[House Report 117-454]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
117th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { 117-454
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DHS RESTRICTIONS ON CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES AND CHINESE ENTITIES OF
CONCERN ACT
_______
August 19, 2022.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Thompson of Mississippi, from the Committee on Homeland Security,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 7779]
The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 7779) to establish Department of Homeland
Security funding restrictions on institutions of higher
education that have a relationship with Confucius Institutes,
and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the
bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 3
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 3
Hearings......................................................... 5
Committee Consideration.......................................... 5
Committee Votes.................................................. 5
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 5
C.B.O. Estimate, New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and
Tax Expenditures............................................... 5
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 5
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 5
Duplicative Federal Programs..................................... 5
Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff
Benefits....................................................... 6
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 6
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 6
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 6
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius
Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act''.
SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS ON CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES' HOST SCHOOLS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Chinese entity of concern.--The term ``Chinese entity of
concern'' means any university or college in the People's
Republic of China that--
(A) is involved in the implementation of military-
civil fusion;
(B) participates in the Chinese defense industrial
base;
(C) is affiliated with the Chinese State
Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for
the National Defense;
(D) receives funding from any organization
subordinate to the Central Military Commission of the
Chinese Communist Party; or
(E) provides support to any security, defense,
police, or intelligence organization of the Government
of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese
Communist Party.
(2) Confucius institute.--The term ``Confucius Institute''
means a cultural institute funded by the Government of the
People's Republic of China.
(3) Institution of higher education.--The term ``institution
of higher education'' has the meaning given such term in
section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1002).
(4) Relationship.--The term ``relationship'' means, with
respect to an institution of higher education, any contract
awarded, or agreement entered into, as well as any in-kind
donation or gift, received from a Confucius Institute or
Chinese entity of concern.
(b) Restrictions on Institutions of Higher Education.--Beginning with
the first fiscal year that begins after the date that is 12 months
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall ensure that an institution of higher education (referred
to in this section as an ``institution'') which has a relationship with
a Confucius Institute is ineligible to receive any Science and
Technology or Research and Development funds from the Department of
Homeland Security, unless the institution terminates the relationship
between the institution and such Confucius Institute. Upon the
termination of such a relationship, the institution at issue shall be
eligible to receive Science and Technology or Research and Development
funds from the Department of Homeland Security.
(c) Chinese Entities of Concern Relationship Disclosures.--Beginning
on the date that is 12 months after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall require each institution
of higher education which has a relationship with a Chinese entity of
concern that is seeking or receives Science and Technology or Research
and Development funds from the Department of Homeland Security to
notify the Secretary of such relationship. Such notification shall
include the following with respect to such relationship:
(1) An identification of the Chinese entity of concern.
(2) Information relating to the length of such relationship.
(3) A description of the nature of such institution's
relationship with such Chinese entity of concern, including the
monetary value of any contract awarded, or agreement entered
into, as well as any in-kind donation or gift, from such
Chinese entity of concern.
(d) Assistance.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide
outreach and, upon request, technical assistance to institutions of
higher education relating to compliance with this Act. In carrying out
this subsection, the Secretary shall provide particular attention to
institutions assisting historically Black colleges and universities (as
such term is defined in part B of section 322(2) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (22 U.S.C. 1061(2)), Hispanic serving
institutions (as such term is defined in section 502 of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a)), Tribal colleges and
universities (as such term is defined in section 316(b) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)), and other minority serving
institutions (as such defined in section 371(a) of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(a))).
(e) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may
waive, on a case-by-case basis, and for a period of not more
than one year, the application of subsection (b) to an
institution of higher education if the Secretary determines
such is in the national security interests of the United
States.
(2) Renewal.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may annually
renew a waiver issued pursuant to paragraph (1) if the
Secretary determines such is in the national security interests
of the United States.
(3) Notification.--If the Secretary of Homeland Security
issues or renews a waiver pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2),
respectively, not later than 30 days after such issuance or
renewal, as the case may be, the Secretary shall provide
written notification to the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate regarding such
issuance or renewal, including a justification relating
thereto.
(f) Reports.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall report to the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate regarding implementation of this Act
during the immediately preceding 12 month period. Each such report
shall include information relating to--
(1) the implementation of subsections (b) and (c), including
the information disclosed pursuant to such subsection (c); and
(2) outreach and the provision of technical assistance
pursuant to subsection (d).
PURPOSE AND SUMMARY
H.R. 7779, the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes
and Chinese Entities of Concern Act,'' prohibits the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) from providing Science and
Technology (S&T) or Research and Development (R&D) funds to any
United States institution of higher education that has a
relationship with a Confucius Institute funded by the
Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It also
requires any U.S. institution of higher education seeking or
receiving S&T or R&D funds from DHS to notify the Department of
any relationship with a ``Chinese Entity of Concern.''
BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION
Starting in the early 2000s, the PRC created Confucius
Institutes where Chinese language instruction was offered at
U.S. institutions of higher education as well as academic
institutions in 160 countries. While these institutes were
marketed as a mechanism to promote Chinese language and
culture, support local Chinese teaching internationally, and
facilitate cultural exchanges, evidence emerged that the
Chinese government sought to leverage the Institutes in ways
that pose risks to United States national security.\1\
Confucius Institutes are almost entirely controlled by the
Chinese government and pose risks in a variety of ways from
stifling academic freedom to aggressive talent-recruitment
programs, among others.\2\ For example, in 2019, the Department
of Justice lodged a complaint against Zhongsan Liu, along with
several accomplices, for attempting to convince at least 7 U.S.
universities to sponsor visas for purported Chinese research
scholars who in reality aimed to recruit American science
talent. The group of conspirators were successful in at least
one attempt to defraud a targeted university. The complaint
also alleged that the head of the University of Massachusetts
Boston's Confucius Institute offered to assist Mr. Liu in the
alleged fraud.\3\ In March 2022, Mr. Liu was convicted of
participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by
obstructing the lawful functions of the U.S. Departments of
State and Homeland Security and with committing visa fraud.\4\
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\1\Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer, ``Confucius Institutes in the
United States: Selected Issues,'' Congressional Research Service, (May
20, 2022), available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/
IF11180.
\2\``Senators Portman & Carper Unveil Bipartisan Report on
Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities & K-12 Classrooms,'' Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, Press Release, (Feb. 27, 2019),
available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/
media/senators-portman-and-carper-unveil-bipartisan-report-on-
confucius-institutes-at-us-universities_k-12-classrooms; ``Agreements
Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities Are Similar, but
Institute Operations Vary,'' U.S. Government Accountability Office,
GAO-19-278, (Feb. 2019), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-
19-278.pdf.
\3\Kate O'Keefe and Aruna Viswanatha, ``Chinese Official Charged in
Alleged Visa Scheme to Recruit U.S. Science Talent,'' Wall Street
Journal, (Sept. 24, 2019), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/
chinese-official-charged-in-alleged-visa-scheme-to-recruit-u-s-science-
talent-11569332862.
\4\``Chinese Government Employee Convicted Of Participating In
Conspiracy To Defraud The United States And Fraudulently Obtain U.S.
Visas,'' U.S. Department of Justice, (Mar. 23, 2022), available at
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/chinese-government-employee-
convicted-participating-conspiracy-defraud-united-states.
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In response, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 and FY 2021 National
Defense Authorization Acts restricted Department of Defense
funding from going to United States institutions of higher
education that host Confucius Institutes.\5\ Following
enactment of this legislation, Confucius Institutes began to
close their doors across America. There were 113 active
Confucius Institutes in 2018, and 79 were closed between 2018
and 2021.\6\ As of July 2022, 16 Confucius Institutes remained
open in the United States.\7\ With this trend toward ending
Confucius Institutes, there is concern that the PRC has
alternate potential avenues to influence American academia and
society.
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\5\See supra, at note 1.
\6\Craig Singleton, ``The Middle Kingdom Meets Higher Education:
How U.S. Universities Support China's Military-Industrial Complex,''
The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, (Dec. 9, 2021), available at
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/12/09/the-middle-kingdom-meets-
higher-education/.
\7\``How Many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?,''
National Association of Scholars, (April 5, 2022), available at https:/
/www.nas.org/blogs/article/
how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states.
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H.R. 7779 seeks to bolster homeland security against
potential intelligence, national security, and cyber espionage
threats posed by Confucius Institutes and is an extension of
the limitations in place at the Department of Defense since
2019. H.R. 7779 restricts DHS S&T and R&D funding from United
States institutions of higher education that have a
relationship with a Confucius Institute and establishes a
reporting requirement for institutions that have relationships
with a ``Chinese Entity of Concern.'' Chinese Entities of
Concern include Chinese universities that are involved in the
implementation of Military-Civil Fusion; participates in the
PRC's military industrial base; or provides support to any
security, defense, police, or intelligence organization of the
PRC or the CCP.
H.R. 7779 recognizes that the Chinese Entity of Concern
reporting requirement may place an additional burden upon
universities, so the bill requires DHS to provide technical
assistance to colleges and universities in carrying out this
requirement with particular attention to historically Black
colleges and universities and other minority-serving
institutions. With respect to the funding restrictions on
United States institutions with relationships with Confucius
Institutes, the bill provides the Secretary of Homeland
Security the authority to issue a waiver from funding
restrictions for no longer than 1 year, should the Secretary
deem it is in the interest of America's national security.
Should such a waiver authority be utilized, the Secretary must
provide written notification to the Committee on Homeland
Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate
regarding such issuance or renewal, including a related
justification.
HEARINGS
For the purposes of clause 3(c)(6) of rule XIII of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, no hearings were used to
develop H.R. 7779.
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION
The Committee met on May 19, 2022, a quorum being present,
to consider H.R. 7779 and ordered the measure to be favorably
reported to the House, as amended, by voice vote.
COMMITTEE VOTES
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII requires the Committee to list the
recorded votes on the motion to report legislation and
amendments thereto.
No recorded votes were requested during consideration of
H.R. 7779.
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII, the
Committee advises that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this
report.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE, NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT
AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, and with respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(3) of
rule XIII and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, the Committee has requested but not received from the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office a statement as to
whether this bill contains any new budget authority, spending
authority, credit authority, or an increase or decrease in
revenues or tax expenditures.
FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT
An estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 423 of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was not made available to the
Committee in time for the filing of this report. The Chairman
of the Committee shall cause such estimate to be printed in the
Congressional Record upon its receipt by the Committee.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the objective of
H.R. 7779 is to increase the security and integrity of science
and technology and research and development efforts at American
institutions of higher education which DHS funds.
DUPLICATIVE FEDERAL PROGRAMS
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII, the Committee
finds that H.R. 7779 does not contain any provision that
establishes or reauthorizes a program known to be duplicative
of another Federal program.
CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED TARIFF
BENEFITS
In compliance with rule XXI, this bill, as reported,
contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or
limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or
9(f) of rule XXI.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The Committee finds that H.R. 7779 does not relate to the
terms and conditions of employment or access to public services
or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of
the Congressional Accountability Act.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
Section 1. Short title
This section states that the Act may be cited as the ``DHS
Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of
Concern Act''.
Sec. 2. Limitations on Confucius Institutes' host schools
This section establishes the definitions for ``Chinese
Entity of Concern,'' ``Confucius Institute,'' and
``relationship.''
This section requires that an institution of higher
education which has a relationship with a Confucius Institute
is ineligible to receive S&T or R&D funds from DHS so long as
the institution maintains such relationships. It also requires
institutions of higher education which have relationships with
a Chinese entity of concern to disclose such relationships to
the Department when seeking S&T or R&D funds.
This section further requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security to provide technical assistance, upon request, to
institutions of higher education relating to compliance with
this Act. In carrying out this subsection, the Secretary is
directed to provide particular attention to historically Black
colleges and universities and other minority-serving
institutions who may experience additional burden. It is the
Committee's intent that the restrictions and reporting
requirements established in H.R. 7779 are implemented in a
timely manner.
Additionally, this section grants the Secretary of Homeland
Security the authority to waive, on a case-by-case basis, and
for a period of not more than 1 year, the funding restrictions
on institutions of higher education if the Secretary determines
it is in the national security interests of the United States.
The Secretary shall provide written notification of the waiver,
and any renewal of the waiver, to the Committee on Homeland
Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate (the
Committees).
Finally, not later than 18 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary
of Homeland Security is required to report to the Committees on
the implementation of this Act.
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