal purpose of a Navy. But many sailors found their leadership distracted, captive to bureaucratic excess, and rewarded for the successful execution of administrative functions rather than their skills as a warfighter. There was considerable apprehension that the surface warfare community in particular lost its fighting edge in the years following the end of the Cold War. With China building and operating a competitive fleet, the lack of proper attention on warfighting was of deep concern to many interviewees.

A dominant and paralyzing zero-defect mentality. A prevalent theme emerged over the course of the interview process: near universal disdain for the so-called “one mistake Navy,” the practice of treating certain errors with career termination and offering no opportunity for recovery. A former senior leader framed this problem using an evocative historical analogy, suggesting that none of the four key Admirals who led victorious fleets in World War II would have made it to the rank of Captain in today’s Navy. The general unwillingness to rehabilitate one-off mistakes, the disinclination to weigh errors against the totality of a naval career, and the practice of discipline-by-paperwork were broadly understood to be a drain on the Navy’s retention efforts.

Under-investment in surface warfare officer training. The investment in surface warfare officer training pales in comparison to investments in aviation and submarine communities. Compounding its under-investment problem, the surface Navy has “re-imagined” its officer training programs multiple times in the past 20 years, often seeking efficiencies (i.e. even smaller investments) and leaving the commanding officers with inconsistent, often ill-prepared wardrooms.

Poorly resourced and executed surface ship maintenance programs. Nearly every interviewee had a story of a cancelled, delayed, or drastically reduced major maintenance availability. Often this was identified as a problem driven by senior civilian leadership and combatant commanders who consistently accepted the “maintenance risk” to squeeze an extra month or two out of a deployment. But this was also seen as a failure in manning and training the surface community to develop and assess maintenance work packages. Finally, there was an overwhelming perception that the surface Navy is the “billpayer” as aviation and submarine nuclear maintenance packages were seen as too risky to underfund. The cumulative effect of this underfunding and poor execution has left the surface warships less modernized and less ready for combat operations.

Expanding culture of micromanagement. Concerns of micromanagement within the surface warfare community are alarming. Sailors’ concerns were two-fold. The first is that technology has empowered admirals and commodores to exercise greater, arguably unhealthy, levels of control over ship captains. The second was that this control drives a level of toxicity and lack of accountability and initiative in the Navy’s warfighting command hierarchy. Given the increasing likelihood that naval commands may be isolated or cut off from communications in a high-end

fight, creating undue dependence on higher headquarters for day-to-day direction could negatively impact future naval combat operations.

Corrosive over-responsiveness to media culture. Sailors believe that Navy leaders are excessively reactive to an unyielding U.S. news cycle, and are unable to distinguish between stories that demand a response and stories that do not. A pervasive sentiment is that Navy leaders have subverted the responsibilities of the chain of command to the pages of *Military.com* or the *Military Times*, and make punitive decisions based on negative news reports rather than the service's own standards of discipline.

Other themes that a majority of interviewees mentioned included:

- The surface Navy wardroom has lost its focus on growing good ship-handlers;
- Sailors are distracted by a tsunami of administrative tasks not related to their ships' lethality;
- The Navy is too small to accomplish all the missions with which it is tasked by senior civilian leaders and combatant commanders;
- Sailors and officers lack sufficient resiliency and are unprepared for the difficulties of combat, in part because their training has deemphasized persistent exposure to adversity.

The interviewees' views of the fundamental causes of these problems varied, but one recurring theme was that the end of the Cold War marked an important inflection point for the culture of the surface fleet. The disappearance of a peer threat at sea, followed a decade later by the focus on significant land conflicts in the Middle East in which the surface Navy played only a peripheral role, "bent" the direction of the surface warfare culture and the Navy writ large. Unlike the ground and aviation combat forces across the services, the surface Navy had neither actual nor imminent confrontation with the accountability of violent conflict at scale. Moreover, the day-to-day operations of a surface fleet in peacetime—while still fraught with risk—are more forgiving than the day-to-day operations of the Navy's own aviation or undersea communities, in the sense that fewer potential errors could lead to an immediate crisis or loss of life. As mentioned, this has also left the surface Navy as "last to the trough" in the expenditure of resources for training, maintenance, and operations.

[I]n a situation where the surface Navy is losing personnel and ships absent interaction with an armed enemy, Navy leadership ought to be concerned as to how elements of their organization will perform when a capable enemy presents itself.

The responsibility for fixing this crisis falls both to the Congress and senior civilian defense leadership. These problems were not created by the Navy alone and cannot be fixed by the Navy alone. Congress must provide the resources to sustain adequate platform capacity, maintenance, and training time. But in a situation where the surface Navy is losing personnel and ships absent interaction with an armed enemy, Navy leadership ought to be concerned as to how elements of their organization will perform when a capable enemy presents itself.

FINDINGS

INSUFFICIENT FOCUS ON WARFIGHTING

One of the most concerning and consistent observations amongst interviewees was that the surface Navy does not promote or advance surface ship warfighting in a meaningful way. Finding and sinking enemy fleets should be the principal purpose of a Navy. But many sailors found their leadership distracted, captive to bureaucratic excess, and rewarded for the successful execution of administrative functions rather than their skills as a warfighter. As one officer related, “the very difficult problem for an O-5 CO (Commanding Officer) is that he’s got 1,000 requirements pushed on him, many of which are administrative or operational...and so his real job is figuring out which requirements he’s just going to blow off...whether it be fixing a material issue or training or warfighting readiness. This has always been an issue for commanders. However, it has been exacerbated due to the absence of a peer threat for a generation and thus lacks an apparent operational imperative to support a commander’s decision to prioritize warfighting.”

There was considerable apprehension that the surface warfare community in particular lost a component of its fighting edge in the years following the end of the Cold War, and with China building and operating a competitive fleet, the lack of proper focus on warfighting was of deep concern to many interviewees. The need for a combat-focused fleet should be fully understood and advocated by every sailor. There is, as one mid-grade officer observed, questions as to “what’s your purpose out here?...I don’t really think there is a mindset there that the reason why the fleet exists is as a warfighting function...I didn’t really feel that fighting spirit in the surface community.”

“I didn’t really feel that fighting spirit in the surface community.”

Interviewers found this to be a common refrain. One recent destroyer captain lamented that, “where someone puts their time shows what their priorities are. And we’ve got so many messages about X, Y, Z appreciation month, or sexual assault prevention, or you name it. We don’t even have close to that same level of emphasis on actual warfighting.”

“There’s no curriculum,” said a former active-duty surface warfare officer and current reservist. “We’ll spend hours and hours on drill weekends or other areas talking about like, ‘OK, what’s the checklist you have to have in place? Do you have all your right uniforms?’ But there is no training like, ‘what is the current situation in China?’”

“What are the things the Chinese are concerned about? What are the things the Iranians are concerned about? [The] Intel folks know that, but like there’s no general education about, ‘What are the wars we could fight, and how do we understand the context of these so we get in combat.’ We can have both the cultural and political understanding as well as the warfighting implications. And to me, if we’re focused on the front-line warfighting, we should know the worst we’re going into and what the greater context is. There’s none of that right now.” While

this lack of attention on likely adversaries could well be a local problem rather than service-wide, it was a theme that manifested throughout the interview process.

By weighing down sailors with non-combat related training and administrative burdens, both Congress and Navy leaders risk sending them into battle less prepared and less focused than their opponents.

"Sometimes I think we care more about whether we have enough diversity officers than if we'll survive a fight with the Chinese navy."

Frustration with nonessential training was found to be overwhelming and not limited to the surface warfare community. Navy leaders have contributed to morass of requirements, but so have senior civilian defense leadership and Congress. While programs to encourage diversity, human sex trafficking prevention, suicide prevention, sexual assault prevention, and others are appropriate, they come with a cost. The non-combat curricula consume Navy resources, clog inboxes, create administrative quagmires, and monopolize precious training time. By weighing down sailors with non-combat related training and administrative burdens, both Congress and Navy leaders risk sending them into battle less prepared and less focused than their opponents.

Sailors increasingly see administrative and non-combat related training as the mission, rather than the mission itself. "Sometimes I think we care more about whether

we have enough diversity officers than if we'll survive a fight with the Chinese navy," lamented one lieutenant currently on active duty. "It's criminal. They think my only value is as a black woman. But you cut our ship open with a missile and we'll all bleed the same color."

Just as concerning is the assertion by interviewees that, when combat lethality and ship fighting are emphasized, they are treated in a box-checking manner that can seem indistinguishable from non-combat related exercises. "The Navy treats warfighting readiness as a compliance issue," said one career commander. "You might even use the term compliance-centered warfare as opposed to adversary-centered warfare or warfighter-centered warfare."

One junior surface warfare officer, still on active duty, confessed "I don't think that the [surface community] see themselves as people who are engaged in a fight."

Commander Bryan McGrath, a retired surface warfare officer who agreed to be interviewed on the record, notably dissented on the question of whether excess requirements were distracting sailors from their primary mission, and further rejected the notion that the Navy does not prioritize warfighting fundamentals.

"I don't think that the [surface community] see themselves as people who are engaged in a fight."

"[The ships] are very busy," he said. "I think there are too few of them for what is being asked...The operational requirements squeeze out maintenance, they squeeze out some training."

"When you're on the ship," McGrath said, the "sexual assault and victim stuff, all that stuff just

seems like a burden. It just seems like it's never-ending...[But] the further I get from it, the more I understand why it's important and why there does have to be very clear signals sent to deck plate sailors that they're, you know, that issues that are important to them are important to leadership.”

A recently retired senior enlisted leader suggested that this dynamic was more a lack of proper prioritization. “I guarantee you every unit in the Navy is up to speed on their diversity training. I’m sorry that I can’t say the same of their ship handling training.”

Administrative excess is a common complaint that plagues all peacetime militaries and it is not unique to the surface Navy. But there was considerable apprehension that the surface warfare community in particular lost a component of its fighting edge in the years following the end of the Cold War. With China putting dozens of fighting warships in the water on an annual basis, the lack of proper focus on warfighting was of deep concern to many interviewees.

“I’ve never heard anyone in any [congressional] testimony that I can think of that talks about actually winning...”

One career surface warfare officer said, “I’ve never heard anyone in any [congressional] testimony that I can think of that talks about actually winning. And so that’s not to absolve the Navy of its responsibility, but it’s just stunning to me.” Another said, “lethality, I don’t think, was touted or promoted, or a warrior culture. And maybe what’s more of a popular depiction was not promoted, I’d say innovation. It was not encouraged and generally frowned upon. And it was very much a put the check in the box and a very risk averse culture.”

A DOMINANT AND PARALYZING ZERO DEFECT MENTALITY

A prevalent theme that emerged over the course of the interview process was a near universal disdain for the so-called “one mistake Navy,” the practice of treating certain errors with career termination and offering no opportunity for recovery. The general unwillingness to rehabilitate one-off mistakes, the disinclination to weigh errors against the totality of a naval career, and the practice of discipline-by-paperwork were broadly understood to be a drain on the Navy’s retention efforts.

Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has framed this in an historical context, suggesting that none of the four key Admirals who led victorious fleets in World War II would have made it to the rank of Captain in today’s Navy. “Nimitz put his first command on the rocks,” Lehman said. “And Halsey was constantly getting into trouble for bending the rules or drinking too much...Ernie King was a womanizer and a heavy drinker. And Admiral Leahy may be the only one that might have made it through, but he had quite a few blots on his record as well.”

“But in each case, there was a critical mass of leadership in the Navy that recognized that these were very, very promising junior officers. And so, while they were punished for mistakes, they were kept in a career path. That’s not the case today. It’s just not done because it’s too dangerous for anybody that tries to help someone who has made a mistake.”

Lehman, though decades removed from his time as Secretary, channeled the sentiment of a vast majority of those interviewed. The Navy’s proclivity to end careers over certain mistakes was perceived less as an effective disciplinary tool and more as a drag on retention, lethality, and morale. One career sailor lamented a “toxic culture of commander responsibility” that has set upon the force.

“Commanders can no longer take risks in a way that they can have small failures, learn, and move forward,” and “Failures are terminal to people’s careers.”

The zero-defect Navy is perceived by sailors as an agent of careerism, a practice that attrits bold, combat-focused leaders in favor of more timid bureaucrats. One former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense who served as a surface warfare officer warned that this creates a harmful incentive structure in the Navy ranks.

“These are guys that are totally zero-risk,” he said of the surface warfare community. “Because they’re like, ‘Hey, I’m going to be the [commanding officer] for 15 months, why try to get [to] the battle? Why try to do really important boardings in the Middle East? I’m just going to make sure I’m talking to the admiral over the VTC (Video Tele-Conference) and [make] sure that he’s for it?’ And I just found that to be really sad.” The implication is clear; the independence of command has been eroded and commanding officers fear risk due to its adverse impact upon their careers.

“These are guys that are totally zero-risk.”

Despite sentiments that the Navy chases away top talent with an intolerant attitude towards error, there was some nuance about what this means in practice. Discipline is foundational to military

culture and this point did not escape those interviewed. Transgressions such as failures of integrity, sexual misconduct or assault, toxic leadership, drug use, racial bigotry, and technical ineptitude were all viewed as indisputably appropriate grounds for terminating a Navy career.

"If zero-tolerance were in place when I was in the Navy," said Secretary Lehman, who built the 600-ship navy as Secretary and went on to found a multibillion-dollar company, "I wouldn't have made it past [Lieutenant] J.G."

However, isolated infractions such as an alcohol-related indiscretion, a poor choice of words with no malice or offense intended, a ship-board accident with no damage or injuries and no demonstrated neglect, and similar offenses are supposed career-ending faults that could instead be weighed in the context of an overall service record and provided with an opportunity for redemption. One officer noted the example of Captain Robert J. Kelly, a combat-tested aviator who ran the USS Enterprise aground in San Francisco Bay several decades ago but went on to earn 4 stars and command of the Pacific Fleet. It was a rare mercy in the early 1980s and unheard of today.

The general unwillingness to rehabilitate one-off mistakes, the disinclination to weigh errors against the totality of a naval career, and the practice of discipline-by-paperwork, were broadly understood to be a drain on the Navy's retention efforts.

Interviewers were told that some of the best officers leave as Lieutenants, often for some of the top business and law schools in the country, even as they professed a desire to continue to serve.

"Goldman Sachs, Amazon, Apple, Google, whatever. All of these institutions of high performance and high excellence do circus flips trying to figure out how to cultivate and retain talent," said one former naval officer who is now a senior leader at a major hedge fund's philanthropic arm. "The Navy all but chases it out the door."

Discipline is critical to all effective militaries and the Navy, as a whole, appears to apply discipline in a healthy and productive manner. But interviewers found no credible defense of the one-mistake Navy and its influence on officer careers in particular. The practice creates fear and apprehension in the fleet. It degrades lethality, atrophies talent, inhibits reenlistments, encourages careerism, and advances those that avoid risks and challenges up the ranks.

"If zero-tolerance were in place when I was in the Navy," said Secretary Lehman, who built the 600-ship navy as Secretary and went on to found a multibillion-dollar company, "I wouldn't have made it past [Lieutenant] J.G."

CORROSIVE OVER-RESPONSIVENESS TO MEDIA CULTURE

The “one-mistake” culture appears to be somewhat recent phenomena in Navy history and some suggested that today’s unyielding news environment could bear some of the blame for its rise.

Frustration among interviewees was palpable, with both the national press corps and the manner in which Navy leaders react to the press. “[Admirals] are supposed to lead us into battle but they hide in foxholes at the first sight of *Military.com* and the *Military Times*,” said one intelligence officer with disgust. “The reporters are in charge, not us.”

*“The reporters
are in charge,
not us.”*

There is an undercurrent of fear in the surface fleet. Sailors described commanding officers who refused to delegate below the Department Head level for basic issues such as watch-bill development, for fear of ending up on the cover of the *Navy Times*. Another sailor described a Commanding Officer who was unwilling to have routine and essential leadership conversations with sailors about their port calls and off-duty experiences, in case any incriminating stories or UCMJ violations arose.

Interviewers observed a number of reactions to this institutional jumpiness around news media. The first is a loss of faith in the chain of command. In the wake of a damaging story, the senior ranks are perceived as quick to sacrifice junior personnel to preserve the credibility of the unit or the career of the senior leader in charge. Disciplinary decisions appear to be bent to the unsteady whims of public perception, not the Navy’s own standards and regulations. This was noticed during the disciplinary actions following the USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald incidents, where perception was that the military administered discipline based on public and Congressional outcry rather than the concrete root causes of both unique incidents.

Another reaction is senior leaders being unwilling to trust their subordinates during “risky” maneuvers, for fear that a subordinate’s mistake might derail the senior’s career. “COs would be quite risk-adverse,” one officer recalled, “they would have their senior department heads manning a lot of watches, especially on the bridge and things like that to make sure that nothing went wrong, because nobody wanted to end up in the media, and nobody wanted to end up on the cover of *Navy Times*.” He finished his statement with a telling observation that, in this day and age, this reaction was “totally understandable.”

The most concerning effect identified was an inversion of the chain of command itself. In an era of social media, text messaging, and email, it is easy for a disgruntled junior officer or sailor to grind their axe with targeted leaks. Many reporters publish their contact information in their bylines. Contacting a journalist is a simple task in the digital age, even for a teenage sailor. This ease of access, combined with the Navy’s proclivity, or at least perceived proclivity, to bend the knee when a reporter files a negative story, has instilled in junior officers and sailors a notion that they can effortlessly exercise power over their senior officers with unauthorized disclosures of internal military affairs.

Much of this is self-inflicted. The military, not just the Navy, has been slow to acknowledge the realities of new media. Commanders do not appear to understand that stories come in a flash and disappear just as quickly. It could potentially be a response to incidents during the sunset of the Cold War, when first the Iowa turret exploded and the Tailhook convention derailed several senior officer careers. One respondent recalled that when Admiral Jay Johnson became Chief of Naval Operations after the death of Admiral Mike Boorda, one of Johnson's top priorities was "to get Navy off the front page of the *Washington Post* and get Navy problems out of *Navy Times*...in fact, Jay would not even allow *Navy Times* reporters in the building." These were the events that defined the Navy in the 1990s, when many of today's senior leaders were in their formative years. It appears to have created systemwide anxieties today.

Journalists are tasked with a difficult job that is vital to a healthy democracy. But their objective is to hold power to account, not to fight and win wars.

These fears are often unwarranted. They do not reflect the new realities of mass media. News has changed drastically in the past 3 decades. Editorial standards for newsworthiness have loosened significantly, saturating audiences with empty calorie news—stories that have emotional appeal but are not particularly informative. Many news outlets, including defense news outlets, have shifted to tabloid models where stories are sensationalized and short-lived. The Navy has forgotten how to differentiate between stories that are ignorable and stories that demand corrective measures.

To wit, 30 years ago the newsworthiness of a Master Chief telling sailors to "clap like you're at a strip club" during a distinguished visitor tour would be questionable. But a reporter overheard those exact comments from the USS Harry Truman's Command Master Chief during a press availability last year. Despite there being no apparent news value in an NCO using mildly "salty" language with sailors, multiple media outlets disagreed. The comments ran across several national news services and a 30-year veteran of the Navy, who would have been an invaluable asset in a conflict at sea, resigned. In what would have normally been discipline via stern conversation from a higher officer, three decades of honorable service were instead ignobly ended.

The inability of senior Navy leaders to recognize that such a story was fleeting and trivial reinforced the perception that the Navy will not stand behind their own sailors when unfair or unfounded or, in this case, farcical stories make it to print. The trend has not gone unnoticed. It creates the impression in the lower ranks that Navy leaders are easily cowed by the press and will throw sailors to the wolves should their name appear in print. It further suggests a profound weakness in the senior rungs of the chain of command, advertising a critical vulnerability to sophisticated information operations conducted by foreign actors and all but inviting sailors with personal vendettas to leak damaging information.

Journalists are tasked with a difficult job that is vital to a healthy democracy. But their objective is to hold power to account, not to fight and win wars. When Navy leaders are perceived as serving the interests of their own reputations and not their own sailors, they risk an erosion of faith in the fleet's good order and discipline.

UNDER-INVESTMENT IN SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER TRAINING

The investment in surface warfare officer training pales in comparison to investments in aviation and submarine communities. Compounding the under-investment, the surface Navy has “re-imagined” its officer training programs multiple times in the past 20 years, often seeking efficiencies (i.e. even smaller investments) and leaving the commanding officers with inconsistent, often ill-prepared wardrooms. No one would ever expect an aviator to land a plane on a flight deck or a submarine officer to dive the boat after a few weeks of reading content on 23 Compact Discs (CDs), but the Navy did exactly that with the surface warfare wardroom starting in 2003.

From the mid-1970s until the early 2000s, officers selected for the surface warfare community uniformly reported to Newport, RI, for Surface Warfare Officer School Division Officer’s Course, a five-month syllabus that exposed a new officer to all aspects of shipboard life in classrooms, various laboratories and generalized and specific shipboard simulators, receiving instruction in leadership, engineering, weapon systems, ship handling, rules of the road, and basic naval task organizations. As one officer recounted, “schools training wasn’t just sitting in lectures. It required getting PQS (Personnel Qualification Standards) signed off and actually putting students through bridge simulators...”

No one would ever expect an aviator to land a plane on a flight deck or a submarine officer to dive the boat after a few weeks reading 23 Compact Discs (CDs), but the Navy did exactly that...

The surface warfare officer community has frequently been under pressure to look for efficiencies, both in resource allocation and time spent before entry to the Fleet. The aviation and submarine communities had no such pressures. It is estimated that getting an F-18E/F Hornet pilot from commissioning to the fleet squadron could cost as much as \$3 million to \$4 million dollars. Getting a SWO to the fleet in some of these plans was often less than \$30,000 or \$40,000, or roughly 1% as expensive. Submarine officer initial training is not as expensive as aviation training but it is a world away from 40k. In terms of timelines to the fleet, aviators take anywhere from 18 to 24 months in pipeline training, submarine officers take 18 to 21 months, while surface warfare officers have often considered 6 months in the pipeline excessive. The aviation and submarine communities have maintained these initial training paths for more than 40 years. At some point this lack of financial and bandwidth investment in initial surface warfare training was bound to introduce risk.

In 2003, the Navy surface warfare community, in its effort to become more efficient, eliminated the initial SWOSDOC training at Newport as well as many of the unit specific combat and engineering systems schools. New officers in this era reported to their ships, where they received 23 CDs from which they were expected to learn their jobs as they did them. As one officer remembered, “We gave ensigns boxes of CDs and told them to train themselves between watches, and that was a colossal failure.” It was noted by more than one interviewee that neither naval aviation nor submarines would ever consider having an officer show up at their first tour command less than fully qualified, but the surface warfare community did.

According to interviewees, this initiative was taken at the same time that the Navy, in another effort to find efficiencies, cut back underway steaming days for its ships from 28–36 days to as low as 10–12 days per quarter, decreasing overall crew size but increasing the size of the officer wardrooms. Officers who were supposed to report for a year of schooling reported to their first command instead. As one mid-grade retired officer remembered, “It was a nightmare for the more senior officers to manage that many clueless junior officers.” It was also a time when administrative burdens grew on commanding officers, decreasing the time they had to mentor junior officers. By shrinking the time available to train officers and NCOs in the fundamentals of warfighting, the Navy self-inflicted a crippling wound on its sailors that came absent Congressional meddling or political pressure.

‘Qualify them anyway.’

Unit pre-deployment qualification and certification requirements did not decrease. This resulted in underway training periods that became “a series of back-to-back events that exist only to ‘check the box’ and not really learn anything.” Some commanding officers attempted to push back against these pressures. One respondent related that he had informed his admiral that, “I’ve got people that I know for certain are not proficient in watch standing.’ And you know what they [told] me? ‘Qualify them anyway.’”

Simulators and artificial training environments were explored as an option for making up for decreased underway opportunities, but interviews suggest that bridge and combat system simulators, while still present, struggled to keep pace with the changing technological and threat environments as software and display modifications were sequenced into the fleet. The Navy simply did not allocate sufficient money to ensure that their training environments matched actual operational layouts in use. Further, simulators lack the pressure of real-world consequences, underscoring both the limitations of simulations and the importance of realistic, hands-on training.

The problems with the simulators and other training evolutions, especially the use of predictable and scripted and sequenced training drills, extended into engineering and combat systems underway. This effective “dumbing down” of the overall training experience onboard ships resulted in the wardroom and crew spending their time “studying to the test” rather than gaining actual knowledge, experience, and wisdom. A former commanding officer revealed that even recently, the “ATG [Afloat Training Group] brought in scripted, predictable training, again checklist process, but no deep understanding.” Division officer tours are often split into two ships, thus decreasing training opportunities as a qualified watch stander, reducing the ability to gain “seasoning” as ship-handlers.

There were also multiple mentions from interviewees that there was a significant cultural change in the surface warfare community in the late 1990s as the vertical launch system and the accompanying Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles were introduced into the life of the cruiser-destroyer Navy. Multiple respondents remarked that the community shifted its focus from being a “ship-handling” community to becoming a “land-attack” community as more training time and operationally deployed time was spent focused on preparing and positioning the ship for land

attack missions rather than training for ship-vs-ship and ship-vs-submarine warfare scenarios that had dominated the surface warfare culture and training syllabi in the past.

A retired mid-grade officer remembered, “all we cared about was launching Tomahawk missiles. And that kind of support of the ground offensive took precedent over everything else...solely concentrating on the deep strike inland...instead of fighting your ship at sea.” Another officer remembered the moment when he shockingly realized, “Oh my God, we’ve become the land attack Navy. Nobody is going to kill ships in a war.”

Two areas of training and education that did remain robust were AEGIS air defense training and damage control and firefighting. The AEGIS training was universally praised by interviewees and produced a mission set where officers felt well prepared. It was noted by some interviewees that AEGIS had strong funding as it draws on a mix of Missile Defense Agency and Navy funds.

*“[A]ll we
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missiles...”*

Nearly every respondent, both in the pre-2003 and post-2003 eras attested to the fact that initial basic firefighting and damage control training as well as frequent refresher training in these essential skills was both prioritized and accomplished as required. Many respondents offered sentiments similar to one officer who stated that the Navy was “very intent on damage control and fire-fighting training [that was] crucial to day-to-day operations.” One important insight was that fire-fighting and damage control simulators had continuously evolved over the past generation to “become very advanced. We developed the use of ones that you could set off fires and contain the smoke and clean the air.” The degree to which the crews of both the USS McCain and the USS Fitzgerald were able to stabilize and counter the serious flooding that occurred following their separate collisions suggest that this is true. While Congress still waits for the full account of the origins of the USS Bonhomme Richard fire, the Navy’s focus on damage control can largely be praised as an example of how proper prioritization of essential training can yield effective results.

The Navy has recently reorganized its division officer training once again and fortunately many of the changes seek to correct the concerns voiced by the interviewees. The Basic Division Officer Course (DOC) of 9 weeks will be augmented by a 4-week Junior Officer of the Deck course. This is then followed by 5 more weeks of Advanced DOC in between the first and second tours as well as specialized training for the second tour assignment. In theory, a continuum of Maritime Warfare training for surface warfare officers will be integrated across both DOC courses, Department Head School and CO/XO training. There are two keys to the potential success of this effort. Investment, in that the Navy invites risk by going cheap on the trainers, the time allotted for training, or the personnel needed to run the trainers. And persistence, where the Navy could avoid past errors by simply adhering to their training program rather than changing it every few years.

POORLY RESOURCED AND EXECUTED SURFACE SHIP MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

The 2010 VADM Philip Balisle Report on Surface Force Readiness highlighted a number of manpower, maintenance, training, and readiness issues plaguing the surface warfare enterprise. One of the most damning was the inability or unwillingness of the Navy to properly fund the planning, conduct, and execution of the surface ship maintenance program. Despite ten years of corrective Navy actions, nearly every interviewee had a story of a cancelled, delayed, or drastically reduced major maintenance availability. Often, this was identified as a problem driven by senior civilian leadership and combatant commanders who consistently accepted the “maintenance risk” to squeeze an extra month or two out of a deployment. But this was also seen as a failure in manning and training by the surface community to assess material conditions, develop maintenance work packages, and supervise maintenance execution. Finally, there was an overwhelming perception that the surface Navy remains the “billpayer” as aviation and submarine nuclear maintenance packages were seen as too risky to underfund. Surface ship maintenance packages are perceived as “bare bones” and unable to absorb growth. The cumulative effect of this underfunding and poor execution has left the surface warships less modernized and less ready for combat operations.

Despite ten years of corrective Navy actions, nearly every interviewee had a story of a cancelled, delayed or drastically reduced major maintenance availability.

The issue of insufficient funding and an unwillingness to commit to appropriate maintenance budgets has severe collateral effects. Said one officer, “If you have budget X and you only do whatever maintenance that is required that you can do under budget X, then you have all the rest of the stuff that you had to descope because you're limited by the budget. And then that just creates a bow wave because what's the second and third order effects to deferring that maintenance? You end up with, for instance, on a cruiser where...we knew that the fuel tank tops in one of the machinery spaces, that if we did the ultrasonic testing (UT) on that space, that then the safety requirements would require us to replace the tank tops. We didn't have the budgets to do the tank tops, so we didn't do the UT. And then it wasn't until we went into the shipyard and we were doing the required cleaning of the tanks, which that was a requirement under the package, then all of a sudden, one of the shipyard workers goes up and goes, ‘Oh, I see sunlight through this tank top.’ Well, now you're forced to do the UT. So now you're forced to re-scope the work. So now you're forced to cram more work into a yard package that you should have had planned in the first place.”

One of the biggest drivers of maintenance challenges clearly happens outside of traditional Navy leadership control. The decision to extend a ship on deployment almost always impacts surface ship maintenance availabilities, which traditionally follow immediately after the ship's return from deployment. The decision on whether to extend a ship's deployment lies with the Secretary of Defense, and thus this is a problem that can be resolved without legislation.

These operational extensions cause a host of problems, including changes to shipyard maintenance schedules (which are often balancing 4-8 ships in maintenance at a time), increases

in the size of the extended ship's maintenance package (i.e. more things break the longer a ship is at sea at sea and partially broken things get worse), backend scheduling problems (i.e. ship wide training programs), and personnel management issues (transfers, retirements). These operational extensions are frequent (20 plus surface ships a year). If the "risk to maintenance" is part of the senior Defense Department and Combatant Command decision making process, it is clearly not heavily weighted. The impact of this neglect has a direct, negative impact on personnel.

CULTURE OF MICROMANAGEMENT

The scientific effects of micromanagement on workforces are well documented. They include low employee morale, high turnover, reduction of productivity and generalized job dissatisfaction. Concerns of micromanagement within the surface warfare community were alarming. Sailors' worries were two-fold. The first is that technology has empowered admirals and other senior leaders to exercise greater, arguably unhealthy, levels of control over ship captains. The second was that this control drives a lack of accountability and initiative in the Navy's warfighting command hierarchy.

An active-duty surface warfare officer with over 15 years of sea duty witnessed this trend evolve over nearly 3 decades in the Navy. We are "holding back more of that autonomy and probably accelerating those cultural tendencies that are creating officers that are less confident and less competent and less comfortable exercising command," he said.

Another active-duty ship's captain said of a recent deployment to the Middle East, "I think it was [10-15] times we escorted ships back and forth through the Strait of Hormuz. And every single time I knew in the back of my head that there were people – that there were admirals that were literally watching the cameras on my ship second guessing every single thing I did instead of trusting [their] commanders."

One active-duty surface warfare officer, with a decade of sea time, likened this to a "10,000-mile screwdriver," with Navy leaders increasingly able to peer into the operational decisions of captains and commanders from the comfort of terrestrial headquarters. There was deeper concern that these practices are worsening with technologic advances.

"Ducks pick ducks," said another, recently retired, career surface warfare officer. "So now those admirals that we have and that were in charge were successful being micromanaged. And so now they view [micromanagement] as success."

One former active-duty officer and current reservist who served on carriers suggested that advances in data science have made it easier for senior leaders to reach down and interfere with the daily operations of a deployed warship.

"I think that there used to be this mindset that either the skipper of the ship, or commanding officer of a squadron, you know, he had the ability to shape the culture of their organization in a way they wanted to do it," he said.

"But now there's far more reporting metrics where the commanding officer of ship is basically just a department head for the destroyer [squadron] commodore who's always checking up on

"[We are] holding back more of that autonomy and probably accelerating those cultural tendencies that are creating officers that are less confident and less competent and less comfortable exercising command..."

him. And, you know, commodore of the destroyer [squadron] is now the department head of the admiral, who is very interested in the day-to-day activities.”

“And so, this level of micromanagement just flows up. And, again, it's evolved for a reason. You want to have metrics. You want to track things. And so, the command autonomy that people aspire to is no longer one that is what it might have been in the past.”

Micromanagement is a term that can be misused. But it is fair to note that the United States Navy has several centuries of sound experience growing warship captains who have been wholly autonomous and independent in commanding their vessels. The ability to communicate instantly with deployed ships is a relatively new development in the Navy's 245-year history. This is generally unique to surface Navy as submarines still have a more limited and less persistent communications path with higher headquarters and pilots in combat have almost none. The “1000-mile screwdriver” is, for now, a primarily surface warfare officer concern.

It is unclear what the use of these technologic advances for increased management and oversight means for a future conflict. But given the rise in electronic warfare and jamming, and the expectations that Navy ships may be isolated and have communications with higher headquarters cut-off in a high-end fight, it is reasonable to assume that creating a dependence on higher headquarters for direction and guidance could negatively impact future naval combat operations.

[I]nterviewees reflected concerns that the Navy has deemphasized the development of risk analysis skills, creating officers and NCOs in danger of paralysis in a high intensity conflict.

Micromanagement can have a stigmatizing effect on developing risk management and decision-making skills and interviewees expressed concern that the Navy has deemphasized the development of risk analysis skills, creating officers and NCOs in danger of paralysis in a high intensity conflict. It is not uncommon for peacetime militaries to struggle with the concept of risk. In 1943, thirty percent of U.S. submarine commanders operating in the Pacific were relieved for cause. Peacetime training had bred cautious leaders, unable to go off script or take the fight to the enemy.

A large number of officers and sailors interviewed expressed the sentiment that the Navy does not place value in appropriate risk-taking, does not train leaders in appropriate levels of risk, and does not reward leaders who take appropriate risk. The preponderance of focus is placed on meeting administrative requirements. One surface warfare officer lamented, “there's always this underlying administrative concern that's looming over the fleet, and I don't think it's because people don't think tactics are important. I just think that's not the thing that we spend our days being told is important.”

Apprehension about risk aversion was most pronounced in surface warfare communities interviewed. Some success stories were found in the Navy submarine and aviation communities. One mid-grade officer (CVN-qualified naval aviator), referenced a late-2000s decision by leadership to train for more night-vision-google (NVG) assisted strafing missions in support of ground forces in Afghanistan. He said that training in the mountains of Nevada with NVGs was

very high-risk, but such training was necessary due to the demand of the overseas' missions at that time. The aviator posited, "[I]s there a way you could train to [a mission] where you're actually running surface ships nearer to each other than what would normally happen in the San Diego training area? Maybe...but I don't necessarily see that as a cultural ethos [in the fleet]."

Interviewees concluded that the surface force has not adjusted to the realities brought on by the reemergence of peer competitor like China. The surface Navy has experienced decades without a competent, well equipped, and disciplined opponent to train against. One interviewee said with frustration, "I think we have trouble doing risk analysis and saying, 'is this risk worth it or not?' More often than not we just say, I'm afraid of losing my job, so I'm not going to take any risk."

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Some of these issues have been raised in other formats, including the 2010 VADM Phillip Balisle Report on Surface Force Readiness and GAO reports on surface warfare readiness. This review is not positioned to offer a comprehensive solution to all of the issues raised in the review. But Congress should leverage their funding and oversight tools to demand eight simple reforms from Navy leaders:

- 1 – Prioritize warfighting. Pay to develop, host, and utilize high end, multi-mission, warfighting training tools for ship crews. Once a ship is ready for deployment, administrative training should be deprioritized by the ship’s captain. Foster in the surface warfare community a better focus on the Navy’s core mission of fighting and winning on the high seas.
- 2 – Encourage risk taking. Develop and conduct experimental wargaming capabilities at all fleet concentration area where warfighters can develop new tactics and experiment through failure.
- 3 – Pick a surface warfare officer training and development path, then ensure it has significant and sufficient resources assigned to it, and then stick with it for a half a decade or more. Identify ways to increase bridge time for surface warfare officers.
- 4 – Develop a rigorous operational-strategic warfighting course (in XO/CO pipeline) with a combat focus on the integration of surface naval capabilities to achieve strategic end states.
- 5 – Publish the annual surface Navy maintenance scheduling and funding plan and then provide a report card to Congress at the end of the year with each delay/change in funding explained (as a factor of risk accrued). Secretary of the Navy or Chief of Naval Operations should assume responsibility and ownership of the plan.
- 6 – Get politics and media out of the wardroom. Renew the Navy’s noble tradition of remaining out of politics. Limit social media accounts and activities by Navy officials, discourage use of toxic platforms by sailors, remove all political and sociological topics from Professional Military Education and replace them with essential warfighting courseware. Modernize public affairs training.
- 7 – Institute a service-level review to place non-combat training in accession pipelines and out of warfighting environments, and to assess and reduce bureaucratic and administrative functions assigned to warfighters on deployment. Empower commanders to make judgments on prioritization of training and support them in their decision.
- 8 – Eliminate distractions. Institute a review to identify and reduce bureaucratic excess, non-essential communications, and unnecessary administrative burdens. Aim to create white space on calendars that can instead be used for training, doctrine, and warfighting fundamentals.

The sailors interviewed for this report do not believe the Navy prioritizes fighting and winning because Navy leaders do not talk about fighting and winning

A major peer-level conflict in the 21st Century will likely play out largely in the naval theaters of operations; unlike the surface Navy's last major war, which concluded 76 years ago, such a conflict will likely proceed swiftly and not permit significant time for organizational learning once it is underway. U.S. national security depends upon the surface Navy being an effective team. The most important step Navy leaders can take is to prioritize, above all else, warfighting and lethality. Their paramount responsibility to fight and win on the seas must be communicated by senior commanders, in wardrooms, over email, in meetings, and most important, to the American people.

The sailors interviewed for this report do not believe the Navy prioritizes fighting and winning because Navy leaders do not talk about fighting and winning. Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis said in testimony that "the United States does not have a preordained right to victory on the battlefield." Unless changes are made, the Navy risks losing the next major conflict.

Rep. Dan Crenshaw: Military focus on 'woke training' is national security threat

nypost.com/2021/07/15/rep-dan-crenshaw-military-focus-on-woke-training-is-national-security-threat/

Samuel Chamberlain

July 16, 2021



America's military leaders are creating a national security crisis by "prioritizing woke training over actual war fighting," Rep. Dan Crenshaw tweeted Thursday.

Crenshaw (R-Texas), a former Navy SEAL and one of four Republican lawmakers who commissioned a report examining the Navy's culture and leadership, responded Thursday to a tweet from Sinclair Broadcast Group reporter James Rosen, who said the armed forces were at "a blinking red moment."

"Unfortunately, the findings of our report aren't surprising," Crenshaw said. "We've known military leaders are prioritizing woke training over actual war fighting. It's what we constantly hear from service members. It doesn't make this any less concerning. It's a threat to national security."

The 22-page document, prepared by retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle and retired Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery and made public Tuesday, found "numerous cultural and structural issues that impact the morale and readiness of the Navy's surface force."

Those issues included “an insufficient focus on warfighting skills, the perception of a zero-defect mentality accompanied by a culture of micromanagement, and over-sensitivity and responsiveness to modern media culture.”

Unfortunately, the findings of our report aren’t surprising. We’ve known military leaders are prioritizing woke training over actual war fighting. It’s what we constantly hear from service members.

It doesn’t make this any less concerning. It’s a threat to national security.
<https://t.co/M8DqksljWt>

— Rep. Dan Crenshaw (@RepDanCrenshaw) July 15, 2021

As one recently retired “senior enlisted leader” told the report’s authors: “I guarantee you every unit in the Navy is up to speed on their diversity training. I’m sorry that I can’t say the same of their ship handling training.”

“Sometimes I think we care more about whether we have enough diversity officers than if we’ll survive a fight with the Chinese navy,” said one active-duty lieutenant. “It’s criminal. They think my only value is as a black woman. But you cut our ship open with a missile and we’ll all bleed the same color.”

The investigation was precipitated by a series of accidents and mishaps, the most recent being the fire that forced the decommissioning of the USS Bonhomme Richard last year.



The report was prepared by Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle and retired Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery.
Efreem Lukatsky/AP

Other accidents mentioned in the report included the August 2017 collision between an oil tanker and the destroyer USS John S. McCain, which caused the deaths of 10 sailors, and a collision two months earlier between the destroyer USS Fitzgerald and a container ship, resulting in the deaths of seven sailors. Following the latter incident, the Fitzgerald's top two senior officers and enlisted sailor were relieved of shipboard duty.

The report surveyed 77 current and former Navy personnel and found that 94 percent of them responded "yes" when asked if the setbacks "were part of a broader cultural or leadership problem in the Navy."

"I believe the surface Navy, our destroyers and other surface combatant ships, need a cultural change," Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), another of the lawmakers who commissioned the report, told Fox News Tuesday.



Sen. Tom Cotton has also called on the Navy to make changes.
J. Scott Applewhite/AP

"Obviously, the Navy has a big and complex task," Cotton added, "but the single biggest thing we have our surface Navy for is to be ready to fight and defeat the Chinese Navy, and right now, I have real doubts that the Navy has instilled the kind of war-fighting mentality that would allow us to accomplish that goal."

Republicans have repeatedly accused defense agencies of pushing a "woke" worldview and being more concerned with diversity and domestic politics rather than the defense of the nation.

In February, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin ordered a 60-day "stand down" of the entire US military for commanders to address "extremism" in its ranks. A month earlier, during his confirmation hearings, Austin vowed to "rid our ranks of racists and extremists."

Last month, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley defended the study of critical race theory, which teaches that America's laws and institutions were based on a foundation of white supremacy, by saying that he wanted to "understand white rage."

"I've read Karl Marx, I've read Lenin," Milley added. "That doesn't make me a Communist."

In May, Cotton and Crenshaw launched a whistleblower tip line for active military members to report “woke ideology” within “diversity training” programs.

The Rise of Wokeness in the Military

COMMENTARY Defense
Sep 30, 2022
9 min read



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An Army master sergeant provides security during a live-fire exercise near Tbilisi, Georgia on August 4, 2019. U.S. Army photo by Army Sgt. LaShic Patterson

Key Takeaways

Precious time and money are being poured into woke programs and projects that would be better

applied towards making the military more capable.

The American military remains a faithful and loyal servant of the republic. Most Americans are still proud and trusting of our military.

But this trust and support cannot be taken for granted.

The following is adapted from a talk delivered on July 20, 2022, at the Allan P. Kirby, Jr. Center for Constitutional Studies and Citizenship on Hillsdale's Washington, D.C. campus, as part of the AWC Family Foundation Lecture Series.

Complaints by veteran soldiers about younger generations who lack discipline and traditional values are as old as war itself. Grizzled veterans in the Greek phalanx, Roman legions, and Napoleon's elite corps all believed that the failings of the young would be the ruin of their armies. This is not the chief worry of grizzled American veterans today. The largest threat they see by far to our current military is the weakening of its fabric by radical progressive (or "woke") policies being imposed, not by a rising generation of slackers, but by the very leaders charged with ensuring their readiness.

Wokeness in the military is being imposed by elected and appointed leaders in the White House, Congress, and the Pentagon who have little understanding of the purpose, character, traditions, and requirements of the institution they are trying to change. The push for it didn't begin in the last two years under the Biden administration—nor will it automatically end if a non-woke administration is elected in 2024. Wokeness in the military has become ingrained. And unless the policies that flow from it are illegal or directly jeopardize readiness, senior military leaders have little alternative but to comply.

Woke ideology undermines military readiness in various ways. It undermines cohesiveness by emphasizing differences based on race, ethnicity, and sex. It undermines leadership authority by introducing questions about whether promotion is based on merit or quota requirements. It leads to military personnel serving in specialties and areas for which they are not qualified or ready. And it takes time and resources away from training activities and weapons development that contribute to readiness.

Wokeness in the military also affects relations between the military and society at large. It acts as a disincentive for many young Americans in terms of enlistment. And it undermines wholehearted support for the military by a significant portion of the American public at a time when it is needed the most.

Let me give some examples of what I mean by wokeness.

In 2015, then Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus rejected out-of-hand a Marine Corps study concluding that gender-integrated combat formations did not move as quickly or shoot as accurately, and that women were twice as likely as men to suffer combat injuries. He rejected it because it did not comport with the Obama administration's political agenda.

That same year the Department of Defense opened all combat jobs in the U.S. military to women, and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter committed to "gender-neutral standards" to ensure that female servicemembers could meet the demanding rigors involved in qualifying for combat. Since then, the Army has been working for a decade to put in place the gender-neutral test promised by Carter. But after finding that women were not scoring as highly as men, and under fierce pressure from advocacy groups, the Army threw out the test. Now there is no test to determine whether any soldier can meet the fitness requirements for combat specialties.

In 2015, near the end of his second term, President Obama initiated a change to the Pentagon's

longstanding policy on transgender individuals in the military. Before that change could take effect, the incoming Trump administration put it on hold awaiting future study. Subsequent evidence presented to Secretary of Defense James Mattis—including the fact that transgender individuals suffering from gender dysphoria attempt suicide and experience severe anxiety at nine times the rate of the general population—raised legitimate concerns about their fitness for military service.

This led the Trump administration to impose reasonable restrictions on military service by those suffering gender dysphoria. But only hours after his inauguration in January 2021, President Biden signed an executive order that did away with these restrictions and opened military service to all transgender individuals. Since then, the Biden administration has decreed that active members of the military can take time off from their duties to obtain sex-change surgeries and all related hormones and drugs at taxpayer expense.

Along similar lines, the Biden administration has recently ended support for a longstanding policy prohibiting individuals infected with HIV from serving in combat zones. The policy had been based on sound science tied to the need for HIV medications and the danger of cross-infection through shared blood.

Physical fitness has long been a hallmark of the U.S. military. But in recent years, fitness standards have been progressively watered down in pursuit of the woke goal of “leveling the playing field.” The Army, for instance, recently lowered its minimum passing standards for pushups to an unimpressive total of ten and increased its minimum two-mile run time from 19 to 23 minutes. The new Space Force is considering doing away with periodic fitness testing altogether.

Back in 2016, Navy Secretary Mabus decreed that Navy sailors would no longer be known by traditional job titles such as “corpsman,” adopting instead new gender-neutral titles such as “medical technician.” The resulting blowback was so severe from enlisted sailors who cherished those historic titles that the Navy was forced to reverse the changes. But wokeness has a way of coming back, and last year the Navy released a training video to help sailors understand the proper way of using personal pronouns—a skill Americans have traditionally mastered in grade school. The video instructs servicemembers that they need to create a “safe space for everybody” by using “inclusive language”—for instance, saying “hey everybody” instead of “hey guys.” Can the return of gender-neutral job titles be far behind?

Much of the emphasis of wokeness today is on promoting the idea that America is fatally flawed by systemic racism and white privilege. Our fighting men and women are required to sit through indoctrination programs, often with roots in the Marxist tenets of critical race theory, either by Pentagon diktat or through carelessness by senior leaders who delegate their command responsibilities to private Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion instructors.

These indoctrination programs differentiate servicemembers along racial and gender lines, which runs completely counter to the military imperative to build cohesiveness based on common loyalties, training, and standards. Traditional training and education programs used to combat racial and sex discrimination have been supplanted by programs that promote discrimination by replacing the American ideal of equality with the progressive ideal of equity—which in practice means unequal treatment based on group identity.

The Biden administration’s Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, decided last year to add Ibram X. Kendi’s book, *How to Be an Antiracist*—one of the leading sourcebooks on critical race theory—to his list of recommended readings. To give an idea of how radical Kendi’s book is, one of its famous (or infamous) arguments is that “Capitalism is essentially racist,” and that “to truly be antiracist, you also have to be truly anticapitalist.”

Last year, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told the House Armed Services Committee, “We do not teach critical race theory, we don’t embrace critical race theory, and I think that’s a spurious conversation.” Despite repeated denials by Austin and others in the Pentagon that critical race theory is being taught in the military, there is no shortage of evidence to the contrary.

Indeed, last year a senior officer in the U.S. Space Force, Lt. Col. Matthew Lohmeier, was removed from command for publicly describing the role of critical race theory in indoctrinating servicemembers at his installation. And just this summer, multiple media outlets reported on training materials on the problems of “whiteness” obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. One training slide read: “In order to understand racial inequality and slavery, it is first necessary to address whiteness.”

Congressmen have obtained curricular materials from West Point showing lectures titled “Understanding Whiteness and White Rage” and classroom slides labeled “White Power at West Point.” When challenged about this, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley became defensive: “I wanna understand white rage, and I’m white,” he said. “I’ve read Mao Zedong. I’ve read Karl Marx. I’ve read Lenin. That doesn’t make me a communist.”

The rationale for reading communist writings in the service academies in the past has been that by doing so, we learned about our Soviet enemies at the time and how they thought. How is that analogous to reading Leftist tracts accusing white people (including servicemembers)—just by virtue of their being white—of racism?

Last year, Secretary Austin alarmingly called for a one-day military-wide stand-down to address the so-called problem of “extremism” in the ranks, despite the fact that there has been no evidence presented—including in testimony by senior officials—that there is a problem of extremism in the military. Commanding officers were required to discuss the topic using a PowerPoint presentation that included Ted Talks asking the question, “What is up with us white people?”

Since 2008, the Air Force has created at least eight “Barrier Analysis Working Groups” to “create an inclusive culture regardless of race, ethnicity, sex, orientation, religion, or disabilities.” These groups include the “Indigenous Nations Equality Team” and the “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, or Questioning Initiatives Team.” President Biden signed an executive order in 2021 requiring all organizations in the military—as well as in the rest of the federal government—to create Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) offices, to produce strategic DEI plans, and to create bureaucratic structures to report on progress towards DEI goals. The overall goal, Biden said, was “advancing equity for all”—again using the Left’s euphemism for achieving desired outcomes through discriminatory policies.

Wokeness also comes in the form of conflating the mission of the military with environmental ideology. A year ago, President Biden told a group of overseas Air Force airmen that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had determined that the greatest threat facing America was global warming—a claim the Joint Chiefs had to walk back. In the same vein, Biden signed an executive order imposing a massive regime of environmental goals and requirements for the Department of Defense. These goals included transitioning to all electric non-tactical vehicles by 2035, carbon-free electricity for military installations by that same year, and net zero emissions from those installations by 2050. As a result, the Pentagon recently announced it will devote over \$3 billion of its already stretched-thin military budget to climate-related initiatives in 2023 alone.

Although direct “cause and effect” studies on the impact of woke policies such as these do not exist, common sense suggests that the consequences for military readiness are dramatic. Spending billions on woke programs while the Chinese are outpacing us on hypersonic weapons, quantum computing, and other important military technologies is one piece of evidence. Recent reports showing the military’s dismal failure to gain new recruits in adequate numbers is another. Is anyone surprised that potential recruits—many of whom come from rural or poor areas of the country—don’t want to spend their time being lectured about white privilege?

These ideological policies move the military in a divergent direction from the American mainstream. In a recent poll of voters, for instance, 69 percent oppose the teaching of critical race theory in schools. Relatedly, Americans are increasingly losing confidence in the military. Between 2021 and 2022, the

percentage of Americans who report a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the military decreased five percentage points, from 69 to 64. In 2012, this confidence level stood at 75 percent.

The bottom line is that precious time and money are being poured into woke programs and projects that would be better applied towards making the military more capable. The billions of dollars that will be spent on Pentagon climate change programs, the time and money spent in creating DEI structures and hiring DEI commissars, and the time spent indoctrinating servicemembers in critical race theory and addressing an imaginary crisis of extremism in the ranks—all this detracts from the purpose of our military: preserving the security and freedom of the American people and nation.

These costs come at a time when the current administration is not even proposing to fund the Department of Defense to keep up with the rate of inflation—and a time when serious threats from China and other adversaries have never been greater.

Last month, Ramstein Air Base in Germany scheduled a drag queen story hour at its base library, where drag queen Stacey Teed was scheduled to read to children. When lawmakers back home got wind of the event and wrote to the Secretary of the Air Force, the event was cancelled. This suggests that pushback can be effective against the tide of wokeness plaguing our military. But there needs to be a lot more pushback.

Legislation introduced this year in Congress would stop the teaching of critical race theory in the military, the creation of the multitudes of diversity offices and officials, and the rolling back of physical fitness requirements. While the ultimate success of these proposals in the legislative process is uncertain, they are a start at least.

The American military remains a faithful and loyal servant of the republic. Most Americans are still proud and trusting of our military. But this trust and support cannot be taken for granted. If Americans perceive that the military is being exploited for political purposes or being used for experiments in woke social policies, that support will evaporate, and the consequences will be dire.

My hope and my prayer are that we figure this out before it is too late.

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'Woke' DEI Chief for Military Base Schools Disparaged White People

braitbart.com/politics/2022/09/16/woke-dei-chief-military-base-schools-disparaged-white-people/

September 16, 2022



kelisawing.com

Kristina Wong

16 Sep 2022

Kelisa Wing — the Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) chief for the U.S. military's education system serving military families all over the world — has openly disparaged white people in recently-reported social media posts.

The education system, called the Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA), is one of two federally-operated elementary and secondary school systems and provides K-12 education to the families at U.S. military bases at home and overseas. It operates 160 schools and has more than 66,000 children enrolled worldwide, according to its website.

Wing — who has described herself in social media posts as “woke” — wrote in June 2020 on her Twitter account, “I’m exhausted with these white folx in these [professional development] sessions.”

She also tweeted in July 2020: “[T]his lady actually had the CAUdacity to say that black people can be racist too... I had to stop the session and give Karen the BUSINESS... [W]e are not the majority, we don't have power.”

“Caudacity” is a derogatory slang term combining “Caucasian” and “audacity.”

Wing has apparently deleted her Twitter account, but not before Fox News captured her tweets.

In other tweets, she said: “[B]eing antiracist means being active against racism... you will NEVER arrive... stop centering this on whiteness.”

She also tweeted, “I am exhausted by 99% of the white men in education and 95% of the white women. Where can I get a break from white nonsense for a while?”

She also tweeted, “If another Karen tells me about her feelings... I might lose it...,” and responded, “Bye Karen,” to another user criticizing her article demanding all teachers take part in “dismantling racial oppression” and claiming that “racism is ingrained in the very fabric of our country.”

Wing also called former President Donald Trump the “whole boy version of a Karen” and referred to former Secretary of Dducation Betsy DeVos as “the queen of Karens.”

She also co-authored children’s books calling on white people to confess their privilege.

Wing was promoted to her current position in December 2021, after serving as a DEI specialist at DoDEA for two months prior.

DoDEA Director Tom Brady praised Wing in a press release as the “right person to lead our efforts in building on the foundational work done to support meaningful change in our organization.”

“This new position will take a holistic approach to identifying and improving how we integrate the practice of diversity, equity and inclusion in every aspect of DoDEA, from curriculum and assessment to hiring and professional development,” he added.

Wind, an Army veteran, also previously served at DoDFA's headquarters as a



MLDC Research Areas

Definition of Diversity
 Legal Implications
 Outreach & Recruiting
 Leadership & Training
 Branching & Assignments
 Promotion
 Retention
 Implementation &
 Accountability
 Metrics
 National Guard & Reserve

This issue paper aims to aid in the deliberations of the MLDC. It does not contain the recommendations of the MLDC.

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Issue Paper #6 Definition of Diversity

Department of Defense Core Values

Abstract

The commission's charter tasks it to create a definition of *diversity* that is congruent with DoD values. In this paper, we characterize the concept of core values, list DoD and Service core values, and discuss the relationship between core values and diversity in an organization. Research has shown that because an organization's core values shape how its people conduct business day to day, they also shape how its people view and relate to the organization's diversity. In particular, core values give people in an organization a shared identity that can allow them to leverage diversity for the benefit of the mission.

One of the tasks for the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) is to develop a uniform definition of *diversity* to be used throughout the Department of Defense (DoD).¹ This task requires the commission to create a definition that is congruent with the core values of DoD and the vision of the department for the future workforce. As part of a series of issue papers intended to aid the commission in its task, this paper presents an overview of the implications of DoD core values for a diversity definition.

Core Values in DoD and the Services

Core values are unchanging foundational principles that guide how people in an organization will conduct their everyday business (see Collins and Porras, 1996, and Lencioni, 2002, for example, for definitions of organizational core values). An organization's core values do not require external justification. They are the internal structure that underlies interactions among its members and that guides the strategies that the organization will employ to fulfill its mission. Ultimately, they motivate how the

organization works and give a shared identity to people belonging to it.

The DoD core values are leadership, professionalism, and technical know-how (Department of Defense, n.d.). However, DoD also places particular emphasis on the special core values that everyone in uniform must live by: "duty, integrity, ethics, honor, courage, and loyalty" (Department of Defense, n.d.).

Although the DoD core-values statement indicates that uniformed military members share a common set of core values, each Service's identity is reflected in its own uniquely defined core values, which serve as common ground for all its members. For example, the Marine Corps' core values "form the bedrock of [a Marine's] character" (Sturkey, 2001), the Air Force's "tell us the price of admission to the Air Force itself" (United States Air Force, 1997), and the Army's are "what being a soldier is all about" (United States Army, n.d.). We list the core values for DoD and each of the Services below.

The Core Values of DoD and the Services²

- **DoD:** Duty, integrity, ethics, honor, courage, and loyalty.
- **Air Force:** Integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do.
- **Army:** Loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.
- **Coast Guard:** Honor, respect, and devotion to duty.
- **Marine Corps:** Honor, courage, and commitment (Department of the Navy).
- **Navy:** Honor, courage, and commitment (Department of the Navy).

Core Values and the Impact of Diversity

Core values provide the common ground shared by all individuals in each of the Services. However, individuals also bring their personal characteristics to their organization. The interaction between the common ground

and the diversity of individual characteristics determines how an organization will function.

Research conducted for the Air Force by Farnsworth Riche, Kraus, Hodari, and Depasquale (2005) identified three factors that help manage diversity so that an organization's mission can be successfully carried out:

- explicitly managing communication
- explicitly managing conflict
- creating a shared identity focused on the mission.

Although core values permeate all three of these factors, they directly relate to the third. If a diverse group of individuals shares an identity focused on a mission, this identity will facilitate the leveraging of that diversity to serve the mission. Thus, a strong sense of organizational identity can reinforce the benefits of diversity for that organization.

In a subsequent paper, Farnsworth Riche and Kraus (2009) provided two recommendations for training leaders to manage diversity that directly relate to the issue of core values:

- Pay attention to human processes, such as the effect of social identity on work groups.
- Set a positive overall unit climate, such as a strong common identity.

These recommendations indicate that, to achieve full benefits from diversity, managers need to be mindful of how individuals view themselves within the organization and how this view affects how they interact with each other. Again, this suggests that core values play a role in framing what diversity means to an organization because core values (1) govern interactions and, therefore, how diverse groups of people interact and (2) provide individuals with an organizational identity in which they can leverage their differences.

Summary

Core values provide a strong organizational identity. In addition to providing a shared identity, core values govern how people interact within the organization and guide the actions of individuals. Both factors shape the role of diversity for mission effectiveness.

While DoD provides an umbrella set of core values for uniformed personnel, each Service brings to the table its own identity in the form of Service-specific core values. A definition of diversity that is consistent with DoD's core values should also be consistent with the Services' core values.

Notes

¹ For a full description of the congressional charter for the MLDC, please refer to the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act.

² Quoted from the Web sites of DoD and each of the Services. For more details, please see the appendix.

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Is The Military Woke? More From Readers

theamericanconservative.com/is-the-military-woke-more-from-readers/

October 26, 2022

Military

Veteran: 'We are in dire straits as a country. Pray that we do not go to war soon'



That image above is a screenshot from [the "Emma" recruitment ad by the US Army](#). It tells the story of a young recruit raised by lesbian moms, who likens her military service to protesting for gay rights. It's the kind of thing people who fear that the military has become woke point to to bolster their case. The point is certainly not that gay soldiers can't fight. The point is that the US military has become so concerned with fighting the culture war (from the Left) that it is compromising its ability to fight an actual war.

The other day, I posted here [a long letter from a military officer](#) serving in a senior capacity. He says that my fears that the US military is compromised by wokeness are overblown, and explains why.

I asked readers to respond, and posted them as an update. Because that original post has gone down a bit in the queue, I am going to post today's updates below. You can go to [the original post](#) to read the officer's defense of the military, and the initial letters from readers

pushing back. These came in overnight:

I never served in the military (I work for the military as a civilian, however), so my opinion, according to your dissenting military officer, is probably worthless. I'm going to share it anyway, because as a taxpayer, that military belongs, ultimately, to Americans like myself and, without our consent, they have no mandate nor mission.

First, I have a serious problem with what he says here:

Especially in an open democracy like ours, any cultural trend is going to be reflected in the armed forces.

Later, he says:

*Much of the woke stuff that exists comes down to this: we want any American to be able to serve *and not feel like an interloper while doing so.**

I'm guessing he thinks this is either a good thing or entirely neutral, but it's not. Qualification for military service isn't just about the physical, it's also about the mental and the moral. Forget the LGBTQ stuff for a second – I can tell you, from firsthand experience, the military is staffed with people in uniform who hold very hard feelings towards this country and many of their fellow Americans. Millions of Americans share the same sentiments. Is this really a cultural trend that ought to be permitted in the military?

Something that's been true of the military in the post-draft era is that most Americans, if given the choice, would rather not serve in uniform. I'd wager that at least 60% of those serving today didn't grow up wanting to join the military. Most of them had to be literally recruited or encouraged to and, only then, did they decide military service was something worth pursuing. There exists evidence that this is the case. My point here is the military is just a job. You wear a uniform, you have to obey lots of rules, you don't have much of your own freedom. But, beyond that, it doesn't really matter what you do or think, as long as you show up for work, do as you're told, and stay out of trouble. Even on that latter point, I can tell you that military discipline is enforced nowhere near as strictly as people think. The military has become a credential, a status symbol, something for people to put on their resumes, especially for the officer corps. Because service tends to be of great benefit to most, if not all, who serve, to deny anyone the opportunity violates our sense of equality and fair play.

If service didn't have its benefits, as is the case in so many countries around the world, I don't know if the military would be as fierce a culture war battleground as it is today. There's a reason why day-laboring, forestry, and mining haven't become Wokeified, as critical these industries are to our national survival.

The idea that the perception of Wokeification of the military is simply the services reflecting American culture at large is actually a bad sign. When we fully professionalized the services beginning in 1973, part of the reason is because we saw that drafting from the entire population brought with it all sorts of problems the military could ill-afford. If this officer thinks it's not a big deal that the military is bringing in elements of society that shouldn't be defending the country, then why not just go back to drafting our troops? Then the military can indulge in all the cultural trends society has to offer. Imagine spending decades and untold sums of money to professionalize the services and get society's ills out of the ranks and, in the end, concluding what we need is for the military to adopt civilian cultural norms in the ranks. Mind you, many join the military precisely to get away from civilian society. This phenomenon was highlighted in Thomas Ricks' 1995 book *Making the Corps*.

Of course, your dissenting officer would never agree to bringing back the draft, because he *thinks* he believes only the best should serve. But again, it's not just about being good at your job. Staff the military with people who don't like this country and don't like the people they're ostensibly protecting, then as the country fails, so will the military. After all, the military's a microcosm of American society. There are valid concerns to the military being too divergent from the society it's intended to protect, but it's also dangerous for a military to become too much like society. It's a scary thought, I know, but institutions like the armed forces really are the first and last line of defense for a country. If we don't want to trust law-abiding Americans with guns to hold it all together, then that really leaves only the military to do the job. But if those in power don't like the idea of the military becoming too far removed culturally and socially from society, I guess you can only shift to the other extreme. After all, balances are among the most difficult things to strike.

If I can say one more thing, on a different but related topic, of our warmongering in Russia:

I promise you everyone is aware of the nuclear risks. Vice leaves virtue with no good options, and Russia's actions leave us with none likewise. We can either leave Ukraine to its fate and allow the entire post-WWII settlement in international law to be cast aside and return to a world where wars of conquest are accepted, or risk further escalation.

He then tries to reassure us all the U.S. military still is fully capable of fighting and winning wars:

I don't mean to be overconfident here--I'm very familiar with risks and capability gaps we face as well--but it's impossible to deny that the U.S. military is incomparably superior to the Russian at any battlefield metric, no matter how un-woke and manly the latter might present itself as.

I'm a bit of an outlier on the Right in the sense I haven't given up faith in the military's competence. Like him, I look at Russia's performance in Ukraine and I'm not blown away. Nor do I think the Chinese would fare much better. However, U.S. tactical competency needs to be placed in context. First, the ranks of those who do the shooting, no matter the service, are still comprised of the very people the military is attempting to decrease the proportion of: White Middle American males. There's an 80/20 rule in effect here, where 80% of the fighting is done by 20% of the force (not literally, but figuratively). Those who serve will tell you, at least on the enlisted side, there exists a distinct cultural divide between the "tooth" that does the fighting and most of the dying and the "tail" who supports them. So claiming that Wokeness hasn't eroded combat effectiveness is something of a non-sequitur since the people who win the tactical engagements aren't Woke and least receptive to the message. If the military is still good at warfighting, it's because, even in 2022, a certain kind of person is still doing the fighting and it's the kind of person our culture, media, military, and political leadership regards as deplorable. Thank goodness they're still filling the ranks, for now, anyway.

Your reader leaves us with his foreign policy views:

If I can say one more thing, on a different but related topic, of our warmongering in Russia: I promise you everyone is aware of the nuclear risks. Vice leaves virtue with no good options, and Russia's actions leave us with none likewise. We can either leave Ukraine to its fate and allow the entire post-WWII settlement in international law to be cast aside and return to a world where wars of conquest are accepted, or risk further escalation.

If they're aware of the nuclear risks, but still choose to go down this path, that's not courage, that's stupidity. As he himself suggests, what happens in Ukraine affects Ukraine the most, not the U.S. We risk nuclear war when it means preserving our civilization and way of life, not to preserve the "post-WWII settlement in international law." I wonder what he'd say about using the military to guard the U.S.-Mexico border? There's nothing unprecedented about that mission, but I feel like he wouldn't consider that an appropriate use of our military and "against our values." It sure sounds to me he's a loyal institutionalist who's swallowed a heavy dose of the Kool-Aid, but that seems a bit lowbrow on my part, so I'll just leave it by saying he's saying what he'd be expected to say to have a successful career in uniform.

Another one:

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I'm not going to comment on the conditions in the military, as your follow-up guest emails totally obliterated the denials from the military person you quoted so extensively. Instead, I just want to make a brief comment on her general cluelessness, which spills over from the existence of wokeness in the military to the actions of the US military itself.

Her whitewashing of the tragic and unprovoked US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan as "mission sets we tended to fail horribly" is supposed to draw a distinction between an invading US military and an invading Russian military. But the US is thousands of miles away from both Iraq and Afghanistan, and doesn't have NATO weapons pointed at it. There was no existential reason for the US to invade either of those countries, and to excuse them as mistakes or mission errors is disingenuous.

Her claim that the US "leaned on Ukraine to de-escalate and not provoke a wider war," is just BS. NATO did everything it could to stop Ukraine from abiding by the Minsk accords, and this was admitted by the former Ukrainian president himself. This woman is clearly an apologist of the rankest order. First for the senseless violence the US military has unleashed around the world, and second for her denial--or outright lies--about the woke infestation of the military.

Another:

I don't know your correspondent, but that letter is so egregiously off-base that I couldn't help chiming in on it with the rest of the folks piling on. I am a Ranger-qualified former infantry captain recently stationed in Europe; I commissioned from West Point near the top of my class and only just left the service, so I have *plenty* of firsthand experience with the new model woke military.

I would like to focus on his point that your writing on the woke military is 'off-key'. In a way, this is true. The military isn't completely woke--not yet. But it is getting there rapidly. And it is doing so because wokeness is a symptom of total, bottomless ideological corruption on the part of America's military leadership. These people don't care about winning wars. They don't care about national defense. They don't care about the American people. The only thing that matters to them are sinecures at Raytheon and Lockheed after retirement. Ideological corruption, not wokeness, will put paid to the American military when we next fight another war.

But wokeness is the un-missable sign that this will *surely* happen. Your correspondent's attempts to dismiss these truths are yet another sign that the rot at the upper echelons of the military is out of control. Your correspondent's claim that the American military is superior to the Russian armed forces in every conceivable metric is laughable. I spent years training with Army units in Europe--the forces theoretically responsible for deterring Russian aggression--and I claim that our conventional, line infantry and armor units are nowhere near proficient enough to take on the Russian Army fighting for its life on its own terrain. Corrupt leadership has demoralized our troops. Training is unrealistic and does not simulate the conditions American soldiers will face against the Russians. The exercises are always fixed so that we win and the Russian enemy loses. We've never fought a war against an enemy with similar attack aviation, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), artillery, rocket artillery, electronic warfare, signals, and other assets that the Russians possess. We've performed quite badly in the two wars we have recently fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, where we possessed immeasurably more combat power in every conceivable metric against poorly armed, poorly trained, poorly organized guerrillas who eventually defeated us.

The 101st Airborne's publicity stunt in Romania this week is a case in point. The 101st Airborne would get rolled in the event of an actual fight with the Russians. It simply does not have the organic artillery assets, armored units, or even ammunition and other weaponry, to survive a pitched fight against even one Russian Battalion Tactical Group, let alone the combined weight of the Russian Army. The United States is *playing with fire* in the way that it has chosen to antagonize the Russians over Ukraine. We are writing a check that we can't cash. When the Russians come to collect, there will be hell to pay for our allies in the Baltics and in Poland who are

counting on our security guarantees. God in heaven forbid, *we* may even be forced to use nuclear weapons to protect our interests in Europe from the Russians (not the other way round!).

It blows my mind that the American public is so ignorant of the sheer dangerousness of the Biden Regime's foreign policy in Ukraine. The Pentagon's insistent focus on wokeness and its fear of offending progressives has totally evaporated its ability to effectively advise and assist the Congress and the American people in military affairs. We are in dire straits as a country. Pray that we do not go to war soon. When we do, the loss of life on the part of American soldiery will be immense.

That possibility may seem inconceivable now, but it will rapidly come to fruition if we do not seek a settlement with the Russians *immediately*.

Exclusive— Robert Wilkie: ‘Woke Agenda’ Is ‘Destroying’ Military Meritocracy, Morale, Readiness

[B breitbart.com/radio/2021/09/28/exclusive-robert-wilkie-woke-agenda-is-destroying-military-meritocracy-morale-readiness/](https://www.breitbart.com/radio/2021/09/28/exclusive-robert-wilkie-woke-agenda-is-destroying-military-meritocracy-morale-readiness/)

September 28, 2021



Alex Wong/Getty Images

Robert Kraychik

28 Sep 2021

Robert Wilkie, former secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and current visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation, warned that “woke” ideology is undermining meritocracy, morale, and readiness across the U.S. military in an interview on Tuesday’s edition of SiriusXM’s *Breitbart News Daily* with host Alex Marlow.

Wilkie noted the Biden administration’s advocacy for and imposition of policies marketed as pursuits for “inclusion, diversity, [and] equity.”

"What I do think is destructive is the extremism agenda that's been foisted on the military by this administration and by many, many of the generals," he said. "The military is the greatest leveler in American society. It doesn't matter where you come from [or] what you look like. If you perform, you're accepted, and they're destroying that. And they're turning the military into a political cauldron where now soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines are looking over their shoulders, either worried about somebody reporting them for something that they might have said, or didn't say — or the opposite. They're telling on their comrades. That's what's going to destroy morale."


He added, "The woke agenda — is probably the most corrosive and pernicious thing the military has encountered in decades. In fact, I can't think of anything more destructive than what we're seeing now, and the politicization of the officer corps."

The White House boosted government employee unions at the expense of accountability among VA workers, Wilkie held.

"[The Trump administration's VA reforms] are not going to be sustained," he remarked. "The ability to get rid of bad actors is going away, if it hasn't already gone away. And the union chiefs are back in charge, and that means veterans issues [and] interests are not put front and center. That's really, to me, the most glaring and immediate warning for what's to come at VA, and that's a very sad thing."

Many VA officials lack a professional military pedigree, Wilkie stated.

He recalled, "[The Trump administration] put in place people [at the VA] who had incredible military experience, people who had served in all of the services, and that gave us instant credibility when we walked into any room, because we had shared those experiences. I think you see with the Biden administration that they lack that."



Denis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs nominee, listens as he testifies during his Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee confirmation hearing, on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC on January 27, 2021. (Photo by SARAH SILBIGER/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

He went on, "As a matter of fact ... I think for Veterans Day coming up, the [VA Secretary Denis McDonough] will not be speaking at Arlington Cemetery because he doesn't have any military experience. I think they're going to let the deputy or one of the others speak, and that sends the wrong message."

Wilkie concluded by highlighting the Biden administration's focus on "transgender policies" at the VA and across U.S. armed services.

VA Secretary Denis McDonough announced in July that his department would provide "gender reassignment" surgeries to "transgender" veterans. He described the move as "the path of progress."

Wilkie remarked, "When when the [VA] secretary says his first four goals are transgender rights, union authorities, diversity, and telework policy, there's one word missing from all of those imperatives: veterans."

Breitbart News Daily broadcasts live on SiriusXM Patriot 125 weekdays from 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. Eastern.

COMMENTS

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Combat ready? Pentagon to host 'transgender and non-binary' gender inclusion and pronoun usage workshop

dossier.substack.com/p/combata-ready-pentagon-to-host-transgender

Jordan Schachtel

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Combat ready? Pentagon to host 'transgender and non-binary' gender inclusion and pronoun usage workshop

dossier.substack.com

Woke army advances the rainbow flag agenda.



Jordan Schachtel

🔒
Combat ready? Pentagon to host 'transgender and non-binary' gender inclusion and pronoun usage workshop

dossier.substack.com

Forget about China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other adversaries. The U.S. Army is focused squarely on getting the troops ready for the real problem with our military: the lack of transgender and non-binary inclusion, the Biden Administration's woke Army has concluded.

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The Dossier has obtained information — through an Army whistleblower who goes by [Terminalcwo](#) — revealing that the Army's Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility (DEEO) office will be hosting a "Gender Inclusion Workshop" on August 30.

The discussion will be on gender identity, transgender and non-binary 101, and use of pronouns

DEEO Leadership Series
"Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility: Gender Inclusion Workshop"

Participate in a discussion on gender identity, transgender and non-binary 101; use of pronouns and other best practices in gender inclusivity.

Dates:
Tuesday, August 30, 2022 **Time:** 1:00 pm to 2:30 pm (EST)

Speaker: Mahri Monson, Federal LGBTQI+ Employee, Resource Group Leader

Location: [REDACTED]

To attend: See ETMS2 Tasker: 9ZJR and RSVP to receive the MS Teams link


Closed Captioning is available in Microsoft Teams

POC: James Mayfield II - [REDACTED]

Terminalcwo

An Army email blasted out to service members says that "The Workshop will cover a discussion/training on gender identity, transgender and non-binary 101; use of pronouns and other best practices in gender inclusivity."

USARMY Pentagon HQDA sending out invites for a gender inclusion workshop



The workshop will be hosted by Mahri Monson, a person described as a "Federal LGBTQI+ Employee," who works as a "Diversity Program Manager" at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM).



Combat ready? Pentagon to host 'transgender and non-binary' gender inclusion and pronoun usage workshop

dossier.substack.com



Print Close

Service members sound alarm against 'extremely woke' military

By Michael Lee

Published October 11, 2022

Fox News

While President Biden's Secretary of the Army has defended its diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programs this week as "important," several current and former members of the U.S. military, who have put their lives on the line to ensure America's security and defend its freedoms, are sounding the alarm over what they call a culture putting "wokeness" before training and combat effectiveness.

Those service members, some of whom served with Special Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, are blaming that culture for its recruiting challenges, which have risen to a level unseen since it was transitioned to an all-volunteer force.

"The military is extremely woke," one service member told Fox News Digital recently.

"I do perceive the Army leadership as woke, and probably the lower enlisted (they have been indoctrinated in school)," another service member said. "Equity-diversity is another way to divide and control the masses. It does nothing for the warfighter."

"We get criticized, frankly, sometimes for being 'woke,'" [Army Secretary Christine Wormuth](#) said at a Monday discussion with other military leaders on national security and the branch's modernization efforts. "I'm not sure what 'woke' means. I think 'woke' means a lot of different things to different people."



Members of the U.S. Army stand in formation. (U.S. Army)

She continued, "But, first of all, if 'woke' means we are not focused on warfighting, we are not focused on readiness, that doesn't reflect what I see at installations all around the country or overseas when I go and visit."

ARMY MISSES RECRUITING GOALS WHILE OTHER BRANCHES FALL BEHIND FOR NEXT YEAR

The service members, who remained anonymous so they could speak freely, almost universally shared a similar sentiment, with many noting that senior members who speak out on the issue risk their careers or retirement pensions.

"Merely questioning the goals or methods used to promote 'Equity & Diversity' is punished and that punishment is swift, harsh, and public," one service member said.

BIDEN'S ARMY SECRETARY RESPONDS TO 'WOKE' CRITICISMS, SAYS DEI PROGRAMS 'IMPORTANT'

"I 100% believe the military is woke. I see daily minorities, overweight people and women not adhering to military standards," another said. "Nobody corrects them due to the fear of being fired and labeled a racist or a sexist."


"I do think we do have a wide range of soldiers in our Army, and we've got to make them all feel included," Wormuth said Monday. "And that's why a lot of our diversity, equity and inclusion programs are important."

Another service member pointed to the military's COVID-19 policies, noting the vaccine mandate has forced many members in good standing into difficult decisions.

LAWMAKERS SOUND ALARM OVER U.S. MILITARY RECRUITMENT CRISIS: 'WHY WOULD I JOIN?'

"Most of us who serve did so because we came from military families. Patriotism and American values are no longer appreciated or expected," one service member said. "Troops themselves are largely treated as expendable and they don't even pretend otherwise. Spending 15+ years in the military during wartime with multiple deployments risking their lives only to be tossed out like garbage. Losing the retirement they have worked years to earn because they didn't want to take an experimental vaccine for an illness that was mild for fit and healthy people."

The military has been facing a recruiting crisis, with the Army failing to meet its recruiting goals in 2022 and the Marines, Air Force and Navy all dipping deep into their pools of delayed entry program candidates to scratch by this year, putting them well behind the pace for meeting next year's goals.



Members of the Navy Ceremonial Guard stand for the national anthem during a ceremony for National POW/MIA Recognition Day, at the U.S. Navy Memorial. (Kevin Dietsch)

"In the Army's most challenging recruiting year since the start of the all-volunteer force, we will only achieve 75% of our fiscal year '22 recruiting goal," Wormuth said in a statement after the numbers were publicly released.

While the military has faced several challenges in recent years, including restrictions to entering schools brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic and a tight jobs market, many others have pinned the blame for the issue on a culture becoming less focused on winning the nation's wars.

"How can we ask young men and women who have decided to risk their lives for America, even die for America, to affirm that our country is inherently racist?" former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo wrote for Fox News last month. "How can we ask them to view their brothers and sisters in arms through the narrow prisms of race or gender? The clear and obvious answer is that we cannot -- not without putting their lives at risk on the battlefield. A woke military is a weak military. Unfortunately, woke and weak are exactly what our military is becoming under Biden's leadership."

AMERICA'S MILITARY AND OUR COUNTRY WON'T SURVIVE IF WOKEISM CONTINUES TO RULE

Many of the service members reached by Fox News Digital expressed similar concerns, with some saying they would not encourage their children to join the military.

"I would not have my children join for the same reason they are in private schools vs. public schools," one service member said.

"I couldn't allow my kids to join the military, and risk having them serve under commanders like I saw on deployments," another service member said, citing the failures of leadership witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

"They'd be better off serving for one of our allies who are focused on defending their country and will come to our aid when our woke and unready force embarrasses itself," another said.

"Why would I have my kids join an institution who works every day to call them evil and diminish the contributions of their ancestors," said another.

AIR FORCE ACADEMY PROMOTES FELLOWSHIP THAT BANS 'CISGENDER' MEN: 'THIS PROGRAM ISN'T FOR YOU'



A Tactical Control Party Airmen and qualified Joint Terminal Aircraft Controller assigned to the 9th Air Support Operations Squadron at Fort Hood, Texas. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. JT May III)

Service members also complained of an overly-political culture among the military's leadership, arguing it has hindered their ability to prepare the country for conflict.

"The DOD is absolutely politicized. No matter what party is in power. Generals have basically become politicians, and 'yes men' and will conform to whatever party is in power," one service member said.

"It seems like in the '90s, DOD was apolitical, but that doesn't seem to be the case now. It seems like more and more leaders are more overtly supporting a political side, rather than their oath," another said.

Though most of the members expressed concern about the direction of the military, some shared optimism that the culture could be turned around.

"I still think the military has values that are salvageable," one service member said.

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Others stressed that the military needs to return its focus on the mission in order to turn things around.

"I prefer a military that was more concerned with the standards of the unit, rather than equity," a service member said, describing those initiatives as "disruptive towards the real training the military should focus on."

Fox News' Houston Keene contributed to this report.

Michael Lee is a writer at Fox News. Follow him on Twitter @UAMichaelLee

Michael Waltz Wants Info on How Critical Race Theory Impacts Classes at West Point

[floridadaily.com/michael-waltz-wants-info-on-how-critical-race-theory-impacts-classes-at-west-point/](https://www.floridadaily.com/michael-waltz-wants-info-on-how-critical-race-theory-impacts-classes-at-west-point/)

Kevin Derby

April 12, 2021

By

[Kevin Derby](#)

-

April 12, 2021, 2:06 pm

Last week, **U.S. Rep. Michael Waltz**, R-Fla., the first **Green Beret** to serve in Congress, wrote **Lt. General Darryl Williams**, the superintendent of the **U.S. Military Academy at West Point**, wanting information on how that school incorporates critical race theory.

Waltz pointed to incidents with the "Corps of Cadets being mandated to attend seminars and presentations on critical race theory that included inflammatory lessons and presentations that are detrimental to the mission and morale of the U.S. Army" and "requested the full presentation of seminars, presentations, assemblies, and other related curricula at West Point" in the letter he sent last week.

"Information has recently come to my attention from unsettled soldiers, cadets, and families that raises serious concerns about the U.S. Army's introduction of elements of critical race theory into cadet instruction," Waltz wrote. "In February this year, I understand the U.S. Military Academy under your leadership required cadets to attend a mandatory seminar on 'Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion.' According to the schedule I received, cadets 'must attend at least one of the seminars.'

"I was provided a presentation slide from one of the workshops with the title of 'White Power at West Point' and 'Racist Dog Whistles at West Point.' Additionally, another presentation slide shared with me depicted a lecture by **Dr. Carol Anderson of Emory University** with the title 'Understanding Whiteness and White Rage,'" Waltz continued.

"Additionally, I understand that on September 24, 2020 the entire corps of cadets was required to report to Michie Stadium for your address as superintendent and to hear from a cadet panel. In this session, an active duty female colonel described to the Corps how she become 'woke' to her white privilege, and felt guilty for the advantages of her race. At this same assembly, white police officers were described as murderers with no context or court documents provided to corroborate the anecdotes of police brutality. While this session may have been well intended to invoke awareness and understanding, I am hearing forcefully that this session and others like it are instead breeding insult and resentment," Waltz wrote.

"These critical race theory teachings take aim at those key pillars and pit cadets against one another through divisive indoctrination under the pressure of 'wokeism.' There is no doubt our country has had to overcome atrocious racial bigotry. We have made enormous progress and there is still much to be done in our country. But, the United States military, uniquely in American society, must strive to unify. Unfortunately, these seminars imbue in our future military leaders that they should treat their fellow officers and soldiers differently based on race and on socio-economic background. In a combat environment, where every soldier must equally share the burden of danger, I cannot think of a notion more destructive to unit cohesion and morale," Waltz added.

Waltz noted that he sits on the **U.S. House Armed Services** and put in for a request "that you provide the full presentation of these seminars, presentations, assemblies, and other related curricula to my office so that the Congress can execute its oversight responsibilities of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Military Academy."

A graduate of VMI, Waltz served in the **Army Special Forces** in **Afghanistan**. He worked in **George W. Bush's administration**, including as an advisor to **Vice President Dick Cheney**. Since then, Waltz has made the rounds on cable TV including as a **Fox News** contributor but he has also made appearances on **CNN, MSNBC, PBS** and other channels. In 2018, Waltz won an open congressional seat representing parts of Northeast and Central Florida, replacing Republican **Ron DeSantis** who was elected governor.

Reach Kevin Derby at kevin.derby@floridadaily.com.



Rep. Mike Waltz: Military and critical race theory – this is why we shouldn't teach soldiers to hate US

Published July 14, 2021

Fox News

Imagine being a recent graduate from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and you are given your first orders as an infantry officer in command of a unit in an active war zone.

You are thousands of miles away from home and responsible for the lives under your command. Like in most instances, your unit is comprised of soldiers of mixed ethnicities, religions and backgrounds.

With all this in mind, you were also taught in a government-funded course that the institutions you serve and that your unit swore an oath to defend, are inherently racist, and that inherent inequality based on skin color should impact your decision making.

Does this impact your thinking as you order a soldier to move forward against a machine gun? Will you select a soldier of a different race because you have White guilt?

CALLISTA AND NEWT GINGRICH: FIGHTING CRITICAL RACE THEORY – HERE'S WHO'S LEADING THE CHARGE AND HOW YOU CAN HELP

As a Green Beret who served in combat while deployed in Afghanistan, I know what it's like to command a unit comprised of different ethnicities. It's not something you care about or consider while giving orders.

In the face of gunfire, you often have less than seconds to make decisions. You have one focus: to complete the mission while mitigating injuries and fatalities.

When a West Point cadet's family came to me with a screenshot of a presentation by Emory University and then-guest lecturer Dr. Carol Anderson titled, "Understanding Whiteness and White rage," I was shocked this was being taught to our future military leaders.

MORE FROM OPINION

Liz Peek: Pelosi, Democrats need Trump – Jan. 6 commission created for this one reason

Sen. Rick Scott: Real police reform – ignore Dems' radical policies and start with this commonsense step

Rep. McCaul: Biden's Afghanistan retreat will usher in 'year of the Jihad'

As I inquired with West Point, it was also shared with me that critical race theory (CRT) is included in a course syllabus. Despite much fervor from Democrats like former Virginia Gov. Terry McAuliffe, who referred to CRT teachings as a "right-wing conspiracy," it's very much alive in our military academies.

When pressed on CRT being taught in the military, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told the House Armed Services Committee, "We do not teach critical race theory. We don't embrace critical race theory, and I think that's a spurious conversation."

Yet the evidence is mounting.

In a recent Washington Post op-ed, Air Force Academy Professor Lynne Chandler Garcia admitted, "I teach critical race theories to our nation's future military leaders" and that "racism was ingrained in the system from the beginning."

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There is no denying the military – and the United States – has a history of racism and a checkered past. We should understand that. But this isn't a history course.

I can't think of anything more dangerous to unit cohesion and moral than to think your fellow soldier of color's advancement contributes to your White rage.

As academic proponents of CRT Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic have put it: "Unlike traditional civil rights, which stresses incrementalism and step-by-step progress, critical race theory questions the very foundations of the liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law."

Why are we teaching cadets to question the principles of the Constitution that they have taken an oath of allegiance to?

I was alarmed when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley sought to defend the teaching of CRT and declared, "I want to understand White rage."

According to Anderson, who addressed West Point cadets, "The trigger for White rage, inevitably, is Black advancement. It is not the mere presence of Black people that is the problem; rather, it is Blackness with ambition, drive, purpose, aspirations, and with demands for full and equal citizenship."

I can't think of anything more dangerous to unit cohesion and moral than to think your fellow soldier of color's advancement contributes to your White rage.

Which is why I've co-sponsored legislation to prevent military academies from promoting doctrines associated with CRT.

When you join the military, everyone has their head shaved and is given the same uniform. You are taught to bleed green and the only color that matters is camouflage.

The enemy's bullets certainly don't care about your race.



As a country, we should want anyone, regardless of race, in our military ranks. Any Americans who are willing to put their life on the line for our country should be accepted with open arms should they meet the criteria that has made our military the best in the world.

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But learning about CRT isn't like learning about Marxism or Mao, as Gen. Milley put it. It is a widely held belief among academics and is being taught as reality by professors such as Anderson.

The American military stands as the country's most trusted institution yet stands to lose the trust of the public should this continue. There are certainly areas to improve but indoctrinating our soldiers to hate the country they serve isn't one of them.

[CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM REP. MICHAEL WALTZ](#)

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<https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/military-critical-race-theory-academies-soldiers-rep-mike-waltz>

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DoD INSTRUCTION 1300.28

IN-SERVICE TRANSITION FOR TRANSGENDER SERVICE MEMBERS

Originating Component:	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
Effective:	April 30, 2021 (This issuance supersedes any previously published contradictory guidance).
Releasability:	Cleared for public release. Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/ .
Reissues and Cancels:	DoD Instruction 1300.28, "Military Service by Transgender Persons and Persons with Gender Dysphoria," September 4, 2020
Approved by:	Virginia S. Penrod, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive 5124.02, this issuance establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures:

- Regarding the process by which Service members may transition gender while serving.
- For changing a Service member's gender marker in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS).
- For medical care for Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) transgender Service members.

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SECTION 1: GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION**1.1. APPLICABILITY.**

a. This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments (including the United States Coast Guard (USCG) at all times, including when it is a Service in the Department of Homeland Security, by agreement with that Department), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD.

b. The requirement in Paragraph 2.5.e. of this issuance does not apply to the USCG.

c. For the purpose of this issuance, the term "Service member" includes cadets and midshipmen in a contracted Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) status and those at the Military Service Academies. This issuance does not apply to individuals participating in ROTC programs in a non-contracted volunteer status. Contracted ROTC midshipmen and cadets have limited eligibility for medical benefits and care through a military medical treatment facility (MTF), delineated in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1215.08.

1.2. POLICY.

a. DoD and the Military Departments will institute policies to provide Service members a process by which they may transition gender while serving. These policies are based on the conclusion that open service by transgender persons who are subject to the same high standards and procedures as other Service members with regard to medical fitness for duty, physical fitness, uniform and grooming standards, deployability, and retention is consistent with military service and readiness.

b. All Service members must be treated with dignity and respect. No person, solely on the basis of his or her gender identity, will be:

- (1) Involuntarily separated or discharged from the Military Services;
- (2) Denied reenlistment or continuation of service in the Military Services; or
- (3) Subjected to adverse action or mistreatment.

SECTION 2: RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS (USD(P&R)).

The USD(P&R):

- a. Evaluates any proposed new Military Department and Military Service regulations, policies, and guidance related to military service by transgender persons and persons with gender dysphoria, and revisions to such existing regulations, policies, and guidance, to ensure consistency with this issuance.
- b. Issues guidance to the Military Departments, establishing the prerequisites and procedures for changing a Service member's gender marker in DEERS.

2.2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS.

Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs coordinates with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs in the management and implementation of this policy, and issues clarifying guidance, as appropriate.

2.3. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS.

Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs coordinates with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs in the management and implementation of health care matters associated with this policy, and issues clarifying guidance, as appropriate.

2.4. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY (DHA).

Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Director, DHA:

- a. Provides or coordinates guidance and oversight, as appropriate, to standardize the provision of medically necessary health care for transgender Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria, including members for whom gender transition is determined to be medically necessary by a medical provider.
- b. Oversees the development and use of clinical practice guidelines to support the medical treatment plan and projected schedule for treatment of Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria.

- c. Oversees the development and use of clinical practice guidelines to support the continuity of care for Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria.
- d. Establishes procedures to require that education and training on transgender health care are conducted in MTFs.
- e. Ensures appropriate standards and procedures under the Supplemental Health Care Program for transgender health care services.

2.5. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND COMMANDANT, USCG.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commandant, USCG:

- a. Adhere to all provisions of this issuance.
- b. Administer their respective programs, and update existing Military Department regulations, policies, and guidance, or issue new issuances, as appropriate, in accordance with the provisions of this issuance.
- c. Maintain a Service central coordination cell (SCCC) to provide multi-disciplinary (e.g., medical, mental health, legal, military personnel management) expert advice and assistance to commanders with regard to service by transgender Service members and gender transition in the military, and to assist commanders in the execution of DoD, Military Department, and Service policies and procedures.
- d. Educate their respective AC and RC forces to ensure an adequate understanding within those forces of policies and procedures pertaining to gender transition in the military.
- e. Submit to the USD(P&R) the text of any proposed revision to existing Military Department and Service regulations, policies, and guidance, and of any proposed new issuance, at least 15 business days in advance of the proposed publication date. In accordance with Paragraph 1.1.b. of this issuance, this requirement does not apply to the USCG.
- f. Provide oversight regarding the implementation of this issuance and any Military Department and Military Service regulations, policies, and guidance related to military service by transgender persons and persons with gender dysphoria, the protection of personally identifiable information (PII), protected health information (PHI), and personal privacy considerations, consistent with current DoD guidance and in accordance with Paragraphs 4.2. and 4.3. of this issuance.
- g. Implement processes for the assessment and oversight of compliance with DoD, Military Department, and Service policies and procedures applicable to service by transgender persons, and persons with gender dysphoria, in accordance with Paragraph 4.4. of this issuance.

SECTION 3: GENDER TRANSITION

3.1. GENERAL.

a. Except where an exception to policy has been granted transgender Service members will be subject to the same standards as all other Service members. When a standard, requirement, or policy depends on whether the individual is male or female (e.g., medical fitness for duty; physical fitness and body fat standards; berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities; and uniform and grooming standards), all Service members will be subject to the standard, requirement, or policy associated with their gender marker in DEERS.

b. The Military Departments and Services recognize a Service member's gender by the Service member's gender marker in DEERS. Consistent with that gender marker, the Services apply, and the Service member must meet, all standards for uniforms and grooming; body composition assessment (BCA); physical readiness testing (PRT); Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program (MPDATP) participation; and other military standards applied with consideration of the Service member's gender. For facilities subject to regulation by the military, Service members will use those berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities associated with their gender marker in DEERS.

c. Service members with a diagnosis that gender transition is medically necessary will receive associated medical care and treatment from a medical provider. The recommendations from a military medical provider will address the severity of the Service member's medical condition and the urgency of any proposed medical treatment. Medical providers will provide advice to commanders in a manner consistent with processes used for other medical conditions that may limit the Service member's performance of official duties.

d. Any medical care and treatment provided to an individual Service member in the process of gender transition will be provided in the same manner as other medical care and treatment. Nothing in this issuance will be construed to authorize a commander to deny medically necessary treatment to a Service member.

e. Any determination that a transgender Service member is non-deployable at any time will be consistent with established Military Department and Service standards, as applied to other Service members whose deployability is similarly affected in comparable circumstances unrelated to gender transition.

f. Commanders will assess expected impacts on mission and readiness after consideration of the advice of military medical providers and will address such impacts in accordance with this issuance. In applying the tools described in this issuance, a commander will not accommodate biases against transgender individuals. If a Service member is unable to meet standards or requires an exception to policy (ETP) during a period of gender transition, all applicable tools, including the tools described in this issuance, will be available to commanders to minimize impacts to the mission and unit readiness.

g. When a cognizant military medical provider determines that a Service member's gender transition is complete, and at a time approved by the commander in consultation with the Service member concerned, the Service member's gender marker will be changed in DEERS and the Service member will be recognized in the self-identified gender.

3.2. SPECIAL MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.

Gender transition while serving in the military presents unique challenges associated with addressing the needs of the Service member in a manner consistent with military mission and readiness. Where possible, gender transition should be conducted such that a Service member would meet all applicable standards and be available for duty in the birth gender before a change in the Service member's gender marker in DEERS and would meet all applicable standards and be available for duty in the self-identified gender after the change in gender marker. However, since every transition is unique, the policies and procedures set forth herein provide flexibility to the Military Departments, Services, and commanders, in addressing transitions that may or may not follow this construct. These policies and procedures are applicable, in whole or in relevant part, to Service members who intend to begin transition, are beginning transition, who already may have started transition, and who have completed gender transition and are stable in their self-identified gender.

a. Medical.

(1) In accordance with DoDIs 6025.19 and 1215.13, all Service members must maintain their health and fitness, meet individual medical readiness requirements, and report to their chains of command any medical (including mental health) and health issue that may affect their readiness to deploy or fitness to continue serving.

(2) Each Service member in the AC or in the Selected Reserve will, as a condition of continued participation in military service, report significant health information to their chain of command. Service members who have or have had a medical condition that may limit their performance of official duties must consult with a military medical provider concerning their diagnosis and proposed treatment, and must notify their commanders.

(3) When a Service member receives a diagnosis of gender dysphoria from a military medical provider and obtains a medical treatment plan for gender transition, the Service member's notification to the commander must identify all medically necessary care and treatment that is part of the Service member's medical treatment plan.

(a) If applicable, the Service member's notification to the commander must identify a projected schedule for such treatment and an estimated date for a change in the Service member's gender marker in DEERS.

(b) If additional care and treatment are required after a gender marker change that was not part of an original treatment plan, the Service member must provide notification to the commander identifying the additional care, treatment, and projected schedule for such treatment.

(c) Recommendations of a military health care provider will address the severity of the Service member's medical condition and the urgency of any proposed medical treatment.

b. In-Service Transition.

Gender transition begins when a Service member receives a diagnosis from a military medical provider indicating that gender transition is medically necessary, and then completes the medical care identified or approved by a military mental health or medical provider in a documented treatment plan as necessary to achieve stability in the self-identified gender. It concludes when the Service member's gender marker in DEERS is changed and the Service member is recognized in his or her self-identified gender. Care and treatment may still be received after the gender marker is changed in DEERS as described in Paragraph 3.2.c. of this issuance, but at that point, the Service member must meet all applicable military standards in the self-identified gender. With regard to facilities subject to regulation by the military, a Service member whose gender marker has been changed in DEERS will use those berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities associated with his or her gender marker in DEERS.

c. Continuity of Medical Care.

A military medical provider may determine certain medical care and treatment (e.g., cross-sex hormone therapy) to be medically necessary even after a Service member's gender marker is changed in DEERS. A gender marker change does not preclude such care and treatment. If additional care and treatment are required after a gender marker change that was not part of an original treatment plan, and that change may impact the Service member's fitness for duty the Service member must provide, medical documentation to the commander identifying the additional care, treatment, and projected schedule for such treatment.

d. Living in Self-Identified Gender.

Each Military Department and Service may issue policy regarding the application of real life experience (RLE), including RLE in an on-duty status before gender marker change in DEERS.

e. DEERS.

Except when an exception has been granted in accordance with Paragraph 3.2.d. or 3.2.f. of this issuance, a Service member's gender is recognized by the Service member's gender marker in DEERS. Coincident with that gender marker, the Services apply, and the Service member must meet, all standards for uniforms and grooming; BCA; PRT; MPDATP participation; and other military standards applied with consideration of the Service member's gender.

f. Military Readiness.

Unique to military service, the commander is responsible and accountable for the overall readiness of his or her command. The commander is also responsible for the collective morale, welfare, good order, and discipline of the unit, and establishing a command climate that creates an environment where all members of the command are treated with dignity and respect. When a commander receives any request from a Service member that entails a period of non-availability for duty (e.g., necessary medical treatment, ordinary leave, emergency leave,

temporary duty, other approved absence), the commander must consider the individual need associated with the request and the needs of the command in making a decision on that request.

3.3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Service Member's Role.

The Service member will:

- (1) Secure a medical diagnosis from a military medical provider.
- (2) Notify the commander of a diagnosis indicating gender transition is medically necessary. This notification will identify all medically necessary treatment in their medical treatment plan and a projected schedule for such treatment, including an estimated date for a change in the Service member's gender marker in DEERS, pursuant to Paragraph 3.2.a. of this issuance.
- (3) Notify the commander of any change to the medical treatment plan, the projected schedule for such treatment, or the estimated date on which the Service member's gender marker will be changed in DEERS.
- (4) Notify the commander of any new care determined to be medically necessary after a gender marker change in DEERS that was not previously approved in the medical treatment plan, in accordance with Paragraph 3.2.a.(3) of this issuance, as such care or treatment may affect readiness to deploy or fitness to continue serving.

b. Military Medical Provider's Role.

The military medical provider will:

- (1) Establish the Service member's medical diagnosis, recommend medically necessary care and treatment, and, in consultation with the Service member, develop a medical treatment plan associated with the Service member's gender transition, pursuant to Paragraph 3.1.a. of this issuance, for submission to the commander.
- (2) In accordance with established military medical practices, advise the commander on the medical diagnosis applicable to the Service member, including the provider's assessment of the medically necessary care and treatment, the urgency of the proposed care and treatment, the likely impact of the care and treatment on the individual's readiness and deployability, and the scope of the human and functional support network needed to support the individual.
- (3) In consultation with the Service member, formally advise the commander when the Service member's gender transition is complete and recommend to the commander a time at which the Service member's gender marker may be changed in DEERS.
- (4) Provide the Service member with medically necessary care and treatment after the Service member's gender marker has been changed in DEERS.

c. Commander's Role.

The Service member's commander will:

(1) Review the Service member's request to transition gender. Approves the timing and oversees, as appropriate, a transition process that:

(a) Complies with DoD, Military Department, and Service regulations, policies, and guidance.

(b) Considers the individual facts and circumstances presented by the Service member.

(c) Maintains military readiness by minimizing impacts to the mission (including deployment, operational, training and exercise schedules, and critical skills availability), as well as to the morale, welfare, good order, and discipline of the unit.

(d) Is consistent with the medical treatment plan.

(e) Incorporates consideration of other factors, as appropriate.

(2) Coordinate with the military medical provider regarding any medical care or treatment provided to the Service member and any medical issues that arise in the course of a Service member's gender transition.

(3) Consult, as necessary, with the SCCC about service by transgender Service members and gender transition in the military; the execution of DoD, Military Department, and Military Service policies and procedures; and assessment of the means and timing of any proposed medical care or treatment.

d. Role of the Military Department and the USCG.

The Military Departments and USCG will:

(1) Establish policies and procedures in accordance with this issuance, outlining the actions a commander may take to minimize impacts to the mission and ensure continued unit readiness in the event a transitioning individual is unable to meet standards or requires an ETP during a period of gender transition. Such policies and procedures may address the means and timing of transition, procedures for responding to a request for an ETP before the change of a Service member's gender marker in DEERS, appropriate duty statuses, and tools for addressing any inability to serve throughout the gender transition process. Any such actions available to the commander will consider and balance the needs of the individual and the needs of the command in a manner comparable to the actions available to the commander in addressing comparable Service members' circumstances unrelated to gender transition. Such actions may include:

(a) Adjustments to the date the Service member's gender transition, or any component of the transition process, will begin.

- (b) Advising the Service member of the availability of options for extended leave status or participation in other voluntary absence programs during the transition process.
 - (c) Arrangements for the transfer of the Service member to another organization, command, location, or duty status (e.g., Individual Ready Reserve), as appropriate, during the transition process.
 - (d) ETPs associated with changes in the Service member's physical appearance and body composition during gender transition, such as accommodations in the application of standards for uniforms and grooming, BCA, PRT, and MPDATP participation.
 - (e) Establishment of, or adjustment to, local policies on the use of berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities subject to regulation by the military during the transition process.
 - (f) Referral, as appropriate, for a determination of fitness in the Integrated Disability Evaluation System in accordance with DoDI 1332.18 or the USCG Physical Disability Evaluation System, pursuant to Commandant Instruction M1850.2 (series).
- (2) Establish policies and procedures, consistent with this issuance, whereby a Service member's gender marker will be changed in DEERS based on a determination by the military medical provider that the Service member's gender transition is complete; receipt of written approval from the commander, issued in consultation with the Service member; and documentation indicating gender change provided by the Service member. Such documentation is limited to:
- (a) A certified true copy of a State birth certificate reflecting the Service member's self-identified gender;
 - (b) A certified true copy of a court order reflecting the Service member's self-identified gender; or
 - (c) A United States passport reflecting the Service member's self-identified gender.
- (3) When the Service member's gender marker in DEERS is changed:
- (a) Apply uniform standards, grooming standards, BCA standards, PRT standards, MPDATP standards, and other standards applied with consideration of the Service member's gender, applicable to the Service member's gender as reflected in DEERS.
 - (b) As to facilities subject to regulation by the military, direct the use of berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities according to the Service member's gender marker as reflected in DEERS.

3.4. GENDER TRANSITION APPROVAL PROCESS.

a. A Service member on active duty who receives a diagnosis from a military medical provider for which gender transition is medically necessary may, in consultation with the military medical provider, request that the commander approve:

(1) The timing of medical treatment associated with gender transition;

(2) An ETP associated with gender transition, pursuant to Paragraphs 3.2.d., 3.2.f., or 3.3.d. of this issuance; or

(3) A change to the Service member's gender marker in DEERS.

b. The commander, informed by the recommendations of the military medical provider, the SCCC, and others, as appropriate, will respond to the request within a framework that ensures readiness by minimizing impacts to the mission (including deployment, operational, training, exercise schedules, and critical skills availability), as well as to the morale, welfare, good order, and discipline of the command.

c. Consistent with applicable law, regulation, and policy, the commander will:

(1) Comply with the provisions of this issuance and with Military Department and Service regulations, policies, and guidance, and consult with the SCCC.

(2) Promptly respond to any request for medical care, as identified by the military medical provider, and require such care is provided consistent with applicable regulations.

(3) Respond to any request for medical treatment or an ETP associated with gender transition as soon as practicable, but not later than 90 calendar days after receiving a request determined to be complete in accordance with the provisions of this issuance and applicable Military Department and Service regulations, policies, and guidance. The response will be in writing; will include notice of any actions taken by the commander in accordance with applicable regulations, policies, and guidance and the provisions of this issuance; and will be provided to both the Service member and their military medical provider. The commander will return any request that is determined to be incomplete to the Service member with written notice of the deficiencies identified as soon as practicable, but not later than 30 calendar days after receipt.

(4) At any time before the change of the Service member's gender marker in DEERS, the commander, in consultation with the Service member and a military health care provider, may modify a previously approved approach to, or an ETP associated with, gender transition. A determination that modification is necessary and appropriate will be made in accordance with and upon review and consideration of the procedures and factors set forth in Paragraph 3.3.c. of this issuance. Written notice of such modification will be provided to the Service member pursuant to procedures established by the Military Department or Military Service, and may include options as set forth in Paragraph 3.3.d. of this issuance.

(5) The commander will approve, in writing, the change of a Service member's gender marker in DEERS, after receipt of the recommendation of the military medical provider that the

Service member's gender marker be changed and receipt of the requisite documentation from the Service member. Upon submission of the commander's written approval to the appropriate personnel servicing activity, the change in the Service member's gender marker will be entered in the appropriate Service database, transmitted to the Defense Manpower Data Center, and updated in DEERS.

d. As authorized by applicable Military Department and Service regulations, policies, and guidance implementing this issuance, a Service member may request review by a senior officer in the chain of command of a subordinate commander's decision with regard to any request pursuant to this issuance and any later modifications to that decision.

e. A Service member who has completed a gender transition but has not resolved the gender dysphoria should consult with their military medical provider and commander. If a return to their previous gender is medically required, the Service member is to use the procedures outlined in Paragraph 3.4. of this issuance.

3.5. CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH RC PERSONNEL.

Excepting only those special considerations set forth in Paragraph 3.5. of this issuance, RC personnel are subject to all policies and procedures applicable to AC Service members as set forth in this issuance and in applicable Military Department and Military Service regulations, policies, and guidance implementing this issuance.

a. Gender Transition Approach.

All RC Service members (except Selected Reserve full-time support personnel) identifying as transgender individuals will submit to and coordinate with their chain of command evidence of a medical evaluation that includes a medical treatment plan. Selected Reserve full-time support personnel will follow the gender transition approval process set forth in Paragraph 3.4. of this issuance.

b. Diagnosis and Medical Treatment Plans.

A diagnosis established by a civilian medical provider will be subject to review and validation by a military medical provider pursuant to applicable Military Department and Military Service regulations, policies, and guidance. A treatment plan established by a civilian medical provider will be subject to review by a military medical provider and the military medical provider will validate any associated duty limitations pursuant to applicable Military Department and Military Service regulations, policies, and guidance.

c. Selected Reserve Drilling Member Participation.

To the greatest extent possible, commanders and Service members will address periods of non-availability for any period of military duty, paid or unpaid, during the Service member's gender transition with a view to mitigating unsatisfactory participation. In accordance with DoDI 1215.13, such mitigation strategies may include:

- (1) Rescheduled training;
- (2) Authorized absences; or
- (3) Alternate training.

d. Delayed Training Program (DTP).

Recruiters and commanders must advise DTP personnel of limitations resulting from being non-duty qualified. As appropriate, Service members in the DTP may be subject to the provisions of Paragraph 3.6. of this issuance.

e. Split Option Training.

When authorized by the Military Department or Military Service concerned, Service members who elect to complete basic and specialty training over two non-consecutive periods may be subject to the provisions of Paragraph 3.6. of this issuance.

3.6. CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FIRST TERM OF SERVICE.

a. A blanket prohibition on gender transition during a Service member's first term of service is not permissible. However, the All-Volunteer Force readiness model may be taken into consideration by a commander in evaluating a request for medical care or treatment or an ETP associated with gender transition during a Service member's first term of service. Any other facts and circumstances related to an individual Service member that impact that model will be considered by the commander as set forth in this issuance and implementing Military Department and Service regulations, policies, and guidance.

b. The following policies and procedures apply to Service members during the first term of service and will be applied to Service members with a diagnosis indicating that gender transition is medically necessary in the same manner, and to the same extent, as to Service members with other medical conditions that have a comparable impact on the Service member's ability to serve:

(1) A Service member is subject to separation in an entry-level status during the period of initial training in accordance with DoDI 1332.14, based on a medical condition that impairs the Service member's ability to complete such training.

(2) An individual participant is subject to placement on medical leave of absence or medical disenrollment from the Reserve Officers' Training Corps in accordance with DoDI 1215.08 or from a Military Service Academy in accordance with DoDI 1322.22, based on a medical condition that impairs the individual's ability to complete such training or to access into the Military Services.

(3) A Service member is subject to administrative separation for a fraudulent or erroneous enlistment or induction when warranted and in accordance with DoDI 1332.14, based on any deliberate material misrepresentation, omission, or concealment of a fact, including a

medical condition, that if known at the time of enlistment, induction, or entry into a period of military service, might have resulted in rejection.

(4) If a Service member requests non-urgent medical treatment or an ETP associated with gender transition during the first term of service, including during periods of initial entry training in excess of 180 calendar days, the commander may give the factors set forth in Paragraph 3.6.a. of this issuance significant weight in considering and balancing the individual need associated with the request and the needs of the command, in determining when such treatment, or whether such ETP may commence in accordance with Paragraphs 3.2.d, 3.2.f, and 3.3.d. of this issuance.

SECTION 4: ADDITIONAL POLICY GUIDANCE

4.1. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY.

The DoD and the USCG provide equal opportunity to all Service members in an environment free from harassment and discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation, pursuant to DoDI 1350.02.

4.2. PROTECTION OF PII AND PHI.

a. The Military Departments and the USCG will:

(1) In cases in which there is a need to collect, use, maintain, or disseminate PII in furtherance of this issuance or Military Department and Military Service regulations, policies, or guidance, protect against unwarranted invasions of personal privacy and the unauthorized disclosure of such PII in accordance with Section 552a of Title 5, United States Code, also known as the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended; DoDI 5400.11; and DoD 5400.11-R.

(2) Maintain such PII so as to protect individuals' rights, consistent with Federal law, regulation, and policy.

b. Disclosure of PHI will be consistent with DoDI 6025.18 and DoDI 6490.08.

4.3. PERSONAL PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS.

A commander may employ reasonable measures to respect the privacy interests of Service members. Commanders are encouraged to consult with the Service member and SCCC when employing such measures.

4.4. ASSESSMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF COMPLIANCE.

a. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commandant, USCG will implement processes for the assessment and oversight of compliance with DoD, Military Department, and Military Service policies and procedures applicable to service by transgender persons.

b. Beginning in fiscal year 2022 and at least every 3 years thereafter, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commandant, USCG will direct a special inspection by the Service Inspector General or another appropriate auditing agency to ensure compliance with this issuance and implementing Military Department, Military Service or USCG regulations, policies, and guidance. Such reports will be endorsed and provided by the Secretary concerned to the USD(P&R) within 3 months of completion. The directing official will review the report of inspection for purposes of assessing and overseeing compliance; identifying compliance deficiencies, if any; timely initiating corrective action, as appropriate; and deriving best practices and lessons learned.

c. Any questions on gender identity in DoD cross-component assessment of Service members (e.g., surveys, focus groups interviews) must be approved by the USD(P&R) via the Department of Defense Human Resources Activity, Director, Office of People Analytics. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commandant, USCG will implement processes for the approval of these questions for assessments containing these items administrated solely within their components.

d. Gender identity is a personal and private matter. DoD Components, including the Military Departments and Services, require written approval from the USD(P&R) to collect transgender and transgender related data or publically release such data.

GLOSSARY**G.1. ACRONYMS.**

ACRONYM	MEANING
AC	Active Component
BCA	body composition assessment
DEERS	Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System
DHA	Defense Health Agency
DoDI	DoD instruction
DSM-5	American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: Fifth Edition
DTP	Delayed Training Program
ETP	exception to policy
HIPAA	Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
MPDATP	Military Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program
MTF	military medical treatment facility
PHI	protected health information
PII	personally identifiable information
PRT	physical readiness testing
RC	Reserve Component
RLE	real life experience
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
SCCC	Service Central Coordination Cell
TRICARE	Military Health Care
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

G.2. DEFINITIONS.

These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.

TERM	DEFINITION
cross-sex hormone therapy	The use of feminizing hormones in an individual assigned male at birth based on traditional biological indicators or the use of masculinizing hormones in an individual assigned female at birth. A common medical treatment associated with gender transition.
Delayed Training Program	A program established by the Secretary of the Army to provide a personnel accounting category for members of the Army Selected Reserve to be used for categorizing members of the Selected Reserve who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment.
gender dysphoria	A marked incongruence between one's experienced or expressed gender and assigned gender of at least 6 months' duration, as manifested by conditions specified in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: Fifth Edition (DSM-5), page 452, which is associated with clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
gender identity	An individual's internal or personal sense of gender, which may or may not match the individual's biological sex.
gender marker	Data element in DEERS that identifies a Service member's gender. Service members are expected to adhere to all military standards associated with their gender marker in DEERS and use military berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities in accordance with the DEERS gender marker.
gender transition is complete	A Service member has completed the medical care identified or approved by a military medical provider in a documented medical treatment plan as necessary to achieve stability in the self-identified gender.
gender transition process	Gender transition in the military begins when a Service member receives a diagnosis from a military medical provider indicating the Service member's gender transition is medically necessary, and concludes when the Service member's gender marker in DEERS is changed and the Service member is recognized in the self-identified gender.

TERM	DEFINITION
human and functional support network	Support network for a Service member that may be informal (e.g., friends, family, co-workers, social media,) or formal (e.g., medical professionals, counselors, clergy).
medically necessary	Health-care services or supplies necessary to prevent, diagnose, or treat an illness, injury, condition, disease, or its symptoms, and that meet accepted standards of medicine.
mental health provider	A medical provider who is licensed, credentialed, and experienced in the diagnosis and treatment of mental health conditions and is privileged at a Military MTF (in the direct care system). Private care sector civilian TRICARE authorized mental health providers may be involved in a specific Active Duty Service member's care. These providers are credentialed through the managed care support contractors.
military medical provider	Any military, government service, or contract civilian health care professional who, in accordance with regulations of a Military Department or DHA, is credentialed and granted clinical practice privileges to provide health care services within the provider's scope of practice in a Military MTF.
non-urgent medical treatment	The care required to diagnose and treat problems that are not life or limb threatening or that do not require immediate attention.
PHI	Individually identifiable health information (as defined in the HIPAA Privacy Rule) that, except as provided in this issuance, is transmitted or maintained by electronic or any other form or medium. PHI excludes individually identifiable health information in employment records held by a DoD covered entity in its role as employer. Information that has been de-identified in accordance with the HIPAA Privacy Rule is not PHI.
PII	Information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual. Defined in OMB Circular No. A-130.

TERM	DEFINITION
RLE	The phase in the gender transition process during which the individual begins living socially in the gender role consistent with their self-identified gender. RLE may or may not be preceded by the commencement of cross-sex hormone therapy, depending on the medical treatment associated with the individual Service member, cadet, or midshipman's gender transition. The RLE phase is also a necessary precursor to certain medical procedures, including gender transition surgery. RLE generally encompasses dressing in the new gender, as well as using self-identified gender berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities.
SCCC	Service-level cell of experts created to provide multi-disciplinary (e.g., medical, legal) advice and assistance to commanders regarding service by transgender Service members, cadets, or midshipmen and gender transition in the military.
self-identified gender	The gender with which an individual identifies.
stable in the self-identified gender	The absence of clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning associated with a marked incongruence between an individual's experienced or expressed gender and the individual's biological sex. Continuing medical care including, but not limited to, cross-sex hormone therapy may be required to maintain a state of stability.
transgender Service member	Service member who has received a medical diagnosis indicating that gender transition is medically necessary, including any Service member who intends to begin transition, is undergoing transition, or has completed transition and is stable in the self-identified gender.
transition	Period of time when individuals change from the gender role associated with their sex assigned at birth to a different gender role. For many people, this involves learning how to live socially in another gender role. For others, this means finding a gender role and expression that are most comfortable for them. Transition may or may not include feminization or masculinization of the body through cross-sex hormone therapy or other medical procedures. The nature and duration of transition are variable and individualized.

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Newsmax

Sen. Cotton: US Service Members Complain of Pentagon's Wokeness

Tuesday, June 15, 2021 10:02 AM

By: Charlie McCarthy

Military service members have complained about being subjected to critical race theory indoctrination as part of the Pentagon's wokeness, The Washington Times reported.

Service members said they were divided by race and sex into groups for "privilege walks," and spoke out against receiving reading lists of critical race theory books as part of the Defense Department's new anti-extremism and diversity training.

Critical race theory is defined by the Encyclopedia Britannica as the concept in which race is a socially constructed category ingrained in American law intended to maintain social, economic, and political inequalities between whites and nonwhites. It holds that the U.S. society is inherently or systemically racist.

"This is about a very specific kind of anti-American indoctrination that is seeping into some parts of our military," Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., said at a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

Cotton received the complaints through a whistleblower website he started in partnership with Rep. Dan Crenshaw, R-Texas, in late May.

Cotton, a former Army infantry officer, and Crenshaw, a former Navy SEAL lieutenant commander, created the site to identify woke ideology within the military, the Times reported.

The Pentagon joins America's schools, workplaces, and other government entities increasingly adopting training and curriculum based on critical race theory as woke culture spreads.

The Times said the DOD has defended the training, saying it promotes diversity, equity, and inclusion in the armed forces.

Others, however, say it is creating division within the ranks.

"One Marine told us a military history training session was replaced with mandatory training on police brutality, white privilege, and systemic racism," Cotton said. "He reported that several officers are now leaving his unit citing that training.

"Another service member told us that their unit was required to read 'White Fragility' by Robin DiAngelo, which claims 'White people raised in Western society are conditioned in a White supremacist world view.'"

Cotton also said an airman complained that an exercise called "privilege walk" was a "racist exercise."

"Members of the wing were ordered to separate themselves by race and gender in order to stratify people based on their perceived privilege," Cotton

said in describing the airman's complaint.

Crenshaw took to Twitter to post video of Thursday's Senate committee hearing and said:

"Worth the watch. We've received hundreds of complaints about this - CRT lessons, white privilege training manuals, even 'privilege walks.' This is a disturbing, real trend in our military that the left wants to ignore. We're not going to ignore it. We're going to expose it."

Cotton mentioned other complaints while questioning Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin during the hearing.

"We're hearing reports of plummeting morale, growing mistrust between the races and sexes where none existed just six months ago, and unexpected retirements and separations based on these trainings alone," Cotton said.

Cotton asked Austin whether he believes the military is fundamentally racist and whether service members should be treated differently based on race or sex.

Answering "no" to both questions, Austin said he welcomed service members to lodge complaints through their chain of command or the inspector general.

"I would also say that diversity, equity, and inclusion is important to this military now, and it will be important in the future," Austin said. "And so we're going to make sure that our military looks like America and that our leadership looks like what's in the ranks of the military."

Cotton said the military's efforts to improve inclusivity have gone too far.

"The military for decades has been one of the institutions in this society where you are most likely to get ahead based on your own performance, on your own merit, irrespective of the color of your skin or where you came from or who your parents were," Cotton said.

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Gaetz Destroys Lloyd Austin Over Military's 'Wokeism': 'I'm Embarrassed By Your Leadership!'

newstreason.com/post/gaetz-destroys-lloyd-austin-over-military-s-wokeism-i-m-embarrassed-by-your-leadership

truth81

April 6, 2022



April 5, 2022

Congressman Matt Gaetz (R-FL) unloaded on Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin during Tuesday's House Armed Services Committee hearing, saying he was "embarrassed" by the senior military official's leadership.

Gaetz mentioned the requested military budget — some \$773 billion — and suggested that perhaps that money ought to be used to take corrective actions after what he argued was a series of "blown calls" made by military leadership in recent months.

"You guys have been blowing a lot of calls lately on matters of strategy, Mr. Secretary. You guys told us that Russia couldn't lose, you told us the Taliban couldn't immediately win, and so I guess I'm wondering, what in the \$773 billion that you're requesting today is going to help you make assessments that are accurate in the face of so many blown calls?" Gaetz asked.

"You've seen what's in our budget. You've seen how the budget matches the strategy and so I'll let that speak for itself," Austin replied.

Gaetz continued to push and Austin pushed back, as the two continued to talk over each other.

Gaetz then pivoted to address the military's recent focus on social issues, suggesting that woke culture was distracting from more important things like strategy, saying, "We got time to embrace Critical Race Theory at West Point, to embrace socialism at the National Defense University, to do mandatory pronoun training —"

"Again, this is the most capable, this is the most combat critical force in the world. It has been so, and it will be so going forward," Austin pushed back, and Gaetz responded, "Not if we continue down this path. Not if we embrace socialism."

"The fact that you're embarrassed by your country? I'm sorry for that," Austin said then, but Gaetz interrupted.

"I'm embarrassed by your leadership! I'm not embarrassed for my country," he said. "I wish we were not losing to China ... that is so disgraceful that you would sit here and conflate your failures with the failures of the uniformed service members."

This is an excerpt from [The Daily Wire](#).

SOURCE: [Resist The Mainstream](#)

4 Examples Of 'Wokeness' Infecting The United States Military

DW dailywire.com/news/4-examples-of-wokeness-infecting-the-united-states-military

Ben Zeisloft



Last week, citing a perceived trend toward wokeness in the military, Fox News host Tucker Carlson criticized Pentagon leadership for designing uniforms fitted to pregnant women.

Carlson went on to contrast the growing military power of China with the American armed forces' fascination with "new hairstyles and maternity flight suits."

"Pregnant women are going to fight our wars," Carlson said. "It's a mockery of the U.S. military. The bottom line is, it's out of control, and the Pentagon's going along with this."

In response, Department of Defense Press Sec. John Kirby — a Biden appointee — denounced Carlson for using his show to "denigrate the contributions of women in the military." The Department of Defense posted Kirby's remarks under the title, "Press Secretary Smites Fox Host That Dissed Diversity in U.S. Military."

"We are better and more effective, not only when we represent the American people, all the American people, but also when we have the morals to include other perspectives and ideas," Kirby added. "A major and specific contributor to that advantage are the women who serve, civilian and military alike."

Though the Department of Defense recently walked back other snarky comments toward Carlson on social media, lawmakers — including Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) — are deeply concerned about the military's reprimand of a civilian expressing a political opinion. In a letter to Defense Sec. Lloyd Austin, Sen. Cruz noted that the military's obligations to "avoid political endorsements and controversy" are being undermined "for the sake of leftwing ideology and political expediency."

The incident with Tucker Carlson is just the latest in a string of incidents which show their apparent leftward drift toward wokeness. Here are four more examples.

Free Gender Transition Surgeries

In a Defense Department memo, Sec. Austin appeared to indicate that the new policy would allow transgender members of the military to receive gender transition services, compliments of U.S. taxpayers.

"Prospective recruits may serve in their self-identified gender when they have met the appropriate standards for accession into the military services," wrote Sec. Austin. "This revised policy will also ensure all medically-necessary transition related care authorized by law is available to all Service members and will re-examine all cases of transgender Service members that may be in some form of adverse administrative proceedings."

According to The Blaze, military health insurance provider TRICARE includes hormone replacement therapy and psychotherapy for gender dysphoria as "covered services." Costs for gender transition surgeries can exceed \$100,000 — a bill that American taxpayers may potentially cover for up to 15,000 service members, amounting to a \$1.5 billion expense.

Transgender Ban Repealed

Within the first week of the Biden administration, Defense Department leadership endorsed the new Commander-in-Chief's reversal of the ban on transgender individuals serving in the military.

President Biden's executive order states that the military thrives when it is "composed of diverse Americans who can meet the rigorous standards for military service, and an inclusive military strengthens our national security."

The measure cited comments made in 2016 by former Defense Sec. Ash Carter, who affirmed that "transgender service members who could meet the required standards and procedures should be permitted to serve openly."

At the signing on January 25, President Biden thanked Sec. Austin, as well as Gen. Mark Milley — chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — for being a “great, great help” on the order.

“What I’m doing is enabling all qualified Americans to serve their country in uniform, and essentially restoring the situation as it existed before, with transgender personnel, if qualified in every other way, can serve their government in the United States military,” remarked the President.

Critical Race Theory Book Recommendations

The United States Navy’s most recent suggested reading list includes books that explicitly endorse critical race theory and intersectionality. Among these books is *How to Be an Antiracist* by Ibram X. Kendi.

The Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program endorses Kendi’s book — as well as other books related to gender politics and “anti-racism” — to sailors.

In a press release, Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Russell Smith stated that “the titles included were methodically chosen in order to provide a specific focus on targeted areas for reinforcement, a focus that will provide enlisted Sailors the greatest benefit given our role in the organization.”

Professor Kendi — who teaches at Boston University and leads its “Center for Antiracist Research” — rose to prominence following the death of George Floyd, and his book now holds a place among the “anti-racist” canon.

Kendi’s conclusions about racial equity often raise eyebrows. For instance, he implied last year that Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett is a white colonizer for adopting two black children from Haiti.

As with the military’s rebuke of Tucker Carlson, lawmakers were not happy with the Navy’s endorsement of *How to Be an Antiracist*.

Rep. Jim Banks (R-IN) — a ranking member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel and a Naval Reserve officer since 2012 — wrote to Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday that “the views promoted in ‘How to Be an Antiracist’ are explicitly anti-American.”

Rep. Banks Banks asked Gilday to offer a written response explaining how the book “cultivates a culture of warfighting excellence” or “remove *How to be an Antiracist* from the CNO-PRP Reading List.”

Pledge About Intersectionality

Task Force One Navy — an entity formed in June of 2020 to address “discrimination and bias” — wrote a pledge for sailors that endorse the assumptions of intersectionality.

“I pledge to advocate for and acknowledge all lived experiences and intersectional identities of every sailor in the Navy,” it reads. “I pledge to engage in ongoing self-reflection, education and knowledge sharing to better myself and my communities. I pledge to be an example in establishing healthy, inclusive and team-oriented environments. I pledge to constructively share all experiences and information gained from activities above to inform the development of Navy-wide reforms.”

Members of Congress likewise condemned the Navy’s embrace of left-wing ideology.

“The Navy’s divisive ‘woke pledge’ to acknowledge intersectional identities threatens the fabric of our military, which has always united our servicemembers through the common theme of service to and love of our country,” said Rep. Louie Gohmert (R-TX) in a statement. “Radical Leftist orthodoxy has no place in the Navy or any other branch of our military.”


“All of our men and women in uniform, including our brave sailors in the U.S. Navy, deserve to have the best tools needed to carry out their mission to support and defend the Constitution of the United States,” added Rep. Lauren Boebert (R-CO). “Unfortunately, liberal intersectional ideology undermines this mission. Our Armed Forces are built upon unity and teamwork, but intersectional philosophy depends on dividing people into warring victim groups.”

Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich wrote in an op-ed that the pledge would lead to a “brainwashed military spouting largely partisan ideological nonsense.”

“Members will be told their survival in the military and their chance for promotion is dependent on learning left-wing baloney,” he said.

The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Daily Wire.

18) AIRFORCE Equal Opportunity initiative




VA announces plans to cover gender surgery for trans vets, in policy reversal

nypost.com/2021/06/19/va-plans-to-cover-gender-surgery-for-trans-vets-in-policy-reversal/

Mary Kay Linge

June 19, 2021



More On: transgender

- **Dictionary goes woke, changes definition of 'man' and 'woman'**
- **Video shows transgender male hockey player savagely checked by larger rival**
- **Ex-Navy SEAL who detransitioned warns transgender teens: 'You need to slow down'**
- **Retired Navy SEAL who came out as trans announces detransition: 'destroyed my life'**

The Department of Veterans Affairs is taking the first steps toward offering gender-reassignment surgery to transgender vets, VA Secretary Denis McDonough announced Saturday at a Florida celebration of Pride Month.

"Transgender vets [will] go through the full gender confirmation process with VA at their side," McDonough promised a cheering crowd in Orlando, CNN reported.

The VA has been paying for prescription hormone therapy and mental health treatment for transgender veterans since 2013. But the directive that authorized those benefits, issued by the Obama administration, specifically excluded surgical procedures.

The policy change comes at the behest of President Biden, McDonough said. Biden rescinded President Trump's ban on transgender service members in January, and in May the US Air Force and Space Force issued new guidelines on the equitable treatment of members undergoing gender transition.

"At the end of the day this is in the President's authority to do," McDonough said. "He's made clear it's time to do it and that's precisely what we'll do."

A VA spokesman estimated that fewer than 4,000 vets would likely be interested in the surgery, the Orlando Sentinel reported — and said that the agency had not calculated its potential costs.

McDonough's announcement signals the start of a lengthy rulemaking process of up to two years that will include a period of public comment.

